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DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND 1
Centralizing Influences of Nation-Building and Planning.. 1
Foreign Aid: Political Neutrality vs Cold War Competition 2
Popular Participation and Decentralization..... 4

I. STAGES AND TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION..... 7
Measuring Decentralization and Democratization..... 11

II. FOREIGN AID AND DECENTRALIZATION..... 17
USAID's Support for Decentralization..... 18
Methodology and Relevant Project Identification..... 19
USAID Centrally-Funded Projects..... 21
USAID Regional Bureau Policies and Projects..... 24
USAID Country Mission Strategies and Projects..... 26

III. ASSISTING DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA..... 32
Background..... 32
USAID and Indonesian Decentralization..... 38
The BAPPEDA Project..... 39
Northern Sumatra Regional Planning Project..... 40
The Kabupaten & Provincial Planning and Management Training Project..... 41
Provincial Area Development Project..... 43
Local Government Training II..... 51
Other USAID Projects..... 53
Conclusion..... 54

IV. USAID AND PHILIPPINE DECENTRALIZATION..... 55
Background..... 55
Early USAID Support For Decentralization..... 58
The Local Resource Management Project..... 60
Continuing USAID Efforts..... 64
Local Development Assistance Program and Future USAID Support..... 66
Conclusion..... 68

V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND PROSPECTS..... 69
Problems and Prospects..... 72

BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 75

APPENDICES
A. INDIVIDUALS & ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED..... 84
B. A.I.D. DECENTRALIZATION PROJECTS BY REGION AND COUNTRY..... 86

DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID

BACKGROUND

Centralizing Influences of Nation-Building and Planning

Early support for the "newly emerging nations", while acknowledging the primacy of economics, recognized that the condition of "underdevelopment" was also manifest in social, cultural and political life. Associated with this condition were the challenges to new governments of: 1) effective exercise of control over territory which was frequently populated by non-homogeneous peoples; and 2) transforming the organs of power from the tasks of colonial domination and extraction to the responsibilities of a modern sovereign state. In both instances there was strong pressure to opt for a highly centralized form of government, under which a strong executive played a dominant role in directing efforts to consolidate power and develop a national economy. Among the hallmarks of these emerging states were a unitary structure[1] and an increasingly centralized administrative apparatus which was to become both the target and instrument of initial development efforts and external support.

Early development assistance took note of the fragility and inexperience of these fledgling administrative institutions and directed their efforts toward improving competence and control. State power was to be enhanced and centralized in an effort to overcome the centrifugal forces of separatism, rebellion and non-compliance which were seen as undermining development in many of the new nations. Commitment to the "trickle down" theories of economic growth, in vogue at the time, reinforced the belief that strong central administration would lead to gains in efficiency and effectiveness and provide the discipline necessary to make and enforce hard economic decisions.

Belief in the efficiency of central planning led to unanimous support for the establishment of specialized national agencies for this purpose -- e.g. national planning boards, industrial development authorities and various development programs -- and to efforts

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1) Among the pressures exerted in favor of the unitary state was the perception that support for a system of federalism was part of a plot by former colonial powers to retain their control over a weak and divided nation. In those instances where the adoption of federalism was made unavoidable by the existence of dominant ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural cleavages, the range of practical dispersion of power was, more often than not, circumscribed by other, centralizing institutional arrangements.

to staff them with "technocrats" who had received scientific and economic training abroad. A World Bank review observed that, "[a]lthough some advocated a lighter type of planning through the market system, there was initially greater enthusiasm for centralized planning that relied on comprehensive controls."[2] At least one dissenting view observed that "comprehensive central planning was certainly not necessary for economic advance; it was much more likely to retard it."[3] In a criticism which echoes the later arguments in favor of decentralization, he went on to point out that the principal policy measures of centralization "reinforced the authoritarian tradition prevailing in many LDCs ... [and] conferred even greater power on the rulers."[4]

Foreign Aid: Political Neutrality vs Cold War Competition

The early provision of assistance and technical advice was broadly characterized as politically or ideologically neutral. In spite of the underlying belief that the democratic system and the basic rights and values upon which it is based represented universal truths which were worth emulating, there was a feeling that efforts to export the institutional forms of Western democracy were inappropriate. There was an implicit faith in the inevitability of the direction of political growth resulting from the right development choices at critical junctures. There was no need to "export democracy" as long as the seeds of indigenous growth were being nurtured along the way.

To the extent that the role of domestic politics in determining the future shape of the developing society was considered, it was limited to consideration of its influence on the direction of economic and social development. One of the most influential observers of these dynamics, Walt Rostow, pointed to the practical requirements of political value systems such as democracy and underlined his belief in the humanizing influence of that particular system when he wrote:

> [S]ocieties must do more than have a creed. They must solve their problems. Democracy itself, when it works,

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2) Gerald M. Meier, "The Formative Period," in Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., Pioneers In Development (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 1984) pp. 17-18.

3) Lord Bauer, "Remembrance of Studies Past: Retracing First Steps," in Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., Pioneers In Development (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 1984), p. 42.

4) IBID.

> is an extraordinary exercise in balance between imposed discipline, self-discipline, and private expression. If we and our children are to live in a setting where something like the democratic creed is the basis of organization for most societies, including our own, the problems of the transition from traditional to modern status in Asia, the Middle East and Africa ... must be solved by means which leave open the possibility of ... a humane, balanced evolution.[5]

Motives and strategies for the provision of development assistance were never very far removed from the influence of international competition of ideologies and the Cold War. The spread -- or threat of the spread -- of communism throughout Europe and in Iran, China, Korea, Indochina, the Philippines and Cuba in slightly more than a decade following the Second World War set the stage for a global competition which exercised a countervailing influence on the goals and direction of foreign assistance.

An example of ideological motivations in the development of U.S. policy on international development was the establishment, in 1951, of the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT and its programs for the study of communist societies and the economic, social and political problems of development. One of the founders acknowledges that CENIS itself was prompted by the Korean War and the conviction that "the struggle to deter and contain the thrust for expanded communist power would be long and that new concepts would be required to underpin U.S. foreign policy in the generation ahead, quite aside from the task of dealing directly with the communist world."[6]

While the extent to which political goals and objectives were explicitly articulated as part of the U.S. development assistance

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5) W. W. Rostow, The Stages Of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960) p. 165. His reference to a "democratic creed" as the "basis of organization for most societies" is reminiscent of the important work on the "civic culture" which were pioneered in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963). A recent contribution to this theme which distinguishes between "village democracy" which remain expressions of tribal or primitive society with modern institutional mechanisms and the more desirable form of modern democracy which is rooted in liberalism and respect for basic human rights is found in Raymond D. Gastil, "What Kind of Democracy?," (The Atlantic Monthly, June 1990) pp. 92-96.

6) Walt Whitman Rostow, "Development: The Political Economy of the Marshallian Period," in Pioneers In Development, p. 240.

program has fluctuated from the origins of the program in the 1950's until the present, they have never been very far removed from consideration. In practice, it has also been more difficult to isolate those broader economic, social and political [illegible] development from the influences of Cold War foreign policy. Consideration of factors related to a client regime's standing with respect to Cold War alignments have been known to exercise influence over U.S. perceptions of that regime's domestic social and political performance. This has led to not infrequent charges of preferential treatment for authoritarian regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America which have defended lapses in their adherence to democratic principles on the grounds that such deviations were unavoidable in view of the pressure of domestic threats from the left.

Popular Participation and Decentralization

Bias in favor of centralization was consistent with an inherent distrust of the technological backwardness and conservative parochialism of local populations and communities. There was little doubt that these local constituencies were the intended targets of radical social transformation and that penetration and mobilization were the intended strategies. It was also concluded that, because throughout the developing world the vast majority of the population was rural and dependent upon the agricultural sector, a strategy of structural reform in favor of creating or strengthening the industrial sector needed to be complemented by the modernization of agriculture. The failure of central planning and management models to cope with the complexity of agricultural needs and potential under diverse local conditions was one of the first indicators that some form of decentralization was needed.

Announcement of the "Development Decade of the 60's" brought with it an increasing emphasis on the multi-dimensional problems of poverty which took as its point of departure the acknowledgement that "the growing gap between rich and poor nations is mirrored by a similar divergence between the well-off and impoverished people within most less-developed countries."[7] It was during this same period that a series of incremental refinements in U.S. foreign policy legislation formed a "Congressional Mandate" which included increased concern for equitable distribution of resources as a balance to macro-economic development. Among the other elements emphasized were support for popular participation, democratic institution building and the encouragement of local government

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7) John M. Cohen, et al., Participation At The Local Level: A Working Bibliography, Rural Development Bibliography Series No. 1 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, June 1978) p. 1.

institutions.[8] A similar shift in emphasis was registered by the United Nations General Assembly and World Bank President, Robert McNamara, recognized that the success of development efforts was enhanced by efforts to "provide for popular participation, local leadership, and decentralization of authority."[9]

For the centralized bureaucracies tasked with the identification of target populations and the delivery of required services, problems of access were translated into organizational and information gaps. One typical response was premised on the development of opportunities for popular participation and various organizational strategies of decentralization. While this response was, in part, born of the earlier cited political conviction that popular participation is a desirable end in itself, this conviction was not unanimously held. Samuel Huntington warned a USAID audience that the "two key elements of Title IX, maximum participation and the growth of institutions are not necessarily compatible."[10] His cautionary note has been interpreted to mean that increased popular participation ought to be discouraged until such time as the appropriate organizational channels have been developed.

The linkage of popular participation and decentralization owes much to formulations which are identified with the "community development approach". A number of contradictory views have come to be associated with this approach, with a basic distinction being made between strategies of penetration and mobilization and those

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8) Beginning with the Kennedy Administration's 1961 review of the foreign assistance program, resulting in the Alliance for Progress, targeting of poor populations for assistance, and the creation of USAID, amendments followed which dictated emphasis on cooperatives (1961) and popular participation at local community level (1962). More explicitly political objectives were introduced with the passage of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1966, only to be tempered by the language of what is popularly referred to as the "New Directions" of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, incorporating emphasis on the shifting of resources to meet the "basic human needs of the poor majority". The Harken Amendment (1974) focused attention on a country's performance with respect to human rights and introduced sanctions for non-compliance or a poor record, while Section 116[e] (1978) supported efforts to encourage greater adherence and respect for human, civil and political rights.

9) Quoted in: John M. Cohen, et al., Participation..., Op. Cit., p. 2.

10) Summary of Executive Seminar on Social and Civic Development: Title IX of the United States Foreign Assistance Act, Antigua, Guatemala, June 1-6, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Advanced Study Program, 9 July 1969) pp. 5-6.

of empowerment. An earlier cited publication of the Cornell Rural Development Committee characterized the view of community development as a strategy of external penetration, mobilization and continued domination of local communities by external authorities and internal stratification as follows:

> While concerned with identification of "felt needs" and with mobilizing self-help resources, in some countries the principal goal of community development was to stabilize the rural sector while national development could be pursued by the central government. ... To some extent, an emphasis on community harmony and getting quick results led to acceptance of local power structures and continued domination of activities and benefits by local elites.[11]

On the other hand, self-help variants of this approach which emphasize enhancement of awareness and empowerment of community members has come to be widely associated with the work of both foreign and indigenous NGO/PVO's are often ambivalent or openly hostile toward government efforts to dominate them.[12] It is this latter vision of participation which is most often cited for its consistency with the goals of democratic pluralism. It is also the view most frequently linked with efforts at decentralization as part of a common goal, in spite of the recognition that the exact nature of the linkage is unclear. According to a recent treatment of the joint concepts, the growing interest in decentralization is linked to its ability to "[f]acilitate effective popular participation in the process of development in a more profound way," and goes on to state that "participation implies local autonomy"[13]

Having posited that the "potential advantages of decentralization and participation overlap," the authors go on to acknowledge the complexity of the relationship between the two concepts when they observe:

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11) John M. Cohen, et al., Participation..., Op. Cit.

12) For a sympathetic review of a number of the early examples of the community development approach which emphasizes self-help and nonformal education, see: Philip H. Coombs, with Manzoor Ahmed, Attacking Rural Poverty: How Nonformal Education Can Help, A World Bank Publication (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), Chapter 6.

13) David D. Gow and Jerry Van Sant, "Decentralization and Participation: Concepts in Need of Implementation Strategies," in Elliot R. Morss and David D. Gow, eds., Implementing Rural Development Projects: Lessons from AID and World Bank Experiences (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), p. 107.

> Increased participation does not necessarily lead to more decentralization or vice versa, although some form of decentralization seems to be a necessary condition for effective beneficiary participation. Whether pursued together or individually, however, these initiatives have not lived up to expectation....[14]

Part of the failure to match expectations is ascribed to the fact that decentralization is variously identified with the solution of a wide range of problems, many of which are vague, difficult to measure and have little relationship to enhanced participation. Included among its claims are:

> It promotes geographical equity, increases popular capacity to insure responsibility and accountability, enables easier access to decision points, reduces conflict and is more democratic.... It improves delivery of service ... it even eases national planning problems through the provision of a more reliable information base.[15]

The number and variety of benefits linked with the concept underline the fact that decentralization is a complex concept which is capable of further differentiation. Not only are there different types and characteristics of decentralization, but it is even questionable whether all of these types are associated with enhanced levels of popular participation or other features of democratic pluralism. The broader question which is central to this investigation is whether decentralization's contributions to democratic pluralism are limited to the expansion of opportunities for participation or whether those contributions might be more broadly defined.

I.
STAGES AND TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION

The literature on decentralization differentiates among at least three subordinate types or conceptual sub-categories -- i.e. deconcentration, delegation and devolution.[16] Each of these sub-

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14) IBID. p. 108.

15) IBID. p. 109.

16) The following conceptual discussion draws upon: Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XLVII, No. 2 (1981), pp. 133-45. and Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization In Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience, World Bank Staff Working Papers Number 581,

categories is used to describe the establishment and evolution of an increasingly complex set of structural and normative relationships governing the assignment or transfer of discrete tasks, functions, and -- only sometimes -- power and authority from the center to local government levels. At least conceptually, these types may be viewed as an arrangement along a continuum which stretches from the transfer of technocratic skills and procedures, at one extreme, to the increasingly political transfer of decision-making authority associated with the goals of democratic pluralism, at the other. It is less clear under what conditions -- if at all -- orderly progress is made along the continuum from one stage to the next.

In describing the forms of decentralization, distinctions are often made with respect to administrative, political and economic characteristics or functions. Reference to **deconcentration** (also called administrative decentralization) is generally limited to the redistribution of administrative tasks taking place more or less exclusively within the hierarchical organizational structure of agencies of the central government. The primary objectives are gains in organizational efficiency and effectiveness achieved by granting discretion to subordinate staff to identify, plan and implement activities and adjust directives, all within the guidelines and limits prescribed for such decentralization. However, It has also been observed that not only is it possible for governments to deconcentrate elements of their bureaucracy without engendering political or economic decentralization, but "administrative deconcentration can appreciably increase the power of the state by creating an organizational structure for deeper penetration and control, as many political leaders of post-colonial African governments were keenly aware."[17]

Administrative deconcentration may be further subdivided to describe the scope of discretion granted. The most limited form of deconcentration entails the <u>delegation of discrete tasks to field staff</u> without comparable grant of either discretion or authority over the scope or outcome of those tasks. One observer resists calling this shifting of central government workload decentralization at all. While he acknowledges that it "may be efficient and convenient for the public and may even promote a feeling that government is close to the people," his disagreement rests on the observation that "it may not involve any decentralization of power

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Management And Development Series Number 8 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1983).

17) Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power and the State: A Critical Response," <u>Development and Change</u>, Vol. 21 (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990) p. 493.

... and may not provide the opportunity to exercise substantial local discretion in decision-making.[18]

Within the organization of a system of field administration staff are authorized to plan and exercise some routine decision-making and discretion within the broad outlines set by higher authority. Under this system the assignment of staff to local government jurisdictions which may have some control over their functions does not change their higher allegiance to the central government agency under whose direction and control they remain.

Local administration encompasses the performance of all subordinate agencies, as well as local government units, in their capacity as agents of the central government. In this case all levels of local government are subordinate to the national government, usually under the authority, technical supervision and control of a ministry or department of internal affairs. Rondinelli further distinguishes between local administrations which may be integrated, "wherein ministry officials and local officers work under the supervision of the local executive, or unintegrated, wherein field staff of central ministries and administrative staff of local jurisdictions work independently of each other and are supervised by different sets of executives."[19]

The second form of decentralization concerns the delegation or transfer of planning, decision-making, administrative and management responsibilities for specific functions to organizations which are only indirectly under the control of central government agencies. Sometimes such transfers are also made to semi-autonomous bodies or organizations outside of the normal bureaucratic structure (government corporations, parastatals, planning boards or development authorities and special project management units) or to voluntary, private or non-governmental bodies (public interest organizations, professional associations and political parties). Such delegation entails the transfer of authority to plan, implement and make decisions over specific categories of activities to organizations which possess appropriate technical capabilities. When transfers are permanent and made to private organizations, it is often referred to as privatization.

The third form, devolution -- often referred to as political decentralization -- entails the conferment of rather broad categories of state power and authority to local government units in order to enable the latter to effectively administer well defined areas of community life and to respond to its routine and extraordinary needs. In this instance conferment by the central government of

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18) James W. Fesler, quoted in Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Government Decentralization....," Op. Cit., p. 137.

19) IBID., pp 137-33.

certain powers and functions includes the assignment of real decision-making authority or, alternatively, the central government may create new levels or units of local government over which it may exercise only supervisory or indirect control. It could be argued that federalism is a form of devolution.

Rondinelli and other observers have noted that, while examples of devolution have been rare in developing countries, deconcentration has been the most frequently used form of decentralization. There has also been a tendency for development project activities to be identified with deconcentration and what one observer has called "successful programmes ... that reduce delays, improve service delivery, and enhance cost recovery."[20] Examples of delegation are also widespread, but they tend to have more limited and specialized applications concerning the control of valuable or profitable resources or where donor agencies wish to maintain project budgeting and accounting separate from normal government procedures.

The earlier cited critic of development projects' identification with the methods of deconcentration argues that decentralization has to do with power relations and is issue specific and that "to make sense of its forms and consequences in particular settings we need to understand decentralization as a political initiative, as a fundamentally political process, and consequently as a site for political struggle."[21] He also reminds us that much of the political tension generated by the concept is between central direction and local autonomy and it is noteworthy that there is no absolute claim to value in either. Most systems which have successfully experimented with decentralization continue to pursue policies which represent a mix of centralization and decentralization.

Recognition that the "indicators and measures of the extent and of the success of decentralization are necessarily specific to particular concrete situations and must refer both to the goals to be achieved (not simply to the institutions created to achieve them) and to the transformation of power relations,"[22] does not preclude the identification of some common frame of reference or set of characteristics which would provide some basis for measurement and comparison. For our purposes a clearer focus is provided by concentration on the relationship between the types of decentralization and the promotion of democratic pluralism.

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20) Joel Samoff, "Decentralization: The Politics of Interventionism," Development and Change, Vol. 21 (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990) p. 519.

21) IBID.

22) IBID., p. 523.

Measuring Decentralization and Democratization

To understand the context within which decentralizing efforts are initiated it is important to obtain an overview of the **distribution of functions by type, level of importance and territorial organization** as well as an overall mapping of the structure of concerned government agencies and levels. An appropriate starting place for this mapping is with the distinction between "generalist" and "specialist" forms of administration. It is one of the legacies of colonial rule that the territorial organization of the former form the basis for development of local government systems, while also being important in determining the distribution and structure of field agencies which perform "specialist" government functions. One factor worth noting is the extent to which administrative levels and the boundaries of geographic units coincide with historic cultural, ethnic, religious or other societal characteristics vs. administrative divisions whose boundaries are dictated by technical criteria, convenience or control. The organization of the various central government agencies of specialist administration may parallel that of generalist administration, develop its own distinctive structure or even vary by functional area of concern.

These structural characteristics are important in determining how various strategies of decentralization will evolve and influence other aspects of the system, including the prospects for expanded democratization. Strategies of deconcentration, while primarily aimed at improvements in administrative efficiency and effectiveness, may also have the effect of personalizing government programs and policies by making it easier for local target groups and beneficiaries to identify and interact with responsible government agents.

Identification of the type and level of importance of various government functions and the extent and nature of their decentralization can provide indicators of motivation and the prospects for future advance. There are certain functions which might be more susceptible to the early stages of decentralization and there are probably also levels of local government and administration which are more appropriate for the assignment of major responsibilities in decentralization efforts. Efforts to map progress in decentralization might adopt an approach which measures progress by sector or identifies the level or levels which are central to the strategy pursued.

With respect to the identification of a specific level of local administration as the focus of decentralization efforts, it is important to determine the rationale for such selection. One possibility is that some aspect of culture or history places such importance on a particular level as the strategic locus of decision-making. On the other hand, attempts to create new administrative levels as the focus of governmental functions are likely to be

indicative of attempts to maintain the center's ability to penetrate and control and is usually indicative of schemes which are limited to administrative deconcentration.

The **discretionary latitude extended to field office staff** and the countervailing exercise of central headquarters control are essentially measures of administrative deconcentration. Of significance here is the range of activities over which some latitude for discretion is authorized as well as the circumstances under which discretion might be exercised. The assumption is that there are guidelines and procedures which have been determined by higher authority to govern the conduct of certain tasks and assignments and that discretionary action might consist of either some act of justified deviation or a choice of appropriate response from some previously established range of acceptable alternatives. Once again the possibility of popular participation being one source of input leading to the identification of discretionary action -- or the need for deviation from procedure -- should be considered and examined.

Determination of the **range of responsibilities assumed by local government units** and the matching scope of decision-making authority provide indicators of the extent to which real devolution has occurred. Concern for such basic elements of infrastructure as roads, bridges, markets, irrigation, etc. is often one of the first areas of decentralization. Among the responsibilities to be considered are decisions on the determination of priority locations, procurement of design and construction services and, finally, the important questions of who shall be responsible for maintenance and its recurring costs.

Identification of the specific units or bodies to which responsibilities and decision-making authority have been assigned and rules governing their exercise also provide insights into how power is shared and functionally allocated within the larger governmental and political system. Of particular interest here are the provisions made for the exercise of popular participation through direct or indirect means and how this impacts on decision-making. One of the more common mechanisms for the exercise of participation is the establishment of elected councils which may play an advisory -- or limited decision-making -- role.

One important method for measuring the scope and context of organizational power -- whether it be local government responsibilities or the range of central government field office discretion -- is to determine the functional types of activities over which it comes to be exercised. In this instance, it is useful to differentiate among a range or sequence of activities which are associated with most development enterprises.

First, it is important to distinguish the process of determining the broad program and sector policies from the more discrete

actions which may be taken at subordinate levels to further the realization of those policy objectives. Although it is expected that meaningful decentralization of policy making will be limited to rather advanced stages of political devolution, the realization of policy objectives provides ample opportunity for the decentralization of a range of activities.

One of the early indications of increasing local initiative is the advance from the implementation of standardized procedures by field units acting at the command of higher authority to the development of more or less specialized units which are capable of planning and designing local interventions. The more specialized and autonomous such planning units become, the stronger the indication is that they are part of serious decentralization efforts. But such advances in local planning are only meaningful if they are, in turn, capable of exercising control over the implementation of their planned interventions. In order for this to occur mechanisms for command and control over implementation must be augmented by monitoring and evaluation.

Devolution of discretionary authority to area political authorities is related to the scope of decision-making authority and range of responsibilities described above. The difference here lies in the definition or identification of the interest or concern over which a decision is required. Whereas the earlier discretion referred to areas in which the questions and choices are well defined as being within the scope of organizational responsibility, this latter expansion of discretion allows for the determination of the public interest in support of a prescribed action by a local organization without reference or recourse to higher authority. The ultimate exercise of such discretion would include the autonomous exercise of the authority to make and implement policy in increasingly expanded areas of public concern.

Differences in the **statutory source of devolution** suggest that there are varying implications of both legitimacy and the practical ability to exercise a grant of devolved authority depending upon whether it issues from the central executive or directly from the legislative body, independent of the delegatory role of the executive. Although, generally speaking, a legislative grant carries greater weight under the liberal philosophy of representative government, it suggests inadequate recognition of the realities of politics in most developing countries which accedes a position of dominance to the executive in the determination of major policies.

Another possibility to be considered is that the devolution of some powers may be provided for constitutionally; which is not to suggest that this will guarantee their enforceability. Once again the role of the central executive must be considered with respect to the policies, institutional arrangements and procedures required to make devolution a reality.

One of the more practical and easily applied measures of local government autonomy is the exercise of **authority over recruitment and other personnel matters.** The fact that recruitment of local government officials and representatives is by a process of election or selection which is locally controlled is only the first step in determining institutional loyalties and control. In the long run these factors effecting entry are probably of less importance than the institutional and hierarchical location of subsequent decisions on assignments, career patterns, pay levels, promotion and other terms of service and benefits.

An additional set of economic criteria for the measurement of decentralization have gained currency in association with the political-economy framework. The **total of local expenditure as a proportion of total public spending** recorded over time will provide a measure of the changing significance of decentralization. Some indication of the potential for devolution may be found in the measurement of the **proportion of total state revenue raised locally** or of the **relative size of a local authority as indicated by its potential revenue base.**

To the extent that there has been an element of concern for the adequacy of local finance, this element of political economy has always been close to the heart of decentralization efforts. But the connection here goes beyond the traditional bounds of local finance. Samoff points out that, while political economy has historically been identified with both classical economists and the Marxist critique based on historical structural analysis, it's terminology has now been appropriated by neoclassical economics. He tells us that in recent literature on decentralization:

> political economy is intended to suggest the symbiosis of neoclassical economics, public choice theory, and policy analysis (that is, the study of public administration and public finance). In [these] terms ... political economy is intended to add political awareness and sensitivity to the case for administrative decentralization.[23]

Samoff's criticism of the approach is that it is "socially responsible capitalism" which would limit both the state and politics in general and that its association with rational choice theory seeks to reduce the role of power in the social construction of public policy. A similar argument is made by Slater, a critic of Rondinelli's "integrated political economy framework" who characterizes Rondinelli's definition of decentralization from an administrative perspective, as preoccupied with operations of market mechanisms and privatization and "a rolling-back of the

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23) IBID., pp. 525-26.

economic functions of the central state."[24] He concludes that the union of neoclassical economic theory and public choice models is of dubious use because "both perspectives leave out of account questions of power and present highly unrealistic visions of economy and society."[25]

More important for our purposes is Slater's view that Rondinelli's approach is anchored in the "official views of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank."[26] While Rondinelli denies that his approach is synonymous with the official views of USAID and the World Bank, he acknowledges that his work does not stress the political implications of decentralization, but instead directs "attention primarily on its technical, spatial and administrative aspects because ... improvements in them can yield most immediate advances in the organizational development needed to provide a foundation for participation in complex economies and polities."[27] He is equally unapologetic in acknowledging that his focus includes "financial instruments (cost recovery, expansion of local revenues, co-financing) and organizational forms (non-governmental organizations, private enterprises and municipal governments)."[28] However, he is not willing to concede that his interest in the relationship between decentralization and the more technical areas of finance and administration represents a preoccupation with politically neutral issues of "governance", and goes on to sketch his more long-range belief that:

> To the extent that decentralization can strengthen the administrative capacity, and eventually the political influence, of large numbers of organizations in developing countries, it may create the potential for wider participation in economic and political processes.[29]

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24) David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change, Vol. 20 (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), p. 520.

25) David Slater, "Debating Decentralization -- A Reply to Rondinelli," Development and Change, Vol. 21 (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990) p. 510.

26) Slater, "Territorial Power ...," Op. Cit., p. 517.

27) Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization, Territorial Power and the State: A Critical Response," Development and Change, Vol. 21 (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990) p. 496.

28) IBID. p. 497.

29) IBID. p. 496.

What Rondinelli relegates to the status of a long term goal, which he expects to be achieved incrementally, populist champions of decentralization are unwilling to concede. They challenge the architects of decentralization for evidence of more immediate progress. For them:

> [I]n addition to its administrative and organizational advantages, decentralization is expected to empower citizens, especially disadvantaged groups, in their relationship to a large, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and distant government.[30]

What their claim to the inviolate rights of local autonomy fails to adequately consider is that calls for devolution of power are also made by illiberal, vested local interests who seek nothing more than to maintain their own control. It is possible "that power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the centre."[31] There are also examples of central governments exercising a liberalizing influence as the champions of policies which provide for broader applications of justice and equity against the opposition of local governments dominated by interests less willing to share power or provide for broader participation.

Within the context of this discussion of the relationship between decentralization and participation consideration should also be given to expanding the understanding of participation to include activities which fall short of direct involvement in decision-making. Under these circumstances it may be possible to measure some less ambitious gains in popular knowledge of and involvement in development activities even as a consequence of successful strategies of deconcentration. It is also worth considering that the concepts of transparency and oversight which are associated with concerns for improvement in governance are also related to our interest in identifying advances in democratization.

The point to be made here is that, while "decentralization and democracy are certainly not mutually exclusive concepts, they are also not necessarily correlated."[32] There is some level of consensus on the notion that all systems do -- or ought to -- contain a combination of central direction and local autonomy. The appropriate mix needs to be situationally determined by the reality of local conditions and the specifics of the problem to be addres-

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30) IBID., p. 521.

31) Quoted in: David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization," Development and Change, Vol. 20 (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989) p. 512.

32) Dennis A. Rondinelli, "Decentralization ...," Op. Cit.

sed. Samoff concludes that "there is little point in constructing a general strategy of decentralization, or a universal model of decentralized government, or a generic set of evaluative criteria applicable in all circumstances."[33]

Although the basic concepts and the range of phenomena which have been discussed in connection with the various understandings of decentralization provide no clear basis for concluding the necessity of its correlation with democratization, it does provide some insight into the ways in which the two concepts might be related. The typology, measures and related concepts which have been developed and discussed form the backdrop and provide a framework for the following discussion of foreign assistance programs for decentralization.

II.
FOREIGN AID AND DECENTRALIZATION

The support of various types of decentralization efforts by foreign assistance extends over the past three decades, whether or not the activities supported have acknowledged that particular objective. While a small number of activities have been clearly labelled as efforts to foster decentralization or improve local administration, the vast majority of interventions with which we are concerned are not so easily identified.

Issues which we now associate with the problems and challenges of decentralization are more likely to have been labelled as rural development (integrated rural development or IRD), regional development, and even some types of urban (or small town) development as well as a number of seemingly conventional sectoral pursuits which are judged to benefit from a decentralized approach to planning and management -- e.g. the development of infrastructure, agriculture, education and health. In most of these activities the concern for issues which we have identified with decentralization and the pursuit of increased popular participation were viewed as necessary, but subordinate, considerations to the primary, sectoral objectives. Another factor which makes it difficult to clearly identify these as decentralization activities is the frequently observed confusion or vagueness with respect to the institutional or administrative level at which they are directed.

There is not only a wide range of donor agencies identified with these efforts, but they also represent a wide range of approaches and areas of specialized interest. In addition to USAID (the United States Agency for International Development) and its institutional predecessors, there are a number of U.S. government

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33) Samoff, Op Cit. p. 523.

and quasi-governmental agencies and organizations active in this field. The multilateral agencies of the United Nations, the World Bank and various regional development banks have a long record of such involvement. Among the bilateral donor agencies, those of Germany and the Nordic countries have also been active and, finally, the varied members of the PVO/NGO community have also actively pursued both direct and indirect strategies of support in this area.

Given the primary purpose of this study to inform and contribute to present USAID efforts to develop and revise its formulation of "democratic pluralism initiatives", its past efforts constitute a major focus of this review.

USAID's Support for Decentralization

While the origins of U.S. foreign assistance pre-date the creation of the United States Agency for International Development by more than a decade, our knowledge of predecessor agencies and their programs and activities related to decentralization is fragmentary at best.[34] One area of interest is the record of early activities based on the previously discussed "community development approach" which once constituted a major focus of the Agency's foreign assistance approach and serves as a link to the approach developed in later decentralization efforts.

The fact that decentralization concerns have been subordinated to other problems and issues in the design of project interventions raises problems in the identification of the precise range of project activities to be included in this analysis. Comparison of a 1982 USAID study of world-wide project experience in the support of local government[35] and a study of the Latin American region which also includes the subject of local government support during

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34) The Point Four Program of the post World War II period was administered by the Economic Cooperation Administration; followed by establishment of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 1954, only to be superseded by the International Cooperation Agency (ICA) the following year and the complementary Development Loan Fund in 1957. The establishment of USAID is linked to the work of the Kennedy Administration Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance in 1961. This chronology and a thorough bibliography of available materials on all aspects of the U.S. foreign assistance program is found in: Identification Of Past Major Studies And Reports, Report to the Counselor of the Agency for International Development, September 7, 1990.

35) Jerry M. Silverman, et al., AID Assistance To Local Government: Experience and Issues, Report to: the Office of Evaluation, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, November 1982.

the same period[36] provides us with an indication of the difficulties encountered in arriving at common definitions and the scope of relevant project experience to be included. In general, the world survey identified a total of 63 relevant projects, while the Latin American study identified 10 local government development projects.

Between the two studies there is a fairly high level of overlap for Latin American projects, but there are also some significant discrepancies. First, the Latin American study applies a more restrictive definition of local government assistance projects by limiting attention to municipal development, while the broader study covers municipal development as well as rural development, the urban sector, highways, health, administration and fiscal reform, and regional development among the 25 Latin American projects identified. Of seemingly greater significance are the disparities in the actual projects identified. Among the ten projects included in the Latin American study were projects in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Venezuela which were not included in the larger study. Considering the more narrow definition applied by the regional study, it was more surprising that the world-wide survey was able to identify municipal development projects in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay which were not covered in the Latin American report.[37] The methodological point to be emphasized here is that the range of USAID project experience relevant to decentralization is sufficiently broad as to defy easy identification.[38]

Methodology and Relevant Project Identification

The present review suffers from some of the same limitations as the earlier studies. While it would be desirable to cover the full range of USAID experience in this area, there is no readily available source of project information which is capable of guaranteeing such completeness. The project information assembled in Appendix B has been compiled from the two studies cited above,

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36) Creative Associates International, Inc., A Retrospective Of A.I.D.'s Experience In Strengthening Democratic Institutions In Latin America: 1961-1981, Report to: the LAC Bureau, Office of Administration of Justice and Democratic Development, Agency for International Development, September 1987.

37) The analysis is based on a comparison of the respective project samples found in: IBID., Appendix C and Silverman, et al., Op Cit., Annex A, Table 1.

38) In this context, it is noted that the Silverman, et al. study avoided the problem of definition by providing no indication of the criteria used for the selection of included projects, not is there any indication as to whether a sample or complete universe was intended.

a computerized search of the CDIE project database using a number of keywords expected to identify the maximum number of relevant projects and various other sources familiar to the author from previous work in this area.

Among the indicators or criteria used to assemble the relevant list of projects are the following. Any sectoral project activity making provision for improved performance of activities or services at local levels was scrutinized for the presence of decentralization objectives or for what it might tell us about the status of decentralization at local levels. By the application of these standard we are led to the conclusion that most general IRD or regional and municipal development activities contain elements which are relevant for our study, while for sectoral activities involving infrastructure, health, education and agriculture the determination of such relevance was sometimes unable to be made on the basis of available information.

Another method of determining project relevance begins with the identification of emphasis on increases in popular participation among their objectives. Remembering that decentralization may serve as a prerequisite for participation, it remains to be determined whether planned participation is to be channeled through formal agencies and to what extent those agencies may be identified as part of a decentralization scheme.

In addition to the range of substantive or sectoral identities by which project interventions may be classified, USAID organization makes possible the funding of the following types of project interventions at these levels: 1.) centrally-funded approaches to the theoretical examination and/or practical solution of certain more-or-less well defined problems of significant and wide spread concern; 2.) regional approaches of a similar type -- which may or may not be more practical in orientation and/or more limited in scope by cultural, geographical or other characteristics identified with the region -- which are sponsored by the concerned geographic regional bureau; and 3.) those activities which are initiated, designed and implemented by the USAID mission in a specific country in concert with the host government, its agents and designated groups and organizations.

The vast majority of the decentralization projects identified are mission-sponsored and country specific and while several of the regional bureau have encouraged the development of country projects around common themes, no regional decentralization projects have been identified. Project activities which are initiated by central policy, planning and technical offices have been of two types. The first type is usually associated with the funding of university-based research and is only indirectly involved in field applications of a practical nature. The second type generally provide core funding for certain operational and research costs, but depend upon supplementary funding from mission-specific "buy-ins" to

provide a medium for related field activities. USAID missions often make use of these outside resources to design new projects, evaluate on-going or recently completed activities, or to provide supplementary support, sometimes for aspects of activities which were not anticipated by the original design. Both of these types are represented in our survey.

USAID Centrally-Funded Projects

Prior to Title IX centrally-funded activities related to decentralization were limited to a few academic studies concerned with popular participation. Yet these research activities did help to underscore the linkage between local government and participation which we have noted as being central to attempts to improve the prospects for democratization.

Both of the early studies considered here are within the tradition of the earlier cited Almond and Verba study of Civic Culture which attempts to explain the determinants of democratic stability.[39] The International Studies of Values in Politics Project and the Interdisciplinary Studies of Change in the Philippines and Columbia Project helped to shed light on the linkage between cognitive, affective and evaluation orientations, on the one hand, and the performance characteristics of national and local government, on the other.[40] While both of these studies were somewhat successful in establishing linkages between citizen orientations toward democratic characteristics and the performance of local units of government, there is scant evidence to indicate that either of these studies exercised much influence over the direction or content of other USAID project activities in this area.[41]

In the late 1970's support appears to have shifted from these more theoretical research efforts toward applied research which was expected to have practical application in policy formulation and development field work, but continued to be dominated by university researchers. In areas related to decentralization three projects were undertaken by the Cornell University Rural Development Committee, the Institute of International Studies at the University of

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39) See: Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Op. Cit.

40) See: The International Studies of Values in Politics, Values And The Active Community: A Cross-National Study of the Influence of Local Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1971) and Harvey A. Averich et al., The Matrix Of Policy In The Philippines (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

41) A third project in this category, Participation Patterns in Modern Societies (Project No. 921-0516), does not appear to have left any documentary record in the USAID/PPC/CDIE Archives.

California at Berkeley, and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

The Cornell Participation and Rural Development Project was prolific in producing an extensive set of publications on local government, administrative deconcentration and popular participation,[42] but differs from the others in this category in that it was less tied to specific USAID project experience. In this case the primary source of USAID support from the Bureau for Technical Assistance, Office of Rural Development was augmented by support from regional bureaux for specific assignments which were either of a broad conceptual nature or allowed authors to draw upon their combined academic and project experience in the preparation of reports. While the projects's published record is widely recognized as constituting a major contribution to the literature on rural development, participation and local government, there is no indication of evaluations or other reviews of this project apparent in the CDIE database.

The Syracuse University (SU) Local Revenue Administration Project was designed to provide consulting, training and applied research on methods for generating local revenue and the funding of local development activities. In contrast to the Cornell Project reviewed above, much of the success of this effort was tied to USAID missions' requests for services and the ability of the SU project team to respond to those requests. Fragmentary documentary records indicate that a high level of mission interest was matched by SU's ability to generate long-term involvement in design, evaluation and research activities in the Philippines, Guatemala, Peru, Rwanda and Upper Volta. The enhanced teaching and research competence in the field of local revenue administration developed by SU through project activities has continued to benefit USAID and its programs beyond the life of the project.

The Managing Decentralization Project at the University of California at Berkeley was less successful at generating support than either of the earlier projects. While it did receive mission requests for work in Somalia, the Philippines, Egypt, Nicaragua, Kenya, Sudan and Senegal, changes in project management and participating faculty dissatisfaction over the availability of research opportunities caused the project to be terminated. A 1981 evaluation added that "[b]ecause the conceptual focus of the project did

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42) In addition to the previously cited book on local organizations by Esman and Uphoff, the project produced a three-volume survey of rural development and participation in Asia and series of monographs, including one on rural local government.

not correspond with the orientation of Mission projects, it was difficult to identify appropriate indepth country activities."[43]

In each of the cases above the strategy for both conceptual development and support of field activities centered on a university-based network of relevant subject matter experts. More recently, contractor selection for implementation of the Decentralization: Finance and Management (DFM) Project has deviated from that pattern of academic dominance by selecting a consortium led by a consulting firm in collaboration with key faculty members from two universities.[44]

Efforts to avoid the difficulties encountered with earlier projects led to a more detailed project design which includes specification of several intervention strategies based on institutional analysis.[45] During early stages of project development it was determined that the problem of recurrent costs related to roads and irrigation system maintenance would become the focus of applied research to be covered by the planned multi-year Mission buy-ins. Although project start-up was delayed well into 1988, there are now indications that the project is attracting increased interest and has already been engaged in support of activities in Indonesia, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Linkage with the major decentralization effort in the Philippines has now also been guaranteed by selection of the DFM prime contractor to provide technical assistance for LDAP (Local Development Assistance Program) as well.

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43) Monteze M. Snyder, Project Evaluation Summary (PES)/Eval Summary (ES), Managing Decentralization Project (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Science and Technology, Office of Rural Development and Development Administration, 23 October 1981) p. 1. In an interview with the former Project Director, he described faculty participants' disappointment over the project's inability to generate meaningful research activities and the return of $1.5 million in unexpended project funds.

44) the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) Project is an earlier example of a centrally-funded project in this field which was contracted to a consulting firm. In spite of the field work performed on 24 projects in 19 countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the widespread recognition of its contributions, search of the CDIE database produced no information on the project.

45) For details of the conceptual approach to this project see: James T. Thomson, Ed Connerly and James S. Wunsch, Decentralized Finance And Management For Development (Revised Draft - May 20, 1986) A Concept Paper Prepared for the Office of Rural and Institutional Development, Bureau for Science and Technology, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Assessment of the impact of these projects may be done from several different perspectives. At one extreme, it is possible to assess the project activities's contribution to the general state of knowledge or theory in its field. Against this criteria only the work of the Cornell University Rural Development Committee qualifies. It has gained wide recognition for its contributions to our knowledge of rural development and participation, while it has also added to our understanding of the functions of rural local government and administration under decentralization.

A second measure of significance is the extent to which these projects and the conceptual and practical tools developed by them have had a meaningful direct or indirect impact on subsequent USAID project activity related to decentralization. One measure of the direct impact is to be found in the type of support provided to other projects in the form of design, research, training, evaluation, etc. and the relative success of that support. In this regard, earlier observations concluded that the Cornell project had only limited project impact, while the SU project had considerable success and the Berkeley project did not attract sufficient mission interest to generate much of a record. From this perspective, it is important to assess the expectations which prompted mission requests for support in order to understand whether the support provided has played a central role in shaping the effected mission activities and strategies. Of prime consideration is the centrality of the view of decentralization to the mission activity being supported, as well as whether the decentralization to be pursued is limited to administrative deconcentration or seeks to make real advances toward devolution of political power. Improvements in local revenue administration are viewed as examples of technocratic administrative reform and are, therefore, closely identified with deconcentration.

Indirect impact is made more difficult to measure by the lack of information on how widely the reports of activities, findings and lessons learned, state-of-the-art papers, etc. which were generated by each of these centrally funded projects were packaged and disseminated. Once again, the wide reputation of the Cornell project makes it likely that it's widely quoted findings have exercised some influence over project design and implementation, but it remains difficult to measure.

USAID Regional Bureau Policies and Projects

There is no record of decentralization project activities initiated by any of the regional bureaux. There are, however, indications of policy guidance which has produced similarities in the types of decentralization efforts undertaken by missions within regional jurisdictions. Evidence of this type of guidance is most apparent in the case of the LAC Bureau.

In the earlier cited Creative Associates International evaluation of LAC Bureau experience in strengthening local government institutions it was noted that the projects reviewed were limited to those dealing with municipal development because these were seen as the dominant form of USAID support in the region. One of the reasons for the dominance of this theme was the Bureau's sponsorship of the XII Inter-American Municipal Congress, but the question of how sponsorship of the Congress is linked with the programming of funds for the region is not made clear.[46]

Similar trends in project types may be found in the rural and regional development projects common to many African and Asian country programs of the 1970's and 1980's, but evidence of how these common themes might be linked to formal policy guidance from their respective bureaux is lacking. In a more recent case, the Philippines Assistance Strategy Statement, issued in March 1990, does provide evidence of response to such guidance when it acknowledges that adjustments were made necessary by the substantial development of the ANE "Bureau open markets and open societies strategic framework."[47] Exactly how that strategic framework may have affected the identification of the three major program themes -- including decentralization -- or the configuration of project activities is not clear.

The recent decline in cold war tensions, drastic alterations in the political map of Central and Eastern Europe and similar reversals for leftist opponents in Latin America have contributed to a resurgence of interest in USAID's role in fostering democratic development throughout the world. While there has, as yet, been no definitive Agency-wide strategy statement,[48] each geographic

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46) A review of projects for the region listed in Appendix A indicates regional and rural development and planning projects similar to those implemented in other regions, but municipal development projects represent a substantial category. For details see: Creative Associates International, Inc., A Retrospective ..., Op. Cit., pp. III/3-4.

47) USAID/Philippines, Philippines Assistance Strategy Statement (FY 1991 - FY 1995) (Manila: USAID/Philippines, March 1990), p. 2.

48) In the Administrator's Statement of Mission of September 14, 1990 and a supporting submission to the Deputy Secretary of State several months later, "support for democracy" was listed as one of the guiding principles and a "Democracy Initiative" was described as a series of initiatives in several of which participation, decentralization and support for local government were seen to play a major role. See: A Proposed Initiative By A.I.D. To Support The Evolution Of Enduring Democratic Societies: "The Democracy Initiative" (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., December 1990).

bureau is at some stage of developing either a strategic framework for its democratic initiatives, a set of related project interventions or both. In each case decentralization or support for local government has been assigned a more or less prominent role.

In some cases this renewed interest recognizes the record of past performance and its short-comings, as in the case of the LAC Bureau's recent statement of strategy for strengthening democracy which attributes its lack of success to preoccupation with strategies of deconcentration:

> AID/LAC intends to re enter this area mindful of its considerable experience with municipal development programs during the 1960s and 1970s. Assistance during this era was not particularly effective in giving greater autonomy and decision-making power to local governments, probably because of an approach to the subject that sought to avoid issues of political power and reflected A.I.D. and multilateral donor comfort in working with central rather than local government.[49]

USAID Country Mission Strategies and Projects

Accepting a definition of decentralization projects broad enough to include not only those which specifically address issues of administrative deconcentration and political devolution but also include the activities of local government agencies which are primarily sectoral in orientation, most USAID country programs have -- at one time or another -- included project activities which would qualify for consideration.[50] There are two approaches which are helpful in the review and evaluation of decentralization activities at this level.

First, analysis of the known project activities in a given country should be expected to provide insights into the type, extent and range of support for decentralization to be found in a country program. In addition to those projects which might be identified as having clearly articulated decentralization goals and objectives, those projects which identify local government agencies as host country counterparts should be examined for evidence of such interest. A 1982 review of assistance to local government projects by the Asia Bureau provided insights into the scope of those efforts by identifying the following four major categories:

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49) A.I.D./LAC, Strengthening Democracy In Latin America And The Caribbean: U.S.A.I.D.'s Experience to Date and Plans for the Future (n.p.: n.d.), pp. 14-15.

50) The projects listed in Appendix A are dispersed among 31 countries and this listing is considered to be preliminary.

(1) institution-building efforts to permit local governments to plan and execute a wide variety of small scale infrastructure projects at the local level; (2) participant training and manpower and human resource development programs; (3) some integrated area development programs which involve local governments to some degree, but which are primarily efforts to coordinate activities of several central government agencies at the regional or local level; and (4) single-focus activities (rural roads, potable water) which attempt to build local planning and implementation capabilities to carry out a specific program of investments.[51]

Of particular significance would be any build up over time in the number and diversity of projects which might indicate a growing interest in a policy of decentralization on the part of both the USAID Mission and the host government. There might also be an expansion in the scope of such decentralization activities as successful strategies are extended into new sectors. Patterns in the choice of sectors might also be indicative of the type of decentralization policy being pursued. An example of this pattern of association might be seen in the correlation between the upgrading of local agency technical skills associated with the construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure or the extension of health service delivery systems and the early stages of administrative deconcentration.

Evidence of a commitment to decentralization is found by reviewing the goals, objectives and implementation strategies of potential projects. In each case the relative importance of components in support of decentralization must be weighed against the project's other concerns and the strategy of decentralization determined. In the most extreme cases decentralization issues and strategies may be only implicit at the individual project level, but a cluster of such low level project commitments may amount to a more ambitious commitment overall. In other cases there may be deliberate efforts on the part of the host government to obscure decentralizing project aims to avoid opposition from agencies which might feel their interests threatened by such pursuits.

The second approach builds upon the recognition that a number of discrete decentralization project activities may be part of a coordinated approach. This approach suggests that documentation for discrete project interventions be augmented by review of the Mission Five-Year Assistance Strategy Statement, Annual CDSS (Country Development Strategy Statements) and any other available

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51) Memorandum To: AA/ASIA, Charles Greenleaf (Designate) On: Assessment of Quality and Substance of Available Research and Evaluation Literature on Local Government Development, April 29, 1982, p. 1.

statements of USAID strategic goals in a given country. Such sources may make explicit the extent and direction of decentralization efforts which may be otherwise obscured by individual project justifications which are cast in terms of sectoral goals and objectives. They may also make explicit the common decentralization strategy which may bind a group of discrete project activities which might be less apparent when viewed individually.

Table 1 provides an overview of the location and level of financial support for the projects listed in Appendix B. While a thirty-three countries in all AID bureau regions are represented as the sites of projects valued at more than $1.6 billion, a substantial majority of both projects (49 or 51.6%) and total funding (89.1%) fall within the combined Asia/Near East (ANE) Bureau. Even then, of the eleven countries in that region, only three -- i.e. Egypt, Indonesia and the Philippines -- account for 37.9% of all projects and 76.1% of total funding. The thirteen countries of the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Bureau provide for 36.8% of all projects, but their more modest size is indicated by their claim on only 8% of total funding. Among the nine countries of Africa represented, the 11.6% of projects and the 2.9% of funding are consistent with more general assistance levels in the region.

TABLE 1:
LEVEL & REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
OF DECENTRALIZATION SUPPORT

Region/Country	Projs. No/%		FYs	Total Funds	%
I. Asia					
Bangladesh	1	(1.1)	81-86	$ 8,200,000	(0.5)
Indonesia	19*	(20.0)	77-93	255,418,000**	(15.6)
Korea	1	(1.1)	68-74	696,000	(0.1)
Nepal	4	(4.2)	62-95	84,750,000**	(5.2)
Pakistan	1	(1.1)	88-89	30,000,000	(1.8)
Philippines	10*	(10.5)	69-94	220,183,000**	(13.5)
Thailand	4	(4.2)	60-88	78,603,000	(4.8)
Vietnam	1	(1.1)	66-75	N/A	
Total Asia	41	(43.2)	60-95	$ 677,850,000**	(41.5)
II. Middle East & Europe					
Egypt	7	(7.4)	78-92	$ 767,620,000***	(47.0)
Morocco	No Details Available				
Yemen	1	(1.1)	79-86	8,720,000	(0.5)
Total Mid-East/Eur.	8	(8.4)	78-92	$ 776,340,000**	(47.6)

III. Latin America & Caribbean					
Bolivia	3	(3.2)	73-84	$ 14,770,000	(0.9)
Brazil	5	(5.3)	62-74	37,056,000	(2.3)
Columbia	1	(1.1)	72-76	32,948,000	(2.0)
Costa Rica	3	(3.2)	70-78	4,729,000	(0.3)
Dominican Rep.	1	(1.1)	66	N/A	
El Salvador	2	(2.1)	N/A	12,650,000**	(0.8)
Guatemala	2	(2.1)	65-78	4,046,000	(0.2)
Honduras	6	(6.3)	65-95	6,935,000**	(0.4)
Nicaragua	2	(2.1)	77-??	3,500,000**	(0.2)
Panama	3	(3.2)	53-87	5,579,000**	(0.3)
Paraguay	3	(3.2)	64-82	7,800,000**	(0.5)
Peru	3	(3.2)	79-90	16,250,000**	(1.0)
Venezuela	1	(1.1)	62	N/A	
Total LAC	35	(36.8)	53-95	$ 129,813,000**	(8.0)
IV. Africa					
Botswana	1	(1.1)	76-78	$ N/A	
Ethiopia	1	(1.1)	78	196,000	(0.0)
Ghana	2	(2.1)	77-??	10,495,000	(0.6)
Kenya	1	(1.1)	N/A	N/A	
Nigeria	1	(1.1)	59-75	2,495,000	(0.2)
Sudan	2	(2.1)	79-90	10,300,000**	(0.6)
Tanzania	1	(1.1)	79-85	21,164,000	(1.3)
Uganda	1	(1.1)	65-76	830,000	(0.1)
Zaire	1	(1.1)	80-83	2,594,000	(0.2)
Total Africa	11	(11.6)	59-90	48,082,000**	(2.9)
Grand Total	95	(100)	---	1,632,085,000**	(100)

Notes: * The number of projects from Indonesia and the Philippines included in the inventory is no doubt influenced by the author's greater familiarity with those countries and their project experience in the field of decentralization. This is evidenced by the large number of sectoral projects included from these countries, which suggests that other countries may be under-represented in this respect.

** There are a number of projects for which financial data is incomplete or unavailable.

*** Data on both the number of projects and levels of funding for Egypt are complicated by the restructuring of the decentralization portfolio into multi-project programs (see the notes in Appendix B), with the resulting possibility that some project funding may have been counted twice.

Among those countries with record USAID support for host country decentralization initiatives -- as measured by number of projects and total funding -- are Egypt (7.4% and 47%), Indonesia (20% and 15.6%), the Philippines (10.5% and 13.5%), Nepal (4.2% and 5.2%) and Thailand (4.2% and 4.8%).[52] However, even among these leaders, each pattern of development is different, as is the type, sectoral scope and level of achievement of the decentralization policy pursued. Extreme variation in local conditions and strategies of USAID involvement suggest that much might be learned from a comparative examination of this experience with respect to its scope and pattern of evolution.

Among those factors which contribute to the comparison of the cases mentioned is the depth of political commitment to the goals of decentralization on the part of the host country and the USAID Mission. One of the primary dimensions of that political commitment is the will to establish and support democratic principles and procedures as part of the long- or short-term goals and objectives of decentralization. USAID-supported efforts in the Philippines and Egypt are unique in that they have culminated in multi-faceted, program-level undertakings in support of clearly stated host country policies of decentralization. It may be significant that both of these countries are the beneficiaries of substantial unique or supplementary assistance programs which are linked to strategic defense issues. This might imply that the availability of a sufficiently large pool of resources to satisfy the immediate needs of central government agencies and still allow them to respond to the needs of widely dispersed local subordinates. The achievement of that sustainable level of formal recognition and prominence either in the USAID program of assistance or by the host government has -- to date -- remained beyond the reach of efforts in Nepal and Indonesia.

In the case of Nepal early USAID support for the development of a tiered system of "panchayat" representative councils to increase local participation and decision making in development was viewed in the early 1960's as a classic model of decentralization in support of delayed democratization. These early beginnings were greeted with such enthusiasm that the "panchayat" councils were assigned key roles in a variety of technical development activities with the support of both USAID and Peace Corps volunteers. Architects and proponents of the system lauded it as the precursor of a full-fledged parliamentary democracy. While the referendum which was promised to lead to the realization of this more democratic goal failed to be held, the "panchayat" councils have continued to play an active role in USAID-supported development efforts -- e.g.

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52) That is not to say that other country programs are not significant in their own right, particularly in view of the suspected under-representation of relevant sectoral and other projects in our database.

in roads, irrigation, health and forestry and land conservation. What remains less clear is whether the councils continue to develop as representative and decision-making bodies or only as adjuncts of more bureaucratic agencies at local or national levels.

More recent experience in Indonesia is related to the combined influence of a demand for equity in the geographic distribution of development benefits, with increased emphasis on the needs of the "Outer Islands", and efforts to strengthen the role of newly created provincial and district planning boards under the supervision of the newly established Directorate General of Regional Development. To these arguments must be added the increasingly poor record of the central sectoral agencies in successful project planning and implementation. Lengthy delays in expenditure and financial administration have resulted in concern on the part of donor agencies over the limited absorptive capacity of these national level agencies as well as demands for improved technical capabilities at local levels.

In these two cases both the motivation and initial stages of decentralization were quite different. While the Indonesian case was motivated by the objectives of technical efficiency inherent in administrative deconcentration,[53] the goals articulated for Nepal were those of increased equity and popular participation pursued under a strategy of political devolution. In Indonesia the benefits of further enhancement of technical competence at provincial and district levels continue to be pursued, while the recent turmoil and accession of the king to the demands for political reform in Nepal have only recently reopened the prospects for evolution of the "panchayat" system in the directions originally discussed. Events surrounding the reemergence of political parties and the drafting of a new constitution suggest that events in Nepal are at a critical juncture with the potential for major change on an order of that occurring in Central and Eastern Europe. In Indonesia progress continues to be made in an incremental fashion in the assignment of increasingly complex bureaucratic responsibilities to local authorities.

The apparent success achieved by USAID in the evolution of decentralization project efforts into full programs of policy support in Egypt and the Philippines also displays few commonalities between either the origins or the present realities in these two countries. The initial motivation and style of decentralization pursued in Egypt has much in common with the pursuit of administrative deconcentration in Indonesia. The reasons for the unequivocal support for decentralization as a policy objective in Egypt probably have more to do with its greater economic, cultural

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53) There are parallels here with the pressures for decentralization in Thailand which arose out of the feelings of neglect which led to insurrection in the Northeast and South.

and geographic cohesiveness and the absence of recent threats to its territorial integrity. In the Philippines decentralization has received a new emphasis in the policies of the Aquino Government.

Regardless of these superficial differences among countries and approaches, a more detailed examination of USAID experience at the country level is required to determine its relative success or failure. In order to determine the extent to which that experience has been directed at achieving advances in democratization as a result of decentralization strategies pursued and the relative success of those pursuits will require a more thorough examination of country conditions and the strategies pursued. The following sections provide an overview of these developments in two of those countries which have been prominent in the support of decentralization with different ends and by different means -- i.e. Indonesia and the Philippines.

III.
ASSISTING DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA

Background

"Unity in Diversity" is not only the Indonesian national motto but the elusive goal which has guided much of the country's modern political and economic history. Beginning with what is now celebrated as the origins of national identity in the myth-rich past of the kingdoms of Srivijaya and Majapahit,[54] the basis was provided for territorial claims over thousands of islands occupied by more than a hundred distinct ethnic and linguistic groups. In the final decade of the Sixteenth Century history was repeated with the arrival of the Dutch colonial power and the subsequent conquest of much of this same area which was to be until the mid-Twentieth Century the Dutch East Indies. One of the legacies of the lengthy and uneven penetration of Dutch colonial control was that both the extent and organizational complexity of territorial administration lacked uniformity.

54.) The rise of these empires on Sumatra and Java has been attributed to a wide-ranging chain of events which includes the Mongol invasion of China, the resulting replacement of the normal trade caravan routes across Central Asia by sea routes across Southeast Asia and control of the strategic choke points at the Straits of Malacca and Sunda by these emerging empires. The history of their rise and extension of influence over the present Indonesian archipelago, as well as the Malay peninsula and parts of Indo-China, in the seventh to the twelfth centuries is treated in: D. G. E. Hall, A History Of Southeast Asia, Third Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), Chapters Three and Four.

Variation in the structure of systems found in different geographic regions also resulted from the deliberate colonial practice of indirect rule which allowed local indigenous rulers and organizational structures to persist, while the policies of extraction and control made them dependent upon Dutch power and subsidy for the exercise of their circumscribed authority. The increasingly centralized exercise of power under Dutch colonial rule was masked by a facade of integrity before local indigenous institutions which had been rendered powerless and functionally irrelevant. The continued distinction between directly governed territory and self-governing lands also caused a different pace and pattern of development of local administration to occur in the Twentieth Century. Whereas appointed representative assemblies were introduced in the three Javanese provinces and selected locations on the Outer Islands by the Decentralization Law of 1903, these trappings of democratization were only begun to be imposed upon the self-governing lands in 1938.[55]

This situation was further complicated by the changes wrought during the wartime years of Japanese occupation (1943-1945) and four years of alternating armed revolt and international diplomacy (1945-1949) which sought to isolate the returning Dutch colonial administration diplomatically and wear them down militarily.

The result of a negotiated settlement reached in 1949 was that both sides agreed to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Indonesia. Among the constituent parts of the federation were the Indonesian Republic whose territory had been greatly reduced by successive Dutch attacks and a mixture of states, neo-lands, federations and special regions which the Dutch had established to offset the influence of the Republic. Popular reaction to these obvious neocolonial intentions of the Dutch resulted in abandonment of federalism in favor of a unitary republic which was unanimously established on the fifth anniversary of the original declaration of independence, 17 August 1950.

It is a tribute to the nationalist movement born in the 1920's and responsible for the successful revolution of 1945-1949 that the concept of a unified Indonesian language, people and nation became sufficiently well entrenched throughout the islands to guarantee the survival and integrity of the nation in the face of post-independence challenges. But the countervailing forces of diverse cultural and historical backgrounds, extreme differences in economic and ecological conditions and the effects of social turmoil has produced its own set of challenges and obstacles to national

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55.) For a review of these developments which is sympathetic to Dutch efforts to develop viable systems of local government both prior to and during the revolution, see: A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation Of Federal Indonesia 1945-1949 (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1955), Chapter 3.

integration and the quest for a viable formula for the exercise of national sovereignty.

The creation of an appropriate mechanism for the conduct of local government was among the most complex of the challenges faced by the new Indonesian nation. In the period from the revolution to 1974 there have been a succession of four major pieces of legislation on local government. Concern over this matter began with the creation of eight provinces (West, Central and East Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Sunda-Ketjil) with governors and regional nationalist committees (komite nasional Indonesia) as one of the first acts of the Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence in August 1945. Further regulations were issued later in that year and the first law on the structure and operations of regional government (Law 22/1948) was issued on 8 August 1948. Subsequently this legislation has been superseded by Law 1/1957, Law 18/1965 and Law 5/1974; each replacing prior basic legislation on the subject. In all but the last instance the legislation was issued in time of crisis and under conditions which resulted in failure in implementation.[56] A lengthy series of legislative acts has also resulted in the redrawing of provincial boundaries until a total of 27 provinces have been brought into existence.

Following a number of shifts in earlier attempts, the 1974 Law introduced a uniform hierarchical structure throughout the country which is based on the dual principles of autonomy and deconcentration, although under the former there continues to be made provision for a category of "assistance" (pembantuan) which is not unlike delegation.[57] In the case of autonomy, the regional units (daerah) which are to be imbued with this quality are established at the provincial and district (kabupaten) levels, while the latter principle of deconcentration is embodied in administrative terri-

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56.) The 1948 Law effected only limited Republican controlled territory and was issued in response to Dutch initiatives establishing federal states in areas which had fallen to their control. The 1957 Basic Principles of Regional Government Law was issued in the face of regional revolts by military and civilian leaders on Sumatra and Sulawesi and was suspended under the constitutional changes accompanying the introduction of "Guided Democracy" in 1959. Events surrounding the attempted coup (or counter-coup) and the beginning of transition to the "New Order" overshadowed the 1965 Law on the Basic Principles of Regional Government.

57.) The origins of this category are rooted in the Dutch colonial period and the concept of *Medebewind* which is described as the entrusting of central (or provincial) government tasks to be carried out by provincial (or district) government with funds provided by the higher authority for that purpose.

tories (wilayah) which co-exist at provincial and district levels and is extended one level to the sub-district (kecamatan).[58]

The idea of autonomous regions which have control over their own affairs and are endowed with the ability to generate revenues in response to their needs is part of the democratic ideal which grew in reaction to the Dutch scheme of federation and in response to regional demands during the early years of independence. More recent development efforts under the "New Order" have emphasized consolidation and the guaranteed integrity of the nation and a slow shift to greater emphasis on decentralized capabilities only when these have been assured.[59] Since the launching of the political and economic stabilization efforts of the late 1960's those aspects of decentralization which are associated with political autonomy and democratization have been relegated to a level of importance below that of administrative efficiency and the allayed principles of deconcentration and delegation.[60]

Development in Indonesia is driven by efforts to achieve the combined goals of stability, growth and equity. The succession of Five Year Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun or REPELITA) beginning in 1969 and followed by the Second and Third in 1974 and 1979 were marked by a shift away from the combination of all-out growth and central planning toward an increased emphasis on equity, with the latter being interpreted in both class and geographic terms. As part of this effort a number of steps were taken to

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58.) In contrast to some earlier versions the village (desa) is not treated as part of either of these systems and is regulated under separate legislation, as was the case in 1965.

59.) In response to questions on the degree of centralization in Indonesia's development efforts as late as 1980, Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Economics, Finance and Industry, Widjojo Nitisastro, explained: "The next step is the regions. Here you have to have regional coordination and synchronization of programmes. So we have to create the capabilities on the regional level. ... First, you have to train people. Then you have to get them interested ... and then you have to give them opportunities. And that means you allocate resources. And let them decide themselves what to do with the resources. But we know, at this stage, capabilities need to be further developed." Guy Sacerdoti, "'The Ayatollah' Speaks Out on Indonesia's Economy," Far Eastern Economic Review (May 16, 1980), p. 46.

60.) Among the key factors to be considered with respect to autonomy and democratization are the election and internal organization of the regional representative assemblies; its role in the process of indirect election-appointment of governors and district chiefs (Bupati); and the role of the assembly in oversight of the executive's budgetary and project implementation activities.

enhance the prospects for regional development. First, the new law on regional government was enacted and development capabilities at the provincial level were improved by the creation (where it did not already exist) of the Regional Development Planning Boards (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah or BAPPEDA).[61] Second, a hierarchical structure of development regions was formulated with four major regional centers, ten regional centers and 88 development centers and this structure became the basis for the annual conduct of regional budgetary consultations which were attended by provincial BAPPEDA, the regional bureaux of the National Development Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional or BAPPENAS) and central government departments. Third, earlier modest increases in the financial resources available to local governments for largely delegated tasks by means of a system of block grants, called INPRES programs, were both expanded and the amount of previously existing grants increased.[62]

61.) Provincial planning boards had already existed in some form in the major provinces of Java and a few other locations when the Presidential Instruction ordering their creation and standardization throughout the country was issued in 1974.

62.) This system of INPRES grants (Instruksi Presiden, so named after their granting authority by Presidential Instruction) were conceived as part of the First REPELITA as a mechanism for streamlining the flow of development funds to meet pressing (largely infrastructural) needs at the village and kabupaten levels. Several years later (IFY 1974/1975) a Provincial INPRES was introduced to replace the transfer of ADO (export tax) receipts to that level of government. By the end of the Second REPELITA INPRES programs had been added for the construction of primary schools (Sekolah Dasar), health clinics (PUSKESMAS), forestry and conservation activities (Penghijauan) and to provide loans for the construction of markets (Pasar) and the size of expenditures under the earlier grant programs had been substantially increased.

Among the motivations for the provision of these programs were the extremely limited revenue base of local government, bottlenecks in the design and implementation of infrastructure projects by central agencies, the pressing need for small-scale improvements at the local level and the need to generate seasonal employment opportunities in rural and small town communities. These programs were to become a major factor in fostering decentralization, although the provision of strict guidelines by higher authority acted to limit local autonomy and label these efforts as deconcentration. A possible exception exists in the operation of the Provincial INPRES, which allows some flexibility in the division of the total funds provided into those which were specifically earmarked (ditetapkan) and those over which only general guidelines had been provided (diarahkan). Although the latter category was initially quite constrained, its growth was to play a major role in decentra-

Two seeming side effects of this increase in regional development activity were the gradual development and proliferation of formal university courses and training programs in regional development planning and an increased interest in the preparation of regional development studies and plans at the multi-provincial, provincial and district levels.[63] In both instances, these activities became the mechanism for the entry and expansion of foreign assistance in an area which had been considered too sensitive politically for such intervention. At the outset these efforts were made to appear less threatening by casting them in the same mold as highly technical assistance efforts at the national level. This was marked by the continued emphasis on physical infrastructure (including the influential INPRES programs) and the role of the Department of Public Works as national level counterpart for the majority of these studies and training exercises, with some involvement by the Departments of Agriculture and Manpower-Transmigration. Among the early donors were UNICEF, the World Bank, German, Dutch, Belgian, British, Canadian, Japanese and Australian bilateral assistance agencies, while USAID was a relatively late addition to the group.

At the provincial level it was the BAPPEDA which played an increasingly active role in actual implementation and it was the staff of these planning boards which became the major beneficiaries of training and what transfer of skills from foreign experts was accomplished in on-the-job exercises. The fact that the BAPPEDA was part of the regional government apparatus of the Department of Home Affairs, which bore primary responsibility for staff training and other functional improvements, must have been influential in causing a radical shift in that agency's policy toward foreign assistance. The Department of Home Affairs had remained aloof from foreign cooperation until the issuance of Minister of Home Affairs Decision No. 309/1976 on The Establishment of Steering and Technical Committees for Foreign Assistance to Regional Governments. Although it appears that this Decision was issued in response to the request of and possible pressure from BAPPENAS, its issuance does mark a watershed in opening both regional government and the Department itself to the foreign assistance programs discussed below.

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lization efforts described below.

63.) These and some of the earlier cited regional development activities are briefly described in: A. Madjid Ibrahim and H. Benjamin Fisher, "Regional Development Studies and Planning in Indonesia," Bulletin Of Indonesian Economic Studies (Vol. XV, No. 2, July 1979), pp. 113-127.

USAID and Indonesian Decentralization

The record of U.S. support for Indonesia's early nationalist aspirations throughout the fifties and early sixties was viewed as mixed, if not suspect. This was particularly true of the record of U.S. involvement in regional affairs and other potentially sensitive areas of political concern during the period of the late 1950's and early 1960's which were marked by regional revolts and rising tensions between leftist political parties and the military. Relations which were already strained by suspicion that the U.S. was providing most of the arms used by rebels on Sumatra were pushed to the breaking point when the pilot of a rebel bomber shot down over Sulawesi was discovered to be American and the plane was suspected to have taken off from the U.S. Air Force facility at Clark Field in the Philippines. This tended to confirm the belief that the U.S. and other Western interests favored the regions at the expense of the center. A further reason for this apparent favoritism was the approval expressed by Westerners for the vocal anti-communism expressed by the rebels.

It was the espoused role of the U.S. during this period to attempt to moderate the more extreme expressions of nationalism in foreign policy and focus domestic attention on the problems of economic decline and the demand for educated manpower. Attempts to influence economic planning and the direction of policy were finally abandoned following analysis by a team of American experts of the 1961 Eight Year Development Plan which had been assembled by the National Development Council (Dewan Perantjan Nasional or DEPERNAS) and an unsuccessful effort to assist in its implementation by assembling a consortium of international donors. Following the failure of this initiative both the Peace Corps and USAID were withdrawn from Indonesia until the climate for foreign assistance improved under the New Order.[64]

When the U.S. did return in the late 1960's it was as part of the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) consortium and its share in the rehabilitation efforts from April 1966 to September 1968 was $282.2 million. From 1966 until the introduction of the First REPELITA in 1969 foreign assistance efforts were devoted to economic stabilization and various forms of emergency relief. Recognizing that this was also a period of political transition, both government and donors continued to exercise caution with

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64.) Two excellent sources on U.S. efforts to assist Indonesia by Americans who were involved in those efforts as Chief of the Economic Aid Mission and later Ambassador and as a member of the United Nations Technical Assistance Mission to Indonesia, respectively, are: Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, Inc., 1971); and Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963).

respect to the visibility and sensitivity of areas in which aid was allowed to be administered. Given this background and lingering sensitivity over the earlier history of American involvement in the regions, the U.S. was cautious to avoid any appearance of interference in an area as politically sensitive as relations with regional governments unless such assistance could be well justified on technocratic and economic grounds and was prompted by an unambiguous Indonesian request for assistance.[65]

Initial U.S. assistance for regional development appears in the context of the preparation of the rather innocuous regional development plans discussed above. But the USAID efforts were to prove to be somewhat more ambitious than their predecessors. The origins of that assistance and the early project design process, which must have begun in 1975, produced a cluster of four related project interventions which were intended to be tested over a short period of time.

The BAPPEDA Project

The first of these projects, The Area Development Project Plan (BAPPEDA) Project, entered implementation in 1976 and functioned as a relatively low budget ($0.5 million) pilot activity which benefitted from an uncomplicated and flexible design. As the name by which it is known implies, the BAPPEDA Project, was initially intended to provide the newly created provincial BAPPEDA with a combination of staff training and technical assistance to help develop agricultural projects for implementation with available provincial funds. Planning and management of non-infrastructural project interventions in a single kecamatan location was intended to provide practical experience in addressing the needs of rural populations for production-oriented assistance, while the short-term overseas training of BAPPEDA staff in neighboring Asian countries provided the requisite skills.

The BAPPEDA Project was scheduled for staged implementation in four pairs of provinces (Bali and N. Sumatra, E. Kalimantan and N. Sulawesi, C. Java and Aceh, and Lampung and Nusa Tenggara Barat) over a period of three FYs (76/77-78/79). At the national level the project was placed under the guidance of a Steering Committee chaired by the Department of Public Works (D-G Cipta Karya), with members from BAPPENAS, the Departments of Home Affairs and Agriculture. The assignment to D-G Cipta Karya of primary counterpart responsibility at the national level was consistent with the role

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65.) The former Indonesian ambassador to the United States and subsequent Social Science Advisor to BAPPENAS, Soedjatmoko, related to the author that he had opposed U.S. support for regional development in the mid-1970's on the grounds that it was too politically sensitive to have foreigners involved in the details of local government administration.

played by that agency in regional development planning activities and its active participation in the design and conduct of BAPPEDA staff training.

The key elements of this project were its emphasis on: 1.) the practical hands-on training of BAPPEDA staff; 2.) the area approach to project planning which was limited to a single sector and only one sub-district per province; and 3.) the linkage between the allocation of provincial funds and the funding of non-infrastructure productive activities. Following implementation in the first two provinces (Bali and N. Sumatra) events occurred which caused a shift in the direction of the project. Minister of Home Affairs Decision No. 309/1976 marked a radical departure in the openness of that department to the expansion of regional development activities by placing its senior officials as chairmen of the Steering and Technical Committees established to regulate foreign assistance. And, in response to this new opportunity, a portion of the BAPPEDA Project's funds for short-term technical assistance were shifted, in 1977, to the design of a major multi-phase Provincial Area Development Project (PDP) with the first phase to be implemented in provinces which had previously been targeted by the BAPPEDA Project (Central Java and Aceh). In the end, the support for multiple provinces which was to have been phased over three years was abandoned in favor of this new and expanded effort.

Northern Sumatra Regional Planning Project

More conventional regional development planning concepts were embodied in a large-scale exercise covering the four provinces (Aceh, N. Sumatra, Riau and W. Sumatra) which constituted all of Major Regional Centre A under the BAPPENAS regional development categorization described above. With grant funding of $1.56 million, the stated purpose of this second member of the design cluster, the Northern Sumatra Regional Planning (NSRP) Project, was to "assist in the establishment of coordinated provincial & regional planning for Major Development Region A."[66] However, a review of the projected outputs indicates that this was more than just another broadly defined regional planning activity and, once again, the provincial BAPPEDA was the key implementation agency and target of technical assistance. Among the expected outputs were: 1.) a system for the upcoming Third REPELITA and intermediate range provincial development programming; 2.) a long-range regional planning and development strategy and framework; 3.) a system for provincial one-year action programming; and 4.) supporting output in the form of a provincial/regional planning information system

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66.) USAID/Indonesia, Project Paper (PP): Northern Sumatra Regional Planning (Jakarta, 25 July 1977), Logical Framework.

and comprehensive manpower development program in provincial/regional planning.[67]

Although neither completion of the design nor implementation of the NSRP had begun when Ministerial Decision No. 309 was issued in December 1976, this project continued to operate under the earlier pattern of national direction based on a Steering Committee chaired by the Department of Public Works (D-G Cipta Karya), with members drawn from BAPPENAS and the Department of Home Affairs. Evaluations conducted in October 1979 and October 1981 indicated that satisfactory progress was made in the development of the planned systems in the lead province of Riau and that they were judged to be transferable to the other three provinces. The earlier of these evaluations also indicated that changes in the structure of the host agency and rethinking of the entire concept of regional planning boundaries suggested the need for modification of intended outputs. By the time of the second evaluation it had been concluded that the possibility of a follow-on project was to be abandoned in favor of absorbing some of the provinces into the PDP -- i.e. Aceh had already been included in PDP-I and it was proposed that Riau be included in what was then envisioned to become PDP-III.

The Kabupaten & Provincial Planning and Management Training Project

The Kabupaten and Provincial Planning and Management Training (KPP&MT) Project and the NSRP share a somewhat common perspective in that they both appear to be part of a more general training scheme for regional development planning and management. There are indications that actual implementation of the KPP&MT was delayed by several years and that its basic design had been influenced by the events described above.[68] Ultimately, KPP&MT was assigned responsibility for the design of a complete training program in regional development planning and management for officials at provincial and district levels, with particular emphasis on the training of staff from BAPPEDA and other local elements of the Department of Home Affairs. It differed from the NSRP in that the training to be developed was intended to upgrade more general

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67.) IBID.

68.) Not only do the two projects have identification numbers which are consecutive but an evaluation of the follow-on to the KPP&MT refers to changes in the projects design, intent and counterpart agency. However, from the description provided it is possible that this evaluation team confused the KPP&MT with one or more of the other projects in this group. See: Russell H. Betts, et al., Report And Recommendations Of The Evaluation Team: Local Government Training-II (LGT-II) Project (Jakarta, 28 March 1983), p. 11.

skills than the production of REPELITA-based outputs which were the focus of NSRP.

The initial fourteen month design phase was tasked with producing a master plan for a nation-wide training program to be conducted by professional trainers from Badan DIKLAT (the Education and Training Board of the Department of Home Affairs) and a network of regional training centers to be established by a follow-on phase of the project. Preparation of the master plan was assisted by a team of three consultants provided under a contract with PADCO (Planning and Development Collaborative International), which was also under contract for the provision of technical assistance under the NSRP. The logic of this redirection of the KPP&MT Project is that the training to be provided to BAPPEDA and other local government staff would support practical project design and management efforts, which were to become the focus of USAID's assistance to Indonesian decentralization.

The team began work in July 1978 and submitted a draft master plan in December of that year, but there is little evidence of influence or consideration of experience from either the NSRP or the PDP-I which had begun implementation at that time. By the fall of 1979 the Master Plan had been discussed and finalized and approvals at the mission level and Washington for a follow-on project had been obtained. The speed with which this project had been designed and the lack of serious consideration for how it would be integrated with other on-going efforts were to prove to be serious flaws which undercut the later implementation of this project.

Another factor which was to influence the failure of this project and its successor in achieving integration with parallel efforts may be seen in the counterpart arrangements at the national level. Following Decision No. 309 leadership in regional development was passed from the Department of Public Works (D-G CIPTA KARYA) to the Department of Home Affairs' Directorate-General for General Government and Regional Autonomy (PUOD or Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonomi Daerah) and, more specifically, the Directorate for Regional Development. In the case of the KPP&MT neither the pattern of national level Steering and Technical Committees created by Ministerial Decision No. 309 nor the older model of D-G CIPTA KARYA leadership were evident in the project management structure. In a complete break with the trend of earlier developments, the training and education unit of the Department of Home Affairs, Badan DIKLAT, was assigned sole counterpart responsibilities at both national and regional levels.[69]

69.) Although the Head of Badan DIKLAT was assigned a seat on the Steering Committee created by Decision No. 309, no representation was provided on the more active Technical Committee. Conversely, the Director of Regional Development from D-G PUOD appears to

Provincial Area Development Project

While design activities for the fourth member of the cluster, the Provincial Area Development Project (PDP), were cited earlier as having begun in 1977 under auspices of the BAPPEDA Project, Implementation came to an end -- with respect to active USAID involvement -- in 1990. During the intervening period of more than a decade the USAID-assisted PDP came to be implemented in three phases (PDP-I in 1978, PDP-IIA in 1979 and PDP-IIB in 1980) and in eight provinces throughout the country -- i.e. Central Java and Aceh under PDP-I; Bengkulu, East Java, South Kalimantan and Nusa Tenggara Timur under PDP-IIA; and West Java and Nusa Tenggara Barat under PDP-IIB. It not only proved to be the most ambitious and long-lived project of the cluster, but it also came to exercise considerable influence over GOI (Government of Indonesia) policy on the role of foreign assistance in regional development as well as over the strategy and allocation of other portions of the USAID assistance portfolio.

With respect to the development of GOI policy there are a number of factors which bear on the nature and extent of decentralization supported by the PDP. First, the primary vehicle for PDP assistance was the provision of a joint USAID-GOI pool of funds which were allocated to participating provinces for the identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation by local government officials of subproject interventions aimed at directly increasing the incomes of the rural poor. Annual funding allocations were provided through the more flexible of the two existing Provincial INPRES channels which allowed for maximum local autonomy in project identification and design. A further element of direct local control over project financial management was added with the deposit of individual project funds in accounts established at the Kabupaten branch of the government-owned BRI (Bank Rakyat Indonesia or Indonesian People's Bank).

In this way the PDP came to represent an example of real delegation of both authority and responsibility to designated provincial and kabupaten agencies for the planning and implementation of development efforts aimed at addressing local needs. However, the prescribed budgetary procedures did include one provision which undercut the democratizing influence of this decentralization initiative. Care was taken to deliberately avoid the allocation of PDP funds at a stage of the provincial budget cycle where plans for the commitment of those funds to specific project activities would be subject to review by representative assemblies at national, provincial or kabupaten levels. While the intent to substantially

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have been overlooked in the KPP&MT structure. The lack of a strong linkage between the management structure of this project and other related efforts was damaging to the prospects for coordination and integration.

enhance the role of local administration in the allocation of local development resources, the exercise was intended to be exclusively one of administrative devolution.

It is generally conceded that the variety of sectoral project efforts which were produced by PDP funds resulted in both technological innovation and a substantial economic impact on the incomes of the rural poor who were the designated target groups in participating provinces.[70] But it is also acknowledged that the individual projects would not have achieved their desired impact without the provision by PDP of a combination of technical assistance and funds for training to improve administrative and technical competence among local government staff and improve the ability of the staff of participating national agencies to support these local government efforts. In addition to the variety of formal and informal training opportunities provided under the PDP, the most visible form of technical assistance was provided in the form of multi-disciplinary teams of provincial consultants.

During the early years of the program two structural adjustments of the apparatus for the control of local development were made which were to have significant implications for the PDP and its scope of operation. First, it has been noted that each of the earlier projects shared a common institutional focus on the development of the newly emergent provincial BAPPEDA and the PDP does not deviate from that focus. While it was emphasized that those technical aspects of project design and evaluation would continue to be the responsibility of the appropriate sectoral agencies, it was made equally clear that primary responsibility for overall coordination of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation at the provincial level was assigned to the BAPPEDA.

Under the PDP decentralization to the provincial level was intended to be only the first step in a process which was forced to come to grips with the problems inherent in a system of regional administration with few common traditions or structural standards. While the Java provinces had not only developed their own provincial BAPPEDA equivalents in advance of the central government's 1974 order for their establishment in all provinces, Central and West Java had gone on to experiment with the creation of comparable planning boards at the kabupaten level. This was just one more indication of the relatively more complete and sophisticated administrative apparatus to be found on Java in comparison with the Outer Islands. Among the other differences which were to effect

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70.) A comprehensive impact evaluation of the PDP conducted in 1986 concluded that 61% of all project beneficiaries believed that their incomes had increased, while 30% showed no current net gain from their pre-project position. See: Survey Research Indonesia, Indonesia PDP Project Evaluation Study 1986: Report of Findings (Jakarta, September 1986), p.7.

PDP execution was the sectoral agency structure and staffing levels in kabupaten on Java which were often the equivalent or superior to conditions found at comparable agency offices at the provincial level outside of Java. The comparison could also be extended to kecamatan and desa levels with similar results, with the added complication that at these levels even the identity of individual units sometimes remained tenuous because of the lack of consensus on the location of boundaries and popularly accepted traditions of community and settlement patterns. The supervision and oversight of these latter levels were the responsibility of D-G BANGDES (Pembangunan Desa or Rural Development) of the Department of Home Affairs which has a tradition of highly centralized administration.

PDP efforts to extend decentralization below the provincial level were aided by the 1980 order to establish planning boards or BAPPEDA TK II in each Kabupaten throughout the country. The implication of this action for the PDP were that the newly created kabupaten BAPPEDA would come to play the same central role in the coordination of the program at that level as had been true from the outset for the provincial BAPPEDA. It was also true that where the kabupaten BAPPEDA had previously existed on Java, the PDP had made early contributions to the development of that institution.[71] It was equally true that the prior existence of the institution made substantial contributions to the progress of PDP. Where the kabupaten BAPPEDA had not previously existed, the early PDP structure at that level was often based on an ad hoc committee which later evolved into or was replaced by the newly created BAPPEDA. The difference was a lack of institutional stability for the program at early stages. Effects of this lack of stability were felt in the development of such important systems and mechanisms as those developed for bottom-up planning.

Nowhere in the original project documentation is the development or exercise of bottom-up planning cited as one of the key components of the desired PDP management system. Yet, every evaluation has treated this component as the most important of the systems developed and in most cases it is further linked to the active participation of project beneficiaries. The 1981 Evaluation stated:

> Both PDP I and PDP II emphasized that subprojects be selected with the participation of the villagers where the projects are to be initiated. The official process

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71.) A 1981 external evaluation of PDP related a comparison of PDP and non-PDP kabupaten (BAPPEDA) capabilities by the Governor of Central Java's Development Bureau staff which noted a favorable difference in planning capabilities which spread beyond PDP. Jerome T. French and Bruce Glassburner, et al., Evaluation Of The Provincial Area Development Program: Draft Report (Jakarta, Indonesia, 8 September 1981), p. 22.

for PDP subproject selection requires project ideas come from below. Officials in the four provinces that we visited claimed that they adhered to this approach.[72]

The capacity building assessment which was conducted earlier the same year (1981) was more circumspect in identifying what it considered to be the positive observations of government officials and PDP staff at all levels working together to promote bottom-up planning:

- There is evident commitment at all levels to a more decentralized project management style which incorporates bottom-up planning. This commitment is clearly linked to PDP.

- The idea of the Kabupaten BAPPEDA is beginning to take shape in some provinces and a significant devolution of basic planning responsibility to this level is evident. This process is a direct result of PDP.

- Various attempts are being made to ascertain local needs and aspirations and to incorporate this information into the planning process.[73]

It is in the combined elements of beneficiary selection and the planning of sub-project interventions which constitute the PDP version of bottom-up planning that we find elements of the decentralization process which also contribute to the democratization of development efforts. The development of the kabupaten BAPPEDA is a further link in the chain which brings the PDP organization closer to the level where it can gain access to the intended beneficiaries and more precise information concerning their needs and abilities. In those cases where organization at the kabupaten level functioned smoothly and effectively, the prospects were enhanced for the conduct of meaningful consultations at kecamatan and desa levels. While in most instances these consultations were limited to the selection of beneficiaries by desa officials, there were also more limited instances where real mechanisms were established which allowed for some measure of beneficiary input into the identification of appropriate subproject interventions.

72.) IBID. p. 30.

73.) Jerry Van Sant et al., Supporting Capacity Building In The Indonesia Provincial Development Program (A Field Report Prepared Under AID Contract No. 936-5300) (Research Triangle Park, N.C. and Washington, D.C.: Research Triangle Institute and Development Alternatives, Inc., February, 1981), p. 14.

It is unfortunate that some of the more successful PDP experiments with organizational structures and strategies for bottom-up planning were not further encouraged and disseminated to other provinces. When efforts at the national level were committed to the development of a standardized PDP system for multi-year program and project planning, those elements which dealt with bottom-up planning and popular participation were left deliberately vague. Part of the problem lay in the earlier cited facts that desa and kecamatan organization and functioning lay outside the normal channels of local administration, but the ability to penetrate beyond provincial and kabupaten levels was also dependent upon the level of competence already available among staff at those levels.

The second institutional development which was to have significant influence on the PDP at the national level occurred in 1981 when the Directorate for Regional Development of the Department of Home Affairs was elevated to the level of the Directorate-General for Regional Development (BANGDA). This move was, in large part, due to the increased size and importance of INPRES block grants in the funding of regional development and an acknowledgement of the important role of BANGDA in the allocation and channeling of those grants. But it was also, in part, an acknowledgement of the leading role played by BANGDA in mobilizing foreign assistance for ambitious new efforts in regional development.

While the elevation of BANGDA was matched by expansion in organizational structure and an increase in staff, the increased volume of demand generated by rapid expansion in the number of international donors attracted and the variety of programs sponsored outpaced advances in institutional capacity. From the outset the assignment by USAID and the GOI of primary responsibility for PDP coordination at the national level to BANGDA was a necessary -- but minor -- consideration. It was the intention that the PDP place primary emphasis on the delivery of financial resources and the upgrading of institutional capacity to the units of local government in participating provinces. The role of BANGDA and other national agencies was to be limited to one of support and monitoring and evaluation of activities and progress at lower levels. It was only during the planning of the second phase of the PDP in 1982 that the need for assistance in developing the capacity of BANGDA was recognized and a program of training and technical assistance was begun in 1983.

However, this and subsequent efforts to improve capacity were incapable of coping with the increasing volume and scope of responsibility and the constraints of outmoded procedures. By 1985, in addition to the demands of the expanding INPRES programs, foreign

assistance programs included under the general category of PDP[74] had grown to include: 1.) integrated rural development activities in twelve provinces with five sources of donor funding;[75] 2.) three watershed development projects covering the three most populous provinces on Java;[76] 3.) the USAID-funded FID (Financial Institutions Development) Project which was aided the development of rural credit schemes sponsored by the regional development banks in the provinces of Central and West Java and West Sumatra; 4.) the CJEDP (Central Java Enterprise Development Project) which USAID had developed as a pilot attempt to stimulate private sector enterprise development with support from various agencies of local government in Central Java; and 5.) the GTZ-assisted integrated Transmigration Area Development Project in East Kalimantan. Within the next few years the situation was made even more complex by the addition of activities from the ADB (Asian Development Bank) and the government of Australia and the further expansion of USAID assistance channeled through BANGDA to include a roads maintenance project.

Growth in the sheer volume and diversity of the foreign assistance portfolio was further exacerbated by the failure to match the expansion with a comparable set of procedures to insure the integration of these programs and projects into BANGDA's more

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74.) From the outset the GOI had altered the PDP label in such a way as to provide for broader application. The term used in GOI discussions and documents, PPW (Program Pengembangan Wilayah or Regional Development Program), came to be used for all of the following programs and projects. In order to distinguish the later activities from the original PDP, the latter was often identified in Indonesian language documents as PPW/PDP.

75.) To the eight USAID PDP provinces referred to above there was added the RNAIC (Royal Netherlands Agency for International Cooperation) LTA-77 Project in Aceh, the GTZ (technical assistance agency of the Federal Republic of Germany) West Pasaman Area Development Project in West Sumatra, the IBRD/IDA Yogya Rural Development Project in Yogyakarta and the CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) Sulawesi Rural Development Project in South and Southeast Sulawesi. Descriptions of these activities are provided in: Directorate-General of Regional Development (BANGDA), Provincial Area Development Program: A Summary of Integrated Rural Development Projects Under Ministry of Home Affairs, Directorate-General of Regional Development (BANGDA) (Jakarta, October 1985). Not included in this survey were two UNDP/World Bank Area Development Projects in the provinces of East and West Nusa Tenggara and an additional two provincial projects which were still in preliminary design stages in Southeast Sulawesi and Irian Jaya.

76.) DAS (Daerah Aliran Sungai or Watershed) Citanduy covering appropriate areas of West and Central Java, DAS Jratunselune in northern Central Java and DAS Brantas in East Java.

routine responsibilities. This failure to develop procedures adequate for the dual management responsibilities imposed by INPRES and foreign assistance programs is related to the fact that the timing of BANGDA's elevation to D-G status and the expansion of foreign assistance programs were highly interrelated. At the same time the demands generated for management time and expertise were viewed as more competitive than interrelated. Although the INPRES programs had provided an inspiration and model for the development of PDP, in practice the programs remained quite separate. The lack of effort made to integrate the management of the programs was as much due to the shortsightedness of the donors as it was the GOI.

For the GOI the diversity and complexity of donor administrative and information needs and the inability to predict or guaranty the basis for budgetary continuation of the various programs led to a short-term problem solving perspective and little consideration of PDP's long-term prospects or policy implications.[77] Within the BANGDA structure the proliferation of PDP also had negative implications in that the various projects were distributed among units with as much consideration for the sharing of project honoraria among staff as for the appropriateness of functional assignments. In some cases donor programs were sufficiently large and demanding of staff time as to completely displace the performance of routine functions.[78] Some perfunctory efforts at

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77.) In part, this short-term perspective was reinforced by the sharp drop in international oil prices which occurred in the early 1980's and the subsequent impact on the GOI's ability to project state revenues and, consequently, foreign assistance needs. Whereas the PDP had been initially premised on a record of excess development funds and a limited absorptive capacity of the national administrative apparatus, by the mid-1980's it was unclear whether the national development budget would be capable of providing the counterpart project funds which had been previously committed. In the latter years of the PDP some provinces were called upon to commit their own limited funds to satisfy the GOI commitment made under the PDP loan agreement.

Although earlier discussions between the author and the Deputy Chairman of BAPPENAS for Regional Development indicated that a new INPRES program based on PDP had been considered, the new climate of austerity curtailed pursuit of this option.

78.) Much of this disruption had been masked by the charismatic style of the founding BANGDA Director-General, Drs Atar Sibero, whose intimate knowledge of and involvement in the process of decentralization had enabled him to orchestrate BANGDA's early growth and operations by means of an energetic "hands-on" direction and crisis management of personnel at all levels. When the time came for his replacement by a manager who lacked his predecessor's extensive background in and understanding of regional development

standardization across donors and approaches were made by collecting together the -- otherwise disparate -- annual planning and implementation instructions for the various programs into a single document, but the result was a confusing collection which was sometimes contradictory and often vague or incomplete. These efforts reached their highpoint with the issuance of instructions in March 1985 to cover all PPW projects for IFY's 1985/1986 - 1988/1989, or the remainder of the Fourth REPELITA.[79] The resulting generality seriously undercut the value of this document as a basis for decision-making.

For the donors the problems of management and organizational structure at the national level were of limited importance. For those with multiple projects or provincial project locations, the scope of management responsibilities was sufficiently broad and complex that it led to the establishment of some physical management presence at BANGDA. But that donor presence was to remain compartmentalized; isolated from each other and from the routine work of their host BANGDA staff. While the USAID, CIDA and UNDP/World Bank programs were quite similar in scope, objectives, approach and organizational requirements, each was assigned a separate unit of BANGDA as counterpart.[80] Resident consultants assigned to assist in BANGDA's management of these programs were preoccupied with tracking the progress of their own particular

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on a national scale, the need for organizational coherence and more conventional styles of decision-making and flow of information also became increasingly apparent. The new D-G's response to deficiencies in the BANGDA organization's structure was to request guidelines for reorganization from higher authority. The response was several years in coming and did result in new lines of structural organization and some shifts in personnel assignments, but there is no indication of whether it has resolved the problems of integration between INPRES and foreign assistance management needs.

79.) Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 12 Tahun 1985: Tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Pembangunan Daerah Dalam Rangka Program Pengembangan Wilayah 1985 s/d 1989 [Instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs No. 12/1985: Concerning Regional Development Implementation Guidelines for the Regional Development Program 1985-1989] (Jakarta, 19 March 1985).

80.) USAID's multiple projects were assigned to different directorates or sub-directorates in accordance with the substantive area of project concern. Although the UNDP/World Bank projects being planned were similar to each other and the other donor's area development activities, the East and West Nusa Tenggara activities were housed in BANGDA while the Southeast Sulawesi and Irian Jaya planning efforts were being conducted under the sponsorship of the Department of Public Works where all earlier area development activities had been centered.

programs to the extent that their demands on BANGDA staff time and other resources caused distortions in that agency's performance of its routine responsibilities.

The result of this institutional overload at the national level was that PDP proceeded at provincial and lower levels in spite of -- rather than with the assistance of -- central guidance and oversight. The receipt of untimely, incomplete and sometimes contradictory requests and instructions from BANGDA resulted in crises at local levels, but the crises passed and PDP continued to experience success and popular support. The greatest loss was the failure to institutionalize some of the innovations and success which was achieved. When USAID support for PDP came to an end in the eight provinces which it had come to cover, BANGDA made an effort to continue the program as an ad hoc activity at greatly reduced levels of funding. The PDP had not been integrated into the Provincial INPRES nor had it been successful in establishing a new INPRES. While the pioneering USAID program was instrumental in attracting other donor support for decentralization and regional development efforts, the resulting complex of programs remains varied and without clear policy direction. During the final stages of USAID involvement planning was initiated for a follow-on project which would attempt to address these policy and national level management issues, but the resulting Local Policy Development Project does not appear to have engendered strong support either at the Mission in Jakarta or in Washington. At present its fate remains unknown.

Local Government Training II

Among the original complex of four projects it was noted above that the KPP&MT Project was unique in several respects. First, it was devoted to the preparation of what came to be officially known as A National Strategy for Training in Regional Development Planning and Management and included the design for a large BAPPEDA and local government staff training project. Second, both the design and implementation of the resulting project were to be carried out under the auspices of Badan DIKLAT (the Education and Training Board of the Department of Home Affairs) and included no provision for inclusion of BANGDA in its management structure. Given the timing and mandate of the resulting Local Government Training II Project to provide training in regional development planning and management, it would appear to have been a natural complement for the recently initiated PDP. Failure to coordinate the parallel activities of these two projects proved to be only one of the major shortcomings of the LGT II.

From the early stages of design pressure had been exerted to speed the transition from concept to project implementation. The sense of urgency was, in part, a result of the promulgation of the National Strategy coinciding with the Minister of Home Affairs announcement of "the government's intention of establishing BAPPEDA

in each kabupaten and kotamadya in the country and establishing a budget with which to train 3000 new members."[81] The project was rushed from Mission approval in February 1980 to AID/Washington approval the following August only to be hampered by a delay of more than a year in the provision of technical assistance. Haste in the design process had also produced a budget and implementation plan which "was a last-minute addition which was devised to assist USAID in the preparation of a project paper to seek funding in Washington rather than to serve as a guide to Indonesian implementation."[82]

While the LGT II was experiencing delays Badan DIKLAT was not inclined to allow these delays to interfere with its own schedule of activities. Prior to the arrival of the consultant team Badan DIKLAT contracted the Centre for the Investigation and Study of Regional Planning (Pusat Penyelidikan Studi Perencanaan Regional or PPSPR) of Gadjah Mada University to provide for the training of trainers to staff the planned regional training centers. Two groups of trainers were passed through this traditional program of lectures before the consultants were available to take over this function. What developed was a pattern which was not unlike that which was experienced with the management of PDP under BANGDA, but with exactly the opposite consequences. Whereas the PDP was seen to monopolize and displace routine BANGDA tasks, "the leadership of Badan DIKLAT was on record as being reluctant to give the project a high priority within the context of ongoing Badan DIKLAT activities, and in particular was reluctant to give LGT-II activities too high a priority compared to the agency's continuing training programs."[83] The result was lengthy delays in the preparation of curricula and other training materials for the basic course in regional development planning and even longer delays in the conduct of this course with trainees from selected kabupaten BAPPEDA on Java.[84]

81.) Russell H. Betts et al. Report And Recommendations Of The Evaluation Team: Local Government Training-II (LGT-II) Project (Jakarta, 28 March 1983), p. 12.

82.) IBID. p. 14.

83.) IBID. pp. 18-19.

84.) Close cooperation between the author, then serving as PDP Planning and Management Advisor in Central Java, and the PADCO consultant assigned to the SELAPUTDA RTC (Regional Training Centre) in Yogyakarta did manage to orchestrate a joint training activity with staff from the kabupaten BAPPEDA involved in PDP as the trainees. Over strong initial opposition from the director of the RTC, training materials were modified to more closely match PDP's emphasis on the rural poor and trainers were enabled to participate in practical follow-up exercises centered on annual PDP planning by

The design and early phases of the LGT-II Project were also criticized for their failure to emphasize the democratization of the decentralization efforts which the project was intended to support. The same 1983 Evaluation noted:

> [O]nce stated, the principles of participation, community planning, acknowledgement of local conditions, and delegation of decision-making to the people get little further attention. The professionalization of the BAPPEDA and other agencies of the government at the provincial and kabupaten levels is described in detail in terms of needs, training, assignment, and manpower policy, but nothing is said as to how civil servants are to assist in creating institutional capacities to deal with people on their own terms and to possess the sensitivity to motivate them to express their aspirations and their priorities and to involve them in the planning process.[85]

Other USAID Projects

The sheer number of projects in Indonesia related to decentralization listed in Appendix B is evidence of the fact that this theme has played a substantial role in the development of the USAID project portfolio. Projects included there are of two types: 1) projects which have been the direct result of PDP sectoral activity success or response to difficulties encountered there and the expanded role of BANGDA in foreign assistance; and 2) projects which have been influenced by the need for a decentralized approach to the regional distribution of services being developed under more or less conventional sectoral projects. It is surprising, given the number of projects listed in these two categories, that the descriptions of USAID development strategy for the years 1984 and 1985 fail to include decentralization among the three major development goals. The documents for both years do include the statement that "[s]pecial attention is also being devoted to decentralization,"[86] without further elaboration as to how or why this is being done.

Among the projects which have resulted from PDP successes or difficulties encountered is the CJEDP (Central Java Enterprise Development Project, included in the Private Sector Development Project) which was prompted by the difficulties encountered in pursuing small scale industry development objectives under the PDP in Central Java. Also included in this category is the FID (Finan-

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the trainees.

85.) IBID. pp. 29-30.

86.) USAID Program in Indonesia (October, 1984), p. 5. and USAID Program in Indonesia (October, 1985), p. 5.

cial Institutions Development) Project which began as an attempt to build upon the success of PDP efforts to revive the BKK (Badan Kredit Kecamatan or Kecamatan Credit Board) in selected areas of Central Java and extend the development of that model to additional provinces.[87] The assignment to BANGDA of responsibilities for the environmental defense and development of watershed areas prompted the choice of that agency as counterpart for a series of watershed development projects on Java and the inclusion in those projects of major decentralization components for smallholder development and the provision of rural credit. The latest addition to this category is a roads maintenance project which will attempt to develop the ability of local jurisdictions to plan and manage this critical activity.

Among the projects in the second category are agricultural and educational policy planning, health improvement and family planning, irrigation and rural works and the development of faculties of agricultural education at provincial universities. The relationship between these activities and the PDP experience or the other more directly identifiable decentralization projects is not immediately apparent. Nor is it clear whether these activities follow a uniform approach to decentralization efforts or whether they go beyond the common theme of administrative deconcentration.

Conclusion

Since the mid-1970's the USAID program in Indonesia has committed substantial resources to the direct and indirect support of that country's efforts to promote decentralization. While several of the individual projects which have been cited as part of the decentralization effort have been successful in their own right in achieving their stated goals, the overall strategy has suffered from a lack of coherence and integration.

Even among the more successful projects, the approach adopted by USAID suggests a neglect of national level policy and management issues in favor of a more direct involvement in the development of capacity at the local government level. With respect to the PDP, it is also likely that closer coordination among USAID and the other donors would have led to an early identification -- and possible resolution -- of the problems related to the distorting influence of the intervention of massive project support on a new and fragile institution such as BANGDA.

87.) For a discussion based on the evaluation of the Central Java experience and attempts at replication in other PDP provinces and under the FID Project, see: John M. Dukesbury, Credit In Support Of Rural Development (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., September 1988).

With respect to the issue of the relationship between the decentralization efforts supported and the furthering of democratic ideals, it is probably true that none of the projects supported had much direct impact on fostering the desired relationship between democratization and decentralization. However, Although the vast majority of these project interventions might be categorized by their commitment to the objectives of administrative deconcentration and delegation, that is not to say that no progress has been made in the direction of enhanced popular participation. Even small gains in popular awareness of and involvement in government activities designed and implemented at the local level can be expected to generate even larger increases in awareness and involvement and, ultimately, in demands for more meaningful devolution of decision-making authority and responsibility. This is the sequence which democratic theory tells us will occur. While advances in real popular participation in PDP bottom-up planning systems have been marginal at best, they have managed to enhance awareness and initiate steps in this direction.

IV.
USAID AND PHILIPPINE DECENTRALIZATION

Background

The Philippines holds a unique position in the history of the development of indigenous systems of centralized administration common in Southeast Asia. In contrast to the other societies in the region, the Philippines did not develop an indigenous centralized authority and supporting bureaucracy with a span of control approaching anything near its present area. While authority was intense, it was also fragmented under the early sultanates. It is a culture that, for the most part, had centralism thrust on it by its colonial masters. Deviation from the pattern of centralizing influence which has come to be associated with the Islamic areas of the South is associated with the Spanish conquest in the Sixteenth Century. Subsequently, centralization was thrust upon the conquered territory unevenly.

The distinction between early history and colonial experience does not lesson the impact of the centralizing forces of alien authority. It is often noted that colonial rule is essentially bureaucratic rule, regardless of the differences between direct or indirect patterns of administration. Philippine experience is also unique in that four centuries of direct Spanish rule was replaced in the final four decades by the more liberal influence of American colonialism. During that latter period tensions grew between the bureaucratic dictates of order and stability and the widening scope of indigenous political competition.

The elites who emerged at independence have solidified their economic power, entrenched their social positions, and generally manipulated the political processes to serve their own ends. Early patterns of patron-client relationships that bound peasants to the land and limited economic benefits have gained new meaning in the form of political patronage and control of the ballot box. Hierarchical and centralized authority has intensified in the development of the Philippine bureaucracy and political system characterized by a web of constituency patronage, kinship relations, and the so-called family dynasties. This culture is best described as paternalistic and authoritarian.

The result has been the entrenchment, at both national and local levels, of a carefully constructed network of economic and political elites. It has been demonstrated that in almost every one of the Philippines' 73 provinces there are one or two families who have come to exercise virtually uncontested political and economic control. There is a widely held perception that the wealth of the entire nation is tightly controlled by just a few well placed families. While the prominence of this network might lend credence to the argument that power in the Philippines is decentralized, it should be remembered that the shared interests which are jealously defended by these families have more in common with each other than with the regions in which they are located.

Yet the need for decentralization, pluralism, and expanded popular participation remains evident and its advocacy has had a long and vigorous, if ineffectual, history beginning with the Philippine movement for independence from Spain. However, the most common pattern has been one of rhetoric substituting for reality and nowhere is this demonstrated more clearly than in the developments of the Marcos era.

Under the lengthy period of Marcos rule decentralization and the expansion of local government[88] authority was often touted, but the reality remained one of personalized power and centralized authority. Showcase rural development strategies were little more than publicity, essentially demonstrations of centralized largess, not popular participation. Following the lifting of martial law in 1980, the return of local elected government was marked by a concentration of political power which made the concentration of economic power inevitable. Centralization of power did little more than increase the dependence of local officials on the central government for a share of available resources and a semblance of participation in decision making. The need to interpret an increasingly complex maze of bureaucratic regulations encouraged increased periphery dependency on the center. Even the broadening

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88.) Local government units in the Philippines consist of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangay (villages also once called barrio).

of the role of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and the establishment of regional planning authorities and provincial and municipal planning offices was more administrative deconcentration, aimed at efficiency and effective control, than a step toward greater autonomy.

The very structure of local government was effected by the establishment of special municipalities, with extensive tax bases, which were legally and administratively removed from their provincial hierarchy and placed directly under Manila's authority. The net result was the further erosion of an already limited provincial revenue base, an increase in their dependence on Manila and decline in their prospects for economic self-sufficiency. Underlying this emerging structure was the reality that the political and economic rewards, corruption and aggrandizement of certain elites required a system which was manageable, centralized in Manila, and reported directly to the presidential palace at Malacanang.

This was the structure and system which was in place when the EDSA Revolution[89] of 1986 swept President Aquino into power and provided the impetus for a fresh, intensified, and far more serious effort at decentralization than had ever been undertaken in the Philippines. Subsequent events have confirmed that the thrust toward decentralization and enhancement of the role and autonomy of local government remains at the center of the political stage.

However, there continue to be strong forces arrayed against decentralization. The 1990 Evaluation of the Local Resource Management Project noted:

> Centralized bureaucratic entities are reluctant to see their staffs and budgets diminished by transfer to local governments, their authority truncated, their opportunities for patronage and power severely tempered. Now, the national government controls 87 percent of all government-provided goods for the average region, and the center spends 90 percent of all public resources, extracting more from the periphery than it returns.[90]

89.) This popular uprising resulted, in part, from reaction to the assassination of the popular political leader, Benigno Aquino, Jr., by members of the Philippine military upon his return from the U.S. His wife became the leader of the movement which was successful in combining disparate sources of opposition to Marcos, fragmenting his support among the military and, ultimately, causing him to flee the country.

90.) David Steinberg, et al., Philippines Decentralization And Popular Participation: An Impact Evaluation of the Local Resources Management Project [LRM-#492-0358], p. 5.

The Philippine Congress -- which is among the beneficiaries of the shift toward increased participation and accountability -- is once again assuming a leadership role after a decade and a half of subservience or irrelevance under Marcos and is not anxious to relinquish its control over regional affairs and program funding. It is also charged that local governments are even more corrupt and incompetent than the center, while others contend that at least local corruption would have the benefit of recirculating resources within the local community.

Early USAID Support For Decentralization

USAID has more than 20 years of experience in providing assistance to local governments in the Philippines through a variety of projects, beginning with Operation SPREAD (Systematic Programming for Rural Economic Assistance Development) in 1966. Operation SPREAD's pilot activities in two provinces concentrated on efforts to develop provincial management and project implementation capacity over a two year period. The project identified concepts, systems, and inputs crucial to the local development process and marked the beginning of USAID's efforts to develop administrative capacity at the provincial level.

Following Operation SPREAD, in 1968 the GOP launched the Provincial Development Assistance Program (PDAP) to strengthen local government capacity by providing advisors, commodity support, and training assistance to a selected group of provinces. Ultimately, PDAP came to be implemented in 28 provinces and 10 cities during the period from 1968 to 1980, and was probably best known for its highly structured approach to developing planning and management capacity. Innovations or major accomplishments which have been attributed to PDAP include: a) the establishment of fully staffed Provincial Planning Development Offices (PPDO); b) the initiation of development performance budgeting; and c) the routine preparation of annual design and work plans at the provincial level. PDAP was also influential in expanding the Provincial Engineer's Office and reorienting its focus from routine maintenance to an increased emphasis on implementation and supervision.

PDAP took the form of an umbrella program, under which USAID provided support through the Provincial Development Project (PDP) and the Local Government Project (LGP). During the period 1968-1973 PDP financed the provision of advisors, commodities and training to selected provinces for the development of sector programs in infrastructure and tax administration. During the following years, from 1974 to 1978, LGP supported PDAP in its development of mechanisms to reduce transportation costs, expand public investment, promote equitable taxation policies, and improve market access.

While many of the central features and early contributions of SPREAD and the support for PDAP may now be seen as the underpin-

nings of the GOP philosophy and technical orientation toward policy reform in the area of decentralization and local government autonomy, it should also be evident that the strategy pursued was essentially that of administrative deconcentration. Throughout this period the Marcos regime remained committed to a policy of increasing the centralization of political authority and made only grudging concessions to deconcentration for the sake of bureaucratic efficiency.

During this period USAID also provided assistance under the PDAP umbrella for the development of such related projects as: a) Rural Roads Projects I and II; b) Barangay Water Projects I and II; c) Rural Service Center Project; and d) Real Property Tax Administration Project.

Rural Roads Projects I and II (1976-1983) were implemented in virtually every province and 10 cities and developed an administrative and organizational structure for provinces to plan, manage, and implement rural roads projects following PDAP-identified procedures. More than 1,000 kilometers of roads and 10,000 linear meters of bridges were constructed and the GOP continued to provide funding for this program through 1988. While the main emphasis was on the development of infrastructure, this marked a shift toward the decentralization of a major GOP program and the transfer of an important technical capability to local government.

Barangay Water Projects (BWP) I and II (1978-1986) developed the capability of 128 local government units to design, install, and maintain barangay cooperative water systems. Evaluations of these projects found that site selection, monitoring techniques, training and technical skills and profiles of the target population were the most important elements for ensuring project success. the need to identify qualified staff (trainers and rural water and sanitation association officers) also hampered project implementation. Most importantly, the BWP evaluation concluded that institution building efforts should establish skills in permanent agencies for sustaining functions once USAID funding terminated.

Building on initial studies under the Local Government Project (LGP 1974-1978) to improve the collection, assessment and records management, the Real Property Tax Administration I (RPTA I) Project undertook tax mapping and related management and collection activities from 1978 to 1984 as a basis for increased revenue generation. RPTA I was pilot tested to plan, administer, replicate, and implement RPTA systems in 72 provinces covering 571 municipalities and cities.

The first real departure from the pattern of administrative deconcentration appears to have been the Rural Service Center Project (1978) which was intended to provide assistance to increase participation of the poor in the planning and implementation of local projects in six selected cities. Among the project accom-

plishments cited are the development of infrastructure capability, including motor pool operation and radio communication, and the conduct of management training, revenue and income analysis, and socioeconomic surveys, but there is no reference to increased participation of the poor which was one of the initial aims.[91]

The Local Resource Management Project

The Local Resource Management (LRM) Project (1982 to present) was designed to represent a significant departure from prior decentralization activities. The implementation strategy called for three interrelated "tracks" of activities to be implemented by separate sets of actors with different objectives and targets, but with the expectation that, over time, these tracks would merge and become integrated. The first track provides for what participating officials consider to be the LRM's major contribution, in strengthening the capacity of regional, provincial and municipal government agencies to identify, plan and implement projects to increase the productive utilization of local resources for development and the resolution of local problems. Funding for these activities was provided in the form of annual Sub-Project Fund (SPF) allocations at the provincial level. This marks the most ambitious transfer to date of responsibility for the planning and implementation of development projects by local government agencies at the provincial and municipal levels with enhanced supervision and assistance from the relatively new NEDA and sectoral regional offices.

The second LRM track was intended to continue the work of the RPTA Project by providing assistance for tax mapping and management systems to improve revenue generation by increased tax collection. Inclusion of this component as part of the LRM Project was intended to address the chronic problem of low rates of collection of real property and other local taxes and link increases in local revenue generation to more active control of development activities by local government agencies. While this component was successful in increasing real property tax collection, there was no apparent mechanism within the project for linking improved collections with enhanced local control over allocations and expenditures. In the absence of such linkage under Phase II of LRM it was determined that the administration of this component was best returned to its earlier status as a separate project activity.

The third track supports Government of the Philippines (GOP) decentralization efforts by sponsoring the formation of local voluntary groups at the barangay level and by assisting them to plan and implement economically productive development activities with revolving seed loan funds. In this instance the LRM contrac-

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91.) See: USAID/Philippines, Local Development Assistance Program (492-0436) Program Assistance Approval Document (September 1990), Section C, Attachment 1, p. 20.

ted indigenous NGO/PVO's to assist in the organization and training of poverty groups to mobilize and manage their own resources for local development. This track provides initial seed financing of project activities by means of a one-time Community Project Fund (CPF) which forms the basis for a revolving loan fund from which self-help activities are financed and continue to revolve within the local community. The use of NGO/PVO contractors is aimed at assisting local government units and empowering local populations by increasing direct popular participation in development.

It was in the design of this third track that the radical departure from previous decentralization strategies was to be found and the first indication of a commitment to political devolution emerged. But the critical linkage between the LRM approach to decentralization and the democratic values imbued in popular participation were to be found not only in the PVO community organizing efforts and CPF activities, but were also seen as a characteristic of the SPF activities which were described by NEDA as "the tangible translation of the LRM participatory planning process to be conducted by local governments."[92] The intended relationship between the two tracks was not only unclear in the original formulation, but became even more complex as project implementation and redesign progressed. While the original LRM documentation provides no specifics on merger or linkage, the 1988 Project Paper Supplement which marked the beginning of Phase II marked a shift away from the experimental and learning process approach of the early project toward an increased emphasis on impact on beneficiaries and went on to declare the two separate tracks integrated.[93]

The report of the 1990 evaluation of LRM attempts to clarify what is meant by this intended integration when it explains that "the Project Paper Supplement for Phase II ... changed the specification for [SPF] subprojects to 'beneficiary-identified service-infrastructure and public social service activities,' abandoning the [movement] toward income-generating projects", and adding that "beneficiary-initiated livelihood subprojects should be financed under the CPF."[94] However, plans for this neat parcelling out of project types by funding source were made less effective in practice by the absence of an integrated process of planning and implementation and there continued to be some crossover in the type of projects funded by both SPF and CPF.

92.) Steinberg, et al., Op. Cit. p. 2.

93.) IBID. p. 3.

94.) IBID. p. 14. One of the reasons cited for the limitation of SPF to infrastructure activities was the need for greater flexibility in the government accounting and auditing system for non-infrastructure projects.

Weak integration resulted from decisions on the appropriate roles to be played by various local government levels based on an assessment of their respective capabilities and the needs arising from the more innovative aspects of the Project. The same evaluation observed:

> LRM was seen as breaking relatively new ground with its emphasis on poverty alleviation, livelihood activities, provision for popular participation by the targeted poor and the involvement of PVO's in assisting to mobilize the poor for self-help efforts. ...[T]hese elements pointed to the need for a local government focus as close to the rice roots of community organization as possible. The decision not to place operational emphasis on the municipality was based on the judgement that the development staff at that level was not yet sufficiently complete or experienced to assume primary responsibility for LRM. However, the designers did acknowledge that it was at this level where intimate knowledge of local conditions and needs would be expected to be found.[95]

This was only one of the reasons for the introduction of PVO assistance in the organization and management of assistance at the community level. However, the element of distrust of government underlying the tradition of PVO involvement in community development referred to in an earlier section also contributes to the integration problems found in the design of LRM. It should be remembered that the design and early implementation of LRM took place during the latter years of the Marcos era which was marked by corruption and politicization of the public sector which adversely effected its ability to deliver adequate public services. In this environment the involvement of PVOs may also be seen as an attempt to bypass ineffective organizations. Since 1986 President Aquino and the new Constitution have encouraged the participation of "non-governmental community-based and sectoral or functional groupings" and have included them in the Medium-Term Development Plan (1986-1992) as well as in the regional councils.[96]

Phase II emphasis on the separation of the types of projects eligible for either SPF or CPF funding is an inevitable consequence of the fear of overlap and duplication which might result from the division of planning, implementation and project management functions between municipal, provincial and higher levels involved in

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95.) IBID. p. 38.

96.) IBID. p. 26. National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 19 (4 May 1990) called upon and deputized recognized non-government and people's organizations and volunteers as well as local government units to assist the government and help provide an element of transparency, openness and honesty in government.

SPF administration, on the one hand, and those involved in the CPF at the level of the barangay, on the other. Nevertheless the evaluation did note that, although the SPF track was expected to be almost exclusively committed to infrastructural development, it has also been used for economic production activities in a number of agricultural and industrial sub-sectors.[97]

It was noted that neither type of project was completely successful in establishing a planning system which guaranteed the type of popular participation which was envisioned. One of the evaluation conclusions drawn in 1990 was that "beneficiaries, even some municipalities, have had minimal say in the development of SPF-funded projects, which was contrary to the project design and the learning process."[98] Limited variation in the range of CPF projects and the repetition of what appeared to be standardized packages of assistance observed in multiple barangay locations within the same province led the evaluation team to conclude that use may have been made of "a 'menu-selection' process, where beneficiaries are presented by the PVO organizers with a list of projects suited for the resource base available to them, and then selected the projects which they find most interesting."[99] In some provincial locations it was obvious that the PVOs had selected projects before community groups had even been formed and the conclusion drawn was that success rates were even lower than in those locations where the menu approach had been followed.

In spite of these planning weaknesses, the evaluators did note a number of indications of progress toward the desired goals of enhanced participation and innovation. It is somewhat surprising that much of the real progress noted has occurred at the municipality level, while that level of local government was not assigned a particularly important role in the Project. Among the advances noted were:

* Examples of improved citizen empowerment as spin-offs from LRM activities which were documented included the case of 100 fisherman who joined together to avoid eviction from the land they occupied and the case of a barangay which was successful in obtaining redress of their grievances when they pursued protests of shoddy

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97.) It was noted that 71.6% of projected and 68.8% of actual SPF expenditures were for rural infrastructure projects -- i.e. roads, water supply and community centers. IBID. p. 14. However, it is also noted that the evaluation was only able to observe projects planned and implemented under Phase I of the Project, prior to the new guidelines.

98.) IBID. p. 18.

99.) IBID. p. 21.

workmanship, improper use of materials and discrimination against locals in hiring practices on an SPF project to NEDA at the national level;

* The activities of PVOs have been successful in reactivating barangay and municipal development councils and "sensitizing" them -- as well as other actors at regional, provincial and municipal levels -- to the needs of the poor;

* The increased desire and capacity of some municipal governments to play a more active and constructive role in the design and management of LRM at that level which was noted to be dependent upon the availability of sufficient and adequately trained staff -- in turn, dependent upon adequate financial resources -- and access to information on project activity and progress; and

* As a result of LRM experience, some municipalities came to realize their need and capability to allocate funds from other sources and emulate PVO strategies, like the use of community organizers, to effectively assist poor communities.

Continuing USAID Efforts

In addition to the LRM Project (which will be concluded on 31 August 1991) ongoing USAID projects which continue to assist in strengthening local capacity include: a) Rainfed Resources Development (RRD) Project, b) the Markets, Municipal Development Fund and Regional Development Fund Projects administered under the ESF Secretariat, c) Enterprise in Community Development (ECD) Project, d) Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Co-Financing Project II and III, and e) Accelerated Agricultural Production (AAP) Project.

The Upland Access Component of the Rainfed Resources Development (RRD) Project is strengthening the capability of selected local government units to plan and undertake construction of minor roads, foottrails, footbridges, river crossings and rehabilitation of provincial roads using labor-intensive technology. A 1989 evaluation of this component concluded that the provision of technical supervision, strengthening of provincial engineering office capabilities and development of maintenance programs for infrastructure were important to ensuring sustained benefits. The evaluation also recommended that roads should be reclassified to permit DPWH to retain responsibility for periodic maintenance responsible for other levels. Once again the focus of decentralization here is the development of technical capabilities at the local level, while furthering the transfer of responsibilities to local government units in accordance with increases in those capabilities. With the transfer of responsibilities the pattern of decentralization moves from administrative deconcentration to

seminar evolved a draft National Vision Statement on Decentralization which will be submitted for the President's consideration and eventual pronouncement.

Among its other related sectoral activities USAID is also supporting Department of Agriculture efforts to improve capacity for decentralized operations through the ongoing Accelerated Agricultural Production (AAP) Project and the Child Survival Program continues to foster decentralized Department of Health operations.

Local Development Assistance Program and Future USAID Support

The record of more than twenty years of USAID support for decentralization in the Philippines which was begun by SPREAD and PDAP activities and continued by an unbroken chain of completed and ongoing projects has been successful in increasing local government participation in planning and implementation, but it has fallen short of the goal of the EDSA Revolution to decentralize authority and financial control to local governments.[100] The newly initiated Local Development Assistance Program (LDAP) will complement earlier and ongoing project efforts by emphasizing key GOP policy adjustments to place decision-making and financial control at the lowest possible level. The Program will also encourage GOP expansion of capacity building activities in selected provinces to enable local government units to assume increased responsibilities.

Among the rationales cited for decentralization is one of democratic pluralism which equates the transfer of resources, responsibility and authority to local governments to open markets. It goes on to explain that "increased authority for local government ... results [in] increased citizens' voice and choice, financial discipline, and political responsibility."[101] LDAP raises democratization to the level of its ultimate goal and describes that goal as "providing an environment which allows and encourages greater participation of the people at lower levels in the decision-making processes and procedures that affect them, but also in the broader context of social justice, specifically in the

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100.) Evidence of the Aquino Administration's commitment to decentralization is found in the 1987 Constitution's provision for the granting of autonomy and the right to levy taxes, fees and charges to local governments and the mandate to Congress to enact a Local Government Code.

101.) USAID/Philippines, Local Development Assistance Program (492-0436) Program Assistance Approval Document. (Manila: USAID/Philippines, June 15, 1990) p. 13.

equitable distribution of power, resources and services which can now be rationally deployed to neglected communities."[102]

The LRM Project was of particular importance as a laboratory for the development of concepts related to the design of LDAP. The complexity of the LRM sub-project orientation and funding arrangements for annual allocations covering an increasing number of provincial and municipal locations has burdened USAID's staff capabilities to the point where it has become one of the key factors in the determining the aversion to the repetition of these patterns in LDAP. This experience has led to a strong preference for the alternative strategy of joint GOP-USAID development of a broad decentralization policy reform agenda with ESF support payments to be made in three pre-determined tranches under the "conditionality" that a well specified set of benchmarks are met. This shift away from the details of feasibility and finance of large numbers of discrete sub-projects should result in a more coherent strategy for determining and pursuing larger policy issues and systems development. The policy reform agenda will concentrate on the following four areas:

(a) Increasing discretionary resources for LGUs from national sources, improving local taxing authority and revenue generation, and removing mandatory restrictions/appropriations over local funds and budgets;

(b) Increasing LGU administrative authority by transferring major national agency activities, personnel, funds for the delivery of basic services, and local control over project development and implementation;

(c) Improving LGU capacity to manage increased resources and authority through training programs and human resource development; and

(d) Increasing the private sector role in local development and the delivery of basic services.[103]

Difficulties in developing an effective system for monitoring project activities and collecting information on other relevant developments observed under the LRM have also been instrumental in placing emphasis on the development of a management information system (MIS) which will provide for more effective filtering and transmission of policy relevant information to concerned decision-makers. To this end a substantial technical assistance component has been provided to support the role of the Program Management Team in LDAP and provide for related studies, research and experi-

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102.) IBID. p. 24.

103.) IBID. p. 31.

mentation. During the design phase LDAP has already made substantial contributions to our understanding of the status and direction of decentralization problems and efforts to overcome those problems through the sponsorship of a number of studies and surveys.[104]

Conclusion

Beginning in the 1960's the USAID program in the Philippines has shown considerable awareness of the potential for decentralization efforts and has maintained a continuous commitment to the support of those efforts. Although the early PDAP experience was both among the most successful and highly visible projects in this area, its record should not detract from the many smaller and less ambitious efforts of the same period and later. It can be argued that it is the varied, multi-sectoral approach to decentralization support spanning three decades, rather than any single high visibility project, which has been decisive in its achievement of success in joining the GOP in its unqualified policy commitment to that goal. The approach has been marked by incremental improvements in local government capabilities, while deferring national level policy and management issues until such time as local capacity was better prepared to assume expanded responsibilities. the launching of LDAP is an indication that such indications of local government maturity are now in sight.

With respect to the relationship between the decentralization efforts supported and the furthering of democratic ideals, it is true that none of the early projects cited had much direct impact on the relationship between decentralization and the enhanced popular participation which is widely viewed as the measure of achievement of our democratic ideals. However, some of the more recent projects have gone beyond the objectives of administrative deconcentration and delegation and some progress has been made in the direction of enhanced popular participation. The LRM experience tells us that gains in popular awareness of and involvement in government activities designed and implemented at the local level can generate demands for greater government responsiveness and improved services.

The Philippines is at a crossroads and the next few years could determine whether it will be able to break with the recent

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104.) Among these is a review and comparison of the many contemporary legislative initiatives on decentralization by Eduardo A. Yotoko, et al. and a critique of decentralization issues and opportunities with emphasis on the field of agriculture and natural resources by Cesar E. Virata and Larry C. Morgan. See: Eduardo A. Yatoko, et al., Policy Analysis Of Philippine Decentralization: Final Report (Manila: Center for Research and Communication, February 9, 1990); and Cesar E. Virata and Larry C. Morgan, A Critique Of Decentralization (Manila: USAID/Philippines, n.d.).

past and make good on the Aquino Administration's promise to continue its pursuit of decentralization and democratization. Much of the recent apparent success is more appropriately attributed to recent political events than to the projects cited above. The EDSA Revolution, the successful election of Aquino, the purging of Marcos cronies at all levels of government and the adoption of a liberal constitution are beginning to fade in the face of challenges from military elements on the right, a continuing communist insurrection on the left, a stubborn muslim separatist movement in the south and politicians who yearn for the old days of centralized decision-making, the pork-barrel and political patrimony.

That is not to say that nothing has changed. While Aquino has been forced to acknowledge her non-candidacy in the upcoming presidential election in order to protect the fragile gains made in the transition from Marcos, those gains have already succeeded in creating the embryo of a powerful lobby which will continue the struggle for increased local autonomy. Not only has the exercise of the first free and fair elections in several decades reminded ordinary filipinos of the rights, but they have brought to power a generation of governors and local mayors who have no commitment to or stake in the old system. Out of this generation has grown a movement for continued reform and an increasingly vocal pressure group which has organized itself around the League of Governors, League of Mayors, and the combined League of Leagues.[105] It remains to be seen how the contest between these two opposing camps will be decided and what role will be played by USAID's continued support for decentralization and democratization.

V.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND PROSPECTS

Over the past three decades USAID investments in decentralization activities covering rural, urban and regional development as well as various sectoral projects represent a substantial program category in terms of overall investment. Among the various forms of decentralization pursued -- i.e. deconcentration, delegation and devolution -- administrative deconcentration is the dominant form to which project assistance is committed. Yet, frequent reference is made at the level of either project goal or purpose to the beneficial effects of increased popular participation and the efficient

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105.) It is also planned that the LDAP will provide grant support to the League of Leagues to "promote transparency, accountability and efficiency in the delivery of basic services at the local level, and support the League's efforts to more effectively act as change agents to make local governments more efficient and more responsive to the needs of the local population." LDAP PAAD Op. Cit. p. 30.

delivery of services which mark the just society -- characteristics which are more commonly associated with political devolution. But little effort is expended to identify the links between specified project inputs and outputs and the achievement of these desirable democratic ends. Nor are evaluations commonly tasked with the responsibility for determining the success of these efforts in fostering increased popular participation and the heightened transparency which it is postulated will improve accountability and citizen satisfaction. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that few direct answers to our questions on the success of efforts to foster democratic values by support for decentralization have been found. However, that is not to say that the examination has provided no insights into the success of those efforts.

On the basis of the preponderance of evidence pointing to emphasis on administrative deconcentration over the pursuit of the more complex political devolution, it would be easy to conclude that democratic values and practices have received little attention or support from the projects under consideration. Two arguments to the contrary have been made above and evidence of their validity examined in the succeeding review of project experience.

In the first instance, it was suggested that the pursuit of administrative deconcentration itself bore at least the potential for advancing democratic ideals. It was acknowledged that administrative deconcentration bears the potential to be used to monopolize power and decision-making in the hands of centralized agencies and, thus, seriously limiting the potential for meaningful devolution. But there is a counter-argument to the effect that widened spheres of bureaucratic participation inherent in administrative deconcentration create an organizational dynamic which is at least supportive of expanded popular participation. An earlier cited work which considers the relationship between decentralization and participation follows its assertion that participation implies local autonomy through which potential beneficiaries can "become capable of managing their own future,"[106] with the qualification that:

> beneficiary participation, however, is unlikely to take place unless some corresponding participation characterizes the work climate of government staff. This staff participation, in turn, may best be stimulated by decentralization.[107]

In the case of the Indonesian PDP we have seen that pressure to install bottom-up planning procedures produced little actual popular participation, but it did encourage unprecedented discus-

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106.) David D. Gow, Op. Cit. p. 107.

107.) IBID.

sion of needs and project proposals with officials and non-formal leaders at the village and sub-district (kecamatan) levels. More importantly, it helped to generate support among participating government agency officials for the belief that widespread participation and consultation were both desirable and an effective means of guaranteeing the appropriateness of project interventions.

The LRM planning strategy in the Philippines stands in sharp contrast to the Indonesian experience. There PVO's were employed to guarantee that popular participation was at the heart of CPF proposals, but this was done at the expense of severely circumscribing the involvement of local government officials. The creation of a second, more formal, SPF mechanism for the planning of more conventional infrastructure projects by government officials inserted an element of dualism which acted to reinforce their non-involvement in the PVO-managed activities, with the result that both the sustainability of the CPF approach and its replicability on a wider scale are called into question.

The second argument hypothesizes that the cumulative project experience of multi-sector activities over an extended period of time in a single country might result in a more substantial contribution to both decentralization and democratization than the sum of those activities if viewed separately. The key element here is the integration and coordination of activities which leads to a cumulative process of development, building on early successes and expanding their benefits into broader areas of application.

Once again, the Philippine and Indonesian cases stand in contrast with respect to the advantages of sustained and well integrated multi-sectoral support for decentralization. USAID experience in the Philippines illustrates an incremental approach spanning three decades and a number of diverse sectors which is now culminating in an ambitious program of government policy support in the LDAP. There is presently no evidence that comparable advances will be made any time soon in Indonesia, nor does the record of past USAID involvement demonstrate the type of incremental approach which might lead to such a culmination. In spite of a large and sustained investment in the PDP and a variety of decentralized sectoral activities and continued collaboration in conservation, credit and road maintenance projects with D-G BANGDA which bears primary responsibility for regional development, efforts to launch a small project to engage in policy dialogue have been unsuccessful to date.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine, even in the case of the Philippines, the extent to which the seemingly successful transition from support for discrete administrative deconcentration activities to the more ambitious policy dialogue on real devolution of power and authority is the product of the more coherent and integrated approach followed or whether success might be more appropriately attributed to the intervention of contemporary political

developments which have pushed the Philippines in directions conducive to these goals. It is worth remembering that progress in decentralization efforts and their successful linkage with the advance of democratic ideals is unlikely in a regime where these pursuits are in conflict with their own values and goals. Where the EDSA revolution in the Philippines was widely viewed as a cataclysmic event which represented a unique opportunity to assert the goals of local autonomy and democracy, political conditions in Indonesia have continued to support a more evolutionary process of development.

Problems and Prospects

Recognizing the renewed interest in this subject on the part of A.I.D. and its geographic bureaux and the scattered information available on past project experience, a more complete and detailed assessment of past efforts and achievements is needed. Among the themes of the democratic initiatives being prepared, the objectives and strategies related to local government administration, participation and decentralization are among the most general and vague in content. This is largely accounted for by the dualism which exists between calls for the heightened transparency and accountability associated with improvements in governance, on the one hand, and the demand for increases in local and popular participation, which is linked with greater openness and responsiveness in government decision-making, on the other. For some decentralization is viewed as primarily a question of expanded popular participation, while for others it is just as clearly a matter of governance and efficiency and yet a third position acknowledges that it is related to both.

In the context of the Asia Near East (ANE) Bureau's "voice, choice and governance" approach to its promotion of "open markets and open societies" decentralization concerns are clearly categorized as part of governance, which is taken to mean "the efficient implementation of transparent laws and regulations which do not place an undue burden on citizens, the economy, and commerce" and within this context decentralization "places decisions as close as possible to those who will be affected by them."[108] An attempt to identify indicators for this paradigm, while concurring with this general definition of governance, expresses concern for what is viewed as the intrinsic contradiction in the attempt to link that concept with voice and choice:

> Democracy is not, and never has been, an efficient form of government. Governance may be a characteristic that ANE wishes to reward, but it should not expect that

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108.) A.I.D./ANE, Democratic Pluralism Initiative: Initial Planning Document (Draft) (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., November 1989) p. 15.

> democratic political systems will necessarily perform well on this factor. More realistically, governance might be a characteristic ANE wishes to monitor because of its interest in the capacity of governments to implement and sustain (often unpopular) economic reforms, the administrative capacity of government institutions to minimize loss to the economy through bureaucratic delays and procedures, and the availability of policy analytic capacities [*sic*] within government.
>
> But what this kind of capacity may actually be measuring is the insulation of government decision makers from interest groups in society. Depending on circumstances, such an outcome can be incompatible with ANE's interest in limited government, implicit in the importance assigned to voice and choice.[109]

The potential incompatibility between governance and the complex of voice and choice is similar to the earlier cited potentially illiberal characteristics of administrative deconcentration. Both require more detailed examination in order to determine the conditions -- if any -- under which these contradictions and incompatibilities can be minimized.

In an Africa Bureau cable to field missions on its democratization strategy reference is made to the ANE study's conclusion that "governance improvements ... don't depend on, or necessarily lead to, democracy," but goes on to qualify that conclusion by observing that the notion of accountability of officials is one element of governance which "does appear to contribute to the prospects for democracy."[110] While favoring the identification of decentralization as part of the strategy aimed at improving participation -- with emphasis on neglected rural areas and support for the role of NGO's -- the Bureau acknowledges that it is also linked to governance in the context of the previously mentioned political accountability.

The earlier cited LAC Bureau's plans for a democratic initiatives regional strategy includes expansion of its efforts to strengthen local and municipal government which will include a mix of governance and participation activities. It mentions decentralization as a growing trend which needs to be addressed in national

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109.) Lester E. Gordon and Elliot Berg, Report on Indicators of Open Markets and Open Societies for the Bureau of Asia and Near East Affairs, AID (Cambridge and Washington, D.C.: Harvard Institute for International Development and Development Alternatives, Inc., March 20, 1990) p. 7.

110.) A.I.D./AFR, Cable to All Missions from A/AA/AFR on AFR Strategy on Democratization (n.p., n.d., c. September 1990) p. 6.

and local policy dialogues as well as in the more practical aspects of improving capabilities in urban development finance and management and program/project planning and evaluation.

Much of what is being planned and discussed here is reminiscent of the earlier discussion of stages and types of decentralization and the measurement of that concept and its relationship to democratization. Yet, discussion of the relative merits and democratic implications of the proposed strategies of deconcentration, delegation and devolution continue with little reference to the lessons of past experience. In order to redress this shortcoming what is needed is a review of that experience which goes beyond the limits of the present exercise. Not only does the examination need to be expanded to include a wider range of national experience, but the rich variety of experiments with deconcentration needs to be examined in greater detail to determine both the record and implications of successful applications and how these activities have affected democratization in the countries concerned. This more intensive review should be capable of going beyond the more or less superficial observations on the fundamental questions related to decentralization and democratization than have been found in most attempts at project evaluation.

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APPENDIX A

INDIVIDUALS & ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED

During the preparation of this report the author contacted the following organizations and persons for the specific purpose of gathering information for the report. However, the observations made here are to a much larger extent the product of almost two decades of extensive contact with USAID and other bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance agency personnel, hundreds of local and national government officials, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as large numbers of decentralization project beneficiaries.

Name	Position/Organization
Millard Arnold	Sr. Assoc., Carnegie Endowment for Internat. Peace
James Boomgard	DAI Dir GEMINI Proj. (former COP Indon. CJEDP)
Steve Brent	AID/AFR/AA
Margaret Brown	former Proj. Off. PDP, USAID/ Indon.
Allan Choate	Ex. Dir., The Asia Foundation
John C. Cool	former Chief, Village Dev., USAID/Nepal
Catharin Dalpino	Carnegie Endowment for Internat. Peace
Bill Davis	Devres Inc. Monitor Nepal Rapti Proj. & Indon. PDP Final Eval.
Dieter Dettke	Reg. Mngr., Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Dirs. for S., SE and NE Asia & Reg. Progs.	The Asia Foundation
N. Cinnamon Dornsife	The Asia Found. Rep. Wash.
William H. Douglass	AID/ST (former Proj. Off. Rapti/Nepal & PDP/Indon)
James M. Dwinell	Ex. Ed., Campaigns & Elections
Gene Galbraith	USAID/Indon.
John Gunning	USAID/OIC/Sri Lanka & Nepal
Travis Horel	AID/PPC/PDPR/SP
Roma Knee	AID/LAC
Robert Kurz	MSI Consult. on LAC Democratiz. Performance Indicators
Janna M. Laudato	Proj. Admin. Asia/Near East, Chemonics Internat. Consult.
David Leonard	Prof. Univ. Calif. Berkeley (former Dir. AID Decent. Proj)
Princeton Lyman	AID (former Chief Title IX Office)

Caleb McCarry	Dir. Internat. Programs, Center for Democracy
Michael Morfit	AID/PPC/PDPR (former USAID/ Indon.)
Larry Morgan	Asst. Dir for Asia, Chemonics Internat. Consult. (LDAP design work)
Program Officers	National Endowment for Democracy
James L. Roush	Sr. Tech. Specialist, Dev. Assoc. (former AID/LAC)
Eric Sanson	AID/PPC/PDPR
Michael E. Shifter	Prog. Off. Andean Reg. & South. Cone, Ford Foundation
Louis Siegal	ARD COP Decentralization: Finance and Management Proj.
David I. Steinberg	Team Leader, Phil. LRM Proj. Eval.
Theodora Stervinou	Dep. Dir., USAID/Nepal
John H. Sullivan	V.P. Dev Assoc. (former AID/ANE)
David G. Timberman	Dir., Center for Asian Pacific Affairs (The Asia Foundation)
Carola Weil	Prog. Asst., Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Betsy White	Afghan. Count. Rep., The Asia Found. (former Indon., Pakistan and South Pacific)

APPENDIX B

A.I.D. DECENTRALIZATION PROJECTS BY REGION AND COUNTRY

I. Central Funding

Contract No: AID/csd-719 Proj. Authority: AID/PPC/Civic Participation Division
Name: International Studies of Values in Politics
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 67 Total Cost: $ N/A
Contractor: University of Pennsylvania
Source: Popular Participation In Development: Title IX, p. 7.
Note: Survey of values relevant to local government in India.

Contract No: F44620-67-C-0050 Proj. Authority: N/A
Name: Interdisciplinary Studies of Change in the Philippines and Columbia
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 67 Total Cost: $ N/A
Contractor: Rand Corp.
Source: Popular Participation In Development: Title IX, p. 8.

No: 931-0516 Proj. Authority: N/A
Name: Participation Patterns in Modern Societies
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 69-74 Total Cost: $ 396,000
TA: N/A
Source: Democratization (Other AID Projects) List, p. 3.

No: 931-1137 Proj. Authority: AID/TA/RD
Name: Participation and Rural Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 77-82 Total Cost: $ 6,114,000
TA/Contractor: Cornell Univ., Rural Development Committee
Source: Democratization (Other AID Projects) List, pp. 7-8.

No: 931-1053 Proj. Authority: AID/DS/ORAD
Name: Managing Decentralization
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 79-82 Total Cost: $ 3,719,000
TA: Institute of International Studies, Univ. California at Berkeley
Source: Democratization (Other AID Projects) List, pp. 4-7.

No: 932-0017 Proj. Authority: AID/W ?
Name: Asia Foundation General Support Grant
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 69-79 Total Cost: $ 41,342,000
TA: The Asia Foundation (TAF)
Source: Other Projects (Mason) List, pp. 4-6.

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/DS/??
Name: Integrated Rural Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA/Contractor: Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and Research Triangle Institute
Source: Implementing Rural Development Projects ... (p. xv) cites assistance to 24 projects in 19 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Near East under this contract as providing much of the information base for this study.

No: 936-5303 Proj. Authority: AID/DS/ORAD
Name: Local Revenue Administration
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 79-88 Total Cost: $ 4,265,000
TA/Contractor: Syracuse Univ., Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
Source: Democratization (Other AID Projects) List, pp. 9-14.

No: 936-5446 Proj. Authority: AID/ST/ORAD
Name: Decentralization: Finance and Management
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 87-92 Total Cost: $ 4,600,000
TA/Contractor: Associates in Rural Development (ARD)
Source: Democratization (Other AID Projects) List, pp. 14-15.

No: 940-1007 Proj. Authority: AID/W Private Enterprise
Name: The Development of Secondary Towns
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 86 ? Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Other Projects (Mason) List, p. 7.

II. Asia

BANGLADESH

No: 388-0056 Proj. Authority: AID/Bangladesh
Name: Zilla Roads Maintenance
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 81-86 Total Cost: $ 8,200,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

INDONESIA

No: 497-0237 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Kabupaten and Provincial Planning and Management Training (KPP&MT)
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 77-79 Total Cost: $ 470,000
TA: Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO)
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 497-0238 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Area Development Project Plan (Bappeda)
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 76-78 Total Cost: $ 393,000
TA: ? PSC's
Source: Silverman et al.
Note: First effort working with local government (Bappeda Tk I in Bali and N. Sumatra) and used for design of PDP-I in C. Java and Aceh

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No: 497-0246 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Northern Sumatra Regional Planning
Prior/Related Projects: 497-0238 Area Development Project Plan (Bappeda)
Duration: FY 77-80 Total Cost: $ 1,560,000
TA: Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO)
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 497-0252 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Sederhana Irrigation II
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78-85 Total Cost: $ 35,345,000
TA: Univ. Gajah Mada; LP3ES; PASA/USDA; 1 PSC
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/84

No: 497-0264 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Provincial Area Development Project I (PDP-I)
Prior/Related Projects: 497-0238 Area Development Project Plan (Bappeda)
Duration: FY 77-88 Total Cost: $ 17,600,000
TA: Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI)
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 497-0276 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Provincial Area Development Project II (PDP-II)
Prior/Related Projects: 497-0238 Area Development Project Plan (Bappeda)
497-0264 Provincial Area Development Project I (PDP-I)
Duration: FY 79-89 Total Cost: $ 41,500,000
TA: Pacific Architects & Engineers/Resources Management International (PAE/RMI)
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 497-0281 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Citanduy II
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 80-90 Total Cost: $ 27,000,000
TA: Resources Management International (Subcontract: PRC/ECI); 6 PSCs
Source: Silverman et al.; USAID in Indonesia, 10/85

No: 497-0285 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Rural Works II (Padat Karya Gaya Baru)
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 79-84 Total Cost: $ 23,500,000
TA: Transcentury Corporation
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/84

No: 497-0297 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Western Universities Agricultural Education Project
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 81-90 Total Cost: $ 21,850,000
TA: University of Kentucky
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/85

No: 497-0305 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Village Family Planning/Mother-Child Welfare
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 80-86 Total Cost: $ 10,000,000
TA: 1 PSC
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/84

No: 497-0308 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Local Government Training II
Prior/Related Projects: 497-0237 Kabupaten and Provincial Planning and Management Training (KPP&MT)
Duration: FY 80-86 Total Cost: $ 9,500,000
TA: Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO)
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in Asia - AID Projects List, pp. 18-21.

No: 497-0311 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Uplands Agriculture and Conservation Project
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 84-91 Total Cost: $ 18,900,000
TA: Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) (Subcontract: Harza Engineering and EDI); PASA/USDA and SCS; PSC for startup
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/85
Note: Joint effort with IBRD providing $ 11,300,000

No: 497-0325 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Comprehensive Health Improvement Program-Province Specific
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 81-86 Total Cost: $ 9,000,000
TA: Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera (YIS); 4 PSC's
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/84

No: 497-0329 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Private Sector Development Project
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 82-88 Total Cost: $ 4,600,000
TA: Internal Revenue Service (IRS/TAAS); U.S. Customs; Business Advisory Indonesia; Pamintory Cipta; Resources Management International (RMI); Redecon; Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) with subcontract to Global Exchange
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/84 and 10/85
Note: This complex project included five distinct components, of which two, The Central Java Enterprise Development Project and the Lhok Seumawe Small and Medium Enterprise Development, are relevant

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No: 497-0341 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Financial Institutions Development Project
Prior/Related Projects: 497-0264 PDP-I
497-0276 PDP-IIB
Duration: FY 84-91 Total Cost: $ 18,500,000
TA: Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI)
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/84

No: 497-0342 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Agricultural Planning Project
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 84-89 Total Cost: $ 9,000,000
TA: Winrock International ?; PSC for startup
Source: Asia List (Mason) pp. 16-18

No: 497-0344 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Education Policy and Planning: An Integrated Information System
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 84-90 Total Cost: $ 6,500,000
TA: Consortium of SUNY at Albany, Florida State Univ, Institute for International Research (IIR), and Oward Univ
Source: USAID in Indonesia, 10/85

No: 497-0356 Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Local Policy Development Project
Prior/Related Projects: 497-0264 PDP-I
497-0276 PDP-IIB
Duration: FY 89-93 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA: N/A
Source: Asia List (Mason) p. 18

No: 497- Proj. Authority: AID/Indonesia
Name: Roads Maintenance Project (??)
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY N/A Total Cost: $ N/A
TA: N/A
Source:

KOREA

No: 489-0652 Proj. Authority: AID/Korea
Name: Public Administration
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 68-74 Total Cost: $ 676,000
26TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

NEPAL

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/Nepal
Name: Panchayat Development Project
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 62-67 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: U.S. Aid And Political Development ...

No: 367-0129 Proj. Authority: AID/Nepal
Name: Rural Area Development: Rapti Zone
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80-84 Total Cost: $ 26,700,000
TA: Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO)
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 367-0135 Proj. Authority: AID/Nepal
Name: Integrated Rural Health/Family Planning Services Project
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 80-90 Total Cost: $ 39,250,000
Source: Asia List (Mason) pp. 1-3

No: 367-0155 Proj. Authority: AID/Nepal
Name: Rapti Development Project
Prior/Related Projects: 3670129 Rural Area Development: Rapti Zone
Duration: FY 87-95 Total Cost: $ 18,800,000
TA: Devres/Winrock (Prior Project by PADCO)
Source: Asia List (Mason) pp. 3-4

PAKISTAN

No: 391-0500 Proj. Authority: AID/Pakistan
Name: Special Development Fund
Prior/Related Projects: N/A
Duration: FY 88-89 Total Cost: $ 30,000,000
TA: N/A
Source: Asia List (Mason) pp. 7-8

PHILIPPINES

No: 492-0200 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Provincial Area Development Project (PDAP)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 69-76 Total Cost: $ 3,776,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 492-0256 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Local Development Project
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 73-80 Total Cost: $ 5,851,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Democratization in Asia - AID Projects List, pp. 3-7.

No: 492-0297 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Rural Roads II
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78-80 Total Cost: $ 35,117,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 492-0298 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Real Property Tax Administration
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78-81 Total Cost: $ 10,000,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 492-0304 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Rural Service Centers
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78-80 Total Cost: $ 1,696,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 492-0333 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Barangay Water Project II
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80-82 Total Cost: $ 20,437,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 492-0358 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Local Resources Management Project
Prior/Related Projects: 492-0298 Real Property Tax Admin
Duration: FY 82-91 Total Cost: $ 23,306,000
TA: Variety of Indigenous PVO's/Firms Assist in Administration of CDF
Source: Asia List (Mason), pp. 10-12; Democratization in Asia - AID Projects List, pp. 7-9.; Silverman et al.

No: 492-0361 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Municipal Development Fund
Prior/Related Projects: 492-0343 ESF Project Design
492-0365 Markets ?
492-0374 Regional Development Fund ?
Duration: FY 81-90 Total Cost: $ 70,000,000
TA: N/A
Source: Asia List (Mason), pp. 12-14; Democratization in Asia - AID Projects List, pp. 9-11.

No: 492-0391 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Local Government and Infrastructure Development Project
Prior/Related Projects: ? Provincial Development Assistance Program (PDAP)
4920358 Local Resources Management Project
4920298 Real Property Tax Admin
Duration: FY 86 ? Total Cost: $ N/A
TA: N/A
Source: Asia List (Mason) p. 14

No: 492-0436 Proj. Authority: AID/Philippines
Name: Local Development Assistance Program
Prior/Related Projects: ? Provincial Development Assistance Program (PDAP)
492-0358 Local Resources Management Project
? Local Government and Infrastructure Development Project
4920298 Real Property Tax Admin
Duration: FY 91-94 Total Cost: $ 50,000,000
TA: ARD (Associates in Rural Development)
Source: Asia List (Mason) p. 14-15, PAAD (September 1990)

THAILAND

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/Thailand
Name: Potable Water Project
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 60-72 Total Cost: $ 2,900,000
TA:
Source: AID/ASIA Memo 4/29/82

No: 493-0163 Proj. Authority: AID/Thailand
Name: Accelerated Rural Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 64-77 Total Cost: $ 63,621,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., AID/ASIA Memo 4/29/82

No: 493-0215 Proj. Authority: AID/Thailand
Name: Need Plan Project
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 68-75 Total Cost: $ 1,482,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 493-0315 Proj. Authority: AID/Thailand
Name: Provincial Planning and Development (Silverman)/ Decentralized Development Management (Democ. in Asia)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80-84/81-88 Total Cost: $ 10,600,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Democratization in Asia - AID Projects List, pp. 16-18.

VIETNAM

No: 730-0339 Proj. Authority: AID/Vietnam
Name: Support of Local Government
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 66-76 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Asia (Mason) List, p. 21.

II. Near East & Europe

EGYPT

No: 263-0021 Proj. Authority: AID/Egypt
Name: Development Decentralization I
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78-87 Total Cost: $ 26,200,000
TA: Checchi and Co. Consulting, Inc., Bluegrass Consortium (Eastern Kentucky Univ., Morehead State Univ.)
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 1-4.
Note: Incorporated into Decentralization Sector Support Program (No. 263-0161 or 263-K605) as Subproject 01

No: 261-0103 Proj. Authority: AID/Egypt
Name: Basic Village Services
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80-88 Total Cost: $ 70,000,000
TA: Chemonics International Consulting Div.
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 4-9.
Note: Incorporated into Decentralization Sector Support Program (No. 263-0161 or 263-K605) as Subproject 02

No: 263-0127 Proj. Authority: AID/Egypt
Name: Provincial Cities Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 81-91 Total Cost: $ 20,000,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 9-10.
Note: Incorporated into Decentralization Sector Support Program (No. 263-0161 or 263-K605) as Subproject 03

No: 263-0143 Proj. Authority: AID/Egypt
Name: Decentralization Support
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80-90 Total Cost: $ 50,000,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 10-11.
Note: Incorporated into Decentralization Sector Support Program (No. 263-0161 or 263-K605) as Subproject 04

No: 263-0153 Proj. Authority: AID/Egypt
Name: Neighborhood Urban Services
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 81-87 Total Cost: $ 20,000,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.: Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 11-15.
Note: Incorporated into Decentralization Sector Support Program (No. 263-0161 or 263-K605) as Subproject 05

No: 263-0161 Proj. Authority: AID/Egypt
Name: Decentralization Sector Support Program
Subproj. 01 Development Decentralization I
Subproj. 02 Basic Village Services
Subproj. 03 Provincial Cities Development
Subproj. 04 Decentralization Support Fund
Subproj. 05 Neighborhood Urban Services
Subproj. 06 Decentralized Planning And Management (Later Sector Development Support)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 82-92 Total Cost: $ 374,000,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 15-31.

No: 263-0182 Proj. Authority: AID/EGYPT
Name: Local Development II
Prior/Related Projects: Follow-on to Decentralization Sector Support I (including projects 0021, 0103, 1043, 0153)
Duration: FY 85-92 Total Cost: $ 231,000,000
TA:
Source: Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 31-33.

MOROCCO

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/Morocco
Name: N/A
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY N/A Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Democratic Pluralism Initiative ... (p. 22) "USAID is currently working to strengthen local governments in Morocco by offering training and institutional development."

YEMEN

No: 279-0045 Proj. Authority: AID/Yemen
Name: Local Resources for Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 79-86 Total Cost: $ 8,720,000
TA: Chemonics International Consulting Div.
Source: Democratization in the Middle East - AID Projects List, pp. 33-37.

III. Latin America & Caribbean

BOLIVIA

No: 511-0082 Proj. Authority: AID/Bolivia
Name: Local Government Assistance
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 73-78 Total Cost: $ 6,170,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Creative Associates International; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 2-3.

No: 511-0471 Proj. Authority: AID/Bolivia
Name: Rural Development Planning
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78-84 Total Cost: $ 3,300,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 511-0543 Proj. Authority: AID/Bolivia
Name: National Urban Development Service II
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 81 Total Cost: $ 5,300,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

BRAZIL

No: 512-0122 Proj. Authority: AID/Brazil
Name: Municipal and State Administration
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 66-71 Total Cost: $ 6,104,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Creative Associates International ?

No: 512-0240 Proj. Authority: AID/Brazil
Name: Sao Pablo Highway
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 67 Total Cost: $ 8,573,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 512-0302 Proj. Authority: AID/Brazil
Name: Municipal and State Administration
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 62-74 ? Total Cost: $ 2,128,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Creative Associates International

No: 512-0277 Proj. Authority: AID/Brazil
Name: Highway Maintenance Equipment
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 71 Total Cost: $ 5,005,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 512-0280 Proj. Authority: AID/Brazil
Name: Health Sector Loan
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 70 Total Cost: $ 15,246,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

COLUMBIA

No: 514-0172 Proj. Authority: AID/Columbia
Name: Urban Regional Sector II
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 72-76 Total Cost: $ 32,948,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 11-12.

COSTA RICA

No: 515-0116 (01-03) Proj. Authority: AID/Costa Rica
Name: Civil and Social Research & Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 70-76 Total Cost: $ 845,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 12-16.
Note: Contains four sub-projects, of which 1-3 are relevant.

No: 515-0118 Proj. Authority: AID/Costa Rica
Name: Municipal Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 70-75 Total Cost: $ 3,574,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Creative Associates International; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 16-18.

No: 515-0129 Proj. Authority: AID/Costa Rica
Name: Integrated Rural Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 76-78 Total Cost: $ 310,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/Dominican Republic
Name: Municipal League
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 66 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Creative Associates International

EL SALVADOR

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/El Salvador
Name: Municipalities In Action Program
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY N/A Total Cost: $ N/A
TA: N/A
Source: Strengthening Democracy In Latin America ... (p. 14) cites this program which has been supported for several years as having "proved very popular and successful in empowering local officials and communities and delivering development services."

No: 519-0242 Proj. Authority: AID/El Salvador
Name: Local Government Strengthening
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY N/A Total Cost: $ 12,650,000
TA:
Source: Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 39-40.

GUATEMALA

No: 520-0176 Proj. Authority: AID/Guatemala
Name: Public Administration (Municipal)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 65-78 Total Cost: $ 1,946,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 44-50.
Note: Democ. in LAC lists this as Subproject 02 with funding of $ 681,000.

No: 520-0196 Proj. Authority: AID/Guatemala
Name: Municipal Development Instruction (Institute)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 71 Total Cost: $ 2,100,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Creative Associates International

HONDURAS

No: 522-0039 Proj. Authority: AID/Honduras
Name: Public Administration Personnel Municipal Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 65-75 Total Cost: $ 1,946,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Creative Associates International; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 57-68.
Note: Listed as 522-0038-7 in Creative Associates and Democ. in LAC indicates 10 sub-projects, only some of which relate to municipal government.

No: 522-0091 Proj. Authority: AID/Honduras
Name: Civil Development (Leadership Training)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 67-75 Total Cost: $ 589,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 70-72.

No: 522-0109 Proj. Authority: AID/Honduras
Name: Municipal Development Bank
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 75 Total Cost: $ 4,100,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 522-0155 Proj. Authority: AID/Honduras
Name: Urban Upgrading
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80-81 Total Cost: $ 200,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 522-0165 Proj. Authority: AID/Honduras
Name: Municipal Development II
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80 Total Cost: $ 300,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 522-0335 Proj. Authority: AID/Honduras
Name: Local Government Strengthening
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 90-95 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, p. 78.
Note: Strengthening Democracy In Latin America ... (p. 14) refers to recent approval of a "major municipal development project in Honduras".

NICARAGUA

No: 524-0119 Proj. Authority: AID/Nicaragua
Name: Rural Municipal Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 77 Total Cost: $ 3,500,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/Nicaragua
Name: N/A
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY N/A Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Strengthening Democracy In Latin America ... (p. 14) cites activity in which "A.I.D. is training mayors and members of city councils."

PANAMA

No: 525-0048 Proj. Authority: AID/Panama
Name: Government Administration and Fiscal Reform
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 53-72 Total Cost: $ 1,579,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 525-0176 Proj. Authority: AID/Panama
Name: Rural and Municipal Development-FY 76
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 75-81 Total Cost: $ 4,000,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Creative Associates International; Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 79-81; LAC (Mason) List pp. 12-13.

No: 525-0237 Proj. Authority: AID/Panama
Name: Strengthening Local Government
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 87 ? Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, p. 81.

PARAGUAY

No: 526-0018 Proj. Authority: AID/Paraguay
Name: In-Service Training
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 64 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Creative Associates International

No: 526-0801 Proj. Authority: AID/Paraguay
Name: Municipal Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 73 Total Cost: $ 2,000,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al., Creative Associates International

No: 526-0112 Proj. Authority: AID/Paraguay
Name: Market Town Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78-82 Total Cost: $ 5,800,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

PERU

No: 527-0178 Proj. Authority: AID/Peru
Name: Integrated Regional Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 79-82 Total Cost: $ 16,050,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

No: 527-0284 Proj. Authority: AID/Peru
Name: Decentralized Planning and Investment
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 86-89 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, pp. 92-93.

No: 527-0331 Proj. Authority: AID/Peru
Name: Decentralized Population and Development Policies
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 88-90 Total Cost: $ 200,000
TA:
Source: Democratization in LAC - AID Projects List, p. 94.

VENEZUELA

No: 529-0032 Proj. Authority: AID/Venezuela
Name: Municipal Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 62 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Creative Associates International

IV. Africa

BOTSWANA

No: 633-8001 Proj. Authority:
Name: Housing Guarantee Program
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 76-78 Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

ETHIOPIA

No: 663-0210 Proj. Authority: AID/Ethiopia
Name: Gemu Gofa Area Rehabilitation
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 78 Total Cost: $ 196,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

GHANA

No: 641-0073 Proj. Authority: AID/Ghana
Name: District Planning and Rural Development (Phase I)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 77-82 Total Cost: $ 7,800,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in Africa - AID Projects, pp. 8-10.

No: 641-0077 Proj. Authority: AID/Ghana
Name: Economic/Rural Development Management
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY Total Cost: $ 2,695,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

KENYA

No: 615-8005 Proj. Authority:
Name: Nairobi Housing
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY N/A Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

NIGERIA

No: 620-0214 Proj. Authority:
Name: Public Service Training
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 59-75 Total Cost: $ 2,495,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

SUDAN

No: 650-0012 Proj. Authority: AID/Sudan
Name: Rural Development Planning (Changed to Regional Finance and Planning)
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 79-90 Total Cost: $ 10,300,000
TA: Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI)
Source: Silverman et al.; Democratization in Africa - AID Projects, pp. 12-15.

No: N/A Proj. Authority: AID/Sudan & WB
Name: Bay Region Agricultural Development Project
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY N/A Total Cost: $ N/A
TA:
Source: Democratization (Other AID Projects) List, pp. 4-5.
Note: Listed as one of the projects for which the centrally funded Berkeley Decentralization Project provided support.

TANZANIA

No: 621-0143 Proj. Authority:
Name: Arusha Planning and Village Development
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 79-85 Total Cost: $ 21,164,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.; Africa (Mason) List, pp. 1-2.

UGANDA

No: 619-0019 Proj. Authority:
Name: Institute of Public Administration
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 65-76 Total Cost: $ 838,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.

ZAIRE

No: 660-0068 Proj. Authority:
Name: Development of Manpower Training
Prior/Related Projects:
Duration: FY 80-83 Total Cost: $ 2,594,000
TA:
Source: Silverman et al.