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PN-ABP-123
15th 92132

TOGO: A PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT REPORT

March 30, 1992

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A three-member team selected by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, in Togo on a two-week study tour, found sufficient commitment from participants in the democratic process to ascertain that elections will be conducted as scheduled. All parties have an interest in seeing that the elections are conducted in such a manner as to be accepted within and without the country as having met international standards of freedom, fairness and openness. The recommendations of the team are:

- The government of Togo should create an electoral commission or agency with a mandate for organizing and administering the entire election process. It should have broad authority and clear decision-making capability in all matters, including but not limited to setting campaign regulations, coordinating security measures, developing a civic education program and soliciting international cooperation. The commission should be independent of all of the ministries and be composed of members nominated by the executive and legislative branches of government.
- A vigorous, pervasive civic education program should be implemented. Most Togolese people have had no experience with democracy or open elections. The government needs to inventory all instruments which could be mobilized to develop and conduct civic education programs to inculcate the basic notions of citizen responsibility in the selection of the country's leaders and the accountability of those leaders to the public. Social, informational and educational institutions, those of the government and of society in general, should be drawn into the effort.
- The body responsible for administering the elections should institutionalize contacts between the contenders for power. Dialogues, forums, meetings, conferences and seminars should be initiated, preferably with clear ground rules designed to avoid exacerbation of conflicts. It is especially important that supporters of the former regime be full participants in these exchanges.
- The government of Togo should begin to engage its diplomatic friends not only for financial and technical support, but as a deterrent to anyone who would threaten the democratization process now underway. All Togolese political actors are sensitive to

the opinions of the international community. Togo has strong friends abroad who will respond to overtures for advice and assistance. A substantial involvement of these countries and institutions will help to assure a detached role of the armed forces and minimize random violence on their part.

- The Togolese should begin now to identify international sources of election observers and consult with them about delegation sizes and qualifications, such as nationality, language ability and experience.

I. INTRODUCTION

Togo has not escaped the tides of popular pressure for governmental reform in West Africa. Twenty-four years of authoritarian rule began to crumble in 1991 when a national conference forced on the regime by popular uprisings declared itself sovereign, drafted a constitution law valid for a transitional period, formed a transitional government and launched plans for nationwide elections. However, Togo has not yet escaped the uncertainties and dangers of the democratization process.

The conference proclaimed the basic democratic freedoms - of speech, association, movement, from arbitrary arrest or abuse - and embodied them in a law that served as a transitional constitution. The president, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma, retained only ceremonial and perfunctory civil powers under the new dispensations. He remains, however, supreme commander of the armies of Togo.

The resulting transition to a functioning democratic government has proved to be less than smooth, and Togo has entered an extraordinarily challenging period with an unwieldy de facto separation of powers. Although stripped of all but ceremonial powers by the transition constitution, President Eyadéma retains primary influence over the military and continues as leader of the former single party, the RPT. Prime Minister Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, the constitutional head of government, is responsible for day-to-day operation of the country and its policies, but his powers are constrained by the enduring loyalty of the military to President Eyadéma, by the serious economic problems facing the country, and by his lack of a majority in the High Council of the Republic (HCR). The High Council, the supreme organ of the transition government, is riven by political factions.

The calendar for the series of elections, set by Prime Minister Koffigoh, has not been respected. A new national census was to have begun on February 29, 1992, and to have been completed three days later. It was rescheduled for March 21 through March 23, but was actually extended until March 27. Three separate trips to the polling places are to follow the census: a referendum on a new constitution now in draft form; local and legislative elections; and finally, the presidential election. All are to be completed by August 29, the first

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anniversary of adjournment of the national conference, the expiration date set for the transitional constitution, the sole legal basis for the conduct of elections.

The government of Togo, represented by the prime minister and his cabinet, asked the U.S. Embassy in Lomé for assistance in evaluating the country's needs so that free and democratic elections can be held. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was selected by the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) to perform the assessment. The assessment was to include an appraisal of the Togolese government's ability to hold free, fair and open elections, suggestions of ways and means of establishing structures and procedures that would be helpful, and identification of technical, personnel, financial and material needs. The team selected was also requested to make recommendations to the U.S. Embassy in Lomé of actions it might take in support of democratic elections. A detailed scope of work is found at Appendix A.

The IFES team was composed of an American, a Haitian and a Canadian, each having a background in elections and two with extended experience in Africa. All three were fluent in French. The team spent 14 days in Togo, during which time the members held discussions with Togolese government officials, political party leaders, media representatives and others as well as frequent consultations with the U.S. Embassy, USAID and the United States Information Service (USIS). Upon arrival, the team participated in the closing day of an election "sensitization" seminar, met with a broad selection of politically active individuals and groups and travelled in central and southern regions of the country.

The IFES team members are grateful to their Togolese hosts for the many courtesies received during the two weeks of their mission in Togo. President Eyadéma, Prime Minister Koffigoh, HCR President Kpodzro, members of the Council of Ministers, *préfets*, police and gendarmerie officers, and a host of government officials made themselves available to the team, speaking frankly and freely of their concerns at this crucial stage of the country's history. All reiterated their commitment to the furthering of democracy and expressed their interest in free and fair elections.

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The team is especially grateful for the cooperation and assistance offered by government officials in arranging the daily programs and in accompanying team members on trips throughout the country.

Without the fine professional assistance and hospitality of the U.S. Embassy, USIS and USAID/Togo, this mission could not have accomplished its purpose or done so in such agreeable circumstances.

II. TOGO: THE COUNTRY

The slice of western Africa that is now Togo has a population of some 3.5 million living in an area slightly smaller than Florida. Half a dozen ethnic groups and twice that many sub-groups engage in basic agriculture and fishing for their subsistence. The modern sector, producing phosphates, cotton, coffee and cocoa, accounts for most of Togo's foreign currency earnings but engages only a small part of the population. Tourism, in periods of political tranquility, has supplemented those earnings. Annual per capita income stands at about \$400.

Togo's adherence to World Bank and International Monetary Fund prescriptions has helped to stabilize the economy in recent years, overcoming some of the difficulties caused by unwise and unprofitable investment in heavy industry during a period of high world commodity prices. The government has embarked on a program to develop an export processing zone expected to provide expanded employment opportunities in the Lomé area. Although the present political malaise has slowed business activity, none of the contenders for power proposes to introduce measures that would make Togo less attractive to foreign investors.

Illiteracy affects some 75% of Togolese women and about half of the men, although a high rate of school enrollment is reducing those figures. Geographic and topographic distinctions within the country are closely tied to ethnic distributions. President Eyadéma's people, the Kabyle, are dry land subsistence farmers producing cereals and tubers, living in small villages and family compounds in the northern plateau and savannah areas. Literacy rates are lower there than among the peoples along the Atlantic coast where centuries of contact with traders have provided greater contact with Western values. The Ewe and Mina peoples in particular have been drawn to commerce and have been highly receptive to opportunities for education and travel.

Togo began its existence as a political entity when the dominant European powers partitioned the African continent among themselves at the Berlin conference in 1884. Togoland was awarded to Germany, that country's only possession in western Africa. However, with Germany's defeat in the First World War, most of her colonies were appropriated by the victorious allies. France and Britain divided Togoland and, after the war, obtained a League of Nations mandate over the territory. After World War II, the mandate was converted to a United Nations trusteeship. France administered eastern Togo as part of French West Africa while Britain treated the western area as part of its colony of the Gold Coast.

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In 1957, when the Gold Coast became independent as the state of Ghana, western Togo, whose people had expressed their preference for integration with their western neighbor, became an integral part of Ghana and remains so today.

Facing the loss of its pre-war African empire, France attempted to form a community that would allow important decisions still to be made in Paris, but the momentum toward breakup of the colonial structure proved irresistible, and Togo, along with other French African colonies, became fully independent in 1960.

III. POLITICAL HISTORY

A. The Independence Period

During the years prior to independence, two strong political rivals vied for power in Togo. Sylvanus Olympio and his brother-in-law Nicolas Grunitzky, with the support of their respective political parties, fought each other to stay atop the political structure of the colony. At the moment of independence, Olympio had succeeded Grunitzky as Prime Minister, and he became the first president of independent Togo in 1961. He subsequently dissolved all opposition political parties and forced Grunitzky and many opposition leaders into exile. Two years later Olympio was assassinated in a coup led by Sgt. Etienne Eyadéma, who invited Grunitzky to return from exile in Paris and form a government. In 1967, however, Eyadéma, now a Lieutenant Colonel, dismissed Grunitzky and his government and took power himself.

Eyadéma abolished the constitution, dissolved the national assembly, formed a committee of national reconciliation and named himself president of Togo. He banned political parties, formed a constitutional committee and pledged to return the country to civilian rule. In 1969 he formed the Regrouping of the Togolese People (Rassemblement du peuple togolais, RPT), the only government authorized political party, and became its president. Thereafter, at various times in his long rule, Eyadéma made several tentative moves, ostensibly toward ending military rule yet remaining in power, citing ethnic tensions as well as economic and regional disparities. In each subsequent presidential election, Eyadéma, running unopposed, won more than 99% of the vote.

In 1974, President Eyadéma survived an airplane crash which he suspected had been arranged by representatives of foreign business interests. Soon thereafter he launched an "authenticity" campaign similar to that introduced by President Mobutu in Zaire two years earlier. Eyadéma decreed that foreign names would not be used for persons or places. He himself changed his first name, Etienne, for the more authentic "Gnassingbe." Ewe and Kabye were to be introduced to eventually replace the French language instruction in the schools.

B. Togo Under Eyadéma

Throughout his years in power, Eyadéma has relied on his military forces to suppress and discourage threats to his regime. They have sometimes acted with a heavy hand, and reports

of torture and death in Togolese prisons, especially during the early days of the regime, are not without credibility. The RPT served as an instrument to mobilize popular support for Eyadéma's governing initiatives, including proposed and actual changes in constitutions, reelection campaigns, social measures and foreign policy positions. Street demonstrations, organized to show support for the regime, were frequently used to counter pressures for liberalizing the government and the political process.

With Marxist-Leninist Benin to the east, an unstable Ghana to the west and a radical Burkina Faso to the north, Eyadéma looked to more moderate states for support and identification. He maintained close relations with Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Zaire, Gabon and, above all, with France. He reinforced his image as a moderate by official visits to the U.S., by welcoming foreign investment and by promoting Togo as an attractive resort and convention locale. The strategy undoubtedly softened criticism of his government's authoritarian rule and its poor record on human rights, thus easing international pressure to return Togo to civilian government.

President Eyadéma introduced changes in the structure of his government from time to time without relaxing his hold on ultimate power or his grip on the military forces that secured his position as head of state. Those forces, primarily an army of about 12,000, are drawn mostly from the Kabye, probably half of them from his own village of Pya, near the northern city of Kara in the prefecture of Kozah.

The most spectacular challenge to Eyadéma's rule occurred July 1986 when a small armed band of dissidents entered Togo from Ghana and attempted to occupy a Lomé military site which included barracks, the president's residence and the national radio station. Eyadéma accused Ghana and Burkina Faso of complicity in the attack. The alacrity with which French and Zairian troops were dispatched to reinforce Togolese forces was a clear mark of Eyadéma's standing. Nevertheless, the president's ability to remain in power was never in doubt. Four months later he hosted the annual Franco-African summit in Lomé.

C. The Path Toward Democratization

Sensitive to his government's image abroad, President Eyadéma has from time to time introduced measures which would broaden public participation in the political process. In 1985, multiple candidates were permitted to contest the national legislature, although all were to be nominated by the single party. Later that year, universal suffrage was introduced for legislative elections, and the requirement that each candidate be nominated by the party was withdrawn.

In 1987, the government established a national Human Rights Commission and gave it powers of access to information and incarcerated persons. More than 230 detainees were pardoned and most death sentences commuted. The government launched an anti-corruption drive and dismissed several high officials and sent others to trial. The amnesties and releases continued in 1988 and 1990.

In the autumn of 1990, a violent student protest led to confrontations and deaths. The resulting trial of two students (later pardoned) were followed by strikes and protests. In October of that year, President Eyadéma authorized the formation of a Constitution Drafting Commission. The commission completed its work at the end of the year, presenting to the president a document that would institutionalize the government, recreate the office of prime minister and create a constitutional council that would have power to review the constitutionality of acts of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Turmoil in the early months of 1991, abetted by evidence of atrocities by military and security forces, brought important new concessions from the president. In March, when the powerful market women joined ranks with students and other dissidents, Eyadéma agreed to a national dialogue forum, granted a general amnesty and authorized the formation of political parties. Disorders continued, however, and on June 12 President Eyadéma formally agreed to the holding of a national conference.

The conference opened on July 8, 1991, chose Bishop Kpodzro to preside, declared itself sovereign and proceeded to appropriate all governing powers. In the seven tumultuous weeks that followed, despite boycotts by Eyadéma's supporters and military attempts to prevent it from meeting, the conference elected Joseph Koffigoh prime minister, created a legislative body, the High Council of the Republic (HCR), with vast authority of oversight, stripped Eyadéma of

most of his powers and reduced his term of office by two years. It called for dissolution of the RPT, drafted a transitional constitution law and planned for national elections.

In October and November, after the HCR formally banned the RPT, army intervention increased, and on December 2, erupted in a full-scale heavy-weapon assault on Prime Minister Koffigoh's office. HCR leaders and members as well as other opposition activists scattered and hid. Koffigoh narrowly escaped death. He was captured by the attacking soldiers and taken to President Eyadéma's residence on the outskirts of Lomé, emerging only late in the day with a new appreciation of the limits of his government's prerogatives. The attack set back the progress toward democratization and called into doubt President Eyadéma's willingness to surrender his real powers.

A few days later, Prime Minister Koffigoh issued a "New Social Contract for a Peaceful Transition" (Appendix B). The document reflected the awareness by the more moderate proponents of democracy that there were limits to the pace and depth of reforms acceptable to President Eyadéma and the military and political forces in his service. While calling for guaranteed security and liberty for all Togolese, its central message was an exhortation for conciliation, for a social truce, for a continuing dialogue and for cooperation among the three organs of government - the presidency, the prime minister's cabinet, and the High Council of the Republic. The document also stressed the fundamental need for free elections in which the Togolese military and government officials would be neutral.

D. Issues Requiring Resolution

The Election Calendar

An electoral census, originally scheduled to begin in February, was conducted from March 21 through March 27, 1992, to establish voters' lists in each district throughout the country. A referendum on the new constitution, and separate legislative and presidential elections are to follow, but the exact dates have not been established. Validity of the transition constitution law is due to expire on August 29, one year after the adjournment of the Sovereign National Conference. Unless that deadline is extended, all elections must be completed by that time.

An Eyadéma Candidacy

Article 61 of the transition constitution bars members of the executive from candidacies in the presidential election. Although the intent of the article was to prevent any prime minister - viz., Koffigoh - from running, it seems to apply to President Eyadéma as well. Supporters of the president are adamant that he must be allowed to compete. Opponents are equally intent on keeping him out of the race. In view of the sensitivity of this issue, more moderate leaders are beginning to look for a compromise with enough legality to allow Eyadéma to run or to present him with an opportunity to decline and bow out gracefully.

The Possibility of Open Elections

At the time of the team's visit to Togo, some of the areas of the country were not accessible to all political parties. The president's home area of Kozah prefecture had not received visits from opponents of Eyadéma, no opposition newspapers were available, the radio and local press carried only heavy, vituperative commentary against the democratic opposition. In defense, officials there cited the RPT's own difficulties in the southern prefectures where violence against the president's followers had interfered with organization activities and disrupted rallies. Elsewhere, RPT properties had been confiscated by the government and party workers often faced the hostility of neighbors. Tolerance of opponents is limited on both sides.

In answer to the question regarding the most important need of Togo for free, fair and democratic elections, all Togolese that the IFES team met during the two weeks of their mission in the country emphasized personal safety and security issues. Both the supporters of the former regime and the opposition defined security as the ability to circulate and conduct political activities throughout the country. RPT members suffered harrassment during and after the national conference and the opposition also had serious complaints in this regard. The actions of military personnel, especially during the last quarter of 1991 had shaken the confidence of many leaders in the ability of the country to carry out elections. The question of President Eyadéma's commitment to the democratic process was raised repeatedly with the IFES team. It may, in fact, be the central issue and a defining moment in President Eyadéma's own personal history.

The Fairness of Togolese Elections

Although newspapers have proliferated, the government-financed daily in Lomé receives a substantial subsidy and sells for one-fifth the price of most of its competitors. The national radio and television staffs are split between Eyadéma's supporters and the opposition, but coverage, although selectively favoring the president, seems generally balanced. Radio Kara has no such balance: it is the voice of the most vigorous of Eyadéma's loyalists.

E. Outlook

Despite the evident hurdles, elections seem possible. There also exists the likelihood that they will meet the minimum requirements to be called free and democratic. President Eyadéma's own image of himself is working in favor of elections. Throughout his years of rule he has shown a sensitivity to international opinion. Fused with his character of military coup maker and assassin is the image of a president received twice at the White House and a man who has had amicable and supportive relations with President Mitterrand and some of Africa's most respected leaders. His rule, although authoritarian, was not as oppressive as those of several of his neighbors. The democratic concessions wrenched from him in the last two years probably reflect in part his own desire for approbation from those he respects.

The almost palpable momentum toward democratization is not to be underestimated in Africa today. National leaders are being bombarded with news about the crumbling of authoritarian regimes on the continent and are aware of expectations of powerful friends and close neighbors for progress toward openness and transparency. They are conscious of the determination of donor governments and the international financial institutions to condition development assistance on progress toward democratization. They know that the countries they govern depend upon private foreign investment and understand that better governance is essential to attract it.

In Togo, Benin's experience permeates the political atmosphere, and Mobutu's current maneuvers are watched with fascination. Togo's Sovereign National Conference cleaved to the Congo model so closely as to select a Catholic clergyman to preside over it. The uncertain future of Houphouët-Boigny and his political party in Côte d'Ivoire also sends a message. Now

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Ghana, a model of IMF-imposed economic discipline, appears to be moving toward free elections and a democratic future. The air of inevitability of the democratic process is present in Togo and may encourage the kinds of decisions that are conducive to open elections.

Finally, both Eyadéma's supporters and the opposition appear convinced that they can win an open, fair election. They would presumably see it in their interest to allow all parties and candidates access to all regions of the country during the election campaign.

IV. DEFINING AN ELECTION AGENDA

Successful conduct of the coming elections will require great efforts on the part of the Togolese government and substantial support from outside the country.

A. Decisions to Be Made

The government needs to complete work on the electoral code and issue it promptly. The election calendar has to be studied and, if politically feasible, modified. President Eyadéma's eligibility as a candidate must be decided.

These tasks are difficult to accomplish, requiring skillful negotiation within Togo and patience on the part of Togo's friends abroad. The three organs of government are still testing their prerogatives and the limits of their authorities, while President Eyadéma and his supporters are weighing their own alternatives.

B. Mobilization for Democratic Elections

The movement directly from authoritarian, one-party military rule to open, multi-party democratic elections constitutes a giant step that spans a generational gap in Africa and arrives at a culmination point in the democratic process without having touched the intermediate stepping stones. The structures of democracy and citizens' awareness of their responsibilities are weak or absent. The government of Togo will be hard pressed to maintain an environment in which free and fair elections can be held.

To create these structures and develop a civic education program, a vigorous central authority seems necessary. That body should identify the potential channels of civic education - government agencies and personnel, political parties, news media, schools, business, religious and civic organizations - and design programs to exploit these entities as channels of communication to and from the citizenry. Civic education efforts should be extended to military personnel as well. Technical assistance in this field should be readily available from abroad.

Institutional dialogue between government and political parties and among political parties themselves - meetings, forums, colloquia, debates - should be created or encouraged. Ground

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rules for the political competition, acceptable to all contenders, should be established. Parties and candidates might be brought to agreement to include a nonpartisan text of information and education to be recited at each rally or public meeting, describing the election process and assuring the secrecy of the balloting and freedom of the electorate from intimidation. Recognized candidates should have access to government-controlled media. Finally, the government of Togo needs to engage friendly nations and international institutions in support of its struggle toward democratization. Expressions and manifestations of that support will have a healthy influence on Togolese actors.

V. ELECTION PREPARATIONS AND CONDITIONS

A. The Role of the Transitional Government and Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security

The three transitional organs established by the National Conference are the President; the Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister; and the High Council of the Republic which serves as the Parliament. Act 7 of the National Conference (Appendix A) refers to the constitutional law organizing the powers during the transition period. According to Article 39 of Act 7, which determines and conducts the politics of the nation, the transitional government is responsible for preparing and organizing the constitutional referendum and the local, legislative and presidential elections. To that end it has at its disposal all the branches of government.

The banning of the former ruling party (RPT) by the High Council of the Republic on November 26, 1991 set in motion a political crisis which culminated with the attack on the prime minister's residence on December 3 by elements of the military loyal to President Eyadéma. As a result, a new government of national unity was formed. The Minister of Territorial Administration and Security was one of the three members of the RPT who were included in the new cabinet. In this capacity he is involved in the coordination of electoral activities with the Secretary of State of the Ministry, appointed specifically for this purpose by the prime minister.

At this early stage of the electoral process in Togo, the control of the electoral machinery lies with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security. It is therefore very important that the Minister of Territorial Administration and Security and the Secretary of State in charge of electoral activities, both members of the new transitional government, cooperate closely in order to promote a free, honest and fair electoral environment that will command the confidence of all the participants in the process.

B. Constitutional and Legal Framework

Constitutional Law for the Transitional Period

The constitutional law for the transitional period was adopted by the Sovereign National Conference on August 23, 1991. The law protects the basic freedoms and provides for a change to a multi-party democratic system. Its provisions are as follows:

- Title I - Of the State and Sovereignty
- Title II - Of Obligations and Civil Rights
- Title III - Of the High Council of the Republic
- Title IV - Of the President of the Republic
- Title V - Of the Prime Minister and the Government
- Title VI - Of Relations of the Government and the High Council of the Republic
- Title VII - Of the Judicial Power
- Title VIII - General Provisions
- Title IX - Final Provisions

In general, this law guarantees basic individual and collective freedoms, namely freedom of movement, expression, religion, press and assembly. It defines the powers of each branch of government, including those of the president, the prime minister, the legislature, the magistrates and the army. The law is to remain in effect through August 28 1992, end of the one-year transition period set by the Sovereign National Conference at its adjournment.

The Draft Constitution

The draft constitution for the Fourth Togolese Republic had not formally been submitted to the High Council of the Republic (HCR) before the IFES team completed its study. A copy of the draft, dated November 1991, was provided. The draft follows the form and substance of the constitutional law for the transition period, discussed above. It defines more clearly the composition and obligations of all authorities - president, government, judiciary, armed forces - and elaborates citizens' rights.

Charter of Political Parties

Law 91-4, dated April 12 1991, entitled "Charter of Political Parties," (Appendix C) defines obligations of each party, rules for creation, financial resources and penalties for actions in contravention of the charter. A minimum of 30 persons from 2/3 of the country's prefectures is required to form a political party. There were 34 parties officially registered at the Ministry of the Interior at the time of the team's visit. Such a large number could complicate the management of elections.

To be registered, a political party has to file documents at the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry has 15 days to verify and approve the documents. If the documents are in order, the political party has to publish its basic information in an official journal and a newspaper. A political party can be approved and have the right to run candidates in elections as late as 17 days before the election date. This seems far too short a time for orderly processing, given the physical and logistical requirements of printing ballots and disseminating information about the party and its candidates.

Recommendations:

- The final day for approval of a party's registration and for its submission of a list of candidates should be at least 30 days before the date of the election.
- In order to shield the process from potential political influence, accreditation of a political party might be granted by a permanent electoral commission rather than by the Ministry of Interior.

C. General Administration Issues

Country Data

The Republic of Togo has a surface area of 56,785 square kilometers (21 925 sq.mi.) with 56 kilometers of coastline and a north-south span of 540 kilometers. The country is divided into five regions: Maritime, with 49% of the population; Plateau, with 24%; Centre, with 11%;

Kara, with 13%; and Savane, with 13%. The 1991 total population was estimated at 3,633,000. The largest cities for each region are Lomé (Maritime), with a population of 725,000 in the metropolitan area, Atakpamé (Plateau), with 42,000; Sokodé (Centre), with 70,000; Kara (Kara), with 47,000; and Dapaong (Savane), with 30,000.

Each region is divided into prefectures, for a total of 30 prefectures established by an ordinance of June 25, 1991. Maritime has six prefectures (Golfe, Lacs, Vo, Yoto, Zio and Ayé). Plateau has nine (Amou, Haho, Moyen-Mono, Kloto, Agou, Dayes, Ogou, Est Mono and Wawa). Centre has four (Sotouboua, Blitta, Tchamba and Tchaoudjo). The Kara region has seven (Assoli, Bassar, Dankpen, Binah, Doufelgou, Kéran and Kozah). Finally, Savane has four (Oti, Tône, Kpendjal and Tandjouaré).

Electoral Boundaries and Map

The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security could not provide the IFES team with electoral maps or indicate boundaries. Those cannot be determined until an electoral code is published. That code must fix the number of election districts and the number of deputies to the legislative assembly. The statistical services of the Ministry estimate the number of eligible voters at 1,700,000. There are at present three members of the High Council of the Republic for each of the 21 prefectures in existence at the time of the convening of the conference, for a total of 63 selected on this basis. (Four additional members of the Council were selected using other criteria). At the time of the IFES team's visit to Togo, a debate was in progress on the optimum number of deputies for the legislature. The present ratio of 1/25,000 (67 conference members for an electorate of 1,700,000) is relatively small. A number of alternative distributions were being put forward. Some favored increasing the number of deputies. Others called for the establishment of a fixed minimum number of deputies for each region.

Recommendations:

- Electoral districts should be established by the authorities using the services of a demographic expert who is knowledgeable about the special characteristics of each region and prefecture.

- Maps of electoral districts should be made public well in advance of the elections.

Census and Voters' Lists

The census, which will be used to establish voters' lists, is the responsibility of the statistical services of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security. It was to have been completed originally in February. The date then slipped to late March. Limited finances and logistical resources were offered as reasons for the delay in getting the census underway. The latest date set for the operation was March 21 to March 27. The Bureau of Statistical Services had previously conducted three censuses and two demographic surveys and appeared to have the capability to complete the present one. They believed it preferable to complete an entirely new census rather than attempt to update the previous one, in which they had no confidence. Given the lack of credibility of previous elections under the one-party system, the IFES team agreed that a new census was the preferred alternative despite its additional cost in resources and time.

The method for accomplishing the census was to identify family units in every prefecture, each unit to consist of about 200 persons. Each census-taker was to meet with each head of family (*chef de famille*) and with him determine how many family members over 18 years of age (the voting eligibility limit) were living in the family compound. In Togo, as in much of Africa, the *chef de famille* has great authority over family members. The Togolese government proposed to use this authority to help obtain reliable figures on population distributions within the country. The only voters to be registered were those actually seen by the census-taker, or whose identity was proven by acceptable documentation.

The census team is composed of a supervisor, a controller, a team leader and the census-taker. With division of the country into regions, prefectures, cantons, towns, villages, neighborhoods and compounds, the Togolese population would be well covered by the census. Instruction manuals and census-taker's notebooks given to the IFES team appeared very well designed for an accurate census (Appendix D). The main concern of political leaders was that the census might be manipulated and therefore not reflect the actual distribution of population. There was concern that multiple registrations might be attempted, especially through the use of consular

certificates of Togolese citizenship issued in Ghana, Nigeria and Benin. The IFES team concluded that the method to be used for the census was a good one and gave reasonable assurance that the endeavor would be conducted responsibly and fairly.

The electoral census data were to be prepared in two copies, presented with the notebook of the census-taker. A copy was to go to the *préfet* and one to the Secretary of State for Elections or Electoral Commission. The census-taker's notebook was to go to the statistical services office.

The census forms given to the Secretary of State for Elections or Electoral Commission are to be used as the basis for issuance of voter identification cards and the establishment of voters' lists. The cards are to be delivered to the voters by the person who conducted the census. Anyone who did not receive a card would know he or she was not registered and would have an opportunity to appeal to a Committee on Revisions.

Recruitment of census-takers was conducted by each prefecture. Ten years of formal education were to be required. A first round selection was to be followed by a training course and a simulated census test before final selection.

The estimate of 1,700,000 voters was only a rough one. A significant difference from the results of the actual census does not necessarily imply fraud or manipulation of data. The following factors could have an important influence on the result:

- The estimate was based on a 1981 census to which a general population increase factor was applied. This was an extrapolation from the 1970-1981 growth rate.
- Some 150,000 Togolese were evicted from Nigeria between 1983 and 1985. Some of them eventually returned, but an unknown number remained in Togo.
- In the absence of accurate written records, age qualifications are sometimes determined only by visual judgment.

- Following the National Conference, an unknown number of Togolese expatriates returned.

Recommendations:

- The government should publicize information about the census process and the results of the numeration.
- Voters' lists should be posted in easily accessible places in each prefecture so that eligible voters have opportunities to note any omissions and correct errors. Managed correctly, this can be an effective contributor to public confidence in the census and the elections.
- Those who will reach 18 years of age by the election date should be registered. The voters' lists should include those who have not yet attained the age of 18 at the time of the census but will have done so by the date of the elections.

Voting Process

The IFES team was not given a copy of the draft Electoral Code but was aware of some of its main provisions from discussions with government officials and party activists. The following comments and recommendations are based on the expectations of technical advisors in the electoral process.

Normally the polling places are open from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. outside Lomé, and from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. in Lomé. Election officials estimate that each polling place will accommodate 1,200 voters. Present at each polling place are the president of the local commission, two assessors, and qualified observers, including those from political parties.

The voter who is registered on the electoral list arrives at the polling place and presents his/her voter's I.D. card to the president of the local commission. If the voter has not yet received his/her I.D. card, it may be delivered to him/her at the polling place by the president. After verifying the registration, the president gives the ballots to the voter. The voter moves to the

polling booth, marks the ballot, places it in the envelope and places the envelope in the ballot box. Then, the voter leaves the polling station.

Ballots, Voting Booths and Ballot Boxes

At the time of the team's visit, the government planned to print one ballot for each candidate. Responsibility for printing and delivering appropriate numbers of ballots to the authorities would rest with the political parties. The government would provide the envelopes. The IFES team questioned this procedure, citing problems of control of the distribution of ballots. The single ballot for each candidate becomes complicated by the proliferation of parties and candidates. If each candidate's ballot is to be a different color, the 34 registered parties will have difficulty selecting colors distinct from all others.

The booths are to be enclosed by roll-up Japanese-style matting. In view of the heavy usage each booth will experience (the referendum, legislative and presidential elections), it is possible that the rather flimsy material planned for these booths will be damaged. Cardboard booths, like those used in Bénin, and provided by Canada, seem more appropriate and more easily transported and warehoused.

The ballot boxes are to be made of wood with one transparent side and to be locked with two padlocks. The transparent side is to show to the voters that the ballot box was empty before the opening of the polling place. The design is meant to be reassuring to the voters. However, as envelopes accumulate in the box, later voters cannot share this reassurance against ballot stuffing. Moreover, if the single ballot is to be used, it is not placed in an envelope. Inadvertent or deliberately poor folding could reveal the vote that was cast.

Recommendations:

- The printing and furnishing of ballots should be a government responsibility.
- Cardboard booths are more durable than Japanese-style matting.

- A single ballot carrying the names and identification symbols of all candidates should be used. The ballot used in Haiti was a successful example of this.
- Indelible ink should be used to prevent double voting.
- Where possible, more than one voting place should be installed in the same building.
- Ballot boxes should have at least four opaque sides.

D. Secrecy of Vote and Security at the Polls

According to some of the people the team met with, there are concerns about the secrecy of the procedure. In the procedure in which the voter selects one ballot for each candidate and discards the rest, the voter still has in his/her possession all the remaining ballots, giving evidence of which candidate he/she has voted for. There are reported incidents of payments being made for returning the unused ballots of competitors in the elections. The single ballot process discussed above would help preserve secrecy of the vote.

Security within the polling place will be the responsibility of the police and gendarmerie. The IFES team commends this arrangement and would add the recommendation that they also have responsibility of protecting the ballot box and delivering it to the proper authorities after the closing of the polls.

Togolese officials and political leaders are very much concerned about the behavior of the regular army during the election campaign and at the time of the elections themselves. It would be helpful to limit the presence of the army during the campaign and even to confine it to barracks during the elections.

Recommendations:

- Security at the polls should be provided by the police and the gendarmerie.

- The army should not be present at the polls or be given a security role during the election campaign.

Counting Process

The IFES team could not obtain information regarding where ballots were to be counted, whether in the polling places or at the prefecture. After closing, the counting process is best done by the president at the polling place in presence of the assessors, observers and political party representatives. A formal record of results should be kept. The IFES team found that counting the votes in the presence of a large number of witnesses could be confusing and might cause disorder. If the counting is done in the polling place itself, this avoids the necessity of moving the ballot boxes before the results are known. Immediate transmission of the results from each polling place will provide additional security, reducing the opportunities for manipulation of the results because they will already be known to the Electoral Commission.

Recommendations:

- The counting should be done at the polling place.
- Counting should take place in the presence of observers, including those from interested political parties.
- Transportation of ballot boxes and official tallies should be done under police and gendarmerie supervision.

Reporting Results

Results from each polling place should be transmitted to the prefecture, then the prefectural results communicated by phone to the Electoral Commission. Subsequently, all the electoral materials (including the ballot boxes and official tallies) should be sent to the Electoral Commission in Lomé to await announcement of official results and to resolve any disputes. The IFES team had no details regarding the procedure. It is important that a procedure be established that allows a minimum lapse of time from the closing of the polling places to

communication of results locally and nationally. Telephoned reports should be considered as unofficial, to be confirmed after receipt of official reports from all stations.

E. Election Workers

The president of the polling place (or local commission) and the secretary are chosen by the mayor or the *préfet*. Most of these polling place officials will be teachers. *Préfets* and presidents will be invited to take a course in electoral procedures. Such training sessions gave satisfactory results in Haiti in the 1990 elections. The IFES team recommends that one representative of each interested political party be invited to attend the same training sessions. This could help avoid conflicts on election day and could be of assistance to the election officials.

Recommendations:

- Political party representatives should be invited to the training sessions in election procedures.
- Detailed instructions on procedures should be provided to each polling station official.

F. Election Preparation

Although the electoral code had not been issued at the time of the IFES team's visit to Togo, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security and its statistical services had begun practical planning for the conduct of the referendum and elections. No agreement had been reached regarding supplies, forms and materials, but the officials had a good idea of what would be necessary based on their experience with single-party elections. However, two or three experts in elections could be helpful in preparing for these elections. Selected for their technical expertise in electoral procedures, they could provide advice and assist in acquisition of materials and equipment.

Recommendation:

- The team feels that one or more technical advisors, experienced in the administration of multiparty elections, could provide valuable assistance to the Ministry in planning for the timely acquisition of materials and equipment as well as in other practical areas.

Transportation of Materials

All election materials should be stored at Lomé, preferably in a garage of the Highways Department under police control. Only the day before an election would the ballot boxes and electoral materials be transported to each prefecture and only by officials of the Electoral Commission, protected by armed police. The prefecture should be responsible for getting the materials to each polling bureau president. The IFES team did not examine the procedure to return all the materials to Lomé after the election.

Recommendations:

- Electoral materials should be transported to each prefecture by Electoral Commission personnel, under armed police protection.
- Delivery to polling places within a prefecture should be the responsibility of the *préfet* or mayor.
- After the counting process, each ballot box should be returned to the *préfet* or mayor and be protected by the police.
- The day after the election, each prefecture should send to Lomé all electoral materials, under armed guard, for safe storage.

Communications

The IFES team noted deficiencies in the existing communications systems. Police and gendarmes said they had inadequate radio communications within their services and with each

other. The prefecture should be able to communicate the results of the elections immediately. A parallel system, using fax or radio communication, would help transmit information concerning the voting process and make it possible to report results of elections promptly.

Recommendations:

- Ensure FAX capabilities in each of the 30 prefectures.
- Develop an alternative facility, with limited access, to be used in case of breakdowns or malicious action at polling places on election day.
- Provide adequate radio communications systems to the police and gendarmerie.

Purchase of Forms, Equipment and Supplies

It is very important, for reasons of economy, for the appropriate purchasing agencies to approach companies for electoral materials immediately. For example, notebooks, voting booths, pens and furniture could be bought now. Specific requests should be sent immediately to countries which might contribute resources to help Togo in the democratic process. Also, Togo might be able to find a supply of booths, ballot boxes or other materials used for recent elections in other countries such as Bénin and Cameroon.

Recommendations:

- Lists of materials and equipment needed for the elections should be sent to countries and organizations interested in the democratic process in Togo.
- A search for reusable equipment and supplies should be conducted in countries which have recently held elections.

Selection of Voting Sites

Selection of voting sites is done by the *préfet* or mayor who submits the list to the Ministry responsible for election administration. By decree, the Ministry must publish the list of polling places.

An average of 1,200 voters is expected for each polling place. For 1,700,000 voters, this means approximately 1,415 polling places. The elections and the referendum are now scheduled to be held on Sundays, with a high level of participation expected. The IFES team finds that an average of 600 to 700 electors seems to be more appropriate for each polling place. Because of the openness of the elections and the proliferation of parties and candidates, it may take more time for each voter to complete the voting operation. A greater number of polling places would make the process more orderly.

The team suggests that each polling place have emergency lamps for use in case of power failure. These lamps would help to assure completion of the voting activity and orderly counting of ballots. Also, polling places should be clearly identified so that voters can find them easily.

Recommendations:

- Polling places should be clearly identified.
- Sufficient polling places should be established to reduce the number of voters to a figure between 600 and 700 each. The number of polling places would then average 2,400 to 2,800.
- Each polling station should have at least one lamp for evening ballot counting.

Mobile Polling Places

In places where there are not enough voters to justify a polling place or where voters have to walk too far to the polling places, mobile polling places could be provided. These units could

move from one location to another at pre-determined times. For example, a polling station could be at one location from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m., then at another from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. Adequately publicized, properly used and well guarded, these mobile polling places could bring the process to a large number of citizens.

Recommendation:

- The government of Togo should evaluate the possibility of providing mobile polling places in thinly populated areas.

Recruiting Election Workers

Recruiting of election workers and alternates should be done promptly. A technical expert might be engaged temporarily to help in the preparation of the training courses for election workers.

Recommendations:

- Election officials should be selected well prior to the elections and publish their names.
- Draw up a list, by prefecture, of substitute officials.
- The government of Togo should engage an electoral expert to help in the preparation of a training seminar for polling place officials.

Administrative Calendar

The calendar for the referendum, legislative and presidential elections was approved by the Council of Ministers on January 29, 1992 (Appendix G). This calendar included the census originally to be completed on March 23, the referendum April 12, legislative elections on May 31 and the presidential elections on June 14, with June 28 for the second round.

The rainy season in Togo begins in March in the south and sometimes as late as early May in the north. It reaches its peak in August. Roads become virtually impassable for days at a time

during these periods, and movement between villages and larger population centers almost ceases. The original calendar, if respected, would have completed the entire election series before the heaviest of the rains fall.

The IFES team estimates two weeks to be the minimum time necessary to prepare the voters' lists after the census. Even if the census is completed on schedule, i.e., March 23, the lists would still not be available before April 9, not in time for April 12, the date set for the referendum. This date is impractical and should be modified. After the lists are typed, another two weeks must be allowed processing by the Review Commission, two more weeks to put the lists in final form and send them to the prefectures and a week for issuance of voters' I.D. cards. This would make May 25 the earliest date for the referendum. In order to keep as close as possible to the schedule and avoid the worst part of the rainy season, the referendum and the first round of the legislative elections could be held at the same time, making the latter one week behind the established calendar.

Two weeks have been allowed for the interval between the first and second rounds of both the legislative and presidential elections. In order to keep to this time limit, compilation of first round results and printing as well as distribution of new ballots must all be done in that two-week period, a time frame that looks very short but possibly could be achieved with a highly efficient operation. This effort would require a full-time, intensive concentration of administrative officials at the top levels of government and the assignment of adequate personnel to each of the tasks involved.

The IFES team recognizes that elections are scheduled on Sundays so as not to interfere with the normal activities of the people. However, the extra money spent to pay officials for overtime hours could be saved by having the elections on Mondays.

Recommendations:

- Consideration should be given to the holding of the referendum and local and legislative elections on the same date.

- Referendum, local, legislative and presidential elections could be held on Mondays instead of Sundays as a cost-cutting measure.
- A detailed schedule, identifying critical dates, should be established to ensure adherence to the calendar, once it is in its final form. Good, tight management is required, with provision for efficient paths of communication throughout the election administration system.

G. Training of Election Officials

Implementation of adequate training programs for election administration officials, party leaders, candidates, representatives of leading nongovernmental organizations, agents in charge of conducting the electoral census as well as for the pollworkers and the pollwatchers is required. Training seminars and workshops about the democratization process and participation in the electoral process should be developed for election administration officials, party leaders, candidates and representatives of the nongovernmental organizations. Taking into consideration the electoral context, these seminars and workshops would include the following topics: development of the skills and knowledge in democratization-related areas such as mobilizing the electorate, assessing candidates, monitoring campaign processes, analysis of election returns, etc.

With a population of 3,633,000 inhabitants, approximately 1,700,000 eligible voters and as many as 1,400 polling places, there will be a need for a massive training program. Each polling place will be staffed with a given number of personnel to accommodate the potential voters. A comprehensive training strategy must be designed in order to reach the personnel to be assigned to the polling locations as well as the pollwatchers. The best approach would be to train a specific number of trainers who would then train the pollworkers and pollwatchers. For the benefit of these field agents, the meaning of the upcoming Togolese elections within international electoral trends as well as the role of elections in the democratic process should be emphasized. In addition, the trainers-of-trainers should receive specific instructions on motivation techniques, voter registration procedures, the importance of the electoral card, candidate registration procedures, voting procedures, ballot counting procedures, procedures of contestation and their overall responsibilities on election day.

There are private organizations such as GERDDES-Togo (Study and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social Development in Africa - Togo Branch) that can undertake these various training sessions. Their program design and budget are attached as Appendix E. Responsible election officials should try to use GERDDES and other civic groups to help with the training program.

H. National Electoral Commission

At the end of the team's two-week mission in Togo, there was no draft electoral law available for consideration. This document would have been useful in addressing the issue of the control of the electoral process. Indeed, perhaps the most important factor in promoting a free, honest and fair electoral environment is the establishment of a system for administering the elections that will command the confidence of all the participants in the process. The government now controls the electoral machinery through a specific ministry. However, in a country where a one-party system has been in place for decades, it is highly unlikely that consensus will exist among all political actors regarding the neutrality and fairness of the authorities of that specific ministry. As such, the alternative would be to have the elections administered by an objective, nonpartisan National Electoral Commission with a clear mandate and consisting of approximately a dozen members made up of representatives of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the President of the High Council of the Republic. This principle of nonpartisan electoral control would then be applied to every step of the electoral process - from the beginning of the electoral campaign to the proclamation of results to post-election investigations of alleged irregularities. To that end, not only must the National Electoral Commission be nonpartisan, but all prefectural or local commissions must be similarly constituted. The National Electoral Commission would then be in a position to play a coordinating role in promoting democratic values among the population through nonpartisan voter education.

I. Civic and Voter Education

Due to the lack of previous experience with competitive election processes or democratic institutions, there is a need to develop a comprehensive civic education program directed to all

sectors of the Togolese society. Government ministries responsible for social affairs, women's welfare, and education and information, along with the political parties, civic organizations and the media all have important roles to play in this connection. Values of democracy must be understood and acted upon by the population if a pluralist system is to be established in Togo. However, in discussing pluralism, the overriding theme should be that the will of the people, as expressed through the election process, is sovereign. The value of pluralism should be emphasized and juxtaposed against the disinclination of any party or individual to cede power.

The majority of the Togolese people have never voted; some, however, have participated in elections which were not truly democratic. As such, many of them do not understand the purpose of voting and think that the mere fact of voting will not really change the political status quo. Most important is the development of a program that can promote a broader understanding of civic participation as a whole. Education to promote civic participation can also be undertaken by private organizations such as GERDDES-Togo, Groupe de Réflexion Démocratie et Développement and Non-Violence et Démocratie pour l'Afrique (Appendix F). GERDDES-Togo, in cooperation with the central authorities, can help design and carry out a civic education program. This program would, first of all, consist of the design, production, and testing of a set of materials on civic participation in different media and then the dissemination of this set of materials through a variety of methods aimed at reaching as many Togolese as possible in the five regions of the country.

An effective civic education program would organize a group of persons to work on the design of a set of messages and themes aimed at educating Togolese people about the meaning and importance of civic participation. These messages and themes would be carefully designed to address the population's uncertainties and doubts about civic participation and to convey the information in a way appealing to the different ethnic groups. Once these messages and themes have been developed, the group would work with appropriate technicians to translate the messages and themes into various media - film, audio, written materials, posters, etc. Local media technicians would be used in order to minimize costs and to assure that the carefully designed ethnic sensitivity of the material is maintained.

In order to reach the greatest number of Togolese in the 30 prefectures, the dissemination of the media material must be done mostly by radio, the only mass media with significant

penetration in the rural areas. An extensive radio program should be developed, making use of central and local radio stations, featuring varied radio spots and fairly heavy saturation. In addition, other dissemination methods such as actual outreach by trained educators should be used. Young educators could be sent into specified rural areas to distribute printed materials and to present information orally.

Civic education programs would specifically inform prospective voters about the mechanisms of voting: what the ballot looks like, how the ballot should be marked, the significance of casting a secret ballot, who is present at the polling location, what should be done in case a name is not included on the voters' lists, and related matters. For example, civic education messages could be: Let's stick together for elections; people who can vote are the electors; electors have the power/power is in their hands because they have the ballots; the electors' right is to vote but first you have to register. Another important function that civic education can perform is to educate voters regarding the need to balance partisan displays of support for candidates with the need not to act in ways that could be construed as intimidating, particularly on election day. For example, the presence of large numbers of people wearing clothing bearing a candidate's image or party color at or near a polling location may dissuade voters from casting alternative votes.

J. Two Competing Groups Among the Electorate

Sharp ethnic conflicts marked recent Togolese social relations. The Kabye of the Kara region have recently felt harrassed in the south and have been returning to their home areas contending that they have been forced from their southern homes even after long years of residence there. Something of a fusion has been occurring in the Kabye-RPT relationship, a melding of the ethnic with the political, estranging the Kabye from the Ewe and Mina in the maritime region. The hostilities will seriously affect the elections, making it more difficult for RPT agents in the south and even more difficult, or dangerous, for southern campaigners to venture into Kozah prefecture.

There is little that can be done to bridge the growing gap, but an effort must be made to promote tolerance on all sides, primarily through civic education, but also through the examples

set by political and government leaders. Strong leadership is needed to create the minimum conditions under which democratic elections can be held.

The political opposition to the former regime and to President Eyadéma is understandably immature. This is a new and heady experience. The proliferation of political parties, almost a standard feature of the emerging democracies of Africa, is matched by a vigorous if scattershot press that stretches the limits of responsible journalism. The opposition press is, in fact, little more than a collection of partisan tracts. None of the Lomé newspapers, except the government's own Togo-Presse, carries actual news stories. Togo-Presse itself is selective about its treatment of news items. A list of press organizations in Togo is attached in Appendix H.

Political ambitions are difficult to separate from principled commitments to the establishment of democracy in Togo, and although some forms of coalition are certain to arise in the election campaign, those ambitions will serve to keep the opposition fragmented and less constructive than it should be at this time in Togo's history.

K. Election Monitoring Assistance

The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the High Council of the Republic, leaders of political parties, journalists, and virtually all the Togolese with whom the team met, indicated the need of having international observers present at the time of the elections. The presence of these observers would be important in helping to convince the electorate that the elections will be conducted fairly and to alleviate the fear of political violence. A memorandum outlining the decisions made at the National Conference regarding international observers is found in Appendix H.

The presence of international election observers may assist in ensuring free, honest and fair elections in Togo. Specifically, international election observers would ensure that an independent, impartial and objective report is prepared which evaluates the electoral process. Moreover, the presence of international election observers would decrease the risk of violence and intimidation that some groups otherwise expect and would influence all parties to accept the results regardless of who wins the elections.

In order to determine the optimal size of an international election observer mission, factors such as the size of the country, its population, the nature and scope of the specific issues the observers will be investigating, the number and distribution of the polling locations, and the availability of financing must be taken into consideration. In Togo, international election observer missions should include people with expertise in given subject areas.

Election observers should also be selected on the basis of their reputation for independence, impartiality and objectivity as well as their ability to speak the language of the host country. Comprehension of election laws and of the broader political context of a given election, knowledge and understanding of international human rights norms, expertise in electoral administration, practical experience in politics in general, knowledge of the host country, participation in previous fact-finding missions, ability to conduct a factual investigation, and ability to report factual findings are also factors to be considered in the selection.

International observers can best contribute to the fairness of an election process where there already exists a comprehensive monitoring effort. Trained and organized Togolese monitors sponsored either by the administrative electoral machinery, political parties or by nonpartisan civic groups should have the opportunity to get involved at the beginning of the electoral process, from the time that the electoral census is being conducted. The development of these local monitors should be encouraged and they should be permitted to observe all phases of the electoral process. They can play a vital role in the transition process to democracy by helping to educate the population on its rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. They can also organize voter education and election monitoring programs in order to enhance confidence and participation in the electoral process.

Observers should arrive in-country at least a week before the election and leave only after the publication of the results. Upon their arrival, their presence should be announced to the general public. They should then meet with a cross section of participants in the political process. Most important are meetings with government officials, party leaders and candidates, members of the government body administering the elections, and representatives of organizations such as labor unions, professional and religious organizations, and human rights and ethnic groups. These meetings should be held before and after the day of election. The international election

observers should be allowed to travel freely in the country in order to have an independent assessment of the electoral process.

On election day, observers should visit as many polling locations as possible. However, unless assistance is specifically requested by the local authorities, they should not interfere with the polling even when confronted with complaints or problems at a polling location. Minor problems should be brought to the attention of local authorities for correction and major problems should be reported to the central electoral authorities. The international observers should report any imperfections in the electoral process and evaluate whether these imperfections had a negative impact on the fairness of the elections. It is particularly important that observers be present at the closing of the polls and the counting of the ballots.

Even though the need for international election observers has frequently been expressed by a cross section of participants in the Togolese political process, there has not been, to date, any formal request to the international community for such assistance. Formal requests should be directed to countries which have maintained good relations with Togo and to other independent international bodies such as:

- The United Nations (UN)
One United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
USA
- The Carter Center of Emory University
1 Copenhill
Atlanta, GA 30307
USA
- The National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Suite 605
Washington, D.C. 20036
USA
- The International Republican Institute
1212 New York Avenue, N.W.
Suite 850
Washington, D.C. 20005
USA

IFES Pre-Election
Assessment: Togo

- TransAfrica Forum
545 Eighth Street, S.E.
Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20003 USA
- Africa Human Rights Watch
36 West 44 Street
New York, N.Y. 10036
USA
- The International Human Rights Law Group
1601 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20009
USA
- The International Foundation
for Electoral Systems
1620 I Street, N.W.
Suite 611
Washington, D.C. 20006
USA

COST ESTIMATES

The Secretary of State in charge of electoral activities at the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security submitted a copy of their electoral budget summary to the IFES team at the end of their stay in Togo (Appendix J). A detailed electoral budget was not made available to the team. IFES' comments and recommendations on this budget follow an English translation of the budget presented below.

TENTATIVE BUDGET 1992 ELECTIONS IN TOGO Exchange Rate: \$1.00 = 250 CFA

CATEGORY	COST
I. ELECTORAL CENSUS	383,890,000
II. TRAINING	5,000,000
III. SEMINARS	5,000,000
IV. SENSITIZATION	20,000,000
V. ELECTORAL EQUIPMENT	
a) Electoral Cards	50,000,000
b) Ballot Boxes	38,500,000
c) Voting Screens	10,000,000
d) Ballots	24,000,000
e) Reports (Procès-Verbaux)	27,000,000
f) Ballot Counting Paper	12,000,000
VI. OFFICE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES (Typewriters, paper, photocopier, etc.)	15,000,000
VII. FUEL	30,000,000
VIII. VEHICLES	100,000,000
IX. HOUSING ALLOWANCE for Observers	10,000,000
X. SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES	
a) Members of the Electoral Commission	30,000,000
b) Officials/Supervisors 20 x (10.000 x 3)	600,000
c) Mid-Career Professionals 15 x (8.000 x 3)	360,000
d) Secretaries 20 x (5.000 x 3)	300,000
e) Journalists 30 x (6.000 x 3)	540,000

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f) Prefectoral Agents (5 x 30) x (5.000 x 3)	2,250,000
g) Communal Agents (Lomé) 25 x (5.000 x 3)	375,000
h) Security Agents (Lomé) 350 x (2.000 x 3)	2,100,000
i) Other Security Agents (Up-Country) 1.500 x (2.000 x 3)	9,000,000
j) Pollworkers (3 x 3.500) x (3.000 x 3)	94,500,000
XI. OFFICE SUPPLIES	
a) Constitutional Referendum & Local Elections	90,000,000
b) Legislative & Presidential Elections	100,000,000
XII. EQUIPMENT: Computer System	320,000,000
SUBTOTAL	<u>1,380,415,000</u>
CONTINGENCY (5%)	69,020,750
GRAND TOTAL	<u>1,449,435,750</u> \$5,797,443

Item

II. Formation (Training) - The amount listed for the training of election officials and pollworkers recommends a total of 8,000 to be trained (four people in each polling place) plus central officials. The IFES team recommends that the number of polling stations be increased from 1,415 to around 2800 in order to reduce the number of voters for each station. This will result in an increase in the number of officials to be trained to 12,000, and will increase the training budget by one half.

III. Seminars - These programs should provide information for nongovernmental organizations, political parties, journalists, labor unions and other groups regarding their roles in the election process. No target number was specified; the team recommends that the seminars involve up to 600 people from each of these areas.

V. Electoral Equipment - IFES recommends that 4,500 to 5,000 ballot boxes be used (two to three per station). 18" x 14" x 14" steel boxes produced in the United States cost approximately \$60 each. IFES also recommends the use of cardboard voting screens, two per station, at \$2 each. Until the ballot design is confirmed, it will be difficult to estimate the cost of ballots; the team suggests that 2 million ballots be printed for an estimated 1.7 million voters.

VIII. Vehicles - This item assumes purchase of land vehicles outside Togo. IFES recommends rental of two helicopters for three days during the elections only to transport ballots from less accessible areas. The approximate cost for rental is \$100,000.

Polling Place Supplies - IFES suggests that this item include lamps for counting purposes as well as communications links such as a radio system or a FAX machine network for message transmittal.

Additional Comments

Not included in the Ministry's budget are technical advisors to the election process, who can provide assistance at all levels of election administration. IFES recommends that technical advisors be retained for direct assistance to the Ministry or the electoral commission, to design a civic education program, and to develop communications links as well as broadcast capability.

Direct Technical Assistance Advisor - 18 weeks

This advisor would work with the electoral commission to develop election procedures, identify districts and polling places, clarify organization and logistical issues, assist in the procurement of commodities and function as a liaison between donors and the commission.

Airfare - \$4,000
Per Diem - \$19,400
Salary - \$34,560

Civic Education and Training Advisor - 4 weeks

A civic education advisor would work with election officials and nongovernmental organizations to design and implement comprehensive education and training programs for officials, pollworkers and citizens.

Airfare - \$4,000
Per Diem - \$4,320
Salary - \$7,680

Communications Specialist - 4 weeks

This advisor would work with the technical advisor and the electoral commission once the districts are established, to design a communications network for all polling stations using existing broadcast capabilities as well as exploring opportunities for new communications systems.

Airfare - \$4,000
Per Diem - \$4,320
Salary - \$7,680

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The challenge of administering elections in Togo is affected by political and social factors, as well as technical factors. This summary of the IFES team's recommendations is divided into these two categories.

Political and Social Issues

- The government should promulgate the new electoral code as soon as possible. A final establishment of election dates cannot take place prior to the code's issuance.
- A central body charged with administration of the elections should be named and provided with the code immediately to facilitate the development of procedures to be used in the implementation of the code, including the requirements for party registration and candidacy.
- The government should encourage dialogue among political parties and nongovernmental organizations through a series of seminars designed to explore the concept and implications of functioning in a multiparty electoral society.
- The electoral body, in conjunction with nongovernmental organizations inside and outside Togo, should assist in the development of comprehensive voter education and election worker training programs.
- Strong interest groups among the electorate, such as businesswomen and students should be identified and brought into the election process through election official training and civic education efforts.

Technical Issues

- The electoral body should promptly determine the election calendar, requirements for voter and political party registration, the electoral constituencies and the general ballot design.

- An advisor should be identified to assist the electoral body with determination of the organizational and logistical aspects of election administration in accordance with the electoral code.
- Multiple elections held on the same day would save organizational time and finances.
- Polling places should accommodate no more than 600 voters. Polling place structure and procedures for voting must ensure that each voter can cast a ballot with the minimum amount of waiting and delay.
- Ballot boxes with four opaque sides should be used, provided that the reasons and implications for their use are made known through the civic education program.
- Polling places should include links by FAX and radio as well as lamps to facilitate ballot counting and reporting.
- Counting should be completed at the polling sites before the ballots are transferred to a central location.