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DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN ZAMBIA
AN ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSED STRATEGY

Prepared for USAID/Zambia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper assesses the status of democratic institutions and governance practices in Zambia eight months after the general elections of October 1991 which brought President Frederick Chiluba's MMD government to power. It also proposes a strategy for consideration by USAID/Zambia in launching a program to promote good governance and democratic consolidation in Zambia in the aftermath of two decades of single-party rule.

A recurrent theme of the assessment and proposed strategy is the coequal importance of the "demand" and "supply" sides of the public policy process. Public accountability, which is the core goal of democratic governance, is attained by active and effective institutions outside of government as well as within it. Hence the paper analyses the capabilities and suggests projects to strengthen three types of institutions: within civil society, within the public sector, and the linkages between them.

While the transition to democracy in Zambia took place rapidly through free and fair elections, there has subsequently been little opportunity to firmly institutionalize a more open process of policy making and implementation. Already, the new government's legitimacy is beginning to dissipate in the face of inherited debt burdens, a shattered public infrastructure, and an untimely drought. Some MMD leaders have also displayed a disconcerting tendency to revert to arbitrary and authoritarian patterns of rule and to undermine newly won rights of freedom of association and expression. There is, therefore, urgent need for USAID to help Zambia's democratically-elected government to make good on its electoral promises: not only to improve standards of living in the long run, but to immediately promote greater citizen involvement and public accountability in the policy process.

Assessment

Within civil society, Zambians face formidable cultural obstacles in attempting to exercise the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship. Both traditional norms and one-party procedures have instilled popular habits of deference to authority and attachment to patronage. Thus, especially in rural areas, Zambia lacks a well-educated and informed citizenry that can check and balance the excesses of political leaders. Moreover, the landslide electoral victory of MMD left Zambia without a viable opposition party. Against this legacy, there are positive aspects to civil society. Zambia's unusually large urban population -- increasingly organized into occupational groups and civic associations -- has asserted new forms of private interest and political awareness, as exemplified by the leading role of the trade unions in the democratic transition. The emergence of an independent press during the 1991 election campaign helped to disseminate democratic values more widely among the Zambian populace. Indeed, the media and civic associations, so important in the transition, remain the principal guarantors of political liberty in the current phase of democratic consolidation.

Within the public sector in Zambia, policy-making had long been overcentralized in the Office of the President. Civil servants, who were unrewarded for entrepreneurship in policy formation or for effective performance in implementation, retreated into passivity and caution. In a context of self-enrichment by politicians and the compression of civil servant salaries, low morale pervaded the bureaucracy. The advent of the MMD government offers opportunities to improve this grim governance record. The government's commitment to privatization charts an entirely new economic policy direction, though concerns remain that politicians may again benefit inordinately. President Chiluba is far more willing than his predecessor to allow latitude to cabinet ministers to make policy, to the extent that Zambia's Third Republic now suffers from a lack of policy coordination. Fortunately, the cabinet ministers openly acknowledge this problem and express desire to improve policy analysis and supervision, both within and between ministries.

The weakness of political linkages between state and society in Zambia is exemplified by the atrophy of the National Assembly. Both constitutionally and in practice, the legislative branch remains subordinate to the executive, notably in the initiation of legislation and the oversight of presidential appointments. While independent-minded parliamentarians on the MMD "backbenches" have begun to play the role of real opposition, they lack resources and powers to evaluate official policy proposals, promote alternate positions, and develop viable and legitimate compromises. There is need also to provide mechanisms for regular domestic policy dialogue between organized economic interest groups, including both business and labor, and the government of the day.

Proposed Strategy

The overall goal of the USAID/Zambia assistance program is to promote "market-oriented, sustainable, broad-based economic growth", in part by encouraging "economic and political pluralism". Economic growth and democratization are mutually reinforcing processes: growth enables the social mobility and educational opportunity that underpin democratic citizenship; democratization in turn releases private initiative and helps to restrain governments from making unwise policy interventions. Thus a D/G program would directly contribute to achieving the broader goals of USAID/Z's ongoing assistance program.

The strategy proposed here consists of several, mutually reinforcing initiatives aimed at the general objective of enhancing public accountability. We urge USAID to treat the proposals below as a whole by supporting at least one major initiative in each of the following three areas: strengthening civil society, improving public governance, and enabling policy dialogue.

Strengthening Civil Society. Working principally with private agencies, USAID should aim to increase civic awareness among Zambian citizens, reinforce a vigorous independent media, and help institutionalize democratic elections. Specifically, we propose projects to:

- * establish a civic education fund to make small grants for education projects and institutional strengthening for Zambian civic associations;
- * provide training opportunities and capital equipment for journalists, for example to a media resources center for the Press Association of Zambia;
- * enable the Elections Office to overhaul Zambia's outdated voter registration system and the Foundation for Democratic Process to monitor the 1992 local government elections.

Improving Public Governance. Within the public sector, USAID should aim to improve the capability of central government agencies to make better and more coordinated policy and to more effectively supervise and evaluate implementation. Project proposals include:

- * the design, establishment and staffing of a policy analysis unit in the Cabinet Office to coordinate interministerial policies and programs.
- * the establishment of a similar unit in a line ministry, probably the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, with added management audit functions to ensure follow-through on policy implementation.
- * technical and logistical assistance to the Ministry of Legal Affairs to prepare legislation to amend the Constitution of Zambia to upgrade the bill of rights, clarify the functions of the Vice President, and grant additional powers to parliament.

Enabling Policy Dialogue. To encourage a meaningful policy dialogue between state officials and organized social interests within Zambia and to build legitimacy for economic and political reform measures (including privatization), USAID should underwrite projects to:

- * improve research, communication and library facilities at the National Assembly in order to boost the capacity of parliamentarians to initiate and scrutinize legislation.
- * introduce an Economic Council, with necessary staff support, for regular policy consultations between representatives of business, labor and farming communities with an interministerial committee of top government officials.

In addition, the U.S. country team should continue to press diplomatically for political liberalization, particularly as threats to democratic freedoms arise. It should continue to consult other donors with active programs in governance (UNDP, IBRD, U.K.) and democracy (Sweden). By adopting the strategy recommended here, USAID has the opportunity to occupy neglected fields and to become the lead donor in sponsoring democratic governance in Zambia.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Scope of Work

This assessment and strategy paper on democracy and governance seeks to answer the following questions: How is the Zambian political system operating currently? What are the strategic entry points to the system? Have government and private interests in Zambia requested D/G initiatives? What are other donors doing in this field? Which specific activities on democracy and governance could USAID/Zambia undertake?

The scope of work for this paper lists a broad array of topics for investigation (see Appendix 3). In order to consolidate the assessment and to develop a coherent and synergistic strategy, we have organized these topics under broader, generic headings that reflect three major sectors of the polity: the civil society, the state, and linkages between state and society. We address the scope of work by probing the requirements of institutions in each of these three areas. Within civil society we examine interest groups and the media; within the state we focus on the cabinet and civil service; and we regard parliament and policy councils as the key linkage institutions.

While the assessment section of the paper surveys the landscape of all important political institutions, the strategy section is more narrowly and carefully focused. It selects aspects of a few key institutions that are considered ripe for USAID assistance.

A recurrent theme of this paper is the coequal importance of civil society and the public sector. This assessment team is convinced that democratic governance does not result from interventions on the "supply side" of the policy process alone, that is, through internal reforms to centralized public sector agencies. Attention is also required to the "demand side", namely to the organized interests in society whose demands and criticisms are the best defense against abuse of power. As well as streamlining the performance of policy-making and service delivery institutions, therefore, there is need to strengthen institutions that lie beyond the boundaries of the state apparatus. They need help to develop a sustainable capacity to channel demands constructively and responsibly into the policy process.

In other words, we see public accountability as the core concept and activity of democratic governance. Accountability has political and administrative dimensions. Procedural reforms within the public service address the problem of administrative accountability, that is, the responsibility of civil servants to ministers for the implementation of policy instructions. But the problem of political accountability, of the government to its citizens, also requires attention. Hence we also consider institutions that express social interests and insert popular preferences into the policy process.

Thus the strategy proposed here is a comprehensive one. It identifies mutually reinforcing

program opportunities within the public sector, within civil society, and within linkage institutions. We believe that an approach which "triangulates" on the problem of governmental accountability from these three directions offers the best chance of obtaining sustained improvements in democratic governance in Zambia.

2. Program Fit

The overall goal of the USAID/Zambia assistance program is to promote market-oriented, sustainable, broad-based economic growth. How can a new initiative on democracy and governance contribute to this overall goal? Fortunately, the evidence is strong that stable democracy and economic development tend to go together. When comparing nation-states across the world, many analysts have noted the co-existence of developed market economies and stable democratic polities (e.g. Seymour Martin Lipset Political Man, 1960; Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 1991).

Indeed, democratization and growth are mutually reinforcing processes; one is difficult to obtain without the other. For example, democratic values and institutions can only flourish in an atmosphere of expanding opportunities for education, economic gain and social mobility. A political culture of tolerance and peaceful competition is unlikely to emerge under conditions of economic scarcity and impoverishment. Thus growth enables democratization. But the causal arrow also runs in the opposite direction. For example, political pluralism and governmental effectiveness are essential stimulants in promoting economic growth. Through participation in associational life and parliamentary government, for example, private citizens can oversee and influence the behavior of officials and the policy decisions of government. Such democratic institutions offer mechanisms for ensuring that governmental activity supports rather than restricts private initiative.

Examples of the relationship between democracy and economic development are many. It gives the people voice to call a halt to utopian, foolish and wasteful government policies and programs. For example, it was evident to nearly everyone but Nyerere that Ujamaa villagization was a wasteful, ineffective and, indeed, destructive program, long before he recognized it and changed policy direction. Or, in Ghana, the cocoa farmers knew, long before policy makers recognized it, that discriminatory pricing was destroying their industry. Examples of worthless and destructive policies that clearly hurt the vast majority of population are everywhere; but absent working democratic institutions to call leaders to account, little can be done until the system reaches collapse. For every "strong man" wise enough to make no mistakes, there are a dozen Nyereres, Kaundas, Mois, Nkrumahs, Marcoses, and more.

On the more positive side, it is equally clear as an economy becomes more sophisticated, specialized and inter-dependent, that vehicles are necessary to gather and process information and allow stakeholders a chance to defend their vital interests and develop working compromises. Even some of the "successful" non-democratic regimes (South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, Singapore, Thailand) have come under eventual and irresistible pressure to open decision-making to the groups empowered in an advanced economy. There is simply no alternative if

stagnation and decline are to be avoided. Finally, democratic legitimacy is often necessary to make those policy changes needed to sustain long term economic development, but unpopular because they will cause short-term hardship to some. Indeed, witness Mexico under Salinas, Argentina under Menem, and Zambia under Chiluba.

As with any effort at institutional change, the consolidation of democracy is a long-term undertaking. Any program to promote democracy and governance in Zambia must allow sufficient time for results to mature. In this report we recommend initiatives for the first three to five years of a D/G program. But, in order to obtain real impact, USAID/Zambia should not enter this field unless it is prepared to commit a sustained flow of resources over a much longer period, in the range of ten to fifteen years.

II. BACKGROUND

1. The Democratic Transition

Zambia's democratic impulse originated largely internally, within domestic society. While the timing of popular protest in Zambia was prompted by the collapse of one-party regimes and control economies in Eastern Europe, the underlying causes of political reform lay in resentment among ordinary Zambians at their loss of purchasing power and political liberties. These concerns were vented spontaneously through food riots and more systematically through demands for multiparty elections by an array of labor, business, student, professional, church, and media organizations. These institutions of civil society were the building blocks of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

Behind the scenes, international donors played a supporting role in the political transition. Unlike in Kenya and Malawi, Zambia was not confronted with overt political conditions on the disbursement of aid. Instead, donors including the U.S. Embassy, helped to provide a conducive environment for political change by encouraging Kaunda when he made concessions to the opposition, and by stepping in quickly once the general elections were announced to underwrite an election monitoring effort by civic associations.

MMD won the October 1991 elections by a landslide, capturing 75 percent of the presidential and parliamentary votes and securing majorities in eight of the nine provinces countrywide. This convincing margin of victory provides the new government with its most valuable resource: political legitimacy. The Chiluba government obtained a mandate from the electorate to undertake sweeping structural reform in both economic and political life.

The critical political challenge during a transition to democracy is to hold general elections that are broadly acknowledged to be free and fair. This Zambia accomplished by October 1991. In the post-transition phase of democratic consolidation there is need to ensure that the practice of elections becomes regularized. Moreover, between elections, the government must provide citizens with institutionalized channels of access to the day-to-day processes of decision-making.

In the Zambian context, where the government has ambitious plans to restructure the economy, there is particular need to ensure that all affected parties have an opportunity to be involved in the public policy process.

2. From Transition to Consolidation

Already, the euphoria and high expectations that accompanied the MMD victory in 1991 have rapidly faded. The contradictions involved in trying to consolidate democracy and privatize the economy at the same time are being starkly revealed. On the one hand, the austerity measures necessary to put the economy on a sound footing threaten to undermine the new government's hard-won legitimacy. On the other hand, the refreshing atmosphere of pluralism and debate in Zambian politics sometimes distracts leaders into unproductive political squabbles and inhibits the construction of coherent public policy.

The economic obstacles are formidable. Zambia faces a monumental debt, high inflation, chronic shortages of development capital and skills, and a reputation for high risk and unreliability among international investors. On the positive side, President Chiluba has taken bold policy initiatives that his predecessor, Kenneth Kaunda, had always resisted. In December 1991, he announced the removal of the subsidy on super-refined maize meal and the reduction to 10 percent of the subsidy on the staple roller meal. Significantly, this announcement was not followed by urban riots, as had occurred following previous subsidy cuts in 1974, 1986 and 1990. At least at the outset, the legitimacy of the electoral victory outweighed potential opposition to austerity.

The policies of privatization and public sector retrenchment will not encounter such smooth sailing. Zambians in many walks of life express a fear that the pain of structural adjustment will not be equally shared. In its first six months in office, the government confronted widespread industrial unrest, including wildcat strikes, especially among public sector workers. Ordinary people attribute the spiralling cost of living to government policies of subsidy removal and devaluation, and to what are seen as disproportionately high salary increments for senior civil servants. There is widespread suspicion that the sale of public corporations will not be conducted fairly or transparently and that Cabinet ministers will use inside information to obtain personal benefits. The press has already revealed cases of ministers making dubious decisions on contract awards. Thus the moral caliber of the government is yet to be tested. As one informant suggested, "the government's decisions on privatization lie at the heart and soul of what accountability means in Zambia".

Zambia also faces a most untimely drought. The 1992 national maize harvest was a virtual write-off and the affects on consumers of maize-meal will be felt until at least the next harvest in 1993. In this context, the U.S. government grant of \$58 million in food aid in FY 1992 is a major contribution, not only to the alleviation of hunger, but also to the legitimacy of the new government. But the government's need to manage the crisis of the drought will further dilute its capacity to focus on the long-term issues of reform of political and economic institutions.

Because the political transition was very rapid -- less than two years from the ZCTU's first calls for multiparty competition in December 1989 to the election of October 1991 -- the MMD had little time to develop a firm institutional base for democracy and governance. Moreover, power struggles at the pinnacle of the MMD structure (notably over the "number three" position below the president and vice president) have caused uncertainty and fluidity, and delayed institutional consolidation.

The government also operates under a compromise constitution that contains many features of centralized presidential rule. President Chiluba has been reluctant to exercise such inherited powers and has allowed his Ministers considerable latitude in policy making. Ministers have regularly made unauthorized and uncoordinated policy announcements which sometimes have to be withdrawn later. Within the executive branch, civil servants display few entrepreneurial attributes: they are accustomed to implementing orders from above, reluctant to offend their new superiors, and unschooled in the rigors of policy analysis. As a result, the MMD government has been slow to get up and running with regard to both the formulation and implementation of policy.

The opposition is also weakly institutionalized. The official opposition party, UNIP, has a small parliamentary presence and a narrow popular base, mainly in the Eastern Province. Instead, parliamentary backbenchers within MMD have played the most articulate opposition role. But, as will be shown below, the MMD party has displayed a disturbing proclivity to stifle dissent in the party ranks. Because political party structures are fragile, many of the tasks of loyal opposition fall to institutions in civil society. The media, economic interest groups and civic associations thus take on added importance in Zambia as sources of pressure on the MMD to uphold its electoral promises including upholding democracy and human rights.

The resource of political legitimacy is easily dissipated, and the MMD government has already spent some of its endowment. But, given diligent husbandry, governments can also renew and expand their political legitimacy. In part this can be done by providing people with tangible economic benefits. But governments also renew legitimacy by distributing political goods such as genuine participation in decision-making. Between elections, this is best achieved by granting citizens a stake in the public policy process. In Zambia, the challenge facing the government is to spin out its legitimacy until such time as the benefits of economic restructuring become widely felt. This suggests the need for concerted effort at strengthening political institutions both with and without the state and at providing linkages that allow for popular participation in the policy process.

The democracy and governance strategy proposed in this paper derives from the above premises. The consolidation of democracy in Zambia is an important goal in itself, a vital component in economic growth, and a model of political change that is being closely watched throughout Africa. For all these reasons, substantial USAID assistance to the consolidation of democracy in Zambia is warranted at this time.

III. ASSESSMENT

1. The Civil Society

A. Mass Political Culture

Historically, Zambia did not develop a democratic political culture. Traditional political systems -- whether the centralized state of the Lozi, or the village kin groups of the Tonga -- vested authority in male elders and allowed few opportunities for participation in decision-making by women and younger people. British colonial rule was also hierarchical; it superimposed a strong administrative state whose influence was felt by most Zambians through the extensive discretionary powers of the District Commissioner. Resistance to colonialism led to mass political mobilization and for the first time in Zambia ushered in a brief interregnum of multiparty politics during the First Republic of Zambia (1964-1973).

A far more formative influence on contemporary political culture, however, was the single-party rule of Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) during the Second Republic (1973-1991). Power was centralized in the office of the presidency and elections were transformed into rituals of affirmation for the ruling party, thus depriving ordinary Zambians of political expression and self-determination. Because UNIP leaders exercised tight control over the distribution of development resources, many ordinary Zambians concluded that their best hope of upward mobility was to attach themselves to the retinue of a powerful party patron. UNIP thus further encouraged deeply ingrained habits of deference to authority. Its leaders used a combination of threats and inducements to ensure popular compliance and passivity to the "party and its government".

It is therefore not surprising that Zambians are ill-prepared to defend their fledgling democracy. First, they are grievously under-informed about the new multiparty political system. They have limited knowledge of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the protections of the constitution, the mechanics of the electoral code, or of legal procedures and processes. The charter document of the Third Republic -- the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 -- has never been published in vernacular languages, has had limited circulation, and is currently unavailable from the government printing office. As a result, most rural dwellers, especially women, do not know that they have a right to run for elected office. And small farmers are unaware that the cooperative movement belongs to them.

Thus, Zambians have yet to take full advantage of opportunities for choosing their own leaders. The electoral turnout of 45 percent in the October 1991 general elections (and some 20 percent in the April 1992 Nalikwanda by-election) was disappointingly low. Low turnout was due in part to practical problems such as incomplete registration and lack of transportation to the polls. But it also reflected an underlying attitude of political alienation among ordinary people bred by three decades of single party rule. In addition, multiparty competition in Zambia has been accompanied by political violence, and this may be a factor which also discouraged people from

exercising their voting rights. Elections in Zambia have always taken place in an atmosphere of intolerance of dissenting views, of intimidation of voters by party officials, and fear of retaliation for voting "the wrong way".

These are formidable cultural obstacles to the consolidation of democracy. By mid-1992, the frequency of violent clashes between the youth wings of UNIP and MMD were increasing. Mass defections of voters and junior party officials from UNIP to MMD indicated that many Zambians continue to seek the rewards of single-party patronage. And too few voices are raised when MMD Ministers try to inhibit opposition activities (for example, by withholding permits for political meetings or outlawing access to public facilities). Instead, there are inertial tendencies for the populace, especially in rural areas, to lapse back into political passivity and deference to authority.

On the positive side, other attributes of modern Zambian society provide fertile soil for the growth of a more active citizenry. The 1990 census conservatively estimates that urban dwellers constitute 42 percent of the population. And, despite the breakdown of education services, Zambia's nominal literacy rate of 76 percent (World Development Report, 1991) is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. There is thus a modernized sector of the population that is relatively detached from traditional mores and attracted to universal democratic values. Most importantly, these Zambians now have first hand experience of the disadvantages of single-party rule and have asserted a preference for basic political liberties. The educated classes of Zambia's urban areas will not easily again accept monopolistic political controls. Their commitment to checking the authority of politicians creates opportunities to spread a democratic political culture more widely among the Zambian population.

B. The Persistence of Pluralism

By the early 1980s, widespread popular discontent with the rising cost and declining standard of living could not be contained within a single, narrowly-based ruling party. Denied opportunities of open expression within UNIP, opposition political leaders took refuge in civil society. Mass politics thus came to be channelled and expressed through institutions such as student unions, professional associations, Christian churches, and especially the labor movement. And with the spread of an independent press by 1991, dissenting opinions were widely disseminated for the time in two decades.

Zambia thus entered the Third Republic with a plurality of active institutions within civil society which together constituted a sound foundation for good governance. Two main types of organized social groups can be distinguished, each with different strengths, weaknesses and needs.

First there are economic interest groups representing occupational categories (like industrialists and traders, large farmers and organized labor) through such organizations as the Zambia Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU), and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The largest population group and

an untapped economic resource are Zambia's smallholder agriculturalists. Unfortunately, they lack an audible political voice because the previous government captured and controlled the cooperative movement. As a result, the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) never realized its potential as a representative body and became instead a quasi-statal marketing agency that was overcentralized, inefficient and unpopular.

Economic interest groups in Zambia are relatively well established: the organizational roots of ZNFU and ZCTU go back to 1930s and 1960s respectively, although ZACCI was largely dormant until its revival under new leadership in 1991. Economic interest groups in Zambia generally possess large memberships, some professional staff, and a measure of capacity to engage in policy analysis and advocacy. They are sustained financially by member contributions which, for present purposes, are adequate. Thus the main needs of economic interest groups do not lie in institutional development, nor do they seek it; the ZNFU, for example, guards its independence in part by refusing to accept donor funding. Instead, this group of organized interests seeks fora for regular consultations with government over such issues as wages (ZCTU), producer prices (ZNFU), and inflation (ZACCI).

Leaders of economic interest groups express commitment to preserve autonomy from government. This is graphically illustrated by the ZCTU, whose organization was Chiluba's stepping stone to political power. On international labor day, May 1, 1992, chairman Fackson Shamenda reiterated that the ZCTU's first priority was worker welfare, even if this meant opposing specific government policies. While, so far, union leaders have attempted to restrain worker wage claims against the MMD government, the labor-government honeymoon may soon be over. Already, labor leaders complain privately that the government owes too many political debts to businessmen (who financed its successful electoral campaign) and that workers have too few opportunities to benefit from privatization.

The second type of organized group in civil society is civic associations such as the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), and various womens' organizations. They draw leaders and members from professional, student and church communities, mostly in the urban areas. Civic associations distinguish themselves among NGOs by explicitly political programs focused on issues of human rights and democracy. For example, FODEP is a coalition of member organizations that first came together as the Zambian Elections Monitoring Coordination Committee (ZEMCC) established to oversee the 1991 elections. FODEP's immediate objective is to monitor the local government election in Zambia scheduled for late 1992. Civic organizations interpret politics in non-partisan terms, eschewing affiliation with any political party, and offering educational and watchdog services to all Zambian citizens.

In contrast to economic interest groups, civic associations have shallow institutional roots. While the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) traces its origins back to the Law Society of colonial days, the National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG) and FODEP were formed as recently as July 1991 and April 1992, respectively. Even though they gained valuable experience with election monitoring, they remain fragmented, untested in sustained program administration, and badly in need of institutional strengthening. Civic associations currently fall

short of their considerable potential because of the following remediable weaknesses: they are composed of urban elites without a limited mass or rural base; they are dependent on donor resources for both core and program resources; and they have lost a measure of energy and direction in the aftermath of the unifying crusade of the general elections.

A word must be said about political parties which, in most democratic societies, are guarantors of political pluralism. In Zambia, political parties lack organization and resources. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) began as a social movement in 1990 and hastily erected a party structure for electoral purposes in 1991. Since the MMD election victory, the party's best talent has been siphoned off into government, leaving a vacuum at its central secretariat. MMD never had much of a branch structure and the leaders' decision to select parliamentary and local government candidates from above has already alienated some local followers. These same leaders say that lack of funds prevents them from holding the party conference for which many in the rank and file are calling.

UNIP too is a hollow shell. The "delinkage" of the party from public offices and finances has effectively eliminated UNIP's resource base. Its formal structure -- main body, women's league, and youth league -- is formally intact, though the occupants of party offices are now broadly discredited in most parts of the country. UNIP has scheduled a party conference for August 1992. This occasion constitutes the party's best chance of renewal, providing it can remove its old guard leadership and define a coherent platform as an opposition party.

Each party contains political splinter groups, namely the Caucus for National Unity (CNU) within MMD and the Save UNIP Pressure Group (SUPG) within UNIP. The CNU is led by financially independent MMD members outside parliament but is believed to have numerous sympathizers among younger intellectuals on the party backbenches. It has called for investigations of corruption among cabinet ministers and for their removal, through an extraordinary party convention, from the party's national Executive Committee. In many ways, CNU is the real opposition in Zambia today. Both CNU and SUPG have their origins in personalistic struggles over leadership positions rather than in any significant differences of policy platform. Each has the potential to split the major political parties.

C. The Special Role of the Media

During its 17-years under the one-party state, the UNIP government owned and controlled all media institutions in Zambia. The only non-government publication in the country was the *National Mirror*, a monthly magazine published by the Catholic Church. Despite this, the Zambian media played a significant role in the process leading to the re-introduction of political pluralism in the country. Their biggest challenge now is to consolidate their gains and enhance their position as a vital institution of civil society in an emerging democratic culture.

In the months preceding the re-introduction of multi-party politics, the media were crucial in publicizing the views of the various opposition groups demanding for change, such as the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which was then led by the current President

Chiluba. The opposition groups had poor access to the government controlled media compared to UNIP. While major demands and demonstrations by the opposition received media coverage, much of the political news was dominated by statements from UNIP officials lambasting the opposition, and editorial comment was overwhelmingly supportive of UNIP. The popular discontent with UNIP's policies and the decline in the quality of life of Zambians had, however, combined to create an environment where the media's audience easily ignored the government message in favor of the forces of change.

In July 1991, a group of young Zambians took advantage of that environment to launch the *Weekly Post* as the first Zambian commercial independent newspaper since the introduction of the one-party state. The *Weekly Post* pursued a fiercely independent path, quickly becoming the most aggressive publication in the country today. A second independent newspaper, the *Daily Express* (which also publishes a Sunday edition), has remained little more than a mouth-piece for the MMD, and a scandal sheet.

The emergence of a private press has established a new news agenda in Zambia. There is a clear trend away from the old hierarchical structure where news was defined solely by the actions and utterances of senior party officials. A wide range of interests now have access to the media and the press, both government and private, report more voices. However, the pace of change towards this new agenda has been slow in the official press, especially radio and television.

The media in the old news order could sometimes attack cabinet ministers, but not the president or any of the central policies of government such as humanism. Everyone knew their place and the limits to which they could go in expressing their opinions. The new news agenda has brought with it uncertainties among the media regarding the nature and limits of press freedom, and the role of the media in an emerging democracy. Within both government and the opposition, there is a feeling of disenchantment with this new development. In an environment where experience of press freedom has been very limited, even the public appears confused by the many conflicting views reported in the press and is at times alarmed by the extent of some of the coverage critical of the government. A substantial part of the media audience, for instance, fears the press goes too far when it attacks the president directly.

This disenchantment and public confusion are probably no different than what is to be found in developed democratic societies where crossed signals from the media are a way of life. In Zambia, however, the situation is compounded by the inexperience of the polity with the dynamics of democratic governance, by lack of sophistication among the readership and by the inadequacy of the media in measuring up to the challenge confronting them.

In addition to hindrances due to their traditional orientation as an organ of the state, the media in Zambia are ill-equipped in both human and material resources. Zambian journalists are generally poorly educated, poorly trained and poorly paid compared to other professionals in the country. Fewer than one out of ten have a college degree. They have little motivation, suffer from low self-esteem, and enjoy a poor public image, fostered under the previous government

and continued under the new administration.

Entry-level journalists are largely trained at the Evelyn Hone College in Lusaka which offers a three-year diploma, and the African Literature Center (ALC) in Kitwe which offers a one-year diploma. Both institutions are currently poorly staffed and ill-equipped to teach courses in journalism and other areas of communications. ALC is owned and managed by the All African Conference of Churches (AACC) and has an enrolment of about 20 students, most of them foreigners from the region. Evelyn Hone is owned by GRZ and enrolls about 24 students, all of them Zambian. Many of the faculty in the two institutions are considered, even by Zambian journalistic standards, as rejects from the local media.

The University of Zambia recently introduced a four year bachelors degree in communication with an enrolment of 30 students, some of them from neighboring countries, especially Botswana and Namibia. But even this program is plagued with the same host of problems that prey on the two older institutions. The Zambian Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM) offers in-service training for working journalists through seminars, workshops and short concentration courses lasting between one and six weeks. In terms of equipment, ZAMCOM has the best facilities of all the four institutions. It, however, also suffers from a serious shortage of teaching staff.

The low educational levels and poor professional skills among Zambian journalists have serious implications for the media's ability to play an effective role in promoting civil society. Editors complain of lack of basic investigative skills among their reporters, and of the journalists' inability to tell any story beyond the ordinary official press releases or public statements. Political and economic implications of statements reported are often lost on the reporters.

There is practically no specialization in Zambian media. Most of the media organizations, for instance, have business sections to deal with economic and financial news; but the staff operating such sections have no specialized training or background in economics, finance or related fields. Even the weekly *Financial Mail*, a supplement of the *Daily Mail* sold independently on Fridays, has no specialized staff but uses the *Daily Mail* reporters to put together its stories. In numerous discussions with reporters and editors, it was clear that a majority of the journalists have little understanding of political and economic policy, and the media institutions themselves have practically no capacity for policy analysis and interpretation.

Individually, most journalists strongly appreciate the need to provide a counter view to that of the government. Efforts to do so with their limited skills, however, tend to merely perpetuate some of the popular myths and misconceptions espoused in the past by opponents of political and economic reforms.

Material constraints in both the production and delivery ends severely limit the scope of media coverage in Zambia. Television and radio services are restricted to urban centers. Reception is poor outside the major cities due to lack of serviceable transmitting equipment. The print media has limited access to printing facilities in a country where there are only two printing

presses.

The scope of media coverage is also restricted by other physical constraints such as lack of adequate infrastructure. Much of Zambia's economic activity has tended to concentrate along the spine of rail line that bisects the Texas-sized country from the southern border at Livingstone to the Copperbelt in the north. Poor infrastructure and lack of transport limit media coverage to this segment of the country. The vast areas to the east and west of the rail line are largely untouched by mass communications. These areas are the home of the largest population group, primarily smallholder agriculturalists, whose interests need to be integrated into national political and economic policy.

During most of UNIP's rule, these vast rural areas of Zambia were covered by six provincial papers published in vernaculars by the Zambian Information Services (ZIS), a government public relations department. The tabloid-form papers carried local government news as well as the activities and pronouncements of President Kaunda and other national leaders. As the government became cash-strapped, publication of the papers was halted. The new MMD government has already begun allocating money toward reviving the publications. Government officials told the assessment team that the government had no intention of privatizing them. There is no reason to believe these papers will be anything more than mere mouthpieces for the current government.

2. The Public Sector

A. Policy Making and Implementation in the Second Republic

Under the previous regime, numerous problems plagued the formulation and implementation of policy. These included overcentralization of authority and decision-making in the Office of the President, the erosion of morale and capacity of the public service, and the lack of clear policy direction and follow-through.

Overcentralization in the Office of the President was in some ways the key problem from which most others either followed, or which reinforced them. The tendency to pull a multitude of decisions, including often very routine ones, into State House weakened seriously senior leadership in the various Ministries. Fear of overstepping extremely vague lines of authority led ministerial personnel to pass ever more decisions upwards. According to many respondents, the norm of the old regime was "make no errors and you'll retain your position for life". This slowed decision-making, clogged the center with what was often trivia, and meant often in the Ministries that a non-decision or one distant from appropriate knowledge was made.

This pattern affects morale and capacity. It leads to a work environment which offers fewer opportunities for personal actualization, growth and satisfaction. More ambitious individuals will exit such an environment; others will simply resign "in place" and continue to appear at work in body, but little more. Numerous respondents interviewed for this study mentioned the decline of meaningful work as important in the erosion of the civil service.

As well as these problems, overcentralization in the Office of the President impeded effective development of policy. Several respondents noted that many Ministry personnel came to believe that their expertise, information and legitimate interests were rarely considered in presidential policy-making, and therefore responded passively to presidential directives. The role of the presidential "Special Assistants" was particularly noted as contributing to a loss of professional esprit and encouraging ministry resistance to centrally made policy.

Civil Service Capacity declined for several reasons, including salary compression, ineffective performance evaluation and reward, politicization of the civil service and a general declining work environment.

Salary compression was a problem throughout the civil service. It particularly hurt officials at the middle ranks, as top officials retained some valuable non-cash perks to insulate them. Observers argued that this led to reduced commitment to work and a general "brain-drain". The more able and ambitious personnel left for the parastatal sector, the private sector, or for other countries.

Salary compression problems were made worse by what has generally been presented as an utterly non-functional performance-appraisal-reward-promotion system. Exceptionally good or poor performance was rarely highlighted and rewarded, and what evaluation was done was confidential (from the employee), not particularly well-developed, and rarely (if ever) used as a developmental device. Instead, either stagnation or politicized rewards appear to have been the norm. As a result, better personnel left.

Personnel development was haphazard at best, with training programs in no way linked to systematic programs of organizational or personal development. Training, furthermore, was (according to our respondents) largely academic, formalistic and poorly linked to the work-world. There were few incentives to take local training, with assignments handed out haphazardly and received without enthusiasm. Foreign training was equally non-developmental, serving primarily as a reward for the politically connected. The limits of time and terms of reference of this study prevented detailed confirmation of these evaluations. However, numerous and diverse respondents presented a picture of a public service which was largely "asleep", of low morale, eroded competency and professionalism, and in need of reinvigoration, reorganization and new leadership.

Looming behind these two problems was a third, the ambiguity and contradictions of overall governmental policy. This took several forms. First, several senior respondents from the civil service criticized "socialist-humanism" for not providing a clear plan of action. They believed contradictory patterns of directives came from State House, making administration difficult in that context. A second problematic aspect of overall policy was the hypocrisy with which several respondents felt it was pursued. The professed "socialist-humanist" ideology was seen as contradicted by the frequently "capitalist-profiteering" behavior of many among and close to the regime's leaders. Elite behavior was seen as calling for sacrifice from the many, but seeking a luxurious life-style for itself.

Such a public perception has several serious implications for policy-making and administration. First, governmental legitimacy is eroded by those apparent contradictions. This has an obvious affect on the population at large, but an affect within the civil service as well, as the moral authority of the hierarchy is eroded by blatant, or even subtle, disjunction between its behavior and its rhetoric. Secondly, as the disjunction between ideology and behavior is in some measure random, it erodes the ability of the civil servants to take initiatives in any but the most formalistic areas: it is difficult to know when which set of norms (and whose interests) apply to any decision of importance. Non-decisions or bureaucratic formalism became the safest strategy. Third, the general clarity in policy needed to allow civil servants of all ranks to exercise unavoidable (at often desirable) discretion in their implementation decision is absent. Working understandings of the mission, priorities, and models of reality of a given agency, are seen in organizational science as essential to keep any agency's disparate parts in some loose coordination with one another. Absent this, confusion, contradiction and/or paralysis reign.

Fourth, and finally, such rhetoric-reality contradictions erode the development of professionalism, as no clear set of ethical principles can develop with which to build a working professional code. In general, the economic erosion of the old regime combined with these patterns to erode its institutional coherence and ethical backbone. Together, they created many opportunities for corruption and few checks against it.

In summary, then, there were strong forces in the previous regime likely, here or elsewhere, to lead to a low capacity, highly formalistic, passive pattern of public management and policy making. From top to bottom one would expect the public service to be ineffective in evaluating policy and programs, in formulating new policies and programs, and in coordinating public activities. It is this unfortunate legacy with which the third republic must begin to deal.

B. Policy Making and Implementation in The Third Republic

As discussed in Section II, the new government begins its tenure with several advantages and opportunities to overcome the problems of the old. However, there remain numerous challenges and unsolved problems which can render its promise of change a disappointment. These include:

- assuring consistency between regime ideology/philosophy and actions;
- achieving effective coordination and policy development at the top levels of government (presidential, cabinet, ministerial);
- strengthening the capacities of Ministries to analyze, develop and implement policies and programs in their respective areas, including rebuilding civil service capacity and morale.

Each will be discussed.

a. **Consistency in Regime Ideology/Philosophy and Actions:** A capitalist-market-oriented structure is probably no less vulnerable to elite perversion than the former "socialist-humanist" ideology. If the new economic structure is seen as unfairly advantaging some and not offering

rewards proportionate to efforts and a general gradual improvement in the circumstances of all Zambians, then the same problems will reappear. If, in fact there are once again two economic systems instead, and the powerful and privileged are able to escape from the discipline of the market, just as in the last regime those well-placed escaped the discipline of socialism, then cynicism, declining legitimacy, eroding esprit de corps in the civil service, declining professionalism, declining ministerial performance and creeping corruption may be once again expected.

Thus the next few months of privatization and how it is handled are critical. The reform must be seen to be transparent and fair, and the rigor (and rewards) of the market must be open to all. In this regard, USAID and the other donors' programs in this area are important and timely.

b. **Policy Coordination and Implementation at the Cabinet - Inter-Ministerial Level:**

No observer of Zambia in 1992 could avoid an impression of confusion and contradiction in policy-making and implementation at the center. If one considers such public questions as the apparent disjunction between the MMD democratic program and the attacks on UNIP personnel (verbal, physical and through the state), the confusion regarding government policy on the producer price of maize, contradictory pronouncements by various ministries on restrictions on UNIP, the starts and stops of the retrenchment process, or simply the general slowness with which privatization seems to be moving, the picture is of disarray. Less visible policy questions also reflect this, including confusion among ministries and quasi-public agencies over who is responsible to whom and for what. In summary, the ability of the center to develop, coordinate and implement and evaluate policy seems questionable.

Several factors account for these problems. They include the inexperience of new personnel; the rapid pace and seriousness of current policy problems; certain institutional ambiguities of the new, third republic, political ambiguity within the MMD coalition; and weaknesses in institutional devices to integrate and develop policy at the center. Some of these problems will likely cure themselves over time (inexperience) and others are generally well beyond the practical and proper verge of the donors (institutional and political ambiguity). These issues will or will not be resolved by Zambians, and there is not a lot we can do about them. However, the problem of institutionalized weakness in policy integration and development may be amenable to donor assistance. Each of these problems and their contribution to current governmental confusion and ineffectiveness will be discussed.

Many respondents pointed to ministerial inexperience as a key contributor to policy development-coordination-implementation problems. Most ministers of the MMD government have never before held a ministerial-level appointment. Several are new to government and have never held any major administrative position. Thus their day-to-day responsibilities are complicated by simultaneously learning what the general role of a minister is, what their particular ministry does, and how to manage a large organization. Finally, it is unclear how competent and vigorous the personnel they have to work with are, at least below the permanent secretarial level.

Specific problems growing from this inexperience have been confusion over the roles of minister and deputy minister, unclear understanding of the limits of their legal authority, unclear understanding of when they overlap and interface with other ministries and agencies (and which is in charge of what), a poor sense of the political ramifications of some of their actions, some confusion clarifying their roles versus the permanent secretaries, a poor understanding of appropriate issues for cabinet discussion, and serious frustration in getting their ministries to follow their wishes and exercise their policies. In some measure these observations are reminiscent of any new administration, particularly after the previous party had been in power nearly 30 years. However, while inexperience is a problem, we did not find evidence that the ministerial and top civil semi-cadres were not up to the task in their basic abilities.

The need to tread the learning curve has been made a bit more difficult by the pace and seriousness of the policy challenges facing the MMD government. "Crisis management" is rarely orderly and neat, and when a major political transition is combined with it, orderly policy-making is even less likely. The onset of the drought combined with severe domestic inflation and strikes create a difficult environment to deal with the policy challenges of privatization, international debt, structural readjustment, and drastic retrenchment. The need to manage a major drought relief program, for example, has commanded a massive commitment for the Minister of Agriculture, pulling him away from routine management, Ministry of Agriculture reorganization, and the demands of the other policy crises of the moment.

Along with these two general administrative-transitional problems are problems of institutional and political ambiguity. In the institutional dimension, the major problem is with the ambiguous positions of the minister, the cabinet and the president vis-a-vis one another.

Typically, clear executive supremacy would be lodged either in an American-style presidency or a Westminster-style cabinet. In the American system the president would have virtually complete autonomy in selecting his cabinet (subject to a rarely exercised Senate veto) with whom he shares administrative functions, but over whom he has complete control. While they normally exercise significant authority in managing their respective departments and formulating intra-departmental policy, the president's clear superior authority restrains their autonomy and helps prevent "loose canons" from disrupting key policies and programs. In the Westminster system the presidential figure is reduced to purely symbolic and honorary functions (the monarch), and the cabinet centralizes executive and legislative functions in itself. The preeminent role of the prime minister and the tradition of cabinet unity work together to assure policy coherence most of the time. Either way, authority and responsibility are clear enough that orderly government is encouraged.

However, in Zambia today, the cabinet and president share administrative and policy functions: according to the constitution "the Cabinet shall formulate the policy of the Government and be responsible to advise the President." Furthermore, the cabinet is drawn from the leadership of the majority party of the National Assembly, reflecting the Westminster tradition. The president, however, is not elected from the legislature as its political leader, but via an independent election by the population. Thus there are two political bases, but little clarity yet,

constitutionally, politically or customarily, as to exactly which offices are to play which roles in the policy-making process. No one disputes the overall superior role of the president: but how this plays out in the details is not yet clear. Also complicating this situation is the pivotal role played in this system by the permanent secretaries of the Whitehall tradition versus the active presidential aspect built into the constitution. Once again, who is in charge?

Along with these constitutional/institutional ambiguities are some political ones, amenable only to tentative speculation from the outside. These deal with the ambiguity of the MMD coalition. Unknown to us (and probably to Zambia's political leaders right now) are such questions as the relative power bases of the various ministers, both in parliament and in the society in general. To what extent is President Chiluba an independent actor, and to what extent must he defer to his ministers? The constitutional/institutional ambiguity along with the political ambiguity probably explains some of the apparent confusion and disorganization seen in the government.

Complicating all this is the reality that MMD was and remains more a coalition than a party, and that the President is probably reluctant to push hard in some policy areas for fear of fracturing the coalition he needs to carry out his program. Similarly, he is probably also sensitive to the fear many hold of any return to the dominant-presidential institutional patterns of the second republic. The combination of these patterns probably explains the oft-repeated comment we have heard: it seems that every minister is "out for himself" and that the President is not "taking charge."

While this pattern helps explain problems of policy formulation and coordination, it is not particularly amenable to donor assistance. However, certain institutional weaknesses at the center appear to be independently contributing to the problem, and if resolved might help indirectly compensate for these weaknesses.

There is a serious deficiency of policy analysis and integration, and management audit capacity at the cabinet level. Such a capacity is important to assess the cross-ministerial implications of proposed policies, to provide an independent (i.e. beyond the home ministry) capacity to follow-up on implementation, and an ability to evaluate program and policy performance. Some of the ministries have developed or are working on some level of internal policy-evaluation capacity already (Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry perhaps). However, these are entirely focussed on internal policies and provide independent analysis of neither proposed actions nor of cross-ministerial implications. The latter should include impacts on other sectors and ministries and needed parallel actions to support proposed policies.

As it now stands, the Cabinet Office has its Cabinet Secretary plus his small personal staff, and no other capacity to perform such analysis. Other personnel in the Cabinet Office are dedicated to other functions. As a result, ministers are responsible for such cross-sector analysis as gets done. But staff shortages in the several ministries plus their own respective sectoral foci mean such analysis is weak or non-existent. Such a central cabinet staff could also aid the Cabinet Secretary in analyzing which policy memoranda (a proposal from a minister and ministry for general cabinet discussions) ought to go back to ministries for reevaluation and reworking, to

go back to be decided in the ministry concerned, or what might appropriately go to an ad hoc sub-committee of the Cabinet for decision. This would facilitate delegation of decision-making, another weakness.

Management audit is a second absent capacity. Once a policy has been adopted, there exist no resources to follow-up on its implementation, in either cross-ministerial or in intra-ministerial areas. The ability to develop specific work plans from policy proposals, to define specific objectives, and to integrate information gathered in administration is non-existent at the cabinet level. Typically, the ministries are organized so the only reporting and analysis of program performance comes up through the line offices charged with implementing the program. As a rule, no special provisions are made to design performance indicators into programs or projects, and ministries lack personnel with the skills to do this. A strengthened capacity at the center could help fill this void.

As a result of this institutional weakness, good analysis of policy, efficient use of cabinet time, effective use of cabinet sub-committees, and good follow through in policy and program analysis are all lacking.

Coordination of policy implementation at the inter-ministerial level at this time seems to require the active and strong intervention of senior ministerial personnel. We have sat in a ministerial office and watched a minister telephone several heads of other Government of Zambia agencies and ministries in order to get done critical actions agreed to days or weeks before. Up and down the line, officials are passive, bucking upward decisions needed if key actions are to occur. There does not seem to be much inter-ministerial action unless the top level person makes a direct, usually oral command accompanied by appropriate brow-beating and implicit or overt threats. Initiative and follow-through appear weak at all levels without such intervention. The absence of any coordination capacity at Cabinet Office has probably contributed to this situation.

The presidential level of action was defined out of the terms of reference of this work, so little can be said of the capacity there. However, in general it can be said that the appropriate level of concern of a president and his personal staff should be on the general directions of policy, rather than working out the details of inter-ministerial policy coordination and performance follow-up. The Cabinet Secretary is the President's permanent secretary in the President's capacity as Minister of the Public Service, and therefore reports to him. Thus the findings and all proceedings of the Cabinet Secretary are and should be available to the President. This assessment team does not believe that providing these resources in State House rather than at the Cabinet Office is appropriate.

Regardless of the last issue, strengthening the central policy analytical and performance management analytical capacity, seems essential if coordination and evaluation of policy across ministries is to occur and to follow up on and help evaluate performance within ministries as well. Furthermore, such a central capacity would be likely to help integrate some of the institutional ambiguity, by providing an administrative counterweight to the fragmenting tendencies of the current ministers. It might also help them learn their roles more quickly and

respond more effectively to current policy crises.

c. **Policy Coordination and Implementation: The Intra-Ministerial Level:** Key ministries evaluated during this assessment are fairly typical of African public service. Overall, performance is not particularly good. Routine service delivery systems are in place, but often fall well short of goals because of resource or staff shortages. Furthermore, they have weak (if any) reflective capacity with which to evaluate performance and/or environment, and to suggest changes accordingly. There are no or ineffective mechanisms to gather information from clientele, and equally weak or non-existent performance measurement systems. Similar weaknesses are found in ministries and offices with regulatory and licensing functions. Nowhere are there examples of realistic and clear work plans organized around priority objectives, related to actual resources, and tied to measurable indicators of goal achievement. Nor can one find examples of program innovations or initiatives produced by those charged with carrying them out.

While routine services and decision-making plod on, some top level officials in Zambia appear to be overwhelmed with current policy issues and crises. The challenge of retrenchment, the drought-relief effort, privatization and pressures toward ministry reorganization seem to dominate their time, and not always with visible progress toward the goals desired. Evident particularly in the Ministry of Agriculture is the dependence of decision-making on the attention and initiative of the Minister. Where he is involved, decisions get made. But initiative beyond him is wanting, as is staff support in his decision making.

In general, ministries do not appear successful in setting clear priorities, defining specific objectives, allocating resources accordingly (including reorganization around priority tasks, reallocating personnel and other resources and following up with staff support), evaluating their performance, learning from their environment, and adjusting policies and programs accordingly. Rather, each year's plans and proposals seem to be driven by the previous year's budget and the program it defined.

As in the instance of inter-ministerial performance, the explanations for these problems are multiple. They include ministerial inexperience, the decline of the civil service over the past three decades, the chronic shortage of resources, and the top-down orientation of most bureaucracies. They also include the dominance of policy-making in the second republic by State House, the government's tendency to overpromise services and overregulate the economy, the neglect of public input on performance by ministerial structure and personnel, and the absence of staff resources dedicated to rethinking and evaluating programs, policies and practices. Regarding the last problem, where efforts have been made to establish such staff capacity, it appears close line support tasks (routine budget preparation, routine project appraisal, data collection) have tended to displace most longer-term reflective, evaluative, and policy alternative functions.

To sum up, ministries have by no means collapsed in Zambia. They remain and perform certain service and regulative functions. But they do so at low levels of efficiency, without self-

reflection, and appear unprepared to mobilize resources to assist senior personnel deal with crises or major policy innovations.

Particularly clear from our interviews is a situation where middle-level management is falling well short of its role in translating general policies adopted at the top into specific plans of action for them and their areas of responsibility. They, according to our respondents, lack either a clear understanding of new policy initiatives and how those affect their particular areas of responsibility, or simply the initiative to follow through in getting the work done. Thus the top is disengaged from the offices and departments which must actually ACT if changes are to occur.

Similarly, middle-management stands accused of ineffectively determining what its people and offices need to do the job and ineffectively representing those needs to the top. One respondent noted that even legitimate claims for resources were so ineffectively presented that they were easily dismissed. Either middle-management personnel are poorly trained in those tasks or have faced such severe resource constraints in the past that serious analysis and presentation of program needs seemed not worth the effort. Again, this means top-management is disengaged from its ability to lead the organization, to evaluate service delivery performance, and to allocate resources effectively to priority needs.

Interestingly enough, while personnel abilities certainly vary, consensus is that this is less a problem of hopeless personnel than it is of the weakness (or absence entirely) of effective management devices: to follow through in implementing policy; and to evaluate the performance of subsidiary units. In other words, top management needs tools to assist and hold middle-management accountable if either one is to be able to do its job. This applies both to new policy initiatives and getting better field performance on on-going programs. Neither should be seen as necessarily intrusive or punitive arms. Middle managers need analytical and evaluation support to do their jobs, as well as the knowledge that there will be managerial follow-through. Such capacities can help define "contracts" between top and middle management so each knows what the other has agreed to do, over what time period and with what resources. Task clarifications and mutual accountability may help resolve another problem we have heard much about: significant communication gaps exist between most administrative levels, and no one takes any initiative beyond the most narrow reading of explicit instructions from his/her immediate superior. Thus much time (and resources) is wasted "awaiting instructions" rather than independently following through an agreed-upon work plan.

While we were unable to gain access to as many ministerial level personnel as we had hoped, the access we did get (confirmed by informed observers outside the ministries) presented a picture of serious frustration by the senior ministers. They felt unable to command the follow-through they needed within their own ministries to get implemented the programs and policy changes they believed necessary. Similarly, they felt unable to command the information necessary to evaluate the true situation regarding ministry operations and results. One respondent said, "If I want something done, I must follow through every step of the way to get it done... otherwise nothing is done. If I want the true information on some program or

situation, I must go outside the ministry to get the information. I cannot get accurate information from the ministry nor can I get action". In this person's mind the problem was less conscious and intentional blocking, but reluctance of anyone to take any initiative or pass on any information. Far from unwilling to delegate responsibility, his frustration was that he was unable to do so with any confidence the tasks would be completed. A great frustration was not just what he did not know, but that he did not know at times what he did not know! He did not find such institutional devices as existed in the planning area to be helpful in resolving these problems.

A general problem, one beyond the scope of USAID's activity we suspect, is the weak role ministers can play in the management of their ministries. With a permanent civil servant, the permanent secretary, effectively in charge of all management of the ministry, ministers interested in effecting substantial policy or performance change find they have relatively little ability to make sure things get done. Line personnel report to the permanent secretary; support staff report to the permanent secretary; information flows through the permanent secretary, so passive or overt resistance at that level is difficult for a minister to overcome. Information is generated at his command; implementation directives travel downward through him; and follow-through must come from him. If the permanent secretary is weak, distracted or away (as is so often the case), nothing will be done. And the minister has little, if any, internal alternative channels to work through. It would seem that if more rapid policy changes are to occur, policy implementation is to be strengthened, and monitoring and performance appraisal (and reward/punishment) is to become more effective, then somehow the hand of the minister must also be strengthened vis-a-vis his ministry.

In the context of these historical and largely on-going problems, the sectoral ministries (at least as indicated by our discussions about and with Agriculture and Commerce) are working in several areas to upgrade capacity and performance. While these are too recently begun to expect significant changes already, they are promising efforts. They include work in Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry in strategic planning and objective setting (UNDP led), workshops and conferences to upgrade the morale and awareness of managerial opportunities among senior management (IBRD, UNDP), the development of and orientation of senior management toward "APEX", a new performance appraisal system (UNDP), work on reviving the Government Consultancy Service, an organization and management central resource (UNDP), pay hikes for senior and middle management, development (over the past several years) of a planning unit in Agriculture (USAID), a proposed reorganization and planning unit in Commerce, Trade and Industry, and efforts in Commerce to reorganize itself to better respond to the MMD program. Thus, much is occurring, though the impact it will have is as yet unclear.

One might expect the planning department of the Ministry of Agriculture to help resolve some of these problems of policy implementation and evaluation. Indeed, our interview with its director reflected awareness of the need to do these tasks. However, he appraised his success in both as limited: because subordinates resisted his attempt to coordinate implementation of policy and because of poor or little reporting of performance information. He also reported that

only 25 - 30% of the planning department resources were devoted to policy implementation and program monitoring/evaluation. The remainder of his resources are committed to more routine staff support activities: budget preparation, project appraisal, sector analysis, data collection and the like. In the light of other interviews, that estimate may be rather high. The fact that the Minister of Agriculture did not mention these activities in planning suggest that what information is gathered is not particularly helpful, at least for policy-making and management at the top.

The Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry's proposals are, of course, still only proposals. However, there appear to be several problems in the design of the proposed planning unit. It appears overly weighted toward economists, with no policy analysts or management specialists in its prospective personnel roster. Overall, it has almost certainly too many duties and responsibilities, lacking any real focus in its organizational mandate. It includes no management-performance-evaluation component whatever. The information gathering unit is primarily archival and not linked organizationally to respond to the unit's policy (or possible evaluation) functions. The policy development/analysis component of the proposed unit is understaffed, overtasked, and includes only economists rather than policy and program specialists.

In general the mandate of the proposed planning unit does not reflect a comprehensive reassessment of what Commerce, Trade and Industry ought to focus on in the MMD, privatization, market-oriented, climate. In many ways the outline of duties of this (and other departments of a reorganized Commerce Ministry) seems to have incompletely made the transition from a national planning role to a private sector-facilitating role. While the unit is tasked with "developing policies..." in numerous areas, it lacks a mandate to reflect upon the performance of those policies and, indeed, on the performance of the ministry's organization and structure. Its role in operational policy setting and appraisal is unclear, and its link to the line branches is ambiguous. How it will interface with them and not become simply an excuse for them to engage in no planning and self reflection is unclear.

This ministry like most line ministries could benefit from a more finely tuned and focused policy-planning-evaluation unit. A unit with a different mix of professionals, fewer routine-pre-scheduled tasks, a more focused agenda, and one more defined as a management-evaluation-leadership staff tool for the minister, might "shake-up" and invigorate the ministry. It could serve as a catalyst for a general reappraisal of the ministry's mission, its priorities and its objectives, and help assess progress to those goals. It could facilitate preparation of realistic work plans, help ministry professionals determine what priorities were, help evaluate what resources actually were available, help propose how best to utilize them, and help set measurable objectives. In all this it would help set out clear policy choices for the minister, and give the permanent secretaries better management tools. Taking a hold of any large organization is difficult without focused information to clarify possible choices and to evaluate performance. Needless to say, unless the ministry has leadership which chooses such a proactive direction, even the best resources may go unused.

3. State-Society Relations

A. **The Habits of One Party Rule:** Whenever new leaders assume power, they are naturally zealous to make a fresh start. But several MMD Ministers (especially those responsible for local government, home affairs, information, and provincial government in Eastern and Copperbelt provinces) have already displayed an inclination to overstep their authority. They have adopted arbitrary habits of decision-making and policy pronouncements that remind many Zambians of the bad old days of single-party rule. The danger is that, by default as much as design, the MMD elite may find itself emulating the authoritarian political style of UNIP.

So far, the brunt of official fiat has been borne by the main opposition party. UNIP MPs claim the police have been given instructions to systematically harass them with arrest warrants. They also claim that MMD leaders threaten UNIP supporters with deprivation from development benefits, including drought relief. Following an ugly stone-throwing incident in May 1992, the Minister of Local Government and Housing angrily threatened to deny UNIP supporters access to public markets, a tactic previously used by UNIP itself. The President too often remains silent when cabinet officials exceed their constitutional authority in such ways.

Thus the rule of law and tolerance of political nonconformism are already ebbing. In the view of one Lusaka observer, "the government feels threatened by anyone who won't take orders". At the time of writing, the political relations between state and society in Zambia are finely balanced. Disturbingly, the MMD government shows signs of abandoning its early commitments to uphold freedom of association and freedom of speech.

B. **Freedom of Association:** Beyond inhibiting the activities of opposition political parties, the government now seems to wish to contain the growth of civic associations and political splinter groups.

The National Women's Lobby Group, for example, was formed to encourage the election and appointment of women to political office. There are no female ministers in the MMD Cabinet (only deputy ministers) and just six permanent secretaries and three ambassadors. In conjunction with the YWCA, the NWLG embarked on a series of training workshops around the country to encourage women from all political parties to run in the local government elections. In Lusaka and on the Copperbelt, however, MMD officials intervened to prevent attendance, charging that the NWLG was a front for opposition factions and parties. For whatever reason, the NWLG has been unable to persuade the government of its own non-partisanship in working with citizens regardless of their party political affiliation.

The MMD has also singled out for criticism the Caucus for National Unity. While President Chiluba has asserted the right of "pressure groups" to exist, he has insisted that they do so outside of the MMD party structure. Other leaders have been harsher, threatening to "ban" CNU and expel its leaders from the ruling party, and to deprive them of their parliamentary seats. The party leadership apparently wishes to quickly enforce party discipline before

dissatisfied members of its diverse coalition can consolidate an alternative power base. At the time of writing, the MMD National Executive Committee was about to decide whether to eject CNU followers; the decision will be a clear indicator of whether or not the ruling party is able to tolerate democratic dissent within its own ranks.

Notably, the press (especially the *Weekly Post*, but also *The Times of Zambia*) and civic associations (notably the Law Association of Zambia) have taken the lead in defending the NWLG and CNU. They are the main critics of abusive cabinet ministers and leading advocates for the right of freedom of association.

C. Freedom of Expression

The UNIP government controlled Zambian media through ownership. The former President Kaunda's government set up the National Media Corporation (Nameco) which owns the two main daily newspapers - the *Times of Zambia* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*; and the Zambian national Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), the only radio and television service in the country. Nameco also owns the only two printing presses in the country - Printpak Limited, which prints the *Times*; and the Zambia Printing Company, which prints the *Mail*. The government controls the media through the Office of the President and the heads of all its divisions, including the editors of the two newspapers and the broadcasting services, which are appointed by the president. The domestic Zambia News Agency (Zana) and the official public relations organ Zambian Information Services (ZIS) are departments within the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. MMD inherited this structure.

Even under UNIP, there was no direct censorship of the press, although on occasion the government, principally the Office of the President, asked newspapers not to print stories which the government considered to have a negative impact on its image. The presidential appointees at the editorial helm ensure effective self-censorship. Instead, the president's office intervened to replace editors who did not measure up to their gate-keeping responsibilities.

Although freedom of the press was one of the basic rights that MMD pledged to uphold in its campaign manifesto, there are indications that the new government may seek to retain controls on the media. Recent pronouncements critical of the press by senior cabinet ministers and other MMD officials have already had a chilling effect on a press traditionally used to conformity with authority. The emergence of an independent press has also prompted the new government to seek new ways of controlling the media. In the first week of the assessment team's visit to Zambia, police arrested and held for questioning for several hours the editor of the *Weekly Post* after he published a column critical of President Chiluba's conduct.

The action against the *Post* focussed attention on the inadequate legal framework within which the Zambian media currently operate. The action was based on an existing law, enacted under UNIP's one-party state, which makes it a criminal offence for anyone, including the media, to ridicule the head of state. There are numerous other laws hostile to the freedom of expression

in Zambia. Libel laws in the country, where truth is not a defence, are considered among the strictest anywhere in the world. Other laws limiting freedom of expression include many governing such matters as sedition, public morality, public order, state security as well as the registration of books and newspapers and distribution of film materials.

UNIP hardly found it necessary to invoke such laws against the compliant wholly government-owned press under the one-party state. The willingness of the new government to invoke the law against the *Post* has raised serious doubts about the government's commitment to scrapping or amending such laws.

Working in favor of the government and against the media is the media's own ignorance of the existence of many of these laws, or their implications for press freedom. More dangerous than that ignorance is the apathy exhibited by most journalists towards their own plight. This leaves the media highly vulnerable to manipulations by government information management specialists, some of whom have recently been appointed from the media's own ranks.

For instance, the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) promised its members to lobby the new government for a freedom of information law to be enacted by parliament. PAZA officials drafted a bill which it informed members it had forwarded to the government and received a favorable response. It turned out that the bill was but a ruse to enact a law empowering the government to license journalists and regulate their conduct. Some of the drafters of the bill have since been appointed to senior information management positions by the new government.

Lack of professionalism among the media operators could also lead to declining public confidence and official backlash against the media. The media have the tendency of equating news with advocacy. Many reports in the media are published with little regard to facts or fairness.

The most potent form of media control in Zambia, however, still remains the government's ownership of the media institutions - and especially the only two printing presses in the country. Already, some of the reporters and editors working for the government-owned media have begun to slip back to the old familiar ways of toeing the government line, conscious of the security of their jobs. Self-censorship due to such insecurities is prevalent in Zambia. Private newspapers such as the *Post*, already considered hostile by the government, are printed by the government-owned Printpak. Potentially, this provides the government a potent weapon against such independent newspapers and a major deterrent to their development.

The only government-owned media organization on the cards for privatization is the *Daily Mail*. Rather, the government envisages a situation where private operators and investors would be free to establish new media organizations (including broadcasting services) to compete with the existing government-owned ones. The government has already re-introduced state subventions to ZNBC which were suspended, together with those to the rest of state-owned media, towards the end of UNIP rule.

The decision to sell the *Daily Mail* has not been publicly released by the committee on privatization at the time of writing this report. GRZ had, however, already received numerous inquiries from parties interested in setting up private broadcasting services. Most of the enquiries were from foreign sources, mainly the United States, Britain and South Africa; but there were a few local interests, including from two cabinet ministers in the MMD government. All the inquiries were for urban-based FM radio and television services.

Establishment of independent broadcasting services will require amendment of the existing laws that give monopoly of such services to ZNBC. New laws governing telecommunications will need to be enacted and some existing ones amended or repealed to bring legislation in line with the latest technology. The privatization sub-committee on the media is already working on a proposals for new laws regulating such things as foreign ownership, type of ownership, cross-media ownership, frequency allocation and location of communications equipment, among others.

There are already indications that future private broadcasting services in Zambia may expect to be heavily regulated. The sub-committee has, for instance, proposed curbs on ownership by certain types of groups, such as religious and political organizations. It has also recommended strict program content controls. These range to assigning percentages of local program content to restricting or banning political and religious messages. Other proposed restrictions include banning private stations from criticizing foreign governments with which Zambia has friendly relations.

It is easy to understand the government's unwillingness to privatize the existing broadcasting services. Radio remains the cheapest medium for reaching the currently marginalized rural folks, but it has little appeal for private enterprise outside the major urban areas with its low potential for generating advertising revenues. The same is hardly true for the urban-based print media which the government also insists on hanging on to. On the short term, such a policy may have a negative impact on the development of a strong independent media in Zambia. The longer term effects may be difficult to assess at this point.

D. Representation and Oversight: Both constitutionally and in practice, the legislative branch of the government of Zambia is weak relative to the executive. For example, whereas the constitution empowers the National Assembly to confirm some presidential appointments (for example the Attorney General), it vests no such check on presidential authority to appoint cabinet ministers. And whereas the National Assembly is nominally the sole authority for approving expenditures from the general revenues of the republic, in the past the president has simply mandated supplementary estimates and excess appropriations without regard to the budget approved by parliament.

Even today, all legislative proposals emanate from the executive branch, usually through the cabinet. Although MPs may introduce "private members' bills", the requirement that legislators personally cover all costs means that this provision is seldom, if ever, exercised. Because the MMD has a large enough parliamentary majority to pass any legislation, the

potential for arbitrary policy making still exists. But, so far, the National Assembly in the Third Republic has refused to become a rubber stamp for decisions made in the party's National Executive Committee or in State House. The present Speaker, Robinson Nabulyato, has a long record as a champion of parliamentary independence and he manages debates in the Assembly with exemplary even-handedness. Moreover, a new generation of MPs, many of whom have professional qualifications and experience, is making use of legislative procedures to debate cabinet bills and to question cabinet ministers. For example, parliamentarians secured an unprecedented agreement from the Ministry of Defence to submit an itemized budget and defeated the government's proposal to appoint the Minister of Legal Affairs to the post of Attorney General.

Legislating occurs primarily in committees, either of the whole house (sitting as the Committee of Supply for purposes of budget approval), or in sessional committees of which there are currently ten. Because the sessional committees possess the power to summon permanent secretaries to give evidence, they can potentially perform watchdog or investigative functions. The committees are composed of parliamentary backbenchers; ministers and any other persons holding appointive government office are excluded from membership. The pivotal institution for ensuring accountability of government to parliament is the Public Accounts Committee which is charged with overseeing the legality, probity and prudence of public expenditures.

Yet the parliamentary committee system does not operate effectively. The budget discussions in the Committee of Supply are cursory and uncritical. It can only decrease, but not increase, estimates provided by the Ministry of Finance. This limitation includes the National Assembly's own budget. The Public Accounts Committee can do little more than review the Auditor General's annual report since it possesses little capacity of its own to investigate or correct financial abuses. Nor has it in the past probed into irregularities in public service hiring practices.

The committee system's handicaps can be traced to severe shortages of resources. There are only three offices and 10 generalist committee staff to service 150 MPs! This staff is undertrained, being unable to offer informational or procedural advice to members. MPs also lack personal staffs and are even unable to rely on the National Assembly for basic secretarial or more than minimal telephone services. Also, the Assembly's research unit is understaffed and its capacious modern library is seriously short of books; the most recent periodical on the shelves dates from 1987. Since the parliament does not control its own budget it is unable to address the problem of these missing amenities. Notably, there is no legislative committee on economic policy, all such business being referred to a committee on parastatals, even though the important upcoming debate on privatization, beginning in June 1992, is predicted to be stormy.

Additionally, since MPs do not have local offices through which to maintain communication with constituents, their contacts are limited to periodic personal visits during parliamentary recesses. Already, some constituents (even in urban Ndola) have complained that their MPs have never visited voters since being elected.

It is generally accepted that legislative bodies provide three key functions necessary for good governance and democracy: oversight of the executive branch's implementation of legislation; formulation of new legislation; and linkage between the public in general and government. To perform these functions effectively, legislators need resources to gather background information, perform detailed research, develop specialized expertise, and build an institutional memory. All these are necessary if a legislature is effectively to assess government proposals and programs, and to respond to the many, varied needs and concerns of its constituents. However, for these functions to be performed, staff and research facilities are necessary.

While the Zambian National Assembly has strived since November to fulfill these tasks, its weak resource base has hindered it. One must understand this weakens both democracy and governance. The first, because general wants and preferences remain unarticulated and the executive is poorly checked. The second, because the positive legislative role of detailed evaluation of policy, developing viable compromises, and building legitimacy for final proposals, is severely weakened.

IV. STRATEGY

In an effort to design a program strategy that is deep rather than broad, the assessment team wishes to propose a brief menu of major initiatives on democratic governance in which USAID/Zambia may choose to make long-term investments. In addition, we identify several "targets of opportunity" in the current Zambian situation where a timely disbursement of small amounts of funding could help to break immediate constraints to democratic consolidation.

The initiatives proposed below amount to a strategy in the sense that they all address the issue of public accountability (in both its political and administrative dimensions). The initiatives are strategically linked in the sense of being mutually reinforcing. For example, the objective of public accountability might simultaneously be addressed as follows: by promoting civic education among the electorate, by strengthening the policy research capacity of parliamentarians, and by improving the ability of top public servants to coordinate and monitor policy implementation.

The initiatives proposed below constitute three "pillars" on which public accountability rests. In order to maintain coherence in the proposed strategy and to maximize synergy among program initiatives from different quarters, we urge USAID/Zambia to treat the proposals below as a whole. We assume that the Mission will choose among these options, accepting some and rejecting or modifying others, plus perhaps adding alternatives of its own design. But we argue that the greatest positive impact on democratic governance in Zambia will be achieved by supporting **AT LEAST ONE MAJOR ACTIVITY IN EACH OF THE THREE SECTORS OF THE POLITY**, that is, in civil society, in the public sector and in linkage institutions. The three pillars of the strategy therefore are:

- * Strengthening Civil Society
- * Improving Public Governance
- * Enabling Policy Dialogue

1. STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY

A strong civil society is an essential component of any program of democratic consolidation. This is so because the best defense against abuse of political power is an active, educated and well-informed citizenry. Moreover, the construction of private and community institutions outside of the state apparatus directly encourages political and economic pluralism, a goal to which USAID/Zambia is already committed. We concur with the senior Zambia civil servant who opined that "most foreign aid should now be diverted from government and into private hands".

A. Promoting Civic Education

The assessment presented above of the status of civil society in Zambia identified a key weakness: many Zambians do not fully understand their roles as citizens in a democracy. The country would therefore benefit from a major, nationwide campaign of civic education. But which institutions in Zambian civil society are best suited to this task? Political parties are too disorganized and too partisan to spearhead an important national program of this sort. And the public education system is still tainted by association with earlier experiments at "political education", including efforts by radical elements in UNIP to introduce instruction in scientific socialism into the school curriculum. What is required instead are institutions with a relatively strong organizational base, and some record of independence and detachment from partisan politics. From this perspective, we conclude the civic associations, interest groups and the media hold the best promise as vehicles for civic education in Zambia.

Design of civic education curriculum and instructional methods would be the responsibility of a project design team and implementing agencies. But a civic education program would presumably include instruction on universal human rights, the Zambian constitution, the laws of Zambia, and election monitoring. Simple instructional materials would be prepared that are accessible to non-literate persons and to speakers of vernacular languages. These materials could be distributed through workshops and seminars, via posters, booklets and newspaper ads, and on radio and television.

For the moment, it is more important to analyze the capacity of private Zambian institutions as potential implementors of a civic education program than to specify its content. We recommend either or both of the following options.

A civic education program could be mounted through a consortium of Zambian civic associations. There are numerous claimants in this field including the Foundation for Democratic Process, the Law Association of Zambia, the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team, the Zambia Youth council, the Institute for Human Rights and Democracy, the National Womens' Lobby Group, and the Washington Office for Democracy in Zambia. In our judgement, no single organization (with the possible exception of FODEP) yet has the political legitimacy, technical expertise or administrative capacity to run a national civic education program on its own. Moreover, rivalry among these small organizations inhibits concerted

program on its own. Moreover, rivalry among these small organizations inhibits concerted action.

Nonetheless, several civic groups -- especially FODEP, LAZ and NWLG -- have relevant skills and experience at civic education. These should be supported to build institutional capacity and, by incentives, to form a consortium for purposes of conducting a national civic education campaign. FODEP appears to be the only entity with potential to become a credible umbrella for all groups, providing it can work with LAZ in order to draw upon the legal expertise and revive linkages with UNZASU to mobilize volunteer student educators. FODEP's principal asset is a network of church committees which provide access into communities countrywide. These committees are led by citizen activists who provide an invaluable resource of voluntary energy for civic work. FODEP is a preexisting infrastructure that reaches deep into the countryside and outstrips comparable institutions in Zambia. Suggestions on how to manage further institutional development are given below.

Alternatively (or concurrently), an economic interest group could act as a viable vehicle for civic education, especially if it could reach and include large numbers of people who would otherwise be politically marginalized. Ideally, Zambia's small farmers, including female farmers, should be a core constituency. Fortunately, the Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF), under a new set of leaders and an amended Agricultural Marketing Act, now has the potential to become a mouthpiece for small farmer interests. Strikingly, the ZCF annual general meeting in December 1991 decided to privatize the organization well ahead of any government initiative to do so. As a private agency, the ZCF now undertakes agricultural marketing functions only on contract and not by governmental instruction. A newly created Development Services Division of ZCF is attempting to revitalize primary cooperative societies through a membership training program emphasizing democratic management within the cooperative movement. (This program is underwritten by direct support to ZCF from a Swedish NGO which entirely bypasses the Zambian government).

The director of this division now requests additional support to expand the numbers of farmers reached by the training program and to extend the curriculum beyond cooperative management to include the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. This training would be made available to ZCF staff as well as male and female farmers.

The project design team should decide whether the civic education activity should be initially contracted to a U.S.-based private voluntary organization or to a Zambian organization. The core mechanism would be a civic education fund administered by the contractor to which Zambian groups could apply for small grants for pilot civic education projects and core administrative expenses. If a Zambian organization takes the lead, then a U.S. PVO should provide strategic management training to help clarify goals, build capacity, and establish collaboration. If a U.S. PVO takes the lead, then be mandated to work collaboratively with all interested civic groups to establish a coordinating body which, after two to three years, would take over the management of the civic education fund and the national civic education program.

B. Strengthening the Media

The development of a vigorous independent media is crucial to the success of any political and economic reforms, and will be central to the development of civil society and emergency of a democratic political culture in Zambia. Addressing the serious constraints to the development of such media in the country must be given high priority.

1. Training: USAID/Z should consider comprehensive media training programs with the University of Zambia and Evelyn Hone College. (ZAMCOM has a funding arrangement with Germany's Frienderich Nauman Stiftung (FNS) over the next five years' while the African Literature Center's (ALC) church affiliation may cause complications for USAID). Such assistance would include both the provision of teaching staff and equipment. The teaching staff could be provided on a contractual basis. Consideration should be given to some revenue generating activities for the media programs at the two institutions, such a limited printing and publication capability, to make them more economically viable.

Some of the support suggested under training could probably be built into existing Human Resources Development projects of USAID/Z. For instance, it may be possible to write in a media component into the AF GRAD project to help the two institutions send journalism and communications teachers for training to the United States. There might also be a possibility of providing additional support to UNZA's Staff Development Program for similar purposes under a media training component. USAID/Z might also explore the possibility of setting up grants for exchanges in media fields between the two Zambian institutions and U.S. institutions under Title 14 of USAID.

It is important that a major input be sought from USIS which has both experience and expertise in training of journalists and which already has some ongoing complimentary projects of its own.

USAID/Z should also promote exchange programs between the private press in Zambia and US newspapers; internships for Zambian journalists and private media managers with US media organizations; and targeted seminars and workshops. This option could be tailored to specialized training for journalists in such areas as political and economic reporting, and investigative skills. USIS also has considerable experience in this sort of work.

Consideration should also be given to providing media organizations in Zambia with media specialists to give hands-on training to local media managers. The International Executive Services Corps (IESC) would be well suited to provide this kind of service.

2. Legislative Environment: USAID/Z should help strengthen the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) so it can defend press freedom and fight to moderate or repeal some of the existing legislation that unfairly limit freedom of expression. Support should also be provided to encourage links between the local professional association and similar associations abroad to broaden the association's exposure to efforts by journalists elsewhere in the world to influence

the legislative environment affecting them. All, or some, of these activities could be supported independently or as part of the support to the media resources center proposed below. A technical advisor could, for instance, be situated at the media center for this purpose. USIS has all the technical expertise required for such a project.

3. Media Resources Center: USAID/Z should consider financing PAZA to establish a media resources center that would provide a wide range of facilities for the journalistic community a library on media law, local legislation; stylebooks, and biographical material; support services such as a shared equipment-pool - desk-top publishing equipment, computers, laser printers, color separations and graphics design services. Users of such services would range from owners of small publications seeking to prepared camera-ready material, NGOs and other interest groups preparing newsletters, brochures and billboards. The center could also provide meetings rooms for media related functions, including training seminars and workshops. Users would pay for all these facilities and services, providing the center with a source of independent income. Technical assistance would be required initially to assist and train local staff in running the center. USAID has the financial resources and can provide the capital equipment for this kind of project, while USIS has the necessary technical expertise.

4. Capital Equipment: Printing: There is an urgent need to overcome the current bottle-neck where the government controls the only two printing presses in the country. One option would be for USAID/Z to consider financing guaranteeing loans for one of the existing private newspapers to acquire a printing press of its own (the *Weekly Post* would probably be the best suited for this). Another would be to finance the establishment of shared printing facilities under a consortium of publishers or under the media resources center. USIS can advise on this. In either case, the project must have the potential to generate its own revenue and be self-supporting.

Broadcasting: As noted in the assessment, there is little opportunity for private investment in rural broadcasting services. To help reach the wide-sprung rural population and help integrate them within the civil society, USAID/Z should consider assisting the government-owned Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) acquire and instal new transmitters and auxiliary equipment. The choice here could be between centrally placed AM transmitters and decentralized FM transmitters. The principal risk is that the GRZ could continue monopolizing radio services to carry government propaganda to exclusion of other interests. FM transmission offer some potential for negotiating an air-time sharing arrangement between the government and other voices, especially local interests. Such time-sharing would allow for local FM stations to dedicate certain period to local news and information in vernacular. This could be a very effective tool, especially in public campaigns on agriculture, primary health care, Aids, etc. FM transmission also offers future options for some of the regions to turn their local FM stations into community or public radio and get the government out.

5. Privatization: There seems little doubt that the *Daily Mail* will be placed for sale soon. There are serious fears that privatized media organizations in Zambia will be taken up by foreign interests due to lack of venture capital internally. USAID/Z may consider the potential for a recapitalization project for the *Mail* under a new local private ownership of joint venture with foreign interest. It is doubtful how much potential exists for a local management buyout at the *Mail*, but this could be looked into with a view to providing USAID support.

C. Overhauling Voter Registration

In order to build public confidence and commitment to electoral processes, there is need to address weaknesses in the voter registration system. Many eligible voters were turned away from the polls in the general elections of October 1991 because their names did not appear on voter registration lists. Because the last comprehensive voter registration occurred in 1987 (with a brief three week updating period in 1990), the lists omitted persons who had recently changed residence or turned 18 years of age.

A target of opportunity exists for USAID/Zambia to enhance democratic participation by providing assistance to overhaul Zambia's voter registration system. The Director of Elections has requested financial and technical support as follows: to design a system to register voters continuously as they turn 18; to coordinate voter registration with national registration (thus eliminating the current requirement for citizens to carry a separate voter's card); and to computerize voter registers at the provincial level. These reforms would enable the rapid production of updated voter registers and enhance access to the polls for eligible voters.

D. Monitoring Local Government Elections

The Local Government Elections Commission has already decided to proceed with the local government elections in late 1992 without first reforming the voter registration system. The 1987 register will simply be reopened for 14 days to allow voters to correct their place of registration if their names have been misplaced.

The U.S. country team could contribute to democratic participation in open elections by support FODEP's plans to monitor the local government elections. FODEP has the experience to conduct this project with minimal outside technical assistance. But it remains severely strapped for logistical resources for training and deployment of monitors. FODEP should be urged to rewrite its current budget proposal to remove excessive administrative overheads and to concentrate on election monitoring only. Once the election date is known, donors should act promptly on this target of opportunity if the late mobilization of monitors (as happened in October 1991) is to be avoided. As before, the U.S. country team may wish to coordinate with other donors (notably the Swedish Embassy) which are contemplating support for the local elections process.

2. IMPROVING PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

A. **Cabinet-Level Policy Analysis Unit:** The primary project initiative recommended in the public sector is the development of policy-program analytical capacity in the Cabinet Office. The assessment team believes these capabilities would enhance Government's ability to make, coordinate, and implement policy.

As noted in the section of this report assessing the public sector, there are no cabinet level policy or management audit capacities. This means that the lateral implications of ministerial policy are only haphazardly assessed, and that there is no independent (of the ministers themselves) capacity to assess ministerial analyses. It has also meant that there is also no mechanism for supervision of cross-ministerial policy and program implementation, nor an independent mechanism to assess ministerial implementation and recommend alternative approaches. Many of the coordination, evaluation and quality problems of the Zambian public sector, we believe, result from these deficiencies. It is likely, as well, that they make the overall task of the president, setting and evaluating general policy, more difficult as essentially administrative problems remain unanalyzed and unresolved, and policy alternatives are not developed.

Therefore we recommend that USAID, in conjunction with the Cabinet Office develop such a policy-program analytical capacity at that level. Some dozen personnel, organized into one unit, directed by the Cabinet Secretary is recommended. This unit would not duplicate economic planning function done elsewhere, but would focus on the administrative aspects and real-world follow-through needed for inter-ministerial policies and programs. Nor would it duplicate general policy analysis and evaluation performed by the President's special assistants. It would rather serve their purposes by its ability to analyze and coordinate the ministerial implications of such general policies. As the President is the Chairman of the Cabinet and as the Cabinet Secretary is his permanent secretary in his capacity as Minister of the Public Service, these resources would be under his control and should be seen as strengthening the President's hand at a key level of government business.

Currently, the UNDP Performance Management Unit plans to work on the management-performance-audit capacity of cabinet. Regarding this, they believe they have a basic strategic and design issues in hand, but see a possibility for other donor support in actually implementing the program.

USAID assistance for a complimentary policy analysis unit could take the form of training for personnel, research and data processing equipment, vehicles, resident technical assistance in the first several years of unit operation, salary subvention, and the like. Preliminary discussions with the Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Office staffers reflect a clear awareness of these staffing deficiencies, and a keen desire to begin building such a capacity. Because the Cabinet Office is, by definition, a staff rather than line agency, there is a somewhat greater chance its resources will not be displaced into line tasks, as has often happened elsewhere.

B. **Ministry-Level Policy Analysis-Management Audit Unit:** A second project initiative would be to build much the same sort of capacity at the level of one or more strategic ministries, although here including a performance-management audit capacity as well, as no donors are active at this level. Again, as our analysis of the public sector indicated, policy planning, coordination, analytical, evaluative and developmental capacities are weak. Even where some resources have been allocated to a general staff-support role (as in agriculture), our interviews suggest they have not been well used to strengthen the self-reflective, evaluative and innovative capacity of the ministry. Agriculture's planning staff has been drawn rather heavily into budget preparation and routine project appraisal work; Commerce, Trade and Industries' proposed planning staff is in only the discussion stage, but at this point seems overly focused on gathering general information and formulating general plans. While these are not inappropriate for such units, they reflect a limited utilization of them for the more critical functions of short and long term policy and program analysis and evaluation, internal management performance audit, liaison with relevant publics, and implementation trouble-shooting. In short, the ministries need a "brain" to better evaluate how well they are doing, how they might do it better, what they might do instead, and an "arm" to assure the relevant subordinates follow-through in implementation. Thus we recommend that USAID consider expanding its activities with the Ministry of Agriculture to include technical assistance, training and equipment to support this and/or begin a close relationship with the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry as it begins to undertake a major reorganization, including proposed establishment of a general research/planning unit.

However, in making this choice, the Ministry of Commerce is clearly much more interested in this than the Ministry of Agriculture. In our conversations with Commerce, Mr. Dipak Patel, Deputy Minister expressed keen interest in developing a comprehensive relationship with a single donor to help define the technical assistance necessary, and to deliver that assistance, for their general reorganization plan. This goes a bit beyond our sense of the Ministry's priority needs in the planning area, but should certainly be considered. Mr. Patel felt a single donor who developed such a relationship with them could help assure focus, coordination and follow-through to their efforts. As the key policy change in Commerce is to move from a licensing/regulatory function, to an "enabling" one for the private sector, an American involvement might reflect a "relative advantage".

In some respects this second proposed project initiative has both greater immediate potential payoffs, but more danger of being diluted by its environment than the first. The greater payoffs are because of the unit's closer proximity to ministries in the thick of immediately critical program and policy decision. On the other hand, line pressures are extremely intense in these ministries, and longer-term-oriented staff activities often are displaced by short-term line demands. Senior personnel in line ministries must value and use services such analytical personnel can offer, or their work will be dissipated.

C. **Constitutional Reform:** A third and smaller proposed project initiative would be assistance to the Ministry of Legal Affairs in its work on reconsidering and revising the constitution.

The MMD government entered office with a compromise constitution not of its own making. The Constitution of the Third Republic is based on the report of the Mvunga Commission appointed by former President Kaunda and reflecting many of the latter's own preferences. Promulgated in August 1991, it contains amendments to enhance legislative powers which were included at the last minute at the opposition's insistence. But the constitution still grants considerable discretion to the state president.

The Ministry of Legal Affairs, honoring an MMD election pledge, now wishes to reform the constitution to embody democratic checks and balances on executive power. The Ministry judges that convening a fresh public commission of inquiry will be too expensive. It has opted instead to reopen the files of the Munga Commission, believing that the full range of public opinion was never fully nor accurately incorporated into the constitution. The verbatim tapes, transcripts and submissions from the commission's nationwide hearings are currently stored (in cardboard boxes on the floor!) in the Attorney General's Office. But the AG's workload and the shortage of qualified lawyers in the Ministry are blocking the important task of reopening and reviewing these constitutional proposals.

USAID/Zambia should consider responding positively to a request from the Ministry of Legal Affairs to provide technical, material and financial resources for a constitutional reform project. The Ministry wishes to hire short-term experts in constitutional law and legal drafting to reanalyze submissions made to the commission. Some relevant expertise is available within the Law Association of Zambia, though a comparative constitutional law specialist would probably be required from another Commonwealth country on a short-term basis, possibly through a USIS initiative. The findings would be published, along with the long-out-of-print constitution, in order to stimulate public debate and elicit additional written submissions. The government printing office may also require an infusion of equipment and supplies to expedite this process.

On the basis of public proposals and comments, old and new, the Ministry would draft a "white paper" for submission to cabinet and parliament, preferably before the end of the last legislative session of 1992. If necessary, there would be a referendum on the constitutional amendments, for which the Government of Norway may cover some costs. The revised constitution would likely upgrade the bill of individual rights, clarify the functions of the vice president, and grant additional powers to parliament, for example to scrutinize the president's nominees to cabinet. As such, this target of urgent opportunity, which could be addressed with FY 1992 funds, will reinforce proposals (outlined below) to strengthen parliament.

In evaluating this last proposal, several factors might be considered. On the plus side, it might reinvigorate debate and discussion about democratic principles and rights and strengthen awareness of just what the constitution says on these issues. It might also improve the current ambiguous positions of the Cabinet and the President, as discussed above, and resolve tension within the MMD over questions of presidential powers. On the other hand, it might equally disrupt a just evolving constitutional structure, and intensify political conflict. The team has noted interest in the issue locally by such well regarded figures as the Attorney General and the

Minister of Legal Affairs, but believe further analysis of the local political implication by US personnel is desirable.

3. ENABLING POLICY DIALOGUE

Too often in the past in Zambia, dialogue on important socioeconomic policies -- including structural adjustment -- has been limited to government and donors. Sometimes donors have consulted private interests in developing an understanding of local needs, but all too seldom have organized interest groups had their own seat at the negotiating table. The objective of the third "pillar" of the D/G strategy is strengthen institutional mechanisms for a meaningful exchange of policy views between state and society.

A. Building Parliamentary Capacity

In the view of one of our Zambian respondents, "Parliament should be supreme". Even if this goal is inappropriate in a mixed presidential-parliamentary system of government, the point still remains that the National Assembly requires improved capacity to initiate and scrutinize legislation.

Thus, USAID/Zambia should consider support to improve research and communication facilities at the National Assembly. The project would focus on the Assembly's Committee and Research Offices and include the following activities: recruitment of additional staff for the Committee Office; training, including study tours for committee chairpersons and committee staff to U.S. legislative bodies (e.g. by greatly expanding the current USIS international visitor programs); library books and periodicals; and computer equipment to upgrade and expedite the publication of the daily Hansard (which is currently running 2-3 months behind schedule). In addition, short-term technical assistance would be helpful to analyse and address the needs of the pivotal Public Accounts Committee and to encourage the formation of a Sessional Committee on Economic Policy to help make transparent the decision-making process behind privatization.

One may object, since Zambia's government was initially modelled on the British parliamentary system, that an American aid agency has no natural advantage in extending support to parliament. But Zambia abandoned the Westminster model, gaining independence in 1964, with a republican form of government under a directly-elected president (the first former British colony in Africa to do so) and evolved a highly centralized presidency under the constitution of the one-party Second Republic. Thus, experience from other presidential systems is now more germane to Zambia. Moreover, the U.S. Congress has relevant attributes -- such as powers of confirmation over Presidential appointments and a legislative process based on independent committees -- which enable legislative openness and assertiveness.

USAID/Zambia should support the institutional strengthening of parliament, not only because the National Assembly is important in its own right as the main representative institution of Zambian democracy, but, as the source of enabling legislation for privatization, the National Assembly is also an instrument to the realization of other USAID/Zambia program goals.

B. Creating an Economic Council

In the half year that has elapsed since October 1991, state-society relations have shifted from confrontation to collaboration. Interest groups have obtained improved access to the policy-making levels of government. Several new cabinet ministers are former leaders or current members of ZACCI (for example Penza, Mwaanga, Kashita, and State House chief of staff Chikwanda). The current Minister of Agriculture, once a commercial farmer, has made a point of attending executive council meetings of ZNFU. ZACCI officials consider that their organizations' suggestions on the Investment Act of 1992 and the 1992 budget were partially heeded by policy makers.

This is not to say that disputes between economic interest groups and government have not arisen or will not intensify. The President's instruction to the Minister of Agriculture to rescind an announcement of favorable agricultural producer prices in May 1992, for example, aroused anger and distrust within the farming community.

In an effort to institutionalize state-society consultations, ZACCI is now proposing an Economic Council in which business, labor and government would hold monthly meetings to discuss pressing issues affecting the economy as a whole such as inflation, wage rates, the budget deficit, retrenchment and privatization. (For example, ZACCI would like to use the Council to push for increased independence of the Bank of Zambia (BOZ) in its role as the regulator of the nation's money supply. In principle, the BOZ supports such a move through pending amendments to banking legislation.) The Council's work is not intended to usurp the policy formation role of Parliament, but to provide an additional opportunity to build confidence and a stake in policy among major players.

The Ministries of Finance and Commerce acknowledge the potential usefulness of an Economic Council. But these ministries have recently advised ZACCI that implementation must await the availability of funds. Because tripartite consultations could begin without donor support, the official hesitance may reflect other unspoken concerns such as reluctance to involve organized interests too closely in policy-making or to reveal disarray in the government's policy-making machinery. There is also need to ensure that the trade unions fully endorse the concept of the Economic Council since some labor unions have expressed a fear that it will be dominated by business interests. The ZNFU also wants separate representation on the Council for farm interests.

While there are, thus, some organizational issues to be settled, USAID/Zambia should encourage their resolution, and follow-up by providing support for a small secretariat of Zambian professional staff to service the Council, principally by providing information and analysis for its meetings. Such data is needed if the Council is to emerge as a powerful public-private "think tank" that can come up with innovative solutions to bottlenecks to economic growth. Given the history of the dormant Export Council of Zambia (to which the Government assigned only junior representatives and which has not met in 1992), special attention must be paid to obtaining full

GOZ commitment. Perhaps USAID could use the establishment of the Council as a triggering device for the release of non-project assistance.

Mr. Dipak Patel, Deputy Minister of Commerce, has been charged with establishing such a council, and expressed strong interest in donor support in this project.

C. Non-Financial Assistance

Of all goals of development, democracy and governance are probably least likely to be achieved with infusions of money alone. African governments have shown themselves to be pliable to diplomatic pressures for political liberalization, and the U.S. country team should continue actively to pursue its ongoing dialogue on this subject with the Government of Zambia. At this time, there is particular need for the U.S. government to indicate clearly its concern about growing threats to the basic democratic rights of association and expression.

Civic leaders in Zambia endorse this approach. As a leading lawyer remarked to this assessment team, "the donors must never again prop up an unpopular government; they must speak up quickly if they see deviations". And a prominent Zambian business leader pointed out the importance of human rights protections to economic development: "you can't improve the quality of life where people are oppressed".

In addition, several Zambians suggested that donors should become more directly involved in scrutinizing and expenditures. In Zambia in the past, aid funds have sometimes failed to reach target populations, being diverted instead by politicians or wealthy local leaders. We were struck by frequent predictions (by both partisan and neutral observers) that local MMD cadres would apply tests of political allegiance to recipients of food aid under the 1992 drought relief program. At least one civic organization (FODEP) has expressed interest in independently monitoring the distribution of food aid. By whatever method it chooses, USAID/Zambia could directly meet the goal of public accountability by rigorously monitoring food aid distribution.

4. SYNERGY AMONG PROJECT COMPONENTS

We would like to make clear in the most emphatic terms our belief of the synergy and necessary complementarity of the three proposed legs of this project. Let us begin with the initiative in the area of governance.

No one we could find argued that the conditions and pattern of governance in Zambia were satisfactory. Particularly wanting was the ability of the public sector to make sound policy, design effective programs, coordinate with one another, implement programs and policies, measure and evaluate performance, and respond to those evaluations. While we believe the interventions recommended here will strengthen the ability of the public sector to do these things, there are powerful and well known reasons to expect these improvements to be marginal unless fundamental changes occur in the environment in which the agencies operate.

It is generally accepted in social science that bureaucracies as a rule are strongly conservative entities. This grows from a number of factors linked to their very organization and the propensity of all human beings do seek to control uncertainty. For bureaucracies, uncertainty includes, the difficulty of supervising large numbers of persons, often geographically dispersed, who are doing diverse tasks difficult to clearly and reliably supervise and measure. To maintain control, bureaucratic leadership tends to focus on a few relatively more easily defined and measured activities, and shy away from more difficult and ambiguous ones.

Bureaucracies are only dislodged from these tendencies by external shocks. As long as they can link their innate conservative tendencies with control over their work environment, they carry on pretty much undisturbed. In so far as public bureaucracies are often in economic monopolistic situations, able to set prices and/or command tax subsidies, and able to define through force of law their working environment, the citizens must generally accept what they are given. In brief, it is in the very nature of bureaucracies to be rigid, opaque, and unaccountable. However, when bureaucracies are challenged by the discipline of a general market place, or by well-developed counter-vailing public institutions such as parliamentary bodies, interest and civic groups, and media, then there is some hope of stimulating them to seek better performance and to respond to external demands.

These tendencies in bureaucracies are not produced by poorly trained or unethical personnel. As long as human beings seek to control their environments, bureaucracies will tend toward the conservative pattern described here. Indeed, the better trained the personnel, the more likely the bureaucracy is to succeed! Nevertheless, poorly trained bureaucracies are not the answer, either.

The approach recommended for this project is to strengthen both the "supply" and "demand" sides of better governance. Bureaucratic performance, particularly in those staffing functions that facilitate self-examination and policy redevelopment, needs to be strengthened. It is a serious weakness in Zambia. But just so, those public actors able to challenge the bureaucratic leadership actually to utilize these resources must be dramatically strengthened: parliamentary abilities, private sector abilities and the media. Of course, actual marketization is desirable where it is feasible given their nature of the goods to be produced. But when it is not, then alternatives are critical. Indeed, even when it is, they are critical to keep a sharp eye on the tendencies of private bureaucracies to capture markets and reintroduce the same rigidity, lack of accountability, and opaqueness of the public bureaucracy.

V. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

The preparation of a project identification document (PID) or project paper (PP) is beyond the scope of this assessment and strategy paper. Nevertheless, as a means to help bridge the gap between strategy and projects, we raise the following considerations for the attention of the project design team.

1. General Considerations:

- * In order to achieve impact on the goal of accountability, USAID/Zambia should launch simultaneously several complementary D/G initiatives. At minimum, there should be one activity in each of the three sectors of the policy: the civil society, the public sector, and linkage institutions.
- * The projects have been designed to be complementary and parallel, not sequential. Thus, while they should reinforce one-another, each can be implemented independently of whatever "hitches" the others experience.
- * To oversee a comprehensive D/G program with several project activities, USAID/Zambia should employ one additional direct-hire staffer in Lusaka. If this is not possible, a second best solution would be for a project contractor to appoint a full-time resident project manager in Lusaka.
- * From this point onwards, D/G program development in Zambia would benefit from local expertise. Carefully selected Zambian professionals (with a proven record of non-partisanship and a capacity to resist patronage pressures) should be hired to provide short-term help to the PID and PP teams.
- * USAID/Zambia should request technical input from the U.S. Embassy/Zambia and USIS/Zambia. Personnel from these agencies should serve on a Lusaka-based interagency review board to advise the USAID D/G program manager. This body could also include the regional D/G advisor from REDSO/ESA/Nairobi.
- * A number of activities might be started from existing funding sources. For example, ZCF seminars on democratic rights might qualify under the Human Resources Development Program. And some of the activities of the policy analysis unit in the Cabinet Office might benefit from resources in the Implementing Policy Change program.
- * Because D/G is a new field for assistance in Zambia and in Africa, USAID/Washington and USAID/Zambia should allow a greater than normal degree of flexibility in developing project methods. There should be clearly defined goals, benchmarks and deliverables. But a measure of "learning" should be permitted to implementing agencies to explore "what works" in this new area.
- * Consequently, and because Zambia is one of the first African countries to democratize through elections, the USAID/Z D/G strategy should be backed-up by an intensive and explicit monitoring, evaluation and research plan. We recommend that an independent contractor, perhaps a political science department from a Title XII university, be hired to systematize the lessons of democratic transition and consolidation for use by USAID/AF and Africa missions.

- * The projects are designed to strengthen institutional capacity as well as to respond to specific pressing needs. For example the civic education activity should meet a real need, but also strengthen the executing non-governmental organizations.
- * Whenever possible, institutions outside the executive branch are the targets of this project and play major roles in implementing it. This is to strengthen policy dialogue and civil society.

2. **Design:** Several local individuals could be possible participants in designing component projects. These include:

- * Mr. Mapanza Nkwilimba, FODEP and /or Mr. Charles Chabala, ZCF (civic education)
- * Mr. Sam Sikazwe, Lusaka Press Club, Press Association of Zambia (media resources center), Josephine Mapoma, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (media projects generally)
- * Office of the Clerks of Parliament (parliamentary research capacity)
- * Dr. M. Bwalya, UNDP Project (Cabinet Office policy unit)
- * Ms. Prisca Nyambe and or Mr. Bonnie Mutale, Law Association of Zambia (non-financial support for democracy)
- * Mr. David Frost, ZACCI (economic council)

Key contacts in government for these proposed projects include:

- * Mr. Ali Hamir, Attorney General, Ministry of Legal Affairs (constitutional reform)
- * Mr. Roger Chongwe, Minister of Legal Affairs (constitutional reform)
- * Mr. M. L. Mbula, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Cabinet (strengthening policy analysis in the cabinet)
- * Mr. Gabriel Phiri, Director, Elections Commission (overhauling voter registration)
- * Mr. Sikota Wina, Deputy Speaker, National Assembly (strengthening parliament)
- * Mr. Dipak Patel, Deputy Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry (Economic Council; CTI reorganization)

3. **United States Contracting Modalities:** We recommend that there be one person with an overall coordinating, integrating, evaluating, supporting, redesigning, follow-on role and responsibility. He or she could be a USAID direct hire or could be from an IQC, a RASA/PASA, or an add-on or buy-in to an existing centrally-funded project such as Democracy and Governance in Africa. There are enough diverse aspects to this general project initiative, the environment in Zambia is sufficiently dynamic, and the potential positive spill-over for the rest of Africa are large enough, that someone tasked to maintain an overview and facilitate learning would be desirable. There might also be several on-going analytical activities built into the project. Bi-annual assessments along the lines of that which led to this report would be desirable. These could be contracted through an IQC or an existing project, or through a relationship with a Title XII institution.

The several components we have proposed call for a variety of possible contract options. For example:

- * Civic education: through a Zambian or U.S. PVO active in human rights or policy advocacy work;
- * Parliament: through a Title XII institution in conjunction with the legislative support research offices of a major U.S. state legislative;
- * Economic Council: through a consortium drawn from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Federation of Labor, and one of the major farm lobbies;
- * Media: through collaborative arrangements with USIS;
- * Policy Implementation Analysis and Management Audit: either with a major school of public affairs and administration, the NASPAA consortium, or an ad hoc team built via RASAs and PASAs from OMB, GAO, USDA and Commerce;
- * Voter Registration: a suitable U.S. state office and/or an appropriate U.S. NGO.

4. OTHER DONOR PROGRAMS

Now that democracy and governance have been recognized as essential components of economic development, several donors are moving swiftly to establish programs in these areas. In Lusaka, interested heads of mission including the World Bank resident representative meet periodically for informal consultations on governance.

A. UNDP: The UNDP has established and placed in operation an important series of initiatives in the general area of civil service improvement. Key elements of this include its "APEX" program, an effort to upgrade the personnel evaluation system so it becomes clearer to all parties involved, linked to specific goals and objectives, and developmental for the personnel and the organization. The system, UNDP personnel report, has been developed and they are now working with specific ministries to help introduce it. Along with and in support of "APEX" is a series of workshops on strategic planning with key ministries (Agriculture and Commerce, so far). These are intended to help the ministries set overall objectives, achieved in a more participatory fashion than in the past. The intention here is to provide objectives to link to the "APEX" system as well as to strengthen intra-ministerial communication and team work. Currently UNDP has also underwritten workshops for seminar management on introducing a more proactive and entrepreneurial spirit in the civil service.

Other activities anticipated in their 1991-1993 Management Development Program, or in possible follow-on activities, include strengthening the "Government Consulting Services", a basic organization and management consulting unit for the ministries, providing a management

development unit in the cabinet to gather and disseminate general information on management, and developing the general parameters of a performance management audit system for the civil service, beginning at the cabinet.

UNDP personnel see their activities as focussed around a general upgrading of the managerial ability of the Zambian civil service. They agreed that a policy-coordination orientation such as that proposed in this report would nicely compliment their activities, and saw no conflict between their program and our proposed one. Indeed, there is complementarity between their general personnel strengthening activities and our more specific ones both regarding Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Commerce.

B. The World Bank: The World Bank program is more of a "clearing-house" operation than anything operational at this point. Using the February Conference at Livingstone as a starting point, and an anticipated July follow-on conference to finalize a series of proposals, the World Bank has attempted to define some 12 - 15 project ideas out of a dialogue with senior Zambian civil service and donor personnel. It is critical that USAID be represented in the July Workshop to ensure adequate U.S. input and donor coordination. Through their overall "Public Sector Reform Management Program" the World Bank representative intends to parcel-out the finalized project ideas to the various donors, with either World Bank or donor activity beginning to come on line approximately January, 1993. Among the project ideas mooted at the February Conference (see Public Sector Reform Management Workshop, Volume II, Technical Annexes, Cabinet Office, 1992), there were no projects developed in policy-analysis (either intra- or inter-ministerial). While development of performance-management audit capacities was mooted there, no-one has begun responding to these ideas at the ministerial level.

Our conversation with the World Bank representative suggested his understanding of his role (as the director of the "donor orchestra", and concert master of all economic policy-making and anything related to that area) might need to be dealt with by the U.S. country team, one way or another. However, having noted that and emphasizing his real sense that anything with economic implications was his to vet, I see no obstacle to our proposed ideas at the World Bank.

C. Bilateral Donors: The Swedish Embassy in Lusaka played a lead role in the consortium of donors which supported the administration and monitoring of the 1991 elections in Zambia. And the newly elected government in Stockholm has given a high profile to human rights in Sweden's foreign policy. Funding in this area for Zambia will rise from \$200,000 in FY 1992 to \$1.2m in FY 1993 to cover small projects in institution building (ombudsman and local government elections commission), legal services (LAZ), and training on democratic rights for youth and women (ZARD, Youth Council). The Swedes are also assisting the Elections Office to acquire voting booths and balloting supplies. Their work with voluntary agencies will be conducted through Swedish NGOs.

The British Government has made recent increments to aid levels to Zambia, to the point that the country is now the largest recipient of ODA aid and drought relief in Africa. There is a major British D/G initiative on decentralization, based on integrated institutional development

at the local level. The British High Commission expresses a sense of "ownership" over local government and field administration, which discourages other donors from developing programs in these areas. Once Zambia's decentralization plan has been agreed to, there will probably be room for support from the other donors in this area. The British also provide assistance to the Ministry of Finance (to improve accounting skills and, if approved by the cabinet, to establish a revenue board) and to the Central Statistical Office (to boost capacity to gather and analyze socioeconomic data). They also have one person working with the technical committee on privatization.

The British are not currently supporting the National Assembly, though the independent Commonwealth Parliamentary Association has sponsored short-term visits among parliamentarians on the subject of parliamentary procedure. Through the Ministry of Legal Affairs, the Commonwealth Secretariat is also sponsoring seminars on human rights and multiparty democracy for the civil service, police and army, leading up to a national human rights conference in October 1992.

Neither the Canadian nor the German Aid programs anticipate any significant activity in the areas of democracy and governance. Both were involved in facilitating the democratic transfer of power, and the Canadians are finishing that up, possibly transferring some equipment to a ZIMT follow-on organization. The Canadians have also provided a very small grant to the Womens' Lobby Group to organize workshops on women in local/municipal elections. It might also continue minor support to the Ministry of Legal Affairs in legal drafting. The German Mission has no plans in these areas.

The Norwegian picture is similar. While their overall program is quite large, only a small portion involves "democratization" and none is involved in "governance". NORAD's activities in the democracy area are primarily with NGO's, and are reactive rather than integrated. They respond to requests to support seminars, meetings, pamphlets, educational programs, and some operating expenses for groups such as the Women's Lobby Group and Non-governmental Organizations Coordinating Council. However, they are consciously moving away from funding operating expenses as they believe this stifles the groups' development of strong indigenous roots. The NORAD office estimated their total effort in areas related to democracy, would be around \$380,000 (US).

The Finnish program is similar, with a large commitment in project aid, and smaller activities supporting a number of NGO programs. Their program has been particularly targeted to women's organizations. They have had a small program to strengthen the farmers' cooperative in Central and Luapula provinces, but are phasing these out.

D. **Previous U.S. Initiatives.** The U.S. country team in Zambia is already active in the D/G arena. The U.S. Embassy contributed leadership and funding to the donor consortium which underwrote international and domestic election monitoring in 1991, the first comprehensive effort of its type in independent Africa. USIS/Zambia has developed a creative D/G program, including teleconferences, study tours and technical assistance for Zambian

parliamentarians, judicial officers and journalists. It has also applied I16e and IESC funds to workshops on entrepreneurship in the civil service and computerization within the court system. Along with NORAD, USIS/Zambia has also played a critical role in sustaining the National Womens' Lobby Group at a time when it is embattled by anti-democratic forces. While building a valuable foundation for a more comprehensive program, D/G interventions by the U.S. government have been relatively modest to date.

Private U.S.-based agencies remain engaged in D/G work. The Carter Center of Emory University cosponsored a workshop with FODEP on "Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy" in Siavonga in February 1992 and a consultation between senior government and business interests on foreign investment in Zambia in Atlanta in June 1992. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) (as part of a consortium with the African-American Institute and the International Republican Institute) has secured a four-year \$12.5m cooperative agreement with USAID/Washington for "Elections Assistance in Africa". In Zambia, NDI will implement a project to build capacity within political parties in Zambia with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.) and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (U.K.). For this reason, and at the request of the U.S. Embassy, the assistance strategy proposed here excludes recommendations of support for political parties.

Instead, we identify several wide-open areas for strategic intervention in democracy and governance. USAID/Zambia has the opportunity to enter several fields unoccupied by any other donor. These include policy coordination, political representation, and civic education. As such, USAID could become the lead donor in sponsoring democratic governance in Zambia.

APPENDIX 1. PERSONS CONSULTED

Tim Andrews, British High Commission

Listard Banda, Deputy Director of Industry, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry

James Billings, UNDP Adviser, Cabinet Office

Coralie Bryant, World Bank, Africa Technical Department

Theodore Bull, Director, *Weekly Post*

M. C. Bwalya, Coordinator/Management Development Unit

Peter Canterbury, Ndola Chamber of Commerce

Jeremy Carper, Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS/Zambia

Charles Chabala, Director, Development Services Division

Robert Charlick, Democracy/Governance Advisor, Associates in Rural Development

Emmanuel Chayi, Acting Director, Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation

F. F. C. Chibomba, Assistant Clerk, National Assembly

Florence Chenowith, Chief of Party, ZATPID Project

D. P. Chiponda, Deputy Permanent Secretary

Rodger Chongwe, Minister of Legal Affairs

Elizabeth Dahlin, First Secretary, Swedish Embassy

David Frost, Director, Zambia Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry

Patrick Fungamwango, Acting Managing Editor, *Zambia Daily Mail*

Bjarne Garden, Senior Program Officer, NORAD

Miriam Guichard, Public Affairs Officer, USIS/Zambia

Gary Gunderson, The Carter Center

Ali Hamir, Attorney General

Laurah Harrison, Chairman, Womens' Lobby Group

John Hawkes, British High Commission

Vuokko Heikkinen, First Secretary, Finnish Embassy

Robyn Hinson-Jones, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy/Lusaka

John Hudson, Director, Zambia National Farmers' Union

John Innes, Resident Representative, World Bank

Patrick Jabani, Assistant Secretary for Media Affairs, Ministry
of Information and Broadcasting

Mpenga Kabundi, ILO

L. O. F. Kaemba, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture

Daniel Kapaya, Editor, *Daily Express*

Ben Kapita, President, Zambia National Farmers' Union

M. G. Katala, Clerk Assistant for Administration, National Assembly

M. C. Kawonga, Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office

Bruno Kosheleff, Deputy Director, USAID/Zambia

John Litschauer, ZATPID Project, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry

Val Mahan, General Development Officer, USAID/Zambia

Bishop Mambo, Foundation for Democratic Process

Isaac Manda, Political Advisor, NORAD

David Marlowe, Birmingham Consulting Group, ODA (Decentralization Project)

Daniel Mauza, Economist

Josephine Mapoma, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

- Francis Mbewe, Director of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture
- S. L. Mbula, Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Office
- James McKenzie, Director of Planning/ZATPID, Ministry of Agriculture
- Fred M'Meinbe, Managing Director, *Weekly Post*
- Rose Mulumo, Executive Director, National Womens' Lobby Group
- Bonaventure Mutale, Law Association of Zambia
- Bridget Mwanakaoma, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Legal Affairs
- Bonard Mwape, Senior Lecturer, Political & Administrative Studies, University of Zambia
- Anne Mtamboh, Economist, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
- M. B. K. M. Mulasikwanda, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance
- Kabeta Muleya, Director of Industry, Ministry of Commerce, Trade & Industry
- Patrick Mvunga, UNIP Member of Parliament
- Jowie Mwiinga, Editor, *Weekly Post*
- Japhet Nakalonge, Senior Economist, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
- Mike Ndaka, Director, Zambia Institute of Mass Communications.
- Philip Njeleka, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Zambia News Agency.
- Leonard Nkhata, Permanent Secretary, National Commission for Development Planning
- Mapanza Nkwalimba, Executive Secretary, Foundation for Democratic Process
- Per Nordlund, University of Uppsala
- Prisca Nyambe, Zambia Independent Monitoring Group
- Sister Rose Nyondo, Head, Dept. of Communication, University of Zambia
- S. Odera-Oteng, ILO

Jerry Olson, Counsellor, Canadian High Commission/CIDA

Dominique Ait Ouyahia-McAdams, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP/Zambia

Dipak Patel, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry

Gabriel Phiri, Director of Elections

Robert Pim, Counsellor, Canadian High Commission/CIDA

John Rigby, Democracy/Governance Program Manager, MSI

Richard Sakala, Special Assistant to the President for Media Affairs

Sketchley Sacika, Secretary to the Cabinet

Guy Scott, Minister of Agriculture

Benson Sianga, Director, Zambian Information Services

Arthur Simuchoba, Acting Managing Editor, *Times of Zambia*

Sam Sikazwe, Chairman, Lusaka Press Club/Paza official

Gordon Streeb, U.S. Ambassador/Zambia

F. K. M. Sumaili, Deputy Clerk, National Assembly

Per Taxel, Swedish Ambassador/Zambia

Earle A. S. Taylor, UNIDO

Jack Watson, Private Consultant

John Wiebler, Program Officer, USAID/Zambia

William Whelan, Agricultural Economist, USAID/Zambia

Sikota Wina, Deputy Speaker, National Assembly

Fred Winch, Director USAID/Zambia

Detlev Wokier, First Secretary, German Embassy/Zambia

APPENDIX 2. ACRONYMS

BOZ	Bank of Zambia
CNU	Caucus for National Unity
FODEP	Foundation for Democratic Process
GOZ	Government of Zambia
IBRD	International Bank for reconstruction and Development
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MP	Member of Parliament
NAMECO	National Media Corporation
NWLG	National Womens' Lobby Group
PAZA	Press Association of Zambia
SUPG	Save UNIP Pressure Group
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNZA	University of Zambia
ZACCI	Zambia Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ZCF	Zambia Cooperative Federation
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZANA	Zambia News Agency
ZAMCOM	Zambia Institute of Mass Communications
ZIS	Zambia Information Services
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation
ZNFU	Zambia National Farmers' Union

APPENDIX 3. SCOPE OF WORK

March 20, 1992

GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN ZAMBIA:

A NEEDS ASSESSMENT

I. Background and Concept for an Assessment in Zambia

On October 31, 1991 the Zambian people elected a new parliament and President in the first free multiparty elections the country had experienced since 1968. In a stunning victory, the opposition MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy) swept 125 of 150 National Assembly seats and garnered 76% of the presidential vote for Frederick Chiluba, its trade unionist leader.

Thus, the MMD came to power on November 2, forming a new government based on a pre-election constitution for the Third Republic promulgated on August 30, 1991, with which it had serious problems, and on the promise of its own electoral Manifesto. The constitution committed Zambia to a multiparty republican government blending features of parliamentary systems with a strong presidential regime. It gave assurances of a number of rights, including freedom of expression of thought and religion and of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association including the right to form political parties, the right to a jury trial with the presumption of innocence, and freedom of mobility. The August constitution, however, seriously limited if not compromised many freedoms through clauses providing for laws to limit rights based on "national defense interests," "public safety," "public order," "public morality," and the "protection of the reputation, rights and freedoms of persons or private lives of persons in legal proceedings." In its Manifesto, and in subsequent speeches by MMD officials including President Chiiuba, the MMD went further, declaring less qualified press freedom, and pledging itself to extending rights to children and women not covered in the constitution. It immediately revoked the long-standing "State of Emergency" which had greatly amplified presidential powers under the Kaunda regime, promised that it would reinvigorate local government as a way of giving power back to the people or of sharing the burdens of government, and pledged that it would de-link the political party from the state and would streamline and reform the bloated Zambian public service.

These dramatic steps set Zambia on the forefront of the road to plural democratic governance. Paralleling them, the new government of Zambia began to implement a new economic orientation based on the MMD's commitment to return Zambia to an economy based on free enterprise, the liberalization of industry, trade and commerce, and the institutionalizing of a government "creating an enabling environment whereby economic growth must follow as it has done in all the world's successful countries." This was translated rapidly into the freeing of foreign investment from burdensome formal government requirement with the establishment of a one-stop Investment Center and Board. In a

politically courageous step to bring down expenditures it reduced consumer subsidies, including the total removal of the important subsidy for the better grade of the staple grain ("breakfast mealie meal"). It also began the process of divesting itself of some of its parastatal organizations (an April 1992 bill will sell ten firms and parastatals with most of the rest to follow). Finally, it negotiated a new "Economic and Policy Framework" with the International Monetary Fund (February 27, 1992) committing the government to seeking macro economic stability through reduced expenditures, largely through reductions in subsidies and major cuts in the size of the civil service, bringing inflation down to 45% in 1991-92 (from 100% in 1990-91), and restructuring its tax codes to raise more revenue including the taxing of cash allowances to urban workers.¹

These have been important, even dramatic, steps which the United States government and other OECD donor countries have heartily applauded. Yet they are only a beginning in a process of consolidating democracy and economic liberalization, and in getting Zambia growing again. The new government, and the Zambia people face very difficult times, with the heaviest per capita foreign debt in the world to bear, with vigorous claims being put upon government for the correction of past wrongs emerging as labor actions, student demonstrations, and faculty protests and strikes, and now with a major drought greatly reducing the maize harvest, threatening widespread hunger and forcing the country to import thousands of tons of its staple food.

Nor are Zambia's governance problems resolved, despite significant gains in human rights and freedoms. On the political front, there has been evidence of a struggle for power among the three top leaders of regime (Chiluba, Mwanawasa, and Miyanda) leading to serious uncertainties and tensions among party factions. MMD backbenchers and several key interest groups in the MMD coalition, organized as the Caucus for National Unity, have challenged Chiluba on a number of key issues. Labor, his principal base, has challenged the government on its "one industry, one union" policy. The powerful railroad workers union (RWUZ) has undertaken a number of industrial actions. Students at Evelyn Hone College, at the University of Zambia and at Copper Belt University have demonstrated and their lecturers have struck. The government has responded by shutting three major colleges down. At the local level, there have been serious questions about how much has changed as some members of parliament and other officials switched from UNIP at MMD, and as MMD local officials claimed the right to UNIP controlled government property. While things have changed, old habits of authority and deference die hard both in local society and at all levels of the political system.

Administratively, these tensions and old habits have been even more obvious, as the government has struggled to sort out internal relationships within and between ministries, to organize the president's office for effective action, to sort out relations between political and

¹International Monetary Fund, Economic and Financial Policy Framework, 1992-1994) unpublished, # EBD/92/32, February 27, 1992.

civil service layers of government, and to get the civil service moving on important policy changes. None of these issues have been resolved four months into the new regime, and each weighs on the regime's ability to govern accountably and effectively. Now comes the very difficult task of governing for effective results, having elevated expectations with promises of a new day of accountable and responsive government. It is in this context that the donors, including the United States Government seek to act to do their part in supporting this important African experiment with free and democratic government and economy.

II. General Concept of the Assessment

The overall purpose of a democracy/governance assessment is to provide guidance to USAID/ZAMBIA and to the U.S. Embassy/Lusaka for determining how it can best support democratization and improved governance in Zambia. In many cases assessments must be very broad covering the panoply of structures, institutions, and socio-economic and political processes going on in a given society which may condition prospects both for moving toward democratic reform and economic liberalization and sustaining them. As the above section indicates, the situation in Zambia is somewhat different. Here AID may be able to focus its activities more strategically from the outset, given what is already known from recent analyses by American actors, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Carter Center, and by other bilateral and multi-lateral donors who have been very active in Zambia in the past year.

The concept of the proposed assessment has been guided by preliminary discussions held in Lusaka with members of the U.S. country team (AID, STATE, USIS), and with some actors in the Zambian government and the non-governmental sector. Although these discussions are very preliminary and incomplete, and must be significantly expanded in the assessment itself, they do reveal a clear set of needs and mutual interests which could be the core of the democracy/governance assessment in Zambia. These needs and interests focus on the issues of accountability, responsiveness and public sector effectiveness, keys to improved governance and, in the mind of many actors on the Zambian scene, crucial issues in the sustainability of Zambia's political and economic experiment today.

Analytically, the proposed assessment will be organized around describing and assessing the state of accountability, effectiveness and responsiveness in national government institutions, particularly in the executive branch, among actors at this level, and between national government and civil society. Programmatically, the assessment will lead to a series of options for action and investment of aid resources. It will also indicate how such investments can best be undertaken, through a new democracy/governance project, through existing projects in AID/Zambia's portfolio--such as its Human Resource Development (HRD) program--or through a combination of new project activity, buy-ins and existing programs.

III. Specific Analytic Objectives

In support of the general objectives defined above, the needs assessment team will undertake the following analytical tasks:

1. Describe and assess² how the GRZ executive branch is organized to make and implement policy. Specifically;
 - a. focusing on the capacity and performance of the executive office (the President's Staff at State House), the Office of the Cabinet Secretary, the Cabinet Committee structure, the Permanent Secretaries Offices and Minister's Offices in a number of key economically-oriented ministries;
 - b. assessing their capacity and effectiveness to set objectives, specific clear goals and targets, establish information systems to assess performance on these goals;
 - c. assessing their capacity and effectiveness in delegating responsibility, in delineating roles and tasks between and among actors, in developing action plans, mobilizing resources including appropriate human resources, and in monitoring results;
 - d. assessing their capacity and effectiveness to communicate with one another in ways which enhance accountability and overall efficiency;
 - e. assessing the capacity of the government to assess performance through independent auditing.
2. Describe, assess, and evaluate how these executive branch institutions organize themselves for public accountability. Specifically;
 - a. assessing how they consult with non-state actors, such as labor interests, business interests, agricultural interests, consumer interests, other special interests such as women, and other relevant interests particularly on economic policy and economic interests, prior to making policy decisions or to significantly revising and implementing them;
 - b. describing the available formal and informal mechanisms for involving these interests in policy making, or in channeling their input in the policy process;

²"Assess" shall be taken to mean evaluate and discuss the constraints and potentials for improvement.

- c. assessing how they make information on their programs and performance available to the public, including particularly the above named interests;
 - d. assessing how they mobilize these groups and other relevant interests in the implementation of policy.
3. Describe the character of the public service (civil service) at the level of these institutions, particularly in several key ministries such as Commerce and Industry and Agriculture, and assess capabilities and weaknesses to perform the required tasks of policy and program formulation, development, implementation and performance assessment. Specifically;
- a. describing and assessing systems of personnel management for performance and financial accountability;
 - b. describing and assessing structures of motivation;
 - c. describing and assessing systems for upgrading and training these personnel for policy change and new tasks.
4. Describe how various interests concerned with economic policy attempt to gain access to the policy process through political parties, particularly through the multi-party structure. Specifically;
- a. assessing the capacity of different parties to aggregate and articulate interests in national level politics;
 - b. assessing the mechanism which parties offer for involving these interests, such as caucuses, vote seeking etc.
5. Describe how parliament and members of parliament are organized to further policy accountability. Specifically;
- a. describing and assessing how Parliament (both the majority and the opposition) is organized and staffed to develop and evaluate policy;
 - b. examining how MPs organize to give interests access and to solicit their views;
 - c. examining and assessing how MPs organize to report their performance to interested parties;
 - d. examining and assessing how parliamentary structures such as regular and special committees are organized to hear the views of these interests;

e. examining and assessing how parliament is organized to report its legislative activities to the public.

6. Describe and assess the role of the mass media in contributing to the public accountability process by informing the public and particularly members of interests of public policy making and of public policy performance. Specifically;

a. assessing the effective independence of the media;

b. assessing the staff capacity of the media, including the training of its personnel, particularly to cover policy issues and economic issues;

c. assessing the economic and material limitations and capabilities of the media.

IV. Specific Programmatic Objectives

Based on the analysis of the above issues, a review of existing AID/Zambia programs and projects, other activities by U.S. government agencies such as USIS, and a review of other donor programs and projects in Zambia, particularly multilateral activities by the World Bank and UNDP, and bilateral activities by ODA (U.K), BMZ (Germany), and SIDA (Sweden), the assessment team shall;

1. Develop a set of programmatic options for dealing with the most critical problems of accountability, public responsiveness and effectiveness including

a. proposed programs

b. and vehicles for conducting programs (new project activities, existing project activities, buy-ins to centrally funded projects, participation in multi-donor projects such as the Public Sector Policy Review Project (World Bank).

2. For each proposed option and mechanism, discuss the specific activity to be undertaken, the goal of the activity, and the expected outcome to be achieved.

3. For each assess the capacity of the potential recipient organization to effectively utilize USG support in a sustainable manner.

4. Assess the risks and assumptions associated with the particular option/options proposed.

V. Methodology

The needs assessment team will pursue its tasks through a number of activities. The basic methodology will include, but not be limited to:

1. Participation in pre-assessment review of documents in Washington (AID, World Bank/IMF, UNDP, NDI, Carter Center, relevant scholarly and current reporting).
2. Participation in briefings in Washington (AID, Bank, NDI, ARD Core Team, State, USIS).
3. Review of documents in Lusaka including AID, State, USIS programs, reports, assessments, World Bank, HIID and UNDP resident reports.
4. Field work in Zambia, primarily in Lusaka, with possible visits to media and interest groups as needed in Livingston and Copper Belt towns. Field work will vary by specialist and task and will average 3 weeks. Meetings with USG personnel, other donors, GRZ personnel in State House, Office of the Cabinet Secretary, Ministries (concentrating on Commerce and Industry and Agriculture), MMD, UNIP, third party leadership, relevant interests groups (see Appendix I), parliamentarians and their staff, editors, publishers and journalists.
5. Following this field work, the needs assessment team will de-brief AID/Zambia and Embassy/USIS officials on results of their work. The mission then will work with team members to help define programmatic components of their findings.
6. Prior to departure from Zambia, the team will brief AID/Zambia and Embassy and USIS officials on their recommendations.
7. Prior to departure, the team will complete the production of its draft report.
8. The team will be self-sufficient for office space (to be rented at the hotel in Lusaka), communication, and report production. It will provide its own computer and word processing equipment. AID/Zambia will provide assistance with transportation and travel, and will provide administrative assistance in helping to set up interviews.

IV. Team Members and level of Effort

A six day work week is authorized. The needs assessment team will consist of three members who will work in coordination with AID/Zambia and other country team personnel.

1. Senior Team Member (Specialties: Public Administration, Public Management, Organization Development, Public Service Personnel Systems).

Qualifications: major specialties required. Preferably with familiarity with AID procedures and design principles, or with equivalent experience with other donors.
Level of effort: 30 working days, including 3 days in Washington pre-Zambia assessment

2. Democracy/Governance Specialist (Specialties: Political Science, political economy)

Qualifications: familiar with AID governance and democracy concepts and guidelines, experience with analysis of parliamentary and presidential regimes, prior Zambian experience and field work highly desirable. Experience working with some types of economic interest groups would be very useful.)

Level of Effort: 20 work days, 2-3 in Washington in pre-field work preparation.

3. Media Public Affairs/Participation Specialist (Specialties: Political Scientist in mass communication, mass communications, governmental public affairs).

Qualifications: familiar with governmental public affairs operations and with government owned and private media, media training, information systems and performance management systems skills very helpful. Knowledge of NGO interest groups and gender issues would be very helpful.

Level of Effort: 20 work days. 2-3 in Washington.

Additional Skills: The team should be assembled flexible to include all of the desired skills needed, in addition to the principal specialties outlined above, so that specialists can fill in needed gaps. These skills include:

- a. NGO participation experience
- b. Gender issues experience related to economic interests and interest representation.
- c. Experience with AID procedures and design skills.

PROPOSED TIMING: It is agreed that this activity should start up by late April in order to assure some overlap of the team with the AID/Zambia Mission Director.

APPENDIX 4. CONCEPT PAPER FOR ZAMBIA ASSESSMENT

AN APPROACH TO SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIZATION AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE IN ZAMBIA PRELIMINARY IDEAS MARCH 20, 1992

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The basic premise of AID/Zambia's approach to D/G is that ways must be found to help institutionalize and sustain fundamental changes in Zambian political and administrative life, as a means of promoting prospects for sustained economic development.

In the past 18 months Zambia has undergone dramatic political changes, ending 27 years of UNIP rule under President Kenneth Kaunda, and nearly twenty years of official one-party rule. Civil unrest, pressure from international donors, and miscalculations among the nation's top leadership all combined to produce a series of concessions which gradually moved the country toward the acceptance of multi-party competition, toward a new, slightly more liberal constitution, and eventually toward elections which resulted in the resounding rejection of the sitting government. The depth of change both in institutions, behavior, and political culture, however, may be seriously questioned.

While it may not be statistically demonstratable that political liberalization, democratization, and multiparty democracy are necessarily associated with economic progress, in the case of Zambia at least, a strong argument can be made for that, if these political developments can not be sustained, there is little hope for continued commitment to liberal, market and production-oriented economic policies.³ In its simplest terms, the argument suggests that, unless the Zambian regime is forced by political interests and necessity to adopt policies which foster productive forces in society, it will choose to foster policies which favor consumption, particularly of those groups most supportive and dependent on the regime--the urbanized public service and the ruling-class composed principally of those who control the instruments and assets of state policy. This political policy preference will be very strong, even when such policies undermine both the long-term economic health of the nation, and its crucial international support. To the extent that African democratic reform has been driven by internal forces, it will ultimately have to be sustained as well by them.

³ The argument in this section draws heavily on the analysis and logical presented in Robert H. Bates and Paul Collier, "The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia," unpublished paper, February 1, 1992.

Preliminary analysis of the Zambian case suggests that what threatens to jeopardize the liberal Zambian political system, hence its economic policy reforms, are three fundamental and somewhat manageable problems. All three of these forces compromise the basis of the new state--its support--by threatening effective and perceived accountability.

These problems are:

--Management ineffectiveness and inefficiency, resulting in poor use of human and material resources to obtain desired policy outcomes;

--Low levels of governmental responsiveness to societal actors, with consequent low levels of public accountability;

--Low levels of public awareness of how to influence the system for desired policy outcomes.

The first problem can be viewed mainly as a technical one resulting from inappropriate or poorly understood and implemented structures, from incorrect incentives, and from poor fits between skills and competencies needed and those available. The remedies for these defects, while not easily achieved, are none the less well understood. They involve institutional analysis and design, adoption of appropriate alternative institutions and behaviors, and the acquisition of more suitable skills to make the institutions work to produce policy objectives. They also normally involve putting into place systems for gauging progress toward goals, for rewarding such progress and correcting lack of progress, usually dependent on relatively objective and disinterested evaluation and auditing. The activities define a sphere of "governance" associated with public administration and management reform, with augmenting competence and intra-regime accountability. Without these steps, the public sector is very unlikely to perform at a sufficiently high level to satisfy its citizens and its interests whose policy needs are rooted in a climate favoring competition and production that the regime deserves support. If incompetence and lack of successful policy action breeds opposition if not contempt, regimes are likely to turn to other clienteles and/or to repression as an option to maintain power.

The second problem is much more a political one, although it may also be very negatively affected by low levels of competence. In this view, the twin goals of political and economic liberalization confront regimes and their leaders with a basic irony: to develop support they must make themselves intentionally vulnerable. It is both an analytic and political decision to structure that vulnerability into the system. It takes the form of building channels and bridges whereby non-state actors can connect to government, attempt to influence it, and hold it accountable for its performance. These channels need not necessarily take the routine form of empowered decision making. Often they can be channels of consultation which specific interests in the public view as meaningful and legitimate. To the extent that the state (government) fails to construct these openings, it only deals with public discontent as crises, either of strident demands for redress, or as withdrawal of support of many sorts vital to the internal resource base of the regime. Remedying this problem is in part a technical matter of analysis and recommendation of appropriate forms of structures and behavior. It is also,

however, a political decision which a leadership must make to risk being held accountable in a competitive way, and to risk the potential for incoherence which public demands may threaten. The purpose, then of organizational development consulting to address this kind of problem is never strictly technical. It must address the "corporate" or organizational culture, confronting it squarely with the consequences of its implicit or explicit decisions so that conscious choice to change can be made. Again, without a sufficient level of competence, these choices can never mean much. But without these choices, competence cannot generate long-term support and must itself increasingly serve limitation of options or repression.

The third problem takes us out of the sphere of state sector governance, and into governance in the society as a well, for it is not only state actors who lack the means to participate in the process of public accountability. The problem is also very clearly with the public itself. Fostering public involvement in public policy decision making is a useful activity for sustaining a liberal state which can better address the needs of productive forces of society, but only when state actors are prepared to open up to such forces. Otherwise, the process of "grassroots mobilization" or cultivating the civil society can only be a foundation for revolution or for frustration. Assuming that there is a willingness and capacity of state actors to interact with non-state publics on policy matters, however, there are important activities that can be taken to redress long-standing deficiencies in the civil society. The first involves the flow of responsible information. the public must have access to information on state policies and performance which help it understand how its interests are being affected. Second, citizens must understand how they can attempt to influence the policy process through a variety of means involving, among others, organizations for advocacy, lobby, and electoral choice. Finally, citizens must be educated in a political culture which is civic, in which opposition is viewed as at least potentially legitimate and healthy, and in which participation in the competitive arena of politics, as in the market, is understood as utilitarian at the minimum.

CHOOSING AMONG OPPORTUNITIES

In Zambia today all three of these problems urgently call for action-oriented solutions. It is tempting to argue that governmental competence and effectiveness is the most preliminary, and therefore the most urgently required. It is also the most familiar and seemingly the least politically controversial. Different actors, such as external donors, may be more or less comfortable undertaking one of more of these activities. Nonetheless, the argument offered here is that all three must be undertaken, or sustainability will be compromised.

AID may have many criteria on which to choose options for its own democracy/governance activities. A more detailed assessment will make it clearer which are most technically and politically feasible, and which are in AIDs comparative advantage.

For the moment, the recommendation of this paper is that AID retain all three as possibilities, focusing most of its attention of the first two, but looking for high-leverage opportunities to get involved in the third as well.

As a strategy for sustainable change in Zambia, the following may prove to be an initial approach:

A. Assessment-- Undertake an assessment which describes and evaluates the organization and performance of the Zambia state for public policy formulation and implementation, and for the involvement of democratic forces in the process, with some assessment as well of the organization and functioning of non-state political interests, and communication channels linking the two.

(Spring 1992),

B. Consultation-- Consider using the results of this assessment as the basis of a workshop with high level Zambian governmental and non-governmental leaders to see how they perceive the situation. Does it constitute a problem for them? Is it a policy problem (one for which they can envision a set of activities which will improve the end-state)? Is there a commitment to change the status quo, and if so why? This is presumably the kind of workshop Warren Weinstein was recommending on his earlier trip. A decision must be made shortly after the assessment is done as to how AID wants to use it. The argument here is that without the committed involvement of the stakeholders, all but the narrowest and most technical remedies are destined to fail.

C. Near-Term Action: Begin to work on organizational competence in a limited and directed way.

Several kinds of early start-up activities may be possible which will contribute to a broader governance program, even prior to the design of a democracy project.

1. Focused training through a buy-in such as IPC in an area where there is strong GRZ interest. AID will have to determine whether an opening still exists for IPC type strategic management priority exercises. Some have already been conducted by ministries following the motivation provided at the Livingston UNDP-GRZ Management conference in February 1992. Others may well still exist, perhaps in the top levels of the government among cabinet members, cabinet committees, parliamentary committees, and permanent secretaries and their senior staff in certain ministries.

2. Skills and organizational training through the existing AID HRD project, targeted at governmental actors. The targets and level of this training still needs to be clarified.

3. Experiential learning through the use of an expert--The mission may be able to identify specific and limited organizational needs which will enhance GRZ planning, coordinating and implementational capability, and which can begin to be remedied by bringing in short-term advisors. One such opportunity could be to invite in a former chief of staff of an American President to advise the Zambian President and his staff on the organization of the executive office, on cabinet and parliamentary liaison and on related issues.

D. Longer-Term Support: Design of a medium to long term Governance project.

While the pieces of this project will have to be identified by the assessment team and possibly by subsequent more specialized consultants, and will have to be chosen by the AID mission, possible components involve responses to each of the three problem areas discussed above.

1. On-going organizational development and management consulting assistance and training to specific actors within the executive branch
2. Assistance to the GRZ in understanding and structuring its choices for public access and accountability through both executive and parliamentary institutions.
3. Assistance to non-state actors in the form of training, civic educational programs, organizational assistance, to make them more effective demanders of government policies and performance.
4. Assistant to the informational process through the mass media, to assure improved access to critical information about policy options and performance.