

PA - ABL-251
EN 77167


IQC

**Evaluation and Development
Information Methods IQC**



**USAID Support for
Chadian Private and Voluntary
Organizations**

Prepared by:

Richard Greene
PVO Evaluation Specialist

for

the United States Agency for International Development
November 21, 1991

**A contract between the U.S. Agency for International Development and the
Academy for Educational Development, Contract No. PDC-0085-I-00-9061-00.**

AED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
I. REASONS FOR SUPPORTING CHADIAN PVOS	1
II. THE CHADIAN PVO COMMUNITY	3
Table 1: PVOs Considered	11
III. STRATEGY	13
A. The Context	13
B. The Alternatives	14
C. The Strategy	14
1. Institutional Development and Project Support	15
2. Service Capability Development	15
D. Eligibility for Assistance under the Project	17
IV. SUSTAINABILITY	19
A. Importance and Alternatives	19
B. Outside Funding	19
C. Recurrent Costs and Income Generating Activities	20
D. Endowment	21
E. The Competition Issue	24
V. THE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION	25
VI. CHADIAN GOVERNMENT ROLE	29
A. The Present Situation	29
B. Required Changes	30
C. A New Role for SPONG	32
1. Data Bank	32
2. Assistance Under the Project	32
VII. ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED	32
A. Types of Assistance	32
B. Level of Funding	34
C. Distribution of Funds	34
D. Endowments	35
E. Use of Local Currency Funds	35
F. Peace Corps	36
VIII. PROJECT MANAGEMENT	36
A. Implementation	36
B. Monitoring and Evaluation	38
IX. RELATION TO UNDP PROJECT	38
X. WHAT NEXT?	38

ANNEX A: PVOS	40
AL-TAAWOUN	41
L'ASSOCIATION D'APPUI AUX INITIATIVES LOCALES DE DEVELOPPEMENT	46
L'ASSOCIATION POUR L'APPUI AU DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE	49
L'ASSOCIATION POUR LA PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT	51
L'ASSOCIATION RURALE POUR L'AUTO-PROMOTION ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL	53
CAISSES RURALES D'EPARGNE ET DE CREDIT	58
LE CENTRE D'ANIMATION RURALE DE MAILAO	59
LE CENTRE D'ETUDES POUR PROMOTION ET RENTABILISATION DES INITIATIVES COMMUNAUTAIRES	60
CENTRE HORTICOLE D'ANIMATION RURALE DE BOUGOUMENE	61
COMMUNAUTE POUR LE PROGRES-GOUNDI	62
DARNA	63
L'INSTITUT AFRICAIN POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL	66
SECOURS CATHOLIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT	67
VOISINS MONDIAUX	69
 ANNEX B: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED	 72
 ANNEX C: REFERENCES	 74

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report contains recommendations for A.I.D. support to Chadian PVOs. It is based on an assessment of the capabilities and needs of the Chadian PVO community and an examination of various issues and choices concerning the strategy and content of a PVO support program for Chad.

The Chadian PVO community, though small and young (there are only 6 Chadian PVOs recognized by the Chadian government and the first was registered only five years ago), boasts at least four PVOs that appear eminently worthy of support with a fifth possible, and another that, though currently a branch of an international PVO is soon to be Chadianized. In addition we obtained information on five other organizations that are not yet PVOs or not yet Chadian but that may well, before too long, qualify for aid under the criteria we have proposed.

There is also in Chad a large number of small associations, covering typically just one village, that are thought of as aspiring PVOs but do not yet, in our view, serve a large enough population to warrant A.I.D. attention, particularly in view of the fact that a UNDP project designed to help precisely these organizations is in the works. There may also well be organizations that would meet our criteria for assistance but that we did not find out about in the course of our investigation. Readily available information on those organizations registered by the government as associations, some of which may qualify to register as PVOs, is not adequate to judge their qualifications for support. We propose, therefore, that a USAID PVO support project (hereinafter referred to as the Project) be open ended, so as to permit the eventual inclusion of any PVOs that may develop to the point where assistance to them is warranted under the criteria set forth in this report.

The common characteristic of the four PVOs that appear to qualify for immediate support is an approach that is perhaps best described by the Save the Children term "community based integrated rural development." The focus of these PVOs is on the community, they tend to take an integrated approach expanding their repertoire of interventions in response to needs and opportunities identified at the community level in the course of program implementation, and they are very much empirical, quickly rejecting solutions that do not work or that generate secondary problems, and trying new ones.

These PVOs thus appear to us to be valuable potential intermediaries between international donors, public and private, and the populations those donors aspire to reach. Because of their community focus, holistic approach and empiricism, these PVOs can help the international donors keep in touch with what is happening at the community level as a result of their programs and other factors impinging on those programs. This is something that international donors, even the private ones, with the

greater scope of their programs and tendency to limit their program focus to certain types of interventions, find it difficult to do.

Among the criteria we have proposed for the selection of PVOs to be supported by the project are multi-community coverage, a proven track record, and leadership capabilities, including appropriate motivation and concepts of development, among the leaders of those organizations. We do not propose that the quality of management be a criterion except in egregious cases, since this is one of the things the proposed Project is designed to help improve.

We propose virtually the full range of possible types of institutional development and program assistance, including operational support and facilities construction as well as technical assistance, training, equipment and supplies, and support for projects. We place particular emphasis on assistance that will help the Chadian PVOs become sustainable, with particular attention to the problem of recurrent cost financing. In addition to providing them with assistance in the processes of obtaining funds from international donors, we propose to help them, from the beginning of the project, develop income generating activities and to provide them with assets, such as facilities (e.g. an office building), that will reduce their recurrent costs and even generate income for them.

All of these solutions, to the chronic PVO problem of obtaining funding for recurrent costs, have drawbacks, and no one solution will solve the problem. We need, *faute de mieux*, to accept their limitations, and support a variety of approaches in the hope that this will provide the assisted PVOs with a viable financial base.

It is also important that the problem of recurrent cost financing be addressed from the beginning of the Project. Too often the problem is flagged and assumptions are made, typically that the assisted PVOs will be able to raise all necessary funds from donors, and it is only as a project draws to its end that attention is focused on the fact that the assisted PVOs are not yet financially viable.

In addition to assistance to Chadian PVOs we propose assistance to the PVO association in Chad, CILONG (the bulk of whose members are, at present, international PVOs), so as to extend the range of its capabilities gradually from its current very limited repertory to the full range of coordination and support services that such an association might desirably supply. Priority attention must also be paid to the sustainability of such an organization, as well as to that of the member PVOs.

The report also contains recommendations for limited support to the Chadian government office responsible for PVOs (SPONG) to

develop an information system and data bank containing all pertinent data on the Chadian PVOs, thus shifting the government's role from one of regulation and control to one of support for the PVO movement.

The report proposes that the project be managed by a U.S. PVO. This "managing PVO" would, working closely with CILONG, pass funds through to the participating Chadian PVOs, assure proper use of and accounting for funds, and assist and oversee the identification and satisfaction of needs for technical assistance, training and other assistance required to assure the sound and sustainable institutional development of the participating PVOs.

The report concludes with recommendations for accelerating the start of Project implementation, including amendment of an existing USAID Chad project supporting U.S. PVOs and exploration of the possible use of Government of Chad PL480 Title III funds. Chadian PVOs, particularly given the instabilities of the Chadian government, can play an especially important role in the development of the country. The sooner they can be enabled to expand their activities and put themselves on a sound and durable institutional footing, the better.

I. REASONS FOR SUPPORTING CHADIAN PVOs

Although the desirability of supporting PVOs in general and even host country PVOs in particular is virtually axiomatic in the development business today, considering why USAID might want to support Chadian PVOs will help us understand how it might best support them. We therefore begin with a discussion of the potential value of supporting Chadian PVOs.

The premise of this analysis is that PVOs in general have certain advantages that give them an important role to play in Chad, as in that of other developing countries. Among the principal advantages are: lower cost; their ability to mobilize private sector resources; a tendency to long-term commitment; a focus on people rather than simply outputs; perhaps most important, an ability to understand and stay in touch with the perceptions, needs and problems of the intended beneficiaries of projects; and an empirical rather than a priori approach to development made possible by continuous monitoring at the community level.

The ability of PVOs to keep in touch with what is happening at the community level is comparable to the role of good intelligence in military operations. Because of this ability, PVOs are an important potential intermediary between international donors and project beneficiaries and a worthwhile element of the current USAID strategy, or, for that matter, any strategy that proposes to foster development among peasant farmers, and/or the urban poor.

An interesting example of PVO adaptability, resourcefulness, flexibility and alertness to what is happening in the community is found in the case of one Chadian PVO, Darna (for which see Annex A). Darna, in the attempt to help people in its project area get into gum arabic harvesting, worked out an agreement with the Government to furnish extensionists. It turned out however, that the extensionists didn't know what they were doing, whereupon Darna looked for farmers elsewhere in the country who were experienced with gathering gum arabic and brought them to the project area to show the local farmers how to do it.

An international donor, even many international PVOs, would typically have taken more than one growing season to find out what the root of the problem was, and possibly even to recognize that there was a problem. Once it did become aware of the problem and its cause, it would most likely have sought fruitlessly to have the government remedy the defect. Eventually the donor would realize that was not likely to happen on its own. At that point it would probably have imported high priced expatriate technical assistance. Darna, by way of contrast, learned about the problem during the first harvest season, determined its cause and came up promptly with an inexpensive and effective solution.

Indigenous PVOs have a particularly important role to play in Chad given the instability of the government, insecurity inhibit-

ing travel by officials of international PVOs located in the capital, the large distances involved and the ethnic diversity of the country. Chadian PVOs are more likely to be able to get around these constraints than the Government or international PVOs as they are not subject to the same political and financial instabilities, are more likely to have their headquarters and/or important permanent representation outside the capital, and are more likely to match the ethnicity of the groups with which they work.

The principal disadvantages of PVOs are: that they sometimes neglect the economic aspects of development, though this is less and less the case, or, at least, lack an overview of the development process as a result specialization and/or a tendency to focus on local rather than national problems; that they sometimes are less professional in technical areas than for-profit organizations and international development agencies; and that, due to their relatively small size they tend to duplicate resources and functions and suffer from diseconomies of scale.

It is important to note that small size is an advantage as well as a disadvantage in PVOs. While it makes economies of scale difficult, it facilitates the sort of direct awareness of what is happening at the community level that is their most important virtue. This is an important reasons for encouraging the development of newly emerging Chadian PVOs through a project, rather than simply supporting the already well-established ones. In this respect and others, the proposed project (the Project) would seek to exploit the advantages of program implementation through PVOs while minimizing the disadvantages.

The advantages discussed above apply to all PVOs, not just those headed by nationals of and incorporated in the country in which they work. Why then support Chadian PVOs? One of the principal reasons for funding host country PVOs is that they would be better able to mobilize in-country resources than foreign PVOs. However, there is not a great deal in the way of resources to be mobilized in Chad.

On the other hand, the costs of host country PVOs are even lower than those of international PVOs, substantially so, which in turn increases the possibility of fielding personnel at the local level and thus staying in close touch with intended beneficiaries. Thus, if PVOs in general can be important intermediaries between donors and beneficiaries, host country PVOs can be even more important ones.

A second advantage of host country PVOs is that they can increase the consciousness and understanding of the needs of and commitment to grassroots development in developing countries. Related to this is the possibility that they will in the long run be more

effective than outsiders in lobbying for certain policies favorable to grassroots development.

A third possible advantage of host country PVOs is that, if they can become financially sustainable, they may be more likely to continue operating in the country than a foreign PVO. Finally, as we mentioned earlier, given the various instabilities of and difficulties of operating in the Chadian environment, Chadian PVOs have an important potential role to play in the development of the country.

PVOs in general can constitute an important supplement to and, where necessary, substitute for government as a medium of development. They are so to speak, a third path along with those of government and international agencies. Although international PVOs can play this role as well, perhaps, as local ones, in the long run it is preferable that this alternative exist at the local level and not be entirely dependent on foreign organizations.

II. THE CHADIAN PVO COMMUNITY

We will in this report use the term PVO (private and voluntary organization) rather than NGO (non-governmental organization), the former being the more common usage in A.I.D. However, it should be noted at the outset that we are including in the term PVO, cooperative organizations, which, though for profit, perform a function that is very similar to and overlaps substantially with that of PVOs.

Chadian PVOs often work with community level associations that in many cases are very similar to cooperatives, savings and loan associations (*caisses d'épargne et de crédit*), for example. We see no reason to differentiate, for the purposes of Project support, PVOs assisting such associations from cooperative umbrella organizations. The differences, if any, are largely legalistic. We consider, therefore, that cooperative organizations should be eligible for assistance under an A.I.D. project for support of Chadian PVOs, although so far as we have been able to ascertain there is no umbrella cooperative organization in Chad at the moment that would be suitable for assistance, and base level cooperatives themselves are generally weak.

The Chadian PVO community is of recent origin and is small even by developing country standards, a function of Chad's low level of development and chronic political unrest. The Chadian Government only began registering PVOs as such a few years ago, and, although predecessor organizations under other official designations (e.g. associations) began work prior to creation of the PVOs as such, in most cases even their beginnings in another form are recent (within the last 5 to 10 years).

There are only six or seven Chadian PVOs registered as such by the Government according to the current acting director of the government unit responsible for PVOs, SPONG (**Le Secrétariat Permanent du Comité Interministériel pour les ONG**), though we've been told that the number of Chadian PVOs differs according to who you talk to at SPONG. We were told by SPONG that there is no written policy on this.

To be considered Chadian according to the acting director of SPONG, a PVO must have a Chadian director and at least 75% of its personnel must be Chadian. We recommend a different definition, a functional rather than structural one, namely that Chadians have a predominant role in the organization's decision-making processes and that it is likely the organization would continue to function effectively if its foreign officers were withdrawn. Organizations that meet those requirements would have the most important of those potential advantages of host country PVOs described above. In essence they would serve the purpose of institutionalizing PVO capabilities in the country.

The functional criterion is more difficult to apply than a structural one, but it is worth the effort, for an organization with a staff that is half or even more foreign, or with a foreign director but a predominance of key personnel who are Chadian and a Chadian board of directors, could satisfy the most important purposes of supporting Chadian PVOs. A strictly functional definition, on the other hand, could exclude PVOs that were capable of making an important contribution to strengthening the Chadian PVO community.

The six registered PVOs characterized by the acting director of SPONG as Chadian are Al-Taawoun, ARPES, ASSAILD, CARM, CHARB and Darna, with a fifth SPONG wasn't sure about, ASSADEC. The meaning of the acronyms, the self-defined role and capabilities of these organizations, and the appropriateness of assistance to them under the project are discussed in Annex A. (The headings and content of sections in the Al-Taawoun write up, the first of those in Annex A, can serve as a model for future appraisals of PVO suitability for project support. We have not set up all of the annexed analyses in this form because we were not able to obtain enough of the required information and documentation for some of them.)

Principal data concerned and ratings of the PVOs that were considered, in widely varying degrees, in connection with this report, appear in summary form in the table at the end of this section. The table and Annex A cover those Chadian organizations that are registered as PVOs, PVOs registered as international but likely to become Chadian, and organizations identified by our informants as worth looking into.

There are, in addition to the six or seven Chadian PVOs officially recognized as such by the Chadian government, several which, though not registered or not considered Chadian by the more limited definition, have the potential to operate effectively as PVOs and in some cases are operating effectively as non-Chadian PVOs but are in the process of Chadianizing or intend to create a Chadian affiliate. These also are discussed in Annex A.

Among the six or seven registered by the Chadian Government, only the first two, the fourth and last are clearly worthy of further consideration, with CARM a maybe. On the other hand these four, as detailed in the Annex, as well as some of the others described in the Annex, appear to have great strengths, most importantly a very clear and cogent understanding of the development process which is borne out by their descriptions of the programs they have carried out and thus appears to be more than just theoretical.

Among the four, ARPES appears to lag a bit behind Al-Taawoun, ASSAILD and Darna in managerial and intellectual sophistication, though its concepts of or approach to development appear to be basically sound judging from its project proposals and statements of program strategy and objectives. Our sense of the situation is that ARPES should receive priority institutional development attention so as to assure its continued exercise of development capabilities that appear substantial, but further investigation is required. In this connection, see the write-up of ARPES in Annex A.

Even in the case of Al-Taawoun, ASSAILD and Darna further investigation would not be amiss. We have spoken to persons outside those organizations who know of their work, as well as with their own senior personnel, and have reviewed documents they supplied to us on request. We have not, however, visited project sites or spoken to the ostensible beneficiaries of the projects. While we have no reason to expect that such investigations would reveal significant problems, it would be only prudent to explore these sources of information.

We recommend that CILONG (the PVO association in Chad, for which see section V. **The Umbrella Organization**, below) be given a grant or contract to perform on-site investigations of these and other potential recipients of aid under the Project. It would do this under the supervision of the U.S. PVO through which funds would be passed to CILONG and the participating PVOs (see Section VIII., **Management**, below) or on its own if appropriate funding can be found before the U.S. PVO is in place. In addition CILONG can, under such a contract, develop detailed information and judgements and make recommendations to USAID (or the managing U.S. PVO once it has come on the scene) as to precisely what assistance the selected PVOs should receive.

Though CILONG would probably have to subcontract most if not all the work, giving it such a contract would launch it on what should be a long term role as a source of such information. If subcontracting is necessary, CILONG should contract with Chadians so as to develop in-country capabilities that will be available to it, and others, in the future. This would also be less expensive than hiring expatriate consultants. USAID, however, should also oversee the operation so as to make its input in the development of criteria by which potential recipients of Project support are to be judged.

CILONG will, in contracting for appraisal of Chadian PVOs and other purposes, such as evaluation, of course be responsible for assuring the adequacy of the contractor's performance. Once the managing U.S. PVO has begun its work it will work with both CILONG and Chadian contractors to enhance the consulting capabilities of the latter.

The Chadian PVOs we looked at have a number of program concerns in common. At the most general level, all of them: work principally in rural areas; take an integrated rural development or program approach, rather than a specialized one; are geographically rather than functionally focused (though geography, or more precisely the environmental niche in which individual PVOs work, does dictate a certain sort of specialization, e.g. in rice and fish culture or wadi agriculture); and emphasize community self-help and other forms of participation.

At a more specific level, certain activities relating to climatic and social conditions prevalent in Chad can be found in most of the programs: dry season agriculture (**culture de contre-saison**); recession (**décrué**) agriculture, which consists of growing crops in areas that are under water part of the year, such as flood plains, rice paddies and reservoir beds, after the water has receded; digging and lining (with locally made concrete casings) wells, with the PVO providing cement, molds and technical assistance and the community supplying labor; cereal banks, to supply seed and foodgrain to tide farmers over during periods of need; communally cultivated fields for the cereal bank; reforestation; and attention to the participation of women in the development process.

Attention to women's needs is present in all the Chadian PVO programs, but we don't know to what degree they are sensitive and responsive to women's needs and their role in the development process. This would be worth a look once a project is underway, perhaps a job for the PVO association. (See section V., **The Umbrella Organization**, below.) Such a study should identify measures that can improve PVO performance in this domain, if appropriate, as well as assessing that performance.

Environmental consciousness appears to be fairly well entrenched among Chadian PVOs. However, the approach taken is almost invariably an "educational" one, i.e. trying to convince farmers that they ought to concern themselves with such things as reforestation. More attention needs to be paid to economic incentives such as benefits other than just soil conservation, production of food for animals and humans, for example, and of firewood, for on-farm consumption or sale, and reduced water evaporation resulting from the planting of shade trees.

Tree farming for fuelwood could be doubly beneficial, providing a needed and marketable product and freeing up, for more productive activities, time currently spent by women and children gathering wood. There is an important tie-in here with women in development considerations. Women may have the greatest economic stake in tree farming and therefore be most likely to be convinced of its value.

Though the Chadian PVOs are paying considerable attention to the problems of women and the environment, not one of the documents furnished by the PVOs has anything to say about family planning or even the common euphemism therefor, "family well-being." Although we recognize the sensitivity of the subject, we consider it essential that efforts be made to remedy this omission.

No development gains will be sustainable among the rural poor in Chad (or, probably, for that matter, among the urban poor) in the harsh, and probably worsening, agricultural environment that exists in much of the country, as long as population growth continues to outstrip increases in production and income. Past experience, in Chad, or throughout sub-Saharan Africa for that matter, provides little ground for optimism that production and incomes are likely to increase rapidly enough to keep pace with population growth, unless the latter is reduced.

We got no argument from the heads of two PVOs, one a Christian and one a Muslim (the heads of APPE and ARES), with whom we discussed this problem in terms as uncompromising as those in the preceding paragraph. In fact they agreed, with considerable evidence of conviction. This suggests significant possibilities for addressing this problem through a PVO project. Priority should be given to exploiting those possibilities.

A family planning PVO is in the process of being formed with support under the USAID maternal/child health program. Support should be provided for it under the PVO Project if needed, and, most important, every effort should be made to sensitize the other PVOs assisted to the need for family planning and to furnish them the resources and guidance necessary for effective measures to further it.

Another thing the PVOs have in common is a wide-ranging integrated rural development approach. Though it may well be a bit of each, we think the balance favors virtue. On the one hand it assures that important components of the development process do not get left out. On the other hand, more rigorous prioritization might be appropriate, e.g. putting income generation activities before certain welfare activities, e.g. health programs (though certainly not before food security). A seminar among the PVOs on prioritization might be useful. (Again see section V., **The Umbrella Organization.**)

In addition to the activities common to most of the Chadian PVOs, there are others unique to the ecological zone in which the PVO operates, such as wadi dams and agriculture, and rice and fish culture.

Most important are the common principles underlying the operations of the support-worthy Chadian PVOs and emerging PVOs that we have looked at, namely: a concern for bettering the lives and increasing the self-help capabilities of the beneficiaries of their programs; the importance attached to obtaining beneficiary opinions about what they, the PVOs, should do and are doing; and an empirical approach responding to what they learn from the beneficiaries and in the course of project implementation rather than adhering to preconceived notions of what should be done.

Thus, these PVOs appear to be in a position to learn quickly if something they are doing is not working or is causing secondary problems, and to be quite ready to abandon the faulty solution and try something else. Similarly, they appear to be quick to learn about additional important needs and opportunities revealed in the course of implementation and to respond to such needs and opportunities.

In sum, these organizations appear to have, in an unusual degree, the ability that is most important to efficacy and survival, the ability to learn and adapt. Most important the way in which they appear to operate makes it more likely that significant and sustainable benefits will be achieved by the participating communities. The abilities of these organizations thus go to the heart of what makes PVOs desirable partners in the development process.

Thus, though the Chadian PVO community is small, it is off to a very good start. The PVOs that we recommend be considered for support establish an excellent role model for other PVOs that may follow. This in itself is a good reason for supporting them.

One issue that has arisen concerning the Chadian PVO community is that of geographic coverage. Coverage is thought to be weaker in the north of the country, and it is sometimes inferred from the disproportionately Christian character of Chadian PVOs, and, for that matter of international PVOs operating in Chad and funding the Chadian PVOs, that Muslims among the potential beneficiaries of PVO programs tend to be neglected. The geographical and sectarian distribution problems tend to coincide, since the country gets increasingly more Muslim as one moves from the heavy rainfall tropical zones into the Sahel.

We're not sure, however, that either of these concerns is justified. First, it is understandable, for security reasons, that PVO coverage is lower in the far north (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti), and not much can or should be done to change that at present.

Secondly, at least four of the six or seven well-established PVOs we looked into are directed by Muslims and/or work in Muslim areas. Two of the four, Al-Taawoun and Darna (Arabic names) work entirely in the Sahel and are headed by Muslims. One of the others (SECADEV), though Catholic, works in predominantly Muslim areas in the Sahelian zone and its Director of Projects, one of its three top officials under the level of the general director (the other two being the Director of Relief Programs, and the Director of Administration and Personnel), is a Muslim. Its Relief Director is also a Muslim.

Finally, we do not know for a fact that coverage in terms of percentage of population or amount spent per capita is higher in the south than in the Sahelian zone, although there is good reason to suspect that is the case. This would be another useful thing for CILONG to look into.

Given that attention to Muslims and the north is not egregiously neglected, and the smallness and newness of the Chadian PVO community, we consider that it would be reasonable for the Project to start with the organizations that seem capable of using aid well at this point, leaving distributional questions to a later stage.

We did ask some of our Muslim interlocutors about the possibility of working with Muslim PVOs financed by the Arab countries. They all replied that those organizations were fundamentalist, didn't understand development, were more interested in promoting the faith than in development, and had not been responsive to efforts to establish contact.

There are, of course, other organizations with significant religious affiliations among the PVOs we looked into, SECADEV, for example, Voisins Mondiaux which was formed by a church group, and ARPES, which receives most of its support from European Protestant groups. It seems improbable on the basis of our

discussions with the directors of these PVOs that they look upon development aid more as a means of proselytization than as the main focus of their efforts. In fact, we would be surprised if they are proselytizing to any significant extent, if at all. However, this should be checked out on field visits.

A table summarizing data concerning the PVOs considered in connection with this report as possible aid recipients under the Project follows. The information and judgments in this table are derived from the discussions of the indicated PVOs appearing in Annex A.

Table 1: PVOs Considered

Name & Status	Inst. Dev.³	Prior-ity⁵	Years Old¹⁰	Funding \$000¹²	Benef. Pop. 000	No. Pro. Staff
<u>Registered</u>	2	2	7/1	785.0	32	9
Al-Taawoun	3	1 ⁶	9/3	unk.	18	11
ARPES	2	5	6/?	10.5	unk.	unk.
ASSADEC	2	2	5/?	260 ¹³	unk. ¹⁶	3
ASSAILD	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.
CARM	unk.	5	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.
CHARB	2	2	2.5	105.0	6	4
Darna						
<u>International¹</u>	unk.	4 ⁷	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.
INADES	2	3	unk.	60.0 ¹⁴	2.7	7
Voisins Mond.						
<u>Debatable²</u>	1	5 ⁸	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.
BELACDs	1	5 ⁹	11/8	6,785 ¹⁵	28	225
SECADEV						
<u>Not Regis.</u>	0 ⁴	3	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
APPE						
Assoc. Biffi-Mafou	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.
Communauté pour Progrès-Goundi	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.
CEPRIC	5	5	unk. ¹¹	unk.	unk.	unk.
CREC	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.	unk.

1. But interested in becoming Chadian.

2. SPONG has classified these as non-Chadian, but the organization concerned has objected and new criteria are being considered.

3. Scale of 1 to 5 based on apparent management capabilities and success in raising funds. 1 is highest.

4. In process of formation.

5. Recommended priority that be given to the PVO for Project funding. Scale of 1 to 5. 1 is highest. 5 indicates should not be considered for aid under present conditions, but should be monitored for change.

6. Most in need of help.

7. Does not plan to Chadianize for at least a couple of years.

8. Too developed.

9. Same as 8.
10. The first numeral before the slash in this column is the number of years of operations before the PVO or predecessor organization started the current program. The second is the number of years since the PVO has been in existence. The former figure is important as no Chadian PVO is more than 5 years old, but many were preceded by organizations such as associations, clubs and international PVOs in which the founders of the PVO were carrying out the same programs.
11. We do not know whether CEPRIC has actually initiated development activities as yet. Our rating of the organization was based on a brochure that describes the program without mentioning any activities that may have been carried out.
12. Since the PVO began operating.
13. For 1991.
14. This is current program funding rather than life of program, and \$20,000 of the 60 is for two years and the other 40 for three. We are thus talking about an average of \$30,000 a year for the first two years and \$20,000 for the third. This contrasts with an approximately \$300,000 budget for 1987-88. Voisins Mondiaux funding, in other words, has declined. This is all, however, internal funding and does not reflect on the Voisin Mondiaux Chad's fund raising capabilities.
15. The figure is \$6,785,000 and it is for the two year period 1990-92.
16. Although ASSAILD lost its note on information we had requested and we were unable to get in touch with them again, it did furnish the number of groupements, village associations, with which it working, which is as of the moment 106, up from 70 last year. Assuming a fairly conservative 100 beneficiaries per groupement that would come to over 10,000 beneficiaries

III. STRATEGY

A. The Context

There exists at the present time a USAID/Chad PVO Development Initiatives Project with about three and a half years remaining in its life and the possibility of \$5 million additional funding under the life of project \$30 million ceiling. The possibility therefore exists of providing support for development of Chadian PVOs under an amendment to the existing project and of using that time as a trial period and, eventually, to develop a PID and Project Paper for a new PVO project. Accordingly the discussion that follows will concern itself first with recommendations for the next 3½ years, though it will concern itself also with a longer range strategy under a follow-on project.

Another contextual element that needs to be taken into consideration is the Mission's overall program strategy emphasis, for the agriculture sector, on marketing. This emphasis is based on the finding that marketing, rather than production, is currently the most serious constraint on increasing small farmer income. It also offers an opportunity to increase farmer income more directly and promptly and in a simpler way than efforts to develop production.

Although we have no quarrel with the emphasis on marketing as a strategy, limiting support to the economic activities of PVOs to those that are related to marketing, as distinguished from production, entails possible dangers to which USAID should be alert. One of the most important advantages of PVOs is their willingness and ability to keep in touch with what is happening at the village level and to work empirically rather than adhering rigidly to preconceived notions. Thus they find out what the ongoing needs and problems of individual communities are and adapt programs so as to respond to those needs and problems rather than offering the same solutions everywhere, or sticking with a program even though it isn't achieving the intended result.

Limiting use of A.I.D. funding of agriculture sector activities to marketing to the exclusion of production might undermine this comparative advantage of PVOs. To be sure, the PVOs could use other resources for production, but their commitment to marketing activities involving resources that could not be used for any other purpose could lead them to devote time and attention to marketing that would result in their being unaware or neglectful of other needs.

This is not to say that this will happen, merely that A.I.D. should be alert to it. The likelihood of its happening can also be reduced by a broad definition of marketing that would subsidize a wide variety of the activities in which the PVOs would be

likely to engage and thus not result in a significant narrowing of their focus.

We would include in the definition of marketing: organization of cooperatives; provision of credit for processing, storage facilities, transport and, most important, pre- and post-harvest family needs, so as to make it possible for farmers to hold their products for a more favorable stage of the marketing cycle rather than having to sell them at harvest time; construction and management of storage facilities; post-harvest handling of agricultural products; dissemination of market information; agricultural processing enterprise development; marketing per se; transport; and road, bridge and culvert maintenance and construction.

Such a broad definition of marketing would appear to us to be consistent with the USAID/Chad Program Logframe. If a substantially narrower definition is adopted, particular attention should be paid to its possible distorting effects on PVO programs.

In conformity with the Mission's current strategy we recommend support for PVO activities in the marketing, small enterprise development and possibly family planning areas for the next 3½ years. We will, however, discuss a long-term PVO development strategy, and leave the door open to the possibility of broadening support for PVO activities under the follow-on project.

B. The Alternatives

There are various ways in which A.I.D. might support the development of indigenous or local PVOs in Chad: (1) it might assist the expansion and managerial improvement of existing, fully functioning PVOs; (2) it might assist PVOs that have been formed but have as yet done relatively little to initiate programs and develop managerial capabilities, hereinafter referred to as "emerging PVOs"; (3) it might assist in the formation of altogether new PVOs as would-be founders come forward; or (4) it might seek out and assist those who are interested in providing PVO services to other PVOs covering specific, identified, development needs.

C. The Strategy

It would be reasonable for an A.I.D. project to do all four of the above things, with the current exception of the third, which the UNDP will be funding. However, we recommend that priority be given in the first phase to the first two categories with some effort to explore and exploit such possibilities as may exist in the fourth (service capability) category, in the first, project amendment phase of the Project, with a perhaps increasing emphasis on the fourth category in the second phase of the Project.

1. Institutional Development and Project Support

We recommend that the Project give primary attention in its first phase to the support of institutional development and agricultural marketing projects. Among them the handful of Chadian PVOs which are already relatively well established, and such promising new Chadian PVOs as may emerge in the course of the Project.

2. Service Capability Development

Service capability development would have a lower priority than institutional development and project support, particularly during the first phase of the project, but might assume greater importance as time goes on and the assisted PVOs become more solid as institutions. What we mean by a "service capability" strategy is - division of labor or specialization, identifying the important functional areas of development in which PVOs can usefully work and assisting PVOs that are working in or interested in working in those areas to expand their capabilities so as to be able to help other PVOs or undertake joint projects with them. This can be done at two levels, at the generic level, that of broad types of services. e.g. credit, or at the level of specific problems such as development of storage facilities that low income communities can afford and maintain, or identification of the most effective seed variety for a particular environment.

There are a number of capabilities that might be subject to generic specialization in addition to those listed under the heading of marketing above (i.e. cooperative organization, credit, storage and post-harvest handling, market information, agricultural processing, transport, and road maintenance and construction). Such other capabilities include: family planning; environmental protection; non-agricultural micro-enterprise development; preparation of audio visual materials and publications; water resource development; provision of seed and other agricultural inputs; plant protection; animal health and other animal husbandry expertise; plant and animal varietal improvement and dissemination; seed multiplication; sapling production; training of animators, extension agents and health workers; non-formal and primary education; health services expertise; and procurement of health supplies.

In theory there could be substantial advantages in such specialization. It would permit a degree of expertise that would not be possible if every PVO developed its own capabilities in every field of specialization, it would permit economies of scale, and it would foster coordination and even cooperation among the PVOs.

In practice, however, there are several questions as to the desirability and feasibility of rationalizing services in this manner. First, there is the question of the need for such

services, i.e. the extent to which PVOs would be able to obtain them from other sources such as the government or specialists for hire so that there would be no important reason for them to develop in-house capabilities.

Then there is the fundamental question of willingness and ability of Chadian PVOs at this stage of their institutional development to develop service capabilities and meet the demands of the others. Related to this is the question of whether those receiving the services would be satisfied with such an arrangement.

Yet another question is whether, even if the Chadian PVOs were willing and able to develop service capabilities, the effort to do so at this stage would divert attention from their primary task of maintaining a thorough and continuous understanding of community needs and problems. Finally, there is the converse question of whether PVOs developing and providing services to order would achieve a level of quality comparable to that of activities they undertook entirely on their own initiative.

These are questions that, for the most part, can only be answered in practice. We therefore propose that the service capabilities approach be experimented with in the first phase of the Project and, if successful, be built up in the second phase. In this connection, there may be certain areas where a significant number of PVOs do not want to develop independent capabilities but cannot buy the services or rely on the government to meet their needs in an adequate manner. Possible examples are credit and road maintenance and construction.

There is also at least one area where all PVOs might want to develop their capabilities but where specialization might make more sense, namely that of publications and audio-visual productions. Rather than giving each PVO the equipment, staff and other assistance necessary to meet these needs it might make sense to give them to one PVO, although giving them to the PVO umbrella organization is an alternative that must be considered. (See discussion below in section on Umbrella Organization.)

There may be other cases where the need is of such importance that USAID would not want to leave it to individual, multipurpose PVOs but would want to foster the development of PVOs with specialized expertise and advocacy capabilities. Examples of specialties that arguably fit this description are environmental protection and family planning. (See discussion of these topics in section II., *The Chadian PVO Community* above.) Finally there may be areas where USAID wishes to complement current U.S. PVO programs with Chadian PVOs, e.g. in the area of non-agricultural small enterprise development.

In addition, there is the possibility of micro-specialization, essentially R&D (research and development). Particular PVOs

might be given funds for seeking out solutions to particular problems such as, in the marketing area, development of storage facilities and food processing techniques that are within the resource and maintenance capabilities of low income communities. Examples in areas other than marketing, should USAID want to branch out, would be techniques for making available, conserving and managing water resources, and identification and field testing of tree, food crop and animal varieties. These are merely theoretical possibilities which we offer with very limited knowledge of what is actually needed in Chad.

What such a strategy amounts to is identifying problems that are faced by many PVOs and farming them out to individual PVOs for solution. It is not meant to imply that the responsible PVOs would solve the problems by themselves. In most cases they would probably call on outside expertise, to be paid for by the Project. The PVO's role however would be to assure that the solutions developed by hired experts took fully into consideration the social and physical environment of the types of communities in which they were to be applied.

Such a marriage of technical and practical socio-ecological expertise would seem to us superior to simply calling upon technical experts and consultants. The R&D approach could, moreover, be a suitably gradual way of working into broader service capability specialization.

In consideration of the pros and cons of service specialization, we propose that in its first phase the Project experiment with R&D assigned to particular PVOs; the services needed by PVOs that many individual PVOs would prefer not to provide themselves; and types of activities that call for independent expertise and advocacy. This would occur at the same time the project is providing program and institutional development assistance to the PVOs.

D. Eligibility for Assistance under the Project

See Table 1, in section II. **The Chadian PVO Community** for a tabulated ranking of the PVOs in order of the priority we recommend they receive for assistance under the project.

An important question concerning eligibility is whether a PVO must receive institutional development support under the Project in order to be eligible for project support, or whether it can receive the latter alone. The critical test case for this purpose is SECADEV (see Annex A) which needs no institutional development support, but could always use more funds for projects, though it does have well established links to outside funding sources and much larger funding levels than any of the other PVOs we are recommending be supported.

An argument can be made for supporting an organization such as SECADEV as a means of getting A.I.D. programs down to the grass-roots level. On the other hand support to SECADEV or similar organizations doesn't offer the other advantages of support to host country PVOs since it is already so well established. Moreover, further support to SECADEV encourages bigness, which can result in attenuation of understanding about what is happening at grass roots level and preempts funds that might otherwise be used to create greater diversity in the PVO movement.

Perhaps SECADEV would be a good candidate for providing specialized services to other Chadian PVOs, for instance in the training and technical assistance area since it is itself so well developed. However, we would also give priority to less developed PVOs with respect to service capability. Beyond that, the arguments for and against assistance to SECADEV seem to us fairly equally balanced.

Aside from the SECADEV case, any Chadian PVO eligible under Chadian law and regulations to receive support from international donors and designated as eligible by USAID would be eligible for support under the Project, subject to the further conditions specified below. This would include the relatively well established PVOs and such of the emerging PVOs as are identified in this report and later on the basis of information to be supplied by the umbrella organization described below.

Among the emerging PVOs, USAID would provide support only for umbrella organizations working on at least a regional scale, not for those PVOs limited to one or a handful of proximate communities. (It should be noted that the term "umbrella organization" is used in this report in two senses, to refer to the Chadian organization to be supported by USAID that will deal with all PVOs, hereinafter referred to as the "Umbrella Organization", and regional or countrywide PVOs that include other strictly local PVOs.)

In the case of well established PVOs at least two thirds of their funding should come from sources other than the Project. Emerging PVOs should be required to match Project funding from other sources on a one to one basis. By match we mean not that an additional dollar must be raised for every dollar provided by the Project, but merely that at least 50% of the PVO's funding must come from sources other than the Project. This matching funds requirement is to encourage the PVOs to raise funds from other sources and avoid excessive dependence on A.I.D.

The principal criteria for selection of emerging PVOs to be supported would be quality of actual development activities conducted by the organization, and leadership qualities of the organization's leadership, including motivation and understanding of development. Assistance should be provided only in exception-

al cases to PVOs that do not have a track record of project implementation.

Managerial and accounting capabilities should not be a criterion of eligibility except insofar as the leadership of a PVO has demonstrated a clear and fundamental inability to manage. Otherwise the response to management weaknesses should be to require the PVO to institute systems, hire personnel and receive technical assistance and training that can meet these needs. Persistent failure to improve management would, however, be grounds for terminating aid to a PVO.

IV. SUSTAINABILITY

A. Importance and Alternatives

To realize the advantages of PVOs to the fullest extent, it is important to build into the project from its beginning efforts to create a sustainable flow of resources for the PVOs. Too often this is left to chance and the project approaches its termination date without addressing the question of where future resources, particularly for recurrent costs, are going to come from. One of the Chadian PVOs that in other respects appears to be worthy of support is a case in point. ARPES, as noted above, received a three year grant, from a Swedish church group to cover operational costs and is nearly at the end of the grant without having figured out how it is going to continue meeting its payroll.

With regard to sustainability we have already recommended that to be eligible for assistance under the Project, the PVO raise an equal amount from other sources, in the case of emerging PVOs, and double the amount in the case of well established PVOs. However, this in itself won't solve the problem.

There are three possible sources of funds for PVOs, in-country donors, outside donors, and earnings from sale of goods and services by the PVOs to their members, and/or others. The likelihood of obtaining in-country donations is slight for the foreseeable future. Resources are simply too scarce in Chad. The Project, therefore, should concentrate on developing outside funding sources and PVO sources of income.

B. Outside Funding

Funding can be obtained from outside sources in two ways, by submitting requests and projects to outside donors and by establishing links to international PVOs that have their own funding sources. The Project should do everything reasonably possible to help the PVOs develop their capacity to tap these two sources. It should, through the PVO association (see next section) help them become familiar with outside funding sources and how they work, help them develop their ability to write effective funding

proposals, and keep after them to develop links with donor organizations.

One way of establishing ongoing funding sources is through affiliation with international PVOs that have their own sources of funds. Such affiliation has other advantages. It can result in low cost technical assistance and training, and information, ideas and guidance that can be valuable in the development of the Chadian PVO. The Project should also, therefore, facilitate and encourage affiliation, particularly in the case of emerging PVOs, with international PVOs engaged in activities and with approaches to development similar to those of the Chadian PVO, with due care, however, that this is not done in such a way as to foster dependency.

C. Recurrent Costs and Income Generating Activities

One of the most difficult problems faced by PVOs is obtaining funding for ongoing, general administrative, as opposed to project costs. Although institutional development grants are available early in the life of a PVO, it becomes increasingly difficult over time for it to obtain funding for recurrent costs. More often than not this problem is addressed, if ever, only toward the end of a project providing institutional development support, so that the time left for developing alternative funding sources is less than adequate.

Developing sources of funding for PVOs recurrent costs should, therefore, receive at least as much attention as obtaining project funds, if not more, and that attention should begin early in the life of the Project. The process will not be an easy one and it's outcome is not certain. This is a risk that must be accepted if the project is to be undertaken.

PVOs can generate earnings that can be applied to their recurrent costs by such activities as marketing, transport, storage, and processing of agricultural products, extension of credit, and selling inputs to farmers (and in some cases, such as that of seed, producing them). Such activities, it should be noted, provide benefits to the farmers at the same time as they generate income for the PVOs. PVOs might also generate income by providing to each other specialized, support services of the sort described section III. C.2., **Service Capability Development**, above, especially those that can be financed by project grants.

The case of lending as an income source merits special comment. Small farmer credit usually generates losses rather than profits. It is provided at subsidized rates that represent a good deal less than its true cost (administration, risk and inflation). The Project therefore should provide funds for credit only if they are lent to the ultimate borrowers at a rate which, if it does not yield profits (which can be put back into lending

capital), at least does not decapitalize the lending funds. USAID should also do what it can in general, through advocacy for example, to encourage positive interest rates among the PVOs.

In principal USAID should encourage and assist PVO income generating activities through the Project. The first priority, at least in the case of emerging PVOs will be to help them develop their ability to carry out programs, but as more Chadian PVOs become well established, increasing attention should be paid to their sources of funds, including earned income. There may also be cases early in the life of certain PVOs where income earning opportunities coincide with activities that meet other PVO needs or that the PVO wants to conduct for the benefit of its clientele in any case. USAID support for these activities should not be limited to those related to marketing, but should include any activity that generates income for the PVO. This is an important element of institutional development and sustainability.

Before Chadian PVOs can engage in income generating activities, however, the law must be changed as discussed below in the section VI., **Chadian Government Role**, below. Chadian law currently prohibits PVOs from engaging in profit generating activities even if the profits are plowed back into development, and it limits interest to 12%.

There is also the distinct possibility that PVOs will not be able to generate enough income to meet all their recurrent costs. At best this will be a very difficult process. It calls upon the PVOs to become businesses as well as PVOs. An additional alternative should, therefore be given attention, endowments.

D. Endowment

There is another way of covering recurrent costs that should be considered along with income earning activities related to program activities (such as marketing), endowments, funded perhaps from aid-generated local currency (title III). In connection with the use of local currency for this purpose, as well as others, see section VII.E., **Use of Local Currency Funds**.

One way of endowing a PVO is to give it an asset other than cash that can reduce its costs, for example, building an office for it, which would relieve it of the need to obtain funds for rent. Taking this a step further one could provide space in the building that could be rented (on a short- or long-term basis, meeting or training space being an example of the former) to generate income that could be used to meet other recurrent costs.

Similarly, construction of farmer training centers with accommodations for the trainees is a common interest among the PVOs. In one case, in an area, where satisfactory moderately priced

accommodations are in short supply the PVO has the idea of renting rooms to visitors when not in use by trainees.

Other examples of an in-kind endowment would be to provide trucks to PVOs which they could use for transport and marketing operations from which they could derive a profit or providing a PVO with an audio-visual and publications capability that would permit it to provide reimbursable services to other PVOs, international as well as Chadian.

There are three problems that need to be considered in this connection. The first is a general one applicable to both cash and in-kind endowments, that once the PVO has the endowment it has little external incentive to continue doing its job well. This will not be a problem as long as the PVO has the right kind of leadership, but leadership can change or turn out to be less well motivated than one thought.

One way of getting around this problem might be to make the endowment to CILONG (see next section) with operating funds disbursed or the income generating asset made available for use only to those PVOs that are carrying out their mission. A variation on this alternative would be to provide CILONG with a facility with space for the PVOs (rather than endowing each PVO located in N'Djamena with facilities) and various centralized facilities and services such as: a warehouse; an office supply store; meeting and training space; a copy/publications center; a secretarial service; building maintenance and repairs; a back-up power source; a message drop, including a telephone answering and information service for PVOs located in other cities; a back-up motor pool; centralized data processing facilities; and even, a restaurant, shops and guest quarters. Firms supplying services to the PVOs such as accounting and consulting firms might also be attracted to such a facility.

Chadian PVOs could occupy the space rent free or at a subsidized rate and receive the available services without charge or at a reduced rate, and the income from the rent and service fees paid by other tenants, including international PVOs, and from sales of services could be used to fund PVO recurrent costs, including those of CILONG.

Criteria for eligibility for such subsidies would need to be developed. During the life of the project the criterion could be A.I.D. approval for project assistance. Any member would be permitted to rent offices in a PVO facility, but only members approved for Project assistance would receive free or subsidized quarters and other benefits.

During the life of the Project, permanent criteria should be developed for eligibility for such benefits. Such criteria might include: need; a clean financial bill of health, from an indepen-

dent auditor; salary levels of officials not substantially (10%, say) in excess of the PVO average in Chad; and significance and quality of programs.

The last criterion would, of course, be difficult, but, we think, not impossible, to operationalize in a sound and fair manner. The determination might be made by a committee of members, and/or might be based on an evaluation by CILONG or an independent evaluator recommending support, and/or a preponderantly favorable response by beneficiaries to an independently administered survey.

The type of facility we are proposing would have advantages in addition to the subsidies provided Chadian PVOs. Such additional advantages would include economies of scale, consolidated management (particularly desirable given the newness and small size of most Chadian PVOs) and the communication among PVOs that would result from proximity.

Of course some PVOs might feel ghettoized and not want to locate in such a facility, but that would be a good incentive for them to locate their headquarters outside of N'Djamena. Given the potential advantages of such a facility, it would seem reasonable to insist that Project-supported Chadian PVOs headquartered in N'Djamena use the facility and its services. The problem might, however, be the converse one, that the facility would tend to attract PVOs to N'Djamena a tendency that might have to be deliberately countered by providing resources and special incentives for the creation of PVO offices outside the capital.

Endowing CILONG rather than individual PVOs, of course, merely transfers the problem of reliability from the individual PVOs to CILONG, though it does simplify the problem of oversight during the life of the project. Moreover, CILONG accountability to its members (which should exist whether it receives an endowment or not, and should certainly be a condition of an endowment) would create an automatic control on its performance, a sort of system of checks and balances, since the members have a vested interest in CILONG performing in a satisfactory manner. The situation would be comparable to that of a cooperative, where the members control management, while management exercises controls over individual members that benefit the membership collectively. The members of CILONG might be reluctant to oust poorly performing fellow members, but CILONG management's raising of issues of PVO performance in such a forum would be a powerful incentive to the offending PVO to straighten itself out.

There is also, of course, the possibility that the whole enterprise would fail after significant investment. That's a problem with any capital investment, but this one might be worth the risk given its possible benefits and the absence of any easy answer to the problem of sustainability. Moreover, the amount at risk can

be augmented gradually rather than all at once, by constructing the facility in the form of a village, rather than putting everything in one building. This would give some privacy to individual PVOs as well as facilitating expansion.

This may seem a grandiose scheme for a PVO community in such a rudimentary stage of development as Chad's and an association staffed at the moment by one volunteer. However, it's important to think from the beginning about how the survival of any national PVOs and an association of PVOs assisted by the Project is to be made likely. Too often this is left to a vague expression of good intentions that are never realized. The difficulties presented by more conventional and fragmentary solutions to the problem of PVO sustainability also justify consideration of more visionary schemes.

In the case of PVOs whose headquarters are outside N'Djamena, though some of their costs might be covered by earnings from a PVO village, the most effective way of endowing them would be to give them their own facilities. This would complicate the problem of project oversight and increase the risks of mismanagement, but we think it would be worth the risk if it could solve the perennial problem of sustainability.

The third problem, also specific to an in-kind endowment, is, as a Chadian consultant has argued, that it would give the PVOs an unfair advantage vis-a-vis for-profit firms, particularly in view of the fact that PVOs already do not pay taxes. He offers as an example a grant to a PVO for construction of a headquarters building with a conference hall. The PVO's lack of investment costs combined with its exemption from taxes, he observes, would permit the PVO to underbid for-profit training firms in offering space for training sessions, thus depriving the latter of a potential source of income. However, this is part of a broader issue.

E. The Competition Issue

The consultant takes his argument an important step further. He characterizes support to Chadian PVOs as creation of an artificial demand, and argues that we should instead give the money to village associations to buy the required services from whomever they think best. This raises a fundamental question as to the validity of supporting host country PVOs at all in a country where it is unlikely that they will be able to obtain funds from local donors to cover their recurrent costs. They must in such cases be perpetually dependent on outside donors (which is a precarious sort of sustainability, if, indeed, it's reasonable to call it sustainability at all) or engage in activities that others could conduct for a profit.

This is a complicated question. It is suffice to say that on balance, we think local PVOs offer advantages of commitment to the welfare of particular groups of people that cannot be obtained through the approach suggested by the consultant and that the latter poses difficult managerial and control problems. However, the fact is that the advantages of either approach are suppositions. We don't know which would work best in practice. The alternatives are to experiment with the approach implied by the consultant's question or choose our hypotheses and live with them.

Nor do we think that the problem of competition with for-profit suppliers should deter USAID from providing resources to PVOs for income generating activities, because we think the PVO's potential advantages as a tool of development outweigh the value of preserving all options for the for-profit private sector. The alternative, as we have pointed out, is to leave indigenous PVOs precariously dependent on outside contributions to cover their recurrent costs. But this also is not an easy question.

V. THE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION

A national organization serving and representing the PVO community should serve the following purposes in connection with the development of Chadian PVOs. These purposes are listed in general order of priority. However, specific needs falling under one or another of the headings may take precedence over some requirements falling under higher priority headings. The purposes are:

- o conducting studies of the PVO community and monitoring it so as to identify emerging PVOs worthy of Project support and determining their support needs;
- o helping PVOs obtain registration with A.I.D. as well as under Chadian law and regulations;
- o monitoring the institutional development of all the associated PVOs and making recommendations or proposing conditions for support that will further the process;
- o helping emerging PVOs develop their capability of formulating project proposals for funding;
- o providing the PVOs with information on and helping them connect with overseas funding sources and international PVOs with which affiliation might be suitable;
- o helping PVOs develop their ability to do long-term, strategic, program as well as project planning;
- o helping PVOs develop income generating activities;

- o helping identify services that it would make sense for certain PVOs to provide to others, PVOs that are willing and able to provide those services and ways in which those PVOs can be assisted to develop their capabilities;
- o fostering and sponsoring exchange of services and information, joint projects, seminars, conferences and other forms of coordination and communication among the PVOs;
- o publishing documents, bulletins and periodicals (such as a monthly or quarterly magazine of the association) and preparing audio-visual materials for the information or use of PVOs;
- o identifying R&D projects to be supported by the Project;
- o disseminating the results of R&D efforts;
- o performing an initial review of PVO project proposals;
- o developing and maintaining, in dialogue with the PVOs, an overview of Chadian development needs that can provide the PVOs with a context and framework for their individual program planning;
- o identifying government policy changes conducive to grassroots development, and representing the interests of the PVO community vis-a-vis the government in connection with such policy issues, as well as on regulatory issues such as customs duties on PVO imports;
- o doing specific studies of PVO programs, such as one on the strength of their efforts to enhance the participation of women in the development process, suggested in Section II., **The Chadian PVO Community**, above;
- o conducting evaluations of PVO programs;
- o possibly, eventually, providing services such as bulk purchasing and insurance brokerage; and
- o possibly, administering endowment funds for the financing of recurrent costs of Chadian PVOs and/or a PVO facilities and service center.

For this purpose we recommend that the Project provide support for the staffing, training, technical assistance, equipment, office rental and other costs related to substantially expanding the operations of the present Chadian PVO Umbrella Organization, CILONG (**C**entre d'**I**nformation et de **L**iaison des **O**NG, Center for Non-Governmental Organization Information and Liaison). CILONG is currently only a minimal organization, with one staff member,

a European volunteer. However, that one staff member is interested in augmenting CILONG's capabilities along the above lines and appears to be capable of playing an important role in the process. We and the staff member have talked to some members of CILONG's Board of Directors concerning a possible A.I.D.-supported expansion of CILONG's role. The Board seems favorably inclined. This, of course, has been an informal, unofficial and incomplete process.

At present CILONG's only continuing tasks are gathering information on PVOs in Chad and attending meetings of or pertinent to them. Otherwise it performs those tasks assigned to it by the Board of Directors in bi-monthly meetings. For example it is currently working on standard PVO/Government agreements, a "Volunteers Day", and a computer training course for PVO personnel. At its next meeting the Board will consider assigning to its staff the task of gathering information on savings and credit programs.

There is a danger, of course, in increasing the responsibilities, and, perforce, size of an organization as substantially as the above functions would require. However, this need not all be done at once. In fact, the process of developing these capabilities can and should be spread out over a period of several years. Although the above functions are listed in order of suggested priority based on our view of their importance to the PVO development process and chronological sequencing needs, as we noted before the list of functions, external events, such as a pressing need for research on a particular problem, could result in individual exceptions to the proposed sequence.

It will be important that USAID and the organization managing the project work with CILONG to encourage participation by the Chadian members, for there is a tendency for them to be overshadowed by the international members who are often more experienced and assertive. One possible approach is to support a separate organization for Chadian PVOs. However, in addition to the duplication of expense and effort that this would entail, the international members will remain for some time through their membership fees - an important source of funding for CILONG.

There are several things that might be done to increase the importance of the role played by the Chadian members in CILONG. First CILONG might, and should, have a Chadian director, or, at least initially, co-director. Second, Chadian PVOs might be asked to speak first at meetings. Carrying this a bit further, Chadian PVOs might be given votes disproportionate to their numbers in the organization's decision making processes. For instance, they might be given 50% of the votes regardless of membership ratios. Finally, the international members of CILONG must be urged to do what they can to foster Chadian participation.

CILONG should be governed by a general assembly of the members. Any organization eligible for registration as a PVO by the Chadian government should be eligible for full membership. However, a limited, lower level membership should be available to emerging PVOs. It would also seem to us desirable that Chadian PVOs pay a lower fee than international members, which have more ample resources, if this is acceptable to the members, Chadian as well as international.

With respect to evaluations it is worth noting that an interesting technique available to PVO associations such as CILONG is to assemble teams of PVO officials on a voluntary basis to evaluate each other. Aside from costing less than hiring outside evaluators this method has the advantage of being as educational to those doing the evaluation as to those receiving it. It is, moreover, educational to the evaluators in more than one way. The evaluators learn from each other, as well as from what the evaluated PVO is doing, and are stimulated by a critical examination of others' programs to pose similar questions about their own. In this connection, see section VIII.B., **Monitoring and Evaluation**, below.

More direct forms of information exchange can also be usefully facilitated by CILONG. The Voisins Mondaiiaux method for field testing new seed varieties discussed in Annex A, for example (which involves volunteer farmers from various core communities who conduct the trials, discuss the results with each other and disseminate the successful ones to surrounding villages), could usefully be adopted by other PVOs. However, they will only learn about such things if means of exchanging information, such as bulletins and annual or more frequent meetings for that purpose are introduced. Fostering such exchanges is an important role for CILONG.

There is also a question as to whether revenue generating services for the PVO community such as production of publications and audio visual materials and bulk procurement should be handled by CILONG, which will have the same sort of recurrent cost problem as the individual PVOs, or by the PVOs providing such services to each other. The advantage of the latter is that it generates income for the PVOs and fosters cooperation among them. The advantages of CILONG carrying out these functions are that it generates income for CILONG and that it will be easier to assure the quality of such services if they are centralized in one organization rather than distributed among many. On the other hand, a couple of PVOs have expressed an interest in getting into publications and audio-visual productions as an income source.

Other things being equal, we favor centralization, since the PVOs have other potential sources of income (i.e. services and materials supplied to their beneficiaries) not available to the association. On the other hand, there is the possibility of covering

CILONG's recurrent costs through an endowment. CILONG's accountability to its members, a situation that could be made a condition of the endowment, could function as a control on CILONG's performance to assure that it did not decline at some point since it would not be a condition of survival once coverage of recurrent costs was assured.

In this connection, as in that of an endowment for the PVOs, the question of whether local currency funds should be used arises once again. The problem again is that this would facilitate and might stimulate Government efforts to control the PVO movement, in this case CILONG.

Another specific thing CILONG should do, along with publishing, to foster exchange of information among PVOs is to hold conferences of PVOs annually or more frequently to exchange experiences, ideas and technological developments. We have found that many of the PVOs have unique approaches, both organizational and technological, that might usefully be employed by the others. An annual conference would facilitate transfer of information about such methods among the PVOs.

The relationship between the role of CILONG and that of the managing U.S. PVO will be discussed in section VIII., **Project Management**, below. Basically it involves CILONG doing as much as possible with the U.S. PVO providing technical assistance and making the ultimate decisions on use of funds.

VI. CHADIAN GOVERNMENT ROLE

A. The Present Situation

At present the Chadian Government often acts as a restraint on the development of PVO programs rather than a positive force. Where its agreement is called for, e.g. in aid from international agencies, it assents only to aid to those PVOs that it has officially recognized. SPONG claims that registration is a quick and simple process, provided, it acknowledges the PVO knows people in the Government, as the SPONG acting director put it, and devotes time and attention to keeping processing of its application moving. Ministry of Interior clearance is required for Chadian PVOs. (International PVOs are required to execute an agreement with the government.)

The PVOs have a less rosy view of the authorization process. In fact, We have it from a reliable source, that pay-offs are required to register a Chadian PVO, particularly if interminable delays are to be avoided. In theory the Chadian Government should prevent this from happening. In fact, that is not so easily accomplished. In the next section we suggest measures that we think will be more effective than simple government agreement to suppress demands for improper payments, for example,

setting time limits and establishing criteria for government authorization of PVO activities, thus reducing the opportunities for officials to elicit pay-offs.

Once the PVO is authorized it must submit all its projects for prior authorization as well. This can take a considerable amount of time in the case of multisector projects, as they are submitted to every pertinent ministry for clearance and may well be sent within the ministry to various functional offices. Keeping this process moving can also require a great deal of individual attention on the part of the PVO.

PVOs are prohibited by Chadian law from selling goods or services at more than cost even where they use the profit to support administrative overhead and for programs for the benefit of their clientele. (It should be noted in this connection that, as indicated in the USAID/Senegal PVO/NGO Support Project (p.3), revised Senegalese legislation allows PVOs to establish "Economic Interest Groups" that can earn profits to finance not-for-profit development activities.) Interest rates on loans by Chadian PVOs are, moreover, limited to 12%.

The government unit responsible for PVOs, SPONG is charged with managing the authorization processes which, along with monitoring to check whether the projects are carried out in conformity with the authorization, consumes most of its time.

The Government also has been attempting to impose customs duties on donor financed, PVO imports. This is contrary to aid agreements thus affecting the donors directly. The problem is therefore likely to be resolved. It is symptomatic, however, of the heavy-handed way in which the Government sometimes approaches PVOs.

B. Required Changes

What is needed in essence is deregulation of the PVO sector, or at least a considerably lighter regulatory touch. Revision of the status and handling of PVOs should be a condition precedent for second phase project assistance. However, USAID should make its best effort to obtain what changes it can before the first phase begins, and begin negotiating with the Government for the required changes early on in the course of the first phase. If the Government appears to be dragging its feet, consideration should be given to suspending the assistance to the Government described below. If Government foot dragging is sufficiently serious, a possible suspension of the project should be considered.

The following conditions should be negotiated:

- o the processing of PVO authorizations should be limited to a fixed period of time, say three months, with the condition that if it is not completed within that time, unless the delay is due to action or inaction of the PVO, the PVO will automatically be authorized;
- o the conditions for authorization or withdrawal thereof and the information to be required in applications for authorization should be negotiated and agreed to by the Government and interested members of the donor community with the advice of the PVOs;
- o international donors should be permitted to provide assistance to PVOs that have not been authorized, up to a fixed amount a year, say \$100,000 for any one PVO, provided that they notify the Government of the nature and amount of such assistance three months before they plan to begin and the Government does not have important objections;
- o the sorts of objections that may be a basis for delay of pre-authorization assistance should be agreed upon pursuant to negotiations between the Government and the donors;
- o time limits should also be set on project authorizations, and conditions for approval or disapproval thereof negotiated in the same fashion as those for authorization of PVOs and pre-authorization funding, except that already authorized PVOs should participate fully in the negotiations;
- o SPONG should be authorized to approve projects, consulting, as it deems appropriate, with other Government agencies, but without any requirement that it obtain their approval;
- o PVOs should be authorized to sell goods and services for a profit, tax free, provided all such profits are used to cover the operating costs of the PVO or projects for the benefit of the PVO's clientele, and provided further that salaries of the PVO's personnel are not in excess of the average paid for comparable skills by other private Chadian organizations;
- o PVOs should be authorized to charge whatever interest rates are necessary to cover the cost of loan administration and risks and compensate for inflation, the maximum rate to be determined for all PVOs annually by independent audit, plus a reasonable profit for other development activities if that is desired by the PVO; and

- o all PVO imports, not just those financed by international donors should be exempt from import duties and taxes.

The last of these recommendations already appears, in a limited form, in a proposed decree governing PVOs in Chad.

C. A New Role for SPONG

1. Data Bank

SPONG should be helped under the Project to concentrate its energies on activities that will facilitate effective PVO action. To that end it should develop a computerized data bank of useful information on established and emerging PVOs, (i.e. those that are not yet authorized but show promise of undertaking significant activities) including: where the PVO operates; what sorts of projects it has undertaken and is undertaking; dates, locations, size of beneficiary populations and funding of projects; experience, qualifications and roles of personnel; technical capabilities of the organization; publications put out by the organization; structure (particularly membership, if any, eligibility for membership, lists of members, nature of governing body, e.g. general assembly of members); sources of funding ; and program philosophy and strategy. Information would be included for PVOs not yet officially authorized. This sort of information would facilitate coordination among PVOs and identification by donors of possible recipients of their assistance and participants (as implementing agents) in their projects.

2. Assistance Under the Project

To help SPONG develop these capabilities the project should provide enough computers for the data bank operation and related activities (with a margin of safety), along with accessories (such as printers and current stabilizers), software (including, e.g., database, word processing and desktop publishing programs), supplies (such as diskettes paper and printer cartridges or ribbons), technical assistance, training and funds for maintenance and repairs (including replacement parts).

SPONG should also be supplied with copying machines to facilitate the process of making copies of data bank printouts, for distribution. It may also be necessary to supply SPONG with a vehicle and operating costs to enable it to obtain the necessary data, though the UNDP may meet this need under its proposed project.

VII. ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED

A. Types of Assistance

As already indicated, assistance is recommended for institutional development of CILONG as well as Chadian PVOs, support for

marketing, micro-enterprise and family planning projects initiated by Chadian PVOs, and specialization in provision of services, advocacy and R&D.

The needs expressed by the PVOs interviewed cover the full range of imaginable inputs. Common institutional development requests included training and/or technical assistance in accounting; supplying computers and vehicles, including motorcycles and trucks; and construction of office space, so the PVOs don't need to pay rent; and farmer training centers, with equipment for the latter. Less common but nonetheless significant items included training in project management (for village level workers), proposal writing and extension methodology; well digging equipment; and funding of administrative costs. These shopping lists represent legitimate needs of the PVOs reflecting their current state of development.

Inputs needed for project purposes tend to be more various, depending on what the PVO is doing. They include such things as credit funds for a variety of purposes (including purchases by market women, loans to farmers at harvest time so that they don't need to sell their crops when the price is lowest, purchases of draught animals for plowing and transport, and purchases of equipment such as grain hulling and milling machines and wagons for transport); technical assistance in preservation of agricultural products; management training for village association officers; pumps; and cement and reinforcing rods (for well casings and storage facilities).

We recommend that assistance be for whatever is needed including, operational expenses (recurring costs) and office construction, along with equipment, materials, supplies, technical assistance and training, in addition, of course to project inputs. A similarly broad range of institutional development assistance should be provided to CILONG. In the case of CILONG the assistance would support the development of the capabilities listed above in section V., **The Umbrella Organization**. SPONG would receive assistance that would help it develop a data bank useful to PVOs and donors.

One issue that needs to be dealt with in preparation of a project amendment is the degree of specificity to be required regarding inputs. Precision will be difficult for several reasons. First, the proposed project design allows for assistance to PVOs that, although they are in an early stage of development or even not yet in existence, may, in the course of the project, demonstrate their ability to use such assistance in an effective way. The number of established Chadian PVOs is so small that it would be desirable to leave the door open to additions.

A second reason that it is difficult to specify needs in advance is the empirical modus operandi of the PVOs. Although they can tell you what they propose to do in the next few years their plans tend to be flexible, adapting to emerging problems and newly identified opportunities as they arise.

A third reason that specificity will be difficult is the sheer variety of inputs that will be needed. We are not talking about one institution here, one project theme (such as credit) or even one area, but of a multiplicity of institutions, operating throughout the country in the full range of ecological and socio-cultural zones, and engaging in a broad range of development activities.

All of these conditions make the task of identifying project inputs a laborious and uncertain one. It can of course be done, but any apparent precision at the project planning stage would be illusory, and it is questionable that it would be worth the effort. Rather we recommend an illustrative list of inputs, perhaps in order of priority, but without any attempt to quantify them.

Detailed lists will, of course, have to be developed for project implementation, and as discussed in the section on The Chadian PVO Community, above, we recommend that CILONG be given a contract to begin developing this information as soon as the PVOs to be assisted have been chosen.

One form of equipment that in our opinion would be particularly useful to the Chadian PVOs would be computers along with appropriate accessories, software and supplies. This can help them in the important task of putting their accounts in a form acceptable to A.I.D., generally increase managerial effectiveness and efficiency, and be extremely useful for preparation of such documents as proposals, plans and bulletins.

B. Level of Funding

During the first phase of the Project, to be funded under an amendment to the existing PVO Initiatives Project, approximately \$4.5 million appears likely to be available (\$5 million as yet unauthorized within the life of project \$30 million minus \$0.5 million that may be needed to complete activities under the present version of the project.)

It is difficult to estimate at this stage the level of funding that a new, follow-on project might reasonably use. That will depend on the rapidity of institutional development of assisted PVOs in the first phase and how many supportable new PVOs emerge. Our ballpark estimate is \$10 million for a 5 year project.

C. Distribution of Funds

Project funds should not, indeed cannot, be divided up a priori among specified PVOs, since, if our recommendations are followed, the amounts provided to particular PVOs would depend on the amounts of matching funds they are capable of raising. Another important factor is that we recommend leaving the door open to funding of newly emerging PVOs the identity of which may, in some cases, emerge only during the course of the Project.

Moreover, though institutional development needs can be determined in the Project amendment process and funding needed for that, accordingly, can be determined in advance, attempting to determine in advance what PVO projects will be financed is not desirable. In accordance with our perception that one of the chief advantages of PVOs is an empirical approach to development based on close monitoring of what is happening in assisted communities, we recommend that the Project support not a few, large multi-community PVO projects laid out beforehand but a large number of small ones formulated on the basis of the needs, opportunities and desires, identified in the course of the Project, of individual communities.

Funding will also be required for the Project management contract.

D. Endowments

As discussed above in section IV., **sustainability**, the use of endowments to cover the recurring costs of the PVOs and of CILONG, should be considered.

E. Use of Local Currency Funds

Title III local currency funds are an attractive potential source of funding for the Project in that the heavy preponderance of costs under the Project will be local and as a way of endowing the participating PVOs with assets that can provide them with future income with which they can cover recurrent costs. Care must be taken, however, that the use of local currency funds does not become a lever for adverse Government influence or even control over the PVOs and/or CILONG.

The endowment device might lessen this risk in that it would offer the Government only one opportunity to assert its influence, at the time of the endowment, provided the Government did not insist on a continuing say in the use of income generated by the endowment. It would be difficult to deny the Government the right to supervise the use of endowment income if it were to ask for it. However, the risk of government interference might be further reduced by using the local currency funds for the creation of assets that can be used for income generating purposes,

such as an office building with rental space, rather than simply setting up an endowment fund. If Government interference seemed likely, it is arguable that it would be better not to proceed with the use of local currency for an endowment. This would be solving one problem by buying a worse one.

There is also the possibility of using local currency funds for current PVO support, particularly for projects. This could be done through an endowment, a project, or an operational support grant agreed to in the project agreement or in the course of project implementation. A request for an endowment exceeding recurrent cost needs would seem more likely to invite Government interference. It may, therefore, be preferable to fund project costs in a more ad hoc manner. If the Government insists on control over the PVOs as the price of the use of these funds, we would, once again, take the position that it would be preferable for the Project not to avail itself of this attractive resource.

The possibility of obtaining local currency for the Project should be looked into as soon as possible, simultaneously with, if not prior to processing a project amendment. Since a large part of the project costs will probably be local, such funds could be used to get things going while dollars are on the way. They could be used, for example, to provide CILONG with staff and operating funds; for studies and the various recommended functions; for additional staffing and operational costs of PVOs; for in-country training and technical assistance; for projects; and for construction.

F. Peace Corps

The possibility of assignment to the Project of Peace Corps volunteers with appropriate skills should be looked into.

VIII. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

A. Implementation

The Project would be managed by another PVO, preferably one already working in Chad, which would have responsibility for disbursement and management of subgrants to the Chadian PVOs, assuring in particular that the funds are properly used and that the accounts of the assisted PVOs are in the form required by A.I.D. USAID might retain approval of subgrants of Project funds initially, while criteria for their use were being evolved. During that period part of the responsibility of the managing PVO would be to make recommendations to USAID concerning the proposed uses of funds. Eventually, however, this should not be necessary and, in the interests of efficiency and an effective relationship between the managing PVO and the Chadian PVO community, the managing PVO should be given authority to approve grants without USAID's prior approval.

USAID/Chad staff is too small to administer the project directly and administration of the project by a for-profit contractor would make it necessary for Chadian PVOs to obtain A.I.D. registration before receiving grants. This is a time consuming task, and many of the PVOs would need institutional development assistance before they could meet the registration requirements. While they are receiving such assistance, it will be desirable to help them get on with their programs, which entails project assistance.

If a grant is made to a U.S. PVO for management of the Project, rather than management being done by a for-profit contractor, the managing PVO can make subgrants to the participating PVOs without need for them to register beforehand with A.I.D. This would permit USAID to furnish assistance in order to help the participating PVO qualify for registration while at the same time getting on with its job. We estimate that most of the PVOs to be helped under the Project should be able to qualify for A.I.D. registration within two years of the time they have begun receiving Project assistance. Some may even qualify more quickly.

We propose making the grant to a U.S. PVO already operating in Chad on the ground that this would save time, reduce overhead costs, and provide the Project with a management unit that already knows how to operate in the difficult Chadian environment and has demonstrated its ability to do so. Given that USAID's management input into the project will be minimal, as a result of its very small staff, it will be particularly important that the project management unit has experience in Chad and has shown its ability to work there.

The managing PVO's responsibilities would also include the institutional development of the PVOs supported by the Project and of CILONG. Initially the managing PVO would provide most of the technical assistance, directly or through contract, but gradually, as CILONG's capabilities increased, responsibility for technical assistance to the participating PVOs would be shifted to it. At the same time, the managing PVO's role would become increasingly one of overseeing the work of CILONG and providing whatever advice and support CILONG might need to guide and assist the continued institutional development of the participating PVOs.

The ultimate aim is to leave behind a Chadian institution that can meet all the institutional development support needs of Chadian PVOs. During the first phase of the Project, the managing PVO would provide CILONG with the technical assistance, training and guidance necessary for CILONG to develop its ability to provide direct support and guidance to Chadian PVOs.

Among the institutional development needs of the participating PVOs and CILONG, the managing PVO should attach particular

importance to fostering and assisting their efforts to develop sources of income that can cover their recurrent costs. Over time, CILONG should take over this function along with others. It might be responsible from the beginning for helping those of the participating PVOs that need such assistance raise funds for project purposes, as distinguished from administrative overhead.

B. Monitoring and Evaluation

Although external evaluation will be necessary, particular attention should be devoted to developing the evaluation capabilities of CILONG and the PVOs themselves. In this connection see the discussion of exchange of evaluation services among PVOs in section III. above. PVO self-evaluation should also be assisted. Emphasis should not be so much on evaluation as a tool of A.I.D. Project management, but rather on the evaluation capabilities of CILONG and the participating PVOs.

IX. RELATION TO UNDP PROJECT

The proposed UNDP project would concentrate on support to CILONG and activities that would foster the development of new PVOs at the community level. The project's support to CILONG would probably be modest and that to SPONG would not include an information bank and would include at most one computer. The UN project and that proposed in this report are therefore complementary rather than overlapping.

X. WHAT NEXT?

Although we recommend that the sites of activity of the PVOs to be considered for support under the Project be visited as a final check on their capabilities and performance, we do not think it necessary that this be done before setting in motion the effort to establish a project. What we have been able to learn in N'Djamena, talking to officers of the promising PVOs and to others who know of their work, and reading documents supplied by the PVOs, makes it clear that there is a sufficient body of well motivated and competent Chadian PVOs to make a project for their support worthwhile.

The purpose of field visits would be merely to make a final determination as to which PVOs should benefit from the project. This can be done while an amendment to USAID Chad's existing PVO project is being prepared, though it might begin sooner.

We recommend that CILONG be given funds to carry out or contract for the field visits. Using expensive expatriate consultants is not necessary or justifiable, and using CILONG would get that organization started on what should be a continuing part of its work, assessing Chadian PVOs for participation in the Project and other purposes.

The possibility of using Government of Chad Title III funds for this purpose should be explored, although use of funds from the existing project would, if feasible, be recommended in the event that a prompt favorable response from the government is not forthcoming.

It would appear to us, however, that use of funds under the existing project without an amendment would be problematic given its clear specification that it is for support of specified U.S. PVOs. On the other hand, if the amounts are small, maybe no one will care, especially if an amendment is being prepared and the work to be financed is in direct support of that process. This needs to be checked further, perhaps with the regional PVO, legal advisor, and or controller.

Meanwhile negotiations should be initiated with the Chadian government as soon as possible for the use of Title III funds to support CILONG as well for other PVO support purposes. Much of what we recommend be done under the Project can be done with local currency (construction for instance) and can usefully be started before dollars arrive.

Local currency might also be used for:

- o operational support for the selected PVOs, most notably ARPES whose need is urgent;
- o project, specialization and R&D grants for the PVOs; and
- o increasing CILONG's staff and providing it with operating funds so that it can help identify suitable local currency grants to the PVOs, oversee use of the grants and carry out the other tasks listed in section V. above, **The Umbrella Organization.**

The one drawback of expanding CILONG's activities rapidly before dollar funding is available is that it would increase the managerial burdens on USAID (although these could be minimal for local currency use). Unless the Chadian government could be persuaded to give title III funds to a U.S. PVO to hire a Chadian to oversee the activity and there were a U.S. PVO willing to take on the responsibility of supervising the operation. Both of these possibilities are problematic but should be explored in the interest of getting a Chadian PVO support activity underway as soon as possible.

If the U.S. PVO were unwilling to take on this job without an additional expatriate staff member, use of funds under the current project without an amendment might be feasible, since this would be a grant to a U.S. PVO. It might not be stretching the point too much to take the position that such a grant would be in furtherance of the objectives of the existing project.

ANNEXE A: PVOS

AL-TAAWOUN

Al-Taawoun, also sometimes spelled Al-Taaoun, though the organization prefers the first spelling, is Chadian Arabic for cooperation, solidarity or mutual support. (Al-Taawoun's letterhead also bears the label Organisation d'Entreaide pour l'Autopromotion Rurale.). The organization, headquartered in Abéché (BP125, tel. 69-81-04 or 05), is one among several impressive Chadian PVOs. It is highly regarded not only by la Fondation Swissaid, which is its founding supporter, but by CILONG as well. A lengthy discussion with the Al-Taawoun director (Secrétaire Général), Alio Adoum Abdoulaye, confirmed this good opinion in our minds.

History

Al-Taawoun was registered as a PVO only a little over a year ago. However, its program is a continuation of a Swissaid program in the organization's area of operations begun in 1984 and directed by Mr. Abdoulaye from that time until the establishment of Al-Taawoun. The history of this part of the Swissaid program, therefore, is also that of Al-Taawoun.

The initial strategy of the program was to diversify farm production so as to produce in the dry as well as the rainy season. This effort was successful and the organization turned its attention next to seed storage. Farmers tend to eat their seeds in hard times, which, of course leads to other problems. Mr. Abdoulaye and Swissaid got World Food Program assistance to tide the farmers over and, at first, kept the seed for them. Eventually it created "seed banks" in the participating villages, which stored two years worth of seed, lending it to those in need on the condition that they repay in kind with 25% interest.

Next Swissaid began asking villages what they needed, dialoguing with them on the needs they identified, and getting them to prioritize them as a basis for future program support. This led to a larger variety of projects including an experience with school construction discussed under Modus Operandi, below, that nicely illustrates Al-Taawoun's persistence and its empirical approach. It also led to an interesting contract with the Chadian government whereby the government supplies teachers two of whom it pays while the community compensates others needed with food and lodging and \$35 a month (CFA 10,000), significantly less than the standard teacher salary.

Sources of Support

Swissaid continues to be Al-Taawoun's main source of financing providing approximately \$415,000 and covering 38% of its budget for the current 2-year planning period, while another 25%, approximately \$270,000, has been provided by the European Development Fund for the first year. Al-Taawoun has also submitted a funding proposal to the Canadian development organization and

held discussions with the UN Equipment Fund concerning the possibility of funding for other activities

Beneficiary Population

Al-Taawoun works with some 32,000 people, inherited from Swiss-aid, in the eastern part of the Sahelian zone, in Ouaddai and Biltine prefectures near the Sudanese boarder.

Leadership

Mr. Abdoulaye began his professional studies at the Chadian National Institute for Agronomic Studies, and completed them in the mid-1980s, after becoming director of a Chadian farmer training center (Le Centre de Formation Agricole), at the Ecole Nationale des Cadres Ruraux in Senegal. Between 1977 and his move to Le Centre de Formation Agricole he worked for Swissaid. Upon returning from Senegal he was offered a choice by the Minister of Agriculture between his old job and the Government/Swissaid project in Ouaddai, his area of origin, which was suffering severely from the effects of the Sahelian drought at that time. He chose the latter.

We have had three lengthy conversations with Mr. Abdoulaye concerning various aspects of the Al-Taawoun program. In all of these conversations Mr. Abdoulaye has shown himself to be knowledgeable about development and interested in doing the right thing.

Staff

Al-Taawoun's staff consists of the General Secretary, an agronomist, an agricultural engineer, an elementary education expert, a sociologist, three social assistants, one administrative officer and various clerical and other service personnel. It is also served by three European consultants with personal ties to the organization, an anthropologist, a civil engineer, and a political scientist who advises on evaluation. In addition it has a technical and managerial advisory council consisting of two lawyers, two economists and an administrator.

Objectives

Al-Taawoun's latest quarterly report states the objective of the organization as supporting village self-help. The organization's statutes provide a more elaborate statement. The objective of the Association it says are to:

- o establish true socio-economic self-help while struggling against flight from rural areas, hunger, malnutrition, illness and ignorance;

- o sustain local development initiatives in agriculture, animal husbandry, silviculture and construction and services relating to water needs, health, education, marketing and transport; and
- o generally improve rural living conditions.

Programs

The area in which Al-Taawoun works, the eastern part of the Sahelian zone, not far from the Sudanese border is one marked by wadis and forms of agriculture adapted to them. Thus, Al-Taawoun is concerned with the construction and maintenance of earthen dams and irrigation systems; retaining and utilizing the water deposited by intermittent rainfalls during the rainy season; and with recession culture in the reservoir beds above the dams after the water has gone.

Al-Taawoun's approach, however, like that of most of the Chadian PVOs, is best described as community based integrated rural development. It takes an empirical approach and responds to needs and opportunities as they are identified and on a priority basis.

Within this framework Al-Taawoun carries out the following activities, in addition to those stemming from the peculiar nature of wadi agriculture: off-season agriculture (also *décrue* basically); well construction; reforestation; establishment of grain banks; cultivation of communal fields for seed and grain reserves; market gardening; women's credit associations (caisses communautaires); small business promotion (ag processing and marketing, leather working, and weaving and dying); food conservation; maternal/child health; primary health care; and school construction.

Modus Operandi

The MO of Al-Taawoun, as of all the existing PVOs we are recommending be supported is encapsulated in a phrase from one of its reports: "the technician is not the principal actor." In other words Al-Taawoun places great emphasis on community participation, in every sense of the term.

Al-Taawoun's approach to development is further elaborated in its first annual report, for the year 1990. "Development aid," the report says, "must...avoid aggravating problems through short-sighted technical solutions. We must bear in mind that each unconsidered action risks destroying fragile relationships between man and nature. We must recognize also that local societies, by virtue of centuries of accumulated experience, have created mechanisms of survival that can't be replaced immediately by "civilizing" activities.

And, further on, "Development aid must, above all, activate the capabilities of [the beneficiary population] and awaken existing potential, instead of undermining, by massive technical and normative inputs, those values and self-confidence that have been able to survive the collision with European culture."

Swissaid/Al-Taawoun's empiricism and sensitivity to local conditions, is illustrated by its experience with school construction. Schools, constructed under the program of compressed mudbrick were plagued by termites causing breakdown of the straw reinforced, mud brick walls. The schools were reconstructed using stone foundations, but the termite problem continued, because, it was decided, the insects were in the mud brick mix.

Baking the bricks was proposed but opposed by one of the organization's expatriate advisors, a Swiss anthropologist, on the grounds that this would put further stress on the environment in the face of an already inadequate and diminishing supply of firewood. (Al-Taawoun is also doing environmental education and trying to introduce more efficient stoves and tree farming, including planting of the thorny prosopis and acacia to keep the community's goats off the firewood trees.) The schools then were reconstructed a third time of stone, which is plentiful in the region, with cement mortar. This eliminated termite damage to the walls, though the project eventually had to resort to metal roofs as well.

Swissaid/Al-Taawoun has also experimented with improved grain varieties obtained from an experimental station in the nearby Sudan.

Plans for Future

Al-Taawoun is particularly interested in obtaining funding for construction of an office, which would free it from dependency on donations for an important part of its overhead. A copy center, a wood and metal working shop, and a vehicle repair facility would give it the capacity to generate income, further guaranteeing coverage of its overhead. As their proposal to the UN Equipment Fund says they "hope to resolve the problem of overhead expenses within the five years of support...This is why [they] seek to create structures of self-financing."

Al-Taawoun also places high priority on "reinforcement of administrative, financial and materials management by training."

Institutional Capabilities

Al-Taawoun, backed up by Swissaid, seems to be basically sound as an institution. At least there has been nothing in our conversations with Mr. Abdoulaye, Swissaid or others, or in our reading of extensive documentation supplied by Al-Taawoun, that raises significant questions. Certainly the organization needs institutional development support, having itself identified general

and financial management training as priority needs. However, this is not so much a matter of dealing with problems as of increasing capabilities.

Further Investigation

Although there is no reason to suspect Al-Taawoun of harboring important problems that have not been revealed by the investigation made of the organization in connection with this report, we recommend as a final measure of assurance that a sampling of communities in which Al-Taawoun works be visited and ostensible beneficiaries of its activities interviewed. CILONG could do this as suggested in section V. above.

Recommendation

Al-Taawoun would, subject to inspection of projects and discussion with beneficiaries, appear to be a prime candidate for A.I.D. support.

L'ASSOCIATION D'APPUI AUX INITIATIVES LOCALES DE DEVELOPPEMENT

ASSAILD (The Association for Support of Local Development Initiatives) is well described by its name. The ASSAILD officer with whom we spoke, the Association's "Secretary" (an executive, not a clerical position), N'Djamena representative, and founding member, a mature Swiss volunteer named Genviève Pillet, was very clear about the organization's objectives and strategy, about which she had obviously thought deeply over an extended period of time. They are to help communities increase their self-help capabilities. ("Encourager l'auto-promotion" was the expression she used.) The ASSAILD brochure she gave us, of which she is the author, is equally emphatic: "ASSAILD's name," it says, "already presents its entire program."

Sources of Support

ASSAILD last year received \$54,874 from Terre des Hommes Suisse, \$48,054 from OXFAM, which has a very favorable opinion of ASSAILD, \$27,786 from Eirene, \$13,704 from HEKS, \$10,883 from Trocaire, and \$9,464 from Terre des Hommes France. It expects the contributions from these sources this year will add up to a slightly larger amount and expects Entreaide et Fraternité and SNV to join the ranks of its donors. It expects a large contribution, \$92,500, from ODA next year. It would appear that ASSAILD knows how to raise money.

Leadership

The CEO (Coordinator) and another founding member of ASSAILD is Fidel Djetodjide. Mr. Djetodjide holds a degree from the Chadian National School of Administration, one in law from the University of Poitiers, and one in Management from the University of Orléans. He worked upon his return to Chad in the Government tax office and was subsequently a deputy director of the Catholic PVO, UNAD (L'Union Nationale des Associations Diocisaines de Secours et de Développement).

Ms. Pillet is a former school teacher who came to Chad a number of years ago as a volunteer doing training of agriculture professionals, returned to Switzerland for graduate studies in education then came back to Chad as a volunteer with Ereine, a German-Swiss NGO. She has been involved with ASSAILD since its conception in 1985 and has been working there since 1988.

Beneficiary Population

We were unable to reach ASSAILD to obtain data on beneficiary population after a note went astray toward the end of our stay in Chad, but we did obtain the information that the organization currently works with 106 groupements, village associations. Assuming, probably conservatively, an average population of 50 beneficiaries each, that would come to at least 5,000 beneficiaries. The number of groupements served by ASSAILD has, moreover, grown impressively, from 6 in 1986 to its present total.

Staff

The third officer of ASSAILD is the Administrative Officer (Gestionnaire). The organization also has a secretary/typist. The three executive officers serve as the organization's animators, i.e. its points of contact with the member villages. It seems that this is ASSAILD's complete staff. However, we were unable to contact ASSAILD at the end of our stay in Chad to verify this. If so, they have very low staff to program and, possibly, staff to beneficiary ratios. This is not improbable given their emphasis on credit extended through village associations.

Objectives

See first paragraph of this annex.

Programs

ASSAILD's principal instrument of assistance is credit. According to its brochure dated January 1991, it had extended approximately \$72,000 in loans as of July 30 of last year (having begun in 1986) and dispensed approximately \$11,000 in grants. Its loans jumped from about \$6,500 in 1988 to over \$36,000 in 1989 and were running at an even higher level through the first half of 1990. Grants followed a less steeply rising curve from about \$3,000 in 1987 to close to that amount in the first half of 1990. ASSAILD charges only 10% interest on its loans, but is considering a higher rate. The maximum allowed by the Government, however, is only 12%.

As of July of last year ASSAILD was suffering from a 54% late payment rate. As indicated in its annual report (a succinct but candid and informative document of which ASSAILD furnished us a copy and which therefore can be found in the USAID PVO file), ASSAILD is taking the problem seriously and considering in a promising manner what to do about.

The largest single category of grants has been for motorbikes which ASSAILD considers important to put communities in touch with the outside world; foster communication and exchange of ideas among them; and facilitate participation in Government meetings, training programs, and trips to Association headquarters. The second largest category of grants is for half the cost of storage facilities, the other half being loan. The grant being given, according to Ms. Pillet, in consideration of the long amortization period for storage facilities and the shorter period of loans, two years. The third most common category of grants is for training. ASSAILD provides training for groupement leaders.

Plans for Future

ASSAILD plans to reduce its growth rate after 1992 with emphasis on more firmly establishing the groupements it is already working

with and with increasing focus on Savings and Credit Associations (Caisses d'Epargne et de Credit) and increased savings.

ASSAILD would like a grant to build or rehabilitate its office in Moundou. It could also use institutional development funds for technical assistance, training and equipment such as computers.

In addition ASSAILD wants to construct a training center with residence quarters the rooms in which, when not in use for trainees, would be rented to visitors. Mr. Djetodjide indicated that there were no satisfactory moderately priced accommodations for travelers in Moundou and that he saw this as an opportunity to generate income for ASSAILD without significantly adding to its administrative burdens.

Institutional Capabilities

Judging by the variety of sources from which it has obtained funds, its program growth, the quality of its presentations and the small staff with which it has been able to do so much, ASSAILD is well advanced in its institutional development and will probably be capable of using more funds well.

Further Investigation

A field investigation should be conducted, with interviews with beneficiaries, as in the case of all PVOs being considered for support under the project. The problem of loan repayment rates should also be looked into to see if ASSAILD is getting it in hand.

Recommendation

ASSAILD appears eminently worthy of support, subject to examination of some of its projects and discussion with beneficiaries. The possibility of providing such support should be pursued.

L'ASSOCIATION POUR L'APPUI AU DEVELOPPEMENT COUMMUNAUTAIRE

ASSADEC, the Association for Support to Community Development (formerly Compassion), is a very small PVO working in only four villages in Moyen-Chari Prefecture in south central Chad and has done very little in the way of development activities. It is headquartered in Sarh, the Prefectural capital.

History

ASSADEC began work in 1985 as a relief operation. The founder, Jean Toningar was a small merchant who out of personal concern with the condition of displaced persons in Sarh began distributing food among them in 1984. While doing this he was invited by a Catholic priest to form a PVO which became ASSADEC. The organization got relief money from BELACD a regional Catholic PVO and from Protestant missionaries in the area.

Subsequently ASSADEC moved into development work directing its initial attention to food security problems and seed supplies. It worked with its four villages for this purpose and the establishment and cultivation of communal fields. Subsequently it supported the construction of two village storage facilities, with a French Government grant. It also tried to do something with animal traction, but the effort did not go well.

Sources of Support

Protestant Missionaries gave Mr. Toningar approximately \$4,500 for relief work and BELACD approximately \$1,000 for relief and close to \$5,000 for operations, a motor scooter, furniture and training. Coopération Francaise, as indicated, gave ASSADEC money for construction of two village grain storage facilities.

Beneficiary Population

ASSADEC works in only four villages. We did not ascertain their population

Leadership

Mr. Toningar completed a technical secondary education in commerce and attended a several month training course in rural development and animation under BELACD sponsorship. At the time he began his relief work he had a small vending stand. Since forming ASSADEC he has worked only for it, however, he does not receive a salary. He is supported by a sister with a well-paying job.

We advised Mr. Toningar that ASSADEC did not seem to fit the criteria we were recommending for A.I.D. support because of its small size and limited experience and suggested that he formulate a list of international PVOs that help organizations like his and make the rounds to them. He reacted to this in a dispirited manner (sighing and rolling his eyes) and argued that ASSADEC's smallness should not be a problem because its statutes provided

for it to cover the whole Prefecture and the only reason it hadn't done more was that it hadn't been able to get the money.

Although Mr. Toningar seems to have gotten into development for the right sorts of reasons, his demeanor raised a question for us about his leadership qualities.

Staff

We failed to ascertain whether ASSADEC has any staff other than Mr. Toningar

Objectives

When asked what his concept of rural development was, Mr. Toningar replied that it involved the supplying to peasants information that they lack and need for development.

Programs

See History above.

Modus Operandi

See above.

Plans for Future

To get some money to carry on operations and finance overhead.

Institutional Capabilities

As is clear from the above material, ASSADEC has very limited institutional capabilities.

Further Investigation

There is a rumor that ASSADEC diverted funds improperly. If, at some future date, ASSADEC is to be considered for assistance, this rumor must be investigated. Mr. Toningar's leadership capabilities should also be assessed further if USAID assistance is to be considered.

Recommendation

ASSADEC should not be considered for assistance at this time, but CILONG should continue to monitor its progress, or lack thereof, and advise USAID if and when the organization has been able to obtain additional funding from other sources and carry out programs of a sufficient magnitude to provide an adequate basis for judging its capabilities.

L'ASSOCIATION POUR LA PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT

APPE is an organization in the process of formation with the purpose of public education and environmental action. The Statutes of the organization exist in draft, the process of seeking government authorization has begun and a site for a farmer training and demonstration center has been chosen.

APPE's chief asset, aside from a concern with environmental protection, is its leadership. The person who has taken the lead in forming the organization is Dr. Balaam Facho, who has been Minister Public Works and Foreign Relations as well as Secretary of State in the Ministry of Plan. His educational background is in animal husbandry in which he has a doctorate from the University of Dakar.

In our discussions Dr. Facho struck us as intelligent and genuinely concerned about environmental protection. Indicative of an interest in environmental matters, is the fact that a year and a half ago, well before he left the government last December, he took the trouble to plant varieties of trees with potential economic and environmental value (teak, leucaena and prosopis) in his yard.

It is clear from discussion with him that he understands the problems of overgrazing and desertification, the importance of economic incentives for reforestation, and such technical matters as the value of certain tree leaves as fodder.

He volunteered in the course of our conversation that he considered environmental protection and community organization two of the top three development priorities. He stated that communities can't keep waiting for a "providential" government to solve their problems but must take their development into their own hands, and can accomplish much by doing so. As an example he cited the case of his village of origin, which, he related, created a health care association at his urging. As a result, the community was able to obtain government support for a dispensary. Mr. Facho is hereditary chief of the village, Kolobo, 65 kilometers from Bongor in the southwest of Chad, and visits it, he told us, at least three times a year.

Though it's possible that he mentioned community organization also because it's popular with international donors, that seems less likely. Rather this seems to reflect a sincere and thoughtful concern on Dr. Facho's part about development priorities and rural communities.

The possibility exists, given Dr. Facho's background that he may approach the community in a paternalistic manner rather than having a genuine commitment to participation. This might work well in a village of which he is hereditary chief, but be less

effective in developing strategies for motivating farmers to take environmental protection measures.

However, we have no reason to believe that Dr. Facho is paternalistic, or the contrary. Talking to him is not a sufficient basis for forming a judgment. The only sufficient basis would be seeing him in action at the village level, either directly or through programs run by him. As this is not yet feasible, it would seem that the best that can be done if support were to be given to APPE in the near future, would be to monitor APPE programs to determine the organization's sensitivity to the need for participation and take corrective measures if it is insufficient.

I was told by an Italian volunteer who is working in SPONG and who impressed me as perceptive, intelligent and candid, that Dr. Facho approached his job of designing the proposed UNDP NGO project energetically, imaginatively and critically. He apparently has a sincere desire to find ways of improving the organization, without hesitating to make recommendations that might not be pleasing to those in positions of power. Mme. Carlier, the Belgian volunteer who runs CILONG also has a good opinion of Dr. Facho's work on the UNDP project and of Dr. Facho's in general.

Although it violates one of the criteria we have recommended for selection of PVOs to be supported under the project to provide assistance to one with no track record, given the importance of environmental protection, it is our opinion that it is worth considering an exception for APPE unless there is a PVO with a (respectable) track record in environmental protection advocacy, which, so far as we have been able to determine, is not the case.

L'ASSOCIATION RURALE POUR L'AUTO-PROMOTION ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL

History

ARPES (the Rural Association for Economic and Social Self-Advancement), was established as a PVO in 1987. However it is successor to predecessor organizations, beginning as a club in 1981 to help the members' community of origin, and passing through an extended phase during which it worked in only one community.

With the exodus of southerners from N'Djamena in 1982 (the "repli"), André Adogré, the director of ARPES, who was then working for CARE, and some friends who had returned from N'Djamena formed a club to help their native village. As the area was a rice growing one, they were able to use fish farming expertise Adogré had developed in his work with CARE to introduce tilapia into ponds on the edges of the paddies. From fish culture ARPES got into rice culture, hydraulic engineering, market gardening and marketing, grain milling, grain storage, village pharmacies, reforestation and literacy. While ARPES increased the variety of its activities it also expanded the number of villages in which it was carrying them out and opened programs in new geographic areas.

Sources of Support

ARPES is currently receiving support from Diakonia a Swedish religious organization and Oxfam. In the past it has received support from the Programme de Solidarité pour le Développement du Sahel (PSDS), of the Conseil Oecuménique des Eglises, a Protestant church group headquartered in Ouagadougou, the Commission d'Entraide Sociale des Eglises et d'Assistance aux Réfugiés, and the French government aid agency FAC (Fond d'Aide et de Coopération). ARPES had a personal connection to PSDS in that Mr. Adogré is an active member of one of its affiliated churches.

Beneficiary Population

ARPES currently works in 24 communities in Chari-Baguirmi, Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjile and Logone Orientale, with a collective population of 18,335 people.

We mention a precise population figure because the way in which we obtained it suggests something about the organization's managerial style. When we asked the director how many people the organization served, he said "Let me ask our statistician for the latest figure," and left the room, presumably to speak to the statistician. Fifteen minutes or so later the statistician called in the above figure.

Leadership

The director (Coordinator) of ARPES, André Adogré, is a founding member, along with the statistician (actually Chief of Management, Administration and Studies). Mr. Adogré was trained as a

construction technician, then got into construction of water systems, and from there into working in fish farming for CARE. As noted above, while with CARE he, along with friends from his village of origin who had come back from N'Djamena during the repli, formed a club to help their village. This eventually became ARPES.

Mr. Adogre seems to have commendable motivation and intelligent notions of what development is about. Although he lacks the sophistication (perhaps just the articulateness) of the heads of some of the other organizations we looked into, he seems to possess the basic prerequisites for effective leadership of a PVO. This is also the opinion of OXFAM and CILONG personnel who know him.

Staff

In addition to the director and statistician/manager ARPES has two area subdirectors (Secrétaires de Liaison), an accountant, a Revenue Activities Generation Officer, a Studies Officer and 4 animatrices in the project areas.

Objectives

ARPES states its objectives as:

- o fostering village organization, taking account of traditional structures, so as to permit active participation in development;
- o helping develop means available in traditional society for meeting development needs, namely,
 - increasing income
 - assuring food self-sufficiency
 - improving health and education
 - promoting increased responsibility of communities for their own development; and
 - promoting integrated development embracing all economic and social sectors.

Programs

ARPES works in the tier of prefectures running south from Lake Chad along the western side of the country, Chari-Baguirmi, Mayo-Kebbi, Tandjile and Logone Occidentale and Orientale. Like the other Chadian PVOs its programs, such as rice and fishculture, are very much a product of the environment in which it works.

The functional areas in which ARPES works are described above under "History". In addition, it is preparing to set up a

training center in its original village, Eré, to open next year, where it will provide training in: pump maintenance and water systems management; surveying; management of village associations, groupements, including accounting and project planning and evaluation, secretarial, managerial and cashier functions; grain bank and storage management; and cost/benefit analysis for small business.

Modus Operandi

ARPES carries out its projects through village management committees of from 5 to 12 persons whom it trains.

Plans for Future

In addition to the training center, which ARPES is already in the process of setting up and continuation and expansion of its existing programs, ARPES is seeking funds to reactivate a Fish Farming Center it previously worked with not far from N'Djamena.

Institutional Capabilities

ARPES has run into a problem that would appear to be indicative of lack of managerial foresight. It is coming to the end of a three year grant covering recurrent costs without having developed an alternative means of meeting that need. If, however, ARPES survives until Project funding is available, we do not think the failure to develop recurrent cost funding sources is a reason for not providing the organization with further support. This is a common problem with PVOs, and, for that matter, cooperatives. Rather we see it as a reason, as discussed in the body of this report, for paying particular attention to the problem of generating sources of funding for recurrent costs.

Another possible sign of institutional weakness, a fish farming center (at Doumngar) that ARPES wants to reactivate apparently ran into financial problems, though the local participants were using "profits" for family needs and investment. Aside from raising a question, not adequately dealt with in ARPES's proposal, about the feasibility of the enterprise, this raises a further question about ARPES's program management and foresight. Any project can run into difficulties and most do. The question is the extent to which it appears that a given difficulty should have been foreseen or recognized earlier than it was, and what this implies about the capabilities and limitations of the assisting organization.

Finally, earlier appraisals of ARPES, a 1985 evaluation and a 1987 project proposal assessment, the second of which was based on the first, by PSDS took the position that ARPES tended to spread itself too thin. Related to this is a criticism that ARPES takes a project by project approach (if that is a fair translation of "travaille par des réalisations ponctuelles") rather than having a global strategy for the assisted communities. Finally these documents state that ARPES was mistaken to

get into fish farming and pig raising, that it was not profitable.

ARPES may be spreading itself too thin. If so, the problem is not unique to it. Wide ranging integrated rural development tends to be the norm for the Chadian PVOs. As for pigs and fish, ARPES argues that the appraisers' position on profitability was erroneous.

With regard to the project by project criticism, the appraisers don't offer a very complete explanation of what they have in mind. It appears that they may have been looking for more rigid adherence to the sort of preconceived plan that would have worked against ARPES's commendable empirical modus operandi and that would result in something less than integrated rural development. On the other hand, they may just have been thinking of more rigorous prioritization. Aside from the possible need for more prioritization, it is not clear to us that what ARPES is doing doesn't add up to a sensible strategy. PSDS, moreover, went on to finance the project. Despite these mitigating considerations and the age of the PSDS criticisms, they are of nature that seems to us to warrant further explanation, if not as threshold questions concerning the appropriateness of aid to ARPES, at least as questions affecting the sort of aid that is needed.

Judging from the funding proposals we have seen, ARPES has a substantial ability to formulate and justify such proposals. Those we have seen contain reasonably thorough and logical descriptions and justifications, including technical analyses, budgets and cost/benefit analyses.

Further Investigation

ARPES's failure to find a source of ongoing funding raises a question about its institutional planning capabilities and managerial sense of priorities. This is not so much a reason for not assisting ARPES as something to be focused on by an assistance program. In addition, the questions raised by the two earlier ARPES appraisals should be looked into.

Although we have seen ARPES Accounting Plan, we have not subjected it to any analysis or examined actual accounts. These also will require further investigation, but only if it is decided to go ahead with support of ARPES on the basis of other findings. As already indicated, we recommend that accounting systems should not be a basis for deciding whether a PVO should receive support or not, but rather an indication of what sort of support it needs. Failure to meet AID accounting standards is a common problem among PVOs. Moreover, most of the PVOs we spoke to volunteered that they wanted training in accounting. This is not to say that PVOs which have shown an egregious disregard for reasonable accounting standards, or ones that have been guilty of misuse of funds should be assisted under the project, merely that

accounting systems per se should not be a basis for deciding eligibility.

Recommendation

On balance it appears to us that ARPES, notwithstanding its problems, is worthy of consideration for A.I.D. support and that further investigation of it should be undertaken.

CAISSES RURALES D'EPARGNE ET DE CREDIT

CREC (Rural Savings and Loan Association), at Mondou is an organization well known to Mme. Pillet of ASSAILD who vouches for the quality of its work and for its director Mr. Ningatouloum Tain-Tain. OXFAM provides financing for CREC and also vouches for the soundness of the organization. Mme. Carlier of CILONG had also heard good things about CREC.

CREC is not registered as a PVO with the Chadian Government.

CILONG should be asked to do an appraisal of CREC along the lines of those provided for other PVOs in this Annex.

LE CENTRE D'ANIMATION RURALE DE MAILAO

CARM (The Mailao Center for Rural Promotion) has been visited by Mme. Carlier who formed a positive impression of it. CARM is financed by the Mission and World Deaconate of Reformed Churches of the Netherlands (CZWD) and states that it works "by Christian witness." It describes its Board of Directors as its "morale, legal and spiritual personality," and those eligible as members of it are listed as "persons experienced in rural development, those representing churches, and, in general, all Christians interested in the problems of the peasant masses."

However it also describes its objective as "bettering the standards of living of the peasant masses without ethnic, religious or linguistic distinction," and its activities include introduction of animal traction, agricultural extension, agricultural input supply, seed multiplication (an operation that Mme. Carlier of CILONG saw and describes as very well run), community silos, credit, recession, décrue, culture (wetland cultivated during the dry season after the water has receded from it), animal husbandry, training, a tree nursery, including fruit trees, "responsibilisation" (which we suppose is translatable as fostering a spirit of self-help), a meteorological station, "etc."

CARM seems to us to be worthy of more analysis along the lines provided and suggested for other PVOs. CARM's director is Roger Gangboussou. CARM does not have a telephone. Its address of record is B.P. 161 N'Djamena.

LE CENTRE D'ETUDES POUR PROMOTION ET RENTABILISATION
DES INITIATIVES COMMUNAUTAIRES

CEPRIC (The Study Center for Promotion of the Profitability of Community Initiatives) apparently does not yet satisfy the recommended criterion for support under the Project of having carried out actual development activities. It offers instead a brochure as pedantic as the organization's name. The brochure also betrays patronizing attitudes toward peasant farmers, seeming to think that insufficient education is the principal cause of their problems and that CEPRIC knows what's best for them. The brochure mentions lack of training, organization, adaptability and (outside?) leadership ("encadrement"), but never once mentions the need for resources. "The peasants must" is a frequent refrain.

The brochure also betrays preconceptions that, if not adding up to ideology, come close. It repeatedly characterizes CEPRIC's objective as modernization without defining the term and invariably calls for formation of groups, never allowing for help to individuals or families, even in the case of microenterprise development.

The organization's strong point seems to be bureaucratic organization. It proposes to help "the least favored populations emerge from their misery" through a Bureau of Research ("Bureau d'Etudes"), which would perform the studies CEPRIC deems necessary to understand the peasant's problems and come up with solutions for them. The Research Bureau would have three divisions - Project Organization, Evaluation and Budgeting, and Training, Documentation and Publication. The officers of the association consist of a President, a Vice-President, an Executive Secretary, a Deputy Executive Secretary and seven Advisory Members.

After CILONG turned CEPRIC down for membership on the grounds that an organization had to have carried out development activities to be a member, CEPRIC spread the word that CILONG was not ready to help Chadian PVOs. This should apparently, in CEPRIC's case, be permitted to remain a self-fulfilling prophecy.

CENTRE HORTICOLE D'ANIMATION RURALE DE BOUGOUMENE

Three very credible informants described the director of CHARB as being a problem.

COMMUNAUTE POUR LE PROGRES-GOUNDI

This organization, runs a hospital and a local "zootechnological" training center. It is described by Mme. Carlier of CILONG as having well-run programs, but being essentially a one man operation, run by an Italian priest, Father Gherardi. It is supported by an Italian PVO, ACRA.

There is a question about whether, being a one man operation run by an Italian, this is a Chadian organization, though somehow, in defiance of SPONGs usual conservatism about characterizing a PVO as Chadian, it lists CHARB as such. A second problem is that a hospital is the wrong kind of health program. It is, in principle, not primary health care, much less a maternal-child health program. It also does little to foster self-help, unless it has some sort of extension program.

The training center is also problematic. It lacks the broad integrated rural development virtues of the other PVOs. On the other hand, it could be of interest as a specialized training service for the other PVOs, if it does its job well.

The organization should be visited and appraised with the above questions in mind.

DARNA

History

Darna, Chadian Arabic for Our Country, was formed in 1988 by its current director, Adoum Soumaïne and a friend, with the support of Swissaid. The founders began by doing a study of villages in the zone in which it had chosen to work and came up with the conclusion that lack of water, for humans and animals, and low incomes, were the most important problems. So they began their program by providing cement, molds and technical assistance to the participating villages for well casings the villagers were to dig themselves. They came up with gum arabic collection as an income generating activity.

The main occupation of the farmers in the area was raising livestock, but the livestock was not their own. It belonged to well-to-do people in the capital and the farmers were paid very little for tending their livestock for them. However, the farmers' animal husbandry activities were less demanding during the dry season than during the rainy season, so the Darna group looked for something that could be done in the off-season. Gum arabic harvesting fit the bill.

Darna persuaded some farmers to try gum arabic collection and obtained the Government's agreement to provide extension assistance. The first effort failed as the extensionists weren't very knowledgeable, whereupon Darna found farmers elsewhere in the country who were experienced with gathering the gum and brought them to the project area to show the local farmers how to do it.

With that Darna began to note and respond to other needs with such programs as support to savings and loan associations that were common among women in the area, who used the loans to buy produce which they then marketed. That led Darna to the problem of bookkeeping, which they still haven't solved because most of the women are illiterate, as a result of which there are continuous set-tos about how much was borrowed and how much repaid. Darna also got into community efforts to develop communal fields and storage facilities to create a reserve for those who ran into trouble.

At an earlier stage of the program Darna considered supporting welfare activities, such as health, but decided that it should concentrate on income generation. This it argues, will provide communities with the resources they need to obtain other benefits.

Sources of Support

In addition to continued support from Swissaid, Darna has obtained funds from Oxfam (\$51,000), the Agence Francaise de Volontaires pour le Progrès (\$48,000), and USA for Africa, a U.S. PVO, which we understand obtained its resources from fund-raising

efforts related to the Sahelian drought and has given away all its funds and closed shop. Darna obtained over \$55,000 from USA for Africa and close to \$60,000 from Swissaid.

Beneficiary Population

Darna works in 11 villages in the two cantons east of N'Djamena in the Prefecture of Chari-Baguirmi with a population of approximately 6,000 beneficiaries. It's goal is to increase this to 32,000. Given the businesslike way in which the director of Darna approaches his work, this doesn't seem an unrealistic goal.

Leadership

Mr. Soumaïne was a secondary school teacher in N'Djamena in 1982 when the suffering of people in the countryside, from the combined effects of drought and civil war, became a topic of discussion among teachers in the school. They formed a club and went out into villages to try to do something. Two of them, one of whom was Soumaïne, remained active and eventually went to Cameroon to study regional planning and enterprise management at the Pan-African Development Institute. On his return to Chad Soumaïne went to work for World Neighbors (Voisins Mondiaux) where he worked until founding Darna.

Staff

Darna's staff consists of Mr. Soumaïne who works also as an animator, an accountant/animator, a secretary/cashier/animatrice and another animatrice. It is worthy of note that, as in the case of ASSAILD, Darna's professional personnel combine village work with other, managerial responsibilities, an interesting model. A computer would free the secretary for field work as well as being helpful to the other personnel.

Objectives

Darna states its goal as sustaining global and endogenous development through socio-economic activities among the most deprived populations.

Programs

See History, above.

Modus Operandi

One of the documents furnished us by Darna contains a "schematic" describing its methodology as consisting of the following four steps:

1. exploratory discussion of problems, causes and possible consequences;
2. conscientization;

3. decision on activities to be undertaken and agreement between Darna and the community on respective responsibilities; and
4. establishment of village development committees to make decisions on and carry out the chosen activities.

Plans for Future

Darna's plans for the future include a reduction of support for well digging, as this, its judgement takes too much time, and a concentration on revenue generating activities including further increases in gum arabic production, intervention in the marketing process (currently handled by buyers from outside the community) including exports, and expansion of the women's savings and loan association program already underway.

Mr Soumaïne is particularly interested in ways of generating income for Darna so that it doesn't need to be dependent on donors for its basic operating costs. Darna includes an overhead percentage in its project proposals but is beginning to encounter resistance to this and would like, in any case, to make its overhead funding independent from that for projects. In this respect Mr. Soumaïne expressed an interest in obtaining audio-visual and desktop publishing equipment with which he proposes to obtain income from the sale of services to other PVOs.

Institutional Capabilities

As indicated by the above and our conversations with Mr. Soumaïne, Darna, at least at the leadership level, possesses a fair degree of intellectual and managerial sophistication. It's performance record indicates that it is capable of carrying out appropriate development programs as well. This is not to say that there's no room for improvement. Indeed, Mr. Soumaïne expressed an interest in training in accounting and project management. However, it does imply that Darna appears to meet the criteria for support under the Project.

Further Investigation

Darna, as all PVOs accepted for participation under the project, should be subjected to a field inspection, i.e. a field examination of what it has done and discussions with the ostensible beneficiaries.

Recommendation

We were very favorably impressed with Mr. Soumaïne and Darna's approach to development and the organization is well thought of by CILONG and Oxfam. It would appear that Darna is a prime candidate for A.I.D. support, subject to inspection of some of its activities and discussion with beneficiaries.

L'INSTITUT AFRICAIN POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL

INADES (The African Institute for Economic and Social Development) is a regional PVO with headquarters in Abidjan that is well thought of by a number of persons we spoke to. Although it is not a Chadian organization, we were advised it plans to set up a Chadian affiliate. When we called INADES, we were told by Mme. Terrier, the Director, that they didn't expect to get around to forming a Chadian branch for a couple of years and that they were too busy to meet with us. USAID should keep track of them either directly or through CILONG.

SECOURS CATHOLIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

SECADEV (Catholic Relief and Development) is a borderline case with respect to the definition of a Chadian PVO. Although its Director General and one of the three Directors under him, the Director of Finance and Administration, are European, the Directors of Projects and Emergency Relief are Chadian as is the Deputy Director of Administration and Finance, for Management. He is the only deputy director in organization.

It is arguable that SECADEV meets the functional criteria recommended in section II above for definition as a Chadian PVO. It can be said that Chadians have a predominant role in the organization's decision-making processes and that the organization would be likely to continue to function effectively if its foreign officers were withdrawn. Because of its staff composition, origins and orientation, SECADEV is also likely to continue to maintain a more permanent presence in Chad than foreign PVOs with a less deeply rooted commitment to the country.

The Director of Projects, moreover, struck us in our conversations with him as intelligent and forceful, having the sort of personality we look for in an organizational leader. The door should not, therefore, be closed on nationality grounds to providing assistance to SECADEV under the project.

There is, however another problem with SECADEV. It is too well established. Its budget for the two year period 1990-92 is close to \$7,000,000 and its professional staff numbers 224 people. SECADEV, thus, is in a class by itself when compared with the other PVOs discussed in this Annex.

Although SECADEV could always do more, A.I.D. support is not needed for its institutional development. SECADEV is extremely well organized, has very solid links to outside funding sources and has very sophisticated planning and marketing capabilities, as evidenced by its 200 page Rapport d'Activités et Compte-Rendu Financier 1990 (Activity Report and Financial Report for 1990) a copy of which we have inserted in USAID's PVO file.

On the other hand, as also evidenced by the annual report, SECADEV has a very sound concept of development and an excellent outreach capability. SECADEV's Roman Catholic foundations do not appear to me a significant limiting factor. SECADEV's programs are in the predominantly Muslim Sahelian zone and the Director of Projects is a Muslim. (A separate group of Catholic organizations, the BELACDs function in the Christian south of the country.) If, therefore, USAID wishes to expand the coverage of Chadian PVOs through the Project, rather than limit its thrust to institutional development--and there is something to be said for such an effort--SECADEV would be an excellent candidate for

support. If SECADEV were admitted to the program, the BELACDs should be looked into and considered for similar support.

SECADEV might also be able to provide technical assistance and training to other PVOs and, in the opinion of its Director of Projects, would be interested in doing so.

VOISINS MONDIAUX

World Neighbors, known in Chad as "Voisins Mondiaux" is a U.S. PVO, which plans to convert its Chadian branch to a Chadian organization and terminate its program in Chad as of June 1993. According to the current Voisins Mondiaux (VM) Coordinator, Youssouf Doldiguim, VM is terminating here because of funding problems and the remoteness of the program from its other programs in Africa the easternmost of which is in Burkina Faso.

Beneficiary Population

Voisin has worked with 39 villages in two areas in Chari-Baguirmi and Mayo-Kebbi (Guelendeng) with a combined population of roughly 2,700. However, the Gueledeng project is now in suspension due to lack of funds

Leadership

In response to our question as to how he got into development Mr. Doldiguim replied that he had wanted to help the poor since he was a child. He ascribed this desire to his father, a village leader in the south, who had similar concerns. However, according to Mr. Doldiguim's description of VM's approach, neither its interventions nor his are paternalistic. Both place heavy emphasis on development of beneficiaries' ability to meet their own needs, participatory planning, and maximizing community self-help in project implementation.

Mr. Doldiguim is educated only through the secondary level, baccalaureate. However, he appeared to us to have a concept of grass roots development in no way inferior to that of more highly educated development agents, and a more than adequate grasp of the technical aspects of the process. This is not to say that technical training would not be useful to him, merely that he has, in our opinion, what it takes to be an effective leader of a PVO program in terms of knowledge and understanding of the development process.

Mr. Doldiguim's understanding of the development process appears to have derived from a sincere concern for the needs of the disadvantaged and four years experience as a village level animator with VM, preceded by 6 doing refugee relief and rehabilitation work with CARE.

We were thus favorably impressed with both Mr. Doldiguim's motivation and concept of development. The CILONG Director, Marielle Carlier, has known Mr. Doldiguim for over a year and has a very positive opinion of him.

Staff

In addition to Mr. Doldiguim, VM has a staff of 6 persons - an agriculture specialist, a community health specialist, an animator, an animatrice, a secretary and a watchman.

Programs

VM's program covers, as described by Mr. Doldiguim, four areas of development - agricultural production and storage, water resources, preventive health, and community organization.

Modus Operandi

Mr. Doldiguim informed us that VM had tested three varieties each of millet, sorghum and beans, and two of peanuts, supplied by the FAO/Government of Chad agricultural research center at Grassi, in the communities in which VM works. VM's manner of testing is to enlist volunteer farmers in six core villages (villages moteurs), to test the varieties on small experimental plots next to their larger fields. After the test had been completed, VM assembled the participating farmers to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the varieties and then invited farmers from surrounding, "satellite," villages to view the favorable results.

Mr. Doldiguim also offered examples of VM appropriate technology activities. VM, he explained, helped with two kinds of potable water systems, those using metal hand pumps and those using animal powered bucket (actually innertube segment) hoists. Mr. Doldiguim also discussed his interest in developing agricultural product storage facilities using locally available materials and community self-help efforts.

The water supply systems described by Mr. Doldiguim also offered a good example of VM's self-help principal in action. The only things VM supplied were cement for well casing and technical assistance, including assistance in locating water. The villagers themselves dug the wells, some as deep as 45 meters, built molds and cast the casing segments.

Plans for Future

At the moment, Mr. Doldiguim's principal concerns are to find funding sources that will take over when World Neighbors terminates its support, and to resume operations in the Guelendeng area. He is also currently interested in developing storage facilities using locally available materials and community self-help efforts.

Institutional Capabilities

Voisins Mondiaux would appear to be basically capable of carrying out an effective development program. It obviously has something to learn about fund raising.

Further Investigation

The reasons for the termination of the Chad program might be checked with the VM regional representative, Peter Gubels, who works out of Burkina Faso. He can be contacted at telephone number 30-31-46 in Ougadougou. VM's address in Ouagadougou is 01 BP 1315. Mr. Doldiguim, resides in Djarmaya, in Chari-

Baguirmi prefecture, and does not have a telephone, but frequently visits N'Djamena and can be contacted through CILONG.

As a further check we suggest a visit to the project site and discussion with the beneficiaries to determine the nature of their participation, what sort of benefits the VM activities have conferred on them, how VM has responded to problems and their perception of VM and Mr. Doldiguim.

One potential problem with VM is that the international organization has religious (Protestant) origins. However, it does not appear to us that Mr. Doldiguim's aim is proselytization or that he would let his personal religious views interfere with sound development work. In fact, the villages in which VM works in Chari-Baguirmi are, according to Mr. Doldiguim, predominantly Muslim. The question of sectarian bias can be checked further by visiting the communities in which Voisins Mondiaux has worked.

Finally the beneficiary communities should be visited for a check of program efficacy and beneficiary opinions of Voisins Mondiaux. The interest in the Guelendeng communities in a resumption of VM assistance would be a particularly interesting test of VM's effectiveness.

Recommendation

Although VM is currently an international PVO, it is soon to become a Chadian one, and would seem, on the basis of our interview with Mr. Doldiguim, to be a good candidate for USAID support. Its approach to rural development appears to be sound, and, most important, we were very favorably impressed with Mr. Doldiguim's apparent motivation and views on the development process.

ANNEX B: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

Alio Adoum Abdulaye, Coordinator, Al-Taawoun

André Adogre, Coordinator, ARPES

Datouvane Adougmara, Controller, ARPES

Wendy Ascher, Project Director, ORT

Jean-Pierre Bemadjita, Acting Coordinator, CILONG and volunteer at ACRA (Italian PVO)

Marielle Carlier, Coordinator, CILONG

Achta Djibroune Sy, Chargé de Projets Féminins, OXFAM

Félix Djeodjide: Coordinator, ASSAILD

Youssef Doldiguim, Coordinator, Voisins Mondiaux

Balaam Facho, principal author of UNDP PVO project and former Chadian Secretary of State for Plan and Minister of Public Works and Foreign Affairs

Joseph Hindman, Country Director, Peace Corps

Luesette Howel, Assistant Project Director VITA

Moussa Idriss, Directeur de Projets, SECADEV

Ralph Klingele, Coordinator, Swissaid (Swiss PVO)

Abba Koura, Directeur Adjoint and Chief of Follow-up Division, SPONG

Aoua Kriga, Family Planning Officer, USAID

Baïodji Maoulé: Chef de Mission Adjoint, Ereine (German PVQ)

Son Hoang Nguyen, Project Manager, PVO Dev Initiatives Project, USAID

Ivan Ose, Project Director, VITA

Ahmet Oumar, Chief, Personnel Division, SPONG

Genviève Pillet, Abidjan Representative, ASSAILD

Bick Riley, Director, Africare

Mohamad Saleh Adam, in charge of ONG project, UNDP

Louis Sarazin, Director, UNAD (Union Nationale des Association
Diocesaines de Secours et de Développement, umbrella organization
for Catholic PVOs in south of Chad)

Günter Simone: Chef de Mission, Ereine

John Smith, Project Director, ACDI

Adoum Soumaïne, Coordinator, Darna

Isaac Tadambe, Training Officer, USAID

Jean Toningar, Director ASSADEC

Salomon Yondailou que Tollum, Administrative Officer, VITA

ANNEX C: REFERENCES

This annex lists those documents consulted for this assessment that were furnished by the PVOs analyzed herein but not, due to the collective and, in some cases, individual bulk of the documents, copied for USAID files. The list does not include documents consulted that were already in USAID files or of which copies were provided for USAID files by the PVO. Some of the latter, such as, but not limited to, the ASSAILD brochure "ASSAILD, Association d'Appui aus Initiative Locales de Développement," are particularly interesting and revealing and should be consulting by anyone seeking a thorough appreciation of the PVO.

Descriptions are included of documents of particular interest. Dates are not given in many cases, since many of the documents are not dated, something to be improved upon under the Project. The documents are grouped by organization furnishing them.

Al-Taawoun

Concept de Développement Communautaire d'Al-Taawoun dans les Regions du Ouaddai et de Biltine. 90 pages. Contains information supplementing that provided in the Rapport Annuel 90, described below. However the latter is the better of the two sources.

Projet Rural Ouaddai

Rapport Annuel 90. This 46 page document contains a wealth of interesting, valuable, and very well presented information, on development needs, problems and possibilities in a region with a distinctive ecology in which a distinctive form of agriculture, based on exploitation of the water resources and conservation possibilities offered by wadis, is practiced. Al-Taawoun's accounts of their experience with Wadi agriculture may be of interest in other parts of the Sahel. The description of other activities such as community animation techniques and the Volet Social, describing activities involving major participation by women, are also very interesting and informative.

Rapport Semestral, September 1991

ARPES

Evaluation des Projets de l'ARPESE, Oct. 1985, a 62 page evaluation of an earlier incarnation of ARPES, commissioned by PSDS, the development organization of the Ecumenical Council of Churches, headquartered in Ouagadougou, which has provided ARPES with funding.

Projet d'Exploitation du Périmètre Irrigué de Eré et les Projets d'Accompagnement, April 1990, a fairly sophisticated, 42 page project proposal.

Projet de Prolongation et d'Extension de Secrétaire de Liaison, April 1989

Proposition pour un Plan de Développement de l'Association Rurale pour la Promotion Economique et Social, May 1987. This 39 page document, written by a consultant to PSDS, contains a thoughtful appraisal of ARPES as well as a good deal of information on the organization and its program.

Réctificatif au Projet Formation et Administrtrtion, September 1988

Darna

Accord de Projet Darna II entre L Gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad et Darna

Budget Darna II 1990

Identification de l'ONG

Introduction

Introduction et Approche du Problème

Note Explicative sur la Continuation du Projet Darna II