

**The Concept of Governance and  
its Implications for A.I.D.'s  
Development Assistance Program  
in Africa**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR A.I.D.'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN AFRICA**

In the past three years the analysis of Africa's development difficulties has increasingly focused on the enabling environment, defined not only in terms of macro-economic policies but in terms of political and administrative factors. Africans have pointed to the limitations of narrowly-based, authoritarian, inept and corrupt regimes and have demanded more participatory, democratic, accountable, competent and public minded policy processes. Donors have followed suit in emphasizing two related elements of this reform--democratization and governance.

This paper sets forth the position of the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. on governance and its relationship to democracy by:

- conceptualizing and defining "governance;"
- showing how "governance" and "democratization" are linked;
- adopting the concept of "democratic governance" as the preferred method of contributing to the politico-administrative enabling environment, in keeping with the broad democratization goals of U.S. foreign policy, and with the developmental goals of the Foreign Assistance Act governing the Africa Bureau;
- suggesting some potential project-level activities that can support dimensions of the concept of "democratic governance."

The paper argues that while "governance" and "democracy" overlap to a significant degree, both emphasizing structures, processes and values which heighten legitimacy, accountability and responsiveness public affairs, they are also conceptually distinct.

*Governance is conceived of as the effective management of public affairs through the generation of a regime (set of rules) accepted as legitimate, for the purpose of promoting and enhancing societal values sought by individuals and groups..*

This conception views governance as a process which takes place throughout society going beyond the workings of "government" and public administration. Governance combines **public sector competence, effectiveness and predictability** concerns, with attention to the nature of power relationships and to the purposes and beneficiaries of public resource management. The dimension of governance referred to as **legitimacy** emphasizes the need for a set of rules which are not only predictable, but which are also widely accepted, and therefore considered authoritative. The dimension of **responsiveness** focuses on the need for the political system to produce reciprocal benefits, not only for holders of power, but for groups and individuals in society as well. It focuses attention not only on the responsiveness of state actors to public demands, but on mutual responsiveness among and between state and non-state actors. This concept of governance includes an expanded notion of **accountability**, involving the ability to hold authorities responsible for the efficient use of resources and for policy outcomes, usually implying the possibility of changing governors in a competitive manner. Accountability also suggests another dimension of governance usually referred to as **transparency, or informational openness**. Finally, governance as employed here stresses **policy pluralism and promotion of civil society**, a dimension focusing on

the importance of non-state actors as vital players in governmental accountability and responsiveness, and as critical providers of governance functions in their own right.

**Democracy, or more appropriately democratization, is conceived of as a particular set of governance relationships or ways of achieving governance objectives. Democratization emphasizes accountability through open competition for authority (usually through electoral choice among alternatives), responsiveness and policy pluralism through participation, particularly by non-state actors, and respect for human rights, needed to assure the viability of these other democratic traits.**

Obviously, there are important areas of overlap between the concept of governance and that of democratization. By focusing on areas where they converge, it is possible to identify a way of managing public affairs which is not only competent and predictable, but which promotes ways of sharing governance and of promoting accountability which are today widely valued by both donors and many African actors. This convergence, which we call "democratic governance," corresponds with the stated preferences of U.S. foreign policy. The paper argues that it also represents an important way to promote the prospect of sustained economic development. In essence, the argument is that democratic governance provides the most promising enabling environment for broad-based economic growth by fostering not only competence and effective societal management, but shared or plural management and decision-making offering the opportunity for non-state actors to demand favorable policies from states including the right to manage many resources without excessive state intervention. In societies, such as those found in most African countries today, where non-state actors, and particularly potentially productive economic forces, have been so dominated and exploited by states, democratic governance is likely to provide a better balance, and to enable these actors to respond vigorously to opportunities to pursue their interests. Democratization and power sharing need not necessarily promote predictability, orderly resolution of conflicts, or economic development, but by combining them with principles of governance these outcomes are much more likely. On the other hand, without democratization, it is unlikely that improved governance practices will command sufficient legitimacy to survive, or that the mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness will long favor the interests of a broad range of non-state actors.

These notions support A.I.D. undertaking a range of activities in both the state and non-state sectors on behalf of democratic governance which will also be closely linked to the promotion of economic and social development. Exactly which activities are the most strategic or promising to pursue will have to be determined by a close assessment of the country context. Tables I to V in the annex of the paper suggest possible governance activities which missions may choose to undertake under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), either as separate projects, as dimensions of existing project activities, or as targets of opportunity to improve the democratic climate. The tables suggest that a number of activities, democratizing in nature, are suitable candidates for DFA financing as part of the promotion of democratic governance.

## Objectives of This Paper

The objectives of this paper are:

- 1) To assist the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. to arrive at a conception and definition of "governance," which is intellectually sound and which reflects the broad goals of U.S government policy in Africa.
- 2) To help link this concept of governance to factors which seem important to sustaining both economic development, through the emphasis on one form of governance which we shall refer to as "Democratic Governance."
- 3) To provide guidance to the Africa Bureau and to A.I.D. Missions by suggesting some possible programmatic initiatives which follow with the objective of "Democratic Governance."

## Approaches to Understanding Africa's Developmental Crisis

In the past three years a number of forces have conspired to produce a new, broader, and more politically-oriented analysis of Africa's development difficulties both among African political actors and international donors. This analysis is certainly not a new one for individual African intellectuals and for leaders of many African and Western non-governmental organizations. For years, they have been stressing the lack of democratic participation in political processes, particularly on the part of the poor, in their analyses of Africa's economic and developmental stagnation. This line of thinking led to the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation issued at Arusha in 1990.<sup>1</sup> In a follow-up meeting, African non-governmental organizations made their political analysis clearer in defining democracy as "popular participation.. the empowerment of people to effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing policies and programs that serve the interests of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits."<sup>2</sup> In his comments on the African Charter, Dr. Adedeji summarized and broadened this vision of democratic evolution arguing for launching a new era in Africa in which democracy, accountability, and development for transformation become internalized in every country and deep-rooted at every level of our society, ... in contrast to despotism, authoritarianism, and kleptocracy..<sup>3</sup>

Recent events, such as the dramatic democratization process in Eastern Europe and the blatant failure of autocracies both in Africa and elsewhere to manage their economies and maintain the standard of living of key groups in society have accelerated demands by African people, including counter-elites, for more democracy. These demands have been evident in popular

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<sup>1</sup>"African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation" (Arusha, February, 1990).

<sup>2</sup>"Beyond UNPAAERD: From Talk to Action," Background document for the NGO Position Paper for the Final Review of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD), 1991, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>"African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation," p. 37.

protests across the continent, usually transforming into politicized demands for political liberalization, and often extending to insistence on democratic reforms.<sup>4</sup> In a series of meetings held in early 1992, Africans consistently expressed the view that political liberalization would in itself be insufficient to meet their aspirations, and that political change would have to bring deep-seated democratization. Nearly always, they linked this aspiration to the hope or belief that such political change would be a pre-condition, if not a precursor, of economic and social development.<sup>5</sup> Whether these analyses, protests and reforms result in full blown democratic regimes, it is indisputable that the absence of democracy has become a major element in the analysis of Africa's underdevelopment.

Recently, this African and non-governmental organization perspective has been echoed by international actors, who, after years of focusing on technical economic factors, have been giving increasing attention to political factors in their diagnoses of the "failure to develop," and in their policy prescriptions. Since the late 1980s, a number of bilateral donors, most notably the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, Canada, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, and multilateral organizations such as the European Community and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the O.E.C.D, have been developing political concepts to add to their analyses and have been stressing different elements of change in their concepts. Broadly speaking, these concepts have ranged from far-reaching analyses of the need for particular kinds of political change, notably toward democracy with free and open electoral choice, to more restricted conceptions of "good government" or "governance" emphasizing public sector administrative competence, transparency and efficiency, and a series of technical and managerial reforms collectively labeled "strengthening the enabling environment."<sup>6</sup>

U.S. foreign policy, for its part, has increasingly been concerned with all of these elements - with democratization of representation and of the underlying political culture, with the improvement of human rights situations, and with the improvement of governance. U.S.A.I.D clearly stressed all of these goals in its Democracy and Governance Policy Paper both as political goals and because of their relevance to enhanced economic development.<sup>7</sup> A.I.D's regional Bureaus for Latin America and the Caribbean, for the Near East, and for Asia have responded to these multiple goals by developing "Democracy Initiatives", or "Democratic Pluralism Initiatives," in which governance has simply been discussed as one dimension. The conception of governance

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<sup>4</sup>Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.) Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 27-55.

<sup>5</sup>See reports from the Conference on "Promoting Good Government in Africa," Wilton Park (U.K.), January 27-31, 1992, and the preliminary report of National Academy of Science Conferences on Democratization in Africa, Benin (January 1992), Addis Ababa and Windhoek (March 1992).

<sup>6</sup>On competence, see the British notion of "good government" as presented in Lynda Chalker's speech at the Wilton Park Conference on Improving Government on Africa, January 27, 1992. On the enabling environment see The World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washington: The World Bank, 1989), pp. 47-62.

<sup>7</sup>USAID, Democracy and Governance Policy Paper, October 1991.

and democracy in the Africa Bureau has been evolving in the past three years. The close relationship between democracy and governance has always been recognized, but Africa Bureau analysts have debated whether these are distinct concepts with different policy implications, or whether one is a subset of the other.<sup>8</sup>

This paper carries this process one step further. It argues that there is a legitimate distinction between the concepts of governance and democracy; that there are significant areas of overlap between these concepts as well; and that by working to promote these areas of overlap, which we shall call "democratic governance," A.I.D./Washington and its missions in the field can contribute both to the broad democratization goals of U.S. foreign policy and directly to the prospect of sustainable economic development in Africa. The paper argues, as well, that while the world wide historical causal relationship between democratization and sustained economic development is inconclusive, there are strong reasons to believe that in much of contemporary Africa the promotion of "democratic governance" will be the most promising avenue for furthering both policy reform and broad-based entrepreneurial activity.

### **Toward A Meaningful Concept of Governance**

Governance is employed in this paper to mean "the effective management of public affairs through the generation of a regime (set of rules) accepted as legitimate, for the purpose of promoting and enhancing societal values sought by individuals and groups."<sup>9</sup>

This definition builds on earlier efforts, expanding them to incorporate structures, norms, and processes, and specifically a normative and consequence-driven concept. It makes use of a number of intellectual and academic inquiries into governance issues, including recent work from the "New Institutionalism" literature, while building on and making more explicit elements of that concept in the work of development practitioners such as the World Bank staff.

Generally, governance has been thought of as a set of processes whereby a society organizes to manage its economic and social resources for some public purpose. Earlier conceptions of governance by the World Bank stress a number of characteristics of this process, principally the predictability of rules and the growth of capacities, particularly in the public

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<sup>8</sup>Democratization in Africa: Background Paper, unpublished, nd. 1990, argued that "democratization (is) the rubric under which the four sub-categories indicated here (political accountability, civil and political rights, governance, and political participation) are subsumed." Yet it also asserted their distinctness contending that "there can be no direct linkage between improving democracy and governance." See also David Gordon, (REDSO/ESA Regional Policy Advisor), "Governance and Democratization in Africa: Issues for USAID," May 19-24, 1991, p. 2, in which the argument is made that the two concepts overlap substantially, but that "democracy is a far more narrow concept than governance..."

<sup>9</sup>This definition builds on Goran Hyden's work presented in Goran Hyden, "Reciprocity and Governance in Africa," in James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, (eds.), The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa, p. 246; and in his "Study of Politics," in Hyden and Bratton, (eds.). op. cit.

sector, to formulate and implement policies effectively and efficiently.<sup>10</sup> The Bank also introduces a dimension of governance called **accountability**, which it defines as the ability to hold public officials responsible for their actions and which it discusses principally in terms of responsibility for the efficient use of public resources and for producing and delivering public goods and services.<sup>11</sup> This conception leaves open a few important issues; namely what the character of power in the governance process is; what the purpose of governance is; and what the range of governance activity is in society.

The definition of governance adopted here adds to the Bank conception a number of ideas synthesized by such scholars as Goran Hyden, Michael Bratton, and the contributors to their recent volume, who drew on insights from the literature of the "New Institutionalism" and of "rational choice." It also embodies further thinking by members of the World Bank's Governance Group.<sup>12</sup> Briefly, these new contributions broaden the basic understanding of governance providing answers to the important issues posed above. Governance, as they conceive of it, focuses on a particular way of managing public affairs, based on the generation of legitimacy through the authoritative use of power. In other words, governance involves power which relies mainly on the consent of the governed and voluntary compliance. The principal means of obtaining that consent is through the generation and sustenance of a "regime--" a set of rules and consequences which are widely known and predictably applied, and which are widely accepted as legitimate.

Governance is a purposeful activity. The Bank refers to the purpose as "development," but leaves unspecified the purpose or consequences of "development."<sup>13</sup> The concept of governance offered here contends that consequence of the exercise of authority is to "promote and enhance societal values sought by individuals and groups."<sup>14</sup> Hence, the concept of "development" as a goal of governance takes on concrete meaning as the management of resources to produce valued benefits. Governance is a process whereby societies manage their public affairs by fostering and structuring an underlying normative consensus on the rules based on a sense of reciprocal or mutual benefit. This domain of mutual benefit Hyden calls the "public realm."<sup>15</sup> The New

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<sup>10</sup>World Bank, "Managing Development: The Governance Dimension- A Discussion Paper," August 29, 1991, p. 1. and p. 23, footnote 2.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 8-10.

<sup>12</sup>Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Ladipo Adamolekun, Nancy Farmer and Raymond Hopkins, "Report of the Second Workshop on Governance," Mayflower Hotel, December 10, 1991. Unpublished report for the World Bank.

<sup>13</sup>World Bank, "Managing Development," p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>Goran Hyden, "Reciprocity and Governance in Africa," James Wunsch and Dele Olowu (eds.), The Failure of the Centralized State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 246.

<sup>15</sup>Hyden, "Governance and the Study of Politics," in Hyden and Bratton, eds., op.cit., pp. 10-14; Shaheen Mozaffar, "Understanding Governance in Africa: A Comparative Analytical Framework," unpublished paper, 1991, p. 14; On the theory of reciprocity see Ronald Oakerson, "Reciprocity: A Bottom-Up View of Political Development," in V. Ostrom and D. Fenny, and H. Picht, Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development:

Institutionalists contend that it is the perception by members of the public of shared obligation and benefit, or at least potentially shared benefit, which provides the incentive for rational actors to play the game according to the rules. A major consequence of this incentive is that actors are far more likely where governance is well developed to attempt to solve societal problems in a way which perpetuates the rules, and which therefore manages conflict.

This view of governance, in turn, expands and clarifies the concept of accountability, adding to it a more explicitly normative dimension. In the concept of governance offered here accountability not only implies that authority holders can be held responsible for the efficient use of resources, but that they should be responsible to the public for producing results which benefit not only themselves but also their people. The governed, in turn must be able and willing to be accountable.<sup>16</sup> As a normative concept, then, accountability is closely linked to the ideas of reciprocity or mutuality and responsiveness between and among actors at various levels of a political system.

Finally, this concept of governance as set of rules for the "public realm" allows us to think about governance much more broadly than institutions of "government."<sup>17</sup> Governance functions can clearly take place at the level of any actor, state or non-state, which manages resources and produces benefits for a collectivity or "public."<sup>18</sup> This view of governance highlights an

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Issues, Alternatives, and Choices (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1988), pp. 141-158. For Hyden, "reciprocity" is based on relationships which seek the public good or "solidarity" as contrasted to "exchanges" based on self-interest. This conception seems unduly specified, however, and can be left to empirical inquiry in particular societies. For an application of this approach to local governance in the United States see the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Organization of Local Public Economies (Washington: ACIR, December, 1987). A comparable definition of governance is found on page 12.

<sup>16</sup>Michael Bratton and Donald Rothchild, "The Institutional Bases of Governance in Africa," in Hyden and Bratton, op. cit., p. 263.

<sup>17</sup>Recent work by members of the World Bank thematic group on governance has begun addressing the importance of governance functions in civil society, including not only the role which such associations can play in holding states accountable, but in supplying some of the governance functions states are unable to do. See Pierre-Landell Mills, "Governance, Civil Society and Empowerment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Building the Institutional Base for Sustainable Development," unpublished paper, World Bank, Africa Technical Department, May 1992, pp. 10-13.

<sup>18</sup>The concept of "public" has been distorted and lost in much of the political science literature. In recent years it has been commonplace to contrast "government" and "citizens," or "state" and "society." Both conceptions can be misleading in a governance perspective, for the process of governance need not be located exclusively or even primarily in one specialized institution called "government" or the "state." Governance, rather, can be seen as the interplay of public management decisions undertaken by a number of actors which operate on behalf of groups. Max Weber and structural anthropologists, such as M.G. Smith, called these actors "publics" or "corporations." The key to any "public" from a governance point of view is that it engage in regime creation and maintenance—that it generate, enforce and apply rules for its members. See M.G. Smith, "Structural Approach to Comparative Politics" in David Easton (ed.), Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1966) pp. 115-119; See John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Denver: Allan Swallow, 1954), pp. 12-20 for a related by less structural view of the "public."

important implication of political structure. Promoting governance processes, as described here, can help strengthen the political process in a given political system without necessarily enhancing the power of the state apparatus vis-a-vis the non-state, or "civil" society. Governance helps the system perform critical roles such as the maintenance of rules and the management of conflict wherever the governance function is being performed, within publics, and between them. In fact, this area of linkage between publics of various sorts, is the very essence of governance.

### **The Concept of Democratic Governance**

In the past few years it has become increasingly apparent that the aspirations of a wide array of both westerners and Africans have not been adequately embodied even in this broad and normative definition of governance. They have, instead, insisted upon a particular form of governance representing the overlap of the basic governance principles outlined above and of democratic political practice. This overlap or convergence has been called variously "good government," "l'état de droit" in its broadest conception, or what we shall term "democratic governance."

Even the most cautious of international donors, such as the World Bank, have increasingly accepted this view. The seminal World Bank paper, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, not only discussed governance in terms of public sector reform, political accountability, regime legitimacy, and the institutionalization of power (as opposed to its personalistic use), it also stressed the importance of some essential elements of political pluralism, participation, and decentralization.<sup>19</sup> Annexes to its subsequent discussion paper "Managing Development: The Governance Dimension," and further expositions by Bank officials Serageldin and Landell-Mills<sup>20</sup> reveal a highly political conception of "accountability" through informed choice and participation in decision-making and regulatory bodies which imply democratic decision making. Similarly, the British notion of "good governance" explicitly includes the political criterion of accountability, understood to mean free and open political choice in a pluralist system, transparent government, the rule of law, and freedom of press and expression.<sup>21</sup> Even the French conception of "l'état de droit" has recently been defined in a way which includes the notion of regime legitimacy based on adherence to basic human rights and the notion of limited and divided state power.<sup>22</sup> For the U.S. government, the Democracy Initiative has essentially represented this same synthesis of democracy and governance concerns.

As a concept, good government, or democratic governance implies a judicious combination of two distinct but related concepts. Democracy, in fact, can best be understood as one form of governance--governance conforming more to the values, rules, and institutionalized procedures of

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<sup>19</sup>World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth A Long Term Perspective Study (Washington: D.C.: World Bank, 1989), pp. 58, 61 and 190-191.

<sup>20</sup>Ismail Serageldin and Pierre Landell-Mills, "Governance and the External Factor," paper for the Annual Conference on Development Economics, April, 1991.

<sup>21</sup>Lynda Chalker, Minister of Overseas Development Administration, speech at Wilton Park, January 27, 1992.

<sup>22</sup>Michel Gentot, "Fonction Publique et Etat de Droit," in *La moderisation des fonctions publiques africaines: Actes du Colloque à Cotonou* (Paris: Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement, 1992, pp. 52-53.

democracy.<sup>23</sup> While this paper will not attempt to enter into the extensive literature on the variety of meanings given to the term democracy, there is broad agreement both among theorists on the minimum characteristics of democratizing regimes.<sup>24</sup> Robert Dahl, distilling the essence of these rules as a structure he called "polyarchy," stressed two elements or dimensions--competition, or "contestation," for positions of authority, and inclusiveness or the right to participate of those not in positions of authority.<sup>25</sup> Diamond, Linz and Lipset in their recent work have added to the dimensions of competition and participation the dimension of respect for civil liberties.<sup>26</sup> Democratization also often implies the establishment of a contractual relationship between a people and its "government" explicitly limiting the exercise of authority (constitutionalism), often with specific structural arrangements designed to check potential abuses of authority inherent in the over-concentration of power. At the heart of modern democratic theory are the concepts of accountability and responsiveness which we have seen are also intrinsic to the concept of governance. Democratization, however, usually specifies movement toward structures and means by which these are likely to be assured, principally through institutions of representation, enforced political accountability through potential alternation of authority holders normally through electoral choice, and structures for checking over-centralization or concentration of power by a single authority or by the state vis-a-vis the civil society.

The concept of democratic governance seeks to do two things. It combines elements of democratic values, structures and processes with elements of our concept of governance which are not necessarily inherently democratic. It also makes explicit the preferred way in which certain elements of governance should be achieved, following democratic thinking. This suggests that the two concepts are not identical and that something of value can be achieved by combining them. At the heart of both are notions of accountability and legitimacy. The notions of predictability and effectiveness, however, do not form an integral part of democratization. Democratizing political systems may well be caught in webs of competing rules empowered by participation and increasingly effective instruments of "voice." Democratization may well lead to the politicization and at least temporary ineffectiveness of public actors such as governmental bureaucracies. Democratization may well lead to a winner take all mentality for groups which can, through the use of the democratic rules, dominate public life. Democratizing regimes may, in fact, be inefficient in the management of public affairs.

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<sup>23</sup>The argument here is that it makes much more conceptual sense to understand democracy as a specific form of governance, than to conceive of governance as an element of democracy.

<sup>24</sup>In fact, defining "democracy" is particularly slippery because it can perhaps best be understood as a goal whose end state has evolved over time, and whose specific form of relationship between state and civil society has varied substantially, depending on historical, situational and regional circumstance." See Raymond Gastil, "DAC Member Support for Democratic Development: Definitions and Issues," unpublished study for the OECD, DAC, April 1992, p. 2; Crawford Young and Boubacar Kante, "Governance, Democracy, and the 1988 Senegalese Elections," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder CO.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 62.

<sup>25</sup>Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale university Press, 1971), pp. 1-9.

<sup>26</sup>Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and S.M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries. Volume I: Persistence, Failure and Renewal (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), p. xiv-xvii.

Governance, for its part, need not imply a democratic mode of choice or a specific form of public accountability such as competitive elections. Governance is less closely associated with minimum rights of minorities, although publics must attend to broadly perceived needs. Governance need not imply direct participation of the governed in any significant way, as long of the rules are accepted and consequences are met. Legitimacy in the concept of governance need not be rooted in legal-rationality or in majoritarian principles, as long as the regime (set of rules) is widely known and accepted. Responsiveness in governance requires the production of mutual benefits, but not necessarily symmetrical power to determine outcomes.

Democratic governance, therefore, is an effort to combine the notions of competence, predictability, legitimacy and responsiveness with respect for human rights, with the promotion of pluralism in form and in policy, and with electoral choice.

### **Democratic Governance and Development**

Why do so many African governmental and non-governmental leaders, and so many donors favor democratic governance as a course of action for contemporary African societies? There are essentially three answers. First, it is clear that democracy has become a prevailing value in its own right, widely sought after as an alternative to exclusionary, often repressive and abusive regimes. Second, it is now widely believed that governance principles such as management effectiveness, regime legitimacy and rule predictability enhance the climate or environment for economic development. Third, there is a mounting view that democratic governance--the convergence of governance principles with democratic values and structures--offers a highly desirable, if not the best, framework for promoting economic development, particularly development which will be based on broad-based growth led by non-state actors.

None of these propositions can be proven definitively. But the logic of the latter two is developed in the following section which examines how five dimensions of governance, and specifically of democratic governance are inter-related and are likely to support development. This examination of different dimensions of governance concludes with some notions of how international donors, like A.I.D., can attempt to assist the development process by assisting the growth of democratic governance.

Drawing on the concept of governance and democratic governance outlined above, we can see that there are essentially five dimensions of democratic governance. These are

- Public Management Effectiveness
- Legitimacy and Public Responsiveness
- Accountability
- Information Openness
- Pluralism in the policy domain (Acceptance and Active linkage of other publics"

## **1. Public Management Effectiveness**

Public management effectiveness is the most widely discussed dimension of governance in literature which attempts to directly link governance to development. Broadly, management effectiveness is the ability to skillfully and efficiently employ public resources to address and ameliorate public problems. Management effectiveness represents the dimension of competence vital to both development and to producing legitimacy and a sense of public responsiveness. Without better management, publics, including the state, will fail to perform well, and will lose legitimacy based on disappointment over their performance on the part of their members and other publics, including international donors. Competent governance, on the other hand, leads people to believe that those in authority are using their resources as well as possible in addressing public problems.

Poorly functioning state bureaucracies with limited administrative capabilities also compromise economic development in a number of ways. They waste scarce resources by controlling expenditures poorly and collecting revenues unevenly. They provide poor environments for investment by limiting returns in both public and private sector investments through their inefficiency. They make poor decisions because they are frequently overly centralized and under-staffed with personnel with appropriate skills. Beyond their negative direct impact on economic development, they erode the basis for stability and predictability by undermining perceptions of legitimacy. Regimes which fail to produce results acceptable to the general population or to important non-governmental groups within society provide little incentive to "play by the rules," to manage conflict creatively, or to voluntarily support the regime and its policies.

The concept of governance offered in this paper contributes an important perspective to the more traditional view of improving public management. First, improving management effectiveness must clearly be distinguished from state-building. The World Bank and other actors often conceive of "public management reform" in terms of strengthening the effectiveness of governments and bureaucracies (the public sector). The broader understanding of governance offered in this paper leads to the view that improving public management effectiveness can be extended to improving management qualities in any "public," including those normally thought of as non-governmental associations (NGOs). It should help any institution to function better, and hence enable the entire system of governance to be more effective. Adding the dimension of democratic governance further promotes the view that management reforms be seen as complementing and enhancing other dimensions of governance, such as accountability and responsiveness. To build managerial effectiveness without promoting the broader context of governance may be to contribute to authoritarian outcomes. Democratic governance will also favor decentralization of management, emphasizing the need to build management capability throughout the society, particularly in the productive private sector. Enhancing the management capacity of the state alone is a poor strategy for promoting competition and balance vital to the development of democratic forms of governance.

Programmatically, public management effectiveness activities pose no real difficulties conceptually. Donors have considerable experience providing technical assistance and training in this area, usually to central governmental institutions. Activities of this sort can either be

undertaken as separate program objectives in the form of public management projects, or as dimensions of sectoral activities such as health and educational programs. In both cases the preference for democratic governance can be emphasized both by building in management skills which make performance monitoring and hence public accountability more transparent, and by consciously broadening the societal base of management competence to include local level actors and non-governmental actors which have productive or economic management functions. For example, assisting parent groups to plan and manage local resources for educational purposes will not only strengthen policy performance, but it will encourage a sharing of the governance function. This approach goes beyond support for formal decentralization which may merely extend the capacity of the central state to penetrate local-level society. It implies that management skills be consciously spread to empower participation locally.

## **2. Legitimacy of Power and Responsiveness**

Legitimacy is the belief that those who exercise power have the authority to do so, leading to the voluntary acceptance of public decisions by other authority holders and by citizens. Legitimacy depends on the existence of a set of rules which are widely known, and accepted and which are respected (adhered to) by both authority holders and the general population.

In modern western societies, we usually think of these rules as formal laws, often as fundamental law or "constitutional law." Modern governments most frequent attempt to establish legitimacy on the basis of promulgating law as a kind of contract between authorities and citizens. Some of the most important of these rules involve the allocation of resources and rights, which if widely subscribed to, are authoritative and therefore form a framework of predictability. This notion of rules corresponds closely with the concept of "rule of law," seen by the World Bank and others to be a pillar of predictability and a basis for establishing an improved environment for investment and long-term economic development. Where the rules are clearly known and are stable, the climate for investment improves because risks and the costs of transactions can be more fully assessed and both may well be decreased. A well defined rule of law also implies a system of adjudication whereby disputes between economic actors--state and non-state--can be resolved, even at the initiation of non-state actors.

The enhancement of legitimacy based on a rule of law is an obvious contribution to economic growth. Whatever the rules, knowledge of them and the expectation that they are likely to be followed contribute enormously to investment, whether by a small-holders in rain-fed agriculture, or an international corporation. Predictability helps all economic and social actors calculate risk and potential benefit. Rules that are likely to be applied help predict how efforts to enforce contractual obligations will fare. If there is also a sense that rules will be fairly enforced by authorities who are relatively disinterested in the results, economic risk taking can be still further encouraged. This, however, will depend on the society's agreements on the rules and institutions.

Democratic governance emphasizes particular ways of developing consensus and then of promoting a fairer application of the rules. Democratic governance may be a highly appropriate basis of developing agreement on rules in Africa where there may be a number of divergent

cultural bases of legitimacy other than legal-rationality.<sup>27</sup> This is because the principle agreement in democracy governance is on procedure. People and groups may agree to be bound when they believe that they can participate in making the rules. Participation in rule formulation, directly or through some system of representation is usually associated with legitimacy in democratic theory, as long as such rule do not violate widely adhered to human rights in the name of majoritarianism. Democratic governance in such societies requires that "publics" forge frameworks, through their dealings with one another and with the institutions of the state to deal with conflicts arising out of this diversity.

Rule of law in democracies also usually implies specific institutions or structures, such as a judiciary independent of both the executive and the dominant political organization, and the capacity of some authority to hold even the highest office holders accountable under that same law. More broadly, non-partisan institutions for mediating and adjudicating not only conflicts in interpretation of law, but even the applicability of conflicting rules, seem vital to maintaining legitimacy and managing conflict in contemporary Africa.

As has been discussed above, governance is based not only on legitimacy, but on the principle of perceived mutual benefit, which we call "responsiveness," and accountability of authorities for producing that result. "Publics" such as the "state," it is argued, are considered to be legitimate when they are perceived to be responsive to demands by their members, and when they can predictably be expected to fulfill their part of the bargain.<sup>28</sup> At the minimum, this suggests that the legitimate rules which govern authority cannot be capricious nor can they only benefit the few. A system on the basis of legitimacy and the perception of mutual benefit represents a significant improvement in the climate for economic development it creates, as compared to a system based on illegitimate exercise of power by arbitrary and self-serving rulers. The latter system can only produce compliance through the massive use of coercion and threat which is inimical to stimulating broad-based economic risk taking or innovation.

There is, of course, a very serious question about the risks of empowering additional actors to make demands on the political system. Public responsiveness is often viewed as government "supplying" benefits in response to popular "demands." If what the population, or significant interests within it, demands is consumption rather than investment, savings and sound fiscal management, there is a real concern that responsive governance may run counter to sustainable economic development. The record on this in sub-saharan Africa is far from clear. There is strong, but unsystematic, evidence that a growing number of African opinion leaders strongly oppose certain kinds of state expenditures, such as large military budgets, while favoring certain government spending, such as expenditures for education, health care, clean water, and in the case of urban populations, housing and food subsidies. These preferences may be viewed principally as investments or as consumption, depending on one's point of view. However, a case

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<sup>27</sup>Many African countries today are characterized by a plurality of "regimes" within a single political system, operating on differing sets of rules or even on differing legitimacy principles. Many non-state "publics" seem to be organized around rules of "affection" or personal relationship, rather than on universalistic legal-rationality.

<sup>28</sup>See Barrington Moore, Lord and Serf: Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), for a discussion of the reciprocity and responsiveness of legitimate monarchies.

can be made for the fact that they stem from structures of authoritarian, often illegitimate, states which have excluded most societal interests from participation in public policy making, rather than from excessively participatory states. Both colonial and post-colonial authoritarian regimes fostered mentalities of the government as "patron." Major sectors of society were consistently excluded from this formula, most notably productive forces of society such as small and medium farmers, and much of the private sector business community.

This fear of the consequences of broadening involvement in policy making neglects the possibility that newly empowered actors will demand policies which permit greater production of policies and commodities outside the state sector, and which, therefore, permit non-state publics to be suppliers as well as demanders. Responsive and legitimate states need not be viewed as the only supplier, but when power is exercised without legitimacy clients will take from patrons whatever they can get. In fact, democratic governance may be more likely to produce responsiveness conducive to sustained economic growth. Democratization implies the growth in participation in decision making and implementation. Where political processes are more participatory, and where a variety of interests can meaningfully participate in economic policy decisions more fully, interests representing productive forces in society seem more likely to be able to both demand policy consistent with their interests. Democratic participation seems especially vital to economic liberalization where productive forces of society have been largely excluded from access to state authority, and where policy has been thoroughly dominated by central state actors. This leads to a preference for participatory and democratic governance within the context of pluralism, not only for its own right, but for its developmental implications. This is admittedly only a hypothesis which bears careful study. It is a hypothesis, however, worthy of promotion in AID strategies in Africa, because the alternatives have proven so thoroughly unpromising and discouraging of both good policy and productive incentives.

The dimensions of legitimacy and responsive point to a range of actions likely to assist both development and democratization. Some missions may choose to make the enhancement of authority, particularly at the national level a major program objective, supported by activities to strengthen not only the judiciary, but also the legislative process. Civic education and support for respecting basic human rights at all levels of society can also contribute directly to both democratization and the enabling environment. Promoting training and the creation of institutions to deal with conflict between communities with different sets of rules may be one of the most important contributions which a donor can make to social peace and a climate of security and growth. Undertaking many of these same activities in the context of specific project activities may prove to be the most suitable strategy for promoting legitimacy, as people learn in the process of undertaking concrete activities such as managing cooperatives or health centers, or building roads and irrigation facilities, to establish rules and create procedures for adjudicating rule disputes both within the group and between themselves and authorities at other levels.

Enhancing responsiveness should be seen as being linked to fostering the ability of non-state interests to both make demands on government and to supply their own localized solutions. AID missions can do this selectively by strengthening the advocacy and analytic capabilities of non-governmental organizations, particularly those whose interests are associated with production. This can often best be accomplished through a product aimed at a particular sector, such as agriculture, manufacturing, or finance. It can also be done less pointedly through assistance to

non-governmental associations as institutions generally, and to the capacity of state institutions such as legislatures to deal with constituency relations and interest group demands in the policy process.

### **3. Public Accountability**

Public accountability is a concept closely linked to legitimacy and responsiveness. It is the element of governance in which there can be consequences for the actions of authorities. In particular, accountability means that both state and non-state authorities will have incentives to adhere to the "rules," and to respond to societal demands or threat of negative sanctions, such as censure, prosecution, or replacement. Accountability can be viewed as a means for reducing arbitrary actions and corruption.

Public accountability implies that clear rules of conduct or performance expectations are known, that relatively objective means are available for assessing conduct, and that legal and political sanctions can be brought to bear. Apart from the technical requirements-- external or objective auditing and systematic review, information openness, judicial independence-- accountability hinges most on the possibility of competition for positions of authority.

In the view of governance offered here, accountability is not exclusively the ability to hold state authorities responsible to the public for their actions. It is also the accountability of authorities at various levels of the state to one another, a typical issue of decentralization in which central officials are made more accountable by the involvement of other actors in decision making and implementation.

Accountability is obviously linked to all the other dimensions of governance. What distinguishes it is the political dimension-- the possibility of sanctioning authority holders through competition for their positions. The concept of accountability as a dimension of governance does not exclude methods for managing competition other than truly democratic elections. For example, in the early years of the Kenyatta regime in Kenya, it appears that a fairly high level of accountability was maintained between politicians and their communities, even in the absence of meaningful institutions of plural democracy, such as multiple parties, through the mechanism of competition within the structure of KANU party. Barkan argues that the key to accountability in Kenyatta's Kenya was the relatively open and resilient nature of the political process with multiple secondary centers of power and a measure of real competition for power. Politicians knew the rules for success and were permitted sufficient latitude to maintain their own power bases. If they failed to deliver benefits to their constituents they could be replaced.<sup>29</sup> Accountability, therefore, may be improved even without the adoption of fully democratic forms. In fact Bratton and van de Walle argue that any increase in political competition represents political reform.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Joel Barkan, "The Rise and Fall of a Governance Realm in Kenya," in Hyden and Bratton, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-192.

<sup>30</sup>Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses," in Hyden and Bratton, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

There are particular reasons, however, for supporting democratic governance, including free elections, as the preferred method for choosing authorities in Africa. Certainly most African intellectuals argue strongly that, given Africa's recent past experience, anything short of open and competitive electoral processes provides too little assurance of responsible authority. This position essentially means that they doubt that pre-colonial traditions for managing competition, and for holding leaders accountable for their actions, will suffice either to assure potential opponents or international actors who are potential investors.<sup>31</sup>

Accountability, it is argued, is linked to economic development in a number of ways. When authorities are known to be accountable and have put into place mechanisms for monitoring their actions in specific areas such as financial accountability, both public and private investors are much more likely to risk their capital. This is equally true for relationships between international donors and national authorities, as between national authorities and authorities at lower levels of the state, or between national financial institutions and leaders of non-state institutions. A working system of accountability is also likely to promote legitimacy and a more predictable political environment with less probability of violent and sudden change. This, too, should prove to be a more conducive enabling environment. Corrupt behavior poses a special problem for development in so far as it complicates calculations of cost and raises the cost of doing business. Corruption is a very serious problem weakening the functioning of publics which arises when public accountability is low, since people rarely accept that their leaders privatize a significant amount of public resources thereby offering little if any mutual benefit from their use. Where the governance function is weak in a society, the rules are either poorly articulated and accepted, or the public has a poorly developed capacity to hold its rulers accountable. Corruption is an indicator of weakly developed governance, particularly of poor accountability.

Supporting increasing accountability can take a variety of forms. With this deep suspicion of any measures other than multiparty electoral processes, it is appropriate to vigorously assist African initiatives in this direction. Actions to promote electoral commissions, to assist in the preparation for elections including registration, to assist all actors in campaign organization and political communication, to support election monitoring and related human rights groups which serve to protect the rights of political competitors can all contribute to building a democratic structure of accountability which will improve the climate for development.

These immediate actions should be complemented by longer-term aspects of accountability, such as improved systems of performance reporting, institutional forms of inter-governmental relations, and systems for improving contractual relation between state and non-state institutions. Specific programmatic initiatives which can help improve accountability involve strengthening evaluation and monitoring functions of government agencies, encouraging effective decentralization designed to bring services closer to users and to encourage the development of

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<sup>31</sup>See Crawford Young and Boubacar Kante, "Governance, Democracy, and the 1988 Senegalese Elections," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder CO.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 62. George Ayittey, is one of the rare contemporary African voices who argues that while post-colonial African regimes have attempted to destroy these "indigenous" and often democratic institutions, they can be revived in a new and original African synthesis which need not take the form of pluralism and liberal democracy. See his Indigenous African Institutions (Ardsley-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1991).

institutional checks on over concentration of authority. Encouraging the participation of representatives of non-state actors in policy making and implementing bodies, and strengthening these capacity to do so in an informed way should also contribute to accountability. These measures, taken together, can constitute an approach to reducing corruption by dividing authority and enhancing the ability of a number of actors to know what others are doing.

#### **4. Information Openness**

Generally information openness and transparency in decision making are acknowledged as vital elements in governance because they are clearly vital to the establishment and maintenance of legitimate authority (rule of law both narrowly and broadly defined) and to accountability. Responsiveness is also critically dependent on a relatively free flow of information throughout society. Information openness and transparency, therefore, are closely related to controlling and limiting such illegitimate and unresponsive behavior as corruption. Information openness is also a vital aspect of democratization, supporting not only the right of the population to know, but to participate meaningfully.

Information openness is the ability of members of the public to know whether those in authority are conforming to the norms and how well they are responding to public demands. It involves two distinct elements. First, the procedures of state publics must be open (transparent) enough so that it is possible to know what the basis of decision is and whether it is being respected in practice. All publics, including external aid donors will be particularly interested in what the norms are determining how financial resources are managed and distributed and how well these norms are followed. Non-state publics must also develop transparent processes, not only to enable their members to hold leadership accountable, but also to enable other publics, such as the state or external donors to exercise accountability. These steps will improve the prospects of economic development by building the confidence of foreign public and private investors in the legitimacy and predictability of those in authority, while giving added assurance that abuses of authority, such as corrupt procurement practices, will be exposed and curtailed.

Second, democratizing information openness requires movement toward a freer mass media, characterized by multiple and even competitive sources of information. In Africa, the state and its leadership have often attempted to monopolize or overwhelmingly dominate the media in order to limit competition and accountability. It is unrealistic to expect a state-run or financed media to ever be adequate to the task of providing sufficiently open information to make effective accountability possible. From this point of view, information openness as a dimension of governance requires a move to non-state and private ownership of the media and toward an improved "enabling environment" ("regime" or set of rules) for media operation. Respect for the civil and property rights of such media owners and disseminators is the minimum requirement. Effective media competition will probably also involve a high degree of transparency in state norms governing media, so that, if these norms are unequal or unfair, that information can be widely known. Finally, information openness involves improving the performance reporting of all publics, particularly the state. If the assumption is that actors and institutions are consequence-driven--that they make choices based at least in part on rational choices--then the information must increasingly be available about the consequences of choices.

Information openness is linked to economic development in a number of ways. In an open and competitive information environment authorities are likely to pay greater attention to public demands and to be more circumspect about using public resources wastefully or corruptly. Information openness also serves to enhance the climate for development indirectly, by potentially raising the performance level of authorities, their adherence to the rules and ultimately their legitimacy. Of course, information openness can also have the effect of discrediting and reducing the legitimacy of corrupt, greedy or inefficient authorities. This, however, is an essential risk if accountability is to be meaningful.

AID can assist information openness by strengthening the capacity of both governments and non-governmental organizations to gather and report information on their performance. It can directly support the development of an effective and viable media by exposing opinion leaders and decision makers to information about the rights and responsibilities of a free media, and by encouraging the development of a legal framework to assure that the media can operate with minimal constraints. This can involve support to civil and human rights groups and journalists associations which can become more effective advocates of the rights of media owners and workers. Finally, it can support training for journalists in covering economic policy issues with greater comprehension and clarity, so that readers can more fully understand not only the sacrifices which reform policies entail, but the potential benefits to particular groups in society, particularly to productive groups. Often this can best be done by targeting such training to specialized print media which focus on economic news.

##### ***5. Policy pluralism-Acceptance and active linkage of other "publics."***

Much of what has been discussed above points to the importance of supporting multiple centers of participation and decision making in society in order to assure better management, responsiveness, and accountability. The term we apply to this is "policy pluralism," which encompasses both decentralization of state institutions, and strengthening of civil society. From a governance point of view, multiplying "publics" is productive mainly when these "publics" gain capacity to act as advocates, particularly to defend and promote their economic interests, but also to defend basic rights which underpin the ability to risk any independent action.

The key to understanding why pluralism contributes to governance and to development is linkage. The mere existence of local governments, or of non-governmental institutions, or the acceptance of their right to exist, may be an important first step in sharing governance functions, but is hardly a sufficient one. Policy pluralism implies that these publics can participate in defining and managing policy. At the minimum, policy pluralism involves the capacity of some publics to limit the impact of others on policies implemented at their level--a minimum of organizational autonomy. Without this capacity, economic interest groups, such as unions or chambers of commerce, will merely be co-opted or manipulated by other publics, usually by central state actors. A fuller sense of linkage involves tolerating or even encouraging the participation of a variety of publics in policy making and implementation. With such participation, economic interest groups can advocate their positions and contribute to policy formulation, thus checking to some degree the over concentration of authority by other actors. Since local-level actors, and productive economic actors, such as business associations and farmer groups, have frequently been excluded from the policy process in the past, assisting in their linkage would not

only strengthen governance, but would likely open up opportunities for better economic decisions. Above, we have described this process not only in terms of encouraging the "demand" side of policy-making, but as a way of increasing the "supply" by effectively decentralizing decision making.

The most productive relationships, however, are likely to take place in the linkage where exchanges of information and mutual checks on the exercise of authority take place. This concept of democratic governance confers a specific meaning to the notion of "empowered participation." It is not just the right of individuals or groups to partake in state functions. It is the right to share in governance. Without this sharing, responsiveness and accountability would be merely a matter of enlightened or benevolent behavior on the part of state officials--a condition on which most societies would hardly wish to rely. Tolerance or encouragement of civil society, on the other hand, is the basis for countervailing power or political competition which seems vital to assuring the responsive and accountable functioning of any political system. Governance, therefore, depends on the willingness of state actors to accept the establishment and maintenance of non-state public actors even when these actors have different interests or perspectives than those of state leaders.

Concretely, A.I.D. can further this dimension of governance by encouraging the decentralization of some state functions, particularly in the area of economic policy making and implementation, and by assisting these actors in gaining the institutional and managerial capacity to analyze their interests, effectively advocate them, and develop programs for their achievement using local resources at the maximum degree possible. A.I.D. can also strengthen these same capabilities in economically-oriented non-state actors. Finally, A.I.D. can encourage effective linkages between the two, supporting such institutions as economic and social councils, where non-governmental voices can be heard.

The key to this process, however, is the right to associate at reasonable costs. Without assurances of at least minimal human rights, civil society can not be assured. For civil society to emerge, defend its interests, be sustained, and play a role in holding public officials accountable, the potential costs of associational life must be bearable. Normally, this must be done by state institutions. AID can assist state institutions in playing a leadership role in this area, eventually supported by new norms of tolerance transmitted through civic education. Promoting minimum human rights associated with the right to organize and to be free from arbitrary sanctions for opposition to public officials is an essential function of democratic governance intimately linked to the promoting of meaningful civil society. Non-state actors also have an important role to play in insisting on guarantees of these rights not only for themselves, but for other non-state public actors. In the African context, where a variety of actors with differing governance rules can coexist, the acceptance of competition and the guarantee of rights for others may pose particularly sharp difficulties. To the extent that a vigorous civil society is viewed as crucial to sustained economic development, these human rights actions are an intrinsic part not only of democratic policy, but of governance for development.

## **Some Programmatic Implications of Democratic Governance Concept**

Below are five tables intended to suggest some ways in which AID programs can support democratic governance. They suggest both a research agenda (in so far as some suggested relationships require further study) and a set of proposed program activities at the country level.<sup>32</sup>

The organization of these tables is significant. First, each represents a dimension of democratic governance concept, although it is clear from reading the tables and the text that the programmatic implications cut across these dimensions. For example, strengthening legislative functions, or the advocacy capabilities of non-governmental organizations in civil society, contributes to a number of dimensions of governance.

Second, each table is divided vertically into two categories--democratic governance, political democratization, implying that some programmatic activities tend to be driven more by the concept of democratic governance, while several are more specifically relates to elements of political democratization, less directly relates to governance concepts per se. These divisions, as indicated by the broken lines, are not tightly compartmentalized. Most activities which AID will want to support fall in the convergence category--democratic governance, and some overlap between democratic governance and pure political democratization.

Third, each table is divided horizontally by a broken line representing the distinction between state and non state publics, or what is often thought of as state and civil society. The point here is that there are important contributions which can be made to both improving and democratizing governance and consequently to promoting economic development at both levels. The broken line again indicates that the compartmentalization is not complete. In fact the concept of governance adopted in this paper promotes the idea of shared governance and linkage. Some proposed activities, therefore, involve both state and non-state institutions.


The last table, Country Team - A.I.D. Supported Programs presents another view of this same issue, suggesting how a country team and A.I.D. mission can think about implementing a set of democratic governance activities, using several different facilities.

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<sup>32</sup>Note: These Tables are based on the above text, and have benefited from Annex 4 of the Global Coalition for Africa, "Recent Meetings and Literature on the Transition to Democracy and Improved Governance in Africa," unpublished Document GCA/AC.2/03/4/92, May 1992. Our definitions of governance and "political considerations" (democratization) differ somewhat, and we add the dimension state and non-state publics.


# PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OBJECTIVES

Table 1. PUBLIC MANAGEMENT COMPETENCE



PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OBJECTIVES

Table 2. LEGITIMACY AND RESPONSIVENESS



# PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OBJECTIVES

Table 3. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY





Table 4. INFORMATION OPENNESS

	DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE	POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION
STATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Improve legislative and executive reporting, data gathering and reporting</li> </ul>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promote open press, reduce barriers on information flows, releases</li> </ul>	
NON-STATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Support independent, competitive media</li> <li>- Promote reporting on economic performance and policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promote basic human rights monitoring groups and lawyers' societies</li> </ul>

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OBJECTIVES

Table 5. PLURALISM IN POLICY



# COUNTRY TEAM - AID SUPPORTED PROGRAMS

	DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE	POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION
STATE	<p><b>EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIARY ACTIVITY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mission designed activities funded through public sector support projects, or selectively through sectoral project activities with specific agencies linked to specific political training;</li> <li>- and through central buy-ins with IPC, D/G (ARD/MSI), Legal Assistance (Chechi/Howard), DFM (ARD).</li> </ul>	<p>Human Rights Fund activities through 116e</p>
NON-STATE	<p><b>MEDIA SUPPORT</b></p> <p>Specific Media support projects or through sectoral activities with civil society components, D/G, DFM</p> <p>Civil Society enhancement through NGO umbrella project</p>	<p>Electoral support through IFES, AREAF</p> <p>Non-Partisan training of Parties through AREAF</p>