


Pnt-ABP-111  
15N 822418



**International Foundation for Electoral Systems**

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**An Orderly Rebellion  
Bulgaria's Transition from  
Dictator to Democracy**

**August, 1990**

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*This report was made possible by a grant  
from the National Endowment for Democracy*

*Any person or organization is welcome to quote information  
from this report if it is attributed to IFES.*

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In June 1990, Bulgaria conducted its first competitive multiparty elections in fifty-seven years. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems sent a seven member team to observe these elections. The IFES team traveled extensively throughout Bulgaria to observe the June 10 primary elections and the June 17th runoff elections.

The team found that administratively the Bulgarian Central Electoral Commission had done a remarkable job of organizing the elections. Within ninety-five days of passage of the Election Act on March 12, 1990, an electoral structure was established, election commissions were formed, registration and voting procedures were designed, and the first competitive election since before World War II was conducted. Seven million voters selected from more than 3,000 candidates from forty political parties, with a voter turnout rate exceeding ninety percent.

The members and staff of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), and of the volunteer regional and section (precinct) election officials, displayed a genuine desire to conduct an election that would produce clear, incontrovertible winners of seats in the Grand National Assembly, which will draft a new constitution. The CEC implemented a very successful voter education program, including nightly television spots on the electoral registry, polling locations, ballot formats, single-mandate and proportional representation seats, ballot security, and allowable partisan activities. As a result, voting at all observed locations went surprisingly smoothly.

The vote count was accurate, and no attempt was made to hide or delay the election results. Disputes stemmed largely from occasional misunderstandings of election procedures. Charges of intimidation were heard mostly in areas where the opposition parties had no electoral strength or campaign presence, and few poll watchers.

The results of the Bulgarian elections have been reported by many Western media outlets as a victory for the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). While the former Communists won 52% of the seats in the Assembly, they fell far short of electing the two-thirds majority necessary to approve all proposals. The BSP candidates found strong support in rural areas and among blue-collar voters, while the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) enjoyed the support of urban intellectuals and younger voters.

In winning 36% of the Assembly seats, the UDF achieved a remarkable feat. This coalition of sixteen political parties, organizations, and movements, formed in December 1989, managed to resist the centrifugal forces of a divisive campaign. The polished UDF

campaign featured rallies, demonstrations, and other accoutrements of professionally-managed political parties. This movement toward pluralization in Bulgaria will be very difficult to reverse.

IFES had a very positive role in the Bulgarian elections. The three-person pre-election assessment team, which met with the CEC in April, helped the Commission identify its needs and the potential pitfalls of its law and procedures. This team arranged for the Canadian government to donate the required ten tons of continuous-feed computer paper, for use at the CEC. Also in response to this needs assessment, and addressing the crucial concern of ballot security, IFES donated ballot transport security pouches and tabs to the CEC, to be used to convey vote tallies and records of official complaints. The pouches and tabs contributed substantially to the confidence of section and regional electoral officials, and the electorate at large.

The election observer team, in addition to working nationwide to document implementation of the law and avert incidents of fraud by its very presence, was provided access to the CEC computer center, to observe tabulation of official election results. When voter unrest at the "delay" in counting the ballots was at its height, IFES specialists responded to a CEC request to tape a special television interview, lending an authoritative perspective to perception of the short time between poll closing and announcement of complete official results.

A limited number of procedural and substantive problems arose that did affect the ability of the Bulgarian people to exercise a full and fair choice in the electoral process. These problems, although they did not appear to materially affect the outcome of the elections in this case, did have a negative impact on the public confidence of a significant proportion of the electorate.

To rebuild voter confidence in the coming months, and to provide an even stronger foundation for local and national elections in the future, it is important for the new Grand National Assembly and the political parties to make improving the electoral system a priority of the new government. Experiences gained in the June elections should become the basis for amending current laws and procedures to more effectively guarantee an objective and streamlined electoral system.

This report concentrates on the content and adequacy of the laws, regulations, implementation procedures, and policy guidelines that affected the conduct of the elections and public perception of the validity of the results.

## II. MEMBERS OF THE IFES OBSERVER DELEGATION\*

Dr. John D. Bell\*

John Bell is Professor of History at the University of Maryland Baltimore County and President of the Bulgarian Studies Association of North America. He is the author of many books and articles on Bulgarian history and politics.

Ronald A. Gould\*

Ron Gould is the Assistant Chief Electoral Officer of Elections Canada, responsible for the administration of federal elections in Canada. He is also responsible for Canada's involvement in international election observation and technical advisory activities, and is a member of the steering committee of the Council on Government Ethics Laws.

Dr. Richard G. Smolka\*

Richard Smolka is Professor in the School of Public Affairs at American University; editor and publisher of *Election Administration Reports*, a newsletter for election officials; and a consultant on elections to WRC-TV in Washington, D.C. He has observed elections in several countries and is the author of numerous books and articles on the election process.

Norbert J. Yasharoff

Bulgarian-born Norrie Yasharoff is a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer with broad experience in public diplomacy and Eastern European affairs. He is currently involved in writing, lecturing, and directing the activities of Yasharoff Associates, a firm of international consultants.

Morton H. Sklar

Morton Sklar is Professor of Public International Law and Human Rights Law at Catholic University Law School, and the Founding Chairman of the Washington Helsinki Watch Commission for the United States. He has had extensive experience working on voting rights with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and on welfare and unemployment issues as director of the public interest group Jobs Watch.

**Charles Lasham**

Charles Lasham is the Electoral Registration and Returning Officer for the Six Parliamentary Constituencies in the City of Liverpool, England. A lecturer in electoral systems, Charles is Chairman of the Association of Electoral Administrators, an organization which represents more than 600 election administrators throughout the United Kingdom.

**Roberta D. Kimball**

IFES Consultant Robbi Kimball is a specialist in political campaign finance and regulation. She has advised and worked in U.S. House and Senate campaigns; has managed several federal political action committees; and has served as Washington representative for major trade associations.

\* Member of IFES pre-election technical assessment team for Bulgaria.

**OBSERVER REPORT**

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### III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

In April 1990, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems received a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy, related to national elections in Bulgaria. IFES agreed to:

- A. Send a pre-election technical assessment team to study the new electoral law and structures designed to implement elections;
- B. Recommend, procure, and deliver election-related commodities that would assist in the conduct of free and fair multipartisan elections; and
- C. Send a delegation of electoral and cultural experts to observe the June 10 primary and June 17 runoff elections and report on their outcome and conduct.

#### A. Pre-election Technical Assessment Team Activities

The IFES three-person technical assessment team met with officers and staff of the CEC, leaders of political parties and citizens' groups, academics, and journalists. They examined the new election laws; the electoral process; the role of political parties in the campaign; the new electoral laws; the composition and role of the CEC and regional electoral commissions; voter registration procedures; ballot security precautions; vote counting and verification procedures; and methods for contesting and appealing election results.

The results of this study were published by IFES on May 24, 1990. In its report, the team indicated that the electoral process seemed to be both workable and reasonable. They perceived a growing confidence that the multi-party make-up of the election commissions, together with the presence of Bulgarian and international observer teams, would provide built-in "checks and balances" to help assure the fairness of the balloting and vote counting procedures.

The team further reported that the Grand National Assembly -- with half its delegates elected from single member majority districts and half elected on the basis of proportional representation from 28 multi-member constituencies -- would provide opportunities to elect a majority party government capable of governing, while offering a chance for some representation for minority parties and interests, through proportional representation.

The ballot mechanism, built on traditional procedures, appeared to be cumbersome in its operation, with a manual tally dictated for multimandate regional commissions outside Sofia. In a nation where paper is always in critically short supply, the system also demanded an unnecessarily large volume of paper ballots. The team observed that opposition parties lacked in resources readily available to the party in power. Opposition parties, however, had been increasingly successful in taking their message to the public through television, radio, newspapers, and posters.

The report of the pre-election technical assessment team is available from IFES.

## B. Commodities Transfer Activities

After extensive discussions with CEC members and staff concerning available resources, the IFES team identified four critical commodities needed to enable the CEC to conduct free elections with verifiable and reliable results, and addressed the needs as follows:

### 1. Continuous feed computer paper.

The IFES team found that the CEC needed computer paper for printing local voter registers. While the Central Electoral Commission had arranged for an adequate number of computers to tabulate results and calculate the winners of the proportional representation seats, there was still a need for ten tons of three-ply NCR tracker paper for the IBM 4341 printer.

IFES observer Ronald Gould, Assistant Chief Electoral Officer of Elections Canada, arranged for the government of Canada to donate and ship ten tons of continuous feed computer paper to the Central Electoral Commission.

### 2. Ballot security transfer cases.

These cases, to be used to convey each section's "protocols" (ballot tabulations, including challenges) from 228 district and regional election committees to the CEC computer center in Sofia, were provided to promote voter confidence in the new system.

IFES ordered reusable, heavy black plastic security pouches, along with 5,000 small uniquely numbered red plastic tabs, to be inserted in the zipper on the pouch and break when the zipper is opened. The broken tabs provide notice that the contents can no longer be guaranteed to be tamper-free. Because of the large supply of tabs donated by IFES, the pouches can be re-used in future elections.

The CEC staff demonstrated correct use of the pouches and tabs to the regional electoral councils, and gave one pouch and one tab to each chairman. After the polls closed, each regional committee reviewed and reached agreement on all its section's protocols, then inserted all sectional protocols into the pouch and sealed it with the tab. The pouch was then given to the two committee members (of different parties) designated to deliver it to the Central Electoral Commission in Sofia. The committee chairman also recorded the unique number on the unbroken tab, in case of questions about ballot security.

**3. Colored paper on which to print the party ballots.**

The team identified the ballot paper shortage as a critical need. In Bulgarian electoral tradition, ballot paper color corresponded to party affiliation. There was no indication of how the CEC planned to meet this need. The team suggested that, if the situation became truly critical, recommendations could be made for an amended ballot style in single mandate districts, which would significantly reduce the quantity of paper required.

IFES estimated that the amount of paper required would be 45 tons each of yellow, orange, blue, pink, and green paper, as well as 40 tons of white paper, for a total cost of some \$300,000.

After an exhaustive search for the paper (and a donor for the costs of purchasing and transporting it), IFES suggested to the CEC that we work with its staff to re-design the Bulgarian ballot, so that a white paper ballot, listing all candidates with their affiliations represented by colored stripes and/or party symbols, could be used. The CEC declined the offer to redesign the ballot, saying that there was 'no possibility' of changing the ballot format or colored paper requirement. In the June 10 and 17 elections, only four parties used colored paper (red for the BSP; blue for the UDF, green for the Liberals, and orange for the Agrarians).

**4. Informational materials, including descriptions of parliamentary procedures; books on teaching English as a second language; and descriptions of the divisions of duties among and between levels and branches of government and between of government.**

The IFES observer mission delivered to the Central Electoral Commission a box of research and reference materials on the following subjects: separation of powers and the three branches of the American government; English as a second language; dictionaries of parliamentary and international law; and parliamentary procedure reference volumes. Earlier, Ronald Gould had sent to the CEC a box of materials on Canadian electoral matters, parliamentary procedures and the functioning of parliamentary bodies.

### C. Observer Delegation Activities

IFES assembled a seven member delegation to observe the June 10 Round One (primary) and June 17 Round Two (runoff) elections. A two-person advance contingent arrived in Sofia on June 3, and completed its post-election activities on June 21.

At the CEC, the advance team found that the computer paper had been received and was being used, and that the transfer cases would be delivered to the CEC the next day. Before the arrival of the rest of the delegation, the advance group also:

- \* arranged for CEC election observer credentials for all members of the group;
- \* interviewed and hired interpreters and driver/car teams;
- \* made contact with major political parties;
- \* contacted other international observer delegations to identify key Round 1 and Round 2 election observation sites; and
- \* contacted the Bulgarian Association for Free Elections (BAFE), a nonpartisan voter education organization substantially funded by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

For Round One observation activities, one team (consisting of two IFES observers, an interpreter, a car and driver) identified towns and villages in the Bansko - Gotse Delchev area containing a significant proportion of Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian Moslems), that anticipated no observers from BAFE or the opposition parties, and/or where rumors of planned fraud by the BSP were rampant. The team visited those towns and villages on the day before the election, both to locate key section and regional voting locations and to alert activists that IFES observers would be present and would be watching for irregularities. On election day, the team returned to these locations.

The second team drove toward Kurdjali, into areas heavily populated by ethnic Turks, where abuses were widely anticipated. A fifth delegate surveyed Sofia voting locations and monitored the activities of the CEC, the media, major parties, and BAFE. In all locations, teams contacted or attempted to contact representatives of major parties and BAFE.

For Round Two, one team visited cities on the Black Sea; a second visited industrial cities in the Troyan - Pleven corridor, where the Communist party had maintained labor camps for political dissidents; a third team visited cities toward Pazardzik, where there were numerous allegations of irregularities in Round One procedures and where there are concentrations of ethnic Turks and gypsies; the remaining delegate surveyed Sofia - Pernik polling locations and monitored the activities of the CEC.

During both Round One and Round Two activities, teams observed all phases of the electoral process, including:

- \* Pre-election regional electoral commission instructions to section election commissions;
- \* Distribution of ballot boxes and ballots from district and region to section commissions;
- \* Sealing the polling place, with materials inside, the night before the election;
- \* Opening the polling place on election morning, including sealing the ballot box, securing extraneous doors, laying out ballots in the voting booth, and laying out envelopes for controlled distribution to voters;
- \* Activities of the section and regional electoral commissions, the partisan and non-partisan observers, BAFE, and international guests;
- \* After the closing of the polls, binding unused ballots and envelopes, and placing them outside the counting area, counting envelopes and ballots, and completion of section and region protocols;
- \* Sealing the protocols into the transfer cases; and
- \* Observing national vote tallying activities in the computer room of the CEC.

Particular praise must be given to election officials and political party leaders who, under extreme pressures and time constraints, and without recent experience with multi-party balloting, handled such critical tasks as establishing the foundation for a multi-party system; providing open and equal access by political parties to the media; updating voter registration lists; resolving policy questions on the conduct of the election process; and administering the collection and counting of ballots.

## IV. BACKGROUND

### A. Historical and Cultural Context

The ousting of Todor Zhivkov, head of the Bulgarian Communist Party since 1954, on November 10, 1989 freed the country's political logjam and opened the door to reformers both within and outside the BCP. The BCP purged the Old Guard from state and party leadership, replacing them with men who were younger, better educated, and ostensibly committed to a program of democratization. The BCP began the process of separating state and party leadership, promised to put an end to the internal oppression that had stifled political discussion and cultural life, renounced the campaign of repression directed against the Turkish minority, and agreed to drop the provision in the constitution that assigned it a "guiding role" in political life.

At an extraordinary party congress in February 1990, BCP leaders denounced the "totalitarian regime" of the past and reaffirmed their commitment to political democratization and to a gradual transition to a market economy. To symbolize its break with the past it changed its name to the "Bulgarian Socialist Party" (BSP).

Many Bulgarians, however, were skeptical of the BSP's willingness or ability to carry out a thorough democratic reform. A number of groups that had formed the core of Bulgaria's dissident movement before the ouster of Zhivkov transformed themselves into opposition political parties. The largest and most important of these formed a coalition, the Union of Democratic Forces, under the presidency of Dr. Zhelev Zhelev, and quickly became the major opposition force.

Another opposition party was the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). During the first half of the twentieth century the BANU was the backbone of the democratic movement in Bulgaria, leading the struggle against royal-military dictatorship before World War II and against Communization after the war. During the Communist period, a sanitized version of the BANU was kept alive to function as the BCP's "little brother." In this capacity it retained the trappings of a party, with offices and clubs, a newspaper, etc., and shared in the government of the country.

When Zhivkov was removed from power, an internal revolt occurred in the BANU that ousted the old leadership. The BANU withdrew from the government, and proclaimed itself an opposition party. The official BANU was faced, however, with a rival organization: the BANU - Nikola Petkov, led by former dissidents who were affiliated with the UDF. Attempts to unify the two Agrarian Unions failed, because the official BANU refused to enter the UDF. Viktor Vulkov, the official BANU's chairman, argued for the creation of a "third force," independent of both the Socialists and the UDF, a policy which BANU - Nikola Petkov refused to accept.

Yielding to internal pressures, in which mass demonstrations and political strikes organized by the UDF played a key role, and hoping to improve Bulgaria's international standing, the BSP entered into a dialogue with the UDF and BANU (official) at a political

"Roundtable." The Roundtable discussions resulted in three major agreements, two of which were translated into law by the BSP government. These were:

1. the law on elections, providing for the carrying out of free elections for a Grand National Assembly with constituent powers to prepare a new constitution for the country;
2. the law on political parties, defining the conditions under which political parties would be recognized and the scope of their activities; and
3. agreement on a code of conduct covering the election campaign.

These three agreements provided the framework for the elections held on June 10 and 17, 1990.

#### B. Campaign Resources and the Incumbency Advantage

A major issue regarding the viability of political candidates and parties concerns their access to media, facilities, and equipment during the campaign. At the beginning of the campaign there was an obvious imbalance of resources between the BSP and the opposition parties. Reflecting its 45 years in power, the BSP possessed a developed political organization with local headquarters and clubs in every populated area; control of the country's largest newspaper, *Duma* (Word), with a circulation of 700,000; and the advantage of holding national and local power.

Some practical reasons were offered to explain these inequities. For many years, the BSP, as the only political party, enjoyed the benefit of well-established facilities located in or close to main government buildings and voting places. In addition, without the benefit of a recent multi-party election, government officials lacked an objective basis for gauging the relative size and strength of competing parties for the purposes of assigning offices and equipment.

Agreements reached by the Roundtable helped to redress this imbalance of resources to the general satisfaction of the opposition. Time on national television was assigned to the individual parties and also made available for debates between party representatives on various issues. Opposition spokesmen generally praised the conduct of the national media and stated that they were given sufficient access to ensure that their message was heard. Foreign observers commented that the conduct of Bulgarian television with regard to the campaign compared favorably with the experience of countries with a longer democratic tradition.

However, access to newspapers was not as equitable. Although opposition parties were, for the first time in many years, permitted to openly publish their own newspapers, access to newsprint and distribution mechanisms was more limited for UDF's *Demokratsia* (Democracy) and other opposition papers than for BSP's *Duma*. This limitation inhibited opposition newspapers to a certain extent. For example, editions of

*Demokratsia*, limited to a daily circulation of about 300,000, were sold out in most locations within minutes of release, while *Duma*, with a daily press run more than twice as large remained available throughout the day.

On the local level, it was apparent that the opposition was not always provided with the resources it expected. In some localities, opposition members complained that local authorities were slow to provide the financial support that the roundtable agreements specified and that they were frequently not given quarters to establish political clubs. Opposition parties voiced numerous complaints regarding inequalities in the size and location of club offices provided by the government, and the rudimentary nature of their office equipment and supplies in comparison with those available to the BSP.

In the town of Gotse Delchev IFES observed that the UDF chapter had erected a small tent on the sidewalk as its local club to dramatize the failure of the town officials to provide anything better. While the opposition did not charge the government with a systematic plan to interfere with its campaign and there were no complaints of censorship, UDF and BAFE pollwatchers did complain of the conduct of individual local officials.

### C. Media and the Campaign

A major factor in the election campaign was the emergence of a pluralistic press. However, even to those who could not read Bulgarian, a quick perusal of the leading newspapers was sufficient to establish the glaring contrast in format, layout, and paper quality between those published by the Socialists and their allies, and those published by the opposition. The UDF and other opposition publishers had great difficulty obtaining newsprint from the state-controlled paper mills, printing an attractive daily newspaper with the inadequate facilities at their disposal, and ensuring fair sales through the state-controlled distribution system. (It should be noted that much of the newsprint used by the newer papers was donated by British publisher Robert Maxwell; other sources must be located to ensure a continued diversity of philosophies in the media.)

Bulgarian newspapers are an interesting blend of editorial opinion and facts. Unlike most Western papers, the two categories are not clearly separated or labeled; even articles that obviously are purely speculation sometimes appear with no by-lines. The best clue to the slant of the articles, therefore, comes in knowing which party published the paper.

*Duma*, the organ of the BSP, a professional-looking eight-page daily newspaper, was readily available throughout the country. Its articles feature current events and policy decisions, especially those that cast a sympathetic light on the BSP. For example, according to *Duma* all opposition charges against the BSP for "allegedly using violent election-campaign tactics and causing a number of deaths" were nothing but instances of "callous exploitation by the UDF of accidents and other human tragedies to whip up anti-BSP passions." Prior to November 1989, *Duma* was known as *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Workers' Cause).

As the central mouthpiece of the UDF, *Demokratsia* used the major part of its four pages to document the crimes of the Communists/Socialists, as well as to promote its platform, although more space may be allocated to other news in post-election months. An example of a typical front-page story was "The Ghosts of Fear Continue to Haunt Us," a summary of a pre-election poll revealing that a majority of Bulgarians fear uncontrollable price increases, political repression, rising unemployment, food shortages, violence resulting from ethnic feuds, ecological catastrophe, and a rising crime rate. Both *Demokratsia* and *Svoboden Narod* (Free People, published by the Social Democratic Party, part of the UDF coalition) reached news stands in very limited quantities.

As the campaign progressed, the main organ of BANU, *Zemedelsko Zname* (Agrarian Banner) began to part ways with its former journalistic ally *Duma*. The June 11 edition's banner headline, "The March to Pluralism is Irreversible," summarized this departure.

Bulgarians were very interested in how their elections were covered and reported by the international press. Describing the quality of American analysis, *Demokratsia* noted:

The intellectual dimensions of the reports are very disappointing ... Except for Celestine Bohlen, former Moscow correspondent of *The New York Times*, there were no 'journalistic stars' among those covering the Bulgarian elections ... Some of the correspondents were obviously unprepared for the task.

The paper saluted the commentary of Carol Williams of *The Los Angeles Times*, who wrote:

In a country where one fifth of all adults belong to the Party, concern about investigations of past crimes gave rise to fear of revenge in the event of an opposition victory. For the more than two million retirees, stability was preferable to promises of change and of a better future which they might not live to enjoy.

Also saluted by the Bulgarian press for their insight were American television commentator Mark Shields; and Roger Boyes of *The Times* of London.

One of the more interesting media phenomena observed by the IFES team was a taped June 3 pre-election commentary by President Ronald Reagan. His remarks were shown on the most popular television show in Bulgaria, *Vsiaka Nedelia* (Every Sunday), hosted by Kevork Kevorkian. In voice-over translation, Reagan assured Bulgarians of America's abiding interest in their fate, and urged them to exercise their right to vote in their free, fair, and secret elections. The speech, which carefully toed the thin line between a general expression of support for democratic elections and an outright endorsement of the opposition, was written by the staff of the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, which also funded its translation and distribution.

#### D. Glossary of Bulgarian Electoral Terminology

Agrarians	Short name for either branch of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union.
Assembly	The Grand National Assembly
BAFE	Bulgarian Association for Free Elections.
BANU (official)	Agrarians traditionally affiliated with the Communist Party. BANU (official) ran as a separate party in June.
BANU - Nikola Petkov	The branch of Agrarians affiliated with the UDF coalition.
BCP	Bulgarian Communist Party.
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party.
BZNS	Same as BANU (official).
CEC	Central Electoral Commission.
<i>Demokratsia (Democracy)</i>	Newspaper of the Union of Democratic Forces.
D'Hondt formula	A method for establishing winners of the 200 proportional representation (multi-mandate) seats. See Appendix 3.
District	One of the 200 geographic areas represented by a single member of the Assembly.
<i>Duma (Word)</i>	Newspaper of the Bulgarian Socialist Party.
Internal passport	Official personal identity document, issued by the Bulgarian government. Also called a domestic passport.
Grand National Assembly	400 member special national legislature which will draft a new national constitution; its mandate ends 18 months from the June 1990 elections.
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

Multi-mandate	In the Assembly there are 200 delegates from 28 multi-mandate regions that are represented by more than one delegate. Delegates are selected as part of a list on a party ballot. This is broadly called a proportional representation scheme, designed to provide minority party access. See Appendix 3.
Quick count	In order to monitor whether the official results were accurate, nonpartisan groups listened to actual ballot counts in ten percent of the sections and called the results to a computer center where the sample was expanded to a national projection.
Proportional representation	A method of aggregating pools of party ballots in order to assign numerical values to each party's portion of votes, and rank the party returns to assign seats in the Assembly.
Protocols	Official vote tally sheets provided by the CEC through the region and district commissions to the section polling places. The protocols also tracked official challenges, as well as commissions' actions on challenges.
Region	One of 28 geographic areas in which party lists of candidates were elected to the 200 proportional representation seats.
Round One	June 10 elections for the 400 Assembly seats.
Roundtable	The multipartisan group that, in the absence of an Assembly, planned the elections and essentially ran the government from April through June.
Round Two	June 17 run-off elections, necessary in 81 single-mandate districts.
Section	One of more than 12,000 voting jurisdictions; roughly corresponds to the American precinct.
Single mandate	One of 200 voting jurisdictions represented by a single Assembly delegate, elected by name.
UDF	Union of Democratic Forces, a coalition of 16 opposition parties.
Zmedelsko Zname (Agrarian Banner)	Newspaper of BANU (official).

## V. THE 1990 PRIMARY (ROUND ONE) AND GENERAL (ROUND TWO) ELECTIONS

As stated in the Executive Summary, the 1990 Bulgaria national elections were, by and large, conducted in a smooth and orderly manner. One IFES observer noted,

The whole process was so uneventful, that had I been observing this situation with no prior knowledge of Bulgaria's political situation, I would have assumed that Bulgarian electors and election officials had been accustomed to democratic, multi-party voting for many years.

### A. Balloting and Tabulation Procedures

The electoral system was designed to combine representative and majoritarian features, with 200 members elected from single member districts of approximately equal population, and 200 elected by proportional representation on the basis of votes cast for political parties in each of 28 regions.

In the June 10 Round One (primary) election, each voter was permitted to cast two ballots. The first, smaller ballot was for a specific candidate from that area's single-member region. The second, larger ballot contained a list of candidates from the same party, running for a regional multi-mandate seat. The winners of the proportional representation seats were determined by the D'Hondt formula, based on the number of votes cast for each party in each of the 28 regions. (For a complete description of the formula, consult Appendix 3).

The elections were administered by the CEC through a series of region, district, and section commissions. The CEC consists of a chairman, two vice chairmen, a secretary, and 20 other members. The officers and commissioners were chosen to reflect the various political parties. The chairman, Zhivko Stalev, is a respected jurist and academic with no political party affiliation whose nomination was approved by acclamation. The Commission worked closely with the Roundtable group of political party representatives in drafting the electoral law and regulations to implement it.

Election commissions were established for each of the 200 single-member (mandate) districts, each of the 28 proportional representation (multi-mandate) regions, and each of the more than 12,000 sections. Members on each of these commissions were named on the basis of party affiliation, to reflect the party support in the jurisdiction.

Registers of eligible voters were compiled by local government officials from lists of residents of the community. This information was gathered from domestic passports, which every Bulgarian receives at age 16. The 20-page identity document contains a photograph, date of birth, address, marital status, names of children under 16, and occupation; by law, changes in this information must be recorded. To prevent duplicate

voting, election officials at the polling place recorded participation for each Round on page 19 of the domestic passport.

The registers of eligible voters were posted in public places prior to both Round One and Round Two elections, allowing people to confirm the information on the list and to correct any omissions. For Round One elections, voters who expected to be away from home on election day were issued certificates allowing them to vote in other locations. Bulgarians travelling or living outside the country were permitted to cast Round One ballots at the Bulgarian embassy in the country in which they were located.

While it had been announced that such absentee voting would not be permitted for Round Two, a June 17 (election day) live radio broadcast featured Dimitur Popov saying that no citizen should be prevented from exercising his right to vote " ... for any reason whatsoever." This led some section committees to allow de facto absentee voting, so long as the voter had a valid internal passport proving he had not already voted in Round Two.

Voting took place on Sundays between 7:00 am and 6:00 p.m. A voter entered the polling place and presented his internal passport to section commission members, who checked it against the register for name, address, and personal identification number. The voter was then permitted to select an envelope from those lying on the table. The option of choosing an envelope reassured voters of the secrecy of the ballot and ensured that he was not being given a marked envelope that would later identify his vote. The voter then entered the booth, where ballots were available. Polling places were allotted one booth and one ballot box per each 600 registered voters.

The empty ballot boxes had been distributed to regional and district election committee chairmen at Thursday pre-election meetings in Sofia, along with blank envelopes, ballots, and protocols. They were passed along to the section committees at meetings on Friday or Saturday. Each box contained strips of paper marked with the official CEC seal, to be used for securing the box, as well as twine, sealing wax, scissors, pens, a tube of glue, and a candle for melting the sealing wax. (Each section's commission devised its own combination of knots, wax, glue, and/or seals; one commission even installed a lock on the box!)

For the June 10 elections, each booth contained both the smaller single-mandate ballots and the larger multi-mandate ballots for all parties fielding candidates in that district or region. A total of forty parties ran candidates nationwide, though only three major parties fielded candidates in every location. Each party had requested from the Central Electoral Commission a particular color or combination of colors for its ballots: red for the BSP, blue for the UDF, orange for the Agrarians, green for the Liberals, white with one pink stripe for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and so on. The June 17 runoff elections involved only single-mandate districts, so only the smaller ballots were used.

The primary source of ballot control for Bulgaria was, ironically, not the ballots, but the ballot envelopes. The distinctive plain white envelopes with blue liners were unique

and closely guarded; after delivery to section polling places on election eve, they were kept overnight in the locked and sealed polling room, along with the ballot box and its contents and the official protocols. The paper strips were used to seal the door of the room overnight; on election day, the committee also secured all windows, doors, and drawers in the room.

The ballots were available at the polling place, but had also been distributed by the CEC to political parties and local electoral officials two to three days before the elections. Voters could bring a ballot to the polling place, and use it to vote; or they could use the ballots located in the voting booth. In either case, each voter placed one single mandate and one multi-mandate ballot into the envelope, exited the booth, and placed the envelope into the ballot box in full view of the section election commission, whose members watched closely. In most polling places, watchers from parties and from BAFE and other nonpartisan groups were also present. After depositing the ballot, the voter reclaimed his domestic passport (which had been marked to prevent duplicate voting) and left the room.

At the close of the polls, the section commission determined how many names on the register had been marked as having voted, in order to determine the number of envelopes that should be in the ballot box. Unused ballots and envelopes were bundled into packets and wrapped with the paper strips displaying the CEC seal, then placed outside the counting area (sometimes defined by tying string to chairs). The ballot box was then opened and envelopes were divided into stacks of fifty and counted. Any ballot found outside an envelope was marked void and the fact noted on the protocol. If the number of envelopes and recorded voters did not match, this fact was also recorded on the protocol, along with an explanation if possible.

The envelopes were then opened and examined to make certain that only one ballot of each size was in each envelope. Split ticket voting (different color for the large and small ballot) was allowed. If an envelope contained two large or two small ballots of the same color, one was destroyed. If the ballots were of the same size but of different colors, both were declared void and destroyed. Any mark on the ballot invalidated it. Void and invalid ballots were also recorded on the protocol.

Each section commission was required to complete two copies of each of two protocols: one for the single mandate ballots cast and one for the multi-mandate ballots cast. Each protocol listed the hours the polls were actually open, the number of voters registered, the number of registered candidates, the number of invalid ballots and empty envelopes, the number of votes cast for each party list of candidates, a list of any complaints made and decisions reached by the commission, any clarifying comments, and a record of persons present at the opening or closing of the polls.

The protocols were delivered by two polling place officials of different political parties in sealed envelopes to the district and region election commissions. A copy of each protocol, together with all ballots, invalid ballots, unused envelopes, the list of voters,

the certificates for absentee voting, the empty box, the statements and complaints lodged with the commission, and all other election supplies, were delivered to local government officials.

The district election commissions for the 200 single-mandate districts and the regional election commissions of the 28 multi-mandate regions received the protocols and tallied the results. These commissions reviewed each protocol to ensure that it was complete and accurate, including the signature and identification of all polling place officials. If there were numerical inaccuracies, such as a difference between the number of voters voting and the number of envelopes in the ballot box, the polling place officials were questioned and the inaccuracies resolved or noted if they could not be resolved.

In some cases, polling place officials had invalidated ballots that should not have been invalidated. In such cases, the district commission, after questioning the polling officials, corrected these errors. For example, some polling place officials confused an allowable "split ticket" with the invalidating situation in which two ballots of the same size but different colors were found in the envelope.

While lines of voters at the polling places had moved quickly, lines at the 28 regional and 200 district offices were long and slow, forcing some officials to wait several hours as the commissions examined each protocol and attempted to reconcile errors or discrepancies. When the protocols from every section had been received and approved, the commission chairman produced the black security pouch and red break-away tab, which had been sent by courier from the CEC on the previous Friday. The district or region commission chairman recorded the number on the red tab, then inserted the protocols into the pouch, closed the zipper, and attached the red tab.

The sealed pouches were then delivered to the Central Electoral Commission. After breaking the tab and opening the pouch, the protocols were checked and their tallies entered into the computer. The verification of the complete Round One tally took more than three days, because each proportional representation region required a verification of all the results for all parties from more than 12,000 polling places in 28 regions and 59 countries around the world. Final official results of the first round were released at a press conference on Thursday, June 14. Results from most single-mandate districts had been announced earlier.

While the CEC was capable of releasing a rapid unofficial vote count based on raw totals from around the country, the Commission had decided to release only final certified totals. Realizing that early results could be subject to correction, the Commission was wary that the corrections would invoke charges of manipulating the results. Meanwhile, 10,000 BAFE volunteers had been trained to watch the section counts in ten percent of the sections selected at random, and telephone the results to Sofia, for an independent quick count. As late as Saturday night, June 9, CEC Chairman Stalav opposed the BAFE count, but finally withdrew his opposition before the June 10 voting began. The BAFE quick count sample proved to be within .3% of the final results.

One week later, run-off elections were conducted in 81 single member districts. Procedures were much the same, but the tallies were concluded more quickly because there were no proportional representation winners to be determined and there were 119 fewer single mandate elections. The election officials already displayed the confidence of experienced administrators who had met and overcome their toughest challenge.

## B. Political Parties That Won Seats in the Grand National Assembly

### The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)

The BSP aimed above all to disassociate itself from its past record, and its campaign was noticeably devoid of Marxist ideology. Indeed, BSP spokesmen rivaled the UDF in their denunciations of "totalitarianism." Party leaders dedicated a monument to the victims at Lovech, site of one of the postwar concentration camps, promising that such "deformations" would never be repeated. The party's new symbols, a red rose and a cartoon boy somewhat resembling Pinocchio, its "thumbs up" gesture, and slogan "Good luck for Bulgaria," replaced the heavy handed mottoes and portraits of party leaders characteristic of past campaigns. Its supporters waved the Bulgarian flag rather than the red banner.

The BSP presented itself as the party of "responsible, conservative change," stressing the experience of its leaders and minimizing its policy differences with the UDF. It denied seeking a monopoly of power and called for the formation of a coalition with the opposition either before or after the elections. Its economic program echoed the UDF's call for a market economy, but promised to bring this about gradually, without the drastic changes that would be required by the UDF's economic program.

BSP propaganda portrayed the UDF as a coalition in the hands of extremists who would carry out a wholesale purge of the bureaucracy and eliminate existing social welfare programs. Its claims that old-age pensions would be endangered by a UDF victory were apparently particularly effective.

In some BSP campaign materials, members of the UDF were pictured as bearded, poorly-dressed youths, hiding behind a mask of democracy. The image projected by BSP candidates was well-dressed, clean-shaven, and responsible.

While cultivating a new image designed to appeal particularly to Bulgaria's middle-class voters in urban areas, the BSP apparently conducted a more traditional campaign in the countryside. There were widespread reports that local party and government officials put heavy pressure on the village population, whose habits of subordination, developed over the past 45 years, were not easily broken. This pattern of intimidation was admitted by BSP leaders, who attributed it to overzealousness on the part of local activists while denying that it was a tactic decided upon at the national level.

The BSP won 211 seats in the Grand National Assembly, to control 52.75% of the votes. In light of the well-publicized Roundtable decision that all agreements must be

passed by a two-thirds majority, the BSP fell considerably short of the "controlling majority" cited in many Western media reports.

### The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)

In retrospect it can be seen that the UDF leaders were overconfident. They sought to make the election a referendum on the past 45 years of Communist rule and assumed that if the populace were given the opportunity to vote freely it would automatically reject the Communists (now Socialists) in overwhelming proportion. As a consequence, much of the UDF campaign focused on the past, particularly on the atrocities committed by the BCP during the Stalinist era.

By its nature the UDF coalition had great difficulty speaking with a single voice. Some of its leaders, for example Dr. Petur Dertliev of the Social Democratic Party, spoke with some compassion of the BSP's efforts to reform itself, advocated an eventual reconciliation, and opposed the idea of reprisals against BSP officials. Others, however, adopted a far more strident tone, frequently referring to the BSP as "murderers" and "a mafia," and clearly giving the impression that UDF would conduct a wholesale purge of the government if it won. Both the BSP and some members of the UDF referred to this as a policy of "McCarthyism."

The UDF rallies observed by team members were extremely positive, reflecting the popular song that had become the unofficial theme of the opposition campaign:

*Kazano chestno, vsichko mi e nared  
I zatova si g'edam napred!*

(Honestly, all is fine with me,  
And that is why I'm looking ahead!)

UDF leaders rejected BSP offers to participate in a coalition government and vowed that under no circumstances would they ever cooperate with the Socialists. In the last days of the campaign, they even turned down a BSP proposal to sign a pledge of mutual nonviolence, apparently on the principle that if it came from the Socialists it should automatically be rejected.

The UDF economic program called for an immediate and complete transition to a market economy. While this may be the best choice in economic terms, it proved to be politically unsettling and less appealing than the BSP's utopian promise of gradual and painless transition.

Candidates of the UDF won 144 seats in the Grand National Assembly, for 36% of the votes.

### Party of Rights and Freedoms

The Party of Rights and Freedoms emerged as the political vehicle of the country's Turkish/Muslim minority. Although its leader, Akhmed Dugan, ostensibly was in an informal alliance with the UDF, relations between the two groups were not cordial. Several UDF leaders expressed strong distrust of Dugan and accused him of nominating candidates sympathetic to the BSP. Dugan pledged to support UDF candidates in the second round if his own party's nominees were eliminated. Judging by the pattern of voting in the second round, he kept this promise.

Movement for Rights and Freedoms candidates won 23 seats in the Assembly, to control 5.75% of its votes.

### Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU, official)

Like the UDF, the BANU (official) pledged not to enter into any compromises with the BSP. Its program, endorsing political democratization and a market economy, with particular attention to the ravages visited upon the countryside during the Communist era, was not greatly different from the UDF's. BANU did very little, however, to actually organize a campaign. Its best moment came on the eve of the election in the televised debate of the BSP, UDF, and BANU (official) leaders. Viktor Vulkov was widely regarded to have "won" over his rivals, but this success could not compensate for the party's inertia.

Agrarian (official) candidates won 16 seats in the Assembly, to control 4% of the vote.

### Fatherland Party of Labor

An anti-Turkish party, the Fatherland Party of Labor was also organized to "defend the rights of ethnic Bulgarians" in areas of heavy Turkish concentration. It received little support, managing to win only a single seat in the Grand National Assembly.

### Social Democratic Party (Non-Marxist)

Led by Yanko Yankov, this party stressed its rejection of Marxism and endorsement of a multiparty political system. Yankov made an informal alliance with Akhmed Dugan and was elected in a district with a heavily Turkish population without opposition from Dugan's Party of Rights and Freedoms. The Social Democrats (Non-Marxists) won one seat in the elections (.25% of the Assembly).

The Fatherland - Union Party won two seats, to control .5% of the Assembly.

Two candidates ran, and won, as Independent National Representatives; they will comprise the remaining .5% of the Assembly.

The Bulgarian Association for Free Elections (BAFE): Although not a political party, BAFE must be mentioned as one of the big winners in the elections. BAFE was organized by student federations that had met with the National Republican Institute for International Affairs in March 1989; early in 1990, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs organized seminars for the group. Using Bulgarian and international funds, the nonpartisan voter education group recruited and trained a nationwide network of some 10,000 election observers; provided continuous monitoring of all aspects of campaign and election activities; and organized an election night "quick count" of ten percent of the sections' results. Without the energy and dedication of the BAFE volunteers, the outcome of the elections could have been substantially different.

C. Party Composition of the Grand National Assembly

The Assembly convened on Wednesday, July 11. Under its procedures, agreements must be passed by a two-thirds majority. The elections produced:

<u># of Seats</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>% of Assembly</u>
211	BSP	52.75%
144	UDF	36.00
23	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	5.75
16	Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (official)	4.00
2	Fatherland Union	.50
2	Independent National Representatives	.50
1	Fatherland - Labor Party	.25
<u>1</u>	Social Democratic Party (Non-Marxists)	<u>.25</u>
400		100.00%

#### D. Reactions To and Interpretations Of Election Results

Disappointment with the election results expressed by the political opposition and by many foreign observers was, perhaps, the result of expectations having been set too high. Comparison of developments in Bulgaria with those in Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia was misleading since the forces of reform and political opposition in those countries had significantly more time to gather strength.

Viewed against the backdrop of Bulgaria's modern history, the political opposition scored some remarkable successes. Fifty-three percent of the electorate voted for parties other than the BSP. The opposition demonstrated its dominance in urban areas and among the young; the ruling Socialist Party was forced to incorporate many of the opposition demands in its own program. Several prominent Socialists, including Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov, were defeated in single-member contests.

Both the ruling Socialists and the opposition parties should be commended for avoiding violence in the campaign and elections. Political leaders of all parties frequently stated their desire to avoid what they called "the Romanian variant," referring to the violence that accompanied the change of regime and creation of a new political order in their neighbor to the north. The fact that Bulgaria's democratic, multiparty elections were held in a calm and peaceful atmosphere was in the long run, perhaps, as important as the actual result.

##### The Bulgarian Socialist Party

The Socialists interpreted the results of the election as an endorsement of their party's commitment to democratization and to a gradual transition to a market economy. They also pointed to the mistakes and "extremism" of the UDF that alienated many voters. They naturally rejected the opposition's charges of massive election fraud and manipulation. While admitting that some irregularities had occurred in the campaign and in the election itself, BSP spokesmen described them as minor, due primarily to lack of experience.

Privately, Socialist leaders expressed some surprise that their party did so well. In a meeting with the IFES delegation, BSP deputy chairman Alexander Stresov stated that "We have done enough to deserve to lose," referring to the Communist record through the Zhivkov era. He added that the UDF's practice of creating an "uproar" rather than calmly discussing policy had a very negative impact on the electorate.

BSP president Alexander Lilov told an IFES delegate that the key factor in the elections was the moderation shown by the Socialists and their advocacy of a dialogue with the opposition. It was "the great mistake" of the UDF, he maintained, to have rejected the BSP's invitation to collaborate in the government or to carry on a substantive political dialogue. Despite a number of shortcomings, he added, the roundtable negotiations between the BSP and the opposition had led to real achievements, demonstrating that cooperation was genuinely possible.

Lilov expressed the hope that the BSP's victory would not lead to complacency within the party or slow its pace of internal reform. He mentioned specifically the need to dismantle the party's hierarchical structure to allow for a greater degree of ideological diversity. An extraordinary BSP Congress would be scheduled for this year, probably in December, to codify some of these reforms. Lilov stated that at this congress the party would "cross the Rubicon" in breaking decisively with the spirit of conservatism. He emphasized that while there would be no violent purges, the BSP would implement an aggressive early retirement program for party members who opposed a peaceful transition to becoming a "modern European Socialist party."

Lilov predicted that the UDF would probably not survive much longer, and that its left and right elements would break apart. In his view the Social Democratic Party of Dr. Dertliev and the BANU - Nikola Petkov of Milan Drenchev would probably play an important role in creating a responsible "center" in Bulgarian political life.

With regard to the upcoming Grand National Assembly, Lilov expressed the hope that a strong coalition government could be formed. Otherwise, he maintained, the next two years would represent a period of "lost opportunities" that would cost Bulgaria heavily.

#### Union of Democratic Forces

The initial reaction of the UDF to the election results was disbelief. The coalition had called for its followers to attend a mass victory celebration in Sofia on the night of the Round One elections. As the news of the results began to come in, the victory celebration turned into a large-scale demonstration against the government and the BSP that continued through the following day. On Monday a sizable crowd appeared in the square in front of the National Assembly building in which the Central Electoral Commission was working. Its loud chants of "Fraud" and "New elections" were clearly disconcerting to the Commission (and to many of the IFES representatives who were observing the Commission's work).

When the Assembly guards were ordered to form a line around the building, the situation became quite tense. Eventually, it was calmed by the appearance of UDF leader Zhelju Zhelev, who asked his supporters to move to another area away from the Assembly. Nevertheless, UDF demonstrations charging election fraud continued throughout the week, and a student strike in Sofia University was still in progress when IFES left the country.

In a meeting with IFES on the Tuesday after the Round 2 elections, Zhelju Zhelev insisted that the election results had been falsified. He stated that the section protocols were doctored by State Security before their delivery to the regional commissions. Later in the week, however, after having more time to evaluate the results, he and other UDF spokesmen dropped many of their charges of fraud on election day and focused instead on the pre-election campaign, particularly the "manipulation" of the rural population by local BSP officials.

By the end of the week, it was also becoming apparent that some UDF figures were beginning to place blame on their coalition partners. The UDF should have created a shadow government, some maintained, but was not able to because the various UDF components could not agree on a division of offices. Some UDF leaders focused on the "extreme anti-Communism" of their partners. Others argued that a number of UDF figures were too close to the BSP, even charging that some might be agents of Bulgaria's State Security.

In his final meeting with IFES on June 16, Dr. Zhelev was more philosophical, pointing to what had been achieved by the opposition during the short eight months that it had had to organize. In an opinion that seemed a mirror-image of that expressed by Alexander Lilov, he stated that he did not expect the BSP to remain united, and that its more progressive elements would gravitate to the UDF.

#### Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (official)

When the BANU-Nikola Petkov refused to break with the UDF, the official BANU decided to go it alone, entering a full slate of candidates in the June elections. The result was disastrous. The official BANU did not elect a candidate in the single-mandate districts or even place a candidate in the run-offs. Its eight per cent of the vote in the first round placed it barely ahead of the Party of Rights and Freedoms (representing Bulgaria's Moslems) and gave it only 16 seats in the National Assembly.

Viktor Vulkov was clearly depressed. In his interview with IFES on June 14, he did not attribute his party's poor showing to electoral fraud or a faulty electoral system. His only criticism along these lines was to the effect that most Bulgarian voters were not sufficiently sophisticated to vote a split ticket, supporting an Agrarian in the single-member district along with the proportional list of one of the other parties.

Vulkov's election analysis stressed party self-criticism. BANU activists, he maintained, had become complacent during the years they shared power with the BCP and had forgotten how to run a real campaign. They sat in their offices, he stated, but made little effort to reach the voters. (This observation was later confirmed by members of the U.S. Embassy staff who had been observing the campaign and were struck by the absence of BANU political activity.) The BANU, he added, had accumulated a lot of bureaucratic dead wood and lost touch with its traditional constituency in the countryside, shown by the fact that it received about 60 per cent of its votes in urban areas.

Vulkov added that the BANU would not enter into any agreements with the Socialists and would support UDF candidates in the second electoral round. (This seems to be confirmed by the pattern of voting in Round 2.) He seemed to expect that at some point in the future there would be a unification with the BANU-NP, but that this would have to await a more general political realignment.

In the weeks after the election, the official BANU continued to keep its distance from the Socialists and joined the UDF in calling for the resignation of President Petur Mladenov.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Most people who agree to serve as election observers become aware that they have assumed a very delicate task. Observers are pledged to measure, document, and critique the efforts of the professional and volunteer election officers against an absolute standard of accuracy and impartiality, documenting both systematic and inadvertent violations of laws, regulations, and procedures.

There are a number of areas that require attention and improvement if the voting public is to continue developing and maintaining confidence in the effectiveness and impartiality of the electoral process. These concerns should be addressed by the CEC before the local elections later this year.

- A. An accurate register of voters must be compiled and verified well before the 1990 local elections.

The CEC acted appropriately in abandoning the outdated lists originally posted, then working to correct the problems in subsequent lists reported by voters in the days before the elections. In the end, there were far fewer errors and omissions than many had feared.

However, "final" corrected lists were not posted until the Thursday before Sunday June 10 elections. When voters requested corrections, they were unable to ascertain whether the correction had been made until they actually came to the polling place to vote. Because this problem was largely a product of the extremely compressed schedule for the entire process, it can -- and should -- be corrected in the future.

- B. The CEC should provide for public notification of the content of all electoral laws, regulations implementing those laws, rules for interpreting the laws and regulations, and election-related decisions of the Roundtable, the Grand National Assembly, all election officials, and the courts.

The following example illustrates this need: For Round One voting, registered voters who could not be in their home sections for good cause were issued absentee voting certificates, which could be used at any polling place in the nation. At the time, it was widely understood that no absentee voting would be allowed for Round Two elections.

However, during the morning of Round Two voting, a live broadcast by CEC Vice President Dimitur Popov noted:

If nevertheless, for any reason whatsoever a citizen has been or should be prevented from exercising his right to vote on election day, 17 June, in a given station, the citizen in question is urged to

immediately call on the CEC and to report which constituency, or local polling station is responsible for such an encroachment on his rights.

Some section committees interpreted this announcement as a change in CEC policy, allowing any person with a valid internal passport to vote at any polling place, providing the document proved that the individual had not already voted in Round Two.

Democratic election processes cannot truly exist without two conditions. First, all participants in the process must know and understand the rules. Second, the rules must not be changed without public knowledge and consent. While the intention of the CEC in changing the rule (increased voter participation) was laudable, Popov's announcement led to confusion, decreased voter confidence in the new electoral system, and confrontations in the polling place between voters and electoral officials.

A full set of electoral laws, regulations to implement those laws, rules for interpreting the laws and regulations, and election-related decisions of the Roundtable, the Grand National Assembly, and the courts should be compiled, updated regularly, and made available at no cost to all district and region electoral commissions, political parties, nonpartisan voter information groups, and university libraries.

The CEC should devise one or more brochures on the voting process, the complaints process, the announcement of unofficial and official election results, and other topics on which information is frequently requested. Developing uniform answers to routine questions will free Commission members to address more complex matters.

- C. Systems for monitoring compliance with campaign rules, processing complaints, redressing grievances, remedying campaign violations, enforcing judicial cease and desist orders, assigning civil or criminal penalties, and providing public participation in future election-related decisions are urgently needed.

More effective oversight of campaign activities deserves to be an important part of future election laws and regulations. Among the most frequent and serious types of alleged campaign improprieties that were brought to observers' attention were:

- Threats to voters by employers concerning job status or terminations;
- Prohibited campaign activity during the 48 hours prior to the election;
- Threats of violence to political leaders;

- Destruction of campaign literature, and break-ins at political clubs;
- Interference with political rallies;
- Improper involvement of high-level military officers in political rallies; and
- Unlawful use of sporting events as a forum for political gatherings.

Article 31(2) of the Election Act gives the Central Election Commission the authority to

... deal with any grievances lodged against illegal acts and actions on the part of district election commissions ... [and to] rule on them in three days." Article 32(5) gives the district electoral commission, in turn, authority to " ... deal with any grievances lodged against illegal rulings and actions on the part of the sectional electoral commissions....

Unfortunately, these provisions do not address the alleged improprieties listed above; i.e., problems associated with the actions of those other than the election commissioners themselves. Nor do they provide specific enough methods for dealing with some of the most important complaints and grievances arising during the June elections.

The current law provides only one form of redress for campaign grievances: the complaints are enclosed with the section protocol and transmitted to the regional commission, which refers them to the CEC, which refers them to the Great National Assembly. Currently, no investigatory body has been assigned to explore the complaints. There are no provisions for assigning civil or criminal penalties related to violations of the law.

Evidence was presented to IFES observers that existing standards and procedures for regulating campaign activities and preventing violations were not working effectively. Rules regulating campaign practices, and accompanying monitoring and enforcement procedures, appeared too general to deter violations. The central election commission, overworked in administering other aspects of the electoral system, was not able to take necessary action to investigate and make determinations on complaints alleging illegal campaign practices.

A fair election requires more than an open and effective balloting process. Regulation of pre-election campaign activities to assure an impartial and unencumbered opportunity for all political parties to present their candidates and platforms to the public is an essential element of the electoral system. For this reason, more effective mechanisms and procedures need to be established to

monitor campaign practices and activities, provide for prompt and objective consideration and redress of complaints, and establish an organization authorized to set and enforce penalties for noncompliance and infringements.

**D. Official observer credentials should be provided by the CEC.**

In some polling places, party and nonpartisan election observers and poll-watchers wore buttons or shirts to identify their status. However, they were then open to charges of violating regulations concerning the presence of campaign materials in the polling place.

To remedy this uncertainty, the CEC should consider designing and distributing official election observer credentials, featuring a photograph of the observer and his internal identification number. These uniquely-numbered badges would be distributed by the parties; the parties would maintain a record of assignment of badges. The introduction of official badges would both eliminate campaign clothing or buttons in the polling place, and would facilitate registration and training of official partisan and non-partisan observers.

**E. In order to curtail the exorbitant cost of ballot paper, and the proliferation of political parties, parties should be required to register with the CEC by filing ballot petitions with the signatures and identification numbers of a minimum number of party members.**

Forty parties fielded candidates in at least one district or region in the Round One elections. The descriptions of party ballots were colorful in the extreme: "white, with one blue, one yellow and one blue stripe" (Organization of Cardio-Vascular Diseased People and Socially Vulnerable Citizens); also there were solid orange, blue, green, and red ballots. In Bulgaria, the genesis of the colored ballot representing a political party was voter illiteracy. With a current national literacy rate of over 95%, the tradition of colored ballot seems outmoded and needlessly expensive.

When the Roundtable decided to require that political parties (in addition to section, district, and region electoral commissions) be furnished with ballots, it became apparent that the new electoral system's legislative and administrative requirements would result in printing and distributing 3.5 times the actual number of ballots required for all single mandate and multi-mandate elections. The CEC estimated that for 6.9 million eligible voters, 700 million ballots had to be printed - of which only about 50 million were used at some point during the electoral process.

Another factor in the proliferation of political parties is language in the political Parties Act denying recognition to "organizations and movements ... based on ethnic or religious principles." Such groups were permitted to form separate

political organs for the specific purpose of participating in the election process. This prohibition primarily affected Turkish minorities and "nationalists" supporting the cause of ethnic Bulgarians; both groups formed parties and fielded candidates.

There is growing support for a requirement that parties qualify for ballot access by furnishing to the CEC or the Council of Ministers the signatures and national identification numbers of a minimum number of party members. The party would then be certified by the CEC, which would supply printed ballots. Currently, the candidate must simply file notice of candidacy and provide a list of supporters, with no verification of support.

- F. **The allocation of office space, office supplies and equipment, and other resources to political parties should be more equitable.**

Opposition parties voiced numerous complaints regarding inequalities in the size and location of club offices provided by the government, and the rudimentary nature of their office equipment and supplies in comparison to those available to the BSP.

It was clear that opposition groups were forced to operate at a distinct disadvantage in many jurisdictions. By and large, opposition party offices were far smaller and less well equipped than BSP facilities. While as a practical matter it may be difficult to eliminate all pre-existing inequities, additional efforts are needed to help equalize access to suitable office locations and space, and to promote a fairer distribution of equipment and supplies.

- G. **Policies that disenfranchise large numbers of ethnic Turks forced into exile in 1989 should be eliminated as inconsistent with an open and democratic election system. Election officials in ethnic Turkish areas should apply voting standards that do not restrict access to the polls.**

A special set of issues and problems surrounds the voting status and treatment of Bulgarians of Turkish heritage and Pomaks, particularly the approximately 300,000 who left the country in the summer of 1989 to escape Zhivkov's repressive policies. Under an agreement reached by the Roundtable, the estimated 175,000 Bulgarian Turks still in residence in other countries were permitted to vote in Round One elections on an absentee basis at Bulgarian embassies by presenting their external passports. They voted for candidates of seven single-member constituencies; their party-ticket votes were added to those of seven multi-member regions. Those returning to Bulgaria could also vote upon presentation of their internal passport or certification of their application for updated internal passports.

The problem this creates is that many of those forced to leave in 1989 were not given external passports by the Zhivkov government, and were stripped of their

Bulgarian citizenship (and therefore the right to use the internal passport) if they stayed abroad. And, only those citizens who had returned to Bulgaria less than two months before the elections, or had left more than five years previously were allowed to vote. It was clear that this rule had been devised to exclude the large numbers who had left in the summer of 1989 and returned immediately following the March 1990 policy changes.

Concerns were voiced about effects of the 1984 law requiring ethnic Turks to adopt Bulgarian names, and the March 1990 decision to allow re-adoption of the Turkish name. There was a tremendous potential for name changes to produce difficulty and confusion in voting registers, and create conflicts with passport document information. Fortunately, this potentiality was largely, but not completely, averted.

IFES observers witnessed many apparent attempts to prevent ethnic Turks from voting. For example, in Blenica three families of ethnics Turks who had just returned to Bulgaria from exile in June 1990 were denied the vote despite having a stamped external passport that met the standards set by the CEC. There was a general concern that incidents in which citizens with Turkish surnames were disenfranchised indicated a predisposition on the part of some section commissions to improperly exclude or discourage ethnic Turks from participating in the elections. While it appeared that incidents reported by Bulgarian Turks were appropriately resolved according to election rules once complaints were raised, the favorable resolution may have resulted solely from the presence of poll-watchers from the Party for Rights and Freedoms.

- H. It is essential that identical election commodities be used in every polling place, to avert charges of fraud or vote-tampering.

There were charges of envelopes that were transparent enough to see through, although use of such envelopes was not witnessed by IFES observers. Apparently this was true in a few places where the local authorities used envelopes from previous elections.

- I. Instructions on the official protocol sheets must use clear, unambiguous language to guide electoral commissions in determining accurate electoral results.

On the protocol, commissions are given the following formula:

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1. Total Number of Voters on the Common and Additional Lists \_\_\_\_\_
2. Number of Registered Candidates \_\_\_\_\_
3. Number of the Electors Who Voted (to be determined on the basis of the number of envelopes in the ballot box) \_\_\_\_\_
4. Number of Invalid Ballots and Empty Envelopes \_\_\_\_\_
5. Number of Votes Cast for Each Candidate:  
(a) for candidate \_\_\_\_\_  
(b) for candidate \_\_\_\_\_  
(etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: Item 5 indicates only the valid ballots cast for each candidate. Invalid ballots and empty envelopes are not included.

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The difficulty in reconciling the number of electors who voted with the number of envelopes containing ballots and with the actual number of ballots lies in the fact that if the elector put only one ballot in the envelope, the vote was still valid but the number of votes and the number of envelopes could not be balanced. In close elections where a few votes decided whether a candidate had reached the 50% mark and won, or had fallen short and would face a runoff election, this distinction was crucial. This problem could be mostly resolved by adding to the protocol information on the number of voters checked off the register as having voted, such as:

6. Number of Names Checked as Having Voted: \_\_\_\_\_

When the ramifications of the ambiguity became clear, the CEC decided to re-calculate only the very close results. Because the lack of time had become

such a crucial factor, in cases where there was no doubt about a majority, no changes were made to the numbers on the protocols. When the race was very close, if the number of votes to constitute a majority had been calculated incorrectly, a correction was made. The correction affected decisions on whether or not to conduct run-off (Round Two) elections in three districts.

In other words, the total number of invalid votes then became the difference between the number of voters and the number of valid votes cast for candidates. Although no change was made to the number of votes actually cast for any party or candidate, allegations that the CEC was changing the numbers on the protocols spread rapidly, and definitely had a detrimental impact on public perception of the validity and honesty of the electoral process.

**J. More than one week is needed between the Round One and Round Two Elections. The CEC should also consider allowing the announcement of "unofficial" results.**

By far the factor that caused the majority of election-related difficulties can be attributed to the insufficient time given to the CEC to carry out its mandate. From the outset of the process in March, too little time was available for the Commission to organize and carry out this first multi-party election in 57 years. It is a tribute to the commitment of the all-party CEC that it met every day from the day its members were appointed, through Round One election day on June 10, then around the clock through the June 14 announcement of official returns.

Unaware that the accurate calculation of official results may take up to three weeks, even in countries with a long history democratic elections, the CEC predicted that it would complete Round One tabulations and announce the results by the day following the elections. This proved to be impossible, leading to accusations of irregularities and fraud, resulting in large public demonstrations, as well as strident (and mostly unfounded) criticism of the competence of the CEC. Given the complexity of the voting system and the fact that Bulgarian voters in 59 countries cast absentee ballots on election day (rather than in advance, as in Canada and the United States), the CEC's ability to announce official results in four days was extremely impressive.

The CEC provided too little time between the Round One and Round Two elections. Many of the 81 Round Two candidates were not officially notified of the need for the June 17 runoff election until June 14, giving parties and candidates involved in Round Two had only a few days to prepare. Especially in light of the mechanics of facilitating Round One absentee voting -- striking the names of absentee voters from registers of their temporary Round One locations, and moving them back to their permanent home sections for Round 2 voting -- the task was overwhelming, leading to Popov's confusing election-day announcement. It would be desirable that the Round Two runoff elections be held no earlier than two weeks following Round One.

The media and the parties should be encouraged to announce the unofficial results on polling night or the day after. In order to facilitate this, they should be given copies of, or have access to, all the protocols from the section commissions. This would tend to satisfy the initial demand of the population for immediate election results and provide additional time for the CEC to review and issue the official results.

## VII. EPILOGUE

On July 6, 1990 President Petur Mladenov resigned from office after admitting the authenticity of a December videotape in which he said " ... let the tanks come." Mladenov, an architect of the coup that unseated Todor Zhivkov in November, tendered his resignation with the statement, "I do not want to become the cause for an escalation of tensions in the country."

Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov (BSP) resigned his post on July 28, saying of the leadership stalemate, "There are only two realistic variants -- a coalition government or a cabinet comprising personalities who can rely on parliamentary consensus." Despite three weeks and six attempts to select a president, none of the three candidates -- Chavdar Kyuranov of the BSP, Petur Dertliev of the UDF, and Viktor Vulkov of BANU/official -- had won the 271 votes necessary for a two-thirds majority.

On August 1, the Assembly elected UDF leader Zheliu Zhelev president, after the UDF threatened a permanent walkout, which would have necessitated new Assembly elections. Zhelev's nominee for vice president, Atanas Semerdjiev, was approved by acclamation.

The Assembly had set August 10 as the deadline for reaching agreement on a President. Rumors circulated that 12 to 14 BSP delegates would join the non-aligned Movement for Rights and Freedoms coalition, and that the Agrarians seemed closer to parliamentary consolidation. The Assembly on July 18 had elected three deputy chairmen: Nikodim Popov of the BANU - "Nikola Petkov"; Ivan Gushkov of the BANU (official); and Ginyo Ganev, chairman of the Fatherland Union.

Until bipartisan support for Zhelev broke the stalemate, the UDF coalition had refused to participate in any government which remained under the control of a BSP parliamentary majority, declaring, "Such participation is doomed in advance to failure, given that the Communist apparatus has not been dismantled at the local levels, in the courts, in the prosecutors' service, in the economic administration, in the Army, or in the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

Meanwhile, hundreds of students, teachers, and artists established a tent "City of Truth" outside the BSP headquarters where their demands for new parliamentary elections could not be ignored. They demanded the resignation of Mladenov. They demanded the removal of Georgi Dimitrov's body from its tomb and that adulation of the father of Bulgarian Communism be halted. On July 16 the body was removed, cremated, and the ashes buried.

Under Zhelev, the Assembly faces a \$10.6 billion foreign debt (with a hard currency reserve of under \$600 million) and heightened consumer unrest. The price of gasoline has doubled, lines outside the shops are lengthening, and some rationing has begun. Although many believe Zhelev's nomination marks the beginning of the end of the BSP, it also marks the beginning of a greater challenge: governing during an economic crisis.

**APPENDIX ONE**  
**MEDIA REPORT**

## MEDIA REPORT: LIST OF BULGARIAN PUBLICATIONS MONITORED BY THE IFES OBSERVER TEAM

*Duma* (formerly *Rabotnichesko Delo*), organ of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (formerly Bulgarian Communist Party). Appears daily in an eight-page format. Printed on good quality paper and with attractive graphic design. Has an estimated circulation of 900,000.

*Demokratsia*, organ of the Union of Democratic Forces (an alignment of sixteen opposition political parties and movements). Appears daily in a four-page format. Printed, in obviously inadequate facilities, on paper of inferior quality. Is anything but sleek (as *Duma* is, by Bulgarian standards) in terms of graphic design. Differing estimates place its circulation at 300,000.

*Svoboden Narod*, organ of the Social Democratic Party which is affiliated with the Union of Democratic Forces. Appears daily in a four-page format similar to that of *Demokratsia* and sharing with it the same problems with regard to newsprint, printing facilities and graphic design. Even the most generous estimates do not claim a circulation in excess of 100,000 copies.

*Zmedelsko Zname*, currently independent organ, formerly allied with the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union - official. Appears daily in a four-page format. Although printed with the help of better equipment and on better quality paper, its graphic attractiveness is somewhere between that of *Duma* and *Demokratsia*. Has an estimated circulation of 150,000.

*Otechestven Vestnik*, organ of the purportedly non-political Fatherland Union (formerly known as the Father Front, a Communist front organization active among non-Party members). Appears daily in a four-page format that has all the technical advantages of its sister publication, *Duma*. Its editors claim a circulation of 200,000.

*Sofia News*, described by its publisher, the Sofia Press Agency, as "an independent weekly publication in English, German, French, Spanish, Russian and Bulgarian." Appears in a sixteen-page tabloid format. Technically, it is almost on a par with the *New York Daily News*. Aimed primarily at foreign visitors, *Sofia News* is available free of charge at all tourist hotels. No circulation estimates are available, but it would not be an exaggeration to place the weekly's total circulation (in all its language editions) at 250,000.

*Reporter 7*, an independent, privately owned weekly on domestic political affairs with an undisguised anti-Communist slant. Appears in an eight-page fairly decent format which indicates that the publishers have both the energy and connections to ensure a better technical quality for their publication. No circulation data available.

*Pogled*, organ of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists. Appears weekly in an attractive, two-color sixteen-page format. During the election campaign, it carried full-

### ВЛИЯНИЕТО НА ГЛАСНОСТТА И ПЕРЕСТРОЙКАТА

Тъкато Живков често говореше за верността на България към Съветския съюз, заявявайки, че двете страни имат "обща кръвоносна система", неизбежно бе той да приеме собствен вариант на "новото направление" на Горбачов, макар че нямаше особен ажуз към него. През 1987 г. той става основоположник на "доиската концепция", която даваше вид, че прегръща идеята за реформа, сякаш сярце. Приоритетна от административни икономически реорганизации, доиската концепция призоваваше към политическа демократизация, включително разширяване на свободата на пресата и експериментирание с избор на един от множието кандидати. Последните две се оказваха твърде краткотрайни.

След обявяването на няколко случая на официална корупция пресата отново бе подложена на строг контрол, а дисидентски настроения редактори и репортери бяха уводнени. По време на изборите за местове, окръжни и областни съвети (проведени на 28 февруари 1988 г.) местните избирателни комисионни дисквалифицираха всички с изключение на официално одобрените кандидати в 80 процента от избирателните райони. Според информацията, предадена на делегацията по време на нейното посещение, в онези райони, където "неблагоприятни" кандидати успели да се вметнат в списъците, властите обезпечили поражението им, като върнали голям брой мъртви души от райони, където не съществували проблеми по отношение на официалния списък, или като променили резултатите върху притоците, предавани от избирателните райони. Сегашната опозиция доста научи оттогава масам и настояваше в Избирателния закон да се осигурят гаранции срещу подобни нарушения.

Въпреки преследването от страна на властите дисидентството в България продължи да се развива по няколко линии. От една страна, много представители на интелегенцията, особено в София, се включиха в Клуба за подкрепа на гласността и преустройството, който се превърна в независима от правителството организация и поддържаше жива дума на критиката. "Подзепа", независимият профсъюз, беше създаден през февруари 1989 г. и бързо започна да привлича хиляди членове.

В град Русе, който бе подложен на бавно отравяне с емисионен избор от румънския комсомолец от другата страна на Дунава, беше създадено организирано екологическо движение, което открито се противопостави на безразличното, демонстрирано от страна на управляващите по отношение на замърсяването на околната среда в България. Много участници в тези движения отказваха да приемат гръб под властта и все повече предизвикваха режими на Живков.

През 1984 г. управляващите подложиха турско мюсюлманство в страната на насилствено българизиране. Етническите турци бяха преследвани за това, че използват турски език и бяха принудени да приемат български имена. В началото на 1989 г. изрешата съпротива на турците срещу тези мерки доведе до сблъсквания с властите. През лятото, когато турско правителство отвори границите на страната за бежанците от България, над 300 000 етнически турци избягаха или бяха изгонени от страната, нещо, което привлече международното внимание върху нарушаването на човешките права в България.

Международната изолация на България, влошаващото се икономическо положение и постоянните грешки и аргантно поведение от страна на самия Живков накараха неговите колеги да организират вътрешнопартийен преврат. На 10 ноември 1989 г. неговата оставка бе набързо оповестена за смаяната страна.

### ПЪРВИТЕ СТЪПКИ НА НОВИЯ РЕЖИМ

Известията за доброволната оставка на Живков продължи само няколко дена. Бързият лидер скоро бе подложен на "остри атаки" за

персонална корупция и установяване на авторитарен (дори "тоталитарен") режим. Неговите роднини и най-близки поддръжници бяха набързо изгонени от заеманите от тях постове в партията и държавата.

Новото партийно ръководство, оглавено от Петър Младенов, дългогодишен министър на външните работи и ключова фигура в преврата срещу Живков, се ангажира в подпомагане на процеса на плурализъм в страната и зачитане на закона. По тази причина бе преустановено преследването на етническите турци и бе отправена покана към малцинските страни да се завърнат; на опозиционните групирания бе позволено да се регистрират като юридически лица; обещания бяха направени, че ще се самимирира вътрешната роля на Държавна сигурност, политическа полиция, която държеше в стража по-голямата част от населението. Партията последва примера на колежките си от Източна Европа, като премагна член I от Конституцията, който гарантираше ръководната роля на БКП в българското общество.

На извънреден конгрес, проведен в края на февруари, партията извърши редица структурни и персонални промени и направи първите крачки към отделинето на партията от властта. Петър Младенов си подаде оставка от ръководството на партията, но остана държавен глава. Анарей Луканов, най-компетентната фигура в партията по общо мнение, стана министър-председател. Александър Лилков бе избран начело на преустройения Висш партийен съвет на БКП.

Макар и немного популярен в страната, Лилков е известен като културен и интелегентен човек и се позова със славата на репресиран от Живков през 1963 г. Оттогава масам той е ръководил Института за социални теории, който има славата на дисидентска крепост. Като символ на намерението му да се раздели с миналото, новото ръководство се отказа от думата "комунистически" и преименува БКП в Българския социалистически партия.

Според някои партийни членове реформите, приети на извънредния конгрес, не стигат достатъчно далеч, което доведе до редица разцепления. Появи се Алтернативна социалистическа партия, която се отцепи от партията. В самата партия беше създадена фракция "Път към Европа", която цели бърза демократизация и политика на помиряване със Запада. Появи се и консервативна опозиция в отговор на премахването на името "комунистически".

В допълнение към промените, които станала в самата партия след 10 ноември, редица приближени на партията организации също преустановиха своето съществуване. Централният съвет на Профсъюзите се обяви за независим от партията и избра ново ръководство. Някои профсъюзи изпуснаха организацията, като в същото време възрадиха профсъюзите, особено независимата "Подзепа", привличаха хиляди нови членове. Демитроуският комунистически младежки съюз, или комсомолецът, се раздели в началото на годината. Той бе заменен от нова организация, която обявя себе си за независима от партията и от редица конкурентни младежки организации, някои от които свързани с политическата опозиция. Маршевият Земедели-

ски съюз изгони старото си ръководство, малкума управлението на страната и се обяви за опозиционна партия.

Става ясно, че редица партийни организации по месторобота са били разпуснати или изгубили предишната си власт. (Н. Б. Някои членове на опозицията заявяваха, че редица партийни организации, по-специално в армията, не са били разпуснати, а също са приемали и недемократично. Това заявление не успява да проверим и потвърдим.) Докато комунистическата партия се разграбваше от наследството на мюсюлманите, се политизира опозиционни групи. Дисидентските клубове се трансформираха в политически партии, подобно на еволюиращото движение, което се преименува в "Екогласност". Появяваха се все нови и нови партии и движения, твърдящи, че броят им е 50, но в края на 1989 г. най-важните от тях създадоха коалиция. Съюз на демократичните сили, който трябваше да се противопостави на комунистите.

СДС бързо показа, че е способен да съвлада масови митинги в столицата, а лидерите му получиха славата на комунистите да започнат дискусии около кръглата маса, където се обсъждаше бъдещето на страната. Кръглата маса, която се превърна в заместител на парламента, прие споразумения за правата на опозицията, уточни времето за провеждането на свободни избори и предяви всичко новия закон за изборите.

### БЪЛГАРСКАТА ИСТОРИЯ И ИЗБИРАТЕЛНИЯТ ЗАКОН

Известен брой традиционни български елементи бяха включени в споразумението за изборите. Първият се отнася до изборите на Велико Народно събрание, а не обикновено, което да подготви нова конституция. Според старата Търновска конституция Велико Народно събрание се различава от обикновеното по това, че е два пъти по-голямо и притежава властта да създаде или промени Конституцията. СДС започна своята кампания в дена, в който се честваха Търновската конституция с голям митинг в самото Търново. Там съюзът открито обявя, че се бори подобно на българските просветители от XIX век да създаде "втора Търновска конституция", която да възстанови свободите, замалчени в първата.

Вторият традиционен елемент се отнася до решението аския политическа сила да има свой собствен цвят и да се гласува с разноцветни бюлетени. Първоначалната причина за тази система вече не съществува — България има един от най-високите проценти на грамотност в света, — но е нещо като връзка с времето преди комунизма.

Можем да посочим възстановяването на много от политическите партии в България отпреди войната, като демократите, радикалдемократите, социалдемократите и Земеделияния съюз. Макар че повечето от тях са обединени в СДС, те доказват съществуването на традиционни обрострация, които са се запазили през 45-те години на комунистическо управление.

Превод: ЕЛЗА СТАНЧЕВА



Карикатурата пречетаване от "Имаже"

40

page political advertisements of all contending parties, including the monarchists. Covers mainly domestic, but also some international, issues. In spite of being by definition a trade publication, it carried very little material related to the journalistic profession during the period June 3 - 22, 1990. No circulation data available.

*Prodkrepa*, weekly magazine published by the Confederation of Labor, an affiliate of the Union of Democratic Forces. Appears in an attractive, two-color, twelve-page format. Parallels *Demokratsia* both in content and circulation.

(The same issue of Duma features in the center of page two the following brief report from its Varna correspondent Nikolai Zhelev)

#### FOREIGN GUESTS VOICE SATISFACTION

Foreign guests visiting Varna for the elections are satisfied. Professor Richard Smolka of Washington, D.C. and Mr. Norbert Yasharoff of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems shared with us [the following observation]: "We are equally satisfied with the cooperative attitude of the Central Electoral Commission and with what we are seeing today."

Duma (Word), Organ of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, June 18, 1990

(Front-page article by Lyubomir Malinov)

#### THE "BLACK BAGS" WERE PUT TO GOOD USE

The "black bags" with special zippers, which were imported from abroad for the purpose of transmitting election documents, were used as intended not only during the first round of elections, but also yesterday.

Placed in these bags, the election protocols were transported from the regional electoral commissions to the Central Electoral Commission.

The "black bags" were not used to transmit protocols prepared by the section [precinct-level] electoral commissions to the regional electoral commissions, because the number of section commissions -- over 12,000 -- exceeded by far the quantity of available bags.

Notwithstanding that, any possibility of election fraud was averted by the fact that section electoral commissions were issuing on the spot, for the benefit of the political forces and the general public, extracts of their protocols.

During the first round of elections, the entire capital city of Sofia represented one multi-mandate region under the proportional system (the 21st). Protocols of election results under this system were not transmitted in "black bags" from the more than 1,600 polling stations to the offices of the regional electoral commission in the Capital People's Council [Sofia City Hall] -- as was the case with the transfer of protocols from other polling stations to other regional commissions.

Under the majority system, the offices of the regional electoral commissions in Sofia were located in [the buildings] of the municipal people's councils [municipal town halls]. From these councils election protocols were transmitted to the Central Electoral Commission in "black bags" -- a procedure followed throughout the country.

Yesterday, all regional electoral commissions, whose task was to preside over the second round of voting under the majority system, received one "black bag" each in order to submit their protocols in sealed packaging to the Central Electoral Commission.

JUNE 18, 1990

## „Черните чантички“ бяха използвани

Внесените от чужбина „черни чантички“ със специални за копчалки за пренасяне на изборните документи бяха използвани по предназначение както на първия тур на изборите, така и вчера.

В тях всички изборни протоколи изминаха пътя си от районните изборителни комиссии до Централната изборителна комиссия.

Протоколите на секционните изборителни комиссии не са получавани в районите чрез „черни чантички“, тъй като броят на секционните комиссии — над 12 000, многократно е надвишавал броя на чантичките.

При това обаче всяка възможност за фалшификация е изключена, защото още на място секционните изборителни комиссии изготвят извлечения за политическите сили и гражданите.

При първия тур на изборите

един — 21-и многомандатен район по пропорционалната система. Изборните протоколи по тази система бяха пренасяни от над 1600-те изборителни секции до районната изборителна комиссия в Столичния народен съвет без употреба на „черни чантички“ също така, както и от другите изборителни секции до другите районни комиссии.

По мажоритарната система районните изборителни комиссии в София се намираха в общинските народни съвети — оттам до Централната изборителна комиссия чантичките са използвани, както в цялата страна.

Вчера всички районни изборителни комиссии, които отново провеждаха избори по мажоритарната система, получиха по една „черна чантичка“, за да доставят протоколите в пломбирана опаковка в Централната изборителна комиссия.

ЛЮБОМИР МАЛИНОВ

Svoboden narod, 29 June 1990.

"Prof. John Bell on the Choice between the Devil You Know and the Devil You Don't"

The American political analyst John D. Bell was in Bulgaria as an official observer of the elections. He is a professor of history at the University of Maryland and president of the Bulgarian Studies Association. His contribution to the study of Bulgarian history is the books *Peasants in Power* (analyzing the views of Stamboliski and the BANC), *History of the BCP* (an analysis of the Communist regime to 1987, and a series of scientific articles and publications.

- Prof. Bell, would you tell us something about the work and purpose of your association?

- The Bulgarian Studies Association of the USA and Canada, of which I am president, is an academic organization that brings together scholars with an interest in Bulgaria. We organize seminars and symposia, disseminate information for our specialists, publish a newsletter with useful facts about events in Bulgaria, and prepare congresses. We will soon hold the Fifth Congress of Bulgarian Studies. In October we will hold a seminar on the them of Bulgaria in the 1980s. We have about 250 members.

- Where does your personal interest in Bulgaria come from?

- It developed almost accidentally. I was originally a major in Russian language and literature. Our universities require students in this field to know additional Slavic languages. At my university, Yale in the USA, Professor Charles Moser was giving a course in Bulgarian which I took. Later I decided to turn to history, and my knowledge of the language edged me toward Bulgarian history. I had the idea of making a comparison between Populism in Bulgaria and Russia, which led me to begin the study of the Agrarian movement of Stamboliski.

- As a historian and specialist on Bulgaria, what new have you learned about Bulgarians from these elections?

- The result of the elections came as a surprise to me. I had assumed that when people had the opportunity to vote for or against Communism they would automatically vote against. I don't believe in the innate conservatism of the Bulgarian soul. Perhaps the explanation must be sought elsewhere - in unchanged national psychology, particularly among the rural population. The Bulgarian (as well as other Balkan peoples) have learned from experience that change is usually change for the worse. We have a saying that may be valid for Bulgarian thinking: "The devil that you know is better than the devil that you don't."

- In my conversation with Prof. Marin Pundeff of the University of California, I asked him as an historian if he

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regarded history as an exact science, particularly in view of the way it has been reshaped in only the last few decades.

- History is a science, but science is not always exact or precise. Science is a way of studying events. One can practice science as an historian, just as one can be a charlatan as a physicist. Science is a method, not a set of results.

- You have deeply studied the history of the Communist Party. What were your thoughts as you were writing your book and what basic sources did you use for it?

- My intention was to focus on the mechanisms of power used by a ruling Communist Party. I was most interested in the period immediately after the Second World War when the political opposition was eliminated, and when the disease in Bulgarian political life began. Of more recent developments, I was interested in developments beginning in the 1960s, in what a chapter of the book called "The Era of Zhivkov." My sources for the book included the works of Bulgarian emigree historians and the Reportage from Far Away of Georgi Markov as a direct source on the situation in Bulgaria. These were sources that historians in Bulgaria could not use.

- As someone who knows well the past, you should be good at predictions. What is your prognosis for the future of Bulgaria?

- I often say that for us historians it is easier to predict the past than the future. . . . I think that the best course for Bulgaria would be to develop its relationships with the West in partnership with the other East European countries. Bulgaria by itself will not be a focus of Western interest. I am afraid that if the process of democratization is delayed or long drawn out, it will separate Bulgaria from the other East European countries moving more rapidly toward western style democracy. I think it was perhaps a mistake that Bulgaria began with parliamentary elections. It would have been better to have begun with local elections to change the situation in the countryside.

- What question do your students most often ask about Bulgaria?

- Where is Bulgaria? That is a joke. . . . Actually there is a good deal of interest in the present situation. They have trouble understanding why the process of breaking with the past has been slower than in other countries. We are witnessing now an "intellectual emigration" from the East which has a tragic dimension. It can only be halted by creating more attractive conditions for work for the intelligentsia in its own country.

- But still the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe is increasing its influence. It is playing a genuine role as the leader of the nation toward freedom and democracy. . . .

- Intellectual freedom, that is "glasnost," has been the main achievement of your intelligentsia in recent years. The best hope for the future lies in this "brain trust," the national intelligentsia, which is the primary source of ideas and progress in society. If it drains away slowly to the West, it would be a genuine disaster for Bulgaria.

We present the chapter "The Historical Context" by Prof. John Bell, taken from the report of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems located in Washington - The 1990 Bulgarian Elections: a Pre-election Technical Assessment.

There follows a translation of pages 6-12 of the IFES pre-election report.

# ПОЗНАТИЯ И НЕПОЗНАТИЯ ДЯВОЛ

Американският политолог Джон Д. Бел беше в България като официален наблюдател на изборите. Той е професор по история и президент на асоциацията за български изследвания в Мерилендския университет. Неговият принос към изследването на българската история са книгите „Селяните на власт“ (анализираше изгледите на Стаболийски в БЗНС), „История на БКП“ (анализ на комунистическия режим до 1987 година), както и редица научни статии и публикации.

— Проф. Бел, бихте ли представили кратко съдържание и същността на вашата асоциация.

— Асоциацията на българистите от САЩ и Канада, на която съм президент, е научна организация, обединяваща хора, които имат интерес към България. Организиране семинари, симпозиуми, разпространяване информация за нашите селства, издване списание с интересни факти за събития в българистите, подготовка конгреси. Скоро предстои Петият конгрес на американските българисти. През октомври ще направим един семинар по проблемите на България през осемдесетте години. Общо наброяване около 250 души в асоциацията.

— А какви са трите ваши главни интереса към България?

— Това стана почти случайно. Отначало в университета изучавах руска филология и литература. Системата в нашите университети е не само да знаете един език, но и да си запознаете с културата на сродните народи — в случая останалите славянски страни. В моя университет — Пейбъкс в САЩ, проф. Чарлз Моуър даваше курс по български език, който завърших. Почти случайно да стана историк и със знанието ми езика си насочих към българската история. Хванах си с идеята да направя сравнение между народничеството в България и Русия, като започнах да изследвам земеделското движение на Стаболийски.

— Като историк и познавач на България какво ново научихте за българите след тези избори?

— За мнe резултатите от изборите са изненада. Мислех, че когато една държава има възможност да гласува за или против комунизма, те не бива да подвоюват да го отредат. Аз не правя във вътрешния конкретен българската думя. Може би обяснението трябва да се търси другаде — в неопределената народна асимилация, особено на хората в селата. България (и в други народи на Балканите) е славянски да българина промяната есласивно като отнаме към по-лошото. Ние имаме една поговорка, която е изключително важна за нас: „Дяволът на българина: „Дяволът, който възмъжава, е по-добър от дявола, който не възмъжава!“

— В нов разговор с проф. Мария Пудилова от Калифорнийския университет го вием да каже историк даден счита, че историкът може да си върне точно определена наука, след като само през няколко десетилетия се налага нейното професионално и преподаване.

— Историкът е наука, но науката минава и трима и шестима. Науката е начинът на изследване на събитията. Можем да си учим като историци, така както може да си шаратанни като физика. Науката е, че научаваме, а не резултатите.

— Все забавяне със съвременната история на комунистическата партия. Какво си мислите, доколко елиментите наглата и слава основно изводи направихте в нея?

— Идеята ми беше да покажа механизмите на властта при една уриващата комунистическа партия. Най-интересният период за мен беше времето веднага след Втората световна война, когато властта е била описана и унивожена, когато започна началото на бостта в българския политически живот. От по-новата история не занимавахме времето на 60-те години на власт и озаглавявах главата от книгата — „Ерата на Живков“. За нея използвах непосредствените си разговори с български историци енаграти, „Зачащите револуция“ на Георги Марков като прик източник за ситуациата в България. Това била източници, межвоимно за възбаване от историците в България.

— Като добре познавач на новото историците бихте бисало да си и добри прогнози. Каква е вашата прогноза за бъдещето у нас?

— Често казвам, че за историците е по-лесно да предсказват миналото, отколкото бъдещето... Мисля, че най-добрият път за България е да развие отношенията си на партньорство със Запада и Европа и САЩ. Дори не сама, а в кооперация с останалите източноевропейски страни. Отделно взета, България не представлява особен фокус за интереса на Запада. Струва ми се, че пропелсът на демократизацията ще продължи много дълго, което ме отдалечава България от останалите източни страни, приближавайки се бързо до западните демокрации. Мисля, че е грешка, че България започва с парламентарни избори. Трябвало да се започне с местни, което може да промени ситуацията в селата, а оттам и цялата характеристика на бъдещето на страната ва.

— Какво най-често ви мисли вашите студенти за България?

— „Къде е България?“... Това на мига. Възможност те много си интересуват от сегашната ситуация, макар че не могат добре да разберат защо процесът на осемдесетилетия от миналото толкова се бави в България за разлика от другите страни. Сега още свидетели и на „мълчалива емиграция“ от Италия, което е трагично. Тя може да се си, тамо със създаване на условия за труд на интелектуалците и за възможна излаза в собствените страни.

— България това днес интелектуалците на Италия Европа е в поледи. Ти обаче в истинската си сила на водач на нацията към свобода и демокрация...

— Интелектуалната свобода, това, което наричаме „гласност“, си вредя всичко завоюване на вашата интелектуалци през последните няколко години. Най-голямата вредна за бъдещето е в съществуването на тази „мълчалива кула“, която е националната интелектуалност; това е най-големият извор на наци и корупцията за обществото. И ако тя „изтече“ бавно на Запад, това калята ще е възможна катастрофа.



Предлагаме ви главата „Историческият контекст“ от ПРОФ. ДЖОН БЕЛ, включена в доклада на Международната фондация за съвременни системи със седалище Вашингтон — „Българските избори през 1990 година: предизборна техника наладжост“.

всеплан политическите партии, извързва даи възможна автономичност или някъс или всички запала. При все това страната успява да създаде и сила, която се осъществява на демократично. Демократическата и Радикалдемократическата партия получиха поддрешката на интелектуалците и професионалните класи, които като цяло бивах верни на Конституцията. Социалдемократическата партия (или широките социалисти) препоръчаваша постепенни реформи и демократичен контекст и се възбави за поддрешката на държавните чиновници в част от работническата класа.

Но най-мече, след като била създадена в края на XIX век, България сиет земеделски народен съюз (БЗНС) се превърна в партия на широката демокрация в България, неслейки да направи възможността, което се състояло от селани, оловоирени участници в политически живот на страната. След Първата световна война аграрното правителство ръководено от Александър Стамболийски, си поставяше за цел да върне конституционното управление в страната и да увеличи омерза държавни фондове, които трябвало да поемат икономическите и образователните ниво на селачеството. Обкураването на малочислената българска мисел договор от страна на Стаболийски обаче отчуждало мажоритаристите и крайните националистически елементи в през 1923 г. неговото правителство било брутално отстранено. Стаболийски в новото министерство била убита.

всеплан съюз, който организирал Ополитичен бива мачел с Никола Петков, частта ила била вътрешна борба с комунистите и търсене на помощ от Запад. В изборите за Велико Народно събрание, което трябва да напие новата конституция и която започнала действително на 27 октомври 1946 г., Ополитичният бива спечелил почти една трета от гласовете, при това в условията на брутална кампания на запала. Безразличното на Запада към България дава възможност на комунистите свободно да се проявят. Петков бива обвинен в престъпство, арестуван и ослепен на смърт, а Ополитичният бива преминал в изгнание. Екзекутираното на Петков чрез обесване отбелязвало края на демократичната спортивна грещу комунизма.

## ЕРАТА НА КОМУНИЗМА

До края на 1947 г. Българската комунистическа партия (БКП) изцяло контролирала институциите на властта и ги използвала, за да върне и последните останали от либерализма. Политическият партия бива разпусната с изключение на маршевите Земеделски съюз, който БКП вярно оставя, като „малка братя“ на БКП в връщаната. Новопретата Конституция изцяло коопира стабилната конституция от 1936 г. Съюзът бива край на частната интелектуална, работническата бива вързана в водичина на държавна проф-

# ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЯТ КОНТЕКСТ

Често се твърди, че България няма особен опит в областта на демокрацията. И вистината през по-голямата част от периода след 1878 г., когато страната е осъбодена от 5-вековно отоманско управление, тя е била управлявана от диктатури от монархически (военен или комунистически характер, които са отблъзнали демократическите институции като „дариетична“ или „буржоазна“). И въпреки това борбата на демократите е сила от централните и често повторни си теми в съвременната българска история. Демократическите стойности са били основен мотив в действията на много български политически, а също така културни, на които българите са дали повече, дори в сравнение с изгнаниците, които са представлявали на чужбина.

През XIX век Българи, особено тавила, получават образоваността си в Запада и Европа, се стремели да възродят националното чувство на свой народ, като издигнали запала за независима, конституционна и демократична държава. Учредителното народно събрание, което се състояло във Велико Търново през 1879 г. и извъзбавило българския модел, преследвало демократична конституция, която била една от най-напредничавите за времето в Европа и възможна еднокласна парламентаризъм, който на университетна база измислял изключително насилие, ограничени монархии и народен кръг от гражданския права.

Опитът да се превърнат земеделята конституция на българския воеща обаче сривнала много често. В България нямало силна средна класа, а високото ниво на грамотност и политическо съзнание сред населението често водило до неговото маневриране от безкласни политическии вожди. Монарсите, които били внесени от Германия, търпели малко симпатизирали на демократичните ценности и се стремели да пресъздават абсолютна, в която бива възбавена. Те разчитали на армията и поддрешката националистически електората.

През 1931 г. Народният бивс, коопирана на Демократическата и Радикалдемократическата партия и Земеделския съюз, преодели малочислената, управлявана от страна на правителството върху изборите, и отбавили реалната победа. Резултатите били праткотрайли, тъй като военен прераз слоини край за правителството на Народния бивс през 1934 г. и в България на началото на 1934 г. се установила монархическа (военна) диктатура.

Въпреки факта, че режимът на цар Борис III обект за закона политическите св. д. традиционните политически приврестия продължили да играят съществена роля и во време на войната. Много от старите политически лидери, които все още си възбавля с уважението на обществостта, се приточавали на съюзничното на пари с властта Германия. Тавното влияние ставало очевидно, когато Германия осемнала от България да деютира сарайското си посолство в Тривана. С помощта на организирани от тях демонстрации те убедили царя да актуира законите за деютиране в българските север армейски войлата.

По време на войната много от партиите в България — Земеделският съюз, социалдемократите и групата от офицери и интелектуалци, наречена „Земко“ — се проточили към комунистите в по-точна към тайната програма за съютоварствено движение в съюзния Отечествения фронт, водили, които запала властта, след като тогавашното правителство било разпуснато в резултат на съюзната навала. Скоро обаче станало ясно, че комунистите гледат на властта само като си върне за постигане на пълна власт. Използвали своя контрол в политиката и стъла и възбавлявали се от съюзната окупация, те проточили към себе си част от работническите си съюзници, а останалите армудали да прикват в оо-звона.

съюз, а през последните няколко години селското стопанство било кооптирвано. Българската армия била държана и другите режими на групи били оставени под край административен контрол. Комунистическите лидери на България се гордеели с това, че поддрешвали на Сталин, и използвали изговата тавила на терор и запала.

По време на воещеното ил. делегацията от нашата фондация в България планирала и осемдесетилетия върху подробно информирала за паспортирното откриване на мислов проф. Белмо до многократни концентрирани лагер до гр. Лодж. В него се съдържали останките на стотина затворници, които били били до смърт. Отригнати е тавис съюзът за истинността, с които страните била вързана в мълчание с Сталинския конституция.

Съюзната децентрализацията навладе, започнала три години след смъртта на Сталин през 1953 г. дошла до силни аронии и в България. Тавор Живков бива най-много оолагодстван от тези промени в числестото си на противни на Хрущов и възбавил се със съюзната оодрешка при изключително на строгото стабилност ръководство. Дългото вързване на Живков на власт не мива и без недостатъци възбавени. Жестокостта на предсказаната оодрешка бе измислено от по-делкати форми на социални и политически контрол; пропелсът на индустриализацията вързана мачетали връчки валор; режими вързали социални нежестивата в сферата на образованието; за да създаде идеализирана слушители, които да могат да участват в това, което Живков често наричаше „научно-технологична революция на нашето време“.

Ако беше починал или се беше пенсионирал едно десетилетие по-рано, Живков може би меше да се радва на особено привлекателно, но той вързали на дълга компания на властта в през 80-те години, когато възможността започва да кола да е състояни на власт в дори на уладя и който все по-образовано население на България започва да се връща, изпразвяване

Среду замалчостта на комунизма в българската податина, като под-... обина на върз място Зем-

МАРИНА КАЦАРОВА

Demokratsia (Democracy), Organ of the Union of Democratic Forces,  
June 13, 1990

(Article by Boris Spiridonov/ front page -- bottom)

Today (June 12, 1990), Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev met with the American political scientist and observer of the elections in our country, John D. Bell, who is a professor of history and president of the University of Maryland's Association for Bulgarian Studies.

"I met with Professor Zhelev to continue our conversation of [over] a month ago on the subject of the Electoral Law. Dr. Zhelev expressed the sincere hope that everything will proceed in a democratic and humane manner and that all kinds of violence will be avoided. In the course of our meeting, we discussed the future of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and its firm determination not to join a coalition government led by the currently ruling Socialist (Communist) Party."

Also discussed was the intention of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to conduct a thorough and detailed study of the electoral process in our country. The UDF has undertaken to hand over all data on election violations to IFES, whose representative in Bulgaria is Professor Bell.

Professor Bell has brought with him one thousand copies of Dr. Zhelev's book, "Fascism," which was published in its Bulgarian original in the United States. According to Professor Bell, the book represents a serious contribution to the understanding of history and to the study of one-party, totalitarian systems. Dr. Bell hopes that the work will also appear in English translation.

4. пълнокръвна демокрация в силно демократично общество.

## ПРИНОС КЪМ СЪВРЕМЕННАТА ИСТОРИЯ

Днес д-р Желю Желев се среща с американския политолог и наблюдател на изборите в нашата страна Джон Д. Бел, професор по история и президент на Асоциацията за български изследвания в Мериландския университет.

Срещнах се с професор Желев като продължение на срещата, която имах преди един месец, за да обсъдим законодателството. Д-р Желев изрази силното си желание всичко да става по демократичен и хуманен начин и да се избегне какъвто и да е вид насилие. В нашия разговор става въпрос за бъдещето на Съюза, на демократичните сили и твърдата му позиция да не влезе в коалиция с управляващата сега (комунистическа) социалистическа партия.

Обсъдени са били също възможностите на Международната фондация за изследване на изборните системи, която

да направи подробно и цялостно изследване на изборния процес в нашата страна. СДС ще предаде всички данни за изборни нарушения на фондацията, чийто представител в България е професор Бел.

Професор Бел е донесъл и 1000 бройки от книгата на д-р Желев "Фашизмът", която бе издадена на български в Съединените щати и която според професор Бел представлява сериозен принос за разбирането на съвременната история и на еднопартийните тоталитарни системи. Той се надява книгата да бъде издадена и на английски.

Борис СПИРИДОНОВ

MEDIA REPORT: THE BULGARIAN PRESS  
COVERAGE OF THE IFES OBSERVER TEAM

Svoboden Narod (Free People), Organ of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, June 11, 1990

(Relevant excerpt from the article, "Everybody Decides According to His Conscience," which begins on the bottom of the front page and continues on the bottom of page three)

"...Mr. Richard Smolka is a member of the [elections] observer team sent [to Bulgaria] by the Washington-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems. He is also a professor of civil law at American University.

QUESTION: Mr. Smolka, what are your first impressions of the way in which the Bulgarian elections have been organized?

ANSWER: A group of us representing the International Foundation for Electoral Systems visited Bulgaria last April. At that time, we met with representatives of the Central Electoral Commission to find out if we could be of some help in the preparations for the elections. At the request of the Bulgarian side, we sent a shipment of ballot security envelopes made of opaque black plastic and equipped with red zippers which are closed after the ballots [protocols] are placed inside and can be opened only if their special security seals, provided for the purpose of ensuring that the envelopes are not tampered with, are broken. The number of plastic envelopes [bags] is three hundred, which should be enough to cover all regional electoral commissions. We also supplied a quantity of computer paper.

Having visited several polling stations, I am impressed with the number of people who turned out to vote early in the morning. I observed at the time the elections that were held in Poland, and I have just arrived from an election observer mission to Czechoslovakia. There is great similarity between the Czechoslovak and the Bulgarian elections, except for the fact that in Czechoslovakia voters had to cast three, rather than two, ballots - which, naturally, prolonged the process of voting.

ни на отделни партии от тези активисти.

биолетини, попреки на опоро

# ВСЕКИ РЕШАВА ПО СЪВЕСТ

(Продължение от стр. 1)

Мая натиск върху избирателите. Но всеки един, с който говорихме досега, ни казваше, че ще гласува за партията „А“ или за партията „Б“ и подчертаваше, че е стигнал до това решение сам, без убеждаване от когото и да било. Би ми се искало навсякъде да е така. И дано да е така, защото главното е да имаме честни избори в България да намери своето място в процеса на демократия, който се развива в Източна Европа. Това би било голяма победа за всички нас.

Гернот Ерлер и Алвин Брик са депутати в Бундестага, членове на Германската социалдемократическа партия.

Как мислите, ще бъдат ли първите български свободни избори истински демократични?

ГЕРНОТ ЕРЛЕР: Откровено казано, не смятам, че посещението ни от 2-3 дни може да ни даде обща представа дали всичко е протекло правилно, или е малко прешки. Но

от срещите, които проведохме се убедих, че коректността и публичността на изборите са тема, която възбужда всички. Полагат големи усилия, за да стане това желанието и действителността на изборите.

АЛВИН БРИК: От всички разговори, които имаме, се убедих, че хората наистина са заинтересовани изборите да бъдат коректни. Да, нека да подчертаем това.

— Каква е прогнозата. Виждате ли настоящите избори?

А. Б.: Според мен, ако хората размислят, какво са направили комунистите в миналото, не могат да си представят нищо друго, освен да изберат новите демократични сили.

Г. Е.: Мисля, вестта за изборите би била победа за цялата България, решаваша одъвка от еднопартийна към многопартийна система. Така, в тази страна, ще удесни път, съкъм Европа.

Г-н РИЧАРД СМОЛКА, член на делегацията от наблюдатели на Международната фондация за избирателни системи със седалище във Вашингтон и професор по гражданско пра

## ПЛАМЕН ГРИЗЕР

во в Американския университет.

— Г-н Смолка, какви са вашите първи впечатления по организацията на изборите в България?

— Като представител на нашата фондация посетихме България още през април, когато разговаряхме с членове на Централната избирателна комисия, за да се опитаме да поговорим, ако има нужда, в подготовката на изборите. Поиска не на българската страна изпратихме специални пластмасови пликчета, които бяха непрозрачни, черни на цвят, с червен цип, който се затваря след като се сложат бюлетините в тях, и за да се отвори този цип, трябва да се счупи една специална капсула, която показва дали пликът е бил отварян. Те са триста на брой и напълно покриват всички избирателни райони. Помогнахме също така и с хартия за компютри.

След като посетих няколко избирателни секции, бях много впечатлен от количеството хора, които гласуваха толкова рано сутринта. Наблюдавах изборите в Полша и току-що пристигам от Чехословакия. Там изборите много приличаха на българските, с тази трудност, че чехословаците бюлетини бяха три, а не две, и то са удължи процеса на гласуването.

Г-н РОБЪРТ ДЖ. ЛАГОМАР СИНО, член на Конгреса на САЩ, съпредседател на международната делегация от наблюда

тели в следващото

тели, организирана от институтите за международни отношения на Демократическата и Републиканската партия на САЩ.

— Мога да кажа, че в районите, където наблюдавахме изборите, влизаме и в казарми. Там положението беше спокойно до толкова, че дори представителите на опозицията изразяваха своето задоволство. Не трябва да забравяте обаче, че независимо от резултатите, тези избори са само началото на един дълъг процес на изграждане структурите на демокрацията в България.

Г-н РОБЪРТ ХИЛ, сенатор от Австралия, съпредседател на международната делегация от наблюдатели, организирана от институтите за международни отношения на Демократическата и Републиканската партия на САЩ.

— В момента е още доста рано за твърди заключения. Но в работата си тук сме извънредно улеснени, защото разговаряме спокойно с хората, те ни звънят по телефона от цялата страна. Имаше слушане на опит за натиск с обажданя по телефона, с пускане на бюлетини в пощенските кутии. Въпреки това смятам, че този случай не могат да окажат никакво решаващо значение. В изборния процес за нас много важно място заема процедурата по преброяване на гласовете и там нашата роля ще бъде активна.

**APPENDIX TWO**  
**LIST OF TOWNS IN WHICH**  
**POLLING PLACES WERE VISITED**

## LIST OF TOWNS IN WHICH POLLING PLACES WERE VISITED

Members of the IFES observer team interviewed election officials and/or visited polling places in these towns during primary and/or runoff elections.

Aldemirovts  
Bansko  
Brenitsa  
Bourgas  
Chernogorovo  
Gotse Delchev  
Gurman  
Krumovgrad  
Kurdjali  
Lovech  
Lubenovo  
Malo Kenare  
Osina  
Pazardzhik  
Peleshat  
Pernik  
Pishtigovo  
Pleven  
Plovdiv  
Pravets  
Radinovo  
Satovcha  
Slivnitsa  
Slavjanovo  
Sofia  
Sopot  
Stanke Dimitrov  
Teteven  
Trojan  
Veliko Turnovo  
Varna  
Zvezdel

**APPENDIX THREE**

**METHODOLOGY FOR THE CALCULATION OF THE  
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION RESULTS:  
THE D'HONDT FORMULA**

# METHODOLOGY FOR THE CALCULATION OF THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION RESULTS: THE D'HONDT FORMULA

## I. General Considerations

1. The present methodology has been worked out and adopted by the Central Electoral Commission in accordance with Article 77 of the Law on the Election of the Grand National Assembly.

2. This methodology regulates the distribution of the 200 seats in the Grand National Assembly determined by the proportional principle.

3. The calculations for the distribution of these seats will take place in the Central Electoral Commission.

## II. The Distribution of Seats in the Grand National Assembly among Political Parties and Coalitions

4. The calculations will be made on the basis of the voting results in the 28 multi-member electoral regions, designated in the decree of the president of the republic on the basis of Article 18 in the Law on the Election of the Grand National Assembly.

5. The data will be taken from the protocols of the precinct electoral commissions which the regional electoral commissions will send to the Central Electoral Commission.

6. The distribution of seats will be based on the valid votes for the parties and election coalitions.

NB: Further on, whenever the terms "votes" or "regions" are used they refer to "valid votes" and "multi-member electoral regions."

7. The number of votes cast for each party and coalition in the 28 regions will be added together.

NB: In this way a so-called "general party total" for the country as a whole will be arrived at for each party and coalition.

8. All valid ballots cast for any party or coalition will be added together.

NB: In this way the "general election total" is determined. This is the sum of all votes cast for all lists in the 28 regions. The "general election total" is equal to sum of all the "general party totals."

9. It is then calculated how many votes constitute 4% of the "general election total."

10. On the basis of Article 76 of the Law on the Election of the Grand National Assembly, parties and coalitions receiving less than 4% of the total number of valid ballots are excluded from participating in the distribution of seats in the proportional system. The votes cast for them are excluded from the following calculations.

11. The 200 seats are distributed among the parties and coalitions that have reached or surpassed the 4% barrier described in points 9 and 10.

12. The calculating procedure, known in law and mathematics as the method of D'Hondt, will be applied to the "general party totals."

The computation may be expressed as follows: The "general party totals" are placed next to each other and divided by whole numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . etc. After this the seats are apportioned strictly in accordance to the diminishing size of the divided parts.

### III. The Distribution of Seats by Electoral Regions

13. The number of seats for each party and coalition arrived at through the D'Hondt method are distributed through the 28 regions according to the lists of the parties and coalitions. This is done by again applying D'Hondt's method strictly in accordance with the following requirements:

(1) Parties and coalitions receive seats only in the regions in which they have electoral lists registered.

(2) The total number of individuals elected from each party or coalition is equal to the number of seats that the party (or coalition) has received in the first distribution according to the D'Hondt method for the country as a whole as described in point 12.

(3) In each region the number of seats assigned is that determined by the decree of the president of the republic.

NB: If the number of individuals elected in a given region is larger than the number indicated in the decree, then the surplus seats in that region are distributed to regions in which the number of individuals elected did not attain the number indicated in the decree: that latter situation will usually be created when the repeated application of the D'Hondt method results in numbers too small to qualify for seats. The party (or coalition) to which these small numbers belong will have them translated into one or more seats in regions which have a "surplus" of seats.

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#### IV. Example of the Method's Application

The following numerical table shows how twenty-five seats would be apportioned among the five parties A, B, C, D, and E. The example assumes that the country is divided into 6 multi-member electoral regions R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6. The number of seats which belong to each region and the number of valid ballots cast for parties (or coalitions) in each region and the whole country is shown as follows:

Seats / Regions	Party / Votes					Total
	A	B	C	D	E	
R1 (7 s)	700,000	600,000	320,000	60,000	20,000	1,700,000
R2 (5 s)	550,000	550,000	50,000	20,000	30,000	1,200,000
R3 (4 s)	400,000	450,000	110,000	20,000	20,000	1,000,000
R4 (4 s)	350,000	300,000	120,000	50,000	80,000	900,000
R5 (3 s)	250,000	150,000	180,000	100,000	20,000	700,000
R6 (2 s)	150,000	50,000	120,000	110,000	70,000	500,000
Total (25 s)	2,400,000	2,100,000	900,000	360,000	240,000	6,000,000

The first application of D'Hondt's method for the distribution of seats on the national level (as described in point 12) gives the following result:

Divisor	Party				
1	2,400,000 /1	2,100,000 /2	900,000 /5	360,000 /14	240,000 /22
2	1,200,000 /3	1,050,000 /4	450,000 /11	180,000	120,000
3	800,000 /6	700,000 /7	300,000 /17	120,000	80,000
4	600,000 /8	525,000 /9	225,000 /25	90,000	60,000
5	480,000 /10	420,000 /12	180,000	72,000	48,000
6	400,000 /13	350,000 /15	150,000	60,000	40,000
7	342,857 /16	300,000 /18	128,571	51,429	34,286
8	300,000 /19	262,500 /21	112,500	45,000	30,000
9	266,667 /20	233,333 /24	100,000	40,000	26,667
10	240,000 /25	210,000	90,000	36,000	24,000
11	212,182	190,909	81,818	32,727	21,818
12	200,000	175,000	75,000	30,000	20,000

The first seat is assigned to the highest number, in this case 240,000, located in the column of party A. The second seat is assigned to the second highest number, in this case 210,000, located in the column of party B. The assignment continues until the last, 25th, seat is assigned.

If the division produces equal numbers, the seats are assigned first to the number that appears higher in the table. This is shown here in the distribution of seats 17, 18, and 19.

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The final result of the distribution of the 25 seats among the 5 parties on the national level is as follows: party A receives 10 seats; party B - 9 seats; party C - 4 seats; parties D and E - one seat each.

These seats must now be assigned to individual deputies on the basis of the party lists in each region. To do this the D'Hondt method is applied to each party based on the votes it received in each region. For each party the assignment of seats continues until the number reaches the number determined in the first application of the D'Hondt method on the national level.

## Party A

	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6
1	700000 /1	550000 /2	400000 /3	350000 /4	250000 /7	150000
2	350000 /5	275000 /6	200000 /9	175000	125000	75000
3	233333 /8	183333 /10	133333	116666	83333	50000
4	175000	137500	100000	87500	62500	37500

Party A receives 3 seats in the 1st and 2nd regions, 2 in the third region, and one each in the 5th and 6th regions.

## Party B

	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6
1	600000 /1	550000 /2	450000 /3	300000 /4	150000	50000
2	300000 /5	275000 /6	225000 /7	175000	75000	25000
3	200000 /8	183333 /9	150000	100000	50000	16666
4	150000	137500	112500	75000	37500	12500

Party B receives 3 seats in the 1st and 2nd regions, 2 in the 3rd region, and one in the 4th region.

## Party C

	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6
1	320000 /1	50000	110000	120000	180000 /2	120000
2	160000 /3	25000	55000	60000	90000	60000
3	140000 /4	16666	36666	40000	60000	40000
4	80000	12500	27500	30000	45000	30000

Party C receives 3 seats in the 1st region and 1 seat in the 5th region.

## Party D

	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6
1	60000	20000	20000	50000	100000	110000 /1
2	30000	10000	10000	25000	50000	55000

Party D receives 1 seat in the 6th region.

## Party E

1	20000	30000	20000	80000 /1	20000	70000
2	10000	15000	10000	40000	10000	35000

Party E receives 1 seat in the 4th region.

This gives the following distribution for the six electoral regions:

Region	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6
By the above computation	9	6	4	3	2	1
By Presidential Decree	7	5	4	4	3	2
Difference	+2	+1	0	-1	-1	-1

So far there are two "extra" seats in R1, 1 "extra" seat in R2, and 1 "unoccupied" seat in each of R4, R5, and R6.

The largest number to which a seat was not assigned in R6 is 150000 for party A; in R5 it is also 150000 but for party B; and in R4 it is 175000 for party A.

The distribution is completed by taking seats 8 and 10 for party A from R1 and R2 and assigning them to R4 and R6 and by taking seat 8 for party B from R1 and assigning it to R5. In this way every seat in each region is occupied. The total number of seats assigned to the parties does not change, but their distribution is as follows:

Party A receives 2 seats in R1, R2, R3, and R4 and 1 seat in R5 and R6 for a total of 10. Party B receives 3 seats in R2, 2 seats in R1 and R3, and one seat in R4 and R5 for a total of 9. Party C receives 3 seats in R1 and 1 seat in R5 for a total of 4. Party D receives 1 seat in R6. Party E receives 1 seat in R4.

R1 has exactly 7 seats; R2 5 seats; R3 4 seats; R4 4 seats; R5 3 seats; and R6 2 seats.

This completes the distribution of seats by party (or coalition) and electoral region.

**APPENDIX FOUR**  
**MINUTES OF SELECTED MEETINGS OF THE**  
**CENTRAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION**

## MINUTES OF SELECTED MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

The Central Election Commission made available to IFES the minutes of its meetings. The following excerpts from these minutes clarify some points of the election law, indicate the sort of problems brought before the CEC during the period of the elections, and provide a picture of the its daily operations.

June 6, 1990, 9:00 am

1. With regard to the letter from the Supreme Council of the BSP of 5 June: the district people's councils in Veliko Turnovo and Polski Trumbesh must provide a full supply of ballots at once to the legal representatives of the party so that they may be distributed to the BSP's members, supporters, and sympathizers.

With regard to the BSP ballots in Burgas Province that have been printed in varying shades of red and in different sizes (a difference of a few millimeters), the CEC finds that this does not render them invalid and they may be used in the election.

2. If the regional electoral commissions receive ballots for candidates in other regions, they must immediately send them to the regions where they are supposed to go.
3. With regard to the report from the secretary of the Sofia People's Council Elen Petrov about the differences in the spelling on the ballot of the first name of Mr Zhelev (on some it is spelled "Zheliu," on others "Zhelio"), the CEC rules that this does not affect the validity of the ballots. Both are equally valid. The Sofia People's Council should be informed of this decision at once so that it should distribute the ballots to the parties.

June 7, 1990, 3:00 pm.

1. Concerning the oral report given by Dimitur Boev that in Sopot the commander of the unit intends to give leave to 400 troops on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday in order to prevent their voting, the CEC assigns Mr Karaichev the task of ascertaining whether this is true, and if it is true he should immediately ask the Ministry of Defense to take the appropriate measures.

June 8, 1990, 3:30 pm.

1. In reference to the inquiry of the Academy of Medicine regarding voting in hospitals, the CEC finds that its previous rulings should be adhered to. Specifically:

- Patients in sickbed who cannot be transported to the voting place will not vote.
  - Patients who do not possess written permission for absentee voting will be inscribed on the voter list on the basis of the number of their internal passport. This information will be communicated by telegraph to the patient's local section, where his name will be stricken from the voter list.
  - This process must be completed prior to election day and will not be allowed on the day of the election itself.
2. In reference to the telegram from the Regional Electoral Commission of the single-member district #133 (Elin Pelin) regarding the incorrect listing on the ballot of the candidate of the Liberal Party - Pernik ("Angel Dimitrov Naidenov" instead of "Angel Dimitrov Angelov"), the CEC finds: that the incorrect listing of the candidate's third name (Naidenov instead of Angelov) does not invalidate the ballot.

June 9, 1990.

1. When a party belongs to a coalition, the coalition and not the individual party nominates candidates for the National Assembly. The present case, however, concerns the removal of candidates from the ballot. The nominated candidates have not objected to the removal of their names that was requested by the party to which they belong.

The leadership of the coalition "Political Opposition Bloc - Center" was informed that the party Vrabcha - 1 was withdrawing from the coalition and that the names of the candidates from that party would be removed from the ballot in the Third Varna Multi-member District and did not object within the time period allowed by the law.

While the Supreme Court may overturn the decisions of the CEC, should this happen on 9 June, the day before the election, the names of the candidates still cannot be restored to the ballot since there is no practical way of accomplishing this.

2. In reference to the letter #1021 from the Union of Democratic Forces regarding the registration of the candidate Velin Ivanov Kerimov as its sixteenth candidate on the proportional list in the 21st Sofia region, the CEC finds that it cannot legally allow this since the registration of candidates was conducted according to the rules established in Article 42 of the Election Law.
3. The CEC will send a communication to the Association for Fair Elections, to its leader Mr. Kevorkian, to the effect that according to the CEC's decisions there may be no analysis or prognostications regarding the results of the elections if they are

not based on the final and official results announced by the CEC. There may also be no parallel counting of the votes or reporting of results based on parallel counting.

A similar letter will be sent to Col. General Dobrev, First Deputy Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army. It will be added that according to the decisions of the CEC, section commissions are obligated to provide copies of its completed protocols to all persons who have the status of guests, including the representatives of the Association for Fair Elections and of the Movement for Free and Democratic Elections.

June 10, 1990, 5:00 pm.

1. PRESIDENT ZHIVKO STALEV: "I propose the following ruling:

If the [section] electoral commission finds that the ballot box cannot hold any more ballots, then it may use a second box.

Before it may be used it must be opened in the presence of the commission members, the representatives of the parties, and the citizens present in the voting place, so that they may see it is empty.

After it is sealed in the same way as the first box, it may be used for the rest of the envelopes. The decision to use a second ballot box will be noted on the protocol. On the protocol will be noted the time that the decision was made.

The first ballot box will remain in view of the electoral commission, without being opened until the voting is over.

After the voting is completed, the two boxes will be opened one after the other. The contents of the two boxes will be placed on the table, and the commission will proceed with the counting just as though there had been only a single ballot box."

2. PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV STALEV: "Bulgarian citizens who have returned from abroad but who have not brought with them a Bulgarian passport may vote using a foreign passport as identification. Those in favor: 4. Those opposed: 14. The majority rules."
3. [SECRETARY] DIMITUR POPOV: "As a result of the measures adopted, an adequate supply of ballots has been assured everywhere and since 12:00 there has been no complaint anywhere about the absence of ballots or about their theft. The election process has not been halted anywhere.

As of 2:30 pm over 60% of eligible voters have cast ballots; as of 5:00 pm over 80%, and in some places 94%.

There have been no serious violations of public order, no excesses, no serious incidents."

PRESIDENT ZHIVKO STALEV: "On the basis of the information you have, would it be fair to say that the elections have been conducted peacefully?"

DIMITUR POPOV: "Absolutely."

4. In reference to the report in the paper *Demokratsia* of 10 June that a mass meeting will be held on the 11th at 6:00 pm, the CEC directs the attention to the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces and of the president of the Sofia People's Council to the fact that the place of the meeting, Alexander Nevsky Square [in front of the National Assembly Building housing the CEC] will interfere with the work of the Commission since final elections results will hardly be reported by 6:00 p.m.

Consequently, the CEC appeals to the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces and to the president of the Sofia People's Council to find another place for this meeting.

This decision will be communicated at once to the Coordinating Council of the UDF and its president, Mr Zhelev, and to the president of the Sofia People's Council.

5. The room in the National Assembly that will hold documents and protocols related to the election must remain under constant guard from the time materials begin to arrive until the CEC has completed its work.

The Secretary of the Operational Bureau or its Director, Mr [Dimitur] Popov will hold the key to this room.

6. In reference to the report referred to the CEC that the regional electoral commission #183 (Sofia; Red Star District) has decided that section commissions in region 183 may not give out copies of their protocols until the regional commission has prepared its protocol: the CEC informs the 183rd regional electoral commission that all section commissions in the country, and this would include those in region 183, are required to make copies of their protocols available immediately after they are signed by the members of the section commission.

June 11, 1990.

1. In view of the fact that the regional electoral commission in the 93rd (Peshtera)

electoral region committed an error in calculating the results in the single-member district - it used the number of voters as its base rather than the number of valid ballots - the CEC finds that the proposal to hold a run-off election in this district is unfounded. If the calculation of the results is correctly made, i.e. on the basis of the number of valid ballots cast, then the candidate Belcho Anterov Belchev has received more than 50% (50.23%) and has therefore been legally elected.

2. The basis for counting votes cast is to take the number of voters and subtract from it the number of invalid ballots and empty envelopes. If on this basis no candidate has received more than 50%, there must be a second round of voting.

The two candidates who have received the most votes compete in the second round. In the specific case of the 90th (Pazardzhik) single-member district Petur Dimitrov Nikolakov and Stoian Dimitrov Ganev will compete in the second round.

June 12, 1990, 12:00 pm.

1. The CEC instructs the Secretary of the Commission Dimitur Popov to determine without delay whether the votes received from abroad have been assigned to their proper regions, and if so to quickly inform the appropriate electoral commissions. He should remind those regional commissions that they are required to submit their protocols as soon as possible after receiving this information.

He should check on the results from region #44 (Lukovit), and if one of the candidates there has received substantially more votes than the others, the commission should proceed without waiting for the results from the two sections in Libya that are located in the wilderness and about which neither the CEC nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has any information.

2. The CEC finds that the votes cast for the proportional lists in the region #21 (Sofia) may be published. But it must be stressed in the press release that these data are from "Sofinform," the center that serves the capital people's council. They have been given to the CEC by the people's council. They are preliminary, not official, figures and do not commit the CEC.
3. The CEC finds that the results in every single-member district for which the CEC has final data must be released as soon as possible. It must be made known in which districts there will be run-offs on June 17 and who the candidates will be.

The CEC instructs the local people's councils in the regions in which a second round will be held to prepare voter lists for the second round.

4. The CEC rules that it cannot investigate the complaints of irregularities in the elections. Material on these complaints will be given to a committee of the Grand National Assembly for investigation and decision.

5. In the second round there will be no permission for absentee voting. Voting in the second round will be based on place of residence only. In this regard the names of voters who voted outside their home sections must be stricken from the voter lists in the places where they voted in the first round and restored to the lists in their home districts.

Names of those who have died since 10 June shall be removed from the voter lists. Names of those who have reached voting age since 10 June shall be added to the lists.

There shall be no voting in the second round abroad or on board ships.

It shall be recorded in the personal passport of the voter that he has voted. This should be done on the same page as was used in round one and should include the date June 17.

June 12, 1990, 6:00 pm.

1. In single member districts in which no candidate was elected in the first round, if a candidate who finished first or second declines to run in the second round, he will be replaced by the candidate who finished third in the voting.
2. In the second round the section commissions may not include on the voter list anyone whose personal passport shows that his current address was registered after 10 June 1990.

June 12, 1990, 6:30 pm.

1. When it is clear from a regional commission protocol that its results are obviously incorrect, that is when they are derived from an incorrect calculation of the numbers, the CEC may correct the mistake in accordance with the electoral law. In the case of the single-member district # 135 (Samokov), the CEC finds that there must be a run-off between Boiko Borisov Chilingirov and Boian Petrov Cheresarov.

June 12, 1990, 10:00 pm.

1. A close relative of a candidate may not be a member of a regional or section electoral commission in the district where the candidate is on the ballot. Such commission members must be immediately replaced.

This CEC decision will immediately be communicated to the Gotse Delchev People's Council and to the Sofia Provincial People's Council.

June 15, 1990, 10:30 am.

1. At the meeting of the presidents of the regional electoral commissions and secretaries of provincial and district people's councils that will take place at the Council of Ministers at 2:00 it must at all costs be explained how the envelopes should be counted, how invalid ballots and empty envelopes should be recorded, and how the number of valid ballots should be calculated.
2. For the second round the CEC will not wait to compile all the results before issuing a statement, but will announce the winners in each election district as soon as the information is received and confirmed.
3. The CEC will remind the presidents of the regional electoral commissions at the upcoming meeting that they must inform the section commissions that they are responsible for transporting elections materials from their location to the regional electoral commission. If they wish, representatives of the two candidates may accompany the materials in the same vehicle.

June 15, 1990, 5:00 pm.

1. In connection with paid leave for members of the regional and section electoral commissions, the CEC rules that members of these commissions in regions where there are run-off elections will receive paid leave of 5 days in order to meet their obligations for the second round.
2. In the second round persons held under arrest will vote in the same section in which they voted during the first round. Those placed under arrest since June 10 will not vote.
3. In the second round, all military personnel, including sailors on land, will vote in the same sections in which they voted in the first round. If sailors who voted on board ship in the first round are in their home sections on 17 June, they have the right to vote there.
4. If a military unit was transferred after June 10 to a location different from that in which its members voted in the first round, then they do not have the right to vote in the second round.
5. Presidents, vice-presidents, and secretaries of the Executive Committee of the National Assembly, mayors and mayoralty secretaries, as well as other official members of executive councils may not serve as party representatives or as members of electoral commissions. This decision will be made known at once through the mass media. Wherever such officials are serving as party representatives or members of electoral commissions, they must be replaced at once.

6. In connection with the preservation of the protocols from the section electoral commission, the CEC decides: that immediately after this meeting the members of the commission will count the protocols from the sections that are located in the computer hall and organized by region. Under the observation of the members of the CEC, officials of the National Assembly will package the protocols and other official documents by electoral region, seal each package, prepare a protocol on its contents, and sign it. The packaged documents will be kept in Room No. 49, the key to which is held by Petur Nikolov. After the documents have been placed there, the room will be sealed and placed under guard.

A group composed of Lidia Mancheva, Solomon Rozanis, and Zhivko Milanov is appointed to unseal the computer room and to seal it again after the material has been transferred.

Georgi Mutafchiev will take from Andrei Tekhov all documents related to voting abroad, package them, prepare a protocol on them, and seal them in the same way that was used for the documents related to the proportional system.

8. Georgi Mutafchiev and Andrei Tekhov will meet with the lady from West Berlin who wishes to see the protocols on the voting there.
9. The CEC places on Kiril Karaivanov the task of checking every protocol which has copies of the decisions of the commission. He will place dates on the ones that are undated corresponding to the full stenographic record of the CEC's work. These dates will be authenticated by CEC member A. Rafailov so that there will not be a single short protocol containing a decision of the CEC that is undated.
10. The CEC will take the following measures to document its work:

At least three copies of the full stenographic record along with three copies of the protocols containing the decisions of the commission will be prepared, properly bound, and kept in Room No. 49.
11. The CEC's grievance committee will collect all complaints and warnings submitted to the CEC (telegrams, telexes, letters, reports etc.) which relate to the elections and which must be submitted to the Grand National Assembly. These materials must be prepared in final form no later than ten days after the completion of the elections. They will be organized in a systematic way by the grievance committee. All members of the CEC should give their proposals on the best methods of organizing this material to the grievance committee.
12. With reference to Saturday, June 16, the day before the second round, the CEC has decided to again remind the leaders of the political parties and the representatives of the Executive Committee of the National Assembly that political meetings, the distribution of campaign material, and any other form of public agitation are not permitted (Article 51, paragraph 2 of the Election Law).

The president of the Sofia People's Council will be reminded immediately not to permit meetings or demonstrations around the building of the National Assembly.

**APPENDIX FIVE**

**BULGARIANS INTERVIEWED BY IFES DELEGATION MEMBERS**

## BULGARIANS INTERVIEWED BY IFES DELEGATION MEMBERS

Boris Atanasov	BSP official
Roumijana Bojuklieva	Sofia Regional Commission
Lyubomir Danchev	Leader of Friends of U.S., and Sofia Press Official
Dr. Emelia Drumeva	Member, CEC
Nikola Elisov	Secretary of Social Democratic Party in Stanke Dimitrov
Marko Ganchev	Editor of <i>Literaturen Front</i>
Paun Genov	Journalist with BANU-Nikola Petkov
Strakhil Gichev	President of BANU - vrabcha 1, a small splinter of the Agrarian Union.
Dimitry Ivanov	Journalist and vice president of BAFE
Juliana Haydutuova	Communications Director, BAFE
Marianna Hill	Press Officer, UDF
Khristo Kirchev	UDF official
Kiril Karaivanov	Deputy Administrator, CEC
Mariana Katzanova	Reporter for <i>Svoboden Narod</i>
Angel Kolarov	BSP official
Alexander Lilov	President of BSP
Dimitur Ludzhev	Member of UDF Council
Petko V. Machkowski	BSP Party Chairman for Veliko Turnovo
Zhelyu Minev	BZNS official
Maria Nesheva	Artists union official
Boyan Obretenov	Editor, <i>Sofia News</i>
Kosta Pavlov	Poet
Reneta Pastarmadjieva	Administrative Secretary, Interparliamentary Council (CEC)
Dimitur Popov	Vice President, CEC
Radoi Ralin	Writer
Blagovest Sendov	President, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; member, BAFE Council
Petko Simeonov	President of Democracy Clubs and campaign manager for UDF
Lyubomir Spasov	Deputy Chief, Penal Division, Ministry of Justice
Zhivko Stalev	President CEC
Dimiter Stefanof	Deputy Administrator, BSP
Katerina Stoyanova	Reporter, <i>Sofia News</i>
Alexander Stresov	Deputy Chairman of BSP
Georgy Todorchev	BTA correspondent
Georgy Traikov	Journalist
Konstantin Trenchev	PODKREPA
Viktor Vulkov	President, BANU (official)
Lyudmil Yonchev	Deputy Mayor of Sofia
Vera Zaharieva	BZNS officer
Zheliu Zhelev	President of UDF

**APPENDIX SIX**

**BALLOT COLORS OF PARTIES AND COALITIONS  
REGISTERED FOR PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS**

**COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE  
UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES**

## BALLOT COLORS OF PARTIES AND COALITIONS REGISTERED FOR PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS


More than forty parties were registered to participate in the elections, many of them of only regional or lesser importance. Some represented special-interest groups, such as the Organization of Cardiacs and Socially Vulnerable Citizens or the Union of Thracian Cultural and Educational Societies. Others were factions that had split from larger parties, and some were organized around particular personalities.

1. Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS): orange
2. Union of Democratic Forces: light blue
3. Liberal Party: green
4. Union of Thracian Cultural and Educational Societies in Bulgaria: white, with three red stripes
5. Bulgarian Socialist Party: red
6. Alternative Socialist Party: white, with three blue stripes
7. Christian Republican Party: white with one yellow, one blue and one yellow stripe
8. Republican Party: white, with one blue, one red and one blue stripe
9. United Popular Union: white, with three yellow stripes
10. Union of Democratic Parties and Movements "Era-3": white, with three violet stripes
11. Political Opposition Bloc: yellow
12. "Independents for Democracy" Movement: white, with three grey stripes
13. National Patriotic Union: white, with one yellow stripe
14. Bulgarian National Radical Party: white, with one green stripe
15. Union of Independents: white, with one orange stripe
16. National Party of Labour, Private Owners, Producers and Creative Workers: white, with one red stripe
17. Union of Independent Guarantors: white, with two green stripes
18. Bulgarian Christian Democratic Party (Centre): white, with two yellow stripes
19. Union of Invalids in Bulgaria: white, with one blue stripe
20. Alternative Socialist Association: white, with two red stripes
21. Conservative Party in Bulgaria: white, with three green stripes
22. Movement for Rights and Freedoms: white, with one pink stripe
23. Fatherland Union: white, with one red and one blue stripe
24. Free Democratic Party: white, with three orange stripes
25. Social Democratic Party (Non-Marxists): white, with two orange stripes
26. Patriotic Party of Labour: white, with three pink stripes
27. Party of Labour: white, with one blue and one green stripe
28. Bulgarian National Democratic Party: white, with one green and one yellow stripe
29. "Stefan Stambolov" National Liberal Party in Veliko Turnovo: white, with one violet, one pink and one yellow stripe
30. Party of the Working People: white, with two red and one blue stripe
31. Obnovlenie Political Party  
Independent Society for Defence of the Rights of the Imprisoned: white, with one green, one blue and one violet stripe
32. Parliamentary Movement for the Turnovo Constitution: white, with one black stripe
33. Strict National Revival Union: white, with two pink stripes
34. "New Democracy" Bulgarian National Union: white, with one blue and one pink stripe
35. Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party in Varna: white, with one red and one yellow stripe
36. Bulgarian Democratic Forum: white, with one blue, one orange and one blue stripe
37. "New Bulgaria" Movement: white, with two blue stripes
38. Organization of Cardiacs and Socially Vulnerable Citizens in Bulgaria, Varna: white, with one blue, one yellow and one blue stripe
39. Independent Popular Democratic Party in Plovdiv: white, with one blue, one orange and one green stripe
40. Bulgarian Popular Party: white, with one blue and one yellow stripe

## COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES

1. Bulgarian Agrarian Party "Nikola Petkov"
2. Bulgarian Social Democratic Party
3. "Civil Initiative" Movement
4. Democratic Party
5. Green Party
6. Club for Glasnost and Democracy
7. Club of Persons Repressed after 1945
8. Committee for the Defence of Religious Rights, Freedom of Consciousness and Cultural Values
9. Confederation of Labour "Podkrepa"
10. Independent Society for Human Rights Protection
11. Independent Association "Ecoglasnost"
12. Radical Democratic Party
13. Federation of Independent Student Societies
14. New Social Democratic Party
15. United Democratic Centre
16. Democratic Front

**APPENDIX SEVEN**  
**MAPS OF BULGARIA**



Vidin

Lom

Nikopol

Ruse

Constanța

44

Mikhayovgrad

Vratsa

Pleven

Byala

Razgrad

Tolbukhin

Baichik

YUGOSLAVIA

Barkovitsa

Piroi

Stanitsi

Iakur

Lovech

Gorna Oryakhovitsa

Turgovishta

Shumen

Provadiya

Varna

BLACK  
SEA

Pernik

SOFIA

Gabrovo

Yantra

Sliven

Aytos

Karnobat

Karlovo

Kazanlak

Tulova

Nova Zagora

Zimnitsa

Burgas

Kyustendil

Samokov

Pazardzhik

Plovdiv

Stara Zagora

Yambol

Elkhovo

Blagoevgrad

Krumovo

Asenovgrad

Dimitrograd

Malko Tŭrnovo

42

General Todorov

Petrich

Smolyan

Khaskovo

Charmanli

Kŭrdzhali

Anda

Monchilgrad


Podkova

G R E E K E S

TURKEY

Aegean Sea

ЕДНОМАНДАТНИ И МНОГОМАНДАТНИ ИЗБИРАТЕЛНИ РАЙОНИ  
 ЗА ИЗБОРИ НА ВЕЛИКО НАРОДНО СЪБРАНИЕ  
 10 - 17 юни 1990 г.



- 20** Граница и номер на многомандатен изборителен район
- 200** Граница и номер на едномандатен изборителен район
- Център на едномандатен изборителен район
- Граница на община

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