

PN-ARJ-687  
74267

## **GUINEA SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE**

*Submitted to:*

U.S. Agency for International Development  
Conakry, Guinea

*Submitted by:*

Alfred Waldstein, Team Leader  
(Associates in Rural Development, Inc.)

Sheldon Gellar  
William Roberts  
Fode Keita

**31 October 1991**

# Table of Contents

---

---

Acronyms and Abbreviations	i
Preface	xi
Executive Summary	xiii
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1    USAID’s Social and Institutional Profile (SIP) Program	1
1.2    Background to the Guinea SIP	2
1.3    The Purpose of this SIP and Overview of the SOW	2
1.4    The USAID/Conakry Program Strategy, the Program Logical Framework, and Their Relationship to the SIP	2 2
1.5    Methodology	3
1.6    The Plan for the Rest of the SIP	3
<b>Chapter 2: Guinea’s Agro-Ecological Zones</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1    Background	5
2.1.1    Overview of Guinean Geography and Climate	5
2.1.2    Peoples of Guinea	6
2.2    Coastal Zone	7
2.2.1    Geography and Topography	7
2.2.2    Population Profile	7
2.2.3    Community Organization and Resource Management	8
2.2.4    Resource Use and Production Systems	10
2.2.5    Commercial and Market Activities	12
2.2.6    Household Livelihood Strategies	13
2.3    Southern Foot’hills	13
2.3.1    Geography and Topography	13
2.3.2    Population Profile	14

2.3.3	Community Organization and Resource Management	15
2.3.4	Resource Use and Production Systems	15
2.3.5	Commercial/Market Activities	17
2.3.6	Household Livelihood Strategies	17
2.4	Central Highlands	18
2.4.1	Geography and Topography	18
2.4.2	Population Profile	19
2.4.3	Community Organization and Resource Management	20
2.4.4	Resource Use and Production Systems	22
2.4.5	Commercial and Market Activities	24
2.4.6	Household Livelihood Strategies	25
2.5	Northern Savannah	26
2.5.1	Geography and Topography	26
2.5.2	Population Profile	26
2.5.3	Community Organization and Resource Management	27
2.5.4	Resource Use and Production Systems	27
2.5.5	Commercial/Market Activities	29
2.5.6	Household Livelihood Strategies	29
2.6	Upper Niger Valley	30
2.6.1	Geography and Topography	30
2.6.2	Demography	30
2.6.3	Community Organization and Resource Management	31
2.6.4	Resource Use and Production Systems	31
2.6.5	Commercial/Market Activity	34
2.6.6	Household Livelihood Strategies	35
2.7	Eastern Savannah	35
2.7.1	Geography and Topography	35
2.7.2	Demography	35
2.7.3	Community Organization and Resource Management	36
2.7.4	Resource Use and Production Systems	36

2.7.5	Commercial/Market Activity	39
2.7.6	Household Livelihood Strategies	39
2.8	Forest Zone	39
2.8.1	Geography and Topography	39
2.8.2	Population Profile	40
2.8.3	Community Organization and Resource Management	41
2.8.4	Resource Use and Production Systems	42
2.8.5	Commercial/Market Activities	45
2.8.6	Household Livelihood Strategies	46
2.9	Conakry	46
2.9.1	Geography and Topography	46
2.9.2	Population Profile	49
2.9.3	Community Organization	50
2.9.4	Economic Activities	51
2.9.5	Household Income and Expenditure	52
2.9.6	Household Livelihood Strategies	54
2.10	Review of Trends Identified	55
2.10.1	Migration Patterns and Female-Headed Households	55
2.10.2	Role of Expatriate Guineans and Returnees	55
2.10.3	Growth of the Informal Sector	55
2.10.4	Economic Pressures on Urban Wage Earners	55
2.10.5	Increasing Agricultural Production	56
2.10.6	Expanding Market Activity	56
2.10.7	Remonetization of Rural Economy	56
2.10.8	Refugees in the Forest Zone	56
2.10.9	Shortened Fallow Periods	56
2.10.10	Decreased Rainfall	56

<b>Chapter 3: Institutional Analysis: The Political, Administrative, and Legal System in Guinea</b>	<b>59</b>
3.1 Introduction	59
3.2 The Colonial Era, 1890-1945: Autocratic Rule and Slow Evolution of Modern Institutions	59
3.2.1 Political Institutions	59
3.2.2 Administrative Institutions	60
3.2.3 Legal Framework and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms	60
3.2.4 Development Policy and Socioeconomic Institutions	61
3.2.5 Decision-Making Mechanisms and Institutional Linkages	62
3.2.6 Interethnic Relations and Political-Social Dynamics	63
3.2.7 Summary of Main Trends	63
3.3 From Decolonization to Independence: 1945-1958	64
3.3.1 Political Institutions	64
3.3.2 Administrative Institutions	65
3.3.3 Legal Framework and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms	66
3.3.4 Development Policy and Socioeconomic Institutions	66
3.3.5 Decision-Making Mechanisms and Institutional Linkages	67
3.3.6 Interethnic Relations and Political-Social Dynamics	68
3.4 Sekou Touré and the First Republic: 1958-1984	68
3.4.1 Political Institutions	69
3.4.2 Administrative Institutions	70
3.4.3 Legal Framework and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms	72
3.4.4 Development Policy and Socioeconomic Institutions	72
3.4.5 Decision-Making Mechanisms and Institutional Linkages	75
3.4.6 Interethnic Relations and Political Social Dynamics	76
3.4.7 Summary of Trends	77
3.5 The Second Republic (1984-present): Political and Economic Liberalization Under Military Rule	77
3.5.1 Political Institutions	77
3.5.2 Structural Adjustment Program and Economic Liberalization	83

3.5.3	Administrative and Legal Institutions	85
<b>Chapter 4:</b>	<b>Sectoral Analyses</b>	<b>107</b>
4.1	Agricultural Production	107
4.1.1	Brief History of Guinean Agricultural Development	107
4.1.2	The Evolution of Agricultural Production	110
4.1.3	Public Institutions Supporting Agriculture	112
4.1.4	Non-USAID Donor Activity and Support	118
4.2	Agricultural Marketing	120
4.2.1	Evolution of Market Agricultural Institutions Since Independence	120
4.2.2	Structure and Conduct of Commodity Marketing Subsystems	124
4.2.3	Other Donor Activities	140
4.3	Natural Resource Management (NRM)	141
4.3.1	History of NRM in Guinea	141
4.3.2	Environmental Action Plan	143
4.3.3	Relevant Legal Codes	143
4.3.4	Institutions	145
4.3.5	Donor Activities	146
4.4	Human Resources and Education in Guinea	148
4.4.1	Introduction	148
4.4.2	Human Resource Development Assistance (HRDA)	149
4.4.3	USAID/Guinea Country Program Training Strategy	149
4.4.4	Donor Involvement in Human Resource Development	153
4.4.5	Primary Education Reform	153
4.4.6	Government Policy and Educational Reform	154
4.4.7	Institutional Organization	155
4.4.8	Primary School Education in Guinean Society	156
4.4.9	Donor Involvement in Educational Sector Reform	158
4.5	Health and Population	159
4.5.1	Introduction	159
4.5.2	Current Health Status of Guineans	159

4.5.3	Government of Guinea Health Policy	160
4.5.4	Guinea's Health Delivery System	161
4.6	Democratization, Governance, and Local Participation	173
4.6.1	Democratization and Political Representation	173
4.6.2	Corruption and Governance	174
4.6.3	State Authority and Local Government Institutions	176
4.6.4	Decentralization and Development Activities	179
4.6.5	State-Private Sector Roles in the Production and Provision of Public Goods and Services	180
<b>Chapter 5: Information on International Institutions, Bilateral Agencies and NGO Development Activities in Guinea</b>		<b>183</b>
5.1	United Nations Fund for Population Assistance (UNFPA)	183
5.2	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	184
5.3	The German Federal Republic	186
5.4	Government of France	188
5.5	Italian Assistance to the Republic of Guinea	190
5.6	EEC/FED	190
5.7	United Nations High Commission for Refugees/Guinea	191
5.8	Canadian Embassy	192
5.9	World Bank	193
5.10	Soviet Union Embassy	194
5.11	Embassy of Switzerland	194
5.12	Information on NGOs in Guinea	194

<b>Chapter 6: Factors Constraining USAID Program Strategy Objectives</b>	<b>197</b>
6.1 USAID Program Goal: Improved Economic and Social Well-Being of All Guineans in a Participatory Society	197
6.1.1 Socio-Cultural Constraints	197
6.1.2 Institutional Constraints	198
6.1.3 Political Constraints	199
6.2 USAID Subgoals	200
6.2.1 Increased Household Income from Non-mining Activities	200
6.2.2 Improved Participation of all Guineans in Defining and Managing Social and Economic Development	201
6.3 USAID Strategic Objectives	202
6.3.1 Increased Sustainable Private Sector Agricultural and Value-Added Output for Domestic and Export Markets	202
6.3.2 Improved Human Resources for Sustainable Economic Growth	205
6.3.3 Increased Local-Level Participation in Economic and Social Development Planning and Management	207
6.4 Implications for USAID Programs	209
6.4.1 Target—Increased Sustainable Private Sector Investment in Agricultural Production and Marketing	209
6.4.2 Target—Lowered Costs of Agricultural Marketing	210
6.4.3 Target—Increased Viable, Rural-Based, Small-Scale Enterprise Activity	210
6.4.4 Target—Strengthened Private Sector Human Resources	211
6.4.5 Target—Improved Performance of Public Sector to Promote Private Sector Growth and Manage Public Sector Functions	211
6.4.6 Target—Improved Quality and Increased Enrollment in Primary Schools with Special Emphasis on Rural and Female Participation	212
6.4.7 Target—Increased Ability of Families to Determine Household Size	212
6.4.8 Target—Increased Local Revenue Generation and Improved Local Revenue Management	212
6.4.9 Target—Increased Accountability of Efforts at the Local Level	214

of

<b>6.5</b>	<b>Areas Where Crucial Information is Not Available</b>	<b>215</b>
6.5.1	Informal Sector	215
6.5.2	Failures of Private Sector Investment	215
6.5.3	Socioeconomic Impact of the Reform Program of the Second Republic	215
6.5.4	Links of the Guinean Emigrant Community with the Guinean Economy	216
6.5.5	Systematic Analysis of Corruption in Donor Programs	216
6.5.6	Local Government Finance	216
6.5.7	Field Impact of Administrative Reform	217

#### **Annexes**

<b>Annex 1:</b>	<b>Scope of Work</b>
<b>Annex 2:</b>	<b>Bibliography</b>
<b>Annex 3:</b>	<b>List of Contacts</b>
<b>Annex 4:</b>	<b>Guinea Program Lograme</b>
<b>Annex 5:</b>	<b>Paper on Corruption</b>

## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

---

ACT	Association de Coopération Technique (Association for Technical Cooperation)
AFEG	Association des Femmes Entrepreneurs de Guinée (Guinean Businesswomen's Association)
AFGRED	Association des Femmes Guineennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (Guinean Women's Association for Research and Development)
AGBEF	Association Guinéene pour le Bien-Etre Familial (Guinean Family Welfare Association)
AGRIMA	Société d'Etat Guinéene pour l'Importation de Matériel Agricole (Guinean Parastatal Corporation for Importation of Agricultural Implements)
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
APE	Association des Parents d'Elèves (Association for the Parents of Students)
BAD	Banque Africaine de Développement (African Development Bank)
BAP	Brigade Attelée de Production (Harnessed Production Brigade)
BARAF	Bureau d'Aide à la Reconversion des Agents de la Fonction Publique (Office Assisting Job Requalification of Civil Service Personnel)
BCRG	Banque Centrale de la République de Guinée (Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea)
BIAG	Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest en Guinée (International Bank for West Africa in Guinea)
BIC	Bénéfice Industriel et Commercial (Industrial and Commercial Profit)
BICIGUI	Banque Internationale pour l'Industrie et le Commerce en Guinée (International Bank for Commerce and Industry in Guinea)
BIG	Banque Islamique de Guinée (Guinea Islamic Bank)
BMP	Brigades Mécánisées de Production (Mechanized Production Brigade)

<b>BNDA</b>	<b>Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole (National Agricultural Development Bank)</b>
<b>BNR</b>	<b>Bureau National du Recensement (Office of National Census)</b>
<b>BRP</b>	<b>Bassin Représentatif Pilote (Representative Pilot Watershed)</b>
<b>BRT</b>	<b>Bassin Représentatif Témoin (Representative Control Watershed)</b>
<b>CAP</b>	<b>Coopérative Agricole de Production (Agricultural Production Cooperative)</b>
<b>CBG</b>	<b>Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (Guinea Bauxite Company)</b>
<b>CCCD</b>	<b>Combating Communicable Childhood Diseases</b>
<b>CCCE</b>	<b>Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (Central Fund for Economic Cooperation)</b>
<b>CCDE</b>	<b>Centre pour la Création et le Développement d'Entreprises (Center for Creation and Development of Businesses)</b>
<b>CCIAG</b>	<b>Chambre de Commerce, d'Industrie et d'Agriculture de Guinée (Guinean Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture)</b>
<b>CCTLS</b>	<b>Commission Consultative du Travail et des Lois Sociales (Consulting Commission on Work and Social Legislation)</b>
<b>CD</b>	<b>Collectivité Décentralisée (Decentralized Municipality)</b>
<b>CECI</b>	<b>Centre Canadien d'Etudes et de Coopération Internationale (Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation)</b>
<b>CEPAM</b>	<b>Centre Pilote d'Action Maraîchère de Dalaba (Dalaba Pilot Center for Horticultural Activity)</b>
<b>CER</b>	<b>Centre d'Enseignement Rural (Center for Rural Education)</b>
<b>CFLACE</b>	<b>Centre de Financement et d'Aide à la Création d'Entreprises (Center for Financing and Assistance in the Creation of Businesses)</b>
<b>CGRA</b>	<b>Commissariat Général de la Réforme Administrative (General Commissariat for Administrative Reform)</b>
<b>CGT</b>	<b>Confédération Générale des Travailleurs (General Workers' Confederation)</b>

CGCE	Comptoir Guinéen du Commerce Extérieur (Guinean Outlet for Foreign Commerce)
CGCI	Comptoir Guinéen du Commerce Intérieur (Guinean Outlet for Domestic Commerce)
CICM	Centre International du Crédit Mutuel (International Center for Mutual Credit)
CMR	Centre de Modernisation Rurale (Center for Rural Modernization)
CMRN	Comité Militaire de Redressement National (Military Committee for National Recovery)
CNDE	Centre National pour le Développement des Entreprises (National Center for Business Development)
CNE	Conseil National de l'Environnement (National Environmental Council)
CNGMP	Commission Nationale des Grands Marchés Publics (National Commission for Large Public Procurement)
CNI	Commission Nationale des Investissements (National Investment Commission)
CNPG	Centre Nationale de Perfectionnement à la Gestion (National Center for Management Improvement)
CNPIP	Centre National de Promotion des Investissements Privés (National Center for Promotion of Private Investment)
CNTG	Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinée (National Workers' Confederation of Guinea)
COPAC	Coopérative de Production Agricole et de Consommation (Agricultural Production and Consumption Cooperative)
CPA	Centre de Perfectionnement Administratif (Center for Administrative Improvement)
CPSP	Country Program Strategic Plan
CRD	Communauté Rurale de Développement (Rural Development Community)
CTRN	Comité Transitoire de Redressement National (Transitional Committee for Rational Recovery)
DAAF	Direction des Affaires Administratives et Financières (Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs)

DERIK	Projet de Développement Rural Intégré de Kissidougou (Kissidougou Integrated Rural Development Project)
DGS	Direction Generale de la Statistique (General Department of Statistics)
DNA	Direction Nationale d'Agriculture (National Department of Agriculture)
DNE	Direction Nationale de l'Environnement (National Department of the Environment)
DNFC	Direction Nationale des Forets et de la Chasse (National Department of Forests and Hunting)
DNFPR	Direction Nationale de la Formation et de la Promotion Rurale (National Department of Training and Rural Advancement)
DNGR	Direction Nationale du Genie Rural (National Department of Rural Engineering)
DNM	Direction Nationale des Mines (National Department of Mines)
DNSA	Direction Nationale des Statistiques Agricole (National Department of Agricultural Statistics)
DNSI	Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique (National Department of Statistics and Information Science)
DPE	Direction Prefectorale d'Education (Prefectural Department of Education)
ED	Essential Drugs Program
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EMP	Education en Matière de Population (Education on Population)
EPI	Expanded Program for Immunization
ERC	Entreprise Régionale de Commerce (Regional Commercial Enterprise)
ERCOA	Entreprise Régionale de Commercialisation Agricole (Regional Agricultural Marketing Enterprise)
ESSOR	Echange Sud Sud Ouest en Milieu Rural (South-South West Rural Exchange)

FAC	Fermes Agricoles Communales (Communal Agricultural Farms)
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération (Aid and Cooperation Fund)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAPA	Fermes Agro-Pastorale d'Arrondissement (District Agro-Pastoral Farm)
FDHIRD	Fouta Djallon Highlands Integrated Regional Development Project
FF	French Franc (6.0 FF = \$1.00: August, 1991)
FIDES	Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development)
FRUITEX	Société d'Etat Guinéenne pour l'Exportation des Fruits (Guinean Fruit Export Parastatal Corporation)
GF	Guinean Franc (790 FG = \$1.00: August, 1991)
GFAG	Groupement des Femmes d'Affaires Guinéennes (Grouping of Guinean Businesswomen)
GOG	Government of Guinea
ha	hectares
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDEX	Société Indépendante Guinéenne d'Exportation (Guinean Independent Export Corporation)
IPN	Institut Pédagogique National (National Institute of Pedagogy)
IRAG	Institut de Recherches Agricole de Guinée (Guinean Institute for Agricultural Research)
IRE	Inspection Regionale d'Education (Regional Educational Inspection)

kg	kilogram
LDPA	Lettre de Politique de Développement Agricole (Agricultural Development Policy Letter)
LOP	Life of Project
MARA	Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales (Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources)
MASE	Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment)
MCH	Maternal Child Health
MEF	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (Ministry of Finance and the Economy)
MEN	Ministère de l'Education Nationale (Ministry of National Education)
MICA	Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat (Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts)
MID	Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Décentralisation (Ministry of Interior and Decentralization)
MIS	Management of Information Systems
MPCI	Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale (Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation)
MRAFP	Ministère de la Réforme Administrative et de la Fonction Publique (Ministry of Administrative Reform and Civil Service)
MRNE	Ministère des Ressources Naturelles, de l'Energie et de l'Environnement (Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and the Environment)
MSP	Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (Ministry of Public Health and Population)
MT	Metric Tons
MTTP	Ministère des Transports et des Travaux Publics (Ministry of Transport and Public Works)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NRM	Natural Resources Management
OCA	Office de Commercialisation Agricole (Agricultural Marketing Bureau)

OIC	Organisation Internationale du Café (International Coffee Organization)
OIC	Opportunities Industrialization Center
ONADER	Organisation Nationale pour le Développement de la Riziculture (National Organization for the Development of Rice Cultivation)
ONEMC	Office National de l'Emploi et de la Main d'Oeuvre (National Employment and Labor Bureau)
ONPA	Office National pour la Promotion de l'Artisanat (National Bureau for the Advancement of Handicrafts)
ONPPME	Office National de Promotion des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (National Bureau for the Advancement of Small and Medium Enterprise)
OPPA	Office National de Promotion de la Pêche Artisanale (National Bureau for the Advancement of Artisanal Fishing)
OPPI	Office National de Promotion de la Pêche Industrielle (National Bureau for the Advancement of Industrial Fishing)
ORG	Office Rizicole de Guéckédou (Gueckedou Rice Cultivation Service)
ORS	Opération Riz Siguiri (Siguiri Rice Operation)
ORT	Oral Rehydration Therapy
PAG	Projet Agricole de Guéckédou (Gueckedou Agricultural Project)
PASE	Programme d'Adjustement Sectoriel d'Education (Educational Sector Adjustment Program)
PCT	Programme de Coopération Technique (Technical Cooperation Program)
PDG	Parti Democratique de Guinée (Democratic Party of Guinea)
PDG	Président-Directeur Général (Chief Executive Officer)
PHC	Primary Health Care
PIP	Programme d'Investissements Publics (Program of Public Investments)

<b>PIRN</b>	<b>Plan Intérimaire de Redressement National (Interim Plan for National Recovery)</b>
<b>PPC</b>	<b>Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination of the United States Agency for International Development</b>
<b>PREF</b>	<b>Programme de Réforme Economique et Financière (Program of Economic and Financial Reform)</b>
<b>PRL</b>	<b>Pouvoir Révolutionnaire Local (Local Revolutionary Authority)</b>
<b>PROSECO</b>	<b>Société d'Etat Guinéenne des Produits Secs et Oléagineux (Guinean Dried Commodities and Oils Parastatal Corporation)</b>
<b>PSI</b>	<b>Population Services International</b>
<b>RA</b>	<b>Réforme Administrative (Administrative Reform)</b>
<b>RDA</b>	<b>Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (African Democratic Assembly)</b>
<b>REFLEG</b>	<b>Regroupement des Exportateurs de Fruits et de Légumes (Grouping of Fruit and Vegetable Exporters)</b>
<b>RTG</b>	<b>Radio Diffusion Television Guinéenne (Guinean Radio Television Broadcasting)</b>
<b>SAAF</b>	<b>Service des Affaires Administratives et Financières (Service of Administrative and Financial Affairs)</b>
<b>SAIG</b>	<b>Société Agro-Industrielle de Guinée (Guinean Agro-Industrial Corporation)</b>
<b>SALGUIDIA</b>	<b>Société Arabe Libyo-Guinéenne pour le Développement Agro-Industriel et Agricole (Arab Libyo-Guinean Corporation for Agro-Industrial and Agricultural Development)</b>
<b>SCAER</b>	<b>Secteur Coopératif d'Aménagement et d'Equipements Ruraux (Cooperative Sector for Rural Development and Supply)</b>
<b>S&amp;T</b>	<b>Bureau for Science and Technology of the United States Agency for International Development</b>
<b>SED</b>	<b>Secrétariat d'Etat à la Décentralisation (State Secretariat for Decentralization)</b>
<b>SEEPU</b>	<b>Secrétariat d'Etat Pour l'Education Pre-Universitaire (State Secretariat for Pre-University Education)</b>

SEMAPE	Société d'Etat Guinéenne pour les Semences et Produits Chimiques (Guinean Parastatal Corporation for Seed and Chemical Inputs)
SENASOL	Service National des Sols (National Soils Service)
SEP	Secrétariat d'Etat à la Peche (State Secretariat for Fishing)
SGAA	Secrétaire-Général Chargé des Affaires Administratives (General Secretary in Charge of Administrative Affaires)
SGBG	Société Générale de la Banque de Guinée (General Banking Corporation of Guinea)
SGCD	Secrétaire-Général Chargé des Collectivités Décentralisées (General Secretary in Charge of Decentralized Municipalities)
SIDA	Service d'Information, Documentation, et Archives (Information, Documentation and Archive Service)
SIP	Social and Institutional Profile
SIP	Société Indigène de Prevoyance (Native Society for Providence)
SMDR	Société Mutuelle de Développement Rural (Mutual Society for Rural Development)
SMPR	Société Mutuelle de Production Rurale (Mutual Society for Rural Production)
SNAPE	Service National d'Aménagement des Points d'Eaux (National Service for Development of Water Points)
SOAGRI	Société Agro-Industrielle de Guinée (Guinean Agro-Industrial Corporation)
SOGIP	Société Guinéenne d'Industrie Pharmaceutique (Industrial Pharmaceutical Corporation of Guinea)
SOGUICAF	Société Guinéenne de Café (Guinean Coffee Corporation)
SOGUIPAH	Société Guinéenne pour la Culture du Palmier à Huile et de l'Hévéa (Guinean Corporation for Cultivation of Oil Palm and Rubber)
SOPAG	Société des Plantes Aromatiques de Guinée (Aromatic Plant Corporation of Guinea)
SPSA	Système Permanent de Statistique Agricole (Permanent System for Agricultural Statistics)

<b>SSPE</b>	Service Statistique et Planification Economique (Statistical and Economic Planning Service)
<b>ST</b>	Secrétariat Technique (Technical Secretariat)
<b>STD</b>	Sexually Transmitted Disease
<b>TBA</b>	Traditional Birth Attendant
<b>T&amp;V</b>	Training and Visit extension system
<b>TSPP</b>	Taxe Spécial sur les Produits Petroliers (Special Tax on Petroleum Products)
<b>UGTG</b>	Union Générale des Travailleurs de Guinée (General Union of Guinean Workers)
<b>UGVD</b>	Union Guinéen des Volontaires pour le Développement (Guinean Union of Development Volunteers)
<b>UNCDF</b>	United Nations Capital Development Fund
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Fund for Population Assistance
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNIDO</b>	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
<b>UNTRG</b>	Union Nationale des Transporteurs de Guinée (National Union of Guinean Transporters)
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>VED</b>	Volontaires Européens de Développement (European Development Volunteers)
<b>WARDA</b>	West African Rice Development Association
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## Preface

---

Guinea is easily among the most exciting African countries to work in at present. A country of immense potential wealth, it spent its first 26 years after independence under a socially, politically, and economically stifling regime. Since the inception of the Second Republic, in 1984, Guinea has reorganized the government from the ground up, liberalized the economy, restored political rights, launched the development of a participatory democracy, and opened up the country to a variety of international exchanges, including international investment.

The Guinean government has been particularly open to strategic and programmatic recommendations of the international community aimed at strengthening its economy and the welfare of its people. The Guinea Social and Institutional Profile (SIP) is an input to the process of development aimed at improving the performance of programs and projects sown on this fertile ground.

The authors of the SIP would like to extend their thanks to a number of people for their time, attention, and support. In particular, we would like to thank David Hess, Colette Chabbott, and Deanna Madvin of USAID/Guinea. They backstopped our efforts, guided our research, and gave us the feedback to keep us on track. We would like to express our gratitude to other members of the USAID Mission as well: Steve Grant, Michael Blake, Kinda Diallo, S. K. Reddy, Michael Kuhns, and Noelle Terpend. Above all, we would like to thank William Kaschak, Director of the USAID Mission in Conakry, for commissioning the SIP and for his commitment to getting a SIP which directly serves the Mission's needs.

At the World Bank Mission in Conakry, Joseph de Stefano, Cherif Diallo, and Jean-Paul Vautherin kept their doors always open to us. We would also like to thank, in particular, the staff at the FAO Mission for giving us access to a cache of valuable documents we found nowhere else in Conakry.

We have also benefitted from interchanges with other social scientists who have recently been working in Guinea. Our thanks to Jonathan Landeck, Andree Wyncoop, and Ibrahima Sory Seck, and the staff at ORSTOM/Conakry.

There is no adequate expression of thanks for the support, encouragement, insights, concrete help, and good fellowship of all the Guineans in public and private life who have played a role in the formulation of the SIP. We hope that the SIP will contribute to enabling Guinea to reach its development goals, and thereby be a token of our appreciation of their efforts on our behalf.

## **Executive Summary**

---

---

The Guinea Social and Institutional Profile (SIP) is the 16th in a series of synthetic overviews of social and institutional life in USAID host countries. AID/Washington's PPC Bureau launched the series in 1981, fully funding or co-funding the majority of earlier efforts.

The objective of the SIP is to provide USAID with the insight into Guinean social and institutional life to serve as a point of departure for developing its program strategy and, ultimately, designing its projects.

The Guinea SIP team consisted of three people: a team leader/senior anthropologist, a junior anthropologist/field coordinator, and a political scientist. All three had considerable experience living and working in francophone West Africa. The junior anthropologist recently submitted a Ph.D. dissertation focusing on Fulbe household economies and gender role differentiation in Middle Guinea Region. The team level of effort was approximately 36 person-weeks.

The Guinea SIP, by nature, is built on synthesis and analysis of existing documents and interviews with informants in government, the donor community, and project implementation organizations. Time and resource constraints limited team field visits to ground-truthing insights from the literature.

Substantively, the Guinea SIP contains four major sections:

- an overview of local-level socioeconomic life in Guinea organized by agro-ecological zone;
- a review of the evolution of political, administrative, and legal systems in Guinea, culminating in an analysis of their current capacities;
- an analysis of sectoral or programmatic areas targeted in USAID's Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP); and
- an analysis of the implications of the SIP's findings for USAID strategy development and recommendations concerning USAID activities.

### **An Overview of Local-Level Social and Economic Life**

Over 20 ethnic groups exist in Guinea, ranging in size from a few thousand to nearly 2 million people. Estimates made in the 1970s place the Malinké and Fulbé each at close to 2 million members, or each constituting approximately 30 percent of the national population. The Sousou have close to a million people, or about 16 percent of the national population. The people of the Forest Region cover another million, or 18 percent to 20 percent of the population.

The SIP team has approached local social and economic life in Guinea by dividing the country into eight agro-ecological zones. These zones are distinguished from each other according to: geomorphology and resource base, community organization and ethnic composition, and production systems and family economic strategies. The objective of organizing the presentation by agro-ecological zone is to identify patterns of socioeconomic behavior which

characterize particular resource mixes as a basis for projecting appropriate donor support activities in the zone.

***The Coastal Zone***—is an ethnically diverse area of islands and estuaries where people practice mangrove rice agriculture and fishing in the lowlands, giving way to rainfed rice and other cereals farther inland; much of this area was in the barana triangle of colonial times; it still produces large quantities of fruit and vegetables for the Conakry market and for export.

***The Southern Foothills Zone***—inhabited by Fulbé and Sousou, is an area of plateaus and hills where relatively active commerce and industry are fostering a market orientation in agricultural production; this area is the largest supplier of commercial fruit and vegetable production; private firms and farmer cooperatives are the main producers.

***The Central Highlands Zone***—is the classical mountainous home area of the Fulbé; this hierarchical society juggles livestock management, different forms of rainfed and flood-recession agriculture, and heavy rates of male outmigration to make household ends meet.

***The Northern Savannah Zone***—is an ethnically diverse lowland plain dominated by Fulbé and related peoples with an active livestock economy and commercial links across its borders with Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

***The Upper Niger Zone***—is an area of plateaus and hills in which Malinké villagers extensively farm rainfed plateau fields, intensively work rainfed village fields, and supplement these rainfed fields with flood-recession agriculture and livestock.

***The Eastern Savannah Zone***—also a Malinké area, is an area where people settle along perennial rivers to take advantage of floodplains for wet rice cultivation; they derive cash income mainly from gold mining and cotton production.

***The Forest Zone***—is lush and ethnically diverse; households produce rice for subsistence and a range of tropical products such as coffee, palm oil, rubber, and fruit for market.

***The Conakry Zone***—is a distinctive zone which is home to one-sixth of Guinea's population and a large share of its industrial, commercial, financial, and informal sectors.

## **Evolution of Political, Administrative, and Legal Systems**

The evolution of political, administrative, and legal systems in Guinea began with the gradual establishment of colonial rule in the last decade of the 19th century. The colonial period, one of autocratic rule lasting more than half a century, has left an indelible mark on Guineans. They regard colonialism as a largely negative experience. The colonial state and bureaucracy governing the colony were repressive institutions which provided few benefits for people. The colonial experience generated suspicion of and hostility toward the colonial state and gave birth to anti-colonialist sentiments which took political form during the Post-World War II era. It left a legacy of popular suspicion of the State and administration, and of traditions of bureaucratic behavior which still prevail, such as overcentralized command structures, an inability of lower-level civil servants to take initiative, and a dependence on the State structure for social benefits and economic programming.

The decolonization era began with the sweeping metropolitan colonial reforms of 1945/1946 and ended with Guinea's decision in 1958 to become the first tropical African colony to break with France and opt for independence. The era was characterized by rapid political, economic, and social change which transformed Guinea from a colonial backwater to a country with great economic potential. More significantly, this was the only period in Guinean history in which the people were allowed to participate fully in democratic politics.

During the First Republic, 1958 to 1984, external factors affected political and economic development in Guinea. France punished Guinea immediately after the September 28, 1958, referendum by withdrawing technical assistance and financial aid and isolating Guinea diplomatically. It left Guinea without competent personnel to run the administration and pushed it into close ties with the Eastern Bloc. Guinea patterned its economy on the Marxist model with central planning and collectivization of agriculture. Politically, Guinea organized a one-party state based on democratic centralism and socialist principles. Various plots to overthrow the regime and the 1970 invasion from Portuguese Guinea reinforced the regime's tendency toward repression, tight control of its people, and isolation from the West. The First Republic dismantled institutions established under French colonial rule and left the country in the institutional void of a Party-State which was not able to survive Touré's death in 1984.

The First Republic left an onerous legacy. When it fell, its economy was in a shambles. Its once prosperous agricultural export sector had disappeared. Many other rural sectors had retreated into a subsistence mode. State industries were operating at a loss. State regulation had all but destroyed private sector activities and initiatives. State bureaucracy was overblown and unproductive. The educational system produced poorly trained teachers, civil servants, and technicians who could not efficiently manage the economy or the government bureaucracy. Centralized Party-State rule had stifled development of autonomous voluntary associations and local initiative. The absence of a legal framework and court system for resolving institutional disputes combined with arbitrary one-party rule to make justice unpredictable. The dominance of the personality of the President undermined people's confidence in public institutions and administration. All these factors contributed to the dissolution of Guinean institutions—perhaps the most serious constraint to Guinean development under the Second Republic.

Since the advent of the Second Republic following the military coup of April 1984, Guinea has undergone radical institutional changes. The Party-State was dismantled and the socialist orientation of the Touré regime reversed in favor of a commitment to a liberal market economy. The Program for Economic and Financial Reform (PREF) transformed the banking and monetary systems, reduced state intervention, privatized or liquidated most state enterprises, and sharply reduced the size of the civil service. At the same time, it disrupted the distribution system and lowered living standards of civil servants and urban dwellers whose families depended on the food and housing benefits that the Touré regime provided to its supporters.

PREF set the stage for a boom in trade, an expansion of the informal sector in Conakry, and a revival of agricultural production. However, PREF reforms still have not created a business climate that attracts foreign and large-scale domestic private investment. High transaction

costs, such as delays in processing paperwork, corruption, and poor telecommunications, remain obstacles to expansion of the formal sector. The government still needs to address mobilization of the formal sector to revitalize the economy. On the other hand, the informal sector is booming without government involvement.

Despite macroeconomic and administrative reforms and progress toward legal and regulatory systems, the institutional and legal foundations are not yet established to sustain a liberal economy. Major obstacles to implementing administrative and economic reforms include: the dissolution of Guinean institutions during the Touré years; the lack of precedent for an economy based on titled property, contractual relationships and court adjudication; and the bureaucratic inexperience and inadequate management qualifications of state officials.

Consistent with the political tradition of the colonial era and the First Republic, most institutional reforms of the Second Republic have been initiated from above with little popular consultation. Consequently, they have little deep popular support, particularly among the groups that have lost ground economically. The donors have been major proponents of financial, economic, administrative, and legal reforms and have provided the government with financial and technical assistance to implement reforms. The conditionality of most donor aid, coupled with its negative social consequences on key groups in the population, risks touching off strong nationalist reaction. Elements within the civil service complain that donors do not give sufficient responsibility to Guinean personnel in managing the new financial and economic institutions, and that the government has given too many concessions to foreign business interests to get them to invest in Guinea. While top echelons of the civil service have been reorganized and revitalized, and new rules based on sound management practices introduced, the old guard and the rank and file have not necessarily internalized and accepted these new rules. Reformers complain that most civil servants do not know the new texts and still do business the old way. Many are also unqualified to carry out their new job descriptions.

In the political realm, the military regime has procrastinated in establishing national democratic political institutions (i.e., political parties, a national press, and a representative national assembly). Instead, the regime has initiated a program of reorganization of the territorial administration from the ground up. Within its decentralization program, it is replacing centrally run subprefectures with popularly elected local government, Rural Development Communities (CRDs) in the rural areas and municipal councils in the urban areas. A new Constitution, approved by referendum in December 1990, calls for a democratic regime to be installed by 1995. Municipal elections took place in June 1990. Popular forces are pressuring the current regime to move up the date of national elections, and pressure is growing for a multiparty system and for legislation to advance the return to civilian rule sooner than anticipated in the new Constitution.

Although the military coup was popular, the military, as an institution, still has little legitimacy with the population. Military men still hold key posts in government. Government has allocated resources to make the military the big winner under the Second Republic. Although President Conté is the most powerful person in the country, he does not have full control over the military and has had difficulty in checking waste and corruption in it. This is undermining his legitimacy and may become a major problem in the future if the military re-

fuses to give way to civilian rule or to accept a reduction in its privileges. Recent strikes and demonstrations by university professors, students, and market women point to a potentially difficult situation.

These tensions may be exacerbated by growing ethnic tensions as different ethnic groups perceive government favoring the Sousou. The Malinké have lost much since the fall of the First Republic due to their association with Sékou Touré and a 1985 coup attempt. The Fulbé, who have lost the most under the Touré regime, have regained economic power but have not gained much political power despite their wealth and numbers. The army claims to be the main unifying force in the country and the bulwark against interethnic warfare since it incorporates elements from all of Guinea's ethnic groups. Nonetheless, it is taking a delicate balancing act within the army to keep all groups satisfied.

## **An Analysis of Sectoral or Programmatic Areas Targeted in USAID's Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP)**

### ***Agricultural Production and Marketing***

The agricultural marketing system cuts across the different agro-ecological regions to channel surplus rural production of food staples to urban consumption centers. Local women are the main actors in collecting and retailing local commodities. Assembly and long-distance trade are in the hands of men who are disproportionately of Fulbé origin. The agricultural marketing system functions on interpersonal relations developed over long periods of exchange between actors at different levels of the system.

Imperfections in the agricultural markets are distorting signals to producers. Some of these imperfections add unnecessary costs to marketing systems. Rent-seeking authorities along the road, high transport costs, and scarcity of credit add to transaction costs within the system. A poor rural roads network drives up transportation costs. Limited storage capacity leads to unnecessary commodity spoilage. Other imperfections are institutional in nature. Scarcity of local marketing institutions increases the transaction costs as commodities move from producer to consumer. High transaction costs depress producer prices while raising consumer prices, and thereby stifle demand. Still other imperfections are created by policy obstacles. Guinea's regulations governing agricultural exports are confusing and cumbersome.

The economic reforms of the Second Republic have sparked investment in commercial production of fruit and vegetables in the Coastal and Southern Foothills Zones, and of coffee and palm oil in the Forest Zone. Independent producers are targeting economy of scale advantages by trying to organize into effective cooperatives in these zones. In other cases, private firms are organizing farmers on their periphery to produce commodities according to their requirements to process and market through them.

### ***Natural Resources Management***

Local communities have recently acquired the statutory right to manage natural resources. Since independence, people have treated natural resources as a public good open to private use on a first-come, first-serve basis. Lack of natural resources management has led to deterioration of the resource base. Communities may now legally constitute local resource man-

agement bodies to administer rights to local resources to sustain local resource production. The incentive to sustainable community management comes from the market potential for local agricultural and forestry products in Guinea and in neighboring countries.

### ***Decentralization and Local Empowerment***

In the last two years, Guinea has embarked on the process of transforming subprefectures into democratically self-governing local bodies that develop and implement their own local development projects in consultation with and with the participation of their constituencies. To date, the government has created 13 of these CRDs. The government plans to extend local self-government throughout the country in coming years. In addition, the government conducted elections for mayors and governing councils for over 30 municipalities in June 1991.

### ***Improved Governance***

Standards of management, performance, and integrity in government have been deteriorating from the early years of the First Republic through the current stage of the Second Republic. Currently prevailing norms are having a negative impact on the expansion of the Guinean economy, the distribution of its benefits, and the creation of a stable society with mass participation.

### ***Education***

Standards of education from the primary school through the university level have suffered from the educational policies of the First Republic. Now faculty members are restive in face of their declining economic position. They do not have access to either sufficient further training opportunities or sufficient economic incentives to improve the performance of the education system and train the next generation of Guineans to an international standard.

Gender differences in schooling are particularly pronounced in rural areas. Female attendance rates in primary school are considerably less than male rates. Fewer girls go to school due to the scarcity of jobs for female graduates and because their mothers need the girls' labor in the household to free them up for economic activity outside. However, well-off families, such as those in the Fulbé elite, have a high rate of female education and may be leading the way for others.

### ***Population and Health***

The population growth rate of Guinea is about 2.85 percent per year. Conakry, under the influence of in-migration as well as fertility, is growing at over 5 percent per year. The economy has expanded at 5 to 6 percent per year during the Second Republic, thus staying ahead of population growth. It will be difficult to maintain this situation as population growth threatens to outstrip economic growth and erode hard-won improvements in Guinea's standard of living.

Attitudes toward family planning, in part, are a function of residence. In rural areas, men want children because family welfare is often a function of the amount of labor it can devote to agricultural production. Women want children because they derive their long-term security more from their children than from their spouses. In urban areas, children are more a drain on cash resources than a source of family welfare. Therefore, couples in urban areas may be more susceptible to arguments for family planning than their rural counterparts.

## **Implications of the SIP's findings for USAID Strategy Development**

Socio-cultural, institutional, and political factors in Guinea constrain USAID's ability to reach its program goal of improving the economic and social well-being of all Guineans in a participatory society.

The main social and cultural constraints to Guinean development are a legacy of the First Republic. Concentration of power in the personality of Sékou Touré and the Party-State has left an institutional void which has created several obstacles to development.

People have no institutional structures and procedures to enlist administrative support for their initiatives. Instead, they must rely on their network of personal relations to achieve goals that require support from the administration.

Guinean bureaucratic culture has socialized officials to await directives from higher authority rather than take initiative. The administrative reforms implemented under the structural adjustment program have compounded the feelings of insecurity of government officials.

Government policy is to build a Guinean nation. People, however, retain a hierarchy of loyalties in which loyalty to the Guinean nation only comes after loyalty to family, to village, and to ethnic and religious group.

The average rural dweller receives few benefits from national institutions as such. Rather he/she depends on local social structure and processes for access to resources.

Social tension between different ethnic groups is another constraint to development. These tensions are born of historical struggles between different groups from pre-colonial times through the First Republic.

In the institutional sector, the First Republic left a legacy of weakness and ineffectiveness which has been a major constraint to the development of a vigorous market economy based on increased agricultural and industrial production.

Three major institutional constraints still block Guinean efforts to revitalize the economy: inefficiency and corruption in government and the state bureaucracy; the absence of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework relevant to Guinean realities; and weak financial institutions.

Political constraints hinder the present regime in building an efficient public sector, and the business climate for promoting a vigorous market economy. These constraints include the following: the refusal of the military to return to their barracks and leave the governing of the country to civilians; the absence of national political institutions and limited public confidence in government; the need to buy social peace by compensating those hurt by policy changes; and interethnic rivalries which could threaten political stability.

At the level of USAID's subgoals, the main constraint to increased household income from non-mining activities lies in the performance of the marketplace. Costs and impediments in the marketing system have a negative impact on market exchanges. These costs and impediments distort the transmission of market signals to producers and dilute the incentives the market system sends them to produce whatever the commodity or service.

The persistent domination of the Guinean government by the military and the absence of national political institutions have been major constraints to improved participation of Guineans in defining and managing social and economic development at all levels.

By far the most serious constraints to reaching USAID's strategic objective of increased sustainable private sector agricultural and value-added output for domestic and export markets in Guinea can be grouped under the general heading of economic constraints. Foremost among the economic constraints is lack of credit. Limitations on the ability to finance production through credit limits production. Other factors that add unnecessary cost to production for market include: the high cost of transport, high spoilage rates, and rent-seeking representatives of law and order authorities along the routes. A second major set of constraints on the performance of the marketing system lies in the poor state of the infrastructure and transport system.

The general constraints to achieving USAID's strategic objective of improving human resources for sustainable economic growth fall into the areas of health care, formal education, and human resource development.

The low level of literacy and numeracy is a constraint to the ability to manage village health centers at the local level. Communication between health workers in the field and the public health authorities is intermittent, and there is little coordination between public, private, and community or traditional healers.

Staffing in the education system is top-heavy at the Ministry. The Guinean government may not be able to support the projected recurrent education costs in a few years.

Constraints to achieving USAID's strategic objective of increased local-level participation in economic and social development planning and management differ somewhat in urban and rural areas, due to differences in needs, educational levels, social practices, basic infrastructure, revenue bases, and local government structures. However, the two areas share many of the constraints: lack of financial management skills and understanding of budgetary processes in the local population; insufficient understanding of government regulations; lack of adequate control mechanisms to check corruption and misuse of public funds; and lack of experience and skills needed to design local development projects and obtain funds from external sources.

# Chapter 1: Introduction

---

The Guinea Social and Institutional Profile (SIP) is the 16th in a series of synthetic overviews of the social and institutional life in host countries for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Missions.

## 1.1 USAID's Social and Institutional Profile (SIP) Program

USAID's Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) initiated the SIP program as an experimental activity in 1981. Its purpose was to provide country-specific documents which describe and analyze social and institutional factors important for overall Mission programming, including project design.

Missions, as part of this program, took the initiative to produce SIPs. Each SIP was designed to meet the needs of the USAID Mission formulating it. The Missions developed the scope of work for the SIP and had considerable latitude to determine topics for SIP discussion and analysis. However, SIPs tended to combine sectoral (especially agricultural sector), institutional, and social analyses.

The particular focus of each SIP document is determined by specific Mission needs. All SIPs conform to the general SIP purpose of providing Missions with an understanding of the socio-cultural and institutional structure, conduct, performance, and trends that underlie current conditions of the host country as well as an exploration of consequent development implications. SIPs are designed to be companion documents to analytical macro-economic and sector documents, feed into the Mission planning cycle (specifically into the formulation of its Country Program Strategic Plan [CPS]), and inform the design of specific Mission projects.

Between 1982 and 1987, USAID produced SIPs for 15 Missions: Oman, Jamaica, Honduras, Uganda, Yemen, Ecuador, the Eastern Caribbean, Somalia, Kenya, Niger, Liberia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Philippines, and Haiti. Each SIP was drafted by a team of social scientists working in collaboration with Mission personnel.

The SIPs were essentially analytic documents that drew primarily from existing data sources. They also included analyses of original field data obtained by SIP team members in an effort to fill in identified data gaps. PPC supported the early SIP effort by subsidizing the funding of SIPs. In addition, PPC organized a SIP working group, with representation from USAID's regional bureaus as well as the Science and Technology (S&T) Bureau, to assist the Missions in formulating scopes of work tailored to their needs and requirements. Finally, PPC assisted in recruiting technical assistance to execute specific SIPs.

The SIP program has been evaluated twice since its inception. Reyna and Gratto (n.d.) were impressed with the overall quality of the first 14 SIPs. They found that the SIPs generally provided a complete and accurate overview of social and institutional life in their respective countries and that they maintained a focus which met USAID's programming needs. Vondal (1988) surveyed the 15 USAID Missions that have executed SIPs. Missions were generally pleased with the SIPs and underlined the valuable role the SIPs were playing in their program planning and project design.

## **1.2 Background to the Guinea SIP**

The Guinea SIP represents a revival of the SIP program after a five-year hiatus.

USAID/Conakry is currently in the process of developing its CPSP. The document will be presented in Washington in October 1991. The Mission, committed to effective strategic planning, wants to ground the CPSP in an informed overview of the social, political, and economic environments in Guinea. USAID/Conakry has asked the SIP team to contribute an overview and analysis of Guinea's social and institutional life as a backdrop for CPSP conclusions and recommendations.

## **1.3 The Purpose of this SIP and Overview of the SOW**

**The purpose of the USAID/Guinea SIP is to provide social, political, institutional, and cultural analysis of trends for changes which can be foreseen in Guinean society, culture, and institutions. It is to provide recommendations for future USAID program development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation related to those findings and trends.**

In order to speak most directly to Mission interests, the SIP focuses primarily on the social, political, institutional and cultural factors which are directly related to the Mission's program strategy, as expressed in its planning documents. The most important program areas for the SIP are agricultural marketing and production, natural resource management, decentralization, education and human resource development, health and family planning, and improved governance. The SIP examines private institutions that are actors in the program areas at the national, regional, and local levels. The SIP's most important central themes are the dynamics of Guinean society and culture which structure the ways in which Guineans make decisions, and how the maximum degree of effective participation of Guinean men and women can be promoted for sustainable economic growth and improved well-being. The SIP examines institutional structures, both formal and informal, and behavior within those institutions.

## **1.4 The USAID/Conakry Program Strategy, the Program Logical**

### ***Framework, and Their Relationship to the SIP***

The goal of USAID/Guinea's programs is to achieve broad-based, sustainable economic growth which improves the well-being of all Guineans. The Mission's strategy is to achieve this goal by coordinating initiatives in three sectors:

- strengthening the agricultural sector, the sector with the greatest potential for growth and for the largest increase in the labor force;
- promoting expansion of the market sector as a way of ensuring circulation and equitable distribution of the benefits of economic expansion; and
- developing the human resources sector and improving governance to enable Guineans to participate in new economic and political opportunities to improve their quality of life.

The Mission's strategic objectives include the following:

- to increase sustainable production and productivity with particular emphasis on private sector agriculture;
- to lower population growth rates and improve the human resources base; and
- to enhance the democratization process.

## **1.5 Methodology**

The Guinea SIP team consisted of three people: a Team Leader/Senior Anthropologist, a Junior Anthropologist/Field Coordinator, and a Political Scientist. All three had considerable experience living and working in francophone West Africa. The junior anthropologist had recently defended a Ph.D. dissertation focusing on Fulbe household economies and gender role differentiation in Middle Guinea Region.

The team invested an aggregate of 36 person-weeks to complete the SIP. The exercise began in April 1991 with a one-month team presence in-country to collect documents, interview key informants, carry out field visits, develop an outline for the final SIP and begin drafting key sections. Team members then spent a month at their home bases composing further sections of the SIP. They finalized the draft for Mission comment in a second month-long visit to Guinea in July/August 1991. The Team Leader submitted a final version of the SIP to the Mission at the end of September 1991.

The Guinea SIP, by nature, was built on synthesis and analysis of existing documents and interviews with informants in government, the donor community, and project implementation organizations. Constraints of time and money precluded substantial original fieldwork. Therefore, the team restricted itself to limited field visits to ground-truth its insights from the literature.

## **1.6 The Plan for the Rest of the SIP**

The body of this SIP consists of four main sections:

- An overview of local-level socioeconomic life in Guinea organized by agro-ecological zone. The SIP team has identified eight agro-ecological zones in Guinea distinguished by geomorphology and resource base, community organization and ethnic composition, and production systems and family economic strategies.
- A review of the evolution of political, administrative, and legal systems in Guinea culminating in an analysis of their current capabilities. The review covers four stages in Guinean development: the colonial era until the end of World War II, the pre-independence period, the First Republic, and the Second Republic.
- A description and analysis of sectoral or programmatic areas targeted in USAID's CPSP. The analysis focuses on the structure and function of the different sectors and identifies constraints to sectoral performance which might respond to remedial measures.

- **An analysis of the implications of the SIP's findings for USAID strategy development and recommendations concerning USAID activities.**

# Chapter 2: Guinea's Agro-Ecological Zones

---

## 2.1 Background

### 2.1.1 Overview of Guinean Geography and Climate

Guinea is situated between 7° 10' and 12° 30' north latitude, and between 8° and 15° east longitude. The size of the country is 245,957 square kilometers (95,000 square miles), and has a population estimated to be 6,150,000 (Ministere du Plan 1990). Guinea shares borders with Senegal, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Atlantic Ocean. One of Guinea's most significant geographic and environmental features is the Guinean Highlands. Here, three great West African rivers, the Gambia, the Senegal, and the Niger have their sources. Nelson, et. al (1976) provide basic demographic and ecologic data for the country's four distinct ecological regions which are summarized below.

Lower Guinea, or Maritime Guinea, borders the Atlantic Ocean. The region consists of a coastal plain between 50 and 90 kilometers (km) wide that extends to the foothills of the Fouta Djallon massif to the east. Marshy islands and peninsulas form a coast dissected by brackish estuaries and mangrove swamps that lie at the mouths of numerous rivers. There is excellent fishing along the coast. The region receives between 2,000 and 4,000 millimeters (mm) of rain annually. The climate and soils make this an excellent area for the production of rice and tropical fruits. Maritime Guinea comprises 18 percent of the country's area. The population of Conakry and the rural areas account for 40 percent of the population, with an average population density of 35.1 people/km<sup>2</sup> in the rural areas.

The predominant geographic feature of Middle Guinea is the Fouta Djallon Highland plateau. This region also includes savannah plains that extend from the western plateau's foothills toward the Republics of Guinea Bissau and Senegal to the west and north, respectively. This region receives between 1,700 mm and 2,800 mm of rainfall annually. Vegetation varies with short grasses on the numerous lateritic outcroppings known as *bowe* (singular, *bowal*) and savannah woodlands or open forest on the slopes and valleys of the plateaus. In Dalaba, a pine forest was planted by Europeans, and gallery forests can be found along some river courses. The climate and soils are well suited for livestock production and fruit and vegetable cultivation. The region contains 20 percent of the country's area and 22 percent of the population, with an average density of 27 people/km<sup>2</sup>.

Upper Guinea consists of rolling savannah between 200 meters (m) and 400 m above sea level, and lies mostly within the watershed of the Niger River. The annual rainfall is between 1,300 mm and 1,700 mm. The vegetation is predominantly savannah shrub and grassland. A very common tree (*Butyrosperum parkii*) is found throughout the region and used to produce shea butter for local consumption and markets in other regions. Upper Guinea is the largest of Guinea's four regions and contains 40 percent of the country's area and 20 percent of the population, with a population density of 10.4 people/km<sup>2</sup>.

The Forest Zone in southeastern Guinea is another mountainous region. Mount Nimba, located in the southeastern corner of the region on the Liberian border, is the highest peak in the country at 1,753 m. Rainfall is approximately 1,700 mm to 3,000 mm per year. At one time, tropical rainforest covered much of this zone's land surface at altitudes below 700 m.

A combination of factors have resulted in widespread deforestation, particularly the long-standing presence of farmers in the area and the lucrative lumber trade. This region contains 22 percent of the land surface and 18 percent of the population, with an average population density of 21.6 people/km<sup>2</sup>.

Guinea lies in the tropical zone of the northern hemisphere and enjoys a humid tropical climate with two seasons: the rainy or "winter" season that begins in April/May and lasts through October/December, and a dry season that is longest in the northern part of the country. Each of the four natural regions has its own type of climate: a monsoon tropical climate, sometimes called the sub-Guinean climate, in Lower Guinea; an altitudinal tropical climate, known as the Fouta climate, on the Fouta Djallon plateau; a dry tropical climate, called the South Sudanese climate, in Upper Guinea; and a sub-equatorial climate in the Forest Region.

The monsoon climate of the coastal region is characterized by relatively high temperatures, a high degree of humidity, and abundant rainfall varying from an average of 4,500 mm in Conakry to 2,600 mm a year in Boké, with maximum rainfall in August.

The Fouta climate is characterized by moderate temperatures on account of its altitude. However, the temperature range is quite considerable. There is a cool, dry period from December to February when the harmattan (the continental wind) blows from the northeast. This is followed by a hot, dry period from March to April. Rainfall varies between 2,200 mm on the western slope, exposed to the maritime monsoon from the southwest, and 1,500 mm on the eastern slope, which is sheltered from the moist air masses. The rainy season (from May to October) and the dry season each last about six months.

The climate of the upper basin of the Niger has a lower annual rainfall than the Fouta with a seven-month dry season and a five-month rainy season. Rainfall decreases toward the north and east, and the dryness of the air masses becomes more marked towards the interior. In Upper Guinea, the dominant wind is the northeast trade wind. It is cool and dry from December to February, becoming hot and dry during the hot period of the dry season from the end of February to the end of May. The north and east are the hottest regions.

Due to its more southerly position and the relatively high massifs, the Forest Region has a sub-equatorial climate with a predominant wet season that lasts eight to ten months of the year. The dry season is shorter towards the south, lasting four months in the prefectures of Kissidougou and Beyla regions, and two months in the prefectures of Loia, N'Zerekore, and Yomou. Rainfall generally increases with altitude. There is a contrast between the northern area of the region which is exposed to the harmattan wind and is consequently drier, and the southern side that is influenced by the monsoon from the Atlantic coast. Overall, the annual temperature range is small.

### **2.1.2 Peoples of Guinea**

According to Nelson, et al. (1976) there are over 20 ethnic groups in Guinea that range in size from a few thousand to nearly 1 million people. Language is probably the most obvious distinction between groups, and it is common for the same names to be used when referring to either the ethnic group or the language they speak.

The last ethnic count for the country was carried out during the population sample census in 1954 and 1955. The Fulbé were the largest group at that time, accounting for 28.6 percent of the population, followed by the Malinké with 22.4 percent and the Soussou with 13.1 percent. The peoples in the Forest Region made up 18.1 percent of the total. Estimates made in the 1970s placed Malinké and Fulbé as nearly equal with 30 percent each of the total population, and the Soussou had increased 16 percent.

## **2.2 Coastal Zone**

### **2.2.1 Geography and Topography**

This zone is 24,897 km<sup>2</sup> (10 percent of the country) and includes the prefectures of Forécariah, Coyah, Dubreka, Boffa, and Boké. The zone has a northwest border with Guinea Bissau, and the coastline runs in a southeasterly direction to the border of Sierra Leone. Its major topographic features are numerous islands, estuaries, and alluvial floodplains. Elevation increases gradually as one moves eastward across a broad, sandy coastal plain dissected by rivers that constrain travel and isolate areas throughout the zone. Elevation is highest in the plateaus that form the far eastern and northern areas of the zone.

The alluvial soils in the zone are well watered by 2,500 mm to 3,900 mm of annual rainfall which occurs primarily between the months of May and October. River levels rise during the rainy season creating floodplains inland and leaching salts from coastal soils where farmers plant rice, the staple food crop of the zone. In addition to rice, the zone provides suitable conditions for the cultivation of manioc, sweet potatoes, millet, fonio, and maize. Soils and rainfall provide excellent growing conditions for mango, orange, kola, pineapple, oil palm, other tropical fruits, and vegetables.

Major resources along the coast are fish and sea salt. Livestock are most numerous in the northeastern areas of Boké and Boffa prefectures where ecological conditions are best.

### **2.2.2 Population Profile**

The 1983 population for this area was 491,138. With an average population growth rate of 3.05 percent (according to the 1988 UNDP study), the estimated population for 1991 is 610,307. All subsequent description of the population refers to this estimate.

The average population density for the zone is 24.5/km<sup>2</sup>, the lowest average density is 21/km<sup>2</sup> in Boké, and the highest average density 28/km<sup>2</sup> is in Boffa. The population is predominantly rural--an average of 88 percent of the people live in villages. The major towns are in Boké (13.6 percent of the population lives in Kamsar, Boké, or Sangaredi) and the prefectural capitals of Coyah, Dubreka, and Forécariah (approximately 14.7 percent of the population).

There are three major ethnic groups in the zone. There are eight **Baga** groups that make up 12 percent (76,570) of the total population, and live in villages along the coastal strip between Coyah and Boké. The **Soussou** make up 49 percent (301,104) of the zone's population, occupying the lowland plains of all the prefectures except Boké. The **Fulbé** make up 13 percent (78,702) of the population, living in villages at the higher elevations in the eastern part of the zone. The highest ethnic diversity is in Boké where Nalous, Landoma, Mikiforé, and other groups make up 59 percent (125,730) of the population. This figure, combined

with the small number of Malinké in the southeastern part of the zone, means that other ethnic groups make up 23 percent (135,777) of the zone's population.

Islam is the religion for 95 percent (580,281) of the people in the zone. The remaining 5 percent (30,026) of the people are primarily Catholics among the Baga living along the coast in Boffa and Boké.

The male-female ratio for the entire zone is 96:100 (298,082 males and 312,625 females). One factor affecting this ratio is that young men migrate to Conakry or other urban centers in neighboring countries seeking work. Forécariah is the only prefecture where males outnumber females, which according to the 1988 UNDP study, is due to immigration of young men seeking wage work on commercial farms. However, this phenomenon is not as marked as in other areas of the country. For example, one researcher studying rural life in Coyah stated he had found no female-headed households in the villages (Peart, personal communication). Several factors may affect this. There is no evidence that population pressure on the land has resulted in landlessness, or that farmers cannot acquire sufficient land for their needs.

Mean household size is lowest in Forécariah (5/household) and highest in Boffa (7/household). The average for the zone is 6.2/household, slightly under the national average of 7/household.

The age structure of the zone's population is fairly similar to the national average. The total population, estimated to be 610,307, can be divided into the following groups. People less than 15 years old make up 39.2 percent of the population (239,346), people between 15 and 64 years of age make up 54.8 percent of the population (334,670), and those 65 years and older make up 6 percent of the population (36,291).

### ***2.2.3 Community Organization and Resource Management***

Almost nine of every ten people in the Coastal Zone live in rural villages. For this reason, the focus here is on village organization. Despite the zone's ethnic diversity, village organization can be described by examining authority, responsibility, and choice in terms of kinship, gender, and age. Islam is an additional organizational factor in Soussou and Fulbe villages, which are more hierarchical than Baga villages.

Descent and marriage are two kinship institutions that organize different sets of relations between villagers. A person's first loyalty is to his/her descent group. This represents a variable number of village households that a person can count on in the case of an emergency, but that are also expected to share in the benefits resulting from an individual's success. Despite the influence of the extended family in decisions about matters such as marriage and inheritance, individual households exercise a great deal of autonomy in organizing production, consumption, socialization, religious, and kinship activities.

Household authority is vested in the male, who is socially responsible for representing the entire household. Marriage is an expensive undertaking, and in-laws are important allies in social and economic undertakings.

In hierarchical societies such as the Soussou and Fulbe, descent defines status relations between family groups, which is often reflected in terms of prerogatives over rights to and control over resources. For example, among the Soussou, the descendants of the village founder

are referred to as the founder family. They generally control the largest and best areas of land in the village. In Soussou and Fulbe society prior to independence, traditional elite or founder families had access to the labor provided by families of lower status who worked on their farms, built their houses, and performed other tasks. These relationships have changed, but the traditional elite continue to hold positions of power and authority in village society.

Traditionally, juniors were expected to defer to the authority of elders and women to defer to the authority of men. This rural tradition has not changed greatly despite attempts during the First Republic to give youth and women public power through village committee organizations. One finds in every village a group of elder men who collectively symbolize the village's moral wisdom. These men serve as advisors to people in formal political positions such as the district committee members and even the subprefect. Although they have no legal authority, their influence should not be underestimated in areas which concern the entire village (i.e., mobilization for self-help projects, use of local taxes, and conflict resolution).

There may be slight variations in the customary rules that structure peoples' decisions regarding the management of resources such as land, water, and other natural resources in different villages throughout the zone. The discussion is framed in terms of resource control and allocation, access to resources, and resource maintenance.

Customary tenure rules underline the importance of descent through the male line, as land rights are passed down from father to son. Men control decisions affecting the allocation of land within and between households. There is no evidence that land shortage is a constraint on agricultural production in the zone. Land borrowing is very common. Among the Soussou, both women and men borrow land. There is very little information about the degree to which land can be bought or sold in this area. One researcher reported that informants from the Soussou villages in Coyah where he studied claimed that land cannot be sold by an individual unless he has the agreement of his brothers.

Upland areas are cultivated for several years and then left to fallow. There is no information about the length of fallow periods and whether they are decreasing. Diallo (1974) reports that the Baga farmers she studied cultivated alternate sections of their lowland mangrove fields from year to year.

Common goods such as water and forest resources that provide food, fuelwood, and construction materials appear to be available to the use of whoever collects them. There is some control exerted over when certain items may be collected. For example, oil palms that were not planted are not considered individual property. In a given area, the fruits mature about the same time although people wait for the word from village elders before they begin to harvest fruits. The fruit belongs to whoever collects it once the season has been recognized.

Women and their children throughout the zone collect water for household needs primarily from ground sources, springs, and streams. There are 320 perennial springs and streams in the zone, with an additional 50 that provide water for less than six months of the year. There are 82 wells in the zone with year-round water; another 98 have water for six months or less. Piped water is available in the towns of Kamsar, Boké, Sangaredi, Coyah, Forécariah, and Benty.

#### **2.2.4 Resource Use and Production Systems**

The mixture of crops in the agricultural production system changes as one moves inland, as does the importance of other complementary production systems (i.e., fishing and livestock). Along the coast, fishing, mangrove rice cultivation, and sea salt extraction are major components of the production system. Inland, the production of tropical tree crops and vegetables increase in importance, as does upland rice and tuber production. The cultivation of mixed upland rice, fonio, peanuts, and tubers, vegetable gardening, and raising livestock are more important in the northeastern part of the zone.

Artisanal fishing is carried out primarily by Baga men and their apprentices who live along the coast between the months of October and May. The number of fishermen is between 7,607 (UNDP 1988) and 9,857 (FAO 1990). Only one-third of the fishing boats are equipped with motors (360 with motors, 727 without motors according to UNDP 1988). Men build their boats, make their nets, and work with women who smoke the fish to preserve it for transportation to distant markets. UNDP reported that 17,100 tons of fish were caught in 1987, with Boffa producing 38 percent of the total catch.

In addition to fishing, sea salt extraction is an important household industry along the coast. There are no figures about the scale of production, but it is known that the salt is a valuable commodity for markets in the interior. This is a dry-season activity, with women providing much of the labor to the man who owns the necessary equipment. Women receive less income from these activities than men, but it is an important source of revenue for them.

Rice is cultivated in three different areas of the Coastal Zone, in mangrove fields, in lowland areas subject to flooding, and on upland fields. Rice is the predominant crop of the zone, and is used to meet household subsistence and revenue needs. The majority of farm work is done with traditional hand tools. Forécariah is the only prefecture where animal-drawn plows or tractors are used. The basic unit of production is the household, and household size and composition determine the basic labor pool which is the primary constraint on production. Men generally clear and burn farm fields, while women and children help with many of the other tasks. Men also, as mentioned earlier, decide how land will be distributed to different household members.

Table 1 uses figures from the FAO survey and shows the relative importance of the three different types of rice fields. The cropping calendars differ for the fields. Upland rice fields are cleared in March, the fields are fired in May followed shortly by planting, and harvest occurs in November and December. Mangrove and lowland fields are planted in June and July, well after the rains have begun. The fields are harvested in December and January.

Production levels for lowland and mangrove rice are generally higher than for upland rice. UNDP (1988) estimated 1.19 tons/ha for lowland rice in Forécariah, where they state rice production has increased from 7,520 tons in 1985 to 14,360 tons in 1987. Mangrove rice production is most extensive along the northern coast of Boké, and many sites along the coast of Boffa, Coyah, and Forécariah have potential for development. Farmers have complained that saltwater intrusion has become more of a problem.

**Table 1. Rice Cultivation in Coastal Zone  
(000 of Ha)**

	<b>Surface</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Mangrove	9.56	15
Upland	51.30	81
Lowland	2.77	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>63.63</b>	<b>100</b>

Farmers grow an increasingly diversified mixture of crops as one moves away from the coastline. At higher altitudes, farmers devote more land to fonio and peanut cultivation. Manioc is grown throughout the zone, but sweet potatoes are only cultivated in the northern area of the zone, in Boké and Boffa. There are no references to farmers constructing fences around their fields as they do in the Central Highlands to keep out livestock. Table 2 gives the total land under cultivation for fonio, millet, peanuts, manioc, and sweet potatoes based upon figures from the 1990 FAO census.

**Table 2. Other Major Crops in Coastal Zone  
(000 of Ha)**

<b>Fonio</b>	<b>Millet</b>	<b>Peanuts</b>	<b>Manioc</b>	<b>Sweet Potato</b>
11.49	1.4	24.29	4.64	1.3

The cultivation of tropical fruits: mangoes, pineapples, oranges, coconut, oil palm, kola, and bananas provide an important source of revenue to many farmer households. Planting a tree confers ownership over its produce, and trees are inherited just as land is inherited. It is unclear to what extent women own trees, although they clearly play an important role in processing palm oil and marketing fruits at local markets.

UNDP noted in its 1988 study that some farmers in Dubreka and Coyah are attempting to rejuvenate the banana industry with some 80,000 plants under cultivation in 1987. Dubreka, Coyah, and Forécariah, which were part of an area known as the "banana triangle" during the colonial era, benefit from their proximity to good roads and ready markets in Conakry, Sierra Leone, and Fria. In Forécariah, one finds the Guinean-Libyan fruit factory, SALGUIDIA, which employs 400 people as factory workers and contract farmers. Pineapple production in this area has increased from 235 tons in 1977 to 1,256 tons in 1988. From the farmers perspective, fruit trees such as mango and kola provide an annual source of income and require very little maintenance. However, pineapple and bananas are much more labor-intensive.

Women have become very active in dry-season vegetable gardening, particularly in Coyah, Dubreka, and Forécariah. In 1987, approximately 345 tons of vegetables were marketed from Forécariah.

Women have control over household consumption since they prepare their family's daily food. There are very few food processing machines in the zone and they are unevenly distributed. FAO (1990) counted 129 rice hullers in Forécariah and 415 grinders in Boffa. Women work with their husbands in nearly all aspects of farm production, but are entirely responsible for daily household maintenance.

Livestock is found throughout the zone, but the cattle are concentrated at the higher elevations in Boké and Forécariah. In Boké, Fulbe herders are reported to move 10,000 head each dry season to water and pasture in Telimele and Boffa (UNDP 1988). Sheep and goats play an important sacrificial role in local ceremonies, and may represent a form of investment which can be quickly liquidated for cash when necessary. Table 3 below presents two sets of figures for livestock in the zone. The 1987 figures are taken from the UNDP (1988) and the 1988 figures from the FAO (1990). While these figures raise questions about methodology and validity and should be treated with caution, they do indicate that cattle production is limited here.

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Goat
1987	63.5	29.5	34.4
1988	27.3	69.3	123.7

### **2.2.5 Commercial and Market Activities**

The overall fertility of the land appears high and it supports a wide range of crops which are readily marketable. The primary roads serving commercial activity in this zone are the Boké-Boffa-Conakry road, the Conakry-Coyah-Kindia road, and the Coyah-Forécariah-Sierra Leone road. There are small daily markets in Boké and Coyah towns, and other prefectures and subprefectures are the sites of weekly markets. Although there are a few areas of the zone that are inaccessible, as secondary roads are only passable during the dry season or they are cut off by rivers, there are some excellent all-weather roads that reach the sites of weekly markets. Transporters bring traders with manufactured goods, imported rice, bread, and other goods to sell to the local people.

Women are important actors in the commercial networks as producers and marketers. They carry what they have to sell to the market where it is either bought by another local woman or a woman from another town who arranges to transport all the produce she buys to the

town for resale. Men drive the transporters/trucks and constitute the majority of large-scale wholesalers.

Kamsar is the second largest and most active port in Guinea, where the Guinean Bauxite Company (CBG) ships bauxite and receives goods. This town was one of three mining enclaves that developed during the Sekou Touré years, and continues to be a center of attraction for rural migrants. With the change in government, the opportunity exists for small business enterprises owned and operated by Guineans to provide goods and services to the mining company. The Guinea Rural Enterprise Development project, financed by USAID, plans to identify entrepreneurs in the area who will attend a training seminar and attempt to develop businesses that can develop commercial links with the CBG's purchasing office.

The commercial sector as a source of full-time employment seems to be most developed in the northern area of the zone (i.e., Boké and Boffa [UNDP 1988]). Fish, salt, and palm oil are shipped to Labé through Gaoual from Boké. Boffa's reputation as a fish producer brings Sahelian merchants south for smoked fish, palm oil, salt, and rice. The southeastern area of the Coastal Zone that is closer to Conakry commercializes fruit, vegetables, salt, and rice.

### **2.2.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

In rural Africa, large household size is an indication of wealth, as well as a means for obtaining wealth through labor and, to some degree, "pooling" incomes to meeting needs. The following are sketches of household production strategies.

**Fishing/Rice Cultivation**—large family for large labor force, improve fishing productivity and access to markets, wives extract salt.

**Tropical Fruit Cultivation**—pineapples, kola nuts, mangoes, oil palm, as primary sources of income. Smaller family size, secondary activity would be some subsistence cultivation to reduce food costs, use money from fruits to begin local commerce.

*Variant*—Wage earner/contract farmer on industrial operation in the south, single man or just married, looking to earn money but not stay in this position.

**Livestock/Mixed Upland Crop Farmer**—looking at livestock and livestock products as source of income and investment, livestock integrated into agricultural production, subsistence grain production with peanuts as a cash crop, some fruit production. Livestock important because of inaccessibility due to poor roads - livestock to markets - demand for meat and milk products high.

The principal social groups in the Coastal Zone, as defined by their occupations, are village farmers and fisherman, town merchants and transport workers, government civil servants, patriate and CBG staff, immigrant wage laborers, contract farmers, and artisans.

## **2.3 Southern Foothills**

### **2.3.1 Geography and Topography**

The southern foothills are made up of Fria, Telimele, Kindia, and Mamou prefectures. The zone is 25,242 km<sup>2</sup>, approximately 10.2 percent of the country. The topography of the zone varies greatly, with alluvial plains and rivers in the south rising to hills and plateaus in the

north where the Central Highlands begin. Altitudes rise from the southern plains at 200 m to average elevations of 400 m to 600 m throughout much of the zone. There are isolated hills that rise to altitudes of 1,094 m. Rainfall in the zone varies between 1,700 mm in the south-east to 3,300 mm around the Fria area. Average population densities range between 24 and 32 people/km<sup>2</sup>, with a zone average of 29/km<sup>2</sup>.

### 2.3.2 Population Profile

This zone is characterized by a relatively large urban population engaged in mining and commerce. To calculate the population for 1991, the SIP team used the Ministère du Plan's (1990) figures for the 1983 census and multiplied this by an average annual growth rate from the Dirasset (1988) study. In 1983, the population for the zone was 541,366, the average annual growth rate is 3.03 percent (ranging from 2.17 percent to 3.74 percent), yielding a 1991 population of 668,956. This population is described in Table 4 in terms of gender, residence, and age.

Category	Figure	Percent
Male	331,133	49.5
Female	337,822	50.5
Rural	497,034	74.3
Urban	171,921	25.7
<15 years	255,064	38
15 - 64 years	371,132	55
>64 years	42,760	7

The male-female ratio is nearly equal (98:100), as the major towns attract single men looking for work.

One aspect of the high urban population is the differences in house type. The Telimele area is the most rural, with 87.2 percent of the population living in a traditional hut. While the majority of the population in Fria live in the town itself, only 35.1 percent of the population in the prefecture live in a traditional hut. The average for the zone is 61.6 percent of the people living in traditional houses, which indicates that people have invested earnings in house improvements.

Islam is the dominant religion, particularly in the rural areas. There are small pockets of Christians in the towns of Kindia and Fria, but they make up less than 2 percent of the population.

Two ethnic groups are predominant, the Fulbe and Soussou. The Soussou are more numerous in the southern part of the zone, and the Fulbe are more numerous further north, at the higher altitudes.

**2.3.3 Community Organization and Resource Management**

Rural Fulbe and Soussou villages are organized similar to their counterparts in the Coastal and Central Highland zones. This zone is characterized by relatively large towns such as Kindia, Mamou, and Fria, which are ethnically diverse. Immigrants to Mamou and Kindia tended to settle in neighborhoods with people from their own ethnic group, which led to the development of ethnic neighborhoods. Fria differs in that the mining company provides housing to many of the workers, and these tend to be relatively mixed neighborhoods. Ethnic tension in towns is much higher than in rural areas, as competition for resources is much keener. In Fria, violence occurred during the period of civil unrest and strikes in May.

Urban neighborhoods or districts elect a representative who acts as an intermediary with the local government and is advised by a group of elders, similar to the villages. In June, all prefectural towns such as Fria and Mamou held popular elections for mayors and delegates who form the municipality that will eventually be relatively autonomous from administrative control. These democratic institutions are in an embryonic stage of development, and little is currently known about the functional problems they are encountering.

Development of large towns in the area and the relative proximity to Conakry has put pressure on forest resources for fuelwood and construction material. Charcoal-making in this area has reduced the size of classified forests. There has been some interest in revitalizing aquacultural activity which was practiced in the Mamou area during the colonial period.

**2.3.4 Resource Use and Production Systems**

Agricultural production systems vary within the zone depending upon soil conditions, population density, and rainfall. The proportionately smaller northern area of the zone is similar to the Central Highlands, where fonio and peanuts are the principal crops, and field sizes are restricted by household size (male outmigration more marked) and population density. Rice is the principal crop in the southern part of the zone on the alluvial plains. These plains are ideal for animal traction; in Mamou and, to a lesser degree, Kindia, farmers have access to plows (6,899 according to the Ministry of Planning 1990) and the cattle to pull them. Table 5 illustrates the field sizes for the southern foothills and the high percentage of larger farms.

<b>Table 5. Field Sizes for Southern Foothills (percent)</b>		
<b>&lt;.5 Ha</b>	<b>.5 - .99 Ha</b>	<b>1 - 4.99 Ha</b>
17.35	23.6	57.5

Farmers in the zone benefit from several factors: good principal roads to large town markets, the presence of an established agricultural research station, and favorable climatic and soil

conditions for a large variety of crops. Table 6 gives an idea of the proportion of land devoted to different food crops for the 1988 agricultural season (Ministry of Planning 1990).

<b>Upland Rice</b>	<b>Lowland Rice</b>	<b>Fonio</b>	<b>Manioc</b>	<b>Peanuts</b>	<b>Sorghum</b>
51	3.2	23.7	5	13.6	3.8

All traffic between Middle Guinea, Maritime Guinea, and Upper Guinea passes through Mamou. The town was created by the French during the period when the Conakry-Kankan railroad was built. Table 7 is used to explain the influence that settlement patterns have on the environment and farmers' choices about which crops to grow. The sites are best described as follows. Site 1 is on the edge of the Central Highlands. The villages such as Timbi and Poredaka have been settled on the plateau for hundreds of years and population density is high. Farmers have cultivated the land using traditional techniques for the same period. Site 2, the area around Mamou town, has been a growth area since the French founded the town. There are good roads and commercial networks to other towns. Site 3 is in the northeastern part of the prefecture where the land is relatively poor and there are many *bowal* (lateritic outcrops) but the population pressure is low. Site 4 is an area of great agricultural potential, but the area is isolated during much of the rainy season.

<b>Site</b>	<b>% of Total Surface</b>	<b>% of Population</b>	<b>Rice</b>	<b>Fonio</b>	<b>Maize</b>	<b>Garden</b>
Site 1	8%	15%	8%	25%	34%	8%
Site 2	15%	33%	23%	14%	19%	70%
Site 3	23%	23%	18%	31%	17%	10%
Site 4	54%	29%	51%	30%	30%	12%

*Source: Dirasset 1988*

Using rice as an index of soil quality, it appears that Site 1 has overworked soils, so farmers grow mostly fonio on unmanured fields, and maize in fields they fertilize around the house using manure and other local inputs. Garden production is not well developed here, compared with Site 2 where farmers have more ready access to town markets. Farmers at Site 3 have poor soils similar to Site 1, but fallow periods here are possibly longer as the population pressure is not as high. The longer fallow periods replenish the soil, enabling some rice culti-

vation. Site 4 is relatively recently settled, land is abundant, and population pressure low, but due to its isolation from markets, farmers have chosen to concentrate on grain production that will provide for their subsistence needs and store more easily.

Livestock are valuable to agricultural production as they provide manure and labor. The greatest number of livestock are in the Mamou area. Table 8 presents figures from the Diras-set (1988) study for 1987, and the Ministry of Planning (1990) for 1988.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Cattle</b>	<b>Sheep</b>	<b>Goats</b>
1987	216	64	42
1988	162	83	120

Despite the discrepancy between the two sets of figures, one sees that cattle are a large part of the resource base in the zone.

### **2.3.5 Commercial/Market Activities**

Rural women's main commercial activities center around the marketing of garden vegetables and food crops commercialization. Women in towns have organized themselves into groups that produce and market dyed cloth, local soap, and tailored and embroidered clothes, and garden on the urban fringes. One group of soap-makers in Mamou recently received a significant grant of money for their soap making operation. Women work as employees and even owners of the numerous shops and restaurants throughout the towns.

Men's commercial activities center around farming, artisanry, and controlling transportation as well as large-scale commerce.

This region is a large exporter of fruits, vegetables, and cattle to urban areas. Cattle are shipped to the Forest Zone and on to Sierra Leone. Sweet potatoes predominate among the tubers exported to Senegal.

The towns in the region import foodstuffs from within the region, as well as onions, tomatoes, and potatoes from the Central Highlands, and fish, rice, palm oil, and kola from the coastal areas. From Conakry, this zone imports manufactured goods, rice, smoked fish, salt, and a variety of processed foods and drinks.

### **2.3.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

The socioeconomic influences of Kindia, Mamou, and Fria towns are expressed as differences in household livelihood strategies between rural farmer and urban wage-earner households in the southern foothills. The persistence of large rural household size is partly attributable to traditional incentives associated with prestige. Additional factors include relatively easier access to modern medical care in the towns, which increases the likelihood of

child survival, and to the town markets for rural-produced food crops and livestock, which require large labor inputs and the demand for and availability of wage-earning jobs. Large rural households have the opportunity to combine market production of food crops and livestock with income from seasonal or long-term wage migration to nearby towns. In many cases, towns and nearby rural areas are linked with excellent all-weather roads that permit easy and frequent changes in household membership as people respond to their perceptions of available economic opportunities. Related urban and rural households exchange goods and provide services to one another, such as in the case when an urban household provides food and housing for a young rural relative continuing his/her secondary education.

Urban households depend much more on wage earning to support themselves than rural households. The principal occupational groups in the towns are merchants and transporters, salaried workers in the mining companies, government administrators and professionals, and artisans and informal sector wage earners. These households have greater access to the public school system for their children, and as children grow older, they have more opportunity for apprenticeships or training in a professional school. Although the town economies are diversified, significant economies of scale have not yet been developed outside of the still relatively isolated mining enclaves.

## **2.4 Central Highlands**

### ***2.4.1 Geography and Topography***

The Central Highlands are located entirely within Middle Guinea, and include the prefectures of Dalaba, Pita, Labé, Koubia, Mali, Tougue, and Lelouma. This area is also known as the Fouta Djallon. The size of the area is 32,336 km<sup>2</sup>, about 13 percent of the country's total area. There are three major plateaus as well as numerous mountains and valleys that define the landscape. Altitude varies between 800 m and 1,500 m, and moderates the area's climate. There are many micro-environments within the zone. Lateritic outcrops on upland areas support grasslands but have little agricultural potential. Slopes and soils on hillsides vary greatly. Alluvial floodplains have good agricultural potential, but health conditions at these lower altitudes are worse due to onchocerciasis and sleeping sickness.

The Central Highlands are well watered, receiving between 1,500 mm and 2,000 mm of rain annually. Agriculture in this zone is predominantly rainfed, and limited hand irrigation cultivation is practiced. Rainfall decreases as one moves north. Most of it falls between the months of May and October. Thirteen major rivers have their source in the Highlands, including the Gambia, Senegal, Koliba, and others. Areas of the zone have insufficient water for resident populations during the dry season due to the cutting of groundcover over the last century, which has led to rapid rainfall runoff, affecting the infiltration and groundwater recharge rates.

One is immediately struck by the beauty of the Highlands. There also appears to be potential for developing hydroelectric production and exploiting the micro-environments to develop fruit, vegetable, and livestock production.

### 2.4.2 Population Profile

The figures below are a synthesis of several sources, the UNDP study (1988) provided information on population growth rates, age groups, and ethnic and religious composition. The Ministry of Planning's Statistical Bulletin (1990) provided information on population size, rural-urban, and male-female percentages for 1983 that the SIP team used to project figures for 1991. As will be shown in more detail, the Central Highlands are characterized by a predominantly rural, female, and young population.

The population census in 1983 counted 940,065 people in the Central Highlands. The average growth rate for this area is 3.15 percent (ranging from 2.06 percent to 3.78 percent) bringing the estimate for the 1991 population to 1,100,012. Population densities vary a great deal in the zone. For example, on the central plateau, average densities range between 22 and 64 people/km<sup>2</sup>. In the northern area of the zone, average population densities fall to between 18 and 24 people/km<sup>2</sup>. Table 9 describes the population in terms of gender, age, and residence.

<b>Category</b>	<b>Figure</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Male	514,238	44.3
Female	648,577	55.7
Rural	1,100,012	94.4
Urban	65,091	5.6
<15 years	495,169	42.5
15 - 64 years	583,761	50.1
>64 years	86,173	7.4

The male-female ratio is 80:100. This is due to the high incidence of male outmigration. In a survey of seven villages in Labé prefecture, Roberts (1991) found 29 percent were female-headed households. Landeck (1990) surveyed two villages in Koumba prefecture and found that 20 percent of the households were female-headed. Although the average household size for the region is 6.3 (the range of averages for the prefectures is 5 to 8), female-headed households are significantly smaller, with 4.6 in one area (Roberts 1991). In addition, nearly half the population is younger than 15 or older than 64 years of age. This has implications for household agricultural production and overall economic strategy that will be discussed in more detail later.

The predominant ethnic group are the Fulbe. The Diallonké people who remained in the Fouta after the Fulbe conquest have largely been assimilated (except those in northern Mali on the northern side of the Gambia River, an area formerly known as Sangalan). There are also pockets of Sarakolle, who are the descendants of caravan traders prior to French coloni-

zation in the northern (Koubia and Mali) and western (Lelouma) areas of the zone. There are Diakhanké (religious specialists) villages in the northern area of the zone. The principal language is Pular/Fulfulde.

Although village size within the zone varies greatly, the majority of villages have fewer than 500 residents (the largest of 13 villages that Roberts and Landeck surveyed was 385). Eighty-six percent of the people in the zone live in the traditional round hut, although one finds well-constructed "modern" houses throughout the zone.

The central zone has a very strong Islamic tradition, with a 98.7 percent Muslim population. The 0.4 percent Christian and 0.3 percent reported animist population in all likelihood represents government civil service in the towns and a few converts.

#### **2.4.3 Community Organization and Resource Management**

As in the Coastal Zone, there is a tradition of junior subordination to elders, and female subordination to males. Islam tradition continues to be a strong factor in the ideological organization of community authority structures and what is considered the proper conduct of social life throughout the zone.

Fulbe society is hierarchically organized into five major groups. The traditional elite are descended from the families who took the lead in the wars which resulted in the formation of a Fouta Djallon theocratic state. The descendants of earlier Fulbe families who were formerly animist and primarily pastoralists are considered another group, often referred to as *pouli*. In the process of creating a theocratic state, the elite took many captives (*maccube*) who became their personal property and the principal labor force for agricultural production. A smaller segment of the population were the caste groups such as blacksmiths, woodworkers, and leatherworkers, who provided essential services to the society. There is another group referred to as free Fulbe, a group that lacks social distinction.

Historically, the social hierarchy was linked to access to resources such as land, education, political power, as well as occupation and economic status. The traditional elite continue to maintain customary control over large areas of land which they rent to other farmers. They also hold key positions in local religious and political organizations through which they exert influence and authority in the public decision-making arena. However, as a result of historical processes, individuals from other social groups have gained ground on the traditional elite. Individual "ownership" of land is now common, and people from formerly landless social groups possess titles to property. In principle, primary school education is available to all people, although schools are often located in the villages occupied primarily by families of the traditional elite (school enrollments for the central zone are among the lowest in the country). During the First Republic, individuals from subordinate social groups gained positions in local political organizations. Men from caste groups, for example, hold some of the most lucrative jobs in the rural areas as butchers, carpenters, and masons.

As in the Coastal Zone, a council of elders exists that embodies the social wisdom and morality of the village. They also arbitrate disputes between families within the village in an attempt to restore social harmony and keep outsiders (the government) out of internal village affairs. A man is socially responsible for his household (minimally composed of a man and his wife). He is expected to pay taxes and represent the household at all village functions and

ceremonies. Should he leave the village for work, as happens for a year or more, a male relative is asked to take social responsibility for the household. There are reduced expectations that a female-headed household will participate in village functions and ceremonies in the same way as if the man were present, which means the household may be saved from these often substantial expenditures.

Age groups are important in the Central Highlands as the groups in which individuals most often socialize. The Fulbe are unlike Soussou and Malinké, where age groups are often the basis of work parties for agricultural production or self-help projects.

There are common resources available to all villagers (i.e., water, forest products, and Koranic education), while other resources, such as land, are subject to rules which vary to some extent within the Central Highlands, but have become individualized.

The Central Highlands is the watershed of West Africa, and the majority of women and their children search for water from springs and streams. There are at least 557 perennial springs and streams in the zone, with another 123 that have water for six months of the year (UNDP 1988). Wells, on the other hand, are less common (301 in the zone). They may be located within the compound of the household who dug them, or located in a public area if built by a project such as SNAPE.

The Fulbe use forest resources to construct and maintain the fences which surround their villages, to build and repair houses, to add a green leaf mulch to the women's fields within the village, for fuelwood, and to make condiments, medicines, and herbal teas. As in the Coastal Zone, people take what is available according to their needs, with the exception of commercially valuable trees for which a license must be obtained. Women and, to a lesser degree, children, are actively involved in natural resource management, collecting wild fruits, *neré*, and *karité*, as well as daily fuelwood supplies. Planting a tree denotes ownership over the tree, and has been extended by some to denote ownership or control over a piece of land.

Koranic education is mentioned here because as it is an essential component of what is required to become a member of the community. All villages have Koranic teachers (*kuro-moko*), who teach children the basics of the Koran, prayer, and correct social conduct. Islam is an integral part of the value system and serves as a reference for decisions. It is a component of village solidarity and ethnic identity, although it reinforces gender, age, and educational stratification.

Men control and allocate land in the Central Highlands. Land "ownership" is most commonly acquired through inheritance, from father to son(s). Land can be bought and sold, although this appears to be rare in rural areas. Landowners loan land to other farmers, and in return receive a *farilla* equal to one-tenth of the harvest. The male household head is responsible for obtaining farm land each year which he allocates among different household members. In order to borrow land, he may give a gift of kola or money to the landowner. Women acquire a field called the *suntuure* from their husbands when they marry. A woman maintains control over this field as long as she remains married to her husband. If her husband dies, she can maintain her control over the field through her son or by remarrying a relative of the deceased husband. Divorces do not appear to last long in the Central Highlands given the prestige men attach to polygyny, but in such a case, a woman would return to her parents' home

and have access to land there. A woman gives part of her *suntuure* to her son's wife when the marriage is completed.

#### **2.4.4 Resource Use and Production Systems**

Farmers cultivate three different types of fields that have different crops and cultivation schedules. Grain fields (*ngesa*) are located outside the village. Farmers follow an extensive shifting cultivation-fallow strategy for fonio, rice, and to a lesser extent, sorghum and sesame. Production levels vary greatly. Women have *suntuure* fields in the village where follox, an intensive cultivation strategy, is used to annually produce maize, taro, sweet potatoes, pumpkins, beans, manioc, and pepper. Farmers also cultivate fruit and vegetable gardens. Men own almost all the fruit trees, and both men and women grow vegetables they sell at weekly markets.

Vegetation cover is an important criterion for farmers in choosing a site to cultivate grains. Clearing land begins as early as January, although most men don't start until March. Clearing is men's work, and prestigious men often benefit from work parties (*kile*) to help them finish farm tasks quickly. Groups of farmers from the same village tend to cultivate an area together, and thereby share the task of building a fence around the field. Although this is a very time-consuming male task, and is necessary to keep livestock from eating the crops, all household members who are able help plant the crop—fonio on the plateau and poorer soils, and upland rice on newly cut fields where the soil is rich enough. Weeding is done by hand, and children spend the days in the fields scaring away birds and other animals as the grain ripens. Harvest begins as early as September for early-maturing fonio varieties, and the entire family participates in harvesting, threshing, and storing the grain. Farmers are aware that, as rural populations increase, there is an increased demand for land, which can lead to shorter fallow periods between cultivation cycles. The result is a spiraling effect of decreased soil fertility, lower yields, and shorter periods of cultivation.

Women regularly throw ashes from their fires, house refuse, and fruit and vegetable peelings onto their *suntuure* to enrich the soil. Manure is added to the soil during the dry season when a woman or her children have the time to collect it. Women and children also place green leaves over their field as a mulch that inhibits weed growth after weeding, protects the soil from erosion, and improves soil structure and quality. As a result of this fertilization, production levels are more consistent and returns to labor are higher than for grain fields. A woman and her children work throughout the year in the *suntuure*. Men's labor contributions are generally confined to repairing the fence around the field to keep out livestock and helping plant maize at the beginning of the dry season. A woman gives her husband a *farilla* of the maize harvest (he is the field owner), but controls the allocation of the rest of its produce. Women generally earn some money by selling produce at the local markets, and the *suntuure* can provide up to half of a household's staple food requirements as well as much of the ingredients for sauces during the rainy season.

Gardens appear to be increasingly popular in the central zone. Oranges, avocados, mangoes, and bananas are produced for markets. Farmers grow vegetables throughout the year. Men have the largest vegetable gardens, but many women are able to borrow land for their own production in return for helping the landowner with watering and marketing tasks. Chemical fertilizers are available from towns, but most farmers rely on using manure to enrich their

fields. Farmers may find themselves in the position of having to choose whether to use manure for their *suntuure* or garden field.

Farmers living on the gently sloping plains of the central plateau or in the river valleys use animal traction equipment when it is available. According to the Ministry of Planning (1990) 20 percent of the plows in the country are in the Central Highlands Zone. The majority of farmers use hand tools which they obtain from local blacksmiths. The slope of the land and the rocky soil are obstacles to mechanized farm equipment. In addition, farmers need to leave tree roots in place as the tree is essential to restoring soil nutrients during fallow and providing fertile ash once the area is cleared and burned.

Farmers grow a wide variety of crops in the different micro-environments found in the Central Highlands Zone. Field size in the zone, as shown in Table 10, is very small as a large number of able-bodied men leave their villages to work elsewhere, generally leaving their wives and children behind. Women continue to farm their *suntuure*, but without male labor, they are unable to cultivate a large grain field. It should be noted that grain yields are often very low. The most frequently used figure for fonio is 500 kg/ha (Stryker 1989).

>0.5 Ha	0.5 - .99 Ha	1 - 4.99 Ha
52.2	23.9	23.3

Two recent studies have calculated that the average *suntuure* size is approximately 0.15 Ha (UNDP/FIDA 1988, Roberts 1991). Table 11 presents an estimation of the annual yields according to UNDP/IFAD (1988).

Crop	Surface ha	Production kg/ha	Production kg
Maize	.040	1,000	40
Beans	.020	300	6
Taro	.030	6,000	180
Sweet Potato	.020	8,000	160
Manioc	.025	8,000	200
Other	.015	2,000	30

Roberts (1991) calculated fonio yields per person for a sample of 19 households in the 1987 farming season, and found that average yields varied from 20 kg/person for female-headed households to 103 kg/person for elite households. The average for the sample was 70 kg/person, well below the FAO's estimate of 200 kg/person/year to meet necessary minimal nutritional requirements.

The diversity of the agricultural system, despite the low productivity of grain fields, is one of the most interesting aspects of the zone. On the one hand, it is hypothesized that farmers in the zone are unable to produce enough food to meet minimum nutritional requirements, and this forces people to migrate (migration as a safety valve). On the other hand, the population growth rates for some areas are the highest in rural Guinea. The feminization of agriculture in this zone demonstrates how many male farmers have decided that migration and not grain farming is the best way to acquire the necessary resources to establish, perpetuate, and further the well being of their households.

The climate of the central zone is well suited for livestock as the upper areas of the plateau are completely free of tse-tse fly. They are valuable elements of the farm system providing manure and in some cases pulling plows. People invest in livestock, particularly goats, since they reproduce quickly and are used for ceremonial sacrifice. Table 12 gives an idea of the numbers of livestock found in this zone based on figures from UNDP (1988) and the Ministry of Planning (1990).

<b>Year</b>	<b>Cattle</b>	<b>Goats</b>	<b>Sheep</b>
1987	425,300	178,200	108,800
1988	220,230	233,127	101,757

The largest discrepancy in the figures is for cattle, which people in the central zone prefer not to enumerate. People generally own small numbers of cattle that they let wander for forage and water for most of the year. Little effort is made to herd the animals, although heifers are generally kept closer to the village. Larger herds are found in the northern part of the zone where population densities are lower, there is more range land, and the possibility of conflict over cattle damage with farmers is reduced.

#### **2.4.5 Commercial and Market Activities**

**Commodity Markets:** weekly markets in subprefecture, agricultural production. women sellers, village sellers, credit, imported rice 3:1 over grains, gardens. Specialty markets such as Tianguel-Bory for cattle.

**Regional and International Markets from Labé:** Transportation links to Conakry, N'Zerekore, Dakar, Basse, Freetown - agricultural product redistribution (palm oil, smoked fish, fruits, imported rice), cattle, indigo cloth, salt, cigarettes.

**Labor markets:** Dakar, Abidjan, Conakry - strategy for accumulation, social stratification differentiation. Both seasonal and longer term, but very pronounced in 15 to 45 year age group for men. Possible connection between occupations sought and traditional social status not determined, wage labor, spiritual specialists, farming, charcoal production. Different area of zone, in north to Senegal and Mali (some gold mining during dry season), in central and southern areas to south, Conakry and Abidjan.

#### **2.4.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

Farm production is the most common rural household production strategy. Adult women produce a substantial proportion of their basic household food consumption needs within their *suntuure* each year. In addition, throughout the rainy season, a good female farmer earns a small but regular income from the sales of *suntuure* produce that she uses to purchase other household food needs in the market. Grain production is largely for household consumption and is organized by the male household head. Dry- and rainy-season vegetable and fruit production appears to be expanding as market demands and incomes earned are increasingly attractive incentives to rural farmers. Constraints to commercial production of fruits and vegetables include access to land, inputs (fertilizer, water), transportation bottlenecks, and marketing gluts that drive prices down.

Male outmigration has affected rural household farm production strategies. Farming appears to be increasingly a vocation for rural women, and their *suntuure* production the distinctive criterion of the farm system. Male outmigration can be attributed to the opportunity costs of grain production in the Central Highlands as perceived by the rural men whose goals can generally be framed in terms of establishing an independent household, ensuring its viability, and accumulating resources for an improved standard of living. A man who successfully established himself in another town will spend much of his active adult life between his rural and urban households, and he will depend on his rural wife/wives for the day-to-day management of household affairs during his absence. He should provide his rural family with money regularly. Some women use part of this money to diversify their own rural economic activities, such as engaging in petty commerce. The high incidence of female-headed households, and the decreasing importance of grain production in many rural areas may result in rural women questioning the "economic need" to continue having large families.

Education is highly regarded, and households apparently choose, with some success, children who do well in public schools as this area has the lowest rates for repetition and the highest rates of advancement to secondary school. All children go to Koranic schools, and education is recognized as a resource for occupational specialization in the modern economy and as influence and power in the more "traditional" village society. Apprenticeship continues to be an important mechanism for occupational mobility and diversification.

In urban areas, such as Labé, merchants exert much socioeconomic influence in their control over international and regional trade networks. This community appears well-organized and close-knit.

## 2.5 Northern Savannah

### 2.5.1 Geography and Topography

The northern savannah zone is northwest of the Central Highlands and consists of the prefectures of Gaoual and Koundara. The size of the zone is 17,003 km<sup>2</sup>, approximately 7 percent of the country total. The hills and plateaus in the east have been settled the longest and are an extension of the Central Highlands with similar topographic features, *bowal* (lateritic outcrops), relatively poor soils, and the higher population densities in the zone. Savannah plains begin at an altitude between 300 m and 500 m in the east, and drop to elevations between 100 m and 300 m to the northwest toward the borders of Guinea Bissau and Senegal. The broad alluvial plains in the zone's river system are subject to annual flooding, and are only 50 m above sea level near the town of Koundara and the area south of Gaoual. This western savannah is an area of relatively recent settlement and has low population densities. Onchocerciasis is present in the river basins of the Balanta and Tominé, where agricultural potential is high. Livestock production is very high in these areas, as there is little competition with farmers for land. Rainfall decreases from the southeastern part of the zone (1,900 mm) to the northwestern part of the zone (1,200 mm).

Gaoual is reported to contain large deposits of Bauxite (194 billion tons with between 40 percent and 48 percent aluminum content) and iron ore (600 million tons with between 31 percent and 37 percent iron content). There are reported findings of gold in the area (UNDP 1988).

### 2.5.2 Population Profile

The zone is predominantly rural and ethnically diverse, although the Fulbe are in the majority.

The SIP used the 1983 census population figure of 172,911 (Ministry of Planning 1990) and the average annual growth rate for the zone of 3.27 percent (UNDP 1988) to estimate the 1991 population of 219,426. Population density is low: the average for the zone is 14.5 people/km<sup>2</sup>. Table 13 gives specific demographic figures for the zone in terms of gender, age, and residence.

**Table 13. Population Profile 1991**

Category	Figure	Percent
Male	104,666	47.7
Female	114,760	52.3
Rural	195,791	89.3
Urban	23,624	10.7
<15 years	93,256	42.5
15 - 64 years	115,638	52.7
>64 years	10,532	4.8

The male-female ratio is 91:100. Migration patterns in the zone are mixed. There is young male outmigration from the southeastern areas, and immigration—pioneer settlement by farmers—in the more fertile areas of the northwest.

Sixty-one percent of the rural population live in villages with 300 to 900 people, and 23 percent of the population in villages smaller than 300 people. Ethnicity and geographic location influence village size. The urban population lives in the towns of Gaoual, Koundara, and Sambailo.

Table 14 presents the ethnic composition of the zone.

<b>Table 14. Ethnic Profile (percent)</b>					
<b>Fulbe</b>	<b>Diakanké</b>	<b>Malinké</b>	<b>Foulakounda</b>	<b>Tenda</b>	<b>Badiaranke</b>
60%	12%	4%	10%	10%	3.8%

Islam is the predominant religion. There are sizeable pockets of Catholics and animists among the Tenda (Bassari and Coniagui) and Badiaranke near the northern border with Senegal equal to a combined total of 30 percent of the population for Koundara.

### **2.5.3 Community Organization and Resource Management**

The Fulbe in the zone organize their villages in much the same way as their relatives in the Central Highlands. What makes this zone particularly interesting is the ethnic diversity. A brief description of the community organization of the major groups follows.

*Foulakounda*—Mixed agro-pastoral economy in small villages.

*Bassari/Coniagui*—Agricultural societies with strong hunting tradition. Have effectively resisted assimilation by politically dominant societies (Fulbe, French, Touré socialists). Permanent compact villages. Bassari leave their villages during rainy season and move to their farms.

*Diakhanké*—Religious specialists with a strong trading tradition. Village of Touba is a well-known religious center.

### **2.5.4 Resource Use and Production Systems**

This is a transitional zone between the Central Highlands and the savannah plains of eastern Senegal and Guinea Bissau. In the southeastern area of the zone, very similar to the Central Highlands, the *suntuure* is the center of agricultural production, complemented with grain fields. There is a significant migration of young men from this area. The savannah plains, which are extension zones for farmers from the Central Highlands, have larger fields and a mixed agro-pastoral economy is practiced. Table 15 gives a breakdown of farms in the zone according to information collected in 1988 by the Ministry of Planning (1990).

**Table 15. Field Sizes in the Northern Savannah 1988  
(percent)**

0 - .49 Ha	.5 - .99 Ha	1 - 4.99 Ha
38%	31.5%	29.5%

A survey conducted on a small sample of 54 households in Koundara found that the average farm size was 5.8 ha (ranging from 4 to 8 hectares). Throughout the northwest, farm sizes are generally larger. Farmers are able to cultivate more land since population densities are lower and animal traction equipment (particularly plows) is available. There are an estimated 6,700 plows in the zone, and 90 tractors worked during the 1987 agricultural season (another 180 tractors were out of commission). The Ministry of Planning (1990) estimated that animal traction was used for 85 percent of the fields in Koundara in 1988. The possibilities for mechanized agriculture in the zone are attractive for groups of outsiders (i.e., merchants from Labé) to farm a large area cooperatively.

Table 16 gives an indication of the relative importance of different crops in the zone. The table presents information for the consecutive 1987 and 1988 cropping years. The 1987 data are derived from a study of 54 households in Koundara (UNDP) and the 1988 data are from the Ministry of Planning (1990).

**Table 16. Crop Selection 1987 - 1988  
(percent)**

Year	Rice	Peanuts	Maize	Fonio	Millet	Manioc
1987	30%	20%	9%	23%	18%	-
1988	36%	28%	11%	8%	8%	8%

Despite larger fields through the use of labor-saving equipment, yields in the area are low, as shown in Table 17. Farmers are reportedly cultivating less floodplain rice than in the past—possibly a function of erratic rainfall (UNDP 1988).

Livestock production is practiced on a large scale in the zone. UNDP (1988) reports there are large herders who left the country with their cattle during the Touré regime who have returned. One owner in Gaoual claimed to have 1,500 head in 1987, and over 170 households reported owning between 100 and 500 head of cattle. It is likely that some owners have underreported the number of cattle they own. Table 18 compares figures from the UNDP (1988) and Ministry of Planning (1990) for the livestock in the area.

**Table 17. Crop Yields in Koundara 1987**

<b>Crop</b>	<b>Yield kg/ha</b>
Rice	485
Millet	380
Fonio	190
Peanut	450
Maize	365

A small number of households in Koundara have purchased donkeys and horses in Senegal which are used for transportation and agriculture.

**Table 18. Livestock in Northern Savannah  
(000 head)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Cattle</b>	<b>Sheep</b>	<b>Goats</b>
1987	192	27	48
1988	114	28	65

Tree crops, which are not very important, consist of mangoes and a small number of bananas. Vegetable gardening has not developed, nor is there a large market for this produce.

#### **2.5.5 Commercial/Market Activities**

The main transportation links are the Labé-Dakar road, the Boké-Gaoual road, and the Sareboido-Guinea Bissau road. Gaoual market of Kansaguel provides cattle to major markets in Tianguel-Bori in the Central Highlands, and Konkoure in the southern foothills.

In addition to cattle, commodity exports include rice and honey to Labé, cattle, forest products, manioc and honey north to Senegal. Major commodity imports are salt, palm oil, fish, flour, and manufactured products from Boké, Senegal, and Labé.

#### **2.5.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

The predominantly rural northern savannah households live in areas with relatively low population densities that are conducive to both extensive (in many areas, mechanical) agricultural production and raising large numbers of livestock. The labor requirements are large for a household to successfully pursue agricultural and livestock production on an extensive scale. This labor requirement acts as an incentive for large families and the maintenance of "traditional" forms of labor mobilization through cooperative work parties. Households with sufficient resources have been able to obtain animal traction equipment that is well suited to

much of the terrain in the area and further expand their production. Rice, peanuts, and live-stock are commodities produced for markets within and outside the country.

Long duration of male outmigration is most pronounced in those areas bordering the Central Highlands, but seasonal migration for wage labor is common throughout the area. Full-time merchants form an important but relatively small segment of the population.

## **2.6 Upper Niger Valley**

The Upper Niger Valley is a sparsely settled zone where an essentially Malinké population practices a mixed farming system which includes a variety of cereal crops plus animal husbandry. The zone is characterized by rolling hills draining into narrow streambeds at the headwaters of the Niger River. Agricultural production systems integrate three types of fields: extensively cultivated family fields on the plateaus, intensively cultivated permanent fields near the village, and limited areas of floodplains and/or natural depressions.

### **2.6.1 Geography and Topography**

The Upper Niger agro-ecological zone covers a ring of upland prefectures that drain into the headwaters of the Niger River in Upper Guinea and the Forest Region. It includes the prefectures of Faranah, Dabola, Dinguiraye, Kissidougou, and Beyla. The zone covers an area of 58,248 km<sup>2</sup>, just over one-fifth of the national territory.

The topography of the Upper Niger agro-ecological zone is characterized by gentle slopes and irregular plateaus. Streams have etched their way through the uneven terrain and left behind narrow floodplains. Rapid stream drops have spawned onchocerciasis in many locations thereby restricting agricultural activity in a number of otherwise promising floodplains.

Annual rainfall averages range from about 1,400 mm in the north to about 2,100 mm in the south.

### **2.6.2 Demography**

The SIP team based its estimates of 1991 population in the zone on revised 1983 population figures reported by the National Department of Statistics and Information Science (1990c). Annual population growth in the zone is 2.95 percent, somewhat higher than the national average. Accordingly, the team estimated the 1991 population of the zone at 679,879 including 340,777 males and 339,102 females. Slightly over 9 percent of the national population lives in the zone. The male-to-female ratio is almost 1:1. The estimated 1991 population density is 13.2 per km<sup>2</sup>. Over 80 percent of the population is rural. Over three-quarters of the urban population is evenly divided between the cities of Faranah and Kissidougou, the only major urban centers of the zone.

The able-bodied adult population is estimated at 376,272 or 55.3 percent. Average household size in the zone is 6.16 persons (Dirasset 1988c; FAO 1988:Annex 3, 1).

Malinké and related peoples dominate the zone, particularly in the northern reaches. Pockets of Ffulde speakers live among them. One group came into the area from the Fouta Toro in the 19th century with the conquests of El Hadj Umar Tall. Other groups coming from the Fouta Djallon immediately to the west have settled on the fringes of the zone. Still others are transhumant pastoralists scattered throughout the zone. The home area of the Kissi lies in the

southern part of the zone. Many of the Kissi are Catholic. The overall population of the zone is approximately 86 percent Muslim.

### **2.6.3 Community Organization and Resource Management**

The rural population lives in villages which averaged just under 500 persons in a 16-village sample in Dabola Prefecture (FAO 1988:Annex 3, 1). Villages coalesce around a founding clan whose senior member plays the role of the village chief. The leaders of the first clans to join the new village establish neighborhoods of which they become head. The heads of the neighborhoods then form a council of elders with the village chief the first among equals. Each neighborhood is made up of a number of extended family households. Later arrivals in the village establish their households in one of the neighborhoods under the authority of the leader of its founding clan.

The council of elders exercises the political leadership of the village and is the ultimate authority in allocation of resource rights. A senior woman of the founding clan usually plays the role of women's leader and represents women's interests in village councils.

Each clan in the village is led by its senior male member. He exercises a moral authority over the households in the village that claim descent from a common ancestor. The head of each of the constituent households is also usually the senior male member. Households among the Malinké and sedentary Fulbe contain an average of 2.5 nuclear families related patrilineally through direct or collateral ties (FAO 1988:Annex 3, 1). Among the pastoral Fulbe, households are smaller as sons tend to split off from their father's household when they marry.

Access to land comes through clan membership. Each household has rights to a share in village clan lands. The household generally works most of its lands collectively. In addition, the head of the household may assign portions of family lands to individual members to work as their private fields.

Malinké and Fulbe society are hierarchical. The hierarchy contains four caste levels: nobles, freemen, various artisans, and captives. People marry outside their clans but generally within their castes. Caste membership has been important historically in determining access to resources. The emergence of choices linked to a market economy is gradually eroding the economic importance of caste. However, caste antecedents still play an important role in assigning people's location in the social landscape despite their achievement in the market economy.

Men and women in the village are each organized into age-sets which cut across clan and caste lines. Age-sets group people of the same gender born within the same five-to-seven-year period. The age-sets are active from initiation through death. They are the framework for cooperative activities in the village, including exchanges of agricultural labor and execution of village projects (i.e., construction of schools, dispensaries, or mosques). In some villages, age-sets have provided a framework for creation of a local nongovernmental organization.

### **2.6.4 Resource Use and Production Systems**

Agricultural production in the Upper Niger Valley is particularly diverse. Half of all households grow between 7 and 10 different crops (FAO 1988). Households produce several types

of rice plus maize, manioc, and fonio, mainly for their own consumption, and peanuts and vegetables mainly as cash crops.

Households have three types of fields:

**Fields on the plateaus and upland slopes** are controlled by the male head of the household. Families use extensive agricultural systems on these fields. As villages have grown, pressures have increased on upland field resources. Rather than cultivate increasingly distant fields, people opt for shorter fallowing periods on proximate fields. Upland fields cover the largest share of family holdings. In most of the zone, rainfed rice is the main rainy-season crop on the upland fields. In the northern areas, maize may take precedence over rainfed rice. Families also generally grow manioc and fonio on their upland fields. Finally, families often grow some millet and/or sorghum on their upland fields during the rainy season.

Women and unmarried young men are often allocated personal fields in the uplands. Women grow peanuts in their personal upland fields in the rainy season. They may allocate their harvests to meet social as well as economic needs without consulting the family head. They may use their own discretion to dispose of income from sales of commodities produced on their personal fields. The cultivation of personal fields is on the decline, as families are redeploying women's labor to maintain production in the family fields in response to economic pressures to redeploy male labor to cash-generating activities.

**Permanent fields** are located closer to the houses than family fields. They are smaller than family fields. People are able to cultivate them perennially by building up the soils with organic fertilizers such as household refuse or animal droppings. Women are responsible for the bulk of the work on the permanent fields. They concentrate on growing maize and condiments.

Finally, households have **fields in floodplains of rivers or in natural drainage depressions**. Floodplains and depressions cover the smallest share of a household's agricultural resources. They are the most reliable and, therefore, the most valuable agricultural resource. These fields are quickly divided up by the founding families within the village territory. Later arrivals gain access by borrowing from original claimants. People use them to grow rice in the rainy season. Women often grow vegetables for market, particularly onions, in the floodplains during the dry season.

Approximately 55 percent of households in the zone cultivate from 1 to 5 hectares per year. The major constraint on the area cultivated is the number of able-bodied adults in the household. Each able-bodied adult can cultivate about 0.6 hectares. Table 19 compares 1987 and 1988 figures for cropping areas for major crops in three of the prefectures in the zone (figures for Kissidougou were not available).

The main value of these figures is in demonstrating orders of magnitude of cropping area and the relationship patterns of surfaces under major crops.

FAO (1988) found that all households in its sample grew peanuts. Similarly, 96 percent of all households grew maize, 94 percent grew rice, and 92 percent grew manioc. It also found that 94 percent of women were growing peanuts on their personal fields, 19 percent were grow-

ing maize on their personal fields, and 48 percent were doing vegetable gardening on floodplains during the dry season.

**Table 19. Cropping Areas for Major Crops of the Upper Niger (hectares)**

	rice	maize	fonio	manioc	millet/ peanuts	sorghum	total
<b>1987</b>	14,607	7,572	9,987	1,489	5,430	3,924	43,009
% of total	34.0	17.6	23.2	3.5	12.6	9.1	100
<b>1988</b>	22,770	4,294	8,559	1,628	5,163	5,583	48,012
% of total	47.4	8.9	17.8	3.4	10.8	11.6	99.9

*Source: Dirasset, 1988c; Ministere du Plan et de la Cooperation Internationale, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique, 1990b*

Diversifying the cropping pattern of the zone allows farmers to maximize their yields by staggering agricultural labor requirements across the rainy season. Farmers plant rainfed cereals in May/June as the rains begin. Planting is earlier in the south than in the north. They plant a long cycle of rice in the floodplains as river waters rise, and plant rice progressively in natural depressions following the receding water level. Maize and early fonio, the first crops harvested, are ready in August. Millet/sorghum, peanuts, late fonio, and rainfed rice varieties are usually harvested in September/October. Floodplain rice is harvested in November/December. Manioc is not harvested until January/February.

The principal labor force of the household is increasingly becoming women and young men. Mature men generally clear the land and prepare the soil. Thereafter, they often leave for the season in search of employment. Women and young men left behind are then responsible for planting and maintaining the crop through harvest. Men's and women's age classes provide important supplemental agricultural labor on a revolving basis at critical periods for 90 percent of the households in the FAO (1988) survey.

The recent national agricultural census (Ministere du Plan et de la Cooperation Internationale, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique, 1990b) estimated that in 1988/1989, farmers in the Upper Niger zone cultivated around 15 percent of cropped land with animal traction. Virtually all of the rest was cultivated by hand.

Average rainfed rice yields increase as a function of increasing rainfall from around 550 kg per hectare in the north to 925 kg per hectare in the southern parts of the zone. Maize yields are around 800 kg per hectare in family fields and may reach 2 tons per hectare in the more

intensively cultivated permanent fields. Fonio yields average around 750 kg per hectare and peanuts around 500 kg per hectare. Manioc yields average over 3 tons per hectare.

Households in the zone keep considerable numbers of livestock. Pastoral Fulbe manage a share of them in a transhumant strategy. However, the majority of the livestock is owned by sedentary households. They allow the livestock to range freely during the day in the dry season. Children are assigned to keep them away from cropped fields during the agricultural season. The animals are generally parked at night near the owner's residence. The permanent fields of the family will receive manure from the animal park. Table 20 compares figures for livestock estimates in the zone in 1987 and 1988.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Cattle</b>	<b>Sheep</b>	<b>Goats</b>
1987	154	53	38
1988	167	74	57

*Source: Dirasset, 1988c; Ministere du Plan et de la Cooperation Internationale, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique, 1990b*

The recent agricultural census (Ministere du Plan et de la Cooperation Internationale, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique, 1990b) recorded 693 hectares of rice in the zone grown in irrigation systems constructed with external technical assistance.

### **2.6.5 Commercial/Market Activity**

Close to one-quarter of the able-bodied population regularly supplements agricultural income with off-farm employment in the vicinity of the village. By far the most common off-farm activity is commerce. Traders account for almost one-third of the population with off-farm employment. Another third is divided evenly between fishing and wage labor.

Upper Niger is a major transit area for commercial ties linking the Eastern Savannah and the Forest Zone with the rest of Guinea. RN 2, the paved road linking Mamou and the coast with N'Zerekore, passes through Upper Niger. The main markets of the zone lie on or near this road. The market at Yende-Millimo, south of Kissidougou, is the major collection point for tropical products, particularly palm oil, from markets in the Forest Zone for forwarding to the distribution markets in Lower Guinea. Similarly, the market in Tiro, south of Faranah, is the major collection point for rice and other cereals produced on the coast or in Lower Guinea, for distribution in the Eastern Savannah or the Forest Zone.

Dogomet, east of Dabola near the Mamou line, has a livestock market which collects large numbers of animals from the northern parts of the Upper Niger for distribution to urban markets in Lower Guinea and the coast.

### **2.6.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

The household livelihood strategy relies on diversification of production to assure family food security. If one crop or one type of field fails, the household should still have production of other crops and other types of fields. The household generates monetary income by marketing a portion of its rice, peanuts, maize, and manioc harvests, in order of importance, and by deploying male labor to employment outside the area.

A number of migrants look for employment in the gold fields of Siguiri Prefecture. The gold fields usually suspend operations for the rainy season. Migrants then return home to help their families through the cropping cycle. Dirasset (1988c) feels that the attraction of the gold fields is having a significant negative impact on agricultural production in the zone.

## **2.7 Eastern Savannah**

The Eastern Savannah is also a sparsely settled area where an essentially Malinké population practices a mixed farming system. The zone is characterized by extensive plains crisscrossed by broad floodplains of relatively slow-flowing rivers. The farming system in the Eastern Savannah therefore incorporates considerably more floodplain land than in the Upper Niger, and the crop mix in the Eastern Savannah is less diverse. People in the Eastern Savannah do not maintain the perennial fields of the Upper Niger.

### **2.7.1 Geography and Topography**

The Eastern Savannah Zone covers the prefectures of Siguiri, Kouroussa, Kankan, Mandiana, and Kerouane—an area of 69,100 km<sup>2</sup>, or more than a quarter of the national territory.

The topography of the Eastern Savannah Zone is fairly flat. It includes a number of locations where riverbeds have widened out into extensive floodplains. Natural vegetation consists primarily of lightly wooded, tall savannah grasses. Temperatures here are higher than in the rest of the country and the dry season is the longest. Annual rainfall averages between 1,100 mm in the north and 1,900 mm in the south. A hard, laterite crust on the savannah soils makes cultivation outside of the floodplains difficult.

### **2.7.2 Demography**

As before, the SIP team projected its estimates of current population in the zone on revised 1983 population figures reported by the National Office of Statistics and Information Science (1990c). The team estimated the 1991 population of the Eastern Savannah at 797,444 including 425,678 men and 371,766 women. Slightly more than one-eighth of the national population lives in the zone. The male-to-female ratio is 114:100. We cannot explain this population imbalance. The population has been growing at 2.78 percent per year, approximately the national average. The population density in the zone is 11.5 people per km<sup>2</sup>, the lowest of the agro-ecological zones in Guinea. The zone is about 85 percent rural. Approximately three-fifths of the urban population lives in Kankan, Guinea's second largest city and the only major urban center in the zone.

The able-bodied adult population is estimated at 431,347 or 54.1 percent. Average household size in the zone is 8.6 persons, (Dirasset 1988c). Dalle (1989) found a 10.7-person household

size in her sample. In either case, households in the Eastern Savannah are significantly larger than in the Upper Niger Zone.

The northern areas of the zone are overwhelmingly Malinké, although pastoral Fulbe account for about 5 percent of the population there. In the southern parts of the zone, Malinké and Fulbe elements live among a Konianke, Kouronko, and Toronka majority. Virtually the entire population is Muslim.

### **2.7.3 Community Organization and Resource Management**

The rural population lives in villages which averaged close to 600 persons in a 10-village sample in Kouroussa Prefecture (FAO 1988:Annex 3, 2). Dalle (1989) found 72 percent of the 203 villages in her sample had a population under 800 persons.

The generalizations concerning community organization and resource management in the Upper Niger apply to the Eastern Savannah as well. Villages are built around a group of founding clans. Authority is vested in a council of elders composed of clan leaders. Caste allegiance and membership in age-sets also play an important role in governing behavior and allocating resources.

### **2.7.4 Resource Use and Production Systems**

Dalle's survey (1989) found that four crops—maize, millet/sorghum, rice, and peanuts—each covered about one-fifth of the land under cultivation in the Eastern Savannah. The remaining fifth was divided among such crops as cotton, manioc, tobacco, and vegetables which, along with peanuts, were grown mainly as cash crops.

Households in the Eastern Savannah have three types of agricultural resources. They resemble those in the Upper Niger Zone but the household deploys them differently in the Eastern Savannah.

Families practice extensive cultivation of lands on the alluvial terraces outside the floodplains of rivers. Alluvial terrace lands are often family fields managed by the head of the household and worked collectively by household members. They grow rainfed rice, maize, peanuts, and sorghum/millet on the terraces. In many areas, maize is the principal crop on the alluvial terraces. They may cultivate the terraces for 5 to 6 years and then let them lie fallow for 10 to 12 years.

People also often use extensive agricultural methods to cultivate more distant upland fields. These fields can usually be cultivated only two to three years before they must be fallowed. People are now going farther and farther away from their villages to find productive upland fields, where they usually grow cotton, maize, or peanuts for market. The upland fields are often personal fields.

About a third of household landholdings are on floodplains. Floodplain holdings are critical to family welfare. Villages in the zone tend to group themselves along watercourses to take advantage of the floodplains. Competition for lands on the floodplains is keen. Flooded rice is by far the most widely grown crop on the plains. People often grow maize, rainfed rice, and other cereals at the edges of the plains using flood-recession agricultural practices. Women often grow vegetables on the floodplains during the dry season.

Over 60 percent of the households in the zone cultivate from 1 to 5 hectares per year. Households are able to manage between 0.7 and 0.9 hectares of cropped land per able-bodied adult. Table 21 compares 1987 and 1988 figures for cropping areas for major crops in four of the prefectures of the Eastern Savannah (figures for Kerouane were not available).

Here, as before, the accuracy of the figures can be called into question, but they are nonetheless useful to illustrate orders of magnitude and relationships between cropped areas.

	<b>rice</b>	<b>maize</b>	<b>fonio</b>	<b>manioc</b>	<b>millet/ peanuts</b>	<b>sorghum</b>	<b>total</b>
<b>1987</b>	35,990	15,283	6,266	13,635	10,433	6,627	88,234
% of total	40.8	17.3	7.1	15.5	11.8	7.5	100
<b>1988</b>	45,780	22,686	19,407	11,712	22,809	19,053	142,447
% of total	32.8	15.9	13.6	8.2	16.0	13.4	99.9

*Source: Dirasset, 1988c; Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique, 1990b*

Rains begin later in the Eastern Savannah than elsewhere in Guinea. Consequently, farmers delay planting their rainfed cereals until June. River floodplains are also cultivable somewhat later than elsewhere as the river crests move from the more well-watered south to the drier north. Cash crops planted on upland fields are usually planted after the floodplains and the alluvial terraces. Flooded rice, the most important crop in most areas, requires virtually no care. After it is planted, household labor can focus almost exclusively on maintenance of terrace and upland crops. Most cereals are harvested in September. Flooded rice is harvested in October. Tubers are harvested in January/February.

The recent national agricultural census (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Office of National Statistics and Information, 1990b) estimated that in 1988/1989, farmers in the Eastern Savannah cultivated 43 percent of cropped land with animal traction, the highest level of animal traction use of the agro-ecological zones of Guinea. Virtually all of the rest was cultivated by hand.

Average rainfed rice yields reflect increasing rainfall and increase from about 400 kg per hectare in Mandiana to 900 kg per hectare in Kerouane in the south. Floodplain rice often exceeds 1 ton per hectare. Maize yields are usually between 700 kg and 800 kg per hectare. Yields for fonio and peanuts are similar. Manioc yields are between 3 and 4 tons per hectare.

Around 60 percent of the households in Dalle's sample (1989) owned at least one head of cattle. These are sedentary households that pasture their livestock close to the village and park them at home during the night. The biggest concentration of livestock is in Siguiri Prefecture; Kerouane has the smallest numbers of animals of all types. Table 22 compares figures for livestock estimates in the Eastern Savannah in 1987 and 1988.

**Table 22. Livestock in the Eastern Savannah  
(000 head)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Cattle</b>	<b>Sheep</b>	<b>Goats</b>
1987	230	58	40
1988	230	77	68

*Source: Dirasset, 1988c; Ministere du Plan et de la Cooperation Internationale, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique, 1990b*

Due to its geomorphology and settlement pattern, the Eastern Savannah lends itself to development of village irrigation. Most villages find a significant share of their agricultural lands on the floodplains of perennial rivers and streams. The Siguiri Rice Operation (ORS) had developed 4,800 hectares of irrigation works in 24 villages by 1988. A 3,000-hectare share of the ORS works are cultivated. The village systems are created in units of 50 to 80 hectares and managed locally by the chief of the village floodplains. Outside of the ORS works, different organizations have developed approximately 2,000 hectares of village irrigation systems in small units scattered throughout the zone. These irrigation works cover only a small share of the lands theoretically capable of being developed in community-managed systems.

The French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CFDT) began implementation of the Upper Guinea Rural Development Project (PDRHG) in 1981. The focus of the project is to promote expansion of production of cotton as a cash crop in the Upper Guinea Region. The project has been most successful in the Eastern Savannah prefectures of Upper Guinea. Cotton cultivation is most successful in places such as Mandiana where the main crop is maize rather than flooded rice. In 1988/1989, 55 percent of the land participating in PDRHG programs was in Mandiana Prefecture alone. PDRHG is the only supplier of chemical fertilizer in the Eastern Savannah. Maize yields benefit from fertilizer residues from the previous season's cotton crop on the same land.

Gold mines are scattered through much of the Eastern Savannah, particularly in Siguiri Prefecture. Diamond mines are in the south. Dalle (1989) found that 80 percent of the able-bodied adults in her sample, both men and women, were participating in mining activities. The average distance from home to mine in Dalle's sample (1989) was 17 km. Most of the mines shut down for the cultivation season and most of the workers spend the cultivation season on their family farms. Mining activity has had some negative impact on food crop production when significant portions of the family labor force have returned home too late to participate in initial agricultural activities. The impact of mining on production has been most acutely

felt in cash crop production, particularly in cotton. CFDT data (Dalle 1989) suggest that cotton production may have peaked in areas with the greatest concentration of mines.

### **2.7.5 Commercial/Market Activity**

Outside of mining, relatively few people in the Eastern Savannah supplement their agricultural income with off-farm employment. About 8 per cent of the population pursues off-farm employment at home. Close to half of this group practices fishing. Another fifth of the population earns income from trade and commerce. A further quarter is evenly divided between hunting and traditional crafts.

The major commercial flows in the Eastern Savannah go north and south between Kankan and Kissidougou. East-west flows have declined considerably since the closure of rail service between Kankan and the coast. The market at Tokounou to the south of Kankan is a collection and distribution point for tropical products. Dielibakoro, north of Kankan, collects and distributes production from Kouroussa and the north.

### **2.7.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

Household strategies in the Eastern Savannah rely less on labor migration than in other zones. They meet their cash needs largely through mining activity. Their most important agricultural resource is their claim to land on the floodplains of rivers and streams. The floodplains are relatively reliable producers of rice from one year to the next. Land on the floodplains appears to be plentiful in most areas. In addition, families invest in a sedentary animal husbandry. Cash cropping, particularly cotton cultivation, was making headway until the recent expansion of gold mining.

## **2.8 Forest Zone**

### **2.8.1 Geography and Topography**

The Forest Zone is made up of Gueckedou, Macenta, Yomou, Lola, and N'Zerekore prefectures. The zone is 23,050 km<sup>2</sup> in size, equal to 9.4 percent of the country. The topography consists of upland plateaus interspersed with small mountain ranges, isolated peaks, and lowland swamps near the numerous rivers that have their sources in this zone. The Ziama mountain range in southwestern Macenta, and the Fon and Kourandou ranges in neighboring Beyla prefecture divide the zone into a northern watershed that flows into the Niger, and a southern watershed with rivers that continue into the Atlantic through the southern border countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. The highest peak in the country is the 1,753-m Mount Nimba, an area of 17,500 hectares designated by UNESCO as an international biosphere reserve because of its unique flora and fauna (such as chimpanzees). Attempts to preserve the tropical rain forests in the lower altitudes of this zone through the creation of forest reserves such as Bero, Tétini, and Diécké have not hindered farmers and loggers from reducing much of the primary forest to secondary growth.

The soils in the zone are excellent for farming a variety of crops that include staple foods such as upland rice and manioc, as well as commercial crops such as coffee, cocoa, and kola. The long rainy season lasts eight months in the northern zone and 10 months in the south. Rainfall varies between 1,800 mm and 2,800 mm per year.

The Forest Zone contains rich mineral deposits. Top quality iron ore (65 percent to 70 percent purity) is located on the land adjacent to the Nimba biosphere reserve. Diamonds, gold, graphite, uranium, azurite, silver, and asbestos have also been found in this area.

### 2.8.2 Population Profile

The 1983 population for the Forest Zone was 619,518 (Ministry of Planning 1990). Using an average population growth rate of 2.48 percent for the zone (the lowest rate is 2.03 percent for Yomou prefecture and 3.23 percent for Gueckedou prefecture) the SIP team estimated that the 1991 population as 743,731 (Ministry of Planning 1990). Table 23 describes the population in terms of gender, residence, and age.

Category	Figure	Percent
Male	360,260	48.4
Female	383,471	51.6
Rural	631,361	85
Urban	112,370	15
years	291,777	39.2
15 - 64 years	414,071	56.1
64 years	37,883	3.7

\* This table does not include figures for the 300,000 Liberian refugee population in the forest zone.

The male-female ratio for the zone is 95:100. The Forest Zone does not have a rural male exodus comparable to the Central Highlands or parts of the Niger River Basin.

Population densities vary considerably, with an average of 37 people/km<sup>2</sup> in the zone, and averages for prefectures ranging between 22 people/km<sup>2</sup> for Macenta and 57 people/km<sup>2</sup> for N'Zerekore. The average household size for the zone is 6.4 people, and approximately 20 percent of the households have 10 or more people (the proportion of households with 10 or more people is highest in N'Zerekore). The largest urban agglomeration is N'Zerekore town (52,050), followed by Gueckedou (23,942) and Macenta (21,211). Although the majority of people live in rural areas, 43.2 percent of the houses are classified as modern (i.e., metal roof and cement plaster over adobe or cement brick).

The Forest Zone is a melange of ethnic groups, many of Mande origin who nonetheless maintain individual identities. The "true" forest ethnic groups according to Germain (1984) are the Toma, Kissi, Guerze (Kpelle), Manon, and Kono. The national boundary actually cuts across the traditional cultural homelands for these groups, which means that Guinean Guerze have relatives in Liberia; Guinean Lola have relatives in Sierra Leone. A common cultural feature of these ethnic groups is their traditional religions that are characterized by ancestral

cults, ceremonial initiations in “sacred forests,” secret societies, and a strong belief in the supernatural and sorcery. Traditional African religions are adhered to by approximately 62 percent of the population (Dirasset 1988). Islam is practiced by 24 percent of the population, primarily Malinké and Fulbe merchants who have settled in prefectural capitals, and Kissi and Toma converts in the northern part of the zone. Catholicism is practiced by 11.4 percent of the population (Yomou and Gueckedou have the largest number of adherents), while Protestants make up less than 3 percent of the population.

Reliable population figures for the different ethnic groups do not exist. In the northern part of the zone, the prefectures of Gueckedou and Macenta are dominated by Kissi and Toma groups, respectively. There are Konianke in the northern part of Lola and N’Zerekore prefectures, but the predominant groups are Kono and Guerze, respectively. The Manon occupy the southwestern section of Yomou and N’Zerekore prefectures.

### ***2.8.3 Community Organization and Resource Management***

The different ethnic groups in the Forest Zone are settled in compact villages that, according to Paulme’s (1954) classic study of the Kissi, rarely exceed 150 people. Clans are patrilineal. The eldest male in the family is the authority who organizes work, settles disputes, officiates at life-cycle ceremonies, and performs actions proscribed by the different ancestral cults in keeping with his role as the intermediary between the living and the dead (Gomou 1980). At the village level, the eldest male of the founder family acts as the village chief, and he is assisted by the elders of the other village families. These same men form the council of elders who represent village interests and tradition to government authorities and outside interests.

Paulme (1954) describes the land-tenure system for the Kissi that appears to be similar to that followed by other ethnic groups. The village is the administrator of the land in its environs, and the tenure rules vary for different types of land. There are sacred areas such as forests, rocks, trees, and pools that are known to every villager. To the extent possible, villagers leave a portion of the forest in their environs in a “virgin” state to provide materials for people’s needs.

Kirship is at the base of the land-tenure system, and the village chief plays an important role trying to assure that each family has enough land to meet their needs.

The first person to clear an area is recognized as having the right to cultivate there, lend it to somebody else, and pass these rights on to his heirs. Sons cultivate the farms of their fathers. If there is not enough land to meet family needs, then the youngest clears more land in the forest, borrows land from a neighbor, or asks his mother’s brother (for example) to help him obtain some land. Individual land ownership exists within a tenure system in which family needs are recognized as validation for the acquisition of additional land. Sons can divide land among themselves after their father’s death, and people who are absent, even after many years, can return to their village and make a claim to land for farming. In the case of a man who dies and leaves a very young male heir, the man’s land is divided among his younger brothers, who keep it until the son is initiated and begins his own family.

Land can be loaned, but anything of value such as fruit trees (kola, coffee, cocoa, and oil palms are important commercial fruits) remain the property of the original owner. For example, the oil palm serves many purposes. Palm oil and palm wine are produced to meet subsis-

tence and income needs. Additionally, fibers from the palm nuts can serve as kindling, male flowers can be processed into a salt, and leaves can provide thatch for huts or screens to protect young plants from the sun's rays, to mention a few traditional uses. Finally, once the tree is old and unproductive, it can be pushed over and left long enough to become filled with palm grubs that are a highly appreciated forest "delicacy."

The garden land within villages belongs to the women, which they receive from their husbands when they arrive at his compound.

Sex and age are the principles used to organize social groups across kinship lines. Age grades for same sex groups follow ritualized ceremonies in which males and females are initiated into progressively more knowledgeable social roles. Everyone is taught how best to exploit their environment in order to become productive village members and eventually heads of households by following the basic social rules of respect for oneself and others, respect for the authority of the eldest, and other customs of the society. Such initiations are alternatively held for males and females in "sacred forests" under the direction of spiritual specialists who appear to act in the capacity of diviner and sorcerer on other occasions. Diviners explain why something has happened, such as sickness or misfortune, and find ways to overcome these mishaps. Everything that occurs is explicable by reference to the ancestors, and the ancestral cults are necessary in order to maintain contact between the living and their dead ancestors. People believe that the dead compensate the living for their actions either positively or negatively, and the birth of an infant is considered the rebirth of an ancestor (Goumou 1980).

People who are hunters, diviners/healers, artisans, or village chiefs have special roles and prestige in the forest societies, but there is no tradition of hierarchical caste structures as is found among the Malinké and Fulbe immigrants into this area.

#### **2.8.4 Resource Use and Production Systems**

Farming is the predominant household economic activity in the Forest Zone, and the environment supports a rich diversity of staple food and cash crops. Upland rice is the most important food crop grown, and farm households diversify their production by cultivating smaller amounts of items such as manioc, millet, maize, and even taro and fonio in some areas. Oil palm is the other essential staple and income crop for households, while coffee, kola, and cocoa represent essentially cash crops. Tropical fruits (i.e., bananas and avocados) are grown throughout the zone to meet both subsistence and income needs.

Four types of farm fields have been described for the Forest Zone. The majority of farmers (86 percent) gain access to farms through traditional tenure relationships (Ministry of Planning 1990).

All adult women intensively cultivate condiments, tubers, fruit trees, and, in some areas, small amounts of tobacco or cotton for home use in gardens behind their houses. Soil fertility is maintained by adding sheep and goat manure as well as household refuse.

Extensive slash-and-burn cultivation is practiced on hillsides and plateaus. Farmers cultivate rice with perhaps some millet followed by some combination of maize and/or manioc before leaving the fields to fallow for three to six years.

Lowland swamps can be used for rice cultivation every year, provided specific traditional agronomic techniques are followed. This type of cultivation is less important than the other two.

Fields cleared in savannah and forest at one time were cultivated using a system of crop rotation for five to six years followed by an equal period of fallow (Paulme 1954). This type of field has apparently become more rare over time due to the increased land under cultivation as a result of population growth.

The majority (68 percent) of households, as indicated below, have farms between 1 and 5 hectares in size (Ministry of Planning 1990). The household cultivates an average of .25 hectares per person. Household rice production varies annually depending on weather, pests, and the health of household members, but production per capita falls in the range of between 100 kg and 180 kg per year, or 50 percent to 90 percent of basic food requirements per person (Dirasset 1988).

<b>&lt;.5 Ha</b>	<b>.5 - .99 Ha</b>	<b>1 - 4.99 Ha</b>	<b>&gt;.5 Ha</b>
8.7	17	67.9	6.4

Rice cultivation requirements dominate the agricultural calendar in the zone. Each agricultural task is preceded by some small ceremony for the ancestors. Men clear land for new rice fields during the dry season of January and February. It is not uncommon in some areas for family members to move to a temporary shelter near their farms to live during the farm season. Minor crops such as peanuts, maize, and fonio are often planted in March and April, prior to planting rice between the months of May and July (different varieties are planted in different periods).

Children watch over newly planted fields until the plants have established themselves, and again when the grains are maturing. Men often begin the task of weeding which women finish while they turn to the construction of a field fence to keep out small stock and other pests. Work parties form along age group lines to help meet farm labor requirements during this period. In some areas, the village chief has his rice harvested first, then everybody else harvests their rice, for the most part in October and November. Rice is generally carried back to the village for threshing. In many areas, women control the granaries and make decisions about whether grain can be sold. Paulme (1954) noted that 40 percent of the harvest is set aside for immediate consumption needs while 60 percent is saved to use as food and seed for the next rainy season.

Farmers use manual, artisan-manufactured tools for the majority of farm work (cutlass, hoe, small hand-held sickle). Animal traction is limited to the northern part of the zone where the incidence of trypanosomiasis is lower than in the south. The majority of farm machinery in the zone is manual, crop-processing equipment such as hand mills, coffee and rice huskers, and some oil palm processing equipment.

The principal tree crops in this area, kola, coffee, cocoa, and oil palm, are important sources of revenue for rural households. Coffee, cocoa, and kola are planted by farmers, while the oil palm growth is encouraged through selective clearing practices. The trees belong to the person who "owns" the land. Coffee and cocoa are generally planted in cleared areas around the villages or along roads in order to facilitate getting the produce to market. Coffee, the more important of the two crops, is harvested in December and January. Kola is planted in the shade of larger trees along footpaths between villages. Forest kola is the best quality in Guinea. The main harvest occurs in January and February (a mature tree produces 15 kg to 20 kg of kola/year, which provides the owner with 1,500 to 3,000 GF/year/tree) and is transported to markets that extend into Senegal and Mali. Macenta and Yomou prefectures are the largest kola producers.

Oil palm nuts are collected between March and June. Men collect the fruit, but women do most of the processing to obtain the oil. There are two different techniques used to produce palm oil: the "Kissian" method, which relies primarily on fermentation to obtain oil of a lesser quality than the "Guerze" method, which relies more on boiling.

The table below gives an indication of the relative importance of different crops in the Forest Zone in terms of the area cultivated.

	<b>Rice</b>	<b>Maize</b>	<b>Manioc</b>	<b>Coffee</b>	<b>Cocoa</b>	<b>Kola</b>
	73,829	3,167	3,640	74,632	6,430	16,772
% of total	41.5	2	2	41.4	3.6	9.3

Despite the forest's excellent agricultural potential, few agricultural development projects have been initiated in this zone. In Gueckedou, the Gueckedou Agricultural Project (PAG) represents the continuation of the World Bank's Gueckedou Rice Operation Project (ORG). This project combines research and extension activities that concentrate on major food crops such as rice, manioc, and peanuts, and the coffee cash crop. Research themes concentrate on developing high-yielding varieties resistant to local diseases or environmental conditions that mature quickly for all crops. Project goals are phrased in terms of area under cultivation using improved crop varieties and agronomic techniques. Extension activities include making available to farmers credit to purchase seeds or seedlings and fertilizers. In 1987, 9,400 farmers were grouped into 824 extension groups; that season, approximately 5,000 farmers followed one of the technical packages for rice cultivation (Dirasset 1988).

The other major agricultural project in the forest is SOGUIPAH (The Guinean Palm Oil and Rubber Cultivation Company) in the southern part of the zone. Created in 1984, this multi-donor, 97 million dollar project aims to create an agro-industrial base by developing 50,000 hectares of oil palm and rubber fields on industrial and village plantations over a 20-year pe-

riod that began in 1986. The project, which began in Yomou prefecture, will develop a factory to produce rubber for export and another to produce palm oil for the national market.

SOGUICAF (Guinean Coffee Company) is a private company formed by Guineans, British, Peruvians, and Argentinians to improve and expand coffee production in N'Zerekore using plants grown from Peruvian and Ivorian coffee seed.

The primary objective for rural forest farm households is to provide food for their subsistence needs. To secure subsistence in the forest, men traditionally hunted local game and fished during the dry season. These seasonal activities are still important in providing protein for household consumption, although game is scarcer now than before, and fish in sacred pools cannot be exploited. The Dirasset (1988) study refers to renewed interest by rural households in areas such as Macenta in fish farming.

Livestock production, especially cattle, is limited in the forest due to the presence of trypanosomiasis. More pigs are raised in this part of the country than elsewhere in Guinea, as there are no religious proscriptions for eating pork. The table below gives an indication of the relative importance of different animals. It should be noted that sheep and goats are important for rural households as an investment, for their use in ceremony and ritual transactions, and for the manure they provide to women's house gardens.

<b>Cattle</b>	<b>Sheep</b>	<b>Goats</b>	<b>Pigs</b>
.94	26.1	42.9	1.2

### **2.8.5 Commercial/Market Activities**

As indicated above, rural households earn income from the sale of the coffee, kola, cocoa, and palm oil grown and processed throughout the region. Market towns such as Gueckedou and N'Zerekore are expanding in size and trade volume as a result of changes in commercial policies and the improvement of roads. As a result, women in these areas have begun to cultivate vegetables to sell in the markets.

Malinké and Fulbe immigrants make up the majority of merchants in the principal prefectural towns, while the "true forest" ethnic groups constitute the principal producers. Due to the Forest Zone's proximity to Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast, there is a significant amount of trade across the borders. For example, most of the cocoa produced in Guinea is eventually sold to traders who take it to Ivory Coast. It appears that the trade flow of coffee has reversed over the last several years; that is, during the Touré regime, what coffee was produced was smuggled into a neighboring country and sold. With the improvement in coffee prices since 1984, coffee grown in neighboring countries is now being brought into Guinea and sold to one of the nine companies licensed to buy coffee for shipment to Conakry.

**Mining** has not yet become an important activity in the forest on either an industrial or artisanal scale, although the possibilities for its development have been noted. Likewise, labor migration in the form of a rural exodus is not nearly as marked here as it is in other areas of Guinea. Seasonal migration to towns by young men seeking work occurs, as does longer-term migration by young people who go to towns to continue their formal education (enrollment rates in the forest are generally slightly higher than the national average).

The following statistics were collected in three prefectures in 1987 and give an indication of the commercialization of agricultural produce. These official figures in all likelihood represent only a proportion of what was actually sold by farmers in the markets for that year. The three most important products were kola nuts (875 tons), coffee (814 tons), and palm oil (662 tons).

The principal imports in the zone are rice, flour, sugar, salt, and fish (fresh and dried) from Conakry, and onions from Liberia.

### **2.8.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

The Forest Zone household's livelihood strategies are centered around agricultural production. Subsistence-oriented production of food crops such as rice, manioc, maize, and taro generally provides sufficient staples for household needs as well as some income during years when harvests are particularly good. The principal cash crops are tree crops, coffee, kola, and to a lesser degree cocoa. All households have access to oil palms which provide cooking oil and palm wine for subsistence needs, and a source of market revenue. As far as household nutrition is concerned, the most noticeable problem is that of animal protein. Forest animals and insects are collected throughout the year. In the case of cattle production, clearly trypanosomiasis is the limiting environmental factor, but for small stock such as sheep, goats, and pigs, it is unclear why households do not invest more heavily in production of these animals.

Average household sizes in the Forest Zone tend to be smaller than the national average as the combination of tree crops and staple food production is spread out over the year. The Forest Zone also receives seasonal laborers from other areas of Guinea who are hired to help with the harvest of tree crops during the dry season; consequently, the household is not necessarily the primary source of agricultural labor.

Periurban land has become more attractive as an investment for some of the wealthier rural families. It is less clear to what degree people from ethnic groups native to the Forest Zone have had in making inroads to inter-regional market activities that have been controlled by Malinké and Fulbe merchants for many years. This possibly is a factor in the recent ethnic troubles in N'Zerekore and other areas of the zone.

## **2.9 Conakry**

### **2.9.1 Geography and Topography**

This section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the natural geography and topography of Conakry. The second part describes the urban geography of the city in terms of housing, water and sanitation, roads and transportation, and the development of an infrastructure for public services such as health, education, and administration.

### **Natural Geography and Topography**

Conakry was originally a palm-covered island to the southwest of the Kaloum peninsula that extends in a northeasterly direction to the Maritime Guinea mainland. The city was founded in 1889, and the island and peninsula have been joined by a landfill. The Iles de Los are several kilometers out to sea.

The urban perimeter is located 36 km from the tip of Conakry. The city has grown between the peninsula's two coastlines with the Sangaréya Bay to the north and the Atlantic along the southern coast. Here, mangroves are interspersed with a rocky coastline. The average rainfall is between 4,200 mm and 4,500 mm per year, and the peninsula has year-round surface water that can be used for agricultural purposes in some areas, and potentially potable groundwater accessible through wells or boreholes. Inland from the coast, the terrain along the peninsula rises steadily as one moves northeast and then becomes a coastal plain toward the urban perimeter.

The natural environment of Conakry has been under intensified human pressure since the population has increased at an average rate of 8 percent per year since 1960. There remain few "natural" areas in the city. The government has built one public garden of 41 hectares and the office for Forest and Water Resources is located in a sort of forest and plant nursery of 14 hectares. The result is that there is only 0.93 square meters of "green space" per person in Conakry as of 1987 (Dirasset 1988).

### **The Urban Environment**

From aerial photographs Conakry's 1987 estimated urban area was 69 km<sup>2</sup>, with a growth rate of 330 hectares per year (Dirasset 1988). The urban agglomeration is largely residential (84 percent), with a relatively small proportion (9 percent) of the city built for industrial and commercial purposes, with the remainder occupied by government buildings (7 percent).

The Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing has classified Conakry housing into seven categories. These are residential housing, low-cost group housing, old-type core housing, recent-type core housing, restructured housing, make-shift housing, and village housing. With a few exceptions (Cité des Ministres, Cité CBG), these house types are interspersed throughout the city neighborhoods so that there are no particularly clear socioeconomic stratifications of Conakry's residential neighborhoods (del Ninno and Sahn 1990). Eighty percent of Conakry's population is housed in low-cost housing that is interspersed among restructured, make-shift, and old-type core housing. Low-cost housing is characterized by overcrowding and a slightly smaller household size (eight) than the average Conakry household (nine). The majority (58 percent) of household heads in Conakry are tenants. Between 1986 and 1988, a trend of rental increases between 25 percent and 130 percent was reported (UNICEF 1990). During this same period, a socioeconomic survey of approximately 300 Conakry households showed that 42 percent had spent money on repairs or improvements to the house (DNSI 1989). Approximately 70 percent of the houses are constructed from adobe and reinforced with cement plaster, 30 percent are made from concrete block, and 85 percent have metal roofs (Dirasset 1988). Neighborhoods are given similar classifications. Dixinn, Bellevue, and Boussoura are examples of restructured neighborhoods housing 37 percent of the population that developed largely as a result of immigration and only later was followed by govern-

ment construction of public goods such as roads and water. The former colonial neighborhoods of Boulbinet, Almamia, and Coronthie were well planned, but now consist of seriously degraded infrastructure and old-type core housing where 16 percent of Conakry's population live (Dirasset 1988).

Cornell University researchers suggest that the type of water source available to a household is a good criterion for the identification of the urban poor (del Ninno and Sahn 1990). Conakry's water system was built in the 1960s for a population of 300,000 people. Dirasset (1988) reports that 75 percent of the population have access to pumped water. A sample of 860 households revealed that only 5.5 percent had a water tap inside the house, 43.5 percent had water in the compound's courtyard, and 38.2 percent had access to water outside their own compound, while 11 percent used wells (del Ninno and Sahn 1990). The majority of households (90 percent) in this sample were drinking water with high levels of faecal colis.

Waste disposal constitutes a major environmental and health problem for the city. Conakry's population generates an estimated 1,600 tons of garbage per day (Dirasset 1988). The monitoring unit of Urban Services has been responsible for collecting garbage with its truck fleet since 1985, and they dispose garbage they collect in an abandoned mine 13 km from the center of town. Many households in the older urban area dump household wastes along the seaside. Human waste disposal has obvious health implications. The dilapidated sewer system in Conakry dates from 1948, and untreated wastes are dumped in the sea. Approximately three-quarters of urban households have access to a latrine, but as many as six households may share a single latrine.

Conakry's commercial role is unique. It is the principal port for food and durable good imports that are, in turn, shipped to other regions of the country. There are 16 markets in the city where the population purchases goods and services. The Madina, Niger, and Bonfi markets account for 57 percent of the commercial activity in the city, while a number of secondary markets serve neighborhoods throughout the city with local and imported foods and a variety of artisanal services (Dirasset 1988).

Commerce depends on the transportation infrastructure. Conakry has three major roads, approximately 150 km (49.2 percent) of the road network is paved. Inadequate drainage and potholes are persistent problems for Conakry's roads. The number of vehicles in Conakry increased 41 percent between 1984 and 1987, and has grown steadily, so that traffic jams during rush hour have become a daily occurrence. There are reportedly 45,000 vehicles in Conakry, with nine filling stations. Two of three rail lines continue to operate and bring the bauxite or alumina that account for 99.5 percent of Conakry's exports from Kindia and Fria, respectively. A clinker line brings people from the cement factory to the port daily. Gbessia airport is the center for international and national air routes.

Downtown Conakry is the governmental, commercial, and financial center. As of 1987, there was one preschool, 74 primary schools, 22 secondary and technical schools, and one university (Dirasset 1988). The government health infrastructure consists of two teaching hospitals, Donka and Ignace Deen. There were five health center-maternities, three maternal-child health centers, and two infirmaries. There are numerous private clinics, dentists, and pharmacies throughout Conakry where health services are available.

### 2.9.2 Population Profile

As of 1983, there were 80,386 households in Conakry, equal to 50 percent of Guinea's urban households and 60 percent of Guinea's urban population (Dirasset 1988). In 1991, the SIP team estimates there are over 100,000 households in Conakry, with an average size of eight people. The average household of eight consists of 5.9 members of the nuclear family, 1.1 dependents less than 20 years old, 0.9 dependent adults, and 0.1 elder dependent relatives (UNICEF 1990). In a sample of 860 households, 7.1 percent were found to be headed by women (del Ninno and Sahn 1990).

Conakry's population in 1983 was 710,000 (DNSI 1990). With an average population growth rate estimated between 6 percent (UNICEF 1990) and 9.2 percent (DNSI 1990), the SIP team estimated the 1991 population at 1,136,000. Estimates for Conakry's 2010 population range between 2,400,000 and 3,000,000. It is important to remember that while the rural immigration is an important growth factor, people return to rural areas for visits with a duration of weeks or months. In other words, the Guinean urban and rural households are bound by extended kinship ties that accommodate frequent residential changes of variable duration. The table below shows the urban population by gender and age groups.

Category	Figure	Percent
Male	578,224	50.9
Female	557,776	49.1
<15 years	511,200	45
15 - 64 years	613,440	54
>64 years	11,360	1

The percentage of the population below 15 years of age is an indication of high urban fertility rates and reduced child mortality. The male-female ratio in Conakry is 103:100. This is above the national average of 95:100 and is largely the result of male immigration from rural areas.

Conakry's ethnic population is difficult to determine. Neighborhood composition gives an idea of the relative proportion of different groups; for example, Dixinn-Mosque and Hafia are predominantly Fulbe, while Dixinn-Port is Sousou. This tendency for relative ethnic homogeneity for residential neighborhoods is found in all multi-ethnic urban areas (e.g., Kindia, Mamou, N'Zerekore). According to Dirasset (1988), in 1983, 60 percent of the urban population had been born in Conakry, 18.5 percent originated from Maritime Guinea (Sousou), 8.5 percent from Upper Guinea (Malinké), 8.5 percent from Middle Guinea (Fulbe), and 2.5 percent from the Forest Region. Inter-ethnic marriage appears more common in

Conakry than other areas of Guinea (Nelson, et al. 1976). Minor but important elements of Conakry's population include an affluent expatriate population that has increased rapidly since 1984 and Guineans of Lebanese origins, who form a distinct, largely endogamous ethnic group living primarily in the old section of the city and have commercial and real estate interests throughout the country.

Islam is the dominant religion in Conakry as indicated by the 63 operational mosques in 1987. The Christian population is served by five Catholic churches and one Protestant church. The number of adherents to traditional African religions is negligible.

### **2.9.3 Community Organization**

The city of Conakry is composed of many different communities that are organized by residential proximity, ethnicity and kinship, and territorial administration.

The basic social element of the different types of communities in Conakry is the household. The urban household is similar to its rural counterpart in that it consists of a group of people that live and eat together. One major difference concerns the extended family. The extended family is fundamental to Guinean notions of social security. In rural areas, the extended family households generally live in the same area and form one of their village's neighborhoods. In Conakry, where living conditions are generally overcrowded, it is not uncommon for the younger (often unmarried male) relatives of a household head to take their meals with his family but sleep elsewhere. These dependents may contribute to household revenue (to be discussed in more detail later), but in the case of students and apprentices, they are more often an added strain on limited household revenues.

The urban residential compound, as described earlier, is generally composed of more than one household. Only 22 percent of the household heads in Conakry are urban homeowners (UNICEF 1990). A homeowner compound often consists of interrelated households, and, in many respects, approximates the residential pattern of the rural extended family. The senior male who is generally the homeowner, has similar responsibilities and prerogatives as his rural counterpart. The 58 percent of the households that are tenants, often live in ethnically mixed compounds where the property owner has designated a representative that organizes meetings and activities that affect all compound residents. For example, should a latrine need repair, it is this representative who will organize the compound's household heads to meet and discuss the appropriate steps to resolve the problem. Note that although neighborhoods can be classified according to predominant ethnic groups (e.g., Dar es Salaam is Fulbe), large tenant compounds such as those in Bonfi have been ethnically diverse. According to one Guinean sociologist, the events that occurred when Sousou men attacked and damaged the person and property of other ethnic groups in May 1991, has caused some people to seek lodging among groups where they feel safer (e.g., Malinké households among the Fulbe).

Ethnicity not only distinguishes different communities, it is a key factor in the formation and organization of voluntary associations organized for different subprefectures. These groups of people from common geographic origins meet regularly on Sundays to discuss matters of importance in Conakry and their rural villages. They elect a president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and other officers who represent the group. Dues are collected regularly, and officers and members make periodic trips to their rural areas to present grants of money to rural leaders for community improvement projects. These groups include people who live in

different parts of the city, who have different levels of education and occupation, but who are related through common origins expressed as ethnicity and kinship. It is reported that such groups from Middle, Upper, and Forest Guinea have recently selected a coordinator who is responsible for resolving ethnic disputes that occur in Conakry. These individuals have no formal recognition by the government.

The neighborhood was, until April 1991, the basic urban political unit. The administrative and political council consisted of six members: a president and his assistant, a secretary for health and social action, a secretary for youth and education, a secretary for security and communication, and a secretary for local development. This council was assisted by a four-member council of elders selected for their wisdom and moral character. The council of elders were responsible for the organization of religious ceremonies, the resolution of disagreements between families, and the protection of the community's cultural heritage.

After the elections of the five municipality presidents and their community delegates in April 1991, the parallel administrative and political structures corresponding to the prefecture and subprefecture were suspended. The municipality is administered by popularly elected delegates and the municipality's president, but the system does not guarantee representation for the neighborhoods making up the municipality. There have been recent elections for the heads of neighborhoods who continue to represent their neighborhoods to the local government. It is common knowledge that there have been many problems with the organization and function of the municipalities since their installation, but the specifics have yet to be studied in any detail.

#### **2.9.4 Economic Activities**

The unemployment and underemployment problems in Conakry are well documented (Dirasset 1988, UNICEF 1990, del Ninno and Sahn 1990). The negative impacts of the job market in Conakry especially affect the following groups: recent school leavers from the university and secondary schools, primarily young men; those individuals who have been released from government employment, including both men and women; migrants from rural areas, again mostly young men; and women in general. Between 60 percent and 75 percent of the women in Conakry are illiterate with little or no schooling or professional training, which limits their ability to earn money. Nearly three-quarters of the unemployed women in the Cornell survey were not looking for work, stating that they were homemakers. As homemakers, they would have an occasional opportunity to earn money by selling some type of food item to neighbors, for instance.

Of the employed population, the largest percentage works in the tertiary sector (84 percent in 1987) with commerce by far the largest proportion (44 percent). The manufacturing and mining sector in Conakry employed 13 percent of those with jobs in 1987, and the primary sector only 5 percent of the people. The Cornell study found in their household sample that the largest proportion of people were employed as street vendors (17.7 percent), followed by professionals (15.6 percent), skilled tradespeople such as carpenters, mechanics, and tailors (13.4 percent), and finally, shopkeepers (11.7 percent). The majority of professionals and skilled tradespeople were men who generally have higher salaries, while women worked mostly in clerical, shopkeeping, and as salespersons.

The formal sector in Conakry includes jobs in the Public Service, manufacturing, and some commercial and service enterprises. In 1987, 27 percent of all salaried jobs in Conakry were in the formal sector, and approximately 87 percent of the salary earners were employed in the Public Service. Since 1987, the number of Public Service jobs has been reduced to approximately 51,000 people, and although salaries have been raised on five occasions since 1986, the average salary of a Public Service employee is still very low. As the state reduces its role as an employer (prior to 1984 graduates from the university and technical schools were guaranteed employment), it is faced with a serious problem of how to create jobs. Promoting the private sector through the establishment of an investment code, promoting nongovernmental organizations, and encouraging credit programs (i.e., BARAF) to stimulate entrepreneurial activity has had only limited success. In 1987, Dirasset (1988) estimated that there were 200 jobs for every 1,000 inhabitants of Conakry.

The informal sector employs 74 percent of Conakry's wage earners in a wide variety of jobs, such as market vendors and people who occasionally sell food from their homes, occasional wage laborers, people who catch and process fish, and artisans. Studies conducted in 1987 found that the average salary in the informal sector was 1.3 times greater than the average Public Service salary. The importance of this sector lies in the fact that this is where the majority of the economically active population in Conakry carry out their primary and secondary income-earning activities.

#### **2.9.5 Household Income and Expenditure**

There have been several studies of household income and/or expenditure undertaken in Conakry since the first phase of structural adjustment began in 1986. The studies have focused on income earners in a particular economic sector, such as the informal sector (ILO 1987; CEGIR 1987) or a "representative" sample of urban households (DNSI 1988; del Ninno and Sahn 1990). These studies have found that income distribution in Conakry is better than in Abidjan. The wealthiest 20 percent of households spend, on average, twice as much per individual as the poorest 20 percent of the households. In other words, the wealthiest 20 percent account for 44 percent of total household expenditures (UNICEF 1990).

The most recent study indicates that 47 percent of household incomes come from salaries (approximately one-third of the Conakry's household heads are employed by the Public Service), 40 percent from business earnings, 6.7 percent from rent, with gifts and agricultural production accounting for 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

Absolute poverty can be defined as the inability of the individual, household, or social group to satisfy its minimum fundamental needs in relation to the lowest standards necessary to survive. The statistics department in the Ministry of Urban Affairs has calculated the monetary value of essential needs for an average household of nine people based on the following hypotheses (from UNICEF 1990):

- 1) The household has two active wage earners, one in the Public Service and one a non-salary (informal sector) earner, with one dependent adult and an adolescent school leaver with limited economic activity, three children in school, and two preschool children.

- 2) The household's food is purchased entirely from the market and consists of a monotonous diet providing an average of 2,000 kcal/person/day (WHO standard 2,100 kcal/person/day).
- 3) The household lives in two rooms with minimum furnishing, pays a neighbor for an electrical extension for two lights and one outlet, obtains water from a public fountain, and pays annual taxes for two people.
- 4) One wage earner gets to work on the bus while the other walks; there are two bus trips to the market/week and one bush-taxi trip to the interior for one adult.
- 5) Clothing is simple but decent; family members go to the hospital for health services and buy their medicines at a private pharmacy.
- 6) The household makes a special effort to educate all children.
- 7) Leisure activities are minimal, no beverages or cigarettes are purchased, no meals bought outside the home, and 10 tickets for the movies and 10 tickets for stadium sports events are purchased for the year. Extra-household social obligations were calculated at 25 GF/week.

In 1986, household income to meet the minimal needs above was calculated to be 68,410 GF/month. A household survey conducted that year found 68 percent to be below this minimal level of income. In 1987, 75 percent of the households surveyed were below a mean income of 75,000 GF, a figure that in all likelihood is below a minimal monetary standard to meet household needs once inflation is taken into account. Taking the most recent household expenditure survey by Cornell University, the 1990 median household expenditure was 162,717 GF/month while the 1989 absolute poverty line was calculated as 165,832/month. The Cornell classification of those households in the bottom 30 percent of expenditures as poor is admittedly arbitrary and somewhat misleading given that the next four deciles are classified as non-poor.

One can conclude that the extent of absolute poverty is relatively high and includes between 40% and 75% of Conakry households. This situation is particularly worrying in that the establishment of this poverty line does not include any safety margin for the standard family in respect to unforeseen events (accidents, illness, etc.) and socioeconomic shocks (rice shortage in the third quarter of 1988). The depth of poverty is also quite considerable, since 48% of households have a monthly income lower than 37,500 GF, that is, 42% of the poverty line. (UNICEF 1990:71)

For the average household, the largest share of monthly expenditures (53 percent) goes toward buying food. Rice accounts for over 8 percent of the monthly expenditures; cooking oil and condiments, 10 percent; meat and fish, 12 percent; and bread, 4 percent. The largest non-food expenditures are transportation, 9 percent; housing, 7 percent; education and services, 7 percent; fuel, 5 percent; and health, 2 percent. These averages give no indication of expendi-

ture variations for households of different socioeconomic levels. For example, wealthier households spend 30 percent on food and 18 percent on education. Education has a positive association with socioeconomic level; wealthier households tend to be better educated and smaller in size than poor households. Interestingly, female-headed households in Conakry are no worse off economically than male-headed households.

In terms of durable goods, households invest in radio-cassettes (65 percent of all households), fans (55 percent of all households), and TVs (30 percent of all households). These durable goods serve as investments that can be resold should an emergency arise.

### **2.9.6 Household Livelihood Strategies**

As a function of its life cycle, the Conakry household begins with a man and his wife whose concerns revolve around establishing and ensuring the survival of themselves and their young children. During this period, per capita income and expenditure may be high, depending on the type of occupations the adults engage in. If the husband is educated and works in the public sector, he will attempt to diversify household income by acquiring capital to invest in informal sector activities, generally in some commercial venture. His wife may be an intermittent wage earner, since the majority of her work centers around the household maintenance activities (cleaning, cooking, caring for children) which are unremunerated. The children will be sent to primary school when they are able, and if the household has successfully established itself, it is quite likely that other relatives, such as the husband's mother, will come to live with them for extended periods of time. It is not uncommon for an older child of a rural relative who is continuing his/her education in Conakry to make some arrangement to move in with the family. Most commonly, there are two wage earners in the household, with perhaps two other members occasionally contributing money toward household expenses to meet the needs of eight people, creating a consumer-worker ratio of 3-4:1.

Household children who are in secondary school are now faced with a difficult decision. Secondary education is expensive for most urban households, and university education, if the student is accepted, is even more expensive. In addition, the child will be in his/her mid-twenties before he/she begins to work, and for seven years (as of 1991), the majority of Conakry University graduates have not been able to find work. Apprenticeship in the informal sector is an attractive alternative, particularly for young men (young women often think of marriage as the social solution which will give them some economic security). An apprentice occasionally receives a small monetary stipend for personal expenses as well as meals taken with the master tradesman and others at the shop. The training period is relatively short (two years average), and almost half the apprentices are guaranteed work, often in the same shop, after they finish their training.

Since travel restrictions to other countries have been relaxed, it appears that young Guineans are increasingly moving to other cities, such as New York, where an expanding Guinean community is accumulating capital that will eventually be repatriated to Guinea. Upper-level civil servants who have the financial and social resources are sending their children abroad to study and obtain the skills that could be put to use in either the national or international labor market. Working abroad has great appeal for young Guineans from families with commercial backgrounds. Nevertheless, these young people encounter many difficulties in making their arrangements to go abroad.

Social relations continue to be a crucial element of livelihood and survival strategies for urban households.

## **2.10 Review of Trends Identified**

### ***2.10.1 Migration Patterns and Female-Headed Households***

The general rural-urban exodus is more pronounced in some regions of the country than others. In the Fouta Djallon, the emigration of a large proportion of the active male population is an adaptive strategy that helps diversify household economies and accumulate resources for significant improvements in the household living standards (e.g., improved houses and diets). The “feminization” of agricultural production has been noted, and the proportion of female-headed households in the rural areas is higher here than elsewhere in the country.

In Upper Guinea, the seasonal migration of young men to artisanal mining sites shows a trend toward long-term mining activities by both men and women who have essentially abandoned agricultural production in their native villages.

Conakry continues to be a strong pole of attraction for young rural men, as well as migrants from neighboring countries experiencing political difficulties.

### ***2.10.2 Role of Expatriate Guineans and Returnees***

The expatriate Guinean community which numbered approximately 2,000,000 at the fall of the First Republic constitutes a major human resource which can be tapped. Returnees have played a major role in government reform. The Finance, Planning, and Interior ministers are all “external” Guineans. Much of the new private investment by Guineans in the modern sectors of the economy since the advent of the Second Republic have been made by expatriate Guineans returning to the country. Expatriates have also sent resources back to their own communities and have facilitated commercial exchanges between Guinea and its neighbors.

### ***2.10.3 Growth of the Informal Sector***

During the Sékou Touré years, the informal sector was known as the black/parallel market, and although most of the country was involved in one way or another, the most important actors were the merchants and civil service. This sector has continued to expand since 1984 as a result of several factors. Rural producers have increased their production and market activities, and informal urban retail networks have expanded along with commercial activities in general. As a result of a small boom in the construction and rehabilitation of housing and infrastructure, there has been a growth in skilled and unskilled labor.

### ***2.10.4 Economic Pressures on Urban Wage Earners***

Several factors have increased pressures on urban wage earners, particularly in Conakry. Reduction of the civil service has resulted in some households losing two-salaried wage earners. Salaries and incomes have not kept pace with inflation and rises in the cost of living (food and rent), which have contributed to a rise in rent-seeking activities, theft, and prostitution. Household heads are obliged to provide social and material support for rural relatives who come to Conakry regardless of their own economic security.

### **2.10.5 Increasing Agricultural Production**

Small farmer households from all regions have responded to a liberalization of market prices by increasing production of staple foods and cash crops that they sell in the market. It is common knowledge that wealthy urbanites are investing in agricultural production (e.g., large rice farms in Maritime Guinea and the Gaoual area). As Guineans cultivate only about one-third of the arable land, it does not appear that land consolidation will lead to the creation of a landless group of rural farmers who will be forced to work as wage laborers for others. However, one could expect a future increase in rural wage labor in the agricultural sector, whereas rural labor mobilization presently occurs primarily through traditional mechanisms.

### **2.10.6 Expanding Market Activity**

Expanding market activity is closely tied to the increase in the informal sector described earlier. Imports have increased as has the interregional and international trade of commodities such as palm oil, kola fruits, vegetables, fish, salt, and artisanally processed goods.

### **2.10.7 Remonetization of Rural Economy**

Remonetization of the rural economy is closely tied to the expansion of market activity, and has been further assisted in specific regions throughout the country by small-scale rural credit projects such as Rural Credit in the western Fouta and the soon-to-begin Guinea Rural Enterprise Development Project.

### **2.10.8 Refugees in the Forest Zone**

At one time, 250,000 to 300,000 refugees from Liberia lived in the Forest Zone. International organizations responded to the crisis as did the local relatives of many of those fleeing the civil war. It is reported that presently, many of the women are returning for short periods of time to their villages in Liberia to plant their fields, which is indicative of their desire to return and continue normal life (the men have stayed in Guinea as they would be harassed by the rebel groups). The refugee situation has certainly created tensions, and it is unclear to what degree this situation affected the ethnic riots in N'Zerekore of April 1991. Some economic displacement has occurred as refugees have been willing to work more cheaply than Guineans.

### **2.10.9 Shortened Fallow Periods**

Increased demographic pressures and unfavorable climatic and environmental conditions have resulted in shortened fallow periods throughout much of the rural areas. This translates into shortened cultivation periods and reduced yields per unit of land. Potentially productive agricultural areas remain closed to cultivation due to the presence of diseases such as onchocerciasis.

### **2.10.10 Decreased Rainfall**

The recent discussion about the duration and regularity of rainfall cycles in Africa indicates that there is much we do not know. However, rainfall has decreased throughout the country since the mid-sixties, and is especially problematic in the northern areas of the country. People in these areas depend mostly on surface water for their needs and suffer chronic and prolonged shortages every dry season, suffering health problems as a result; livestock suffer

every dry season; and crops suffer as a result of erratic rainfall and occasional small droughts during the growing season.

# **Chapter 3: Institutional Analysis: The Political, Administrative, and Legal System in Guinea**

---

## **3.1 Introduction**

In precolonial times, Guinea established patterns of settlement, interethnic relations, land-tenure, and political decision making which persist despite its experience of the last century. French colonial rule superimposed new political, economic, and administrative institutions on the precolonial order, and transformed precolonial power relationships. Sékou Touré and the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) led the post-World War II anti-colonialist movement which culminated in Guinean independence in 1958.

The First Republic (1958 to 1984) was characterized by radical political, administrative, social, and economic change. It evolved into a one-party state managing a centralized economy which stifled the private sector. A military coup on April 3, 1984, shortly after the death of Touré, ushered in the Second Republic. The Second Republic has implemented institutional reforms which have sharply reduced the size of the public sector and liberalized the economy. Guinea's military rulers have simultaneously launched the process of establishing a democratic order based on law and human rights.

Guinea's current difficulties in getting its new institutions to take hold can only be understood in the context of the evolution of Guinean society and institutions under colonialism and the First Republic.

## **3.2 The Colonial Era, 1890-1945: Autocratic Rule and Slow Evolution of Modern Institutions**

French control over Guinea was established during the last decade of the 19th century, primarily through military conquest. Major groups resisted French conquest and the imposition of colonial rule. Due to their settlement in the Maritime Region, where France established its foothold in the country, the Sousou and Baga were the first Guinean groups to come under colonial rule. Samory Touré led Malinké resistance that thwarted French ambitions in the interior for many years. The Fulbé in the Fouta Djallon revolted as they saw the French refuse their regional autonomy. The French were unable to subdue the Forest Region until well into the 20th century.

### **3.2.1 Political Institutions**

The establishment of French colonial rule in Guinea during the last decade of the 19th century meant destruction of autonomous African political units and incorporation of their populations into the French colonial empire. French Guinea became one of eight colonies in French West Africa.

The French formally abolished the slave trade. They did not, however, give Guineans the political and civil rights of French citizens in the metropole. During this period, they did not permit African political parties, trade unions, or press. French colonial administrators dominated representative institutions in the colony. French settlers and businessmen alone elected representatives to these political bodies. The colonial administration named Africans sitting on these bodies from the ranks of traditional chiefs they deemed trustworthy.

### **3.2.2 Administrative Institutions**

The French colonial administration was centralized, autocratic, and based on principles of hierarchy and unity of command. It was headed by a French colonial governor named by the French Colonial Minister.

The district commander was the key official in territorial administration. He administered his territory and supervised colonial officials at the subdivision level. During early phases of colonial rule, military officers often held the post of commander, particularly in areas recently subdued. The two main tasks of the colonial administrator were maintenance of order and tax collection.

The canton, which was the basic administrative unit, was headed by an African canton chief named by the colonial governor. The colonial government ruled through these canton chiefs. They collected the head and cattle taxes levied by the French and received a percentage of the taxes they collected. Many canton chiefs abused their authority and collected more taxes than required. They also commandeered labor to work on local road construction and maintenance and other public works projects.

The chieftaincies became one of the most unpopular institutions in Guinea. Chiefs now served as officials of the colonial state instead of as leaders of their people. The chieftaincy system, therefore, undermined the authority of the chiefs. However, village chiefs generally retained their traditional prerogatives and authority. They too owed their office to the colonial administration. The French wanted to demonstrate that their authority extended directly to the grassroots level.

The roots of the rural population's mistrust and fear of state officials in Guinea lie in its initial contacts with the colonial state and its officials. The tax system, based on cash levies, placed burdens on communities having cash crops or other local sources of cash incomes. Many young men were forced to leave their communities to seek wage-earning jobs so their families could pay their taxes. Forced labor also deprived rural communities of young male labor and disrupted traditional household production systems.

Administrative services were limited throughout the colonial period. Taxes went mainly toward covering the basic costs of administration. Few schools and medical services were provided outside the capital and major trading centers. The Native Society for Providence (S.I.P.) was the only major rural development institution. It was organized at the district level and presided over by the French commander. The S.I.P. provided seeds to farmers and some rudimentary farm equipment on credit. Farmers perceived the interest rates charged on these loans as still another form of tax. Commanders often forced farmers to grow certain crops based on directives from the governor. They established production quotas which were often impossible to meet.

### **3.2.3 Legal Framework and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms**

The French National Assembly made laws which determined the basic rules for governing French Guinea. French law designated the inhabitants of colonies as subjects with limited political and civil rights. French colonial law gave French officials broad powers over sub-

ject populations under a system of justice known as the *indigenat*. French officials could jail and fine subjects without trial for many offenses.

The French set up a parallel legal system based on the metropolitan model for Europeans and some Guineans. For example, they adapted French commercial codes and tax laws to the colonial needs. They thus introduced rules that were used in France under the Third Republic for licensing and classifying businesses, for taxation and imposition of customs duties, and for registering urban property. French colonial law also gave the colonial state the power to expropriate land and to manage natural resources. The 1935 Forestry Code classified Guinea's forests, forbade Guineans from clearing land and cutting wood in forest reserves without permits, restricted hunting rights, and imposed stiff fines for transgressions.

Guineans resented these laws as they restricted traditional prerogatives over natural resources. The laws levied fees on merchants, market women, woodcutters, hunters, and fishermen for practicing their traditional activities. They imposed fines and jail sentences for violating legal codes written in a language that remained largely inaccessible to rural Guineans.

The French set up a court system in the capital and in some trading towns. Rural Guineans continued to resolve land tenure and inheritance disputes and to regulate family and village life through customary and Islamic law. When they were unable to resolve local disputes, French colonial administrators often intervened to arbitrate. The colonial state would override local rulings that violated French colonial law or were inconsistent with the interests of the colony.

### **3.2.4 Development Policy and Socioeconomic Institutions**

Metropolitan colonial policy focused on the overseas territories, primarily to provide raw materials for French consumers and to consume French manufactured goods. During this period, Guinea, unlike Senegal, the capital of the French West African Federation, or the Ivory Coast, with its French settler population, received little investment capital to develop its infrastructure. Public investment was concentrated in Conakry and the Maritime Region.

The French dominated the monetized sector of the colonial economy. It was based on agricultural exports produced primarily by French plantation owners. They grew bananas and other tropical fruits in the Maritime Region and coffee in the Forest Region. By 1938, Guinea was exporting over 90,000 tons of bananas. A handful of European trading companies based in France and, to a lesser extent, England, controlled Guinea's foreign trade. It constituted the main engine for growth and generated revenues that supported the colonial administration and its development programs. Import-export companies handled most of the products coming in and out of the colony. They controlled domestic trade in cash crops and distributed basic consumer goods. Lebanese traders also served as middlemen by bringing goods to rural markets where the European companies did not go.

Domestic markets for imported European goods were limited. Most Guineans remained outside of the monetized economy. As subsistence farming was the rule, Guinean farmers produced only small amounts of cash crops for export or urban markets. For a while, rubber production was a major source of revenue for farmers in the Fouta Djallon. However, world

rubber prices dropped drastically just before World War I with the exploitation of more efficient rubber plantations in Asia.

Taxation forced rural Guineans to seek cash incomes to pay their taxes. Fulbé and Malinké men began to go to Senegal to work seasonally on peanut farms. Kissi and other forest peoples worked on the French plantations which began production during the 1920s and 1930s. The Sousou had the most direct contact with the French due to their settlement in Conakry and the Maritime Region.

Conakry grew slowly during this period and was the only urban center in the country. It had a population of 15,000 in 1939. Some Guineans worked as wage earners on the European plantations or as unskilled laborers and domestics in Conakry. A small number of Guineans worked for the colonial administration and European trading companies as minor officials, clerks, and middlemen. During this period, wages were low and Guineans did not have the right to organize trade unions.

Precolonial trading patterns persisted across colonial borders. Dioula traders conducted long-distance trade between forest and savannah areas. Itinerant cattle merchants traded cattle between the Sahel and the coast.

French education was available to a small number of Guineans. Access was greatest in Conakry, although a number of Catholic mission schools were established in the Maritime and Forest Regions. The curriculum stressed French history, language, and cultural values at the expense of African religions and culture. During this period, there were no secondary schools in Guinea.

The Fouta Djallon and Upper Guinea were the most Islamized regions in Guinea. They had few public schools. Koranic schools continued to be the main source of formal education. Islam spread steadily under colonial rule. It penetrated the Forest Region which had long resisted Islamization. Most Guineans, however, had little interest in assimilating French culture and values. For their part, the French, through their failure to develop a mass education system, did little to promote assimilation.

The status of women changed little during this period. Girls rarely went to public schools. Practically none worked as wage earners. Most clung to their roles within their families and local social organization.

### ***3.2.5 Decision-Making Mechanisms and Institutional Linkages***

Most of the basic decisions affecting the political and economic development of Guinea were made in France. The main vehicle for executing colonial policy was the colonial administration, which had a centralized command structure. The Colonial Minister was at the top. The Governor-General of French West Africa was responsible for coordinating economic policy in the colonies, while the Governor in Guinea was responsible for administering the day-to-day affairs of the colony. The colonial bureaucracy in Guinea had central services in the capital. French commanders and subdivision chiefs, who led the territorial administration, executed directives of the Governor. Guineans played no role in decision making. Canton chiefs collected taxes and helped maintain order. Guineans working in the civil service were expected to follow orders without hesitation and to take no initiatives without approval of

their superiors. Initiative passed from the top down. Little effort was taken to consult lower-level administrators or the subject populations. The population was expected to follow the advice and orders of the administration.

In the private sector, decisions affecting commercial operations in Guinea were made in the metropole. Banks operating in Guinea were overseas branches of metropolitan banks. Import-export firms in Guinea were overseas operations of the metropolitan-based trading companies.

Private sector expansion in Guinea was affected by decisions made in the French Parliament concerning tariffs and overseas public investments. During the 1930s, France established high tariff barriers to protect colonial products exported to the metropole and French goods coming into the colonies.

The colonial administration often restricted African access to private sector activities. For example, Guineans were forbidden to engage in diamond mining. Other administrative regulations hampered the free movement of Guinean merchants and added transaction costs to their activities. Parallel markets and clandestine trade emerged to circumvent official rules and regulations. Poor infrastructure and the small number of colonial officials made it difficult to police and enforce regulations.

### ***3.2.6 Interethnic Relations and Political-Social Dynamics***

During the autocratic phases of colonial rule, patterns of interethnic relations emerged which laid the groundwork and context for post-World War II political competition. Malinké influence declined with the defeat of Samory Touré and the shifting of the locus of economic activity to Conakry and the Maritime Region. Fulbé chiefs collaborating with the colonial administration fared better than other traditional leaders. Many were named to head the chieftaincies. On the other hand, the captives, who constituted as much as 50 percent of the population of Fouta Djallon at the onset of colonial rule, retained their low status and remained subjugated to the Fulbé chiefs.

Conakry and the Maritime Region drew people from all over the country due to their importance in the colonial economy. They gathered a multi-ethnic population base of people working as wage earners or artisans and merchants in the informal sector. The Sousou remained the most prominent ethnic group in Conakry and the Maritime Region. Sousou emerged as a lingua franca for city dwellers in Conakry. The Kissi provided cheap labor for French plantation owners. French, the language of the elite, also contributed to breaking down ethnic barriers, as it became the idiom for social and cultural groups to conduct their business.

Ethnic groups had no outlet for political competition in the absence of representative political institutions and trade unions. Instead, members of different ethnic groups formed ethnic associations in Conakry, which maintained their ties with their villages back home and provided mutual aid for their members.

### ***3.2.7 Summary of Main Trends***

The colonial period, one of autocratic rule lasting more than half a century (1890 to 1945), has left an indelible mark on Guineans. They regard colonialism as a largely negative experience.

The colonial state and bureaucracy governing the colony were repressive institutions which provided few benefits for people. The colonial experience generated suspicion of and hostility toward the colonial state and gave birth to anti-colonialist sentiments which took political form during the Post-World War II era. It left a legacy of popular suspicion of the state and administration, and of traditions of bureaucratic behavior which still prevail, such as overcentralized command structures, an inability of lower-level civil servants to take initiative, and a dependence on the state structure for social benefits and economic programming.

### **3.3 From Decolonization to Independence: 1945-1958**

World War II marked the transition to the decolonization era. It began with the sweeping metropolitan colonial reforms of 1945/1946 and ended with Guinea's decision to be the first tropical African colony to break with France and opt for independence in 1958. The era was characterized by rapid political, economic, and social change which transformed Guinea from a colonial backwater to a country with great economic potential. More significantly, this was the only period in Guinean history in which the people were allowed to participate fully in democratic politics.

#### **3.3.1 Political Institutions**

The 13-year post-World War II period was characterized by three major political developments: evolution of competitive party politics; elected representation in political bodies in Guinea, French West Africa, and France; and PDG emergence as the dominant political force in the country.

Colonial reforms taken in 1945/1946 changed the status of Guineans from subjects to citizens and permitted them to participate in democratic politics. Guineans thus sent representatives to sit in the French National Assembly, the Grand Council of French West Africa, and Guinea's Territorial Assembly.

The focus of political activity was in the metropole where deputies from different colonies aligned themselves with metropolitan parties to promote their own interests and that of their territory. Politics was competitive. Many colonies sent deputies from different parties to Paris. Several inter-African blocs emerged at the metropolitan level.

From 1946 to 1956, Guinea sent deputies to Paris who aligned themselves with the French Socialist Party. Fulbé-based parties dominated Guinean politics. Other ethnic-based parties also emerged, but had less influence due to their smaller base. The colonial administration backed the conservative Fulbé parties. Their main competition was the radical and nationalist PDG, led by Sékou Touré. He was a young trade union leader with links to the French Communist party and the General Workers Confederation (CGT). The PDG also aligned itself with the African Democratic Assembly (RDA), led by Houphoet Boigny of the Ivory Coast.

Elections were fiercely contested. Major elections took place in 1945, 1946, 1951, 1952, 1956, and 1957. The electorate expanded rapidly. By 1957, all adult Guineans could vote. During this period, the PDG built a strong interethnic coalition and established itself as a mass party. By 1955, it claimed 300,000 members. In the 1956 elections, it won 62 percent of the vote and sent Sékou Touré to the French National Assembly. In the March 1957 elec-

tions, the PDG won 59 out of 60 seats in the Territorial Assembly. It now dominated Guinea's political life.

Guineans exercised little power within the Territorial Assembly. It remained essentially an advisory body that approved budgets prepared by the French governor. Executive power remained in the hands of the colonial administration which was accountable to the Ministry of Overseas France (the new name for the Colonial Ministry). Efforts to influence administrative policy thus had to take place in France.

In 1957, Sékou Touré formed a Guinean-based government which shared executive power with the colonial administration. Demands for full independence from France began to grow shortly thereafter. Guinea voted "no" in the September 28, 1958, referendum to continuation of their status within the French colonial empire, becoming the first French tropical African colony to become an independent nation.

### **3.3.2 Administrative Institutions**

The colonial administration evolved considerably during this period. It continued to be centralized, but less autocratic. With the introduction of party politics and competitive elections, and Guinean representation in the Territorial Assembly, it also became more politicized. Thus, governors were nominated according to their affiliations or acceptability to parties in the current metropolitan government coalition and to their African allies. The colonial administration did not remain neutral in its organization and management of elections. It intervened on the side of the conservative political parties until 1955, when Touré officially broke his ties with the CGT and the Communists. Thereafter, the administration stopped harassment of PDG organizers and made its peace with Touré.

Touré and the PDG won popular support by campaigning against the colonial administration and the chieftaincies. Despite its liberalization, the colonial administration still remained an alien institution which lacked legitimacy for most Guineans. It remained dominated by the French. Few Guineans held posts in the bureaucracy requiring post-secondary degrees. Only a small number of Guineans had gone beyond high school. Guineans thus held relatively low positions in the colonial civil service. They had little or no management responsibility.

The size and scope of the colonial administration expanded rapidly during this period. France invested in Guinea through its Investment Funds for Economic and Social Development (FIDES). It maintained its role as tax collector and guardian of public order. At the same time, it assumed more responsibility for providing schools, dispensaries, urban housing, and other social services. It also assumed a greater role in expanding Guinea's basic infrastructure, providing more agricultural extension services, and creating new agricultural research institutions.

In 1957, the Touré government made changes in the organization of the administration. It abolished the chieftaincies, established village councils and direct election of village chiefs, and reorganized administrative boundaries and units. For the first time, French colonial officials had to follow directives of a Guinean-led executive. However, the French held on to their police powers until independence. For the most part, French colonial officials cooperated with the Touré government.

### **3.3.3 Legal Framework and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms**

The Constitution of the French Fourth Republic gave its overseas populations citizen status. The Constitution was followed by changes in the law which liberalized colonial rule and provided the framework for democratic institutions. These changes included the following:

- the abolition of forced labor;
- the end of the *indigenat* system of justice;
- the right of association;
- universal suffrage;
- a labor code which protected workers' rights and provided for collective bargaining; and
- a law providing equal pay for equal work for African functionaries.

Until 1957, none of the representative political institutions in Guinea and other French African colonies had real legislative or executive powers. The 1956 Constitution provided the legal framework for limited self-government and for an African executive to share control over the territorial administration with the colonial governor.

The legal and court systems in Guinea remained rudimentary and inaccessible to most Africans. They drew upon French legal traditions recorded in French. Court proceedings were conducted in French. Moreover, the transaction costs of using the court system were far too high for most Guineans. As a result, law enforcement and resolution of conflict remained the domain of the colonial administration. Guineans rarely used the courts to resolve conflicts with the administration.

Whereas Guineans had little recourse during the autocratic phase of colonial rule, they could now work through political channels to overturn administrative decisions. For example, deputies could pressure the Overseas Minister in Paris to remove undesirable colonial officials. They could also lobby for changes in laws and decrees adversely affecting their constituents and for appointments in the colonial service for their supporters. Guineans thus began to rely on political connections rather than administrative channels or the courts to resolve conflicts and win support for their cause.

### **3.3.4 Development Policy and Socioeconomic Institutions**

This period was marked by large-scale public and private investment which transformed Guinea from a colonial backwater to a rapidly expanding economy.

Officials of the Overseas Ministry carried out economic planning. They formulated FIDES plans for allocating public investment to French West Africa. France established institutions which made their African territories overseas extensions of the metropolitan economy, which included the following:

- a monetary and banking system which linked the CFA franc to the French franc and gave the metropole direct control over monetary and financial affairs;

- an imperial preference system which oriented most of Guinea's foreign trade toward France. The result was that Guinea paid more than world market prices for its imported goods and got more than world market prices for its exports; and
- investment codes that favored French investors and excluded non-French investors.

Guineans were not associated with the planning system. Moreover, since the monetized sectors of the economy were controlled by the French, Guineans were primarily interested in orienting public investment toward the social sector.

Development strategy for Guinea focused on promoting export agriculture and mining. Much of public investment was devoted to building infrastructure in Conakry and the Maritime Region. It financed improvement of Conakry's port facilities and construction of railroads for evacuation of iron ore and bauxite whose mining began in the 1950s. Plantations expanded their activities and use of Guinean labor. By 1958, Guinea was exporting 98,000 tons of bananas and 15,000 tons of coffee. On the other hand, little was done to develop other sectors and regions in Guinea.

French development strategy led to major economic and social changes during this period:

- the rapid expansion of the number of Guinean wage earners (20,000 to 30,000 plantation workers and nearly 100,000 wage earners by the late 1950s);
- the growth of Conakry from a town of 30,000 in 1945 to 100,000 in 1958;
- the acceleration of the rural exodus in Fouta Djallon and other areas;
- the emergence of a powerful Guinean trade union movement led by Sékou Touré;
- a sharp increase in the number of children going to primary schools (42,000 by 1957, about 9.5 percent of the school-age population); and
- resentment at the preference of the colonial administration for the French private sector and at the income gap between the French-dominated economic sectors and the rural sectors.

### ***3.3.5 Decision-Making Mechanisms and Institutional Linkages***

One of the major developments during this period was the decline of colonial administrative authority.

Trade union activity often pitted Guinean state employees against their French superiors. Sékou Touré, himself, was head of the Postal Workers Union. In 1953, he launched a major strike in the public sector. Public sector employees wanted higher pay rates and more opportunities for advancement. However, growing labor agitation did not change French responsibility for major administrative decisions. Thus, Guineans gained no managerial experience in the civil service.

Administrative authority also declined in the rural areas where the authority of canton chiefs was declining. In some areas, farmers stopped paying taxes and taking orders from unpopular chiefs.

The decline of administrative authority was accompanied by the rise of the PDG as a mass party and an alternative authority structure. As a mass party, the PDG reached from the national to the village level. Power was centralized. It listened to popular grievances, formulated party policy, and counted upon its organizers to mobilize popular support.

The PDG also established horizontal links with non-party institutions such as trade unions, trade associations, and women's and youth groups, incorporating many of them into the party. The party became the central institution for mobilizing forces within Guinean society against the colonial regime.

### **3.3.6 Interethnic Relations and Political-Social Dynamics**

During the post-war period, most Guinean political parties were organized along ethnic lines. Touré began his political career with the Mandingue Union before launching the multi-ethnic PDG in 1947. In some ways, the PDG was a broad, anti-Fulbé coalition built on a Malinké base in alliance with Sousou and ethnic groups from the Forest Region. However, Touré also presented the PDG as a nationalist party transcending ethnicity and overcoming interethnic rivalries and conflict. In the mid-1950s, he put prominent Fulbé intellectuals (i.e., Saifoulaye Diallo) near the head of his ticket and gave them important posts in the party.

Touré also appealed to powerless or underrepresented groups in Guinean society. He campaigned against the Fulbé chiefs and championed the serfs. Touré won the support of women's groups by calling for revisions in traditional family practices. He also won support from young people by giving them a greater role in the political process. Touré's charisma and oratorical skills appealed to the young.

The PDG capitalized on grievances of various social groups and promised them relief. The PDG called for: lower head taxes for the rural populations, higher salaries and better working conditions for Guinea's wage earners, and less administrative harassment and discrimination against traders and transporters.

The main themes of the party were nationalism and anti-colonialism. They won over the great majority of the Guinean people to Touré and his party. Touré delivered on certain campaign promises when he assumed power in 1957. He abolished the chieftaincies, lowered head taxes, raised the minimum wage, introduced measures to abolish forced marriages, and ended administration harassment of Dioula traders. Just before independence, his popularity reached a peak. In 1958, less than 60,000 people voted against independence. People overwhelmingly supported Touré's decision to assert Guinea's independence despite French President Charles DeGaulle's promise of dire consequences for a "no" vote.

The short 13-year decolonization period was not long enough for democratic institutions to take hold. After a promising start during the first two or three years of independence, Guinea became transformed into a one-party state.

## **3.4 Sékou Touré and the First Republic: 1958-1984**

During the First Republic, 1958 to 1984, external factors affected political and economic development in Guinea. France punished Guinea immediately after the September 28, 1958, referendum by withdrawing technical assistance and financial aid and isolating Guinea diplomatically. It left Guinea without competent personnel to run the administration and pushed it

into close ties with the Eastern Bloc. Guinea patterned its economy on the Marxist model with central planning and collectivization of agriculture. Politically, Guinea organized a one-party state based on democratic centralism and socialist principles. Various plots to overthrow the regime and the abortive 1970 invasion from Portuguese Guinea reinforced the regime's tendency toward repression, tight control of its people, and isolation from the West. The First Republic dismantled institutions established under French colonial rule and left the country in the institutional void of a Party-State which was not able to survive Touré's death in 1984.

### **3.4.1 Political Institutions**

Shortly after independence, the PDG absorbed the two Fulbé-based parties which had been its main opposition and created a one-party state. The party replaced the colonial administration as the main institution for controlling the population.

Political institutions and political life under the First Republic could be characterized by the following traits:

- absence of competitive party politics, a legal political opposition, and free elections;
- incorporation of most important organizations into the party structure (e.g., trade unions, women's groups, youth groups, religious organizations);
- weakness of the legislative and judicial branches of government which became subordinate to the executive branch and the party;
- subordination of the administration to the party;
- absence of a free press and state control of the media;
- repression of imagined and real opponents of the regime;
- establishment of popular militias as a counterweight to the Guinean army and control of the military by political commissars;
- greater participation of youth and women in local and national party structures;
- ideological mobilization around nationalist and socialist themes; and
- domination of the party by Sékou Touré who articulated and set national policy.

The PDG was organized along hierarchical lines. It paralleled the organization of the territorial administration. A village-level grassroots committee was organized, which eventually became the Local Revolutionary Authority (PRL). The PRLs within a district sent delegates to the section, and the sections within a region sent delegates to the regional federation. Periodically, the PDG would hold a national congress to elect a National Council which, in turn, chose its Political Bureau, which chose the Central Committee.

The PRLs elected officers every year. Two of the ten offices were reserved for women. Nearly all adults had PDG party cards. Party membership was tantamount to being a good citizen.

Under principles of democratic centralism, grassroots units of the party passed their views up through the party hierarchy until they reached Sékou Touré and the central committee of the

National Political Bureau. Once the party leadership made a decision, the rest of the party would mobilize the people to implement it. During the early years of the First Republic, Sékou Touré made frequent tours to keep in touch with the grassroots units and to hear their grievances. This practice diminished after the 1970 invasion as he became less responsive to grassroots sentiments and more isolated from the public.

### **3.4.2 Administrative Institutions**

As the French left, they dismantled Guinea's administrative structures, pulling out all of the expatriate personnel who held positions in the bureaucracy as well as schoolteachers, doctors, and technicians. The French also destroyed records and took most of the office equipment with them. This left a vacuum in the administration and, by necessity, accelerated the Africanization of the civil service in Guinea.

The Party-State regime recognized no clear-cut separation between party officials and civil servants. Thus, civil servants held most of the higher posts in the party. Advancement in the civil service depended more on political criteria than on educational qualifications and merit. For example, presidential nomination was required for officials to reach A level, the top classification in the civil service.

The civil service itself was divided into several ranks from A to F. It incorporated all public employees, including those working for state enterprises and the military. They were all included under a single civil service statute. The size of the civil service increased rapidly under the First Republic for several reasons:

- the nationalization of the private sector, with the exception of mining, made virtually every wage earner a state employee;
- the establishment of new state institutions and enterprises such as banks, foreign and domestic trade corporations, and factories created many new jobs;
- the rapid expansion of public services required large numbers of schoolteachers, medical personnel, extension agents, etc.; and
- the policy of guaranteeing every post-secondary school graduate a job led to rapid swelling of the bureaucracy.

By 1984, the number of public sector employees had risen to 90,000. However, this was not much larger than the total number of wage earners in both the public and private sectors just before independence despite a doubling of the general Guinean population under the First Republic.

Touré made an effort to reduce the gap between the higher and lower ranks of the bureaucracy by freezing salaries of those at the top and raising salaries of those at the bottom. Leveling the salaries kept official wage scales low in comparison with those in other African states. However, the low salaries were compensated by measures which made state officials a privileged class. These measures included the following:

- subsidized housing;
- a rationing system which gave state employees and their families preferential access to basic food commodities and consumer goods at subsidized prices; and

- an overvalued currency which permitted high-ranking officials to purchase appliances, automobiles, and other luxuries at prices well below world market value.

While some civil servants used their positions to enrich themselves, accumulation was limited by party ideology and constant surveillance of state officials and their acquisition of wealth. Ministers and officials abusing their office could be jailed or executed for corruption, especially if they aroused the ire of the President.

The state administrative structures under the First Republic can be divided into five basic categories, each with its own logic, functions, and management requirements:

- institutions involved in management of state finances and regulation of the economy. The expansion of this sector was a function of establishment of a centrally planned economy. The performance of this sector suffered from several factors. It lacked reliable economic data. Institutional staff had insufficient levels of financial and economic training and experience. Appropriate procedures to supervise banks, customs, tax collection, trading corporations, and other state agencies involved in this sector were absent. External institutional models were not easily adapted to Guinea;
- state enterprises involved in manufacturing, commerce, and export agricultural activities. The state assumed management roles previously carried out by the French private sector. State enterprises were poorly managed, inefficient, and operated below capacity. State managers tended to neglect the importance of measuring production costs, worker productivity, and market.
- various public services. The First Republic was more successful in expanding and managing these services. French personnel had carried them out before independence. Lacking trained staff, the government established a national university and several technical institutes to train Guineans for these public services. The government also sent Guineans to study in Eastern bloc countries. The government was successful in expanding basic social services for the people, particularly in the realm of education. However, the quality of the services left much to be desired because of inadequate staff training of Guinean cadres and lack of resources;
- the territorial administration covering rural areas. During French rule, the colonial administration was responsible for governing the rural populations. After independence, the party at the village level (PRL), took on administrative functions such as collecting taxes, enforcing state regulations, dispensing justice, and maintaining vital statistics. Officials who held command posts at district and regional levels had to be trusted party members; and
- the police and security services. Touré relied heavily on PDG youth militias to maintain security and to combat subversion. He had little trust in the army and tried to limit its size and power to forestall military coups. During the mid-1960s and 1970s, his regime became increasingly repressive. "Enemies of the revolution" were denounced, jailed, and sometimes executed. During the last

years of the regime, repression eased. However, various security services remained instruments of the state apparatus in controlling the population.

### **3.4.3 Legal Framework and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms**

Three different levels of legal framework existed under the First Republic:

- a liberal constitution;
- legal codes and court systems inherited from the colonial era and somewhat modified by the Touré regime; and
- a system of revolutionary justice meted out by the party.

The Guinean Constitution of November 10, 1958, provided for a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. It called for an independent judiciary and guaranteed freedom of speech, press, association, assembly, and religion. It permitted trade unions and the right to strike. It guaranteed the inviolability of the domicile of citizens. There was no mechanism to ensure that the Constitution was enforced.

For the most part, Sékou Touré maintained the framework of the French legal and court system inherited from the colonial era. Guineans who attended the law faculty in Guinea learned French law. However, few Guineans used these courts during the First Republic.

Moreover, the law itself was subordinated to politics and the needs of the revolution. The state justified its violations of civil rights and law in terms of the higher needs of the revolution. In some instances, the PDG cracked down on corruption as counter-revolutionary and punished civil servants who sabotaged the revolution by diverting public funds. People accused of political crimes were tried in Conakry.

The PDG created revolutionary tribunals at the PRL level to judge local infractions of the law. The PRL courts often followed village precedents for resolving marriage, inheritance, and land disputes, and handling minor criminal cases. Local notables remained in control although officiating in the name of the PDG.

Sékou Touré himself became the final court of appeal in resolving conflicts which were not settled within party, administrative, or traditional channels. During the First Republic, the Guinean legal system thus became a tool of the regime in power rather than an independent institution for providing justice and resolving conflicts in Guinea. The French-based legal system fell into disuse. Despite the dominance of the Party-State, traditional legal norms and mechanisms tended to survive.

### **3.4.4 Development Policy and Socioeconomic Institutions**

During the First Republic, development policy focused more on nationalizing the leading sectors of the economy and the collectivization of agriculture than on promoting economic growth. Control and social transformation goals dictated the choice of economic strategy and institutions.

Nationalization began during the First Republic with the creation of the Guinean Outlet for Foreign Commerce (CGCE) in 1959. It had the state monopoly over the import of basic consumer goods (i.e., rice, sugar, flour, cement) and key agricultural exports (i.e., bananas and

coffee). It also had the power to license private firms to trade. In 1960, the government established a central banking system, created a non-convertible Guinean franc to replace the CFA franc, and nationalized all the French commercial banks. These measures drove most of the French import-export firms out of Guinea. France ceased subsidizing Guinean agricultural exports. Profit margins disappeared. French plantation owners left. Eventually, the rest of their plantations were taken over by the state. Guinea still has not recovered from the collapse of the agricultural export sector that took place in the mid-1960s.

Monetary and fiscal policy, which led to nationalization of banking and monetary institutions, led to problems later on. The nationalized banks permitted a rapid expansion of credit which produced inflationary pressures. They imposed an overvaluation of the Guinean franc. A growing balance of trade deficits made imported products increasingly scarce because of foreign exchange shortages. The state became almost totally dependent upon the mining sector for foreign exchange and revenue. Mining production and exports counteracted the loss of foreign exchange and state revenues caused by the rapid decline of agricultural exports and falling imports by growing rapidly during the 1960s.

State regulations and pricing policies discouraged domestic trade and agricultural production. The rural sectors remained largely at the subsistence level since there were few incentives to produce a surplus for the market. This meant that rapidly growing urban populations had to rely increasingly on food imports. Guinea rice imports thus rose from a few thousand tons in 1958 to over 80,000 tons by 1984. Most of it went to feed Conakry.

Efforts to collectivize and mechanize Guinea's agriculture failed to increase production. The regime regarded Guinea's traditional agriculture as backward and reactionary. It made little effort to improve smallholder production through extension, improved inputs, and price incentives. Instead, agricultural policy focused on collectivization through expropriation of land and establishment of cooperatives and state farms. This policy entailed importing tractors and other equipment and relying on agricultural technicians to introduce new technology. The party organized production brigades to work the land under the direction of political cadres and mobilized students as farm labor.

The last major scheme for mechanizing agriculture was the establishment of the multifunctional District Agro-Pastoral Farms (FAPAs) in 1979. They failed to meet their production quotas and entailed heavy losses for the state. While promoting collectivized agriculture and state farms, the party squeezed the traditional farming system by setting low prices for agricultural commodities, imposing heavy taxes on farmers and herders, and providing few consumer goods. These policies stifled the commercialization and monetarization of the rural economy, and divided the country into those who worked for the state and those who did not.

Under the First Republic, Guinea evolved a three-sector economy:

- an enclave mining sector which generated revenue and foreign exchange for the state, but had few spread effects;
- a state-run sector which employed most Guinean wage earners but suffered from poor management, low productivity, and heavy losses; and
- a subsistence sector which encompassed most of Guinea's population.

For much of this period, the Guinean private sector had little or no access to credit and limited opportunity for expansion. It specialized in clandestine border trade. As a class, Guinean traders and merchants were often denounced as economic saboteurs and blamed for much of Guinea's economic ills.

Guinea became isolated from the West and relied heavily upon Eastern bloc countries for trade, aid, and technical assistance. Guinea provided mineral resources in exchange for their capital and consumer goods, often on a barter basis. The Eastern bloc provided most of Guinea's expatriate technical assistance personnel and scholarships for Guineans to study abroad. The reconciliation of Guinea with its neighbors and France in the late 1970s opened the way to western and World Bank development capital and technical assistance. This had little impact on Guinea's centrally planned economy which experienced growth in its foreign debt due to growing food imports and stagnant exports.

Development policies under the First Republic had a profound impact on the evolution of Guinean institutions. The lack of economic opportunities in the countryside, oppressive taxing policies, and political repression accelerated the rural exodus. Guineans left to seek employment in neighboring countries. By 1984, an estimated two million Guineans lived outside Guinea. Conakry also saw its population soar from 100,000 in 1958 to 800,000 by 1984. A rationing system, which favored Conakry residents and state employees, drew people to the capital and provided most with a modest living standard.

The First Republic made a major effort during the 1960s to expand the educational system. In 1965, 20 percent of the state operating budget went to education. The percentage of Guinean children in primary school increased from less than 10 percent at independence to 28.3 percent by the 1962/1963 school year (Suret-Canale 1970). Following the departure of the French, the Touré regime established a Guinean university, Africanized curriculum and teaching staff, and introduced local languages as instructional languages in primary schools. By the late 1970s, more than 20,000 Guineans were attending the university, far more than the system could absorb. Despite its successes, the Guinean educational system suffered from the following defects:

- inability of the school system to meet actual needs;
- production of underqualified teachers and technicians due to inadequate training;
- curriculum characterized by ideological indoctrination at the expense of basic skills;
- low educational standards and limited fluency in French;
- lack of performance incentives as all post-secondary school students were guaranteed a job when they graduated;
- lack of training in basic management skills; and
- an educational budget which provided shrinking salaries for teachers and practically no resources for textbooks and other school materials.

The First Republic dampened local initiative and created an atmosphere in which people awaited everything from Party-State jobs, education, and development programs.

The First Republic emancipated certain groups in Guinean society, such as women, youth, and captives, in its effort to transform precapitalist social structures to create an egalitarian socialist society. Thus, girls had greater access to education. Women held important posts in the party and government. The regime relied on youth to modernize agriculture and change society. It placed emphasis on providing them with educational and cultural opportunities and ideological indoctrination. It also gave former captives access to land rights without passing through their former masters and freed them from labor obligations.

However, rural social structures remained largely intact as the Party-State did not have the resources to transform rural society. By neglecting smallholder production systems and focusing on large projects and state farms, the First Republic contributed to maintenance of the very structures it wanted to transform. Since the regime could financially survive without turning the subsistence farmer into a cash crop farmer, a *modus vivendi* developed during the late 1970s and early 1980s with mild steps toward political and economic liberalization.

### ***3.4.5 Decision-Making Mechanisms and Institutional Linkages***

Major decisions affecting society were taken by the central organs of the PDG. Changes in economic and social policy were discussed at national party conferences before being implemented. Political and ideological criteria took precedent over economic and technical criteria in making policy decisions. For example, the party decided to overrule advice from technicians from the forestry service to institute a forestry code that would restrict access to classified forests in the name of conservation (Barry 1990). Such measures had been unpopular during the colonial period. The regime was reluctant to restore these restrictions, despite environmental damage and deforestation. Elsewhere, the regime overruled recommendations to limit introduction of FAPAs to an experimental basis in certain areas before extension throughout the entire country. FAPAs were, in fact, established in nearly every district.

Throughout the First Republic, Sékou Touré remained the undisputed leader of the PDG, the nation's last court of appeal and the source of national policy. Major personnel appointments had to be cleared by Touré. His intervention created uncertainty and unpredictability in decision making. He tolerated little criticism. Many of his ministers and political associates wound up in prison or were executed.

Each of the three sectors of the economy had its own decision-making mechanisms. The regime gave the foreign-owned mining sector freedom to make its decisions according to economic and market criteria, provided an agreement had determined the share of profits and export receipts to be allocated to the state. Economic criteria played a small role in decision making in the state-run sector. State factories maintained their employees despite their losses. Inefficient and corrupt managers were occasionally fired or jailed. Removal, however, often depended on political criteria or the personal whims of Touré. The party could overrule decisions of administrators and technicians in the civil service. This danger stifled initiative and undermined effective implementation of policy. Finally, decision-making authority in the subsistence sector of the economy remained primarily with the household which devised strategies in the face of party efforts to control the rural populations.

Few linkages existed among the three sectors. The mining export sector was an enclave which imported its technicians and capital goods. The state sector relied little upon the sub-

sistence sector for its resources. The subsistence sector, in turn, received relatively few goods and services from the state-controlled sectors of the economy.

The party provided tenuous linkages between national, regional, and local institutions. The deterioration of Guinea's road and railroad infrastructure made it difficult for the party to control local-level institutions. The decline in living standards, unpopular economic policies, and police state tactics reduced the legitimacy of the PDG Party-State. The failure of the party to establish a solid institutional base in the countryside contributed to its inability to resist the April 3, 1984, military coup which followed the death of Sékou Touré.

#### **3.4.6 *Interethnic Relations and Political Social Dynamics***

Although Touré came to power with an ideology of treating all ethnic groups in Guinea fairly, the regime favored the Malinké by giving them a disproportionate number of party and government offices. Thus, Malinké held 50 percent of the 700 territorial administrative command positions (Charles 1989) and most of the key ministries. Malinké also dominated the security services. The Sousou and forest peoples were underrepresented. As an ethnic group, the Fulbé chiefs and people of Fouta Djallon lost the most under the First Republic. The Fulbé were accused of permanently plotting against the revolution. Many Fulbé leaders were jailed or killed, and many of their followers fled the country.

Religion also played an important role in Guinea's political social dynamics. Touré Africanized the Catholic church in Guinea. He insisted that the European archbishop of Conakry be replaced by an African. He also nationalized Protestant missionary schools in the early 1960s. The elite of the Sousou and forest peoples had been educated in these schools. Touré, himself a Muslim, promoted Islam in Guinea, especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s when Guinea established ties and received financial aid from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. However, the regime insisted that Islam was to serve the state and that Muslim clerics would have to support the party publicly and stay out of politics. Touré antagonized some of the forest peoples by trying to eliminate some of their forest rituals. The Malinké and the Fulbe were the most Islamized groups in Guinea. The Fulbé considered themselves the most devout and knowledgeable in the Koran. The First Republic established a Religious Ministry and Islamic Leagues to incorporate religion into the Party-State structure.

Trade unions, women's groups, and youth groups mobilized in the PDG's rise to power lost their dynamism and initiative when they became incorporated into Party-State structures. Nearly all wage earners outside of mining became state employees. As employees of a socialist state, they were not permitted to strike. Women traders and market women of Conakry who had supported the PDG in the independence struggle became disaffected with the regime, but they still managed to retain some of their influence. Demonstrations by the market women of Conakry in 1977 compelled the regime to liberalize trade and reduce its harassment of the private sector. Young people received benefits and attention from the regime in the form of access to secondary and higher education, jobs for graduates, and opportunities to engage in sports and other cultural activities. At the same time, youth became dependent upon the state for their education and livelihood.

Those who lost the most under the First Republic were French business interests and the Guinean merchant and trader class. The French, for the most part, left of their own accord following the nationalization measures of the early 1960s. Merchants and traders saw their

activities limited and subjected to state control and themselves denounced as counter-revolutionaries when it suited party purposes. Anti-merchant policies drove the merchants underground and raised the costs of doing business. The Lebanese business community managed to survive despite official antagonism.

Despite the poverty in Conakry and other urban areas, urban populations were favored vis-à-vis the countryside. State employees were able to support nine to ten people in their households despite their low salaries due to privileges they received from the state such as ration cards, subsidized prices for basic commodities, and subsidized housing and utilities. These benefits provided a safety net and dampened anti-regime sentiment. They also made urban populations dependent upon the state and discouraged private initiative and critical evaluation of the regime.

The regime was overthrown in a bloodless military coup in April 1984, shortly after Sékou Touré's funeral, while the PDG leadership was trying to name a successor. The PDG received no support from the people who welcomed the coup and the end of a repressive regime. The military freed all political prisoners and promised to liberalize the economy and establish a democratic regime.

#### ***3.4.7 Summary of Trends***

The First Republic left an onerous legacy. When it fell, its economy was in a shambles. Its once prosperous agricultural export sector had disappeared. Many other rural sectors had retreated into a subsistence mode. State industries were operating at a loss. State regulations had all but destroyed private sector activities and initiatives. State bureaucracy was overblown and unproductive. The educational system produced poorly trained teachers, civil servants, and technicians who could not efficiently manage the economy or government bureaucracy. Centralized Party-State rule had stifled development of autonomous voluntary associations and local initiative. The absence of a legal framework and court system for resolving institutional disputes combined with one-party rule to make justice unpredictable. The dominance of the personality of the President undermined people's confidence in public institutions and administration. All these factors contributed to the dissolution of Guinean institutions—perhaps the most serious constraint to Guinean development under the Second Republic.

### **3.5 The Second Republic (1984-present): Political and Economic Liberalization Under Military Rule**

#### ***3.5.1 Political Institutions***

##### **The Preeminence of the Military**

The military coup which overthrew the First Republic won the army considerable prestige and was enthusiastically received. The military established a Military Committee of National Recovery (CMRN) to rule the country during a transition to a civilian regime. The CMRN then set up a government headed by Colonel (later General) Lansana Conté who became President and Chief of State. Conté named Colonel Diarra Traoré as Prime Minister. In December 1984, the post of Prime Minister was eliminated.

Dissension within the military erupted in July 1985 when Colonel Traoré, with the support of elements in the Malinké-dominated police, attempted a coup d'état. The abortive coup may have been an attempt to put the Malinké back in power. In addition to controlling the presidency, the Sousou are disproportionately represented in the top echelons of the military and government. In 1989, Sousou headed four out of five of the major military services and comprised 70 percent of the Presidential Guard.

After the coup, Lansana Conté emerged as the undisputed leader of the military. He consolidated his power by strengthening the prerogatives of the presidency. Despite early promises to restore civilian rule, the CMRN procrastinated in establishing a Constitution and developing political institutions.

Until the December 22, 1990, referendum, which approved a new Constitution, the CMRN remained the ultimate political body in Guinea. When it took power, the CMRN abolished the old Constitution, dissolved the PDG and its affiliated organizations, and ruled by decree. It thus created a political void which was filled by the military.

The military dominated the CMRN and held a commanding role within the government. It provided nearly three-quarters of the ministers until December 1985, when Conté appointed a civilian majority to the Council of Ministers. In the February 1991 government, military men head eight ministries and serve as resident governors for all four of Guinea's natural regions. Moreover, the Transitional Committee of National Recovery (CTRN), which replaced the CMRN after the December 1990 Constitutional Referendum, is dominated by military men. They hold the positions of President and Secretary-General, and constitute up to 50 percent of the executive board and provide 12 of the 36 members of the CTRN—all appointed by President Conté. During the early years of the regime, military men held 28 percent of territorial administration posts and 27 percent of top management positions in state enterprises compared to 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, during the First Republic (Charles 1989). Military officers serve as prefects, especially in border areas, and hold important posts in key economic areas.

#### **Absence of National Political Institutions and Emphasis on Local Government Bodies**

Important elements within the military are still reluctant to establish a political system based on multiparty competition due to fears of exacerbating interethnic rivalries. The regime has also resisted pressures to permit and promote national political institutions as part of the democratization process.

Instead, the regime opted to create institutions at the grassroots level as part of a program of political and administrative decentralization. It created elective District Councils in the rural areas and Neighborhood Councils in the urban areas. At the district level, the rural populations also elect a Council of Advisors consisting of four elders to advise the District Councils and mediate local disputes. The first elections to these bodies took place in 1986.

The next step in the democratization process came with the creation of Rural Development Communities (CRDs) to represent District Councils at the subprefecture level. Elections to the CRD were indirect. Each District Council sent two representatives to the CRD. The first CRD was established in late 1988, and 12 more were established by April 1991. Plans are to create 100 CRDs nationally by the end of 1992.

The government also created representative bodies in the urban areas. Conakry was divided into five municipalities. Municipal elections were held in March 1991. Candidates submitted a multi-ethnic list which they headed. Elections were based on proportional representation. After elections, Municipal Council members elected a mayor and sent representatives to the Conakry Municipal Council, presided over by a Governor named by the central government. Elections for Municipal Councils in Guinea's prefectures took place in June 1991. They were marred by interethnic violence in several areas.

Despite the establishment of these Decentralized Municipalities (CDs) or local government bodies, Guinea has no national political institutions such as political parties, an elected National Assembly, an independent judiciary, or an independent national press. Until April 1991, the government-sponsored weekly, *Horaya*, a carryover from the old regime, was the only national news publication. In April, a new political newsletter, *La Nouvelle Republique*, appeared for the first time as a forum for discussion of national issues and a platform for political dissent. Since then, other newspapers have appeared.

The trend toward multiparty democracy throughout Africa is making it increasingly difficult for the regime to hold off transfer of power to a civilian regime or to put the Constitution into effect. Recent social unrest has been accompanied by demands for rapid implementation of the Constitution.

### **The Constitution**

The December 23, 1990, Constitution commits Guinea to democratic government. It guarantees basic civil and human rights, including religious freedom, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of the press, and the right to join trade unions and strike, to all citizens. The Constitution stresses the rule of law and equality before the law. It forbids discrimination by gender, religion, race, and ethnicity, and ensures equal access to employment opportunities. Article 8 specifically states that men and women have the same rights.

The most controversial parts of the Constitution are Article 3 and Article 95. The former gives the government the right to set the number of political parties and the conditions under which political parties may be constituted and function. The latter limits the country to two political parties until further notice. The regime, until recently, rejected a multiparty system as unsuitable to Guinea. It insisted that the number of parties be limited to two in order not to exacerbate ethnic rivalries. However, it now seems likely that the CTRN will permit a multiparty system.

The Constitution states that a political party must have representation throughout the country and cannot be racial, ethnic, religious, or regional in nature. It also calls for punishment of racial, religious, or ethnic discrimination and for attempts to undermine the unity or the territorial integrity of the nation.

The Constitution establishes a strong presidency. The President is elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term, renewable once. The presidency is incompatible with pursuit of any other public or private activity. The President can no longer exercise any responsibilities within a political party; therefore, the President can no longer serve as party leader. The President names all civilian and military employees, directs the government, heads the mili-

tary services, and negotiates international agreements. The Constitution is mute on operations of the executive branch. It does not mention a Council of Ministers.

The Constitution also creates a National Assembly to vote on the laws. Deputies are elected to five-year terms. In order to run, a candidate must be a member of a legal political party. Thus, independents are excluded from running. One-third of the Deputies are to be elected by a majority vote of their district. The other two-thirds are to be elected from a national list according to proportional representation. This electoral system makes candidates more beholden to their party than to their constituents.

The Guinean Constitution sets up an independent judiciary, including a Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of laws and international commitments, and a High Court of Justice to try the President or government ministers for high treason or lesser crimes carried out in office.

The Constitution also creates an Economic and Social Council as an advisory body to be consulted when laws and long-term programs affecting the economy are being considered.

The Constitution specifically refers to local government bodies. It grants them the right to administer their affairs through elected councils. Nevertheless, they remain under the control of a government representative who is responsible for seeing that they respect national law. The central government thereby retains authority over local government and limits its autonomy of action, although the extent of the authority is not clear.

Finally, the Constitution gives legislative power to the CTRN during the interim period following approval of the Constitution. The major political issue facing Guinea now is the length of the interim period. The new system has to be fully implemented by the end of 1995, and political parties formed at least one year before. The CTRN is currently drafting legislation to establish new institutions by the end of this year. It is less clear when national elections will be called.

### **Political Decision-Making Centers**

There have been three national decision-making centers in Guinea since the advent of the Second Republic: (1) the CMRN and its successor, the CTRN; (2) the presidency; and (3) the Council of Ministers. All three are controlled by Lansana Conté. The CMRN created the presidency and the government shortly after taking power.

The CMRN, which reflected the views of the military, replaced the PDG's Executive Bureau as the political decision-making body in Guinea after the coup. Its role declined as Lansana Conté consolidated and reinforced his personal authority within the military, the CMRN, and the government. The Constitution gives the President the right to name the members of the CTRN. However, Conté still has to consult with his top military officers before initiating any major political and governmental reforms. The CTRN is less powerful than its predecessor. Its mandate is limited to drafting constitutional legislation.

The office of the presidency is the most powerful decision-making center in Guinea. The President directly controls more than one-third of national budgetary resources. He names all ministers and senior civil servants. He is the last court of appeal. The President has separate civilian and military cabinets. The military cabinet permits the President to keep tabs on the

military. The civilian cabinet deals with protocol, presidential press relations, management of presidential residences, and security. The General Secretariat of the presidency determines access and regulates the flow of information to the President. The General Secretary has the rank of Minister. He arranges meetings of the Council of Ministers, studies reports of government departments, and monitors execution of presidential decisions. Major governmental decisions are cleared through the presidency. Centralization of power in the presidency is reflected in its involvement in small affairs. For example, the President's signature is needed to allocate foreign scholarships to Guineans studying abroad or to grant permission for building on government-owned land in Conakry.

The Council of Ministers is the third major power center in the government. The President presides over its meetings. He has the decisive voice in making decisions and resolving disputes between ministers. The Council of Ministers consists of a mix of military and civilian ministers named by the President. Military ministers have often acted as super-ministers and overridden decisions of civilian ministers.

Although the 1984 military coup was carried out in the name of the Guinean people, the military regime did not allow the public to choose national leaders, government officials, and representatives. Civilian ministers were co-opted by the ruling military elite and the President. Moreover, the weakness of Guinea's judicial system meant that the public had little recourse against abuses of power. The absence of accountability has encouraged corruption and permitted the military to receive a disproportionate share of national budgetary resources. Since the President, himself, is obliged to the military for power, he cannot take vigorous action to restrict the military's role in government without endangering his own position. Therefore, the military is able to preserve its preeminent position in government despite promises to establish a civilian regime.

### **Interethnic Relations and Political Social Dynamics**

While the Constitution reflects Guinean desire to dampen interethnic rivalries and conflicts, the Malinké, the dominant group during the Touré regime, have lost power and influence, particularly since the aborted 1985 coup by Colonel Diarra Traoré. They have been underrepresented in the CMRN, government, and territorial administration. The Sousou, who have been overrepresented, have gained the most. Their power has been reinforced by their dominant position in the military. The President, himself, is Sousou. The situation of the Fulbé improved considerably. However, they remain underrepresented in the CMRN, government, and territorial administration. Liberalization of the economy and the end of Fulbé repression have permitted the Fulbé to assume a dominant position in trade and the private sector. The Forest peoples still remain underrepresented in the government and a marginal force in national politics.

The Second Republic has witnessed little interethnic violence. Anti-Malinké riots in Conakry followed the aborted coup in 1985. Anti-Fulbé riots broke out in 1987, when rice prices soared and Fulbé merchants were blamed for prices and shortages. During recent municipal elections in N'Zérékoré, Guerzé attacked Malinké in the city and the surrounding countryside. Interethnic tension also rose in the Maritime Region during student and teacher strikes in May. Some Sousou saw the strikes as an attempt to dislodge them in the power structure.

The military regime has made an effort to reduce interethnic tensions. Ethnic arithmetic has been a factor in naming government officials. Within each ministry, the regime has made an effort to balance top positions among ethnic groups. Thus, the posts of Minister, General Secretary, and Cabinet Chief, the three most important positions in any ministry, are often held by members of different ethnic groups. However, the perception among non-Sousou is that the President is favoring his ethnic group over others.

The Second Republic has been less interventionist in religious matters than its predecessor. The new regime has not promoted Islam as vigorously as Sékou Touré, although it shows respect for Muslim religious leaders. The Sousou are less deeply Islamized than the Malinké or Fulbé. Guinea did not support Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It maintains close ties with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Radical Islam has not had much influence in Guinea. Christians, who have fared better under the Second Republic are overrepresented in the government in relation to their share of the population: seven of the current 24 ministers are Christian.

The influence of women in government and the upper echelons of administration is limited, and the military is essentially a male institution. The current government has no female ministers and only two female secretaries of state. Three women hold seats in the CTRN, including a representative of the National Workers' Confederation of Guinea (CNTG). Women are also underrepresented in the civil service.

Conakry's market women retain some power. The President needed to meet with them in the spring of 1991 during a period of social unrest and Conakry voters in the municipal elections of March 1991 gave a local businesswoman a significant victory in the municipality of Matam.

During the early years of the Second Republic, the trade union movement was not very active. The Labor Code of January 1988 gave workers the right to organize and permitted unions to compete with each other. The General Union of Guinean Workers (UGTG) thus recently emerged as a rival to the CNTG, which is aligned with the government. Under the First Republic, wage earners were nearly all state employees. Trade union activity today continues to be concentrated in the public sector. The formal private sector employs few wage earners. Wage employment in the informal sector is booming, but the informal sector is less subject to unionization pressures. The decline in living standards for urban wage earners and civil servants will likely lead to vigorous trade union activity in the future.

After the overthrow of the First Republic, many exiled Guineans returned home. They have emerged as an important political and economic group (Bah 1989). Former exiles hold five ministries in the current government, including the Finance and Interior Ministries. Fulbé businessmen have also returned in large numbers. Many are investing in housing and have thus set off a construction boom in the Fouta Djallon. So-called "external" Guineans in government are generally better educated than counterparts who remained in the country during the Touré era. Rivalry for government jobs has created tension between the two groups.

Former inmates of the Boiro concentration camps that Sékou Touré established to punish his political rivals constitute another major group in the new regime (Charles 1989). More than a quarter of the ministers in the government, including the General Secretary of the Presidency, are from former Boiro detainees and their families.

Guinea faces a difficult transitional period to democracy: firstly, due to reluctance in the military to yield power to popular civilian government; and secondly, due to growing social unrest spawned by the impact of structural adjustment reforms on urban populations, civil servants, teachers, and students.

### **3.5.2 Structural Adjustment Program and Economic Liberalization**

The regime did little to implement economic reforms until the end of 1985. In a major speech of December 22, 1985, President Conté presented a series of policy reforms, the Program of Economic and Financial Reform (PREF), to dismantle the economic and financial institutions of the First Republic and replace them with institutions which would foster a free-market economy. PREF reflected the structural adjustment reforms demanded by the IMF and World Bank as preconditions for granting support to Guinea's economy. Emphasis was placed on elimination of policies which distorted market signals.

The first phase of the PREF began in December 1985 and lasted until the end of 1988. It included six major reforms:

- devaluation of the Guinean currency and monetary reform;
- trade liberalization;
- creation of a commercial banking system;
- privatization and liquidation of government enterprises;
- abolition of state marketing boards and the removal of most price controls; and
- civil service reform aimed at reducing the size of the state bureaucracy.

Guinea's currency was first devalued in October 1985, when the rate was set at 290 sylis to the dollar. It had previously been 25 sylis to the dollar. In January 1986, the government called in sylis and replaced them with new Guinean francs (GFs). The devaluation made the official rate of the Guinean franc close to the parallel market rate. By the end of May 1986, the GF was set at 335 to the dollar. In mid-1991, the dollar was worth about 720 GF. As a result of devaluation and loosening of controls, foreign exchange became more plentiful than under the First Republic. In auctioning off foreign exchange, the Central Bank gave Guineans access to foreign exchange thereby stimulating foreign trade and importation of a wide range of goods.

While devaluation stabilized the Guinean currency, it also touched off inflationary forces which depressed living standards of wage earners and civil servants. Under the Touré regime, their low salaries had been counterbalanced by the low cost of food imports and other basic necessities made possible by a system of overvalued currency and price controls.

Trade liberalization consisted of reductions in tariffs and replacement of import licensing by a system of import declarations available to registered traders. Under the First Republic, tariffs had been high and complex, and were frequently evaded. Tariff regulations introduced in January 1986 established a basic rate of 10 percent. Essential commodities and agricultural inputs paid a 5 percent rate, and luxury goods a much higher rate.

Banking reforms were a major part of the PREF. They responded to the deterioration of the state-controlled banking system during the first 18 months of the Second Republic. In 1985,

the government passed legislation to permit establishment of a private banking system. It gave the Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea (BCRG) the power once again to issue currency. On December 22, the day that President Conté launched the PREF, the government closed down and liquidated the six state-owned banks. Several private banks active in other parts of francophone Africa stepped in to inject new capital into the economy.

The PREF also called for privatization and/or liquidation of most state enterprises with the exception of essential service industries and state-owned mining and petroleum distribution industries. By the end of 1988, the government had privatized 25 state enterprises and liquidated 68 others. The government was slower in restructuring state enterprises it planned to keep. While the liquidation of state enterprises clearly contributed to reduction of state deficits, it also increased social tension. Thousands of employees working for these companies lost their jobs and swelled the ranks of the unemployed.

The creation of a private banking system and privatization were not without cost. The private banks received generous tax exemptions, as did many of the privatized firms. Moreover, some of the state enterprises were sold at very low prices and paid off over several years without interest. Assets of liquidated enterprises were often sold at token prices. The lack of transparency in these operations created widespread criticism of the process.

In 1986, the government removed price controls on most goods. It ended its monopoly on long-distance transport and storage. It dismantled the state marketing system which had controlled Guinea's commercial sector during most of the First Republic. Controls had given officials the opportunity to exact rents. The elimination of regulations concerning conduct of trade contributed to reduction of transaction costs due to fewer opportunities for officials to exact rents. Since most trade during the last years of the Touré regime was already taking place in parallel markets, these measures had little immediate impact on prices. However, they legitimized the private sector and provided incentives for farmers to produce surpluses for market.

The final element of PREF was the civil service reform. It focused on reduction of the number of public sector personnel. A census of public sector employees taken between December 1985 and May 1986 counted approximately 90,000 public sector employees: 72,000 in administration and 18,000 in state enterprises. Between 1986 and the end of 1988, the government reduced the number by 30,000. These cuts reflected policies of: retiring officials eligible for pensions; providing incentives for early retirement and voluntary departure; eliminating unqualified personnel through testing; privatizing and/or liquidating state enterprises; and reclassifying unskilled workers who had civil service status. Those who lost jobs were partially compensated by severance pay and incentives to start private sector businesses. For the most part, layoffs were unpopular and generated resistance to further civil service reforms. More detailed analysis of civil service reforms and its impact will be given in the next section.

PREF reforms were accompanied with measures to improve management of public expenditures, increase domestic revenues, and provide the legal framework in which the private sector could function efficiently.

The establishment of a three-year Program of Public Investments (PIP) in 1987 and Guinea's first formal budget in 1988 reflected the need to rationalize public expenditure management. Under the First Republic, inefficient tax and customs services rendered domestic resource mobilization ineffective. As a result, the government was almost totally dependent on taxes from the mining sector for its revenues. Outside of the Special Tax on Petroleum Products (TSPP), introduced in 1986, little was done to raise more revenue through non-mining resources. As part of PREF reforms, legislation and codes were enacted in various fields. However, application often lagged behind adoption.

The first phase of PREF focused primarily on policy changes which would have a positive effect on the macroeconomic environment by transforming Guinea into a market-oriented economy. The second phase, which has continued since the end of 1988, focuses more on institutional reform.

For example, it was easier to reduce the number of public employees and liquidate state enterprises than it is to reorganize the performance standards of the civil service or to restructure surviving state enterprises to operate cost-effectively. Similarly, PREF reforms in budget procedures, tax laws, and tariff structures are being undermined by weaknesses in government agencies implementing them as well as by resistance from groups adversely affected by them. Legal codes drawn up under PREF provide a framework for institutional reforms but are not being fully applied. They suffer from the lack of enforcement mechanisms.

Although PREF has stimulated economic growth and expansion of agricultural production and trade, production outside the agricultural sector has stagnated as private investors remain reluctant to invest in the Guinean economy. The government has reduced its intervention in the economy, reorienting it on a liberal capitalist model. Yet, the complexity of the institutional changes sought, the resistance of key actors to these changes, and the negative social consequences of structural adjustment reforms on urban populations have complicated the government's task. Political, administrative, and legal institutional constraints to implementing these reforms will be discussed later in more detail.

### ***3.5.3 Administrative and Legal Institutions***

#### **Dismantling the Party-State**

After taking power in 1984, the military regime dismantled political, administrative, and legal structures of the First Republic. It suspended the Constitution, banned the PDG and its youth militias, dissolved the National Assembly, jailed leading PDG officials, and replaced PDG loyalists in government with military men, former exiles, and civil servants not compromised by connections with the old regime.

In May 1984, the military regime changed the name of the country from the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea to the Republic of Guinea to distance itself from the radical stance of its predecessor. At the same time, the military regime reorganized the territorial administration. The prefecture replaced the administrative region, while the subprefecture replaced the district. The PRLs were dissolved and replaced by rural districts and urban neighborhoods. Although the military regime initially retained the province as an administrative unit, it eventually divided the country into four natural regions, each administered by a military resident minister named by the President. To preclude development of regional eth-

nic bases, the resident minister generally came from an ethnic group not dominant in the region.

The turnover in administrative personnel following the demise of the First Republic created an atmosphere of uncertainty. Decision-making authority became blurred by staffing the territorial administration with both military men and career civil servants. Civil servants previously accountable to PDG party officials and Sékou Touré were now accountable to a military government and a rational hierarchy. Women remained absent from command posts. The people themselves remained afraid to speak out not knowing if the military regime would be as repressive as the Touré regime or whether the old regime would soon return to power.

Dismantling the Party-State also meant scrapping state enterprises, rationing, and regulations controlling the economy. Socialist ideology no longer guided economic and development policies. On the contrary, the Second Republic committed itself to building a capitalist economy. Dismantling the Party-State and acceptance of the IMF-World Bank program for economic reform sparked an influx of aid and technical assistance from the West, and enabled Guinea to reduce its dependency on East Bloc aid, trade, and technical assistance.

The French, in particular, returned in force to influence reshaping Guinea's financial and educational institutions. Thus, French capital dominated the private banking sector and export agricultural companies. The French language again became the dominant language of instruction at all levels.

### **Civil Service Reform**

One of the major by-products of dismantling the Party-State and the structural adjustment program was an effort to reduce the public sector and upgrade the civil service through improved training and management techniques. Administrative reform, an integral part of the PREF, had the support of the President. The General Commissariat for Administrative Reform (CGRA), the key institution in initiating early reforms, was created in 1986 and attached to the presidency. In 1988, the Ministry of Administrative Reform (MRAFP) was organized to oversee continuation of reform and to manage the civil service.

#### *1/ Administrative Reform Objectives*

The primary objective of administrative reform was to build a system of rules which would define the organizational principles and mode of operation of the civil service and redefine the relationship between the state and society in a regime based on democratic and liberal economic principles (MRAPF, February 1991). Reform had four major goals:

- to determine the mission, powers, and functions of the civil service and the distribution among the different components of the administrative system;
- to create and operationalize administrative structures capable of implementing their assigned missions and roles;
- to move toward deconcentration of the territorial administration and the decentralization of power from the central government to local bodies and agencies; and

- to avoid double employment and overlapping of structures by a hierarchical distribution of roles and functions at each level of the administration.

These reforms were designed to rationalize the state bureaucracy and to reduce the size of the public sector and state intervention in the economy. The reforms adopted traditional bureaucratic approaches based on hierarchy and unity of command.

## *2/ Reducing the Size of the Public Service*

The reduction of the number of state employees was one of the first administrative reform measures. Between 1985 and 1990, the number of civil servants declined from 90,000 to 50,000 in the wake of the following measures:

- First, the liquidation and privatization of state enterprises took over 5,200 state employees off the public payrolls in 1986 alone. Others who continued to work for surviving state enterprises such as the mining companies (over 14,000 people) were no longer civil servants.
- Second, the government compressed the civil service hierarchy from seven grades to three. Employees in the E, F, and G grades were transformed into contractual workers with limited benefits. The A, B, C, and D category civil servants, with the exception of health and education personnel, had to pass exams to test their competence in order to stay in government service. Of the 23,000 civil servants tested, 13,000 survived, 5,000 were fired, and another 5,000 had to undergo retraining. Those who were fired or retrained continued to receive their salaries. At first, laid-off employees were entitled to only six months of salary. However, under pressure, the government agreed to pay 10,000 laid-off employees under the special availability program until the end of 1990.
- Third, the government forced employees with 30 years of service to retire and provided incentives for early retirement and voluntary departure. Over 8,100 employees retired between 1985 and 1990. Bolstered by donor financial aid, bonuses were given to voluntary retirees. A special office, the Office Assisting Job Requalification of Civil Service Personnel (BARAF), opened to provide technical assistance and credits to retirees launching private sector activities. The government and donors assumed that the expanding private sector would absorb former government employees. The fact that the private sector did not generate sufficient employment opportunities for laid-off personnel led to social tensions and reinforced opposition to reforms reducing the size of the public sector.
- Fourth, the census of state employees and payrolls revealed fraud and chaos in public payrolls and enabled the government to eliminate hundreds of positions. The census found people collecting salaries of deceased staff. Others were receiving more than one salary. Still others continued to get paid after leaving the civil service.
- Finally, the government has ended the policy of guaranteeing employment to all university graduates. As a result, few graduates from post-secondary institutions

have found employment in the government since 1985. In 1990, the government hired 2,204 staff, almost exclusively in the Ministries of National Education and Public Health (MRAFP, December 1990). In 1991, government provisions call for adding 9,000 civil servants to the payroll while reducing the number of contractuels by 850. Two-thirds of the growth is in the C grade. Most of the rest is in the B grade. Less than 200 new posts were scheduled for the A grade.

Measures reducing the number of state employees also had an impact on the structure of the public sector and the status of civil servants. Under the First Republic, all state employees had civil service status. Moreover, the regime's policies kept salary differences and benefits between high-ranking and low-ranking civil servants small. Under Second Republic reforms, unqualified personnel throughout the bureaucracy lost their jobs. At the bottom end of the scale, orderlies, drivers, and other relatively unskilled employees lost their civil service status. They number around 10,000 and now constitute about 20 percent of the public sector work force. Privatization, liquidation of state enterprises, and dismantling of surviving state enterprises have eliminated other workers from the civil service. The result is a streamlined civil service consisting primarily of well-educated and skilled personnel involved in providing public services.

Administrative reform had little impact on the military. During the First Republic, the military was part of the civil service and subordinate to party control. After the 1984 coup, the military was granted special status and saw an expansion of its privileges. Approximately 15,000 people serve in the military and security services. The size of the military has probably increased since 1984. Military expenditures may account for 30 percent of the wage bill. Since taking power, the military government has promoted numbers of officers and granted higher salary increases and greater benefits to military personnel than to civilian counterparts. Moreover, millions have been spent to improve housing facilities in installations such as Camp Samori. Military expenditures are not made public. As a result, public resources have been diverted to activities which have cancelled out gains made by reducing the public sector.

The military's privileged status has created resentment among civil servants who lost rice and gas subsidies and other privileges as a result of PREF reforms. Salaries of civil servants are as little as one-sixth of salaries of their counterparts in neighboring countries. Devaluation aggravated the economic situation of state employees. Their salaries cover only a fraction of their family expenses (Schwartz 1989). The privileges of the military have added fuel to a dangerous situation, especially in Conakry where the population suffers from declining living standards and limited employment opportunities.

### *3/ Upgrading the Quality of the Civil Service*

Administrative reform is now focusing on upgrading the quality of the civil service through the following:

- revised organizational charts defining the mission and responsibilities for each administrative post;
- higher educational qualifications;

- improved and continuous on-the-job training programs; and
- better salaries and working conditions.

Guinean civil servants have contributed to an evaluation and critique of the progress of the Administrative Reform (RA) (MRAFP, February 1991), starting with an analysis of the legacy of the First Republic. Under the Touré regime, central administrative services suffered from the following weaknesses:

- poorly adapted bureaucratic structures and procedures;
- overcentralization of decision making;
- dilution of responsibility among party and state officials;
- fear of making decisions without prior approval of superiors;
- poor flow of information throughout the bureaucracy;
- poor use of qualified personnel as rewards were based more on personal and political criteria than on performance;
- conflicts of competence and poor performance of duties; and
- widespread corruption.

Field administration suffered from the same weaknesses as well as from parallel Party-State structures and absence of local government institutions outside Conakry's municipalities and the PRLs.

Lack of clearly defined job responsibilities led to confusion concerning roles and duties of civil servants and their place in the hierarchy. The RA addressed this problem by establishing job descriptions and organizational charts for each ministry and publishing appropriate legal texts. In December 1988, the Civil Service Statute, in effect since 1959, was updated (MRAFP, March 1989). During the course of 1989, MRAFP published documents for practically every government ministry listing texts and staff positions with qualifications and civil service grade levels. Civil servants implementing the reform complained that they needed more support from top echelons of government to ensure application of texts and organizational charts. Within MRAFP, the Office of Administrative Reform Strategies and Programs has played a key role in providing the rationale and outlines of bureaucratic reorganization.

Under the First Republic, most of Guinea's civil servants had been educated in Guinea. After the advent of the new regime, Guinea sent more people to receive training in western countries and hired well-trained Guineans returning from abroad to take many government jobs. This has created tension between the "externals," who support the reforms, and those in the Civil Service threatened by cutbacks and reductions in status for insufficient educational qualifications. This tension is particularly acute in the education sector where only 16 percent of university professors hold doctorates and where most secondary school teachers were trained to teach primary school.

The Guinean government has also introduced short-term training programs to improve the performance of its civil servants. In March 1988, the Center for Administrative Improvement (CPA) was established within MRAFP to:

- evaluate training and retooling needs of civil servants;
- organize training and retooling courses, seminars, and programs to meet training needs;
- develop audio-visual and other pedagogical materials for training purposes;
- conserve, publish, and diffuse documents to keep government officials informed of the latest developments in public administration;
- maintain a data bank of computerized information; and
- participate in the evaluation of state employees and the organization of competitive exams for career advancement.

The CPA focused heavily on upgrading management skills of civil servants. In 1989, 186 civil servants received support for studying abroad while nearly 600 state employees participated in Guinea-based professional improvement programs (MRAFP, December 1990).

The RA's strategy called for improved salary scales and working conditions as well as rewards for performance to keep the best people in service and to draw new talent. In 1989, the establishment of a salary scale that provided opportunities for advancement and linked promotions and pay increases to staff performance reflected this policy. However, pay scales remain among the lowest in Africa. They are insufficient to cover living costs despite more than doubling in real terms between the 1985/1986 devaluations and the end of 1990. Demands for higher salaries by university professors and researchers in May 1991 pushed the government to promise 50 percent increases in June and another 50 percent by the end of the year (*Jeune Afrique*, May 22, 1991).

#### *4/ Improving Human Resource and Financial Management*

During the First Republic, the absence of mechanisms for managing personnel and resources left public finances in disarray. The government took measures to improve the situation during the late 1980s, including the following:

- control mechanisms, DAAFs and SAAFs, within ministries and the territorial administration;
- a finance law to designate areas of revenue collection and resource allocation; and
- a procurement code to regulate purchase of supplies, equipment, and other materials.

Despite norms and procedures to manage financial and human resources, Guinean public financial management remains weak. Implementation of management reforms has been handicapped by: failure to apply new rules and procedures; poor definition of ministerial roles in controlling resource allocation and expenditures; absence of a program for resource mobilization; and non-accountability of segments of the national budget under control of the presi-

gency. Corruption, another factor hindering government reforms, will be discussed in Annex 5.

A major innovation was the establishment in 1988 of a Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs (DAAF) in every ministry. The DAAFs monitor and control ministerial personnel, material and financial resources, and ensure management within the ministry. The DAAF has two main sections: Staffing and Training, and Finance and Accounting. The former links with MRAFP to address personnel and training issues. The latter links with the MEF, particularly the National Department of Budgets, for approval of ministry expenditures. The Service of Administrative and Financial Affairs (SAAF) was created at the prefecture level to carry out the managerial functions of the DAAFs.

A second instrument of financial management was the Finance Law. The 1988 Finance Law gave a legal basis to revenue collection and funds appropriation (Zorick 1988). The 1989 Finance Law tightened budgetary procedures. It also put order in estimating revenue collection which, in the past, had been overestimated. The Finance Law is imposing fiscal discipline on government revenue collection and spending.

The MEF is the main actor drawing up the Finance Law and controlling financial affairs. It initiates the budgetary process, dominates the budgetary commission and oversees Treasury and Central Bank transactions. It is the only agency which can obligate the state. The present Minister, a former World Bank official, has upgraded the staff and operating procedures with the help of foreign technical assistance. However, the MEF is not able to exercise full control over revenue collection and expenditure due to the prerogatives of the presidency. They have been exercised to authorize use of funds for "Sovereign Expenditures" or to modify allocations set by the MEF for departments (Zorick 1988). Expenditure in the Defense Ministry remains outside the control of the Finance Law and the MEF. Implementation of the Finance Law suffers from the legacy of poor accounting and reporting practices, lack of trained personnel, and persistence of revenue collection and expenditure controlled by the presidency and the military, outside budgetary control.

A third instrument for improving the management of financial resources was the December 22, 1988, Procurement Code. The Procurement Code defined the legal basis and rules for contracts between public agencies and suppliers of materials, goods, and services in the private sector. The full application of the Code was delayed as the decrees of application were not enacted until October 22, 1990.

For small contracts, an interministerial committee, presided over by a representative of the MPC and consisting of representatives of the MEF, the ministry having authority over the contract, and the delegated supervisor of the project, examines bids and gives its approval. The decision-making body for examining and approving large contracts is the National Commission for Large Public Procurements (CNGMP).

The CNGMP serves under the President. It is presided over by the Economic and Financial Control Minister, a military officer attached to the presidency. Other members include the Finance Minister, the Planning Minister, the Governor of the Central Bank, and the Minister of Justice. Again, the presidency exercises a large voice in granting large state contracts.

The Procurement Code describes the state's prerogatives to penalize suppliers for not meeting their obligations. It says little about recourse for suppliers in disputes with the government. Private contractors first have to defend their cases before authorities involved in the contract. If they do not get a satisfactory decision within 60 days, they can take the case to the appropriate court or international conciliation or arbitration body. However, the Guinean court system is not yet prepared to handle such cases and lacks authority to impose its decisions. The problematic nature of legal recourse may discourage some suppliers (especially non-Guinean) from dealing with the government.

#### *5/ Decision Making Within the Civil Service and Obstacles to Reform*

The Second Republic RA has attempted to rationalize decision making and establish lines of authority and responsibilities within and between ministries through new texts and organizational charts. With texts and organizational charts in place, decision-making lines within the civil service are clear. However, the tendency to wait for the formal approval of the Minister before taking initiatives prevails. Staff continue to appeal directly to top officials in the ministry or even to the President rather than go through official channels in cases of dispute. Civil servants have inadequate recourse for reviewing complaints about unfair practices and abuses of power by their superiors.

Bureaucratic consensus concerning organizational roles of the Central Bank, MPC, and MEF in determining national economy policy and resource allocation has not yet emerged. It has also been difficult to achieve consensus on how and how much to streamline specific ministries because of the implications of reduction of personnel for loss of power within the ministry. Those who lose are tempted to fight reforms. Those who have survived the reforms and held on to good jobs in the civil service, have insisted that those who have lost be given compensation. Without consensus, reforms will be undermined.

Reorganization of ministries and reassignment of roles, coupled with frequent turnover in personnel and placing of personnel with little experience in command posts, has made establishment of bureaucratic consensus difficult. It will take time for civil servants to learn new rules; become familiar with their new roles, responsibilities, and place within the bureaucracy; and accept the authority of new bureau heads.

Bureaucratic authority and legitimacy are also important issues. The dual nature of the regime often blurs authority lines. Thus, civil servants call for delineation of authority within the territorial administration between the Resident Regional Ministers who are always military men, and the Minister of the Interior and Decentralization who is a civilian (MRAFP, February 1991). Should a prefect obey the Resident Regional Minister who is the administrative authority in the region, or the Interior Minister who is the prefect's superior? In a similar case, the current MEF minister has authority to make changes in economic and financial policy consistent with the IMF-World Bank structural adjustment program. However, his authority to impose order within the Customs and Tax services in his ministry seems to be problematic. Moreover, the President has authority to modify MEF budgetary decisions or to spend money without being held accountable to MEF.

One of the obstacles to administrative reform has been resistance of segments of the civil service. This resistance is due partly to transforming norms, attitudes, and work habits and adopting new ones. Civil servants had little experience in making a bureaucracy work. The French trained few Guinean civil servants during the colonial period. During the Touré regime, the civil service operated under political criteria, giving little attention to bureaucratic procedure or management techniques. Bureaucrats who served under the First Republic had little experience in management and may feel threatened. Secondly, resistance lies partly in the legacy of the Touré regime which has made it difficult for civil servants to accept transition to a system where the role of government is limited and economic policy is geared toward promoting the private sector, possibly at the expense of their jobs. Thirdly, resistance also comes from dissatisfaction with reforms that sow job insecurity, low salaries, and loss of past privileges. Fourth, many civil servants accept the need for reform but feel that foreign donors are forcing change without adequate consultation or sufficient sensitivity to the social costs of reform. Finally, civil servants feel that they are bearing most of the burden of reform while the military and those close to the President are using their access to power to their own advantage.

### **Legal and Regulatory Reforms**

To provide the legal framework for private sector promotion, donors have encouraged the government to establish legislation and regulations affecting Guinean social and economic life. At the same time, they have pressured the government to eliminate laws and regulations stifling the development of the private sector.

The laws, codes, and regulations recently enacted or soon to be enacted include the following:

- an investment code;
- a labor code;
- an environmental code;
- a forestry code; and
- land and property legislation.

This legislation specifies legal principles. However, legal practice often differs from legislation as it is difficult to break past habits and practices and because mechanisms are not yet in place to enforce the rules or adjudicate disputes. As a result, settlement of disputed cases is often negotiated with public officials rather than taken to the courts. The absence of an effective court system constitutes an obstacle to enforcement of contractual relationships.

#### *1/ The Legal and Court System*

Little has been done under the Second Republic to reinforce and develop the court system. The Guinean court system is modeled on the French system. It has three levels: (1) the justices of the peace at the prefecture level (30); (2) the tribunal of first instance located in Conakry and the regional capitals; and (3) the court of appeal in Conakry and Kankan. The judicial system, set up in July 1986, also provides for specialized courts dealing with labor and children as well as a military tribunal and a court of state security.

The Constitution creates a Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of laws and international commitments and a High Court of Justice to try government ministers for crimes and the President for high treason. These judicial institutions have not yet been established. In the interim, no court can declare on the constitutionality of a law. Instead, a court of national annulment can only declare on the legality of decisions rendered by lower courts. This court handles about 300 cases a year.

The legal profession is not developed in Guinea. Guineans rarely use the courts. The country has few trained jurists. Moreover, salaries of judges in the Ministry of Justice are too low to shield them from the temptation to take bribes. Therefore, the court system is not likely to flourish or to handle the litigation made possible through establishment of legal codes and regulations.

## *2/ Investment Codes and Commercial Regulations*

As part of PREF, the government in 1987 established an investment code designed to provide incentives for private sector investment in the economy. The Investment Code has come under attack due to cumbersome application and approval formalities, the vagueness of various code provisions, and the latitude of government discretion in administering it and applying its disciplinary sanctions (Duncan 1987).

Different ministries have granted benefits outside the investment code such as tax write-offs and exemption from customs taxes. These grants have distorted the incentive system and led to establishment of uneconomic firms. To correct this, the Government, in February 1989, forbade granting of exemptions without the prior approval of the Minister of Finance. It later obliged all special conventions to be reviewed by the National Investment Commission (CNI) before approval by the Minister of Finance. The CNI thus became the watchdog for all privileges granted within and outside the Investment Code.

Since 1985, rules regulating professions have reduced red tape to acquire licenses. July 29, 1987, regulations permitted any company to establish itself in Guinea by incorporating at the Trade Registry. However, Article 34 stated that one condition for obtaining a professional license was approval of the governing ministry if necessary. The ministries invariably insisted that approval was necessary. Firms needed a license as they could not obtain credit without it. Thus, in practice, incorporation became onerous and time-consuming, involving high transaction costs. Government ministries used their powers to exact rents from applicants and undermined one purpose of PREF liberalization, which was to promote the private sector by eliminating entry barriers. A May 3, 1990, ordinance provided relief by stating that professional registration was no longer required to pursue commercial or industrial activities (Article 3), thereby eliminating the need to obtain approval. Moreover, establishment of a corporation was no longer required for preliminary approval and a bond no longer required to constitute a commercial venture (Article 5). Simplification of the rules governing entry into business and reduction of the areas in which administrative authorities give approval reduce transaction costs and promote a better climate for the private sector.

### *3/ Labor Regulations*

The 1989 Civil Service Code defined the status of civil servants and their relationships with the government. The Labor Code, which appeared in 1988, defined the status of workers and employers in the private sector and contractual workers hired by the government. It also barred job discrimination against women and gave them the right to 14 weeks of maternity leave without prejudicing their jobs.

The 1988 Labor Code gave government a role in collective bargaining and definition of obligations of employers vis-a-vis their employees. The Labor Code institutionalized relations among government, employers, and workers by establishing the Consulting Commission on Work and Social Legislation (CCTLS) where all three parties were represented. The mission of CCTLS was to study problems concerning work, the labor force, social security, and health and safety in the work place; provide its views on related legislation and regulations; and study the establishment of a minimum wage scale. The Labor Ministry (MASE) could also ask CCTLS to examine collective bargaining procedures and give its views concerning economic consequences of collective bargaining agreements.

The 1988 Labor Code gave workers and employers the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining, and defined their obligations toward each other. Workers can strike, while employers under certain circumstances can use the lock-out. The Code also gave the government the prerogative to initiate collective bargaining, supervise negotiations, and participate in arbitration undertaken by the Labor Tribunal. Donors promoting the private sector and employers have criticized the Labor Code for being cumbersome and presenting obstacles to employers. Firms in the formal sector are required to hire workers through MASE. Employers must have National Employment and Labor Bureau (ONEMO) approval before a new employee can begin work. Procedures for laying off workers have also been restrictive, as they may require MASE approval before workers can be laid off. Other labor regulations stipulate that contracts for expatriate employees must be approved by MASE and not exceed two years. However, there are no clear criteria for approval of contracts or rules for renewal.

Another issue of contention for employers is the discretionary power of labor inspectors from the Inspector General of Labor in MASE. The labor inspectors frequently intervene in labor-management disputes, often on the side of the employees. Labor inspectors also have the power to block a firm's proposal to lay off more than 10 workers on various grounds: improper procedures, lack of economic reasons to lay off personnel, or insufficient measures taken to reclassify or find other jobs for workers. To override the opposition of the labor inspector, the employer is obliged to take his case before a Labor Tribunal. Thus government intervention forces employers to pay high transaction costs in relations with labor. Donors have pressed the government to simplify hiring and firing procedures and to introduce regulations that would reduce government intervention in labor-management relationships.

From the workers' perspective, Guinean wages are low by West African standards and often do not cover family needs. As of mid-1991, there was no legislation setting minimum wages. Employers thus have the possibility of paying low wages to their workers. Job security and social benefits are also important issues for workers who may now negotiate on these issues. The government cannot restrict these benefits without running into opposition from the work-

ers. However, the cost of providing decent salaries, social benefits, and job security may be more than employers can afford, given the relatively low productivity of Guinean workers.

To sum up, the Labor Code and other labor regulations give MASE broad powers which increase costs of doing business and afford opportunities to extract rents from the business sector. At the same time, the Code does not satisfy the aspirations of workers in the private sector for higher wages or those of employers for freedom in hiring and firing workers and for lower outlays in providing government-mandated social benefits and workplace conditions. These conditions adversely affect the business climate and discourage investment.

#### *4/ Land and Property Laws*

The Land Nationalization Law of October 20, 1959, gave the state rights over all land. The state often recognized family and municipal usufruct rights, but real estate could not be sold or exchanged without its approval. The Touré regime repudiated any notion of private property and insisted that the state control all land. This system discouraged property maintenance in urban areas and made it impossible to use real property as collateral for credit.

The Second Republic has held to the state's right to eminent domain over all land. It has also recognized private property rights. Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees private property rights and the right to fair and prompt compensation if property is expropriated by the state. The government has been working on a comprehensive Land Code for many years. The issue of property rights is difficult to resolve, particularly after the Touré years in which land and property rights were often abrogated in favor of different people. The confusion has been aggravated by poor record keeping.

The establishment of property rights legislation is an important condition for development of the private sector. The Land Code now being prepared will clarify property rights and compel claimants to register property in the Property Plan in their local jurisdiction and with the Property Preservation Service. Property rights will be recognized after publication of the particulars in a Land Registry Book.

The proposed code gives government rather than the courts the role of resolving disputes over property. The code establishes a Land Commission in each local jurisdiction which will be charged with the following tasks:

- conciliating contending parties with conflicting claims;
- conciliating contending parties involved in expropriation cases and advising on compensation due the owner in case of expropriation; and
- advising on questions related to land policy orientation of the local jurisdiction.

The Land Commission will be composed of seven members, four of whom are representatives of the urbanism, agriculture, interior, and mining ministries. The other three will be well-known local people named by the prefect, or by the Governor of Conakry in the case of Conakry's municipalities. The Land Commission will not hear cases already taken up by the courts. If the contending parties do not reach an agreement under Land Commission mediation, the case goes to court. The court system and legal profession may need to expand to handle the backlog of litigation over property rights.

The Land Commission will also verify improvements made on property. In urban areas, improvements include putting up houses and other buildings on the property. In rural areas, improvements could refer to putting up permanent housing, investing in land improvements, or setting up a plantation.

The proposed Land Code gives the state property rights over the sub-soil. The mining sector provides the majority of state revenues. The Code also gives the state authority to ensure that land use conforms with the environmental code and urban planning schemes. It specifies conditions under which the state can expropriate property for public use and mechanisms for compensating the owners. Under the code, the military has the right to take over land without a preliminary investigation.

The proposed code is more explicit about defining state property rights and mechanisms for individual ownership and registering property than it is in explaining how rural land ownership rights will be determined. The urbanism ministry handles land and property questions in Conakry while the territorial administration intervenes in land disputes in the rural areas. Administrators have broad powers and opportunities to extract rents from those seeking property title. Absence of reliable records also increases chances for disputes over ownership.

Lack of property legislation and poor administration of land registration constitute obstacles to investors seeking to lease land and develop commercial properties. In registering property and establishing ownership, the proposed Code has the potential to increase expansion of rural and urban credit since property could be put up for collateral on loans. The application of the Code would also stimulate monetarization of the economy by facilitating sale of property. Under the Code, married women would have the right to sell their property without approval of their husbands.

#### *5/ Environmental Legislation and Policies*

Little attention was paid to environmental issues during the First Republic. Guinea has a rich natural resource base, which has been deteriorating. The Guinean government under the Second Republic has been actively addressing this problem.

In 1987, Guinea adopted an Environmental Code which established the principles of its environmental policies and defined general rules to protect the environment against further degradation (Mekouar, April 1990). The Environmental Code has been complemented by legislation concerning protection of natural resources (i.e., the 1986 Mining Code, the 1989 Forestry Code, and a Water Code replacing 1981 regulations). Urban land-use legislation further complements the Environmental Code.

Since 1989, the government has been preparing an Environmental Action Plan to coordinate efforts by different ministries to fight environmental degradation and maintain Guinea's ecological balance. A comprehensive environmental policy would include the following:

- improvement of management of fisheries, forests, watersheds, and minerals;
- protection of nature reserves and beaches;
- improvements in the urban environment;

- legislation to provide funding to support environmental measures and tighten existing regulations;
- training for officials and private actors involved in environmental management; and
- measures to inform and raise public awareness.

The Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment (MRNE) is the main government ministry involved in protecting the environment. The MRNE has a dual mission: first, to ensure the protection of nature and the environment; and second, to develop Guinea's mining and energy resources. The National Department of the Environment (DNE) is responsible for executing environmental policy. It also produces studies, monitors environmental impact of different projects and activities, fights urban and industrial pollution, disseminates information, and proposes environmental legislation (Cadres organique, MRNE, August 1989). The National Department of Mines monitors operations of mining companies and the impact of mining operations on the environment. It is more concerned with developing the mining resources which provide Guinea with most of its foreign exchange than in protecting the environment.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MARA) also has environmental responsibilities in the domain of soil conservation, use of pesticides and insecticides, and protection of forestry resources. The National Department of Forests and Hunting (DNFC) has the primary responsibility for carrying out the Forestry Code and enforcing regulations concerning bush fires, tree cutting, and protection of forest reserves and endangered species. The National Soil Service (SENASOL) is also attached to MARA.

An interministerial National Environment Council presided over by the Minister of MRNE meets twice a year to plan and set policy and to coordinate activities of the ministries involved in environmental issues. A parallel body, the Regional Environment Council, exists at the natural region level. It is presided over by the Resident Minister, but has not been very active.

At the prefecture level, the Prefectural Department of Rural Development and the Environment, established in 1989, executes the policies of MARA and MRNE in the field. The forestry and environment sections are the most involved in environmental surveillance.

Four important weaknesses undermine existing environmental legislation:

- the overlapping of texts from different pieces of legislation related to the environment which occasionally lead to conflicting versions in the law;
- a lack of precision in implementation regulations after the broad lines of policy have been specified;
- the assignment of officials from different ministries to perform the same mission; and
- insufficient funding, which makes it difficult for government agencies to carry out their environmental management activities.

## **State and Private Sector Linkages**

The economic liberalization programs of the Second Republic required collaboration between the government and the private sector. The World Bank and IMF provided technical assistance to help the government establish institutions and programs to foster development of the private sector.

### *1/Government Links with the Commercial Banking Sector*

The state controlled banking activity until August 1983, when the Guinea Islamic Bank (BIG) began operations in accordance with the principles of Islamic Law. When the military regime came to power in April 1984, less than 5 percent of deposits and credit were in private banks. The state banking sector was in chaos and collapsed in 1985, when the government liquidated the state banks. The BCRG oversaw the liquidation of state banks and negotiated conditions for establishment of new commercial banks.

To coax foreign banks to come to Guinea, the government offered benefits, such as long tax holidays, the right to hold capital in foreign exchange, and exemptions from customs payments for imported equipment and supplies (Tenconi 1988). Critics have said that the government made too many concessions to attract foreign capital. Three commercial banks began operations in 1985 and 1986 (Tenconi 1988): the International Bank for West Africa in Guinea (BIAG), which started with 51 percent government participation; the General Banking Corporation of Guinea (SGBG), which started with 55 percent of the capital subscribed by private Guinean investors and 45 percent by the General Corporation of France; and (3) the International Bank for Commerce and Industry in Guinea (BICIGUI) with 51 percent government participation. Government participation in BICIGUI has since fallen to 39.5 percent. All three banks had foreign participation in capital, and expatriates from French banks in top management.

One function of BCRG today is to supervise operations of the rest of the banks in the Guinean system. BCRG currently receives technical assistance from IMF and other donors to enable it to oversee supervision of the creditworthiness, financial stability, and liquidity ratios of commercial banks.

BCRG, and the entire banking system by extension, is heavily dependent upon credit extended by donors. Low interest rates for depositors have discouraged individuals from putting their money in banks. The banks have been reluctant to make loans to the private sector. At the end of 1988, loans to the private sector represented 3 percent of GDP and 40 percent of total bank assets. The banking system is caught in a vicious cycle. People do not trust banks. Also, the absence of a private sector credit history has caused banks to be reluctant to give out loans. Furthermore, the present business climate, especially in the industrial sector, has dampened demand for credit.

The weakness of the legal system and the absence of rules permitting banks to enforce their rights when the borrower defaults constitute obstacles to expanding credit. The absence of property legislation to enable borrowers to put up property as collateral, makes the extension of credit a risky business. In addition to the Land Code, other legislation is now being consid-

ered by the Ministry of Justice to remedy this situation. Banking legislation for Guinea is an innovation which requires creation of legal infrastructure which will take several years to construct. Guinea is a predominantly agricultural economy with little available rural credit (Chemonics International, April 30, 1990). Commercial banks do not have the expertise and staff to evaluate agricultural projects. Conversely, few farmers are equipped to formulate bankable projects. Donor-financed rural development projects provide the rural credit in the country in the formal sector.

## *2/ Government Efforts to Promote Private Enterprise*

Economic liberalization policies of the Second Republic required a transformation in state-private sector relations. Instead of suppressing the private sector or restricting it to limited areas, the government is promoting private enterprise and creating incentives and institutions to foster its development. In fact, a good part of Guinea's formal private sector is comprised of recently privatized state-owned enterprises.

The government has established several institutions to promote private sector development under the supervision of MICI, MPCCI, MEF, and other ministries. The most prominent are: the Center for Creation and Development of Businesses (CCDE); the National Bureau for the Advancement of Handicrafts (ONPA); the Guinean Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture (CCIAG); the National Center for Promotion of Private Investment (CNPIP); BARAF; and the National Bureau of Training and Professional Improvement (ONFPP).

MICI has the principal responsibility for promoting the private sector. A certain tension exists between its role as watchdog and regulator of the private sector and its newer role as promoter and facilitator.

To support development of small and medium-sized enterprises, the government in 1990 established CCDE, which replaced the ineffectual National Bureau for the Advancement of Small and Medium Enterprise (ONPPME). CCDE supports Guineans for project identification, development, and monitoring. It is encouraging establishment of private consulting firms specializing in auditing, legal matters, and management and organizational skills, areas in which Guinean entrepreneurs lack experience. New firms will also benefit from assistance of CCDE in completing formalities to register and benefit from the Investment Code.

ONPA was established in 1988 to promote artisanal activities throughout the country. The Touré regime had encouraged maintenance of traditional artisanal skills. These skills were important to rural populations who remained largely outside the monetized economy and had little cash to buy manufactured goods. Artisanal production also fit with a policy of national self-reliance. The Second Republic's policy seeks to rationalize the artisanal sector and integrate it into the national market economy. The ONPA has artisanal services in all regions and prefectures as well as several artisanal training centers.

The Chamber of Commerce, established in 1986, is a para-public body under the supervision of MICI. It represents interests of Guinean businessmen, industrialists, and agriculturalists.

Various national business associations are represented in CCIAG and include the following among others:

- road transporters;
- industrialists;
- importers and exporters;
- construction and public works entrepreneurs; and
- herders and several export-oriented agricultural groups.

Despite CCIAG's role as a defender of private sector interests, the government names the President and Secretary-General, its two top positions. Merchants and traders dominate CCIAG. The Conakry branch has 2,000 members, and branches have been organized in each prefecture. MICI works with CCIAG in providing information concerning trade opportunities and in organizing trade missions and expositions. CCIAG also mediates conflict among its members and provides information concerning laws and regulations. The informal sector is unrepresented in the CCIAG, despite the fact that it has outstripped the formal sector in size. Guinean businessmen perceive CCIAG primarily as a para-public body with links to the government rather than an autonomous support agency for private sector activities.

MICI institutions promoting private sector activities have been less important than MICI institutions regulating private sector actors involved in trade and manufacturing through licensing, price controls, verification of weights and measures, and other control mechanisms.

The MPCFI oversees CNPIP, which was created in 1985 to promote private investment in Guinea in accordance with national planning objectives. The CNPIP provides legal, financial, and economic information to potential investors concerning investment opportunities in Guinea.

BARAF promoted private sector activity by offering technical assistance and credit support for former civil servants to start business enterprises under the voluntary retirement program. Now that the program has been phased out, some of BARAF's personnel is being reassigned to the CCDE.

The ONFPP provides training to people in the informal sector. Housed in MASE, it provides training programs and various apprenticeships for workers in the construction industry. Its activities are largely financed by a tax of 1.5 percent of total payrolls.

To date, these institutions have not been effective in achieving their goals. Most of their activities remain concentrated in Conakry. The current business climate in Guinea makes their task a difficult one.

#### **MARA's Support Services for Agricultural Sector**

MARA is not involved in marketing operations, and is only marginally involved in distributing inputs. Instead, it provides services, primarily to small-scale rural producers. These include extension services, agricultural research and seed services, the training and organizing of farm and herder groups, crop protection and quality control, protection of soil and forestry resources, and small-scale rural infrastructure. MARA also oversees donor-financed rural de-

velopment projects. The State Secretariat for Fishing (SEP) is under the MARA authority. SEP has two agencies to promote fishing activities, the National Bureau for the Advancement of Artisanal Fishing (OPPA) and the National Bureau for the Advancement of Industrial Fishing (OPPI). Both offices provide technical and financial assistance to private groups and firms involved in fishing.

MARA has five divisions which provide the services listed above: Agriculture, Livestock, Training-Rural Advancement, Rural Engineering, and Agricultural Research. MARA also has offices at the regional and prefectural levels which deal directly with rural populations. The Training-Rural Advancement Division provides functional literacy, training, and support services to cooperatives, rural artisans, and women's groups and encourages participation in small-scale projects.

Since PREF reforms, MARA's staff has been reduced from over 15,000 to a little over 5,000. Current policy is decentralizing decision making and keeping permanent field staff small, with donor-financed projects hiring additional personnel for the duration of projects.

Although development of export agriculture through large-scale plantations is high on the list of rural development priorities, MARA plays a small role in this subsector. MICA is more involved due to its efforts to promote exports and its control over export licenses. The CCIAG is also playing a role in associating planters with foreign investors to obtain the technical knowledge, financing, and market outlets to revive Guinean agricultural exports. With sufficient donor financing and technical assistance, MARA might develop extension and research services for the plantation sector.

Key private sector actors in plantation agriculture include the Grouping of Fruit and Vegetable Exporters (REFLEG), the Guinean Fruit Federation (FFG), the Grouping of Pineapple Planters of Fruguigbé (GPAF), SOGUICAF, DAFCO, and SOGUIPAH, a public enterprise managed by a private firm dealing in rubber and palm oil.

#### **National Decentralization Policies and Grassroots Institutional Linkages**

President Conté's December 22, 1985, policy reform statement stressed the importance of decentralized and deconcentrated political, administrative, and economic structures to foster local solidarity and development. Since then, the Guinean government has moved in three areas:

- the deconcentration of administrative and technical services to work more closely with the grassroots;
- the creation of new local government bodies; and
- the promotion of small-scale, locally managed development projects.

#### *1/ Ministerial Responsibilities*

The key government actors in formulating and implementing decentralization policies are the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization (MID) and the State Secretariat of Decentralization (SED), which is under the authority of MID.

**MID** is responsible for both administering the country through the territorial administration and organizing decentralization policy. It also prepares national and local elections and exercises authority over local government. MID promotes economic and social development of jurisdictions under its authority and coordinates activities of technical services working in the field. MID also presides over the intergovernmental Commission for Decentralization which includes representatives of most ministries working in the field.

**SED** implements decentralization policies. It devises legislation for establishing CDs, monitors their activities, and ensures that development programs harmonize with the national plan. It also provides assistance to local populations in development efforts and works closely with MPCCI to formulate decentralized planning programs. In dealing with grassroots initiatives, SED coordinates activities of NGOs, exercises authority over the cooperative movement, and provides assistance to local government, NGOs, women's groups, cooperatives, and other grassroots organizations in preparing small-scale projects. The former SED minister has recently been promoted to Minister of the Interior, a sign that decentralization policies will continue to receive high priority.

**MPCCI** has a regional planning division with sections for each of the four natural regions and one for Conakry. It works closely with SED in gathering documentation on local government, NGOs, and donor development activities in the regions. MPCCI also has an office to compile dossiers and finance small-scale projects.

## *2/ Dispersion of the Administration*

The reduction of the civil service was accomplished at the central level. For example, in MARA, practically all of the cuts took place at the central level, while field staff remained intact. By the end of 1990, less than 12,000 civil servants worked for the central administration. More than 75 percent of the 50,000 civil servants worked for dispersed administration units (MRAFP, December 1990).

The key actor at the regional level is the Resident Minister. He represents both the government and the CMRN. The Resident Minister supports decentralization policy, is involved with CDs and regional development, serves as watchdog over regional field administration, and maintains public order in the region. He also presides over the Regional Decentralization Commission. The Resident Minister, in effect, is the eyes and ears of the military.

The region is a geo-political entity with no administrative status. It contains regional services but no elective bodies. The heads of administrative jurisdictions below the regional level are accountable to the Minister of the Interior. The resident ministers make tours, get involved in administrative and local body activities, and settle disputes within the region. Although not responsible for management decisions, they often intervene in administrative affairs.

Guinea has made the prefecture the field administrative unit. The prefect heads the field administration, coordinates activities of field services, and presides over the Prefectural Development Committee. The prefect has a General Secretary in Charge of Administrative Affairs (SGAA) and a General Secretary in Charge of Decentralized Municipalities (SGCD). The latter, named directly by the President, maintains the territorial administration's linkages with grassroots development activities.

Most technical and social services have field offices at the prefecture level. To avoid proliferation of offices, two or more functions have sometimes been combined into one prefectural inspectorship such as the Regional Inspection for Rural Development and the Environment which covers MARA and MRNME responsibilities.

Little information concerning operations of technical and social services in the field is available. Outside of education and health, most function within the framework of donor-financed projects. Guinean field administration lacks the resources to maintain close contact with the grassroots. Further obstacles to close ties include poor rural transport networks and the general mistrust of the rural population toward the state.

### *3/ Links with Local Government (CDs) and Local Development Activities*

Three major factors affect state linkages with local government bodies. First, decentralization policies have led to creation of decentralized municipalities imposed from above. Second, these institutions are just getting started (i.e., the urban municipal councils at the prefecture level, the Rural Development Community at the subprefecture level, and the Conakry municipal and city councils). Locally elected officials thus have had little experience in managing CDs. Third, the state exercises supervisory powers over local government which makes it questionable how autonomously the CDs will function.

In rural areas, state linkages with CDs are administrative, managerial, and developmental. The prefect and subprefect exercise authority over local government and are responsible for collecting taxes and maintaining public order. They also settle disputes within and between District Councils and CRDs, or between CDs and the administration. The subprefect supervises budgets of CRDs.

As the representative of the prefect, SGCD arbitrates disputes in three areas:

- establishing and determining boundaries of the CD;
- resolving conflict in elections concerning CDs and advisory bodies; and
- resolving land disputes involving CDs.

He also coordinates and monitors small-scale projects initiated by CDs as well as those carried out by NGOs operating in his district.

Officials from SED provide technical assistance for local government in managing its financial affairs and preparing for NGO- and donor-financed small-scale projects. They draw up plans and contracts, collect statistics on financial and developmental activities of CDs, and provide training and guidance for local officials. SED also prepares forms and other materials for managing CD budgets. SED thus exercises authority over CDs in technical matters.

In urban areas, local government is comprised of municipal councils. The governor of Conakry exercises authority over these councils as well as the city council in the capital. Resident ministers and prefects exercise authority over urban municipalities in the interior. They have power to annul decisions taken by municipalities when contrary to law or detrimental to their "general interest and harmonious development" (Ordonnance no. 019/SGG/90 of April 1990) and to suspend the municipal councils.

### **Summary of Trends**

Since the advent of the Second Republic following the military coup in April 1984, Guinea has undergone radical institutional change. The Party-State was dismantled and the socialist orientation of the Touré regime reversed in favor of a commitment to a market economy. PREF transformed the banking and monetary systems, reduced state intervention, privatized or liquidated most state enterprises, and sharply reduced the size of the civil service. At the same time, it disrupted the distribution system and lowered living standards of civil servants and urban dwellers whose families depended on the food and housing benefits that the Touré regime provided to its supporters.

PREF set the stage for a boom in trade, an expansion of the informal sector in Conakry, and a revival of agricultural production. However, PREF reforms still have not created a business climate that attracts foreign and large-scale domestic private investment. High transaction costs, such as delays in processing paperwork, corruption, and poor telecommunications, remain obstacles to expansion of the formal sector. The government still needs to address mobilization of the formal sector to revitalize the economy. On the other hand, the informal sector is booming without government involvement.

Despite macroeconomic and administrative reforms and progress toward legal and regulatory systems, the institutional and legal foundations are not yet established to sustain a liberal economy. Major obstacles to implementing administrative and economic reforms include: the dissolution of Guinean institutions during the Touré years; the lack of precedent for an economy based on titled property, contractual relationships, and court adjudication; and the bureaucratic inexperience and inadequate management qualifications of state officials.

Consistent with the political tradition of the colonial era and the First Republic, most institutional reforms of the Second Republic have been initiated from above with little popular consultation. Consequently, they have little deep popular support, particularly among the groups that have lost ground economically. The donors have been major proponents of financial, economic, administrative, and legal reforms and have provided the Guineans with financial and technical assistance to implement economic reforms. The conditionality of most donor aid, coupled with its negative social consequences on key groups in the population, risks touching off strong nationalist reaction. Elements within the civil service complain that donors do not give sufficient responsibility to Guinean personnel in managing the new financial and economic institutions and that the government has given too many concessions to foreign business interests to get them to invest in Guinea.

While top echelons of the civil service have been reorganized and revitalized, and new rules based on sound management principles introduced, the old guard and the rank and file have not necessarily internalized and accepted these new rules. Reformers complain that most civil servants do not know the new texts and still do business the old way. Many are also underqualified to carry out their new job descriptions.

In the political realm, the military regime has procrastinated in establishing national democratic political institutions such as political parties, a national press, and a representative National Assembly. Instead, the regime has initiated a program of reorganization of the territorial administration from the ground up. Within its democratization program, it is re-

placing subprefectures with popularly elected local government (CRDs) in the rural areas and municipal councils in the urban areas. A new Constitution, approved by referendum in December 1990, calls for a democratic regime to be installed by 1995. Municipal elections took place in June 1990. Popular forces are pressuring the current regime to move up the date of national elections, and pressure is growing for a multi-party system and legislation to advance the return to civilian rule sooner than anticipated in the new Constitution.

Although the military coup was popular, the military, as an institution, still has little legitimacy with the populations. Military men still hold key posts in government. Government has allocation resources to make the military the big winner under the Second Republic. Although President Conté is the most powerful person in the country, he does not have full control over the military and has had difficulty in checking waste and corruption. This is undermining his legitimacy and may become a major problem in the future if the military refuses to give way to civilian rule or to accept a reduction in its privileges. Recent strikes and demonstrations by university professors, students, and market women point to a potentially difficult situation.

These tensions may be exacerbated by growing ethnic tensions as different ethnic groups perceive government favoring the Sousou. The Malinké have lost much since the fall of the First Republic due to their close association with Sékou Touré and a 1985 coup attempt. The Fulbé, who lost the most under the Touré regime, have regained economic power, but have not gained much political power, despite their wealth and numbers. The army claims to be the main unifying force in the country and the bulwark against interethnic warfare since it incorporates elements from all of Guinea's ethnic groups. Nonetheless, it is taking a delicate balancing act within the army to keep all groups satisfied.

## **Chapter 4: Sectoral Analyses**

---

### **4.1 Agricultural Production**

#### **4.1.1 *Brief History of Guinean Agricultural Development***

##### **The Colonial Period**

In the years leading up to independence, the French launched a succession of programs to extend improved agricultural technologies to rural farmers organized in cooperative groups. The Native Society for Providence (SIP), inaugurated in 1932, required farmers around head-quarter towns of the administrative districts to enroll as members and maintain dues payments. In exchange, the SIP made loans in cash and in-kind to its members, assured marketing of production, and extended agricultural technologies (i.e., selected seed and animal traction). The compulsory character of farmer participation in the SIP was its undoing.

In light of difficulties implementing the SIPs the colonial government created the Cooperative Sector for Rural Development and Supply (SCAER) in 1951 as a voluntary adjunct to the SIP. The objective of the SCAER was to organize farmers to use machine cultivation techniques to increase irrigated rice production. In practice, the SCAERs often had difficulty implementing local projects due to internal management problems and insufficient extension support.

The colonial administration founded the Mutual Society for Rural Production (SMPR) in 1953 as a transition from the SIP to an independent cooperative structure. The SMPR also had internal management problems. SMPRs foundered on the difficulties of farmer administrations in collecting reimbursements of credit extended to farmer members.

In early 1958, on the eve of independence, the government began an experiment with an entirely private cooperative structure, the Mutual Society for Rural Development (SMDR). The SMDR structure was dissolved in 1960 and replaced by the Center for Rural Modernization (CMR) and by the Agricultural Production Cooperative (CAP).

The SIPs channeled agricultural credit, such as it was, to farmers during most of the colonial period following 1932. However, in 1955, the colonial administration founded Guinea Credit as a specialized banking institution to extend credit to cooperatives, associations, and small businesses.

##### **The First Republic**

Agricultural development under the First Republic took place within the framework of four national development plans implemented during the period.

Under the first three-year plan (1960 to 1963), the priority of the new government was to restructure the economy through rapid development of infrastructure and industry. The government invested relatively little in the agricultural sector. During this period, agricultural exports, hitherto a mainstay of the Guinean economy, began to drop.

Among its agricultural programs, however, the government created the CMRs to serve as state enterprises to train farmers and initiate them in intensive agricultural production meth-

ods. Each CMR was allocated 300 to 600 ha, agricultural equipment, selected seed, plant materials, and livestock. The CMRs were compromised because their lands were not properly developed for agriculture by government services and the material and extension support the government promised did not arrive on time.

One aspect of the CMR mission was to extend its productive technology packages to surrounding farmers organized into an Agricultural Production Cooperative (CAP). The CAPs received support in the early years, but they floundered as well on insufficient extension assistance and untimely deliveries of material. In the meantime, the National Agricultural Development Bank (BND) terminated its agricultural credit program to the CAPs because of a poor reimbursement rate. Farmers then began to abandon the CAPs en masse.

The government's priorities for the following seven-year development plan (1964 to 1971) continued to be investment in infrastructure and industry. The agricultural sector continued to perform poorly. Food imports continued to grow and agricultural exports continued to drop. The government introduced the Agricultural Production and Consumption Cooperative (COPAC) as an approach to promoting increased agricultural production. A member of a COPAC would be assured access to consumer goods to the degree that he produced agricultural commodities and marketed them through the group. The COPACs were not successful since consumer goods were not made available through them and the price for agricultural commodities marketed through them was too low to spark farmer interest. By 1969, the government decided to focus its efforts on developing the Center for Rural Education (CER) to train farmers and form them into rural agricultural collectives.

Under the following five-year plan (1973 to 1978), the government acknowledged the shortcomings of its overly centralized approach to development. It tried to decentralize the planning process by associating people in formulation. The plan acknowledged the failures of collectivization and the importance of the family farm. However, implementation of the plan was suspended in 1974 as it was too ambitious.

The government organized Production Brigades with the objective of supplying industrial workers with food staples. These Brigades were supplied with tractors and other equipment through loans on favorable terms. In the meantime, the government organized villages into PRLs, dominated by the Party. PRLs then organized farmers into a different type of Production Brigade to produce rural food supplies. Yields in both types of Brigades were half those of independent farmers. By early 1975, the Brigades were transformed into Mechanized Production Brigades (BMP) and Harnessed Production Brigades (BAP). The BMP usually included 15 to 20 adults and 6 students cultivating about 110 ha. Authorities drew up production targets according to political rather than agricultural criteria. Therefore, production targets were not often met. BAPs were collective groups organized through the PRL, under tight political control. They cultivated 30 ha with a group of 30 farmers and also about 6 students. The farmers were asked to participate in the BAP at the expense of their own family fields. BAP work, therefore, got short shrift. The objective was one BMP and one BAP per PRL. In fact, only a small number were ever created. By 1978, the BAP and the BMP concepts were fused into the Communal Agricultural Farms (FAC). National rice production dropped by 15 percent from 1973 to 1979.

In 1978, the government began creating the District Agro-Pastoral Farms (FAPA). The FAPAs targeted research in intensive agricultural technologies and extension to the younger generation of farmers. The FAPAs failed for the same reasons as previous experiments in increasing agricultural production in Guinea: infrastructure was not built, supplies and equipment did not arrive on time, and central planning did not accommodate local particularities. FAPA yields were consistently low.

Under the First Republic, the government approached development of the agricultural sector through direct investment in agricultural production and marketing. At the same time, the government neglected other areas where the public sector has traditionally supported the agricultural sector—in particular, agricultural research, training, and extension activities were ignored, rural infrastructure deteriorated, and the state's responsibilities as manager and protector of publicly owned natural resources were not met.

The strategy of the First Republic was to intensify agriculture by collectivizing production and introducing machine cultivation. It expected that intensive agricultural extension through cooperative structures would lead to wide and rapid diffusion of adaptive technical packages. In fact, agriculture during the First Republic remained essentially subsistence agriculture despite a series of experiments with collectivization that followed one another for a period of over two decades. As a result, Guinea, which was a net exporter of agricultural commodities at independence, gradually became a major importer of food under the First Republic.

### **The Second Republic**

The development strategy under the Second Republic has departed completely from that of the First Republic. Since 1984, the Government has sought to reorient itself toward public service responsibilities and away from direct involvement in agricultural production and marketing. Liberalization of the economy has been its hallmark. Under this policy, agriculture and small and medium enterprise have expanded rapidly.

The Interim Plan for National Recovery (PIRN) covered the initial planning period of the Second Republic, from 1985 to 1987. The PIRN raised agriculture to a priority sector from its status under the First Republic. Within the agricultural sector, it established three objectives for the new government: food self-sufficiency; production of exportable agricultural surpluses; and production of raw materials to supply agro-industry. The PIRN strategy was to rely on independent, small-scale producers to achieve these objectives.

The PREF, inaugurated in 1986, launched the government's efforts to liberalize the economy. Of interest to the agricultural sector, the government freed up commodity prices, canceled input subsidies, rescinded import and export controls over most agricultural commodities, and began the process of privatizing agro-industries and cooperatives.

By the Second National Conference on Rural Development in March 1989, the government was ready to begin drafting an Agricultural Development Policy Letter (LPDA) as a frame-

work for developing the agricultural sector. The LPDA is being drafted with FAO assistance. The principles of the LPDA were defined at the outset:

1. the government will make agriculture the engine of Guinean development by promoting expansion of profitable sectors and by developing the infrastructure necessary to support them;
2. the government will integrate agricultural policy into its overall economic policy by liberalizing the agricultural sector, thereby relying on the private sector, encouraging exports and targeting food self-sufficiency;
3. the government will decentralize public sector services to agriculture;
4. the government will study, enact, and implement appropriate liberal agricultural policy including the removal of the public sector from agricultural production and marketing, removal of trade barriers, and liberalization of prices; and
5. in the process, the government will take special care to preserve the resource base and to manage natural resources in a sustainable way.

A second draft is currently circulating within the government for comments. It should be signed soon.

The government is currently implementing its Program of Public Investments (PIP) for 1990/1992. Under the current PIP, the agricultural sector is receiving 26.8 percent of public investment. Only infrastructure, at 34.5 percent, is receiving a larger share.

#### **4.1.2 The Evolution of Agricultural Production**

Rice is the most important food staple in Guinea. In 1985/1986, Guineans cultivated an estimated 750,000 ha of rice, about half of all the land then under cultivation. About half of all rice produced in Guinea is upland rice produced mainly in Forest Guinea and Upper Guinea. About a third of the rice is produced on bottomland and floodplains of rivers all over the country. The remaining production comes from the mangrove areas in the estuaries and coastal plains of Maritime Guinea. Overall, rice yields approximate 800 kg/ha.

Domestic rice production has not kept pace with population growth. Guinea imported 7,000 MT of rice in 1958. By 1989, Guinea imported an estimated 200,000 MT of rice. In the current liberal economic climate, competition from imported rice is pressuring the price of domestic rice down to the point where it is discouraging production. People have an aesthetic preference for domestic rice, but they are willing to pay the price premium only for festive occasions.

Guinea produces about 200,000 MT of fonio each year. Fonio ripens before other, preferred cereals. It grows on worse soils and is more drought-tolerant. Fonio yields are 500 kg/ha, significantly lower than any other cereal. Fonio requires more labor to grow and more labor to process for human consumption. Therefore, fonio production is probably dropping in Guinea as in neighboring countries. People seem to be deciding their time is better spent, if they have the alternative, earning cash to pay for imported rice to tide them over till their own rice

harvests than to grow fonio. Half of Guinea's fonio comes from Middle Guinea. The rest comes from Maritime Guinea and Upper Guinea.

Women in Middle and Upper Guinea produce maize in small garden plots close to their houses. The plots are often fertilized with kitchen wastes. Therefore, the same plots may be cultivated year after year. Yields range from 700 to 1,000 kg/ha. Overall, national production of maize is approximately 50,000 MT annually.

Total national production of cassava is estimated at around 350 MT. Cassava grows slowly and stays fresh in the ground for a certain period until it is needed. Yields range from 6 MT to 10 MT per hectare.

Groundnuts are grown in quantity in all regions of Guinea except the Forest Region. They are a popular snack food and a popular condiment for sauces. Part of production also feeds two oil factories in operation. Annual groundnut production ranges from 100,000 to 200,000 MT. Yields are approximately 500 to 700 kg/ha which equals 100,000 to 200,000 MT.

Banana production is concentrated in the "Banana Triangle," an area with a perimeter that goes from Mamou to the mouth of Rio Pongo, down the coast to the Sierra Leone frontier, and back to Mamou. Guinea currently produces about 100,000 MT of bananas. It is all consumed domestically. Prior to independence, Guinea was a major banana exporter. Exports peaked at 98,000 MT in 1955. Thereafter, the banana plantations were attacked by disease which cut yields from 22.6 MT/ha to 12 MT/ha. Many small planters were then forced out by rising production costs. At independence, when Guinea lost its main export markets, many remaining planters then left. Despite considerable effort during the First Republic to revive banana production, exports gradually declined and finally disappeared. Recent marketing studies are pessimistic about Guinea's chances for reestablishing a niche in world banana markets.

Studies are more optimistic about Guinea's prospects in world pineapple trade. In 1950 Guinea exported 2960 MT of fresh pineapple and 517.5 MT of juice and canned pineapple. Exports grew to 7,800 MT by 1960. Exports then began to fall, but due to establishment of markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, exports revived in the late 1960s to reach 10,000 MT in 1970. However, by 1980, they dropped to 1,000 MT. SALGUIDIA was created in 1976 primarily to process fresh pineapple for export, to can pineapple, and to make juice and concentrate. For want of sufficient supplies, it has consistently run at a loss. In recent years, however, pineapple exports have been growing.

The cannery at Mamou opened in 1964 with technical assistance from the Soviet Union to can fruit and transform it into pulp, juice, and concentrate. It closed in 1980, but reopened in 1988 with Guinean and private French financing. In the meantime, Italians opened a fruit juice plant in Kankan in 1967. It, likewise, was constantly plagued with insufficient raw materials to process sufficient volume to make a profit. The fundamental problem was that the price the plants felt constrained to offer farmers for their fruit were too low to encourage farmers to sell.

Throughout the First Republic, the government tried to encourage vegetable farming. Women, generally organized into cooperative groups, were the primary targets of these efforts. The government ran 10 state farms for vegetable production in Maritime Guinea for

three years before dissolving them in 1979. Since 1983, the Dalaba Pilot Center for Horticultural Activity (CEPAM) has been active in Dalaba in carrying out UNDP-financed vegetable crop experimentation and extension activities. It has had successful demonstration experience with potatoes, tomatoes, carrots, and cabbage. Although Dalaba Prefecture is one of the most productive areas in Guinea for vegetables, the Center's location dilutes its impact on other important centers of vegetable production in Maritime Guinea.

Vegetable varieties are mainly of local origin, but some are imported. Most commodities are cultivated throughout the country, although some are particular to a certain region. Almost universally cultivated are gumbo, tomato, local and imported varieties of eggplant, lettuce, cabbage, green onions and cucumber. Potatoes are a specialty of the Fouta Djallon, cayenne pepper of Kindia and Mamou, garlic and watermelon of Kindia and Forécariah, and onions of Upper Guinea. Green beans and squashes, which are recent introductions, are currently concentrated in the Kindia area. In general, Kindia is the most productive region of the country for vegetables.

Vegetable production appears to have been expanding rapidly in the last three to four years, particularly at the periphery of urban centers. Production has gone beyond the stage of family consumption to become a source of income for many families.

Coffee exports have followed a similar trajectory. Guinea's coffee exports peaked in 1961 at 19,200 MT. Production is concentrated in Forest Guinea. Opening year-round road connections to the ports of Liberia and Ivory Coast encouraged farmers to expand their coffee production. However, around Guinean independence, coffee plantations came under attack by tracheomyosis. At the same time, official prices for coffee dropped dramatically. Farmers began to abandon their fields in favor of other activities such as rice production. National coffee production began to drop. Exports had fallen to 4,400 MT by 1972 and 2,000 MT by 1983. SOGUICAF was created in 1985 to revive coffee production and export. It identified 40,000 ha of abandoned coffee plantations. With a dramatic increase in the producer price of coffee, SOGUICAF has been able to encourage a revival of production. SOGUICAF exported 3,500 MT in 1988/1989—approximately half of national coffee exports that year. In 1987, the CCCE began financing a coffee production project in Forest Guinea. Guinea is now producing 8,000 to 10,000 MT of coffee on 45,000 ha. Yields approximate 200 kg/ha.

Forest Guinea has 45,000 ha of natural palm forest. In 1987, SOGUIPAH was organized to create 5,000 ha of selected palm varieties and 8,000 ha of rubber. Planting began in 1989. Part will be produced in a nucleus estate and the rest by extension to neighboring independent farmers.

#### **4.1.3 Public Institutions Supporting Agriculture**

By general agreement, the government under the First Republic was ineffective. At the end of 1985, the new government began the process of trimming and restructuring the bureaucracy. At that point, the Ministry of Agriculture had 15,000 employees. The government's objective was to reduce the staff of the Ministry to 5,100. At the same time, it sought to group all activities in the agricultural sector into a single ministry. The Ministry of Rural Development was thus created to cover activities in the areas of crop production, fisheries, livestock, forestry, and rural infrastructure development. The name of the Ministry was changed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MARA) in 1988.

MARA contains a cabinet of councilors to the Minister, six operational departments for technical activities, and a separate unit for administration and finance. In addition to its central departments, MARA currently oversees some 84 projects throughout the country. Most projects are associated with one or more ministerial departments. Large projects are often managed by semi-autonomous services.

MARA has been the recipient of USAID support through the Economic Policy Reform Support Project (675-0218) since 1986. The goal of the assistance has been to help the Ministry overcome some of its most severe institutional and managerial problems. The assistance to MARA has focused on: planning and budgeting; resource management; information systems, monitoring, and reporting; and capacity-building for management training and personnel development.

Long-term technical assistance to MARA began with a focus on improving the functions and the capabilities of the Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs (DAAF). Since then, the program has been broadened to include other activities and other departments of the Ministry.

MARA technical departments currently support agriculture with services in agricultural statistics, economic analysis and policy formulation, agricultural extension, crop protection and quality control, forestry management and protection, animal health and production support, rural infrastructure development and fisheries management. Input supply, credit and banking, and agricultural research and training lie outside its jurisdiction.

In each of the four administrative regions, an Agricultural Inspection, part of the regional government, houses representatives of each of MARA's departments. At the prefectural and subprefectural levels, these departments are represented by Technical Prefectural Departments. Under the staff reduction plan that MARA began to implement in early 1989, MARA will decentralize. It intends to concentrate its resources and staff at the prefectural level, while reducing regional and central staff.

### **Agricultural Statistics**

The most useful source of current agricultural survey data is the National Agricultural Survey, carried out in 1988/1989 through the Statistics Department of the Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation with technical assistance from FAO/UNDP. The survey covered a sample of about 4,500 rural households. Its results, disaggregated by administrative region, provide a basis for measuring activity in the agricultural sector.

Continuous monitoring of the agricultural sector through periodic follow-up survey is now the responsibility of the Permanent System for Agricultural Statistics (SPSA) funded from 1989 to 1991, principally by UNDP with technical assistance from FAO. USAID has contributed some vehicles to the project. The objective of the SPSA is to execute three surveys of the rural sector to track the evolution of agricultural production. These surveys include an annual agricultural survey of 1,848 representative production units located in 462 villages, a livestock survey, and a farm-level price survey.

SPSA has a staff of 13 professionals of whom 5 have received long-term training overseas. In addition to its central office, SPSA has established offices in each of the four administra-

tive regions of the country, each with a supervisor, one control officer for every two prefectures, and two survey technicians per prefecture. Each survey technician collects data from 28 households.

Using the field-tested and proven FAO data collection methodology, SPSA, with necessary logistical support, should be able to track and quantify important variables to monitor the agricultural sector. Although the agricultural survey for 1990 fell behind schedule and was incomplete, SPSA is now planning its 1991 survey. SPSA is also capable of implementing rural surveys on subjects targeted by particular government departments or international donors.

### **Agricultural Extension**

The National Department of Training and Rural Advancement (DNFPR) is the MARA department primarily responsible for agricultural extension. Other MARA departments cover extension activities in livestock, forestry, and fisheries. Lack of resources has severely hampered the performance of the extension services for many years.

The World Bank is currently implementing an agricultural extension support project designed to improve the performance of the extension services. The project is based upon the Training and Visit (T&V) approach to extension.

Individual projects have mounted their own extension systems with more or less success. Different projects are taking different approaches. The FAO-funded Fouta Djallon Rural Development Project is working through the prefectural extension services. CFDT has its own extension system for cotton cultivation in Upper Guinea. The system involves close supervision of farmers who are constrained by meticulous application of technical packages under threat of rejection of their deliveries by CFDT, the sole cotton buyer. PAG is concentrating on rice in Gueckedou, and ORS is concentrating on rice in Sigui. Several private enterprises also have an extension arm. SAIG, in the Mamou area, and SOGUIPAH, in Forest Guinea, have created nucleus estates which are extending fruit cultivation and oil palm cultivation technologies, respectively, to their neighbors to produce additional products for the firms to buy, process, and market.

### **Agricultural Research and Training**

Agricultural research in Guinea has suffered from neglect for many years. The colonial administration financed an agricultural research structure oriented toward food crops, fruits and vegetables, and industrial crops. It established research stations at Bordo, Foulaya, Koba, and Sérédou. Food crop research concentrated on rice, maize, and groundnuts. In the two decades following independence, research funding became scarce and the research stations turned from research to production.

By the early 1980s, the First Republic began to take a new interest in agricultural research. The Peoples Republic of China financed Outreach Centers for Agricultural Techniques in Bamban (Kindia) and Yatiya (Faranah) where research was done on rice, tea, and tobacco from 1979 to 1983. With the assistance of USAID, the government established a new laboratory at the Foulaya Institute of Scientific Research, a research and extension center at Tindo, and an experimental livestock farm in Faranah. For various reasons, USAID closed out its participation in each of these efforts early. In 1981, ONADER launched its program of rice

research in Guinea Maritime at the Koba Center for Rice Research. After 1981, PAG created a research station at Kamalo (Gueckedou) and took responsibility for centers at Baro (Kankan) and Koba (Boffa). Each station specializes in testing varieties of upland rice, flooded rice, and mangrove rice, respectively. WARDA is the source of the genetic material. The best performing varieties are being distributed within PAG, but are not yet available throughout the country. Finally, the North Koreans built the Kim II Sung Institute of Agromomic Research in Kilissi in 1985 to carry out research on rice as well as on vegetables.

Today, agricultural research activities have been placed within a newly formed institute, the Guinean Institute of Agricultural Research (IRAG). IRAG includes eight research centers. Four are regional research centers: Foulaya in Maritime Guinea; Bordo in Upper Guinea; Bareng in Middle Guinea; and Sérédou in Forest Guinea. The other four, Kilissi, Faranah, Koba, and Boussoura, are specialized centers. In its current program, IRAG is giving priority to applied and adaptive agricultural research. This research is largely concentrating on seed improvement, water control, and better crop husbandry. A major aim of the IRAG program is to identify crop varieties with low requirements for intermediate inputs. The strategy of reduced dependence on inputs recognizes that the high cost of inputs at unsubsidized prices outstrips the production budget of most farmers without subsidized rural credit.

#### **Irrigation Development**

Guinea had 13,150 ha under irrigation in 1987. Most of the irrigation was in a poor state of repair. The colonial administration developed a number of alluvial plains to foster irrigated rice production cooperatives.

After 1958, the First Republic had several false starts developing large-scale irrigation systems. The USSR began developing 2,400 ha on the Monchon plain in Boffa in 1972. The system is now in production, but development costs were so high its cost/benefit is negative. In 1978, the EEC financed brigades of the National Department of Rural Engineering (DNGR) in Labé and Kankan to develop 2,526 ha of irrigation between them along river plains in their regions. The systems that the DNGR brigades developed did not give farmers full water control. Rather, their objective was to improve water management on the floodplains to the point of guaranteeing one harvest a year.

The problem with all of these systems has been poor maintenance. Since DNGR does not have the financial, material, or human resources to maintain the systems, attempts were made in later systems to involve farmers. A system was developed in Kakack in 1983 with this approach, but many of the farmers were civil servants and found ways to extricate themselves from paying their share of the maintenance cost.

DNGR has now initiated a policy of contracting out the work to develop irrigation systems, and no longer does construction in-house. It will supervise construction work and carry out maintenance during a three-to-five-year transition period until beneficiaries are ready to take over. It will undertake only small-scale systems, initiate its efforts only in response to a request from a CD, and mobilize only when farmer participation has been assured. This policy should keep down the costs of irrigated development and maximize beneficiary participation in the operations and maintenance of the systems.

### **Agricultural Credit and Banking**

From its founding in 1961 until its closing in 1985, the National Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA) was the primary source of agricultural credit for Guinean farmers. It evolved, along with all state banks, in three distinct phases: uncontrolled expansion in 1961 to 1964; credit restrictions in 1965 to 1978; and limited loans in 1980 to 1985.

During the first period, the Bank of Guinea made inexpensive credit available to all sectors of the economy. Agriculture, through the BNDA, received 1.9 billion sylis. The BNDA extended loans to export-oriented state enterprises (i.e., coffee, cacao, and fruits) and to Family Agricultural Cooperatives which were collectivized family farms. This period of BNDA evolution came to an abrupt halt in 1964 due to a high rate of default.

From 1965 to 1978, the Bank of Guinea adopted a policy of severe credit restriction. During this period, BNDA lent 155 million sylis to the agricultural sector, almost exclusively to public sector enterprises such as AGRIMA, FAPAs, and SEMAPE. By 1980, the default rate on these loans to the public sector forced the BNDA to reconsider its credit activities.

From 1980 to 1985, credit came to a standstill. Agricultural loans were limited to short-term facilities for inputs, extended exclusively to farmers or planters in or near donor-financed agricultural projects. Robert R. Nathan Associates, et al. (1989) report that in 1984, the BNDA extended credits amounting to 14,707,850 sylis, of which 9,523,000 sylis went into medium-term credit to pineapple producers around the Daboya project (Kindia), and 5,184,850 sylis went into short- and medium-term credit to farmers in the ORG. BNDA had hoped that close monitoring by project agents would improve recovery rates. However, recovery rates in the best case, ORG, reached 42 percent, and by the end of 1985, more than 80 percent of the bank's loan portfolio was uncollectible and was written off. At present, Guinea does not have an agricultural bank.

Commercial banks have not taken up the slack. The resources of commercial banks have been concentrated almost exclusively on credits to commerce. The banks cite four reasons for their reluctance to assume an active role in agricultural credit:

- the banks' lack of experience with agricultural credit;
- the inability of farmers to provide acceptable loan guarantees in the present legal environment;
- the historically demonstrated high level of risk in agricultural credit; and
- the high cost of servicing small loans.

At present, rural households have no access to institutional credit. Rural credit is provided primarily through the informal sector. Most credit comes from within the extended family or the circle of friends and neighbors. To some degree, people formalize these relationships into revolving credit associations.

In general, commodity traders do not give any significant forward financing to farmers in exchange for proprietary rights to the farmers' harvest at discounted prices. For their part, farmers do not give any significant forward financing to commodity traders. Almost all transactions occur on the spot market.

Credit flows are much more important between wholesale and retail traders. Almost all of the traders interviewed in a Robert R. Nathan Associates (1989) informal survey were benefiting from credits from larger wholesalers and passing these credits, in part, on to their suppliers. Generally, the intermediation taking place is very short term. Interest rates are twice inflation. Transaction costs are low, and default is practically unknown.

The CCCE/FAC-funded Guinean Agricultural and Rural Credit Project channels agricultural credit through small groups to test the viability of group credit. The project, which started in early 1989 in Téliimélé and Koundara, is experimenting with small groups of self-selected membership to determine if this is a formula for high reimbursement rates. Borrowers apply in groups of five unrelated members. The project has no preconception of what borrowers will finance with their loans. The credit ceiling is 100,000 GF in the first year. The ceiling will rise as a function of the group's successful record of reimbursement. The only guarantee of repayment is the joint interest of group members to keep credit flowing.

By March 1990, 50 groups with 247 members had distributed 22.5 million GF in credits from the project. Women received 28 percent of the funds and made up 38 percent of the beneficiaries. In the first year of the project, repayment was required to begin one month after the loan. Therefore, repayment terms discouraged investment in agricultural production where payback on investment would be several months after reimbursement had to begin. Most loans, in fact, went to finance commerce. Repayment requirements have recently been relaxed to encourage agricultural investment. Borrowers had reimbursed 100 percent for the first eight installments due, as reported in the Institute of Research and Application of Development Methods (1990). At a later stage, the project wants to start a savings program.

CCCE/FAC is also financing a credit union project in Labé and Kindia under direction of the International Center of Mutual Credit (CICM). CICM began organizing in Labé in 1988 and in Kindia the following year. People have been slow to put money into the credit unions, possibly due to traumatic experiences with banks under the First Republic and because the inflation rate is higher than the interest rate they pay. However, by April 1990, the project had created 17 credit unions in Labé, Pita, and Lelouma, and nine in Kindia with a total of 7,470 members. These credit unions started giving out loans in late 1989. The interest rate on the loans is 23 percent.

A number of agricultural development projects have had credit components. They include PAG, the CFDT project in Upper Guinea, ORS, and DERIK. The Institute of Research and Application of Development Methods (1990) reviewed these project credit programs and concluded that they all have poor records for reimbursement.

Two other projects with important agricultural credit components recently became operational: the Kolente Agricultural Project, financed by the African Development Bank; and the Maritime Guinean Rural Development Program, funded by EDF. It is too early to evaluate their credit components.

### **The Cooperative Movement**

Promotion of cooperative organization was a key element of development strategy in the First Republic. Most cooperatives were created through state programs as a mechanism for training and extension and for provision of inputs and credit. Throughout Guinea, coopera-

tives of farmers, planters, women, artisans, and transporters were organized during that period. Many survive to this day. Cooperatives are officially registered and supervised by the Ministry of Decentralization.

As a result of the heavy role played by the government in the creation and operation of cooperatives, participation by cooperative members has never been high. Although many of the older cooperatives are still headed by government appointees, government involvement in the cooperative movement has declined during the Second Republic.

The government would like cooperatives to continue to play a role in Guinea's development, particularly in agriculture. The legal and administrative framework of agricultural cooperatives remains to be determined. A proposal elaborated by the government, with the assistance of the Frederick Ebert Foundation, requires that cooperatives be voluntary organizations, formed freely by individuals or associations motivated by common interests. These cooperatives would be autonomous and have rights as private entities without interference from the state.

#### **Input Use**

Seed supplies for vegetables primarily come from local stocks. These include gumbo, tomatoes, both local and imported varieties of eggplant, watermelon, cucumber, and local onions. Farmers produce seeds locally and sell them on the local market. Farmers buy imported seeds for crops, such as carrots, cabbage, potatoes, and onions where they cannot produce the seeds themselves. The imported seed is brought into Guinea by UNICIG in Conakry and ACT in Kindia.

Present use of fertilizers is estimated at 3,000 MT per annum. Development projects such as PAG and ORS are importing 80 percent of the total and selling it to project beneficiaries. Fertilizer would probably increase if subsidies were instituted. Rice production and cotton production would benefit the most from increased fertilizer use.

Present demand for pesticides is estimated at 28,000 kg per annum. Nearly 80 percent of the pesticides are used on cotton.

About 80 percent of the overall input market is in the hands of different development projects. The market left to the private sector is too small to justify an extensive distribution network.

#### **4.1.4 Non-USAID Donor Activity and Support**

From independence until 1974, the Guinean government financed agricultural development through internal credits. As the government recognized the negative impact of this policy on inflation, it began to turn to foreign sources of investment capital and technical assistance.

International organizations gave little aid to Guinea before 1978. Between 1978 and 1984, Guinea's main international support came from the EEC, the IBRD, IFAD, and FAO/UNDP. From the beginning, the EEC and the IBRD concentrated on aid to small-scale farmers and the private sector. IFAD and FAO/UNDP were more willing to work within the collectivist development agenda of the government.

The EEC began its programs in 1978 by financing the reconstruction of rice irrigation systems in Labé and Kankan. The EEC also funded work in cotton development. It refused to finance the FAPAs. In more recent years, the EEC has funded the Guinean Maritime Rural Development Project and the Upper Guinea Rural Development Project, irrigated rice projects in Boffa and Boké, and agricultural research efforts in Koba and Foulaya.

The IBRD began its programs in 1977 with the rehabilitation of rice irrigation. It later assisted the government in organizing the National Organization for the Development of Rice Cultivation (ONADER) as a service to plan and support rice cultivation. The IBRD also financed the Daboya Agricultural Enterprise Project, although it abandoned the project in 1981 due to input supply problems and, especially, to output exporting problems. The IBRD began funding the Gueckedou Rice Operation (ORG) in 1981. It implemented the project through ONADER for five years before terminating its support. The IBRD also refused to finance the FAPAs.

IFAD is funding the Siguiiri Rice Operation (ORS) and is cofinancing ORG's successor, PAG. The BAD also contributes to the funding of these two projects.

FAO was not very active in Guinea during the first two decades of the First Republic. It wasn't until April 1977 that it signed its accord with the Guinean government to set up its representation in Conakry. Until then, FAO carried out some short-term technical assistance missions under UNDP auspices and awarded some scholarships for overseas study. In 1978, FAO began projects similar to the Technical Cooperation Program (PCT). From 1978 to 1984, it carried out 33 PCT projects. It also executed several projects financed with UNDP monies and a few under Trust Fund monies in cooperation with the Guinean government. The FAO, itself, regrets that little remains of these efforts (see Thorigné 1990). Part of its problem may have been that, as opposed to the EEC or the IBRD, FAO executed its mission entirely within the ideological framework of the government of the First Republic.

At the end of 1990, FAO was implementing 12 PCT projects with combined LOP budgets of \$1 million, 13 PNUD/FAO projects with combined LOP budgets of \$25 million, and 3 government cooperation projects with combined LOP budgets of \$1 million. FAO's annual project budget for FY 91 is \$9.3 million. Its current program focuses on the following areas:

- watershed rehabilitation and management;
- agricultural development of natural depressions and floodplains;
- mechanized agriculture appropriate for small farms;
- support to the national administration to define and operationalize regional rural development strategies;
- strengthening of the agricultural management and planning capability, particularly through support to development of the SPSA and the LPDA; and
- support in the development of various legislative initiatives: fishing code; forestry and rural legislation, implementation of the environmental code, creation of rural radio, and promotion of artisanal fisheries.

FAO is currently planning a series of projects designed to support different official organizations to carry out their missions. It is also coordinating a large multi-donor rural development project in the Fouta Djallon.

By the late 1970s, the government, under pressure from the IBRD and the EEC, began to explore possibilities for private sector investment in agriculture. The government fostered a group of projects to develop 500,000 ha to produce rice, soy, cacao, coffee, palm oil, rubber, and beef. These projects were developed in collaboration with foreign private capital and were intended to function as private agro-industrial enclaves.

In 1979, for example, Guinea created the Guinean Agro-Industrial Corporation (SOAGRI) with 80 percent Guinean capital and 20 percent foreign private capital. SOAGRI was supposed to develop 10,000 ha of irrigated rice to help substitute for imports.

Countries in the socialist bloc were the source of Guinea's bilateral aid throughout the First Republic. Most of the agricultural development projects executed under this funding were implemented in isolation from the mass of agricultural producers and had no impact on their production or production technology. Guinea received little bilateral aid for agricultural development from liberal democratic countries before the advent of the Second Republic in 1984.

France is the biggest bilateral donor in Guinea. About 36 percent of its assistance is going to rural development. In Forest Guinea, it is participating in the revival of coffee production and in the development of oil palm and rubber production. It has rural development projects in Gaoual, Koundara, and Kankan prefectures. It has irrigated rice production projects in Kamsar and Kindia, and is active in development of watershed along the Boli and Bafing. France is also active in the fisheries sector. Finally, it is funding a rural credit project mentioned above.

DERIK is the biggest German project. The Canadians are funding irrigated rice projects and small-scale local infrastructure. The main interest of the USSR remains, as it has for some years, the development of the Monchon plain for irrigated rice cultivation.

Over 140 NGOs, international and local, are officially registered in Guinea. About 40 of them have programs which they are implementing in the field.

## **4.2 Agricultural Marketing**

### **4.2.1 Evolution of Market Agricultural Institutions Since Independence**

Agricultural marketing institutions in Guinea, as most other institutions, have changed considerably since independence as a reflection of the political evolution of the country.

During the colonial period, agricultural marketing between different prefectures and regions in Guinea was controlled by private Lebanese traders and French firms with representation in each of the prefectures. Each of these groups had a cadre of local agents circulating through the weekly markets of the prefecture to collect designated commodities. They paid for their purchases in cash and brought their purchases back to prefectural headquarters. From there, the commodities were either shipped to headquarters in deficit prefectures for local sale or to Conakry for local sale or export.

During the First Republic, the Government attempted to monopolize agricultural markets through extensive intervention in all aspects of agricultural production and trade. It organized cooperatives at the village and regional levels, supported by local and national organizations, and established numerous state farms and agro-industrial enterprises.

Immediately after independence in 1958, Sekou Touré built a government marketing system based on the existing private system. The Guinean Outlet for Domestic Commerce (CGCI) initially had the monopoly on internal trade. Its branches in each prefecture replaced the representation of the French firms and the private traders. It executed contracts with private agents to keep its branches supplied with locally produced agricultural commodities. The central government annually determined the prices to be paid to producers and collectors, and to be paid by consumers. These were pan-national price levels which did not take account of local conditions.

In 1960, the Guinean government founded the Guinean Outlet for Foreign Commerce (CGCE) as a counterpart to the CGCI to take charge of importing consumer goods and exporting agricultural commodities. CGCI was responsible for wholesale distribution of locally produced goods and of imported goods it received from CGCE. CGCI was also responsible for assembly of locally produced goods for distribution throughout its domestic network or for transfer to CGCE for export.

In 1961, GUINEXPORT, along with approximately a dozen specialized government import firms, replaced CGCI and CGCE. The new structure retained the network of local outlets for buying agricultural commodities for internal distribution. GUINEXPORT created its own network of outlets to buy commodities for export. GUINEXPORT subsequently evolved into the Agricultural Marketing Bureau (OCA).

In 1973, the network of local outlets joined with the OCA to form the Regional Commercial Enterprise (ERC) which took overall charge of distribution of commodities imported by the government as well as wholesale distribution of locally produced commodities, either for local consumption or export. ERC was represented at the local retail level by the popular district and neighborhood stores.

Official mistrust of private sector traders was an immutable tenet of the ideological basis for the government's agricultural marketing policy throughout this period. Yet until 1975, private sector traders were able to operate successfully as agents collecting agricultural commodities and distributing consumer goods for the local stores, OCA, ERC, or whatever the name of the government marketing organization at the particular time. In the meantime, these traders were increasingly able to ignore government-set prices in their dealings with producers.

The Government established producer prices based on official consumer prices for importables and world market prices for exportables. Both were artificially low due to the overvalued exchange rate. Official producer prices were then determined by subtracting a margin at each level of the marketing chain. Prices were standardized throughout the country and across seasons and varied little over time. For some important products, such as rice, the Government subsidized costs to maintain low prices.

The effectiveness of this public marketing system was undermined by the economic strength of parallel market channels. Since official prices were lower than parallel market ones, quo-

tas served to tax agricultural products, and thus to discourage their production and official marketing. Official prices were often fixed at a fraction of those on the parallel market. Pineapple and mechanized cotton were the only commodities in 1975 for which official producer prices exceeded actual production costs. Official purchases of agricultural products therefore declined from 1974 to 1980 and, by 1980, represented only a small percentage of total production.

The Government attempted to seize control of the marketing of agricultural products. In 1975, the government tried to end private commerce by commandeering traders' stocks and selling them at official prices. At this point, the government controlled marketing completely. A number of traders were ruined. A number of traders fled to neighboring countries. The city of Kankan, hitherto an important trading center, has never recovered economically.

The government initiated a system of levying market quotas on agricultural producers in order to gain control over the share of local production that was finding its way into the blossoming parallel market. From 1975 until 1981, it required all agricultural producers to market a prescribed share of their output at official prices. The Local Revolutionary Authority (PRL) was assigned the responsibility formerly played by the private traders, of assembling quantities of commodities for distribution through the ERC system. Production such as coffee or bananas designated for export markets were handled by the public export enterprises PROSECO and FRUITEX. Products for internal markets were sold locally at official retail prices to workers with ration cards or shipped to the public enterprises in Conakry for sale in food deficit regions. After meeting his quota, a producer could barter further production against manufactured goods available through the ERC.

Livestock products were similarly marketed. The government required herders to sell a certain percentage of the livestock at the official price to regional livestock trading enterprises. These enterprises then sold the live animals to official butchers or to one of the state slaughterhouses. The government allocated meat throughout the country to be sold in limited quantities at official prices.

The government also held the monopoly on the purchasing and marketing of imported food through the agency IMPORTEX. These imports, along with locally produced surpluses, were turned over to individual trading enterprises such as ALIMAG for rice and flour or ALIDI for sugar, cooking oils, and other diverse food commodities, which then distributed them locally and regionally through other state organizations. Urban consumers, particularly in Conakry, were the primary beneficiaries of this official food supply system.

In 1975, the government suppressed the periodic markets. It required all periodic markets to be held on Sunday. Under those conditions, people attended only the large markets. By 1976, the normal schedule of periodic markets was restored.

By 1977, private trade began to revive. It grew gradually between then and 1984, although government organizations continued to dominate the marketing sector. Private traders remained few in number. The scale of their operations was small. The government authorized them to buy and sell only at official market prices.

Recognizing that its policies were constraining the performance of the agricultural sector, the Guinean government instituted a series of reforms beginning in April 1981, to reduce the

public monopoly of marketing and trade. First, the government permitted private traders to market and export a wide range of non-priority goods. Second, marketing quotas were replaced with a per-worker annual tax. Third, the government reorganized trade to allow private individuals to serve as intermediaries between producers and consumers. Fourth, the government disbanded public holding companies. Fifth, producer prices for export crops were significantly increased (although most still remained below producer costs). Finally, the Regional Agricultural Marketing Enterprise (ERCOA) replaced the ERC, although the structure of the marketing system remained otherwise essentially unchanged until the advent of the Second Republic.

In 1985, the new regime began to liberalize the economy and to give free rein to the private sector. By 1986, the Government decontrolled prices on all goods and services except for imported rice and petroleum products. It opened all levels of external and domestic trade to the private sector. Several parastatal enterprises were dissolved while others entered a process leading toward privatization. Government agents were no longer responsible for collecting agricultural commodities. Stores in the prefectural centers were closed. Internal barriers to circulation of food commodities were dismantled.

Following the currency devaluation of 1986, the schedule for import tariffs was simplified. Imports are currently subject to a base rate of 10 percent, plus a 10 percent tax on gross business receipts, plus a 30 percent to 40 percent luxury tax. In tandem with tariff reform, the government liberalized import procedures. Import licensing was abolished as well as the monopolies of parastatal enterprises. By the end of 1984, the private sector had taken charge of all food imports except for rice. ALIMAG and ALIDI, the government food import monopolies, were dissolved at the end of 1985.

Under the First Republic, the Government had exercised a monopoly on the supply of agricultural inputs and credit as well. AGRIMA was responsible for acquiring and distributing agricultural equipment and machinery, while SEMAPE handled chemicals and seeds. AGRIMA distributed its products through a network of outlets scattered throughout the country. SEMAPE used the same stores for its distribution. The National Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA) had primary responsibility for providing agricultural credit. Credit during this period strongly favored cooperative and parastatal enterprises.

The cost of agricultural inputs to farmers was very low. Farmers gained access to input through membership in a cooperative. The cooperative would apply for credit from the BNDA to cover a large part of input costs. BNDA would pay SEMAPE and AGRIMA directly and they would deliver to the cooperative.

The liberalization of commerce in 1985 meant the dissolution of SEMAPE and AGRIMA along with other parastatal enterprises. SEMAPE and AGRIMA gradually sold off their stocks and finally shut their doors.

The private sector has been slow to fill in the void left by AGRIMA and SEMAPE. Domestic firms have neither the funds nor the expertise. Foreign entrepreneurs do not have the confidence in the Guinean political or economic environment to justify such an investment.

In addition, during the 1984 to 1988 period, the cost of agricultural inputs increased by 15 to 20 times due to the devaluation of the Guinean currency and the reduction of subsidies. The

producer price increased by only three times during the same period. At the end of 1989, the government relieved agricultural imports of all customs duties in an effort to cut input costs. The government was also studying a way of pooling agricultural input orders in the expectation that importers would pass on quantity discounts in the form of lower prices to farmers.

#### **4.2.2 Structure and Conduct of Commodity Marketing Subsystems**

Agricultural marketing systems in Guinea vary according to the commodity traded. The following section of the S.P, therefore, breaks the analysis of agricultural marketing systems down by commodity subsectors.

##### **Market Hierarchies**

Guinean markets fall into four categories according to their function. In most cases, higher-level markets, such as assembly markets or regional and national markets, exist as overlays of higher functions on lower functions. Regional markets, for example, carry out the mission of assembly markets as well as that of the local periodic markets.

##### *Local Periodic Markets*

The majority of rural markets fall into this category. They are usually found in locations relatively easily accessible on foot or by animal load to producers in the surrounding agricultural area. Women commonly bring small quantities of household production to the local periodic markets to exchange for cash or consumer items.

At the local periodic markets, locally produced agricultural commodities circulate among local producer/vendors and local consumers. Traders and agents for wholesalers from assembly markets outside the agricultural zone also attend local periodic markets to collect agricultural commodities for distribution on regional, national, and international levels.

Each prefecture has a number of local periodic markets. Several of them tend to group together into a marketing cycle. Each member of the cycle meets on a different day of the week. Agricultural commodities and consumer goods circulate among the markets of the cycle brought by traders who ply these markets.

##### *Assembly Markets*

Each prefecture has an assembly market. Assembly markets meet most often on Sundays. The largest assembly markets meet daily.

In assembly markets, a wholesale distribution function is grafted onto the retail purchase and sale function of the rural periodic market. Traders and wholesalers' agents who frequent the periodic markets funnel their commodity purchases to commercial houses in the assembly markets where they are bulked into standard containers and readied for the next stage in the distribution. Owners of the commercial houses in the assembly markets rely on agents, employees, and freelance traders to collect commodities in small quantities in the rural periodic markets for bulking in the assembly markets. From the assembly markets, the commodities are sent in wholesale quantities to distributors in the prefecture or beyond.

Characteristically, assembly markets offer better infrastructural support than rural periodic markets, including accessibility to large-capacity transport, storage facilities, electricity, and

telephone facilities. Kindia, Mamou, Pita, Timbi-Madina, Kissidougou, Faranah, and Yendé-Milimou are all major Guinean assembly markets.

### *Consumer Markets*

The consumer markets in Guinea are responsible for retail sales of agricultural and manufactured commodities in the major urban areas of Guinea. The urban areas are, for the most part, the headquarter towns of the prefectures and, above all, Conakry. In some cases, the consumer markets are also assembly markets. However, in a number of cases, the consumer market is in the center of the urban area while the assembly market, which keeps it supplied and through which interregional trade passes, is on the outskirts.

### *Border Markets*

Border markets are special purpose assembly markets in close proximity to national frontiers. They serve as ports-of-entry and as distribution points for imported goods. Consequently, they are located along the major trunk routes. They usually play less important roles as assembly points for regional agricultural production. Conakry, the primary port-of-entry for Guinean imports is a major border market. Gueckedou is the major port of entry for Asian products entering via Liberia, although the Liberian civil war has had a negative impact on its economy. N'Zérékoré and Sinko are entry points for items from Ivory Coast.

### **Market Actors**

At present, virtually all agricultural marketing activity is in the hands of private sector actors. Public sector entities handle only a small share of agricultural commodity trade. The private sector is wholly responsible for importing and distributing food stocks and for domestically grown agricultural commodities. The private sector dominates export trade and the transport sector. It is least active in the importation of agricultural inputs, partly due to competition from SEMAPE and partly due to weak demand.

A number of private actors play roles in the chain that ties agricultural commodity producers to consumers.

### *Producers*

Producers are the first actors in the marketing system. Women are most prominent in this role of selling household production in the local periodic markets.

The women sell their products by the pile, by the piece, or by idiosyncratic units such as tomato paste tins. Prices are established early in the day. They tend to drop just before the market closes. They vary little from one seller to another in the same market on a given day. Negotiation takes place within a small margin. Preferred clients with whom the seller has an established social relationship often get a price break.

### *Collectors*

Collectors are primarily women who move from periodic market to periodic market where they purchase small quantities of agricultural commodities for resale elsewhere including in the assembly markets. An alternate strategy is to visit producer households to make pur-

chases at the farm gate. Many collectors also bring consumer items, such as salt, soap, and cooking oil from the assembly markets for resale in the periodic markets.

The collectors usually operate on low margins with low capital resources. Collectors often operate as agents for traders in the assembly markets. In these cases, the traders may advance credits to the collectors to underwrite commodity purchases.

Terpend (1991a) estimated that the typical collector was operating with a capital fund of 30,000 GF to 100,000 GF. Such limited funds limit her to handling no more than three sacks of rice without moving them on to a wholesaler. Profits on rice sales for the collectors range up to 10 or 15 GF per kilogram.

Collectors have several options for selling their stocks. On the one hand, they can resell them directly to consumers in periodic markets of the market cycle they attend. They can also transport stocks to the assembly market where they can sell to a wholesaler with whom they have established commercial relations or sell to a retailer or sell their stocks directly to the consumer themselves.

Collectors represent the crucial link in the marketing system. They attend numerous rural periodic markets across a prefecture or region. They have the information to know where to buy and where to resell at a profit.

The proliferation of collectors in this commercialization network may be an outgrowth of economic policies that suppressed wholesale activities during the First Republic. Collectors may have adapted by creating a network of informal but solid bonds between them and farmers.

### *Wholesalers*

The wholesalers are located in the assembly markets in the market towns. They assemble and distribute locally produced agricultural commodities as well as receive shipments of rice from importers in Conakry for distribution.

The wholesalers are universally men. They operate from permanent shops and have their own storage facilities. They may have a small truck which they use to transport stocks between local periodic markets and assembly markets, and inter-regionally, between assembly markets. They concentrate their trade in non-perishable commodities (i.e., cereals, dried cayenne pepper, palm oil).

Wholesalers usually finance their operations entirely out of their own funds, although they occasionally lend money back and forth to each other. Terpend (1991a) estimates the financial resources of the typical wholesaler at 700,000 GF to 10 million GF. However, not all of this sum would be devoted to agricultural marketing operations. Wholesalers often spread their risks by handling manufactured imports as well as local agricultural commodities.

Wholesalers rarely visit the local periodic markets. They rely on collectors to keep them supplied with agricultural commodities. The collectors either bring in the supplies themselves or the wholesaler dispatches a truck to pick up the stocks where his collector has stored them.

Wholesalers sell some of their stocks retail to well-off consumers such as civil servants who have the resources to buy in quantity. Otherwise, they sell to retailers who sell their stocks in small quantities or they sell in bulk to wholesalers in other assembly markets in other prefectures or other regions of Guinea.

### *Retailers*

Pure retailers have a role only in the consumer markets. In the rural periodic market, collectors usually double as retailers. Retailers in the consumer markets buy their stocks directly from collectors or from wholesalers in the assembly markets. The vast majority of these retailers are women. The bulk of their trade is in cereals and tubers. They also often sell other local products such as tomatoes, gumbo, groundnuts, shea nut butter, *sumbara* and various spices. As the producers in the local periodic markets, the retailers in the consumer markets sell by the piece, by the pile, or by idiosyncratic measure.

Terpend (1991a) estimates that the typical retailer operates with a capital fund of 25,000 GF to 30,000 GF. She typically makes a profit of 500 GF to 1,000 GF per day.

### *Transporters*

Private transporters in Guinea are often also traders who wholesale or retail the goods they transport.

Each of the large towns in Guinea has a municipal car park where public transport vehicles such as trucks and taxis await their clientele. The Transporters Union often has its branch office at the municipal car park. It is responsible for organizing and programming activity at the car park.

Vehicles not owned by wholesalers are rarely owner operated. Most owners have other economic interests to occupy them. Consequently, the owner generally leases the vehicle to an operator for a specific period. The operator is responsible for profitably managing the vehicle. He accompanies the vehicle on its trips, overseeing loading of passengers and cargo, collecting fares, paying for gas, and making arrangements with officials along the route to facilitate smooth passage. The owner usually pays for major vehicle repairs.

The cost of transport for a given trip may vary from day to day according to the price the vehicle operator pays for gas that morning and to the payments he anticipates making to officials along his route that day. Passengers all pay the same price for that day. Charges for cargo depend on the size and weight of packages and are negotiable.

The Guinean national transport fleet tends to be old, outdated, and in poor repair. Many Russian vehicles from the First Republic are still in use. Most trucks have a five-to-eight-ton capacity. Only a small number exceeds a ten-ton capacity. The smaller trucks serve the rural periodic markets. These tend to be the oldest vehicles in the worst repair. Therefore, the rural periodic markets have the worst transport service.

The larger and newer 15-ton, 20-ton, and 30-ton Berliets, Toyotas, and Mercedes serve the assembly markets where they are primarily responsible for inter-regional, national, and international trade. USAID estimates that the country has about 4,000 trucks overall (Aberg and Blacque-Belair 1990).

### *Processors*

Processing of agricultural commodities is very limited in Guinea. Terpend (1991a) estimates 200 rice mills in Guinea, 65 percent in Maritime Guinea and 33 percent in Forest Guinea. Otherwise, households process their crops manually whether cereals, tubers, or tomatoes for household consumption or *sumbara*, shea nut butter, or palm oil for market.

### *Consumers*

The major consumer markets in Guinea include Conakry and the headquarter towns of the prefectures. The main agricultural commodity in the consumer markets is imported rice. Demand for rice is growing very rapidly in Guinea, particularly among urban consumers. Many years, as food supplies in rural households run down just before the new harvest, local periodic markets may also bring in food supplies for sale to rural consumers.

Consumer demand for other agricultural commodities, such as fresh vegetables, is also growing rapidly in urban markets.

### **Commodity Flows**

The Post-Harvest Handling Service in each prefecture keeps a record of agricultural commodity flows out of the prefecture. While quantitative data on tonnages is unreliable, the records credibly map out flows from prefecture to prefecture and from region to region and beyond.

#### *From Subprefecture to Prefecture*

Flows from subprefecture to the consumers market in the prefecture headquarters town are usually locally produced agricultural commodities which include primarily cereals, but also tubers, oil crops, fruits, and vegetables. In many areas, just before harvest, if farmer household food stocks are low, rice may flow temporarily from the assembly market in the prefecture town to the subprefecture.

#### *From One Prefecture to Another*

Exchanges of cereals and tubers commonly take place between prefectures and their neighbors, as in the following examples:

- Téliélé produces surpluses in rice and in manioc. It markets rice surpluses in Boké, Boffa, Lélouma, Pita, Kindia, Fria, and Conakry and markets manioc surpluses in Lélouma, Pita, and Coyah;
- Beyla is a large producer of cowpeas, manioc, and fonio. It markets surpluses of all three in N'Zérékoré;
- Faranah markets its surplus production of rice, fonio, and manioc in Kankan, Kérouané, Sigiri, and Dinguirey;
- Kindia markets the bulk of its vegetable production in Conakry; and
- Forécariah supplies Conakry with the bulk of its domestically produced rice.

### *From Region to Region and Beyond*

The volume of trade between regions in Guinea is substantial, particularly for fish, salt, fruits, vegetables, and imported products such as rice and flour from Conakry.

For the most part, patterns of inter-regional trade in Guinea reconstruct patterns of trade of precolonial West Africa in which merchants exchange products produced in different ecological zones. The principal trade routes had a north-south orientation and meant exchanges of forest products with savannah products. East-west trade routes in Guinea bring coastal products to the Fouta Djallon and the Savannah. In addition, Guinea maintains a lively cross-border trade with Senegal, Mali, and Sierra Leone, in particular.

The classic pattern of trade in Guinea is a “triangular” trade in which merchants buy salt in Maritime Guinea which they trade for cola and palm oil in Forest Guinea, which they resell in the Fouta Djallon, Senegal, and the Gambia in exchange for manufactured products for which Guinea has a rapidly growing market.

Each region specializes in the production of certain agricultural commodities and supplies markets in the rest of the country as well as in neighboring countries.

Exchanges between the coastal prefectures and the other regions of Guinea normally pass through Conakry. However, Boké supplies fish and locally produced rice directly to Middle Guinea. In addition, Maritime Guinea produces palm nuts and palm oil distributed throughout the country and exported to neighbors. Maritime Guinea also produces groundnuts for shipment to Forest Guinea where quantities are then sold to neighboring countries; Cola comes from the coastal areas and moves north; surpluses are sold in neighboring countries such as Mali, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and the Gambia. Guinea as a whole imports large quantities of rice, wheat flour, sugar, oil, and processed food commodities. The volume of food imports, rice in particular, is projected to continue to grow rapidly. Conakry is the port of entry for these imports which it then supplies to other consumer centers nationally.

Middle Guinea is an important national and international supplier of livestock products, fruit, onions, *graines de néré*, potatoes, tubers, and fonio. Labé and Dalaba supply Maritime Guinea with taro. Labé markets surplus fonio in Upper Guinea, Middle Guinea, Conakry, and, to some extent, Forest Guinea. Maize flows from Mamou and Dalaba in Middle Guinea toward Conakry and Labé. Groundnuts produced in Middle Guinea are shipped to Forest Guinea for resale. Livestock from Middle Guinea are either trekked or trucked to Maritime Guinea and the Forest Region. It also distributes to the rest of Guinea various agricultural and manufactured products imported from Senegal and the Gambia.

Trade in Upper Guinea is very active, fueled by the recent gold boom. Agricultural products exported from Upper Guinea to the rest of the country and to Mali include rice, yams, maize, manioc, fruits, vegetables, groundnuts, smoked fish, livestock products, and shea nut butter. Kankan is the main center supplying the rest of Guinea with African yams. Groundnuts produced in Upper Guinea are shipped to Forest Guinea. Shea nut butter comes from Upper Guinea where the women who harvest the shea nuts transform them into butter themselves and send the surplus on to consumers in Middle Guinea. It also distributes consumer goods imported from Bamako.

The Forest Region is a major supplier of plantains, palm oil, and bananas to all regions of the country. It officially supplies coffee and palm kernels to international markets and unofficially exports coffee to neighboring countries. Forest Guinea supplies Upper Guinea with domestically produced rice. Kissidougou supplies Conakry and Upper Guinea with taro. Forest Guinea produces palm nuts and palm oil for distribution throughout the country and export to neighbors. Cola comes from forest areas as well as the coastal areas. The Forest Region supplies Guinea with goods imported from Sierra Leone and Liberia.

### **Commodity Subsystems**

#### *Rice*

Rice circulating in the agricultural markets comes from two different sources, from domestically produced rice and from imported rice. In each case, rice travels in either long-distance marketing channels or short-distance marketing channels.

#### *Domestically Produced Rice*

The bulk of domestically produced rice circulates within a 30 to 50 kilometer radius of urban consumption centers such as headquarter towns of prefectures. Collection of production surpluses in the rural periodic markets and retail sales in the urban markets or other rural periodic markets is often controlled by the same small-scale collectors.

The rural collector does not process the rice at all. He sells it in the form he buys it, whether paddy or husked. Only a few large-scale traders in the short-distance rice trade will have the equipment to process the rice before sending it on.

For economic efficiency, the long-distance rice trade requires processing to shed the husks, approximately one-third of rice weight, and assembly in large quantities before shipment. Therefore, long-distance rice trade means capital investment in processing equipment, transport, and storage facilities far beyond those required for short-distance trade.

Filippi-Wilhem (1987) identified three long-distance rice marketing channels in Guinea: from Kumbia to Labé; from Kissidougou to Kankan and Siguiiri; and around Conakry and from Conakry to the interior.

In the Kumbia to Labé channel, rice is shipped from the production areas of Kumbia for storage in Labé. Wholesalers rent storage services in Labé and do not transfer ownership when they deliver their stocks. During periods when imported rice cannot satisfy demand in Middle Guinea, silo operators take domestic rice out of storage in Labé, distribute it to regional markets, and credit the receipts to the accounts of the wholesalers owning the stocks.

In the second long-distance channel, wholesalers from Kankan and Siguiiri come to Kissidougou to take possession of stocks already assembled by wholesalers there. Wholesalers from Kankan and Siguiiri also buy up other basic consumer items in Kissidougou and Yende to take home with their cargo of rice.

The volume of rice trade through the Kissidougou to Kankan and Siguiiri channel is significantly larger than that of the Kumbia to Labé channel. However, the volume is relatively small compared with the trade of some Sahelian grain merchants. Guinean grain merchants

are handicapped by the legacy of the First Republic under which they were not able to assemble or maintain the capital to engage in large-scale grain trade.

Domestic rice consumed in or in transit to Conakry comes either from the islands of Kaback and Kakossa to the south of the city in Forécariah prefecture or from the Koba plain to the north in Boffa prefecture. The rice is generally shipped to Conakry by motorized pirogue. The port of Boussoura receives rice from Kaback and Kakossa. Their shipments far outstrip those from Koba which, prior to recently initiated rehabilitation efforts at the port, used to land at Dixinn.

Generally, the producer delivers his rice to Boussoura himself. He pays for processing at one of the small mills in the port and sells the processed rice to wholesalers from Conakry, traders from one of Guinea's major regional markets or local retailers on the spot. Alternatively, women involved in processing rice in the port may go to the islands themselves to stock up, bring back rice, process it, and realize larger profits than if they waited for producer deliveries.

Rice arriving in Dixinn from Koba used to be principally for consumption in Conakry. However, rice arriving in Boussoura is often stored in warehouses at the port and resold to traders from regional markets who come to Conakry to stock up on various consumer goods in addition to rice. Rice landed at Boussoura may supply markets in the interior of the country, principally in Kindia, Mamou, and Labé.

### ***Imported Rice***

Rice importation is concentrated in the hands of a small number of firms. In 1986, 20 firms covered all of Guinea's rice import needs. Less than a dozen had the resources to finance imports over 5,000 MT. In 1987, six firms alone brought in 63,000 MT of the total private sector importation allotment of 80,000 MT.

The large-scale rice importers in Conakry engage in other commercial pursuits as well. They often import sugar, flour, and construction materials such as cement. Some also have fleets of trucks for transport of merchandise.

Most imported rice goes through short-distance channels supplying the city of Conakry. The importer sells stocks directly to retailers who sell to consumers in the city markets. Some also goes through long-distance channels which supply urban areas in the interior of the country and the rural populations of regions, such as the Fouta Djallon or Upper Guinea, where domestic rice production does not meet demand. A number of different actors and relationships, as described in greater detail in Section 4.2.2.2, play important roles in long-distance imported rice marketing.

Importers sell their stocks to distributors in Conakry and in the interior. With the exception of the SGC, importers have little storage capacity. Therefore, they must dispose of their stocks as soon as they arrive in the port. Importers tend to act as agents for a group of distributors with whom they have long-standing personal and professional relations. These relations are translated into favorable business terms, including price breaks and credits for the most faithful distributors.

The most important import distributors in Guinea are based in the Madina market in Conakry. They buy large quantities of rice directly from importers. At the same time, they are often importers, themselves, of other consumer products such as sugar, flour, and cloth. On the one hand, they sell directly to retailers in the Conakry market. On the other, they sell to large-scale wholesalers in the interior.

These large distributors are the principal financiers of the imported food distribution system in Guinea. They have storehouses scattered about the city where they stock various commodities in addition to rice for later distribution in Conakry and elsewhere.

Wholesalers in the main interior cities often couple handling of imported rice with handling of other imported goods as well as locally produced rice as described in Section 4.2.2.2. They often distribute imported goods through their collectors who exchange them for locally produced rice in the rural periodic markets.

The wholesalers of the interior usually have limited financial resources and storage capacity which limits their stocks to under 100 MT. They usually do not own large transport vehicles. These wholesalers often attempt to form associations to benefit from group purchase of stocks, group management of storage facilities, or transport.

The wholesalers in the interior sell their stocks in part to traders with small shops in the market place. These traders generally only specialize in rice and flour sales. They can stock up to a hundred sacks of rice. They sell imported rice by the sack to the women who sit out in the open in the market and retail rice in measured units to the public.

Most of the actors in the imported rice marketing channels are small-scale operators with low capital requirements for participation in the system. The system operates, in large part, on credit originating from the large importers of the capital. Considering the value of money, stocks must circulate rapidly, profit margins per transaction must be cut back, and risks must be minimized.

### *Livestock*

The marketing system for livestock is similar in principle to that of rice. However, the livestock marketing system includes a role for livestock brokers who work for both herders and wholesalers.

In general, when herders are interested in selling livestock, they bring their animals to a market town where they contact a broker they know, trust, and usually with whom they already have a satisfactory history of dealings. The brokers generally do not travel across markets to sell the herder's livestock. However, they will attend other markets to purchase livestock if their regular suppliers cannot meet their wholesale orders. The brokers supply wholesale butchers from urban centers that either sell to other butchers or to exporters.

The herder needs the broker because he does not have the time to attend the market, because he does not know actual market conditions and prices, and because he does not have the network of social relations among purchasers. The wholesaler needs the broker to ensure a constant and stable source of supply.

Herders generally give brokers their livestock to sell on consignment. Wholesalers often extend credit to herders to purchase livestock for them. Brokers, themselves, may extend credit to wholesalers at times to dump livestock in the shadow of an impending price collapse. Herders may also come to weekly markets to sell directly to local consumers.

### *Coffee*

In 1989, coffee production was estimated at approximately 13,500 MT. About 6,000 MT were exported through Senegal and 5,000 MT were exported through Conakry by various coffee exporting firms. These estimates include coffee coming into Guinea from Liberia, quantities which can only have grown since 1989.

Producer prices for coffee range from 250 GF/kg to 400 GF/kg according to the location of the village and the cost of transport from the farmgate to the docks. The producer generally sells his production at the farmgate to a collector working for a wholesale trader who then sends it on to an exporter.

Certain exporters have offices, processing equipment, and storehouses in the coffee production zones and buy directly from the collectors:

SOGUICAF has offices in Kissidougou, Gueckedou, Macenta, and N'Zérékoré. Various plants can shell up to 8,600 MT of coffee per year. In 1989, SOGUICAF paid 375 GF/kg to 400 GF/kg for dry beans delivered to its processing plants, where it shelled the coffee. SOGUICAF exported about 2,000 MT of coffee in 1990. The company recently split in two. One successor will concentrate in coffee production, processing, and marketing; the other is turning to a more diversified export program.

- INDEX, based in N'Zérékoré, exports coffee and imports a range of consumer goods. In 1989/1990, it exported 440 MT of coffee. INDEX paid 500 GF/kg to 525 GF/kg delivered for beans already shelled. Overall, about 60 percent of Guinean coffee is sold already shelled.
  - DAFCO has a coffee plantation in Kissidougou and branch offices in Macenta, N'Zérékoré, and Gueckedou. DAFCO's processing plant is in Conakry. The company is programming up to 5,000 MT of coffee exports in coming years. It already exports some fresh fruit and imports tobacco, food commodities, and construction materials.
  - PROSECO was originally the coffee marketing parastatal. It was privatized in late 1989 and endowed with the equipment and facilities of its predecessor.
- All the other coffee exporters are based in Conakry. The number of Guinean coffee exporters dropped from 30 in 1987 to 7 in 1989.

Since July 1989, international coffee agreements have been in abeyance. Therefore, Guinean coffee exporters have been able to sell as much coffee on the international markets as they are able without OIC sanction. On the other hand, suspension of OIC agreements has led to a dramatic drop in world coffee market prices. The price for arabica coffee in October 1989 was less than half its March 1989 price.

### *Other Exports*

The Grouping of Fruit and Vegetable Exporters (REFLEG) and the Guinean Fruit Federation are both independent associations whose membership is interested in expanding fruit and vegetable production and marketing.

CCIAG established REFLEG in 1987. It is made up of eight private produce exporting firms. At present, REFLEG is not an effective marketing organization.

The Fruit Federation was created in 1984 by fruit growers from a group of defunct government cooperatives essentially in the Maritime Region. It is now a private association principally representing fruit growers (primarily mango and pineapple growers).

One of the most prominent member groups of the Fruit Federation is the Kindia Prefectural Union of Cooperatives which groups eight fruit-grower cooperatives and three vegetable-grower cooperatives. These cooperatives have an overall membership of over 1,000. They have been working together for some time and are relatively well-organized. They are cultivating over 15,000 ha with a production potential of 100,000 MT of fruit and vegetables.

Fruit and vegetable production and marketing is benefitting from a certain amount of project support. The French Village Initiatives Support Project is supporting pineapple growers' groups in Friguiagbé. The Loire Atlantic General Council, a French NGO, is supporting the Kindia Women's Action Group, an affiliate of the Guinean Businesswomen's Association (AFEG). The Association for Technical Cooperation (ACT) is another NGO active in Kindia in fruit and vegetables production for the market.

Fruit and vegetable production and export marketing are done mainly by small-scale producers operating within cooperative associations. Agro-industrial corporations in Guinea play important roles in production of special commodities based on cultivation or collection of raw materials:

1. The Guinean Corporation for Cultivation of Oil Palm and Rubber (SOGUIPAH) is based in Forest Guinea. It is a parastatal organization managed by a private French firm. SOGUIPAH is creating nuclear estates of its own for palm oil and latex production and extending cultivation packages to outgrowers in villages on the margins of its plantations. It will buy village production to feed its processing units. It is also supporting its outgrowers by extending rice production technical packages suited for the natural depressions of the surrounding countryside.
2. The Aromatic Plant Corporation of Guinea (SOPAG) is based in Labé. SOPAG, whose predecessors go back to 1928, was revived in 1987 with a majority of private French capital. The Guinean government holds 39 percent of the shares. SOPAG produces essential oils which it exports to the perfume industry in France, and has a 144 ha plantation on which it is growing jasmine and citrus. It also buys raw materials such as wild flowers from neighboring villagers. Villagers are not as forthcoming as in the past to extract orange essence for SOPAG at the prices it is able to pay. Therefore, SOPAG has recently been obliged to close its doors for good.

3. The Guinean Agro-Industrial Corporation (SAIG), based in Mamou, is a cannery originally built by the Russians but now taken over by SIASS, a private French group. The Guinean government holds 10 percent of the stock. SIAG completed its rehabilitation in 1990. Its operations focus on manufacturing juice concentrates. It grows passion fruit on its own plantations, but buys its supplies of tomatoes and other fruit from neighboring villagers. It has a potential of 7,800 MT of production per year. Half will be passion fruit. A quarter will be citrus. The rest will be divided among other fruits such as mango, tomato, pineapple, and papaya.
4. The Arab Libya-Guinean Corporation for Agro-Industrial and Agricultural Development (SALGUIDIA) is based near Forécariah. The firm has a 2,000-ha plantation of which 250 ha are under pineapples. It has a factory for canning fruit and producing fruit juices and concentrates. Recently, SALGUIDIA has been exporting fresh pineapples and mangos in considerable quantity.

Table 28 shows the level of Guinean fruit and vegetable exports in the 1988-89 season according to the largest exporting firms.

	<b>pineapple</b>	<b>mango</b>	<b>various</b>	<b>total</b>
AFRIC-FRUITTS	178	47	-	225
BANGOURA	50	30	-	80
BIOGUINEE	24,5	25,5	10	60
FRUITEX	151	83,5	-	224,5
GUINEA-FLEURS	-	-	20	20
SALGUIDIA	380,5	188,5	-	569
SOLFICI	185	50	-	235
SOGUITIE	55	78,5	-	133,5
Others	106,5	380	3	489,5
Informal by road	150	100	50	300
Total	1.280,5	953	83	2.346,5

*Source: Chemonics, 1990:A5 6*

Guinea exports pineapples to the EEC (France and Belgium), Morocco, Libya, and Senegal. It exports mangos to the EEC and Senegal and oranges to Senegal. Exports to the EEC have approximated 500 to 550 MT of pineapples and mangos per year since 1985. In 1987/1988, according to REFLEG, Guinea exported 1,086 MT of pineapples to the EEC, Morocco, and Libya. Fruit exports to Senegal can only be roughly estimated.

#### **Public Institutional Support and Relations with Private Sector Actors**

Agricultural marketing systems in Guinea receive support from an array of public sector institutions.

##### *The Post-Harvest Handling Service*

The Post-Harvest Handling Service is a survival from the colonial era. It is primarily responsible for quality control of agricultural commodities destined for the market. It operates at ports of entry for imported agricultural commodities as well as in the periodic markets in all the prefectures in Guinea.

Until 18 January 1991, the Post-Harvest Handling Service levied a tax at the point of origin on agricultural commodities traded in Guinea. Over the years, tax collection took precedence over control of the quality of the national food supply in the Post-Harvest Handling Service agenda. In principle, the prefecture levied taxes according to the market value of the commodity in question according to rates laid down in 1986 regulations. In fact, rates were arbitrarily determined and arbitrarily applied, and might vary from prefecture to prefecture. The prefecture was supposed to transfer the tax receipts to the national treasury. For a number of reasons, collections declined dramatically, particularly in Conakry, during the last years of application of the tax.

The Post-Harvest Handling Service is currently a division of the National Department of Agriculture (DNA) of MARA. It is composed of three sections in Conakry and one section in each prefecture. Its staff has dropped from a high of 1,400 with 15 in each prefecture to its current 500 to 600 total. Further reductions are planned leaving the Service with an overall staff of 200, including about four in each prefecture.

##### *Market Administrators*

All the public markets in the country have a market administrator whose role is to oversee the conduct of the market. He generally collects a market tax from people selling merchandise on market day. The tax is usually in the order of 25 GF to 50 GF per market day. The money collected is remitted, in principle, to the prefecture budget. In fact, for a number of reasons, collections are generally significantly lower than expected.

The market administrator is named by the prefecture. The administrator of the assembly markets in the headquarters town of the prefecture is usually paid. Other market administrators usually are not.

### *The Chambers of Commerce*

The national Guinean Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture (CCIAG) was created with government support in April 1985 as an outgrowth of several earlier experiments with organizing Guinea's commercial sector.

The CCIAG is housed in the *Maison du Peuple*. It has over 2,000 members in Conakry. Merchants and traders make up the majority. The governing body of the CCIAG is council of 101 delegates which meets once a year to elect an unpaid executive board. The government appoints the president and the secretary general of the executive board. The other 17 members are elected. The executive board meets weekly at CCIAG headquarters.

The CCIAG represents other organizations such as the National Teamsters Union of Guinea, the National Herders Union, the National Union of Entrepreneurs in Buildings and Public Works, the National Industrial Union, the National Union of Importers-Exporters, the Fruit Federation, and REFLEG.

CCIAG corresponds with the Chambers of Commerce in neighboring countries. It is a member of the West Africa Federation of Chambers of Commerce and of the Permanent Conference of African and French Chambers of Commerce. It maintains particularly close relations with the Chambers of Commerce of Rouen and Marseilles in France.

In 1989, CCIAG launched an effort to establish cells in each prefecture in the country. The purpose of covering all the prefectures of Guinea with a network of Chambers of Commerce was to facilitate communication among merchants and traders, and to organize them into an association which could lobby the prefectural and national administration in the interests of its membership.

At present, however, other than Labé, few prefectures outside Conakry have an effective Chamber of Commerce organization. Few understand the role or potential of the prefectural Chambers of Commerce. CCIAG headquarters in Conakry has not been able to give the prefectural Chambers the support they have needed. Consequently, their active membership has been declining.

UNIDO has begun to support the CCIAG with training of division chiefs and with technical assistance in carrying out its private enterprise promotion mission. The German government, the World Bank, and USAID are all studying avenues for further support to the CCIAG.

CCIAG has not yet realized its potential. Part of its problem is that it is still seen as a creature of the government rather than as a purely private sector organization. A large share of the potential membership is remaining aloof. The government has kept control over the most important offices of the executive board. Consequently, few members have kept up to date in their annual dues payments.

### *The Transporters Unions*

The National Transporters Union was created on 28 October 1988 under the authority of the Minister of Transportation and Public Works. As with the CCIAG, the Nation Transporters Union has representation in all of the prefectures of Guinea. The prefectural headquarters are located at the car park of the prefectural capital. A prefectural Transporters Syndicate, which

unites drivers and mechanics, is often headquartered in the municipal car park side by side with the Union.

These Prefectural Transporter Unions have lobbied effectively in times of fuel shortages to get the supplies they needed to continue their service uninterrupted. As testimony to their effectiveness in protecting their members' interests, their membership includes a larger share of those active in the sector than the CCIAG includes merchants in the commercial sector.

#### *Support from MARA and MICA at the Prefectural Level*

MARA and MICA both have a presence in the prefectures. Major MARA functions of development interest at the prefectural level are agricultural extension, forestry services, and quality control of agricultural commodities.

MICA staff at the prefectural level are charged with administering the commercial codes, particularly concerning weights and measures, and with collecting commercial statistics.

#### *Police, Gendarmerie, Customs, and Army*

The police, gendarmerie, customs, and, most recently, the army play a role in agricultural marketing by keeping a running check on the public transport system and the goods it carries. These services have set up control points where they stop and inspect all traffic along major roads.

They often levy fines on drivers or renters of public transport and demand payment on the spot. These fines have to be covered in the cost of transport and, by extension, in the consumer price of agricultural commodities. The whole process also slows down the movement of goods in Guinea which, in turn, has an impact on commodity pricing.

The problem of interference of the security forces in movement of goods and agricultural commodities is most acute in the Forest Region.

#### *Parastatal Export Corporations*

Despite the program of the Second Republic to liberalize and privatize the country's trade and marketing institutions government resources and policies are still directed at influencing performance of the commercial sector. The Guinean government is continuing its support for four marketing parastatals—AGRIMA, SEMAPE, PROSECO, and FRUITEX.

The first two of these, AGRIMA and SEMAPE, import and distribute agricultural inputs. They no longer have a monopoly in this sector. On the other hand, they have no effective private competition since farmer demand for agricultural inputs is so weak.

The second two, FRUITEX and PROSECO, are publicly owned exporters of fruit and coffee, respectively. Their monopoly hold on their sectors was legislated away in 1985 and their activity has dropped off considerably since then. In 1988, for example, PROSECO exported 500 tons of coffee, one-tenth of total coffee exports, and one-fifth to one-half of the quantities PROSECO normally exported when it had monopoly control of the export market. PROSECO was privatized at the end of 1989.

PROSECO coffee purchase and export procedures parallel those of the private sector. PROSECO also operates one of Guinea's two roasting and grinding facilities. It produces a certain amount of roasted coffee for local consumption. Part of the rationale for PROSECO's continuing parastatal status is to safeguard the public interest in efficient and equitable coffee export marketing by its operations. PROSECO has handicapped its effectiveness as a coffee trader by taking too literally the farmgate reference price for coffee established by MICA, its patron ministry, when its private competition offers higher prices.

FRUITEX exports fresh fruit and vegetables. It is supplied directly by producer cooperatives. It performs sorting and packaging operations, transports the produce to Conakry, and ships it out via air freight. Therefore, it operates much like its private sector competition. Its prices are competitive with those of the private sector as well. However, FRUITEX has two advantages over the private sector: its losses are covered by the national budget, and it has access to military planes to export fruit directly via Dakar. FRUITEX exports fruit mostly to Europe, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

The FRUITEX export monopoly ended in 1985. By that time, its level of operations were already in decline. Banana exports, 42,000 tons in 1967, had ceased completely by 1979. Pineapple exports had declined 12,000 tons in 1972 to virtually nothing. Mango exports in 1983 were not quite one-tenth their peak. Overall, total FRUITEX exports declined from 50,000 MT to 500 MT between 1967 and 1983. FRUITEX engaged in no export sales in either 1984 or 1985. In 1989, FRUITEX exported 60 MT of pineapples and 120 MT of mangoes. FRUITEX apparently only remains in operation due to the government's willingness to cover its operating deficit.

### *Collection of Market Revenues*

Several types of market-related revenues are collected at the national, prefectural, or subprefectural levels.

At the national level, the treasury is responsible for assessing and collecting the Industrial and Commercial Profit (BIC). This tax is assessed to importers and exporters at 30 percent of annual profits. The national treasury sends assessors to the prefectures annually to collect the tax. The destination of this revenue is the national treasury.

At the prefectural level, the registrar of revenues and payments oversees collection of market user fees. Actual collection is performed at subprefectural and prefectural levels, and deposits are made at the prefecture.

Responsibility for assessment of small business taxes lies at the prefectural level in the hands of the miscellaneous contributions, the prefectural division which collects a variety of charges and taxes assessed to the public. Patents are issued to small, medium, and large enterprises with taxes assessed on the size and revenues of the enterprise. Patent fees range from 12,000 GF to 120,000 GF. The license is similar to the patents, but applies to smaller-scale enterprises. The stall rental is a user fee assessed for occupation of publicly owned, fixed, small boutiques.

The subprefecture collects market-user fees, boutique rents, and parking charges. An assistant of the subprefect is generally responsible for administration of collection and accounting procedures for these revenue types.

Market-user fees are collected with varying degrees of success throughout the country. While most subprefectures collect market fees, the collection process is haphazard, poorly organized, inconsistent, and inadequately managed financially. Most subprefectures obtain their tickets at either the prefectural or national level. When stocks of tickets run out, revenue collections may stop for extended periods.

#### **4.2.3 Other Donor Activities**

Several international donors, USAID among them, have launched efforts aimed at improving the performance of the agricultural marketing sector. To date, actual field activity has concentrated on road construction and improvement. Otherwise, most donor-financed work in the area of agricultural marketing has meant the preparation of studies and reports. However, the World Bank and USAID are preparing agricultural export projects which focus on improving the ability of Guinean fruit and vegetable growers to profit from international markets. The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) is currently implementing a project in Forest Guinea to improve coffee production and marketing.

USAID, KfW, FAC, and IBRD are all currently implementing projects repaving trunk roads and rebuilding rural roads. In the next five years, 2,500 km of rural roads in 16 prefectures in all four regions will be rehabilitated.

Guinea has benefitted from a series of agricultural marketing studies executed by different donors over the last six years. In 1985, the FAO/World Bank financed an agricultural marketing survey to identify weaknesses in the marketing system and to suggest measures to improve the efficiency of the system. The survey found little prospect for Guinea to recover its position as a large-scale banana exporter. It identified some potential for rebuilding export trade in pineapples and mangos. The report recommended against major public sector investments in the fruit industry in favor of encouraging the entry of private investors.

FAO is currently finalizing a seven-month study of agricultural marketing systems in Guinea. Similar to many marketing studies in Guinea, this FAO study examines rice marketing more closely than the marketing of other commodities. The author of the FAO report, Noelle Terpend, is now working with USAID on the preparation of USAID's agricultural export project.

Robert D. Weaver, a consultant to the World Bank in 1987, completed a study of the comparative advantage of smallholders and included a description of the farm-to-market chain. The study also presents data on market flows collected from regional markets in Kankan, Labé, Faranah, and Gaoual, among the most important markets in Guinea. The data provide a sample of the major commodities traded and some indication of the direction of trade between different markets.

In 1989, the World Bank began the process of preparing an agricultural export promotion project. An appraisal of the project took place in May 1991. The objective is to increase agricultural earnings from fruit and vegetable exports. The overall project budget will be \$37.5

million. The project's geographic scope is limited to six prefectures in the Fouta Djallon and in the former Banana Triangle of Maritime Guinea. The project will work through a thoroughly restructured and privatized Chamber of Commerce to identify international markets for Guinean fruit and vegetable exports. The project will give producers the production support they need to meet the demand of these markets. Project operations will be coordinated and monitored by an independently contracted management consultant.

In 1987, the UNDP financed a marketing study in Guinea. The study focuses on rice marketing, but also gives insight into the operations of marketing systems for other commodities, profiles of market participants, and identities of goods traded.

### **4.3 Natural Resource Management (NRM)**

As elsewhere around the world, growth of population in Guinea has put pressure on the natural resource base. For food production to keep pace with population growth, people have shortened fallow periods, intensified production technologies, and extended agricultural production onto marginal lands.

In the process, people have cut Guinean forests back considerably. Of the 15 million ha of dense forest of a generation ago, barely 1 million remains, the rest sacrificed to expanding agriculture, firewood needs, and mining projects. The 260,000 ha of mangrove along the coast are under assault by woodcutters attracted by the enormous market for firewood in Conakry. Savannah woodlands now cover 16 million hectares, but they are also disappearing at a rapid rate. In large measure, this situation is due to a practice, as common in Guinea as elsewhere, of ignoring environmental cost in economic analysis of projects and investment opportunities. In addition, Guinea has hitherto not had the legislative framework, the institutional support, or the qualified technical personnel to develop and implement resource-conservative environmental policy.

#### **4.3.1 History of NRM in Guinea**

The objective of forestry policy in Guinea under colonial administration was to control access to forest lands and to regulate harvesting of wood and other resources through a system of permits and harsh fines. The colonial forest code of 1935 consisted largely of a list of protected species and prohibited activities. Forestry agents had a police role. They had the power to restrict and/or suspend use rights inconsistent with forest management objectives. Recruitment of forest agency personnel from the ranks of the military and gendarmerie further underlined this regulatory and enforcement approach to forest management.

The colonial hunting code of the same year took the same approach. The colonial government established a network of forest reserves which, today, covers 1,142,905 ha. In addition, it initiated a program of reforestation. A significant portion of the forest reserve was protected due to local beliefs that the sites were haunted. Springs, edges of cliffs, sacred groves, and big trees were thus reserved.

Colonial forestry policy was based on exploitation and regeneration of the dense forest. It favored harvesting wood for industry over firewood. The savannah also benefitted from protection measures and from trials at growing exotic forest species, such as teak. Forestry policy included no role for local participation. Involvement of the local population came only with

infractions of regulations and consequent penalties. After independence, the First Republic had difficulty enlisting local cooperation in changing from a coercive to a persuasive approach to forestry management.

The PDG aggravated the problem by including, in its anti-colonial campaign, a promise to villagers, in exchange for their electoral support, to expand their economic opportunities by lifting colonial restrictions on exploitation of the reserves. At independence, the forest service lost all its technical personnel. The forest service was then understaffed and did not have the technical expertise to defend the reserves on their merits against the PDG onslaught. During the First Republic, the forest service practically disappeared.

In November 1958, the new government opened up the forest reserves for agroforestry and allowed clearing of certain parts of the reserves. In fact, all regulation of the reserves lapsed and people attacked them systematically. By November 1960, Sékou Touré became alarmed at the rapid disappearance of the forest reserve and tried to reimpose access restrictions. Violations continue to this day.

Bush fires destroyed large forested areas during this period. The government tried to regulate them after 1960 without much success. The savannah woodland of Upper Guinea was the greatest victim of forest fire. Farmers are reluctant to forego bushfires, which are the most cost-effective technology for them to use to clear new land.

In recent years, Guinea has undertaken a number of reforestation and natural resource management efforts. In 1981, FAO, with UNDP funding, launched a reforestation project in the Kokoulo watershed. By 1983, it was operating in other watersheds in the Pita area. Its object was to regularize stream flows at the heads of the watersheds. The project made important contributions in the fight against erosion, the protection of springs, the improvement of pastures, tree planting and technical training of forestry agents. It carried out research on 190 forest species.

Since 1985, the Guinean government has been mobilizing donor attention on protection of the watersheds of the Fouta Djallon Highlands. Several major West African rivers—including the Niger, the Senegal, and the Gambia—have their source in the Fouta Djallon Highlands. The government has launched a program to protect 12 watersheds. Different donors are taking responsibility for actions in different watersheds. Consequently, programs and approaches differ somewhat from watershed to watershed.

The government is also studying approaches to protection of the savannah woodlands. The dramatic decline of onchocerciasis has opened up for agriculture 160,000 ha of savannah woodlands previously uninhabitable. The government is now also requiring environmental impact studies for all development projects, including mining projects such as MIFERGUI and hydro-electric projects such as Konkouré.

Guinea was one of the first African countries to develop its Tropical Forest Action Plan. The plan presents a forestry investment program for the six year 1988 to 1993 period. The plan focuses on strengthening the forestry service, continuing the campaign against bush fires, popularizing improved cookstoves, and staff training. The plan was approved in 1989.

The government created a National Environment Council (CNE) in 1987, at the same time it adopted its Environmental Code. The CNE is a coordinating body composed of staff seconded from different ministries and placed under the leadership of the Minister of Natural Resources. In principle, it meets twice a year. The function of the Commission is to inform the government of the environmental consequences of proposed investments and projects. The Commission met for the first time in 1989. Since then, it has not played an active role—in part, because guidelines for conducting environmental impact studies under the Environmental Code have yet to be established.

In addition to an Environmental Code, the Guinean government, in 1989, adopted a Forestry Code as well as a Hunting Code and a Wildlife Code. The government is now finishing a systematic forest inventory. At the same time, the government is drafting a Land Tenure Code.

#### **4.3.2 Environmental Action Plan**

In 1989, the government began the process of developing an Environmental Action Plan. It created the Support Cell for the Environmental Action Plan within the Ministry of Planning to organize a series of seminars and to mobilize the participation of donors and international organizations interested in environmental issues. This unit is coordinating the efforts of four interministerial working groups: Environmental Economics and Planning; Environmental Policy, Institutions, and Legislation; Management of the Natural Environment; and Tools and Information Systems. The objective of the plan is to determine steps that Guinea and the donors should take together to protect the environment in a number of problem areas. The approach of the Environmental Action Plan is to chart out environmentally conservative economic development programs. The final Environmental Action Plan will be included as a part of the forthcoming national development plan.

#### **4.3.3 Relevant Legal Codes**

The Guinean government published new forestry and environmental codes in 1990 and 1987, respectively. The Land Code is currently undergoing a last revision prior to publication. Each of these codes specifies a normative framework in its sector. Implementation of the codes requires a body of specific regulations.

#### **Forestry**

In 1988, the government published a Forestry Policy and Action Plan to address forestry, biological diversity, and natural resource management issues. The document had the following policy objectives:

- to assure the sustainability of the country's renewable natural resources;
- to maintain and improve national forests;
- to maximize benefits indefinitely from the country's forests;
- to assist and control the exploitation, transformation, and commercialization of forest products;
- to improve involvement of the administration, private sector, collectives, and private citizens in national forest policy; and
- to improve implementation of forest policy.

The Forestry Code was revised in 1990 by DNFC with assistance from FAO. It permits use of certain forestry areas for exploitation and reforestation by local communities. The government based its Forestry Code on the Forestry Policy and Action Plan. The Forestry Code adopts a policy of community participation in management of local natural resources and recognizes the application of local tenure systems. It rejects the colonial approach to forest management. Articles of the Code provide for the elaboration of national and regional management plans, and for information campaigns and participation of local populations in forest management. Policing language and measures remain in force to some degree. Specific provisions recognize local use rights to the forest domain. The Code makes provision for development plans to permit communities to participate in and profit from the management of forest reserves. These development plans identify protected areas, present plans for their development, and specify permissible agricultural and pastoral activities and use rights. The role of the forestry service in such a situation is to provide technical assistance to draw up and implement the development plan.

Enforcement of the Code's provisions will continue to be a problem until DNFC evolves as an institution. The major shortcoming of the new Code is the way in which forest land rights are defined. The problem is a specific case of the general problem of land rights in Guinea. Further points may require clarification. Article 46, for example, specifies that an individual must obtain a permit to cut trees other than in house gardens or in permanently cultivated fields. The implication is that a permit is required to cut on non-perennial fields, including, presumably, those in fallow. This ambiguity has implications for people's willingness to plant trees.

### **Environment**

Similar to the Forestry Code, the Environmental Code of 1987 provides for the protection and development of Guinea's natural endowment. Its language is more restrictive. Its objective is to protect the environment against all forms of degradation, develop natural resources, fight against pollution, and improve the standard of living of the people while respecting the ecological balance. It prescribes penalties for infractions and requires issuance of various permits in certain cases. Its major innovation is the requirement for environmental impact studies for a specific variety of development activities. Its promulgation initiates a national awareness of the need to protect against environmental degradation, in both rural and urban settings, within the context of economic use of natural resources.

### **Land**

The government is currently attempting to redefine the land-tenure system. Two proposed texts have been drafted which are largely incompatible. One, which was prepared for the Ministry of Urbanism and Habitat, is oriented toward the problems of the urban sector. A second proposal was elaborated for MARA. The two texts differ strongly with respect to the power and prerogatives of the state, the role retained for customary rules and local authorities, and the possibilities for private ownership of land. The two have now been merged into a combined code with provisions accommodating all areas of the country. The new Land Code has not yet been promulgated and, at the present time, is undergoing final revisions.

The new code departs from earlier policy. Colonial policy arrogated all unoccupied land to the state; some of this land was then given out as concessions to European colons and busi-

ness concerns. Owners were able to get title to land, yet outside urban areas, most land remained subject to customary tenure rules. Under the First Republic, by way of contrast, all land was claimed by the state. Private property rights were no longer obtainable. In reality, though, as in the colonial period, customary tenure systems continued to govern land-use rights throughout most of the country.

The Rural Code contains a general framework demonstrating the general approach of the draft. It includes three texts governing the application of the framework in specific situations: the attribution of land in the national domain for use by private bodies; the attribution and rights of farmers in irrigation systems; and the respect of customary tenure rights.

The draft code reaffirms the basic principle that land belongs to the nation represented by the government. It specifies a number of special tenure regimes within the general principle of eminent domain of the government. These include public domain, private domain, use permits, rural concessions, customary tenure, and irrigation systems.

The draft code specifically recognizes the importance of customary tenure systems over much of the country. It supports local communities in their management of land rights. Rather than impose a single, national system of land tenure, the draft code provides for the evolution of customary systems at the pace of the particular community. It acknowledges that this approach will underscore long-standing social inequalities in many areas such as the Fouta Djallon. Therefore, the new code should not pose a threat to local practices and the rights of local authorities to manage their own environments.

Among other measures, the draft code provides for the establishment of land registers, in which local land rights are to be recorded. However, the draft code does not specify whether rights of ownership or use are to be entered (or both), and this will need to be clarified.

#### **4.3.4 Institutions**

The National Department of Forests and Hunting (DNFC) is the MARA department with major responsibilities in management of forestry resources. DNFC wrote the National Tropical Forestry Action Plan. It developed the Forestry Code and the Wildlife Code.

DNFC has already reduced its staff at the national level from 180 to 69. The regional staffs are scheduled to be reduced from their current level of more than 2,000 to 981 persons.

The newly reorganized DNFC is responsible for forestry management and reports directly to the MARA through the General Secretary. It includes an Administrative Section, a Planning and Coordination Unit, and four divisions:

- A Division of Wildlife, Forest Protection, and Bushfire Control, encompassing protection of hunting reserves, national and city parks, and the environment;
- A Forestry Management Division, responsible for forestry management and master plans, classification, and reforestation;
- A Rural Forestry Division, providing services for forestry extension, fuelwood production, soil conservation, and village plantations; and
- An Economics and Legislation Division responsible for economic analysis, forest legislation, and production control.

The Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment (MRNE) couples a conservation mission in environment and natural resources with a development mission in mining and energy.

The National Department of the Environment (DNE) is the MRNE department principally concerned with protection of the environment. The mission of the DNE is to implement the government's environmental policy. The DNE has four divisions:

- A General Studies and Synthesis Division prepares, among other things, an annual environmental update; it is also responsible for implementing environmental impact studies;
- A Pollution and Harm Prevention and Control Division conducts pollution inspections for a number of sites on its registration lists;
- An Environmental and Resource Protection Division is concerned with protection of the productive resources in the rural areas; and
- An Environmental Law, Information, and Environmental Education Division is charged with developing legislation to apply the national environmental code.

Each prefecture has a Prefectural Department of Rural Development and the Environment which is responsible for implementing MARA and MRNE policy and programs at the prefectural level. It is administratively controlled by the prefect, but is technically managed and guided by relevant MARA and MRNE departments. Most prefecture-level forestry departments are poorly equipped and are not operational.

#### **4.3.5 Donor Activities**

USAID's proposed Guinea NRM Project is an integral, but freestanding component of the multi-phase, multi-donor Fouta Djallon Highlands Integrated Regional Development (FDHIRD) Project. The objective of FDHIRD is to ensure the rational use and protection of the Fouta Djallon Highland's natural resources, and to improve the living conditions of its people as well as the people living in the areas irrigated by the rivers which originate from the Highlands.

In 1988, the Government of Guinea instituted the Fouta Djallon Highlands Integrated Rural Development Project (FDHIRD) following a preliminary three-year phase (1984 to 1987) of extensive studies. Twelve pairs of watersheds—Representative Pilot Watersheds (BRP) and Representative Control Watersheds (BRT)—were chosen throughout the Fouta Djallon Highlands and proposed to donors for funding. The project is carrying out adaptive research and extension to identify techniques to both protect these watersheds and improve their productivity. Currently, there are three funded and actively managed watersheds: BRP Pita, Guetoya (FAO); BRP Mamou Bale (FAC); and BRP Mamou Bafing (FAC). Several others are in the process of being funded.

- BRP Pita

The central plateau of Pita Prefecture is characterized by high population, intensive land use, and a preponderance of poor soils. This area is generally less wooded than other areas in the Fouta.

Activities in Guetoya have been in operation longer than other natural resource projects in the region. It is now a geographically focused version of activities that formerly covered a large area. Up until 1989, the main thrust was research, species trials, erosion control, and plantation techniques, with little emphasis on farmer participation. In the last year, due, in part, to a new approach on the part of the FAO in general, the project has started to reorient itself to a more participatory approach.

- **BRP Mamou**

Bafing Source and Bale are the two watersheds included in the BRP Mamou project. Bafing Source is characterized by dense population and is physically representative of the southeastern Fouta. Overgrazing and population pressures are major causes of land degradation. Bale, on the other hand, has a lower population density and is more representative of the transition between the Fouta Djallon and Upper Guinea. Uncontrolled fires are a major problem in this area.

The two projects are managed from Mamou and financed by FAC. They have had a somewhat different approach than that of BRP Pita with the same major objectives. These projects have taken a more integrated and participatory approach to watershed protection and development.

The Rural Development Project (PDR), based in Labé, is financed by UNDP and implemented by FAO. It covers four prefectures: Mamou, Labé, Pita, and Dalaba. It is the largest project in the region. This project covers a wide variety of small interventions, including agriculture, credit, extension, women's programs, small enterprise, and others. In essence, it is a big project composed of small projects.

A number of NGOs are operating in the natural resources sector in Guinea. Among them South-Southwest Rural Exchange (ESSOR), a French NGO; European Development Volunteers (VED), a loose coalition of European volunteers; Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI), a Canadian NGO; and the Guinean Union of Development Volunteers (UGVD) are involved in natural resources work from living fences to gardening. Most have been in operation less than four years.

NGO activities often started with institutional and organizational issues such as organizing farmers into farming groups to give them access to credit and inputs. These types of activities addressed farmers' needs for quick returns and helped establish the NGO in the community. Most NGOs had not yet moved beyond these activities, although many had planned to begin other natural resource activities soon.

The Dalaba Pilot Center for Horticultural Activity (CEPAM) is financed by FAO/UNDP to enhance vegetable production in a valley fed by a dam constructed with Saudi Arabian and German financing. It has organized farmers into a group and provided technical assistance in vegetable production. A truck assured transport to the Conakry market. The project is expanding to include testing of new imported fruit varieties under a Belgian regional project.

The Project for Production Initiatives and Advancement of Peasant Organizations in the South-East watershed of the Fouta Djallon is a UNDP/UNCDF project that took over three plains that had been improved either by the National Service for Development of Water Points (SNAPE) or DNGR. Since the users had never been involved in the SNAPE actions, the land was never exploited to its potential.

The project took over the Soumbalako Plain (Mamou), the Douka Plain (Tougué) and the Ditinn Plain in Dalaba. Rice, vegetables, and maize are the principal crops that are being promoted. The project has a credit function and an engineering component.

## **4.4 Human Resources and Education in Guinea**

### **4.4.1 Introduction**

All Guineans are traditionally educated within their families and communities to prepare them for adult roles in these levels of society. The purpose of formal school education is to teach people the necessary skills for the modern occupations required to develop a national society. Prior to 1984, the First Regime had "revolutionized" education in Guinea, adopting eight national languages as the media of instruction and heavily politicizing the curriculum. Students were required to perform manual productive labor beginning in primary schools and continuing throughout. Technical schools and research institutes proliferated in response to ideological aspirations, but they lacked financial, administrative, and managerial support necessary for their operation. Throughout the system, equipment was lacking, the quality of instruction was very low, and consequently, people who finished any level of schooling had acquired poor skills. One result of this is the 70 percent illiteracy rate for all Guineans, although the rate for women is closer to 85 percent.

The adoption of the PREF by the Second Republic is a necessary first step toward redressing conditions created during the Touré regime. The government has depended on donors for financial support and technical assistance in conceptualizing and implementing policy reform. Inefficiencies within the Guinean government have created bottlenecks to development assistance that are, in large part, the result of uniformly low educational and poor skill levels among civil servants. The problem also exists in the private sector, where development efforts have conflicted with human constraints caused by a lack of appropriate education and training for "modern" business. Guinea desperately needs people in both the public and private sectors with the appropriate knowledge and skills to expand upon the progress already made toward a liberal competitive market in a democratic society. In response to this immediate need, USAID has been a leader among donors in setting up a system to train Guineans for specific skills in-country, in other African countries, or in the U.S. as part of the regional Human Resource Development Assistance Program. The first part of this section is a discussion and analysis of this program.

This program meets many of the immediate needs for those adult workers developing the foundation for Guinea's future. It is imperative that the educational system that is responsible for preparing future generations for positions in a modern society give them the necessary skills they will need. The Educational Sector Reform Project is a coordinated effort led by the World Bank that includes USAID to expand and improve access to primary education throughout rural Guinea, with a focus on increasing female enrollments. This is an essential

step that has long-term significance for the country. For example, the knowledge and basic reading and numeracy skills acquired in primary school that are lacking throughout Guinea are major constraints that impact on health and family planning, democratization and local governance. A discussion and analysis of this program forms the second part of this section.

#### **4.4.2 Human Resource Development Assistance (HRDA)**

The Human Resource Development Assistance Project is a follow-up to the African Manpower Development Project (1976 to 1987) that provided training for 3,168 Africans. HRDA was designed to increase in-country and third-country training in order to reduce unit training costs and train more people. It was thought that this would provide more appropriate training opportunities for the private sector and women. Women were targeted because they represent half or more of the labor force and the bulk in the private sector are micro- to medium-sized entrepreneurs in African countries.

The stated goal of the project is to strengthen the capability of African development institutions and private sector entities to promote economic growth, where lack of adequately trained people is identified as a primary constraint. Institutions include governmental ministries and departments, research institutions, and private training institutions. The purpose of the project is to stimulate, facilitate, and support national and regional training programs that will provide qualified technical and managerial personnel and policy planners to strengthen African development institutions, enhance the growth of the private sector, and increase the participation of women in development. The plan stated that human resource and institutional development activities should be linked to development goals of the host country and the USAID mission.

The project has a strong WID component. Its targeted output is for 35 percent of the participants to be women and 50 percent of the participants to be working directly with the private sector. Through long- and short-term, in-country, and third-country training, the project concentrated on developing scientific, mathematical, technical, and management skills related to needs in the fields of government, education, and private enterprise. An important component of the project is building the capacity of African training institutions. The outputs of the project are to provide training for a total of 6,991 primary beneficiaries.

#### **4.4.3 USAID/Guinea Country Program Training Strategy**

USAID Guinea completed a private sector profile that focused on a needs assessment in 1988. This study found the areas that needed strengthening to achieve USAID development objectives. The goal was to increase agricultural production and trade through the implementation of structural reforms. This meant promoting private sector production and marketing, improving the efficiency of human resources, and expanding and consolidating the structural reform program. Two strategic objectives were formulated: clearing the way for a dynamic market economy through liberalization reforms and through reduced government presence; and establishing an increasingly competitive environment for the trading of agricultural commodities.

The mission found similar training needs for the ministries most closely involved with the strategic objectives: Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Economy and Finances, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation, Ministry of Admin-

istrative Reform, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Ministry of Economy and Finances, State Secretary for Decentralization, and Ministry of Information and Justice. These included basic management skills for better organization and a more business-like manner in order to communicate and work with the growing private sector; public administration skills including a clearer understanding of the decentralization and other reform processes, in addition to improving public finance and budgeting skills; an increased understanding of privatization and how growing small and medium businesses could be assisted; the necessary skills to identify and advise on developing a micro project; secretarial skills and document management; and regional planning skills. Special training needs were identified for the directors of women's centers in Guinea in how to manage their centers and market their products to become more self-sufficient and less dependent on government support. English language training was also identified as an area of special consideration.

In the private sector, the mission identified training needs in improved management and accounting skills; improved entrepreneurial skills; improved credit appraisal and management techniques for lending to small-scale enterprises; and methods for strengthening local training institutions and business promotion units.

The mission identified several constraints to public sector training. The first constraint was a lingering anti-private sector sentiment in the government, exacerbated by overloaded and inefficient government bureaucracy that frequently constrains rather than facilitates private sector development. There have been further reductions in public sector personnel since the project started, but some public sector actors persist in their anti-private sector attitudes. The mission is targeting its training on upper-level personnel in various ministries as the most cost-effective strategy to bring about changes in the public sector's attitude toward the private sector.

Another constraint of the public sector was the lack of a fully developed legal framework, including a credit policy and commercial codes, that would give investors and banks the confidence to make long-term resource commitments in Guinea. An investment code has been established, a constitution ratified, and a number of important business codes established. The implementation of these codes remains as well as the establishment of structures to resolve business conflicts or enforce contracts. A continued constraint on long-term industrial and other capital investments in Guinea is the deficiency of technically skilled people necessary to make these businesses viable.

The mission also identified the paucity of data and analyses on the agricultural sector, especially on agricultural production systems and marketing. The agricultural and marketing sector analyses shows that progress has certainly been made in this area, although there is still much to be done. These data are essential for sector and project planning and project evaluation.

The constraints identified for the private sector focused on Guinea's limited pool of experienced entrepreneurs, although there appeared to be little shortage of entrepreneurial spirit. The needs focused on the core nature of private enterprise and business management with a focus on marketing and technical skills. ”

The mission submitted a survey of local and regional training resources in the first country training strategy paper. The local institutions that would work most closely with the Mission include the National Center for Management Improvement (CNPG); the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) of Guinea, an NGO that provides training to disadvantaged Guinean youths in carpentry, masonry, secretarial skills, and basic business management; and the Center for Administrative Improvement (CPA). A number of third country training centers were identified in Ivory Coast, Dakar, and Burkina Faso.

### **Project Implementation**

The 1991 Country Training Plan notes that, at the outset of the project, the kinds of training programs selected for funding under the plan were made by the Training Office of USAID, due to the expertise available in that office. The rationale behind the choices comes from the three training needs assessments studies alluded to earlier, and from updates from the two GOG participant selection committees.

The public and private sector training committees that have formed are essential elements to project implementation. The director of CPA has been designated to head the public sector committee, which includes representatives from the personnel and training departments of all the ministries concerned. The private sector committee is presently headed by a member from the Chamber of Commerce (who will resign and, in all likelihood, be replaced by a current female member), and includes representatives from two women's NGOs, representatives from OIC, CNPIP, the banks, and private sector promotion organizations. The committees are responsible for updating and prioritizing training needs assessments, preselecting candidates for training, and, to a lesser extent, evaluating the results of the training experiences. Candidates from the public sector have generally been people who have demonstrated competence in a priority need area or stand an opportunity for promotion. In the private sector, the mass media is used to announce the program's objectives to the population, and anyone can apply. All candidates preselected by the committees for training have their applications submitted for review to the USAID training office where an interview with the candidate is held. Trainee input is an important element for evaluating the effectiveness of the training program. Prior to attending the training program, trainees are asked to complete a questionnaire that elicits their responses to questions about the selection process and what they hope to learn from the program. Upon their return, trainees are asked to complete a questionnaire that elicits responses about their experiences, what they learned, and how they hope to utilize what they learned. Later on, the trainees have a meeting that includes his/her supervisor and the director of the USAID training office. The purpose of this type meeting is to sensitize the supervisor about the utility of the training, and seek support for its implementation. It should be noted that for logistical reasons, this follow-up is limited for the most part to the more structured public sector jobs. Another questionnaire that elicits responses about how trainees have implemented what they learned, difficulties encountered, and what they plan to do in the future is administered about three to six months after returning to their job sites.

Flexibility has been programmed into the training plans for each year. For example, in 1990, an option to change training locations when the need arose and to structure new training programs when targets of training opportunities materialized was built in. In 1991, \$50,000 in budget was set aside to finance training activities which fall outside of private and public sector assessment needs, but nevertheless relate to overall strategic objectives of the Mission.

This might include training for export promotion centers and training for the Rural Roads project in order to make certain the project is not delayed due to the lack of a critical quantity of trained manpower.

The FY 1991 Plan calls for approximately 333 Guineans to be trained for the public sector of whom 156 (46 percent) will be women. Training will focus on: improving the management, planning, programming, and budgeting skills of personnel in the technical ministries and providing specialized courses in public administration for high-ranking government officials, such as Ministers and Secretary Generals in addition to providing training for their secretaries in order to enhance overall office performance. Other training target areas include improving the management skills of female entrepreneurs and managers; introducing concepts involved in marketing agricultural products for export; and introducing selected journalists and magistrates to the democratization process through special study tours.

### **Program Impact**

To date, a total of 1,678 Guineans have been trained at a total cost of \$3,136,000. This represents one of the highest training outputs among the 24 African countries participating in the project. Of that total, 896 were men and 782 women. Public sector trainees totaled 774, of whom 152 were women. The total cost of public sector training was \$2,214,567. Private sector trainees totaled 904, of whom 630 were women. Total private sector training equalled \$921,004. In 1991, there will be a total of 760 trainees: 334 in the public sector with 153 women, and 336 in the private sector with 236 women.

A preliminary analysis of questionnaires indicates the private sector has been quicker at accepting and absorbing new ideas presented to it than the public sector. There is little evidence that the program has met the objective of increasing dialogue regarding the constraints on market performance and expansion between concerned public and private sector actors. This may be partly due to the present structure of the program in which public and private selection committees and training programs are, for the most part, separate because of the different mix of training needs. For example, exploring some means to bring together representatives of the public and private sector in a seminar for trainee candidates and another for trainee graduates, represents an initial step in this direction to promote dialogue about common constraints and identification of possible solutions.

This program has been very successful as one step toward meeting immediate training needs and building up the capacity of selected public and private institutions to do specialized training. The program has also successfully responded to the special training needs of women in a variety of roles, such as clerks and secretaries, and private entrepreneurs. The successful training in specific skills for actors who can make relatively rapid progress on several fronts crucial to Guinean development is laudable. However, it should be emphasized that in the long run, future generations of Guineans will require access to quality higher education in Guinea where they can learn the appropriate skills they need. This represents a costly, long-term effort beyond the capabilities of any one donor currently working in Guinea. Coordinated efforts on the parts of all interested parties can lead to improvements in this area.

One recommendation made in the 1991 Country Training Plan was for USAID and GOG to consider establishing a coordinating mechanism through either the UNDP or the World Bank

in order to maximize training strategies and programs among donors. This requires a sensible division of labor; in this way, different segments of Guinean society can be targeted for training toward a common set of objectives. The basic education program, discussed in the second part of this section, demonstrates that such a coordinated effort can be made. This section concludes with a brief description of previous donor efforts in training.

#### **4.4.4 Donor Involvement in Human Resource Development**

Between 1975 and 1988, USAID/Guinea sent more than 100 participants to U.S. and third countries for training. Three hundred participants were trained in 20 seminars and workshops in-country. As of this writing, 27 participants were under AMDP pursuing advanced degrees and 29 participants were involved in short- or medium-term training—26 of these in the U.S. The World Bank supports 20 percent to 30 percent of CNPG training activities. UNICEF involved in training health ministry personnel and community health committee members. UNDP is administering competency test and financing workshop to retrain personnel managers. France is heavily involved with education sector, and technical assistance at all levels. Donors' training programs followed USAID's thrust to emphasize third country and in-country training. The donor community is contributing to the development of high-level manpower in Guinea through long-term training abroad, although the focus of attention is on raising immediately usable skill levels through locally structured training programs.

#### **4.4.5 Primary Education Reform**

World Bank calculations show that the average social rate of return on higher education is 12 percent. Primary and secondary education rates are 26 and 18 percent, respectively. The private rates of return are much higher. The World Bank has coordinated efforts with the GOG, USAID, and, to a lesser degree, FAC, in initiating an education sector reform focusing on primary education.

People's disillusionment with the First Republic's educational system has been a carry-over factor that kept primary school enrollment rates low throughout the 1980s. A lack of accessible classrooms and teaching materials as well as poorly trained and unmotivated teachers are other factors that resulted in a country-wide enrollment rate of 27.49 percent in 1989/1990. For girls, the rate was only 17.38 percent, placing Guinea among the countries with the lowest enrollment rates in the world. Although the number of enrollments in primary school has increased, the rate has been inferior to population growth. The number of enrollments at the secondary and higher levels has actually decreased. On average, 20 percent of the places in primary school and 25 percent in secondary school are taken by students repeating a grade, so that in order to produce a primary school graduate, the system must dispense the equivalent of about 16 years of instructional resources.

A reflection on the quality of instruction in schools is that in 1987, less than 50 percent of primary teachers had a primary teacher's diploma. Furthermore, the FAC administered tests that found the majority had only sixth grade level French. In higher education, 62 percent of secondary teachers had been trained only as primary teachers, and only 16 percent of university professors had a doctorate. In addition to an undertrained teaching staff, none of the regional inspectorates or prefectural directorates whose responsibilities include making school visits to check on instruction quality had a vehicle.

Educational resource distribution has been skewed for some time in favor of higher education and urban areas. The GOG recently increased recurrent revenue allocated to education to approximately 14 percent, but this remains below the regional and African averages of 21 percent. Nine out of ten dollars in the education budget are used to pay salaries, leaving an annual per-student nonsalary expenditure in primary schools at \$0.16. Higher education receives close to 25 percent of educational resources, although it only has 2 percent of the students. At the university, over 50 percent of the budget is for food and scholarship aid to students.

#### **4.4.6 Government Policy and Educational Reform**

One of the actions the government of Guinea is taking in order to increase the productivity of its labor force and improve the quality of life of its citizenry is to improve the quality of primary school education and increase the numbers of primary school age children enrolled in the system. The government has given priority to equitable access for traditionally disadvantaged groups (i.e., girls and rural children). These goals have been articulated in a National Education Policy that calls for a concerted effort to restructure, expand, and improve Guinea's educational system. The policy has been operationalized in the Educational Sector Adjustment Program (PASE), which comprises a series of administrative and policy reforms intended to lay the groundwork for subsequent expansion of enrollments and improvement in quality in the system.

For the reform program to work, the Ministry of Education will receive support from the donors on certain conditions (e.g., that they seek to improve the administrative skills and develop management capacity at all levels of the Ministry). Planning skills must be developed at all levels within a decentralized administrative framework. The goal is to expand primary education coverage by raising the admission rate to 50 percent by the year 2000 and reduce the rates of grade repetition from 24 percent to between 5 percent and 10 percent. Teaching more students will require the rehabilitation and construction of additional classrooms, but as the costs of this program are high, the administration must become very cost conscious and encourage local and private initiatives in education, such as communities assisting in classroom maintenance or providing school equipment. Teachers need retraining and reassignment to currently disadvantaged areas. New teaching techniques such as multigrade classes in rural areas and double shift schools in urban areas will be implemented to increase student coverage. Additional teaching materials will be required. This requires increased budgetary allocations to education sectors to cover these costs as well as the introduction of a computerized management system for budget and personnel.

In order to monitor such a reform program, the government has stated they have prepared a budget plan to show annual increases in educational expenditure as well as prepare annual reports. The government recently completed a baseline study at the prefecture level on indicators such as facilities, teachers, and enrollments by gender and region. They have also prepared a plan specifying targets for teacher training and redeployment and school reconstruction.

The short-term outputs expected are that approximately 35,000 new students will be enrolled in 1992, and pedagogical inputs per student will rise from \$0.16 to \$4.00. In this second year, GOG stated it will conduct a study to determine the factors involved in household deci-

sions to enroll children in primary schools and develop a plan to redress constraints at national and regional levels to the enrollment of children in rural areas and girls.

#### **4.4.7 Institutional Organization**

The structure of the formal public education system is similar to that found throughout francophone West Africa. It comprises three levels: six years of primary; seven years of secondary, divided into lower *college* (four) and upper *lycée* (three); and five years of tertiary education. Vocational and technical training schools have three-to-four-year programs at the secondary and tertiary levels.

The Ministry of National Education (MEN) is overseen by a Minister of Education. The Ministry has recently been reorganized with an agency (SEEPU) responsible for all pre-university level education in the primary, secondary, and technical/professional schools. SEEPU is headed by a female Secretary of State who has the reputation of being a liberal and dynamic person. SEEPU school administration and supervision is managed through a provincial structure of five Regional Inspectorates (IRE) for the four natural regions and Conakry. The IRE is a corps of inspectors who cover French, mathematics, physical sciences, biological sciences, history and geography, philosophy and economics, and technical and professional training. They administer and supervise through the 36 prefectural-level Directorates of Education (DPE) and 210 subprefectural Pedagogic Delegates. The effectiveness of the DPE in supervising schools, collecting and updating records, distributing school resources, and paying teacher salaries on time has been facilitated recently by the distribution of vehicles by the World Bank.

A higher education agency under the Minister oversees the two national universities (Conakry and Kankan), the Institute of Educational Sciences, the Institute of Agronomy at Faranah, and the Institute of Mining and Geology at Boké, as well as seven research centers covering oceanographics, linguistics, and science education, among other areas.

The MEN is divided into three technical departments, a general inspectorate, a department of higher education, and a department of scientific research. The support services for MEN include a division of administrative and financial affairs (DAAF), a division for information, documentation, and archives (SIDA), and a division of external relations and transportation. The services of the planning and statistics office (SSP) is shared by both higher and pre-university education agencies. SEEPU has support services similar to MEN, plus a technical cooperation and construction service, an examination service, and its own general inspectorate. Attached to SEEPU are the National Pedagogical Institute (IPN) and the National Literacy Service.

Even with reorganization, there is much divisional overlap and redundancy at the Ministerial level, leading to inefficient personnel staffing that acts as an obstacle to PASE implementation. As the Basic Education Program Paper pointed out, not all the posts in central office of DAAF of SEEPU have been filled, and many of the positions at the regional and prefectural levels need to be filled. In the IPN, there are 65 administrative staff members, 28 of whom have the title "chef" or "directeur."

The World Bank has created a Technical Secretariat (ST) to advise and assist MEN and SEEPU in the implementation of PASE. It is assisted by three committees. The steering com-

mittee, comprised of all the education office directors, meets at least once a month to plan each step of the reform. The monitoring committee, composed of members from several concerned ministries, meets at least four times per year and writes quarterly evaluation reports on PASE. An informal "honors" committee meets weekly and discusses problems within the Ministry, such as personnel roles and responsibilities, management problems, and the distribution of workloads within the Ministry. The ST is officially outside the hierarchical structure of the Ministry but has found a voice in the decision-making process.

The USAID effort in PASE implementation is focused on providing the necessary technical assistance to increase the capability and improve the performance of specific Ministry personnel, reminiscent of HRDA efforts with the public sector. Specifically, USAID will concentrate on two divisions. The monitoring and evaluation effort involves working through the Statistical and Planning Service (SSP) which collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates educational data for primary, secondary, technical, and professional level education. The DAAF will have the responsibility of developing and executing the budget, as well as tracking and reporting all aspects of the budget process. These sources of information will show whether donor conditions are being met, and identify outputs and indicators to evaluate intermediate and long-term effects of PASE. The project plan suggests using several types of data such as school-level data on amounts and types of instructional materials and equipment available; statistical data on school performance (i.e., enrollment and completion rates, and student achievement); central-level inputs on expenditures for instructional materials, teaching, and training activities; and qualitative data to complete the profile of the educational sector and determine the viability of classroom interventions.

It is expected that DAAF will be able to better manage and track education personnel at the end of the project. This is the largest branch of the public sector, employing about 23,000 people. Personnel management has been described as nonexistent as no comprehensive pay list is maintained and the personnel files are out of date. One of the dilemmas is how best to train DAAF personnel. Two interrelated problems affect this issue: the difficulty of freeing up staff for training and, as has been the case with HRDA, there is no guarantee for employment for people chosen for long-term advanced degree training outside the country upon their return. The USAID Project Paper recognized a definite need for advanced degrees.

#### **4.4.8 Primary School Education in Guinean Society**

The SSP of SEEPU recently completed a baseline study of the educational system in Guinea (SSP 1991). Following is a summary of some of their findings. In 1988-1989, there were a total of 295,801 primary school students, 31 percent of which were female students. The highest primary school enrollment rates were in Conakry (58.21 percent) and the lowest in Middle Guinea (18.32 percent). Urban areas where the population has easier access to more schools have the highest enrollment rates (40.15 percent average), while the difficult access to fewer schools in rural Guinea results in much lower rates (20.66 percent). Female enrollment averages 19.37 percent, with the lowest rate in Middle Guinea (11.89 percent), where only one girl in ten of school age enrolls in school, and the highest rate in Conakry (42.32 percent). Part of the reason for low enrollments is insufficient classroom space for students.

For each place available in a classroom, there are four children who apply for admission. The government has set a standard of 40 students per class in rural schools and 50 per class in ur-

ban schools. This means that the number of classrooms must increase by 400 percent in order to comply with standards. The distribution of applications per space available reveals the disparities in classroom distribution throughout the country. There are 29 subprefectures which have 10 students apply for each place; in four of these SIPs, between 22 and 55 school-aged children apply for each place.

Another factor that limits the space available for new enrollments is repetition. The highest rate of repetition is for the final year of primary school, leading up to the required exam which primary students must pass before going on to the *college* (seventh grade). Only 57.26 percent pass on the national level, with Middle Guinea having the highest rate (69.75 percent) and the Forest Zone having the lowest (43.79 percent). Throughout the primary system, 18.71 percent of students (1 in 5) repeat each year. The rate is 21.22 percent for girls, with the highest repetition rate in Conakry at 27.52 percent, and the lowest in Labé at 12.71 percent.

The national government bears the majority of educational costs by paying the salary of education personnel and providing teaching materials. Primary education personnel totals 8,899 people, of whom 1,052 of work in administration. The number of females in primary education include 144 (11.82 percent) in administration, and 1,817 (23 percent) of the 7,847 teachers are women, with 39.46 percent of these women teaching in Conakry. Multigrade teaching has been initiated in 20 experimental schools. By 1992, the process of reassigning teachers from secondary to primary schools will begin. No strategy for moving teachers from urban to rural schools has yet been devised.

In an effort to share the cost burden, the government has encouraged districts, subprefectures, parent-teacher associations (APE), and individual families to participate in the construction and maintenance of classrooms. To date, 2,341 primary schools are operation—320 urban schools and 2,021 rural schools. The majority (1,354 or 57.83 percent) have only one or two classrooms, and 96 percent of these are rural schools. The greatest concentrations of schools with only one classroom are in Middle and Upper Guinea, where enrollment rates are lowest. Only 396 (16.91 percent) schools have six or more classes; over half (52 percent) are in urban areas.

Three subprefectures have no school and one subprefecture has a school but no students. These locations are in Middle and Upper Guinea. The relationship between classrooms and enrollment is clearly demonstrated when noting that the 28 subprefectures that have enrollment rates below 5 percent also have 84 percent of their schools with only one or two classrooms. The 208 subprefectures that have enrollment rates between 6 percent and 28 percent are slightly better, with only 69 percent of schools having one or two classrooms (it was judged that 31 percent of these schools could increase enrollments through multigrade teaching). The 15 subprefectures that have enrollment rates higher than 50 percent have only 16 percent of their schools with one or two classrooms.

The conditions of the 7,416 classrooms in 2,341 primary schools varies depending on the construction material used. For example, 84 percent of all classes in Middle Guinea are cement construction compared to only 48 percent in Upper Guinea and 25 percent in the Forest. Fully one-third of existing classrooms require reconstruction. Water and sanitary facilities are largely absent; 79 percent of the 357 schools with toilets are in Conakry, as are

the 35 percent of 362 schools with latrines. Only 315 schools have running water or a well, 39 percent of which are in Conakry.

Instruction and learning in public primary schools are made difficult by several factors. Textbooks are rare, so that students depend on what they copy into their notebooks to study at home. Almost no books or written materials are present outside the school. Absenteeism runs about 18 percent on any given day, often due to illness. It has been noted that those who do attend sometimes lack energy and are given to dozing in class, due to both undernourishment and long periods of inactivity during the school day. Teaching methods in schools emphasize memorization and recitation, very similar to the manner in which Muslim children are taught in Koranic schools.

#### **4.4.9 Donor Involvement in Educational Sector Reform**

The World Bank identified inadequate recurrent cost financing for nonsalary expenditures for primary schools as a key problem in the Guinean education system. The Bank has been instrumental in the concerted donor effort in educational reform. They have allocated \$20 million toward education sector reform over a three-year period, following previous programs in vocational and technical training, and educational planning and school construction. This education reform in the long run should complement other aspects of the structural adjustment program. In the short run, improving the administration and efficiency of the largest public sector ministry is consistent with efforts made to improve and streamline the civil service.

USAID's education sector reform program consists of an allocation of \$22.3 million in the form of cash disbursements, provided the government meets conditionalities. These include allocating adequate funding for teaching materials and other operating expenditures; assuming an increasing share of recurrent costs associated with PASE until donor support ends (1996); and training and redeploying staff and redistributing resources within the educational system to encourage more equal access to schooling throughout the country, especially for girls and children in rural areas. USAID will provide technical assistance to the government necessary to produce the required improvements in the administrative and financial management of the Guinean educational system to make the PASE successful.

The basic education and HRDA programs together represent a significant WID initiative on the part of USAID. The short-term beneficiaries will be the civil servants of the DAAF and SEEPU. The logical progression is that as a result of DAAF's improved work performance, primary school personnel and parents will also benefit, and in the long run, the educational reforms will benefit all school-aged children and result in more girls entering school.

The other major component of educational reform is the actions taken by the French government working steadily with the Ministry of Education to develop pedagogic materials, improve the curriculum, and institute teacher training. The French have been working in this sector since French language was reinstated as the language of instruction in 1984/1985. The French are cooperating more closely with other donors and will provide \$12 million during this same period in continued technical assistance to improve the quality and content of education. They have a long-term plan to strengthen the inspectorate since this service evaluates and monitors the actual teaching in classrooms and oversees the collection of statistics and preparation of reports in the interior.

The Soviet Union has supplied the university in Conakry with large numbers of professors in the physical sciences, math, engineering, and mechanics since the 1960s. The number of Soviet professors at the University has decreased since 1984 to about 100 in 1991.

UNICEF has developed materials for a pilot Child to Child Health Education Program in ten primary schools, two Koranic schools, and five scout groups. UNFPA and UNESCO have developed educational materials about population issues which are being implemented in pilot elementary and secondary schools.

## **4.5 Health and Population**

### **4.5.1 Introduction**

The World Bank and USAID conducted Guinea health sector analyses in 1984 and found a dilapidated system with a crumbling and underequipped infrastructure staffed by under-trained and largely unmotivated health personnel struggling to survive on the lowest salaries in West Africa. As a result, the health status of the population was dismal compared to neighboring countries. Guinea had the lowest life expectancy in the area (39 years) caused by high mortality rates for all age groups, particularly infants. The vehement pronatalist policies of the government grew out of an intense nationalistic ideology that had played a major role in causing the stagnation and subsequent decline in living standards for the majority of Guineans.

The government that formed the Second Republic was much more receptive to working with international donors and bilateral organizations to redress the condition of the country's human resources. Consequently, these collaborative efforts over the past seven years have resulted in measured progress by rebuilding and refurbishing basic infrastructure and upgrading the technical expertise of health personnel. This section describes the curative and preventive health services available to the Guinean population through the public, private, and traditional medical systems. The interrelations between these systems are discussed when appropriate. Population issues which cross-cut several areas of health concern are discussed throughout, with a special section of discussion for the family planning program. Another section describes briefly the areas in which different donors and nongovernmental organizations work.

### **4.5.2 Current Health Status of Guineans**

Life expectancy rates in the different regions of Guinea vary as a function of mortality rates. Maritime Guinea has the country's lowest mortality rate 17.4/1,000 since the population has greater access to public and private medical services as well as generally higher levels of education. Upper Guinea has the highest mortality rate at 24/1,000. Males have a higher mortality rate than females (20/1,000 compared to 17/1,000) and rural areas have twice the mortality rate as urban areas (22/1,000 compared to 9/1,000). Infant mortality rates mirror the general mortality rates, being lowest in Maritime Guinea and highest in Upper Guinea. As a result, life expectancy is 47 years in Maritime Guinea (59 years in Conakry), but only 38 years in Upper Guinea. As a whole, the average Guinean life expectancy in 1990 was 47 years.

The leading causes of morbidity in Guinea are malaria, respiratory diseases, and skin infections that account for 73.5 percent of reported illness episodes. Concern exists over the resurgence of chloroquine-resistant malaria in the country. It is estimated that adults suffer from two malaria episodes/year while children under five years of age have five to seven episodes/year. Childhood disease patterns are slightly different from the general population. Diarrheal diseases account for 15 percent of the illnesses for the under-five age group, and each child is estimated to suffer from six to eight episodes/year. Factors that contribute to diarrheal diseases are poor hygiene, unsanitary environment, and contaminated water supplies.

The predominant communicable diseases that cause deaths among the under-five population are measles, whooping cough, and diarrhea. Concern is growing about the purported increase in sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) such as gonorrhea and syphilis among adolescents and adults. The first diagnosed case of AIDS was in 1986. Although the incidence of AIDS infection and disease are estimated to be low, actions to increase public awareness about the disease have begun.

It is estimated that a woman will have an average of six children during her lifetime. In rural areas, the 20 to 24 year age group has the highest birth rates, while in the urban areas, the age group is slightly older (25 to 29 years) reflecting the later age at which urban women marry. Birth rates are generally higher in rural areas than in urban areas. The highest birth rates are in Upper Guinea (where the highest infant mortality rate is recorded) and it is lowest in the Forest area. Using the crude birth rate, crude death rate, and net migration rate to figure population growth rate, the growth rate is presently 2.4 percent per year; by the year 2000 to 2005, it is estimated to be 2.58 percent per year; and by the year 2020 to 2025, it will diminish to 1.81 percent per year.

One factor that affects fertility trends and nutritional status is education. Little detailed data exists in Guinea, but one KAP (knowledge, attitudes, and practices) survey found that people with only Koranic education expected to have up to 10 children. Those with primary school education expected 7, and professional or high school educated people expected 5. Similarly, the preliminary results from the Cornell University nutrition study showed that chronic child malnutrition decreases in households where one or both parents have progressively higher levels of education, particularly for the completion of secondary education. While levels of chronic malnutrition among urban children are low, nearly 45 percent of the children in the study were malnourished with little difference between boys and girls. Among adults, men are three times as likely to be underweight to the point where it is a health risk than women.

#### **4.5.3 Government of Guinea Health Policy**

The government's policy objectives are to reduce the total mortality rate of Guineans, paying particular attention to infant and maternal mortality rates, and to reduce and control the morbidity of principal communicable diseases. Guinea is an Alma-Ata signator and promoter of Primary Health Care (PHC) and is the leader in francophone Africa on implementing the 1987 Bamako initiative. The government espouses the goal to achieve health for all by the year 2000.

The Guinean government has elaborated the following objectives to implement its health policy:

- prioritize preventive medicine over curative care;
- increase people's access to health care throughout the country;
- integrate an appropriate system of primary health care in conjunction with the rehabilitation of health care facilities;
- strengthen the curative health care infrastructure;
- improve the efficiency of clinical and non-clinical personnel in all areas of health care, particularly management;
- supply essential drugs to health facilities;
- promote primary health care by encouraging local active participation in the health sector in which people receive education about nutritional and communicable diseases and access to potable water supplies and immunizations;
- explore the means to integrate traditional medicine into the health system; and
- integrate family planning education and services into Maternal Child Health (MCH) and Primary Health Care activities.

To determine its progress in achieving its policy objectives, the government has set for itself the following goals:

- construct an appropriate health infrastructure that serves 600 to 1,000 individuals;
- provide preventive and post-partum care to mothers and their children with essential drugs;
- provide anti-malaria chemoprophylaxis to 80 percent of mothers;
- supervise pregnancies by a minimum of three prenatal visits (to ensure tetanus protection) to 80 percent of pregnant women;
- provide adequate protection from childhood diseases by immunization to 80 percent of infants under one year;
- ensure growth monitoring for 60 percent of children between 0 and 5 years;
- provide oral rehydration therapy (ORT) for infants 0 to 5 years with diarrheal episodes;
- provide systematic anti-malaria chemoprophylaxis to children with fever; and
- provide antibiotic therapy for 60 percent of children with infection.

#### **4.5.4 Guinea's Health Delivery System**

##### **Organization of the Health Ministry**

The Ministry of Public Health and Population (MPHP) is divided into three departments, the Department of Administration and Finance; the Department of Studies, Research, Planning, and Training; and the Department of Health. The National Department of Health is made up of seven technical divisions, each responsible for particular sets of activities in the delivery

of national health services. These are the division of health promotion (three sections); the division of hospital care (three sections); the division of bio-pharmacy (two sections); the division of preventive health care (four sections); the division of food and nutrition (three sections); the division of infrastructure, equipment, and maintenance (three sections); and the division of traditional medicine (three sections). The Ministry certainly faces future reorganization as attempts to improve the implementation and management of the interventions to help the government achieve its health goals progresses.

### **Organization of Public Health Services**

The Public Health System is organized in such a way that integrated levels of health care facilities provide curative and preventive health services to the population. At each level, a person is designated with the title and responsibility to supervise and/or coordinate a set of health activities. Aside from the heads and staffs of the Conakry-based departments and divisions discussed above, the levels are territorially organized. There are four regional headquarters with regional inspectors coordinating activities of the regional and prefectural hospitals with the prefectural health inspectors. The 36 prefectural health inspectors are responsible for coordinating the health activities and collecting information about these activities in their sub-prefectures. Each prefectural hospital has a director in charge of ensuring the smooth running of the hospital. In the health centers, a chief of post works with the staff to implement the Primary Health Care program, refer serious health cases to hospitals, train and supervise village health agents, and keep statistical records, sending them regularly to the prefectural health inspector.

The curative health infrastructure consists of two university teaching hospitals in Conakry (there are two mining company hospitals at Fria and Kamsar), and four regional and 29 prefecture hospitals throughout the country. The four regional hospitals have a larger staff than the prefectural hospitals and serve populations of over one million inhabitants. The 29 prefectural hospitals serve populations of approximately 100,000 to 300,000 inhabitants. The USAID health sector evaluation stated that the quality of health care is about the same in all hospitals since they are all poorly equipped and, in most cases, their physical facilities are dilapidated. There are a total of 3,500 hospital beds in the country equal to 1,683 persons/bed. However, 35 percent of the hospital beds are located in Conakry facilities where, along with private health facilities, the ratio is 470 persons/bed.

The majority of Guineans (70 percent) live in rural areas where it is planned that 346 health centers will provide them with preventive and curative health care as outlined by the National Health Program. Presently, 173 health centers are operational, while the population has constructed 340 health posts that eventually will provide preventive care as local people are trained to work with health center personnel.

### **National Health Care Program and Health Center Operation**

The National Health Program is essentially a program integrating the Primary Health Care (PHC), Expanded Program for Immunization (EPI), and Essential Drugs (ED) programs. There is also a Maternal-Child Health and Family Planning program (MCH-FP). The program reflects the government's policy favoring the Bamako Initiative.

There is approximately one health center for each subprefecture, and since 1986, UNICEF and USAID's CCCD project, in collaboration with the GOG and other donors, has led the way in making these centers the focus of Guinea's effort to implement the Bamako Initiative as an integral part of national health policy and the organization of the medical system. As a result, there has been marked improvement in curative and preventive health education and services for the 178 health centers that have been set up on a system whereby the following occurs:

- renovation of the center and installation of necessary equipment;
- medical personnel receive intensive technical and management training to ensure the efficient running of all services; and
- formation of a village health committee that is actively involved in health center management and accountability procedures, information/education campaigns, and social mobilization as well as the bi-annual evaluations in which problem areas are identified and strategies developed to resolve the identified problems.

Rural health centers have an average of 6 personnel, and urban health centers between 8 and 12 people. The chief of the center provides outpatient consultation and, with her/his assistant, is responsible for accounting procedures. There is also someone in charge of prenatal consultation and infant monitoring, vaccination, and the sale of drugs from an essential drug kit of 30 medicines. The essential drug kit will soon be enlarged to include a range of contraceptives as the family planning component becomes an integral part of pre- and post-natal consultations for the center's clients. The medicines are sold at an affordable price which enables the center to restock its supplies as well as contribute to some of the center's operating costs.

It is estimated that each center serves between 10,000 and 15,000 people within a 5 km radius of its location, although some evaluations state that only 50 percent coverage is achieved by any center. In order to extend coverage to villages that are further away, a program to train and work with traditional birth attendants (TBA) is underway. Presently, selected centers have been authorized to train five TBAs recommended by people living in the largest villages in the 5 km to 15 km radius from the health center. These women are trained, given some equipment to help with deliveries, and become part of the mobilization effort to promote infant vaccination campaigns in the outlying areas from the health centers at regular intervals.

The government plans to have 346 fully functioning health centers in the future. Between 1988 and 1990, approximately 25 health centers were opened each year. At this rate, all centers should be functioning by 1997.

## **Health Programs**

### *Control of Endemic Diseases*

A national program to control leprosy includes 22 medical specialists with a support staff of nearly 200 people. They have offices in Boké, Kindia, Faranah, and Kankan. There are three NGOs working in this area in the Forest Region, where the incidence apparently is highest. An association formed to assist efforts in the fight endemic tuberculosis operates, and the onchocercosis control campaign has had some success in the hyper-endemic areas of Upper and

Middle Guinea. Other endemic disease programs include intestinal and genito-urinal schistosomiasis, cholera, and typhoid monitoring. Yellow fever and meningococcal meningitis are recognized as constant epidemic threats, especially in the north.

#### *Water and Sanitation Programs*

There is no well-defined policy for water and sanitation. One of two Guineans depends on surface water for their needs, and one-third depends on well water. Having access to a sufficient quantity of water is a problem for many people in Middle and Upper Guinea: access to good quality water is a problem for everyone. The National Service for the Improvement of Water Sources (SNAPE) operates throughout the country and has provided 744 water points to the population. The estimated coverage is about 40 percent for water supply and between 54 percent and 70 percent for sanitation in urban areas. In rural areas, 20 percent has been the estimated coverage showing an increase of 8 percent in a three-year period. The sanitation situation in rural areas is estimated at 1 percent coverage, despite a latrine construction project between 1983 and 1990 that proposed as a goal the construction of 190,000 latrines (no evaluation of this project available).

#### *Mother and Child Programs*

The Maternal Child Health Office was created in 1975, under the former Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Family planning is one of the components of MCH programs, but will be discussed separately. Among the other major components are the expanded immunization programs carried out during pre- and post-natal consultations. The USAID-sponsored CCCD project led the way in childhood vaccination, and latest estimates are 35 percent coverage in Primary Health Care project areas. CCCD and UNICEF promoted increasing childhood survival through the use of Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) to treat the estimated 8.5 million annual cases of diarrhea/year in Guinea. Another component of child survival is malaria prophylaxis and treatment for the estimated 7.3 million cases of malaria each year that require 44 million packets of chloroquine syrup for treatment. To reiterate, the MCH-FP and EPI-PHC-ED are the major components of the government's health policy to reduce mother-child morbidity and mortality.

Nutritional education is supposed to be an aspect of postnatal care for infants. There is an Institute of Nutrition and Child Health at Donka hospital in Conakry. The highest incidence of goiter in rural areas is in Middle Guinea, where one study has documented prevalence between 65 percent and 73 percent in villages around Labé. Attempts are underway to integrate goiter and the leprosy program mentioned above into the National Health Program and operationalized at all health centers.

#### *Family Planning and Population*

The First Republic of Guinea was decidedly pronatalist. UNFPA conducted a population assessment in the early 1980s and began a health project in 1983 that aimed to reduce childhood mortality. By 1987, there was a center in Coronthie for MCH-Family Planning and a staff of 38 doctors and 26 paramedicals had been trained outside the country in public health, birth spacing techniques, gynecology, and management.

The second three-year phase of the project began in 1988 within a political climate much more favorable to family planning. The objectives of this phase were to provide training for 20 doctors, 75 midwives, and/or 250 traditional birth attendants, who would provide MCH and family planning materials in health centers and maternities. Contraceptives were provided to selected health centers to increase their utilization rate. An effort to improve Management of Information Systems (MIS) was planned for primary health care centers to collect reproductive health information, and two studies were planned—one on sexuality of youth and the other about the low fertility rate in areas of the Forest Region. The evaluation of this phase in March 1991 showed disappointing results. Only 8 doctors, 55 midwives, and 152 birth attendants had been trained, and there was inadequate contraceptive distribution. Modern contraceptive users numbered 4,525 (53 percent of the goal) in Conakry and 1,792 (36 percent of the goal) in prefectural cities. It was judged that the MIS had been ineffectively implemented, and the team recommended to limit the project area to 19 health centers (9 in Conakry and 10 in Guinea Maritime) and 8 maternities. UNFPA had a team of consultants in-country in May 1991 to help elaborate the third phase of the project.

After the Second Republic began in 1984, with its more liberal political climate, the International Planned Parenthood Foundation became associated with a group of Guinean professionals concerned by issues such as the reduction of birth spacing, and increases in adolescent pregnancies outside of marriage, unwanted pregnancies and clandestine abortions, and black-marketing of contraceptives. They formed a national NGO, the Guinean Family Welfare Association (AGBEF), that was formally recognized by the government in 1985 and became operational in 1986. This NGO has collaborated with all donors and international NGOs interested in family planning issues. The group has established its expertise and credibility in the areas of informing and educating (IEC) the general public about the advantages of family planning and birth spacing so that both mother and child will be healthier. For example, in December 1990, AGBEF organized a meeting for religious leaders in Labé who declared their support for family planning and, furthermore, stated that a number of perceived religious taboos were unjustified, including use of modern contraceptives. AGBEF has also become the principal trainer for family planning services and technologies for other organizations working in the health field.

AGBEF has grown into an NGO with a \$200,000 annual budget and 29 employees working in four model clinics in different regions of the country delivering family planning services and contraceptives. AGBEF projects involve integration of family planning and provision of contraceptives through health centers in rural areas, accompanied by IEC campaigns. However, similar to the Guinean Public Health Sector, AGBEF is dependent on external funding. Population Services International (PSI) has noted that AGBEF experiences cash flow problems and its personnel are spread very thinly over the country making supervision difficult.

The government would like to reduce fertility rates indirectly through increasing resources available for family planning activities. PSI has developed a project plan that USAID will fund that calls for close collaboration with organizations already working in family planning. This project is designed to overcome a number of constraints to family and population planning, such as gathering more accurate FP service data, improve the circulation of FP information between top levels and fieldworkers, upgrade and improve storage and delivery systems for contraceptives and create/establish easily accessible outlets. Additionally, the project is a

logical extension of PSI's ongoing condom distribution program to help prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STD) such as AIDS. Contraceptive use to date is less than 2 percent nationwide, and according to the numbers of contraceptives distributed by MCH-FP clinics between 1988 and 1989, the preference is for female contraceptives. Out of a total of 28,676 contraceptives distributed, oral contraceptives accounted for 50 percent, condoms for 30 percent, spermicide for 10 percent, and injections for 7.5 percent.

### *STDs and AIDS*

Guinean awareness of and knowledge about AIDS is almost nonexistent. As stated earlier, the use of contraceptives and, in particular, condoms, as a mechanism for the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases including AIDS is largely unknown. Condom use has been largely to avoid unwanted pregnancies. The Ministry of Public Health and Population would like to integrate its HIV/AIDS activities with a stronger program for identification, treatment, and control of other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), especially gonorrhea and syphilis. The latter diseases are believed to be prevalent in Conakry.

AIDS was first diagnosed in Guinea in April 1986. That year, studies conducted in Conakry (431 patients) and Labé (900 subjects) found 0.8 percent HIV prevalence. Both viruses were found, HIV1 was more prevalent among those who were symptomatic; HIV2 was more prevalent among those who tested seropositive but were not symptomatic. HIV testing facilities in the country remain inadequate. Another study of 3,855 blood donors in Conakry, Fria, and Kamsar found a prevalence of 0.44 percent. Between April 1986 and March 1989, a total of 52 cases were diagnosed. The predominant risk factor was heterosexual contact (81 percent), and 86 percent of the cases were male. The number of AIDS cases is relatively low compared to other African countries—they have been diagnosed at a rate of five/month. The WHO estimate that every person diagnosed with AIDS is equal to 50 to 100 people infected with HIV, and the fact that seropositivity rates are increasing in Conakry is cause for action.

Population Services International has been actively promoting a condom and AIDS prevention education campaign in collaboration with the Committee for the Campaign Against Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS financed by WHO. The committee consists of a three-person unit led by a pharmacist in the Health Promotion Division, which has close collaboration with PSI, in the Ministry of Health. All three committee members have had an AIDSTECH counseling course, and the majority of their activities are educational. PSI, in collaboration with the committee, has held a series of inexpensive seminars for leaders and professional groups in urban areas to "personalize" AIDS information, answer questions, and distribute condoms. USAID has donated 400,000 condoms for distribution. According to one estimate, a total of 93 million condoms would be required annually to protect approximately 930,000 sexually active males in Guinea.

HIV testing facilities are still inadequate. The EEC has provided US \$638,800 for laboratory operations and the French have provided Eliza kits. The Guinea AIDS prevention committee plans to emphasize an approach in which STD consultations can be used as an opportunity for transmitting family planning information to the afflicted person and their partner.

### **Access to Health Services**

The medical/health system is concentrated in Conakry where one-third of all medical staff live and work. The public health service employs 702 doctors (45 percent work in Conakry), 351 midwives (64 percent work in Conakry), and 5,592 paramedical staff (25 percent work in Conakry).

PharmaGuinea has had a monopoly on production, importation, warehousing, and distribution of pharmaceuticals through state-operated pharmacies from (1959 to 1984). Drugs and medicines provided to health centers and hospitals are based on prior inventories rather than on a system of actual usage rates. PharmaGuinea, which is being restructured and reconstructed by the African Development Bank, may be operational in 1992 to provide drugs to the public and private health sectors. Essential drug distribution is managed separately. UNICEF currently procures essential drug kits directly from its Copenhagen warehouse, in order to supply health centers under the National Health Program, but in the long run, PharmaGuinea is expected to take over this operation.

SOGIP is a newly privatized drug manufacturing concern with significant potential to manufacture drugs and reduce prices for the general public. PSI currently rents warehouse and packaging facilities from SOGIP for its condom social marketing/AIDS prevention program.

The majority of private sector health specialists and services, such as pharmacists (58 percent) and dentists (54 percent), are also in Conakry. Private pharmacies are found in all major urban areas, and, in 1988, reported a total sales of 5.5 billion Guinean Francs, which equals 982 GF/person/year for pharmaceuticals. Pharmacies import their "name brand" products from France and other European countries, then sell them at premium prices. The price of medicine is relatively high compared to per capita incomes.

In 1989, there were 272 private practice- and health-related businesses in operation. Medical and dental accounted for 53, 58 were nursing and obstetrics, 5 were bio-medical laboratories, 130 were pharmacies (with 65 in Conakry) served by four private pharmaceutical wholesalers, and 28 were other drug companies. Two private clinics were visited by the 1990 USAID health sector assessment team. The medical-surgical clinic in Sanoya operates near 100 percent capacity and caters primarily to wealthier clientele, with outpatient costs ranging between 8,000 GF and 15,000 GF per visit and hospitalization between 15,000 GF and 30,000 GF per day. The obstetrics and gynecology clinic in Donka was primarily outpatient that served the wealthier segment of the urban population.

The informal or parallel health sector provides a wide variety of medicines at more affordable prices to a large sector of the population. The commercial value of medicines sold in this manner is unknown, but in all probability, is significant. At every weekly market in the rural areas, there is at least one individual who acts as both doctor and pharmacist (i.e., diagnosing people's ailments, prescribing, and, in the case of injections, administering medicines from his/her stock). In some cases, these individuals are retired from the public health sector and are well-known in the areas in which they work, so public confidence in their services is high. By providing services at the weekly market, they give the large numbers of people who attend easy access at a time when the local health center may close relatively early due to the

“holiday” environment associated with weekly markets and the need for health center personnel to make their purchases early.

The major problems with this informal health sector are primarily technical having to do with the proper storage and conservation of medicines as well as the possibility of inappropriate diagnosis of illness and prescriptions. It would be helpful to know more about how this sector functions (e.g., where they obtain medicines, relations with the public health sector, revenues).

WHO has financed a survey of traditional medical practitioners in 16 prefectures, and studies of traditional therapeutic techniques in 3 prefectures. Traditional medicine has many different connotations; for example, in nearly every village there is an elder woman who helps deliver children and who represents a resource for community participation in the government's Primary Health Care program.

Another important segment of the population that the government should try to work with are those individuals who perform circumcision/excision operations as part of local initiations (e.g., to take proper steps to avoid or treat tetanus, AIDS, or other infection). Herbalists provide treatment for diarrhea, jaundice, fever, and other common ailments from locally available materials. It is common for spiritual specialists to treat a wide variety of illnesses whose cause is perceived as having a spiritual component, such as sorcery, ancestral sanctions, or witchcraft. These illnesses manifest themselves psychosomatically and people are often reported to have gone “crazy.” In many rural areas, although modern medicines are greatly appreciated for providing relief from various symptoms, these specialists are called upon to determine the “real” cause and take actions to correct it. In all cases, payment for services comes in many forms, including prestige, money, and gifts in-kind.

### **Health Training**

Since 1985, the medical school at the University of Conakry has trained 416 students, about one-sixth were females. Medical school consists of six years of academic training followed by one year of practical training at one of the teaching hospitals. There is a large expatriate staff at the medical school which still lacks the personnel to train medical specialists.

There is a national school of health where state-registered nurses, midwives, and laboratory technicians are trained in three-year programs. Paramedical personnel are trained at secondary schools of health in Kankan, Labé, Kindia, and N'Zérékoré. These schools graduated 1,600 paramedical students in 1988 who had difficulty finding employment. The 1990 USAID health sector assessment reported that only 300 had been employed. Since that time, the health ministry hired 900 paramedical staff, but clearly the public health sector cannot absorb many more graduates, and it is doubtful that the private health sector will generate sufficient employment for these potentially valuable young people.

The Pharmacy school was established at the University in 1964. Over 348 pharmacists have graduated. In 1990, there were 137 students enrolled in the five-year program. At the Biology Institute at the University, students study biological sciences and their applications in medicine, industry, and nutrition. The Institute is constrained by limited resources, and, to date, completed research projects remain shelved as there is no established system to publish and disseminate findings.

Training in demography occurs during the fourth and fifth years for geography students in the Social Sciences Faculty at the University of Conakry. Here also, the quality and resources for training are very limited. Students have only four to six hours/week of courses on the subject. Since 1974, approximately 75 demography theses have been written, primarily monographs on a village or urban neighborhood.

In-service health training as part of the Primary Health Care National Health Program sponsored by UNICEF is an example of ongoing activities to improve the knowledge and skills of the health personnel. As mentioned earlier, AGBEF has been contracted by several NGOs to train people in family planning techniques, and this should increase in the future as PSI implements its family planning project. Public health personnel compete for the limited number of scholarships to go abroad and improve their knowledge and skills in specialized medicine.

Traditional practitioners such as herbalists, bone setters, and traditional birth attendants acquire their skills through experience and/or apprenticeship. In many cases, this knowledge is passed down within families. Spiritual healers combine knowledge of local medicines, spirituality, and social psychology in their practice, which they acquire through practice and study.

A special program that deserves mention is the project to integrate education about population into the school curriculum. Begun in 1983 as a collaborative effort between UNFPA, UNESCO, and the Guinean government, the Education on Population (EMP) program was an educational response to Guinea's population problem. The long-term objectives of the program are to raise public awareness of the present and future effects of population on living standards, and increase the understanding of young people so that they become more responsible about their sexual behavior. The approach planned to use both formal and non-formal education and mass media, but the project was delayed between the First and Second Republics.

Between 80 and 100 teachers were trained by National Pedagogic Institute (IPN) and shown how to integrate population information into their course material (physical sciences, math, geography). A pilot group of 17 primary schools was selected, which used the educational materials developed for population education. Classes were held to cover three major areas: Population and Socioeconomic Development, Population and Environment, and Family Life and Parental Responsibility. A second phase of the project (1991 to 1993) is to be managed by an expatriate to expand the program into 43 more elementary schools and develop materials for secondary schools as well. It is planned that 800 more teachers will be trained and five secondary schools will be selected to begin the program.

Several formal and informal channels have been used to communicate information to educate the general public about important issues such as child survival, family planning, and immunization campaigns. There has been relatively little use of the few journals that exist in Guinea, such as the weekly state newspaper, *HOROYA*, and a daily newspaper printed for highly placed government officials, as they are printed in limited numbers and reach relatively few people. The Radio-Television Broadcasting of Guinea (RTG) is much more effective for spreading news to a larger number of people. There have been rural radio broadcasts in Middle and Upper Guinea since 1990 that reach into parts of Forest and Maritime Guinea. Both of these mediums have carried special health programs in the past. An increasingly popular medium is videos, with 13 rental outlets in Conakry, and movies, although there are

only 43 movie theaters in Guinea, 27 of which are in Conakry. These possibly important mediums have not been used to any degree for health education in Guinea.

There appears to be a conscious effort on the part of the government, NGOs, and donors to develop a participatory approach to community health education. For example, religious authorities (Islamic League) who have a great deal of credibility with the populace as well as with village and neighborhood councils of elders have been included in educational seminars on special topics such as family planning and primary health care. In a few subprefectures in Telimele, Middle Guinea, Health Promotion Committees comprised of local leaders have been established. The main function of the committee is to inform and educate the population.

### **Health Information Systems and Data Collection**

Basic information about the Guinean population is essential to development planning for all sectors. There have been two enumerations of the Guinean people, the first was a census by population sampling conducted by the French in 1954/1955, and more recently, a demographic census sponsored by UNFPA in 1983. There were a series of administrative census taken every five years in 1962, 1967, 1972, and 1977 using tax roles. However, this information was more for political purposes than having any empirical value. The general population and housing census of 1983 collected the most reliable demographic and socioeconomic data to date, but this information only became available in 1990. Even this data is thought to have been an underestimation of the population given the political climate of the period (rural people tried to avoid taxes in-kind that were based on their household size, and Conakry households were given food credits based upon their size).

Another national Demographic and Health survey is planned to begin with preparation of survey design and instruments in 1991. Data collection should begin the first quarter of 1992 and results are expected that same year. Many of the researchers from the Population Unit at the Ministry of Plan worked on the 1983 census, and will be under the supervision of UNFPA statistical consultants.

The National Department of Statistics and Information Science (DNSI), previously known as the General Department of Statistics (DGS) is the main institution responsible for the collection, management, analysis, and publication of demographic data. The Demographic Division is headed by the head of the Office of National Census (BNR). In this division, there are 16 people, 3 demographers, and geographers and statisticians with some demographic training divided into three sections: the Survey and Census Section, the Mapping and Sampling Section, and the Social Statistics Section.

The Ministry of Health and Population's Division of Health Statistics publishes information about health infrastructure, medical personnel, and prevalence of major diseases.

At the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization, there is a Census and Population Statistics Division that conducts administrative censuses along with DNSI. At the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources, the National Department of Agricultural Statistics has conducted a National Agricultural Census in collaboration with DNSI, and is attempting to establish a permanent system for the collection and publication of agricultural statistics, which may have some future use in the development of food and nutrition policy.

In the Health Ministry, there is a Department of Studies, Research, Planning, and Training that is responsible for the collection of health statistics as well as two research sections in the Occupational Health and Food and Nutrition Divisions. The data collection and management system is functioning haphazardly. Only 17 percent of health centers comply with service statistics, requirements, and reporting. Most reports are incomplete and inaccurate. Service statistics do not include information on special programs such as endemic diseases. Compared to the Ministry of Plan, who has benefitted from donor activities in building its data collection capabilities, the Ministry of Health has much work to do. FSI for example, proposes to put a major effort into the development of its information management system for the family planning project.

USAID is supporting a Cornell University-managed nutrition study in Conakry which promises a rich set of data for analysis of the urban population. The World Bank also supported a nutritional survey in the Labé area carried out by Tulane University.

The information gathered from basic demographic, health, and socioeconomic data is intended to provide basic statistics for the National Population Commission, is useful for sensitizing national and religious leaders to population issues, and will facilitate the articulation of a national Population Policy that is important for the development of family planning capabilities. There are plans to improve the collection of civil information beginning in 1991 through the CRDs under the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization and the Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation. Since 1962, the law 52/AN/62 declared that births, deaths, and marriages were to be reported within eight days of occurrence in urban areas and 30 days of occurrence in rural areas. However, these civil statistics, at best, have been fragmentary and of limited use.

### **Financing Health Care in Guinea**

Guinea's population growth rate is 2.85 percent, and the population will double in 29 years. The government's budget allocation for health from 1977 to 1985 was, on average, 3.9 percent—much below the 8 percent to 12 percent recommended by WHO. The government is heavily dependent on donors for support to this sector. Of 44 health projects evaluated in 1990, 77 percent received at least one source of foreign finance. More money was available for the health budget in 1990 than 1989, but as a percentage of the total budget, the figure fell. The majority of the budget (80 percent) is for recurrent costs (20 percent alone for the two university hospitals). The remaining 20 percent is insufficient for the investments necessary for the government to achieve its health objectives; consequently, the government counts heavily on donors.

### **Donor and NGO Health Activities**

Major donors in project development, training, technical assistance, and financing for infrastructure improvements and equipment include UNICEF, USAID, WHO, UNFPA, UNDP, and the World Bank. UNICEF has played a major role in coordination of donor and Government of Guinea activities in health. The Primary Health Care program has become the major vehicle for community participation in health, and the services provided under this program are expanding. Accordingly, PSI plans to incorporate family planning activities into the PHC program.

The African Development Bank, Saudi Arabia, FAC, FSD, and FED (University of Liege) have primarily provided funds for new construction and improvements to existing infrastructure.

There are at least 74 national NGOs and 52 international NGOs working in the health sector, mostly in service delivery. UNICEF is financing 10 that assist in child survival activities and, again, has led the way in coordinating some NGO activity. The little coordination that exists between NGOs is the result of working in the same geographic region, working on similar activities, or collaborating with the same donor. The lack of coordination that exists between NGOs has been previously noted and organizations such as PSI intend to take steps to improve coordination and cooperation, initially in family planning.

Below is a list of some of the areas in which donors and NGOs are actively working.

***Endemic Disease Control:***

Leprosy control—Philafricaine, Order of Malta

Tuberculosis control—Medecin Sans Frontier Luxembourg

PHC-MCH-EPI

USAID—supported CCCD project child survival, PSI family planning project, support for AGBEF family planning activities, Cornell Nutritional Surveys.

UNICEF—National Health Program development support - Primary Health Care/Expanded Immunization Program/Essential Drug and Maternal Child Health/Family Planning.

World Bank—Health Services Development Project for Primary Health Care.

GVC—Italian NGO constructing and training personnel for nine health centers in Labé and Pita.

Medicin Sans Frontier Belgium—Primary Health Care support for seven health centers in Forest Region.

Medicin Sans Frontier Grance—Primary Health Care support for eight health centers in Upper Guinea.

CECI—Canadian NGO providing Primary Health Care training.

***Construction and Training:***

AFVP—French volunteers constructing two health centers.

FSD—Construction of 10 health centers in Kankan.

KFW—Construction of two hospitals in Forest Region.

## **4.6 Democratization, Governance, and Local Participation**

Guinea's decentralization policies and institutions are discussed in Section 3.6. This section provides a concise analysis of five major democratization, governance, and participation issues which impinge on USAID/Guinea's program strategy:

- Democratization and political representation.
- Corruption and governance.
- State authority and local government institutions.
- Decentralization and development activities.
- State-private sector roles in the production and provision of public services.

### **4.6.1 Democratization and Political Representation**

When the military took over in April 1984, the Guinean people greeted them as liberators. Seven years later, Guinea still had no representative national political institutions. However, since the adoption of the new Constitution and the dissolution of the CMRN, events have pushed the regime to accelerate the pace of democratization. As a result, the CTRN plans to have the legislation for the new national political institutions finished by the end of this year. Several political parties have already begun the process of applying for formal recognition, and it appears the regime will now accept a multiparty system rather than hold to its former position of limiting the number of national political parties to two. National elections could take place as early as the end of 1992.

The democratization process will not be completed until the people choose their national representatives and leaders in national elections and the military leaves the government. Although President Conté has staffed the government with civilians and transformed the CMRN into the CTRN, the military continues to exercise a decisive voice in major governmental decisions. The non-accountability of the military to a civilian government poses a serious obstacle to democratization in Guinea. As long as the military maintains its hold over the country, the government will be subjected to a dual authority. The non-accountability of the military has enabled it to give itself many financial and material advantages which have undermined its claims to be the guardian of the Guinean national interest. In democratic regimes, civilian authority prevails over the military. The democratization process in Guinea thus finds itself faced with the dilemma of how to get the military back to the barracks, out of politics, and prepared to accept civilian authority, even when that authority is likely to cut back its privileges.

Having accepted the multiparty system in principle, the regime must now work out the details concerning the recognition of the new political parties; the electoral code under which presidential and national legislative elections will take place; the amount of freedom to be given the national press; and the amount of access political parties will have to state-run media (i.e., radio and television). These are all important democratization issues which will affect the quality of political participation.

The government will be faced with the enormous task of organizing national elections for an electorate which has not had the opportunity to vote for more than one party since the 1957 national elections which brought Sekou Touré and the PDG to power, and which has not

been allowed to vote for a party since the 1984 coup. The public's lack of experience in voting matters will necessitate a massive educational campaign on the part of the government and the newly created political parties to inform the people about electoral procedures and the issues. This will also greatly expand the role of the press and the mass media.

Another major issue is how to minimize and control interethnic tensions that may rise during and after election campaigns. Although the new constitution bans the formation of political parties based on ethnicity, region, or religion, interethnic violence in recent urban elections has raised fears that political competition will exacerbate interethnic rivalries and tensions. Electoral rules applied to the March 1991 communal elections in Conakry ensured that multi-ethnic lists would contend the elections and that the mayor would have to be the choice of several ethnic groups. More recently, neighborhood boundaries have been redrawn in some Conakry neighborhoods to minimize ethnic conflict.

National and local politicians and their parties will have to act responsibly and not fan interethnic hatreds if violence is to be avoided. Creative ways could also be devised to encourage the forging of political coalitions that cut across several ethnic groups. For example, the new constitutional rules calling for all political parties to be run throughout the entire country if they are to be recognized are designed to discourage ethnic or regionally based parties.

While a multiparty system might, in fact, run the risk of increasing interethnic tensions, it would also open up the political system to groups that have not been equitably represented in the current regime. A more democratic system would likely give certain ethnic groups (i.e., the Malinké

who lost out because of their association with Sekou Touré) more access. It would also provide representation for opposition groups who don't share the ideological perspectives of the current regime or like the kind of government they are getting. These people now have no voice in government. Greater political participation and competitive elections will enable political parties to articulate and aggregate the interests of different social and economic interests in the country and create the conditions for national public policy debate.

Until there are functioning national representative political institutions and the opportunity for Guineans to choose an alternative government, the regime will remain unaccountable to the general public for its policies and programs. Competitive elections and an informed citizenry are important components of a successful democratization strategy to make national governments more accountable to the public.

Recent USAID/Washington policy statements have made democratization an important criterion in determining the amount of support to be given to individual African countries. Democratization has also emerged as a potential area for USAID mission activities to complement interventions seeking to promote local participation in planning and managing economic and social development and better governance by improving the performance of the public sector.

#### **4.6.2 Corruption and Governance**

One of the main obstacles to efficient government in Guinea is the widespread corruption throughout the government. Donors and foreign investors alike have complained bitterly

about corruption. In Guinea, two of the main centers of corruption have been in the customs and tax services. Donors have pressured the government to replace corrupt officials and to institute stronger control mechanisms in the customs service, but corruption still persists at all levels of government and the state bureaucracy.

Corruption in Guinea takes several forms—bribery, extraction of rents for performing services which should be free, extorting money from citizens for alleged violations of regulations, and placing unqualified people in jobs because of personal and ethnic ties. Different forms and scales of corruption affect government policies and society differently. The practice of the military and the police of extorting small amounts of money from taxi drivers, market women, and small businessmen undermines the legitimacy of the regime with the people as does the kind of top-level government corruption which results in the proliferation of Mercedes and villas while the rest of the population is expected to make sacrifices to get the economy back on track. Corruption undermines the rule of law and creates cynicism about the system.

Corruption also increases transaction costs. It raises the costs of doing business for those in the private sector and wastes limited government resources in the public sector. It makes decision making more problematic and implementation of policies more difficult, even when policies are sound. Corruption in Guinea has discouraged foreign investors from coming to Guinea, driven many of those who have come to leave, and thwarted the development of private sector activities needed to spur and sustain economic growth. It also reinforces the tendency of investors to seek short-term, high-profit projects rather than to invest in Guinea's productive capacity for the long haul.

Corruption can be dealt with on several fronts:

- reducing the opportunities for state officials to extract rents by reducing the number of areas that are regulated by the state;
- establishing improved control and monitoring mechanisms within key branches of government;
- providing decent salaries that will permit civil servants to meet their family expenses, thereby reducing the temptation to tap the public till or extract resources from victimized citizens;
- organizing anti-corruption campaigns backed by the highest political authorities with strong sanctions taken against those caught violating their public trust;
- ensuring greater accountability of government in general and government officials in particular to the public through public exposure of corrupt practices and periodic elections that can change local and national governments; and
- encouraging the internalization of new norms and modes of behavior on the part of officials and citizens alike to regard public service and the public treasury as a trust not to be violated.

Corruption is a complex phenomenon which must be analyzed carefully if successful measures are to be taken to defend against it. Donors can take measures to reduce the harmful effects of corruption on their own programs and projects. The World Bank, for example, has

identified potential weak points in the GOG's procurement procedures which make it relatively easy for unscrupulous officials to divert resources for private gain. To combat this, the Bank has tightened up its own procurement procedures and reinforced its control mechanisms to alleviate this problem. USAID/Guinea could design anti-corruption components as part of its various programs. (See Annex 5 for a more detailed analysis of corruption and governance issues).

#### **4.6.3 State Authority and Local Government Institutions**

Although the Guinean government has declared decentralization to be one of its main policy objectives, it still retains a tight control over the diverse local government bodies it has set up. The state authority is built into Guinea's unitary state system. Guinean legislation gives the state strong supervisory powers over local government which can stifle local initiative and reduce local government to an appendage of the central government. Local government activities, thus, must fit within the framework of the government's national development program. State officials supervise, monitor, and often intervene directly in the management of local government bodies. Heavy-handed intervention by the subprefect and prefect in local government affairs discourages local participation and retards the democratization process.

The CRD is still in the pilot project stage. Less than 10 percent of Guinea's subprefectures currently have a CRD despite plans to have 100 CRDs in place by the end of 1991. CRDs vary in size and population but average from 25,000 to 30,000 people. District Councils in the subprefecture send two delegates to the CRD Council, which then chooses a president and vice-president. The law gives the president extensive powers and responsibilities which include managing CRD revenues, preparing, presenting, and executing the budget, formulating and implementing CRD development programs, and representing the CRD in court. The president is usually an important rural notable or merchant in the area. School teachers also frequently serve on the CRD Council while women rarely do.

Elections take place every four years. Meetings are usually held in the local language; but the minutes of the meeting are written in French and sent on to the prefect. SED appoints one of its officials to serve as the Community Secretary (SC) and take care of the day-to-day administration of the CRD. A accountant from MEFs' Treasury office keeps the accounts and handles expenditures.

The authority of the president vis-a-vis the administration depends on his own influence in the subprefecture and is enhanced by fluency in French and the ability to understand and master administrative procedures. The president of the CRD in Timbi-Medina, for example, is a well-connected merchant who is able to run the affairs of his CRD with relatively little interference from the subprefect or prefect. On the other hand, many presidents defer to the authority of the subprefect or the SC and rarely take any initiative in launching projects or preparing budgets. Guinean bureaucratic traditions under the First and Second Republics accustomed the local populations to follow instructions from state or party officials. This practice needs to be altered if democratization is to progress and local populations play a greater role in running their own community affairs.

One of the major problems facing the new CRDs and affecting their effectiveness is the lack of experience of most CRD council members and officers of modern financial management and administrative procedures as well as non-familiarity with the basic texts detailing the

powers, functions, and responsibilities of the CRD and their own role as local government officials. Translating these texts into the local language and training officers and council members in simple bookkeeping and administrative procedures related to their functions would enhance their governance skills and enable them to assert their autonomy vis-a-vis the territorial administration. Peace Corps volunteers have been assigned to individual CRDs and are providing some assistance in drawing up and seeking financing for local development projects. One potential PCV role could be to train local officials in simple governance and bookkeeping techniques to enable them to take full control over CRD financial affairs.

The District Councils represent a population of 1,000 to 4,000. Each Council has nine members with specialized roles. The local populations directly elect the President and Council members. Until the creation of the CRDs, the District Councils used to receive half of the head taxes collected in their subprefecture (1,000 GFs); they now share head tax revenues with the CRDs who receive 70 percent of the 1,000 GFs while the Districts receive only 30 percent. The other 1,000 GFs go to the prefecture. While the District Councils are responsible for having their constituents pay their taxes, it is the subprefect and prefect who actually collect the taxes and redistribute them to the District and CRD after taking the administration's share. It is, of course, possible for unscrupulous administrators not to return the full amount to the local government bodies which are not always informed as to how much taxes are actually collected, either in their district or in the subprefecture and prefecture as a whole.

There is some talk that the government may eventually eliminate the subprefects and prefects, and turn over their present functions to local government officials. A 1991 National Workshop on administrative reform recommended that local government also be established at the prefecture level. Territorial administrative officials are likely to resist such measures, especially when they are military officers. However, there are signs that younger officials now being assigned to the territorial administration are more willing to let the CRDs run their own affairs with a minimum of interference. If the prefects and subprefects were eliminated, the revenues now going to the territorial administration could go directly to the CRDs and District Councils and provide more funding for the projects. At the same time, the SC could become an employee of the CRD rather than a civil servant working for the central government and accountable to the prefect or subprefect.

While the law technically permits districts to form their own CRDs, in fact, it is the central government through SED which makes the choice as to which locality/subprefecture will be endowed with a CRD. The imprint of the administrative authority can also be seen in the decision of the government to establish the seat of the CRD at the subprefecture level and to have all districts in the subprefecture belong to the same CRD. Hence, unlike the American system of local government, which permits the creation of overlapping jurisdictions, local government in Guinea follows administrative boundaries fixed by the central government and corresponding with the territorial administration. These do not always coincide with local social, economic, and cultural realities. However, these boundaries facilitate administrative control and correspond with the jurisdiction of the technical field services.

Local government in the urban areas operates somewhat differently than the CRDs and District Councils, having different constituencies, powers, and concerns. The Municipal Coun-

cils are new institutions, established in 1991, following the March municipal elections in Conakry and the June elections in the seats of Guinea's prefectures.

Conakry has a special statute and contains five municipalities. It also has a city council presided over by the Governor of Conakry who administers a wide range of city services. Each municipal council sends five representatives and its mayor to

the City Council. The Conakry City Council is much more an organ of the central government than the municipal councils in the interior. Although the City Council has to approve the budget, the real power lies with the Governor who is named by the President. The Governor is responsible for the development and organization of Conakry, the preparation and execution of the budget, and managing all the personnel working for the city. He represents both the central government and the CD of Conakry.

With the installation of local government at the municipal level in Conakry, the role of the former prefects, which used to administer the municipalities, has diminished considerably as the mayors have taken over some of their powers and control over municipal affairs. These powers include responsibility for municipal police. While the texts establishing the urban municipalities give the mayor considerable authority over a wide range of municipal resources, they do not specify quantitatively how many resources will be available to the municipality. The Governor currently seems to control most of the resources of local government in the capital.

Since Conakry is a multiethnic city with members of all Guinean ethnic groups living there, urban politics takes on a special flavor as the potential for interethnic conflict is much higher than in the more homogeneous and smaller rural districts. Women also participate more in politics in Conakry than in the interior, where traditional women's roles keep them out of politics and less likely to run for public office.

The urban municipalities in the interior must have a minimum population of 5,000. The number of Councilors varies from 11 for municipalities with a population of 10,000 or less to 41 for those having a population of more than 200,000. The authority also has the right to name up to five representatives of social and economic interests (e.g., trade unions, business associations) as councilors. The Council members choose the mayor who has extensive powers in drawing up and executing budgets, elaborating the municipal development program, and managing municipal personnel and property. Each Council must set up two major committees: the first deals with financial, economic, and land-use issues, while the second deals with social and cultural matters. Municipal accounts and expenditures are supervised by the mayor but are directly controlled by an official from the Treasury—the *receiver*. Since the municipal councils are new institutions, little information is available concerning their actual functioning. Given their lack of experience in municipal government and the complexity of the texts, urban government officials could also benefit from training programs in financial management and administrative procedures.

Donors working with local government will continue to work closely with SED and the territorial administration due to the latter's authoritative powers and involvement in local affairs.

#### **4.6.4 Decentralization and Development Activities**

Decentralization and deconcentration are terms often used by the Guinean government to describe its political and administrative policies. The term “decentralized contractual planning” implies that the local populations are involved in planning local development activities.

In reality, administrative officials dominate the advisory development committees at the regional and prefecture levels where there are no elected local government units. Thus, the resident minister presides over the regional development committee while the prefect presides over the prefecture development committee. As representatives of the central government, they represent national rather than local interests. The regional and prefecture development committees consist mostly of officials from the different government field services working in the district.

Actual decentralized development activities can be channeled through four sets of actors:

- local government bodies who can devise their own projects and request donor or NGO financing. For example, the CRD in Timbi-Medina has requested funding from the American Ambassador’s Self-Help Fund to reconstruct a bridge which will make communications between Timbi-Medina and outlying villages possible during the rainy season. A Peace Corp volunteer helped in drawing up the project;
- foreign and domestic NGOs working with the local populations in small grassroots projects. Over the past decade, donors have been relying more and more on NGOs to implement local development activities because of their generally lower costs and ability to work well with local populations. In the past five years, many Guinean NGOs have sprung up to specialize in development activities. Many exist on paper and have not yet proven their effectiveness. Donors will have to look thoroughly into the credentials of the Guinean NGOs they wish to use to carry out local development activities;
- various local community organizations and associations and private sector enterprises (e.g., youth groups, women’s associations, cooperatives, small rural enterprises, trade associations). For example, villages can organize to manage their own renewable natural resources—grazing lands, village woodlots, etc. In the Fouta Djallon, women’s associations are receiving credit and technical assistance to carry out various small-scale development projects;
- deconcentrated regional and sub-regional state technical services who assume the responsibility for project management and implementation, often in conjunction with external technical assistance. This has been the “traditional” donor pattern of intervention. But decentralized policies call for working more directly with local government and local community groups.

All of the CDs—Conakry city government, urban municipalities, CRDs, and District Councils—have a mandate to formulate a development program for their local government unit and are encouraged to seek external funding to finance their projects. In the rural areas, the emphasis is on micro-projects. These include bridges, market infrastructure improvements, rural roads, health centers, and schools. At the present time, much of the external funding for

micro-projects is funded through local government units rather than through community and subcommunity organizations. SED also provides assistance to local government in drawing up plans for development projects. A small office within the MPCCI has recently opened which will also finance micro-projects. In supporting local government development efforts, USAID/Guinea has the opportunity to enhance local government productivity and to promote greater local participation in planning and managing development projects.

#### **4.6.5 *State-Private Sector Roles in the Production and Provision of Public Goods and Services***

Guinea, similar to many other African countries, has suffered from the failure of state revenues to keep pace with the costs of bureaucracy as well as the lack of adequate public services to meet the needs of rural and urban populations. The unitary state through the central government tends to assume most of the responsibility for providing public goods and services to the local populations. The inability of African governments to provide local services have made African rulers more willing to turn over responsibility for providing some of these services to local government units.

One of the key issues to be resolved is the division of labor between the central government and the newly created CDs in providing public services such as schools, health facilities, youth centers, potable water, sewers, streets, and electrification. For example, in Conakry, the responsibilities of the Governor and the municipalities providing urban services are divided. Related to the issue of providing public goods and services is that of financing such services. Will local government have the authority to levy taxes and user charges without preliminary government approval in order to increase its tax base and provide more services? Will the central government transfer funds to local government units? To what extent should donors support local government units to provide these services?

A second important issue is that of letting the private sector produce or co-produce some of the public services. For example, garbage collection can be contracted out to a private firm. Other activities now carried out exclusively by the public sector, such as veterinary services, can be privatized. In short, central and local government can develop a partnership with the private sector in providing vital services to the local populations in such areas as public housing, road construction, health, and educational services. For example, parent-teacher associations can be mobilized to build schools or hire more or better qualified teachers. Thus far, Guinean policymakers and donors have not given this approach much attention. Privatization policies have tended to focus more on state enterprises than on the production or co-production of public services by private entrepreneurs and firms.

The government's decentralization policies are giving local government greater responsibility for providing basic public goods and services and greater control over more financial resources. The expansion of local government services and development projects provides an excellent opportunity to stimulate the growth of complementary local private sector activities. For example, the construction of local government offices, improved market facilities, paved streets, and rural feeder roads can provide contracts and employment for local builders, construction workers, electricians, masons, and road construction companies. Improved market facilities and road communications will stimulate local commerce and make more goods available to the local population. As local government expands, there will be a grow-

ing need for competent and solvent local enterprises to produce or co-produce the goods and services needed to fulfill local government's public service and development mission. USAID/Guinea and other donors could assist this process by providing training in the relevant management and technical skills as well as credit to potentially sound entrepreneurs.

The democratization, governance, and participation issues discussed above all have an impact on the potential effectiveness of Guinean development policies and donor aid programs, and deserve further attention when formulating USAID/Guinea's program strategy.

## **Chapter 5: Information on International Institutions, Bilateral Agencies and NGO Development Activities in Guinea**

---

### **5.1 United Nations Fund for Population Assistance (UNFPA)**

#### ***Current Projects***

#### **(I) Project Gui 188/PO2**

- Official title: Population Unity
- Ministry: Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation (M.P.C.I.)
- Line Institution: ILO
- Project Objectives
- Formulation of the Population Policy
- Integration of demographic variables in Planning
- Topic: Population and Development
- Project's life: from 2/89 to 11/92
- Financial means: U.S. \$564,000 UNFPA's grant  
GNF: 56,000.00 Guinea Gut.
- Personnel
- International Experts - 2
- National Personnel as counterparts - 4
  - Demographer 1
  - Economist 1
  - Economist planner 1
  - Economist demographer 1

#### **(II) Project Gui/90/PO2**

- Official title: Population Education, Population and Multi-media support
- Ministry: Secretariat of State for Pre-University Education
- Implementing Institution: Institut Pedagogique National (IPN) The National Pedagogic Institute
- Executant Institution: UNESCO
- Geographic target zone: The four natural regions

- Purpose: To promote education about population issues
- Financial means: US \$597,290 grant from UNFPA  
GF 147,271 Guinea Government
- Designed appraisal date: 12/91
- Personnel International Expert - 1
- Plan monitoring and appraisal: Information, not available

**(III) Expected activities**

- UNFPA's future activities program plan is being prepared

## **5.2 United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**

UNDP's current development projects part of their 4th program cycle (1987-1991) with a total financial package of \$39,727,100.

Number of projects: 58 with 33 new projects begun in the 4th cycle with a budget of \$27,786,140

- 12 projects continue from the 3rd cycle with a budget of \$7,958,703
- 9 projects continue from the 2nd cycle with a budget of \$889,414
- 4 projects are in the pipeline with budgets of \$1,005,000

The program is centered on three principal objectives:

***Objective 1: Strengthening GOG planning and management ability***

**Current projects**

1. Sectoral Planning and Economic management: Gui/84/007, Gui/88/001
2. Administrative Reform: Gui/85/008, Gui 88/002
3. Local Participatory Development: Gui/86/010.
4. Training Planning Services: Gui/78/007
5. National Computer Technology Science and Management Center: Gui/78/010
6. Training Scholarships: Gui/89/027
7. Assistance to Civil Aviation: Gui/81/004, Gui/87/027
8. Reorganization of the Postal Service: Gui/85/007
9. Dissemination of Economic Information: Gui/86/002
10. Assistance to the "Centre Pilote": Gui/82/009

### **New Projects**

11. Technical Documentation Center For Development: Gui/87/007
12. Telecommunications Development: Gui/87/001
13. National Agricultural Survey: Gui/86/013
14. Permanent System of Agricultural Statistics: Gui/89/007

### **Projects not Included in the 4th Program Cycle**

15. Guidelines for Industrialization: Gui/87/003
16. Development Assistance to Small and Medium sized Firms (P.M.E.): Gui/88/012
17. Assistance to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Agriculture: Gui/88/007
18. Guidelines for Telecommunication: Gui/89/001
19. Assistance to the Central Bank: Gui/88/016
20. Assistance to Foreign Support Coordination: Gui/88/017
21. Assistance to Agricultural Planning and Development: Gui/88/008

**NB:** Justification for seven unspecified projects apparently is based on the need to consolidate the benefits of economic and financial adjustment program through extra support to improve the GOG planning ability to promote the private sector.

### ***Objective 2. Rural Development***

#### **Principal Projects**

1. Integrated Rural Development: Gui/86/004
2. Restoration and Development of the Bantingel Riverbasin: Gui/87/004
3. Assistance Funds to Local Initiatives: Gui/87/003
4. Small Scale Fishing at Kaback: Gui/87/004

#### **United Nations Capital Assistance/U.N.D.P. projects**

5. Production in the Southeast Fouta Djallon: Gui/87/015, Gui/86/001
6. Rehabilitation of Rural Roads: Gui/87/019, Gui/86/005
7. Artisanal Fishing at Kamsar: Gui/87/004, Gui/86/003

#### **Unspecified Projects**

8. Rural Construction with Local Manpower: Gui/87/014
9. Small-scale Agricultural Mechanization: Gui/87/017

***Objective 3: Employment Generation, Human Resource Development, and Quality of Life Improvement***

**Projects**

1. Work Authority: Gui/85/008
2. Drained Plots: Gui/85/006
3. Assistance to Handicapped Persons: Gui/86/003
4. Promotion of the Informal Sector: Gui/86/005
5. Social Security: Gui 87/003
6. Assistance to the National Training Office: Gui/87/011
7. Draining Lansebounji Area: Gui/87/002

**Shelf Projects**

8. Support to Training and Employment: Gui/88/003
9. Survey for a Housing Policy: Gui/87/010
10. Support to the Orthopedic National Center: Gui/86/003
11. Assistance to the Essential Drugs Program: Gui/005
12. Assistance to O.I.E: Gui/87/029

***Monitoring and Evaluation***

The dates of UNDP projects can be found in the UNDP country program assessment.

UNDP projects are evaluated individually. The first evaluation is mid-term evaluation. The evaluation team is made up of experts from the UNDP, the executing agency, and the Guinea Government.

The second evaluation is an in-depth assessment conducted by a delegation of top-level experts sent by the UNDP head office.

***Future Programs***

The priority activities for the future will follow a midterm program review of the 4th cycle (1977-1991) that stressed UNDP assist the Guinean Government's policy to strengthen and promote the private sector. The 5th cycle for the 1992-1996 period is in planning.

**5.3 The German Federal Republic**

Within the framework of international cooperation, the Federal Republic of Germany's assistance to Guinea involves different activities of development and touches all sectors:

- Rural Development
- Transport and Communication Infrastructure

- Electric power
- Protection of forests
- Promotion of the Private Sector

### **Ongoing Rural Development Projects**

#### **Ongoing Projects:**

1. The Kissidougou Integrated Rural Development Project (D.E.R.I.K.), implemented by GTZ.
  - Duration of the project is 9 years, from 1986 to 1994
  - Finance package: D.M. 10 million
  - Human Resources: 4 German Experts, some European volunteers and 120 Guineans
2. Kissidougou-Guekedou Rural Health Project, implemented by GTZ.
  - Duration of project: 10 years, from 1983 to 1993
  - Financial package: D.M. 21.6 million
  - German personnel: 2 Doctors
3. Project for the Training of civil engineers, implemented by GTZ.
  - Duration of project: 3 years, from 1990 to 1992
  - Financial package: D.M. 2.1 million
4. Consultant for the forestry programme, implemented by GTZ.
  - Duration from 1986 to 1994
5. Consultant at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
  - Duration: 1986 to 1993
  - Finance package: D.M. 2.3 million
  - Monitoring of Projects
  - An annual evaluation on project progress and identification of problems and constraints.
  - A final evaluation at the end of the project by a delegation from the main office. This assessment report is sent to the G.T.Z. Headquarters which in turn forwards it to the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation.
  - Project to provide rural areas with potable water through bore holes.

### **Transport and Communication Infrastructure**

- Renovation and extension of the Conakry Harbour co-financed with the IDA and the ADB. A German Consultancy
- LACKNER and PARTNER is monitoring works.
- Giving assistance to the Guinea Radio and Television Broadcasting Station.

### **Energy**

- Installation of the Tombo Electric Generator to supply Conakry city with electricity.

### **Protection of Forest (c/o GTZ activities)**

#### **Promotion of private investment in Guinea is a major policy of the Germans and Guinean Governments.**

As a result, Germany participates in the mining of bauxite in Guinea (C.B.G.) and in the SOSCA Canning Factory at SONFONIA.

Another important area of intervention is professional training, the promotion of small and medium-scale enterprises, as well as the promotion of cooperatives - The Friedrich Ebert Foundation is very active in this sector.

#### *Prospects:*

- Strengthening of ongoing projects.
- More major activities in the field of Rural Development through the National Project for Rural Infrastructure (PNIR) which has just started.

### **5.4 Government of France**

- The CCCE is defined as being first of all a credit organization that also has the option to make grants.

The CCCE started operations in Guinea in 1979, but it was not until the advent of the 2nd Republic on 3rd April, 1984, that its operations amplified and diversified considerably.

- With the exception of Health and Education, the Fund serves all sectors.
- Financial assistance given by the Fund to Guinea between 1985 and 1989 is estimated at over two thousand million French Francs, or an average of 40 thousand million Francs/year.

The distribution of this fund among the major sectors is as follows:

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Total in Million FF</b>	<b>%</b>
Rural Development agro-industries, fisheries	785.30	37.70
Urban transport Hydraulics and telecommunication	637.60	30.61
Industries, factories, Energy	237.80	11.42
Multi sectorial and not valued	322.52	15.48
Structural Adjustment Loan	100 (1989)	4.80

#### **Total**

- The number of activities financed by the fund are in the hundreds, about five hundred (500) alone in the P.M.E. and P.M.I. sectors.
- In the agricultural sector the fund participates in all the major agricultural projects - cotton in Upper Guinea, Goaul, and Koundara; coffee, oil palm plantation and hevea in the Forest Region; pineapple in Kindia; rice in Forecariah and Boke.
- For the benefit of the rural areas, CCCE financed a programme for 800 village bore holes equipped with standing pipes installed by the S.N.A.P.E. There is also a Rural Credit pilot project.
- For the urban area, apart from water-supply projects in Conakry. it financed the maintenance of roads and the extension of the double lane road beyond Gbessia to as far as Matoto thus easing the flow of traffic in the suburbs and the Conakry city centre.
- In the transport sector, the CCCE financed improvements of airport infrastructure, the opening of the Conakry Airport Joint Management Company, as well as the SOGETRAG public bus line.
- In the field of Public Works CCCE granted a loan of 203 million French Francs for the construction of a new road between Dubreka and Boffa.
- To restore equilibrium to GOG finances along with the World Bank and the I.M.F., France has, through the Fund, granted a structural adjustment loan of 100 million French Francs equal to ten thousand million Guinean Francs.

#### **Future Prospects**

- The CCCE intends to maintain current levels of funding for several years in the same areas of intervention.
- CCCE hopes to increase its activities to promote private enterprise emphasizing on food production and processing, including expanding rice production, and increase the availability of rural credit.

## **5.5 Italian Assistance to the Republic of Guinea**

Within the framework of Technical Cooperation, Italy financed a number of development activities carried out by either N.G.O.s or by Italian companies in Guinea.

- The Group of Civil Volunteers (G.V.C.) is an Italian N.G.O. that carries out projects in rural areas.

The G.V.C. has been operational in Middle Guinea since 1986 with an Integrated Rural Development Project which covers 9 sub-prefectures including 6 in LABE Prefecture and 3 in PITA. They estimate the beneficiaries of their actions to be about 118,000 people.

- The G.V.C. works in 3 primary areas: village water supply, agriculture, and health.

The G.V.C. cooperates closely with the National Department for the Improvement of Water Supply (SNAPE), and with Prefectoral and sub-Prefectoral health services for their primary health care activities.

A multidisciplinary team of between 5 and 8 Italian volunteers has carried out numerous activities in the sectors mentioned above.

The S.C.I.O. receives G.V.C.'s support and technical assistance for logistics and relations with international level organizations.

- In addition to the G.V.C. two other Italian NGOs operate in Guinea. CESTA works in the Health Sector in Maritime Guinea and ISCOS works in the organization and planning of cooperatives.
- Italy is currently carrying out water supply projects in Conakry (Kaporó), Kankan, Dabola and will probably expand their operations into Kouroussa.
- The Italian Company P.I.T. ITALPESCA is working towards the formation and promotion of fishing and fish smoking cooperatives in DUBREKA, TABORIA, and KOBÁ Sub-Prefectures, and in BOFFA Préfecture. The company is helping to construct fish smoking shops for women and supply out-board motors to fishermen. They are encouraging some fishermen to build their canoes using synthetic material.

## **5.6 EEC/FED**

The UNDP report on development cooperation in Guinea indicates that the EEC's priority areas of operation in Guinea concern rural development. 32 projects are currently within the rural development framework of the EEC. The principal regions of intervention are Upper Guinea and Maritime Guinea.

The primary objectives of GOG and EEC cooperation under the Lomé 4 convention with a budget of 135 million ECU are:

1. Improve access between isolated rural production areas and secondary towns with rural roads

2. Focus on actions to improve the quality of life for rural and small town populations
3. In agriculture, concentrate on rice production and tropical fruit exports
4. Provide assistance to private sector initiatives in horticulture, gardening, livestock and fish farming

The total financial resources provided by the Lome 3 convention were 126.5 million ECU. The primary sectors of intervention are:

- Rural development programs - 76 million ECU
- Small-scale programs - 4.5 million ECU
- Agro-Industrial program for hevea-palmier (SOGUIPAH) -5 million ECU (special loan)
- Integrated Fouta Djallon river basin development - 1.5 million ECU

In addition to these primary sectors:

- Health - 10.5 million ECU
- Education and Professional training - 5.8 million ECU
- Cultural Cooperation - 20,000 ECU
- Technical Cooperation - 1.3 million ECU

### **5.7 United Nations High Commission for Refugees/Guinea**

The UNHCR's activities in Guinea concern mostly emergency assistance. The influx of Liberian refugees into Forest Guinea necessitated immediate assistance in education and social services, accommodation and provisions, health and water. The distribution of seeds for agricultural activities is being undertaken by the UNHCR at the moment in the Forest Regions.

The principal interventions are:

- Provision of water and health facilities, rural roads and transportation.
- Education and Social Services.
- Agriculture.
- Reforestation (planned for 1992).

The 1990-1991 budget was 13 million dollars. The above actions are implemented by 18 organizations in the area listed below.

#### **Health**

- Medecin Sans Frontiere, Belgium
- Philafricaine
- Guinean Red Cross
- Directio Prefectorale de Sante/Gueckedou

**Water**

- SNAPE
- FABRA
- SEEG

**Rural Roads**

- SOGUIPAH
- PAG

**Transport**

- ADRA
- Micro Projects
- CIDR

**Agriculture**

- Inspection Regionale de l'Agriculture de la Guinee Forestiere
- PAG

**Education and Social Services**

- Agence Musulman Africaine
- Protestant Church

**Refugee Census**

- Unite de Population from the Ministry of Plan and International Cooperation

**5.8 Canadian Embassy**

1. Multiannual Scholarship programme in Guinea
2. General Institutional Support
3. Assistance to National Electricity Company - SNE
4. Civil Aviation
5. Credit line phase II
6. Support for rural development
7. Rehabilitation of electricity network
8. Rehabilitation or rural roads
9. Additional Study of the FOMI dam

10. Social dimensions of Structural Adjustment
11. Institutional support phase II fisheries
12. Improving Leloma road network
13. Food Aid
14. Ball
15. Assistance to ENELGUI
16. Counterpart Fund Canada - Guinea
17. FCIL
18. Training programme

The LACDI's financial assistance to Guinea is shown in the attached diagram for the 1987 to 1990 period.

## **5.9 World Bank**

Current number of projects - 25

### *Budget by Sector*

- Country Operations - \$ 134,563,000.00
- Agriculture - \$ 109,512,000.00
- Industry-Energy - \$ 52,786,981.00
- Human Resources - \$ 57,855,000.00
- Total - \$ 588,264,981.20

### ***Monitoring and Evaluation***

- A permanent system of monitoring and evaluation exists for each project, systematic reporting on project progress.
- Mission site visits to supervise project implementation.
- Mission review of country development strategy. This is a general annual review of country economic memorandum that systematically identifies development constraints.
- In current review one of the major problems is payment of project funds by GOG, there is a current deficit of 1.5 billion Guinean Francs for 4 Bank projects in FY 1991.

### ***Priority Intervention Sectors***

- Human Resource Development
- Infrastructure, rural roads

with external technical assistance. This has been the “traditional” donor pattern of intervention. But decentralized policies call for working more directly with local government and local community groups.

All of the CDs—Conakry city government, urban municipalities, CRDs, and District Councils—have a mandate to formulate a development program for their local government unit and are encouraged to seek external funding to finance their projects. In the rural areas, the emphasis is on micro-projects. These include bridges, market infrastructure improvements, rural roads, health centers, and schools. At the present time, much of the external funding for

179.

### **5.10 Soviet Union Embassy**

The Soviet Union cooperates with the GOG in the following sectors:

- The mining sector with the Office de Bauxite de Kindia (O.B.K.), this is one of the longest standing cooperative efforts between GOG and USSR.
- In the agriculture sector the Soviets are beginning a 2,500 hectare lowland rice project in the Monchon area of Boffa prefecture that should continue for many years.
- In the education sector there are 108 Soviet professors, 100 at the University of Conakry and 8 at the Geology-Mining faculty in Boke. The number of professors in Guinea will in all likelihood decrease because of insufficient financial support.
- In transportation the Soviets are building the road known as “le Prince” in Conakry.
- The Soviets have operate an oceanographic and geographic research institute in Conakry.

The Soviet Union in Guinea for the first time responded to the UNDP questionnaire for the document describing development programs for 1990. More detailed budgetary information will be available when UNDP releases this document.

### **5.11 Embassy of Switzerland**

Swiss development efforts in Guinea consists of:

- University scholarships
- Training of Post and Telecommunications and Customs personnel
- Assistance to the development of Radio-Rurale
- The Swiss recently signed a three-year agreement with the GOG to open and develop a forestry school in Mamou between 1991-1994.

### **5.12 Information on NGOs in Guinea**

To date S.C.I.O. has recorded over 200 NGOs in Guinea, 169 National NGOs and 59 international NGOs.

- SCIO considers that 69 of the registered NGOs are “Operational.” S.C.I.O. officials stress that the term “operational” in the practical sense applies to only about ten NGOs. The other NGO’s (about 90%) can only be said to be operational when they have been given financing from an external source.
- SCIO judges that local NGO’s lack experience and management skills necessary to be fully “operational.”

The following list includes the National NGO’s that are most active:

1. A.G.B.E.F. - Guinean Association for Family Welfare - This successful NGO operates in the field of family planning and maternal and child health.

2. O.I.C./Guinea - Remarkable success in professional training for carpentry, masonry and secretarial skills. Its financial resources come mostly from American organizations including USAID.
3. The C.P.A.T.A. - Center for Agricultural Promotion and Adapted Technology based in Coyah, the CPATA successfully operates in the following areas:
  - Agricultural production and food processing
  - Forest and agro-forest protection
  - Health /Nutrition
  - Technical assistance to village communities and cooperatives
4. The U.G.V.D. - Guinean Union of Development Volunteers. It operates mostly in the agricultural sector training and supporting peasant groups for garden production and marketing of vegetables and cereals. This group has recently undertaken a project to grow white maize in Dubreka Prefecture.
5. La SAMARITAINE = Guinea - This group undertakes professional training for disadvantaged youth. Some 40 youths (boys and girls) are undergoing training at its centers at Kipe and Kassa. The boys are learning carpentry, the girls (31 in all) are doing dress-making, dyeing, and cooking. Samaritaine hopes to train 300 youth between now and the year 2000.
6. A.G.A.P. - Guinea Association for Assistance to Peasants. This group is active in the areas of education, health, and maintenance of agricultural infrastructure, as well as providing support for peasant groups.
7. ALPROVI - Association for village Development. The group operates in the Faranah Prefecture and has carried out major activities in the rehabilitating rural roads and constructing schools and health centers.
8. AGUDAR - Guinea Association for the Development of Rural Cottage Industries. The group is active in Coyah and Dalaba where it trains and supports craftsmen such as dyers, weavers, and shoemakers.
9. CERAC/HEALTH - an NGO specialized in the field of health and nutrition. Apart from the health programme, it trains and supports female groups in market gardening.
10. AVOYEG - A group that operates primarily in Forecariah working on infrastructure and social amenities projects, village water supply, agricultural production, and training and support for village groupings.

*\*\*With the exception of the ALPROVI, all the local NGO's listed above received some financing from UNDP and other donors.*

## **Foreign NGOs**

Out of the 59 foreign NGOs registered at the SCIO, 34 are recognized as operational. Those mentioned during the interview were as follows:

1. Euro Action Accord - a British NGO that works in Dinguiraye and Siguiri on village water supply, market gardening, and agro-forestry.
2. The Italian G.V.C. at LABE and PITA mentioned previously constructs/renovates schools and health centers, and promotes village water supply and agriculture.
3. AFVP (France) works in several Guinean prefectures in the following areas: bas-fonds agriculture, health and health education, village water supply.
4. AFRICARE (U.S.A.) has been active in the Forest Region and has recently undertaken a rural roads project in Forecariah.
5. C.E.C.I. (Canada) an organization that works in these general areas:
  - a) Support programs in rural development that includes rural credit, agriculture and agronomic technical assistance, training and support for the National Union of Guinean Contractors.
  - b) Voluntary Cooperation Program supports the following sectors through teaching and training in Guinea:
    - Institutional support for Guinean Development NGOs - This is within the framework of the support programme for institutional strengthening of Guinea Development NGOs (PARO).
    - The PARO aims at developing national expertise in project planning and implementation. It proposes to bring about an efficient device for continued training and staffing which will develop and consolidate the operational base of national NGOs.
6. Atlas 3ic - Cooperation (France) is based at Kindia where it works on projects for processing agricultural produce and training peasant groups.
7. Plan Internation - Guinea (U.S.A.): Operates in Guekedou in the field of health and basic social infrastructure.
8. ESSOR (France)
9. CESTAS (ITALY)
10. F. FRIEDRICH EBERT (Germany)

## **Chapter 6: Factors Constraining USAID Program Strategy Objectives**

---

### **6.1 USAID Program Goal: Improved Economic and Social Well-Being of All Guineans in a Participatory Society**

The factors constraining achievement of USAID's program goal include socio-cultural, institutional, and political factors.

#### **6.1.1 Socio-Cultural Constraints**

The main social and cultural constraints to Guinean development are a legacy of the First Republic. Concentration of power in the personality of Sékou Touré and the Party-State has left an institutional void which has created several obstacles to development.

People have few institutional structures and procedures to enlist administrative support for their initiatives. Instead, they must rely on their network of personal relations to achieve goals that require support from the administration. Various levels of gifts are often required to assure a favorable outcome from such personal relations.

Guinean bureaucratic culture has socialized officials to await directives from higher authority rather than take initiative. Rather than take the risk of making a decision that commits the administration, officials have been trained to respect the political agenda of the Party-State, however arbitrary. However, officials will take risks in rent-seeking as they feel the short-term benefits far outweigh the long-term costs of losing their jobs.

The administrative reforms implemented under the structural adjustment program have compounded the feelings of insecurity of government officials. Thousands of officials have already been laid off. More lay-offs have been programmed. Job performance expectations are unclear for many officials who remain. In the meantime, officials have experienced an erosion of their standard of living. They have been deprived of the food and housing benefits of the First Republic. Their salaries have been losing ground against inflation. Their increasingly precarious economic conditions contribute to the prevalence of rent-seeking in the bureaucracy.

Government policy is to build a Guinean nation. However, people retain a hierarchy of loyalties in which loyalty to the Guinean nation only comes after loyalty to family, to village, and to ethnic and religious group.

People prefer large families. In the rural economy, family welfare is often a function of family numbers. Few families have the resources to assure development of all members to their full potential. In addition, extended family loyalties often deplete the resources of members with a measure of economic security thereby discouraging individual initiative.

People make gender distinctions in allocation of their scarce resources. Females have little formal decision-making authority in rural communities. They are at a disadvantage in terms of benefitting from rural investment. People will invest in a son's education before a daughter's; they will assure a son's income stream before a daughter's.

The average rural dweller receives few benefits from national institutions, as such. Rather, he/she depends on local social structure for access to resources. The rural elite, particularly religious leaders and local elders, continues to dominate resource rights and political participation. These long-standing dependency relationships are the keystone to organizing communities and expressing community concerns, needs, and capabilities. They can act as a brake on allocation of rural resources.

Social tension between different ethnic groups is another constraint to development. These tensions are born of historical struggles between different groups from precolonial times through the First Republic. The advent of the Second Republic heralded the eclipse of Malinké political domination in favor of the Sousou. Despite government efforts to overcome ethnic rivalry, it continues to be expressed in social tensions and occasional violence in urban areas. Voting patterns in recent municipal elections showed the importance of ethnic divisions. People are quick to interpret government actions, such as decisions on scholarship awards for overseas study, according to which ethnic groups are favored and which are not.

A further pattern of discrimination in Guinean social life exists to the disadvantage of people who fled the country during the First Republic. Many of them have professional training and experience that is otherwise difficult to find in Guinea. Yet many of them are having difficulty finding posts that fit their qualifications.

### **6.1.2 Institutional Constraints**

The First Republic “deinstitutionalized” Guinean society and left a legacy of weak institutions which have been major constraints to the development of a vigorous market economy based on increased agricultural and industrial production.

USAID/Guinea’s program strategy addresses three major institutional constraints blocking Guinean efforts to revitalize the economy:

- inefficiency and corruption in government and the state bureaucracy;
- an inadequate educational system; and
- weak financial institutions.

While the GOG has done much to ameliorate these constraints, much more needs to be done to overcome these institutional weaknesses.

Despite appropriate GOG policy reforms to streamline and adapt the state bureaucracy to its new mission of fostering a liberal market economy, the state bureaucracy still has not reached the level of efficiency needed to effectively implement and sustain GOG policy reforms. Most Guinean civil servants lack the training, experience, and qualifications to manage complex modern bureaucratic structures. The few Guinean cadres having the requisite skills are overworked and not able to meet all the heavy demands made on them by donors and the GOG. Although the quality of civil servants in the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy has definitely improved, not much has been done to improve the quality of middle- and low-level civil servants responsible for implementing policies at the grassroots levels or to provide them with adequate financial and material resources to do their job properly.

Bureaucratic efficiency has also been marred by frequent changes in personnel and command structures which undermine bureaucratic authority and consensus, blurred authority lines between civil servants and the military, and poor comprehension by civil servants of their job descriptions. Finally, corruption still plagues all levels of the bureaucracy. Corruption has not only led to the misallocation of public resources; it has also raised the transaction costs of doing business in Guinea to the extent that many foreign and domestic investors no longer want to invest in Guinea.

The First Republic left Guinea with one of the most underdeveloped and dysfunctional educational systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Teachers at the university and secondary school levels were poorly trained, underqualified, and often unmotivated; the quality of teaching was low and classes overcrowded. Primary school education suffered from exceptionally large classes, a scarcity of texts and other materials, and a highly politicized curriculum in the local languages which delayed the acquisition of fluency in French. Guinea's shortage of well-trained technical, administrative, and entrepreneurial cadres is largely the result of Guinea's inadequate educational system. During the early years of the Second Republic, little was done to rehabilitate Guinea's educational system. Much remains to be done to reform and expand Guinea's educational system so that Guineans can effectively manage the development of their country. Weak financial institutions are a third major institutional constraint to further economic expansion. The banks are in a difficult situation due to poor repayment rates of loans and relatively small portfolios due to a paucity of bankable projects and reliable investors. Public investment is almost entirely dependent upon donor largesse and the banks have little capital to finance private sector investment. Moreover, Guinean banks are not set up to offer rural credit to farmers needing funds to modernize and improve their operations. The BCRG also suffers from a lack of trained personnel needed to exercise effective control over the private banking system and its own institution.

### **6.1.3 Political Constraints**

Political constraints hinder the present regime in building an efficient public sector and the business climate needed for promoting a vigorous market economy. These include the following:

- the refusal of the military to return to their barracks and leave the governing of the country to civilians;
- the absence of national political institutions and limited public confidence in government;
- the need to buy social peace by compensating losers hurt by policy changes; and
- interethnic rivalries which could threaten political stability.

Although the military, to its credit, overthrew a corrupt and repressive regime and introduced major liberal political and economic reforms in Guinea, it now constitutes one of the major obstacles to better governance. Expenditures on the military and security forces comprise an estimated 30 percent of national budgetary revenues and constitute a drain on limited public resources. The military has used its power to acquire privileges not enjoyed by civil servants, urban dwellers, and other groups of citizens who have been asked to make sacrifices in the

name of policy reform. The military still remains largely unaccountable to civilian government and has retarded the democratization process in order to retain its privileges.

Another political constraint closely related to the persistence of the military in power is the absence of national political institutions giving Guinean citizens a greater voice in national affairs. These are needed to make the government more accountable to its people and to create a suitable climate for debating public policies. The resistance of the regime to establishing national political institutions has undermined its legitimacy and public confidence and has been a major source of political tension in the country.

The government's decision to double the salary of civil servants before the end of the year and to increase family allowances for children has revealed that the regime is not secure enough to impose harsh austerity measures and make them stick. Instead, it has opted to buy social peace at the expense of several programs which will be dropped from the budget to provide revenues to pay for salary increases. Its limited authority also compels the regime to buy off the military by maintaining their privileges as part of the cost of getting them to return to the barracks and not intervene to stop the process of democratization.

Finally, interethnic rivalries exacerbated by competition for power and greater access to state resources pose a potentially dangerous threat to Guinean political stability and social peace. Both political stability and social peace are needed to create a favorable climate for foreign and domestic investment and the mobilization of national energies and resources.

Notwithstanding the difficulties raised by the above systemic political constraints in implementing democratization at the national level, and the limited capacity of USAID/Guinea to affect these constraints, USAID/Guinea's strategic goal of increasing Guinean participation in defining and managing social and financial development can be promoted at the local level.

## **6.2 USAID Subgoals<sup>1</sup>**

### **6.2.1 Increased Household Income from Non-mining Activities**

The main constraint to increased household income from non-mining activities lies in the performance of the market place. Costs and impediments in the market system have a negative impact on market exchanges. These costs and impediments distort the transmission of market signals to producers and dilute the incentives the market system sends them to produce whatever the commodity or service.

Any transaction that involves displacement of goods or people is subject to delays, costs, insecurities, damage, and rough handling of the transport system. The state of rural infrastructure may contribute to driving costs of goods and services beyond the budget of the potential consumer.

---

<sup>1</sup> The SIP is based on a USAID draft program strategy logframe of August 1991. Minor changes in wording but not in substance may have occurred before final submission of the FY 1991 to FY 1996 CPSP in September 1991.

Institutional constraints also have an impact on increasing household income. In many areas, farmer-operated cooperatives are just getting off the ground. Rural enterprises are also having as much trouble organizing themselves as finding a niche for their production. Government institutions have limited material, financial, and human resources. They have not been able to give households much effective support in increasing their incomes.

At all levels, a major constraint on increasing household income has been the lack of institutions for financial intermediation and the scarcity of investment funds available to small-scale entrepreneurs whether in the production or the service sector.

### **6.2.2 Improved Participation of all Guineans in Defining and Managing Social and Economic Development**

The persistence of military domination of the GOG and the absence of national political institutions have been major constraints to improved participation of Guineans in defining and managing social and economic development at the national level.

The PREF reforms carried out by the military regime with donor support were imposed from above with little consultation of the Guinean people or even the rank and file in the state bureaucracy. The government's dependency on donors for financial and technical assistance and the paucity of well-trained Guinean personnel have resulted in relatively limited Guinean participation, even within the government, in formulating and managing Guinea's national development program.

The current regime's power and authority derive from the military coup which installed its own leader as president of Guinea rather than from a mandate from the Guinean people. It thus lacks legitimacy as the government is not the outcome of a national election. By not holding national elections and delaying the creation of political parties and a national press, the regime has slowed down the process of democratization and limited popular participation in government to those acceptable to the regime. Important opposition elements still remain outside the political process. Furthermore, the absence of national newspapers and political parties reflecting divergent views has prevented the emergence of vigorous public debate over Guinean economic and social development policy.

The application of the new constitution may alleviate some of the constraints and provide new opportunities for participation as national political representative institutions are established and restrictions on entry to the political system are lifted. Once national political life is restored, informational and educational campaigns by the media will be needed to overcome the public's lack of experience and knowledge about elections and modern electoral procedures.

The GOG has done much more to improve Guinean participation in defining and managing social and economic development at the grassroots level by creating District Councils, CRDs, and urban communes which have the power to elaborate their own development programs and budgets. However, effective participation and control over planning and managing these programs is limited by the state's authority over these institutions, the fear of local citizens to take initiatives before getting the approval of the administrative authorities, the lack

of skills and experience of elected officials in financial and administrative management, and limited revenues to finance social and economic development projects.

### **6.3 USAID Strategic Objectives**

#### **6.3.1 *Increased Sustainable Private Sector Agricultural and Value-Added Output for Domestic and Export Markets***

The most serious constraints to production for marketing goods, services, and agricultural commodities in Guinea can be grouped under the general heading of economic constraints. Foremost among the economic constraints is lack of credit. Limitations on the ability to finance sales through credit limits the number and size of transactions at all levels of the system. Limitations on the number and size of transactions reins in incentives that producers of goods, services, and agricultural commodities receive to increase their production. Limitations on the ability to finance production through credit limits production.

Without access to credit, the capital of all of the operators in the agricultural marketing system is too meager for them to make large purchases at favorable prices at harvest time, to store for six to nine months to take advantage of later price rises. Such a pattern would tend to moderate price swings during the year by raising the producer price at harvest time and reducing the consumer price when the larger stocks are liquidated later in the year.

Actors in the agricultural marketing systems from wholesalers down must move their stocks rapidly and avoid tying up their meager funds for any length of time. In addition, merchants must often sell so low in order to free up their capital that their profit margins preclude any capital accumulation. Marketing permits market actors to contribute to family subsistence, but it only infrequently allows them to go beyond.

An important factor keeping prices and, therefore marketing margins, too low to permit capital accumulation is the low income level of the consumers. Consumers can generally afford only small purchases at any time. Prices are kept low and profit margins are minimal on such purchases.

Since capital resources and profit margins are so low at all levels of agricultural marketing systems in Guinea, actors are careful to minimize their risk and exposure in the market place.

Other economic constraints are responsible for adding costs to prices for goods, services, and agricultural commodities. They thereby discourage consumption and, consequently, production.

The cost of transport, for example, is unnecessarily high. UNTRG has established a standard national rate of 125 GF/km ton. However, the rate varies according to the price transport operators must pay for gas on a particular day and the sums they have to pay rent-seeking authorities at barriers along their route. In addition, rates must often cover the transporter's costs of a return trip without a load.

Processing of most agricultural commodities is done by hand or not at all. Hand processing often has a negative impact on the quality of the commodity. Lack of processing of many commodities, fruit and vegetables in particular, leaves the commodity vulnerable to high

spoilage rates which, likewise, must have an impact on the cost of that commodity successfully marketed and, by extension, on the incentives for further production.

The transaction costs that cover person-time for a large sale are more or less the same as for a small one. Therefore, transaction costs per unit benefit from economies of scale in large sales. Due to modest income levels, however, consumers normally make their purchases in such small quantities that high transaction costs raise the price of the commodity.

A final element that adds unnecessary costs to marketing of goods and agricultural commodities, and depresses production is the presence of rent-seeking representatives of law and order authorities along the routes. These agents routinely pull vehicles off the road, particularly trucks, to inspect them. When the value of the load is determined, the agents assess a charge that the transporter must pay the agents in order to continue. These fees are not legal. If transporters refuse to pay they will not be allowed to continue and may risk their cargo. Pay-offs to agents increase all costs along the distribution network.

A second major set of constraints on the performance of the marketing systems for goods, services, and agricultural commodities in Guinea lies in the infrastructure and transport system.

According to Aberg and Blacque-Belair (1990), after lack of credit, the poor condition of the road system in Guinea is the most serious constraint on the performance of agricultural marketing systems. This observation is just as true for the output of rural enterprise. People have no incentive to produce past a certain point unless they can distribute their output, whether goods or agricultural commodities, outside their locality. Shortcomings in the transport system in the rural areas of Guinea add such costs to marketing in many areas that they discourage expansion of production.

Various donors are addressing this problem. The condition of the roads adds considerable time to any trip. It reduces the useful life of motor vehicles and aggravates spoilage in transit of perishable agricultural commodities and other fragile goods.

The Guinean vehicle fleet tends to be old, out of date, and in poor repair. Acquisition of spare parts to maintain the vehicles properly has been a problem.

Commodity transport is complicated by difficulties in purchasing fuel for transport vehicles. Filling stations are scarce outside the major urban centers. Scarcity of filling stations has an impact on transport activities in certain parts of the country. However, the presence of a filling station does not guarantee the presence of fuel supplies. Dependable availability of clean fuel is an element attracting transporters to pick up locally produced goods or agricultural commodities for market.

Low-cost, low-loss storage facilities for agricultural commodities are also scarce, particularly in rural Guinea. Most storage depots are humid, infested with insects and parasites, and not particularly specialized for the crops they receive. Losses are high. Terpend (1991) estimates peanut losses in storage at 50 percent, losses for fresh tubers at 25 percent to 30 percent, but at 10 percent for dry tubers. She suggests that grains store best. Their losses are about 10 percent. Losses increase as a function of the length of time in storage. Due to the normal operating conditions of agricultural marketing systems in Guinea, grains are kept in storage depots

only a few weeks before they are sold. If it were economically possible to store grains for longer periods, the problem of storage losses would certainly become more acute.

Marketing of fruits and vegetables, particularly for export, presents its own set of constraints. Production support is difficult to find for fruits and vegetables. The most appropriate genetic material to supply target markets has yet to be identified and extended to farmers in technical packages. Fertilizer is only marginally available in rural areas. The one Guinean plant capable of manufacturing packing materials closed its doors for good recently. Guinea still has no processing facility capable of treating large quantities of fruit and vegetables for international shipment or storage facility where commodities can await loading for final destinations.

Most importantly, however, fruits and vegetables have hitherto been shipped to European markets by air. Air shipment now costs upwards of 4.5 FF per kg. The less expensive alternative would be ocean shipment. However, ocean shipment requires loads of 300 MT to 500 MT to make it economically worthwhile for ocean-going ships to put into port. It would also require installation of a complete cold chain and other port improvements to enable loading the boat from 30 to 50 large trucks in a day or two.

On the policy level, liberalization of the economy may be discouraging expansion of the agricultural sector. Imported rice is less expensive than domestic rice, particularly since increases in the cost of inputs have placed fertilizer beyond the reach of most farmers. Increasing imports of rice, meat, and milk are competing favorably with local production. The most cost-effective use of family resources is increasingly to allocate time to generating revenue to buy imports rather than to increase agricultural production.

Government institutions, such as MARA's technical departments, are still having trouble establishing effective operations, particularly at the regional and prefectural levels. The most important shortcoming is in the area of research and extension. Farmers do not get the support they need to identify and apply adaptive technical packages to expand production. At the same time, the effectiveness of MARA support is largely a function of the technical expertise of its staff. Therefore, improvements in the technical training of the staff at all levels should have a positive impact on the performance of the agricultural sector.

Other institutional constraints are particularly pertinent to creation of sustainable private sector agricultural production for market. For example, a key constraint is the appropriate level of authority for the appropriate level of rights and responsibilities for management of local productive resources. A second issue is how to assure that the appropriate management level has the authority it requires. These issues can be solved only in the context of legal codes and their application. Unless individuals and local communities have security of tenure and the authority to manage the resources that they use, the chances for successful management are poor. At the same time, spillover effects that extend beyond local and national frontiers imply that management at the national and even international level is necessary.

Efforts to increase household income have little hope for success without the participation of the local population. Several projects have begun to implement participatory approaches: BRP Mamou, BRP Pita, ESSOR, and PDA Timbi Madina (VED). None has yet developed and documented an effective methodology for catalyzing local participation. Other constraints to implementing participatory development include the following:

- a lack of experience of farmers and technical specialists in collaborative development;
- low levels of appropriate training and experience of GOG staff;
- ambiguities in tenure and usufruct;
- rural exodus and labor constraints;
- gender constraints;
- the low level of organization of the population into producer groups; and
- social isolation and poor communication.

Labor is a major constraint for intensive management schemes. For example, rural exodus has created a severe labor shortage in the Fouta Djallon. Projects often assume that labor, while perhaps not a free good, is nonetheless available for worthwhile activities. This cannot be assumed everywhere in Guinea. Any schemes which create additional demands for labor will need to do a serious evaluation of whether or not this labor is available, who will provide it, and when and what trade-offs that person or family unit will have to make.

### **6.3.2 Improved Human Resources for Sustainable Economic Growth**

The general constraints toward achieving this subgoal can be summarized under three current areas of intervention: health care, formal education, and human resource development.

The major efforts to improve the medical services delivery system are to upgrade the health infrastructure; expand and improve the training of health personnel, and redeploy personnel in the rural areas; provide all the levels of health care with sufficient equipment and medicine to meet the needs of the population; implement a cost recovery system for services and medicines that will improve the chances for a sustainable health care system; and develop a participatory health care system at the local level so that people are more involved with curative services and more receptive to the preventive component of the National Health Plan.

The Primary Health Care system as implemented in Guinea is consistent with the process of decentralization and increased participation of local populations in defining and managing their own socioeconomic development. There continues to be a human resource problem for many of the villagers who are members of their village health center. Committee members who lack literacy and numeracy skills are effectively limited in their roles to watch over health center budgets. The low level of literacy and numeracy among the rural population is a constraint to local management ability in many areas.

Training programs for health personnel have proliferated, and the health workers' capabilities seem to be steadily improving. To change the authoritative command structure that characterizes the public health hierarchy and to devise some system to overcome the current situation of only intermittent communication between fieldworkers, their supervisors and the health ministry remains to be overcome. Even with salary increases, the salaries remain low, and it appears that fieldworkers are expected to do increasingly more work as the services under the Primary Health Care program expand. Health care personnel working in the more remote areas of the country provide services to the neediest segment of the population, but it is very difficult to convince the most qualified people to serve in these areas without a stronger

financial incentive. Given the financial limitations of the government, the solution to this problem will be difficult to work out, and are certain to be beyond the means of any one organization.

There are still segments of the Guinean population that lack access to basic curative services. The isolation of remote areas makes it increasingly difficult to maintain the projected pace for opening health centers, yet the need for curative services is so great that it takes the majority of the time and effort of most government health workers, leaving them little time for preventive health education. The sectoral analysis described the many people providing health services to Guineans, yet there is little coordination between public, private, and community or traditional health providers. Much remains to be learned about what factors influence peoples' decisions to seek treatment from the different health services available.

The formal education system is in the process of sectoral adjustment which involves the reallocation of resources from higher to primary education; the reallocation of teaching personnel from urban to rural schools and from secondary to primary schools; and the adoption of innovative teaching methods to maximize space and personnel.

The human resource problem is evident again as the PASE seeks to redress a wide variety of deeply rooted problems in all parts of the education system simultaneously through an under-skilled, unmotivated, and fragmented education system. Even after reorganization, the staffing of the educational sector is top-heavy at the Ministry.

In terms of long-term benefits to a large proportion of the population, education, similar to health, should be maintained as a priority development area. The Guinean government continues to need assistance on how to reallocate budgetary resources to achieve its own development goals. There are powerful vested interests to overcome and political stability is uncertain. Additionally there is the problem of the continued dependence of the Guinean economy on mining revenues.

The Human Resource Development Training/Assistance to public and private sector actors has been underway for three years in the attempt to foster liberal economic policies that will encourage a competitive market. In terms of project objectives, Guinea has surpassed the number of people successfully trained and, more importantly, surpassed the proportion of women trained.

The persistence of public officials' negative attitudes toward the private sector undermines public sector support for private sector initiative and entrepreneurship. USAID has developed a "critical mass" strategy whereby a significant number of highly placed people in areas of government that interact with the private sector receive training and exposure to experiences that can positively influence their attitudes.

A component of the program that still has to be developed is some type of institution or forum for private and public sector actors to meet and discuss common interests and problems. This is very important if public and private actors are to develop a "common language" with which to overcome the difficulties facing Guinean socioeconomic development. The current configuration of the CCIAG does not meet this need.

The HRDA was designed to meet immediate short-term needs for skilled and knowledgeable people in the development process. Although several local professional training institutions are more capable and stronger as a result of this program, some institutional capacity remains to be developed for higher-level, broadly based training to reach a wider population who will be in future leadership positions.

### **6.3.3 Increased Local-Level Participation in Economic and Social Development Planning and Management**

Constraints to and opportunities for local-level participation in economic and social development planning and management differ somewhat in urban and rural areas due to differences in needs, educational levels, social practices, basic infrastructure, revenue bases, and local government structures.

In the rural areas, the local populations participate in economic and social development planning and management through the District Councils, which can be found everywhere in the country, and the CRDs, which thus far have been established in less than 10 percent of Guinea's subprefectures.

Some of the major constraints to increased local-level participation in government in rural areas include the following:

- social customs which tend to exclude women and young people from holding public office;
- poor communications and road networks which make it difficult for people and officials from outlying areas to attend meetings held at the seat of local government. This is particularly true of the CRDs whose boundaries are much larger than those of the District Councils;
- suspicion and mistrust of government due to the legacy of the past;
- lack of information concerning the mission, functions, and powers of the District Councils and CRDs;
- lack of experience of local populations in working through the District Councils and CRDs because of their recent creation; and
- the tradition of state authority over local government institutions which make the prefects, subprefects, and other administrative officials the primary decision makers in planning and managing local-level development.

The above constraints relate to participation; it is also important to identify the major constraints to effective planning and management of social and economic development by local officials. These include the following:

- lack of understanding of budgetary process and financial management techniques;
- lack of experience and skills in designing development projects and formulating requests for financial aid from GOG, NGOs, and donors;
- lack of consensus concerning development priorities;
- inadequate control mechanisms for preventing corruption and misuse of public funds by local government officials, administrative officials, and suppliers; and

- heavy-handed intervention by authority officials which prevents local government members from taking the initiative in budgetary and development project planning.

Local-level participation in economic and social development planning and management also takes place within various nongovernmental organizations and associations (e.g., chambers of commerce, private firms, village cooperatives, merchant's associations, women's groups, and community management of natural renewable resources). Constraints to increased participation here include the following:

- lack of credit and limited capital to finance their activities;
- poor access to markets;
- difficulty getting official recognition and legal status for their organization from the state;
- high transaction costs involved in organizing and keeping the organization going; and
- high transaction costs of doing business due to shakedowns by state officials.

Effective planning and management for such groups and organizations in the private sector are constrained by inadequate financial management skills; lack of information concerning potential markets, improved production technologies, and government regulations; and inadequate control mechanisms to prevent embezzlement, theft, and other misuse of the organization's resources.

In the urban areas, local-level participation in social and economic development planning and management takes place in the public sector in local government institutions such as the Municipal Councils and Conakry's City Council, and, in the private sector, through various socio-professional and economic organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, trade unions, professional associations, private companies, local NGOs, and religious institutions.

Major constraints to increased local-level participation and involvement in local government in Conakry and the urban municipalities include the following:

- a large, floating population of temporary residents with few attachments to their neighborhood (Conakry);
- a lack of familiarity and experience in dealing with municipal institutions;
- a general mistrust and suspicion of government;
- a lack of information concerning the kinds of problems and issues that can be dealt with through urban government institutions; and
- state authority traditions which leave citizens relying upon the central government to provide most public goods and services, thus discouraging local initiative.

Many of the major constraints to effective local-level planning and management of social and economic development are similar to those found in the rural areas (e.g., lack of financial management skills and understanding of budgetary process on the part of local officials,

insufficient understanding of state regulations, lack of adequate control mechanisms to check corruption and misuse of public funds, and lack of experience and skills needed to design development projects and obtain funding from external sources). However, there are also constraints peculiar to a large city such as Conakry: an insufficient pool of technical expertise to effectively manage city water and electricity supplies, garbage collection, industrial zoning, and other municipal services and facilities; the absence of clear-cut property rights to land and buildings owned by residents and businessmen; unchecked and anarchic urban sprawl; and widespread social unrest exacerbated by interethnic rivalries, high levels of unemployment, and deteriorating living standards.

The regime's economic liberalization measures have fostered a dramatic increase in local-level participation in private sector organizations involved in economic and social planning and management. Although usually better educated than rural Guineans, urban businessmen and professionals in the private sector often lack the financial, technical, and administrative skills needed to effectively manage a modern business organization and suffer from constraints similar to those faced by their rural counterparts.

## **6.4 Implications for USAID Programs**

### **6.4.1 Target—Increased Sustainable Private Sector Investment in Agricultural Production and Marketing**

Reaching the target of increased sustainable private sector investment in agricultural production and marketing means action in several spheres.

Investment responds best to demand pull forces. People will invest money when they feel they have a fairly secure market for their output. Therefore, scouting markets for agricultural output is an essential element for reaching this target. A useful strategy might be to factor backwards from a knowledge of the markets to technical packages to extend to producers. They would thus be in a position to enter market windows with the right variety and with the right specifications when they open up.

Private investment capital is scarce in Guinea. Shortage of credit is a severe limitation on the amount of product the marketing system can handle and, by extension, it tempers the incentives to produce. Similarly, shortage of credit constrains agricultural production. Therefore, opening a credit window to underwrite market transactions would be another essential element in reaching this target. Specialists in the field will have to determine the nature, operational modalities, and institutional home of this credit window.

Guinean institutions have little experience or capability, either at the national or the local level, promoting private sector agricultural marketing. Scouting markets, disseminating marketing information, identifying and extending technical packages to satisfy those markets, and, possibly, brokering transactions are functions which require a national-level institution. However, the nature of this target precludes public sector institutions filling that role. Again, the mandate, charter, structure, and operational modalities of this institution is a subject for further study.

Producers at the local level, discouraged by their experience of collectivization under the First Republic, are interested in community associations, but are struggling to find an ap-

to reach to make them operationally effective. In many parts of Africa, cooperatives reap benefits for their members of quantity discounts for commodity purchases and of wholesale prices from assembling production for sale. Therefore, a further contribution to achieving this target would be the development and implementation of a methodology for catalyzing participatory community organizations capable of mediating marketing transactions and for extension support for their membership.

#### **6.4.2 Target—Lowered Costs of Agricultural Marketing**

The practical solution to weaknesses in the national transport network is to target fruit and vegetables produced in Maritime Guinea, a region which specializes in such production. Attempts to collect production regularly farther afield may lead to increased transport costs and confidence crises between producers and intermediaries.

Assembling fruit and vegetable shipments large enough for economic ocean transport to Europe will present a challenge. Producers have hitherto sold their harvests in small quantities. Financial resources in the marketing system have been too sparse to underwrite large transactions. Moreover, the risks and exposure at all levels in the marketing system would be prohibitive.

Implementation of an agricultural export project targeting fruit and vegetable exports for Europe implies a restructuring of the current fruit and vegetable market and of its usual marketing practices. The first challenge of penetrating the European market is to identify a well-placed intermediary and accommodate the business practices of the European distributors. This would be followed by the challenge of assembling large quantities of production on a given schedule, collecting it at the farm gate, handling and treating it for ocean shipment, transporting it to the port, and loading it on ships.

#### **6.4.3 Target—Increased Viable, Rural-Based, Small-Scale Enterprise Activity**

The strategy for reaching the target of increased viable, rural-based, small-scale enterprise activity is similar to that for reaching agricultural production and marketing targets.

A demand-pull strategy holds the greatest promise. The strategy should begin by identifying markets for goods and services within the technical mastery of small-scale rural enterprise. Once the markets have been identified, demand signals can be factored backwards to indicate to the entrepreneurs what they may profitably produce.

At this point, entrepreneurs may need assistance in three areas. Virtually all entrepreneurs will need access to credit to underwrite production, particularly if they are expanding their scale of operations. Many will also need assistance in adapting their administrative skills, particularly their business management skills, to the challenges of increased scale of operations. Finally, a number of entrepreneurs will need technical assistance in their particular area of production to establish and maintain quality standards, to adopt cost-effective systems for producing goods and services on a larger scale, to increase productivity, and to identify measures for cutting costs.

Performance of rural-based, small-scale enterprise will, as agricultural production systems, be plagued by the inadequacies of transport infrastructure and transport systems. The consequent high costs of transport will have a fundamental impact on the viability of the enter-

prises, yet will be only marginally responsive to management improvements they initiate. Public sector initiatives to improve the performance of transport systems will potentially have a positive impact on the performance of rural-based, small-scale enterprise.

#### **6.4.4 Target—Strengthened Private Sector Human Resources**

The private sector in Guinea does not yet have strong institutions that can organize and promote their interests (i.e., cooperatives, unions, and professional associations). The sector appears to be fragmented, competitive, and paternalistic as characterized by patron-client relationships. Continued exposure of private sector actors to such organizations in neighboring countries, and the continued development of their technical skills can lead to long-term improvements. Adult literacy and numeracy programs are needed in many rural areas. Looking toward the future, the complement to training programs aimed at the active adult population is to increase access to and improve basic and higher educational facilities.

It is important that human resource development needs be closely aligned with labor market needs. One needs only to look at Kenya where literacy rates are high and public education is available to all, yet the unemployment problem is deep and, as a result of their education, Kenyan youth are not interested in returning to the countryside.

People who have completed training programs and are enthusiastic about new ideas frequently lack the means of position to implement what they've learned. There is a real need in Guinea for employment creation opportunities. The Guinea Rural Enterprise Development project should have a positive impact in this regard, as it intends to help people obtain credit so they can act upon their ideas and eventually achieve economies of scale in the private sector.

#### **6.4.5 Target—Improved Performance of Public Sector to Promote Private Sector Growth and Manage Public Sector Functions**

Public sector actors need to understand that the development of the Guinean private sector holds the key to a prosperous future for Guineans. Government attitudes and practices that have developed over a period of 26 years do not change in seven years, but continued exposure of the current generation to new ideas and practices can have short-term benefits. The long term depends on adequate preparation of the next generation of government workers.

The public sector needs to learn how a strong private sector can create resources which will help the government, tax base, and diversified revenues from exports. Currently, the HRDA program generally has separate training for public and private sector actors as the skills they need are different. The inauguration of follow-up seminars could be organized to bring trainee graduates together.

The HRDA and basic education training programs both seek to improve the management and administrative skills of different areas of the public sector. These programs should have both immediate and long-term positive effects on the private sector. Improved job performance will lead to a more efficient government, and improved basic education will lead to the creation of a better-educated society with the necessary skills to actively participate and manage their own development.

**6.4.6 Target—Improved Quality and Increased Enrollment in Primary Schools with Special Emphasis on Rural and Female Participation**

It has been suggested that the possibility of working with Koranic schools to promote literacy and numeracy be explored. This type of educational system, modern Koranic schools that teach other subjects, has been successfully implemented in the Gambia. It requires identifying people or a group who are capable of teaching both the Koran and basic reading and writing skills.

**6.4.7 Target—Increased Ability of Families to Determine Household Size**

In order to increase the ability of families to determine their household size, households must have access to family planning information, services, and technologies. To maximize coverage, these must be made available through both public, private, and community or traditional medical practitioners.

The public needs more information about the relationships between population, family planning, and household living standards. Means to support education initiatives in public schools as well as local seminars and mass media need to be explored as to what is most effective to reach different segments of the population. For clear economic reasons, the effort should be concentrated initially in urban areas where limited family size should lead to healthier families, and an effort to constrain urban growth rates/population increase may help ease the pressures on urban services.

The potential male-female problems surrounding the use of family planning techniques should be addressed and accommodated. Large family size continues to be a source of pride, prestige, and perceived social security. Marital instability can result from perceptions of infertility or infidelity.

**6.4.8 Target—Increased Local Revenue Generation and Improved Local Revenue Management**

Increased local revenue generation for local government requires interventions that will increase the local tax base. Rural Guinea has an exceptionally low tax base as much of the rural economy is still not monetized and thus has little cash that can be tapped by the CDs. Programs to increase the tax base by increasing commercial activities would include:

- improving rural roads to lower transportation costs and increase access to markets;
- conducting programs to increase productivity to permit farmers to produce a marketable surplus (e.g., rural credit to purchase better equipment and inputs, support of IRAG research programs and MARA extension services);
- providing better market information for farmers and rural entrepreneurs; and
- developing projects to improve local capacity to manage natural renewable resources and the ability of local communities to generate revenues through rational exploitation of forestry resources.

Guinea's lack of tradition in local government and the population's mistrust of government in general are also major constraints to the mobilization of rural resources for the CRDs and

District Councils. Rural Guineans see taxation primarily as a burden imposed on them by the administration rather than a means to provide needed public services. They don't see the connection between taxes and services, especially when the taxes collected through the District Council get handed over to the subprefect and prefect. Measures to increase taxpayer confidence in local government and decrease temptations to evade taxes would include the following:

- changes in the rules so that tax monies would stay in the hands of local government and not be handed over to local administration officials before being turned back to local government; and
- translation of basic texts concerning local government finances from French into the local languages and the diffusion of simple explanations of how people's taxes provide local government, which represents them, with revenues to produce needed services. Explanations could also be provided through rural radio.

In the rural areas, the major source of revenue is the head tax. Improved census data and recordkeeping techniques which would systematically register all eligible taxpayers would likely expand the taxrolls and generate increased revenues for local government. Training of local government officials in better recordkeeping techniques and financial support to obtain simple computers and appropriate software are concrete measures to achieve this goal.

The identification of areas of potential taxation which would be both acceptable to the local population and bring in more revenue would be helpful. Authoritative rules should be made more flexible so that local communities would have the right to levy taxes on certain activities and services up to a certain point without having to submit them for the approval of the central government.

Rural residents could also be encouraged to make in-kind contributions (e.g., labor, land, building materials) to local government projects. Increased mobilization of greater local resources for local government would depend upon the popularity of the project with the people being asked to make the contribution. Public meetings could be held at the village and district levels to discuss local priorities and how to mobilize local resources.

Increased revenues for local government can also be obtained through external resources. Donors, NGOs, and the GOG have funds available to finance small-scale development projects. Specific measures to assist local government in obtaining these resources would be training of local government officials and employees in project design and grant application techniques and the circulation of information to local communities on how they can apply for grants and the conditions they must meet to get them.

Increased revenue generation in urban areas are affected by many of the constraints listed above—mistrust of local populations in government, nonrelationship between taxes collected and services rendered, a floating population that is difficult to put on the taxrolls, and low incomes. In the urban centers of the interior, the head tax is also a major source of income. However, urban centers also have a higher tax potential because more commercial and, therefore, taxable activities take place there. Urban areas also have more clearly taxable property resources than the rural areas. On the other hand, towns are expected to provide services

often not provided in rural areas such as electricity, paved streets, garbage collection, and social services. User fees can be charged or increased to help pay for the costs of these services.

Most elected local rural government officials have little experience and lack basic skills in financial management and budgetary processes. Although the president is responsible for managing the CRD's finances, he is assisted by an accountant from MEF and a secretary from SED. Improved local revenue management measures would include training for the presidents and officers

of the District Councils and CRDs in preparing budgets, supervising disbursements, and understanding procurement procedures, contractual obligations, and legal penalties for misuse of public funds. Joint seminars would be held with local government officials and representatives to discuss ways of ensuring transparency and more efficient revenue management. Similar kinds of training programs could also be initiated for the mayors and urban municipal officials which would be adopted more to urban financial management problems. Numeracy and functional literacy training could also be offered for illiterate local government officials in the local languages. Numeracy training would be particularly important for understanding local government finances.

Ensuring the production and provision of quality local government services constitutes an important component of improved local government revenue management. Local government officials will need to devise measures to control the quality of the work which they contract with the private sector. In the rural areas, local entrepreneurs—road and bridge builders, construction workers, electricians, and others in the private sector performing services for local government—often lack the technical and management skills needed to do a good job. Training programs to upgrade these skills should be established. Joint seminars between local government officials and local entrepreneurs should be organized and would discuss such topics as government standards and regulations to ensure quality, procurement and disbursement procedures, the mutual rights and obligations of local government and private contractors, and mechanisms for conflict resolution and sanctioning violations of contractual obligations. Again, similar training programs and joint private-public sector seminars adopted to urban realities could be established for the urban municipalities and Conakry.

These recommendations could be incorporated into a USAID democratization and governance program.

#### **6.4.9 Target—Increased Accountability of Efforts at the Local Level**

Participation and public confidence in local government and the state bureaucracy are enhanced when greater accountability is ensured. Several measures can be taken to increase the accountability of CD and locally based state officials to their constituents. Minutes of the CD proceedings could be translated into the local languages and transmitted in written or oral form by local officials through postings or in public meetings. The books of the CD would be translated into the local language and made available for public scrutiny. Informational campaigns in the local languages could be conducted explaining the role of local government, sources of revenue, how money is spent, and ideas for designing and financing developmental activities. Rural radio could be used to transmit this information.

A watchdog citizen's committee could be set up to monitor CD spending and procurement procedures, and to evaluate the quality of work done by private sector contractors as a safeguard against corruption. An ombudsman-type of office could also be established in each CRD to collect and process citizen complaints about administrative abuses, misuse of public funds, and discriminatory practices in recruiting personnel or giving out government contracts. The ombudsman office would investigate the complaints and seek redress for the wronged party or clear the accused party if deemed innocent. If the conflict was not resolved to the satisfaction of the concerned parties, the case could be taken to the Council of Elders, higher administrative channels, or the court system. Trusted people chosen by the community would comprise these committees and receive training in the skills needed to carry out their watchdog and ombudsman duties. Before introducing these new institutions, these ideas should be pre-tested in meetings with the local populations to ascertain their compatibility with traditional African practices and cultural norms as well as their feasibility at this stage of local government development.

Peace Corps Volunteers with local language skills could play an important role in assisting local efforts to make the CDs more accountable. Extensive use could also be made of appropriate Guinean NGOs familiar with Guinean society, which could receive USAID technical and financial assistance to increase their capacity to provide the kind of training and informational activities suggested above. USAID/Guinea could also explore the possibility of financing a private Guinean local self-governance foundation which would promote better governance and increased participation in Guinean public institutions.

## **6.5 Areas Where Crucial Information is Not Available**

### **6.5.1 Informal Sector**

The urban informal sector is the fastest growing part of the Guinean economy. Most data available on the informal sector provides a static profile of the size and kinds of activities taking place. More data needs to be gathered concerning the growth dynamics of different sub-sectors of the informal economy (i.e., the provision of private health services). The results could then be used to design projects to provide training and credit to support the expansion of informal sector activities.

### **6.5.2 Failures of Private Sector Investment**

While there is much anecdotal information about the causes of private sector investment failure in Guinea, there is no systematic analysis of this phenomenon. Data should be collected concerning the number of firms shutting down in Guinea and the reasons for their failure. Interviews and questionnaires would systematically gather data concerning credit, marketing, labor, management, and corruption problems in order to identify the key causes of failure. This information could be used by USAID/Conakry to design projects that would address these constraints.

### **6.5.3 Socioeconomic Impact of the Reform Program of the Second Republic**

Cornell University has prepared a nutritional study which provides good baseline data concerning basic socioeconomic conditions in Conakry households. Follow-up studies should be

supported to trace the socioeconomic impact of PREF reforms on Guinean households over time. These studies would be used to complement World Bank studies using other measures to ascertain the impact of structural adjustment programs on Guinean society.

#### **6.5.4 *Links of the Guinean Emigrant Community with the Guinean Economy***

One of the most important potential sources for mobilizing economic and human resources is the Guinean emigrant community living in other African countries, in Europe, and in North America. Many of the larger Guinean businesses begun under the Second Republic have been initiated by former emigrants. Guinean emigrants have invested heavily in housing construction in Fouta Djallon and are major participants in trading activities between Guinea and her neighbors.

Little is known about the links between emigrant Guineans abroad and the national economy in terms of capital flows and investment patterns. A study of the emigrant community would examine the various linkages of external Guineans with the national and local economy and how they mobilize resources; prospects for their investing more in Guinea; and the kinds of incentives that would stimulate more emigrant support in financing and organizing private sector expansion in Guinea. Particular attention would be given to the Fulbe emigrant community due to the Fulbe's prominent role in the Guinean economy. The study would facilitate the integration of some of Guinea's most dynamic elements into USAID/Guinea's private sector development programs.

#### **6.5.5 *Systematic Analysis of Corruption in Donor Programs***

There is much talk about corruption in Guinea, but there has been little systematic analysis of this phenomenon and its impact on donor programs and economic reform. An analysis of corruption in donor programs would focus primarily on identifying the areas in which donor programs, in general, and those of USAID/Guinea, in particular, are vulnerable to corruption, the costs of corruption, and possible measures that could be taken to control corruption. The World Bank Mission in Guinea has already begun to look at corruption as a major constraint to implementing their program in Guinea. Although focusing primarily on USAID/Guinea programs, the study would also collect data on corruption problems in other donor programs and how donors are striving to deal with them. The study would produce recommendations concerning the kinds of measures that could be taken to control corruption, and possible donor and GOG collaboration in controlling corruption. Understanding the processes and forms of corruption in Guinea could save the Mission large amounts of money and markedly improve prospects for successful project implementation.

#### **6.5.6 *Local Government Finance***

A paucity of data exists concerning local government finance. Most data-collecting efforts have concentrated on national finances. Effective local government necessitates a sound financial base. A study is needed to survey current local government finance at the District Council, CRD, and urban municipality levels. Such a study would look at the kinds of taxes collected, the efficiency of tax collection, the actors and institutions involved in local government finance (e.g., CDs, prefects, subprefects, and SED officials), and proposals for increasing the local tax base and mobilizing local resources. On the output side, the study would look at the pattern of local government expenditures, the efficiency of public services financed by local government, and accountability methods used to ensure proper use of funds.

Recommendations would be made on how to tighten control mechanisms and ensure greater transparency in local government finance.

#### **6.5.7 *Field Impact of Administrative Reform***

Little data exists concerning the extent to which recent administrative reforms have been assimilated and understood by field-level administrative and technical services personnel. Reforms have been imposed from the top with little consultation with field officials. This study would probe the understanding of state field officials of their new mission, evaluate their qualifications and the material resources available to them to carry out their tasks, and examine feedback mechanisms between field personnel and their superiors as well as those between field personnel and the local populations. The study would produce recommendations concerning the kinds of technical and financial assistance and rule changes needed to improve the field performance of state officials.

## **Annex 1: Scope of Work**

SECTION C  
STATEMENT OF WORK

SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE  
SCOPE OF WORK

I. OVERVIEW

THE USAID/GUINEA SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE (SIP) WILL PROVIDE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND CULTURAL DATA AND ANALYSIS OF TRENDS FOR CHANGES WHICH CAN BE FORESEEN IN GUINEAN SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND INSTITUTIONS. THE SIP WILL ALSO PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE USAID PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATION RELATED TO THOSE FINDINGS AND TRENDS.

THE SIP WILL PRIMARILY FOCUS ON THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND CULTURAL FACTORS WHICH ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MISSION'S PROGRAM STRATEGY AS EXPRESSED IN ITS PROGRAM LOGICAL FRAMEWORK. THE SIP TEAM WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH MISSION STAFF TO MAXIMIZE BOTH THE RELEVANCE OF THEIR WORK TO THE MISSION PROGRAM. THE TEAM WILL ALSO TRANSFER TO MISSION STAFF OF THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF GUINEAN SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND INSTITUTIONS.

THE MOST IMPORTANT USAID/GUINEA PROGRAM AREAS FOR THE SIP WILL BE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND PRODUCTION, NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, AND HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING. THE SIP WILL EXAMINE PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE ACTORS IN THE PROGRAM AREAS AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL AREAS. THE SIP'S MOST IMPORTANT CENTRAL THEME WILL BE THE DYNAMICS OF GUINEAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE WHICH STRUCTURE THE WAYS IN WHICH GUINEANS MAKE DECISIONS AND HOW THE MAXIMUM DEGREE OF EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF GUINEAN MEN AND WOMEN CAN BE PROMOTED FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IMPROVED WELL BEING.

II. GENERAL TERMS OF REFERENCE

THE SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE WILL:

- 1. SYNTHESIZE DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION ON GUINEAN RURAL AND URBAN POPULATIONS DISAGGREGATED BY: (1) GENDER; (2) ETHNICITY; (3) RELIGION; (4) RELIGION; SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND INCOME GROUP; AND (5) SPATIALLY BY ECOLOGICAL ZONE AND/OR POLITICAL, TERRITORIAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS. PATTERNS OF MIGRATION AND FLOW OF RESOURCES SHOULD BE DETAILED.

- 2. DESCRIBE AND ANALYZE THE STRUCTURES AND INTERPLAY OF THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS (ORGANIZATIONS) THAT SERVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL LEVELS. THE EMPHASIS SHOULD INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP OR PERSONNEL WITHIN THE

ORGANIZATION, CONSTITUENCIES THEY SERVE, THEIR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AND ARTICULATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS, AND RELATIVE POWER TO EFFECT DECISION-MAKING AT VARIOUS LEVELS. FORMAL AND INFORMAL AND MODERN AND TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE EXAMINED FOR HOW THEY OPERATE. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID IN ANALYZING HOW INFORMAL AND CUSTOMARY SYSTEMS CARRY OVER OR ARE MIRRORED IN FORMAL, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS. THE SIP SHOULD EXPLAIN HOW HISTORY AND TRADITION HAVE SHAPED AND WILL CONTINUE TO SHAPE GUINEAN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR. THE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN RELATION TO GENDER FOR THOSE FACTORS JUST MENTIONED.

- 3. THE SIP SHOULD ANALYZE THE FUNCTIONAL AND POLITICAL LINKAGES BETWEEN LOCAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS AND HOW EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE THEY ARE IN THE PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES.

- 4. DESCRIBE AND ANALYZE THE MOST IMPORTANT CULTURAL VALUES AND RESULTANT BEHAVIOR PATTERNS WHICH AFFECT DECISION MAKING ABOUT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. THESE VALUES AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS SHOULD BE DISAGGREGATED BY RELIGION, ETHNIC GROUP, OR OTHER WAYS WHICH PROVIDES INSIGHTS FOR IDENTIFYING FACTORS WHICH WILL CONSTRAIN OR PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF AID'S PROGRAM STRATEGY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EFFECTS OF THE CENTRALIZATION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND DECISION-MAKING, ANTI-IMPERIALIST RHETORIC, AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY UNDER GUINEA'S FIRST REPUBLIC SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN THIS REGARD.

- 5. WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS (MINISTRIES, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES, PARASTATALS, PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS, COOPERATIVES) LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MISSION'S PROGRAM? WHICH OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN KEY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND SECTORAL POLICY REFORM WHICH WILL BE IMPLEMENTED BY OTHER DONORS BUT WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MISSION'S PROGRAM? WHAT EXTERNAL SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL FACTORS IMPINGE UPON OR ENHANCE THEIR PERFORMANCE? WHAT INTERNAL FEATURES (E.G., PERSONNEL COMPOSITION DIAGGREGATED BY GENDER, LEVEL OF TRAINING, COMMUNICATION LINKAGES, ORGANIZATIONAL HIERACHY, DECISION MAKING PROCESSES, VALUES AND GOALS) PROMOTE OR DETRACT FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS?

- 6. BASED ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN (1) THROUGH (4), ABOVE, IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES THAT CONSTRAIN OR FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION PROGRAM STRATEGY. PROJECTIONS OF THE TRENDS WHICH THESE VARIABLES MIGHT TAKE IN CONSTRAINING OR FACILITATING STRATEGY ACHIEVEMENT SHOULD BE PROVIDED. DISCUSSION SHOULD FOCUS ON THE LEVELS OF GOAL THROUGH SUB-TARGETS OF THE MISSION PROGRAM LOGICAL FRAMEWORK IN IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THOSE VARIABLES AND TRENDS. MISSION PROGRAM PLANNING IN ITS OBJECTIVE THREE ANALYSIS AND PROGRAM LOGICAL FRAMEWORK ARTICULATION SHOULD BE REVIEWED. THE SIP TEAM SHOULD IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC CONSTRAINTS, PROBLEMS, OR OBJECTIVES WHICH NEED TO BE INCLUDED TO COMPLETELY AND COMPREHENSIVELY ENUMERATE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT SOCIAL, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS IN THOSE TREES.

- 7. BASED ON THE ANALYSIS PROVIDED IN (5), IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THE IMPLICATIONS OF DISCUSSION IN NUMBER (6) FOR MISSION PROGRAM PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION. SPECIFICALLY, THIS SECTION OF THE SIP SHOULD DISCUSS THE WAYS IN WHICH THE DESIGN OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES, PROGRAM ACTIVITIES (PROJECT AND NON-PROJECT ASSISTANCE, PVO/NGO SUPPORT, FOOD ASSISTANCE, POLICY DIALOGUE) AND THE INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITY AND OVERALL PROGRAM IMPACT MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND REPORTING SYSTEMS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IDENTIFIED SOCIAL, POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES AND TRENDS.

- 8. IDENTIFY ALL AREAS WHERE CRUCIAL, RELIABLE INFORMATION ON SOCIAL, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, OR INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IS NOT AVAILABLE. RECOMMEND HOW THIS INFORMATION CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY BE OBTAINED.

### III. CONSULTANT REQUIREMENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS

A. TEAM LEADER/ANTHROPOLOGIST - THE CONSULTANT WILL PROVIDE OVERALL LEADERSHIP IN GATHERING THE DATA, PERFORMING THE ANALYSIS, PREPARING THE REPORT, PRESENTING THE REPORT'S FINDINGS TO THE MISSION, AND PRODUCING THE FINAL REPORT TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF ALL MISSION COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS, AND ADVISING THE MISSION ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN. THE OTHER CONSULTANTS WILL BE GUIDED BY THE TEAM LEADER/ANTHROPOLOGIST AND THEIR REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE TEAM LEADER/ANTHROPOLOGIST FOR EDITING INTO A FINAL REPORT. THEIR REPORTS MUST BE ACCEPTABLE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE TO THE TEAM LEADER/ANTHROPOLOGIST BEFORE THEY (THE OTHER TWO CONSULTANTS) CAN RECEIVE FINAL PAYMENTS.

221

## **Annex 2: Bibliography**

BIBLIOGRAPHY  
GUINEA SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE

- Aberg, Julie A. and Pascal Blacque-Belair. "The Role of Market  
1990 Towns in Guinea". Research Triangle Park, North  
Carolina: Research Triangle Institute.
- Adamolekun, Ladipo. "Politics and Administration in West Africa:  
1969 The Guinean Model". JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION,  
No.8, October.
- \_\_\_\_\_. SEKOU TOURE'S GUINEA: AN EXPERIMENT IN  
1976 NATION BUILDING. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
- Alatas, Syed Hussein. THE SOCIOLOGY OF CORRUPTION: THE NATURE,  
1968 FUNCTION, CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION.  
Singapore: Donald Moore Press, Ltd.
- Albert, Jocelyn, Robert Hecht. "Project Identification Document:  
1981 Guinea Agricultural Research, Training and Extension  
Project Draft". Abidjan: United States Agency for  
International Development (USAID).
- Amin, Samir, TROIS EXPERIENCES AFRICAINES DE DEVELOPPEMENT: LE  
1965 MALI, LA GUINEE, LE GHANA. Paris: Presses  
Universitaires de France.
- Ayensu, Edward S. and Spencer Duncan. "Potential Niche-  
Industries  
1991 in Selected West African Countries". Washington, D.C.:  
International Resources Group Ltd.
- Azarya, Victor and Naomi Chazan. "Disengagement from the State  
1987 in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and  
Guinea" in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY,  
Vol. 29: No. 1, pp. 106-131.
- Ba, Amadou Oury, Bintou Keita and Benoit Lootvoet. "Les Guinéens  
1989 de l'Extérieur: Rentrer au Pays," POLITIQUE AFRICAINE,  
No.36, December, pp. 22-37.
- Barry, Ibrahima. "L'Expérience du Développement Rural en  
1990 Guinée". Conakry.
- Binet, Jacques. LES SOUSOUS DE GUINEE. Paris: ORSTOM.  
1955
- Botte, Roger. "Pouvoir du Livre, Pouvoir des Hommes: La Religion  
1990 Comme Critère de Distinction." JOURNAL DES  
AFRICANISTES, 60 (2). pp. 37-51

- Bouderbala, Negib. "Legislation Foncière Rurale: République de  
1988 Guinée." Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of  
the United Nations (FAO), Report TCP/GUI/6757.
- Brown, Alex. "Guinea Family Planning Project Paper Proposal."  
1991 Conakry: Population Services International.
- Brown, James G. "Investment Opportunities in the Guinean Coffee  
1987 Industry". Washington, D.C.: Chemonics International  
Consulting Division.
- Bustin, Jean-Paul. "Appui au Monde Rurale: Quelle Politique de  
1989 Crédit en Guinée?" Conakry: Ministère de l'Agriculture  
et des Ressources Animales (MARA); Projet Crédit  
Agricole et Rural en Guinée.
- Camara, Fana. "Etude Concernant les Echanges Frontaliers dans la  
1989 Région de Koundara (République de Guinée)". Conakry:  
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de Ressources Animales  
(MARA), Projet de Crédit Agricole et Rural en Guinée.
- Camara, Papa Ousmane. ETUDE SOCIOLOGIQUE DU QUARTIER DE BONFI.  
1991 Memoire de Diplome de Fin D'Etudes Superieures. Conakry:  
Universite Gamal Abdel Nasser de Conakry.
- CEGIR. "Etude du Secteur Informel en Guinée: Potentiels et  
1987 Contraintes, vol 1." Conakry: Ministère des Ressources  
Humaines et de l'Industrie et des PME.
- Ceougna, Bintou. "Rapport: Etude Socio-Economique: Fumage de  
1987 Poisson et sa Filière de Commercialisation." Conakry:  
United Nations Development Program, (UNDP): Fumage de  
Poisson Project.
- Charles, Bernard. LA REPUBLIQUE DE GUINEE. Paris: Editions  
1972 Berger-Levrault.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Quadrillage politique et administratif des  
1989 militaires". POLITIQUE AFRICAINE. No.36 December,  
pp.9-21.
- Chemonics International Consulting Division. "Etude de  
1990 Faisabilité du Project National de Promotion des  
Exportations Agricoles." Washington, D.C.
- Conde, Namory, Mamadou Bailo Sow, Ibrahima Diallo. CONTRIBUTION  
1987 A L'ETUDE DES PROBLEMES LIES A LA PROMOTION DU SECTEUR  
DE L'ARTISANAT ET DES PETITES ET MOYENNES ENTREPRISES EN  
GUINEE, TROISIEME ETAPE: PROVINCES DE KINDIA, BOKE ET  
DUBREKA. Conakry: Fondation Fredrech Ebert.

- Council for International Development. "Guinea Rural Enterprise  
1990 Development Project (675-0215) Cooperative Agreement  
Proposal." Washington, D.C.
- Cournanel, Alain. "Economie politique de la Guinée (1958-1981)",  
1985 in H. Bernstein and B.K. Campbell, eds. CONTRADICTIONS  
OF ACCUMULATION IN AFRICA: STUDIES IN ECONOMY AND  
STATE. Beverly Hills, California: Sage, pp.207-248.
- Dalle, Sabine. "Connaissance du Milieu Rural de la Haute Guinée:  
1989 Synthèse des Enquêtes Effectuées par le Projet de 1986  
à Début 1989." Paris: Compagnie Française pour le  
Développement des Fibres Textiles, (CFDT).
- del Ninno, Carlo and David E.Sahn. "Survey Methodology and  
1990 Preliminary Results of Household Welfare in Conakry: A  
Progress Report". Washington, D.C.: Cornell  
University, Food and Nutrition Policy Program.
- Derman, William. SERFS, PEASANTS, AND SOCIALISTS: A FORMER SERF  
1973 VILLAGE IN THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA. Berkeley: University  
of California Press.
- Deschamps, Jean-Jacques. "Review of Guinean Financial Markets  
1986 and of USAID/Conakry's Credit Strategy." Washington,  
D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc.
- Development Economics Group. "Impact Monitoring and Evaluation  
1990 System for Agricultural Infrastructure Development  
Project (675-0213)." Washington, D.C.
- Diallo, Aliou Samba and E. Philip Morgan, "Analysis of Management  
1990 Development and Training Needs of High-Ranking Public  
Administration Officers; Republic of Guinea." Conakry:  
United States Agency for International Development  
(USAID).
- Diallo, Ibrahima Sory and Moussa Touré. "Evaluation de la  
1990 Participation Communautaire au Lancement des Centres de  
Santé du PDSS". Conakry: Ministère de la Santé Publique  
et de la Population.
- Diallo, Ousmane. "Evolution sociale chez les Peuls du Fouta  
1961 Djalon". RECHERCHES AFRICAINES, No. 4, pp. 73-94.
- Diallo, Rouguyatou. MONOGRAPHIE HISTORIQUE DU BAGATAYE DE LA  
1974 REGION ADMINISTRATIVE DE BOKE DES ORIGINES A 1958.  
Memoire de Diplome de Fin d'Etudes Supérieures.  
Conakry: Institut Polytechnique Gamal Abdel Nasser.

- Diallo, Saidou. "Seminaire National sur la Nouvelle Politique Commerciale de la République de Guinée et ses Imperatifs (Conakry, 15 au 20 octobre 1990): Sous Theme 1, Le Commerce en République de Guinée de 1958 a 1984." Conakry: Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat.
- Diallo, Tahirou. CONTRIBUTION AU PROBLEME DE LA DEFINITION D'UN MODE DE PRODUCTION AU FOUTA-DIALLO D'AVANT L'INDEPENDENCE (1727-1958). Memoire de Diplome de Fin d'Etudes Supérieures. KanKan, Guinea: Institut Polytechnique Julius Nyerere.
- Dirasset. ETUDE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE REGIONALE: BILAN-DIAGNOSTIC AU NIVEAU DES PREFECTURES: GUINEE MARITIME. Conakry: United Nations Development Programme/Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (UNDP/DTCD). Project PNUD/DTCD GUI/84/007.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ETUDE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE REGIONALE: BILAN-DIAGNOSTIC AU NIVEAU DES PREFECTURES: MOYENNE GUINEE. Conakry: United Nations Development Programme/Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (UNDP/DTCD). Project PNUD/DTCD GUI/84/007.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ETUDE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE REGIONALE: BILAN-DIAGNOSTIC AU NIVEAU DES PREFECTURES: HAUTE GUINEE. Conakry: United Nations Development Programme/Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (UNDP/DTCD). Project PNUD/DTCD GUI/84/007.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ETUDE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE REGIONALE: BILAN-DIAGNOSTIC AU NIVEAU DES PREFECTURES: GUINEE FORESTIERE. Conakry: United Nations Development Programme/Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (UNDP/DTCD). Project PNUD/DTCD GUI/84/007.
- Duffau, Jean-Marie, Laura Ann Fernea and Patriya S. Tansuhaj. 1988 "USAID/Guinea/HRDA Public Sector Training Needs Assessment & Recommendations for Country Training Strategy". Washington, D.C.: NASPAA.
- Dumont, René. RECONVERSION DE L'ECONOMIE AGRICOLE: GUINEE, COTE D'IVOIRE, MALI. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Duncan, Allen and Mitchell. "Report on the Investment Code and the Law on Commercial Activities of the Republic of Guinea." Conakry: United States Agency for International Development, (USAID).
- Dupire, Marguerite. ORGANISATION SOCIALE DES PEUL. Paris: Plon. 1970

- Ernst and Young. "Departing Volunteers: Evaluation of Use of  
1990 Counterpart Funds of PL480 for the Government of  
Guinea's Voluntary Departure Program (Draft Report)."  
Conakry: United States Agency for International  
Development.
- Etude Economique Conseil. "L'Entrepreneuriat en Guinée et Ses  
1991 Potentialités dans le Secteur Industriel". Conakry.  
United Nations Industrial Development Organization  
(UNIDO).
- Equator Advisory Services Limited. "Investment Climate  
1986 Assessment: Republic of Guinea." Conakry: United  
States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Filippi-Wilhem, Laurence. "Assistance à la Capacité de  
1987 Planification et de Gestion de l'Economie Nationale:  
Circuits de Commercialisation et de Distribution en  
Guinée." Conakry: United Nations Development  
Programme/Department for Technical Cooperation in  
Development, Project No. PNUD/DTCD GUI/84/007.
- Food and Agriculture Organization, (FAO). "Guinée: Projet de  
1988 Développement Hydro-Agricole de la Région de Banko;  
Rapport de l'Etude Socio Economique de la Zone du  
Projet." Rome: FAO Investment Center. Report No.  
55/88 CDF-GUI 22.
- Gardiner, John A. and Theodore R. Lyman. DECISIONS FOR SALE:  
1978 CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN LAND-USE AND BUILDING  
REGULATION. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Garvey, William. "Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives in  
1987 Guinea". Washington: National Cooperative Business  
Association.
- Gaudreau, Martha, Peter Gilruth, G. Edward Karch, Karen McKay,  
1990 and Barton Sensenig. "Guinea Natural Resources  
Management Assessment." Washington, D.C.: E/DI,  
Natural Resources Management Support Project.
- Godfrey, Harry. "Strengthening CCCD Intervention Services in  
1989 Conakry Health Centers" Conakry: United States Agency  
for International Development, CCCD Project.
- Goumou, Justin. EDUCATION TRADITIONELLE DE LA JEUNESSE DANS LA  
1980 PREFECTURE DE LOLA. Memoire de Diplome de Fin d'Etudes  
Supérieures. Conakry: University of Conakry.

221

- Guilavogui, Sovy. ESSAI D'ANALYSE DES PROBLEMES SOCIOLOGIQUES  
 1979 LIES A L'AMELIORATION DES CONDITIONS DE VUE EN MILIEU  
 RURAL: APPLICATION AU PRL DE TEULELA (REGION  
 ADMINISTRATIVE DE MACENTA). Memoire de Diplome de Fin  
 d'Etudes Supérieures. Conakry: Institut Polytechnique  
 Gamal Abdel Nasser.
- Hanrahan, Charles E. and Steven Block. "Food Aid and Policy  
 1986 Reform in Guinea." Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt  
 Associates, Inc.
- Harza Engineering Company. "Feasibility Report on Riceland  
 1964 Reclamation in Guinea: Koba Project." Conakry: United  
 States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Henfrey, Patrick. "Investment Opportunities in the Guinean Rice  
 1986 Industry". Washington, D.C.: Chemonics International.
- Hirnschall, Gottfried. "Système National d'Information  
 1989 Sanitaire: Rapport d'Evaluation". Conakry: United  
 States Agency for International Development, CCCD  
 Project.
- Institut de Recherches et d'Application des Methodes de  
 1990 Développement (I.R.A.M.) "Projet Crédit Rural: Etude  
 de Factibilité d'une Deuxième Phase". Ministère de  
 l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales (MARA).
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).  
 1991 "Report and Recommendation of the President of the  
 International Development Association to the Executive  
 Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 15.4 Million to  
 the Republic of Guinea for an Educational Sector  
 Adjustment Credit." Washington, D.C.
- 1990a "Republic of Guinea: Country Economic Memorandum (Vol.  
 1) Main Report." Washington, D.C.
- 
- 1990b \_\_\_\_\_ . "Republic of Guinea: Country  
 Economic Memorandum (Vol. 2) Sectoral Analyses."  
 Washington, D.C.
- 
- 1990c \_\_\_\_\_ . "Report and Recommendation of the  
 President of the International Development Association  
 to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR  
 38.7 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Guinea for a  
 Private Sector Promotion Program." Washington, D.C.,  
 Report No. P-5207-GUI.
- 
- 1989a \_\_\_\_\_ . "Guinea: Public Investment Review."  
 Washington, D.C.

218

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Aide-Memoire: Projet Cadre de  
1989b Promotion des Exportations Agricoles: Mission Banque  
Mondiale de Post-Identification." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of  
1989c Guinea: National Rural Infrastructure Project."  
Washington, D.C., Report No. 8012-GUI.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Republic of Guinea: Education  
1989d Sector Adjustment Loan; Initiating Memorandum."  
Washington, D.C.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Aide Memoire: Programme  
1989e d'Adjustement Sectoriel Education (PASE); Mission  
d'Evaluation." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of  
1988 Guinea: Second Economic Management Support Program."  
Washington, D.C.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of  
1987 Guinea: Transport Sector Project." Washington, D.C.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Staff Appraisal Report:  
1984 Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea: Conakry  
Urban Development Project." Washington, D.C.
- International Labor Organization. "Le Secteur Non-Structuré  
1987 Urbain en République de Guinée: Analyse Typologique,  
Facteurs de Blocage et Perspectives de Promotion."  
Conakry: United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP).  
Project GUI/86/014, Programme d'Enquetes dans le  
Secteur Non-Structuré Urbain.
- Jarvis, Nancy et. al. "USAID Guinea Health Sector Assessment."  
1990 Washington, D.C.:John Snow, Inc.
- Jensen, Rolf. "Socio-Economic Survey of the Sous-Prefecture of  
1985 Gnalia: Republic of Guinea." Ann Arbor, Michigan:  
University of Michigan, Center for Research on Economic  
Development (CRED).
- Johnston, Michael. "The Political Consequences of Corruption: A  
1986 Reassessment." COMPARATIVE POLITICS. No. 18, July.
- Klitgaard, Robert. CONTROLLING CORRUPTION. Berkeley, California:  
1988 University of California Press
- Kremer, S. "Projet de Développement Rural Intégré de Kissidougou  
1987 (DERIK): Plan d'Opération 1988-1990". Conakry:  
Cooperation Guineo-Allemande.

- Kourouma, Vecke Alkaly, Zakaria Cissé and Laye Sibori Sidibé.  
1990 "Rapport de Mission: Objet: Etude Circuits Produits Agricoles; Recueil des Données Economiques et Statistiques en Zone Forestière." Conakry: Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat.
- "La Riziculture en Guinée Maritime." Conakry.  
1990
- Landeck, Jonathon. CONTRIBUTION TO CULTURE-BASED CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURAL AND EXTENSION EDUCATION: PERCEPTIONS OF SOIL MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION BY FARMERS IN FUUTA JALON, GUINEA, WEST AFRICA. Doctoral dissertation. Michigan State University.
- Larfeuil, Bernard. "Guinée: Premier Bilan d'une Expérience de Reconversion de Fonctionnaires", AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE, No. 155, 3rd Quarter, pp. 3-22.  
1990
- Leighton, Charlotte. "Country Assistance Report: Management Improvement and Organizational Development Assistance Project in Guinea". Washington, D.C.: NASPAA.  
1988
- LePlaideur, A., F. Forbeau, Y. Meneux and E. Orrit. "Quelques Premières Informations sur l'Economie du Riz en Guinée Conakry: Labé, Boké, Téliméli, Gaoual, Koundara." Montpellier, France: Institut de Recherches Agronomiques Tropicales et de Cultures Vivrières (IRAT).  
1990
- Lestranger, Monique de. LES CONIAGUI ET LES BASSARI. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.  
1955
- Long, Lynellyn D. and Hawa Fofana. "Study of Girls' Access to Primary Schooling in Guinea". Conakry: United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
1990
- Lowdermilk, Melanee. "Guinea: Food Needs Assessment (1989/90)". Conakry: United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
1989
- Makinen, Marty and Steven Block. "Pricing for Cost Recovery in Primary Health Care in Guinea (Draft)". Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt Associates.  
1986
- Marty, Paul. L'ISLAM EN GUINEE. Paris: Leroux.  
1921

Mekouar, Mohamed Ali. "Mise en Oeuvre du Code de  
1990 l'Environnement: Guinée (Rapport Intérimaire)". Rome:  
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United  
Nations. Technical Cooperation Program TCP/GUI/8956  
(A).

Mikulovski, "La Réforme Administrative aux Yeux de l'Opinion  
1989 Publique Guinéenne". Conakry.

Ministère de la Réforme Administrative et de la Fonction  
1991 Publique (MRAFP). "Atelier National sur le Bilan et  
les Perspectives de la Réforme Administrative en  
Republique de Guinée." Conakry.

---

1990a \_\_\_\_\_ . "Annuaire de  
l'Administration Centrale de la République de Guinée  
(2ème édition)." Conakry.

---

1990b \_\_\_\_\_ . "Rapport Annuel des  
Activités pour 1990." Conakry.

---

1989a \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recueil des Textes et  
Cadres Organiques du Ministère de la Réforme  
Administrative et de la Fonction Publique (première  
édition)." Conakry.

---

1989b \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recueil des Textes et  
Cadres Organiques des Services de la Présidence de la  
République (première édition)." Conakry.

---

1989c \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recueil des Textes et  
Cadres Organiques du Ministère du Plan et de la  
Coopération Internationale (première édition)." Conakry.

---

1989d \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recueil des Textes et  
Cadres Organiques du Ministère de l'Economie et des  
Finances (première édition)." Conakry.

---

1989e \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recueil des Textes et  
Cadres Organiques du Ministère de l'Agriculture et des  
Ressources Animales (première édition)." Conakry.

---

1989f \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recueil des Textes et  
Cadres Organiques du Ministère des Transports et des  
Travaux Publics (première édition)." Conakry.

---

1989g \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recueil des Textes et  
Cadres Organiques du Ministère des Ressources  
Naturelles et de l'Environnement (première édition)." Conakry.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Recueil des Textes et  
1989h Cadres Organiques du Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la  
Décentralisation (première édition)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Recueil des Textes et  
1989i Cadres Organiques du Ministère des Affaires Sociales et  
de l'Emploi (première édition)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Recueil des Textes et  
1989j Cadres Organiques du Ministère de l'Industrie, du  
Commerce et de l'Artisanat (première édition)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Recueil des Textes et  
1989k Cadres Organiques du Ministère de la Santé Publique et  
de la Population (première édition)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Recueil des Textes et  
1989l Cadres Organiques du Secrétariat d'Etat à la Pêche  
(première édition)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Recueil des Textes de la  
1989m Fonction Publique." (2 vols.) Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Recueil des Textes  
1987 Statutaires de la Fonction Publique. Conakry.
- Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population. "Revue  
1991 Tripartite OMS/FNUAP/Gouvernement: Rapport sur l'Etat  
d'Avancement du Projet Santé Maternelle et  
Infantile/Planification Familiale (Exercice 1990)." Conakry.
- Ministère de l'Agriculture et Des Ressources Animales (MARA).  
1990 Lettre de Politique de Développement Agricole (Seconde  
Version)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Analyse des Operations  
1989 de Crédit dans les Projets, Propositions  
d'Amelioration." Conakry: Projet Crédit Agricole et  
Rural de Guinée.
- Ministère de l'Education, Secretariat D'Etat a l'Enseignement  
1991 Pre-Universitaire, Service Statistique et  
Planification. "Rapport Donnees de Base de la  
Scolarisation en Guinee 1990." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Direction de la Statistique  
1989 et de la Planification de l'Education (DSPE).  
"Declaration de Politique Educative." Conakry.

- Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Décentralisation, Secrétariat  
1990 d'Etat à la Décentralisation, (SED). BULLETIN DE  
LIAISON INTER ONG. No. 3, 4, September, December.
- 
- 1988a Réalisations (Année 1988) Synthèse Générale." United Nations Development Programme/Department for Technical Cooperation in Development, Project PNUD/DTCD GUI 86/O10.
- 
- 1988b Réalisations (Année 1988, 2ème Tranche): Fiches-Projets, Basse-Guinée." United Nations Development Programme/Department for Technical Cooperation in Development, Projet PNUD/DTCD GUI 86/O10.
- 
- 1988c Réalisations (Année 1988, 2ème Tranche): Fiches-Projets, Moyenne Guinée." United Nations Development Programme/Department for Technical Cooperation in Development, Projet PNUD/DTCD GUI 86/O10.
- 
- 1988d Réalisations (Année 1988, 2ème Tranche): Fiches-Projet, Guinée Forestière." United Nations Development Programme/Department for Technical Cooperation in Development, Projet PNUD/DTCD GUI 86/O10.
- 
- 1988e Redressement Economique National." Conakry: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and UNICEF.
- 
- 1988f Textes Légaux et Reglementaires." Conakry.
- 
- n.d. Organisations Non Gouvernementales de Développement en Guinée: Cadre Organique du 'Service de Coordination des Interventions des O.N.G. de Développement en Guinée' (SCIO)." Conakry.
- Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi, Direction  
1990 Générale du Travail et des Lois Sociales. "Code du Travail de la Republique de Guinée." Conakry
- Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale. "Code des Investissements et ses Textes d'Application/Investment Code and Texts for Its Application." Conakry.

- 1991 \_\_\_\_\_, Direction Nationale des Investissements Publics. "Bilan et Perspectives des Investissements Publics de 1984 à 1990." Conakry.
- 1991 \_\_\_\_\_, Direction Nationale du Plan et du Développement Economique. "Rapport Economique et Social 1990." Conakry.
- 
- 1990a \_\_\_\_\_, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique. RESULTATS DU RECENSEMENT NATIONAL DE L'AGRICULTURE 1988/1989. TOME 1 - RESULTATS NATIONAUX ET REGIONAUX. Conakry: United Nations Development Programme/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (UNDP/FAO). Project GUI/86/013.
- 
- 1990b \_\_\_\_\_, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Informatique. RESULTATS DU RECENSEMENT NATIONAL DE L'AGRICULTURE 1988/1989. TOME 2 - RESULTATS PREFECTORAUX. Conakry: United Nations Development Programme/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (UNDP/FAO). Project GUI/86/013.
- 
- 1990c \_\_\_\_\_ . "Bulletin Statistique Numéro Special." Conakry.
- 
- 1989 \_\_\_\_\_ . "Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (Février 1983): Analyse des Resultats Definitifs." Conakry.
- Mission Francaise de Coopération et d'Action Culturelle. "La  
1988 Coopération Franco-Guinéenne: Bilan 1987." Conakry.
- Mitchell, Lloyd M. and Fremont A. Regier. "USAID/Guinea: Economic  
1991 Policy Reform Support Project (675-0218); Evaluation of NASPAA Assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources." Washington, D.C.: DAC International.
- Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter. "Trade Unionists and Chiefs in  
1964 Guinea." in POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICA. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.219-254.
- Morice, A. "Guinée 1985: Etat, corruption, et trafics", LES  
1987 TEMPS MODERNES. February, pp. 103-136.
- Mueller, Sanine, Werner Warmbier and Kalabadan Condé. "Etude sur  
1987 la Commercialisation dans la Préfecture de Kissidougou/ Guinée (Projet de Développement Rural Intégré de Kissidougou)." Conakry: Gesellschaft fuer Agrarprojecte in Uebersee M.B.H.

- Nyirjesy, Francis. "Investment Climate in Guinea." Washington, 1987 D.C: Chemonics International Consulting Division.
- Olivola, Kenneth J. "Children and Women in Urban Guinea (with special reference to Conakry) (Draft)." Conakry: UNICEF. 1990
- Oularé, Ali. LES CONDITIONS SOCIO-ECONOMIQUES DE TRANSFORMATION SOCIALISTE DU MILIEU RURAL A PARTIR DES CENTRES D'EDUCATION REVOLUTIONNAIRE (GUINEE MARITIME). Memoire de Diplome de Fin d'Etudes Supérieures. Conakry: Institut Polytechnique Gamal Nassar. 1971
- O.N.S. Inter Inc. "Actions de Production et de Promotion des Organisations Paysannes dans le Versant Sud-Est du Fouta Djallon: Rapport de Mission." Conakry: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Project GUI/87/015. 1989
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Développement Rural dans le Fouta Djallon: Rapport de Mission." Conakry: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1989
- Orsini, Deborah M. and David P. Harmon, Jr. "Private Sector Training Needs Assessment: Human Resources Development Assistance Project." Conakry: United States Agency for International Development, (USAID) 1988
- O'Toole, Peter. AN HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF GUINEA. New Jersey: Scarecrow Press. 1977
- Paulme, Denise. LES GENS DU RIZ: KISSI DE LA HAUTE GUINEE FRANCAISE. Paris: Plon. 1954
- Projet de Développement Rural de Haute Guinée (PDRHG), Suivi Evaluation. "Organisation Sociale des Villages et Structures des Exploitation en Haute Guinée." 1991
- Renard, Gerard M. "Rapport de la Mission sur les Finances Locales en République de Guinée." Conakry: United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (UNDTCD). 1986
- Renaudière, Xavier de la and Charles Moizeau. "Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact of the initial USAID African Program for Economic Policy Reform (APEPR) Operation in Guinea (Final Report)." Washington, D.C.: International Science and Technology institute (ISTI). 1988
- Republic of Guinea. "Document de Base de la Coopération entre le Gouvernement et le FNUAP." Conakry. 1991

225

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Preparation du Plan d'Action Environnemental  
1989 (Organisation, Programmation et Budget): Document  
Conjoint du Gouvernement Guinéen et des Organisations  
Participantes (UNDP, FAC, CEE, USAID, ACDI, UNESCO,  
IUCN, FAO, UNICEF, BM)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Comité Militaire de Redressement National,  
1990 (CMRN). "La Loi Fondamentale." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Présidence de la République. "Ordonnance No.  
1985a 118/PRG du 17 Mai 1985 Portant Reglementation de la  
Profession Commerciale Pour les Personnes Physiques."  
Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Ordonnance No.  
119/PRG  
1985b du 17 Mai 1985 Portant Reglementation des Sociétés  
Commerciales." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Secrétariat Général du  
1991 Gouvernement. "Projet de Code Foncier et Domanial  
(Draft)." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Ordonnance  
1990a No. 025/PRG/SGG/90: Portant sur les Formalités de  
Déclaration des Entreprises et Suppression de  
l'Agrément Commercial ou Industriel." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_.  
"Ordonnance  
1990b No. 091/PRG/SGG/90: Portant Régime Financier et Fiscal  
des Communautés Rurales de Développement (CRD) en  
République de Guinée." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_.  
"Ordonnance  
1990c No. 092/PRG/SGG/90: Portant Organisation et  
Fonctionnement des Communautés Rurales de Développement  
en République de Guinée." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_.  
"Ordonnance  
1987 No. 063/PRG/87: Portant sur l'Exercice des Activités  
Commerciales par les Personnes Physiques ou Morales en  
République de Guinée." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_.  
"Ordonnance  
1986a No. 109/PRG/86: Portant Organisation Judiciaire.  
Conakry.

- "Ordonnance  
1986 No. 110/PRG/86: Portant Création d'une Chambre Nationale d'Annulation." Conakry.
- Reyna, S. P. and Nancy E. Gratton. "An Evaluation of the Social and Institutional Profile Program of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination of the United States Agency for International Development." Durham, New Hampshire: University of New Hampshire, Department of Sociology and Anthropology.  
n.d.
- Rivière, Claude. GUINEA: THE MOBILIZATION OF A PEOPLE. Ithaca  
1977 New York: Cornell University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Lutte Ouvrière et Phénomène Syndical en  
1975a Guinée." CULTURES ET DEVELOPPEMENT, 7(1).
- \_\_\_\_\_. DYNAMIQUE DA STRATIFICATION SOCIALE EN GUINEE.  
1975b Paris: Librairie Honore Champion.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Dynamique de Systèmes Fonciers et Inégalités  
1973 Sociales: Le Cas Guinéen." CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE, 54.
- Rhatigan, Donald J. "A Survey of the Private Sector in Guinea  
1986 and Recommendations for Future Development."  
Washington, D.C.: Chemonics International Consulting Division.
- Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc. "Guinea Economic Policy Reform  
1991 Support Project." Conakry: United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- \_\_\_\_\_. and The World Council of Credit  
1989 Unions, Inc. "Guinea Economic Policy Support Project: Draft of Final Report." Conakry: United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Roberts, William. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FULBE HOUSEHOLD  
1991 ECONOMIES IN THE RURAL FOUTA DJALLON. Doctoral dissertation. American University.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY.  
1978 New York: Academic Press
- SCET AGRI. "Deuxième Projet d'Appui aux Services Agricoles:  
1987 Renforcement du M.D.R." Conakry: Ministère du Développement Rural (MDR).

- SCET AGRI and Agroprogress. "Etude de Restructuration des Services Agricoles et de Schemas Directeurs Régionaux de Développement Rural: Synthèse." Conakry: Ministère du Développement Rural (MDR).
- 1986a
- 
- 1986b
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Etude de Restructuration des Services Agricoles et de Schemas Directeurs Régionaux de Développement Rural: Guinée Maritime." Conakry: Ministère du Développement Rural (MDR).
- 
- 1986c
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Etude de Restructuration des Services Agricoles et de Schemas Directeurs Régionaux de Développement Rural: Moyenne Guinée." Conakry: Ministère du Développement Rural (MDR).
- 
- 1986d
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Etude de Restructuration des Services Agricoles et de Schemas Directeurs Régionaux de Développement Rural: Haute Guinée." Conakry: Ministère du Développement Rural (MDR).
- 
- 1986e
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Etude de Restructuration des Services Agricoles et de Schemas Directeurs Régionaux de Développement Rural: Guinée Forestière." Conakry: Ministère du Développement Rural (MDR).
- 
- 1986f
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Etude de Restructuration des Services Agricoles et de Schemas Directeurs Régionaux de Développement Rural: Restructuration des Services Agricoles; (1) Organisation Cible à Moyen Terme, (2) Etapes de la Réorganisation." Conakry: Ministère du Développement Rural (MDR).
- Schwartz, Jacques. "L'Adjustement au Quotidien." POLITIQUE AFRICAINE. No. 36, December. pp. 84-96.
- 1989
- Scott, James C. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- 1972
- Service de Coordination des Interventions des ONGs, (SCIO). "Rapport sur les Réalisations des ONGs en Guinée." Conakry.
- 1990
- Smith, Jennifer. "An Analysis of Current Activities and Actors in the Domain of Women in Development in the Republic of Guinea with Recommendations for Future Directions for UNDP." Conakry: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
- 1990
- Stervinou, Lucien L. and Emmanuel Dem Diarra. "An Assessment of Present and Potential Private Sector Activities for U.S. PVOs in Selected Areas in Guinea." Conakry: United States Agency for International Development.
- 1988

- Stryker, J. Dirck, Jeffrey C. Metzler, Katherine E. Baird and  
1989 Charles J.D. Stathacos. "Agricultural Sector  
Assessment: Republic of Guinea." Conakry: United  
States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Suret-Canale, Jean. LA REPUBLIQUE DE GUINEE. Paris: Editions  
1970 Sociales.
- Tenconi, Roland. "Restructuring of the Banking System in  
Guinea."  
1988 Conakry: International Bank for Reconstruction and  
Development.
- Terpend, Noelle. "Assistance à la Commercialisation des Produits  
1991a et Intrants Agricoles: Resultats, Conclusions et  
Recommandations du Projet (Draft)". Conakry: Food and  
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),  
Project TCP/GUI/8957.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Etude de Marché sur les Semences Maraichères  
1991b et le Matériel Végétal Fruitier". Conakry: Food and  
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),  
Project GCP/GUI/007/BEL.
- Thenevin, Pierre. "Propositions d'Amélioration du Fonctionnement  
1989 de la Filière Rizicole en Guinée". Conakry: Caisse  
Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE).
- Thorigné, Henri. "Secteur Agricole et Rural en République de  
1990 Guinée de 1958-1990: Situation et Perspective".  
Conakry: Food and Agriculture Organization of the  
United Nations (FAO).
- Touré, Ahmed Sekou. L'ACTION POLITIQUE DU PARTI DEMOCRATIQUE DE  
GUINEE. 20 VOLS. 1958-1975.
- UNICEF. SITUATION ANALYSIS OF GUINEAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN.  
1990 Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Composante Sociale du Deuxième Pret d'Adjustement  
1988 Structurel: Rapport du Groupe de Travail  
Interministériel." Conakry: Ministère du Plan et de la  
Coopération Internationale.
- United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP). "Coopération au  
1991 Développement: Guinée, Rapport 1989." Conakry.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Coopération au  
1990 Développement: Guinée, Rapport 1988." Conakry.
- United Nations Fund for Population Activities, (UNFPA).  
1991 "Document de Base de la Coopération Entre le

## United Nations Fund for Population Activities, (UNFPA).

- 1991 "Document de Base de la Cooperation Entre le  
Gouvernement et le FNUAP (Draft)." Conakry.
- 1989 "Amélioration des Services de Santé Maternelle et  
Infantile et de la Planification Familiale (GUI/89/P01)  
Project Appraisal." Conakry.

## United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

- 1991a "Guinea Rural Roads (675-0216) Project Paper." Conakry.
- 
- 1991b \_\_\_\_\_ . "Natural Resources Management  
(675-0219) Project Paper." Conakry.
- 
- 1991c \_\_\_\_\_ . "Country Training Plan for  
Guinea for the Human Resources Development Assistance  
(HRDA) Project (698-0463.75)." Conakry
- 1990a \_\_\_\_\_ . "Agricultural Marketing and  
Sectoral Management (675-0216) Project Identification  
Document." Conakry.
- 
- 1990b \_\_\_\_\_ . "Agricultural Marketing and  
Investment (675-0221) Project Concept Paper." Conakry.
- 
- 1990c \_\_\_\_\_ . "Guinea Program Strategy Plan  
(Preliminary)." Conakry.
- 
- 1990d \_\_\_\_\_ . "Audit of Economic Policy  
Reform Program in Guinea: Guinea Economic Policy Reform  
Program (675-0217), Economic Policy Reform Support  
Project (675-0218)." Dakar: Regional Inspector General  
for Audit, Audit Report No.7-675-90-02.
- 1990e \_\_\_\_\_ . "Program Assistance Approval  
Document Guinea Education Sector Reform Program (675-  
0222/0223 - 675-T-602)." Conakry.
- 1988 \_\_\_\_\_ . "Guinea Country Training  
Strategy 1988." Conakry.
- 1987 \_\_\_\_\_ . "Human Resources Development  
Assistance (HRDA) Project Paper (698-0463)."  
Washington, D.C.
- 
- 1983 \_\_\_\_\_ . "Guinea Smallholders  
Production (675-0210) Project Paper." Conakry.

- Vondal, Patricia. "The Social and Institutional Profile Program:  
1988 Field Mission Evaluation of the Experience.  
"Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for  
International Development, PPC/PDPR/RP.
- Wynkoop, Andree. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MIGRATION: A CASE  
1991 STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF OUT-MIGRATION IN RURAL GUINEA.  
Doctoral dissertation. Boston University
- Zorick, Michael P. "Report on the Current Status of the 1988  
1988 Budgetary Process in the Republic of Guinea." Conakry:  
United States Agency for International Development  
(USAID)

9 August 1991

## **Annex 3: List of Contacts**

PERSONS CONTACTED

**USAID-Conakary**

William Kaschak, Director  
Alan Reed, Deputy Director  
David Hess, Program Officer  
Colette Chabott  
Steve Grant  
Gerry Render  
Deana Madvin  
Michael Blake  
Mamadou Kinda Diallo  
Michael Kuhns  
Noelle Terpend  
Jennifer Smith

**Financial Institution Team**

Jane Seifert  
Gil Crawford  
Gordon Bradford

**Natural Resources Management Team members**

Jonathon Landeck  
Carol Dickerman  
Mike McGuehy

**Rural Roads Team**

Cyril Boucher  
Walter Sherwin

**NASPAA Evaluation Team**

Lloyd Mitchell

Fremont Regier

**HRDA Country Training Program**

George Corinaldi

**P.L. 480 Project Team**

John Paul Paddack

Scott Allen

Ray Victurine

Bob Rabatsky

Paula

Larry Meserve

**RHUDO team from Redso**

Stephen Giddings

Carlene Dei

**U.S Embassy**

Aron Panner, Political Officer

Jonathon Terak, Economic Officer

David Kyzner, Political Officer

**Peace Corps**

Jean de Marteau, Director

Stewart King, Assistant Director

Rachel Gibson, PCV Bangouya

Robin PCV Boke

Steve Rogers, PCV Forecariyah

Steve Ashley, PCV Missira

Mark Shmidt, PCV Saramoussaya

Peter , PCV Koba

Christine Graham (sp.?) Timbi-Madina

**FAO**

Gerard J. Bernard, Resident Representative

Zakary Rhissa, Program Manager

**World Bank**

Michael Wilson, Resident Representative

Jean Paul Vautherin

Joseph de Stefano

Cherif Diallo, Economist

**United Nations Development Programme**

Jill Rizika

Aissatou Bah

Ms. Keita

Annette Bickel

**United Nations Fund for Population Assistance**

Bakary Kaba

**United Nations Children's Fund**

Daniel Benjamin

**United Nations High Commission for Refugees**

M. Pivi, Assistant Program Officer

**World Health Organization**

Dr. Guy Imboua Bogui, Representative

Abraham Abraham, Program Officer

**Caisse Central de Cooperation Economique**

Gilles Chausse, Chargé de Mission

245

G.T.Z.

Jochen Kiarr, Counselor

**Ministere de la Reforme Administrative et de La Fonction Publique**

Faceley II Mara, Director: Service Information et Documentation

M. Kouyate, Bureau de Strategie et Programmes de la Reforme Administrative

Mme. Diallo, Conseiller de la Formation Centre de Perfectionnement Administrative.

**Secretariat d'Etat a la Decentralisation**

M. Kouyate

Mommadou Tunkara, Directeur National de la Decentralization

**Ministere de la Planification et de la Cooperation Internationale**

M. Bakary Kaba--Director, Projet d'appui au Developpement Socio-Economique (PADSE) or/Dimension Sociale de l'ajustement structurelle

Ibrahima Sory Sangaré, Statistician (PADSE)

Joseph Wambach, Technical Advisor, Unite de gestion de petits projets

Dr. Oumar Kouyaté, Chef de la Division des Etablissements Publics

Mommadou Lamine Keita, Directeur de l'Unite de la Population

Hawa Fofana, Expert National en Formation PNUD/DTCD Gui 88/001

Salim Diallo, Expert National en Statistique PNUD/DTCD Guin 88/001

**Ministere des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi**

Sidi Touré, Director General, Office National de Formation et de Perfectionnement Professionnels

Mommadi Doumbouya, Chef de Division, Inspection Generale du Travail

246

**Ministere de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales**

Mamadou Kante, Director, NASPAA project (check out his exact title)

Mr. Conde, Director, Directeur Systeme Permanent des Statistique Agricoles

Mallal Barry, Bureau Suivi-Evaluation

Ousmane Kallo

**Ministere de la Justice**

Daniel Gauthier, Conseiller Juridique

M. Smith-Ba, archivist

**Comite Transitoire du Redressement National**

Cellou Diallo, Member Economics Commission

**Maternite de Coronthie**

Dr. Mamadi Condé, Director SMI/PF, President AGBEF

**Projet du Developpement de Sector Sante**

Mr. Magassouba, Director

**Embassy of Japan**

Mr. Amada, Secretary

**Embassy of Italy**

Ezio Mario Sammartano

**Embassy of Switzerland**

Ms. Roth

**Embassy of the Soviet Union**

Youri Moisseev, Commercial Expert

**University of Conakry**

Ibrahima Sory Seck, Sociologist

Fode Keita, Sociologist

Aliou Oulare, Sociology Department Chair

Abdoul Goudoussy Diallo, Faculty of Social Sciences Chair

Siba Grovogui, Political Scientist

Betsy Schmidt, Fullbright Historian

#### ORSTOM

Stefan Bouju, Anthropology Graduate Student

#### Researchers

Bill Polidaro, Anthropology Graduate Student, Pita

Ariele Setbon-Giovanani, Anthropology Graduate Student,  
Macenta

Gerard Peart, Graduate Student, Coyah

#### Population Services International

Alex Brown, Resident Representative

#### Council for International Development

Paul Rippey, Resident Representative

Sidi M. Touré, Director General

#### Service de Coordination des Interventions des O.N.G. de Developpement en Guinee

Yamori Conde

Mammadi Keita, Chef, Section Juridique et Affaires  
Administratives

Mr. Ethienne

#### Euro-Accord

Mammadi Keita, Administrative Secretary

#### Association Francaise des Volontaires de Progres

Anne Chretien

#### A.G.A.P.

Alhoussane Conde, President

#### Fondation Friedrich Ebert

Horst Mund, Economist

**Africare**

John

**Kindia**


Sekou Camara, Prefet

M. Laho, Secretaire Generale aux Collectiviteés  
Decentralisées

Fasemane Toure, Directeur des Microprojets

Mouctar Sow, Gestionnaire, Collectivités Decentralisées

## **Annex 4: Guinea Program Logframe**



25/1

## **Annex 5: Paper on Corruption**

## Annex 5

### Corruption and Governance Issues: Donor Perspectives

Donors, government officials, and public opinion in Guinea all agree that corruption is rampant in the country. Donors are primarily concerned with how corruption in government affects their policy objectives and programs in Guinea. This annex explores different definitions, types, causes, and costs of corruption and identifies those forms of corruption which are most dysfunctional to donor objectives and programs. Finally, it suggests measures and programs for controlling corruption.

#### A. Definitions

"At its most basic level", one commentator suggests, "corruption is the abuse of public roles for private benefit" (Johnston 1986: 460). Corruption also usually implies an illegal act that violates the law or breaks a rule. Thus, a corrupt official is one who acts illegally to use his public office for private gain.

One can use a moralistic definition which defines all corruption as being bad because it violates moral norms or a functional definition which asks how corruption affects different outcomes. Thus, corruption, in some circumstances, may facilitate economic growth-- e.g. when bribes of key officials enable an important economic sector to function despite formal government restrictions against it. Or, it may throttle economic growth as is the case when corruption increases transaction costs to the point that a particular economic activity is no longer profitable.

#### B. Types and Components of Corruption

One can cite several types of corruption:

(1) bribery. Bribery entails a situation in which a public official accepts money or services in exchange for performing a service connected with his office which benefits the bribe-giver. Thus, one can pay off customs officials to not levy duty on imports or undervalue the product in question, tax inspectors to undervalue the tax due, building inspectors to overlook violations of the building code, etc. These kinds of bribes generally enable entrepreneurs to carry out their business, albeit at the expense of state coffers or the general public. Bribes can also be offered to get preferential tax treatment under the national investment codes, government contracts, and exoneration from fulfilling certain legal requirements. The types of bribery listed above are the ones most likely to take place

between government officials and individuals and companies in the private sector.

A more pernicious form of bribery which falls just short of extortion are bribes to officials for providing services which legally should be provided free of charge. In Guinea, foreign and local businessmen complain that they have to pay bribes in order to get officials to sign documents needed to conduct business even though signing should be automatic and free, provided the businessman has fulfilled the legal requirements. These "speed-up" bribes when multiplied among many officials lead to costly delays and raise transaction costs, often to the point where it does not pay to do business. The average citizen also often has to pay bribes to get access to hospitals, medicine, and other government services which, in principle, are free.

(2) extortion. Extortion takes place when a public official threatens to invoke a sanction against a person unless that person pays him off. Thus, officials inspecting one's papers may refuse to hand them back unless paid off or threaten to jail or fine the person despite the fact that there has been no violation of the law or a government regulation. This form of corruption is particularly ugly and undermines public confidence and the legitimacy of the regime that tolerates it.

(3) nepotism and cronyism. Nepotism entails allocating public jobs, services, resources, and special favors to individuals and groups on the basis of personal, ethnic, and religious considerations. This practice often leads to the misallocation of resources, the placing of unqualified or corrupt people in government jobs, and reduced government revenues when cronies, relatives, and other members of the official's group are not suitably charged for services rendered or receive state resources and services to which they are not entitled.

(4) embezzlement and theft. Embezzlement refers to the manipulation of accounts and financial records by a public official to cover up his/her stealing of public funds. Theft refers to the stealing of public resources by public officials.

Bribery is the form of corruption that most affects private sector activities. It also affords the bribed public official the chance to make money or receive other benefits without directly stealing public funds. It should be noted that private sector firms or individuals often inaugurate the process in order to obtain special benefits that they would not enjoy if they conformed with the rules or law. Nepotism and cronyism affect the efficiency and credibility of the public sector while embezzlement and theft diminish public resources. Extortion often has political consequences because it entails a public official abusing his power to victimize a citizen. This form of behavior arouses popular hostility against the government that allows it.

### C. Causes of Corruption: Values and Structures

Traditional values and attitudes can support certain forms of corruption (Scott, 1972). Traditional gift-giving practices to chiefs and officials are modernized into small-scale bribery for obtaining certain services and benefits. Gift-giving implies mutual reciprocity with the gift-giver expecting some favor or pay-off from the recipient which may or not be equivalent to the value of the gift. Bribery entails a straight commodity transaction. The kind of petty bribery built on traditional gift-giving practices poses no major threat to donor programs.

Community values stressing family, kinship, village, and ethnic ties over national ties underly different forms of nepotism in which personnel is hired, and public resources distributed according to personal, family, and ethnic criteria which discriminate against other groups and misallocate resources. The president in Guinea favors and is expected to favor his own village and ethnic group in distributing the largesse of the state. This kind of nepotism is accepted by other groups as long as they feel they are not being excluded from sharing in the benefits or being given too small a share.

Traditional social and family obligations and access to relatively large public resources put great pressure on state officials to fulfill their family and social obligations by diverting public resources for the benefit of their family, village, or ethnic group. Low salaries and higher expectations on the part of family and kin often tempt the civil servant to engage in various forms of corruption. The absence of a sense of "public trust" on the part of state officials and Guinean society make corruption more tolerable. However, this is true only if the corrupt official shares some of the resources he has diverted with family, village, and ethnic group. Traditional values don't sanction the diversion of public funds for personal aggrandizement-- i.e., the multiplication of Mercedes, villas, and Swiss bank accounts-- when resources are not widely shared.

Several structural factors contribute to fostering corruption: (Scott, 1972): (1) the relative importance of government as a source of goods, services, employment, and regulator of the economy which provides government officials with more opportunities and temptations for corruption; (2) the lack of checks on the power of the state; (3) the absence of control structures within the bureaucracy; (4) the absence of clear-cut property and contract rights; and (5) an unstable and insecure political and economic environment which pushes people to maximize short-term gains.

#### D. The Costs of Corruption

The costs of corruption generally outweigh by far its benefits. Corruption adversely affects society in four key areas (Klitgaard, 1988:46):

1. Efficiency. Corruption wastes resources, creates "public bads"--e.g.-- the provision of poor quality or unsafe public goods and services, and distorts policy.

2. Distribution. Corruption reallocates resources to the rich and powerful, those with military or police power, and to those with monopoly power.

3. Incentives. Corruption distorts the energies of officials and citizens towards the socially unproductive seeking of corrupt rents. Monopoly powers over the disbursement of public goods and services such as export permits, tax assessments, admission to university, etc. may tempt officials to engage in rent seeking. Corruption also increases risks, induces unproductive preventive measures, and distorts investments away from areas of high corruption.

4. Politics. Corruption breeds popular alienation and cynicism and creates regime instability.

One can get an accurate profile of the costs of corruption by looking at various forms of corruption operating within specific spheres of activities and organisations and their effects on the four categories listed above.

#### E. Corruption: An Obstacle to Implementing Donor Policies and Programs in Guinea

Widespread corruption in the GOG has undermined donor policy objectives and programs. To devise effective measures to combat corruption, donors need to be aware of the forms of corruption which are most dysfunctional to achieving their objectives, which areas of government are most susceptible to corruption, the causes and costs of corruption in the specific areas that most concern them, and the people who gain and lose the most through corruption.

For example, donors have frequently stated that one of their major policy objectives is the creation of a better business climate that will attract private investment. Despite the passage of liberal investment and commercial codes, private investors are still reluctant to come to Guinea. Why? Corruption within various branches of government has raised transaction costs in Guinea to the extent that many potential investors do not think it worthwhile to do business in Guinea. Corruption can take place at all levels of government, from the minister down to the local field official.

Bribery has the worst impact on the business climate in Guinea because it is the form of corruption that most directly affects transaction costs. The need for multiple payoffs to get business done plagues the private sector in Guinea. Thus private firms and entrepreneurs have to pay off government officials to become legally registered (MICA), get their goods and equipment through customs (MEF), hire local and expatriate personnel of their choice (MASE), and not be fined or otherwise penalized for alleged violation of government rules and regulations. The winners are the officials who are well positioned to get bribes; the losers are the honest businessmen whose competitive position is undermined by the high transaction costs.

On the other hand, unscrupulous businessmen can bribe government officials to get advantages and benefits which undermine another donor goal-- increasing state revenues. Thus, payoffs can be made to avoid paying customs duties and taxes (MEF), to get government contracts which charge the state higher than market prices for goods and services (nearly all ministries), and purchase the assets of former state enterprises (MICA, MEF, MPC) and leases for government owned property (MUH) and national mineral resources (MRNE) for lower than market prices. The winners are the dishonest businessmen and corrupted officials. The losers are consumers and taxpayers who get shoddy and often more expensive goods and services, and honest government officials.

Nepotism, bribery, embezzlement and theft are all forms of corruption which undermine specific donor projects. Nepotism may force donors to deal with a corrupt or inefficient Guinean project counterpart. Bribery might entail public officials giving out tenders for government contracts to those with the highest bribe rather than to those with the lowest bids. Donor projects have also suffered from embezzlement and theft of funds, equipment, and commodities.

#### **F. Measures to Control Corruption**

While corruption can't be totally eliminated, it can be controlled. Klitgaard's (1988) masterful study of corruption provides excellent guidelines for devising a strategy for controlling corruption which donors could adopt for Guinea.

The first step entails what Klitgaard calls a "participatory diagnosis" which looks at six variables: (1) type of corruption; (2) how much money is involved; (3) the beneficiaries of corruption; (4) the ones most hurt; (5) the causes; and (6) the cures. Steps 4 and 5 will help identify the forces most likely to support and to oppose anticorruption programs.

Adopted to Guinea, the "participatory diagnosis" would first involve the managers involved with the donor project who would discuss the kinds of corruption present in their project and identify what they felt to be the causes. Finally, they would come up with some policy suggestions as to how to control it. This would complete the first stage.

The next stage could entail a meeting with GOG officials from the ministry involved in the project. The importance of fighting corruption would be discussed and underscored. Then GOG officials would be asked to come up with ideas about the causes of corruption. Once this is done, donor and GOG officials would be asked to come up with measures to control corruption in their project. Hopefully, the result would be a joint plan which would be acceptable to both the donor and the GOG.

In the event that the GOG would not cooperate or offer lukewarm support, the donor could withdraw from the project, reduce its scope, or unilaterally institute internal control measures whose acceptance by the GOG would be a precondition for continuing the project.

Klitgaard prevents five categories of anti-corruption measures:

(1) Selecting agents. The donor would try and get honest and competent counterparts from the GOG for their project. This would require considerable knowledge of the government ministry or division with which the donor was working.

(2) Changing Rewards and Penalties. GOG could be rewarded for good performance. This could be extended to GOG personnel working on the project who could be offered bonuses for meeting targets. Serious cases of corruption would lead to ending project, reducing its scope, or cutting off or reducing future assistance to the responsible ministry unless sanctions were taken to punish project officials involved in corruption--e.g. removal from the project, demotions, or even imprisonment.

(3) Changing Principal-Agent-Client Relationship. This would entail changing the rules to reduce the government official's discretionary powers and monopoly vis-avis the client. This kind of measure would not directly affect donor projects but it would contribute to implementing donor policy objectives to reduce transaction costs of doing business.

(4) Changing Attitudes Towards Corruption. Donor agencies would have to tighten up their own practices and stick more to the rules. They could also work closely with GOG officials on an anti-corruption public educational campaign.

(5) Collecting and Analysing Information. Information is perhaps the most important component of any anti-corruption campaign. Gathering information increases the possibility that

corruption will be detected and punished. Analysis of data on procurement and other procedures, control systems, and supervision are particularly important for identifying vulnerable areas where corruption is most likely to occur. Donor project designs could have information searches built into them which would identify potential vulnerable areas which would help efforts to design measures to control corruption.

Donors would have to weigh the costs of specific anti-corruption measures against the benefits. Anti-corruption measures are not equally effective or equally costly. Donors would have a two-prong strategy. The first prong would encourage the GOG to institute measures to control corruption within its own house. The second prong would be related to reducing corruption in specific donor programs and projects.

USAID/Guinea could incorporate an anticorruption component into its project designs, formulate procedures to control corruption in project implementation, and review the effectiveness of these measures in project evaluation. Moreover, an anti-corruption component could be made an important part of decentralization, participation, and governance projects which would focus on procedures and control mechanisms to increase transparency and accountability of local government officials and the dissemination of information concerning the workings of local government to the concerned populations. USAID/Guinea could also work with other donors to share information concerning their experiences in Guinea with corruption. Finally, the mission could also collaborate with other donors, GOG officials, and representatives of the private sector to devise a common corruption control strategy.