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STUDY AND REPORT  
OF  
POLICE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS  
IN  
BOLIVIA

RECOMMENDED FOR  
DATE 11-30-88  
FOR OFAM USE  
*James L. Harper*

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FORWARD

This study and report was conducted as a result of a proposal by AID/W (State 193952, AIDTO 786, dated May 13, 1967) and agreed to by the Ambassador, USAID/Bolivia Mission Director, and other components of the Bolivian Country Team (La Paz 2934, TOAID 1483, dated May 18, 1967).

The study was started on June 5, 1967, and completed June 16, 1967.

Its basic objectives were to survey the overall organization, operations and other aspects of the Bolivian police agencies to:

1. Provide factual information which could be used as a basis for recommendations to improve overall police services and to suggest ways for the police to more effectively deal with existing and expected threats to internal security.


2. Provide data to be used in making a final determination as to the scope and size of the USAID Public Safety Program in light of current and anticipated threats to Bolivia's internal security.

The police agencies studied during the conduct of this survey include:

1. The recently created National Police made up by:
  - (a) The National Guard (GNSP)
  - (b) The Traffic Police (TRANSITO)
  - (c) The National Department of Criminal Investigation (DNIC)
2. Customs Police

The information presented here was gathered as a result of studies and field observations of these police agencies and through discussions with their officers and men as well as discussions with the Ambassador

and members of his staff, the USAID/Bolivia Mission Director and members of his staff, and other components of the Country Team active in internal security matters. Also the following materials on file in the Embassy and USAID were reviewed:

1. Report on the internal security forces of the Republic of Bolivia, dated October 15, 1956, which was the initial survey prior to implementing the Public Safety Program in Bolivia.
  2. Project Agreements, for past years including the draft ProgAg for FY 1967, which will be signed prior to June 30, 1967.
  3. PIO/C's issued for public safety commodities from inception of the Program to date.
  4. Prior year PIO/P's and a recently compiled list of some 180 Bolivian police officers now on duty who have received police training outside the country.
  5. Study of Bolivian Police Situation by Goin-Hardin. (See TOAID 613, dated February 3, 1965).
  6. Audit Report No. A-316 on Public Safety Program, Project No. 511-11-710-091, dated March 18, 1965.
  7. Telecommunications Survey made in 1965 (exact date of report not shown -- was made by Richard Willig, Public Safety Advisor, Communications, USAID/Peru).
  8. Public Safety Monthly Reports from January 1964 to date. However, between August 31, 1964, through May 19, 1967, no reports were found.
  9. Country Assistance Program/Bolivia, Parts I and II, for Fy 1966, prepared in September 1964.
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10. Memorandum of Agreement signed December 21, 1966, by Ambassador Henderson, President Barrientos, General Alfredo Ovando Candia, Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces of Bolivia, and Antonio Arguedas Mendieta, Minister of Government.

11. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) -- Bolivia, dated March 18, 1967.

12. Financial Program Report for Public Safety Program (Project symbol 511-11-710-091, for the quarter ending March 31, 1967).

13. All recent airgrams, cables and other miscellaneous documents concerning the Bolivian Public Safety Program.

The Survey Team regrets that the time available for this study was not sufficient to completely deal with all the many problems and needs of the police agencies concerned. It was only possible to cover the high points of each agency.

All information contained in this report has been checked and rechecked. However, with the many complexities of police operations and a constantly changing situation during the 11 years that there has been a Public Safety Program in Bolivia, it is possible that certain mistakes of fact or information still remain. For these, the Survey Team takes full responsibility and hopes that the Country Team will make any corrections that are not completely accurate.

Sincere appreciation is expressed to the many persons who assisted in the conduct of this study and in helping to make the Survey Team's task easier and their brief stay in Bolivia more enjoyable. These persons include:



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The officers and men of the police agencies previously indicated, officials of the Ministry of Government, Justice and Immigration; U.S. Ambassador Douglas Henderson and members of the Country Team and Embassy staff; Mr. Irving G. Tragen, USAID/Bolivia, Mission Director and members of his staff, with special thanks to Mr. Charles D. Matthias, USAID/Bolivia Program Officer, who was the Survey Team's contact, and Bertha G. Acosta, who turned in an outstanding performance as the Team's secretary; and Public Safety Advisor (Investigations) Hugh E. Murray; without whose cooperation and assistance this study would not have been possible.


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GENERAL INFORMATION

Bolivia, situated in the heart of South America, has an approximate area of 450,000 square miles (about the size of Texas and California combined) and a population of 4,136,400 inhabitants (the lowest density in Latin America). Of these, 80% live in the Andean area at an altitude of about 13,000 feet above sea level. There are 1,348,300 urban inhabitants and 2,788,100 rural inhabitants. Productive population is 2,263,000. Rate of increase is 2.27% annually. It has three principal geographic regions, each of which differs widely from the others in altitude, climate, vegetation and population -- The Altiplano or high plateau in the west which is about 500 miles long and 80 miles wide; the Yungas or valleys in the center, which comprise the eastern slope of the Andes; and the sparsely populated llano or great plain in the east which comprises well over half of the country's territory.

Bolivia is a centralized republic with President, Cabinet, Congress and Supreme Court in which the President appoints and removes departmental and municipal officials.

The Chaco War of 1932-35, which Bolivia lost to Paraguay, exhausted the country economically, discredited the traditional ruling class and produced unrest which led ultimately to the MNR revolution of November, 1952. The MNR (Movimiento Revolucionario Nacionalista) ruled the country for 12 years and introduced three revolutionary reforms: mining nationalization, universal suffrage and agrarian reform. In November, 1964, a military junta overthrew the MNR regime and announced that it would support



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a "restorative revolution" which would correct the abuses of the MNR regime, while preserving its achievements and which would prepare the way for elections which would return the government to civilian control. These elections took place on July 3, 1966. General René Barrientos, who resigned as co-president of the military junta to run for the office of constitutional president, won a four-year term with backing from a group of small parties and splinter groups, which formed what they called the Frente de la Revolución Boliviana (FRB).

The population of Bolivia is about 65% Indian, 5-15% European and 20-30% mixed. The overwhelming majority of these people have never played significant roles in the country's national life (though their status has improved since the Revolution of 1952). Well over half of them speak Quechua, Aymara or other Indian dialects rather than or in addition to Spanish and 70% of them make their living in agriculture (mostly subsistence). 70% of the remaining 30% depend on the Government, with only 30% employed in private enterprise.

According to information on file at Traffic Police headquarters, there are 42,000 vehicles registered in Bolivia of which 18,000 are in La Paz.

Since the inception of the Public Safety Program, early in 1957 total U.S. expenditures have amounted to \$1,662,655. See Annex I.

From 1957 until 1964 there was an active Public Safety Program carried out in Bolivia. Following the November 1964 Revolution, the police services command structure was changed and a good deal of the police equipment previously supplied by USAID was taken over by the Armed Forces; consequently,

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the effectiveness of the police services was sharply diminished. USAID Public Safety Project assistance was reduced to the services of a single advisor and has remained at this level until the present time.

In October 1965, the then Minister of Government negotiated a memorandum entitled "Doctrine of Operations Prepared by the Armed Forces of Bolivia and the Public Safety Services of Bolivia for the Control of Activities Affecting the Internal Security of the Country", outlining in general terms the responsibilities and relationships of the Armed Forces and the police services with regard to internal security.

In December 1966, the functions and relationships of the police services with the military had become relatively well defined and a proposal was made for renewed USAID assistance. A Memorandum of Agreement (See Annex II) was signed between the Governments of Bolivia and United States regarding the renewal of USAID assistance as soon as feasible.

It is intended that the renewed assistance be focused on: (1) the re-initiation of training programs that had been suspended in November 1964, including the establishment of a Basic Training School for all incoming police personnel; (2) refresher training for police officers previously trained in the United States, Panama, Puerto Rico or other countries and instruction in the use of firearms and communications equipment; (3) commodity assistance necessary to increase the effectiveness of the police services; and (4) the establishment of maintenance procedures to assure the adequate upkeep of equipment previously<sup>ly</sup> supplied by USAID and to be supplied by USAID under the renewed Public Safety Project.

Since the U.S. Military Assistance Program figures heavily in any attempt to assess existing and expected threats to internal security, a brief background of the program may be helpful to reviewers of this report.

U.S. military assistance began in 1942. The MNR Revolution of 1952 defeated the army and for some six years a peoples' militia controlled the country. During this period, U.S. military assistance was negligible. In 1958, the U.S. MilGRP re-established a program which has continued to date. U.S.

Military personnel presently on duty in Bolivia is as follows:

1. U. S. Military Group	49
2. IAGS	3
3. STRATCCM	25
4. Blue Baron	<u>6</u>
Total	83

*The approximate*  
*1*  
*P*  
Present strength of the Bolivian Armed Forces is:

1. Army	18,350
2. Navy	1,510
3. Air Force	<u>2,450</u>
Total	<del>22,318</del> 22,310

## OVERALL PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS

### A. Basic Considerations

The following discussion of police problems and suggestions for their solution includes only those which have overall application to police agencies of Bolivia:

#### 1. Police Problems

The present crises in Bolivia, ( a State of Seige was declared during this survey -- June 7) with widespread violence, harassment, terrorism and general lawlessness looming as a very acute threat, serves to emphasize a number of basic problems of law enforcement and to point out the important role of the police as the first line of defense against such acts. While many of these problems have existed over a long period, the present situation tends to dramatize the vital need for more effective police service if the basic safety and security of the country is to be maintained. Since the outbreak of the Castro Communist inspired insurgency in March 1967, the Bolivian Government has faced the prospect of prolonged guerrilla activity in the rural southeast. Other immediate problem areas are with the miners and the students. Economic difficulties which have plagued Bolivia for years will probably continue to cause strikes, demonstrations and disturbances, which seriously challenge the country's public order forces.

The Country Team believes that (though unlikely at present) a significant threat could develop, if a joint effort by leftist parties or groups is undertaken to overthrow the GOB. This could entail a broad based plan of organized rural insurgency, urban terrorism, rioting and mass general strikes where improved police capabilities would be vital. The Survey



Team cannot help but compare conditions in Bolivia with those of other Latin American countries with which it is familiar. In doing this, it is evident that a dozen or so well-trained urban terrorists of the type operating in Venezuela could throw the city of La Paz into complete chaos within a few hours.

So too, can the seriousness of the present situation be considered as presenting an opportunity for bringing about certain much needed reforms and improvements in the police and other related public services.

In dealing with the problems of the police, it must be realized that there is no magic panacea or a cure all that will end terrorism, violence or lawlessness in the next few days or weeks. Just as the problems are complex and difficult so are their solutions.

#### B. Basic Recommendations

One of the critical needs of the Bolivian police at present is to get police patrols on the streets. The heart of the police effort against crime is patrol -- moving on foot or by vehicle around an assigned area, stopping to check building, to survey possible incidents, to question suspicious persons or simply to converse with the residents who may provide intelligence as to occurrences in the neighborhood. At present vehicles are virtually non-existent; but police patrols on foot or by bicycles can be of utmost importance.

The Survey Team thinks that any practical solution toward improving police capabilities must include both immediate and long term actions. One issue which must be faced is whether the police can continue to be

part military and part civil in its organization, administration and operations. There are different concepts of policing held by civil and military authorities which often do not agree. It is recommended that a sincere re-evaluation of functions and duties, in relation to basic police objectives be made by each agency and that all non-essential and marginal activities and services of a non-police nature be eliminated.

#### 1. Immediate Action

Although, the Traffic Police is a part of the newly founded National Police, they wear a different uniform and perform only traffic duties. Such specialization is very expensive, ineffective and is not conducive to the overall coordination of police efforts. The Survey Team can think of no valid operational reason why this condition should be allowed to continue. There should be immediate action to integrate the National Guard and the Traffic Police. Through such integration additional manpower and equipment could be made available for basic patrol and other overall police activities, while at the same time improving the overall traffic service of the police. It could also do much to develop the needed public support of police efforts by showing the people that the police are interested in all phases of law enforcement.

#### 2. Long-Range Action

Definite plans should be developed for the taking of further steps to accomplish the actual practical integration of the three police agencies into a national police force. This force should wear a single uniform. The plain clothes unit performing investigative duties should be organized

to function as a detective bureau of the national police.

It is strongly urged that external political influences be kept out of the new organization and that emphasis be placed on quality rather than on quantity of personnel. Within the limitations of GOB capabilities, adequate salaries and career opportunities should be provided.

The lack of basic controls and other recognized principals in the overall organizational structure of the police existed in all police agencies studied. This includes the controls over the police by other governmental and political agencies, which have made it difficult for them to function collectively or effectively. No police agency can provide efficient service when outside control or influence is allowed to dominate the decisions of those directly responsible for its administration. There is much evidence to indicate that external pressures brought to bear on the police have been major factors in bringing about the present conditions of ineffective organization, dissipated striking, power, lack of coordinated action and generally unfavorable public attitude toward their efforts.

It is recommended that all possible step. be taken to eliminate external influences and controls over the police, their activities and personnel.

It is recommended that a detailed organizational study be made of all police agencies with special attention to such recognized principles of organization as span of control, chain of command, level and delegation of authority, inspection, channels of communication and others. Also that such factors be given prime consideration in the planning and development of the newly created National Police Agency, including the establishment of a workable structure of control and inspection needed to assure its

effective administration and operation at all levels.

### 3. Other Basic Recommendations

#### a. Public Relations

Planned public relations be continued and expanded by all police agencies to develop public support and understanding of police programs and objectives. This activity should involve more than just contact with the newspapers and other new media. It must be fully coordinated and not seek to promote the interest of any one particular agency. In sum, public relations activities should be controlled at the Superior Command headquarters of the National Police.

#### b. Emergency Equipment

The police be provided with special types of emergency equipment, including gas masks, weapons and ammunition. Also that adequate training be provided to assure safe and effective use of this equipment. The Survey Team noticed that most tear gas in stock at National Guard headquarters and stations, as well as that carried by some police officers was outdated. Although USAID/B had recently supplied gas masks and tear gas, these items were not in possession of policemen directly involved in riot control. Not only should emergency equipment be procured, but steps must be taken to see that it gets into the hands of the operational people.

#### c. Training

In addition to the now existing training at the National Police Academy, training efforts of all police agencies should be continued and expanded along truly functional lines designed to provide information needed in the performance of duty; develop ability to perform new duties; develop and

maintain a high degree of moral; and to provide more uniformity and overall effectiveness in police activities.

Discussion of the specific problems of the various police units that make up the recently created National Police are included in the sections dealing with the separate police agencies.

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(DATE) <i>11-30-88</i>
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<i>James L. Harper</i>

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

The judicial establishment of the country is administered by the Minister of Government, Justice, and Immigration, who also controls the three police forces that make up the National Police, which is responsible for law enforcement and internal security.

The Minister of Government is a cabinet officer of the highest rank, appointed by and reporting directly to the President, whose principal function is the internal administration of the country. He controls immigration, vital statistics and, as previously mentioned, the National Police. He does not control the customs police who work for the Ministry of Hacienda (Treasury).

The Minister of Government is directly responsible for law enforcement. The incumbent, Dr. Antonio Arguedas Mendieta, is a 38-year old lawyer who favorably impressed the Survey Team. He appears to be making a concerted effort to improve the capability of the police. To meet his law enforcement responsibility, the Minister created a superior command and later converted this into a national police force and set up headquarters in the Ministry of Government building.

It may be said unequivocally that civil police responsibility is poorly executed. To say the police are ineffective and have a limited ability to prevent crime and terrorism is not to criticize the police. The police, more than anybody, are frustrated between the wide gap between the task they are expected to perform and the methods at their disposal to perform it. For example there are no motorized patrol operations outside La Paz.

In La Paz the only motorized patrol is that carried out by the Traffic Police. This is very limited and deals with traffic assignments only. In La Paz the National Guard are carrying out foot patrol operations in the business areas and a few highly populated areas. Parts of the city are without any police protection whatever. There are 4-six hour patrol shifts with approximately 140 men assigned to each shift. The police patrol in pairs and have only batons, except a few were seen carrying tear gas canisters in their belt. The canisters inspected by the Team had an expiration date of 1965. Other than a few policemen guarding important government buildings, uniform police are not provided arms of any kind. Proper administrative and command precepts are not followed, and field supervision is poor. There is no communication between the patrol teams nor between the patrol and their headquarters.

In sum, although civil police responsibility is being poorly executed, sincere efforts are being directed toward improving their capability to meet immediate and long range internal security threats. The police of Bolivia are eager for and in dire need of U.S. assistance.

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NATIONAL POLICE

A. Mission and Responsibility

1. Legal Authority and Background

The legal authority is Title 8 of the new Constitution enacted February 2, 1967, which provides for the reorganization of the police forces of Bolivia. It also incorporated the National Guard, Traffic Police and the National Department of Criminal Investigation into the National Police.

The Traffic Police has been a separate agency since it was created. The National Guard and what is now the National Department of Criminal Investigation made up what was known as the Bolivian Police, until they were separated on January 2, 1965. Between January 2, 1965, and February 2, 1967, each agency (Traffic, National Guard, and National Department of Criminal Investigation) operated independently and were called the Public Safety Services of Bolivia.

The Superior Command of Public Safety, created in order to put the three Public Safety Services under one command, preceded the National Police.

2. Basic Responsibilities

- a. Maintenance of public order
  - b. Preservation of personal liberties and rights
  - c. Prevention and investigation of crimes
  - d. Conviction and sentencing by police judges of persons who have committed minor offenses
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- e. Apprehension of offenders to put them under the competent authorities
- f. Control and regulation of traffic of pedestrians and vehicles
- g. Issuance of identification documents

## B. ORGANIZATION

### 1. Overall

The National Police is composed of the General Directorate, National Directorate of the National Guard, National Directorate of Traffic and National Directorate of Criminal Investigations. (See Chart No. 1).

The National Police is under the Minister of Government who reports directly to the President.

The National Police is headed by a Director General who is appointed by and reports directly to the President.

### 2. General Directorate

This is the highest level of command and coordination.

The major duties of the Director General are to administer, coordinate, and supervise the three agencies that make up the National Police.

The Director General is directly assisted by:


a. Command Staff, composed of the heads of the Personnel Division, Intelligence Division, Planning and Operations Division, Logistics and Disbursements Divisions.

b. Administrative Staff, composed of the Director's Adjutant, Public Relations Officer and Secretaries.

c. Superior Disciplinary Tribunal, whose basic responsibilities are to review disciplinary actions taken by Departmental Disciplinary Tribunals.

C H A R T I

BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE



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The Director General and his staff make up what is called the General Directorate, which is located in the Ministry of Government building.

The major duties of the Administrative Staff, Command Staff, and the Superior Disciplinary Tribunal are not as yet very well defined.

The heads of the National Guard, Traffic and Criminal Investigation Agencies report directly to the Director General.

The Police Academy operates directly under the General Directorate.

The present Director General is an active Army Lt. Colonel who was appointed in March 1967.

C. OPERATIONS


The National Police has no operational personnel other than those contained in the three agencies previously mentioned who make up this organization.

D. PERSONNEL

Other than the Director General and a small administrative staff assigned to the General Directorate headquarters, all personnel are drawn from the other three agencies.

The personnel breakdown as explained to the Survey Team was as follows:

National Guard	3,703
Traffic Police	987
National Department of Criminal Investigation	<u>1,249</u>
Total personnel of National Police	5,939




E. TRAININGNational Police Academy

The National Police Academy is the basic training institution for the training of officer Candidates who apply and are accepted by the National Police. It is located in La Paz in a residential zone called Següencoma. It is a relatively new 3 story building and fairly modern by Latin American standards. The National Police Academy was constructed in 1963 with monetary assistance of AID. At the entrance to the Academy is a plaque which states that the academy building was constructed with assistance provided by the Alliance for Progress.

The capacity of the Academy is 180 students but can be increased by at least one third, if necessary. When visited by the survey team the school appeared well kept and orderly. A serious water problem was noted, however. According to officials, the Academy at this time has no water except for a very limited amount which is carried by one small pipe from the Center of town into the main plaza of the Academy. On the day of the survey team's visit, water was being carried by personnel in buckets and tubs for use in the Academy building.

The present director of the National Police Academy is Col. Néstor Valdez Aníbarro who has over 20 years service as a police officer. He has a staff of 39 Instructors, 19 of which consist of a permanent staff of one Lt. Col., three majors, two captains, and twelve lieutenants. These instructors are supplemented by other officers and



professionals from the Ministry's and the local University. Three IPA graduates are presently assigned to the Academy staff.

The Academy has the usual services, including a medical section, supply section, transportation section, food services section, a small visual aids section, and cadet lounge.

The audio-visual section has one movie projector which has a part missing and inoperative. Films are obtained from USIS on a loan basis but not many films used are police training films or even concerned with police subjects.

There is one DIFFO Machine which is in poor condition. This machine is used primarily to produce Administrative materials and not training materials as there is a shortage of paper.


There is an adequate but small pistol range with 10 firing points on the Academy grounds. This range has shooting points at seven yards, 15 yards, and 25 yards and can be effectively modified to provide training in combat or double action shooting.

The organization of the Police Academy follows general military lines. See chart #5.

Courses offer a combination of practical, theoretical, and Military subjects. Emphasis is placed on teaching the student Military bearing and discipline. A large portion of training is also dedicated to instruction in sociology, psychology, and theory on cultural improvement. The length of the course is three years.



Chart 5



La Paz, June 8, 1967

The Training Provides for:

- A. National Guard
- B. Traffic Police
- C. National Dept. of Criminal Investigations.

The training Program is as follows:

First Year1st. Semester

1. Introduction to Police Operations
2. Introduction to Criminalistics
3. Constitutional Law
4. History and Police Doctrine
5. Psychology
6. Sociology
7. Police Ethics
8. Oral Expression and Report Writing
9. First Aid
10. Police Organization and Policy
11. English Language
12. Military Instruction for Police
13. Physical Education and Sports

2nd. Semester

1. Police Operations and Patrol
2. Criminalistics
3. Administrative Law
4. History and Police Doctrine
5. Psychology
6. Criminal Law
7. Culture Improvement
8. Letter Writing and Filing
9. Health Hygiene
10. Police Organization and Regulations
11. English Language
12. Military Instruction for Police
13. Physical Education and Sports.

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SECOND YEAR1st. Semester

1. Police Operations and Procedure
2. Criminalistics
3. Criminology
4. Human Relations
5. Personal Identification
6. Legal Medicine
7. Searches and Seizures
8. Civil Law
9. Communications
10. English Language
11. Military Instruction for Police
12. Physical Education and Sports.

2nd. Semester

1. Control of Civil Disturbances
2. Criminalistics
3. Criminology
4. Criminal Law
5. Public Relations
6. Personal Identification
7. Legal Medicine
8. Instructor Methods
9. International Law
10. English Language
11. Military Instruction for Police
12. Physical Education and Sports.

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THIRD YEAR

(Specializations)

1st. SemesterNational Guard  
(GN)Traffic  
(PT)Investigations  
(DNIC)

- |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| 1. Patrol Techniques                   | 1. Patrol Techniques                   | 1. Patrol Techniques                                   |
| 2. Police Administration               | 2. Police Administration               | 2. Police Administration                               |
| 3. Intelligence Opns.                  | 3. Intelligence Opns.                  | 3. Intelligence Opns.                                  |
| 4. Juvenile Matters                    | 4. Juvenile Matters                    | 4. Juvenile Matters                                    |
| 5. Police Law                          | 5. Police Law                          | 5. Police Law  |
| 6. Topography                          | 6. Topography                          | 6. Topography  |
| 7. Community Development               | 7. Community Development               | 7. Community Development                               |
| 8. Criminal Speech and Characteristics | 8. Criminal Speech and Characteristics | 8. Criminal Speech and Characteristics                 |
| 9. Fire Fighting                       | 9. Fire Fighting                       | 9. Fire Fighting                                       |
| 10. English Language                   | 10. English Language                   | 10. English Language                                   |
| 11. Military Instruction for Police    | 11. Military Instruction               | 11. Military Instruction                               |
| 12. Physical Education and Sports      | 12. Physical Education and Sports      | 12. Physical Education and Sports                      |
|  | 13. Traffic Direction and Control      | 13. Finger Prints                                      |
|  | 14. Traffic Accident Investigation     | 14. Organ., Admins., and opns. of DNIC (Invest. Dept.) |

UNCLASSIFIED

2nd SemesterNational Guard  
(GN)Traffics  
(PT)Investigations  
(DNIC)

- |                                       |   |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| 1. Radio Patrol opns.                 | 1. Radio Patrol opns.                       | 1. Radio Patrol opns.                           |
| 2. Intelligence opns.                 | 2. Intelligence opns.                       | 2. Intelligence opns.                           |
| 3. Driver Training                    | 3. Driver Training                          | 3. Driver Training                              |
| 4. English Language                   | 4. English Language                         | 4. English Language                             |
| 5. Military Instruction<br>for Police | 5. Military Instruction<br>for Police       | 5. Military Instruction<br>for Police           |
| 6. Physical Education<br>and Sports   | 6. Physical Education<br>and Sports         | 6. Physical Education<br>and Sports             |
| 7. Military Tactics                   | 7. Preparation of Cases<br>and Presentation | 7. Preparation of Cases<br>and Presentation     |
| 8. Firefighting Techniques            | 8. Investigation of<br>Traffic Accidents    | 8. Interrogations                               |
| 9. Use of Police Dogs                 | 9. Auto Mechanics                           | 9. Typing Classes                               |
| 10. Jail Policy and<br>Regulations    | 10. Traffic Regs.                           | 10. Regulations pertaining<br>to lower offenses |
|                                       | 11. Traffic Education                       | 11. Modus operandi File                         |
|                                       | 12. Traffic Records and<br>Statistics       |   |

After completing two years of general training, cadets receive specialized training during the third year in accordance with their assignments with the National Guard, Traffic Police, or the National Directorate of Criminal Investigations.


At present there are 128 students divided as follows:

1st year	-	54 cadets
2nd year	-	41 cadets
3rd year	-	<u>33</u> cadets
Total		128 cadets

Note: 3rd year cadets graduate in December, 1967 and will be distributed equally (11 each) among the three agencies that make up the National Police.

The requirements for the appointment of cadets to the National Policy Academy are the following:

Applicant must:

1. Be a native born Bolivian
  2. Be single
  3. Be between 17 and 21 years of age
  4. Be a high school graduate or equivalent.
  5. Pass a medical exam and agility test.
  6. Pass a written exam
  7. Provide a bond of 300.00 pesos (\$25.00)
  8. Provide personal recommendations
  9. Not have been previously dismissed from the Police Department.
- 

The above requirements are not inflexible according to Police officials. Also it appears that a pre-employment investigation is not mandatory.

Students upon being accepted are provided with uniforms and bedding by the Academy. Students must personally provide shoes, towels, underwear, ties, 1 khaki uniform and other personal gear.

Upon graduating cadets are commissioned as second Lieutenants and are assigned to one of the three police Agencies in La Paz or the Interior.

Although a training program for NCO's or troop level personnel does not exist at the National Police Academy there are two other training activities located there.

By special arrangements with the Director of the National Police and supported by the USAID Customs Advisor, customs police officers are trained at the National Police Academy. 35 customs policemen were receiving instruction at the Academy at the time of this survey. Additional details are provided in the section on Customs Police training in this report.

The National police dog training school is also located at the Police Academy. At the present time there are 2 officers and 18 enlisted men assigned to this activity. The young Lieutenant who is in charge of the dog training school received training in this field in Peru and in Germany. Dog kennels are located in the rear of the Academy and are presently accommodating 40 dogs of different breeds.



Police officers stated that the dogs were used for Patrol, control of civil disturbances, and counter guerrilla operations. Police appeared certain that the dogs used in counter-guerrilla operations were successful. Dogs are used with a trainer to scout guerrilla areas ahead of troop movements. According to the police this has prevented guerrilla ambushes on several occasions. Although on one occasion the dog and his handler were killed.



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F. EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

The General Directorate has : 1 automobile, 2 pick-up trucks, and 2 carryalls for a total of 5 vehicles. All are in poor condition for lack of spare parts and maintenance.

Four

Four transceivers (Packmasters), they are in good condition but often non-operational for the lack of batteries. One single Side Band base station

(Compact 4, Number 790) communicating with the interior. Good condition and in operation at time of survey.

Usual office furniture (good condition) and supplies (very limited).

G. BUDGET

See Annex 3.

H. COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS

1. Comments

It is not likely that the Bolivian Military will allow a strong National Police Force to develop. None-the-less, the present so called National Police is better than having the three agencies operating independently.

2. Suggestions

That a basic re-evaluation of police functions and duties, in relation to basic police objectives -- ~~prevention of crime, protection of life and~~ property, detection and punishment of offenders -- be conducted by police officials and that greater emphasis be placed on the following operations:

a. Development of an effective foot patrol service for the entire city of La Paz, with adequate supervision and planned coordination with bicycle

patrols, radio car patrols as they become available, and other police units such as detective teams.

b. Expansion of present patrol service, by using traffic police officers for patrol duties. This should include the motorcycles and vehicles that have radio communication with the FM base station at Traffic Police headquarters. One National Guardsman and one Traffic Policeman should make up two men patrol teams, when possible. In the beginning, two Traffic Policemen should not work together, as neither they nor the public are accustomed to the Traffic Police performing non-traffic duties.

c. The FM base station now located at Traffic headquarters should be moved to National Directorate headquarters and be the beginning of an operations room directly under the General Director and his special staff. This center should operate on a 24-hour basis, preferably in 8-hour shifts. Each shift should be commanded by an official empowered to make to make operation decisions in the name of the Director General. Orders should be issued that this operations center takes over full control of all police operations in unusual or emergency situations.

It is also strongly recommended that all administrative staff and support units be centralized. This will save money, personnel and avoid overlap and duplication.

NATIONAL GUARD

(Guardia Nacional)

A. Mission and Responsibilities1. Legal Development

The Guardia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (National Guard of Public Safety) was created by Supreme Decree N° 07016 of January 4, 1965. Prior to this decree this agency was known as "Policía Boliviana" (Bolivian Police), which included what is now the National Department of Criminal Investigations.

2. Mission

The National Guard is responsible for providing uniformed police services throughout the Republic including frontier areas. Their duties consist of usual law enforcement functions and patrol services in urban and rural areas, control of civil disturbances, demonstrations, border control operations, and service as penal guards. The National Guard has national jurisdiction and authority.

B. Organization

The organization of the National Guard is along classic Military lines, with a Personnel Department, Intelligence Department, Operations Department, and a Logistics Department. Also on the same level of hierarchy as departments, are a Civic Action Department, a Public Relations Department, a Fire Department, and a Housing Department. See chart .


It appears that the Civic Action Department is more theory than fact.

The Intelligence Department has a present staff of 15 men who are beginning to get organized. The Fire Department which is under the National Guard

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C H A R T 2

BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE NATIONAL GUARD



Directorate provides services to the city of La Paz and is the only fire-fighting unit in the city.

The Guardia Nacional also has an emergency center located in the center of La Paz which operates as a semi-autonomous unit. This center is responsible for responding to emergency situations occurring in La Paz, providing foot patrols, and guards for sports events.

The total strength of the Guardia Nacional is 3,703 officers and enlisted personnel. Personnel are distributed throughout the Republic to nine departments, provinces, cantons, and border areas. Departments are equivalent to states, and provinces and cantons are equivalent to towns and villages. Located at Department and Province level are police contingents headed by a Director. There are approximately 1,752 men located in La Paz and the rest of the personnel are distributed to Interior Departments varying from 370 in the largest interior department to 11 men in a frontier area. The department of La Paz is the largest in the country.

Major units aside from the National Guard Directorate at La Paz are located at the following departments:

1. Department of Oruro	204 men
2. Department of Cochabamba	371 men
3. Department of Chuquisaca	202 men
4. Department of Potosí	230 men
5. Department of Tarija	135 men
6. Department of Santa Cruz	352 men
7. Department of Beni	81 men
8. Department of Pando	41 men

The title of Direccion (Directorate) is used for Guardia Nacional contingents in the Interior, and Traffic and Investigations contingents use the term Jefaturas (headquarters) for their units in the same locale.

The Guardia Nacional has a Headquarters (Directorate) building in La Paz and separate buildings (Cuarteles) for the Fire Department, (actually owned by the municipality) the Centro de Emergencia (Emergency Center) and the National Guard Directorate of La Paz, which is responsible for providing police services in La Paz.

#### 1. National Guard Headquarters Directorate

This is the Command Headquarters of the National Guard and is located in a Cuartel (Fort like building) in La Paz. It has the usual Latin American characteristics and house keeping services found in Military and police buildings called Cuarteles.

The Headquarters Directorate is responsible for supervising and coordinating the functions and responsibilities of the National Guard on a nationwide scale.

The Headquarters Directorate of the National Guard is directly responsible to the General Directorate of the National Police which is located at the Ministry of Government (Casa de Gobierno) in La Paz.

#### 2. Fire Department

The Fire Department Cuartel (building) is located in downtown La Paz and is a wall enclosed compound which has one entrance and exit point. The mission of this organization is two fold: This unit provides fire fighting services in La Paz and provides support to National Guard units engaged



in controlling civil disturbances. The total strength of this organization is 90 men which includes 12 officers. The total strength of the Fire Department in Bolivia is 130 men.

The equipment used by the Fire Department in La Paz, includes 3 Neptune water throwing vehicles which were obtained in Argentina. Two of the vehicles are serviceable, and one is inoperable. The trucks can carry 5,000 liters of water and are considered inadequate for fighting fires, and would probably be ineffective in riots of any scale.

Personnel are used to control disturbances using the Neptune water trucks, to spray rioters with water under pressure. The trucks are protected by wire screen mesh on the windows, but are completely vulnerable to gunfire and molotov cocktails. Dye is used on occasions to mark rioters.

This unit also has limited tear gas capabilities and personnel carry wood batons of 21 to 24 inches in length.

Officers told the Survey Team of the use of ammonia gas for controlling riots. This gas is obtained from Buenos Aires, and can be lethal in concentrated doses especially to persons with ill health.

### 3. National Guard Directorate of the Department of La Paz

This organization serves the same basic police purpose in La Paz as other Departmental Directorates do in the Interior. Their mission is to provide uniformed police services in La Paz for the purpose of law enforcement, and protect the community against crime and violence. The total effective strength of this organization is 1,363 officers and enlisted men.

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The National Guard Directorate of the Department of La Paz is in a separate building from the Directorate General of the National Guard. The building is similar in construction and also enclosed and guarded 24 hours a day.

An organization which is called the Emergency Center (Centro de Emergencia) and which has a specific riot control mission is under the command of the La Paz Directorate.


The Emergency Center (Centro de Emergencia) is also located in downtown La Paz in a separate compound like structure. The mission of this unit is to provide riot control forces in the event of civil disturbances; provide foot patrols in four areas of La Paz; and provide guards for sporting events, demonstrations and parades, key buildings and facilities, and banks.

The total strength of this unit is 270 officers and enlisted men.

G. Operations

Since the attempt to reorganize the Police Forces of Bolivia was initiated after the Revolution of November 1944, the capabilities and operations of the police have been changed. Currently, the present National Guard Commander, Col. Agustin Morales Duran is making changes in operations in order to provide better police coverage by the National Guard in La Paz. He is obviously hampered by the lack of mobility, communications and trained personnel.

Present patrol coverage is inadequate in La Paz and even weaker in the Interior. Patrol operations consist of 2-man foot patrols primarily in downtown La Paz. Patrols are reinforced by one National Guard truck which



patrols the city sporadically with one officer and six guards.

The city of La Paz is divided into seven zones for patrol purposes and three zones are assigned to the National Guard Directorate of the Department of La Paz and four zones are assigned to the Emergency Center (Centro de Emergencia) for patrol coverage by personnel from those Cuartels. There is no centralized control of Patrol Operations and all seven zones are not covered at any one time.

Personnel are also dispatched from these two Cuartels to guard banks, control demonstrations and civil disturbances, and to provide security at ball games and other crowd gathering events.

There is no communications available for patrol operations by the National Guard.

Systematic mobile patrols are unavailable. More adequate mobile patrol coverage could probably be provided by the traffic police who have more mobility and communications than the National Guard.

Patrols are composed of 20 men assigned in pairs, per zone when available. This is considered totally inadequate for a city the size and composition of La Paz. In the event of widespread disturbances and systematic urban terrorism the National Guard would be totally unable to meet even their most basic responsibilities as a Law Enforcement Agency.

1. Emergency Operations

This is one of the most serious problems faced by the National Guard and one that has the most significance in Bolivia at this time.



The present capabilities of the National Guard to control riots, and urban violence is very limited. Under their present conditions, efforts to suppress mass violence or terrorism of a large scale nature will probably result in an embarrassing defeat for the police and possible serious injury to persons as well as property damage that could normally be avoided.

At the present time there is no capability to control or coordinate the efforts of the National Guard forces in emergencies. A command center with adequate communications, which would provide overall supervision and support in emergencies does not exist.

The organization and training of emergency forces should be greatly improved. Plans for contingencies are available only in the mental preoccupations of some of the National Guard officers.

Standard procedure to control demonstrations and civil disturbances is to pull in all National Guard foot patrols in the city. That personnel is then used as a control force and a reserve.

Riot formations with wood batons are used often in conjunction with chemical agents or water throwing vehicles.

There have been cases where Riot Control contingents have become isolated and surrounded by a mob and have had to retreat, sometimes individually, into buildings or fight their way out of a mob encirclement. Tear gas munitions and gas masks in the possession of riot forces was seen to be inadequate. Chemical munitions stocks were small, and almost all munitions were outdated.



Chemical munitions recently provided by the Public Safety Program of AID have not been issued to the units with the most urgent need for this type of equipment.

Tactical communications for riot control forces consist of seven handi-talkies, and four pack masters of which over one half do not function properly.

National Guard personnel were observed on duty with one or two tear gas grenades hanging on their belts. Individual use of tear gas grenades is ineffective and is often counter productive. Units, equipped, trained and organized to function as a team with adequate supervision to employ chemical agents are presently non-existent.

D. Personnel

1. Number and Ranks

The National Guard is a quasi military organization and has a total of 3,703 employees, including 640 officers, 352 civilians, and 2,711 N.C.O.'s and enlisted personnel with standard military grades.

The effective force of this organization is misleading due to the many fixed posts and miscellaneous assignments such as bank guards, etc. which deplete the strength of this organization.

For a breakdown of personnel by rank see Annex 4 . The salaries of personnel are also indicated on Annex 4 .

In addition to basic allowances personnel receive a rations allowance. The average pay of a patrolman is approximately \$28 a month. Uniforms are provided as well as police equipment which consists of a wood baton.

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2. Recruitment

Enlisted personnel are recruited on a voluntary basis for a minimum of a one-year period. There is a very high turnover of enlisted personnel. Officer personnel are appointed in accordance with the requirements explained in the "training" section of the National Police.

Basic requirements for enlisted personnel include:

- a. Certificate of Military Service
- b. A simple literacy examination
- c. A satisfactory medical examination
- d. Birth Certificate

The minimum age for employment is 19 years of age and the maximum age is 30, according to Police Officials. This requirement and the requirement for a pre-employment investigation are very flexible.

3. Other Benefits

Include medical benefits, retirement and old age benefits. These fringe benefits are obviously limited. Officers and enlisted men are authorized between 15 and 30 days vacation per year in accordance with their grade. There is no limit on sick leave and this factor is mostly a matter of decision by the commanding officer and/or doctor.

4. Promotions

There is no firm promotion process for officers or enlisted men. However, officers must take a written exam and have a specific number of years in grade prior to promotion. These requirements vary on occasion. Enlisted personnel can attain the highest grade of warrant officer. Promotions are given based generally on work performance and recommendations by superiors.

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### E. Training

The officers assigned to the National Guard receive three years of general police training at the National Police Academy prior to being commissioned as officers. It appears that very little training is given to officer personnel after their graduation from the Police Academy.


Details on the training for officer personnel is found in Section of the report on the National Police.

Recruits assigned to the National Guard generally apply directly to that organization and training is given at the National Guard Cuartel where they are assigned. There is no formal training program and according to police officials training is given to new personnel on a continuing basis on the following subjects:

1. Patrol techniques
2. Military instruction
3. Riot control
  - a. riot control formations
  - b. use of police baton
  - c. use of tear gas
4. Civics
5. Police procedures

Firearms training is no longer given since police personnel are not armed with revolvers.

Recruits are generally assigned to a Escuadron (company) under the command



of a junior officer. The training is arranged for and provided by the officer in command. OJT training is also provided for the new recruits by assigning him to patrol with an experienced policeman (Guardia) on a regular shift. It is not unusual for a new recruit to go out on patrol immediately without any previous training other than just a brief orientation as to procedure.

Since the inception of the AID Public Safety Program 186 police officers have received U.S. or third country training. It was observed that a great many of the graduates of the Inter American Police Academy in Panama, and of the International Police Academy in Washing D. C. have been promoted and several occupied key positions in the police. However, more of these officers should be utilized in training functions to provide training to enlisted personnel including N.C.O.'s.

It was interesting to note that 15 officers have received training in Chile, 38 in Puerto Rico, 15 in Argentina, and 22 in Cuba on or about 1957,

Training as a whole is very weak and should not only be augmented but also expanded on a nation-wide basis. This can be done by the use of mobile training teams using police participants as instructors.

#### F. Facilities and Equipment

##### 1. Communications

The present communications capabilities of the National Guard in La Paz is poor. There are no mobile radio units available for patrols or operations in La Paz. Handi-talkies or portable pack masters are almost all inoperative due to the lack of maintenance or repair facilities.

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The Guardia Nacional, (National Guard) can communicate with the headquarters of the Traffic Police by radio but the real operational advantage of this was not fully explained.

The National Guard Headquarters has a small radio room not more than 8 x 8 feet which is kept operational 24 hours a day. From this radio room the National Guard Headquarters can communicate with the National Guard Directorates in the nine departments in the country, and the Directorate of the National Police which is located at the Ministry of Government (Casa de Gobierno).

The National Guard does not have an Operations Center where available communications facilities are integrated with an Operational Command, and used to coordinate and control operations.

Radio equipment presently in the possession of the National Guard is:

- a. 4 pack master portable EM-RCA Model
- b. 7 Handi-talkies ERC/6 units
- c. 19 Base Stations COMPACT IV R. F.

There are almost no repair and maintenance capabilities available.

2. Armament

The National Guard was disarmed after the Revolution of 1964 by the Armed Forces. At the present time, almost 100% of the Guardia personnel in La Paz and in the Interior are unarmed except for a wood baton. There are shot guns, and rifles in the possession of the National Guard; however, in small numbers.

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According to information provided by the police, the National Guard has the following weapons:

a. Carbines, Cal 30M1	30
b. Shotgun, Cal 12g	63
c. Gas guns (tear gas)	88
d. Wood batons (21-24 inch)	555
e. Nawara sticks	148

The National Guard also has 533 wood shields used for riot control, 158 gas masks, 500 tear gas projectiles, and 3,050 tear gas grenades of different types.

Police reports on the number of .38 caliber revolvers vary. One report indicated the existence of 8 revolvers, while another indicated no revolvers in stock. Several guards outside the Ministry of Government, however, were noted to be carrying relatively new .38 caliber revolvers. Official police reports revealed that 739 .38 caliber revolvers, (of which 587 were Smith and Wesson and 152 were Colt) were received by the police between 1962 and 1964 from the AID Public Safety Program. According to the police these revolvers were almost without exception taken by the Armed Forces.

According to police reports, only 20,000 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition, and 2,453 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition is available.

### 3. Transportation

The following vehicles were reported by the police to be available to the National Guard:



a. Sedans GMC	2
b. Jeeps	2
c. Trucks 6 x 6	3
d. Neptune Trucks	4
5. Carry all	<u>2</u>
Total	13

The sedans are used by the Commander of the National Guard and his staff.

The condition of the vehicles is generally fair to poor. There are no maintenance and repair facilities organized on a permanent basis. There is absolutely no provision for this in the present budget.

H. Comments and Suggestions

The National Guard represents the principle line force of the National Police. It has the largest number of personnel of all the police agencies in Bolivia. The capabilities of the National Guard, however, are limited when compared to the mission this organization must accomplish. The limitations of this organization are generally recognized by the command officers. There is a tendency, however, for the officers to think that their weaknesses can be corrected by the mere acquisition of equipment.

There is a great need for guidance and technical advise to implement carefully studied plans of action to improve operations. There is an urgent need for training, reorganization of forces, and the implementation of basic police measures such as adequate patrols in La Paz, and in the Departamentos (Departments).

There is a need for coordination and cooperation between the National



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Guard and other enforcement agencies to obtain an effective utilization of all resources available in the police field.

There is a great need to improve the public image of the National Guard so as to obtain the support and respect of the people. This can be done by proper training, improved police procedures and techniques, and a sound public relations program which can filter down to all levels.

To improve the emergency operations of the police, training for riot control personnel should be expanded and intensified, with emphasis on practical exercises as well as theory. The confidence and discipline of personnel should be improved to the highest level possible by training and indoctrination.

The effectiveness of the present water throwing vehicles for riot control should be re-evaluated. The use of DM or sickening gas should be immediately discouraged. The use of ammonia gas is dangerous and not conducive to earning much needed public support for the police.

According to Dr. John L. Beahler, U.S. Embassy doctor in La Paz, ammonia gas in concentrated doses will produce a high irritation of the mucous membranes, coughing, vomiting, edema, permanent damage to the eyes, and serious skin irritation.

More effective chemical agents such as CS and CN agents should be procured and DM (vomiting) agents eliminated for use in the control of mobs.

A plan for controlling disturbances, urban terrorism and sabotage, should be developed as soon as practicable and personnel prepared to implement all

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measures of defense. Coordination and cooperation should be encouraged between the various police agencies and with the appropriate armed services to deal with emergencies which threaten internal security and public safety, and which may escalate to a point beyond the capabilities of the police.

## TRAFFIC POLICE

### A. Mission and Responsibility

#### 1. Legal Authority and Development

The current agency, is called "Dirección Nacional de Tránsito" (National Directorate of Traffic). This name was assumed when the former agency was incorporated into the National Police. This former agency "El Servicio Nacional de Tránsito" (National Traffic Service) was created by Supreme Decree N° 6128, of June 3, 1962.

A Military Junta, which had control of the Government in October, 1951, decreed the reformation of the older traffic agency so as to more effectively handle traffic and parking regulations in Bolivia. The 1951 decree revised decrees relating to traffic which was issued in 1939 and 1949.

An agency for traffic control has perhaps existed, at least in a rudimentary form, for 40 years or more. However, no record dating back beyond 1939 could be found.

#### 2. Basic Responsibilities

1. Enforcement of traffic laws.
2. Issuance and control of vehicle titles and license plates.
3. Examination of drivers and issuance and control of drivers' licenses.
4. Maintenance of the registry of vehicles.
5. Determination of routes and services for public transportation vehicles.
6. Handle intersection control, congestion problems and general parking enforcement.
7. Inspection of vehicles and preventing the operation of any found to be unsafe.

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## B. Organization

### 1. Overall organization

The entire organization is under the administrative supervision of the National Director of Traffic, with rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He is appointed by the President, upon recommendations of the Minister of Government. The incumbent is a career traffic officer, with twenty years of service.

Major duties of the Director are to administer, coordinate, and supervise the various units of the organization, to assist the Director of the National Police in maintaining relations with other police and governmental agencies, to determine policies to be followed, to prepare and submit budgets, and other duties required for the efficient functioning of the agency.

Operating under the supervision of the Director are the major departments of the organization (see Chart N° 3) which include the following:

Operations Commander

Legal Advisor

Adjutant

Administrative Staff

Inspector General

Personnel Department

Logistics and Disbursement Department


Vehicle Registration Department

Drivers License Department

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C H A R T 3

BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF TRAFFIC



Medical Department  
Public Relations Department  
Transportation Department  
Zone Chiefs  
The nine zones include:

La Paz  
Cochabamba  
Oruro  
Santa Cruz  
Potosí  
Chuquisaca  
Tarija  
Beni  
Fando

The Operations Commander is responsible for the planning and supervision of traffic activities in the La Paz area, including foot and car patrols, motorcycle patrols, intersection and parking controls and special assignments, such as Soccer games and other special events.

The Legal Advisor, Inspector General, and other Department heads have duties and responsibilities about such as their names imply. The survey team was not furnished a breakdown of their specific responsibilities.



### C. Operations

#### 1. Overall Operations, La Paz.

The General Command of the Traffic Police is located in a four story building in downtown La Paz and handles the planning and supervision of most traffic operations in the La Paz area. These operations include; very limited car and motorcycle patrols and intersection control. Intersection control downtown is mostly handled by policemen perched in a "tub-like" elevated apparatus covered by a thin umbrella type roof. From here they hand control signal lights. These "tubs" were donated by the Coca Cola Company about 21 years ago and have not changed much since then. There are also point control Traffic Officers stationed at many intersections and they do a pretty good job of controlling traffic. They keep their blue uniforms in good order and tend strictly to their business; but do not feel any responsibility for preserving law and order, unless it relates to traffic.

#### 2. Operations in the Interior

Highway control is limited to maintaining a few check-points, where all traffic is stopped for inspection. Interior cities, operating under the zone chiefs, have little traffic enforcement.

#### 3. Specific Operations

All accident investigations are made by the Traffic police. These investigations are not uniformly handled. Traffic personnel generally has no way to get to the scene of an accident, other than

by hitch-hiking or on foot, other than in La Paz, where a few motorcycles are in operation.

#### D. Personnel

##### 1. Number and Ranks

There is a total of 987 Traffic policemen.

For rank and salary see annex I:° 4

##### 2. Recruitment

Since the Traffic Police became a part of the national Police, basic requirements for officer and enlisted personnel are the same as for the National Guard. See Training Section of National Police for officer requirements and "recruitment" under "D. Personnel" of National Guard section for enlisted personnel.


3. Other Benefits and Promotions are substantially the same as in the National Guard.

Note: The National Police are now working toward standardizing personnel practices and procedures.

#### E. Training

None - other than at the National Police Academy.

There is a class-room, with approximately forty arm chair desks at Traffic Police Headquarters; but there is no training at present.



F. Facilities and Equipment1. Transport

Consists of:

- 1 automobile
- 3 jeeps
- 1 pick-up truck
- 3 carry alls
- 21 motorcycles
- 1 tow-truck

Total 30

Note: Other, than 16 motorcycles which are in good condition, the above listed vehicles are either on blocks for lack of spare parts or in poor condition.

There are no repair and maintenance facilities.

2. Communication:

- 1 Transmitter - Receiver, Radio Base Station, "Motorola"
- 8 Radio, Motorcycle, "Motorola".

3. Weapons

None

G. Budget for 1967

7,894,334 Bolivian Pesos equivalent to \$671,881.16.

See Annex N° 3.



NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

A. Mission and Responsibilities

1. Legal Development

La Direccion Nacional de Investigacion Criminal (National Department of Criminal Investigations) was created by Decree N° 07015, of January 4, 1965. This organization formerly was the Investigations Division of the Bolivian National Police. In the reorganization of the Bolivian Police Forces in 1965, it became a separate agency.

2. Responsibilities

The National Department of Criminal Investigations is responsible for the investigation of major crimes as well as minor offenses (faltas policiales) that fall under the jurisdiction of the National Police. This organization is also responsible for the investigation of activities, groups, or persons which threaten the security of the GOB and/or the internal security of the country. The National Department of Investigations has national jurisdiction and authority.

B. Organization and Personnel

Prior to the National Decree of January 4, 1965, which was promulgated by the revolution of November 1964, the National Department of Criminal Investigations formed an integral part of the uniformed police organization known as the Bolivian Police (Policia Boliviana).

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As a result of the reorganization of the Bolivian Police which was based on the Decree of 1965, the National Department of Criminal Investigations became a separate entity under the command of a National Director of Criminal Investigations. The Organization has been completely separated from the uniformed police in regards to administration and operations.

The present Director of the National Investigations Department is Hermogenes Rios Ledezma, who was formerly Director General of the National Police of Bolivia. After being exiled to Brazil as a result of political difficulties, he returned under the auspices of President Barrientos, and assumed the position of Director of the National Investigations Directorate.

The National Director of Investigations reports directly to the Director General of the National Police. The National Directorate (National Command) of Investigations is located in La Paz in a two-story building of old construction which also houses the Jefatura (headquarters) of the Investigations Department which has police investigative responsibilities in La Paz.

The National Directorate of Investigations has as major functional departments at the national level; a Personnel Department; Plans and Operations Department; Administrative Department; a Radio Communications Department; a Crime Laboratory which serves La Paz and other Departments in the interior; a non-criminal identification section;

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and an Interpol section. An intelligence organization of approximately 15 men reports directly to the Deputy Director. In the interior and frontier areas, investigations contingents are called Jefaturas (headquarters) and operate in nine Departments (States) and three provinces and five frontier areas. There are smaller contingents assigned to the border areas.

The total strength of the National Directorate of Criminal Investigations is 1,249 men.

Operations in the interior of the country are conducted chiefly through the local offices which are called "Jefaturas".

The distribution of investigations personnel through the Departments (States) is as follows:

1. La Paz	564 men
2. Oruro	99 men
3. Cochabamba	95 men
4. Chuquisaca	61 men
5. Tarija	56 men
6. Potosí	93 men
7. Santa Cruz	109 men
8. Beni	41 men
9. Pando	23 men

The smallest organized DNIC contingent has a strength of seven men and is located at Bermejo.

**[REDACTED]**

Organization

The DNIC Departments in the interior are generally commanded by a Comisario Jefe, who is equivalent in rank to a Major. The present organization of the National Directorate of Criminal Investigations is shown on chart 4. The organization of the Jefatura Departamental de Investigacion Criminal de La Paz (Headquarters of the Criminal Investigations Department of La Paz) is shown on chart 6. This is the type of organization which is found in all Departments (States) in the interior but on a smaller scale.

1. Interpol Section

This section is under the National Directorate of Criminal Investigations and has specific responsibilities for the investigations of drug peddling and smuggling and coordination of Interpol matters with other countries.

Messages are sent by radio to Interpol Headquarters in Paris through Buenos Aires. The present radio equipment in use is on loan to the Bolivian Police from the Argentine Police. There are approximately 10 men assigned to this section.

2. Crime Laboratory

The police crime laboratory was established in 1963 with AID assistance. The services of the police laboratory are available to police investigations units throughout the Republic but from all appearances it appears that any service on a nationwide scale would be difficult. However, the laboratory appears fairly well equipped and organized. This facility, according to the police chief in charge, has had good results. The




C E A R T 4

REPUBLICA DE CHILE  
 MINISTERIO DE SALUD  
 SERVICIO NACIONAL DE SALUD

SECRETARÍA GENERAL  
 DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE SALUD PÚBLICA  
 DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD  
 DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ASISTENCIA SOCIAL

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE SALUD PÚBLICA  
 DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD  
 DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ASISTENCIA SOCIAL



Inferior República		Provincia		Inferior de	
Valparaíso	Antofagasta	Antofagasta	Antofagasta	Antofagasta	Antofagasta
Copiapó	Santiago	Ribera de	Ribera de	Ribera de	Ribera de
Valdivia	Santiago	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de
Concepción	Santiago	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de
Temuco	Santiago	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de
Osorno	Santiago	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de
Chilo	Santiago	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de	San J. de

CHART Nº 6

BASIC ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT OF LA PAZ

GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION


CHIEF DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS OF LA PAZ

DEPUTY CHIEF

INSPECTOR

LEGAL ADVISOR

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF



laboratory has an excellent comparison microscope and photographic equipment of various types. Recently acquired equipment include four brand new photographic enlargers which cost well over \$1,500.00 each. It appears that the types and quantity of laboratory equipment presently available may be out of balance with the type and amount of work to be done by this section.

The officer in charge is a chemist and received training in the U.S. through the AFD Public Safety Program. The crime laboratory as a whole appears to be an efficient operation and a source of pride to the DMIC.

### 3. Records and Identification

Although the National Directorate of Criminal Investigations has nationwide responsibilities and authority there are no centralized records available. The National Directorate which is located in La Paz maintains the records of criminals and criminal activities that fall within the jurisdiction of the Department (State) of La Paz.

Very little if any information is actually coordinated for the purpose of maintaining centralized records for the use of Investigations Departments.

Records are kept in wooden file cabinets of different sorts. Records of a political nature, which includes information on Communist Party members or suspects are kept in metal cabinets which are locked by individual locks of all sizes. These locks were observed to be vulnerable



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to being opened even by the most unskilled novice.

The National Directorate of Criminal Investigations in La Paz also has a Personal Identification Bureau which is non-criminal in nature. The Investigations Department processes and issues identification cards called "cedulas", which are required by law for all Bolivian citizens and foreign nationals who reside in Bolivia. New cards are required every six years and cost approximately 65 cents (U.S).


I.D. cards can be issued by the National Investigation Directorates in the Departments, (States) but a copy is supposed to be forwarded to the National Directorate in La Paz for their files.

For a breakdown of personnel assigned to the National Department of Criminal Investigations by rank see Annex 4. The salary scale of personnel is also indicated in the same Annex.

DNIC personnel receive the same benefits and allowances provided the National Guard, and recruitment is basically the same.

Officers are recruited by the National Police Academy and upon completion of three years training are assigned to the DNIC, based on preference and needs of the service.

Troop level personnel apply directly to the DNIC National Directorate for employment.



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C. Operations

Overall operations of the DNIC consist primarily of receiving complaints of a crime being committed, investigating the complaint, and preparing the case for prosecution by the courts.

DNIC departmental organizations operate semi-autonomously except in the Department of La Paz where greater supervision is exercised by the National Directorate because of its proximity. DNIC units in the border and frontier areas are small and practically isolated from central offices.

The National Directorate maintains overall supervision of DNIC operations generally through the field offices in the Departments and provinces. Field offices generally provide personnel to carry out investigations in the border and rural areas within their jurisdiction. In the event of serious problems, the National Directorate in La Paz is contacted and a team from La Paz is dispatched to assist.

Personnel in rural areas use public transportation facilities to move from field offices to the problem area because there are no vehicles available.

In the urban areas DNIC personnel are assigned to Seccionales (Precinct stations) located in commercial and residential zones in the city. The National Investigations Directorate of the Department of La Paz has 20 precinct stations (Seccionales) dispersed throughout the city. Two precinct stations were visited by the Survey Team. Both were probably

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no larger than a good size bath room and the poverty observed was startling. The purpose of the precinct station is to provide a convenient police facility where citizens can report a crime or file a criminal complaint. Prisoners arrested during that shift are also kept in small, dirty holdovers located at or near the precinct stations.


Seven men are generally assigned to the precinct stations to operate as 2-man teams. The teams are on duty for 24 hours straight and off 24 hours. During the 24-hour shift both men take turns sleeping.

There is telephone communication between the precinct station and their headquarters. However, the police stated that service was off most of the time.

There have been occasions when mobs have assaulted the DNIC precinct stations and practically destroyed them. During disturbances, officers abandon the place if they have the opportunity.

DNIC operations in La Paz follow patterns similar to other Latin American countries and in some cases are similar to U. S. police operations.

The National Department of Criminal Investigations of the Department of La Paz being the largest, has "sophistication" not found in the DNIC units in the interior. The DNIC Department in La Paz has separate units responsible for the investigation of crimes against persons and crimes against property. A Special Investigations Unit is used to



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investigate cases not normally related to criminal acts such as political meetings, etc. This unit could probably provide operational intelligence information needed by the police. From all indications efforts are concentrated on the surveillance of political activities.

A Juvenile Section is responsible for the handling of all cases concerning juveniles.

The crime laboratory ostensibly has a large staff which consists of a ballistics section, suspect document examination section, crime scene technicians, photographic section, and a criminalistics section. (See chart 6).

The DNIC Department of La Paz which is located at Calle Comercio and Ayacucho also provides urban patrols using detectives to cover areas where crimes are most frequent.

#### D. Training

According to the Director of the National Investigations Department, 95% of his personnel are untrained. The Director describes his personnel as being "empiricos" which literally translated means empirical in English.

Training for DNIC enlisted personnel is non-existent. There is no training program presently in existence and there does not appear to be any training program planned for the near future. According to the police this is due primarily to the lack of qualified instructors in the DNIC.

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Officers presently being assigned to the DNIC receive the general course of instruction at the Police Academy and are also receiving specialized training in investigations. The number who have received this training however is less than 25.

Detectives receive no formal training at all except for orientation on police procedure and practices.

New personnel are generally assigned to work with a more experienced detective until he acquires the working knowledge and experience judged to be sufficient so he can operate on his own.

There is no doubt that a basic training program in investigations can be initiated by using the officers who have received training in investigations in the U.S. and third countries. Since the inception of the Public Safety Program in Bolivia, 186 officers have received general police training which included training in criminal investigations. Many have received specialized training in investigations.

Undoubtedly, training is one of the most immediate requirements of this organization.

## E. Facilities and Equipment

### 1. Communications

The DNIC does not have a telecommunications capability to supervise or coordinate field operations in La Paz or in the interior.



The present radio equipment available to the DNIC is a COMPACT IV R.F. base station with which messages can be relayed to DNIC or National Guard contingents by using the National Police nationwide radio network.

Mobile units, or walkie talkie units are completely unavailable.

## 2. Armament

According to DNIC officials, since the police was disarmed by the Armed Forces after the 1964 Revolution, DNIC personnel do not carry arms.

An equipment list provided by the police does not show any firearms (of any kind) for the DNIC. Special equipment consists of the following:

- |                             |    |
|-----------------------------|----|
| a. Gas Masks                | 51 |
| b. Steel Helmets and Liners | 51 |

The above equipment is used by National Guard personnel, (12 men) assigned to provide security for DNIC Cuarteles.

Conversations with DNIC officials resulted in the same information mentioned above in regards to hand guns.

## 3. Vehicles

The following vehicles are available for DNIC operations in La Paz:

- |                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| a. Sedan         | 1 |
| b. Jeep          | 1 |
| c. Pick-up truck | 2 |
| d. Carryall      |   |
| e. Prisoner Van  |   |
- 

d. Carryall	1
e. Prisoner Van	<u>1</u>
Total	6

According to the information provided by DNIC officers, there are no vehicles available to DNIC officers in the interior.

#### F. Budget

Figures on the budget provided to the DNIC is found in Annex 3.


#### G. Comments and Suggestions

The National Directorate of Criminal Investigations under the present situation is being seriously challenged in accomplishing its assigned mission.

A reorganization might provide a more effective use of the human resources available but the effectiveness of this unit is also hampered by the lack of mobility, communications, and training.

The separation of functions made in 1965 of the National Police made the DNIC an independent organization. This has increased the need for close cooperation and coordination between police agencies, but it is apparent that a wider breach in working relations has resulted.

A lack of cooperation and coordination by the DNIC and other police agencies will impair the overall effectiveness of the National Police to the detriment of the country.



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It is suggested that training for DNIC personnel be encouraged to proceed without delay. This should include an orientation on official and public conduct so as to promote public support and respect which appears to be sorely lacking for this organization. Improvement of techniques and standards can also be accomplished by training.

Effort should be made to establish adequate centralized records in La Paz and procedures established to permit the use of these records by all elements of the National Police.

The intelligence capabilities of the DNIC and the National Police as a whole are limited. Internal Defense measures against subversion or insurgency are based on adequate intelligence. Effort should be made to improve the intelligence capabilities of the National Police by reorganizing their resources, defining responsibilities in this field at all levels, and encouraging the establishment of a centralized office responsible for this function.

The DNIC in general is considered undermanned. It is suggested that more personnel be selected and trained to provide the added manpower necessary for nationwide operations. The actual effective strength of this agency is not reflected in the number on the personnel roster. There are quite a number in reserve status and others are confined to office duties.

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## CUSTOMS POLICE

### A.- MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

The primary Mission of the Customs Police is the enforcement of laws pertaining to contraband violations and the prevention of smuggling. The customs police maintain Control Operations at the border and in the interior of Bolivia to prevent the illegal entry of goods and people into Bolivia, and the smuggling of goods into neighboring countries.

### B.- ORGANIZATION:

An organic law which provides a legal basis for the organization of the Customs Police does not exist. The organization is based on policy and anti-smuggling laws. The customs police are under the Ministry of Hacienda (Treasury Dept.), and operate under the Direction of the Director General of Customs. The majority of Customs Officers are military personnel from the Bolivian Army or Air Force. Non-officers are hired as needed and generally on the basis of personal or political recommendations.

The Customs Police are dispersed throughout the country and operate out of what is called an Administrative Headquarters located in the main urban centers. Administrative Headquarters detachments at Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Uyuni, Sucre, Potosí and other urban areas function with a small contingent of personnel assigned under a chief of customs to exercise control duties in a specific area.

There are also fixed posts and Custom Houses located in the border areas the size of which is determined by the importance given to the area.

An organic law is being drafted to provide a more appropriate legal basis for the Customs Police.

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
A decree is also presently being drafted to create a Technical Advisory Group (Dirección de Asuntos Técnicos y Especiales) to assist the Minister of Hacienda on matters related to Customs Administration and Enforcement. This is a four man body which is to be composed of the Director General of Customs, the USAID Customs Advisor and 2 former Director General's of Customs. (See Chart 7 on Organization) GOB is unable to furnish chart.

C.- OPERATIONS:

The customs police at present are probably the only organization in the country seriously involved in contraband and border control duties. It would be an understatement to say that the overall effort being directed at the control of smuggling in Bolivia is inadequate in relation to the formidable problem involved.

Enforcement efforts are generally concentrated at official entry and exit points, Lake Titicaca, (Peruvian Border) and Rio Mamore, (Brazilian Border) and various commercial areas within the country. Contraband control in the border areas is an impressive task due to the vastness and difficulty of the terrain involved and the limited resources of the Bolivian Customs Police. This problem is very partially modified by the exercise of contraband control at various commercial areas where smuggled goods eventually end up.

Adding to the problem of contraband control is the fact that many people in the border areas, (often including local officials, police and armed forces personnel) are directly or indirectly involved in smuggling activities.



The border areas which are most affected by smuggling are near the Eastern Brazilian border and along the Paraguayan border. Isolated fixed posts and very limited patrols are presently operating in those areas. There is no radio communication of any type between La Paz and other customs police contingents on the border or in the frontier.

Due to the small number of personnel available and the complete lack of mobility and communications it is physically impossible for the Customs Police to provide any type of effective patrol coverage.

The Administrative Headquarters contingents mentioned earlier, which are located in the urban areas generally provide the manpower for patrols and roadblocks in their respective areas.

Other patrols are provided by launches on waterways, lakes, on a fairly consistent basis. To improve the operational capacity of the customs police the AFD Customs Advisory has presented a plan to the Minister of Hacienda for the creation of an Investigations Branch to investigate cases of smuggling. This plan calls for a centralized office with 10 men which will operate nationwide. The branch if created will be directly under the Director General of Customs.

D. PERSONNEL

The total strength of the Customs Police is 591 officers and troop level personnel. There are 64 officers all with the grade of Lieutenant and 527 enlisted personnel which are called Guardias (Guards). There are no N.C.O. ranks.

There are no rigid entrance requirements for the customs police. Personnel are generally orally interviewed and receive consideration based

CUSTOMS POLICE  
BOLEVIA

Districts	Officials	Guards	Geographical Situation
Dirección General (La Paz)	4	16	Capital
La Paz - District	22	146	Capital and frontier with Peru
Charaña	2	32	Frontier with Chile
Oruro	5	57	Commercial centre and frontier with Chile
Cochabamba	2	15	Commercial centre
Uyuni	2	39	Mining-Commercial centre frontier with Chile
Villazón	5	56	Frontier with Argentina
Yacuiba	6	40	Frontier with Argentina
Rtosi	1	5	Commercial centre
Santa Cruz	4	19	Commercial Centre
Puerto Suarez	5	25	Frontier with Brazil
Guayaramerin	2	42	Frontier with Brazil
Villa Bella	2	16	Frontier with Brazil
Cobija	2	19	Frontier with Brazil
TOTAL	64	527	

Personnel distributed through Frontier Posts.

mostly on personal recommendations.

The average base salary for enlisted ranks is 40 dollars per month and 50 dollars per month for officers. Pay is generally augmented by bonuses received for successful seizures of contraband. Personnel receive approximately 65% of the total amount of seizure of contraband. The amount is generally shared by several persons. As a consequence of the extra incentive pay, almost all Customs Police personnel are much better paid than regular police personnel (National Police).

Personnel procedures and operations of the customs police are not fully organized with transfers and promotions occurring generally on the decisions made by command officers. Pre-employment background investigations are not mandatory and a firm recruitment process is non-existent.

#### B.- TRAINING

Customs police by a special arrangement with the Director General of the National Police, and supported by USAID use the facilities of the Bolivian National Police Academy at Seguencoma to train their personnel. The classroom facilities appear fairly adequate by Latin American standards but the quarters provided for the students are poor, crowded, and cold in the Winter months. Morale appears high and the training presently being provided is considered generally adequate for the purpose intended.

Training includes:

- 1.- Customs Law.
- 2.- Customs procedure and practices.
- 3.- Public Relations.
- 4.- Border Patrol techniques.



### 1 - LAUNCHES

Four launches are used for patrolling inland waterways and lakes. One is a 30 ft. launch armed with two old german Schmitzer 50 caliber machine guns which operate in conjunction with a smaller 15 ft. launch on Lake Titicaca. Two other 9 ft. launches are used for patrol operations at Rio Mamore. The condition of the launches is from poor to fair.

### 2 - VEHICLES

There is a total of 24 vehicles of various types and models used by the customs police in La Paz and in the Interior.

20 vehicles were donated by AID in October of 1964, and were taken away from the customs police by the Armed Forces in the revolution of November 1964. Since that time 18 were recovered by the AID Customs advisor. The 18 vehicles are 1964 International Caxxys which due to lack of maintenance are in general poor condition.

According to the USAID Customs Advisor 10 jeeps are planned to be purchased in 1968 by the GOB.

### 3 - COMMUNICATIONS

At present radio communications for the Customs Police is non-existent. Messages of an urgent nature are usually dispatched to and from field offices using Government nets or commercial facilities.

Future plans of the AID customs program include the establishment of a nationwide radio net which is expected to be installed by the end of FY 1968. This will include 15 SSB base stations at main centers in the interior and frontier areas. Total cost estimated for this network is \$20,000.00



The GOB is expected to share the costs by contributing \$16,000.00 for this project.

Other telecommunications equipment such as mobile units and Walkie Talkies, is also non-existent. Radio repair capabilities are considered nil and will require attention if radio equipment is to be provided.

#### 4 - ARMAMENT

Although the armed forces disarmed the customs police in 1964 after the revolution, the GOB is now permitting customs officers to use a limited number of small arms on patrols.

As mentioned previously, a launch operating on Lake Titicaca is also now equipped with 2 old german .50 caliber machine guns.

100 .38 caliber revolvers provided to the customs police by AID were confiscated by the Armed Forces in 1964. Apparently none were later found or returned. It is estimated that approximately 10% of the total force is presently armed. Weapons include several 7.65 caliber Czechoslovakian rifles, .38 caliber revolvers and 24 tear gas guns and a very limited supply of tear gas. Ammunition was reported to be totally insufficient. AID funds in the amount of \$285,000.00 have been provided for the construction of four customs houses and ten customs posts in the frontier. The custom houses will be located at Desagadero on the Peruvian border, Villazon on the Northern Argentine Border, Yacuiba also on the North East border of Argentina, and Quijarro on the Brazilian border. It is estimated that the custom houses will be terminated by March 1968. The



Customs posts, which are smaller facilities on the frontier will be constructed after the custom houses are completed.

G.- BUDGET

We were unable to obtain meaningful figures on the annual budget provided for the Customs Police.

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James L. Harper

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( ) ( )  
INVESTIGATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Customs Police do not function as a regular public order force. However, by the nature of their mission, this organization can play an important role as part of Bolivia's Internal Defense Forces.

At the present time there is one AID customs advisor providing technical assistance to the Customs Police. The AID Customs Advisor, Mr. Kenneth Stacey, is a British subject working as an AID contract employee and is assigned to the Government Administration Development Division of AID. Previous to August 1964, there were five British customs advisors providing technical assistance to the Customs Police and the Civil Administration under AID financing.

AID assistance is based on a project agreement and has provided a total of \$272,420.00 to this program since its inception in April of 1963.

AID FUNDS EXPENDED ON CUSTOMS PROJECT SINCE

INCEPTION IN APRIL 1963

	<u>\$US</u>
Technicians:	
PIO/T 511-082-3-30082 5 technicians April 63 - August 64	120,000
PIO/T 511-082-3-40230 1 technician from August 64 onwards	7,500
PIO/T 511-082-3-50055	16,380
PIO/T 511-082-3-60084	<u>25,000</u>
Total	<u><u>\$168,880</u></u>

EQUIPMENT

	<u>\$US</u>
Vehicles, motor-cycles, typewriters, etc.	
PIO/C 9-1-0324	2,900
PIO/C 9-30323	3,050
PIO/C 511-720-082-1-39153	2,000
PIO/C 511-720-082-1-30370	12,250
PIO/C 511-720-082-9-30309	<u>83,340</u>
Total	<u>\$103,540</u>
GRAND TOTAL	\$US272,420

Program accomplishments are hard to measure during this brief survey but there is no doubt that the 1964 Revolution gave any effectiveness this organization had a setback. The Customs Police as other police organizations in Bolivia are fraught with political interference and pressures. Customs Advisor Stacey feels that since the 1964 Revolution, cooperation by the GOB has greatly improved. It appears that Mr. Stacey has excellent working relationships with the host country officers. His understanding of local conditions assist him greatly in his role as an advisor. Under present conditions, although difficult, it appears that Mr. Stacey is making good progress.

and when the Public Safety Program is expanded and it becomes administratively feasible, consideration should be given to the assignment

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of the AID customs advisor to the Public Safety Program. Apart from the homogeneity of assignment, the proximity of missions and capabilities can be utilized and coordinated by the GOB with USAID assistance to accomplish Internal Defense objectives. In any counterinsurgency effort, the control of border and frontier areas is important to prevent the free movement of goods and/or people which will help the insurgents.

At the present time, fairly good cooperation exists between the National Police and Customs Police. Efforts, of course, should be directed at improving the coordination and cooperation of these agencies. The AID customs advisor makes frequent contact with National Police officials to coordinate program activities. A close working relationship between the AID customs advisor and the AID public safety advisors can be mutually beneficial, in carrying out projects.

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MUNICIPAL POLICE


Each city in Bolivia has an Alcaide or mayor. The Alcaldes are appointed by the President (probably with guidance from the Minister of Government), and serve under the direction of the Minister of Government.

The Municipal Police are responsible to the alcaide.

In La Paz, the Municipal Force numbers about 400 uniformed officers and men. Their work consists of protection of public property and utilities installations. They are not armed.

Also, the Municipal Police of La Paz have a plain clothes unit of about 100 men, who check merchants and markets. They also check bars and restaurants for illegal sale of liquors to minors.

No attempt was made to survey the Municipal Police. However, any complete review of Bolivian Police agencies must consider the Municipal Police, as they are in all parts of the country. Other than furnishing limited surplus property and some training materials, the Bolivian Public Safety Program has not assisted or advised the Municipal Police.



OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Observations

The Survey Team has made every effort to compile a complete and factual report that will enable AID/W, in consultation with the Department and other interested agencies, to determine the scope and size of possible expansion of the USAID Public Safety Program. We hope the report will also provide factual information which can be used as a basis for recommendations to improve overall police services and ways for the police to more effectively deal with existing and expected threats to internal security.

In dealing with the problems of the police it must be realized that there is no magic panacea or cure-all that will end violence and lawlessness in the next few days or weeks. There are no instant solutions. Just as the problems are complex and difficult, so are the solutions. However, there can be little doubt that an effective patrol system in the city of La Paz would have a decided effect on reducing general crime as well as being a real deterrent to acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage.

The police, as representatives of the Government, have a great responsibility in the maintenance of internal security and stability. They cannot, however, be expected to fully meet this responsibility until certain basic improvements are made in closely related areas of public administration. There is a vital need for the development of a basic civil service,



c. Equipment Required

The Division of Chief Public Safety Commodity Program, TOAID A-562, dated April 7, 1967,<sup>6</sup> projects a three-year commodity program in the amount of \$632,985. While it is not within the purview of the Team to judge the adequacy of expenditures projected, we do have some comments and reservations about some of the items on the list:

(1) 1,000 projectiles speedheat sickening gas (DM) - this item should be eliminated entirely.

We have reservations about the feasibility of motor cycles with sidecars for use in La Paz.

With respect to tear gas, it is felt that CS rather than CN gas would be more effective. Also consideration should be given toward ordering general M16-4 tear gas - police model. This is much more effective than the cannister type tear gas now being carried on the belts of some of the foot patrols.

The 300 safety shields should be eliminated. In La Paz there are several hundred wooden shields that were made at the time Chief Public Safety Advisor Salcedo was in Bolivia. These wooden shields are more effective than the plastic ones and they are already on hand.

We would not attempt to state specifically what will be needed in the way of commodities in the next three years. However, it is strongly suggested that no P10/C's be issued for transportation equipment until

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the Mission is assured that adequate preventative maintenance facilities are established. Then at least 15% of the acquisition cost of each vehicle should be used for purchasing spare parts. Another factor is whether or not there are adequate funds to operate the vehicles. At present the two trucks that the National Guard has in La Paz are not operating full time, because there are no funds to buy gas.

d. Public image of police?

Poor -- The average Bolivian thinks of the police as synonymous with inertia, inefficiency, graft and corruption.

e. Intelligence collection and utilization?

All three services, the Guardia Nacional de Seguridad Publica, Transito and Departamento de Investigaciones Criminal, have an Intelligence Section, although their capabilities vary to a great degree. The most effective section belongs to the Departamento de Investigaciones Criminal, with most of their work revolving around surveillance operations against opposition political parties, and high level members of Communist and leftist parties. Most of their information is reported to the Ministry of Government, which has direct control over all three police services. There does not seem to be any attempt on the part of the Departamento de Investigaciones Criminal to evaluate any of the information, such as the significance of meetings between various groups. This is apparently done within the Ministry itself. The primary reason behind these surveillance activities seems to be a control mechanism on movements of subversives within the country, so that they can be immediately

picked up if the Government considers them a threat to its security. These activities are carried out in smaller detail by the Guardia Nacional and Frecuencia. Jealousy between the three services seems to be the main reason for this duplication, each feeling that it is a method of self protection to have their own Intelligence Sections. Exit and entry controls are poor. Unless it is known well in advance that a certain wanted individual is planning to leave or enter the country, it is almost impossible for the police to do anything about it. Although the police receive the incoming manifests of personnel arriving by aircraft, they do not get them until quite a while after they have cleared through customs. There are no on the spot police checks at the airport. Control is even poorer for personnel arriving in Bolivia by rail or by vehicle.

F. Degree of cooperation between the civil police agencies and military forces?

Fair -- it is perhaps more appropriate to say that the police at present are almost completely subordinate to the military. Two copies of the film "First Line of Defense" were ordered recently and it is suggested that this film be widely shown to both police and military personnel. The film clearly defines the correct relationship between the military and police forces in handling an insurgency problem.

G. Command structure including the department of \_\_\_\_\_ exercising control of the civil police and the present concept of chain of command?

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Satisfactory within the Ministry of Government. He has set up a workable command structure at the top level. However, one only has to glance at the organizational charts of the various police agencies that now make up the National Police and an unwieldy span of control and a cumbersome command structure is apparent.



2. Recommendations

a. That the Public Safety Division (The USAID Mission Director has kept Public Safety in a separate division) be expanded soonest to include:

- (1) Chief Public Safety advisor
- (2) Public Safety Advisor (Training)
- (3) Public Safety Advisor (Investigations)
- (4) U. S. Secretary

The immediate need for the three advisors is so obvious, that no justification is attempted. If AID/W requires justification, we are sure the Country Team is prepared to furnish it.

With regard to a U.S. secretary, we invite attention to the following facts:

(1) During the more than ten years that there has been a Public Safety Program, (other than in 1957 and 1958 when there was a U.S. secretary) Public Safety personnel have had to depend on secretarial help from other sources -- AID Directors' Program Officers', etc. secretary. Consequently, the Public Safety Program has not been properly documented, required reports have been delayed or not submitted, and advisors' time, which can be better utilized in operations, has been devoted to administrative and to some extent secretarial duties.

(2) A U.S. secretary could set up Public Safety files, in accordance with existing manual orders; and maintain them on a day to day basis.



She would be the contact point for advisors, who should spend most of their time in the field, and other Country Team components coordinating with the Public Safety Division.

(3) In countries where there are Public Safety Division secretaries, it has been proven beyond doubt that the cost of a secretary is minimal, when compared to the improved operations, effectiveness and smooth running of the Division.

(4) A Public Safety secretary should be carefully selected. We submit the Survey Team's secretary, as a prototype, if and when this position is approved.

We urge AID/W to fill the two proposed additional advisor positions as soon as possible.

We urge the Mission to provide office space within the Embassy for the Public Safety Division. A large space is not required, but a place where classified material can be stored and readily available is essential to an effective operation. Also, Public Safety Division offices should be near the offices of other components of the Country Team involved with internal security matters.

b. USV personnel required in the next few months should include:

(1) A two-man training team, fluent in Spanish and well qualified to plan and administer a three to four week basic police training program. This team could also train Bolivian instructors to carry on this basic program. Public Safety Division USAID/Venezuela is prepared to furnish such a team.

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
(2) A criminalist advisor to assist the Crime Laboratory. An expert that they have some expensive equipment, but lack crystal and other basic essentials. The laboratory needs help and guidance. For example, the Chief of the Crime Laboratory showed us the results of a paraffin test which he would use to convict a woman for murder. He considered the test as conclusive that the woman had fired a weapon. Actually, this test is not used, or at least not considered conclusive, by knowledgeable criminalist throughout the world. As a matter of fact, the cigar smoking member of the team, if given the paraffin test, would produce a more positive test than the one given to the woman, and he has not fired a weapon in months.

Here again Venezuela is prepared to furnish a criminalist for TDY and to provide third country training in this field.

(3) A communications advisor will be needed for TDY in the not too distant future.

This request should be made to Technical Services Division, Office of Public Safety, AED/W.


NOTE: Even though we have pointed out the availability of personnel in Venezuela, requests for their TDY should be sent to Office of Public Safety AED/W.



FINAL COMMENTS

When we met with the Ambassador and other members of the Country Team, before making contact with GOB officials, the Ambassador stated that he and the Country Team are convinced that the design and implementation of an effective Public Safety Program is an essential element in the overall program for development of Bolivia.

It was pointed out that the Country Team has not had an easy task persuading the Bolivian Government of the program's multiple benefits. Stemming from rivalries between the military and civilian police during the MNR era, the Bolivian Armed Forces have until recently resisted the development of an effective police service for Bolivia. In recent months, however, General Ovando, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, has recognized the importance of the police function and has signed a memorandum of understanding agreed to accord its development the full cooperation of the Armed Forces. Taking advantage of this favorable decision and otherwise considering the increasing climate of uncertainty and unrest, the Country Team believes the time most opportune to move ahead with a meaningful Public Safety Program.



UNCLASSIFIED

A N N E X I

COMPARATIVE COSTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM, BOLIVIA FROM UNCLE SAM'S PROGRAM  
IN 1957, THROUGH 3/31/67

	<u>Police</u>		<u>Commodities</u>		<u>Govt. Services</u>		<u>Participants</u>		<u>US. Relations</u>	
	<u>Obligated</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Oblig.</u>	<u>Exp.</u>	<u>Oblig.</u>	<u>Exp.</u>	<u>Oblig.</u>	<u>Exp.</u>	<u>Oblig.</u>	<u>Exp.</u>
3/31/67	1,072,472	1,652,635	704,526	694,936	1,000	1,000	187,913	187,913	312,000	312,128
6/30/66	1,651,122	1,651,087	694,936	694,936	1,000	1,000	187,994	187,994	361,769	361,514
5/30/65	1,042,947	1,597,145	697,311	651,634	1,000	1,000	190,703	190,703	348,443	348,318
6/30/64	1,727,029	1,527,266	826,059	635,113	1,000	1,000	187,759	175,759	302,918	302,168
6/30/63	1,450,000	1,010,000								
6/30/62	1,048,000	839,000								
6/30/61	717,000	583,000								
6/30/60										
6/30/59										
6/30/58	251,000	277,000	110,000	67,000			54,000	36,000	39,000	34,000
6/30/57	66,000	19,000					21,000		26,000	18,000

Note: The survey team was unable to compile a complete listing of commodities received. However audit report N° A-316, dated March 18, 1965, on file in Program Office USAID/Bolivia and presumably AID/W, lists P.S. commodities imported during 1961-64. Total expenditures for commodities prior to 1961, was \$67,000, in 1958.

The above figures in \$ U.S. dollars


Being one of the principal functions of the State to guarantee the preservation of the public safety, life, rights and property of the people, pursuant to provisions made by the Constitution of Bolivia, the laws and all the legal dispositions, the need to raise the professional and technical level of the civil institution that constitutes the three fundamental services of public safety is basic and essential.


Whereas, pursuant to judicial provisions of the country, the Armed Forces only intervene to preserve the public order in case the public safety forces are insufficient, and that the Armed Forces need and support an organization of public safety adequate to allow the Armed Forces to stay outside of the limits of the police mission unless an emergency situation necessitates intervention as provided by laws.


The Government of Bolivia wishes and requests assistance for the purpose of improving its police services, and it is jointly agreed that the Government of the United States will supply such assistance within the limits of availability of funds and personnel which may be mutually agreed to in detail by the representatives of both Governments.

La Paz, 21 December 1966

  
Antonio Arguedas Mendieta  
Minister of Government

  
Gral. Alfredo Ovando Candia  
Commanding Officer of the  
Armed Forces of Bolivia

  
Gral. René Barrientos Ortuño  
President of the Republic of  
Bolivia

  
Douglas Henderson  
Ambassador of the United  
States of America

GOB 1967 PUBLIC SAFETY BUDGET

Superior Command - Headquarters	\$b	630,400	\$	52,533.33
National Guard	\$b	28,802,718	\$	2,400,226.40
National Department of Criminal Investigation	\$b	9,946,643	\$	828,886.92
Traffic Police	\$b	<u>7,894,334</u>	\$	<u>657,881.16</u>
Total National Police	\$b	47,274,095	\$	3,939,507.91
Ministry of Government Budget	\$b	62,554,375	\$	5,212,864.58
Total GOB Budget	\$b	3,944,207,165	\$	328,683,930.40

% of Public Safety Budget against:

Ministry of Government	75.6%
Total GOB Budget	1.2%

**COMMENT:**

The above total Bolivian budget includes funds for GOB autonomous agencies. Although, these figures were given to the Survey Team, it was learned that the actual GOB Operating Budget for 1967 is \$b 1,040,000,000 -- roughly \$ 80 million -- Public Safety agencies (national police and other entities within the Ministry of Government) are receiving more than 10% of the total operating budget.

This amount is not adequate in light of existing and expected threats to internal security. However, this is true across the board. The USAID/B Mission Director told the Survey Team that budgetary problems were the most acute and perpetual problems faced in administering the overall ADP Program.

# Best Available Document

ANNEX IV

Approximate exchange \$b 12.00 = \$1.00

## P E R S O N N E L

Grade	Positions	Active Duty	Professional Corps	Active Duty Bonus	Retirement
<u>ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL (ACTIVE DUTY)</u>					
1	Col.	\$b 210.-	\$b 305.-	\$b 900.-	\$b 200.-
85	Lt. Col.	196	287.-	750.-	175.-
139	Major	183.-	269.-	500.-	200.-
136	Capt.	170.-	246.-	400.-	175.-
124	1st Lt.	160.-	223.-	300.-	150.-
145	2nd Lt.	150.-	200.-	200.-	125.-
20	Warrant Off. 1st cl.	115.-	115.-	500.-	80.-
3	Warrant Off. 2nd cl.	112.-	106.-	400.-	80.-
102	Warrant Off. 3rd cl.	108.-	97.-	300.-	80.-
15	Sgt. 1st class	102.-	75.-	200.-	80.-
141	Sgt. 2nd class	101.-	64.-	150.-	80.-
161	Corporal	100.-	50.-	100.-	80.-
2176	Patrolman	91.-	41.-	80.-	80.-
<u>CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (ACTIVE DUTY)</u>					
11	Col.	188.-	281.-	500.-	175.-
7	Lt. Col.	175.-	217.-	500.-	175.-
28	Capt.	160.-	195.-	300.-	200.-
32	1st Lt.	150.-	169.-	250.-	175.-
14	2nd Lt.	145.-	165.-	150.-	125.-
43	Warrant Off. 1st cl.	116.-	110.-	400.-	80.-
40	Warrant Off. 2nd cl.	106.-	94.-	350.-	80.-
35	Warrant Off. 3rd cl.	104.-	87.-	300.-	80.-
50	Sgt. 1st class	100.-	60.-	200.-	80.-
33	Patrolman	91.-	41.-	80.-	80.-
<u>UNEMPLOYED PERSONNEL (INACTIVE DUTY)</u>					
7	Col.	210.-	305.-	--	200.-
17	Lt. Col.	190.-	287.-	--	200.-
17	Major	180.-	269.-	--	200.-

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Strength	Rank	Basic Salary	Professional Bonus	Active Duty Bonus	Rations	Additional % for rations
2	Capt.	170.-	246.-	---	200.-	
3	Lt.	160.-	223.-	---	200.-	
4	2nd. Lt.	150.-	200.-	---	200.-	
1	Warrant Off. 3rd. cl.	108.-	97.-	---	80.-	50.-
<b><u>CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (INACTIVE DUTY)</u></b>						
2	Capt.	160.-	195.-	---	200.-	
1	Lt.	150.-	169.-	---	200.-	
<b><u>NATIONAL BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (ACTIVE DUTY)</u></b>						
1	Inspector General (Col.)	210.-	300.-	900.-	200.-	
1	Inspector (Lt. Col.)	190.-	280.-	700.-	200.-	
15	Comm. Chief (Maj.)	180.-	260.-	500.-	200.-	
24	Comm. (Capt.)	170.-	240.-	400.-	200.-	
74	Sub-Comm. (Lt.)	160.-	220.-	300.-	200.-	
155	Det. 1st. class (2nd. Lt.)	150.-	200.-	200.-	200.-	
305	Det. 2nd. class (Warrant Off. 1st. class)	116.-	115.-	240.-	80.-	50.-
675	Detective (Patrolman)	91.-	40.-	80.-	80.-	50.-
<b><u>INACTIVE DUTY</u></b>						
1	Comm. (Capt.)	170.-	240.-	---	200.-	
7	Sub. Comm. (Lt.)	160.-	220.-	---	200.-	
6	Det. 1st. class (2nd. Lt.)	150.-	200.-	---	200.-	
14	Det. 2nd. class (Warrant Off. 1st. class)	116.-	115.-	---	80.-	50.-
5	Detective (Patrolman)	91.-	40.-	---	80.-	50.-

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Rank	Basic Salary	Professional Bonus	Active Duty Bonus	Rations	Additional pay for rations	Total
<b>MEMBERSHIP OF TRUSTEES (ACTIVE DUTY)</b>						
Lieutenant Colonel	210.-	300.-	900.-	200.-		1,610.-
Lt. Col.	190.-	287.-	700.-	200.-		1,377.-
Major	180.-	260.-	500.-	200.-		1,140.-
Capt.	170.-	240.-	400.-	200.-		1,010.-
Lt.	160.-	220.-	300.-	200.-		880.-
2nd Lt.	150.-	200.-	200.-	200.-		750.-
Warrent Off.	108.-	95.-	300.-	80.-	54.-	637.-
Sgt.	102.-	70.-	200.-	80.-	54.-	506.-
Corporal	100.-	50.-	100.-	80.-	54.-	384.-
Sergeant	91.-	40.-	80.-	80.-	54.-	345.-

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Annex N° 5

STATISTICS OF INCIDENCE OF CRIME

In general there has been a constant increase in the number of major crimes and minor offenses - known to the Police - committed during last years as shown in the following statistics furnished by the National Directorate of Criminal Investigation.

Year	Major crimes and Minor Offenses
1964	41,945
1965	46,503
1966	52,582

Major crimes and minor offenses committed during the second half of 1966 and the first 5 months of 1967.

pt.	Chuquisaca		La Paz		Cochabamba		Potosí		Oruro		Santa Cruz		Tarija		Beni		Pando		Total	
	1966	1967	1966	1967	1966	1967	1966	1967	1966	1967	1966	1967	66	67	66	67	1966	1967		
Major crimes and minor offenses	4,122	4,170	10,857	11,167	3,133	3,271	2,503	2,581	3,285	3,406	1,827	1,868	1,121	1,167	842	906	154	168	27,844	28,700