

## INTRODUCTION: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY

by Larry Diamond

On October 19, 1986, Nigeria's most vigorous, fearless, and important journalist, the 39-year-old crusading editor of its first and best weekly news magazine, was blown apart by a massive and sophisticated parcel bomb. Dele Giwa believed the mission of the press was to serve and find the truth, wherever it might lead, in the quest for a democratic and open society. He knew this required, for a developing country like Nigeria, new standards of journalistic rigor, initiative, courage, and professionalism. Toward this end, he pioneered in the development of investigative journalism in Nigeria. When his sense of mission could no longer be squared with the interests of the millionaire publisher whose newspaper he edited, he struck out boldly with three like-minded colleagues to found the weekly Newswatch. The extraordinary story of that magazine is described here by Giwa's co-founder and successor as Editor-in-Chief, Ray Ekpu. Its searing indictments of the country's faults, repeated exposures of corruption and abuse of power, innovative style, and brave but professional reporting changed the face of Nigerian journalism and sustained democratic aspirations and values through a difficult period of authoritarian rule. But it also landed Giwa and his magazine in frequent trouble with the authorities.

Shortly before his assassination, Giwa was detained by the State Security Service to answer patently preposterous charges that he was conspiring to foment a socialist revolution in the country, and to import arms for that purpose. Less than 24 hours before the fatal parcel was delivered to his house, the Director of Military Intelligence telephoned

there to ask for directions, indicating something needed to be delivered to Giva. To this day, Giva's murder has never been solved, and many Nigerians remain convinced that their own government was responsible.

Unfortunately, Dele Giva was only one of many journalists who have been murdered in pursuit of the news, the truth behind the news, and the freedom to report it all without fear. In its latest annual survey of press freedom in the world, Freedom House reports that 43 journalists in 19 countries were murdered in line of service in 1990. This was down from 73 in 1989, but still alarmingly high. And this was not all. Sixteen journalists were kidnapped or "disappeared" in 1990; 145 in 45 countries were arrested or detained in connection with their work; 41 were wounded, 16 beaten, 82 assaulted, 50 threatened with death, 170 harassed, and 31 expelled. In 1990, fifty publications and radio stations were closed by governments, 12 were bombed or burned, and 30 were occupied; in addition, 37 radio programs and publications were banned. In all, Freedom House documented 834 attacks on the press in 91 countries in 1990, down from 1164 in 1989 but still almost twice the number in 1987 or 1988. Of course, these figures underestimate both the number of press attacks and the number of individuals involved, as many cases are not reported, and others may affect scores of journalists at once.<sup>1</sup>

Among the most disturbing aspects of these statistics is that most of these murders occur in countries that profess to be democratic. In 1990, 7 took place in the Philippines, 3 in Peru, 4 each in Pakistan and Mexico, and 6 in Colombia (down from 20 in 1989 because of a partial but apparently only transient ceasefire).

The practice of journalism in Colombia has been under siege for several years now, as a courageous press has sought to expose and denounce the cocaine traffickers and terrorists who are ravaging the rule of law in that country. In response, these powerful groups have mounted a war on press freedom in Colombia. One of the more recent casualties of that war was the sister of another contributor to this volume, Maria Jimena Duzan. Both Maria Jimena and her sister, Silvia Margarita, worked for the Colombian newspaper, El Espectador. That newspaper -- a leader in exposing the identities and activities of the traffickers and demanding their extradition -- lost its publisher, Guillermo Cano, to narco-assassins in December 1986 and its offices to a massive bombing by the drug mafia in September 1989. Yet still it has persevered, despite the murder of numerous staff members and countless death threats to others, including Maria Jimena, who has frequently been forced into refuge overseas.

Silvia Duzan was killed on February 26, 1990, along with three leaders of a nascent peasant union movement. The latter were attempting to find a peace formula for a troubled region of the country's drug-producing highlands that had been contested by leftist guerillas and death squads financed by the drug traffickers and wealthy landowners of the region. At the time, she was working on a documentary for British television about the efforts of the union leaders to relieve the peasants of the region from the pressures of these two armed forces beyond the control of the state. She was one of more than forty Colombian journalists to have been killed since the war against the press began in earnest in the early 1980s.<sup>2</sup>

And it is not only journalists who are at risk. Wherever people struggle for democracy, for human rights and social justice, for openness

and accountability in government, they threaten powerful interests, and are liable to be arrested, intimidated, tortured, murdered, or "disappeared." The files of Amnesty International and the various regional branches of Human Rights Watch are stuffed full of horrendous accounts of great and ordinary people who have been murdered or viciously attacked in this cause.

Evilio B. Javier was simply one such person. He was shot dead on February 11, 1986, defending the sanctity of the ballots cast four days previously in the presidential "snap election" Ferdinand Marcos called and then tried to rig in order to restore his shattered legitimacy. Elected governor of Antique province at age 28 (the youngest in Philippine history), Javier had crusaded against political corruption while launching popular and innovative development projects and adroitly managing to maintain a democratic style of provincial governance during the first eight years of Marcos' martial law rule (1972-1980). At the time of his assassination, he was provincial chairman of the opposition alliance led by Corazon Aquino, and his political talent, courage, and vision were leading many to speak of him as a leader of the potential greatness of President Mag:aysay or Benigno Aquino. He was watching over ballot boxes in the town plaza of San Jose, Antique, when gunmen attacked, pumping 24 bullets into him.

Although his assassins have never been brought to justice, Evilio Javier's murder was one of the battlecries in the massive popular protest that brought down the Marcos dictatorship two weeks later. Moreover, the principles of his life and the manner of his untimely death inspired a group of prominent Filipinos to form a foundation, named after him, to advance his dream of developing a new breed of public official committed to serving the public honestly. The Evilio B. Javier Foundation -- whose Executive

Director, Dette Pascual, is another contributor to this volume -- now works to train local political leaders, especially mayoralty candidates and incumbent municipal and city mayors, in the ethics and skills of democratic governance. It also lobbies for greater local government resources and autonomy and trains young people for future leadership positions in local government. Like the other organization about which Dette Pascual writes in this volume, the Women's Movement for the Nurturance of Democracy (KABATID), and countless others in the Philippines and throughout the developing world, it is on the front lines of the long, slow, arduous and subtle struggle to develop a democratic citizenry and value system capable of sustaining democratic government and making it work to improve people's lives.

#### **MARTYRS AND HEROS OF DEMOCRACY**

This book is dedicated to Dele Giwa, Silvia Duzan, and Evilio Javier, and this introductory essay is begun in their memory, not because they were unique among the many martyrs to the cause of democracy worldwide, but because the democratic revolution -- like all great struggles for change in human history -- has its martyrs, and they deserve to be recognized and remembered for the sacrifices they made. I have chosen these three people because of the special meaning they have to three of the contributors to this book, and to the struggles about which they write. In addition, Dele Giva had a special meaning to me as a personal friend and inspiration, someone who stood out from the greed and cynicism destroying his country. He offered it some hope for a democratic future precisely because, to quote

Justice Isagani Cruz in his tribute to Evilio Javier, "He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return to freedom of his country."

Democracy does not generally come these days via the kind of bloody revolution that brought it forth in the United States, but the changes that give it birth often amount to a revolution, and rarely are they made without a great many people risking their comfort, security, wealth, livelihoods, and -- too often -- their lives. I have introduced this volume in this way not only to pay tribute but to make this important substantive point. Democracy is not achieved simply by the hidden process of socioeconomic development bringing a country to a point where it has the necessary "prerequisites" for it. It is not delivered by the grace of some sociological deus ex machina. And neither is it simply the result of the divisions, strategies, tactics, negotiations, and settlements of contending elites. Political scientists who conceive of democratic transitions simply in this way miss an important element. That element is struggle, personal risk-taking, mobilization, and sustained, imaginative organization on the part of a large number of citizens. Some of them may be "elites" in the sense that they have privileged social status and wealth, if not access to power. And in challenging a corrupt and autocratic status quo, they who are expected to be a part of it take the greatest risks. In doing so, they often lose if not their lives, at least their jobs, and perhaps their personal freedom.

Several of the contributors to this volume have suffered for the risks they have taken to advance the cause of freedom. Anthony Heard lost his

editorship. Bona Malwal was imprisoned for a year, lost his newspaper, and more than once, was in danger of losing his life. Clement Nwankwo was arrested by state security agents, and then suffered a serious attempt on his life. Maria Duzan has lived for most of a decade under continuing threat of assassination by the cocaine traffickers. And they and their fellow contributors to this volume have made many other sacrifices, of their time, money, and energy. They are represented here not only because their stories are important, even extraordinary, but because their lives are exemplary; they are not just democratic citizens, they have devoted their lives to the cause of democratic citizenship.

But the democratic revolution is not the work of lone heroes. It is the cumulative achievement of tens and hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions of citizens who become actively involved in civic movements and independent media. And it has been to the cause of promoting and informing such civic participation that all of the contributors to this volume, in one way or another, have been dedicated. In this sense, their work has been self-effacing; for democracy, perhaps alone among the forms of government, cannot triumph on the basis of heroic leadership and action. It requires an educated and active mass base, alert to the dangers of hero-worship, conscious of the need to perpetually replenish the ranks of political leaders, and poised to return to the ranks of ordinary citizens any who would abuse or aggrandize their political power or fame. This is the type of democratic citizenry all of the journalists and activists in this volume have been struggling to create.

## HOW CIVIL SOCIETY CONTRIBUTES TO DEMOCRACY

Although some of our contributors have served briefly in political office, one thing that distinguishes them all is their lack of interest in acquiring political power for themselves. They have chosen as their arena of action not politics and the state but civil society, that complex realm of community life that lies between the individual family on the one hand and the arenas of the state and the electoral struggle for state control on the other. Stepan has defined "civil society" as

that arena where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings, and intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes (such as lawyers, journalists, trade unions and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests.<sup>3</sup>

In such a civil society, autonomous mass media and cultural life constitute another important dimension of interest and expression. Such movements, organizations, and institutions may address themselves to powerholders, and express their preferences in the contest for state power, but they do not seek to control it directly. "Political society," by contrast, is the arena in which political actors and institutions -- in a democracy, parties, factions, politicians, alliances, electoral campaign and voter turnout organizations, etc. -- contest for control of the state, in all its administrative, bureaucratic, legal, legislative, and coercive dimensions, at all levels of its authority.

The struggle for democracy must have as one of its primary goals the establishment of a viable and democratic political society, of democratic political parties and campaign machineries that contend for power through regular, free, fair, and peaceful elections.<sup>4</sup> This much is obvious to the casual observer. But democracy also requires the construction of a vibrant, vigorous, and pluralistic civil society. Without such a civil society, democracy cannot become developed and secure.

A strong civil society can contribute to democracy in many ways. Perhaps most fundamentally, it represents a reservoir of resources -- political, economic, cultural, and moral -- to check and balance the power of the state. A strong array of independent associations and media provides "the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control."<sup>5</sup> If the state controls the mass media, there is no way of exposing its abuses and corruption. Even if the independent media are simply weak and professionally underdeveloped, rather than legally barred or harrassed, democracy will suffer. Likewise, it is the presence of a vast array of noisily assertive and creatively resourceful interest groups that keeps the state from being captured by any one interest and forces the state to be accountable to its citizens and responsive to their claims and concerns.

In the latter respect, it is not only the strength of civil society that matters but also its diversity, its pluralism. When a wide range of interests are organized, they provide an important basis (both beyond political parties and working through them) for democratic competition. Functional groups -- business and producer organizations, trade unions,

professional associations, peasant leagues, student associations -- are able to press their various interests; issue-oriented movements -- for environmental protection, women's and minority rights, community development, civil liberties -- theirs; and ethnic, cultural, and religious organizations theirs as well. Not all groups will have equal resources or access to power proportionate to their numbers, but the presence of conflicting interests, pressures, and pulls will tend to keep the state in a democratic system from becoming the captive of any one group or interest, and will compel some accommodation of divergent interests. Moreover, it is precisely the freedom to organize, and to mobilize the political power implicit in their numbers, that gives poor and disadvantaged groups in a democracy the capacity to improve their lot -- more gradually, to be sure, than under the banner of a socialist revolution, but in the long run, more reliably and humanely as well.

Third, a rich associational life supplements the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens, and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizenship. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his early observations on democracy in America, was perhaps the first to note the symbiotic, mutually reinforcing relationship between participation in civil society and participation in political life:

Civil associations, therefore, facilitate political association; but, on the other hand, political association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes....

Political life makes the love and practice of association more general....<sup>6</sup>

construing "political associations" to include, more broadly, the kinds of civic associations represented in this volume, de Tocqueville observed that people are often reluctant, at first to come together in "civil partnerships" (read business firms or economic interests groups) because they risk financial resources in the process.

They are less reluctant, however, to join political associations, which appear to them to be without danger because they risk no money in them. But they cannot belong to these associations for any length of time without finding out how order is maintained among a large number of [people] and by what contrivance they are made to advance, harmoniously and methodically, to the same object.... Political associations may therefore be considered as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association....

In their political associations the Americans, of all conditions, minds, and ages, daily acquire a general taste for association and grow accustomed to the use of it. There they meet together in large numbers, they converse, they listen to one another, and they are mutually stimulated to all sorts of undertakings. They afterwards transfer to civil life the notions they have thus acquired and make them subservient to a thousand purposes.<sup>7</sup>

Some of the democratic civic associations represented in this volume, and many similar efforts of other groups, large and small, throughout the developing world, draw quite purposefully on de Tocqueville's image of the association as a "large free school" where members of the community go to learn the general art of association. The Argentine women's group,

Conciencia, which has spread to 14 other countries in the past few years, has sought not only to educate citizens about the specific elements of the constitutional and electoral systems, but to develop more general and subtle features of democratic participation and association: the need for tolerance and respect for the views of others, the dynamics of reaching consensus within a group, the means by which people can cooperate to solve the problems of their communities. Conciencia has developed a program to enter the schools and develop these arts of association in young people, and another to facilitate community improvement efforts by neighborhood and district groups. Recently it has taken on as one of its major missions the nurturing and training of associational leaders all over the country, so that, in the words of Maria Rosa de Martini, "they can become the 'backbone' of a democratic society." KABATID in the Philippines and Participa in Chile are also engaged in programs that seek to enlarge and energize independent organizational life in those countries.

There is much of the Tocquevillian spirit in what these groups are doing. It is not just in their conscious efforts to promote the skills of active citizenship and organizational involvement, and not just in the fact once such civic organizations take root successfully they "tend amazingly to multiply," to quote Tocqueville again. Their further contribution lies in a fourth function, appreciated by Tocqueville but often overlooked in an age when social scientists still worry that societies with too many strong interest groups and movements demanding too much can become "ungovernable." "Freedom of association," de Tocqueville mused, may, "after having agitated society for some time, ... strengthen the state in the end."<sup>8</sup> By giving people a deeper stake in the social order, a society rich in participation

and organization may give stability to the state. By bringing people together in endless combinations for a great diversity of purposes, a rich associational life may not only multiply demands on the state, it may also multiply the capacities of groups to improve their own welfare, independent of the state, especially at the local level.

A fifth function of a democratic civil society is recruiting and training new political leaders. Typically, again, this emerges as an unplanned byproduct of whatever else associations may be seeking. As individuals emerge to leadership positions within civic and interest groups, social movements, and community efforts of various kinds, they may gain recognition as possible new leaders in the political arena as well. Where leadership recruitment within the established political parties and networks has become narrow, unrepresentative, or stagnant, this can be a particularly important function for democracy. Most of this is on-the-job training, learning by doing. A citizen who discovers how to organize her neighbors or co-workers effectively, how to mediate their conflicts and produce consensus, how to manage their associational finances responsibly, also learns, often unwittingly, skills and insights necessary for effective and responsive management of affairs of state. Less formally, through leadership in pursuit of collective interests, or on behalf of democratic consolidation -- or through the public articulation in the media of a clear and compelling alternative vision of politics and policy -- new personalities emerge in the public realm who may be recruited to run for political office, either by the grassroots or the party leaders.

Here, too, some democratic civic groups are playing this role very consciously and effectively. I have already noted Conciencia's leadership

training courses. which have been attended by activists in voluntary organizations. community groups, and trade unions, as well as by local politicians. A prime purpose of the Evilio B. Javier Foundation in the Philippines, as Dette Pascual explains in her essay, is to train able and honest political leaders at the local and provincial levels, both elected public officials and candidates from all parties.

There is a sixth democratic function of civil society that often precedes all of these in temporal terms: to resist the domination of an authoritarian regime and hasten its exit from power. The distinguishing feature of totalitarian rule is that it eliminates civil society, subjecting all forms of expression and organization to control by the state, and by the mobilizational party that runs the state. In such regimes, the emergence from the underground of the first faint glimmers of unofficial expression and independent organization represents the first real crack in the armor of totalitarian domination. The movement of a regime from totalitarianism to "merely" authoritarian rule closely corresponds to this emergence of a civil society independent of the state. The movements for democracy in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China -- and now, on the periphery of the surviving Communist world, in countries like Vietnam and Cuba -- all had their seeds in and have drawn their primary energy from the growth of autonomous organizational, cultural, and intellectual life.<sup>9</sup> As Vilem Precan observes, the first step in transforming Eastern Europe from totalitarian rule toward democracy was "the cultivation of citizenship, the implementation of the principle of life in the truth, and the rise of independent culture and samizdat." As this "moral revolution" took hold, autonomous organization spread (first and most importantly demanding respect

for human rights) and communist domination eroded and fell, until the point where "civil society enters the political arena as a self-assured and independent force."<sup>10</sup>

Where the transition is from authoritarian rule and civil society survives in a battered and fearful state, its emergence from fear and galvanization marks a turning point in the struggle for democracy. To be sure, one reason for the emergence or persistence of authoritarian rule is the acceptance or active collaboration given it by powerful elements of society, typically landowners, bankers, industrialists, etc. When these groups turn against the regime, a crucial element of its support base falls away and its demise is usually near. But long before that happens (and an important reason why it happens), authoritarian domination is eroded by what O'Donnell and Schmitter call "the resurrection of civil society," though in some developing countries large elements of civil society are only newly emerging. This phenomenon involves a veritable explosion of civic consciousness and activity:

the sudden appearance of books and magazines on themes long suppressed by censorship; the conversion of older institutions, such as trade unions, professional associations, and universities, from agents of governmental control into instruments for the expression of interests, ideals, and rage against the regime; the emergence of grass-roots organizations articulating demands long repressed or ignored by authoritarian rule; the expression of ethical concerns by religious and spiritual groups previously noted for their prudent accommodation to the authorities....<sup>11</sup>

Many of our contributors to this volume have been on the cutting edge of this outpouring of civic activity that has undermined authoritarian rule. Monica Jimenez de Barros played a leading role in organizing the Crusade for Citizen Participation that mobilized Chileans to register and vote in the December 1988 plebiscite, which defeated General Pinochet's bid to extend his dictatorship with the cover of popular support. Dette Pascual was a leader in NAMFREL, the National Movement for Free Elections, which frustrated Ferdinand Marcos's effort to steal the 1986 presidential election victory of Cory Aquino. Felix Bautista edited the one publication, Veritas, that dared to expose the lies and abuses of the Marcos regime and to call for its ouster through elections. Through their courageous writing and editing, Ray Ekpu in Nigeria, Bona Malwal in Sudan, and Anthony Heard in South Africa pressed out the boundaries of what was possible in opposing authoritarian rule. So did the Civil Liberties Organisation, and its co-founder, Clement Nwankwo, in exposing to national and international attention the human rights abuses of an avowedly liberal military regime in Nigeria. And the publishing from exile in Costa Rica of Xavier Zavala's Libro Libre must be credited with helping to sustain democratic ideas and values in Nicaragua until that moment when the people were finally given the chance to vote the Sandanistas out of power.

Many groups that have been instrumental in struggles such as these are, unfortunately, not represented in this volume, and indeed are too numerous to mention. We should not lose sight of the important role that has been played by religious institutions. The Catholic Church, for example, sponsored and helped to shield from harassment the voter mobilization in Chile, the weekly Veritas in the Philippines (and ultimately the "Miracle at

Edsa" there that brought the downfall of Marcos), as well as many other democratic and human rights movements throughout Latin America in particular. Nor should we forget that lawyers have been active, often at great risk, in resisting authoritarian rule through their bar associations (as in Nigeria and Brazil) and human rights groups they have helped form. Recently lawyers have been on the front lines of the struggle against the increasingly repressive rule of President Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, and two of the leaders in that struggle, Gibson Kamau Kuria and Gitobu Imanyara, have found themselves respectively in exile and in and out of detention, with Imanyara's crusading Nairobi Law Journal officially banned.<sup>12</sup> Leaders of trade unions, such as Frederick Chiluba of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, and of student and intellectual associations have also taken the lead in mobilizing mass pressure for democracy in China, Burma, Bangladesh, and now across the African continent, from Algeria to South Africa.

Through their exemplary actions and statements, but more so through their quiet daily work, these individuals and many others have mobilized effective popular resistance to authoritarian rule and quickened the transition to democracy. Some of them, like Dette Pascual and Monica Jimenez de Barros, subsequently helped to establish new organizations that would serve to strengthen and consolidate democracy after the transition. Others, like Maria Rosa de Martini and her colleagues in Conciencia, and Chai-Anan Samudavanija in his civic education work in Thailand, took the task of deepening and consolidating emergent democracy as their organizational starting point. Others still, like Clement Nwankwo in his human rights work, and Xavier Zavala in his efforts to promote democratic

values and ideas. continue and adapt their work when the political context changes from an authoritarian to a democratic regime.

These types of organizations, by their very nature and purposes, contribute to democracy in many ways, both through their explicit objectives of democracy promotion and through the democratic procedures of discussion and popular involvement they employ internally toward that end. It should be emphasized, however, that certainly not any and every organization contributes to democratization, simply because it may be autonomous from the state. There remain in many struggling democracies, such as El Salvador, Peru, and the Philippines, a good many organizations in civil society, both on the right and the left, that have as their goal not democracy but some version of its opposite, and whose methods of internal governance are authoritarian, if not rigidly Leninist. Whatever their explicit interests or goals, independent associations will contribute to democracy if in their own affairs they govern themselves with democratic procedures and respect and promote democratic norms of participation, tolerance, cooperation, accountability, openness, and trust. Any association can become "a large free school" for democracy if it inculcates these norms. But a civil society that systematically trounces them is not any ally of democracy, no matter how autonomous and vigorously organized it may be.

#### **THE ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVE**

The troubles of many new and emerging democracies in the world demonstrate that it is one thing to install a democracy, and another (in many instances much more difficult) task to maintain it, to consolidate and

breathe vitality and meaning into it. Democracy often arrives amidst a kind of revolutionary wave of popular mobilization, what O'Donnell and Schmitter call a "popular upsurge," in which diverse elements of civil society come together into a massive common front that identifies itself as "the people" and mobilizes huge numbers of them into the streets. Such mobilization may be episodic and controlled, spurring on negotiations for a democratic transition, or it may be massive, sudden, desperate, and decisive, as in the "miraculous" outpouring of "people power" to stop Marcos's tanks at Edsa, or the huge demonstrations that brought down one East European communist regime after another in the final stunning months of 1989, until the last Stalinist, Ceaucescu himself, came crashing down to a fatal collapse. But as Schmitter and O'Donnell rightly observe, in either case, such mobilization cannot last.<sup>13</sup> Sooner or later the question must be faced, what comes after the deluge?

Whether or not it achieves its immediate aim of pushing out the authoritarian regime, the popular upsurge eventually leaves in its wake "many dashed hopes and frustrated actors."<sup>14</sup> Expectations so deliriously raised cannot be quickly met. The challenge shifts to making democracy work, politically and economically. Old conflicts resurface and new ones emerge among diverse groups in civil society that had united in their commitment to democracy but may share little else in common. Not all interests and expectations can be satisfied, and probably none can be met completely. Policies must be crafted and interest conflicts played out and reconciled while new political institutions are still being forged and tested. It is a delicate and difficult time, a period of many large and a thousand small challenges of politics and policy, and very few of them

compare in excitement and moral clarity with the crusade to rid the country of despotism. Typically, this is the period when democracies founder -- in the early years when institutions are inchoate and norms fragile.

In such circumstances, how can the moral energy and commitment of the democratic revolution be sustained? One crucial answer, our contributors tell us, is organization. Obviously, new and effective parties must organize to provide the citizenry with clear policy alternatives and effective capacities to mobilize support for them. But effective parties are not enough. Civil society must organize, too, and now in new and different ways: not for the short-term emergency of mobilizing against dictatorship, but for the longer, more multi-dimensional, less thrilling struggle to make democracy work.

This task is a slow and complex one. It requires, in part, training and empowering the politicians, elected officials, and legislative staffs who must make democratic institutions work effectively. This type of work, in which the Institute for Public Policy Studies in Thailand and the Evilio B. Javier Foundation in the Philippines are actively engaged, has a defined but still very large constituency, since if democracy is to work it must work not only at the top but at the grassroots, in local and provincial governments. And effective leadership training requires intensive work with small groups of individuals over extended periods.

Mass civic education also involves meticulous attention to individual citizens and to many aspects of democratic citizenship. People must come to learn not only the value of democracy but the ways of democracy: the importance of voting and being informed; the need to temper partisanship with respect for opposing parties and viewpoints; the means through which

grievances and needs can be brought before elected officials, both directly and through the mass media; the techniques by which communities can organize themselves to achieve common ends; and the details of how their own electoral system, legislature, bureaucracy, local government, and legal system work.

All of this can be conveyed by instruction, by seminars and lectures, but instruction alone is not enough. As Conciencia so often emphasizes, it must also be internalized through repeated practice. Citizens learn by doing, by groping together for solutions in extensive workshops, by meeting frequently to discuss issues and hear the views of others, by teaching these principles to others, by repeatedly listening to civilized and substantive debates of the issues, by keeping actively informed, by creating new organizations of their own. One reason why the task of educating and training democratic citizens is so slow and difficult is that learning by doing requires intensive work with small groups: ten, twenty, thirty people at a time; housewives in a living room, students in a classroom, workers on a shop floor, strangers around a discussion table. Large numbers of trainers and facilitators must themselves be trained. Effective dynamics of small groups must be developed, refined, and replicated many times over.

This work is time-consuming and resource-intensive, most especially in human resources. As the number of specific functions increases, it must also become increasingly specialized. If the civic organization is to survive and succeed, it must undertake effectively a growing range of tasks. Some staff, even a great many, must become skilled at lecturing and training citizens. Others may become more skilled at facilitating interactive workshops. Others at working with the schools. Others at raising money, at

recruiting and motivating new members, at designing brochures, at developing campaigns through the mass media, at working with businessmen and trade unions, and at networking with like organizations and foundations in the regional and international communities. And some people must evince skill in managing all of this growing and increasingly differentiated organization.

The story of Conciencia, in Argentina and throughout Latin America, of KABATID in the Philippines, Participa in Chile, and many other such groups throughout the developing world is one of dynamic organization: working, expanding, specializing, consolidating, expanding further into new regions and groups, adapting to respond to new issues and problems.

Decentralization of authority and flexibility are crucial in this undertaking, as Monica Jimenez de Barros observes in her reflections on the Crusade for Citizen Participation in Chile:

Flexibility, promoted at all levels of our organization, enhanced our ability to work on multiple campaigns simultaneously.

Flexibility made it possible to maintain unity in purpose yet diversity in action within our communal groups. We reached compromises between autonomy of action for territorial groups, which facilitated creativity, and unity in objectives and goals.

These qualities of dynamism, adaptability, openness, and ingenuity have much to do with the success of the civic organizations represented in this volume. So does the clarity and depth of their unifying moral commitment to democracy as a value and way of life. But most of all, their success derives from their willingness to undertake, and recruit a great many others

to undertake, the hard, unglamorous, painstaking organizing that builds an enduring civic foundation for democracy.

### THE POWER OF WORDS

It could be considered quite strange that so many journalists and writers in so many countries are subjected to so much pressure, repression, and intimidation. After all, one might say, paraphrasing Napoleon's cavalier dismissal of the Pope, how many troops has the press?

On occasions, the press can mobilize people into the streets in anger, but that is hardly its primary function. A free press is dangerous first and foremost because it denies the state, or privileged social groups, control over "the facts," "the truth," the way that citizens perceive reality. Real tyranny can only survive by a combination of force and fraud. When fraud is exposed, when the lies and untruths that disguise its abuses and fantasize or inflate its achievements are revealed, all that is left is force, and force alone is not normally enough to sustain a regime for long. For a dictatorship, then, the truth is a dangerous thing, for it unravels the entire web of deceit on which whatever tenuous legitimacy it may have is based.

Words, and in our times the visual images of photo journalism and television news and documentary, are indeed powerful. The first mission of the press in a democratic society, or a society struggling to become democratic, is to report the facts. This is not easy to accept in a situation of massive injustice and polarized divisions, as in South Africa or Colombia, where caring journalists are inclined to want to take sides and

to use the press as a weapon of opinion and mobilization. As Heard notes in his essay, and Duzan in a different way in hers, there is a place for such "advocacy journalism" in the struggle for democracy. But unless the journalistic profession in general devotes itself first to honest, full, and truthful reporting of the facts, it will sacrifice the credibility it needs to become an effective counter to and check upon the state, and citizens will lose the one best hope for the information they need to exercise their rights intelligently and effectively.

Of course, facts are open to interpretation, are often empty without a context of understanding, and are never fully "out there" to be seen with the naked or lazy eye. These challenges point to the additional functions the press must perform in the struggle to get and keep and deepen democracy. A democratic press must probe for the facts, sometimes taking risks to dig them out when they are threatening to powerful forces. It is precisely the risk-taking, investigative reporting of Newswatch that has made it an important and notably democratic innovation in Nigerian journalism. It was this seeking out of dangerous facts and alternative views that landed Anthony Heard's newspaper, The Cape Times, and others, such as the Rand Daily Mail, in constant trouble with the South African authorities during the 1980s, and those of Bona Malwal and Felix Bautista in their countries and times as well. Such constant harassment and repression subjects the editors to a very subtle form of torture: the daily or weekly anguish of determining what can be printed, how things can be stated, how far one can go, without risking permanent closure. The contributors to this volume have all faced this dilemma. It is perhaps most difficult in a semi-authoritarian context where the boundaries are unclear, and a serious-

minded editor must balance the need to press out and test those boundaries with the need to keep the publication alive. In contrast to the underground or alternative press, which can rage against dictatorship and injustice, this dilemma of the more established democratic press is one where the moral imperatives conflict into a blur.

A democratic press must not only report, it must also interpret and, with clear demarcation, opionate. These challenges again tax the nerves and imaginations of embattled democratic editors. Sometimes they must find a way to denounce but not too blatantly, to clarify, but also to leave the readers to draw certain conclusions on their own. Sometimes they must reach for a special, more symbolic, even poetic language of opposition and resistance. Part of the achievement of Newswatch has been its skill in treading this fine line in recent years as it has sought to stay in print without being banned once again by the military regime. A serious magazine whose opinions become too elliptical and revelations too muted and selective risks being criticized for having been "tamed" by the regime, but the decision on how much and how often to risk closure and imprisonment is one that few outsiders could claim to have the moral right to judge.

There is another challenge, too, facing the practitioners of such democratic challenge. Effective interpretation of developments, or "news analysis;" aggressive investigative reporting that exposes hidden truths but only responsibly, when the facts can be proven and documented; and even regular, informed, and versatile commentary on a range of issues -- all of these requires resources. Specialized staff are needed for such functions; a single major investigative or interpretative story may require the full-time work of several journalists for several weeks. And those journalists

must be trained in the more advanced tools of such work. If it is interpretation they are doing, they may benefit from advanced education in the particular field, be it economics, diplomacy, or crime. Few newspapers and magazines in developing countries have the money to maintain the large, specialized staff, and research library and materials to perform these functions well. Few journalists have the advanced training needed to interpret comprehensibly and authoritatively complex policy questions for a general readership. Moreover, democratically committed media in developing countries are often the least well funded precisely because their challenge to established interests may limit potential advertising revenue.

A major element of the global struggle to develop and institutionalize democracy in the coming decade must involve the mass media. The skill levels and resources of democratically committed journalists, editors, and writers, and of their publications, need to be improved. So does the capacity of the journalistic profession overall to monitor and educate itself, to maintain high standards of integrity and responsibility, and to defend journalists and publications legally against attacks. Investments also need to be made in opening up the radio and TV airwaves to a free and full flow of information and a pluralistic array of viewpoints. Anthony Heard proposes in this volume a Free Expression Foundation to perform these types of functions in South Africa. In South Africa there is outside the state the money to fund such an important independent effort, if the white business community will recognize its own long-term interest in free, pluralistic, and effective mass media. However, in many developing countries, private resources are hardly available on the necessary scale, and to the extent they exist, are heavily concentrated amongst groups little

inclined to favor, much less to invest in promoting, free expression. A major question underlying all of these democratic initiatives is always, where is the money to come from?

#### **SUPPORTING THE DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE**

Increasingly, the democratic revolution is an international one. As the world becomes a global village, linked by jet travel, booming trade, satellite television, fax machines, and CNN, countries are more and more densely, profoundly, and complexly affected by one another. Ideas, techniques, and principles; people, goods, and services; all of these are spilling across borders at rates that seem to increase exponentially. It was Marx and his followers who forged the idea of international revolution; Lenin and his disciples who constructed an international communist movement for that purpose. But it is the disciples of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, of Susan B. Anthony and Martin Luther King, of Madison, Bolivar, Montesquieu, Locke, Voltaire, and Gandhi, who are making revolution today internationally -- and, by distinction, nonviolently.

From the time of the American revolution, democrats in this country have appreciated that the fate of freedom in one country was bound up, ultimately, with its development in the rest of the world. Now there is an opportunity, unprecedented in world history, to foster that development simultaneously in dozens of different countries. Contrary to many assumptions, democrats in the developing world are not poor in ideas and insights into how to structure democracy. Certainly, their experiments can be enriched by the experiences of established and stable democracies like

those in Europe, Japan, and North America. But we, too, have something to learn from their democratic innovations. Nor are Third World democrats poor in energy, commitment, and ingenuity. They are lacking in one primary element: resources. Money. Skills. Technology. This is what we in the West have most to offer, and how can make the greatest difference to the worldwide struggle for democracy.

The creation of the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983 marked a turning point in the United States experience. This was the first time that an agency, albeit a nongovernmental one, had been officially established for the sole and explicit purpose of promoting democracy and strengthening freedom and pluralism in other countries. But as Xavier Zavala notes in concluding his essay, that effort began with little in the way of resources, and although the annual Congressional allocation to NED has been increased from \$16 to \$25 million in the current fiscal year, with the prospect of further future growth, it remains tiny by any calculation of U.S. capacity. Other, official, U.S. agencies -- in particular the U.S. Information Service and AID -- are also engaged in democracy promotion, and spend perhaps \$100 million or more each year on activities that serve this goal. Recently, AID has listed support for the evolution of stable democratic regimes as one of its six principal goals in offering development assistance. But resource commitments remain well below what this country is capable of, and for the sensitive work of assisting democratic groups in civil society that are challenging both a nondemocratic state and privileged elements outside it, support from official arms of the U.S. government may not be politically feasible or desirable.

In the United States and throughout the wealthy and industrialized democracies, we need to increase the financial and technical assistance we offer to these many brave and clever efforts springing up from the grassroots of developing societies to democratize -- in a fundamental and enduring way -- their politics, institutions, and ways of life. Specialists on any of these emerging or aspiring democracies know that there are many incipient or struggling associations and publications in these civil societies that die stillborn or limp along with limited impact because of lack of resources. Even with some of the enterprises represented in this volume, there is much more work that could be done to build democracy but is not because the resources are, at present, simply not there. Ultimately, such efforts need to become self-sustaining, but that is partly dependent on the economic development of these countries. And in many of them, it has been their very political tyranny and instability that has constituted the largest obstacle to their economic development.

The resource needs of media and organizations like the ones in this book are not great by international standards. Often thirty, fifty or a hundred thousand dollars can make the difference between success and failure for a new or innovating think tank, magazine, human rights group, trade union, small enterprise association, and so on. Like amounts can enable such groups, once established, to take on new functions and programs. Larger amounts are needed to help finance the crucial work of developing effective political parties and legal and administrative structures.

And it is not only to sympathetic governments that democratic forces in the developing world look for assistance. Important forms of support -- moral, informational, financial, and technical -- come from civil societies

in the established democracies, from voluntary organizations funded by private individuals and groups. I have mentioned the leading human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. A lesser known but crucial group in the struggle worldwide for press freedom is the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, which closely tracks abuses against journalists and news organizations in more than 100 countries; documents them in its bimonthly Update and its systematic annual Attacks on the Press; publicizes abuses in the news media; and sends protests to offending governments and fact-finding delegations to countries with patterns of press abuse. Maria Jimena Duzan is only one of many beleaguered journalists around the world who have been helped by CPJ and in turn have collaborated closely with it.

The Committee to Protect Journalists is only one example of the growing number of nonprofit, nonpartisan voluntary organizations that are playing a role in the struggle for democracy and freedom worldwide. International in their networks and concerns, and sometimes in their memberships and funding, they represent the early signs of development of a globally based civil society rooted in democratic principles. This emerging global infrastructure, beyond control by any government, will be an important foundation on which to build the coming decade. Indeed, if a democratic Karl Marx were writing today a manifesto for the global revolution already underway, he or she would undoubtedly proclaim, "Democrats of the world, unite!"

1. Leonard R. Sussman, "The Press 1990: Contrary Trends," Freedom Review, Vol. 22, no. 1, p. 58.

2. In addition to Maria Duzan's account in this chapter, the murder of Silvia Duzan is also reported in CPJ Update, no. 38, May 1990, p. 8, of the Committee to Protect Journalists.
3. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 3-4. The distinction between state and civil society dates back to Hegel, and in recent treatments "civil society" has often been conceived of as the entire "non-state (market-regulated, privately controlled or voluntarily organized) realm" (John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (New York: Verso, 1988), p. 1). Important for our purposes, here, however is the emphasis not only on "non-state" but on "voluntarily organized."
4. I define democracy as a system of government with three essential features: extensive competition for state power through regular, free, and fair elections; highly inclusive access to rights of political participation, such that no adult social group is excluded; and civil and political liberties -- freedom of speech, the press, association, and the rule of law -- sufficient to ensure that political competition and participation are meaningful and authentic.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 204.
6. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume 2 (New York: Vintage Books, 1945 (1840)), p. 123.
7. Ibid, pp. 124, 125.
8. Ibid, p. 126.
9. See for example, Jacek Kuron, "Overcoming Totalitarianism," and Vilem Precan, "The Democratic Revolution," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 72-74 and 79-85; Christine M. Sadowski, "Autonomous Groups as Agents of Change in Communist and Post-Communist Eastern Europe;" report prepared for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research; S. Frederick Starr, "Soviet Union: A Civil Society," Foreign Policy, no. 70 (Spring 1988), pp. 26-41; Gail Lapidus, "State and Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., Politics, Society, and Nationality: Inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 21-47; Thomas Gold, "The Resurgence of Civil Society in China," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 18-31; Andrew Nathan, "Is China Ready for Democracy?" Journal of Democracy, vol. 1, no. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 50-61; Vo Van Ai, "Reform Runs Aground in Vietnam," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 81-91; Carlos Alberto Montaner, "Castro's Last Stand," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 71-80; and Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Cuba's Cloudy Future," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 113-130.
10. Precan, "The Democratic Revolution," p. 80.
11. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from

Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies  
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

12. Todd Shields, "Kenya: Lawyers vs. the Law," and Gitobu Imanyara, "Africa through Blinkers," Africa Report, Vol. 35, no. 4 (September-October 1990), pp. 13-18; CPJ Update, no. 40 (November 1990), pp. 1-2, 24.

13. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, pp. 53-56.

14. Ibid, p. 56.