

Evaluation Publications Catalog

October 1991



United States Agency for International Development
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

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Introduction

This catalog provides abstracts of the evaluation studies published by the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) and its predecessor offices during the last decade. The purposes of the catalog are to make the evaluation studies more accessible to a broader audience and to increase the development community's awareness of A.I.D. development efforts, experiences, and findings.

Since the early 1980s, CDIE, the central evaluation office of A.I.D., has been performing a series of cross-country, comparative evaluations of the results and experiences of A.I.D. interventions within priority program areas. Unlike most of the evaluations undertaken by A.I.D. Missions, which focus directly on improving project implementation, these centrally sponsored studies have broader objectives of analyzing, comparing, and synthesizing findings from a series of interventions on their longer term developmental impacts and the factors influencing their performance. By focusing above the individual project level, these evaluation studies provide synthesized and comparative information to senior A.I.D. managers

for making Agencywide programming and policy decisions. The studies also inform the U.S. Congress, Office of Management and Budget, and various special interest and constituency groups of the performance and impacts of A.I.D. programs. Since the evaluations contribute to a better understanding of the development process and the role of donors, they have been of interest to the broader development community as well, including other bilateral and multilateral donors, international and regional development organizations, private voluntary organizations, nongovernmental organizations, developing country governments, and academic institutions.

The methodologies used in these studies have varied, depending on such factors as time, resources, and level of interest in the topic. Some studies have relied on a series of field-based assessments in a number of countries, using a common scope of work to assess and compare similar types of projects, whereas other studies have relied on "desk studies" involving the review and synthesis of existing evaluation reports previously performed by Missions.

CDIE has published more than 200 evaluation studies over the last decade. These documents provide considerable knowledge and lessons learned about the Agency's experience in numerous programs. For example, reports cover programs in agriculture, rural development, natural resource management, policy reform, infrastructure, private sector development, social services, human resource development, food aid, and disaster relief. Some studies focus on "cross-cutting" policy themes, such as impacts of A.I.D. programs on achieving women-in-development objectives or ways of improving program management effectiveness and sustainability. Still other CDIE publications provide guidance on evaluation methods and procedures, including guidelines on various approaches to data collection and performance measurement.

Ordering information for the publications appears on page 111. In addition, the full text of CDIE evaluations publications will be available on CD-ROM as well as on microfiche and hard copy.

Sample Citation

Title _____ **Agricultural policy analysis and planning: a summary of two recent analyses of A.I.D.-supported projects worldwide**

Document identification number _____ **PN-AAX-205**

Citation _____ *Tilney, John S., Jr.; Riordan, James T.
Abt Associates, Inc.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Science and Technology. Office of Agriculture (Sponsor)*

CDIE publication series _____ *U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

A.I.D. project number _____ *Aug 1988, viii, 15p. + appendix: statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 55
9364084*

Abstract _____

Over the past 20 years, A.I.D. has funded a broad range of agricultural policy analysis and planning projects worldwide. This paper synthesizes the findings of two recent reviews of such projects—a final report on agricultural planning projects in Latin American and the Caribbean, and an interim report on similar efforts in Africa, Asia, and the Near East. The two studies used the same methodology and thus permit a comparative analysis of the effectiveness and impacts of projects in different areas.

The study's major conclusion is that, while the projects sponsored by A.I.D. during the 1970s and early 1980s achieved their primary purpose of improving the analytical capacity of staff in host government...

1.0 Agriculture

1.1 GENERAL

Program review of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

PN-AAL-045

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Feb 1985, x, 35p. + 3 appendices: statistical
tables, Eng.*

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 21

This A.I.D. program evaluation concludes that the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is making a significant contribution to improving the economic condition of the rural poor in developing countries. IFAD's performance has been shaped by its unique, sole focus on increasing food production and income of small farmers and the rural landless; its reliance on other development organizations to implement projects; its requirement to maximize co-financing with other donors; its relatively small staff and funding level; the broad range of countries IFAD helps; and its accountability despite limited direct project control. Over the past 7 years, IFAD has helped implement 160 integrated rural development, irrigation, credit, and agricultural production projects in 84 countries. Despite the newness of most projects, increased yields and incomes are already apparent and IFAD is emerging as a leader in designing credit projects, promoting donor involvement in higher risk projects, and introducing improved technologies. IFAD's most successful projects have: focused on well-speci-

fied target groups and had clear mechanisms for reaching them; introduced quick-yielding food production techniques adapted to poor farmers or comprehensive packages of integrated services; emphasized large-scale production of low-cost foods; and fostered on-farm employment. Less successful IFAD projects have emphasized large-scale infrastructure investments which only indirectly benefit the rural poor. IFAD needs to increase its emphasis on and range of institutions chosen for co-financing projects; improve project monitoring and evaluation; try to reach more women; increase emphasis on priority U.S. development assistance policies, especially on long-term institutionalization of project management; and focus aid in fewer countries. Three appendices give details on IFAD projects.

Assessment of A.I.D. activities to promote agricultural and rural development in Sub-Saharan Africa

PN-AAX-204

*Johnston, Bruce F.; Hoben, Allan; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Apr 1987, xiii, 173p. + attachments, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 54*

A.I.D.'s assistance to sub-Saharan Africa for agricultural and rural development is assessed under five major headings.

1. A summary of the evolution of A.I.D. policy and strategy from the early 1960s to the present stresses the influence of evolving U.S. policy interests in the area.
2. An analysis—both by general sector and, within agriculture, by subsector—is presented

of the level and content of A.I.D. assistance to the region and its six countries (Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal, Cameroon, and Malawi).

3. The present study's analytical framework is described, with an emphasis on its view of development as a generalized process of the balanced accumulation of "capital"—a term defined broadly to include human and other forms of productive resources.
4. The ways in which the effectiveness of U.S. assistance is conditioned by A.I.D.'s decisionmaking processes and programming procedures are examined. It is argued that the pattern of the Agency's evolution has created a career system that militates against good programming, design, and implementation.
5. The evidence from the country studies regarding the impact of major agricultural activities supported by A.I.D. is summarized, as is A.I.D.'s support for rural infrastructure projects and for rural health and population activities.

Overall conclusions are that the impact of A.I.D. assistance in sub-Saharan Africa has been severely limited by: distinctive conditions in the region (the physical extensiveness and harshness of the countries, the absence of infrastructure, the rise of central planning after independence); Africa's low priority in A.I.D.'s scheme of things; the absence of a clear political constituency for long-term foreign assistance, which has left A.I.D. vulnerable to faddish policy shifts and pressures from special interest groups; and the lack of an Agency-level consensus on the critical elements of agricultural development strategy, together with persistent overoptimism concerning technology transfer. These conclusions are specified in terms of A.I.D. programs in selected subsectors, the potential advantages of A.I.D.'s emphasis on country Missions, and A.I.D.'s programming system; related recommendations are made. Includes 14 tables, 16 figures, and a 13-page bibliography (1950-87).

1.0 Agriculture

Agricultural policy analysis and planning: a summary of two recent analyses of A.I.D.-supported projects worldwide

PN-AAX-205

Tilney, John S., Jr.; Riordan, James T.

Abt Associates, Inc.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Science and Technology. Office of
Agriculture (Sponsor)*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Aug 1988, viii, 15p. + appendix: statistical tables,
Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 55
9364084*

Over the past 20 years, A.I.D. has funded a broad range of agricultural policy analysis and planning projects worldwide. This paper synthesizes the findings of two recent reviews of such projects—a final report on agricultural planning projects in Latin American and the Caribbean, and an interim report on similar efforts in Africa, Asia, and the Near East. The two studies used the same methodology and thus permit a comparative analysis of the effectiveness and impacts of projects in different areas. The study's major conclusion is that, while the projects sponsored by A.I.D. during the 1970s and early 1980s successfully achieved their primary purpose of improving the analytical capacity of staff in host government institutions, they were less successful in influencing policy and programmatic change. Policy issues were often given insufficient emphasis in project design and were consequently downplayed during project implementation.

In order to contribute more directly to policy reform and programmatic change, A.I.D.'s approach to and design of policy analysis and planning projects need to be modified.

1. Better diagnosis is needed of the key problems and policy constraints facing the agricultural sectors in developing countries.
2. Far greater attention should be given to the needs of host country decisionmakers, without whose support and active participation there is little reason to initiate a project.
3. The strategy for targeting agricultural policy analysis and planning assistance to host governments needs to be reexamined. Assistance

should be targeted to the government units that decisionmakers rely on for policy analysis, whether these units are located inside or outside the Ministry of Agriculture.

More specific recommendations for designing future projects are presented in the last section of this report. It is encouraging to note that some of these recommendations, which are based on the experience of A.I.D. projects implemented in the 1970s and early 1980s, have been incorporated into projects designed in the mid-1980s and are currently being implemented in countries such as Ecuador, Niger, and the Philippines. Includes 15 lessons learned and a list of the projects examined.

[Author abstract, modified]

Agricultural policy analysis: a manual for A.I.D. agricultural and rural development officers

PN-AAX-215

Abt Associates, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

Abel, Daft & Earley, Inc.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

Feb 1989, ix, 43p. + 9 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 61

Effective agricultural programming requires A.I.D. Missions to seek reforms of policies that affect the agricultural sector but lie beyond the reach of agricultural ministries. This manual presents a methodology to help A.I.D. personnel identify, rank, and diagnose key policy problems at the macroeconomic, agricultural sector, and agricultural subsector levels and to assess their impact on selected criteria, such as government objectives, economic performance indicators, social indicators, or some combination of these factors. One of the methodology's main strengths is its capacity to highlight areas of divergence and agreement between A.I.D. and the host government with respect to both the issues and their impact. A checklist is presented to help in identifying and mapping institutional participants in the policy process in order to identify appropriate points of intervention. A discussion of strategies to influence agricultural policy focuses on three issues: selecting the project or program mode of assistance; policy analysis itself; and monitoring

of policy changes that affect the sector. The final sections use lessons learned from recent A.I.D. and other donor experiences to present guidelines for designing, implementing, and evaluating (1) projects to build analytic capacity, and (2) program assistance for policy reform. Appendices provide a draft scope of work for policy analysis, country case studies, a list of institutions with expertise in policy analysis, a glossary of economic terms, and a 5-page annotated bibliography.

Small-farmer attitudes and aspirations

PN-AAX-217

Kusterer, Ken

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Jun 1989, 26p. + 2 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper, no.
26*

Related bibliography: PN-ABE-979

Conventional wisdom considers small farmers to be tied to their land, resistant to change, and influenced as much by tradition as by reason. In the countering view of the present study, a reflective summary of unpublished studies (mostly Ph.D. dissertations) of small farmers' attitudes toward economic development, small farmers appear eager to improve their status by entering the market economy—they are the microentrepreneurs of rural areas. The small-farm household, which emerged as the proper unit of analysis, was found to be a complex and diversified economic enterprise, subsistence farming being only one of many productive activities. In making economic decisions, small farmers appear to be driven by goals which are hierarchically structured. The basic level is the establishment of their household base through subsistence production, while the highest is the securement of an independent income for all adult household members. Although tradition is important, small farmers take risks appropriate to their situation, protecting their current position in order to advance to the next level. Thus, from the perspective of the small farm householder, economic development ultimately means transcending small-farmer status, either by becoming a large farmer or, more often, by becoming a part-time farmer whose primary economic activity is elsewhere. The final section of the report makes recommendations for consider-

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ing these aspirations in the design of economic development projects aimed at small farmers.

Small farmer perspective on development: village survey in northeast Thailand—synthesis report

PN-AAX-224

Solem, Richard Ray

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Oct 1989, ix, 24p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 64

Related document: PN-ABC-399

Northeast Thailand, one of the poorest regions in Thailand, has long been a target of donor assistance. This report summarizes the opinions of villagers in the Weeping Plains area of Northeast Thailand on the effects of donors efforts over the past 20 years. Both group interviews and in-depth individual interviews were conducted, focusing on the major categories of A.I.D. assistance: fertilizer, seed, and agricultural credit. A contextual background study was conducted as well. Major findings included the following.

1. Physical infrastructure improvements were by far the most highly valued changes affecting the villagers' lives. This finding is especially noteworthy in light of A.I.D.'s withdrawal from such activities over the past two decades.
2. Government policy regarding rice prices has affected all agricultural activities, tending to inhibit adoption of high-yielding varieties despite efforts by A.I.D. and other donors to promote them.
3. Exogenous economic influences, such as the boom in cassava production, and migration to temporary employment elsewhere have been the source of most of the conspicuous wealth (e.g., automobiles and televisions) among villagers.
4. A.I.D.'s and other donors' agricultural service projects are generally well regarded, with credit programs receiving the highest marks.
5. Thai farmers are not passive recipients of development assistance. Far from having to break down resistance to change, donors need to make their interventions competitive in the marketplace of available options.

1.2 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH & EXTENSION

Kitale maize: the limits of success

PN-AAH-723

Johnson, Charles W.; Byergo, Keith M.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

DEC 1979, 62p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 2

Ninety percent of Kenya's people depend on maize as their staple food. This report examines the impact of A.I.D.'s support to maize breeding projects in Kenya, which aimed to make regular improvements in hybrid maize through development of a breeding methodology and to create an institutional capacity in East Africa for maize research. The evaluation is particularly concerned with the spread of improved hybrid technology and its impact on economic growth, equity, and government policy. Most of the breeding program for high potential areas was a success—yields improved by 25% under research station conditions and, by 1972, the new maize seed had increased yields by one million tons. The private sector was crucial in the rapid diffusion of hybrid maize specifically adapted to the different regional climates. The new seed was of greatest value to those farmers with sufficient land, labor, and capital to fully utilize the innovation, but it also allowed numerous smallholders to improve their food security. The projects' successes, however, were limited by their concurrent failures. The majority of the poor did not participate in achieving the high yields made possible by the improved technology. Research to improve maize protein quality and to develop varieties in low rainfall areas was not successful; neither were efforts to create a regional maize research capacity. The Government of Kenya failed to adjust pricing and marketing systems to problems of abundance and did not insure availability of critical inputs, e.g., fertilizer and credit. Even more importantly, the planned development of an indigenous, ongoing maize research capacity, including training aspects, did not occur. It was learned that the simplicity and viability of the hybrid seed contributed

most to its success; equity cannot be expected to arise from technological improvements; and the long-term continuity of foreign experts, which ensured the breeding program's success, did not allow institutionalization of the research capability. An 118-item bibliography (1963-79) is appended.

Central America: small-farmer cropping systems

PN-AAH-977

Hobgood, Harlan H.; Bazan, Rufo; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 111p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 14
596C064

Rural development strategies have increasingly focused on extending modern production technology to improve the low yields of small farmers who produce most of the world's food crops. This report evaluates a research project to increase small-farmer production in Central America by developing improved cropping practices. The Small Farmer Cropping Systems Project (SFCS) supported research by the Tropical Agriculture Research and Training Center (CATIE) in Costa Rica on the traditional multicropping systems used by over 4 million small farmers in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Although progress was slow in El Salvador and Guatemala, the project succeeded in implementing on-farm research and developing area-specific recommendations. The major shortcoming of the 5-year project was that it concentrated on the research process itself rather than on verifying and disseminating results. Farmer impact was thus limited to the 75 small farmers on whose farms research was conducted. Farmers in Nicaragua and Guatemala were active participants, whereas those in Costa Rica and Honduras remained largely ignorant of the project and disinterested in adopting alternative systems. Test farm yields increased in every country but Guatemala. CATIE's staff, training, and support capabilities were greatly improved and most national agricultural institutions involved were positively affected. The team concluded that SFCS is a replicable model capable of significantly improving the lot of the small farmer. Recommendations for future projects are: (1) disseminate research results; (2) stress an interdisciplinary approach; (3)

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seek the active participation of farmers; (4) improve SFCS methodology by upgrading farm selection criteria, clarifying the relationship between on-farm and central station experiments, and increasing attention to the non-agronomic aspects of small farm systems; (5) promote maximum interagency collaboration; and (6) shorten the time lag between research, verification, and dissemination. Appendices on evaluation methodology, project impact on CATIE, and CATIE's production data are included, as are reports on Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Guatemala: development of the Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology (ICTA) and its impact on agricultural research and farm productivity

PN-AAJ-178

*McDermott, James K.; Bathrick, David D.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Feb 1982, xiii, 14p. + 5 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 30
5200232*

In 1975 A.I.D. initiated a project to increase the production and nutritive quality of basic crops in Guatemala and to develop the capability of the Institute for Agricultural Science and Technology (ICTA) to generate and promote the use of improved small farm technology. This report describes the project's setting and activities, outlines its impact, and summarizes its lessons. Under the ICTA system, new farm-tested seed varieties and cultural practices acceptable to small farmers were developed for maize, beans, and sorghum and led to increased yields and development of a thriving private seed industry. In addition, ICTA staff increased both quantitatively and qualitatively (although rigid government salary schedules have led to a high attrition rate among the 10 Guatemalans who received advanced degrees, threatening ICTA's future progress); benefited from expatriate help in its research work and organizational growth; and received dramatic increases in financial support from the government. ICTA has come to represent a new and innovative model for agricultural research and is now working to share its approach with DIGESA, the Ministry of Agriculture's extension service. Project

experience taught: the benefit of an unconventional approach to generating acceptable small farmer technologies; the importance of sustained USAID/G involvement and of investing simultaneously in human, institutional, and technological resources; A.I.D.'s potential for developing agricultural institutions, its comparative advantage in institution-building projects, and the need in such projects to provide for an institution's support after the project ceases; the productivity of ICTA's linkages to international and U.S. agricultural research centers; the importance of coordinating technology and sociology in small farmer research projects; and the need for special financial incentives to retain ICTA's advanced degree scientists, special feedback information systems to test technology results, and flexibility in project implementation. Appendices treat the evaluation methodology, ICTA's approach to technology development and farmer acceptance of it, the role of improved seed, and ICTA's institutional development.

Korean agricultural research: the integration of research and extension

PN-AAJ-606

*Steinberg, David I.; Jackson, Robert I.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Jan 1982, ix, 23p. + 5 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 27
4890705*

In the context of a Government of Korea (GOK) strategy to improve rural life, A.I.D. funded a 1974-80 project to strengthen the GOK's agricultural research (AR) service. The impact of that project is here reported. Results in the three project areas were mixed. Training was universally regarded as the most successful component, with the provision of equipment (especially a computer and library materials) of notable, but decidedly secondary importance. Short-term foreign help was of greater importance than resident help, which was of marginal utility. The project paper was simplistic and somewhat misleading, underestimating current experimental yields and calling for breakthroughs that had already occurred, e.g., development of high-yield varieties (HYV) that helped make Korea self-sufficient in rice by 1975. Concentration on rice led to a deemphasis

on other important crops. Thus, while project yield increases may be achieved by their 1984 target date, overall national targets will not be met. In fact, despite yield increases in some crops, hectareage in others have been falling—due to a rigid command structure which prevented the GOK's well-organized extension service from taking precautions, especially regarding new races of blast fungal disease and cold-sensitive varieties, the factors causing, respectively, the 1979 and 1980 crop failures. In sum, the project, while appropriate at the time, was not innovative; the future of AR in Korea will depend on the GOK's resources and political will. Other lessons learned are that: overstress on achieving targets and too strong a command structure can lead to undue focus on short-term results; an AR program must be continuous and integrate AR, extension, training, agricultural education, and farmer incentives; P.L. 480 can retard AR by deferring improved prices; HYV adoption can have both positive and negative economic effects; technical help should be reviewed prior to a project; ongoing contracts with international AR centers are essential; and the causes of the agricultural successes in Sino-centric societies should be studied. Appendices include six individual reports and a 42-item bibliography (1958-81).

AID experience in agricultural research: a review of project evaluations

PN-AAJ-613

*Crawford, Paul R.; Barclay, A.H., Jr.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Development Alternatives, Inc.
May 1982, xiv, 260p., Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 13*

To provide background information for future A.I.D. agricultural research (AR) policy, this paper summarizes A.I.D.'s past and present AR activity and identifies major issues affecting AR projects. First, major trends in AR over the past 10-15 years are reviewed: the development of new technologies adapted to both adverse and optimal conditions; and greater emphasis on on-farm research, communication between researchers and farmers, support for national AR systems in developing countries, and longer time

frame requirements. A review of A.I.D.'s AR experience reveals a changing pattern. In the 1950s, the belief that adequate technologies already existed made AR a low A.I.D. priority, while congressional restrictions and limited in-house expertise inhibited AR activity in the 1960s. The 1970s New Directions strategies emphasized other development initiatives. From 1978 to 1981, however, a new awareness of the lack of appropriate technology needed for food production increases and the success of the green revolution led A.I.D. to increase funding for AR by almost 70% to \$143 million, with most of the funds going for mission projects. Next, 131 evaluations of 48 A.I.D. AR projects are reviewed. Standard evaluations were found to focus on inputs and outputs; to provide neither an adequate picture of project performance nor the data needed to compare projects; and to not fully treat problems entailed in doing AR in developing countries, the need for more off-station AR and dissemination of findings. Only the four Impact Evaluations included in the sample measured project effect on beneficiaries. The documents did, however, reveal several recurring issues in AR projects. For the 39 regional and mission projects reviewed, these focused on problems in conducting AR and involving farmers in it, AR quality and priorities, construction delays and the time allotted to AR, and inadequacies in inputs and A.I.D. supervision. Issues in the nine centrally funded projects reviewed concerned linkages with host country institutions, performance of long-term staff, project scope and funding, and AR quality. The study indicated the need for more than the standard evaluations of A.I.D. AR projects. Fourteen appendices include a 246-item bibliography (1963-81) of documents examined for this report.

Food grain technology: agricultural research in Nepal

PN-AAJ-614

Simmons, Emmy B.; Beausoleil, Joseph W.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

*May 1982, xiii, 22p. + 6 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 33
3670054*

*Availability note: Document contains oversize
pages available only in microfiche*

Examination of the impact of a 17-year food grain technology project in Nepal (1957-74), presented in this report, provides both a sense of solid accomplishment and a basis for some disquieting fears. Project accomplishments include development of a functional and decentralized research system with five stations in the Tarai flatlands, training to B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. levels of almost 600 Nepali agricultural scientists, a sharp increase in farmers' awareness of the need for agricultural development, and the beginnings of a partnership between research and extension. Technology packages including improved wheat, rice, and maize varieties were extended to Tarai farmers and farmer awareness of the new technology was found to be virtually universal. However, channels of communication between researchers and farmers—whose problems and priorities differ—are less open than they might be. Researchers urge adoption of demonstrably high-yield varieties, while farmers, who have adopted the new technology only selectively, worry about the risks involved and point out other needs, especially for reliable water and fertilizer supplies. Further, the green revolution in Nepal has not yet led to long-term food security and economic independence as expected, but rather has contributed to economic and environmental destabilization. Indeed, the potential for serious ecological deterioration associated with increasingly intensified cropping is enormous; stabilizing the process will require major changes in the coming decades. Finally, the productivity of researchers, extensionists, farmers, and agricultural input agencies is far from optimal. The project has taught: the need to understand farmers' needs, resources, and constraints in order to establish sound research priorities; the importance of off-station research, long-term research programs, and long-term environmental considerations; the inappropriateness of monopolies in the distribution of agricultural inputs when farmer demand is strong; and the decisive importance of close communication among researchers, extensionists, and farmers. Tarai-related discussions of farming systems, population pressure and agricultural change, and agricultural research and risk are appended.

Agricultural research in northeastern Thailand

PN-AAJ-615

*Calavan, Michael M.; DeBoer, James; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Asia, Thailand*

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

*May 1982, vi, 26p. + 8 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 34
493018002*

In 1966, A.I.D. initiated a project to establish a major multidisciplinary agricultural research center at Tha Phra in Northeastern Thailand. This report summarizes the project's setting and activities, describes its impacts, and presents lessons learned. Project experience was mixed. An excellent physical facility was built, 118 scientists received U.S. training, and a substantial research program (although not sufficiently linked to farmers' needs) was developed at the Center. However, since the project ended in 1975, research programs have been reduced and many Center employees have been absorbed into other units of Thailand's Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Present research is routine, laboratory- or station-focused. Bureaucratic conflict has created an atmosphere in which research done at the Center is often rejected out of hand by central Ministry units. On the other hand, a variety of creative outreach programs, deserving of modest A.I.D. support, have been undertaken by the Center since the project ended. These include television and radio programs, a mobile extension unit, and an agricultural information network. USAID/T officials were in a position to recognize the Center's bureaucratic impotence well before the project ended, but failed to take action to either strengthen the Center's bureaucratic position, support only promising (e.g., training) components, or withdraw support completely. Project experience shows that institutional development projects must fit the existing bureaucratic structure and be flexible enough to allow for major readjustments; that advisors and funds provided under technical assistance contracts may shield a project from direct bureaucratic opposition only as long as they are present; and that A.I.D. procedures and incentive structures do not promote investigation, analysis, and action to solve

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implementation problems. The following remedial measures are recommended: a detailed, retrospective review of A.I.D. professional development work every 5 years; project review for mid-course correction every 2 years; and division of large complex projects into modules to provide more flexible options.

West Africa rice research and development

PN-AAL-012

Lewis, John van Dusen; Bowers, Sidney F.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

May 1983, xiv, 26p. + 6 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 44
6980382; 6980429

The West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) was created in 1970 to increase rice production in its 15 member countries via research and training activities. This study evaluates the impact of a 1975-80 A.I.D. project aimed at helping WARDA define and attain these goals. Of the project's two research programs, only the mangrove rice program at Rokupr, Sierra Leone, produced important and still circulating results. This was due to its long history as a research station, its financial and administrative independence, better communications with local farmers, and strong scientific leadership. The deepwater/floating rice project at Mopti, Mali, on the other hand, proved an undisciplined effort without significant result. Overall, and due in part to the separation of technological and economic policy solutions in its charter, WARDA's impact on regional rice production has been very limited and imports are higher than ever. WARDA's current AID-supported collaboration in upland rice research—neglected so far, although it has the greatest potential—may help reverse this situation. WARDA also established a training center next to Liberia's Agricultural University at Fendell for students from member countries; graduates of the rice production course in particular have been an stimulus to rice growing competence in the region. U.S. training provided to key WARDA researchers has been without impact, since no trainees have yet returned, but a rice economics study undertaken with Stanford University's Food Research Institute has given important new scope to WARDA's interdisciplinary

research. The project taught that donors should share common priorities with research organizations and that regional research organizations should be freed of excessive administrative burdens and helped in defining collective strategies and in improving—not substituting for—inadequate national scientific systems. Overall, WARDA's sensitivity to the political and administrative environments in its member countries makes it effective in exercising quality control and providing advisory backup services to research undertaken in its member countries. Several specific recommendations for WARDA action are included.

Strengthening the agricultural research capacity of the less developed countries: lessons from A.I.D. experience

PN-AAL-020

Murphy, Josette
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Sep 1983, v, 49p. + 4 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 10

Lessons learned from A.I.D.'s efforts to strengthen developing country agricultural research capacities are assessed. The assessment is based on the findings of impact evaluations of AID-funded research projects in Kenya, Central America, Korea, Guatemala, Nepal, Thailand, Tunisia, and West Africa; a review of other project evaluations; and a 6/82 AID-hosted international conference (proceedings appended). Key findings and recommendations for future A.I.D. efforts fall into four categories. First, a genuine, long-term commitment to agricultural research by the host government determines research sustainability and indirectly the use of research findings. Such support will be more likely if there is continuous dialogue among politicians, administrators, and researchers, and if the government receives a clear demonstration of the potential benefits of the research and agrees with the research institution on the latter's mandate and authority. Second, since host government policies and infrastructure partially determine farmer adoption of new technologies and the availability of needed support services, research programs should be selected within a broad rural development policy and planning framework. Also, technological

changes can sharpen inequity among rural households if technology adoption depends upon a resource distributed unequally. Third, research programs can only help increase food production if their designers are aware of existing farming systems and local agro-ecological and economic conditions and the resources available to farmers. This will demand linkages among researchers, extensionists, farmers, concerned government entities, and agricultural training institutions. Fourth, the sustainability of research demands efforts to retain skilled personnel. To this end, A.I.D. training should complement technical assistance and be adapted to a country's real needs and capabilities, and returning trainees should be given adequate incentives. National research institutions should maintain an active network of information exchange with other national and international institutions. Most of the above issues, it is concluded, share a common solution—coordination and information flow among all concerned.

Tunisia: the wheat development program

PN-AAL-022

Johnson, William Frederick; Ferguson, Carl E.; Fikry, Mona

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Board for International Food and Agricultural Development

Oct 1983, xiv, 33p. + 8 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 48

The real question, when evaluating an agricultural research project, is whether or not an institutional capability to carry on sustained research and extension has been developed. By this criterion, Project Wheat, implemented in Tunisia during the period 1965-77, was a success. The project was designed to introduce and adapt to Tunisian conditions semi-dwarf high-yield wheat varieties developed by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico, and to train Tunisians in agricultural research and extension. Many project impacts are only now being realized. Tunisian research capabilities—developed through M.S. and especially Ph.D. training of 19 agricultural researchers (13 are still involved in cereals programs in Tunisia) as well as practical training for 55 others—are now being demonstrated in improved research, extension, and educational programs, conducted without external assistance; and in increased

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farmer acceptance of new varieties and technologies. During the project, five bread wheat and five durum wheat varieties were developed; Tunisian researchers have since developed two improved varieties of each type. An extension and farm demonstration program begun during the project is now staffed with trained Tunisians and still successful. During 1971–81, Tunisian cereal (wheat and barley) production increased by 5,302,000 MT over the previous 11 years (saving nearly \$126 million in foreign exchange costs), and annual per capita production increased from 104 kg in 1970 to 160 kg in 1980. In addition, both per capita cereal consumption and farmer incomes have increased and subsistence farmers are now better integrated into the economy. Crop increases have been used for export and for tourist hotel supply, improving Tunisia's trade balance. On the other hand, increased employment of women in farming and rural industry (due to the migration of men), has had one negative result: greater use of prepared food and consequently a poorer farm diet. Further, not all institutional goals (e.g., integration of research and extension) were achieved, nor was the perhaps illusory goal of food production self-sufficiency. A 99-item bibliography (1960–82) is appended.

Review of A.I.D. experience with farming systems research and extension projects

PN-AAX-230

Bymes, Kerry J.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation
Jan 1990, xix, 43p. + 7 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 67

A.I.D.'s experience with farming systems research and extension (FSR/E) has been mixed. FSR/E projects have provided opportunities for developing country professionals to acquire training and field experience in this new approach to research. However, most projects have not had the impact on technology development and transfer or institutionalization of FSR/E as had been assumed in project designs.

This report, based on a case study review of evaluations of 12 A.I.D.-funded projects, synthesizes the Agency's experience with FSR/E from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s and assesses the impact of these projects on agricultural development.

Major sections of the report overview FSR/E, summarize project experiences, provide lessons learned, and discuss the approach's future in A.I.D. projects. FSR/E's performance has been affected by several key constraints, including a lack of the following: (1) a problem solving approach; (2) effective collaboration across disciplines; (3) links of research with extension; (4) consensus on methodology; (5) stakeholder understanding of FSR/E; (6) agricultural policy and strategy defining FSR/E's role in research and extension; (7) staffing of projects with trained personnel; and (8) government funding to meet recurrent costs. The report concludes that while the FSR/E concept has not been well understood or carried out by project implementers and A.I.D. management, agricultural projects that seek to strengthen technology development and transfer can benefit by using the concept more effectively.

[Author abstract, modified]

Review of A.I.D. experience: farming systems research and extension projects—1975–1987

PN-ABC-863

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

A.I.D. evaluation highlights, no. 4, Jun 1989, 8p., Eng.

Full review: PN-ABB-001

Farming systems research and extension (FSR/E) projects funded by A.I.D. have had a mixed impact on technology development and transfer and institutionalization of FSR/E. These projects have provided research and extension personnel with opportunities for training and field experience, but FSR/E has yet to be effectively incorporated into technology development and transfer systems to the extent that would permit FSR/E to begin to achieve the expected impacts on agricultural production. Key constraints to FSR/E project implementation and impact have included the absence of the following: a problem-solving approach, effective collaboration across disciplines, research-extension linkages, consensus on an FSR/E methodology, stakeholder understanding of FSR/E, an agricultural policy and strategy defining FSR/E's role in research and extension, staffing of projects with trained

personnel, and government funding to meet recurrent costs. In sum, while the FSR/E concept often has not been well understood by project implementers or A.I.D. management, agricultural projects that seek to strengthen technology development and transfer can benefit by using the FSR/E concept more effectively. The lessons learned from this Center for Development Information and Evaluation review can serve to improve design, implementation, and evaluation of agricultural projects having a technology development and transfer component.

[Author abstract, modified]

1.3 AGRICULTURAL SERVICES & CREDIT

Korean agricultural services: the invisible hand in the iron glove; market and nonmarket forces in Korean rural development

PN-AAL-036

Steinberg, David I.; Ban, Sung H.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)

Mar 1984, 5p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 52
4890675; 489H027; 489H026; 4890685;
4890688; 4890594

During the past three decades Korea has sharply increased its agricultural productivity through an intricate mixture of public and private initiative, but always with government playing the leading role. The contributions of six A.I.D. agricultural services projects to Korean agricultural development are assessed in this impact evaluation. A.I.D. assistance, the authors suggest, was appropriate and, in some cases, critical in increasing land and labor productivity. A.I.D. helped in the construction of new fertilizer plants and grain storage facilities and, while it is not possible to pinpoint specific policy changes directly attributable to A.I.D. technical assistance, the continuing dialogue on projects and policies and the extent of A.I.D. involvement (including participant training, which may have been A.I.D.'s most enduring contribution) evidently had a positive overall in-

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fluence. Major policy reforms and their timing, however, were products solely of the Korean government's perception of political and economic needs. A.I.D. assistance to the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF)—a critical element in rural growth—increased government control over rural areas, but at the time the NACF was the only mechanism available to deliver agricultural services. Lessons emerging from the Korean experience include the importance of land reform as the bedrock of agricultural development, the difficulty of fostering mechanization without careful attention to labor absorption, the importance of sequencing agricultural interventions (beginning with research and training), and the recognition that policy reform is more likely to come through a cumulative process of dialogue than directly from technical assistance. Subsidies (a key component in Korea's rural strategy) may be more effective in promoting agricultural development than are parastatal institutions. Korea, because of its particular administrative structure, and because it first stimulated industrial rather than agricultural development, is unlikely to be a model for other nations. Included are a 35-item bibliography (1971–83) and 9 appendices providing detailed data on Korean agricultural development.

U.S. Aid to Paraguay: Assistance to CREDICOOP's agricultural credit union system

PN-AAL-041

Solem, Richard Ray; Tippet, Bruce A.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jan 1985, xiv, 20p. + 5 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 56
5260101; 5260113; 5260118; 5260122

The impact of A.I.D.'s support for CREDICOOP, Paraguay's national agricultural credit institution, is evaluated. CREDICOOP has established a significant network, growing from 16 to 70 credit unions, doubling its membership, and evolving from a savings and loan institution to a multipurpose cooperative. Its effectiveness, however, has only been fair to poor, being seriously hampered by a high loan delinquency rate due to unwise early lending policies, poor harvests caused by bad weather, and a wildly unpredictable crop market. Yet despite apparently

steady decapitalization, CREDICOOP survives; it has developed an institutional toughness which defies logic. CREDICOOP's impact on small farmers has been mixed. Many fell into debt and have gone back to the private traders who have no collateral requirement and a short loan process; others have graduated to seeking credit from commercial banks and the National Development Bank. The key lesson learned is that, despite several decades of public sector support for CREDICOOP and other large, formal credit institutions, the private sector credit delivery system continues to command 84% of the overall agricultural credit market and fully 98% of the small farmer market. A.I.D. should learn from these village-level businesses and seek ways of working through them. Other lessons learned are that: (1) integrating farmers and non-farmers in the same credit union can level financial flows within a union and provide relatively sophisticated leadership; (2) a credit institution must take into account both its operating costs and the costs of its competitor's money if it is to develop long-term sustainability; (3) the greatest weakness in any agricultural credit program is the unpredictability of weather and market conditions; (4) determination is the key to succeeding in a free market environment; (5) the ability to lend without requiring mortgage collateral, while raising the risk of default, also raises the ability to reach small farmer borrowers; and (6) availability of a credit union tends to make other agricultural service suppliers more competitive. Appendices provide greater detail on the individual A.I.D. projects involved and discuss traditional and CREDICOOP interest rates.

Tanzania seed multiplication

PN-AAL-042

Ratchford, C. Bryce; Meyers, L. Richard; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Science and Technology

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
(Sponsor)

Jan 1985, xv, 21p. + 7 appendices: chart, map, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 55
6210092

Tanzania has long suffered from lack of an organized seed production and distribution system. This report presents the results of an impact assessment of a project (1/70–12/82) to increase the quality and quantity of seeds produced in Tanza-

nia. The project succeeded in enacting seed legislation and regulations and creating a system for producing high-quality seeds and distributing them to small and large farmers. Farmers are using the seeds and increasing their crop production. The returned recipients of long-term training have proven to be dedicated and competent. Despite these successes, Tanzania's overall crop production system is working far below its capacity. Only 4,000 T of food crop seeds were sold in 1982, less than 5% of capacity. Total food crop production has continued to decline since the early 1970s. Credit and extension institutions have not cooperated with the seed project as expected. Finally, project sustainability is threatened by lack of spare parts and trained service personnel to support the project's mechanized seed production process and by the failure to institutionalize training for a second generation of project personnel. Lessons learned are that: mechanization should be minimal and kept simple; project implementation should be flexible; distribution and marketing problems should be addressed prior to the start of production; design assumptions regarding the expected cooperation of related institutions should be carefully evaluated and diligently pursued during implementation; the design should take into account the fact that, in an economy with strong public sector control, free market mechanisms will not operate as in a market economy; exaggerated claims for potential impacts may initially create enthusiasm, but will ultimately hurt project credibility and sustainability; and design and implementation plans should seek to compensate for weak or lacking institutional support systems. Appendices include, inter alia, a 25-item bibliography (1975–83) and information on the evaluation methodology, on seed production, and on sociopolitical, agricultural, and general characteristics of Tanzania.

Agricultural credit in the Dominican Republic

PN-AAL-048

Araujo, Frank; Viveros-Long, Ana Maria; Murphrey, Jim

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jun 1985, xi, 13p. + 4 appendices: map, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 58
5170110; 5170116

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Interviews with beneficiaries provide the main basis for this impact assessment of two loan projects undertaken by A.I.D. in the 1970s to spur development among Dominican Republic small farmers. The first loan, channeled through the public-private Agricultural Bank, provided small farmers with credit, technical assistance, and vocational training and financed the construction of rural infrastructure. The second loan was designed mostly to upgrade the Ministry of Agriculture's (MOA) capabilities to serve the small farm sector, although credit was still a notable component. The loans enabled the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) to increase the provision of credit to small farmers and contributed to ongoing training programs for Bank and MOA personnel and for farmers. However, there is no evidence that the increases in food crop production and in use of modern inputs during the projects' time frames were due to the higher availability of credit. Further, the local institutions which employed the projects' trainees were and remain weak and so have been unable to use their new personnel effectively. Finally, the MOA's provision of agricultural services was ineffective and may have inhibited the growth of the for-profit agricultural services sector. Sustainability is a major issue. Few, if any, activities are being efficiently implemented and positive gains have not been sustained. The loans were overambitious and highlight the difficulty of promoting development through subsidized credit and services. The main lesson learned is that human and financial resources cannot have significant impact within a non-supportive economic policy and institutional environment; as the projects unfolded, P.L. 480 Title I proceeds had to be used to prevent a complete collapse of some efforts. Another lesson is that credit cannot generate agricultural development, but only facilitate investment in existing productive activities—few of which, apart from rice, are available to Dominican Republic small farmers. A final lesson is that existing economic and development incentives must be favorable to project goals. Since the GODR's pro-urban bias was clear at the time the loans were planned, a move to a neutral structure of incentives might have led to increased impacts.

Synthesis of A.I.D. experience: small-farmer credit, 1973–1985

PN-AAL-074

Lieberson, Joseph M.; Kotellos, Katherine A.; Miller, George G.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Oct 1985, ix, 48p. + 7 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 41

In Spring 1973, A.I.D. reviewed its small farmer credit (SFC) programs to determine why so many had recently failed and to set conditions to improve future SFC programs. The effect of the Spring Review is analyzed in this study, which is based on an examination of 150 evaluations of 80 SFC projects undertaken between 1973 and 1985 and on in-depth analyses of 50 of those projects. The study found that since credit is typically a very small part of farm production costs, its absence is seldom a major constraint and its presence, even when highly subsidized, cannot offset other constraints. Specifically, the roughly one-third of the projects that proved successful were those that recognized three factors.

1. Farmers can invest credit productively only when appropriate technology and supporting services such as inputs, extension, and marketing are available.
2. Developing country policies (price controls, taxes) and economic conditions (inflation, interest rates) often need reform if agricultural development efforts are to succeed.
3. Mechanisms for credit delivery/recovery (assessment of creditworthiness, loan disbursements, loan monitoring, loan recovery) are best handled on a local level.

Farmer groups, when well organized and committed to development, were positive factors in this regard. The thoroughness of a loan application form and of the loan review process had little relationship to repayment rates. The key factors were the local loan officer's ability to judge character and creditworthiness, and good accounting, recordkeeping, and control practices in the local loan institution. Projects that worked with an existing rather than a new institution succeeded best, as did projects that provided technical assistance and training to improve institutional capacity. The study also found that provision of an interest subsidy to borrowers undid a large number of projects and that cheap credit can create resource misallocations by

encouraging inappropriate technology and inappropriate investment—lenders that provided cheap credit were not financially viable, whereas those that set lending rates high enough to cover their cost of capital were successful.

Agricultural credit, input, and marketing services: issues and lessons from A.I.D. project experience—an introductory review

PN-AAL-079

Solem, Ray; Wilcock, David; et al.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Aug 1985, x, 53p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 15

The design of A.I.D. projects providing agricultural credit, input, and marketing services has been too supply-side oriented, relying on criteria established by economists and scientists rather than on what will be adopted by farmers, and this orientation has carried over to the implementation stage. Thus concludes this A.I.D. evaluation study based on review of 203 projects, 44 of which were closely examined and 5 of which were selected for field-level impact evaluation, and discussion of findings at an international conference. The majority of A.I.D. agricultural service projects fell short of their potential because they failed to meet three essential conditions—the user must find the service technologically and financially desirable, its delivery compatible and timely, and its utilization profitable. Credit projects typically fell short because they were tied to unproven technologies, implemented in a hostile policy environment, or included complicated application procedures or interest rates which were arbitrary and not dictated by the marketplace. Input projects often promoted technologies that, while scientifically sound, were judged inappropriate by farmers. A common mistake in marketing projects was failure to collect produce from farmers in a timely fashion; lack of market price stability was a problem in some projects. The evaluation also assessed the relative advantages and disadvantages of public sector, private sector, and mixed delivery systems. Public sector delivery mechanisms were clearly superior for very general projects (e.g., infrastructure) and

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for those either focused on policy (e.g., price or exchange rate policies) or aimed at social transfers (e.g., price supports or input subsidies). Mixed public/private entities were most effective when projects required political support along with flexible and responsive management, while private delivery systems worked best in projects requiring both flexible management and individual farmer contact. Retailing of credit and inputs and purchasing at the farm gate were two tasks best performed by private sector entities such as PVOs, co-ops, and for-profit businesses.

Credit programs for small farmers: a project manager's reference

PN-AAL-090

Chew, Siew Tuan

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Jun 1987, x, 37p. + 6 attachments, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 47*

Most of the agricultural credit programs funded by A.I.D. between 1950 and 1985 encountered serious implementation problems and failed to meet their objectives. This report, the first in a series of reference guides for project managers, summarizes A.I.D.'s experiences with small farmer credit and its current policy, and describes two new approaches to providing agricultural credit. The lessons learned to date revolve around four issues.

1. Certain pre-conditions must be met if a credit program is to succeed: favorable market conditions and government pricing policies; adequate post-harvest support; sufficient land and labor resources among target farmers; and the existence of an appropriate, profitable agricultural technology.
2. Positive real interest rates should be charged; this is a fundamental lesson, but often requires long-term, sector-wide policy reform.
3. In the area of loan administration, A.I.D.'s experience suggests certain steps (outlined herein) that can help project managers design an appropriate loan portfolio, identify possible alternatives to big banking institutions, minimize transaction costs, protect against inflation and bad debt, and address equity concerns.

4. Standard methods of evaluating credit programs are costly and inefficient; perhaps evaluation should focus less on changes in farm income and more on the development of self-sustaining rural financial institutions. Two experimental approaches to funding agricultural credit programs—rural savings and private equity investment—are currently underway.

1. Early results from a program in Honduras and the Dominican Republic suggest that local agricultural banks and credit unions can successfully mobilize deposits in conjunction with their lending, although they might require substantial technical assistance and training.
2. A USAID/Honduras project is testing the feasibility of establishing a private company to share investment risks with small livestock farmers. Appendices include excerpts from A.I.D. policy papers and annotated bibliographies (along with ordering instructions).

1.4 HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

Malawi: Bunda Agricultural College

PN-AAL-094

Welsch, Delane; Flora, Jan; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Jul 1987, xii, 19p. + 9 appendices: map,
statistical tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 64
6120054; 6900054*

When Malawi attained independence in 1964, few of its citizens had any advanced training in the agricultural sciences, and most top-level agricultural jobs in the public and private sectors were filled by expatriates. This impact evaluation report reviews A.I.D.'s involvement with the Bunda Agricultural College, which was founded within the University of Malawi (UM) in 1966 to address this personnel constraint. Bunda has been the focus of two A.I.D. projects (covering the periods 1966-70 and 1976-82) to finance campus construction, provide long-term expatriate facul-

ty, and train Bunda faculty at U.S. universities. Bunda's record over the past 20 years has been one of outstanding accomplishments as a teaching institution. During this period, Bunda has granted 861 diploma degrees and 300 B.S. degrees; nearly all the expatriates in the agricultural sector have been replaced by Malawi nationals. The relevance, quality, and efficiency of Bunda's educational program remain high, even though the College has had to adjust in recent years to a shrinking operational budget. Despite Bunda's success, changes in Malawi and in the College itself now dictate a new approach. Demand for Bunda graduates is projected to decline during the remainder of the 1980s. At the same time, Bunda's still growing Ph.D. faculty focuses almost exclusively on teaching and has had but little involvement in Malawi's national research program. Clearly, Bunda's traditional emphasis on teaching needs to be adjusted to focus more on research, but such a change would require a closer institutional link with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Bunda's relative isolation from the MOA and even from other colleges within the UM has caused problems in faculty career development, in designing educational programs that address national priorities, and in the college's ability to contribute to the larger agricultural research/extension systems already in place in Malawi. Future programs to develop agricultural colleges should include measures to strengthen inter-institutional relations.

Hassan II Institute of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine in Morocco: institutional development and international partnership

PN-AAL-096

*Eriksen, John H.; Busch, Lawrence; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Asia and Near East, Morocco*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Jul 1987, xiv, 28p. + 10 appendices: map,
statistical tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 65
6080088*

A.I.D.'s assistance to Morocco's Hassan II Institute of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine

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(IAV) has been uniquely successful among projects to train agricultural researchers and educators in Francophone Africa. This impact evaluation reviews A.I.D.'s support to the IAV over the past 18 years, and assesses the kind of support required to ensure continued success. Starting with a single Moroccan faculty member in 1969, the IAV now has a 350-member faculty, more than 85% of which is Moroccan, and IAV graduates now occupy a wide range of management positions in government agencies and state-run and private agricultural enterprises. The IAV has played a central role in the modernization of the Moroccan agricultural sector, and has become a major regional resource as well, drawing many students from other African countries. IAV's success can be traced to many factors, including the commitment and excellence of the IAV's charismatic leadership, a complementary long-term commitment on the part of A.I.D. and the primary Title XII contractor (the University of Minnesota), a curriculum model that integrates classroom experience with rural realities, and the existence of a broad base of secondary school graduates in science. However, IAV remains fragile; it must now face the problems of a change in leadership, mounting operating costs, and concerns on the part of private sector employers as to the relevance of IAV training. IAV's experience illustrates the crucial importance of high-level political commitment; strong, effective institutional leadership; and the flexibility to adapt a wide range of faculty experience and attitudes that "fit" institutional needs. Building a successful university faculty is possible, but takes time: in this case, 18 years of hard work by A.I.D. and the University of Minnesota. Withdrawing support too early may jeopardize the gains achieved.

[Author abstract, modified]

Three Nigerian universities and their role in agricultural development

PN-AAX-200

Gamble, William K.; Blumberg, Rae Lesser; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Mar 1988, xi, 19p. + 7 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation, no. 66
6200743; 6200817; 6200742; 6200602

During the 1960s and the 1970s, A.I.D. supported three newly established Nigerian universities via three cooperating U.S. land grant universities—Ahmadu Bello University (Kansas State University), the University of Ife (the University of Wisconsin), and the University of Nigeria at Nsukka (Michigan State University). This study identifies the impacts of these projects. All three universities have expanded exponentially—from a few hundred students to 21,000 at Ahmadu Bello (including its non-degree granting schools), 13,000 at Ife, and 12,000 at Nsukka. Their brief history encompasses four eras of Nigerian history: the heady period of independence beginning in 1960; the 1967–70 civil war; the oil-boom years of the later 1970s; and the oil-bust period from the early 1980s to the present. Efforts to transfer the tripartite land-grant model (teaching, research, extension) to Nigeria had mixed success. Ahmadu Bello comes closest to the model in practice. Staff at the other two universities understand and appreciate the concept but have been limited in their ability to practice it. All three universities have adopted the model's teaching component, but only Ahmadu Bello, because it incorporated established Nigerian research institutes at its founding, has produced significant achievements in research and extension. Thus, while the universities have contributed to solving Nigeria's agricultural problems (e.g., through staff participation in state, federal, and parastatal commissions, the development of improved food crop varieties, and research in production economics and animal health), their impact (except at Ahmadu Bello) has been less than expected. Three factors seem to have determined the universities' impact: (1) the reluctance of government ministries to transfer research and extension responsibilities to the universities; (2) the failure of the universities' promotion and incentive systems to reward research and outreach by staff; and (3) the declining financial fortunes of the universities resulting from the sharp drop in oil prices in recent years. Several lessons were learned.

1. Of the three components of the U.S. land-grant model, teaching is the easiest to transfer.
2. Structural factors in many countries inhibit the development of relevant, problem-solving research and extension.
3. It is unrealistic to expect a university to be a major influence without a suitable incentive and reward system for its staff.

[Author abstract, modified]

Dominican Republic: the Superior Institute of Agriculture—development of a private institution of higher agricultural education

PN-AAX-201

Hansen, David O.; Antonini, Gustavo A.; Strasma, John

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Mar 1988, xiv, 19p. + 8 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation, no. 67
5170125; 5170144; 5170160

The Superior Institute of Agriculture (ISA) was created in 1962 by a group of socially minded community leaders to remedy the Dominican Republic's lack of trained agricultural manpower. Originally a high school, ISA was later expanded to include an undergraduate degree program through a local university, as well as a specialized non-degree program in rural development administration. It recently gained autonomous university status. This report focuses on ISA's development impact. These impacts have been numerous and important. ISA's training is generally regarded as excellent. Current and former faculty are vitally involved in national decisionmaking regarding agricultural and rural development, either indirectly (via research) or directly (via government employment or consultation). ISA faculty have conducted innovative commodity research which has led to important foreign exchange savings and have influenced government policy on critical issues such as agrarian reform and reforestation. Several factors account for ISA's vitality: continuous, strong leadership from its founding group; early institution-building inputs by Texas A&M University; responsiveness to societal needs; innovative training and other programs funded by the Dominican Secretariat of Agriculture (DSOA), A.I.D., and other donors; and ISA's own commitment to quality education. Constraining factors include an overly theoretical curriculum, insufficient linkages with research and outreach activities, and pressures on ISA to turn to the private sector in the light of dwindling government/donor support (which threatens to divert ISA's attention from the small-farm sector) and to reduce or

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terminate its technical/vocational program (despite the present shortage of lower- and mid-level agricultural technicians). Lessons learned include the following.

1. An agricultural college needs strong, supporting linkages to its primary bureaucratic constituency (in this case, the DSOA).
2. Donors should follow institution-building efforts with projects to build linkages to research and outreach.
3. Moderate resource scarcity can generate institutional entrepreneurship and innovation.
4. External funding should not infringe on the recipient's basic institutional autonomy, which may be a major impetus to social relevancy.
5. Institutional autonomy needs to be coupled with direct accountability to ensure responsiveness to societal needs; oversight by the founding group is an important mechanism in this regard.

A 15-page Spanish/English bibliography is included among the appendices.

[Author abstract, modified]

Universities for development: report of the joint Indo-U.S. impact evaluation of the Indian agricultural universities

PN-AAX-206

Busch, Lawrence

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Sep 1988, xix, 96p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 68

From 1955 to 1972, A.I.D. contracted with several U.S. land grant universities to help India establish eight agricultural universities. Today, India boasts 28 State Agricultural Universities (SAUs), and the SAU system, together with the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), has become the world's second largest agricultural scientific establishment, with numerous achievements in agricultural education, research, and extension. The SAU's have developed the capacity to train students through the Ph.D. level, provided technical support to various state extension services, and made a considerable impact on Indian agriculture in terms of person-

nel, productivity, and technology development and transfer. Besides detailing these achievements and the factors contributing to them, this study, part of a worldwide review of A.I.D.'s support to higher education in agriculture, documents: (1) the historical development of the SAU's and their current structure; (2) their conformity with the ICAR Model Act; and (3) the issues which, in the view of SAU faculty and others in India, now face the system given the changing nature of world agriculture. Pressing management issues include: (1) strategic planning to build new constituencies; (2) the isolation of the SAU's and the overcentralization of the SAU system; (3) compromises in regard to faculty quality; (4) faculty uncertainty about the mission of the SAU's; (5) high staff turnover and in some cases very high levels of faculty vacancies, resulting in heavy teaching loads and student frustration; and (6) the inadequate representation of women both in professional disciplines and among the student body. Key educational issues are: (1) lack of staff in the social sciences; (2) outmoded methodologies for teaching and for extension education; (3) severe limitations in regard to the basic sciences; (4) the high number of students from urban rather than rural areas; and (5-6) the need to develop an interdisciplinary approach to research and expand job opportunities for graduates. The report concludes that the crucial test for SAU's in the next decade will be to develop into "proactive, environment-shaping" organizations. This can only be accomplished by forging new links with other agricultural institutions (e.g., the state irrigation departments) and, more importantly, by ensuring the continued political support of the Government of India. Includes a 7-page bibliography.

Kasetsart University in Thailand: an analysis of institutional evolution and development impact

PN-AAX-207

Enksen, J.H.; Compton, J.L.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Sep 1988, xiii, 26p. + 8 appendices + bibliography: charts, statistical tables, Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 69
3980249*

Founded in 1943, Kasetsart University's (KU's) original goal was to provide trained personnel to Thailand's Ministry of Agriculture and other public sector agricultural agencies. More than 40 years and some 38,270 graduates later, the university is entering a new phase: the transition from agricultural school to a broad-based academic institution capable of providing skilled graduates to Thailand's growing private sector. This document reviews KU's institutional development and draws valuable lessons for the development of agricultural universities in general. KU has participated in several programs which have fundamentally improved Thai agriculture. Of special interest is the National Corn and Sorghum Research Program, which has provided Thai farmers with improved maize varieties and cultural practices, resulting in a hundredfold increase in maize production. KU has also influenced the development of Thailand's world-renowned tropical fruit industry and has been instrumental in developing specialty crops such as honey, straw mushrooms, tropical orchids, and silk. KU scientists have contributed to supplying the Thai people with low-cost, high-quality protein supplements and have helped fight environmental degradation by participating in soil mapping, land use classification, and remote sensing activities. A number of lessons can be derived from KU's experience.

1. The role of agricultural higher education needs to be reconceptualized in order to enhance the relevance of agricultural schools and facilities.
2. Universities should develop strategic mechanisms for integrating diverse faculties and research programs around a common, institutional goal.
3. New forms of university organization are needed to provide more opportunities for students and faculty to engage in active, problem-oriented learning activities.
4. Universities should be held accountable for the relevance of their programs to the needs of the community.
5. The university should encourage and support leaders capable of introducing change and innovation within the university.
6. Donors and host governments should more effectively address long-term faculty development needs.
7. External donors should focus more on developing ties between the university and its outside policy, scientific, and industrial constituencies.

Includes a 10-page bibliography.

Indonesia: the Bogor Institute of Agriculture

PN-AAX-216

Theisen, Gary; Armstrong, George; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Mar 1989, x, 23p., Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 70
Appendices: PN-ABE-981

Assisted by one of the longest periods of continuous support ever provided by A.I.D., the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (Institute Pertanian Bogor or IPB) has been at the forefront of Indonesia's agricultural and educational development for over 30 years. IPB faculty and staff have helped to develop and disseminate improved corn hybrids, control the brown plant hopper, improve soil fertility, develop farming and land-use techniques to promote transmigration, and promote major initiatives in natural resource management and conservation. In the educational sector, IPB's pioneering efforts in academic planning have had notable repercussions throughout Indonesia, improving the quality of students and curricula and accelerating the rate at which students complete their studies. IPB graduates are in great demand and its faculty are frequently called on by Government agencies to conduct research and provide policy advice, and by other Indonesian universities to serve as lecturers, administrators, and resource personnel. Yet a number of problems cloud the Institute's future. Pressures to expand enrollment have stretched infrastructure and human resources very thin. IPB is also being pressured by the Government to take the lead in promoting provincial universities at a time when its energies and resources are needed at IPB itself. Opportunities for faculty development are much more limited than in the past, when donors funded overseas study; few of the new staff have had the development opportunities available to their seniors. Cutbacks in Government funding have left IPB with almost no discretionary research funds, not only placing IPB's leadership in basic research in jeopardy, but leaving its very research agenda at the dictates of external agencies. If IPB is to remain a sectoral leader, it must develop a comprehensive, strategic, long-term vision and plan. Major needs are to identify a smaller

number of technical specialties on which IPB can concentrate its resources and to enlist external support to maintain faculty skills, stimulate innovative approaches, respond to changing development needs, and establish long-term linkages with academic and research institutions in the industrialized and developing world.

Ethiopia: Alemaya University of Agriculture

PN-AAX-219

Price, Edwin; Evans, Conrad
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jun 1989, vii, 16p., Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 71

Alemaya University of Agriculture is the primary institution of agricultural higher education in Ethiopia and the only institution offering B.S. and M.S. degrees in agriculture. From its establishment in 1952 through 1968, the University received major institutional development assistance from A.I.D. This report measures the impact Alemaya has made through its graduates and its research and extension activities. The University has granted 1,629 diplomas, 2,558 B.S. degrees, and 81 M.S. degrees, and graduates are employed at all levels of administration and education in Ethiopian society. Research results produced by Alemaya faculty are eagerly awaited by the Government and by farmers, and many plant varieties developed by the University are in use throughout the agricultural economy. Alemaya-developed techniques in animal breeding and conversion of waste by-products have also been successfully implemented. These accomplishments have been achieved under conditions of considerable hardship. The University is extremely understaffed, largely due to the exodus of faculty members during and after the 1974 revolution. Nevertheless, the University is not highly politicized, but rather presents the image of a technocracy, heavily oriented to achieving agricultural breakthroughs. Although Alemaya has solid leadership and appears poised for rapid progress, neither donors nor the Ethiopian Government appear inclined to provide the University with necessary support.

Beyond the Neoclassical University: Agricultural higher education in the developing world—an interpretive essay

PN-AAX-229

Hansen, Gary E.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jan 1990, vi, 19p., Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 20

Most public agricultural universities in the Third World have developed according to a neoclassical model which limits their ability to remain innovative and responsive to important social needs. This study synthesizes findings of an evaluation of agricultural universities in ten countries (India, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Malawi); and explores an approach for revitalizing agricultural education. Four main problems inherent in the neoclassical model are identified.

1. The effectiveness of agricultural universities in promoting rural and agricultural development is often limited by the policy environment. Three factors stand out here: the absence of strong linkages to the Ministry of Agriculture; the lack of autonomy concerning enrollment, programming, and finances, together with weak internal mechanisms for keeping university leaders accountable; and policymakers' conservative views of the role of the university.
2. Another constraining factor is the universities' overemphasis on research in crop and animal production and neglect of broader social and economic concerns and public policy issues.
3. The traditional university is organized around discipline-based departments, their involuntarily tendencies unchecked by cross-disciplinary structures, strong extension services, or well-organized external constituencies.
4. A final constraint is posed by a highly didactic philosophy of education which views learning as merely transfer of knowledge in the classroom. The paper concludes that a new type of university is needed. This post-neoclassical model would have the following attributes: a broader curriculum to include general issues of rural well-being (e.g., em-

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ployment, education, tenure security) in addition to the subjects of crop and animal production; an innovative, activist orientation toward both educational methods and educational goals, involving increased cooperation among faculty, students, and local citizens; and a new university structure, in which interconnected task groups are clustered around major programmatic themes.

Universities for development: lessons for enhancing the role of agricultural universities in developing countries

PN-ABC-900

Hansen, Gary E.

U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Aug 1989, vi, 11p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 31

Rapid changes in the global economy and the world scientific community are changing the traditional role of agricultural universities in the developing world. This study examines six problems pertinent to this changing focus and draws related lessons for A.I.D.

1. Agricultural universities traditionally define themselves as sources of the science and technology needed to increase agricultural production. They need to summount this narrow perspective by defining their mission more dynamically and addressing the dominant technical, institutional, and policy issues of the rural sector.
2. Many agricultural universities have only tenuous linkages to public and private constituencies and policymakers. This isolation deprives universities of important research and outreach resources and hinders them from attaining political and developmental relevance. Universities need to promote strategic planning as a tool for agenda setting, management, and linkage development.
3. Program development depends inordinately on organizational structures. As a result, the university programs become aggregates of courses and research projects lacking focus and direction. Flexible and integrative structures fostering multidisciplinary research and problemsolving approaches are needed.

4. University efforts to address the rural sector's systemic resource and institutional problems have had limited success due to reductionist or didactic learning models. Major emphasis needs to be placed on active, participatory, and problemsolving approaches.
5. University innovation is hindered by conservative, overly centralized government policies. Governments need to shift emphasis from regulating to facilitating university innovation.
6. University leaders are isolated from international developments in higher education. Mechanisms are needed to link universities to outside sources in a way which provides the university with access to advanced innovations in education and research.

Impact of investments in agricultural higher education

PN-ABD-922

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

A.I.D. evaluation highlights, no. 5, Aug 1989, 8p., Eng.

Since 1952, A.I.D. has assisted in the development of agricultural universities and faculties in 40 Third World countries. An evaluation was begun in 1985 to assess the impact of A.I.D.'s investment in agricultural higher education, the highlights of which are provided in this brief. Field visits were made to 23 agricultural universities and faculties in 10 countries. Most of the assistance has been provided through a partnership with U.S. land-grant universities. Large numbers of U.S. faculty were sent on long-term overseas assignments to the host country universities to help establish and strengthen education and research programs. Concurrently, thousands of host country faculty were sent to U.S. universities for advanced degree training in the agricultural sciences. These investments have yielded high returns. Most of the U.S.-trained, host country faculty returned to their home universities and emerged as leaders in expanding and moving their institutions toward a position of educational prominence. The universities have expanded their undergraduate programs, greatly enhancing the supply of trained agriculturalists, and many now support training at the graduate level. Several institutions have led re-

search and development efforts for new production technologies for the agricultural sector. Despite these past accomplishments, the future growth of many of these universities will likely be constrained by declining budgetary resources, faculty "inbreeding", excessive government regulation, and a lack of access to state-of-the-art advances in international science and education. To maintain the universities' leadership in research and education, new forms of international collaboration are needed to address larger issues of renewing and sustaining university vitality.

[Author abstract, modified]

1.5 IRRIGATION

Philippine small scale irrigation

PN-AAH-749

Steinberg, David I.; Caton, Douglas D.; et. al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Development Program Review and Evaluation

1986, 66p., Eng.

A.I.D. project evaluation report, no. 4
4920274; 4920301; 4920334

Since 1976, the Philippine Government (GOP), with A.I.D. support, has built or rehabilitated over 1,000 village irrigation systems. This document evaluates the two successive A.I.D. projects which have contributed to this effort. The evaluation begins with a brief description of the projects, in which small, subsistence farmers are encouraged to form cooperative organizations called Irrigators Service Associations (ISA's) in order to gain access to loans and electricity and to construct, operate, and maintain village irrigation systems. The GOP provides loan monies and extension services and arranges for electricity to be brought to the area. The next section analyzes the economic, social, and political impact of these projects. Although irrigation provides the opportunity to grow two crops each year and this double cropping has led to increased on-farm employment, these effects have not necessarily guaranteed real income benefits for the farmers, particularly since they must curtail off-farm employment. Increasing costs of production, debt burdens from capital investments, and persistent

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technological and water management problems have dampened the rise in farm incomes. The small farmers also do not receive the higher price paid by the GOP exporting company because they cannot afford to adequately treat their rice after harvest. The improvement in family income that does occur is often spent on education rather than improved nutrition. A concluding section contains major findings and policy implications. Overall, the village irrigation systems have had immediate and visible benefits. Nevertheless, more extensive use of total farm resources (raising livestock), complementary off-farm enterprises, post-harvest grain treatment, and timely and adequate credit provision will be necessary to increase farmer income to a level enabling them to carry their debt. The authors recommend, therefore, that any future A.I.D. support concentrate on technical assistance to improve the productive capacity of farms in existing irrigation systems rather than continuing to expand the ISA network. Six appendices concerning related topics, including a 20-item bibliography (1975-1979), are included.

Korean irrigation

PN-AAH-975

Steinberg, David I.; Morrow, R.B.; et. al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 89p., Eng.
A.I.D. project evaluation report, no. 12
4890706

The irrigation project evaluated in this report was designed to help South Korea become self-sufficient in rice and barley and to raise farm incomes. Fifty-five irrigation works including pumping systems, drainage, reservoir construction, and land reclamation were completed. All were small (and in many instances nearly complete) elements of a larger system. Rice self-sufficiency was achieved by 1975, soon after the project began. Barley production declined due to a high rice support price and a growing demand for wheat in urban areas. Farm incomes increased. However, because farm incomes are directly related to farm size, the project affected beneficiaries unequally. The project's success is attributable to the high degree of engineering and administrative competence demonstrated by the Government of Korea, the effective delivery of extension services and agricultural inputs, and

the high support price for rice. Lessons learned include the following:

1. More attention to overall economic trends and collection of baseline data is needed in the project design stage.
2. Small and medium irrigation schemes can be economical when added to an already effective farming system.
3. Because neither the bureaucratic nor social structure of Korea permits farmers and their wives to participate in project decisionmaking, community development outputs should not be expected from such special projects.
4. The assumption that a strong correlation exists between higher income and improved nutritional standards is false in non-subsistence economies. Korean farm families directed their extra income to the education of their children rather than to dietary improvements.
5. Unless the effects on women are considered in the project design, women's working conditions may deteriorate.

(The labor-saving technology introduced in this project benefited men; women have undertaken a larger share of the field work as children have left home for school or urban employment.)

Aging of the farm population as the result of increased education and migration to urban areas will be an important factor in future farm development. Appendices include related socioeconomic studies and a brief bibliography (11 entries, 1974-80).

Impact of irrigation on development: issues for a comprehensive evaluation study

PN-AAJ-208

Berry, Leonard; Ford, Richard; Hosier, Richard
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 82p., Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper, no. 9

Although irrigation can greatly improve the world's capacity to feed itself by increasing agricultural production, most irrigation projects fall short of this goal. These failures are due sometimes to defective design, but more often to the expense involved, poor management and leadership, and improper use of resources. A sound system of evaluation can improve the effectiveness of these projects. This report examines A.I.D.'s

current evaluation process and recommends revisions to improve project design. After reviewing the current status of irrigation in the developing world, the authors discuss A.I.D.'s evaluations, which typically concentrate on a project's conformity to its original purpose or on the performance of the implementing agency. The study found no evaluations which look comprehensively at a project's three stages—preparatory, construction, and operational—or examine and compare basic themes of irrigation project designs. Recommendations are: (1) that in order to improve project management and design, far greater use be made of evaluative data; (2) that evaluations focus on donor, host country government, and user needs; (3) that a grid of analytical questions/criteria be used consistently in evaluating each project; (4) that use of local public and private institutions in evaluating projects be increased; and (5) that evaluations stress management and environmental issues and farmer risk responses. Finally, evaluation guidelines designed around five major components are presented for routine use at each of a project's three stages. The five areas are economic viability; use of land, water, capital, and labor resources; performance and management of the water system; environmental effects (including health impacts); and social soundness, including effects on production and income distribution. At least one project from each of A.I.D.'s four regional bureaus should be selected for more detailed examination, and an overview of the irrigation in each region where A.I.D. has or will have irrigation projects should be developed. A 107-item reference list (1967-80) and annexes on related U.N. projects, environmental considerations, and criteria for project site selection are appended.

Sederhana: Indonesia small-scale irrigation

PN-AAJ-608

Holloran, Susan; Corey, Gilbert L.; Mahoney, Timothy
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Feb 1982, xi, 12p. + 4 annexes, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 9
4970242

A.I.D.'s Sederhana project was designed to increase Indonesian rice production by rehabilitating or constructing small, technically simple

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irrigation systems. An A.I.D. team visited 29 subprojects (SPs) to prepare this review of Sederhana's impact. The project proved difficult to administer. Only 52 of 600 SPs completed or underway by June, 1980 had been reimbursed by A.I.D. due to start-up problems, design and construction faults that required work to be redone, and to the Fixed Amount Reimbursement method which allowed payment only after technical certification of completed construction. Nonetheless, the project led to substantial increases in rice production on Java and Sulawesi, confirming the assumption that farmers could make immediate use of additional water. In Sumatra, however, the production impact was not encouraging, due to adverse environmental conditions and farmer resistance to growing labor-intensive, non-cash crops. In most SPs, increased production benefited both landowners and permanent tenants, but sometimes affected sharecroppers and landless laborers adversely, as landowning families filled many of the jobs created by the increasingly profitable Sederhana system. Key problem areas were a trade-off between SP quantity and quality due to a highly centralized implementation process, which should be altered to increase participation from the provinces and especially from farmers (whose participation, especially in geographically scattered projects such as Sederhana, is essential); lack of coordination between implementing agencies, a factor essential to the success of any project; and the lack of technical assistance which early on led to costly errors and the failure to build an experienced cadre in government agencies. Technical assistance should be increased as the project moves to marginal areas, with a focus on improving local construction and management skills. The project also demonstrated the need for baseline data to assess a project's progress and the fact that programs such as Sederhana, while they can substantially benefit the rural poor, cannot result in the redistribution of wealth. Appendices include an analysis of the project's irrigation and water management systems and a September, 1979 A.I.D. audit of the project.

Sudan: the Rahad irrigation project

PN-AAJ-610

Benedict, Peter; Ahmed, Ahmed H.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Mar 1982, vii, 19p. + attachments, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 31
6500100

Although the Rahad Irrigation Project in Sudan, partly AID-funded and nearly complete, has been operating for only four seasons, it faces problems which threaten its viability. This report assesses these problems, the project's impact, and the lessons learned. Designed to maximize use of government investments in Nile water management, to upgrade the living standards of 100,000 herders and farmers, and to produce cotton and groundnuts for export, the project is pursuing full mechanization and 100% intensive rotation of crops. Production is supervised by the Rahad Corporation which controls pricing, marketing, and most decision-making. The Corporation has not coped well with management of a mechanized operation, erroneously perceived labor shortages, and tenant dissatisfaction. Faced with little incentive to grow cotton, farmers have produced less and are working as day laborers and raising livestock, sorghum, and groundnuts. Mechanization has further reduced project-generated income and threatens to displace labor. In addition, limitations on local currency have resulted in the inadequate and unequal provision of educational, health, and other promised services. Among the lessons taught by the project are that: a policy of 100% mechanization needs more analysis; farmers must be given a role in the decision-making process and be allowed choices; harvest-time labor shortages must be viewed in relation to prevailing wage rates; environmental analyses must be conducted and used in designing and implementing irrigation projects; programs to control water-borne diseases should be designed and funded in irrigation projects; and crop protection techniques should be reviewed prior to project implementation and coordinated with public health officials. Appended are photographs; a list of contacts; a 56-item bibliography (1968-81); and reports on: the institutional and social effects of controlled resettlement, micro-level management of technical resources, economic analysis

of agricultural enterprises, labor/tenant relations, and Sudan's environment and natural resources.

Vicos experiment: a study of the impacts of the Cornell-Peru project in a highland community

PN-AAJ-616

Lynch, Barbara D.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Office of Development Programs

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Apr 1982, vii, 108p., Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 7

*Availability note: Document contains
oversize pages available only in microfiche

The often criticized Vicos Cornell-Peru project, an action-oriented research program to improve the quality of life in a highland hacienda community in Peru—was one of the earliest efforts to bring about planned social change in the developing world. The author of this study interprets data on the project from an anthropological viewpoint, presenting a comprehensive analysis of the project's background, interventions, and results. During the period 1952-65, the Vicos project aimed to increase Vicosinos' status and self-esteem by undertaking a broad range of activities, e.g., the introduction of improved potato seeds, technology, and a credit package, other agricultural activities, educational improvements, health and nutrition programs, military recruitment, and the creation of new political institutions. Although many of these efforts succeeded, positive impacts were mitigated by a variety of unintended effects. Potato production increased dramatically, leading to increased cash and commerce in the community and better diets; however, as the new technologies were available only to wealthier Vicosinos, the relative position of smallholders declined. Educational improvements increased literacy, Spanish speaking ability, and opportunities for secondary schooling, but lowered the status of women (due to unequal educational opportunities) and of the aged (as educated children took stronger roles in household decisionmaking); jobs for the secondary school graduates were scarce in Vicos. Regularization of Vicosinos' military status led to the creation of a power bloc of veterans, generally committed to social and

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economic innovation, which tended to weaken kinship institutions and traditional elites. Traditional authority was further weakened by the (largely successful) transfer of political power to elected delegates and a governing body of literate Vicosinos. The project did improve Vicosinos' self-esteem and their position outside the community, but it also increased their status and role ambiguities. The author concludes that project success (qualified though it was) was due to the anthropological sensitivity of key project staff and that project willingness to work with existing Peruvian institutions increased the transferability of Vicos innovations within Peru.

On-farm water management project in Pakistan

PN-AAJ-617

Painter, James E.; Malone, Sandra; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jun 1982, viii, 30p. + appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 35
3910413

Watercourse improvements conducted under A.I.D.'s On-Farm Water Management Project in Pakistan have enabled farmers to increase their crop yields and incomes. This report analyzes the setting, history, and impact of the project. While water user associations were not effectively established, farmer awareness of the importance of mutual cooperation grew, informal mechanisms have been quite successful in maintaining watercourses, and demand for watercourse improvements has risen. However, the project failed to increase district government awareness of the need for on-farm water management and failed to institutionalize a mechanism through which that need can continue to be met. Moreover, the project design did not address regional differences, baseline data collection and project monitoring were inadequate, and the cost of watercourse improvements exceeded original estimates. Planned precision-leveling of fields to improve water use was not as successful as envisioned due to farmer reluctance to participate and the Pakistani Government's decision to deemphasize leveling. Nor was extension training of farmers adequately implemented, due partly to competition with an existing extension service as well as to A.I.D.'s use of the fixed amount reimbursement mechanism. Project experience also showed that:

(1) costs could have been reduced and benefits spread wider if farmers had been asked to contribute, as they were willing to do; (2) flexible project design is needed to adapt to local needs; (3) in a cultural setting where community cooperation is not traditional, formal structures must be built to ensure system maintenance; (4) concentrated land ownership can cause small farmers to realize little increase in water; and (5) more attention should be given to planning extension functions, training implementers and extensionists, collecting baseline data, and developing local governmental commitment. Appendices provide sample data; the evaluation methodology; a case study of the project's impact in Sind; and papers on the implications of on-farm water management, the project's economic impact, the socioeconomic impacts of increased income, and the role of honor, power, and rivalry in Pakistani villages.

Bangladesh small-scale irrigation

PN-AAL-010

Friedkin, Tom; Lester, Robert T.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)

Apr 1983, x, 27p. + 4 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 42
3880019

The Small Scale Irrigation Project in Bangladesh is an example of a project which could not fail, but, due to a variety of institutional shortcomings, almost did. So concludes this evaluation of the project, which was initiated in 1976 to provide hand tubewells (HTWs) to small farmers in Bangladesh. The project was designed to take advantage of a technology already widely accepted in Bangladesh and well-adapted to the country's climate and its high water table. The HTW, or handpump, is simple to operate and maintain, and makes use of cheap local labor. Most importantly, it is inexpensive, and with credit available, affordable by small farmers. Despite these positive factors, the project was plagued by problems from its beginning, mainly because its initial design failed to adequately address a number of crucial issues: the need to import iron (lack of raw materials delayed implementation for years) for indigenous manufacture of HTWs; the exact design of the pump; production by local foundries; and, especially, the credit

and distribution system. To ensure that targeted farmers—those owning 3 acres or less—were reached, a system of certification and documentation was created. The system proved ineffective and its paperwork a hindrance. Worse, institutional inadequacies with the credit system (along with farmer dislike of the system, which required their land as collateral) made farmers owning 3 to 7 acres the primary beneficiaries. Such farmers are at the upper end of the landholding scale in Bangladesh. Most of these problems have now been worked out—although spare parts are hard to obtain and the credit system still inadequate—and some 180,000 HTWs are in use, primarily for irrigating a third, dry season crop which would not have been planted but for the pumps, and which is, in some cases, a cash crop. A market has recently developed for used HTWs, making them available to the poorest farmers, those not well served by the credit system. The HTWs have also been used to increase the supply of potable water, reducing the incidence of dysentery and stomach ailments.

Irrigation and A.I.D.'s experience: a consideration based on evaluations

PN-AAL-019

Steinberg, David I.; Clapp-Wincek, Cynthia; Turner, Allen G.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Aug 1983, xii, 237p., Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 8

Lack of good management is the principal reason that most irrigation projects have failed to reach their potential. Thus concludes this review of A.I.D. irrigation projects, based on impact evaluations, other studies, and a 5/83 AID-sponsored conference on irrigation management. Included are discussions of types of irrigation systems; social and economic impacts; policies and investment strategies; management; maintenance and rehabilitation; and project planning, monitoring, and sustainability. Although irrigation normally improves yields, it is not a simple solution to food deficits. Socioeconomic impacts (on, e.g., civic participation, women, the environment) are difficult to assess. Irrigation systems range along a continuum from local management to external control. The former is most effective, yet traditional community-based systems are often ignored in policy considerations. Problems of

1.0 Agriculture

water management, either by water user associations or implementing agency, are exacerbated by donors' bureaucratic priorities; involving farmers in planning undoubtedly leads to improved management. System maintenance is also best done at the local level. Existing water user associations should be encouraged and equitable cost recovery from users fostered. Irrigation project planning is subject to a series of pressures prompting hurried approval. Design problems include poor donor coordination and failure to adequately consider such factors as farmer needs, host country commitment, agronomic realities, and social context. Planning should be done within the context of natural resource strategy, and relationships between irrigated and nonirrigated areas understood. Issues such as system size, public vs. private, or rehabilitation vs. new construction are closely interrelated. Technology choice should allow maximum flexibility in design, installation, and operation. Agricultural triage (choosing between competing needs and goals) is usually dictated by fiscal constraints, but may reinforce income and social differences; a donor influencing policy should realize the implications thereof. Appended are a 9-page bibliography (1950–83), a list of A.I.D. irrigation studies, summaries and a discussion of the impact evaluations, and the conference proceedings.

Helmand Valley project in Afghanistan

PN-AAL-028

Clapp-Wincek, Cynthia; Baldwin, Emily
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Dec 1983, xiii, 29p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 18
3060090

The Helmand Valley Development Project in Afghanistan, a complex effort—assisted by 25 A.I.D. and predecessor agency projects (1949–79)—to settle new farmers on desert lands reclaimed by irrigation, is herein reviewed. Although often accounted a failure, the project did spur impressive growth in agricultural productivity and income. The amount of land under cultivation increased from 77,000 to 145,000 ha, 5,500 new families were settled in the valley, fertilizers and high-yield varieties were brought into widespread use, and double cropping increased dramatically. Average farm income

increased by as much as ten times. By 1975, however, inadequate attention to drainage and salinization and failure to adequately train farmers in water management (as more settlers arrived and the project focus shifted from irrigation to integrated rural development) began to slow income increases. Long-time residents dealt with these problems better than did new settlers. Still, even in areas where salinity was severe, income remained well above pre-project levels. Nonetheless, the increased crop yields were not enough to significantly improve Afghanistan's export situation. Social services (some of which the United States was responsible for) failed to mitigate the negative impacts of severe salinization and waterlogging—impoverishment, illness, and outmigration. The project taught that: mixing export production and resettlement goals makes achievement of either unlikely; social services must be given high priority and integrated with other activities, but crop production gains must be consolidated before positive social impacts can be sustained; successful nomadic settlement programs must provide strong economic incentives, adequate social services, and effectively communicated agricultural information; and close integration of donor and host country activities and goals is essential. The success of A.I.D. activities in such a project depends on the success of the effort as a whole. Thus, provision must be made from the outset for all essential elements. Appendices include an analysis of four farm economic surveys conducted in the Valley between 1963 and 1978 and a 41-item bibliography (1955–1980).

On-farm water management in Aegean Turkey, 1968–1974

PN-AAL-029

Casstevens, Thomas W.; Kolars, John F.; Wilson, James D., Jr.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Dec 1983, ix, 18p. + 17 annexes, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 50
2770426

The impact of the On-Farm Water Development Project, jointly undertaken from 1968–74 by A.I.D. and Turkey's General Directorate of Soils and Water (TOPRAKSU) in the fertile Aydin region, is reviewed. Implementation stressed the concepts of the "farmer as planner"

and of "learning by doing" and focused on various forms of training designed to help farmers level, drain, and otherwise improve their land; promote local manufacture of farm machinery; and encourage private contractors to do land leveling. Overall, the project was very successful. A 1971 study of four project farms showed an average increase of 1,500 kg/ha in cotton yields and an average decrease of TRL1,000/ha in production costs—a return on investment of over 200% in the first season. Land improvement not only doubled yields in the traditional season, but also created a second season for a second crop, leading to a boom in fruit and vegetable production. The project also stimulated local production of farm machinery, which is now well established, and a growth in the number of private contractors conducting land leveling activities. TOPRAKSU engineers trained under the project (74 in the United States, 219 in-country) carried the spirit of the project with them throughout Turkey. Indirect benefits included widespread electrification, improved nutrition, and upgraded women's roles. Negatively, increased distribution of water led to deterioration of the fig crop (due to fig sensitivity to moisture) and a spread in crop diseases, while occasional overproduction has led to still unmet needs in crop forecasting, packaging, and marketing. The project taught that: demonstration projects are more likely to succeed (and thus be replicated) when designed in close cooperation with the farmer/manufacturer/contractor; farmers are more apt to experiment if risks are limited; a complex project should be modularized and decisionmaking delegated to the lowest practical level, with a simple evaluation and feedback system; technology must be easily adaptable and repairable locally; and help may be rendered more effectively by increasing employment and demand for goods than by direct intervention. Appendices offer further treatment of individual points.

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Peru: improved water and land use in the Sierra

PN-AAL-040

Wilkinson, John L.; McKean, Cressida; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Peru

Dec 1984, ix, 21p. + 8 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 54
5270156

The key problem facing Peruvian agriculture is that of realizing more effective use of land and water resources. To this end, A.I.D.'s Improved Land and Water Use in the Sierra project (1976-83), called Plan MERIS after its Spanish acronym, included construction of irrigation and drainage works, investment credit for on-farm land development, complementary tree plantings, technical assistance, and training. Although Plan MERIS did not reach its numerical goals for construction, beneficiaries reached, or total irrigated hectares (despite a 2-year project extension), all farmers, large and small, now have greater access to a reliable water supply. The infrastructure built under the project appears to be well designed and was constructed at a relatively low cost. However, for the most part neither credit nor technical assistance have reached the small farmers who were to be Plan MERIS's primary beneficiaries; in fact, the credit component has reached less than 1% of beneficiaries overall. Implementation shortfalls were largely due to the Government of Peru's budgetary difficulties; in this connection, revenues for future maintenance of the irrigation systems are not assured. The project's forestry component appears to be progressing adequately, although community awareness of the benefits of such activities is lacking. On the whole, the Plan MERIS model is well-suited to small farm conditions in much of the developing world. However, it must be recognized that the primary purpose of such a project is to provide technical assistance and services based on an assured source of water for irrigation, not to provide irrigation works supplemented by technical assistance. Other implications of the Plan MERIS experience are: (1) beneficiaries should be involved in project activities from the early stages; (2) production credit and especially technical assistance must

accompany investment credit; (3) financing should be ensured from the start, even if A.I.D. must shoulder the burden; and (4) in irrigation projects, land ownership patterns must be clearly understood and a realistic time period allotted for implementation.

Soil and water conservation project in two sites in Somalia: seventeen years later

PN-AAL-064

McCarthy, John W.; Clapp-Wincek, Cynthia; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Aug 1985, xiii, 24p. + 5 appendices: ill., maps, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 62
6490019

The impact of an A.I.D. soil and water conservation project in northwest Somalia to increase low crop yields in a cultivated watershed is assessed 17 years after the project's end. In the major intervention, about one-half of the watershed was bunded (surrounded with contoured earthen dikes) to catch spring rains. This virtually doubled grain yields in the early years, in comparison with non-bunded lands, although these increases have been reduced by about 50% over the years due to spotty maintenance by farmers over the years. Also, planners ignored the agropastoral nature of food production and the possible effects of having the best watered part of the farm permanently cultivated while the rest was given to perennial grazing by farm livestock. In addition, bunding even small farms has proved too labor-expensive to be economically justifiable for farmers. Finally, bunding had only a modest demonstration impact—this is contrast to an add-on subproject to build dams and diversion structures to provide flood-irrigation to a religious farming community. Without any systematic training inputs from the project, this community replicated the project at four sites, enabling it to satisfy its grain needs, produce a cash crop, and purchase farm machinery and chemical inputs. Lessons learned are that: (1) agropastoral subsistence depends more on the pastoral than on the agricultural base; (2) projects to enhance a productive subsector of less importance to producers should avoid dependence on substantial community inputs; (3) projects to

enhance a weaker productive subsector should ensure that such will not occur at the expense of the more valuable subsector; (4) projects to enhance food security should consider all of the target area's nutritional and productive resources and problems and how these may be brought into congruence; (5) "appropriate" rural technology fits into existing social organization and does not depend on social tinkering by outsiders; (6) local communities invest themselves according to their own, not donors', priorities; and (7) the current trend towards involving rural people in research, planning, and resource allocation processes should be encouraged.

1.6 LIVESTOCK

Sociology of pastoralism and African livestock projects

PN-AAG-922

Horowitz, Michael M.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1979, ix, 102p., Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 6

To be successful, development projects not only must be technically sound but also must take account of developing countries' values and indigenous strategies. This paper analyzes the sociological and ecological assumptions which underlie A.I.D. interventions in the West African livestock sector. Against a background portrait of the African herdsman, A.I.D. sector interventions in the region (infrastructure improvements, replication of western commercial production systems, and organizational innovations) are identified and critically reviewed in terms of the problems of desertification and mixed farming, range tenure, pastoral ofttake, mobility, herd management, and the role of women. The author faults A.I.D. projects for ignoring the social and ecological realities governing African pastoral life. He stresses the fact that pastoralist behavior is a logical outgrowth of past involvement with the Sahel environment. Development efforts which impinge on mobility or threaten the herd's ability to support a large number of persons will be resisted. "Top-down" approaches that ignore the highly individualistic nature of West African

1.0 Agriculture

herdsmen are likely to meet with failure. In line with the work of other anthropologists and social scientists, the author notes the following functional relationships between herdsmen and herding conditions which should be safeguarded in livestock interventions:

- (1) Due to the variability of semiarid grazing conditions, mobility is often necessary for survival.
2. Pastoralists recognize claims existing on land and water use and their movement is constrained by those claims.
3. Pastoralists seek to increase and maintain the size of their herds because of the many and different benefits deriving therefrom.
4. Despite the desire to increase herd size, there are managerial constraints on the number of animals maintainable under the direct control of a single herding unit.

Expansion beyond that point leads to diminishing returns, reflected in an increase in disease, predation, theft, runaways, and watering costs. A 108-item list of French and English references cited (1939-78) is appended.

Workshop on pastoralism and African livestock development

PN-AAH-238

*Institute for Development Anthropology, Inc.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa (Sponsor)*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*(Workshop on Pastoralism and African Livestock
Development, Harpers Ferry, WV, US, 23-26
Sep 1979)*

1380, 86p., Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 4
9300047*

At a recent workshop on pastoralism and African livestock development, it was agreed that livestock sector programs must be reoriented to make them more compatible with the social, economic, and environmental realities of arid and semiarid pastoral regions of Africa. This report summarizes the discussions of that workshop. Workshop topics included range degradation and productivity, program and project objectives, institution building, marketing, and case studies examining the SODESP Senegalese Project, the Maasai Livestock

Project in Tanzania, livestock development in Kenya, and the evolution of livestock projects in Botswana. Consensus on the following points was achieved.

1. Quantitative data relating to pastoral systems are unreliable for two reasons. First, arid and semiarid regions experience considerable climatic instability. Data gathered at a specific time or location may not be relevant under future conditions. Second, data gathering techniques are insufficiently standardized to encourage comparability.
2. Management units for development interventions in livestock should be both small scale and based on existing cultural ecological systems. In large projects, decisionmaking is centralized and remote from individual herd managers who are locally in charge of herd movements and offtake.
3. Herd mobility can be due to crisis-survival mechanisms or effective strategies for long-term range exploitation. Planners must understand these processes and find ways of delivering quality-of-life services to mobile populations without constraining mechanisms of pastoral life.
4. Semiarid rangelands can undergo biological and climatic stress without long-term secular degradation, the very identification of which is difficult. Incorrect range analysis and treatment can exacerbate the semiarid ecosystem.
5. Livestock program emphasis should be placed on supporting the subsistence base of the pastoral herder rather than stressing commercial activities benefiting consumers.
6. Program monitoring and evaluation should be made components of programs in the livestock sector. Areas of further research are specified. Appendices include a list of workshop participants and agenda, and questionnaires.

Land tenure and livestock development in Sub-Saharan Africa

PN-AAL-072

*Bennett, John W.; Lawry, Steven W.; Riddell,
James C.*

*University of Wisconsin at Madison. Land
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*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Science and Technology. Office of
Agriculture (Sponsor)*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*May 1986, xiii, 159p. + bibliography: statistical
tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 39
Earlier version: PD-AAP-900*

Prompted by the disappointing record of its livestock and range management projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, A.I.D. beginning in 1979 sponsored a series of studies by the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center on pastoral development projects in East, West, and Southern Africa. Those studies are herein summarized. Conventional donor policy for livestock projects in the 1960s and early 1970s is examined first. Generally, this strategy focused on improving livestock quality and range conditions and increasing market "offtake," and largely ignored the broad social, economic, and ecological environment of the pastoralists. More recent approaches have recognized the importance of these broader issues, but this alone has not guaranteed success for African pastoral systems are in a transitional stage and herders often respond in unexpected ways to incentives offered by new markets and projects. Regional differences in Africa's changing pastoral systems are next examined. The experience of A.I.D. and World Bank projects in East Africa (Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania) and West Africa (Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Cameroon, and Mali) are reviewed, followed by a discussion of the evolution and outcomes to date of Botswana's Tribal Grazing Land Policy. A variety of land tenure issues are identified and analyzed in these regional studies. The tendency of host governments and donors to overemphasize the institutional upgrading of range control and marketing agencies is noted. Concluding that some form of communal tenure will be the rule for the foreseeable future, the authors outline a tenure system that will allow small and medium producers continued participation in commercial livestock production: (1) large, commercial producers may need exclusive rights to extensive grazing areas; (2) small and medium producers, because of their inability to capitalize private range investments, will need some kind of modified communal tenure (development thereof will often be difficult, requiring close attention during project design); and (3) small, itinerant producers present special problems best dealt with through land use zoning and promotion of mixed farming or, in some cases, off-farm employment.

2.0 Rural Development

Philippines: Bicol Integrated area development

PN-AAJ-179

Sommer, John G.; Aquino, Rosemary; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jan 1982, ix, 20p. + 8 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 28
4920303; 4920275; 4920281; 4920310;
4920319; 4920289

The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) in the Philippines is important because it melds three themes current in development thinking—a concerted focus on a discrete geographic area; systematic integration of various services down to the farm level; and income redistribution and equitable economic growth. This report assesses the BRBDP's impact, emphasizing seven A.I.D. projects. The BRBDP to date has had a limited but promising impact. Much of the first 8 years has been spent building infrastructure (e.g., roads and irrigation systems); designing and starting projects (e.g., agroforestry); training staff (e.g., health workers); and raising resources. Although institutional coordination is satisfactory, the BRBDP is still too centralized. Participation has been adequate except at the critical farmer level; efforts to promote private investment have been few and unsuccessful. Additional detailed findings on the impact of roads and irrigation and on the BRBDP's effect on regional development and on institutions are presented. Experience gained under the Program has shown that: (1) the BRBDP is a viable model and the river basin a suitable unit for integrated area development and that consistent national support is a must; (2) while hyperbole may gain initial support, dis-

appointment and loss of this support may result from the delays and problems which inevitably arise; (3) the concept of integration is more useful as a planning device than as an implementing procedure; and (4) early beneficiary participation is both possible and crucial to success, which is ultimately measured by changing attitudes. Thus, the authors note that the future success of the BRBDP depends on promoting greater farmer participation, increasing farmers' productivity, and on stronger, more creative leadership from the central BRBDP Program Office. Appended are an overview of A.I.D. assistance to the BRBDP; the scope and methodology of this evaluation; an economic analysis of the Program; a report on the benefits and beneficiaries of the BRBDP; a description of the BRBDP's institutional aspects; selected farmer profiles and a discussion of the importance of participation; and a list of 32 references (1967-81).

Egypt: the Egyptian American rural improvement service, a point four project, 1952-63

PN-AAL-011

Johnson, Pamela R.; El Dahry, Ahmed; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)

Apr 1983, xi, 26p. + 10 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 43

The long-term impact of the model Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service (EARIS) project (1952-63), still Egypt's most successful land reclamation effort, is evaluated in this report. Alignment with Egypt's top political and developmental goals enabled EARIS to successfully reclaim 37,000 acres of lake bottom

and desert land at three sites, build 13 complete and 64 satellite villages, and resettle 7,500 landless families. A semi-autonomous structure facilitated implementation but hindered transfer of responsibility to Egypt's line ministries, while infrastructure building was unrealistic and lacked long-term planning for upkeep and recurrent costs. The project's main accomplishment was to put needed inputs—land, water, credit—into the hands of small farmers. Political shifts and the move to large state farms on reclaimed land prevented its replication. The 30,000 acre site at Abis was EARIS's most successful, thanks in part to the marketing, economic, and service opportunities offered by nearby Alexandria. Today, farm income in Abis has risen dramatically, average large animal holdings have increased from 1 to 4 per household, and land values have soared; prosperity is evident. Individual and cooperative investments have allowed farmers to intensify land use, control marketing, and process their milk and cheese. About 25% of cropland is devoted to high-value vegetable production, and cereal crop production equals or exceeds that of the Old Lands. The two desert reclamation sites, Qoota and Kom Osheim, totaling 7,000 acres, have not fared as well. Only a fraction of the lands' productive potential is now being used due to the large-scale withdrawal—legal and illegal—of irrigation water by spontaneous land reclamation upstream. Some of the 1,600 settler families have abandoned their farms and many who remain depend on semi-skilled work in Cairo. The project taught that small farms on reclaimed land are financially viable and highly productive if irrigation water is assured and well-managed and farmer choice permitted and that population increases result in land fragmentation, indicating the need for a diversified economic base. U.S. support for the project made a difference that is still felt.

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Haiti: HACHO rural community development

PN-AAL-025

Brinkerhoff, Derick W.; Fotzo, Pascal T.; Ormond, Barbara J.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Nov 1983, xiii, 29p., Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 49
5210061*

The Haitian-American Community Help Organization (HACHO), founded in 1966 to provide health and community services in resource-poor Northwest Haiti, received A.I.D. funding from that date through 1979. The vicissitudes and impacts of HACHO—which soon became a focal point for local residents seeking help as well as for donors seeking a vehicle to provide assistance—are herein reviewed. HACHO, which began by providing health services in one small town, soon expanded geographically—into other parts of the Northwest—and sectorally—into community organization, road construction, and later, agricultural extension, irrigation, potable water, and handicrafts. The primary impact of the HACHO project lay in its provision of basic services where none existed before. Residents valued its health care, agricultural, and infrastructure programs, a road network constructed by Food for Work teams, and its development of community councils to facilitate service delivery and mobilize local resources and self-help. However, HACHO was also frequently called upon to coordinate donor response to natural disasters, and even though the project's design in later years tried to emphasize production-oriented programs and local capacity building, HACHO's relief activities tended to skew development efforts toward unsustainable service provision. The community council movement was fraught with contradictory expectations (regarding self-help vs. dependency on external relief), and HACHO itself suffered from serious organizational and managerial weaknesses: a centralized decisionmaking structure with headquarters far away in Port-au-Prince, and an inadequate information system, resulting in lack of guidance, continuity, and evaluation. Several lessons emerge: the difficulty of achieving development and relief objectives within the same program; the need to

clearly understand true costs and benefits in sustainable development activities; the necessity of long-term attention to management improvement, as well as long-term donor support, in developing an indigenous organizational capacity; and the vulnerability of integrated rural development projects to external, macro-level constraints.

Area development in Liberia: toward integration and participation

PN-AAL-038

*Harbeson, John W.; Binneuidijk, Annette L.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Jun 1984, xii, 24p. + 9 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 53
6690142; 6690139; 669T025*

The Bong and Lofa Agricultural Development projects in Liberia were administratively successful integrated rural development efforts, but they produced only limited socioeconomic benefits because mid-course design corrections were not taken when preproject assumptions proved unrealistic. The projects, designed to diversify and expand the economy by encouraging small farmer production of coffee, cocoa, and swamp rice, focused on planting new coffee and cocoa trees, rehabilitating old trees, restoring old swamps, and clearing new ones; support activities included monitoring schistosomiasis, training farmers and extensionists, building wells and latrines, strengthening and establishing marketing cooperatives, repairing feeder roads, and creating semi-autonomous project management units (PMUs). Some 17,000 farm families have been involved in these efforts. Although the PMUs performed ably in coping with unforeseen circumstances, the projects lacked provision for the formal and comprehensive mid-course redesign work which was necessitated by, inter alia, commodity price fluctuations (which limited farmers' incentives to participate in the crop development programs), the lack of a strong agricultural research program (erroneously assumed to exist), and unresolved national-level policy, financial, and administrative problems. Also, district cooperatives—which are to be the PMUs' heirs—have not yet proven their viability, and long-term social impacts (e.g., women, land tenure, the environment) are still unde-

termined. It was learned that: (1) broad-based projects must be flexible enough to allow design changes; (2) agricultural projects should test proposed technical packages; (3) decentralized projects are viable given national policy and administrative support; (4) farmers' participation depends upon their perception of material benefit; (5) decentralized projects should be integrated, with explicit linkages between central government and project staff, among donors, and across sectors; and (6) locally-based agricultural research which involves farmers and is closely tied to extension is crucial in agricultural development.

Development potential of new lands settlement in the tropics and subtropics: a global state-of-the-art evaluation with specific emphasis on policy implications, executive summary

PN-AAL-039

*Scudder, Thayer
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Sep 1984, vi, 46p. + attachment, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 21*

9365305

New lands settlement is defined as the settlement of areas which are largely uncultivated. Focusing on policy implications and development potential, this report analyzes new lands settlement experiences in the tropics and subtropics. An initial section classifies and defines new lands settlements based on the type of settler (spontaneous, voluntary, compulsory) and the nature of the sponsor (government, another agency); the magnitude of contemporary new lands settlement and the potential for greater government involvement are assessed. Comparative and longitudinal analyses of new lands settlements indicate that successful past projects have involved regional planning and integrated area development; more settlements would have been successful if attention had been paid to their scale and spatial layout, farming systems diversification, settler family income, employment generation, and national development policy. The bulk of the paper outlines

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four basic settlement stages—(1) planning, initial infrastructural development, and settler recruitment; (2) transition; (3) economic and social development; and (4) handing over and incorporation—and reviews basic issues to be addressed in each stage by planners, administrators, and settlers. A final section describes the basic features of an ideal settlement process.

Bolivia: integrated rural development in a colonization setting

PN-AAL-043

Solem, Richard Ray; Greene, Richard J.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Bolivia

Jan 1985, xvi, 25p. + 6 appendices: ill., maps, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 57
5110514; 5110050

The impacts of two A.I.D. projects promoting integrated rural development (IRD) and new lands settlement in the subtropical lowland areas of Chane-Piray and San Julian in eastern Bolivia—a 1974 loan to the National Colonization Institute (INC) and a 1979 grant to the private Foundation for Integral Development (FIDES)—are evaluated. Physical infrastructure work, which was carried out by INC before the settlers arrived, was rated poor; technical services, which were provided by FIDES on a self-help basis, were rated excellent. Micro-level economic and social impacts were mixed at Chane-Piray but, thanks to FIDES's influence, were very positive at San Julian. Macro-level economic, social, and environmental impacts were substantial and generally positive, although the long-term impact of merging Indian and Spanish cultures and of replacing virgin forests with crop and pasture land is unknown. IRD activities were limited to San Julian. On the whole, the design of the projects was replicable. Regarding IRD, the projects taught the need for: continuity of commitment, along with comprehensiveness of perspective as well as an ability to adapt individual IRD elements; proximity of implementors to beneficiaries, active participation by the latter, and close program monitoring; support systems promoting self-help and self-capitalization; and a quick-response capability (decentralized decisionmaking) on the part of implementors. Regarding resettlement, the projects taught that: farming

conditions should be evaluated (e.g., via experimental farms) before settlement; settlement proved most successful when due to a combination of self-selection and the provision of essential (but not dependency-creating) support services; the most essential infrastructure items are water, access roads, and viable community layouts; critical services must be provided until the first crop is harvested and sold; turnover of a settler's parcel of land does not necessarily reflect failure; and consolidation and growth ultimately depend on settlers' own efforts and resources. Appendices treat project interventions, impacts, development issues, and lessons learned in detail and include a 42-item bibliography (1968–83).

Ecuador: private sector cooperatives and integrated rural development

PN-AAL-062

Soos, Helen E.; Weber, Clemence J.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jan 1986, xiii, 18p. + 14 appendices: ill., map, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 59
5180096

Agricultural credit unions and cooperatives can be agents of integrated rural development, according to this impact evaluation of a project to assist cooperatives and credit unions in Ecuador during the period 1962–76. A.I.D. assistance to the credit union movement can be claimed as an unequivocal success. Ecuadorian credit unions have 2.5 million members and provide major impetus for rural development, especially in the agricultural sector. A.I.D. assistance to agricultural cooperatives has had a less widespread, though still catalytic impact on rural development, an impact which is due mainly to the fact that co-op membership in Ecuador is associated with land acquisition and with the creation of new communities; in many cases, cooperatives were the first or main community organization, through which members expressed demands for health, education, and other services. Ironically, the Improved Rural Life (IRL) program, a small project add-on specifically aimed at helping co-op members acquire multisectoral services, had little effect on integrated rural development. The primary reason for this difference is that the cooperative approach, unlike the IRL, succeeded in

rewarding community participation and initiative. However, of the five cooperative federations assisted by A.I.D. under the project, only the credit union federation attained financial viability. Several lessons pertinent to cooperative development can be learned: (1) financial viability is hard for agricultural cooperative federations to achieve, because in most cases there is no obvious service that they can provide more effectively than the private or governmental sectors; (2) credit programs for co-ops must be linked with skilled technical assistance; (3) technical agricultural skills must be conveyed to cooperative farmers at the outset; and (4) education in cooperative management is essential at all levels to alleviate problems like those facing Ecuadorian cooperatives today—infighting and lack of communication, corruption and poor financial management, lack of unified leadership, and the as yet unaddressed issue of how to replenish the leadership cadre in successful cooperatives, all of which are dominated by one to three leaders.

Study of two Sri Lankan rural development projects managed by the Ceylon Tobacco Co., Ltd.

PN-AAL-077

Eaton, George T.; Albert, Jocelyne; Merrey, Karen L.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Mar 1986, xi, 20p. + 4 appendices: map, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 60
3830056; 3830073

The impacts of 2 irrigated resettlement projects in Sri Lanka which were managed by a private firm, the Ceylon Tobacco Company, Ltd. (CTC), are herein examined. Farmers in both projects look back to CTC days as a time of excellent agricultural advice and input delivery, but in other ways the projects differed widely. In the first project, the Mahiyangana Colonization Scheme, CTC served as sole donor and manager from 1966 to 1980. While CTC's generosity to the 59 project families transformed their lives, it also created strong physical and psychological dependency. The result was an enormous economic and social impact on a small number of people, but not a model settlement. CTC played a lesser role in the second project, Mahaweli System H, Block 9,

2.0 Rural Development

which at full size served 2,122 families. In 1979, CTC took over management of agricultural inputs, extension, and marketing through an informal understanding with the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL); the latter remained responsible for water management and nonagricultural functions. A lack of clearly defined spheres of responsibility led to misunderstandings and competition between CTC and MASL. Also, CTC was never able to recover operating costs, even after negotiating a fee from MASL. In 1983 both parties agreed to end the arrangement. Lessons learned are: (1) Giving a private entity partial responsibility within a government system is a difficult task at best and must be supported by good planning documents rather than informal understandings. (2) Great endowment breeds great dependency. A settlement project can become self-reliant, if it sets specific limits on support (avoiding unusual and very expensive inputs), requires settlers to contribute labor and—once harvests are being marketed—money, is sparing in direct staff attention, encourages but does not direct or dominate farmer and water user organizations, and promotes a business relationship with farmers by trying to place agricultural inputs/services in private hands. (3) Donors and agents do best what they know well. A firm like CTC that knows one commercial crop is likely to do well in another but should not be expected to manage community development.

Burkina Faso: integrated rural development projects in Seguenega and Dori departments

PN-AAL 080

McCall, Davy; Fleming, Allen P.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

May 1986, xiv, 20p. + 10 appendices: map, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 61
6860220; 6860231

The impacts of two community-based integrated rural development projects in Burkina Faso's (formerly Upper Volta) Seguenega and Dori Departments are examined. The projects were implemented, respectively, by Africare and Save The Children Federation (SCF). Both PVO's worked with village groups, helping them to

organize and carry out self-help development activities. Africare integrated its personnel with those of a provincial office to form a project unit which worked independently of both USAID/BF and the central government. Africare followed A.I.D. programming practices and by project end had achieved most planned outputs relating to organization of village groups, agriculture, health care, road-building, and literacy. Provision of initial funding for credit and well digging were key ingredients in the project's success. The Dori project began as a pilot activity; when A.I.D. decided not to fund a continuation (due to SCF's failure to meet programming requirements), SCF continued the project on its own, with a somewhat trimmer focus. Although villagers in Dori, unlike those in Seguenega, lacked a tradition of group action, SCF succeeded (to a lesser extent than Africare), in sensitizing villagers to self-help activities, enhancing the local government's development capacity, and increasing local technical knowledge. The project's physical accomplishments are harder to assess because specific targets were not set. Experience shows that integrated rural development is a management-intensive activity. Lessons learned include: (1) expect a slow start-up and plan at least 8–10 years of inputs; (2) select an area with some tradition of community action; (3) choose activities that do not conflict with local customs and start with activities that villagers have already found profitable; (4) select a capable PVO and ensure that sufficient government resources will be provided, then leave responsibility for implementation with the local government and PVO; (5) integrate horizontally to achieve greater impact from mutually reinforcing activities, vertically to achieve sustainability; and (6) for financial sustainability, include credit rollover arrangements, build up the village's financial resources, and develop management skills.

A.I.D.'s experience with integrated rural development projects

PN-AAL-095

Kumar, Krishna
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jul 1987, xi, 31p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 19

Although A.I.D. enthusiastically embraced integrated rural development (IRD) projects in the 1970s as a way of reaching remote and disadvantaged populations, this retrospective study, a synthesis of impact evaluations of 11 IRD projects implemented in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, reveals them to have been plagued with a number of management and implementation problems. Although most of the projects examined increased agricultural productivity and incomes, they also tended to benefit wealthier farmers. The projects' social service components did reach the needy, but their impact was undermined by a general tendency to reduce services when faced with financial or administrative problems. In fact, the projects' sustainability in general is dubious, mainly because the host governments have neither the will nor the resources to maintain inputs and services at project levels. The IRD projects were only modestly successful in achieving national level objectives, such as food self-sufficiency. The problems experienced in IRD frequently stem from the choice of implementing agency. Four types of agencies have been used for IRD projects (project management units, national line ministries, subnational government bodies, and private voluntary organizations)—each type having its own advantages and shortcomings. As a general rule, however, IRD management has been hampered by poor coordination among participating agencies, overreliance on public bureaucracies, poor timing of outputs, and inflexible project design. Other problems have been inappropriate national economic policies, inability to establish effective beneficiary organizations to promote sustainability, inadequate attention to socioeconomic factors, and inadequate (or nonexistent) technical packages. In sum, IRD is a valuable strategy for certain special circumstances (e.g., narcotics control development, multisectoral assistance to remote or famine-affected areas), but IRD projects should be designed so as to minimize coordination requirements, while maximizing the use of private sector firms to provide services.

2.0 Rural Development

A.I.D.'s experience with rural development: project-specific factors affecting performance

PN-AAX-213

Binnendijk, Annette

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*(Seminar on Rural Development: Lessons from
Experience, Paris, FR, 18-19 Feb 1988)*

Jan 1989, vi, 47p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 60

In recent years A.I.D. has responded to the unpredictable, complex, and long-term nature of rural development by experimenting with alternative approaches. This report draws general lessons from these experiments. Discussion focuses on economically productive rather than social service activities and is restricted to factors within a donor agency's or project management's control, although methods of influencing external factors are also considered. The paper is organized according to four key project-related issues.

1. Project organization and management issues are examined, beginning with an assessment of various types of implementing organizations (i.e., government agencies, semiautonomous agencies, and private organizations). General recommendations are presented for effectively engaging beneficiaries in management decisions, a key aspect of successful project performance and sustainability. Management strategies are examined for addressing internal and external problems, enhancing indigenous institutional capacity, and improving financial viability.
2. Discussed next are the two main technological issues affecting rural development projects: (a) the acquisition and adoption of appropriate agronomic technical packages, and (b) the choice of appropriate rural infrastructure technologies.
3. The paper then evaluates recently developed project design techniques, focusing on the factors of flexibility, size, lifespan, complexity, and integration.
4. A final section examines project monitoring and evaluation processes, which have also been revised recently to suit the realities of rural development. The report concludes by

emphasizing that rural development strategies are rarely universally applicable—the key to success is the appropriateness of project approach to local contextual conditions.

Rural development: lessons from experience—highlights of the seminar proceedings

PN-AAX-214

Binnendijk, Annette

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
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Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*(Seminar on Rural Development: Lessons from
Experience, Paris, FR, 18-19 Feb 1988)*

Jan 1989, vi, 19p. + appendix, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 25*

Proceedings are summarized of a special seminar held in February 1988 to promote donor exchange of evaluation experiences relating to rural development (RD). Participants agreed that despite setbacks, the basic objective of RD—improving the lives of the rural poor—is still worthy of donor commitment. The following are among the lessons drawn from what emerged as a commonality of experience.

1. RD strategies should be in tune with individual country conditions and should be integrated into a coherent macroeconomic policy.
2. Activities should focus on generating cash flows, making economic returns possible, and increasing productivity.
3. Project designs should be flexible enough to permit adjustment during implementation and should encompass a phased "learning" process, which implies a donor commitment of 15-20 years.
4. Project organization and implementation schemes should be as simple as possible.
5. More use should be made of non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and higher priority should be given to strengthening local institutional and human resources.
6. Potential beneficiaries should be involved early on in the project identification process.
7. RD projects should support rather than take over the development efforts of the local community.

Some of these lessons imply a need for major changes in donor agencies (e.g., a national focus requires greater in-house analytical ability), as well as for greater staff continuity and more decentralized decisionmaking. They also suggest the need to seriously consider difficult, unpopular actions such as longer-term financing of recurrent project costs and "untying" aid in order to allow competitive procurement of equipment appropriate to country conditions.

On their own: the Aga Khan rural support program in Pakistan—an experimental partnership in village-controlled development—summary

PN-ABC-920

Mason, John

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Jun 1989, 8p.: ill., charts, statistical tables, Eng.
Innovative development approaches, no. 1
9380265; 9300085*

This summary describes the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP), an experimental program aimed at improving rural production and incomes in the isolated northern areas of Pakistan through a highly participatory, decentralized, village-controlled approach to development. The program is supported by a nongovernmental organization, the Aga Khan Foundation, and it is funded by several donor agencies, including A.I.D. It has met with initial successes in organizing villagers, raising local savings, and in initiating infrastructure projects to increase local productivity and incomes. Although the program is firmly rooted in the principle of cooperation between villagers and program facilitators, it has significant organizational flexibility for project design and implementation. In the words of Program Director Shoaib Sultan Khan, "the only blueprint was our conceptual package; you have to organize, you have to generate savings, capital through savings, and you have to upgrade." Because of its natural mode of village participation, the program exhibits a simplicity uncharacteristic of many other—especially, integrated—rural development programs.

[Author abstract]

3.0 Natural Resource Management and Environment

Socio-economic context of fuelwood use in small rural communities

PN-AAH-747

Wood, Dennis H.; Brokensha, David W.; et al.
Devres, Inc.
1980, 318p., Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 1

All successful community fuelwood programs must take into account the importance of local participation, consider the specific socioeconomic characteristics of the proposed location and its environs, and critically examine alternative plans and approaches. These are some of the major conclusions of this indepth report which examines the socioeconomic and environmental aspects of fuelwood use in developing countries and analyzes critical issues regarding this use. Fuelwood is defined as including firewood and charcoal and conclusions are detailed as to the sources, accessibility, harvest or production, distribution, and consumption of each. A description of community fuelwood programs in general is provided in the body of the text, while an annex is devoted to the discussion of specific fuelwood programs in India, South Korea, Nepal, Thailand, Indonesia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the People's Republic of China, and Colombia. For those designing and implementing individual community fuelwood programs, guidelines are provided to resolve the following questions confronting such projects: (1) What goals can be achieved through community fuelwood programs? (2) Which types are most suited to a particular community? (3) How can these programs encourage local participation, especially of women, who are the main participants in wood collection, distribution, and consumption?

(4) What resources are required? (5) What are the management requirements? (6) What are the costs and benefits of such programs? Appendices include footnotes, a bibliography, terms of reference for study, organizations and individuals contacted, and the report's research methods. Additional appendices describe selected fuelwood programs and possible future fuelwood activities. An extensive bibliography (261 entries, 1922-79) includes topics on national or global deforestation, afforestation, fuelwood use, and several dissertations on energy, agricultural economics, and social issues.

Agroforestry projects for small farmers: a project manager's reference

PN-AAX-212

Chew, Siew Tuan
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jan 1989, xiv, 42p. + 5 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 59

Between 1977 and 1987, A.I.D. funded 43 bilateral, research, and community projects in agroforestry, projects whose primary objective was to encourage farmers to grow trees using species and techniques (e.g., contour hedgerows, intercropping) that can protect and sustain topsoil, increase crop or livestock production, and, in most cases, provide wood and other products to augment income. This study reviews A.I.D.'s agroforestry experience and identifies major issues to be addressed in designing and implementing future projects. The issues are discussed under six categories.

1. The selection of tree species and techniques must be based on technical, economic, and sociocultural criteria. Trees must be adaptable to agroclimatic and farming conditions, and the project must take into consideration the purpose of the planting (e.g., whether trees are grown for subsistence needs, as a cash crop, or both), as well as farmers' risks, benefits, costs, and customary beliefs and preferences.
2. Tree growing must work within—or seek to change—government policies and traditional land tenure arrangements.
3. Key institutional issues include the capacity of line ministries to meet technical and extension requirements, and the support that can be provided by the private sector. A major lesson is that project designers and implementing agencies must train and supervise farmers and extensionists in site selection, planting techniques, spacing requirements, care of young trees, pruning methods and schedules, and the harvesting and use of tree products. Close coordination among all parties is urged, as is encouragement of farmer participation.
4. Some evidence suggests that traditional incentives such as free seeds may not be effective. Recent projects have experimented with alternative incentives, e.g., helping to secure land or tree tenure or funding small community projects.
5. Information gaps concerning past forestry projects underscore the need to fully fund data collection, monitoring, and evaluation.
6. Crosscutting issues include the possibility of implementing projects in phases over 7 years or more; the importance of broad, programmatic approaches to improving and sustaining land use; and the importance of donor coordination.

Descriptions of A.I.D. agroforestry projects and 13 pages of references are appended.

3.0 Natural Resource Management and Environment

Natural resource management: A.I.D.'s experience in Nepal

PN-AAX-247

Chew, Siew Tuan

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Oct 1990, vii, 14p. + attachments, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 41*

Since 1980, A.I.D. has invested about \$77 million in projects to improve Nepal's natural resource management, particularly in the hill regions where most poor farmers live. This paper reviews the two largest projects—Rapti Area Development and Resource Conservation and Utilization (RCU); it also describes how USAID/Nepal is supporting multidonor forestry projects. The review identifies several important lessons.

1. USAID/Nepal has been more effective in influencing policymaking and institutional changes when supporting multidonor projects than when acting alone.
2. The Rapti and RCU projects underscore the difficulty of implementing large projects that involve technologies far beyond the host country's capabilities. More importantly, they demonstrate that support for resource conservation need not always be technically sophisticated, but can begin by integrating research and extension activities into existing agricultural and rural development projects. Such activities should concentrate on developing simple, low-cost technologies that can be undertaken and sustained by farmers individually or on a communal basis to improve livestock management, replant forests, and curb soil erosion on hill slopes and in catchment areas. To gain farmer support, such activities should increase livestock and tree production without compromising food crop production.
3. Efforts to decentralize forestry management should not stop at the local government but should involve the affected communities themselves.

Environmental assessments of development projects: a preliminary review of A.I.D.'s experience

PN-ABA-143

Chew, Siew Tuan

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Jun 1988, vi, 15p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 17

Since the late 1970s, donors and host country governments alike have become concerned with reversing the environmental degradation taking place in many Third World nations and limiting the adverse impact of development projects on the environment.

This study describes, and reviews the effectiveness of, A.I.D.'s system for assessing the potential environmental impacts of proposed projects. Using examples of projects that were revised after environmental review, the study discusses A.I.D.'s methods for classifying the environmental risks of development projects (the so-called black, grey, and white lists), and the impact of the assessment process on revising project designs and implementation. Experience indicates that in many cases the assessments have helped project designers to identify and address significant environmental issues, and that they provide a forum for host country officials to voice their concerns about project impacts. The system is less effective, however, in screening activities indirectly funded by A.I.D. (e.g., activities of A.I.D.-supported intermediary credit institutions) and it does not provide guidance on how to detect or address unforeseen negative effects that might occur during implementation. Another potential problem is that budget-conscious Missions, fearing expensive project redesigns, might avoid the process altogether by funding only those projects on the "white list," i.e., that qualify for a categorical exclusion.

Natural resources management: issues and lessons from Rwanda

PN-ABC-904

Chew, Siew Tuan

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Apr 1990, x, 19p. + attachment, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 35*

Rwanda is an exception among low-income developing countries in that it has given high priority to environmental and natural resource management (NRM) issues. This paper describes A.I.D.'s support for these efforts and explores the possibility of integrating them into agricultural and rural development programs in Rwanda and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Major findings are as follows.

1. Government support is a prerequisite to developing the long-term strategies needed to address specific NRM issues.
2. Developing appropriate NRM technologies is a complex undertaking requiring site-specific applied research.
3. Donors should appreciate the difficulty host countries face in balancing NRM with development, conservation, and equity objectives.
4. USAID/Rwanda assistance has covered a wide range of NRM activities, many of them complementary to those of other donors, some part of a coordinated multi-donor effort. Such collaboration is especially necessary in complex projects.
5. The program includes several innovative and potentially replicable approaches, including the promotion of ecotourism and wildlife conservation and park management, and agroforestry and fish farming to conserve soil and water resources while increasing farm productivity. Since such activities require costly investments and yield their benefits only in the long term, a broader framework than simple cost-benefit analysis might be needed to incorporate them into USAID/Rwanda's agricultural and rural development portfolio.

4.0 Policy Reform and Public Sector Management

4.1 POLICY REFORM & NON-PROJECT ASSISTANCE

Recent evaluations of AID commodity import programs (CIP's)

PN-AAT-505

Lieberson, Joseph
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Mar 1985, 15p., Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 4

Although non-project assistance plays an increasingly important part of A.I.D.'s overall development program, the relative emphasis accorded its two principal components differs notably, with cash transfer programs increasing sharply and Commodity Import Programs (CIP's) declining. This report evaluates the effectiveness of CIP's on the basis of a review of four CIP's—one each in Zimbabwe and Somalia and two in Egypt. Areas covered in detail include policy reform, beneficiary targeting, foreign exchange rates, and local currency programming. Major findings are as follows.

1. The linkage between CIP's and policy reform has been weak, the CIP's in both Egypt and Zimbabwe lacking policy conditionality. On the positive side, the Somali CIP did have policy conditions and the government initiated a package of reforms.
2. In all three nations, there has been difficulty in gearing CIP's to specific target groups. Faced with a trade-off between targeting and

rapid disbursements, CIP's usually were designed to meet the disbursement objective.

3. In all cases, CIP imports were offered to importers at an "official" exchange rate, 30-100% below the free market rate, providing an opportunity for a windfall profit. Nevertheless, for most developing country importers, a CIP was not as desirable as free foreign exchange.
4. A.I.D. involvement in regard to local currency programming varied widely, being minimal in Egypt and heavy in Zimbabwe, where local currency programming has been used as a major development tool and has demonstrated the potential effectiveness of counterpart funds in affecting host government budget allocations and sectoral priorities. Policy implications of these findings are detailed in conclusion.

Implementing policy and institutional change via performance disbursement: examples from the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Niger

PN-AAT-608

Hermann, Chris
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Jul 1985, v, 24p., Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 1

Performance disbursement (PD) is a recently developed mechanism whereby A.I.D. disburses program funds in a series of tranches, each conditioned by host country attainment of pre-established benchmarks in implementing policy and institutional reforms. This paper reviews limited applications of PD in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Niger in order to evaluate the practice

in light of possible wider use. PD's major advantage is that it softens the adverse effects of policy reforms by lengthening the reform process over time and by providing monetary compensation for losses incurred by the reforms. Among other advantages are that it gives A.I.D. greater control over disbursement and promotes mutual agreement on project activity between A.I.D. and the host government. Outstanding issues concerning PD discussed in the report include, inter alia, that: the conditions making PD an appropriate funding mechanism, as well as PD's compatibility with U.S. Government regulations, are unclear; the use of PD is largely a matter of judgment and host country circumstances; PD constitutes for both A.I.D. and the host country a high-risk and staff-intensive activity; and finally, PD does not ensure long-term institutional development. Sixteen guidelines for the further use of PD conclude the study.

Effectiveness and economic development impact of policy-based cash transfer programs: the case of Costa Rica

PN-AAX-210

Newton, John; Lieberson, Joseph; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Nov 1988, xxii, 65p. + 2 appendices: charts,
statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 57

In the early 1980s, A.I.D., the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) worked with the Government of Costa Rica to design economic reforms needed to alleviate the country's economic crisis. This report assesses the impact of these reforms and of attendant

4.0 Policy Reform and Public Sector Management

international assistance, especially A.I.D.'s cash transfer programs. The objectives of cash transfers are explained both in general and in the Costa Rican context. The report first discusses the IMF's lending programs, which emphasize short-term stability, and the World Bank programs, which have the longer-term objective of promoting export-led growth. A.I.D.'s contribution, consisting of cash transfer and local currency programs, are then analyzed in depth. Cash transfers represent 83% of the USALD/Costa Rica program—totaling \$800 million—since 1982. The reforms and assistance programs have generally had a beneficial impact on the Costa Rican economy. The A.I.D. program was larger than the IMF and World Bank programs combined, but the conditionality provisions and impacts of the three programs are closely related. The report details positive results in the following areas: (1) production and private sector performance, (2) international trade, (3) fiscal performance, (4) financial performance, (5) employment and equity, and (6) agriculture. The only negative aspect of the program noted in the report is the potential for creating economic dependency. The main recommendations address this issue, stating, *inter alia*, that each program should have a short-term performance indicator and termination date. The evaluation resulted in several conclusions of general application. (1) Cash transfer programs should be designed to be phased out. Missions should show that the program creates no dependency and can fully meet its objectives within 5 years, and that individual local currency projects will have full impact and can be discontinued within 3 years. (2) Cash transfer programs should specify Mission administration of both dollar and local currency funds and the permissible level of Mission discretion in using these funds. (3) The decision to implement local currency programs should be made on a case-by-case basis. Although such a component is often very useful, its costs can outweigh its benefits.

Effectiveness and economic development impact of policy-based cash transfer programs: the case of Jamaica, 1981–1987

PN-AAX-220

Allen, Richmond; Hermann, Chris; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Jun 1989, xv, 58p.: charts, statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 62

From 1973 to 1980, Jamaica underwent severe economic decline as a result of protectionist economic policies and greatly expanded social service programs. In response, in 1981 A.I.D. initiated a cash transfer program which provided \$396 million over a six-year period as support for economic stabilization and structural adjustment efforts. The program focused on reducing government involvement in commercial enterprises and in production and investment decisions, maximizing the role of the private sector in national development, and encouraging export-led growth. According to this evaluation, the Government of Jamaica achieved many, although not all, of the policy reform goals. Major achievements were: (1) the development of a simplified and equitable tax system; (2) privatization of a broad array of public sector enterprises; (3) deregulation of export marketing organizations, leading to increased investments in the banana, coffee, and citrus industries; (4) reduction of subsidies and elimination of commodity price controls; (5) reduction of quantitative import restrictions; and (6) the doubling of nontraditional exports to countries outside the Caribbean Common Market. A negative result of the economic stabilization program, however, has been the deterioration of Jamaican living standards and social services. According to the report, these conditions were made even more severe by the Government of Jamaica's slowness in implementing economic stabilization policies. Serious efforts to make the exchange rate more competitive and to reduce central government expenditures were delayed until 1985, which only increased the strain on the poorest segments of the population. Three major lessons were learned: (1) Certain implementation requirements of structural adjustment and policy reform programs may be better addressed through project rather than program modes of assistance. (2) Cross-conditionality between two A.I.D. programs is likely to magnify problems that arise within each program. (3) Coordination and complementarity across the A.I.D. portfolio contribute to the policy dialogue and reform process.

Operational issues in developing A.I.D. policy reform programs

PN-AAX-225

Vondal, Patricia
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Jun 1989, vii, 28p. + 3 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 28

Program assistance for the support of macroeconomic and sectoral policy reform has become a major element in A.I.D.'s strategy for fostering broad-based and sustainable economic growth in developing countries. This paper identifies and discusses some of the major operational issues involved in the process of planning, designing, and negotiating policy reform programs. It is primarily based on lessons learned from A.I.D. experience in developing sector-specific and macroeconomic policy reform programs in Central America, Asia, the Near East, and Africa since 1983. The topics covered include: approaches to selecting policy objectives; analytical requirements for designing programs; donor coordination; design of conditionality; use of A.I.D. resources in packaging reforms; sources of A.I.D. influence; and negotiation strategies and styles. The study also suggests approaches to developing and promoting reform programs based on past successful experiences. The primary conclusion is that the manner in which A.I.D. develops and negotiates policy reform programs has major implications for the degree of support, the implementation, and the sustainability of the reform program, as well as for the tenor of bilateral relations between the U.S. and host country government. Therefore, A.I.D. efforts which emphasize collaboration, consensus-building, flexibility, cultural sensitivity, and recognition of local political and economic realities hold the most promise.

Author abstract, modified

4.0 Policy Reform and Public Sector Management

Impact evaluation of A.I.D. policy reform programs in Dominica and Grenada

PN-AAX-231

Lieberson, Joseph M.; Bowles, W. Donald;
Roach, E. LeRoy

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Jan 1990, viii, 32p., Eng.

A.I.D. impact evaluation report, no. 72

5180096; 5380141

During the period 1985–1989, A.I.D. supported economic policy reforms in Dominica and Grenada—*island nations strikingly alike in their socioeconomic make-up. Despite their similarities, however, the countries' experiences with reform were drastically different. In Grenada, A.I.D. had the opportunity to implement a total reform package after the 1983 U.S. intervention toppled the country's Marxist government. Nonetheless, reform efforts, which focused on budget deficit reduction and private sector development, were far from successful. According to the report, these changes failed because they were implemented too rapidly and did not mesh with local business practices, government staff were inadequately trained to implement them, and public and government support and compliance were inadequate. In Dominica, A.I.D.'s approach was more gradual, first focusing on improving management of the existing tax system and only later working on incremental tax changes and new taxes. By any economic measure, the Dominica reform program was a success. It increased revenues, improved tax collection efficiency, and encouraged productive investment. Economic growth picked up sharply and remained strong throughout the reform period. Critical factors in guiding future planning and management of policy reform programs in these and other countries are identified.*

A.I.D. economic policy reform program in Mali

PN-AAX-236

Rugh, Michael A.; Cashion, Jerry; et al.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

A.I.D. impact evaluation report, no. 74, Mar
1990, viii, 19p., Eng.

6880240

A.I.D.'s 1985–89 Economic Policy Reform Program in Mali had two major objectives: to encourage private sector activity through deregulation and fiscal reform and to improve the efficiency of public services. The program has decontrolled prices, lowered a number of business taxes, introduced a new commercial code, and loosened restrictions on import-export trade. Despite the country's inhospitable economic environment, these reforms have produced impressive benefits for the private sector. The most notable achievement is price decontrol, which has lowered consumer prices across the board. Business tax reductions have enabled some firms to raise production, investment, and employment (although these gains may be offset by a recent increase in business license taxes), and the new commercial code has simplified business registration requirements. Changes in import-export regulations are too recent to be assessed, but their effects are expected to be minimal. Although the reform program has made progress in improving the private sector climate, its impact on public sector efficiency has been marginal at best. An examination of government expenditures indicates that no improvement has been made in the delivery of social services. Finally, while a voluntary early departure program for civil servants has led to real budgetary savings, there is concern that many of the departees will not be able to successfully establish private sector businesses.

A.I.D. economic policy reform program in The Gambia

PN-AAX-241

van der Veen, Jan H.; Hobgood, Thomas D.;
Marlett, Melanie J.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Sep 1990, viii, 16p., Eng.

A.I.D. impact evaluation report, no. 76

6350228; 6350231

In 1987, A.I.D. provided The Gambia with a \$6 million grant to support a series of financial and agricultural marketing reforms as part of a multi-donor economic reform program. The sectoral reforms were designed to encourage greater private sector involvement in productive activities and discourage the Government from regulating and controlling activities that could be done by the private sector efficiently. Specifically, the Government of The Gambia agreed to: implement appropriate policies regarding term lending, agricultural credit, and development lending; enforce market-determined interest rates; prohibit preferential access to credit; and ensure equal allowances for all buyers involved in agricultural marketing. After two years, it is too early to assess the effects of this complex policy reform program. However, the program faces barriers: (1) an inadequate amount of technical assistance and institutional development; (2) poor donor coordination; (3) continued government control over fertilizer grants, undermining the liberalization of groundnut marketing; (4) high interest rates; and (5) resistance to market reforms by government and parastatals. On the other hand, several external factors have improved the economic climate and helped reform: good weather, which helped improve agricultural production; a halt in the secular deterioration of the terms of trade; a strong pro-rural political bias; and satisfactory relations with neighboring Senegal.

4.0 Policy Reform and Public Sector Management

A.I.D. economic policy reform program in Senegal

PN-AAX-242

Lowenthal, Jim; Chambas, Gerard; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa. Senegal

Sep 1990, x, 18p. + 4 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. impact evaluation report, no. 77
6850292

In 1986, A.I.D. initiated a program to reform Senegal's system of tax and revenue administration. The program was designed to complement industrial sector reforms managed by the World Bank, since industrial stagnation was largely attributed to years of heavy tariff protection and high taxes on both the agricultural sector and consumers. A.I.D. contributed \$14 million in cash transfer funds and \$1 million in technical assistance to promote the reforms, almost all of which were implemented by 1988. The Government of Senegal substantially reduced quantitative restrictions on imports; implemented a new commercial investment code; reduced across-the-board tariff protection; and designed a dramatically revised tax revenue system that included major provisions for taxing urban real estate. Contrary to expectations, the immediate impacts of the reforms were negative—economic activity in the formal industrial sector slowed and government revenues seriously declined. Private firms, accustomed to decades of protection, had made no provisions for competing in an international market. Their competitiveness was also weakened by an unfavorable national political and economic climate, increased administrative fraud following the reduction in customs rates, and the failure of donors and the Government of Senegal to implement additional, complementary reforms. Despite these constraints, the reforms are now showing signs of the desired effects, particularly with regard to promoting private sector competitiveness and reversing the decline in government revenues. It is expected that the medium-term impacts of the reforms will meet the program goals.

Effectiveness and economic development impact of policy-based cash transfer programs: the case of Honduras

PN-ABC-864

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

A.I.D. evaluation highlights, no. 3, May 1989,
8p., Eng.

Progress has been slow in promoting sustained economic growth and structural reforms in Honduras. This report examines the effectiveness and development impact of A.I.D.'s Honduran Cash Transfer programs since 1984. Areas covered in detail include fiscal policy, monetary policy, foreign exchange reforms, trade policy, and privatization efforts. Major conclusions are as follows.

1. Informal discussions, such as those held by the Joint Economic Working Group to promote changes in the tariff system and exchange rate policy, can bring results in cases where conditionality and leverage do not work.
2. Basing disbursements on substantive effort rather than strict compliance with targets serves to keep the reform program moving, as when A.I.D. disbursed funds in late 1987 despite anomalies in the government's economic stabilization program.
3. Concomitant foreign policy objectives and economic objectives mean accepting slower progress in the latter area, despite the fact that economic growth is a crucial component in achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.
4. Local currency generated by cash transfer programs can be earmarked for activities that support the goals of policy reform, such as the Working Capital Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises and the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises project, both of which were funded from a local currency account.

Despite progress in some major areas, the fiscal deficit and economic inequity continue to be areas of concern.

Effectiveness and economic development impact of policy-based cash transfer programs: the case of Costa Rica

PN-ABH-145

Liebersohn, Joseph
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

A.I.D. evaluation highlights, no. 1, Oct 1988, 8 p., Eng.

This document summarizes an evaluation of A.I.D.'s Cash Transfer program in Costa Rica between 1982-87. During this time, A.I.D., working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, provided \$953.1 million in assistance to the Costa Rica's economy, which had gone into decline after the doubling of oil prices in 1979 and the worldwide recession that followed. Program-mandated reforms (1) called for the divestment of unprofitable state-owned firms, (2) promoted export of non-traditional agricultural and manufactured products to U.S. and European markets, (3) instituted a new foreign exchange rate system that reduced the overvaluation of Costa Rican currency, (4) reduced the public sector deficit through cash transfer conditionalities, (5) restructured financial and capital markets by reducing government regulation, and (6) expanded the private sector through a variety of local currency-financed reforms. These reforms have generally been successful: exchange system reforms have been a major success, nontraditional exports have grown rapidly, and the public deficit has been sharply reduced. Unfortunately, this success has also raised the question of sustainability. Given the large amount of aid (\$55 per capita), the Costa Rican economy has grown accustomed to external support. When and how this support can be phased out without precipitating economic decline is uncertain. The program teaches that broad policy reform objectives should be translated into specific targets that can be monitored, policy reform deadlines should be realistic, the number of local currency projects should be strictly limited, and the development of local capacity for economic analysis is critical for sustainable policy reform actions.

4.0 Policy Reform and Public Sector Management

Effectiveness and economic development impact of policy-based cash transfer programs: the case of Jamaica

PN-ABH-146

Lieberson, Joseph

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

A.I.D. evaluation highlights, no. 2, Oct 1988,
8 p., Eng.

This document summarizes an evaluation of A.I.D.'s Cash Transfer Program in Jamaica during the 1981-87 period. To stop a downward economic spiral caused in part by a significant downturn in bauxite and alumina prices (which had generated almost 70% of Jamaican export earnings), the A.I.D. program focused on reforms designed to maximize the role of the private sector in national development. Specifically, the program (1) helped stabilize the economy by reducing government expenditures and by changing the foreign exchange rate from a fixed to a floating unified rate; (2) reformed the complex Jamaican income tax by instituting a flat 33% tax rate; (3) required the government to divest itself of unprofitable public sector enterprises; (4) encouraged market reform by requiring the removal of some government price controls and subsidies, (5) encouraged traditional agricultural exports by removing the monopoly control of the government's export marketing organizations; (6) required removal of quantitative import restrictions and a rationalization of the import tax system; and (7) moved to encourage private investment. Although these reforms (which often necessitated wholesale reductions in public services such as education and health programs) have made middle-income Jamaicans hard-pressed to maintain their standard of living and have severely affected the poor, the program has can be classified as a qualified success. The economic stabilization and tax reform components have been successful, especially the tax reform plan, which was a major A.I.D. policy reform success. In most cases, however, the government has been slow to implement program-mandated changes, and gains in export promotion and private investment have been small. Nevertheless, the GOJ seems committed to the adjust-

ment program, and eventually when the reforms have worked their way through the Jamaican economy low-income groups should reap the benefits of increased employment opportunities and a more solvent public sector. The program teaches that (1) a small developing country like Jamaica "lives" or "dies" on world demand for its exports; (2) major economic dislocations require major structural adjustments; (3) donors should consider ways of limiting the impact of adjustment programs on the poor; and (4) natural disasters (in this case, Hurricane Gilbert) can undo even the best of efforts.

4.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT

Local government trends and performance: assessment of A.I.D.'s involvement in Latin America

PN-AAL-023

Gall, Pirie M.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)

Nov 1983, viii, 27p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 17

The history of and future possibilities for A.I.D. involvement in developing local government in Latin America are herein assessed. After a brief resume of the history of local government in Latin America, post-1960 trends toward municipal development and the obstacles to increased decentralization are reviewed. It is noted that the relative emphasis of the 1960s on rural development largely shifted during the 1970s to urban development as the pace of rural-to-urban migration accelerated and with it the need for greater urban infrastructure. At the same time, municipal development institutions were established or strengthened in such countries as Costa Rica, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, and Panama. The municipalista movement to push for autonomous local gov-

ernment also played a significant role during this period and is addressed likewise. A.I.D. evaluations of its municipal development activities in the 1970s—in the areas of local bank lending for infrastructure and social service subprojects, technical assistance and training, legal and legislative reform, and institutional planning and management—are then reviewed and A.I.D.'s involvement since 1980 assessed. The last and longest chapter summarizes the effects of the historical, sociocultural, ideological, legal/legislative, political, policy, and bureaucratic frameworks existing in Latin America on local government development and outlines a strategy for future A.I.D. involvement. The author concludes that A.I.D. should build on the potential for local government already established, focusing future efforts, where possible, at the municipal level in preference to other governmental levels. These efforts should target urban-rural linkages (especially food supply and non-farm employment), energy efficiency, planning in secondary cities experiencing rapid growth, and—to enable real and sustainable autonomy to emerge—financial planning, management, and administration. The scale of such interventions, it is noted, will depend on local conditions.

AID assistance to local government: experience and issues

PN-AAL-026

Silverman, Jerry M.; Crawford, Paul R.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Nov 1983, xvi, 31p. + 5 annexes, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 17

During the past decade A.I.D. has increasingly provided assistance to local units of government. This study, based primarily on review of A.I.D. documentation of 63 local government projects, addresses three key issues: the projects' effectiveness in enhancing local authority, their impacts on the private sector, and their success in achieving local development per se. The authors show that emphasis on local government has grown partly as a result of dissatisfaction with centralized public planning and implementation and partly due to country-specific and Mission-specific factors. A.I.D.'s local government portfolio consists of a hodgepodge of program types

4.0 Policy Reform and Public Sector Management

(decentralization initiatives, area development programs, components of larger programs, and direct assistance); institutional arrangements (including indirect assistance through regional or national entities), and strategies (management training, revenue generation, financial studies, and participant training). The projects' effectiveness in increasing local autonomy is likewise mixed, and appears to be a function of central government commitment, preexisting local capacity, and stage of decentralization. Paradoxically,

it is often necessary to increase national strength temporarily to achieve the long-term objective of decentralized autonomy. Generally, local government projects have lent support to private sector development, both directly and indirectly, although in a few instances the private sector may have been displaced. The issue is seldom addressed in A.I.D. documentation, however. Capacity building within local governments, while not easy, is a valuable strategy in situations where these governments play a key role in de-

centralization efforts or are needed to implement A.I.D. assistance. However, local government support should be viewed as a means to achieve sectoral objectives and not as a goal in itself. Finally, the authors caution that as the importance of local governments varies from country to country, the formal statements found in project documentation are of little use in assessing specific situations. Informal behind the scenes patterns of decisionmaking are far more important. A 76-item bibliography (1967–1982) is provided.

5.0 Infrastructure

5.1 ROADS

New directions: rural roads

PN-AAG-670

Tendler, Judith

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

1979, x, 67p., Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 2*

*French ed.: PN-ABC-652
9300635*

In order to increase the impact of road projects on the rural poor, emphasis has gradually shifted from paved highways to rural roads and from capital-intensive to labor-intensive construction methods. The author of this paper analyzes the benefits of the labor-intensive approach and the options A.I.D. can pursue to encourage its use. Various research findings on the cost-effectiveness and employment-generating potential of labor-based construction are reported. Several reasons are given for the continued preference of host countries and contractors for capital-intensive designs despite these findings. One simple reason is that both donors and developing country governments are more accustomed to working with equipment than with labor management. In fact, donor requirements for financing tend to encourage adoption of the capital-intensive mode. However, rural road construction, which is increasingly frequent, is more conducive to the labor-based mode than are highway or paved road projects. Since most central government highway departments lack the capabilities needed to manage labor-inten-

sive rural road projects and have maintained a high priority on arterial road construction, A.I.D. should resist pressure to invest in the latter, investigate possibilities for complementary rural road construction, and remove management of such projects from national highway departments. Site selection criteria are discussed and recommendations are made to facilitate the adoption of labor-based construction. By refraining from subsidizing equipment costs and by seeking more acceptable environments, A.I.D. will lessen the relative costs of such techniques. It is emphasized that decentralized management can increase the political appeal of such projects and improve the chronic problem of maintenance, particularly use of the "no-maintenance model" (paving roads before the volume of traffic warrants the investment). Finally, to improve A.I.D.'s rural road policy, it is recommended that a country's road system be examined in its entirety rather than project by project and that community-based construction, including participation in road financing, be encouraged. A 94-item bibliography (1966-78) is attached.

Impact of rural roads in Liberia

FN-AAH-750

Cobb, Richard A.; Hunt, Robert W.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

1980, 49p., Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 6
6690116*

Since the construction in Liberia of four all-weather rural roads, some villagers of the Lofa, Nuaba, and Grand Jide counties enjoy increased accessibility to markets, schools, and health clinics. Because these projects have apparently

succeeded in providing such services, other villagers are now clamoring for similar assistance. First, however, it is necessary to assess who the actual beneficiaries were and how they benefited. A five-person evaluation team found that substantial implementation and road design difficulties were encountered in construction of the four roads by local contractors under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works; and that the roads are economically justified in terms of the volume of passenger and cargo traffic. It was also found that the roads have had a mixed impact. Improved transportation has bettered educational opportunities for children of tribal communities, stimulated the cultivation of the cash crops of coffee, cocoa, and rubber; and reduced not only produce loss due to spoilage but also cargo costs of agricultural products by 90% in more isolated areas. Perhaps the most serious, long-term impact which negates these short-term benefits is the change in the land tenure and use system. Land belonging to farmers' tribes has increased in market value due to its proximity to the new roads and hence is sought by wealthy Liberians. Their renewed interest in this land impinges upon the traditional land tenure system, forcing farmers to relocate to areas removed from the benefits the roads provide. The net effect is the loss of a fundamental component of economic security and social stability. If people are to take full advantage of the access the roads offer, questions of resource and benefit distribution need to be addressed. Other negative impacts were identified. Roads have induced expanded lumbering activity and altered cropping practices—both of which threaten the environment. Vehicle repair costs have risen sharply due to the damage vehicles suffer from poorly maintained roads. Appendices discuss the evaluation's methodology; project design, implementation, maintenance and feasibility issues; and the impact of Liberia's coup d'etat on rural development.

5.0 Infrastructure

Effectiveness and impact of the CARE / Sierra Leone rural penetration roads projects

PN-AAH-751

Anderson, G.W.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 111p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 7
6360191; 6360101; 6360126

After years of dependence on declining mineral exports, the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) recently shifted its focus to agricultural development. The feeder roads projects reviewed in this report were intended to complement that shift. Overall, the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), which is implementing these projects, has performed well, successfully coping with funding delays and other difficulties. CARE has also displayed considerable innovation in several instances—using Peace Corps and other volunteer engineers, involving local chiefs and villagers in construction and maintenance, and helping the GOSL to improve its road selection process. Whether the Ministry of Works will provide continued maintenance is a major question. Project benefits have included more frequent visits by extension agents, increased stops by light vans providing local transportation, increased ownership of motorcycles and bicycles, and greater access to health care. Fertilizer use and marketing of greater varieties and quantities of crops are also more prevalent. According to some reports, commercial activity (new rural markets, bank lending, new rice mills) has been stimulated. On the negative side, indications are that CARE roads may have precipitated shorter fallow periods for upland rice cultivation, greater rice scarcity, and increased swamp rice cultivation. These factors suggest that food crops are being replaced with cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, and oil palm—and are thus associated with reduced soil fertility, erosion, deforestation, and increased exposure to waterborne diseases. During project implementation, there was a shift from labor-based to equipment-based road construction. Unfortunately, A.I.D. and CARE did little to document this shift. The author recommends that in future projects A.I.D.: (1) determine whether the agricultural development strategy supported by the road project will benefit the poor; (2) obtain a commitment from the host government regard-

ing road maintenance; (3) carry out baseline and impact surveys of new and old roads; and (4) provide incentives to A.I.D. personnel to carry out impact evaluations. A more detailed version of this report is appended.

Colombia: small farmer market access

PN-AAH-768

Van Haalte, G. R.; Singer, Steve; et. al.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1979, 46p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 1
Spanish version: PN-AAV-581
5140194

Can labor-intensive (pick and shovel) construction of market access roads in the mountainous regions of Colombia result in significant improvements in the welfare of local campesinos? This document assesses the impact of one such effort—A.I.D.'s Small Farmer Market Access Project. Some 900 km of all-weather, unpaved access roads were planned to link isolated mountain communities with the nearest market road in order to stimulate agricultural production and trade and to open these communities to agricultural extension, health, and educational services. Construction was directed by the host government agency Caminos Vecinales, but as most of the work was performed by the intended beneficiaries, 60–65% of road construction costs were paid as wages to local campesinos. Substantial underestimates of the cost of construction will cause the final total of 59 roads averaging 8 km in length to fall well short of the projected total. Impacts of road construction and road use are discussed in detail. Marginal farmers, the landless, and the unemployed provided the main labor source, using the income gained to make improvements on house and farm, for fertilizer and improved seed, and for purchase of consumer goods. The resulting switch from animal to motorized transportation sharply reduced transport costs, leading to increased agricultural production without changes in policy or agricultural extension services. Wages in the areas near the roads have also increased, as the landless now have alternative employment opportunities. The anticipated increase in government services such as health and education has yet to take place, however. The

evaluators raised long-term questions concerning the inadequacy of maintenance funds, the need to guard against erosion and siltation of rivers, and the lack of political support for replication of the project. In conclusion, the project was found to offer a replicable model for labor-intensive construction of rural roads under specific conditions. Attached to the report are various annexes regarding evaluation methodology, development strategies, alternative construction methods, and environmental considerations.

Rural roads in Thailand

PN-AAH-970

Moore, Frank J.; Alton, C. T.; et. al.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 51p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 13
4930165

Nearly 30 million people in the formerly isolated villages of North and Northeast Thailand have benefited from the 8,000 miles of roads built between 1964 and 1974 under the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) Project. This report focuses on the impact of ARD on Thais who experienced for the first time a wide range of opportunities within and away from their home community. ARD's institutional objective was to increase the capability of provincial governments to respond to rural needs by delegating to local governors the responsibilities of planning, designing, building, and maintaining rural roads, water facilities, and other public works. Although the degree of decentralization sought by A.I.D. has not been sustained, the existing ARD system does encourage local initiative. The roads have generally impacted favorably on those in formerly isolated areas. Continued education beyond the primary grades has been introduced to rural people, along with educational programs in health care and nutrition; and there have been increases in job opportunities both within and away from villages and in access to food, agricultural credit, inputs, and technical assistance. The land under cultivation and the intensity of land use increased dramatically wherever roads provided access to markets. Availability of water and better transportation increased rice production and encouraged crop diversification, especially of corn, soybeans, and peanuts in the North and of cas-

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sava and kenaf in the Northeast. The most serious negative impact of the roads has been rapid deforestation and soil erosion due to increased demands, stemming from population and income growth, for food and agricultural products. Also, the social benefits of roads have been somewhat offset by a spread of various epidemic and contagious diseases in areas from which it had previously disappeared. ARD has created a strong national institutional capacity to sustain the rural development effort, with most of the AID-funded equipment still in use in the project's original 31 provinces. Future ARD activities—which will focus on maintaining existing roads—will be constrained mainly by budget limitations. Appendices include a 17-item bibliography (1966–80).

Honduras rural roads: old directions and new

PN-AAH-971

Hamilton, J. M.; Chapin, Norman M.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1981, 56p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 17
5220070; 5220100

Honduras has the lowest ratio of roads to area and population in all of Central America. To assist Honduran road construction, A.I.D. developed two roads approaches differing in inputs and impacts. In 1965, A.I.D. approved a project to build feeder roads in areas isolated from marketplaces on the "trickle-down" theory that the roads would benefit rich and poor alike, lead to cash crop production, and reduce subsistence farming and cattle ranching. The project called for road construction with no complementary credit, extension, or marketing services. Case studies of two of the feeder roads showed that the roads stimulated the cultivation of additional land, the production of cash crops, and also improved local access to medical and educational services. Project benefits varied, however, depending on external factors. In one case, sugar cane production increased due to a sugar mill built after road completion, while in the other, an agrarian reform program initiated by the National Agrarian Institute promoted production of palm oil and citrus by small farmer cooperatives. In 1974, A.I.D. approved a project to assist agrarian reform by providing credit and technical assistance to model

rural cooperatives and by constructing roads to connect cooperative fields to all-weather highways. Project delays prevented the planned use of local construction crews, education regarding the roads' benefits, and the establishment of an ongoing local road maintenance unit. These roads encouraged cash cropping, the availability of credit and extension services, and the cooperatives' development of schools. The evaluation team concluded the following: roads are needed for development, but do not guarantee it; corollary policies greatly affect the roads' distribution of socioeconomic benefits; access roads are more consistent with A.I.D.'s new policy than are feeder roads, since the former allows specific selection of beneficiaries; and, a road's long-term impact makes it difficult to render a final project assessment. Appended are descriptions of evaluation methodology, a technical analysis of the roads, and an aerial study of the first project's impact in one area.

Kenya: rural roads

PN-AAH-972

Roberts, John E.; Clapp-Wincek, Cynthia; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jan 1982, xiii, 19p. + 9 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 26
6150147; 6150168; 6157011

A.I.D.'s ongoing rural roads project in western Kenya is designed to provide isolated rural areas with all-weather accessibility to production and social services, largely through a program to identify, construct, and maintain 14,000 km of rural access roads (RARs). This study by an AID/W team details the project's impact to date. Most RARs were found to be well-constructed and serviceable, but direct economic benefit—apart from the generation of local employment due to the labor-intensive nature of the RAR program (the project's graveling, bridging, and culverting program, by contrast, employs capital-intensive techniques)—was not in evidence. Pedestrian traffic dominates due to a lack of vehicles and the high costs of vehicle use, while the fixed prices of staples and major commodities prevent buyers/sellers from recuperating transport costs and thus serve as a disincentive to private sector development in isolated areas. A variety of public service and official-use vehicles are urgently needed to serve such areas. More

positively, the RAR program seems capable of being institutionalized in view of the commitment of both officials and people to labor-intensive methods and a road selection process that begins at the local level. Maintenance activities, especially those of a labor-intensive nature, were found to be successful, but a lack of indigenous engineers threatens long-term maintenance. Roads built under the Vihiga-Special Rural Development Program already require almost total rehabilitation; an agreement to perform such work during the present project was concluded as a result of this evaluation. Lessons learned are the benefits of the RAR program's labor-intensive and participatory approach and the need to promote more effective road use by coordinating other integrated development activities at both the national and local levels; undertake cost and supervisory planning to ensure post-project road maintenance; and resolve the policy causes of the project's current lack of direct socioeconomic impact (an appendix argues for an integrated time-phased strategy). Lessons of general import for A.I.D.'s Kenya program are also noted. Appendices also include a review of other evaluations of rural roads in Kenya.

Philippines: rural roads I and II

PN-AAH-973

Levy, Irwin A.; Zuvekas, Clarence, Jr.; Stevens, Charles S.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1981, 69p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 18
4920272; 4920297

The socioeconomic and institutional impacts of the A.I.D. Rural Roads I and II projects in the Philippines are herein assessed. Of 69 completed or nearly completed road construction projects, 8 were selected to be analyzed as a representative cross-section. Overall, road construction proceeded well, but maintenance was inadequate. Socioeconomic impacts ranged from nil to dramatic, but the institutional impact was disappointing as provincial planning and engineering offices failed to reach desirable levels of professional competence or to achieve staff continuity. The provinces did not conduct high-quality feasibility studies or keep up to date on evaluation schedules. Road selection was based primarily on political rather than equity considerations.

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Nevertheless, project-constructed roads allowed more people to market their produce directly and significantly improved rural access to doctors, clinics, and hospitals in adjoining areas. Other infrastructure (e.g., power systems) was expanded in some areas, but generally not as a result of the project. Social benefits were modest and educational and recreational benefits very minor. However, the great majority of residents interviewed said they had benefited from project activities. Lessons learned are: site selection criteria need to be more precise if benefits are to be focused on the rural poor; institution-building might have been more cost-effective if focused on regional rather than provincial offices, although this might have compromised decentralization goals; design was strongly biased in favor of capital-intensive methods and community involvement was limited; feasibility studies had little effect in determining construction priorities; design standards were too high for prevailing conditions; impacts would have been greater had construction/improvement of provincial roads and barangay township roads been linked and had there been better coordination with other rural development programs; the construction of penetration (as opposed to feeder) roads and of bridges has had the greatest impacts; and the fixed Amount Reimbursement scheme was, on balance, a positive aspect and merits consideration in other A.I.D. projects.

Socio-economic and environmental impacts of low-volume rural roads—a review of the literature

PN-AAJ-135

Dessaint, Alain Y.; Jackson, B. A.; et al.

Devres, Inc.

1980, 183p., Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper, no. 7

The focus of current development investments in transportation has shifted from highways and railroads to low-volume rural roads, but few evaluations of the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of these roads have been conducted. This study reviews the available evaluative literature and presents issues to be considered in designing future rural road projects. Emphasis is placed on the broad social impact of rural roads and the diffusion of benefits to the rural poor. Im-

portant areas in which roads are a significant factor are identified, e.g., agricultural production, employment, health, and education. Examples are offered of the potential benefits and problems of road construction in each impact category and questions are proposed for use in future evaluations. Roads must be location-specific in design if maximum benefits are to be derived, since roads are only one aspect of a region's development process. Roads almost invariably facilitate agricultural production and permit changes in crop composition (in response to increased market access), although it is usually the larger, wealthier farmers who benefit most. Roads also expand the use of technology by wealthier farmers, aggravating regional income disparities. Increased government extension services and cooperatives also tend to benefit the wealthier farmers. Increased availability of raw materials and markets encourages agribusiness and other commercial enterprises, but tends to discourage cottage industries. Road construction increases short- and long-term employment and land values and intensifies land use, while lower transport costs encourage a greater flow of consumer goods and travel. New roads also increase access to health, nutrition, and education services. Road development commonly causes local environmental problems such as deforestation, erosion, and decrease in soil fertility. The effects on national integration, community development, women, and minorities are too complex and regionally influenced to be generalized. Finally, criteria for designing projects in furtherance of social, environmental, and economic goals are suggested. Attached are a 170-item bibliography (1950-79) and lists of sources consulted.

Jamaica feeder roads: an evaluation

PN-AAJ-199

Berg, Robert J.; Gardner, Carleen; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

1980, v, 17p. + 9 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 11
5320035*

Although it upgraded a total of 181 miles of rural roads between 1972 and 1976, the Jamaican feeder roads project failed to have any demonstrably significant benefits. This report investigates the causes of that failure by examining the

logic, appropriateness, and achievement of the project's goals. It was planned that road improvement would generate rural employment and help to stabilize the political climate. Furthermore, the roads were to facilitate market access, thereby stimulating increased agricultural production and income for small farmers. However, A.I.D. made a fundamentally illogical decision in relying on a feeder roads project as means to these goals. The projected labor-based construction mode was never actively pursued either by contractors or by the implementing agency and no significant employment was generated. Even had rural employment increased, the authors show that each step in the planned chain of events—decrease in migration and urban crime, increase in tourism, and political stabilization—was only loosely linked to the preceding condition, making their achievement highly unlikely. From the developmental perspective, the project neither lowered transport costs nor increased land under cultivation, once again because of a flawed program logic. The project also had limited (even adverse) social, environmental, and institutional effects. It demonstrated the inadvisability of relying on central departments to implement labor-based construction and the need to consider rural roads projects as a part of integrated rural development, not as isolated infrastructure. The authors conclude that the haste brought about by the project's high political priority ultimately caused its failure. A more methodical design and review process would have revealed the ineffectiveness of the rural roads approach and its propensity for failure. These conclusions are particularly important since politically-oriented foreign assistance from any source could encourage repetition of similar difficulties. Detailed project strategies and economic, social, environmental, institutional, and engineering analyses are attached.

Rural roads evaluation summary report

PN-AAJ-607

Anderson, G.W.; Vandervoort, Charles G.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Mar 1982, xiv, 62p. + 10 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 5
9360096; 9365317*

This report assesses rural road projects in eight countries: Sierra Leone, Colombia, Liberia, Ja-

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maica, the Philippines, Honduras, Thailand, and Kenya. After a short introduction, Part II examines the effectiveness, economic and social impact, other key issues (e.g., local participation) of the projects and makes recommendations for the future. Part III presents working group reports from a rural roads evaluation conference held in 1980, while Part IV discusses the implementation of lessons learned from rural roads evaluations. Overall, although these projects constructed roads that were still in use, many of their designs suffered from overly optimistic estimates of benefits, costs, and completion time. A.I.D. did improve its ability to plan road projects with satisfactory overall economic returns, but economic and social analysis and justification of projects often overlooked agricultural price policies, land tenure problems, weakness of the transport industry, absence of complementary agricultural services, and other critical factors. Further, in the majority of cases, maintenance was neglected because of both donor and host country policies. Developing countries could more easily obtain aid for road construction or rehabilitation than for maintenance and therefore let roads deteriorate until rehabilitation was necessary. Moreover, the engineers who ran highway departments were more interested in road building, with its greater prestige, than in maintenance. Donors did not often act together in requiring progress in rural road maintenance before funding further construction. Other key findings were (inter alia): (1) new road construction was associated with greater increases in agricultural production than was road upgrading, and contributed to the proliferation of small shops in towns and the expansion of rural markets along new or improved routes; (2) road building usually caused environmental degradation, including deforestation, soil erosion, and declining soil fertility (caused by shortened fallow periods); and (3) rural roads provided easier access for rural people to existing medical services and education, but had little effect by themselves on the expansion of health and educational systems. Although each developing country is unique, there are several characteristics of effective rural road projects. A project should: (1) be carried out by an institution whose principal mission is the construction and maintenance of lower volume rural roads; (2) help enhance the construction and maintenance capacity of the host country institution; (3) work with a host country whose road activities are decentralized to the provincial and local levels; and (4) involve local villages substantially in route selection, construction, and maintenance,

and use improved labor-based construction and maintenance to encourage community participation. Recommendations are therefore to: improve the project design process by better preparation of design teams, judge objectives and costs on the basis of experience rather than by referring to other designs; and encourage better host country road maintenance programs, through institutional development and policies that tie construction funds to tangible commitments to maintenance.

5.2 ELECTRIFICATION

Rural electrification: linkages and justifications

PN-AAG-671

Tendler, Judith

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

1979, xi, 69p., Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 3*

*French ed.: PN-ABG-651
9300085*

Unlike health, education, or nutrition projects, rural electrification (RE) projects do not directly benefit the poor and have thus been de-emphasized in recent development assistance programs. RE projects can, however, promote integrated rural development significantly by encouraging productive and municipal, as well as traditional household, electricity usages. In this paper, a justification for increased attention to RE projects is made based on these additional usages and issues: are identified for further exploration. The author notes that RE planners generally tend to seek replication of the successful Philippine RE project, which strongly favored household consumption. Various issues are examined for their impact on the rural poor. These include the choice of rate mechanisms (meter or flat); lowered rates for high-volume users; beneficiaries and cost-effectiveness of RE projects; preference of the consumer for wood in cooking; economic drawbacks to the use of electricity; and the superiority of independent over central station generation. The author concludes that an RE project is not

justified on the basis of household consumption alone; most often the poorest members of the community cannot take advantage of the benefits offered by household electricity. They can benefit much more significantly from the increase in employment which accompanies RE use by producers and from the increase in public services resulting from RE's municipal use. A.I.D. should investigate means of encouraging employment generation in RE projects, e.g., by providing credit and technical assistance to small industries. A.I.D. should also identify public services which are electricity-dependent, such as clinics and schools, and link provision of RE projects with extension of these services. The author also recommends the creation of a central A.I.D. office to promote local (rather than international) suppliers for the equipment and labor demands of infrastructure projects and favors an AID-supported central fund to promote local cooperatives and autogeneration projects. A 94-item bibliography (1966-78) is attached.

Philippines: rural electrification

PN-AAH-976

Mande, David H.; Allgeier, P.F.; et. al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

1980, 95p., Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 15
4920314; 4920306; 4920888; 4920321*

A.I.D.'s overall evaluation of its Philippine Rural Electrification (RE) program, consisting of eight successive projects, noted that it has had limited effect on the rural poor and the economic development process. This program began in 1965 and has since energized 844 (59% of the national total) Philippine municipalities, 9,088 (27%) barrios, 1,159,434 (20%) households, and 101 new cooperatives; resulting in a change of schedule for total national energization from 1990 to 1987. To improve the productive capacity of the poor, cooperatives were organized and lent funds to extend electrical power into their areas. Many of the poor, however, could not afford its installation, continued use, or more than one or two light bulbs a month. Community lighting, such as street-lighting, indirectly helped the poor in various ways, such as by providing greater personal security. Those with sufficient financial resources or skills were able to use the electricity for entrepreneurial activities. RE im-

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fact upon development occurred in areas with a concentrated population, available technical skills and capital, and access to large and diverse markets. Active promotion of electricity-dependent investments and projects also increased program impact. Conclusions reached are: (1) Economic growth requires not only electricity, but also the development of power-oriented projects and programs. (2) Electrification must be complemented by development efforts aimed at the poor if it is to directly provide higher productivity levels, employment opportunities, and better public and social services. (3) The service nature of cooperatives requires that a high priority be given to effective management—even at the expense of beneficiary participation or democratization of the development process. (4) Productive power use and slower expansion rates encourage the financial viability of RE systems. (5) Because of the availability of other fuels, RE does not greatly increase energy demand. Appended are the evaluation's methodology, assessments of the financial viability and development potential of RE cooperatives, cooperative statistics, socioeconomic case studies, an energy impact statement, and a 23-item bibliography (1974-80).

Bolivia: rural electrification

PN-AAH-978

Butler, Edward E.; Poe, Karen M.; Tendler, Judith
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Office of Evaluation

1980, 56p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 16
5110049; 5110205

Two rural electrification systems initiated in Bolivia in 1973 and 1974 are the subject of this report. By 1979, all distribution networks were completed, except in the La Paz region. Power was supplied to 42,000 consumers and was used primarily for residential lighting. Although demand outpaced supply, consumption per household was lower than projected and irrigation and industrial use was negligible. The preponderant positive impact of the projects was social. Household lighting improved the physical quality of life for 7% of Bolivia's rural population. Electric light was more convenient, less expensive, safer, and healthier than previous lighting sources such as kerosene and candles. Unfortunately, electrical power did not appear to play a catalytic role in

economic development nor was it a precondition for it. Excessive technical design standards increased capital and operating costs of the systems. The premature termination of project financing for the initial hookups resulted in disproportionate exclusion of the poor from project benefits. The urban-rural rate structure, although beneficial, provided insufficient revenues for utilities to expand the rural systems. In addition, the absence of an aggressive promotion program, including a mechanism to mobilize financing by beneficiaries, resulted in a smaller number of residential and productive consumers than might otherwise have been possible. Several lessons were learned: (1) Similar projects should be located where a demand for productive use is evident from the productive use of other forms of energy. Alternatively, if the project purpose and probable impact is purely social, the system should be designed to maximize household connections. (2) Designers should introduce cost constraints into technical standards by allowing choices to be made by host-country technicians and by those who will be concerned with the utility's revenue-earning operations. (3) Electrification projects should be linked to other development activities. (4) A vigorous promotional program to teach rural people how to obtain and make productive use of electric service is recommended.

Ecuador: rural electrification

PN-AAH-979

Kessler, Judd L.; Ballantyne, Janet C.; et. al.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Office of Evaluation

1981, 65p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 21
5180069; 5180071; 5180072; 5180099

The direct and indirect benefits of rural electrification in Ecuador warrant A.I.D.'s continued sponsorship of such programs. This assessment of A.I.D.'s 1964-75 sponsorship of four electrification projects in Ecuador concludes that, although implemented along with other development projects such as road construction, the program was a key factor in upgrading the towns of Santa Elena, Santo Domingo de los Colorados, Daule, and Ambato into regional market and service centers. The main benefits of this program, which was not originally designed to benefit the poor, were job creation, access to agricultural product processing facilities, and increased opportunities

for small commercial enterprises. The growth of Santa Elena into a successful summer resort, with tourism and its related services the major economic activities, was made possible by electricity. Santo Domingo now features small industries of metal mechanics and automotive repair, as well as 67 crop processing plants for coffee, hemp, and milk. Electricity in Daule also led to local processing plants, as it led to the growth of small industry/artisanry activities in Ambato. Residential electricity has been mainly used for appliances of convenience and recreation, which is not to diminish its importance to those who made sacrifices for this luxury. The direct impact of electricity upon agricultural production has been nil, however, as has been its effect upon delivery of social services to rural areas. Since, in the absence of the development potential provided by a market town or service center, rural electrification has a low cost-benefit ratio, it should be designed as part of an integrated development process. The issue for A.I.D. is not whether electrification is worthwhile, but whether A.I.D. should alter its role from funding the purchase of equipment to providing technical assistance and training. In addition, A.I.D.'s marginally successful use of cooperatives did not correspond to local conditions and improperly employed a top-to-bottom approach. In future impact evaluations, local scientists should conduct advance field surveys. Appendices include a description of the evaluation's methodology and a 24-item bibliography (1972-80).

Product in progress: rural electrification in Costa Rica

PN-AAJ-175

Goddard, Paula O.; Gomez, Gustavo; et. al.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Office of Evaluation

1981, 83p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 22
5150092

Because Costa Rica had abundant hydroelectric potential and a government which was strongly committed to equitable growth, a considerable return was reaped from a relatively small investment in rural electrification (RE). This report details this success and A.I.D.'s contribution (1965-69). Aiming to diversify agriculture, increase income, expand agroindustry, and develop replicable RE cooperatives (RECs),

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5.3 WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION

Policy directions for rural water supply in developing countries

PN-AAG-691

Burton, Ian

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1979, vii, 43p., Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 4

Spanish ed.: PN-ABG-602

French ed.: PN-ABG-653

9300085

In order to provide an adequate potable water supply for every individual in developing countries by 1990, greatly increased efforts have been slated by donor agencies during the International Drinking Water Decade (1980-90). To be effective, however, these increased efforts must improve on previous water projects, which have had a high failure rate. This paper examines problems associated with rural water supply programs and recommends changes in policy directions. The author briefly reviews the history of water assistance projects and the priority accorded them by donors and host countries and lists recent evaluations conducted by international and bilateral donors. The many maintenance-related problems which are most commonly responsible for failures in water supply projects are discussed. In general, the lack of spare parts and other supplies, coupled with insufficient national program support (often reinforced by donor emphasis on construction, rather than maintenance), leads to equipment breakdown or misuse, and not the technology itself. Lack of coordination among the myriad of donors and consultants leads to further confusion and inefficiency. Lastly, villagers are often unaware or misinformed about the benefits of potable water—they tend to value taste or convenience over safety. Project planners often ignore the social/religious value placed on water by the community, which can lead to a lack of local motivation to maintain and use the new systems. To ensure the effectiveness of future programs, the author recommends that A.I.D.: (1) choose

the project produced positive but not wholly anticipated results—small sugar and rice processors benefited more than larger enterprises in Guanacaste; San Carlos' dairy industry grew markedly but at the expense of agricultural diversification; and coffee production quadrupled and in-migration increased in San Marcos. In general, RE had the greatest impact on agricultural processing and less impact on farm-level production, partly due to the absence of outreach programs to enlist farmer participation. RE had a clearer impact on expanding health care and educational opportunity—the availability of electric lighting led to creation of an extensive night school system. In terms of quality, quantity, and cost of service (fees are based on the size of customers' property), RECs were rated highly by users. The project's success has shown that: (1) income and ability to utilize electricity are interrelated; (2) accurate forecasting in RE projects is difficult; (3) RE can be financially risky until a certain degree of growth occurs in a project area; (4) supportive government policies and funding of educational programs to motivate participation contribute to REC success; (5) RE's impact on agroindustry can be partially predicted based on existing patterns of productive activities; (6) where RE costs can be minimized and the rural poor are concentrated, electricity can become the favored type of household energy, although firewood stoves may still be preferred for cooking; (7) RE alone does not affect rural-urban migration, but combined with other interventions it enhances rural life and stems migration. Descriptions of the RECs, RE clients, RE's value and use, the role of RE in migration, household survey methodology, and a 65-item English and Spanish bibliography (1965-80) are appended.

Power to the people: rural electrification sector, summary report

PN-AAL-027

Wasserman, Gary; Davenport, Alice

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)

Dec 1983, ix, 37p. + 6 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 11

WID copy classified at 621.393.W322

Results of studies of the impact of rural electrification (RE) programs in Bolivia, Costa

Rica, Ecuador, and the Philippines are summarized. Conclusions are as follows: (1) Programs helped the poor—who valued the programs and comprised a notable percentage of the beneficiaries—to electrify their homes, although their ability to use electricity productively was limited. (2) Public usage was primarily for lighting, e.g., in streets and public squares; further public usage would require explicit linkage of RE to strong, ongoing social service programs. (3) Economic impact was generally proportionate to level of development. Direct impact on agriculture was limited to large and fairly sophisticated operations, although there was a strong indirect impact on farm service industries such as equipment repair and crop processing. Impact on commerce and industry was greatest in relatively developed areas; complementary interventions such as credit and roads would be needed for there to be an impact in less developed rural areas. (4) The success of RE cooperatives depended on political traditions and support of the central government. Decisions on the type of organization (public, private, or cooperative) to manage electrical systems should be made in light of these findings and not in view of social participation, on which cooperatives had little impact. (5) Heavy government subsidies were the most common of the many methods used to achieve financial viability. Rate schedules were generally progressive and seldom reflected the true costs of service to rural areas, rapid expansion to which may actually endanger financial viability. U.S. technical standards may be unsuitable and too costly for low Third World consumption levels. Policy implications are that A.I.D. should: view RE as part of the energy sector and not as an end in itself; obtain clear notions of all costs and benefits (financial, social, political); in view of shrinking budgets, target interventions to its areas of strength; link programs to other development efforts in poorer areas, while realizing that the poorer the area, the less likely it is that RE will enhance development. A 4-page bibliography (1965-81) and several substantive annexes are included.

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appropriate technology which is cost-effective and easily maintained; (2) increase donor collaboration; (3) improve the manpower, administration, and commitment of host governments to national water programs; and (4) increase community participation and education related to local water projects. The author especially recommends a shift in emphasis from the planning of individual projects to a national or sector approach in which institutional building activities as well as hardware are funded. A list of practical steps to achieving these policy shifts is presented. A 14-item bibliography (1975-78) and an appendix on problem dimensions are attached.

Kenya rural water supply: programs, progress, prospects

PN-AAH-724

Dworkin, Daniel M.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

1980, 45p., Eng.

*A.I.D. Project impact evaluation report, no. 5
6150166*

Despite high levels of investment, Kenya's 10-year old water supply program has been unable to build successful water supply systems in rural areas; even as new systems are built, the number of inoperative systems increases. This paper evaluates the impact of the national program and the reasons behind its failure and makes policy recommendations for future A.I.D. water supply projects. The two types of activities supported by Kenya's Ministry of Water Development (MWD)—systems built and operated by MWD and self-help (Harambee) water projects—are discussed. Of special interest is a Harambee program financed by A.I.D. and the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) which succeeded in building only 1/3 of its scheduled projects, with increases in per capita costs of over 100%. Complexity of design, lack of supervision and government support, widely scattered site locations, and the large number of scheduled users were among the problems responsible for these and other MWD project failures. The MWD program's impact is analyzed in terms of reliability, service to users, and socioeconomic, health, and other benefits of rural water supply. The author's main conclusion is that delivering

pipled water to individual metered connections is inappropriate for rural Kenya due to the lack of engineers, high capital costs, inadequate operational/maintenance funding, and ineffective administration. Specific recommendations are: (1) that groundwater resources be developed and that use of improved shallow wells and handpumps be encouraged; (2) that new projects demand only as much institutional support as is available, while upgrading support capabilities; (3) that additional funding sources for the program be located; (4) that increased system reliability become a primary A.I.D. focus; (5) that health and sanitation measures be included only if existing community practices are deemed inadequate; and (6) that A.I.D. finance self-help projects on a regional or national, rather than a piecemeal, basis. Appendices are included on major donors to the Kenyan program, reasons for diesel system unreliability, water development expenditures, evaluation itinerary, and data collected on selected systems.

Potable water project in rural Thailand

PN-AAH-850

Dworkin, Daniel M.; Pillsbury, B.L.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

1980, iv, 14p. + 10 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 3
4930186*

The greatest impact of the Potable Water Project in Thailand was not health-related, but occurred in the form of economic benefits such as increased gardening, livestock raising, and crafts production. This surprising conclusion is a primary finding of this project evaluation. Some 250 water systems were constructed under this project, with an additional 550 systems built later by the Thai government. An estimated 17% of the rural population is now served by piped potable water as compared to only 3% prior to the project. Most of these water systems are not only still operating, but also financially self-sufficient, with users paying full costs of maintenance and operation. With only a few exceptions, operators appear competent and motivated, and have received consistent supervision from the Rural Water Supply Section of the Thai Ministry of Public Health. The economic, social,

environmental, and health impacts of the project are evaluated. Although lack of initial baseline and village-specific health data prohibit confirmation of claims that health has improved, the convenience of direct, reliable water delivery close to villagers' homes has resulted in considerable time savings and increased water use, both of which have contributed to the above mentioned economic benefits. At first, almost all socioeconomic groups benefited equally from public-tap access. But as revenues lagged, metered private connections had to be installed to finance systems' operations—effectively cutting off the poorer villagers from service. The success of the water systems were found to have resulted from initial community contribution of time, labor, and funds; training and subsequent support for local operators; and the evolution of viable rate structures for delivery of water to rural households. It is recommended that piped water projects be considered and planned not just for health gains, but for their economic benefits as well. Other recommendations, some generally applicable to A.I.D. projects, others specific to water projects, are included.

Rural water projects in Tanzania: technical, social, and administrative issues

PN-AAH-974

Dworkin, Daniel M.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

1980, 31p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 3

A survey was conducted of 20 Tanzanian villages in which A.I.D. had installed water systems using the four major technologies available for dry, wet, and mixed regions. Villages visited represented regions with different natural water resources. Three major results from this survey are presented in this report. On the technological level, it was found that of the types of water systems surveyed—those driven by diesel engines, gravity, windmill/diesel, and shallow well handpumps—handpumps represented the most appropriate technology due to their greater reliability and lower capital and operating costs. Shallow wells were also labor-intensive and the use of local construction and maintenance materials increased employment. A lesson learned was that a number of diesel and windmill/diesel

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systems did not function due to a lack of funds for fuel and parts. It was also found that most users were willing to pay operational costs if the systems were perceived as equitable and useful. Finally, on the administrative level, it was found that some donors set up separate parallel organizations with offices isolated from the office of the Regional Water Engineer who will eventually be responsible for the project. Without close coordination, successful continuation of the project is uncertain. Three recommendations were made: (1) A.I.D. should specify the use of shallow wells with handpumps for village water projects in Tanzania. (2) Users should pay for the system's operating and maintenance costs and be involved in the water supply decision. In addition, rural water projects should incorporate a method to assess users and to collect funds to cover operating and maintenance costs. (3) Project planners should ensure that the activities of the Regional Water Engineer are integrated with donor initiatives. This can be accomplished by training counterpart personnel, conducting periodic reviews to prevent duplication, and adopting or adapting the methods of donor projects into the regional program. Appendices on field studies, bilateral assistance, and technical requirements for A.I.D. potable water projects are included.

Water supply and diarrhea: Guatemala revisited

PN-AAJ-007

Dworkin, Daniel M.; Dworkin, Judith
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 49p., Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 2

Evidence indicates that improved water supplies in rural communities reduce the incidence of diarrhea. To demonstrate this phenomenon, two communities in Guatemala, Florida Aceituna and Guanagazapa, were selected for study due to their similar population, environment, and health characteristics. The former, which obtained water from shallow wells and rivers, served as a control to establish a norm for diarrheal incidence without project assistance. The latter was provided with a piped chlorinated supply system. Data from both communities were analyzed independently. Halfway through the project, a program to alter sanitary behavior and encourage latrine con-

struction was instituted in Guanagazapa, allowing changes in diarrheal incidence to be ascribed either to water alone or to both water and the new program. The mean amount used per person over the project was 26 liters daily for each person in Florida Aceituna and 68.4 liters in Guanagazapa. Eighty percent washed their clothes and bathed at home in Guanagazapa compared to less than 1/3 who did laundry and 1/5 who bathed in the control village. Guanagazapa showed a significant improvement in sanitary awareness over the project period and 79 new latrines were installed. Latrines continued to be built at a rate of two per month following the project. Almost no construction occurred in the control village. Data suggest that water alone was a sufficient condition to reduce diarrheal rates. Diarrhea declined substantially among the 1-45 age group in Guanagazapa, with children 1-7 benefiting the most. The health program and the increased use of latrines did not appear to decrease diarrhea notably. Data also indicate that water quantity rather than quality was responsible for improved health—the amount of water used at home was three times greater in the experimental than in the control village. Water quality, however, while good at the tap, deteriorated in the transfer to domestic containers. Analyses determined that half of the samples from domestic containers had fecal coliform bacteria and three quarters had some coliform bacteria. Three appendices and a 17-item bibliography (1948-79) are appended.

Korean potable water system project: lessons from experience

PN-AAJ-170

Chetwynd, Eric J., Jr.; Dworkin, Daniel M.; Kim, S. U.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1981, 69p., Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 20
4890251

To address the potable water needs of semiurban communities (population 5,000-10,000) overlooked by rural and urban development projects, A.I.D. joined CARE in 1977 to sponsor a piped water system (PWS) project for 6 South Korean communities. This report, based on interviews with PWS operators and users, evaluates the project's impact and lessons for the future.

The project was generally unsuccessful, failing to achieve any of its objectives completely. Only four of six targeted PWSs were fully operational by the project completion date (1979) and two of these were technically deficient, failing to treat water sufficiently or to locate adequate water sources. In addition, only one village committee had been formed to operate their PWS system; the public education program was poorly conceived and managed; a lack of baseline data made it impossible to measure the project's impact on community health; and a user requirement to pay for connections and meters put the system beyond the reach of many poor households. There was also an indirect negative effect: runoff from flush toilets (the installation of which the project facilitated) created a potential for transmitting waterborne diseases. The project's major shortcoming, however, was that its design lacked any features allowing it to be replicated nationally or even regionally. On the positive side, the project did save time and make life easier for users, especially women. Chief lessons learned and accepted by the Government of Korea were that PWS project priority need not necessarily go to the poorest towns since these often experience shrinking populations and prefer traditional water sources; PWSs should be accessible to the poor but without subsidization; project design should entail a regional or national focus to serve as a model; and environmental assessments should accompany all PWSs. Using identical data but focusing on the piped-water supply throughout all of Korea, an attached second evaluation recommends, among other things, servicing urban industrial and polluted rural areas before those with traditional, but sanitary water supplies. Other recommendations are included in the appendices.

Peru: CARE OPG water health services project

PN-AAJ-176

Haratani, Joseph; Viveros-Long, Ana M.; De Gonzales, A.M.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1981, 52p., Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 24
5270177

Where piped water is a local priority, A.I.D. should be willing to authorize projects aimed solely at improving the accessibility, quantity,

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and quality of water to the exclusion of other health interventions. This and other lessons found in this report were learned in an AID-funded CARE project to provide piped water, vaccinations, health education, and sewers in Peru's Ancash Department. For a \$20 fee and less than 15 cents per month, 2,600 households in the smallest villages received piped water from 29 gravity-fed water systems which supplied 60 liters of potable water per day. The impact was pronounced. Not only did use of piped water for drinking, cooking, and bathing increase, women were relieved of the burden of spending 3 hours each day collecting water and so had more time for productive activities such as weaving. Unexpectedly, women also made inroads into the male-dominated social structure by participating in the village juntas which conducted many project activities. Because the project produced lasting tangible benefits, villagers' predisposition to community action was stimulated. On the other hand, the vaccination program was cancelled; there was no indication that health education improved health, and, because of higher installation costs and fewer perceived benefits, only five sewer systems were built. The project also showed that: (1) development projects often upset the status quo and cause conflict among implementers; (2) private voluntary organizations can be a valuable resource in specialized projects; (3) when a project's purpose is to provide drinking water, perfunctory evaluations attempting to attribute health impacts to the project should not be conducted; (4) since imported materials often become a limiting factor, use of local construction materials, even when more expensive, should be encouraged to enhance a project's sustainability and to support local industry; and (5) where voluntary participation in community projects is traditional, food for work can be counterproductive. The evaluation methodology and persons contacted; the project budget, design, and chronology; water system diagrams and statistics; and recommendations for the Government of Peru are appended.

Tunisia: CARE water projects

PN-AAJ-207

Bigelow, Ross Edgar; Chiles, Lisa; et. al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 59p., Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 10
6640286; 6640288; 6640298; 6640299

Some 100,000 Tunisians living in dispersed rural settlements are using wells and springs that have been improved with U.S. assistance. This report evaluates a series of projects conducted by Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), with partial funding by A.I.D. and assistance from the Peace Corps, in which 600 existing Tunisian water sources were renovated. According to the report's project implementation section, the projects involved little local participation. To control water contamination, the springs and wells were enclosed with relatively low-cost technology requiring little maintenance. Subsequent sections describe the projects' impact on availability and use of potable water, health and quality of life, beneficiary participation, and local institutions. On the basis of Tunisian records and standards, about 75% of the project sites were not producing potable water. Only 50% of the project sites visited were fully operational and adequately protected from surface contamination. No relationship between the CARE water projects and a change in the incidence of water-related disease could be determined. A negative impact on health may have occurred where users discontinued their own disinfection practices thinking the water was safe when in fact it may have been contaminated because project-provided treatment had ceased. Although most local disinfection and health education teams established under these projects are still in existence, they have not generally been effective. Included among the lessons are: (1) future AID-supported water projects should concentrate on increased water quantity, dependability, and accessibility; (2) project design should reflect demonstrated community need rather than prepackaged donor solutions; and (3) U.N. water quality standards will have to be scaled down if ambitious potable water goals are to be met during the Drinking Water Decade (1981-90). The authors recommend that A.I.D. work with the Tunisian government to agree on a long-term public health strategy, experiment with alternative potable water technologies, and evaluate projects in a collaborative fashion. Various project-specific appendices are included.

Panama: rural water

PN-AAJ-609

Meehan, Robert; Viveros-Long, Ana M.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

May 1982, viii, 16p. + 9 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 32
5250170; 5250181

From 1972-1981, A.I.D. assisted Panama's Department of Environmental Health (DEH) in a program to provide 500 piped water systems and 1,300 handpumps to small villages. The program was planned to enlist community participation and commitment to operate and maintain the systems. By 1980, 562 water systems had been completed; 26 were selected at random for this evaluation. Sixteen of the systems had good operation records, with effective management, adequate maintenance, and regular fee collection. The other 10 were experiencing serious problems, although communities with strong local organizations should resolve their problems within a year. Individuals trained to operate and maintain the system and handle simple repairs were found in all the villages. Monthly household charges ranged from 25 cents for gravity systems to \$3 for diesel-powered systems. Few villages had difficulty covering operating costs. Piped water, access to which water was almost universal in the villages visited, was of good quality; was used for drinking, cooking, bathing, and cleaning; and relieved women and girls of the time-consuming duty of gathering water. In an unintended effect, the systems helped stem rural-urban migration and were clandestinely used to water vegetable gardens and small livestock. Participation in building and maintaining the systems promoted community initiative and self-reliance. At the macro-level, the water systems helped reduce rural infant mortality and diarrhea. A survey of handpumps in 8 adjacent villages confirmed DEH estimates that non-use of handpumps is widespread. The problem is the failure to require community commitment to operate and maintain the pumps and the impossibility of repairing the pumps locally. Reasons for the project's success included DEH's effective administration and prior experience, use of simple and reliable technology, community participation, adequate water resources, and moderately high rural per capita income. But, there is a potential for problems due to DEH budget cuts, rising energy costs, and growing improper use of piped water.

5.0 Infrastructure

Community water supply in developing countries: lessons from experience; evaluation summaries and conference findings

PN-AAJ-624

Dworkin, Daniel M.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*(Conference on Community Water Supply,
Marriottsville, MD, US, 24-28 Jan 1982)*

Sep 1982, x, 82p. + 3 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 7

Related document: PN-AAV-122

Because efforts to improve rural water supplies in developing countries have faced increasing criticism and declining donor interest in recent years, A.I.D. in 1979 began a 3-year effort to analyze its experience with community water supply projects. From 1979-1982, 15 projects funded by A.I.D. and other donors in Kenya, Korea, Panama, Peru, Tanzania, Thailand, and Tunisia were evaluated in terms of the water systems' reliability, benefits, and accessibility (i.e., equity). Proceedings and recommendations of a 1982 conference held to discuss the results of these evaluations, which were conducted to field test the relevance of the following hypothetical attributes of successful water projects: host country and community commitment; realistic national goals; financially sound support institutions; coordination of donor support with all project needs; appropriate technology; the presence of comple-

mentary health, education, and sanitation activities; and increased availability of clean water. In general, the evaluations found the hypotheses to be verified; in-depth discussions of each point are presented. The participants went on to recommend that: (1) A.I.D. use both Health and Food and Nutrition Account funds for water projects; (2) the issue of water quality be addressed within a project's socioeconomic setting; (3) community interest be gauged early on and projects be designed to be locally self-supporting; (4) strong financial and technical institutions be developed to oversee system construction and maintenance; (5) related training needs be adequately addressed; and (6) special sanitation and education components not be included automatically but on the basis of local need and demand. Lists of the conference participants and evaluation team members are appended.

6.0 Private Sector Development

6.1 GENERAL

Social impact of agribusiness: a case study of ALCOSA in Guatemala

PN-AAJ-172

Kusterer, Kenneth G.; Estrada De Batres, M.R.; Cuxil, J.X.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

1981, 103p., Eng.

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 4
5960097; 5960068*

ALCOSA, a large agribusiness in Guatemala was evaluated favorably by A.I.D. in 1977, but subsequently criticized by others as having unexpected negative social impacts. This review attempts to resolve this ambiguity. ALCOSA's growth, operations, and its impacts—at the company processing plant and its three cauliflower-producing highland towns—are discussed. By 1980, due to organizational and technical problems, ALCOSA was facing an operating crisis. Vegetable purchasing had outstripped the company's capacity to control and administer it, leading to a breakdown in field organization, temporary suspension of purchases, and losses for 300 to 400 of the 2,000 small farmers involved. In addition, field employees had defrauded farmers, sometimes for long periods before being detected and dismissed by management. In one town, ALCOSA's close relationship with its Ladino subcontractor worsened already strong Ladino-Cakchiquel (Indian) tensions. The company is taking steps to resolve these problems. There

have, however, been several positive effects, including at the village level: increased use of credit and investment in farm equipment; much new agricultural know-how; improved living standards; and a shift from cultivating a variety of vegetables to concentration on cauliflower and broccoli and a related appreciation of the efficiency of marketing large quantities of produce to a commercial purchaser as opposed to small time-consuming local sales. In many cases, participation in the ALCOSA program has enabled the poorest farmers to increase their incomes and to remain independent family farmers. In one village, Santiago, women participate more fully in agricultural production, almost as equal partners with their husbands. Here, ALCOSA's impact has been most positive, perhaps because the residents have used the company as a resource for planned community development, and because ALCOSA works through a cooperative, avoiding the tensions existing elsewhere. At the ALCOSA plant, where almost all employees are women, wages are high, permitting workers either a new economic freedom or a great increase in family standard of living; 95% of employees report high satisfaction with their jobs, pay, and lives as workers.

Economic development of Korea: sui generis or generic?

PN-AAJ-177

Steinberg, David I.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Jan 1982, iv, 50p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 6

Korea's phenomenal economic growth since 1963 is the subject of an eight-volume study prepared by the Korea Development Institute (KDI)

and Harvard Institute for Economic Development. The study findings (seven volumes have been published to date) are herein reviewed in an analysis focusing on the replicability of the Korean experience and on the extent to which A.I.D. assistance has contributed to Korean success. In chapters covering, in turn: historical and cultural factors in Korean development; rural development; trade, industry, and finance; entrepreneurship; foreign aid; education; population, urbanization, and health; and income distribution, the author shows that Korea cannot be considered a model for other developing countries, partly because of its unique culture and history (which have both positively and negatively influenced development) and partly because development has occurred in a way and a setting that directly contradict current A.I.D. priorities: e.g., economic growth resulted from intensive export promotion benefiting urban dwellers rather than the rural poor; Korea remains a highly centralized, non-participatory society; private enterprise is weak and cooperatives, labor unions, and commercial banks are government-controlled; women's status is low; neither income distribution nor public health have been primary goals of the Korean Government; and education, while open to society as a whole, in practice serves to reconfer prestige on an established elite. U.S. assistance, the author concludes, has been of only peripheral value in Korea's development, having been more effective at the project than the policy level; P.L. 480 aid has in fact inadvertently deterred grain pricing reforms. The training abroad of Koreans has perhaps been the most significant U.S. contribution. Several recommendations are made regarding future priorities for A.I.D. assistance in Korea, and the implications of the Korean experience for A.I.D. development strategies are drawn. Regarding the KDI-Harvard study itself, the author finds it an important analysis, but limited by its sole focus on economic development and its neglect of such critical factors as competition with North Korea, world market conditions, and the role of the military.

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Turning private voluntary organizations into development agencies: questions for evaluation

PN-AAJ-612

Tendler, Judith

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Management
Services. Office of Program and Management
Support (Sponsor)*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Apr 1982, vii, 151p. + 3 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 12*

To improve the analytic quality and policy relevance of A.I.D.'s evaluation of projects carried out by private voluntary organizations (PVOs), this report, based on a review of 75 such evaluations (conducted by A.I.D., third party contractors, and PVOs themselves), discusses key issues in PVO project evaluation. To help evaluators move beyond the rhetoric which PVOs generally use to distinguish their approach from that of large donors (e.g., that it is participatory, targets the poor, and is innovative), the author probes, often by way of questions left unanswered, the features of PVO projects and finds them paradoxical. Participation, for example, often signifies decentralized decisionmaking by local elites, a feature which may or may not benefit the poor (examples are provided) or may benefit them only through the trickle down effect criticized by PVOs themselves. Discussion is given to three aspects of PVO projects which make the poor seem more unreachable than they actually are: the PVO turns from relief to income-earning efforts and from small to large projects and PVO neglect of women's issues. Although PVOs contrast themselves with the public sector, their efforts partly depend on their various types of relations with host country governments (complementarity, competition, replication, filling in "unoccupied territory", takeover by the government, and brokering between government entities and the poor). Evaluators of PVO efforts must determine which relations are operative, whether project success was due to PVO efforts, and instances of impact (e.g., when a PVO project serves as first stage of an effort later amplified by the government). Although PVOs claim to be innovative,

many of their projects fall below the state-of-the-art. The innovativeness of PVO small-business credit projects is examined in detail. A discussion of deficiencies in evaluations of PVO projects concludes by noting that evaluations should determine how decisionmaking is being done, who benefits from the project, and what is successful or not, including unanticipated successes. Key elements to be considered in determining project success are project type, time or place of implementation, and the PVO-government relationship. Appendices include extensive suggestions to evaluators and a 178-item bibliography (1966-82).

Private sector: ideas and opportunities; a review of basic concepts and selected experience

PN-AAJ-618

Hageboeck, Molly; Allen, Mary B.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Jun 1982, v.p., Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 14*

In response to the U.S. government's emphasis on private sector initiatives in the development process, A.I.D.'s Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination has been investigating both A.I.D. and non-A.I.D. efforts to foster private enterprise as a means of increasing the resource base and momentum of development. This paper presents preliminary findings of these studies. The first section, written from the entrepreneur's perspective, examines market processes and other key factors influencing the growth of private enterprise in developing countries. Market size, specialization, and participants are considered as is the relationship between market size and enterprise size. Among the other factors discussed are political systems and practices, governmental policy interventions, infrastructure, financial systems, sociocultural practices, and the availability of capital, business expertise, and technology. In Section II, the authors examine the effectiveness, and so far as possible, costs of specific approaches to fostering private enterprise. These approaches have tended to take two forms: policy reforms and specific programs/projects to directly assist private enterprise, the latter including feasibility

studies, promotion of business ventures through the conference approach, business clearinghouses, trade fairs, management training, technology transfer, the development of infrastructure and financial systems, and capital assistance. The final section examines several private sector ventures which have had visible development benefits as a basis for identifying ways for A.I.D. to assess the impacts of existing and future programs. The authors find that tools are needed for evaluating both the impact of many private enterprises on the economy as a whole and the impact of a single firm on its immediate environment. The authors conclude that (1) market mechanisms, when allowed to operate freely, will provide incentives to which the private sector will respond and (2) relatively small public sector investments can effectively stimulate private sector development resources. An 8-page bibliography, and lists of pertinent A.I.D. projects, case studies, and evaluation publications are appended.

Private sector, public sector, and donor assistance in economic development: an interpretive essay

PN-AAL-007

Wolgin, Jerome M.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Mar 1983, 52p. + attachment, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 16*

To provide A.I.D. with a view of how host country policies, coupled with donor actions, have fostered vital private enterprise economies in developing countries, a study, herein presented, was made of the development history of four countries which have dramatically raised their peoples' standard of living in the last 20 years—Malawi, Cameroon, Thailand, and Costa Rica. After briefly reviewing the structural changes in the economies of the four countries, the study profiles their private sectors, noting the types of enterprises present and the linkages between them. Next, the role of markets in development and the limitations of purely market-oriented strategies are discussed and reasons for government interventions in markets listed. Finally, each country's political economy and role in the world economy is outlined. The study concludes

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that a free and competitive private sector is efficient in allocating resources and that public policies and donor interventions can, if wisely targeted, have a beneficial effect on such enterprises. Donors are encouraged—with some caveats—to help developing country governments facilitate the expression of creative energies within the private sector. Twenty-four case studies illustrate the report's arguments.

Free zones in developing countries: expanding opportunities for the private sector

PN-AAL-024

Sahre Foundation

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)

Nov 1983, 21p. + 7 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 18

Developing countries are increasingly using free zones—geographic areas offering tariff, tax, and/or regulatory relief to businesses in their area—to stimulate the private sector. This report examines existing data on a limited number of free zones, including free trade, export processing, enterprise, and free banking zones, as well as free ports and the Mexican maquiladoras, and the factors conducive to their success or lack of it. Positively, free zones can make a major contribution to the rise of modern, export-oriented, industries by increasing employment, foreign exchange earnings, rates of return, and technology transfer, and have served in some countries (e.g., China) as proving grounds for economic reform. On the other hand, many zones have failed to stimulate economic activity due to lack of a stable investment climate, unreliable general infrastructure and service delivery, and user-insensitive zone management. Even in successful zones, linkages to the surrounding economy are often lacking. Further, since zones seem most successful at the beginning of a country's move away from import substitution, they may in time become less effective as magnets for foreign investment. Finally, changing global economic conditions may soon make traditional zone development strategies obsolete. Several recommendations are included. Appended are case studies, lists of free zones, tables on wages

for export processing workers in selected countries, and a list of incentives available in export processing zones.

Comparative analysis of policies and other factors which affect the role of the private sector in economic development

PN-AAL-031

Dunlop, David W.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Dec 1983, xi, 80p. + attachment, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 20

How can governments foster the private sector? To help answer this question, six countries—Malawi, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Thailand, the Dominican Republic, and Sri Lanka—are herein compared in terms of economic development, international trade, economic policy and political economy, trends in mobilization and allocation of capital and human capital, and allied issues such as the development of entrepreneurial skills and the role of small businesses. Although all of the governments professed to support the private sector, actual interventions varied. Positive actions included investing in infrastructures which are complementary to private production processes, contributing to the supply of savings and channeling donor assistance (preferably on concessionary terms), and improving the country's human capital, although it is probably wise for governments to focus on general education rather than on specific occupational requirements. Pragmatic leadership—requiring public entities to perform without subsidies or special assistance—is also important, especially in countries where resources are meager and private investors few. On the other hand, governments should not try to control or regulate prices, establish quotas, or otherwise alter free-market functions to help finance social welfare programs; if they do, large-scale problems can quickly emerge, as Costa Rica and Sri Lanka have learned. This is especially true in regard to agriculture-marketing boards, established to stabilize prices for small producers, have in fact been used for taxation purposes, resulting in reduced output and a worsened economic situation. Finally, except where there are clear economies of scale and the potential for a natural mo-

nopoly, as in public utilities, governments should probably not own companies or producing units. Parastatals' lack of the discipline of the marketplace can lead to disastrous long-term implications, as a number of African countries have already witnessed.

Review of A.I.D.'s experience in private sector development

PN-AAL-049

Bremer, Jennifer; Cole, Elizabeth; et al.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)

Apr 1985, xiv, 132p. + 5 appendices: statistical
tables, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 14

A.I.D.'s experience since 1981 in implementing the Private Sector Development Initiative (PSDI) is synthesized in this report. After brief reviews of the background and methodology of the study and of PSDI itself, the report provides a conceptual framework for interpreting A.I.D.'s experience in programming PS projects by identifying the distinct features and requirements of PS-led development (firms, markets, international investment, constraints) and the major parameters that shaped A.I.D. programming (resources, limitations). Detailed discussion is then given to A.I.D. and other donor experience in the four key areas of PSDI—policy reform, project assistance to private enterprise, project assistance through private organizations, and mobilizing the Third World's PS for development. A final section assesses implications of the study for future A.I.D. programming in this area. The following are the key findings.

1. Increased emphasis on host government policy reform can further the development of competitive markets and private enterprises.
2. Only 17% of A.I.D.'s FY 1982–84 development assistance budgets was targeted for PS development projects.
3. There are in the Third World both advantages to using PS delivery systems and a large, barely tapped potential for doing so, although public sector involvement is often necessary, either as a direct provider or as a regulator.
4. A.I.D.'s current institutional strengths suggest expanding PS programming in agricultural production and services, agro-industry, small

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and medium enterprises, and housing and social services (but not via direct lending to or direct equity investment in individual Third World firms, or support of U.S. private organizations).

The report's fundamental suggestion is that A.I.D. continue its approach of balancing private and public initiatives and seek to increase awareness of possibilities for PS development in all Agency activities. Detailed recommendations for specific A.I.D. practices and related studies are included. Appended are descriptions of other-donor PS programs, a synthesis of A.I.D. Special Studies on PS development, and a bibliography of relevant publications.

Private sector: the tortoise walk: public policy and private activity in the economic development of Cameroon

PN-AAL-004

Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore; Roush, James L.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*March 1983, xvi, 55p. + 10 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 10*

Cameroon's economic performance over the past 20 years, unlike that of most developing countries, has been remarkably good. To help determine the reasons for this success, this paper examines the effects of public policies on private sector development in Cameroon. Initial sections describe Cameroon's demography and its history and review political and economic development since the country gained independence in 1961. Next, the principles underlying Cameroon's public policies—national unity, political and social order, a mixed degree of government control of the economy, and a slow and cautious approach to economic development—are outlined. Specific government policies and their economic effects are then detailed. External policies are described as being nonrestrictive in regard to international payments and currency exchange, but overly restrictive in regard to commerce, especially exports. Internal economic policies regarding agriculture, finance, and industry are shown to combine direct intervention with a laissez-faire approach. Thus, the government limits its use of price controls and refrains from manipulating

food crop production, but has controlled interest rates and promoted import substitution at the expense of local entrepreneurs. A review of the role of U.S. and other donor assistance to the private sector shows foreign aid to be an important source of import capacity, although increasingly overshadowed by oil revenues. It is recommended that future U.S. aid specifically support economic policies oriented toward growth. A detailed case study of one of Cameroon's parastatals, the Corporation for the Development of Cotton, is then presented, and the Corporation's success in providing economic opportunities to small farmers without destroying their economic incentives noted. The study concludes that, while the effects of public policies on private development in Cameroon have been mixed, Cameroon's experience demonstrates the viability of a gradual, cautious approach to economic change. More detailed discussions of select items and a 6-page bibliography citing works in French and English (1954–82) are among the appendices.

Costa Rica private sector study

FN-AAL-005

*Pratt, Robert G.; Adamczyk, Christine; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Asia*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Mar 1983, xv, 58p. + 6 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 9*

*Availability note: Document contains
oversize pages available only in microfiche*

Although a development strategy stressing industrialization based on import substitution and participation in the Central American Common Market (CACM) has helped Costa Rica achieve growth with equity since 1960, the country is now in a severe economic crisis. Key factors endemic to the crisis are identified in this report on the effect of public policies and supporting donor interventions on Costa Rica's recent economic and social history, with special reference to the private sector. It is found that the success of the industrialization strategy, which was due almost entirely to external opportunities, was accompanied by: (1) dependence on the export of a few traditional commodities, prices for which have recently fallen; (2) policies fostering the establishment of capital-intensive and inefficient industries to the relative neglect of agriculture; (3) the near ex-

haustion of import substitution opportunities; (4) heavy reliance on borrowed, often foreign, investment capital; (5) a policy bias against exports; and (6) the failure of the nationalized banking system to attract internal savings and provide adequate financial intermediation. On the social level, substantial progress has been made in such areas as education and health, but at the cost of a large and inefficient bureaucracy in which ever more resources are allocated to pay public employees, with decreased public benefit. Further, the progressively unsustainable cost of social programs has led to increased external borrowing and a huge and unmanageable foreign debt. It is concluded that: (1) public policies, while fostering economic and social progress, failed to prepare for or adjust to adverse external conditions during 1978–82; (2) donor support, despite major positive contributions, had little effect on these policies; and (3) the private sector, especially the key industries of food processing and apparel, reacted predictably to market and public sector signals throughout the period. Lessons taught by the Costa Rican experience are summarized and private sector needs and constraints for the period of recovery spelled out. Appendices include several statistical tables and an analysis of the impact of the CACM on Costa Rica.

Private sector and the economic development of Malawi

PN-AAL-006

*Wolgin, Jerome M.; Clapp-Wincek, Cynthia; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Mar 1983, xiii, 46p. + 5 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 11*

Malawi's economic progress since independence in 1964 has been unusually rapid. The private nonagricultural economy has developed, despite a lack of indigenous entrepreneurs; per capita GDP has grown at an annual rate of 2.9%; the government has shifted from a net dissaver to a net saver; employment in the wage sector has increased over 150%; and manufacturing output has almost doubled. Fundamental to this progress, according to this evaluation of the private sector's role in Malawi's economic development, was the government's market-oriented economic policy framework, which permitted development of private enterprise with minimal governmental interference. Three partly private and partly public

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holding companies were developed, which gradually gained control over much of the private economy, while management remained generally in the hands of the expatriate firms. An Investment Development Bank guided by expatriate personnel mobilized capital and acted as both lender and investor in new enterprises. The years 1977-81, when management was subjected to increased political influence leading to bad economic decisions, brought a downturn in the economy which was worsened by the international recession. In the past 2 years a return has been made to less politicized management; the policy of easy credit is being revised and reorganization of the public holding companies is underway. The main lesson learned from Malawi's experience is that public policies supportive of market-oriented growth are a major determinant of economic progress. A constructive approach includes: (1) reliance on market forces to determine the allocation and use of resources; (2) the ability to mobilize capital (especially foreign aid); (3) a pragmatic approach to the use of foreign capital and expatriate management personnel; and (4) government efforts to create an operating environment conducive to market development and for-profit business expansion. Political interference in economic affairs will ultimately lead to noneconomically motivated decisions, often obstructing sustained economic growth. Fifteen tables illustrate the text.

Ventures in the informal sector, and how they worked out in Brazil

PN-AAL-009

Tendler, Judith

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance. Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (Sponsor)*

*Mar 1983, xvii, 159p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 12*

Unusually high (92%-98%) repayment rates, a competent and dedicated staff, low overhead, ability to reach firms previously without access to formal credit and to attract public funding, and avoidance of political intervention are some of the strengths which have led many to consider the Northeast Union of Assistance to Small Businesses (UNO), a Brazilian PVO established in Recife in 1973, a model of how to provide credit to small businesses. Surprising weaknesses,

however, such as high operating costs (ranging from 46% to over 100% of loan value), low productivity (especially in light of UNO's use of low-paid student workers), slow growth (reaching only 1% of the client population), inability to attract private sector financial support or become financially independent, and the failure of assisted firms to increase output, create new jobs, or gain access to bank credit cast doubt on the replicability of UNO's program. This study discusses these interrelated strengths and weaknesses in light of UNO's history, operations, and beneficiaries. Many of UNO's weaknesses, it is argued, can be traced to the often forgotten characteristics of the small enterprise sector itself, e.g., that many small businessmen refuse to expand because of the increased managerial burdens involved or that assistance to businesses often results in saving rather than in creating jobs. Further, UNO's weaknesses are often inextricably tied to its strengths. For example, UNO's high costs and its lack of interest in "productive" clients are rooted in the same financial prudence—the decision to focus for the most part on providing established retail firms with modest amounts of working capital for ongoing activities—that has contributed to UNO's survival and good reputation. Although UNO has produced a good organization, its small budget and limited horizons have exempted it to date—contrary to what might have been expected—from a concern for productivity, impact, or program costs. However, a major expansion and diversification under World Bank auspices currently in progress is forcing UNO, perhaps in spite of itself, to expose itself to these disciplines.

Private sector: regulation of rural markets in Africa

PN-AAL-014

Bates, Robert H.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Jun 1983, viii, 42p. + attachments, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 14*

In Africa, government agricultural pricing policies often undermine production incentives. So concludes this study of the forms and effects of government intervention in rural African agricultural markets. The authors first review government regulation of African export crops, including coffee, cocoa, palm oil, cotton, sugar, and bananas. Although privately produced, these

crops are required by law to be sold through state-controlled marketing boards originally designed to stabilize prices for the benefit of farmers. Instead, the boards have heavily taxed export crops in order to finance development of nonfarm sectors, obtain foreign exchange, and pay their own high operating costs. As a result, prices received by farmers for their crops are often less than half of international prices. Many farmers have responded by shifting to production of less heavily taxed crops, and high marketing costs imposed by the boards have played a part in dramatic declines in exports from Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, and the Sudan. Export crop producers are also burdened by the high level of currency overvaluation in many African countries which further undermines production by reducing the value of export earnings. In the second part of the paper, the authors show how African governments regulate domestic food prices. Marketing bureaucracies act to lower food prices but in so doing increase marketing costs and price inefficiency and weaken production incentives. Governments also use trade policies to lower food prices by banning exports, allowing duty-free imports, and maintaining overvalued currencies. The origins of these food pricing policies are traced to the need of governments to satisfy the demands of politically powerful urban food consumers for low-cost food. In a final section, a proposal is presented for reforming the marketing boards which would entail allowing markets to make and retain a limited amount of profits to encourage efficient operation. The boards would be made accountable by including producers and cooperative society members on executive committees.

Private sector: ethnicity, individual initiative, and economic growth in an African plural society: the Bamileke of Cameroon

PN-AAL-016

McFerson, Hazel M.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Jun 1983, xi, 29p. + 5 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 15*

Of the more than 200 ethnic groups in Cameroon, the Bamileke appear to be the most economically successful. Reasons for their success

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are analyzed in this study of traditional Bamileke culture and its adaptation to contemporary economic conditions. Unlike most other African ethnic groups, traditional Bamileke society provided avenues of upward mobility to all, with improved status through hard work and initiative. Emphasis is placed on competition in work, effort, savings, and economic improvement, and on frugality rather than emulative consumption. Individuals are expected to make their own way in the world while retaining a strong ethnic identity and contributing to the group. Traditional Bamileke institutions have adapted to modern economic functions easily. For example, the Mandjong—a traditional title society—play an important role in generating capital through a savings and loan system. Women have always been important economic producers, and modern-day women's societies, derived from earlier associations of the best women cultivators, strongly influence economic development and capital accumulation. The Bamileke spirit of enterprise has also been influenced by land pressures and inheritance patterns. The high population density of the Western Province of Cameroon—the traditional Bamileke home—has led young people to push out into urban areas, where they have found economic success, albeit not without support from others in their group. Similarly, the patrilineal system of inheritance—another divergence from the African tradition—allows inheritances to be used for economic gain, rather than shared with poorer family members. The Bamileke experience demonstrates that group solidarity does not necessarily stifle individual initiative and private enterprise, but can be a positive force in economic development. While the Bamileke success has developed in a policy environment which is non-ideological and pragmatic, with little government intervention, not all ethnic groups have responded to the same stimuli. In a plural society, ethnicity is a vital social issue and must be considered in any strategies of public or private sector development.

Private sector evaluation: the Dominican Republic

PN-AAL-018

Culbertson, Robert E.; Jones, Earl; Corpeno, Roberto

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Dominican Republic (Sponsor)*

*Jun 1983, xviii, 119p. + annexes, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 16*

The single most important element contributing to the growth of the private sector in the Dominican Republic has been the integration, at both program and project levels, of training, technical assistance, and capital assistance. Thus concludes this paper, one of a series of country studies examining A.I.D. assistance to the private sector. After describing historical, geographic, socioeconomic, and public policy factors relevant to private enterprise development in the Dominican Republic, the authors outline the Dominican institutional framework for promoting private sector growth, showing how lenders, training and technical assistance institutions (and organizations that support both credit and training institutions) help to bring about private sector growth as much as do external donors like A.I.D. Case studies of ten lending institutions (four financieras, two commercial banks, and four public sector banks) and of fourteen institutions that serve lenders by providing educational, training, and advisory services to credit recipients are then presented. The authors find that public policy in the Dominican Republic—which has long encouraged the private sector to seek its own solutions—resulted in the private sector's discovery of the central role of training in the capital lending process. Since 1962, the entire private sector effort has been based on the principle that a financial institution must train before lending and an enterprise must be trained before borrowing. Other factors that have abetted private sector growth in the Dominican Republic include: a pervasive spirit of cooperation within the private sector; a high literacy rate and abiding belief in the value of education; and a positive attitude towards foreign assistance. Although the Dominicans have structured and carried out their own private enterprise development program, A.I.D., by being sensitive and responsive to their needs, has made several crucial contributions. Future development of this sector, as programs move to encourage entrepreneurship among lower-income strata, must, however, proceed cautiously, with consideration given to public subsidy of costly lending services.

Capitalizing workers: the impact of employee stock ownership plans in selected developing countries

PN-AAL-033

*Goldmark, Susan G.; Roth, Alan D.; et al.
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Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Jan 1984, xiii, 41p. + annexes, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 19*

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) represent a potential A.I.D. strategy for strengthening the private sector by extending capital ownership to economically disenfranchised groups. Such plans can supplement employee benefits and improve workers' income and retirement security, while providing companies with capital formation, access to new credit sources, tax advantages, and gains in productivity. This study examines two ESOP programs in each of three developing countries—Costa Rica, Thailand, and Zimbabwe—and two, for comparison, in the United States. Also provided are discussions of the theoretical framework behind ESOPs and of different types of plans. All the companies studied were large and financially successful, but their success could not definitely be linked to the presence of ESOPs. All but one were enthusiastic about their ESOPs—the exception being a Zimbabwean company which borrowed money to purchase shares which later declined drastically in price. As none of the developing countries provided tax benefits or other incentives to encourage ESOPs, all the plans were instituted at some cost to the company or to stockholders. Three companies contributed post-tax earnings to purchase newly issued stock for employees; two provided an interest-free loan to a trust for that purpose. Thus the funds flowed back into the company so the main financial cost was the dilution of the value of existing shares. Employees' gains varied considerably: some employees obtained substantial income or retirement security, while others had not yet received any financial benefits. One company gave the employees' trust a controlling interest in the firm and others gave employees increased involvement in personnel management issues. Generally, national and company-specific factors affected the plans' success, precluding generalizations as to their impact. In conclusion,

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the authors recommend an experimental A.I.D. program to promote ESOPs and evaluate their impact. The possible elements of such a program are described. Appendices provide detailed information on the factors behind the adoption of ESOPs and their national—and company—level impacts. A 53-item bibliography (1958–82) is included.

Guanchias Limitada: a case study of an agrarian reform cooperative and its long-term relationship with a multinational firm in Honduras

PN-AAL-046

McCommon, Carolyn M.; Rueschhoff, Nordin G.; et al.

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U.S. Agency for International Development. Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Mar 1985, ix, 33p. + 3 appendices: charts, map, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 22
9300085

Guanchias, Ltd., a Honduran banana-producing cooperative, has since its inception in 1965 achieved remarkable economic growth and effected considerable improvements in the lives of its members—accomplishments due in no small part to its partnership with Standard Fruit and Steamship Company, a U.S.-based multinational agribusiness firm. This study traces the development of Guanchias and of its collaboration with Standard. Guanchias' origins lie in the failure of Honduras' agrarian reform movement to adequately address the problems of landless peasants; the promise of financial security through a guaranteed market for its bananas led the co-op—which had barely survived its first 3 years—to seek participation in Standard's independent growers program. Over the next 15 years, benefiting from exposure to Standard's work ethic and technical and business procedures, Guanchias members learned how to become efficient managers and laborers, how to bargain as an equal with their more sophisticated partner, and how to reinvest capital earnings in productive and socially beneficial member services—potable water, sanitation, housing, health care, and

education. Standard, for its part, received an assured supply of bananas at relatively low cost and low risk in an uncertain environment and enhanced its public image through its involvement with independent growers. The Guanchias-Standard partnership has been criticized as a one-sided relationship in which a paternalistic benefactor takes advantage of contracted labor, but in fact the joint venture has served both parties well and has also been good for economic, human, and institutional development in Honduras. Although it is unclear as to how the relationship will evolve in the future, its strength was great enough to override a challenge to the contract in the early 1980s. Moreover, Guanchias' continued reliance on Standard for materials transfers, extensive credit, and technical assistance suggests mutual acceptance of their interdependency. Implications of the Guanchias-Standard collaboration for Guanchias, the Government of Honduras, and development planners and donors are offered in conclusion.

Private sector development in the Thai seed industry

PN-AAL-047

Brown, Larry; Underwood, Wayne; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development. Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jun 1985, xiv, 20p. + 7 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 23
4930270; 4930326

Factors contributing to the dynamic growth of a modern, private sector seed industry in Thailand over the past 9 years are reviewed. A.I.D.'s 1975 and 1981 seed development loans have been a major factor. Implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture with excellent technical assistance from Mississippi State University, the projects have established six seed centers. While primarily aimed at producing improved rice seed for distribution to disaster victims, the centers' ability to process improved seed of other species and their small size and location in rural areas close to producers and markets enable them to demonstrate and transfer appropriate technology to private seed producers. A major component of the second loan has been creation of—and MSU participation in—a Seed Club composed of representatives of the Thai seed industry's public, private, and education sectors. The timing of the

projects was essential: the first coincided with the development in 1975 of Suwan I, a high-yielding, downy mildew-resistant corn which demonstrated the commercial viability of varietal seed production and provided the catalyst for private sector investment. The development of Suwan I was a crown in the Royal Thai Government's (RTG) extensive varietal research program, dating back to the 1940s, which, together with the RTG's promotion of agricultural development within the context of a free enterprise, market-based economy and its efforts to disseminate information to farmers and investors, develop an agricultural extension service, and increase private sector activity through the Board of Investment, has been a critical factor in the growth of the seed industry. The industry's growth has also been abetted by the Thai university system's contribution of several research breakthroughs and a good supply of trained scientists and technicians; A.I.D. participant training and crop development programs; other donor programs (Rockefeller Foundation, the European Economic Community, Japan); as well as a stable socioeconomic system, and good public infrastructure. Suggestions are made for ways in which the RTG and A.I.D. can continue successful private sector development.

Management education in modern Tunisia: L'Institut Supérieur de Gestion, Tunis

PN-AAL-050

Casstevens, Thomas W.; Johnson, Nancy C.; et al.

U.S. Agency for International Development. Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Apr 1985, viii, 24p. + 6 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 24
6640228

With the help of technical assistance and overseas faculty training from A.I.D., the first graduate school of business administration in North Africa, l'Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG), was founded at the University of Tunis (UT) in 1969. Initially, ISG offered only a 3rd cycle program modeled on the American M.B.A.; at the Government of Tunisia's urging, however, 1st and 2nd cycle (undergraduate) programs were added. ISG's institutional spinoffs are quite impressive.

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A Faculty of Economics and Management was founded in Sfax; its dean is a former ISG dean. Other ISG faculty have joined the Institute of Advanced Commercial Studies and the Faculty of Law, Politics, and Economics; ISG 3rd cycle graduates are now junior faculty at UT. ISG has fostered upward social mobility—its graduates, most of whom are from low-income families and many of whom are women, have little difficulty finding good jobs. On the other hand, ISG's popularity has created a problem, as other institutions have raided not easily replaceable doctoral faculty. Another problem (recently resolved through policy dialogue) was the reluctance of Tunisian officials to accept the American Ph.D. as the equivalent of the French Doctorat d'Etat. Although the goal of 25–40 3rd cycle graduates annually was reduced to 10–12, the addition of 1st and 2nd cycles, which graduate 100 and 150–200 students respectively, has increased the total number of graduates. While A.I.D. may have withdrawn its technical assistance too soon for best results, the project was nevertheless a very successful example of institution building and technology transfer because it was appropriate to Tunisia's needs as a middle-income country with a rapidly growing economy. The project has taught several commonplace, yet important lessons: (1) a project is more likely to succeed if objectively appropriate and subjectively desired by the host country; (2) institution building is a long-term affair; (3) the renewal of cadres is indispensable in the long run; (4) competing demands for trained personnel tend to disperse that scarce resource; (5) a viable institution adapts to its environment and often diverges from its original plans; and (6) a project's spinoffs may be more significant than the project itself.

Ecuador industrial development finance

PN-AAL-051

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U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Jun 1985, x, 47p. + 8 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 25

With the help of A.I.D. seed capital, the public sector Corporacion financiera Compania Nacional (CFN) and the private sector financiera Ecuatoriana de Desarrollo, S.A. (COfiEC)

were established in the mid-1960s to provide long-term financing for industrial development in Ecuador. This study examines the relative success of these two institutions, as well as some of their shortfalls. The study: (1) analyzes the macroeconomic context in which the banks were created and in which they have operated, especially the industrial and financial sectors and the institutional and legal factors affecting them; (2) reviews the banks' development, management and lending procedures, portfolios, and financial performance; and (3) analyzes a representative sample of A.I.D. subloan projects. Together, CFN and COfiEC mobilized about 25% of all the capital invested in medium- and large-scale industry between 1966 and 1982 and contributed to the creation of 45% of the new jobs in the sector during that period. Both have also provided a training ground for financial administrators. CFN has been more demanding in loan evaluation and administration (only about a third of its clients seek repeat loans), but currently maintains a higher-quality loan portfolio. The more growth-oriented COfiEC has maintained higher profitability through higher risk. CFN has focused more heavily in larger and longer term loans, i.e., manufacturing, and has been relatively more active outside of Quito and Guayaquil, the foci of both institutions' efforts; lending by COfiEC outside these cities has been mainly for agriculture in Guaya Province. Among lessons learned are that: both public and private development finance institutions can effectively allocate resources for industrial development, each likely to be more effective in the presence of the other; the availability of resources constrains the term structure of sublending, reflecting the influence of macroeconomic policies on financing supply as well as demand; both institutions are overly dependent on external resources, and as a result have been severely affected by recent devaluations and foreign currency exposure. Subloan and CFN/COfiEC financial data are provided in appendices.

Private Development Corporation of the Philippines

PN-AAL-085

Love, Ray; Theil, Peter A.; Ruppert, Philip W.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Oct 1986, xiv, 25p. + 3 appendices: map, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 46

Based on in-depth interviews, client visits, and financial analysis, this evaluation of the Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) is part of A.I.D.'s reappraisal of its 30 years of experience in private sector initiatives. The PDCP, founded in 1963, was originally capitalized by an A.I.D. loan of P27.5 million. Despite the adverse effects of inflation, devaluation of the peso, and constrictive government regulation of imports and interest rates, by the end of 1982 PDCP had provided assistance to 1,183 projects having a peso value of over P5 billion. This expansion is complemented by the fact that PDCP has retained a trouble-free loan portfolio and has benefited from continuity of management and very good in-house staff training. Problem areas have been in the diversity of the portfolio—originally, loans were made predominantly to large industry, although by 1983 small and medium industries were receiving more attention—and in the geographic distribution of the funds, which still go mostly to the central regions. The local currency supply has been a problem as well, although PDCP's ability to tap the peso resources of the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (a separate institution also established in part with A.I.D. funding) has alleviated the problem somewhat. The establishment of a Central Bank credit line in 1981 also increased the supply of pesos from foreign currency loans for local expenditures. The PDCP experience points up several factors which A.I.D. should heed as it draws up a new private sector development policy. For example, greater attention must be paid to analysis of the financial sector in recipient countries as a prerequisite to A.I.D. investment. Priority should be given to wholesaling rather than retailing financial assistance to the private sector. Finally, training and technical assistance should be part of every A.I.D. attempt to establish or strengthen development finance institutions. Appendices include a statement of PDCP's current business policies and 28 tables of financial statistics.

[Author abstract, modified]

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Development finance institutions: a discussion of donor experience

PN-AAX-240

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*(Meeting of the Expert Group on Evaluation of
the Development Assistance Committee,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, US, Feb 1990)*

Jul 1990, 15p. + attachment, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 31*

Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have for several decades been key instruments of donors aiming to fill long-term credit gaps and channel financial resources to priority groups. A recent review of donor evaluation reports of DFI projects shows, however, that these intermediaries had and may continue to have considerable difficulty achieving these ends. Three particular problems are highlighted.

1. DFI-directed credit programs have encountered serious problems in reaching targeted beneficiaries, especially the informal sector and marginal farmers.
2. The poor financial and management performance of many DFIs has caused some donors to question their sustainability.
3. DFIs have not proven effective in strengthening Third World financial markets due to increasing competition from commercial banks and other long-term credit sources and the restrictive financial policies of many host countries. Moreover, donors have operated at cross purposes by supporting a multiplicity of DFIs aimed at a wide range of economic sectors.

The result has been confusion among sub-borrowers and inefficient use of loan funds. It is recommended that donors:

1. Adopt more coordinated responses to promoting DFIs;
2. Encourage DFIs to lower the administrative cost of loans, charge real positive interest rates, and emphasize credit and financial market development;
3. Reconsider the objective of DFI self-sustainability; and
4. Support policy reforms to increase competition among DFIs.

6.2 SMALL SCALE & MICROENTERPRISES

Assisting small business in Francophone Africa: the Entente Fund African Enterprises program

PN-AAL-002

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Bureau for Africa. Regional Economic
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*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Dec 1982, xix, 30p. + 9 annexes, Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report,
no. 40*

6250715

The Entente Fund's African Enterprises Project is designed to develop a modern entrepreneurial business class in the five member nations of Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta. Reported here are the findings of the first impact evaluation since A.I.D. began funding the project in 1973. A.I.D.'s objectives are to provide, through the Fund, monies and technical assistance to six development banks in order to assist African-owned companies and to encourage development and commercial bank lending to these companies. However, although 572 subloans have been made to date to develop a variety of economic sectors, these objectives have not been achieved. Subloans have been too few (many to large firms) to significantly affect national economies; four of the six banks show excessive subloan delinquency rates; and failure to implement the technical assistance plan has limited the positive achievements of borrowers. Further, the development banks as a whole, as well as the promotion centers and national guaranty funds, have not been effective in assisting small businesses. The banks' ability to extend small credits has not improved and they provide subborrowers little or no technical assistance. Reasons for the program's failure are inadequate management and insufficient resources on the part of the involved institutions, the volatile economic and financial climate in which the program has had to operate, the lack by the En-

tente Fund—a nonfinancial institution—of the approach and discipline needed to manage a high-risk credit program, frequent changeovers in U.S. advisors, and inadequate A.I.D. supervision. The project has taught that: (1) subloan criteria should be well-defined, with emphasis on higher quality subloans yielding real economic returns, including increased employment; (2) implementing institutions should be carefully assessed and A.I.D. staff need credit expertise to monitor them; (3) borrowers should make reasonable financial contributions; (4) implementing institutions and borrowers need meaningful technical assistance; and (5) changes in the financial and economic climate markedly affect the success of a small business loan program. Specific issues are discussed further in nine appendices.

Evaluation of small enterprise programs and projects: issues in business and community development

PN-AAL-013

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*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Jun 1983, vii, 59p. + attachments, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 13

Bibliography: pp.53-59

Current interest in small enterprise development reflects a felt need to understand the 20-30 year heritage of efforts to promote this sector, so that future programs may have optimum effects. Based on a review of literature and field practices, this paper records and analyzes evidence regarding effective small enterprise programs. The author explores, in turn, definitions of the small enterprise sector, the effects of definition on the project design and evaluation process, and the question of project impacts on firms, individuals, and communities. He concludes that research on small enterprise interventions, though limited, suggests that such programs can increase employment and enhance income among the poor, encourage efficient use of capital, and promote integrative linkages throughout the economy. The effects of specific programmatic (e.g., credit provision, the use of financial intermediaries) and external (political, institutional, social, and psychological) factors are considered next. The vari-

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ety of factors considered is seen as suggestive of major differences in the emphases of past projects. Assumptions and evidence relating to each factor are reviewed and assessed, and observations regarding the possible advantages of one type of approach over another in particular settings are made. The primary purpose of the analysis, however, is to organize factors for the use of evaluation teams. Finally, to further clarify the various diverse assumptions about what makes small enterprises work, three fundamentally different approaches to enterprise development—resource transfer, psychosocial motivation, and community-building—are identified and evaluated. It is suggested that awareness of these categories can provide evaluators with a sensitivity to the large range of alternative assumptions about project inputs and sequences as well as to all possible project outcomes. Appended are a comprehensive list of development indicators appropriate for small enterprise projects and a 7-page bibliography (1954–82).

Promoting the manufacture and use of small-scale agricultural machinery in Indonesia

PN-AAL-052

Sinding, Monica K.; Delp, Peter; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Jun 1987, xiii, 58p. + 7 appendices: ill., charts,
map, statistical tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 26
4980265; 3980265*

The effectiveness of AID-supported efforts by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) to promote indigenous private manufacture of agricultural machinery in target areas is assessed. Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions as to the program's direct socioeconomic benefits, the feasibility of substituting less costly and more easily maintained and repaired Indonesian-made farm machinery for imported machinery has been established. The technology being transferred under the IRRI-GOI program is easily adopted by small manufacturers because it requires little capital or equipment and relies on skills already present in many rural workshops. While firms varying in size and market orientation have participated in the program, sustained

commitment is found only among smaller fabricators directly linked to farmers; IRRI-type equipment now represents an important part of the livelihood of these entrepreneurs. Program efforts have also successfully turned around GOI policy toward locally manufactured farm equipment; import bans have been imposed and credit made more available to both manufacturers and buyers of small farm equipment. Indigenous manufacture has already spread spontaneously beyond target areas, and it appears that the program is replicable in other Indonesian provinces, or, with some modifications, in other countries with a suitable policy environment and sufficient sophistication in metal fabrication. Replication with respect to nonagricultural manufacturing, however, is less likely to be successful—only in agricultural manufacturing is fabrication so closely linked to service and so dependent on local adaptation of design. Also, the fact that much of the program's success is due to the enormous dedication and enthusiasm of the IRRI project officer and his Indonesian counterparts creates further doubts about replication. Lessons learned are: the overall business environment for fabricators must be favorable; developing country commitment to a clearly articulated policy and program for farm mechanization must exist; and coordination among and within the principal involved ministries is essential.

Report on the workshop on private voluntary organizations and small-scale enterprise development

PN-AAL-053

*U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary
Assistance. Office of Private and Voluntary
Cooperation*

*(Workshop on Private Voluntary Organizations
and Small-Scale Enterprise Development,
Washington, DC, US, 31 Oct–2 Nov 1983)*

Jul 1985, xii, 17p. + 8 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 22*

Discussions at a 1983 workshop held in Washington, D.C. of recent assessments of small-scale enterprise (SSE) development projects conducted by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are summarized in this report. Participants agreed that the benefits of SSE projects should be both

economic (improvements in firm performance and linkages with the local economy) and social (personnel, community, and political development). They also agreed that the sequence of benefits is critical, but differed on according priority to economic or social outcomes. Participants also identified some causes of successful SSE projects (PVO cost-effectiveness, the availability of ample credit from well-managed financial institutions, and careful allocation of technical and financial assistance), as well as several factors that promoted equity (having beneficiaries participate in project design and implementation, developing institutions to mediate with governmental and market entities on behalf of SSEs, providing a supportive network of PVO umbrella groups, targeting assistance to the poor and to those with an entrepreneurial spirit, and seeking means to channel returns from SSE projects to community activities). Participants also discussed the comparative advantages of PVOs in SSE promotion (flexibility, low personnel costs, capacity to work over extended periods with the poor while gaining their trust), as well as some disadvantages (insufficient technical expertise of field staff, organizational bias against financial management, limited ability to provide assistance). Recommendations focused on refining and disseminating successful PVO methodologies for working with SSEs and publishing a "how-to" sourcebook on the subject, encouraging additional workshops, and coordinating donor support efforts.

Private voluntary organizations and the promotion of small-scale enterprise

PN-AAL-055

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Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary
Assistance. Office of Private and Voluntary
Cooperation*

Jul 1985, xii, 47p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 27

The role of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in developing small-scale enterprises (SSEs) is reviewed in this report, prepared for an A.I.D. workshop on the subject. The literature shows that SSEs can be successfully promoted through credit, technical assistance, and short-term training. However, it is small- or medium-sized manufacturing firms rather than micro-enterprises and trading businesses that seem to

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generate new employment and establish links to other economic sectors. For this reason, critics question the cost-effectiveness of SSE projects by PVOs, which focus increasingly on generating empowerment and equity among the poor. Such questions indicate the need for a systems approach to SSE development, i.e., one that embraces all relevant factors and institutions. Several AID-sponsored SSE projects conducted by PVOs are enlightening in this regard. Two evaluations of entrepreneurship training programs of Opportunities Industrialization Centers International (OICI) indicate the value of a comprehensive institution-building effort. OICI's extensive efforts in establishing public and private sector advisory and policymaking bodies ensure the availability of expert advice and facilitate working relationships with the government, thus increasing the policy voice of local OICIs. Other organizations, such as the Sarvodaya Shramadana in Sri Lanka, the Northeast Union of Assistance to Small Business (UNO) project in Brazil, the Partnership for Productivity project in Burkina Faso, and Manila Community Services, Inc. in the Philippines, are even more insistent on the importance of the social and political and not merely the economic concerns of SSE projects, both as outcomes to be pursued and as causes of project success. Rather than adopting a conventional, narrowly conceived cost-benefit approach, these organizations suit a project to the local situation in order to effect sustainable change benefiting the largest possible public. Such systems projects are small and simple. The key factor is the entrepreneurial spirit that successful PVOs increasingly seem to be displaying in their SSE projects. A 5-page bibliography (1965-83) is appended.

Searching for benefits

PN-AAL-056

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance. Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Science and Technology. Office of Rural and Institutional Development*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

*Jun 1985, xii, 121p. + appendix, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 28*

*WID copy classified at 332.742.K48
9380800*

The net economic benefits of microenterprise assistance projects in Burkina Faso, Brazil, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Peru are compared in order to determine the factors responsible for project success. All except the project in Peru were designed and implemented by private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Following an overview of the microenterprise sector, the paper describes the methodology used to calculate project benefits. Based on sales, profits, wages, and employment data, three measures of net economic benefit can be calculated: (1) the minimum estimate, derived from the increase in value added to the firm with a deduction for the opportunity cost of labor; (2) the maximum estimate, which assumes lower labor opportunity costs; and (3) the most likely estimate, which falls in between the above two extremes by factoring in omitted variables. Separate chapters analyze each project, describing its design and implementation and presenting a step-by-step construction of the three benefit estimates. A final chapter compares the performance of the five projects in terms of project design, the external environment, the credit delivery system, technical assistance, project costs, and PVO contribution. Numerous tables and a bibliography (1980-83) are provided.

Promoting appropriate technology change in small-scale enterprises: an evaluation of Appropriate Technology International's role

PN-AAL-084

*Delp, Peter; Velasquez, Antonio; et al.
Devres, Inc.*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
(Sponsor)*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Nov 1986, xii, 31p. + 9 appendices: charts,
statistical tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 45
9365428*

*Appropriate Technology International (ATI),
a private, nonprofit development assistance or-*

ganization, was created through a 1976 Congressional mandate to experiment with and develop new approaches to technology development and transfer. This evaluation, based on field visits to ATI projects, analyzes its success to date. ATI's unique role in economic development assistance—to link appropriate technology and small-scale enterprise development within an experimental learning framework—is inherently risky. Thus, it is not expected that each project will be successful. Still, ATI has met all quantifiable performance indicators under its current cooperative agreement with A.I.D., and its overall capacity to plan and implement projects has grown steadily (though not without accompanying weaknesses). The direction, quality, and impact of its technology development activities have also in general improved, although ATI's concentrated attention on the replication of hard technologies has diminished other important aspects of its mission, particularly the development and transfer of innovative soft technology. Projects under the cooperative agreement have not yet matured enough to provide many benefits to the poor. Regarding project planning, ATI has significantly improved its technical and commercial appraisals, although further refinement and more consistent application are needed for the latter. More attention to market analysis and the assessment of implementing organizations' capabilities is also needed. ATI's field management allows for a responsive, flexible working style, which, however, has the disadvantage of weakening ATI's ability to learn from its experience; lessons learned have not been systematically identified and disseminated. Monitoring and evaluation systems should be revised and integrated with planning and field supervision. Some aspects of the A.I.D. system and in particular its oversight role impede attainment of ATI objectives; also, better communications with Missions are needed. Finally, although A.I.D. financial support is declining, ATI has not yet succeeded in finding other sources of funding.

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Microenterprise stocktaking: a statistical look at A.I.D.'s microenterprise portfolio

PN-AAX-222

Lieberson, Joseph M.; Doyle, William
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Sep 1989, 10p. + 3 appendices: statistical tables,
Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 63

A.I.D. is currently implementing 87 microenterprise development projects or programs that will spend \$290 million over their total project life. This study, part of a larger stocktaking of A.I.D.'s microenterprise assistance, provides a statistical overview of the program, including information on its magnitude, composition, and organization; the types of projects being operated; the types of agencies implementing the projects; and the types of services being provided to microentrepreneurs. The report concentrates on financial levels as a means to help explain and classify the projects and the approaches used in different regions. Most field projects deal with broad problems (e.g., finance, private sector development, and private voluntary organizations), with only 12% focusing exclusively on microenterprises. While nearly every project includes an institutional development component, only 15 (representing 34% of funding) focus solely on this goal; the others concentrate on providing direct benefits and services to entrepreneurs. Private voluntary organizations implement two-thirds of the projects, representing 52% of funding, while financial institutions implement 16%, covering 37% of funding, and host country governments directly implement projects representing only 4% of funding. The typical A.I.D. project uses a "full service" approach of credit, technical assistance, and training; 55 projects, representing 57% of program funding, employ this approach. Fifteen credit-only projects represent 37% of funding, while 17 projects representing 6% of funding provide only technical assistance and training.

A.I.D. microenterprise stocktaking: synthesis report

PN-AAX-227

Boomgard, James J.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Dec 1989, xxx, 93p.: statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 65

A synthesis of A.I.D.'s recent stocktaking of its 32 microenterprise development projects and programs is presented. Three approaches are distinguished: enterprise formation, enterprise expansion, and enterprise transformation (i.e., graduation from the sector). Key findings include, inter alia, the following.

1. Measurement of program impacts—both their magnitude and sustainability—could be considerably improved.
2. Most programs focus on a limited number of beneficiaries, especially when compared to the number reached by financial institutions. The latter, however, cannot meet the long-term needs of microenterprises.
3. Microenterprise programs are well suited to integrating women into the development process and can reach members of the poor majority, but affect the poorest of the poor only indirectly, i.e., by creating jobs.
4. The programs can create productive new employment opportunities, particularly in manufacturing, and often have a significant influence on the development of financial markets.
5. Cost per beneficiary varies widely across programs, being relatively high in formation programs, often low in expansion programs, and high in transformation programs.
6. Cost per dollar loaned varied from \$0.19 for a simple credit program to \$7.68 for a women's enterprise formation program. In general, the available data, while limited, suggest very high returns to investments in microenterprises.
7. To be successful, the implementing agency needs honesty and good management, but not financial sustainability; some form of subsidy is usually required.
8. Programs that provide direct, short-term credit have a better record than do more ambitious transformation programs. However, the needs of the vast majority of microenterprises cannot be satisfied by small working capital loans.

The question how to meet these needs remains unanswered.

9. Successful programs focus first and foremost on developing profitable businesses and on other objectives, e.g., directing resources to disadvantaged groups, only if consistent with this purpose.
10. The role played by credit is much better understood than that played by technical assistance and training.
11. When possible, transformation efforts should focus on graduating programs (from project to commercial funding sources) rather than enterprises.

Taking stock of A.I.D.'s microenterprise portfolio: background and conceptual overview

PN-AAX-228

Boomgard, James J.; De Santis, Dennis; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Dec 1989, ix, 38p. + appendix, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 66

During 1988–1989, A.I.D. undertook a major stocktaking of its microenterprise development activities to identify effective projects and programs and the factors responsible for their success. This paper provides a conceptual overview of microenterprises to help clarify some of the issues involved in the stocktaking exercise. After an introductory review of the exercise, Section 2 presents a brief history of microenterprise development and of A.I.D.'s involvement in it. Section 3 examines the nature and characteristics of microenterprises, locating them midway between the survival activities of the very poorest and more complex small-scale enterprises and identifying the entry barriers between these levels of economic activity. It also presents a framework for comparing programs by distinguishing three approaches to microenterprise development: (1) enterprise formation, which integrates those in the survival-oriented economy into the microeconomy; (2) enterprise expansion, which improves the performance of existing microenterprises; and (3) enterprise transformation, which graduates firms from microenterprises to small-scale enterprises. Section 4 focuses on program performance as

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measured by the criteria of impact on beneficiaries, cost-effectiveness, and institutional sustainability. Section 5 outlines the major factors which influence program performance: targeting, strategy, credit tactics, technical assistance/training tactics, and institutional factors. An appendix profiles the 32 microenterprise assistance programs reviewed during the exercise.

A.I.D. microenterprise stock-taking: Malawi

PN-ABC-701

Webster, Russell; Mooney, Timothy
Development Alternatives, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jul 1989, xv, 13p. + attachment, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 20
6120214; 9311096

Since 1980, A.I.D. has supported microenterprise development in Malawi by providing technical assistance, credit, and training through two Malawian intermediary institutions. This report, part of major A.I.D. stock-taking of its experience with microenterprises, describes the composition and growth potential of Malawi's small enterprise sector, followed by an evaluation of the institutions—the Development of Malawi Traders Trust (DEMATT) and the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO). DEMATT provides technical assistance and training to traders, producers, and service businesses; in 1986/1987, DEMATT reached 545 enterprises with a total of 1,254 employees. MUSCCO provides savings and credit services in 79 Malawian villages—many of which offer no other credit sources except through informal markets. MUSCCO loans are used to fund household expenses, including school fees and funeral costs, as well as productive investment such as fertilizer and other agricultural inputs. Unfortunately, the impact of DEMATT and MUSCCO services on their clients is impossible to determine due to the failure of both organizations to develop adequate monitoring systems. Moreover, the long-term sustainability of these organizations is endangered by inefficiency and an unwillingness to charge interest rates or service fees high enough to cover a significant portion of their operating costs.

Microenterprise stock-taking: the community and enterprise development project—Kaolack, Senegal

PN-ABC-702

De Santis, Dennis; Howald, Barbara; Sposato, Steve

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jul 1989, xviii, 22p. + 2 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 21
9311096

The A.I.D. Community and Enterprise Development (CED) Project in Senegal administers a \$600,000 loan fund in the Sine Saloum region. This stocktaking report assesses the impact of the project and details the key factors influencing the performance of two components that finance loans through the fund. The performance of the small-scale enterprise (SSE) credit component has been positive. About 315 loans have been made to 241 enterprises; of the 104 loans that have come due, most were paid on time or early, or were rescheduled, and only 3% have defaulted. This performance can be traced to the fact that the component has had the flexibility to streamline its delivery structure and improve overall efficiency; has operated in a generally favorable business environment and has decentralized the lending sector, ensuring good pre-loan client knowledge, close supervision, and immediate follow-up for non-payment. The PVO component, in which indigenous PVOs provide services to village level groups, has made 136 loans, which are just now coming due. Although the overall economic impact of the loans has been negligible (due to their small size), the credit has served to increase the villagers' level of confidence. Credit has been only a small part of this component's activities; community-based PVOs have lacked the financial expertise to administer credit projects and thus required a high degree of staff training in business administration and credit management. From the SME component, it was learned that lending projects should: (1) begin with the goal of building sustainable financial institutions and

work towards that goal over the long run; (2) limit and prioritize objectives to assure that objectives are congruent and not mutually exclusive; (3) have socioeconomic impact indicators built into project design; (4) be flexible enough to allow for mid-course design changes; and (5) have simple, direct, and decentralized loan delivery systems to work closely with the small-scale borrower. Moreover, it was found that lending projects servicing larger microenterprises tend to create more new employment while small microenterprises tend to reduce underemployment. Additional lessons can be learned from the PVO component.

1. Group solidarity guarantees can be as effective as financial guarantees in assuring loan repayment if the group has strong social and cultural ties.
2. If a lending project works through PVOs, final responsibility for loan approvals and monitoring must rest with the real lender.
3. PVO projects do not create new employment but rather tend to redefine or expand existing employment in the village.

Microenterprise stock-taking: Guatemala

PN-ABC-703

Hirsh, Michael H.; Cannellas, Andrew A.; McKean, Cressida S.

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jul 1989, xiv, 25p. + appendix, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 22
9311096

While Guatemala's 356,000 microenterprises employ close to 1 million persons, they have virtually no ties to the formal financial sector and suffer all the problems generally associated with informality. This report examines the experience of three A.I.D.-supported PVOs providing microenterprise assistance—the Women's Development Foundation (FDM), the Small Business Assistance Foundation (FAPE), and the Foundation for the Development of Socioeconomic Programs (FUNDAP). The FDM and FAPE programs, which targeted enterprises with 1–4 employees, had dramatic employment generation impacts. Loans averaged \$1,000–

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\$3,500 per business, were made for both working capital and fixed asset investment, and were almost all given to manufacturing and service businesses. In general, the beneficiaries of these programs are not the poorest of the poor but moderately poor people who have a skill and a few assets.

Although FUNDAP's microenterprise program has not been in operation long enough to demonstrate employment or income impacts, its sheep production subprogram has had some income generation successes. The report summarizes the key factors influencing project performance and impact.

1. Microenterprise projects are in jeopardy due to the lack of clear commitment to institution building or sustainability.
2. The creation of trade or industry-specific beneficiary groups is an effective, cost-efficient way of reaching targeted clients and leveraging resources.
3. FUNDAP's integrated, industry-specific approach is effective when a real market exists for the improved quality and quantity of raw materials and finished products.
4. All three loan projects operated in a sound, businesslike manner.
5. The formal financial sector either does not or cannot reach the types of enterprises that benefited from these projects.
6. FAPE and FDM achieved relatively high rates of income and employment generation by targeting low-income skilled group enterprises that had a viable enterprise or idea for an enterprise.

Lessons learned are as follows.

1. More attention should be placed on graduating the credit institutions aiding microenterprises rather than on graduating the microenterprises themselves.
2. The creation of new market channels for assisted enterprises is crucial.
3. The use of group or association-based training or technology transfer is particularly effective in insular, rural communities.
4. Greater employment and income generation impacts accrue from projects oriented towards servicing microenterprises than projects servicing the community through microenterprise development.
5. Women-specific programs can be successful if operated in a businesslike manner by lending on the basis of economic performance and not on the basis of female ownership.
6. Microenterprise development projects can have significant secondary impact by focusing the attention of the host government or

other donors on a region or sector of economic activity.

7. The use of umbrella agencies as channels for funding appears to have limited potential to contribute to the institutional sustainability of PVOs assisting microenterprises.

Microenterprise stock-taking: Cameroon

PN-ABC-704

De Santis, Dennis; Lang, Paola

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Jul 1989, xv, 24p. + 5 appendices: statistical
tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 23
9311096*

The Cameroon Cooperative Credit Union League (CamCCUL) is an example of a thriving credit movement. This field study looks at the cooperative to assess why the movement has been so successful in mobilizing savings and the extent to which CamCCUL is involved in microenterprise lending. Several factors have influenced the successful operation of CamCCUL.

1. CamCCUL serves real market with real needs, is an appropriate fit with the local cultural and social environment, and has a sound lending philosophy.
2. CamCCUL and the credit union movement are long-term in their nature and focus.
3. External donors did not capitalize and have not been extensively involved with CamCCUL.
4. CamCCUL is dedicated to providing long-term staff training and development, and has made only modest investments in non-income producing overhead assets.

Nine major lessons were learned, among them (1) successful rural credit programs mobilize local financial resources and do not depend on external capitalization by one or two major donors; (2) credit programs should make loans at market rates or rates that can support the lending institution and should not try to direct economic activity; (3) strong local leadership plays an important role and is essential to the success of building a local institution; (4) an institution has a greater chance of success if it fits well with the

local cultural and social environment; (5) institution building programs are successful only over the long run; and (6) rural credit unions can effectively provide credit to microenterprises.

Microenterprise stock-taking: the Dominican Republic

PN-ABC-705

*Poyo, Jeffrey; Hoelscher, David; Malhotra,
Mohini*

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Jul 1989, xiii, 23p. + appendix: statistical tables,
Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 24
9311096*

To help create productive employment for the Dominican Republic's growing urban population, A.I.D. is promoting micro- and small enterprise development. This report assesses the microenterprise programs of two A.I.D.-funded intermediary institutions—the Asociación Para el Desarrollo de Microempresas (ADEMI) and the Programa de Asistencia a la Pequeña Empresa/Fondo para el Desarrollo (PROAPE/FONDESA). Key findings are as follows.

1. ADEMI's experience shows that clear institutional objectives (e.g., the separation of credit and technical assistance activities) and the autonomy to pursue them lead to improved project performance. PROAPE/FONDESA's business development thrust is constrained by the social welfare orientation of its sponsor, the *Asociación para el Desarrollo*.
2. Microenterprise projects should ensure equal access to project resources by women, especially by targeting the type of enterprises they operate.
3. Financial intermediaries can be self-sustaining if, like ADEMI, they charge positive real interest rates and have decentralized organizational structure, flexibility, well-trained staff, and sophisticated management. PROAPE/FONDESA's negative real interest rates are decapitalizing its portfolio.
4. Attempts by the intermediaries to "graduate" successful microenterprise clients to the formal banking system are unrealistic and, even

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if possible, would, undermine the intermediaries' own financial viability.

5. Government demand management and regulation were the most important factors in microenterprise success.

Microenterprise stock-taking: Fundacion Paraguaya de Cooperacion y Desarrollo

PN-ABC-706

Magill, John H.; Alfonso, Arelis Gomez

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

*U.S. Agency for International Development:
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Jul 1989, xvii, 18p. + 5 appendices: statistical
tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 25
9311096*

Operating in the Asuncion metropolitan area, the Fundacion Paraguaya de Cooperacion y Desarrollo is at present A.I.D.'s only effort in microenterprise development in Paraguay. The Fundacion has provided loans, training, and other assistance to 711 groups with a total membership of nearly 3,000 microenterprises (with some 60% of program beneficiaries women). This report summarizes the experience of the Fundacion and is divided into two parts—the main text, which provides general findings, conclusions, and lessons learned, and a set of appendices, which contain more detailed analysis directly related to the Fundacion, brief overviews of two similar activities in Paraguay, and a description of information system improvements which need to be made by the Fundacion. The report cites a number of factors contributing to the success of the Fundacion, including: (1) strong executive leadership and broad base of managerial talent; (2) a politically neutral stance in a sensitive political environment; (3) the knowledge that there would not be long-term A.I.D. support and the absence of a large, low-cost pool of loan funds; (4) a non-charity approach by promoters and trainers; (5) the ability to mobilize resources from local and international sources, instead of being dependent on a single donor; (6) program features that have been well-suited to the needs of the beneficiaries and characteristics of the informal sector; (7) the ability to learn from program failures; (8) the

role of the Peace Corps in supplying seed capital and providing much-needed skilled personnel during the formative period of the institution; (9) the fact that similar accounting, client management, and statistics systems were previously developed and could be applied to the project; and (10) the fact that beneficiaries paid positive, rather than subsidized, interest rates. However, the Fundacion also had some setbacks.

1. The organization's small portfolio may have helped the program make realistic program and pricing decisions during its formation, but it will have to grow significantly for the Fundacion to make a major impact on the microenterprise sector in Asuncion.
2. The Fundacion has a tendency to take on ancillary functions and activities without paying adequate attention to the effect of these on personnel and other resources and on its ability to accomplish its basic objectives.
3. Certain donor agency demands have been detrimental to the program's long-term success.
4. Its application procedures are time- and resource-consuming for the borrower.

A.I.D. microenterprise stock- taking: Ecuador

PN-ABC-707

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Jeffrey*

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*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

Jul 1989, xi, 19p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 26

*A.I.D. microenterprise stock-taking: Ecuador
field assessments*

9311096

Ecuador's microenterprise sector plays a major role in generating urban employment, accounting for about two-thirds of private sector employees. Nationwide, microenterprises (defined as non-farm firms with fewer than 10 employees) number 153,000, or 97.6% of all firms. This report evaluates the Small Enterprise Development Project (SEDP), a project to expand and improve the supply of credit, TA, and representational services to Ecuador's small enterprise sector. Although it is too early to accurately measure

project performance, it is clear that progress has been hampered by a design that is extremely complex and difficult to implement without alterations. Furthermore, changes in economic and political conditions, as well as in judgments about A.I.D. project elements and contractors, has led to a number of components either not implemented or implemented in random sequence. Despite these problems, some accomplishments have been made. About 2,800 loans totalling roughly \$54,000 were administered to small entrepreneurs and street vendor solidarity groups. About 575 small manufacturing enterprises have received in-depth technical assistance (TA), surpassing the target of 400. Programs consisting of shop seminars, clinics, practical courses, and individual TA are 69% completed, and 21 technical manuals have been published, far exceeding the objective of 5. The representational component and an activity to provide TA to credit guarantee corporations are not yet operational. Five lessons are drawn from this project: (1) complicated, integrated projects are difficult to implement, especially in rapidly changing environments; (2) it is easier and cheaper to implement a project through existing organizations than to create new ones; (3) project design is dependent on political and economic conditions that can change faster than project implementation; (4) financial sustainability is hard to achieve unless credit and TA components are separately funded and evaluated; and (5) graduation of clients into the formal credit sector is often very difficult to achieve.

A.I.D. microenterprise stock- taking: Bangladesh field assessment

PN-ABC-708

*Webster, Russell; Blakeslee, Katherine; Tzavaras,
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Development Alternatives, Inc.

Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

Jul 1989, xiii, 13p. + appendix: charts, Eng.

*A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 27
9311096*

Part of USAID/Bangladesh's increasing focus on private enterprise, the Women's Entrepreneurship Development Project (WEDP) provides credit, training, and business support services to

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women-owned and -managed microenterprises in Bangladesh's more remote and rural areas. This assessment of WEDP, which is managed by the Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation, finds that program impact has been appreciable; in a 1987 survey, 57% and 75% of WEDP clients reported increases in income and productivity, respectively, while 36% reported increases in employment. On the other hand, measurement of impact is constrained by lack of data on program services and client activities. WEDP's financial sustainability is a problem. The program does not generate any interest income to offset its operating expenses and by assisting clients with the loan approval process, WEDP is actually subsidizing the banks which provide the loans. Further, because its clients are mainly small entrepreneurs, WEDP is unlikely to collect fees for its services and in fact sustains significant losses in providing per diem and pocket money for its client trainees. Other factors hindering WEDP sustainability include the policy and regulatory environment governing capital markets, WEDP's cumbersome administrative practices, and the government's practice of cancelling interest payments after floods, which has been partially responsible for a drop in the loan recovery rate from 80% to 47%. Policy—and program—related lessons taught by the WEDP program conclude the report.

Microenterprise stock-taking: the financial institutions development, Puskowanjati Women's Cooperative, Maha Bhoga Marga, and Yayasan Dian Desa projects, Indonesia

PN-ABC-709

Biddle, C. Stark; Sinha, Sanjay; et al.
Development Alternatives, Inc.
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jul 1989, xix, 42p. + appendix: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 28
9311096

A.I.D.'s efforts to support microenterprise development in Indonesia are assessed in this report. Major activities consist of support to rural credit

institutions; the Puskowanjati Women's Cooperative, an umbrella organization of women's cooperatives; and the Maha Bhoga Marga and Yayasan Dian Desa private voluntary organizations. Except in the case of Yayasan Dian Desa, which concentrates on introducing appropriate technology to raise incomes and generate employment, A.I.D.'s support for these institutions has focused on strengthening their credit services. All the projects established sound business procedures, displayed moderate to high levels of financial viability, and greatly increased the poor's access to institutional resources. In particular, the credit projects' low transaction costs and easy access are a benefit to the poor while high interest rates and a diversified portfolio ensure institutional sustainability. The net effect is increased employment and income generation, which stimulate economic growth through broad-based linkages and multiplier effects. In sum, the experience of these projects shows that it is possible, even in less than optimal economic and regulatory environments, to assist the poor by treating them as entrepreneurs through a decentralized, business development approach rather than through poverty-focused programs.

A.I.D. microenterprise stock-taking: Egypt

PN-ABC-710

Grant, William; Bigelow, Ross E.; et al.
Development Alternatives, Inc.
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jul 1989, xiii, 21p. + 4 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 29
9311096

In the last 10 years, USAID/Egypt has supported a number of projects with modest microenterprise components. In contrast, the current trend is to segregate microenterprise development from other initiatives. This report evaluates two projects which utilize these different approaches. The former approach is represented by the small enterprise loan program (SELP), a tiny component of the very large Helwan urban development project, while the current strategy is represented by a microenterprise loan fund operated by the Coptic Evan-

gelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS). CEOSS has been more successful in some respects. By the end of the grant in 1986, CEOSS had made 421 loans totalling \$140,000, and the fund has continued to grow. Only 14% of the outstanding balance is in arrears, and only 5 loans are in default, each because of the borrower's death. The future of the SELP loan fund, however, is in doubt. As of 6/87, about 19% of the outstanding balance of loan payments was in arrears by an average of 10 months, and there is little prospect for on-lending the repaid funds now that the SELP component of the project is over. CEOSS's success can be attributed largely to local participation in project design and the effective integration of credit with technical assistance and training activities. Both projects were inhibited by Egypt's macroeconomic policy environment and the high rate of inflation (22%-25% per annum), however, and despite the fact that some of CEOSS's loans were making returns of up to 200%, the small value of the loans has limited both activities effectiveness in generating new jobs.

A.I.D. microenterprise stocktaking evaluation

PN-ABC-905

Lieberson, Joseph
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

A.I.D. evaluation highlights, no. 6, Dec 1989,
8p., Eng.

A.I.D. recently completed a comprehensive stocktaking evaluation of its Microenterprise Assistance Program. This paper provides a brief synopsis of the study, highlighting the program's impact, key findings, and lessons learned. The 1989 study included field visits to 10 countries and reviewed 32 projects. Five major findings are listed below. First, microenterprises have a heterogeneous character and include a wide range of firms operating with varying degrees of economic sophistication. As a result, A.I.D. has used three broad types of assistance which can be applicable to different enterprises—enterprise formation (typically community development programs designed to overcome social and economic constraints to establishing microenterprises), expansion (providing credit and training/

6.0 Private Sector Development

TA to existing enterprises), and transformation (graduating larger enterprises up and out of the microenterprise sector). Second, A.I.D. projects have clearly demonstrated that it is possible to deliver services (TA/training, credit) to disadvantaged persons (including women) in remote locations. While the poorest 20% are generally not becoming entrepreneurs, they do benefit from the employment opportunities generated by microenterprises. Third, there is often a tradeoff between the development of successful and sustainable businesses and the goal of targeting special disadvantaged groups. The most successful microenterprise programs tend to focus primarily on strengthening or establishing profitable and sustainable businesses rather than achieving social goals. Fourth, A.I.D. projects have had limited success in graduating microenterprises to nonconcessional, formal credit markets. As an alternative, it is recommended that rather than trying to graduate firms, the programs themselves should graduate to nonconcessional sources of capital. These funds could then be retailed to the enterprises by the program. Finally, the enterprise expansion approach is the least costly way of reaching the largest number of beneficiaries. When the problems faced by microenterprises extend beyond just credit, A.I.D. has much less knowledge of how to deliver cost-effective TA/training.

6.3 TRADE & INVESTMENT

Promoting trade and investment in constrained environments: A.I.D. experience in Latin America and the Caribbean

PN-AAX-237

*Louis Berger International, Inc. Development Economics Group
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)
May 1990, xv, 42p. + 3 appendices: charts, statistical tables, Eng.*

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 69

Since 1974, A.I.D. has disbursed more than \$675 million for more than 120 trade and investment projects. The majority of these funds were spent in Latin America and the Caribbean, where country experiences with foreign trade are widely diverse. While A.I.D. projects in strong exporting countries have often been successful,

there is some doubt as to their impact in constrained economic environments. This report reviews 15 projects, with emphasis on the following variables: the country's productive structure; the policy environment; the export capability of the target group; host country support; project delivery mechanisms (public sector, private sector, or mixed); A.I.D. management effectiveness; and level of risk. The report also classifies the 15 projects according to three generic types: the transmitter approach, which relies mostly on developing and transmitting market information by maintaining data bases and answering investor/exporter queries; the facilitator approach, which provides multisectoral, general investment and export promotion services; and the promoter approach, which offers enterprise-specific technical assistance and brokering services to a limited number of producers in a limited number of sectors. The report concludes that the promoter approach seems best suited to the weak productive structure and volatile policy environments within which A.I.D. projects typically operate. The three major strengths of the promoter approach are its high degree of targeting, its focus on demonstrating project impacts early on, and its flexibility in allowing project managers to change the objectives, scope, and level of funding of a project in response to market forces.

7.0 Social Services and Human Resource Development

7.1 POPULATION & FAMILY PLANNING

Study of family planning program effectiveness

PN-AAG-672

Sinoing, Steven W.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation.*

1979, iv, 18p., Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 5*

It is generally accepted by population experts that a decline in fertility rates depends upon the interrelationship between the supply of family planning (FP) programs, determined by a government's political commitment and its administrative capability, and the demand for FP services, determined by the acceptability and adoption of the small family norm. This paper analyzes the results of a review of the literature on the relation of demand and supply determinants to FP effectiveness; it also develops guidelines to determine the conditions under which a major FP action is appropriate. The literature review found that FP programs do make a difference in the rate of fertility decline; progress in development alone is not enough. Key variables such as adult literacy, education, life expectancy, infant mortality, and GNP per capita combine to create the social context within which FP programs are implemented. The existence of favorable levels of achievement in these areas does not, however, necessarily guarantee the success of FP pro-

grams, just as their absence does not guarantee failure. For example, Indonesia and the Philippines have achieved high levels of contraceptive use despite development conditions that should preclude a demand for FP services, while Venezuela and Mexico have progressed rapidly on the development scale but are unable to achieve real decline in fertility levels. A set of theoretical guidelines to achieve rapid fertility decline are presented for further study. First, a country's social setting should be examined to determine the appropriate role for the public sector. If the setting is favorable, and fertility is declining even in the absence of a major public effort, the role of the state can be limited to ensuring the availability of FP services. If, on the other hand, decline in fertility is slow or nonexistent, the state needs to be more active. The paper's major conclusion is that political will and administrative capability alone cannot overcome basic socio-cultural obstacles unless direct government action on reproductive behavior is an important feature of the program. Recommendations for specific countries conclude the paper.

Third evaluation of the Thailand national family planning program

PN-AAH-006

Minkler, Donald; Muangman, Debanom; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Asia, Thailand*

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

Feb 1980, iii, 67p. + 11 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 3
4930209; 4930283; 4930291; 4930325;
9320877*

Since the development of the first family planning project implemented in Thailand in

1968, great progress has been made there in FP and the use of contraceptives. Findings from an evaluation of Thailand's National Family Planning Program (NFPP) are presented in this report. The NFPP has had the following significant impacts upon population growth: contraceptive use, especially of the pill, has increased substantially since the commencement of NFPP; fertility is decreasing faster in rural areas than in urban areas; the steady decline in the fertility rates since the mid-1960s has accelerated since NFPP began; and the population growth rate has decreased from 3.6 percent to 2.6 percent during 1960-75. Despite these achievements, Thailand still faces unmet FP needs in such subgroups as the hill tribes and Indo-Chinese refugees. Also included in this report are findings from the NFPP statistics system and from operational research studies in FP conducted in Thailand; information on the current status of specific NFPP program components such as information dissemination and education, manpower training, and contraceptive services; and a list of sources of support for NFPP. For the success of this program to continue, increased support is required from the Royal Thai Government and international donors. Other recommendations arising from this evaluation include: (1) giving priority to geographic regions and subpopulations where FP acceptance is low; (2) emphasizing improved management and supervision at the village level; (3) including information about FP in health education programs; (4) giving all health education personnel formal training in rural health and FP delivery; (5) evaluating the impact of NFPP on health status, particularly with respect to maternal and infant mortality; (6) continuing pilot projects to determine the use of non-physician personnel in FP service delivery; and (7) continuing subsidy by Royal Thai Government to health facilities for voluntary surgical sterilization. Consultation reports and technical appendices are attached.

7.0 Social Services and Human Resource Development

Family planning program effectiveness: report of a workshop

PN-AAN-196

Sinding, Steven W.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

(Family Planning Program Effectiveness Study
Workshop, 3 Apr 1979)

Dec 1979, ii, 26p. + 4 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 1

A study of family planning (FP) program effectiveness culminated in a workshop in April 1979, the proceedings of which are reported here. Workshop participants sought to identify from research and experience the combination of direct FP services and development activities most appropriate for reducing population growth in specific country situations. Part I summarizes the four background papers used as a framework for discussion, one of which was a typology for estimating the possible success of FP strategies in a specific country; Part II summarizes discussion of individual country experiences and policy-related issues; and Part III summarizes areas of consensus and concluding statements. Country conditions identified as crucial to FP effectiveness are political commitment, administrative ability, and the socioeconomic and cultural acceptability of FP. Countries were categorized as "certain," "probable," "possible," and "unlikely" to achieve an annual birth rate of 20 per 1,000 by the year 2000, based on the above-noted typology. It was proposed to follow the Asian Bureau in adapting FP programs to each country's needs by varying their sequencing, their mix of services, and their relationship to other development activities, including efforts to enhance the status of women and to upgrade the quality and availability of demographic data. Consensus was reached on recommendations to: (1) adopt a country-specific approach to FP planning and policy based on realistic, long-term goals; (2) identify conditions within individual countries, regions, or subgroups that favor specific strategies; (3) provide more varied and more flexible FP services; (4) seek support from local governments and institutions for a decentralized FP program; (5) promote awareness, especially among African politicians, planners, and decisionmakers, of the links between population and development; and (6) revise FP policy statements to reflect the large numbers

of adult unmarried women and the high rates of adolescent pregnancy. Two of the four background papers are appended.

A.I.D.'s role in Indonesian family planning; a case study with general lessons for foreign assistance

PN-AAH-425

Heiby, James R.; Ness, Gayl D.; Pillsbury, B.L.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Asia

1979, 85p., Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 2
4970188

The AID-financed family planning program in Indonesia is one of the world's most successful, prompting the question of how to replicate that success in other family planning assistance programs. This report uses data collected from field visits and interviews to evaluate A.I.D.'s assistance to the Indonesian program and identify the underlying reasons for its success. The report describes the program's service network, its consumers, demographic impact, and A.I.D. inputs. A sociocultural study of the country shows that high population growth, administrative support, and community acceptance are the three factors whose convergence most favored the project's success. The history and description of the program, particularly the types and extent of service, are given. A.I.D.'s support is described in terms of leadership, commodities, organization, resources, local-cost programming method, and interagency linkage. Major strengths of the program are: (1) a high level of national political support; (2) strong Mission commitment to the goal of the project and to Indonesia's national family planning program; (3) provision of grant rather than loan assistance; (4) responsiveness of the local cost programming process to local needs; (5) effective decentralization; (6) strong support from the Mission director and a competent, tenured staff; (7) close collaboration between Mission staff and local counterparts; (8) rapid adaptations based on field experiments; (9) a management rather than demographic orientation to the data system; (10) effectiveness of participant training; (11) integration, emphasizing process over structure, of health and nutrition services into family planning (not the reverse); (12) use of non-material incentives for acceptance;

and (13) abundance of oral contraceptive supplies. Future problems faced by the A.I.D. program are imminent staff turnover; failure to extend services to urban areas and the outer islands; management, data, and logistical problems of expanding services into health and nutrition; and relations with the reorganized country planning board. Four appendices tabulating data on the program and an organizational chart of the Mission are included.

A.I.D.'s experience with contraceptive social marketing: a synthesis of project evaluation findings

PN-AAL-073

Binnendijk, Annette L.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Science and Technology. Office of Population

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Apr 1986, xviii, 83p. + 2 appendices: charts,
statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 40
9363028

The effectiveness of twelve AID-assisted contraceptive social marketing (CSM) programs which were active in 1984 is reviewed in this report and characteristics affecting CSM performance are discussed. CSM sales in 1984 provided nearly 5 million couple-years of protection (CYPs) in the 12 countries and, by optimistic estimate, averted some 890,000 births (or about 2% of live births). Four of the programs were quite successful, providing coverage to 7-15% of eligible couples. CSMs share of the contraceptive users' market ranged from 20-50% in the more successful countries, but was considerably lower elsewhere. The programs have been most effective in reaching urban/semiurban populations among the lower, though not the poorest, income groups; special outreach efforts can increase rural coverage, but at higher costs. Studies suggest that CSM is more cost-effective than clinic- or community-based contraceptive distribution methods, with net operating costs for mature programs ranging from \$0-\$4 per CYP. It may be unrealistic, however, to expect the programs to achieve both widespread contraceptive coverage and

7.0 Social Services and Human Resource Development

economic self-sufficiency, since only Colombia has succeeded in this. Several other countries have generated enough revenue to cover all operating (though not commodity) costs. A number of elements appear to influence CSM success. Key among these is the use of commercial-sector marketing channels, promotional techniques (e.g., mass media advertising, giveaways), market research techniques, and management models. Most CSM programs are operated within the private sector. Those managed totally within government structures tend to be the least successful, while management by semiautonomous agencies, which allows a host government to maintain oversight of CSM activities, has been very successful in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Egypt. Of external factors affecting CSM, the most crucial is host-government support—most CSM programs that have failed did so because of political and/or regulatory factors.

Getting the message: the communication for young people project

PN-AAX-208

Kincaid, D. Lawrence; Elias, Jose Ruben Jara; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Oct 1988, ix, 28p. + appendix charts, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 56
9363004*

A.I.D.'s Communication for Young People Project in Latin America, which used two popular songs to promote sexual responsibility among teenagers and urge them to postpone sex until they were more mature, was a resounding success by any standard. The songs, sung by young vocalists Tatiana and Johnny, reached the top of the popularity charts in every country and—along with discussion about them—received about 1 million hours of air time, as well as substantial favorable publicity in the press. Both qualitative and quantitative research demonstrated that the songs' messages were appropriate for and understood by teenagers. The youngest teenagers were particularly receptive to the idea of postponing sex—an achievement that cannot be overstated, since it is this segment that is the least informed about sexuality and at the greatest risk of unwanted

pregnancies. It was also found that younger teenagers and those who could readily recall the songs considered sexual relations less important to their self-concept than did older teenagers and those who could recall the songs either not at all or only after prompting. Older teenagers, especially males, were not as receptive to the idea of postponing sex, but they agreed that people should be mature before engaging in sexual activity. The project was less successful in channeling young people to family planning (FP) counseling or services. Teenagers felt that teachers and schools should be the main source of information on sex, though most Latin American schools provide only general information in these areas. Many teenagers had discussed the songs with their mothers or girl friends, however. What made the project successful was its commercial viability. Media executives responded very well to the songs because they could make money while promoting a valuable social cause. The teenage audience emphatically endorsed the project's entertainment approach through their purchase of the record and their many phone calls and letters to radio stations, the record company, and FP centers. Because the social message was conveyed not via a lecture, but in an attractive, modern format by appealing, credible role models and had immediate relevance to the audience's lives, it reached and was remembered by millions of young people throughout Latin America. Appendices include lyrics of the two songs.

[Author abstract, modified]

7.2 HEALTH & NUTRITION

Reaching the rural poor: indigenous health practitioners are there already

PN-AAG-685

Pillsbury, Barbara L. K.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

1979, 63p., Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 1*

Obstacles to improving the health and nutrition of the rural poor include not only a dearth of trained physicians and modern facilities, but also the economic, social, and cultural differences that often exist between the health professional and the rural patient. Because over 2.3 billion people worldwide continue to rely on traditional healers and midwives rather than utilize a system they neither understand nor trust, a sensible policy to improve rural health is to encourage and utilize the resources represented by indigenous health workers (IHWs). This paper examines the potential for incorporating IHWs into formal primary health care (PHC) systems to increase community acceptance and improve the utilization of PHC services. The author recommends a comprehensive evaluation of all past and present projects containing a traditional health component to assess the problems and benefits involved in working with IHWs. Several common objections to the use of IHWs and countervailing arguments are presented. The objections include the tendency to disparage low-cost PHC as "second-class medicine"; donor fears that indigenous PHC is dangerous or of inferior quality; and the hypothesis that traditional medicine competes with modern medicine for patients. Since IHWs provide excellent services in drug distribution, birth attendance, and care of the mentally ill, their services in these areas should be encouraged. Where formal collaboration with IHWs is not possible, emphasis should be placed on understanding and building upon the concepts which underlie traditional practices, thereby making modern innovations more acceptable. The author recommends that A.I.D. follow the World Health Organization's lead in adopting the following policy changes: (1) encourage and support programs which train and utilize IHWs; and (2) focus attention on traditional practices in training professional health workers and in PHC project designs. Specific program guidelines and recommended sector studies conclude the report. Annexes on information needs, a 1977 World Health Assembly resolution, recommendations of a congress sponsored by the Pan American Health Organization, and a 100-item bibliography (1962-79) are attached.

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Senegal: the Sine Saloum rural health care project

PN-AAJ-008

Weber, R.F.; Kerr, Graham B.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, xi, 15p. + 14 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 9
6850210

Have A.I.D.'s health care projects helped alleviate malaria, infant diarrhea, and other health problems afflicting the people of Senegal? This evaluation of the Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project provides a partial answer to this question. Despite difficulties from the start, several important achievements were realized. With the help of villagers, health huts were constructed and equipped in 200 target communities. Training materials and a records system were developed and a village health staff was trained in their use. Three conditions must be met, however, if the project is to succeed: the huts must earn enough to cover operating costs; government supervision and support must improve; and the medicine resupply system must function. Other problems include a high turnover of hut health workers; proximity of the huts to each other, forcing some to close; and high salaries paid to village health workers which drain the system's capital. Finally, the project's scale is too large and project management unsatisfactory. Although the huts have not operated long enough to make the project's impact clear, records show that visits to village health huts are often for treatments already obtained at larger, more distant health centers. However, closing health huts because of poor project management may negatively affect villagers' attitudes toward primary health care. Recommendations include: altering the health hut financial system to avoid collapse; closing health huts with overlapping services; halting construction of more health huts until existing huts are improved; including a family planning component; obtaining firm assurances of budget support from the government; and strengthening A.I.D.'s project management team. Since this evaluation, several corrective measures have been made: delaying project expansion; recruiting an experienced project manager; studying similar, more successful projects; and redesigning the project. A 24-item French and English bibliography (1968-80) and technical appendices are attached.

Review of issues in nutrition program evaluation

PN-AAJ-174

Sahn, David E.; Pestronk, Robert M.
Community Systems Foundation
1981, 231p., Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 10

Despite agreement that evaluation is integral to development programs, substantial diversity exists on the best methods of evaluating nutrition interventions. This report, based on the present practices of several multilateral, bilateral, and private donors, reviews these methods. The authors propose standardized evaluation terms and concepts for examining nutrition education, supplementary feeding, food fortification, multisectoral, and planning programs. Presented are two models of nutrition programming—A.I.D.'s log-frame, outlining a causal progression of events at the input, output, purpose, and goal levels; and the Nutrient Flow Model, depicting nutrition as a function of activities such as food production, trade, loss, and distribution. Linked to each of these models, respectively, are process and impact evaluations. For process evaluations (often conducted along with impact evaluations), information is collected on pre-existing indicators, project components, and intervening events in order to reveal nutritional improvements attributable to a program. Impact evaluations seek to determine improvements in overall nutritional status. Various impact evaluation designs (e.g., situation assessment, before/after, recurrent institution cycle, comparison groups) and threats to their internal and external validity are reviewed. The authors also discuss alternative evaluation methodologies which combine aspects of both evaluation types to assess such program aspects as effort, adequacy, appropriateness, etc. They also differentiate operational program evaluation (analysis of a program's specific impact and performance), the subject of this report, from basic research (knowledge gained using scientific methods and controlled experimentation) and evaluative research (field testing applications of existing knowledge). Anthropometric, biochemical, clinical, and dietary nutritional measures are examined in terms of objectivity, coverage, directness, completeness, and precision. Also presented are 70 abstracts of published evaluations, emphasizing methodology over outcomes, and brief descriptions of the programs and approaches

of several donors involved in nutrition programs. A 171-item bibliography (1955-80) is appended.

Toward a health project evaluation framework

PN-AAJ-619

Dunlop, David W.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jun 1982, ix, 35p. + appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 8

Despite the increasing importance of health programs, there is little hard evidence that they lead to improved health status. To determine if primary health care is in fact working, this report presents a conceptual framework for evaluating such projects. First, the authors describe the problems related to current health project/program evaluations, including the assumed linear flow of impacts, attribution, feedback and indirect impacts, and time as an important variable in evaluation. Emphasizing the subtlety and long-term nature of the evaluation process, the authors then develop five concepts: (1) the use of the economic concepts of investment and consumption rather than such measures as morbidity and mortality to gauge final project impact; (2) the importance of context and constraint analysis; (3) the growing claim of recurrent health program costs on national budgets; (4) equity considerations; and (5) the essential importance of a dynamic evaluation system which incorporates the above ideas. Finally, the authors discuss a series of practical issues which must be addressed before any evaluation strategy can be defined, namely, attribution of impact, timing of impact measurement, audience differences, data availability, and information costs. Attached are a 57-item bibliography, a list of generic questions for an economic evaluation of primary health care projects, and a proposed set of measures/indicators for health project evaluation.

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Korea health demonstration project; project impact evaluation

PN-AAJ-621

Dunlop, David W.; Oldwine, Eileen B.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Jul 1982, xix, 38p. + 10 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 36
4890710*

It is being increasingly recognized that Western-oriented medical systems cannot meet the health care needs of developing countries. This report evaluates a project to create a capability within the Government of Korea (GOK) to plan, conduct, and evaluate low-cost, multi-county, integrated health delivery projects. After outlining the project's setting, design, and implementation, the report focuses on the project's institution building and health care delivery impacts. Initial progress was considerable. The Korean Health Development Institute (KHDI) was created to implement health delivery systems in three counties, and a National Health Council was formed to coordinate participating public and private agencies. The KHDI's approach was to introduce a new cadre of multipurpose para-professionals and to improve the professional capabilities of an existing single-purpose cadre. The two cadres then worked through teams of village volunteers to increase community involvement in health care delivery. By 1978, considerable progress had been made in improving access to health care in the three project areas; the average cost per visit at the most peripheral health unit was \$1.90. Concurrently, physicians' share of the market fell 40-50%. At the urging of physicians, health paraprofessionals were disallowed from providing services outside their legal scope of practice. Other significant events also occurred during 1978-80. The number of medical school graduates doubled and more graduates were assigned to rural areas, a comprehensive GOK health insurance program was launched, and per capita income in the three counties grew. As a result, health service utilization fell markedly and the cost per curative visit rose to \$3.00. The authors notes several lessons, including: the riskiness of developing an extra-governmental agency such as the KHDI; the need to anticipate economic impacts of changes in health care policy; the need to

perform incentives and contextual analysis of all potential project actors; and the difficulty in determining a project's impact on overall health status. A postscript addresses the long-term financial impact of the GOK's health insurance program. Extensive tables, charts, and graphs are contained in the text and in appendices; the latter also includes a 33-item bibliography (1975-81), a report on the current status of health care delivery in Korea, project-related public documents, and other information.

Prospects for primary health care in Africa: another look at the Sine Saloum rural health project in Senegal

PN-AAL-037

Bloom, Abby L.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*Apr 1984, xi, 25p. + bibliography, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 20
6850210*

The history of the user-financed primary health care (PHC) project in Sine Saloum, Senegal, teaches valuable lessons for community development programs, according to this case study. The key lesson is that a thorough, critical evaluation, when taken seriously and acted upon by a donor and the host government, can save a failing program. A 1980 evaluation of the Sine Saloum project concluded that, despite the training and deployment of a large number of village health workers, the project's future was being jeopardized by several critical problems: village health huts were not viable financially; supervision and support for village health workers were inadequate; and the drug supply and transportation system were unable to cope with new demands. As a result of changes made since that evaluation, the Sine Saloum project has turned around and community-level health services are largely self-financing. Major steps taken have included: standardization of user payments; village contributions to salaries of village health workers, construction and maintenance of village health huts, and building of drug stocks; vigorous training of community members in management and financial responsibilities; improvements in community health worker selection, training, and supervision; and more

intensive project management by USAID/S. Problems remain, however. Because the services provided are mainly those that clients demand and are willing to pay for, the program is still almost exclusively curative, and efforts to introduce preventive measures such as improved health and hygiene behaviors, oral rehydration therapy, and family planning information and services have met with little success. Still lacking are the educational, outreach, and surveillance activities needed to effect long-term attitudinal and behavioral changes, as well as the indepth analysis and experimentation needed to determine if other PHC services can be user-financed and yet stay attractively priced. Finally, recent research suggests that client satisfaction and participation could be significantly improved. Appendices include tables and a 27-item bibliography (1969-83).

Impact review of the onchocerciasis control program, Ougadougou, August 1985

PN-AAL-078

Kelly, Jim; Shift, Clive J.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*May 1986, xiv, 34p. + 5 appendices: maps,
statistical tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 63
French ed.: PN-AAX-202
698039?*

A 20-year, AID-supported Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP) initiated in 1974 by WHO, the World Bank, FAO, and UNDP, and currently covering portions of seven affected West African nations, is evaluated. Program results have been impressive. In 90% of the program area, onchocerciasis transmission has been interrupted, resulting in marked decreases in the incidence of blindness, disability, and debility; some 27,000 cases of blindness have been prevented in Burkina Faso alone over the past decade. The program's economic benefits are potentially large: an estimated 15 million ha of tillable land have been opened up in formerly endemic regions. Additional investment is required, however, to exploit the liberated areas. Further, although the reserves of the parasite have been reduced, the movement of people from infected into freed areas could spark a

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resurgence. Program experience has shown that such a program would not have achieved its level of success without the long-term financial commitment of donors at the outset. Other lessons learned are that: (1) complex disease control programs may require time for experimentation before they can become fully operational; (2) vertical disease control projects may play a useful role in helping to reinvigorate primary health care delivery programs; (3) undertaking development assistance programs within a multilateral framework and implementing them through established international structures can greatly facilitate success; (4) vigorous, sustained research efforts are crucial for the program's ultimate success; (5) aggregate economic and social welfare benefits are difficult to calculate precisely; (6) international support is imperative at early stages for regional disease control efforts; (7) initial high-technology control methods must be gradually replaced by low-technology methods and local capacity building; (8) highly specialized project components should be contracted out; and (9) socioeconomic development in freed lands depends on initiatives from outside the OCP organization.

Development assistance and health programs: issues of sustainability

PN-AAL-097

Buzzard, Shirley

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Oct 1987, xii, 69p. + attachment, Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 23*

A.I.D. has placed increasing emphasis on creating health sector programs which are sustainable, that is, capable of being continued by the developing countries themselves and of providing benefits lasting beyond the period of A.I.D.'s technical, managerial, and financial support. This review of the literature on the health programs of A.I.D. and other large donors such as UNICEF and the World Bank intends to generate larger and deeper discussion of the issue of sustainability. Five factors key to sustainability are identified: financing, host country policy, community participation, program type, and management issues of resource allocation and information collection

systems. The author finds that programs are most likely to be sustained: when they are affordable by the country and the community, and include provisions for cost recovery or private sector participation; when beneficiaries have a role in planning and managing them; when simple, but effective management systems are in place, including information, monitoring, and evaluation sub-systems; and when they are focused on but not limited to a single intervention, i.e., when they offer an "integrated" range of services and do not attempt too much with too few resources. Attempts have been made to incorporate these lessons into A.I.D.'s present emphasis on the four major child survival interventions (immunization, oral rehydration therapy, birth spacing, and nutrition) which combines the strengths of both the single target programs of the 1950s and the integrated programs of the 1970s. The paper includes a review of A.I.D.'s health policy history as well as 7 pages of references.

Evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Gambia mass media and health practices project

PN-AAL-098

Lieberson, Joseph; Miller, Devorah; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Dec 1987, xvii, 35p. + 2 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 51
9311018*

The experimental Gambia Mass Media and Health Practices project was very successful in using mass communications techniques to promote oral rehydration therapy for treating acute childhood diarrhea, but it failed to ensure that the methodology it developed would continue to be used once A.I.D. support was withdrawn. Although some elements of the project methodology are still in use, the Gambian government has been unable to continue project activities at a satisfactory level. Sustainability problems began with the project design. From the outset, a premium was placed on the development and refinement of the experimental health intervention techniques, the assumption being that if the techniques were successful the project would be continued; little attention was given to sustainability.

Second, the project's time frame was too short—the project was planned to last 2 years and was extended a third, when A.I.D. experience shows that most projects take 5 years or more to institutionalize new techniques. Lack of a formal long-term training component also adversely affected sustainability. When the project ended there were not enough trained Gambians to run the communications program, and there was no phased plan for the withdrawal of technical assistance—the project was terminated abruptly when A.I.D./W and USAID/G could not agree on how to structure future assistance. When A.I.D. pulled out, most project activities simply stopped. The Gambia experience raises important questions about A.I.D.'s responsibility in a pilot research and development effort. Clearly, A.I.D. should have explored ways in which the Gambian government could have assumed financial responsibility for the project and—given the high cost of developing new approaches to health education—project designers should make specific plans for sustainability if the pilot approach proves successful. A plan for phased withdrawal of donor assistance is essential. Includes bibliography (1978–86).

Evaluation of the factors of sustainability in the Lesotho rural health development project

PN-AAL-099

Lieberson, Joseph; Miller, Devorah; Keller, Howard

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Dec 1987, xvii, 39p. + appendix, Eng.

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 52
6320058*

A.I.D.'s project to provide primary health care (PHC) in rural Lesotho by creating a cadre of paramedical physician-extenders (mainly, nurse midwives) and by strengthening the existing PHC management system to support this approach has proved sustainable, according to this evaluation. A dovetailing of host country capacity and donor design contributed to this outcome. The project's technical package was appropriate to Lesotho's conditions and capabilities, while training, supervision, management, and logistic requirements were successfully

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institutionalized within the Ministry of Health. To alleviate the chronic problem of financial sustainability, the project was designed to gradually phase in Government of Lesotho (GOL) funding, so that by the end of the project the GOL was paying all personnel and nearly all training and supervision costs. The only threat to financial sustainability is the low level of user fees. For political reasons, the GOL has decided not to charge patients for the full cost of treatments, but GOL revenues have been falling and an International Monetary Fund reform package will require increased budget stringency. The GOL is already having problems with financing the current level of health services. The only choice is to increase the fees charged, and combined A.I.D. and World Bank pressure should persuade the GOL to do so. A number of lessons about health project sustainability can be learned from the Lesotho project; these include (inter alia) that: (1) project design should match the country's level of development and economic conditions; (2) adequate fees are necessary for financial sustainability, and fee structures should not discriminate against the poor (as was sometimes the case in Lesotho); (3) projects stand a better chance of success when they build on existing capabilities and personnel rather than start from scratch; (4) developing countries can better handle recurrent costs when they are gradually phased in according to a well ordered plan; (5) designers should stress the need for appropriate counterparts early in their dialogue with the host country; (6) health workers at all levels should receive appropriate guidance and supervision; and (7) it is important to involve all interest groups in the project early on (e.g., the Lesotho project worked hard to alleviate physicians' fear of competition from paramedicals). Includes references (1971-85).

Sustainability of U.S.-supported health, population, and nutrition programs in Honduras: 1942-1986

PN-AAX-211

Bossert, Thomas; Godiksen, Lois; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Dec 1988, xii, 35p. + 9 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 58

Adopting a broadly sectoral and historical perspective, this study examines the sustainability of U.S.-supported health, population, and nutrition projects in Honduras since 1942. The authors differentiate between "immediate" outputs (e.g., personnel trained) and "replicating" outputs (e.g., schools to train personnel). It was found that once A.I.D. funding stopped, some immediate outputs were sustained with national funds, but that replicating outputs typically were supported by other donors' funds. An analysis of three cases of high degree of sustainability (auxiliary nurse training, rural water supplies, and latrine and pump projects) and three cases of low degree of sustainability (family planning, malaria eradication, and nutrition projects), revealed the following significant relationships. (1) National commitment to project goals was essential to the sustainability of project outputs and benefits. (2) Cooperative negotiations between A.I.D. and the Ministry of Health with regard to project objectives, design, and implementation contributed to sustainability. Projects viewed as imposed by A.I.D. were not well sustained. (3) Vertically organized projects often generated institutional resentment that jeopardized sustainability, whereas integrated projects tended to be better sustained, though at lower levels of effectiveness. Use of a multi-component matrix organization which combines several vertical components with an integrated managerial and planning structure might lead to higher levels of effectiveness. (4) Projects perceived as effective during the life of the project were more likely to be sustained than those which failed to achieve anticipated outputs. Effectiveness did not, however, guarantee sustainability. (5) Coordination among donors was important for sustainability. No clear relationship was found between sustainability and the size of A.I.D. funding relative to Honduran contributions to the project, national assumption of recurrent salary costs, cost recovery, or the proportion of the national health budget devoted to hospitals (versus primary health care). Similarly, the amount, type, and duration of technical assistance, training, and community participation were not significantly related to sustainability.

Child survival programs in Egypt

PN-AAX-235

Tumavick, Nancy; Binnendijk, Annette; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

[1990], vii, 26p.: ill., charts, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. impact evaluation report, no. 73

In the early 1980s, A.I.D., together with the Government of Egypt, UNICEF, and WHO, developed a strategy for child survival focused on two key interventions: oral rehydration therapy (ORT) to control diarrheal diseases and an expanded program of immunizations (EPI) against the six major communicable childhood diseases. This report evaluates the performance and health impacts of the two programs. Both programs have had high levels of success. ORT awareness and use has spread throughout Egypt and child nutrition during diarrheal episodes has improved. Statistics suggest that an accelerated decline in infant and child mortality in the mid-1980s is essentially the result of the program, especially of its popularization of home and private rehydration. However, the actual incidence of diarrheal episodes has probably not changed, indicating that the program's preventive aspects, ranging from promotion of hygiene among mothers to massive investments in potable water and sewage systems, have yet to prove effective. The EPI program has resulted in rapidly increasing and high coverage rates among children for all antigens. Although reliable data are not available, EPI has most likely reduced both mortality and morbidity, since unvaccinated Egyptian children are at significant risk from the targeted diseases. On the negative side, coverage rates for tetanus toxoid injections of pregnant women have lagged considerably in comparison with the rest of the program. The rapid success of the two programs is largely due to Egypt's unique positive circumstances: the population's cultural and linguistic homogeneity and concentration along the Nile; extensive health infrastructure and large pool of trained health personnel; availability of low-cost ORT and immunization technologies; and wide access to television. While these factors limit the programs' replicability elsewhere, the programs' flexibility, limited focus, and use of mass media are broadly applicable. Partly because of the success of the two programs, the patterns of infant and child mortality are shifting in Egypt, with acute respiratory infection now emerging as the leading cause of death and hence the main concern of future child survival efforts.

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Child survival in Indonesia

PN-AAX-238

Dichter, Phyllis; White, Michael; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Asia and Near East. Indonesia*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Jun 1990, 31p.: ill., charts, Eng.

A.I.D. impact evaluation report, no. 75

Indonesia's child survival program, a top government priority, has had a positive impact on child health and appears to be reducing infant and child mortality. The program has also strengthened the country's primary health care system by rapidly expanding services outside the physical and administrative confines of the existing public health facilities. Principal achievements include: a rapid expansion of community-level health posts (posyandus), which deliver child survival interventions nationwide; high rates of child immunization (65% for DPT3 and 50% for measles); successful education of mothers in oral rehydration therapy; and nationwide expansion of growth monitoring and nutrition education through the posyandus. Much of the program's success can be attributed to the incremental growth of highly focused and vertical efforts to deliver key services, beginning with family planning and nutrition in the 1970s and later adding immunization and diarrheal disease control. By 1985, the country began large-scale efforts to integrate these services at the community level. A.I.D. has played a critical role in stimulating and shaping the program, providing \$60 million (over and above support for family planning) and supporting more than 25 bilateral, private voluntary organization, and central projects over the last decade. Key elements of A.I.D.'s contribution include: sustained commitment and support for highly focused programs (family planning, immunization), effective policy dialogue coupled with research, provision of some operational costs for major activities, provision of supplemental support from centrally funded A.I.D. programs, collaboration with other donors, and investment in training and education. Despite the child survival program's achievements, however, sustainability is still in question. Additional efforts are needed to ensure the long-term financial basis, consolidate activities, and solidify political support and popular demand.

Sustainability of U.S.-supported health, population and nutrition programs in Tanzania: 1971-1988

PN-AAX-243

Dunlop, David W.; Godiksen, Lois H.; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa. Tanzania (Sponsor)*

*Sep 1990, v, 28p. + 8 appendices: statistical
tables, Eng.*

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 37

Evaluation of the sustainability of six health-related projects in Tanzania, including a series of urban water projects, maternal/child health (MCH) aide training, a pilot primary health care program in Hanang District, cancer control, school health programs, and continuing education for health workers. Sustained activities included all the urban water projects, the health components of MCH aides training project, the curative aspects of the cancer control project, and the village health services component of the Hanang project. However, even most of these efforts were having difficulties in continuing to provide services. The water projects were all continuing to provide services, although maintenance was weak and future demand could not be met with present capacity. MCH aides who were trained were still providing services although there was some deterioration of services. The hospital-based cancer control center was fully operational and gaining an international reputation. The village health worker program was still active in many villages although there had been a significant dropout of trained workers. The continuation of project activities was affected negatively by a significant economic decline, which has severely limited the government's ability to continue project funding and import necessary medical and transportation supplies and equipment. On the other hand, sustainability has been supported by the political environment—characterized by a broad-based and strong ideological commitment to the poor and a high level of donor coordination. The success of the sustained projects underscores the importance of the following design and implementation characteristics: (1) integrating

project activities into existing administrative structures and the avoiding vertical project design; (2) a high or increasing level of project funding through national sources (e.g., budgetary and cost recovery mechanisms); and (3) providing visible services and demonstrating effectiveness of project activities to develop demand among providers and beneficiaries.

Sustainability of U.S.-supported health, population, and nutrition programs in Zaire: 1972-1988

PN-AAX-244

Mock, Nancy B.; Bossert, Thomas; Milanga, Miatudila

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa. Zaire (Sponsor)*

Sep 1990, vii, 22p. + 5 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 38

Factors affecting the sustainability of health projects in Zaire are identified in this report. Four projects are examined—maternal/child health clinics administered by Mama Yemo Hospital, community health-integrated rural development implemented by the Salvation Army, and two projects (health systems development and malaria control) implemented by the Ministry of Health. All of the projects were completed at least three years prior to the study. Only two of the projects were sustained. The MCH project is still providing clinical and family planning services, and using the educational materials developed during the period of A.I.D. assistance. Most activities under the Salvation Army project are also continuing, with the majority of recurrent costs being covered by user fees. By contrast, the malaria project has been completely dismantled, and none of the direct activities of the health systems project are continuing. The report concludes that the sustainability of projects in Zaire is strongly affected by contextual factors, such as the country's weak, poorly funded, and corrupt state institutions; continuing economic crisis; and weak implementing institutions (e.g., the extremely fragmented Ministry of Health). However, while more effort is necessary to strengthen the economic and institutional contexts of projects in Zaire, several improvements could be made to enhance the sustainability of future projects.

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These improvements include: (1) project integration into the normal administrative structure of implementing institutions; (2) the involvement of implementing agencies in the project design process; (3) strong training components; (4) increased community participation; (5) utilization of cost recovery and other alternative financing mechanisms; (6) demonstrated appropriateness and effectiveness of projects; and (7) high-quality technical assistance. Appendices include an assessment of the sustainability potential of current health projects. Also available are papers on the sustainability of health projects in Senegal (PN-AAX-245) and Tanzania (PN-AAX-243).

Sustainability of U.S.-supported health, population, and nutrition programs in Senegal

PN-AAX-245

Adamchak, Susan; Aguilhaume, Claude; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa. Senegal (Sponsor)

Sep 1990, vii, 24p. + 6 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 39

This evaluation of the health care components of two projects—Bakel Irrigated Perimeters and Casamance Rural Development—in Senegal focuses on the sustainability of the projects, which were implemented during the period 1977-1985. One component of the Bakel project, an epidemiological survey, was unsustainable, while another component, primary health services, was fully sustained; in fact, activities of local communities and of the Ministry of Health have further improved primary health care since the end of the project. The health and nutrition component of the Casamance project was moderately sustained. The modest success of these activities is largely attributed to contextual factors, including: weak state institutions and a lack of commitment to social welfare; an economic crisis which limited the government's ability to continue project funding as well as the beneficiaries' ability to pay for services; fragmented and unstable implementing agencies; and weak national commitment to primary health care and family planning. However, even in this unfavorable environment, several steps could be taken to enhance sustainability:

(1) integrate projects into existing administrative structures; (2) ensure that the national government absorbs progressively larger portions of project costs and/or develops cost recovery mechanisms; (3) provide training in both technical and administrative subjects; (4) avoid short-term projects and include significant TA components; (5) design projects with visible benefits that create demand for project services; and (6) include community participation mechanisms in projects with cost recovery.

Sustainability of U.S. supported health, population, and nutrition projects in Guatemala: 1942-1987

PN-AAX-248

Bossert, Thomas; Godikser, Luis; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Guatemala

Sep 1990, xiv, 47p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 40

Since 1942, A.I.D. and its predecessor agencies have funded 19 major health-related projects in Guatemala in five areas: health services, water sanitation, malaria control, family planning, and nutrition. These projects have brought significant and in many cases sustained benefits to the country. This report identifies two kinds of factors affecting project sustainability—contextual factors, i.e., those beyond the control of project designers and managers, and project characteristics. In regard to contextual factors, national commitment to project goals and support from influential groups was a positive force on sustainability, whereas the inadequacies of the implementing institutions (in terms of fragmentation, conflicting goals, and poorly trained staff) had an adverse influence. Sociocultural differences were positive or negative depending on whether or not they were attended to. Other contextual factors, such as natural disasters, political environment, U.S.-Guatemalan relations, economic changes, the private sector, and donor coordination, seemed to have little impact on sustainability. Project characteristics important to sustainability included: visibly effective

achievement of project goals, integration of the project into the structure of the implementing agency, qualified and stable leadership from both the implementing agency and A.I.D., ability to provide for progressive absorption of recurrent costs, provision of significant professional or paraprofessional training and technical assistance, and cooperation between A.I.D. and the Guatemalan Government in project design. Project characteristics which did not seem important for sustainability include: foreign exchange demand, cost recovery, cost-effectiveness, appropriate technology, and community participation. Policy implications are presented in conclusion.

Health care in Nepal: an assessment of A.I.D.'s program

PN-AAX-250

Blue, Richard M.; Van Dusen, Roxann; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Feb 1991, xi, 22p. + 2 appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 70
Related document: PN-ABG-063

The evolution of Nepal's health care system and the impact thereon of A.I.D. programs over the past 30 years are assessed. Major findings are as follows. (1) Health status has improved, as reflected by increasing life expectancy, declining infant mortality, and substantial control and reduction of malaria. A.I.D. programs—especially malaria and diarrheal disease control, technical and managerial training of health workers, and (with UNICEF) the Expanded Program of Immunization—have contributed notably to these improvements. (2) The family planning program, which until recently focused overly on sterilization and did not offer a broad choice of methods, has not been a success; only 15% of Nepalese practice modern contraception. (3) Persistence of high female morbidity, maternal mortality, neonatal disorders, and high incidence of diarrhea, worms, respiratory infections, and skin diseases suggests a cluster of maternal/child health problems which do not respond well to either vertical campaigns or passive curative treatment. These problems may be associated with low levels of female education and poverty, including extremely poor hygiene and polluted

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water supply. (4) The system has been dominated by the Government of Nepal's (GON) effort to fulfill its promise to provide a reasonable level of health care to all citizens. While the gains from this approach are undeniable, many institutional weaknesses persist. Most importantly, the demand for health care outstrips the GON's ability—especially financial—to meet it. (5) The private sector's role in health care is poorly defined, despite widespread willingness to use private, fee-for-service sources. Efforts of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement health insurance or prepaid drug schemes, and NGO experience in general, are largely ignored by the GON. (6) GON efforts to decentralize health care decisionmaking have thus far consisted of little more than formal changes in the organizational chart. The recent establishment of a corps of women community health volunteers is a positive sign, though there is a danger that this corps will be incorporated into the system as a new "bottom rung" of the health bureaucracy. (7) The advent of a new constitutionally democratic government gives Nepal an opportunity to reexamine its approach to health care and A.I.D. a unique opportunity to help chart a fresh approach.

[Author abstract, modified]

7.3 EDUCATION

U.S. aid to education in Nepal: a 20-year beginning

PN-AAJ-168

Sellar, Peter O.; Sprague, David; Miedema, Virgil
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1981, 90p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 19

Primary education is alive, if struggling, in Nepal. This report measures the impact of A.I.D.'s educational projects in Nepal over a 20-year period (1954-75). After briefly describing the genesis of Nepal's education modernization program, to which A.I.D. has been the only major donor, the authors evaluate the program's successes and shortfalls. Successes include dramatic increases in the numbers of primary

schools (PS) (from 321 to 8,708), PS students (0.9-59% of that age group), PS teachers (640-17,728), secondary schools (11-2,809), secondary school enrollment (0.15-24%), an increased literacy rate (2%-17%), and development of a cadre of 310 trained educational administrators (a key area of A.I.D. assistance), a totally Nepali curriculum, and a superior textbook production and distribution system. Nevertheless, severe problems remain. Stressing quantitative expansion has led to low quality and levels of learning (especially in writing and mathematics), a 50% rate of student dropout before functional literacy is attained, and schools that are isolated (in rural areas), overcrowded (in urban areas), and unhealthy. Due to advancement opportunities for trained teachers—the largest area of A.I.D. assistance—and increases in the number of PSS, qualified teachers are still in short supply. The vocational training (VT) system has failed due to insufficient training levels, lack of employment incentives, and student loss of the system as a springboard to college. As elsewhere, as in other countries, the development of basic education in Nepal has impacted positively on economic and agricultural development, fertility rates, health, and women's role and societal status and has generated attitudes conducive to overall development. The success of A.I.D.'s education assistance efforts, demonstrates that significant impact is possible when consistent support is given over a sufficient period of time and when local as well as U.S. costs are financed. Other lessons learned include the need to develop innovative educational approaches and to improve VT programs by correcting the above deficiencies. Appendices include a 61-item bibliography (1954-80).

Korea elementary-middle school pilot project

PN-AAJ-169

Witherell, Ronald A.; Morgan, Robert M.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1981, 81p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 5
4890696

Although the value of Instructional Systems Design (ISD) had been proven, ISD had never been applied on a large-scale in a developing

country until A.I.D. funded such an effort in the Republic of Korea (ROK) from 1972-77. This report draws several conclusions based on this success. Although converging factors—deep cultural respect for education, a growing cadre of trained educators, an urgent need for educational reform, and a motivated government—made the setting ideal, the project clearly proved the value of ISD to a developing country's educational system. In seeking to provide cost-effective education to prepare Korea's youth to enter the working world, the project, implemented by Florida State University, established the Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI) to orchestrate reforms, including a modernized curriculum reflecting Korean culture and the technical needs of a growing economy; development of guides to upgrade instructors' capabilities; the introduction of Instructional Radio, Educational Television, and correspondence high schools; a rapid increase in higher education enrollment; abolition of private tutoring which had favored the wealthy; and creation of an Educational Research Information Clearinghouse and a 14-year Educational Development Plan. The report concludes that: (1) many countries need institutions such as KEDI, staffed by committed and purposeful people, to invent functionally useful educational practices; (2) flexible project execution is essential to meet changing circumstances and maintain host country support; (3) A.I.D. programs should give priority to proven technologies in which the United States leads; (4) continuity of technical assistance from a qualified source strengthens a donor's contribution; (5) in any potentially controversial project, selling the project concept is as important as good implementation; and (6) donors often attempt too much without providing adequate time and money. The evaluation methodology and a list of interviewees; notes on the authors; a 12-item bibliography (1971-81); project and education sector data; an overview of KEDI; lists of KEDI publications and visitors to KEDI; and recommendations for the ROK are appended.

Thailand: rural nonformal education—the mobile training school

PN-AAJ-171

Giovanni, Ray San; Armstrong, Larry T.; Jansen, William H.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

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1981, 43p., Eng.

A.I.D. Project impact evaluation report, no. 25
4930162

Each year Thailand's Mobile Trade Training Schools (MTTSs) teach employable skills to 30,000 rural men and women who might otherwise move to the cities and join the ranks of the urban unemployed. This report traces the history and analyzes the impact of MTTSs. In 1960, despite a 30% literacy rate among the 87% of Thailand's population which was rural, educational change came slowly and favored the cities. Based on the belief that peasants valued education, the MTTSs were designed in the early 1960s to operate from provincial polytechnic schools, using portable tools and travelling instructors, to teach employable skills to drop outs. Under USAID assistance (1960-72), the 45 MTTSs became more permanent and expanded their courses to include skills upgrading and skills for personal use in traditional subjects (e.g., auto mechanics, dressmaking) and newer fields (air conditioning, radio repair). Of the 80,000 students enrolled, 56,000 graduated, and many non-graduates acquired employable skills. Since 1972, MTTSs have had a lasting impact on the Thai educational system and on the lives of the rural poor, supporting and diversifying rural values and offering a local alternative to the traditional apprentice system. About one-half of the MTTSs are still operating, but many others have been absorbed by a broader nonformal education system of Lifelong Education Centers which are modelled on the MTTSs, employ many MTTS teachers, and, together with the MTTSs, annually enroll 40-45,000 students. The success, popularity, and endurance of MTTSs has shown that: (1) Providing short-term vocational training to a large number of marginally educated people can positively effect rural development. (2) Nonformal education can integrate the rural poor into the mainstream of national life and thus aid national unity. (3) Projects conceived to serve a limited purpose can sometimes become a catalyst to broader development efforts. (4) Projects which appeal to the perceived needs of beneficiaries can succeed—contrary to conventional wisdom—even without beneficiaries participating at the design stage. MTTS enrollment and staffing data, a course listing, and profiles of six graduates are appended.

Northern Nigeria teacher education project

PN-AAJ-173

Mitchell, Robert Edward; Seymour, James M.;
Tuckman, Howard F.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1981, 51p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 23
6200710

Although the design and perspective of the Northern Nigeria Teacher Education Project (NNTEP) were deficient and little progress was made toward project objectives, NNTEP was nonetheless a success. This document describes the lessons provided by NNTEP for the design and implementation of future participant training programs, especially those in education. The authors' major conclusion is that NNTEP's unanticipated effects had a more important and long-standing impact on the leadership and institutional development of the Nigerian education system than did the negligible progress made in improving the quality and efficiency of primary teacher training. After describing the project's history and objectives, the paper discusses several impediments to the achievement of A.I.D. expectations. For example, the University of Wisconsin (UW), which implemented the project, had insufficient experience and time to devote to curriculum development despite A.I.D.'s emphasis on this component. Nevertheless, the curriculum, developed cooperatively by UW and the Ahmadu Bello University Institute of Education (IE), contributed substantially to IE's growth as a major educational resource and influence in the region. Another of NNTEP's major achievements was the development of a regional consensus on examinations and curriculum. A key lesson taught by NNTEP is that the training program's success was largely due to highly motivated trainees, committed mid-career professionals, and host country recognition of the contracted U.S. university as a superior institution. NNTEP also demonstrated, however, that curriculum reform cannot be achieved overnight and, more generally, that technical assistance projects must be designed with realistic implementation schedules and carefully delineated supervisory responsibilities. A.I.D. should show host governments alternative, least-cost solutions to stated policy goals, including one of

the most effective of such strategies, participant training. Appendices on evaluation methodology, NNTEP curriculum development, and the expansion and financing of the Nigerian educational system are included.

Radio correspondence education in Kenya

PN-AAJ-620

Eilers, William L.; Layne, Patsy P.; et al.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa, Kenya

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Aug 1982, xv, 261 p., 10 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 37
6150129

If the Kenya Radio Correspondence Project—established in 1977 to upgrade the qualifications of primary school teachers through correspondence courses and radio instruction—had a flaw, it was that it was too successful. Thus concludes this impact evaluation of the project, which trained 5,000 teachers during the 4 years of A.I.D. involvement and 7,000 thereafter, and allowed Kenyans to pursue educational certification without the personnel or system costs of formal schooling, a method of great potential value to developing countries, and applicable in many fields. Unfortunately, the resulting numerous teacher promotions and salary increases, coupled with the hiring of some 5,000 new teachers annually, strained Kenya's education budget and led in 1974 to the government's abandoning the automatic promotion policy which had motivated many teachers to join the program. Enrollments fell drastically, and although the project-created Correspondence Course Unit (CCU) at the University of Nairobi survived as an institution, its operations and client services deteriorated. In an effort to increase enrollment, the CCU turned to commercial courses which were not in keeping with long-range socially sound objectives. Nonetheless, the CCU has demonstrated its resilience and has been selected to provide new and significant distance teaching services, including programs in adult literacy, primary teacher updating, and primary education for nomadic peoples. The project taught that distance teaching requires well-organized field support in close touch with the target population; strong financial incentives

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for learners to invest time and money in courses; a reliable postal system; national radio transmission reaching most potential clients; a flexible institutional base with a corps of well-trained specialists; and a willingness to equitably distribute educational benefits to rural and disadvantaged groups. (Educators should remember, however, the limitations of distance teaching for technical subjects.) Other lessons learned are that A.I.D. Missions should keep in touch with assisted institutions after project completion, and that informal exchanges of information among developing countries about the distance teaching method can be extremely valuable.

Project impact: a low-cost alternative for universal primary education in the Philippines

PN-AAL-001

Wooten, John; Jansen, William H.; Warren, Marion K.

*U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

*Sep 1982, xv, 20p. + 7 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 38*

Project IMPACT (Instructional Management by Parents, Community, and Teachers) was implemented in the Philippines to test an approach to primary education which would sharply reduce costs per student without loss of educational quality. Canada's International Development Research Center funded the project, which was developed by the Center for Innovation and Technology, a branch of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization. A.I.D.'s evaluation of the project, based on a review of records and interviews with parents, teachers, and IMPACT officials, is here presented. Under the project, 100 or more primary school students, divided into groups of 5-10, were taught by intermediate (grades 4-6) primary school students using programmed teaching modules under the supervision of professional teachers. Parents and skilled workers served as community resource persons, and a local primary or high school graduate provided clerical, administrative, and logistic support. Cost-effectiveness studies and academic performance tests indicate that the project achieved its objective. An added benefit was the greater poise and personal initiative evinced by IMPACT students over their conventional counterparts, possibly as a result of

IMPACT's stress on independent study and peer group interaction. Unfortunately, initial project savings were not used to maintain qualitative levels in subsequent years (e.g., by replacing texts and equipment and repairing school buildings), resulting in declining professional support for IMPACT. Parents viewed IMPACT as benefiting the brightest students, but as less successful with average students. It is recommended that the Minister of Education and Culture (MEC) assess the first few years' implementation as a basis for a policy decision on IMPACT. If the result is positive, support should be arranged for the IMPACT schools' unmet needs, preferably using MEC budgetary resources. Regional directors should be encouraged to be more resourceful in implementing this unique education delivery system. Appendices include tables relating cost and academic achievement in IMPACT and conventional schools and a 17-item bibliography (1973-1981).

U.S. aid to education in Paraguay: the rural education development project

PN-AAL-017

*Nicholson, Ronald L.; Miles, Henry L.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Office of Evaluation*

*Jun 1983, xi, 19p. + 6 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 46
5260095*

The impact of an A.I.D. project (1970-76) to improve the availability and efficiency of rural education in Paraguay is assessed. As a result of the project, a much better educational program is available to many more students and is delivered by a system and a staff responsive to change. Although fewer rural primary schools were built than targeted (32 of 120) due to rising costs, they have greatly improved rural students' access to formal education, afforded students more time to help with farmwork, and reduced seasonal dropout and transportation costs. The project also revised primary and secondary school curricula, introduced a textbook production and distribution system, and shifted administrative responsibility from the Ministry of Education (MOE) to two Regional Education Centers. These Centers, which have conveniently been located in rural areas, have provided preservice and inservice teacher training, demonstrated use

of the new curricula, helped diffuse reforms in formal education, and have become effectively decentralized units of administration. On the other hand, the reforms have been limited in both scope and implementation. The new curricula are in use in only 10% of schools nationwide (although in the AID-built schools) and improving achievement scores and retention/promotion rates have annoyed teachers—who are very poorly paid—by imposing greater workloads at no extra pay. Unfortunately, the MOE's budget is so inadequate that even necessary instructional materials are in short supply. This continual underbudgeting threatens to unravel the project's achievements. The project taught several lessons: (1) Provision by local communities of land, labor, and continued maintenance excellently demonstrates the impact of local citizenry on educational reform. (2) Despite the skills provided by over 20 years of A.I.D. assistance, it was a new and committed Minister of Education who provided the political catalyst needed to make the project work. (3) Realistic and effective national budget allocations are needed to ensure sustained educational reform. In a word, responsibility for expanding and refining the program now rests with the Government of Paraguay.

A.I.D. and education: a sector report on lessons learned

PN-AAL-034

*Warren, Marion K.
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Jan 1984, xi, 34p. + annexes, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 12*

findings from impact evaluations of 12 A.I.D. education projects are herein reviewed and summarized. The projects (four each in Asia and Latin America, two each in Africa and the Near East) included such activities as establishing institutions and institutional processes, curriculum reform, distance teaching, vocational and nonformal adult education, teacher training, and building/equipping educational facilities. The following lessons were drawn: (1) Since the lasting effects of an education project are only apparent over time, A.I.D. should be prepared to make long-term commitments. (2) A.I.D. efforts have significantly helped to increase and equalize

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access to education. (3) A.I.D. training of professionals and support of educational institutions have been successful, especially when supported by career advancement and salary incentives. (4) Careful prefeasibility studies and serious collaborative planning are essential to projects that introduce new teaching methods and curricula in remote areas. (5) To ensure continuity, A.I.D. must not only introduce cost-effective reforms, but also determine how recurrent costs are apportioned, whether the costs are reasonable, and what will motivate continued payment of maintenance expenses. (6) A project must fit into the wider economic context, respond to work force needs, and advance economic growth. (7) Project success depends on good rapport among host country officials, institutions, and key A.I.D. personnel, and on careful consideration during the design phase of host country policy and of institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural constraints. Future research needs are to: undertake a more comprehensive study of A.I.D.'s education interventions and a more representative study of A.I.D.'s non-formal education efforts; balance the need to expand access to education with the need to maintain its quality; determine whether the generally poor results of job-oriented education projects are representative; and assess the indirect impact of A.I.D. projects on established institutions and programs. Appended are data sheets for the 12 projects and proceedings of a 2/82 A.I.D. conference on the above findings.

7.4 TRAINING

Annotated bibliography of participant training evaluations, studies, and related reports

PN-AAU-752

Elmer, Laurel; Moser, Tom
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Apr 1986, viii, 75p., Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 8

Part of an effort to develop and initiate a long-term impact evaluation program for A.I.D.'s Participant Training Program, this annotated and

comprehensive bibliography presents evaluative information on participant training for the first time in a systematic format. The bibliography covers the program over a 30-year period and contains 211 citations under the headings of: (1) general studies; (2) country studies; (3) regional studies; (4) evaluations of specific components of the training program; and (5) sector training evaluations. The documents include AID/W and Mission staff reports, studies sponsored by A.I.D., and relevant studies not sponsored by A.I.D. Materials are arranged by title in chronological order. In addition, sections 2-4 are arranged by country, region, and training program component, respectively. The majority of the reports may be found in A.I.D.'s Development Information System or in the A.I.D. Library. Inquiries regarding the ordering of documents should be addressed to the latter.

[Author abstract, modified]

Review of participant training evaluation studies

PN-AAV-288

Moser, Tom; Elmer, Laurel
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

May 1985, xvi, 42p., statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 11

The first step in an effort to develop an impact evaluation program for A.I.D. participant training (PT) activities, this study reviews 206 evaluations and related documents on PT over a 30-year period and from all A.I.D. geographic areas. The study showed relatively limited PT activity during the 1970s (due in part to A.I.D.'s preoccupation with Vietnam and to the Congressional mandate to reach the "poorest of the poor"), increasing PT activity in Africa and the Near East, and, with three notable exceptions, that the evaluation of PT has focused on operational issues rather than on PT's long-term effectiveness. The 141 specific recommendations contained in the documentation were classified into categories representing the program's major features—orientation; A.I.D. management; training design, strategy, and location; re-entry and follow-up; support services at training site; participant selection and placement; English-language training; complementary programs;

and research and evaluation. An annotated bibliography of the documentation was developed and has been published separately.

[Author abstract, modified]

Analysis of AID participant training projects

PN-AAV-430

Elmer, Laurel; Moser, Tom
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jun 1986, x, 25p., statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 12

In order to define and assess the project mechanisms through which A.I.D. provides participant training, a descriptive analysis of 107 AID-supported projects was conducted; findings are provided in this paper. Three categories of projects (training only, multi-input projects with a training element, and centrally-funded projects) are defined, and within these, nine training modes (e.g., scholarships, university support, or U.S.-focused) are identified. Evaluative summaries of the training modes are presented, with particular attention given to their respective strengths and weaknesses, followed by findings on 10 general issues of interest to USAID personnel responsible for participant training: English language ability, candidate availability, training utilization, attrition, women's participation, selection, participant placement, location of training, program extensions and successive degrees, and degree equivalency. Two recommendations are given for improving the evaluation of participant training, and thus gaining evidence of the benefits from investment in training programs.

Assessment of the impact of A.I.D.'s participant training programs in Nepal

PN-AAX-234

Kumar, Krishna; Nacht, Michael
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

7.0 Social Services and Human Resource Development

Mar 1990, xv, 57p.: charts, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 68

Since 1951, the U.S. Government has provided long-term training in the United States, India, and other countries to 1,719 Nepalese nationals. This report evaluates the training programs on the basis of case studies of particular institutions and hundreds of interviews with participants and their coworkers. A major finding is that the programs have introduced large numbers of highly trained people into Nepalese society, who, in turn, have created a multiplier effect by strengthening or creating new institutions. Most of the trainees have moved to middle and senior levels of government agencies, with a few rising to positions such as cabinet minister, permanent secretary, and head of educational and research institutions. Many have been effective in diffusing new attitudes towards the work ethic, the merit system, and the need for continuous training into their respective institutions. It is apparent that Nepal's economic development would have been far less successful without the support of these programs. The contribution of third country training deserves special mention: given Nepal's severe shortage of trained personnel, many major development initiatives in agriculture, health education, rural development, and family planning would not have been implemented without it. On the negative side, trainees have not reflected the Nepalese population as a whole. Rather, they are drawn primarily from the socioeconomic elite and from the Katmandu Valley and other high-population areas. Women

have been decidedly underrepresented, and in fact, the percentage of women participants actually declined from 14% in the 1955-1964 period to 4% from 1975-1984.

Role of participant training in building social science capabilities in Asia

PN-ABC-901

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Aug 1989, 8p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 32

An extensive study of participant training programs funded by international foundations and A.I.D. suggests that such programs have largely succeeded in building indigenous social science capabilities all over Asia. The study found that an overwhelming majority of the trainees were satisfied with the support provided by funding agencies for travel, immigration, health, family, and academic work. However, recent trainees (i.e., those who studied after 1975) were slightly less satisfied than the earlier ones. Most of the participants also expressed satisfaction with their training and found it to be quite useful to their work and profession. The findings indicate that participants did not encounter major reentry problems. They adjusted easily to their home environments and work situations and did not

expect or require any help from the funding sources. Adjustment to professional work was a different matter, however. Most participants faced difficulties in getting access to current books, professional journals, and funds for research and overseas travel and felt the need for support from both national and international agencies for their professional advancement. An overwhelming majority of the trainees returned home and continued to work there. Thus there is absolutely no evidence that overseas training contributed to migration of Asian social scientists to the United States or other industrialized countries. Many of the participants were occupying senior positions at the time of the study. They were secretaries, joint secretaries, and directors in governments; presidents, deans, and professors in universities and research organizations; chairpersons of public bodies and enterprises; and even top executives of business organizations. A majority of the foundation trainees went to universities and research institutions, and most of the A.I.D. participants to jobs in government. Participants who joined educational institutions were involved in teaching graduate and undergraduate students, conducting field research, and consulting with national and international agencies. Even the participants who took administrative and technical jobs often taught courses and kept in touch with the academic community. On the whole, participants have made profound contributions to the growth of various social science disciplines and the legitimization of applied research for policy formulation and decisionmaking.

[Author abstract]

8.0 Food Aid and Disaster Relief

Morocco: food aid and nutrition education

PN-NAH-851

Gilmore, Judith W.; Adelman, Carol C.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

1980, 63p., Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 8
6080123

Although Morocco has a high per capita GNP relative to most developing countries, its income distribution pattern is skewed and the health and nutrition status of many is deficient. In this report, the impact of the introduction by Catholic Relief Services of nutrition education into 250 Moroccan social education centers (SECs) which distribute PL 480, Title II food is described. To launch this education program, a nutrition institute was established at Marrakech to train a cadre of Moroccan women in basic nutrition and health. This cadre developed a curriculum of practical lessons in nutrition, sanitation, and the treatment of childhood diseases which were presented at monthly nutrition classes held at the SECs. Class attendance was spurred on by the prospect of obtaining Title II food. There was a significant correlation noted between increased education and improved nutrition in the children taking part in the program. Moreover, mothers enrolled in the program demonstrated a greater knowledge of proper breastfeeding practices, appropriate pregnancy and nursing diets, treatment of infant diarrhea, diseases requiring vaccination, and animal and vegetable protein sources. Management of this program was exceptional, as indicated by prompt food deliveries, an excellent record-keeping system, uniform and accurate infant weighing procedures, weekly home follow-up visits for absent or sick mothers, and monthly visits from the provincial directrices. It was

learned from the program that dependence on Title II foods inhibits the potential expansion of this program and endangers its continuation; Title II programs can be used to gather data for project design; and requiring all mothers to pay to participate in the food and nutrition education program kept the individual centers self-sustaining and created a sense of responsibility for the mothers. It is recommended that Title II organizations establish cooperative relationships with relevant ministries; that methods be devised to phase out the donated food component; and that attendance be increased without diminishing the education program's impact. A 29-item French and English bibliography (1972-80), footnotes, and various other appendices are included.

PL 480 Title II: a study of the impact of a food assistance program in the Philippines

PN-AAJ-622

Blumenfeld, Stewart; Flores, Maria B.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Asia, Philippines

Aug 1982, xii, 147p. + 6 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 6
492PL02

The relatively high prevalence of malnutrition among preschool children in the Philippines is a persistent and serious problem. This evaluation is designed to assess the nutritional impact, cost-effectiveness, and achievements of A.I.D.'s PL 480, Title II program in the Philippines and to produce information which will enhance the program's effectiveness. It is concluded that the Maternal/Child Health (MCH) and Day Care programs are effective in combatting the highest priority malnutrition (in children under 6), and so have the greatest nutritional impact (as evidenced by weight gains by beneficiaries), but that School Feeding addresses a lower nutritional priority and

does so less effectively. MCH and, to a lesser degree, Day Care were also found to be the most cost-effective. The Food for Work program, while providing positive and equitable community benefits, failed to have a substantial or sustained impact on individual participant households. More regular delivery of commodities in greater amounts is required for optimum program effectiveness. In future Title II allocations in the Philippines, MCH and Day Care should be accorded the highest priority, followed by the School Feeding and then Food for Work programs until the latter two programs are phased out. Other Child Feeding and Adult Feeding activities lack integrated developmental objectives and should have fifth priority, but on strictly humanitarian grounds. The Snack Food program should have lowest priority, in spite of its revenue-generating potential, since its audience is adequately nourished and more economically advantaged. Lessons learned include the need for better assessment of the long-term impact of supplementary feeding programs and for increased long-term, grass-roots involvement of nutritionists and nutrition planners in Title II decisionmaking. Experience also suggests that programs covering the family as a unit will be more cost-effective than those benefiting children alone.

Sri Lanka: the impact of PL 480 Title I food assistance

PN-AAJ-623

Steinberg, David I.; Adamczyk, Christine; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Oct 1982, 38p. + 9 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 39

The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) has a long history of food support to its population, aided since 1956 by a PL 480 Title I program which has

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provided some \$277 million worth of food—mainly wheat flour and wheat. This impact evaluation is the first of a series of country PL 480-I studies. Title I continued to provide food aid despite wide changes in U.S. policy and in Sri Lanka's political and economic life. Apparently, the commodities did not affect domestic rice production, which increased; the relatively minor production of coarse grains was reduced, however. While the wheat and flour did not reach many of the rural poor—who prefer to purchase rice, using food stamps—its availability may have freed rice for broader consumption. Groups at high-risk of malnutrition have not received any special benefits. The self-help measures in the Title I agreements have been virtually superfluous because the GSL has on its own pursued sound rural development policies. At any rate, proceeds from commodity sales were credited to a general account and cannot be identified. On balance, the program has probably contributed positively to U.S.-Sri Lanka relations and has been modestly helpful in relieving U.S. grain surpluses and opening sales possibilities for U.S. firms. Title I provides Sri Lanka with a significant positive balance of payments and is treated by the GSL as a multi-year resource, although it is programmed annually. An innovative multi-year commitment of food aid which would not require GSL policy reform nor involve Title III administrative costs is recommended. The PL 480 experience in Sri Lanka suggests that Title I is policy neutral in its effects, despite attempts to integrate it into overall assistance strategies. Self-help measures need not be quantified annually when a country's basic policies are sound; if self-help measures must be quantified, an adequate monitoring system is needed. This evaluation also shows that Title I commodities do not have to be consumed directly by targeted groups; it would be well for donors to understand local food demand patterns. Finally, provision of Title I commodities requires detailed analysis of a country's ability to forecast production and consumption. Seven reports on various aspects of Sri Lanka's food supply are appended.

Food aid and development: the impact and effectiveness of bilateral PL 480 Title I-type assistance

PN-AAL-003

Clay, Edward J.; Singer, Hans W.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Dec 1982, x, 65p. + attachments, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 15

Food aid programs operate today within the contexts of priority for the relatively poorest countries, a multiplicity of food donors, tighter food markets, restrictive host country financial regimes, and an increasing focus on food aids developmental potential. This report surveys existing literature on the nearly 30-year-old PL 480 program to assess the direct and developmental impacts of program food aid (Titles I and III) on recipient countries. An analysis of the direct impact of Title I programs discusses why food aid may be an inferior form of resource transfer, investigates the food import problems of low-income countries and the relation between food aid and food security, and evaluates the use of food aid as balance of payments support. The developmental impact of food aid is discussed next, with special attention given to its incentive and disincentive effects; the role of changing tastes; the impact of food aid on government policies, nutrition, income distribution, and production technology; and the results of targeting poorer groups. A discussion of programming and operational issues covers the increasing importance of donor effectiveness, the relation of food aid to other development assistance programs, and conditionality requirements for host country self-help measures. A brief summary of the highly diverse impacts of food aid on development concludes the report. Appendices include a review of food aid in India and a six-page list of references (1936-81).

PL 480 Title I: the Egyptian case

PN-AAL-015

Blue, Richard N.; Dunlop, David W.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jun 1983, xix, 48p. + 9 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 45
263PLO1

The history and varied impacts of the PL 480 Title I program in Egypt (reinstated in 1974 following a break in 1967) are assessed in light of Government of Egypt (GOE) policies and food needs. Also assessed is the program's impact on U.S. objectives. Major conclusions are: (1) To the extent that it reduces the cost of food imports essential to the GOE's policy of ensuring a plentiful supply of cheap bread, Title I supports policies that act as disincentives to farmers (despite evidence that improved technologies could increase production by 50%); 1967-74 data support the inference of a disincentive effect. Population growth and other pressures, however, may force the GOE to improve domestic production; options for doing so are presented. (2) Wheat distribution by the Ministry of Supply tends to strengthen the Ministry's control over all elements of the food distribution chain, possibly making it difficult to reorient the system—which has eliminated or severely reduced regionally centered private marketing and processing of wheat and wheat flour—toward increased local production. (3) General data (it is almost impossible to disaggregate Title I wheat from the total supply) show that daily per capita caloric intake has reached nearly 2,800 and that infant mortality increases when the wheat supply is interrupted, but also that there may be increased obesity and diabetes due to high carbohydrate intake. (4) Self-help provisions have been poorly monitored by USAID/E, although policy dialogue, Egyptian coordination, and the specificity of the agreements have improved since 1979. (5) Title I, which the GOE considers critical to U.S.-Egyptian relations, has helped ensure the U.S. foreign policy objective—which has been overriding—of Egyptian stability, a key factor in the Mideast peace process. (6) Marketing and budgetary effects have been limited. The United States should continue to encourage GOE efforts to adjust its agricultural pricing policy in order to ensure that this largest of all Title I programs fully complies with the

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letter and spirit of recent PL 480 legislation and U.S. development policy initiatives. Included are 25 tables, 13 figures, several complementary analyses, and a 40-item bibliography (1968-82).

Impact of PL 480 Title I in Peru: food aid as an effective development resource

PN-AAL-021

Johnson, Twig; Berry, Elizabeth B.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Oct 1983, xvii, 49p. + 10 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 47

Peru's experience with PL 480 Title I food aid provides some important lessons, especially regarding USAID/P's success in integrating Title I into overall A.I.D. assistance. The Title I program's in-country context, key elements, and impacts in Peru, 1978-83, are herein reviewed. While it is difficult to isolate Title I impacts on agricultural production or nutritional status, several results of long-term importance can be noted. USAID/P's use of Title I-generated local currency to provide counterpart funding has kept USAID/P development projects fully funded in times of economic crisis, allowed the Mission to respond quickly to new initiatives and special projects, leveraged additional Government of Peru (GOP) resources into successful projects launched with the help of Title I resources, and, perhaps most importantly, significantly increased funding for PVO Food for Work projects. Its inclusion as part of the U.S.-GOP project level dialogue indicates Title I's integration into the total USAID/P program. On the other hand, the year-to-year uncertainty of Title I resources makes programming hazardous, sometimes forcing projects to be terminated or reduced, even, as in the case of reforestation, to the jeopardy of previous gains. Further, USAID/P development objectives seem to carry no weight in A.I.D./W program decisions. The program's instability is further increased by the sometimes conflicting aims pursued by the many agencies defining yearly programs and by U.S. and GOP staff and institutional changes. It is noted that the actions of special interests (such as the U.S. rice lobby in 1982), when not coordinated through Embassy channels, can jeopardize U.S. foreign policy interests. A pilot 3-4 year Title I program is recommended to eliminate program uncertainties and

allow USAID/P to exert greater policy leverage, e.g., in reforming agricultural credit policies, and to allow the programming of local currencies to be integrated with the Peruvian budget cycle rather than the Title I cycle. Appendices include, *inter alia*, overviews of Peru's economic situation since 1968, of PL 480 programs, and of the uses of local currency 1955-65 and 1979-82, and a 67-item bibliography (1961-82).

Comparative analysis of five PL 480 Title I impact evaluation studies

PN-AAL-030

Dunlop, David W.; Adamczyk, Christine; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)

Dec 1983, xiv, 62p. + annexes, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 19

A comparative analysis of the findings of impact evaluations of PL 480 Title I programs in Bangladesh, Egypt, Jamaica, Peru, and Sri Lanka is presented. Initial sections describe changes in U.S. agriculture and policies since Title I's inception in 1954, and the resulting effect on PL 480 programming. Next discussed are the various host country contexts and their evolution, including two cases (Egypt and Peru) where Title I aid was interrupted. A review of socioeconomic development in the five countries highlights differing possibilities for program impact. Assessment of Title I's macroeconomic impact shows that the impact on balance of payments support, while positive in each case, was more apparent in countries with greater economic constraints (Bangladesh, Jamaica) and that the program tended to directly benefit the more affluent in Jamaica and Peru. Evaluation of microeconomic and development impacts reveals a production disincentive effect since the early 1960s for one or more food crops, although these disincentives may be offset by improvements in food import policy. The impact on nutritional status and dietary patterns was found to vary: wheat consumption increased in Egypt and Sri Lanka, while the program helped place a floor on caloric intake in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. A final section notes that Title I has promoted U.S. foreign policy aims but has not strengthened U.S. agricultural markets or (except in Bangladesh) policy dialogue. It is concluded that: either Title I's multi-

year option or a modified Title III would provide significant programmatic and policy improvements; self-help agreements are too vague and should be replaced by a rolling 5-year planning exercise, as in Peru; improved coordination between food and nonfood donors, especially the International Monetary Fund, can increase the likelihood of desired policy changes and minimize host country logistical problems. Further data needs are to measure more precisely the long- and short-run disincentive effects of PL 480 on large and marginal programs and to better document the nutrition and dietary pattern impacts of food aid, especially Title I. The impact evaluations demonstrate the need to monitor A.I.D. programs continuously.

Jamaica: the impact and effectiveness of the PL 480 Title I program

PN-AAL-035

Sidman, Barry; Crosswell, Michael; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Feb 1984, xv, 31p. + 12 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. project impact evaluation report, no. 51
532PL01

The impact of A.I.D.'s PL 480, Title I program in Jamaica during the period 1975-80 is evaluated. Despite increases in PL 480 and other direct and indirect forms of A.I.D. assistance, Jamaica's economy continued to decline during the period: the Gross Domestic Product fell 14%; unemployment rose 5% to 27%; and production remained overly dependent on imports with no increased export capacity. PL 480 food aid, which averaged \$10 million annually (1977-80), at best alleviated the symptoms of economic crisis—while at the same time increasing the country's foreign debt. Positively, PL 480 aid did not increase food imports (although it may have affected their composition), because post-1975 Jamaican policies stimulated domestic food production and helped reduce food imports by 54%; this indicates the importance of host country food import policies in determining potential disincentive effects of food aid. Self-help measures had little if any effect on Jamaican development, although agreement on counterpart allocations stimulated line ministries to meet their implementation responsibilities to avoid forfeiting future PL 480 funds. Reports on self-help measures should be given

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importance in designing and implementing Title I programs. While generally consonant with PL 480 objectives, the program did not directly promote the key objectives of economic reform and structural adjustment; nor are these sufficiently ensured by agreements with the International Monetary Fund, agreements which US-AID/J should scrutinize carefully. Further, the program's foreign policy and balance of payments justifications clashed and ultimately overcame market development objectives, although this was perhaps inevitable given the economic situation. Recommendations are that: school feeding be either phased out or supplied by counterpart funds and local commodity purchases; efforts be made to ensure that all parties participate in determining self-help measures and local currency uses; and Title I impacts be evaluated on the basis of economic indicators and policy concerns rather than such elements as institutional change, technology transfer, and small farmer benefits.

PL 480 Title I: a discussion of impact evaluation results and recommendations

PN-AAL-044

Rogers, Beatrice Lorge; Wallerstein, Mitchel B.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Feb 1985, vii, 24p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 13

In April 1983, A.I.D.'s Office of Evaluation convened a 4-day conference to discuss the results of a 2-year effort to evaluate the impacts of the PL 480 Title I program. This report summarizes discussion by the conferees on: (1) the varied impacts of Title I food delivery, e.g., in terms of agricultural disincentives, food self-reliance, policy reform, and structural adjustment; and (2) the various mechanisms (e.g., single-year vs. multi-year programming, self-help agreements, and commodity mix) used to administer the Title I program. All conferees agreed that the Title I program could be improved by: implementing multi-year programming; integrating food aid with other development assistance; making self-help agreements more specific and food delivery more timely; programming food by volume instead of value; giving recipient countries a greater say in the choice of food commodities; improving A.I.D./host country policy dia-

logue; accepting the inefficiency of the multi-agency structure; and promoting the involvement of the private sector. A summary of action taken on these recommendations since the conference concludes the report. Summaries of impact studies in Sri Lanka, Peru, Egypt, Jamaica, and Bangladesh are appended.

School feeding programs in developing countries: an analysis of actual and potential impact

PN-AAL-060

Levinger, Beryl
Columbia University. Teachers College. Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance. Office of Program, Policy and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jan 1986, x, 99p. + bibliography; statistical table, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 30

Studies of the effects of school feeding programs (SFPs) on student attendance and enrollment, nutritional status, and cognitive development are assessed.

Regarding SFP impact on attendance and enrollment: (1) 3 retrospective analyses and 6 comparative studies proved inconclusive, although the latter suggest that SFPs may be most effective in poorer areas where attendance is low, and that program regularity is a key factor; (2) of 8 studies covering 11 countries and based mainly on teachers' impressions, 7 noted a positive impact of SFPs on attendance and enrollment, although methodological imprecisions make these findings suspect. Studies from Guatemala and Nepal on the general impact of nutritional status on school attendance were reviewed. Both suggested that SFPs designed to improve nutritional status will indirectly improve attendance and performance as well. The Nepal study also found that the influence of nutritional status on enrollment may differ between boys and girls. Regarding cognitive development: (1) general studies of the relation of diet to cognitive development showed a positive correlation between the two, but also that a climate of poverty compounds dysfunctions due to malnutrition; (2) of 4 studies of the specific impact of SFPs on cognitive development, 2 lacked base-

line data and proved inconclusive, while the other 2 suggest that exogenous factors affect performance as much as SFPs themselves, but also that SFPs are not designed to mitigate these factors; (3) 6 studies of short-term behavioral effects of SFPs provided conflicting results, but suggest that the provision of breakfast may enhance performance; (4) 5 studies of long-term behavioral effects of SFPs were seriously flawed methodologically. The report also examines how SFPs can help improve a school system's efficiency, especially in relation to attendance and academic performance. A final section proposes recommendations for operations research on 3 issues—the changes SFPs promote and for whom they promote them, the interdependence of these changes, and the ideal SFP design. A 9-page bibliography (1949–83) is appended.

Evaluation of the emergency food assistance program: synthesis report

PN-AAL-082

Wood, Dennis H.; Baron, Albert; Brown, Vincent W.

Devres, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance. Office of Program, Policy and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Nov 1986, xxiv, 81p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 16
U.S. response to the African famine, 1984–1986, v. 1

9380800

Provided herein is a detailed examination of the U.S. Food Assistance program in Chad, Mali, and the Sudan during 1984–85. The program helped 6 million people in Sudan, 2 million in Mali, and over a million in Chad cope with the worst food crisis of written record. The program succeeded by identifying food distribution channels—especially PVOs and the private sector (coordination with other donors helped in Mali and Chad only)—and by utilizing all distribution modes, including specialized feeding programs (which allowed targeted beneficiaries to be reached regularly), monetization (a key component in all 3 countries), and general distribution (effective when well-monitored). Also, the traditional coping mechanisms (e.g., sharing, use of famine foods) of the affected populations served greatly to extend the distribution of emergency foods.

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Program effectiveness was enhanced by the use of socioeconomic and nutrition/health data to target needy persons and areas for supplemental feeding. This was especially evident in Chad; lack of supplemental feeding in Sudan and Mali reduced the impact on those most at risk, especially children. Packaging of resources (e.g., providing technical assistance, money, seeds, transport as well as food) also increased effectiveness, particularly for certain distribution modes such as resettlement in Chad. Although the 3 USAID's performed well, given limited staff resources, program management suffered in that it was attempted within normal development channels, and mostly by persons with little or no emergency food aid experience. There was a striking lack of preparedness—although the drought was already in its third year—on the part of USAID's, donors, and host governments; needs assessments were far off the mark, due to lack of accurate data. Also, monitoring was introduced late and focused more on adherence to procedures than on impact assessment. Development programs in the three countries were not being aimed at raising inadequate income levels—the root of both underdevelopment and food emergencies. Nor, except for resettlement efforts in Chad and minor Food for Work projects in Mali, did the program address the income problem. Included is a detailed strategy, based on lessons learned during the program, for achieving U.S. emergency food assistance objectives.

Analysis of policy formation and program management

PN-AAL-083

*Siegel, Stanley; Gutman, Harvey; et al.
Development Associates, Inc.*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Nov 1986, xxii, 93p. + 3 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 17
U.S. response to the African famine,
1984–1986, v. 2*

While the efforts of U.S. and international donors saved many African lives during the 1984–86 drought and famine, coordinated disaster relief (DR) needs improvement. This paper reviews the policy formation and management of the U.S. food response and suggests methods for improving DR for future emergencies. An

opening section presents a history of past and present DR efforts and the prospects for implementing successful future programs in the face of an increasingly difficult world economic, environmental, and political situation. Given that disasters often occur across national borders or in “unfriendly” countries, the political aspect of DR (including management issues and the level and mode of emergency famine assistance) weighs heavily. In response to this, the report recommends that an international task force, composed of African and donor representatives, be created under the aegis of the World Bank. Plans are presented for gaining the necessary legislative and economic (including supplemental funding) support for DR. Methods for utilizing and/or upgrading existing early warning systems (EWSs) to better anticipate emergency situations are given and recommendations are presented for: integrating national EWSs; defining the role of host governments; using EWSs in development programs; and evaluating EWS projects. Because the U.S. will probably play a key role in future DR programs (as it has done in the past), attention is given to which management structure the U.S. should adopt. Recommendations are also given for managing assistance to refugees and coordinating the inputs of other agencies. A thorough review and detailed recommendations for implementing DR programs is given including logistics and transportation, and the coordination of donor activities. Much of the implementation of past DR programs has been dependent on PVOs which, because they are in the field, play a large role in disbursing relief goods. Recommendations are given for maintaining good relations with the public and Congress, both of which provide important DR support. Because emergency relief is, by nature, short-term, methods are given for turning DR into recovery and eventually development efforts; ways of doing so and the roles of donors and host governments comprise the subjects of the final chapter.

Evaluation of the African emergency food assistance program in Chad, 1984–1985

PN-AAL-091

*Brown, Vincent W.; Brown, Ellen Patterson; et al.
Devres, Inc.*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Jun 1987, xx, 48p. + 8 appendices: charts, map,
statistical tables, Eng.*

*A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 48
Earlier ed.: PN-AAV-790*

A.I.D. and other donors mounted a massive emergency effort to feed the 1.5 million Chadians affected by the 1984–85 drought. Despite its shortcomings, the program was a success, according to this evaluation. Based on secondary sources review and interviews and observations in Washington, D.C. and in the field, the evaluation presents detailed findings, conclusions, and recommendations in five key areas—timing, management, impact, health and nutrition, and transition to development. Timing. Due to a lack of early warning, emergency preparedness, and contingency plans, available amounts of emergency food were insufficient in late 1984 and early 1985, diluting program effectiveness. Chad's weak transportation and logistical systems—compounded by political problems—proved major obstacles. Management. The management strategy of using the World Food Programme (WFP) and PVOs, supported by a network of action committees under the Government of Chad (GOC), as the main implementing agencies proved very successful. Fuller and earlier delegation by AID/W to USAID/C of contracting responsibility would have helped avoid delays. Impact. Although insufficient in late 1984 and early 1985, emergency food assistance was targeted successfully and saved many lives, especially among the needy who received food in targeted programs of the WFP and PVOs rather than through general distribution. Resettlement programs successfully limited the creation of spontaneous camps; some of those resettled were taught productive agricultural techniques. Health and nutrition. The GOC depended heavily on donors and PVOs to define the health and nutritional impacts of the famine. PVOs in particular did an excellent job of identifying geographical areas for emergency food distribution. However, lack of infrastructure greatly inhibited health efforts. Vitamin A deficiency was neither assessed nor treated, nor was oral rehydration therapy used extensively. Transition to development. The shift from emergency relief to development was facilitated by mechanisms such as food for work and resettlement. The transition needs, however, to account for persons still at risk and to develop a strategy in case the drought recurs in 1986. Included are 10 general recommendations for future emergency food distribution programs.

8.0 Food Aid and Disaster Relief

Evaluation of the African emergency food assistance program in Mali, 1984-1985

PN-AAL-092

Baron, Albert R.; Hammond, Peter; Swartzendruber, H.D.

Devres, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jun 1987, xx, 57p. + 8 appendices: map,
statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 49
Earlier ed.: PN-AAV-789

An emergency food aid program of A.I.D. and other donors helped the Government of Mali (GOM) combat the 1984-85 drought, the worst on record in that food-deficit, drought-prone country. This evaluation, based on document review and interviews, provides findings and recommendations in key areas of the program, to which A.I.D. allocated 95 MTs of emergency food (worth \$46 million). Poor timing reduced program impact and cost-effectiveness. A 6-month delay in the arrival of emergency food at port—a problem compounded by lack of contingency planning—led to shortfalls in the emergency food available in the period (March-June) before the rains and again early in the July-August rainy season. USAID/M devised an effective food distribution strategy, which consisted of: using the well-established mechanisms of the Mali Grain Marketing Board (OPAM) to distribute food supplies in urban areas (where they were augmented by monetization of Title II foodgrain); using indigenous private voluntary organizations and donor agencies to manage free distribution in rural areas; and promoting close donor cooperation with the GOM. This strategy overcame the serious deficiencies of prior programs and got emergency food supplies to some 2 million people. Distribution was well targeted, rations were appropriate and sufficient, and losses and misuse of food were small. But, an inadequate needs assessment led both the GOM and donors to seriously underestimate the need for emergency food in rural areas. Also, while donor coordination was strong at the national level (despite strained GOM and USAID/M resources), local-level planning largely ad hoc and uncoordinated. Even so, the program was decisive in averting massive rural famine and exodus. USAID/M also helped estab-

lish an effective system of cholera control and treatment and financed important studies to assess Mali's overall drought situation and its 1985-86 agricultural situation. The report includes general recommendations to relate emergency food programs in Mali more closely to national food strategies, as well as several detailed annexes.

Evaluation of the African emergency food assistance program in Sudan, 1984-1985

PN-AAL-093

Brown, Vincent W.; Stolba, Soheir Sukkary; et al.
Devres, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jun 1987, xxv, 63p. + 5 appendices: charts,
maps, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 50

A.I.D.'s massive emergency food program to combat the 1984-85 drought in Sudan is evaluated in this report. Although the program critically benefited millions of people, it could have had greater impact and been more cost effective. A.I.D.'s plans to have foods in position prior to the rainy season failed, causing serious delays and shortfalls in food delivery. As a partial result, timeliness was a continuing problem—nearly 12 months elapsed between each USAID/S request and full distribution of the foods. An added problem was the inability of other agencies and the host government to meet their obligations on time. Program management was good given the small and inexperienced USAID/S staff, AID/W's inflexible management system, and a decision to coordinate with other donors at the country level (thus placing the burden on USAID/S). USAID/S effectively used the private sector, local governments, and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in managing the program, a strategy that helped develop local food emergency capacities. On the other hand, USAID/S's failure to link the food emergency with long-term development led to very late rehabilitation responses. PVOs proved especially effective, but private contractors were reluctant to deliver food to remote areas. Rural people, especially in those areas, received too little food and did not receive it when needed. The program substantially limited migration from villages, but initiated supplemental feeding late and health inputs hardly at all. Title II monetiza-

tion in urban areas did not work well due to lack of distribution and financial controls.

Development impacts of program food aid: a synthesis of donor findings and current trends and strategies

PN-AAX-239

Vondal, Patricia J.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

(Meeting of the Expert Group on Evaluation of
the Development Assistance Committee,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, US, Feb 1990)

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper, no.
30, Jun 1990, 21p., Eng.

For the past two decades, donor food aid programs have had their greatest impact at the macroeconomic level in the form of balance of payments and budgetary support; in many cases, these programs were critical to sustaining debtor governments. Recently, however, the strain of structural adjustment programs on the poor has renewed interest in the uses of program food aid for its original objective—the alleviation of hunger. Accordingly, many donors have attempted to influence recipient governments to use local currency generations for agricultural projects and to reform their food policies. In general, however, this approach has been hampered by limited managerial and financial resources when only one donor is involved, as well as by the complexity of food security issues. Multi-donor approaches, which have been coordinated by the World Food Programme and focused on implementing food and agriculture policy reforms, have proven more promising. Several related lessons have been learned from these efforts: (1) to attain the goal of food security, donors and recipient governments must negotiate a set of mutually supportive strategies for the use of donor common funds; (2) these negotiations must be supported by multi-year commitments of donor support; (3) the strategies developed must be based on a joint, unbiased analysis of the underlying causes of food insecurity in the recipient country; and (4) the use of food aid to alleviate hunger requires that vulnerable groups be identified at the program planning stage.

9.0 Other Programs

9.1 DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES

A.I.D.'s experience with democratic initiatives: a review of regional programs in legal institution building

PN-AAX-232

Mason, John P.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Feb 1990, x, 43p., Eng.

*A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 29*

A.I.D.'s experience in promoting democratic institutions in developing countries has produced only modest results. To review A.I.D.'s involvement in this area, this report examines the Agency's legal institution building programs, using a set of four criteria—management organization, institution building effectiveness, improvements in human rights, and sustainability. The assessment revealed real constraints in the management organization of the programs and projects. While these may result from inadequate coordination with the Mission or A.I.D./W, they may also reflect a lack of full commitment by the Agency to democratic development. Further, the more ambitious goals of legal reform or transformation of judicial systems have simply not been met. Much the same is true of human rights improvements; no sense of broad societal changes in attitudes or behavior could be detected. Moreover, in cases tested, it did not

appear that democratic initiatives would be sustained after the withdrawal of A.I.D. funding. The report argues, however, that A.I.D. can make a significant contribution to improving legal institutional structures in a country which initiates such improvement and openly accepts U.S. assistance. It is probably also necessary that the initiating country already possesses a basic legal system on which it can build. Lessons learned are that: (1) to achieve success, the Agency as a whole must transmit the substance and process of democratic development, and not simply the form, to developing countries; (2) regional bureaus must gear program priorities for democratic initiatives to country-specific needs; and (3) Missions must be actively involved in designing and implementing democratic initiatives and not depend simply on a centralized A.I.D./W effort.

9.2 URBANIZATION AND HOUSING

Impact evaluation of housing guaranty programs in Panama

PN-AAL-008

McDonald, Ann W.; Sorock, Margarita; et al.
*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Mar 1983, xii, 31p. + 4 appendices, Eng.

*A.I.D. project impact evaluation report,
no. 41*

525HG08; 525HG09

In response to A.I.D.'s "New Directions" policy, the Government of Panama and USAID/P

began in 1974-75 to reorient housing guaranty (HG) projects toward the poor majority. This report describes and evaluates the impact of the first two completed HG programs exemplifying this reorientation. In the Nuevo Chorillo Housing Cooperative Project, physical outputs, i.e., housing solutions, were surpassed, but considerable delinquency in loan repayments to the cooperative and the latter's lack of a working system to promote community development make replication of the project doubtful. In the slum upgrading project at San Miguelito, basic infrastructure and services were provided as planned, but major revisions were made in the type and number of low-cost housing units due to weak demand and rapidly rising costs. Evaluation of the projects' impacts on beneficiaries was extremely difficult because the program planners tended to treat physical outputs as project purposes. The most dramatic, positive impact, confirmed by beneficiary interviews, was an improved standard of living, especially in Nuevo Chorillo. It is recommended that future HG projects: (1) include short-term indicators of beneficiary impact (e.g., reduced population densities, time and labor savings, provision of basic services, cost-efficiency of solutions); (2) determine beneficiaries' housing preferences and seek their participation; (3) obtain data on specific low-income target groups as to their capacity and willingness to pay for alternative housing; (4) reliably calculate affordability through a full accounting of carrying costs and available household income; (5) seek more innovative cost reduction methods (e.g., less costly materials, lower construction standards, self-help construction with technical assistance); and (6) recognize that subsidies may be required indefinitely to ensure the accessibility of low-income housing. Finally, since inflation and program reorientation have reduced the number of jobs generated by the HG program, adjunct programs to provide jobs for unskilled laborers in other fields (e.g., light manufacturing) should be supported.

9.0 Other Programs

Role of urbanization in national development: bridging the rural-urban divide

PN-AAX-221

Mason, John P.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Jul 1989, ix, 43p. + attachments: charts,
statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 27

Since the late 1960s, A.I.D. and much of the donor community have adopted rural-based development strategies—often deemphasizing urbanization or even considering it as a problem. This paper discusses the importance of urbanization in overall national development, with a specific focus on rural-urban linkages. It is argued that urbanization in developing countries falls along a continuum of two extreme theoretical types: Type I, in which urbanization contributes to national economic growth; and Type II, in which it is coincident with inadequate growth and even underdevelopment. Generally, countries in the Near East share characteristics of Type I, sub-Saharan countries share characteristics of Type II, while Asian and Latin American nations share a mixture of both types. Government policies affecting human settlement and economically motivated rural-to-urban migration have been two key factors influencing urbanization. Equally important is the character of rural-urban linkages, which encompass economic, technological, spatial, infrastructural, financial, administrative, and participant (e.g., producer, processor, distributor, consumer, etc.) aspects. An A.I.D.-funded study of Kitus Town, Kenya, is cited to illustrate these features. According to the report, rural-urban linkages in Type I urbanization actively contribute to dynamic market systems, while linkages in Type II environments fail to create opportunities for increased employment or income generation. In reaction to the usual separation of rural and urban planning, an analytical framework for rural-urban linkage development, called ARULINKED or "Are You Linked?," is developed based on A.I.D.'s 15-year experience of trying to capture and channel energies that reinforce both rural and urban development. This framework examines patterns of migration,

backward linkages, off-farm employment, urban poverty, and mega-city growth. ARULINKED is also used to generate illustrative questions—posed in terms of macro- and sector-level analysis and planning issues—to guide project designers and Mission strategists toward a new view of urbanization.

9.3 COUNTER NARCOTICS

Review of A.I.D.'s narcotics control development assistance program

PN-AAL-054

Kumar, Krishna; Carter, Ernest; Samuelson, Stan
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Mar 1986, xii, 46p. + 5 appendices: maps,
statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 29
3910471; 4930294; 5117271; 5110543;
5270244

A.I.D.'s experience with narcotics control activities has been recent, with most projects still in the implementation stage. Nevertheless, in concert with the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters and the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse and Control, A.I.D. has played a significant role in U.S. efforts to control narcotics production and trade in several source countries. This paper reviews A.I.D.'s policy, field activities (summarizing those in Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Peru, and Bolivia), key issues in project implementation, and items of special interest in evaluating narcotics control projects. A.I.D. employs three major intervention strategies in development assistance for narcotics control: (1) crop substitution, or, primarily, the identification and introduction of crops to replace narcotics; (2) negotiated assistance, providing development assistance to areas where local and government officials have agreed to control narcotics production; and (3) area development (believed to be most effective), to provide new income and employment

opportunities for farmers adversely affected by a narcotics control project. Impediments to the control of narcotics crop cultivation through development have included: host government inability or unwillingness to formulate long-term control programs and policies; the high profitability of narcotics crops; difficulty in reaching remote areas; faltering national economies making narcotics cultivation and trade attractive; local cultural acceptance of narcotics; and the presence of powerful trafficking organizations. It is recommended that A.I.D.: (1) pursue multidimensional area development in narcotics-producing areas; (2) design these initiatives for the long term; (3) lend greater weight to sociocultural factors significant to narcotics trade and its eradication; (4) consider giving project management staff freedom to plan and act; (5) include in each project a separate unit to mobilize the population against narcotics cultivation and trafficking; (6) initiate and support public education in potential source nations; (7) establish linkages with local law enforcement agencies; and (8) exploit project evaluations for data collection.

9.4 EMPLOYMENT GENERATION

A.I.D.'s experience with selected employment generation projects

PN-AAX-203

Bowles, W. Donald
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Mar 1988, xix, 90p. + 2 appendices + 2
attachments, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 53

In response to the high levels of Third World under- and unemployment, A.I.D. has increasingly funded employment generation (EG) projects, particularly in the off-farm sector. This study reviews over 30 such projects, with a focus on the policy environment as it relates to distortions in foreign exchange, factor, and product pricing. Initial sections present the

9.0 Other Programs

conflicting views of the employment problem in the literature, summarize current A.I.D. strategies in the area, and present the basic concept underlying the study's approach, namely, that of aggregate production function, according to which (other things being equal) increased growth means increased employment. The paper's central section examines five different types of EG projects—vocational education, labor-intensive infrastructure, Food for Work (FFW), export promotion, and small-scale enterprise (SSE) credit and technical assistance—reviewing each type in terms of its success, policy context, and lessons learned. A final section specifies relevant factors in the policy environment for the five areas studied (though

acknowledging the study's weak empirical base) and discusses the study's programming implications. Two areas requiring urgent donor attention are noted: the vitality of the informal sector in creating new jobs and the feasibility of export promotion projects in the present international economic environment. General conclusions on the projects studied are as follows. (1) As tools for EG, vocational education programs frequently had poor payoffs, suggesting caution in their future use. (2) Labor-intensive infrastructure and FFW projects are promising on paper, yet encountered multiple problems and typically affected small numbers of workers. There is a need to strengthen economic analysis of these projects, especially of FFW.

(3) Export promotion projects are closely tied to exchange rates—the variable most closely associated with economic growth, according to a World Bank study. (4) SSE projects provided some employment, but sometimes at great cost per job. Overall, the results of EG projects were middling or disappointing. Women were generally given no special consideration, equity was sometimes ill served, management was always difficult, and the projects were hostage to an economic and administrative environment beyond their control. Appendices include a list of conditions promoting the success of the five types of EG projects studied and a list of sectoral policies, suggesting a wide range of policy options.

10.0 Operation, Management, and Cross-Cutting Issues

10.1 GENERAL

Military expenditure and economic growth: an overview of research

PN-AAT-504

Baker, Robert

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Aug 1984, 10p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 2

Recent research on the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth is reviewed. There are three major findings: (1) Military expenditures are easily hidden and are therefore difficult to measure and assess; (2) Contrary to conventional wisdom, high military expenditure is negatively related to growth; and (3) Specifically, high military expenditure has a negative impact on human resource development, modernization, technology transfer, and the industrial sector. Recommendations are: (1) increase resources for collecting data on military expenditures; (2) match any increase in military assistance with a proportional increase in economic assistance; (3) conduct country-level analyses of military expenditures so that policymakers can better understand economic conditions in countries with different levels of spending; (4) promote improved strategic factors as an argument for economic growth.

Flexible project design approaches: AID/Washington views and examples from the Philippines

PN-AAU-631

Hermann, Chris

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Jan 1986, xii, 40p. + appendix, Eng.

*A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper,
no. 3*

The performance of project design approaches which maximize flexibility during implementation and thus allow for mid-course changes is compared with that of traditional, more specific designs. An initial section summarizes the two perspectives, citing experience with irrigation projects to clarify how flexible designs differ from standard project designs. The use of flexible design concepts by USAID/Philippines in four core projects provides the basis for discussion in section two of common design characteristics and the Mission's experience with initial implementation. Particular attention is given to the project management demands of these projects. Also, a distinction is made between two types of flexible design—rolling design, which specifies a project's ends but not its means, and process design, which remains general in regard to both. Advantages and disadvantages of flexible design are discussed and recommendations regarding its use provided.

Improving project implementation via soft management changes

PN-AAV-283

Hermann, Chris

*U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Mar 1986, 18p. + appendix, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 7

Cover date: Feb 1986

A.I.D.'s approach to resolving recurrent project implementation problems often involves "hard" management changes concerned with design issues, such as locus of authority and responsibilities. This paper identifies "soft" management changes—those that focus on people and A.I.D.'s organizational culture—that might resolve these problems. The job performance of 25 foreign service officers with a reputation for management excellence was examined to identify those characteristics (including quantity and quality of work; versatility; consistency; attitude; operational orientation; technical, analytic, and interpersonal skills; ability to reverse a bad situation; and soundness of judgement) that contributed to management effectiveness. The study suggests that in rewarding excellence A.I.D. shift its emphasis from design, planning, and general administration to management and that it correct its promotion practices so that those with implementation skills remain in project management. A.I.D. should also place greater emphasis on project manageability in project design and evaluation, and confer greater recognition, visibility, and rewards to expertise in project management.

10.0 Operation, Management, and Cross-Cutting Issues

Future of foreign assistance: a summary of issues and annotated bibliography

PN-ABC-092

Britan, Gerald M.; Bymes, Kerry J.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Apr 1989, 64p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 18

Fifty recent documents related to the prospects for U.S. foreign assistance—including major reports prepared by the A.I.D. Administrator, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and other key agencies and interest groups—are the subject of this annotated bibliography. The bibliography is arranged in three parts, focusing on, respectively: (1) the future of foreign assistance programs, organizations, and legislation; (2) changing Third World conditions that these foreign assistance programs must address; and (3) particular substantive areas (agriculture and rural development, social services, and technology transfer). An introduction briefly analyzes the issues raised in the documents and points out areas of agreement and disagreement. Overall, the documents reveal the emergence of a broad consensus that U.S. foreign assistance needs rethinking. This consensus rests first of all on common recognition of development trends—the increasing diversity of developing countries, the growing importance of economic interdependence over economic dependence and aid, the relative insignificance of official foreign assistance compared to other economic relationships, the long-term nature of economic development, the relative importance of policy and institutional changes over project interventions, the transnational nature of many development issues (e.g., debt, drugs), and the ability of markets to allocate development resources more efficiently than governments. The documents also share common perceptions of the internal problems facing U.S. foreign assistance—an obsolete Foreign Assistance Act, an ambiguous mixing of goals (military, political, humanitarian, and development), a weak constituency, emphasis on planning and monitoring over results and on short-term performance over sustainable growth, excessive rigidity, Congressional micromanagement, overreliance on the public sector, weak inter-donor coordination, and the declining size

of U.S. foreign assistance relative both to developing world economies and contributions from other donors. Despite these commonalities, the reports differed in important respects, especially regarding the structure and role of a new or revamped foreign assistance agency, the strategic emphasis of foreign assistance (e.g., whether to emphasize poverty alleviation or economic growth, whether to accept the social costs of structural adjustment as unavoidable or seek to alleviate them) and the priority sectors and countries for foreign assistance.

Terms of endowment: a new A.I.D. approach to institutional development

PN-ABG-001

Hansen, Gary
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Dec 1990, 20p., Eng.

Innovative development approaches, no. 3

Since the mid-1980s, several A.I.D. Missions and host governments in Latin America and the Caribbean have worked together to establish endowments for existing and new institutions. While many of these endowments are being used to strengthen the institution's financial base, others serve as innovative mechanisms for transferring key development functions from the inefficient public sector to the more entrepreneurial and non-bureaucratic private sector, typically to a non-profit private foundation or other non-governmental organization. Currently, nine A.I.D.-endowed institutions in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Portugal are performing development roles in such areas as agricultural research, natural resource management, and trade and investment promotion. (A review of these endowments is included in the present report.) Funding for endowments has come primarily from Economic Support Fund and PL 480 food program local currency generations, though the new Debt-for-Development Initiative now allows the use of dollar currency for this purpose. Interest earned on these funds may be reinvested in the endowment or used for stipulated development activities. Endowment agreements also generally stipulate that A.I.D. funds be invested, either in country or overseas; some agreements contain

matching formulas as an incentive for the organization to diversify its resource base. In granting endowments, Missions are cautious to avoid duplicating and displacing government institutions. They are also aware of the need to keep organizations with guaranteed endowment income from yielding to organizational inertia, and to protect the endowment from political interference, the devaluation consequence upon economic instability, and financial mismanagement.

Recycling old debt for new ventures: debt-for-nature and debt-for-development swaps

PN-ABG-002

Chew, Siew Tuan
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jan 1991, 20p., statistical tables, Eng.

Innovative development approaches, no. 4

Financial transactions popularly known as "debt-for-nature" or "debt-for-development" swaps were introduced in the late 1980s as an alternative means of alleviating Third World debt. A debt swap involves a third party, usually a non-governmental organization (NGO), acquiring a developing country's hard currency debt from foreign banks and exchanging it with the debtor country government for local currency funds to finance conservation or development projects or local investment. This paper discusses the concept and process of debt-for-nature and debt-for-development swaps, A.I.D.'s support for these mechanisms during 1987-90, a Congressional Mandate for increased debt swap funding in the future, and key implementation and macroeconomic issues. Efforts to promote debt conversions are impeded by two major factors: (1) the capacity of NGOs to address the complex financial and legal issues involved; and (2) the potential macroeconomic problems (e.g., inflation) resulting from large-scale debt conversion. However, these problems are not insurmountable, as host countries and A.I.D. can take steps to mitigate them. Experience thus far suggests that well-designed debt conversion programs can provide a financially viable means for recycling Third World debt. However, debt swaps are clearly not a panacea for solving all debt problems in developing countries. Much of the debt is not traded in the secondary market

10.0 Operation, Management, and Cross-Cutting Issues

and therefore cannot be retired through debt swaps. Further, there is a limitation to the extent to which debt swaps can meet the interests of all parties involved.

10.2 DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT & INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Effective institution building: a guide for project designers and project managers based on lessons learned from the A.I.D. portfolio

PN-AAJ-611

Barnett, Stanley A.; Engel, Nat
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Science and Technology, Office of
Development Information and Utilization

Mar 1982, v.p., Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 11

9300085

Based on a review of the 659 institution-building field projects undertaken by A.I.D.'s four geographic bureaus over a 10-year period, this paper develops guidelines for institution-building project planning and management. A pattern analysis of project design and evaluation assessments reveals that A.I.D. has focused on helping existing organizations (75% of the projects) rather than on creating new ones (25%) and on helping single (56%) rather than multiple groups (44%). A total of 64% of all projects focused on national organizations, with the rest divided among sub-national entities and organizations with a multinational focus. The majority of the groups assisted were in the economic/development planning and food/agriculture sectors. Assistance to educational, health, and community development and housing groups was in the 16-12% range, while 9% of the total went to groups related to infrastructure. These patterns were exemplified in all bureaus, although institution building activity was found to be most prevalent in Latin America (44%), followed by

Africa (28%), Asia (18%), and the Near East (10%). An analysis of project evaluations (over 49% of which came from Latin America, with evaluations of African projects being the fewest in number) shows that issues most dealt with are project management and achievement of initial project outputs (34% of all comments), with comments equally distributed into positive and negative; together with project planning (31%), with negative comments outweighing the positive by nearly two to one. Other areas focused on were the quality of project staff (13%), with an equal number of positive and negative comments; non-monetary support (7%) and financial arrangements (6%), with both areas receiving more negative than positive comments; and commodity procurement (2%), which received only negative comments. A 30-page check list, incorporating over 70 lessons learned, is then presented for use in planning and managing future institution-building projects. Areas covered include program planning, host country factors, project inputs, training, the target institution, special situations (such as projects with construction elements), program delivery, and delivery of inputs. Appendices include a discussion of the study's methodology, of institution-building models, and of three country programs; and a 30-item bibliography (1966-81).

Development management in Africa: the case of the land conservation and range development project in Lesotho

PN-AAL-061

Warren, Marion; Honadle, George; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Dec 1985, xi, 16p. + 6 appendices: charts, maps,
statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 31
6320215

The Land Conservation and Range Development (LCRD) Project, begun in 1980, was designed to strengthen Lesotho's Ministry of Agriculture and arrest crop and range land degradation. To date, LCRD: (1) has established a prototype range management area (RMA) for applying improved livestock/range management methods; (2) is making a concerted effort within

the RMA to introduce rotational grazing, controlled breeding, culling of less desirable animals, disease control, and marketing of livestock and livestock products; and (3) has established a livestock owners' grazing association (GA) to enforce RMA grazing regulations. LCRD offers several lessons for development project management. (1) Training should be extended beyond government counterparts to participants—in LCRD, livestock owners and their herdboys—who can sustain project interventions. (2) Rigorous financial management may not be an important determinant of project success. LCRD is meeting planned targets despite elementary bookkeeping. USAID is imposing rigorous financial management procedures on itself rather than on the project. (3) A project that introduces new resource management techniques must co-opt local authorities and yet relieve local organizations of responsibility for unpopular decisions. LCRD imposes such decisions on the GA but blames failures on the U.S. technical team. (4) Local organizations established to control resource allocation must have supportive linkages to pre-existing legitimate institutions—in LCRD, the hierarchy of chiefs. (5) Integration of a project into an existing institution—in LCRD, the Ministry of Agriculture—can strengthen a country's institutional capacity. (6) Different project components, levels of focus, and implementation periods may require different management styles. Early on, some U.S. technicians located in Maseru held line positions while their counterparts studied in the United States. Upon the latter's return, the technicians have become advisors to the Ministry. Within the RMA, on the other hand, U.S. technicians are not merely advisors, but must tell the RMA what to do.

[Author abstract, modified]

Development management in Africa: the case of the North Shaba rural development project in Zaire

PN-AAL-063

Rosenthal, Irving; Jackson, Leroy; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development,
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Dec 1985, xvi., 21p. + 7 appendices: ill., maps,
statistical tables, Eng.

10.0 Operation, Management, and Cross-Cutting Issues

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 32
6600059; 6607016

The 10-year North Shaba Maize Production Project is evaluated as a case study in development project design and management. Major findings are that: (1) the number of new and rebuilt roads and bridges were on target; (2) production and marketing of maize exceeded targets; (3) the general economic condition of beneficiaries improved after the commencement of project activities; and (4) pressure by the project helped achieve a higher farm gate price which, while not a stated project goal, contributed to the project's success. Findings on the project's management strategy were both positive and negative. On the positive side, the project established an effective management unit under the direction of qualified Zairois and achieved a high level of local participation; also, the Government of Zaire provided project cadre who were motivated, capable, and well trained as managers. On the negative side, the project had a shifting objective and goal, which were never fully understood by the stakeholders; inadequate attention was given, especially early on, to project sustainability, and only partial solutions were found in the final years to sustain the project's institutional, personnel, and financial interventions. Lessons learned are that: (1) an in-depth understanding of the local socio-economic and technical environment is a sine qua non for project design and effective project management; (2) a development project tends to be more successful if its design is administratively simple and its management interventions are integrated into local social and production systems; (3) more complicated projects should devote greater time and money to management issues and need a long timeframe to achieve project goals; (4) where a project's larger context is administratively difficult, it may be more appropriate to design a project that works around, and is not a part of, the established system; and (5) although short-term accomplishments fostered by expatriates can help convince beneficiaries to accept long-term solutions, it is more important in the long run to train local personnel at all levels to implement project activities, even if this temporarily slows implementation.

[Author abstract, modified]

Report of a preparatory evaluation workshop on the management of agricultural projects in Africa

PN-AAL-066

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Africa. Office of Regional Affairs*

*(Preparatory Evaluation Workshop on the
Management of Agricultural Projects in Africa,
Easton, MD, US, 4-8 Sep 1984)*

*Jan 1986, vii, 146p. + appendix: statistical table,
Eng.*

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 33

The principal papers and discussions of a September 1984 workshop on agricultural project management in Africa are presented in this report. The purpose of the workshop was to sensitize field evaluation teams to management issues and prepare them to undertake a series of evaluation case studies funded by A.I.D.'s Center for Development Information and Evaluation. The workshop opened with a broad review of the evolution of A.I.D.'s development management policies and practices; some concern that current A.I.D. projects may be too complicated to be effectively managed was expressed. Subsequent sessions focused on component management factors and tools for overcoming management constraints caused by Africa's cultural traditions, organizational structures, and unstable economic and political environment. The workshop focus then narrowed to examination of more specific project management issues. Two such issues (organizational, institutional, and structural linkages; and administrative processes) were discussed and a paper was presented on practical guidelines for assessing and explaining development management performance. Based on these papers and discussions, the evaluation team members were able to establish their roles, develop detailed project scopes of work, and schedule field activities. The final sessions of the workshop were devoted to planning the evaluation field trips and ensuring that reports would maintain the overall focus of the evaluation series. The following was accepted as the framework for field evaluations: (1) contextual factors relating to management; (2) organizational

structure and institutionalization; (3) administrative process changes; (4) resource input management; and (5) human resource management and behavioral considerations. A 14-page bibliography for the papers presented at the workshop is appended.

Development management in Africa: the case of the Bakel small irrigated perimeters project in Senegal

PN-AAL-067

*Seymour, Matt; McPherson, Laura; Harmon,
David*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Dec 1985, xii, 13p. + 7 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 34
6850208*

The Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters project was initiated in 1977 to introduce irrigated rice agriculture to the upper Senegal River basin. The management strategy was to build on the efforts begun by farmers to install small irrigated perimeters. The project worked with the National Society for the Development and Exploitation of the Senegal and Faleme River Basins (SAED) to supply inputs and extension services to farmers who supplied labor to develop small irrigated perimeters. Although the project met only 50% of its quantitative targets, its accomplishments are important because of farmer acceptance of irrigation technologies, increasing farmer participation in the project, and flexible SAED management. The major findings of this evaluation are that project accomplishments were possible because of concomitant policy changes by the Government of Senegal and SAED and that success was enhanced by the openness and outward orientation of the people of Bakel and by SAED's willingness to let farmers organize and administer irrigated perimeters on their own terms. Several key lessons were learned. (1) Projects should carefully assess socioeconomic characteristics of target populations at the design stage. (2) An effective project management strategy is one that fosters local participation in management decisions and permits local organizations to build on indigenous structures and practices. Allowing the organization to choose its own officers and management

10.0 Operation, Management, and Cross-Cutting Issues

style, for example, fosters organizational and hence project sustainability. (3) Appropriate government policy changes may be necessary to permit community participation in project decisionmaking. (4) If host country staff is adequately trained, a loose management style by donors can be effective management, fostering a sense of ownership of the project among the staff. (5) A strategy fostering beneficiary participation requires concomitant and comprehensive training. In addition, appropriate training for mid- and upper-level managers can have significant impact on the project, particularly when reinforced by needed policy changes.

[Author abstract, modified]

Development management in Africa: the case of the Egerton College expansion project in Kenya

PN-AAL-068

Nicholson, Norman; Ostrom, Elinor; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Dec 1985, xi, 15p. + 5 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 35
6150169; 615T014

The management aspects of an A.I.D. sub-project to expand diploma-level agricultural training at Egerton College, Kenya, are explored in this evaluation study, part of a series on development management in Africa. The project was a success although it lacked an explicit management enhancement effort. Student enrollment increased on schedule to a current level of 1,437 without any impairment of Egerton's standards or the practical orientation of its training. With few exceptions, all faculty sent to the United States for training returned to assume their planned responsibilities. The construction program was well planned and completed ahead of schedule. The simple and straightforward goal of physical expansion and the strong commitment by the Government of Kenya and College staff were key factors leading to successful project management. The fact that the College had autonomous status and operated during a period of fiscal surplus further facilitated implementation. Lessons learned are: (1) it is important to keep within the manage-

ment capabilities of the host institution; (2) the simpler and clearer project goals, the easier it is to reach consensus on them and provide objective criteria for resource allocation; (3) management enhancement takes time—to train staff, develop systems, adapt them to local needs, and become accustomed to them; (4) management success has more to do with leadership quality than with specific reforms or skills; (4) a fiscal surplus permits management flexibility and innovation; (5) weak budgeting and financial management systems may be less of a constraint in small institutions with personal or hierarchical management styles; (6) parastatals and other institutions with significant management autonomy and fiscal flexibility can provide an environment for management innovation and initiative; (7) mid-level management participation in project planning can promote high morale and efficiency; (8) a shared institutional "doctrine" can help overcome potential problems; and (9) congruence of key actors' interests and incentives contributes to rapid, efficient project implementation.

[Author abstract, modified]

Development management in Africa: the case of the Niamey department development project in Niger

PN-AAL-069

Painter, Thomas M.; Poulin, Roger J.; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Dec 1985, xii, 15p. + appendix: map, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 36
6830240

The Niamey Department Development II (NDD II) Project, begun in 1980, was designed to institutionalize a process of rural development by establishing self-managed village organizations to help farm families increase food production on a self-sustaining basis. Major efforts have included establishing training centers to train farm couples in improved production and extension techniques, establishing cooperatives and village-level mutual cooperative groups, training cooperative officers in literacy and arithmetic skills, and promoting cooperation among Government of Niger (GON) district-level technical services in the four project zones.

After several years of operation, NDD II's capacity to enhance rural development remains limited. The project's agricultural production technologies only partially address farmers' constraints; their profitability at the farm level is contested and they are insufficiently responsive to local variations in production conditions. For reasons largely beyond the project's control, efforts to integrate GON technical services have had only a modest impact. Overall, a basic change of intervention strategy may be necessary. NDD II offers several general lessons for development project management. (1) Projects which improve existing technical services instead of creating new ones may reduce implementation effectiveness. (2) Promoting cooperation among government technical services requires a commitment of these services to project goals, horizontal integration among the services, and changes in the internal structure of individual services. (3) Management styles of individual project directors can critically affect the morale and performance of project personnel. A supportive style can have a positive impact on efforts to strengthen local management. (4) Projects that seek to improve farm-level resource management must understand and address local production and non-production constraints. (5) Project interventions should include systematic follow-up and support for beneficiaries' activities, as well as feedback mechanisms. (6) Management must ensure proper allocation not only of physical and material resources, but also of human resources.

Development management in Africa: the case of the agriculture analysis and planning project in Liberia

PN-AAL-070

Hermann, Chris; Shaw, Margaret; Hannah, John
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation

Dec 1985, xii, 18p. + 4 appendices: ill., chart,
map, statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 37
6690137; 6690123

The central objective of the Agriculture Analysis and Planning Project and its predecessor, the Agriculture Development Program, was to im-

10.0 Operation, Management, and Cross-Cutting Issues

prove the capability of the Government of Liberia's (GOL) Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) for the data collection and analysis necessary for sector planning. Although sector planning has not been institutionalized in the MOA, the projects have achieved limited success in key management areas; these include establishing a Statistics and Planning Division (SPD), training 50 MOA staff members in agricultural economics and statistics, and making the MOAs internal structure responsive to a sector planning approach. The projects also provided a base of support to the SPD at a time when such support could not be provided by the MOA. There is room for improvement, however. Data collection and analysis capabilities are weak and need continued support from technical advisors. Staff training, particularly in-country, needs to be continued to offset turnover. Further reorganization and development of effective management systems are needed to improve the MOAs performance. Nonetheless, the fact that the projects have had even limited success is noteworthy, given Liberia's severe economic problems during the past decade, the political instability resulting from the 1980 coup and its effect on the GOL's ministries, and Liberia's organizational culture and approach to public administration. The most serious current obstacles to improving the MOA's management capabilities are the country's severe fiscal crisis and the significant budget constraints it creates. Key lessons learned are: (1) sustainable data-related technologies must be simple and low-cost, but sufficient for basic information requirements; (2) the transfer of technology creates management demands which must be anticipated and used as criteria in selecting technical assistance; (3) technical assistance and training must be continuous to assure that gains made are not lost; (4) in-country training must be emphasized to minimize the disruption of agency operations; (5) necessary organizational changes must be anticipated; (6) advisors should provide quality control and staff support if the agency does not; and (7) project planning should be flexible.

Managing development programs: management strategies and project interventions in six African agricultural projects

PN-AAL-071

White, Louise G.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jan 1986, vi, 50p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 38
6830240; 6320215; 6150169; 6850208;
6690137; 6690123; 6600059; 615T014;
660T016

Management strategies used to implement six agricultural development projects in Africa and corresponding interventions for improving indigenous management capacity are herein assessed using a matrix which relates management actors (i.e., the project unit, program agency, or a unit whose management capacities are being upgraded) to five specific activities: leadership, policy, organizational design, internal systems, and relations with the larger environment (resources and constraints). A total of 51 lessons learned are presented. Recommended strategies for project managers are to use informal means of persuasion before formal action and to delegate management so as to provide room for leadership. The manager should recognize tradeoffs between simple, clear project goals and more general and flexible ones and adapt goals to new information or local conditions. To establish linkages with other governmental levels, the manager should set up a professional unit to coordinate supplies, delegate responsibilities to local managers (and provide them both logistical and informal support), and give other agency personnel a voice in planning and a stake in the results. Strategies are also suggested for personnel, financial, and information systems and for relating projects to their environment. Program agencies (i.e., in the projects examined, Ministries of Agriculture) should set up autonomous units to manage projects, establish broad and multiple goals to facilitate coordination, provide services to local units, adopt a planning/control system that decentralizes some planning functions without losing control, experiment with computerized monitoring and regular reports, approach planning as a series of steps,

and channel data directly to decisionmakers. Finally, efforts to improve host institutions' capacities to design and manage development projects should analyze existing management strengths and weaknesses, anticipate how the project will affect these, design an appropriate management strategy (if enough information is available to do so), encourage managers to learn and adapt (allowing a long timeframe), and encourage the institutions to plan for long-term project sustainability.

Development management in Africa: context and strategy—a synthesis of six agricultural projects

PN-AAL-076

Honadle, George

Development Alternatives, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Jan 1986, vi, 46p. + appendix: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 43
6150169; 6320215; 6690123; 6690137;
6830205; 6830240; 6250208; 6600059;
9361406; 6850208; 615T014; 660T016

The importance of context in development management is the focus of this paper, in which the findings of six A.I.D. evaluation case studies of agricultural projects in sub-Saharan Africa are synthesized in light of other academic and field studies of the relative importance of development management and development policy. The author concludes that: (1) management practices can constrain or expand policy effectiveness, just as policies can help or inhibit management; (2) the solution to Africa's economic crisis lies less with the importation of Western policy and management cures than with appropriate responses developed for the local context; and (3) project performance results from the interaction between management strategy and context. Successful management strategies may have either clear, simple goals or multiple, complex ones, but they must be tailored to a project's objectives and local setting. In particular, care must be taken to identify who stands to lose and who stands to gain from project success or failure and the risk level for each; when the stakeholders are many and the risk

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high, multiple and complex objectives may be necessary to deliver benefits to all affected parties. Other key conclusions are: (1) successful management utilizes informal practices and communication channels and benefits from flexible project design; and (2) rigorous financial controls are less important for project performance than is commonly supposed. Regarding the enhancement of indigenous management capabilities, the six projects reviewed showed that bad policies and inadequate organizational structures—not personnel deficiencies—are the main constraints. Thus priority should be given to organization and management assistance, policy reform, and action-oriented training. The specific implications of these findings for project design, management, and evaluation as well as for future research are outlined, and it is noted that the conclusions presented here transcend agricultural projects, and are in fact especially relevant to policy reform and human resource development—both of which focus not on programs alone but on interactions between programs and their contexts.

Development management in Africa: experience with implementing agricultural development projects

PN-AAL-081

Rondinelli, Dennis A.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jul 1986, vi, 110p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 44
6150169; 6600059; 6250208; 6830240;
6830205; 6320215; 6690137; 615T014;
560T016

Managerial and organizational problems seriously undermine the implementation of development programs and projects in all developing countries, but particularly so in Africa. This paper reviews and analyzes management experience in six A.I.D. agricultural and rural development projects in Africa. Section 1 examines the scope and seriousness of development management problems faced by public and private organizations in implementing projects, and describes procedures for evaluating experience in Africa. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework for evaluating development management;

the framework identifies four factors which affect management—policy, design, contextual factors, and internal management (the latter including organizational structure, administrative procedures and practices, resource inputs management, and human resources management). The framework is then used, in Sections 3–5, to order findings from evaluations of the six African projects. The lessons learned from the projects and their implications for enhancing development management are summarized in Section 6. A major lesson learned is that projects are affected by numerous factors which vary from country to country; therefore a practical strategy for project managers is to determine how their projects differ from others and decide which management strategies that worked effectively in another country or project may be appropriate for their projects.

Signposts in development management: a computer-based analysis of 277 projects in Africa

PN-AAV-287

Rosenthal, Irving; Tuthill, Janet; et al.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

May 1986, vi, 49p. + appendices: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 10

A study of 277 mostly agricultural projects in Africa was conducted using project documentation in A.I.D.'s Development Information System. The following characteristics were examined: (1) the level of organizational direction; (2) development management enhancement interventions; (3) enhancement and training components; (4) level of success; and (5) development management problems. Key findings were: projects in Africa are still directed from the national rather than rural level; local administrative support directly influences project success; technical assistance should be viewed as a means of increasing indigenous management capacity; formal schooling remains the primary form of training although more management training would be beneficial; contextual, especially socioeconomic, factors were considered most important in explaining project success;

and data in A.I.D.'s information system were often inconclusive as to what constitutes project success. The study's statistical findings are presented in 32 tables. Appendices include a list of projects studied and methodological details.

Achieving local institutional development: PVO co-financing projects in Indonesia and the Philippines

PN-ABC-906

Vondal, Patricia

Labat-Anderson, Inc.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Jan 1990, 8p.: ill., charts, Eng.

Innovative development approaches, no. 2
9300085

PVO co-financing projects in the Philippines and Indonesia have proved effective in building local institutions, encouraging self-reliant community development, and supporting private sector growth. The co-financing concept, initially developed in the 1970s by USAID/I and supported by USAID/P since 1980, provides an innovative mechanism for Missions to work directly with PVOs. Both Missions have shown a strong commitment to develop the capacity of indigenous PVOs (IPVOs); their experience provides valuable lessons for Missions that are considering support for grassroots-level projects. The major achievement of PVO co-financing projects has been their ability to strengthen local institutions. IPVOs registered with A.I.D. are qualified to provide skills training and disburse and oversee subgrants for smaller PVOs. Registered IPVOs are requesting a new status as equal partners with U.S. PVOs and broader recognition of their achievements. A long history of IPVO collaboration with U.S. PVOs and A.I.D. staff underlies this success. This includes provision of skills training to IPVO staff to strengthen their organizational capabilities, a gradual transfer of increased project management responsibilities from Missions and U.S. PVOs to IPVOs, and the ability of IPVOs to cope with public sector-led development biases of their governments. The co-financing concept is a cost-effective means of helping IPVOs build local organizational abilities and reach development objec-

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tives. But, replication of the model used by USAID/I and USAID/P should proceed cautiously; the successes noted are due mostly to a history of relationships between the two Missions and the PVO community. It is clear that achieving high levels of local institutional development is a long-term process.

10.3 SUSTAINABILITY OF PROGRAMS

Sustainability of development programs: a compendium of donor experience

PN-AAX-209

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

*Nov 1988, x, 54p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 24*

With only 11 percent of 212 A.I.D. projects recently evaluated showing good chances to be self-sustaining after the termination of U.S. assistance, the seriousness of the sustainability issue is now being recognized at the highest levels of the Agency. This report consolidates the experience of A.I.D. and 15 other donor agencies to identify the most important factors affecting sustainability. The paper discusses and briefly illustrates the factors affecting sustainability—government policies; management, organization, and local participation; finance; technology; socioculture; environment and ecology; and external political and economic circumstances. Techniques and conditions that favor sustainability are identified, such as realistic goals, adequate project duration, sufficient maintenance and support systems, continuity, and flexibility. In conclusion, the paper examines current donor efforts to ensure consideration of sustainability in project design and implementation. These efforts include intense host country collaboration and the development of monitoring and early warning systems which can identify impediments to sustainability. An appendix illustrates interrelations among sustainability factors.

10.4 WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

Assessing the impact of development projects on women

PN-AAH-725

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U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Women in Development*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

*1980, iii, 105p., Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation discussion paper,
no. 8*

French ed.: PN-ABG-691

The current methodology for evaluating development projects—even “women-specific” projects—concentrates on logistical questions of timing and supplies rather than on social impact questions and is therefore inadequate to assess a project's impact on women. In order to develop a new evaluative framework which addresses these inadequacies, this study reviews evaluations of 32 A.I.D. and private voluntary organization women-specific projects. The evaluations only indirectly assess women's concerns but provide sufficient information to analyze the success of projects in meeting three basic goals for women-in-development projects: (1) participation in project decisionmaking; (2) access to immediate project benefits; and (3) improvement in socio-economic status. Specific factors which contribute to the achievement of these three goals are identified. For example, women's participation in the decisionmaking process is higher when projects are administered by women's associations. Women's access to benefits will be greater when project activities build on the prevailing sexual division of labor and increase women's control over their own earnings. Social impact of projects tends to be greatest when women are organized for group action and are directed in activities carrying clear economic benefits. Indicators of physical, economic, and social well-being are presented for determining a project's direct and distributional social impact. It is noted that this evaluative framework is useful to assess not only the impact on women of any project (whether

women-specific or not), but, more generally, the differing impact of any project on various social groups. The author stresses that factors which increase women's participation in development should be an integral part of project design and that women's economic and social roles in household and community should be taken into account. The paper's final section suggests methods of data collection to improve determination of a project's impact on women; interviews and group discussions with beneficiaries and the evaluator's perceptions are stressed over an objective or document's-only approach. A 50-item reference list (1971-79) is appended.

Women in development: A.I.D.'s experience, 1973-1985, vol. 1: synthesis paper

PN-AAL-087

*Carlton, Alice Stewart
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Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Women in Development*

*Apr 1987, xviii, 51p. + 4 appendices: chart,
statistical tables, Eng.
A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 18*

Based on desk reviews and/or field studies of 102 projects related to women, this report synthesizes the results of A.I.D. experience since 1973 in targeting women in development (WID) activities. The major finding is that mainstream projects that ensure women's participation in accordance with their roles within the project's baseline situation are more likely to achieve their aims than projects that do not. Agricultural projects that delivered resources directly to women according to their role in the local farming system were much more likely to achieve their purpose than projects which did not. Employment projects (i.e., projects to generate income or to provide job training and credit) that adapted mainstream training and credit programs to women's needs were more successful than projects designed specifically for women. Similarly, the success of energy and water/sanitation projects was dependent upon adequate knowledge of women's responsibilities and patterns of water/fuel use rather than on strictly technical criteria. In education projects, the level of

10.0 Operation, Management, and Cross-Cutting Issues

women's education clearly correlated with improvements in health, hygiene, nutrition, and family planning, as well as higher productivity and employment. The correlation between the level of female participation and achievement of immediate project purposes was difficult to document, however, since most of the reports studied overlooked gender disparities in enrollment when assessing educational institution-building projects. A review of the relationship of gender variables to the achievement of socioeconomic goals

found that understanding gender factors in agricultural production—differential access to and control over resources, gender-linked labor constraints, control of income from crop sales, and differing stakes in and incentives for increasing output—is crucial to successful technology transfer. Also crucial at the level of socioeconomic impact is an understanding the various sources of and control over income and of gender roles in consumption. Ten practical suggestions are made to improve gender analysis techniques,

deliver resources to women, and track women's participation in project activities. A concluding review of the various types of women's projects finds that: (1) mainstream projects with "gender sensitive" designs are the most effective at meeting WID objectives; (2) women-only components in larger projects can be effective, although they may lead to tokenism if gender differences are ignored; and (3) women-only projects tend to be small in scope and costly in staff time, and are best suited for the delivery of training.

11.0 Country Studies

Role of external assistance in the economic development and planning of Thailand: torques and tensions in the American aid program

PD-AAS-326

Steinberg, David I.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Jan 1986, v, 41p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 6

Despite relatively constant levels of military aid, there is a stark contrast between Thailand's strategic importance to the United States and the dwindling levels of economic aid that it receives. This report explores the following five major aspects of the overall U.S. aid program to Thailand in the context of the uneasy relationship between security and developmental concerns since the 1950s. (1) Security and economic development. Historically, security considerations have been paramount in the provision of economic aid (e.g., a number of road-building projects were more notable for their security applications). (2) Stabilization of Thai frontiers. A major element in U.S. assistance has been bolstering Thai national unity by improving the GOT's presence in remote regions, particularly the northeast (through building roads and police stations, training security forces, etc.), to uncertain effect. (3) Helping the rural poor. A.I.D. programs, inasmuch as they have attempted to enhance the power of the GOT, have tended to benefit the bureaucratic elite more than the rural poor. (4) Private sector support. A.I.D. has increased its activities in support of the Thai private sector, but whether

this has contributed to Thailand's rapid economic growth is uncertain. At any rate, common distinctions between "public" and "private" sector entities tend not to apply under Thailand's "patrimonial" system, which encourages intimate ties between government and industry officials. (5) Institution building, training, and technical assistance. A.I.D. has worked to increase the administrative capacity of the Thai government, which has served to reinforce traditional bureaucratic values. Current U.S. strategy focuses on remediating specific sectoral problems, such as increasing rural employment and the value-added in exports.

U.S. aid to Zimbabwe: an evaluation

PN-AAJ-605

Wasserman, Gary; Pielemeier, John; et al.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Aug 1987, ix, 20p. + 7 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. program evaluation report, no. 9

The impact of A.I.D. assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) during the early 1980s is examined in this report, focusing on a \$20 million reconstruction program grant and a \$2 million project grant for rebuilding rural health clinics. Major topics include the aid's political impact, macroeconomic rationale, relief and reconstruction activities, and conclusions and lessons learned. For the most part, A.I.D. assistance was successful. The GOZ administered the programs efficiently and equitably. Roads, schools, cattle dips, government housing, and clinics were rebuilt during difficult circumstances, and seed and food relief were distributed. Additionally, through the recon-

struction activities, the GOZ was able to reestablish administrative structures in rural areas from which it had been excluded by the civil war. Unfortunately, recognition that A.I.D. had contributed to the reconstruction effort was practically nonexistent in rural areas and uncertain in political circles. There was little evidence of A.I.D. oversight of the reconstruction and relief activities, because of the assumption that the cash grant mode of assistance did not require it and a lack of resident Mission staff. Moreover, some of the programs were limited in their achievements (e.g., the winter vegetable seed packet, which was too complicated and funded too late to be of much help to the farmers who received it, and the rural health clinics, which, though rapidly reconstructed, suffered from a lack of drugs, equipment, and adequate inspection by the Ministry of Health). The bureaucracy which effectively implemented the programs watched its future competence put into question by reorganization, changing personnel policies, and the uncertain tenure of white administrators with their often dated attitudes toward rural Africans. Lessons learned are as follows. (1) A.I.D. has a range of foreign assistance tools available, such as policy analysis and technical expertise. The success of the Zimbabwe program should not delude the Agency into thinking that money is all it has to offer. (2) A.I.D. can respond flexibly and quickly when political priorities are clear and sufficiently important. (3) If a high priority is given to foreign assistance as a symbol of U.S. commitment, it needs to be thought through as carefully as the development objectives. The country team should ensure that a strategy for achieving political benefits from the aid is established and its progress regularly assessed. (4) The Zimbabwe experience suggests the need for more flexible forms of assistance. Appropriate changes should be made to simplify A.I.D. procedures.

11.0 Country Studies

Foreign aid and the development of the Republic of Korea: the effectiveness of concessional assistance

PN-AAL-075

Steinberg, David I.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation*

Oct 1985, xi, 93p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation special study, no. 42

The role played by foreign aid in the Republic of Korea's economic recovery after World War II and the Korean War is examined in this admittedly personal study. The author believes that although some reasons for the recovery, e.g., linguistic unity, are exclusively Korean,

the Korean experience offers some general lessons in achieving sustainable economic growth. At first, Korea pursued a policy of import substitution, discouraging exports and stressing donor support, chiefly from the United States. After 1961, however, the government recognized import substitution's failure to ensure long-term economic growth and initiated an export promotion program while shifting the focus of donor support away from excessive reliance on the United States. The government used its administrative, political, and social power to control the economy by allocating institutional credit, setting and enforcing export targets, and promoting foreign investment. The Korean GNP, exports, overseas construction earnings, and manufacturing capacity grew accordingly, despite rising energy prices, a worldwide recession, and a large defense burden. The creation of employment opportunities—a process aided significantly by donors, especially via training and human resource de-

velopment—has lowered the poverty percentage from 40% to 10% and greatly enhanced equity. Nevertheless, notable rural and urban income disparities and regional income differences still exist, and women are denied equal status in the development process. This is largely due to the elimination of pricing subsidies and to the government's control of institutional credit, which limits marketplace access to major industrial and trading conglomerates. While Korea could not have experienced even moderate economic growth after 1953 without substantial donor support, a successful export program, commercial lending, and foreign investment have lessened the amount of concessional aid. Donor policy advice was generally followed if it was seen as serving Korean interests and supporting national directions already determined by the government. While multilateral donors have greater prestige and flexibility than bilateral donors, both types have their limitations.

12.0 Evaluation Methods and Systems

Lessons learned from A.I.D. program experience in FY 1984: a review of the year's project evaluation and audit reports, world-wide

PD-AAR-863

*Development Associates, Inc.
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

3 Aug 1985, vii, 141p. + 5 appendices, Eng.

An analysis of 263 evaluation and of 45 Inspector General audit reports provides the basis for this review of the lessons learned from A.I.D.'s FY84 program experience. Both evaluation and audit reports focused on five issues. Key findings are as follows. (1) Most projects have been responsive to host government, country development, and U.S. needs. However, some have been incompatible with cultural and ethnic factors (factors sometimes unseen even by host governments); thus projects with national scope may be ineffective in important geocultural regions of a country. (2) Institution building is widely viewed by USAID personnel and increasingly by contractors as A.I.D.'s core function, and A.I.D. staff have become skilled in developing host country capabilities. (3) Project design and monitoring systems are highly professional and in many respects effective, but have impeded full realization of institution building and timely goal achievement; management and administrative problems from overall direction to logistics and finance have impeded project objectives. (4) Sustainability has been inadequately emphasized. (5) The effectiveness of technology transfer has been mixed. Agriculture has posed the most serious problem, as many projects to raise small farm productivity

are falling short of goals, in most cases because input delivery systems have not reached the great majority of rural families, but in some cases because farmers have rejected the new technologies. Delivery capabilities, technology acceptance, and community participation have been greater in health projects, but securing an acceptance of preventive medicine equivalent to that of curative services has proven difficult. Also, in each case where the installation of potable water systems was the project objective, successfully achieved, water consumption failed to increase. In a number of countries, family planning is enjoying levels of acceptance and participation similar to primary health services. Despite the superiority of new fuel-efficient stoves over traditional models, the new stoves have not yet been accepted, especially in African countries. Employment generation has not resulted from rural regional agro-industrial projects as expected.

Synthesis of A.I.D. evaluation reports: FY 1985 and FY 1986

PD-AAW-776

*Kear, John; Turner, Allen; et al.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (Sponsor)*

Mar 1988, xviii, 111p. + 5 annexes: statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 16
9300085

A comprehensive review of 212 evaluation reports (ERs) from FY 1985 and 1986, this document focuses on five key topics (implementation constraints, sustainability, women in development, environmental impacts, and private sector initiatives) in order to provide a distillation of recent experience and to identify patterns of both

problems and successes. The document uses a rating system to assess the significance of about 40 subtopics related to the five topics mentioned above. Findings are as follows. (1) Implementation constraints. About a third of the ERs reported that project design and adequacy of borrower/grantee staffing and budgeting were severe constraints to implementation success; projects with minimal implementation constraints were associated with strong management, well defined roles, relationships and responsibilities in project design, and activities that addressed needs clearly perceived by participants and beneficiaries. (2) Sustainability. Good project sustainability was associated most with positive ratings for technology acceptance (31%) and strength of project constituency and host country policies (24% and 21%). Poor sustainability was associated with negative ratings for organizational/institutional capacity, for financial provision for operation and maintenance, and for management capacity. (3) Women in Development. WID was a major purpose in about 15% of the projects. Successful projects tended to have positive ratings for strengthening locally based women's institutions, including women as participants in project design/planning, and extending services for women into rural areas. (4) Environment. About 29% of the ERs made some sort of statement about environmental impact. Typically, high-rated environmental projects were associated with strong institution building components and the provision of medium-term economic motivation for improved resource management. (5) Private sector. About 21% of the ERs were concerned with private enterprise development. Key findings in this area included (inter alia): many A.I.D. projects are not designed explicitly to achieve certain desired impacts (e.g., employment creation); evaluation procedures are not adequate to capture the failure of projects to generate such desired impacts, and quality of design received the highest percentage of strongly negative ratings for private enterprise

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projects. Includes five annexes describing in detail the study's methodology.

Manager's guide to data collection

PN-AAH-434

Hageboeck, Molly
Practical Concepts Inc.
1979, 100p., Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methods,
no. 1

French ed.: PN-AAJ-165; Spanish ed.: PN-AAJ-
166

9300047

Project managers, who rely on data to assist them in decisionmaking, project design, and evaluation, often lack the ability to collect the data themselves and must therefore turn to experts. This report is intended as a guide for managers, enabling them to differentiate between credible and suspect data and to direct all data collection efforts on a timely, cost-effective basis. Four aspects of a manager's role in data collection and analysis are discussed: (1) identifying why, what, and when information is needed; (2) determining the appropriate level of funding and time investments; (3) choosing the most effective information-gathering approach; and (4) managing the data collection and analysis process. For example, a manager faced with a need to fund or replicate a project, or to terminate specific activities, may find he needs baseline information. He must then evaluate the prospective cost of data collection to determine whether the value of the information warrants a lesser, or greater, level of investment. The amount of money or time to be appropriated to the data collection necessarily affects the choice of a collection method, as does the existence of relevant information in Mission or Washington offices or in other resource centers. Where sufficient data does not exist, however, the manager may choose a field data collection method. Finally, although the manager does not himself gather the data, he must be able to formulate guidelines for use by the investigators on the study's purpose, its target population, the time frame required, and other issues. The guide specifies criteria to assist a manager in these choices and considers basic information study design issues to help managers determine what answers are needed and how to control their

quality. Approaches to field data collection are surveyed to familiarize managers with available options. Finally, the guide examines the benefits and drawbacks involved in using the sampling process and discusses its applicability to managers' needs. Other data collection techniques, such as direct measurement, observation, and interrogation, are presented. A 96-item bibliography (1951-79) is appended.

Selection and justification procedures for rural roads improvement projects

PN-AAL-032

Vandervoort, Charles G.

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation

Jan 1984, 42p. + attachment, Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methods,
no. 2

Responding to a recommendation made at a 1980 A.I.D. conference which identified inadequate road selection procedures as a frequent reason why A.I.D. rural road improvement projects fail to help their intended beneficiaries, this report presents guidelines for project selection and justification. Selection procedures are reviewed for A.I.D. rural road projects in Liberia, Jamaica, Bolivia, Kenya, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia, and a proposed application of linear programming to road selection is discussed. Good road selection criteria, it is noted, should be comprehensive (giving due consideration to economic growth, quality of life, and equity), cost-effective, easily applicable by local technicians with consultant help, and flexible enough to allow best judgment by experts on the basis of verifiable assumptions. The criteria should also enable A.I.D. project officers to exclude economically infeasible roads and identify politically biased calculations. Presented next is a three-phase selection procedure for rural roads projects: (1) initial screening of road location and length, population served, community commitment to maintain roads, land ownership, and present condition/cost of improvement; (2) socioeconomic ranking according to economic factors (agricultural potential, degree of access improvement, and the extent of parallel development activities in the road influence area), access to social services, and equity; and (3) economic justification in terms of likely

impact of a specific road on agricultural production and personal mobility. A lengthy analysis of the Haiti Secondary Rural Roads Project is provided to exemplify economic justification methodology. A brief discussion of field data collection activities needed to implement the above-noted selection and justification procedures concludes the report.

Selecting data collection methods and preparing contractor scopes of work

PN-AAL-057

U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Bureau of the Census.
International Statistical Programs Center

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Aug 1985, v, 45p. + appendix, Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 3

Four major data collection methods are available to A.I.D. program and project managers to meet their information needs: representative methods, such as censuses and sample surveys; intermediate or quasi-statistical methods; case study methods; and secondary methods, which rely on existing data. These differ in advantages and disadvantages, and the choice of any one or combination will depend on a number of factors, including: (1) the information needed and its intended use, i.e., the need for statistical representativeness, data quality (validity, reliability, or precision), replicability, potential for secondary analysis, and specificity; (2) characteristics of the subject population, such as heterogeneity and geographic dispersion; and (3) practical considerations, such as expediency, host country capabilities and needs, and cost. The method selected should provide the information needed to make policy decisions as cheaply and expeditiously as possible; appropriate applications are distinguished herein according to these criteria. In practice, most data collection activities combine a variety of methods. Typically, A.I.D. has relied on: representative methods (supplemented by intermediate and case study data) for program and policy planning; secondary data for program and policy evaluation; and case study and intermediate data for project-level planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Once the methodology has been defined, a budget for data collection

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activities must be developed to include: designing the research; selecting samples and sites; developing and testing instruments; training assistants; collecting, processing, and analyzing the data; preparing reports and deliverables; and communicating and coordinating among implementors. The main components of the scope of work for data collection (which will vary somewhat with the method used), are: the study's background and purpose; questions to be addressed; the study approach; special skills required; time frame; reporting requirements; and deliverables. Provided for each method are model scopes of work and suggested wording to ensure that documented data sets and other deliverables are received under contract.

Evaluation guidelines for nonproject assistance: commodity import programs (CIPs) and CIP-like activities

PN-AAL-058

*Development Associates, Inc.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Office of Evaluation (Sponsor)*

*Aug 1985, viii, 54p. + 5 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 4*

In response to suggestions from the General Accounting Office, this report presents A.I.D. management with guidelines for evaluating two types of nonproject assistance activities (that is, activities aimed at rapidly infusing foreign exchange or commodities into a nation's economy)—Commodity Import Programs (CIPs), which finance the foreign exchange costs of commodity procurement and shipping for developing countries, and CIP-like programs, such as agricultural development loans to provide for commodity imports established with Economic Support Fund or Development Assistance funding. The report, based on a review of past CIP evaluations by A.I.D. and the World Bank, focuses on both the procedural and substantive aspects of evaluation. Individual sections of the report treat: (1) the theory and practice of CIP and CIP-like programs; (2) the main areas of concern in evaluating these programs (program management, a consideration of particular importance in CIP programs; achievement of objectives; intended and unintended impacts within

the recipient country; and lessons learned); (3) the evaluation scope of work; (4) preparatory work such as preparing data collection instruments, training interviewers, and interviewing U.S. officials in the host country; and (5) major issues affecting the program's economic impact (policy reform, the targeting of commodities and beneficiaries, foreign exchange rates, and local currency programming). Particular stress is laid on problems in tracing the end uses of A.I.D. resources and on ways evaluators can establish a causal link between A.I.D. assistance and various economic impacts (e.g., on selected economic sectors, on balance of payments, on equity, and on private firms). A presentation of indicators for measuring the program's effectiveness in key areas leads to some brief, concluding suggestions regarding the physical preparation of the report. Appended are sample questionnaires, suggested outlines for a CIP evaluation report and for scopes of work for evaluating both a CIP and a CIP-like program, and a review of selected World Bank evaluation documents.

Approach to evaluating the impact of A.I.D. projects

PN-AAL-059

*White, Louise G.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

*Mar 1986, vi, 56p., Eng.
A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 5*

Traditionally, the impact evaluations produced by A.I.D.'s Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) are "rapid impact studies" in which teams of development experts, some of them A.I.D. staff, go into the field for 3-4 weeks to make observations and to collect and analyze data. An overview of this methodology from its inception in 1979 to 1985 is presented. The report is in two parts. Part one describes the rationale, activities, and products that typify CDIE impact studies in contradistinction to other kinds of evaluations. Included is a detailed description, intended as an overview of the methodology for development workers, of the organization of evaluation teams and the procedures used in the impact studies (topic selection, topic coordinator, background studies, planning workshops, site selection, team composition,

team workshops, fieldwork, conferences, and publications). Part two explores more specific methodological and operational issues, and is intended for those who anticipate direct participation in impact evaluations and who therefore require additional "how-to" guidance. The first of its three sections discusses evaluation design, including developing conceptual frameworks, identifying impacts, designing the study and developing working hypotheses, and selecting evaluatory techniques, resources, and measures. A second section discusses procedures for collecting and analyzing data from field observations and interviews. The final section presents strategies for reporting evaluation findings, including written reports, debriefing sessions, and the responsibilities of team members in concluding the evaluation process. The study emphasizes several characteristics which make the use of impact evaluations ideal for A.I.D. projects. (1) Although it is difficult to assess impact, the studies are valuable reminders of the difference development assistance has made. (2) Impact evaluations are important in helping A.I.D. policymakers address broad policy concerns. (3) The studies give development experts the opportunity to compare what was done with what should have been done and to develop alternatives for the future—a stance less common with more narrowly defined evaluations.

Manual for evaluating small-scale enterprise development projects

PN-AAL-065

*Goldmark, Susan; Rosengard, Jay
Development Alternatives, Inc.
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Science and Technology, Office of Rural and Institutional Development (Sponsor)*

*Nov 1985, xv, 287p., Eng.
A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 6
9311090*

Practical advice on how to conduct cost-effective impact evaluations of small scale enterprises (SSEs) is presented in this manual. The techniques described, which fit into the normal time frame for impact evaluations (3-6 weeks each for field work and for data analysis and write up), are based on experience from evaluations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Low-, medium-, and high-level options from which to choose, de-

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pending on time and budget constraints, are given along with key issues to investigate, checklists for data collection, and frameworks for analyzing results. The manual's chapters discuss: (1-2) background of the manual and factors to consider prior to designing an evaluation methodology; (3-4) general guidelines for data collection and data analysis; (5-8) how to evaluate the performance of the donor agency, SSE credit institutions, SSE technical assistance agencies, and assisted SSEs; (9) how to determine the SSE project's impact on community members; (10) how to synthesize the findings from the above analyses into a project-level evaluation. A 45-item bibliography (1968-85) is appended.

A.I.D. evaluation handbook

PN-AAL-086

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Apr 1987, v, 43p. + 4 attachments, Eng.
Report no. TM-3S-12*

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 7

To help managers make well-informed decisions, A.I.D. oversees an intricate system, herein described, to monitor and evaluate its development assistance activities at all levels and stages of implementation. An initial overview of the system notes U.S. Government requirements for accountability in the use of development assistance funds; A.I.D.'s focus on meeting management needs; the decentralized nature of the system to allow for flexibility and responsiveness; the multiple types of evaluation activities; and the importance of host country collaboration. A description of the procedural components of the system covers: (1) using past experience in designing new activities; (2) incorporating an information component (i.e., a plan for data collection and analysis activities) in project design; (3) deciding when, how, and what to evaluate; (4) writing an evaluation scope of work; (5) assigning Mission or AID/W backstopping responsibilities; (6) completing the evaluation (e.g., internal review, debriefing, submission requirements); and (7) making the evaluation useful through Mission or AID/W follow-up on recommendations. A concluding section delineates the evaluation responsibilities of Mission and of Regional and Central Bureau personnel. Appendices provide

outlines of basic project identification data and of an executive summary, and steps in preparing an annual evaluation plan.

Conducting group interviews in developing countries

PN-AAL-088

*Kumar, Krishna
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Apr 1987, x, 46p., Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 8

Conventional qualitative data collection methods (e.g., censuses, sample surveys, ethnographies) often yield overly elaborate and inappropriate information for A.I.D.'s management and evaluative purposes. An alternative that is often overlooked is the group interview. This handbook discusses group interview methodology in non-technical language, paying special attention to the problems of conducting interviews in developing countries. Elements of interview design and execution are examined at length, including among others: (1) defining the scope and objectives of the interview; (2) determining the size and composition (e.g., by age, sex, class, etc.) of the groups; (3) interviewing techniques; (4) methods for controlling the discussion; and (5) recording results. A separate section discusses the community interview, a carefully structured form of the town meeting. Although the interview method has certain disadvantages (for example, interviewer bias may affect results, and the data produced are not a representative sample), it can nevertheless be a useful tool in project planning, implementation, and evaluation. A two page bibliography is included.

Guidelines for data collection, monitoring and evaluation plans for A.I.D.-assisted projects

PN-AAL-089

*Norton, Maureen; Benoliel, Sharon Pines
U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Apr 1987, xii, 51p. + 3 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 9

A review of recent A.I.D. experience with data collection introduces these guidelines aimed at helping A.I.D. managers obtain the project performance data they need for effective decision-making. The paper presents two sets of guidelines. The first set covers collecting data during project implementation in order to improve project monitoring and impact assessment; data gathering techniques, the need for rapid, low-cost studies, and the use of the latter to answer the questions posed by managers are discussed. The second set of guidelines, which concerns the preparation at the project design stage of plans for data collection, monitoring, and evaluation, presents a step-by-step approach to designing a project information system; items covered include identifying information users, clarifying the project's logframe components, identifying managers' questions and the data for answering them, clarifying counterpart involvement, developing feedback procedures, and developing a budget. Appendices provide a checklist of issues for preparing Project Paper data collection plans; discuss data gathering techniques for conducting rapid, low-cost studies; provide sample data collection, monitoring, and evaluation plans for projects in various sectors; and present an extensive bibliography on methodologies for project evaluation.

Rapid, low-cost data collection methods for A.I.D.

PN-AAL-100

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Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Dec 1987, vii, 34p., Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 10

The high cost and the length of time required to mount large-scale rigorous data collection campaigns (e.g., censuses, sample surveys) can be a major constraint on A.I.D. project planning and management. This guide, written for A.I.D. managers who commission studies involving data collection, explores five types of less rigorous and

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more cost-effective data collection methods: (1) key informant interviews (in-depth discussions on a specific topic with knowledgeable persons); (2) focus group interviews (in which a group of participants discuss project ideas and issues among themselves under the direction of a moderator); (3) community interviews (i.e., a community/village meeting, in which interviews are usually conducted by a team of two or more investigators following an interview guide); (4) direct observation (an intensive and systematic observation of a phenomenon in its natural setting, but not as elaborate as participant observation); and (5) informal surveys (surveys that focus on just a few issues and utilize a small sample size). Each method is discussed with regard to its uses, advantages, limitations, and the times and skills required. The paper concludes with a guide to developing a scope of work for contracting a study based on rapid, low-cost data collection.

Flexible project design approaches: AID/Washington views and examples from the Philippines

PN-AAU-631

Hermann, Chris

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Jan 1986, xii, 40p. + appendix, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 3

The performance of project design approaches which maximize flexibility during implementation and thus allow for mid-course changes is compared with that of traditional, more specific designs. An initial section summarizes the two perspectives, citing experience with irrigation projects to clarify how flexible designs differ from standard project designs. The use of flexible design concepts by USAID/Philippines in four core projects provides the basis for discussion in section two of common design characteristics and the Mission's experience with initial implementation. Particular attention is given to the project management demands of these projects. Also, a distinction is made between two types of flexible design—rolling design, which specifies a project's ends but not its means, and process design, which remains general in regard to both. Advantages and disadvantages of flexi-

ble design are discussed and recommendations regarding its use provided.

Evaluating the socio-economic impact of rural road projects: three approaches to baseline and follow-up data collection designs

PN-AAV-431

Hermann, Chris

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Apr 1986, 21p. + appendix, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 9

Guidelines for planning baseline and follow-up surveys to evaluate the socioeconomic impact of rural road projects are presented. Four steps in planning the surveys are discussed: (1) identifying the project's most likely and/or important socioeconomic impacts (both direct and derived, the latter of which emerge after some time and may be better addressed through later impact evaluations); (2) specifying data requirements to measure these impacts; (3) selecting an appropriate study approach, in most cases based principally on funds available for evaluation (three general approaches—minimum, low cost, and high cost—are compared in a table); and (4) writing a scope of work based on the decisions made concerning the impacts to be evaluated, data requirements, and study approach. A concluding section cautions that, where baseline data are inadequate or unusable or where host country support for data collection has waned, it is prudent to evaluate the usefulness of a follow-up survey before wasting valuable energy and resources. Appended is a sample scope of work.

Information planning for policy reform programs

PN-AAV-806

Hermann, Chris

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Aug 1986, vii, 27p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 13

Four types of data commonly needed to monitor and evaluate A.I.D. policy reform (PR) programs—data on host country compliance with disbursement conditions, on the performance of public sector institutions, on the program's economic and political context, and on the private sector's response to PR—are discussed. Also identified are three features of PR programs which delimit their information requirements: (1) basic information needs for monitoring implementation are defined in disbursement conditions; (2) information requirements increase as restrictions on the use of funds become more specific; and (3) the difficulty in demonstrating the macroeconomic and sectoral effects of PRs, which frequently precludes this as an evaluation strategy, may lessen information needs. Several recommendations concerning staffing and funding for the information component are made. The report, directed to A.I.D. and host country program staff and to specialists with limited experience in the information requirements of PR programs, cites programs in Niger and Mali to exemplify both the types of data needed and the methods used to collect them.

Methodologies for assessing the impact of agricultural and rural development projects: a dialogue

PN-AAX-218

Kumar, Krishna

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Jun 1989, viii, 24p. + 2 appendices, Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 11

In January 1988, A.I.D. sponsored an international workshop to discuss key issues concerning impact assessments of agricultural and rural development projects. Major findings and conclusions were as follows.

1. Current strategies for computing the net impacts of agricultural and rural development projects—statistical control and quasi-experimental design techniques—are impractical and should be replaced by rapid, low-cost data collection methods (e.g., informant interviews,

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community meetings, surveys) to determine whether anticipated or unanticipated change occurred in core impact areas, and whether these changes can plausibly be related to the project.

2. Production impact should be assessed by examining not only a project's impacts on targeted crops, but also the project's effect on non-targeted crops and activities, the use of the targeted crop, the persons responsible for production and marketing, the cost opportunity of the new crop, and gender issues.
3. Impact on household income can be assessed by conducting small, sample surveys for extended periods of time. These surveys should focus on household expenditures, key standard-of-living indicators, and intrahousehold control of income.
4. Besides food production, factors such as seasonality, crop mix, income, the role of women, crop labor requirements, marketing, and government policy are vital in assessing the attainment of food consumption objectives. Nutritional impact can be measured by simple and easily learned anthropometric methods. Also pertinent are questions about the frequency of meals consumed during different agricultural seasons and the number of nights the respondent or his/her acquaintances went to bed hungry.
5. Agreement is lacking among scientists and donors on suitable models for assessing project impact on natural resources and the environment. Such models, when developed, should include not only biological and physical aspects, but social and economic aspects as well. Excessive use of technical language and evaluators' sense of their inability to affect environmental issues are also problems.
6. More needs to be done to devolve assessment efforts to host country agencies, building, where necessary, the required institutional capacity.

Indicators for measuring changes in income, food availability and consumption, and the natural resource base

PN-AAX-223

Kumar, Krishna

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

(*Impact Indicators Workshop, Arlington, VA, US, 20-22 Jun 1988*)

Sep 1989, vi, 36p., Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology [report], no. 12

Though often confused with concepts such as "data," "targets," or "standards of evaluation," impact indicators are objectively verifiable and replicable variables that measure change in a given phenomenon or process. This report documents the findings of a workshop held in 1988 to identify a set of simple, practical indicators for monitoring the impact of A.I.D.'s agricultural and rural development assistance. Three groups of indicators are discussed: (1) indicators to measure income change, e.g., macro-level indicators such as GNP and GDP and micro-level indicators such as household income and expenditures and indicators of intrahousehold income distribution; (2) indicators to measure changes in food consumption, e.g., per capita calorie intake, food expenditures, and market availability and prices, as well as anthropometric indicators such as weight at birth; and (3) natural resource indicators, including indicators of topsoil erosion, crop yield, actual land use versus soil suitability, surface and groundwater pollution, and the status of rangelands, forests, and wetlands. Good indicators, according to workshop participants, should provide valid measures, be reliable, sensitive to change, replicable, and based on easily accessible data; they should also be measurable quickly and cost-effectively, and be easily understood by policymakers. The attempt to measure impact indicators for every project was agreed to be impractical; instead, program assessments should be based on impact measurements from a sample of projects and on key qualitative studies.

Conducting key informant interviews in developing countries

PN-AAX-226

Kumar, Krishna

U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Dec 1989, vi, 37p. + attachment, Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 13

Although key informant interviews are widely conducted in development settings, the quality and nature of the information they generate is often of dubious value and low credibility. To improve the quality of this data collection method, this report provides guidelines for conducting informant interviews in developing countries. After a brief introduction, Section 2 describes the main steps that investigators should take to prepare for the interviews. These include: formulating study questions, reviewing available information, developing a conceptual framework, preparing an interview guide, and selecting key informants. Section 3 details the actual interview process, focusing on meeting and probing informants, wording and sequencing questions, controlling conversations, using translators, and recording the interview. Section 4 profiles simple, practical techniques that can be used to analyze interview data, including summary sheets, descriptive codes, storage and retrieval systems, and presentation of data. Finally, Section 5 describes the steps to take to ensure reliability and validity of the findings by checking the key informant's "representativeness" and reliability, examining the interviewer's own possible bias, and keeping an eye out for negative evidence. Overall, the key informant interview is a good evaluation method since it provides information and insight that cannot be obtained with other methods, provides flexibility to explore new issues, and is inexpensive to conduct. However, certain drawbacks exist as well. Key informant interviews do not provide quantitative data, are susceptible to interviewer biases, and can be unreliable if fewer than 15 persons are interviewed.

Preliminary indicators for monitoring changes in the natural resource base

PN-AAX-233

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U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)

Feb 1990, vi, 34p. + attachment, Eng.

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 14

Since most agricultural and rural development projects call for intensive resource use, they are likely to have both positive and negative impacts

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on the physical environment. This paper describes ten simple, low-cost indicators which can be used by field personnel as an alternative to sophisticated data collection systems in monitoring these changes. These indicators were selected because they: (1) allow easily measurable, low-cost, rapid data collection; (2) are applicable over a broad range of ecosystems; (3) have a project-level focus; and, where feasible, (4) permit local participation. The paper details how to collect and use these data for soil, water, vegetation, wildlife, and to some extent, areas of scientific, cultural, historical, and religious significance. The most important indicators of impact on the quantity of water are changes in the stream flow, water table, or drainage patterns, while changes in water quality are detected by monitoring physical, chemical, and biological properties. Impacts on soil are measured by observing wind and water erosion and trends in soil productivity, particularly in traditional farm fields. Vegetation is monitored by looking at changes in the ratio of permanent vegetation to open or farmland areas; in the composition and density of the vegetation; and in tree or shrub coverage on farmland or in open areas. To measure the impact on wildlife, the number of species, the size of the animal population, and the extent and quality of the habitat are observed. Finally, areas of special significance should be monitored, according to their importance to the local people (e.g., sacred forests, burial grounds) or to the international scientific community (e.g., sites of geological significance or species diversity).

Conducting mini surveys in developing countries

PN-AAX-249

Kumar, Krishna

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Dec 1990, vi, 65 p.: charts, statistical tables,
Eng.*

A.I.D. program design and evaluation methodology report, no. 15

While mini-surveys cannot substitute for complex, large-scale surveys, they can provide valuable information in a variety of program and project settings. This paper provides a comprehensive, step-by-step guide to conducting mini-surveys in developing countries. It details how to

plan surveys, prepare questions, design the questionnaire, select respondents, ask questions, and analyze and present the survey data. A mini-survey may be defined as one which: (1) focuses on a narrowly defined issues; (2) keeps the number of questions small (15-30); (3) employs a small sample size (25-70); (4) typically uses closed rather than open-ended questions; and (5) may employ informal sampling procedures, though the more objective probability sampling is preferred. Such surveys have several advantages. Unlike other low-cost data collection methods, they can generate qualitative data. In addition, they can be completed within a short time-span (3-7 weeks), contain few nonsampling errors, and are relatively low in cost. Their use is particularly appropriate when: (1) limited time or resources do not permit or justify the launching of a large sample survey; (2) the purpose of the survey is to develop questions, hypotheses, and propositions for further testing; and (3) some quantitative data are needed to supplement qualitative information. The limitations of mini-surveys should also be borne in mind, however. Their findings are less capable of generalization, for example, while the small sample size may not permit statistical analysis and frequently places the survey's credibility in question.

Designing monitoring and evaluation systems: issues and opportunities

PN-AAY-391

Hermann, Chris

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Oct 1987, v, 13p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 14

Management problems can occur at any time in the project cycle. An increasingly recognized way of identifying and correcting these problems is through use of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. This paper discusses issues pertaining to the design of M&E and related information systems. After summarizing the problems commonly found in past M&E activities (poorly defined data collection needs, reliance on overly sophisticated data collection and analysis methods, inadequate data analysis, insufficient staffing and funding levels), the paper presents guidelines for future M&E planning. (1)

No single approach to M&E is uniformly applicable. (2) Direct measurement of project impacts is not always necessary or feasible. (3) M&E systems should begin by identifying user needs, and should let the nature of the project, not research criteria, determine information requirements. (4) Multiple data collection methods (including informal methods) and multiple data sources should be used. (5) Collaborative implementation of M&E systems can build host country data collection and analysis capabilities and increase host country responsiveness to M&E findings. A final section describes three alternative approaches to organizing M&E units.

USAID/Jakarta's strategic use of empirical information

PN-AAY-392

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Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

Oct 1987, x, 22p. + appendix, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 15

The extent to which A.I.D. Missions comply with the A.I.D. policy that management decisions be based on hard, empirical evidence varies greatly from Mission to Mission. This paper describes the exemplary performance of USAID/Jakarta in this area. The paper sketches and exemplifies the three stages in the evolution of the Mission's strategy for using empirical information—developing problem-oriented evaluations, coordinating information activities for project, program, and policy purposes, and disseminating information to potential users—and delineates the central roles played in this evolution by the Mission Director, the Project and Program Support Office and the Evaluation Section, and Mission technical offices. The report also specifies problems limiting the Mission's further improvement and greater use of its information system. A review of the lessons which other Missions can learn from USAID/Jakarta's experience stresses the need for a clear commitment to information activities by senior Mission managers and active involvement therein by the Mission Director; insights for developing a Mission information strategy are also provided. A concluding section suggests that in the face of the low priority accorded within the Agency to information activities (in fact, if not in policy), A.I.D. focus on de-

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veloping regional information services rather than in-house Mission capabilities.

Review of the quality of A.I.D. evaluations: FY 1987 and FY 1988

PN-ABC-321

Hopstock, Paul J.; Kellum, Allan C.; Young, Malcolm B.

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

May 1989, xiii, 40p. + 2 appendices: charts, statistical tables, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 19

To provide a clearer picture of A.I.D.'s evaluation practices, this report reviews 287 evaluations submitted by A.I.D. Missions and offices during FY87 and FY88 to examine their overall quality and compliance with the A.I.D. Handbook. Among the report's key findings are (1) over half (53%) of the evaluations were conducted solely by contractors, while A.I.D. and host country personnel participated in 29% and 27% of them, respectively; (2) on average, less than 50% of the recommendations could be acted upon by the A.I.D. Mission or Bureau that sponsored the evaluation, the rest being directed to those actually implementing the project; and (3) regarding special concerns, detailed discussion was given to women in development issues in just 9% of the evaluations, and to environmental issues in 8%. Sustainability issues were discussed in 36%. Other findings are listed below. (1) The majority (89%) of the reports evaluated single projects, 10% more than one project, and 1% nonproject assistance. (2) On certain key measures (e.g., completeness, methodology), evaluations prepared for the Asia/Near East and Latin America/Caribbean Bureaus were rated highest. (3) Interim evaluations accounted for 69% of the total. (4) Regarding their primary focus, 64% of the reports addressed outputs, 28% addressed purpose, and 2% addressed goals. (5) Complete data were available on outputs in 51% of the evaluations, purposes in 19%, and goals in 4%. (6) Possibly because of the short time taken to conduct the evaluations (on average about a month), data collection relied heavily on key informant interviews and to a lesser extent on site visits, with little or no use made of focus group or community interviews, formal or informal surveys, or direct ob-

servations. (7) Of reports using analytical methods, 50% analyzed trend data, 23% analyzed cost-effectiveness in detail, and 11% used comparison or control groups. (8) Some 60% contained information on financial monitoring and 79% on program monitoring; of these, 66% of the projects evaluated were given high marks for financial monitoring and 54% for program monitoring. (9) A total of 59% of the reports called for improvements in the project monitoring, evaluation, or management information systems. (10) Included in 66% of the evaluations was the required ES or PES containing a section for listing actions to be taken on the basis of the evaluation. (11) Some 18% of the evaluations noted that recommendations from prior evaluations had not been implemented. (12) Cost data, which were provided for 45% of the evaluations, indicate a mean cost per evaluation of \$37,450, with 17% costing less than \$10,000 and 20% costing over \$60,000. [Author abstract, modified]

Impact indicators: general issues and concerns

PN-ABC-899

Kumar, Krishna

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

(Impact Indicators Workshop, Arlington, VA, US, 20-22 Jun 1988)

Aug 1989, 14p., Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 30

Impact indicators—which may be defined as measures of the effect of development interventions on people, economic sectors, society, and the environment—are a largely unexplored and even ambiguous topic within A.I.D. This paper examines some basic issues affecting impact indicators for agricultural and rural development projects. The paper lists technical and practical criteria for selecting impact indicators and argues the indispensability of these indicators in determining whether and to what extent development changes have occurred, although the use of supplementary qualitative studies is urged to develop a reasonable certainty that the changes are causally linked to a given project. Three impact areas—household income, food availability and consumption, and the natural resource base—are identified as central for providing a systematic assessment of the Agency's progress towards its

agricultural and rural development goals; simple criteria for selecting sample projects on which to gather data in these three areas are presented. A final section suggests concrete ways of reducing the costs of establishing a system for collecting and analyzing impact data.

Indicators of household income for use in the evaluation of agricultural development projects

PN-ABC-902

Rogers, Beatrice Lorge

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and Evaluation*

Oct 1989, v, 22p. + appendix, Eng.

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 33

Changes in the amount of household income as well as in the form, timing, and flow of income are important in measuring the effectiveness of agricultural interventions. Household income is difficult to assess, however, due to problems in selecting an appropriate reference period, the possibility of severe income fluctuations in the short term, and, in some settings, the reluctance of people to discuss their income. This report examines selected income indicators, including wealth and asset ownership, in kind and cash income, home labor and its monetary value, expenditures, consumption, and quality of life indicators (i.e., nutritional status and infant and child mortality). Various data sources for measuring income are then described, including secondary data, administrative records, project records, and primary data for evaluation purposes. According to the report, a reliable evaluation is likely to require primary data collection, since secondary sources are unlikely to provide the necessary level of detail. The final section of the report summarizes onsite data collection methods, including direct observation, focus groups, key informant interviews, and small-scale surveys. The report recommends frequent, small-scale evaluations to generate data for use in program modification. Appended is a lengthy excerpt from a questionnaire from a food consumption survey conducted in the Dominican Republic which exemplifies different approaches to estimating household income.

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Impact indicators for measuring change in the natural resource base

PN-ABC-903

McCracken, Ralph J.

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Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*Nov 1989, v, 24p. + 2 appendices, Eng.
A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 34*

This paper identifies and describes several impact indicators that can be used to evaluate changes in the natural resource base over time—changes that may be associated with development efforts. Specifically, the impact indicators include: six soil resource indicators (to measure water- and wind-caused erosion, soil productivity and degradation, land use, and run-off), five water resource indicators (to measure availability of ground and surface water, upstream flooding, irrigation efficiency, surface water pollutants, and groundwater contamination), four plant resource indicators (to assess local farming practices, the carrying capacity of rangeland, and

the status of forests and wetlands), and two ecosystem indicators (to evaluate general ecological deterioration, and to measure the relative productivity in calories of food produced in a soil-plant ecosystem). The document also provides a checklist of baseline data needed to implement the indicators. It is not feasible to use a common set of impact indicators for all interventions, the document concludes; variations in climate, soil, and vegetation in different locations and over time require different sets of indicators.

Food availability and consumption indicators

PN-ABC-907

*O'Brien-Place, Patricia; Frankenberger,
Timothy R.*

*U.S. Agency for International Development.
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination.
Center for Development Information and
Evaluation*

*(Impact Indicators Workshop, Arlington, VA, US,
20-22 Jun 1988)*

*Dec 1989, vii, 22p. + 3 appendices: statistical
tables, Eng.*

A.I.D. evaluation occasional paper, no. 36

Food availability and consumption indicators can be obtained through methods varying from time-consuming, detailed analysis to rapid data collection involving rough approximations. This report looks at food availability and consumption indicators, focusing on both direct (e.g., budget surveys, minimal data sets) and indirect (e.g., household food availability, nutritional status) indices. These data can be used to design agricultural and rural development projects, choose a target population or appropriate interventions, or monitor and evaluate project results. National food and agricultural planning also relies on food consumption data for knowledge of the nutritional and food consumption status of the population and for forecasting future food consumption needs. The document concludes that government policies from foreign exchange rates to fertilizer subsidies have an eventual impact on food consumption, making food consumption data a vital part of estimating the effects of present and proposed policies. Three appendices detail food consumption considerations in the design of agricultural projects, data categories for dietary assessment, and secondary data sources for food and nutrition status indicators. This report includes a bibliography (1970-88).

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PN-AAL-090	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-208	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-238	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-091	\$2.50	\$3.00	PN-AAX-209	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-239	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-092	\$2.50	\$3.00	PN-AAX-210	\$2.50	\$3.00	PN-AAX-240	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-093	\$2.50	\$3.00	PN-AAX-211	\$2.50	\$3.00	PN-AAX-241	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-094	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-212	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-242	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-095	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-213	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-243	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-096	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-214	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-244	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-097	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-215	\$2.50	\$3.00	PN-AAX-245	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-098	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-216	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-247	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAL-099	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-217	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-AAX-248	\$2.50	\$13.13

PN-AAX-249	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-707	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-906	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAX-250	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-708	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-907	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-AAY-391	\$1.25	\$2.34	PN-ABC-709	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-920	\$1.25	\$1.04
PN-AAY-392	\$1.25	\$4.42	PN-ABC-710	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABD-922	\$1.25	\$1.04
PN-ABA-143	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-863	\$1.25	\$1.04	PN-ABG-001	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-ABC-092	\$1.25	\$8.71	PN-ABC-864	\$1.25	\$1.04	PN-ABG-002	\$1.25	\$3.00
PN-ABC-321	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-899	\$1.25	\$2.34	PN-ABH-145	\$1.25	\$1.04
PN-ABC-701	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-900	\$1.25	\$2.08	PN-ABH-146	\$1.25	\$1.04
PN-ABC-702	\$1.25	\$5.46	PN-ABC-901	\$1.25	\$3.00			
PN-ABC-703	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-902	\$1.25	\$5.07			
PN-ABC-704	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-903	\$1.25	\$3.00			
PN-ABC-705	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-904	\$1.25	\$3.00			
PN-ABC-706	\$1.25	\$3.00	PN-ABC-905	\$1.25	\$1.04			

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