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5. Author(s)

1. Dennis Wood
2. Jayne Wood
3.

6. Contributing Organization(s)

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**EVALUATION
OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM**

Support to P.L. 480 Title II Cooperating Sponsors

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance
Office of Program, Planning and Evaluation
Washington, D.C.**

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OF THE
THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM**

Support to P.L. 480 Title II Cooperating Sponsors

Prepared for the Agency for International Development
under Contract No. PDC-0085-I-00-9089-00, PIO/T No. 1384209

by

DEVRES, INC.
7201 Wisconsin Avenue
Suite 500
Bethesda, MD 20814.
Telephone: (301) 951-5546
Telefax: (301) 6542-5934

June 1992

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES	x
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	xiii
A. Purpose, Procedure and Scope	xiii
B. Key Conclusions	xiv
C. Recommendations	xv
1. Overall purposes and direction of IGSP	xv
2. Effectiveness of ISGP	xv
3. Management of IGSP	xvi
4. FAM	xviii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Background on the ISG Program	1
B. Purpose, Procedure and Scope	1
1. Purpose	2
2. Procedure	2
3. Scope	4
II. DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF ISG PURPOSES	5
A. Original Goals for DA Title II Assistance and Changes in Them	5

1.	How and why were the original goals and purposes of the ISGP changed from predecessor programs?	5
a.	Outreach	5
b.	Enhancement	9
c.	Conclusions	12
2.	Were the recommendations of previous external evaluations taken into account in shaping the goal and purposes of ISGP?	12
3.	What were the original goals and purposes of the ISGP?	13
a.	Strengthening	14
b.	Innovation	15
c.	Planning Assistance	15
d.	Conclusions	16
B.	Changes in ISGP Purposes	17
1.	How have the goals and purposes of ISG changed during the course of the project?	17
a.	Strengthening	17
b.	Innovation	17
c.	Planning Assistance	19
d.	Conclusions	19
2.	Has a core of identifiable common purposes been retained?	20
a.	Three retained purposes	20
b.	Conclusion	21
3.	Are ISG's purposes consistent with the intent of the P.L. 480 legislation?	21

a.	Public Law 480 background and legislative intent	21
b.	ISGP and P.L. 480 legislative purposes	22
c.	Conclusion	23
III.	ACHIEVEMENT OF OVERALL ISGP PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES	25
A.	Strengthening PVO's Ability to Administer Food Aid for the Alleviation of Hunger and Malnutrition	25
1.	Discussion	25
a.	Program direction	26
b.	Broad support	29
c.	Specific institutional strengthening	30
2.	Conclusions	32
B.	Filling Unmet Logistical Requirements in PVO Food Aid Programs	33
1.	Discussion	33
2.	Conclusion	34
C.	Stimulating New Approaches By CSs to the Use of Food Aid as a Development Resource	34
1.	Discussion	34
2.	Conclusions	36
D.	Encouraged New PVOs to Become Food Aid Cooperating Sponsors	36
1.	Discussion	36
2.	Conclusion	38
E.	Serving Other Core Purposes and Objectives	38
1.	Discussion	38

2.	Conclusion	39
IV.	ACHIEVEMENTS AND QUALITY OF INDIVIDUAL PVO GRANT PROJECTS ..	41
A.	Overview of PVO Grant Purposes	41
B.	Impact of ISGP on Long-Range Planning of PVOs	43
C.	Impact of ISG on Headquarters' Activities/Management	44
1.	Provision and Training of Personnel	46
2.	Establishment of Food Aid Programming Units	46
3.	Establishment of Organizational Policies and Guidelines for Food Aid	47
4.	Establishment of Improved Management and Monitoring Systems ..	47
5.	Cost Effectiveness	49
6.	Conclusions	50
D.	Impact of ISGP on CSs Field Activities	51
1.	Did ISGP Influence CS Field Activities	51
2.	ISGP Purpose Achievement at the Country Level	53
a.	Program Direction	54
1)	Discussion	54
2)	Conclusion	55
b.	Program Management	55
1)	Discussion	55
2)	Conclusions	58
c.	Reporting	58
1)	Discussion	58
2)	Conclusion	58
d.	Planning, Logistical and Accounting Improvements	58
1)	Discussion	58
2)	Conclusion	59

e.	New Training	60
1)	Discussion	60
2)	Conclusion	60
f.	New Program Innovations or Creation	60
1)	Discussion	60
2)	Conclusions	61
3.	Did CSs Create Measurable and Cost Effective Impacts that Achieved the Country Level Purpose(s) Sought by IGSP	62
a.	Discussion	62
b.	Conclusions	63
4.	USAID and PVO Relationships	64
5.	Special Problem Areas Associated with ISGP at the Field Level	64
E.	Conclusions	65
V.	ASSESSMENT AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FOOD ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (FAM) PROJECTS	67
A.	Description of FAM	67
B.	FAM Structure and Organization--Has FAM Established a Workable Structure and Organization for Achieving its Grant Purposes?	67
1.	Discussion	67
2.	Conclusion	69
C.	Activities and Achievements--Has FAM Produced Relevant Outputs that Successfully Promote the Purposes and Objectives of Importance to FHA and the ISG Program?	69
1.	Discussion	69
2.	Conclusions	72
D.	A.I.D.-FAM Relationships	72
1.	Discussion	72

2.	Conclusion	73
E.	Role and Longevity of FAM	74
1.	Discussion	74
2.	Conclusion	78
F.	Recommendations	78
VI.	PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING	79
A.	Eligibility and Selection Process for ISG Funding	79
1.	Discussion	79
B.	Program Management and Monitoring	82
1.	AID/Washington-FHA Project Management	82
a.	Discussion	82
b.	Conclusions	83
2.	USAIDs	84
a.	Discussion	84
b.	Conclusion	84
3.	PVOs	84
a.	General Management	84
1)	Discussion	84
2)	Conclusions	86
b.	Monitoring and Evaluation	87
1)	Discussion	87
2)	Conclusion	90
C.	Financial Management	90
1.	Federal Cash Transactions Report and Financial Status Report	90

	a.	Discussion	90
	b.	Conclusion	91
2.		Accounting Systems	91
	a.	Discussion	91
	b.	Conclusion	91
D.		Funding Levels, Use and Attribution of A.I.D. Grant and Matching Funds .	92
1.		Funding Level Adequacy of ISGP	92
	a.	Discussion	92
	b.	Conclusion	93
2.		PVO Cost Sharing	93
	a.	Discussion	93
	b.	Conclusion	103
3.		Attribution of A.I.D. funds and PVO Matching Funds	103
	a.	Discussion	103
	b.	Conclusion	104
4.		Adequacy of ISGP Funding to Meet PVO Funding Gaps	104
	a.	Discussion	104
	b.	Conclusion	104
Annex 1:		Scope of Work	1-1
Annex 2:		List of Persons Met	2-1
Annex 3:		Questionnaire	3-1

Annex 4:	Documents Reviewed	4-1
Annex 5:	PVO Grant Activities	5-1

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

		<u>Page</u>
Table 1:	ISGP Amendments to PVO Grant Agreements	42
Table 2:	Status of CS Evaluations under the ISG Program	88
Table 3:	Budgets and Expenditures of A.I.D. and PVOs	94
Table 4:	A.I.D. and PVO Fund Distributions	96
Table 5:	Total Budgeted and Actual Expenditures of A.I.D. and PVOs by Grant Agreement Line Item	98
Table 6:	A.I.D. and PVO Grant Agreement Line Items by PVO	100
Figure 1:	Time Phasing of Outreach Enhancement and Institutional Support Grants . . .	6
Figure 2:	Illustration of IGSP Conceptual and Operational Structure	18
Figure 3:	Total A.I.D. and PVO Budget and Disbursements	95
Figure 4:	Fund Distribution Between Headquarters and Fund Offices	97
Figure 5:	A.I.D. and PVO Expenditures by Grant Agreement Line Item	99
Figure 6:	A.I.D. and PVO Actual Expenditures by Grant Agreement Line Item and by PVO	102

LIST OF ACRONYMS

A.I.D.	United States Agency for International Development/Washington, DC
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
ADT	African Development Team
AFR	Africa
CARE	Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Evaluation
CDSS	Country Development Strategy Statement
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CS	Cooperating Sponsor
DA	Development Assistance
DIP	Detailed Implementation Plan
EEC	European Economic Community
FAM	Food Assistance Management
FAT	Food Aid Test
FFP	Office of Food for Peace
FFW	Food for Work
FHA	Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance
FPA	Food Programming Assistant(s)
FVA	Bureau for Food and Voluntary Assistance (became FHA in October 1991)
FH	Food for the Hungry
FHI	Food for the Hungry International
FPU	Food Programming Unit
FY	Fiscal Year
GACAP	Generally Accepted Commodity Accounting Principle
ISG	Institutional Strengthening Grant
ISGP	Institutional Strengthening Grant Program
IDA	International Development Association
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MIS	Management Information System
MYOP	Multi-Year Operational Plan
OPG	Operating Program Grant
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Date
PEG	Program Enhancement Grant
P.L.	Public Law
PPM	Office of Program, Planning and Management (now Office of Program, Planning and Evaluation, PPE)

LIST of ACRONYMS (continued)

PSC	Personal Service Contractor
PVO	Private and Voluntary Organization
SF	School Feeding
SFC	Save the Children Federation
SF	Standard Form
SGT	Support Grant Team
SHARE	Self Help And Resource Exchange (World Share)
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development/Missions
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WFP	Work For Peace
WS	World Share
WV	World Vision
WVRD	World Vision and Relief Development Organization
WVI	World Vision International

EVALUATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM
NO. 938-0800

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Purpose, Procedure and Scope

The purpose of this evaluation was to determine the progress made by the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and Cooperating Sponsors (CS) under the Institutional Development Support Grant Program (ISGP) funded by the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). Specifically, the evaluation assessed the quality of A.I.D.'s management of ISGP, the effectiveness of ISGP-sponsored program inputs and outputs in eight Private and Voluntary Organization (PVOs) and the Food Assistance Management Project (FAM) as a means to achieve clearly defined project purposes, and recommended means to better apply cash grants in support of Title II food aid programs.

The procedure followed in carrying out this evaluation was to 1) Prepare appropriate questionnaires to guide the above interviews and document review; 2) Conduct discussions with FHA and other A.I.D. personnel currently or previously associated with the ISGP, current and past CS staff involved with ISGP, and other professionals in the food aid field familiar with ISGP activities; 3) Review all relevant ISGP documents and products; 4) Visit ISGP sponsored activities and CSs in two or three developing countries on two continents. This procedure was designed to provide information in all areas of the Scope of Work indicated below.

The complete Scope of Work for the evaluation is provided in Annex 1. The scope included gathering accurate information and carrying out appropriate analysis in the following areas of inquiry:

- o The definition and evolution of ISGP purposes;
- o The achievement of the overall purposes and objectives of the ISGP;
- o The achievements and quality of the individual grant projects of Cooperating Sponsors;
- o The achievements and quality of the Food Assistance Management (FAM) Project;

- o The efficacy of ISGP's purposes with suggested modifications;
- o The effectiveness of ISGP management and funding; and,
- o The overall effectiveness of the ISGP effort with proposals for improvement.

B. Key Conclusions

- o ISGP contributed substantially to the expansion and improved use of food in the development programs of CSs. CSs believed the most important ISGP contribution was to fill gaps in their funding of food assistance activities. From A.I.D.'s perspective, ISGP's most significant contributions were to the improvement of the design and institutionalization of developmental food aid by CSs and the further professionalization of CSs' systems in support of developmental uses of food.
- o ISGP financial support will be needed indefinitely to help CSs maximize the efficiency and development impact of their food assistance. ISGP funds help overcome CSs' resistance to expanded developmental uses of food and ameliorate the overhead costs and management difficulties CSs face in using and accounting for food effectively in new and "trying" program and geographical areas.
- o Specific impacts were difficult to attribute solely to ISGP funding because ISGP funds were usually blended with funds from other sources to achieve specific objectives, especially at the field level, and because CS monitoring and evaluation efforts were not very effective in identifying and assessing ISGP activities and impacts.
- o The most significant weakness of the ISGP was the lack of a detailed prior assessment of the problems ISGP funding was to help solve. The problems to be addressed, baseline information and the impacts to be achieved by ISGP were not always identified and fully documented by CSs, A.I.D. or other objective observers in developing the support grant. Another ISGP weakness was that its grants to some CSs were larger than they were able to absorb effectively during the grant period.

- o Specific objectives within the original purposes of ISGP remain acceptable to key stakeholders--improved design and institutionalization of developmental food aid efforts by CSs, further professionalization of CS's systems in support of developmental uses of food and continued use of grant funds to fill critical gaps in CSs' programs.
- o ISGP's purpose overlap, but do not conflict with, those of 202(e). With careful development of guidelines for both sources of funding, ISGP and 202(e) can become highly complementary.

C. Recommendations

1. Overall purposes and direction of ISGP

- o ISGP should continue as a source of long-term funding for CSs using food developmentally in their overall portfolios.
- o The core purposes of ISGP should be to:
 - Support the design--including innovation--and institutionalization of developmental food assistance by participating CSs.
 - Further professionalize CS systems that support developmental uses of food, including those of PVOs new to food for development activity.
 - Fill critical planning, design and other management related funding gaps of CSs' Title II programs.
- o A.I.D. should continue to use ISGP to support changes in program direction by CSs that support CSs' long-term achievement of ISGP purposes. Given that changes in institutional program directions are difficult and time consuming, A.I.D. should be prepared to remain in long-term support of CSs that make progress in this important area.

2. Effectiveness of ISGP

- o PVOs should have more adequate knowledge of their ISGP progress. More emphasis should be given by them to use of viable monitoring systems and to determination of the level of effort required to undertake monitoring at headquarters and in the field. Monitoring should be made, by A.I.D., an important element in providing guidance for management of ISGP activities for PVOs already involved in using food

as a development resource and for PVOs with planning assistance grants. ISGP management should ensure that selected indicators can be measured by CSs, A.I.D. and other objective observers alike and should manage ISGP grants to realize the agreed indicators as evidence of the achievement of the desired objectives.

- o CSs should evaluate ISGP by itself--perhaps with the help of a standard ISGP self evaluation format--against its grant proposal, MYOP, DIP benchmarks and indicators, not as part of a general country-wide evaluation of their overall program.
- o PVO grant proposal submissions should incorporate the experience and lessons learned from the past several years in implementing ISGP and not set out overly ambitious programs. Incremental/additional funding of ISGP grants should be based on PVO attainment of agreed upon impact indicators or adequate CS understanding and explanation of the reasons they were not attained.
- o A.I.D. should distill the substantial anecdotal evidence available at the project level that indicates ISGP funding had a significant development impact. Together with CSs, it should identify, document and highlight ISGP sponsored development impacts for CSs, A.I.D. staff and country governments. These impact experiences or situations should be used as examples of how CSs, e.g., those just now being awarded planning assistance grants, could use ISGP effectively to achieve important ISGP purposes.

3. Management of ISGP

- o A.I.D./W should designate a full time Project Officer for ISGP who will have sufficient resources to enable travel both to headquarters and to field offices. This Project Officer should be pro-active in further shaping ISGP grants to achieve measurable development impact.
- o ISGP grant management should be simplified by focusing grants on fewer problems and determining how to assess grant progress more simply by documenting fewer indicators. CSs should objectively assess the problems to which ISGP funding will be applied and new CS applications for ISGP funds should specify one or two high priority specific problems to be solved or objectives to be achieved and indicate the extent of funding needed to solve or attain them.
- o A.I.D. should improve policy coordination of its food related programs. Joint A.I.D. and USAID consideration of the objectives of various

programs and how to collaborate with each other and CSs better in carrying them out should be undertaken as a first step, perhaps at a workshop or conference.

Issues such as whether CS country programs based on 100 percent monetization should be allowed, ways to improve the administration and impact of Title III, linkages between Titles in PL-480, appropriate roles of USAIDs and CSs and their staffs in ISGP funding and implementation decisions and concerns about accountability should be jointly considered over time. Expansion of ISGP linkages with USAID and other programs should also be explored.

- o A.I.D.'s and CSs' management of ISGP should eliminate duplication of effort among CSs when possible. Efforts to create manuals and similar ISGP activities should be examined carefully to be certain a model or version does not already exist with another CS or elsewhere in the food for development arena. Project design templates, planning procedures and similar outputs should be shared widely within and among PVOs rather than duplicated by each CS.
- o PVOs should develop standardized ISGP reporting formats as much as possible in order to facilitate synthesizing information at the Field Office level and again when it is incorporated into a Headquarters report for either internal or external distribution.
- o A.I.D. should encourage PVOs to be more precise in attributing ISGP funds to outputs. The PVOs' accounting systems should attribute ISGP funding to the program/project level of identification in addition to the chart of accounts number and funding source number.
- o A.I.D. should continue funding PVOs at the same level as in the first phase of the ISGP on the condition that the initial phase's apparent "absorptive capacity" issue is resolved. The PVOs that have attained at least 70 percent of disbursements against their budgets should be considered for increased funding if it is requested and their indicators/benchmarks' progress is satisfactory.
- o A.I.D. should standardize ISGP cost sharing clauses to be either mandatory or nonmandatory cost sharing requirements and standardize PVOs' cost sharing percentages. A.I.D. should also modify the cost sharing/match clause to include language which requires PVOs to provide a yearly match as a percentage in proportion to actual annual A.I.D. funding with the remaining percentage to be provided in the final year of the grant agreement. A.I.D. should manage CSs' matching

contributions to ensure CSs are contributing at an appropriate rate during the life of the ISGP grant.

4. FAM

- o FAM should continue as an interactive and catalytic organization to provide CSs with technical and management assistance to improve the developmental use of food in their programs, to manage such uses of food more effectively and to promote coordination among CSs.
- o A.I.D. and CSs should work together through FAM and other forums to address specific generic problems that now hinder ISGP's impact--e.g., staff turnover of CSs being supported by ISGP, the sustainability of ISGP sponsored changes within CSs, the absorptive capacity of CSs, and the timeliness of ISGP and companion sources of funding.
- o Through FAM, ISGP sponsored CSs should identify and work toward management enhancement based on "industry wide" food for development standards developed cooperatively by involved PVOs, A.I.D., the IG and others.
- o Funding for FAM should be increased to support sufficient technical specialists and support staff to implement agreed upon additional activities.
- o FAM should improve its performance by better meeting the needs of smaller PVO members and by identifying and implementing ways to assure all PVOs that their interests are well understood and fully accounted for vis-a-vis those of A.I.D.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background on the ISG Program

The Bureau of Food and Voluntary Assistance (FVA) changed its name to the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) on October 1, 1991. From FY89 through FY91, the Bureau for Food and Voluntary Assistance (FVA) obligated over \$20 million in Institutional Development Support Grants (ISGs) to Title II, P.L. 480 food aid, private and voluntary organization (PVO) Cooperating Sponsors (CSs). This program was a redesign and consolidation of the predecessor FHA outreach and enhancement grant programs. In brief, the Institutional Development Support Grant Program (ISGP) has provided dollar support to PVOs who administer USG food aid commodities as Cooperating Sponsors.

The request for proposals for the present and initial grant cycle was sent to existing PVOs in 1988. It defined desired purposes and objectives for the grants arising from dollar support programs. As originally stated, the program was intended for PVO logistical costs and to improve developmental food aid programming through institutional strengthening, innovation, and planning assistance. However, the purposes and objectives have been subsequently modified in response to changing perceptions of needs and priorities within A.I.D. and the PVO community.

In FY89, seven grants to existing PVOs were recommended for funding, four strengthening grants (CARE, FHI, CRS, and ADRA), two innovation grants (CRS and CARE), and one planning assistance grant (World SHARE). However, before these grants were awarded, the grant types were combined under the heading of ISGs, e.g., CARE and CRS each received one ISG with innovation and institutional strengthening components. Later in the year, a new PVO coordinating organization, the Food Assistance Management (FAM) Project, was also funded. In FY90, funding for the original five grants was expanded in accordance with modified objectives. And AFRICARE and WVRD received two-year funded extensions on their preexisting enhancement grants. SCF also received a funded extension on its preexisting enhancement grant.

As this cycle of grants is coming to a close in 1992, the office of FHA/PPM wanted to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the ISG program in order to plan for the request for proposals (or guidelines) which will initiate the next grant cycle in FY92.

B. Purpose, Procedure and Scope

1. Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation was to determine the progress made by FHA and Cooperating Sponsors (CSs) under the Institutional Development Support Grant Program (ISGP), now commonly referred to as the Institutional Support Grant Program--ISG.

Specifically, the evaluation assessed the quality of A.I.D.'s management of ISGP, the effectiveness of ISG sponsored program inputs and outputs in eight CSs and in FAM as a means for achieving project purposes and how funds were spent by CSs. The evaluation did not evaluate individual CSs or the specific programs or projects of each CS. Time and resources were not available for such an analysis. Rather, the team looked at the ISGP as a program. The team did assess whether CSs had met the terms of their grant agreements and whether the guidelines for ISGP were appropriate and adequate to assist CSs in achieving ISGP purposes. The evaluation recommends some means to improve the use of grant support to meet the needs and purposes of A.I.D.'s Title II food aid program.

2. Procedure

The procedure followed in carrying out this evaluation was to: 1) Prepare appropriate questionnaires to guide the above interviews and document review; 2) Conduct discussions with FHA and other A.I.D. personnel currently or previously associated with the ISGP, current and past CS staff involved with ISGP, and other professionals in the food aid field familiar with ISGP activities; e) Review all relevant ISGP documents and products; 4) Visit ISGP sponsored activities and CSs in two or three developing countries on two continents. This procedure was designed to provide information in all areas of the Scope of Work (see Annex 1).

Key informant interviews were carried out with A.I.D. officials in Washington and in USAIDs, with the staff of CSs and with beneficiaries of CS food-related development efforts. Team members visited the headquarters of seven CS grantees and FAM to interview key program management staff. The evaluation team also visited with several CSs in the field--in Bolivia, Peru and Senegal. In Bolivia, the evaluation team discussed and observed ISG sponsored activities with USAID, ADRA, CRS, CARITAS, FHI, and SCF. The team visited with USAID, ADRA and CARE in Peru. In Senegal, the evaluation team discussed ISGP activities with USAID, WVRD and Africare. Team members also interviewed staff at the headquarters of all CSs regarding their field operations.

More than 100 people had been interviewed for this evaluation as of February 25, 1992. An information gathering protocol (Annex 3) was developed to guide the

interviews with the staff of the PVOs and A.I.D. and help to synthesize the data collected. A List of Persons Interviewed and the questionnaires used for these interviews are included in Annexes 2 and 3.

Some of these individuals were interviewed in depth, others for their views and assessments of one or several key aspects of ISGP. Some individuals were very knowledgeable about ISGP and contributed factual material, analysis, conclusions and opinions about many aspects of the project. Others were well informed about only some ISGP activities and made more limited contributions to the evaluation. The information obtained from these interviews, taken as a whole, provided a substantial portion of the facts included in this evaluation report and a basis for many of the conclusions reached herein. A limitation of this method was that the facts and generalizations developed were based mostly on instant recall, determined by what key informants chose to "remember," and--except for consonance among multiple interviewees--were not systematically validated through other information channels. On the other hand, because of the intimate involvement of many of these contacts with ISGP over extended time periods, their recall of project facts and their conclusions regarding project activities and events were invaluable in arriving at an adequate evaluation of the project. Also, most of the data gathered in interviews was validated by information from document reviews and observation.

The evaluation team also obtained and reviewed reams of project documentation and reports from A.I.D. and the grantees as part of its methodology. The team asked CSs and A.I.D. for and received completed grant agreements, detailed implementation plans, annual reports, documentation of training sessions, internal and external evaluations, special activity reports and other relevant materials it believed existed. These written documents were read and assessed in light of the informal protocol developed and the Scope of Work.

The limitations of this method were that the evaluation team did not receive all relevant documentation and received different documents from different sources. Also, time restrictions sometimes did not allow adequate explanation of materials by CS, A.I.D., USAID or other staff to evaluation team members. However, the objectivity possible through use of this method was high because facts or interpretations of the evaluation team based on these materials could be accurately revisited by CSs, A.I.D., USAIDs or others and the evaluation team.

During the evaluation the team also read and became conversant with other pertinent documentation such as the Title II and Farm Bill legislative provisions, guidance, and regulations; all ISG authorizing memoranda and proposal guidelines; and external evaluations of predecessor programs.

These methods provided ample information for developing the necessary set of reliable facts, sound conclusions, and appropriate recommendations to ensure a

accurate evaluation of ISGP. Discussions with Washington-based A.I.D., Benchmark and Mendez-England staff provided a perspective on ISGP purposes, activities and management that was cross-checked directly by our interviews in Latin America. The field work highlighted the activities of ISGP and special problems faced by CS' country offices and USAIDs in effectively using project outputs. Documents and other materials made available by CSs at their headquarters and field offices and by A.I.D. in Washington, Bolivia, Peru and Senegal also added to the total information available to the evaluation team and substantiated facts and conclusions regarding many of the issues included in the scope of work.

3. Scope

The procedures above were designed to gather accurate information in the following areas of inquiry:

- o The definition and evolution of the ISGP purposes;
- o The achievement of the overall purposes and objectives of the program;
- o The achievements and quality of the individual grant projects of the cooperating sponsors;
- o The achievements and quality of the Food Assistance Management (FAM) Project;
- o An overall assessment of the grant purposes with suggested modifications;
- o Project management and funding; and,
- o An overall assessment of grant management and inputs with proposals for improvement.

A copy of the complete Scope of Work is included in Annex 1.

II. DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF ISG PURPOSES

A. Original Goals for DA Title II Assistance and Changes in Them

1. How and why were the original goals and purposes of the ISGP changed from predecessor programs?

ISGP is a follow-on program to two others: Outreach and Enhancement. A.I.D.'s Outreach, Enhancement and ISGP programs partly overlapped in time frames and purposes as shown in Figure 1. The Title II Outreach Project was originally approved in August 1978 and extended for two years in late 1981 and again for four years in late 1983. A.I.D.'s Title II Enhancement Project was approved in early 1985 and extended in June 1988 for an additional three years.. The ISGP was approved in 1988 for a four year period and contained three components--strengthening, innovation and planning assistance. An additional extension of one year is now anticipated, which would extend ISGP's time frame to March 1993.

ISGP goals and purposes were different from the original goals and purposes of its predecessor programs--outreach and enhancement. Its goal and purposes were altered to meet changing perceptions of the needs of PVOs seeking to expand the use of Title II food in their development programs. The evolution of these perceptions is evident from an analysis of the A.I.D. and PVO experience with the Outreach and Enhancement Projects, as briefly set out below.

a. Outreach

A.I.D.'s Title II Outreach Project was originally approved in August 1978 and extended for two years in late 1981. Its principal purpose was to help PVOs comply with the Congressional mandate that food aid reach low-income populations by providing support for in-country transportation, storage, distribution, administrative and logistical expenses directly related to Title II programs. The Project Paper indicates that ...the purpose of this project is to extend the availability of Title II resources to persons of great need living in logistically difficult areas...¹

¹A.I.D., Project Paper: Title II Outreach (A.I.D.: Washington, DC, 1978), p. 18.

The project was amended in 1981.² The amendment altered the goals and purposes of the outreach project to a small degree. It:

- o Permitted funding of small non-logistical items to increase the developmental impact of food aid up to a maximum of 20 percent of each grant, and
- o Established new Outreach Project selection criteria to:
 - Incorporate expanded area coverage, increased beneficiary numbers and enhanced developmental impact as equal selection criteria; and
 - Incorporate support for technical assistance, nutrition education or access to health care to ensure specific outreach program objectives would be achieved.

As early as 1981, then, the original purpose of the Outreach Project was being altered by internal amendments. The explanation for these alterations was included in the amendment. Problems had arisen in some areas of project implementation and there was broad consensus among the PVOs and A.I.D. that the project should be modified in specific ways to enable its outreach purpose to be achieved more easily and to heighten the development impact of the food assistance being extended by the project.

The Outreach Project was evaluated in late 1982.³ The evaluation report strongly endorsed continuation of the outreach effort, concluding that the project had met its objective of expanding beneficiary numbers and targeting needier recipients. It suggested some marginal goal and purpose changes in the project too, namely that:

- o Increased money be provided for "enrichment"--more than the 20 percent allowed in the project amendment. The evaluation team believed that the project should focus even more on identifying developmental activities that could be associated with Title II and that outreach project funds should be available in larger quantities to support such activities if other funds were not available;
- o USAID Missions work with PVOs to study "areas of potential collaboration"; and

²A.I.D., "Title II Outreach Project Paper Supplement," nd.

³Stephens, Betsy; Vandervoort, Charles; Gilmore, Judith; Rodriquez, Jose, Outreach Grant Project Evaluation (International Science and Technology Institute, Inc.: Washington, DC, January 1983).

- o Priority be given to future outreach proposals seeking to strengthen, rather than expand, existing programs.

These recommended changes followed upon the alterations already made by the project amendment and further shifted the goal and objectives of the project from their initial positions. The evaluation report states that the main reason for suggesting these changes in the project goal and objectives was that USAIDs, A.I.D. and PVOs generally agreed that such changes would further improve the project. Increasing the enrichment focus of outreach grants would enhance the developmental impact of Title II food aid.⁴ Sufficient money to support the new planning and programming necessary for developmental use of Title II was not available from other sources and "may have to come from FFP".⁵ Outreach funds could be used for training, to provide supervision of project activities and to pay for materials (e.g., seeds, vitamins, tools) needed to launch new development or FFW projects.⁶

The evaluation also recommended some administrative changes, particularly that outreach grant requests be developed in conjunction with annual or multi-year operational plans to ensure the availability of needed commodities to support the longer-term efforts being undertaken by PVOs.

In 1986, some additional refocusing of the Outreach Project was accomplished through a project amendment. The amendment aimed more outreach grant resources toward improved coverage of needy beneficiaries and developmental activities and less toward additional geographical coverage.

The Outreach Project was evaluated again in 1987.⁷ The report concluded that:

- o Outreach grants did encourage Title II start-up programs by PVOs in new countries and expansion of existing food aid programs;
- o Outreach funds increased the degree to which PVOs were willing to enter into food distribution activity or expand existing programs; and

⁴Outreach Grant Project Evaluation, p. 14.

⁵Outreach Grant Project Evaluation, p. 14.

⁶Outreach Grant Project Evaluation, p. 14.

⁷Robert Nathan Associates, Inc., Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs (Washington, DC: October 1987). This report, in Chapter II, provides a historical overview of the outreach and enhancement grant programs from 1978 through 1987.

- o Outreach funds did not increase the number of Title II food for development beneficiaries overall.⁸

The evaluation did not recommend specific changes in the purpose of the Outreach Project. The report did recommend that A.I.D. reexamine the ..."structure of Title II programming and determine the directions that Food for Development should take in the future." It also recommended that A.I.D., based on the results of this reassessment, should use DA support for Title II activities to fill the "funding gap"⁹ of PVOs for A.I.D.'s highest priority countries and activities. The authors of the report believed that A.I.D. could not provide sufficient funds to meet the funding gaps of all PVOs and food assistance programs. They favored reduction in funding of enhancement activities and expansion of funding for recurrent (especially logistical) costs, similar to the direction now taken by Sec. 202(e). Therefore, the authors proposed criteria for A.I.D. to use in setting priorities for its food for development assistance which strongly supported the purposes of the Outreach Project as they existed at the time of the evaluation (but which diminished the importance of enhancement purposes).¹⁰ The authors' key recommendation was that A.I.D. use a block grant--which would break the link between specific activities and uses of grant funds--to close the funding gap of PVOs carrying out Title II programs in support of high priority A.I.D. objectives. However, they were so enamored with the block grant concept that they actually recommended all purposes of the Outreach and Enhancement Projects be incorporated into one umbrella project that would use block grants.¹¹

b. Enhancement

A.I.D.'s Title II Enhancement Project was originally approved in February 1985 and extended for three years in June 1988. Its principal purpose was to enable PVOs to develop and implement an agency strategy to ..."improve specific Title II programs (i.e. MCH, SF, FFW) through adding or improving complementary program activities." PVOs were to incorporate critical non-food inputs into their on-going Title II programs, thereby offering beneficiaries comprehensive services rather than solely a package of food. The specific end result sought, as cited later in the Title II Enhancement Project Extension

⁸There is possible confusion regarding attribution of these conclusions strictly to the Outreach Project. The 1987 evaluation considered both the Outreach and Enhancement Projects and, within the report, frequently lumps together discussion and conclusions regarding them. See, for example, Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs, pp. 12ff.

⁹Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs, pp. 23ff.

¹⁰Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs, p. 73.

¹¹Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs, p. 73.

memorandum,¹² was to ensure that FHA's food programs were achieving their desired developmental objectives. The complementary program inputs supported by the project included, but were not limited to:

- o Training of field staff in project design and implementation of specific program support activities;
- o Monitoring and evaluation systems;
- o Education programs;
- o Supervision and program management;
- o Selected operational research activities with direct implications for field programs; and
- o Integration of health and educational activities into programs.

The Enhancement Project was evaluated in 1987.¹³ The evaluation report concentrated mostly on the Outreach Project. It did not set out crisp recommendations regarding the Enhancement Project, although it categorized the purpose of the Enhancement Project as a "luxury". The report said that DA support of Title II activities was scarce and that strengthening activities financed by the project made no contribution to closing the funding gap for core Title II activities at all. Moreover, the report indicated that, while improved management of Title II activities was possible via enhancement support, sustained financial flows would probably be necessary to ensure that ADRA and new PVOs such as Africare and SHARE became proficient CSs. It argued that enhancement funding should either go to CARE and CRS (with 97 percent of the Title II distribution activity) or be eliminated altogether in 1988.

The explicit recommendation of the evaluation regarding the Enhancement Project was to eliminate the project *per se* in 1988. However, in their desire to obtain the block grant mechanism, the authors appear to have retained the purposes of the Enhancement Project. They evidently believed that the less important purposes of enhancement would be sublimated to higher priority purposes within their proposed block grant DA funding program. Thus, the authors suggested criteria for A.I.D. allocation of "scarce" DA funds in support of Title II that gave the concept underlying the Enhancement Project low priority relative to the concepts at the foundation of the Outreach Project. In this recommended reconfiguration of DA

¹²Tanner, Larry, "Action Memorandum for the Acting Assistant Administrator, FVA, PL480 Title II Enhancement Project Extension," June 30, 1988.

¹³Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs.

assistance for Title II programs, A.I.D. would fill PVOs' funding gaps only in cases that supported A.I.D.'s high priority objectives. Title II programs would have become more A.I.D.'s programs, rather than PVO programs or shared PVO-A.I.D. programs.

However, the evaluation report's overall recommendation was that the ..."primary role of DA funding for Title II ...be to encourage Title II programs to move in directions consistent with AID's overall policies and desired development strategy." For example, A.I.D. might want Title II programs to bolster its development efforts in countries where such programs require higher costs; or, A.I.D. may want expanded Title II activity in certain countries to support their structural adjustment progress.

The recommendations of the 1987 evaluation regarding the focus of DA assistance for Title II programs on specific A.I.D. objectives for priority countries and activities were never adopted by A.I.D. Thus, the purpose of the Enhancement Project was not altered in response to the evaluation. The Enhancement Project was not converted to the recommended multi-year block grants either. The original purposes of ISGP did not stem from the recommendations in the 1987 evaluation. However, the multi-year grant approach was used by A.I.D. to pursue the expanded purposes of ISGP (which were based in part on the evolving purposes of the Outreach and Enhancement Projects)

The Enhancement Project was extended in June 1988 to provide support for some PVOs with expiring outreach grants and to further contribute to the original purposes of the Enhancement Project. An additional reason for extending the project was to enable a smooth transition to the upcoming strengthening, innovation and planning assistance grants--later to become the ISGP.

The amendment authorization for the Enhancement Project described the project as ..."a flexible instrument for responding to dollar requirements of project food aid implementers in improving program performance and developmental impact. The project proposes to further the institutionalization of food as a development resource and to increase the developmental and humanitarian impact of PL 480 food assistance."¹⁴ This statement did not substantially alter the project purpose, but it did emphasize "institutionalization of food" as a development resource in ways that the initial project document did not. The focus of the Enhancement Project was altered, however, by the detail included in the amendment authorization. Instead of emphasizing development of PVO strategies that improved specific Title II programs by providing needed complementary inputs, the amended project provided priority funding for grant programs that:

- o Integrated food into agency strategies for responses to emergency, rehabilitative and development programs;

¹⁴"PL 480 Title II Enhancement Project Extension," Tab B, p. 2.

- o Created agency-wide food programming capability...; and
- o Explored innovations in the use of food aid to further development.

Thus, the Enhancement Project became an explicit vehicle to foster "food" as a development resource within PVO strategies rather than a means to develop PVO strategies to improve food programs already underway. Of course, the amendment also broadened the purpose of the enhancement grant to cover, fully, the initial and amended purpose of the Outreach Project.¹⁵

c. Conclusions

The goals and purposes of the Outreach and Enhancement Projects underwent changes during the life of the two projects. These changes were made in response to the needs and perspectives of key stakeholders in the projects--mainly A.I.D. and participating PVOs. As the formulation of the ISGP began, its backdrop was a decade of DA support for Title II programs. ISGP's purposes and procedures were shaped by this ten years of Title II program experience and the felt needs of PVOs and A.I.D. as they sought to carry out Title II programs.

2. Were the recommendations of previous external evaluations taken into account in shaping the goal and purposes of ISGP?

The recommendations of previous external evaluations were taken into account in developing the ISGP. The initial 1982 evaluation of the Outreach Project recommended additional focus on "enrichment," strengthening outreach programs, identifying areas where USAID Missions and PVOs could collaborate more, and organizing DA assistance for Title II programs on a multi-year basis. The ISGP incorporated and embellished all of these recommendations.

The 1987 evaluation of the Outreach and Enhancement Projects proposed that A.I.D. consider DA assistance for Title II Food for Development assistance as a tabula rasa. A.I.D. did not completely reassess its Food for Development activities and did not reorganize its DA support for PVO Title II efforts to support solely its own interests. Nor did A.I.D. sharply diminish the importance of the purposes of the Enhancement Project and reduce funding for enhancement activities. Thus, while the recommendations of the 1987 evaluation were "taken into account," most were not implemented within the existing Outreach and Enhancement Projects. The recommended multi-year programming of DA support for PVO Title II activities was incorporated into the ISGP.

The decision of A.I.D. to disregard the recommendations of the 1987 evaluation regarding the Enhancement Project was formalized in the 1988 amendment of the project which retained and expanded its enhancement purposes. This decision and the subsequent Enhancement Project amendment strongly shaped the direction and activities of the nascent ISGP.

¹⁵"PL 480 Title II Enhancement Project Extension," Tab B, p. 3.

A.I.D. officials suggest that they actually did follow the recommendations of the 1987 evaluation in developing the ISGP--especially in establishing a modified block grant mechanism that incorporated a broad array of purposes in support of Title II activities. The emphasis in the evaluation on diminishing enhancement activities in favor of hard core funding for existing programs in high-cost countries, etc., apparently was not a significant issue for decision makers compared to adoption of the multi-year funding approach. Block grants were a major innovation. It was easy for A.I.D. to incorporate prior outreach and enhancement purposes into the block grant concept and to depend on CSs to identify specific purposes to be pursued with grant funds.

The block grant administration of ISGP resolved key constraints cited in the 1987 evaluation report. However, A.I.D. chose not to adopt clear priorities and selection criteria whereby it would use DA funding of Title II activities under ISGP to achieve A.I.D.'s priority objectives. Its new ISGP allowed CSs to use DA support for multiple legitimate purposes (with special emphasis on strengthening) and to pursue many different outputs. **This conceptual framework diffused ISGP's focus, measurable impact and contribution to A.I.D.'s priority objectives, the opposite effect of that recommended by the authors of the 1987 evaluation report.**

It appears that A.I.D. deliberately constructed ISGP to achieve long-run, rather than short-run, improvements in Title II program results. By moving ISGP toward even more sustained, but diffuse, support for CSs' Title II activities, A.I.D. continued PVO engagement in all aspects of Title II food assistance. A.I.D. thus bought time for it and PVOs to garner additional experience in incorporating or improving the use of food in their various activities. This use of ISGP also enabled PVOs and A.I.D. to plan systematically over a longer time frame and a broader base for the future of Title II food assistance. A.I.D. thus opted for A.I.D.-PVO shared responsibility for Title II food assistance rather than treating Title II as a vehicle to achieve A.I.D.'s own singular priority objectives.

3. What were the original goals and purposes of the ISGP?

The original goals and purposes of the ISGP are stated in the Request for Proposal "Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation PL480 TITLE II DEVELOPMENT GRANT PROGRAM SCHEDULE - FY 1989," dated August 15, 1988.

The Development Grant Program was made up of three components--strengthening, innovation and planning assistance. Each component had a different principal purpose and individual grants for each component were contemplated. Initial evaluation of proposals in 1989 led to decisions to award four strengthening grants, two innovation grants and one planning assistance grant. However, before these grants were awarded, the three grant types were combined under the heading of ISGs, e.g., CSs received one ISG which included one or all of the three components--strengthening, innovation and/or planning assistance--as appropriate.

The overall purpose of the Development Grant Program can best be described as: "To enhance the utilization of PL480 as an effective development resource." However, no formal overall purpose for the Development Grant was stated. Rather, the ISGP was perceived as an envelope for its three separate programs--strengthening, innovation and planning assistance. Each of these three components had specific, but overlapping, purposes and objectives as follows:

a. Strengthening

The purpose of the strengthening grant component was: "...to provide broad support to Cooperating Sponsors, as partner organizations with A.I.D., in achieving mutually important objectives in the developmental uses of food commodities provided under PL480 Title II."

The specific objectives of this key strengthening grant component of the Development Grant Program were to:

- o Design and institutionalize the developmental uses of food aid;
- o Economize and increase the effectiveness of food assisted programs; and
- o Expand financial resources and flexibility of CSs.

The first two objectives flow directly from earlier experience in the Outreach and Enhancement Projects. Beginning with additional "enrichment" in the first alterations of the Outreach Project and ending with the amendments of the Enhancement Project to further "institutionalize" food as a part of development assistance, ISGP's predecessor projects led directly to the first two strengthening grant purposes set out in the ISGP.

The third purpose--expand financial resources and flexibility of CSs--was not a direct outgrowth of prior evaluations. Both the 1981 and 1987 evaluations mentioned expansion of PVO resources as one appropriate objective of DA assistance for Title II activities,¹⁶ but neither recommended changes in the Outreach or Enhancement Projects to achieve this purpose. In fact, both evaluations cited the need for PVOs and A.I.D. to agree upon funding support by A.I.D. with respect to purposes of Title II activities and the types and volume of costs to be covered. Both evaluation reports were clear: A.I.D. should not expect PVOs to provide additional funding of their own to support Title II Food for Development activities. Even if this ISGP purpose could be construed to mean providing food to PVOs' as an additional fungible development resource, adding food also creates a funding gap that PVOs cannot or are reluctant to fill by themselves. Thus, the purpose of using ISGP to expand the

¹⁶Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs, pp. 50ff.; Outreach Grant Project Evaluation, pp. 43ff.

financial resources and financial flexibility of PVOs appears to have arisen from within A.I.D., not from A.I.D.'s experience with the predecessor Outreach and Enhancement Projects as identified by external evaluations.

b. Innovation

The purpose of the innovation grant component was to "...to stimulate new thinking and creative approaches to food programming to alleviate the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition."

The innovation grant's objectives were to encourage CSs to explore, conduct feasibility tests and demonstrate new ideas and approaches which might lead to significant new ways of maximizing the developmental impacts of Title II food resources.

At the time of the 1987 evaluation, PVOs had maintained their scheduled plans in terms of staff expansion and development. However, their efforts at program experimentation was lagging behind planned benchmarks.¹⁷ In fact, the evaluation team strongly believed that the innovation, management strengthening and planning assistance aspects of the Enhancement Project should not be a top priority for A.I.D.¹⁸ Thus, the ISGP's continued emphasis on innovation was not derived from the external evaluations. However, innovation was an integral part of the Enhancement Project and, therefore, its purposes were well established as a current or potential activity eligible for funding. The 1987 evaluation, while not preferring innovation activities as compared to others, did include innovation as a high priority, especially for "existing" programs.

c. Planning Assistance:

The purpose of these grants was: "To encourage qualified PVOs to become Cooperating Sponsors with A.I.D. for utilizing PL 480 Title II resources to address the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition."

The RFP stated that the objective of the planning assistance effort was to enable PVOs not currently involved as Cooperating Sponsors in Title II programs to explore program feasibility and develop plans for implementation.

Establishment of new CSs was taking longer than anticipated at the time of the 1987 evaluation.¹⁹ The evaluation concluded it was unlikely that new PVOs would be able to

¹⁷Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs, p. 10.

¹⁸Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs, pp. 10, 63ff.

¹⁹Assessment of PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Programs, p 10.

continue their Title II efforts without continued enhancement support and questioned whether it was appropriate to spend scarce DA funds in support of new CSs becoming proficient managers of Title II activities. However, A.I.D. built upon its prior intent to create new CSs; it took an opposite tack in the ISGP to the authors of the 1987 evaluation in the ISGP, namely: Because it takes longer than anticipated to develop good CSs, A.I.D. should continue its support of PVOs trying to become Cooperating Sponsors for a longer time period.

d. Conclusions

A.I.D. developed ISGP based on its perceptions of its own and PVO needs and on the external evaluations of the Outreach and Enhancement Projects. The Outreach Project sought mostly to expand use of food for development; the Enhancement Project aimed mostly to improve the use of food already being used in development. A.I.D. did not sharpen the focus of ISGP but rather scooped most prior Outreach and Enhancement purposes into it and expanded on the purposes most closely related to enhancement activities. ISGP did adopt the multi-year grant approach recommended in the 1987 evaluation, but it de-linked the block grants from clear A.I.D. priorities and objectives.

The net result of ISGP's broad and multiple purposes was to allow CSs to select their own purposes, objectives and--especially--subobjectives for DA funding with little concrete guidance from A.I.D. Each CS selected one or more of ISGP's multiple major purposes and objectives and numerous more specific subobjectives to pursue. The self-selection of objectives by CSs was usually made without baseline or other analysis to indicate the importance of the objectives chosen and the extent of the constraints hindering their achievement. One result was that, while ISGP supported improved use of food for development in general, it funded a plethora of different subobjectives and supporting activities at the more specific level. Another result was that it was difficult for CSs and A.I.D. to determine whether the purposes and objectives being pursued could be achieved and, if so, what the impact would be on CSs or their development objectives.

When ISGP is viewed from the top down, then, the project's goal and purposes--although multiple in number--are coherent and rational. These purposes and objectives are used as the rationale for providing DA funding to CSs and as a framework for monitoring grant progress. However, when the ISGP is viewed from the bottom up, the wide array of DA supported subobjectives and activities it contains is difficult to dissect and assess in terms of its contribution to the project's overall goal and purposes. Figure 2 illustrates this point graphically. In supporting this myriad of activities of value to participating CSs, ISGP has become a source of flexible institutional support for their overall efforts to expand and improve the developmental use of food within their overall programs.

B. Changes in ISGP Purposes

1. How have the goals and purposes of ISG changed during the course of the project?

a. Strengthening

The design and institutionalization of developmental uses of food aid within CSs has continued to be a major purpose of ISGP. All CSs have used ISGP funding to help achieve this purpose for their own programs either at the headquarters level, at the field level, or both (as reported in detail in Chapters 3 and 4).

The purpose of economizing and increasing the effectiveness of food assisted programs has also been maintained as a part of ISGP. However, increasing the efficiency of food programs has not been emphasized by CSs as much as improving the effectiveness of food assisted programs. CSs are concerned about "economizing" mostly to the degree that it ensures clean audits, although good food loss records and more efficient logistical mechanisms also are important. However, the funding gap for food used for development has been getting larger, according to most CSs, and cannot be met simply by more economical food logistics or management.

CSs are interested in improved effectiveness of food assistance programs because they envision their major work to be development or relief, both of which more effective food programs can help achieve. By learning how to design and manage monetization activities, for example, some CSs have been able to link food and development more effectively.


The purpose of expanding financial resources and flexibility of CSs has received little emphasis, although some CSs mention it in their grant proposals and annual reports. A.I.D., in evaluating grant proposals does emphasize this point, but mostly in the context of requiring additional fund raising to companion ISGP funds. The concept of ISGP strengthening exercises being positively used to expand CSs' financial resources is not prominently mentioned or pursued. The overall purposes of ISGP have changed to the degree that this purpose has become less significant or operational.

b. Innovation

The purpose of innovation remains a legitimate and occasionally used purpose of ISGP. However, little actual emphasis has been placed on it by most CSs. Some CSs can document innovation experiments and resulting ideas and approaches to maximize the development impact of food assistance. Mostly, however, innovation has become a less important purpose of ISGP than initially envisioned.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Figure 2: Illustration of ISGP Conceptual and Operational Structure



c. Planning Assistance

ISGP's purpose of helping newcomers become Title II CSs has not changed for the few PVOs being assisted. However, it has become apparent to participating PVOs and A.I.D. that the goal of creating new CSs is a long-term one. There is some concern among A.I.D. staff that PVOs receiving planning assistance funding have moved little food. The long-term commitment needed to bring new CSs into being and the implicit expectation that these new participants need to perform quickly in using food effectively for development have diminished the importance of this purpose of the ISGP over the life of the project.

The main change that planning assistance funding has made to date in participating PVOs has been to encourage them to examine and use food as a part of their resource mix for development. These PVOs, and most others, are not trying to develop food programs. They believe they have development programs for which food may be one resource to help make them more successful.

d. Conclusions

- o Initial Outreach Grants aimed to expand food programs primarily by strengthening food distribution infrastructure. Enhancement Grants were designed to strengthen program management and design capabilities of CSs carrying out feeding programs. ISGP purposes evolved from predecessor programs to meet several significant needs of CSs and A.I.D.--to help CSs: 1) Design and further establish their developmental uses of food aid; 2) Increase their capability to maximize the efficiency and development impact of their food assistance, and 3) Expand, stabilize and make more flexible their financial base for food aid activities. These CS and A.I.D. needs were valid at the time ISGP was initiated, and they continue to be legitimate today.
- o The purposes of ISGP have evolved substantially. ISGP purposes initially emphasized planning assistance, institutional strengthening and innovation. ISGP has moved from these initial purposes toward flexible institutional support of CSs' efforts to expand and improve the developmental use of food within their overall programs.

2. Has a core of identifiable common purposes been retained?

a. Three retained purposes

A core of three identifiable common purposes has been retained within ISGP to date. The first common purpose is to support the design and institutionalization of developmental food assistance by participating CSs. This purpose looms large for every CS involved in ISGP. WVRD, for example, is using ISGP funding to inculcate development principles, some involving direct use of food, into its entire program. CRS is using ISGP funds to re-sensitize its staff to the use of food as a development resource and to strengthen the capacity of local PVOs to plan and execute effective development projects, some involving food. Africare is seeking to incorporate food into its resource mix and to use it developmentally.

The second core purpose of ISGP that remains intact is to further professionalize CS systems that support developmental uses of food. All CSs use ISGP funding, in part, to help achieve this purpose--as shown in detail in Chapter IV.

The third core purpose of ISGP that remains acceptable to key stakeholders is to use grant funds to fill critical planning, design and other management related gaps in CSs' Title II programs, especially at the headquarters level. This purpose is supported by ISGP in two ways, as indicated above. First, ISGP contributes to specific funding gap requirements for Title II activities--e.g., headquarters staffing costs, development of central, regional and country MIS or accounting systems, and--to date--purchase of vehicles and software. Second, ISGP money is fungible. CSs tend to use it where it will directly meet critical funding gaps or enable other funds (e.g., monetized local currency or Section 202(e) money) to be applied to such gaps. For example, one CS was "hoarding" ISGP funds received from its headquarters for a few months so it would be able to cover what its management knew would be a temporary, but painful, short-fall in hard currency funding for its overall program later in the fiscal year. In the interim, it was meeting its ISGP financial needs with monetization funds.

Other initial ISGP purposes are less significant to persons directly involved with ISGP and appear, as a matter of practice, to have become less important aspects of ISGP's operations. Of course, various of ISGP's participants and practitioners differ as to the importance of innovation or other purposes for ISGP. However, in both concept and practice, stakeholders in ISGP support purposes that strengthen the role of food in development and the ability of CSs to plan and execute food for development efforts cleanly--in terms of audits and management control--and effectively--in terms of use of a significant volume of food that does improve the economic and social conditions of the poor that A.I.D. and the CSs seek to help.

Stakeholders tend to agree on these core purposes of ISGP. However, CSs would prefer that ISGP's central purpose be to support improvement of their developmental food use

programs through unrestricted block grants. All would apparently now temper the thrust of ISGP in light of Sec. 202(e) funding availability and guidelines, focusing ISGP cash grants more on headquarters and headquarters sponsored design and institutionalization matters and 202(e) funds on establishing new Title II programs and on paying for specific administrative and funding gap costs necessary to carry out Title II programs effectively in developing countries.

b. Conclusion

- o Specific objectives within the original purposes of ISGP remain acceptable to key stakeholders--the design and institutionalization of developmental food aid by CSs, further professionalization of CSs' systems in support of developmental uses of food, and use of grant funds to fill critical management related gaps in CSs' programs--and constitute a remaining core of identifiable common purposes. However, most CSs would prefer ISGP's central purpose to be to support improvement of their developmental food use programs through unrestricted grants.

3. Are ISG's purposes consistent with the intent of the P.L. 480 legislation?

a. Public Law 480 background and legislative intent

The Agricultural Development and Trade Act of 1990 is the latest version of the US food aid program. The intent of the Act, as expressed in its preamble, is to ..."promote the foreign policy of the United States by enhancing the food security of the developing world through the use of agricultural commodities and local currencies accruing under this Act..."²⁰ Title II of the Act, Section 201, directs the President to establish a program to:

- (1) address famine or other urgent or extraordinary relief requirements;
- (2) combat malnutrition, especially in children and mothers;
- (3) carry out activities that attempt to alleviate the causes of hunger, mortality and morbidity;
- (4) promote economic and community development;
- (5) promote sound environmental practices; and

²⁰ Agricultural Development and Trade Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 3632 ff.

- (6) carry out feeding programs.

Two specific uses of Title II, Sec. 201 funds are set out in Section 202(e) of the Act-- to establish new programs under Title II and to meet specific administrative, management, personnel and internal transportation and distribution costs for carrying out programs in foreign countries under this title. Title II also introduced other programming and management changes that required A.I.D. and USDA to undertake new activities and efforts in using America's food production to spur economic growth and market development in developing countries. The Act also raised several new issues regarding PL 480 program implementation.

Title II of the new 1990 legislation enables the USG to use grant commodities to meet emergency food needs. It also continues to sponsor food aid to combat malnutrition, alleviate the causes of hunger, promote economic development and sound environmental practices, and to carry out specific feeding programs. It specifies that grant non-emergency food aid be linked tightly to indigenous institutions. In situations where local currency is generated, the Title specifies that the proceeds be used to enhance the effectiveness of the commodities being provided and to implement a wide variety of economic development activities in recipient countries. Assistance in achieving successful sales programs can be provided by direct USAID actions. A Food Aid Consultative Group is established by the new Title II to review the activities undertaken via Title II.

b. ISGP and P.L. 480 legislative purposes

How do ISGP's purposes fit into the new Agricultural Development and Trade Act of 1990? There is no direct conflict between ISGP's purposes and those of the Act. However, there is overlap. ISGP's objective of "further professionalizing" CSs' management and accounting systems is very similar to the ..."activities aimed at improving the management and efficiency of ongoing Title II programs" which A.I.D.'s guidelines indicate will be supported by 202(e) funds. Likewise, ISGP's focus on planning assistance to encourage development of new CSs could be considered to overlap with Sec. 202's emphasis on establishing new Title II programs.

On the other hand, there are substantial differences between ISGP's purposes and Sec. 202(e)'s emphases. ISGP, for example, focuses on innovation which 202(e) does not. ISGP emphasizes broader scale, more systemic planning and use of food as one part of the development mix used by CSs. Sec. 202 speaks almost entirely to ways to expand Title II food programs and to make them work better. ISGP's purposes, then, were and certainly are now, focused broadly on making food assistance a more integral part of A.I.D.'s and CSs' overall development strategies. Sec. 202(e) is aimed more directly at creating and sustaining high quality food programs.

These overlaps and different foci are fairly easy to reconcile. ISGP can continue to provide cash grants to CSs to help them improve their use of food as a development resource,

including innovation efforts, and to make their overall assistance efforts more developmental and sustainable. Sec. 202(e) can focus on enlarging and sharpening the impact of Title II food programs by PVOs whether or not they are participating in ISGP.

c. Conclusion

- o ISGP's purposes overlap, but do not conflict with, those of 202(e). With careful development of guidelines for both sources of funding, ISGP and 202(e) can become highly complementary.

III. ACHIEVEMENT OF OVERALL ISGP PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

The purposes of ISGP were contained in the specific purposes of its three components- strengthening, innovation and planning assistance. ISGP sought "To enhance the utilization of PL480 as an effective development resource." The strengthening portion of the grant was "to provide broad support to CSs in achieving mutually important objectives in the developmental uses of food commodities". The innovation component of the grant was designed "to stimulate new thinking and creative approaches to food programming to alleviate the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition". The planning assistance element of the grant "to encourage qualified PVOs to become Cooperating Sponsors with A.I.D. for utilizing PL 480 Title II resources". The objectives of each component were more specific.

PVOs utilized the ISGP for a multiplicity of activities within the general, and the specific, grant purposes to improve their food aid programs. At this relatively early stage (three years into the grant agreements) it is difficult to assess the long- term impact of ISGP in terms of greater efficiency of its operations of Title II programs. In the long run, ISGP's impact will be measured in terms of PVOs' ability to handle larger amounts of food and program it cost effectively for development. At present, ISGP's impact must be assessed in terms of changes in CSs' program directions, better strategic and program planning and project design for the use of Title II food as a resource in development activities, improved CS Title II food use management systems and performance, innovations in the use of food for development and the movement of additional CSs into Title II operations.

The paragraphs below summarize ISGP's overall achievement of its purposes.

A. Strengthening PVO's Ability to Administer Food Aid for the Alleviation of Hunger and Malnutrition

I. Discussion

In evaluating the impact of the ISGP on strengthening the institutional capabilities of the PVOs, it is important to note that ISGP funded PVOs at different stages of maturation in the use of food aid . For example, CRS and CARE have been involved with large quantities of food aid, though not only for development purposes, for decades. On the other hand, Africare, WVRD and SHARE are "newcomers" to the food-for-development business. FAM, of course, is a newcomer to Title II issues because it was initiated only recently. Thus, the impacts of ISGP, the original purpose of which was "to enhance the utilization of PL 480 as an effective development resource" on individual PVOs, are necessarily varied.

The ISGP strengthened PVOs' capability to administer Title II food aid programs in developing countries in a number of ways, but three broad themes are of major importance. First, ISGP encouraged and enabled PVOs to examine and change the direction of their food and their development programs, particularly by making food programs more developmental

and by adding food or more food as a resource to their development programs. The changes in policy and direction with respect to food made by PVOs could be classified as better capability to administer food programs, or at the organizational level, as innovations. In this evaluation they are treated as both.

Second, ISGP provided "broad support" in the form of financial inputs and flexible programming to improve many aspects of PVO programs at the headquarters and field level. While most PVOs viewed ISGP as a means to specific ends, the overarching perception expressed by them was that ISGP filled critical gaps in their funding (e.g., for personnel, procurement, logistics support) that enabled their entire program to function better. ISGP, in their eyes, was seen as a general support grant for their entire food for development program, even though it was used to fund numerous very specific needs and activities. "ISGP's major contribution," said one, "is that it helps us float the entire ship (our total program) conceptually and financially, even though it is designed to fix only specific parts of the vessel and does not involve very much money." Thus, a key conclusion drawn by PVO officials is that specific and general program improvements fostered by ISGP helped them, as one put it. ..." get ahead of the curve...", in thinking about and operating their food aid programs.

Third, in addition to improving PVOs' clarity about the role and uses of food within their programs, ISGP funding led directly to leadership, management and administrative improvements in CS programs. Strengthening CSs in these areas involved better strategic and food assistance program planning and project design in the use of food as a resource in development activities and improved food use management systems and performance.

a. Program direction

Numerous CSs used ISGP to change the direction of their food aid work. ISGP helped these PVOs make organizational changes to better integrate food into their planning processes and development programs, thus institutionalizing food as a development resource within their overall program. As one PVO representative put it: "ISG has meant 'disaster mitigation' in terms of staff availability and training." It freed key management at headquarters and in the field to focus on key food aid issues, especially the use of food for development. Thus, ISGP has been responsible for "new" thinking and more positive attitudes within the PVOs about the priority, use and programming of food as a resource within their overall programs. The impact within the PVOs is differentiated as to organizational purpose, size, length of involvement with food aid, and the status of the PVOs program and its thinking about food assistance when ISGP support was received. However, ISGP has encouraged all PVOs to examine the nature and direction of their food assistance efforts as they join with the remainder of their development (and relief) programs.

ISGP has provided the funding for the development of new policies, strategies, programs and projects using food as a resource for development. Without this funding

mechanism, the resources were not available, at PVO headquarters, regional field offices and country field offices, for this purpose because other relief and development programs had priority. PVOs, experiencing a general funding "squeeze", considered the kind of policy/program reviews necessary to proceed with new and innovative programs a "luxury" in the crunch of day-to-day crises and emergencies to which they responded around the world. For the smaller PVOs who had not previously been involved with food aid, it would not have been possible to develop the kinds of food aid programs which have evolved with ISGP funds.

Equally important, the availability of ISG funds motivated some PVOs to reconsider food aid programs which had previously been dropped for philosophical, technical and/or managerial reasons. One PVO reported an important attitude shift which has resulted organizationally both at headquarters and in the field as a result of the ISG support for a technical team that could provide meaningful assistance the country programs in the design, planning and implementation of Title II programs. Without the ISG there would have been no technical team and probably no expansion of programs using Title II food for development purposes.

Resources provided by the ISGP allowed PVOs to review their existing programs, develop new program directions and learn how to design and implement some new food aid programs. One PVO reported that the ISG program "helped to challenge and push" the organization to get more serious about multi-year planning and meeting professional standards for management, technical approaches to development, etc. Another PVO reported that the ISGP was the motive force for it to take a hard look at its programming and use of food aid and to establish a food aid policy for the organization. ISGP has helped other PVOs "get ahead of the curve" in planning for contingencies. The ISGs helped various PVOs better understand the role of food aid in their overall portfolio of activities.

Under the ISGP some PVOs have moved from smaller scale programs to medium and/or larger scale programs using food aid. To make this transition these PVOs rethought their approach to development and considered how larger quantities of food and/or monetization funds could be creatively used for development purposes. Without the ISGP they would not have had the technical or managerial staff to develop or manage these larger programs and would likely not continue them.

At CRS, for example, the impact of the ISG has been "tremendous", particularly in the creation of a food policy, where none had existed, or at least was not written, for over 40 years. One senior manager stated that the ISG had strengthened CRS' management capacity to deal with food aid issues at a conceptual level and not just on the day-to-day level of moving food. Whereas decisions to use or not to use food aid had always been made outside the regular planning process in an almost ad hoc manner, the ISGP-supported Support Grant Team (SGT) focused CRS on the importance of food aid and how to integrate it into CRS' planning process. The SGT proceeded in a logical manner, using grant funds, to increase CRS' staff understanding of why food aid is important and how it could be programmed for

development rather than for "relief". CRS also has explored how food aid resources could be used to promote small enterprise and other business development

Supported by ISGP, CRS, at the headquarters level, did not use ISGP as a way to "have a better food program", but as a means to consider how to use food more effectively to achieve development objectives. CRS wanted to decrease its dependency of food, especially on local beneficiary contributions (which CRS halted). CRS examined how to use food--monetization, imported food for distribution, food swaps within and outside of countries, etc.-to further its development objectives. CRS held workshops to discuss the food assistance policy and plan with all CRS staff. It also created analytical templates for CRS staff to use in assessing the relevance and potential impact of food assistance in specific CRS programs.

At the field level, examinations of CRS' Bolivian Title II programs in the late '80s indicated that the entire effort was food driven rather than development driven. ISGP was intended, according to Mission personnel, to help rectify this situation. Accordingly, ISGP funding has been used primarily for overall CS program support--aimed at turning food driven programs into development driven ones.

ADRA/Peru attributed ISGP with enabling it to make "huge changes" in the last three years. In the past, ADRA though principally of distributing food and increasing the number of persons helped. Now it is measuring its objectives in terms of development and the economic and social circumstances surrounding each person assisted. Its Peruvian staff believed the changes in ADRA's program quality, personnel and administration had been substantial, mostly because of the support of ISGP.

WVRD's original Food Aid Test (FAT) Enhancement Grant was developed to assist WVRD "test" the use of more food aid for development purposes. The availability of this grant helped WV reconsider how it might increase its capacity to use food aid in ways consistent with its overall philosophy and program. Subsequently, WVRD's ISG-type Program Enhancement Grant (PEG) afforded it the opportunity to put some of its "tested" approaches into practice. In providing resources to support an Area Development Program (ADP) Team operating out of Senegal, ISGP contributed to an "attitude shift" in many WVRD field offices regarding the use of food aid in their programs. Provided with technical support to design and manage programs funded by food aid, many WV field offices have become more willing to try these new approaches. These changes are reflected in the fact that World Vision has increased, more than six fold, the amount of tonnage handled on an annual basis. The ISGP (PEG) enabled PVOs to improve their capability to program these larger amounts of food. Overall, this reflects a major attitudinal change within World Vision toward using food as a part of a "mix" of resources for development programs.

On the other hand, WV's initial intent in working with ISGP was to increase the amount of sources available to it (e.g., food) to carry out its programs. Instead, WV has experienced ISGP as a catalyst to encourage it to examine and perhaps change the entire organization to be a more "developmental" one, including its use of food in development.

ADT has helped WV recognize the importance of sustainable development and the role of food in enabling it.

ISGP provided the impetus for PVOs to review their current policies and programs regarding the use of food. It was a catalyst for the grantees in terms of "pushing" them to integrate more food into their development and programs. The directional change in PVO programs that resulted from ISGP funding will, in time, encourage PVOs to increase food use within their development programs and to use it effectively. Thus, although not yet obvious, the impact of this increased capacity will be more programming of food aid for development (some of which has already been achieved in specific projects and country programs) and better internal systems at PVO headquarters and field levels to manage the food resource and its use.

b. Broad support

As indicated in Chapter II, ISGP's broad and multiple purposes allowed CSs to select their own purposes, objectives and--especially--subobjectives for DA funding. ISGP purposes and objectives provided the rationale for the allocation of DA funding to CSs, but CSs could and did operationalize ISGP as general, rather than specific, support for their programs. Thus, PVOs used ISGP funds to fill critical planning, design and other management related gaps, either by directing ISGP funds to areas where specific funding gap requirements existed or by ensuring that ISGP money was fungible within their programs. PVOs used ISGP funds to benefit their entire program (to cause the whole ship to rise a little bit), not only to resolve the issues included in their grant agreements.

The broad support provided by ISGP is evident in all ISGP components. For example, in the strengthening component, WVRD has created a team of specialists in Africa (the African Development Team--ADT) fully funded by ISGP to help reshape the efforts of WVRD's country teams throughout the continent. Food, as a resource, is intended to be part of this new "focus" where appropriate, but its percentage of total WV resources is likely to remain small. The team is assisting WV country teams to prepare development strategies and project designs that include the use of food and to manage food for development projects, and it has expanded WVRD's capacity to use food in its development efforts. But, the team has taken on a much more daunting task--to help WV International intensify the impact of its very large private cash flow stream on development in the countries where WV operates. ISGP has, by design or default, provided the broad based support needed for WV to engage and improve its fundamental development approach. If WV adopts a strong developmental strategy and links food assistance to it, A.I.D.'s ISGP funds for WV will have been well spent.

Another example of the importance of broad based support by ISGP is Africare's effort to use food in its development programs. A long-time development agency, Africare has drawn on ISGP funds to explore mixing food assistance with its existing development efforts to enhance their outreach, impact and sustainability. Africare has used ISGP funds to

support a food for development headquarters team to integrate food assistance into Africare's overall program. As a new CS, and a CS faced with mitigating circumstances in some developing countries where it has sought to establish food aid programs, Africare's incorporation of food into its overall effort happened slowly. However, ISGP's broad support enabled Africare to pursue new food for development activities.

c. Specific institutional strengthening

ISGP's contributions to institutional strengthening occurred at three levels within CSs: PVO headquarters, regional offices and country field offices. ISGP funding enabled hiring of more headquarters' staff for Food for Development Units and technical consultants at headquarters offices. It allowed hiring of staff and funding of consultancies at the regional offices and hiring of technical and logistical personnel at the field level. It also enabled establishment of more and better warehouse capacity and personnel at the field offices. The ISGP helped develop a cadre, albeit small at this stage, of better trained personnel, both expatriate and national, for the PVO community at large.

Specific evidence that the ISGP achieved its overall purposes and objectives includes its success in:

- o Assisting PVOs to develop the capacity to identify the how food assistance could be used in their overall and development programs;
- o Improving PVO capability to develop multi-year planning via MYOPs as required in the grant agreements;
- o Enhancing PVO ability to account for food and funds related to Title II via commodity tracking systems and improved financial accounting programs;
- o Increasing the "professionalism" of PVO Title II headquarters program managers, field staff and host country nationals through training programs related to Title II design, management, monitoring, etc;
- o Improving PVO understanding and use of monetization;
- o Establishing food aid programming units or groups at PVO headquarters or regional offices to serve as focal points for the development and coordination of food programs; and,
- o Increasing PVO information flow both within and between PVOs regarding food aid programming and management.

Numerous examples illustrate ISGP success in achieving these and similar specific purposes. CARE developed a very decentralized food aid management system, particularly in terms of accountability. The ISGP enabled CARE to coordinate these decentralized efforts

more effectively. CARE, with ISGP funding, established a Food Programming Unit (FPU). The FPU helped improve coordination and consultation between the various technical units at CARE that might utilize food aid in their programs. The FPU took a pro-active role in developing training materials, manuals and workshops for use by headquarters and field staff. The manuals and workshops were adaptable to particular headquarters and field situations.

Africare used its grant to train headquarters office staff for food assistance activities--planning, accounting and food handling procedures. SCF improved the capacity of its staff to deal more effectively with monetization and, from its headquarters level, computerized the accounting systems of country Missions. ISGP also was used by SCF to finance numerous workshops to strengthen financial management.

ISGP helped CSs strengthen their financial stability, base and management (see Chapter VI). Creating and accessing monetized funds, for example, was important to CRS, Africare and other CSs. It provided them with cash for their development projects and other activities. For WVRD and others, inclusion of food for development activities in their portfolio helped attract additional individual giving, especially from certain groups of donors. ADRA argues that its receipt of ISGP funds helped it cope more effectively with the vagaries of funding receipts from other sources--202(e), headquarters offices. ISGP funds flow enabled ADRA to move food and cover gaps in its programs that other programs would have covered had their disbursement been timely. ADRA/Peru also strengthened its accounting capability substantially with ISGP funds. CARE suggested that, while ISGP filled funding gaps during periods of time when these gaps should have been met by other funding sources, ISGP, 202(e) and other funding sources need to work together as an integrated package of funding components. Some of the most difficult management and development problems faced by them and other CSs arise from the lack of timeliness and full integration of available funding sources.

Despite its success in strengthening PVOs, ISGP also had weaknesses and experienced problems. One issue was: Would A.I.D. fund the same PVO activities until they were "institutionalized"? Institutional strengthening is not a "one shot" deal, but a continuous process. Maintenance and expansion of Title II programs requires regular training at the management and "grassroots" levels. PVOs engaged in important training programs provided by FAM, other PVOs or their own staff. However, concern by PVOs about ISGP funding weakened their long-run commitment to a high level of training and to other strengthening expenditures. If ISGP funds were to terminate, many PVOs would not be able or willing to provide needed training.

Another issue raised by some was whether ISGP sponsored strengthening of PVOs would be sustainable. ISGP enabled PVOs to improve their institutional capability to greater or lesser degrees (as described more fully in Chapter 4). However, Most PVOs experienced considerable turnover in personnel, particularly at headquarters, but also at the field level. Many of those trained under ISGP moved to other positions within the same PVO (in which case their training is not "lost"). Some went to other PVOs (where their training may or may

not be applicable). Others moved out of the food aid business entirely. In the latter two cases, ISGP's institutional strengthening efforts were lost, in part, and had little long-term impact on PVOs. CARE, for example, had an almost complete change of personnel (four out of five positions) in its Food Programming Unit in the 1990-91 period. WVRD, Africare, FHI, SHARE, and ADRA had a minimum of one change in managers or directors responsible for the ISGP.

The training of local personnel, a major focus of the ISGP, met with varying degrees of success. Local personnel had varying capabilities to benefit from the training and thus take over and/or manage the projects, prepare the necessary documentation and maintain accountability for the commodities. There are several reasons for this: First, many local PVOs do not have knowledge of donors, their program objectives, or the way they operate. Second, many lack the conceptual and/or analytical and writing skills necessary for managing complex Title II programs. Third, there is sometimes a question about the quality or appropriateness of the local staff being trained for particular responsibilities. Sometimes their selection is more a political than a professional process.

Detailed assessment of the problems ISGP funding was to help solve was not carried out in support of most grant applications. The problems addressed by ISGP, baseline information and the impacts sought were infrequently researched or developed by the CSs. While a number of the CSs installed new commodity tracking, accounting and management information systems, the objective(s) served by these systems were not clear--e.g., how did they improve the delivery of food aid? However, the consensus among the PVOs is that these new information systems dramatically improved their ability to manage food aid programs. These systems have improved the quality and quantity of information available to the PVOs, but their long range impact on the ability of PVOs to program more food is unclear.

In sum, while the ISG provided resources to strengthen PVOs' ability to administer food aid, particularly in the hiring and training of additional personnel, virtually all the PVOs stated that this enhanced capability would not be sustainable, especially in the intermediate term, without the continuing support of A.I.D. They perceived the risks associated with the management of increased volumes of food aid as sufficiently high to warrant this additional financial support. Moreover, the additional monitoring and auditing requirements, combined with the push from A.I.D. to use more local PVOs, meant more people would be required to administer food aid programs. Without additional staff, the necessary monitoring and more in-depth management of Title II programs would not be possible.

2. Conclusions

- o ISGP strengthened the PVOs' institutional capabilities to administer Title II food aid programs in developing countries. It helped CSs: 1) Design and further establish their developmental uses of food aid; 2) Increase their

capability to maximize the efficiency and development impact of their food assistance, and 3) Expand, stabilize and make more flexible their financial base for food aid activities.

- o However, institutional strengthening of the PVOs is not a "one shot" effort; it is an on going process that must be supported by A.I.D. if PVOs are to expand their food aid development programs in the future.

B. Filling Unmet Logistical Requirements in PVO Food Aid Programs

1. Discussion

ISGP enabled some PVOs to develop new and/or improved procedures for their logistical capabilities in such areas as transportation, commodity storage and warehouse management. The key element made available by ISGP has been hiring of additional staff at headquarters and in the field who could focus on improvements in logistical support for Title II programs.

The impact of the ISGP on logistical requirements varied from PVO to PVO. Illustrative of the ways that the ISGP filled previously unmet logistical requirements are the following:

- o PVOs' use ISGP funding to expand their efforts--at headquarters, regional field offices and country field offices--to improve or expand their accounting and commodity management systems (by obtaining technical assistance through external consultants or internal staff). SHARE's Country Director, for example, upgraded internal systems for accounting and commodity management. CARE developed manuals (e.g., Commodity Storage and Handling), which became an important resource for several PVOs. Africare developed a Food for Development Handbook which included a section on management and logistics, and ADRA/Peru spent over a third of its ISGP funds on improving its commodity handling facilities via training and warehouse systems improvement.
- o Several PVOs utilized ISGP funds to procure equipment, including vehicles and computers, to meet logistical support needs, mainly in the field. ADRA, in Bolivia, improved its food logistics system, including warehouse management, computer tracking of commodities and ADRA/Bolivia Mission control of food commodities. FHI/Bolivia used a significant portion of its funding to pay for warehouse space and transportation, control food within its warehouses, and to cover personnel costs for warehouse management and operation;
- o FHI's contribution to the Bolivian monetization program stemmed directly from ISGP funding which enabled FHI/Bolivia to meet its logistical needs. Because

FHI/Bolivia had better maintained and larger warehouses under the management of an expanded and higher quality commodity management team supported by the ISGP, it was selected to lead the Monetization Program by USAID/Bolivia.

In sum, most PVOs reported they had become "more analytical and professional" in their approach to the storage and handling of food commodities as a result of ISGP funding. Workshops and other training sessions carried out with ISGP funds for personnel from headquarters and field offices helped some PVOs develop standards and policies for more efficient and cost effective ways to handle transport and storage requirements. Other PVOs reported that ISGP was not critical to improving their transport and storage of food, but it did help provide financial support to personnel who needed to attend the training programs.

2. Conclusion

The ISGP helped PVOs fill unmet logistical requirements in food aid programs by improving their logistical capabilities in transportation, commodity storage and warehouse management.

C. Stimulating New Approaches By CSs to the Use of Food Aid as a Development Resource

1. Discussion

The second component of the ISGP was "innovation". The intent of this component was to encourage, stimulate and support the development of new and different ways to program food for development purposes.

Two primary outcomes have resulted from the innovation efforts of ISGP. First, and to date most important, CSs and other PVOs have begun to talk and think about innovation in their use of Title II food. CSs are actively exploring ways food can be used innovatively in their existing and expanded development programs. The application of innovation has not been limited to A.I.D.'s funding of innovation grants. Innovation has been explored and considered across the spectrum of CS activities--planning, project design, improved management, and logistics, project implementation and expansion of the use of food in to new geographical and substantive areas of activity.

Second, CSs have developed innovative uses of food in their programs, mostly at the project level. Where such innovation has occurred, the major impetus for it was ISGP funding and the increasing desire of PVOs to use food constructively and carefully in their development programs. Using ISGP funding, CSs were able to support further examination and new or innovative uses of food for development in their on-going programs at a time when the use of food was being re-examined and new approaches to food for development were being sought.

Relatively few "new" approaches to food for development have resulted from ISGP efforts to date. That is, wholly different approaches to food aid have not been the principal

outcome of the ISGP or its innovation component. However, linkage of food aid to development initiatives in new ways has occurred as a result of ISGP's emphasis on innovation. Africare, for example, is actively using grant funds to find ways to create revolving capital funds from food aid resources. FHI is actively involved, together with other CSs in Bolivia, in collaborative monetization activities. SFC's ISGP funds, following SCF's closure of a major project in Bolivia, have been used almost exclusively to support this collaborative activity.

CARE/Bolivia, used an initial amount of \$100,000 of ISGP funds--together with funds from CARE/New York and monetization--to support its innovative Wawawasi Project. Aimed at MCH, and especially children, the project used food distribution and child nutrition monitoring and related education at first. It then introduced "centers" where food production and child health and nutrition training was made available to the community. Stemming from the work of these centers, the project has enabled the communities involved to raise their own nutritious food for their children. The crops grown for children are sustainable and displace the distributed food used to initiate the program. This project reaches 100 communities, but CARE/Peru hopes to expand it to 300 communities soon. ISGP funds were used for training of CARE/Peru staff, "center" staff and community members; 202(e) funds were used to purchase computers and trucks.

ADRA/Bolivia's urban food for work efforts in small municipalities has been very successful compared to other efforts to use food for development. While not a new innovation, *per se*, the success the program enjoys encourages USAID/Bolivia and ADRA to expand the program and support it with other development activities.

In Mali, WVRD's work with nomads in the Menaka Oases Program in the Seventh Region resulted directly from training and other support provided by WVRD's ISGP and predecessor grant. In the Menaka program food was used as a resource in several ways. Food served as seed capital in the barter of food commodities for animals which were loaned to families to replenish their herds. Food served as an income transfer when given to families who received a small herd. Food resources also provided a full wage payment to elicit participation from the community in trying out new technologies such as tree planting, tree care and wild grass seeding. Public works activities also used food as a wage payment.

The key to success in the Menaka program was the design of the project. It successfully pulled together, in the project, many different elements of the existing socio-economic and political context. The person who designed the program received project design training in using food as a resource from WVRD's ADT supported by the Food Aid Test grant and the Program Enhancement Grant (WVRD's ISGP).

PVOs identified one area where innovation efforts had not yet seemed to bring available benefits. Triangulation between countries in food monetization, global monetization, Mission buy-ins to similar programs, and use of monetization to fund PSCs to work with CSs at the Mission level on food for development were mentioned by CSs as areas A.I.D. seemed reluctant to explore.

2. Conclusions

ISGP successfully fostered innovation in the use of food for development, although specific innovations realized were not as extensive as desired. ISGP caused all CSs to be more aware of and actively concerned about innovative uses of food in their programs. Numerous project level innovations were successful and replicable--e.g., the use of food to encourage sustainable gardening for children. CSs' staff at both headquarters and field levels contributed to innovation in food use.

D. Encouraged New PVOs to Become Food Aid Cooperating Sponsors

1. Discussion

The ISGP has encouraged new PVOs (e.g., Africare and SHARE) to begin to use food assistance in their programs and, ultimately, to become food aid Cooperating Sponsors. While some organizations, such as SHARE, were involved in other kinds of food programs before receiving planning assistance grants, ISGP enabled them to become involved in food assistance programs for development. Africare, for example, wanted to use food aid as a resource to facilitate the implementation of its development projects. Africare's initial exposure to food aid and its potential to support development efforts occurred when AID suggested to Africare that it consider becoming a CS. Africare began its exploration of food assistance for development with an AID-financed pre-enhancement grant which has been extended several times.

ISGP's planning assistance component was not used widely at first. SHARE was the only ISG with a planning assistance component awarded in the first round of grants. However, Africare's and WVRD's extended enhancement grants were generally perceived to be for planning assistance as well, by Africare and WVRD management and A.I.D. Subsequently, numerous planning assistance grants have been awarded under ISGP.²¹

Several steps unfolded in developing Africare's WVRD's and SHARE's capacity as potential CSs. First, they had to deal, on their own, with the role of food assistance in their organizations. The developmental and philosophical issues involved in determining whether or not to use food as another resource for development were substantial. WVRD, for example, continues to examine its overall program for sustainable development content to which food for development can be linked successfully. Second, these organizations had to "learn" about the food assistance business from nearly all angles before determining how to integrate food into their programs. Training sessions, food assistance manual development, changes in accounting systems, and acquisition or development of specialized food management skills all were required. Would they carry out food for work efforts? Depend

²¹FVA, A.I.D., Title II Food Aid Development Grants, Master List of 10/10/91.

mostly on monetization? Blend food into existing programs or start food for development efforts in new programs or even new countries?

Third, Africare and SHARE had to "learn" to identify, design and implement food for development efforts. Africare, in attempting to identify means to monetize food, was thrust into the difficult analytical and programmatic issues involved in country-wide commodity and food aid systems with little analytical or experience basis for dealing with them. WVRD hired seasoned specialists to meet its headquarters and regional professional needs, but put less effort into educating its headquarters staff regarding the use of food for development. WV found it lacked the skills to link multiple sources of funding together for its desired project work. In Mali, for example, WV's food related project involved four A.I.D. funding sources and several WV offices. WV found it did not possess the skills to integrate readily all these sources of funds into food related development work. WV/Mali found it programs based on numerous "special funds" and had to learn how to deal with them. ISGP helped WV deal with these issues, even though ISGP funding accounted for only about five percent of the money required to deal with them.

Fourth, PVOs found their personnel and compensation systems were inadequate to support their new directions in the use of food in their development programs. Their "development" staff were not especially open to the use of food for development; commodities specialists could not find an adequate career path in smaller scale development organizations nor acceptance in large organization such as WVRD.

Fifth, PVOs with planning assistance support found it took more devotion of policy, management, and elapsed time to become effective CSs than anticipated. Interactions with A.I.D., USAIDs, and others to identify and launch programs, internal training and organizational issues, accountability concerns, and difficulties in deciding how to link food with on-going development efforts were complex and took time. For all these PVOs, the use of food was an adjunct to their portfolio. Business as usual was on-going and integrating food into their programs did not receive top priority on many occasions.

Despite the difficulty associated with becoming CSs, each of those receiving ISGP support persevered. They expended the needed effort, carried out the training, and became well versed in food assistance activities and how food fit into their larger development programs. Africare, for example, made several serious attempts to establish Title II programs in Africa. It recently continued these efforts in Senegal, but returned with a recommended Title III program instead. Thus, while PVOs receiving planning assistance support have not developed wide-spread Title II programs quickly, they have grown into the role of CSs and expanded their own and A.I.D.'s use of food for development. World Vision, as noted above, increased substantially the amount of food tonnage it handled on an annual basis. Africare established one Title II program in Africa and is contemplating a Title III program soon. SHARE established a Title II program in Guatemala.

2. Conclusion

ISGP did successfully encourage new PVOs (e.g. Africare, WVRD and SHARE) to become food aid cooperating sponsors.

E. Serving Other Core Purposes and Objectives

1. Discussion

ISGP, in addition to accomplishing the objectives set out for it directly, accomplished other purposes and objectives supportive of ISGP purposes.

The ISGP helped develop a cadre, albeit small at this stage, of better trained personnel for the PVO community at large. While it is readily acknowledged that staff turnover in the field and at headquarters has made it difficult to institutionalize some skills provided in training sessions, it is also the case that the larger number of trained personnel now have the potential to help CSs in areas broader than only ISG-funded projects. For example, while some FPAs at CARE have left for other positions, they have remained active in food aid with other organizations. Similarly, some ISG trained personnel who have developed design and planning skills could help resolve relief-related problems. In other words, the generic skills that have been learned in terms of planning, implementing, managing and monitoring food aid development programs can be applied to other fields.

ISGP helped create a wider partnership for the use of food in development. WV, for example, has found that Canada, Australia and other national WV offices have become much more supportive of the potential role of food in development because of ISGP sponsored efforts.

Numerous international PVOs helped strengthen local PVOs and localized country offices. WV, for example, works with country teams made up entirely of local people., ISGP has supported WV's efforts to shape the programs of these local teams to involve food for development activities. CARE has worked directly with local PVOs to support their development activities, including the use of food in development. Changing local PVOs to be more developmental and to include food assistance in their development programs has become one of the important impacts of ISGP to date.

Another benefit of ISGP has been the increased attention it has focused on the linkages between relief and development. Food often plays a major role in alleviating the problems of disaster. However, PVOs exposed to enhancement, planning assistance and strengthening grants have begun to ask how their "relief" efforts can become more developmental, more immediately.

2. Conclusion

ISGP contributed to important objectives ancillary to those defined by its designers. It broadened support of food for development explorations by existing and potential CSs and contributed to CS concern and thinking about the linkages between their relief activities and development. Prominent in relief efforts, the role of food in fostering a shift from relief to development during emergencies is especially significant to emerging CSs.

ISGP strengthened, directly and indirectly, local PVOs as development agencies and managers of food for development activities. It supported efforts of international PVOs to shape their country teams and programs to be more developmental, including to use food developmentally.

Another important achievement of ISGP, apart from realization of its concrete objectives, was its contribution to the training and upgrading of PVO staff in food for development skills and initiatives. While institutional strengthening of PVOs funded by ISGP was sometimes affected by staff turnover, many staff benefiting from ISGP training and support remained within the Title II food assistance system and continued to contribute to the objectives of ISGP directly.

IV. ACHIEVEMENTS AND QUALITY OF INDIVIDUAL PVO GRANT PROJECTS

A. Overview of PVO Grant Purposes

PVOs and A.I.D. incorporated the purposes or objectives of the overall grant program in their individual grant agreements. Some original grant agreement purposes were modified in funded extensions over the grant period, but these modifications were consistent with the intent of the grant program. Table 5-1 in Annex 5¹ summarizes the purposes and objectives of each of the individual grant agreements. These objectives, as indicated in earlier chapters, cover many different substantive areas. However, they reflect the purposes and objectives of the overall grant agreement in that they aim, generally and specifically, to enhance the use of food to relieve hunger, malnutrition and poverty among disadvantaged people.

CSs' DIPS and Annual Plans illustrate a large degree of achievement of planned outputs from ISGP funding. The DIPS of the CSs reviewed, on their face, appear to provide feasible and efficient implementation plans. The implementation plans developed were followed and did link inputs to the outputs sought.

The degree of achievement of many of the outputs taken credit for by CSs in their annual reports was sometimes lower than planned. However, the field observations of the evaluation team and CSs' own formal monitoring indicate CSs accomplished much of what ISGP funded them to do. There were not major discrepancies between what CSs planned to accomplish and what observation and their own annual reports indicated they achieved.

Table 1 below indicates the number, type and value of amendments made to ISGP grant agreements during the time period examined by this evaluation. As is clear from the data in the table, numerous amendments were made for nearly all PVO grant agreements. Many of these amendments occurred in quick succession, creating an administrative burden for A.I.D. and the PVO. However, the amendments did not introduce purposes or objectives inconsistent with the overall grant program. Most amendments involved funding changes, not purpose changes.

¹Table 5-1 was derived from the Annual Reports submitted by the PVOs for 1990, from DIPS at home, and from additional interviews with other PVOs. The 1991 Annual Reports were not available at the time of this evaluation, but the table provides a quick overview of the vast array of activities undertaken with ISGP funds through 1990.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Table 1: ISGP Amendments to PVO Grant Agreements

	Amendment 1	Amendment 2	Amendment 3	Amendment 4	Amendment 5	Amendment 6	Amendment 7	Amendment 8
<p>FHI Effective Date Sept. 1, 1989 Orig. Amt. OBI \$200,000 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$345,000 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt.</p>	<p>May 2, 1990 Administrative</p>	<p>May 22, 1990 -Additional funding of \$115,000 -Extension of grant period</p>						
<p>CARE Effective Date July 1, 1989 Orig. Amt. OBI \$1,475,000 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$4,375,000 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. \$5,898,221</p>	<p>Sept. 1, 1989 Incremental funding of \$492,000 for program support</p>	<p>Sept. 28, 1989 Incremental funding of \$202,000 for program support</p>	<p>Jun. 7, 1990 Incremental funding of \$1,414,500</p>	<p>Aug. 21, 1990 Incremental funding of \$115,000 for Sept. 30 - Oct. 31, 1991</p>	<p>Aug. 28, 1990 -Additional funding of \$897,000 for June 1, 1990 - June 30, 1991 for Haiti Shortfall due to no monetization program</p>	<p>Aug. 5, 1991 Incremental funding of \$676,000</p>	<p>Aug. 19, 1991 -Additional funding of \$626,221 -Enhance organizational capacity in food prog. -Allow additional support to country programs in Nicaragua Afghanistan -Extension of grant agreement</p>	
<p>AFRICARE Effective Date Aug. 1, 1988 Orig. Amt. OBI \$1,215,899 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$1,509,472 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. \$2,811,334</p>	<p>Jan. 18, 1989 -Additional vehicle waiver to amend grant</p>	<p>Aug. 1, 1989 Incremental funding of \$284,573 to fully fund agreement -Extension of grant period</p>	<p>Mar. 5, 1990 Extension of grant period</p>	<p>Jun. 14, 1990 Additional funding of \$550,000 -Extension of grant period</p>	<p>Jun. 14, 1990 -Additional funding of \$550,000</p>			
<p>SCF Effective Date July 1, 1987 Orig. Amt. OBI \$869,551 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$2,004,670 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. (not revised)</p>	<p>Aug. 13, 1988 Incremental funding of \$1,135,119 to fully fund agreement Clarify cost sharing requirements Correcting OBI</p>	<p>Dec. 18, 1989 Extension of grant period incorporate new approved indirect cost rate</p>						
<p>ADRA Effective Date July 1, 1989 Orig. Amt. OBI \$1,590,000 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$3,180,000 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. \$3,681,000</p>	<p>Nov. 3, 1989 Administrative</p>	<p>May 21, 1990 Incremental funding of \$795,000</p>	<p>Aug. 17, 1990 Additional funding of \$501,000 to support Title II activities in Haiti from Jun. 1, 1990 - June 30, 1991</p>					
<p>WS Effective Date Aug. 1, 1990 Orig. Amt. OBI \$130,000 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$626,000 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. \$633,331</p>	<p>Additional funding of \$400,000 changed program description</p>	<p>Nov. 7, 1990 -Administration Change of WS representatives</p>	<p>Jul. 30, 1991 -Additional funding of \$113,331 to support Title II Institutional Support Agreement</p>					
<p>WVRD Effective Date Jan. 1, 1987 Orig. Amt. OBI \$1,500,000 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$2,459,315 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. \$4,059,315</p>	<p>-Additional funding of \$959,315 to fully fund agreement</p>	<p>Mar. 27, 1989 No Cost extension of grant period Make modifications to program activities</p>	<p>Aug. 10, 1990 extension of grant period additional funding of \$1,600,000 Amendment to program description incorporate indirect cost rate</p>					
<p>FAFI Effective Date May 15, 1989 Orig. Amt. OBI \$500,000 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$940,000 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. \$740,000</p>	<p>Sept. 6, 1990 Additional funding of \$240,000</p>							
<p>CBS Effective Date Sept. 15, 1989 Orig. Amt. OBI \$1,141,000 Orig. Tot. Est. Amt. \$3,501,033 Revi. Tot. Est. Amt. (not revised)</p>	<p>Sept. 21, 1989 Incremental funding of \$380,000 to support program activities</p>	<p>July 19, 1990 Incremental funding of \$810,000 to support program activities through Sept. 30, 1991 Change recipients cost share amount Add standard provision in participant training</p>	<p>Sept. 28, 1990 Incremental funding of \$400,000 to support program activities through Mar. 15, 1992</p>	<p>Aug. 30, 1991 Additional funding of \$360,111 to fully fund agreement</p>				

One of the critiques PVOs had of the grant process was the "insertion of every new A.I.D. agenda into each new grant". PVOs believed they had to shift their program foci to adjust to new A.I.D. guidelines, even if the new guidelines effectively cut-across or detoured around on-going, successful programs. PVOs felt that, to get their grant, they needed to adjust to A.I.D.'s current interests. An A.I.D. commitment to longer grant periods or "automatic" renewals would enable the PVOs to plan better for the long-term and utilize their resources efficiently. While A.I.D. effectively has adopted this policy, most PVOs continue to perceive their grants remain subject to almost continuous PVO proposals to A.I.D. and that A.I.D.'s requirements for PVO submissions undergo frequent change.

B. Impact of ISGP on Long-Range Planning of PVOs

ISGP helped increase long-range planning by CSs in several ways. Prior to the ISGP, long-range planning by PVOs using food as a development resource was not viable because A.I.D.'s yearly funding of commodity activities limited planning to an annual basis. The implementation of the ISG multi-year mechanism gave PVOs sufficient stability in funding over a defined period of time (with extensions also being possible) which, in turn, encouraged PVOs to undertake longer-term planning. CSs did not have to worry about annual funding all the time while developing and implementing their plans and activities. Assured long-term ISG funding enabled them to establish food assisted development programs and undertake them on a time frame that fit their development experience and management capability.

ISGP funding encouraged and helped achieve improved long-range planning by the CSs' both at their Headquarters and Field Offices. CSs were encouraged to establish Multi-Year Operational Plans indicative of their requirements over several years and not just from year to year. Field Offices established or improved their Multi-Year Operational Plans (MYOP) with design training provided from CS Headquarter's Staff, including short-term consultants. As applicable to the individual cooperative agreements, CSs staffed either Headquarters and/or Field Office positions to carry out Multi-Year Operational Plans. Training--in the form of seminars, workshops, and individual assistance--was matched by CSs to their needs in designing longer-term food aid projects and programs.

The MYOP process helped CSs learn to develop feasible program and project implementation plans linking inputs to outputs. ISGP encouraged PVOs, via the MYOPs, to think more critically about their programs, particularly in terms of planning for staff and other resources to carry out larger Title II based projects. While MYOPs were not always "impact" oriented, some identified and specified means-goal linkages and resource levels to reach the goals of their program. Many PVOs reported the planning exercises required for ISGP had a "spillover" effect on their other programs. ISGP thus helped CSs improve their planning capability over the long-term in all areas of their program.

However, the MYOPs prepared by PVOs vary in terms of quality. They vary considerably, for example, in their monitoring and evaluating programs. Some, like WVRD and FHI, provided considerable detail regarding indicators of success for their programs and

used MYOPs as useful monitoring devices for some PVOs. With few exceptions, CSs' MYOPs also were long on description and short on analysis. Not all PVO staff were familiar with the rigorous process of logframe-type planning and analysis which links inputs to outputs to achieve definable objectives.

ISGP support for strengthened long-range planning recognized the differential ability of PVOs to develop quality MYOPs. ISGP funds helped fill the gap in PVO capability to plan sound development projects and to use food to support them (MYOPs). PVOs used ISGP funds to train headquarters and field staff to prepare MYOPs. Africare, for example, produced an up-dated MYOP for its Guinea Bissau project with no outside consultant's help in 1991. Its headquarters staff also became capable of backstopping field staff in the design and execution of MYOPs as did other PVOs.

The ISG grant format also helped increase PVO flexibility to use food and carry out their development programs too. The minimum line item requirements of ISG's budget and the ability given PVOs to transfer funds up to a specified percentage between line items as needed gave PVOs flexibility to work within broad budgetary parameters in undertaking their grant agreement activities.

C. Impact of ISG on Headquarters' Activities/Management

ISGP funds were well-used to expand and/or initiate headquarters activities that served ISGP purposes. Activities supported were those that explored or led to changes in program direction (see Chapter III) and development of systems--e.g., management, evaluation, project design and development, accounting, planning--that improved the capacity of PVOs to manage food aid programs. ISGP impact on targeted CS activities at headquarters (and in the field) was more than proportional to its contribution to CS budgets. ISGP funds constituted a small portion of CSs' overall budgets, headquarters budgets and many specific CS activities budgets. These funds, however, have prompted most CSs to give significant attention and some additional resources to specific ISGP objectives at headquarters and in the field.

It was not possible to determine the specific impact of ISGP sponsored activities on the effectiveness or efficiency of PVO headquarters functions. By way of example, it was difficult to measure the impact of improvement in PVOs' accounting systems to control food assistance revenues and expenditures on their total accounting or administrative system. Likewise, the impact of ISGP sponsored expansion of information systems on overall PVO activities was hard to determine. However, as indicated below, it was possible to determine ISGP's contribution to the achievement of specific outputs sought by A.I.D. and PVOs at headquarters levels--e.g., improved accounting systems, strengthened personnel policies and procedures, and better food assistance project design capabilities--via ISGP funding.

One reason the impact of ISGP sponsored activities on CSs headquarters functions was difficult to determine was that the activities sponsored by ISGP--improved accounting, information, program and project design, and other systems--were, themselves, not very

amenable to impact assessment. Moreover, impact was made more difficult to determine because baseline data from which to measure progress was not available. Another reason was that ISGP funded activities were a small part of the total activity of each PVO's headquarters. Staff turnover at headquarters was common. Some of the "core" ISGP funded staff had not been in place long enough to assess their impact on the organization. ISGP sponsored headquarters (and field) staff did not account for the time they allocated to specific outputs. Africare headquarters staff, ADT regional staff of WV and most other PVO headquarters and field staff supported by ISGP maintained records of time spent without reference to specific outputs being pursued.

The impact of ISGP on PVO headquarters activities varied by PVO. In most instances, ISGP enabled PVOs to enhance or create systems that clearly improved their information flow, accountability, planning frame and direction and control by top management. In other instances ISGP did not appear to change the way PVO headquarters operated in managing food aid programs.

ISGP had differential impacts on the operations of PVO headquarters for several reasons:

- o Most PVOs had considerable staff turnover, and even corporate reorganization, during the grant period. This made it difficult for them to institutionalize many headquarters changes made with ISGP support;
- o Decentralization of the PVO operations, particularly of the larger PVOs (CARE, CRS, World Vision), reduced the impact of changes initiated at headquarters on field operations. The more decentralized the PVO's operations, the more difficult it was to create a basic structure at headquarters that dealt appropriately with the coordination, implementation and monitoring of food assistance programs in the field;
- o Pressure on PVOs to become "more efficient" and decrease their overhead costs lessened their impetus to expand headquarters' responsibilities for food aid programs in the field;
- o PVOs were in different stages of institutional development with respect to food assistance when they received ISGP funds. Africare and SHARE, for example, were initiating food assistance programs in developing countries; CARE and CRS had long histories of implementing food aid efforts. PVOs started efforts to improve their headquarters operations in support of food assistance from different levels of experience and staff and systems capability; and
- o PVOs needed different results from their Title II activities and used ISGP accordingly. Africare, for example, did not anticipate moving large quantities of food nor making food aid a central part of its activities. Its success in

strengthening its headquarters Title II capacity was not especially critical to it. CRS, for which food assistance was very important, found itself moving less and less food. Its use of ISGP to strengthen headquarters capacity to deal with Title II issues effectively was very important to it.

Table 5-1 in Annex 5 summarizes the activities undertaken by each of the eight PVOs under this round of ISGs, including those at headquarters level. The following discussion summarizes the impact of ISGP on PVOs' headquarters activities and management in specific areas:

1. Provision and training of personnel

ISGP had a positive impact on the quality and quantity of personnel at PVO headquarters assigned to work on food aid programming. ISGP enabled PVOs to identify and hire better qualified professionals for home office management positions because the resources it provided for these positions would not otherwise have been available from unrestricted, private donations or other sources. The potential for increased management capacity was created by the presence of new "core" staff assigned to focus on food aid planning, management and monitoring. No longer assigned simply to "move tonnage", the new food aid staff were challenged in all PVOs to develop strategic development planning, training in commodity management, monetization programs and other food assistance program improvements.

ISGP enabled PVOs to upgrade the skills of headquarters' staff. It provided support for improved program planning and the design and implementation of headquarters systems to program, manage and monitor food aid efforts. It also enabled headquarters' staff to train field staff in the use of food aid for development. In Africare, for example, six home office staff with direct food aid responsibility were trained with grant funds on the uses of food assistance and in standard procedures for programming and managing food resources. At CARE, field staff were brought to headquarters to learn more about CARE's planning and monitoring processes. CRS used ISGP to hold specific workshops for headquarters staff to sharpen CRS's food policy. It worked with headquarters staff on the administration of food assistance efforts. CRS also introduced what it termed an "analytical tool box" at headquarters level to help make CRS's analysis of the potential of food assistance more objective. ADRA used ISGP funds to improve headquarters control of field operations and to strengthen planning of food assistance efforts. FAM provided workshops to CSs that helped improve the skills of headquarters (and field) staff.

2. Establishment of food aid programming units

Numerous CSs established food programming units at their headquarters with the support of ISGP funds. Most PVOs said these units would not have been established without the support of ISGP.

ISGP sponsored food programming units deeply influenced PVO headquarters activities and management regarding food assistance activities and objectives. The staff of food programming units received and provided training, undertook self-evaluations of country

programs, coordinated implementation of special activities--e.g., installment of MISs, accounting and commodity management systems--and managed headquarter and field office relationships to achieve food assisted program objectives in specific countries. Overall management was improved as specific functions, such as tracking commodities, food assistance planning and policy development, budgeting, training and A.I.D. liaison, were separated and assigned to specific staff. In some of the larger PVOs, e.g., CARE, the food aid unit improved coordination and consultation between various technical units. For example, if a regional or non-food technical unit had not utilized food aid as a development resource, headquarters unit staff brought people together to discuss possibilities for the

utilization of food assistance. In sum, PVO food programming units successfully carried out multiple responsibilities supportive of ISGP objectives. They were pro-active and identified and developed food assistance efforts that supported existing or desired development activities of PVOs.

3. Establishment of organizational policies and guidelines for food aid

A direct consequence of having food programming units in CSs to coordinate, manage and monitor food aid programs was the establishment of clearer guidelines and policies within PVOs regarding the use of food aid that are compatible with the rest of the PVOs' goals and objectives. The objective of using some or more food in their programs required most PVOs to examine their existing approach to "doing development" and determine the impact that use of food or more food would have on it. This examination brought nearly all CSs to deeper or new understandings of what food aid meant for their organization and how to integrate food as a resource into their development efforts.

4. Establishment of improved management and monitoring systems

PVOs developed improved management and monitoring systems for their food aid programs with ISGP support. Indicators of this improvement are legion: Better Annual Reports and Grant Proposals, initiation of MYOPs and DIPs or development of more detailed MYOPs and DIPs, more regular financial reporting, better commodity management in the field, expanded quality evaluation efforts, improved management of CS field offices and expanded CS presence within countries and in other countries.

ISGP helped improve CS management systems in numerous areas:

- o Overall commodity management (especially tracking systems to control food movement and allocation, commodity inventory reporting and leakage);
- o Logistics procedures for the handling of Title II commodities in the field;
- o Accounting systems to incorporate food assistance into overall and specific programs;

- o MISs to provide planning, project identification and design, monitoring and evaluation and resource control and use information to management; and
- o Development program and project design concepts and procedures that include food as one source of funding or support.

CARE, for example, developed a series of manuals which, though designed for CARE's operations, will be used by the food aid community at large. Completed or in process are manuals on monetization, inventory, food storage/warehouse management, administration, evaluation, monitoring, and programming. Practical, hands on documents, they are being utilized to train field personnel at all levels via a series of workshops. Africare also developed a food assistance manual for use by its headquarters and field staff. WV has conducted numerous training sessions in the use of food for development in program and project design. It examined its personnel structure to identify career pathways for individuals who handle food. CRS included food for development concepts within its structures for middle management and created incentives--cash awards for quality food programming, highly visible attention to food use for development by top management, and premiums per ton for those managing food--to spur food for development activity by middle managers. It also emphasized strengthening of management and monitoring systems of national PVOs (e.g., CARITAS in Bolivia) to improve their development capability, including their use of food.

The management systems developed or improved with ISGP support contributed to specific ISGP purposes and to CSs' overall objectives, especially improved development impact. These improved systems helped CSs design and institutionalize the developmental uses of food aid (e.g., WV), economize and increase the effectiveness of food assisted programs, especially for development (e.g., CRS) and expand their financial resources and flexibility (e.g., Africare). CSs established innovation as an objective and created space and internal planning and reporting mechanisms to consider creative approaches to food programming. Africare and SHARE's organizations were permeated with systems improvements aimed at incorporating food assistance into their development programs effectively.

CSs pushed as far as they did in making management and monitoring improvements under ISGP because there was an obvious need for management strengthening and the project provided "overhead" funds to help meet the need. PVOs interviewed were unanimous in stating that improvement of their management and monitoring systems, both generically and with respect to Title II, was needed. No matter what individual CSs had emphasized in their management strengthening process to date--e.g., MIS, food handling capability, project design improvement, accounting--they believed ISGP enabled them to deal with a key need. CSs also identified additional management areas where improvement was needed. Thus, CSs agree on the need for management and monitoring improvement and that ISGP is useful in helping meet that need.

Most individual and organizational contributors to PVOs are reluctant to provide funds for management strengthening. They want their money to go to "programs", not management. Nor do CSs allocate funds to management improvement. They are under pressure to retain low administrative costs as a proportion of total costs to convince contributors their organization is "efficient". These circumstances create a continuous funding gap for management improvement which ISGP helped fill. Needs for management improvement are obvious, but funds from normal sources are not available to meet them.

Most CSs indicated that ISGP funds for headquarters management and monitoring improvement constituted a "net addition" to their overall budgets. That is, ISGP funds aimed at strengthening headquarters and or field management did not displace CS funds that would have been used for the same purpose. ISGP funded management improvements at headquarters or the field, then, also tend to create net additions to CSs' capabilities, especially to effectively use Title II. Without ISGP these improvements in management systems would probably not take place.

ISGP provided flexible support for management improvement. As one PVO said, "A.I.D. has very wisely kept ISGP very flexible. Assumptions in all such programs soon go awry, and we all need to adjust. A.I.D. has allowed such adjustments in ISGP, and we have been able to use it as appropriate over time to improve our management systems." CRS, for example, used ISGP to step back and examine its management systems (as well as its overall policy regarding the use of food). In doing so, it brought its staff together to consider various management and policy issues. The dialogue was an important source of learning for both headquarters and field staff about management systems needs and potential improvements. Over time, CRS focused--at the management level--on eliminating the ad hoc nature of its field decisions regarding whether or not to use food assistance. It created a food use policy, a strategy to implement it, established a training regime to support it and began to educate its top management regarding the structures and actions necessary to support food use for development. Personnel hiring, incentive systems, new analytical tools, and consensus regarding food use within CRS were all areas worked on with ISGP support.

5. Cost effectiveness

As indicated in Chapter II, ISGP really serves two purposes--to fill the funding gap of CSs and to create specific outputs that improve or expand CSs' use of food for development. These purposes both lead to the overall purpose of the Development Grant Program: "To enhance the utilization of PL480 as an effective development resource." Is ISGP or another mechanism most cost effective in achieving these overarching purposes and the more specific strengthening, innovation and planning assistance objectives sought by A.I.D.? While this question cannot be answered definitively, an approximate answer is possible.

The overall cost effectiveness of ISGP could not be determined by this evaluation for several reasons.² No alternative mechanisms to attain the desired objectives have been developed. It is difficult to create an alternative means to undertake some ISGP activities--e.g., funding of staff positions, logistical costs and procurement. ISGP's resources are small compared to CSs' total resources and the linkages between ISGP's means and goals are numerous and occur at many levels--e.g., project, organizational management systems, CS purposes, legislative objectives of Title II. Both factors make its impact and benefits difficult to measure. For most CSs, there is not a firm estimate of the quality and quantity of outputs desired or the inputs necessary to achieve them. That is, while there is agreement that the problems being addressed with ISGP funds exist, few of them have been carefully studied. As a result, it is not known, with precision, what level of resources will be required to solve them. Nor is it known when most issues being addressed by ISGP have been fully resolved--e.g., strengthened MISs, accounting systems--or, because baseline data is seldom available, what concrete progress has been made. Most importantly, as indicated below, the cost effectiveness of ISGP or an alternative mechanism turns principally on PVO cooperation and goodwill, not on the potential efficiency of the different mechanisms. PVOs' perceptions regarding the source of funds or assistance, their control of the funds and their participation in defining the activities to be carried out with them are crucial factors in fashioning a cost effective delivery mechanism.

6. Conclusions

- o ISGP funds have been well-used by most CSs for the development of systems--management, evaluation, project design and development, accounting, planning--that improve the capacity of PVOs to manage food aid programs.
- o ISGP funds had measurable and significant impacts on CS headquarters, but the results vary by CS. In some instances it is clear that ISGP funds enabled CSs to enhance or create systems to improve their information flow, accountability, planning and implementation of programs that use food developmentally. In other instances it is not clear that ISGP made discernible changes in the way the CS headquarters operate in planning and carrying out development projects involving food.
- o ISGP's overall cost effectiveness could not be determined during this evaluation. However, it appears that ISGP's cost effectiveness could be improved by increasing emphasis on problem diagnosis and solutions where specific outputs are sought. Other mechanisms would be more cost effective in creating specific outputs as indicated in Chapter V and Annex 5.

² ISGP cost effectiveness in specific CS and project settings is addressed later in this chapter.

D. Impact of ISGP on CSs Field Activities

1. Did ISGP influence CS field activities?

ISGP had a significant impact on CSs' field activities. As documented below, ISGP influenced CSs' process activities at the field level--e.g., accounting, monitoring, personnel policy--and CSs' substantive activities--including their impact.

ISG funds were used to initiate as few as one (e.g., Africare) and as many as seven (e.g., CRS) programs in the field. The addition of staff and availability of technical assistance made possible by ISGP were two key factors that improved CSs' capabilities to expand or initiate field level activities. Field office needs to enable Title II program improvement and expansion were legion: More personnel in commodity management, additional training and technical assistance support in areas such as Title II project design and evaluation, improved systems and better trained personnel to develop and operate commodity tracking systems, better monitoring of storage and distribution of food and of development project performance, expertise in monetization, increased ability to develop MYOPs, time for exploratory studies and innovation experiments, and skills to consider how to integrate food further into their country development program. ISGP provided critical support in these and other areas for CS field missions. Without this ISGP support, the receptivity of CS field missions to enriching or expanding their food assistance programs would have been less. A number of PVOs stated emphatically that without ISGP support they would not be carrying out Title II food aid programs.

The overall impact of ISGP supported activities in "development" terms could not be measured. In Bolivia, for example, USAID staff were emphatic that ISGP was used entirely by CSs for "overall support". They concluded it was impossible to attribute specific impacts to ISGP funding. However, some CSs had clear purposes, focused their efforts in specific geographical areas, and had high quality projects and baseline data to show their results. For them, ISGP impacts-- although still indirect--could be more readily traced. Other PVOs, with lower quality, more widely scattered programs, absorbed ISGP funds into less articulated systems where their impact could not be determined.

While ISGP' impact could not be determined at the program level, substantial anecdotal evidence was available at the project level to indicate ISGP funding had a significant development impact. ADRA/Peru, for example, developed an MIS that showed improvements in quality and impact of its ISGP funded projects--MCH, agricultural development and infrastructure provision. ADRA's municipal infrastructure program was

praised by USAID/Bolivia as having excellent development impact and a high degree of acceptance by community officials and beneficiaries. ADRA improved its MCH program dramatically with ISGP support for training and training materials.

CARE/Peru was crystal clear: ISGP was critical in launching its ARCA, PRODIA and Wawawasi projects, all of which had proven development impact. ISGP was used by CARE for strengthening (especially training) within these projects, thereby improving their impact and sustainability. PRODIA, for example, involved 450,000 beneficiaries. Food was distributed through community kitchens; sales of food by these kitchens provided funds for improvement--e.g., purchase of refrigerators. Food distribution was accompanied by training in gardening (to enable people to raise their own food), nutrition, knitting and sewing, household food management, and management of the community kitchens. Credit was provided for small scale enterprises. ISGP helped with transportation of food for distribution and purchase of needed equipment for the kitchens.

CRS/Bolivia's projects via CARITAS in wheat and bean production in different parts of the country were reported by USAID/Bolivia to be doing very well in terms of development impact. CARITAS/Cochabamba's projects in afforestation, erosion control, potable water supply and fruit production were very successful according to CARITAS/Bolivia. Also, CARITAS/Cochabamba's social development program improvements--training in handicraft, accounting, literacy and nutrition--had strengthened the impact of the effort.

USAID/Peru indicated that ISGP has been very instrumental in making food aid effective in Peru. USAID activity in Peru was curtailed for a time because of Peru's inadequate debt repayment. Economic conditions were extremely difficult and austerity measures were extreme. Food assistance was used to alleviate the suffering of many and PVOs ensured its effectiveness. ISGP funding was flexible and applied broadly. It enabled PVOs to sustain US interests in Peru and helped accomplish the development objectives of USAID, the GOP and PVOs.

ISGP contributed to many other activities aimed at achieving development impact. Table 5-1 in Annex 5, cited earlier, provides a summary of the numerous activities carried out by eight PVOs which were directly attributable to ISG funding or ISG-supported headquarters improvements. The influence of ISGP on specific development objectives of A.I.D. and PVOs is explored further below.

ISGP had several overall impacts on CSs' field activities. Observation and documentation indicated that CSs arranged numerous of their programs and activities to take advantage of ISGP funds. For example, ISGP funding was seldom the major portion of any one CS activity, project or program. Rather, it was blended into other funding sources to heighten the success of specific projects and programs. CARE/Peru's ISGP funding accounted for only 2.85 percent and 3.40 percent of its FY 1991 and FY 1992 total budgets respectively. Records of funding sources for the ARCA (Agro-forestry) Project of CARE/Peru showed that ISGP funds provided from 10 to 17 percent while monetization supplied from 63 to 83 percent during the FY89 through FY92 period. ISGP funding comprised only 2.5 percent of ADRA/Peru's total FY1992 funding. It supplied only 19 percent of ADRA/Peru's Supervivencia Infantil Project funding, 9 percent of its Desarrollo

Agricola Project funding and 13 percent of its Micro-Empresa Project funding. WVRD's Menaka Oases Program in Mali involved numerous funding sources, including ISGP. CARITAS/Bolivia hired 21 staff with ISGP funds in 1991; its total staff was 360. FHI/Bolivia's ISGP funded staff constituted 3.25 positions of a total of 55.

This model--in which a project or program receives funding from several different sources--was used by most CSs. Thus, PVOs frequently used ISG monies to fill concrete funding "gaps" (e.g., additional staff to administer, manage and monitor Title II programs) for specific field activities. ISGP funds leveraged other available resources and enabled CSs to undertake fully funded, feasible field activities. CARE/Peru was especially direct about the role ISGP played in filling critical funding gaps in its major project efforts.

ISGP influenced the effectiveness of other A.I.D. sponsored programs. For example, ISGP meshed well with expanded monetization for PVOs expanding their food assistance at the country level. ISGP provided specialized support and met hard currency gaps and monetization met the bulk of local costs for specific projects. In some cases, ISGP supported the overall intent of several A.I.D. objectives at once. Africare, for example, after serious attempts to identify a Title II program for Senegal, concluded that a Title III program would be more appropriate. ISGP funds, in the form of Senegal field staff salaries and other costs, were used to help carry out the work leading to this conclusion. The planned Title III program also will draw upon a USAID/Senegal project designed to support the development work of PVOs in Senegal. ISGP's planning assistance effort, while not resulting in direct Title II activities in this case, did support Title III and USAID development objectives. SCF/Bolivia used ISGP to support its Title II and collaborative monetization activities. However, when SCF ceased food distribution in Bolivia, A.I.D./W policy directed it to use Title III, not monetization, to support its work in Bolivia. SCF continued use of ISGP funds in support of collaborative monetization efforts (e.g., to attend monetization committee meetings, carry out monetization studies) and to explore use of Title III and other means (e.g., OPG) of continuing its development effort in Peru.

2. ISGP purpose achievement at the country level

The evaluation team visited with several CSs in the field--in Bolivia, Peru and Senegal. In Bolivia, the evaluation team discussed and observed ISG sponsored activities with USAID, ADRA, CRS, CARITAS, FHI, and SCF. The team visited with USAID, ADRA and CARE in Peru. In Senegal, the evaluation team discussed ISGP activities with USAID, WVRD and Africare. Team members also interviewed staff at the headquarters of all CSs regarding their field operations.

The scope of work for this evaluation (see Annex 1) included a specific focus on field observations and conversations with CSs in the field. The principal concern was whether or not individual grant projects of CSs expanded or initiated activities that helped attain ISGP or

other purposes³ and whether ISG funding created measurable and cost effective impacts that achieved ISGP's country level purposes. The evaluation team was asked to provide its estimate of the measurable effects of the ISG program at the country level.

Did CSs expand or initiate field activities to serve ISG purposes? The short answer is yes. The discussion below covers specific areas in which ISGP contributed to expanding or initiating field activities to serve its purposes:

a. Program direction

1) Discussion

Numerous CSs used ISGP to change the direction of their development and food aid work. Field offices of PVOs did not view ISGP funds in isolation from their total program and its development context. They consistently perceived ISGP as one component of their overall program--not as a special program requiring burdensome changes in their reporting, programming or other activities.

Examination of A.I.D.'s Title II programs in Bolivia in the late '80s, for example, indicated that PVO activities were food driven rather than development driven. Mission personnel viewed ISGP as a means to help rectify this situation, and it did. It helped CSs use food for development by making resources available to facilitate this change. ISGP, for example, helped CRS/Bolivia get the right people in place to change over and focus its program. To do this, CRS needed hard and local currency, food and people. ISGP, monetization, farm bill funds, CRS money and other sources of funds made up a new CRS funding package. The impetus and stability offered by ISGP enabled CRS to create a very different program than the one evaluated in the late 1980s.

CRS/Bolivia did not see ISGP as a way to "have a better food program", but as a means to support the use of food to achieve development objectives. It wanted to decrease its dependency of food, especially on local beneficiary contributions (which CRS halted). In

³As indicated in Chapter II, the specific objectives of the key strengthening grant component of the Development Grant Program were to design and institutionalize the developmental uses of food aid; economize and increase the effectiveness of food assisted programs; and expand financial resources and flexibility of CSs. The innovation grant's objectives were to encourage CSs to explore, conduct feasibility tests and demonstrate new ideas and approaches which might lead to significant new ways of maximizing the developmental impacts of Title II food resources. The objective of the planning assistance component was to enable PVOs not currently involved as Cooperating Sponsors in Title II programs to explore program feasibility and develop plans for implementation.

Bolivia (and globally), CRS used ISG funding to help it examine how to use food--monetization, imported food for distribution, food swaps within and outside of countries, etc., as a means to further development objectives. CRS staff worked with how to distinguish emergency food aid from non-emergency food aid and how to make links to development activities sooner when food is being used in response to an emergency situation. ADRA/Peru used ISGP to focus on development impact and to move away from its prior emphasis on counting the number of beneficiaries that received food. CARE carried out pilot efforts supported by ISGP to prove their development impact, sometimes redesigning them several times.

Changes in Title II program directions by PVOs raised specific concerns. USAIDs, for example, argued that ISG funds fostered good and bad development efforts. The programs of some CSs were already too scattered and, according to some USAIDs, not effective. The expansion of program concepts-- encouraged by ISGP, 202(e) and monetization--for these CSs was not appropriate. ISGP encouraged these CSs to expand into areas where their expertise was limited and to undertake unproven program options. CSs, for example, were strong in certain substantive areas. Encouraged by ISGP funding, these same CSs moved vigorously into other programs such as agricultural extension, agricultural development, soil conservation, forestry development, health and nutrition and various types of education where they were not experienced or prepared. USAIDs see this as building on weakness rather than strength and as a return to past development approaches (e.g., integrated rural development). Such PVO expansion of services based on food generated funds was not strategically sound or cost effective. Could it be, these Missions ask, that ISGP and related funds such as 202(e) are pushing CSs to undertake efforts using discredited approaches and in substantive areas where their expertise is less than optimum compared to other organizations?

2) Conclusion

ISGP effectively supported changes in CSs' program direction toward more developmental uses of food assistance. However, ISGP--together with funding from monetization, 202(e) and other sources--encouraged some CSs to undertake development activities outside their area of special expertise.

b. Program management

1) Discussion

ISGP helped CSs improve their program management in several ways. They provided technical and training inputs, hired skilled personnel and procured needed equipment (vehicles, computers, software, and training and project materials) and developed systems to enable improved operations. ISGP funds also were used to strengthen US PVO headquarters operations and local PVOs. As with all changes in the status quo, ISGP fostered changes also introduced new problems for PVOs.

Examples of how ISGP funds helped CSs improve their program management abound. FHI/Bolivia created a technical manual for use by its staff. It developed standard project design guides for the types of activities being carried out. It hired technical staff to prepare

these manuals and to design projects. The ISGP funded outputs were meshed with monetization projects and staff. FHI staff hired under monetization funding received the manuals and were trained in project design from ISGP funded technical staff. In this way, FHI's management directed its ISGP program resources toward high quality development projects.

FHI also created an internal MIS for its projects which documented their development impact. It developed an updated personnel manual and used ISGP funds to hire a manager for its monetization activities--receiving, storing, selling and buying. FHI handled monetization for all PVOs, so it linked ISGP funds with collaborative monetization activities. (As indicated below, FHI also used ISGP funding to improve its warehouse space and operations.) It procured computers for its MIS, warehouse operations and central and regional offices and vehicles for its overall program. FHI also used ISGP funds to hire its office administrator, cartographers, a driver and consultants. The administrator was to manage vehicles, maintain relationships with the government and generally support FHI's food program.

SCF/Bolivia used ISGP funds to hire a program manager and training officer for a major project (which was later abandoned), a headquarters and junior accountant, and a deputy office director at the national level. The latter worked mostly on monetization activities, but also on planning (MYOPs), program baseline creation to enhance SCF's ability to document the development impact of its program, and supervision of project implementation. Africare trained regional and country representatives in Title II food programming and used ISGP funds to develop possible projects at the country level. SHARE used ISGP to organize and implement its Title II program in Guatemala.

Several US CSs used local PVOs to carry out projects. They believed use of local PVOs was desired by A.I.D. and that local counterpart organizations were better positioned to run programs and promote sustainability in certain countries--e.g., Peru. These CSs used ISGP to strengthen the food for development capabilities of local PVOs and to assist them to become local CSs. CRS, for example, saw itself as a partner with local groups. In Bolivia, it expanded its relationship with CARITAS via ISGP, seeking new ways to make CARITAS self sufficient. CRS believed CARITAS could become a qualified CS or sponsor as a result of ISG funding. ISGP enabled CARITAS to increase its technical planning and project design capacity at the national, regional and diocesan levels. Over 75 percent of the ISGP funds provided to CRS in Bolivia (all used for CARITAS) were expended to hire additional planning and design technicians. ISGP dramatically increased the number of people CARITAS could hire in this specialized "development" area. These development planning and project design personnel began to document project outputs and impacts, to monitor progress and to move CARITAS away from simple food distribution. CARITAS became able to plan good development projects, moving away from the concept of a Bishop's request for "needs." Its capability has risen to the level that it can prepare satisfactory monetization projects at a high level of quality.

While ISGP enabled international and local PVOs to incorporate food aid into their development strategies, it also introduced problems. PVOs faced implementation problems with their food aid programs. They were frequently slowed by a shift in USAID Mission priorities, by civil disturbances and by lack of full financial or managerial support from their headquarters. Overall absorption of ISGP funds was slow (see Chapter VI). When CARITAS/Bolivia used food resources to attain development objectives and fund specific projects, it found required matching funds hard to obtain. CARITAS also experienced stops and starts with ISGP and difficulties in integrating different personnel into a predominantly food distribution organization. Inadequate salary levels and insufficient professional career pathways for CARITAS's new technical professionals led to rapid staff turnover. CARITAS also had a limit on the number of monetization projects it could implement. Its national management in Bolivia believed these "problems" were simply part of changing the focus of CARITAS' Bolivia program. Eventually, with the help of ISGP funds, CARITAS was expected to integrate its funding sources and development objectives and strategy.

Another management problem at the field level was the relationship between CSs and USAID Missions. Some PVOs and USAIDs believe there is miscommunication and lack of communication as to the intentions of the other regarding ISGP and the use or expansion of Title II programs. For example, in Bolivia, the Mission funded a project through which a contractor organization directly assisted other PVOs to strengthen their management of Title II programs. PVOs felt that the contractor organization, rather than they, received all the "strengthening" resources. The contractor was also perceived as an extension of A.I.D. by some PVOs. In contrast, ISGP was perceived as having been designed to fulfill PVOs' needs and to provide directly (rather than indirectly) the resources PVOs needed. For participating CSs, the ISGP was the preferred mechanism.

USAIDs indicated another problem. ISGP, they claimed, was awarded at too high a level, missing country issues. Frequently, ISGP funding at the country level went to PVOs that did not have satisfactory people or programs. This misallocated ISGP funds relative to their potential to produce development impact if the funds had been awarded to stronger organizations.

PVOs felt pressure from A.I.D. to conform to conventional modes in their Title II programs. For example, they felt forced to pool resources for monetization activities in some countries. Integration of ISGP and other support for food assistance activities too tightly exacerbated these feelings. Title II activities, under such "integrated" auspices, become--in the view of some PVOs--too much A.I.D.'s efforts.

Some food assistance programs supported by ISGP funding were managed better than others. For example, according to USAID personnel in one country, the programs of some CSs had clear purposes and specific geographical focus. These programs established better baseline data, more monitoring activities, and tighter management. USAID concerns about control and monitoring of these programs were limited. Other programs, such as MCH Title II efforts in Bolivia, were of poor quality and program support for them was cut back. Where success of urban public works projects was substantial, food aid efforts were expanded into other areas--health, training, potable water, etc.--to improve development impact.

Several PVOs utilized monetized food in their development activities. However, A.I.D.'s policy was that a CS country program based on 100 percent monetization--in Bolivia, for example--was not acceptable. PVOs and USAIDs thought this policy to be inconsistent. ISGP funds were used to prepare some PVOs to do 100 percent monetization at the same time others were denied access to Title II funds, including ISGP. A.I.D.'s policy pushed PVOs to use Title III, an exercise fraught with difficulty. Governments, for example, had their own criteria for dealing with Title III. They moved slowly and based their decisions on political criteria. USAIDs got into the act, commenting at length on PVO proposals to use Title III for development purposes. This policy emphasis discouraged CS food for development efforts.

2) Conclusions

ISGP helped CS field missions improve their management of Title II programs, especially in the area of improved MISs, enhanced accounting systems, better program planning, more effective project design, improved control and accountability for food commodities, and strengthened personnel systems.

ISGP supported duplication of effort in many areas among CSs seeking to strengthen their programs at the field level by encouraging program improvement tailored to individual CSs rather than management enhancement based on "industry wide" standards and supplied by specialized personnel or organizations.

c. Reporting

1) Discussion

CARITAS, for example, now receives planning documents from all 16 of its diocesan offices. It receives a MYOP from each of its regional offices and consolidates them for A.I.D. at the national level. CARITAS became able to prepare its own budgets for food assistance activities and its farm bill presentation. It prepares a time line and benchmarks for each project, develops a report for each trip taken by national and local office staff, and prepares quarterly and annual reports of its work.

2) Conclusion

Reporting by CSs from field level improved, becoming more timely and more focused on development impacts.

d. Planning, logistical and accounting improvements

1) Discussion

USAIDs indicate that ISGP helped CSs improve their accounting systems at the field level and to prepare for and undergo audits more successfully. CARITAS, for example, used some ISG funding to hire strategic development specialists at the national and regional levels. A central planning team composed of a National Planning

Coordinator, two technical staff, and two floating specialist positions was established. At three regional CARITAS offices, technical teams were created to work with the diocesan offices in the region. They planned development strategies, designed specific technical development projects, and created multi-year plans for using food developmentally.

The 16 diocesan offices appreciated the contributions of regional technical teams. They requested and were supplied with one technical person for each diocesan office. By November 1991, however, two of the diocesan offices had stopped participating in the program. The technical officers supplied by CARITAS and paid for by ISG funds supported the food related development planning, including project design, of the diocesan offices. Prior to this greater degree of technical input, there were only efforts to meet "special needs" and to directly distribute food.

The value of technical project design and monitoring personnel to CARITAS's program was large. Planning documents began to emerge from each diocese. Each diocese is preparing a MYOP for 1993-1995, for example. After only a little more than a full year of ISG support, this planning process does not depend on substantial CRS guidance. Strong projects were prepared and forwarded to CARITAS headquarters for review and approval.

CRS did not use ISG funding to emphasize accountability in Bolivia for two reasons. Audit and control problems in Bolivia were identified and dealt with on a timely basis. The initial concentration of effort was in improving CARITAS' ability to plan and design development projects which included food. If ISGP funding continues, the next steps will be for CARITAS staff to improve their accountability and other systems for dealing with food.

ADRA/Peru used over a third of its ISGP funds to support its food handling operations--port to warehouse transport, storage, and repacking. Warehouse documentation and control were improved and personnel skills upgraded. It also improved its accounting system in its follow up to an audit. FHI used a portion of its ISGP to obtain quality warehouse space, to control its food inventory and to hire warehouse personnel. SCF used ISGP funds to hire a headquarters accountant and accountant assistant. The accountant was not expected to improve SCF's accounting system but to bolster the capacity of its accounting department to carry out day-to-day activities.

2) Conclusion

ISGP contributed substantially to improving planning, logistical and accounting functions of CSs at the field level. Improved planning and accounting activities supported by ISGP influenced the entire programs of CSs within which they were carried out. Logistical improvements were more compartmentalized in their impact, but did fill critical needs for some CSs.

e. New training

1) Discussion

Additional and new training was fostered for nearly all CSs by ISG funding. CRS, for example, provided training workshops to its staff from around the world. The content of the training included replicable innovations in the use of food for development, CRS's role when countries graduate from direct food distribution efforts, food assistance management and internal CRS policies regarding the use for food for development. Numerous CRS staff also attended FAM sponsored workshops; staff was very pleased with the FAM sponsored monetization conference held in November in Virginia.

FHI's technical staff, funded by ISGP, provided formal training and substantial on-the-job training too. SCF in Bolivia used ISGP funds to provide training, training materials and computers in support of training objectives. WV's ADT staff provided many hours of training to WV's African field offices in areas such as design of Title II food projects, management of food resources and implementation of gender and environmental projects.

2) Conclusion

ISGP's support of training met a strong felt need of CSs at the field level. The training provided was appropriate and rewarding to those trained. Continued and additional training was needed because most CSs experienced a significant degree of staff turnover. Also, in many areas, the depth of training provided was not sufficient to enable trainees to reach desired levels of competence.

f. New program innovations or creation

ISGP successfully encouraged PVOs to develop new innovations in their Title II activities. CARE/Bolivia, used \$100,000 of ISGP funds--together with funds from CARE/New York and monetization--to support its Wawawasi Project. Aimed at MCH, and especially children, the project used food distribution and child nutrition monitoring and related education at first. It then introduced "centers" where food production and child health and nutrition training was made available to the community. Stemming from the work of these centers, the project enabled communities involved to raise their own nutritious food for children. The crops grown for children were sustainable and displaced distributed food used to initiate the program. This project reached 100 communities, but CARE/Peru hoped to expand it to 300 communities. ISGP funds were used for training of CARE/Peru staff, "center" staff and community members; 202(e) funds were used to purchase computers and trucks.

ADRA/Bolivia's urban food for work efforts in small municipalities was very successful compared to other food for development efforts. While not a new innovation, per se, the success the program enjoyed encouraged USAID/Bolivia and ADRA to expand the

program and support it with other development activities. The program was very well received by mayors, municipal councils and neighborhood committees, thus integrating popular support and improved use of food for development.

In Mali, WVRD's work with nomads in the Menaka Oases Program in the Seventh Region resulted directly from training and other support provided by ISGP and its predecessor grant. In the Menaka program food was used as a resource in several ways. It served as seed capital in the barter of food commodities for animals which were loaned to families to replenish their herds. Food served as an income transfer when given to families who received a small herd. Food resources also provided a full wage payment to elicit participation from the community in trying out new technologies such as tree planting, tree care and wild grass seeding. Public works activities also used food as a wage payment.

The key to success in the Menaka program was the design of the project. It successfully pulled together, in the project, many different elements of the existing socio-economic and political context. The person who designed the program received project design training from WVRD's ADT supported by the Food Aid Test grant and the Program Enhancement Grant (WVRD's ISGP).

Africare actively pursued use of grant funds to create revolving capital from food aid resources. FHI is actively involved, together with other CSs in Bolivia, in collaborative monetization activities. SFC's ISGP funds, following its closure of a major project in Bolivia, were used almost exclusively to support this collaborative monetization activities.

PVOs identified some areas where innovation efforts had not brought desired benefits. Triangulation between countries in food monetization, global monetization, Mission buy-ins to similar programs, and use of monetization to fund PSCs to work with CSs at the Mission level on food for development were mentioned by CSs as areas A.I.D. seemed reluctant to explore.

2) Conclusions

ISGP successfully fostered innovation in the use of food for development, although specific innovations realized were not as extensive as desired. ISGP caused all CSs to be more aware of and actively concerned about innovative uses of food in their programs. Numerous project level innovations were successful and replicable--e.g., the use of food to encourage sustainable gardening for children. CSs' staff at both headquarters and field levels contributed to innovation in food use.

Specific and replicable innovations arising from ISGP support were limited. However, important, more generalized, innovations--e.g., use of monetization, concentration of programs substantively and geographically, mixing of food as a resource into traditional development programs, and involvement of local people in development of food for development project design--were fostered by ISGP.

3. Did CSs create measurable and cost effective impacts that achieved the country level purpose(s) sought by ISGP?

a. Discussion

Each PVO carrying out Title II programs had specific objectives which, in applying for ISGP grant funds, they tried to conform to ISGP purposes. ISGP was designed to link with CSs' purposes, and CS proposals submitted set out this linkage clearly. ISGP--to be successful--only had to further PVO development objectives. In many cases, it did so. However, attribution of impacts solely to ISGP was difficult. As noted earlier in this chapter, ISGP funding was a very small part of most of the activities or projects undertaken by CSs. Monetization, CSs own funds, OPGs, Title III and other sources of funds played more major roles than ISGP funds in most activities. ISGP funds were blended with these other funds to enable a specific project or activity to be undertaken. Also, while anecdotal evidence based on observation and other documentation exists that CSs did accomplish development impact in areas where ISGP funds were used, detailed evaluation and attribution of impacts to ISGP funds were usually not available, having not been carried out by CSs. Despite these measurement and attribution difficulties, CSs were very clear that ISGP funds were a critical ingredient in enabling them to achieve the development impact desired in their programs and that much of that impact had been achieved. The limited field work carried out by the evaluation team supported this conclusion of the CSs. ISGP funds were used, together with other funds, to contribute directly to the achievement of development impact in the areas set out in CSs grant agreements. The exact extent of the impact versus that expected and the degree to which ISGP funds contributed to impact achievement are less clear. The directional impact achieved by ISGP funds for PVOs are considered briefly below.

ADRA/Bolivia did handle Title II commodities more efficiently and effectively and re-targeted its beneficiaries with ISGP support. ADRA's activities included agricultural projects, produce stores, nutritional gardens, potable water development and construction of pharmacies, hospitals, health posts and latrines. ADRA/Peru used funds to provide for commodity movement and storage including warehouse improvement. The commodities it used supported child survival, agriculture, micro-enterprise growth and infrastructure development.

CRS/Bolivia significantly increased CARITAS/Bolivia's professional and technical capacity to implement development activities. It helped CARITAS/Bolivia expand its developmental impact over time by strengthening its fund-raising capacity. It established national and regional CARITAS planning teams and supported them in their overall organizational planning and budget formulation. ISGP funding also supported teams in each of 16 dioceses composed of four locally hired specialists from the fields of civil engineering, agronomy, veterinary sciences, economics and sociology. CRS/Bolivia also worked to ensure the sustainability of the restructured CARITAS organization. The plan called for CARITAS, at the national and diocesan levels, to assume full responsibility for fund-raising. CARITAS' ability to plan, design and implement sustainable productive activities was central to attracting additional donors.

FHI/Bolivia increase training for its staff and implemented an institutional information system to track project performance. It provided technical assistance for irrigation systems and helped the Ministry of Education assume increasing responsibility for the school breakfast program.

SCF/Bolivia supported training activities for SAVE agriculture staff and community promoters working in ongoing agriculture and animal husbandry projects while it had the Beni Project underway. However, it pulled out of the Beni Project without achieving substantial development impact. The ISGP funds and personnel dedicated to the Beni effort were allocated to SCF's Inquisivi Project. SCF maintained its presence on the PL-480 Monetization Committee and searched for ways to utilize commodities in its future programs.

CARE/Peru successfully reduced the malnutrition rates for children who were beneficiaries of the Wawawasi Project with sustainable food production from local crops. Most of the community centers involved in the project attained self-sufficiency with food from their own crops. It expanded the margins of beneficiaries assisted in the PRODIA Project by providing food support to community kitchens and involved communities and encouraging better nutrition. CARE's ARCA Project expanded afforestation and soil conservation in 350 communities. It introduced two important innovations--the propagation of native species (as contrasted to eucalyptus and other new species) and the establishment of community tree nurseries (as contrasted to total dependence on government nurseries). CARE/Peru also trained community participants in health organization and income generation.

WV successfully expanded its Africa regional capabilities in program/project development. It built its field office capacity for development and expanded food-assisted development projects. It also enhanced field office capability to carry out program/project development and management, using food as one resource in sustainable development.

WV developed and strengthened networks between WV Regional/Field Offices and its own international offices--Canada, Australia, the United States and others. WV's ADT made progress in integrating food-assisted development activities into WV's African development strategy and helped develop WV's capacity to conceptualize, design, and implement food-assisted development programs. It developed African national staff capability to manage multiple-resource assisted development programs, to design and implement sustainable development projects that increase food security and to integrate food resources with other development strategies and programs.

b. Conclusions

CSs created numerous, specific measurable and cost effective impacts that contributed to the achievement the country level purpose(s) sought by ISGP. ISGP did link very effectively with CSs' purposes and further PVO development objectives.

The exact extent to which PVOs' desired development impacts were achieved was unclear, but substantial achievement of planned objectives was documented by CSs and by the evaluation team in several cases. The degree to which impacts achieved could be attributable directly to ISGP funding could not be determined in most cases because ISGP funding was a small part of most activities and blended with funds from other sources.

4. USAID and PVO relationships

Did ISGP improve the integration of CSs programs with USAIDs' objectives at the country level? Were there any conflicts? Did ISGP enable CSs to work more effectively with USAIDs?

ISGP brought PVO and USAIDs together on many occasions. For example, CRS, CARITAS and USAID/Bolivia came together on the importance of Title II program activities. CRS/Bolivia asked for a certain budget from A.I.D., but was told to cut it down. CRS said the level of resources could not be reduced if the program was to be successful. USAID/Bolivia supported CRS and CRS received its full request of ISG funds.

A.I.D.'s policy not to allow CSs to do 100 percent monetization created problems for PVOs. SCF and CRS in Bolivia were both told by A.I.D. they could not operate monetization programs unless they were also distributing food. This decision hampered SCF's program in Bolivia substantially. USAID/Bolivia provided only a small portion of SCF's Title III program request. ISGP was used, however, to create new CSs who will do 100 percent monetization.

USAIDs cooperated effectively with PVOs in many areas, but not always in the area of food aid. For example, CSs felt forced to pool resources in dealing with monetization. More dialogue with Missions is needed, perhaps a development forum on food aid use. In El Salvador, the CRS country representative wants to carry out a specific Title II program. However, the Mission does not want to be accountable for the food resource. Similar situations exist in Guatemala and Nicaragua. FAM could be a helpful interlocutor in these and similar cases.

5. Special problem areas associated with ISGP at the field level

Several problem areas for ISGP emerged from this evaluation. These matters were identified by CSs and USAIDs, as well as by the evaluation team. Staff turnover was cited by many CSs as a matter of concern. ISGP funds were often used to train staff, strengthen systems within which staff were critical and to establish new directions or objectives for CSs which depended on staff buying into new approaches and purposes. High staff turnover--an endemic problem according to most PVOs--reduced the impact of ISGP sponsored activities in these and other areas. Sometimes, but not always, a staff member of one CS would move to another CS so that ISGP supported training of that staff member was not lost to Title II activities.

Sustainability was another problem that concerned PVOs and USAIDs. Nearly without exception, CSs expected ISGP funds to be eliminated "soon." Apart from the general uncertainty this perception raised, the specific concern of PVOs was how they would sustain the activities supported by ISGP. Many PVOs used ISGP to carry out overhead activities--e.g., to hire staff for planning, design, accounting. If ISGP support for these areas was eliminated, they could not foresee replacing it with their own funds. To do so would raise their overheads and increase the funding requirements from their own parent organizations, neither of which they thought likely. Where ISGP was imbedded in project activities, it served a major role in creating flexibility in terms of 1) timeliness--e.g., even monetization funds were difficult to obtain exactly when needed in many cases; 2) expanded purchasing power compared to local currency, and 3) meeting hard currency needs. ISGP provided leverage to expand funding for projects from other sources. It also was a stable, committed funding source over a multi-year period that improved project stability. Virtually no other funding source had these attributes. Without continued ISGP funding, then, CSs expected these advantages to be lost to their programs.

Another problem area was the absorptive capacity of PVOs receiving ISGP funds. Nearly without exception, PVO staff at the field level reported that their ISGP funding levels were adequate to achieve their intended purposes. However, as shown later in Chapter VI, CSs tended to underspend their ISGP allotments. Some of this underspending was caused by force majeure situations or by changes in project work--e.g., SCF's decision to withdraw from its Beni Project in Peru. However, some of the slow drawdown of ISGP funds can be attributed to limited absorptive capacity of PVOs. The intensive management systems, innovation, and planning activities supported by ISGP are difficult and time consuming at all levels in PVOs. Careful examination of the ability of specific CSs to absorb ISGP resources to carry out activities in these areas may make ISGP more cost effective.

Timeliness of the provision of ISGP and other funding by A.I.D. is another problem area frequently cited by CSs. As noted throughout this evaluation, CSs constantly put together funds from several sources to support a single project or activity. When one or more of these funding sources does not supply funds when anticipated, the consequences in terms of management and impact are legion. Funds from 202(e), ISGP and money from other sources were, in the past, provided later or in different amounts than anticipated by some CSs. Clearer understanding of the "integrated" nature of CSs funding at the field level by A.I.D. and USAIDs, as well as by their own headquarters, would improve the impact of ISGP and other funds provided in support of CSs programs.

E. Conclusions

- o ISGP achieved its major purposes and consistently contributed to the achievement of PVO grant purposes in specific countries (Bolivia, Peru and Senegal)--e.g., program planning, development project design and implementation, logistical monitoring and management, implementation of specific projects and skills training and specific project impacts. In most cases

ISGP achievements cannot be specifically measured. Nevertheless, ISGP produced development impacts at the country level which were observed and which informant interviews and activity assessments documented, many of which appear to be substantial.

- o ISGP constructively supported the overall effectiveness of CSs' programs at the country level in terms of flexibility, provision of planning, training and other skills, and the supply of hard currency to fill in gaps such as procurement, expatriate salaries and other staff support. ISGP also enabled some CSs to develop and/or improve their commodity tracking systems and stewardship of the Title II commodities. These improvements are likely to enable CSs to handle effectively a larger volume of commodities in the future.
- o ISGP's impact can be further improved if a limited set of administrative and policy issues area addressed. These problem areas include staff turnover of CSs being supported by ISGP, the sustainability of ISGP sponsored changes within CSs, the absorptive capacity of CSs, and the timeliness of ISGP and companion sources of funding.

V. ASSESSMENT AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FOOD ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (FAM) PROJECT

A. Description of FAM

The FAM Project began on May 15, 1989 for an initial period that lasted until December 31, 1991. In 1991, an amendment extended the life of the project to September 30, 1992.

The principal objectives of FAM are to:

- o Promote the adoption of common management standards and policies for food assisted programs;
- o Foster the development of basic food assisted management systems;
- o Develop curricula for the training of food assistance management personnel;
- o Provide a forum for the discussion of food assistance management concerns; and
- o Facilitate collaboration and coordination of activities among the member PVOs to achieve the forementioned.

B. FAM Structure and Organization--Has FAM established a workable structure and organization for achieving its grant purposes?

1. Discussion

Structured as a participatory organization, FAM is managed by its members through a Steering Committee comprised of the five initial participating PVOs and A.I.D. representatives from FHA. The FAM Director reports on the organization's activities during the quarterly meeting of the Steering Committee. As determined by the Steering Committee, and with input from the FAM Director, Standing Committees or Task Forces are established on a ad hoc basis to undertake specific tasks in conjunction with FAM staff. The present FAM staff is comprised of a Director, a Program Assistant, interns and secretarial support.

The structure of FAM is like that of an association--officials of member organizations serve on the board of directors and provide direction and policy guidance for the organization. FAM's management structure is ideal for the audience it is designed to serve and issues it was created to address. It enables PVOs to discuss their needs and concerns and priorities

among them in a forum which has resources available to address them. In subsequently establishing FAM's priorities, the Steering Committee members ensure that FAM's allocation of its resources is understood by the PVOs it serves. FAM's management structure also enables PVOs' to ensure that their needs and concerns are fully incorporated into all FAM's objectives and activities.

The participatory management structure--whereby the PVO community is responsible via the Steering Committee for FAM management and priorities--also helps FAM, A.I.D. and PVOs address and resolve important food aid management issues. Food assistance is provided through numerous CSs. To improve its management, each CS must, in turn, enhance its own food aid management and choose to use FAM's assistance to help it do so. Having assisted in developing the FAM program, PVOs--individually and collectively--are more disposed to use FAM support to help improve food assistance management.

Evidence of the appropriateness of FAM's management structure is that it began operations from "zero" and managed to develop a forum to consider food assistance management issues. FAM gained PVO confidence quickly, whereby their real needs and ideas could be discussed and acted upon, by themselves and FAM. Its PVO membership has increased from five initial members to eight participating members. This accomplishment was achieved in the complex circumstances in which FAM was established. PVOs were seldom cooperating on management issues, tended not to share management information, and were not very communicative at the headquarters level about food assistance management solutions. A.I.D. did not have a clear or consistent channel of information flow to PVOs about these and other issues, working only with individual PVOs. As a result, cost effectiveness of CS food assistance efforts was lower than necessary and redundancy sometimes resulted.

The Steering Committee, formed to serve as a project management committee for FAM, provided an excellent forum for dialogue among the PVOs and with A.I.D. The matters taken up by the Committee were ones which FAM could deal with by undertaking designated activities and/or coordinating and facilitating activities between member PVOs. During Steering Committee meetings, issues included contact with European NGOs, updates on FAM activities, individual PVO experiences with food aid issues, the impact of USG OMB circulars, innovative opportunities to use food aid and disaster preparedness.

The structure and organization of FAM enabled its staff to provide an important forum to "support" its member PVOs. The Steering Committee's establishment of priority areas for FAM's attention made FAM staff aware of what was important to PVOs. Thus, FAM fulfilled a significant "information exchange" function, enabling PVO staff to share information and approaches to using Title II food. FAM's monthly newsletter provided a forum for FAM members and practicing food aid professionals to exchange ideas. FAM provided a place where PVOs seeking employees could advertise. FAM has been an important networking operation too, fostering professional relationships among PVO staff and thus more understanding among PVOs about their various Title II programs.

FAM's Steering Committee also highlighted the need for FAM staff to promote professionalism, accountability and "ethical standards" for PVO management of food aid. Several PVOs cited these aspects of FAM's assistance as "helpful" and "important". FAM has been especially useful in assisting PVO staff to become more "professional". In sum, FAM has effectively assisted the PVOs to become more efficient and effective in using food aid as a resource.

Most importantly, FAM's structure has been very helpful in promulgating the idea that food aid is an industry and that the PVOs involved in this industry should have and adhere to common standards and practices for the good of the industry. FAM management--the PVOs--prioritized this idea and FAM staff educated PVOs to this need. FAM has made PVOs aware of their own responsibility to participate in setting and maintaining of professional standards.

2. Conclusion

FAM has established a workable structure and organization to achieve its grant purposes. FAM's management by a committee of participating PVOs is appropriate and contributes substantially to FAM's achievement of its objectives.

C. Activities and Achievements--Has FAM produced relevant outputs that successfully promote the purposes and objectives of importance to FHA and the ISG Program?

1. Discussion

FAM has progressively met the intent of its grant agreement--to help PVOs' meet their food assistance management needs and to provide a forum for PVO collaboration to resolve food assistance management issues. Evidence of FAM's progress is the increased collaboration between PVOs, FAM and A.I.D. toward improving management and operational issues. As a participatory organization, FAM has increased its membership. High quality management and planning documents have been produced and distributed for use in PVO headquarters and field offices. Well received workshops have resulted in a better PVO understanding of the use of food as a resource. FAM also has served effectively as a resource center through its FARM clearinghouse and Forum Newsletter activities.

FAM's progress is commendable given its fledgling position as a coordinating project/organization where, previously, little coordination or collaboration was evident. Frank discussion of important mutual needs and issues by these members has become commonplace and the degree of coordination occurring among them regarding Title II and related food assistance management concerns is growing.

A continual increase in FAM activities is taking place as the interactive relationship between FAM, the PVOs and A.I.D. becomes stronger. At present, FAM's staff is challenged by the increasing amount of activities and will be hard pressed to meet future workloads without additional personnel. To date, FAM has successfully undertaken numerous activities designed to attain its grant objectives. Selected examples of these activities are:

- o Development of Generally Accepted Commodity Accounting Principles (GACAP);
- o Development and circulation of a monthly newsletter;
- o Development of food aid standards;
- o Establishment of the FAM Steering Committee;
- o Establishment of the FAM (resource clearinghouse) and newsletter;
- o Establishment of the Capabilities Committee;
- o Establishment of the Accountability Task Force;
- o Conduct of the Cairo Workshop;
- o Conduct of the Monetization Workshop in the US; and
- o Conduct of Commodities Workshop in the Dominican Republic.

The Accountability Task Force was one of FAM's significant activities. It was established to develop accountability standards in commodity management. FAM participated in this effort through which commodity accounting practices and manuals of PVOs were reviewed. The Accountability Task Force found that PVO accounting was not based on established accounting principles but on donor requests for information. Therefore adequate management information was not always being provided. To rectify this deficiency, the Task Force compared commodity accounting requirements with generally accepted accounting principles to develop the PVO Generally Accepted Commodity Accounting Principles (GACAP). Then, FAM prepared a draft set of principles which were distributed to the PVOs, A.I.D., and the accounting community. From this review, a Task Force meeting was held from which the GACAP was prepared and distributed by FAM.

GAPAC is the first step in a process of creating food aid standardized systems. The purpose of GAPAC is to establish a baseline against which PVOs providing food aid can be measured in terms of accountability for food aid management and accounting for the commodities. GAPAC is important because it helps to set an industry standard against which IG auditors can measure and evaluate food aid management and use. It also helps PVOs to take responsibility for their own actions in terms of framing the debate of how their performance is to be judged and evaluated.

Another example of FAM's activities was the conduct of the monetization workshop. The workshop provided information to PVOs and others about problematic issues associated

with monetization--how to deal with them, techniques for the implementation of the monetization process--and with documentation for use in regional workshops and other follow-up activities. Field staff reported a high level of satisfaction with this workshop and other FAM activities.

FAM established information networks through its FARM Clearinghouse and Food Forum activities. The FARM is a computer data base of documents related to the management of food aid. It is comprised of documents gathered from PVOs and other organizations worldwide which are annotated and made available to PVOs and others involved in the food aid. The FARM Clearinghouse is sharing A.I.D.s' Micro Disk library automation software package for use by its members. With this software, FAM members become a primary installation by entering their food aid and related documents into the system and FAM becomes a point of collection from which documents within the system can be sourced.

A second information network is FAM's newsletter, Food Forum, which provides a forum for food aid management concerns and issues and its target is field-based food aid managers. The mailing list has over 500 people and organizations on it and this is increasing as the mailing list is updated.

Participation in and/or use of these information systems by PVOs has, according to PVO staff, increased to varying degrees PVO professionalism at headquarters and in the field. The success of these systems also serve as evidence of the collaboration of PVOs on common interests concerning food aid as a resource.

FAM's progress has not occurred without constructive criticism which has helped guide FAM as an innovative initiative. For example, the implementation of FAM activities has been slower than anticipated by some. This slower start highlights the difficulties inherent in creating a collaborative forum of PVOs, A.I.D. and others to discuss food assistance related needs and concerns and their food aid management and development issues. It also reflects, to some degree, the difficulty of involving PVOs and others in agreeing on priority issues in food aid management and appropriate means for FAM to help PVOs address them.

Some individuals in PVOs and elsewhere expressed specific concerns about the role and long-term future of FAM. For example, in the absence of a long-term strategic plan for FAM, some individuals questioned its goals and sense of direction. Were they explicit, appropriate and generally supported by PVOs and others? Other individuals raised their concern that FAM could become yet another bureaucracy which would manage/monitor food aid programs. Some believed the resources devoted to FAM could be provided directly to PVOs for their own programs.

Some within A.I.D. suggested that the ISGP-FAM approach be altered, building on the FAM concept and shaping an external center of excellence in all aspects of food assistance.

In Bolivia, for example, the Mission funded a project through which a contractor organization directly assisted PVOs to strengthen their management of Title II programs. PVOs felt that the contractor organization, rather than they, received all the "strengthening" resources. The contractor was also perceived as an extension of A.I.D. by some PVOs. In contrast, ISGP-FAM was perceived as having been designed to fulfill PVOs' needs and to provide directly (rather than indirectly) the resources PVOs needed. For participating CSs in Bolivia, the ISGP and FAM were the preferred mechanisms.

FAM has room to improve its performance. Smaller PVO members of FAM need different kinds of support than larger PVO members, particularly in the areas of fiscal management of grants and response to new grant guidelines and administrative requirements. At present, FAM is not structured to provide this assistance because it does not have appropriate technical expertise on its staff.

Two perceptions held by PVOs also need to be dealt with by FAM. They are: FAM is not a PVO, but an A.I.D., program; and, FAM is closely linked and more responsive to the larger PVOs. The first perception could be corrected if FAM's future performance illustrated that PVO needs and concerns vis-a-vis A.I.D.'s were carefully accounted for in FAM's activities. The second perception could be mitigated if FAM's performance showed that small PVOs were not favored over larger ones. Equal funding of FAM from a line item in PVO grant agreements--rather than by A.I.D. directly--could also help ensure that all PVOs received commensurate attention.

2. Conclusions

- o FAM has made substantial progress toward achieving the grant's purpose and has produced outputs leading to the achievement of the purposes and objectives of the ISGP. It has served as a forum for PVO collaboration on food aid management issues and as a source of support for improving professionalism and operating standards of PVOs using food assistance. This progress assures both A.I.D. and the PVOs that PVOs can more effectively undertake food assistance programs to achieve the objectives of food aid; and
- o FAM can improve its performance by meeting the needs of smaller PVO members better and assuring all PVOs that their interests are well understood and fully accounted for vis-a-vis those of A.I.D.

D. A.I.D.-FAM Relationships

1. Discussion

A.I.D.-FAM relationships began cordially enough, and today they are strong. However, there was a period in which A.I.D. was unclear about the efficacy of FAM and, at

the level of top management, wanted FAM activities to cease. The management of CSs and other PVOs rallied to support FAM and indicated that FAM was important to them. FAM's 1991 Annual Report indicates that this intensified interest of PVOs in FAM resulted in their mutual cooperation and a degree of willingness to take action that was very beneficial to FAM.⁴ Since that time, A.I.D.-FAM relationships have been healthy and productive.

A.I.D. serves on the Steering Committee of FAM. FHA provides a representative who attends the quarterly FAM Steering Committee meetings. Unfortunately, the same A.I.D. representative(s) have not been able to attend FAM Steering Committee meetings, resulting in some lack of consistency in A.I.D.'s relationship to the Committee. However, as the top management of PVOs became more involved in FAM, the presence and input of A.I.D. at the Steering Committee level became less important.

FAM, today, experiences strong leadership from its PVO Steering Committee members. Most PVOs believe that FAM is as much their organization as A.I.D.'s. A.I.D.'s leadership and participation in FAM has taken a lower profile in light of the PVOs' leadership and ownership of the effort. This self sufficiency on the part of FAM's PVOs in dealing creatively and effectively with food aid management collaboration and issues is exactly what A.I.D. set out to accomplish with FAM.

A.I.D. staff attends and participates in FAM functions--workshops, training sessions, etc. A.I.D.'s participation in these activities, rather than its involvement in FAM's management per se, is central to all parties achieving their objectives from FAM activities. By this standard, A.I.D.-FAM bonds are improved and being further strengthened as FAM matures.

A.I.D. staff receive FAM publications and have been actively involved in formal and informal ways in FAM efforts to develop and adopt common management standards (e.g., GAPAC), create training curricula, and facilitate collaborative activities among PVOs. Interaction with FAM by A.I.D. at this level is very important to FAM's success and to A.I.D.'s overall management of the food aid program. It provides a channel for A.I.D. and PVOs to use to explore issues, fashion solutions and actually improve systems affecting day-to-day management of food assistance.

2. Conclusion

FAM-A.I.D. relationships are sound. A.I.D. participates in FAM Steering Committee meetings and many A.I.D. staff have joined in FAM conferences and workshops. A.I.D.'s involvement in the management of FAM has been relatively hands-off, leaving the principal direction and day-to-day activities of FAM in the control of its participating PVOs, especially those on the Steering Committee, and FAM staff.

⁴FAM, "Food Assistance Management Project--Annual Report", Grant No. OTR-0704-G-SS-9173-00, Effective May 15, 1989 through December 31, 1991. nd.

E. Role and Longevity of FAM

1. Discussion

The FAM Project was initially funded for the period May 15, 1989 through December 31, 1991. An amendment subsequently extended the Project Activities Completion Date (PACD) to September 30, 1992. Thus, at the time of this evaluation, the role and longevity of FAM needed to be considered to help determine the future of FAM as of September 1992.

For PVOs operating Title II programs, three basic sources of A.I.D. assistance other than commodities per se are available to them--cash, technical assistance and procurement and training. ISGP, 202(e), OPGs and other A.I.D. spigots have provided CSs with cash. Technical assistance has been provided by global A.I.D. projects (e.g., the Food Needs Assessment Project), Mission projects such as the PVO strengthening projects operated by USAID/Bolivia and USAID/Senegal and OPGs and by the current Food Aid IQCs. Procurement funding has been provided by global A.I.D. projects, Mission projects, and various OPGs. Training has been available from many sources, but FAM has been significant because it focused directly on PVO needs and it paid most training expenses of PVOs.

FAM's role in supporting PVOs active in Title II to date has concentrated on facilitation--creation of a supportive forum for discussion and provision of training, workshops and exchanges to foster improvements in food assistance management systems and techniques. Could the current role of FAM be expanded? If so, how? Should such an expansion in role be considered? How long are FAM's services likely to be needed?

These questions involve not only the role and longevity of FAM, but also impinge on the role and longevity of ISGP itself. ISGP and FAM are aimed generally at increasing the efficacy of Title II activities as carried out by CSs. The ISGP approach followed to date has been to provide cash grants to PVOs for them to use in increasing their outreach, strengthening their capacity or expanding their innovation in the use of Title II food. The FAM Project is a more communal aspect of this same approach.

Another approach, suggested by A.I.D. staff and others, would be to establish a specialized "global center"--replacing both ISGP and FAM--to help PVOs achieve the above ends. The center could provide proven systems, training, technical assistance, publications, and specialized expertise to PVOs in appropriate areas of food assistance management and operations. It could use its specialized in-house or external expertise to conduct objective assessments of PVO problem areas--e.g., what are the problems with a PVO's management information system or commodities logistic system and what could be done to remedy them?--and provide custom assistance programs to solve the problems identified. OFDA, for example, has used a version of this approach in hiring the Dade County Florida Fire Department to train various developing country organizations in disaster preparedness planning and techniques. National diagnostic and training centers exist to meet the

specialized needs of fire departments, police departments and other service organizations.

The role and longevity of FAM, then, turns on the answer to two questions:

- o Will FAM attain its objectives fully at some point so that it will no longer be needed?
- o Should ISGP-FAM, presently or in the future, continue with the same approach or should there be some kind of "central" support facility for PVOs that incorporates both programs?

Will FAM ever fully achieve its objectives? Most PVO and A.I.D. staff do not believe so. The need for a forum for CSs to consider food aid related issues will never disappear, although it could be posited in a different organization than FAM. As one A.I.D. official said about CS collaboration in an earlier "internal" evaluation of FAM⁵: PVOs ... "are only scratching the surface."

FAM may be able to satisfy PVO needs for common management standards and policies fully from time to time. However, as the last year or two have shown, Title II and food assistance programs in general tend to change on a regular basis, requiring adjustments by PVOs and A.I.D. FAM's assistance in considering these adjustments on a continuous basis is likely to be required over the long-term.

Dealing with PVO food assistance management concerns is also likely, according to most who commented, to be a continuous need of CSs. Improved food aid management by CSs is a moving target, but an important one to all involved in Title II activities. More in-depth management improvement is needed by CSs today as staff turnover and management requirements change in response to world and country conditions and A.I.D. priorities.

While services like those provided by FAM may be needed over the long-term, most PVOs and A.I.D. officials envisioned a future for FAM that diminished its role or altered its configuration to link it less directly to A.I.D. Only a few suggested the need for an expanded FAM or a combined ISGP-FAM concept. This is consistent with the comments made by PVO and A.I.D. officials in the 1991 internal evaluation of FAM.⁶ However, in considering FAM's future, most PVO and A.I.D. officials appear to believe its present configuration should be maintained for the time being. FAM should be kept "small and lean" and utilize consultants, rather than its own staff, for specialized technical assistance. One PVO suggested that FAM have only a five-year life span at the end of which it could be evaluated as to its

⁵Cousins, William J., "Evaluation of Food Aid Management, July 1991, p. 11.

⁶Cousins, "Evaluation of Food Aid Management," pp. 16ff.

effectiveness. At that point it might become a professional association supported by PVOs to provide needed services rather than a service center supported by A.I.D.

Structurally, FAM has established a minimum base from which to carry out training and support. FAM's ability was demonstrated, for example, by the workshops it carried out or coordinated in its first two and one-half years, its establishment of a Food Policy Committee to gather and disseminate documentation on food aid issues to PVOs, etc. However, FAM is currently being asked by PVOs and some A.I.D. staff to expand its efforts by providing more workshops facilitating development of specific standards and identifying other ways to professionalize food aid activities. Thus, an effective source of training and a forum for consideration of food aid policy and other related issues will continue to be needed by PVOs and A.I.D. Several points need to be addressed if FAM, in its present configuration, is to meet these increased needs in a way that satisfies its members' expectations: Additional technical staff support and logistical support for FAM to carry out additional activities will be required; up front PVO commitments to continue to use FAM as a technical training resource for headquarters and field staff will be necessary; PVOs will need to agree on the curricula to be programmed; and increased funding for FAM's expanded agenda will be needed.

Some suggest that PVO needs should be met by a different approach than FAM's. A center of excellence, for example, could be developed to help PVOs using Title II to create consistent programs, policies, standards and approaches "for the industry", rather than depending on each PVO to undertake these development tasks solely or mostly for itself.

If such a central facility is used, what should its characteristics be--like FAM or even more centralized and self-sufficient? What should its functions be--similar to FAM or more extensive in the areas of technical assistance, etc.? The term "central support facility" is not meant to be equivalent to the bureaucratic growth of FAM per se but to describe an independent system. The center could take on several different configurations, ranging from an association of PVOs to a completely independent center for food aid. An independent center could be public, quasi-public or private in nature, and each of these sub-options could involve PVOs in various ways. For example, PVO members could constitute the entire board of directors of a private center; or, a private center could be comprised entirely of a contract with an outside PVO or other organization, perhaps with an advisory board of CS members.

Do PVOs and A.I.D. need such a super FAM? PVOs do not believe so. CRS, for example, is itself attempting to become an important source of specialized food assistance management expertise and to share this capability with others. CRS staff has written articles, invited itself to other meetings, etc. Also, FAM has adequately met many of the CSs' needs. CSs do need manuals and means to link logistic and programming people together, and FAM has been very helpful in these areas according to PVO headquarters and field staff. CSs also need more dialogue with Missions. CRS national offices have come up with several possible country and regional training concepts that have not received Mission support. FAM could be more helpful in facilitating movement in this area. FAM also could bridge the gap between USAIDs and PVOs in considering the role of food aid and mechanisms for actualizing it.

What are the pros and cons for continuing the ISGP-FAM approach vs. an independent national center approach?

ISGP-FAM approach:

Pros:

- o ISGP and FAM are already established, understood and quite widely accepted by PVOs, A.I.D./W and USAIDs; both have been successful in achieving substantial portions of their objectives;
- o ISGP and FAM allow CSs to identify and deal with their own problems (with the support of A.I.D. funds) and FAM is managed directly by CSs, both of which encourage CSs to participate in Title II programs and ISGP;
- o ISGP and FAM encourage flexibility in addressing issues identified by CSs; and
- o ISGP and FAM are relatively easy for A.I.D. to manage.

Cons:

- o ISGP and FAM rely on PVOs to identify areas of need; they are not precise in identifying the nature and extent of the problems to be solved with ISGP funds nor the amount of funding necessary to solve them; and
- o ISGP and FAM support a plethora of food assistance related activities by PVOs making it difficult to identify and analyze the impact of their support on the achievement of the objectives of ISGP and FAM.

Specialized global center approach:

Pros:

- o Establishes a center of high quality specialized expertise to support all PVOs in their food assistance efforts;
- o Provides an external objective organization to help diagnose PVO problems and provide resources for and undertake solutions; and
- o Serves as a source of "cutting edge" knowledge, techniques, management tools, and professional expertise and a repository of evaluation and other historical food assistance data.

Cons:

- o Reduces the principal role of PVOs in identify and solving their own problems and in directing the activities of FAM;
- o Does not contribute to filling the funding gap of CSs because funds are allocated to the center and not directly to meeting the personnel and other needs of PVOs; and
- o Eliminates much of the flexibility of application of funds possible under ISGP.

The principal pro for continuing with the ISGP approach is that it involves the PVOs directly in identifying their own problems and solving them with the benefit of direct grants of ISGP funds and in managing FAM. This direct participation of CSs and their receipt of cash from the ISGP is a critical factor in encouraging their use of food assistance, enhancing their ability to use food developmentally and innovatively and improving their management of food aid operations.

The principal con for the specialized global center approach is that it would reduce the present high degree of PVO involvement in solving their own food assistance related problems and limit their direct receipt of ISGP funds to do so. While PVOs could conceivable constitute the Board of Directors of a center, the center would provide resources to the PVOs indirectly through outside technical assistance, workshops, etc.--a la FAM today, but on a much larger scale.

2. Conclusion

FAM is the preferred approach for coordinating and supporting PVOs involved with Title II food assistance at the present time. FAM has established its credibility in fulfilling its mandate, has performed successfully in doing so and is highly responsive to PVO direction. The concept of a "center" as compared to FAM is not a desirable option for PVOs. ISGP meets many central needs of PVOs through its cash grants which a "center" approach would reduce. Also, PVOs are heavily involved in directing FAM's operations but may have less influence on the policy of a center for food aid management.

F. Recommendations

- o FAM's current interactive and catalytic approach under the direction of the PVO Steering Committee should be continued;
- o Funding for FAM should be increased to support sufficient technical specialists and support staff to implement agreed upon additional activities; and
- o FAM should improve its performance by better meeting the needs of smaller PVO members and by identifying and implementing ways to assure all PVOs that their interests are well understood and fully accounted for vis-a-vis those of A.I.D.

VI. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING

A. Eligibility and Selection Process for ISG Funding

1. Discussion

Eligibility criteria were set out in the Proposal Guidelines for the Title II Institutional Support Grant Program. In essence, any PVO/CDO Cooperating Sponsor or organization qualified to receive Title II commodities was eligible to participate. Regarding requests for funding under Section 202(e) of P.L.480, potential grant recipients must also, to the extent practicable, be registered with the Administrator of A.I.D. The eligibility criteria were intentionally general to allow a broad range of PVOs to participate in the program.

A specific process was established to review ISG proposals and allocate grant funds. The A.I.D. Project Officer was in charge of the process. The review process was discussed at the onset of the whole ISG program and for each series of reviews. The process included the following elements:

- o Establishment of general criteria, which were stated in the Proposal Guidelines, by which the proposals would be evaluated;
- o Selection of a review committee comprised of A.I.D. professionals familiar with the grant program, the PVOs and/or the country where the proposed program was to take place;
- o Preparation of a technical review of each proposal by an outside evaluator for the use of the review panel;
- o Review and evaluation of the proposals by the review and establishment of a ranking for each proposal; and
- o Final selection of proposals and signing of agreements with organizations whose proposals were selected.

This evaluation process was not precise or thoroughly objective in measuring each proposal against specific criteria. Senior management within the pertinent A.I.D./W Bureaus were not very engaged in the selection process and as a result were not attentive to some of the issues that the process raised. Also, while the review process was a group process little attention was paid to achieving consensus among the group members. While there was considerable discussion about the various proposals under review questions raised by panel members about the proposals were not necessarily "resolved" before a decision about the award was made.

The program was viewed by A.I.D. as a "competition". There were no "givens" regarding funds for any particular PVO. The proposals were of varying quality related in part to the experience of the PVO in developing such proposals. A.I.D. did seek to work with different PVOs to improve their proposals as a part of the submission and review process in order to enable those PVOs with less experience and expertise in proposal preparation to submit an appropriate proposal.

The review or selection panels for the ISG proposals were comprised of four to six individuals who were knowledgeable about FFP and had experience both with the PVOs and/or with their programs. The number of people on the panel varied with the numbers of proposals being reviewed at any given time. Generally the panels included A.I.D./W personnel representing different bureaus. They variously involved FFP officers, division chiefs, food officers from the regional bureaus and representatives from the General Counsel's office. Food policy specialists from PPC were also involved in the discussion of the guidelines. On occasion, USAID staff visiting in Washington were also invited to sit on the review panels as they knew the country circumstances well and often had knowledge of a particular PVO's work in that country. They were selected on the basis of their first-hand knowledge and experience with PVOs though it was sometimes the case that the responsibility of evaluating the proposals fell on the staff most willing to undertake the work, not necessarily those most familiar with a particular country or program. Initially, the Deputy Director of the PVO Office chaired the meetings.

Prior to the meeting of the selection panel, outside technical evaluators were hired to do a technical review of the ISG proposal. The technical reviewer's task was to prepare a brief analysis of the proposal including a summary of its approach to the proposed ISG-funded project, an assessment of its technical feasibility and cost effectiveness, and a review of the issues and/or problems which would need to be resolved before the proposal could be accepted. Prior to the review committee's meeting the technical analyses of the proposal were circulated to the review committee members.

After the technical review, the proposals were to be evaluated and scored using the criteria which had been published in the Proposal Guidelines for the ISG Program. These selection criteria were consistent with ISG program goals and purposes though they were very general. The Selection Criteria set forth, for example, in the Guidelines for FY 1992 grants indicated that proposals would be assessed under the following specific criteria;

- o Consistency with A.I.D. Policies and Priorities
- o Technical Soundness/Appropriateness of the Proposed Activities
- o Capacity of the Organization to Implement and Evaluate the Proposed Replication/Innovation Grant
- o Contribution of the Proposed Replication/Innovation Grant to Strengthening the Overall Food Aid Program
- o Collaboration

With the exception of the last item, Collaboration, each of the above criteria has several sub-heads which further defined the individual criteria. However, these too were somewhat general in nature and left considerable latitude for interpretation and application.

The level of generality of these criteria has allowed for considerable flexibility on the part of both the PVOs and A.I.D. in terms of the types of programs that were proposed and considered acceptable for funding under the ISG program. In some ways this was good; the use of food for development purposes (CK) was "uncharted territory" and the level of generality of the guidelines allowed for a variety of approaches to be tried. However, the absence of more specific criteria meant that there were no clear, objective measures for evaluating individual proposals such that one proposal might be acceptable because it met specific criteria while another proposal might not be acceptable. As a result, many camels got their "noses inside the tent" before either A.I.D. or the PVOs were organized to manage and/or monitor the projects to achieve the objectives proposed.

In theory, each of the proposals was to be evaluated by the review panel members and given points which reflected the degree to which the proposal met each of the criteria. The proposal rating sheets mirrored the criteria. Then the points were to be totaled, the rankings for the proposals established and decisions made. In practice, the absence of detailed and discrete selection criteria made it difficult to establish much of a "ranking" for each of the proposals though minimum scores were required for funding. As each proposal was scored by the review panel members, the scores were compared and averaged. Reviewers were expected to back up their scores if they were questioned. Because the criteria were so general it was relatively "easy" for a given proposal to meet the criteria as stated and to gain the minimum number of points. There was little difference in the total points awarded to the various proposals and a very limited point spread in the rankings of one proposal against another. Moreover, as A.I.D. initially had more funds available than it had projects requiring funding, most of the proposals were funded though not necessarily at the levels originally requested.

In general, the selection process was considered "fair" by the PVOs particularly as the selection criteria, however general, were made known from the beginning. PVOs interviewed indicated that the process helped to eliminate some of the "arbitrariness" which some feel tends to characterize some A.I.D. awards.

As the ISG program has evolved so has a clear consensus within A.I.D. developed that the evaluation criteria for evaluating proposals should be more detailed and specific. There should be only one set of criteria for the proposals and these should "serve as a tool" for the PVO in developing the proposal and for A.I.D. in evaluating it. A.I.D. staff interviewed for this evaluation indicated that the PVOs' should become more goal oriented and that the selection criteria should reflect and promote this orientation. As a part of the process of clarifying the evaluation criteria it is also be important ot clarify the review process both for A.I.D. officers and for the PVOs.

RECOMMENDATION:

- o Develop more specific, discrete criteria for evaluating ISG proposals and include these criteria in the Guidelines for the RFA. Such criteria should focus PVOs on achieving particular goals and objectives in their programs and on developing measures for monitoring the achievement of these goals and objectives. Equally as important is the setting of standards or measures of accountability, both financial and substantive.
- o Develop a more rigorous evaluation process which spells out clearly the composition of the review committee, the approach to scoring proposals and the factors to be considered in the final ranking of proposals for awards.

B. Program Management and Monitoring

1. AID/Washington- FHA project management

a. Discussion

PVOs alternately characterized A.I.D./W's management style as either a complete "hands off" approach or as "micro management" at its worst. PVOs noted that ISGP management in A.I.D./W was thin and lacked a middle management tier. However, all PVOs gave the ISGP backup team within A.I.D., past and present, high marks. Past project officers and past and present contractor staff were praised for being supportive and helpful in the preparation of proposals, in fashioning solutions to problems and to obtaining information and answers to CSs' questions. Timely information was provided; communication was good, although it was principally by phone and letter.

The PVOs and A.I.D./W reported that ISGP monitoring by AID/W was weak. It was almost entirely a paper process. There were few "live visits" made to PVO headquarters or to field sites by past Project Officers to monitor ISGP implementation progress.

One issue raised consistently by PVOs was the lack of sufficient numbers of FFP officers (in A.I.D./W and at the Mission level) adequately trained in the use of Title II for development purposes. FFP officers both in Washington and in the field frequently did not know the rules or regulations for Title II, even though such programs were sometimes a large part of their budget. In other words, even though Title II has grown, A.I.D. did not plan well for the management and monitoring of this expansion.

Some--but not all--PVOs, both at headquarters and in field offices, viewed the ISGP relationship with A.I.D./W quite negatively, principally over administrative matters. They believed the accountability, reporting and planning requirements of A.I.D. for ISGP were excessive and placed a heavy burden on field staff in particular.

One area of policy concern from the PVOs' perspective, is that A.I.D. has been on a "collision course" between competing objectives with its Title II program and ISGP. On one hand, A.I.D. desired to expand Title II, use more local PVOs in-out-of-the way places and

improve PVOs' management and accountability. On the other hand, many within A.I.D. did not support food for development generally or in specific situations. A.I.D. itself did not allocate the resources, particularly in terms of A.I.D. personnel, to assist the PVOs with this process. The competing objectives and agendas within A.I.D. mitigate the success of an expanded Title II program. The regional bureaus in A.I.D., for example, often did not support using food as a resource. USAIDs were cautious about food for development expansion too. They did not like the management responsibility and audit dangers in some cases. In others they lacked expertise to fashion or assess possible projects. In some USAIDs, the staff did not believe use of food for development was appropriate on the merits of the situation. The PVOs ended up being "trapped" between those in A.I.D. who "pushed food" for political and/or development reasons and those who did not choose to support the use of food for development generally or in specific situations.

Some CSs argued that, in the past, they made mistakes by going too far in certain directions desired by A.I.D. or by not being fully prepared for or aware of the impact of audits of their food aid programs. These PVOs wanted to ensure that food for development efforts fit into their programs and were not done only in support of A.I.D. objectives. Their past experience and the tension within A.I.D. regarding the role of food for development made certain PVOs cautious about expanding their Title II programs.

Additionally, PVOs indicated that there was an aura of unreality within A.I.D. about what is possible to do within a given time frame. At the same time that the PVOs were being held to tighter standards of accountability for the food they handle, they were also being asked to work more closely with and utilize local PVOs under increasingly difficult circumstances. They were asked to improve their planning capabilities and plan carefully for the long-term, but found A.I.D.'s own approval process to be long and tedious. One PVO reported that two years passed between its study for its MYOP and the final approval of the MYOP. By then the situation had so changed in the country involved that the assumptions upon which the MYOP was based were not longer valid. PVOs believed this problem stemmed from lack of clarity within A.I.D. as to who had the authority to approve a MYOP. In sum, A.I.D./W's decision-making process was slow with respect to non-technical, management issues such as approvals of proposed implementation plans and revisions in grant agreements.

b. Conclusions

- o A.I.D. management and direct monitoring of ISGP has been adequate but is now thinner than appropriate. Recent staff reductions have removed the position of project officer for ISGP, thereby reducing middlelevel management and monitoring of ISGP by direct hire A.I.D. staff. At present, A.I.D. direct hire management and monitoring of ISGP is:

Almost entirely a paper process; no visits to CS headquarters or to field locations were planned by A.I.D. personnel;

Entirely resident with senior FFP staff; while these senior managers have been very responsive to the needs of contractor staff carrying out day-to-day ISGP activities, they could not devote substantial management and monitoring time to ISGP;

- o A.I.D.'s ISGP project officers in the past provided timely, useful technical information to grantees which facilitated the implementation of ISGP. The strong level of communication stemmed from the personal interest and commitment of the A.I.D. direct hire and contract staff assigned to backstop the grantees and not necessarily from A.I.D.

2. USAIDs

a. Discussion

USAID Missions showed varying degrees of support for expanded Title II programs under the ISGP. PVOs report that support was generally present when the Mission Director or senior staff had successful experiences with Title II programs in other countries. If they were knowledgeable about the possibilities as well as the pitfalls and/or if a Title II program easily "fit" with the existing Mission portfolio, senior USAID managers were more supportive of additional Title II activities. For example, Africare received strong support for its efforts in Guinea-Bissau and the food aid program went forward. Conversely it did not receive support from the Mission in Guinea for food aid because the Mission concluded food assistance was inappropriate in the development context that existed at the time. However, the Mission did fund a farm-to-market roads project partially designed with enhancement grant funds even though the project had no food aid component. Similarly, in Senegal, Africare changed its initial region of intervention for a food aid program because that region was no longer in the Mission's CDSS. USAIDs were little involved in the development, monitoring and evaluation of ISGP activities.

b. Conclusion

USAIDs' support for Title II and ISGP sponsored activities varied from country to country. USAIDs' direct involvement in ISGP management was limited in nearly all countries.

3. PVOs

a. General Management

1) Discussion

PVO management of the ISGP was generally decentralized. The PVOs' field offices ran their programs with support from headquarters. In essence, headquarters served as a resource base that included monitoring of the ISGP. Staff size at PVO headquarters was a function of the number of country field offices and the size of each country field office's program. For instance, at one end of the continuum CARE had a five

member headquarters staff (four ISGP funded) that worked with more than six country field offices and its regional programs. CRS had a three member headquarters staff that worked with seven country field offices. At the other end of the continuum, FHI did not have a staff member directly funded to support ISGP program activities for its field office in Bolivia. The functions attributed to the headquarters staff were delegated among the larger PVOs according to designated responsibility. In smaller PVOs, one person was responsible for all headquarters support and served as liaison for the PVO, the PVO's field office, A.I.D., provided technical assistance as requested, and coordinated the documentation preparation required by the ISGP.

The PVOs believed their country operations should be managed by field staff and not from some distant headquarters office for several reasons. Field staff know from both programming and operational perspectives what is going on in a country. They should be responsible for the field office programs and activities developed and included in MYOPs and DIPs. Most PVOs believed headquarters staff should be resources upon which the Field Offices draw for technical assistance, training, guidelines in working with food aid, programming assistance, grant development assistance, monitoring and evaluating support, liaison with other PVOs and A.I.D. and policy and strategy support. ISGP helped strengthen this model of PVO management in general and of ISGP in particular. In the larger PVOs' headquarters, ISGP helped improve knowledge of country programs and how food as a development resource could be used to support them. Consequently, field staff said the credibility of PVO headquarters management capability in providing specialized technical assistance, providing Headquarters guidance, long-range program planning using food as a resource, program monitoring and serving as a coordinating resource unit increased.

The tools of general management for the ISGP were the MYOPs, DIPs, Annual Reports and Self/Internal Evaluations. With the grant's funding, headquarters and field office staff were challenged to produce policies, strategies, programs, projects and to undertake institutional development to become more efficient and effective in using food as a development resource. PVOs stated unanimously that without the support of the ISGP funding, the MYOPs and DIPs would not have been undertaken because of time and staff constraints and lack of knowledge to prepare both documents. With the technical assistance support from either headquarters staff or consultants, field office staff received the training and guidance necessary to develop the MYOPs and DIPs. Just as importantly, funding for technical assistance through headquarters support and technical assistance consultants permitted PVOs to either establish or improve commodity management and MIS systems both at field and regional levels.

As a result, the PVOs are using the MYOPs, updating them as necessary, and DIPs to follow the program activities set forth in PVO grant agreements. One point to note is that in general, the MYOPs and the DIPs are ambitious. This probably was due to the unfamiliarity of preparing the documents combined with the concept of using food aid as a development resource in developing strategies and programs. With initial experience gained under the ISGP, the Field Offices and headquarters staff will prepare MYOPs and DIPs that are more realistic. The Annual Reports indicated that progress was made against long- and short-term benchmarks indicated in the MYOPs and DIPs. To help assess this progress Self Evaluations were conducted by some PVOs according to their established evaluation procedures. The

individual country self evaluation reports were generally sent to PVO headquarters to be incorporated into an expanded evaluation report.

An important issue for PVOs in using ISGP was the staff turnover factor, the causes of which are well known by the PVOs, A.I.D. and USAIDs. Staff turnover at the field level makes it imperative for PVOs to have strong headquarters support in providing technical assistance, consultants or regional staff to assist field offices maintain continuity in the level of management, including programming and management reporting. ISGP funding provides this support and the result is more efficient and effective use of food aid by the PVOs.

Staff turnover at the headquarters was another issue. Almost all of the PVOs experienced turnover within the unit working with the ISGP. This impacted the smaller and less experienced PVOs more than the larger and more established ones. Smaller PVOs' central support function to the ISGP was more affected when there was a turnover. Replacements were generally not available immediately. Fortunately, with a decentralized management, ISGP program activities were not totally affected by headquarters turnover of ISGP staff. And now, with FAM serving, among other activities, as a coordinating function member PVOs, there is another resource to help resolve the turnover issue. Through the Steering Committee meetings, seminars, workshops and general service, FAM served as a network for candidate inquiries among the PVO members for current or impending vacancies.

Several PVOs undertook efforts to establish and improve their MIS systems. For instance, CARE is contributing to a worldwide effort by using ISGP funds to support its Manila, Philippines MIS Unit to implement a MIS Food/Accounting Program. CARE, with ISGP funding, hired two data programmers to assist in the design of a MIS Food Accounting program and participate in the testing and implementation. Other PVOs started MIS systems: SCF--a Commodity Tracking System; and ADRA--a Food Tracking System. The establishment or improvement of commodity management and MIS systems helped PVOs increase their capability to use food aid. The PVOs emphasized improving their tracking systems and commodity systems to demonstrate more professionalism and accountability when working with food as a resource. The Steering Committee for FAM established an Accountability Task Force to work within the PVO member community to develop a Generally Accepted Commodity Accounting Principles (GACAP). Several other selected PVO efforts to improve commodity management are:

- o World Share--Commodity Manual and a Warehousing Assessment
- o Africare--Commodity Handbook
- o CARE--Commodity Storage and Handling Manual
- o FAM--Generally Accepted Commodity Accounting Principles

2) Conclusions

- o Establishment and improvement of professionalism in the management of food aid as a resource for development occurred at the headquarters

and field offices of the PVOs participating in ISGP. The funding provided enabled the PVOs to fund positions both at the headquarters and field levels which increased and improved strategic planning, programming, logistic improvement, monitoring efforts, new efforts in monetization, installation of MIS and improvements in commodity management and financial systems.

- o Although the PVOs implemented or improved upon the various management systems, they were still in the first phase of utilization and the specific development impact of their work has yet to be determined. Initial MYOPs and DIPs were perhaps too ambitious given that they were the first exposure to use of food as a resource for most of the PVOs and in the light of PVOs' staff turnover. However, PVOs were strengthened by ISGP support to move ahead in their use of food for development and to carry out their work done in more professional and competent manner.

b. Monitoring and evaluation

1) Discussion

PVO monitoring of progress against their grant objectives was not done very well. The quality of their internal monitoring and evaluation (M & E) systems at the headquarters and field level varied though it was not consistently good. Frequently they did not develop the necessary base line against which progress could be determined. Also, when an evaluation was done, it often was general and not specifically carried out to assess the impact of ISGP.

Some PVOs developed an internal capacity to monitor and evaluate, others did not. Africare and WVRD, for example, created the capacity to monitor and track ISGP grant and program activities. However neither had an internal evaluation capacity and each has relied on outside evaluators to the present⁷. ADRA, on the other hand, had an internal evaluation unit that carried out M & E work. However, it was behind schedule in undertaking its evaluations. CARE did self evaluations with its headquarters staff but it too was behind in conducting all of its evaluation activities. FHI did not undertake its self evaluation. World Share completed both the self and external evaluations and CRS plans to do its external evaluation before the end of the current ISGP in September 1992. A self evaluation was conducted by SCF and an external evaluation of FAM was carried out. Apparently, several of the PVOs were not required to undertake external evaluations.

Table 2 gives the status of evaluations under the ISGP. As stated in the grant agreements, the self evaluation is conducted in accordance with PVOs' normal evaluation programs and the external evaluation, if it is required, can be either a mid-term or final evaluation. What transpired regarding the evaluation process was that ISGP was considered

⁷The Mid-term Evaluation of December 1990 by Joyce King.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Table 2: Status of CS Evaluations under the ISG Program

CS	Grant Effect. Date	Grant Requirement	Self Eval. ⁸	External Eval. ⁹
1. FHI	9/1/89	Yes	Planned	Planned
2. WVRD	1/1/87	Yes	completed	Not Req.
3. Africare	8/1/88	Yes	Completed	Not Req.
4. CRS	8/15/89	Yes	Planned	Planned
5. WS	8/1/89	Yes	Completed	Completed
6. SCF	7/1/87	Yes	Completed	Not Req.
7. ADRA	7/1/89	Yes	Completed	Planned
8. CARE	7/1/89	Yes	Completed	Planned
9. FAM	6/15/89	Yes	Not Req.	Completed

1. Self/Internal Evaluation is to be conducted in accordance with its normal evaluation program as described in its grant proposal.

2. At least one evaluator is to be engaged who is not a current employee of the CS and the inclusion of at least one staff member of the CS on the evaluation team is encouraged.

part of the PVO overall self evaluation process and the external evaluations were being scheduled as final evaluations. It is difficult to say exactly why this occurred. One reason appeared to be lack of available staff in combination with the demand of other important ISGP activities. Another was that PVO's knew ISGP was highly blended into other funding sources in many activities and would be more difficult to assess earlier in the grant period. Also, attribution of documented progress to ISGP funds would be difficult and was a task PVO evaluators did not relish.

PVOs made progress in monitoring grant finances and commodities as they flowed through their systems. As noted earlier, several modules and handbooks were developed by CSs--e.g., CARE and Africare, to name two--for this purpose. These documents strengthened the capacity of PVOs to improve field staff performance in important aspects of their overall and Title II programs.

While the PVO grant agreements required that the PVOs carry out self and/or external evaluations which could then be used as a management tool for the PVO and for A.I.D to assess the progress being made under the ISGP, requirements for monitoring ISGP activities on a current basis were less clear. The PVOs generally did not monitor their activities in a systematic manner. They set forth their plans for a particular project and in many cases developed indicators of success or progress. However, most PVOs monitored their projects only at the time of their annual internal evaluation.

The structuring of the self evaluations tended to be done on a country-by-country format, not in an ISGP synthesized format. ADRA and WV, for example carried out their annual reviews of programs, of which ISGP was but one part. ISGP received only a general review because field office staff concentrated on the more important program activities (larger percentage of funding and level of effort). This country-by-country approach should be changed in order to provide one source of information to managers, external evaluators and A.I.D. For example, a standard ISGP self evaluation format could be developed at headquarters or in the field whereby the ISGP would be evaluated against its grant proposal, MYOP, DIP benchmarks and indicators. Perhaps, there is a role for FAM to play in assisting with a design of a generalized evaluation format for use by its members. In this manner, the self evaluation will serve better its purpose as an internal formative tool and indicator of progress under the ISGP.

At the time of the evaluation team's visits to the various PVOs' headquarters, at least half of the external evaluations (not all the PVOs were required to undertake external evaluations) were in the planning stages. Only FAM, World Share, Africare and WVRD had conducted external evaluations. Africare and WVRD conducted their self evaluation by using outside consultants. The other PVOs planned to undertake final evaluations of ISGP instead of mid-term evaluations because they review ISGP as part of their annual review of country programs. Like self evaluations, external evaluations are extremely important as a formative tool in helping the PVOs, A.I.D. and USAIDs to assess the ISGP as a mechanism providing assistance to PVOs who are or will be using food as a development resource. Thus, final external evaluations should be undertaken before the current ISGP grant period comes to an end, and in the future, PVO mid-term external evaluations of the ISGP should be required no later than fifteen months after the signature of a future ISGP grant agreement. Again,

developing a general evaluation format for ISGP would be of importance in the future for the PVOs and A.I.D.

2) Conclusions

- o CSs did not monitor and evaluate progress under their ISGP funding well. Most CSs that did carry out ISGP required M & E activities did so as part of overall program monitoring and evaluating activities.

C. Financial Management

1. Federal Cash Transactions Report and Financial Status Report

a. Discussion

In undertaking the evaluation of the PVOs financial management part of the evaluation, the following method was used to trace the flow of ISGP funds through the financial system: A Federal Letter of Credit drawdown was selected and traced by reviewing the supporting documentation-- field office expenditure reports, headquarters expenditure reports; SF 269s; Federal Cash Transactions Report; SF 272 and SF 272a (Financial Status Report). These were reviewed for continuity in reporting. The PVO's financial/accounting departments were responsible for compliance and preparation of the reports. To avoid problems of government documentation due to interest payments because of an excessive drawdown, many of the PVOs advanced the initial funds to start operations under the ISGP. Therefore there was a continuous advance being worked against. The amount of the advance depended on how closely the PVO controlled the funding at the field office level. The advances covered from one to three months of budgeted ISGP operations. Headquarters accounting staff were responsible for translating field office financial reports into the format required for ISGP reporting. This usually meant that a field office financial report's line items were consolidated and totaled along with those of other field offices.

Occasionally there were drawdowns that exceeded expenditures. This occurred, for example, when activities did not occur but were budgeted for in the previous Federal Letter of Credit drawdown. In the case of excess drawdown that exceeded the advance or if an advance was not used, the difference was recorded on the SF 269 as cash on hand at the end of the period. During the review, two opposite cases were noticed where PVOs had large cash on hand balances. One PVO had such a balance due to a change in its accounting procedures. Another PVO had a negative balance on hand because of an error in an estimate of the funding level to be covered by the PVO's unrestricted funding. The balance was to be adjusted in the following accounting period.

Several of the PVOs indicated that in the event of an excess drawdown, when they reconciled, they noted that private funding from unrestricted sources was used instead of government funds. They also indicated that the interest that would have been earned on the private funds would exceed that of overdrawn government funds so that no interest is due the

government. Review of the SF 269s and SF 272s indicated that the PVOs were following the procedures and reporting rules required. One point of interest is the PVOs tended to complete the SF 272s differently--by functions, programs or activities. In addition, several of the PVOs completed documentation on a quarterly basis while the others completed it monthly. The total value of a PVO's Federal Letter of Credit which encompassed all of its federal funding determined the reporting period requirement.

b. Conclusion

The PVOs' financial management of ISGP was satisfactory. ISGP funds were accounted for in a systematic manner in field offices and at PVO headquarters. Standard reporting forms SF 269s and SF 272s were completed and submitted in a timely manner and A.I.D.'s Financial Management Office was advised when PVOs submitted financial reports after the normal reporting date. PVOs recorded excess cash balances and interest balances owed to the USG.

2. Accounting Systems

a. Discussion

While the majority of PVOs¹⁰ concentrated on improving other management systems, several PVOs did undertake efforts to improve financial/accounting systems, usually through expansion or internal development of better accounting software. All of the PVOs had computerized accounting systems and all were different from each other: For example, CARE used CUFS, WVRD used SUN and SHARE used Realworld. The PVOs used a chart of account number and a fund number to record ISGP expenditures. CARE and FHI went one step further in recording expenditures by adding a third number that attributed the expense to a specific project or program. Of the PVOs who concentrated on other accountability improvements, ADRA and SHARE upgraded, in part, their accounting systems either at headquarters and/or in field offices. Headquarters accounting departments generally receive field office reports.

b. Conclusion

PVOs used computerized accounting systems at headquarters and at country Field Offices to record and account for ISGP funds disbursed under the grant agreements. The accounting systems were approved as satisfactory by each PVO's external auditing agency. The PVOs software accounting programs had the capacity to provide for more specificity in attributing expenditures to activities/tasks if it was required.

¹⁰. Detailed reviews of the financial management policies and procedures were carried out for the following PVOs: CARE, Africare, WVRD, SHARE, FHI, CRS.

D. Funding levels, use and attribution of AID grant and matching funds

1. Funding Level Adequacy of ISGP

a. Discussion

PVOs stated that ISGP funding was adequate given the purposes and objectives of their initial grant agreements approved by A.I.D. As PVOs required additional funding for their programs, their grant agreements were amended either through incremental or additional funding amendments. (See Table 1 in Chapter 4 for a review of the amendments issued to the individual PVO grant agreements.) Thus, while PVOs' viewed ISGP funding as adequate, all expressed an interest in increased funding over a longer time period for expansion of country programs given the experience gained from the initial grant time period. While CARE, CRS, FHI, SHARE, and FAM indicated that funding was sufficient, several PVOs felt that initial reduction of funds from what had been requested in grant proposals affected their long-range planning for the use of ISGP. For example, WVRD's request for five year funding was reduced to three and one half years and Africare's funding was reduced from \$2.5 million to \$1.5 million. At one point, because of delays in receiving additional funding from A.I.D., Africare had to finance its ISGP activities from unrestricted funds to avoid reducing or closing operations in several countries.

Both WVRD and Africare have Enhancement Grants which were continued under the ISGP. Table 3 and Figure 3 show total A.I.D and PVO actual versus planned expenditures under the grant program. Table 4 and Figure 4 show how funding was distributed on an actual expenditure basis between headquarters and field offices.

From the figures presented in Tables 3 and 4, it appears that adequate funding was made available to the PVOs by ISGP. However, this finding was based on funding provided and funding disbursed by the PVOs under ISGP. Total combined A.I.D. and PVO actual expenditures were about 44 percent of the combined A.I.D. and PVO funding under the ISGP grant agreements. In disaggregating the total budgeted by A.I.D. and PVO funding against the total expended, similar percentages were calculated, respectively, of 44 and 42 percent. At the high end of A.I.D. budgeted funding, FHI and Africare each expended 78 percent and 77 percent of budgeted funding, respectively. At the low end of expenditures, CRS and CARE expended 39 and 21 percent of budgeted funding respectively. Similarly, at the high end of PVO funding use, FHI and CRS expended 137 and 67 percent of budgeted funding respectively and, at the low end of funding use, SCF and CARE expended 30 and 26 percent of budgeted funding respectively.

Another way funding adequacy was checked was by comparing actual grant expenditures to budget line items in the grant agreements. Table 5 and Figure 5 present the PVOs budgeted line items in the individual grant agreements and the actual expenditures by budgeted line items. Overall as a group, PVOs expended about 48 percent of Program, 43 percent of Procurement, 21 percent of Evaluation and 46 percent of Indirects of the budgeted line item amounts for ISGP. A review of PVOs individually, showed similar percentages by

budgeted line items as shown in the Table 6 and Figure 6. In comparing expenditures to budgeted funds for PVOs as a group and on an individual basis, expenditures were well under the amounts budgeted in the PVOs grant agreement line items. On the basis of funds disbursed to date for undertaking grant activities, the ISGP provided adequate funding. However, if the implementation of ISGP activities had been more advanced, ISGP funding might not have been adequate.

b. Conclusion

Based on PVO expenditures to date compared to PVO grant agreement budgets, ISGP funding was adequate for the rate of expenditures incurred by the PVOs in implementing their grant activities. FHI and Africare, which disbursed over 70 percent of their available funding, felt ISGP funding was adequate to meet their needs as set out in their grant agreements. Both, however, stated that more funding would be requested in future grant proposal submissions to support expanded food aid activities.

2. PVO Cost Sharing

a. Discussion

PVO disbursement of cost sharing/matching funds compared to disbursement of A.I.D. funds indicated that the PVOs were close to meeting match requirements on a PVO to A.I.D. actual expenditure basis. On average as a group, the PVOs combined actual cost sharing/match was about 45 percent of A.I.D. expenditures. This level was close to the estimated average PVO total budgeted cost sharing/match for all grant agreements combined. On an individual basis, the PVOs separated into three groups when looking at their total actual matching expenditures compared to A.I.D.'s total current actual expenditures under the grant agreements. The first group was composed of FHI, CRS and CARE. They were ahead in actual cost sharing to A.I.D. actual expenditures. The second group of Africare and WVRD was within range of meeting actual cost sharing requirements. And in the third group, SCF and SHARE were under their cost sharing levels by more than 20 percent and 12 percent, respectively. To attain the actual match expenditures relative to current and future A.I.D. expenditures before the end of their respective life of project grant agreements, they need to expend this percentage of their match targets.

Another perspective on matching was to look at actual PVO cost sharing to A.I.D. budgeted funding under each grant agreement. Only FHI met its cost sharing requirement. Other PVOs were quite far from attaining their planned cost sharing percentages. Assuming that the remaining activities of the PVOs were implemented in the six to nine months before the end of the ISGP grant agreements, most PVOs would have to double their cost sharing over what they expended in the previous twenty to thirty six months.


INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Table 3: Budgeted and Expenditures of A.I.D. and PVOs

PVO		As of Amd.#	Total AID Grant Obligation	Actual A.I.D. Expend.	A.I.D. ACTUAL EXPEND%	Total Budgeted PVO Match	PVO Actual Match	PVO PVO Act. Match ACTUAL as a % of A.I.D. EXPEND% Act. Expend.	Act. PVO Match to A.I.D. Grant Oblg.%	Total Budgeted PVO Match to A.I.D. Grant Obl.
FHI	FY 89-91	2	345,000	270,399	78.38%	117,420	161,145	137.24%	59.60%	34.03%
AFricare	FY 88-91	5	2,811,334	2,168,424	77.13%	229,310	132,705	57.87%	6.12%	8.16%
CRS	FY 90-91	5	3,501,033	1,378,129	39.36%	1,834,580	1,231,204	67.11%	89.34%	52.40%
CARE	FY 90-91	7	5,898,221	1,273,498	21.59%	3,283,377	845,904	25.76%	66.42%	55.67%
SHARE	FY	3	633,331	352,930	55.73%	283,000	116,438	41.14%	32.99%	44.68%
WVRD	FY 89-91	3	4,059,315	2,146,608	52.88%	1,480,601	740,474	50.01%	34.50%	36.47%
SCF	FY 88-91	2	2,004,670	976,201	48.70%	1,231,897	363,954	29.54%	37.28%	61.45%
ADRA	FY	3	3,683,000	0	0.00%	1,227,667		0.00%	NA	33.33%
FAH	FY	1	740,000	542,000	73.24%	0	0	NA	0.00%	0.00%
			<u>23,675,904</u>	<u>9,108,189</u>		<u>9,687,852</u>	<u>3,591,824</u>			

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Figure 3: Total A.I.D. and PVO Budget and Disbursements




INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Table 4: A.I.D. and PVO Fund Distribution

PVO	HEADQUARTERS ACTUAL EXPENDITURE			FIELD ACTUAL EXPENDITURE		
	A.I.D.	PVO	TOTAL	A.I.D.	PVO	TOTAL
ADRA						
AFRICARE	\$1,334,528	\$132,705	\$1,467,233	\$833,896	\$0	\$833,896
CARE	\$330,421	\$152,912	\$483,333	\$3,903,871	\$1,407,751	\$5,311,622
CRS	\$475,528	\$0	\$475,528	\$902,601	\$1,231,204	\$2,133,805
FHI	\$40,906	\$72,053	\$112,959	\$229,493	\$89,092	\$318,585
SCF	\$591,753	\$363,954	\$955,707	\$384,448	\$0	\$384,448
SHARE			\$0			\$0
WVRD	\$69,629	\$268,553	\$338,182	\$2,076,979	\$471,921	\$2,548,900
TOTAL	\$2,842,765	\$990,177	\$3,832,942	\$8,331,288	\$3,199,968	\$11,531,256

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Figure 4: Fund Distribution Between Headquarters and Field offices



Regional Program Support is included in the Field Office Segment


INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Table 5: Total Budgeted and Actual Expenditures of A.I.D. and PVOs
by Grant Agreement Line Items

PVO	Program Costs			Procurement Costs			Evaluation			Indirect Costs		
	Total Budgeted	Total Actual	Percent Actual/Budg.	Total Budgeted	Total Actual	Percent Actual/Budg.	Total Budgeted	Total Actual	Percent Actual/Budg.	Total Budgeted	Total Actual	Percent Actual/Budg.
FNI	374420	376110	100.45%	68000	5968	8.78%	20000	9903	49.52%	0	39563	
Africare	1889800	1358816	71.90%	439993	418990	95.23%	0	0		710851	523323	73.62%
CRS	1858970	1010644	54.37%	2928460	1491289	50.92%	123141	847	0.69%	425042	115511	27.18%
CARE	7477677	4120828	55.11%	924213	346897	37.53%	63332	46975	74.17%	716376	348128	48.60%
SHARE	604981	295971	48.92%	194900	32938	16.90%	22500	20548	91.32%	0	0	
WVRD	4736010	2554580	53.94%	156400	47468	30.35%	0	0		647506	286012	44.17%
SCF	2620032	1057443	40.36%	0	0		183221	76151	41.56%	260143	177105	68.08%
ADRA	3245389	0	0.00%	745659	0	0.00%	384481	0	0.00%	535138	0	0.00%
FAN	608381	439000	72.16%	69285	50000	72.17%	5370	10000	186.22%	56964	43000	75.49%
Total	23415660	11213392	47.89%	5526910	2393550	43.31%	802045	164424	20.50%	3352020	1532642	45.72%

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Figure 5: A.I.D. and PVO Actual Expenditures by Grant Agreement Line Item



INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Table 6: A.I.D. and PVO Grant Agreement Budget Line Items

PVO	Program Costs		Procurement		Total Evaluation		Indirect		Other		Grand Total		Total	Match %
	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO		
FHI	257,000	117,420	68,000	0	20,000	0	0	0	0	0	345,000	117,420	462,420	34.03%
Africare	1,712,274	177,526	432,592	7,401	0	0	666,468	44,383	0	0	2,811,334	229,310	3,040,644	8.16%
CRS	1,713,014	145,956	1,396,210	1,532,250	117,541	5,600	274,268	150,774	0	0	3,501,033	1,834,580	5,335,613	52.40%
CARE	5,004,273	2,473,404	376,957	547,256	57,590	5,742	459,401	256,975	0	0	5,898,221	3,283,377	9,181,598	55.67%
SHARE	383,431	221,550	166,400	28,500	16,000	6,500	0	0	67,500	26,500	633,331	283,050	916,381	44.69%
WVRD	3,432,795	1,303,215	152,010	4,390	0	0	474,510	172,996	0	0	4,059,315	1,480,601	5,539,916	36.47%
SCF	1,443,815	1,176,217	0	0	163,221	20,000	260,143	0	137,491	35,680	2,004,670	1,231,897	3,236,567	61.45%
ADRA	2,167,390	1,077,999	613,080	132,579	367,392	17,089	535,138	0	0	0	3,683,000	1,227,667	4,910,667	33.33%
FAM	608,381	0	69,285	0	5,370	0	56,964	0	0	0	740,000	0	740,000	NA
	16,722,373	6,693,287	3,274,534	2,252,376	747,114	54,931	2,726,892	625,128	204,991	52,180	23,675,904	9,687,902	33,363,806	

* SHARE - Administrative Support
 SCF - Training/Documentation

** WVRD - Program Costs include N.O., Pilot Project Devel. and Replication

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Table 6 (Cont'd): A.I.D. and PVO Grant Agreement Expenditures
by Budget Line Items


PVO		Program Costs		Procurement		Total Evaluation		Indirect		Other		Grand Total		Total	Match %
		A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO	A.I.D.	PVO		
FHI	FY 89 - 91	257,502	118,608	3,974	1,994	8,923	980	0	39,563	0	0	270,399	161,145	431,544	60%
Africare	FY 88 - 91	1,284,538	74,278	385,293	33,697	0	0	498,593	24,730	0	0	2,168,424	132,705	2,301,129	6%
CRS	FY 90 - 91	751,815	258,829	522,622	968,667	847	0	111,803	3,708	0	0	1,387,087	1,231,204	2,618,291	89%
CARE	FY 90 - 91	2,757,313	1,363,515	264,880	82,017	36,675	10,300	243,297	104,831	0	0	3,302,165	1,560,663	4,862,828	47%
SHARE	FY 90 - 91	217,742	78,229	32,938	0	15,800	4,748	0	0	31,250	17,460	297,730	100,437	398,167	34%
WVRD	FY 89 - 91	1,885,968	668,612	28,399	19,069	0	0	233,220	52,792	0	0	2,147,587	740,473	2,888,060	34%
SCF	FY 88 - 91	693,489	363,954	0	0	76,151	0	177,105	0	29,456	0	976,201	363,954	1,340,155	37%
ADRA	FY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA
FAH	FY 89 - 91	439,000	0	50,000	0	10,000	0	43,000	0	0	0	542,000	0	542,000	NA
		8,287,367	2,926,025	1,288,106	1,105,444	148,396	16,028	1,307,018	225,624	60,706	17,460	11,091,593	4,290,581	15,382,174	

* SHARE - Administrative Support
SCF - Training/Documentation

** WVRD - Program Costs include H.O., Pilot Project Devel. and Replication

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANT PROGRAM

Figure 6: A.I.D. and PVO Actual Expenditures by Grant Agreement Line Item and by PVO



b. Conclusion

CSs were, on the average, close to meeting their matching requirements when measured on the basis of PVO to A.I.D. actual expenditures. However, when CSs cost sharing was measured as a percent of A.I.D. budgeted funding, CSs were behind their cost sharing requirement.

3. Attribution of A.I.D. funds and PVO matching funds

a. Discussion

ISGP was an important funding mechanism to help PVOs meet critical gaps in funding while carrying out food development activities. However, it was but one of many funding mechanisms and sources used by the PVOs. Therefore, the A.I.D. and PVO matching funds were treated as fungible at both the headquarters and field offices. They were mixed with other sources in the budgeting reporting process. A.I.D. grant and PVO matching funds in general were not always clearly attributable in the accounting sense to grant outputs. They were traceable to specific budget line items that corresponded to specified outputs described in the grant agreement's program description and detailed in the MYOPs and DIPs. Examples of the general attribution used by most PVOs are:

- o A headquarter's staff member provided planning assistance to a country field office in preparing a MYOP and providing training. The person's time was cost to the ISGP as staff support. It did not show up effort attributable to the MYOP and training activities.
- o A field office staff person worked on three activities in one day related to eventual ISGP outputs such as monetization and commodity management. The efforts were recorded as a work day but time was not allocated to each activity on a functional task/activity basis. This approach was "program oriented". It attributed costs only to program line items.

There were some exceptions to the practice of general attribution. One was when an activity was 100 percent financed by ISGP and segregated as a budget line item/sub-line item. Specific technical assistance consultancies, production of manuals, procurements (purchase of a vehicle, training) and workshops are examples. Several PVOs, such as CARE and FHI, went one step further in attributing their funds toward output levels. They added a project/program number to their charts of account and fund numbers. The third number was used in the general ledger to record an expenditure, thereby allocating the expense to a budget line item, a funding source and a project/program. To attribute ISGP funds to an activity required adding a fourth number to the account encoding process for an expense transaction. No PVO believed it necessary to do so.

b. Conclusion

PVO expenditure reports did not attribute A.I.D. and PVO matching funds as a standard accounting procedure to grant outputs. PVO accounting and financial procedures recorded expenditures using a chart of accounts system; numbers were assigned to funding sources. Procedurally, field office expenditure reports were sent to PVO headquarters and incorporated into an ISGP report. The report listed expenditures by a grant agreement's normal three to five budget line items.

This method was acceptable for the PVOs other funding sources. Changing the method for ISGP alone to attribute costs by function was viewed as being too much work for too little return, especially because ISGP funding was a small part of overall PVO funding. Every PVOs software accounting program and financial reporting system was different.

4. Adequacy of ISGP funding to meet PVO funding gaps

a. Discussion

The level of ISGP funding did meet the funding gap assumptions beneath the Program Descriptions of the individual PVO grant agreements. Among the PVOs, FHI, SHARE, SCF and CRS indicated the initial assumptions were on target. CARE, WVRD and Africare concurred, but also said their original grant funding requests were reduced. The reduction affected their long range planning and implementation which correlated with their estimate of the funding gap. In other words, reduced funding meant re-evaluating the program levels and funding gaps. Readjustment of PVO food aid priorities also occurred to link with available ISGP funding.

Nonetheless, all the PVOs said ISGP funding provided resources not otherwise available to establish food assistance units at headquarters, provide technical assistance for programming and training and support logistical requirements linked to using food aid as a resource. Integrating food as a resource into policy and programming meant commitment of resources that most PVOs were unprepared to allocated from their own funds. A.I.D.'s ISGP provided PVOs an opportunity to use food aid and avoid the burdens of cost and risk associated with food aid at their own headquarters and field offices. This was very evident with the smaller and new PVOs who wanted to integrate food aid into their programs and at the same time minimize their risk. The concern of the larger and more established PVOs was redirecting their efforts to a new approach to using food aid.

b. Conclusion

ISGP funding was sufficient to meet the funding gap assumptions of most CSs.

ANNEX 1

Scope of Work

SCHEDULE

ARTICLE I - TITLE

Evaluation of the Institutional Development Support Grant Program; No. 938-0800.

ARTICLE II - BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE

A. Background

From FY89 through FY91, the Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FHA) has obligated over \$20 million in Institutional Development Support Grants (ISGs) to Title II, P.L. 480 food aid, private and voluntary organization (PVO) cooperating sponsors. This program was a redesign and consolidation of the predecessor FHA outreach and enhancement grant programs. In brief, the Institutional Development Support Grant Program (ISGP) has provided dollar support to PVOs who administer USG food aid commodities.

The request for proposals for the present and initial grant cycle was sent to existing PVOs in 1988. It defined desired purposes and objectives for the grants arising from dollar support programs. As originally stated, the program was intended for PVO logistical costs and to improve developmental food aid programming through institutional strengthening, innovation, and planning assistance. However, the purposes and objectives have been subsequently modified to an unknown degree in response to changing perceptions of needs and priorities within A.I.D. and the PVO community.

In FY89, seven grants to existing PVOs were recommended for funding, four strengthening grants (CARE, FHI, CRS, and ADRA), two innovation grants (CRS and CARE), and one planning assistance grant (World SHARE). However, before these grants were awarded, the grant types were combined under the heading of ISGs, e.g., CARE and CRS each received one ISG with innovation and institutional strengthening components. Later in the year, a new PVO coordinating organization, the Food Assistance Management (FAM) Project, was also funded.

In FY90, funding for the original five grants was expanded in accordance with modified objectives. And AFRICARE and WVRD received two-year funded extensions on their preexisting enhancement grants.

Now as this cycle of grants is coming to a close, the office of FHA/PPM wants to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the ISG program. We are, therefore, planning the next request for proposals (or guidelines) which will initiate the next grant cycle early in FY92.

B. Objective

The objective of this evaluation is to determine the progress made by FHA and cooperating sponsors under the Institutional Development Support Grant Program (ISGP). (Now commonly referred to as just the Institutional Support Grant Program). Specifically, the evaluation shall assess the quality of A.I.D. management, the effectiveness of program inputs and outputs as a means to achieve clearly defined project purposes; and shall recommend means to better tailor cash grant support to meet the needs and purposes of its Title II food aid programs.

As a part of the study, the evaluator must examine how funds have been spent and how well the program has been managed by FHA. Recommendations should provide A.I.D. a guide to the deficiencies of the program, if any, and how to improve program design, funding-levels, management, or other inputs.

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

A. Methods

FHA/PPM will rely heavily on the evaluation team to make judgements and observations independent from interference by A.I.D. or PVO interests. The study must be approached as a formative evaluation: a tool for improving the management of an on-going program.

The evaluation team shall review all relevant project documentation and reports from FHA and the grantees, visit all PVO grantee headquarters, and visit two or three selective countries where grant funded program improvements by a number of PVOs can be observed first-hand.

The team must become conversant with at least the following documentation: pertinent Title II legislative provisions, guidance, and regulations; all ISG authorizing memoranda and proposal guidelines; specific grant agreements; annual grantee reports; internal evaluations by PVOs; and external evaluations of predecessor programs. Of special importance is the final evaluation of the predecessor program done in 1987 by Bremer-Fox, Lang and Pines, Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs.

The team shall, at a minimum, interview the FHA/PPM program management, key PVO program management at headquarters and in the field, and other independent and knowledgeable experts on the issues.

The team shall describe and employ explicit methods of data collection including -- but not limited to -- a protocol for collection of information from documents and interview schedules for A.I.D. and PVO staff at different levels of responsibility.

B. Analytical Tasks

The methods shall be designed to gather accurate information in at least the following areas of inquiry:

1. The definition and evolution of the ISGP purposes.

- a. What were the original goals and purposes of the program? How and why have they changed from predecessor programs? Were the recommendations of previous external evaluations taken into account?
- b. How have the goals and purposes of the program been changed and modified in subsequent years?
- c. Has a core of identifiable common purposes been retained? What are they?
- d. Are purposes consistent with the intent of the P.L. 480 legislation? Do key stakeholders agree on the purposes?

2. Achievement of the overall purposes and objectives stated in definitive documents or otherwise identified in 1 above. For example, has the program:

- a. strengthened PVOs ability to administer food aid for the alleviation of hunger and malnutrition?
- b. filled unmet logistical requirements in PVO food aid programs?
- c. stimulated new thinking and approaches for PVO food aid programs to alleviate hunger and malnutrition?
- d. encouraged new PVOs to become food aid cooperating sponsors?
- e. defined and served other core purposes or objectives?

3. Achievements and quality of individual grant projects of cooperating sponsors. Specifically have they:

- a. incorporated the purposes or objectives of the overall grant program in the individual grant poses agreements? If not, how were purposes modified, tons initially or in funded extension, over the grant period? Were these consistent with the intent of the grant program?
- b. presented feasible and efficient project implementation plans linking inputs to outputs that can reasonably be expected to lead to the purposes they have agreed to pursue?

- c. expanded or initiated headquarters activities that serve purposes that can be directly attributable to ISG funding, such as management, evaluation, planning, and accounting systems?
 - d. measurable and cost effectively achieved the purposes at headquarters? What is the team's estimate of the measurable effects the ISG program at PVO headquarters?
 - e. expanded or initiated field activities that serve ISG, or other purposes that can be directly attributable to ISG funding, or to ISG-supported headquarters improvements? Such as,
 - i. logistical or accounting improvements
 - ii. program management, planning, or reporting
 - iii. new training and new program innovations
 - iv. filling other important funding gaps
 - f. measurably and cost effectively achieved the purposes at country-level? What is the teams's estimate of the measurable effects of ISG program at country-level?
4. Achievements and quality of the Food Assistance Management Project. Specifically, has FAM:
- a. established workable structure and organization for achieving its grant purposes?
 - b. produced relevant outputs that successfully promote purposes and objectives of importance to FHA and the ISG program?
5. Overall assessment and suggested modification of the grant purposes. Specifically,
- a. Were clear purposes and objectives defined and pursued?
 - b. Are the assumptions underlying the purposes for the program still valid? What new assumptions are warranted, if any?
 - c. How are the purposes and objectives viewed by different stakeholders in the light of recent program experience, the new P.L. 480, etc.?
 - d. What changes in overall goals and purposes does the team recommend to FHA?

6. Project management and funding. Specifically,
- a. Was an effective process and were proper criteria established for the determining eligibility, reviewing ISG proposals, and allocating grant funds?
 - i. What was the process for reviewing proposals? Were review criteria objectively defined? Were panels comprised of persons of sufficient experience to render sound judgements? How were they chosen? How were judgements made?
 - ii. Where selection criteria in accordance with ISG program goals and purposes?
 - iii. Does funding allocation correspond well with demonstrated PVO needs and/or food aid program requirements in recipient countries?
 - b. How is the progress of grants monitored by FHA project management? Such as the following:
 - i. Are appropriate objectives, indicators, planned activities, and implementation schedules well-defined and used?
 - ii. Are periodic annual reports used for program diagnosis and revision? Are useful formal reviews conducted? If not, why not?
 - iii. In expenditure reports, are A.I.D. funds and PVO matching funds, if any, attributable to activities associated with individual grant outputs?
 - c. Did the FHA/PPM project officers provide timely information and direction to grantees? Was communication between A.I.D. and the grantees effective?
 - d. Are A.I.D. grant and matching funds clearly attributed to grant outputs at PVO headquarters? If not, how can attribution be improved?
 - e. How well have PVOs evaluated progress against grant objectives? What is the quality of their own monitoring and tracking systems or internal evaluations, at headquarters and at the field level?
 - f. Do levels of ISG funding correspond well to the estimated cash needs of PVOs? Were initial assumptions about the funding gap correct? How have they changed? Is funding more or less than will be needed to achieve mutually agreed purposes and objectives?

7. Overall assessment and suggestions for grant management and inputs. Should funding levels, grant allocations criteria, or project management and monitoring be modified to meet current or evaluator's recommended program purposes? If yes, recommend specific improvements.

ARTICLE IV - REPORTS

The contractor shall present to the Project Officer the following:

1. A written plan of work within 15 days following the signing of the delivery order. This will include: (a) a plan for implementing the scope of work, (b) schedules for completion of different stages of the study, (c) drafts of data collection instruments, (d) travel plans, (e) preliminary lists of documents to be reviewed and persons to be interviewed.
2. At least four in-person, oral progress briefings: (a) before data collection begins, (b) after data collection in the U.S. is completed, (c) after field data collection is complete, and (d) when the final draft is presented.
3. Ten copies of the draft report within 60 days of the date after the effective date of the Delivery Order. The report shall include:
 - a. an executive summary of not more than 2-3 pages clearly stating the major findings and recommendations of study.

ANNEX 2

List of Persons Interviewed

ISGP EVALUATION

List of Persons Interviewed

1. ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY INTERNATIONAL

Gloria Aleman
Nutritionist
(Bolivia)

Edwin Baumgartner
Director Ejecutivo
(Peru)

Maria Virginia Torrealva Calligos
(Peru)

Arturo Castillo
Agricultural Engineer
(Bolivia)

Noemi Chambilla
Nurse
(Bolivia)

Ken Flemmer
Acting Director

Ines Tipacti Gordillo
MICRO ENT., ADRA Project
(Peru)

Fermin Molle
Civil Engineer
(Bolivia)

Rudy Monsalve
Assistant Director, LAC

Gullik Nilsson
National Supervisor, Agriculture
(Bolivia)

List of Persons Interviewed

Goodwell Nthanni
Auditor Intern
(Bolivia)

Raul Paniagua
Doctor
(Bolivia)

Lizandro Rios
(Peru)

Gunilla Smars
Social Worker
(Bolivia)

David Taylor
Director, Food Supported Development

Ramiro Tirao
Civil Engineer
(Bolivia)

Manuel Torres
Extensionist
(Bolivia)

Freddy Villarroel
Agricultural Engineer
(Bolivia)

Gregory Vino
Extensionist
(Bolivia)

2. AFRICARE

Juan Douda
Administrative Assistant

Joseph Kennedy
Director of International Development

List of Persons Interviewed

Camerica K. Nchami-Quan
Administrator
(Senegal)

Katharina Puffenberger
Food Resource Manager

Jeannine B. Scott
Resident Representative
(Senegal)

John Woody
Financial Manager

3. CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

James Bailey
Financial Office

James Burkwist
Food Aid Analyst

John Donnelly
Senior Director, Office of Project Resource Management (OPRM)

Mike Frank
Deputy Director, OPRM

Mary A. Hodem
Gerente de Proyectos - Titulo II
(Bolivia)

Mike Nolan
Financial Office

David Piraino
Grant Manager, ISG

List of Persons Interviewed

Mrs. Tamara
Office Administrator
(Senegal)

Christine H. Tucker
Directora Oficina Sub-Regional
Directora Programa en Bolivia
(Bolivia)

R. Dieter Wittkowski
Director de Proyectos
y Recursos Materiales
(Bolivia)

4. CARE

Bob Bell
Deputy Director, Food Programming Unit

Francesco Boeren
Gerente de Recursos Naturales
(Peru)

Brenda Bucheli
Assistant, PRODIA
(Peru)

Robert Calamor
Accounting

Carol Chang
Assistant, Food Programming Unit

Saba Gessesse
Director, Food Programming Unit

Eva Guerrero
Coordinator, PRODIA
(Peru)

List of Persons Interviewed

Shelly Kessler
Director, CARE/ASIA

Rick LaRoche
Vice President, Finance

Sandy Lavmark
Director, Technical Assistance Group

Raul Sanchez Loli
Gerente de Finanzas
(Peru)

Teddy Penaherrera
Coordinador Proyecto ARCA
(Peru)

Guillermo Saldarriaga
Director, Project Wawawasi
(Peru)

Judy Schroeder
Gerente de Programa de Salud y Alimentos
(Peru)

Scott Solberg
Grants Manager, Food Programing Unit

Gladys Soto
Analysta Superviso de Proyectos
(Peru)

5. FAM

Pam Weeks
Program Assistant

Thomas Zopf
Director

List of Persons Interviewed

6. FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY

Nohami Chambilla C.
(Peru)

Edgar Churvimia
Agronomist
(Bolivia)

Alfredo Fernandez D.
Proyectos
(Bolivia)

Randall Hoag
Vice President for Latin America

Jorge Montero
Agronomist
(Bolivia)

Robin Schell
Vice President, International Operations/Asia

Stan Schirm
Vice President

Sharon Schoenhals
International Program Coordinator

Larry Walton
Director of Finance

Ted Yamamori
President

7. SAVE THE CHILDREN

Nora Bazy
Project Coordinator

118

List of Persons Interviewed

Felix Fernandez
Gerente de Programas
(Bolivia)

Anna Revilla
Administrative Assistant
(Bolivia)

8. WORLD SHARE

Peggy Adams
Project Officer

Paulette Hardin
Director of Development

Andy Morikawa
Executive Director

Bruce Morris
Director of Finance

Elisa Sabitini
Senior Program Development Specialist

9. WORLD VISION RELIEF ORGANIZATION

Robert Burke
Director of Training and Evaluation
ADT
(Senegal)

Lynn Belland
Senior Project Manager

Anne Claxton
Senior Consultant, Food Aid

Tom Getman
Director, Government Relations

List of Persons Interviewed

Russ Kerr
Vice President, WVI/Relief

Bruce Lawson
Program Manager

Joe Mwonge
Director, Multilateral Funding Programs

Paul Peterson
Associate Director, Government Relations

Julian Pitchford
Director, International Development Programs

Randy Strash
Coordinator International Operations, WVI

David Taylor
Director, Office of Emergency Assistance

Paul Thompson
Executive Director, WVRD

10. A.I.D./WASHINGTON

Bob Hechtman, FHA/FFP

Rita Hudson, FHA/FFP

Tom Marchione, FHA/PPE

Jeanne Markunas, FHA/FFP/AFR

James O'Meara, FHA/FFP/C

Larry Tanner, FHA/PPE

Harry Wing, Jr. FHA/PVC

List of Persons Interviewed

11. A.I.D./WASHINGTON CONTRACTORS

Joan Gooden, Mendez-England

Ben Hoskins, Mendez-England

Noreen O 'Meara, Benchmarks

Ms. Perez-England, Mendez-England

12. USAID

Mr. Cisse
Evaluation Officer
(Senegal)

Julius Coles
Director
(Senegal)

Richard Greene
Program Officer
(Senegal)

Rudolpho R. Griego
Chief, Food and Agriculture
(Peru)

Lance Jepson
Agricultural Development Officer
(Senegal)

Michael Kerst
FFP Officer
(Peru)

Ney H. Lopez
Asesor, Credito, Agroindustries y Comercializacion
(Bolivia)

List of Persons Interviewed

Luis Fernando Moreno
Coordinador de Programma P.L.480, Titulo III
(Bolivia)

Salvatore Pinzino
Gerente, Del Programa Alimentos Para El Desarrollo
(Bolivia)

Tom Ray
FFP Officer
(Senegal)

Olga Sedo
Assistant FFP Officer
(Senegal)

Oswaldo Vega
Coordinador de Programma P.L.480
(Bolivia)

13. Other Organizations

Romero Forunda
Director of Planning
CARITAS
(Bolivia)

Senora Mary
Executive Director
CARITAS
(Bolivia)

Charles Patterson
Planning Assistance
(Bolivia)

Antonio Rosa
Economist
CARITAS
(Bolivia)

List of Persons Interviewed

**Epifanio Velasquez
Agronomist
CARITAS
(Bolivia)**

**Patricia Villarroel
Sociologist
CARITAS
(Bolivia)**

ANNEX 3

List of Documents Reviewed

Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA)

CONTRACT

OTR-0704-A-9175-00 (Cooperative Agreement), July 1989

AMENDMENTS

Amend. 1
Amend. 2
Amend. 3

IMPLEMENTATION

Detailed Implementation Plan for Strengthening Grant, 1989-1990
Detailed Implementation Plan for Institutional Support Grant Program

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Progress Report/Bolivia, 1990-1991
Progress Report, 1989-1990
Progress Report/Ghana, 1990
Operational Plan/Ghana (FY 1989-1990)
Operational Plan/Ghana (FY 1990-1991)
Operational Plan, 1992
Balance Sheet/Peru, June 1991
Balance Sheet/Peru, July 1991
Balance Sheet/Peru, August 1991
Financial Budget/Peru, 1990-1991
Financial Budget/Haiti, 1991-1992
Commodity Supported Development Management Report/Bolivia, August 1-8, 1991
Commodity Supported Development Management Report/Peru, August 9-14, 1991
First Annual Progress Report, Institutional Support Grant, 1989-1990

OTHER

Proposal for Title II, Institutional Support Grant, December 1990
Proposal for Title II, Institutional Support Grant, April 1990
Proposal for Title II, Innovation Grant, December 1988
Proposal for Extended Financing of PL480 Title II Food Activities/Haiti
Proposal for Extended Financing, May 2, 1990 revised on June 14, 1990
ADRA Strengthening Grant Proposal (Project Officers Analysis Report)
Evaluation Report for Enhancement Grant/Headquarters, Bolivia, Ghana, Peru and
Rwanda, July 1990
Commodity Support Development Travel Report/Ghana, Sudan, Mozambique, May 1991

Africare

CONTRACT

Signed Grant Agreement # OTR-0701-G-SS-8242-00, September 1988
Enhancement Grant (revised)

AMENDMENT

Amend. 1
Amend. 2
Amend. 3
Amend. 4
Amend. 5
Amend. 6

IMPLEMENTATION

Included with Enhancement Grant
Detailed Implementation Plan for Amend. 6
Detailed Implementation Plan (FY 1990)
Detailed Implementation Plan (FY 1991)

ANNUAL REPORTS

Enhancement Grant Annual Report (FY 1990)

OTHER

List of Output (Documents) from project
Exempt Employee Performance Appraisal
P.L. 480 Title II Enhancement Grant Revised, January 1988
5th Quarterly Report, Aug. 1, 1989 - Oct. 31, 1989
Unfunded Extension Request, February 9, 1990
Enhancement Extension Grant Proposal, December 15, 1989
Incremental Funding Request, May 10, 1990
Enhancement Grant Supplement A Proposal, October 10, 1990
Budget (FY 1990 and FY 1991)
Project Financial Report, June 30, 1991
Feasibility Study of Africare/Guinea P.L. 480 Monetization
Revised Budget for Supplemental Funding for Mozambique and Senegal
Africare - Food for Development Handbook
FY 1992 MYOP Update
Sample Funding Request Letter, Form 1550-11 abbreviated, Sector Summary Sheet
Enhancement Grant - Consolidation of accounts
Review of Africare's Detailed Implementation Plan

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

CONTRACT

OTR-0704-A-00-9181-00 (Cooperative Agreement), July 1989

AMENDMENT

Amend. 1
Amend. 2
Amend. 3
Amend. 4
Amend. 5
Amend. 6
Amend. 7

IMPLEMENTATION

Detailed Implementation Plan, September 29, 1989
Detailed Implementation Plan/Haiti, Oct. 1991 - Sept. 1992
Detailed Implementation Plan/Guatemala (FY 1992)

ANNUAL REPORT

Annual Report, Oct. 1990 - Sept. 1991
Progress Report/Guatemala, MCH (FY 1991)
Annual Report/Haiti (FY 1991)
CARE Country Office Annual Report/HQ, LA, ASIA, AFRICA
Food Unit Schedule of Activities, May - August 1990
Annual Report/Prodia, 1990
Annual Progress Report/Honduras, MCH, Oct. 1990 - Sept. 1991
Annual Progress Report, Municipal Infrastructure and Technical Assistance(MITA)/Urban
Food for Work Program (UFFW), Oct. 1990 - Sept. 1991

OTHER

Additional Funding Request, December 10, 1991
Additional Funding Request, April 4, 1991
Monitoring Systems
CARE International/Haiti Strengthening Grant Proposal
Evaluation of Food Programs (Draft)
FPA Assessment
FPU Retreat, February 1, 1991
FPU Retreat, June 25, 1991

CARE Continued

OTHER (continued)

Prodia Evaluation Report/Peru

International Review Food Assisted Agroforestry Project/Peru

Evalacion del Proyecto de (R.C. Heurse)

Evaluation Module Report

CARE/Dominica PL480 1990

**International Review of Municipal Infrastructure and Technical Assistance/Urban Food
for Work Program (MITA/UFFW) (FY 1990)**

MITA/UFFW Workplan 1992

Audit Report on CARE's PL480/India, April 2, 1991

Food Notes, December 1989 & October 1990

Catholic Relief Service (CRS)

CONTRACT

Cooperative Agreement # OTR-0704-A-00-9189-00, September 1989

AMENDMENTS

- Amend. 1
- Amend. 2
- Amend. 3
- Amend. 4
- Amend. 5

IMPLEMENTATION

Detailed Implementation Plan and Work Plan for Strengthening Grant, July 2, 1990

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Report for, Sept. 15, 1989 - Sept. 30, 1990

OTHER

- Report - Strengthening Grant Workshop #2, June 4-7, 1990
- Report - Strengthening Grant Workshop #3 - Disaster Response, December 18, 1990
- Report - Strengthening Grant Workshop #4 - General Information
- Background & Issues CRS/Headquarters Strengthening Grant, March 1990
- CRS Headquarters Strengthening Grant Workshop, April 4, 1990
- Report of Expenses, January 1, 1991 - March 31, 1991
- Report on Planning Skills Training Workshop, Lome, Togo, Jan. 7-11, 1991
- Summary Report "A Systems Analysis and Baseline Study of the Maternal & Child Health and Nutrition Program CRS/Kenya" February 1991
- Trip Report by Jim O'Connor - Lome Cluster, September 9, 1991
- Presentation to OPRM 1992 Planning Session
- Budget Comparison Report
- Budget Summary, October 23, 1991
- Dominican Republic Workshop Presentation
- Strengthening Grant Questionnaire
- CRS Food Policy
- Food as a CRS Resource
- Food Aid - Time for a New Look
- Africa Training Workshop, Lome
- Headquarters Workshop, Strengthening Grant

Food Aid Management (FAM)

CONTRACT

OTR-0704-G-SS-9173-00, September 1990

AMENDMENTS

IMPLEMENTATION

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Report, April 1990

Annual Report, May 15, 1989 - Dec. 31, 1991

OTHER

Evaluation of FAM July 1991 by William J. Cousins

Proposal for an Extended Monetization Training Activity, June 25, 1991

FAM Monetization Workshop Agenda: Planning Meeting, August 9, 1991

"Management of Food Aid: An Inventory of Tasks," August 1991

"Food Aid Cost Worksheet for PVO Commodity Distribution Projects," August 1991

Food Forum Newsletter (Issues 1-9)

FAM's "Generally Accepted Commodity Accounting Principles"

"Food Aid in the Nineties"

Draft - Ethical Standards

Food For the Hungry International (FFHI)

CONTRACT

OTR-0704-A-00-9171-00 (Cooperative Agreement), September 1989

AMENDMENTS

Amend. 1
Amend. 2

IMPLEMENTATION

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Report, Sept. 1989 - Sept. 1990
Annual Report, Oct. 1, 1990 - Sept. 30, 1991
Semi Annual Report, Sept. 1989 - Feb. 1990
Progress Report, FFHI/Bolivia (FY 1990)
Progress Report, FFHI/Bolivia (FY 1992)
Operational and Monetization Plan/Bolivia, 1990-1992

OTHER

Food Aid Standard and Practices, January 1991
Overseas Opportunity List, October 1991
Supplementary Justification for Third-Year Extension
Letters and Supporting documents re: amendment to corrected budget line items

Save the Children Federation

CONTRACT

OTR-0701-A-00-7178-00 (Cooperative Agreement), July 1987
Title II Enhancement Grant

AMENDMENTS

Amend. 1

Amend. 2

Budget Revision Request & Implementation Plan for year 5, Oct. 1991 - Oct. 1992

Addendum to concept paper requesting enhancement funds for FY 1991

IMPLEMENTATION

Detailed Implementation Plan, 1987-1990

Detailed Implementation Plan, 1991

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Report (FY 1990)

Annual Report, July 1987 - June 1988

OTHER

Enhancement Grant Report and Plan, June 1990

Mid-Term Evaluation and Year Two Report

Intermediate Evaluation, November 1991 (In Spanish)

Correspondence

World Share (SHARE)

CONTRACT

OTR-0704-A-00-9176-00 (Cooperative Agreement), August 1989

AMENDMENTS

Amend. 1
Amend. 2
Amend. 3

IMPLEMENTATION

Detailed Implementation Plan for 1991 included in Annual Report (FY 1990)
Detailed Implementation Plan, Oct. 1989 - Sept. 1990

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Report (FY 1990)
Title II Commodity and Recipient Status Report, 2nd Quarter (FY 1991)
1st and 2nd Year End Reports
PAG Distributions, April - June 1991
PAG Expenses
General Ledger Trial Balance (Guat. PAG & GUAT OH)

OTHER

Title II Institutional Support Grant, Funded Extensions Program for (FY 1990)
Title II Institutional Support Grant, Additional Funding for (FY 1991)
Title II Multi-Year Operational Plan, Income Generation (Update to FY 1990-1992)
Title II Multi-Year Operational Plan, Natural Resource Conservation (Update to
FY 1990-1992)
Title II Multi-Year Operational Plan, MCH Child Survival (Update to FY 1990-1992)
Warehousing Assessment/Guatemala
Assessment of PL480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Program (No. PDC-0000-1-04-
6135-00)

World Vision Relief & Development Inc. (WVRD)

CONTRACT

OTR-000-A-00-7174-00 (Cooperative Agreement), January 1987
ETH-31-165218

AMENDMENTS

Amend. 1
Amend. 2
Amend. 3

IMPLEMENTATION

Detailed Implementation Plan (FY 1991)

ANNUAL REPORTS

Annual Report (FY 1990)
Annual Report (FY 1987)
Operational Plan/Ethiopia (FY 1990-1994)
Operational Plan/Mali (FY 1990-1992)
Operational Plan/Mali (FY 1992 Update)
Operational Plan/Kenya (FY 1991-1993)

OTHER

Request for Extension to September 30, 1992
12 Month Progress Report, Oct. 1988 - Sept. 1989
Mid-Term Performance Assessment, Sept. 1987 - Sept. 1990
Research Report (Food Aid as Development Resource)
Five year Refined Enhancement Strategy
Program Enhancement Proposal (PEP)
Food Resources Workshop/Ethiopia
Menaka Oases Program/Mali
Trip Reports/Mali
Amended Monetization Plan 1992-1994

U.S. Agency for International Development Bibliography

_____. Food and Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990. U.S. Government: 1990.

Memo from AID/FVA/FFP/POD, Herbert "Smith, Fiscal Year 1991 Budget for P.L. 480 Title I/III, Title II." Washington, D.C.: August 5, 1991.

Memo from AID/FVA/PPM, Larry Tanner, "PL 480 Title II Enhancement Project Extension." Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1988.

Care. Food Storage and Handling: A Manual for Private Voluntary Agencies, New York, Care: June 1991.

_____. The Development Impact of U.S. Program Food Assistance: Evidence from A.I.D. Evaluation Literature. Washington, D.C., Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, Agency for International Development: August 1989.

_____. Evaluation of the African Emergency Food Assistance Program 1984-85. Washington, D.C., Bureau for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, Agency for International Development: July 1986.

_____. Assessment of the PL-480 Outreach and Enhancement Grant Programs. Washington, D.C. USAID/FVA: October 1987.

Memo from AID/FVA/C/FFP, Thomas H. Reeves "Title II Outreach Project Authorization Extension."

Memo from AID/FVA/FFP, Peggy Sheehan.

Memo from FVA/FFP, Thomas E. Reese, III, "Title II Outreach Project Authorization."

Memo from A.I.D./OPPR, Working Group on Bilateral Assistance, "Worldwide - Title II Outreach," Washington, D.C.: July 19, 1978.

Stephens, Betsy, Charles G. Vandervoort, Judith W. Gilmore, and Jose Rodriguez. Outreach Grant Project Evaluation. Washington, D.C., Bureau for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, Agency for International Development: January 1983.

ANNEX 4

PVO Grant Activities

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: 5-1 Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY INTERNATIONAL (ADRA)

Goal: To improve the quality of life in participating communities by strengthening ADRA International and ADRA Country offices in design, management, implementation, evaluation and sustainability of a variety of commodity-supported development projects.

Purpose: To partially fund ADRA's food assisted development programs with the focus being to consolidate the progress in decentralization of management and funding of country programs; increase the use of food as a resource for development; increase the use of alternate or additional sources of funding such as monetization, container fees, etc.; improve monitoring of financial and commodity movements; and, promote innovative projects which increase cost effectiveness of food programming.

Objectives/Activities:

	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
<u>Hdqtrs.:</u>	Technical assistance	Pilot projects in Ghana and Peru
	Training	Orientation training workshop Training for trainers workshop
	Monitoring	Monitoring visits to Bolivia, Ghana, Haiti and Peru

197

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

**Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)**

Evaluation

Evaluation of CSD internship program

End of project evaluation, Enhancement grant

Evaluation of ADRA/Haiti and ADRA/Ghana

Completed mid-term evaluation

Customize monitoring systems

**PL 480 tracking system for HQ was designed,
written, installed and tested**

**Financial accountability
system**

Installed financial accounting system

Data collection system

Revised data collection systems in ADRA/Haiti and ADRA/Ghana

Annual report

Prepared Annual Report

MYOP

Prepared MYOP

**Standardizing financial &
documentation procedures**

**Develop an agency Country
Directors Manual for
commodity supported development
programs**

**Prepared and distributed final
draft**

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)

Up-date the agency's policies and guidelines for the use of food aid

Produced and distributed

Generate and increase in Seven-day Adventist Church's support of both HQ and field programs by an average of at least five percent per year through the three years of the grant

Maximize other program financial support

Procure and increase program support in grant countries from northern ADRA partners other than A.I.D. by an average of at least five percent per year through the three years of the grant

Each country anticipated its projected funding diversification (5% per year)

Establish a professional internal auditing procedure

Established auditing procedures

Promote innovative uses of food as a development resource, establishing at least one pilot project per grant country per year

Completed strategic planning process

Develop a framework within which to plan for Commodity Supported Development programs

AER reports were submitted and liaison with A.I.D. and ADRA entities have occurred regularly

139

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)

Cooperate with country administration and technical staff in the design, production and implementation of country specific strategic plans and DIPs for Bolivia, Ghana, Haiti and Peru

Completed the preparation of DIPs

Conduct an assessment to determine the training priorities for Bolivia Ghana, Haiti, Peru and HQ

Implemented assessment questionnaire in Bolivia, Peru, Haiti, Ghana and HQ

Conduct at least one in-service management technical workshop completed each year for HQ and one for each country

Conducted Haiti, HQ, Bolivia and Peru Management Workshops

Continue the management internship program begun under the Enhancement Grant

Updated contract, guidelines, application; developed curriculum & schedule; interviewed potential interns, and hired new interns

Expand/enhance the HQ Materials and Resource Center and assist with the establishment of field centers

Procured materials and supplies

Computerization HQMR center

Generated resource catalog

Other

Review of Country Director's manual for CSD

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

**Field:
Bolivia**

Make organizational changes

Retarget beneficiaries

Irrigation

Irrigation canal construction

Terracing

Irrigation walls/dikes construction

Produce stores

Nutritional gardens

Family green houses and nurseries

Portable water develop.

Well/pumps were constructed

Construct pharmacies

Hospitals

Health posts/latrines

Immunization program

Construction of rural infirmaries

Construct schools

Educational centers

Conducted Nutrition courses

Other

Training workshops

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

**Field: Bolivia Other
(Cont.d)**

Internal and External Audits
Constructed bridges, roads and streets
Constructed private houses
Build parks and gardens

Field: Ghana Initiate agro-forestry project

FFW projects in reforestation,
Community farming, and
Road building

Water development

Education

Established nurseries
Roads were build to improve marketing
Constructed hand-dug wells
Constructed/rehabilitated schools
Established new planning and reporting system
Established a data collection system
Cultivated farms

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

**Field: Ghana Other
(Cont.d)**

Provided monthly feeding
Primary health care education for mothers and caregivers
Family planning education
Constructed/rehabilitated KVIP toilets
Constructed/rehabilitated clinics
Organized groups for S.E.D.

**Field: Haiti Continue multi-faceted program
which includes FFW**

Conducted irrigation programs
Conducted reforestation programs
Conducted soil conservation program through terracing
Build/repared roads
Constructed four schools
Vaccinated children and mothers
Four MCH inspectors make a minimum of three inspections per week

Integrated MCH

16

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Field: Haiti

(Cont.d)

Integrated MCH

Increased timeliness of food deliveries

Conducted inspections of MCH centers

School feeding

Conducted a survey on weight of children on MCH program

Conducted the school feeding program for undernourished

Other child feeding

Joint warehouse operations

Improve transportation efficiency

Other

Conducted a strategic planning workshop

Assistant Director of Programs attended a S.E.D. workshop in Kenya

Revised data collection system

As part of water resources- built a wind mill

Sponsored five regionally-based one-day training events

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Field: Peru

Commodity movement
Storage/warehouse improvements

Silos/crop storage

Child survival

Agriculture

Field crop production

Fruit production and reforestation

Irrigation canals

Reinforced terraces

Wells, reservoirs

Land leveling

Micro-Enterprise development

Organize groups for S.E.D.

Training and T.A. to S.E.D. projects

Infrastructure building

Building roads

Other

Construction and rehabilitation of schools

Primary health care education

Family planning education

ADRA (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Field: Peru
(Cont.d)

Other

Every Person Immunization program

Growth monitoring

Pre-natal activities

Functional referral services for high risk mothers and children

Home garden and diets

Construction/rehabilitation of KVIP toilets

Construction of hand-dug wells

Field: Uganda Relief and resettlement

Agriculture

Reforestation

Management

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

AFRICARE

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this funded addition to Africare's current Title II Institutional Support (Enhancement) Grant is to provide support to enable Africare to continue developing the capacity within its organization to design and implement food for development programs and to manage effectively P.L. 480 resources. The grant supports staff development; country project design and implementation; and operation system development.

Specifically, the additional resources provided under this grant amendment will allow Africare to undertake the design and development of refugee and displaced persons resettlement project supported by Title II commodities in Mozambique, and to establish a monetization/commodity manager position in Senegal.

OBJECTIVE:

- A. To train Africare's regional, food program, and in-country staff in the development of a Multi-Year Operational Plan which involves the direct distribution of commodities.
- B. To develop a Multi-Year Operational Plan for refugee resettlement program in Sofala Province, Mozambique, based on the following project goals:
 1. provision of food commodities, distributed in stages enabling individuals to return to their traditional areas and begin farming
 2. implementation of an agricultural program which would introduce sustainable agricultural techniques to the returning farmers. This would include provision of credit, supplies, equipment and other essential ingredients of such a program; and
 3. training of Mozambiquans both as employees of Africare and as managers and owners of their farms and businesses.
- C. To develop a logistical plan for commodity distribution which maintains proper accountability and control while reducing the logistical burden.

AFRICARE (Continued)

Objectives:

- D. To design a distribution system which in itself has a developmental purpose in addition to the provision of commodities to beneficiaries.
- E. To document the achievement of objectives C and D in the form of a step-by-step, chronological procedural guide, a case example to be inserted to Africare's commodity manual, and other appropriate training and resource materials for use in other countries.
- F. To establish and manage effectively a monetization program and a system for potential future commodity distribution in Senegal, and to develop a regional technical assistance capability for a new monetization program in other countries, such as Cape Verde.

Objectives/Activities:

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:

Management and training

Completed refresher course

Conducted a P.L. 480 refresher course in which 10 staff participated

Developed and institutionalized procedures for the maintenance of shipping files

The Operations Officer visited Guinea-Bissau to conduct a refresher course

Set up shipping and monetization recording procedures

Completed FFD manual in draft

15/2

AFRICARE (Continued) Planned

Achieved

**Hdqtrs.: Management and training
(Cont.d)**

Training of six home office staff in food distribution and backstopping

Hired one full-time staff

Project Design

Studied monetization opportunities for sale of Title II commodities in Conakry

Carried out a food needs assessment

Funding

Submitted a proposal for a two-year extension

Submitted reduced budget requesting year one funding

Signed amendment for Enhancement Grant

Received year one Enhancement Grants

Prepared grant proposal for FY93

Started monetization through open bidding process

**Field:/ Other
Guinea**

Completed food need assessment

**Received approval to proceed with the design of
the Forecariah Farm-to Market Roads Rehabilitation Project**

AFRICARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field/

Guinea-Bissau Other

Submitted MYOP to USAID/Bissau

Monitored Guinea-Bissau market for rice (domestic and imported) as well as wheat flour and vegetable oil

Submitted the Forecariah Farm-to-Market Road Rehabilitation project proposal and obtained full funding for the project

Completed Monetization

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

COOPERATIVE FOR AMERICAN RELIEF EVERYWHERE (CARE)

Goal: To improve CARE's capabilities to design and manage enhanced, expanded, and innovative food assisted programs which directly address the defined set of interventions, including appropriate technical assistance, training and self-help initiatives.

Purpose: To further strengthen and integrate CARE's technical services (including the headquarters' food unit); to develop, region and institutional critical elements of its food programming principles (such as monitoring, reporting, evaluation and needs analysis) so that overseas missions develop a functioning, institutionalized capacity to design and implement efficient monitoring systems and effective food assisted activities; enable CARE to further enhance its food programming capability by providing technical assistance on a regional basis; and to support CARE's collaboration with other U.S. Cooperating Sponsors to promote similar improvements.

Objectives/Activities:

	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
<u>Hdqtrs.:</u>	Build Capacity of CARE's Food Programming Unit	Hired four staff who provide support in training, evaluation, needs assessment and technical resources
	Recruit food unit personnel	Hired eight FPAs and one short-term local consultant
		Hired four food programmers
		Established a FPA program to assist with enhancement of food programming

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)

Design and implement efficient field monitoring system and developmentally effective food supported activities

Develop quality food programming capability on a regional basis

Continued to coordinate commodity purchases, shipment and claim submission for the missions

Implemented the commodity management system

Conducted three field information system consultancies

Held a five day workshop in Latin America (Honduras) on monitoring systems

Conducted 10 project review consultancies

**Development of monitoring guideline module
Program planning and implementation review**

Developed various modules for food aid programming including administration, evaluation, inventory control, notification guidelines and programming. Currently most are at field-comment stage

Completed the generic tracking program

Completed and distributed a Warehouse management module of the food programming manual

157

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)

Setup and implement an effective protocol and methodology for collaboration with local and international NGO's

Implementation of Food Accounting MIS System

Hired a computer programmer for MIS unit Manila

Interorganizational food storage and handling workshop in Ethiopia

Carried out a needs assessment and pre-workshop logistics

Interorganizational seminar on nutrition issues

Hire two Food Aid Regional Technical Consultants

Hired technical consultants

Publication of food notes

Expand food unit library

Updated the Food Programming Unit Library

Complete/Disseminate Food Use Manual

Completed and distributed a Warehouse Management module of the food programming manual

Liaison and representation activities

Conducted mission-to-mission "cross visits"

Program planning and implementation review

Ongoing

159

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)

New staff orientation

Brought field staff for orientation

Final/mid-term evaluation

Held mid-term evaluations

Annual/final reports

Prepared Annual Report

**Baseline survey and evaluation
plan**

Implemented a draft of survey in field

Other

Identified, trained and placed expatriate and national employees in food programming missions

Conducted regional workshops: the Honduras Monitoring Workshop; and Mozambique Food Storage and Handling Workshop

Brought in three national level local field staff to headquarters for three months training program

Participated regularly in Food Aid Management and the Coalition for Food Aid Activities

Participated in food aid legislation advocacy

Resolved Special problems in Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, Dominican Republic and Mozambique

Implemented Afghanistan village assistance program and Nicaragua urban community development program

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)

Set up commodity management systems in two countries

Field:/
Ethiopia

Increase knowledge and improve the skills
in food storage and handling of NGO's

Distributed food aid

Field: Asia/
East Africa

Install and operate a four-module MIS
commodity tracking system in
one Asian and three East African country
offices

Other

Afghanistan **Repatriation efforts**

Bangladesh **Orientation of FPA**
IFFW labor profile/pay rate survey

India **Redesigned PHC organizational table**
Filled all RM positions

**Funded Dr. Steve Atwood to coordinate
projects in PHC, particularly training**

152

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

**Field:/Asia
East Africa**

Other

India

Formed a state level working group

Thailand

**Project development funding.
Funded Carrie Miamoto to identify food programming possibilities in South East Asia**

Field:

**Increase knowledge of nutrition
how to apply nutrition
interventions of 30
NGO middle managers in MCH
and SF programs**

**Dominican
Republic**

Trained 31 public health nurses

"

Trained extensionist

"

Supervisors visit each food distribution site

"

Hired health trainers

"

**Trained health trainers in planning principals
Carried out educational sessions on Health, AIDS,
Smoking, and Family Planning**

"

"

**Revised and adopted maternal/child health care
topics workshop manual**

"

Developed a diagnostic study plan and complete a staff-wide survey

"

Hired an Administrative Assistant

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field:

Other

Dominican
Republic

Defined commodity inventory and movement
system

"

Hired a Computer Programmer

"

Established a timeline for programming and field testing system

"

Trained PL480 office and field personnel

"

Visited project sites to finalize system design for field management
information system

"

Completed technical assistance consultancy with CARE-NY food unit
director

"

Hired a program manager

"

Approved organigram and job description
by mission director

"

Divided departments into Operations, and Systems & Planning

"

Planned and supported the Sistema INCA workshop

"

Compiled and revised educational materials from outside sources

157

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field:

Other

**Dominican
Republic**

Prepared guidelines for selecting random samples (statistician consultant)

"

Designed computer programs for data processing related to field research

Other (MCH)

Guatemala

Hired a Project Coordinator

"

Hired a trainer to assist in the training of supervisors

"

Trained 16 supervisors to facilitate training sessions at the regional level for MOH Program Administrators

"

Initiated regional workshop activities on Growth Monitoring

"

Hired 2 additional supervisory staff to assist in the supervision/orientation activities

"

Trained new staff for two months before they directly participated in field activities

Other (Urban food for Work)

"

Recruited two community development extensionist

"

Constructed eight drainage systems in four cities

157

CARE (Continued)	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
<u>Field:</u> Other (MCH)	Guatemala	Established 15 project management committees for project development and implementation
	"	Established and equipped six maintenance commissions
	"	Conducted training sessions with community participants in environmental education and safety in public works in 15 communities
Other (Agroforestry)	"	Hired CARE food supervisor
	"	Designed and implemented food survey
	"	Prepared report on food survey results
	"	Designed and carried out a food management workshop for 16 counterpart technical staff
Other	"	Produced two pamphlets on food use
Other (Materials Development)	Haiti	Developed training materials for Training I and Training II
Other (Training Sessions)	"	Held Training session I and II
	"	Hired seven new staff in August 90
Other	"	Procured 12 vehicles
	"	Drafted institution records and reporting formats

151.

CARE (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field: Other

Honduras

"

Revised field-level monitoring tools

Held training sessions in monitoring system purposes and procedures

"

Developed a standardized set of computerized reports

"

Tested new tools for measuring food rations at the field level

"

Investigated alternative methods of food distribution

"

Completed sewer projects in San Pedro Sula

"

Completed street improvement/rainwater drainage projects

"

Held seminars on promotion and community organization

"

Conducted on-site training on basic construction techniques

"

Organized forestry committees

"

Organized seed collection and purchases

CARE (Continued)**Planned****Achieved****Field: Other****Honduras****Established tree plantations projects****"****Conducted on-the -job training****"****Trained communal promoters to take the educational role of the extensionist community****"****Conducted soil conservation activities****"****Distributed PL 480 food to the community****Peru****Provided food support to communal kitchens****"****Provided food support for communal initiative works****"****Trained communal kitchen participants in health organization and nutrition****Mozambique****Identified Nampula province for future research****"****Assessed the potential to develop food assisted development projects in the Nampula****"****Researched the potential to develop current Nampula interventions into development projects****161**

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICE (CRS)

Goal: To Improve the quality of programming food resources to achieve regional and country objectives focused resources to achieve regional and country objectives focused on the alleviation of hunger and malnutrition and equip CRS with the capability to strategically apply resources to developmental, relief and emergency preparedness applications carried out through capable counterpart organization.

- Purpose:
1. Assist CRS to strengthen counterpart organizations in five African countries, plus Bolivia, to more effectively plan and implement development programs utilizing food as a resource. This would include:
 - Bolivia
CRS proposes to increase counterpart professional and technical capacity to implement development activities;
 - Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Kenya
Assist counterpart agencies to design, implement and evaluate food aid development programs, and to retain them in financial and commodity management accountability.
 2. Support ongoing programs in Haiti including provisions of partial support of food programming costs to enhance activities.
 3. Assist CRS agency-wide to incorporate food resources in a strategic manner.

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.:

Conduct workshops

Held nine workshops on management skills to Diocean and all center personnel handling Title II food programming

**Provide in-service training in
Accounting procedures,
Planning
Personnel policy development**

**Transfer of recipient contributions to counterparts
maintaining accurate accountability through
preparation of financial reports
Held ten center personnel workshops**

Logistics

Procurement

Monitoring and evaluation

**Develop project implementation plans of work
to include benchmarks**

Developed a detailed implementation plan

**Review progress reports from counterparts to CRS
Initiate Food Commodity Systems**

Evaluate counterpart organizational structure

103

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs:
(Cont.d)

Identify country specific needs and requirements for complementary inputs

**Started a System/Baseline survey study
Identified areas to open new MCH centers on a need basis**

Provide assistance to counterparts in ways to improve the impact

Hire a full time Food Aid Coordinator

Hired a Food Technical Advisor

Review food aid policies and guidelines and develop a new CRS food aid policy and guidelines

Through new food aid policy not officially approved, steps taken to implement various aspects of it including workshops to resensitize CRS personnel to food aid as development resources; development and testing of analytical tools for decision reference use of food aid. Consideration of incentives to promote use of food aid

Promote information sharing

Develop quantifiable and measurable objectives for the headquarters component to incorporate food resources and strategic objective

Hire a full-time Food Aid Technician in Africa

Hired candidate and signed contract on file

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs:

Conduct six workshops to begin process to develop food aid policy, guidelines and analytical framework

Held six workshops

Review existing food aid policies and guidelines

Completed review

Constitute task force to develop CRS food aid policy and guidelines

Established task force and work has begun

Organize a series of workshops for HQ and field staff on food aid issues

Conducted six workshops

Promote sharing of food aid information through newsletters, workshops, and send information to field and HQ staff on food aid

Newsletters, copies of workshops reports and other information to field and HQ staff

Determine HQ's interest in and capacity for achieving HQ's sub objectives

Obtained letter from executive office to HQs and field staff restating CRS' commitment to food aid

Conduct reviews of "lessons learned" in food aid

Shared reports on "lessons learned" with staff

Incorporate changes and complete final draft of CRS Manual on Food Aid Policy

Changes from board incorporated into CRS Manual on Food Aid Guidelines

Completed final version of manual and sent to field for use

165

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs:
(Cont.d)

Conduct studies to determine the appropriate uses of monetization

Review of monetization in CRS country programs completed

Investigate potential linkages with other agencies

Apply cost-benefit analysis on a case-study basis to identify true costs

Other (MCH)

Held ten Health and Nutrition/MCH workshops

Provided individual counselling to participating mothers

Promoted immunization. 74% of participating children were immunized while 26% are continuing with immunization

Provided monthly health education sessions and cookery demonstrations on weaning diets

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field/Haiti

Distribute and monitor distribution of commodities (provide two main meals a day for 5,000 children)

School feeding program

Refocus the program towards poorer rural areas

Distributed 340MT of food to 6,838 beneficiaries

Examine and further promote counterpart compliance with food program distribution and reporting requirements

Established administrative committees

Provide technical assistance to community groups engaging in development activities

Developed an administrative operations manual

Provide inputs for community development activities

Conducted small scale agricultural development activities

Monitor the growth of 8,020 children under-five children

Constructed 6 warehouses, 8 kitchens, and 1 dining hall

Hired nutrition consultant to evaluate the MCH program and develop proposal for its restructuring

Distribute 410 MT of Commodities

Assisted orphaned or abandoned children, mainly in urban centers

Sent relief rations to the drought-stricken areas of Thomassique and the island of La Gonave

Internal evaluation of the MCH program

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

167.

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field:/Haiti

Strengthen the capacity and know-how of 25 clinic-based health workers

Hired a nutrition consultant to study and restructure the MCH program

End-use check each MCH center twice during the year

Monitored nutrition centers

Conducted end-user check at each center

Train at least 100 community workers

Established committees and trained at the center level for the administration of food assistance

Insure the receipt and quality of all reporting emanating from MCH centers

Developed the Operations and Administrative manual. This manual was distributed at regional training sessions

Established minimum quantitative standards for inspectors

Field/

Madagascar

Identify training needs

Completed training for three NAMANA personnel

Develop programs covering growth monitoring, education and reporting requirements

Conducted a community health and nutrition program for NAMANA staff

Assessed targeting strategies, the appropriateness of the ration and complementary program components

Conduct seminars/workshops

Held a seminar on methods for collecting, analyzing and interpreting MCH nutritional data

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field/

Ghana:

Coordinate with GOG on developing a training plan

Developed a training plan and established it with MOH, Department of Community Development (DOD), Ghana Education Services (GES)

Conduct training sessions with MOH, DCD, and GES

Conducted training sessions with MOH, DED, GES

Provide input to counterpart activities

Transferred funds to counterpart and submitted budget

Other

Field/

Gambia

Hire Coordinator

Hired three coordinators

Assist GAFNA to become operational

Signed protocol agreement to assist Gambian Food and Nutrition Association (GAFNA) to become operational

Assisted GAFNA to hire Executive Secretary, Supplements Coordinator and secretarial staff

Trained Training Officer

Fund GAFNA's core staff (on-going)

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

**Field/
Gambia**

Enable PHC circuits to have management committees to manage local contributions and participation in the program

Selected Women's kafos center management committees

Hired record keepers to replace program managers on each management committee

Field/Bolivia Hire staff for National Planning Team

Staffed National Planning Team

Hire staff for three Regional Technical Teams

Staffed three regional technical teams

Design training sessions for National Planning Team

Designed training session for National Planning Team

Devise system of proposal review in which CRS will be integrally involved

Devised a system of proposal review in which CRS will be integrally involved

CRS (Continued)

Planned

Achieved

Field/Bolivia Provide necessary training
in budget planning

Provided training in budget planning

Provide necessary fund raising
skills, such as proposal writing

Provided training to improve fund raising skills

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY INTERNATIONAL (FFHI)

Goal: To assist Food for the Hungry International to alleviate the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition through sustainable integrated development in Bolivia.

Purpose: To support FFHI's efforts in using P.L. 480, Title II commodities as a development resource and strengthen their capabilities to design, implement and manage effective food assisted development programs in the areas of: drought preparation, improved agricultural production, primary health care for families, appropriate technology and school feeding. The planned focus is on improving project quality.

Objectives/Activities:

	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
<u>Hdqtrs.:</u>	Increase level and quality of Training Increase project supervision Implement an institutional information system to track project status To support a team of experts to oversee field projects and assure a strict level of quality	No manpower at headquarters as all are used in the field

FFIII (Continued)

Planned

Field/Bolivia Assist the Bolivia's Ministry of Education to sustain the school breakfast program

Achieved

Hired FHI staff including key administration staff, local warehouse staff and technical assistance staff

Established school breakfast program

Establishment of three strong programs:

- o Wells and greenhouses (over 1000 of each at the household level)

- o Child survival, MCH

- o Technical assistance for irrigation projects

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION (SCF)

Goal: SCF has a commitment to process -- the gradual, steady growth of confidence, participation and control by local people. The process puts decision-making in the hands of indigenous communities in a "learning by doing" setting. SCF plans to expand this initiative by integrating PL 480 food assistance programs with existing CBIRD programs.

Purpose: Assisting SCF to couple food aid with SCF's proven experience in community-based development, the grant will effectively and positively improve and expand SCF as a creative catalyst in the social and economic improvement of lives in developing countries. This four year Enhancement grant provides funds to support staff development, including training, technical service and consultancies, and staff hiring. To assist SCF in improving its programming and management capabilities, the grant will fund the development and implementation of a food-assistance, management information system, including a Commodity Tracking System which will be put in place at headquarters and FFW/CBIRD field offices; the systematic use of evaluation in program management and planning; and the discrete use of technical assistance.

Objectives/Activities:

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.: Staff development

Established the Food Assisted Program Unit composed of a Director and a Project Coordinator

SCF (Continued) **Planned**

Hdqtrs.: **Staff development**

Staff Food Unit

Management Information

Achieved

Unit liaises with FVA, FFP, FAM, Coalition for Food Aid and PVOs

Staff participation in CARE/DR commodity management workshop

Developed and approved SOW phase I & II

Hired a Program Coordinator

Hired two Program Officers

Hired an Administrative Assistant

Hired Field-based Project Officers for Somalia and Bolivia

Designed and completed the MIS system in Ethiopia

Trained Ethiopian staff

Produced micro-computer programs for Somalia and Bolivia

Developed computerized system internally and user's guide contracted externally



SCF (Continued) Planned

Hdqtrs.: System implementation

Pilot activities implementation

Monitoring and evaluation

Field:/Bolivia

Achieved

All Field Offices use SC standard computerized system known as PEMs

Food programs incorporated in system

Completed mid-term evaluations in Oct. 89, including pilot project evaluations

Pilot projects in Bolivia, Somalia; piggy-back Projects in Burkina & Gambia

Submitted implementation plan for year IV to and system development FVA/PPM in June 90

Submitted mid-term and Yr. II progress reports to FVA/PPM, Nov. 89

Monitoring and evaluation indicators included in MYOPS

Organized and carried out training, technical assistance and agriculture extension to improve the production of rice and vegetables

Conducted three complementary project- water wells, and up-grading the training/demonstration center

Workshops for community promoters

176

SCF (Continued) Planned

Field:/Bolivia

Field:/Honduras

Field:/Somalia

Field:/Gambia

Field:/Burkina Faso

Achieved

Participated in the USAID/Bolivia policy planning session on the future of food and monetization activities

Trained 104 volunteers

Transported food shipments

Prepared a 4-year MYOP including an annual monetization component

Salary of one staff and other general support to develop food for work program in natural resources management

Procurement of equipment to support food for work program

Procurement of food for work operational plan

School tree planting competition among a total of 11 schools

Small dam construction

Hand-dug wells

Rehabilitation of schools, stores, homes and latrines

SCF (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Field/Burkina Faso

Emergency food distribution to malnourished children

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

SELF HELP AND RESOURCE EXCHANGE (SHARE)

Goal: To assist World Share in its efforts to alleviate the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition and raise the standard of living through self-help projects among targeted populations in Guatemala.

Purpose: Support Share's efforts to develop, implement and strengthen the full management capabilities necessary to successfully participate in P.L. 480 Title II programming in food assisted development programs such as: feeding in child care centers; education for family planning and health; community service for sanitation; and maintenance and improvement of infrastructure through food for work.

Objectives/Activities:

Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.: Develop management information system for food tracking and accounting

Upgraded information system in the field

Management training

Training needs assessment

Hired project compliance officer

Field evaluation

179

SIIARE (Continued) Planned

**Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)**

Staff training

**Program planning and implementation
review**

Private Sector/NGO development

Achieved

Held training sessions with counterpart staff on establishment of maternal/child health sites and agroforestry projects

Provided Spanish language training for project officers

Participated in the monetization workshop

Recruited technical personnel to assist with program component development

Received progress reports from Country Directors

Executive Director of International Programs participated in two country visits to review programs

Country Director along with headquarters identified program component areas

Assisted in the development of materials to attract private sector support and provide information to NGO's as to how they may participate in the program

Designed and developed an informative brochure

SIHARE (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Hdqtrs.: Grant review and evaluation
(Cont.d)

Hired a consultant to complete and internal review

Completed internal review of the accounting and food management system

Hired consultant to carry out a programmatic evaluation

Completed review a review of program components and prepared a scope of work for the evaluation

Field:/Guatemala

Hired field director and deputy director plus several consultants

Development of a Food Handling Manual with a consultant

Participated in a warehouse workshop

Developed an accounting reporting system

Management training for local hires and counterparts

**MCH/Child Survival
Program**

Distribution of rations

Growth monitoring

SIHARE (Continued) Planned

Achieved

Field:/Guatemala
(Cont.d)

**MCH/Child Survival
Program**

Counseled parents on nutrition and health

**Referrals for vaccinations, immunizations, and for
medical conditions**

Other

Agroforestry

Internal program review

**Provided technical assistance to set up a natural
resources conservation program**

Sent two staff for training - one to Costa Rica and one to Philippines

Established 181 agroforestry nurseries and reforested 685 acres

**Food For Work
(Community work)**

Hired a supervisor

**Developed project selection criteria and
procedures for application approval**

Initiated and completed 28 FFW projects

English language training

Business administration courses

On the job training for local staff

ISGP EVALUATION

Table: Achievements of Individual PVO's with ISG Funding

WORLD VISION RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT INC. (WVRD)

Headquarters:

Goal: To increase food security in food deficit regions of Africa through the enhancement of World Vision's Regional Headquarters' and Field Office staff's capability to conceptualize, design, implement, and evaluate food-assisted development programs.

Purpose: To strengthen the WVI Africa Region's capacity to effectively and efficiently undertake medium- to large-scale sustainable development activities through staff development needs assessment; project and program design; implementation; monitoring, reporting, and evaluation; and disaster preparedness.

Pilot Country Programs:

Goal: To promote and enhance Africa Field Offices in the three facets of food security: agricultural production, stability of price and supply, and access by beneficiaries to sufficient food.

Purpose: Training of national staff in all phases of program concept, design, implementation and evaluation, building the proposition that food is one resource among many that comprise a sustainable development program.

Objectives/Activities:

	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
<u>Hdqtrs.:</u>	Build Field Office Capacity for the rapid expansion of food-assisted development programs and in a response to eventual disasters	Staff training

183

WVRD (Continued) Planned

**Hdqtrs.:
(Cont.d)**

Maximum use of technical assistance through USAID and other PVO's to promote food security through program design, implementation and evaluation

Integrate food-assisted development with child survival and Africa region's sustained development strategies

Develop capacity to conceptualize, design, and implement disaster preparedness intervention techniques through food-assisted development programs

Other

Achieved

Performed a mid-term evaluation of Program Enhancement Grant

Revised and distributed the Commodity Management and Accounting Manual

Completed Gift-In-Kind tracking system

Utilized Field Office Financial System software package

Published and distributed "Food Aid as a Development Resource: Issues and Concerns"

Program audit

134

WVRD (Continued) Planned

**Field/Pilot
Countries**

Develop national staff through workshops, mentoring, and career path

Design and implement sustainable agricultural production projects

design and implement projects that increase the local availability and accessibility of basic foods at affordable prices

Integrate food resource assistance and other Field Office development strategies and programs

Mali

Achieved

Income transfer programs to workers and their families

Participative incentive to mothers attending the WV/Mali CREN activities

Conducted an internal review

Commissioned a consultancy/feasibility study to explore avenues for further programming in the 7th Region, with emphasis on natural resource management

ADT logistical support

Evaluated the Menaka Oasis Project

125

WVRD (Continued) Planned

Kenya

Ghana

Achieved

Undertook socioeconomic studies at four potential water resource project sites

Conducted a socioeconomic study aimed at identifying specific farmers interested in participating in the rehabilitation and extension of the scheme as well as assessing the support to be guaranteed by local government officials

Morulem Irrigation Scheme MYOP was submitted and approved

Field visits to Northern Ghana

Conducted community meetings

Prepared Plan of Action outline as guideline in project design

Initiated project draft proposal base on needs identified in communities

Held numerous meetings among key GOG ministry officials, PVO management, and international development donor agencies

Continued liaison with USAID/Ghana

WVRD (Continued) Planned

Ghana (cont.d)

Ethiopia

Achieved

Prepared and distributed monetization concept paper among key GOG ministries

Held meetings among WV/Ghana and field personnel regarding present and future food-assisted development programming

Continued program activities at Antsokia, Omoshelleko, Adama, and Mehal Meda

ANNEX 5

Discussion of an Alternative Means to
Achieve ISG's Purposes

182

Discussion of an Alternative Means to Achieve ISG's Purposes

ISGP provides funds directly to CSs to achieve its purposes. An alternative means to achieve ISGP's purposes would be a separate technical assistance organization--see also Chapter V. This approach was used at the country level by USAID/Bolivia, for examples. Several organizational concepts could be used for such a mechanism--an A.I.D. contract with an outside entity, an A.I.D. operated institute, a PVO operated entity, etc. The organization established would be a source of assistance for CSs in all areas necessary to achieve ISGP purposes--e.g., accounting systems, MIS, project design, training in all areas, logistics support, innovation in the use of food. It could also pay for long-term personnel hired by CSs, just as ISGP now does in some cases, support procurement, etc. It would serve as an outside source of technical assistance (although it could hire or use PVO staff as "experts" as appropriate).

How would ISGP and this alternative organization compare in cost effectiveness terms? No definitive answer is possible without defined units of output and cost. However, it is likely that ISGP is more cost effective overall and that the alternative organization would be more cost effective in achieving some specific outputs.

ISGP's overall cost effectiveness is likely to be highest for two reasons. First, it most directly meets the funding gap of PVOs by providing cash for use in strengthening, innovation and planning. The cash grant mechanism creates immense goodwill among CSs. They define their own specific needs and ways to meet them. Once ISGP funds are received, CSs control them. They are used flexibly to support many activities and to make up part or all of the resources needed to carry out each activity. PVOs feel the cash transfer and flexible control offered by ISGP impacts on and improves their entire program, thus adding cost effectiveness beyond the specific outputs being sought.

Second, the ISGP approach creates what PVOs call their intangible measure of cost-effectiveness--fewer errors in judgment in the planning, design and implementation of efforts to improve the use of food for development. Although staff are not always experts in the areas they address, the false starts and partial successes they experience because of ISGP's direct cash support are critical to longer run success. As one PVO reported, "Our own front line experience factor, if we can keep it (in the CS), is what improves our program over time. This can't be replaced by outsider trying to help us."

The alternative organization described above could not easily meet CS's needs for cash transfers to fill their overhead, logistics and other funding gaps. It would

dramatically decrease the flexibility enjoyed by CSs now because it would offer specific technical assistance to complete defined tasks. Control of technical assistance by CSs would be limited. PVO cooperation would be likely to decrease as a result, making the alternative organization less effective in an overall sense than the ISGP.¹

On the other hand, the alternative organization may be more cost effective in creating specific outputs such as improved accounting systems, quality training courses and innovations in food use. PVOs now develop these outputs from within. Most use their own staff, many of whom are on a steep learning curve regarding the issues they are addressing. Duplication of effort between CSs occurs. For example, several CSs developed similar food handling manuals with ISGP funds using staff who were not experts. The alternate organization could develop or hire expertise to ensure that accounting systems, manuals and other specific outputs were at the cutting edge technically and professionally and developed efficiently.

The alternative organization would probably be more cost effective also because it would emphasize problem-diagnosis--as contrasted to problem identification--prior to embarking on a solution. Assessment of CSs specific needs and design of a program to meet them by the alternative organization would help ensure an improved match between needs and resources and efficient allocation of the resources available. While ISGP has not emphasized better problem definition, baseline development and tighter monitoring of progress in solving problems, it could do so to improve its cost effectiveness in this area.

¹ ISGP and an alternative approach similar to the one suggested here operated side by side in Bolivia. PVO reaction to the alternative mechanism was mixed. As one PVO staff person said, the technical assistance organization .."hired its own people, created its own offices, could not provide funds to anyone, and was choosy about what it would help us do. It was our perception that it was a creature of A.I.D" Another PVO used the technical assistance organization successfully and extensively. The PVO cut back on its use of the organization, however, when it came to believe the organization was gaining a position of substantial influence over its activities.