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THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION  
AND UNITED STATES POLICY  
IN  
PAKISTAN

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The viability and political development of Pakistan remain a major concern for U.S. policy interests in South Asia. In December 1984, General Zia-ul-Haq set in motion a three stage process designed to restore civilian rule to Pakistan against a background of economic deterioration, increased border pressure and heightened ethnic, sectarian, and regional conflict. The process has resulted in the successful election of national and provincial assemblies, the selection of a new civilian government and the restoration of a substantially modified version of the 1973 Constitution. Zia announced that martial law would be lifted in stages, and many hope that the eight-year-old political deadlock has finally been broken.

Despite the limited success of the initial phase of the transition process, Pakistan continues to face a variety of problems. The military is uneasy about the impact of the new political process, the extra-parliamentary opposition has refused to accept its legitimacy and Pakistan's elites have become increasingly uneasy with the government's Afghan policies and its restored cooperative relationship with the United States.

The politics of transition have occurred at a time when the first phase of the restored Pakistan-American relationship is about to draw to a close. The \$3.2 billion six-year military-economic aid program designed to help Pakistan cope with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan ends in 1987. A post-1987 program is beginning to take shape. Such a program must be carefully constructed to take into account Pakistan's insecurities, domestic vulnerabilities and regional relationships, especially that with India. The package would best accomplish U.S. objectives if it contained the following elements. It should be multi-year, slightly larger than the 1981-1987 program, contain a higher ratio of economic to military aid and include both a series of public diplomacy initiatives and a program designed to assist Pakistan in building its political infrastructure. Such a package would gain greater support in the U.S. Congress, be less threatening to India and strengthen Pakistan's political development.

United States interests in the South Asia region depend heavily on a viable Pakistan and therefore, Pakistan's political development remains a major concern for U.S. policy. The first six months of 1985 have been especially delicate for Pakistan as the country entered a period of transition from military to civilian rule. The process, which is not yet complete, is marked by both hope and fear. The hope is that Pakistan has broken its eight year political deadlock which began with the military coup of July, 1977. The fear is that Pakistan, as in the past, might be plunged into another political crisis.

The longest period of martial law government in the history of Pakistan may be drawing to a close. The regime has embarked upon a carefully staged process of holding popular elections, reestablishing a constitutional order and restoring civilian rule and governmental legitimacy. This delicate transition, however, is taking place against a background of economic deterioration, increased border pressure and heightened ethnic, sectarian and regional conflict. In short, Pakistan's long struggle for identity, security and survival still depend heavily upon its ability to evolve a viable domestic political order, the ambitions of its neighbors and the support and encouragement of its allies.

Despite the skepticism of his critics, General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan, finally delivered on his previously unfulfilled promises to hold national elections and begin the transition to civilian rule. Although the phased and controlled process began inauspiciously with a somewhat tarnished referendum victory in December, 1984, the highly successful

national and provincial assembly elections of late February 1985 helped restore credibility and an element of legitimacy to his regime. Despite a boycott of the elections by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a coalition of 11 defunct opposition parties, the regime proved it could conduct a popular and peaceful poll and secure participation in the new governmental system created under the Zia constitution of 1985, known officially as the "Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order" (RCO).

The process of transition to civilian rule began in December, 1984 when Zia announced that a national referendum would be held in which the people would be asked "whether they supported the process initiated by the Government for the Islamization of all laws in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah and whether they supported the Islamic ideology of Pakistan." A "yes" vote, Zia proclaimed, would ensure a peaceful transfer of power to the people's representatives, strengthen the ideological foundations of the state and serve as a vote of confidence by electing him President for the next five years.

The idea of holding a referendum was opposed by elements of both Zia's civilian and military supporters and was labeled a fraud by the MRD. The MRD called for a total boycott of the referendum, which was held on December 20, 1984. Intense official pressure to turn out the vote and a criminal penalty for open advocacy of a boycott produced a government-proclaimed turnout of 64 percent of Pakistan's eligible voters and a 97.7 percent approval vote. Most independent analysts, however, estimated a turnout of no more than 30 percent while the MRD claimed the turnout was no higher than 5

percent. The tarnished image of the referendum created a climate of division and uncertainty.

Undaunted, Zia continued his efforts at redeeming his pledge to hold national elections. Elections for the National Assembly were scheduled for February 25, 1985 and for the Provincial Assemblies on February 28. Initially Zia insisted on partyless elections, a restricted campaign, disqualification of key opposition party leaders, and refused to outline the nature of the new constitutional order until after the polls had taken place. Zia proclaimed that political parties were un-Islamic and had taken a variety of steps to control or destroy them. At first he tried to control political parties by requiring them to register. Most major parties refused to comply. In October 1979 he decided simply to ban all parties. Despite this legal ban, however, the "defunct" parties continued to function. In an effort to block leaders of these parties from seeking election, Zia imposed a series of disqualification rules which would prevent regime opponents from seeking public office. In a dramatic last minute effort to increase participation, enhance the legitimacy of the elections, and bring his opponents into the electoral process, however, Zia withdrew his disqualification order thereby enabling most disqualified politicians to take part in the elections. He also announced that it would no longer be mandatory for voters to produce their identity cards before the polling officers. Zia's actions created a considerable degree of disquiet among both his civilian and military supporters who felt that he was making far too many concessions to his opponents.

Despite these concessions, however, the MRD refused to partici-

pate in the poll. The MRD saw Zia's decision to hold elections as compounding his earlier error in judgment in holding the referendum and urged its supporters to boycott the elections. The MRD wanted elections held under the 1973 constitution and objected to the restrictions placed on campaigning and the refusal of Zia to outline his future constitutional order prior to the poll.

Unlike the referendum, the assembly elections attracted much wider public support. A large number of candidates entered the race including many MRD defectors, the campaign was more lively than expected and voter turnout was quite high despite the MRD call for a boycott. Widely accepted official figures showed that some 53 percent of the eligible voters participated in the National Assembly elections and 57 percent in the Provincial Assembly elections. The high turnout was partially attributable to a last minute relaxation of restrictions on campaign activity, the popular desire to end martial law and government efforts to counter the MRD boycott which was declared illegal. The credibility of the elections was enhanced not only by the relatively high voter turnout but also by the defeat of five of Zia's ministers and the victory of a variety of new and younger candidates. Although the electoral results reflected some dissatisfaction with the Zia government, the government appeared to have benefitted from political stability, a healthy economy and Zia's success in splitting the opposition.

The elections brought to power the old core of the anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance. Although the polls were conducted on a partyless basis, two major "defunct" parties drawn from the right of the Pakistan political spectrum were the most conspicuous victors.

The party which was the most successful was the landlord dominated Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Pir Pagaro. The PML had distanced itself from the martial law regime quite early in its history but also refused to join the the MRD. The party won an estimated 25 percent of the seats in the 237 member National Assembly and also did quite well in Sind and the Punjab. The second major party to score some success in the election was the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The party won 10 seats in the National Assembly. Although this represented more seats than it had ever won before, many saw the Jamaat performance as a defeat. Unlike the PML, the Jamaat had been more clearly identified with Zia and his Islamization program and was expected to gain greater ground.

Socially, the newly elected assembly members were drawn from the same coalition that had brought down the Bhutto government and had prospered under Zia's martial law. These included the small traders and shopkeepers, industrialists, landowners, religious leaders and the orthodox sectors of the urban middle classes. Although 75 percent of the assembly members were new, they tended to be related to or were retainers of the traditional politicians. An estimated 47 Members of the National Assembly (MNA's) were former members of Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Most of the former PPP members, however, were drawn from the large landowning families of Sind and Punjab rather than those representing the more populist sectors of the party. In fact the new assembly left almost totally unrepresented the newly mobilized Bhutto constituencies of organized and unorganized labor, the urban and rural poor, small landowners, tenant farmers, landless labor and key elements of the

modern middle class intelligentsia.

Partyless elections, in short, basically brought the traditional elites of Pakistan back to power. The absence of political parties as a mobilizing force resulted in mobilization based on traditional loyalties, dependencies and identities. In Baluchistan the key sectors were the tribal chiefs (Sardars), and in the Northwest Frontier Province rival local power groups dominated. In Punjab and Sind it was the traditional landed families, religious leaders, Pirs and extended families (biradaris) who were successful. These leaders used money and narrow parochial appeals based on traditional ethnic, sectarian, caste and tribal loyalties. In the absence of parties, there was little effort to mobilize Pakistanis on the basis of broader identities that would transcend this localism.

The character of the new civilian regime was best reflected in the man selected by General Zia to become the new Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo. Junejo is 54 years old, a large Sindhi landlord and a murrid (religious follower) of PML chief Pir Pagaro. He is unambitious but has a reputation for honesty, even temperedness and consensus building. Junejo seems prepared to cooperate with General Zia in the new civilian-military regime.

The guarded optimism and enthusiasm generated by the successful February poll proved to be shortlived. On March 2, 1985 Zia released his Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order (RCO) which restored all but 27 articles and two sub-clauses of the 1973 Constitution. He also announced, however, that martial law would continue and would be lifted only gradually and in stages. Although Zia characterized his RCO as simply an attempt to balance the power between

the President and the Prime Minister, his opponents accused him of abrogating the 1973 Constitution rather than restoring it. Zia's constitution was Gaulist in character and moved the Pakistan political system in the direction of greater presidentialism and centralization. The President was given the discretionary power to appoint the Prime Minister, initiate referendums, dissolve Parliament and appoint governors, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three service chiefs. While Zia claimed he was simply the constitutional head of state, with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet responsible for performing executive functions, the press, jurists, intellectuals and the MRD accused him of concentrating power in his own hands.

Despite the civilian-military power sharing that the RCO implied, most Pakistanis were prepared to give the new system a chance. Eight long years of martial law tempered potential confrontation at a time when a restoration of civilian government seemed so imminent. Even the MRD, chastened by the turnout at the polls, decided to bide its time, realizing that even if agitation succeeded in removing the newly elected assembly it would simply be replaced by more martial law. Moreover, the MRD suffered an enormous loss of prestige when the voters ignored its appeals for a boycott of the elections, and this miscalculation of the popular mood in turn generated discontent within the movement.

The newly elected National Assembly met for the first time in late May, 1985 for its Budget Session. Despite its restricted powers, the assembly attempted to assert itself in limited but visible ways. The newly appointed Prime Minister Junejo received a strong vote of

confidence and immediately proceeded to form an Official Parliamentary Group (OPG). An estimated 190 members of the 237 man assembly joined the official group. At the same time, the Members of the National Assembly rejected the government's candidate for Speaker by electing their own nominee, used procedural motions to debate the status of martial law and raised questions about government policies during the pre-assembly period. In addition, although the rules limited National Assembly debates during the Budget Session to budget and fiscal matters, members raised questions about the continuation of martial law, Afghanistan, partyless democracy and the character of the constitutional order. Members were also critical of the Finance Minister's budget proposals and received a variety of concessions.

The initial session of the National Assembly was a tame 'fair' but also demonstrated that the assembly would not act solely as a rubber stamp. At the same time, it was also clear that the assembly's willingness to challenge the government would be limited so as not to jeopardize the process of transferring power from military to civilian hands. In response to assembly criticism of martial law and partyless democracy, the Prime Minister agreed to create a 29 member committee to review these issues and report back by July 20, 1985. Zia, however, has insisted that martial law would continue for some time in order to ensure the stability of the new institutions and the new government.

The most significant political activity in Pakistan, however, continues to take place outside the assembly. Behind the scenes Zia and his new government are attempting to wrestle with three major problems that will determine the future success of the new

order. These problems involve the following sets of relationships: (1) the relationship between Zia and the military and the new government and the military; (2) the relationship between Zia and the Prime Minister; (3) and the relationship between government and the extra-parliamentary opposition.

The Pakistan military, Zia's primary constituency, has been far from united on the issue of elections and the transfer of power to civilian control. Zia's insistence that martial law be lifted gradually and in stages is at least partly designed to prevent a sudden loss of power by a military elite that has been deeply involved in the day-to-day administration of the country for the last eight years. Military officers, both active duty and retired, became dominant throughout government offices, public sector corporations and even non-governmental political, social and cultural organizations. These officers are not very anxious to lose their positions of status and privilege. Zia is attempting to ease the process of removing high ranking active duty officers from key martial law positions by a system of normal retirement. These officers are being replaced by newly promoted junior officers who can then be more easily removed before they become too committed to their new privileges. In this way, the process of retirement and removal can be justified as part of the normal process of creating promotion opportunities for junior officers. The scheme is expected to work, however, only if the National Assembly and the extra-parliamentary opposition remain under tight control and do not provoke a military response. In short, Zia, the Prime Minister and the National Assembly must act cautiously to ensure that the military does not

feel threatened. Zia in particular must insure that his chief constituency does not become aliénated and decide to bring the civilianization process to a halt.

Zia has a major stake in the survival of the new order. It has enhanced his international image, added some legitimacy to his rule and has weakened his opponents. He has, therefore, been especially solicitous to his handpicked Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo. Zia refers to himself as "constitutional head of state" and insists that the Prime Minister and his cabinet perform all executive functions "while I watch". Zia has made a special effort to boost the Prime Minister's image and Junejo has taken a variety of steps to assert his authority. For example, Junejo was alleged to have refused to sign an ordinance on Islamic banking on the grounds that the National Assembly would shortly convene and therefore, signing such an ordinance would be inappropriate. Despite Zia's commitment to his Islamization program, he accepted the Prime Minister's decision. In another incident Zia's close confidante LtGen Mujbibur Rehman was removed as Permanent Secretary of the Information Ministry because of a conflict with Junejo. Junejo and Zia however, appear to differ on the issue of ending martial law as soon as possible and on the issue of partyless democracy. A final decision on these issues has yet to be reached.

A final element in the political equation of Pakistan centers on the relationship between Zia and the opposition MRD and the new government and the MRD. Zia would like to destroy the MRD, especially the PPP, which is its dominant element. While the MRD clearly suffered a loss of prestige when Pakistan voters largely ignored

its appeal to boycott the assembly elections, its constituent elements are far from dead. The extra-parliamentary opposition is attempting to line up support within the new assembly in an effort to gain additional leverage. The movement itself, however, is confronted by possible fragmentation, disunity and a lack of direction. The MRD insists there can be no compromise with Zia and continues to demand an end to martial law and the restoration of the 1973 constitution. It has decided to lay low for the present to see how Zia handles the martial law issue. Internally, however, the movement suffers from a variety of problems. Many of its members are unhappy with the leadership's decision to boycott the election, and the unity of the movement itself is threatened. The most immediate threat to the survival of the MRD stems from the desire of the centrist Tehrik-i-Istiqlal led by Asghar Khan to quit the coalition. A second source of friction involves a split within the PPP itself. One wing remains loyal to Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; a second group has developed around Mumtaz Bhutto, Benazir's uncle, and his effort to create a Sind, Baluch, Pathan regional front against the politically dominant Punjabis. Mumtaz has joined with Khan Bux Marri and Ataullah Mengal, Baluch separatists, and Wali Khan, the Pathan leader of the NDP, in demanding the transformation of Pakistan from a federal republic to a confederacy of autonomous states. The confederation demand has generated substantial antagonism within the MRD, especially among its Punjabi members. The left within the PPP has referred to the group as a coalition of Khans (NWFP feudal lords), Waderas (Sind landlords) and Sardars (Baluch tribal leaders).

Pakistan's efforts to cope with its political problems have been compounded by the deterioration of the economy and the dangerous heating up of its western border. After six straight years of sustained economic growth fueled by good harvests, worker remittances and foreign aid, the Pakistan economy has begun to lose some of its momentum. A severe drought in 1984 reduced real growth to 3.5 percent, the lowest since Zia seized control. The drought resulted in a disastrous cotton crop and a poor wheat harvest. It was accompanied by a 5 percent decline in remittance and poor export performance. These developments fed the flames of inflation and aggravated Pakistan's already precarious foreign exchange and balance of payment situation. Despite several debt reschedulings in the 1970s and early 1980s Pakistan's debt service ratio has continued to grow. Although it remains manageable, Pakistan's debt problems must be carefully monitored.

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The economic strain has forced replacement of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-1988) announced in November, 1983 by a three year rolling plan which was designed to salvage the core of the Sixth plan. A second poor wheat crop in 1985, a further drop in remittances and a massive budget deficit have continued to create a negative environment for the politics of transition. Even under martial law Pakistan's economic managers seemed unable or unwilling to cope with a myriad of economic problems and policy issues including the need for greater domestic resource mobilization, huge subsidies, lack of sufficient public sector investment, poor performance of public sector units and major structural reform. Given the conservative character of the newly elected National Assembly, major

economic changes will become even more difficult. Landowners who dominate the assembly will not allow themselves to be taxed, land reforms are even less likely and even reform of the public sector will face massive opposition from labor, the military and the civilian bureaucracy. The Finance Minister has already cautioned aid donors to be patient in demanding tough economic decisions due to Pakistan's new and delicate political environment.

The deteriorating economy has been accompanied by a substantial heating up of Pakistan's western border and has compounded the Afghan refugee problem. In the last year there have been well over 100 attacks on Pakistan by Soviet-built aircraft based in Afghanistan. These incidents have resulted in a large number of civilian casualties and have raised anxieties not only among intellectual and opposition critics of the government but even among sectors of the military and bureaucratic elites who feel that Zia is running too high a risk in defying the Soviets. Thus, just at a time when American domestic support has increased for a larger U.S. role in assisting the Afghan mujahidin, Pakistan's resolve has begun to weaken.

A final dilemma confronting Pakistan's new political structure is the persistence of ethnic, sectarian and regional conflict. Zia's Islamization process was partly designed to cope with this issue. Islam was to act as the cement holding Pakistan society together. Such a focus, however, also has the negative effect of heightening sectarian conflict and ignoring legitimate ethnic and regional demands. Islamization has created anxieties among Pakistan's large Ahmadi community, a religious sect declared to be non-muslim by

the government, who feel deprived of their rights and has resulted in clashes between the dominant Sunni and the minority Shia communities, especially in Sind.

Zia's efforts to destroy the existing party system may not, in fact, produce the desired results. A breakup of the MRD is most likely to result in a shift toward political mobilization on a regional basis. Anti-regime movements will pass into the hands of groups like the Sindhi Awami Tehrik (Sindhi People's Movement), Baluch separatists and the newly formed Sind, Baluch, Pathan Front (SBPF). The new system does not effectively integrate these groups into the larger polity.

Zia's management of political affairs in Pakistan reflects a variety of continuities with past political behavior. Since partition, Pakistan politics has been characterized by a fragmented political culture which has been shaped by a set of often conflicting values drawn from Islam, the folk milieu of a highly traditional social order, British liberalism and colonial rule, and the nationalism of the Pakistan movement. All have played a major role in the debates over the nature of Pakistan's national identity, in the building of regional integration, and in the difficulties in establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of the political system.

Pakistan society remains deeply divided by internal conflicts based on primordial identities, a lack of coherent and effective conflict resolution mechanisms and intense competition for control by groups and elites in which almost all norms, values and procedures are manipulated to secure the desired results. Organizational ineffectiveness, paralysis or disintegration are the invariable result.

New forms of association and organization that could serve as agents of integration, participation, linkage and support have been very slow in developing. This in turn has inhibited the development of a process of reintegration and participation along new lines.

Zia's partyless democracy, normless behavior and personalization of power reflect continuities with the past. Zia's repeated postponement of elections, his numerous changes in political rules, his emphasis on a controlled process backed by suppression and his creation of a highly personalized and centralized constitutional order raise substantial questions about how long his new order will last. In Pakistan's recent history each ruler has created a constitution which lasted only until his demise --- the Ayub constitution of 1962, the Bhutto constitution of 1973 and now the Zia constitution of 1985.

It has taken Zia eight years to reach the point of restoration of civilian rule which Ayub was able to accomplish in four. Despite this longer gestation period, there is little assurance that Zia's reforms will endure much longer than Ayub's. Like Ayub, Zia wants partyless democracy, a controlled political process and a centralized state. Despite Zia's insistence that parties are un-Islamic and martial law must be lifted slowly and in stages, a consensus has already developed in the Pakistan National Assembly for an immediate lifting of martial law and an end to the legal ban on political parties.

In short, the politics of transition have resulted in a more complex decision-making environment. At the same time it is doubtful that the Zia constitution of 1985 has assured the long term future of the Pakistan political order. The basic problems of participation,

identity and legitimacy remain unsettled at a time of increased regional tension and external pressure.

### Implications for U.S. Policy

United States interests in the South Asia region depend heavily on a viable Pakistan. Yet the politics of transition demonstrate that Pakistan remains a very fragile state with an extremely weak political infrastructure. American strategy in South Asia, therefore, continues to rest on a rather weak reed. Zia has strengthened his political hand at the possible cost of inflaming separatist tendencies. Pakistan is being asked to play a role in coping with the crisis in Afghanistan which its internal political structure may prevent it from continuing to perform very effectively. Its elites are extremely uneasy with the current policies being pursued by the Zia government and are equally uneasy about their relationship with the United States. Urban intellectuals, the leaders of the extra-parliamentary opposition and even significant sectors of the military and bureaucratic elites shares an anxious feeling that the Pakistan state is simply not strong enough to perform the role assigned to it by the United States, China and its Gulf allies. These elites are troubled by Pakistan's designation as a front line state and prefer to develop the status of a neutralized Austria or Finland. Some even advocate a policy of total accommodation with the USSR and the Karmal government in Afghanistan. Zia and his new civilian government are not in a position to totally ignore these growing feelings of uneasiness which will surely be voiced in Pakistan's new assemblies.

Uneasiness with Zia's Afghanistan policy is accompanied by a similar sense of apprehension concerning the restoration of Pakistan's

American connection. Pakistan's unhappy experience with its past security relationship with the United States; its eagerness to preserve a close identity with the Islamic world, and its desire to maintain the country's only recently recognized non-aligned status combine to further complicate the American-Pakistani relationship. Thus, although official relations between the United States and Pakistan are excellent, the regime is haunted by images of the past and the weakness of domestic support for its foreign policy objectives. Strong anti-American sentiments have exploded in the past and continued to exist just beneath the surface in Pakistan and can be sparked by a variety of developments, especially those emanating from the Middle East.

Given this background, the lifting of martial law and the emergence of the National Assembly as a new political arena are bound to complicate the American-Pakistan relationship at a time when the first phase of that renewed relationship is about to draw to a close. The multi-year \$3.2 billion military-economic aid package will end shortly and discussions on a new post 1987 program have just begun. It is appropriate, therefore, to re-examine the basis of the relationship in light of past experience and the changes that have taken place within Pakistan and within the South Asia region as a whole.

From its very inception, American policy in South Asia has been bedeviled by the longstanding, deepseated suspicion and antagonism between Pakistan and its dominant neighbor India. Partition, communal enmity, three wars and irredentist claims have embittered the relationship and have made regional cooperation extremely

difficult if not impossible. There exists a constant fear in both India and Pakistan that the longstanding territorial dispute over Kashmir will explode into open conflict should either side feel it has acquired a temporary military or political advantage. These fears have become more acute as a result of conflicting charges on the part of both countries of fomenting ethnic unrest in strategically located border provinces and efforts by both sides to develop a nuclear capability. In the resulting atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility, no action on the part of a third party is seen as neutral. American attempts to strengthen Pakistan against Soviet pressures are seen in India as fortifying Pakistan's ability to carry out adventurous policies against India on the issue of Kashmir. No American policy can ignore this fundamental dilemma.

Given the domestic and regional parameters of the United States role in South Asia, what are the limits and opportunities for American policy in the region for the late 1980's?

1. The security relationship

Neither the Government of Pakistan nor Pakistanis in general wish to be formally allied with the United States. Both the CENTO and SEATO treaty relationships of the past are considered failures from a Pakistani perspective. Pakistan's leaders, therefore, want to strengthen Pakistan without becoming aligned with one of the great powers.

It is this very desire for maximum autonomy that drives Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Pakistan sees a nuclear weapons program as a way of reducing its vulnerabilities. The nuclear option enjoys widespread public support in Pakistan. It is seen as

a symbol of national prestige, as an equalizer in dealing with its hostile neighbors and as a bargaining chip which can be used with both friends and enemies. In short, Pakistanis feel there are persuasive strategic and tactical reasons for building nuclear weapons even if the political, diplomatic and economic costs are high.

Although it is highly doubtful that United States policy can stop Pakistan's nuclear program, American policy can play an instrumental role in delaying the process for at least the next five years through a proper balance of political, military and economic programs.

## 2. The aid relationship: Military

Pakistan's insecurities and domestic vulnerabilities require a proper balance between military and economic aid. The security threat to its western border clearly requires a degree of military support. This support however, must take into account legitimate Indian concerns. India's concerns involve not only the levels and types of weapons systems but also their impact on the overall military balance between the two countries. Although India's total military capability is far greater than Pakistan's, this static comparison of force levels is quite misleading. Indian arguments concerning its extensive deployment requirements along its vast border and its internal security commitments require careful study and analysis. Not only should American military aid to Pakistan be highly selective and configured to meet Pakistan's legitimate defensive needs, but a careful review of Indian force levels and the military balance also appears to be appropriate. Defense of the Indian subcontinent will fail if efforts to strengthen the

countries of the region against a Soviet threat result in upsetting the regional military balance and trigger a fourth Indo-Pakistan war. Such a review should precede new commitments to Pakistan for the post-1987 period.

### 3. The aid relationship: Economic

Arms alone will not reduce Pakistan's vulnerabilities. Ultimately, Pakistan's protection and very survival as a state lie in its internal political stability and support for its internal integrity and integration. Pakistan must be made viable, and this cannot be done through military aid alone. Reducing regional disparities, creating greater employment opportunities for a rapidly expanding population, increasing food production, reducing population growth rates and developing the social sector are all critical. Thus a proper balance must be negotiated with Pakistan's leaders over the proper ratio of military and economic support.

Despite its surface prosperity, the Pakistan economy is in trouble. The economic success of the past six years under General Zia was based on a high level of overseas remittances, high levels of foreign aid, good weather and a running down of infrastructure. Pakistan's impressive growth rate has begun to falter as a result of declining remittances, inadequate domestic resource mobilization, policy defects and weak monsoons. The result has been a slowdown in growth, a decline in export earnings and erosion of foreign exchange reserves.

Sustained levels of foreign aid and economic policy reform will be needed to offset this gradual economic erosion. Therefore, the relative balance between economic and military aid for the post-

1987 period should be reviewed. The military aid provided in the previous six year program has helped considerably in strengthening Pakistan's ability to cope with its most immediate military threat. In the next phase, the level of economic aid should be increased in proportion to military aid, and a greater share of foreign military sales should be on a grant basis. Such a strategy would have a variety of advantages. First, it would reduce the potential domestic pressures facing the new Pakistan government. A strong and healthy economy is critical to Pakistan as part of an effort to reduce regional tensions, create employment for a rapidly increasing labor force, develop opportunities for returning overseas workers and control the social pressures which an economic downturn would generate. Second, a shift in the aid package to economic aid would ease apprehensions in India concerning the renewed American-Pakistan relationship. Third, higher levels of economic aid could be used to strengthen Pakistan's infrastructure and enhance the American policy dialogue designed to correct distortions in Pakistan's economy which inhibit growth. Finally, a slightly reduced military aid package would enjoy greater support in the U.S. Congress.

A viable Pakistan is absolutely essential to South Asian security. Its disintegration would result in a political vacuum which would have dangerous regional and global security implications for the West. Given aid levels equal to or slightly higher than the previous six year program, policy reform and effective economic management, many analysts believe Pakistan has the potential to move within the next five to ten years from the ranks of the poorest, least developed of the LDCs to the ranks of the middle income

countries. Sustained economic growth in turn would ease regional tensions and enhance political and social stability.

#### 4. New initiatives and concerns

If Pakistan's front line status is to continue, steps must be taken to assist its development in non-traditional ways. Pakistan's military and economic security must be reinforced by renewed efforts at developing a more effective and sustained political infrastructure. The cycle of accumulated frustration, mass mobilization, crisis, systemic breakdown and military intervention must be brought to a halt. This requires the encouragement and development of a political infrastructure which has been repeatedly neglected in the past. Only in this way can a political vacuum be avoided.

While clearly the major initiative must come from political and social forces within Pakistan itself, such forces can be strengthened and encouraged by outside support. Two instruments of administration foreign policy would be especially applicable to Pakistan. The first is the instrument of public diplomacy which should be used to gain greater understanding and support from local elites for Pakistan's regional security policy. This would include seminars, academic exchanges and greater coverage of Afghanistan developments and their implications for Pakistan. Pakistan's urban intellectuals remain skeptical about and uneasy with the present foreign policy of the Government of Pakistan. Support for this policy could be enhanced by demonstrating the importance which Middle East Gulf states, China and Pakistan's supporters in the West attach to this policy. The notion that nothing can be done to reverse the situation in

Afghanistan must be addressed, and the implications of failure must be clearly examined.

A second major instrument that might be used in Pakistan is the National Endowment for Democracy. The United States should embark on a major effort to encourage, develop and strengthen modern secondary associations in Pakistan that can act as intermediaries between the state and society and cut across traditional identities and loyalties. These include trade unions, business associations, medical societies, bar associations, etc. These organizations exist in embryonic form in Pakistan but are weak, poorly organized and lack direction. The United States played a limited but important role in assisting such organizations in the 1950s. USAID, for example, provided support to Pakistan's business associations when Noel Sargent of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was asked to advise Pakistan businessmen on how to develop more effective industry associations. Business associations, despite their shortcomings, are the most effective organized groups in Pakistan society today. They have come to play a constructive role in development, export promotion and representation.

The National Endowment for Democracy or USAID might therefore ask the AFL-CIO to perform a similar role today in helping Pakistan's highly fragmented trade union movement. Pakistan's trade unions have traditionally been non-ideological but poorly financed, weak and ineffective. Yet trade unions could play a highly constructive role in assisting the re-integration of Pakistani Gulf workers into society and articulating the demands of a rapidly expanding urban work force.

Despite the authoritarian character of the Zia government, Pakistan is still highly influenced by British practices and traditions. For a variety of reasons, secondary associations including political parties are extremely weak in Pakistan. They need to be strengthened. Selected college graduates might be brought to the United States and employed as interns and staff members in trade unions, bar associations or even political parties. Young and promising office holders in existing organizations might also be involved. In this way through a process of training, education and experience, the basis of a new political infrastructure might be effectively developed. A similar program might be conducted among Afghan refugees. While the Government of Pakistan will no doubt initially resist efforts in this field, a carefully planned, cautious and modest program might ultimately be accepted. If successful, the program could be further developed and expanded.

Efforts at developing secondary association and political infrastructure can accompany greater USAID and World Bank attempts at developing Pakistan's social sectors. Increased education and literacy must be accompanied by programs designed to channel and organize these new literates to play a constructive role in the political and social order. Effective trade unions, bar associations, medical associations and teachers associations can play a valuable role in both representation and in service to the society and the community. Leadership training, organization and a service orientation can play a constructive role in preventing these sectors from becoming radicalized and mobilized by others.

Soviet strategy in South Asia has increased pressure on Pakistan.

Inappropriate United States military support to Pakistan will have the negative effect of inhibiting American-Indian relations and result in increased Indian pressure on Pakistan. An American strategy which places greater emphasis on economic aid, carefully selected, defensive military aid and building the civilian sector would go a long way toward accomplishing U.S. objectives in the region.