PN-ABL-789
38739

MADIA
MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON, SENEGAL AND TANZANIA (1960-1986)

WALTER KENNES

Research Report #17

This paper has been prepared as part of the study Managing Agricultural Development in Africa (MADIA) being carried out in the Development Strategy Division, Development Research Department, World Bank, in cooperation with Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, The United Kingdom, The United States, and the Commission of The European Communities. Funding from the World Bank has been provided through the Research Projects Approval Committee (REPAC) #673-04.

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W.KENNES
March 1987
(draft)

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SUMMARY

General description of EC funding

Cameroon, Senegal and Tanzania are members of the group of 66 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries that signed the third Lomé convention. This convention is the most recent in a series of five-year agreements, mainly on aid and trade, that associate a group of countries with the European Community (EC). The financing of these agreements is provided through the European Development Fund (EDF). The 1st EDF covered the period 1958-64. The 6th EDF that corresponds to the third Lomé Convention is now operational, but as yet disbursements have been limited. Cameroon and Senegal have benefited since the first EDF was set up, Tanzania participated only from the 4th EDF. The EDF is managed by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) except for a relatively small component of risk capital that is handled by the European Investment Bank (EIB).

The EDF resources can be subdivided into programmed and non-programmed aid. The envelope of programmed aid allocated to a country is determined at the beginning of each convention and consists mainly of grants and a smaller quantity of special loans(soft loans with more than 80 % grant element).
The allocation is determined largely on the basis of population and per capita GDP and takes into account also land-lockedness or insularity and the level of past EDF assistance.
Non-programmed aid is not allocated to specific countries. Depending on the circumstances countries may benefit from it.
An important type of non-programmed aid is STABEX which serves to compensate for downward fluctuations in earnings from exports of selected agricultural products to the EC. A similar system exists to cover mineral exports (SYSMIN). Other types of non-programmed aid are risk capital that is used to acquire temporary minority holdings in companies and exceptional or emergency assistance granted to cope with calamities.
Outside the EDF, but within the convention framework, there are "normal" loans provided by the EIB. These loans are at market conditions, but they may be softened by interest subsidies that come from the EDF. Apart from the

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conventions Tanzania, Senegal and to a much lesser extent also Cameroon have benefited from grant aid financed on the CEC annual budget. The most important form of such aid is food aid, followed by cofinancing provided to non-governmental organisations.

A summary of EC aid to Cameroon, Senegal and Tanzania is given in table 1.The figures in table 1 are expressed in European Currency Units (ECU), a basket of European currencies. For simplicity, no distinction is made between the European Unit of Account and the ECU which was only introduced in 1978. Up to 1970 the ECU was defined to be equivalent to the dollar. From 1971 to 1981 the ECU was "strong" against the dollar with a peak in 1980 when 1 ECU equalled about 1.4 dollar. Between 1981 and 1986 the ECU was weak versus the dollar (down to 1 ECU = 0.80 $), but recently the situation was reserved (presently 1 ECU = 1.14 $). When the figures in table 1 are converted to constant 1983 ECU purchasing power and further into dollars one obtains cumulative aid commitments to Senegal and Cameroon in excess of 900 million dollars. In this total amount the first and second EDF weigh heavily. For Tanzania the 1983 constant dollar value is around 400 million.

Referring to table 1 one can see that normal EIB loans have been particularly important in Cameroon. Special loans have been relatively important both in Senegal and Cameroon. Aid to Tanzania has been largely in the form of grants. Senegal has received very high STABEX transfers. In fact Senegal has been the major beneficiary of STABEX aid.

Not represented in table 1 are the regional projects. Both Senegal and Tanzania and to a lesser extent Cameroon have benefited from such projects. In the case of Tanzania they focused on transport links with neighbouring landlocked countries. In the case of Senegal important finance was provided for the dams on the Senegal river. Other regional finance covered training facilities, agricultural research and particularly animal disease control.

Procurement for EDF projects is mainly done by international tendering open to all ACP and EC Member States. The 3rd Lome convention contains some provisions to favour contracts in ACP States. Their share in the total value of EDF contracts has increased from almost 15 % in the sixties to approximately 30 % by 1984. Around 2% goes to third countries.

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Sectoral breakdown of commitments

One can see in tables 2 and 3, that up to the third EDF (1971-75) project funding has been concentrated on physical infrastructure. In Cameroon this included roads and port facilities but it was mainly focused on railways. In Senegal trunk roads and bridges accounted for the bulk of physical infrastructure.
Agricultural and rural development activities, broadly defined such as to include processing, rural roads, rural health centres, irrigation facilities and agricultural schools,has been the second most important funding sector up to the third EDF. More recently, especially for the 5th EDF (1981-85) this sector is the most important covering in Cameroon, Senegal as well as Tanzania more than 50 % of project funds.
Social infrastructure, defined as schools and hospitals, constitutes the third most important sector for EDF assistance.

Together, the above mentioned sectors have absorbed more than 80 % of EDF resources. Nevertheless several other activities have consistently benefited from some EDF support : non-agriculturally linked industry, mining, scholarships, trade and tourism promotion and assistance for development administration.

Within agricultural and rural development there have been quite drastic shifts over time in the shares of different subsectors (see table 4). The most striking shift in Senegal and Cameroon has been from export crop production and processing towards food crop production.
Livestock, fisheries and forestry have on the whole absorbed a relatively small part of EDF aid. (An exception is livestock in Senegal that accounted for 25 % of agricultural aid under the 4th EDF).
It is noteworthy that for Tanzania the 5th EDF (1981-85) maintained a larger share for export crops within total agriculture than either Senegal or Cameroon.

The importance of technical assistance for agricultural production has fluctuated in Senegal and Cameroon being on average between 10 and 15 %. However in all three countries the 5th EDF (1981-85) has a high share of technical assistance (almost 20 %).

The factors that explain the sectoral breakdown of EDF funding and its evolution over time are diverse and usually reflect country priorities. However, in a general way, they also reflect the trends in development thinking. In the sixties the lack of basic infrastructure was seen as the major constraint on

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economic growth. As the newly independent countries did not have resources to finance such investment the EDF stepped in. Another major growth constraint was lack of human resources explaining EDF investment in educational and health facilities. At the same time export crops were seen as the only expandable sources of foreign exchange and government revenue to pay for industrialisation and for the consolidation of public administration, explaining the high share of support for such crops.

The 1972-74 world food crisis has influenced the breakdown of funding. Food imports in many African countries (e.g. Senegal) had been rising rapidly and were absorbing a large share of export revenue. The high prices and volatility of food prices on the world market provided important justifications to move aid funds towards food crops. This shift is clearly applicable to EDF funding in Cameroon and Senegal. More recently it became apparent that African governments had serious problems to finance the recurrent costs associated with physical and social infrastructure. This led to a slow down in the funding for such infrastructure and to the possibility to use EDF resources to cover recurrent expenditures and rehabilitation.

Agricultural assistance to Cameroon

Under the first EDF agricultural cooperation was quite dispersed and consisted mostly of rural infrastructure. For the second and third EDF resources were concentrated on export crops: groundnuts, coffee, cotton, sugar cane but most importantly palm oil.

The palm oil projects concerned mainly the creation of plantations in the South West near Douala. More than 10,000 ha of palm trees have been developed. Assistance was also provided for processing. The palm oil operations have been financed by using a mix of grants, risk capital, special loans and normal loans. More recently, using 4th EDF funds an outgrowers programme has been financed in the same area. On the whole, the palm oil actions have been quite successful contributing to export revenue, domestic consumption of vegetable oil as well as employment. Problems have been encountered especially as regards land tenure issues.

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The outgrowers scheme has been a success in terms of area planted, but less in terms of yields. However, the scheme also led to a reduction in shifting cultivation and thus made a contribution to resource conservation.
Other cash crop development supported by the EDF, particularly tea has been much less successful, partly due to coordination problems with cofinancing agencies, management problems and cost overruns.

Integrated rural development in the North East Benoue area was started in 1973 using mainly 3rd EDF funds. The project was continued under the 4th and 5th EDF. It amounted to a resettlement project with most of the resources devoted to infrastructure (access roads, schools, health and community centres). Extension both for food and cash crops and to encourage animal traction was also included. Immigration into the area turned out to be much more rapid than anticipated and the project has certainly contributed much to the well being of these immigrants. Infrastructural targets were generally met and school enrollment jumped upwards. Agricultural production targets were met for some cash crops (cotton) but not for food crops even though food availability has been satisfactory. More recently (1984) a fisheriesproject that seems to be very promising has been set up in the same area.

The EC, together with Cameroon government, German and IFAD assistance, has also supported integrated rural development in the North West province. The main emphasis for EDF funds has been to strenghten small scale farming by underpinning the cooperative movement and organising storage and distribution of farm inputs. On the whole, disbursement has been slow and results have not yet fulfilled expectations.

The other major agricultural project supported by the EDF has been in the upper north and concerns irrigated rice production along the Logone and Chari rivers. This project was conceived around the time (1975) when the real price of rice on the world market was at record levels. Actual operations started in 1979. Apart from contributing directly to food availability the project has a clear regional equity objective, because it generates cash revenue in the most arid region of Cameroon. Similar projects, of a larger scale, are supported in the same area by the World Bank and France.

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The project has chosen an approach using modern technology and full water control, allowing double cropping. Yields have been rather spectacular and higher than expected : more than 10 tonnes of paddy per ha per year (2 seasons). Nevertheless, the costs have also been high because of advanced technology. During the recent drought (1982-84) the scheme certainly contributed to food security and revenue in the area. However, more recently,better rainfall has led to a large increase in availability of traditional crops (sorghum / millet) decreasing local needs for rice. At the same time the import parity price of rice in the large urban centres of Douala and Yaounde has decreased drastically.
As a result, the rice from the Logone and Chari cannot be profitably sold outside the area. This problem is further aggravated by a lack of paddy processing capacity. Currently (1987) there is a large stock of paddy for which there is no market outlet. Therefore, despite technical success the economic viability of the rice projects appears at present conditions very doubtful. A solution could be sought by simultaneous action along different lines : reducing costs of the irrigation schemes, introducing alternative crops with strong demand, planning of processing facilities, developing an adequate rice price policy at national level. Tempory abandoning of purchase guarantee at fixed producer price might not be avoidable.

Agricultural assistance to Senegal

The EDF support for agricultural development in Senegal shows an evolution over time that is broadly similar to what happened in Cameroon.
During the sixties emphasis was put on export crop production, particularly groundnuts, but also cotton. However, unlike in Cameroon there were already at that time EDF projects focused on food production in the Casamance area. In the seventies the focus has shifted towards development of food crops and livestock.

The large scale EC interventions in the groundnut system started around 1965 and were conceived as an integrated package with two main components : strengthening the production system (through extension, supply of inputs, introduction of animal traction) and price support to make the groundnut products competitive on the European vegetable oil market. The subsidies were designed to be phased out over five years, the period that was judged necessary to reduce production costs to be compatible with world market prices.

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The programme has been hindered by irregular and low rainfall, by low and unstable world prices and by marketing problems. Nevertheless it seems fair to say that both programme components contributed towards preventing a collapse of the sector which up to now remains one of the essential sources of foreign exchange in Senegal.

Already under the second EDF the groundnut programme was complemented by projects to diversify the sources of export revenue. After initial experiments in the early sixties cotton was introduced as a cash crop. Confectionery groundnuts were introduced somewhat later. Both products have made a modest, but sustainable contribution to farm income and employment, equilibrated regional income distribution and export revenue.

Sizeable investments have been financed by the EDF, in addition to several other contributions, to strengthen irrigated agriculture in the Senegal river area. Both large scale and small scale schemes have been developed. EDF funds have mainly been used for land development, infrastructure and technical assistance. Management has been the responsability of a parastatal. Because of good farmer participation and low investment and maintenance costs the results on the small schemes have been quite satisfactory. The profitability of the large schemes has been low due to high overhead costs.
Nevertheless both large and small schemes are presently facing serious problems because of the very low import parity price of rice. The problems are similar to those in the North of Cameroon, but they are harder to tackle in Senegal because rice imports are much larger and because Senegal has less foreign exchange resources than Cameroon. More flexibility needs to be introduced in the schemes so that farmers can adjust their crop mix and take advantage of the opportunities of livestock products to maximise their revenues. For completeness one should also add that the EDF is contributing to the large dam projects (Diama and Manantali) on the Senegal river.

It was stated above that Senegal has been the major beneficiary of STABEX transfers. All of these transfers have been to compensate for the reduction of the export value of groundnut products. In a way one can see these transfers as a continuation of the price support that was provided during the sixties. Most STABEX resources have been allocated as balance of payments support directly to the government agency to stabilise farm prices of groundnuts.
There has also been some use of STABEX funds in specific rural development projects.

With respect to Senegal it is also important to refer to food aid. A significant part of the food import bill has been covered through food aid, especially during the drought years. Much of the food aid allocated to Senegal has been used for free distribution to disadvantaged population groups.
More recently the EC has insisted to have food aid (in normal years) sold at the market price and have the resulting counterpart funds geared towards regulating the cereals market or to finance rural development projects. In 1985 a common(i.e. multidonor) counterpart fund was established.

Agricultural assistance to Tanzania

EC cooperation with Tanzania dates effectively from 1975 when the first Lome convention was signed. Therefore the EDF "portfolio" in Tanzania is much more limited than in Cameroon and Senegal. In relation to agriculture three broad areas have been funded : coffee production, integrated rural development in Iringa region and processing of agricultural raw materials.

Coffee is (and is expected to remain in the foreseeable future) the most important foreign exchange earner for Tanzania. Since 1978, the coffee development programme has covered several aspects : nurseries, research, extension, provision of inputs, processing, feeder roads and technical assistance. All the major coffee growing areas have been supported. It is believed that this has contributed to maintaining production levels (while several other export crops have declined significantly, e.g. cotton, sisal and cashew nuts). It is foreseen that coffee support will, under Lomé 3, be complemented by support for food production in coffee growing areas. Especially from 1979-1983 the profitability of coffee production at the farm level has been adversely effected by the overvalued exchange rate (in other words by maintaining a constant exchange rate during a period of rapid domestic inflation) and by the insufficient availability of basic consumption good in rural areas. More recently, especially since mid-1986 the exchange rate has moved towards a more realistic level and coffee producers have received important price increases in real terms.

Since 1978 the integrated rural development project for Iringa region has provided assistance for agricultural extension, oxenization, small scale irrigation, veterinary support, poultry improvement, reforestation and feeder

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roads. Apart from the delivery of farm inputs and extension, the main physical achievements, included the construction of stores, the improvement of access roads, the establishment of oxen training units at village level and an increase of the pyrethrum area.

The results of the project in terms of generating additional farm income are difficult to assess but seem to have been rather disappointing. Insufficient administrative capacity and lack of direct involvement of the local farmers are partial explanations, but the effect of these shortcomings has been amplified by an adverse price policy environment.
More specifically farmers could not obtain a sufficient reward for their marketable surplus of maize on the official market. Also the increase of the project area during the second phase (Lome II) of the project meant that resources were spread rather thinly over a large area.

Agricultural processing has been supported through the construction of a cotton canvas factory, which was completed in 1983. At the beginning production has been seriously hampered by the lack of foreign exchange needed to obtain spare parts. Currently, because of the prices of raw material and the exchange rate and because demand by a neighboring shoe factory is much below expectation, profitability is very low.

Food aid has also been relatively important in the case of Tanzania. Over the past five years cereals imports have been almost 300 kt per year of which more than half has been covered by food aid provided by several donors including the EC. In 1984 an agreement was reached on the use of counterpart funds generated by EC food aid. This agreement is a basis for better integrating food aid with other forms of assistance. In principle the funds will be used for rural development.

Recent developments

The third Lomé convention which was signed in December 1984 and came into effect by mid-1986 contains a number of methodological improvements designed to increase the efficiency and viability of EC assistance. Some important changes are :

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- concentration of aid in one or a two sector programmes;
- some form of "policy dialogue" to ensure that a sector programme is not hindered by an unfavourable "policy environment";
- increased flexibility (e.g. to cover maintenance and rehabilitation;
- possibility to finance import programmes linked to a concentration sector;
- integration of food aid with other aid, partly by using counterpart funds.

These improvements are in line with the food strategy approach that was followed in 4 pilot countries. For each ACP State the government, together with the EC has prepared an indicative programme that defines the concentration area, sets out the policy measures that are deemed necessary and outlines the broad framework to allocate the aid resources. In most cases, particularly in Cameroon, Senegal and Tanzania food security has been chosen as central objective and more than 80 % of programmable resources will be allocated to agricultural and rural development.
In Tanzania and Senegal efforts will continue to integrate food aid with other development aid.

The main policy measures that are referred to in the indicative programmes are :
- adequate price incentives for farmers;
- land tenure measures to guarantee farmers continuous and secure access to land;
- an adequate commercial policy as regards cereals;
- measures to prevent or diminish environmental decline;
- sufficient foreign exchange retention for export crop producers.

As regards Cameroon it is planned to allocate most programmable resources (96 MECU) to consolidating rural development in Logone and Chari area, to extenting the North East Benoue activities and to setting up a rural development programme in the North West. In the case of Senegal the intention is to concentrate all Lome III programmable resources (97 MECU) on rural development in the Senegal river area. The most important component will be for the further development of the small scale village irrigated perimeters. Another major component will be rural infrastructure, including road rehabilitation. The programme has a five year horizon and fits into the new agricultural policy of Senegal.
In Tanzania the indicative programme (169 MECU) will be concentrated on food production, coffee expansion and rural infrastructure to support agricultural development.

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Conclusions

It is extremely difficult and hasardous to draw conclusions out of more than 25 years of development cooperation between Cameroon, Senegal and the EC. Even though the period of cooperation with Tanzania was much shorter the complexity of agricultural development issues necessitates caution to avoid easy generalisations. The points listed below, must therefore be considered as tentative.

1. Cash crop projects have on the whole been more successful in terms of reaching physical targets and also in terms of generating revenue for farmers than food crop support, even though there have been periods when adverse world market prices have caused severe problems. A possible explanation is that cash crop development could build on more institutional and other resources. It is easier to attract progressive farmers to start a new venture than to upgrade traditional crops for a large dispersed group of subsistence producers. This is reinforced by the lack of technological packages for such crops.

2. Cash crop projects can make a contribution to smallholder development (e.g. coffee in Tanzania, groundnuts and cotton in Senegal, outgrowers scheme in Cameroon).

3. "Integrated" rural development has often led to disappointing results. Possible explanations could be that such projects are very demanding on local management capacity or that the time horizon over which such projects are carried out is too short in view of the complexity of the tasks. Projects that focus on generating a marketable surplus of food crops or that rely on timely delivery of new inputs (seed, fertilizer etc..) are particularly vulnerable. Also from the donor's point of view such projects are difficult to supervise and coordinate. Communication with field staff can be time consuming and problematic. To alleviate some of the difficulties one could use a cluster approach implying that e.g. an educational activity is only set up if it helps to remove a bottleneck on agricultural production. Also one should not spread resources too thinly over a large area and take a long term approach that is build up gradually.

4. Government policies, even though not necessarily directly related to agriculture (e.g. exchange rate) have a more profound effect on the success of projects than is usually assumed at the appraisal stage of projects.

5. Large irrigation schemes geared to rice production have been rather unsuccessful in economic terms. The profitability at farm level could often only be obtained by the free or subsidised supply of inputs. In many cases the losses on production are hidden in the overall deficits of the parastatals that supervise such schemes. On the whole better results are obtained when the supervising or management organisation has a high degree of financial autonomy. Large schemes also do not create a lot of employment because of the use of advanced technology. Small irrigation schemes have been more successful, to a large extent because of lower cost and better farmer's participation.

6. Food aid has "graduated" from being either surplus disposal or a pure relief operation in to a development resource. The increased use of triangular food aid is also important in this respect as is the possibility to substitute input aid for food aid, if the circumstances make that preferable. In this way "food aid" can contribute to a balanced cereals market policy.

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Table 1a Aid commitments to Cameroon (a) (million ECU)

	EDF 1	EDF 2	EDF 3	EDF 4	EDF 5
Programmed aid					
(allocation)	(51.3)	(53.9)	(58.8)	(55.3)	(69.0)
grants	51.3	39.4	49.9	32.8	29.2
special loans	-	14.5	8.9	20.8	17.9
subtotal	51.3	53.9	58.8	53.6	47.1
Non programmed aid					
interest subsidies	-	-	0.5	4.2	20.9
risk capital	-	-	0.5	5.0	-
exceptional aid	-	-	-	2.3	1.6
STABEX	-	-	-	4.1	29.6
subtotal	-	-	1.0	15.6	52.1
Total EDF commitments	51.3	53.9	59.8	69.2	99.2
CEC budget commitments(b)			0.5	3.5	2.5
EIB loans (c)	-	11.3	6.0	32.6	95.7
TOTAL	51.3	65.2	66.3	105.3	197.4

Notes

(a) The figures reflect financing decisions up to 30 September 1986 and are expressed in current prices. As an approximation one can say say that US $ 1.0 = ECU 1.0

(b) Commitments on the annual CEC budget consisting mainly of food aid, NGO cofinancing and special programmes.

(c) EIB loans are allocated within the context of the different cooperation conventions, using the Bank's own resources.

Table 1b Aid commitments to Senegal (million ECU)

	EDF 1	EDF 2	EDF 3	EDF 4	EDF 5
Programmed aid					
(allocation)	(42.9)	(67.4)	(57.1)	(59.0)	(69.0)
grants	42.9	61.5	52.8	39.4	37.4
special loans	-	5.9	4.3	19.3	18.9
subtotal	42.9	67.4	57.1	58.7	56.3
Non programmed aid					
interest subsidies	-	-	-	1.8	5.6
risk capital	-	-	0.8	7.4	4.2
exceptional aid	-	-	9.2	4.6	2.1
STABEX	-	-	-	65.1	90.6
subtotal	-	-	10.0	78.9	102.5
Total EDF commitments	42.9	67.4	67.1	137.6	158.8
CEC budget commitments	-	-	14.3	14.9	29.3
EIB loans		2.4	1.4	12.0	21.0
TOTAL	42.9	69.8	82.8	164.5	209.1

Table 1c Aid commitments to Tanzania (million ECU)

	EDF 1	EDF 2	EDF 3	EDF 4	EDF 5
Programmed aid					
(allocation)	-	-	-	(103.4)	(120.7)
grants	-	-	-	69.7	96.4
special loans	-	-	-	32.9	11.6
subtotal	-	-	-	102.6	108.0
Non programmed aid					
interest subsidies	-	-	-	0.1	-
risk capital	-	-	-	7.8	11.0
exceptional aid	-	-	-	0.3	0.5
STABEX	-	-	-	20.7	20.9
subtotal	-	-	-	28.9	32.4
Total EDF commitments	-	-	-	131.5	140.4
CEC budget commitments	-	-	7.5	14.1	48.0
EIB loans	-	-		5.0	-
TOTAL	-	-		150.6	188.4

Table 2 Sectoral allocation of EDF project assistance (a) (MECU)

	EDF 1	EDF 2	EDF 3	EDF 4	EDF 5
Cameroon					
Agri-rural development	5.9	15.5	17.4	28.6	35.8
Transport infrastructure	34.0	26.0	29.2	20.5	22.6
Social infrastructure	9.7	7.8	9.2	4.1	3.2
Industry	-	1.6	-	6.3	4.8
Other	1.7	3.0	4.0	5.6	3.2
TOTAL	51.3	53.9	59.8	65.1	69.6
Senegal					
Agri-rural development	9.3	52.9	37.4	26.4	35.9
Transport infrastructure	22.2	5.4	21.1	14.6	5.0
Social infrastructure	11.0	6.9	1.5	17.1	11.0
Industry	-	-	1.1	9.7	8.4
Other	0.4	2.2	6.0	4.7	7.9
TOTAL	42.9	67.4	67.1	72.5	68.2
Tanzania					
Agri-rural development	-	-	-	49.0	61.4
Transport infrastructure	-	-	-	40.8	26.4
Social infrastructure	-	-	-	6.3	21.3
Industry	-	-	-	13.5	9.1
Other	-	-	-	1.2	1.3
TOTAL	-	-	-	110.8	119.5

(a) All EDF commitments, excluding STABEX allocations.
Situation at 30 Sept. 1986.

Table 3 Sectoral allocation of EDF project aid (percentages)

	EDF 1	EDF 2	EDF 3	EDF 4	EDF 5
Cameroon					
Agr. and rural development	11.5	8.8	29.1	43.9	51.6
Transport infrastructure	66.3	48.2	48.8	31.5	32.6
Social infrastructure	18.9	14.5	15.4	6.3	4.6
Industry (non agr.)	0.0	3.0	0.0	9.7	6.9
Other	3.3	5.6	6.7	8.6	4.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Senegal					
Agr. and rural development	21.7	78.5	55.7	36.4	52.6
Transport infrastructure	51.7	8.0	31.4	20.1	7.3
Social infrastructure	25.6	10.2	2.2	23.6	16.1
Industry (non agri.)	0.0	0.0	1.6	13.4	12.3
Other	0.9	3.3	8.9	6.5	11.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Tanzania					
Agr. and rural development				44.2	51.4
Transport infrastructure				36.8	22.1
Social infrastructure				5.7	17.8
Industry (non agr.)				12.2	7.6
Other				1.1	1.1
TOTAL				100.0	100.0

Table 4 EDF aid for agricultural and rural development (percentages)

Cameroon	EDF 1	EDF 2	EDF 3	EDF 4	EDF 5
Subsistence crop	0.0	0.0	6.0	26.3	25.8
Export crops	0.0	78.9	47.4	28.6	10.5
Crop processing	0.0	14.2	33.0	11.5	11.8
Livestock	14.2	0.0	0.0	3.1	4.8
Fisheries	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6
Forestry and conservation	12.2	0.0	0.6	2.9	2.0
Phys. infrastructure	25.4	0.0	12.1	3.9	27.0
Social infrastructure	8.1	0.0	0.0	17.6	4.3
Other	40.1	6.9	0.9	6.1	8.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total value (MECU)	5.9	15.5	17.4	28.6	35.8

Senegal	EDF 1	EDF 2	EDF 3	EDF 4	EDF 5
Subsistence crops	10.2	6.9	42.0	30.9	41.8
Export crops	0.0	81.5	27.6	26.8	9.0
Crop processing	0.0	1.4	2.6	3.0	0.0
Livestock	0.0	1.4	18.3	25.8	4.6
Fisheries	8.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1
Forestry and conservation	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	6.7
Phys. infrastructure	30.6	0.0	8.0	0.9	27.7
Soc. infrastructure	42.4	0.0	0.7	8.9	2.5
Other	8.6	8.0	0.8	3.7	2.7
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total value (MECU)	9.3	52.9	37.4	26.4	35.9

Tanzania	EDF 4	EDF 5
Subsistence crops	8.2	18.4
Export crops	23.6	36.6
Crop processing	64.1	13.5
Livestock	0.0	15.3
Fisheries	0.0	0.0
Forestry and conservation	0.0	1.7
Phys. infrastructure	3.8	4.1
Soc. infrastructure	0.0	6.6
Other	0.4	3.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0
Total value (MECU)	49.0	61.4