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# Community Development Focus

Reports on Programs  
IN

**BOLIVIA**

**GUYANA**

**NEPAL**

**TANZANIA**

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## INTRODUCTION

Community Development as a process for human, social, economic, and political development has evolved, in part, from the efforts of Western countries to assist developing nations. The process is now recognized as an important method for the development of people and their programs in all parts of the world. Much of the experience in developing countries now provides a wealth of material from which we may obtain information and guidance in Community Development efforts.

Each of the four papers, making up this initial volume of Community Development Focus, draws upon the professional experience of one of the authors in a Community Development program. Each describes the background and context out of which the program has developed, discusses the nature and outcome of the program, and considers the implications of the program and its contributions to Community Development theory and practice.

The Department of Regional and Community Affairs hopes to publish additional volumes of Community Development Focus. It is the Department's belief that such volumes will contribute to the growing body of knowledge on Community Development. They not only provide information on specific programs, but offer insights into the Community Development process itself. Our purpose will be realized if this and future volumes provide the reader with a better understanding of such programs and significant features of Community Development.

Lee J. Cary  
Professor and Chairman  
Regional and Community Affairs  
University of Missouri - Columbia

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SOME ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS  
IN THE INITIATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL  
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF BOLIVIA

by  
C. David Anderson

Historical Perspective. In order to perceive of the setting in which the National Community Development Program of Bolivia came to be launched, it is necessary first to treat in brief of the fashioning of Bolivia's cultural foundations.\*

The written history of Bolivia begins with the Spanish invasion of 1532.<sup>1</sup> Shortly after the conquest, the colonial area that was to become Bolivia came into prominence with the discovery of the Potosi silver deposits in 1545--some of the richest in the world.<sup>2</sup> By the close of the 16th century, the pattern was set that was to continue with few changes til the end of the Spanish-American empire, two centuries later. The economy was built upon the mining of silver and the population was divided into strata which allowed little mobility--the Spanish-speaking peninsulares holding the key positions in controlling the society with the majority of the population, the Indians, relegated to exploitation in the mines. The Roman Catholic Church was established as the spiritual benefactor and protector of the generally privileged Spaniard and deprived Indian.

Towards the end of the 18th century, the Indians of the Peruvian and Bolivian Andes rose in revolt in an effort to drive out the Spaniard and restore the Inca empire. Colonial government, then centered at

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\* For this historical perspective, certain parts of the Introduction to The Theory of Community Development (New York: Associated Educational Services Corporation, Simon and Schuster, 1968) were drawn upon. Appreciation is hereby extended to Simon and Schuster, Inc., for permission to draw upon these materials.

<sup>1</sup> Jose Macedonio Urquidi in his Nuevo Compendio de la Historia de Bolivia (La Paz: University of Cochabamba, 1921) presents a grandiose and idealized account of Indian culture prior to the conquest, which casts significant sidelights concerning the attitude of the Bolivian elite toward Indian culture.

<sup>2</sup> Harold Osborne, Bolivia, A Land Divided (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. 49.

what is present-day Sucre, by rallying the Spanish inhabitants, was instrumental in quelling the revolt but only with difficulty.<sup>3</sup>

This last period of colonial rule witnessed the rise of influence of the University of San Francisco Xavier at present-day Sucre. Here the Inquisition had not been able to prevent discussion by Spanish-speaking inhabitants of revolutionary ideas from Europe and the United States, a situation which was to figure large in laying the groundwork for the break with Spain, especially when Napoleon's invasion of Spain threw into question who was to wear the Spanish Crown. The Revolutionary ideas of freedom and independence, however, were not to be applied to the enslaved Indian by the Spanish-speaking element in seeking the break with Spain.

This last period of colonial rule was also characterized by an increasing decline in prosperity in the area which accompanied a falling off of mineral wealth--a situation closely linked with the fierceness of the Indian revolt of 1780. It is probable that the heavy costs to the Spanish in putting the revolt down served to strengthen the conviction of the Spanish-speaking inhabitants that heavy suppression of the Indian and his exclusion from society were continuing necessities. The economy by this time had assumed a basically dual nature. One part, given to exploiting mineral wealth, which was exported and largely processed beyond the borders of the area, was oriented to world markets; and the other part principally agricultural and oriented to local markets, was traditionally organized in small subsistence farms or large estates, latifundia. The land tenure system, fashioned after feudalistic Spain, served to immobilize the workers of the land in a set and unchanging way of life. The Church buttressed this system by placing a premium on acceptance of traditional patterns and by emphasizing rewards to be had only in the hereafter. As patterns of social, economic and political behavior became locked within the confines of the land tenure system, the institutional foundations of the society based upon rigid stratification of classes came to be traditionally set--a system which was to remain functionally intact through independence down to the impact of the Chaco War.<sup>4</sup>

The ties that bound the nation at independence were weak and were to continue to be so on into nationhood. This was due in some measure of course to the physical features of the land itself, with its many natural

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<sup>3</sup>At one time La Paz was besieged for more than 100 days by approximately 40,000 Indians, and even after the Indian leader of the revolt was treacherously captured and executed, the revolt continued for approximately two more years. Indicative of the Indian's will to be free were other revolts in 1661 and 1730. The one noted above lasted from 1776 to 1780. John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America (New York: Collier Books, 1966), p. 220.

<sup>4</sup>Richard N. Adams, et al., Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 114-115.

barriers, which in many ways overshadowed the human elements of the country and in various ways reinforced a fatalistic outlook and contributed to the development of a strong sense of regionalism on the part of the people. The distinction between "Indian" and "white" continued as a basic criterion for the functioning of the individual in the society, with it believed on the part of both that the terms denote a real difference in race as well as basic differences in the cultures of the two groups; however, since the Spanish conquest, the two originally distinct races had so much interbred that the racial differences had largely disappeared in most areas.<sup>5</sup> Today, with a total population estimated to be about 3½ million, it is estimated that approximately two-thirds are regarded as "Indian," while perhaps more realistically nine-tenths are mestizo (cholo), and only about one-tenth "white" or "whitish."<sup>6</sup> The racial myth coupled with ideas of Indian natural inferiority served to strengthen real cultural differences.<sup>7</sup> And today, with it estimated that only six to eight per cent of the Indian population speaks Spanish (with about thirty-eight per cent speaking only Aymara and fifty-four per cent speaking only Quechua, with both of these languages divided among numerous dialects, which limit the Indians' ability to communicate effectively with other Indians outside their immediate localities), it is apparent that the diversity of languages and dialects involving the major segments of the population caused serious problems of communication for the development of the area as a nation.

Such physical features of the land and human features of the society were to make it difficult, indeed, for her leaders in succeeding years to weld the area into a real nation. Bolivia began her independence with the rule of a dictator.<sup>8</sup> Since independence, the country has had fifteen constitutions, each providing for an orderly succession of governments through elections and designed to limit the powers of the president. Despite such, Bolivia's history from independence to the present has been one generally of dictators, embracing periods ranging from relative stability to anarchy.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Adams, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

<sup>6</sup> Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 553.

<sup>7</sup> Adams, op. cit., p. 113.

<sup>8</sup> It is perhaps significant to note that during Bolivar's tenure until the end of 1826, in his attempting to impose his ideas, he did show his awareness of the Indian problem by seeking to inculcate respect for manual labor in the rest of the population, perhaps realizing and hoping, as Arnade indicates, to overcome the liability of continued exploitation of the indigenous population. Charles W. Arnade, The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957) pp. 183-205.

<sup>9</sup> Bolivia had more than 60 coups d'etat in the 19th century. From 1925 through 1952, no president completed his term of office.

In short, the Bolivia that entered the 20th century rested upon weak national ties: her people remained essentially of two culture worlds--an elite Spanish-speaking, relatively educated minority, who controlled the economic (both the mines and agriculture in the primarily agrarian society), as well as the social and political institutional means of control of the society; and a largely illiterate and uneducated majority unable to communicate among its major components nor in any significant measure with the elite, essentially trapped within a feudalistic system of social, economic, and political immobility, with little means for the majority to realize that life might be different.

During the 1920's when official Washington diplomacy in Latin America was devoted mainly to protecting its citizens' business interests, U.S. banking institutions also came into unusual prominence in Bolivian internal affairs.<sup>10</sup> A general perception of the U.S. economic presence in the country which increasingly was to become identified as allied with the exploitative internal elite was to serve in the development of negative attitudes towards the U.S. in the future.

It was the Chaco War<sup>11</sup> which set off reactions, not only among the elite (especially angered and humiliated young Army officers) but especially on the part of the peasantry which were eventually to alter the foundations of the society. Bolivia was defeated in the War,<sup>12</sup> but it was not the loss of lives nor the defeat which was to have the greatest impact on the nation.

To fight the War, Bolivians of all classes volunteered or were drafted into the Army. (There is record of Altiplano Indians being chained and taken to the Chaco to fight.)<sup>13</sup> The elite found itself suddenly needing the serfs for its infantry. And the Indians found that for once they mattered. Also,

<sup>10</sup>For example, loans to the Bolivian government were conditioned on its acceptance of the authority of a Permanent Fiscal Commission, an entity controlled by New York's financial interests, to collect Bolivia's taxes for a period of 25 years. In this way, Americans actually served as Director General of Bolivia's customs, as head of the Fiscal Commission, and as director of the National Bank. Luis Penalzoza, Historia Economica de Bolivia, La Paz, 1946.

<sup>11</sup>A classic and ironical tragedy which developed as a result of a dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over title to a region in the Gran Chaco, an area to which neither country had clear title and which was largely undeveloped. Both sides fought with heavy losses until they were exhausted with a truce being agreed to in 1935. Approximately 70,000 Bolivians and 40,000 Paraguayans died in this war, many of them due to disease and inadequate medical care. Herring, op. cit., pp. 558-59.

<sup>12</sup>The Bolivian Army has participated in a number of national conflicts but has won very few, indeed.

<sup>13</sup>Herring, op. cit., p. 558.

for the first time, many Indians saw other parts of the country, and for the first time became "the object of propaganda designed to persuade them that they were citizens of a...nation, no longer Indians...but 'persons' in the same sense as the 'whites.'" One of the principal results of the Chaco War was "the rise of a liberal image of the prospective role of the Indian within the nation, and a new sense of participation, real or frustrated, by the Indian in the national life."<sup>14</sup> U.S. involvement in attempts to arbitrate the Chaco dispute under neutral inter-American auspices further precipitated Bolivian resentment of U.S. actions pertaining to Bolivia when ultimately arbitration fixed the boundary line in a way that appeared disadvantageous to Bolivia.

Although Bolivia after the war was to return basically to the pattern of strong-arm dictatorship typical of the 19th century, although the same traditional dissention among her leaders was to continue, and although there was the same absence of political participation by the vast majority of the population, Bolivia was never to be quite the same again. The foundations of the society that depended upon maintaining the Indian as a serf in a feudalistic structure had been upset--irrevocably. The disaster of the war also led to an upsurge in political party activity in the country although such did not involve the peasant as a major factor in any way. The political leaders always of the elite, still regarded peasants as inferiors to be excluded from society and coerced when necessary to keep them powerless. But such was not to remain the case for long.

In 1936, almost immediately upon the heels of the Chaco War, in the heavily populated Cochabamba Valley, peasants of the province of Cliza established a syndicate with the aim of freeing themselves from the feudal obligations of service to the patrons of the latifundia. The syndicate leased their holdings from the landlords, an act which released them from the feudalistic duty of performing services for the patron without pay. In defense of the feudalistic system, a group of large landowners organized to destroy the young syndicate. In 1939, a group of these landlords bought the land the peasants had rented, took back the land, and cleared large areas by destroying the houses of the peasants. They then proceeded to oust all peasants from the land except those who would consent to serve as pegujaleros (share-cropper serfs) whose obligations differed little from the older type colonos.<sup>15</sup>

The attack on the syndicate members, however, tended to unify the Indian population and contributed to his political awakening. Acts by landlords previously regarded as acts against individual peasants were now recognized as a concentrated attack by landowners upon the whole group of Indians just because they were Indians.<sup>16</sup> With this defeat, the syndicate then centered in the Indian

<sup>14</sup> Adams, et al., op. cit., p. 115.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>16</sup> Loc. cit.

community of Ucurena in the province of Cliza (still one of the most politically volatile areas of Bolivia) and turned from directly attempting to secure land to a program of school building and other improvements designed to organize and prepare the peasants for what they now saw as an inevitable struggle with the patrons.<sup>17</sup>

U.S. investment in Bolivia which had become somewhat heavy-handed in the 1920's included the obtaining of oil concessions.<sup>18</sup> In 1937, the Bolivian Government expropriated the Standard Oil Company which had been operating in the country since 1922, declaring the entire country a national oil reserve and vesting exclusive exploratory and exploitation rights in a newly established government company. Standard Oil appealed to the Supreme Court and lost.

In ensuing years there were various liberal movements with the universities contributing to increasing ferment. In attempts to pacify the new unrest, liberal governments enacted new laws from time to time, which were forgotten later, as tradition-dominated governments attempted to prevent any basic change. However, as transfers of governmental power only essentially involved the elite, the basic imbalance of the society became increasingly pronounced.

The Setting: Bolivia and U.S. Technical and Financial Assistance, 1941-1964. The United States Government has maintained programs of technical, financial, and military assistance to the Government of Bolivia since the early 1940's. The U.S. policies which have determined the nature of such assistance have varied. Technical assistance began during World War II largely for strategic reasons when the United States was cut off from its customary sources of raw materials and feared the ascendancy of German influence in Bolivia. A U.S. Mission, composed of economic experts, assessed the economy and prepared a report for the Bolivian government in 1941, the recommendations of which were promptly followed by the Government of Bolivia in creating a semi-autonomous government agency, the Bolivian Development Corporation, which, until after the founding of the National Community Development Program, figured prominently in the economic development of the country. The Bolivian Development Corporation received an initial capital of \$25 million jointly from the Export-Import Bank of Washington and from the Bolivian Government.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The syndicate of Cliza was not to emerge from political suppression until 1947.

<sup>18</sup>Oil had been known to exist since colonial days, but exploitation had not begun until the 20th century. In 1916, after 7.5 million acres had already been granted to companies for exploitation, the government passed a law nationalizing oil exploitation. This law had been repealed in 1920 with foreign investment permitted. See Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

<sup>19</sup>The activities of the Corporacion Boliviano de Fomento (CBF) came to include many sectors of the economy: beef air transport, a sugar mill, a cement plant, a milk processing plant, a livestock project, road construction, a hydroelectric plant, a sawmill, a lime plant, colonization

Shortly after CBF began its operations, U.S. separate programs of technical assistance were inaugurated in health, education, and agriculture. The health project was implemented in 1942 and was designed to improve health conditions regarded as prerequisite to development of rubber and metal reserves and to facilitate cinchona development. An education project was commenced in 1944 and an agricultural project in 1948.<sup>20</sup>

Each of these separate projects evolved into servicios or administrative units attached to the respective Bolivian ministries but actually were controlled by U.S. personnel who, along with Bolivian counterparts, were to work together until such time as the ministries were supposed to be prepared to incorporate these activities into regular functions. Each government contributed funds to the servicios to pay for their operations (although at times the Bolivian contributions were made from funds provided by the U.S. to the Bolivian government). In addition, the U.S. paid the salaries of its own technicians and of Bolivian trainees engaged in the projects, training costs for Bolivians to study abroad, and for commodities needed for demonstration purposes.

The Inter-American Agricultural Service (Servicio Agricola Interamericano), SAI, quickly came to be the largest of the servicios, accounting for more than one-third of all project assistance funds as it expanded its initial operations of research and education to include machinery pools, establishment of an extensive network of agricultural credit, an agricultural extension service designed along the same lines as that of the U.S., construction of a milk plant, promotion of irrigation, and a host of other activities. The Inter-American Cooperative Public Health Service (Servicio Cooperativo Inter-Americano de Salud Publica), SCISP, expanded its activity to include work for establishment of a national health program; and the Inter-American Cooperative Education Service (Servicio Cooperativo Inter-Americano de Educacion), SCIDE, undertook programs in teacher training, the construction and equipping of schools, the printing of textbooks, vocational training, and other educational activities.<sup>21</sup>

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projects, irrigation projects, credit operations, etc. It had a highly influential lobby in Washington and ran an annual deficit which averaged somewhat more than \$3,000,000 a year. The impact of its operations will be touched upon later.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Operations Mission to Bolivia, Point Four in Bolivia, 1942-1960 (La Paz: USOM, 1960).

<sup>21</sup> After the Revolution, but before the major changes were made in the program of U.S. assistance, in addition to a roads servicio, the provision of U.S. assistance also came to include programs in civil aviation, a school of public administration, a minerals survey, preparation of a national petroleum exploitation code, the drafting of a minerals code, a financial survey mission, operation of an audio-visual center, an office of special projects, and additional programs for training Bolivians abroad.

From the beginning of the program of assistance through 1951, the U.S. provided a total of somewhat more than \$40 million to the Government of Bolivia.<sup>22</sup>

It was within this technical and economic assistance framework that the Bolivian Revolution broke in 1952. The question immediately arises as to what pertinence was the programs of U.S. technical and economic assistance to that Revolution.

A review of the project agreements and their field operations indicates that they bore little relevance or understanding of the society in which they were designed to operate.<sup>23</sup> Although some physical edifices were constructed such as agricultural experiment stations, several health installations, a number of educational institutions, in basic import none of the programs were either planned or carried out in a way that effectively engaged the Indian, who composed the majority of the population. In 1952, the Indian constituted the force, which by taking affairs into his violent hands, rid the rural areas of the controlling "white" patron, seized the land, and thereby destroyed the structure of feudalism on the land which had prevailed for more than 400 years in Bolivia.<sup>24</sup>

By the nature of Bolivian society and the structuring of the servicios, the Bolivian counterparts were of the "white" elite and the Ministries to which the servicios were attached were under the control of the same minority. The American technicians and administrators working in these projects were thus by the nature of the structures of the operations of the projects more closely identified with the "whites" than with the Indians. The programs were planned, financed, and carried out with the elite.

Although basic frictions had come to exist between American and Bolivian technicians,<sup>25</sup> any such working relationships with the Indians were practically non-existent. The Indian observed the American identified with the elite. He saw the American working with his oppressor; or, perhaps more accurately, he saw his oppressor working with what he might have been generous enough to term "the uninformed" American, whether the American realized it or not, lending

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<sup>22</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Aid by the U.S. Government, 1940-1951 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952).

<sup>23</sup>See, for example, Adams, et al., op. cit., pp. 108-176.

<sup>24</sup>For an excellent treatment of the institutional, social, economic and political roots of the Revolution, see Arnade, op. cit.; and for an admittedly biased but highly informative account of the Revolution, see Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958).

<sup>25</sup>See for example, Allan R. Richards, Administration--Bolivia and the United States (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1961), pp. 31-32.

his efforts to propping up the supports of the elite-dominated society which oppressed him. Few of the project operations directly engaged the Indian substantially in actual practice.

For example, when Indians happened to venture to American-advised Agricultural Extension Stations which were under the control of, and operated by, members of the "elite", they were often thrown out or had vicious dogs set upon them. The Indians on a large scale in the vicinities of these installations came to have a great deal of hatred for them as was evidenced during the Revolution when they physically attacked some of them, seized others and attempted to distribute their lands, seized machinery, vehicles, and killed prized livestock and ate it.

None of these projects, including the CBF, in practice penetrated to any degree in depth the other cultural world of the Indian. In short, the U.S. programs of financial and technical assistance in Bolivia from the early forties down through the Revolution of 1952 in their basic components not only were not designed nor carried out to be promotive nor supportive of the forces of change in Bolivian society, they were by their natures essentially supportive of the social, economic, and political status quo.<sup>26</sup>

With the triumph of the revolutionary forces in La Paz on April 11, 1952, the U.S. hesitated. The revolutionary regime promptly nationalized the tin mines, emasculated the Bolivian Army, conferred citizenship on the Indians, instituted universal adult suffrage,<sup>27</sup> and confirmed the seizure of lands from the patrons by the Indians, appointing a committee to complete a special study within 90 days for carrying out a program of land reform. During the month previous to victory of the revolutionary regime, the U.S. had halted her stockpiling of tin refusing to pay the price Bolivia had been receiving, closed its Texas smelter, and did not renew the contracts of its Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purchase of Bolivian tin.

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<sup>26</sup>It might be added that such technical and financial programs of assistance were essentially in keeping with U. S. political, strategic, and economic policy interests during the period. In fact, the U. S. had a pointed record of its interests and actions in attempting to prevent the rise of the revolutionary regime of the MNR which took over the reigns of government in Bolivia in 1952. It should also be noted that although the U.S. was successful in carrying out and attaining its basic war-time policy objectives concerning Bolivia, (i.e., to keep that country out of the fold of the Axis powers and to obtain from Bolivia the strategic raw materials that country had that the Allied powers needed--the U.S. was also able to obtain certain advantages for U. S. investors during the period), that policy was made and carried out with little attention to the forces at work in Bolivia which were to result in chaotic upheaval. U. S. military assistance to the elite-officered Bolivian military served as well to buttress the forces of the status quo, all of which were to no avail in 1952.

<sup>27</sup>However, since the new government suspended the electoral process for four years, the newly broadened electorate had no elections in which to make its voice heard until 1956.

With the Indians becoming even more engaged with seizing lands in the rural areas, with those of the patron class flocking to the larger cities or leaving the country, the previously patron-controlled system of agricultural marketing collapsed, and the spectre of famine came to threaten the cities. With mineral exports accounting for approximately 90% of Bolivia's foreign exchange earnings (of which tin alone accounted for approximately 80%), the new revolutionary regime came to face the possibilities of even more disruptive economic, social, and political chaos.

With the Bolivian economy rapidly deteriorating, the U.S. government announced that it was making available to the new government agricultural products valued at \$5 million and was extending \$4 million to purchase essential commodities and services.<sup>28</sup> However, it was approximately one and one-half years before the U.S. came to extend significant amounts of economic assistance to the revolutionary regime, and during that period the U.S. brought policies to bear which were to cause the revolutionary regime to increasingly veer its course more to the right.

In the final analysis, it is perhaps most true that the U.S. came to support the revolutionary regime in order to be able to attempt to prevent even more radical elements from taking over the revolutionary movement. Certainly it was not due to an over-riding concern for insuring that the revolutionary government was supported in its asserted efforts to build a democratic society. Future developments in Bolivia were to tend to substantiate this evaluation.

In late 1953, an accord was reached which, although it did not set any final figure for compensation, did provide a procedure whereby Bolivia through its new government-owned corporation (in which the former holdings of the three big tin mining companies had been placed upon nationalization) would pay certain sums on account pending final agreement as to how much it owed the old owners.

In 1954, the U.S. stated that the importance of avoiding chaos and total disruption superseded any ultimate assessment which it might make of the revolutionary regime and announced that it was inaugurating a program of economic aid. U.S. economic assistance more than doubled between 1952 (from a total of \$5,917,000, which included no cash grant assistance, and \$5,260,000 in credit) and 1954 (to a total of \$12,538,000, which included \$2,924,000 for technical assistance, \$7,913,000 for grant assistance, and \$1,701,000 in credit).<sup>29</sup> This included assistance to the government-owned tin corporation but not directly for land reform activities.

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<sup>28</sup>Curtis A. Wilgus and Raul D'Eca, Latin American History (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963), p. 262.

<sup>29</sup>U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits by the U. S. Government, June Quarters, 1951-59; Data for Technical Assistance, 1952-59, supplied by the Agency for International Development.

In 1954, the revolutionary regime also began a resuscitation of the military, advised by a U.S. Military Mission. And in 1955, when the U.S. Congress was considering the further extension of assistance to Bolivia, Juan Lechin--one of the leaders of the revolutionary regime, who favored full implementation of land reform, if necessary with the cutting-up of all large holdings, and who had a fanatical following in the mines--resigned as Minister of Mines. Also in 1955, the Bolivian Government, with the aid of the U.S. government, contracted with a firm of American experts to draw up a new petroleum code, which, promulgated in 1956, paved the way for granting concessions to foreign firms, generally establishing a 50-50 basis for distribution of returns for oil operations.<sup>30</sup>

In 1957, the U.S. was to insist that Bolivia carry out a stabilization plan prepared by American experts, cut off all funding for carrying out any development activities and insisted that Bolivia not use any of its resources for development.<sup>31</sup> Also in 1957, with about 140 U.S. specialists in Bolivia, the U.S. began a reduction in U.S. technical assistance personnel which was to continue until 1962 when there were about 60 specialists remaining.

Although in 1959, the U.S. permitted the reactivation of some development activity, the austerity program, undertaken by Bolivia upon the strong insistence of the U.S., brought on a clear split in the ranks of the revolutionary party, which, as events were to prove were not to be healed, and resulted in an open struggle for power which was to culminate in 1964, in the ousting of the revolutionary regime.<sup>32</sup>

The impact of the revolution in Bolivia did not result in any basic changes in the approach of the U.S. in Bolivia to development in the traditional (or revolutionary) society. A detailed examination of the situation was made in 1956 by the economic adviser of the U.S. Embassy in La Paz and a member of the U.S. Operations Mission, which placed the blame for the failure of the program of economic and technical assistance, not so much "on the

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<sup>30</sup>The action of Henry Holland in resigning as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America and turning up shortly thereafter as a lawyer for the oil interests seeking concessions in Bolivia was widely criticized by Bolivians, especially as he had been Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America at the time the Petroleum Code was written with the advice and assistance of U. S. Government officials. See Alexander, op. cit., pp. 161-171.

<sup>31</sup>As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs told the U. S. House Committee in 1960, "We had to tell the Bolivian Government that they couldn't put their money into it (their development program) and we weren't going to put ours into it." Mutual Security Act of 1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 847.

<sup>32</sup>It might be noted, by a U.S.-advised military, when U. S. policy was unquestionably fully in support of the revolutionary regime.

dubious wisdom of the economic policies, but rather on the circumstances that the policies had been framed in terms of a society and an economy which had existed prior to 1952, and which have since then been changed even more drastically than most people realize."<sup>33</sup>

The machinery which came to be set up by the revolutionary regime for land distribution, especially as that regime came to turn more to the right, was not vigorous.<sup>34</sup> The machinery ground on (most often officered by persons who did not favor the campesino<sup>\*</sup> revolution in reality or who stood to benefit financially by keeping land titles undecided), with much criticism for the slow rate of speed in validating land titles for the new owners.<sup>35</sup> Despite such delays and the expense to Indians in meeting the complexities of the administrative procedures and despite the government's failure to provide technical assistance to the new owners, the Indians continued to support the increasingly conservative revolutionary regime.

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<sup>33</sup>Zondag, Cornelius H., "Problems in the Economic Development of Bolivia," U. S. Operations Mission to Bolivia, 1956, mimeographed.

<sup>34</sup>Nuflo Chavez, the political leader most closely identified with the Indians, who had been elected Vice President to Siles in 1956, was one of the first ones to strike politically against Siles in opposition to the U.S.-advised stabilization plan by backing an ultimatum to the Congress with a threat to resign. Chavez miscalculated. Congress rejected this ultimatum and accepted his resignation. This event was to have perhaps more long-range significance than is generally attributed to it in most works to which this writer has had access. For one thing, the central figure of the voice of the campesino, in the swift-moving game of advantage in La Paz, had been somewhat easily removed. Juan Lechin was the next to challenge Siles when he organized a miner's walkout as a demonstration against the Plan. Siles, by declaring a hunger strike, rallied support and broke the demonstration. By July, 1957, the U. S. considered left-wing influence to have been eliminated from the government. It might be added that Siles had to offer his resignation a total of eight times, each time being supported by the Congress, in order to continue his support of the stabilization plan, before it became apparent that he could no longer convince miners, workers, and farmers of the need of "indefinitely prolonged sacrifices for the sake of stabilization." Siles was accused of "slavish adherence" to U.S. policies and was denounced for his "status quo policies". Adams, op. cit., p. 158.

\* A term that had come into usage with the Revolution of 1952 to eliminate the derogatory connotations that the word "Indian" bore historically.

<sup>35</sup>During Paz's first administration, by June, 1956, only 109 large estates had been legally expropriated. Alexander reported that as of 1957, at the rate at which the land was being divided, it would take 25 years to complete the job of redistributing the land subject to expropriation. Alexander, op. cit., p. 79.

In 1960, the U.S. Operations Mission became the subject of Congressional investigation. For one thing, more than \$2 million worth of fiber shipments had been lost through pilferage, fire, and extended storage. It was found that implementation of projects had resulted in waste, as was most prominently demonstrated by the presence of a large quantity of unused farm machinery imported by SAI. The servicios, which were originally planned to be transferred to their respective ministries, were ordered to be so transferred, after which all that were transferred died natural deaths as they were by their natures imposed and bore little reality in relationship to Bolivian culture and institutions--neither those of the Indians, nor those of the elite.<sup>36</sup>

The total value of economic aid and technical cooperation disbursements, not including military assistance, between 1942 and 1961 was more than \$222 million. In 1961, nine years after the revolution, the revolutionary government, which had commenced working on it in 1960, promulgated the 15th and latest constitution, which attempted to embody the changes wrought by the revolution of 1952. Despite continuing violence, the genuine efforts of the revolutionary party to define and serve the interests of the majority of the population, as best it could, seemed as late as 1964 to have been rewarded by at least a small measure of political stability almost unknown prior to 1952.<sup>37</sup>

The revolutionary decrees were incorporated in the new Constitution. The agrarian reform program was outlined in a special section of the Charter: the right to possess land was to derive from works performed on the land, the explicit right of government to redistribute rural properties was specified, the status of the peasant homestead and small farm were unconditionally guaranteed while medium-sized and commercial properties were conditionally recognized if they fulfilled social functions; the large estate, the latifundia, with its extremely inefficient utilization of the soil, was prohibited; community and cooperation arrangements for working the land were supported; the state was to recognize the Indian syndicates, and was to sponsor educational programs in the rural areas.<sup>38</sup>

Nevertheless, much of the old body of attitudes and practices were to be continued. The executive remained the strongest branch of the government, with the government structure continuing to be unitary with pronounced

<sup>36</sup>The public administration project which was commenced after the Revolution was discontinued also in July, 1960, after which the School of Public Administration at the University of San Andres "withered to death on the vine." Richards, op. cit., p. 41. Although the USOM managed to continue SAI under the control of A.I.D. until early 1966, when its transfer was also forced, that servicio came organizationally to undergo the same fate.

<sup>37</sup>Three Presidents (Paz, Siles, and Paz) had been allowed or at least managed to complete their legal terms--the first to do so in 25 years.

<sup>38</sup>Charter to the Bolivian Constitution of 1961.

centralization of power on the national level. The same was true of the judiciary which, although formally responsible only to the laws of the Constitution, had little real independence of the presidential will. A constitutional keystone of the supremacy of the executive remained the strong grip it legally maintained on departmental and local governments, for the administrators of all territorial divisions and municipalities remained named by, and responsible to, the executive. Also, the Constitution continued the important provision that under certain conditions the President could assume extraordinary powers after having declared the nation to be in a state of seige; under this provision he can suspend civil liberties, impose censorship, and levy taxes on his own initiative.

Paz resorted to the state of seige frequently in 1961. The military, which had been initially repressed was expanded to include the Air Force and the Lake Forces, as well as the Army. The popular Indian militias, which the government continued to use frequently for political purposes, were formally sanctioned and stated to be a part of the military reserves. The national police were explicitly placed under the authority of the President. The President designates not only the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but also the heads of each of the three armed forces, as well as the national police.

In 1961, the Alliance for Progress was gotten underway with a total of \$80 million earmarked as contribution to the Bolivian Government's 10-year plan.<sup>39</sup> And during the same year, the Bolivian Government commenced a serious attempt to put national planning on a long-range basis with its announcement of an ambitious and comprehensive 10-year plan for economic and social development. An agency which came to be titled "La Direccion Nacional de Desarrollo Rural" was established in the new Ministry of Campesino Affairs, which was to shoulder the major responsibility for development of the rural areas.

The Cuban invasion attempt of 1961 touched off violent expressions of anti-Americanism in La Paz where the American flag was burned, and in Cochabamba where the U.S. Consulate was attacked. The visit of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in June of that year was the occasion of violent demonstrations in La Paz, then racked with the turmoil concerning the miners' strike and the possible resignation of Paz. Five demonstrations were directed at the U.S. Ambassador in a period of a few months, culminating in a bomb attack. Wheat shipments of the U.S. were publicly attacked as an attempt to keep Bolivia dependent on outside sources of vital foodstuffs (in many

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<sup>39</sup> Aid to provide about \$60 million and the Inter-American Development Bank, financed with large U. S. contributions, the remaining \$20 million (\$6 million for engineering studies to be conducted by U. S. firms; \$3 million for emergency public works; \$7.6 million for colonization; \$2.1 million for rural development; \$4 million for housing; \$4.7 million for potable water; \$10.4 million for credit banks; and the remaining \$42.2 million for financing projects to emerge from the engineering studies).

areas U.S. wheat could be bought on the black-market more cheaply than it could be grown and sold in Bolivia). Similarly, the U.S. technical assistance program to the Bolivian government-owned mining corporation was attacked as a device for keeping the mining industry under the control of the U.S.

In April, 1962, the Minister of Campesino Affairs, at the Buenos Aires meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank's Board of Governors, had attacked the administration of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia, charging that Bolivia's requests for assistance were being held up in spite of its having met the qualifications of social and economic reform spelled out in the Alliance. The Minister described the forthcoming Bolivian mission to Washington as a final attempt by Bolivia to determine whether the Alliance program was "fact or fiction". He stated that Bolivia was anxious that, having met the program's criteria in the area of land and tax reform and the formulation of a national development plan--one of only two Latin American countries to accomplish all three by March, 1962--Bolivia not be passed over.<sup>40</sup> The visit by the Bolivian delegation to Washington took place in May, but its substantive results remained unclear. The arrival of the first contingent of Peace Corp Volunteers in July, 1962, was the subject of criticism by politicians and newspapers in general of the left.

The government's problems in 1962 were, if anything, worse than previously. There is evidence that even at this time the President was concerned with the possibility of a coup by rightists in the military (two officers were arrested in 1962 on such charges). The government's position had become more, rather than less, tenuous. The interest groups to which it had looked for support became more divided. The Indians, too, organized in their syndicates found their previous unity of purpose diminishing; after having achieved their goal of land ownership, the most critical purpose of their organization had been accomplished, and the tendency to focus on local issues and needs came to hamper their effectiveness as a national, majority, interest group. The Indians had not become a single interest group and did not yet constitute a cohesive element in Bolivian society. They remained torn by conflicting regional interests and, on occasion, through the emergence of a new kind of "Indian patron" (regional or area leaders who rendered certain services and expected certain loyalties) engaged each other in combat involving large numbers of Indians in armed conflict, as well as posing serious problems to the government in attempting to maintain control--one of the factors involved in its reactivation of the military, with the Indian militias being made only a reserve.

Paternalism, so long a feature of Bolivian society, was by no means dead; not only did it retain some of its old forms concerning the relations

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<sup>40</sup> Bolivia was the second country to submit an integrated plan of economic development to the OAS's Committee of Nine--its special advisory body on national applications under the Alliance. In 1962, funds had been made available only to finance some of the engineering surveys by U. S. firms and some for emergency public works.

of Indians to the new local Indian leaders, especially in the Cochabamba Valley where several of these leaders came to be locked in a power struggle for control of cattle marketing, but was also retained in certain practices pertaining to the relationships of Campesinos in their relationships with government officials.

In 1962, the Bolivian 10-year Development Plan was under revision after having been reviewed by the Alliance for Progress, primarily by the Agency for International Development, which at the operational level primarily only through SAI was still maintaining the same technical assistance approach concerning rural Bolivia, under the new guise of Rural Development, that had prevailed in Bolivia since 1948 and which in basic respects was hardly identifiable with, or applicable to, the integrated plan proposed by Bolivia.

In spite of these difficulties the revolutionary regime, having weathered a chaotic eleven years, with financial assistance particularly from the U.S. along the lines described above, continued to attempt to develop and expand programs by which it hoped to pull the republic out of economic chaos and political disorder. Its days, of course, were numbered. It was within this setting that the National Community Development Program came to be launched.

#### The Initiation and Establishment of the National Community Development Program of Bolivia

Organizational Factors within A.I.D. and Technical Assistance in Community Development. In April, 1964, the Agency for International Development assembled a team composed of an Agricultural Economist from the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Washington, an Agricultural Economist from the University of Utah, an Agricultural Extension agent from Connecticut, an Agriculture Administrator from the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Washington, and a Community Development Advisor then serving in Iran, to go to Bolivia to make a survey of the rural development situation obtaining in that country. The team was later joined by the Dean of the School of Agriculture of the University of Utah, as previous negotiations concerning the possibilities of a long-range contract for development work in Bolivia by agriculture at that University had already been underway with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and A.I.D. The team was also joined when it assembled in Washington by the A.I.D. Chief of Rural Development serving in Bolivia. The briefings in Washington were held in the U.S. Department of Agriculture and were presided over by officials of that Department.

As of April, 1962, the organization of A.I.D./Washington, which had been formally changed by the Kennedy forces from a technical-assistance-division approach to a geographic-regional-bureau approach, remained in a somewhat chaotic state, with many of the same officials from the previous organization, now in different positions, not completely sure of just how they would come to operate in the new structure. Many of the previous upper echelon officials, especially of the technical divisions, had been moved into "consultative positions," with many of their previous subordinates serving at operational levels in the regional bureaus. In theory "planners

and administrators" were supposed to have replaced the previous control by the heads of Technical Assistance Divisions, which had primarily been ruled by agriculture with "balanced development" represented by separate programs of much less support in health, education, community development, housing, etc.

With the Kennedy reorganization, an official was appointed to serve as head of Institutional Development, A.I.D./W; such official was representative of one of the technical fields, located at a level directly accessible to the Director, serving all of the A.I.D. organization as a technical resource, but not in an operating capacity, and of course not as a part of any one of the operating Regional Bureaus. One Community Development officer remained in the A.I.D./W Latin American Bureau responsible for serving all of Latin America; this official had responded to State policy instructions to A.I.D. that a Community Development Specialist be included on the "Rural Development Team" being sent to Bolivia, and was attempting to insure that the new meaning of "Rural Development" would not come to be determined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's conventional approach with health, education, community development, etc., not engaged in planning for determining program scope, approaches, and organization, but rather merely tolerated as appendages to present a "balanced picture of rural development." The Community Development position at the highest level of A.I.D./W in the Technical Assistance Branch, remained unstaffed.<sup>41</sup> Although there were indications that the Kennedy forces had planned to make Community Development one of their prime programming instruments, in foreign technical assistance programs, as of 1964 there were few Community Development specialists left in the entire A.I.D. establishment. This was due to a number of reasons.

After the general success of the Marshall Plan--which involved largely capital and equipment inputs, as the human and institutional resources were basically available in host countries--programs of technical assistance were commenced in lesser developed areas in 1950. Before the technical-division-approach came so fully to dominate programming with establishment of State-side bureaucratic clienteles, a significant number of Mission Directors had established large-scale, coordinated and integrated programs of Community Development in countries considered especially crucial to U.S. interests with the strong support of the State Department.

Notable were the India Program established in 1952, the Philippine Program in 1954, and the Iran Program in 1956. To assist in carrying out these programs, a significant number of Community Development Specialists came to be employed by the Foreign Operations Administration and later International Cooperation Administration (predecessors of A.I.D.). For example, the Community Development Program Plan for Iran in 1956, called for a total of 57 Community Development Advisors. This plan was not ever

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<sup>41</sup>This crucial Community Development position has since been eliminated.

to be put fully into operation, however, primarily due to agriculture's increasing strength with a widespread and powerful political lobby in the States and its opposition to becoming one of several technical services in support of an over-all integrated development process.

The same fate came to meet the Community Development Program that had been commenced in Pakistan in 1954, and the Community Development Program commenced in 1958 in Korea (incidentally both of these Programs were terminated by the same official as Mission Director--an ex-agricultural official, one among many promoted from the agricultural technical stable to positions as Country Mission Directors, as agriculture came to increasingly dominate not only the technical assistance program but the administrative structure of the organization, itself).

The India and Philippine Governments held on to their Community Development Programs, however, despite pressures from the U.S. aid program bureaucracy. In India, Nehru and U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles (a strong proponent of Community Development) respectively gave strong national identification and support to the program in the early years.

Mission Directors who had strongly supported the programming of community development programs in the early days of technical assistance had therefore increasingly become unpopular and had been demoted or moved out of the foreign assistance program. Ambassadors who promoted such programming found the matter tied up in the continuing struggle between the "diplomats and the farmers," as to whether the foreign aid program would be run by State and in the opinion of the "farmers," thereby become trapped in "politics," or be run by "developers" (agriculture), able to attend to "economic" development (supported in this view by the economists in the aid structure) without political interference. Up until the Kennedy reorganization effort, the position of the farmers and economists of the "semi-autonomous" aid program had largely prevailed in these respects with operationally indefinite working relations existing between A.I.D. directors and the ambassadors prevailing in the field. In general, ambassadors left aid programs alone except in special or emergency situations.

The Kennedy forces had originally favored all instruments of the U.S. government overseas being placed under the control and direction of the Ambassador. With the exception of the Peace Corps, for certain external purposes only, this generally was the system that came to prevail, including the U.S. military except in geographic areas where the military itself has been placed in command specifically by the President.

Lastly, on a most practical basis, Community Development which had emerged as an applied technical field in response to findings of western social scientists in lesser developed areas, did not have a significant political clientele in the U.S. and of those in the offing in the U.S. that may have come to provide such, the nature of their narrowness of specialization, at least in the view of a number of specialists in the field, entailed certain liabilities to necessary integrative and coordinative features of the technical field. The Kennedy reorganization had in actuality, by divesting technical fields of their programming controls, gotten only far

enough to deprive Community Development of its prime organizational means of survival: the fact that agriculture by its means of control had been committed thereby to retain the technical-division approach to programming and in that all programs could not be all agriculture had at least provided Community Development with an institutional base, small and relatively weak though it was.

In the briefings held in the Department of Agriculture, prior to departure of the Team for Bolivia, it was made clear that, at least in that Department's view and of the officials of Rural Development in A.I.D./W, the prime purpose of the Mission was to confirm the need for the contract in agriculture with the University of Utah and that the approach would be that of conventional U.S. agriculture: essentially agricultural research and U.S.-patterned agricultural extension--the approach that had been basically followed in Bolivia since the beginning of the U.S. agricultural program there in 1948.

Initial Community Development Survey. The Rural Development Survey Team departed Washington in mid-April, 1964, for Bolivia and in its majority was in Bolivia for approximately two months.

After field trips to various parts of the country by most of the members of the Team, it came together again in La Paz to make recommendations. The Agricultural members of the team recommended the proposed contract with the University of Utah, the technical details of which had been worked out during their absence from La Paz, and the Community Development Specialist drew up a feasibility report on the possibilities of establishing a National Community Development Program in Bolivia.

Upon completion of the feasibility report, the Community Development Specialist was advised by the Chief of Rural Development of A.I.D. in La Paz, a fisheries expert, that a report by him was not necessary, that all that was needed was presentation to him of an "E-1" (programming document) to facilitate funding to provide training in Community Development techniques to agriculture extension agents, and that he did not wish a "full-fledged Community Development Program with village councils and a lot of organization in Bolivia."

In the absence from La Paz of the Community Development Advisor in the field, the Rural Development Chief had, in conversations with the Deputy Mission Director, stated the necessity of the Community Development Specialist becoming a "member of the Team" in its programming recommendations to be made upon its return to Washington. In conferences with the Community Development Specialist, the Deputy Mission Director stated that he did not "believe in Community Development Programs" and that he advised the Community Development Specialist to "get on the Team," or else he would "not be returning to Bolivia." The Community Development Specialist stated that he had been "sent to Bolivia as a Community Development Specialist," and that although he had not planned to return to Bolivia, that as long as A.I.D. was going to staff a Community Development Advisor and in view of the odds, he believed he would be returning to Bolivia "to give it a go as a Community Development Advisor."

The Community Development Specialist then proceeded with negotiations with officials of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs for obtaining a cash and in-kind contribution of the equivalent of \$50,000 to more than evenly match a U.S. contribution for implementing a drafted Community Development Project Agreement.<sup>42</sup>

The project Agreement was in part as follows:

Purpose of the Project. The purpose of this Project is to assist the Government of Bolivia in establishing and putting into operation a national Community Development Program for effectively engaging the campesino in the nation-building process of the country on a self-help basis. The prime goal of the project is the establishment and operation of the local and governmental, organizational and institutional structure which can provide for the development of a system of stable, self-reliant, democratic communities with an assured sense of social, political, and economic growth and responsibility, and to increase thereby the local initiative, participation, and responsibility of the campesino in the nation-building process of the country.

This will be done by the establishment and development of local campesino organization for providing campesinos with experience-by-doing in the organization, execution, and maintenance of community self-help projects, by invigorating Government services in response to community self-help efforts, and by the provision of technical know-how, funds, materials, and other resources to the self-help efforts of the campesinos, for their effecting improvements in the standards of living, in local living conditions, and in the development and growth of representative local community organization for development.

This activity will therefore help campesinos find methods and means to organize self-help projects and will furnish the techniques for cooperative action on plans which they and technical specialists from the Government, acting together, develop to effect basic and meaningful

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<sup>42</sup>In that a Mission plan made previously stipulated that, by that year, 1964, U. S. contributions to any technical assistance project in Bolivia could total no more than 60% of total costs, by 1965 no more than 40%, by 1966 no more than 20%, and by 1967 no grants at all, and in that Community Development programs are by their nature long-range in their concern with interrelated social, economic, and political transition on a national basis, such was to place Community Development in an extremely difficult programming situation in the future.

improvement and development in the life of the campesino. The activity will function to bring the required range of technical knowledge to bear on the program which the campesinos come to decide is necessary for their own social and economic progress. It will promote a unified approach to the related social and economic problems of rural development by agencies of the Government concerned and by the campesinos themselves.

Project Plan. Activity targets for this Project for FY-65 and FY-66 are as follows:

- 1) To provide technical assistance and services to the Director and his Staff of the National Organization of Rural Development,\* both at headquarters and in the field, in their planning, organizing, and implementing Community Development activities to be carried out through the Regional and Base Development Centers established by the National Organization of Rural Development and through the Agricultural Centers associated with the U.S.A.I.D. Rural Development Division which are to be upgraded and developed into Rural Development Centers, such development activities to be carried out on a coordinated and integrated basis;
- 2) To provide advanced-level Community Development participant training to senior officials of the National Organization of Rural Development responsible for operations of the Community Development Program, at selected institutions and field operational sites in the United States and/or Third Countries;
- 3) To provide technical assistance and services in the establishment and operation of Community Development training activities for the development and establishment of a trained and competent cadre of Community Development personnel both at headquarters and in the field which will be responsible for effectively reaching, responding to, and involving the campesinos in self-help activities for the establishment and institutionalization of local organization and campesino participation in those local affairs and development activities upon which the social, political, and economic development of the rural areas can be mounted and built; and

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\* La Direccion Nacional de Desarrollo Rural.

- 4) To provide technical and other assistance in the planning, organization, and implementation of regular Community Development field operations in the rural areas of the country.

Specifically, in-country training activities for FY-65 will be given to the preparation and development of Community Development training materials, to the training and development of training staffs; and to the establishment of Community Development training program operations at the Belen Center on the Altiplano and at the Paracaya Center in the Yungas....

Technical personnel of the various fields of rural development in health, education, and agriculture at the Regional and Base Development Centers of the areas will assist on a teaching basis in the training of the campesino to be selected from the rural communities of the various areas concerned and who upon completion of the formal phase of training will return to their areas for the inauguration and commencement of multi-purpose Community Development field operations, each, initially in from three to four rural communities depending upon distances involved, project developments, etc. Technical personnel of the various fields of rural development at the Regional and Base Development Centers will also receive special courses of training in Community Development at the Training Centers.

Specialist technical assistance available at the Regional and Base Development Centers will utilize the Community Development workers in getting their particular technical know-how adopted, utilized, repeated, and maintained in self-help projects to be decided upon, planned, and carried out by the campesinos on a self-help basis with whatever financial, commodity, and other assistance as may be made available from the Government.

Food for Peace, Civic Action, Potable Water, and other special commodity assistance to the self-help efforts of campesinos in carrying out community projects will be made available on a coordinated and integrated basis in support of the institutional structure for development through the Rural Development Regional Officer in response to project proposals to be made by campesino local organization with the assistance of the campesino Community Development village worker, to the technical team working out of the Rural Development Bases and Centers. In FY-66 it is planned that campesino representatives of the various local community organizations of each area will come to be represented on a development committee for each Base, such elected representatives will participate with the Technical Team in the development planning and programming for the area....

In-country training activities for FY-66 will be given to the training of approximately 60 campesino Community Development Workers at the Belen Center, and to approximately 80 at the Paracaya Center for the implementation of Community Development field operations in the areas of from five to six additional Development Bases and Centers. Peace Corps Volunteers, trained in Community Development, will serve as counterpart staff to the campesino village Level Workers and to Bolivian Community Development staff members at the various levels of field operation.

FY-66 Participant Training will be provided to a total of three officials, of the Organization of Rural Development, responsible for operations of the National Community Development Program, at the University of California at Berkeley, such to include training in the special program of "Principles and Practices of Community Development", as well as field observational training in Community Development work in Jamaica and Puerto Rico....

This preliminary document was signed by the Community Development Specialist with representatives of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs and officially submitted by Memo to the Chief of Rural Development with a router to the U.S. Mission Program Office (where in its directioning there was no support for Community Development), to the Deputy Director, and to the Mission Director.

It was also during this period that the Community Development Specialist became acquainted with Bolivian military, U.S.-military-advised, penetration and control within the Rural Development Division of the A.I.D. Mission in La Paz through Accion Civica, a program intricately intermeshed with cash and Food-for-Peace operations with public and private, religious, and other organizations, which constituted a large-scale give-away program being used for right-wing political purposes.

The "Team," accompanied by the Chief of Rural Development, then departed for Washington for de-briefings in the Department of Agriculture, where two reports were given: one recommending that for purposes of administrative "rationality" all functions pertaining to agriculture be transferred from the Ministry of Campesino Affairs in Bolivia to the Ministry of Agriculture with a concentration on certain crops (indefinite concerning increases in wheat production, which had decreased since large shipments of that commodity and its products had been made to Bolivia) and wool production, to be carried out through agricultural research and extension, and to be supported by a contract with the College of Agriculture of the University of Utah; and the other, second, minority report, recommending the mounting of a "full-scale National Community Development Program in Bolivia."

The Community Development Specialist of the Latin America Regional Bureau, A.I.D./W, upon being informed of the results of the field survey initiated personnel action for transfer of the field Community Development Specialist from A.I.D./Iran rolls to A.I.D./Bolivia rolls, such action

to take place upon the Field Specialist's completion of home leave in September, 1964. Two significant developments were to take place during this period of home leave: The A.I.D. Mission in La Paz, with strong financial inducements to the Government of Bolivia through its Rural Development Division, and over the strong objections of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs, succeeded in having La Dirreccion Nacional with its 10-year Development Plan, and all other "rural development" functions, with the exception of a non-operating rural literacy program, the bogged-down program for straightening out and granting land titles, and a few other miscellaneous activities, transferred in their totalities to the Ministry of Agriculture, along with their funding. In that A.I.D. was not providing cash nor technical assistance to the land titling nor literacy programs of the Ministry of Campesino Affairs, such left that Ministry virtually stripped of any external financial support. Secondly, the CD Specialist of the Latin America Regional Bureau of A.I.D./W resigned, leaving Community Development without program support in the field in Latin America.

#### Commencement of the Bolivian National Community Development Program

Upon arrival in La Paz, the essential internal organizational structure of the A.I.D. Mission pertaining to Community Development as far as programming hierarchy was concerned, was as follows:

Director

Deputy Director

Program Office

Chief Rural  
Development  
(Agriculture)

Community  
Development

As for Community Development possibilities on the part of the ministries and agencies of the Government of Bolivia, all ministries concerned with the rural areas, with the exception of the Ministry of Agriculture, were starved for development funds, and funds were being withheld from it in order to attempt to force it to maintain transferred S/I employees and operations and to conform to the operational plan being proposed by the Rural Development Division of A.I.D.

Aside from weak operations of a number of curative health facilities and the operation of a mobile health unit for making chest X-Rays of workers in the mines and occasionally in certain other areas and sporadic vaccination programs in limited geographic areas, there was no program being carried out by the Ministry of Health in preventive health and sanitation in the rural areas of the country. The Ministry of Campesino Affairs came to attempt to

carry out a national rural literacy program without any personnel staffed in the rural areas. There was no central, over-all planning for the training and staffing of personnel of the various technical ministries in the rural areas. The plans that the individual ministries did have were aimed at staffing separate programs in various technical fields from the national to the village levels, a projection which bore little technical feasibility and less possibility financially of ever being implemented. Whereas, for example, the Ministry of Health might have had a curative health center operating in one geographic area, technical, budgetary, and staffing considerations rendered its possibilities of repeatability for its character and kind of operation across the country virtually nil. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture with 17 Agricultural Extension Agents stationed on the Altiplano, where resides over half the rural population of the country, by the nature of their operations, were engaging only approximately 10% of the population with little penetration in-depth of even this fraction, and by the nature of program structuring and the methods and techniques being used, even if there had been significant increases in personnel--exclusive of the necessary inter-relatedness of health and education work--such did not stand to improve the means for reaching and involving the campesinos in the development process.

Problems of over-lapping and duplication in ministry program efforts, without adequate human and financial resources for carrying out basic programs, further complicated the situation. Furthermore, of the trained human resources available, most, of the elite minority, were stationed in the larger cities and were not generally interested in being transferred to live and work in the rural areas. Also, as previously noted, in the years since the revolution, in addition to the new type of campesino patron who had arisen in the syndicatos, a new paternalistic feature had also arisen whereby certain individuals (both elite and Cholo elements especially) had come to make a profession in seeking "handouts" from government, especially from the A.I.D. agencies, in La Paz in order to attain various types of control over peasants in numerous geographic areas. Aside from the graft involved in such operations, this development, reinforced centralization in La Paz, did not lend itself to establishment of an authentic institutional development structure between people and government, and in basic respects facilitated the continuing political manipulation of peasants by persons little identified with their interests. Basically, in many respects, such operations by-passed government of Bolivia agencies in that A.I.D. controlled and directly disbursed such funds.

Another serious complication was the role of U.S. military advisers and Bolivian right-wing army officers, the latter of whom were directly employed by the A.I.D. Mission in the Rural Development Division, who were engaged in the previously-noted large scale "hand-out" program with few controls on the part of A.I.D. Known as a program of "Civic Action," designed to improve the image of the Bolivian military, as well as those of the U.S., in the eyes of the general populace by providing services, such as the use of heavy construction equipment, tools, and engineers, to assist civilians in carrying out development projects which the villagers would decide they wished to carry out, the program in reality had little identification with the type of Civic Action program outlined by the U.S. Congress for U.S.

assistance.<sup>43</sup> Civic Action was, as far as the campesinos were concerned, essentially an imposed program, which was one of the prime contributing factors to the very large number of projects that had been commenced and remained uncompleted. There was also evidence of extensive utilization of this program by extreme right-wing Bolivian army officers--on the A.I.D. payroll--for political purposes.

The operations of the Civic Action program were tied in with widespread misuse and abuse in the utilization of U.S. food commodities in the Food for Peace aspects of the program. Such activities were inter-woven throughout the fabric of Bolivian government agencies concerned with development, the A.I.D. development branches, other international agencies, various church organizations, and other public and private organizations, as well as with a number of private individuals--all of which constituted an intensely complicated barrier to any basic change in the developmental status quo, not only among the populace, but among the agencies concerned with carrying out developmental activities, as well.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Of an approximate total U.S. input into Bolivia in 1964 of \$50 million, it is estimated that military assistance accounted for approximately \$17 million. However, it should be noted that project funds for Civic Action came from A.I.D., not from military funds.

<sup>44</sup> It might be noted that this situation bore certain sinister aspects as well. Upon the arrival of the Community Development Specialist, a Bolivian military officer, one of the last-ditch leaders of the right in the Revolution of 1952, who had been restored as an Army officer with the resuscitation of the military, and who was as well employed within the A.I.D. program where he was in reality in charge of the Civic Action Program, had just completed writing a handbook on development and had had it printed with A.I.D. funds for widespread distribution. This work was actually a primer on fascism; and upon the suggestion that a copy be translated and sent to the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Mission Director, who had not seen the volume previously, ordered all copies destroyed. This military official, who was later to attempt to have both the A.I.D. Director and the U.S. Ambassador declared personae non gratae, stated that it did not matter that the U.S. Mission upon the advice of the CD Specialist was cutting off funds to Civic Action until it completed the projects it had commenced and accounted for its expenditure of funds, that he had been informed that the U.S. Pentagon was with the next fiscal year going to make available the sum of \$1 million for continuance of the Civic Action Program, and that he would not have to depend any longer on A.I.D. This official who was popular with certain officials of the U.S. military in Bolivia and with certain A.I.D. officials as well, was to continue on the A.I.D. payroll until the overthrow of the Paz regime, a plot in which he was a ringleader, and after which he became Minister of Economy, having the Civic Action program, on the Bolivian government side, transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Economy, where he subsequently changed the name of the Program, as shall be discussed in more detail presently.

Although approval of the original Community Development Project Agreement (signed with La Direccion Nacional, which had been transferred from Campefino Affairs to Agriculture) was to be subjected to delays in the A.I.D. Rural Development Division and was not approved or funded until March, 1965, the Program was actually gotten underway in January of that year when meetings were commenced with various groups of Bolivians, Americans, and various other nationalities, from government ministries and agencies, various education institutions, the Peace Corps and from private life--both from the cities and the rural areas for discussions concerning the needs for, and the possibilities of, establishing a National Community Development Program. These discussions were based on the feasibility study that had been carried out the previous summer. The group, composed of interested persons from many walks of life, came to center itself on a prime common interest which promptly developed in the discussions: how to develop and establish a means for reaching and involving the campesinos on a national basis in efforts to help themselves and at the same time and by using such local interest and action to provide the government with the institutional and organizational means for integrating the campesinos into the national life of the country--on their own terms and providing the means for increasing local decision-making concerning development.

After several weeks of intensive seminars, during which time the group grew to a total of about 60 persons, a great deal of the time of which was given to study of the field of Community Development, the group organized itself into two major sub-committees and began field survey work in three provinces on the Altiplano.

Several crucial determinations were made in these early seminars. First, the group had decided that in order to establish lines of communication between campesino and government would require the full-time services of a campesino, himself, to be chosen by the campesinos of the geographic area in which he would serve, that no technician or other official of the elite minority could serve effectively in such a position, that it would take a campesino "elected" by the campesinos, themselves, as their "representative" in the program, who would be paid a salary--minimum though it should be--by the government. This new campesino official would serve as a means to "bridge the gap," to promote dialogue and development action between government technical services and the campesinos.

While the field survey work was being carried out in the three provinces of the Altiplano, the other major sub-committee of the group commenced preparation of a Village Level Worker Training Curriculum in La Paz. And in the meantime, a Community Development office (the work had been commenced in the A.I.D. Agriculture building) had been created in La Direccion Nacional, and the group--now of approximately 80 persons participating (either on loan from other agencies or volunteers)--had moved to La Direccion Nacional. Some vehicles had been obtained from U.S. Army surplus as well as some funding for gasoline and maintenance from old project balances in the Mission for use in carrying out the surveys on the Altiplano. Rural Development/A.I.D. instructions concerning the move of the Community Development Program to La Direccion Nacional was for Community Development to force the return of all agricultural personnel employed by La Direccion Nacional to the Ministry

of Agriculture proper. It will be recalled that La Direccion had been transferred from the Ministry of Campesino Affairs to the Ministry of Agriculture where it remained a semi-autonomous agency under the control of the Minister of Agriculture. A.I.D. now instituted negotiations aimed at having La Direccion abolished.

It was during the time of the work of this original group for establishment of the CD Program that the Bolivian military establishment overthrew the Paz regime.<sup>45</sup> As has been noted previously, it was the policy of the U.S. Government to continue support of the Paz regime.<sup>46</sup>

Paz, of course, had been briefed on the CD Program Plan and had approved it, as he did many other plans during this period. However, it was not thought desirable to seek political identification of the CD Program at this stage of its development with any political party--all that was sought was identification with the campesinos, and to the extent necessary with the government technical services to assure their provision and coordination, and to put the CD process into operation on as broad a local base as possible as rapidly as possible.<sup>47</sup>

It should be inserted here that the U.S. military disclaimed any knowledge of the plot to overthrow Paz, although Paz stated that he had informed the U.S. Ambassador of his knowledge of the plot and had sought advice concerning the wisdom of whether he should arrest the Bolivian head of Civic Action--on the A.I.D. payroll.<sup>48</sup> In any event, the U.S. military and the Bolivian head of Civic Action and his followers were to constitute a serious obstacle to establishment of the National CD Program in Bolivia. The head of Civic Action, of course, did not believe in a program aimed essentially at the social, economic, and political development of the campesino; he made this view continually known in all quarters as he repeatedly attempted to undercut the program even before it could be commenced.

<sup>45</sup> It might be noted that top-level officials of the U. S. Embassy had been advised by A.I.D. field specialists of indications of this possibility.

<sup>46</sup> This fact was also evident in Bolivia, where to an uncommon extent for a period of time approaching the elections, both the U. S. Ambassador and the A.I.D. Director, and other officials accompanied Paz and other officials of his regime on tours of the country which were little disguised as being what they were, political campaign trips.

<sup>47</sup> Nonetheless, during his last trips to the Altiplano, Paz explained the CD Program Plan to the campesinos and vigorously supported the idea in his speeches.

<sup>48</sup> Paz was to insist after his ousting that it was a plot carried out with the knowledge and support of the U.S. military. There is no question that the overthrow took the U.S. Embassy by surprise; such is especially confounding when the U.S. military was responsible for advising those army units which participated in the coup.

Upon the disposition of the Paz regime, the Bolivian head of Civic Action, as previously noted, became Minister of Economy and, contrary to the provisions of the U.S. Agreement concerning Civic Action, attempted to move that program from the Ministry of Defense with him to the Ministry of Economy. He did succeed in moving his staff both from Defense and from A.I.D. to Economy where, as has been noted, he somewhat incongruously changed the name from Civic Action to "Social and Human Development."<sup>49</sup> He then intensified his efforts to take over the nascent CD Program, which he was to persist in attempting until he became Ambassador to the U.S.

Upon the departure of the Bolivian head of Civic Action to the U.S., the CD Program was able to obtain the services of two U.S. Army Engineers from Civic Action to begin the work of bringing not only U.S. but Bolivian military resources and services to bear in support of, and in response to, the wishes of growing civic organization and development action by the campesinos which by that time was underway on the Altiplano.<sup>50</sup>

With the ousting of the Paz regime, La Direccion Nacional, as well as all other important government agencies, was placed under the direction of military officers. Undoubtedly the enthusiasm and fast-paced work momentum of the CD group had a great deal to do with the eventual strong support and leadership the military officers eventually came to provide the new Program--so strong as to be the determining factor concerning possibilities of survival of the Program later in crucial program negotiations.

The field survey teams with detailed explanation of the idea of the Program in large group meetings with campesinos, found a broadly strong response, especially to the idea of its being their program, that its success or failure rested with them, that accomplishment of program objectives depended on them, and a vigorous and authentic community interest and participation in the selection of candidates for training as Village Level Workers to serve as their representatives in the Program.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup>Subsequent to which, the U.S. Military was to continue its "Civic Action" program in Defense with continuing direct working relationships with the Bolivian military officer's "Social and Human Development" program in Economy.

<sup>50</sup>These two U.S. Army officers, called in especially from the Panama Headquarters for Latin America, were to become important bulwarks of the CD Program; they were later to propose the incorporation of Civic Action in its entirety into the structure of the CD Program.

<sup>51</sup>Real campesino distrust of government cannot be overemphasized; they had of course been made many promises previously. The "line" of the teams was not based on promises: the campesinos especially responded to the proposition that it was to be their program and its real results rested in what they, themselves, decided upon and did. It is not within the scope of this paper to treat of the different types of Indian communities

Many communities joined together to volunteer to labor to build a training center (an agricultural experiment station was to be renovated for use as the first training center, as such was a part of the plan to render these installations responsive to development needs); many communities offered to supply the person elected from their area with food during the time of his course of study.

In short, the response of the campesino in the first three provinces was beyond the expectations of even the more optimistic members of the survey teams. This response, which truly shocked some members of the teams, most of whom were themselves members of the elite, was to continue to mount rapidly as the program developed in the three provinces and came to be launched in others.

A total of 44 VLW trainees were finally selected and entered training in April, 1965, one month after signing of the CD Project Agreement.


The first class of 40 Village Level Workers completed training on August 2, 1965, and the next day returned to their villages for the commencement of regular CD field operations where in the three provinces they came to engage approximately 237,573 persons in 365 communities or approximately 7.1% of the total rural population of Bolivia. They were serviced by the establishment of two Area Operations Offices for the purpose of providing technical assistance from the Ministries to the self-help efforts of the campesinos. With the commencement of field operations the organization of the Community Development Division was as follows: (see following chart). Peace Corps counterparts to the VLWs and Area Operations personnel were to join them in the field shortly thereafter.

While the first group of VLW recruits were under training on the Altiplano, field survey teams for the selection of candidates by the communities of the Cochabamba Valley had been gotten underway. Of more than 170 candidates proposed by the communities of ten provinces of that area, a total of 70 were finally selected for training; and while this work was underway the facilities of the La Direccion Nacional de Desarrollo Rural Base in the Cochabamba Valley were renovated for use as a CD Training Center in that area. The 70 VLW candidates entered training there on August 16, 1965, and completed their training February 15, 1966, after which they were posted in ten provinces of the Valley, engaging approximately 700,733 persons in 465 communities or approximately 12.1% of the total rural population. They were serviced by the establishment of three Area Operations Offices.

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in Bolivia--from pure Inca to those controlled and dominated by government agents; suffice it to note here that the campesinos of rural Bolivia in general have their devices and techniques to keep the elite minority and "gringos" "out" of the sensitive areas of their real involvement and sense of meaning whenever such is considered necessary to their protection and welfare.

# ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION



In late December, 1965, 100 VLW candidates from five additional provinces on the Altiplano were selected by the communities of those areas and entered training at another Rural Development Base on the Altiplano on January 15; they graduated in June, 1966, and were posted to the field that month engaging approximately 365,870 persons in 764 communities, or approximately 10.9% of the total rural population of the country. Therefore as of June, 1966, the CD Program was engaging roughly 1,004,176 persons in approximately 1,394 communities or about 30.1% of the total rural population of the country.

This programming completed in a little more than one year was rushed in the hopes that by getting a large enough institutional base at the local level, the Program would be able to take on the enormous challenge that was approaching, which might well determine the life or death of the Program: the battle for reorganization and institutional reform at the National level aimed at the coordination and integration of development efforts and improvement of government administration in the rural areas, for economic and technical feasibility of programming and staffing and operations, and to insure more adequate technical support from the various ministries and agencies of the government to the CD process as the program expanded and whose technical needs were to become more crucial to maintenance of its momentum.

It is not within the scope of this paper to deal with the character and kinds of development projects initiated by the campesinos during the first year of field operations of the Program. It should be noted that during the five months from August 3, 1965, when the first group of 40 VLWs reached the first three provinces, through December 31, 1965, campesinos launched a total of 83 projects which entailed local contributions of money, local building materials, and labor, which were equivalent in value in cash and/or in-kind of \$50,000, in those three provinces alone.<sup>52</sup> For these 83 projects launched where there were trained VLWs, the campesinos contributed a total of 90.51% of the total cost of these projects with the Community Development Program contributing the remaining 9.49% of the costs.

As has been mentioned, prior to the commencement of the CD Program, a number of projects of an imposed nature had been started by various agencies and for those which could not be completed by these agencies, the CD Program was assigned the responsibility for getting them completed.

Local self-help contributions were practically non-existent for these projects, but by organizing special CD field teams to go into the areas where the program was not yet functioning and explaining to the campesinos concerning these projects, local contributions were raised to 37.45% without any further government contributions being made. These, a total of 45, projects were completed. Also while VLWs were in training, with the government position being that all development activities in the rural areas could

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<sup>52</sup>Salaries for the 40 VLWs for the period totaled \$6,400.

not be halted waiting upon VLWs to reach the field, and in order to stop the widespread give-away operations, the CD Program undertook 39 other projects without field staff to which the campesinos contributed a total of 63.39%; however, these latter projects were actually more expensive than indicated in that they had to be supported by the small headquarters staff (purposefully kept small) which was strained continually beyond its resources in all of its work, being shifted continually to different areas in order to keep the program going and to prevent Weber's classic features of bureaucracy from being established in this phase of the program--being shifted to headquarters training of technicians from other ministries to be used in staffing Area Operations Offices, serving on the training staffs of the different field training centers for VLWs, working on the field surveys, keeping up with all three kinds of projects which were underway (a total of 162 during the first five months of the Program). In this way, all headquarters personnel learned all areas of work by doing it, all areas of work were kept "open" throughout the organization from the approval of projects through funding, implementation, and completion. Such helped to muster all program elements in support of the integrity of the program, and gave it a strong momentum, determination, defense, solidarity, and esprit de corps, including as well the VLWs and campesinos, during this period, which despite the many attacks made to thwart the program or take it over for political purposes, was to provide one of the soundest supports of the program it had.

In January, 1966, the Rural Development Division of A.I.D. had its way; utilizing great financial pressure, it had President Ovando (who had taken over the reigns of the military junta to permit Barrientos to run legally for the presidency) promulgate by Supreme Decree the reorganization of Bolivia's rural development program, abolishing La Direccion Nacional and establishing organization along lines which gave the Ministry of Agriculture virtual control of such--and basically oriented to a return to the previous uncoordinated, segmented approach to rural development. Community Development was faced with the irrational prospect of attempting to build up the means for such coordination at a level far below the ministerial level.

Except for the one requirement that all of the operational structure be under the Ministry of Agriculture, CD was allowed to contribute to fashioning the new institutional structure for the rural development program. This opportunity was used to secure incorporation of the organizational structure the CD Program already was building in the rural areas. As noted, the Decree put an end to La Direccion Nacional and its control for execution of the rural development program, calling for the transfer of all technicians (many of which had already been forced by A.I.D. through program budgetary controls), except those to be retained for liaison with the Colonization and CD programs, to the various technical ministries of the government (in order to ease this shock, A.I.D. Rural Development did not insist upon the immediate transfer of the remaining health and education specialists--although this was provided for by the Decree--only those from agriculture--in fact A.I.D. Rural Development officials who were making these decisions did not express much interest in what then was to happen to the health and education technicians). The prime result was that the integrated approach that had at least been built up to some extent in La Direccion had been broken, and the instrument most concerned with establishing the coordinated

and integrated approach, CD, had been placed under the Ministry of Agriculture. The remaining staff of La Direccion was to become a new Institute of Colonization and Community Development directly under Agriculture.


It is not possible to treat of the Colonization Program in this paper. In brief, that program in basic respects, with some exceptions in the Okinawian colonies--had become an excessively expensive, sprawled, and ineffective operation, and was considered a political liability by the Bolivian government. The CD Program, on the strong pressure of the Bolivian government (not A.I.D.) was requested to take over the colonization areas and establish regular CD field operations in them as promptly as possible.<sup>53</sup>

The following chart depicts the organizational structure of the rural development program as provided for by the Supreme Decree. One factor which does not show itself on the organizational chart, which has been noted, is that the Decree insured that the entire structure would be run by the Minister of Agriculture. The structure for effective functioning depends upon the technical Ministry of Agriculture coordinating the functions of the other technical ministries concerned with rural development, a most unlikely occurrence which, if it did develop, would be of questionable technical and administrative feasibility. As is to be expected, the Inter-Ministerial Council, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Agriculture, is weak, and in reality does not function.

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<sup>53</sup> It should be noted that this request complicated (due to the scarcity of trained staff) but did not stop the regular expansion of the Program as planned next to the Department of Chuquisaca. In addition the CD Program took elected VLW recruit trainees from three colonization areas for training with those from Chuquisaca, and until they could be trained and returned for work in those areas, established Area Operations Offices in those areas for ending paternalistic and fraudulent giveaway operations which had assisted the colonizers in the development of an attitude of belligerent demanding that everything, including the provision of food, schools, water supplies, tools, seeds, fertilizers, land-clearing service, etc., be done for them, which it had done in the planned, non-spontaneous colonization areas, since they were begun. The government was wary of political difficulties with the colonizers in that it no longer had the means at its disposal to continue giveaway operations, and the elaborate facilities and rusting equipment, as at the agriculture extension stations, were more than an embarrassment (such equipment was to be sold) in that rectification was required if further assistance was to be provided to these areas. Not only was the Colonization Program, itself, greatly in debt, but with an average grant investment averaging, for example in the Alto Beni area, more than \$5,000 per family, but the colonizers themselves were greatly in debt--all complicated by the fact that they did not want to do anything to help themselves and in general felt the government was obligated to look after them. This was perhaps as much due to the way the program was started, as it was to any basic fault of the colonizers, as persons from the same families were participating fully in self-help development activities in other areas of the country.

ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT



It is well to point out, however, that this organizational structure for the national level (and that for the regional, provincial, and village levels was of course what had been sought) was as adequate to the needs of CD as that preceding it had been.

The second stage of program need then became the establishment of adequate coordination of ministry and agency efforts at the national level, and this the CD Program then set out to do by signing Inter-ministerial agreements at the national level. This, of course, had to be accomplished through the Ministry of Agriculture, as CD was under that Ministry.

During the course of the first year of the Program's establishment and development, numerous and continuing conversations and negotiations had been held with representatives of the various ministries and agencies of the government and other public as well as private organizations for the purposes of technical assistance in the various fields of rural development for support of the CD Program. These negotiations had proven highly successful with numerous public and private agencies, volunteer, religious, and educational institutions and organizations.

In late May, 1966, the CD Program issued a status report, which pertaining to technical support for the Program read in part as follows:

A. Agriculture. Numerous discussions were held with the Director of the Agriculture Extension Service and other officials of that Ministry commencing as early as October, 1964. At the time of the commencement of the first class of VLW-recruits in April, 1965, these negotiations were intensified and the services of two persons from Agriculture Extension were obtained on temporary loan for the purpose of assisting in teaching the agricultural sections of the Curriculum to the VLWs. Upon graduation of this class of VLWs in August, 1965, negotiations were again undertaken with representatives of Agriculture Extension in an attempt to provide a means for systematizing regular support by Agriculture Extension of project proposals made by the campesinos to Area Operations Offices.

Although, as previously noted, such technical support in several geographic areas, when such services happen to be available at, or near, an Area Operations Office, has been highly cooperative on a volunteer basis, no definite organizational arrangements have yet been made to systematize the provision of Agriculture Extension services at the Area Operations level. The problem here does not appear to be primarily one at the field level, as many field agents are willing, despite lack of instruction from the national level, to cooperate in providing technical services to self-help, locally initiated project proposals.

In recent weeks, the Director of the CD Program has met with the Director of the Agriculture Extension Service in an attempt to develop more adequate organizational arrangements

in these respects in view of the expanding needs of the CD Program. Until recently the only progress he had made concerning this matter was the proposition by the Director of Agriculture Extension that the provision of such assistance would be considered if CD would agree to pay Agriculture Extension for each project for which it provided technical assistance to campesinos. However, on May 6, following discussions with the Minister of Agriculture and with the Director of Agriculture Extension, the Director of CD and the CD Advisor met with the Director of Agriculture Extension, and the Director of Agriculture Extension readily agreed to provide the services of an Agriculture Extension Agent at each Area Operations Office currently scheduled.

The agreement of the Director of Agriculture Extension is, indeed, a major step forward towards the effective mounting of the entire rural development program, as--of the much more widely diversified types of projects that campesinos are now proposing and for which they are willing to pay--an increasingly significant number are agricultural. However, this verbal agreement does not obviate the need to formalize such an institutional arrangement for the provision of technical services at the Area Operations level as well as for provision of the agricultural features of training of the CD Program. And, it appears that the opportunity for formalizing such arrangements now exists. One of the ways in which CD has sought to demonstrate the values and benefits to be derived by all from such collaboration is its full and continuing support of the presently-underway sheep-shearing training courses on the Altiplano which is being supported at all levels by the CD Program.

In June, the Minister of Agriculture announced that the CD Program would be the "major, institutional, operational development area" upon which he would "build and carry out the development of the rural areas of the country." Shortly thereafter a formal agreement was signed by Agriculture Extension and the CD Program providing that the former would continually provide agricultural extension services at each Area Operations Office established by the CD program, such specialists to work with, and through, the multi-purpose VLWs.

The CD Program then directed efforts towards obtaining such formal agreements with the Ministries of Health and Campesino Affairs, which still remained responsible for education in the rural areas.

In the same May status report, sections pertaining to these technical services read in part as follows:

B. Health. Preliminary negotiations were commenced with representatives of the Ministry of Health in August, 1965, for the purposes of training and obtaining the services of eleven Health-Education-Sanitarians at the Area Operations level as of June, 1966. A ready response was found in the Ministry of Health, and Mrs. Joy de Leon, then an employee of the World Health Organization, undertook the task of technical

liaison between the CD Program and the Ministry of Health for the purposes of developing this source of technical assistance which does not exist in the field. A proposed project agreement was drafted, discussed with, and agreed to, by the Ministry of Health officials. Of a first year total cost of the equivalent of \$11,000, for execution of this proposed agreement, the Ministry of Health agreed to pay the equivalent of \$6,000.<sup>54</sup>

With the integration of the CD Program into the ex-La Direccion for the creation of the new Rural CD Division of the Institute, the previous record of competition with, and duplication of, Ministerial functions by ex-La Direccion and the reluctance of ex-La Direccion personnel then in authoritative positions in the CD Division, resulted in the temporary breakdown of negotiations for consummation of the proposed agreement.

A number of discussions have recently been held by the Director of the CD Program with representatives of the Ministry of Health concerning this and other matters. In the meantime, the draft of the proposed project agreement between the CD Division of the Institute and the Ministry of Health has been cleared through the Program Office of the USAID and transmitted by the Director of the CD Program to the Ministry of Health for consummation.

(This agreement was consummated the following month, June, 1966.)

C. Education--Literacy. In August, 1965, negotiations were commenced with representatives of the Ministry of Asuntos Campesinos for the purposes of the training and providing of the services of eleven Education--Literacy Specialists which would be required as of June, 1966. Representatives of the Ministry of Asuntos Campesinos, which had recently launched a national literacy campaign, without one literacy specialist stationed in the field, were especially responsive to the proposed plan of action. They wished to take the matter up with the Minister of Asuntos Campesinos immediately and to consummate the agreement promptly. As the proposed agreement envisioned implementation in January, 1966, and required new funding, the proposed agreement was then held in abeyance.<sup>55</sup> However, it should be stated that with the source of literacy and textbooks available to the CD Program, the training of VLWs in literacy, the numerous self-help

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<sup>54</sup>This proposal was initially blocked by A.I.D. agriculture, in the A.I.D. Program Office.

<sup>55</sup>As a result of being stalled in the A.I.D. Program Office by A.I.D. Agriculture.

school construction and equipping projects now being undertaken, and with the availability of personnel at the Area Operations level who can substitute in literacy supervision, a great deal of successful work in education and literacy is taking place in areas where the CD Program is operational. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not contribute to the proper institutionalization of the Program and steps should be taken to rectify it as soon as funding determinations have been made and the proposed health agreement has been consummated.

Indications from Bolivia in 1967 and 1968 were that pressures had developed within the Bolivian government to move the CD Program out from under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, and any other technical Ministry, either to a special office of CD, or Ministry of CD, to operate directly out of the President's office, with the President as Chairman of a National Coordinating Committee for Rural Development and the Director of the CD Program as Executive Secretary, and the Ministers of Health, Education, Campesino Affairs, Agriculture, Planning,<sup>56</sup> and Roads, as members.<sup>57</sup>

If possible, there should be no rush to this. Such should be done, however, prior to commencement of the third phase of the program, that is, beginning the horizontal integration of the field organization of the CD Program with the organs of local government (now unitary, appointed, with all power orientation upward) to render them representative of the people. When such is done, every effort should be made to convince the President of the idea that the best political use he can make of the program is not, for example, to interfere with established procedures for approving projects, but rather to let it continue to function with integrity, and lend his efforts to insuring the coordination and integration of technical services concerned for back-stopping the CD process, thus getting such know-how out of the cities onto the land (Area Operations Offices), to the villages where the problems are, where such services are projected into a developmental process with the people who have the decision-making authority adequate to reorienting the technician's performance to meeting the needs

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<sup>56</sup>It is not within the scope of this paper to treat of the significant relationship that came to exist between the Ministry of Planning and the CD Program; suffice it to say that it was not typical of such relationships that are generally found in the traditional society where "narrow economic development dimensions" given to "imposed" projects often prevails in planning agencies.

<sup>57</sup>Four days after he took office, Barrientos had asked for conferences with CD officials concerning the Program being moved to his office who explained fully and in depth why such a move was considered, aside from the "politics" of the matter, premature. Barrientos accepted this explanation at the time.

as expressed by the people.<sup>58</sup> This phase two should be well advanced with a broad local institutional base (phase one) prior to commencement of phase three which should concurrently involve commencement of work on development of local autonomy legislation.

### Conclusions

The preceding narrative is intended to indicate some of the more salient problems pertaining to organization and administration encountered in the initiation and establishment of the National Community Development Program in Bolivia, and through such narration, to indicate value judgments made, and courses of action taken, in an attempt to, if not solve, at least face and deal with those problems as adequately as possible under the circumstances. No particular success is pretended or claimed concerning many of these problems. This work actually involved two different worlds--one exciting and most meaningful that existed in rural Bolivia with the Bolivians and Americans who were working with the program both in government and in the cities and villages; and the other one, somewhat detached from that world, that existed in a somewhat saddening way in the "bureaucratic" world of A.I.D. in La Paz. The writer is fully aware of certain procedures which are considered to be sound in public administration which he consciously violated repeatedly (for no other reason than he did not see any other reputable course of action under the circumstances), and he is also aware that the CD Program in Bolivia is not yet institutionalized,<sup>59</sup> and faces many serious hurdles, with very real questions as to possibilities of its "authentic" survival. Nevertheless, perhaps there are some lessons to be gleaned from the experience, and perhaps even if the program is organizationally eventually killed, it is fairly certain that its ideas will not be killed with the campesinos, nor with large numbers of the elite.

Community Development is, of course, an integrated social, economic, administrative, and political development process, and necessarily so. Attempts to analyze its effects in any one of the other areas, prove inadequate in many respects. For example, in this paper, administrative and organizational problems, it is believed, might have taken on more perspective, had space permitted more treatment of economic and political development components of the Program. It appears that this factor might have pertinence to programming public administration work in lesser developed areas.

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<sup>58</sup> For example, each Project Completion Report made by the campesinos, a copy of which goes to National CD Headquarters, contains a statement on the performance of the technician involved in the project. As systematic reviews came to be made at higher program levels of such reports technicians of the elite became increasingly interested in the evaluations of their work that came to be made by the campesinos.

<sup>59</sup> For example, for political reasons, and for the first time in the history of CD Programs as far as this writer knows, the Embassy requested that within one year the Program be made ready for complete transfer to Bolivian control--an unusually difficult request to meet, but which was met.

In that A.I.D./W and Rural Development/A.I.D./La Paz (as well as other echelons in the A.I.D. hierarchy in La Paz), under which the CD Program had to function, did not offer much assistance to the CD effort, but rather in many respects presented highly serious obstacles, traditional public administration concepts pertaining to hierarchy, the traditional concepts of rationalization, as well as personnel sanctions were regretfully (but in view of what possibilities for getting the program underway were) either ignored or by-passed although a continual effort was made to accommodate the short-sighted, expedient demands continually made by these structures without crippling the Program.

Within the CD Program organization, itself, the traditional concepts of hierarchy, specialization, and rationalization were deliberately avoided in the initial stages of the Program for a number of reasons: to prevent conventional and prevailing organizational and administrative practices and procedures and routines from being utilized, to promote the development of an "open" organization with a high degree of momentum, to avoid any onset of graft or corruption in program operations, and to insure a strong adherence to openly promulgated program principles and project procedures (including continual statements of all expenditures with their purposes) so that all--campesinos, CD personnel, other ministry and agency personnel, the general public, volunteer organizations, and A.I.D. employees, etc.--would know exactly what was not only happening but what was expected of them and each of the others in carrying out the Program, with a resulting built-in series of checks to attempt to insure this; and to insure that all major decisions were known and that all major efforts of the new organization remained oriented and directed towards attainment of the goals of the program.

First, the essential organizational approach of the Program was predicated on the idea that to have utilized traditional public administration concepts would have made certain there would have been no CD Program, that it would not have "gotten off the ground." Secondly, it was predicated on the idea that to have "taken on" the problem of administrative organization, coordination, reform, and improvement at the national level at the onset in terms of a program that did not yet exist in the field would have insured that certain "prices" would have had to be paid which would negate possibilities for the emergence of a program of any integrity in its operation--in other words being trapped within the traditional administrative status quo. And "integrity" of operations of the Program in the field and at each of the other levels was considered (perhaps oddly so at first glance on the part of many parties) potentially the most prime possibility for insuring any success for establishment and growth of the Program, as such. In other words, the conventional "paper" battles concerning organization and administration at the national level were bypassed in initial phases of the program except to the point of being able to insure the provision of a cadre of trained and reliable persons at that level to set about the task of developing a large enough institutional base, "program clientele," outside the program, itself, at the "grass roots" level of the country, with the campesinos, to insure adequate leverage--not only in project accomplishments but in locally promoted emerging pressure, responsible pressure, on the administrative world at the national level--to provide the program with enough support to be able to face such problems of integration and coordination of efforts with any hope of success.

In short, the task of administrative reform and improvement at the national level, so crucial to the success of the Program, was bypassed in order to create an as broadly-based as possible system of support in the "production-line arena" of the program, itself, i.e., at the local level with the campesinos.

The dilemma posed here was that the larger the local base became, the more technical assistance was required, and the more technical assistance was required, the more coordination and integration of efforts were required at the national level--such could only be met with extremely careful and highly flexible timing.

It might be noted that such an approach did not permit any basic compromises in the operation of the program, itself; and although after the Program came to prove itself in the field, it could become available to requests for its commencement in certain areas troublesome to the government (the Colonization areas, for example, in addition to maintaining its planned geographic expansion), once the basic approach and course of action was set upon, it did not permit any turning back. It should be added of course that open opposition to the Program at the national level receded in most cases (with the exception of Rural Development/A.I.D.) at a rate somewhat commensurate with the Program proving its validity and development success in the rural areas.

The Program, therefore, was fundamentally dependent upon the success it, itself, had to accomplish in "reaching and effectively involving the campesinos" in development efforts to help themselves. The experience in Bolivia well indicates that if CD principles, methods, techniques, and procedures are adhered to in all phases of field operations (from training, to supervision, to project planning, implementation, and completion, to and through successive aspects of the project cycle in villages), people of traditional societies, no matter how great they have become "institutionalized in their disinheritance," no matter how much they have been mistreated by "outsiders," and no matter how much distrust and suspicion they may hold for "government," can be, indeed, "reached" and can be effectively "involved" in development matters affecting their own destiny.<sup>60</sup> In short, the campesinos provided support to the Program without which the Program could not have been.

It is perhaps also significant to point out that in overall measure, the problems that the CD Program faced in Bolivia were due in large measure to U.S.A.I.D. program organization and development approaches and not primarily

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<sup>60</sup> It might be noted that it was not necessary to utilize campesino support for the program to any degree such as was possible when the program faced phase two of the plan; in fact at times in response to government requests CD personnel participated in meetings with campesinos to explain that no stronger actions of support, other than making the Program, were required as the government was providing the support required at the time or concerning a particular Community Development principle.

to either organizational and administrative problems or physical project and development activity problems (which of course were to be expected and for which CD was designed to deal) encountered in Bolivian society. In fact, second to the campesinos, Bolivian government officials (and of the "elite") came to be one of the strongest sources of support for the program, including especially the Minister of Agriculture, who on numerous occasions prevented the mortal crippling of the program, many times over the objections of the A.I.D./Rural Development Chief, and on two notable occasions over the objections of the Peace Corps Director and the A.I.D. Director.

The End-of-Tour Report of the first CD Advisor to the Program, issued in June, 1966, in its conclusions read in part as follows:

This report has not emphasized the many accomplishments made by the CD Program during its initial state of existence nor has it depicted the many obstacles and problems that have been overcome since its inception; rather it has centered basically on current problems. Accomplishments have been significant, and in this sense this report is not completely representative of the overall situation pertaining to CD in Bolivia. For example, less than a year ago little was known of CD in Bolivia. Now CD is recognized policy of the GOB as provided for in the Supreme Decree for reorganization of its approach to rural development.

It might be noted that the problems to be anticipated in the establishment of a CD Program in any traditional society have not been unduly difficult in Bolivia. CD is highly appropriate to Bolivian development needs. The major difficulties encountered have been those over which CD had no control. For example, the necessity of its creation and establishment within an organization supported by numerous international agencies with very appreciable funding, all geared to a ten-year plan, and with a large, sprawling, yet intricately meshed, bureaucracy which for its continued existence regarded CD as a threat in view of the A.I.D. policy that La Direccion Nacional de Desarrollo Rural would be discontinued and its specialized technicians transferred to other Ministries and Agencies of the GOB with the reorganization. CD is of the view that this matter could have been approached in a much more constructive and beneficial development manner. Fortunate it is that some of the Program's strongest support now comes from ex-La Direccion Nacional personnel. In other words, these problems had to be dealt with in order to, and in the meanwhile, get at the heart of the work to be done--to mount the CD Program. (CD could have been killed off under orders of, and fighting a battle designed by, A.I.D./Rural Development, against La Direccion Nacional.)

The basic objective was the establishment of the CD process in the rural areas of the country and the gradual establishment of the means whereby government efficiency could be increased in providing services to its people, and responsible government

based upon "grass roots" and representative institutions of the people can emerge. Such, of course, takes time, and the CD Program is in its infancy. Yet basic progress has been, and is being made in these respects.

There is no question that CD will work in Bolivia; it is working, but there is also no question that it could still be quickly ruined. As the success of the CD Program in its initial stages has become increasingly apparent, so the interests of various organizations associated with scattered and widely diversified approaches to rural development have intensified to either take control of the program and utilize it for various purposes or to join it. Such developments are not to be unexpected. It should be pointed out, however, that the Program is not yet sufficiently strong for authentically proper political utilization; however, if the Program continues at its present rate of development that result will be obtainable.

Real skill, art, education, and well-considered timing must be utilized in accomodating and paving the way for the proper and full participation of other organizations, in addition to the many already working with the Program, else the CD Program in various and even conflicting accommodations might well be absorbed into traditional Bolivian development patterns and thereby lose its validity and potential for Bolivia before sufficient time has elapsed for the process to become fully established. It should be stated that progress has been made and is being made in this area and this should be pursued, but it should not be pushed nor rushed at the cost of the proper mounting and institutionalization of the Program. Such especially applies to organizations, including Civic Action, which have conventionally sought to impose development decisions on campesinos.

The momentum of the CD Program remains strong, not only with the campesinos and VLWs in the field, but with CD Headquarters and Area Operations personnel. The reorientation of the myriad of organizations, institutions, and agencies concerned with rural development in Bolivia, of course, takes time and persistence, but this transition is now definitely underway.

In the opinion of this Advisor, the present period constitutes one of the more crucial ones to the institutionalization and effective establishment of the CD Program. It is a time when some of the heaviest demands will be made on crucial resources of the Program--and all at a time when those responsible for carrying out the Program are engaged in learning what the Program is and how it operates amid many pressures aimed at diverting the Program to other approaches to development.

It is recommended that the U.S.A.I.D. continue with full support of the Program. In summary, the Program remains in basically sound condition; it is confronted with a number

of problems which complicate its continued progression but which it is believed can be overcome with persistence and timing, not necessarily time for time's sake. The next several months will be a real test and strain on all the resources of the Program, and its administrative efficiency and flexibility to meet varying operational requirements will have to be increased to keep pace with these requirements.

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS  
OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN GUYANA  
AS AN IMPERATIVE FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

by

Marjan Van Overbeek

Introduction. The purposes of this paper are to present the Guyana Community Development Programme as has been organized and practiced during the last five years.

Community Development in its rudimentary form was introduced in Guyana in 1944 as a program of the Social Welfare Division of the Guyana Government.<sup>1</sup> In 1954 a Rural Self-Help Plan was drawn under the Government Development Programme and applied in three Pilot Projects in distinct parts of the country.<sup>2</sup> During this period community development was attached to the Ministry of Education; the evaluation of this work shows a heavy emphasis on educational projects.<sup>3</sup> In order to promote this type of work in self-help projects the World Food Programme was introduced which provided food aid to the school projects.<sup>4</sup> However, although these efforts may have contributed to the establishment of the present form of community development\*, its

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<sup>1</sup>Country Statement For Guyana, Report for the Regional Training Workshop on Community Development and Local Government, 1968, (Unpublished Manuscript), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Theo L. Vaughn, Community Development in British Guiana: Annual Report on Pilot Projects at Golden Grove-Nabaclis, Crabwood Creek, Huis 't Dieren, 1957, Georgetown, British Guiana, 1957.

<sup>3</sup>British Guiana: Papers Relating to Development Planning, Vol. I, General Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare, 1947-1956; Vol. II, Reports of the Sub-Committees of the Main Development Committee of the Legislative Council, Georgetown; Legislative Council Paper No. 11/1948, 1948.

<sup>4</sup>World Food Programme Aided Self-Help School Extension Programme, Georgetown; Ministry of Education, Co-operatives, and Social Security, August, 1964.

\* Further in this paper the term 'community development' will be abbreviated to C.D.

true philosophy did not emerge until 1964 when the People's National Congress became the ruling party in the Government.<sup>5</sup> The basic ideology of the P.N.C. (People's National Congress) is identical with the community development ideology; the P.N.C. ideology is based on socialist-democratic principles: democracy implies autonomy at all levels of the society, and socialism means contributions from the grass-roots to national development. The Guyana development ideology is not intended to be an imitation of any other nation's political development aspiration, although it may draw upon elements of both democratic and socialist ideologies of other countries. In Guyana, as in many other small and developing countries, there is a great urge to create a national identity in order to cope with the internal development problems and with the international environment.<sup>6</sup> The political value system of the Guyanese people is pragmatic and courageous:

The truth is that the majority view is one resistant to domination of this country by any foreign power or ideology, be it from the East or West. The majority view is one that holds that Guyanese can only advance economically, politically and socially as Guyanese in their own right--not as Anglo, or American or worse still Russo-Guyanese.<sup>7</sup>

This value system emerged only after seven years (1957-1964) in which the country experienced political instability with declining attraction of foreign investment, with increasing fragmentation of the political culture among the people resulting in racial conflicts, and with an ever widening gap in the ratio between the birth rate and Gross National Product. Colonial England had left the country with a high rate of literacy (85 per cent of the people), with increased recognition of development, with a recognition of democratic values, but without the means to implement such values:

The British, while establishing a limited form of parliamentary democracy and an independent Judiciary, made no effort to educate the people politically.<sup>8</sup>

If the people were to build a nation of their own with a stronger economy, then a broader differentiation would be required. There were only two possible courses of action: one, the creation of an imposed structure

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<sup>5</sup>Our Achievements in Perspective, People's National Congress, Georgetown, Guyana Lithographic Co. Ltd., 1966.

<sup>6</sup>The Hon. S.S. Ramphal, C.M.G., Q.C., Building the Foundations, Lecture at the Carnegie Seminar on Diplomacy at the Institute of International Affairs, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, June 1967, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup>"The Majority View". Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy, 8.24.1969 (Criticism on an interview with Cheddi Jagan).


<sup>8</sup>Guyana, Two Years of Independence and Progress, Georgetown; Ministry of Information, May 1968, p. 5.

without the necessarily increasing opportunities for democratic socialization; or, two, the establishment of a democratic as well as inexpensive structure that could serve both the human development needs of the people and the economic needs of the country. The developing political ideology of the country, in the aftermath of the colonial period, did not give a solid basis for establishment and operation of such an imposed structure for purposes of development; neither did the technical and financial outlays required for such an imposed structure lend feasibility to such a course of action. Therefore the Government established in 1964 the present Community Development Programme in order to promote the first steps toward independent development, and at the same time a mechanism to improve structural differentiation and democratic socialization.<sup>9</sup> Conceptually there would emerge a continuing process of increased subsystem autonomy, based on the people's capabilities to mobilize their own resources, to handle their process of interest articulation, and to participate in the decision-making processes.<sup>10</sup> There exists a mass of unevaluated data in Guyana concerning these overall development features of the Community Development Programme. It is a pleasure to compile this material into a more integrated form and to present it with the hope that it will point out future opportunities and directions for Guyanese development as well as to bring the rich experiences of the Guyana Community Development Programme to a wider audience.

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<sup>9</sup>British Guiana (Guyana) Development Programme (1966-1972), Chapter VII, Community Development; Chapter IX, Co-operatives; Chapter X, Amerindians, Georgetown; The Government Printery, February 1966, p. iv.

<sup>10</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little and Brown, 1966 pp. 229-332.



Total population 700,000 (1968)  
 Area 83,000 sq. miles

## CHAPTER I

Guyana: Social, Economic, and Political Conditions.

Geographical Factors. Guyana, the only English speaking country on this continent, is located on the North Coast of South America, surrounded by Surinam, Brazil, and Venezuela. Geographically, Guyana belongs to the Latin American Continent. Culturally, politically, and economically it is part of the Caribbean (see map on page 1). Guyana has been associated with the Caribbean region because of its traditional relationship as a British West Indian colonial country. Today, it is still a member and an economic partner in the British Commonwealth along with other English speaking countries in the hemisphere.<sup>1</sup>

Guyana is in a transitional stage of development, moving from a traditional colonial system towards becoming a Cooperative Republic by 1970.

The population consists of approximately 720,000 people, living on an area of 83,000 square miles. The coastal area, much of which is below sea-level and diked, supports 90 per cent of the people, of which 30 per cent live in the urban areas of Georgetown and New Amsterdam. The interior, consisting of impenetrable jungles, mountains, and savannahs, has a great abundance of natural resources that are largely unused because of the lack of management and specialized technicians, and funds for exploration.

The Population and Population Growth.

The population in Guyana, as a result of historical events, is varied. The total population grew from 371,000 in 1945 to 718,000 in 1969.<sup>2</sup> The original residents, the Amerindians, today occupy mainly the interior of the country. Amerindian races are presently Carib, Arawak, and Warao (the last being immigrants from the Orinoco Delta). The Amerindian group forms 7.5 per cent of the 1961 population in Guyana.<sup>3</sup> Since Independence (May 26, 1966) the Amerindians have been strongly urged to participate in national development and decision-making processes. The largest Guyanese group at the present is the East Indian population (51.0%) which composes, with the Afro-Guyanese

<sup>1</sup>Best, "Economic Planning in Guyana", The Caribbean in Transition: Papers on Social, Political, and Economic Development, Second Caribbean Scholars' Conference, Mona, Jamaica, April 14-19, 1964, F. M. Andic and T. G. Mathews, eds., University of Puerto Rico, Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1965, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup>Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1967, Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1968, fig. 5.

<sup>3</sup>Rodriguez, "El Caribe en Cifras", The Caribbean in Transition: Papers on Social, Political, and Economic Development. Loc. cit., table 2.

group (31.0%), the majority of the population.<sup>4</sup> The Afro-Guyanese were imported in large numbers as slaves by the Dutch and British colonists as labor force on the large sugar estates and rice plantations during the 17th, the 18th, and the early 19th centuries. With the abolition of slavery in 1834, the freed Negro population was not anxious to remain in the agricultural areas, and the majority left the estates for a life in the cities. After 1834 the East-Indians were brought into the colonial West Indian Region as cheap labor force. Other minority groups in the Guyanese population are the Chinese, the Portugese, and the Europeans (13.9%).<sup>5</sup>

The inability of the two large population groups to integrate has been due to many painful historical struggles. The previous slaves, being free after 1834, created a state of rising expectations primarily with regard to city occupations and white collar jobs. The East-Indians, however, who came to the country as free people and who did not suffer the humiliation of slavery, remained in the agricultural areas. A minority went into small business, although the colonialists held both the basic economic and political power. Advanced education, agricultural production, and communications among the rural population increased this state of rising expectations and aspirations. The emerging demands of the Indians have been regarded as a visible demonstration of discriminative policies by the Negroes, and as such, have been used by political opposition within the country as well as by hostile neighboring countries.<sup>6</sup> The rapidly increasing population has been due mainly to better health conditions. There is a certain amount of contradiction about the population increase. On the one hand Guyana needs more people to exploit the natural resources and to create a healthy market for production and consumption; on the other hand, the increase does harm to the overall national development if the labor market and education do not develop simultaneously. The national GNP increases have been only 4%<sup>7</sup> while the birth rate increases have been over 3%. The annual population increase over the past years has decreased slightly while the GNP has improved.<sup>8</sup>

### Religion.

Along with the variety of races there is a great diversity in religions. The majority of the people belong to Christian churches (65.6%).

<sup>4</sup> John Macpherson, Caribbean Lands: A Geography of the West Indies, London; Longmans Press, 1963 (revised 1967), p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Nehemkis, Latin America: Myth and Reality, New York; New American Library, Mentor Book, 1966, pp. 18-19.

<sup>7</sup> Guyana: Two Years of Independence and Progress, pg. 9.

<sup>8</sup> Sources: Bank of Guyana Annual Report, 1968, table VIII-8 extracted. Statistical Abstracts of Latin America, 1967, table 74, extracted.

The Afro-Guyanese and Amerindians belong mainly to the Christian churches while the East-Indian population is predominantly Hindu and Moslem (34.4%).<sup>9</sup> The ethnic and religious differences in the Guyanese population are leading to a greater cultural fragmentation.

#### Economic Characteristics.

The economy of Guyana is still mainly agricultural. The coastal areas have been used for centuries for the rice and sugar industries. The interior has been given over to cattle-rearing in the south-west and north-west savannahs. Explorations for interior resources have begun, especially in mining and forestry. A large part of the present profits from agricultural production and bauxite mining, however, leaves the country, because the sugar estates and mining companies are primarily owned and controlled by British, American, and Canadian enterprises. The Guyana Government has hesitated to nationalize these industries because the country has only rudimentary forms of domestic management and technical specialists.

The rising expectations result in a greater demand for imported goods and has had consequently a negative effect on the import-export balance. In order to create incentives for new needs without losing the necessary equilibrium in trade, the Government is promoting domestically the "Buy Local" Campaign, whereas on the Caribbean regional level, the "Caribbean Free Trade Association" has been introduced in 1965 by Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham.

The recent political disturbances along with the population explosion have resulted in unemployment and underemployment problems. Aspects of unemployment and the efforts for solutions will be reviewed in later chapters.

#### Health and Education.

Improved health services have caused an increase in population during the last two decades. Many causes of death have and are being eliminated by means of actions against diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, enteric fever, bronchitis, dysentery, and nephritis.<sup>10</sup> Besides the struggle against diseases and infant mortality a large amount of money is being spent for preventive services. Maternity care, infant care, venereal disease control, sanitary inspections, and nutritional education are a few of these programs.

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
<sup>9</sup> Ibid., table 42.

<sup>10</sup> Guyana: You and Your Government, 1965-1967, Georgetown; Ministry of Information Publication, 1968, p. 36.

The 1947-1956 Development Programme estimated that \$535,000 (BW)\* would be spent for health programs.<sup>11</sup> This capital, however, could not cope with the increasing demands for better health and medical services. In 1969 the people of Georgetown raised \$500,000 (BW) for a specialized hospital in the capital which will be constructed in stages as a response to emergency situations.

In the 1966-1972 Development Programme another \$14 million (BW)\* will be allocated for the implementation of a pyramidal health and medical system.

HEALTH STRUCTURE.



Several of the improvement activities will be carried out with the assistance of the World Food Programme through the C.D. program.<sup>12</sup>

Mainly by means of self-help and C.D. programs the following health projects have been completed (1966):

- 51 Medical projects;
- 3 Hospitals;
- 32 Projects in pure water supply;
- 1 Ambulance station;
- 6 Medical outposts;
- Infant welfare clinics.

Currently 54 more projects are under construction.<sup>13</sup> Large scale health programs have been undertaken such as polio rehabilitation, vaccinations,

\* \$ BW is British West Indian Dollar = U.S. 50 cents.

<sup>11</sup> British Guiana: Papers Relating to Development Planning, loc. cit.

<sup>12</sup> Request to the U.N./F.A.O. World Food Programme for Assistance for Nutritional Improvement of the Inmates of Certain Hospitals in Guyana, Georgetown; Office of the Prime Minister, 1969.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

malaria eradication, and the establishment of x-ray units. Presently the Interior will be provided with medical outposts and dispensaries.<sup>14</sup>

In 1947 there were 225 primary schools with a total of 61,000 school places.<sup>15</sup> Other basic educational facilities are scarce. In 1963 the number of schools was increased from 225 to 340. However, in the same period the school population had doubled. In 1964 a self-help program started with assistance from the World Food Programme of the U.N./F.A.O., in order to create 8,000 additional school places.<sup>16</sup> For the period 1964-1974 another 52,000 school places are expected to be required. The capital expenditure on education has increased from 78,000 BW in 1950 to 3,000,000 in 1967-- an increase of 500%.<sup>17</sup> In 1967 with assistance from the World Food Programme, sixty self-help projects were completed and twenty-five were under construction.<sup>18</sup>

It is evident that self-help efforts alone cannot solve the education problem. The demand for well-trained and specialized teachers is becoming increasingly necessary. An even more important and related problem is to provide those who have had education with adequate jobs. The national economy must respond to the educated youth of the near future. Youth unemployment, especially in the urban centers, has risen to approximately 45 per cent, in the ages between 14-21 years.<sup>19</sup> A positive factor is that presently about 85 per cent of the population is literate, which increases the possibility for effective training and communications throughout the country.

#### Political Structure and Development.

After World War II, Guyana was guided by two Guyanese leaders under the supervision of the British Crown. The leaders were Cheddi Jagan (East Indian descent, educated as a dentist), and Forbes Burnham (Afro-Guyanese, educated as a barrister in law). In 1957 the People's Progressive Party (P.P.P.) of which Jagan and Burnham were the leaders, split on ideological grounds. Forbes Brunham founded the People's National Congress (P.N.C.). The ideology of the

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<sup>14</sup>British Guiana (Guyana) Development Programme (1966-1972), loc. cit.

<sup>15</sup>British Guiana: Papers Relating to Development Planning. Loc. cit.

<sup>16</sup>U.N./UNESCO/W.F.P. Project No. 71: Construction and Extension of Schoolbuildings, Georgetown; 1964.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. p. 6.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>19</sup>Report on a Survey of Manpower Requirements and the Labor Force, British Guiana; 1965, Vol. II.

P.N.C. is one of socialist-democratic values, whereas the P.P.P. adheres to the Marxist-Leninist dogma.<sup>20</sup>

Jagan governed Guyana from 1957 through 1964. During this period the country suffered seriously from internal wars, strikes, riots, and economic decline. Unrest and fear were characteristic of the nation at that time.<sup>21</sup> The political instability made England decide to delay the date of Guyana's independence.<sup>22</sup> In 1964 new elections were held on a proportional basis and Burnham, who had a greater support among the population, won and took office.<sup>23</sup> The 1964 Government was a coalition Government, with the minority political party the United Force (conservative). Finally, on May 26, 1966, independence was obtained.

The period following 1964 can be characterized as a time of laborious efforts to establish internal peace, political balance, and economic reliability. Guyana experienced a stabilizing policy of development with many praiseworthy achievements. The recent past, however, could not immediately be forgotten, either by Guyanese citizens or by outside observers. Although foreign financial inputs have contributed to the development of Guyana, foreign investment has not been as great as in other developing countries. The main part of the development achievements, therefore, has been due to the Guyanese people themselves. In an effort to become an independent nation with social and economic welfare without losing their identity as Guyanese citizens, Caribbean members, and as partners in the emerging Third World, they felt it necessary to undertake their own development.

In February 1970, Guyana became a Cooperative Republic. The results of community development and cooperative activities have initiated a high degree of participation and political motivation. Becoming a republic was regarded as a revolutionary change and the last step toward complete independence from Britain. Efforts and socialization programs to be described in later chapters indicate that government was aware that motivation processes had to precede the political change in becoming a cooperative republic. Recognition of this preparation phase of motivation is indicated by the following editorial comments:

In the history of the Caribbean, from discovery to independence, every moment originated from outside. This has left us with a heritage of thinking that no creative or constructive effort can originate from

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<sup>20</sup> Cheddi Jagan, "What The Future Holds for Guyana", World Marxist Review, Vol. XII, No. 10, October 1969, pp. 42-48.

<sup>21</sup> Tad Szulc, The Winds of Revolution: Latin America Today-and Tomorrow, New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, pp. 210-211.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>23</sup> Guyana: Two Years of Independence and Progress, p. 5.

inside the region. But independence has changed the trajectory of the origin of the movements.<sup>24</sup>

Information is regularly provided to the people about the physical and infra-structural consequences of the establishment of the republic.

The view has been expressed that Guyanese must efface all traces of the colonial mentality which still prevades the society and begin to stand on our own feet; but there should be an analysis of opinions of various communities and their capabilities of standing on their own feet.... It would be hypocritical to think that divisions do not exist among our people. The aim of a President must be to remove the divisions and unify the communities into one nation, and not appear one who takes a special side.... Will the republic be capitalist-socialist or socio-capitalist? It has been pointed out vaguely that the object of a "Cooperative Republic" is to accord the right to workers as a whole to participate actively in industry, such as by way of contribution of capital and the like and to avoid large capitalist-type enterprises holding the economy.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>"This Spiritual Revolution", Guyana Graphic, 9-11-1969.

<sup>25</sup>"The Pros and Cons of the Republic", Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy, August 24, 1969.

## CHAPTER II

Institutional Factors for National Development.

Community Development is an integrated function of the national development process. We will observe the means for motivation and the means of changing attitudes as a mechanism and a set of goals to achieve optimal development in various sectors of the economy, the political body, the social body, and the overall culture.

Structures for Differentiation and Communication.

The question now is how the increasing awareness and simultaneous demands for participation in decision-making, and the distribution of goods and services through a developing subsystem autonomy, take place. Improving functional role performance requires means of communication. C.D. in Guyana is regarded as the social infra-structure serving as the channel for the conversion of the political demanding process. In order to obtain good understanding of the process it is necessary to understand the structure that the process must operate through.

C.D. is not the only arena for demand and allocation of goods and services. A few forms of emerging private interest groups have been discussed. Three political parties are in operation. Further there are women's associations, youth organizations, business and trade groups. Occupation groups are arising throughout the country, educational systems are contributing to the socialization and mobilization processes, and the churches are creating strong interest groups.

Following the Guyana national ideology, the Government does not ignore these various interest groups. On the contrary, by demanding political commitment to the country's future as a republic, the distinctions among various interest groups will become sharper and more articulated. By creating a clearer political structure for the political process the immediate result will be the emergence of other interest groups.

Communications and communications media form an important institution for social, economic, and political development. In Guyana the main means of communication are newspapers and radio. Unlike many other developing nations the newspapers form an important contribution to the social development process, the people being largely educated and literate. The balance maintenance between the technological possibilities of mass media and the traditional aspects of the people's needs has been and still is a great concern for the Guyana Government who acts with great prudence in policy affairs regarding the subject of communications. Television has not been introduced yet, although discussions have started. Likewise in administrative affairs there are opportunities for bureaucratic procedures, whereas at the same time the informal face-to-face communications play an important role.

### Governmental Structures.

A specific means for system performance is the governmental structure. At first glance the Guyana case may seem confusing. The central government stresses the need for interest articulation; it creates new channels (C.D.) for these procedures and acts through these channels. At the same time the likely structure for the political process--the governmental structure--is bypassed. For eighteen years there have been no elections at local and district levels, whereas the systems of community development councils have become increasingly strong. This has been due to the motivation process and to allocated sub-system autonomy. The present central government is practicing its ideology by means of active policy. The P.N.C. party wants to practice the principles of its value system in Community Development, Self Help, and Co-operative Efforts. By these means the government believes the nation will become effective and democratic and will be able to function with differing interests in the organized structures. An imposed governmental structure would emotionally be related to the previous colonial system and would conflict with the existing political ideology. In the colonial era local governments had two basic functions: the extraction of taxes and the maintenance of order. A democratic government, however, demands and operates on the basis of the participation of the people in order to achieve the ideal of self-government rather than a "ruling elite governing the country." The immediate establishment of new local governments would hinder the emergence of freedom which was formerly inhibited. Plans are under construction to create a new governmental structure in the nearby future. The implementation, however, requires educational programs and geographical re-arrangements suggested in the Marshall-Proposals.<sup>1</sup> The important role C.D. can play in the emergence of strong local governments with a high degree of participation from the part of the people is discussed at the Caribbean Regional Conference on this subject:

Community Development, by promoting group-action and encouraging popular participation in local activities, facilitates the process of political development and the modernisation of the political culture. In this way, Community Development contributes to the development of the capabilities of "integration," "mobilisation" and "participation" in the local communities. The stage is thus set for the wholesome growth of local governments.<sup>2</sup>

### The Community Development Structure and Process.

A second reason for the C.D. emphasis in the development process is the educational aspect. At least in the initial stages when the people are not

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<sup>1</sup>Guyana: You and Your Government. Loc. cit., p. 39.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Report of the Caribbean Regional Training Workshop on Community Development and Local Government, Port of Spain; Trinidad and Tobago, 18th-30th March, 1968, p. 41.

yet familiar with new political processes and structures, they should not be forced into a pre-mature political commitment. C.D. is the essential mechanism to promote socialization and political recruitment without being too threatening or challenging. C.D. educates people in their ability to choose according to their beliefs. C.D. is not without political aspects: on the contrary, it is at its best the very heart of the political process. The basis, however, is a broad appeal to every member of a locality to improve the new right to participate in this process. Therefore C.D. itself cannot be committed to a particular choice if its task is to bring the people to commit themselves. The Guyana Government has recognized that the time for major efforts is now occurring. In November 1969 new elections for local governments were held, preceding the event in February 1970 when the nation became a republic. The C.D. task will not be completed after these elections. A higher degree of political differentiation and subsystem autonomy requires new concern about community improvement and education.

The Community Development process can be distinguished by a set of stages or steps:

1. A local community or group decides that it wants to improve itself. Usually the community is motivated regarding available resources and national goals, stated through the communications media and face-to-face contact with neighboring communities.
2. A community council is elected. A guideline for representation is provided by the central government. These guidelines provide for representation of all interest groups. The council bargains with the local government, with the District Community Development Officer, and with its own hinterland. Other groups in the community who express the desire to carry out programs, are coordinated by the C.D. council. The constitution is passed usually with assistance of the District C.D. Officer. Once established the C.D. council will compose a program of common interests and requirements from which priorities will evolve. The results are discussed with the District C.D. Officer and the application for governmental assistance is filled out on the basis of consensus about priorities. For technical estimates the District Officers of the various governmental departments are consulted.
3. Applications are aggregated at district level through District C.D. Committees recommending applications from local communities. The district committees, however, have not yet been established throughout the country. The idea is to create a group of citizens with additional governmental specialists under the chairmanship of the District Commissioner. This level will be authorized to approve projects up to \$1,000 (BW). Where no district committees are established the National C.D. Division is in charge of approval.
4. Projects running from \$1,000 (BW) to \$5,000 (BW) require approval from the National C.D. Division, whereas projects over \$5,000 (BW) need approval from the Cabinet.

5. There exists no formal national list of priorities, although a certain trend can be observed in the applications and approvals; any feasible project that serves the local community according to nation development purposes will have an equal chance for approval.<sup>3</sup>
6. Distribution is granted only on the basis of the self-help principle. Initially the national contribution to a rural project was 50 per cent of the total cost and, in the Interior, 75 per cent. However, because of the special nature of various programs, the Government changed this policy and provides at the present time, 100 per cent of the required material, equipment, and technical specialists for supervision.<sup>4</sup> A request can be made for apprenticeships. Young unemployed boys are placed in a learning situation on a self-help project; they will work closely with the technical supervisor and they will be regarded as paid labor. After a certain amount of experience these boys will be hired as paid supervisors on new projects.
7. In several cases the Government is not able to reward the initiatives of the local community; in most of these cases the people will raise the funds to supply the additional material and requirements.
8. Together with the application for governmental aid, a request is made for food aid (World Food Programme and U.S.A.I.D.) to meet the daily needs of the self-help participants. This allocation is not regarded as a substitute for financial payment,<sup>5</sup> but merely as a means to introduce better nutritional methods.
9. There is no maximum limit to the number of applications a community can turn in. However, because of scarce national funds the Government and the C.D. Division are sometimes forced to set priorities for distribution.
10. Although there are no formal priorities in types of projects, general trends can be recognized. During the period that C.D. was attached to the Ministry of Education the project emphasis concentrated on creating new school places. During this period, 50,000 new school places were provided by self-help efforts. In 1957 the

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<sup>3</sup>British Guiana (Guyana) Development Programme (1966-1972), loc. cit., P. VIII-2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. VIII-2.

<sup>5</sup>In 1969 a request was made to the United Nations to change the former Project 71 into a multi-purpose project: Request to the UN/FAO World Food Programme for Assistance in a Multi-Purpose Project for Economic and Social Development from the Government of Guyana, Georgetown; Ministry of Economic Development, April 1969.

Government urged the development of farms and home-gardens (532 farms, and 155 home-gardens have been completed). Emphasis was also put on the opening of the Interior. During the same year, eighteen airstrips were built by Guyanese citizens. The year 1968 was devoted primarily to agricultural improvement in the form of farm improvement, land settlement, and water control. A secondary emphasis was the introduction of nutritional programs.<sup>6</sup>

11. Although the Guyana Development Programme presently concentrates mainly on the rural areas, the three urban areas of Georgetown, New Amsterdam, and Mackenzie, have special urban C.D. programs, besides activities carried out by private associations. Emphasis in the urban programs is on physical improvement, health and sanitation, cultural and recreational programs, and economic programs. There are few specific education and social welfare projects, although aspects can be found in existing programs with other purposes. Guyana is well aware that urban problems may be a result of rural development and that attention must be devoted to urban problems as well as rural.<sup>7</sup>
12. In the overall development activities the main emphasis is on the activities themselves. Anxiousness to achieve the goals and to complete the projects sometimes inhibits the necessity to evaluate and design new policies.


The governmental structure of Community Development in Guyana is outlined on the following page.

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
<sup>6</sup>Country Statement for Guyana, loc. cit., p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>Report of the Caribbean Regional Training Workshop on Community Development and Local Government, loc. cit., pp. 15-17.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE



COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STAFF STRUCTURE



## CHAPTER III

Community Development in Guyana: Means and Ends and Political Development.

Though they are a minority, a small minority, there are still too many Guyanese who do not yet appreciate that the building of a country, a nation, is primarily the task of its own people. The free man is he who frees himself. The slave looks to others to free him and still remains a slave.<sup>1</sup>

The words of the Prime Minister, spoken on the third anniversary of Guyana's independence, express the strong beliefs that a Government ought to motivate its people to determine their own future and their own policy. The quoted words may sound familiar to citizens of developed and democratic countries. They are, however, new music to people who lived for centuries in slavery and political and economic suppression. The adventurous and liberal attitudes that were the characteristics of colonial powers have always been alien to the political subjects in the colonial territories. Eugene Staley points out a fact that is applicable to the Guyana case, when he questions the "lack of freedom in spirit:"

But how can we explain the greater disposition toward freedom among the early-comers than the late-comers? One hypothesis which fits the facts is the following: It took a considerable degree of individual and intellectual freedom to make possible the invention and initial growth of the modern industrial system, including modern science and all that goes with it.<sup>2</sup>

Intellectual freedom did not, however, fit the paternalistic attitude of the colonial system. Slavery did not only mean economic dependence, it meant intellectual "unfreedom", and consequently little or no initiative or management. In a country where the political and economic powerholders are foreign, and often physically absent, there is little dialogue and little freedom. The Guyana Government is well aware of the fact that the basic requirement for national development is the essential change of attitudes among the people:

This spiritual development constitutes the true emancipation of the region. Without it, in spite of our universities and our changing

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<sup>1</sup>The Hon. Forbes S. Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana, Guyana has Prospered, An Address to the Nation on Guyana's Third Anniversary of Independence, May 26, 1969.

<sup>2</sup>Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications of Economic Development, London-New York; Praeger Paperbacks, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1961.

forms of governments, the region would be self-enslaved. And this is a type of slavery from which there is no freedom.<sup>3</sup>

It is the belief of many Caribbean intellectuals that previous efforts for initiative (like the West Indian Federation, the Custom Union, etc.) failed because the initiative did not receive the necessary support of the people who were dedicated to take development in their own hands. The C.D. approach in the developing nations is a useful and effective mechanism to build an economically feasible structure and, moreover, to free the peoples from the induced systems of cultural imperialism. This viewpoint has been expressed by Guyanese leaders in several cases.

#### Means for Implementation.

The statement on C.D. purposes can be regarded as an ideological statement; it is, however, more than that. The realities of the development of a country go beyond the ideals and values of an ideology. A country builds toward its development by exploiting and mobilizing its resources. Guyana is rich in natural resources but lacks the technical and financial conditions for exploitation or even preliminary surveys. Guyana has a rudimentary administrative system which cannot respond (yet) to the demands of an elaborate and specialized economic life.<sup>4</sup> Guyana has a population that is relatively educated but it lacks the opportunities for adequate employment. Guyana has rich and fertile areas but it lacks an infra-structure to centralize and market agricultural crops. Guyana has a small but motivated population, willing to contribute to the national development process. The Guyana Government considers Community Development as a feasible means for creating a social infra-structure. A nation needs capital resources and a surplus in order to obtain the required capital for re-investment and social overhead capital.<sup>5</sup> In Guyana the main capital

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<sup>3</sup>"This Spiritual Revolution", loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup>British Guiana (Guyana) Development Programme (1966-1972). Loc. cit., pp. VIII-1.

<sup>5</sup>In addition to the domestic efforts the United Nations provide a comprehensive development program spending annually U.S. \$2 million. Some basic programs are:

- Surveys in natural resources;
- Consultation in physical and social planning;
- Provision of technical officers to fill empty posts, and to train Guyanese citizens;
- Training, conferences, seminars, and fellowships;
- Food programs for schools and land settlement;
- Provision of technical equipment;
- Children's welfare and public health;
- Economic programs in agriculture and fishery;
- Coordination with other donors (England, United States, Canada). Working

input is the people of Guyana. There are more capital resources available; however they are scarce, and time is scarce also. The ambitions and aspirations of the people are to be met and satisfied in a short period. The Guyanese people make it possible to increase the available financial resources by means of their own mobilized manpower, by regulation of distribution and allocation according to their motivation and political capabilities. The Guyanese people build their own communities, physically and politically. In this way the people now govern the country, as opposed to earlier times when the British ruled the nation. The development process evolves at a pace that is determined by the local communities; development goes in a direction desired by the people at the grassroot level, and the conditions are created at the local level. At this point the local needs meet the national wants. The Government's inputs are not merely technical and physical, although these inputs may result in a stronger motivation. Continuing processes of information and perception for people's needs and desires are required and these processes, in turn, require channels for communication. Social structures need to be built for the processes of demand and distribution, and levels of subsystem autonomy must be created in order to maintain the sensitivity for grassroot development. Regularly, new motivations and incentives must bring new enthusiasm among the people, and the acquired value systems must be shared and constitute a dynamic process as well. The basic requirement for this complex system of development is training and socialization or, in other terms, education for participation.

#### Education and Training.

The formal educational facilities do not sufficiently satisfy the need for socialization processes; they only meet the most urgent needs as we have observed in the previous chapter. The present adult population is active in social and economic processes and will gain more benefit from practical, on-the-job training. The socialization process contains two interrelated aspects: technical training and political education. The latter is carried out in social programs through government and private agencies and associations. The governmental institutions (Community Development, Self-Help, and Co-operative Societies, and others)<sup>6</sup> function as mechanisms for both social and technical education. In the self-help projects, on-the-job training is provided by the technical supervisors. A special program is sponsored for unemployed youth who receive special training in the self-help projects. For Cooperative Societies, special training programs are organized to improve specialization among the people and to promote the basic requirements for economic development. In cooperation with specialized agencies C.D. organizes training courses in handicraft, cottage industry, nutritional programs, child care, agricultural affairs, home economics, and so on. Emphasis

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Together for Development: United Nations Aid in Guyana, Georgetown; Printed for Government and United Nations Development Programme (Guyana), by the Guyana Lithographic Co. Ltd.

<sup>6</sup>British Guiana (Guyana) Development Programme (1966-1972), loc. cit.

is placed on the technical training of bureaucratic personnel. Thus 1967 was proclaimed as "Efficiency Year" and this campaign was executed by the National Efficiency Council.<sup>7</sup> Large numbers of public service officers and people in the private sector met in workshops, training courses, and conferences.<sup>8</sup> Many types of informal training were provided. For instance, today, in the majority of the infant welfare clinics the waiting hours are used to give technical information to the mothers about child care, nutrition, family planning, etc. The Government established various camps where training is offered to people who are willing to exploit the Interior. With this mechanism various purposes are served; e.g. the unemployment problem, the youth problem, the necessity to improve the agricultural production, and the political socialization process. Of the private and voluntary organizations, the churches and their youth organizations contribute in great amounts to the process of education and motivation. The Guyanese women's organizations mainly promote training programs; little emphasis is given to the entertainment aspect. Also economic groups and corporations contribute to the development goals. The sugar estates have elaborate social welfare programs with training and education departments. The Guyanese schools, at various levels, have outdoor training programs and work in cooperation with C.D. programs.

#### Communications and Mass Media.

An elaborate and adequate system of communications will improve the economic development and the cultural integration of the country, as well as a balanced spread of people over the total area. One of the reasons why the Guyanese people remain in the coastal areas is that there is a lack of means of communication and transportation with the Interior.<sup>9</sup> The 1966-1972 Development Programme provides for \$40 million (BW) for improved communications systems throughout the country, such as electricity, roads (\$16,5 million for repair), harbor projects (in order to spread marketing and export-transportation), civil aviation, mobile post offices, and expansion of the telephone system (\$17.5 million BW).<sup>10</sup> Better means of communications will encourage the economic as well as the process of social and political development. In 1967 the following communications projects were completed through self-help efforts:

38 bridges
26 roads
<u>20 airfields</u>
84 projects

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<sup>7</sup> Guyana: Two Years of Independence and Progress. Loc. cit., p. 33.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 33-34.

<sup>9</sup> Guyana: You and Your Government, loc. cit., p. 9-15.

<sup>10</sup> Guyana: Two Years of Independence and Progress, loc. cit., p. 13.

Plans for the period 1968 were:

56 bridges
71 roads
2 airfields
<hr/>
129 projects <sup>11</sup>

The high rate of literacy promotes a dialogue between Government and the people. Presently Guyana provides information through:<sup>12</sup>

- 3 daily newspapers
- 8 weekly newspapers
- 1 fortnightly journal
- 3 monthly papers
- 1 bi-monthly magazine
- 1 annual journal
- governmental publications

Two radio stations operate across the entire country and form the most important means of communication with the interior. The first discussions regarding television have started. Both technical, financial, and ideological reasons have withheld television until now. Television in Guyana will require a large investment in technical pre-conditions with little chance for outputs because of the vast but scarcely populated area. In addition, the low per capita income inhibits large scale markets for television and much of the consumers' capital potential will leave the country to foreign television producers. Also the technical staff and management will have to come from outside which will put a heavy financial burden on the national budget. Meanwhile, while the communications experts and the Government are in closed-door discussions; public opinion is expressed in the press. Emphasis is put on the means for audiovisual education, information and for entertainment which will hopefully decrease the present crime rates.

#### Social Structures and Community Development.

The Government, in its various ministries and departments, is actively involved in the motivation process. The C.D. structure contains the means for motivation, for information, and for socialization. It will result in stronger community structures and in a better performance of public and social functions. Through the cooperation of Community Development with private and public organizations and interest groups, the structures become increasingly differentiated and specialized.

The Government is conscious that the progress of our country depends on all of us performing efficiently the tasks assigned to us. We

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<sup>11</sup>Country Statement for Guyana, loc. cit., p. 2.

<sup>12</sup>Information Provided by the Guyana Information Service.

need to develop skills. We need to maintain an attitude of mind by which we are constantly reminded not only to 'get it done,' but also to 'do it now.'<sup>13</sup>

In addition to these rational processes which increase the capacities, awareness, and participation of the citizens, an integrated psychological and emotional process of motivation is used. The C.D. program solicits many informal meetings between the country's representatives and the local communities. The Prime Minister and his staff of ministers regularly pay visits to the self-help projects; they attend meetings, lectures, and training conferences. On these occasions the representatives hear and experience the opinions and emotions of the people; they are able to reward the people for their efforts and achievements, and encourage face-to-face contact which provides maximum motivation.

#### A Case Study.

At a training conference for Amerindian leaders, which was attended by the Prime Minister, Mr. Forbes Burnham addressed the group in a final meeting evaluating the progress. By reading the address it becomes clear that the Prime Minister obtained information which would never have reached him through formal bureaucratic procedures. In showing and expressing his perception, the Prime Minister gave new incentives for motivation in land settlement and community development. Having listened to the people's needs and interests, the Prime Minister promised:

In future, as Prime Minister, I am not going to let other people tell me what the Amerindians want; I am going to find out from the Amerindians what they want. It is all well and good for people to be pretending to speak for you, when sometimes they are speaking for themselves and are nothing but sheep in wolves' clothing. This is a new era, a new age in Guyana.<sup>14</sup>

In a similar manner the Prime Minister urged the people to improve their production for their own welfare as well as for the benefit of the national economy:

Well, one thing we have got to learn in this world today is that if we are to be able to get some of the things which we need, we have got to produce a surplus, produce extra, which we can then sell or exchange for the things which we want and which we ourselves do not produce.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>"This Spiritual Revolution", loc. cit.

<sup>14</sup>Prime Minister Forbes S. Burnham, A New Era, Address at the Closing Session of the Conference of Amerindian Leaders held at Queens College, Georgetown; from February 28 to March 3, 1969, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

A clear role description for Captains<sup>16</sup> provided (with a reward of honor) a greater degree of functional acknowledgement which meant representation in the Cabinet, and in the Amerindians Land Commission. Guarantees could be provided for the market place for surplus production of agricultural crops, if the crops were suitable to the limited means of transportation (air transport). A final quotation may complete an impression of a motivation process that ought to be twofold. It has to be gained through hard work, and its results have to be recognized and rewarded in increased allocation of power and autonomy.

It is easy to talk about equality but what is important is that equality must be practiced. It is no sense telling me that I am equal to 'X,' if 'X' gets certain privileges that I don't get. There is no point in telling any section of our community that it is equal to other sections of the community, unless it is dealt with fairly and in the same manner as those other sections.<sup>17</sup>

#### The People's Response.

The attitude of the Government is not merely an attitude of "waiting till the communities wake up." There is a pressing appeal to all groups and sections of the nation, and often the appeals come from different levels in the various structures and institutions of the nation itself. The people's responses have been expressed in many effective ways. Community Development and Self-Help activities are the most evident cases. Other responses can be found in the mass creation of cooperative societies, cottage industries and handicraft centers, as well as in the favorable reaction to the Government's proclamation of the "Buy Local" campaign.<sup>18</sup> A young man in Georgetown, with little education but intense motivation undertook with his peer group a survey of the backgrounds of juvenile delinquency because they could not believe that youth was evil. In his final statement, the initiator writes:

There are too many Community Centres used only for dances and other fund-raising activities. These places can be transformed into suitable training centres for the benefit of the young people.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Captains are Amerindian Leaders.

<sup>17</sup> A New Era, loc. cit., p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> Guyana: Two Years of Independence and Progress, loc. cit., p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> Philip B. M. Grimes, A Working Paper on Juvenile Delinquency in Guyana, Presented at the Seminar for Removing Delinquency, Camp Kayuka, Timehri; June, 1969, p. 3 (unpublished).

The Guyana Institute for Progressive Youth, of which Philip Grimes\* is the ideological leader, is not the only concerned group in Guyana. Voluntary organizations express their opinions and become increasingly involved in development activities. The Guyana Institute for Social Research and Action is involved in establishing medical and health centers;<sup>20</sup> the Council of Churches recently carried out a survey on youth unemployment in the urban areas;<sup>21</sup> a concerned teenager sent an article to the press about the physical conditions of the public facilities in his village; other youths organized cooperatives for development of the Interior. These are organizational responses. What is more basic all over the country, is that people are actively participating in development projects.

#### Special Groups and Programs.

Amerindians. The Amerindian conference has been used as an example of the dialogue between various levels of structural interaction. The Amerindians are a special concern for the Government. The physical conditions in their villages require special arrangements. The Amerindians do not only need schools, but also hostels for the children of wandering tribes. They need special means of education and training; they need more investment in infrastructural projects, health (\$380,000 BW) and economic incentives (\$1,043,000 BW).<sup>22</sup> The Amerindians need these facilities not because the group lacks the abilities, but because the group has been neglected for so long and requires more input in order to achieve equal opportunities for development. In addition, by developing the area in which the Amerindians live, new means for national development will be created which will serve all other groups of the nation.

Women. A second public concern is the changing role of the woman in the Guyanese society. There is concern, not because this group has suffered deprivation, but because they presently form an integral part in the education and socialization processes of the young. A noteworthy program has been executed by the Women's Institute, in cooperation with the Carnegie School

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\* Philip Grimes (18 years old) is one of the most surprising people I have met during my journey in Guyana. His activities have been dedicated to the improvement of East-Ruimveldt, a housing scheme in the suburbs of Georgetown. Some of his intentions have been misinterpreted by officials, but I have found him to be deeply concerned and actively involved in the development process of his country.

<sup>20</sup> Memorandum on the Establishment of an Ecumenical Community Welfare Centre in the South Georgetown Area, Georgetown; Guyana Council of Churches, 1969 (unpublished document).

<sup>21</sup> Youth Unemployment Survey, Georgetown; Youth Council of Churches, 1969 (unpublished report).

<sup>22</sup> British Guiana (Guyana) Development Programme (1966-1972), loc. cit., p. X-1.

of Home Economics and the Community Development Division. Until recently these institutes sent specialists and teachers into the rural areas to teach courses in home economics, cookery, nutrition, handicraft, and needlework. This program operated as the Rural Education Programme and the Home Improvement Class. Through cooperative effort, this activity has been re-organized. Local leading women have come to Georgetown for a voluntary two-year program in these courses. After returning to their community, they will teach their fellow residents. It is evident that only a middle level quality can be expected, but more time, effort, and commitment will improve the overall chances for results.<sup>23</sup> A comparable program has been set up with the National Nutrition Programme of the Ministry of Health, and with the Handicraft Department of the C.D. Division, although shortages of staff require different approaches.<sup>24</sup> These programs operate with assistance from the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the UNICEF. One of the praiseworthy activities has been carried out by the Y.W.C.A. in Georgetown. This organization established, besides short-term activities, a two-year educational program for girls from broken homes, with noteworthy results. These and other programs promote both the personal welfare of the participants, as well as the national development efforts.<sup>25</sup>

The unemployment percentage among women has increased from 5.6 per cent in 1960, up to 17.2 per cent in 1965.<sup>26</sup> Various reasons for this increase may be clearly seen. As new developments in agricultural methods and production have been created, more women were registered as unemployed, because more efforts could be made by less people, with higher outputs. This unemployed group must find new tasks. A second reason for greater unemployment has been the increased desire and opportunity for girls to acquire secondary education. This gap creates higher unemployment rates, because the higher level of education inhibits the acceptance of lower-level jobs. The influence women have on the child-rearing process, the emotional influence on the male population, the traditional "care-role," the increasing amount of leisure time, all create a new resource for development.

Opportunities to develop and accept leadership in social and civic affairs at both community and national levels [should be provided]. If women are to carry out their role effectively, they have to

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<sup>23</sup> Magda Pollard, Home Economics and Community Development, Lecture at the Orientation of New Staff and General Staff Meeting, Management Training Centre, Atkinson Field, 1st-6th September, 1968, p. 15.

<sup>24</sup> Guyana; Two Years of Independence and Progress, loc. cit., p. 34.

<sup>25</sup> Paper on the Handicraft Industry of Guyana, Georgetown; Guyana Development Corporation, November 1967, providing suggestions for encouraging cottage industry organized by community groups and private organizations, promotion of efforts, marketing of results, and a co-ordination structure.

<sup>26</sup> Bank of Guyana Annual Report, 1968: Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment, Table VIII-7.

understand the nature of changes in society, develop the ability to adjust to them and acquire the confidence to meet them. Much emphasis must be placed on the inculcation of new attitudes. In this sphere we know that women are in a most favorable and strategic position and must therefore be the prime movers in our efforts to overcome some of the obstacles to development. Experience has proved that in countries where women were not drawn into the process of change, they tended to act as brakes on development.<sup>27</sup>

Youth. It has already been mentioned that the youth of Guyana need special consideration in the development process. The insufficient opportunities for education, and the imbalance on the labor market result in a high rate of youth unemployment. Also the recent population explosion, and the need to create a healthy nation in the near future are reasons for special concern. The most integrated effort may be found in the establishment of the Guyana Youth Corps in which young volunteers are trained for land settlement purposes in the Interior,<sup>28</sup> as well as the Industrial Training Centre providing education for unemployed youth.<sup>29</sup>

The youth problem in Guyana is, as in most other places, a problem with consequences and ramifications, and a problem of many causes. Philip Grimes points out in his paper that it is not the youth per se, that creates the problem; rather youth problems arise as a result of societal problems. Some clear objectives and goals are listed of which some are already in operation:

1. The urge to put more emphasis on communications rather than on physical projects;
2. A miniature Youth Corps in every community;
3. A greater sense of responsibilities by cinemas, police, and press;
4. Reformatory schools, instead of jails;
5. Free secondary education;
6. More industry;
7. Youth Corps and land settlement;
8. Voluntary social programs;

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<sup>27</sup> Elsa Charles, What Community Development Officers Can Do in Promoting Work with Women, Lecture at the Orientation of New Staff and General Staff Meeting, Management Training Centre, Atkinson Field, 1st-6th September, 1968, p. 9.

<sup>28</sup> Guyana: You and Your Government, loc. cit., p. 40.

<sup>29</sup> Guyana: Two Years of Independence and Progress, loc. cit., p. 17.

9. Social education programs;
10. Financial support from industries.<sup>30</sup>

Physical Problems. The two major physical problems are the development of the Interior, and the control of water in the agricultural coastal area. Many agricultural crops have been destroyed by river-flooding and, worse, by seawater overflowing onto the land. The coastal area is situated below sea-level, with insufficient defense and control systems. It takes the Government \$3 million (BW) per year to regulate water in the agricultural areas. Along the coast the people are building a sea-defense, primarily through self-help. At the same time a new type of rice-paddy is being introduced which is salt-resistant. At the present time, the larger part of this low area is criss-crossed by canals, sluices, dams, and irrigation systems. New agricultural education can make a start to provide higher agricultural production.

The development of the interior is not an easy problem. Most people hesitate to go because of the lack of facilities and social services. In many cases the husband goes but leaves his family in the city, which often results in broken homes and double families. Efforts to attract immigration of West Indian people from the overpopulated Caribbean Islands have had little result, mainly because of the lack of support from those respective governments. In an article in the Weekend Post the Government of Guyana has been criticized for insufficient information and implementation of means for development of the Interior:

'Go to the Interior, Go to the land,' is the cry. But the people, on the other hand, ask: 'Why the Interior; what will our future be; what assistance can we expect.'<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Grimes. Loc. cit.

<sup>31</sup>"The Push Needed to Go to the Interior", Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy, August 24, 1969.

## CHAPTER IV

Conclusions.

In previous chapters attention has been paid to the backgrounds of the Guyana Development Programme, the role of C.D. in relation to the political, social, and economic development, as well as the implementation and interrelation of the various programs. For a study in C.D., Guyana provides an interesting case, having an overall C.D. program and being in a crucial development stage. The widely accepted belief among the Guyana population, that C.D. is an essential means for national development, has been used in this paper as the object for study. In addition, the historical events in the recent past make it possible to restrict the study to the period between Independence (1966) and the shift to complete independence as a Republic (1970). A great deal of the obtained material has been gathered by means of oral information through interviews with C.D. officers and other governmental personnel. This information has not been complete, due to the limitations to compiled reference material and written evaluations.

Being a nation in transition, Guyana needs to mobilize all the available resources in order to accelerate the processes of development. The accelerated pace is necessitated by the state of rising expectations of the population, on the newly obtained state of independence necessitating independent political and economic development, and on the international pressure for competition in economic and political affairs.

The development process has various aspects such as social-psychological, economic, and political. In addition, the development process will have to take place at all levels of the society in order to create a stable system in which equality in decision-making processes as well as equality in distribution of common goods and services will find a guarantee.

One of the essential means for development is C.D., though certainly not the only one. Educational processes, industrial investment, trade agreements, improved social and health conditions, and many other aspects contribute to the development of Guyana. However, none of these processes is as basic as C.D. in its grassroot approach, emphasizing the personal welfare of the individual which consequently results in community welfare and national welfare. Another characteristic of C.D. is its holistic approach responding to all the social and economic needs of the person in his community. C.D. operates through the interrelation of social-psychological, political, and economic aspects of a society, thereby supporting and encouraging development processes in the various fields. Because of these two aspects of C.D., the development process is necessarily a dialogue between the local community and the national society. The social-psychological need for improvement of the individual can only be met by political bargaining processes and, vice versa, the development of the public social system is impossible if there is no process of human development. If a process of improving human needs and demands takes off in a democratic system the result will be a greater differentiation in social structures, and more specialized role-performance will be required. This process of functional and structural development can easily be rewarded with a higher degree of subsystem autonomy,

thereby improving the chances for optimal system capabilities. In a process of nation building all the system capabilities need to be developed, both in the input and in the output functions. Unlike a process of state building in which emphasis is placed upon the integration and control capabilities, in a nation building process the essence is regarded as the involvement and participation of the people in decision-making processes. This input can be increased by a greater distribution of subsystem autonomy.<sup>1</sup>

The development of the individual, the changing attitudes, the state of rising expectations, is not only imperative to the process of political development but, moreover, forms an incentive for the economic development process. Being a small nation Guyana has many special economic problems; it is not possible, therefore, to simply apply a theory of economic development to the process in Guyana. At the present time Rostow's theory has been widely accepted and there are certainly elements that can be applied to the case of Guyana. As Rostow formulated, the basic requirement for take-off of the economic development process is the willingness of the people changing their attitudes into one of an entrepreneurial spirit. There are, however, other aspects in Rostow's theory that do not fit the Guyana situation. Modern methods in industry inhibit large scale employment; improved production also requires an improved consumers' market; foreign capital decreased the opportunities for domestic savings and re-investment, etc.<sup>2</sup> Therefore the Guyana Government has introduced new means of development, in the form of Community Development and cooperative societies. By these means both efforts to change the people's attitudes and to create incentives for savings and higher production are encouraged. At the same time the influence on the international environment has increased because of Guyana's initiative in creating the Caribbean Free Trade Association as a means for a larger common market and as a bargaining institution with the British Commonwealth, the European Economic Community, and the Organization of American States.

Community Development responds to the need for basic requirements for economic development, the unemployment problem, and the educational process. Cooperatives serve the demand for the entrepreneurial attitudes, for education and training, for savings and economic initiative in land settlement and cottage industry. Besides these two processes the Government has initiated two economic campaigns: the "Buy Local" action and the "Grow More Food" campaign as a regulation of the import-export balance and, moreover, as a motivation process for the Guyana population. As a result there has been a great shift in the trading balance with the other Caribbean countries.<sup>3</sup>

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
<sup>1</sup>Almond and Powell. Loc. cit., pp. 311-314.

<sup>2</sup>W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, New York; Cambridge University Press, 1960.

<sup>3</sup>"Trading with Carifta", Guyana Graphic: Carifta Expo Issue, April 19, 1969, p. 6 (extracted).

## TRADING WITH CARIFTA--1966-1972

(in millions \$ BW)



The economic results do not simply mean that Guyana is prospering. Industrial investment and development has been hindered by many psychological barriers, both inside and outside the country. John Kenneth Galbraith defends the case of the developing countries by assuming that a too prudent investment policy may result in "communist movements," especially in Latin American nations.<sup>4</sup> Also Nelson Rockefeller in his report on a trip to South and Central America advocates a loyal policy in foreign assistance and investment in these countries:

The U.S. has all too often demonstrated, at least subconsciously, a paternalistic attitude toward other nations of the hemisphere. It has tried to direct the internal affairs of other nations to an unseemly degree, thinking, perhaps arrogantly, that it knew what was best for them. The U.S. has talked about partnership, but it has not truly practiced it.<sup>5</sup>

These criticisms make it evident that changes in the international development policies have to occur but, moreover, social-psychological changes within the developing nations are a requirement.

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<sup>4</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, The Triumph, Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> "The Rockefeller Report on Latin America", Time Magazine, November 14, 1969, p. 42.

Though a great deal of literature on the theory of C.D. and on case-studies has been written, the Guyana situation is in many regards different from other situations. In addition, many existing reports on C.D. programs do not show the important interrelationship among the various aspects of national development, whereas the case of Guyana emphasizes this interrelationship, coordinated in the C.D. programs and in the cooperative efforts.

This paper on the C.D. program in Guyana does not intend to portray an eldorado of optimal C.D. practices and conditions. The examples provided on the preceding pages have been given as a demonstration of the comprehensiveness of interactions of local needs with various levels and stages of national development and growth. Likewise they have shown the necessity for a comprehensive approach (not only among various technical levels, but among various levels of sub-autonomy in the national patterns) and the necessity for work at the grassroots level. In terms of C.D. theory, the C.D. efforts of the Guyanese people have not been perfect. It is one of the major theses of this paper, then, that the Guyanese people have developed a practical understanding of the C.D. approach to social and political development and that they are energetically and successfully working toward their national goals and purposes. There are still many people who do not support the principles of C.D., as the Prime Minister and others in the governmental structure have pointed out; there are still communities that start programs in isolation of other development activities thus creating even heavier development burdens on the government which must eventually deal with the completion and follow-up of this type of project. It has also been for this reason that the Guyana Government has announced a different priority in development activities for the period 1970: the completion and follow-up of existing C.D. activities. Agricultural and agriculturally related projects are still undertaken with insufficient consideration for the social and cultural consequences and with little thought as to the overall integration into the overview of development activities. Conferences are often organized in cooperation with C.D., but C.D. is not always able to motivate the people in non-physical ways. Many of these deficiencies have been and still are painfully recognized by governmental officers but often the means for a greater input are not available. Further, many specialists complain that farmers stop producing as soon as subsistence level has been reached. Because of the lack of integrated programming between different segments of the overall development pattern, early profits are likely to be consumed in Guyana Rum instead of more spiritual and entrepreneurial, less intoxicating facets of development. In spite of a number of problem areas, the C.D. efforts in Guyana have demonstrated the willingness of the Guyanese people to master their own development problems in a decent, relatively orderly, and productive manner. The tangible achievements of the program are evident. Thus,

1. 11,500 people were paid laborers in the Self-Help programs or 6 per cent of the working population.
2. 250,000 people were volunteers in the Self-Help programs or 36 per cent of the total population.

3. In 400 communities Self-Help programs have been completed or are in operation.
4. The Government estimates that the Self-Help program has saved approximately \$20,000,000 (BW) which could then be used in other areas of the development efforts.<sup>6</sup>
5. These Self-Help projects represent efforts in education, health, infrastructural development, agriculture, cottage industry, housing, water control, cooperative movements.<sup>7</sup>

Other consequences of the programs have been an increased degree of initiative and self-confidence, self-determination for local decision-making, changed attitudes with regard to the physical environment,<sup>8</sup> a declining necessity for encouragement and incentives, greater communications among villages, racial integration at the grassroot level, the start of a more democratic political process resulting in an increased need for formal structures, and educational aspects of increased economic and occupational specialization. These consequences, however, are less measurable and may very well be much more important and profound for the development of Guyana. The C.D. program as executed in Guyana emphasizes local initiative and decision-making with regard to projects and priorities. The needs and demands based on the local community and the values of its individuals are valued through the principle that higher levels of authority will only interfere in local affairs if they are invited by the community. The principle of not interfering without request forms a guarantee for a relation of partnership and two-way communication between the people and the political elite. Evidently there are processes of motivation, information, and social mobilization from the central government to the local communities; however, the decisions for action and direction are made at the local level. The C.D. programs make clear that there are few conflicts between local needs and demands, and priorities set by the Guyana Government. Local decision-making and popular participation, however, requires local responsibility and mental autonomy which is recognized by the central government and rewarded in distribution of goods and services according to the degree of responsibility the local communities are willing to take. Communities which show a high degree of initiative have been rewarded for their additional demands for governmental assistance in self-help projects.

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<sup>6</sup>Guyana: Two Years of Independence and Progress, loc. cit., p. 21.

<sup>7</sup>In 1968, 780 Cooperative Societies were established or in the process of foundation, ibid.

<sup>8</sup>In a lecture for new C.D. staff members Miss Sybil Patterson (Deputy Chief C.D. in Guyana) points on the relation between the change of attitudes, the involvement of large groups of the community, and the consequences for better economic and physical conditions. On a field trip in the Caribbean Miss Patterson noticed that different approaches toward farming methods are emerging as a result of technical and social education. "Working Through Groups", Atkinson Field, 1968, p. 5.

Increasing sub-system autonomy, therefore, follows immediately the increased capability to mobilize local resources and to handle local development processes.

Guyana is developing and has mobilized human and natural resources in order to accelerate this process. Community Development functions as a motivating force, as a regulator and distributor of national goods and services. C.D. encourages the value of self-confidence, self-consciousness, self-help, decision-making processes, and the emergence of social infrastructures. C.D. in Guyana promotes the development of the individual in his community as well as the economic welfare of the national community.

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## A REPORT ON VILLAGE AND PANCHAYAT DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL

by

James E. Blackwell

Since World War II, many architects of nation-building and social change have relied heavily upon community development as a major instrument for propelling the less developed nations toward the age of modernity. Conceptualizations of community development in the past twenty years have been expressed in as diversified terminology as have been the programs and behavior described by such definitions.<sup>1</sup> In Nepal, the concept of community development is presently a significant dimension of a much broader and more encompassing term--"Panchayat Development."

This paper discusses both village development and panchayat development in Nepal by focussing attention on the conditions existing in the country at the inception of these programs, their objectives, organizational structure, functions, and directions. The terms "community development" and "Panchayat Development" are used interchangeably in this discussion.

### Geography, Politics, and Social Conditions

Although the limits of this paper preclude a detailed analysis of the political and social forces that shaped the history of Nepal, it is incumbent upon the writer to point to a few of the more salient facts of this nature.

Nepal is one of three Himalayan Kingdoms and, shaped like a rectangle, it is about 90 to 150 miles wide and 500 miles long. It approximates the size of the American State of Illinois. This land-locked country, covering some 54,500 square miles of extremely varied topography, is bounded on its north by Tibet, its east by the Himalayan

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<sup>1</sup>For definitions of community development, see: B. Mukerji, Community Development in India, Calcutta: Orient Longmans Ltd., 1961; T. R. Batten, Communities and Their Development, Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1959; Douglas Ensminger, A Guide to Community Development, New Delhi: Ministry of Community Development, 1957; Joseph DeFranco, "Differences Between Extension Education and Community Development," Community Development Review, Washington, D.C., International Cooperation Administration, vol. 4, number 1, 1959.

Kingdom of Sikkim, and on its south and west by India. Its most important town and political capital is Kathmandu which is situated some 500 miles east of New Delhi. It is only a few hours by plane southwest of Lhasa, Tibet and less than 2,000 miles south of Peiping. Nepal is, therefore, both a gateway to and a buffer between the two most populous nations of the world.

The country's physical diversity is evidenced in its complex mountain chains which contain most of the world's highest peaks, including Mt. Everest; its steaming swamps and jungles which form the northern rim of the Gangetic Plains, and its great fertile valleys interspersed between these extremes.<sup>2</sup>

The Rana dynasty exercised complete hegemony over Nepal from 1846 to 1951 when this regime was overthrown and the Crown was restored. Prior to 1951, Nepal was isolated from the rest of the world. The people of Kathmandu were equally isolated from the remainder of their countrymen. The end of the Rana era marked more than the beginning of Nepal's effort to forge itself into the modern world. It was a vital step toward the creation of a government concerned both with the welfare of its people and the relation of its people to the government.

The lack of a basic infrastructure such as a communications network or a system of roads and highways impeded the development of national identity and nationhood. Ninety-seven percent of the people existed on subsistence agriculture. Most of the people employed primitive methods of production which resulted in a marginal level of agricultural outputs. Health conditions were poor and, by any yardstick, poverty was ubiquitous. Without public schools and promoting the concept of "education only for the elite," the rate of illiteracy exceeded 90 percent for the male population and approximated 99 percent for the females. Economic and social disparities existed between castes and social classes as well as within these artificial yet potent social categories. Given these conditions, most of the Nepalese people seemed to have been unaware of any other form of life than the type they were then experiencing.

Cautiously, in 1951, Nepal opened its door to an alien outside world. That act unleashed forces which were to raise the level of aspirations of its people, restructure the governmental system, and pave the way for modest beginnings of the modernization process in many parts of the country. Political and social analysts alike

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<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1964, Chapter 1.

record that the Government and the People of Nepal began to be concerned about what Barbara Ward aptly calls "a revolution of modernity"<sup>3</sup> standing in tepid shadows in some distant horizon. Intelligent and perceptive leaders began to recognize the conservatism of Nepalese traditional society as well as the fact that this conservatism was uniquely and inextricably intertwined in the religious ideology, the systems of land tenure, land ownership, and inheritance pervasive throughout Nepal. The more enlightened leaders began to express what would have been at some other point in history a heretical belief that the moment had come for meaningful and substantial social change in Nepal.

Such concepts as "people's participation," "dignity of man," "duties and responsibilities," "felt needs," "democratic process," and the "development of human resources" signaled a new phase in Nepalese life and culture. There was, however, no "revolution of rising expectations" because there was no genuinely understood model for determining what the Nepalese people could, in fact, achieve. What was immediately observable, in many circles, was simply a common feeling that the traditional way of living was incompatible with Nepal's desire to achieve economic and social progress in a rapidly modernizing world.

The desire for change was present but Nepal was without the technical and financial resources to produce such changes. In this situation, Nepal looked to newly acquired friends and old neighbors for financial assistance and technical expertise. Guaranteed such aid, a program for development was immediately launched.

An examination of the two major development programs initiated in Nepal during the first decade of its Government under the Crown reveals four dominant and related themes. These are: (1) a commitment to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people, (2) a determination to construct a governmental system which both meets the needs of Nepal and encourages the participation of the people in governmental affairs, (3) the mobilization of human resources and the training of manpower in order to meet the demands of a potentially modernized state, and (4) the changing of attitudes among the people to such a degree that they will accept the notion that they have a stake in their own welfare and that they can utilize their own resources to create a better and more enjoyable way of life for themselves and their progeny.

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<sup>3</sup> Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations. See also: "Prologue" in Gustav Ranis, The United States and the Developing Economies, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1964.

### The Village Development Program

The inception of community development in Nepal can be traced to its first development program, the Village Development Project, which began under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture, in 1952. Drawing heavily upon American aid and advice, this program commenced with the opening of a village development training center in Kathmandu.<sup>4</sup> At that time, the Village Development Program, hereafter referred to as VDP, was conceptualized as a multiple-purpose organization which the Government of Nepal was building in order to have an organized effective means of distributing increasing services to the people and a channel through which people may pass their judgments about problems and solutions to the Central Government.<sup>5</sup> A similar interpretation offered nine years later, was that the VDP was designed to "achieve a change in the mental outlook of the people; to bring them the knowledge that things can be better, to encourage them to work for their own welfare and to bring about a coordination of a country's resources so as to achieve a solution to the manifold problems of today."<sup>6</sup> Implicit in these two views is the position that the VDP was originally conceived as a type of field service organization in which the interests of the people could be stimulated and directed into useful and productive self-help activities. The program or project was merely the coordinating instrumentality for assuring that the technical assistance from extension specialists in such units as health and education, agriculture, public works and an embryonic local government organization could be successfully integrated and brought to the people.

As Deussenberry points out, this program required three organizational imperatives. These were: (1) a central office which had the responsibility for program planning, accounting, and overall supervision, (2) a training section for the operation of training programs and schools, and (3) a field service component which was basically the integrating and development force in the rural areas of Nepal.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Eugene B. Mihaley, Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 31.

<sup>5</sup>USOM, Nepal, "A Little Country With Big Problems," 1954, p. 13.

<sup>6</sup>USOM, Proforma of Village Development Field Service, Kathmandu, August 10, 1961.

<sup>7</sup>Harold L. Deussenberry, Six Years of Village Development In Nepal, Kathmandu: Village Development Department, 1958, pp. 3-4.

### VDP Organization and Administration

The program began as largely an agricultural one and was administratively located in the Ministry of Agriculture. The Central Office was originally composed of a director and his administrative-supervisory staff. All funds, personnel and administrative services were provided by the Government of Nepal. American assistance was in the form of commodities and technical advice. Within a few months, the VDP was transferred to the Ministry of Planning and Development, still headed by a Director. From 1955 to 1958, the joint "Cooperative Service" was established and maintained as a vehicle for administering American assisted programs in Nepal. Under this plan, the VDP was financially supported by both the Governments of Nepal and the United States. Following procedures jointly established by the two governments, one Nepalese and one American advisor administered a joint fund and cooperative service. Each Government made periodic deposits to the fund for the support of the VDP and other projects.<sup>8</sup>

The basic unit of development was a block or administrative unit drawn along geographic, political and population dimensions. The primary plan called for two blocks for each three electoral constituencies. Following a phased pattern, Nepal was to be divided into approximately 190 blocks for development purposes. These blocks were equivalent to districts or "development centers" and were supervised by a district officer or chief of the development center. A District Improvement Committee was established to serve in an advisory capacity to the chief of each development center. This committee consisted of political heads at the district level and outstanding leaders from the villages within a given district. Blocks were to be expanded at the rate of approximately eight per year or roughly 183 blocks by 1975.<sup>9</sup>

Each department assigned technical personnel to the VDP field service at the district or block level and placed them under the direct administrative supervision of the district officer. The salaries of the technical personnel were paid by the technical or home department who also provided them with the necessary field support. The district officer, in turn, furnished office space, facilities, transportation and coordinated the work of all technical personnel assigned to him. Within this structure and aided by the village development workers trained at various multiple-purpose training centers, all development work was to occur.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> ibid., p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> USOM, Country Assistance Program for 1959.

<sup>10</sup> Op. Cit.

As late as 1961, a plan was devised which envisaged four different types of development centers which were to be integrated into phases of development. Under this plan, each new block was to begin as a NUCLEAR BLOCK. "During this phase of one year, it is to survey the area, help to organize panchayats and stimulate people to some constructive project."<sup>11</sup> After one year, the nuclear block was to become a RURAL DEVELOPMENT BLOCK. "During this phase of three years, cooperating department technicians are added to the block staff, technical programs are planned; demonstrations are made and subsidies become available. After three years, it becomes a VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT BLOCK where activities are increased."<sup>12</sup> The fourth type of block was to be called the INTENSIVE VALLEY DEVELOPMENT but this type was to revert to a rural development block after three years of intensive development.

Experience and response to the exigencies of time have a way of changing targets, modifying concepts and altering objectives of any program. Such was the case with the VDP. It soon became apparent that the target of approximately 190 development centers or blocks was unrealistic and that a more manageable number was seventy-five which also had the distinct advantage of being consistent with the intended geo-political subdivisions of the country. The block development scheme advanced in 1961 was never implemented primarily because of its inherent unfeasibility, its psychological drawbacks implicit in the intention to increase then reduce activity in a given area, and because of the uncertainties of continued financial support for the program.

Administrative reorganization was often necessary in the VDP. Between 1955 and 1963, the VDP was transferred and reorganized successively under a separate Ministry of Village Development, a Ministry of Development with a Department of Village Development, a Department of District Development and a Department of Local Self-Government, and then, under a Ministry of National Guidance and Development, and finally, after the project was terminated, its activities were to some extent incorporated in the programs of the Panchayat Ministry.

Training personnel was an essential component of the VDP. Training Centers were established for the training of manpower required to conduct the program at the village level and Development Centers. Village workers trained at the training center were

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<sup>11</sup> USOM, Proforma of Village Development Field Service, Kathmandu: August 10, 1961.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

assigned to the Development Centers and placed under the direct control of supervisors. There was one supervisor for every ten village workers.<sup>13</sup>

The fundamental objective of the training program was to train multiple-purpose workers in basic agricultural practices and who, in turn, could apply that knowledge in such a way as to increase food production and help raise the standard of living for rural people. In broader terms, the multiple-purpose workers were to be the primary agents for the transmission of information, technical assistance, motivation, innovation, and change. Each worker was to be able to establish contact and work with a minimum of five hundred families.

The curriculum for training multiple-purpose village level workers included such subjects as: field crop and vegetable culture, entomology, plant pathology, livestock and poultry disease, livestock and poultry improvement, improved farm tools, irrigation, extension methods, health and sanitation, literacy, social services, sociology and psychology.<sup>14</sup>

Literacy, ability to perform simple arithmetic functions and willingness to work wherever assigned upon completion of the four-to-six months training course were the only requisites for participation in the training program.

#### Indian Assistance to Village Development

As early as 1956, the Government of India expressed an interest in assisting Nepal in Village Development. The Indian concept of participation was based upon the conviction that the best interest of the Village Development Program could be served by dividing the country into Indian-aided and American-aided Zones. Aid was to be funneled through His Majesty's Government to blocks supported by either of the two aid donors. This plan was at first unacceptable to the Americans mainly because of their opposition to a fragmented approach to development. After considerable discussion which involved Nepalese, Indian and American officials, a plan was agreed upon whereby each of the two donors assumed responsibility for a designated geographic area under the VDP.

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<sup>13</sup> USOM, Technical Cooperative Program of the Government of Nepal and the Government of the United States--Village Development, Kathmandu, 1954.

<sup>14</sup> Deussenberry, Op. Cit., p. 5.

"India concentrated its village development efforts in the plains and in three Valleys: Patan, second largest town in the Kathmandu Valley...; Pokhara, the farthest north of the major valleys...; and Palungtar, through which winds the Tribuhuvan Rajpath."<sup>15</sup>

The Rajpath is the main north-south road connecting India and Nepal.

It was not until July 28, 1959 that India took steps toward active involvement and participation in the village development program. Their plan was one of massive financial assistance and extensive technical advice. Importantly, it also called for the expansion of development blocks along the pattern of the block development system occurring in India. The Government of India promised the equivalent of some 5.3 million dollars worth of assistance to the village development program. Its field workers and administrators were to assume responsibility for thirteen development blocks, including six that had been under the direction of USOM.<sup>16</sup>

The entry of India into the VDP had the unfortunate consequence of triggering competition between herself and America in this field. This competition, as will be explained later in this discussion, had negative effects on the program.

#### Local -- Self-Government Activity

By 1961, a local self-government activity was added to the overall Village Development Program. The basic purpose of this activity was to "extend and strengthen the participation of villagers in their own local government by the organization of village panchayats. This involved the election of members of the Panchayats and training these members for the performance of their duties." As a consequence, Nepal was to have at least the rudimentary machinery essential for vertical communication within Nepalese National society.<sup>17</sup> The Government of Nepal established two basic targets for this activity:

- (1) CREATION OF AN EFFECTIVE, HONEST AND REASONABLY efficient organization of semi-autonomous local government bodies throughout Nepal capable of discharging those functions of local government, responsive to the will of the people as expressed through their local representatives;

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<sup>15</sup> Mihaley, Op. Cit., p. 148.

<sup>16</sup> USOM, Country Assistance Program, 1959.

<sup>17</sup> USOM, Country Assistance Program, 1962.

- (2) Provision of means of vertical communication to insure that the national government does not become isolated from the people and unresponsive to their needs.<sup>18</sup>

To achieve these targets, all facilities required would be geared toward organizing 4,000 Panchayats, and training 4,000 Panchayat Secretaries and 24,000 elected members of Panchayats by 1966.<sup>19</sup>

After considerable debate and discussion of all issues involved, His Majesty's Government decided to abandon the Village Development Program and to phase it out by 1963. To achieve this end, it was mutually agreed that India would withdraw its support from the program and the United States would divert its financial and technical support to other types of development activities.

#### Evaluation of the Program

The Village Development Program was not without its shortcomings. In spite of these, it made commendable headway in achieving some of its development objectives.

It may be fruitful to first examine some of the weaknesses of the program. Mihaley put forth a forceful, if not always correct, argument that the village development program failed. He postulated that the program failed because of the flaws in the assumption that Nepal "was being swept by a revolution of rising expectations." He argued that:

"Nepal, however, was not in the grip of a revolution of rising expectations. The majority of its inhabitants were unaware that a way of life different from their own existed. Those who were aware either refused to believe that change was possible for them or they had a vested interest in the status quo.... Most of the peasants, who comprised about 95 percent of the population, lived at such a low standard and were in the grip of such an iniquitous land-ownership system that their interest in the world beyond the village boundaries were minimal. To them, prospects of change involved unacceptable psychological and material risks. Peasants who owned land and made up the power structure in village life looked upon practically any innovation as a direct threat to their position...."

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

For this reason, efforts to improve agricultural techniques and to raise yields by means of approaches to the peasants through village development, agricultural extension, and similar projects met with nearly total defeat."<sup>20</sup>

"This resistance to change was also found among the towns-people, the middle class, civil servants, and politicians.... The status quo was reinforced by religious attitudes, by standards of conduct and morality, and by social institutions, such as the inheritance system."<sup>21</sup>

Mihaley also claimed that "the program failed due to the quality of people who formed the ranks of village development workers." To him, "the success of the program depended on the graduates of the Kathmandu School because they were the primary elements in the channel of communication between the Government and the people. The first graduates were city born and bred and had little understanding of the problems of farmers and less comprehension of the various technical dimensions of agriculture." Once in the countryside, these idealistic young people were confronted with what Mihaley describes as "an incomprehensible, uncomfortable, and hostile environment." The program also required the trainees "to be independent, to have initiative, and to be able to teach others. In the Nepalese society, where the joint family had not yet begun to crumble, where the young lived under a strict paternalism at home and initiative was discouraged by tradition, and where education was, at best, poor, this was an intolerably large order."<sup>22</sup>

Mihaley's conclusions, although harsh and sometimes based upon incomplete evidence, cannot be summarily dismissed either as irrelevant or without foundation. They are inconclusively supported and partially rejected by a subsequent evaluation of the Village Development Program by a group of Nepalese scholars.<sup>23</sup> However, it must be pointed out that failure itself is as relative as is success. Each is dependent upon the quality of the categories of variables designed to test or to substantiate it. It is appropriate to raise the question, by what objective criteria shall the success or failure

<sup>20</sup> Mihaley, Op. Cit., p. 176.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 32-33.

<sup>23</sup> D. P. Shrestha, et. al., Report on Village Development Program in Pokhara (Kaski), Kathmandu: Department of Economics of Tribhuvan University, 1963, and Report on Village Development Programme in Chitwan (Rapti), 1967.

of the Village Development Program in Nepal be judged? This question will be examined later in this paper. Pertinent findings in the studies by the Nepalese scholars mentioned above will be considered in a further discussion.

According to assessments made by this writer, there were weaknesses in the Village Development programme much more fundamental than those articulated by Mihalev. Specifically, targets were hindered because of poor communications, inadequate transportation facilities outside Kathmandu Valley, and other impediments to physical mobility imposed by the rugged terrain in many parts of the country. Inescapably, competition and misunderstanding resulted by the participation of two nations with divergent views and different objectives to be achieved in the same development project. Each nation had its own conceptual approach to village development and these were not always compatible with each other. Each had its own techniques of implementation and these were prone neither to uniformity nor to coordination.

The operational difficulties of the program stemmed from the participation of both India and the United States in the program and the tendency of His Majesty's Government to accept advice from these two sources simultaneously. "Under the Indian Aid Mission's (IAM) method of operation, all money for health, agriculture, public works, education, etc., was controlled by Village Development. Under the USOM's method, all such money was funneled through the separate divisions. IAM paid one salary scale and allowance; USOM paid the HMG scale."<sup>24</sup> These differences affected morale as well as performance on the job, and eventually led to the restructuring, if not the demise, of the entire Village Development effort.

### Accomplishments

The Village Development Program and the Village Development Workers accomplished both tangible and intangible results in the ten years before it was phased into the Panchayat Development Program.

The period between 1952 and 1959 seems representative of some of the quantitative achievements in self-help activities. In this period, the village development workers and associated technical specialists stimulated the following types of response and participation from the people:<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> USOM, Proforma of Project Village Development Field Service, Kathmandu: August 10, 1961, ("USOM" refers to United States Overseas Mission).

<sup>25</sup> USOM, Country Assistance Program, 1961.

Improved agricultural practices	157,482 contacts
Improved insect control, seed and fertilizer methods	6,040 acres of demonstration
Improved sanitary home practices	17,603 contacts
Improved latrines built	7,012
Minor irrigation canals constructed	302 miles
Motorable roads and tracks constructed	903 miles
Tube-wells and dug wells constructed	2,560
Schools established	694
Innoculations and vaccinations given	272,603
Literary classes organized	476
Improved kitchen practices	1,962 contacts
Improved food habit practices	2,327 contacts
Improved mother-child-care practices	3,842 contacts
Improved health habits and sanitation	4,214 contacts
4-Leaf Clubs organized	350
4-Leaf Club members	8,955

By 1961, the significant changes mentioned in selected activities below are illustrative of the increasing pay-off of the Village Development Program:<sup>26</sup>

Small village wells dug or driven	3,473
Improved latrines constructed	10,542
Village schools established	2,811
Canals and channels dug	662
Roads and tracks built	1,340
Bridges built	759
Dams constructed	166

At the end of 1961, the following personnel had been trained:<sup>27</sup>

Village development workers	860
Gram Sivaks (women workers)	120
Block Youth Program Officers	25
Social Education Officers	45
Block Development Officers	50

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<sup>26</sup> USAID, Country Assistance Program, 1962

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

The national staff consisted of 35 individuals who gave support to 120 District Office Staff and 116 specialists who were working in 2,104 villages and reaching approximately one million Nepalese people. It is apparent that the number of projects suggested the extent to which the people were actively involved in self-help activities and the degree of social mobilization which was underway in Nepal at that time.

Significant progress was also achieved in the effort to establish a viable system of local self-government. By 1962, seventy-five political districts and fourteen zones had been created. In January, 1962, the Gaun Panchayat or Village Council Law was enacted. This law was of special importance because it:

1. Authorized the Village Councils to deal with local matters.
2. Gave the Village Councils the responsibility for the initiation and execution of self-help activities.
3. Contained within it the concept that development activities should make use of local resources and skills.
4. Authorized Gaun Panchayats to impose local taxes (equal to ten percent of the land revenues of the area).
5. Allowed Gaun Panchayats to receive a tax rebate from the Government equal to ten percent of the land revenue.

"Between February 18, 1962 and June 15th of the same year, some 3,476 nine-man village councils were elected in the seventy-five development districts in Nepal."<sup>28</sup> One of the more compelling consequences of these elections was the decision by the Nepalese Government to establish a Ministry of Panchayats which was enjoined to undertake a national program for self-help development through the Panchayat organization at both the village and district levels.

These elections were solid evidence that the Panchayat system was becoming institutionalized in Nepal; that democracy could be built from the bottom up, and that the elaboration of a government by democratically elected councils was, indeed, consistent with long established traditions in Nepal. The Panchayat System is a four-tier structure in which the lowest body, the village council, is elected by direct vote. Each higher body, the District, Zonal and National Panchayats, is elected by the next lower body. At the national level, His Majesty

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

the King appoints additional members and representation is also accorded non-political bodies called class organizations. The National Panchayat consists of 125 members.

Two definitive studies of the Village Development Program were conducted by Dr. D. P. Shrestha and some of his colleagues at Tribhuvan University and reported in 1963 and 1967. Dr. Shrestha selected eight villages covered by the Village Development and compared various activities in them with the same type of activities in three villages not covered by the Program. Some of his more important findings are listed below:

1. In the villages covered by the Village Development Programme, the average percentage of literacy and the level of education among females is higher than that in the villages outside the Programme.<sup>29</sup>
2. The productivity of rice is in no way better in those villages which were covered by the Programme than in those not covered by the Programme.<sup>30</sup>
3. In all the families, the majority of the families do not possess any idea of improved types of implements at all.... The degree of ignorance is greater in those villages not covered by the Village Development Programme than in those covered by it.<sup>31</sup>
4. The lack of farm implements like the kuto (hoe) and the kodāl' (spade) is more apparent in those villages not covered by the Programme than in those covered by it.<sup>32</sup>
5. The activities of the Village Development Programme are relatively more pronounced and more widespread in the field of vaccinations and inoculations of cattle than elsewhere.... As much as 40 percent of the households reported to have inoculated their cattle.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> D. P. Shrestha, Report on Village Development Program in Pokhara (Kaski), Kathmandu: Department of Economics, Tribhuvan University, 1963, p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

6. TABC and smallpox vaccinations are higher in the villages within the programme than in those outside the programme.<sup>34</sup>
7. On the whole, more than two-thirds of the households were reported to have contributed cash, labour, and materials to various construction works. The proportion ranged from 80.9% to 60.0%.<sup>35</sup>
8. People contributed money, labour, and materials primarily for the construction of schools, roads, bridges, canals, wells and community halls. Contributions were higher in those villages covered by the Village Development Programme than in those which were not covered by the Programme.<sup>36</sup>
9. In the case of (knowledge and distribution of) better seeds, it is not, however, clearly seen that the degree of ignorance (about them) is greater in those villages which were not covered by the Village Development Programme than in those which were within the Programme.<sup>37</sup>
10. "The activities of the (former) Village Development Programme seem to have been concentrated on construction of school building, vaccination of livestock, TABC inoculations, DDT spray, smallpox vaccination, and demonstration of better seeds and fertilizer. All people who had access to them did not use them well or equally. It, therefore, appears that the weakest link in the working of the Village Development Programme has been the lack of efforts directed towards the process of demonstration, experimentation, persuasion, propagation or training in those matters which are as yet, quite novel to the rural people."<sup>38</sup>

Finally, there is evidence that the Village Development Program did awaken a significant number of the Nepalese people to the possibilities of change in their traditional way of living and it created an

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 16

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

understanding of the alternatives for improving their existence. The VDP made the people aware of their Government and it brought the Government much closer toward a realistic assessment and consciousness of the needs of the people than at any time in the history of Nepal. It is not important that Village Development Workers achieved a measure of success, especially in introducing essential and fundamental community development and self-help principles into many villages and districts of Nepal. The VDP was, in effect, the logical precursor of the present Panchayat Development Program. As such, it provided a springboard for community action and local development.

### Panchayat Development

Having recognized the need either to restructure or abolish the Village Development Program, His Majesty's Government of Nepal embarked upon a program of Panchayat Development in 1963. Community development in Nepal in 1969 takes the form of Panchayat Development. This is essentially a program of district and local government administration and development.

Development projects under this program are directed at the central level by the Home-Panchayat Ministry; at the District level by the District Panchayat and the Chief District Officer who is a paid Government Official and serves as the Secretary of the District Panchayat, and at the Village level by the Pradhan Panch or Village Council Chairman

The coordinating functions of development projects in the field are found at the District level. The Chief District Officer has the responsibility of coordinating and utilizing the expertise provided by the technical ministries at that level for the most efficacious implementation of development projects.

A compendious expression of the objectives of this program was provided by Dr. John Cool, a USAID/N official formerly associated with this project. He saw the Panchayat Development Project as a program for:

1. Bringing into existence competent, legally sanctioned, local government bodies, to which decision-making authority could be decentralized;
2. The establishment of an institutionalized framework within which the rural people may actively participate in the process of development;
3. Bringing about a radical change in the attitudes of the agrarian populace toward their environment and toward their government;

4. The mobilization and development of human resources for economic development, and
5. Overcoming the passivity of the people.<sup>39</sup>

His Majesty's Government committed itself in 1963 to reforms which require the participation of the people as well as the support of the rural people and their leaders. These reforms included ten reforms in the tax system, considerable agricultural reorganization (as described in the Agricultural Reorganization Act of 1963 and the Cooperative Bank Act of 1963), a fundamental commitment by the Government to a program of decentralization, and concerted efforts to involve the population more actively in self-help development.

This activity took the form of administrative and organizational development, local development projects of a tangible nature, and development training programs. In the implementation of the development and training programs, the districts and villages are assisted by the following types of personnel: Panchayat Development Officers, Assistant Panchayat Development Officers, Panchayat Training Officers, Panchayat Training Assistants, Panchayat Development Workers, as well as by Village and Local Leaders. All but the latter two categories of functionaries are assigned to specific district headquarters but work at both District and Village levels.

Since 1963, three Panchayat Training Institutes for men have opened in Nepal. These are located at Rampur in the Rapti Valley, Jhapa in Eastern Nepal, and Nepalgunj in Western Nepal. A fourth institute was scheduled for construction and opening during the fiscal year, 1967-68. However, it was later decided that the best interest of the country could be served by improving the quality of existing institutes rather than by opening others. These institutes provide training in job responsibilities and development programs to all of the elected and non-elected officials and leaders at the Village and District levels.

Between 1963 and 1967, these programs reached:

1. A total of 2,964 paid district staff members of all categories who received from one to four months of training;
2. 373 Women Village Workers who were given from 3 to 6 months of training in subjects designed to improve the position of village women;

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<sup>39</sup> John C. Cool, The Panchayat System and Self-Help Development, Kathmandu: USAID, 1962, pp. 1-4.

3. Approximately 40,000 Village Panchayat Members who received from one to two weeks of training in Panchayat Principles and procedures;
4. Almost 24,000 village women leaders who were given training in nutrition, child care, sewing and knitting, health practices, and Panchayat philosophy;
5. Approximately 750 local leaders who were given training in the principles of leadership, Panchayat philosophy, and local development techniques;
6. More than 1200 elected officials of District and Town Panchayats and class organizations in special conferences and seminars on problem-solving, and
7. 284 officers of the District and Zonal levels who were given training of a specialized nature.<sup>40</sup>

Greater coordination in the programs of the districts and the operations of their offices is being achieved under the new directions provided by the Panchayat Development Program. Procedures for the initiation and approval of self-help projects have been established and effectuated in most of the 75 Districts. The Government of Nepal appropriates the equivalent of \$400,000 annually for the support of self-help projects. New accounting procedures for controlling the utilization of grant-in-aid funds have been developed and implemented. Improved personnel records and personnel management procedures have been adopted and implemented.

Construction continues in the areas of village community centers, district offices, minor irrigation works, bridges, culverts and roads. Village water supplies are improving throughout the nation.

Projects are financed by special allocations from the Ministry, District and Village Panchayat funds and foreign assistance such as from USAID.

### The Future

Human resource development remains the most critical need in Nepal. Without it, there can be no significant achievements in

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<sup>40</sup> USAID, Country Assistance Program, 1967.

agricultural and economic development. Without it, there can be no real "take-off," into the mainstream of a world largely engaged in a revolution of modernity.

Nepal now has an institutionalized political structure which can assure the participation of the people in their own affairs. An important reality is simply this: The available massive labor supply must be mobilized in such a way that the myriad problems facing this developing nation can be eradicated within a short space of time. This is not a denial of ample evidence of the people's interest and willingness to participate in development activities, especially in those areas where dynamic leadership prevails and where there is reason for the people to believe that their energies will not go unrewarded.

In December, 1967, His Majesty the King initiated a "Back to the Village" Campaign in which urban people and especially Government leaders of Nepal were charged with the responsibility of stimulating development to every village in the country through leadership, active participation, and field implementation. Results throughout the country have been encouraging. Although it is somewhat premature to make a final assessment of its long-term results, the campaign has broadened the base of community participation in development activities and is a vehicle through which the leaders and the people are being brought another step closer toward political integration and national development.

HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS  
OF  
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA<sup>1</sup>

by  
Boyd Faulkner

Introduction

Community development, as a concept within governmental operations, has existed in Tanzania since 1946. As a separate agency of government designated by title as "Community Development," it came into existence shortly after Tanzania gained its independence in 1961.

During the period of more than two decades in which formal recognition has been given to it as an important part of nation building in Tanzania, very little information concerning the operations was disseminated beyond official channels. The field workers kept records and made monthly reports of their activities, and the headquarters regularly produced annual official reports concerning its efforts. The training and other officers of the Division produced comprehensive materials for internal program guidance and for use in annual budgetary exercise.

Also, in recent years, a scattered literature highlighting particular aspects of the Tanzanian Community Development Program were produced by research personnel from the United Nations and other international agencies.<sup>2</sup>

However, both in the case of internal reports and research materials, little external distribution was made. The international body of Community Development literature, therefore, contains no sequential documentation of the emergence, establishment, and operation of the Tanzanian program which is one of the largest and oldest national Community Development programs in operation today.

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<sup>1</sup>The country was known as part of German East Africa from 1884 to 1917 and as a part of British East Africa from 1922 to 1946. In 1946, the United Nations placed it under British trusteeship as Tanganyika. In 1964, after independence and union with Zanzibar, it became Tanzania.

<sup>2</sup>A. S. Ruskin and J. Ruskin, on fellowships from the Ford Foundation's Africa-Asia Public Service, prepared a report on Tanganyikan Community Development and its participation in Village Development Planning in 1962; V. Junod and M. Jellicoe of Makerere College (Uganda) of East Africa and M. King of UNICEF (Paris) made special Community Development studies in 1966, but the writer is familiar with these only in their draft form.

Of more importance to Community Development practitioners than the recital of statistical data concerning projects completed and other physical accomplishments of the program in retrospect are the lessons found in terms of the process in action in this particular cultural, political, and socio-economic environment. The structure and functions of the Community Development organization, the interrelationships of an integrated approach, the short-term targets and the overall purpose, and the methods and training used are only typical of many of the national programs in existence in several of the lesser-developed countries. A description of these features would provide no surprising depth of information. The value of the present narration lies more in the attempt to describe the numerous obstacles and hazards that need to be taken into consideration in order to produce a useful Community Development program out of the precedent of a long period of colonial practices followed by a shorter period of newly gained independence and nationalism. Crucial to this analysis is an appreciation of the limitations to, and the possibilities for, planned developmental socio-economic change which have their genesis in the history, environment, and culture of the Tanzanian people.

### Social History

Tanzania has a rich archeological story of worldwide fame. The subsequent story of its exploitation in terms of ivory, precious minerals and human beings is no less known. Although Tanzania's pre-history and early exploitation is extremely interesting and provides facts useful in the scientific and historical fields, the distant past has very little significance for the country of Tanzania and its people today. The greatest social and economic impact upon the people of Tanzania came more recently when the country came under German hegemony just before the turn of the century and subsequently when the country came under British colonial influence at the end of World War I.

The colonial administrators of both these European powers introduced many changes. They established some national identity through the new administrative structure, built communication facilities, and introduced government civil service institutions. They fostered agriculture, public health, and education, and stabilized the Swahili language as the official medium of communication. Although the colonial system provided an opportunity for all to enter large scale farming or commercial business, the ambitions, drives, and resources of the foreign settlers placed them in possession of all major resource development opportunities.

Very little thought was given by colonial administrators to the preparation of the Africans to enter into the national economic endeavor. Few Africans were in key government positions. None were engaged in extensive cash crop production or in commercial enterprises. The

economy of the average African seldom rose above subsistence level despite the existence of basic opportunity and resources. Much to the surprise of the colonial authorities, Tanzania demanded its independence at least twenty years before scheduled. It was granted with graciousness in December 1961.

With independence came a great change in the role of the African. Though many key positions remained filled by Britishers, the policy of Africanization placed about 100,000 Africans in public service positions formerly held by Asians and Britishers. After independence, many of the European plantation operators were forced to depart, and the production of agricultural exports suffered. Only a few Africans successfully replaced the foreign operators as export producers. Although the opportunity for Tanzanian businessmen to assume commercial leadership arose, the credit and technical ability factors militated against the development of an entrepreneurial class. Many of the commercial businesses became socialized under governmental control. The quality of government services generally suffered as well because of African attitudes engendered in the colonial period that affected acquisition of managerial and organizational ability. Taxes increased and savings were strongly affected by rising prices.

In summation, the decline in agricultural export earnings, increased taxes, rising domestic prices, the lack of entrepreneurial ability, the decline of administrative standards, and all the other problems which face modern societies, such as urbanization, population increase, demands for improved education, welfare, and public health, were present in Tanzania. And it is in this climate that the Community Development program had to seek its way during the independence years.

### The Natural Environment

Tanzanian environment is generally described on the basis of its five regions, which provide a variety of distinguishable climate and physical features. Climate ranges from that usual to tropical equatorial areas along the coast and in other low elevations to the temperate climate of the highlands and mountain regions. Only half of the country receives more than 30 inches of rain annually, but the coast and Eastern Plateau receive up to 80 or more inches in a year. The seasonal rainfall distribution has greater influence on agricultural activity than does the quantity of rain. Quite regularly, the period of long rain extends from March to May. In most areas, the short rainy period comes in November and December. In some parts of the country the two periods merge. Rich soils are found in the volcanic and valley areas, but soils elsewhere are generally infertile and tend to erode. Irrigation is only partly developed, though it is a contribution to power and irrigation. Lakes provide inland transportation and fish as food for the people of the western part of the country. The sea-coast has three excellent harbors and the ocean waters provide a subsistence livelihood to native fishermen.

Vegetation is that typical of the rain forest, the semi-desert, the mangrove swamp and the upland savanna. Grassland proper, closed forests and semi-desert comprise only about ten percent of the country. When the rains come to the dry areas, they luxuriate with grass and flowers. The forests contain useful timber, which is zealously guarded by the Forestry Department. The grassland provides pasture for domestic herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and goats of nomadic peoples and settled ones. Wild animals are found throughout most of the country and are an important tourist attraction. These, too, are carefully protected as a national treasure and are not to be molested by the African poacher.

From an economic point of view, the natural resources of the country have not yet been fully exploited. Possibilities exist for increased production and income in foods and fibers, fishing, forest products, and the tourist industry to mention only a few aspects of the economic potential of the country. The greatest asset, however, is the people themselves. Without the continuing development of their potential, little cultural or economic expansion will take place. A brief description of the Tanzanian people is pertinent to the understanding of what is necessary to arouse their active interest in economic and social progress.

### The People

Due to the events of the past century, the society of Tanzania is a mosaic in which physical, sub-cultural, and linguistic differences separate ethnic, tribal, and dialectic groups from one another. The mainland contains approximately 12.2 million people of whom ninety-nine percent are African. The one percent includes Asians, Arabs, and Europeans.<sup>3</sup> The Asians (mostly Indians) constitute the largest non-African category but, because of their varied origin and their traditional recognition of caste and social stratification, they do not form a cohesive social unit. Asian groups do settle together in urban settings, but they have not integrated with the Africans as the Arabs have and, as a race, are disliked by the Africans. They are a generally modernized population and continue to hold social and economic position over the Africans, though often with uncertainty and fear. Many of the Asians have not chosen citizenship, and many know no other country. Individually, however, some Asians are fully accepted socially and are found to be working within the government structure.

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<sup>3</sup>American University, Area Handbook of Tanzania, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1968, p. vii.

Europeans form the smallest ethnic group but bear considerable influence. The majority of these are the British who assist the Tanzanian Republic in its administrative tasks and conduct both government and private enterprises. Their presence is becoming gradually reduced. Most of the plantation owners are Greek, Dutch, and Danish. South Africans were early sent from the country. Social relations between Europeans and Africans are generally agreeable, although the average African prefers to associate with his own people. White groups are frequently snubbed for political reasons and as an outgrowth of tensions built up between white administrators and Tanzanians during the colonial period.

The Republic has taken responsibility for a large number of political refugees from Mozambique, Rwanda and Congo who are much more a liability than a manpower asset at the present time.

The African population can be described generally as having the characteristics usually attributed to people of the less developed countries. Ninety-five percent live in rural areas and are engaged in subsistence agriculture, pastoral practices, or hunting and gathering. Two-thirds of the people live in the upper third of the country where soil and climate are favorable to living. The most fertile areas support up to 500 people per square mile but the less productive only about three. The average density is thirty-five per square mile. The manpower force between 14 and 65 years of age comprises about sixty percent of the population.<sup>4</sup> Though there are more than one hundred distinguishable tribes, each with its particular traditions, language (or dialect) and locality, the national charismatic leadership has helped to fuse the various societies into a semblance of a nation. Nevertheless, despite colonial and present government discouragement of tribalism, tribal loyalties are strong. Variability of climate, soil and similar environmental situations have traditionally made for the differentiation of tribal practices and have brought about social variations now reflected in differences of occupation and educational opportunities. Yet, a consistency of cultural content is evident for most of the African tribal people.

For the most part, the extended biologic family is traditionally the strongest social institution. Increasing amounts of education and the participation in a wage economy tend to be the most disruptive factors to traditional social structure and ways of making a living. Though the leadership of the country attempts to subvert many traditional institutions, it strongly encourages the ever-extending family and brotherhood concept. Household labor continues to be based on sex

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

and age. The aged are still respected for their wisdom and guidance. Kin groups and neighbors encourage mutual work on community activities traditionally based on labor exchange in farm work and community living.

Most tribes settle in scattered homesteads, often forming neighborhood farming units. Some, however, are nomadic and move by families along with their herds. Along the coast and in some other areas, village type settlements exist. Living conditions vary greatly since climatic and thus, economic variations affect food supply. Diseases and debilitating infections are endemic. One-third of the people die before maturity. Government health facilities are ever over-taxed, houses are usually crowded and unventilated. Water is generally polluted and food remains unprotected. Human waste disposal is usually primitive and the waste matter is a source of disease. Rural families are quite self-sufficient in the traditional sense for they grow most of their own food and build their own homes. They feel a need of money only for clothes, some commercial foods, taxes, school fees and for a few luxury items such as a radio or a bicycle. Modernization, education and outside influence have raised the anticipations of many rural people and have greatly influenced their values and desires. Many have moved from rural areas to the towns in search of work and a fuller life. Although the migration to urban centers is discouraged and even prohibited, it continues; and very few return to their rural homes despite tribal and family ties. Government leaders and politicians have organized with the people a number of new settlements or village schemes for establishing centers of improved rural living, effort, and services. These have met with variable success depending largely upon the extent of local participation and are not being increased appreciably.

Urban conditions vary among city inhabitants. The skilled workers, semi-professional, and affluent members of the society live very well. The majority of urban dwellers, however, have no professional skills and live in conditions far less desirable than those found in rural areas. Towns have arisen only as a result of foreigners establishing transportation, marketing, and other public service centers. Villagization<sup>5</sup> is not a general Tanzanian tradition.

The rate of population growth is around 2.25 percent per annum.<sup>6</sup> Africans generally consider that procreation is the prime feature of marriage and are not inclined to practice contraception. Children are thought to be a sort of social security in that their duty is to support their parents in the parent's old age.

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<sup>5</sup> A term used in Tanzania meaning formation of villages.

<sup>6</sup> American University, op. cit.

Although the number of modernized, sophisticated Africans (in the Western sense) is increasing quite rapidly, there is not a large African elite in Tanzania who distinguish themselves apart from their tribes and their peoples. This feature of political life eliminates the possibility of a self-perpetuating ruling elite with minimum interest in providing social mobility to rural and lower income groups.

#### Traditional Values and Change in Attitudes

Education and experience have had great impact upon traditional characteristics in recent years. Following independence, the people were urged by their leaders to take up productive ways of life and to help otherwise in building the new nation. National pride, a new confidence in native ability, and national self-respect took the place of passivity and apathy, especially in the outlook of urban people. Nationalism, other feelings, and new outlooks arose. The youth of the nation became less content with traditional ways and acquired new aspirations that now drastically alter the course of their lives and eventually will influence the course of the national destiny.

Yet, a deep-seated conservativeness persists in the rural areas that militates against a mass movement that would appreciably change the social and economic situation of these communities. About half of the population still adheres to the tribal religions. Within tribes, little social or occupational differentiation exists other than the traditional division of labor between the sexes mentioned previously. In most communities, diviners are respected and wield considerable authority. Witches, sorcerers, spirits, taboos, and charms are all a part of everyday life despite government attempts to introduce rational tribal explanations of phenomena. A few of the traditional concepts and practices favor particular changes, but more often they prevent the acceptance of innovations. Although the lack of response of people to inducements for change is often blamed on their indifference, lack of understanding, and absence of information, the resistance may be more properly attributed to the conflict between urged change and traditional concepts. Nevertheless, many of the traditional values within the African society are those commanding universal respect. Cleanliness, modesty, loyalty, pleasantness, and industry are admired in a wife. A husband is expected to be generous, hospitable, brave, and a good conversationalist. Respect and obedience are expected and given by the tribal members to tribal authorities and elders. Values tend to support egalitarian behavior, mutual cooperation and sharing of surplus.

The remnants of tribal social control play an important part in the maintenance of national stability. However, the impatience of modernizers with tribal institutions and ties is weakening those many needed controls and services which are not yet available from the

government. The national leadership puts great pressure upon people to engage in nation-building projects and to take other responsible actions. In many respects, people have wholeheartedly responded. However, too few responses have resulted in appreciable changes in income, savings, attitudes, or knowledge. People have difficulty equating work per se with any new values and the end result is that many Community Development projects have produced structures as evidence of the people's loyalty rather than beneficial modernization in a deeper sense.

One synchronization of the modern with the traditional, however, is making use of Tanzanian music, dancing, and art as a means of establishing national identity in modernization. Traditionally, music and dances are a part of every tribal social occasion; they comprise an important aspect of community living. Even though, in urban settings, the singing and dancing are becoming commercialized, these arts continue as a means of fusing people into a nation. In rural areas, music, singing and chanting are also a part of the self-help work. As for the plastic arts, Tanzanian carvings in ebony have become important in art circles all over the world. Simpler carvings are made for the tourist trade. Both types of art are now highly commercialized and provide an income to a few people. Music, dancing, and art have all helped to distinguish Tanzania as a distinct country with its own artistic tradition.

Though nationalism brings about an immediate strong response, the response is sporadic and is, in the writer's opinion, without enough objectivity to be permanently viable. A community group may undertake an agricultural or construction project as a gesture of political loyalty, but they are less likely to accept a profitable agricultural practice as individuals until they find a rationale for changing old methods and have adequate assurance that such a change will not be detrimental. Community Development, as it matures as a social science, can provide the method whereby people are motivated to make socio-economic adjustments to tradition patterns themselves and thus find psychological justification to accept new values.

#### Community Development Before Independence

No precise date can be set as the time that Community Development was first practiced in what is now Tanzania. The traditional societies had many activities that could be equated with Community Development as it is now practiced. Most tribes, for example, recognized a particular day of the week when the members would come together to engage in some building project, such as a road, a canal, or a house. Problem solving by the community was a common procedure, and sometimes tribes joined in making the decisions.

When the area became a part of colonial East Africa, both of the colonial governments encouraged self-help work and a considerable degree of tribal self-determination. Some question exists whether the self-help at this time was the result of voluntary and spontaneous group

decision or a form of government coercion and whether local government was more for the convenience of central government than for seeking local opinion. In any case, the people of the communities appear not to have questioned the practice seriously. A United Nations official, in one instance, took a colonial technician of the area to task for prevailing upon the local Masai tribesmen to build dams for their livestock. They had received at the time of their work a subsistence amount of food. The official contended that this was exploitation of people. Today, many such projects are encouraged by many of the governments over the world with no such question being raised.

As a national program of government, Community Development started in 1946 when the Social Welfare Department was organized by the British colonial government. One of the first projects was to set up recreation and learning centers in urban areas for reorientation of returning war veterans. The veterans showed little interest in becoming reorientated to their country, so the centers were opened to the public for recreation and educational purposes. The behavior of some of the people gave the centers a questionable reputation. However, in addition to the dance hall and bar, which provided operational finances, adult classes in Swahili, English, mathematics, and home economics were held.

In 1950, six senior British officials and thirty British assistants plus two African assistants were assigned from the Social Welfare Department to form the Social Development Department within the Ministry of Local Government. (This was the first of several departmental titles and ministry locations of the Community Development effort in Tanzania over the next two decades.)

As a Social Development Department, generally the activities of the workers did not alter appreciably from those initiated under Social Welfare, but the activities were intensified and extended. Through this organization, a few special individual projects of importance were generated. Separate Commissioners were appointed for urban and rural sectors. In the urban areas, the activities were confined to the community centers. According to the reporting format, success was measured by the extent that the financial returns met operating costs rather than upon the success of the educational efforts. In most instances, the centers paid their operating expenses, which included utilities, teachers, and study materials. In the rural areas, community self-help projects were urged, literacy classes in Swahili were promoted, special projects were undertaken by youth groups, and women's clubs were formed for learning homecraft. Consideration was given to the formation of Village Development Committees, each representing several communities or villages.

By 1961, Social Development activities of 75 workers covered nine towns and localities in twenty districts within six of the eight Provinces.

A significant addition to the development structure was the formation by the representatives of Social Development of Community

Development Committees at the district and regional levels to bring about a joint consideration of local problems. The joint effort was entirely dependent upon the Social Development Officer. Most community efforts were those sometimes now subsumed under "Community Development". The objectives stated in the annual reports of the Department during this period state objectives which are also in keeping with modern-day Community Development. In a few areas, the Department collaborated with agricultural and health officials in projects increasing agricultural productivity and in improving public health. In these few special instances where an integrated approach was made, the results were surprisingly successful and had permanent influence. Despite the fact that these efforts in a joint approach to local needs demonstrated the advantage of such a method beyond reasonable doubt, they had little effect upon ministries and departments getting together as a general policy.

The Social Development Program was supported by thirteen mobile film-showing units and six UNICEF Landrovers for transporting women workers to areas not covered by regular women workers. Film showings were made largely according to the independent schedule established by the Film Section of the Department. The "UNICEF" units gave packaged lectures and demonstrations to groups of women outside usual work areas.

The monthly and annual reports have recorded that hundreds of self-help projects worth thousands of dollars were continually underway, that around 28,000 people enrolled in literacy classes each year to learn Swahili, and that more than 14,000 women belonged to at least 400 registered clubs for receiving lessons on home and life improvement. The organization of people for self-help work, the formation of adult literacy classes, and the lecturing and demonstrating to women on improved home practices became the accepted way of community development in the minds of most people. The statistics provided administrators and politicians with impressive figures that helped to establish budgetary support. Most Social Development workers had found a way of work that did not tax their ingenuity or tend to rouse questions about the usefulness of their effort. These entrenched methods of work required no justification beyond that of providing statistics. The only demand was that the statistics be accurate and impressive.

Adult literacy organizers usually contended that people needed to become literate in order to avoid being cheated by the local Cooperative officials and the merchants and to read the directions on road signs and rest rooms. The effort could have been expected to be more useful if it had been directed towards the encouragement of honest business practices and towards preparing people to meet actual and urgent problems. It seems that the promoters of literacy erroneously equated the inability to read and write with ignorance and stupidity and presumed that people could not improve their lot unless they became literate. Somewhat more useful efforts included mathematics, English and other subjects that gave people skills they needed to obtain jobs and better positions. In doing literacy projects, the Social Development worker spent a great amount of time searching for volunteer teachers, checking literacy attendance, making monthly reports and urging people to form classes.

The officials of the Department who were in charge of the literacy work put continued pressure on field workers to increase their statistical figures. Literacy training became a full-time job for some workers. The people enrolling for classes purchased their own literacy books, work papers, and pencils. The teachers were volunteers who donated their time except where grateful students paid them in cash or in kind. The Department furnished the blackboard and teacher instruction. It was a project that could function without any large expenditure of funds. Moreover, it gave satisfaction to many workers and people. Becoming literate was usually a matter of pride rather than of utility. Most of the workers contended that it was a method of getting people together so that they could discuss common problems and arrive at actions. They argued that literacy classes provided a means of organizing communities for planning and action. In reality, the Social Development Assistants could have been helping people engage in far more useful efforts. The literacy classes' activity bypassed the basic requirement of Community Development that action should involve as large a part of the community as possible and should arise as a result of local decision making.

Self-help projects were usually the outcome of what the worker thought the community needed rather than the result of people deciding what activity was best for themselves. It was thought to be a means for making use of idle manpower; community centers, school houses, and roads could be built cheaply through self-help. The concept and the motivating forces used in the early community development effort were misleading to the people and to the government. Community centers and other buildings often were constructed because the people did not want to lose the chance of obtaining the free materials offered by government or because they wanted to keep up with the recognized efforts of adjacent communities. Thousands of local community centers were built only to remain idle, dozens of clinics were erected without staff or medicine available, and hundreds of schools were built without teachers being available. One genuine instance of self-help, however, was the effort of the local units of the association of parents who built their own school houses and found their own teachers since they could get no response from government for assistance. Unfortunately, their efforts were considered illegal by the colonial government because such schools did not meet with colonial educational standards.

The women workers spent their time with the women's clubs, which consisted largely of the elite of the communities. The wives of the African officials and government workers were anxious to learn the basic modern techniques of homecraft and entertaining. The regular meetings of these clubs, particularly those engaged in sewing, became habitual recreational events. Some clubs had been "doing sewing" for years.

Although these ingrained activities of the Department are not to be highly lauded, they need not be condemned. The work had effect upon the people over a long period of time and some worthwhile practices came from the efforts. On balance, however, those Social Development

workers who were not lost in organizing classes and groups, but who were instrumental in getting people to become interested in considering their most serious problems, and doing something about these problems were the most effective, since more positive results of the latter approach were evident in relatively shorter periods. The reflection of this understanding of the Community Development process lies in the reports of those more perceptive workers who recognized what were meaningful results. Most Social Development Officers and some of the workers did recognize the fallacy of introducing into communities government projects not based on the people's desires as a way to development, but change in a government bureaucracy is fully as difficult to bring about as it is in communities. Training was one of the means used.

Until 1961, Social Development Workers were introduced to their work by being placed for a few months in the field where they worked with an experienced worker. This kind of training was very useful to a discerning worker, but generally it provided little opportunity for any new dynamic approaches to change. Nevertheless, some workers learned how to work with people in terms of needs and wants on the basis of trial and error despite past customary procedures that had become standard.

The women workers had received special skill training in basic cooking, clothes making, health practices, and child care ever since the inception of Social Development operations. Their training related quite well to actual situations and many useful practices were learned that had application in resolving home problems. A major mistake was made, however, in that little or no training in the Community Development process was given to the women. They learned only homecraft and farm skills and were expected to teach these to women groups.

Although the Department, stimulated by a knowledge of the need to apply the concept of the Community Development process, was desirous of making changes in the methods and approaches of its workers, it faced many serious difficulties, some of which continue today because of the heavy hand of the past in procedure setting. Workers are much more comfortable in introducing familiar activities where they can be looked upon as teachers or organizers. To interest people in considering their own problems and to concern other government workers in an integrated approach to working with people on these problems was much less encouraging to workers and required a greater expenditure of thought and tact than following a set pattern for introducing what the government considered beneficial change. If concentration had been on bringing about changed attitudes in communities toward development rather than on the introduction of project activities, the statistics on monthly reports would have been much less impressive but result of the work would have had far greater impact towards establishing local competence and sustained growth.

### Community Development After Independence

Before Dr. Nyerere became President, he frequently reminded Tanzanians that when independence came they would need to exert themselves more than ever before. The common salutation was "uhuru" (freedom) and the response was "na kazi" (and work). Everyone, young and old, said it. Upon independence, the people responded enthusiastically to the plea of the President and to the urgings of the Community Development Workers, the politicians, and the officials to take up self-help or nation-building activities. Projects sprang up so rapidly that the government could not hope to meet the whole effort with technical and material assistance. Many projects of little use were completed and many useful ones were not completed. Most of the effort did not contain the essentials of self-help; the ideas for projects came from the outside promoters, were motivated by patriotism and political enthusiasm, and added very little to the competency of the people or to sustained development. Yet, many communities built schools, clinics, and roads that were sorely needed. The effort did have an identifying effect.

In 1961, and immediately following independence, the Social Development Department became the Community Development Division under a single Commissioner in the Ministry of Cooperative and Community Development. The interrelationship between the Cooperative Division and the Community Development Division was negligible and the Ministry officials favored the Cooperative Section. The Community Development Division was one of the first units of government to become fully staffed with Africans under the government Africanization policy. Key positions became filled by Africans who had been well prepared through experience for their responsibilities. These new officials initiated policies that changed objectives and methods and finally invoked those principles and programs long urged by the professional Community Development Officers.

The training of field workers and supervisors was one of the first actions initiated. The training was directed towards instilling useful attitudes in workers and giving them skills in working with people. Some technical skills also were taught. The number of mobile units to service communities with films and women workers was increased. A mobile service for guiding and training communities in self-help construction projects was added to most of the Regions.

With the advent of independence also came numerous proposals of foreign assistance. Some of it was sought by the Planning Ministry and some of it was urged without request from Tanzania. The Community Development Division shared in some of this foreign assistance to expand its organization and functions. Simultaneous expansion in several directions at one time no doubt caused sacrifice of quality in some operations. Assistance sometimes appeared to be more in accord with the interest of the donor than to the benefit of the Tanzanian program.

A national planning commission was formed in 1960 from the Council of Ministers and established a three-year development plan for 1961-1963. The plan was based on the results of a study by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which indicated that primary focus should be on the establishment of infrastructure with emphasis on the expansion of agriculture, public works, and higher education. The plan did little more than provide some guidance to regional development planning and to encourage the expansion of Ministries. The plan was neither comprehensive nor detailed.

To improve the outlook and understanding of the newly appointed Regional and Area Commissioners, who had replaced the British Provincial and District Commissioners, the Community Development Division was given the task of orienting these new political administrators in the precepts of Community Development. The orientation in most instances was welcomed by the new officials, and their subordinates highly lauded the resulting change in attitudes. The field workers and their supervisors conducted simultaneous district seminars, through the recently oriented District and Regional Commissioners. These seminars presented Community Development approaches for use in planning and plan implementing. At this period, workers gave concerted attention to the formation of Village Development Committees so as to establish local institution through which people could present their plans and requests. The Committees were formed through strong encouragement from field workers and district officials rather than as a result of a need recognized by the people. Many of these organizations never functioned. Some of the selected leaders felt they should be compensated by government for their efforts in furthering local development because, they felt, they were acting as agents of government. Had the Village Development Committees been organized by people who were ready to make their needs known, the results very likely would have been much more gratifying to the officials and to the people. Since most of the Committees contained twenty-five or more members and dozens of them existed in every district, the training requirements to make them effective were insurmountable.

The Economic Development Ministry was established in 1962 to prepare professionally a long-term development plan. The Ministry encompassed the former planning commission and included trained economists of several foreign countries from the East and the West. It contained a coordinating committee and a planning secretariat under a Director of Planning. It produced, as a beginning to a 20-year plan, the five-year plan from 1964 through 1969. The strategy was based on the premise that the poverty of the country was the result of structural deficiencies in the economy and society rather than from the actual lack of potential in either area. The plan was useful in that it provided per capita income, longevity, and manpower targets on which to base regional planning. The plan provided further encouragement for ministries to expand despite scarcity of capital.

The national planners converted the Community Development Committees of the regions and districts into national committees for planning and implementation of plans. In urban areas, Ward Development Committees were established to function under the town councils. The national planning group, however, did not concern itself below the regional level; the responsibility to obtain the district details for regional planning rested with the Regional Development Committees. Each District Development Committee included key members of the District Council, the Area Commissioner serving as chairman, with the technicians and officials of various ministries as representatives. Each committee had the responsibility of planning development for a district with some consideration of local plans coming from Village Development Committees. Although the system was somewhat cumbersome and many of the district personnel were unaccustomed to planning, this was a move closer to local decision-making urged by the Division.

The Division was next placed in the Ministry of Community Development and Local Culture. Although this change caused a few of the Community Development Officers to change emphasis due to the influence of new and uninformed officials, the Division succeeded in retaining its basic precepts. The Division firmed its plans and set its target at 1,500 trained Community Development Assistants and Officers by the end of the five-year period. Such a plan did not provide the possibility of having such a number of workers properly trained within that period of time.

These workers were to establish 7,500 Village Development Committees to assure the participation of people in development planning. Sixty district training centers (termed "people's training centers" by the Division) were to be completed and to be provided training managers by the Division within the period. These centers were to be maintained by the District Councils for use in developing the understanding, skills, and knowledge of technicians, leaders, villagers, and other key government, political, and industrial people. They were designed also to give opportunity for new adult literates to expand further their education and to prepare them for even more advanced political, civic, and technical learning at Kivukoni College.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the gap between the formally educated and the less formally educated would be lessened. Essentially, these were adult education centers directed towards the urgent training needs of the district. The number of regional mobile units was increased, and these were assigned to work from the district training centers. A plan was made for the establishment of a communications production center to provide materials for the training centers and field workers. This plan never materialized because it was not a project of interest to any donors, although personnel was provided by foreign countries to prepare the technical plans. The Division, however, made some progress under its own resources to produce materials and initiate training of production personnel.

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<sup>7</sup> A government sponsored college for political training.

In 1965, TANU<sup>8</sup> was declared to be the sole political party of the mainland of Tanzania. In addition to aiming for independence, it had a principle concern for economic development through a socialistic system. When TANU was recognized as the sole party, the mutual interdependence between party and government became apparent. Organizations under its direct control included the Tanu Youth League, the United Women of Tanzania,<sup>9</sup> and the Elder's Section. Its subsequent influence on other organizations has been appreciable. Major national political and government policies have been voiced usually through the Party. It has zealously nurtured political attitude and has done much to further new national values. The TANU local leaders were, and are, generally younger people with dedication and zeal. They have been extremely active in nation building efforts, sometimes to the consternation of some Community Development workers. The strength of TANU has rested and continues to rest in its leadership under President Nyerere, who is its founder. His demonstrated sincerity of purpose, deep interest in the welfare of the people, and exemplary performance have won the confidence and the love of the Tanzanian people.

In the years 1966 and 1967, a number of important actions set the direction and pace of political and development endeavors. One noteworthy TANU action was its effort to establish the ten-household cells whereby every ten families were to elect a leader who would help to maintain security and be a means of direct contact between the people and national leaders. The greatest value of this nationwide network of organized small local areas was to provide a channel of communication between people and their government in matters of policy and development. No other local institution existed that could serve the purpose. In most areas of Tanzania, no aggregation of families brought about the establishment of typical villages. The Village Development Committees were too extensive and too exclusive to provide an effective link; they contained too large a membership for effective performance and covered too large an area for complete representation. Some leaders were over-zealous in their security activities, but many of them were extremely useful in development effort. These organizations were new to the society and did not arise voluntarily out of locally recognized needs; however, many of the elected leaders effectively encouraged and helped in community action. Cells readily formed in urban areas where security matters were well understood, but the growth was much slower in the rural areas.

In June, 1966, the President presented his "Principles and Development" memorandum which emphasized some points of particular interest to Community Development. The document pointed out the importance of the nation understanding its objectives and assessing

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<sup>8</sup>Tanzanian African National Union.

<sup>9</sup>UWT grew out of the Women's Clubs organized by the women Social Development workers.

the best means of reaching them. A first principle stated was the right of Tanzania to be free to determine its own home and foreign policies and to meet the expectation of the people to be free to decide their own destiny. The memorandum stressed the rejection of a class system and the intention of all Tanzanians to equally share the hard work and its fruits alike. It mentioned that in addition to economic development, an equally important need was for people to live in harmony, security, and mutual respect.

After five years of trial and study, the Arusha Declaration was presented in January, 1967, as a statement of principles, policies, and aims of TANU. The creed committed the party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (equality, dignity, freedom, protection, just return for labor, etc.). One theme of the presentation was that development of the country could only come through the efforts of the people and that wealth should be the result and not the basis of development. It stated that the prerequisites of development were people, land, good policies, and competent leadership. It reiterated the need for intelligent hard work. The membership and leadership rules were that TANU and government leaders had to be peasants or workers, could not hold shares or directorships in private enterprises, could receive no more than one salary, and could not have any house for rent. It urged that members stop teaching ideology and start living it. These requirements forced some politicians and officials to resign from TANU leadership and government posts. A few weeks later the policy paper "Education For Self-Reliance" introduced significant changes in primary and secondary education content: education was required to prepare young people to meet the realities of life and to appreciate their environment and to take responsibility in improving it.

Most principles stated by the political party and government were those basic to a Community Development program. Community development was so closely concerned in national development effort that it was difficult to distinguish whether it was leading or following in the local development outlook.

A few months later the Ministry of Community Development and National Culture became the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, and the Division became the Division of Rural Development. Its underlying policies and objectives were unchanged, but its responsibilities and authority were increased. Since 1961, the Division had urged a national development program based on a joint effort of all ministries engaged in local development work. Until 1968, it had worked at getting other ministries to cooperate in an integrated effort, but the responses were merely token acceptance. Now the Division had the mandate from government to design a national development proposal. The resulting basic proposal presented was approved by the Cabinet and the President gave assurance of any necessary assistance.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Minister for Local Government, The Promotion and Implementation of Rural Development, a memorandum, Cabinet paper 70/67, December, 1967.

A number of changes took place in the total development structure. Members of the District Council of each district became the District Development Committee. The government officials and technicians of each district became technical advisors to the planning body of the District Council, whose task was to prepare development plans based on the needs and desires of the people expressed through the Village Development Committees. The prior typical functions of the District Councils had been to collect taxes, enforce laws, and carry out the general duties of government at local levels. Now, each council had direct responsibility for the development of the communities through local planning for action. It was recognized that not all Councils or Council members were well versed in development planning and its implementation, but with the advisors delegated to work with them, the experience was expected to develop their expertise. The major improvement in principle was that planning was made to be the responsibility of those who had to carry out the plans.

The Rural Development Officers and Local Government Officers were required to join forces in becoming agents to assist in planning and implementation. The move met with a mixture of responses. Some Local Government Officers welcomed the opportunity to encourage local development and others had reservations. The change, however, did bring about a closer relationship between departments and a willingness to share responsibilities. It also encouraged close working relationships between the Regional and Area Commissioners and the Rural Development (Community Development) Officers at each level of government.

The Rural Development Division sponsored a conference in January, 1968, which included key regional and district representatives of TANU and the various ministries. This conference provided explanations and opportunity for discussions on the principles and procedures of the Rural Development Program. Studies and instructions concerned joint planning of development actions by ministries and their representatives at all levels, principles of local decision making, and the development of people to become willing and able to take action. Definite understanding was reaffirmed that the national rural development program of Tanzania was not merely an agricultural endeavor as usually characterizes rural development programs; instead, it was a strengthening of the Community Development process wherein all Ministries with a concern for local development recognized the advantage of a joint effort for preparing people to make significant and social gains.

Before making any further analysis of the program, let us review the investment and returns of the Tanzanian program since 1961.

### Inputs and Results

The Community Development or Rural Development Division of the mainland of Tanzania expended from all local sources, from fiscal

year 1962 through fiscal year 1968, a little over \$8,600,000.<sup>11</sup> About 40 percent was for salaries and travel. In addition to this sum, twelve foreign countries and four United Nations agencies granted or loaned an estimated \$3,400,000 to the program. Approximately one-fourth of this was for salaries and personnel support. The foreign workers included 52 volunteer community workers, 20 specialists, and two Community Development experts. The usual tenure of the foreign workers was two years. The specialists included low-cost construction experts and organizers, communication media experts, and specialized adult education professionals. The external aid agencies gave assistance for self-help materials, training centers, training grants, special mobile units and, educational materials. Much of the assistance served useful purposes for the Division, but some of it detracted attention away from more crucial operations. On the other hand, some urgent needs received no consideration. For example, a request for funds to improve the inadequate audio-visual production section and film center was rejected by all aid agencies.

The rate of growth of the organization of the Division since 1961 has been fully adequate according to the situation, although it has not reached the proportions anticipated in the long-term plans. The most tangible<sup>12</sup> accomplishments for the direct expansion of the Division were as follows:

- (1) Increase in key headquarters staff from two to ten.
- (2) Field force expanded from 275 people working in twenty districts to 965 people working in all sixty districts.
- (3) Increase of supervisors from 30 to 144 located at zonal, regional, and district levels.
- (4) Thirty-five trainer-managers placed in 21 district training centers.
- (5) Increase in training and audio-visual mobile-unit specialists from 30 to 87 and placement in all regions.
- (6) One hundred fifty officer sent for training outside Tanzania.
- (7) Seven hundred seventy-one Division workers received Community Development training, of whom 330 women workers also received Home Economics training.

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<sup>11</sup> Funds were derived from regular budget appropriations, district council revenues, 25 percent of a special National Fund from voluntary contributions, and the Community Development Trust Fund of a non-profit Tanzanian organization that derives its funds from private contributions.

<sup>12</sup> Boyd Faulkner, Project History and Analysis Report on Community Development in the United Republic of Tanzania for the Period of January 1, 1965 to June 30, 1968, presented to United States Agency for International Development, June 1968.

- (8) Six permanent Rural Development trainers appointed and long-term plans prepared.
- (9) Twenty-one district training centers completed and furnished.
- (10) An institution for Home Economics training built and furnished.
- (11) A national Community Development training center provided.
- (12) A national training center established for women leaders.

The accomplishments in functioning operations included the following:<sup>13</sup>

- (1) Fifty-six Area Commissioners given special course in Community Development to orient them to work with people.
- (2) Thirty-five courses in Community Development and integrated planning given to over 700 members of District Development Committees and Councils.
- (3) An estimated 150,000 leaders received training as members of Village Development Committees, United Women of Tanzania, private institutions, and Communities. (Yearly report totals range from 20,000 to nearly 95,000.)
- (4) Over 20,000 self-help construction and production projects completed, receiving technical and/or material assistance totaling \$918,700 in grants to produce projects valued at more than \$15,000,000.
- (5) Increase in number of people in literacy classes annually from around 200,000 to over 400,000.

The foregoing accomplishments listed are of no great import when compared to some less physical results that helped to cause establishment of policies and principles within government for a national development program following the precepts of Community Development. Influences of this nature resulted in:

- (1) A recognition that people needed help to become willing and able to engage in progressive actions before sustained physical development would occur.
- (2) A consideration of the collective life of the people and a joint effort of planning and action to help people meet their problems and needs.
- (3) A provision of opportunity for people to make their needs known to government and for government to respond and influence in terms of local needs.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

- (4) A recognition that agency plans should encompass only agency actions and that people's plans needed to be made by people themselves if they are to be successfully accomplished.

#### Prospects for Community Development

At the outset of independence, Tanzanian leaders apparently recognized the critical elements that had to be considered for nation building. National targets for feasible economic growth were established, a structure for a holistic local and national development approach was formed, and policies promoting national identity and guidelines for leaders to follow in pursuing political and economic goals were proclaimed. An operational and administrative schema was made for useful association and joint effort between people and government; the Village Development Committees were organized to promote local planning and action by people; District Rural Development and Planning Committees were formed to amalgamate the plans of people and government into useful local action; the Regional Development Committees were given the task of presenting the interests of government at that level, and a national committee of Ministers and key officials was formed to give overall credence and guidance to the entire effort. This new administrative structure was formulated within a relatively short time with little evidence that particular caution was used in the sweeping reorganization. Putting the system into motion for effective results, therefore, has been a much slower process delayed by oversights, afterthoughts, and indecisions at national and departmental levels. Though the Rural Development Division may have had and felt responsibility for planned actions, it was not always in position to initiate desirable action.

Community Development in Tanzania has found exceptional support in the policy decrees issued by the President, Julius Nyerere.<sup>14</sup> These emphasize the right of self-government, the right to live in dignity and equality with all others, the right of freedom of speech, and the right to participate in decisions which affects one's life. The President stresses that development means people developing themselves so that they may make changes in their own interest. He points out that if development is for greater freedom and well-being of people, then it cannot result from force. He contends that decision-making and willing action can take place only if people understand their needs, know how to meet these needs, and then have the freedom to decide and act upon them. How much closer could a government policy coincide with the intents and methods of community development? However sincere the President, ambitious and anxious leaders and officials often overlook or fail to understand these national principles. Time and again instances of force are

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<sup>14</sup>Principles and Development, Arusha Declaration, Education for Self-Reliance, and Freedom and Development.

authorized despite the fact that colonial history shows that such methods were not effective in Tanzania. If such policies issued by the President are ignored, Community Development cannot expect its smaller voice to have much weight unless it sets about the task of sharing in a joint or integrated approach to development. It has made considerable strides in this direction, but the final steps have not yet been taken.

The Community and Rural Development operational growth of the Division has not yet completed its metamorphosis, nor has it yet reached its full influence in the national development effort; but it has made remarkable progress, particularly in effecting the establishment of the framework for a national program wherein the national policies and aims are fully congruent to a community development objective.

So long as the operations of Community Development were social and innocuous, other ministries and departments made no resistance and paid little attention to them. However, when the operations became seriously objective in community development terms, some conflict arose with other government units. The conflict might have been avoided if a full understanding of the intentions of the Division were fully understood by the others, but the Division found it difficult to carry on dialogue with those who had little desire to consider any change in developmental approaches. Although understandings have been reached, the full educational task has not yet been completed.

Many Village Development Committees had little notion of how to perform usefully, and some had no particular desire to do so. To train or prepare around 150,000 members of 7,500 organizations was a task that appeared to be beyond possibility. Training a half million ten-cell officers was an even larger task. Many of these leaders now have received training, but much of the training has been an exercise of acquainting leaders with government targets and policies rather than helping them to become competent guides. It is by no means too late to provide meaningful training by combining objective training efforts of all agencies, including TANU. These Committees or their equivalent are essential to development; they form the liaison between groups of people and technical or other assistance that is required to give credence to government targets and people's felt needs. The Rural Development Division is the most qualified Tanzanian agency to determine the content and methods of such training.

The competence of the District Rural Development and Planning Committees is variable. The technicians of the service ministries who have so long worked at building up and supporting their own agencies do not find it particularly satisfying to sacrifice their gains in an integrated effort. The means should be found whereby personnel of ministries and departments discover for themselves the importance of a jointly shared approach to local development. The councillors elected by the people usually lack experience in planning and are dependent upon the assistance of the technicians. The district officers have been effective in many instances in helping these committees to be an

asset to the development effort, but in some cases their efforts have produced few or no plans. Again, the proper orientation of all members is a task as yet only partially completed. If the policies and procedures for considering local plans and for promoting applicable national development are not understood, there can be no response of people to government or of government to people. An urge for creative and unified action must be established when it is lacking.

One serious handicap within the Division to the establishment of an efficient operation has been the frequent shifting of government personnel. By administrative heritage, any word from superiors is always highly regarded and they must be obeyed regardless of how uninformed they may be of the program. Tanzania has been fortunate in having had key officers who were very knowledgeable in Community Development principles, and generally they have been effective in influencing national directives. However, if the time comes that influential knowledgeable people are not present, then the operations will regress. Changes made in personnel location generally appear to be based on rational judgment, but seldom do such changes solve the problems or meet the needs as anticipated. Until such time that orientation, sound training, supervision, or guidance are provided instead of making transfers, some basic problems and handicaps will continue to threaten the very existence of Rural Development and other useful programs. Program directors, policy makers, and implementers of plans must have the opportunity to become and remain operating experts in establishing the Community Development process. The importance of their being administrators is far less important than their knowledge of approaches and methods of work essential to Tanzanian development and their recognition of the need to implement them. An administrator or supervisor who is incompetent in Community Development can do irreparable damage to the program. Any change in personnel should not take place unless the opportunity exists to prepare the new personnel for their task.

One of the problems of training has been that of obtaining suitable trainers. Tanzania has had no place from which to recruit its trainers, so it has had to depend upon using people with some experience in working with people. It has sent some trainers and potential trainers to training institutions outside Tanzania. In most instances, this training has contained very little Community Development and the returned trainers have been more interested in teaching social science topics than in helping the worker gain a grasp of his work. Some trainers have needed more training and education than others to attain adequate competency. Although a fully adequate teacher is rare, Tanzania has been fortunate to have some capable people who know the process and know how to teach it. It has been preparing a few more such trainers.

For several years, due to necessity, worker training was confined to the classroom and institutional grounds. Little change in practices occurred as a result of this training. After continued insistence by trainers, administrators permitted them to give a part of each course as supervised practice in actual field work. The new practice not only

imbued the trainees with the needed concepts and approaches, but it also benefitted the Community Development Officers, government officials, and other local workers who were involved in the planning and implementation of the supervised training.<sup>15</sup>

Through the field and classroom training, and from the experience of applying the training, most experienced front line workers have discovered the merit of following Community Development approaches. However, it should not be inferred that their earlier activities were valueless. Despite not being in accord with prescribed precepts, over a long period of time, these efforts have had definite influence in getting people to become accustomed to new ideas and in bringing about some basic changes in attitudes and practices, particularly in the area of home living. Evidence indicates, however, that if these activities had been an integrated part of a Community Development process, the influence would have been accelerated appreciably.

Most plans of the Division have not been fulfilled beyond its capability. However, if the plans for increasing field personnel had not been delayed by unsuccessful recruitment, the Division would have had several hundred untrained new workers while it already had several hundred on hand that were not yet adequately trained. Although commendable progress had been made in training and supervising by 1968, too many have remained satisfied to introduce to the people self-help, adult literacy, and home economics teaching as government projects; too many have too little concern about whether or not the recipients of their attention are any better able to help themselves economically or socially than they were before engaging in the exercise. Regardless of the competence of administrators, a program can be no better than its field workers.

However excellent the training may be, some influences always persist in detracting officials and field workers from their purpose. In some instances loyalty and ambition may have caused greater concern for appearance and for impressive reports than for helping to bring about important needed changes. The administrators need to recognize that these possibilities exist and that they must be overcome through training and orientation at various levels.

Occasionally, the Division apparently has overlooked the President's guiding principle that people are more important than money, because in a few instances it has accepted outside assistance and additions to its operations of far less significance to the development of the people than other features of the ongoing program. The acceptance of such offers of assistance generally required the alteration of plans and the bending of policies and intents. This fluidity of plans and purposes have been a greater threat to success than an inadequacy of funds, particularly when the change was more in the interest of an outside agency than in the interest of the local people.

Prior to 1968 the Community Development Division made no attempt to formally evaluate any of its operation, but it did permit judgments to be reported by a few research workers on personal assignments. In 1968 the Division obtained a research specialist from the United Nations and began its first evaluation studies. An ongoing evaluation from the outset of the program would have been useful to planners and workers, but the far greater significant influence on improvement of effort and aims has been the awareness of the administrators to the problems and shortcomings of the program. Their self-criticism may not have helped to establish a favorable image, but it did bring about needed changes in the prime objectives and methods that might not have been done by less concerned and less knowledgeable officials. Only through persistent attention by the administrators did change in approaches take place. The nation building projects of communities have become more and more the result of rational local decision making and less and less the response of people to the haranguing and prodding of political leaders or field workers; the adult literacy classes have become "functional" and consider various problems and needs of people in addition to reading and writing Swahili; and women workers no longer cater to the elite but introduce ideas and practices that have meaning in the lives of all local people. Through the concerted effort of the key officials, the structure and atmosphere for the Community Development process have been successfully established within the National Rural Development operation.

In conclusion, it is the opinion of this writer that, barring unexpected adverse temperament pervading the national development movement, the quality of leadership that engendered the elements of a Community Development process into the program in 1968 is capable of giving deserved validity to this means of significantly accelerating rational social and economic change.