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**PERSPECTIVES ON  
DEMOCRACY:  
A.I.D.'s ROLE IN ASIA**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Summary of Proceedings . . . . .	1
II.	Opening Remarks Kelly Kammerer, USAID/Nepal . . . . .	10
III.	Remarks of the U.S. Ambassador to Nepal The Honorable Julia Chang Bloch . . . . .	14
IV.	Asia Democracy Program Richard Whitaker, ASIA/DR/TR . . . . .	18
V.	The Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Development Larry Diamond . . . . .	21
VI.	Varieties of Democracy Raymond D. Gastil . . . . .	39
VII.	Democracy and Decentralization Harry Blair . . . . .	52
VIII.	Democracy Program Experiences from USAIDs . . . . .	60
	USAID/Nepal . . . . .	60
	Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan Affairs . . . . .	64
	USAID/Pakistan . . . . .	68
	USAID/Indonesia . . . . .	72
	USAID/Thailand . . . . .	76
	Office of Khmer Affairs . . . . .	80
	USAID/Sri Lanka . . . . .	82
	USAID/Philippines . . . . .	86
	USAID/Bangladesh . . . . .	89

### ANNEXES:

- List of Attendees
- Agenda

## I. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

### A. Introduction

The Asia Bureau's Democracy Officers' workshop, "Perspectives on Democracy: A.I.D.'s Role in Asia," was held in Kathmandu, Nepal from January 27 to January 30, 1992. The meeting served as a forum to examine the theoretical framework of democracy, to share experiences and "lessons learned" in promoting democracy, and to identify the key opportunities and challenges in fostering democracy in the region. Participants included representatives from: Asia USAIDs, select U.S. Embassies, U.S. Information Agency, A.I.D./Washington, local NGOs (Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Nepal), The Asia Foundation, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; and democracy scholars from the United States and Pakistan.

This document synthesizes the key points of the workshop's presentations and discussions. Also included in this document are: papers prepared for the workshop, descriptions of democracy programs from the Missions, and transcripts from the opening remarks of USAID/Nepal Mission Director Kelly C. Kammerer and U.S. Ambassador to Nepal Julia Chang Bloch.

### B. Global Perspectives

#### ● A.I.D.'s History in Promoting Democracy

Although the Democracy Initiative began in 1990, several speakers noted that democracy-like activities are not new to A.I.D. For instance, Mr. Kammerer remarked that the Agency has a long history of promoting broad-based participation in the development process. Ambassador Bloch pointed out that the goal of the Nepal Mission has always been to support the country's independence, sovereignty and economic well-being. Mr. Whitaker, Chief of the Asia Bureau's Private and Voluntary Cooperation Unit, added that A.I.D. has long strived to increase participation of recipient country citizens in economic development, through the development of PVOs and NGOs. Additionally, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean has been active in the development of democratic institutions, especially with the administration of justice.

#### ● The Link Between Economic Development and Democracy

The link between democracy and economic development was a key topic of the workshop. There was broad consensus that the two are related, but the exact nature of their relationship was the focus of much discussion.

*The statements of independent consultants and participants do not necessarily reflect official positions of the U.S. Agency for International Development.*

In his presentation, Mr. Diamond, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, noted that it was Seymour Martin Lipset who first posited that economic development was a prerequisite for democracy (1959). Later Robert Dahl suggested that there was an income threshold below which democracy would have difficulty surviving. Currently, that threshold is estimated at approximately \$1,000 per capita. Dahl's thesis implies that in very poor countries, such as Nepal, democracy is unlikely. The next extension of this thesis was that for countries with very low levels of income, economic development may require an authoritarian regime. This would imply that poor countries should concentrate on economic growth and defer political liberalization. The Asian NICs, including South Korea and Taiwan, are good examples of this model.

Mr. Diamond questioned these arguments for several reasons. First of all, economic development is a powerful facilitator for the development and maintenance of democracy, but not necessarily a pre-requisite. His second argument is that economic growth leads to democracy only to the extent that it alters certain intervening variables, including political culture, class structure, and civil society. Additionally, there are a number of countries that have developed democratic institutions with low levels of economic development, including India, Costa Rica, and currently Nepal. Finally, Mr. Diamond emphasized that political and economic development should not be thought of separately. Indeed, in the poorest countries, democracy may be the a pre-requisite for economic development.

Mr. Diamond stressed that socio-economic development, not merely economic development, is what is important to the growth of democracy. Socio-economic development promotes democracy both by strengthening it where it exists and by laying its foundation where it does not. Socio-economic development can lead to the demise of an authoritarian regime in two ways: on the one hand, poor economic performance discredits it, while on the other, good performance fuels pressures for increased participation and liberalization. Furthermore, economic development facilitates the promotion of democracy only to the extent that it effects changes in the intervening variables. This hypothesis implies that poor countries can democratize only to the extent that they change these variables. Thus, democracy is not incompatible with economic development.

Ambassador Bloch and others spoke of the case of Nepal, one of the poorest countries in the world. She remarked that, in contrast to the general trend in Asia of moving away from democracy, Nepal has been peacefully transforming into a constitutional multiparty democracy. If democracy achieves legitimacy in Nepal, it will demonstrate that democracy can work not only in Asia, but also in other poor countries.

Mr. Gastil, independent consultant previously with Freedom House, cautioned about assuming an automatic relationship between economic development and democracy. He suggested several counter examples of countries that had achieved levels of economic development that would have indicated a move toward democracy but instead rejected it. He argued that the economies of pre-World War II Japan, Germany and Italy and recently Iran,

were all past the threshold of economic development considered necessary for democracy, but nonetheless adopted fascism and Islamic fundamentalism instead.

Mr. Diamond agreed that it is clear that the relationship between economic development and democracy is not a linear one. However, there is a tendency for more developed countries to press for democracy.

- **Different Models of Democracy**

The central theme of Mr. Gastil's paper was that the U.S. model of democracy is not the only one and that other models may be more appropriate to different LDCs. There was a general consensus among the participants that the U.S. should not try to foster its own kind of democracy.

He stressed that democracy could be defined on many levels depending on the interests of the definers. While some definitions were confined to traditional political and civil rights, other definitions emphasize self-determination, economic equality, economic freedom, and freedom from corruption. Some definitions require that certain "preconditions" are present before a country can be said to be democratic. Mr. Gastil compared five countries (Japan, Sweden, the United States, Switzerland and India) that are widely-regarded as important democracies in order to highlight the differences among their political culture and systems. These societies vary greatly. For example, Japan and Sweden are highly centralized, while Switzerland and the U.S. can be classified as more decentralized. In none of these countries, however, was a classical multi-party system functioning very well. Even in the United States, one can argue that the two parties are not distinctly different. Japan, India and Sweden are close to dominant party systems. Switzerland is run by a grand coalition of major parties that changes very little.

Mr. Gastil encouraged the group not to think of a fixed set of requirements for democracy, but rather to consider the full spectrum of possibilities. Assistance should be given to countries to think through their own situation, and they should not be condemned for adopting different models. Although he urged the participants to recognize the variability of democracy, he also cautioned against using too loose a definition.

- **Democracy at the Local Level**

Mr. Blair, Professor of Political Science at Bucknell University, argued that democracy must function well not only on the national level, but also at the local level. Otherwise, a plebiscitary democracy is likely to result. In fact, local issues, such as education and provision of drinking water, have much more of an immediate impact on individuals than macro issues. Local democracy can keep local officials accountable, encourage local initiative and foster pluralism (and thus alternative centers of power) at all levels.

The main vehicle for promoting local democracy has been decentralization. For this purpose, decentralization can be defined as moving authority downward. Decentralization is important because central governments do not know how to promote development in the countryside. To use an analogy, a command political system, like an economic one, lacks a mechanism to allocate resources efficiently. In spite of some negative experiences in decentralization in Asia, Mr. Blair argues that decentralization has achieved some successes. For example, over some time, decentralization policies have helped middle farmers and then disadvantaged sections of the countryside acquire a place in the local political scene in rural India. Once again, similar to the market system, democracy can guarantee access, if not success. If the poor are involved in local politics, they have an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.

There are, however, limitations on what even effective democratic decentralization can do. Natural resource management is a serious problem. There is a tendency for local governments to waste resources rather than allocate them to their best uses. Experiences with local user groups, in which the resource is administered by those who use it, have been more successful. A good example is the success of irrigation management groups in Nepal.

In conclusion, democratic decentralization can bring decision-making and accountability closer to the people who are affected by political activity. Decentralization shifts power to the citizens, endowing them with a sort of political "consumer sovereignty." One area, however, in which the system does not work well, is natural resource management.

- **Ethnic Conflicts**

Concerns about the role of ethnicity in the democratic process were raised several times during the course of the workshop. In Mr. Blair's opinion, the problems of ethnicity require greater attention. He noted two ways of dealing with ethnic problems. First, modifying a country's political culture, or second, changing the "rules of the game." The first, in Mr. Blair's opinion, is difficult to implement and unlikely to be effective. The second would entail encouraging leaders of different groups to work out deals to get along with each other (i.e., a "consociational" democracy).

Mr. Lunstead, Political Counselor of the American Embassy/Bangladesh, asked Mr. Gastil during his presentation about reconciling ethnic or nationalistic claims with self-determination. Mr. Gastil agreed that defining self-determination is a difficult issue because, on the one hand, every group has a right to self-determination. On the other, there are no democracies in the world that fully accept that right.

- **Commitment of Country's Elite**

Mr. Diamond argued that economic development is a powerful facilitator for the development and maintenance of democracy, but not necessarily a pre-requisite. The only absolute pre-requisite for democracy he identified is the commitment by the political elite to

a democratic system. Mass support, economic development and other factors can develop simultaneously with democracy. Messrs. Blair and Gastil both concurred with Mr. Diamond on this point. Mr. Gastil added that democracy will only be stable if the thinking of the elite and the general population do not differ too widely, thus, democracy is less likely to survive in countries with extreme income disparities.

- **Role of Islam**

Mr. Greeley, Project Officer of the Office of Program and Project Support, USAID/Indonesia, asked about specific challenges and obstacles that Islamic cultures pose in promoting democracy. Mr. Diamond responded that any totalistic ideology is problematic for democracy. He suggested that the best way to build a constituency for democracy in Islamic countries may be to allow fundamentalist parties to come to power if elected. If their system fails to perform, it will lose its legitimacy. Mr. Shafqat, Chief Instructor of the Civil Service Academy-Lahore, urged the group not to view Islam as a threat to democracy or to equate it with fundamentalism. Mr. Diamond recognized that there is pluralism within Islam, and in fact saw an opportunity for supporting democracy through moderate, democratic Moslem groups. Mr. Diamond asserted that the poor in Algeria adhere to fundamentalist ideology because they see no other hope. Mr. Lunstead pointed out that it is not only the poor. For example, in Iran, the middle and upper classes are predominantly fundamentalists.

- **Input vs. Output Institutions**

Mr. Blair noted Samuel Huntington's distinction between input institutions, including NGOs and political parties, and output institutions, including the bureaucracy and military. The former represent interest groups and serve as a channel for political expression, while the latter process those demands. The stability of a democratic system is threatened by an imbalance in the capacities of the two kinds of institutions. When the strength of input institutions is greater, the output institutions cannot adequately deal with the demands. When the input institutions are weaker, the output institutions do not have enough information to respond appropriately to the interests of the citizens.

### **C. Implementation Issues**

- **Role of Country Teams**

There was a great deal of discussion about the role of USG Country Teams in the development and implementation of democratic programs. Representatives from USAIDs expressed support for the coordination of the Nepal and Bangladesh Country Teams. Mr. Huchel, Country Affairs Officer of East Asia Office, U.S. Information Agency, also emphasized the importance of working together to complement resources. Several participants added that these Country Teams are more unified in part because of the

commitment and strong leadership of the ambassadors. In particular, Ambassador Bloch's clear commitment to promoting democracy has been an important factor in the success of the Nepal program. Mr. Nelson, Deputy Director of the Office of Food for Peace and Voluntary Cooperation, USAID/Philippines, also commented that proximity of USAIDs and Embassies can facilitate coordination in some cases.

- **Long vs. Short-Term Efforts**

There seemed to be an agreement that long-term activities, including promoting civic education, are necessary in promoting democracy. There is a strong emphasis, however, on demonstrating results in the short-term, which is difficult for many democracy activities.

- **Need for Clear Objectives and Benchmarks**

Many participants echoed the need for objective measurements of democracy. Mr. Young, Program Officer, USAID/Bangladesh, commented that it was important to differentiate between measuring output and process. The break-out group led by Mr. Miedema, Chief, Office of Program, USAID/Pakistan, suggested that it would be useful if the Asia Bureau helped develop a PQLI-like (physical quality of life index) index. Mr. Gastil cautioned about getting trapped into doing only activities that are easily measurable.

- **Degree of Receptiveness of Host Country**

Mr. Lunstead made the distinction between countries that are receptive to democracy activities and those that are not. The USAID presentations evidenced the range of country receptiveness. On the one hand, the Nepal Country Team has taken advantage of the democratic opening. Indeed, the need to respond quickly inspired much effective work. On the other, the Office of A.I.D. Representative/Afghanistan has a limited development mandate. In Indonesia, the Mission's democracy effort is framed in development terminology. In countries that are less receptive, Mr. Diamond suggested working on laying the groundwork for democracy in anticipation of future opportunities.

- **Integrated vs. Stand-Alone Democratic Efforts**

The issue of whether to integrate democracy into current A.I.D. programs or whether to develop a separate program was raised. One break-out group argued that democratic objectives should be integrated throughout the mission portfolio where in-country circumstances do not permit having a discrete democracy project. Mr. Gastil suggested that a stand-alone democracy program would be better for several reasons. First of all, it is possible for democratic objectives and economic objectives to serve various purposes or possibly conflict. Second, since he questions the definitive link between economic development and democracy, it follows that he would support programs that deal with democracy more directly.

- **A.I.D.'s Democracy Activities**

There was a great deal of discussion and some consensus on what activities should be supported by A.I.D. The following key points were made:

- 1) Elections

Several participants spoke of their activities in supporting the electoral process. Ms. Tinsley, Deputy Director of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, told the group about the services that IFES provides to support the mechanics of elections. The services it provides include on-site pre-election assessment surveys, technical election assistance, training for election officials and poll workers, civic education materials and observers. IFES recognizes that free and fair elections do not ensure a stable democracy, but they are an important element.

Mr. Tamang, Chief Executive Officer of the Service Extension and Action Research for Communities in the Hills (SEARCH), spoke of two projects that SEARCH has been involved in during the past two years in Nepal. The first project focused on educating the predominantly illiterate rural population about voting procedures by creating posters and a brochure. The second project involved monitoring elections in remote areas and reporting observations to the press.

Although elections are important, several participants cautioned against overemphasizing them. Mr. Gastil commented that a common misperception is to equate democracy with elections. For example, elections do not ensure democracy in cases where a large portion of the population cannot vote (such as women), there is a significant degree of fraud, or there is no real choice among candidates. Mr. Diamond specifically cautioned against putting too much emphasis on the upcoming elections in Cambodia. In that case, holding elections before citizens are properly educated and groups are able to organize could lessen the meaningfulness of the process.

- 2) Legislatures

Many participants spoke about the need to strengthen legislatures in order to improve governance. Mr. Gastil, however, expressed concern about overemphasizing legislatures, pointing out that a strong and independent legislature is not a characteristic of most parliamentary systems.

- 3) Political Parties

Most participants agreed that training for political parties was important, but that A.I.D. should fund the activities only in rare instances when special circumstances prevail. Mr. Stewart, Regional Program Officer, International Republican Institute, and Mr. Johnson,

Senior Program Officer, National Democratic Institute, both spoke of their organizations' efforts to strengthen democratic political parties.

#### 4) Freedom of Information

The importance of information was discussed by many participants. Three representatives from the U.S. Information Service spoke to the group about USIS' role in promoting democracy. USIS has a long-standing interest in democracy, but has only recently formalized its commitment. The Voice of America, USIS' main tool for information dissemination, has always been used to disseminate information and to promote democracy throughout the world.

Ms. Garchitorena, Executive Director of the Ayala Foundation, offered some first-hand experiences that illustrated the importance of the media. She spoke of how she joined with eight other professional women after the assassination of Ninoy Aquino to denounce the murder and the subsequent political repression in the Philippines. This group used the media in creative ways to voice dissenting views and gain international attention. For example, during a National Assembly move to impeach President Marcos, her organization, working with other strategically placed NGOs, held up white sheets spelling out "Impeach Marcos." This internationally-televised demonstration showed the extent to which Marcos had lost popular support.

#### 5) Support for NGOs

Overall, strengthening the capacities of NGOs is important because it fosters participation and strengthens civil society. According to Mr. Diamond, even participation in non-political groups is important because it improves organizational capabilities and facilitates articulation of interests. The experiences of Ms. Garchitorena and Ms. Udagama demonstrate how NGOs can serve as a counterbalance to state power. Mr. Tamang, Chief Executive Officer of SEARCH, spoke of the role NGOs could play as social service providers in Nepal. He explained that NGOs are increasingly filling the role of local government in Nepal, which is non-existent. He sees a need for NGOs to teach people about basic fundamental rights.

Several participants suggested that A.I.D. should concentrate its resources on developing NGOs. For example, according to Mr. Miedema, leaving sustainable programs is a priority in Pakistan because of the A.I.D. program's termination required by U.S. legislative restrictions in that country. At this time, the NGO community is not strong, but USAID/Pakistan has set up a trust fund to support NGOs, particularly for human rights, legislative support and women's groups, that will continue beyond the cut-off of aid to Pakistan.

Like USAID/Pakistan, USAID/Thailand focuses on assisting NGOs. However, USAID/Thailand will be able to continue support for NGOs while other Mission programs will be terminated due to U.S. legislative restrictions. Ms. Chatyanonda supported

assistance to NGOs as a means of promoting democracy because she felt that Thai NGOs have the resources and the right attitude to help citizens.

6) Associational Life

There was a broad recognition that a rich and varied associational life is important to democracy. Mr. Blair suggested increasing multiple associations to ensure that decentralization shifts power closer to the people and guards against patronage. According to Mr. Diamond, a rich network of associations forms the root of the world's trend toward democracy. These organizations have a positive impact on democracy by mobilizing and giving "voice" to groups, thus countering the power of the state.

7) Human Rights and Redress

A stable democracy requires that the government adhere to some standard of human rights including freedom from torture and arbitrary imprisonment from political dissent. Ms. Udagama founder of the Human Rights Center, University of Colombo, spoke of the many human rights institutions in the 1980s that were created. These groups documented and disseminated accounts of alleged human rights violations. Their work was used by such organizations as Amnesty International and Asia Watch.

Several participants voiced the need for people to be educated about their rights and to increase access to legal services. In other instances, where laws permit the accused to be handled brutally and held indefinitely without being brought to trial, there is a need for legal reform.

8) Contextual Support

There are a variety of ways to support democracy indirectly. Mr. Diamond suggested that improving socio-economic development facilitates democracy. Additionally, Mr. Gastil encouraged civic education and English language programs. Mr. Gastil also suggested using public opinion polls to monitor changes in a country's political culture and to bring people into the political process.

## II. OPENING REMARKS

**Kelly Kammerer<sup>1</sup>**  
**Mission Director**  
**USAID/Nepal**

Thank you very much. Ambassador Bloch, Speaker of the House Dhungana, colleagues and friends. I want to welcome you most warmly to chilly Kathmandu. I also want to thank Henrietta Holsman-Fore and Phyllis Forbes, who are not here, and Richard Whitaker, who is here, for holding this conference.

I received a telegram today informing me that the conference of A.I.D. mission directors, originally scheduled for next month, has been postponed because of the budget problems. So I'm sure that significant thought went into whether this conference could be held. Holding this conference despite the current budget problems is a reflection of how important the Agency and the Bureau view democracy strengthening activities.

I also want to thank Ambassador Bloch who, when we approached her with the idea of bringing 30 odd people to Kathmandu, and the logistical strains that would certainly put on the Mission and the Embassy, was most enthusiastic about having this conference. I'm sure, in fact, that if we had not volunteered, she would have been disappointed.

I am personally very pleased that the Administrator of A.I.D. and the Asia Bureau have made democracy strengthening such a high priority. Not just because democracy is a precursor or necessary ingredient for free market development, but because as Americans we stand for personal freedom and liberty. Democracy strengthening activities are somewhat in vogue right now, because of changes in the world and Nepal. However, it's worth remembering that they have been the bedrock of A.I.D. programs since 1961. It came as a surprise to me that some in Congress who provide oversight for our programs questioned, or have even been critical of, the Agency's role in democracy strengthening. Reasons for this criticism include whether we are the most appropriate agency to do this work or whether democracy strengthening activities are the most pertinent way to achieve economic development. But for those of you who have been in the Agency long enough, you know that this is a program that goes back to the earliest days of A.I.D.

As Richard mentioned, I am a lawyer, and started working in the Agency as a lawyer. Whenever I look at Agency programs, I like to go back to the organic legislation under which we operate. This afternoon I looked at some of the statutory provisions in the Foreign Assistance Act that relate to programs of democracy strengthening. It's startling because we tend to think that some of our programs or initiatives are new. To look back at the original legislation, for example, Section 102(b)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which in its recent form was enacted in 1978, but existed in almost identical form in the original Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, says, and I quote:

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<sup>1</sup> The literal transcript of Mr. Kammerer's remarks has been slightly edited.

When carrying out bilateral development assistance programs, maximum effort shall be made to stimulate the involvement of the people in the development process through the encouragement of democratic participation in private and local government activities, and institution building appropriate to the requirements of the recipient countries.

Section 116(e), the human rights amendment introduced by Congressman Frazier and Senator Percy in 1974, directs A.I.D. to carry out programs and activities to encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights. And going back even further, Title IX, Section 281 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which is still current law, states that:

In carrying out bilateral economic assistance programs, A.I.D. shall make sure that there is maximum participation in the task of economic development through the encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions, and when allocating development assistance, emphasis should be given to research that examines political, social and related obstacles to development and to research designed to increase understanding of the ways in which development assistance can support democratic, social and political trends.

I hope that during the sessions this week you will keep in mind the Agency's long history of programs to strengthen democratic institutions, and how important and central they are to all of the activities and programs we carry out. Strengthening democracy, or as most of us say, promoting participation of the people that we are trying to help, is a central theme that underpins everything we do.

I want to echo what Richard said in terms of how fitting we at USAID believe it is that this workshop is being held in Kathmandu. We think we have something to say and Mike Calavan will be talking about it at greater length, along with Todd Greentree of the Embassy and Suzanne Wallen from Asia Foundation, in the session on Nepal. But it's not just the activities that we have been able to carry out since the change in government in Nepal almost two years ago that make it important to have this program carried out here.

I think some of the work done here before I arrived in the late 1980s is more symptomatic, and perhaps important, of what we intend to accomplish under our democracy strengthening activities. Once there was a change in government and a democracy established in Nepal, it became quite a bit easier to design programs to help the government prepare a new constitution or carry out an election or strengthen the institution of the parliament.

The difficult part of our human rights and utilization of democratic initiatives programs occurred before the change in government. We've been in Nepal since 1951, almost 40 years, and for many of those years we've believed and convinced ourselves that changes were occurring. I suspect that many of us working during that time realized full well that the political environment for development wasn't as conducive as it could have been, or

should have been. But in the late 1980s, largely through the efforts of USAID employees Stacy Rhodes and Mike Calavan, as well as by using the Asia Foundation, A.I.D. began to work with individuals and groups, and in particular, with lawyers. It's hard to believe today when we speak so openly about democratic activities that two or three years ago you couldn't talk about change in government, you couldn't talk about an elected government, you couldn't talk about elected parties in Nepal.

Speaker Dhungana, who you will hear from shortly, participated in some of the activities we financed in 1988 and 1989. Almost two years ago, Daman was sitting in prison for being so outspoken as to recommend that there should be pluralism, political pluralism, in Nepal, that there should be political parties. It must have been terrifying for him not to know if he was risking his family's security and his own career by taking a stand. I think for that reason alone, those of us who have been involved in democracy strengthening programs at USAID really welcome the opportunity to host this conference.

The other reason I think it's so fitting is that, and this gets me back to my role of introducing Ambassador Bloch, we have such a unique relationship between USIS, the Embassy and USAID in jointly carrying out and financing democracy strengthening activities. We recently received a copy of a letter from the head of USIS, Henry Catto, to the Administrator of A.I.D., Ronald Roskens. In it Mr. Catto said:

Mention was made at our meeting of the extraordinarily effective cooperation between our two agencies to promote a fledgling democracy and free market economy in Nepal, in a part of the world that gets less attention these days than Eastern Europe. There are many examples of cooperation, and we didn't have time at the meeting to dwell on any one country. But I think this one deserves special attention because it is kind of a model.

I understand that differing administrative mechanisms and program structures sometimes introduce obstacles to USAID and USIS cooperative projects. In Nepal at least, our USIS and USAID officers have been notably successful in identifying and eliminating procedural stumbling blocks through adjustment, accommodation and constant communication. The close cooperation between our two agencies in Nepal strikes me as a model of what can be accomplished if our people in the field work together creatively to promote shared goals.

I'm proud of that cooperation, and I know Ambassador Bloch and Janey Cole of USIS are equally proud. Sometimes I think we tend to forget that even though we work in different agencies, we all work for the same government. It should be our objective to find ways for our programs to mesh, and not to see who can get the most credit, or who can run the most programs.

So without further ado, I would like to introduce Ambassador Bloch, who has done so much to instill in us that sense of cooperation. She has been extremely active in the last two years

in supporting the new democratic government in Nepal. Ambassador Bloch was, as all of you know, an Assistant Administrator in two bureaus in A.I.D. You also probably know that she used to work at USIA and at the Peace Corps as well. She's a veritable self-contained Country Team meeting. It's my pleasure and privilege to introduce Ambassador Bloch. Thank you and welcome again.

### III. REMARKS OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NEPAL

#### The Honorable Julia Chang Bloch

Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first welcome you all to Nepal. I can think of no more appropriate place for A.I.D. to hold its first Asia Regional Conference on Democracy than here in Kathmandu, and I feel privileged to address you this evening because democracy for me holds special meaning.

As a refugee from Communist China, I have lived under both totalitarianism and democracy. So, I particularly value the significance of this conference. In the next three days, as you address the challenges to democratic governance and politics, as you discuss what is needed to make democracies work, and as you define A.I.D.'s role in the democratization process, you may very well make a difference on whether democracy succeeds or not in Asia.

I commend your foresight in choosing Nepal for these deliberations. No other country in the region could offer a more congenial environment for a democracy conference. Democracy in Asia, contrary to trends in most of the rest of the world, has been going backwards rather than forward. The recent military coup in Thailand killed the region's one model of a prosperous democracy, reinforcing the popular belief in Asia that parliamentary democracy, with all its messy freedoms, is incompatible with economic progress and Asian cultures.

Nepal, on the other hand, offers hope for peaceful democratic change in this region. It is a showcase of a democratizing LDC in transition. Now, nearly two years since parliamentary democracy returned here for the second time in 32 years, Nepal has been undergoing a relatively peaceful transformation, gradually but steadily converting its absolute monarchy into a constitutional, multi-party democracy. If the legitimacy and efficacy of democracy can be established in Nepal, one of the poorest countries in the world, there can be important lessons for understanding how democracy can take root not only in Asia but, also, in other LDCs, whose democratization reports to-date have been largely sporadic, unstable and temporary.

And like other democratizing nations, Nepal is finding the process of creating enduring democratic values and institutions considerably more difficult than toppling an authoritarian regime.

Founding a democracy and maintaining it are two different things, particularly where the economic and social conditions favorable to democracy are lacking. In the last two years Nepal has provided fertile ground for combatting the challenges of democracy -- fragile democratic traditions, weak political institutions, and poor economic conditions.

In the process this Mission has developed what I consider a model democracy program. Let me briefly highlight what makes it work:

- **Clear Objectives:** The goal of Mission activity in Nepal has always been clear -- to support the independence, sovereignty and economic well-being of Nepal. U.S. support for democratic norms, practices and institutions has always been implicit in that goal. Once the people's movement got underway in Nepal, supporting peaceful democratic change became the central focus, the defining feature of our bilateral relations.
- **An Integrated Approach:** Supporting democracy in Nepal is a U.S. Government priority. It does not fall under the mandate or expertise of any one USG Agency alone. While the Democratic Pluralism Initiative (DPI) is an A.I.D. program, its successful implementation requires a coordinated Mission-wide effort. USAID can support a wide range of technical assistance to develop institutions, services, and capabilities necessary in a democracy; but USIS can organize exchanges, speakers and training to familiarize Nepalese political leaders, officials, journalists and others to U.S. democracy; and the Embassy has the necessary political knowledge and insight, as well as close relationships with the country's leaders. DPI, therefore, is important to all elements of the Mission, and to U.S. foreign policy as a whole, as it forms the centerpiece of our bilateral relations. As such, the role played by the USG has to be more prominent than in traditional development projects, where implementation is by-and-large in the hands of contractors or NGOs. Generally lacking in implementation capacity, it is all the more important for all elements in the Mission to pull together in their support of democratization efforts. In Nepal the Mission has developed into a cohesive force, which can marry the differing mandates and procedures of the various elements to use the capacities of each and all to the maximum advantage. Responsibility as well as credit are shared equally.
- **Recognition that Economic and Political Development are Inextricably Linked:** Providing direct support for democratization does not fit neatly within USAID's traditional portfolio. But poverty is probably the principle obstacle to democratic development, and the alleviation of poverty is USAID business. USAID/Nepal recognizes that obstacles to economic development are obstacles to the expansion of democracy. By working to support the consolidation of democracy in Nepal, USAID/Nepal understands that it also is working to create the conditions necessary for the country's economic development. This Mission, therefore, has joined our support for economic liberalization with our support for democratization in Nepal as complementary goals because economic development makes democracy possible.
- **Openness and Transparency:** We have been careful to ensure that our democratic support activities are open and transparent, balanced and non-partisan. Our objective clearly is to help strengthen the democratic processes and institutions, not to ensure the victory of one faction over another. DPI

helps to strengthen the democratic culture among all groups, regardless of ideology, as long as they expound and participate in the democratic process.

- **Flexibility and Timeliness:** During democratic transitions social and political institutions can change dramatically. New, often inexperienced, political leaders emerge. Legislatures and judiciaries are often ill-equipped to settle down to business. Politics and governance become far more complex almost overnight. In supporting democratization, timing is critical, as the political situation can evolve significantly from day-to-day, requiring procedures not to hinder or delay activities from being carried out as the need arises. This can be particularly difficult when disparate and incompatible rules and regulations of different agencies complicate a rapid response, but action can be taken quickly when agencies understand the value of flexibility and coordination. Early identification of opportunities and problems plays a major part in this; so, in Nepal inter-agency communication about DPI is an ongoing exercise, both through regular DPI coordination committee meetings and more informally between officers of the various agencies. From this process, action is not only timely but it is all the more appropriate and effective for being a Mission-wide response. Because of USAID's forty-year experience in Nepal and because of a willingness on the part of all agencies to be flexible and to coordinate all efforts, this Mission has been able to, and did, act from day one of this country's newly-declared democracy.
- **Tolerance:** Like so many other new democracies, Nepal is in the throes of moving simultaneously from authoritarianism to democracy and from a planned economy to a market-driven one. This is particularly difficult, as implementing economically necessary but politically unpopular economic policies in the face of unbridled popular expectations puts severe strains on all fledgling democracies, Nepal's notwithstanding. Moreover, because of the flux endemic to all democratic transitions, newly established democratic governments may appear less effective and stable than their authoritarian predecessors. This Mission has learned that efforts to consolidate democracy require realistic time horizons, that elected leaders will find it difficult to pursue unpopular policies, no matter how wise or necessary, and that relief may be required to make policy reforms politically palatable.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the process of consolidating new democracies may pale against the drama of democratic revolutions, but it is no less critical and is receiving far too little attention where Asia is concerned. Here in Nepal, this Mission has given this process our highest priority. In this Post-Cold War world as the international community searches for new purpose and meaning, we believe there is no higher calling for the U.S. -- including USAID -- than to help new democracies mature and flourish. Otherwise, why would men and women die for democracy. Let me end by quoting one of this conference's speakers,

Larry Diamond, "Democracies are less likely to wage war and . . . are the only reliable foundations on which we can build a new system of international security and prosperity".

If these words can't stir this conference into action, I don't know what will. You have important work to do, and I wish you every success.

#### **IV. ASIA DEMOCRACY PROGRAM**

**Richard S. Whitaker**  
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The Congress, the Administration, the State Department, the A.I.D. Administrator, and Bureau for Asia Assistant Administrator Henrietta Hoisman Fore have all identified the promotion of democracy as a key element of U.S. foreign assistance. But for A.I.D., which has traditionally -- although not exclusively -- been an economic development agency, what does this mean?

You've all heard the questions in your own office or mission: What is the Democracy Program? Why are we doing it? Should we be doing it? What activities should we concentrate on? Do we know enough about the consequences of our actions? How can we measure progress, impact and results? What level of effort should we assign to the program? How do we cooperate with USIS? And, more importantly, how do we cooperate under the direction of the Embassies? These are all valid questions -- some have been answered to an appropriate degree and others await our action. Now today, we add two more questions: What do we see for the future? And what do we need to do that job?

This workshop will hopefully answer those questions. By design, the workshop will take us through a process whereby we take a look at what we know about the field, what we see transpiring throughout the world, how this translates to the local level, the technical expertise of various organizations, what programs the USAIDs have been pursuing, and finally what we see for the future of the program and what's required to meet that objective.

First, let me say clearly that the democracy program is an very important element of the Asia Bureau's overall mission. While just a few short years ago this may not have been true, today the notion that foreign aid should focus on democratic development is widely accepted. Working in partnership with governments that seek to initiate steps toward greater pluralism and the strengthening of democratic institutions is both responsive to local indigenous needs and responsive to U.S. foreign assistance goals.

What do we know about promoting democratic development and human rights? In 1966 the Foreign Assistance Act was amended by Congress to call for the "maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions." Many of us remember this as the Title IX Program. In addition, during the Carter Administration, Congress earmarked a small human rights program for A.I.D. which concentrated on the strengthening of political institutions. While the Latin American Bureau has been engaged to a significant degree with the building of democratic institutions -- particularly in Administration of Justice programs -- A.I.D.'s major thrust into the field of democratic

development began in 1990. This new program thrust will require new analytical skills, the support of the entire A.I.D. Mission, and a set of new relationships with U.S. Embassies and the entire U.S. Government Country Team.

In many respects, A.I.D.'s movement into the field of democratic development is a byproduct of the end of the Cold War. First, it was the historic political changes in Central and Eastern Europe, portions of Asia, interest in many quarters in Africa, and finally the transformation of the USSR. In a very short period -- in the war of ideas throughout the world -- democracies and free market economies have suddenly developed a throng of supporters.

But what does implementing a democracy program at the mission level really mean? Some people may view it as a way to scoop up scarce resources for PVO programs that have suddenly taken on aspects of giving greater "voice" to local groups. But its really much more than that and we all know it. The program isn't just signing up a grant with a U.S. or local group and then checking the outputs. The real issue is how to do democratic development effectively within A.I.D.'s overall developmental context.

Much of the literature points to democracies perhaps being friendlier with the United States, being more cooperative on international treaties and agreements, being better trading partners, being less likely to resort to armed conflicts, having greater respect for human rights and civil liberties, and a whole host of possibilities that imply a friendlier and more cooperative world. These are certainly commendable ends in-and-of-themselves. However, for A.I.D. our charge is to integrate democracy program activities into a broader economic development context. Democratic development and economic development activities must reinforce each other.

This will be easier said than done, but that's our charge. To let our democracy programs represent a type of special add-on to our mainline development portfolios will be doing a disservice to our bureau, our missions, and ourselves. We must employ A.I.D.'s comparative advantage in the democracy program by recruiting the strengths of our development agenda. But what are the trade-offs for strengthening parliaments as opposed to working with local NGO advocacy groups or monitoring elections. It's clear that we have many more questions than answers.

With respect to the Asia Bureau's recent mission "focus" exercise -- designed to concentrate mission resources and efforts -- I know that a number of missions have been closely analyzing this issue of integrating democracy programs into mission development portfolios. Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh are just three examples that come to mind, but I know there are many more and I applaud the excellent work.

Throughout the next few days we can listen to the experts and talk among ourselves about just how we can try to accomplish this feat. I certainly don't expect us to be able to develop

a set formula or a checklist but we should be able to set in motion some procedures that will help integrate democracy programs within mission development portfolios.

This point can be expressed another way. I believe that this workshop is being held at a critical point in time for the democracy program. The question of Where's the Democracy Program going? needs to be answered. And rather than answer that question individually from each mission, we are trying to answer it collectively here in Kathmandu. As I see it, in order to be accepted as a viable force with A.I.D., the democracy program must mature and professionalize, and the single most important way to mature and professionalize the democracy program is to prove its relevance to A.I.D.'s development portfolio.

I hope that when we leave this workshop late on Thursday we will have been able to define - at least to a significant degree -- the future for the program. The future is ours to define and I encourage you to be an active participant.

## **V. THE LINKAGES BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

**Larry Diamond**  
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### **A. The Trend Toward Democracy in Asia and the World**

We are living now in the midst of the greatest and most promising expansion of democracy in human history. By the count of Freedom House, there were more democratic (or "free") states in the world in 1990 (65) than at any time in the history of the world. That number increased in 1991, and not just because of the greater total number of states, with the breakup of the Soviet Union. This global democratic trend has been underway since 1974, when the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship set off what Samuel P. Huntington has called "the third wave" of global democratic expansion.<sup>1</sup> The decade of the 1980s witnessed particularly extensive democratic progress, with democracies increasing from about 32 to 39 percent of all the world's states, and the proportion of "not free" states continuing to decline to less than a third.<sup>2</sup>

Global democratic progress is even more apparent when we examine various degrees of regime change. Elsewhere, I have proposed a typology of seven regime types, moving in step fashion from the most highly closed and authoritarian to the stable and fully liberal and institutionalized democracies.<sup>3</sup> Tracing the movements between these seven categories over the past decade shows even more dramatic progress than is revealed by the movement between the Freedom House categories of "free," "partly free" and "not free." The two most extreme authoritarian regime types, what I call "state hegemonic" regimes, declined sharply, especially between 1989 and 1990. There are also many fewer moderately authoritarian regimes (less than half the number in 1980) and significantly more semidemocracies (26 in 1990 as opposed to 17 in 1980). Most encouragingly, in the three most democratic categories, the biggest increase has come in the most democratic regime type ("stable, liberal democracies"), which increased from 18 to 26 between 1980 and 1990. Democracy, it appears, is becoming not only more common in the world but more rooted.

The progress toward more democratic forms of governance has been dramatically apparent in Asia. Indeed, the massive demonstration of "people power" in the Philippines, peacefully mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people to topple the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986, was one of the crucial catalytic events in the global democratic revolution of the 1980s, generating powerful demonstration effects in Asia and beyond. Soon after the ouster of Marcos, South Korea's own transition to democracy began in earnest. A year later, President Chun Doo Hwan's suspension of all consideration of constitutional reforms unleashed a tidal wave of public protest that was only stemmed when Chun's designated successor, Roh Tae Woo, conceded to opposition demands for direct presidential elections. Diffusion effects also spilled across the South China Sea to China, inspiring pro-democracy forces that eventually crystallized in the movement in Tiananmen Square that was brutally suppressed in June 1989.

During the late 1980s, more incremental but nevertheless substantial democratic progress took place in Taiwan and Thailand as well. That progress has continued in Taiwan but was tragically interrupted by a military coup in Thailand on February 23, 1991. While the coup was a serious setback for the institutionalization of popularly responsive and accountable government in that country, and while Thai military elites (serving and retired) appear determined to construct enduring forms of undemocratic political control, a process of at least partial redemocratization is underway. The regime appears to recognize that some kind of civilian, electoral, constitutional regime is necessary for domestic and international legitimacy, and the growth of democratic forces in civil society opens the possibility for a gradual deepening and improvement of a chronically corrupt and unstable Thai party system.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, while the pro-democracy movement in China has temporarily been suppressed and driven underground, the underlying trends - including the continuing shift of economic power to private enterprises and the growth in independent media and intellectual activity - suggest the likelihood of renewed democratic progress when the current aging leadership dies off.<sup>5</sup>

There have been other shattering setbacks for democracy in Asia, as in Burma, where the sweeping victory of the opposition National League for Democracy, in the May 1990 People's Assembly elections, has been obliterated by the military junta and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest. And several existing or emergent democracies have visibly eroded in recent years: Sri Lanka, under the savage pressure of an ethnic civil war; India, under strain from growing ethnic, caste and religious violence, as well as statism and corruption; and Pakistan, in the wake of the irregular process by which the government of Benazir Bhutto was toppled in August 1990.

Clearly, the new democracies of the 1980s remain insecure as 1992 begins, and many old ones have become newly embattled. Yet, around the world and throughout Asia, there are also many signs of continued democratic ferment and potential. A new dawn of political pluralism and constitutionalism appears at hand in Cambodia. Although it still clings to Leninist totalitarian practices, the Communist regime in Vietnam is experiencing growing pressure from intellectuals, journalists, students, entrepreneurs, and ordinary peasants and laborers, who have staged numerous protest demonstrations and riots since 1988. Like China, Vietnam is discovering that, ultimately, economic liberalization cannot be pursued without political liberalization as well, since the growth of commercial markets and private enterprise unleash social forces demanding personal and political freedom as well.

In a different way, Indonesia is also beginning to discover that economic development cannot proceed indefinitely without political consequences for authoritarian rule. Though its per capita GNP is only half Thailand's \$1,000, Indonesia has also experienced continuous and often vigorous economic growth over the past two decades that has "laid the foundations for 'sustained and relatively rapid growth' over the next decade," even possibly the "economic miracle... that doubles real incomes in ten years and lifts whole countries out of poverty in two generations."<sup>6</sup> Ironically, this steady and impressive performance is making the military a victim of its own success. Its corporatist-authoritarian domination of political and social

life is beginning to wear thin. The combination of obvious accomplishment in eliminating the threats that brought it to power, aging leadership, and growing divisions within the ruling elite generate the political conditions for a democratic opening. And the growth in sophistication, resources, and autonomy of organized groups in civil society is generating democratic pressure and mobilization from below.<sup>7</sup>

## **B. Socioeconomic Development as a Cause of Democracy**

### **1. Sources of Democratic Transition**

Even from the above very brief summary, it is apparent that the global democratic trend cannot be explained merely by the international diffusion of democratic values and norms, or by the demonstration or "snowballing" effects of some earlier transitions "stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization" in other countries, though such effects have clearly made a large contribution.<sup>8</sup> Nor can the democratic changes sweeping the world be adequately understood as merely the aggregate of a number of discrete political processes of authoritarian divisions and failures, all following closely upon one another. To be sure, O'Donnell and Schmitter are broadly correct "that there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence - direct or indirect - of important divisions within the authoritarian regime, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners."<sup>9</sup> Certainly in all cases of democratic transition -- as O'Donnell and Schmitter also emphasize, along with Dankwart Rustow, Juan Linz and others -- the choices, behaviors, and strategies of a relatively small number of leaders in regime and opposition, including the conflicts they wage and the agreements they negotiate, are critical in determining whether, how, and at what pace, a democratic transition will be effected.<sup>10</sup>

But to some extent, this only begs the question of why the split occurs, why some leaders and supporters of the authoritarian regime come to believe that it must liberalize and then ultimately democratize its structures. Two factors appear decisive here. First, the authoritarian regime loses legitimacy - or at least what legitimacy it had - either because it has succeeded in solving the problems that ushered it into power (economic crisis, social polarization, political violence or insurgency), or because it has failed to realize its self-proclaimed mission, or perhaps in part because societal values have changed to become less tolerant of authoritarian rule (see below).

Spain, Chile and South Korea are three classic instances of authoritarian regimes that became victims of their own success, producing economic growth and social change that generated new interests and coalitions in society demanding democratic change. The repressiveness of the Chilean and South Korean regimes early on and periodically thereafter also served to narrow their support bases. Although their democratic transitions have been more incremental, evolutionary, and ambiguous (and now in the case of Thailand, clearly reversible), Thailand and Taiwan also saw a narrowing of support for authoritarian rule and defections from authoritarian commitment at the very top of the regimes for the same reason.

By contrast, democratic transitions were more or less forced upon the authoritarian regimes in Greece, Argentina, Uruguay, the Philippines, and Eastern Europe precisely because they had proven themselves such miserable failures economically and politically.

The second factor that brings down dictatorships is the shrinkage (often quite abruptly) of their material, symbolic, and coercive resources. This is often due to changes in the international environment, as well as to failures of the regime itself. But another reason for this precipitous decline often has to do with changes in society that deprive the regime of much of its passive and active support.

To understand fully why democratic transitions come about, we need to examine what causes the division within an authoritarian regime, "the emergence of the soft-liners." O'Donnell and Schmitter make (but do not develop) this crucial point: that what turns some hard-liners into soft-liners "is their increasing recognition that the regime they helped to implant ... will have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation," and thus will have to begin by introducing certain freedoms.<sup>11</sup> Most such "visionary" regime liberalizers undertake democratic reform not out of any intrinsic commitment or conversion to democratic norms, but for hard-headed, calculating, strategic reasons. They foresee or recognize that they cannot hold on indefinitely to absolute power. And the reason they cannot is often the real origin of democratic transitions: the changes and mobilization in civil society.

While some limited authoritarian regimes (e.g. recent military regimes in Turkey and Nigeria) get out in due time because they never intended to remain indefinitely in power, most authoritarian rulers abandon power because they see they cannot hold it indefinitely, at least not without costs they do not wish to pay. And they cannot hold it because society will not let them.

Any one of several changes may explain why society will no longer condone the continuation of authoritarian rule. The predominant values and norms in the society may have altered over time to become less tolerant of repression and concentration of power and more demanding of freedom. In much of Latin America during the 1970s and early 1980s, this value change among influential groups in society came about partly as result of the experience with brutal repression, which brought in its wake a "revalorization" of democracy, especially on the left.<sup>12</sup> As people come to place a higher value on political freedom and civil liberties -- in and for themselves -- they also become more inclined to speak out, demonstrate, and organize for democratization, beginning with the denunciation of human rights abuses.

A second change may come in the alignment of interests in society. As O'Donnell and Schmitter note, an important turning point in the transition to democracy comes when privileged elements of society -- landowners, industrialists, merchants, and bankers -- who had been part of the regime's support base "come to the conclusion that the authoritarian regime is dispensable," again either because it has succeeded or because it has failed, and its continuation might risk damage to their long-run interests.<sup>13</sup> Such large-scale shifts in

strategic elite interests were crucial in bringing about the democratic transition in the Philippines, and have also been visible more incrementally in Thailand, Taiwan and perhaps now embryonically in Indonesia. They constitute a major factor pressing for democratic transition in South Africa, where the major white industrial and banking interests have been among the leading critics of apartheid, because they see it as inconsistent with the long-term security of a capitalist system increasingly dependent on skilled black labor.

A third change in society that may undermine authoritarian rule comes in the growth of formal and informal organizations in civil society, and in their capacities, resources, autonomy, and self-confidence. This profound development can radically alter the balance of power in the country, as an authoritarian regime that could once easily dominate and control the society is thrown on the defensive. It is this phenomenon that underlies the "upsurge" of popular mobilization that O'Donnell and Schmitter speak of. Students march in the streets demanding change. Workers paralyze key industries. Lawyers refuse to cooperate any longer in legal charades. Alternative sources of information pierce and then shatter the veil of secrecy and disinformation. Local development groups break the dependence of peasants on landlords or the state, and generate alternative sources of power and activity. Informal networks of production and exchange emerge that deny the state resources and control. Not all of these developments are necessarily positive in their implications for the development of democracy, but they all contribute in a cumulative way to the erosion and destruction of authoritarian control.

What is striking about the process of socioeconomic development is that it tends, in the long run, to generate all three of these changes. Let us, then, examine more closely the impact of socioeconomic development on democracy.

## **2. Why Socioeconomic Development Fosters Democratization**

**Political Culture.** At the individual level, increasing education, income, and social/occupational status foster more democratic norms, values, and behaviors. People become more tolerant of differences and opposition, more valuing of freedom, more respectful of minority rights, more interested and better informed about politics, more inclined to participate in politics and to join organizations, more politically efficacious, and thus, more politically confident and assertive.<sup>14</sup> There also appears to be an independent contextual effect on attitudes and values of living in a more developed country. Even when the socioeconomic status of the individual is held relatively constant, residents of more developed countries tend to manifest higher levels of tolerance and anti-authoritarianism, of efficacy, interpersonal trust, and personal satisfaction.<sup>15</sup>

Behaviorally, the level of socioeconomic development is inversely correlated with political violence. Death rates from political violence are significantly higher in less developed democracies than in more developed ones, and this has been a major factor in the greater incidence of democratic breakdown or erosion in such countries (e.g. Turkey, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines).<sup>16</sup>

**Class Structure.** Changes in the class structure associated with more advanced stages of economic development may also foster democratization. While early stages of economic development often aggravate inequality, after a certain middling point development tends to reduce inequality and mitigate feelings of relative deprivation and injustice in the lower class, thus reducing the likelihood of extremist politics polarized around class divisions.<sup>17</sup> Even where inequality per se is not much reduced, development broad enough to lift the incomes and opportunities of all classes of people may profoundly strengthen the democratic prospect by reducing the mass poverty that is a breeding ground for religious and ethnic, if not class-conscious, extremism. (Alternatively, uneven development, too, can generate democratic pressure, in the form of a new threat to long-run social and political stability that the dictatorship is ill-equipped to resolve).

The effects of socioeconomic development on political culture are heavily mediated through changes in the class structure. In fact, these changes -- the growth of the middle class, and more specifically of a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie; the enlargement, unionization and improved incomes of the working class; the migration of the rural poor to cities, and consequent disruption of clientelistic and feudalistic relations in the countryside -- are heavily interrelated in time and logic. Their interactive effect in stimulating democratization in Taiwan has been succinctly depicted by Cheng:

Rapid growth... had liberalizing consequences that the KMT had not fully anticipated. With the economy taking off, Taiwan displayed the features common to all growing capitalist societies: The literacy rate increased; mass communication intensified; per capita income rose; and a differentiated urban sector -- including labor, a professional middle class, and a business entrepreneurial class -- came into being. The business class was remarkable for its independence. Although individual enterprises were small and unorganized, they were beyond the capture of the party-state. To prevent the formation of big capital, the KMT had avoided organizing business or picking out "national champions." As a result, small and medium enterprises dominated industrial production and exports. As major employers and foreign exchange earners, these small and medium businesses were quite independent of the KMT.<sup>18</sup>

Democratization in Taiwan was particularly advanced by "the newly emerging middle-class intellectuals who had come of age during the period of rapid economic growth," who were connected through family and social ties to the emergent bourgeoisie, and whose training abroad in law and the social sciences heavily disposed them to "Western democratic ideals."<sup>19</sup>

Taiwan is unique in many senses, and theoretically it stands out here for having achieved rapid economic growth while at the same time significantly improving the distribution of income, and thus accelerating the democratic impact of development by diffusing it more rapidly to the lower strata. Typically, income inequality is aggravated during the early phase of industrialization. However, where this effect does not become too severe, and where the material conditions of all class groups improve at least in absolute terms, economic

development is eventually likely to have political consequences similar to those Cheng identifies for Taiwan. Even at a much lower stage of economic development, brisk economic growth (averaging 6.4 percent annually in GDP during the 1980s) generated pressure for democratization in Pakistan. Particularly important were the emergence (as in northern India) of rural and small-town entrepreneurs, the general improvement of the rural economy, the diminishing power of the traditional rural landed elite, rapid urbanization, and a better organized and more active trade union movement. Moreover, development may be expected to deepen and invigorate democracy over time in Pakistan by propelling into politics a new, better educated generation from rural elite families, broadening the base of political parties long dominated by elite, urban families, most of whom fled from India at the time of partition.<sup>20</sup>

Of course, whatever impact economic development has on democracy will be more decisive to the extent that it thrusts a country into higher levels of development, and to the extent that it occurs rapidly, since "rapid economic growth creates rapidly the economic base for democracy" and may also generate "stresses and strains" that wear thin the fabric of authoritarian rule.<sup>21</sup> This was a critical underlying factor, Huntington argues, in the democratic transitions in Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the mid-1970s, whose (per capita) economic growth rates in the quarter-century before their transitions averaged five to six percent annually. Such vigorous and sustained development rapidly expanded the middle classes, while at the same time raising expectations, heightening inequality in some cases (especially Brazil), and generating frustration, discontent, and political mobilization (for democracy).

As Huntington recognizes, the burgeoning middle classes are not always pro-democratic, and may even actively support authoritarian rule under conditions of social polarization, class insurgency, or general political disorder. However, as I have noted, one irony of the combination of effective authoritarian rule and rapid economic development is that it eliminates (albeit often at tragic human cost) these conditions of class polarization and insurgency, rendering the authoritarian regime "dispensable."

Thus, socioeconomic development may also alter interest coalitions, as shrewder and more visionary economic and political elites see that the defeat or withering away of extremist threats renders authoritarianism obsolete, or that the political system must open and enlarge its boundaries to incorporate newly assertive social groups, or that the contradictions engendered by uneven development under authoritarian rule -- as in Brazil and South Africa -- must be mitigated if stability is to be preserved. Much of this effect may be the product of changes in the nature and interests of the bourgeoisie as a country moves into higher stages of industrial development that increase the size of the middle class and reduce the power of populist labor and peasant organizations.

These changes in both the alignment of the bourgeoisie and the culture and structure of society more generally have had a powerful impact in motivating democratic transition in South Korea. Rapid economic growth -- averaging seven percent annually in per capita GNP

since 1965 -- had democratizing consequences similar to those in Taiwan, even though industrialization proceeded with greater concentration of capital and repression of labor. Indeed, in both countries, an important incentive for democratization was not only the increasing contact of urban middle classes with Western democratic values, but the realization -- quite powerful for a country where industrialization is so heavily led by exports -- that "democratization is the necessary ticket for membership in the club of advanced nations."<sup>22</sup>

**International Diffusion.** These indirect effects of economic development in "internationalizing" a country's elite and its values have probably always been present, but they are more intensive today than ever before. In an era of satellite communications, jet travel, and increasing global interdependence, "economic development in the 1960s and 1970s both required and promoted the opening of societies to foreign trade, investment, technology, tourism, and communications.... Autarchy and development were an impossible combination."<sup>23</sup>

Further contributing to this internationalizing impact of development has been the increasing salience of formal and informal supranational structures, like the European Community, which regard democracy (explicitly in the case of the EC) as a prerequisite for membership. This growing interconnectedness adds an additional dimension to the impact of socioeconomic development. So does the rapid improvement in the technology of communication, transportation, and information storage and retrieval, which has had two very strong pro-democratic effects: radically decentralizing and pluralizing flows of information; and producing more powerful, immediate, and pervasive diffusion effects than ever before, reaching well beyond the elite sector. Where the dominant themes and images conveyed are democratic, as they have been in world culture for more than a decade, so will be the political consequences.

**Civil Society.** Socioeconomic development also fosters democracy by pluralizing and empowering civil society.<sup>24</sup> For development involves not just growth in overall economic output but a vast array of interrelated transformations. Society becomes more differentiated as people move into a much more complicated and specialized array of occupations and functions. Urbanization fosters wider and more numerous, overlapping circles of communication and interaction. Communication expands, as does intellectual life in general, and with these the sheer quantity of information available to citizens (as well as their intellectual resources to make sense of it). Control over information becomes less, not more, centralized as telephones, photocopiers, fax machines, computers, modems, satellite television dishes, and other modern technology become physically and financially accessible to a much wider range of people. All of this makes civil society more pluralistic, questioning, and inclined to organize through structures and for goals independent of those sanctioned by the state.

In much of the world, it is this secular increase in independent organizational capacity and density that represents the real indigenous origin of the democratic trend. And this is not a

new development; it was a crucial dimension in the spread and invigoration of democracy in the United States almost two centuries ago,<sup>25</sup> and in the mobilization for and subsequent success of democracy in India before and after independence.<sup>26</sup> In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, the growth of autonomous organizational, cultural, and intellectual life, surreptitiously at first, has been the cutting edge of movements for democracy.<sup>27</sup> Democratic change in Taiwan during the 1980s has been stimulated and advanced by a host of social movements -- of consumers, workers, women, aborigines, farmers, students, teachers, and the environmentally concerned -- breaking free of traditional deference or state intimidation and control to seek both specific demands and long-range goals.<sup>28</sup> Similar developments have been deepening the democratization process in Thailand in recent years and perhaps inaugurating it in Indonesia, where the rapid proliferation of private development organizations has increased awareness and autonomous activity in the countryside while diminishing the hegemony of the state.<sup>29</sup>

In the Philippines under Marcos, Nigeria under the military, Kenya under Moi, and before that Latin America under various military regimes, associations of all kinds -- often initially of students, intellectuals, lawyers, and human rights workers, and then of trade unions, businessmen, manufacturers, women, doctors, teachers, and peasants -- have been crucial in keeping democratic aspirations alive, protesting authoritarian abuses, and then pressuring for democratization.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the growth of informal organizations and movements throughout Africa, and of political participation in them, has come to constitute the chief pressure and hope for democratization in much of the continent.<sup>31</sup> In a great many countries -- including, notably, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Korea, Poland, Haiti, South Africa, and most recently Kenya -- religious institutions (especially the Catholic Church) have been prominent in the movements to oppose, denounce, frustrate, and remove authoritarian regimes.<sup>32</sup> Specialized political but non-partisan organizations, like the Philippine poll-watching organization, NAMFREL, have also played crucial roles at sensitive moments in the transition process.<sup>33</sup> Finally, where -- as in the Philippines, South Africa, and Nigeria -- the press has been allowed some autonomy, or an alternative, underground press has emerged, its exposure of abuses and airing of liberal viewpoints has made an important contribution to the momentum for democracy.<sup>34</sup>

Resisting and overthrowing authoritarian rule is only one of the contributions that a strong civil society may make to the development of stable democracy. Tocqueville was perhaps the first to note the symbiotic, mutually reinforcing relationship between participation in civil society and participation in political life, depicting associations as "large free schools" where political interests were stimulated and political and organizational skills enhanced.<sup>35</sup> A rich variety of independent associations can be an important resource for increasing citizen interest and participation in democratic politics.

Third, a vibrant associational life -- and more generally, a robust and pluralistic civil society -- checks and balances the power of the state. Related to this, a vibrant associational life makes for a pluralistic competition of interests, and provides poor and disadvantaged groups the capacity to relieve or redress the injustices they face. With the deterioration in the party

system and the quality of political leadership, India's vigorous civil society has become an increasingly crucial (if turbulent) instrument of democratic accountability, interest articulation, social reform, and political renewal.<sup>36</sup>

One can imagine other positive consequences for democracy of a vigorous and pluralistic associational life. To the extent that they are democratic in their internal procedures of governance, voluntary associations may socialize their members into democratic values and beliefs and help to recruit and train new political leaders for the arena of formal democratic politics. More focused research is necessary to determine whether associations do (as a byproduct of their other pursuits) perform these roles, but the emergence of civic organizations focused explicitly on these goals is significant.<sup>37</sup>

**Statism and Corruption.** Socioeconomic development also enhances the democratic prospect through other systemic alterations in the relationship between state and society. As a result of massive state expansion in the quest for rapid development, control of the state itself has become the principal means of personal accumulation and hence the principal determinant of class formation in Africa and much of Asia, Latin America and the Middle East as well.<sup>38</sup> Both through legitimate state employment and contracting and through all manner of illegitimate diversion of public funds, manipulation of state resources became the easiest, most common, and least risky means for accumulating personal wealth.

This distorted relationship between state and society has been one of the most fundamental causes of democratic breakdown in Africa and Asia following decolonization, because it has generated many of the other factors superficially identified with democratic malfunctioning. It entrenched political corruption as the chief instrument of upward class mobility, draining democratic states of economic resources and political legitimacy. Both through the perverting effects of systematic rent-seeking, and through the pervasive impediments to productive enterprise generated by gross excesses in state ownership, regulation, taxation, and staffing, statism depressed and obstructed economic growth. By crowding out economic competition from the private sector, it prevented the emergence of an autonomous, productive (rather than parasitic) bourgeoisie. By subjecting virtually all developmental activity to state mediation and control, it made community as well as individual advancement dependent on control of the state, heightening inequality and political tension between ethnic and regional groups. Because of the latter inducement to group conflict, and because of the enormous premium for individuals on control of the state, it induced pervasive fraud and violence in the electoral struggle for power. Indeed, Powell's finding (above) that deadly political violence is strongly negatively associated with economic development tells us a good deal more about the effects of statism in this context than about intrinsic features of the political culture.

Collectively, these consequences of statism - corruption, abuse of power, economic stagnation and crisis, ethnic conflict, electoral fraud, political violence - heavily explain the repeated failures of democracy in such African countries as Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda; the three breakdowns or interruptions of democracy in Turkey; the ethnic polarization and

consequent democratic deterioration in Sri Lanka, and the broad decline in democratic performance (including rising levels of corruption, party decay, group conflict and political violence) in India.<sup>39</sup> Certainly, swollen states conducive to rent-seeking are not inevitably a consequence of low levels of economic development; Singapore and Taiwan have developed rapidly while managing largely to avoid this syndrome, and Botswana has even done so within a democratic framework. Nor is statism absent at higher levels of development. However, statism is uniquely toxic to democracy at low levels of development precisely because it places such a high premium on control of the state. As Lipset argued, "If loss of office means serious losses for major power groups, they will seek to retain or secure office by an means available."<sup>40</sup>

### C. Some Conclusions and Policy Implications

From the above evidence, and an extensive analysis I have recently done of numerous quantitative and qualitative studies of the relationship between democracy and development, several conclusions may be drawn.<sup>41</sup> First, socioeconomic development promotes democracy in two senses. Where democracy already exists, sustained development contributes significantly to its legitimacy and stability, especially in the early life of the regime.<sup>42</sup> Where democracy does not exist, it leads (sooner or later) to the establishment, and eventually (if not initially) the successful establishment, of democracy. However, it is difficult to predict at what point in a country's socioeconomic or historical development the democratic moment will emerge. There is an upper threshold of per capita income, perhaps about \$6,000, above which democracy is extremely likely. Below that, many factors intervene to structure the probability of a democratic regime, and these are, as Huntington has suggested, heavily a matter of political institutions and political leadership and choice.

Second, socioeconomic development does not produce the same enduringly legitimating effects for authoritarian regimes that it does for democratic ones. Rather, it presents the former with an inescapable dilemma. If authoritarian regimes "do not perform, they lose legitimacy because performance is their only justification for holding power. However, ... if they do perform in delivering socioeconomic progress, they tend to refocus popular aspirations around political goals for voice and participation that they cannot satisfy without terminating their existence."<sup>43</sup>

Third, it is not economic development per se, and certainly not mere economic growth, that is the most important developmental factor in promoting democracy. Rather, it is the dense cluster of social changes and improvements, broadly distributed among the population, that are vaguely summarized in the term "socioeconomic development." Most important here are improvements in the physical quality and dignity of people's lives: access to potable water, safe and sanitary neighborhoods, and basic health care; literacy and advanced (probably at least some secondary) education; sufficient income to provide at least minimally adequate food and clothing and shelter for one's family; sufficient skills to obtain a job that provides that income. Of course, the standards for what constitutes the decent and "minimally

adequate" change over time and across cultures. But these basic material dimensions of "human development," as summarized in the UNDP index of that name, better predict the presence and degree of democracy than the level of per capita national wealth. Economic development provides a structural context in which human development can occur, but to the extent that its benefits are grossly maldistributed (or that its correlates, like urbanization, only alter the form and scale of human squalor), it may do little to promote democracy, or may even generate stresses and contradictions that are hostile to democracy. For the democratic prospect, one aspect of economic development overrides all others in importance: reducing the level of absolute poverty and human deprivation.

There are several reasons why democracy is so closely related to the physical quality of life. First, these conditions generate the circumstances and skills that permit effective and autonomous participation. Second, when most of the population is literate, decently fed and sheltered, and otherwise assured of minimal material needs, class tensions and radical political orientations tend to diminish. And third, human beings appear to frame their values at least partly in response to what the psychologist Abraham Maslow termed a "hierarchy of needs."<sup>44</sup> Recent comparative research indicates that physiological needs, for physical security and material sustenance, do take precedence over "higher-order" needs of a more social, intellectual and aesthetic nature (even though such research gives no support to Maslow's assumption of a predictable, pan-human hierarchy beyond the physiological needs).<sup>45</sup> Thus, while the satisfaction of lower-order needs does not automatically increase the salience of individual needs for political freedom and influence, it makes the valuing of those needs more likely.

Fourth, economic development produces or facilitates democracy only insofar as it alters favorably crucial intervening variables - political culture, class structure, state-society relations, and civil society. Thus, mere increases in per capita wealth, without corresponding changes in the above variables, will not markedly improve the democratic prospect. This is why the oil states of the Persian Gulf remain heavily authoritarian.

And this leads to a fifth conclusion of great importance. Democracy *can* occur at low levels of development if the crucial mediating variables are present. Economic development is not a pre-requisite for democracy. In fact, Lipset wrote of it as a "requisite," meaning literally something that is essential but does not necessarily have to exist in advance. In a much neglected passage of his famous essay, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," he anticipated a crucial element of democratic experience in the contemporary developing world:

a "premature" democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal literacy, or autonomous private organizations. <sup>46</sup>

Those developing countries that have maintained democracy for long periods of time have done just that. They have inherited or developed political cultures that emphasize tolerance, inclusion, participation, and accommodation; as has been the case (more or less) with India,

Costa Rica, Botswana, Venezuela after 1958, and Chile and Uruguay before their polarization in the late 1960s and again in very recent years. Many of them have, as noted earlier with regard to India and Costa Rica, developed vibrant civil societies. And perhaps most of all, they have performed reasonably well in delivering human development. The ten developing countries (above one million population) that maintained more or less continuous democracy since 1965 reduced their infant mortality by a median annual rate of 3.25 percent from that year until the late 1980s, compared with a median annual reduction of 2.3 percent among ten of the most prominent continuous dictatorships in that period. These democracies have survived in large part because they have substantially improved the quality of life for their citizens.<sup>47</sup>

This suggests, finally, that democracy is not incompatible with development, and that in fact the causal trend can be reversed, with democracy leading to development. Although cross-national studies of the effects of democracy on economic development are inconclusive,<sup>48</sup> there remain strong theoretical grounds for expecting that political participation, liberty, accountability, and pluralism "would be conducive to economic achievements by industrious persons, particularly entrepreneurs," and to improvements in basic human needs as well.<sup>49</sup> To formalize slightly Lipset's argument about "premature" democracies, poor countries can maintain democracy, but only if they deliver broad and sustained (not necessarily rapid) socioeconomic development, especially "human development."

The policy implications of this are rather obvious. First, giving priority to basic human needs is not only sensible from the standpoint of economic development policy, and intrinsically more humane, it is also more likely to promote or sustain democracy than more capital-intensive strategies that view basic health and literacy needs as "consumption" that must be deferred.

Second, in no country should democracy absolutely be ruled out as a possibility. Certainly in very poor countries it is less likely, especially in its complete institutional configuration, but since "democracy comes to every country in fragments or parts,"<sup>50</sup> development policy should try to encourage the institutionalization of as many parts or features of democracy as possible, as early as possible. A careful reading of Lipset's thesis reveals that economic development promotes democracy only by effecting changes in political culture and social structure. Even at modest levels of economic development, countries can achieve significantly democratic cultures and civil societies, and significant reductions in absolute poverty. If social and political actors, private and public, focus on these intermediate goals, they stand a good chance of developing democracy "prematurely."

## NOTES

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6. The Economist, November 17, 1990, p. 37, 38.

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17. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981 (1960))17.

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21. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 69.

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## **VI. VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY**

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My remarks should be prefaced by an explanation of what I am not about. In discussing "varieties of democracy" I do not mean to launch into a political scientist's discussion of the difference between voting systems or legislative forms. This would be a useful discussion in itself; perhaps others here more able than I will wish to return to this aspect of "varieties" at some point. Proportional representation, for example, has advantages and disadvantages that should be explicated analytically and in terms of historical experience. Such discussions are very important to those engaged in developing a new democracy. But the following discussion does not focus on such issues.

The collapse of Soviet communism has been accompanied by a growing conviction among some Americans, including political leaders, that the universalization of democracy is both a possible and desirable near-term goal for American foreign policy. Although some view democratization as an economic and security panacea, many Americans believe, like Woodrow Wilson, that the United States has a unique historical responsibility to support the right of all peoples to a democratic system. For this and other reasons, and regardless of inevitable conflicts between this and other foreign policy goals, democratization is now a central element in American foreign policy, supplementing and to some extent supplanting the program to universalize basic human rights that became U.S. policy in the 1970s.

Among the many tools employed in the campaign America has launched to universalize democracy are the personal influence of the President and his staff, the educational programs of the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America, and the special "Radios" broadcasting to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Although ostensibly private, the National Endowment for Democracy devoted to promoting democracy and undermining dictatorship throughout the world operates much like a governmental agency. A similar organization, the Asia Foundation, relies in large part on government money to support democratic and related objectives in Asia. Recently, the Agency for International Development has made democratic development an important part of its development agenda throughout the world. Independently, some Congressmen promote democracy and human rights through individual and Committees actions. American efforts are to some extent paralleled by those of its allies. However, except for Germany, other major democracies have been less enthusiastic.

Particularly since most American efforts in support of democracy were undertaken or conceptualized well before the implosion of the Soviet Union, the campaign requires some

serious rethinking. Our friends and enemies have always suspected, and with considerable reason, that aside from its origins in American moralism and naivete the democracy campaign was adopted as a major American foreign policy thrust in the early 1980s because of its usefulness in the struggle with international communism, which was still considered a serious threat almost everywhere. Today, with international communism evaporating, many Americans fail to see why the campaign should continue. The unwillingness of the Bush administration to press issues of democracy and human rights in regard to China and the Middle East suggests the superficiality of the commitment of many in our foreign policy establishment. After all, only a few years ago it was prevailing wisdom within that establishment that (1) we should not be concerned with the form of government in societies not actively hostile to us, and (2) most societies were not culturally or economically fertile ground for democracy in the near future -- if ever.

However, the euphoria provided by the "victory" of democracy over communism, the unraveling of military dictatorships in Latin America, and strident demands for democracy in countless repressed and semi-repressed societies are probably sufficient to sustain the democratization campaign -- at least until it suffers serious reversals. If so, then we will as a nation need to give serious attention to the question of how we understand the term "democracy" in the development context and in the context of our own society, a society we continue without irony to suggest to the most diverse peoples as the model for their future.

In a previous article, I addressed the question "What Kind of Democracy?"<sup>1</sup> The discussion contrasted an earlier, **tribal democracy** with the civil liberties-based **modern democracy** Americans and West Europeans identify with the word. I pointed out that unfortunately tribal democracy had much deeper historical roots and many more connections to the social and cultural traditions of developing peoples or the peoples emerging from Soviet repression than modern democracy. We should not, then, be surprised if new democracies often sacrifice minority or individualistic interests to the interests of the majority. Such democratic performance will, however, raise difficult policy issues for a United States government committed to the universalization of both modern democracy and individual human rights.

#### **A. Levels of Definition**

Since writing that article, discussion of democracy with people within and without the development community, with academic political scientists, and with the democratizing peoples themselves has made me aware of the greater complexity of the definitional problem raised by the commitment of the United States and other developed countries to the universalization of democracy. In order to understand this complexity, the following discussion sketches ascending "levels" of democratic definition. The reader should note that testing a society at each level roughly presupposes that it has satisfied the criteria suggested for lower levels.

Democracy on the **first** or primary level is equivalent to group self-determination. Strictly speaking, group self-determination has no necessary relation to democracy; yet "freedom" and "democracy" have frequently been treated as though they were equivalent. The "free world" rhetoric of post-World War II American presidents referred to a world of states free of the domination of other states -- or at least not occupied by them. But the interweaving of closely related concepts made it easy to make the mistake of assuming that the Free World was also a Democratic World. In visualizing the post-World War I Europe, Woodrow Wilson identified the concepts: to Wilson "self-determination" referred to both the right of all peoples to states of their own and to a democratic political system.<sup>2</sup> Wilson would have argued that self-determination is a hollow and meaningless achievement without freely elected governments. Yet we must admit that many peoples have attained and will attain what the world labels self-determination without meeting the second-level criteria of political democracy.

The **second-level** definition equates democracy with one or another form of majority rule. Majority rule might be expressed through a modern representational system or simply a gathering of citizens such as those that governed classical Athens or New England communities. Except for occasional referendums, democracies today use a representative system with perhaps one or more directly elected leaders (such as the American President). It is now assumed that popular political rights or majority rule imply regular, more or less competitive multiparty elections. In the history of the older modern democracies, rights to vote and compete for office were only gradually extended from small minorities to the whole adult population. Democracies today, however, are launched with universal suffrage. However undesirable this might be in theory, the rhetoric of contemporary democratization makes this unavoidable.

Equating democracy with elections simplifies the task of the historian or political scientist because their presence or absence is relatively easy to determine. Therefore, studies that list for successive years the number of democracies in recent centuries define democracy largely or exclusively in terms of the extent to which countries have had elected governments.<sup>3</sup> The relative simplicity of rights at this level has also led many people within and without government to identify democracy with elections in the current discussion. Of course, such observers may add that elections to be meaningful must pass the test of being "free and fair", thereby incorporating at this level the higher levels of definition below. However, applying this test rigorously is difficult. Tests of whether an election was "free and fair" also fail to address the question whether the elected civilian government can maintain its authority in the face of entrenched and nonelected forces such as the military.

Unfortunately, in many countries the criteria of level one interfere with those of level two. Just as a people can achieve a form of self-determination without political rights, they can also have political rights without self-determination. In the 1990s, the people of Hong Kong face a situation in which an increase in political rights is moving them toward democracy at the same time as London's grant of a veto on the country's future to China undermines the

colony's self-determination. Similar conflicts of self-determination and political rights are ubiquitous, especially in the less developed world. No matter how thoroughly the principles of freely elected government are accepted, very few poor countries will be able to establish functioning democracies in the next few years that do not deny self-determination -- and in this important sense "democracy" -- to an important part of their population. The populations are too heterogeneous and the legitimacy of recently established state boundaries is too much at issue.

On a **third level**, democracy requires respect for civil liberties. This is an essential level of definition for modern democracy. Freedom of expression, freedom of organization, freedom of assembly, and freedom from arbitrary imprisonment are perhaps more important to the modern democratic citizen than episodic rights to vote -- rights that the political scientist can show are almost never in the interest of individuals as individuals to bother to exercise.<sup>4</sup> (Since elections are almost always decided by margins of hundreds or thousands, an individual decision to vote or not vote is largely of symbolic importance.) From another perspective, it can be argued that only respect for civil liberties make meaningful the exercise of political rights. Without civil liberties, the organization of a majority in support of new or alternative political ideas or new social forces is seriously impeded, if not altogether impossible. Majority rule is only democratic, then, if it offers its citizens a reasonable possibility that new majorities supporting different ideas or individuals can be brought into being before the next election.

On a **fourth level**, democracy exists only if the society and its political system adheres to international human rights standards, codified or widely respected. A democracy defined at this level does not legitimize torture or the mistreatment of incarcerated persons, no matter what the provocation. In most of the older modern democracies, but not the United States, respect for the individual precludes capital punishment for any reason. Rights of emigration are a generally accepted aspect of democracy at this level, as are at least limited international rights to immigration -- particularly if potential immigrants can prove political necessity. Rights to privacy, such as noninterference in the actions of "consenting adults", are an emerging aspect of modern democracy that carries society beyond respect for civil liberties as traditionally understood. Rights to adequate prison conditions for common criminals, for example, are important items on the new human rights agenda. (They are, incidentally, more difficult for poor countries to recognize than the rights on the older agenda.)

As used in this discussion, and quite aside from the basis on which the U. S. Supreme Court should address legal issues, traditional civil liberties in areas such as freedom of speech can be thought of as both limiting and undergirding majority rights at lower levels of definition.

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On the other hand, some newer human rights standards simply undermine majority rights. For example, judicial respect for individual rights in areas such as family life may greatly restrict the legislative power of the majority (which may or may not be desirable). Whatever one

believes about a "right to abortion", to take this out of the realm of majority decision through judicial rulings may effectively remove the issue from majority control.

On a **fifth level**, a country may not be considered democratic unless it meets reasonable tests of efficiency, fairness, freedom from corruption, and the rule of law. At first sight, this level may seem misplaced, for we know that efficiency and freedom from corruption may characterize less than democratic societies. The overturning of democracy has often been justified to achieve greater efficiency or to reduce corruption. Nevertheless, a society in which the relatives of high officials regularly win a markedly unfair proportion of government contracts or scholarships to the best schools is only a "facade democracy" in the opinion of many, regardless of the formal characteristics of the system. Others believe that a society in which people of one class, race, or gender are treated by the courts quite differently than those from other subgroups is not democratic. A society that allows a few people to plunder the treasury while the rest of the population has to pay the bill has lost a good deal of its democratic luster -- particularly when the public and its leaders seem unable to find ways to redress the inequities. Others may not consider a society democratic if major nongovernmental actors, such as generals, gang leaders, landlords, or foreign powers ignore the country's laws with impunity. Should a country that cannot control its own military forces be called a democracy?

Discussion of the fifth level easily leads into that of the **sixth level**, economic democracy. Conservative political scientists regard entering this discussion to be misguided. They point to the false comparison of "two kinds of democracy", Eastern and Western, that became popular among leftists who argued that the "peoples' democracies" of Soviet or Chinese inspiration were at least as democratic as the "bourgeois democracies" of the West. Today this comparison, and the hopes it reflected, are shattered. One or another form of bourgeois democracy has become the democracy of choice of nearly everyone. Yet many people throughout the world continue to believe, and with good reason, that economic issues should play a part in any adequate definition of democracy. Let us note at least three forms that their case might take.

The first version is commonly associated with the political left, or with anyone who believes in a welfare state. The essential thought is that a state with vast disparities in wealth, or with many people continually on the edge of starvation, cannot be a meaningful democracy. Some would argue that a caste society with certain groups excluded from particular positions or access to certain values cannot be democratic, no matter what the results of "freely contested" elections. They would point to the dependency relationships often resulting from these discrepancies, relationships that produce "delivered votes" rather than freely cast votes. Such observers would argue that a society can be said to be democratic only if its political, social, and economic "playing field" has been substantially leveled through social programs or other means.

The second version of the economic test for democracy derives from the new right. In this definition, the existence of the democratic regulatory system associated with a market economy is necessary for the development of democracy; indeed, the presence of such a system may be seen as an essential part of the definition of democracy. For example, Hernando de Soto, in discussing the problems of the unregistered or informal economic sector in Peru writes:

Among the most pressing of the informals' concerns was their lack of participation in rule making, or the absence of any dialogue between themselves and the government about laws and regulations. . . . In Peru, there is no Freedom of Information Act, no prior publication of laws before they are enacted, no regular means of objecting to rules with which you do not agree. . . There is no independent General Accounting Office. There are no referendums. There is, in fact, no democracy."<sup>5</sup>

One might agree with de Soto's remarks on Peru; yet be surprised that de Soto uses his tests to exclude Peru from the democratic ranks. For others on the right who implicitly identify individual economic freedom and democracy, the issues are often more ideological than for de Soto. They reason that highly regulated and taxed societies cannot be considered democratic. Ultimately, this approach would lead us to doubt the democratic credentials of countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, or India. This rightist identification of democracy with a model of market economy free of most of the inhibitions of regulation, subsidies, and other "interferences" raises an issue that will continue to fester underneath the present American enthusiasm for democratization, whether in Latin America or the successor states of the Soviet Empire. Is democracy necessarily the antithesis of the overregulated, bureaucratic past in these countries, or is democracy simply a more modern and just way to organize a political system, a system that once established can choose a wide variety of economic alternatives?

The third version of the economic definition or test for democracy revolves around the relation of money and politics, and thus is more directly concerned with the political process. What is the meaning of democracy where getting elected is primarily dependent on courting the favor of small unrepresentative groups that are willing and able to bankroll campaigns? Never mind other issues. Assume, for example, that a society has met the tests of democracy to this point in our march through levels of definition, and that it also has met the other economic tests of left and right. Still, if good candidates fail to enter its political processes because of the nature of the financial requirements of campaigns and good representatives leave the political process because they do not effectively play the money-raising game, in what sense can we say that voters are given an adequate or even free choice? One should not rush to a judgment that these conditions exist in the United States or that analogous conditions exist in a particular developing democracy. But readers should notice that they have come face to face with another and quite different definition of democracy, one that cannot be ignored. This brings back in a new form the old Marxist

arguments that those with concentrated economic power are the real rulers of bourgeois democracies.

## **B. Development Requirements or Preconditions for Democracy**

Even after we have considered democracy in terms of these six levels of definition, from the development perspective we will need to deal with questions not of how democracy is to be defined, but of the **capabilities for democracy** of previously nondemocratic peoples or societies. Perhaps the most common objection to raising the level of American pressure on poor countries to democratize is the feeling that starving people can have no interest in something so abstract as democratic rights and institutions. Although experience, particularly in India, suggests that even very poor people often act as though they are interested in attaining or preserving democratic rights, the argument remains intuitively appealing.

The broader questions are: "Should we not concentrate on developing the preconditions for democracy before we campaign for the introduction of formal democratic institutions? Without the adequate preparation of peoples, will we not bring discredit on the concept of democracy when it fails, as it inevitably must in such situations?" From this standpoint, questions of capability are asked such as: Is democracy possible without adequate subsistence for most of the people of a society? Is democracy meaningful in a society comprising more than a few thousand persons unless the people have enough literacy and information to understand and judge national issues? Is democracy possible in a society without a network of organizations that can intervene between the political system and the people? DeTocqueville's remarks on the organizational density in the United States in the nineteenth century is seen by many to have been the precondition for our success. Is democracy possible without adequate and independent mass media? Many societies under pressure to democratize have few if any independent newspapers or broadcasting stations: how can democracy be meaningful under these conditions? Is democracy possible if the people do not have access to a functioning legal system? If the legal system is such that poor people have no possibility of a fair hearing, how can they resist the pressures of those stronger than themselves in everyday life or political life?

Can there be a democracy if there is no nation? Can a country achieve or maintain democracy if a large proportion of its people do not recognize the political boundaries within which they live? Even the advanced democracies of the United Kingdom and Ireland are unable to resolve the struggle of the people of Northern Ireland (Ulster) over which country they belong in. Until this dispute is resolved, effective democracy in Ulster remains "on hold". Unfortunately, analogous situations affect much of the post-colonial world, a world that now includes the emerging states or quasi-states of the former Soviet Empire and its Yugoslavian offshoot. The relationships of different peoples within a state can be worked out by constitutional formulas, given the goodwill of the parties and a more or less modern and democratic political culture. Yet goodwill and democratic culture are often weak or nonexistent. As long as a people, especially a territorially distinct people, regard the

majority people of their state to be their illegitimate oppressors, the majority people are likely to regard them as actual or potential traitors. In this case, fair elections and uncensored media cannot resolve the issue, for the group with the fewer votes always loses on what it defines as the critical votes. Up to a point, the greater the disparity in the sizes of the groups, the more violent and undemocratic the response of the smaller must be -- as long as it does not abandon its cause.

Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the universalization of democracy is the question whether modern democracy is possible without the equality of women. While democracies historically began well before the legal and political emancipation of women enjoyed by the advanced democracies today, most people in modern democracies would not consider societies without at least legal gender equality to be democratic. Yet in many nondemocracies and new democracies most women are oppressed in ways unimaginable in modern society. In the short run, at least, more democracy is not likely to improve the situation -- indeed, it may worsen it. Formally, of course, new democracies generally will offer both genders equal suffrage and equal access to political office. However, in many developing countries most women in these societies will live under heavy male compulsion throughout their lives, compulsion that will greatly limit their opportunity as well as their ability to play an equal political role. It is embarrassing to advocates of democracy that otherwise oppressive but modernizing societies, such as those under communist autocrats or leaders such as Saddam Hussein, have often done more for women's equality than neighboring societies with equivalent cultural backgrounds. Throughout the Muslim world, many fear that greater democracy would lead to fundamentalist victories that might reverse progress in the emancipation of women. The fear is most urgent after recent results in Algeria.

This leads to a final and more general question: Is democracy possible without a democratic culture? Another way to phrase the question is to ask whether all inherited political cultures offer a promising basis for democratic development. Many aspects of a democratic political culture have been suggested by observers. One is how the culture defines the relationship of leaders and followers. For example, if political leaders are expected to be tyrants who concentrate all power in their personal hands and citizens are expected to be suppliants who meekly accept what is offered them, the constitutional guarantees of a democratic system are unlikely to be upheld. If intellectuals deeply distrust the general public and imagine all wisdom lies in their educated peers, they may undermine populist leaders and throw their support to autocratic usurpers who promise to listen to the intellectuals more attentively. Perhaps the most important requirement of a democratic society, alluded to above in discussing the legitimacy of boundaries, is a spirit of tolerance. Democratic people must be willing to listen to one another, and to accept and to some degree accommodate one another's views and interests. They must be willing to accept the right of quite different people to live in their midst on a basis of equality and according to their own lights. They need not like one another, but there must be a minimum of respect. A democratic people must be willing to work out compromises, and to accept decisions attained by legitimate

political process. A democracy is hard to achieve and impossible to maintain unless the population that it strives to organize develops a minimum level of mutual respect and willingness to compromise.

### **C. Understanding the Full Spectrum of Acceptable Democratic Models**

One conclusion that might be drawn from the discussion is that the first task in the struggle to universalize democracy must be to agree on a working set of criteria and then help people everywhere to meet them. But I would emphasize rather different conclusions. To the extent that we recognize that existing democracies meet the criteria reflected in the definitions and preconditions ascribed to democracy in different ways and to different degrees, we should conclude that democratization can proceed along quite different tracks and reach somewhat different end points without violating the overall value of democratization. In thinking this through, Americans, the most enthusiastic promoters of international democratization, might come to realize that theirs is only one of many evolving models of acceptable democracy, and not necessarily the model that will be most valuable and useful in all situations.

Adopting this approach should considerably broaden and deepen the campaign for democracy. Of course, it must not be allowed to broaden it too much. Some models to which the word democracy has been attached, such as the former German Democratic Republic, did not meet enough of the criteria for democracy on any level to fall within the bounds of "acceptable democracy". Where these limits are will remain controversial, but with effort a fair degree of consensus can be reached.

To provide the reader with some intimation of the wide range of acceptable models with which Americans should approach the question of democratization, it will be useful to go over some comparative notes on five democracies selected from the spectrum of alternative models for democracy: the United States, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, and India -- countries that have by common consent been considered democracies for at least the last forty years.

The diffusion of political power in the **United States** among different levels and branches of government is unparalleled in other democracies. At every level in American society and politics, individuality and individualism are manifest. Resort to the courts to settle disputes is more common than in most democracies. Emphasis on individual responsibility on the one hand and anarchical traits on the other contribute to one of the highest rates of imprisonment in the world,<sup>6</sup> and are reflected in both high murder rates and the retention of the death penalty. America's political parties are nonideological and weak. Political candidacy is decided by individual and voter choice (the use of primaries is absent in most democracies) rather than by political party elites. On election day, American voters pride themselves on their independence, on voting for the individual rather than the party. Legislators pride themselves on their freedom from party direction, voting each issue "on its merits". As a result, legislators have individual power unknown in other democracies. Compared to other

wealthy Western democracies, the "safety net" characteristic of modern welfare states is relatively undeveloped. Ours is a pluralistic, immigrant society whose citizens characteristically have shallow roots in the communities in which they live; it is a society in motion. The resulting lack of cohesiveness is more than psychological: in general, the United States lacks "national systems", whether in education, transportation, health or other areas of social or economic concern. In spite of the growth of big government in this century, the country's dominant political principle remains Jefferson's belief that the best governed are the least governed -- or that government is responsible for the rules, but every individual is responsible for his or herself.

The **Swedish** people are homogeneous in language, culture, race, and historical background. Political power is concentrated and centralized; the country's political parties are controlled by self-perpetuating elites. The broadcasting media are government owned and controlled. The domination of the country by the Social Democratic Party for most of the last 60 years has been based on its performance, the high percentage of the population working for the government, the party's close relationship to a centralized union structure in a highly unionized society, and the inability of opposition parties to combine effectively to oppose it. With a weak legislature and few constitutional checks, the governing party has ruled with the help of an entrenched bureaucracy and the close cooperation of labor, business, and other elites. Although the Social Democrats have been ousted from office for a short period in the 1970s and again currently, the pattern is likely to persist. The Swedish people will continue to see the government as responsible for the well-being of the people. High quality, expensive, and highly centralized welfare, educational and other systems are accepted and expected by the citizenry. Very high taxes, very high benefits, and liberal concessions to industry and labor have combined to produce a society with little inequality and a high living standards.

The **Swiss** state grants important political powers to its constituent cantons and to the communes of which they are composed. With deep historical continuity, individual cantons and communes represent far more than the administrative convenience that lies behind the demarcation of local or regional units in most democracies. Swiss are citizens by birth of Switzerland, a particular canton, and a particular commune; they cannot freely transfer their cantonal or community identity even after years of living in another part of the country. Switzerland has three official languages, with most communes defined as speaking one or another. For some purposes and in a small area, a fourth language, Romanisch, is also recognized. In this frozen pluralism, there is little provision for outsiders, either from within the country or from the outside. The expectation that people will vote for the same parties in about the same proportions decade after decade produces remarkable stability. Switzerland has been ruled for generations by a grand coalition of all major parties; consequently, the composition of government is changed little if at all by successive elections. On the other hand, the interests of all major political persuasions as well as minority views that cross-cut party positions are taken into account in the formulation of policy. Reliance on the initiative and referendum for the decision of major national, regional, or local issues is a distinctive

aspect of the system that greatly ameliorates the significance of the immobility produced by the "normal" democratic institutions that we expect to find in a representative democracy.

**Japan** is intensely homogeneous racially, linguistically, and religiously. In its highly centralized political system, there is little distribution of power: all branches of government are subservient to an entrenched bureaucratic-party elite. It is a corporate society in which business, labor, and government are not expected to play independent roles. Individualism in the Western sense plays little role. All parts of the society are expected to work closely together for national ends, ends that lie beyond the particular personal goals of the individuals that comprise the nation. When in difficulties, leaders at every level are expected to sacrifice their positions for the good of the nation or at least of the subgroup to which they bear allegiance -- an expectation fulfilled more often today by resignation than suicide. Ruling the country since the early 1950s, the Liberal Democratic Party represents a continuity of leadership with prewar roots. Opposition parties have remained weak and cult-like; one of the more important is actually the political arm of a religious sect. Instead of competition among parties the important political struggles have been among factions within the Liberal Democratic Party. These factions, however, differ little in ideology or policy. Operating more like clans than parties, and little concerned with issues, the factions struggle over the division of the extensive networks of influence and wealth that make possible their continuity. The rule of law is weak, lawyers few. Problems are addressed at every level in terms of developing working relationships and means of conciliation that avoid sharp distinctions of right or wrong, or of we and they. Criminal organizations operate openly; these caste-like groups are implicitly granted a claim to existence comparable to that of other units of society. Likewise, police are viewed as a positive part of society; citizens welcome their regular intrusions into their homes in a manner unimaginable to Americans with their legalistic and individualistic approach.

**India** is a notably heterogeneous society on every plane. Its constituent states represent people of different linguistic groups and the societies of each are cross-cut by deeply felt variations in religious and caste identification. Many states have a historical basis that predates modern India. Although constitutionally each has considerable independent power, the vicissitudes of politics, violence, and the necessity to hold the country together has developed a tradition of intervention by the center in state administration. India has a parliamentary system developed and modeled in large part on the United Kingdom's. Yet, in practice, the system works quite differently than in its homeland. The Congress Party has ruled India for most years since World War II -- much as the Social Democrats have ruled Sweden, or the Liberal Democrats Japan. However, the secret of its rule has not been so much the coalescence of a powerful elite about a party as an attachment of the Indian people to a ruling family. The charisma of leadership was transferred at independence from Gandhi to Nehru, and subsequently passed to his descendants. Quite "undemocratic" in a sense, this attachment is probably what has held the country together and preserved its commitment to secularism -- a commitment that was necessary if the country were to overcome, or live through, the many violent conflicts that have remained unresolved. In spite of the dominance

of Congress, opposition parties have been much more important in India than in Japan or Sweden. First, ideological Communist parties have dominated the government of major states; secondly, some state governments are dominated by regional parties that by their nature have had little chance to rule at the national level. At whatever level, the tendency has been for individual personalities and nonpolitical loyalties to determine electoral outcomes much more than ideology or policy differences.

The energies of Indian democracy have since independence gone primarily into maintaining the system against a multitude of threats, achieving and maintaining agreements among the warring elements of Indian society, and the creation of a sense of the nation that commands greater loyalty than that to its many subgroups. In this context, it is not surprising that the Indian broadcasting services have remained firmly under government control, while violent crowd control and short-term detention for political offenders have been commonplace.

The Indian government has been dominated by a small, elite, well-educated political class with loyalties to a statist, egalitarian, quasi-socialist model of government. In such a poor society, ideological commitment to egalitarianism has not resulted in the attainment of general literacy, freely available medical services, or building a "safety net" for the population as a whole. On the other hand, many Indian leaders have demonstrated in their lives a commitment to poverty and simplicity rarely exhibited by the leaders of other democracies.

Experts on each of these five societies will object to these brief characterizations. However, precision is not important for present purposes; what is important, and what experts will affirm, is the wide variation of each case from the others -- in historical experience, the operation of the political system, and the cultural underpinning of democracy.

The careful reader may be surprised to note that a basic theoretical requirement of democracy -- competitive multiparty elections -- has played a relatively minor and questionable role in three or four of the five cases. We pride ourselves on our two-party version of multipartyism. Yet many observers, particularly those from other democracies, question whether ours is a functional system that offers voters an opportunity to make a meaningful choice among policies.

If Americans are to seriously pursue their effort to universalize democracy, we must as a nation be sure we know what we are about. In the course of testing the limits of democracy and the many forms in which it exists, we may come to see our own experience and development as one strand among the many strands of democratic experience from which the world may profit. Perhaps on this basis we may be able to develop a more inclusive concept of democratization and of the variety of roads that may be followed in attaining it. It may make sense, for example, to start thinking in terms of South Asian or East Asian models of democracy based on ideals and modes of operation significantly different from our own.

## NOTES

1. Raymond D. Gastil, "What Kind of Democracy?", **The Atlantic**, June, 1990, pages 92-96.
2. Michla Pomerance, "The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception", **American Journal of International Law**, 70,1 (1976): 1-28.
3. Cf. George Modelski and Gardner Perry III, "Democratization in Long Perspective", paper delivered at the International Conference on "Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior", June 14-16, 1989.
4. See Ian McLean, **Dealing in Votes** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pages 68-92.
5. Hernando de Soto and Deborah Orsini, "Overcoming Underdevelopment", **Journal of Democracy**, 2,2, 1991, pp. 105-113(112).
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## VII. DEMOCRACY AND DECENTRALIZATION

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This paper will focus on local level democracy in an Asian context and strategies for supporting it. It will emphasize the role of local democracy in holding government accountable to its citizenry, facilitating local initiative, fostering pluralism and managing natural resources. Its central arguments will be that a democratic decentralization strategy will be the best way to achieve the first three objectives but that a user group approach is better suited for local natural resource management. The author's own experience is largely in South Asia, a background which the paper will reflect, but most of its argument should be applicable to Southeast Asia as well. It is hoped that the paper will stimulate discussion at the workshop on the issues it presents.



Democracy must exist at many levels if it is to take firm root in a polity, but its systemic requirements can be considered at two basic levels: the national and the local.<sup>1</sup> At the national or macro-level, democracy has a number of key requisites, which can be summed up in USAID's five Asia Development Program (ADP) objectives of Voice, Choice, Governance, Redress and Accountability. All are essential if democracy is to continue over the longer term. But a democratic system existing **only** at the macro-level is not likely to endure very long; at best it will be a plebiscitary democracy, in which citizens are offered a choice at election time between giving what amount to blank checks to those in power or throwing them out. Only the broadest general issues are subject to citizen judgment, and these all too often only in terms of leadership personalities. Can the incumbent leadership be

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<sup>1</sup> Needless to say, the term "local" has been the subject of many (sometimes conflicting) definitions, just as has been the case with "democracy" itself. For the purposes of this paper, it will be used to mean units of levels of governance close to the individual - village, township, county, municipality, or in the South Asian context thana, block, tehsil, taluq, upazila or (in Nepal) district. A reasonable upward population limit on such units might be 200,000-300,000 (although districts in India - which do belong in a "local" context in this present discussion - can be as large as several million). States or provinces can also be considered "local" in that substantial powers are often decentralized to them, especially in federal systems like those found in India or the United States. But here we will be dealing largely with smaller units. The emphasis here will also be largely rural, though much of the discussion would apply equally to urban local democracy.

trusted to promote general prosperity? Is the prime minister essentially a patriot or a scoundrel? This tends to be the level of question asked (with a commensurate level of citizen participation called forth) when democracy can be found only at the macro-level.

If citizens are to have a genuine role in determining government policy and holding it to account for what it does in matters that affect them, then democracy must be present at the micro-level as well. National policies do affect people individually, to be sure, at times very profoundly, as in decisions for peace or war, for reducing inflation by starting a recession, or even with more modest initiatives, such as a public health drive to promote oral rehydration therapy as an antidote for diarrheal diseases. But in general people are much more affected by governmental activities close to home than by those decided in far-off capital cities.

Obtaining safe drinking water, maintaining school standards, contending with the village constables, ensuring honest bookkeeping at the local property recording office, getting advice for dealing with crop blights - these are the kinds of issues that most affect people, and national-level democracy cannot really do much about them for the most part. Money can be allocated in the capital city to construct village handpump wells, school standards can be promulgated, police conduct rules can be issued, anti-corruption regulations can be decreed, and plant pathology circulars can be disseminated to agricultural extension officers, but deciding such things in the capital does not mean they will happen in the countryside. For that to happen, there must be channels for those in the countryside to hold their officials accountable. And while letters of protest can be written to national ministries complaining about official misconduct at local level, taking the case directly to an elected village council member is more likely to be effective. Local democracy offers many more possibilities for ensuring local accountability.

In addition to accountability, local initiatives are also difficult in the absence of local democracy. Getting a school built (and staffed) or a dispensary established usually comes much more quickly when a democratic council can allocate resources to it than when the only avenues are petitions to the national ministry or favoritism from a high-level official.

A third reason to support local democracy lies in its potential to foster pluralist democracy at all levels. It is by now axiomatic that an enduring democratic polity must be characterized by a multitude of differing interest groups such that most (and hopefully all) of them can influence the system but none can gain lasting control of it.

But where is such a pluralistic structure to come from? At least a few interest groups are always in place - government workers, traders and businessmen, a rural elite, an intelligentsia (however undernourished it may have been) - and can assume important roles if and when a democracy comes into being.

Yet a much larger range of interest groups must enter the political arena if democracy is to endure, for the groups just mentioned (or at least the first three of them) can all too easily

form a political oligopoly to share power and its fruits among themselves at the expense of the vast majority who are not represented in the system. For the polity to reflect and represent the concerns of the wider citizenry, other interest groups have to be a part of it. Middle farmers, workers, children (through their parents), women, landless agricultural workers - all need their own representatives guarding their stakes and pushing their goals.

Interest groups like these do not spring forth to life full blown, however, when the first open national election is held and the first popular constitution is established. They need slow, steady nurturing, or at the very least they need an environment in which they can tend to their own growth. And if we look at the experience of the largest and longest-lived democracy in Asia, we find that in India its three-plus decades of growing pluralism at local level has been instrumental in fostering the growth of pluralism at national level. This argument will be taken up in more detail later on.

### **A. Decentralization and Democracy**

In both advanced and developing countries, the primary vehicle for bringing democracy to the local level has been one form or another of decentralization. As might be imagined, given all the attempts at decentralization, the literature on the topic is voluminous, but for purposes of this essay we may define it as centrally initiated efforts to move authority and responsibility for significant governmental activity downward to local statutory governmental units, along with accountability of those units to the local populace through democratic elections. In the South Asian context over the past several decades, the panchayat systems of India and Nepal, the Basic Democracies scheme in Pakistan and the upazila structure of Bangladesh have all been decentralization schemes, some of them clearly more democratic than others.

Most of the analysis of decentralization has been quite negative, holding that whatever the intent may have been in establishing them, local government schemes were little more than a formula for funnelling resources from above into the hands of local elites. Gunnar Myrdal's magisterial 1968 analysis *Asian Drama*<sup>2</sup> is the most widely cited critique of the Indian case, but it is only one among many, and contemporary analyses tend to follow the same tack. For Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal the story is more or less the same. Most observers essentially agree with Theodore Lowi, who concluded in his landmark study of the American experience that "decentralization is only carte blanche for vested interests."

That this might be the case does not seem so strange when one reflects that historically the principal reason behind decentralization has been that indirect rule over the countryside made

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<sup>2</sup> Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

things easier for those at the center than trying to control everything directly - whence the various jagirdars, nawabs and other satraps of the Mughal period, as well as the zamindars and 'native princes' of the British era. Today some of the indirect rule approach continues in the subcontinent, particularly in such places as India's Bihar state, as governments find it convenient to ensure suzerainty over the countryside by relying on local elites to maintain stability and calm in return for which they are permitted to arrogate a disproportionate share of whatever comes down from the central government to local level for themselves, an arrangement that explains much of the distributional inequity noted above as characterizing decentralization schemes. It would be hard to argue with such an analysis of the decentralization efforts of the past three or four decades in Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan.

Why decentralize at all, then? From the policy-making viewpoint, the main reason why decentralization continues to be necessary, in spite of all its adverse effects on equity, is that centralized regimes wishing to promote rural development<sup>3</sup> simply do not know what to do in the countryside. Rural development policy cannot just be decreed from the center (or from a state capital in India), for there is too much variation in the countryside. Even in a nation as relatively homogeneous as Bangladesh (to say nothing of such countries as India, Indonesia, Nepal and Pakistan with their much wider internal variations), local differences are altogether too great for unvarying policies to work everywhere. What might work in one region is likely to fail elsewhere. The state cannot order rural development on a uniform basis any more than it can operate a command economy or decree the abolition of poverty. It has to find out what to do in each locality, and the best way to do so is through some form of decentralization incorporating a significant degree of local initiative and discretion.

And in fact decentralization has done rather better in promoting democracy than such observers as Myrdal and Lowi would admit. Despite the unhappy experiences of places like Bihar state, widely regarded as a cesspool of feudal elite domination and stagnation, decentralization policies have over the course of several decades encouraged first middle farmer groups and then less-favored sections of rural society to claim a place on the local political scene in much of rural India. Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh are all cases in point. What seems to have happened is that initially landed elites dominated the new panchayati raj system when it was set up in the late 1950s and early 1960s, just as they had controlled most other aspects of rural life. But then middle peasants began to see the possibilities of organizing and deploying their larger numbers to displace the gentry at the ballot box.

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<sup>3</sup> Promoting rural development and fostering rural stability (especially in the manner noted immediately above in the text) might seem to be more than somewhat contradictory. And so they are, but the South Asian state is no more monolithic than any other large institution and so pursues conflicting goals just as others do.

Thus middle peasants (who tended also to be middle castes as opposed to the upper caste gentry) got themselves elected to village panchayats, and then gradually to higher level institutions, eventually taking over district bodies, state legislatures and - during the brief prime ministership of Charan Singh in 1979-80 - the national level as well. As they entered politics, the middle peasantry also put together a political agenda, calling for higher crop support prices, greater agricultural subsidies, increased rural electrification, etc.

These lessons were not lost on other elements in the countryside, and slowly the lower rural strata began to involve themselves in politics. Dalits (ex-Untouchables) in Maharashtra and landless laborers in Kerala are two examples here. But the modest successes enjoyed by these later entrants should not be overstated or romanticized. While their achievements have perhaps ameliorated their lot somewhat through providing more educational opportunities or rural works projects, they remain deeply mired in deprivation and poverty, as upper- and middle-level groups continue to dominate the political scene. Still, they have made considerable progress in mobilizing themselves to participate in local politics and in claiming a voice in local decision making. And democratic politics, after all, even when honestly and openly practiced, has never been a guarantor of social equity;<sup>4</sup> it has only provided the opportunity for all to take part.

Just as importantly, what other avenues for upward mobility and self-advancement are available to the rural poor? Individual achievement in an open society is the standard Western answer, but this sort of path is difficult indeed in societies where social (and often socio-economic) status is determined at birth, the present opportunity cost of education for the poor generally outweighs its possible future benefits, and rural elites are accustomed to having local officials attend exclusively to their interests, not to those of upward mobility seekers.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can and do make organizational resources and knowledge available to the rural poor, and their role has been an invaluable one in improving opportunity structure for the poor. But NGOs, no matter how well managed and well meaning, cannot reach all those who need to be reached, for there are simply too many of them.<sup>5</sup> Nor can underfunded and overextended bureaucracies manage the task of serving the rural poor. Indeed, in the present era of budgetary stringency, structural adjustment and the

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<sup>4</sup> It should be underlined that **equity** or fairness is not the same as **equality**. Flourishing democracies try to provide the former, but have always been uncomfortable at pushing the latter.

<sup>5</sup> An estimate made several years ago for Bangladesh, which is one of the Third World's most advanced countries in terms of effective NGOs (some have organizations ranging upwards of several hundred thousand people), was that about seven percent of rural families were being reached by at least one NGO. Even if today's figure were ten or twelve percent, it is still very small in terms of the need.

like, the governmental reach in the near-term future is more likely to diminish than to expand as far as rural development is concerned. And as largesse from the central government decreases, local elites will try to divert an even larger share to themselves than they had customarily been receiving as their "political rents." To keep a school operating or a local footbridge repaired will become even more difficult than it had been.

The remedy will have to be a politically active citizenry, able and willing to assert that public resources must be spent to meet public needs. And the best way to assure such an outcome will be to have a multiplicity of public groups making claims for those resources.

## **B. Democratic Decentralization and Natural Resource Management**

Parallel with a rising interest in democracy in recent years has been a growing concern for the environment. In a sense, the causes are opposite, for the democratic enthusiasm has been inspired largely by its rapidly increasing incidence in the world, whereas the environmental emphasis has stemmed from the rapid degradation and disappearance of natural resources, particularly in the forestry sector. But each manifests definite developmental needs, and it is not surprising that USAID has found itself increasingly focusing on both democracy and natural resource management.

How do the two go together? The answer has to be, "somewhat uneasily." At the national level, environmental constituencies have often been able to obtain a hearing and have even been able at times to affect policy in substantive ways. On the other hand, just as pluralistic politics allows environmentalist groups to bring pressure to bear on the system, so too it permits resource-using, development-oriented constituencies to mount their own drives to influence policy, and the latter often carry the day against their opponents. Still, the environmentalists get some chance at determining the rules for utilizing natural resources. Thus in India Kerala's Silent Valley was preserved from the developers, and the Narmada Valley dam complex in Western India may well get stopped also.

But at the local level, where managing natural resources cuts much closer to the bone of people's livelihoods, environmental agendas have generally had a harder time of it, certainly in a democratic governmental setting. Local elements (and even those at state level) **wanted** the Silent Valley dam for the money and jobs it would bring into the area; it was national-level environmental groups that were able to mobilize sufficient support at the Parliamentary level to stop the project and preserve a unique natural resource. Similarly most of the support for the Narmada project is from local and state-level people, while the opposition led by Baba Anite depends on a national constituency of environmentally concerned activists.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Much the same could be said of the United States, where local interests (in alliance with large corporate timber concerns) want to cut the aged conifers that serve as the last home of the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest while a national constituency wants to preserve both conifers and owls. Similar dramas play out at state level as well. In my own state of

And the same appears to hold true at village governmental level too. For example, panchayats have not done very well at managing village woodlots in India's social forestry programs.<sup>7</sup> They tend to reflect forestry department priorities such as fuelwood rather than user wants like poles and fodder, and - to the extent that they do manage their woodlots at all - they reflect the priorities of village elites, who would rather sell off the produce for fee (siphonable to themselves) than distribute it to the villagers as a whole.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, local **user groups** (in which the resource is administered by those who use it) appear to have a considerably better track record at managing natural resources than local governments. Nepal offers a large number of examples in the irrigation and the forestry sectors, in which at least three reasons emerge behind the success achieved. To begin with, the user group includes only those who have a material interest in both managing and using the resource, as opposed to a local governmental unit, which comprises all those living in a given jurisdiction. From this, two important consequences follow. First, user groups tend to be more homogeneous than the village as a whole; within such a group, it is easier to enforce norms of behavior, especially the cultural norms of a moral economy that operate alongside the "rational calculus" of economic calculation. Second and partly on account of this, the group can control access to the resource; those who aren't members (and who have no commitment to conserving the resource) can be kept out. Free riders, in other words, who would exploit the resource without contributing to it, can be excluded. And third, group members can see a firm linkage between their contribution to managing the resource and their benefits deriving from it.<sup>9</sup>

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Pennsylvania, local realtors and contractors want to realize the potential of the Pocono Mountains for vacation homes catering to a New York/New Jersey clientele, while state-level environmentalists press for legislation and regulations to restrict this local development. Lower levels want to exploit the resource as constituencies at higher levels want to preserve the environment.

<sup>7</sup> One must be careful to distinguish the community woodlot components of social forestry projects from the farm forestry components, which have almost invariably been extremely successful. The privatization argument that owners husband their property wisely would seem to hold here.

<sup>8</sup> One could ask if the outcome might be different were the poor in control of the village panchayat (or if they had a significant influence on it, as per the hopeful scenario sketched elsewhere in this paper. Given that the poor are even more eager for quick income than the rich, probabilities are that they would support efforts to sell off the produce and steer the proceeds into the pockets of panchayat members.

<sup>9</sup> Local irrigation groups fit this structure somewhat better than do forestry groups, but the same analysis applies in essence to both. Fisheries and grazing sites are other examples here. It can be argued that this strategy basically amounts to privatizing the resource in question, and in a sense this is true, but the important point is that the privatization is to a

When village governments manage natural resources, on the other hand, the management unit is heterogeneous and thus less capable of enforcing group norms. Access is open to anyone from the village, whether he or she contributes to resource management or not; free riders are encouraged. And citizens see little point in contributing to something that others will benefit from without contributing to it.

### **C. Conclusion**

Democracy and democratic decentralization offer many opportunities for bringing decision making and accountability closer to those who will benefit or suffer from political activity. Democratic decentralization establishes a kind of political "consumer sovereignty" akin to what a market is supposed to create in economic terms. But just as markets do not meet all needs in the economic realm, so too local democracy does not handle all needs in the political sector. In particular, natural resource management may best be administered by other forms of local control.

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user group rather than to an individual.

## **VIII. PROGRAM EXPERIENCES FROM USAIDS**

### **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: USAID/NEPAL**

#### **1. Political Background: Pre-Revolution**

The USAID/Nepal Democratic Initiative was launched shortly after successful culmination of the brief popular revolutionary movement of February-April 1990. Before this time, the political system in Nepal was the Partyless Panchayat (council) system, under which power was wielded by an absolute monarchy served by a malleable, one-party parliament. Amendments to the system in the 1970s (including constitutional provision for direct election of 112 of the 140 National Panchayat members) did little to appease growing popular discontent, in particular with the continued ban on political parties and suppression of freedom of speech. The economic difficulties of the 1989 India trade blockade and the wave of democracy sweeping Eastern Europe provided the context for the 1990 movement, which resulted in the King succumbing to the demands of popular leaders for a system of multi-party parliamentary democracy under a constitution vesting sovereignty in the people.

#### **2. Political Background: Post-Revolution**

The new constitution was promulgated in November 1990, and the first national elections were held in May 1991. The King is now in the position of modern constitutional monarch, with legislative, executive and judicial power held by three distinct branches, independent of his control or apparent influence. Of the more than 40 political parties which were registered prior to the elections, only eight gained parliamentary seats (along with 3 independents who have subsequently joined the Congress party). An absolute majority is held by the Congress party (now 113 out of 205 seats), with the United Marxist-Leninist Front (UML) constituting a significant opposition with 69 of the remaining seats. The other six parties elected hold one to nine seats each.

### **Democracy Activities: April 1990 - January 1992**

#### **1. General**

The Democracy program, rather than coming from a coherent strategy, largely grew in response to key political developments (constitution drafting, elections, parliamentary strengthening, support for the judiciary, decentralization) and to creative programming suggestions offered by local NGOs. The Mission has thus had considerable flexibility to react appropriately and swiftly to changes taking place in the rapidly-developing democracy, and activities undertaken in this way have largely been successful. Our ability to react quickly and flexibility has been strengthened by inter-agency cooperation within the Mission, and has enabled the Mission to determine the most promising approaches to supporting democratization in Nepal.

Although activities have been developed in a responsive manner, outputs of the program generally coincide with the sub-objectives of the Asia Democracy Program, namely Voice, Choice, Governance, and Redress.

## **2. Voice**

The first major activity funded under our Democracy Program was a nationwide public opinion survey, which elicited local views on the new constitution, before it was drafted. The resulting report was accepted by the Drafting Commission, and directly affected some sections. A similar project is currently ongoing. Another local NGO is performing a survey concerning the shape of local government legislation, and results of the survey are being shared with the Ministry of Local Development and Parliament. Other activities intended to strengthen public participation in decision-making include establishment of an NGO newsletter and annual NGO conference, and development and publication of civic education materials for newly-literate Nepalese.

An umbrella grant to The Asia Foundation (TAF) is funding activities in key areas of democratization, activities which are integrated into the overall TAF program. Under what might be termed the "Voice" component, TAF has used AID grant funds to enable a local NGO to hold public fora on economic issues, and has extended institutional support to the National Press Institute.

AID is funding democracy training activities in collaboration with USIS (the International Visitors Program), with specific activities directed towards grassroots NGO development and journalism training, both in-country and in the U.S.

## **3. Choice**

The main focus of this portion of our program has been the national elections in May 1991. The Mission funded various local groups to undertake voter education and election monitoring, especially in rural areas. TAF funded, from its AID grant, the Election Commission in production of a voter education film for cinemas, television and videos. The International Foundation of Electoral System, using AID funds, participated in election monitoring and produced a detailed report and recommendations relating to the election process in Nepal. The funds remaining under this grant will be used for further election-related activities, such as a project to establish a system of voter identification. An academic study of the May 1991 general elections, and the nature of Nepalese political parties, was produced by a team of three U.S. professors.

Another activity, partially directed toward elections, led to production by a local NGO of a series of district political profiles, providing impartial information about the political, economic and social situation in each district.

#### **4. Governance**

The bulk of funds directed towards supporting good governance have financed a TAF program to strengthen the Parliament and its Secretariat, by developing the library and research service, (through management training, computerization and increased printing capacity), and training Members and Secretariat employees (through Asian Study tours). USAID procured additional computer equipment for Parliament, which the TAF legislative systems consultant will work to integrate into the current system. USAID is funding a local NGO, the Society for Constitutional and Parliamentary Exercise (SCOPE), in its work in parliamentary development, notably through seminars, publication of a parliamentary magazine, and support for committees.

Training for MPs and political leaders has also been taken on by USIS, which has co-funded and organized trips for MPs and political leaders to the U.S., mainly under its International Visitor program. Funds for in-country training to improve parliamentary processes and administrative support have also been obligated, and experts will be brought in under the USIS Academic Specialist Program.

#### **5. Redress**

Most activities connected with strengthening the judiciary and protection of constitutional rights have been funded through TAF. These include: institutional support to an NGO to establish an arbitration council to carry out research, and proposal reform of Nepal's arbitration system, and a grant to a human rights organization for desktop publishing equipment and costs of attending a regional conference. TAF also used AID funds to support the Supreme Court Bar Association which held a seminar and follow-up workshops on the new constitution, the judiciary, and Supreme Court decisions under the new constitution. An earlier TAF project, which included provision of printing equipment to the Ministry of Law and Justice, has been supplemented by a grant for training and desktop publishing equipment. To complement direct TAF support of seminars organized by the Nepal Law Society, TAF used USAID funds to support establishment of a Constitutional Research Section within the society.

TAF has also received AID funding for support of the Judicial Services Training Center, providing training of trainers, consultancies, upgrading of library and training materials, Asian study tours and an internship in the U.S.

#### **6. Additional/Miscellaneous**

Democracy funds have also been used to hire two Nepali professionals to participate in the Nepal Democracy Strategy team, and to hire a PSC Democracy Program Manager. Support has also been extended to an NGO which is caring for children of the martyrs of the 1990 democracy movement.

## **Future Plans**

Informal development of the program has proved successful so far, but as Nepal moves into its second year of democratization, USAID, in conjunction with other USG agencies and other donors is moving towards a longer term approach. The Nepal Democracy Project is currently in the PID design stage. This will be a four year project, focussing on three or possibly four components. Our experiences of the past two years, and relationships developed with key institutions, indicate that one major component should be strengthening the Parliament. Other possible areas include: strengthening of NGOs, particularly at the national level; work with media; and work with local governments, particularly in raising and managing financial resources.

In addition, activities directly supportive of democratization will be funded under other projects. The PVO Co-Financing and Development Training projects can be used to strengthen capabilities of private and public sector individuals and groups to actively uphold and promote democracy. Other projects, primarily directed toward economic development, can also strengthen democracy. In particular, these include: support for user groups under the Rapti, Irrigation Management, and Forestry Development projects; policy dialogue and strengthening of private business associations under the Economic Liberalization and Agroenterprise projects; and grants to CARE and Save the Children for community development work under PVO Co-Financing. One of USAID/Nepal's three program objectives is to "strengthen Nepal's development potential through liberalization and democratization."

**PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: THE OFFICE OF THE A.I.D.  
REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AFFAIRS**

The Office of the AID Representative for Afghanistan Affairs (O/AID/Rep) has a \$1.3 million democracy portfolio which began in August 1990. It includes two grants to U.S. organizations: The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). TAF is the intermediary for a \$1 million small grants program which has made sub-grants to over ten Afghan NGOs and two U.S. PVOs. The IRC has a smaller \$300,000 grant for Female Education Programs.

The democracy portfolio operates in a complex situation in which many of the traditional democracy activities are not feasible because the participants have little experience of democracy after thirteen years of war and few democratic institutions, such as an elected government, a judicial system or mature media, within which to operate. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that the democracy program is part of a cross-border program in which U.S. government employees are not permitted to enter Afghanistan. The cross-border program was suspended from July to December of last year for security reasons, which affected three subgrants; the others are located in Peshawar and Quetta and in the refugee areas of Pakistan.

Another constraint is that a major portion of the democracy funds support activities to enhance the status of Afghan women, at a time when cultural and religious constraints against women's participation in society has made it difficult and even dangerous for Afghan women to be associated with donor programs (see Attachment B).

Because of the lack of government and societal institutions with which to work, the Afghanistan democracy program is concentrating on promoting democratic values by focusing on three areas of concern: providing opportunities for the disenfranchised, especially women; increasing the free flow of information among Afghans; and, expanding Afghan participation in open and international forums.

**ACTIVITIES**

1. **Disenfranchised Groups:** The objective is to provide increased opportunities and public participation of the disenfranchised, especially women. Three groups have been selected as especially in need:
  - a. **Underserved, ethnic groups, specifically the Hazaras.** Two Hazara NGOs have received grants for adult literacy training in Quetta and inside Afghanistan.
  - b. **Afghan disabled.** One grant to an Afghan NGO, managed by disabled persons, working on behalf of disabled men, women and children.

c. **Women.** Eight grants to NGOs with activities for women. This is the largest part of the democracy program because of the great need to improve the lives of Afghan women and because women's programs receive a minor share of the donor community's resources.

Activities for Women: The O/AID/Rep has two prongs of support for women:

- **Literate/Educated Women:** Although the donor community has addressed some of the primary education needs of Afghan girls, little has been done in the areas of secondary and tertiary education. The democracy program has thus provided support for a women's higher education science school, managed by a women's NGO. The administrators and professors are mostly graduates of Kabul University and the school has over 200 students.

The IRC grant for Female Education Programs assists educated women through courses in public administration, health educator training, and English language training. The employment rate for students in these courses is approximately 60%. Many of the graduates find employment with other O/AID/Rep contractors or sub-grantees. For example, two IRC health educators are employed by the Afghan Women's Resource Center.

- **Illiterate/Uneducated Women:** Believing that literacy is a first step in creating an informed public, which is the basis for democratic participation, the O/AID/Rep supports literacy programs for adult women, managed by Afghan NGOs, which are based in Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad, the refugee camps and in two provinces of Afghanistan. The literacy classes include sewing and knitting instruction and basic health and nutrition education.

The democracy program has also undertaken a pilot project in income generation because of the demand for skills training and other opportunities to provide income. It is a poultry raising enterprise, inside Afghanistan, organized around a women's discussion group.

2. Free Flow of Information: The objective is to stimulate free and open discussion of matters of public concern. Activities include:

a. **Journalism Training Program** for women managed by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). A good percentage of the graduates acquire jobs in Peshawar in fields related to journalism. A similar program for men is supported by USIS.

b. **Conferences and Publications:** O/AID/Rep has made subgrants to two Afghan organizations for conferences and publications -- the Writers Union for Free Afghanistan (WUFA) and Cultural Council for Afghan Resistance (CCAR). The conferences have dealt with the political future of Afghanistan; education; the

economy; the media and freedom of discussion; reconstruction; the organization of the future Afghan state, and the relationship of Islam and democracy. The publications include newsletters and quarterly journals; papers presented at each conference, and special issues on specific topics. Distribution is to Afghans and others, both locally and abroad.

3. Internal Forums: The objective is to move Afghans into the global mainstream by enabling them to participate in regional or international conferences and seminars. The President and Deputy President of the Afghan Mujahideen Bar Association attended a meeting of Bar Association Presidents in Korea; eight professional Afghan women attended a Women-in-Development (WID) conference in Islamabad; a U.S. PVO Afghan project manager participated in a Young Professionals Conference in San Francisco; seven professional Afghan women made a study tour of WID projects in Egypt and participated in an international WID conference in Washington, D.C.; two disabled men will attend Independence 92 in Vancouver, Canada.

#### Institutional Development of NGOs

There is little tradition of independent civil association in Afghanistan and few opportunities to develop these associations since the Soviet occupation in 1978. NGOs could however, play an important role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In the past few years, NGOs formed by resistance groups have mushroomed with international donor support. Some of them have little more than an office and two to three workers; other have become viable organizations implementing substantial relief and development projects. An integral part of the democracy program has been to encourage the latter's development through the medium of sub-grants. This gives the NGO's professional staff practical management experience, which is enhanced by their participation in short-term management and finance courses made available to them through the democracy program. Many sub-grantee professional staff have participated in conferences and workshops, both locally and abroad. Four Afghan NGO administrators are currently working together to organize a literacy workshop.

#### Evaluation and New Directions

By September, 1991, many of the initial sub-grants were either completed or nearing completion and it was decided to evaluate the women's activities, which comprise the bulk of the democracy program, and to articulate a strategy to guide future women's programming. In order to accomplish this, the O/AID/Rep hired, on a long-term intermittent contract, a Women-in-Development specialist who had extensive experience with female programs in the Islamic world.

The evaluation report was recently submitted and the O/AID/Rep will move ahead to implement recommendations in two main areas -- literacy and income generation. In literacy, the major thrust will be to improve and strengthen existing programs. The income generation program will be expanded in the area of skills training and business

entrepreneurship. The democracy program is making a cautious beginning in this area and will need technical assistance in selecting appropriate income generating activities. A pilot project in small business entrepreneurship training is just beginning at IRC, based on a Pakistan model.

The democracy program must also prepare to respond to new events such as a political settlement in Afghanistan. Within the coming months, it may become important to initiate activities which will support the election process and political reform. Since the development of civil associations is an essential adjunct to the growth of democratic institutions, we may also need to expand our assistance to non-governmental organizations.

Democratic Pluralism Initiative  
TAF Cooperative Agreement

*Summary*

<i>Subgrantee</i>	<i>Approved Amount \$</i>	<i>Total \$</i>	<i>Other Support</i>
<i>MUSLIM SISTERS: WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY</i>			
<i>Year I</i>	37,166		<i>Asia Found., Private Donors</i>
<i>Year II</i>	48,000	85,166	<i>Jammiat, Arab Countries</i>
<i>WRITERS UNION OF FREE AFGHANISTAN</i>			
<i>Conference &amp; Publications Year I</i>	50,567		<i>USIS, NED</i>
<i>Conference &amp; Publications Year II</i>	28,950	79,517	<i>Konrad Adenauer Foudnation Norwegian Committee</i>
<i>CULTURAL COUNCIL OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE</i>			
<i>Education Seminar</i>	11,504		<i>NED,</i>
<i>Economy Seminar</i>	8,500		<i>Konrad Adenauer Foundations,</i>
<i>Media Seminar</i>	9,000		<i>Asia Foundations</i>
<i>Immediate needs Recon. Seminar</i>	7,000		
<i>Administration/Archives</i>	19,000	48,004	
<i>Organization of Afghan State Seminar</i>	5,000		
<i>AFGHAN NGO DEVELOPMENT</i>	20,500		
<i>AFGHAN WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTER</i>			
<i>1. Ardab Road Center</i>	100,000		<i>Australian Aid</i>
<i>2. Akora Camp Outreach</i>	29,000		
<i>3. New Akora Camp</i>	58,000	187,000	
<i>SCF: WOMENS SELF RELIANCE</i>	38,154		<i>RAPIUN Agencies</i>
<i>Small enterprise for widows-Nangarhar</i>			
<i>KHORASAN ASSISTANCE GROUP:</i>	7,757		<i>TAF (Village Newspaper UN Agencies</i>
<i>Village Basic Civic Education, Ghazni</i>			
<i>INTERNATIONAL FORUMS</i>	50,000		<i>TAF</i>
<i>AFGHAN WOMENS EDUCATION CENTER ISLAMABAD</i>			<i>Previous party support</i>
<i>ENGLISH: LITERACY Year 1</i>	25,374		
<i>ENGLISH: LITERACY Year 2</i>	25,000	50,374	

Democratic Pluralism Initiative

TAF Cooperative Agreement

*Summary*

<i>Subgrantee</i>	<i>Approved Amount \$</i>	<i>Total \$</i>	<i>Other Support</i>
<i>NAHEED SHAEED SCHOOL</i>	<i>19,613</i>		<i>Norwegian Committee</i>
<i>IRC: JOURNALISM TRAINING</i>	<i>37,023</i>		<i>USIS</i>
<i>SHUHADA: WOMENS LITERACY, QUETTA AND GHAZNI</i>	<i>10,600</i>		<i>INDOORS/Norwegian Committee</i>
<i>RECONSTRUCTION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT OF AFGHANISTAN Literacy, Skills Training in Wardak</i>	<i>11,235</i>		
<i>FREE WELFARE SOCIETY AFGHAN DISABLED Advocacy, Information, Employment &amp; Training</i>	<i>15,000</i>		<i>RADA BARNEN (Swedish SCF)</i>
<b><i>TOTAL SUBGRANTS</i></b>	<b><i>671,943</i></b>		

67B

**COMMUNIQUE**  
**YOUNG MUJAHID GUERRILLAS OF AFGHANISTAN**

All Muslim refugees and those who have abandoned their soil and homeland for safeguarding their honor are notified.

As the (current) situation and clear evidence indicate, the social system and Islamic ethics have suffered disruption and are unsatisfactory. Afghan maidens and women freely move in the streets, bazaars and foreign organizations and associate with Jewish, Christian and Parsee infidels, though the sacred religion of Islam strongly condemns such practices and terms those persons as infidels and criminals who commit such acts. As these acts bring about immorality and corruption in the Islamic society and lead to great misery and misfortune, the Afghan nation is warned for the first time to prevent such abominable acts. If such acts are repeated, the responsible sources will be obliged to take immediate action and treat the violators in compliance with the rules of Islamic Sharia. The Mujahideen will launch an overall operation to follow and identify corrupt elements.

As you have sought refuge in a neighboring land to safeguard your religion, faith, and honor and have left the country due to Communist atrocities and oppressions, you should not let Jewish, Christian and atheist infidels to cause a damage to the honor of Afghans in foreign organizations. Those who continue to commit such anti-Islamic acts should expect serious consequences. The responsibility then will lie upon them and their mean families.

The following points are brought to the attention of all refugees:

1. No Afghan woman or maiden can anywhere contact a foreigner and work and move with them in UnIslamic organizations.
2. All family heads, such as father, brother, uncle and close relatives, are directly responsible for their families. They deserve strong punishment, if such misfortunes are repeated.
3. Discuss all problems with the nearest mujahideen organizations, so that they can take necessary measures for their solution. All refugee families are strongly asked to correct their behavior in compliance with this communique. Otherwise, they will be treated according to the decision of Islamic court.

(signed)

Group of Young Mujahid Guerrillas residing in Peshwar.

120

## **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: USAID/PAKISTAN**

USAID/Pakistan continues to work with some local NGOs and human rights activists in the areas of women-in-development and democratic pluralism, as well as with all six of the country's legislatures. Among the activities we presently fund are two legal aid centers and a model half-way home for destitute women; a human rights study; and computerization of legislative systems. We also provide funds to NGOs for some construction of facilities. Such on-going and recently completed USAID-funded activities are briefly described hereunder:

### **I. Parliamentary Development Project - \$3,506,407**

**Nature of activity:** computerization of legislatures

**Funding source:** Project funds (bilateral)

**Issue:** completion of activity within project assistance completion date

Operational Program Grants have been provided to The Asia Foundation (TAF) to assist in strengthening the research and legislative tracking systems of the National Assembly, the Senate and the four Provincial Assemblies. The project includes procurement and installation of computerware, staff training and library improvement.

### **II. Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (LHRLA), Karachi - \$95,762**

**Nature of activity:** legal aid/legal awareness

**Funding source:** Section 116(e) FY 90 Human Rights Fund

These funds support paralegal training seminars and the operation of an on-going legal aid center in Karachi. Because of its high performance, this organization has received quite a bit of publicity in the local press, which in turn has generated donations from the general public. It is anticipated that this organization will be able to carry on its free legal aid services, though possibly on a lower scale, even after USAID funding is no longer available.

### **III. AGHS Legal Aid Cell, Lahore - \$73,682**

**Nature of activity:** legal aid

**Funding source:** Section 116(e) FY 90 Human Rights Fund

**Issue:** sustainability after USAID assistance ceases

These funds have been used to set up a model half-way home named "Dastak" (Urdu word for "knock") for destitute women. Women at the home are those convicted of offenses under the Enforcement of Zina Ordinance (an Islamic law which, although intended as an anti-rape statute, in many instances operates in a fashion which results in the victim/accuser being jailed for long periods of time without trial) who have been released on bail through the

intervention of AGHS lawyers. The half-way home acts as a temporary haven for such women who are given shelter, psychiatric help if needed, and are taught some income generating skills.

**IV. Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association (PWLA), Karachi - \$35,000**

**Nature of activity:** legal assistance/legal awareness

**Funding source:** Section 116(e) FY 88 Human Rights Fund

**Issue:** sustainability after USAID assistance ceases

These funds supported a PWLA liaison legal aid center at Rawalpindi to extend legal assistance to indigent women. In addition, the center serves as a base for PWLA to monitor and gather reliable information as to pending legislation affecting the rights of women and positions being taken by legislators, as they affect the rights of women. USAID assistance to this project ended in December 1991. The center is still operational but with reduced staff. PWLA is now looking for further funding from other donors.

**V. Federal Judicial Academy, Islamabad - \$292,158**

**Nature of activity:** in-service legal training

**Funding source:** Project funds (bilateral)

These funds, administered by TAF, are being used to establish a Federal Judicial Academy in Islamabad. The project is concerned primarily with institutional and manpower development and includes continuing education for judges, training of trainers, national and regional seminars and conferences, and a judicial information center with a small library. An additional \$265,000 has been reserved for on-going activities under this grant. A grant agreement to this effect is to be executed in the near future.

**VI. Behbud (Urdu word for "welfare" ) Association (BA), Islamabad - \$186,047 (welfare oriented)**

**Nature of activity:** construction

**Funding source:** Project funds (bilateral)

Under this grant we are funding construction of five buildings in five branch office locations and providing some office furniture. Once these buildings are in place, Behbud's activities -- geared to teaching, imparting income generating skills, providing health and sanitation training and conducting adult literacy classes -- will move out of costly rented premises.

**VII. All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA), Lahore - \$116,279  
(welfare oriented)**

**Nature of activity:** construction

**Funding source:** Project funds (bilateral)

These funds are being used to construct a multi-purpose auditorium for seminars, conferences and workshops, and training sessions for low-income group women of Lahore in the areas of health, family planning and income generating skills.

**VIII. Punjab Social Services Board (PSSB), Lahore - \$24,424  
(women-in-development activities)**

**Nature of activity:** report

**Funding source:** Project funds (bilateral)

These funds will be used to fund a Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT) consultant who will recommend ways to strengthen selected NGOs in the Punjab.

**IX. Family Welfare Cooperative Society (FWCS), Lahore - \$355,000  
(welfare oriented)**

**Nature of activity:** construction

**Funding source:** Project funds (bilateral)

Under this grant, we have recently completed the construction and furnishing of a working women's hostel in Lahore. The two story hostel has been built as part of an existing community center complex at FWCS headquarters. This facility is within walking distance of government offices and institutions in an area where there is no suitable accommodation available for women. Women using this facility are being charged some fee to partially meet recurring costs of the hostel. The balance of the recurring costs are being paid for by USAID under this grant. However, by the time the USAID grant ends, residents will be charged at actual costs and the hostel should be self-sustaining.

**X. Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), Karachi - \$95,000  
(community-development oriented)**

**Nature of activity:** construction

**Funding source:** Project funds (bilateral)

**Issue:** sustainability because of BCCI closure

These funds have been used to construct and partially furnish a Karachi-based research and training institute for the betterment of katchi abadis (slum areas). Community workers, capable of replicating OPP's successful interventions to benefit other urban poor and to perform further research into the nature and

possible solutions to problems faced by tatchi abadis will be trained at this institute. The OPP grew out of a charitable initiative by the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) to assist refugees in the urban slums of Karachi in the early 80's. Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan was approached to lead this effort along the lines of his successful Comilla (Bangladesh) model whereby projects were designed for the development of people's awareness; economic, technical and managerial skills; and the creation of local organizations.

**XI. Provisions of Legal Aid to Women in NWFP, Peshawar - \$32,334**

**Nature of activity:** research

**Funding source:** Section 116(e) FY 90 Human Rights Fund

**Issue:** further funding for recommended follow-on activities

These funds were given to a law professor at the Peshawar Law College to research problems and issues confronting women in NWFP and to propose remedies and solutions for improving the status of women in that area. The draft report has been submitted to USAID/Pakistan and is under review.

**IMPACT OF PRESSLER**

In response to increasing opportunities in Pakistan and given AID/Washington's democratic pluralism initiative, USAID/Pakistan was developing, before Pressler non-certification, a Strengthening Democratic Process Project (ten-years, \$18.0 million) which would have greatly expanded our involvement and brought a number of democratic pluralism-related on-going and future activities under one umbrella. A Program Strategy document and a Project Identification Document (PID) were prepared by the Mission and approved by AID/Washington. Due to Pressler, this proposed project was dropped from the Pakistan portfolio. Copies of the documents can be made available upon request.

In addition, we have not been successful in using 123(e) authority which allows new assistance to NGOs, despite Pressler.

## **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: USAID/INDONESIA**

### **Problem:**

The basic problem is the lack of broad-based independent popular participation in the shaping of Indonesia's development. The problem derives from the historical underdevelopment of the government institutions and independent organizations that make such participation possible in more economically advanced nations. The Indonesian government has been dominated by the executive branch under the President (and Cabinet) since 1958. The GOI view is that consistent implementation of more effective democratic representation may make it difficult for the executive branch to control the pace of development. As in many Third World nations, executive power has been exercised through highly centralized planning, command implementation through an expanded bureaucracy, and imposition of limits on dissent and freedom of action outside the central government.

### **Strategic Focus:**

USAID's main objectives are establishment of more effective representative governance within a transparent system of law. To achieve these, USAID will target support to strengthen institutions in four main subareas: the legal system, the legislature, the media, and advocacy organizations. The first two subareas constitute the fora in which the popular will is transformed and refined into concrete government decisions. The second two provide for orderly and effective means for channeling the voice of diverse and popular interests into government decision-making fora. Within each subarea, it is USAID's prime intent to support strengthening of institutional capacity, not to advance any particular policies or positions.

### **Guiding Principles:**

1. Increase the number, sustainability, and viability of independent organizations.
2. Focus on activities promising high impact and spread effect.
3. Take Government of Indonesia sensibilities and spread effect.
4. Minimize in-house staff costs.

## **Highlights of USAID's Institutional Strengthening Approach:**

1. Efficiency and productivity of the marked economy. Strengthening the market economy leads to increasing societal complexity, expansion and empowerment of middle and professional classes, and the proliferation of economic interest groups which foster the growth of participatory institutions. Among major USAID activities contributing to economic growth and complexity, and thereby strengthening democratic institutions, are:
  - projects providing assistance to firms, associations and local organizations in a number of sectors: agribusiness (shrimp and horticulture), health care (hospitals and health maintenance organizations), family planning, urban sector services (solid waste and waste water disposal), and forestry and marine parks;
  - Ongoing and new projects for both training and development of training programs -- including business schools -- for entrepreneurs and business managers; and
  - Development of key institutions in the financial system, including the stock exchange, banking, credit.
2. Legal System
  - Economic law and improved procurement systems project aimed to facilitate and support an increased level of private transactions and investments, while also helping to foster more equitable treatment for all firms and individuals;
  - assistance through The Asia Foundation (TAF) for development of full-text computerized legal research system, improved law curricula for the provincial law schools, long-term U.S. training for judges;
  - Assistance through AFFLI to improve implementation of labor laws, including dissemination of pertinent information about labor rights and protections, provision of legal counseling for citizens harmed by having asserted worker rights, and testing the viability of a regional, fee-based legal defense system for workers; and
  - Support for dissemination of Hernando De Soto's ideas including assistance to a local PVO to translate Hernando De Soto's seminal book The Other Path into Bahasa Indonesia and to host De Soto's visit to Indonesia, and plans for follow-up activities with De Soto to address property rights issues particularly in urban areas.

3. The Legislative Framework

- Assistance through The Asia Foundation (TAF) to the National Parliament (the DPR) and the University of Indonesia, to help create and institutionalize an issues-oriented research service for members of Parliament;
- Assistance through TAF for in-country and U.S. training programs for DPR (Parliament) members, workshops for members of provincial parliaments, and development of computerized database for the DPR;

4. Press

- Assistance through TAF for development of the first private press institute and graduate school of journalism; also, TAF sponsorship of local PVO training for desk editors of Indonesian provincial newspapers;
- A grant to a local PVO (LP3ES) to upgrade the quality and marketing of 10 province-based newspapers;
- Assistance to Indonesia's consumer organization in improving and broadening the distribution and improving the viability of its monthly consumer magazine; and
- A grant to a local PVO to translate and publish 15 books on democracy and human and economic freedom.

5. Education

- A major project for developing the quality of primary education, through maximizing the private sector role in providing teaching materials and other educational inputs; and
- A major project for developing universities -- both public and private -- and the Sumatra and Kalimantan regional university consortium, through upgrading faculty, instruction, and research in a range of disciplines.

6. PVOs. The USAID approach in this area has evolved from one focusing on increasing the numbers of PVOs, to supporting PVOs which can directly help implement the DI strategy. Priority categories for funding (under the new Strengthening Institutional Development/PVO Co Fi III project and other sources) include:

- Advocacy groups -- focusing on issues such as environment (WALHI, World Education, World Wildlife Fund), and urban development (LP3ES);

- Intermediary organizations extending assistance to smaller PVOs -- in health (PATH) and environmentally sustainable income-generating activities (PACT); and
- Advocacy PVOs on priority Eastern Islands -- ETADEP (land tenure) in East Timor, and YPMD (forest protection and rural development) in Irian Jaya.

## **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: USAID/THAILAND**

### **1. Mission's Involvement in Democracy Program and Human Rights Activities**

#### **A. Democracy Program**

Three umbrella grants under the PVO Co-Financing II Project have been awarded to 3 U.S. PVOs to implement the Democracy Program in the following projects:

1. The Asia Foundation (TAF) - "Strengthening Responsiveness and Capability of the Elected Government" TAF has received \$1,000,000 for a four-year integrated project to strengthen the capability of the National Assembly of Thailand in order that it may participate more responsively in the formulation of public policy. The project addresses the needs of elected representatives and leaders to deal with an increasingly complex range of issues related to social and economic development of Thailand through the institutional development of the Legislative Research and Budget Office of the House of Representatives, National Assembly of Thailand. Conversely, it seeks to broaden popular participation in the policy process, and widen avenues of contact between citizens' groups and the National Assembly through the promotion of non-governmental civic education advocacy groups.

Specifically, the project aims to strengthen the role of subcommittees in the Standing Committee system of the House of Representatives, and so strengthen their role in law-making and constituency outreach. Sample activities include:

- Assist five selected House Committees to improve their ability to gather information and formulate policy, through the use of the subcommittee system. The subcommittee will commission research, conduct constituents surveys, and schedule open hearings.
- Carry out pilot programs to strengthen the production of subcommittee reports and related proceedings for public use, and develop an index that will alert the public about the availability of the publications.
- Carry out exchange programs between the committee's professional staff members and the professional staff of U.S. Congressional Committees.

Additionally, the project works with citizen participation in the policy-making process through expanded access to elected government in Thailand. Sample activities include:

- Introduction models for Thai non-governmental advocacy organizations through linkages with U.S. public issues groups.
- Provision for Thai non-governmental organizations with training and materials in the role and function of representative government in Thailand.

2. Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT) - "Strengthening NGO Institutions, Building NGO Coalitions: An Environmental and Self-Sustaining Approach"

PACT has received \$1,608,055 for a three-year project to build the capability of a vital non-governmental, non-profit sector in Thailand that can determine and articulate the interests of their constituencies and develop concrete problem solving efforts for improving access to government programs and for influencing public and private sector programs and policies. The project will reach this long-term goal by supporting the Thai NGO sector to develop a research and action capability to reform non-profit legislation; to build media use and communication skills that enable disadvantaged communities to articulate their interest to policy makers; to build skills, expertise and factual knowledge of environmental issues within the NGO community; and to develop creative, alternative solutions, involving government/NGO and private commercial sector coalitions, to environmental problems. Sample activities include:

- Formation of an NGO consultancy group comprised of NGO leaders who have long held an interest in NGO legal issues that influence organizational financial viability. This NGO group will be instrumental in researching and analyzing the effects of current legislation, presenting alternatives from the Thai NGO perspective, collaborating with other organizations, and participating in the drafting of legislation.
- Assist an NGO media production and NGO media management organization to expand their activities to rural communities in the Northeast and Lower North/Central regions of Thailand.
- Design, with Thai NGOs/U.S. NGOs and private/public sector coalitions, four pilot projects that employ a community-based coalition building mechanism and address a particular environmental problem. These pilot efforts in the rural areas, are in 1) community forestry and land use; 2) environmental education/public awareness/problem solution campaigns; 3) environmental health; and 4) appropriate technology for environmental protection.

3. Asiar American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) - "Worker Participation in the Government Decision Making Process" AAFLI has received \$700,000 for a three-year project to enhance the capability of the Thai labor movement to access and articulate the interests of workers to the public and to effectively channel these interests into the government decision-making processes to achieve concrete problem resolution. A comprehensive approach consisting of a number of interrelated activity-areas will be utilized to achieve this objective. First, the establishment of a broad-based Labor Think Tank will be supported that will assist the Thai labor movement to develop well-reasoned policy initiatives on national issues affecting workers. Second, efforts will be made to increase the participation of urban wage earners in the decision-making process and strengthen the capabilities of the Thai labor movement to act as their institutional voice. Finally, the project will promote private sector union development as a means to incorporate non-state

enterprise workers into the economic and political fabric of Thai society. Sample activities include:

- Organization of a series of multi-sector symposia on labor-related issues and/or research and policy initiatives of the Labor Think Tank. Their purpose is to provide a forum for the Thai labor movement to exchange views with other sectors of society in order to gain a broader perspective on national issues affecting workers and to articulate to others the concerns of workers.
- Organize monthly programs for residents of worker communities on how to transfer residence, government services that accompany residence transfer such as public education, the importance of participating in elections, and the harms of vote buying.

## **B. Human Rights**

USAID/Thailand is currently supporting AAFLI in the implementation of the Worker Rights Protection Project in the amount of \$40,000. The project aims to encourage adherence to worker rights and protection in accordance with Thai law by strengthening the tripartite nature of existing legal machinery, increasing worker participation and effectiveness at the Labor Court and the Labor Relations Committee of the Department of Labor, and developing a viable model for the provision of on-going legal counseling to workers. The Program on Human Rights in the past was focussed on the legal dissemination and leadership role awareness for women in Southern Thailand. The grants were awarded to The Asia Foundation for sub-grants to the Women Research and Development Center, Faculty of Management Science, Prince of Songkhla University.

## **2. Constraints/Opportunities**

After the signing of the three major DPI grant agreements in September 1990 and the PVO's initiation of their planned activities, on February 23, 1991, the Thai military engineered a successful coup d'etat against the government of Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhavan. The National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) was established, the Constitution suspended, the National Assembly and all State Enterprise Unions dissolved. The incidences created major problems for TAF and AAFLI projects as far as their planned activities with the National Assembly and State Enterprise Unions respectively are concerned. Although PACT's activities were not directly affected by the coup but Section 513 of the FY 91 Appropriations Act prohibited the obligation and expenditure of funds. PVOs were instructed to minimize expenditures until June 4, 1991 when they were advised by USAID to resume the normal USAID-funded activities after the AID Administrator approved the continuation of the PVO program.

Although delays were unavoidable and a few program adjustments had to be made because of the coup, there is a strong indication that the DPI Program in Thailand will pick up its lost speed and original vision once Thailand has a democratically elected government. The new Constitution became effective on December 10, 1991 and a general election is scheduled on March 22, 1992. Significant attention by the NPKC to the issues of democracy and vote buying, as evidenced in the Ministry of Interior's "Democracy Training Program" among villagers throughout the country assures the timely need for USAID involvement in DPI in Thailand.

### **3. Lessons for Other Missions**

When USAID/Thailand began its planning to include in its portfolio the DPI program in response to AID/Washington's proposed new strategic themes (Open Markets - Open Societies), the PVO Co-Financing II Project was considered to be appropriate for building in the new themes because of its nature in goal in promoting and strengthening local institutions and encouraging participation of socio-economic disadvantaged persons in local matters. The project utilizes PVOs which, by their very experience in Thailand, have an appreciation of the developing democratic process and issues facing the society. It has proven to be the right decision because the strengthening of these PVOs through their participation in the sectors which solely possess the decision-making power in the country. The more participation of the masses the more democratic the country will be.

From the project management point of view, the Mission also finds that the "umbrella" type of grant to fewer PVOs, who then sub-grant to other institution, helps solve the management intensive problem of limited number of Mission staff.

## **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: OFFICE OF KHMER AFFAIRS**

### **1. Current Situation and Constraints on FY '92 Planning**

The Office of Khmer Affairs (O/KA), still operating from the USAID compound in Bangkok, Thailand, has not yet begun to fund activities related to the development of democratic institutions in Cambodia. Only one grant was awarded in FY '91, to The Asia Foundation, for democracy training of Cambodian refugees in Thailand. Planning for FY '92 funds was begun only recently, though creation of a significant Democratic Pluralism Program with FY '92 funds is a stated objective as we anticipate O/KA's move to Cambodia, the appointment of a USAID/Cambodia director and a continuation of the reconciliation of all sides in the Cambodian conflict. This paper will briefly outline the current situation faced by O/KA and will review activities anticipated with remaining FY '91 funds.

The signing of the Cambodian Peace Accord in Paris in October of 1991 significantly altered the political and economic landscape of Cambodia, making free elections in 1993 a stated objective of all signatories and opening up Phnom Penh and the rest of the country for the return of legal political opposition, international development assistance and foreign private investment.

The tasks facing the new Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC), made up of representatives of all four political functions, and the United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC), which is the UN organization established to implement the peace settlement, are enormous: disarm the combatants, determine the countryside, repatriate and provide for the nearly 370,000 refugees currently in Thailand, take control of and manage key central government ministries, police the entire country and, ultimately, gain the trust of the Cambodian people -- in effect becoming the government of Cambodia until free elections are held. The role assigned to the UN in the peace settlement, if filled, will be the biggest, most expensive operation in the organization's history.

Entirely dependent on the progress of UNTAC and the SNC in completing the above are the preparations for the elections themselves. Until UNTAC is fully operational on the ground, has begun to demonstrate control, and basic decisions about the election process have been decided, all donor governments are limited, for practical purposes, in the type of election and democracy training assistance they can provide to Cambodia.

Though O/KA, with a significant budget for FY '92, has identified myriad opportunities for constructive involvement in the promotion, preparation and monitoring of elections, our active participation will require the SNC and UNTAC first to adopt an election strategy and then to agree on American involvement it.

### **2. FY '91**

Four hundred thousand dollars were earmarked for the Democratic Pluralism Initiative for the FY '91 funds available to O/KA. To date only one grant from these funds has been awarded -

- to The Asia Foundation for \$131,954.00 for three projects related to the training of democratic principles to Cambodian refugees.

Project One under this grant was successfully completed in October of 1991 by the Political Science Department of Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. Forty Khmer students from the Site 2 and Site B refugee camps were trained in a two week seminar on democratic principles. The trainees, all of whom were either students of the camps' law schools or actively involved in the Khmer justice committees in the camps, participated in debates and were exposed to the inner workings of Thailand's various political parties. The trainees returned to the camps and conducted "echo seminars" of their own on Human Rights Day in December.

Project Two involves the writing and printing of materials and manuals in election theory and monitoring, campaign practices and voter literacy. The manuals are being written by the Khmer themselves in conjunction with Chulalongkorn University. Completion is anticipated by March of this year.

Finally, Project Three, which will begin next month, funds the training of Site 2 Khmer justice committee members in adjudication skills. The training will be conducted at Thailand's Department of Justice training center and will involve several days viewing real criminal proceedings in Thai court.

O/KA is currently reviewing two other proposals for funding with the remaining FY '91 funds:

The first is for training in human rights of the soon-to-be demobilized soldiers of the two non Communist factions. There is great apprehension among Khmer villagers and refugees about the worsening conduct of the approximate 30,000 soldiers of the KPNLAF and ANS factions, many of whom are too young to know any other way of life. With the cessation of most hostilities as well as financial support for these armies, and with a delay in UNTAC's planned disarming and contonement of the troops, banditry, rape and general lawlessness is on the increase on both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border. The human rights training, as proposed, would be conducted by Khmer Americans and leaders from the refugee camps to soldiers in their field encampments with the hope that the soldiers transition to civilian life would be hastened.

A final proposal currently under consideration involves training the leaders of non-Communist factions in electioneering and campaign techniques. This proposal is now being revised by the authors and would be implemented in Cambodia or Thailand.

## **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: USAID/SRI LANKA**

The U.S. Mission in Sri Lanka supports a number of programs and activities aimed at strengthening Sri Lanka's democratic institutions and processes. These initiatives complement the ongoing bilateral dialogue on the critical issue of human rights, and support the growing U.S. foreign policy interest in fostering democratic and market-based systems as inter-related elements of our political, economic and cultural relations.

The overall theme of USAID/Sri Lanka's country-specific democratic initiative is that of citizen participation in democratic systems. In support of this programmatic direction, the Mission has identified five specific areas where the Agency will sponsor activities and interventions to strengthen citizens' roles:

- Reinforcing human rights (through rule of law) and encouraging peaceful conflict resolution;
- Facilitating access to information and expression of opinion;
- Assisting citizens' organizations and associations (and, by implication, the fundamental rights of freedom of association and assembly);
- Providing humanitarian assistance in response to disaster and conflict (to all, irrespective of their political views or roles in the conflict); and
- Promoting increased local and regional governance.

### **Assisting citizens' organizations and associations**

This cluster of activities includes support for environmental advocacy groups, private voluntary organizations, chambers of commerce, trade and industry associations, labor unions and farmers' organizations, as well as the more obviously democracy-focused advocacy groups for human rights, legal services and individual liberties. These programs may be considered part of the democracy program by virtue of their role in giving voice and empowerment to the people in determining their economic, social and civic well-being.

USAID currently sponsors the following specific support to citizens' organizations:

Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Co-Financing II Project: \$13.5 million over eight years for grants to PVOs in Sri Lanka. Includes -- in addition to a variety of development activities in agriculture, small enterprise, health, population, etc. -- grants with specific democracy focus to the Center for the Study of Human Rights of the University of Colombo, to The Asia Foundation noted above, and to the Asian-American Free Labor Institute.

Private Sector Policy Support Project: \$1.8 million over four years for grants to local chambers of commerce and trade and industry associations.

Natural Resources and Environmental Policy Project: \$1.2 million over five years for support of citizens' environmental organizations.

Mahaweli Agriculture and Rural Development Project: \$2 million over eight years for support of farmer organizations and irrigation water users' groups.

Irrigation Systems Management Project: \$1.5 million over six years for support of farmer organizations and irrigation water users' groups.

### **Promoting increased local and regional governance**

USAID is currently assessing needs and opportunities for assistance to Sri Lanka's eight provincial councils. These regional government bodies have been given enhanced responsibilities and fiscal resources under the devolution process that began in 1987.

### **Reinforcing human rights and encouraging peaceful conflict resolution**

As part of the PVO Co-Financing contribution cited below, a grant of \$120,000 has recently been awarded to the newly-established Center for the Study of Human Rights at the University of Colombo.

This category also includes support for efforts to strengthen the rule of law. Activities toward that end include public education on the fundamental rights and responsibilities of citizens in a democratic society.

- Funded in FY 1991 under the Asia Democracy Program (and channeled through the PVO Co-Financing Project), the new Asia Foundation grant for "Strengthening Democratic Institutions in Sri Lanka" includes, in the human rights/peaceful conflict resolution category, support for training members of the judiciary at the Judges' Institute; academic training for law students and in-service training to the bar in legal ethics; and development of new textbooks covering the syllabus offered at the Sri Lankan Law College.

Likewise, activities supported under the Section 116(e) funding mechanism, the primary funding mechanism until 1990, have included:

- Two grants to the Law and Society Trust: a total of \$65,500 for promotion of legal literacy and teaching of human rights and social justice to citizens through production and presentation of films and television programs. Topics covered by these productions include such things as bonded labor and unfair labor practices; custodial care and the mentally ill; the rights of remand prisoners.

- Grant of \$17,483 to the Asia Foundation in partnership with the Open University Law Division for "Promoting Legal Literacy through the Mass Media." A wide range of topics are covered in radio and television programs developed under the grant; among them are landlord-tenant rights, child labor, domestic violence, inheritance rights and women's status, and legal protection against occupational health hazards. An additional grant to the same grantees, in the amount of \$54,540, supports a pilot legal aid clinic to give law students practical training while providing legal services to poor clients who would otherwise remain unserved.
- Two grants totalling \$82,825 to the Nadesan Center Legal Library, a legal service organization for lawyers and human rights activists. The grants support their efforts to strengthen the work of lawyers, organizations and individuals working in the field of human rights by providing a library, documentation, consultancy and advisory services in local and international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Their coverage is islandwide.
- Funded in FY 1991 under the Asia Democracy Program (and channeled through the PVO Co-Financing Project), the new Asia Foundation grant for "Strengthening Democratic Institutions in Sri Lanka" includes, in the human rights/peaceful conflict resolution category, support for training members of the judiciary at the Judges' Institute; academic training for law students and in-service training to the bar in legal ethics; and development of new textbooks covering the syllabus offered at the Sri Lankan Law College.

### **Facilitating access to information and expression of opinion**

Again within the PVO Co-Financing budget, activities amounting to \$146,200 are being supported within The Asia Foundation democracy grant for strengthening the electronic and print media, including the establishment of a new degree program in development journalism at the University of Colombo. A \$96,000 component of the same grant supports improvement of the research and information capabilities of the Sri Lankan Parliament, including its library -- aiming thereby to improve the quality of debate and deliberation by lawmakers in dealing with public policy issues.

### **Providing humanitarian assistance in response to disaster and conflict**

While disaster relief is provided by AID worldwide irrespective of political systems and is not, strictly speaking, a democracy-strengthening activity, in Sri Lanka it helps to promote national unity and ethnic harmony by ensuring that embattled minorities are adequately served. The U.S. Government responded generously to the Government of Sri Lanka's special appeal for funds to promote normalcy in the Northeast region following the 1987 Peace Accord with India, providing a total pledge of \$75 million for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

### **Additional U.S. Activities Under Consideration**

To further enhance the opportunities for Sri Lankan citizens to express their views in a democratic manner, USAID/Sri Lanka is exploring the possibility of supporting the development of an independent local public opinion capability, and has requested funds from Washington to support a feasibility analysis. Such a capability was cited as a key need by a team of political scientists who visited Sri Lanka in 1990 to assess needs and opportunities for strengthening democratic systems here.

## **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: USAID/PHILIPPINES**

The USAID Philippine Assistance Strategy Statement (PASS) for FY 1991-1995 identifies three major areas of program emphasis that, to varying degrees, intersect with democracy themes. Policy reform, the private sector and decentralization, are related to the Asia Democracy Program Strategy's categories of voice redress and governance. Specifically:

### **1. Voice**

#### **A. NGOs**

This is an area of which USAID has been playing a significant role since the start of its PVO Co-Financing Program in 1980. The Office for Food for Peace and Voluntary Cooperation (OFFPVC) is currently managing 67 grants valued at \$22.4 million many of which are involved in developing civic awareness or leadership skills. OFFPVC is also helping Islamic and other minority NGOs and community organizations in Mindanao.

Under the Natural Resources Management Program (\$125 million) administered by the Office of Natural Resources, Agriculture and Decentralization (ONRAD), approximately \$25 million is being provided to support environmental NGOs and public policy reform, and to establish an independent non-governmental foundation which will address conservation issues. This complements a related initiative, ONRAD's Refined Resources Development Project (26 Million) which includes NGO participation and NGO-government collaboration. Private sector advocacy groups are receiving approximately \$1.2 million through ONRAD's Accelerated Agricultural Production Project to assist their efforts to advocate changes in policies that adversely affect the agricultural sector. Similar support will be included as a component of an \$80 million Agribusiness Support and Assistance Project.

The Office of Population, Health and Nutrition, working first with The Asia Foundation and soon with John Snow, Inc., is helping the Philippine NGO Council on Population, Health and Welfare strengthen its management capacity to coordinate the activities of its member NGOs in the provision of family planning information and services to the public.

The Mission's Office of Private Enterprise Support plans to assist small businesses to formulate and communicate their policy preferences, by funding research on relevant regulations and laws; particularly as they pertain to the informal sector, and by support for advocacy of policy reform.

## 2. Redress

### A. The Legal System

A \$1.5 million Co-Financing grant to The Asia Foundation for Improving Access to Justice currently supports four NGOs whose lawyers address legal needs of farmers, fishing communities, upland indigenous people, women, the urban poor, labor locals and environmental groups. Additional assistance to The Asia Foundation for these NGOs and for alternative dispute resolution projects is under discussion, and support for judicial administration projects also may be provided. The Xavier University College of Law in Cagayan de Oro is receiving assistance for a combined legal aid/human rights program.

### B. Human Rights

A grant to The Asia Foundation from Section 116(e) funds (\$160,000) enables the Nueva Ecija Human Rights Auction Center to carry out a human rights program that includes investigation of military excesses, legal aid, and educational radio broadcasts. Support for the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (\$82,000) has gone toward educating trade unionists on civil and political rights, and development of radio dramas on civil and political rights.

## 3. Governance

### Decentralization

USAID supports a number of activities related to decentralization. ONRAD's Local Resource Management Project improves governmental and non-governmental capabilities to manage decentralized services, and supports community-based enterprises. ONRAD's Local Development Assistance Program (LDAP) (\$50 million) is concerned with the delegation of resources and capacity to local governments, to removing constraints on local government. Its Decentralized Shelter and Urban Development Project (\$54 million) bolsters the delivery of services by chartered city governments, NGOs and the private sector to the urban poor.

The Child Survival Program of the Office of Population, Health and Nutrition provides \$50 million which will, among other things, support policy changes aimed at decentralizing health planning and improving service delivery to the poor.

### **The Strengthening Philippine Democracy Project (1993 - 98)**

Since the "EDSA Revolution" of February, 1986, Philippine Democracy has been challenged by a variety of political-economic threats and problems. Newly-restored democratic institutions have inherited major institutional problems from the Marcos Era, including corruption, constraints on access to justice, and limited access to disadvantaged groups, especially outside Metropolitan Manila, to policy-making processes.

USAID, working over a five-year period with approximately \$12 million, will initially aim at: (1) strengthening skills of professional staffs in the national and provincial legislatures; (2) improving the administration of justice; (3) building capabilities of public advocacy among NGOs and other private sector organizations; and (4) improving the flow of public policy information, primarily through the print and broadcast media.

The Philippine NGO community which includes legal aid and labor organizations, research entities, foundations, and institutes which work with the media, are already at work promoting legislative capabilities, improving access to justice, and skills of journalists. Thus, NGOs will be the primary vehicle through which SPD will be implemented.

### **PVO Co-Financing IV (1993 - 98)**

PVO Co-Fi IV will expand upon the experience gained through three successful PVO Co-financing projects since 1980. Its strategic objectives are linked to USAID's promotion of sustainable economic growth in the Philippines through an active public and private sector partnership in fostering open markets and an open society.

Obligating an estimated \$25 million over 5 years, the Co-Fi IV Project will: (a) foster policy dialogue and closer working relationships between PVOs and all levels of the Government of the Philippines (GOP) concerning mobilization of credit, agrarian reform, housing, introduction of appropriate employment-generating technology, community-based health care and sanitation, and natural resource management; (b) encourage the growth of regional and national networks of community groups, NGOs and local government units active in the above areas; (c) continue development of indigenous PVOs' capacities to function as intermediate institutions managing grants and providing training to smaller community organizations representing ethnic and religious minorities; and (d) promote community-based disaster preparedness and response capability via PVOs working with GOP disaster management units at national and local levels.

## **PROGRAM EXPERIENCE: USAID/BANGLADESH**

One of the four major objectives of the USAID Mission's country development strategy is stated as "increased voice and choice in local and national government." We approach this objective by supporting the holding of free and fair elections, strengthening of NGOs as key interest groups in society, and enhancing involvement of local governments and other local level organizations in infrastructure development.

During the past year, Bangladesh has made dramatic accomplishments in achieving increased "voice and choice" in local and national government. The national election held in February 1991 was conducted by an interim, impartial government and was widely viewed as free and fair by both domestic and foreign observers. The stage is now set for the new government to establish a permanent footing for democracy. The first step in this process was completed last week with the formal adoption of a constitutional amendment changing the political system from a Presidential to a Parliamentary system of governance.

In addition, the new Government has stated that decision-making power will be further decentralized to the village level by the establishment of a Gram Sarkar or village government system. Also, a more positive attitude towards NGOs is evident. Statements by government officials refer to NGOs as partners in development, and recognize the complementary roles NGOs and government agencies play at the field level, particularly in reaching areas underserved by infrastructure and services. Experience during the recent cyclone relief phase demonstrated that this development partnership is more than rhetoric.

Specific areas where the USAID program affects democratic development in Bangladesh include:

- Financial support to election observer teams from both the National Democratic Institute and The Asia Foundation during the February 1991 Parliamentary elections. USAID also provided a grant to a local NGO to produce a voter literacy film just prior to the elections.
- Grant to The Asia Foundation to support strengthening of Parliamentary offices and operations, administration of justice, and local press coverage of important national issues.
- Finance development of NGO "learning groups" around specific issues of concern to urban and rural poor, including forestry, environment, women, literacy, sustainable agriculture, and disaster preparedness. Included here is strengthening of indigenous NGO mid-level management.
- Support for the Rural Electrification program which establishes cooperatively-owned electrical systems which are managerially and financially viable. Eleven of the seventeen coops which USAID supports have met these viability tests.

- **Development of rural roads through better local level planning and increased attention to environmental impact.**

PROJ. # & NAME: 388-0091 Human Rights Support PROJ OFFICER: Rabiul Hoque OFF: PROG REVISED ON: 11/11/91

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY: Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights (BSEHR) CONTRACTOR: N/A CONSULTANTS: N/A

LAST FIELD VISIT: N/A NEXT PLANNED FIELD VISIT: N/A

3880091.00 HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORT	G	07/12/90 09/30/91	46,150	46,150	46,150	20,871	25,279
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FY 92 PROJECTED EXPENDITURE: \$24,000

FY 92 PLANNED OBLIGATIONS

None

PROJECT GOAL AND PURPOSE: To prevent and discourage human rights violations through investigations followed by remedial actions.

STATUS OF CPS AND COVENANTS: N/A

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: This project provides salary support, equipment, travel and training costs, to strengthen the Human Rights Investigation Cell of BSEHR. BSEHR is a local PVO, started in Dhaka in 1979, and is working on human rights and legal aid activities. At present, BSEHR covers all the districts and has 315 branches throughout the country. USAID assistance is being provided to BSEHR under the FY 90 the Democratic Pluralism Initiative, to help the Investigation Cell improve its operational effectiveness, and thereby improve BSEHR's ability to address human rights violations.

STATUS OF OPEN AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

WID/ENV/EVALUATIONS: Last Eval: None

Next Schedule: Internal Assessment is scheduled for the second quarter of FY92.

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO RESOLVE: NONE

OTHER ACTIONS: Initiate close-out procedures.

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS: Though the one-year Grant period started with the signing of the Grant on August 30, 1990, the activities could not be started until January 1, 1991 because of delay in obtaining the NGO Bureau's approval of project activities. Therefore, the Grant was extended up to December 31, 1991, based on BSEHR's request. BSEHR has already procured equipment including computer, video-camera, photocopier and still camera. One other item -- cassette recorder -- is expected to be procured by November. Procurement of a Microbus from Japan for which a waiver has been issued will be completed by December. Training activities, delayed due to political events, started early November for a batch of 25 Volunteers. Training of three other batches consisting of 75 Volunteers from all over the country will be completed by December. Of an estimated 25 investigations, 17 have been completed to date by the BSEHR's Investigation Team using the newly procured equipment. Expenditures for the Grant up to September 30, 1991 amount of \$20,871. With the planned procurement of the vehicle in December and the completion of training for 3 more batches, about \$24,000 of the unspent funds of \$25,279 will be expended by the PACD of December 31, 1991.

HOST COUNTY CONTRIBUTION: N/A

Is project subject to full 25% HC Contribution? YES / / NO / x /

Date requirement waived: 8/28/90 per Action Memorandum signed by Acting Mission Director (on basis that value of time donated by volunteers will exceed equivalent of 25% of project cost).

PROJ # & NAME: 388-0079

Inst. Strengthening of Civic Part.

PROJ OFFICE: Paul Greenough OFF: PROGRAM DIVISION

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY: The Asia Foundation  
LAST FIELD VISIT: 11/23/91

CONTRACTOR: N/A  
NEXT PLANNED VISIT: 12/91

CONSULTANT: N/A

3880079.00 INSTITUTIONAL STRENG. FOR CIVIC G	06/13/89	3,150,000	2,316,892	2,316,892	935,502	1,301,390
FY 92 PROJECTED EXPENDITURE	05/14/93	1,000,000	FY 92 PLANNED OBLIGATIONS		510,000	

PROJECT GOAL AND PURPOSE: Goal is to strengthen institutions involved in the development of democracy in Bangladesh. Purpose is to increase opportunities for people to exercise their rights as citizens.

STATUS OF CPS AND COVENANTS: None

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: This Project supports and strengthens democratic institutions in Bangladesh. Areas in which TAF works are: Parliament, Judiciary, election process, the press, local government and Constitutionalism. Specific activities include: technical assistance, studies, training and observation tours, and provision of equipment and reference materials. TAF will also explore other alternative avenues for increasing democratic participation.

STATUS OF OPEN AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS: None

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS: In response to the political events of the past year, TAF is now able to move away from a "target of opportunity" approach to a more strategic program focusing upon elections, strengthening Parliament, and the judiciary.

WID/ENV/EVALUATION: Last Eval.: None Next Scheduled: 93  
The funding of women judges training, support for BAWJ, and above all the expansion of legal services to women will greatly enhance the WID impact of this project.

In response to the February 1991 Parliamentary elections, the first free and fair elections in a decade, TAF funded the Coordinating Council for Human Rights in Bangladesh (CCHRB) to mobilize a network of NGOs to monitor the elections, and supported the Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights (BSEHR) to produce and distribute a short voter motivation film.

The upcoming Democracy Assessment will provide guidance to the Mission and TAF in setting strategic priorities over the remainder of the life of the project.

In July, TAF invited House Judiciary Counsel Michael Remington to meet with senior MPs and the Secretariat, and explain U.S. Congressional procedures. This was followed by a TAF consultant for legislative programs, Jane Lindley, who wrote a needs assessment with 23 specific recommendations for reform and strengthening of the Parliament. Two MPs and the Parliament Secretary also attended the Comparative Legislatures Seminar and Observation Program in San Francisco during that same month.

ISSUES/RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO RESOLVE: N/A

OTHER ACTIONS: N/A

TAF is now planning to use its family planning NGO network to provide legal aid services to poor women. Provided that family planning resources are not diverted but rather supplemented, it will meet a critical need and take advantage of existing organizational capacity. TAF has also sponsored overseas study for two female judges, and may assist a newly formed Bangladesh Association of Women Judges (BAWJ).

HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION:  
Is project subject to full 25% HC Contribution ? YES/X/ No// Total HC Contribution required by ProAg: \$1.05 M. To date HC Contribution required: \$510,000. To date HC Contribution made: \$878,641  
If HC Contribution not up to date, briefly mention action taken to remedy.

For FY 91, planned expenditures were \$500,000 and actual expenditures were \$632,000, or 126.4% of planned.

92

# ANNEXES

**PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY:**  
**A.I.D.'S ROLE IN ASIA**

**JANUARY 27-30, 1992**  
**KATHMANDU, NEPAL**

**ATTENDEE LIST**

Harry Blair  
Professor of Political Science  
Bucknell University

Ronald A. Briggs  
Assistant General Development Officer,  
Project Officer for Democratic Pluralism  
USAID/Thailand, Office of Khmer Affairs

Mike Calavan  
Chief  
Office of Program and Project Development  
USAID/Nepal

Pornsiri Chatiyononda  
Project Management Specialist  
USAID/Thailand

Janey Cole  
Public Affairs Officer  
U.S. Information Service/Nepal

Larry Diamond  
Senior Research Fellow  
The Hoover Institution

Victoria P. Garchitorena  
Executive Director  
The Ayala Foundation, Inc.  
(Philippines)

Raymond D. Gastil  
Consultant  
Formerly of Freedom House

Edward Greeley  
Project Officer  
Office of Program and Project Supports  
USAID/Indonesia

Todd Greentree  
Political Officer  
American Embassy/Nepal

Gordon Hein  
Director of Program Planning and Review  
The Asia Foundation

Gerald Huchel  
Country Affairs Officer  
East Asia Office  
U.S. Information Agency

Lionel Johnson  
Senior Program Officer  
National Democratic Institute

David Johnston  
Deputy Director  
Office of Economic and Institutional Development  
Bureau of Research & Development  
A.I.D./Washington

George Jones  
Deputy Mission Director  
USAID/Sri Lanka

Joanna Kirk  
Asia Democracy Program Manager  
USAID/Nepal

Susan Lenderking  
Assistant Project Development Officer  
Office of A.I.D. Rep./Afghanistan

Jeff Lunstead  
Political Counselor  
American Embassy/Bangladesh

Lynne Marrique  
Associate  
Coopers & Lybrand

Virgil Miedema  
Chief, Office of Program  
USAID/Pakistan

David R. Nelson  
Deputy Director  
Office of Food for Peace and Voluntary Cooperation  
USAID/Philippines

Flora Painter  
Managing Associate  
Coopers & Lybrand

Ray Peppers  
Public Affairs Officer  
U.S Information Service/Bangladesh

John Sloan  
Director of Education  
Asian-American Free Labor Institute

Saeed Shafqat  
Chief Instructor  
Civil Service Academy - Lahore  
(Pakistan)

Edward B. Stewart  
Regional Program Officer  
International Republican Institute

Deepak Tamang  
Chief Executive Officer  
SEARCH (Service Extension and Action Research for Communities in the Hills)  
(Nepal)

Sarah Tinsley  
Deputy Director  
International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Deepika Udagama  
Human Rights Center  
University of Colombo  
(Sri Lanka)

Suzanne Wallen  
Director, Nepal Program  
The Asia Foundation

Richard Whitaker  
Chief  
Democratic Affairs and Private and Voluntary Cooperation Unit  
Technical Resources Division  
Office of Development Resources  
Bureau for Asia  
A.I.D./Washington

Melissa Wong  
Associate  
Coopers & Lybrand

Frank Young  
Program Officer  
USAID/Bangladesh

**PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY:  
A.I.D.'S ROLE IN ASIA**

**JANUARY 27-30, 1992  
KATHMANDU, NEPAL**

**WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES:**

- 1. Enhance the knowledge of democratic processes and issues.**
- 2. Share Missions' and Bureau's experiences and approaches.**
- 3. Identify key areas of opportunity.**

**Monday, January 27th**

4:00-5:00 Registration

5:00-6:00 Formal Welcomes

Richard Whitaker, Chief  
Democratic Affairs and Special Issues Branch  
Technical Resources Division  
Office of Development Resources  
Bureau for Asia

Kelly C. Kammerer, Mission Director  
USAID/Nepal

Honorable Julia Chang Bloch  
American Ambassador to Nepal

Daman Nath Dhungana  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Parliament of the Kingdom of Nepal

6:00-6:15 Workshop Rationale and Objectives  
Richard Whitaker, ASIA/DR/TR

6:15-6:30 Workshop Agenda and Logistics  
Flora M. Painter  
Coopers & Lybrand

6:30-7:30 Informal Get-Together

8:00 Working Dinner with Moderators

- cf

**Tuesday, January 28**

**MODULE I: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY**

**MODULE I OBJECTIVES:**

- 1. Provide an overview of the dynamics of democratic development.**
- 2. Highlight key aspects of democratic processes in the Asia region.**

- 8:30-9:00 Introduction  
Richard Whitaker, ASIA/DR/TR
- 9:00-9:30 Welcome Remarks: Global Trends in Democratization  
Presentation: Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Development  
Speaker: Larry Diamond, The Hoover Institution  
Moderator: Richard Whitaker, ASIA/DR/TR
- 9:30-10:00 Discussion
- 10:00-10:30 Coffee Break
- 10:30-11:00 Various Forms of Democracy  
Speaker: Raymond D. Gastil  
Moderator: Larry Diamond
- 11:00-11:30 Discussion
- 11:30-12:00 Democracy and Decentralization  
Speaker: Harry Blair, Bucknell University  
Moderator: Mike Calavan, USAID/Nepal
- 12:00-12:30 Discussion
- 12:30-2:00 Lunch
- 2:00-2:30 Trends in Democratization in Asia  
Speaker: Saeed Shafqat, Civil Service Academy-Lahore, Pakistan  
Moderator: David Nelson, USAID/Philippines
- 2:30-3:00 Discussion

(See over)

- 9/1

**Tuesday, January 28 (continued)**

**(MODULE I, continued)**

**EXPERIENCES FROM LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**Moderator:** George Jones, USAID/Sri Lanka

**3:00-3:15** Human Rights  
Deepika Udagama  
University of Colombo (Sri Lanka)

**3:15-3:30** Women's Organizations in the Democratization Process  
Victoria P. Garchitorena  
Ayala Foundation, Inc. (Philippines)

**3:30-3:45** Voter Education and Election Monitoring  
Deepak Tamang  
SEARCH (Nepal)

**3:45-4:15** Discussion

**4:15-4:30** Coffee Break

**RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE**

**Moderator:** Raymond D. Gastil

**4:30-4:45** Gerald Huchel, U.S. Information Agency and Ray Peppers, U.S. Information Service/Bangladesh

**4:45-5:00** Gordon Hein, The Asia Foundation

**5:00-5:15** Sarah Tinsley, International Foundation for Electoral Systems

**5:15-5:30** Edward Stewart, International Republican Institute

**5:30-5:45** Lionel Johnson, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

102

Wednesday, January 29

**MODULE II: A.I.D.'S EXPERIENCE IN DEMOCRATIZATION**

**MODULE II OBJECTIVES:**

1. **Share regional and Agency experiences.**
2. **Identify areas of opportunity and conflict in integrating democracy programs in Asia region.**

8:30-8:45 Overview of Asia Bureau's Democracy Program  
Richard Whitaker, ASIA/DR/TR

**DEMOCRACY PROGRAM EXPERIENCES FROM USAIDS**

8:45-9:30 Panel Discussion USAID/Nepal

Presenters: Mike Calavan, USAID/Nepal  
Todd Greentree, American Embassy/Nepal  
Suzanne Wallen, The Asia Foundation  
Janey Cole, USIS/Nepal  
Moderator: Harry Blair

9:30-9:45 Discussion

9:45-10:15 Coffee Break

10:15-10:45 Experiences from USAIDs-Constraints and Opportunities in the Sub-continent

Presenters: Susan Lenderking, Office of A.I.D. Rep./Afghanistan  
Virgil Miedema, USAID/Pakistan  
Moderator: Raymond D. Gastil

10:45-11:15 Discussion

11:15-12:00 Experiences from USAIDs-Economic Performers and New Opportunities

Presenters: Edward Greeley, USAID/Indonesia  
Pornsiri Chatiyononda, USAID/Thailand  
Ron Briggs, USAID/Thailand, Office of Khmer Affairs  
Moderator: Larry Diamond

(See over)

101

**Wednesday, January 29, (continued)**

**(MODULE II, continued)**

12:00-12:30 Discussion

12:30-2:00 Lunch

2:00-3:00 Experiences from USAIDs-Consolidating and Preserving Democratic Gains

Presenters: George Jones, USAID/Sri Lanka  
David Nelson, USAID/Philippines  
Frank Young/Jeff Lunstead, USAID/Bangladesh and American  
Embassy/Bangladesh  
Moderator: Harry Blair

3:00-3:30 Discussion

3:30-4:00 Coffee Break

4:00-5:00 Wrap-up by Moderators

Reception by the Honorable Julia Chang Bloch, American Ambassador to Nepal

*CPH*

**Thursday, January 30**

**MODULE III: FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE ASIA DEMOCRACY PROGRAM**

**MODULE III OBJECTIVES:**

- 1. Discuss challenges and opportunities for democracy programs.**
- 2. Identify priorities for integrating democracy within the overall development context.**

**8:30-10:00** Three break-out discussion groups:

**Moderators:** Virgil Miedema, USAID/Pakistan  
Susan Lenderking, Office of A.I.D. Rep./Afghanistan  
Frank Young, USAID/Bangladesh

**Topic 1:** Future directions and program priorities.

**Topic 2:** Mission and Bureau roles, level of effort and technical assistance.

**Topic 3:** Career development and training for Democracy Officers.

**Topic 4:** Workshop messages for Missions and A.I.D./Washington.

**10:00-10:30** Coffee Break

**10:30-1:00** Resume discussion groups

**1:00-2:30** Lunch

**2:30-4:00** Break-out group summary presentations

**4:00-4:30** Coffee Break

**CLOSING SESSION**

**CLOSING OBJECTIVES:**

- 1. Highlight the major findings and conclusions from each module of the workshop.**
- 2. Reach an initial consensus of important workshop conclusions and recommendations.**
- 3. Outline recommendations and action steps for consideration by Mission, Bureau and A.I.D. senior management on key areas of opportunity for democratic programs.**

**4:30-6:00** Wrap-up discussion and closing