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BUREAUCRACY FOR DEMOCRACY

THE DYNAMICS OF EXECUTIVE-
BUREAUCRACY INTERACTION
DURING GOVERNMENTAL TRANSITIONS

Ledivina V. Cariño



College of Public Administration
University of the Philippines



International Center for Economic Growth



Philippine Institute for Development Studies

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**College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines
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Philippine Institute for Development Studies**

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**To Ben, Benjie and Hiyasmin
who keep me alive and loved
through all the struggles and transitions
of my life**

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Foreword

At no time in history can this volume be considered more timely than today when tremendous transitions in governments around the world are taking place or have recently taken place.

Such transitions which usually witness the realignment of interests and loyalties bring to the fore a particular dimension in public governance that is often felt but rarely documented in a comprehensive manner - - the struggle between the political executives and the bureaucracy. Since the principal instrument used by a political leadership in implementing its vision for the country is the civil service or bureaucracy, the relationship between the political leadership and the bureaucracy therefore becomes crucial if the former is to succeed in attaining the mission it has initially set out to do.

How does a new government make use of the existing bureaucracy in its process of governance? How does the bureaucracy respond to the new leadership? What kind of relationship exists between the new leadership and the bureaucracy during the critical period of transition? How does this relationship contribute to the realization of a truly democratic society?

These are some of the questions dealt with in this study written by Dr. Ledivina V. Cariño, Professor at the College of Public Administration of the University of the Philippines. A scholar of public administration and government for many years, Professor Cariño brings new insights into her analysis of the theoretical basis of the relationship between these two protagonists. The analysis is supported by a rich body of data made even more interesting by the various case studies presented under different models of presidential succession.

Considering the rapidly changing world scenario, the lessons to be drawn from this exposition should prove to be useful to all the political actors concerned. As Professor Cariño says, this issue of executive-bureaucracy struggle is not only of academic interest but could also be used by the actors "... to weaken authoritarians and to refine their imperfect democracies."

The Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) under whose auspices this study was partly written and which undertook the preparation of translating this work into a book; the International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG) which provided the funding of this publication; and the College of Public Administration of the University of the Philippines under whose wings Professor Cariño's analytical and perceptive query was nurtured, therefore, join hands in publishing this volume, with the hope that new governments would have something to guide them as they embark on a new alliance with the bureaucratic machinery.



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This volume is not as good as any of them envisioned it to be, but it would have been much worse without their faith, encouragement and assistance. They are therefore absolved from my errors that remain here.

This book reflects my training and interest in public administration, sociology and political science and represents an integration of several strands of my research career. As such, it is perhaps inevitable that parts of some chapters have already appeared in sections of earlier articles, most of them written during the period of the Rockefeller and PIDS fellowships. The permission of the editors of the following is gratefully acknowledged:

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"Bureaucracy and Balance." *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 32, 1-2 (January-April 1988): 7-30;

"Bureaucracy for a Democracy: The Struggle of the Philippine Political Leadership and the Civil Service in the Post-Marcos Period." *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 33, 3 (July 1989): 207-52;

"A Dominated Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Formulation of, and Reactions to, State Policies on the Philippine Civil Service." Occasional Paper No. 89-4. Diliman, Quezon City: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1989.

"An Assessment of Public Administration in the Philippines, 1986-1988." Working Paper Series No. 90-03. Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1990.

"The Philippines." In V. Subramaniam (ed.) *Public Administration in the Third World: An International Handbook*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990: 102-27;

"Regime Changes, the Bureaucracy and Political Development." In Ali Farazmand (ed.) *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1991: 731- 44.

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The Executive-Bureaucracy Struggle: The Themes and Strategies

"Turn the rascals out!"¹

That strong advice was hurled at incoming American governments from Jefferson's era onwards. In somewhat different words, though often with more vehemence, a similar slogan rings out whenever a government is changed today. It is an assessment, a demand, and a promise: a judgment on the administration being replaced, a desire that its vestiges be removed, and an implicit pledge that the newly installed government will be better than its predecessor. As such, it aptly summarizes the inevitable friction between a new political leadership and the holdovers of the past government, especially the permanent bureaucracy.

On one side are the new governors, still flushed with victory from having won power and eager to launch the mission of transforming the country (all of them visualize this) only to find out that they have a flawed instrument with which to reach this supreme achievement.

On the other side is the bureaucracy, inured in the ways of the outgoing executive, perhaps frustrated that it failed to bring about a transformation, resentful that its momentum had been cut by the ascent of a new government, unconvinced that this one can do a better job, or unwilling to be a party to failure once more. Or each player may see the other as standing in the way of its own unproclaimed selfish goals. That they could have more positive expectations of each other may moderate but not eliminate the tension of the encounter.

The new leadership has to manage its relationship with vital groups and institutions: the other branches of government; the political parties; the military; pressure groups inside the country and abroad; and the mobilized populace. Their outpouring or withdrawal of support is more visible, and thus may seem more urgent. By contrast, its inevitable struggle with the

1. The phrase first appeared in this form as Charles Dana's advice to Horace Greeley when the latter ran (unsuccessfully) against President Ulysses S. Grant in 1872. (Dana was a muckraking reporter for the New York Sun.) However, political analysts have used the phrase to describe the dilemma of new presidents even in earlier periods. For instance, Binkley (1951: 90) suggests that for Thomas Jefferson in 1801, "a turning out of the rascals *en masse* would have been impracticable." Although Jefferson held that federal jobs should be based on merit, finding few deaths and no resignations, he removed Federalists and replaced them with Democratic-Republicans, "foreshadow[ing] the spoils system" (*World Book Encyclopedia* 1978: 65).

bureaucracy tends to be regarded as an in-house, insignificant affair that will somehow resolve itself while the more important linkages are nurtured and the problems they raise tackled head-on. Nevertheless, the success or failure of the new ruling group rests, to a significant extent, on how this underestimated relationship with the career civil service is resolved. For the bureaucracy is the principal instrument and partner of the executive in its struggle for supremacy over the other social forces and in its efforts to lead the country to development, democracy, greatness- whatever it envisions as its goals.

This study deals with how the bureaucracy emerges from this struggle with the executive as a more responsible political institution. Sometimes executive supremacy advances its development towards that goal. At other times, such subordination to the executive makes it a more effective tool of repression. Alternatively, the bureaucracy may attempt to be more responsive to the people while going against executive commands, or, while enjoying its autonomy, crush popular desires which the political leadership supports. Neither executive ascendancy nor the bureaucracy's attempt to sublate it would necessarily lead to the enjoyment of greater democracy by the people.

The democratic development of the bureaucracy is analyzed here in the context of the interaction between the executive and the bureaucracy, with special emphasis on the critical period of turnover from one government to another. It is a study of several concentric dimensions. First, it is an analysis of the executive-bureaucracy connection: the conflicts, accommodations and compromises which two important parts of a political system undergo at their initial encounter. As such, it tests a central theme of the discipline of public administration - that the bureaucracy is a subordinate instrument, that is, only a tool of the person or group who holds the reins of power. As an hypothesis (rather than as an assumption as it is frequently regarded in the discipline), it allows the identification and analysis of other possible relationships, such as a bureaucracy's subversion of executive decisions.

Second, it delves into the executive-bureaucracy nexus as it takes place under different systems of government. Although many bureaucracies have actually thrived under authoritarianism, democracy is the implied context of most theoretical discussions of politico-administrative relations. Moreover, the possibility of a civil service bidding for power *vis-à-vis* the executive has not been tackled systematically in the literature.² This has occurred not only because of the assumption of a democratic context but also because of what this implies: a stable system that goes on regardless of changes in the political leadership. Indeed the literature hardly considers

2. Case studies in public administration usually detail how a particular bureaucracy has changed over time, with a change of government generally regarded as a background rather than an active influence on the growth (or stagnation) of the civil service. See, particularly, country-papers in Thurber and Graham (1973), Lee and Samonte (1970) and Tummala (1982).

that what may take place are not mere changes of governments but even transformations of political systems.

Third, the struggle is shaped by the behavior of other actors within and beyond the halls of government. It is embroiled in the crises that beset the political system and in the accords and disharmonies affecting society. The cooperation and conflict of the state and of other social forces shape and limit the executive-bureaucracy struggle.

Thus, the study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. How do the executive and the civil service relate to each other at the crucial moment of transition from one government to the next? What weapons does each protagonist wield in this struggle?
2. How is the executive-bureaucracy nexus shaped by the type of succession and the actions of other political forces?
3. What patterns of interaction between the political leadership and the bureaucracy emerge under different types of political systems? What factors give rise to or result from these patterns?
4. How do executive-bureaucracy relations strengthen or detract from democracy and the public interest? How can the bureaucracy develop so that it can solve "the classic problem... addressed by democratic theorists throughout history: how to make power accountable" (Knott and Miller 1987: 257)?

Lessons from the Literature

This study attempts a broad sweep. Its relevant antecedents span the fields of public administration, political science and political economy.³ The major issues raised by this disparate literature are presented in this section. They include the types of power distribution in the political system and the society, particularly their connection with the rascal-throwing event of government change and the relationship of the new executive and the civil service with it. These issues will be explored as they affect the democratic development of the bureaucracy and the society.

Distribution of Political Power in Government: Executive Domination of or Sublation by the Bureaucracy

According to liberal theory, the civil service carries out the policies of the government which has direct access to the people through its electoral

The political science literature pays greater attention to changes in government, often concentrating on the political leadership or discussing its relationship with other social forces. However, they devote only a few lines to the bureaucracy (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1978; Herz 1982; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). Exceptions are Lojset (1952) and a short piece by Burin (1952).

3. These issues have rarely been conjoined, thus one can only make this endeavor with great trepidation. Moreover, continuities, contrasts and conclusions may have been drawn which the original authors may not have seen or intended

mandate. However, an executive's dominance over the bureaucracy is not automatic. Rather the relationship between the political leadership and the bureaucracy is a constant struggle for control and domination. This struggle may take on one of two main forms: (1) executive ascendancy (or bureaucratic subordination), and (2) bureaucratic sublation of, or attempt at co-equality with, the executive.

Executive ascendancy. The political leadership bases its claim to supremacy on the mandate of God or of the people, or on some notion of the public interest. This might be legitimated by elections, force, or de facto acceptance by the citizenry. Under the liberal model, control runs through a single line from the supreme authority through its representatives (the political leadership) to the bureaucracy. Where power is derived from the people, this is called "overhead democracy" (Redford 1969: 70).

The dominance of the political leadership, or "executive ascendancy," is supported by the politics-administration dichotomy, a doctrine whose influence dates from the founding of public administration as a discipline (Wilson 1887). The idea of the supremacy of the political leadership over the bureaucracy arises from the functional distinction between politics and administration, and the assumed superiority of political function over administration. The dichotomy also suffers from the erroneous shift of referents from functions to structures, i.e., from a distinction between policy making and implementation to politics as the realm of the political leadership and administration as that of the civil service (Kirwan 1987).

In a sense, the notion of distinct domains for politics and administration is the simplest application of the dichotomy since the compass of each realm, especially its organization and membership, is well-defined. The confusion arises not so much from the differentiation between structures as from the juxtaposition of their functional and hierarchical distinctions, i.e., the idea that politics is the prerogative of the executive being the superior body, while the bureaucracy simply carries out decisions of the regime and does not exercise any power at all.

This understanding of the politics-administration dichotomy gives rise to another durable concept in the discipline - that of civil service neutrality. Here the institution and its membership are presumed to have no political preferences, a view helped along by the assumption that a bureaucracy has no political role. Thus, from these interpretations of the politics-administration dichotomy and bureaucratic neutrality, executive ascendancy over the bureaucracy is practically a given, being only a matter of definition.

Bureaucratic sublation of, or co-equality with, the executive. The bureaucracy of any country is not merely an implementing mechanism. Even Max Weber recognized that real bureaucracies (as against his "ideal type") have power apart from that delegated by the political leadership. According to Weber:

The question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery. And such control is possible only in a very limited degree to persons who are not technical specialists. Generally speaking, the trained permanent official is [more] likely to get his way in the long run than his nominal superior, the Cabinet minister, who is not a specialist (1947: 338).

A bureaucracy that recognizes its power may attempt to be on an equal footing with the executive by expecting its ready-made policy proposals to be accepted without question and its demands for recognition and benefits supported generously by its formal superiors. In extreme cases, what may occur is the process of "sublation" under which the bureaucracy sets aside (in a manner of speaking) the executive while retaining it as the formal head⁴ (Hegel 1969; Mure 1940). Sublation is always short of full ascendancy, because when the civil service completely rules over the leadership, then it has engineered a coup and has become the executive.

Many scholars maintain that the bureaucracy, if uncontrolled, will work primarily for its own interests. For instance, Saint-Simon, Marx and Trotsky all call it a "parasite on the body politic" (Kamenka and Krygier 1979: 37; Held 1983: 127; Lefort 1974-75: 53).⁵ Bureaucratic interests may be directed at its well-being as an institution or toward the advancement of its membership, particularly those occupying its highest levels. A bureaucracy may promote its goals not only in sublating the leadership but also in "resist[ing] subordination" (Weaver 1973: 359), or in "insulat[ing] itself from all but the most drastic changes of political direction" (Siegel 1973: 373).

The power of the bureaucracy may be a concomitant of its own distinctive characteristics. The conclusions of a study of bureaucracy during the reign of Frederick the Great identifies sources of its power that are put to good use even by its contemporary counterparts:

[The bureaucracy was said to] almost automatically...derive great advantage from the impersonal basis of its strength; from its huge size as an organization; from its permanence, functional indispensability, and monopoly of expert knowledge; from its self-consciousness as an aristocratic status group and power elite; and from its patient and oblique obstructiveness. (Rosenberg 1966: 176, as cited in Kamenka and Krygier 1979: 8).

4. Hegel uses the term "sublation" to denote putting together as in one action the opposing processes of cancelling and preserving, as in "[t]he thesis is cancelled as such by the antithesis, but preserved with the antithesis in the synthesis" (Mure 1940: 135). Thus "what is sublating is at the same time preserved, it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated" (Hegel 1969: 107). The concept is considerably modified here as it is applied to the action of institutions which are not coming into synthesis and, being engaged in a battle for supremacy, remain even at its end different entities.

5. The similarity of their views has led Kamenka and Tay (1979: 112) to comment that "the fear of bureaucracy makes strange bedfellows."

The struggle between the executive and the bureaucracy may occur either in stable systems or under disruptive political change. However, no matter how it acquires power, a new leadership is often critical of the performance of its predecessor. Thus, it will generally attempt to reform its key instruments of governance upon its installation. A new government can activate diverse means of dealing with the bureaucracy. They run the gamut from wholesale dismissals to full absorption of the existing organization, from a general overhaul to small-scale tinkering with individual units and processes.

The bureaucracy, for its part, does not simply accept the supremacy of the new leadership. Outright insubordination is rare, but the same thing may be accomplished by absenteeism, malingering and work slowdown. It may also organize its own forces against the leadership through its unions or its supporters in the legislature, the economic elite or mass media. It may seek a reversal of executive decisions through the courts. It may even usurp executive functions while formally acting as the instrument in the name of the leadership. As will be later discussed in the Saskatchewan experience, the executive may not even be conscious of the sublation until the bureaucracy has successfully set it aside, so to speak.

The relationship that obtains between the bureaucracy and the executive is further affected by the position of the country in the democratic-authoritarian axis. Another set of factors derives from the role of the state in society. The executive-bureaucracy relations expected from the operation of these two sets of factors are discussed next.

Distribution of Power in Society: Democracy and Authoritarianism

The basic distinguishing factor of the democratic-authoritarian axis is power concentration. A supplementary feature is how a state passes on the mantle of power from one government to another. Democracy is marked by dispersion and regular alternation of power. On the other hand, authoritarianism concentrates power in one person, family or party, and succession by any other group is usually attended by violence and disruption.

Democracy. Power is supposed to reside in the citizenry in a democracy. As such, those designated as "power-holders" are accountable to the people and govern in their name. Power is thus *distributed* in a democracy; those who want to exercise power compete freely and openly for it. Transfer of power to others outside the incumbent's circle is supposed to take place peacefully and according to accepted rules.

The governors are expected to work for the general welfare. Equality of all is theoretically guaranteed by the right of suffrage, where each person has the same chance as any other to influence the outcome of elections, thus building in a bias for decisions favoring the majority. However, the balanc-

ing of freedom and equality may not be vouchsafed by constitutional procedures in situations where glaring social inequalities exist. This limitation represents one of the main problems of democracy (Lipson 1985).

The process of democratization ideally entails both procedural and substantive aspects. However, its minimal referent is procedural or formal democracy, which at least uses popular methods of governance. As Linz puts it,

The vain hope of making democracies more democratic by un-democratic means has all too often contributed to regime crises and ultimately paved the way to autocratic rule (1978: 97).

Authoritarianism. While democracy tends toward openness and alternation, authoritarianism "is excluding" (Collier 1979: 24), concentrating power in one person or clique. The government is inaccessible to groups outside of the dominant clique except when it mobilizes the citizenry for its own ends.

Power relations are organized in favor of the executive (Cardoso 1973, Thomas 1984). The centrality of executive power manifests itself not only in strong presidents but also in token parliaments and opposition parties, if they are allowed at all.

Although all states ultimately rest on their monopoly of coercion, authoritarianism puts repression in the front of the cart, relying on state violence to control dissent. Such display of state power is justified in the name of stability and order, which in that system are values prized over individual liberty.

The democratic-authoritarian axis. The closer a state is to democracy, the higher is its level of political development. The minimal content of democracy is "formal" and is provided by such processes as regular elections, party competition, universal suffrage and due process. These elements feed into "substantive democracy" as they symbolize the freedom, participation, choice and justice that are nurtured and protected in the system (Bobbio 1984; Mounce 1985; Viola and Mainwaring 1985). Living in the real world, one cannot find completely satisfactory democracies or fully totalitarian states. A functioning democracy may sometimes practice blatant censorship or suppress human rights, while a dictatorship may tolerate protests or even hold dialogues with its political opponents. The distinction between democracy and authoritarianism may blur as either one may use the same procedures, with varying degrees of formalism and commitment. For instance, bloody elections are hardly improvements over their non-competitive counterparts in one-party states, except that the former allow for the possibility of replacing a corrupt and unresponsive regime with another leadership (even if it should turn out to be just as undesirable).

Executive changes. Executive changes in democracies tend to be unproblematic since there are constitutional procedures for succession. Terms are fixed or can be cut short by prescribed procedures (e.g., a vote of no-confidence, followed by general elections in parliamentary systems). A change of leadership thus rests on some exercise of electoral preference, although working democracies differ in the level of genuine participation of qualified citizens in the polls. For instance, the selection by the outgoing president of Mexico of the candidate of the ruling party amounts to a virtual anointment of his successor, since no opposition candidate has ever won the presidency.

Succession in dictatorships is not a subject open to discussion in the polity. Rulers expect to maintain power for life and to bequeath it to a chosen offspring or close associate. Their deaths usually precipitate an internal power struggle that throws aside the designated heir. The ruler is also more likely than in a democracy to be removed violently either by assassination, *coup d'état* or revolution.

The relatively easy removal of political leaders in a democracy works in its favor. The people frequently have no choice but to remove a hated dictator by force, leading to the collapse of his regime. By contrast, even an odious democratic president can be effectively replaced at the voting booths without any risk of breaking down the system.

Elections may be complemented by consultations, demonstrations and other mechanisms to hear out and study popular demands. Nevertheless, these channels of communication cannot deal with all conflicts in a democracy, and force can also topple democratic governments just as it can oust dictators.

After an abnormal change of government or a severe crisis that threatens its hold on power, the political leadership has to undertake the process of reequilibration (Linz 1978). The executive that manages to stay in power must endeavor to rule at the same or higher levels of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness. Meanwhile, a new government may desire a legitimated mandate through a new constitution, referendum or election, before getting down to the business of governing.

One of its main problems would be putting in place its own mode and style of governance. This will entail having to deal with the key institutions, including the civil service, left behind by its predecessor. How they are treated by the new government, whether as neutral instruments, collaborators, beneficiaries or victims, will determine to some extent the kind of changes that it will institute (Herz 1982).

Implications for the executive-bureaucracy interaction. That the executive-civil service interaction takes place in a democratic system is practically a given within the discipline of public administration. The bureaucracy is expected to follow the political leadership through which the sovereign

people express their will. Thus, in much of the literature, bureaucratic subordination is a normative assumption. However, such an assumption fails both as description and prescription. As description, it glosses over the question of whether or not the bureaucracy is in fact dominated by, and is obedient to, the political leadership in all democracies.

The norm of executive ascendancy also fails to anticipate whether - or how - the prescription changes under a dictatorship. Should the bureaucracy remain subordinate to the political masters? Or, raised in democratic soil, ought the bureaucracy now sublate the executive, that is, should the bureaucracy assert its own interpretation of the public interest against that of an executive whose authority precludes popular accountability?

When the types of power distribution in government and society are juxtaposed, four theoretical (as opposed to normative) possibilities emerge. The matrix below identifies the resultant type of executive-bureaucracy interaction by number. These labels will be used to identify the executive-bureaucracy nexus in the countries to be analyzed in this volume.

Patterns of Executive-Bureaucracy Interaction

Power Distribution in Society	Power Distribution in Government	
	Executive Ascendant	Executive Sublated
Democracy	Cell 1	Cell 2
Authoritarianism	Cell 3	Cell 4

Cell 1, executive dominance in a democracy, has received the most attention in the literature. The other three cells are recognized in the discipline principally as distortions of the first one and have received only scattered theoretical support and empirical illustrations. Yet, each pattern poses a different set of political and administrative problems for the state. Besides, since the executive-bureaucracy relationship is born out of tensions and struggles, it is never completely settled. Thus, an ascendant political leadership at a given period may be sublated by its civil service at another.

The State and Executive-Bureaucracy Interaction

The executive and the civil service are not only important political institutions but are also parts of civil society. Their interrelationship thus depends on the character and performance of the state which is the major arena of struggle of political groups in society. Such a view of the role of the state is not well-recognized in the literature. Instead, theorists have tended to line up behind two other perspectives: the liberal view of the state as a neutral arbiter of interests of relatively equal groups in a society, and the Marxist perspective of the state as the puppet of the elite⁶. Their differences notwithstanding, these two perspectives share similar expectations about the executive-bureaucracy relationship.

The liberal view. Liberal theory assumes a civil service which is subordinate to the political leadership and whose actions are circumscribed by the latter's rules and commands. Theoretically, the bureaucracy makes no contribution to policy, and is deemed inaccessible to other interest-bearers of the society. It hardly plays any role outside those of compliance and implementation. The bureaucracy therefore appears to be unproblematically a *public servant*, ever bowing to the authority of the political leadership.

Bureaucratic subordination is a normative ideal accepted by career officials. As LaPorte asserts:

It is in the nature of the higher bureaucracy to reach some accommodation with whoever is in power...High-level civil servants understand power and its use (1982: 148).

Such power may come from a strong mandate of the electorate in a democracy, or from coercion to which the bureaucracy (like the rest of society) acquiesces under a dictatorship. Bureaucratic subordination is thus explained by the acceptance by the civil service of the legitimacy of the executive.

Although the exercise of bureaucratic power is practically overlooked in this ideal type, it is viewed as a problem in discussions of "bureaucracy in a democracy" (Hyneman 1965; Riggs 1987; Suleiman 1984). In this context, it is observed that, left uncontrolled by the political leadership, this theoretically subordinate institution will work primarily for its own interests. Thus, the liberal view has limited bureaucratic politics to only two theoretical possibilities: a bureaucracy bowing to the political leadership, and a bureaucracy-for-itself.

6. The author is indebted to David Held (1983) for clearly delineating the different perspectives on the role of the state. In this volume, however, the liberal or mainstream view puts together what he has discussed as the "liberal," "liberal democratic," and "pluralist" perspectives. The two Marxist positions have also been classified separately here since the criteria used were different from his, being guided by the degree of state autonomy and the role of the civil service therein.

The Marxist view. Marxists tend to see the state as a subservient instrument of the dominant class which functions "to create stable conditions of class oppression essential to monopoly capital" (Nabudere 1977: 170). This view contrasts with the liberal one in its disavowal of civil service neutrality. The bureaucracy is regarded as the "state apparatus," designed to pursue its goals of economic expansion and social exploitation. As in the liberal view, it is expected to subscribe to the leadership's choices. However, from the Marxist perspective, the bureaucracy has a stronger reason to accept policies since these are not only superior to other alternatives in a rational confrontation but represent the only interests which the state recognizes as having a legitimate claim on it.

While the bureaucracy is considered mainly as a tool of the dominant class, its image as a self-interested organization is not entirely effaced. Rather, Marx describes it as a "particular closed society within the state" which "constitutes itself as a real power and comes to have a material content of its own" (1977: 30-31).

As the state apparatus whose function is to protect bourgeois dominance, the bureaucracy is expected to have concerns coinciding with state policies. Again, this is explained partly by its character. For instance, as Miliband (1969) asserts, the coincidence of interests may be due to the similarity of class origins of capitalists and bureaucratic elites. But while this may be true in some societies, this is not the case in many developing societies where employment in the civil service is a means of social mobility. Thus, the bureaucracy, even at higher levels, may have many members who come from the lower classes.

Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" provides a better explanation of bourgeois control of the bureaucracy. Hegemony is "the ideological pre-dominance of the dominant classes in civil society... the acceptance by the ruled of a conception of the world which belongs to the rulers" (Carnoy 1984: 68). Since its members are socialized to fit into the bourgeois world, the bureaucracy may see little to question in a political system which regularly legislates in favor of the elite.

Bureaucratic obedience to the dictates of the elite may also be explained by the state's actions to depoliticize relations of domination. As a consequence,

political goals are transformed into technical problems whose solution requires not public discussion but subordination to the technically necessary (Hearn 1978: 43).

Depoliticization treats issues of allocation and distribution as parameters of decision making rather than as variables subject to change in response to demands from the people. As the state upholds technical expertise, it strengthens the bureaucracy as an organization which, in turn, reinforces

the latter's unquestioning acceptance of the hegemony. Under this condition, for instance, preferential admission of upper-class children to state universities or the priority of big business in obtaining government services is automatically assured by procedures enshrined in the bureaucracy.

The performance of the civil service may also be affected by alliances between fractions of its organization with particular capitalist interests. For instance, an industry may cultivate close relations with its regulatory agency so that bureaucratic decisions are made in its favor regardless of the merits of its case or those of its antagonists.

The capitalist's control of the bureaucracy has also been attributed not only to the strength of the dominant class but also to the political disorganization - and thus, the corresponding weakness - of the working classes (Poulantzas, cited by Held 1983: 33).

Thus, although the Marxist and liberal views posit different roles for the state, they look at bureaucracy in a surprisingly similar manner, that is, as a willing subject of the political leadership, with no links to other social forces. They also entertain the same ambivalence about its power - sometimes considering it as a mere implementor of decisions made at the top, and at other times recognizing it as potent in its own right.

The third perspective. The third view of the state adopts the liberal view of a relatively autonomous system which is the focus of competing demands from various sectors. But it differs from the liberal view in that it accepts the Marxist assumption of a society composed of conflicting classes with unequal economic and political power. Instead of being a neutral arbiter, the state practically has the status of a "playing referee," able to concede to poor people only when they can demonstrate organized power to disrupt and destabilize the existing order.

Under this view, tension between the bureaucracy and the political leadership is expected. The former may merely take orders from, or it may actively participate in the struggle for superiority against, the executive. It may serve the privileged or the disenfranchised, and choose to play along or be at cross-purposes with the executive. Contrary to the first two views, the third perspective recognizes the potential power of the bureaucracy and hypothesizes its possible independence from both the state and society.

The bureaucracy under this theory does not simply implement decisions made by political officials but also generates and fights for its own policy ideas. It may even change policy in the process of implementation. The apex of the bureaucracy may side with the political and economic elite but may also, like the rank and file, identify more strongly with their underprivileged clientele because of frequent contact with them and commitment to the spirit of their programs. This prompted Guerrero (1971: 119) to assert that, especially at lower levels, the bureaucracy may be a victim rather than a collaborator or beneficiary of oppressive governments.

In addition, the bureaucracy may generate conflicts and tensions ...typical of complex modern organizations [which] are exacerbated as administration becomes politicized, these tensions becom[ing] class tensions within state bodies and departments (Todd 1982: 363).

These may result in bureaucratic disagreement with mainstream state policies (expectedly in favor of capital) and give room for the voice of the weak within the civil service.

However, bureaucratic actions on behalf of the poor do not necessarily manifest genuine commitment to substantive democracy. High-level bureaucrats may go against the executive's support of big economic interests because they perceive the elite's influence as a threat to the bureaucracy's role as guarantor of socio-economic order and efficiency (Poulantzas 1980: 156). Poulantzas goes on to say:

They (the bureaucrats) may interpret the theme of democratization of the state not in terms of popular intervention in public affairs but as the restoration of their own role as arbiters standing above social classes.

Thus, a bureaucracy may help the poor only to safeguard its own interests as "it assigns its own goals to the state" (Lefort 1974-75: 33). This attitude may explain why non-dominant groups continue to have little influence on the bureaucracy despite the abundance of poverty alleviation programs.

A few analysts believe in the sincerity of civil servants who sympathize with the poor. Thus they are hopeful that agencies created to implement policies that represent gains for the working class may develop values and structures beneficial to it. Etzioni-Halevy cites cases where bureaucracies, not being invariably conservative, have "created the professional reformer" (1985: 212). This has occurred even in programs that come about only because of the desire of the dominant class - and the state - to pacify and regulate the poor.

The bureaucracy may also identify more with the state or nation than with the government and thus maintain its separation from it (Linz 1978: 45; Held 1983: 39). This position is not only more in keeping with its identity as a "public organization" but may also develop with its permanence as an institution, coupled with a merit and incentive system that makes a lifelong career in the bureaucracy worthwhile.

Theoretically, it is only under the third conception of the state that the relationship of the bureaucracy and the political leadership becomes a real issue. It is the only perspective which sees the subordination of the civil service to the political leadership (a key liberal assumption) and its domination by the economic elite (a Marxist postulate) as possible logical

outcomes of the executive-bureaucracy encounter. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the pursuit of bureaucratic self-interest which is acknowledged under both the liberal and Marxist views continues to be regarded as a distinct possibility here.

Because it allows for all possible types of executive-bureaucracy interaction, the last view of the state is the perspective that informs this study. While the full analysis of the state-society struggle is outside its scope, this volume recognizes that political systems do not exist in benign milieu of equity and value consensus. They are located in turbulent environments characterized by labor-capital conflicts, ethnic clashes, regional divisions, religious riots. Although some of these may be simply regarded as conflicts and in civil society, when they increase in scale, duration and intensity, they are often brought to the state for arbitration or decision.

As suggested by the preceding enumeration of the potential conflicts, the third view applied here is modified by positing the state as an arena of struggle not only of social classes but of other groups as well. While many divisions have their roots in, or are related to, economic exploitation, the protagonists' perception of the nature of their struggle (e.g. as a battle of ethnic, linguistic or religious groups) affects their ability to mobilize support and win or lose adherents, and bears directly on the processes and outcomes of their efforts. At the same time, following the original proponents of this perspective, this study regards the state as the entity forced to arbitrate and decide on the fate and progress not only of these conflicts, but of the entire society as well.

While the state generally sides with the dominant groups, from time to time it does give other forces a hearing or even aligns with them. Such accommodations may not occur due to goodwill or a sense of fair play and social justice. Rather the state may promulgate policies favoring the working classes because of their strong organization and militance, that is, by virtue of having "[won] over the state by struggling within it as part of class conflict" (Carnoy 1984: 169). In some instances, they have really won nothing: they may have been allowed their "victories" as part of the elite strategy of regulation and pacification of non-dominants to ensure the long-term success of the capitalist enterprise, or indeed, of the continued domination of an ethnic group (Piven and Cloward 1971).

To summarize: Different analysts have identified several factors affecting the executive-bureaucracy interaction. For instance, such assets as specialization, permanence, monopoly of information, and rationality give the bureaucracy leverage in pressuring the political leadership to initiate policies in its favor. In addition, liberals take account of the influence of the bureaucracy's sense of responsibility to the political leadership and its acceptance of its legitimacy in determining its role in a state which is supposed to be that of a neutral arbiter. On the other hand, its subordination to the upper classes has been explained in terms of class origins, col-

laboration in the hegemonic order, connection with small capitals, and the executive's attempt to depoliticize decision making. However, when the state is viewed as the major site of struggle, the bureaucracy is affected by (1) its status as a victim of capitalism, (2) its role as a guarantor of order and efficiency, (3) its identification with the state and the nation rather than with the government of the day, and (4) intra-agency conflicts.

This study postulates that if these factors operate at all, they do so whatever may be the perceived role of the state; they have not been analyzed together because of the biases inherent in one's choice of theory. All of them should thus be considered in analyzing why the bureaucracy becomes dominant over, or is dominated by the executive under a democratic or authoritarian regime.

Linking the Bureaucracy and the Society

The struggle between the executive and the bureaucracy is usually discussed without reference to the nature of the state and society. In fact, the literature on the state-society nexus is almost completely separate from that on the executive-bureaucracy relationship. Each acknowledges the other topic in a few lines and then completely ignores it afterwards. On the one hand, many Marxist studies preoccupied with the role of the state in society simply assert that the bureaucracy is a state apparatus and never mention it again.⁷ On the other hand, detailed narratives of the experience of the civil service during transitions of government simply provide a paragraph to introduce the "social setting" and then proceed to its operations as an organization with little further reference to its complex ties with society and the state (e.g., cases in Tummala 1982; Lee and Samonte 1970; and Thurber and Graham 1973).

The specialization is understandable given the size of the field of scholarship, much of which remains unexplored. However, concentrating only on the executive-bureaucracy nexus without reference to the state-society linkage weakens the analysis of the first interaction tremendously. It is as if the leadership and the civil service operate in a closed system and make decisions only with reference to each other's strength or weakness, or that their actions do not reinforce or enervate the ascendancy of economic and social groups. Because they do, discussing the executive-bureaucracy relationship in the context of the state-society linkage will throw light on the nature of the society itself.

Understanding the society through the bureaucracy may be brought about in two ways. First, the bureaucracy may be seen as a microcosm of society, that is to say, it shares the latter's inequalities and biases, its weaknesses and its commitments. The conflicts between the classes are repeated in the clashes between the political and administrative elite and

7. This situation has been remedied by such works as Draper (1977) and Perez-Diaz (1978).

the rank and file in the civil service. The hegemonic values of the economic and political leadership which have been internalized by the bureaucracy inform its relationship with its clients and the public. Yet the linkage between society and the bureaucracy may not be discovered until they have been analyzed in juxtaposition.

In addition, societal interaction with the state means dealing with the bureaucracy as well as with the executive. After all, the civil service is penetrated by society directly as well as indirectly through the political heads. In a democracy, the society supposedly channels all its demands through elected officials who in turn process into law the demands that they accept. They then direct the bureaucracy to implement the laws and policies; the bureaucracy, in turn, reports the results of their orders directly to them. If bureaucratic behavior is completely conditioned by the power and choices of the political authority, the bureaucracy can be socially responsive only when the state and society agree on priorities and policies. When they disagree, it is simply assumed that the bureaucracy will follow the executive and therefore will not be able to respond to social demands.

In the real world, the bureaucracy is more permeable than the theory suggests. Social interests link with the bureaucracy directly through kinship and other ascriptive ties, through the force of common professional identities, in their role as clients and beneficiaries of government programs, or as their opponents and victims. Given the multitude of access points, the society and the bureaucracy may be able to reinforce or coalesce against the political leadership. Or more accurately, since social groups are not created equal, some fractions of the society may team up with some elements of the bureaucracy to accelerate or deter the pace of national development. In some cases, executive commitment to social reform may be jeopardized through sabotage perpetrated by the bureaucracy in alliance with dominant groups. For instance, economic leaders may use their power to keep agrarian reform out of the agenda of the state. When it enters the lawbooks, perhaps as a means of dousing rural unrest, the policy can still be nullified by the wealthy in the countryside through their allies in the bureaucracy who are capable of subverting policy without changing any legislative provision.

In other cases, however, the bureaucracy is blamed when barriers to more responsive governance lie elsewhere. Often, policies conceptually incapable of effecting changes are hidden from public consciousness by means of misleading propaganda or rhetoric. For instance, the foreign debt issue has been discussed simply in terms of government's inability to pay the loans and of the low "absorptive capacity" of the bureaucracy to use the borrowed funds, obscuring the fact that even if its proceeds had been used properly, it would still have played a major role in the perpetuation of underdevelopment. In such a case, the failure of policy may be charged to poor administrative technology or bureaucratic recalcitrance rather than

foreign and native elite manipulation with the political leadership to maintain the status quo.

Administrative Development: Democratizing the Bureaucracy

The pattern formed by the executive-bureaucracy struggle is related to another important issue - the democratic development of the bureaucracy or what is termed here as "administrative development." As political development advances with increasing democratization, the development of the bureaucracy may be measured by the extent to which it meets Rohr's principle:

The fundamental ethical problem of civil servants is how they use discretionary power in a manner consistent with the values of a democratic regime (1983: 217-48).

The bureaucracy's principal function is policy implementation. However, it is involved in the choice not only of means but also of ends. As an expert and permanent body, the civil service can and does participate in all phases of the policy process, from initiating and drafting policies to dealing with consequent pressures and lobbying for their adoption. Its involvement takes place at all levels, from the enactment of law to the promulgation of regulations and thence their application to concrete situations. As it performs both political and administrative functions, the bureaucracy may observe the executive's priorities or follow its own agenda.

Administrative development recognizes the civil service as a political body which not only has its own values and commitments but also acts on them. However, not all of its political activities are necessarily developmental: it is developed only to the extent that it husbands its resources and actively seeks to bring about what it considers to be the public good. Ritualistic compliance with rules, no matter how efficient or methodologically expert, is not administrative development. nor is effective pursuit of anti-popular goals. As Caiden states,

An inefficient organization working in the right direction is better for society than an efficient organization going in the wrong direction; the latter's efficiency only compounds the policy-making error (1971: 75).

Although the bureaucracy can be both powerful and responsible, "administrative development" should not be confused with a bureaucracy-for-itself - one which sets and pursues its own goals while remaining uncontrolled by any other political institution. For this reason, administrative development must also involve the delicate job of maintaining the balance of power between the bureaucracy and other political actors (Riggs 1963,

1968). Normally, this would refer to control by the political leadership which is its legal and institutional superior. However, one must not rule out the possibility of a developed bureaucracy moving away from an executive which it perceives to be illegitimate. In such cases, other political actors - e.g., opposition parties, citizens' groups, the church - may take the initiative and influence the bureaucracy to be accountable to the people through them. This scenario falls outside the authorized structures and qualifies as administrative development only in extreme cases. However, it is preferable to the alternative possibility of a civil service assuming sole guardianship of the public interest after breaking with the executive since the latter proceeds from power concentration and absence of accountability that is inimical to the growth of a democracy.

Scope and Coverage

The major focus of this volume is the democratic development of the bureaucracy as it struggles with the executive. Special emphasis is given to the period of transition to a new government although the background and aftermath of the change of the executive, as appropriate, is also provided. Three sets of factors affect the struggle: the integral characteristics of the principal protagonists, the executive,⁸ and the bureaucracy;⁹ the kind of political system in which their struggle occurs; and the constellation of social forces that impinge on the executive, the bureaucracy and their relationship that affect their performance as political institutions accountable to the people.

8. As used here, "executive" is equivalent to "political leadership" which is in turn used synonymously with "the government of the day" (or simply, "government" or "governors"). In presidential systems, it refers collectively to the President or Chief Executive and his or her ranking assistants (department secretaries or ministers). In parliamentary systems, it refers to the Prime Minister and his/her Cabinet. Whenever only the head is referred to, it will be clear from the context. An executive may come to office by election and other procedures defined by law. He/she may also win power by force, inheritance or negotiation. "Political officials" include persons appointed by the power wielders to positions of leadership and confidence in the bureaucracy. They serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

9. "Bureaucracy," "civil service" and "administrative system" are used interchangeably to refer to the civilian state apparatus of each country. As such it specifically excludes the military because while the latter is technically part of any nation's administrative system, its function as the government's coercive arm and its frequent direct assumption of political leadership raises more issues than can be tackled in this work. (This decision does not preclude discussing the military when it is the government.) "Bureaucrats" and "civil servants" occupy what the country designates as career and permanent positions.

The bureaucracy is not a monolithic institution that speaks and acts in one voice. There are areas of slack which allow, for instance, for the existence of pockets of patronage to exist in a functioning merit system. Therefore, "bureaucracy" used without qualification refers to its dominant features and central tendencies. However, certain segments may go against the main grain and, though representing small factions, may demonstrate significant qualities that invite comment and study. It should be clear from the context when only some sectors are covered, whether these groups are at the apex or the rank and file, or a particular set of agencies within the government sector.

This study combines a diachronic and synchronic approach: diachronic as it analyses a country's system over time, and synchronic as it compares that country's experiences with similar situations in other nations.

Diachronic focus on the Philippines. The Philippines, the principal country examined, has undergone the whole range of government changes. These include:

(A) Change of government following regular democratic procedures. Applied here is a minimal definition of "democracy" (cf. Neubauer 1967; Bobbio 1984; Mounce 1985; Viola and Mainwaring 1985)¹⁰ in which, although flawed, the system allowed for elections where the opposition had a real chance of winning (and actually won), and dissenters were generally not subject to repression and persecution.

All change of government from 1946 to 1969 followed regular succession procedures. With the exception of Ferdinand Marcos' reelection in 1969 and the election in their own right of vice presidents who assumed office upon the death of the president, the bureaucracy faced a new executive after every presidential election. Because of such regularity and of time and resource constraints, only the last two normal transitions, i.e., from Carlos P. Garcia to Diosdado Macapagal in 1961, and from Macapagal to Marcos in 1965, are treated at length.

(B) Abnormal change of government. The Philippines has undergone three forms of this type: (1) the shift from colonialism to a government led by its own people, (2) the change from a working democracy to an authoritarian system; and (3) the movement from authoritarianism towards redemocratization. The first refers to the formal withdrawal of American control in 1946. The second started with Marcos' imposition of martial rule in 1972, which was a species of a palace coup. The third refers to the current period which started on February 25, 1986, following a four-day popular revolution.

The diachronic approach illuminates the encounter between the executive and the bureaucracy not only in terms of contemporaneous factors, but also in relation to how focal institutions and influences on them have changed over time. History reveals how present accords have resulted from earlier conflicts, and where changing elements of the struggle require new or modified responses.

Close attention to the manner in which regimes change in one country over time allows for a more comprehensive and thorough acquaintance

10. The Philippines fits even better under the criterion provided by Linz (1978: 5): "The exclusion from political competition of parties not committed to the legal pursuit of power . . . is not incompatible with the guarantee of free competition in our definition of a democracy." Thus, what is used here is only a test of procedural democracy, admittedly still a long way from substantive democracy.

with it than would have been possible if all the countries brought into the discussion were given equal attention. Focusing on the Philippines is facilitated by the fact that the author is native to it. However, it may also constitute a limitation since intimate knowledge of the events covered might have rendered the investigation less objective than otherwise.

The synchronic strategy. The experiences of other countries were brought in partly to correct that possible bias. Although each country has been chosen to represent a particular type of executive succession, a sense of the historical development of both the civil service and the leadership-bureaucracy nexus is presented in each discussion.

A synchronic approach has other advantages. Since states, executives, bureaucracies, and societies are universal institutions, it would be difficult to make any conclusion on the basis of one case alone (No conclusions are definitive even with the addition of a few cases.) A comparative study is useful because it raises questions that, a person concentrating on only one country, one would not have considered salient. This is apart from the advantage of introducing one to different strategies and results which can inspire new initiatives for reform in the Philippines or other similarly situated countries. For instance, they may show an executive-bureaucracy nexus that illustrates a relatively successful means of coping with the merit-spoils controversy or provides vivid examples of what strategies to avoid. Further, they become bases for firmer conclusions when, for example, continuities of bureaucratic control surface despite the variety of types of government and national situations. The use of several countries also allows for a more comprehensive horizontal survey, complementing the depth provided by the diachronic analysis.

The Plan of the Book

The present introductory chapter lays out the main issues tackled in this volume, and how they are presented. The next five chapters analyze the executive-bureaucracy struggle under different types of political systems and changes of government. Chapter 2 discusses how a leadership and a bureaucracy face off under normal succession, based on the experiences of several countries. Great Britain and the United States which have provided the main models for the political control of the bureaucracy are treated at length. There are shorter case studies on the Dominican Republic after Trujillo, pre-Pinochet Chile, Mexico, and Saskatchewan, Canada in the 1940s; they show different versions of a "working democracy," circumstances of succession, and approaches in resolving the executive-bureaucracy conflict.

The Philippine democratic experience is detailed in Chapter 3 which also traces how the executive and the bureaucracy have responded to each other and to other social groups since the colonial period. A description of

Philippine society and government provides a richer background to the conflict than has been possible in any other case. A comparison of the Philippine situation with those examples presented in the previous chapter concludes Chapter 3.

Chapters 4 and 5 cover the executive-bureaucracy nexus during the takeover of authoritarian governments. Chapter 4 describes the modes of linkage and conflict which an authoritarian executive has forged with the civil service in different countries. The examples of the dominated bureaucracies of the Philippines under Marcos' martial law and Korea under Park Chung Hee form the bulk of this chapter.

Chapter 5 discusses the case of Thailand, which exemplifies the model of an ascendant bureaucracy under authoritarianism. The executive-bureaucracy interaction in that country is also compared with that of countries discussed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 6 tackles the relationship of the president and the civil service under an early stage of democratization or a return to it from authoritarianism. The cases presented are those of Bangladesh after Liberation, Nicaragua under the Sandinistas and the Philippines since 1986. As in Chapters 3 and 5, a comparative analysis of the country-cases is made, this time in order to deal with the problem of how the executive and the bureaucracy interact in states emerging from authoritarianism.

The final chapter examines (1) how the transition problem is handled by the political leadership and the bureaucracy; (2) the strategies used by the executive in attempting to dominate the bureaucracy; (3) the weapons wielded in turn by the civil service; and (4) the role of other political forces in the struggle. These various factors forge different modes of executive or bureaucratic ascendancy; how each mode emerges under a democratic or authoritarian system is also explained. The patterns of domination and subordination are then analyzed in terms of how they reflect the democratic intentions of the protagonists and how they have led to the development or retrogression of the bureaucracy as a tool of democracy.

2

The Executive And The Bureaucracy Under Normal Successions: Some National Patterns

All working democracies have fixed terms and rules for succession for the political leadership. Moreover, each modern state maintains a permanent bureaucracy that the chief executive can utilize in his/her task of implementing the laws faithfully.

Under normal succession, the incoming executive can deal with the bureaucracy using the combination of merit and spoils that has evolved in that democracy. For its part, the civil service may comply with enthusiasm, be passively submissive, put up a resistance, or institute policies of its own. The resulting interaction may lie in a continuum ranging from executive ascendancy to bureaucratic sublation. Other social forces may strengthen the dominance of either protagonist.

Models of Bureaucratic Subordination

This chapter and the next focus on the relationship between the presidency and the bureaucracy when there is a regular change of leadership. Since the change of executive takes place under peaceful conditions, practices that have been observed by previous governments tend to be continued. Thus, although each leadership and each bureaucracy could bring their own styles to the battle, certain modes of behavior may transcend individual successions.

Executive-bureaucracy interaction under normal succession has been the object of more scholarly studies than any other type of turnover. Hence, more country-examples were available for analysis in this chapter. Explored here are bureaucracy-executive struggles in Third World political systems which grapple with political and administrative problems similar to those of the Philippines. However, because they have been the principal civil service models in this century, the British and American examples are considered first.

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Great Britain

The formal relationship of the bureaucracy to the political leadership in most countries usually attempts to approximate the Westminster/Whitehall system of Great Britain, the model for Cell 1. This system envisions a permanent and neutral bureaucracy staffed by people who have been chosen through merit and who regard public service as a career. The organization is responsible to the government of the day which sets the policy directions and is directly answerable to the sovereign people through the electoral mandate. It is expected to comply with the thrusts, regulations, and instructions of the prime minister and his/her cabinet, and follow their lead no matter how different they may be from the policies it has implemented under the previous government. It is expected to show the same obedience to the next government. In other words, the political responsibility of the bureaucracy is completely channeled through the political leadership.

The ascendancy of the British political leadership over the civil service did not emerge merely from a desire to adhere to a norm, but has resulted from victories of the newly enfranchised commercial class, university intellectuals and the political parties in their struggle with the aristocracy (Kingsley 1944). Thus, increased recruitment based on merit, tenure, and other aspects of civil service reform "furthered the interests and power of the dominant political forces in the country" (Knott and Miller 1987: 233). Neutrality and accountability as desirable bureaucratic attributes were cultivated along with democratization, since the British bureaucracy, unlike that of Japan, Germany and many Third World countries, came after the development of democracy (Hetzner 1989).

Nevertheless, British adherence to its own model is not unproblematic. The sheer complexity of the public policy arena - something that has proven too difficult for non-experts to tackle - and the strong support of its unions and client groups have given the civil service power independent of that delegated to it by the leadership. Thus, some policy making has moved out of the hands of the Parliament and the cabinet. According to Hetzner, delegated legislation has become the norm in this century:

Although it is true that Cabinet ministers direct public policy formulation and initiation in those areas where the government has made a campaign pledge or where a minister has a particular interest (and even in these areas, they may be turning to the civil servants for a great deal of substantive help), they otherwise let civil servants. . . take the lead (Hetzner 1989: 602-3).

The myth of civil service obedience to opposing policies of succeeding Tory and Labor governments has been explained in three ways. One view posits that the opposing political parties have more policy continuity than is often realized. Both the Conservative and Labor Parties support the need of business for an efficient state, or, as Navarro puts it,

the basic commitment of all governments to maintain the health of the economy over the health and well-being of the people (Navarro 1976: 268; cf. Kingsley 1944; and Lipset 1952).

The second view attributes the constancy to the civil servants who tend to be middle-of-the-road, and hence, better able to absorb leftward or rightward shifts of new governments more easily than partisans. Also, their ethos appears to "eschew enthusiasm and reverence caution" (Hetzner 1989: 605-6). Thus, while the general public may discern changes in the bureaucracy as it serves different governments, the political leaderships concerned may decry it as inflexible. It is interesting that both the Labor Party in 1972 and the Conservative government that replaced it have accused the bureaucracy of being less than fully supportive of their radical agenda; some elements in both have in fact suggested that civil service actions have verged on sabotage (Hetzner 1989).

The third view refers to the bureaucracy-society connection. Reflecting "the basic inequalities of the social structure and the prevailing temper of the nation" (Kingsley 1944: 141), the civil service reads the demands of the rulers well and acts accordingly. Thus,

permanent, nonpolitical officials insured continuity of government regulations and practices, and made for stable relations with the state, regardless of shifts of party fortunes (Lipset 1952: 222).

Traditions developed over time by the executive-bureaucracy nexus itself ensure that the political leadership will be supreme. In the British system, ministerial dependence and bureaucratic power are recognized but handled deftly by the traditions of bureaucratic "policy advice" and secrecy. The bureaucracy's superiority of access to information and interpretation and the significance of its institutional memory are acknowledged; it is even expected that bureaucrats would be forthright in telling the minister about the pitfalls of a decision. In some cases, a bureaucrat may offer "constitutional (as opposed to merely political) advice" (Rohr 1989: 389). However, such advice is also expected to be conveyed only to the minister. Secrecy is maintained not only due to the requirements of the Official Secrets Act but also because of its acceptance as an ethical norm of conduct; hence, the bureaucracy must observe:

the requirement of the British constitution which maintains the fiction that decisions are made by ministers and it would be contrary to the spirit and customs of the constitution to recognize the part played by officials (Chapman 1988: 220).

This "passion for anonymity" is sustained by adequate material rewards and high prestige accorded to civil servants. Accordingly, any conflict engendered by the choice of policy and any difficulty in implementation generated by a change of policy are treated as internal matters not for the information of the world. This nurtures the strong tradition of bureaucratic acceptance of its secondary role, making the British civil service hew closer to the ideals of the liberal theory than most other bureaucracies.

The United States

As the chief exporter of civil service reform and modern public administration, the United States (US) may be expected to have an executive-bureaucracy relationship that follows the lines of administrative orthodoxy. At first glance, this seems to be indeed the case. As much as 99.85 percent of appointments in the federal bureaucracy are based on merit examinations (Knott and Miller 1987: 248); career professionals staff the various agencies; decisions are based on rules and standard processes; and submission to the hierarchy which ultimately connects the bureaucracy to the political leadership principally ensures its accountability. The enthrone-ment of the merit system appears to be a settled issue, and little change is expected of the bureaucracy upon the entry of a new executive.

This apparent placidity masks a protracted historical struggle between the executive and the bureaucracy, with the legislature as another key actor. Although this triangular interrelationship has changed very much since the heyday of Andrew Jackson and the spoils system, that struggle is still continuing, and is re-enacted with a slightly modified script with each presidential turnover. .

The weakest point of the presidency might be said to be the term of Ulysses S. Grant, who thought of himself as "the chief clerk" serving the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. He frittered away the executive power of appointment, for instance, by acquiescing to legislative demands for "courtesy," a partiality betrayed by giving federal positions to supporters of the senator or representative in charge of the corresponding legislative committee (Knott and Miller 1987: 83). At that time, policy initiatives and bureaucratic patronage were both seen as congressional prerogatives.

Light years away from Grant were twentieth century "imperial presidents" who claimed supremacy in both policy and politics, and who found the permanent civil service as an obstacle to their grand designs. Distrust

of the bureaucracy led Richard Nixon to "a New American Revolution" - not the development of revolutionary doctrines, but a "forging of new institutions to serve a new America" (Seidman and Gelmour 1986: 98). His official instrument was government reorganization which affirmed his faith in the orthodox doctrines of public administration - the politics-administration dichotomy, economy and efficiency as goals, limited span of control, and accountability through hierarchy. Pending, and as a supplement to, reorganization, he undertook what top assistant John Ehrlichman called "guerrilla warfare" against the career bureaucracy (Seidman and Gelmour 1986: 100). He appointed his partisans as regional directors, assistant secretaries of administration and officials of the Office of Management and Budget, key positions which were traditionally held by career officials. The administration also used

what leverage it had under civil service regulations to put political pressure on civil service officials whose actions were contrary to the administration's purposes (Knott and Miller 1987: 241).

The Reagan administration, for its part,

systematically exclude[d] career executives from policy-making deliberations based on the fear that they would try to undercut the Administration's policies if they were included (Pfiffner 1987: 58).

This was effected through "jigsaw puzzle management" which pressured career staff to supply information without being told the policy goal it was serving. Political appointees were encouraged to promote conflict and competition among the permanent staff to get them to give better information than others (Pfiffner 1987: 59).¹

Early in his first term, Ronald Reagan's method involved keeping political posts in the civil service unfilled. This gave him time not only to evaluate possible appointees more fully, but also to carry out his new controversial economic programs without opposition from these agencies, troubled as their bureaucrats were by presidential indifference. He also appointed several of his White House staffers to positions in the Executive Office² effectively making it a part of the transient political organization of the Executive. Civil service neutrality was compromised as regional repre-

1. This strategy of politicization was not divined by a critic but was a defense of the sabotage of the bureaucracy provided by a conservative think-tank of the administration (Sanera 1985, cited in Pfiffner 1987).

2. The Executive Office included the Offices of Budget and Management, Policy Development, and Personnel Management and were considered part of the career service, unlike positions in the White House.

representatives of the Office of Personnel Management appeared to combine their regular assignments with political campaign duties. And, reverting to Jacksonian practice, secretaries and clerks from these offices and the White House were replaced by people loyal to the new administration (Knott and Miller 1987: 249). Viewing the bureaucracy as more of the problem than a solution, Reagan's government reduced the force by 92,000 employees between 1981 and 1983. On the other hand, it increase political appointments, and the power to make these appointments were centralized in the White House instead of being delegated to Cabinet secretaries (Pfiffner 1987).

Fighting the civil service is not a sole Republican predilection. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for instance, had a different style of subduing the bureaucracy. This Democratic president created and maintained agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and made them win his support in open competition. He also tried to ignore civil service requirements for most of his long tenure. New Deal programs were called "alphabet soup" by detractors due to the rise of many agencies each with its own acronym which were filled by people supposedly blessed with the proper zeal, social concern and expertise, all exempted from civil service procedures. After the first two years, there were 100,000 such personnel in sixty agencies (Knott and Miller 1987: 91). In his first term, Roosevelt appointed over 250,000 people, only 20 percent of whom were under the civil service (Knott and Miller 1987: 86).

His opponents' claim that his presidency marked the return of the spoils system turned out to be politically popular. Recognizing this, Roosevelt became a champion of the merit system in his third term. He sponsored three civil service laws which accelerated the transfer of erstwhile political positions to the career service. The president thus regained the upper hand in a powerful political issue; the move also "institutionally protect[ed] his New Deal programs for decades to come" (Knott and Miller 1987: 92).

Roosevelt's support of civil service reform after making an unprecedented number of appointments outside its ambit is not merely an executive ploy nor is it his own invention. The game has been played as early as the nineteenth century. For instance, in 1882, the Republican-dominated Congress passed civil service reform measures "both as a way of freezing their supporters in office, as well as taking the political wind out of the reform sails" of the Democrats, the party traditionally associated with civil service legislation (Knott and Miller 1987: 233). This freezing maneuver conferred merit-system legitimacy to positions originally created to accommodate political proteges and party programs. However, because it was politically risky to return any merit post to the patronage pool, the net effect of freezing was to extend the merit system to an ever bigger proportion of the bureaucracy, even as the civil service expanded further as new special agencies were created by each new president.

Thus, whether a president appears to support or fight against the merit system, it is clear that he wages a battle against the career bureaucracy whose neutrality he regards more as an inability to be responsive to his major policies than anything else.

Between Grant's term and the 1980s, the roles and powers of key political institutions changed dramatically. Political appointments started out as the exchange of votes for jobs by individual legislators. Later they became instruments of political parties whose machineries delivered votes during elections as well as votes in support of a particular legislation. Party power was thus concentrated at the apex; in Congress, this was held by the Speaker. He was, however, "unhorsed" in 1910, loosening his clout over agenda-setting in the House which was eventually delegated to different committees. By the 1960s, the appropriate committees had considerable power over the fate of proposed legislations. While they could kill over 86 percent of bills, those that they approved had a 50-50 chance of becoming law (Knott and Miller 1987: 190).

How do these changes relate to the executive-bureaucracy nexus? One has to see them within the context of the relationships between legislative committees, the industries or sectors they are supposed to regulate, and the agencies that are supposed to implement the regulatory laws. A representative's ability to choose a committee membership depends on his party affiliation and seniority. When these are favorable, he also has the privilege of remaining in any preferred committee term after term, enabling him to develop expertise on its concerns, and familiarity with the groups involved in them. Over time, rather than checking on each other, the representative and the interested parties could develop alliances. Since the public remains largely unorganized, only the big firms managed to get into this network of alliances.

The positions taken by these powerful groups are frequently reinforced by the only other group just as easily accessible and only slightly less influential - the civil service professionals whose position papers on new regulations were probably prepared by, or done in consultation with, their colleagues in the industries. The longer a legislator stays in office, the better acquainted he would be about the industry's needs or problems (from the latter's perspective), and the more responsive he would be to agency interests. This pattern has been so marked that it has earned the name "sub-governments" or "iron triangles" (Riggs 1988) which leaves both the executive and the general public out in the cold.

Meanwhile, the new spoils system would also follow a triangular pattern rather than being one-sided, since its benefits include political support and votes for the legislator as well as appointment of his followers not only to the civil service but also to firms within his alliance. However, the iron in the triangle can also hurt. According to a study of congressional influence on appointment and removals,

probably more executive branch officials have been fired or reassigned as a result of pressure from the Congress than from the President (cited in Seidman and Gelmour 1986: 51).

These alliances have tended to make agencies become "little islands of decision making" which pay greater attention to the industries and their representatives in Congress than to the executive and other parts of the bureaucracy (Knott and Miller 1987: 236-37). Their influence may also blind them to the needs and demands of unorganized and smaller clients. While it falls short of bureaucratic sublation, the increased autonomy of individual agencies makes it difficult for the president to orchestrate the implementation of his program.

The tensions generated by the American system in maintaining executive ascendancy seeks relief in several forms. Roosevelt's strategy of competition and redundancy has found favor with theorists, as it challenges the bureaucracy to prove not only its neutral competence but its political responsiveness as well. But resort to it by other American executives is rare, since it also requires the president

to know how bureaucratic interests interact, in order to be the master rather than the prisoner of his organization, and also in order to mold the rational interests of the bureaucracies into the national interest as he sees it (Halperin 1971, quoted in Seidman and Gelmour 1986: 87).

Instead, most executives resort to traditional civil service reforms, such as reorganization, the centralization of personnel administration under the president, or the introduction of an administrative control technology. This technical response to a very political problem easily attracts proponents in Congress since the merit system ranks next to motherhood in the hagiography of American politics. (Besides, the fate of representatives is now built upon interest group politics rather than personal patronage.)

Despite such administrative reforms, presidents have brought inherited agencies under their control without taking the bureaucracy into their confidence. Consequently, the highest ranking officials of the career civil service still report directly only to political subordinates of cabinet officials, a situation which led Hecló (1984) to characterize the regular bureaucracy as a "hollow center." Thus, this alternative neither breaks the iron triangle, nor makes the second track, discussed below, unnecessary.

The problem of political responsiveness has been tackled by various presidents by putting some form of political bureaucracy in place. This is the intent of the second track, which first became prominent in the 1960s. It is composed of people with the correct party affiliation who are regularly called in at the start of a new term to service cabinet secretaries and the president (Hecló 1984). Thus, they are also called "the in-and-outers"

(MacKenzie 1987). It is from among them that presidents from Kennedy to Reagan have largely selected their political assistants. These political appointees maintain familiarity with issues and processes of government between presidential terms by serving in congressional staffs or in academe. Around 10 percent of those appointed between 1964 and 1984 were former career civil servants ambitious for service beyond their agency turfs (Fisher 1987: 15). The second track answers the criterion of responsiveness to political directions while meeting the competency requirements of the state. However, the arrangement leads to certain problems.

First, as Light suggests, "worlds collide" when political appointees and career officials meet. The former have short-term perspectives and "must insert themselves into their jobs quickly and bluntly," in order to make a difference. On the other hand, careerists who "are expected to stand by in readiness," can, "short of massive cutbacks... outlast even the strongest president" (1987: 156). Through the years, the in-and-outers have increased, resulting in a "'thickening' political level [that] makes it almost impossible ... to forge positive relationships with the bureaucracy" (Light 1987: 157). This makes for hostility, frustration and reinforcement of bureaucratic bashing. However, those who make an effort to avoid a collision find that bureaucrats may actually play one or more of the following useful roles: as passive extensions of the presidency or its active supporters, as brokers of conflicting interests, or as protectors of the public interest (Light 1987: 166).

Second, in Knott and Miller's terms,

presidents sought to improve their capacity for leadership by circumventing the established bureaucracy (Knott and Miller 1987: 248).

Seidman and Gelmour (1986:85) are more harsh, regarding the establishment of a complex White House bureaucracy as the secession of the presidency from the executive branch and its installation as an independent branch of government.

This presidential strategy formally espouses the merit system while actively undermining it, and without seeking to change it to make it serve the political requirements of the state better. Knott and Miller (1987) were thus gravely disappointed that whenever bureaucratic inadequacies elicited enough presidential and legislative attention, the recommended solutions were uniformly and uncreatively designed to improve the bureaucracy not as a politically responsive entity but as a technical and neutral body, the very reason why presidents have rejected it as their main partner in governance in the first place.

Third, in siphoning off the best personnel to the political technocracy, the service is left only with those who are happy with bureaucratic routine, lacking in initiative and uncommitted to the major programs of govern-

ment. But because these are the very persons who serve the public directly, the little clients become losers twice over: they do not receive adequate service while they also find the career employees ineffectual as a channel for their political demands.

Fourth, the main relationships of the political appointees are horizontal, linking them with congressional officials, department secretaries and outside groups. They harbor a distrust of the vertical relationships that go down to the regular system and upwards to the president. Instead, they tend to be preoccupied with organized lobbies. Hence, they may merely reinforce sub-governments, instead of seeking or providing alternatives to the latter's narrow views. They would thus be unable to help the president in unifying and integrating the different elements of his government's thrust.

These problems make it difficult for the government

[to] act as a collective enterprise with institutional continuity and with some sense of purpose that is more than a reflection of the preferences held by those who happen to be mobilized to affect its work (Hecl: 1984: 30).

That the hollow center will in time command a hollow system therefore threatens on the horizon.

Other Experiences of Normal Succession

Despite the exemplification by Great Britain and the US of Cell 1, other countries which underwent normal successions, though greatly influenced by one or both of them, had different executive-bureaucracy relationships. Attempts at executive sublation toward the model of Cell 2 may even be observed in some countries.

The Dominican Republic after Trujillo

The Dominican Republic is among the few countries formally operating under a patronage system. Although its civil service system is diametrically opposed to that of Great Britain, both are examples of Cell 1. The merit system in the Dominican Republic was originally instituted, like those of other new states, at the instance of the US which directly controlled the country from 1916 to 1923. The dictator Trujillo abrogated it in 1951, claiming its incongruity with the native culture. Since the country returned to elected governments in 1978, legislators and civil service reformers have tried to bring back the system of appointments based on competence and expertise. However, the move has been blocked by a strong lobby of civil servants, about half of whom owe their recruitment to political connections.

Besides, no chief executive wants to give up what has always been considered as his "traditional right" to dismiss political enemies and reward friends (Kearney 1986). Thus, all new presidents enjoy great latitude in changing the people they find in the civil service, and can instill fear and obedience in everyone that they allow to stay. Those who rebel can be thrown out easily, and there is even no need to prove that they are rascals.

Pre-Pinochet Chile

The civil service systems of most countries fall somewhere between the patronage system of the Dominican Republic and the merit system of Great Britain. For instance, pre-Pinochet Chile attempted a compromise scheme of a political-cum-professional bureaucracy. It maintained a technically developed bureaucracy although civil servants had full rights of party membership and leadership. However, Petras' survey of 1964 disclosed that most of them thought promotions were based more on favoritism than on performance (Petras 1969). Given such a situation, party allegiance might be expected to have priority over professionalism.

This attitude would have made it difficult for any new leadership to utilize the bureaucracy. However, Chile had instituted some practices that tried to make the executive-bureaucracy nexus more harmonious, although at a great expense and with just a little less disruption than the wholesale turnover of the Dominican system. An incoming president could compel his inherited bureaucracy to comply with his policy innovations through budgetary and appointment processes. The budgetary route was more limited because it needed the cooperation of Congress which had enjoyed autonomy *vis-a-vis* the president due to a long history of congressional dominance (until 1925) and a multi-party system. Together these meant that, in order to increase or cut agency funds, an executive had to be able to generate supportive coalitions in both houses.

A new president had a better chance of succeeding by using his powers of appointment. These included appointing his supporters to top political and administrative positions and using a unique feature of Chilean transitions: special administrative powers to reorganize the bureaucracy (Parrish 1973). In addition, he could use the system called *la persecuidora* whereby undesired bureaucrats are persuaded to retire by providing them with a pension commensurate to their latest salary. The new president could then appoint his own people to the new vacancies (Valenzuela 1984).

In 1964, President Eduardo Frei tried, upon election, to get even broader powers to change the bureaucracy, but he was blocked by some civil servants and their allies in the legislature. In the end they settled for an expensive compromise: a dual system under which the unwanted officials kept their positions and salary (if they did not want to avail themselves of *la persecuidora*), while Frei's choices got their powers and duties.

However, even with these instruments, policy reforms could hardly be instituted with a civil service which purported to be committed to social change in general but was actually conservative and middle class in its specific attitudes (Petras 1969). Administrative reforms could not give the new executive a more malleable bureaucracy either since

they often strengthened the capacity of the national bureaucracies to dominate their environments. This allowed them to set their own goals independently of the structures constitutionally charged with responsibility for goal selection (Parrish 1973: 230).

Parrish attributes this not only to the civil servants' connections with politicians in the legislature but also to "the activities of reform-oriented foreign advisory groups" (1973:230). It appears that the dislike of American public administration experts for politics made them undermine the demands of democracy, that is, as Landau (1972) warned, in using the civil service as an instrument against politics, they ultimately wielded it against democracy.

The model of Chile resembles that of Cell 2, with the executive struggling and sometimes losing against a dominating bureaucracy. Its politicalization is designed to benefit itself and its supporters. These features approximate a cartorial state:³

The essence of a Cartorial State is found in the fact that the State is, in the first place, the maintainer or guarantor of the status quo. . . Public employment is not in actuality directed toward the rendering of any public service, but only toward the more or less indirect subsidization of clientele in exchange for electoral support (quoted in Parrish 1973: 245).

Mexico

Since the revolution of 1910, Mexico has been dominated by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The corporatist scheme of the PRI has allowed important sectors such as the military, professionals, business, unions and the church to mobilize and be represented in national positions. As it became entrenched in the political system, however, PRI moved away from a revolutionary stance and became more conservative. Succeeding PRI governments have been criticized as corrupt and authoritarian.

The PRI contends that it has continued the Revolution's philosophy of "effective suffrage: no reelection" and that Mexico has enjoyed normal democratic succession every six years. The new president has been invariably the candidate of the PRI who was handpicked by his predecessor and

3. This was a term originally used by Helio Jaguaribe to describe Brazil (Parrish 1973).

ratified in the party convention and subsequent election. Opposition parties have been able to win local seats, however.

Given this stable party dominance, one would expect the bureaucracy to simply go on from one executive to another, with nary a modification. This has not been the case. In fact, there has been practically a wholesale turnover of positions after every election period, with the incoming president bringing in his own top officials who, in turn, replace civil servants with their own people (Tuohy 1973). The huge turnover - about 18,000 elective and 25,000 appointive officials in the seventies and eighties - conduced to the feathering of one's own nest fast; the local joke is that the Mexican political system creates a new set of millionaires every six years (Sloan 1982).

However, since there would certainly be overlaps among the followers of the previous president and his successor (more precisely his protege) the civil service may not be so much replaced as rearranged. An official named to a new position may bring his staff with him, a practice which reinforces the priority accorded to personal loyalty over institution building (Weaver 1973). This tradition allows civil servants to maintain a long-term career in government, acquiring in the process expertise and a sense of belonging to the institution. It also gives them a chance to consolidate their power *vis-a-vis* transient politicians who are dependent on them for information and advice. This situation gives the civil servants leverage in their struggle with the new leadership. For instance, Camp (1985: 113) reports that bureaucrats withheld information from President Luis Echevarria on the true potential of Mexican oil reserves "for fear that he would use it irresponsibly." Further bureaucratic hegemony over the leadership is indicated by another passage from Camp:

Now, rather than influencing decisions with their advice, *they are making most of their own decisions directly* (1985: 113, underscoring supplied).

Paradoxically, what may save Mexico from being like Chile in Cell 2 is the recent increase in the number of technically trained persons in the political leadership. Having followed the administrative rather than the political path in the pursuit of their careers up to that point, cabinet officials and even presidents could already be less dependent on the career bureaucrats for advice on technical options. There is, however, a trade-off. The leadership may itself be narrowing the range of alternative strategies because the technocrats in the political leadership "may be unaware of or lack the ability to use the broadest range of political options" (Camp 1985: 111). The problem is doubly critical because their training has made them look to Western technology for methods and solutions, and this may preclude them, being less in touch with society, from seeking peculiarly

Mexican solutions. However, because they share this predilection with the bureaucracy, it is unlikely that they will meet conflicts or criticisms from the career officials as they make these decisions.

Saskatchewan State in the 1940s

Unlike the other examples cited here, Saskatchewan is not a country, but a province of Canada. It is used here because its succession experience in the 1940s is among the few solid case studies on the subject and represents practically the textbook example of bureaucratic sublation (Lipset 1952: 221-32).

The radical Saskatchewan Cooperative Commonwealth Foundation (C.C.F.) managed to win the elections in 1944, wresting leadership from the Liberal Party. Despite its name, the latter was similar to the Conservative Party with which it had previously alternated in power. Fighting against the blatant patronage of its opponents, C.C.F. had opposed political appointments in its platform. However, suspicious of the leanings of the bureaucracy, it had also exempted the post of ministers and other major policy positions from the career service. Thus, upon assuming power, it was free, both within the limits of its platform and the political traditions of Saskatchewan State, to replace the top civil servants with its own partisans.

However, the new government did not make wide-ranging replacements for two reasons. First, the heavy agenda of reform could not await the creation of a new apparatus; inexperienced ministers thus found themselves dependent on the career bureaucracy for immediate action on their transformation program. Second, they found little overt opposition to their new policies in the bureaucracy. Thus they saw no necessity for an overhaul.

Yet, almost imperceptibly, especially in the beginning, the civil service managed to modify the C.C.F.'s goals. For instance, discrimination against racial minorities was anathema to the new governors. Thus, they immediately moved to end these practices. However, the bureaucrats first postponed implementation and then slowly ingratiated themselves with their new superiors, becoming "the best 'socialists' in Saskatchewan" (Lipset 1952: 224). As they became indispensable, their view of the difficulties of carrying out the new policies was gradually accepted by the leadership and thus practically determined the pace and fate of their reform agenda.

In another instance, farming leases and privileges were allocated to rich farmers instead of poor farmers and landless veterans, as envisioned by the new policies. Since this tampering with policy was not official and took place in the field, the minister involved did not learn about it until complaints from local C.C.F. farmers reached him. Thus, he could replace his staff only after the damage had already spread far and wide.

Thus, although pre-C.C.F., the executive-bureaucracy interconnection exemplified Cell 1, under the C.C.F. the relationship approximated Cell 2,

with the radical vision of the successor-government becoming blurred in the face of bureaucratic sublation.

Preliminary Comparison

The survey shows that different patterns of executive or bureaucratic subordination are operating in different countries. In addition, even countries exhibiting the same mode (e.g., executive ascendancy) differ in their legal structures, bureaucratic features and level of democratic and social development. Although each country with normal leadership turn-overs has developed its own mode of executive-bureaucracy interaction, there is a perceptible variation from one government to the next and from one state to another. This does not imply that personality and culture are the major deciding forces, because there remain strong structural and comparative features. However, it does signify the importance of history and other non-institutional variables. These factors are more fully addressed in the analysis of regular successions in the Philippines, the subject of the next chapter.

3

The Executive and the Bureaucracy Under Normal Successions: The Philippines

This chapter traces the process of normal succession and executive-bureaucracy interaction in the Philippines, the principal country example. The interaction under the colonial era and early years of independence is presented to put the discussion of the Macapagal and Marcos presidencies in perspective. The chapter ends with a comparative analysis of executive-bureaucracy interactions in all the countries discussed here and in Chapter 2.

Philippine Political and Administrative History

Lying south of the continent of Asia, the Philippines, an archipelago of over seven thousand islands, and extends over 300,000 square kilometers, qualifying it among the upper third of contemporary nations in terms of area. With over 60 million inhabitants, it is one of the most highly-populated countries in the world. The sizes of human settlements vary widely, with Metropolitan Manila, the capital region, being overcrowded and polluted, while many other areas remain remote and comparatively uninhabited.

Blood and ritual kinship ties and patron-client relations involve almost all Filipinos in a network of reciprocal obligations. However, schools, the bureaucracy and the law extol Western norms of universalism and individualism. These have differing consequences on government-people relations. Traditional values uphold authoritarianism but also humanize relations. At the same time, universalistic norms facilitate equitable as well as mechanical treatment and, in a society in which certain groups have been disadvantaged over time, can be used to perpetuate such discrimination.

These value systems clash with and accommodate one another on different occasions. Some officials regularly use government positions for personal power, while others freely make available their own resources for public purposes. Either strategy - greed or unselfishness - can find a normative base in society, and it is contingent upon the pertinent social interaction to decide which one should earn public approval or condemnation.

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Filipinos tend to be homogeneous, generally brown-skinned, dark-haired and relatively short. Due to their trade and colonial history, many have Chinese, Spanish or American blood. Reflecting a strong sense of colonial mentality, Filipinos associate beauty with western physical features.

But certain other differences among Filipinos carry great import. For instance, Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion. However, *Moros* (Filipino Muslims) who now comprise about five percent of the population used to be the majority in the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu.¹ They continue to predominate in what have now shrunk to a few provinces in the region. With a proud history of continuous resistance to both Spain and the United States (US), they have kept their Islamic culture despite western colonialism. However, the migration of other Filipinos and the encroachment of plantations and industrial enterprises of multinationals, wealthy Christians and *Moro* leaders have crowded out and marginalized the natives. The religious question has thus combined with political and economic issues to fan the *Moro* secessionist movement.

The *Moro* problem is symptomatic of other divisions marking the Filipino people. While the original question may be phrased in terms of religion, ethnicity or occupation, it often boils down to the problem of overwhelming poverty and exploitation. The majority live in dismal conditions while a small group of families thrive in luxury and appropriate for themselves the wealth of the land. To the latter belong descendants of the native, Spanish and American colonial elites, multinational executives, and Chinese capitalists. It also includes others who got to the top by capturing political positions or using their influence on government officials. The domination by the few, backed up by government resources and military force, has contributed in no small way to breeding rebellions that have been endemic in the country since the Spanish conquest in 1521.

The Spanish Period

The Philippine archipelago was composed of separate communities at the time of the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century. Some of these settlements might be called "original democracies" (Manglapus 1987) wherein rulership rotated among several families, each temporary governor was accountable to his "subjects," land was held in common, and consensual decision making was the rule. This last is a system of governance retained by present-day Cordillera tribes and reflected in the tradition and written history of the peoples of Muslim Mindanao (Tancangco 1990).

1. "Moro" used to be a pejorative term applied to the largely Muslim Filipinos of Mindanao and Sulu. However, since it was used by the Mindanao liberation movement to refer to its goal, Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation), it has gained respectability and is a preferred term to refer to the communities of Maranaos, Maguindanaos, Tausugs, Samals and Lumads.

The Spaniards at the time of conquest coopted local rulers as the Crown's representatives in the countryside, supervised by a Spanish governor and aided by a small contingent of feared soldiers and priests. In the capital city of Manila sat the other officials who had bought their positions in Madrid and were primarily concerned with getting fast and high returns on their investment. They were headed by a governor general who reported to the viceroy in Mexico half a world away, who in turn took orders from the head of the Overseas Ministry in Madrid. Spain's laws tried to exact accountability from servants of the Crown and to minimize the oppression of the natives. But since its investments needed to be secured, Spain also tended to side more with the exploitative officials than with the "inferior" natives. And so it was that under Spain, the natives were ruled by a Christian government on paper while enduring an abusive and pillaging state for almost 400 years.

Resistance was endemic throughout the four centuries of Spanish hegemony, but, being localized, it could not succeed against the formidable combination of sword and cross. This changed in 1896 when Filipinos waged a revolution for independence and succeeded in toppling the colonial government. However, Spain surrendered not to the natives but to their erstwhile ally, the US, which annexed the Philippines in the Treaty of Paris of 1898 for \$20 million.

The American Period

The US promptly declared that it would hold the colony only long enough "to teach the Filipinos the art of self-government." That declaration was an oversight of history. By that time, Filipinos had already thrown off the Spanish yoke in the first war of independence waged by an Asian colony, and that they already had a functioning government as of June 12, 1898. Americans prevailed only because of superior arms and because a contingent of wealthy Filipinos made peace to save their possessions (Agoncillo 1956). The US then went on to use free public education as the other major instrument of domination. Appealing to the hearts and minds of the populace, it piously downplayed the lure of Philippine mines, resources and markets in launching their first imperialistic mission and succeeded in erasing from national memory its brutal period of martial law government (1898-1902) (Wolff 1960).

The number of Filipinos in the Spanish bureaucracy was so small that when Spain left, the Americans practically had to create a civil service from scratch. The Civil Service Act of 1900, one of the first laws they enacted, introduced the values and methods favored by US civil service reformers - recruitment by competitive examination, promotion by merit, permanence

2. At that point, the merit system and other elements of civil service reform had been instituted only in three states of the Union.

and neutrality despite changes in the political leadership, and accountability of public office.² That Act created a bureaucracy which appeared to live up to its billing as one based on a merit system. It confronted the corruption scandals that surfaced openly and spared neither the small fry nor their leaders, even if they were American (Endriga 1979). On the whole, the civil service then stood in marked contrast to that of the Spanish period and later.

This apparent idyllic situation however, not signify that the American era was a golden age. It only meant that the battle had taken place elsewhere. American attention was not concentrated on the bureaucracy. The US established a *laissez faire* government which involved itself in the colony's economy only to provide for the needs of its merchants, industrialists and other capitalists. They bought mines and plantations; and they got forestry and fishing concessions. They dominated foreign commerce and shared domestic trade with the Chinese. They took over public utilities and the mass media. All that the apolitical bureaucracy had to do was to guard as property rights.

The colonial master prohibited civil servants from membership in political parties. Non-partisanship was facilitated by two facts: (1) the Americans upheld the merit system and imposed immediate sanctions on its violators; and (2) the colony was effectively a one-party state throughout the American regime. These meant that despite party turnover in the US and elections in the Philippines (since 1907), the bureaucracy did not have to contend with wide policy swings nor deal with new political personages after each election period.

The prohibition against party membership also meant that civil servants were cut off from political debates during the most exciting part of the struggle for independence from America. They were stuck with technical assignments that could be accomplished regardless of their policy orientation. This practice came close to the classical definition of the bureaucratic role and ingrained neutrality in them not only about parties but also about political causes. This principle would be reenforced after Independence when "development" as the predominant concern would simply be regarded as a technical question, not a political one.

The native elite, in allying themselves with the new gods while professing neutrality about everything else, had projected a kind of "acquiescent nationalism" that made the Americans confidently transfer the bureaucracy to Filipinos quite early in their colonization (Mahajani 1971). At the same time, the replacement of Americans by Filipinos was an economizing move, since Americans did not work at the substandard wages of their native counterparts. Nevertheless, when the new Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson proceeded to implement its policy of immediate Filipinization in 1913, the American community felt that they were "hit by a cataclysm" (Hayden 1942: 94). Although the previous annual turnover of American civil servants was "always much higher than was desirable," the remaining colonials thought the decision to leave or stay was theirs rather

than the government's. This purge was the very first suffered by the Philippine civil service and affected only Americans. As later explained by Francis B. Harrison, then governor-general,

Their (the American bureau chiefs') power had increased to such an extent that they had assumed an attitude of rivalry and antagonism toward one another, if not toward the government itself;...their "prestige" was all-important, and they were generally inspired with a *disbelief in the ability of Filipinos to carry on any important work of government*...The new policy would be impossible if bureau chiefs were to perform political sabotage upon the political machinery (quoted in Hayden 1942: 97-98, underscoring supplied).

Harrison's rationale would anticipate that of Marcos' and Aquino's later purges: that the bureaucracy as it stood was tied to the policies of the old administration, that it had used its power for its own sake, and that it would not be able to internalize the philosophy of the new regime. However, it differed from them in two major ways. First, the policy spoken of was Filipinization, a progressive and necessary step for a soon-to-be independent country. Second, it was successful within the limits of its definition, in that at the end of the Harrison regime, Americans had decreased from 29 to 4 percent of the entire bureaucracy (Hayden 1942: 96-97).

However, Filipinization was simply that: the replacement of American by Filipino personnel. It did not change the government's basic thrust, which was to protect American economic interests, this time with Filipinos at the frontlines. While Spanish colonial plunder took place under the aegis of church and state, Americans came as the bearers of free enterprise. A neutral bureaucracy served American interests better since exploitation of the colony could proceed apace while the image of a benevolent government remained untarnished.

The Japanese Interlude

During World War II, the Japanese declared the Philippines as an independent state and installed a puppet government. However, the Filipinos as a whole remained loyal to the US. This behavior contrasted with the manner in which other Asian peoples used the Japanese period to further their struggle for freedom against all colonial masters. Filipino faith in America was expressed later in the adoration accorded the GIs as "liberators." The allegiant attitude toward the US was so widespread that even radical groups such as the *Huks* (Philippine communists) muted the anti-American aspect of their struggle during this period and "premised their program on the return of American sovereignty" (Constantino and Constantino 1978: 146-47).

For those who served in the bureaucracy during this period, sabotage of the enemy became an act of high patriotism. In normal times, this would have been regarded as corruption, if not treason. A civil service that allowed nationalism and personal survival to rule would not have found it easy to return to the relative value-neutrality and absence of commitment of the pre-war era. This was the state of the administrative system when the Philippines entered the period of the Third Republic in 1946.³

The Philippine Republic, 1946-1972

A strong president, a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary comprised the tripartite democratic structure ordained by the Philippine Constitution of 1935,⁴ and carried over into the new Philippine Republic of 1946. They were complemented by the declaration of the sovereignty of the people, a bill of rights, regular elections and other appurtenances of a liberal democracy.

Yet the reality left much to be desired. Elections were bloody and dishonest, although they occurred regularly and did result in some turnover of political officials at the national and local levels. Parties were personalistic agglomerations with little policy differences, except for the Communist Party which was outlawed in the early 1950s. Those who controlled the resources of the land remained entrenched in power despite every president's vow to extend social justice, and notwithstanding the protests of the peasantry and labor and outright insurgency of the Left. Despite these flaws, the Philippine political system dispersed power among the three branches of government, allowed the mass media to report on government scandals, and provided few restrictions on basic freedoms.

The extent of Philippine independence was also under question. The new Republic had established relations with its Asian neighbors, and sought membership in the non-aligned bloc. However, it avoided relations with socialist nations, afraid to be tainted with communism. Moreover, with the justification that

the Philippines is the only nation in which. . . American democracy has been so deeply transplanted. . . It is supremely important for the United States that Philippine democracy continue to prosper and to mature within its own constitutional framework (Wurfel 1965: 150),

3. The First Republic was that established by the Philippine Revolution in 1898. The Second Republic was the puppet government under the Japanese during World War II. The Third Republic began with the withdrawal of the American sovereignty in 1946.

4. This was the structure of government throughout the Commonwealth era (1935-46), [except during the Japanese occupation (1942-45)] and the Third Republic (1946-72).

the US continued to intervene in Philippine affairs by assuming direct control of its monetary policy (until 1949), dictating terms of parity rights with Filipinos in the exploitation of its natural resources and public utilities (until 1994), determining quotas on its major exports, and providing for the maintenance of military bases in over 12,000 square miles of Philippine territory (expiration date: 1991). The list should also include technical assistance programs which by the 1950s had explicitly embodied the policy that "aid is intervention" (Wurfel 1965: 156).

The bureaucracy assumed the major responsibility for these programs; in its ranks the neo-colonialism that was being fostered went unnoticed as did the use of public schools as the principal means of imperialism at the turn of the century. The civil service continued to regard itself as the arsenal of means and not as the articulator of values.

Public education itself was for many civil servants simply a means to an end, and its instrumental function was more important than the substantive education it could have imparted. Besides, many government employees used public schools and public employment as twin avenues for social mobility. Thus, the civil service became staffed by individuals with high educational qualifications whose diplomas did not necessarily ensure competence. Moreover, many were not suited to their positions - for instance, a pharmacist or dentist might hold the position of an auditor (Tantuico 1988). The bureaucracy tried to correct such mismatching with training programs that were as up-to-date as any in the world. Thus, the Philippine civil service could be characterized as highly trained and professionalized even though it continued to be inefficient and ineffective.

Meanwhile, the children of elite families prospered in the political and economic realms, with the gains in one sphere liberally affecting their status in the other. Few bureaucrats crossed over to politics even after retirement unlike the practice, for instance, of many Indians (Jain 1976). The dichotomy between politics and administration was therefore concretized in the careers of most civil servants, even though entry into politics after service in the bureaucracy was not sanctioned by the principle of civil service neutrality.

What it did prohibit was involvement in partisan politics while an individual was in the career service. However, civil servants succumbed easily to the enticements of their patrons who needed campaigners in their bid for political power. Together they engaged in many subtle circumventions of the policies of neutrality and anti-patronage throughout the American period (Corpus 1965) and with considerably less subterfuge (because of much less risk) afterwards. Government resources and personnel served the electoral campaign needs of both the executive and the members of the legislature. However, the fact that no president was reelected until 1969 suggests that the partisan politicalization of the bureaucracy was not complete.

Like other Philippine political alliances which are based on kinship and other ascriptive ties, the relationship between civil servants and politicians was strongly personalistic. Political intervention was more obvious and frequent at entry levels. It was also sought for transfers to more desirable places of assignment (e.g., Manila). The demand for political brokering was relatively weaker for promotions, not so much because government workers, were rewarded for meritorious performance, but due to strong allegiance to the seniority rule (Francisco 1960). This made exemplary achievers restive, but contributed greatly to the stability of the system.

During the colonial period, reaching the top of the career ladder meant attaining a bureau directorship during the colonial period. This was continuously upgraded until it extended to the undersecretary level by the 1950s. Security of tenure for permanent employees was largely upheld.

Few administrative officials tried to suggest their own policy agenda - except where these involved working conditions, such as reorganization programs and pay scales (Viloria 1969; Samonte 1970). They had little role in conceiving policies, although they did assist in their formal drafting and in following them up through the legislative mill. They were also hardly disposed to change the ways of politics. In one survey, at least a third of middle-level bureaucrats admitted to having help in an electoral campaign even though this was against civil service rules. Another third acknowledged nurturing political ambitions, though they were aiming more towards patron-replacement than system reform. About a half of total respondents closed the door on political careers, and about two-thirds confessed to feeling little respect for legislators. Such exasperation led many more to wish for a stronger leadership (about half asking for a dictator), or for that "bureaucratic utopia" where administrators, instead of politicians, ran the country (Abueva 1970: 168).

The Process of Normal Transition

From 1946 when the US formally withdrew its sovereignty, until 1972, when Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, the Philippines had six presidents. Four of them were elected directly by the people and two succeeded presidents who died in office; the latter were subsequently elected to the presidency in the next polls. Each turnover was peaceful and without any untoward incident. The last two were led by Diosdado Macapagal who served from 1961 to 1965, and Ferdinand Marcos who was first elected in 1965.⁵

5. Marcos won the 1965, 1969 and 1981 presidential elections. His 1981 reelection occurred after the quasi-lifting of martial law and was a classic "demonstration election." Major opposition leaders boycotted the polls and he had to produce his own opponent - an obscure politician - over whom he handily won. His 1969 reelection was also marred by complaints of fraud and widespread vote-buying.

The civil service was transferred from one president to the next with little upheaval. Policy shifts were rare, despite party alternation, because the economic elites were represented in the opposing political parties which adhered to similar political and economic beliefs.

Each president put his stamp on the bureaucracy through personnel and organizational changes. The executive appointed agency heads and aides that could be justified as "policy determining, highly technical or primarily confidential," qualities which exempted the appointee from civil service requirements. Others were hired as "casuals," employees who enjoyed *de facto* permanence due to the regular renewal of their temporary "emergency" appointments. By passing a civil service test later, many political appointees became permanent employees.

A new president could summarily remove political transients and casuals. The vacancies created became convenient openings for followers of the new gods. Nevertheless, the turnover was never wholesale since few Filipinos were without access to patrons from both sides of the political fence. Thus, civil servants from casuals to top officials effectively enjoyed security of tenure, giving any new administration very little formal room to recruit its own people.

The other recourse was to restructure the bureaucracy. All Philippine presidents created offices directly under their supervision to identify what would be their main thrusts. In addition, they tried to get congressional authority for a general reorganization as soon as they took office. The code words were always "economy and efficiency" but the timing and results usually signified new power alignments. A usual recommendation was to decongest the office of the President of the favorite functions of his immediate predecessor. This of course was again resorted to in the next over-all restructuring.

Reorganization commissions likewise tried to inject some order into the government corporate sector, a favorite means of escaping personnel and auditing controls. Another typical recommendation was to strengthen field operations which served not so much to deconcentrate the bureaucracy as to open up new positions all over the country. New offices were also regularly created, some as "improved" varieties of notoriously ineffective or corrupt agencies.

Reorganization then seemed like a painless way of changing the bureaucracy, with the executive getting rid of unsatisfactory civil servants or agencies without directly criticizing them — a culturally important face-saving device. However, because it was an authority delegated by Congress, no executive actually got everything he wanted. Agencies and bureaucrats dissatisfied with his proposals fought them in Congress, a process which made the reorganization process protracted, leading to the triumph of horse-trading over organizational principles. The fate of the work of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission (GSRC,

1954-1956) was not a typical. Three years after it disbanded, 13 of its 33 re-organization plans were never implemented. The reasons for failure were the following: "(a) opposition to the plans by the operating agencies; (b) lack of understanding of the meaning of some provision. . .; and (c) presidential inaction" (Viloria 1969: 75).⁶ Apparently, a subordinate bureaucracy could also win by tiring out a president.

Both Presidents Macapagal and Marcos did little to drastically change the executive's relations with the bureaucracy in the first years of their term. Macapagal maintained a hands-off policy throughout his tenure. However, Marcos increasingly sought personal loyalty from individual bureaucrats in the latter part of his so-called "democratic period." How each president interacted with the bureaucracy at the onset of his incumbency, as well as the similarities and differences between their relationships with the civil service and other executive-civil service arrangements, comes into focus in the following sections.

The Bureaucracy Under Macapagal

Diosdado Macapagal became president in 1961. He was the first vice-president to succeed to the presidency through elections and the third to win against an incumbent since the Commonwealth period. In all these electoral exercises, the support of the former colonial master, the US, was clearly thrown behind the eventual victor.

Macapagal entered the presidency with impressive credentials. Known as "the poor boy from Lubao," a farming town in Pampanga at the center of the island of Luzon, he "lacked even a *compadre* or *comadre*⁶ of any influence" (Reynolds and Bocca 1965: 19, 22) presumably until he became a politician of note. He earned law and economics degrees (the latter a Ph.D.) from local universities partly as a working student. He started as a cub reporter in a Manila daily and then became a career civil servant for 20 years. He became a congressman in the 1950s, having been discovered by Elpidio Quirino, the second president of the Republic. He regularly made it to the "most outstanding congressmen" list during an incumbency of eight years (1949-57) (Valenzuela 1958). He was known as a sponsor of social legislations, including those on the minimum wage, barrio autonomy, rural health, and agricultural credit.

Macapagal assumed the presidency a few years after the *Huk* (local communist) uprising had been undercut by Ramon Magsaysay and his American advisers. Pro-American sentiments were still riding high; they would not be subject to much rethinking until after the Vietnam debacle. However, agrarian unrest continued, fueled by an exploitative tenancy arrangement that the *Huks* and many peasants found insufferable. He also

6. A *compadre* is a man and a *comadre* is a woman, who become one's kin by virtue of their sponsorship of the ritual of baptism or marriage for one's child.

inherited an economy encumbered by almost a decade of foreign exchange, trade and price controls.

Macapagal faced two Houses led by political rivals. Thus, many of his legislative initiatives were spurned and a number of his appointees underwent an arduous confirmation process.

His relationship with the bureaucracy was more peaceful. The civil service underwent a general reorganization between 1953 and 1957 (spanning the Magsaysay and Garcia terms) during which two American consultancy firms trained Filipinos not only in the art of creating, modifying or abolishing agencies, but also in such new technical pursuits as position classification and management auditing. Macapagal remains the only postwar president who did not overhaul the entire bureaucracy.⁷ His principal activities which affected the bureaucracy were in the following areas: (1) appointments; (2) professionalization; and (3) combating graft and corruption.

Political and administrative appointments. A president was expected not only to appoint his ranking followers to top political posts but also to allow for the appointment of lower-level people to the bureaucracy through the replacement of casuals. However, Macapagal did not dismiss the casuals in large numbers. In fact, he did not even place his ranking supporters in key positions until the terms of their incumbents had ended or they had voluntarily resigned. And when they did, his first appointees were career officials even to such plum bureaus as Customs, Internal Revenue and Forestry. In his memoirs, the former president asserted his philosophy thus:

In appointing administration men to key positions, we took care to safeguard the career service. Our appointees were mostly troubleshooters who would infuse the reformist spirit in the offices and then be reassigned to other missions (Macapagal 1968: 41).

He was almost as good as his word. A case in point was in regard to the position of Civil Service Commissioner, the head of the central personnel agency at the time. As early as the campaign period, Macapagal had considered Abelardo Subido, a prominent writer and lawyer, as his civil service adviser and "shadow official" for that post. However, the position carried a fixed term. Thus, it took almost a year for Macapagal to first find an appropriate judgeship for incumbent Amado del Rosario before he could appoint Subido to the post.

Although Macapagal generally did not appoint his men to top positions unless they became vacant by operation of law, his predecessor was not so

7. However, like everyone else, he called for such a reorganization in his first State - of - the - Nation Message on January 22, 1962 (Abueva 1969: 6-7).

circumspect. Garcia, for his part, contributed the term "midnight appointments" to Filipino political parlance. In the closing days of his term, he appointed 350 people to senior positions. It required the Supreme Court to resolve the controversy that his action created. After it invalidated all the midnight appointments, no outgoing president has ever again tried to do it.

Professionalization of the civil service. Among Macapagal's achievements relative to the bureaucracy was the promulgation in September 1962 of the implementing rules and regulations of RA 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959. The Act strengthened recruitment, grievance and performance rating procedures. It also decentralized civil service operations in two ways: by establishing regional offices throughout the country, and by creating personnel offices in all government agencies. While this Act was passed midway during Garcia's term, its implementation languished until Macapagal's incumbency.

Much of the administrative reform during this period was identified more with Commissioner Subido than with the president, a telling symbol of Macapagal's conviction that the civil service should be independent of politicians' whims. His mandate to Subido was "to fight for the merit system" (Subido 1965). Among Subido's first moves was to conduct several competitive examinations aimed at creating rosters of civil service eligibles. These examinations could be regarded as conciliatory measures to legitimize the thousands in office who got in through political connections.⁸

Macapagal's Civil Service Commission also expanded its jurisdiction. Subido ruled that personnel in government-owned and controlled corporations as well as special groups like state universities were subject to its rules. This had been provided for by law since Quirino's administration but had never been implemented. The Commission's jurisdiction was likewise extended to the legislative and judicial branches, which fought the policy to no avail.

Subido also did all he could to nullify two laws which he thought were "wreaking immeasurable havoc on the merit system" (Subido 1972: 41). These were: RA 1079, which eliminated the two-year prescription on civil service eligibility earned after an examination, and RA 1080, which extended that eligibility to everyone who had passed government licensing examinations (such as those for physicians, lawyers, accountants, etc.). He issued a memorandum circular which limited the eligibility that the two laws could give only to positions requiring the professional knowledge which those examinations were attesting to. Thus, he revoked the permanent appointments of 101 (out of 102) chiefs of hospitals on the ground that hospital administration required a different kind of competence than that

8. RA 2260 required that non-eligible employees with at least five years of satisfactory service be given qualifying examinations within one year of the effectivity of the Act.

indicated by a physician's license. He then scheduled a new examination despite protests of the hospital heads. Significantly, Macapagal sustained Subido's revocation of these appointments despite the advice to the contrary of his Executive Secretary, the most powerful person in a Filipino president's Cabinet (Varela 1988).

Other programs to strengthen the merit system included the promulgation of a merit promotion plan, a performance rating system, and complaints and grievance procedures. Government-wide training programs were also conducted regularly. Subido also required nine graduate units of public administration as a prerequisite for promotion to supervisory positions. This had the effect of creating schools of public administration practically overnight but the contribution to civil service performance was not so dramatic.

Among many other controversial decisions, Subido demoted even his own brother whom he felt unqualified for his high position, and tangled with the mayor of Manila and national legislators on their differing interpretations of what the bureaucracy should be like (Varela 1988).

Subido's record was all the more remarkable because he had to face the (legislative) Commission on Appointments for the confirmation of his own appointment. Without backing down, he eventually got official *imprimatur*.

However, the politicians had other cards up their sleeve. One of these was the so-called 50-50 plan first unfolded in July 1959 during Garcia's incumbency (Francisco and de Guzman 1963). Finding 1,800 positions created in the 1959 Appropriations Act, the majority party divided them up equally between executive officials and its 33 members in the Lower House. Each congressman was given a quota of positions to which he may recommend his followers. Although equality was supposed to be the norm, officers of Congress were able to make recommendations beyond the quota, and a few minority party members were also allowed into the magic circle.

Nominees were screened by a committee under the Majority Floor Leader. Over 400 such political recommendees had been accepted by the agencies before the secret plan was unearthed by a majority senator. (Members of the Upper House were excluded from the distribution.) Senators denounced the deal as immoral and no different from the spoils system, but were never quite able to arouse much public indignation perhaps because the people saw it "as a mere formalization of what was regarded as a widely existent practice" (Francisco and de Guzman 1963: 118). In early 1960, the screening committee inquired into why other recommendations were not honored and received respectful replies from administrators who complained about the lack of funds.

With the defeat of Garcia at the polls, the 50-50 plan should have been shelved but was not. Through the vagaries of Philippine politics, the Majority Floor Leader under Garcia had joined Macapagal's Liberal Party, and in June 1962, he wrote his fellow congressmen to submit their recom-

mendees to vacancies in the 1962-1963 budget again. Thus, Macapagal and Subido's desire for an independent civil service did not come to pass since it still had to continue dealing with political interference from legislators.

The moral regeneration program. Since Garcia lost to Macapagal partly on the issue of graft and corruption, the latter took it upon himself to clean up the government as a major part of his mandate. As the independent *Fookien Times* declared in an appraisal at the end of 1962 (Olivera 1962: 56):

Seven months after Macapagal assumed the presidency, he had already made history. Cynical citizens had thought that in this country, the powerful and the influential were beyond the pale of the law. . . Not this time. The big clean-up started with a bang in March....

The March event alluded to concerned Harry Stonehill, an American tobacco magnate who was charged with corruption of public officials, tax evasion and smuggling. Stonehill named several of his associates who were in public office. Macapagal forthwith removed these men, including two Cabinet members and almost 20 other political and bureaucratic officials, and then deported the American.

Macapagal also went after a senator and his former running mate in the Liberal Party for allegedly using political power to entrench their families economically. These actions were very controversial. It was charged that he deported Stonehill rather than bring his case to court because the American's revelations were getting too close to Malacañang (the Office of the President). Other critics pointed out that the big fish caught were Macapagal's political enemies even though some belonged to his party. However, although they decried his drastic methods, they could not charge him with any violation of law.

At the civil service level, Macapagal's chief lieutenants for his moral regeneration drive were Subido and Cesar Climaco. They successively headed the President's Anti-Graft Committee, which was created shortly after he took office. After his first year in office, Macapagal claimed to have dismissed 117 officials and employees for alleged misconduct and corruption following PAGCOM chief Subido's recommendation (Varela 1988).

But the moral fervor might have waned afterwards. Though the President himself remained an exemplar of honesty, Climaco would report after *his* first five months in office (in 1964) that the record of his agency was "no hits, no runs, all expenses" (PAGCOM 1965: 185). Nevertheless, Macapagal's record against corruption may be the best of any postwar government.

Major thrusts. A President has to do more than watch over the bureaucracy or keep the political system clean and honest; his task is to lead the nation. Macapagal regarded his first two years as crucial, and devoted the

first year to invigorating the economy, and the second, to reforming land tenure and reorienting foreign policy. The civil service was instrumental in all these programs but remained virtually invisible. As stated in his memoirs:

During this period of concentration on fundamental activities, the Department Heads were given virtually full discretion, authority and responsibility for the affairs of their respective departments (Macapagal 1968: 387).

In reply to a question on how he treated the bureaucracy, Macapagal declared:

Because of my high opinion of the civil service, I do not recall having given special attention to the civil service (Macapagal 1987a).

He instituted decontrol in the first month of his tenure. As he explained in his first State-of-the-Nation Address:

All these moves have been taken after consultation with and [after getting approval from] the International Monetary Fund. In addition, we have secured commitments from the US government and from private banking institutions to support our decontrol program (Macapagal January 22, 1962).

The policy accelerated the gradual decontrol program started by Garcia in April 1960. Macapagal regarded decontrol as his contribution to the country's return to free enterprise, to which he was strongly committed. The peso-dollar exchange rate dipped to P4 (from the controlled rate of P2). Decontrol led to an increase in exports, foreign exchange reserves and GNP. However, it also created difficulties for manufacturers needing foreign-made materials and fueled inflation.

Government employees were among those hardest hit by rising prices. Wages unable to provide a decent living had been the lot of the civil service for decades, a fact blamed on the rise of graft and corruption as early as 1932 (de la Torre 1986, citing a *Manila Daily Bulletin* editorial of that year). Or as a leading politician of that day delicately put it:

The feeling during these times is that the performance of public functions is not compensable by official salaries, but must be further rewarded with special remuneration from the immediate beneficiaries (Romualdez 1959).

With the peso depreciated by almost 100 percent, the real wages of all workers, including civil servants, declined considerably. Macapagal ad-

dressed this problem by increasing salaries and other benefits to public employees through legislation, after receiving pressure from several employees' organizations.⁹

The first major change he introduced in the bureaucracy was prompted by his economic policies. When Macapagal entered Malacañang, he found that not even one assistant or clerk was handling economic matters there. Nine months later, he appointed an assistant executive secretary for economic affairs to head the Program Implementation Agency (PIA), composed of 150 economists and other technical personnel (Executive Order No. 17, August 1962). The PIA was made necessary by the new economic problems brought about by decontrol, and by the problem of coordinating the plans of several agencies that had been created for each special economic program. In the words of its first Director General, the PIA was

an agency of economic rationalization...whose task was not to supplant but to energize the economic branches of government and harmonize their normal operations with the patterns demanded by a consistent developmental strategy (Roxas 1965: 379-80).

The National Economic Council (NEC) lost ground with the creation of the PIA. Although created to be

at the peak of grandeur as the highest economic and social development planning body of the country, the institutional adviser of the government in general and the President in particular on economic matters (Soberano 1961),

the NEC had been ignored by Magsaysay and Garcia, both of whom preferred to get economic advice from the Budget Commission (Alfonso 1969: 156). The NEC's failure to win presidential acceptance could be traced to many reasons, many of which are beyond the scope of this work. However, one factor is relevant here: its composition as a joint legislative and executive body. Given the rivalry of the two branches, especially the relative rarity of a cooperative congress, presidents had been loath to share this very important economic function with legislators.

Macapagal could therefore be said to be simply continuing a trend, although his method of attack was more direct. The original distinction was that the NEC would retain the function of broad aggregative planning, while PIA would engage in "heavy analytical research work in project

9. These included: RA 3675, raising the salaries of government employees in response to high prices; RA 3665, adjusting the salaries of teachers; and RA 3881, increasing their pensions. There were three specifically for the military: to raise the base pay of enlisted men (RA 3460) and officers (RA 3592), the longevity pay of both (RA 3641), and the pensions of veterans and their dependents (RA 4117).

priorities, operational planning and day-to-day proposals. . . There was no intention right from the outset to create an agency which would duplicate the functions of the NEC" (Alfonso 1969: 162). Nevertheless, as Alfonso herself stated, President Macapagal adopted the economic plan submitted by PIA, not that given by NEC (1969: 156).

The creation of PIA in the Office of the President sent ripples all across the bureaucracy. Although regarded with fear and suspicion primarily by those in the NEC, other civil servants, especially topnotch career professionals, welcomed the opportunity to join a new agency enjoying direct access to the President.

Though important, this consideration could not completely explain the favorable attitude of the civil service since PIA's recruits generally came from outside the service - i.e., from the private sector and academe. The positive response to PIA was thus not mainly due to a self-serving attitude on the part of civil servants. In fact, they could have regarded these outsiders as favored rivals since appointments of PIA staff were not subject to civil service regulation and those appointed enjoyed relatively higher salary rates than the rest of the bureaucracy (Ocampo 1978: 38).

The generally favorable welcome to PIA appears to have been due in large measure to a general acceptance given by the bureaucracy as well as by the general society, of technocracy and the developmentalist perspective which PIA represented. This perspective regarded development issues as basically technical questions that should be safeguarded from politicians. Its main goal was economic growth, with social benefits expected to trickle down in time to the masses. Enconscing an agency handling these matters in the Office of the President, far from the probing eyes of legislators, was probably its best location.

Macapagal's second major program was land reform, and here again, he did not disturb the existing bureaucracy (or from another viewpoint, he ignored it). He convened a secret committee of agrarian experts and friends from the private sector to draft a land reform section in his 1963 State of the Nation message and a new bill for Congress. Such was the secrecy that he deleted that section from the draft message he sent to the leaders of both Houses, convinced that by so doing, he would prevent landlords and other opponents of reform from mobilizing their forces. Once the bill was drafted, he certified¹⁰ it to Congress, and then called a special session seven times, until the weary legislators gave him a land reform act.¹¹ His commitment to the measure reflected a concern borne out of having been reared in poverty. He was also following the advice of many American experts who saw land reform as the main weapon against insurgency.

10. The Constitution of 1935 authorized a president to certify to the urgency of an administrative bill. This provision was retained in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

11. Special sessions are called for special purposes and may only discuss bills certified as urgent by the president.

However, the act he drafted was not radical at all. It made leaseholders of tenants, mandated a retention limit of 75 hectares, and provided that they pay at a court-approved rate over a period of 25 years. There was hardly any protection for landless workers, the most deprived of all.

The third priority of Macapagal's administration was foreign policy. Although supported by the US in his election bid, Macapagal strayed away from American policy on several occasions. One instance was the founding of Maphilindo (Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia), the forerunner of today's Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Maphilindo signified his friendship with Sukarno whose non-alignment and perceived pro-Communist image enraged the West. Another important symbolic act was the change of the country's Independence Day from July 4, 1946 - the American-chosen date - to June 12, 1898, when the Philippine Revolutionary Government declared its independence from Spain. In a major policy speech towards the end of his first full year in office, he also criticized US policy as "morally and ideologically weak" (Olivera 1962: 57).

Rather than denoting an ideological shift, however, Macapagal's stance seemed to be motivated by pragmatism, and it was reactive to American actions. For instance, when the American Congress failed to pass a war damage bill, he promptly cancelled his scheduled state visit to Washington and venerated June 12. Yet he campaigned for reelection in 1965 on the issue of sending Philippine troops to America's war in Vietnam and acted favorably on American-recommended economic policies throughout his term. Whether pro- or anti-American, however, his policy initiatives did not affect the bureaucracy in terms of personnel, organization or directions.

Analysis. Macapagal gained control of a bureaucracy that enjoyed a mixed reputation for knowledgeability on the one hand, and inefficiency and corruption, on the other. Many entered with politicians' recommendations but, once absorbed into the organization, did not necessarily constitute a bloc to support their *padrino's* bid for power. They enjoyed security of tenure if lodged in permanent positions; and often even politically appointed casuals gained permanency by simply staying on.

Macapagal entered office intending to reorganize the bureaucracy. Unable to get authority for it from the legislature, he proceeded to use it without a major overhaul. Two decades after leaving, he retained a healthy respect for it, describing the civil service in this way:

Left alone to itself, it would do marvelously - the civil service now is a victim of infection, not a source of violation (Macapagal 1987b).

This attitude may explain the way Macapagal dealt with the bureaucracy: distancing himself from it, having Subido fight its battles, for instance, or

allowing his Cabinet officials to run their departments with minimum interference. When his programs demanded it (for instance, in the realms of economic and anti-corruption policies), he expanded the bureaucracy, but he did not create new agencies simply to emasculate the bureaus that he distrusted. (Distrust of inherited institutions is a theme that runs through many regime turnovers.) He did cut off individual "victims of infection" decisively enough in the first months of his term, but his strong anti-corruption will did not last, perhaps because of the demands of reelection politics.

The President assumed power with a clear view of what he called "fundamentals." He was in authority but was open to bureaucratic demands. Under another political system, an administration such as that of Macapagal would have been a period of muscle flexing for bureaucrats. Yet the Philippine civil service did not push for a greater share of power: why did it not challenge the ascendancy of the presidency?

The first reason may be found within the bureaucracy itself. It was developing into a modern bureaucracy, but it considered itself as a technical instrument of the leadership. Unaware of the possibilities of their power as a bloc, officials and employees accepted "their place" without question. This might have been partly because Macapagal did not proceed to upset the status quo, and "business as usual" would hardly be a cause for organized acts of resistance. It might also be explained by an administrative culture that accepts authority without question, is turned toward itself, and is without any strong commitment to programs.

The second factor has to do with the part played by other political actors. The president himself was fighting a lot of battles with his fellow politicians, few of whom had anything to do with the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, having gotten used to absorbing political interference from the executive and legislative branches, the civil service now faced a president who was willing to let it be and legislators who cheerfully acted as recruiting agents and carefully guarded their appropriations powers but had very little to do with personnel movements for those already inside the bureaucracy. In dealing with these problems with politicians, the president and the bureaucracy were allied; therefore, it did not make sense for them to struggle against each other.

The third reason may be that the thrusts of the Macapagal administration in many cases interested mostly members of the formal governmental system and did not affect entrenched interests, that is, drastic reallocations of power were not effected. For instance, those who benefited most from the decontrol were the exporters and producers of agricultural products who had been dominant in society for a long time. The main business losers such as the importers and manufacturers were linked by family ties or partnership arrangements to many of these who benefited. Also, the land reform law would have meant a redistribution of wealth, but it was so mild and its implementation even less disturbing that the social

structure remained intact. The main losers in decontrol and land reform were not strong voices either in the bureaucracy or in the society at large and therefore could not have prevailed upon the bureaucracy to work against the president, or vice versa.

Marcos' Democratic Period (1965-1972)

Ferdinand Marcos' biography, to admirers and detractors alike, has a story-book quality about it. He was the eldest son of a minor politician in Ilocos Norte, the center of the "Solid North" in Philippine politics. He was a brilliant student and campus leader at the University of the Philippines. But on his last year there, the man who defeated Marcos' father in the previous elections died from a single gunshot wound while looking out the window of his home. The suspicion immediately centered on young Ferdinand, a known sharpshooter. After being charged for the crime, he gained permission to defend himself despite not being a lawyer. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, and while in prison he reviewed for the bar examinations. He not only topped the bar but also got himself acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence in 1940.

When the Second World War broke out in the following year, Marcos joined the guerrilla movement and became the most bemedalled Filipino of that war, a fact not lost on President Roxas whose attention and patronage were instrumental in thrusting him to the forefront of Philippine politics. However, some of his medals were given only years after the war, raising doubts about the authenticity of the battles he was supposed to have figured bravely in (Friend 1986: 14). His pre-political life was thus enveloped in controversy.

Marcos subsequently became a member of the House of Representatives and was named an outstanding congressman every single year of his entire tenure (1949-59). He later topped the eight-man senatorial race in 1959 and became concurrently president of the Liberal Party and Senate President. Marcos' interests as a legislator, according to an adoring biography, included government incentives to commerce and industry, the protection and extension of civil rights, government aid to farmers, a higher standard of professional ethics in politics and the civil service, and fairness to military veterans and their families (Spence 1969).

The debonair Marcos was already a congressman when he met and married Imelda Romualdez in a whirlwind courtship of 11 days. Mrs. Marcos was a poor cousin of the then-Speaker of the House but had assets that served well in Philippine politics - Southern origins (to complement Marcos' hold on the North), a beauty title, and a passable voice. In most capsule biographies, a romance like this would have easily been left out. But not in this instance, because Mrs. Marcos came to wield considerable power in her own right, sometimes in competition with the president.

Marcos left the party in power to run against its leader for the presidency. Even while he was Senate President, Marcos had distanced himself from Macapagal. He spoke against the increase in foreign debt under the latter's government, as well as against its decontrol program, its support of the Americans in Vietnam, its break with Malaysia and its corruption and waste (*Philippines Free Press* 1965; Varela 1988).

After Marcos won the presidency he first restored relations with Malaysia in 1967 and moved for the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, in 1968, the infamous Jabidah massacre occurred, in which about 30 Muslims allegedly being trained to claim Sabah for the Philippines mutinied and were slain. This cooled off relations with Malaysia, since Sabah was one of its constituent states.

Marcos' political chicanery became obvious as he espoused policies he had criticized bitterly during the campaign. Although blaming decontrol for a lot of the country's problems, he nonetheless declared his "faith in free enterprise" and sounded the call for the entry of foreign investments. Not much later, the eloquent opponent of Macapagal when the latter sought authority to contract foreign loans presided over the increase of the foreign debt from \$275 million in 1962 to \$1.9 billion in 1969 (Villegas 1987). The balance of payments was stabilized not by increased export earnings but by US aid and purchases related to the Vietnam war (Noble 1986: 76).

Instead of taking the expected anti-American stance, Marcos reversed his campaign promise and dispatched Filipino troops to Vietnam within a year of his inauguration. And while Macapagal could at least defend his administration with initiatives in social amelioration, Marcos simply accelerated his predecessor's disastrous economic policies with nary a social cushion for the most disadvantaged. Reacting to the resurgence of the *Huks* in their Pampanga stronghold, he declared it as his pilot area for Macapagal's Land Reform Act. However,

the four-year budget for land distribution was matched by a military budget for 1967 that was twice the defense budget for 1962 (Noble 1986: 75).

Marcos, however scored major accomplishments in the area of self-sufficiency in rice and public works during his first term. The vaunted rice self-sufficiency program was launched almost as soon as he took office and was entrusted to the legendary Rafael Salas, his first Executive Secretary. The President tapped funds from domestic and foreign sources to turn around the ignominy of the international center for rice research that relied on expensive imports of the precious commodity. He put together all agencies having to do with rice from production to expansion of credit services and marketing under a coordinating body reporting directly to the Office of the President (Iglesias 1976).

Marcos started where his predecessors Garcia and Macapagal left off. All three had their own rice crash program which failed to increase rice production, primarily because of the lack of financial resources, the relative unconcern for the administrative machinery, the strong influence of partisan politics, and inter-agency squabbles. Macapagal also had to contend with the problem of land reform conflicting with rice production, since tenants' payment for ricelands was based on the value of their harvest.

The rice self-sufficiency initiative paid off as scheduled, in 1968. The country even became a minor rice exporter as of that year (Iglesias 1976). However, there had been peaks and lows since. Besides, the boost in production did not bring the price of the staple down for the consumers. The rice technology which accounted for the success had since fallen out of favor, as it was based on expensive and ecologically unsafe inputs of pesticides and fertilizers.

Nevertheless, self-sufficiency in rice was a major achievement for Marcos. The first big harvest came in time for Marcos' first by-election and was a factor in his party's victory. More than that, however, it showed the political leadership's competence when matched by single-minded dedication to a goal. It was a compliment to the civil service as well. Except for Salas and the dean of the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines, the program was undertaken by career civil servants through a network of coordinating councils at all levels, from the center to the village.

Roads, schoolbuildings, airports, irrigation and electrification projects - the whole gamut of public works - became visible accomplishments of Marcos almost as soon as he took office. The low-cost "Marcos schoolhouses" became household words as they started to dot the countryside. He promised a Pan-Philippine Highway to link the archipelago by land transport, and basically completed it by 1970. Some of his public works projects were *quid pro quo* for other actions. For instance,

it was reported (and later confirmed) that Marcos' proposal to send troops to Vietnam, finally approved by the Philippine Congress in August 1966, followed a secret agreement that Washington would provide funds for engineering battalions to be used for road building and other community development projects in the Philippines and would subsidize the Philippine contingent in Vietnam (Noble 1986: 76).

Items in the Marcosian cultural agenda consisting mainly of public works were presided over by Imelda Marcos. These included local beautification projects, and on a grander scale, the reclamation of Manila Bay to house the complex of structures around the Cultural Center of the Philippines.

Appointments and removals in the civil service. Providing for such a complex of structures was incongruous in a regime whose first call was for austerity. Announced in his first inaugural, it had direct effects on the civil service.

Marcos immediately ordered a retrenchment of casuals, the semi-permanent employees who entered the public service without the required eligibilities (Flores 1966). Subido, who was retained by the new president, had announced before Marcos' inauguration that the Civil Service Commission would screen and approve the appointment of all casual employees. Marcos ignored his statement with respect to the evaluation of the criteria for dismissal and recruitment. For as in earlier years, the bureaucracy expanded instead of shrunk, despite the retrenchment order.

In any case, closing the civil service to patronage would have been more difficult for Marcos than for any other leader because he was paying for political debts to followers from both parties, the Liberal Party, of which he was president until the eve of his candidacy, and the Nacionalista Party under which he ran as a "guest presidential candidate." These debts were paid in the bureaucracy in two forms: the qualified associates who were hired as "policy making, primarily confidential and highly technical," appointees exempt from eligibility requirements; and the ordinary job-seekers who became the new set of casuals (Varela 1988).

Unlike Macapagal, Marcos did not play a waiting game with his preferred officials. However, he also upheld the unexpired terms of people in government corporations and regulatory bodies and left the rest of the bureaucracy to Subido.

The Commission established several examination programs at the start of Marcos' term. They included the following: (1) a regular examination program covering the general clerical field, the career service, supervisors, statisticians and stenographers; (2) a seven-year teacher examination program; and (3) an examination program for professions involved with economic development.

Although public school teachers have always been the biggest single group in the Philippine bureaucracy, there has been a recurrent shortage of eligible teachers. Thus, examinations to provide those willing to teach with the proper credentials was a top priority. The teacher examination of 1965 was meant to grant eligibility for incoming teachers as well as those with casual appointments. However, about 4,000 examinees failed, including hundreds who were already in government. To avert the mass lay-off which would have ensued, Subido adjusted the grades of those who made 69 percent to 70 percent, (the passing mark), provided they had had at least two years' teaching experience with a rating of "satisfactory."

Another issue affecting teachers broke out two years later when about 5,000 public school teachers were discovered to have fake eligibilities. Coupled with a reported leakage in the medical board licensure examina-

tion in the same year and the earlier grade readjustment, this new anomaly shook the confidence and pride of civil servants. However, Marcos did not involve himself in the controversies.

Organizational changes. Like everyone else, Marcos wanted to overhaul the governmental machinery and proposed a bill for that purpose as early as during the special congressional session in 1965. The bill however, was ignored, but was to be reiterated annually, until September 1968.

Although he lost the mandate for an over-all reorganization in his first three years, Marcos managed to create two important organizations: the Police Commission and the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO), which took over the PAGCOM. The Police Commission was designed "to emancipate the police forces from the clutches of politicians" and to prevent their use as private armies of local warlords (Subido 1966). It centralized what until then had been a local function and would conveniently serve Marcos' purposes later when he declared martial law.

PARGO had a checkered history. Created in January, 1966 and abolished eleven months later due to bickering among its top officials, it was reinstated in 1968. It became a vigorous body under Ramon Bagatsing (1968-1969), judging from the media coverage. To get it out of the scrutiny of legislators, Marcos made PARGO solely dependent on the general intelligence fund of the armed forces.

Despite this show of presidential support, as of 1970, it had been responsible for the prosecution of only nine percent of 402 investigated cases and rarely touched top officials. It was removed from the cabinet and transformed into a division early in Marcos' second term (Alfiler, 1979). Former PARGO Secretary Bagatsing made his own critique of the agency as follows:

The present administration through the PARGO has miserably failed to succeed in its mission. PARGO has frustrated tremendous public expectations. . . Corruption is still rampant at all levels of the bureaucracy (1971: 99-100 quoted in Alfiler 1979: 343).

Epilogue: The second term. Marcos' first term was lackluster, for he simply continued many of the policies of his predecessor without the latter's social concerns and basic honesty. Economic conditions worsened and graft and corruption in government grew. As his term ended, however, many confidently bet on his reelection, for two reasons: the lack of appeal of his opponent, Sergio Osmeña, Jr. and the enduring charisma of the incumbent; and his recognized astuteness. But while politicians in power often used government resources for their election campaigns, Marcos' overspending in 1969 was unprecedented, and included personally giving government checks to every village head (Noble 1986: 77).

In his campaign speeches, Marcos banked on the World Bank-IMF assurance that the economy could be salvaged without devaluation. Upon his reelection, however, the conditionality for standby loans to cover debt service and the negative balance of payment required exactly that. He tried to cushion the shock by "floating the peso" instead, and it settled at around P6.85 per dollar from the previous P3.90, a devaluation of around 60 percent, which effected a drop in real wages of around 50 percent (World Bank 1980, cited in Bello, Kinley and Elinson 1982: 136). For the civil servants, the devaluation meant a freeze on new hiring and promotions, and a rejection of their demand for increased salaries. Government expenditures were cut especially for social services - which traditionally received the biggest share of any Philippine budget - and human resources. However, the share of the military increased, both in the budget where it could easily be seen, and in the foreign aid program, where there was less scrutiny.

During the second term, strikes occurred more frequently and collapsing businesses threw more people out of work (Villegas 1987). At the same time, protest organizations accelerated their mobilization activities, profiting from the new ideological consciousness of the 1960s. Even the government had to concede that something was dreadfully wrong. Its solutions were to overhaul two basic institutions: the 1935 Constitution and the civil service.

The legislature heeded the people's call for an elected constitutional convention (instead of making Congress the constituent body). Aside from the usual politicians, the elections attracted luminaries of the Civil Liberties Union, retired jurists, progressive students, and other respected citizens. However, the peasantry and labor were hardly represented. Garcia presided over its sessions until he died, after which Macapagal took over.

From the very start the Convention saw its mission as the transformation of the basic law from a colonial constitution which had to be approved by the American president to a nationalistic document which would embody Filipino goals and aspirations. It was also obvious that the trend of the discussions was to deny to Marcos the possibility of continuing in office beyond the end of his second term in 1973. The Ban-Marcos move was so high in the agenda that it threatened to obscure the other key issues. But the forces in Malacañang had also been busy and in 1972, an aging delegate from Mrs. Marcos' home province revealed that she had been giving payola to many commissioners in exchange for support of Marcos' desired resolutions, her most brazen effort to influence the course of the proceedings (Brillantes 1987). From then on, the credibility of the Convention could not be recouped. It did not finish its work until martial law was declared, so that it truly became the dictator's constitution.

Government reorganization suffered a similar fate. Marcos had submitted a reorganization bill to Congress as early as 1965 but RA 5435 was passed only in September 1968. Its rationale was that the civil service had to be not only economical and efficient, but also organized for development. The Commission on Reorganization was a joint legislative-executive bipartisan

body that started work in June 1969. It was different from earlier bodies in that it was an all-Filipino project, devoid of American consultants and advisers who practically controlled the previous reorganization effort under Magsaysay. The Reorganization Law provided that the plans would be submitted as a single document which must be accepted or rejected in toto. The original deadline of a year was eventually moved twice because pressures from within and without the bureaucracy exerted tremendous influence upon individual congressmen to be cautious about the overhaul (Segovia 1977: 238).

The Integrated Reorganization Plan was eventually submitted to Congress in March 1972, but, lacking sponsors, did not even make it to the committee level. Shelved at the adjournment of Congress, it was overtaken by the fateful events of September 1972.

Factors Hospitable to Executive Ascendancy

Executive ascendancy has been the pattern of president-civil service relations in the Philippines since the American period, and Macapagal and Marcos simply extended it. The timidity of the civil service springs from the culture of both the bureaucracy and the society, and its socialization under the US. In addition, the lack of change of basic policy between regimes and shared attitudes of the leadership and the bureaucracy regarding the role of government in society reenforced the subservience to the executive.

The Philippine social structure has tended to be authoritarian, and Filipinos have been trained to accept orders without question from childhood. Thus, civil servants have found it easier to simply implement laws rather than argue with superiors about their merits or propose new schemes to improve their programs.

Besides, the desire for smooth interpersonal relations and deference to age combined to give high premium to seniority in promotions. This was a tradition that even political patrons did not dare to touch. Under such a situation, conformity became more valued than new ideas and flexibility; this perspective was strengthened the longer one stayed in the bureaucracy. Thus security of tenure and careerism - which could nurture a trail-blazer or protect someone rebelling from tradition - reenforced the subordination of the civil service.

However, executive superordination was not immutable. Civil servants also sometimes played off the executive against Congress, confident of its ability to get appropriations despite the absence of presidential support. This had implications on the executive-bureaucracy nexus:

Along with the personalistic and fragmented party system, this beneficial alliance between individual administrators and legislators contributes to the paradoxical inability of the president,

despite his ample constitutional authority as chief executive, to direct, co-ordinate, and control the numerous agencies of the bureaucracy effectively (Abueva 1970: 167-68).

Bureaucratic subordination has thus been incomplete. The attempts of civil servants to resist executive wishes and directives might be too sporadic to be called a "struggle" but there were other, more organized steps to which that term could apply. For instance, employee organizations have protested against low wages since the 1930s (Varela 1988). This was a late awakening considering that private-sector unions had already been around for two decades before that time (Constantino and Constantino 1978). The most militant public enterprises performing proprietary functions, the only ones allowed to bargain collectively with management. Other groups had served as professional organizations or social clubs for the most part, holding annual technical seminars and general meetings which produced occasional "fighting resolutions" but rarely baring fangs in between. Less overt opposition also occurred; for instance, individual employees or groups could ask their legislative or executive patrons to seek a change of reorganization plans or other rulings affecting them. In the same class were grievances aired through the mass media. Of course, civil servants also made their objections felt by slowdown and inaction, protests which might not be totally conscious, or might not be perceived as bureaucratic opposition, given the general image of inefficiency of the service. In any case, most of its struggles seemed focused on its internal problems and the private demands of its members.

American colonialism had endeavored to develop such a subordinate civil service, with rules for a merit system, political neutrality, and security of tenure. The American era was exceptional particularly because the battle was not so much in the state as in civil society, as the new colonists won over the earlier Spanish and British investors for control of the country's natural resources and commerce. The colonial power needed to develop an apolitical, competent machine which could service its requirements while having one less group involved in political agitation and demands for independence.

With independence and the ideology of economic growth and central planning in place, power tended to be concentrated in government. And while the poor were served pacification laws,¹² privileges for national reconstruction and licenses were dispensed as favors since corruption rather than rational allocation had become the order of the day. Corruption was helped along by the fact that, while the state had very strict anti-graft laws, they were on the whole not enforced, and when they were, they applied

12. "Pacification laws" are meant to quiet down mass protests of the lower class without giving them the substance of their demands (Piven and Cloward 1971). See Villegas (1987) and Catilo (1981) for the record in labor and agrarian reform laws.

only to political "outs" and to small fry in the bureaucracy.

Each outgoing government was changed by a disillusioned electorate largely on the issue of graft and corruption. It was little appreciated that many civil servants eschewed participation in dishonest activities. This was due to the greater visibility of corrupt leadership and the systemic nature of corruption being perpetrated by informal corrupt syndicates paralleling the formal government structure.

After independence, a dominated bureaucracy could also better carry out what was then thought to be the politically neutral and technical goal of "development." Under both the colonial power and the Republic, efficiency was sought over commitment; and having set the goals, the executive needed only to drill the civil service on methods and techniques to attain them. The unintended politicalization of corruption and partisanship made the bureaucracy less a tool of the people than an instrument for itself and for its executives.

Comparative Analysis

The pattern of succession from one executive to the next in countries with regular elections is quite varied, as we have seen. Perhaps the first striking comparative characteristic is that it is usually not disruptive, since it tends to follow practices that have been repeated so often that they have acquired the patina of tradition. However, the nature of the tradition varies among countries. In older nations, the executive-civil service relationship has resulted from a protracted constitutional struggle and has settled into the pattern whose form was then exported and imposed as a legal norm in most new states. The older nations enjoyed democracy before the imposition of bureaucracy. New states, however, had a long experience with bureaucratization first, and the demand for the subordination of the civil service became part of an internal struggle for power, rather than a fulfillment of the democratic goal of responsiveness to the people.

Any new executive expects to change the bureaucracy in some way and prepares for it between the election canvassing and the formal turnover of power. Whether the merit system is operating or not, the new leadership is expected to bring in partisans to supervise the career bureaucracy and to ensure the achievement of its stated goals. This is really a modification of the merit system, but it is so widespread and the need for political direction is so accepted that the practice is no longer controversial. Each country sets the point at which political officials may come in. Great Britain's strict rule of changing practically only the ministers has also evolved in the Philippines even though political interference and patronage are more widespread in the latter.

Any other change in the civil service would be at the rank and file whose work needs neither specialized training nor political acumen and whose

members are thus replaceable. Justification for change at the bottom of the hierarchy is reminiscent of the rationale for the spoils system - that government work can be done by anyone, so it might as well be entrusted to the political followers of the victors, rather than to other people who have no stake in their success.

As a rule, it is the huge middle level - the professional core - which is maintained in the government bureaucracy. Even exceptions, such as Nixon, who dipped lower than usual in appointing regional directors, or Reagan, who appointed clerks from among party members, did not touch the career personnel at the middle levels of the hierarchy. This is where the merit principle rules and where expertise, permanence and neutrality are most valuable.

Another remarkable feature is that "turning out the rascals" is no longer the mode. While replacements at the top and at the bottom do occur, today the tendency is for a new government to accept the bureaucracy, and, in case of problems, even to expand it. Politics, in other words, tends toward addition. For instance, instead of removing the chosen of previous governments who did not voluntarily leave, Chile's new presidents accommodated them, although they were shorn of power. New agencies were established by Macapagal, by Marcos, by Roosevelt, and perhaps by all other new executives, instead of abolishing those no longer useful nor satisfactory to them. The second track developed in the United States as a means of getting power into the White House without diminishing the personnel and agencies of the established organizations.

From that standpoint, the relations between the presidency and the bureaucracy look serene, which they are, for the most part. Executive ascendancy, which is the legal norm, prevails. Conventions have been developed that recognize both the supremacy of the leadership and the contributions of the bureaucracy to its success, so that each can adjust to the other without conflict. The civil service is socialized into subordination not by putting it down, but by allowing it to show its strengths in ways that do not threaten the executive. Thus, the system of policy advice in Britain has also surfaced in Mexico. Also, the Filipinos' acceptance of a politically neutral bureaucracy was bred by a long colonial tutelage that allowed it total participation except in electoral exercises. It developed rewards for seniority and long tenure instead of innovation and performance. At the time of Independence, the civil service continued without disruption because it had been Filipinized and rendered relatively powerless for three decades, while civil servants of the other newly independent Asian countries jumped to top positions overnight, savoring the power that had been wielded by colonial expatriates for so long.

The generally placid nexus is also influenced by the relative continuity of interests of different governments and by the continued domination of the same sectors in society. Thus, the absence of a struggle may be due not so

much to the willingness of the leadership to accommodate the old practices and styles of an inherited organization, nor to the desire of the bureaucracy to acquiesce to the demands of the new practices, as to the absence of major differences between them, having shared goals and allies to start with.

The instances where the bureaucracy angled to sublate the executive reflect the influence of opposing factors. The first condition would be a change in the basic policy of the executive which the bureaucracy could not easily accept. Thus, for example, the Saskatchewan and Mexican civil service tried to teach the new people lessons on how to govern, which included their own ideas not only about methods but also about goals and substantive directions. Drawing from the same expertise and stability that political leaderships sharing similar attitudes with their career personnel had no problems harnessing, the executives ran up against people who were blocking their plans. Bureaucratic recalcitrance was further strengthened by alliances with politicians in the legislature or with privileged clients.

A bureaucracy may fight for ascendancy in the pursuit or in defense of two special roles which are not necessarily compatible with each other. First, the bureaucracy may harbor the notion that it is the protector of the nation, assuming that it is more responsible than the political leadership, or that it can define the public interest better. This arises when a president takes a direction different from that which the bureaucracy has long been used to. Etzioni-Halevy was thinking along this line when she asserted that democracy needs bureaucracy, and that the civil service should

exempt itself from political control in order to prevent the disruption of the democratic process itself (1985: 92).

Both Mexico and Saskatchewan bureaucrats felt it necessary to stand against the leadership for this purpose. Even the American federal service which has long accepted executive dominance assumes this role from time to time. Note, however, that the bureaucracy's concept of the public interest may not be necessarily correct. While Mexican civil servants attempted to conserve resources against a potentially profligate president, the Canadian state's civil service sought to go against a mandate that was not only popular but also just.

Second, the civil service may feel the need to protect itself against the desire of the executive to make it more responsive to the latter's will. Chile's struggle with the executive is an example, as is the Filipino's intermittent intransigence over policies on reorganization, working conditions, and salaries which are seen as directly threatening the civil service. In these instances, the bureaucracy uses its expertise and monopoly of information for itself, without even pretending to higher goals.

4

Executive-Bureaucracy Interaction under Authoritarian Successions: Korea and the Philippines

The next three chapters focus on how the civil service relates to a new leadership, and vice versa, under conditions of abnormal succession. Chapters 4 and 5 specifically deal with the executive-bureaucracy relationship at the emergence of authoritarianism. Chapter 6 will tackle their interaction during the transition to democratization.

Whether the abnormal succession will lead to authoritarianism or democracy is difficult to say at the start, since it could be independent of the granting or withholding of legitimacy by the people, and because most leaders will claim a transition to democracy, no matter how authoritarian the road they choose to get there.

The distinction is easier to detect in hindsight, after the regime has shown its mettle or run its course. Nevertheless, three characteristics may differentiate an authoritarian from a democratic succession at the outset: (1) the composition of the political leadership; (2) the manner of handling dissent and the people's exercise of civil liberties; and (3) the opportunity opened up for other groups to gain power through fair elections.

Authoritarian takeovers generally exhibit certain proclivities: to give military leaders prominent roles and to be inhospitable to the idea of members of non-traditional, (especially poverty) groups getting into leadership positions, to resort to repression and suspension of liberties, and to steer clear of elections or to develop a single party (after banning all others) in preparation for demonstration elections (Herman and Brodhead 1984). Democratic initiatives, by contrast, tend not only to be multi-sectoral but to be more receptive to the involvement of disadvantaged classes, to be more partial to the consultative approach and more solicitous about the exercise of political rights, and to allow elections that offer a credible challenge to the leadership.

Under these criteria, military coups or declarations of martial law by political leaders (such as Indira Gandhi's in India in 1975 and Marcos' in the Philippines in 1972) are authoritarian transitions. Successful revolutions

differ in how they handle the second and third factors previously cited. Fidel Castro is socialist but authoritarian; he never allowed his leadership to be challenged in Cuba but had impressive social achievements, some within the first two years after the revolution (Petras 1973; Benjamin, Collins and Scott 1984). Nicaragua, however, has tried to move towards democracy.

Executive-bureaucracy interactions in irregular successions do not have the stabilizing rules that turnovers following elections have. Under normal successions, power is passed on to a new leadership under widely accepted rules and conventions. No matter how hotly contested the election, the victor receives a gracious concessionary statement from his rival. The machinery for turnover is started even before the inauguration, with briefings given to the incoming team by the incumbent (even if the election loser) on everything from matters of national security to the condition of the lawn at the presidential residence. This leisurely accession does not take place when a new leader takes over under abnormal circumstances. For one thing, the outgoing executive may not even survive his ouster, let alone give tips on how to govern the country.

More than in a normal succession and redemocratization, in the early days of an authoritarian regime, the new executive takes center stage. All other social groups are silenced; their prominent members may be in flight, and others await the moves of the new government in fear. This situation may be true even of bloodless coups. Armed force holds sway, even though many new authoritarians take the precaution of keeping a cooperative civilian citizen out in front. This characterization may be less true of governments ushered in by revolutions, where sectors that fought side by side with the new leaders may be allowed to raise demands. Nevertheless, even they may still impose oppressive directives like censorship and curfews, lest the new opposition take advantage of the incoming leadership's initial uncertainties and launch its own takeover.

Consequently, all activity will seem to emanate from the state; power may be most concentrated at this time. The new leaders may also turn inward into the state institutions that they have unwittingly inherited. They may abolish what they can - legislatures, courts, political parties, etc. Only the sheer size of the bureaucracy - in the hundred thousands, even millions - may keep it from being dismantled.

Thus, perhaps more than in any other regime, the first business of authoritarians will be to deal with their bureaucracy. The examples in this chapter describe executive-bureaucracy interactions illustrating Cell 3, with the executive in ascendant position; Chapter 5 shows the civil service attempting co-equality with, though not virtual sublation of, the leadership.

Korea under Park Chung Hee

The Korean case exemplifies a dominated bureaucracy in an authoritarian system (Cell 3). The new leadership of 1961 was distrustful of politicians and the political process and preferred to infuse the civilian system with the methods of military administration. Furthermore, it believed in the priority of bread over freedom, claiming that "political democracy is attainable only when the living standards of the people are improved" (Cho 1970: 138, citing a recurrent theme of General Park's speeches).

Korea experienced a military coup in May 1961, a year after the student revolution that toppled the oppressive government of Syngman Rhee, no longer hailed, as in 1948, as the father of his country. It took place 11 months after the free elections that put the diplomat Chang Myon at the helm as prime minister. That regime had to deal with "the aftermath of years of political repression, with a bankrupt exchequer and a police force so discredited. . . it could no longer maintain order" (Reeve 1963: 145).

Among its first acts was an unpopular devaluation - urged by the US for years - followed by unprecedented privileges for American technical assistance programs and advisers.¹ At the time, the US contributed 52 percent of the Korean budget and was perceived to have desired a greater role in drawing it up. Meanwhile, devaluation had ignited inflation, business stagnation and the unemployment of about two million people.

Students, having succeeded in ousting Rhee, mobilized again, invoking anti-Americanism and unification with the North. When, early in 1961, they began collecting one million signatures for unification and seeking more political and economic contacts with Pyongyang, the army decided to act (Reeve 1963: 148).

Although the Korean war had been over for a decade, the country's dependence on the US was so strong that the coup plotters still had to get the support of the United Nations Command (effectively an American unit) and the US embassy before making a move. Only then they did they turn to their own political business.

Park's Relationship with the Bureaucracy

Within four days, the plotters had reorganized the Cabinet, reserving ministerial positions in the economic sector to civilians because army officers were deemed "not adequate for the posts" by reason of education, experience and capacity (Cho 1970: 137). In the first two weeks, members of the core group

1. They included permitting continuous observation and review of the implementation of technical assistance programs by American representatives, their diplomatic immunity and tax exemptions (Reeve 1963: 146).

were busy in wiping out the politicians. . . [and] in rearranging the power structure through the appointment of military men to various key posts [including] the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction" (SCNR) (Cho 1970: 133).

Because of these, they needed a point of stability, which was answered by the initial retention of President Yun, the head of state, and the vice ministers in charge of administration who were to supervise the daily operation of their respective ministries. The SCNR then created a reorganization subcommittee under the Planning Commission to reform the administrative machinery. Working under pressure, the subcommittee called in civil servants of the agencies concerned. As Cho concluded,

thus the ideas accumulated under the previous governments were presented through the hands of civil servants (1970: 134).

Other bureaucrats were absorbed into the new Ministry of Construction, a focal agency, or became advisors to the Supreme Council.

Civil servants were not, however, destined to enjoy co-equality with the regime. Several rapid moves destabilized the permanent bureaucracy as they hit those who committed heinous crimes and slight offenses alike. On July 2, the junta decreed the death penalty for dishonest public officials. In September, 34 former government officials, including military men, were ordered to pay US\$5.5 million for acquiring illegal wealth under previous regimes. The puritanical streak was further manifested by requiring the use of "austerity clothing," and, more significantly, by dismissing over 1,000 civil, police and military officials for keeping concubines (Reeve 1963: 156). From June to September, every agency was asked to reduce its force by 26 percent. The axe fell summarily on rank and file and seniors alike. However, those in the planning bureau were untouched (Cho 1970: 138).

The purges were massive. In early June, 9,291 employees were fired for not completing military service and 1,518 provincial government positions were abolished. In July, 17,726 personnel of the Ministry of Social Affairs and its attached units were removed and 2,000 military officials retired. These generated savings (estimated at 500 million hwan a year) and made the promotion of younger officers possible. At the same time, they also added to the unemployment figures, which at a time of economic disarray, was rather risky (Reeve 1963: 156-57).

After having ordered the dismissals, Park Chung Hee, the regime strongman, announced that the first revolutionary task of wiping out the evils of the past had been accomplished and that the reconstruction of the country's economy had become the new revolutionary mandate.

Reconstruction required the preparation of a plan which eventually was based on three drafts. The first was the paper of the Economic Planning

Council using guidelines formulated by an American technical adviser. Approved by the Cabinet as early as 1959, it was never implemented. It was adopted by the Ministry of Construction immediately after the coup. Two other drafts were used: the Bank of Korea (BOK) draft, undertaken by a Bank research group under the previous government; and the SCNR's own plan, prepared by economists of Seoul University. Park recruited a four-person team, including a career civil servant, to formulate Korea's first five-year plan. Their work was discussed with sixteen other persons, seven of whom were scholars and at least three others of whom senior civil servants. The common qualification of the team members and their assistants was technical training in the US. They also knew each other well, sharing similar ideological orientations and getting in touch constantly. Because of these, bureaucrats who belonged to these circles survived the purge and militarization of the bureaucracy. Working rapidly, they were able to submit the plan by September, and the Supreme Council approved it on December 30, 1961.

The SCNR's next concern was to institute in the bureaucracy the planning and programming system (PPS) which had operated in the Korean Army since 1954 and which would backstop the implementation of the five-year plan. The staff study on the personnel, budgeting and other managerial techniques to accompany PPS was assigned to the Bureau of Administrative Management (BAM) and its O & M (Organization and Management) Section, both of which were then headed by colonels. Within 38 days and with only seven to eight participants - exclusive of the Cabinet officials to whom the system design was submitted - the PPS draft was adopted. It was made with such haste and secrecy that the research committee of the BAM "did not notice that such an important [document] was being made" (Cho 1970: 147). The proponents also glossed over some difficult implications of the proposal on such managerial functions as work measurement, performance budgets, work simplification and position classification (Cho 1970: 145).

PPS was a major complement to the military government's economic thrust. It also had far-reaching effects on the entire bureaucracy. It had a reorganization component which included the replacement of the vice-minister in charge of political affairs with a planning and control officer (PCO), a clear signal that politics needed to give way to technocracy. The top PCO assigned to the Prime Minister's Office was a brigadier general with a staff of 32 men, many of whom were recruited from the army, not from the civilian bureaucracy.

PPS also called for the training of every civil servant above the first supervisory level on the new system. This was a crash course of two weeks for 169 civil servants slated for assignment in the planning and control offices in the central government, and one week for everybody else. However, many of the former preferred to go back to their original jobs rather than to establish PCOs.

PPS was underutilized and its implementation was even sabotaged for at least three reasons: its strong military back-up, the suspicion engendered by its secret decision-making process, and the perception that it was a control mechanism over the bureaucracy (Cho 1963). However, by their non-participation, civil servants paved the way for further militarization of the bureaucracy. Their perceived "unreliability" might also have led to Park's reliance on civil and military officials from his home region of Kyong Sang more than the rival provinces of Cholla and Honam (*Asiaweek* 1991).

By contrast, the economic plan, the other major reform measure, had supporters in the civilian bureaucracy as well as the rest of society.² This could be due to the general acceptance of the free enterprise ideology it espoused and to the relatively more open and wider consultation it was subjected to from drafting to promulgation. The latter showed the importance of an open political process, even within the narrow confines of an authoritarian regime.

The plan directed government to be the leading sector which would provide physical and social infrastructure within which the private sector can thrive. Free enterprise, however, did not translate to free trade internationally because Koreans protected their own producers.

A major feature of the plan was its dependence on popular support, depending heavily on private savings for its success even if severe austerity had been imposed throughout the plan period. But for Lee, in terms of administrative development,

the real significance of the plan. . . was that the military administration took it seriously. For the first time, a major administrative instrument of social innovation was adopted (Lee 1968: 160).

The seemingly overambitious plan target (of 7.1 percent growth per annum) was exceeded in 1963, when real GNP growth stood at 9.3 percent. The high growth rate was sustained throughout the plan period (Lee 1968: 158), catapulting the country into the elite group of newly industrializing economies within a decade.

Military confidence was such that by August 12, 1961, General Park announced a return to civilian rule could already be effected in the summer of 1963. In 1962, in quick succession, martial law was lifted, a new constitution was ratified, and political activities were restarted (except for many officials of previous governments who were prohibited from re-joining the political process). A big debate then ensued as to the remaining proper role for the military. The moderate officers suggested a return to the barracks, but die-hards pressed for their continued supervision of the progress of the programs they had started.

2. Cho claimed that when the press became less restricted, support for the plan still came from all sides and even became greater than when it was first announced in July 1961 (1970:143).

The latter won, and in 1963, South Korea had elections which returned the country to civilian rule. Whether the new government was truly civilian and democratic is however subject to question since it took in the same leaders, fresh from retiring their uniform and forming their own political party. Park held on to power until his assassination in 1979; his authoritarian rule was continued by Chun Doo Hwan, also from Park's region. Massive protests forced Chun to give up power and call for democratic elections in 1986. With the opposition divided, his chosen successor, Roh Tae Woo won in the polls and continued the country's gradual movement to open democratic politics.

The students and intellectuals who led the April Revolution toppled the Rhee dictatorship but were themselves "thwarted by another regime with a dictatorial method of government" (Lee 1968: 174). Their demands for social reforms, political openness and entente with the North would continue but would be muted until 1986 when another military leader would yield to their demands for democracy and call for open elections to determine his successor. At that time, they would be joined by labor unions which would articulate their grievances against the system in a massive scale for practically only the first time.

Changes Evident in the Bureaucracy

At the end of formal military rule, the bureaucracy had changed significantly from what it was just two years before. With a net increase of only 24 people between 1960 and 1961, the civil service grew by 13,185 (5%) in 1962 and by 21,140 or another eight percent in 1963 (Kim 1986: 65). It also was literally rejuvenated, the purges and forced retirements having removed older people at the top and allowed a number of younger officials to replace them. The average age of a bureau director or lieutenant governor was 40, younger than his immediate subordinates (Kim, 1986: 81).

By 1963, the bureaucracy was much less of a civilian force; about 28 percent of top managerial positions was filled by former military men (Lee 1968: 174). Lower-ranking officers were in the civil service as well. As much as 14 percent of the total force consisted of former military officers (Kim 1986). Kim sees in the militarization an increase not only in managerial competence but also in the orientation towards "order-submission." He further traces from it and the centralization brought on by authoritarianism a new surge of corruption.

While the military government talked about professionalism, Park was not immune to the pressures of his regional affiliation. It was during his long tenure that natives of the Southwestern provinces of Cholla and Honam were "systematically eliminated from the army and government." The rule of the Kyongsang-born was strengthened with a new bureaucratic rule that required job applicants to show proof of their house registration

and parents' birthplace, documents that disclosed their regional origin (*Asiaweek* 1991).

The bureaucracy was also transformed from a seniority-based to a merit-based organization. This resulted in tension between those committed to social change and those who saw government service only as a source of security (Lee 1968: 170-173). But the change Lee which perceived pertained only to technology and growth; the bureaucracy maintained its conservative attitudes, which corresponded with the leadership those but did not reflect the demands of the protestors in the streets.

The Philippines Under Martial Law

On September 21, 1972, amidst massive demonstrations denouncing the corruption of his government, its subservience to the US and the accelerating poverty and inequality among the populace, Ferdinand Marcos engineered a palace coup and put himself at the head of a martial law regime. Although a strongman that some of them had wished for was now at hand, civil servants still did not operate in the country under what Abueva called a "bureaucratic utopia" (1970: 168). Instead, like Korea, the Philippines under martial law illustrates an executive-bureaucracy nexus at Cell 3.

Major Thrusts of the Authoritarian Regime

President Marcos forthwith claimed to lead "a revolution from the center" which would cut the powers of the oligarchy and deliver social justice to the poor majority. He abolished the legislature and jailed most of its leadership. The Constitutional Convention's Ban-Marcos provisions disappeared from the Constitution of 1973 which was "ratified" by viva voce in village assemblies (which in many parts of the country did not meet at all). That Constitution, already tailor-made for Marcos, underwent amendments and demonstration plebiscites whenever it suited him. Thus the presidential system became classic parliamentary at one point and quasi-parliamentary at another.³ This cavalier disregard of the spirit of constitutionalism he called "constitutional authoritarianism" and "martial law with a smile." With his new legislative powers, Marcos wrote decrees that made him and his family immune from prosecution after his term, and others that made many Filipinos subject to harassment and indefinite detention for rumor-mongering, having beliefs different from his, and being seen at rallies; the meaning of "subversion" became very open-ended at that time.

3. It also meant that in less than 14 years, he was successively President, Prime Minister, President and Prime Minister, and President again, with each change "ratified" by a referendum amending the Constitution.

The protracted decision making that marked the open discussions in Congress had been replaced by a procession of pleaders of special interests, draft Presidential Decrees (PDs) in their pockets, able to get them signed before the day was out. The main advantage of decrees affecting the bureaucracy was that they became known once promulgated, since personnel and physical equipment had to be moved. Other decrees, especially those affecting political freedoms or favoring individual persons or firms, could be kept secret for long periods and then sprung on unsuspecting individuals at the least convenient moments.⁴ As in the democratic period, few ideas were drafted by the civil service.

At the transition, fear combined with a wait-and-see attitude to give Marcos a wide berth. Many Filipinos had felt frustrated by the excesses of democracy: the freest press in Asia was frequently accused of bordering on licentiousness, Congress was regarded as a very expensive debating society, and officials were elected through the combined use of guns, goons and gold. The wish of Abueva's middle-level bureaucrats for a dictator that could provide instant progress was shared by many in society. Thus, Benigno Aquino Jr.'s hope that his arrest would spark widespread protests did not materialize. Middle- and upper-class Filipinos quietly changed the rhythm of their lives by submitting to curfews, censorship, and endless broadcasts of slogans about discipline and the New Society. Meanwhile, the people, especially the poor, learned early and painfully that this was definitely not martial law with a smile as arrests without warrants, military raids and unexplained deaths and disappearances began to intrude upon their daily lives.

Although Marcos took the precaution of getting the tacit support of the US for his proclamation of martial law, he nonetheless spouted nationalistic rhetoric and railed against the west. In defending his choice of bread over freedom, he claimed that the latter was a western liberal ideal inappropriate to the Philippine context which was characterized by grinding poverty and exploitative control by the elite (Corpuz 1975). The regime's charges against the oligarchy struck a responsive chord among many Filipinos. Marcos played on this by swiftly signing an agrarian reform law and declaring it as the centerpiece of the "New Society," one of many phrases by which he described his new government. Within a few months, it became obvious that the economic elite would not be destroyed, only those factions that were opposed to the Marcoses. Nor did agrarian reform result in the "liberation of farmers from the bondage of the soil." The program was limited to rice and corn lands above seven hectares, representing only 6.5

4. Some decrees were attached to unrelated previous decrees, perhaps to keep them secret or to preserve the chronological sequence of antedated laws. For instance, PD 1067 was the Water Code but its supplements had nothing to do with water. PD 1067-A created the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), and PD 1067-B and 1067-C were amendments to the PAGCOR Law.

percent of the cultivable area. Besides, lands planted to these crops under plantation management or labor administration were exempt. Nor was it intended to benefit landless agricultural workers - around 48 per cent of the agricultural labor force (Catilo 1981).

Implementation did not abide by the already limited provisions of the agrarian reform law. For instance, landlord compensation grew from 68 to 92 percent of land value, on top of tax exemptions that could allow them to recoup more than the value of their lands; the process itself allowed the owners much bargaining advantage (Richter 1980). The slow pace of making a land inventory and of issuing land transfer certificates contracted the scope of agrarian reform further. Many peasants soon entered into unprotected new tenure arrangements or became workers in large plantations or corporate farms (Catilo 1981).

Implementation problems could be traced to extreme centralization in the Ministry, inadequate coordination with other agencies in the program, such as banks and the agricultural extension agency, and financing problems. In addition, the organization was

not equipped adequately to protect tenants' rights. While the organization now has nearly 9,000 employees, they are often inefficiently deployed and turnover is relatively high. . . Lawyer shortage has become particularly critical (Richter 1980: 13).

Recruitment problems, on the other hand, could be attributed to low wages (a service-wide issue). However, exemptions to wage standardization were enjoyed by many offices performing non-focal functions, such as the Philippine Tourism Authority (Richter 1980).

As authoritarianism prospered, lip service to the democratic rhetoric also flourished. Citizen participation was heralded by a return to village-level democracy as a series of decrees seemed to strengthen the status of the *barangay*. Meanwhile, a series of referendums gave a semblance of direct citizen involvement in major decisions. Yet, these were conducted within very narrow limits and without adequate safeguards to free expression (de Guzman and Associates 1977).

Decentralization and participatory programs were decreed during this period in order to bring government closer to the people. Local officials were spared the ax that befell national legislators. In reality, retaining (and later, extending the term of) local officials earned President Marcos their loyalty and that of their bureaucracies since all now held office at his sufferance. The new Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) that was supposed to facilitate the performance of presidential powers of general supervision and to assist local government units to handle local autonomy instead became a weapon to recentralize the political system, since its supervisory powers bordered on control. Central-

izing trends also became evident in several functional areas, such as public works, agriculture, community development and education, and in local planning, revenue and personnel administration (Oamar and Rivera 1975).

The MLGCD also organized *samahang nayon* (village organizations, SN) pre-cooperatives that helped groups of land reform beneficiaries in handling production and income problems. Few of these managed to outgrow their formalistic beginnings.

At the same time, residents' organizations were maintained or created by other agencies for their specific sectors. For instance, the Ministries of Agriculture, Social Services and Development and other agencies continued their rural organizations while the new Ministry of Human Settlements created *barangay brigades*. The civil service even managed to create and foster the growth of some viable community associations throughout the country. Thus the regime got a few tangible examples to back up its claims as a participatory, consulting government. However, many civil servants required to seek the participation of their clients found that they were liable to be purged or arrested for subversion for doing this duty.

Other community organizations were born in reaction to martial law. Accordingly, the regime regarded their structural analysis of the roots of poverty and malaise in Philippine society as "subversive." These groups became the objects of confrontation and armed conflict. Some, like the Zone One Tondo Organization in the country's biggest slum area and the people's organizations in the Cordilleras, became focal points for protests against government programs on squatter settlements and displacement of traditional cultural communities (Bello, Kinley and Elinson 1982).

Marcos decreed the use of the national language in government and the broadcasting of original Filipino music. Yet the nationalistic thrust was not sustained in his economic policies which reversed the protectionist stance taken by Congress and the Constitutional Convention. Incentives for foreign investments were increased (PD 92, January 6, 1973); foreign investors were allowed into areas theretofore restricted only to Filipinos. The proponents of these measures acknowledged that they would have been difficult, if not impossible, to pass with a working Congress (de Guzman and Associates 1977). Marcos also allowed the Philippines to be the first recipient of the World Bank-IMF's first structural adjustment loan (Bello, Kinley and Elinson 1982; Broad 1989). Native enterprises could not survive without subordinate licensure arrangements with the multinationals. The few local firms that flourished during this period were well connected to the political leadership.

These policies did not lead to growth. Rather, the export-oriented strategy, coupled with mismanagement of the economy and the government, led to business shutdowns, overall economic crisis and negative growth by 1984. As these moves for dependent development went on, the civil service was flooded with sloganeering on behalf of the "Mabuhay ang

Filipino" movement which espoused the purchase of locally made products and extolled pride in the Filipino.

The Executive-Bureaucracy Relationship

After the oligarchy, Marcos' other whipping boy was the bureaucracy, although he had already been at its helm for over five years. He claimed that coddling by the legislature and the oligarchy and their opposition to his reforms prevented him from transforming the civil service to serve the goals of development. His actions toward the bureaucracy mirrored his approach to the rest of the society. They were clothed in legality, adorned with the highest values and backed up by force. Rhetoric outpaced reality, which resulted in contradictory signals confusing to the bureaucracy. Authoritarianism showed through in summary dismissals and militarization in the midst of programs that espoused citizen participation and decentralization. While participatory administration was being encouraged, employees of public enterprises performing proprietary functions, along with their counterparts in the private sector, lost the right to strike. The authoritarian dispensation preached nationalism and sovereignty on the one hand, and perpetuated a dependent economy on the other. Politicalization of the bureaucracy was ostensibly a move to generate commitment and responsiveness to the people, but became mired in corruption and partisanship.

Marcos tried to make his first acts affecting the bureaucracy appear regular and legal. As he and all previous presidents had sought the power to reorganize the administrative system within their first month, so did Marcos in his new role as authoritarian leader. The first presidential decree (PD) promulgated the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP), which the defunct Congress had refused to accept.

The IRP was hailed as "organizing for development" (PCR 1978), a goal-centered structure a cut above the usual reorganizations which were focused merely on economy and efficiency. It revitalized the planning body called the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) by putting together the National Economic Council and the multifarious other bodies involved with long-term development planning. At the implementing level, a model departmental structure was devised in which bureaus became staff agencies and service delivery was deconcentrated to thirteen regional offices. This was complemented by the creation of regional development councils (with counterparts at lower local levels), the attachment of public enterprises to departments in the same technical field and the creation of a career executive service, the highest level of the hierarchy.

The Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Reorganization maintained that the IRP was meant to be a rational instrument and that the President refrained from interfering with it while they worked. He could

recall only two changes ordered by the President, both relatively minor⁵ (Fabella 1987).

The Integrated Reorganization Plan, conceived and approved by and implemented under the same president - a major advantage in any language - rapidly disintegrated. It was amended by 11 PDs between September and December 1972, by 13 in 1973, a high of 31 in 1974 and finally 12 in 1975, a total of 67 amendments in the first three years and three months of the regime (Segovia 1977: 258-63).

Among the new agencies not recommended by the original legislative-executive reorganization commission was the Ministry of Public Information, one of two overt propaganda arms of the regime. (The other was already existing as the National Media Production Center.) All other agencies had to do their share of extolling the regime and the First Couple, including dedicating government programs to them on their birthdays, naming public works projects after them and the like. Later and more perniciously, it would include changing facts (such as the history rewriting project called *Tadhana*), adjusting social indicators or withholding from the public facts that are unpalatable to the regime.

Reorganization was followed by PD 6 which allowed for summary dismissals from the service. There was really no need for this decree since all civil servants were required to submit courtesy resignations soon after the declaration of martial law. But it did provide a legal basis for the removals that were already going on.

The grounds for purging covered such a wide scope that hardly anyone with a face disliked by an agency head could escape it. A permanent civil servant could be removed:

- (1) when the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;
- (2) when the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and
- (3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable (PD 6, 1972).

A ranking official of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) (and later, its head) asserted that this policy would have been "unthinkable and unacceptable in the permissiveness of pre-martial law days" (Dans 1977: 301).

The summary dismissal of a large number of personnel under the authority of PD 6 occurred at least twice: in early 1973, when over 1,500 heads rolled⁶ (Gamalinda 1974-75); and on the third anniversary of martial

5. The first concerned the inclusion of the province of Pangasinan in Region I, indeed a minor change. The second retained the Philippine Constabulary in the Armed Forces, which in retrospect, was not so minor, because it continued the militarization of what was originally a civilian force.

6. The number is probably much larger. Gamalinda was in the Office of the President and claimed that her unit handled 1,525 *protestis* against purges.

law (September 21, 1975) when the removal of personnel all the way up to Cabinet level was announced to the applause of private citizens and many civil servants. Dismissals in various offices took place at other occasions, notably at revenue-collecting agencies, but none received as much publicity as these two purges.

The purges as a whole did not follow careful study. For instance, many victims turned out to be long dead, resigned, or transferred from their offices. In addition, several others successfully appealed and were reinstated but not necessarily exonerated. The embarrassment caused by the discovery of many errors in the second purge was rumored to have led to the resignation of the top men of the office of the Executive Secretary who ran the purging machinery. Ten months after the event, many major officials supposedly removed remained in their posts, often appearing to wield as much power as before.

The bases for a purge were not clear, and thus did not provide precise guidelines on how the remaining employees should behave. "Notoriously undesirable" is a notoriously difficult term to define, and many employees, on finding their names or the names of their colleagues in the dismissal lists, were at a loss as to the grounds for their inclusion. To be sure, many of those purged were widely known to have extracted private profit from public office. However, some of the dismissed only had absenteeism or frequent tardiness in their records, and many wondered whether those grounds should be equated with corruption and be subject to the same dire punishment.

On the other hand, some of those dismissed had sterling reputations. A case in point was that of a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) whose dismissal seemed to be based solely on events that had transpired over ten years before. At that time, he was a middle-level employee of an agency implementing the land reform program, and had defended a group of tenants in a litigation against their landlords. A superior filed an administrative case - which did not prosper - charging that he had violated the rule against private practice without official permission during office hours. After review, the Minister of Agrarian Reform reinstated and commended him for going beyond his duty in rendering service to his agency's principal clients, the tenants. But his case and that of many others damaged the credibility of any supposed clean-up.

The purges created an atmosphere of fear instead of encouraging people to excel. For instance, the promulgation of a relatively tame bill, PD 868, which placed government corporations under the civil service (a recurring law), threw non-eligibles in these offices into a panic although no removals were made. Instead, the CSC gave them a chance to qualify through examinations.

Fear of the purge made many employees more determined to stay on the safe side where they were unlikely to make errors. The agencies also tended

to emphasize visible projects with quantifiable results.

There was also some backlash. A study showed that the months following the purge of September 1975 did not result in improved attendance and punctuality in one agency. On the contrary, employee behavior actually deteriorated. Why? The causal chain seems to have gone like this: the purge engendered fear and anxiety, which usually preceded absenteeism and tardiness. Since the reasons for purging were not consistent, an employee could argue that his performance did not matter. Thus he became indifferent, instead of trying to meet the norms (which would not be rewarded anyway) (Ocampo 1978: 366).

The random nature of the purges make a security of tenure for all employees regardless of performance. Even high performers voiced anxiety about this. Instead, success in keeping one's position came to be based on a complicated assessment of risk which depended on whether or not one could run to a petty god v. ho could assure one's continued stay in office, regardless of how one performed. The rise of corruption in one agency after a clean-up at the start of martial law was explained by one knowledgeable insider as just that: when the new power structure was revealed, one simply looked for an opportunity to again hitch his wagon to an unfading (or at least not yet faded) star.

Purging also gave rise to a major irony: the bureaucracy was being purified while suspicions about the accumulating wealth of the First Family were mounting. In fact, some people believed that Marcos declared martial law because he had to cover his tracks (Brillantes 1987). The full extent of the plunder of the economy would not be revealed until after he was ousted from office (Aquino 1987).

Marcos sought not only to reorganize and replace the bureaucracy but also to transform it. Thus he moved to politicize what was largely a neutral organization. On paper, such politicalization was directed towards greater responsiveness to the poor and commitment to the public interest. Thus, he formed the *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (KBL) which, as its Filipino name implied, was supposed to be the vanguard of the New Society he vowed to create. Although names of politicians allied to him crowded the KBL roster, civil servants were forced to "volunteer" to become members. In time, the KBL became the only party sanctioned by the state. Civil service neutrality thus became an early casualty of martial law.

The civil service was invaded by the military in large numbers. They came in one of three ways: openly as top officials in strategic agencies; covertly as heads and members of security units that served as the eyes and ears of the President in each government office; and directly as soldiers performing military functions in civilian programs. In the last capacity, they broke up strikes and ejected squatters. Instead of encouraging dialogue and negotiations as he previously pronounced, Marcos fielded the military even in agencies such as the National Housing Authority which

had strong participatory components in their programs. This strategy was designed to cow militant protest organizations into submission while mobilizing groups composed of Marcos' own allies.

The bureaucracy's wish for a dictator had been fulfilled but he did not provide the longed-for progress. Nor did the civil service gain recognition as the executive's partner in governance. Subjected to purges, reorganization, military espionage and low wages, the bureaucracy in the Philippines was laid aside in much the same manner that the Korean civil service under Park was.

The bureaucracy also had to deal with confusing directives. While they were enjoined interminably to remain clean, individual civil servants found themselves or their colleagues rewarded for delivering shares of their booty to the dictator. Working under authoritarianism, the civil service was instructed to decentralize and seek out the citizens. The economic program called for a strong foreign component while cultural development looked backward to the people's indigenous way of life. Technocracy came hand in hand with politicization, but a career in the bureaucracy meant no security of tenure.

The System on the Eve of Marcos' Fall

The Philippine administrative system at the end of the Marcos regime was a strong modernized bureaucracy which, like the executive, harbored many contradictions. The principal ones concerned its authoritarian, developmentalist and political qualities, each of which had its own opposing characteristics which were also evident within the system.

Authoritarianism in the guise of democracy. Existing as a major instrument of an authoritarian regime, the civil service of the 1980s continued its long tradition of centralism and hierarchical supremacy. This was further strengthened by the appointment of military officials to civilian positions and especially by the frequent resort to the military to enforce civilian decisions and cut short the democratic but time-consuming process of negotiations with affected groups. Nevertheless, it had a decentralized structure with many competent and dedicated personnel at subnational levels. It also promoted people's participation in many of its programs. Some of these taught the people how to "properly" receive government favors, but others started real community organizations.

The developmentalist syndrome. The civil service has demonstrated through the years many of the key elements of the US-exported concepts of development and development administration whose goal is economic growth through private enterprise and incorporation into the global economy. To make this work, the bureaucracy was modernized and introduced to all

manners of planning, implementation and evaluation technologies. An already highly educated, professional, and much-trained group readily absorbed everything. Filipinos learned how to conduct feasibility studies to justify the location of a project in the President's (or some other important person's) favored site. They conducted planning exercises which incorporated all possible project ideas, so that any later decision could be legitimated. They created intricate management information systems to which were inputted reports submitted pro forma by field personnel who were already burdened with the writing of too many reports which were not read or analyzed at any level.

Agencies, programs and officials that seriously considered these administrative reforms and innovations found some of them immediately useful for improving performance. Some had to be modified to suit Philippine conditions and local temperament and eventually became part of the accepted methodology. Others, however, were *ad hoc* changes which were never institutionalized. Some modifications included what were viewed as indigenous ways of doing things or were solicited during negotiations or discussions with clients. Some social agencies were populist and socialistic (at least in rhetoric) and encouraged their personnel to consider their work as contributions toward social justice.

Politicalization of the bureaucracy became manifest in conflicting ways. On the one hand, some members had identified the leadership of the government of the day as the sole focus of their commitments, equating obedience to its pressures and demands with service to the people. In addition, the use of inappropriate criteria for major decisions resulted in widespread corruption at both policy and implementation levels, the manipulation of statistics and public information, and unfair allocation and distribution of public resources.

On the other hand, some politicized factions expressed their dissent in different ways: advocating opposing policies and programs openly; leaking questionable decisions and data to the alternative and foreign press; refusing to be hauled into KBL rallies during the campaign for the snap elections. Conscientious civil servants viewed their action not as opposition but as dedicated performance of their duties as they defined them. This meant, for some field workers, serving even in territory held by communist guerrillas, which rendered them suspect to the military. What made their actions "political" was not partisan involvement but the use of non-bureaucratic values - moral or professional - even when these conflicted with office norms governing regular hours, "statistical success" and standard operating procedures. They were political because the civil servants performed as whole persons, unlike the Weberian ideal of "separation of the office from the person." Many of these civil servants believed that they were living up to the ideal norm of neutrality in public service as

they endowed the letter of their statements of duties and responsibilities with its presumed spirit.

For the majority of civil servants, the authoritarian and developmentalist characteristics of the regime were probably not difficult to take being, after all, like most Filipinos who swallowed unquestioningly the values of hierarchy and American-sponsored modernization. Thus, being in Cell 3 was something of an easy option. However, the corruption, open partisanship and manipulation of technical definitions and measures touched their work directly and became major problems for many civil servants during this period. To be sure, some bureaucrats engaged in these with little discomfort and even profited from them personally, but many more felt the same outrage that their compatriots outside the bureaucracy harbored. Perhaps they felt it more, since they were aware of more problems than outsiders. Moreover, they were regarded as Marcos' collaborators and beneficiaries by many of their fellow Filipinos (sometimes even by their own families). By contrast, they regarded themselves as simply doing their duty - both as civil servants and as people who had no other way of earning a living in a shrinking economy. Thus, they ended up as unwilling but helpless victims of the regime.

Those who wished to play the role of protector of the public interest chafed under a Cell 3 arrangement. However, Cell 4 was not a possibility because the civil servants who dissented were a minority and did not occupy central positions in the bureaucracy. In any case, their views were not acceptable to the increasingly self-serving authoritarian leader. The dissenting minority would have been more comfortable as a bureaucracy under Cell 2, but this would have required overthrowing the dictatorship and being accepted by the new democratic government that replaced it. It was this group that joined the protest marches that eventually culminated in the 1986 people power revolution. It was also instrumental in forming the public sector unions that now fight the Aquino government.

Preliminary Analysis

Park Chung Hee and Ferdinand Marcos both assumed authoritarian power when they grew weary of what they considered the "excesses" of democracy, as shown by the mounting anti-government demonstrations and protests in their respective capitals. They both promised economic growth at the expense of individual liberties and backed up their power with military might. Conflict with the civil service did not seem inevitable because the bureaucrats appeared content to remain subordinate to the leadership.

However, events showed that the bureaucracy should have been wary. Anxious to legitimize their claim to power, the dictators had to show strength of will and purpose in a hurry. The quickest way was to lean on

a nearby visible structure in need of reform. Thus, although the leaders attempted to co-opt a few civil service officials, they wielded the strongest possible weapons so that it would appear that they were transforming the bureaucracy immediately.

In carrying out this objective, the two autocrats took different paths. Park's purges seemed more effective since they followed clear guidelines. However, Marcos' attempts at purification faltered as they became mired in pro forma compliance. Their administrative reforms also diverged, with the Korean technique being concentrated on the achievement of the goals of the economic plan, while the Philippine approach aimed at a general overhaul and appeared to do everything at once. In the end, the Korean experience proved more effective in reaching its target. Since the two governments enjoyed American support and had the same markedly unequal social structures, their differing approaches in managing their bureaucracy could have played a part in determining the divergent outcomes of their reform programs.

Neither executive led the society closer to democracy. Nor did their bureaucracies move in that direction, although in the Philippines, a small segment developed greater nationalism and closer links with the underprivileged, in contrast to the mainstream of the civil service and the executive.

5

Executive Bureaucracy Interaction under Authoritarian Successions: Thailand

This chapter presents an extended treatment of Thailand, tracing how its political system has changed in the last fifty years, and especially how its executive-bureaucracy nexus has developed as a model of Cell 4.¹ It first reviews the pre-1932 historical record to establish the political setting upon which constitutionalism was supposed to be grafted. It also describes the purported aims and programs of the coup and the ways in which they were supposed to push the nation towards democracy.

The next task, as in earlier chapters, is to focus on the bureaucracy. The discussion here is two-pronged: first, to describe factors affecting the military and civilian bureaucracies which precipitated the 1932 coup; second, like the treatment of other nations, to discuss the impact of the new regime on the bureaucracy. The leadership-civil service nexus is then placed in its societal context by analyzing the performance of other potential power holders in the economy and in the political system. The prospects for the democratic development of the Thai bureaucracy are then assessed. It concludes with an analysis of executive-bureaucracy interaction under authoritarianism, incorporating, in addition, discussions in Chapter 4.

Thailand ironically shed off royal absolutism in favor of bureaucratic rule, instead of the democracy pledged by the plotters of the coup of 1932. However, that event was not an accident nor a sharp break from the road to modernization started by the Chakkri Reformation of the 1800s. Rather, the drive for democracy was weakened not only because of the presence of a strong bureaucracy but also due to the kind of constitutional structures erected, the weakness of countervailing political forces, and the structure of the economy.

1. Thai and western scholars alike have referred to this relationship as a "bureaucratic polity," following Fred Riggs (1966). A "bureaucratic polity" is one where the bureaucracy dominates society and is not under the effective control of extrabureaucratic political institutions. "Bureaucratic" in this context refers to persons in both civilian and military services, unlike its usage in this volume. To avoid confusion the phrase will not be used again.

The Political Record Prior to 1932

Thailand alone among the southeast Asian nations maintained a state independent of the expansionist Western powers in the eighteenth century. British and French incursions resulted in some loss of territory² and opened the realm to trade with the West. They also precipitated the modernization of the polity as the monarchy, learning from and adopting certain Western administrative methods, extended effective control over all its territory. Riggs (1966) argues that the West found the monarchical machinery (the forerunner of today's bureaucracy) difficult to comprehend because it was originally structured following cosmological patterns. The system adhered to a strict hierarchy, with the prince at the helm and mixed together with military and civil functions, as well as with territorial and functional responsibilities. Officials conducted government business in their own homes and extracted funds from the population for their upkeep.

The monarchy's visibility and power decreased the farther one moved from the center. The king attempted to consolidate his control through the skilful use of patronage and delegation of powers. Royal protection was necessary to wield power in the rural areas and in moving up from local to central levels. The monarch in Bangkok allowed the nobles and their allies, many of them Chinese businessmen, to gain wealth at the expense of their subjects through tax-farming and corvee labor. Hence, corruption and exploitation were regular features of the political and administrative machinery (Riggs 1966; Chai-Anan 1987a; Chai-Anan 1989).

The modernization of Thai society extended the span of bureaucratic control and made it more difficult for the masses to escape from its clutches, as they did in simpler times when they simply retreated into the jungle (Siffin 1966). Worse, as the number of bureaucrats increased, "the degree of bureaucratic abuse of power correspondingly increased" (Chai-Anan 1987a: 28).

The dramatic growth of the bureaucracy spawned an internal struggle which had repercussion for all of society. Top positions in the bureaucracy were monopolized by princes and nobles, most of whom had the requisite training and capability. They blocked the upward mobility of equally well-educated and competent persons who lacked the kinship and patrimonial connections. To the latter, the monarchy thus symbolized the main obstacle to reaching the apex of the bureaucracy.

The traditional patrimonial bureaucracy underwent radical change under King Mongkut and his successor, Chulalongkorn, in what has been called the Chakkri Reformation. Chief among the reforms was the introduction

2. In quantitative terms, the loss was considerable, totalling about 90,000 square miles (Chai-Anan 1987a). It was mitigated by the fact that these areas were at the periphery, representing self-governing communities effectively beyond the reach of the "absolute" monarch (Vella 1955).

of modern fiscal administration, which meant that regular salaries rather than unrestricted extraction from the masses served as payment for services. They also separated the private from the public purse, trained the children of nobles and elite commoners for what is now called "public administration," and created the Ministry of Interior, through which the concerns of the palace were communicated to the officials and residents of local areas.

The west played two roles. One was negative inducement: its threats of war and colonialism and demands for extraterritoriality and other concessions pushed Thailand to undertake changes that enabled it to control its own institutions and destiny. The other influence was more positive: western modernization was so attractive that the king voluntarily took in foreign advisers for his various reform measures. Thus, budgeting, the construction of irrigation canals, the training of the royal children and even negotiations with foreign powers benefited from the expertise of expatriate consultants chosen by the king or his *senabodi* (chief ministers).

The West might have provided the techniques for modernization but the Reformation drew its ideology from religion. Mongkut claimed a return to the Original Doctrine of Buddhism and laced his reforms with philosophical re-statements of Duty. For instance, he laid emphasis on acts of "merit" with social value, rather than alms for alms' sake. More importantly, he propagated the Buddhist ideal of the Great Man. In so doing, he abandoned the Hinduistic idea of divine kingship, the very basis of the absolute monarchy, and embraced the accountability of the king to the people since he "rule[d] so that the welfare of all [might] increase" (Riggs 1966: 96).

Viewed in this light, the seeds of the transformation of the state into a limited monarchy could have been sown a full century before the coup of 1932. That political idea had other precursors. One of these was a body of nobles newly returned from studies abroad who viewed the absolute monarchy as an anachronism. As early as 1885, Chulalongkorn had successfully resisted the demands of such a group for a constitutional monarchy, i.e., "a more broadly based political structure... as the only way to save Siam from being colonized by the imperialist West" (Chai-Anan 1987a:26). However, he did establish a Cabinet government in 1892. That did not really widen the base of power since among the heads of ministries were nine of his brothers and three other nobles. The king, in alliance with progressive noble families, had triumphed over traditional nobles in rural areas who further saw their powers curtailed by the stronger central machinery (Chai-Anan 1987a: 27). Chai-Anan also surmises that by effectively coopting radical princes into the establishment, the king might have aborted their flirtation with a more democratic ideology.

The call for democratization was also fueled by a free press which was born at the turn of the century. It spread democratic ideology further and

put heavy pressure on the traditional system (Chai-Anan 1987a: 30). The increasing clamor for a democratic form of government made its appropriateness for Thailand a major question for Chulalongkorn's successor, Vajiravudh (Chai-Anan 1989: 306). He sought to hush it by mobilizing the educated populace, especially the bureaucrats, towards greater national commitment. However, the mobilization for nationalism reenforced the demand for political participation which, again, the reigning king did not heed. (Chai-Anan 1987a: 29).

The Government Created by the *Coup d'Etat* of 1932

On June 24, 1932, eleven government officials seized power in a bloodless coup and declared the end of the absolute monarchy. In its stead, they installed a new government with all the trappings of western democratic government: a (provisional) constitution, a parliament, political parties, an electoral system, and a government headed by a prime minister and his Cabinet. However, the premier was not elected to Parliament but was imposed on it, as were most of his ministers.

Aside from the formal structures, the coup of 1932 had other features that augured well for democracy. Although its libertarian cast was not strong, the reduction of the powers of the monarch and the change in the focus of accountability from him to the people were some of its prominent features. Its promoters' manifesto read in part:

Let us understand that this country belongs to the people, not to the King as we have been deceived into believing (quoted in Riggs 1966: 107).

Their revolutionary imperative implied the removal of the monarchy. Yet, within two days, the promoters apologized to King Prachathipok and their provisional constitution created the structure not of a republic but of a limited monarchy.

Far from leading to democratization, the coup led to power concentration in a small group of officials outside the monarchy and nobility. Its members had different ideological perspectives (socialistic vs. anti-communistic), country models (pro- versus anti-Japanese, German as against French training), and institutional memberships (military versus civilian). However, they were mainly factionalized by personalistic loyalties and their rank in the bureaucracy (i.e., a "senior" clique composed of men largely in their forties and trained in Germany, and a "junior" group, about ten years younger, trained in France) rather than by any substantive differences (Riggs 1966).

Under the provisional constitution presented by the coup "promoters," political authority was to rest in a national assembly which would elect a People's Committee as its head. The Committee would supervise the

Cabinet. the new executive - which was composed of ministers who had been career officials. Envisioning a period of tutelage, the promoters selected the first members of the assembly. They also appointed as prime minister a judge who was acceptable to, but not a member of, either faction. The Cabinet - then the same as the People's Committee - included the promoters, augmented by three other older officials (Riggs 1966).

The first "permanent" constitution was promulgated in December 1932, six months after the coup. It created a unicameral legislature equally divided between elected and appointed members. Most of the appointed legislators were military and civilian officials (Chai-Anan 1989). The legislature never developed autonomous power *vis-a-vis* the executive because the constitution allowed the latter to enact laws during parliamentary recesses. Since it met for only three months, the supremacy of the more representative body held for only a quarter of each year (Kanok 1988). Added to these formal limitations was the absence of any strong political group outside government which could become a counterforce to it.

The same constitution also merged the People's Committee and the Cabinet into a State Council (generally referred to since as the "cabinet"), thereby throwing out "the crucial idea of a political group outside the administration capable of imposing its control over the government" (Riggs 1966: 161). At that point, the Cabinet had increased to 20, of which eight were military officers and 12 were civilian officials (Riggs 1966: 216). However, eight bureaucrats who had served in the absolute monarchy headed ministries, while the 11 promoters joined the Cabinet without portfolio (Riggs 1966: 221).

These senior officials set the stage for the consolidation of bureaucratic rule, and later set to discredit the Assembly and the People's Party. The latter was identified with Pridi, a junior civilian who was the popular figure of the revolution. He had led in the preparation of an ambitious economic program that seemed more socialistic to, and beyond the capacity of, the bureaucracy to accept and implement. Preempting the possible approval by the Assembly which had a number of People's Party supporters, the prime minister, with the support of the senior clique, obtained a royal proclamation proroguing the assembly (Riggs 1966: 221-222). The third Cabinet was then formed, three months after the second. The military gained the upper hand, increasing its number from eight to 11, while the number of civilians was reduced from 12 to nine. The military gained one more member in the Cabinet, increasing its group to seven, while civilians (who were followers of Pridi and thus seen as "radical") decreased drastically from five to one (Riggs 1966: 316).

The second coup came three months later, close to the anniversary of the first one. This time, it was led by the junior promoters and excluded the senior clique and their chosen administrative officials. However, they still needed the help of senior bureaucrats, and the new prime minister recruited 12 of them to run ministries (Riggs 1966: 225-26). Still working under

the 1932 constitution, they sought the king's acceptance, and the discontinued assembly reconvened to legitimize the new regime. New elections were held in the following November. This resulted in a slight Cabinet change, but not in a realignment of power.

In October 1933, the bloodiest challenge to the new regime came through an unsuccessful royalist rebellion. In its train, it became clear that the junior clique - an alliance of military and civilian officials - had emerged on top, and that the monarch, as ruler (though not as legitimizer), had been dealt a death blow. While there were signs that the parliament could threaten the cabinet (or it would not have been discontinued), the major conflicts from then on were within the cabinet and the military and civil service institutions. "Revolving-door governments" affecting cabinet membership, military commands and bureaucratic offices - but little else in the society - had begun.

The 1932 constitution would have the longest period of effectivity (13 years and five months by the calculations of Chai-Anan 1989: 322) among Thailand's thirteen constitutions. Six such "semi-democratic" constitutions governed Thailand for most of the last half-century. "Democratic" constitutions which provided for fully-elected membership were in effect for only about six years (under three separate periods). Four periods lasting altogether about 13 years were under "non-democratic" constitutions.³

Whatever the category of the basic law in effect, Thai constitutions have been primarily concerned with facilitating the rule of executives rather than providing guarantees for the popular exercise of civil rights. Thus, "constitutionalism" here has a limited connotation, with national security, public order and public morality taking precedence over the protection of political liberties.

A prime minister emerging from parliament itself had become a rarity. This was partly because of the frequency of coups which catapulted self-selected power wielders into office. Between 1932 and 1987, Thailand had 13 general elections, nine successful coups, seven failed attempts and 43 Cabinets (Chai-Anan, 1989: 320). A coup had interrupted the tenure of all but four parliaments (Chai-Anan 1989: 325). There was a brief flowering of democracy between 1973 to 1976 when students, supported by workers and peasants, toppled the military government and paved the way for a fully elected legislature. That democratic experiment ended in another coup. But once out, the genie could not be put back into the bottle. The previously depoliticized having had a taste of power, the bureaucracy was no longer the only political institution to reckon with in Thailand (Somsakdi 1987a; Chai-Anan 1989).

3. Chai-Anan (1989) applied the label "democracy" to some constitutions based only on the theoretical capacity of legislatures to check and balance the executive. A constitution is "democratic" when a Parliament is fully elected and political parties are allowed to function, "non-democratic" when appointed members outnumbered the elected.

The bureaucratic politicians that emerged from the coup started out proclaiming themselves as the vanguards of democracy but ended up practicing "constitutional authoritarianism" (Somsakdi 1987a: 199). Military rule was partially mitigated by the fact that it had not been very repressive, the armed forces being given to flexibility and pragmatism. Also, Thailand's free press and independent judiciary have provided some checks to power concentration (Chai-Anan 1989: 337).

The Rule of the Bureaucracy

As already mentioned, the demand to democratize the polity had been building up for many decades. Its earliest proponents were princes, nobles and other elites in the bureaucracy who were sent abroad for training by the king himself. The apex of the bureaucracy was off limits to even elite commoners, being the exclusive preserve of the nobility (Wilson 1962: 172-73). In a sense, the liberal ideas and career frustrations of senior bureaucrats combined to fuel the conspiracy against the monarch.

The Great Depression of the 1920s which put Thailand in dire financial straits aggravated the monarchy's problems. Instead of increasing taxes or incurring more foreign debt, King Prajadhipok resorted to radical financial retrenchment. He undertook *dullayaparp* (balancing) or a reduction of the size of the bureaucracy (Kanok 1988: 49). The number of government employees decreased by 11 percent from 1926 to 1932 (removing almost 8,000 people).⁴ The diminution accelerated so that, between 1931 and 1932, the decrease was almost eight percent (raw data from Chai-Anan 1987b: 85). While maintaining that "a bureaucratic rebellion remained inconsistent with social reality," Siffin (1966: 142) noted many other "painful domestic actions" that tyrannized the civil service: salary reduction, premature pensioning and the discharge of thousands of *wisaman* or temporary employees.

Nevertheless, the immediate effect of the coup on most of the bureaucracy was, in a word, nothing. According to Siffin (1966: 143):

The civil bureaucrats - and most of the military - were distinguished by their non-involvement in the coup and its aftermath. One of the first actions of the coup group was to issue an order that civil and military officials should continue to do their work without interruption, and they complied.

Reorganization ostensibly towards consolidation of the various ministries started during the emergency and was continued by the new govern-

4. Riggs (1966: 126) cites a decline of 17 percent between 1925 and 1932, a loss of 3,000 jobs by 45,000 men. The difference in the statistics may be due to restriction of Riggs' data only to persons in the career service.

ment. For instance, the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce were combined into the new Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1933. The Agriculture Department became a "Service" later that year, then a "Sub-Ministry" in 1934 and finally a separate ministry again. It had a net addition of one unit, the Department of Cooperatives, in 1935. Riggs (1966: 127) was hardly exaggerating when he concluded:

All the revolutionary furor... had amounted to little more than a reshuffling of departments in which, with a few consolidations but without the addition of anything new, the same structure emerged at the end as had entered at the beginning.

While the net effect of reorganization in terms of number of functions and organizations might have been negligible, the bureaucracy nevertheless changed visibly in size. As previously mentioned, the king had cut down the number of civil servants in the 1920s. However, between 1932 and 1936, the employee force rose by 24.33 percent or an average annual increase of six percent, a rebound from the decrease of almost 8 percent in the year before the coup. Such a big annual growth rate was not matched until 1966 (raw data from Chai-Anan 1987b: 85).

The same trend was evident in the ratio of number of government officials to the population. Dropping from 8.5 in 1922 to 5.5 in 1933, the ratio was up again at 8.5 by 1959 (Prudhisan 1987: 115).

Tinkering with the bureaucratic machinery through reorganization and personnel changes is expected in both regular and abnormal governmental transitions. Thus, the changes in the civil service of Thailand described above hardly signified its rise as a part of the ruling group. To substantiate the latter assertion, one must look at both the internal dynamics of the politico-administrative system and its relationship with other forces in society.

First, the 1932 coup has been called "a revolution of the bureaucrats, by the bureaucrats and for the bureaucrats" (Kanok 1988: 50), an appraisal shared by most Thai and western scholars. However, Kanok's use of "bureaucrats" covers a wider scope than its usage in this volume as it includes members of both the military and civilian bureaucracies. The military bureaucracy is frequently the one that is prominent but the civilian service is the partner that had aspires to and even garners co-equality from time to time. Thus, the relationship between the political leadership, usually dominated by the military service, and the "bureaucracy" (its civilian counterpart, consistent with its usage in other chapters) needs to be clarified.

The promoters of the coup of 1932 were a mixed group of military and civilian officials who chose a civilian bureaucrat as the first prime minister. There were nine other civilian premiers, of whom one was a retired naval

officer and four were usually described as fronts of the military. The remaining seven were military officials (updated from Suchit 1987: 61-62; Chai-Anan 1987b: 97; and Riggs 1966: 316). These military premiers had a combined tenure of 49 years, while the 10 civilians together had only eight. For the 1932-77 period, the extent of military participation in the 39 Cabinets came to 39 percent overall, with a high of 75 percent in 1952 and a low of nine percent in 1945 (Chai-Anan 1987b: 95). The military had run most of the radio stations (the rest were run by other civil service agencies); some of them were used to rally the public to support a coup (Suchit 1987: 58; Riggs 1966: 151; Chai-Anan 1989: 324). It had also sponsored political parties whenever they were allowed (Chai-Anan 1939: 344). Thus, it is safe to say that since the 1932 coup, the military has been in control of Thailand.

Nevertheless, the civilian service shares power as it participates in the activities of three principal decision centers: the "promoters' groups," the Cabinet and the Parliament:

(1) Civilian officials have joined in planning and executing coups. In the 1932 takeover, all the 11 promoters were career officials, five of them civilians. Between 1932 and 1958, there was a preponderance of military men (39 of 56 promoters), but there were still 14 civil servants. Between 1944 and 1947, there were no military officers, only 54 civilians, of which 37 were civil servants.⁵ However, the coups from 1947 to 1958 were purely military affairs (Riggs 1966: 316, 420-27).

(2) The Cabinet, which is the effective executive and policymaking body of government, has never been without a civilian bureaucrat. During some periods, the civilians outnumbered those from the military. In the first 26 years, for instance, the various Cabinets had 100 civilian as against 84 military officials (Riggs 1966: 317). There have been more civilian government officials than military men in the prime minister's seat although their tenure has been much shorter, and some have served as front men of the army (Suchit 1987: 61-62; Chai-Anan 1987b: 97).

(3) Bureaucrats have also been appointed to the Parliament. Including the police (a civilian force), they have constituted the second largest group of appointed officials, next only to the military. In 1959, they accounted for 18 percent of all appointive seats, increasing to 27 percent in 1972, on the eve of the democratic interlude. Reduced to 17 percent in 1974, they still constituted the second largest group in the assembly (Suchit 1987: 66).

Until 1991, the appointed Senate included all undersecretaries and equivalent officials, along with senior military officials (Chai-Anan 1989:

5. This may overestimate the number of promoters and the civil servants among them since Riggs' data are listed by Cabinet change, not by name of official, and thus some overlapping may have occurred. This writer simply added together the number of promoters and bureaucrats Riggs listed in all the appropriate cabinets.

323). These members provided continuity in the assembly since only elected members could lose their seats during parliamentary disruptions such as coups; appointed members tended to stay on (Chai-Anan 1989: 325).

While bureaucrats have been favored in terms of appointments, some of them have also filled elective posts. In 1975, 30 of the 252 elected members of Parliament (a good 12%) were bureaucrats (Prudhisan 1987: 149-51). Former civil servants constituted another big group; for instance, in 1969, they captured a fifth of the total elected seats in Parliament (Suchit 1987: 66). In addition, it has been suggested that many elected businessmen and professionals "owed much of their rise to power to their prior connections with political bureaucrats" (Prudhisan 1987: 149-51).

While civilians have encroached upon the political turf of the military, the latter have not pre-empted civil service posts. In 1958, for instance, only 20 of the 300 special-class managerial positions (less than 7%) were filled by military officials. They also have seldom occupied key positions outside the police department. Siffin explains this as

... a tacit understanding that civil posts will not be used for military patronage on any sizeable scale - [an] understanding which the civil sector could never enforce, but which depends on something more basic ... than overt rules and sanctions. This is simply the abiding acceptance of the boundary between the civil and the military services - *an acceptance which is made easy by the absence of any problem of controlling the civil bureaucracy* (Siffin 1966: 157, underscoring supplied).

This attitude has been maintained through the years. Up to the late 1980s, the military continued to allow civil bureaucrats a great deal of freedom in undertaking development programs and even counter-insurgency programs. Day-to-day direction and personnel hiring have been left to civilians who have been successfully coopted (Chai-Anan 1987b: 95).

If that implicit boundary exists behaviorally, in what sense then does the civilian service share power? It must be accepted that, in the strict sense, "rulership," even the associate rulership posited here, was not wielded by the vast majority of civil servants. By Riggs' estimate, based on the civil and military bureaucracy of 1958 (with a total size then of 350,000), outsiders accounted for about seventy percent of the appointments. The ruling group, meanwhile, consisted of

the dozen or two who at any given time were Cabinet members, ... the next larger circle consisted of perhaps a thousand special grade and high military officers, followed by another 2 or 3,000 men holding key administrative posts, being drawn gradually closer to the inner circle. Outside this circle one found more than 25,000 career men with good prospects, the rank and file admin-

istrators, all of whom expected to move up gradually in terms of salary and status, and some of whom expected, in due time, to join the more influential and rewarding inner circles (Riggs 1966: 329).

Yet, despite the unlikelihood of their admission into the ruling circle, the rank and file still have an advantage over the general populace in that they are a major beneficiary of the cozy leadership-higher civil servant nexus. In fact, the institutional interests of the civil service are principal criteria for both political and administrative decisions. In addition, struggles for priorities and resources have taken place within agencies and in the Cabinet, beyond the view of the people. As shown below, access is also afforded selectively to dominant economic groups, and the process entailed there has strengthened the grip of the bureaucracy on the political system.

The Key Constituency

The shift to a constitutional monarchy, affecting only the palace rather than all of society, did not increase the pressure on government to be accountable to the people. Instead, the main constituency of the new government became the bureaucracy which simply changed patrons from the monarchy to the military-civilian leadership (Thinapan 1987: 173). Thus, the bureaucracy became the "first new strategic interest to emerge in modern Thailand" (Prudhisian 1987: 115). Although promoters created political parties, these were little more than their personal followings; parties rose and fell with the fortunes of their founders. Besides, parliaments were dominated by appointed members (except in 1946-47, 1949-52 and 1974-76) so that even well-fought elections could not produce a viable opposition in parliament. As Wilson (1962: 277) said:

As much as the leadership of the Thai revolution might have wished things to be otherwise, it was not able to muster much popular interest outside the bureaucracy upon which to base itself.

The demands of the average civil servant are self-serving: getting employment, keeping it and enjoying as much resources as possible while in office. An ever-expanding "empire of bureaucrats" (Kanok 1988: 50) is not only a boon to lower-level employees who would otherwise be unemployed; Chai-Anan suggests that the growth of the civil service up to the 1960s primarily meant more jobs, not an expansion of government services (Chai-Anan 1989: 85-86). The expansion of the civil service was also a way of increasing the power of the leaders of bureaucratic cliques who competed for more loyal client-employees as well as for bigger resources under their command.

The patron-client pattern within the bureaucracy is best described by Wilson (1962: 137):

A minister. . . can expect to get the deference, respect and obedience from his subordinates... He is obligated by tradition to look out for these subordinates... in order not to disturb his authority and perhaps that of the whole clique.... His ministry then becomes his constituency and he represents it in the Cabinet. He fights for its budget, and he protects its employees. The success with which he does this depends upon his relative position within the ruling clique although the best he can expect is a compromise with his fellow ministers.

Budgets and personnel have programs attached to them, but the development schemes they are supposed to undertake have been regarded by bureaucrats as arenas of turf battles, not responses to public demands or expressions of rationality and efficiency. In the absence of some superior center of power (such as a representative legislature), these inter-ministerial conflicts tend to be nothing more than a scrambling for more pork barrel. Worse, they tend to be more responsive to field officials than to the communities they are supposed to serve. Not being politically subject to the assembly, which itself has no organized parties or pressure groups to give it independent support, Cabinets rely only on the recommendations emanating from the bureaucratic hierarchy which further strengthen the latter's one-sided power advantage (Riggs 1966: 330-32).

The absence of a strong center outside the bureaucracy has reinforced the feeling of superiority of the civil service and its contempt for politicians. The sense of the bureaucracy's power has continued on for more than 20 years after Riggs' analysis. In the 1980s, a newly appointed minister from the elected parliament stated:

When I was walking into the Ministry, I really felt like I was walking into a tiger's cage with bare hands (quoted in Kanok 1988: 51).

Thai civil servants have also played principal roles in politics, not simply as they affect the implementation process (which all bureaucracies do) but particularly through their participation in the initiation, conceptualization and promulgation of laws.

However, the most definitive manifestation of their power is their ability, together with the military, to determine constitutional arrangements. Being the main drafters of all but the 1974 basic law, they have successfully written into them obstacles to the growth of the legislature as a rival political institution. These include provisions prohibiting elected members from becoming Cabinet officials (1968 Constitution) and exempting the Cabinet

from a no-confidence vote (1932 Constitution). In addition to these provisions, the 1978 constitution also required that all bills pass the Bill Screening Committee, in which government maintained a majority. Thus, Chai-Anan calls the assembly a "clique legislature," an adjunct of the bureaucracy which is interested in using the legislature but not in having it gain very much power" (Chai-Anan 1987b: 98).

Laws initiated by bureaucrats have also aimed at limiting the rise of other political institutions. For instance, all associations are required to register, a provision reflecting official suspicion towards groups which can challenge its authority (Prudhisan 1987: 123). For many years, this was simply an interesting law, since the bureaucracy created most associations anyway (Prudhisan 1987: 117). Besides, whether the result of bureaucratic initiative or not, all organizations are subject to the financial and personnel controls of various ministries (Chai-Anan 1987b: 99). In 1981, a new law was passed ostensibly to promote the formation of political parties. However, its effect was to stunt their development by requiring that all aspirant-organizations provide evidence of membership and support in all provinces and regions of the Kingdom, a mobilization that can be undertaken for all practical purposes only by the bureaucracy (Chai-Anan 1989: 326).

Bureaucratic attempts to control participation also show through in the regulation stipulating that only farmers with landholdings of a certain minimum size could qualify as members of cooperatives. This effectively turns away poor peasants who need the co-op movement more and "reflects the centralized Thai bureaucratic system in which high-level decision-makers make decisions which do not necessarily conform to the needs of each locality" (Prudhisan 1987: 129).

Some laws have simply been left to the bureaucracy to make either because of its acknowledged expertise or because the Cabinet and the assembly do not consider it worth their while to deal with them. The (appointed) Senate takes this view, and took just over 30 minutes to pass the voluminous 1963 budget, for instance. It also passed 65 bills in 1960 with hardly any debate. [By contrast, the elected House took over 70 hours to deliberate on the budget bill and passed only seven laws in 1975 (Suchit 1987: 67)]. Yet the Cabinet would have decided on the budget bill not on the merits of the proposals, but on the relative influence of the faction represented by the minister who presents them (Riggs 1966: 329-38).

Another political prerogative delegated to the bureaucracy is the conduct of the government's decentralization program. Originally, this policy was part of the democratic agenda of the first coup plotters. Laws created municipal and provincial governments and elected legislative assemblies at local levels. However, local powers were limited by the lack of resources and the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, which was not eager "to provide needed subventions." Confronted by demoralized and inexperienced councils, indifferent electorates, and poor municipalities, the Ministry of Interior intervened more and more through local executives whom

they have appointed (Riggs 1966: 183-86). This pattern has persisted to this day.

The power of the civil service has also been enhanced by the frequent changes of government. With any political leadership expected to be interim, the burden of governance falls on the shoulders of those who have outlived several regimes. This leads to what Somsakdi (1987a) calls "the politics of coping" which has several grave consequences. Foremost of these is the lack of national vision and prioritization of programs. Another consequence is what may be called "the administration of coping," whereby extraordinary powers - shortcuts to an overcentralized, cumbersome system - are brandished even for ordinary decisions in order to obtain results. Besides, since the bureaucracy knows that the regime is transitory, it can risk not to implement decisions which it "perceive[s] to be wrong or harmful to its own institutional interests" (Somsakdi 1987a: 205).

The idea of the bureaucracy as a partner in rulership may convey the image of a strong and decisive organization. However, the civil service has wielded great power apparently with little concern for values other than the enhancement of its own resources and prestige. Since performance is not its *raison d'être*, efficiency and effectiveness are bested by clientelist exchanges. The factionalism that divided coup promoters and the Cabinet has also riddled the bureaucracy, even as it has to forge the compromises necessary to resolve disputes. Moreover, the bureaucracy tends to postpone, and ultimately to centralize, decisionmaking due to the reluctance to make decisions that will pit the patron and his employees against each other. This leads to the proliferation of committees where difficult matters can be brought and, hopefully, forgotten. Even when able to make decisions, the omnipresence of committees indicates the tendency to spread out responsibility to as many people as possible (Siffin 1966: 83-84; Riggs 1966: 311-66; Chai-Anan 1989: 92-94). Minor problematic cases may even be brought before the cabinet which thus frequently finds itself dealing with trifling matters (Riggs 1966: 311-66). It creates a paradoxical situation where administrators and the bureaucracy at large enjoy political roles, while those at the very top deal not with political but with administrative matters.

Dealing with Potential Rivals

Since 1932, other power centers could have provided an alternative to bureaucratic control. The first is the monarchy, whose powers the coup wanted to clip considerably. However, after the royalist rebellion of 1933, the monarchy remained above politics, becoming instead the beloved symbol of the unity and stability of the Thai nation (Suchit 1987: 58-60). The present king "has survived seven constitutions, nine general elections, and . . . over eleven [now twelve] prime ministers" (updated from Chai-Anan 1989: 337). Moreover, the king has acted as the main consensus builder and legitimizer of regimes; no coup can succeed without his acceptance of the

new rulers. This fact was reaffirmed twice in the mid-1980s; without the king's support, the Prem government might not have survived (Chai Anan 1989: 337-38).

The other potential rival is the Chinese business community which controls the economy. Its failure to develop into an independent bourgeoisie may be explained by the status of its members as "pariah entrepreneurs," non-citizens and cultural outsiders (Riggs 1966). As such, they could not openly engage in politics but have to seek and develop patrons in government in order to survive. To protect their investments, the Chinese have needed the protection of government officials whose directorships in their corporate boards could facilitate the granting of licenses and quotas, as well as the warding off of arrests or extortion.

Their allies in government also provide the Chinese business leaders with subsidies, privileges and contracts which answer not only their need to survive but also their demand for expansion and increased wealth. The business community also bankrolls political leaders and candidates, some openly through political parties, others through support of coup plotters (Riggs 1966: 253; Zimmermann 1978: 51). In fact, a bureaucratic ruler's political status depends not only on his position in the bureaucracy, but also on his business interests and associates (Prudhisan 1987).

Riggs' 1966 study of Cabinet members from 1932 to 1962 showed that out of a total of 107 firms, 42 companies had three or more Cabinet officials in their boards, while 65 had two and 40, one. Cabinet members could not monopolize this lucrative arrangement with the Chinese elite. Particularly in later years, sub-Cabinet military and civilian officials including civil servants in regulatory offices gave them competition (Prudhisan 1987: 120).

It has been said that in Thailand, officials obtain power first and then cultivate the right business associates to obtain wealth (Riggs 1966: 250). For the businessmen, however, sharing the wealth is not a difficult option since their allies can and do provide opportunities to further expand their assets. Their special relationship proved particularly valuable for the Chinese during the period when "Chinese" and "communist" were considered synonymous terms in Thailand.

The symbiotic relationship has continued even though many among the Chinese business elite have become Thai citizens and could legally enter the political arena. That pattern of collaboration has tended to "perpetuate the concentration of economic power in the hands of a small elite" (Prudhisan 1987: 123). It has also meant a government responding primarily to the demands of the economic elite whose interests - not by happenstance - coincide with those of its chief officials.

Their partnership has been profitable for the economy which has grown tremendously particularly from the 1960s onward. However, wealth has not seeped down to the people outside the rulers' circle; poverty continues to be the lot of a large segment of the population, particularly those in the rural areas (Suntaree 1991).

New Seekers of Political Power

Thais are said to have undergone "a socialization that favors authoritarianism" (Thinapan 1987: 179). Besides, they are accustomed to benign authoritarian governments and a tradition of electoral apathy, deference to superiors and passive acceptance of the hierarchical social structure. Nevertheless, pressures to move Thailand closer to the promise of its formal democratic institutions have never been completely absent despite the fact that even the democratic constitutions of the 1940s resulted from clique politics.

The upheaval that preceded and culminated in the government under the 1974 constitution reflected the stirrings of societal forces which were then ignored. Initially led by students and limited to the safe theme of anti-Japanese importation, the movement eventually became "the vanguard of the growing peaceful demand for a democratic constitution" and embraced more controversial issues like the removal of US bases (Prudhisan 1987: 139). It also grew to embrace workers and peasants as well as business executives and professionals. This mobilization, later known as the October 1973 uprising, resulted in the fall of the government. It also paved the way for the drafting of the first constitution that passed through an "ordeal of fire." As Zimmermann (1978: 41) relates:

The King, journalists, professors, lawyers, politicians even students and the common man through protests at Parliament's gates or by "letters to the editor" of Thailand's leading papers helped to one degree or another in the drafting of the document.

The new constitution guaranteed freedom of speech and organization "without restrictive clauses." Politics and administration were separated. The Senate, a body of appointive members, was barred from participating in no-confidence votes while members of the House of Representatives, the elected body, could not hold civil service or military positions concurrently. The prime minister and at least half of the Cabinet members had to be elected. All legislative and executive officials had to make a yearly disclosure of their assets and liabilities (Zimmermann 1978: 41-42). There were no restrictions against the formation of political parties, which mushroomed overnight.

The popular groups soon realized that getting a constitution, even one which was a vast improvement over its predecessors, brought forth neither a revolution of participation nor redistribution. They succeeded in stripping the military of control in Parliament, reducing their membership from 62 percent in the 1972-73 assembly to eight percent in the 1973-74 body (Suchit 1987: 65). They "force[d] [government] to adopt an official land reform policy... Officials were obliged to follow this policy strictly" (Kanak 1988: 62). They demonstrated against American foreign policy, injustice,

and military suppression of communists (Suchit 1987: 54) and succeeded in removing the American bases (Zimmerman 1978: 82-86). Nevertheless, they were frustrated that the constitution retained the appointive Senate but did not lower the voting age to 18. This last effectively disenfranchised about half of the studentry who, fresh from stints in villages where they saw firsthand the poverty of the people, were disturbed that "socially unrepresentative MPs" (referring to business executives and retired officers) were upholding their self-interest over social justice (Prudhisan 1987: 135-147, quotation on p. 153).

The military and business elite, for their part, worried about the students' leftist sympathies, particularly their espousal of peasant and union rights and their fury against foreign investments and American imperialism (Prudhisan 1987: 154-57). To deal with this problem, the military created and funded student groups (Prudhisan 1987: 154-57; Chai-Anan 1987b: 106-107; Zimmerman 1978). As Somsakdi (1987a) suggests, this strategy reveals, more than anything else, how strong the extrabureaucratic groups had become during that period.

The newly awakened groups also turned their attention to making the government accountable. Between 1973 and 1974, over 300 student demonstrations were mobilized to complain against the poor performance and corruption of specific government agencies. In response, Parliament passed an Anti-Corruption Act (Chai-Anan 1987b: 106). In addition, parliamentary debates and interpellations of elected legislators forced the military rulers to listen to grievances from the countryside. Most of these concerned people's living conditions and the ineffectiveness of government services. Some representatives even went to the extent of asking for the removal of certain local officials who had incurred the wrath of their constituencies. Political parties became channels of popular demands in place of the ubiquitous government officials (Suchit 1987: 67-69).

Both military and civilian bureaucrats were disturbed by the glassbowl openness of the democratic process and appalled at the corruption which was now clearly evident (some because they had become more vulnerable, others because they had not realized the extent of corruption until then). They also resented having Sino-Thai businessmen in Parliament, since, as their new bosses, they had to defer to them rather than the other way around (Prudhisan 1987: 153-57). A more important reason, however, is that they found "democracy as a destabilizing factor causing confusion, instability and delay in government administration" (Chai-Anan 1987b: 106).

It was perhaps inevitable that on October 6, 1976, three years to the day of the first big student victory, a military National Reform Council launched another coup and installed a new Cabinet headed by a trusted anti-communist and conservative civilian (Zimmerman 1978). It was among "the most violent and bitter in Thailand's considerable experience" (Somsakdi 1987a: 207). It was followed by a clampdown on the press, political parties and universities, and mass arrests of student and labor leaders, even the burning

of leftist books. An aborted coup in March 1977 led to the rare execution of the plot leader. The rest of the 1970s saw a procession of seven prime ministers and 10 governments (Somsakdi 1987a: 207; Zimmerman 1978: 87-93).

Nevertheless, the continuation of military power notwithstanding, politics was markedly different in the 1980s from what it was in previous decades. Prem Tinsulanonda, who became premier in 1980 while Commander-in-Chief of the Army, retained the post seven years beyond his retirement from the military. This flew in the face of the previously held view that dual tenureship of top military and political posts was necessary for the continued stability of the country (Somsakdi 1987b: 213-14). He voluntarily refused to hold over in 1988, although he could have mustered a coalition to support him.

Prem also widened the base of recruitment for his Cabinet ministers. The usual pool of military and government technocrats was joined by Assembly members recommended by political parties in the coalition. However, although regarded as a realistic strategy to create stability, it did not reduce bureaucratic strength in the political system (Somsakdi 1987b: 214).

Meanwhile, interest groups were provided easier access to the ruling elite. Groups of economic dominants such as the Association of Industries, the Chamber of Commerce and the Bankers' Association were given a consultative role in the decisionmaking process affecting the economy. Unions gained a similar but more limited role in labor relations. Private associations also flourished in Bangkok, but farmers' groups were still controlled by the Interior and Agriculture Ministries (Chai-Anan 1989: 333, 338).

The active involvement of the new political groups may have forced their own recognition. Order No. 65/2525, promulgated in 1982, seemed to concede the need to develop a "limited pluralist system." It recognized the value of popular participation and of interest groups and provided guidelines for their regulation. The armed forces were enjoined to strive for "a correct understanding of democracy and [to] preserve this system." Government officials were regarded "as the main instrument for achieving democratic development," along with "ordinary people with idealism who are prepared to cooperate to bring about a model democracy" (quoted from Chai-Anan 1989: 332). Despite some concessions, the "democracy" envisioned was still that guided by both the military and civilian bureaucracies.

Even this limited democratizing process was broken when Prem's successor was dislodged by a coup in February 1991. Like most Thai military takeovers, it was bloodless and did not seem to disrupt the society. Opposition from students who have been a very vocal group since the 1970s did not materialize. Moreover, state enterprise unions - the "opposition" within the bureaucracy - were abolished without so much as a whimper. The apex of the civil service itself had comfortably settled into a warm relationship with the new military-headed configuration (Tasker 1991).

Whether this signifies a major break from the democratization process cannot be predicted at this stage. By appointing a respected civilian (and former career civil servant) as interim prime minister, the coup leaders headed by the Supreme Commander and three service chiefs have assuaged the fears of the stock market and business. Anand Panyarachun's known independent-mindedness and the possibility of elections in six to 14 months likewise augur well for democratization. However, the interim constitution also contains a provision that gives the military a "supervisory role" over the Cabinet, which can revert the country to strong-man rule (Handley 1991).

Toward the Democratic Development of the Bureaucracy

The coup of 1991, precipitated by "rampant corruption in government... (and) attempts by politicians to manipulate the bureaucracy," among others, shows the limits within which the military will play the democratic game. What, then, are the prospects for the democratic development of the civil service? As shown above, the bureaucracy can only govern in cooperation with the military which not only has armed force but is also perceived to be more able and decisive than its civilian counterpart. The military has permitted civil servants what Chai-Anan calls "limited decentralization" - i.e., a great deal of latitude in administering programs without day-to-day direction from military officers. However, the civil service and the people recognize that this manifests the military's "continued tolerance" of bureaucratic activity rather than delegation of power (Chai-Anan 1989: 95). Thus, implementation rather than the setting of policy directions continues to be its main lot.

The civil service continues to attract well-educated people with its promises of security, prestige, power, and, if one played one's cards right, wealth (Thinapan 1987: 183). On the other hand, the decrease in the number of young university graduates who choose to be in the public service is perceptible (Suchitra 1991). This may channel into the bureaucracy only those civilians who seek to be the key constituency of the leadership instead of those who see it as their venue for public service.

Even within these limits, the civil service can develop as a genuine democratic institution if it shows better performance and greater accountability to the people. Such an outcome may be helped along by at least four other factors.

The most significant of these is the continuing reform of the military. Optimism has been generated by an evident change in military socialization. This has been brought about by adjustments in strategies and tactics in dealing with insurgency, that is, moving away from violent suppressions to civic action and dialogue with the people (Chai-Anan 1989: 331-32). Further reform may come about as the military becomes more tolerant of the involvement of other groups in the political system, and indeed, by its

assumption of any leadership role as a move of last, rather than first, resort, if only to lengthen the tenure of any leadership. The latest coup has not necessarily foreclosed this possibility, but it also shows the continuing ability of the armed forces to disrupt the democratization process. Short of wishing away the military's political power, its reform may be the most viable means of buying not only political stability, but also the ability of any government to realize some of its goals (Somsakdi 1987a: 207-10).

A second democratizing measure is creating more opportunities for increased enjoyment of economic growth and concomitant strengthening of the middle class. Its pressures for liberalization would tend to be more acceptable to the military than the rumblings of "leftist" students, unions and peasant groups.

The development of other political institutions, particularly representative bodies and the electoral process, will be a third step in the right direction. The proliferation of political parties during the last decade could well be a beginning. More significant, however, is the upholding of electoral results, and the non-intervention of the military in the process. The Thai experience has shown that even when expected to be a rubber-stamp, Parliaments have succeeded in at least raising some questions about governmental performance and directions, a fact that makes the bureaucracy stand on its toes.

The fourth reform consists of factors directly affecting the bureaucracy itself. Kanok's 1988 study on the value system of the civil service suggests what these might be. He notes that the bureaucracy has operated on a dual value system - "clientship," and "rational" or "scientific" administration. The former value system makes bureaucrats decide on the basis of personal relationships and can lead to abuse of power. The latter does not suggest the "technical" or "value-neutral" bureaucratic codes it normally implies; Kanok associates it instead with policy- and program-oriented decision making.

Kanok finds that the prospects for making rational decisions are increased when issues are (1) given high priority by the regime, (2) dealt with by a powerful office, (3) handled by more than one agency, (4) well-understood by the public, and (5) participated in by interest groups. The first three criteria characterize issues given high substantive importance and provide evidence of a leadership that is at least trying to formulate a vision. The latter two show the impact of politicization on bureaucratic commitment. These two sets of conditions are not unrelated in that politicization may itself be decisive in bringing an issue to the top of a regime's agenda.

Kanok's analyses of decision making in land reform and rice pricing suggest the possibility that bureaucrats can be prevailed upon to abandon patrimonial and traditional modes of behavior. This change would be contingent on the articulation by the executive of a clear vision of its goals and the strengthening of political and social forces dealing with the military

and civilian elites. Thus, the growth of extrabureaucratic forces is an important ingredient for the democratization of the Thai bureaucracy.

Comparative Analysis

Our three cases are all successful first coups in specific countries which, however, illustrate different types of authoritarian successions. Thailand moved from one kind of concentration of power - the monarchical - to another, this time in the hands of officials from the military and civilian bureaucracies. Korea, already sliding into authoritarianism in the final years of Syngman Rhee, came from a one-year democratic "spring" when the coup intervened. The Philippines, meanwhile, had a president who cut short a quarter-century of democratic experiment when he staged his own palace coup. In no case was the leadership totally unfamiliar with the government whose power it seized. All three used a democratic facade to legitimate their continued stay at the helm.

They also took a different stance *vis-a-vis* the bureaucracy. The new Thai leadership regarded the civil service as a victim of its predecessor and as its own ally. Korea's Park found some political use for a few civilian leaders and sectors but, on the whole, saw the civil service as incapable and flawed. Marcos shared some of Park's attitude, and more directly blamed the bureaucracy for much of the failure of his earlier administration. For different reasons, it would not be correct to say that these leaders regarded the organization as a collaborator with the previous regime. Moreover, they all contended that the bureaucracy would need to be drastically reformed if it were to become its partner in leadership.

The easy acceptance of the bureaucracy by the Thai coup plotters and their successors is understandable since most of them saw themselves as bureaucrats, whether they came from the military or the civilian sector. Besides, the coup was precipitated by the monarch's poor treatment of the bureaucracy. The sympathy it enjoyed was not unique to Thailand. As will be seen in the next chapter, the successors to Mujib's government in Bangladesh (also well supported by civil servants) shared the same sentiment. Various military governments, for instance in Latin America and Turkey, have also shown support for the bureaucracy which reciprocated their trust. In these cases, the struggle is not so much between the new leadership and the bureaucracy, as between the two of them and other political groups, such as militant farmers, students and laborers.

In Thailand, the potential power of these groups lay dormant for some time, giving the authoritarian government and the bureaucracy free rein in society. In the process, a bureaucracy-for-itself was engendered, strengthened in no mean way by its ability to set constitutional arrangements and thus deter the development of potential rivals. Even the private sector - undeniably superior in wealth and economic power - could not compete with the bureaucracy because it was considered an outsider in society. The

Thai government's slow drift into a more open polity was signalled by the rise of new political groups, particularly students, especially in the brief democratic period of 1973 to 1976.

The Chinese elite in the Philippines maintained their alliance with the political leadership rather than with the bureaucracy. The close association between businessmen and politicians was also evident in Korea. For this reason, the civil service was not able to use private-sector support as a leverage in its struggle with the executive. A somewhat parallel scenario took shape with respect to the United States. Although both the Korean and Philippine bureaucracies were the focus of American technical assistance, their modernization could not be used against the executive, which also enjoyed American support.

Park and Marcos both concentrated on changing the bureaucracy since its commitments, attitudes and performance were perceived to have contributed to the failure of the previous leadership. Thus, they instituted both personnel purification and general reorganization. Freed of the stabilizing rules required by normal successions, the weapons they used against the civil service were very drastic, and would have been unthinkable under non-military regimes.

Rejection of the bureaucracy, however, was never total. This was due not only to its size and knowledge of government operations. Rather, in both cases, after purification, it was even regarded as a victim, that is, forced by necessity to work within the options set by the previous system as a neutral civil service should, its technical expertise hamstrung by the irrational compromises politicians make in order to please their constituents.

To substitute for that, both executives applied ideological indoctrination, politicizing the bureaucracy even as they exposed it to more modern techniques to sharpen its skills. The ideology was a mixture of nationalism and developmentalism. It gave the civil servants a focus for their commitments which would be compatible with a technical and depoliticized approach to their work. These terms are used advisedly. Civil servants were *politicized* as they were enticed to give themselves to the cause of economic growth as the highest good, which was in turn regarded as attainable only if politics were kept out of the picture. Their decisions were to be made without the taint of pressures from the constituency, and to be based on rational and professional standards. This was not difficult for the bureaucracy to accept because it was consistent with the neutrality principle they were supposed to have cultivated. Moreover, authoritarians can be less destabilizing of the bureaucracy than those pushing for democracy because they share a common hierarchical and centralized approach to problems, and have little to do with the consultation and mobilization methods favored by democracies.

Both Park and Marcos selected which parts of the bureaucracy to work with and gave greater rewards to their collaborators. In addition, they recruited people from the military, the private sector and academe to

infuse the service with new blood. The favored bureaucrats and these new recruits reenforced the reverence for technology which their respective regimes wanted. Militarization, moreover, did not just transform military methods for civilian use. It also grafted military methods onto civilian administration, substituting coercive measures for negotiations and consultations in dealing with perceived political opponents. Within the bureaucracy, these came in the form of precipitate dismissals (and, in the case of Korea, death for corruptors), dissenting labor and peasant leaders received the direst punishments without due process.

With turnover rules suspended and its security of tenure thrown out the window, the bureaucracy could not expect to proceed with business as usual. Seeing how strong the uncontrolled power of the executive was, it responded with fear initially, just like the rest of society. When it recovered, its next reaction was to protect its own interest as much as possible, through the re-submission of policies supporting itself that the previous government did not (or in the case of Marcos, could not) promulgate. The Korean bureaucracy's proposals seemed acceptable at first, but were later ignored in favor of the recommendations of the new technocrats. In the Philippine case, new policies affecting the bureaucracy were swiftly promulgated, but they were not drafted by civil servants.

The bureaucracy resorted to sabotage next, a recourse taken against Park but not against Marcos. However, the internal opposition to the PPS only occasioned more recruitment of trusted outsiders. Thus, in time, the bureaucracy bowed to the will of the political leadership, particularly because they shared fundamental beliefs about development and its thrusts anyway. As the dictatorship flourished, less punitive measures were taken against the bureaucracy and greater give-and-take between the antagonists prevailed. Thus, both came closer to the idea of the bureaucracy as a major constituency and ally of the government, as did Thailand.

6

The Executive-Bureaucracy Nexus: Towards Redemocratization

This chapter describes how the executive and the bureaucracy have interacted in three countries in transition towards democracy - Bangladesh under Mujib, Sandinist Nicaragua and the Philippines under Corazon Aquino. So far, these are the only cases which have sufficient discussion on the administrative system in the available literature on the subject. Despite a growing body of material on the (re)democratization experience of many countries, the relationship of the executive and the bureaucracy in the transition process is usually crowded out by many other important political and social considerations that attend it (e.g., O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986; Herz 1982; Herman and Petras 1985; Share 1987; Viola and Mainwaring 1985; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989).

The period of redemocratization follows the downfall of an authoritarian regime and the installation of a new government sworn to uphold civil liberties and to return sovereignty to the people. It is a most fragile transition in that it attempts to inaugurate an alternative political lifestyle in an atmosphere of freedom. Unlike a newly-installed authoritarian regime, it does not resort to repression or the use of armed force against its enemies. Instead, it is those who fight against it that have no qualms about using violence to achieve their ends.

Sustaining redemocratization becomes problematic due to the difficulty of maintaining the delicate balance between liberty and discipline which is required to make any democracy not only pleasant but productive. A censored press, if unleashed, can become licentious in a matter of days. Peace may not be followed by order if people choose only those rules that they are willing to obey, even if they argue on the ground that some laws have propped up the dictatorship.

A democratizing government needs a clear vision of where it wants society to go, as well as a strong sense of its legitimacy and commitment to liberty to maintain itself in this tumultuous period. Most redemocratizing regimes are marked by continuous attempts to dismantle it. Others, less fortunate, fall on the first coup attempt.

Any new government, pressed by its supporters for new programs and jobs, will find it difficult to leave the bureaucracy alone. A government

replacing an authoritarian regime is under greater pressure because its followers can stoke the fires of resentment by constant reminders of the lack of legitimacy not only of its predecessor but of its instruments as well. Since the civil service is assumed to be both a legacy and an extension of the dictatorship, it is deserving of distrust and punishment. Thus, it must be changed, purged, rehabilitated (the terms are interchangeable when resentment politics reigns); otherwise the ideals for which the revolution stood will be sullied. After all, the bureaucracy is assumed to have received special advantages from the old regime and is therefore equally liable for many (wrong) decisions. A bureaucracy so perceived can justifiably be subjected to punitive reorganization if not outright purges and replacement by more sympathetic citizens.

Thus far, the above statements assume a political leadership wielding the upper hand in its relationship with the bureaucracy. However, the precedence and technical competence of the latter may be adequate weapons for fighting back. Their interaction with other social groups will also allow the executive and the civil service to discover other ways of dealing with each other as antagonists.

Bangladesh Under Mujib

Bangladesh was part of the British colony of India until 1947 when it became the eastern wing of the new state of Pakistan. In 1971, East Pakistan won its war of liberation against the western half, separated from it by almost 1,000 miles of Indian territory, and a new country was born.

Like many other states emerging from revolution, the first few months of Bangladesh saw "state activity centered around the reorganization of the party and the administration" (Islam 1985: 188), particularly in curbing the power of the former East Pakistan Civil Service.

That bureaucracy was used to being the ruling elite. Britain had exported its Westminster/Whitehall model of administration to its colonies, and succeeded in creating a civil service that was permanent, competent and neutral, that is, unquestioning of the laws of the British empire and uninvolved in the drive for independence waged by the native politicians around them. However, while the Indian civil service accepted a role subordinate to political leaders after Partition (Jain 1976), Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the "father" of the nation of Pakistan, and Liaquat Ali Khan, its first prime minister, "depended more on senior bureaucrats rather than experienced political leaders to run the state," and soon, these administrative officials were taking "key decisions on their own..." (Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 159). Besides their dominance, the civil service also engaged in "large-scale corruption, abuse of official powers, and gross misconduct" (Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 160). The Pakistan example may be considered an instance of Cell 4

Secession was incited by charges of internal colonialism by West Pakistan, in large part perpetrated by the civil-military bureaucracy then running the country. Thus, it was expected that the new government of Bangladesh would restore political control over the civil service, the arrangement hallowed by the British Raj.

Accordingly, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), the first prime minister, with the support of his party, the Awami League, initiated several measures "to recast the administrative system in keeping with its commitment to democracy and socialism" (Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 163).

Although the 1972 Constitution protected the rights of civilian public offices (Article 135), it also provided that civil servants may be removed or reduced in rank at the pleasure of the president. Presidential Order No. 9 provided for the dismissal, without right of appeal, of any government officer "in the interest of the ... Republic" (quoted by Anisuzzaman 1988). Almost 6,000 employees, including nine former officers of the Civil Service of Pakistan (the highest career level), lost their jobs on charges of collaboration with the Pakistan Military Regime (Anisuzzaman 1988). Moreover, senior officials lost some of the perquisites of their status. Specialists were installed in positions previously reserved for elite generalist bureaucrats (Anisuzzaman 1988), a departure from the British model.

The power of the bureaucracy was further eroded by its disunity. Among the points of conflict was the ticklish question of who was more loyal and who should therefore be rewarded under the new regime: those who continued to serve while the war was in progress or those who fled into exile in sympathy with the liberation forces. This dilemma was aggravated by the problem of who should be placed in the vacancies created by the flight of (West) Pakistanis who served on the eastern side before 1971. Further, the nationalization of industries also brought in new competitors for the old civil servants - the private-sector members of the Awami League which led in both the victory and the formulation of the policy expanding the public sector. These problems sparked conflicts and created tension, as individual civil servants and interested outsiders jockeyed for position in the new order. Thus, the initial result of Liberation was "a denounced, demoralized and demotivated bureaucracy" (Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 160).

The second strategy was reorganization and administrative reform. In March 1972, the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) was created with a senior civil servant as one of its members. The ASRC solicited the opinion of 183 services associations (societies of civil servants), interviewed top political and administrative officials, local-level personnel and a cross-section of the citizenry, visited the Soviet Union (as a model of a "socialist administrative system") and re-studied the report of the Fulton Committee of Great Britain, the major influence in its work. In April 1973, it recommended the development of an integrated public personnel management system based on merit and competition, with promotions based on merit and seniority.

However, the top level of the Bangladeshi bureaucracy would not give up its turf without a struggle. Allegedly because of an orchestrated protest by senior members of the elite cadre,

the political leadership shelved the Report and barred it from public circulation (Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 164).

The National Pay Commission (NPC), created in July 1972, initially seemed to be more successful. Aware of societal inequality and the economic difficulties of the population, the NPC called for a plan that would "share hardship in an equitable manner" and provide "institutional arrangements for eradicating evils like corruption, conspicuous consumption and unplanned family life" (The NPC Report, quoted in Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 166). It closely coordinated with the ASRC and incorporated the latter's recommendation of a ten-grade pay structure. The resulting salary structure was quite flat, reducing the disparity between the highest and lowest levels from 1:28 to 1:11.

Unlike the ASRC Report, the NPC managed to have its paper accepted. However, among its recommendations, only the pay scales of the lowest levels were implemented. Again, the elite cadre had gone to work. The officials demanded - and got - the suspension of implementation of the new pay scales. They also tried to increase their wages and fringe benefits, but were unsuccessful in that move.

The new government also took steps to make the bureaucracy more representative. This was designed to check the dominance of elite families and to provide for more equitable representation of the population in the bureaucracy. For this purpose, at the highest two levels, positions would be filled on the basis of a quota of 40 percent for merit, 20 percent for women, 30 percent for freedom fighters, and 10 percent for minorities. At the lower levels, 10 percent was allotted for merit. This move was bucked by the ASRC recommendations which insisted on merit as the main basis of appointments. However, with the ASRC report kept confidential, the quota system remained in the books (Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 174-75).

Reforming the civil service was necessitated by the fact that the Mujib regime had promised to do a lot. The 1972 Constitution declared its fundamental principles to be "the high ideals of nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism" (quoted in Islam 1985: 187). Accordingly, the ruling Awami League reversed policies pursued by the overthrown Pakistani regime which functioned as

an 'administrative state,' strictly controlled by the civil-military bureaucracy,...focused on rapidly increasing the GNP through heavy reliance on private investment... (which) failed to bring about any noticeable reduction in inequalities in income, unemployment, and poverty (Islam 1985: 185).

Instead, the new government nationalized industries and financial institutions, placed ceilings on investment in the private sector, pursued agrarian reform through state acquisition of lands bigger than family-sized farms and their distribution to peasants who owned less than 1.5 acres of land, and instituted a self-sustaining cooperative system. In short, the strategy of development was two-pronged: the bulk of manufacturing and finance became the responsibility of an expanded public sector, and agriculture, commerce and the rest of industry were placed in the hands of a relatively large number of small farms and enterprises.

The commitment towards a socialistic democracy included the implementation of two programs that directly affected the civil service: nationalization and decentralization of development activities. These initiatives required a great deal from the bureaucracy. The first program, nationalization, expanded the scope of the state, as businesses in private hands were transferred to the government. It called for skills in business management which the civil service did not have.

The Awami League's strategy was to fill positions in the nationalized industries from outside the existing civil service. However, it turned out that

the management personnel in the nationalized sector...were given the jobs not because of their commitment to socialism or because of their expertise, experience and efficiency, but because they had the right connections with the Awami League (quoted from *The Wave Weekly* (Dacca) 1973, by Islam 1985: 206).

Even promotions from within were awarded in the same way. A study of 39 public enterprises from 1972-1975 found that

25 percent of the total employees were promoted from unskilled to skilled clerical level, 56 percent were promoted from clerks... to the officer level, and of these at least 30 percent did not have the requisite qualifications for the post to which they had been promoted (cited in Islam 1985: 197).

The second program, decentralization, was designed to restructure social institutions with a view to curbing the dominance of big landholders. To do this, government at local levels was to act not as a controlling agency but as a responsive focal point of nation-building and socio-economic activities. The approach originally called for a bottom-up scheme in which the bureaucracy had to play a mobilizing and supportive role to political leaders at national and local levels. To this end, coordination in the field became the responsibility of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) from the Awami League. One MP was appointed Chair of the District Relief and Rehabilitation Committee and the others headed the thana councils at the

next lower level. This arrangement would have made the MP a broker whose job was to transmit political direction from the center to the thanas and to bring up the demands and needs of the lower levels to the knowledge of people at the top. However, as Ali concludes, even if it was true during the early days of 1972,

... these experiments did not succeed and coordinative arrangements reverted ... to pre-1971 days (1987: 40)

when the bureaucracy orchestrated development at the local level. Thus, the civil service became even more powerful in the countryside.

Two other circumstances tended to reinforce bureaucratic power. First, activities were directed by the bureaucracy, and, despite a call for participation, people were involved mainly as recipients of government benefits. Second, the pivotal political position of district governor was not filled by election, as expected, but by appointment of Mujib's key supporters from the Awami League, including seven high-ranking bureaucrats, 13 former civil service officials, at least one military officer, and 27 sitting MPs (Anisuzzaman 1988).¹

At this time, the regime had transformed the multi-party parliamentary system into a one-party presidential type. The authorized party, the BAKSAL, included civil and military bureaucrats in its central committee. It would appear, then, that political control of the bureaucracy was being turned around, such that control of the political system would come from senior bureaucrats themselves (Khan and Zafarullah 1982).

This was done in the name of socialism and democracy, but as Islam points out,

the leaders basically were influenced by considerations of political convenience rather than by commitment to ideology. To those who controlled the state, socialism meant no more than nationalization of major industries, some land reform, and a few other halfhearted measures. Its ideological proclamations were rarely anything more than middle-class romanticism (1985: 196).

Thus, while the state did curb the resources and power of the upper bourgeoisie, it did not address the needs of the poorest citizens either. Despite the beguiling slogans, the benefits redounded to the main supporters of the ruling party - the "intermediate class" composed of professionals, small manufacturers and businesses in the urban centers, and rich peasants and middle income farmers in the countryside (Islam 1985: 196-200). This class would by definition also include most of the members of the civil and

1. However, this scheme was overtaken by the Zia coup and was never implemented

military bureaucracies, including their top levels. In the Bangladeshi case, however, they were already powerful to start with, and Mujib's policies tended to undercut rather than strengthen the bureaucrats.

The policies of the intermediate state could not check the economic crisis engulfing the country. Its performance was particularly unsatisfactory to the military which staged a coup in August 1975. It was alleged that high-ranking bureaucrats in the police service were a party to this putsch. Where the sympathies of the civil service lay might be gleaned from the fact that all the members of the president's Advisory Council during the military regime of Ziaur Rahman were retired or incumbent civil servants.

The efforts towards democratization of the Mujib regime fell apart as the euphoria of independence from Pakistan gave way to the hard realities of an impoverished population and continuing economic crisis. It had showered benefits on the intermediate class which could not produce the hoped-for economic recovery. Even before the coup, the leadership had shown its authoritarian tendencies by concentrating power in the president and prohibiting all parties except his.

The bureaucracy might be said to have played a pivotal role both in democratization and in its failure. The Mujib government proposed to put it under Cell 1, a big change from Cell 4 where it was under Pakistani hegemony. However, the executive leadership failed to consolidate its supremacy, with the bureaucracy fighting hard throughout its tenure to bring their interaction to Cell 2. Administrative reforms were designed to make the civil service an effective instrument of a democratic state: they would have demonstrated the equity desired by the regime in its organizational and pay structure; they would have attempted to redress past inequities as the bureaucracy became more representative; they would have shown, in the consultative process taken in the reforms, how the government could reach out to the people; it would have been the center for development activities at the grassroots. All these reforms would have indicated how a bureaucracy changes under strong political control.

However, the opposite happened as the bureaucracy abandoned the norms of Whitehall and continued its inherited role under Pakistan as a political force rivalling the leadership. The results were more tragic since the goals it fought for seemed to have been strictly motivated by "the selfish ground of self-preservation" (Khan and Zafarullah 1982: 181). The political leadership contributed to its own undoing by choosing patronage over merit in the pivotal nationalized sector and in pushing only for the rhetoric of socialism rather than its full realization.

Nicaragua Under the Sandinistas

On July 19, 1979, the revolutionary forces led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) ended over 40 years of rule of the Somoza dynasty.

Since then Nicaragua has been engaged in the difficult process of democratization, through the creation and utilization of new modes of consultation and participation and the re-allocation of benefits following the logic of the majority. The process has been all the more difficult because the nation had never before enjoyed democracy.

Like most of Latin America, Nicaragua had been a Spanish colony. After independence in 1821, it had been treated as a *de facto* colony by its northern neighbor, the US, following the Monroe doctrine.² It even had a self-appointed American president in 1858 who reinstated slavery, expecting it to be the "model" society of the South on the eve of the American civil war (Weber 1981, reprinted in Rosset and Vandermeer 1983: 98-99).

The first direct intervention of the US government was in 1909 when it installed a president of its choice. Nicaraguan protest against the arrangement provoked the dispatch and permanent detail of American marines from 1912 to 1924, and for another eight years starting 1926. By 1934, the National Guard under the first Anastasio Somoza, having been trained by the US, was ready to assume power as the surrogate colonial army (Fonseca 1979, in Borge *et al.* 1982: 23-42). The Somoza family protected American interests for over four decades while managing to entrench itself into a "sultanate" (Cavarozzi 1986). Its corruption, unconcern for the people and repression could be encapsulated by the events following a disastrous earthquake in Managua in 1972 when it diverted international aid to the victims for its own purposes, and American Marines patrolled along with the National Guard to stop any protests. The second Anastasio Somoza was by then in charge; he alienated the traditional capitalists and radicalized the poor by his handling of the funds which (coupled with favorable prices for Nicaragua's main export commodities) could have reversed the stagnation which the economy had been suffering since the 1960s. As Jarquin and Barreto (1983: 7) put it,

The Somoza bloc, sustained by State power, exacerbated the existing administrative corruption by excluding other sectors of the bourgeoisie from the opportunities for investment created by the earthquake. Somoza enriched himself personally. . . by organizing his own bank, insurance company, finance and construction firms.

At the same time, the government's failure to respond to the critical needs of the people following the earthquake precipitated a crisis of support among the middle class and especially among the masses of suffering poor. The exaggerated adminis-

2 Named after the fifth president of the United States, James Monroe, the doctrine was a proclamation of "unilateral US protection over the entire Western hemisphere" (*Encyclopedia Britannica* 1988: 268), in short, "America for the Americans"

trative corruption had led to an alarming decline in the level of public administration.

The revolution cost 50,000 lives and an estimated \$580 million worth of property. Estimates of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) put the 1979 gross domestic product per capita in the same level as that of 1962, a retrogression of 17 years. With a foreign debt of \$1.53 billion, of which close to half a million dollars was due each year, the national treasury only had \$3.4 million when Somoza fled (Ortega 1979, in Borge *et al.* 1982). Indeed, Violeta Chamorro, widow of the publisher Pedro Chamorro whose assassination accelerated the unification of the opposition, was hardly exaggerating when she declared after the victory, "we receive Nicaragua in ashes."³

The victorious forces set up a coalition junta and proceeded to preside over a mixed economy based on the traditional exports of coffee, sugar and cotton, banking on the cooperation of the remaining capitalists, workers and peasants. The transition would be troubled; a brochure produced by a group sympathetic to the Sandinistas observed: "The revolution was the easy part."

Like every new government, the Sandinistas faced an administrative system that was not up to their specifications. The bureaucracy, very much on the defensive, was malleable and clearly deferred to a dominant political leadership, an unequivocal example of Cell 1. Among the early decisions of the Sandinista government, a relatively easy one to accomplish was to dismantle the National Guard, which had acted as Somoza's private army and was hated for its repressive acts throughout the dynastic rule.⁴

The Guard was replaced by the Sandinista army as the idea of defense as a people's responsibility was instituted. Neighborhood defense committees were established and became responsible for civilian defense as well as for public health, food distribution, adult education and other campaigns. Meanwhile, self-defense militias in the rural areas and the reserve battalions and militia units in the cities were organized for military defense and kept in a constant state of readiness and mobilization. This resulted in a wide distribution of arms to civilians, a remarkable symbol of the government's legitimacy among the populace. Indeed, providing citizens with weapons with which to fight counterrevolutionaries could have boomeranged against the state if it had little support from the masses (Huezo 1988).

A few Sandinistas entered the bureaucracy to head agencies of basically the same ministries of the old regime. Only those government officials

3. Mrs. Violeta Chamorro was elected President on February 25, 1990, under the UNO coalition opposing the Sandinistas. She had served in the first Junta and left after policy disagreements in the early 1980s.

4. A large contingent of the old guardia is said to have been reorganized into the Contra forces by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

determined to have collaborated actively with the Somocista Security Forces and to have engaged in repressive activities were subsequently fired⁵.

The goals of the Revolution implied an expansion of the role of the state. The Sandinistas immediately created organizations they had planned for even before their victory, the most notable of which were charged with the task of (1) undertaking agrarian and other social reforms; (2) returning Somoza's ill-gotten wealth to the state; (3) administering the nationalized banks, mines and export trade; and (4) improving public administration. New ministries were formed practically from scratch or from a combination of smaller units, both requiring massive recruitment. Among these were the Ministries of Industry, Internal Commerce, External Commerce, Agrarian Reform, Mining, Fishing, Culture, Higher Education and Social Welfare (Oquist 1989).

New administrative arrangements were introduced in December 1979 and again in December 1980, each reorganization occasioned by a different set of demands (Oquist 1986: 12-13). As it created new organizations, the government allowed a great deal of institutional autonomy, particularly between 1979 and 1981. Each organization was responsible for its own operational programs. The practice made the delivery process swift and accountability clear; the decentralized set-up also produced healthy competition among implementors. However, it also tended to encourage each agency to seek the maximum concentration of resources for itself, as if "trying to realize the revolution completely in its area" (Oquist 1986: 14).

The individualized strategy was tamed through the next two years, as systems of planning, information, budget control, and investment and resource allocation were developed. Institutional discipline and inter-departmental coordination were particularly required in view of the war with America through its surrogates, the Contras, and its destabilization campaign against Nicaragua. At the same time, the administrative mobilization required to deal with armed conflict also necessitated the creation of new organizational forms, including experiments with more decentralized approaches (Oquist 1986).

One of these was regional autonomy, first granted to the South Atlantic Coast inhabited by Miskitos, an English-speaking minority. The policy was born out of an acknowledged mistake - an early policy that ignored the cultural distinctiveness of this group, making it vulnerable to seduction by the Contras. The counter-insurgency content of the policy was embodied in the formula "autonomy = peace," through which the government attempted to consolidate its hold on this and the other regions of their territory (Ramirez 1984 in Marcus 1985: 391-95).

⁵ The purging process was facilitated by the fact that files of the Somocista Security Police were captured by the Sandinistas. This included records of the Security Forces, regular members, covert members and informers (Oquist 1988).

A plan was unveiled each year to harness societal energies and achieve coherence in policy making and implementation. The model of export-led growth was presented in Plan '80; the economic program it outlined was on the whole realized. Like other endeavors of the Sandinistas, the plan resulted from "the joint effort of hundreds of staff officials, in conjunction with some representatives of mass organizations and large private capitalists" (Ruccio 1987: 13).

The 1981 plan presented a new concept of the state as the "center of accumulation," in control of the economic surplus including that part directly accessible to it in state enterprises and the other portion which was generated by non-state enterprises. This was however, a tenuous center, because, with the war and the desire not to squeeze capitalists, cooperatives and other producers, such accumulation has been based largely on internal and foreign debt. Although planning expertise had been developed and the state's role had become better articulated, military exigencies had made the plan more geared to short-term policy making and thus less able to fulfill its vision (Ruccio 1987).

Two major strengths of the new government were built upon its commitment to democratization: the degree of participation and consultation it brought to bear on every decision, and the assignment of responsibility to organized people's groups outside the administrative system. These were evident in its implementation of programs in agrarian reform, education and health.

Prior to 1979, as each territory was won, peasants who comprised the bulk of the FSLN proceeded to invade idle lands. What was encouraged while fighting Somoza's forces, however, became unacceptable after Victory, as the junta sought to reactivate the economy, deal justly with all landowners, and not take on more responsibilities than its young and inexperienced leadership and its badly understaffed bureaucracy could handle. Thus, the junta asked the peasants to return some of the lands they had confiscated. As Deere and Marchetti (1985: 80) put it, it was a tribute to the faith of the peasantry "in the commitment of the Sandinista leadership to the goals of the revolution" that they did. They also abided by the slower pace of agrarian reform it instituted.

Immediate redistribution applied only to land abandoned by Somoza and his followers; these were subdivided into individual farmplots or taken over by cooperatives. The pace was accelerated as other capitalists fled into exile, making it necessary to transfer their land to the state (so it would not become idle) and become an Area of People's Property (APP). In many such cases, the original farm managers were retained, their feudal and repressive manner leading to conflicts with the peasants' more socialist orientation. At others, it was the farmers who reverted to pre-revolutionary thinking, taking their "historic vacation" (that is, engaging in malingering and absenteeism) any time they pleased, after the fashion of the Somocist landlords they replaced (Deere and Marchetti 1985). Productivity fell,

which led to charges that "Soviet-style collectivism" was being imposed, ignoring the openness and experimentation towards a third model - neither capitalist nor socialist - that the Sandinistas were trying to fashion (Conroy 1984).

In fact, the agrarian reform process was more tentative and subject to changes than the discussion above suggests. Frequent consultations were undertaken with the affected parties at all levels, including associations of peasants and farmworkers (ATC) and of small and medium producers (UNAG)⁶. Different styles were allowed, depending on the circumstances obtaining in local areas. Many mistakes were made, but they were acknowledged, and appropriate adjustments were made as a consequence (Collins 1982). Indeed a reading of the speeches of major Sandinista leaders impresses one not only with their candor but also with their commitment to participation and debate and their ability to laugh at their "romantic errors" which were born of inexperience, idealism and, sometimes, frustration. (The quoted phrase is from Wheelock 1981, in Borge *et al*, 1982: 122. Cf. Collins 1982).

The Agrarian Reform Law, promulgated after much consultation with all sectors in 1981, was "pragmatic, ... even conservative, and ... virtually unique" among land reform measures. Land subject to expropriation was based not on size but on efficient use; there was no ceiling on land ownership provided the land was not idle or underused (Collins 1982: 88-89). However, with almost 25 percent of landholdings abandoned by Somocistas and other idle lands taken over with due compensation, the ownership profile did change drastically. Large landholdings (over 500 *manzanas*, about 714 hectares) decreased from 36 percent in 1978 to only 11 percent in 1985. About 40 percent remained in the hands of small and medium producers; the rest were almost equally divided between cooperatives and those under state enterprises [Instituto Nicaraguense de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC) 1986: 9].

Sandinista successes were scored swiftly in the areas of education and health, accomplishments acknowledged by both the Kissinger Commission (Kissinger 1984, reprinted in Rosset and Vandermeer rev. 1986: 356) and the Economic Commission for Latin America (Conroy 1984: 1023). The campaign for literacy started immediately after the Victory, its urgency shown by a high illiteracy rate which stood at 50.3 percent. Using student volunteers and veterans of the revolution who fanned out to the rural areas, the program became an international model, receiving honors from UNESCO in 1980 and 1986. Within two years, illiteracy was down to as low as 12.9 percent. School enrolment increased by 94 percent and the national education rate from 44 to 56 percent between 1978 and 1986 (INEC 1986). In addition,

⁶ However, criticisms have also been aired about the inadequate number of consultations and the incapacity of some administrators to respond to the demands of the people at the bottom (Conroy 1984)

schools were constructed in or relocated to rural areas, where 95 percent of them stood by 1981 (Junta for National Reconstruction in Rosset and Vandermeccr rev. 1986: 262).

The achievements in health were no less significant. The infant mortality rate declined from 121 to 80 per thousand live births, a decrease of a third between 1978 and 1983, "one of the most dramatic improvements in child survival in the developing world" (UNICEF 1986: 38). Life expectancy rose from 56 to 59 years between 1979 and 1986 (INEC 1986). So-called "Popular Health Campaigns" increased immunization rates rivalling those of some developed countries; no polio case has been reported since 1981 (UNICEF 1986: 25, 38). With limited government resources, these improvements could not have occurred without people's acceptance of responsibility for their health. Indeed, rather than resorting to massive DDT spraying to combat malaria, Nicaragua opted for "the simultaneous vaccination of the entire population," a superior method but an impossible strategy unless a government was certain of the massive support of its people (Collins 1982: 7, his underscoring).

The Sandinistas faced less problems with the peasantry and urban workers - who were their main political base anyway - than with the urban middle and upper classes who received support from the institutional church and the US. Distrustful of Sandinista pronouncements of respect for and encouragement of the private sector, many in the commercial and industrial sector "decapitalized," keeping plants at less than their capacity or deinvesting altogether. In some cases, they followed enough government requirements to be entitled to incentives or subsidy but kept production at low levels or sold goods at the black market. This behavior constricted government funds, which, already low and stretched to the limit, could not sustain the production targets envisioned by the incentive system.

The economic situation improved tremendously between 1980 and 1983 when a 9.1 percent GNP growth was registered. Thereafter it declined to 7.6 percent in 1984 and 4.8 percent in 1985 (INEC 1986). As early as 1980, however, a downturn could have been predicted as multilateral agencies such as the World Bank withdrew their aid and called in their loans, making the government hard-pressed for cash. This was exacerbated in 1981 when American support of the counterrevolution became an open secret, and the CIA mined harbors and funded Contra forays from bases in American-supported neighboring countries. As of 1985, the annual direct economic effects of the war was estimated to equal about five-and-a-half years of income from the nation's exports (INEC 1986).

It was against this background that a state of emergency was declared in 1982, imposing censorship and suspending rights of assembly and speech. By then, the nature of the coalition government had changed with Chamorro and other original representatives of the business sector resigned from and

opposing the junta. In 1984, presidential elections were held, freer than any ever held before in Nicaragua. Seven parties competed, comprising the whole political spectrum. As much as 75 percent of the qualified population registered, and 75 percent of them voted [Centro de Comunicacion Internacional (CCI) 1985: 14].

All parties were given free radio time and similar privileges to ensure a truly competitive electoral process. Communist and Socialist parties and a Marxist-Leninist group together got about 4 percent of the votes; the Sandinistas' main opponents were the Conservatives (13 percent), independent Liberals (10 percent) and Social Christians (6 percent). However, the US-supported opposition party of Arturo Cruz (Coordinadora Democratica) withdrew on the eve of balloting, claiming it could not win in an atmosphere of fraud and intimidation⁷. Daniel Ortega, a Sandinista commander and head of the junta, won but with only 67 percent of the votes, a result which would have been unlikely had the counting been manipulated (CCI 1985: 14).

The normalization promised by the ratification of the new constitution and the shift from a junta to the presidency did not materialize because the military and economic assaults on the Sandinista government continued. Parts of the constitution were suspended soon after it was ratified, but the Western countries' fear of subsequent suspension of civil liberties was belied by continuing favorable reports from Amnesty International and other human rights monitors which cited more Contra than Sandinista abuses. However, violations by the government - from a cipher in 1979-80 - have begun to be reported by 1988.

Under Somoza, the civil servants were infected with "bureaucratism," the idea that "their special jobs [were] only marginal to political decisions" (Borge 1981 in Borge *et al.* 1982: 137). However, a government that is participatory must also develop civil servants that

link [them]selves to . . . the masses, . . . that must go to the heart of the problems, where the conflicts are, must get to know the procedures, get out of their offices, and simplify things (Borge 1981 in Borge *et al.* 1982: 138).

On the whole, the bureaucracy responded well enough to Sandinista direction so that a member of the political leadership could describe "a transformation of the administrative apparatus" by the tenth anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution (Oquist 1989). Tensions rose in the early 80s

7. Arturo Cruz later admitted that the idea was never to genuinely participate in the campaign but rather to attempt to delegitimize the elections by means of his own non-candidacy. He also admitted while at Harvard University that he was receiving a salary of US\$6,000 per month from the CIA during the period in which he was supposed to be a presidential candidate (Oquist 1988).

when a CIA manual surfaced which gave detailed instructions on how government employees could sabotage the government. However, the bureaucracy did not heed these provocations and continued to cooperate with the leadership. The positive interaction could have come about due to the identification of most of its members with Sandinista goals since they had come from the same peasant and labor families which formed the core of the regime's support.

Nevertheless, the civil service still fell short of the regime's expectations. While direct attacks on the government hardly occurred, the Sandinistas believed that civil servants could also undermine the goals of the revolution unconsciously, through malingering, absenteeism or other forms of indiscipline, which they regarded as "antirevolutionary attitudes [which] in practice are decapitalization" (Borge 1981 in Borge *et al.* 1982: 136).

At the same time, the civil service might have reeled from the sheer magnitude of the task. For instance, there were only about 720 extension workers for the whole country (Deere and Marchetti 1985: 95). Inexperience at all levels, already alluded to, accounted for other mistakes. Obviously, because of the combination of revolutionary ardor and inexperience, some bungling was bound to happen (Wheelock in Borge *et al.* 1982: 122, 123; Collins 1982: 143).

Although the transformation is as yet unfinished, Nicaragua entered a new stage in February 1990 with the upset victory of the opposition party candidate for the presidency. The defeat of the Sandinistas could probably be attributed to the "war weariness" of Nicaraguans (Oquist 1990) and their growing conviction that "increases in public services are inadequate compensation for a deteriorating economy" (Colburn 1986: 119). Still, the democratic experiment is not over. Perhaps the best test that a democratization process is in progress was the peaceful transfer of power on April 25, 1990.

Corazon Aquino and the Bureaucracy

Corazon Aquino became president after a "people's power" revolution in February 1986. Charged with the mission of re-democratizing the country and removing the vestiges of the Marcos dictatorship, she presided over the ratification of a new constitution, the installation of the legislature and the judiciary, and the re-enshrinement of suffrage, civil liberties and other democratic processes. But after six years, the revolutionary promise has not been fulfilled. The government of Ninoy Aquino's widow has maintained Marcosian economic policies, and has been rather cautious in meeting social imperatives such as agrarian reform and labor demands. It appears more as a restoration rather than a revolution as economic influentials - pre-martial law and others of Marcosian stripe - have regained political and economic prominence.

Part of the mandate of the Aquino government was the reform of inherited political institutions, including the civil service. The Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR) declared the need to systematically "de-Marcosify" society. For the bureaucracy, this was to be accomplished through (1) the promotion of private initiative; (2) decentralization; (3) accountability; (4) efficiency of front-line services; and (5) cost-effectiveness of operations (PCGR 1986). In effect, this program was a comprehensive articulation of "bureaucracy for democracy" and might be regarded as the government's goal in relating to the civil service. The first injunction defined a limited role for government, focusing primarily on the promotion of privatization and community self-reliance; the second emphasized democratization of power; the last three underscored bureaucratic responsibility with respect to its behavior and use of resources. All these guidelines had a political content: that administrative values would play a secondary role to the bureaucracy's political commitments. Aquino controlled the civil service through personnel and organizational changes as well as policies affecting employee conduct and behavior.

Changes in Personnel and Organization

Despite her campaign assurances to civil servants,⁸ Aquino's Cabinet capitalized on the revolutionary nature of the government and followed the Marcos model of summary dismissals instead of the pre-martial law tradition of retrenchment of casuals and appointment of transients to political positions. The purge was accompanied by a general reorganization more tumultuous than any ever undertaken before. There are several reasons for this characterization. *First*, the overhaul was decreed soon after the takeover and was, therefore, especially in the first year, hardly distinguishable from the purge. Many employees who could not be dismissed under the already broad grounds of summary removal were "reorganized out" - that is, their positions in the agency were deleted.

Second, reorganization was supposed to have the participation of the parties affected and to be finished in a hundred days. The cramped timetable made participation practically a formality. Moreover, agency heads undertook their own clean-up-cum-restructuring simultaneously with the PCGR, often coming up with different recommendations. These reorganization plans competed for the signature of the President (the sole legislator from February 1986 to July 1987). In the process, a compromise plan was usually drafted and enacted, generally with even less consultation with the parties concerned.

Third, reorganization was also affected by frequent changes of agency heads. Each new appointment generated a new wave of reorganization

8. In a letter widely circulated in January 1986, candidate Aquino said, "I will retain everyone in government whose personal performance meets the standards the job requires."

which sometimes brought back personnel who had been dismissed and threw out those who had earlier been retained. As of December 1991, only two of over 20 heads remained as Aquino's first appointees to Cabinet-level positions; one department has had as many as six secretaries.

Fourth, for all the frenetic activity of the overlapping reorganization committees, the reorganization measures they recommended were getting approved very slowly at the President's door. Apparently, they were competing not only with each other but with all other vital policy matters waiting to be resolved by an overworked and overwhelmed government.

The purge and the drastic reorganizations seemed to be justified by the view of the civil service as a major collaborator with, and not just a tool of, the dictatorship. However, four factors undermine this position. *First*, that view is empirically flawed. While there were indeed many civil servants who were personally loyal to the Marcos couple or otherwise a dishonor to the service, a big majority were neutral civil servants and a smaller group was made up of open or closet oppositionists to Marcos.

Second, the armed forces which were untouched, even pampered, by the new government, were more closely identified with Marcos. Yet, in reaction to coups mounted by disaffected military officials, the leadership not only offered more incentives to the loyal armed forces than to their counterparts in the civil service, but also provided less severe punishments to military rebels than to striking public school teachers and other civilian employees. Employee organizations have denounced this selective treatment (COURAGE, October 19 1987) which emasculates the purification argument.

Third, the purge could not have rid the service of all the corrupt and other "notoriously undesirable" personnel because the evaluation process that accompanied it was not designed to do so. With some exceptions,⁹ most agencies (especially those headed by persons with careers in politics rather than in administration) removed employees regardless of qualifications or performance; many used political loyalty tests (Cariño 1989: 218-19).

Fourth, de-Marcosification as a rationale weakened with the growing distance of each new wave of reorganization from the original bureaucracy left by Marcos and the acceleration of removals in the later months.¹⁰ Especially telling was that many prominent people identified with Marcos were being appointed to key positions (including the Cabinet), being elected under the administration party, or joining it shortly afterwards. Thus it appeared that punishment for being "Marcosian" was being meted

9 Among these were the Departments of Health (Alfiler 1987), Education, Culture and Sports (Alonzo 1987), Finance (Mariano 1988) and Trade and Industry (Barranta 1988), all headed by non-politicians. The Aquino government reverted to the word "Department" to refer to Cabinet-level agencies from "Ministry," the term used by Marcos under a supposedly parliamentary system.

10. The number of civil servants removed before and after reorganization increased from 3.7 percent in July 1988 (DBM August 14, 1988) to 8.1 percent in January 1989 (DBM, January 25, 1989).

out not to the most culpable but to the most vulnerable persons - civil servants who thought they were only doing their job and who had not been personally associated with the ousted President.

Bureaucratic trimming did not occur either. Despite the lay-off of tens of thousands of personnel, the number of civil servants actually increased, with top administrative positions showing the highest rate of increase.¹¹

No substantial concession to deconcentration occurred under reorganization as regional offices had 87.4 percent of the personnel before the program, and 88.6 percent afterwards. The strong decentralization rhetoric was not matched in practice until late in the term when the new Local Government Code was enacted on October 10, 1991. Full implementation awaits the entry of a new president in June 1992, but it has already unsettled the national bureaucracy. Ten basic services had been devolved, with their pertinent personnel due to be transferred from the central departments to the local government units. The career path of most civil servants would be shortened drastically as promotion to any level higher than a provincial position seems to be foreclosed.

This treatment of the bureaucracy did not occur without resistance or conflict. Employee response was at first only sporadic and individual - complaints to superiors, possible political patrons or the press, alternative job-hunting, often at other government offices, or service slowdown. The boldest resisters soon channeled their efforts through employee organizations which also managed to garner support from other political and social sectors. This was a new turn; the martial law purge, though equally flawed, was quietly accepted.

The different reactions may be explained by the contrasting attitudes toward the two regimes and the manner in which the purging was conducted. Marcos was an authoritarian; resistance against his military-backed leadership could be fatal. However, his officials were a known quantity and one could rely on connections to get what one wanted. This was not the case with the new government. Not only was its resort to purging unexpected, but the reaction of its officials to the appeal to patronage could not also be predicted. Besides, Aquino's personal popularity and disavowal of undemocratic methods as well as the 1987 Constitution seemed to encourage employee unions.¹²

11. Based on only 39 agencies which reorganized with an average completion rate of 88 percent, reorganization increased the number of personnel by 48,974 (DBM February 25, 1989). The newly appointed were certainly much more than these since this does not disclose the number of terminations. From the author's detailed check of only eleven agencies and 92 public enterprises (of which two and five were abolished, respectively), a total of 16,341 were separated from the service from March 1989 to June 1987. These included personnel summarily dismissed as well as those who voluntarily resigned or retired. It is difficult to estimate the total number of the purged unless one went from agency to agency.

12. The 1987 Constitution upheld the civil servants' right to self organization but did not mention rights to collective bargaining and strikes (Article IX, Sec 2(5))

Thus, many civil servants mobilized their peers, assuming that a government claiming to restore democracy would not move against protest groups. Their assumption was not totally correct, since heads of many agencies immediately gave leaders of employee groups what they euphemistically called "a difficult time." The effectiveness of their moves also varied widely. A few groups succeeded in getting their heads to agree to their participation in the reorganization and purification processes. However, very few associations were able to protect their members from dismissal or to stop what they viewed as unfair reorganization programs. Thus, collective action did not necessarily work. Personalistic or less than universalistic demands would be made outside center stage. This strategy was used in the fight for higher wages: as the rallists were making the headlines, salary increases for certain employee groups or agencies were quietly being negotiated and became known only with the publication of the pertinent executive orders.

Nevertheless, the groups with more universalistic concerns won a few battles. They could succeed if they got the President's ear or won the support of their colleagues in other agencies, or of political leaders, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Congress, and mass media.

The first of these victories was the executive response to employee criticisms aired through the mass media. Executive Order 17 (May 28, 1986) defined the grounds for removal of officials and employees as allowed by the Freedom Constitution, the interim basic law of the Revolutionary Government. In the government's view, the Freedom Constitution meant to protect the service from being forced to retain those who have dishonored it, and E.O. 17 was intended to protect employees from a more sweeping purge (Gonzales 1986). E.O. 17 also created a Central Review Committee (CRC) to hear appeals arising from the purge. The CRC hardly made a dent since very few appealed through it. Besides, although most the CRC's decisions were favorable to the employees, it had no power to enforce them.

Another significant victory came in the form of guidelines from the CSC. It set criteria for evaluating employee fitness for retention, laid out a grievance procedure and set a deadline of six months to finalize placement actions (Memo Circular No. 10, September 2, 1986). CSC later required both employees and the Commission to be represented in placement committees (Memo Circular No. 16, October 2, 1987).

The Senate proved to be a major supporter of the embattled civil service. Senate Resolution No. 14 (October 9, 1987) proposed to suspend reorganization - and in effect, the removal of employees - for 60 days. The President did not heed this proposal, yet it got so much publicity that she had to act somehow. She thus belatedly required that reorganization be humane and transparent and set deadlines for the placement and release of separation benefits (Presidential Memorandum Circular, October 2, 1987). On October 14, she followed this up with a 60-day moratorium on removals, which was close enough to the employees' and the senators' intent.

The Senate passed a second Resolution on March 1, 1988 suggesting the suspension of reorganization. It was also rejected: the executive claimed that the reorganization process had been criticized only by those disadvantaged by it, not by the general public. Employees easily disputed this point, citing both a report of the National Economic and Development Authority¹³ and a statement of the CSC head (NEDA 1988; Sto. Tomas 1988).

The Senate also conducted a series of hearings on the reorganization issue and submitted a February 1988 report that exposed its problems. The hearings gave rise to three laws. The first repealed the provision allowing for summary dismissals in the bureaucracy (RA 6654, May 20, 1988). The second protected "the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the implementation of reorganization" (RA 6656, June 10, 1988). Among others, it defined "bad faith" reorganization and imposed a deadline of 90 days for the completion of the process. The third was an Early Retirement Law (RA 6683) which legislated benefits for persons "reorganized out" as well as others vacating positions that could be cut from the gigantic bureaucracy.

On balance, however, the employees lost most of their battles. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (referring to protesting teachers) and the CSC threatened employees with administrative sanctions if they resorted to mass action leading to service disruption. E.O. 183 (June 1, 1987), also limited the employees' room to maneuver. A Civil Service Code drafted by the CSC would have given organizations broader powers.¹⁴ It was submitted to Congress in May 1988 but remains unlegislated. Thus, in late 1990, DECS made good its threat and dismissed striking teachers. With no new Civil Service Law to protect them, the civil servants were spurned not only by DECS and CSC but also by the Supreme Court.

Deadlines set by the legislature met the same fate as end dates set by the President. Reorganization was unfinished several months after the deadline of RA 6656, nor were early retirees paid on time. Failure of implementation may be attributed to both the executive and the civil service. Executive officials may be faulted for resorting to spoils and loyalty tests and their continued distrust and suspicion of the bureaucracy. This led them to introduce *ressentiment* politics, much as the Koreans did under Park. On the other hand, the instability of their status pushed many civil servants - including those supposed to implement reorganization and personnel benefits - to greater inflexibility and lack of innovation, largely to avoid making mistakes (Sto. Tomas 1988). This in turn encouraged their new su-

13. The update on the implementation of the Philippine Development Plan, a report made by an inter-agency committee convened by NEDA, acknowledged the lack of popular support for reorganization, the flaws in its approaches and perceived distortions in implementation (NEDA 1988: 13-19).

14. Sec. 9 of The Draft Code reads: "Employees . . . shall have the right to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with law."

periors to look down on them, thus creating a vicious circle that hurts their cause as much as the assaults of the new officials did.

Employee Conduct and Behavior

The drive for accountability introduced changes involving both structure and process. The first big step was the creation, as soon as Aquino took office, of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) which was charged primarily with the retrieval of the national wealth plundered by Marcos.

Second, the Constitution of 1987 not only retained but gave additional powers to institutions charged with evaluating accountability, both of which were inherited from Marcos: the Ombudsman (originally called *Tanodbayan*) and the Sandiganbayan (a special administrative court), as well as the Commission on Audit and the CSC, both constitutional bodies mandated to protect government funds and personnel, respectively.

An important third move was the creation of a Cabinet-level Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability in May 1987, following criticisms on the lack of executive initiative against ongoing corruption. Departing from the failed strategy of previous administrations (Alfiler 1979), PCPEA decentralized graft-busting by making each head responsible for the ethical performance of his office. PCPEA viewed corruption as a managerial issue and believed that it could be checked by increasing its risks and reducing its benefits. This implied the provision of ample resources for the strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws, which, however, did not improve under Aquino.

Fourth, some agencies streamlined their operations and used volunteer watchdogs to prevent graft. For instance, the then-Ministry of Health reported huge savings generated by these moves within the first one hundred days of the Aquino takeover (MOH 1986). The appointment of administrators with probity and courage and the provision of extra benefits for persons in sensitive positions also awakened the hope that the problem could be licked (Alano 1988; Santiago 1988).

Despite these moves, public opinion polls still regularly list graft and corruption among the main problems of the present government. While more reports of government corruption may be attributed to a much freer press, not one "big fish" has been caught and prosecuted despite widespread rumors of high-level corruption and the promise made by the Ombudsman to bring one to justice within a month from January 1989. In other cases, what has occurred is not outright corruption as much as greed and lack of sensitivity - the purchase of luxury vehicles for "public servants," their frequent international travels and flagrant violations of family morality have aroused public indignation.

Besides, the prosecution of corruption cases has not prospered because of the backlog in the judiciary and administrative agencies. Yet, because

they are inconclusive, tainted officials are either retained or moved to higher positions, which have made people wonder why legality rather than morality - the Marcosian rule - still reigns in the political order.

In its campaign to uphold ethical conduct in public office, every news item exposing malfeasance would bring hope, but many tainted officials still seem as untouchable as the politicians of the old days. On the other hand, civil servants are constantly exhorted to behave ethically - to lead modest, honest lives and so on, but the "what for" of such ethical conduct is not underscored. This is perhaps best illustrated by the rules implementing the incentives system of the Ethical Standards Act (RA 6713) which confers awards for outstanding ethical conduct to personnel who may not be effective producers of government services. Ethics thus seems equated only with honesty and viewed apart from service, productivity and responsive performance. This emphasis on the "how" of behavior recalls the politics-administration dichotomy which has defined executive attitude toward the bureaucracy since the start of American tutelage - that civil servants simply obey and accept the decisions and prescribed methods of the political leadership without necessarily developing their own commitments to the ultimate goals informing these decisions.

The emphasis on methods goes beyond the anti-corruption drive. As in the past, the bureaucracy has not distinguished itself as a source of policy ideas. Some NEDA personnel did put together a list of policy gaps in economic development to be handed over to the new Congress in 1987. However, this plan did not prosper and no other bureaucratic group has crafted any proposal involving other vital policy matters. Instead, policy proposals continue to be the handiwork of executive officials, with assistance from private-sector think-tanks, advisers or academics. The employees would simply put these proposals into bill-form, if necessary. Many of them would undertake this task despite any reservations they might have about the issue at hand. For instance, the standardization of salaries of civil servants was largely prepared by external consultants, with some assistance from insiders in computation and in rendering into the form of a bill. However, some of them thought the standardization scheme unfair because it gave disproportionate increases to top-level positions. Yet, they never voiced out their sentiment to their superiors.¹⁵

Another explanation may be the divisions within the bureaucracy itself. The changes in wage scales under Aquino have favored Career Executive Service officers over the rank and file, the military over civilians, certain professional groups over others (Cariño 1989), each the result of lobbying by employees or their agency heads. These groups also compete for scarce government allocations. Conflicts also arise due to distinctions between

15. This case was told in confidence. On other occasions, the author asked civil servants about their policy role: aside from repeating those mentioned in Abueva's survey, they generally added only their primary responsibility in drafting administrative bills.

professional groups and agencies - for instance, between personnel in the Department of Labor versus those in the Department of Trade and Industry and the NEDA over the issue of a minimum wage hike for private-sector employees. However, these intramurals occur with considerably less emotion, given the absence of strong commitment of these civil servants to their policy areas.

The nature and frequency of corruption episodes and scandals suggest that the risk-benefits calculus has not been altered in favor of rectitude. These show that many civil servants either have not turned their backs on opportunities for individual corruption or still find it "part of their job" to obey superiors even when their orders involve them in systemic corruption.

A few employee organizations have taken up the cause of ethics and accountability. In a case raised by a public enterprise union, President Aquino sustained the order establishing the propriety and legality of purchases of a fleet of cars for corporate executives, but the corporation president himself suspended its implementation, reacting sensitively to public opinion. Employees representing six other unions have brought up corruption charges and were likewise heeded, although at considerable cost to the union officials and members (e.g., Gaffud 1990). However, not all union activities toward monitoring the performance of their agency head have been successful.

On the whole, the Aquino government has had to contend with a bureaucracy that has become militant about guarding its own interests and is slowly venturing out to make the executive more responsible. Its more articulate and critical elements have railed against unequal treatment, the lack of political neutrality and irresponsible performance, thus underscoring the same values which the political leadership itself admonished them to uphold (but which it does not accept when made as a criticism against itself). Hence, the tension between them is creative and may well be preferable to the passive acquiescence traditionally demanded by executives or the sublation of the leadership that would have allowed both of them to rule without accountability to the people.

Why a Dominated Bureaucracy?

The Philippine civil service has been faithful to the model of an executive-controlled organization since its creation. This, despite going through four kinds of regimes - American colonialism, a working though flawed democracy after independence, authoritarianism, and now, a redemocratizing government. Each regime needed a subordinate bureaucracy for its own purposes. The colonial government wanted an apparatus for both its competence and its non-involvement in the struggle for independence. The immediate postwar presidents required efficiency so that western style development would go unquestioned.

By contrast, the authoritarian government initially tried to politicize the bureaucracy and to upgrade its status from subordinate to partner by encouraging civil service involvement in policy and party matters. Ideological training also nurtured a belief in participation and nationalism which, although never genuinely desired by the dictator, fostered closer interaction between members of the bureaucracy and the underprivileged in society. They also developed a greater sense of accountability in the civil servants which put them at some distance from the dictatorship. At the same time, however, the leader, assisted by a few technocrats and career civil servants, set aside justice and equity for plunder and self-enrichment.

A regime characterized by double-speak and brute force cultivated the cowed acquiescence of the society and produced the same dread on the part of even its supposed collaborator. While a few at the top enjoyed the trappings of power and others developed a sense of integration with the masses, the rest of the civil service became even more dominated.

The people ousted the authoritarian regime and installed one which promised redemocratization. Believing the civil service to be a Marcosian partner, the Aquino government undertook purification to bring it back to the status quo ante. However, like its pre-1972 predecessors, it regarded the bureaucracy in the traditional terms of domination, without Marcos' inducements to "partnership" and co-equality. Moreover, it introduced a new element brought about by the break with the past: resentment politics.

Ambivalence marked the Aquino government's initiatives: the pledge to uphold due process and transparency, the rights of association and criticism, and sensitivity to public opinion were accompanied by summary dismissals, "bad faith" reorganization and weaknesses in enforcing ethical and performance norms. Meanwhile, the politicalization sown formally by Marcos had blossomed under a more tolerant government and enabled civil servants to claim to uphold democracy in their attempt to resist executive decisions.

Conflict between the executive and the civil service is more evident now than ever before. It has come to involve more people and breaks out in more areas and agencies. Its complexion has also started to change from being internally-oriented and concerned with wages, benefits and positions to being public-interested and concerned with accountability of political and administrative officials in their use and management of public funds. However, none of these circumstances has altered the nature of the relationship of these two important parts of the political system.

The continued domination by the presidency is fostered by the operation of certain factors, some perennial and others applicable only to one period. Among the former is an authoritarian culture, which is reinforced in the bureaucracy by the hierarchical line of command. Thus civil servants learn early to accept power-holders and their orders without argument. In the same category is the Filipino's strong sense of shame. The fear of losing face

drives civil servants to take the path of least resistance because they are unwilling to take risks lest these turn out to be mistakes. This attitude produces a reactive organization that would rather wait for executive initiative rather than help it think of new thrusts and approaches.

The civil service would also be stronger were it more united. However, inured to a system of dyadic relations and factional power play (Lande 1960), each of its many divisions has learned that fighting for itself can be more effective than waiting for resources to be available to everyone. This strategy has been validated by some successes in getting exemptions from standard pay scales and in modifying reorganization plans.

These predisposing factors are exacerbated by the debilitating impact of a slow economy marked by job scarcity. Hence, the fear of losing one's job has made a virtue of necessity, putting a premium on acquiescence to superiors and practically rooting out employee complaints and criticisms of the executive. This may be overcome only by collective risk-taking, such as what some public sector unions are now initiating.

Moreover, the civil service struggle against executive domination is taking place within an economic and social structure that has remained unchanged despite drastic changes in the political system. Marcos' attacks against the oligarchy simply removed his personal enemies among the elite, but the interests of their class were never threatened. Today, the old powerful families are influential again in the Aquino government. Since policies have been maintained across regimes, it is unrealistic to expect bureaucrats - with their intimate knowledge of the ways of politics and avowal of "neutrality" - to come up with anti-elite proposals. Besides civil servants have long enjoyed the patronage of economic giants, and as socially mobile individuals, are unlikely to work against the interests of the class to which they aspire to belong.

The accoutrements of executive power also favorably influence the course of its struggle with the civil service. The colonial governors-general and post-independence presidents have had ample powers as well as strong personalities. The presidency's powers were clipped by a 1986 constitutional commission wary of dictatorship. However, the historic role of the incumbent president in the revolution makes it difficult for the executive's antagonists to gain allies. Her identification with "people power" has provided her government with a reservoir of goodwill which enables it to insist on certain decisions despite their unpopularity.

Presidential superordination is further supported by the bureaucracy's putative partnership with the previous regime and its corruption and inefficiency even prior to it. Besides, the employees responded to the instability wrought by reorganization with work slowdown and continuation of devalued activities like corruption instead of proving themselves through quality performance. Because it remains ineffectual, corrupt and timid, the bureaucracy has been unable to attract allies from other social

forces. However, it has gained sympathy and support in cases where these groups have perceived that the executive branch has treated it unjustly.

The legislature has been a conglomeration of rival politicians to the President except during Martial Law. Before 1972, they were independent patrons of civil servants and their partners against the executive, helping them stall decisions and undermine the merit system. They were silenced by the authoritarian leader and became his satellite patrons instead. Under Aquino, the legislature has been liberated, completing the triangle with the civil service and the presidency. Its changed position is manifest in the swiftness with which it has passed laws protecting the bureaucracy and in effect, clipping the powers of the President in that domain. However, the new Congress is not necessarily immune from the abuse and corruption it is attempting to check in both the civil service and the executive.

The policies of the present government *vis-a-vis* the civil service combine methods used by the dictatorship with traditional means of controlling the bureaucracy. They may be considered successful in that near the end of its term, the Aquino government remains on top of the civil service. However, it has had to deal with an increasingly empowered membership that is slowly getting out of the narrow groove of bread-and-butter issues into endeavors addressing the problem of accountability. This new posture has forced the executive to clarify and refine its means of, and justifications for, subduing the civil service. On the whole, the struggle between them has been over methods of performance more than goals and directions. Perhaps this is to be expected when the bureaucracy is viewed simply as a technical arm of the state. However, in the context of a system ridding itself of the vestiges of a dictatorship and bureaucratic politicalization, the continuing struggle of the bureaucracy and the executive is a progressive step in their development as democratic institutions. As they compel each other to clarify their respective visions for society, their struggle itself will become an important factor in the movement of both the executive and the bureaucracy towards achieving their appropriate role in a democratic society.

Comparative Analysis

The experiences recounted in this chapter exemplify different transition scenarios from authoritarianism into democratization. Bangladesh underwent a war of independence, while Nicaragua and the Philippines went through two types of revolutions: the Somoza dynasty was overthrown in a bloody, protracted popular revolution; the Philippines had a middle-class, non-violent, four-day display of people's power.

In all three cases, a new pact with the people had to be forged in the form of a new constitution. The relationship between the bureaucracy and the executive was part of the reform program written into the basic law of Bangladesh, where the civil service was envisioned to change along with the

restructuring of society. Thereafter the bureaucracy was expected to be more representative and responsive. It would step down from its superior status as part of the ruling elite and reconcile itself to the idea of being subservient to the executive. Subsequent moves would have provided for a more equitable and decentralized structure and greater powers for elected subnational officials.

This vision did not materialize because the bureaucracy managed to shelve the proposals it found to be deleterious to its interests or to change their intent as they were implemented in the field. For its part, the leadership vitiated its own reform efforts by succumbing to the pressures of its followers to accommodate their own needs for jobs and preferential treatment rather than work for the realization of its ideals. Moreover, it did not broaden its own power base but kept it within the ruling party, especially the select few around the president. In hindsight, it was able to deliver benefits only to the intermediate class. The Bangladeshi democratic experiment was short-lived. The bureaucracy, unreconciled to its reforms, might even have consorted with the opposition to bring the Mujib government to an end.

What the Nicaraguan government expected of its bureaucracy was not spelled out in the constitution, but could be inferred from the revolutionary transformation it envisioned which enshrined the participation and voluntary intervention of the people in governance. The popularity of the anti-Somoza sentiment was such that the Sandinistas held little distrust of the bureaucracy as a whole. Instead they singled out certain bureaucratic sectors which were supposed to have collaborated with their predecessor. The flight of most of these people made a massive purge unnecessary. Instead, the crowded reform agenda required the expansion of the civil service and the retention and recruitment of all available trained personnel.

However, like other new organizations starting from scratch, Nicaragua made many errors in the process of concretizing its commitments. Some of them were "romantic" and unrealistic in that they required more time than was allotted to bring about reform. Others failed due to lack of foreknowledge (such as the problem with the minority at the Coast) or adequate preparation to carry them out. Its major problems centered on the management of the economy, which had its share of such romantic errors. However, most of the economic difficulties could be laid at the door of the distrustful and uncooperative economic elite, some of whom decapitalized and put even greater pressure on the country's already low resource levels. The other major factor was the American blockade, support of the Contras and pressure on other international sources not to assist Nicaragua's hard-pressed government. Many of these affected the civil service, which expanded and contracted by turns, and became more autonomous of, and then was subjected to more, central direction. Despite the increased pressure on the economy, Nicaragua delivered on its social promises. This resulted in some expansion of the bureaucracy, but more significantly, it

also showed the significant role played by volunteers, neighborhood committees and other popular forces in the process of governance.

The Philippine interim constitution was quick to guarantee civil liberties, but did not state directly what it desired the bureaucracy to be. However, in giving the political leadership license to remove any public official or employee, it reflected the new government's appraisal of its poor qualifications as its agent of change. The pro-people, humanist orientation of the permanent constitution ratified a year later emphasized the accountability of both the leadership and the bureaucracy, but continued to support the drastic changes being inflicted on the latter.

In many ways, the leadership's action relative to the bureaucracy mirrors the problems which the former is undergoing in realizing its vision for society. Claiming a limited role for government, the Aquino leadership has instead expanded it, just as in promising to trim the bureaucracy it has managed to add both more people and more organizations. Underscoring equity, it has tended to give more benefits to the top echelon in terms of higher salaries for its executives as well as subsidies and privileges to the private sector. Democratization would also have meant decreased reliance on the military, but they remain prominent not only in society but in the civil service as well.

Both Nicaragua and the Philippines emerged from authoritarian regimes whose bureaucracies participated in their excesses but did not take part in their major decisions. Such subordinate bureaucracies tend not to produce problems for a successor-government. Thus, Nicaragua faced not disloyalty but the lack of personnel and the problem of competence among those who were already there. This hardly called for purification; rather, what it needed was expansion and training while relying on the voluntary work of mass political groups at the same time. Ideological transformation and improved methods took care of the need for committed performance.

On the other hand, the Philippine bureaucracy was regarded as requiring de-Marcosification, implying the use of resentment politics against people who were basically neutrals. Distrust of the civil service combined with austerity goals was supposed to have produced purification. However, the lack of clear criteria, pressure from followers for jobs and the desire to court the private sector led to policies which did not weed out Marcos' followers or corrupt employees. Instead, they expanded the bureaucracy and increased the confidence gap between the top leadership and the rank and file. Moreover, competition from the military for equal attention shrank the civilian share of government resources and did not allow for the demilitarization of the bureaucracy.

Being subordinate, the civil service of the Philippines and Nicaragua seemed more ready than that of Bangladesh to accept a new government, especially since the ascension of each, though under extraordinary circumstances, was popular to the people, including a majority of government personnel. This, the Sandinistas no doubt enjoyed. Thus, despite a longer

tenure by the Somoza dynasty, the bureaucracy did not suffer the distrust of the Sandinista leadership and did not have to undergo the purification measures used by Aquino against her organization. Its relationship with the civil service was thus smoother than that which obtained in the Philippines where grievances were so widespread that public sector unions mushroomed overnight and protested against practically all state policies affecting the bureaucracy. Moreover, many deliberately resorted to work slowdown, the closest to sabotage that they ever got. In spite of their open and frequently bitter struggle, however, the Philippine civil service has remained firmly entrenched as an institution under the leadership, reconciled to the unwelcome realities of the purge, reorganization, salary standardization and other bitter pills it had to swallow.

7

Transitions, Bureaucracy and Democracy

Transitions, bureaucracy and democracy: these three concepts underlie the main themes that have been explored in this volume. Transitions provide the immediate context of the study, as it has tried to analyze if — and how — a new political leadership is able to change the bureaucracy. The issue of bureaucratic tenacity, in turn, is bound up in the forces unleashed by the political leadership and the civil service and how their nexus and struggle are shaped not only by their own qualities and actions, but also by the participation of other political groups. The openness of the struggle to such groups is further affected by whether it takes place in a democratic or authoritarian system. Finally, the study deals with the extent to which their struggle results in a bureaucracy that is developed, that is, better suited to serve the needs of a democratic society.

The Transition Problem

Weber (1947: 338) first posited the hypothesis of bureaucratic tenacity:

Even in case of revolution by force or of occupation by an enemy, the bureaucratic machinery will normally continue to function just as it has for the previous legal government.

His observations were based on studies of Prussian and British bureaucracies, the first existing in an authoritarian system, and the second in a democracy, but each able to impose its will on its supposed master.

Weber's contention is echoed by Goonatilake, although the latter observes still another group of countries, that is, new states and the colonial bureaucracies they have inherited from the West:

It is difficult to imagine that the bureaucracy of a country would change in any fundamental manner largely as a result of changing the national political regime (Goonatilake 1975: 6).

However, it would be inaccurate to say that the bureaucracy remains unchanged because no attempt has been made to modify it. Under any

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political system, the first move of the political leadership is to deal with its bureaucracy, and the usual first option is to try to change it.

Executive Actions

Theoretically, a new government can discard the old bureaucracy altogether and create a new one in its place, thereby satisfying demands for "political purity." Or it may accept the old civil service and adapt it to its new requirements, a decision based on the leadership's need for professional performance and confidence in its competence and political neutrality. As we have seen, the empirical examples fall between these two extremes. What actually happens depends on the new executive's perception of the past and potential performance of the bureaucracy, the actions and reactions of the civil service toward executive initiatives, the kind of succession in which their encounter takes place, and the involvement of other political forces. The first two factors are discussed below; the last will be tackled after an analysis of the counter-strategies of the bureaucracy.

Executive distrust and bureaucratic purification. Every executive wants the bureaucracy to be receptive to its control and direction and to enhance its chances of staying in power. Ironically, these are political demands which the civil service is expected to meet from one regime to the next through *neutral* competence. However, rarely does a political leadership assume neutrality on the part of any institution which is a legacy of its predecessor. On the other hand, neither does it want the bureaucracy to be nothing less than enthusiastic and committed to its programs.

An incoming regime may consider the civil service a potential saboteur because of its presumed collaboration with the previous leadership, especially if it has served not just as follower but as co-author of major decisions. Among leaders of a hostile successor-government, "collaborator" may be used pejoratively to refer to one who has traitorously cooperated with "the enemy," which is its predecessor-regime.

A distrusted bureaucracy is open game for the methods of *ressentiment* politics - purification, overhaul, or the freezer. Purging is justified as the removal of the unwholesome vestiges of a despised regime, such as the "denazification" of the German bureaucracy after the Second World War (Burin 1952; Herz 1982) or the "de-Marcosification" proclaimed by the new government of Philippine President Aquino. Such grand programs prefixed by "de-" have seldom succeeded, because the civil service is embedded in rather than isolated from the rest of society, and wholesale dismissals of government employees always manage to strike sympathetic chords in the hearts of important sectors of the nation, including the alma mater, regions, organizations and even families of officials of the new leadership (Herz 1982). Such dismissals also have great potential for being unjust,

particularly in the absence of criteria on who and what are to be dropped from the bureaucratic roster. Yet, to specify political criteria may open up delicate political wounds since support for the former executive is never completely absent.

Purification also fails in another way: through the re-appointment of those purged into the bureaucracy. President Aquino's government might have been so hard-pressed for competent administrators that there was little choice but to introduce a less drastic variant of the de-Nazification experience in Germany: "begun with wholesale incriminations turned in the direction of wholesale exemptions and ended in wholesale exoneration" (Herz 1982: 29).

The purging of specified groups or the removal of individuals for clear indicators of (poor) performance, such as corruption and inefficiency, though controversial, are much more acceptable than removals based on loyalty tests. For instance, the "dejuntafication" undertaken by Premier Karamanlis of Greece involved a clear use of due process and speedy trials which responded to the people's desire for justice, in terms of both punishing the guilty without making them objects of sympathy, and cleansing the military and civilian bureaucracies (Psomiades 1982). In the same manner, Nicaragua's dismantling of the hated Guardia and the removal of their collaborators based on records left by the previous regime were much easier to accomplish than a blanket de-Somocization of the bureaucracy would have been. The Korean purification was a puritanical move based on objective guidelines, removing only those who engaged in corruption or who breached Korean marriage and family norms. Likewise, Marcos' purge in his new role as dictator in 1972-75, and Aquino's dismissals in her first year were initially welcomed even by the bureaucracy expecting a clean-up of government. It was only when vague political tests began to be applied that they became unpopular.

Purification does not have to be negative or limited only to mass dismissals. For example, the Bangladeshi and Korean bureaucracies were moved closer to the image desired by the political leadership through the recruitment of people sympathetic to the reforms proposed by Mujib and Park. In the former case, special quotas for women, freedom fighters and minorities spelled out in the new constitution signalled the desire to create a representative bureaucracy attuned to socialism. However, the business sector and middle-class professionals actually formed the bulk of the new recruits, contrary to pronouncements of the regime.

In the case of Korea, the new appointees came from the military and business establishments which formed the backbone of support for Park's regime. The higher civil service was originally in this group but was phased out later, after Park realized that he did not need them to legitimate his leadership. Marcos also recruited from the military and technocratic communities for persons who shared his developmentalist views for the nation.

Chile's *la persecuidora* and Mexico's rearrangement and redeployment of civil servants both retreat from a total condemnation of the civil service in that, while the retained collaborators were transferred to less significant positions, they were allowed to enjoy some benefits. Reagan's method of not giving enough information to civil servants, as it keeps them in office but in diminished roles, is akin to these maneuvers. In a way, Philippine general reorganizations have the same purpose, particularly as they relocate favored agencies of a previous president to less prominent places in the hierarchy.

Successors sharing the party or ideology of the previous regime probably look at its collaborator more kindly. Thus, the Thai bureaucracy has remained the major constituency of the political leadership despite frequent changes of the executives themselves. By contrast, in 1932, the civil service was seen as the victim of the Thai monarchy, and the coup of that year stopped the reductions in force, decreases in salaries and other sources of instability for government employees which had been decreed by the ousted regime.

Although it collaborated with the executive to a much less degree than the Thai did with its political leadership, the Philippine bureaucracy also enjoyed a number of benefits from Ferdinand Marcos. In the later years of martial law, Marcos rewarded high ranking civil servants with presidential appointments (up to Cabinet level) and elective positions. However, the rest received low salaries and were subjected to threats and intimidation. In this sense, a major part of the civil service was victimized during his long tenure.

Clearly, then, the bureaucracy may be purified by hiring new personnel. Such new entrants may be classified into three groups: high-level persons identified by their belief in the new political gospel; professionals and technocrats who provide the expertise assumed to be unavailable within; and rank and file political followers.

The need for the first group of recruits to fill policy determining positions is often already incorporated in the law or tradition of each state. Political appointees of this kind become controversial only when they are more than the expected number or when they are made to occupy career positions. The recruitment of in-and-outers to lower levels of the bureaucracy under Nixon and Reagan immediately comes to mind.

The second type takes on many forms. To get his own kind of professionals, a new president may create an agency to take care of his major policies, rather than locate them within established institutions with similar concerns. Roosevelt's New Deal, the Sandinistas' creation of ministries for their expanded social programs and Macapagal's Program Implementation Agency share this strategy. Another means is to hire consultants on contract and vest them with line functions, the technique used by both Marcos and Aquino sub-cabinet technocrats to get around civil service rules. Putting in military officers in civilian functions because of their professionalism and efficiency was Park's alternative.

The appointment of political followers to lower-level jobs, a remnant of the spoils system, is alive and well in many jurisdictions formally adopting the merit system. Commitment to the executive's policy normally takes second place to patronage and insuring votes, although an ideologist like Reagan may justify replacement of career clerks by political newcomers as a way of consolidating conservatism. The trend in the US toward more political appointees indicates that distrust of the career service is characteristic not only of countries which do not have enough jobs for its partisan professionals or of societies which have been labelled as more personalistic and parochial.

The application of more positive and productive methods of purification does not necessarily mean growth for the bureaucracy. Nicaragua infused new thinking into the old Somoza apparatus not primarily by packing it with Sandinistas (although it did expand the bureaucracy), but by making it more subject to the influence of people's organizations. The dedication of its volunteer corps enabled the state to greatly expand its literacy, health and welfare services without further taxing its economically strapped government.

In a different fashion, the Korean bureaucracy was purified through innovative techniques successfully used in the conduct of war. Technical assistance provided by foreign advisory groups in Korea and Chile, as in other Third World countries, had recommended administrative reform which was expected to cure the ills of inefficiency, ineffectiveness and lack of accountability. Position classification, planning and information systems, and performance rating schemes came from the arsenal of civil service orthodoxy and were so justified by the new executive. The tendency is to insulate the bureaucracy from politics by infusing it with more technocrats and their methods. Indeed, in the face of the leadership's difficulty in finding a civil service sympathetic to its new thrusts, it is surprising how many of them fall back on methods that are supposed to make the organization more neutral rather than more politically responsive.

The view that the bureaucracy is neutral has been rare, and is best exemplified by the stable turnovers of Great Britain. Macapagal also belongs to this rare breed, as he maintained the civil service he inherited as a source of stability. His attitude toward the bureaucracy was a carry-over from American tutelage, since the colonial bureaucracy was inherited practically intact when sovereignty passed on to the Philippines in 1946.

All political leaderships claim that their actions have been unadulterated moves to simply make the bureaucracy a better mirror of their intentions or a more adequate instrument for the achievement of their purposes. For instance, the salary standardization of the new Bangladesh republic was a clear move towards equity, as it narrowed the gap between the administrative class and the rank and file. Nevertheless, one may recognize consequences and possibly, even intentions, different from the proclaimed goals. The infusion of military officials into the Korean civil service was justified

as a move toward greater professionalism rather than as something heralding dictatorship or the denigration of civilians. The development of the second track in the US was aimed at making the lines of responsibility clearer, not at reducing the power of line agencies. Large-scale dismissals in the Philippines were justified as ways of promoting austerity instead of opening positions to the regime's political following. Reorganizations are always claimed to effect economy and efficiency rather than to move offices away from or closer to the corridors of power.

The kind of succession as a context. The actions of an executive are also affected by the type of succession that put it on the saddle so to speak. A leadership which assumes power under normal succession tends to be more constrained about its choice of weapons than another which seizes power by force or other irregular means. For instance, mass dismissals and ideological indoctrination tend to be features of abnormal transitions. The incoming authoritarian governments of Park and Marcos used both of these methods, crushing any possibility of bureaucratic co-equality with them. Purgings, however, is not a monopoly of incipient dictatorships. Aquino and Mujib, in proclaiming democracy also found it necessary to wield the ax against the civil service.

By contrast, successions that do not alter the system of government tend to rely on less drastic methods of effecting change. New appointments, budgetary re-allocations and administrative reform measures may be made instead of reductions in force, since the niceties of removal for cause must be observed. Each country sets the apex and floor of its career bureaucracy; beyond these limits, political appointments can be made without need for disguise. Thus, the Philippines unprotected only its casuals and cabinet members but resorted to reorganization at every turn; Chile had a gracious retirement scheme in *la persecuidora* and allowed budget alterations; Mexico accepted its massive turnovers every six years. Meanwhile, the US constructed a second track of in-and-outers, a political and semi-permanent staff. Laws were also used which bound successors to honor bureaucratic changes made by the incumbent leadership, in so doing, Roosevelt and Dominican Republic executives alike froze political appointees in the career service.

The mode of succession likewise determines the kinds of persons that gain entry into the bureaucracy. Militarization of the civil service seems to accompany authoritarian governments, as Park's and Marcos' regimes again show. This is not a perfect correlation, however. The Thai military has not joined the civil service in massive numbers, relying instead on its control at the top and its shared ideology with its civilian counterpart. On the other hand, the weakness of the Aquino government shows in the continued influx of military officials into the civilian government, despite its announced commitment to redemocratization.

As transitions toward authoritarianism tend to militarize the civil service, the first moves of a redemocratizing regime toward its inherited bureaucracy reflect its democratic goals. Thus, Mujib's government tried to go against elitism and to establish equity in the organization. The expansion of the bureaucracy was intended to nationalize industries. Devolution of power to local officials and recruitment of the liberators and underprivileged groups were supposed to disperse the power of the bureaucracy, which is the ruling elite in Pakistan.

Similarly, the Sandinista government took decentralization in terms of institutional and regional autonomy seriously. The expansion of the bureaucracy mirrored its commitment to workers and peasants, even as they also participated in the more open planning process with civil servants and private capitalists. Even the replacement of the Somoza guards became a democratic exercise as neighborhood committees took over their own defense and took on social service functions besides.

The Aquino administration also showed openness to "people power" advocates, although most of them belonged to the middle class rather than the poor who are supposed to be the real beneficiaries of a revolution. It has also conducted more experiments in decentralization than any previous Philippine government. However, ambivalence marks its response to such issues as demilitarization, public sector unionism and equity in the bureaucracy.

Weapons of the Civil Service

The bureaucracy has its own means of fighting back. First it draws on its institutional memory and expertise to make itself useful and even indispensable to the new team. The permanent civil service provides "policy advice" to the British political leadership. Through it, civil servants, drawing from their long experience, may warn the ministers about the pitfalls of a proposed policy or suggest alternatives to it. This potent weaponry draws its strength from the fact that the civil service has accepted its subordinate status and is bound by the traditions of anonymity and secrecy to maintain the fiction of the supreme power of ministers and to keep from the public how great a part civil servants play in the making of policy.

The bureaucracy may use the same sources of its strength *against* fledgling leaders. Under Echevarria's Mexico, secrecy played a different role, that is, the higher civil service did not even provide the political leadership the information it needed for policy formulation. Instead, it attempted to make decisions on its own, this time being the one to distrust the competence of its political masters.

Following in the same tradition but more intent in having its own way was the Saskatchewan Civil Service. Finding the new leadership dependent on it for the basic principles of governance, it even intervened with and redirected policy. Thus, ostensibly working at the technical level, the civil

servants led the new government away from pursuing the more radical elements of its platform.

A bureaucracy may become more active in looking out for itself. For instance, constitutional and policy ideas emanating from Thai civil servants tried to safeguard its role and prevent the development of political rivals.

Other civil servants find in the entry of a new regime the opportunity to legislate proposals to protect their turf and enlarge their powers. Thus, they ignore the executive's plans when they are not in their interest. For instance, Park's planning and programming system suffered bureaucratic sabotage in its implementation. Nor did the Bangladeshi bureaucracy allow the reorganization, decentralization and administrative reform efforts of the Mujib regime to succeed since these would dislodge it from the power coalition. Similarly, reforms in Chile were blocked by an alliance of legislators and bureaucrats. LaPorte (1982) also talks of "reform ritualism" in Pakistan under which bureaucrats rejected (by not implementing) administrative reform measures that would have led to their greater control.

Holding back on performance may also be seen as another bureaucratic strategy. The work slowdown in Aquino's administration finds a parallel in the Indian civil service where "the civil servant not only remains entrenched but also threatened, hence very cautious" (Tummala 1982: 111). Filipino recalcitrance was occasioned by the instability resulting from a succession of purges and reorganization. Again, in India, the same maneuver was a reaction to the punitive transfers of people seen as unresponsive to or against government policies. This was used both by Indira Gandhi and the two governments that succeeded her (Tummala 1982: 110-11).

Civil service action may also indicate the widely varying interests and desires of different agencies. The Bangladesh bureaucracy implemented the new salary scale only at the bottom, refusing to allow the flatter pay schedule to be fully carried out. This move is reminiscent of the incomplete implementation of reorganization programs and position classification in the Philippines because various professional groups or agencies managed to get exemptions from the standard structure with the aid of sympathetic legislators.

The lack of opposition on the part of many bureaucracies must not be overlooked. This is due in part to the recognition of the legal superiority and power of the political leadership. Countries as disparate as Britain, Nicaragua and the Philippines have socialized their civil service into long-term acceptance of such a role.

Deference to executive power may also be partly attributed to fear of what the executive can unleash if the civil service disobeys. The US federal civil service, for example, had to toe the line following Reagan's show of indifference toward them. Pakistan's bureaucracy though, often regarded as the ruling organization is also forced at times to defer to its legal master, having arrived at an "understanding [of] power and its use" (LaPorte 1982).

The shared commitments of the political leadership and the bureaucracy also account for the lack of conflicts between them. Korea's civil service resisted the use of methods imported from the military, but had no trouble with the economic policies which Park espoused vigorously. The Chilean bureaucrats were comfortable with the conservative policies of different leaderships. Even the British civil servants, in adhering to the middle road, were able to absorb policy shifts to either side demanded by new governments.

The Role of Other Political Forces

The involvement of other politicians, particularly those in parliament, in the executive-bureaucracy struggle was evident in many countries. Since the passage of administrative reform policies is a prerogative of the legislature, the intervention of Congress is part of the regular procedure. Legislators frequently accept the president's recommendations on the civil service because the latter falls within the scope of his or her management function. However, they may also enact policies which limit presidential direction and control of the bureaucracy. For instance, laws enlarging the scope of the merit system and upholding neutrality have limited the American executive's leeway in appointments.

Civil servants in the Dominican Republic have long fallen back on legislative support for the protection of their interests. By reminding their congressional patrons of the benefits they derive from their bureaucratic clients, the personnel have managed to keep administrative reform laws from upsetting their comfortable political arrangements. Legislatures have prevented reorganizations by Chilean President Frei and thwarted the proposals of several Philippine presidents as they threw their support behind particular sectors of the civil service in their struggle against their formal head, the executive. American legislators have played an even greater role as one of the major components of the "iron triangle," through which they support and are supported by both civil servants and the business lobbies that maintain them in power.

Dominant economic groups have been involved in the process as well. Mujib's socialistic platform was derailed not only by the appointment of professionals and technocrats into the service, but also by the concerted efforts of business leaders to lobby for policies more favorable to their class. Originally barred from openly engaging in politics, the Chinese business elite in Thailand profited from their connections with both the executive and the bureaucracy. By keeping government officials well-provided, they ensured the formulation and implementation of policies favorable to their individual businesses and to investments in general. They may now have less use for civil servants, since new generations of economic elite have entered the political arena and can compete for power directly.

The influence of poorer sectors is probably weaker but can be already be discerned among the democratizing states under study. In Bangladesh and Nicaragua, it was the new executives who made the bureaucracies more attentive to the demands of the poor. In Bangladesh, this was done by admitting them into the civil service and by making them privileged recipients of services. In Nicaragua, it was their parallel organization with the bureaucracy, their participation in policy planning, and their augmentation of its service arms that mattered. In the Philippines, during the time of Marcos, some civil servants took advantage of the participatory rhetoric of the regime and developed links with popular organizations in the villages. Later, with people power enshrined in the Constitution, a few non-governmental organizations got involved in monitoring government programs and performance. However, most of the participants came from middle-class groups more than from the poor.

The role of foreign groups and models in the executive-bureaucracy relationship must also be recognized. A country may be regarded as a model of preferred reforms for various reasons. Bangladesh turned to the Fulton Report in Britain, and the Philippines to American consultants because of their respective colonial histories. On the other hand, Bangladesh also looked up to the Soviet Union for its transformation to socialism. Thailand at the turn of the century imported nationals from different countries to assist in forming and managing various aspects of governmental operations.

In addition, a foreign government can exert such control over a political leadership that the latter would not dare make major changes without its agreement. American acceptance of the martial law regimes of Park and Marcos, for instance, strengthened the position of these two autocrats against the protests of other political groups.

Public administration has been a popular concern of technical assistance since the Second World War. Hence, western advisory groups as guardians of administrative orthodoxy may side with the executive, as they have in the Philippines, Chile and Korea, for greater control of the civil service. However, their recommendations have tended to put priority on rational criteria and efficiency to the neglect of the requirements of responsiveness and popular involvement. As bureaucrats become inured to them, they may get impatient with the slower ways of democracy. Consequently, they may be seduced by the authoritarian political order, as were the bureaucracies of Bangladesh and Korea.

Patterns of Executive-Bureaucracy Relationships

The struggle of the bureaucracy and the executive results in four patterns of submission or sublation: Cell 1, executive ascendancy and bureaucratic subordination, and Cell 2, executive sublation or bureaucratic co-equality, alternatives under a democratic system; and Cell 3, executive domination, and Cell 4, its sublation under an authoritarian state. In the foregoing

chapters, the interaction of the president and the civil service in each of the countries studied was assigned to the most appropriate cell. What will be examined here next are the factors supporting the incidence of each pattern based on the country examples, theoretical expectations and other cases brought up in the public administration/political science literature.

Executive Ascendancy and Bureaucratic Subordination

The dominance of the executive over the bureaucracy can be seen in many countries regardless of the types of transition - the normal transfer of power following election, or a new authoritarian or democratic government emerging from an abnormal succession. This is hardly surprising because the executive is supposed to be on top, if not the chief initiator, of whatever changes take place in a state. Thus it may be expected that the stronger the leadership, the more complete the subordination of the bureaucracy to it. Accordingly, Cell 3, marking executive domination over the civil service in an authoritarian setting, would be the most predictable pattern and thus provides a good starting point for this discussion.

Executive ascendancy under an authoritarian leadership (Cell 3). The concentration of all power in an authoritarian ruler and his dominance over all aspects of political and social life define a dictator, and what would he be if he cannot maintain his ascendancy over his key instrument for governance? Since, as has been maintained throughout this book, the leadership is not the sole determinant of the executive-bureaucracy nexus, that question is not a rhetorical one. Rather it is necessary to examine what factors and processes support executive dominance, if only to determine how such an arrangement differs from the domination of the bureaucracy by a democratic leadership.

The first factor that stands out is the role of the military as an institution. Since authoritarianism can hardly be maintained without coercion, the armed forces are usually part and parcel of the dictatorship. The concentration of power in the ruler gives the bureaucracy (and indeed any other political institution) very little room within which to maneuver.

Take the Korean experience under Park. The coup leaders originally installed a civilian politician at the head of government and sought the advice of the bureaucracy on matters concerning development thrusts as well as on issues directly involving civil servants themselves. However, bureaucratic influence diminished as the regime tightened its hold on the nation, a process helped in no small way by its control of the armed forces. The latter were used not only against the rest of society but also against their expected allies in the civilian bureaucracy. Large-scale dismissals and executions of civil servants and military officers created terror. In addition, military officers invaded the bureaucracy, replacing ranking civil servants. Military ideas replaced the thrusts and technologies favored by civilians.

The violence was a direct assault; the entry of military officers throughout the civilian force was a more subtle means of intimidating the bureaucracy. The military takeover was also helped by civilian belief in the myths of military professionalism and effectiveness.

The probability of violent reprisals by the regime in addition to militarization *per se* may also result in the emasculation of a bureaucracy, one fearful of publicly voicing any ideas that may be construed as dissent from the leadership. Something of this nature appears to have happened to the Philippine bureaucracy under martial law. With purges and worse threats hanging over their heads, the civil service personnel consented to distortions and violations of professional standards. Some were even prevailed upon to circulate social indicators that made the regime look good, undertake mass mobilization in the guise of people-empowerment, or count poll results before election day. Such abject compliance resulted not only from the fears generated by an authoritarian system, but was also made possible by a formalistic structure under which a well-trained staff learned advanced rational technology but applied it in particular to what would suit best the demands of powerful persons.

At times, it may be the bureaucracy itself that seeks authoritarian rule. In asserting that the administrative system may be more congenial to authoritarian traditions than to democratic methods, Sloan (1982) stresses the bureaucracy's hierarchical structure and accustomed submission to authority, which is similar to the structuring of authoritarian states. Indeed, a full decade before the Marcos coup, the middle levels of the Philippine bureaucracy were already openly wishing for such a strong ruler to lead the country.

Executive ascendancy in a democracy (Cell 1). The executive-bureaucracy interaction is more problematic in a democracy, where bureaucratic subordination should be more clearly understood as a prescription and a norm towards which efforts should be directed, rather than an automatic result of the assumption of a political leadership to power. As such, Cell 1 is the ideal pattern and at the same time the key problem for liberals. Once they recognize the power potential of the bureaucracy, they must find ways to maintain it as a tool of the democratic system. The very need to translate the executive's vision for the nation makes him dependent on the civil service. Pendleton Herring, one of the major proponents of the doctrine of executive ascendancy, describes the bureaucratic role in the process as follows:

If democracy is viewed as the free reconciliation of group interests, "a great administrative machinery [is needed] to synthesize group interests into a unified conception of the public interest" (as rendered by Redford 1969: 189).

Executive ascendancy is enhanced by the bureaucracy's socialization in the democratic ethos, which accepts the legitimacy of elections and its

concomitant —the principle of rule by majority choice. Perhaps the best illustration of the effectiveness of this socialization is the way the constitution regulates the behavior of the British bureaucracy toward any new government. There, the bureaucracy does not disagree with the leadership openly but makes use of accepted modes such as policy advice to get its points across.

The influence of the democratic ethos is also well illustrated in the Philippines where the ascendancy of the political leadership has been maintained through to six post-independence changes of government. Its civil service had a mixed system: laws strongly favoring merit, and political interference in appointments but not in promotions. Bureaucratic subordination in this case was also nurtured by American tutelage, which emphasized a strong presidency, neutrality, and staffing by specialists.

Bureaucratic subordination continued throughout the authoritarian years and through the redemocratizing regime of Corason Aquino. Her presidency is relatively weaker by virtue of new constitutional provisions and by her own predilections. The civil service is stronger, with more militant employee organizations which are supported by labor, cause-oriented groups and the Senate. However, it remains unable - and unwilling - to contest the leadership for power, appearing to be content with being treated more fairly, rather than gaining more power for itself.

Forces outside the leadership-bureaucracy nexus strengthen executive ascendancy. They include the legislature, the political parties and the beneficiaries of government activity. The influence of congressional participation on this interaction stems not only from its important constitutional and institutional role but also from the ties of its individual members with the executive, individual bureaucrats and their more aggressive clients. As the most representative government branch, the legislature can inquire into whether or not the performance of the executive and the bureaucracy has been accountable. State policies on the civil service show instances of legislative cooperation with the executive in controlling the bureaucracy. However, some laws may attempt to curb the power of the executive and favor civil servants, for instance, through limits to reorganization or appointment powers in the Philippines and Chile. Actions of certain legislative sectors may also be directed at protecting the interests of some civil servants through patronage or even through formal committee decisions favoring parts of the civil service and their allies in industry, as members of the so-called iron triangles.

The influence of political parties has been prominent in executive-bureaucratic history. In pushing for political appointments, parties have attempted to ensure that the pendulum of power swings toward the executive. The aim is not only to reward party workers but also to get some assurance that policies favorable to them would be enacted. Policy-oriented parties like the Sandinista Front and the Awami League are better able to support executive ascendancy than personalistic parties because they can

muster long-term support for executive actions on an institutional basis. Personal followings are easier to lure away, being based more on incentives given to individuals than commitment to certain goals.

Since many working democracies are oligarchic, economic elites usually find the policies of the leadership congenial to their interests. Thus, they prefer the stability that flows from obedience to constitutional provisions and therefore the dominance of the president. Their common class membership makes them his or her important allies.

On the other hand, in a democracy that is attempting to give power to the people, executive dominance may be fostered by the leadership's strong links with popular forces, a strategy that makes orchestrated resistance to it futile. This is illustrated by the civil service left behind by the dictator Somoza which did not even try to sabotage the new Sandinista government despite covert support for such action by the US. Nor did the Sandinista regime find the need to purge personnel as many leaders of abnormal transitions do, but did make it more permeable and subject to popular organizations.

Bureaucratic Co-Equality or Sublation of the Executive

Executive domination over the bureaucracy is a norm to which all bureaucracies are socialized. However, the doctrine would not actually work unless the executive is supported by other institutions and groups which then help to neutralize the powers of the civil service. Their expertise, ability to harness and keep vital information, and other important qualities make many bureaucracies in both democratic and authoritarian systems very assertive. In extreme cases, they may dominate over their antagonist through sublation or merger with the new executive. Ordinarily, however, a civil service simply becomes a power bloc in its own right, subverting its nominal superior in programs affecting its own interests and fighting for but not actually establishing a pattern of bureaucratic ascendancy. These cases fall under either Cell 2 or 4, depending on the level of power concentration in their respective political system.

Bureaucratic co-equality or sublation of the executive in a democracy (Cell 2). The desire of the bureaucracy to gain equality with the leadership is motivated by two diverse goals: the first is to guard the public interest against "politics" which it perceives as dirty and unresponsive to the people; the second is to maintain or enhance its power position. The first goal has received much support in the theoretical literature. For instance, in maintaining that democracy needs bureaucracy, Etzioni-Halevy practically prescribes the institution of Cell 2 and the sublation of the executive as a means of safeguarding democracy, particularly in situations where the bureaucracy appears to be the strongest or most responsive political institution. Betraying a distrust of the ways of politics and politicians, she sees

the latter's decisions as based not on accepted policy goals but on "open or disguised bribery" of supporters who then maintain loyalty to the decision makers. She equates permanent appointments with the bureaucracy's ability to resist partisan pressures, adding that

... only in a strong and politically independent bureaucracy is the structure of self-interest such that one may reasonably expect partisan criteria to be kept out of the process of allocation (1985: 92).

In the same vein, Thompson extols a "participatory model" of bureaucracy whereby public interest groups directly confront civil servants in the administrative rule-making process (Thompson 1983). Bureaucrats are then expected to respond to the challenges of the representatives of the poorer sectors, potentially making them feel more responsible for upholding social justice. The participatory model can lead to a stronger democracy as it is able to involve groups previously left out of the consultation process, notably racial, gender and class minorities.

The views of Etzioni-Halevy and Thompson are supported by proponents of New Public Administration who extol the idea of an administration attuned to the values of equity and social justice. Civil servants are thus less rooted in institutional relationships and more concerned with direct access to the people they serve. For instance, Michael Harmon not only recognizes the pragmatic necessity of "leadership by administrators in the formulation of public policy" but also endorses it ungrudgingly (1971: 174). He also takes exception to the view that democracy within administration is incompatible with political democracy (the position descriptive of Cell 1). Instead, he argues that "participative decision making in public agencies will meet the test of responsible behavior in a political democracy" (Harmon 1971: 178), disconnecting it from political representatives who, under orthodox public administration, provide the only line of accountability.

Bureaucratic assumption of direct responsibility to the people can lead to conflict with the political leadership. This occurs particularly because unlike the electoral process where loss or victory is decided by majority vote, there are no rules to go by in the power struggle between the civil service and the political leadership (Etzioni-Halevy 1985: 96-98). The leadership may insist on their authority but the civil service can choose to act as the colonial bureaucrats of Spain once did: *Obedezco pero no compito* (I obey but I do not comply) (Endriga 1979).

In Saskatchewan, the civil service tried to impose its will against the CCF executive. In that struggle, the bureaucracy appears to have been mainly motivated by its conviction that it knew what was in the interest of the public better than the leadership despite the latter's mandate from the electorate. This was also the same position taken by some bureaucrats in Mexico who thought they could be more responsible than the new President

in handling the matter of oil reserves. In both cases, the bureaucracy was more conservative than the executive or society itself, betraying a commitment not only to the *status quo* but also to the business and social interests repudiated at the polls. These cases suggest that instead of being enhanced by bureaucratic attempts to sublate the executive or to share its power, as some analysts have suggested, democracy may actually be endangered by such moves.

Besides, a bureaucracy may champion the cause of the poor only as a ploy to maintain its role as the main arbiter of society (Poulantzas 1980; Lefort 1974-75: 33). Even Thompson who espouses the "participatory model" notes that officials may remain "mere adjudicators of the claims of competing groups" and still "easily play them off" against each other. Civil servants may also coopt the poor to legitimate their decisions and thus maintain bureaucratic supremacy. This in turn makes their popular accountability that much more difficult to establish (Thompson 1983: 246-48).

Thus, the distrust of the bureaucracy that many executives feel upon taking over has some justification. The organization through which they expect to rule draws power from precisely those sources which, despite electoral victory, they cannot match - long tenure and therefore experience if not technical expertise, institutional memory, and access to information which it can withhold even from the leadership. In addition, it has, like the leadership, continuing relationships with the public. The very mundaneness of the bureaucratic tasks of implementing standard operating procedures and precedence rules makes the civil service seem esoteric and unworthy of the attention of the leadership. Yet, they embody the patterns of how government works. If the political leadership does not grasp their importance and does nothing to break the bureaucratic monopoly of ways of translating policy into action, its democratic intentions may never be achieved.

The proclivity to become a bureaucracy-for-itself may arise from an organization's consciousness of the sources of its strength: its expertise, permanence and institutionalization (Weber 1947; Kamenka and Krygier 1979). The case studies show that through these resources, many bureaucracies have been able to dominate their political superiors and the system itself. In addition, the attempt of executives to make the bureaucracy more malleable through administrative reforms can backfire. This has been seen in the case of Chile. In the same manner, the Indian bureaucracy is said to have allowed reforms to prosper only if they could "increas[e] their (civil servants') power or [be] neutral *vis-a-vis* their existing roles" (Jain 1976: 427).

The situation of newly independent Bangladesh at the start of Sheik Mujibur Rahman's regime seemed to be different. Attempting to reverse bureaucratic dominance under Pakistan, Mujib tried to move towards a more representative, decentralized and less powerful civil service. However, the bureaucracy overwhelmed the leadership and turned around the policies aimed at curbing bureaucratic power and increasing that of the

poorer groups. In the end, the Bangladesh civil service succeeded in becoming a bureaucracy-for-itself. Besides, the leadership did not help its own cause by violating some of its own principles - for instance by recruiting unqualified persons from the private sector, delivering benefits primarily to its main supporters rather than the most underprivileged, and engaging in the corruption and authoritarianism it had derided in the previous Pakistani regime.

The support provided by legislators, dominant economic groups and foreign advisory groups gives civil service officials added ammunition in fighting the executive. The country examples demonstrate that legislators and bureaucrats may be equally captured by dominant groups such that they will line up against the executive even where the latter is trying to redress the balance in favor of the underprivileged. This happens because in many new states, legislators are not really "representatives" of the nation. Rather, they are chosen and maintained in power by the wealthiest whose class membership they share or to which they aspire. The majority may be said to vote them into office only in the superficial sense, their choice being constrained by the absence of alternatives, their habitual acceptance of the leadership of the rich, their immediate gratification in the form of bribes or vote-buying, or the fear of physical or economic sanctions.

Foreign advisory groups as the bearers of administrative doctrines have also played prominent roles. Even as they define their role as "neutral" and "nonpolitical," they have tended to endorse civil service attempts to gain power in spite of the executive. Their apparent distrust of politics has also fostered misgivings about democracy that have pushed them as management experts to either extol bureaucratic ascendancy in a democracy or support authoritarian regimes.

Bureaucratic co-equality or sublation of the executive under authoritarianism. (Cell 4). Many bureaucracies can feel quite comfortable with concentrated power and its strong sense of purpose, authority and hierarchical order. However, precisely because of the compatibility of interests between the ruler and the bureaucracy, just a thin line separates subordination from co-equality, and many career personnel may be eager to cross it. They would rather deal with only one person or cabal, instead of having to negotiate with politicians, students, business people and other interest groups. Thus, the civil service may find it easier to use its expertise and access to information first to convince its political superior about its proposals, and second to usurp its decision making power and leadership role. This situation gives rise to Cell 4 in which the authoritarian leadership is joined by a bureaucracy assuming less explicitly subordinate roles.

The principal example analyzed here is Thailand where military and civilian bureaucrats have ruled since the coup of 1932. As may be recalled, the civil service reaction to King Prachathipok's mass personnel lay-offs was a factor that precipitated that event. From then on, with the legislature,

parties and interest groups relatively weak, the Thai bureaucracy has been the strongest influence on the executive, whether the leader be an elected prime minister or one installed by a coup. Bureaucratic capture of the political leadership is considerable since it not only resists control but has itself determined constitutional arrangements.

Bureaucratic dominance in Cell 4 has been anticipated in the literature in terms of the same intrinsic attributes identified in Cell 2. Hegel adds that the bureaucracy has "*the most important role*" in the state since it provides the rationality without which the decisions of the ruler can only be arbitrary (Perez-Diaz 1978: 10, 11). Marx would later argue that, through this same role, the bureaucracy will elevate its interests to the level of the universal, "while the general interest is reduced thereby to the status of a special interest" (as cited in Lefebvre 1968: 142).

Other cases show that, once administrative leaders are recruited to the regime, they become indistinguishable from it. This explains why high-level bureaucrats were alleged to have been party to the coup of 1975 in Bangladesh and to several putsches in Turkey (Dicle 1982). Senior civil servants may therefore welcome authoritarian rule as an opportunity for augmenting their power.

Ironically, authoritarianism and bureaucratic ascendancy might have been encouraged by American aid after the Second World War. Landau (1972), for instance, interprets the large-scale American exportation of tools of administrative development as indicative of the belief that a minimization of political interference and the requirement of technical qualifications for appointment would assist the democratization process. He asserts that the tension at that time was between "democracy" and "politics," which signified a negative reaction against the corruption, nepotism, and favoritism of politicians. However, too much emphasis on the technical aspects of development at the expense of the political dimensions has relegated "democracy" to the background. Indeed, it might have encouraged the notion that development might be worth the price of dictatorships (Huntington 1968; Nef and Dwivedi 1981).

Toward Democracy

Democratization may be the highest level of political development, but many "democracies" including those discussed in the preceding pages fall way short of that ideal. They have usually adopted the processes of democracy, particularly periodic and relatively meaningful elections and some sharing of power by the executive with other political forces, but true government by, of and for the people has not been attained. Thus, executive domination may mean little more than the guaranteed rule of the elite. In many Third World countries, the elite may not even be home-grown but be represented by multinational corporations, former colonial masters, or foreign advisory groups ostensibly there to promote development and

good public administration. Even so, the open political contests and the freedom to engage in them, whether they be elections or policy battles, are definite advantages over the closed systems of authoritarian leaderships.

If democratization is the goal, what can the executive-bureaucracy struggle contribute to it? In the light of the experiences discussed in this volume, two overlapping roles may be discerned. First, their struggle may serve as a mirror of the democratic intentions of the protagonists. Second, it would highlight the role of the bureaucracy as a hindrance to or an instrument of democratization.

Reflecting Democracy

When new governments take over from totally or partially discredited regimes, do they use the means of democracy to further their goals, or do they, like the authoritarians, simply pay lip service to it? Linz has warned about the ultimate ineffectiveness of resorting to undemocratic means to attain democratic goals. Yet both ongoing and newly restored democracies have done precisely this.

Undemocratic means for democratic ends. Many leaderships taking over from defeated democrats or delegitimated dictators have used short cuts to improve the bureaucracy. However, dismissals that lay aside due process have rarely resulted in actual improvement of the civil service. Instead of encouraging competence and purposiveness, what this strategy communicates is the idea of simple power alternation between lions and foxes and the opportunism of the new powerholders. After all, the discarded rascals are replaced by new people of the same ilk who would again be thrown out when newer gods take over. Within the bureaucracy, such purges have not driven those who survived to prove their worth. Instead, they conserve their energy and avoid mistakes, or rake in as much profit as they can for the remainder of their uncertain tenure.

The executive-bureaucracy struggle is not an in-house event of little interest to the rest of society. Citizens assess it in terms of their relationship with civil servants, that is, as their client, beneficiary, victim, kin, classmate, colleague, etc. Even those who are largely critical of the organization have some links that can be activated in favor of individual bureaucrats if not the bureaucracy at large. This happens both because the civil service is one of the largest if not the largest of all employers and also because of the wide scope of government activities. Since the bureaucracy is not an isolated entity, the instabilities and unfair punishments which civil servants suffer exacerbate tensions that accompany successions and make more difficult the task of reconciliation in the larger society. They show what happens to "enemies of the regime;" thus, the purge of relatively quiet civil servants does not augur well for what the executive might do to its more visible critics.

The negative repercussions of purging are mitigated as they become less whimsical and arbitrary and thus move closer to the rule of law which democracies swear to govern by. Clear guidelines, procedures in good-faith, a just and effective appeal machinery, and fair compensation packages can help to quiet the critics and validate a government's claim to democracy.

The burden of proof, however, is not on the executive alone. Civil servants must also show not only that they do not deserve to be summarily dismissed, but also that they fight in democratic ways. Sabotage of programs, opportunistic haymaking and work slowdowns weaken their cause; they remind people of their worst experiences with the bureaucracy. The emerging strength of public sector unionism in the Philippines as a vehicle of both economic reform and political struggle seems more acceptable to society. However, their espousal of inactivity and confrontational methods produces conflicts that detract from their acceptance.

Social justice for the rank-and-file and for the poor. As the state authoritatively allocates values in society (Easton 1953), so does it create and maintain an internal structure of rewards and benefits to the people in the government service. An executive that takes power-pledging justice to everyone is expected not to exploit its partners in the endeavor. Since most income structures are steep and skewed in favor of the apex, the usual demand is for a new democratic government to institute a flatter scheme which will distribute the rewards to civil servants more equitably.

Two cases brought the issue of just distribution to the fore, and each one imparts a different lesson. In the first, the Mujib regime tried to realize its aspiration for equity but found its efforts hamstrung by a civil service that wanted to keep its privileges. Moreover, as it failed to pursue its social justice objectives within the bureaucracy, it also found its redistribution scheme for society attacked by its main political supporters. Its success was partial on both counts, and, as such, may finally be adjudged a failure. In the bureaucracy, it managed to raise the salaries of those at the bottom, but could not narrow the gap between them and those at the top. In the larger society, on the other hand, it succeeded in bringing down the elite from their traditionally prominent positions, but could not increase the benefits enjoyed by marginalized groups because its major allies in the middle class wanted to enjoy the spoils of power. Its efforts to bring about equity were thus defeated on both fronts, and its inability to confront both its economic supporters and its bureaucratic enemies doomed its commendable but impotent designs.

On the other hand, the Aquino government which made the same pronouncements regarding both the civil service and society has shown little inclination to pursue either goal. Finding bureaucratic incomes extremely low, it decreed general salary increases four times. However, the main increases have accrued to the top levels, thus creating a more unequal

income structure than before. The unfairness is reinforced in the kid-glove treatment of the military versus the relentless purge in the civilian force, and the double standard of enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Government commitment to the poor is pursued in a classic, trickle-down fashion: providing more subsidies for business while maintaining the cheap-labor, climate it demands; vacillating on agrarian reform; and paying even its unjust debts at the expense of much-needed social services. Nevertheless, the Aquino government has not lost the support of its main allies (unlike Mujib), because the traditional elites continue to enjoy their privileges. They did have a few anxious moments at the beginning of her stewardship, when groups identified with the underprivileged were perceived to have much more influence on her than they actually did. The bureaucracy and others similarly disadvantaged outside the organization have not found common cause, with each probably wary of the other, since the increased strength of one may conflict with the attainment of the goals of the other. Indeed, playing off victims against each other, though not a conscious strategy here, has been tried in other instances with relative success.

Dispersing power. A democracy by definition is a government that disperses power, or more accurately, one that encourages, nurtures and allows many people to wield power. However, it matters a lot who enjoys power in a democracy. The goal of empowerment is to disperse power to the currently underprivileged and dominated, although often, government may define a smaller role for itself in order to yield power much more overtly to the already dominant.

The usual option of ongoing democracies is to enhance decentralization. The first step is to deconcentrate by creating administrative units outside the capital. The government is indeed brought closer to the people, who nevertheless remain passive recipients of government services. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy expands and is thereby strengthened, its extensive domain rivaling the influence of the political leadership. In the case of Thailand, where decentralization largely means deconcentration, the bureaucracy is the government and the leadership is known only through what the civil service does.

The goal of empowerment is better served by devolution of power to subnational governments. This allows lower-level authorities to respond to local demands with efficiency and timeliness. However, the bureaucracy may capture even local governments, as Mujib's government found out when it took over functions already entrusted to it by elected officials.

Nicaragua's route to local autonomy was also difficult, because the Sandinistas did not immediately recognize the distinctive characteristics of the cultural communities at the Atlantic Coast. However, its problems in decentralizing did not emanate from the civil service but from forces literally outside both government and country.

The traditional mechanisms of decentralization have been recently joined by a third - the surrender of some functions to nongovernment groups. The entities to whom government power is transferred can be further differentiated. Most governments have yielded a few functions to private groups; the other option is for government to allow popular participation to blossom. Most policies designed to shrink the role of government have privatization at its core. Privatization tends to exaggerate the performance of private business as it assumes the inefficiency, ineffectiveness and wastefulness of government (an implicit critique of the bureaucracy). Ironically, the most saleable public enterprises are usually the ones performing well using the criteria of the market. On the other hand, where local economic giants have ties with foreign interests or cannot compete with them, privatization tends to lead to the surrender of that part of the economy to foreign hands. But privatization is not wholly to blame. As the cases of Bangladesh and Thailand show, government economic policies, whether they result in the creation of public enterprises, joint ventures of government officials and private business or outright privatization, ultimately strengthen the elite's control of the economy and the state unless they clearly define what benefits the underprivileged are supposed to gain from them. Thus, redefinition of the role of government through privatization does not disperse power but may even lead to its concentration.

The other new mode of decentralization is more positive for democracy, as previously disenfranchised groups are allowed entry into the corridors of power. Mujib tried to open up the civil service, but the new appointees came from the same professional and middle class groups already in the bureaucracy at the expense of other groups who could have represented the interests of the less privileged. Recall that in the case of Thailand, the "participatory" organizations turned out to be those that had been organized and given imprimatur by the bureaucracy. This arrangement corroborates Poulantzas' contention that the bureaucracy's actions to involve poorer groups may simply be a means to maintain their control over society.

The Nicaraguan example is more instructive, as the new leadership attempted to make power accessible to its partners in the revolution. It succeeded in increasing health, education and other social services dramatically, even as it tempered - and prevailed upon the peasants to accept - the pace of agrarian reform. The same goal was sought but not attained in Bangladesh because no empowerment of the supposed beneficiaries came about there. The Nicaraguan civil service worked as a partner of both the executive and the people, thereby demonstrating the ideal of administrative transformation called for in a democracy. The bureaucracy was molded to be responsive to the purpose of the revolution without working at cross-purposes with the executive, as many Cell 2 bureaucracies are wont to do.

Bureaucracy against Democratization

Democracy flourished before bureaucracy in such states as Great Britain and in the US. There, the civil service developed an ethos of subordinating itself to the will of the people as expressed in the election of political officials. This process, not accidentally, also developed other political institutions ahead of the civil service, which made its secondary role not only ethically imperative but also nurtured by the countervailing power of party systems, legislatures and interest groups. Executive ascendancy is reinforced in these two countries by an economic structure whose dominant group shares similar class origins with the political leaders or represents the class to which they and members of the bureaucracy aspire. The democracy that has evolved gives ear and voice to the interests of this elite, but bureaucratic socialization into subordination shows through as well in the adoption of the hegemonic values of the elite by the underprivileged groups in society. Thus, the latter tend to blame their lot on their personal mistakes or lack of competencies, rather than on a system inimical to them.

The struggle of the leadership and the civil service seems more intense and common in societies where the bureaucracy developed before democratization. In those countries the bureaucracy was not only subordinate to the colonial masters, but also instrumental in their domination of the rest of society. This role is enhanced by its status as a technical and permanent body which has set it apart from other social forces, nurturing ambitions for dominance while remaining uninvolved in the political struggle for independence that their compatriots pursued. Its hatred for those above it might have made it chafe against the restrictions its subordinate status and ethos implied; this hypothesis is strengthened by the development of a bureaucracy trying for Cell 2 in the Indian sub-continent, in contrast with a quiet Cell-1 type civil service in the Philippines where the American master had effectively subdued the hearts and minds of the populace.

In the post-independence period, states have become captives of economic elites in both authoritarian and democratic settings. The case of Thailand illustrates this type of domination where political or high bureaucratic office is a means of entry to the higher reaches of the economy, provided it continues to churn out policies favorable to the business sector. The executive and the bureaucracy show hardly any signs of conflict here.

However, the struggle is evident in other instances where the economic elite remain the key players. There, although both the executive and bureaucracy may work for the elite, each may champion the cause of different factions. This is evident in the various alliances formed by the legislature, the bureaucracy and the top industry lobby groups in the US which have their counterparts in the Philippines and Chile.

The bureaucracy may gain strength over the executive as its intrinsic characteristics make it seem more "neutral" and thus more inclined to maintain the *status quo*. The economic elite may also court the bureaucracy

more actively than a democratic executive because its decisions are not as visible and open to publicity as the latter's. When this happens, the executive and the bureaucracy may disagree on specific policies and procedures although they may share the same ultimate goals. Such disagreements may involve direct state policies on the civil service itself, which despite seemingly innocuous tinkering with boxes, may presage a change of access to the civil service by business groups, legislators and even the executive, and thus are bound to be resisted.

The bureaucracy's continuing relationship with the elite and its growing proficiency will not always be offered in the service of the political leadership. Rather, the civil service may reverse the direction of benefits and define itself as the executive's chief constituency, much as its counterparts in Thailand and Chile have done. A bureaucracy-for-itself would not exist independently of one dominated by the elite, because it can draw its strength and stability from their support. By recognizing and mustering up its bases of power, it can provide some benefits for its membership even as it satisfies elite needs. Indeed, Thailand's rule of the bureaucrats is simultaneous to and nurtured by the continued support of its economically dominant groups.

Bureaucracy for Democracy

The advocates of bureaucracy find in its increasing strength *vis-a-vis* the leadership a hope that it can serve as guardian of the public interest. The optimism is especially strong when the executive seems to be unmindful of government's larger social responsibilities or appears to be undertaking self-serving purposes. Dissatisfied with the unresponsiveness of political officials, they would rather have the civil service establish direct links with popular forces and ignore the hierarchical and legal claims of the incumbent government. The model is the bureaucratic reformer who charges forth to bring democracy to the people - with or against the leadership. A good example is the substantial minority of the bureaucracy in the closing years of the Marcos regime which concretized popular participation, the primacy of human beings, their nationalistic commitments and their concern for the underprivileged - all under the cloak of pronouncements desired to be upheld only in rhetoric by the dictatorship. However, this reformist bureaucratic stance presents certain dangers.

First, weakening the link between the leadership and the bureaucracy will not necessarily push the latter to seek guidance from popular groups. Instead it may regard itself as the guardian of society's interests and deem its own choices as "the public good." Unchecked, this can delude the bureaucracy into seeing the general interest as coincident with its own, thereby glorifying its own needs as the people's (cf. Poulantzas 1980). The Thai bureaucracy certainly saw in the monarch's unfair treatment of it the symbol of the inequity and exploitation of the entire society. But when it

replaced the power holders in the name of democracy, it simply concentrated power unto itself and identified its membership, along with the pariah entrepreneurs, as the regime's major constituency.

Second, the implicit assumption seems to be that the bureaucracy can lead in the transformation of society because of its expertise and good knowledge of development issues. Trusting the bureaucracy to undertake such a colossal task in the hope that it can lead to a realignment of power in society has not proved viable in the cases discussed in this volume. On the contrary, it has led civil servants to withhold information from the executive, as in Mexico, or to limit the ways by which other sectors can get it, as in Thailand and Bangladesh. Thus, reform-minded persons are better advised to work through other social groups with more direct responsibility to the people. The bureaucracy can at best assist in this endeavor, but the structure and socialization it has undergone provide it trained incompetence in democratic processes of negotiations, dialogue and open discussions, and unnecessary neutrality regarding burning issues of equity and justice.

Third, the problem of accountability is not solved by allowing one group to make unrestrained decisions, no matter how well meaning. Given its long tenure, some bureaucracies do learn to identify with the state or nation instead of individual governments, as Linz has suggested. However, the national interest is defined by the bureaucracy from its limited perspective of reverence for hierarchy and technical expertise, especially if it does not have experience at the grassroots nor possess active regard for and interest in listening to the people. On the other hand, the political leadership, no matter how authoritarian, cannot exist completely out of the pale of public accountability. It has to maintain a semblance of legitimacy and thus will work for some public acceptance no matter how twisted its ends. Hence it must continue to be a focal point of demands, protests and reforms, along with and not as an alternative to pressures on the bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy is a problem-solving system; it has a whole arsenal of technology for every imaginable problem. Its development along technical lines has been the usual prescription of administrative reformers. Yet its political development must also be enhanced because its power is intrinsic to its size, expertise and permanence. That enhancement must be towards greater responsibility to the people, normally through its formal superior, the executive. The executive-bureaucracy conflicts discussed here indicate that the winner is not a foregone conclusion, nor that the victory of either one will necessarily lead to the attainment of democracy.

What does emerge, however, is that the struggle forces each party to clarify its vision or show its selfish motivations - thus to show what it stands for. Moreover, both protagonists cannot persist in their chosen paths without allies and support from other political groups; the participation of the latter is often crucial to the resolution of the conflict. It is therefore important not only to recognize and analyze the battles that the executive and the bureaucracy are waging, but more so to see whose interest they

uphold, and where the popular forces should line up to push the resolution of their struggle toward higher levels of justice and welfare. Thus the study of the nature of their encounter is not only of academic interest; it can also be useful to all persons and institutions anxious to weaken authoritarians or to refine their imperfect democracies.

The best bureaucracy is one whose expertise is utilized and tamed for higher democratic purposes. The best imaginable system is one where an executive with the will to substantiate democracy is assisted by a bureaucracy that believes in this goal and does all it can to achieve it. The political leadership would hardly find a civil service ready-made for its needs, the public interest not being something out there just waiting to be picked from a tree. Therefore it must develop the democratic means that will enable the bureaucracy to fulfill its mission, even as the latter from its own view tries to modify its policies - to align them with the procedures and practices it is used to, to ensure that it will not be left out of benefits, and to proffer its own ideas of where the society should be headed. The general and the selfish interest will probably get mixed, just as for the executive, the demands of the expedient, the partisan and the common good will be hard to sort out.

Difficult as this battle may be, it would not be fought before a computer terminal where the environment is constant and the result ascertained beforehand. On the contrary, the struggle requires that alliances and coalitions with and among political institutions, groups and even unorganized individuals (themselves representing different interests) will be made and the outcome will not necessarily be as predicted. The already dominant groups will have the cards stacked in their favor. But if the executive is strong and the bureaucracy responsive, and if the executive or the bureaucracy has allowed government to be receptive to the demands of those at the bottom, then there is a chance that democratic policies will not simply become expedient measures to pacify the poor. Here the state will not be autonomous, but it will also not be enslaved by the forces that have stunted the growth of real democracy. Popular education and involvement in the struggle of the executive and the bureaucracy are necessary to make this contest redound to the benefit of the people.

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