Social Anthropological Research on "Mali Livestock I," directed by Professor Michael M Horowitz, Contract No. AID/AFR-c-1045, Research Foundation of State University of New York.

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# DESCENDANTS AND CROPS: TWO POLES OF PRODUCTION IN A MALIAN PEASANT VILLAGE

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dissertation submitted to the Department of Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, Yale University.

John Van Dusen Lewis

March 1978

ML
392.32
L674

CARD 1

Descendants and crops...

Lewis, John Van Dusen.
Descendants and crops: two poles of production in a Malian peasant village. c1978.
233 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.) - Yale University.
AID/afr-C-1045 698036500

1. Social groups - ML. 2. Peasantry - ML. 3. Kinship - ML. 4. Farmers - Behavior - ML. 5. Agricultural production - ML. 6. Agricultural economics - ML. 7. Sociology, Rural - ML.

ML
392.32
L674

CARD 2

Lewis, John Van Dusen.
Descendants and crops...

I. Title. II. Contract. III. Yale Univ. IV. State Univ. of New York. Research Foundation.

loyalties. The descent groups hold the individual not only, as with the ward, and the village, because of the security advantages of establishing rights in labor through organizations removed from the commodity exchange market, but also because it (the descent group) guarantees the bridewealth and the marriage alliance which can make such security possible at the level of the domestic group. These institutional practices for reproducing controllable labor - for this is what the peasants consider a descendant to be - both complement and conflict with effective crop production in ways that are examined in detail.

The study seeks a methodology for interpreting the valuation given to measurable economic returns by a farmer intent at the same time on expanding and consolidating a corporate unit of reproduction. This corporate unit is sometimes consolidated at the expense of measurable profit, and its value can only be felt, let alone measured, over a period of generations. Finally, the study considers the development cycle of this corporate farming community in light of the allocation of the factors of production and the division of labor in the region as a whole.

## ABSTRACT

## DESCENDANTS AND CROPS: TWO POLES OF PRODUCTION IN A MALIAN PEASANT VILLAGE

John Van Dusen Lewis

Yale University 1978

An attempt is made here to give an anthropologically and historically valid account of the economic behavior of subsistence farmers of the central Malian savanna. To this end the interface of descent group and domestic group relationships with production inputs and outputs is carefully charted for the case of a single peasant village. Similar kinship groupings have received much attention in the anthropological literature on rural West Africa and the analysis of them has become relatively refined. Here such an analysis is used to evaluate the peasants' farming profits and rationality in terms most appropriate to their total historical situation.

This kinship-oriented approach to the Malian rural economy is based on the preliminary ethnographic finding that, under present technological conditions, the reproduction of its peasant communities depends more on their control of labor than on their margin of agricultural surplus. While there are provocative opportunities for individual laborers outside of the subsistence sector or outside of the farming community itself, the security of the majority depends upon the retention of the farming services of a maximum number of these individuals. These individuals are retained through ward and village institutions which check and redirect the fissioning tendencies of the descent groups holding their primordial

## PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This field study, like its subject matter, is itself the outcome of a complex network of social relationships. Its conception grew out of professional ones, its execution depended upon administrative ones, and its success is tied to cross-cultural ones.

Given the history of their country, few Americans - however much some might wish it - can be indifferent to the reality of West Africa. Even as a Euro-American I felt that new possibilities of self-discovery were opened to me when as a graduate student my economic anthropological interests were directed by Sidney Mintz and Leith Mullings to the case of West African peasants. A course on "primitive agriculture" with Harold Conklin served to focus my interest on the intricate management problems of shifting cultivation systems on the African savanna.

The timing, location, and theme of the study that grew out of these more general interests were related to the tragedy of the Sahelian drought which reached its nadir in 1972. Michael Horowitz of the State University of New York at Binghamton, viewing the mounting international reconstruction effort with some apprehension, and given the foreign aid community's profound ignorance of the intricate and delicate economic systems in the rural areas of the Sahelian countries, persuaded the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Regional Economic Development Services organization for West Africa (REDSO/WA) to finance (as a grant through the Research Foundation of the State University of New York (RFSUNY)) some extended anthropological field research on these systems. He solicited French-speaking graduate students in anthropology for this purpose, and our paths crossed. He was in West Africa in constant communication with me throughout the entire period of my field research. He was also able to visit the field site at the end of the 1974 rainy season. His commitment to and insistence upon total immersion field work made the physical and psychological hardships this involved seem like just part of the research contract and therefore easier to bear. His lively analytical approach to ethnographic problems echoed in my mind between our communications providing a continual stimulus for my curiosity as the months wore on in my chosen savanna village.



That we, I and John Graysel (the other anthropology student selected by Horowitz), were invited to perform the base-line field studies called for by our RFSUNY grants in Mali can be attributed to the commitment of Dr. Boubacar Sy, of L'office Malien du Betail et de la Viande (L'OMBEVI), to getting as wide a variety of professional inputs as possible towards solving the economic problems in the rural areas of his country. This commitment led him far beyond the mere invitation to come to Mali: through him the resources of L'OMBEVI and the Service d'Elevage were at our disposition to facilitate our installation, comfort and guidance in the field study sites. To this end Nouhoun Cissé of L'OMBEVI escorted me to the proposed study zone in May of 1974 and with the invaluable and perceptive counsel of Brihima Coulibaly of the Service des Eaux et Forêts in that zone, helped me to select a village of residence and study.

In the same view Dr. Kouma and Seydou Diarra of the Service d'Elevage in Segu made their vehicles available to us, particularly on one occasion when I was ill. And finally Dr. Sy chose Dangui Sissoko, a sociologist, to research with us in the field. As both a professional colleague and a Malian, Dangui generously provided us with a uniquely valuable optic on the cross-cultural space which it was our task to traverse. I only fear that we could not provide a comparable service to him as he pursued his share of the research. Without his consultation on a gamut of ethnographic problems while in the field I would not have been able to make even as little sense as follows out of the farming community we were in.

It had been arranged between RFSUNY, REDSO/WA, and L'OMBEVI that I would do my economic anthropological research in a zone of some 20-30 farming villages to the north of the Dukolomba forest reserve which lies on the north bank of the Bani River 50 km southeast of Segu (see map below). This reserve was to be subjected to a range management and rest rotation regime, which was to improve its grazing resources, as specified in USAID's and L'OMBEVI's "Mali Livestock I" project. The herd-owning farmers who were to benefit from these improved grazing lands were also to be included through this project in a credit scheme enabling them to furnish cattle with cotton seed or cultivated cow pea hay for sale at the end of the dry season, when meat is scarce.

The specifications of this project, Mali Livestock I, determined the general area in which I would pursue my study, but the RFSUNY



contract called for a base-line study. So on arriving in this general area I described to Brihima Coulibaly of the Service des Eaux et Forêts, who was intimately familiar with the forest reserve zone, what sort of knowledge I was after. It was his recommendation that I, a stranger, would get the best idea of what the farming life there was all about if I lived in Dukolomba village. If I accomplish nothing else by this study, I at least hope to have demonstrated the wisdom of his advice. As the sixteen months of our study progressed I was able to recognize social processes in villages with which I had only a passing acquaintance because I had seen more developed and visible forms of the same processes in Dukolomba.

Because of the esteem in which he is held by the villagers in this area, Brihima Coulibaly, in presenting me to the chief of Dukolomba, was able to gain an immediate offer of hospitality. This chief, Zumana Buare, immediately insisted that I take the clan name (jamu) of my escort, Kulubali. Bearing this last name, I was immediately placed on a joking relationship (senanku) basis with all bearers of the Buare clan name: as will be seen, this included a significant proportion of the village's population. Next the chief gave me the first name of N'tji which was given by the non-Muslim Bambara (the chief himself had only converted to Islam four years before) to their first born son. The chief explained that as the first white to "sit down" in their village, I was obliged to take this name. To this day I am known by no other name either in the Dukolomba area or anywhere else I have ever gone in rural Mali.

My wife and I were given the house of an unmarried male youth in the compound of Yacuba Jara (#8, cf. below) which was in the chief's ward. According to what I had read about Mande social organization, I figured that this made Yacuba Jara the "host" (jatigi) to my "stranger" (dunan) role. The literature emphasized the importance of this relationship so I attempted to cultivate it. Yacuba proved to be a lively interviewee and a tireless teacher of the Bambara language. But he did not tell me that Dukolomba was more than a conglomeration of autonomous compounds, and that he was not my only or even my most important "host". He did not tell me, as it turned out, because, like all his neighbors, he did not like to be outranked by another neighbor. Finally, when I loaned my radio to Yacuba, my real "host" could restrain himself no longer. The chief's eldest son, Karrim Buare, sat me down and explained, over and over again as my Bambara was very weak then, that I was living in a ward founded by a Buare ancestor of which his father, the chief, was the oldest living descendant. Therefore, he, Karrim Buare, since his father, the chief, was cripple, was effectively my "host" and the first man to whom I should turn for the most mundane detail of my living arrangements, as well as for the most abstract information about a general cultural theme underlying their social life. When he saw the high school student I had hired from compound #19, Kaliph Formba (#19 I, cf. below) returned to school in September of 1974, he called in a literate cousin of his from Bugula, Toumani Tangara, to take over Kaliph's data-gathering chores, and he saw to



it, using all the authority of an elder kinsman, that they were performed reliably. Without the assistance of Kaliph and Toumani, such data as I do have on agricultural labor inputs would have been inconceivable.

The openness of these hosts should come as no surprise to those familiar with the Mande hospitality system. Nurtured through the centuries to meet the needs of the far-flung empire, the Mande host[1] is remarkably generous. But the case of my visit to Dukolomba was somewhat special because of the "Mali Livestock I" project which was to follow after me. Whether for better or worse, the project did have implications for their economic future, and therefore the village elders had decided that someone connected with the project such as I was should be given as clear an idea about their economic priorities as possible. For example, if the project had not been looming on the horizon, it is doubtful whether these farmers would have let me count their crop yields.

It is always difficult to know where to stop when acknowledging one's debts for such an experience as this sixteen month study. In addition to those already mentioned, Jean Haddon of RPSUNY, Dave Weisenborn and David Shear then of REDSO/WA, and Modibo Sidibe of L'OMBEVI should be thanked for their various forms of help and encouragement. I can not bring up more names with the associated stories of their assistance (although many remain), for fear of drowning out the recognition due to the other American "strangers" who shared with me the novelty of this savanna experience:

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[1] jatigi - the same Mande word is used to describe this role in the other major language of this part of West Africa: Pulfulde.

John and Mary Grayzel in their collapsable hut in the Fula hamlet 15 km to the north of Dukolomba who brought the fun of a group enterprise to our common professional and personal discoveries; and my wife Faith who had never heard of Mali in 1974 and by 1975 spoke Bambara better than any non-African I have ever met, who forbade me to call her friends in Dukolomba "informants", and who showed me that by successfully studying the people of Dukolomba I was not thereby successfully socializing with or relating to them.



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"At the center of the 'high sounding vibration' (originally made up of four elements which enabled it to vibrate secretly) was the 'spirit' (the egg of the world in which nature was enclosed), in the spirit was the 'doing', in the doing was the 'coming' of all things, and in the coming was the 'going' of all things. These four terms also define the four basic elements of creation, respectively air, earth, fire, and water; air and fire being male, earth and water, female . . . .

The essential part of that which the 'high sounding vibration' stirred up as it rotated was the spirit. The spirit, inflated by all its potential power, finally began to sound. 'The spirit resounded in the midst of facts', and as it was the strongest element in space, it held itself up alone and arose. Then it burst and from it poured elements which slowly separated, dispersed, and ordered themselves. It is said of this event: 'In the old days, all things came out together'. These fundamental elements, numbering twenty-two, are at the origin of creation which is classified into twenty-two categories . . . .

The first seven are the 'came out together' of which it is said: 'The seven come-out-together came out first'. . . .

The seven come-out-together summarize the general characteristics of beings and things:

1) kelenya - unity
2) makari - pity, mercy
3) mago - necessity
4) sinaya - aggression, jealousy
5) fadenya - rivalry
6) maloya - shame
7) shiya - race, species, stock"

- Dieterlen (1951: 10-12) after the translation of Katia Wolff for the Human Relations Area files 1960.

## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

### The Place and the Time of the Study

It may seem strange that I have excerpted a segment of the "Bambara" creation myth recorded by Germaine Dieterlen (1951) in order to introduce a study about economics, agriculture and social relations carried on in 1974-5. However, I thought it interesting that my preoccupations and those of the quite divergent Griaule-Dieterlen School, (which has produced much of the anthropological literature on Malian culture to date), should come together at that primeval point in time.

Presumably unity and rivalry, pity and jealousy, shame and descent receive such seniority in the "Bambara" genesis because, as I discovered, they are the building blocks of those farming communities where most "Bambara"[1] come from generation after generation. This is a study of one such community on the north bank of the Bani River about 60 km southeast of Segu, which is itself on the Niger River (see map, next page).

Not all of the communities in this inter-Niger-Bani region are farming, nor are they all Bambara. To the degree that I came to know Dukolomba and to understand the conditions governing the perpetuity of its institutions and therefore, in this case, the continuity of its membership, I began to understand that many neighboring communities were different. This difference was born of a more market-

[1] "Bambara" is the Arabic and Fulfulde, and now French and English, version of the Bambara word bamana. Since I use the Bambara word Fula to designate the Pulbe, I do not see why I can not stick with the Fulfulde word for Bamana, Bambara, in conforming with usages already in the literature. In any case, bamana has special meanings in the actor's world which must form part of the analysis.



Figure 1: MAP OF DUKOLOMBA AREA (1:500,000)

KEY TO VILLAGE SYMBOLS USED THROUGHOUT APPENDICES AND TABLES:

| VILLAGE (dugu)* | SYMBOL: | FRENCH SPELLING USED ON MAP: |
|---|---|---|
| Bamanadugu | | |
| Janfugunani ("four villages of the alluvial clay plain"): | | |
| Dukoloma | DK | Doukoloma |
| Dufunu | DF | Dofounou |
| Dangola | DN | Dangolola |
| Bwala | BW | Douala |
| Dilidugu ("villages of the rainfall swamps"): | | |
| Kachena | KAT | Katiena |
| Bugula | BUG | Bougoula. |
| Dugakungo | DUG | Dougakongo |
| Faliniugu | FAL | Faljnbougou |
| Nt'jiiugu | NJI | Ndiedougou |
| Kala | KAL | Kala |
| Jedugu ("clay soil villages") | | |
| Kòkun | KOK | Kokouni |
| Kala | KAL | Kala |
| Jòngoni | JON | Diongoni |
| Famorala | FAM | Famorola |
| Yolo | YOL | Yolo |
| Ton jòniugu: (villages restructured through hegemony of the Segu state - cf. text) | | |
| Ngola | NG | Nouola |
| Nyèndela | NY | Niendela |
| Sinzana | SIN | Zinzana |
| Saaine | SA | Saaone |
| Ngakoro | NGA | Ngakoro |
| Tongo | TO | Tongo |
| Babaniwèrè | BAB | Babini |
| Bla | BLA | Bla |
| Gwalabugu | GW | Goualabougou |
| Togoba | TOG | Togoba |
| Nianiwèrè | NIANI | |
| Balanzowèrò | BAL | (3 villages just to the |
| Sidikiwèrè | SID | (north of Dukolomba, |
| | | (existed only as hamlets |
| | | (when map was made. (1954) |
| Jònkodugu (villages in the Tuna zone south of the Bani River): | | |
| Tuna | Tu | Touna |
| Njina | NJ | Djina |
| Faana | FA | Faana |
| Zandela | ZA | Zandela |
| Nyèsira | NS | Niansira |
| Zuaso | ZU | |
| Kulasso | KU | (not on map |
| Bugula | BU | |

*See Glossary at end for explanation of transcription of Bambara adopted.



oriented economy which usually entailed a more endogamous marriage strategy and a more intense commitment to Islam, both of which inevitably led to an "ethnic" designation other than that of Bambara. The commercially-oriented Maraka, with their Islam, and the Fula, with their easy going life-style, sought to accentuate their differences to the subsistence-farming Bambara. What was similar in each case was that ethnically-linked behavioral attributes were such an important part of economic organization. Possibly this is because there was so little economic profit around that not much organization could depend on it alone. Herders, hoers, and traders were all partially motivated by other values besides money. Even many of the economic exchanges through which this rural population reproduced itself did not pass through the medium of money. That more millet could be produced as a by-product of a Bambara's maintaining his work reputation; that the calving rate of a herd could be improved as a by-product of a Fula's desire to cultivate his intimacy with this part of the animal kingdom; and that trade goods could be moved more cheaply as a by-product of a Maraka's interest in visiting a Koranic teacher in the next town, all served to raise the standard of living in a zone where the going cash price of both these labor inputs and their product outputs was out of the reach of most of the population. This rural economy is not unlike that discussed by Mintz (1959) in so far as its internal marketing relations carry a greater stimulus to production than their cash return might warrant. More direct petty commodity

production, blacksmithing, wood working, and tanning[2] is performed by dispersed segments of endogamous caste groups.

Each one of these ethnically-linked styles could not have developed without the presence of the others. The Bambara resistance to the introduction of market relations into their farming organization not only reflects the long-term presence of the market but also could not have developed, in as much as it depended upon a uniformity of economic roles, without the availability of non-farming, non-Bambara-produced goods on that market.

Dukolomba had a small Friday market of its own to which fish, locust bean, red peppers, cotton, and calabashes were brought by women from the Bani and south (some of these women having married into Dukolomba from that region) whence they returned with millet, sorghum, and shea butter. Tuna, south of the Bani on the Segu-Koutiala Road, (see map above) was the closest market (Wednesday) carrying the largest volume of long-distance trade goods. It was therefore the largest market frequently attended by Dukolomba's women, many of whom were from the Tuna region (see Table V below). Those few men in Dukolomba who did sell kola nuts or kerosene at its own market, procured these goods by bicycling to the Thursday market at Zinzana, also on the Segu-Koutiala axis. Small ruminant livestock were purchased, and less frequently sold, at the Juna (Diouna) market (Saturday) to the north. Further to the north is the famous Bussen (Boussé) cattle market (Tuesday) which, to my knowledge, was attended by no one from Dukolomba

[2]Weaving is a widespread activity performed by many farmers in the idle, dry season. It has not become the exclusive domain of an endogamous caste like these other craft skills, except in Fula communities in the interior Delta to the east.



during my entire stay. Cattle, as well as smaller ruminants, for reasons which will become clear as the analysis proceeds, were more frequently sold at lower prices to buyers passing through Dukolomba itself. And only #36, the official grain weigher and representative of the co-operative situated in the arrondissement seat (Katiena), ever made a practice of catching the bush taxi from Zinzana to the Monday market in the regional capital, Segu.

## The Social Organization of the Village

As with many of the older villages on the open savanna of this inter-Niger-Bani region, the larger wards of Dukolomba present themselves like fortresses of consolidated rectangular mud-brick houses surrounded by heavily manured cattle parks or tall sorghum, maize, or millet housefields, depending upon the season. Each of these wards (sokalaw, "support of the house") is divided into walled-off patrilocal domestic units, referred to here as compounds (dugu). In each compound there will be a minimum of one house for each married woman; if this house has a flat mud roof it is called a so, if it has a pointed thatched roof it is called a bugu. Because of the orientation of Dukolomba's farmers towards the permanent implantation of their descent line (shi) in the soil (dugukolo) of their village (dugu), most of their houses are of this more permanent flat-roofed variety. Pointed thatched roofs are more common in newer villages with more transient populations not all of whom could be referred to as Bambara or bamana.

Most compounds, except for some very small or very new ones, are entered through a vestibule (blon), where women card cotton and mill

millet, where fish nets and those heads of sorghum to be used as the next year's seeds hang from the rafters. This vestibule is also where, if it is a non-Muslim compound, white traces of the porridge (dèrè) and chicken feathers used in the most recent ancestral sacrifice might flank each side of the outer doorway. Through the vestibule the court (dukene) of each compound is dominated by the large communal granary (foroba jiginè) and a hearth (gwa). There should be a maximum of only two of the former, one for sorghum, one for millet, and only one of the latter - so that the compound (du) chief can be called gwatigi instead of dutigi. Where two cooking hearths emerge in one compound it is a sure sign that it is a "full" compound (du fara) and about to "break" (du kari).

Compound fissioning is a subject of obsessive concern to these farmers for technological and social structural reasons which I spent the entire duration of my stay in Dukolomba (July 1974 to August 1975) trying to unravel. One of the most fundamental reasons for this is that the size of the extremely corporate compound affects the range and the durability of the corporateness of the lineage (somaw, "people of the house"), which includes compound members as well as many of their neighbors. The vitality of these localized lineages may have less of a technological importance than the vitality of the compound farming unit - although the reader will see that the lineage is not without significance in this domain either. But I came to discover that in ensuring a political future for the village, and therefore an economic one, a viable lineage is essential.



As elsewhere in West Africa, the fissioning tendencies of patrilineal groupings in Dukolomba do not stop at the compound level. They continue right up through the lineage to the clan level, such that when the word for agnats, faden, "children of the father", is made into a quality by the addition of the -ya suffix, the Bambara word for rivalry, fadenya, is formed. Rivalrous half-brothers and minimal lineage segments are kept localized at the maximal lineage level because of their simultaneous organization into different groupings by the village-wide age-set system. All that Dukolomba's age-sets (tu nyògòn: "born together") have in common with its descent groups, besides their personnel, is the principle of seniority.[3] Therefore, to the degree that the egalitarian organization of these age-sets is disciplined and respected it provides a check to both the fissioning and the hierarchical tendencies of the patrilineal descent system. But the descent group offers its members a material security which the age-set does not. How then can the latter so successfully compete for its members' labor and loyalty?

## Farming and Social Organization

My arrival in Dukolomba in May of 1974 followed close upon one of the most severe Sahelian droughts on record (Dalby and Church 1973). The drought stimulated the allocation of funds that made the research possible (see Preface), and brought me and the villagers together in an acute concern for the mechanics of agricultural productivity.

[3]The age-sets are separated one from the other according to this seniority principle, but within them a strict egalitarianism is the norm.

For their part, the villagers were privately and publicly re-examining not only how they had been brought to the brink of famine, but also why they had not precipitated over that brink as had several neighboring villages. For myself, I was included in this re-examination process not only on account of its public moments, but also because my presence in Dukolomba was linked, however vaguely, to economic improvements promised for the area under the provisions of the "Kali Livestock I" project of American A.I.D. Just what these were to be was only somewhat less of a mystery to me than to the villagers.

As my proficiency in the Bambara language increased - this not only facilitated communication but also served the villagers as an indication of my interest in their way of life - I gained greater access to the more private side of this re-examination process. While we had been discussing such public topics as soils, crop varieties, rotations, plowing, hoeing, labor oganization, cash cropping, vaccinations, and marketing from the beginning, it was only in this latter stage that I was shown how local political considerations mediated the management of these economic factors.

I was struck by an emphasis given to the production of surplus food grains which seemed to go beyond those stocking requirements of a prudent subsistence reserve. Certainly, much of this food surplus was sold for a price well below that which the same amount of labor could have gained from an expanded peanut crop or from the production of a cow pea vine forrage for the dry season fattening of livestock.



The price for food grains was very high during the drought, to be sure, but by the time I began my field work, when the farmers were planning their 1974 fields, it was back down to its pre-drought levels (18-20 francs maliens (FM) per kilogram). Meanwhile the guaranteed price for peanuts had gone up to 40 FM per unshelled kilogram.

Surplus food did not appear to be the only goal of this subsistence farming behavior either. If his quest for surplus food resulted from the farmer's desire for recognition as a good citizen, to the degree that he had grain in stock, then presumably he would seek to produce as much of that grain as possible. However, I often saw known agronomic techniques for improving grain yield neglected in favor of practices already suited to the mobilization of labor through the compound lineage, ward and age-set structures.

## Kinship and Economic Organization

I was not toally unprepared for these findings. At least since Bohannan and Dalton (1962) it has been known that rural West Africans carry on important economic exchanges through non-market relations for non-monetary ends. However helpful as it has been to have identified these non-market "spheres of exchange", it has been difficult explaining why rural West Africans value what they do, for how long, and under what conditions. Dupre and Rey (1973)[4] effectively demonstrate the possibilities for seeing beyond these "spheres of exchange" when the

[4]See O'Laughlin (1975) for the intellectual background to their approach.

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system of productive relations are considered. The way in which goods are produced affects the relations through which these goods are used and exchanged. In a peasant society where co-operative laborers are bound together by non-monetary ties, it is inevitable that some sort of non-monetary good or value circulate between them in order that these ties be maintained (Chayanov, 1966). But in rural West Africa, Dupre and Rey (1973) were confronted with the lineage and the lineage segment as the predominant units or production. Since the produced goods did not recirculate from the senior to the junior members of the lineage, Rey (1974) classifies the "lineage mode of production" as a step in the development of the exploitation of labor.

Other economic anthropologists have interpreted the lineage differently in their study of the relations of production in rural West Africa. Meillassoux (1964) emphasizes its flexibility in defining a co-operative labor force appropriate to the technological conditions of shifting cultivation:

> The agricultural community is modeled on the lineage or segment of a lineage. Relations of production are built on the basis of genealogical kinship relations, which are themselves subject to constant modification and renewal. The kinship relations revealed to us are the result of these changes . . . Life and death act as disturbances and tend to break down the natural family. Economic imperatives, among others, contribute to the creation of new units whose members are tied by relations of production and consumption. The biological family cannot stay within its narrow genealogical framework and is replaced by functional familes whose members are associated by economic obligations rather than by relationships of consanguinity. Under such a dynamic, the bonds of kinship have to be sufficiently elastic to adapt to such modifications (1964: 168-9, translated by Mary Klopper in Terray 1972: 141-2).



Unfortunately, Meillassoux does not proceed to consider some of the other reasons forthe vitality of these relations; as does Bloch (1973) after having made similar points about the appropriateness of extended kinship relations for the labor requirements of shifting cultivation:

> Would it be too much to suggest that the selective value of kinship is precisely the combination of the many functions which it can perform without it being reduced either incharacter or in time to any single one? (1973: 87).

Among the francophone economic anthropologists working in West Africa, Berthoud (1969-70) does emphasize the role of the lineage in amassing bridewealth for the junior laborer, but he does not go on to explore the economic implications of such an organization for marriage as it leads to filiation and descent. Terray (1972) seeks to free the lineage from the technological determination given it by Meillassoux by distinguishing between simple (household) and complex (community) labor co-operation. He does not reduce the lineage to either one of these technological organizations, but rather he sees it as the outcome of the existence of these two forms of co-operation in the same group. Finally, Meillassoux himself has come back with a remarkable book (1975a) which places the economics of reproducing offspring on an analytical par with the economics of producing their food and other necessities.

In each of the cases the lineage is progressively conceded a greater objective role in the economic functioning of these rural African societies. But these francophone economic anthropologists have yet to avail themselves of a subtle understanding of the

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dynamics of certain West African lineages, which has been achieved by some of their anglophone colleagues (Fortes 1945, Forde 1947, Smith 1956, Goody 1963).

Specifically, we have some understanding of the ways in which the West African lineage (a) fosters egalitarianism at the same time as it supports a hierarchy of authority, (b) fuses large numbers into a reliably corporate group at the same time as it encourages a fissioning independence among its members; (c) denies rights of ownership and use to some individuals while at the same time redistributing them to many others; and (d) excludes matrilateral relatives from the corporate estate at the same time as it gives them an essential role in maintaining its perpetuity. There is no reason why this understanding of such complicated organizational processes can not be used in the analysis of economic behavior in a West African farming community like Dukolomba, where lineage organizations lie behind the goals and actions of many.

The Theme

Like the francophone economic anthropologists, I found in Dukolomba, that the patrilineal descent system lent an important element of discipline and reliability to the relations of production used in savanna farming. Like the anglophone social anthropologists, however, I also found that technological efficiency in this farming was often sacrificed to the organizational demands of that patrilineal descent system. Meillassoux (1975a) has suggested why subsistence farming technique and the organization for reproducing offspring can



equally affect the economic future of a West African peasant community such as Dukolomba. Where labor is scarcer than land, the organization which reproduces labor can become more important than the adoption of efficient farming techniques, should the two prove incompatible. Here I propose to take a closer look at these parallel practices to see how they do affect each other.

I did not undertake this study with the idea of contributing to this larger anglophone discourse on the West African lineage. I came to Dukolomba to look at the economic practice and the economic possibilities of the savanna subsistence farmer. As a result of the ethnography I pursued there, I am obliged to analyse this economic practice in terms of the farmers' manipulation of a patrilineal descent system.

Let me review some of the steps by which my ethnography led me to take this tack. The quantitative data which I collected on farming labor inputs data pointed to the importance of the extra compound co-operative labor in overcoming the work bottlenecks characteristic of the short savanna farming season. Nevertheless, the farmers always emphasized the autonomy of the individual patrilocal compounds in the area of crop production. No matter how much outside labor they borrowed, claimed, or were given, the management of their fields and their choice of production goal was held to be strictly their own. Yet almost for every compound, this goal was the same: a gloriously full granary. The reward for even the pursuit, let alone the attainment, of such a goal was a good reputation permitting unhindered access to the communal labor pool.

But the villagers insisted that there was not an immediate connection here. The goal of food production was not conceptually linked to the attainment of co-operative labor. They were both the result of good citizenship and therefore were found together, but the one was not seen as engendering the other. Some compounds filled their granaries without using outside labor; other more negligent compounds let their yields go to the birds and the monkeys yet were still given continued access to sources of outside labor.

These villagers had social goals which often ran at cross purposes to their economic goal of crop output. The autonomy of that lineage segment which consists of the compound was emphasized, in spite of its frequent dependence on other compounds for agricultural success, because it was the arena in which the initial allegiance of children was defined.

The ward and the village seek to retain the labor of these children in order for there to be any crop output at all. The organization of this control can not always be adapted to the most efficient farming practices known. This social goal of controlling children had a comparable importance to that of crop output because the reproduction of the peasant community was equally dependent upon its success. But it is one thing to recognize (as does Meillassoux 1975a) the importance of the domestic reproduction of laborers, and therefore of kinship, for the development of the overall agricultural economy. It is another thing to identify the dynamics of that domestic organization so that its interface with changing agricultural practices can be



evaluated. For this reason I will not be referring to the outcome of domestic reproduction as "offspring", but rather as "descendants".

## Descent and Production

I have chosen to use the word "descendants" in describing this village product because it comes closest to conveying the meaning of the villager's word denw ("children"). Den is suffixed to the name of a group (duden, tonden, bolokoden, maliden) to describe its members. It forms the prefix of the word denbaya which is the only non-pluralized word designating a kin grouping. Descendants are of course different from raw children in that they carry a freight of rights and obligations appropriate to the economy in which they are reproduced. A family with no children can acquire descendants, whereas another with many children may be able to retain none as descendants. Dukolomba's reproductive social goals are more concerned with descendance than filiation or succession. That is, descendants are not just the product of the individual patriline (shi); they are socialized as descendants by the community at large not only for their separate lines but also for that community. Descendants are defined in opposition to their particular ancestors as well as in terms of their collective ancestory at the lineage, ward and village level.

In reproducing many children, a farmer is not necessarily working against the goals of maximally efficient crop production. Those children are likely to work in his own fields. If, that is, the lack of outside opportunities leads them to work for kin at all. But reproducing descendants is a little different. He must lay the institutional

groundwork in which his unborn descendants will be received regardless of their numbers. If they are few, then his line will need the aid of luckier collateral lines if it is not to peter out before its luck changes. If they are many, then they can reinforce the unassailability of descent lines as such by helping weaker lines around them.

Thus reproducing descendants, as they are defined in Dukolomba, is the same thing as keeping the farming compound of brothers and parallel cousins united. Many compound juniors (duden) are reluctant to take the risk of starting a descent line which could die out and leave widows and ancestors defenseless. These larger family compounds have a definite crop producing importance, to be sure. But the reproduction of descendants goes beyond the underwriting of agricultural organization in its implications. The control of labor in rural Mali transcends its use in agriculture in importance. In the next chapter, by exploring the historical reasons for the priority given to the control of laborers in the Dukolomba area, I will at the same time be answering the question of why the descent system has such an impact on the other kinds of production that engage the peasant.

The rural Malian villagers, while organized into a web of relations to produce crops, are at the same time organized along other lines to reproduce what I have called descendants. Where the relations geared to one of these productive efforts are incompatible with relations organizing the other, that one effort, or both of their



outputs, cannot be pursued to its "rational" conclusion. In Dukolomba, kinship provides an important organizing principle for agricultural production. However, kinship is also conditioned by its use in the reproduction of descendants. I will attempt to show how the Dukolomba peasant meets the uncertainties and the hostilities of the outside world by organizing, with his neighbors, to produce offspring who will remain united and thus protect and provide for him. This organization is done from a basis of patrilineal descent but it comprises wards, age-sets and other institutions. The Dukolomba peasant owed his security as much to the numbers of young who descend into these institutions as to the crop surpluses he can produce.

Ideology in Peasant Life

Torn between these two poles of production, with the products of each being constantly reinterpreted by the outside world, the social organization of Dukolomba cannot rely on self-evident norms. The more universal these norms become, the more they distance themselves from their material component and sanction, and thus the less easily do they retain allegiance in the egalitarian social atmosphere of this village. As each set of norms is anchored to a material output, the social organization is less prone to upset by pressure from the outside world that often conflicts with the ultimate security of the peasant. The social relations on which the peasant relies are less easily disrupted if these are developed in close association with material benefits - crops, descendants, labor.

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The villagers insist that all of their significant relations had a material component. They divide reality into its dryness or image (ja) and its life (ni). All appearances, principles, ideologies, and laws are dry (ja) shadows (ja) without the moisture (ji) of a life (ni) giving material flow between them.[5] For the villagers each set of significant relations produced something material (each ceremony a meal, each visit a gift, each marriage a child, each initiation a new person . . .). Any significant social relation has form (ja) and life (ni). Such a relation either produces or distributes a material, life-giving substance, not unlike the relations which Mauss (1967) argued are basic to all social life.[6] It could be argued that the villagers' outlook was born of the realism required of them by their peasant condition.

If the observance of rights and duties within Dukolomba's production units did depend upon the ideological commitment of their members, then outside ideological structures (Islam, for example) could easily distract certain members away from the rigors of community life. Only force could keep them together, but the imposition of force would destroy the egalitarianism that attracts juniors into becoming descendants. Juniors are constrained by the material importance of becoming descendants without being forced or

[5]See Dieterlen 1951, Zahan 1960, and Cissé 1974 for interpretations of these Bambara concepts which studiously avoid any of their economic implications.

[6]Neale's interesting argument (1967) for the economic importance of "services" which replicate the form if not the material content of economic transactions would be difficult to apply in the case of Dukolomba.



paid for. This non-authoritarian constraint is the complex achievement of the lineage as it exists in Dukolomba. This achievement is not merely an expression of the need for labor in shifting hoe agriculture on the savanna. The lineage cannot be reduced to such technological constraints, because its functioning often compromises technological efficiency. On account of the need for mobilizing non-salaried labor, the lineage has an objective impact on the material life of the village. But that impact is not one of merely supplying labor. It goes beyond that.

Dukolomba and its Neighbors

This emphasis on binding a wide network of descendants into an imperative set of non-market, reciprocal farming relations does not characterize the economic organization of all the villages in the Dukolomba area. In some, a wealthy cattle owner, trader, or marabout will found a settlement and draw a circle of non-agnatic, non-kin clients around him. These settlers are not seen as true bamana by the farmers in Dukolomba; they are rather identified as pious Muslim Maraka or as the tonjòn (cf. next chapter) descendants of the former Segu rulers. These villages contain the richest residents in the area as well as the poorest. The rich are rich on account of their livestock assets or their religious following not on account of their agriculture. These assets enable them to purchase more elaborate ploughs than are owned in Dukolomba, for example. But these ploughs[7] still do not

[7]The "multiculteur" tool bars, several of which are owned in these stratified villages, can be, but have not been, adapted for weeding in this area.

free them from hiring outside workers for the weeding, harvesting, and threshing labor bottlenecks. Such labor has to be hired where the village age-set organizations are weak and where the farmer has few relatives nearby to draw on for exchange-labor assistance. The poor are poor because they are similarly isolated from the labor assistance of kin in addition to having no livestock assets to supplement their income.

Whether dominated by Maraka, Fula or tonjòn what all these stratified villages have in common is their newness. They do not last like the bamana villages such as Dukolomba. Consequently, it is the latter type which constitutes the majority of the region. Nevertheless, when the bamana farmers search in the outside world for kola nuts, salt, or small livestock purchasers, it is to the affluent members of these nearby stratified villages that they turn.

The organization of the bamana village cannot be understood without considering the other economic organizations that surround it and that have enabled it and caused it to develop its characteristic corporate structures. From time to time I will be referring to illustrative differences between Dukolomba and this minority of stratified villages. But only in the concluding chapter will I consider the relative implications of each type of village for social and economic change in the region.



## CHAPTER II: DESCENT GROUPS AND VILLAGES IN SEGU HISTORY

### Empire and Bambarahood (Bamanaya)

Dukolomba lies between the Niger and the Bani Rivers, 65 km southeast of Segu and the Niger, only 5 km north of the safety of the Bani swamps. According to local tradition, it has participated in every phase of the development of the Segu state (1712-1861) (Tauxier 1942) and yet escaped subjection to that state's primary mode of organization: slavery (jòrya) (Bazin 1974).

This removed relation with the Segu state, and the other slave-producing empires which preceded it on the Middle Niger, confers, in their own eyes, a bamana identity upon the peasants. Bamana means "to refuse a master", which is why, wherever the so-called "Bambara" (the Fulfulde and Arabic rendition of the term which has passed into French and English) ethnic group is found, there have been rulers, masters, slaves and states well into the past. One of the "masters" whom the Bamana have been refusing is Allah and, of course by implication, his worshippers, who have always dominated the ruling group - even in the Segu state where the king (faama) himself was pagan but whose dominant counselors were marabouts and Muslims. (Park 1800). Other observers from Delafosse (1912) to Tauxier (1942) dwell on this interpretation of the significance of bamana. Monteil (1924) adds that it may also mean "black people". This twist is not inconsistent with the other translation of the term, since the oppressed bamana peasants have always recognized a certain whiteness in their rulers: even when it hasn't been the "white" Almoravids, Moors, Fula, Tuareg,

Morrocans, or French, raiding them, their blacker rulers have almost invariably used the prestige of what they saw as a white man's religion - Islam - with which to rule them. The fact that so many Sudanese emperors sought to claim Arab descent did not exactly deter the peasants from associating blackness with the fact of being oppressed. Their age-old oppressors, the Maraka, merchants and agents of empire (cf. Bazin 1972, Pageard 1961a, Gallais 1967) are referred to as white, red, or black depending upon how long ago their ancestors began to pray. The "white" Maraka of old Soninke Muslim origin are usually as black to look at as the Bambara, but the symbolism remains. For those peasants who have not yet been influenced by the French-derived tribal classification system, American blacks also qualify as Bamana. Not only are they black African and oppressed by whites, it is remembered that many of them were taken out of bamana villages - even before the Segu state began to mass produce slaves for the Kangaba, and ultimately the Gambian, marketplace (Park 1800, Bazin 1974). Speaking nothing but bamanakan does not qualify Segu Tukolor and Maraka to be Bamana, likewise Minyanka and Senifo peasants to the south who cannot speak bamanakan are still spoken of at one level as banana in opposition to the "white" ruling groups listed above.

This bamana identity seems not to have begun with the Segu kingdom of the 18th century. There is a revealing way in which the distribution of the Bambara "ethnic" group (Paques 1954) follows the southern border of the ancient Sudanese kingdom of Ghana (Levtzion 1973) which fell to the desert Almoravids in 1076: Beledugu Bambara



to the south, Segu Bambara to the southeast. The Wassalu Bambara south of Bamako towards Buguni had to await the rule of the Mali empire in order to become bamana refusers, hence, perhaps, their retention of Wassalu Kaw as an alternative group name. Based on this evidence, one can surmise that on this southern frontier there was open slave raiding, pillaging and tax collecting by the Ghanian cavalry from Wagadu, the capital of that medieval kingdom. The only southern frontier which did not become a bamana homeland, the southwestern, was the one through which the gold from Bambuk passed (Levtzion 1973). This frontier could not be so easily pillaged since the prosperity of the empire depended upon the reliability of this gold trade (Bovill 1958). Where the peasants were not raided, pillaged and taxed but rather where they were encouraged to look after the safety of the trade routes, there would be less reason for them to design their community social organization for covert resistance.

These oppressed bamana areas turned to the powerful Mande chiefdoms, in the mountains to the west, for protection. With access to the Bure gold fields, these latter had some purchasing power with which to supply an army (with horses) to oppose that of Ghana. When Sunjata Keita, the founder of the Mali Empire in 1235, was caught as a youth in a succession struggle for control over these chiefdoms, he took refuge among allies of the Mande to the east (Niane 1965) in what would now be considered Bambara territory. This period of co-operation with the Mande chiefdoms may have witnessed the spread of

their language to the various groups of oppressed peasants seeking their protection.

Thus even as early as the days of the Ghana empire a distinction may have been manifest between the bamana and the manden in spite of their linguistic and cultural homogeneity. The former had developed an egalitarian community organization designed to minimize the predatory impact of outside rule from Ghana; the communities of the latter remained under a ruling hierarchy from within with stratified lineages, higher percentages of casted nyamakala, and slave descendants unable to bury their inglorious ancestry (Leynaud 1961, Jones 1976, Hopkins 1972).

As the Mande chiefdoms began to consolidate their gold trading power, this distinction between them and the Bamana was made indelible by their conversion to Islam. The Muslim magicians (Massa) sent by the Mande to rule over the Segu Bambara were readily tagged as Maraka, just as the former Soninke rulers from Ghana[1] (some of whom were retained in power by Mali) had been, in reference to their religion (Pageard 1961b), and so that they would not be mistaken as sympathetic to the Bamana in spite of the linguistic similarities.

This is how Father Henry (1910: 67-70), who, after all, spent more time in rural bamana villages than most subsequent researchers, sees this Bambara history:

> For centuries now, Islam has penetrated into the heart of Africa and established itself in the midst of our

[1]Raffenel makes a spontaneous observation in Kuarta (1856: 385) which tells us something about the relationship between bamana peasantry and maraka potentates wherever they are found together: "Les Bambara, particulierement les Kourbaris (Kulubalis), méprisent beaucoup le commerce, et le secours qu'ils trouvent pour cet objet dans l'entreprise des Sarracoles (Sonnike-Maraka) leur fait une obligation de les ménager".



> Negro peoples; slow as its advance has been, it has not failed to leave its mark. The Bambara, the most important kernel of the Mande peoples, was always at war against the Moslem to safeguard his independence and the faith of his fathers (the wars were primarily religious). They were in turn conqueror and conquered, but most often conquered (for the Bambara, egoistic, plan their personal and individual interests before that of the group, and they always lacked cohesion and agreement, and never really had a leader at the top); they could not escape. Since they are nevertheless essentially deceitful, crafty, and hypocritical so that other peoples compare them to a piece of cow dung, dry outside but soft and loose inside so that it breaks and soils as soon as a foot is placed on it - and this comparison pleases them - I do not hesitate to say that they took nothing from Islam that was not already in their minds. If they have taken Arabic terms to express themselves, I cannot doubt that this was purely diplomacy on their part. The use of Arabic terms that correspond to their own ideas in order to express their beliefs in present-day language represented adaptation and in no sense acceptance on their part. I would even assert that here they gave evidence, not of tact towards their conqueror (this is a quality which at the present time they do not possess even in an embryonic form), but of a certain pliability and shrewdness. In fact, by appearing before their tyrant on an equal footing with respect to dogma, they avoided the stroke of the sword or slavery, kept their faith in fetishes intact, and shielded both themselves and their children from all religious propaganda . . . If the Bambara have fought to safeguard their independence, they have done so primarily to preserve their faith and keep their fetishes. They have shown such great attachment to these, that their conquerors have described them as rebels and applied to them the epithet Bamba synonym of Kafri (pp. 60-62 of 1960 translation by Anne Coleman for HRAF). (emphases mine).

## Social Mobility

The bamana peasants were not only anxious to keep themselves distinct from Muslims because of a religious loyalty to their pagan cults and altars, but also because then, as now, their collective lot could be improved by impeding social mobility among their numbers. Conversion to or an intensification of Islamic worship was and is

an effective way of dodging community obligations in the interests of moving up in the world, and local pagan cults were and are organized so that it is difficult for their members to do so. I shall be dealing with this egalitarian aspect of bamana peasant life at length. Here I am just trying to provide historical background for the bamana hostility to urban Islam in Mali. This is a hostility which has not ended with the recent conversions of many of these bamana.

A polarization developed between the stratified Mande villages, on the one hand, each supporting a local nobility which attended the court and presided over the destiny of empire (Monteil 1930, Niane 1962) and, on the other hand, the egalitarian bamana villages. The latter grew to hide all signs of wealth and ostentation from predatory rulers, and then from each other, and yet their existence depended on having the wherewithall to pay taxes, thereby avoiding debt bondage and slavery. These differences were enhanced by the fact that the Sonrai rulers from Gao took over the Bambara zones after 1450 whereas the Mande were able to retreat to their homeland mountain villages (Levtzion 1973). Again as in the days of Ghana, it was the bamana Mande speakers who came under foreign rule. Both the geographical evidence and the political history of these medieval Sudanese empires suggest that the existence of the bamana as a separate group is due to the fact that they were uniquely the peasants who always fell under the direct control of foreign rulers.



The only outlet for advancement in these tax-paying peasant villages was emigration. Occasionally a youth could escape to a Koranic school and then link up to a Maraka[2] trading network by means of his studies, or he could escape to join the Mande traders, julaw, to the south. But again, unless he had Islamic learning to offer or unless he had kinsmen in the commercial network, he risked being turned into a slave so far from home. Each of these attempts at mobility was an irrevocable step because it involved a conversion to Islam and a degree of absenteeism which membership in the bamana age-set and initiation cult system does not take lightly. Absenteeism also entails the loss of farming labor for the village and the compound farming unit, but abandonment of one's citizenship obligations in village and family institutions is considered the more serious offense. It is the imperative aspect of these institutions which keep many more from going.

Hiring oneself out as a mercenary was a more popular route to private wealth since it required no religious conversion. It was rare, however, that such a mercenary could return his earnings to his kin group at home. For this reason, and because he worked under the authority of a non-kinsman, he was seen as a slave, jòn, even if he had chosen this calling (see Meillassoux 1971, 1975b on the mutual exclusivity of slavery and kinship). Even before the Moroccan conquest of 1591 the Songhoy state was hiring Bambara armies in the Segu

[2]See Gallais (1967: 115) on ethnic mobility in this part of Mali. He cites examples of Dogon, Bobo, and Bozo subgroups passing into a "black" maraka fin category with their conversion to Islam, and even claiming the more prestigious "red" maraka bilen identity after several generations. But he gives no examples of Bamana attempting this.

Macina region (Monteil 1924, Delafosse 1912). This practice continued through the internecine wars of the Moroccan conquerors (Willis 1971), to the point where one of these armies, the tonjòn of Biton Kulubali, was able to set up a separate state of its own at Segu (Monteil 1924) in 1712 (Tauxier 1942). The commercial importance of such predatory armies was enhanced by the increasing international demand for slaves at this time (Bazin 1974).

The bamana peasantry did not view this newest set of rulers, through drawn from their own ranks, as different from the others. They made a sharp distinction between real bamana and tonjòn, the latter including practically the entire population of Segu town and its satellite villages (Bazin 1974). As always, bamana referred primarily to the peasant farmer, taxed and pillaged, refusing Islam or membership in any state administrative apparatus, but still free.[3] The tonjòn, on the other hand, however powerful and wealthy he may have become, still worked under the authority of a non-kinsman and could extend his earnings to only a limited range of kin (Bazin 1974). He was therefore a slave, jòn (cf. Meillassoux 1975b). This status category included the royal Jara dynasty, since its founder Ngolo Jara, had been Biton Kulubali's slave.

The descendants of the tonjòn are still referred to as such by the descendants of the free bamana of the Segu hinterland. The

[3]A free man is called a horon, or nobleman. Horonya means freedom. Unlike feudal Europe, such noblemen tended to be the poorer peasants rather than the slave elites of the rulers. Even today many members of the ruling elite are descendants of former slaves while there are many descendants of noblemen among the rural poor. It is considered characteristic of noblemen not to lie. If they have to do so, they usually call on a slave descendant to do it for them.



former do not always accept this distinction, trying to style themselves as Bamana by virtue of the more regional applications of the term. But there is no question of them returning the insult of the peasant bamana by calling them tonjòn as well. The fact that Dukolomba is included in the janduguw naani "4 villages of the clay flats" group (see map above) gives it unassailable status as a genuine bamanadugu. The name of this group links these villages (duguw) to the earth (dugukolo) rather than to the tonjòn state that ruled over them.[4]

When the residents of the Tuna area just south of the Bani speak of all residents north of that river as tonjòn, the Bamana of Dukolomba retaliate by calling the people of Tuna jònka. This name is a blend of tonjòn and Minyanka, the latter being the pagan Voltaic speaking farmers who predominate further south of the Bani. Tuna was in fact an important outpost of the Segu state from which the Jara dynasty organized its resistance after the Tukulor and French conquests (Ward 1976).

This reconstruction of the development of the bamana identity results from an application of the peasants' sense of their own history to the documented facts. When turning to the more recent evolution of this identity southeast of Segu, I am on surer ground with the information gathered in Dukolomba.

[4]Dukolomba was in the administrative canton, or kafo, of M'peba, which, lying on the Niger between Segu and Banankoro (see map), was almost as far away as Segu itself. Many of these canton seats appear to have been close to Segu (Ward 1976) with their areas of jurisdiction going out like spokes from the hub of a wheel. The Segu faama was not the first king to attempt to control his magnates (kafotigiw in this case) through such centralisation.

Labor and Taxation

The imperial history of the Middle Niger region is thus responsible for the bamana emphasis on both crop production and the establishment of descendants. The scarcity of labor relative to land (cf. Boserup 1967, Harner 1975) has obliged West Africans seeking to extract a maximum surplus from a group of laborers to reduce them to servitude (Hopkins 1973). Terray (1974) has linked the slave acquisition process to the formation of states in labor scarce West Africa. These slave holding states used their slaves or the surpluses they produced (often mining gold or salt) to maintain their income and power relative to the subject population. Terray's emphasis on the production processes organized by these states has ended the confusion that persisted as long as analysts (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1972, Amin 1972) attributed Sudanese imperial hegemony to a control of long distance trade. Far from taxing the traders, these states sought to facilitate their journeys through imperial territory. After all, the traders were the means by which state-produced surpluses could be commercialized and converted into horses and rifles through which the state's power could be maintained. Goody (1971) emphasizes the role of commercial weapons acquisition for the survival of these states:

> In terms of social organization, one major factor in the distinction between acephalous societies, forest kingdoms, and savannah states lay in differences in the means of destruction and in their ownership. It is because the crucial control of force was the first element of the systems to disappear under the colonial regime that this factor has so often been underplayed in retrospective analyses and postcolonial reconstructions. (1971: 56)



Of course, just as the state had to keep up its sale of surpluces, it had also to keep up its acquisition of slaves to produce the abundance. The local peasantry was as convenient a source of such slave labor as any; because, as their land was too vast to control and tax, it was difficult to get a surplus out of them in any other way. Such local peasantries could be left alone to the degree that they contributed temporary troops (i.e. soldiers who did not have to be billeted by the state) to the imperial army[6] or paid taxes.

The Segu state owed its existence to the tonjòn professional army. The billeting expense of this standing army was justified by the year-round raiding that the Niger waterway permitted them (Meillassoux 1963)[7]. Excuses for constantly renewing the pillaging campaigns were readily found: an insufficient tax payment here, a diplomatic slight there.[8] Though many were of bamana origin, these tonjòn soldiers developed social values very different from those of the farmers (Bazin 1974). For example, when the military tonjòn were ordered to farm in the rainy season, they revolted (Monteil 1924: 56).

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[6] As did the Kulango peasants to the Abron kingdom analysed by Terray (1974).

[7] With the Middle Niger under the control of the Segu fama's Somono navy (Pageard 1961c) the Segu state, unlike the Abron kingdom of Gyaman, had a captive trade route. Even so, it appears as if the state courted the merchants heavily (Park 1800, Bazin 1972) laying the better part of their tax burden upon the peasantry; perhaps this was due to the relative autonomy of Djenne and its river route to the east which bypassed Segu' control even at the apogee of the latter's hegemony (Gallais 1967).

[8] See the rationalizations for war in the historical epics of the griots recorded by Kesteloot 1972.

The Segu state was therefore less needy of troop contributions from its own peasants; it could consequently tax or enslave them without undermining its own position (Raffenel 1856:386-7, Mage 1867: 333). The tax alternative ("honey price" disòngo) was clearly preferable to the peasant villagers themselves, so they had to organize themselves to produce a continuing surplus in order to avoid enslavement.

Such a peasant village organization could not replicate the hierarchy of the state organization or it would not be able to maintain a surplus producing capability. If they attempted to recruit their own slaves in order to produce this surplus, the latter could side with the state against their owners, bringing these owners down into slavery as well (Terray 1975).

I found that in Dukolomba,and the other janduguu naani villages, the peasantry had turned to the egalitarian relations subsumed in their agnatic kinship system in order to maintain a united economic front against the outside world. This united front depended not only on a steady production of surplus crops, but also on a steady reproduction of social equals to co-operate in producing them. If the social egalitarianism of collaterally reproduced descendants were sacrificed to a momentary maximization of crop production in one of the segments, those farmers who realized the greater crop surpluses might be tempted to pawn off their less successful neighbors when the latter defaulted on their tax contributions.[9] In fact this very

[9] Of all the offences (if insolvency may be so called) to which the laws of Africa have affixed the punishment of slavery, this is the most common." (Park 1800:44).



crop success could have come from the prior possession of slave labor and could be used to acquire more.

However, such agricultural successes could not continue indefinitely given the ecological uncertainties and the lack of possibilities for technological investments in this savanna agriculture. When the successful farmer reached less fortunate times he might have to sell his slaves the moment his taxes fell due. If the unlucky streak continued, he might find himself in the position of having to pawn his own children since he had not developed reciprocal rights in labor and capital with neighbors and collateral agnates when times were better.

Properties labored towards more private ends are called jònforow, "slave fields", not only because these were the only sort of fields slaves were permitted to manage (they were not allowed to farm a communal compound field, foroba, with their own minimal lineage segment) but also because a concentration on fleeting, private production so often led to a dependance upon non-kin persons and structures if not to slavery itself. Villages emphasizing such private production exist now as they did in the past, but unlike the more egalitarian bamana villages, they are not the same villages or do not contain the same descent lines. These villages remain together only as long as the surpluses on which its component units are focused continue to be produced. Therefore, such villages are always new villages. They are named tonjònduguw, as opposed to the older bamana duguw, after the tonjòn "slaves of the state" who settled them in search of personal

gain.. The name remains, even though few of the original tonjòn villages do, and it is applied to those settlements (always new) of "strangers" who are farming and trading for themselves far from their descent lines.

Of course, when times were good such private producers could become Muslim, take on a jula trading or a fula herding identity, and turn some of their crop surpluses (those left after the payment of the disòngo tax) into merchant capital. As long as this wealth continued to produce an income they could keep the slave-hungry state at bay regarding their person. But if the income failed, they would have few jula and fula kinsmen to turn to for a loan, and having converted to Islam they might not be so welcome back in their bamana village of origin. For their part, the bamana villages and their component compounds of agnates were organized such that few would be inclined to take such a step. There were many sanctions against those who neglected their participation in community life: witches (subagaw) (Tauxier 1927, Labouret 1935), the dangers of falling behind on the sacrifices of the altar cults (foroba boliw), retaliations against those who did not remain in their initiation societies (jow) (Zahan 1960),[10] the curse (danga) of ancestors living and dead. But more important than these idelological measures was the day-to-day working organization of seniors and juniors in the compound of agnates, and of "twins" (filan-ni) in the village-wide age-sets (filan-bolo).

[10]Unfortunately few of the many writers on "Bambara religion" have related its ideas and practices to the politics and economics of peasant village life.



The Lineage and the Village

Horton (1971) traces an interesting continuum for the genealogical and residential organization of "stateless" societies in West Africa. At one extreme he places the classic segmentary pattern (he uses the Tiv as an example) where genealogical and residential positions were, more or less, one and the same. For the middle of the continuum he attributes the heterogeneous distribution of lineage segments over the ground to land pressure restricting the logical expansion of the segmentary system. At this point land cults emerge alongside of ancestral cults (he cites northern Ghana as an example). Finally at the other extreme of the "stateless" continuum, he notes how nucleated villages, born of the defensive needs of warfare conditions, stress membership in residentially-based ritual cults that de-emphasize or "kill" kinship, further frustrating co-ordination among the dispersed segments of a single lineage and thus preparing the way for the state. He sees the ritual specialists, who horde the secrets of these non-ancestor cults, as prototypes of a state elite.

The case of the bamana nucleated village is somewhat different since it has never been "stateless". Of course, whether within or between states, all exposed villages on the West African savanna were faced with the possibility of attack - the presence of states at all was an indication of the pervasiveness of warfare - and either had to find a protector, nucleate behind a defensive wall, or both. Even where the Segu state could give a degree of security to its villages such that they could dispense with the wall, the village was still

required to remain nucleated in order to facilitate tax assessments. For their part the bamana villagers themselves sought economic, if not always physical, security from a nucleated community. Should a villager default on his taxes, his neighbors would cover him through the office of the village chief (dugutigi) rather than pawn him, since they would someday need his labor or his children's labor assistance to produce the surplus from which all of their security sprang. Ritual cults, and even less ritual specialists, were not needed to keep the village together when threats of physical attack did not serve to unite them. For the bamana peasants the economic threat was always there, and the formation of an elite of ritual specialists as in Horton's "stateless" nucleated villages could only increase that threat by undermining the egalitarianism essential to sustain a motivated, village labor pool.[11]

These bamana villages that survived under the threat of a slave-producing predatory state were those that discovered community-wide co-operation in the production and redistribution of an agricultural surplus. The egalitarianism that could facilitate this co-operation was most reliably developed out of agnatic kin relations. Of course, agnatic kinship in these bamana villages did not go all the way back to the segmentary end of Horton's continuum. The surviving Bamana

[11]In the light of this history, perhaps one can begin to compare the universal emphasis on egalitarianism and personal philosophical awareness in the Bambara initiation societies (Zahan 1960) as opposed to the complicated liturgical mythology of the once stateless Dogon (Dieterlen 1965).



diffused the egalitarian aspects of agnatic relations but not their segmentary aspects. They maintained a patrilineal descent system as the arbiter of important political and economic relations without letting any of its segments fission off from the village. How was this done? How did a patrilineal ancestor maintain authority over the laborers in his line, keeping them equal in relation to him while denying them the right to split off from each other in their own time? Could a patrilineal authority structure reproduce itself without each junior gaining authority over his own segment and without these segments spreading out beyond the confines of the village in order to permit him to do so?

Dukolomba's "descendants" are organized collaterally at the compound, ward, and village level for many of their vital economic activities, but such collateral organizations depend on separate agnatic segments, the basis of the compound domestic group, for reproducing their membership. Only those domestic segments can supply the larger, residentially defined organizations of collaterals with participants interested in joining without ruling. These participants could forgo a quest for hierarchical power to the degree that their security depended on the egalitarian distribution of reproductive powers (wives) among agnates in the fraternal domestic segment. Even though all "brothers" in the agnatic compound are ranked according to absolute age[12], this ranking is respected on the presumption that

[12]This is one reason why the relations between twins, here as elsewhere in West Africa, are treated so delicately.

each is given the wherewithall (wives) to become elders and ancestors[13]. Thus Dukolomba's egalitarianism begins with a ranking determined by age before one determined by economic assets can intervene.

Peasant villages like Dukolomba have been reproduced where some of that agnatic group equality had been transposed to larger, residentially based organizations (Callais 1960: 132). If these village-wide organizations became hierarchical and coercive, similarly hierarchical outside administrative and commercial structures could more easily alientate the village's labor from the village's rulers. Therefore, the degree to which Dukolomba's neighboring agnatic groupings can overcome the fissioning tendencies which arise out of the organization of field management, marriage payments, and lineal inheritance in order to sustain a maximally effective joint farming effort at the compound, ward, and village level has been the degree to which it could survive as a populous farming community.

Even when precolonial raiding or the colonial head tax did not deplete food reserves on a regular basis[14] a socialization of disciplined and motivated farmers was needed if anything at all was to be got out of the short[15] farming season on this dry savanna.

Modern Migrations

I have often used the present tense in this historical retrospective on the egalitarian organization of the Segu bamana village.

[13]Rey's (1970) and Terray's (1975) treatments of seniors and juniors in Congolese and Abron lineages, respectively, do not apply to senior-junior relations in Dukolomba's compounds and lineages.

[14]See Gallieni's (1885:387) observations on this economic constraint during the Tukulor period.

[15]See Appendix I on rainfall.



Although the corporate bamana village developed during an era of slave-raiding and predatory states, the outside claims on peasant labor in the post-slavery modern era have had a similar impact on this strategy. Whether it was the colonial administration, the French army, or, more recently, capitalist plantations in the Ivory Coast, the outside world had wanted the Bamana's labor more than anything else he could produce. Even when the French colonial adminstration wanted to intensify the peanut output of French West Africa, the defacto policy was to let Bambara "navetanes", as these migrants were called, come to Senegal on a seasonal basis to grow the peanuts rather than to buy them from the Bambara villager at home (Ward 1976). The French Sudan and Mali have been what Amin (1972) has called labor reserve zones: producing laborers for enterprises established in the coastal areas more accessible to the outside investors. In this way the pressures on the bamana village have not changed since the slave raiding days.

Even then the displacement of labor had not always been coercive: the bamana villager had the choice of leaving his farming units and going off to seek his fortune, usually as a voluntary tonjòn, who was after all a slave. On the other hand, today displaced bamana labor cannot always be considered voluntary. While the forced labor policy of the colonial administration did not continue, villagers were still forced to leave their farms for rock bottom wages in order to pay the increasing head tax (Ward 1976: 315). Even the hostage system was substituted by the colonial administration for the precolonial pawn system (Ortili 1939) for those who defaulted on their taxes (Ward 1976:

288-304). If they tried to raise the necessary amount through cash-crop peanuts, they would have to sacrifice food grain output in order to produce them, and even then they were not always sure of finding a buyer.[16] It made more sense to leave home in the idle, dry season.

However, the organization of the bamana peasants for the reproduction of a maximum number of descendants has not been a passive response to market demand for slaves and then later, migrant labor. It is for this reason that I have referred to the reproduction of descendants rather than the reproduction of laborers. With many properly socialized descendants one can have enough labor to keep the outside market from destroying one's village altogether by enticing less ancestor-oriented laborers away from subsistence activities. For descendants, as opposed to mere laborers, are as interested in the future of their family estate as in any transitory income. They therefore continually come home to farm, at least during the weeding season, practically irrespective of the quality of wage earning opportunities to be had elsewhere. By producing subsistence crops, the bamana village is only ensuring the reproduction of laborers but not necessarily the production of itself because these laborers

[16]This has not been the case since Independence (cf. Hopkins 1972), as Operation Arachide has guaranteed certain prices (from 14 - 16 francs, before the 1967 50% devaluation of the Malian franc, to 24 - 40 francs since). However, in Dukolomba, as long as sufficient cash for taxes and bridewealths can be raised through migrant labor, there is no reason to expect that a secure market for peanuts could disrupt these peasants' disciplined grain, and therefore descendant, producing organization during the farming season. It has not so far.



could leave. Therefore, if optimal crop yields have to be sacrificed in order that descendants loyal to the farming community will be raised, this does not mean that the village has behaved uneconomically. It is from this perspective of the total economy, of persons as well as commodities produced (cf. Meillassoux 1975a) that I wish to evaluate Dukolomba's agriculture. Until such point as Dukolomba's laborers cease to be peasants (cf. Wolff 1966, Mintz 1973) and become commodities, this dual approach to their productive activities is necessary.

This task of discovering the organizational definition of a laborer in the village farming context bears on an important modern problem. What sort of resource does the nation of Mali have in its village organizations? A misunderstanding of their production dynamic has already doomed one comprehensive development plan (Modibo Keita's) to failure (cf. Jones 1976). The different (smaller) percentages and shorter periodicity of Bamana in the Ivory Coast as compared to other laborers (e.g. Mossi) from other Sahelian "labor reserve" countries (e.g. Upper Volta, cf. Amin 1974: 99) should remind us of the modern economic implications of local village organizations that can reclaim their laborers for important parts of their working life as opposed to those that cannot. It is because of the importance of these differences that Pierre-Philippe Rey calls for studies of the kind I have attempted here:

> La véritable explication de ces differences c'est dans les contradictions internes du mode de production pré-capitaliste et dans les possibilités plus ou moins grands

d'utilisation de ces contradictions par le capitalisme qu'il faut la chercher; et cela ne peut être fait que sur la base d'une connaissance très précise de chacune des sociétés concernées; certes il est plus facile d'affirmer que le capitalisme a déjà éliminé ou va éliminer rapidement toutes les caractéristiques spécifiques des modes de production antérieurs et va regrouper ces sociétés en deux grands ensembles, celui des fournisseurs de main-oeuvre et celui des fournisseurs de produit agricole, les deux categories n'etant plus que des variants du mode de production capitaliste lui-même et toute analyse de leurs differenciations internes relevant de l'érudition et de la speculation gratuite; mais, d'une part, il est périlleux de se lancer dans des pronostics de ce genre, au moins tant qu'on ne dispose pas d'enquêtes suffisamment précises et suffisamment diversifées pour les conforter . . . . cette connaissance detaillée des contradictions internes des sociétés rurales et des modalités diverses suivant les quelles le capitalisme se les est sommis, base de la compréhension, aussi bien des différences d'attitude des differents groupes face à la migration que du processus même aboutissant à cette migration dans chaque cas n'a donc rien d'une speculation gratuite ni pour le présent ni pour l'avenir (1976: 52-3).

Bamanya and Islam Since Independence

The historical development of a corporate bamana village such as Dukolomba has been linked to the dominance of non-Muslim religious institutions within the community. The name bamana itself refers to this proud paganism, but for most of its history it simultaneously referred to rural peasants whose economic situation and horizons were markedly different from that of the agents of empire. The name has not changed its meaning as many of the descendants of the once pagan bamana since the colonial period, and particularly since Independence, have begun to make more or less sincere conversions to Islam. In certain contexts, and with a stress



on the middle syllable, it is still used to distinguish pagans from Muslims, or pagan practices from Islamic piety even if those practices are carried on by Arabs (Moors) themselves. Otherwise, bamana still refers to the self-sufficient peasant relative to the herder, fula, trader, jula, or administrator, fama, irrespective of which of these may be Muslim and which pagan.

However much the recently converted Bamana have been able to keep their relative identity constant, even as nominal Muslims they have had more difficulty exercising the sanctions of these pagan cult groups that had guaranteed some of the solidarity of the corporate farming village. As with those stateless villages incorporated for defense analysed by Horton (1971), the residentially-based earth-cult groups enforced a solidarity upon the total community membership where ancestor cult sanctions could not guarantee sufficient solidarity for the survival of the community. Even with the most superficial allegiance to Islam, it was difficult to maintain a semblance of organization in either of these cult groups since two of their most basic elements, altars (boli) and sorghum beer drinking were specifically proscribed by the new religion.

In the next chapter I will retrace the present distribution of lineage segments among the six wards of Dukolomba (see Figure II) according to the histories of conversions to Islam that affected their residential cleavages.[17] At present in Dukolomba, of forty-

[17]See Goody (1958: 60) for a terminological distinction between fissioning and cleavage.

four compound heads, eleven (#4, #5, #12, #13, #23, #24, #29, #30, #31, #32, #33)[18] are still unrepentantly pagan, and where their sons have converted and taken on a Muslim name (usually while in the Ivory Coast) they still attend and participate in pagan ceremonies to the degree that their age and training permit them to do so. Twelve more compound heads (#6, #9, #10, #14, #21, #22, #25, #37, #42, #43, #16x) had converted, changed their names, and abandoned their ancestral sacrifices but nevertheless kept open contact with (if not membership in) pagan religious groups in the village. The remaining twenty compound heads were more serious about Muslim practices and proscriptions. But of the eleven of these who most frequently attended the mosque, (#2, #11, #16, #17, #18, #26, #28, #35, #36, #39, #40: all elders) four were the most reputed sorcerors (subagew) in the village. In Chapter V, I will refer in greater detail to the realignment of the farmers' participation in individual sorcery or in group cults, respectively, according to whether they had converted to Islam or not. I only wish to note here, at the outset, that in spite of the recent mass conversions to Islam, pagan institutions continue to guarantee community solidarity as they have done through much of bamana history, albeit with a greater emphasis upon individual rather than group practices.

It is necessary to understand the "peasant" meaning of bamana, that had grown out of its "pagan" meaning, in order to interpret the conversions to Islam which have recently taken place in villages

[18]Each compound in Dukolomba has been numbered according to genealogical proximity wherever possible: see Figures III and IV.



such as Dukolomba. Through Mali's precolonial history, in signifying "pagan", bamana at the time signified those who did not participate in the state administration, since these administrators were invariably Muslim. Even when the pagan tonjòn army ruled at Segu, the leading councillors, bureaucrats and traders of the state were still Muslim (Park 1800). But when the state administration became French, a peasant no longer had to be non-Muslim in order to emphasize his identity as a bamana outsider. In fact as Independence approached, Malian politicians argued persuasively on the radio that conversion to Islam was an effective form of protest against that administration of Christians and French speakers. It was at this point that many of Dukolomba's farmers began to convert (see next chapter)[19]. And since Indpendence in 1959 with its French-speaking secular rulers not necessarily associated with Islamic piety, these peasant conversions have continued.

## CONCLUSION

In Dukolomba the disposition of genealogical, particularly agnatic, relations within and between farming groups was considered to be as basic to crop production as was any agronomic technique. Without ensuring the perpetuity of these production units, where relations were invulnerable to fluctuations of the value of labor on the outside market, continuity gained from the production of a wind-fall food grain harvest would be only temporary.

[19]Closer to Segu itself, where the Islam yoke of the Tukolor had weighed more heavily, there had been a resurgance of paganism after the French conquest in 1891. However, as oppressive colonial practices developed and came to head during the conscription drives of World War I, Islam made important inroads. (Ward 1976).

CHAPTER III - CLAN, LAND AND SETTLEMENT

Introduction

This chapter is intended to serve two purposes. One, in describing the land-use patterns in Dukolomba, I intend to introduce the reader to the genealogical position, compound, ward, and age-set of the individuals whose labor during the 1974 farming season will be the subject of this analysis. Two, at the same time I wish to illustrate the interplay of crop-producing and descendant-reproducing considerations in the development of this land use pattern. The juxtaposition of these two sets of considerations will reappear when I look at the allocation of farming labor in subsequent chapters.

Seniority

In Dukolomba, as in the other three of the "four villages of the innundable clay flats", jan duguw naani, as well as in many other genuine bamana villages, the principle of seniority is applied without modification to all questions of ownership and authority. The oldest patrilineal descendant of the original clearer of any given field space is the owner of that field. If the descendants of this original clearer have split into separate compound farming units (duw) in an orderly fashion, the field holdings are split equally between the off-spring compounds, that is between the chiefs (dutigiw) of these compounds who manage the land with and on behalf of the compound members (dudenw), regardless of their number. Likewise, the oldest surviving member of the eldest generation of patrilineal descendants of the earliest settler in the area, is chief



(dugutigi) of the village (dugu) there, providing that he was not from a nyamakala caste.

Does this rigid application of the seniority rule restrict a more flexible manipulation of land and labor factors in the interests of improving crop yield? Sometimes, as I shall detail below. But perhaps a more germaine question is how does one measure the long term advantages of unselfish co-operative participation, (that flourishes as long as the seniority system prescribes authority[1] and ownership instead of permitting them to be achieved) against yearly crop yield? If juniors were permitted to gain influence by separating out the results of their labor from that of their slightly less productive consociates, then the unity of the compound farming units as well as of the bamana village itself would disintegrate. But because authority can only come with age, juniors do not concern themselves with it, concentrating instead on their reputations as equals. As this discussion proceeds I will be evaluating, for different production situations[2], the relative emphases given to maximal crop yield on the one hand and to the development of corporate farming institutions based ultimately on patrilineal descent on the other hand. These two goals are by no means consistent with one another at all times. They cannot always be pursued with equal

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[1] I am following Smith's (1956) distinction between institutionalized "authority" and raw "power".

[2] My research methodology was influenced by the technique described by Van Velsen (1968) as "situational analysis" where the interplay of certain social relations is documented for key activity contexts.

emphasis over the course of the same activity. The socialization of juniors is as important an outcome of farming activity as are crops.

The arguments of other students of West African peasantries who emphasize either the exploitative relations (Rey 1970) or the class differences (Terray 1975) between the seniors and juniors do not apply in the bamana case. For the Dukolomba bamana, the authority of the seniors serves only to forestall the development of "class" differences between the productive members of the population. Such authority as the seniors have is authority that all male citizens will some day hold and it is a pale reflection of the outside state and commercial powers which the villagers must protect themselves against. As already mentioned and to be elaborated on forthwith, such protection must be undertaken collectively by the entire village.

There is one slight but significant difference between the succession to chiefly office (dugutigiya) and the succession to compound headship (dutigiya)[3] with the field ownership rights that usually go with it. Village chiefs, barring outside political interference, are senior by generation first and by age within that generation second. Compound heads succeed according to absolute age seniority only. But there, a man who does not wish to remain under the authority of a more aged elder brother's "son" can always

[3]This succession pattern - and much else with it - has been upset in certain key villages closer to Segu in the precolonial era (Bazin 1970) as well in more local administrative centers since then.



leave the compound. However, if male members of the chiefly clan saw the chieftainship passed to a senior male in the junior generation and felt slighted thereby, they would stand more to lose by leaving the village chiefed by their "son" than if they merely left a compound headed by such a senior "son". In a new village their own line would not have rights to succeed as chief. He could start a new settlement, of course, but not only would he lose all the advantages of the community laborpool, his heirs would not be chiefs until the community was sizable enough to be recognized as a village. This could take several generations, if it happened at all.

Thus it can be seen for Dukolomba (see Table I on age-sets) that while #2 (age-set b)[4], the oldest member of the chiefly clan, is chief, the next oldest #13 (age-set c) member of this clan (compounds #1 - #26) will never be (one can safely assume). He is a "son" in the next generation down (see Figure III, Genealogy of Chiefly Clan). No, it is rather #17 of age-set e who would become (did become in 1976) the next chief.

The Chiefly Clan

This difference in the rules of succession between the chieftainship and the compound headship can also be attributed to the

[4]I have numbered every compound in Dukolomba in the order of their patrilineal proximity to one another where applicable, as it is in most cases, and where it is not, in the order of their residential proximity (see Figure II, III and IV). Age-sets are lettered according to their rank. I have used lower case letters for those elder males who have graduated from the ton youth association and capitals for those younger males and unmarried females who have not (see Table I). Where no age-set letter is given after a compound number and yet an individual is being discussed, it is the compound head who is being referred to. Village chiefs are given Roman numerals according to the order of their succession.

FIGURE III: GENEALOGY OF COMPOUND #s 26, 28, 37, 27, & 35

KEY:

| : In-marrying women are to be understood by this descent line in each case. The letter symbols for their clan and village of origin can be identified on TABLES V & I respectively. The same symbols are used to identify the origins of males when necessary.

▲: village chief

▲: dead male ancestor

△: living male

○: living female

→: levirate

*: adopted child

compounds are circled.

: compound head

▼: slave or captive

▽: former captive

The age-set of each individual born in Dukolomba is indicated by the appropriate letter (cf. Table I)

⊕: Resettled in hamlet to the east.




FIGURE III

DUKOLOMBA 1973



FIGURE III: GENEALOGY OF COMPOUND #s 1-15




FIGURE III: GENEALOGY OF COMPOUND #s 16-25






FIGURE III: GENEALOGY OF COMPOUND #S 1-6, 32-34.




☆ chief of fishing village directly to the south of Dukolomba on the Bani River.

Table I - AGE-SETS

| Elder Age-Sets | Year Threshing Supervised (nyobogotigiw) | Approximate Year of Birth |
|---|---|---|
| a 33[2] | | |
| b 2[1] | | |
| c 13 | | |
| d 29[2] | | |
| e 17, 33 | | 1910 |
| f 3 | | |
| g 4 | | |
| h 5, 19, 20 | | 1915 |
| i 12 | | |
| j 16, 30 | 1952 | |
| k 26, 31, 40 | 1954 | |
| l 1 dead, absent Jara | 1956 | |
| m 10, 1 | 1958 | 1920 |
| n 6, absent Jara | 1960 | |
| o 11, absent 37 | 1962 | |
| p 23, 39 | 1964 | |
| q 10, 35 | 1966 | |
| r 25, 14, 37 | 1968 | |
| s 36, 2, 11 | 1970<br>1972 | 1930 |
| t 11, 21, 31, 37, 34[3], 34[3] | | |
| u 11, 22, 29 | | |
| v 3, 8, 2, 34, 37 | | |
| w 7, 28 | | |
| y 13, 33, 35, 35 | | 1940 |

Tondenw

| Junior Age-Sets | Initiated Junior Males | Approximate Year of Birth |
|---|---|---|
| A | 2[4], 39[4], 38[4], 8, 17, 16, 35, 16 | 1942-1944 |
| B | 27, 16, 13, 26, 28, 35, 41, 16 | 1947 |
| C | 26, 16, 2, 30 | 1948 |
| D | 22[5], 26[5], 26[5], 16[5] | 1949 |
| E | 8, 26, 32, 16-19, 10 | 1951 |
| F | 26, 7, 1, 27, 30, 32, 35, 10, 34, 29 | 1952 |
| G | 9, 29, 33, 36, 35 | 1953 |
| H | 25, 4, 35, 38, 18, 7 | 1954 |
| I | 15, 19, 30, 26 | 1955 |
| J | 1, 11, 26, 34, 31 | 1956 |
| K | 2, 11, 11, 16, 26, 28, 10, 23, 8, 9, 35, 23, 17, 25, 26, 10 | 1958 |
| L | 2, 2, 11, 11, 7, 10, 18, 28, 32, 26, 30, 6, 16, 35 | 1960 |
| **Initiated Unmarried Females[6]** | | |
| F | 10, 11, 6, 16, 24, 36, 7 | 1955 |
| G | 11, 32, 32, 14, 25 | 1957 |
| H | 1, 8, 26, 26, 30, 10, 1 | 1958 |
| I | 34, 34, 28, 17 | 1959 |
| J | 2, 26, 16, 1, 15, 39 | |
| K | 11, 11, 34, 1 | 1960 |

[1] Each letter is an individual. Age-sets in ton are presented in capitals, their seniors in lower case letters.

[2] Ruare members dead.

[3] Eldest in age-set therefore act as lead nyobogotigiw (threshing tontigiw)

[4] Tontigiw

[5] Tonprieri tigiw

[6] M'bogotigiw

fact that the former office, and the clan united around it, have more ceremonial rather than management functions.

In Dukolomba, the chiefly clan, the Buare (compounds #1 - 26, see Figure III), includes a large part of the village population. This is true of the neighboring three bamana villages of this alluvial zone[5] as well, although there the clan name (jamu) of the chiefs is Kulubali (or was very recently; cf. Bwala). A bard[6] from Segu reports that Dukolomba itself was also a Kulubali village until, not more than 250 years ago, these Kulubali were wiped out by an invading faction of Buare. The Buare, of course, deny this story and their neighbors diplomatically claim ignorance, but the absence at the top of the Buare genealogy (see Figure III) of the name of the hunter Dukolo, for whom the village was named, lends credence to the story.

There is no reason to suspect that the Buare displaced these Kulubali, if in fact that was the case, as a reward for services to the Segu ruler (fama). Such fiefs as were given to past warriors were usually carefully chosen closer to Segu (Bazin 1970), and often without the original chiefly line losing hold of the religious,

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[5]These four (naani) villages (duguw) of the clay flood plain (jan), janduguw naani, are Dukolomba, Dufunu, Bwala, and Dingola (see map, Figure I).

[6]These bard or griot singers (usually of epics) are most commonly members of the jeli caste (nyamakala). In this case, however, I was informed by a fineke bard who claimed that, in addition to singing epics and flattering the great as the jeli do, recalling juridicial precedents from the past was also a speciality of his caste.



earth cult (da siri)[7] functions of that office (cf. Henry 1910: 100). These ritual functions are clearly in the hands of the Buare in Dukolomba, even after the chief, as was customary, the priest of this earth cult, converted to Islam. In addition, I have already referred to Dukolomba's symbolic identity link with the "innundable clay flats" (jan) characteristic of this part of the north bank of the Bani River. This association with the soil gives it a bamana dugu status not to be confused with a tonjòn dugu, closer to the seat of state authority and with other concerns besides farming. If Cètomo Buare (see Genealogy, Figure III) had been a tonjòn general, Dukolomba would have never been included in the select club of janduguu naani. It can be seen from the map (Figure I) how many villages near the "clay flats" (jan) are not included in this club. Except for some older villages around Katiena, called diladuguw after some swamps (dilaw) in that area, they are all tonjòn duguw. And, except for Bla, which was sacked by the Tukulor and thereby lost much of its bamana population and status (replaced by newer tonjòn elements), they are all smaller and newer.[8]

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[7]Such earth renewal cults are not unusual in agricultural communities and are, or were, virtually ubiquitous in those nucleated West African villages where genealogically distant or diverse lineage segments found themselves in close proximity (cf. Horton 1971). Original data on the Bambara da siri grove and its cult can be found in Henry (1910), Lem (1948), and Dieterlen (1951) in addition to the other authors cited on Bambara religion (Delafosse 1912, Monteil 1924, and Tauxier 1927). The fact that this cult is village-wide and yet concerns itself with agricultural productivity has not led any author to look beyond the family compound in analysing farm management in the Bambara community.

[8]Ngakoro is the old juridicial seat, Massadugu, of the area and was therefore never a bamanadugu in the first place - see Pageard (1961a"Le marche orientale") on the relation of these Massaduguw to the Mali empire . However, because the Segu fama exterminated Ngakoro's maraka Travèlè Massa clan, it has been called a tonjòndugu by all but its own residents.

And finally, the fact that Dukolomba and its sister villages are linked with a clay as opposed to a sand or loam soil, stands them in further stead as a genuine bamanadugu. The black clay (bogofin) of this region is harder to work either with hoe or plow and it dries out more quickly after a light rain. However, it is preferred by diligent first weeders - such as the proud bamana farmer - because it supports less of a weed regrowth than sandier soils. A less conscientious farmer, a tonjòn for example, may prefer to deal with the milder first weed growth on the sandy loams even if the subsequent regrowth is more severe than on clay. To deal with the heavy first weed growth on clay, such a tonjòn would have to mobilize bamana co-operative labor groups. To do this he might have to sacrifice some accumulated wealth to the development of stronger kin and neighborly ties through which such labor groups could be mobilized.

Yet cattle prefer the sands. Thus it can be conluded that the original settlers who were exclusively interested in the noble calling of farming chose clay zones. Those more concerned with territorial position or cattle accumulation might choose the sandier zones closer to Segu. It is remarkable how within a 15 km radius of Dukolomba, maraka, fula, and newer tonjòn villages are found on sandier soil areas where the bamana[9] villages remain on clay (see Figure I).

[9]The historical development of these four "ethnic" or status categories has been described in Chapter II.



Dukolomba's Buare are from Welentigila directly to the north on the far side of the Niger[10]. In that zone, not far from the famous maraka trading town of Sansanding visited by Mungo Park on both of his journeys, Buare is the dominant bamana clan name, just as Kulubali dominates among the Bamana north of the Bani around Dukolomba. South of the Bani towards Tuna, Tangara is the dominant clan name. Thus, as the dominant clan name of the inter Niger-Bani region, Kulubali is flanked by two of its senankun joking partners (cf. Pageard 1958), the Buare and the Tangara, to its north and to it south respectively. It is no accident, as I will argue in the next chapter, that established marriage routes (furusiraw) also follow these north - south joking relationships.

There is very little to unite the component compounds of Dukolomba's chiefly clan, as against the other compounds in the village, except the chiefly office. While the oldest member of the oldest Buare generation is the village chief, at least two other members of this generation (#17 and #16) sit on his council as "witnesses" syèrew. The chief (#2) would not consent to a formal interview without them. Otherwise the Buare are dispersed into each ward of the village: this dispersion has been governed by factors of lineal and/or religious allegiance (cf. next section). As can be seen from their genealogy (Figure III), the Buare have difficulty remembering their

[10]Located just to the east of Sansanding, though not shown on the 1/500,000 map reproduced in Appendix I.

linkages to each other after three or four ascendant generations. They are not even willing to propose a link between compound #26 or former chief XI (#29's mother's father) and the others. This inability to unite all the Buare through remembered genealogical connections does not mean that the unconnected members lose their rights to the chieftainship.

Nevertheless, the chiefly clan does play an important unifying role in the economic life of the village. The fact that so many members of each ward[11] (see Appendix II) come from this single clan, helps the village to build up a co-operative unity on the model of agnatic egalitarianism. The formidable achievement of such a bamana dugu is that the rivalry (fadenya) which guarantees the equality between agnates (faden) has not been permitted to mar the co-operative solidarity basic to such a village's defense. Rather this rivalry is rechanneled, through the age-set institutions among others, away from the agnatic segments it could threaten to split with irretrievable repercussions for the community's cohesiveness. The age-sets are linked to the villages' agnatic infra structure, the chiefly clan, by the requirement that a Buare be born into each one before its membership be closed off to the later born, usually after two to three years. Only this makes it difficult for a segment of the most conspicuous patrilineal grouping in the village to find itself in a

[11]Only the wards Manawèrè and Wèrèba (see Figure II, Schematic map of village) do not have a majority of Buare compounds, but matrilateral ties bind #29 and #32 in the first and #27 and #28 in the second to the Buare clan core giving this more cognatic unit a majority in each (see Figure III). Sunsurunmugu consists of only one compound, #34: a descendant of a one-time Buare owned slave.



stand-off with an age-set (over farming labor time, payment for the hire of the youth association etc.), since an agnate from that grouping is in each one. Only the elder age-sets a and d (see Table I), whose chiefly clan members are deceased, are without Buare at present. In the next chapter I will discuss behavioral and ideological links between the conduct of age-mates and that of agnatic "brothers".[12]

The fact that the Buare are dispersed throughout almost every ward (sokala) in the village is one factor that enables the village structure to defuse the tensions which arise as these clan mates jealously inspect each other's equality. On account of this residence pattern where there are patrilineally controlled rights to labor, cattle, bridewealth, or access to useful trees, to quarrel over, two agnates implicate neighbors and matrilateral kin into the struggle at the same time as other agnates get involved. Thus it is difficult for the dispute to polarize larger segments of agnates. Agnatic kinsmen do not place their patrilineal connection to the primary parties above all other considerations. Yet at the same time it is true that agnatic kin let neighbors and affines offend community sensibilities to a degree that they will not tolerate in each other. They retaliate against their enemies as witches (subagaw),

[12]Peters' (1972: 124) comments about a youth group in rural Wales applies equally well to Dukolomba's age-sets and the ton youth group made up of them: "The youth group garners the harvest of social relations which the formal institutions fail to contain."

poisoners[13] and, since the advent of Islam in the village, through what is known in French as "maraboutage" (jinèmori baara).[14] Rarely do such disputes go beyond the lineage segment (somaw) of contiguous compounds (duw), united a generation or two back. Even other agnates within the quarrelsome lineage segment try to stay clear if no one from their compound is involved. This is easier to do if they are in another ward.

Because of the residence pattern within a ward and the economic relations that that entails under this system of agriculture, agnates cannot join in a quarrel with any confidence that their patrilineal genealogy will limit the number of parties who will

[13]Lest one think that the Bambara villager does not mean business with this sort of sanction, it is worthwhile listening to Father Henry's (1910: 50) testimony: "Thus sorcerors are consulted at every death; one is sought through their mediation. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is the great maxim for the Bambara as for the Jews, and vengeance must be taken on the one who was able to win over the good graces of a fetish and force it to bring suffering or mourning into the bosom of a family. This vengeance is obtained through the intermediary of a fetish, and therefore secretly, and good relations between the actual or supposed culprit and the unfortunate family are not broken in anyway. The strange fact that has always surprised one is that all these people converse amicably, do each other small favors, invite each other to drink and eat, while in their hatred they maintain a constant guard. They watch each other as they smile - one party to protect their lives and their interests, the other to obtain vengeance";(1960 translation by Anne Coleman for HRAF Press pp. 40-41). Both Father Henry (1910: 47-56) and Tauxier (1927: 245-263) go on at length about the mechanics of Bambara poisoning. Nor were they the only ones. Brasseur's bibliography (1964) lists numerous articles from the colonial period devoted entirely to the Korti and other poisons. Presumably this interest was related to the mysterious deaths of some colonial administrators. Imperato (1977) places these poisoning techniques in the context of Bambara ideas on sickness and dying.

[14]Also see Imperato (1977) for the relations between bamana sorcery and moribaara.



also feel concerned. In other words, when #18 prematurely deserted #17's compound after the death of his own father (cf. below), because of #17's reputation as a witch, his agnate friend #15 could not visibly come to his support because #17's neighbor and ally #26 would have then become concerned. Although a Buare, #26 had no close agnates who were not already in his compound (see Figure III); therefore as #16, #18, and #19 formed a factional alliance, #26 became concerned that his status as an equal member of the chiefly clan might be jeopardized. However, if such a distant clansman as #26 had come to #17's side, #35, a non-Buare, would not have hesitated to agitate in favor of his immediate neighbors #18 and #16. Therefore, having lost landrights (cf. below) in deserting #17, #18 borrowed land from a slave descendant, #34, from clear across the village. No one dared join #18 in exchange labor during the peak bottleneck period (see Table VI on weeding in 1974); #16 could only help with the less jealously guarded labor of harvest time.

If this affair could have been contained within the somaw agnates #16, #17, #18 and #19 who share a closer common ancestor than they do with any other Buare, the allied parties (#16, #18, #19) could have run the witch #17 out of the village. Instead #17 is now (1976) chief, suspected of having practiced sorcery against his predecessor. But #16 could not get involved without involving #26, and #26 could not interfere without #35 fearing for those allies, #16 and #19, from whom he intended to borrow bridewealth money that year.

The agnates keep an eye on each other, but they cannot follow up with disruptive sanctions without involving neighboring compounds regardless of the kinship link, if any. This intermingling of neighbors into the segments of the agnatic infrastructure of the village - the chiefly clan-is achieved along many avenues: religious alliances, marriage, and settlement history. But they would not become so involved unless they were each linked to different segments of agnates who themselves, as agnatic kinsmen, were already snooping into each other's affairs.

The question of why these agnates of the chiefly clan were so concerned about each other can be approached on two levels. (1) As the farmers see it, agnates are sacrificing to some of the same ancestors, competing to gain the life-souls (ni) under the control of those ancestors for their own patriline (Zahan 1960: 347, Henry 1910: 56). For the agnates in the chiefly clan there is also the ni loose in nature, nyama, with which their ancestor, the first settler, developed a special relation when he made his first sacrifice to the nyama of the bush he came to clear. Delafosse describes the dangers of this relation with a non-ancestral life-force as follows:

> For the same motive, the nia (nya) of a parcel of ground, not having to busy itself with vivifying a being which does not move, which has no dia (ja) and which, contrary to animals and plants, is subject neither to death nor to the vicissitudes of life, enjoys an exterieur force and an independence comparable only to those of the nia of the most distant ancestors and occupies, at the side of these, a privileged position in the scale of divinities. (1931: 223).



Occupational specialists who deal with the nyama life-force on a permanent basis, blacksmiths, woodworkers, singers and bards, and leather workers, are confined to endogamous castes called nyamakala. Hunters and farmers who have more fleeting contacts with uncontrolled nyama, learn the necessary sacrifices and magic (Cissé 1964), but can still marry women who are ignorant of them. Nevertheless, the chiefly clan has a collective responsibility to appease the nyama of the zone that was first dislodged by their ancestor. They are responsible for the sacred forest (da siri tu) which is supposed to "bind (siri) the mouth (da)" of the forces so that they will accept the introduction of fields in the zone and even stimulate the earth to provide them with fertility.[15] (2) From the point of view taken in this analysis, where I am trying to understand the productivity of this savanna agricultural system, one would say that the bamana co-operative strategy fosters this jealousy between agnates. The farmer recognizes that his present harvest as well as the harvests of his heirs depend on the willing assistance of neighbors particularly if his line has not been rewarded with many laboring children. The most helpful neighbors are also those who are more interested in cultivating such sources of willing assistance for themselves and their descendants than they are in measuring labor given against labor received in any particular year. If his agnates

[15]See footnote 6 above. I will be returning to a further discussion of the relation of these ideas on ni life and nyama vibrations to bamana agricultural organization in subsequent chapters. There is already a rich literature on these ideas (see references in footnote 6 plus Zahan 1960 and Cissé 1972) but nowhere are they related to the dominant real-world activity of their bearers: farming.

fail him with this assistance, who else will not? Therefore, the farmer is particularly attentive to any signs that his closest agnates are losing interest in sharing the same economic fate. This jealous concern is most intense within the du compound where the pooling of agnatic labor is total, and where compound splitting could considerably reduce the security of some of its component segments overnight. Nevertheless, in so far as this concern is a concern for patrilineal descendants, agnates feel they have a right to survey more distant collaterals. This surveillance takes many forms from sorcery to passive neglect.[16] But a basic ideological referrent for this surveillance is the idea that their life energy (ni) comes from their ancestors; and to the degree that that is a common ancestor, their respective life energies depend on the extent to which that ancestor is appeased, through sacrifices and proper kinship behavior, by each of the descendants. The ubiquity of the chiefly clan throughout the village ensures that this intense interagnatic concern is widespread through many occasions in village social life.

Wards

Now I will turn to a more precise examination of two avenues along which the fates of Buare agnates got so closely bound up with non-Buare in their wards and village. In the next chapter, I will

[16]Dukolomba's men rarely gossiped about their rivals and enemies, agnatic or otherwise. See Zahan 1963 on the material importance given to speech in Bambara ideology.



look at a third route along which residentially-based social networks have been made more dense: marriage.

Where Buare compounds (such as #11, 12, 13, and 26) are not found in the same ward (sokala) as the compounds of their closest agnates (see map of village: Figure II), it usually means that religious differences, that is, conversions to Islam, have intervened during the history of their settlement and resettlement. That religious differences could have such an impact betrays not so much the fervor of Islamic worship in Dukolomba as the dangers of abandoning ancestor worship given the continuing emphasis on the reproduction of descendants in the village economy. The abandoned ancestors could hardly be expected to remain neutral; so to spare future descendants from retaliation, the compound vestibule (blon), where ancestral sacrifices were made before conversion, had to be vacated and along with it the old compound and ward.

The youth of Dukolomba are organized into the tonbaw, "big tons", each headed by members of age-set A (see Table I). The division between these two youth associations corresponds to the distribution of those compounds ancestral to each member between the two wards of the old pre-conversion village - now to be found in ruins just to the west of the present habitations (see village map: Figure II).

From one of these wards, Siribala "Siriba's place", over 20 years ago the older brother of #26, who, not unrelatedly, had the most cattle in the village, converted to Islam and moved east to found a new ward, where the village mosque now stands. Over the years

other Muslims flocked to this ward: #28, #36, and #39 from other villages, and, somewhat later, #35, #40 and the Buare lineage segment #s 16-19 from the second ward, Bananikòrò "under the little bana tree", of the old village. To emphasize their break with pagan practices these Muslims did not name their ward after its ancestral founder, but simply called it Wèrèba, "big hamlet".

This early conversion of #26's older brother may explain why the genealogical link between his line and the rest of the Buare has been "forgotten". But his accumulation of cattle appeared equally un-bamana to his agnates, and his flight to the new ward might have been as much to protect these assets from the sabotage of the living as to protect his own children from his ancestral dead. His younger brother, #26, now the elder of this line, has received greater tolerance from his agnatic neighbors. Not only was he not the original culprit, his long-standing Islamic piety lent prestige to the village in the later colonial period when Islam was no longer seen as the religion of the oppressor and therefore many Bamana were hurrying to convert (cf. Chapter II above). Furthermore, some respectable Bamana had begun to use ploughs (cf. Chapter VI) and they needed to borrow #26's oxen for this purpose.

In 1949, shortly after this first flight from Siribala, the four brothers with the same mother (baden) of compound #11 split off from their pagan half brother (faden), #12, and their pagan agnatic cousins, #10, then in the same compound, to practice Islam in a separate ward of their own, Bumunkoro "under the Kapok tree", to the east. Somewhat



later, poverty obliged #12 to follow them, although his paganism and his age, which would have made him compound head, prohibited his rejoining compound #11 entirely. By then the third of the baden brothers in #11 had become the village imam (alimami).

Even with all these reshufflings #26's youths remained in the Siribala tonba and were joined by #36's personnel of the appropriate age even though this compound had settled directly in Wereba. Likewise those who had resettled from Bananikoro, #s 16, 17, 18, 19, 35, and 40 remained in that tonba and were joined by #28 and #39 among the new settlers in Wereba. Today this tonba is known as the Wèrèba ton.

Meanwhile, the pagans back in the old village were having troubles of their own. The group altar, foroba boli, of the village, which was named bugu kono nyana, was coming too exclusively under the control of the expanding Buare clan. Non-Buare (#s 29-33) were gravitating towards a nya altar (cf. Holas 1955) recently introduced from the south. The famous komo society[17] which usually attracted disenfranchised Bamana[18] was off limits in Dukolomba since the bugukòno nyana was fatal to blacksmiths,[19] who usually led the komo society in this part of the Segu hinterland. Actually the komo is more frequently found in tonjòn villages since its universalistic

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[17]See Dieterlen and Cisse 1972 for a recent addition to the voluminous literature on this secret society.

[18]See Trimingham 1959 for this aspect of the komo's history.

[19]These occupational specialists form another nyamakala caste: mamu.

appeal reaches these uprooted citizens more than it does bamana noble men (horonw) (Meillassoux 1968: 53), who are still settled in the lineage and earth cult (da siri) context of their ancestors. In fact none of the bamana villages in the area, except for Bla whose bamana status was questionable in any case (cf. above), had a komo society.

The followers of the nya, led by #30, left their respective wards (#s 29-31 leaving Bananikoro and #s 32-33 leaving Siribala) to found a new ward named Manawèrè after #30, Mana Kulubali, the founder.

They were joined by a pagan Buare, #23, who had had a falling out with his agnates in the bugu kònò nyana group. These agnates, descendants of Bablòn (see Figure III) from Bananikòrò, seeing more Buare in Siribala getting ready to convert to Islam (cf. below), moved to avoid what they anticipated would be a general retribution on the part of the ancestors in the old village.

#20, also a descendant of Bablòn, but seeking to convert himself, left the village entirely, rather than join in this reaffirmation of animist solidarity by his lineage segment, leaving his son #21 behind. #20 is expected to return to claim the chieftainship after the death of #17 (see Table I and Figure III). These descendants of Bablòn (#s 21-25) except for #23, but including his wife #24 and her children, moved with #14 east from Bananikoro to found Bablunda named after the ancestor in bamana fashion. #13, #15, and #37 from Siribala, not being bound by close agnatic ties to the



converting Buare there, joined the Bablòn group in this new pagan ward. #37's older brothers (see Table I), seeking a more serious conversion to Islam, followed #20 out of the village to a hamlet way to the east rather than live in this pagan ward.

It was not until Mali approached Independence (1960) that other Buare from Siribala agreed to convert. They were influenced by the yeerejèlè, "clean yourself up", propaganda circulating at the time. Even though #4 and #5 remained as pagans, the entire lineage segment, #s 1-9, moved together a few hundred meters to the southeast of Siribala where they could still use a new well which they had just dug for the old ward. At this time #s 1-6 were still in a single compound, and #s 7-9 were united under Chief XV. These Buare had already been abandoned in 1946 by two pagan families who moved west to Dawariwèrè, and later by a converted relative of #33 and #34 who had moved to an eastern hamlet (wèrè) with #20, and #37's brothers. The last group had been discouraged not only by the paganism of their close agnates but also by the creation in 1948 of a Dukolomba forest reserve by the colonial administration. These compounds lost some of their best ancestral farming land to this forêt classée, as it was called. Another Jara family held out, however, moving with its Buare neighbors and #38 from Siribala to the new ward, hoping that some of this land, maybe even its own, would be returned to the villagers for farming. In 1958 and again in 1966 some of this southerly land was returned by the Service des eaux et forêts responsible for the reserve, but

since none of this particular family's ancestral lands fell in the sections returned (these were close to the village and therefore all owned by Buare), the family head moved south of the Bani in a huff.[20]

By this time #10 had long been abandoned by close agnates #11 with #12 following after. #10 therefore followed the somewhat less close agnates #s 1-9 to their new location. The descendants (#33, #34) of a slave of the Siribala Buare were also gone by this time. #33 had gone to Manawèrè with his fellow Nya cultists. And #34, a Muslim and a misanthropic diviner, went off to start his own ward, Sunsurunnugu, not far from the new Siribala well. With #13 gone to Bablunda with his stranger, whose son was to set up compound #42, with #15, and with #37, whose Muslim brothers had left the village with #20 (cf. above), Siribala was now empty. However, the name was not moved with the majority of Siriba's descendants (#s 1-10) to their new ward. The latter was simply called Sokala, "ward", in all public contexts, not so much in an effort to eschew bamana practices, but in order not to highlight the more embarrassing fact that some of Siriba's descendants (#11, #12) were not there.

This issue of pagan and Muslim agnates living together or separately calls for further comment. While #s 1, 2, 3, and 11 became devout Muslims they did not chase their pagan agnates #s 4, 5 and 12

[20]Since he is no longer in Dukolomba he and his compound have not been given a number. Therefore when his daughters, as well as women from other emigre compounds have married, only DK is written after their clan name (J: Jara) on the genealogy and on Table IV (marriage routes).



respectively, out of their wards. The brothers #3 and #4, however, had to form separate compounds on account of this religious difference. In fact #4 kept up the ancestral sacrifices for the entire Siriba line and his Muslim agnates were quietly grateful to him for doing so. With the conversion of chief XVI in 1970, at the urging of his long since converted sons, leadership in the bugu kònò nyana society and of the da siri earth cult was taken over by the next oldest Buare, #13, who, luckily, was still pagan. As already noted he had moved with the remainder of the bugu kònò nyana group to Bablunda. Those next in line for the chieftainship, #17 and #16, had long since converted, each already having sent away a son to train as marabouts (moriw), one to Sansanding and the other to Bamako.

However, pagans younger than #4 and #13 and without such heavy cult responsibilities could not hold out against the spread of Islam. All of the bamana duguw in the area, except for Kokun, have completely converted. Therefore the residents of Bablunda, even though their Muslim relatives (#20 and #37's brothers) had already abandoned them for a hamlet east of Dufunu, converted, leaving #13 alone with a bamana name. However, these conversions were less than serious, and these Muslims became known as filankafo "torn between the two". When the koredugaw (cf. Zahan 1960) held their vigil at the end of the dry season under the shade tree of #30, these filankafo from Bablunda were present late into the night drinking sorghum beer (dolo).

In Manawèrè, on the other hand, only a few youths in their twenties converted, and only during visits to the Ivory Coast. Yet

they too participated inthe leaping dance and the beer drinking of the koredugaw vigil (cf. Henry 1910). The rest of the animists in Manawèrè remain on various stages of the road towards becoming serious koreduguw (cf. Zahan 1960) and are known as Kafri: proud pagans.

Nevertheless, all the newly circumcised initiates in a ward, whether from pagan or Muslim families, recuperate from their wounds in a group - under a tree for the boys, in an old woman's house for the girls.

Land Inheritance

Despite all these conversions to Islam, the inheritance system has changed very little from the bamana practice to those called for by the Prophet. Women still leave all that they own (musoforo), usually livestock and jewelry, to their daughters, while private male property (jònforo) goes to the sons equally. The reason these inheritance practices have not had to change is that they are not conspicuous. First of all, the Bamana pride themselves on not having to accumulate much moveable property; and what they do have, they try to hide from each other so that it does not affect the egalitarian social relations on which their major economic activities depend. Second, expensive equipment has had very little impact on this agriculture. Land and labor are the most important assets of a bamana farmer and are therefore owned "communally" as part of the corporate



estate of the patrilineal compound.[21] In fact, as I am trying to demonstrate here, keeping labor from being alienated from this corporate estate is as important an economic activity for these peasants as farming itself.

Land, as well, is not open for flexible manipulation even when agronomic efficiency might seem to call for it.

The first clearer of virgin bush and his descendants become the owners (tigiw) of that land (dugukolo), just as the first settler and his descendants become the chiefly clan (dugutigiw) when his settlement reaches village (dugu) size. The first farmer, like the first settler - who is also a first farmer, makes the necessary sacrifices to appease the vital force (nyama) lurking in the untamed bush which he is about to cut. If the crops themselves did not depend on these same natural forces, such sacrifices might be more optional. But they are even unashamedly practiced by devout Muslims, though the Muslims give the nyama vital force more of an evil connotation calling it jinè (genii) or sitani (satan). Each year all of Dukolomba's farmers renewed this original sacrifice in a less elaborate form: they could all be seen carrying a white chicken out to their fields early one morning at the beginning of the farming season.

The descendants of this first sacrificer and clearer share the land for as long as they remain in the same compound (du). When

[21] Monteil (1929) calls the compound estate "communisme familiale", Labouret (1934) refers to a "communauté taisible". This unit as well as its echo, the village, is not disintegrating passively in the face of modern pressures as Gallais (1960) and others would have us believe. I hope to show why here.

the compound splits, the holdings are divided equally regardless of the number of members (dudenw) in each of the offspring compounds. The policy of dividing the land equally between corporate units rather than between living individuals results from the peasants' looking beyond the mere feeding of children to the organization of descendants. When the holdings are split, one of the new compounds could be twice the size of another, but this demographic situation could be reversed in two generations. If the land had been divided according to need when the original compound split up, not only would twice the disproportion appear two generations later as would have been the case had the land been divided equally from the beginning, but the principle of the perpetuity of the compound identity would have been sacrificed as well. Such land is part of the foroba ("big field") compound estate and can only be passed along as such. Compounds function as corporations in the village organization and have more perpetual identities than those of its members. For this to remain so, the compound corporations have to be treated as equal units. The corporateness of one compound depends upon the corporateness of the compounds to which it is juxtaposed. The terminology of Goody (1973: 60-61) is apt here:

> Single activity groups such as dwelling groups or marriage groups can only split completely (fission) never partially (cleavage). For if they are defined upon the basis of that one activity, then when the group subdivides in relation to that activity there can be no more inclusive group based upon the same criterion of eligibility. If on the other hand eligibility is based upon a general principle of association such as unilineal descent or contiguity then internal subdivision may occur at one level of the merging series and identification at the next. Indeed a genealogically defined group such as a lineage subdivides by cleavage every time a birth occurs. The result is a state of segmentation, a merging series. Maximal lineages constantly subdivide throughout their entire generation depth but this genealogical subdivision only becomes significant in the context of particular activities which must be performed by a group based upon one generation depth or, as Fortes calls it, order of segmentation, rather than another. These activity groups are of course subject to fission. For example, if a regular farming party grew too large it would split into two discrete groups, partly because there is an optimum size for these but, more important, because of the demands of reciprocity. For each of the groups is differentiated only in the context of other similar groups and between these groups a number of reciprocal services are carried on. (emphasis mine).



The villagers state that if property were distributed according to the needs of individual members rather than according to the identity of the group, individuals would use that property towards individual (jònforo) ends, and the basis of their security through agriculture would be lost.

If the compound splitting is amicable, caused only by a "full compound", du fara, then the agnates will continue to redistribute usufruct of the best land of the original holding according to need. Ultimate ownership will always rest with the component compound corporations in equal shares. However, if the split has not been so amicable, if the "compound broke", du karila, the compound land is not so willingly divided by the senior party. Thus, among the Buare now in Wereba, #17 gave none of his ancestral land to his older brother's son, #18, whom he felt had impertinently deserted him after he, #17, had "worked so hard" for #18's father. However,

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because of #17's reputation as a witch (subaga), many people were sympathetic to #18. Yet these sympathies had to remain largely verbal because of the structure of the situation.

#18 had to borrow land in the isolated and inferior field spaces of #34, although his ally #16 joined him out there with a peanut field. But #16 himself did not lend #18 land, as he did to #19, for fear of incurring the enmity of #17, the next chief. Neither was #18 engaged in a labor exchange chain during the 1974 weeding season (although this changed in 1975 after #17 had succeded to the chieftaincy). He was admitted to a labor pool with #16 and #19 for the harvest as this labor bottleneck is not as serious, and therefore less conspicuous, than the weeding one. Since #17 also had trouble getting to the outside labor pool during the weeding season, particularly the ton (see Table VI), his sense of having been wronged would only be further aggravated if he saw #18 getting superior assistance at this time. #18's allies showed a great reluctance to have questions concerning patrilineal organization subject to the power plays of factional politics.

However, without wishing to tamper with the orderly inheritance of land and the string of sacrifices used to maintain ritual continuity between the first clearer and the present user, #16 had still been able to remove some land claims from the provenience of #17. Some time ago #19 and #17's older brother, the faden of #19's father (see Figure III), fissioned into separate compounds with the land divided equally between them. Since #19 had no son and heirs, #16



gave him a son. This adopted child, lamòden, is in the E age-set. Upon #19's death, which occured while I was in the field (and has been variously attributed to the sorcery of both #16 and #17), this lamòden (#19E) inherited the holdings of his foster parent. The next farming season he promply returned to his real father's compound bringing these land claims with him. There was talk of such (choice) land being used to sustain #19's widow. If #19 had not had an heir, this land would have reverted to his closest agnate, #17 (#18 was disenfranchised), upon his death. In gaining these land rights, #16 managed to gain on his enemy not by adjusting the patrilineal inheritance system to particular circumstances but by insisting on its literal interpretation.

Although he may rue the loss of these land claims, far be it from #17, an expectant heir to the chieftaincy, to complain about the orderly functioning of the patrilineal inheritance system. Furthermore, as the head of a small compound, his descendants had everything to gain from a system that guaranteed their title to half as much land as their close agnate #16 whose compound is four times as big. (Since #17's and #16's fathers split apart, #17's share of this ancestral land has been divided only once, by his split with #19 - though not, as yet, by his split with #18, see genealogy Figure III). But, #16, with four times as many mouths to feed, also has an interest in letting #17 claim this surfeit of land. With a high rate on infant mortality which devastates some compounds while it leaves others unscathed, some day #16's line could dwindle

in numbers. This newly weak group could have no way of guaranteeing security for their own descendants should they regain their present members, unless their land claims remained intact throughout this period. Thus the weaker group will not leave the village but will remain on hand to pool whatever labor they do have with the stronger group. For their part, the stronger group would rather have this labor than authority over the land which the smaller groups claim but cannot use. It is through borrowing land, for a season at a time (no charge), that its use in structuring the patrilineal order for the reproduction of groups of descendants can be reconciled with more agronomic considerations.

Both the passivity surrounding such a dispute on the one hand, and the right of compound units to divide equally the ancestral holdings, regardless of the numbers in each, on the other, reflect the use of land for the non-agricultural goal of this village economy: the incorporation of children as descendants. In this village economy each compound is a corporation for organizing loyal descendants as much as it is a farming unit; therefore where it may not need all the land inherited at one moment for farming purposes it must maintain the claims on the theory that there should be no limit to the number of descendants which living compound members should seek to reproduce.

These land rights must be respected even though arable land is not particularly scarce, because the patrilineal succession system must appear to function of its own unquestionable logic oblivious of any demographic variations or factional politics. Otherwise, scope



would be left for the development of a big man syndrome, and that which was gained in egalitarian co-operation by the villagers' observance of a reciprocity underscored by agnatic kinship would be lost to agnatic rivalries (fadenya) (also underscored by the same kinship reciprocities) which a more optional egalitarianism could not control.

Tree Tenure

Of the privately owned trees in and around Dukolomba, the baobab (Adansonia Digitata) is the most jealously guarded. This gigantic tree belongs to the man who first plants it. Without his permission only his wives are allowed to pick its leaves. These are used in to sauce (na) after first having been dried and milled into a powder. The baobab also produces a hard fruit, the white lining of which is much appreciated in dège porridge. The farmers say that the baobab does not grow naturally in the Dukolomba area; nevertheless, there are some very old ones growing in the bush around the village. If any of these ancient baobabs in unclaimed, anyone can pick its leaves. But if its branches are pruned to produce more leaves, this pruner becomes the owner.

While there are many baobabs with uncut branches far into the bush, closer to the village pruned trees or recently planted ones, both of which are of easier access than those of a long-branched tree, are rarer. A busy wife may be tempted to snatch a few from one of these nearer trees owned by another compound instead of making

an extra trip to the bush. I saw this sort of act cause whole lineage segments of agnates to convene and remind each other of the history of the tree. But this was only at the end of the dry season when the baobab was finishing its annual cycle of leaf production. The imprudent wife who had not stored some baobab leaf powder might be tempted to steal some of these nearby leaves at the last minute.

Like the mango tree, the baobab is inherited by the compound at large once its original planter, or branch cutter, dies. But if that compound subsequently splits, the tree is usually given to the lineal sons of this original owner.

Most of the mangoes in the village have been planted and cared for by compounds surrounded by other members of their lineage segment. Compound #33 is the only one with more than three (8) mangoes in or around it where the closest agnates are not next door: #34, the closest agnate in this case, is in its isolated ward clear on the other side of the village (cf. above). The lineage segments #s 11-12, #s 16-19, #s 30-31, and #37[22] own 83 of Dukolomba's 98 mangoes. The largest, localized lineage segment, #s 1-6, owns, between themselves, only 7, the remaining 8 mangoes being held, one each, by 8 compounds, or individuals within them, isolated from other agnates. It is easy to explain why the lineage segment, as opposed

[22]When the mangoes were planted this was a larger segment until #37's older agnates emigrated with #20 to a small hamlet to the east- cf. above.



to the isolated compound, invests in a larger mango plantation: on the one hand, it is more likely that members of the lineage segment will remain under the planted tree for at least the better part of its life, several generations, and on the other hand, and this is the way the villagers prefer to explain it, lineage relatives are more likely to chase goats away from the young plantings than non-relatives.

However, it is more difficult to explain, at the same time, why the larger, localized lineage segment, #s 1-6, has not invested in mango trees. But in looking at this case, the other side of lineage relations becomes visible. Because some of the compounds in this group, #s 4-6, are either short-handed or have management difficulties, or both, they are too taken up with more pressing tasks to be able to give any attention to the production of luxury mangoes. Their better organized agnates, in the larger compounds #s 1-3, do not wish to appear too conspicuously better, so they eschew investing in a row of very visible mangoes themselves as well. As the argument develops it will become more clear why this premise of equality is so important, particularly, in the localized lineage segment.

Another important fruit tree in Dukolomba is the shea butter tree (Butyrospermum Parkii) (also called <u>shè</u> in Bambara because it was first described in English by Mungo Park, 1800, who first encountered it in a Mandingo speaking area). This tree sprouts

naturally and can only be said to be cultivated to the extent that it is allowed to grow in cleared field space where most other trees are cut. The fruit that falls from the trees in a field are owned by the field-owner (forotigi), not the land owner (dugukolo tigi). Fruit from trees in fallowing bush areas can be claimed by anyone from the village to which that bush belongs. I will discuss the processing of the shea butter nut, and the women's labor organization that comes with it, in Chapter IX.[23]

Two of the other trees left to grow in field space, the Caicedra (jala) (Khaya Senegalensis) and the ngweni tree (Pterocarpus Crinaceus) are both appreciated for their hard termite resistant wood and their leaves which can be used to strengthen oxen at the end of the dry season, right before ploughing is due to begin and yet when very little livestock pasture is available. The jala is actually planted occasionally but only as a shade tree in the village.

The most important shade tree is the dugalè (Ficus Thonningii) whose branches are carefully pruned to achieve the maximum leaf growth. The more vertical growing branches are cut while the horizontal ones are left to grow out. They are even given upright logs as buttress supports to prevent them from breaking. If properly prepared, a grown dugalè can shade an entire meeting (gwatigi wèlè)

[23]See Ruyssen 1957 for a comprehensive discussion of the botany, economic uses and processing techniques of this tree.



of all family heads (gwatigiw). But such a meeting only takes place under a dugalè tree when it is called by an outsider such as the chef d'arrondissement. A dugalè is owned by its planter (although a woman, preferrably unmarried, is said to have to plant the dugalè cutting if the tree is to prosper) and only used as a hang-out by himself and his allies. A guatigi wèlè just like a tonsigi (ton meeting) has to take place on neutral territory. They are usually held by the market place.

The ngaba (Ficus Platyphylla) is also planted as a shade tree. It requires less care, but also does not have the same shade producing potential as the dugalè.

Shade trees unlike fruit trees are not inherited within the compound. Only the closest allies of the original planter will pass the day (usually making rope, from da jute (Cannibium Hibiscus), or granaries and grass partitions from Andropugon and Cymbopogon straw) with him under his shade tree. In any case, this tree will remain small through much of the lifetime of the original planter. However, upon the death of this owner the whole lineage segment (somaw) or even the whole ward (sokala) will act as if it is as much theirs as it is the owners heirs' or fellow compound members'.

The famed balanzan (Acacia albida) (Dieterlan 1951: 38) which predominates in most fields closer to Segu is virtually absent around Dukolomba (I saw one). The villagers claim that their clay soil is not appropriate for this unusual tree. However, the fact that it was planted by the Segu fama in the fields of villages which

he had assigned to his tonjòn (Ward 1976: 29) may also help to explain its absence in Dukolomba. Of course, as already noted, clay soil pleased the weeding bamana as much as it displeased the non-farming, cattle-holding tonjòn and their maraka, foroba fula, and jula associates, all of whom chose to settle in sandy areas when they could. In fact I rarely saw balanzan in the bamana villages I visited, whereas beginning with the tonjòn villages and forming a halo around Segu itself, almost every field had these trees. But then this difference also corresponded to the boundary between clay and sandier soil areas. Important outposts of Segu power across the Bani, such as Tuna and N'jina, had many of these acacias as well, but they also were on sandy soils.

Land Tenure

All of the compounds are listed on Table II according to the proximity of their major bush field (kungoforo) in the 1974 farming season. This is done to indicate which compounds co-operate in the surveillance of each other's crops. Ward membership is also listed to show where co-operation in guarding this bush field (foroba) parallels ward contiguity and therefore the guarding of the permanently cultivated "house fields" (soforow) which surround these wards.

In the case of both the bush field and the house field patrols, planting times, and crop rotations have to be synchronized. When crops are high, two farmers patrolling adjacent fields at the same time may end up chasing each other, taking the noise of the neighbor

Table II — CROPS AND LAND TENURE

| PRESENT FOROBA | | | | | OLD FOROBA | | | NEW FOROBA | | | MISC. SPACE FIELD | | SOFORO (HOUSEFIELD) | | WARD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| compounds | former cultivator/owner | year begun | major crop | minor crop | owner | crop | adjacent field | owner | crop | adjacent field | owner | crop | owner | crop | |
| 36 | fa | 1974 | S | P,E | fa | P | | | | | | | | | Wèrèba |
| 32 | 17's fa | 1974 | BS | P | DF | M,P | | | | | | | 23 | | Manawèrè |
| 38 | 2 | 1974 | S | P | 2 | M,P,P | | | | 1 | | | 37,13,fa | S,C | Sokala |
| 5 | Siriba/fa | 1966 | M | | | | | Siriba | S,P E | 36 | | | fa | S,C | Sokala |
| 1 | Siriba/fa | 1966 | M | | | | | " | AS,P | 36 | | | 1 | S,C | Sokala |
| 3 | fa | 1966 | M | E | DF | P | | | | | | | fa | S,C | Sokala |
| 4 | 2 | 1966 | M | | | | | 4 | S,P,E | | | | | | Sokala |
| 2 | fa 1/3 14's | 1966 | M | AS,P,F | | | | | | | 21 | | fa | S,C | Sokala |
| 17 | kòròke | 1966 | M | F | 26's guest | S,P | | | | | | | fa | S,C | Wèrèba |
| 11 | Siriba/fa | 1966 | M | | fa | F | | fa | S,E | 6, 27 | Bablòn IX | | Bablòn IX | M,C,P | Bumunkòrò |
| 12 | | 1966 | M | | ADJUNCT TO ABOVE | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30 | 23 | 1966 | M | F | DF | | | jara (absent) | S P,E | | | | 31 | | Manawèrè |
| 8 | jara (absent) | 1966 | M | BS | | | | | | | XV | | XV | BS,M,C | Sokala |
| 31 | jap (unclaimed) | 1967 | M | | 22 | E | | | | | XV | | fa | M | Manawèrè |
| 7 | mòkè | 1966 | M | | | | | | | | moke | P,S | fa,6 | S,C | Sokala |
| 43 | 2 | 1966 | M | | | | | | | | | | | | Bablunda |
| 9 | fakòròke XV | 1966 | M | | | | | 35 | S | 6 | ba | P,F | fakòròke XV | S | Sokala |
| 39 | famusofa | 1966 | M | | | | | 36 | S | 36 | 36 | P,F | famusofa | M,C | Wèrèba |
| 28 | fa | 1966 | M | P | XV | S | | | | | | | fa | S,C | Wèrèba |
| 42 | 13 | 1966 | M | | 2 | F | | | | | | | fa | M,C,E | Bablunda |
| 24 | 23's kòròke | 1966 | M | P | | | | | | | | | | | Bablunda |
| 23 | fa | 1966 | M | P,E,F | | | | | | | | | fa | S | Manawèrè |
| 16 | kòròke | 1966 | M | | | | | 34 | S,P | | | | fa | S | Wèrèba |
| 26 | fa | 1966 | M | P | | | | fa | S,E | 27 11' | 15 | F | fa | S,C | Wèrèba |
| 13 | BWtigi | 1977 | S | E | fa | P,F | 8 | | | | | | fa | M,C | Bablunda |
| 29 | kòròke | 1974 | S | | IX | P,F,E | | | | | | | IX | BS | Manawèrè |
| 27 | 11 | 1974 | S | | | | | MZH; baromusocè | P | 7 | E | | MZH | M,C | Wèrèba |
| 40 | 26 | 1974 | S | P,E | | | | | | | | | 15's fa | S,C | Wèrèba |
| 41 | 17's guest | 1974 | S | E | 28 | P,F | | | | | | | 23 | M,C | Bablunda |
| 10 | fa | 1974 | S | E | fa | P,F | | | | | | | fa | S,C | Sokala |
| 15 | fa | 1974 | S | E | fa | P | | | | | | | fa | M | Bablunda |
| 19 | 16 | 1974 | S | | fa | F | | | | | | | fa | S,C | Wèrèba |
| 35 | BW | 1974 | S | E | fa | M,P | (suraforo) 5,15,14,28 | | | 27 | | F | fa,jan (unclaimed) | | Wèrèba |
| 21 | fa(20) | 1974 | S | | 2 | | | | | | | | fa(20) | S,C | Bablunda |
| 25 | Bablòn IX | 1974 | BS | | fa | P,F | | | | fa | | | fa | S | Bablunda |
| 22 | fa | 1974 | S | P,E | fa | M,P | 37 | | | | | | fa | S,C | Bablunda |
| 37 | fa | 1974 | S | E | fa(jan) | P,F | 22 | | | | | | fa | M,C | Bablunda |
| 14 | fa | 1974 | S | | fa | | 2 | | | | | | fa | M,C | Bablunda |
| 6 | XV | 1974 | S | P,E | fa | | | | | 13 | | F | fa | S | Sokala |
| 34 | fa | 1969 | M | BS,P | fa | | | | | | | | fa | BS,C | Susurunsugu |
| 33 | fa | 1969 | M | S,P | fa | | | | | | | | fa | M,C | Bablunda |
| 18 | 34 | 1973 | M | BS,P | 2 | | | | | 34 | | | XV | BS,C | Wèrèba |

* compounds listed acc. to contiguity of foroba
— signifies break in contiguity
fa: father
mòkè: grandfather
Kòrìkà: older brother
maso: wife

CROPS: S: sorghum F: fonio C: maize
M: millet P: peanuts E: earthnuts
AS: American sorghum BS: black sheath sorghum

for that of a monkey, wart-hog[24] or cow. Since one individual can patrol more than one bush field, if the others are contiguous, seeds planted at the same time can be patrolled for birds at the same time. If planted at different times, twice as much patrolling would have to be done.

Sorghum, millet and peanuts (the major crops) each attract their own types of bird and monkey pests at different stages in each of their growing cycles. Thus if any given field area forms a patchwork of these crop varieties, or even if the patchwork is only made of the same crop at different stages in its growing cycle, a greater proportion of the surrounding fauna will be attracted into the field at any given time. Certain species of animals will destroy crops of a species or growth stage that does not interest them on their way to crop stands that do. If there is one ripe peanut in a peanut field a monkey will be drawn (by the smell or the passing of the yellow peanut flowers?) into that field on account of it. But, once there, he may pull up whole sections of unripe peanuts looking for the edible one. If the whole field were ripe at once and left unguarded, this monkey would eat its fill from the first three or four uprooted plants and then leave. Furthermore, even when the field is being guarded, if millet and sorghum have been planted next to the peanuts, monkeys or wart-hogs can hide in the tall grain undetected by the passing patrol. In fact wart-hogs

[24]These are becoming more prevalent with the increase in conversions to Islam, which proscribes the eating of this pork.



will not come to a peanut field unless there is cover nearby. After the harvest, when the grain is spread out on a threshing ground cleared in the middle of the harvested field, wart-hogs will not approach this vulnerable food. This unprotected grain still receives twenty-four hour surveillance, however, because by threshing time goats and sheep are allowed to run free in the day, and herds of cattle are pastured nearby during the night. The dangers of combining crop stands are said to be so great that even if a fallen seed of last year's sorghum sprouts in this year's millet field it is weeded out. Sorghum, at certain stages, attracts birds that molest millet but who would not descend on the field unless the sorghum was there. Likewise, at a later stage in the growing cycle, other species of birds are attracted to the millet and they damage the ripe, hanging sorghum heads as they pass - if, that is, a farmer has been foolish enough to plant sorghum nearby. Monkeys like to suck the sweetness of sorghum stalks at a certain stage in its growing cycle; one such sorghum stalk will bring them into a field but they will break off millet stalks and younger or older sorghum stalks to try them on their way - again if the seeding strategy of adjacent field owners has not been co-ordinated in advance.

The farmer, of course, could plant in any pattern he thought would be best for the physiology of the crops if he could give the field perfect twenty-four hour guarding attention. But he cannot, so he must co-ordinate his planting strategy with many of his neighbors.

In view of this need for field guarding co-operation between the managers of contiguous fields, it is interesting to read from Table II exactly which farmers chose to farm side by side. There is considerable room for choice here even though close, agnatically related compounds tend to inherit adjacent field spaces as their share of their common ancestor's land. If this ancestor had cleared four bush field spaces so that each could fallow for at least the ideal twenty years (see section on "crop rotations" below), each descendant compound would normally receive its (equal) share from (equivalent) land in each of the four. Of course, if these close agnates chose not to co-operate in field guarding, they could rotate around to each of these four bush areas at staggered intervals.

But this is never the case. As can be seen from Table II, most of the village's bush fields (foroba) are found in only two aggregate field blocks. Within each of these blocks one could visit almost every field without having to re-enter uncleared bush in going from one to the other.[25] Where a land-owning compound cannot cultivate all of its ancestral holdings within one such block, it is loaned to one of the newer settling "stranger" compounds in the village which might have had difficulty claiming virgin land for itself. While such virgin land is still marginally available, it is a risky undertaking to cultivate a single isolated field surrounded by raw bush. Unless other compounds can be persuaded to join this "stranger" in opening

[25] This is less true for the first year sorghum fields in the second major field block listed (Table II ).



up a new field area, he most likely will not go it alone, trying to claim land for his descendants in this manner. This is because he can always borrow better land, for this reason already claimed and farmed, and which will be surrounded by other fields from land-owning members of the chiefly clan (dugu tigiw) and non-chiefly, earlier settlers (siginyògòn few "those who sit together"[26]). All descendants of settlers (#s 27, 36, 39, 43) who arrived after the old village had begun to be abandoned are called "strangers" (dunanw), except for #28 whose ancestors were in the now displaced chiefly clan of Bwala, the village next door to the north. The "stranger" can expect his descendants to continue to have access to decent borrowed farming space as long as he maintains good relations with those who own such land.

These good relations grow not only from high grain yields but also a willing pooling of the stranger's labor such that the corporate land-owning compounds can continue to function even through demographically lean periods of their history. If these weak land-owning compounds were allowed to peter out, the strangers would not get the land in any case. It would revert to the close agnatic compound that will already have this amount of land for itself. These land gainers would thereby have a greater concentration of power with which to impose more stringent borrowing conditions on the "strangers".

[26] Gallais (1967) emphasizes the co-operative relations between these two groups in discussing agriculture and land tenure in a Bambara village in the Interior Delta, northeast of Segu.

Therefore the latter have an important commitment to the viability of the weaker land-owning compounds; they a vested interest in the agnatic links of the latter. The spread of these agnatic ties ensures a spread of egalitarianism in the village by which these newcomers can only stand to gain.

Of course, a village in which land control is concentrated in the hands of fewer compounds may appear a less attractice place for a "stranger" to settle in. Such a village thereby loses a valuable addition to its collective labor pool.

Nevertheless, it is not always the smaller and weaker land-owning compounds which loan land to "strangers" or the more recently arrived settlers (siginyògònfew). Table II shows that these newcomers borrowed land from such sizable compounds as #s 2, 8, 11, 13, 16, 26, and 34 and that four of these, #s 2, 8, 11, and 13, turned around and borrowed from weaker compounds themselves. This is done so that these large compounds can have their larger foroba in one contiguous space even if their own holdings do not permit it. In addition there is an understanding that the lending of good field space conveniently located relative to the other holdings or borrowings of the borrower can replicate itself in a more crucial exchange of labor during the weeding bottleneck period (compare Table II with Figure IV on these labor-exchange networks).

This rearrangement of the inherited land tenure plan through borrowing protects it, and the patrilineal succession system it is



based on, both from demographic variations and the year to year adjustments needed to co-ordinate field guarding strategy with neighboring field owners. But it is not only in order to discourage predators that both a single field and groups of neighboring fields are placed on the same growing cycles. There are other management constraints imposed by the social relations through which field owners can most effectively mobilize labor. To understand how these social conditions affect field management, I first must take a closer look at the crop rotation practices used in Dukolomba.

Crop Rotations

The house fields (soforow) are recharged with household refuse, particularly goat and sheep manure, so that they can be permanently cultivated. After the harvest and threshing when are no crops in the fields, the three village cattle herds are corralled for the night in certain of these house fields - usually those of compound heads owning cattle in the herd. On account of this manuring, these fields are sufficiently fertile to support both maize and sorghum (see Table II). Often within the house field space of any given compound the maize and some of the sorghum (there is always more sorghum)[27] alternate position from year to year. When the bush field foroba of that compound is in sorghum, it may want to cultivate millet in its house field since one of the Bambara staple dishes,

[27] A maize plant which is not rained upon within one week after germination will be lost. Such week-long droughts are not uncommon during the seeding season (July) - see Appendix I on rainfall.

porridge (dège), is preferably made with millet. However, it can only switch the main crop of the house field if neighboring house field owners are willing to go along and switch theirs. Otherwise, the bird threat, magnified by the sorghum-millet combination, would become too much for both crops. As can be seen from Table II, the residents of the Bablunda ward all agreed to grow millet in their house fields in 1974. It can also be seen in the Table that most of their bushfields were in sorghum that year.

Between the house fields and the nearest bush fields runs a band of space given over to women's private fields (muso forow). These are usually the concern of older women who have been replaced in the foroba by daughters-in-law. However, by 1974 the drought had temporarily arrested the fruit production of the shea butter nut tree, thus depriving many of these younger wives of much of their private income. Processing the shea butter nut for its soap and oil content is totally a female concern, performed both physically and economically outside of the compound. Therefore, husbands and compound heads were less critical of younger women who cleared a musoforo in 1974.

In villages, with fewer of what are known as bamana characteristics, that is in villages where the leading citizens are more interested in Islam and in commerce, women are not required to join the men in farming the foroba bush field. They are urged to stay at home as this is seen to confer prestige upon the family. However, often



less devout than their husbands, these women usually spend all day in their muso forow - some of which are even further into the bush than their husbands' foroba bush field. In such cases, however, the wife is entirely responsible for purchasing the condiments (nafenw) for the sauce (na) (see Chapter IX). This is the major weekly expense in all of these peasant households, and the quality of the sauce (na) is often one of the only ways one can detect wealth (nafolo) differences between compounds. For this reason wealth is called (nafolo) after na(sauce) and a wealthy person is a nafolotigi. As already noted for the case of mango trees, conspicuous consumption is eschewed as it does not improve the farmer's authority with his neighbors. Sauce quality is less conspicuous and therefore considered a surer sign of real wealth differences.

The bush field foroba rotation ideally includes a fallow of twenty years, but in actuality this comes out closer to sixteen. Since a new field is always cleared about five years into the eight year cultivation cycle of the old one, five bush field sites are needed if each one is to get the ideal twenty year fallow. But most land-owning compounds rotate their field, ideally in cadence with neighbors in a field block group, between four sites, cutting down on the fallowing period for each one.

After being cleared, hopefully not far from several other fields being cleared at the same time, a bush field is planted in sorghum (Sorghum Vulgaris). If the ground has had a satisfactory fallow,

and if no neighboring fields are switching over to millet, sorghum can be grown for a second year. The seeds of the two varieties of sorghum which predominate on the fields of this village, "red sorghum" (kenigè bilèn) and "black sheath" sorghum (munyèfin), are mixed, however, with the emphasis going either to one or the other. Kenigèbilèn can ripen as much as a month sooner than munyèfin, so the latter is emphasized where labor constraints restrict a prompt harvesting of the former. Kenigèba, "big sorghum", the slowest but the most productive variety available here, has not been planted since the drought. A very fast variety, american-nyòni ("little american grain") has come into prominence since the drought, but it is grown in separate stands where it can be given special attention by bird watchers as its grains ripen before the worst of the bird menace has gone south with the rains, or off to other grasses in seed.

The foroba sorghum seed is mixed with "nisbe" cow peas (shò) (Vigna Sinensis) which grow as a ground-covering, weed-blocking vine beneath the sorghum stalks. While it is known that this cow pea legume "reinforces" the soil (fixes nitrogen) for the sorghum, the proportion of cow peas mixed in with the grain seed has been declining since the drought. The farmers say that if there is a gap in the early rains, the cow pea vine and the sorghum stalk sprouting out of the same mound compete too heavily for moisture such that neither succeeds. Even in 1974, when the rains were adequate for producing a satisfactory grain harvest, these vines produced no cow peas. In such cases they still have a residual value as dry season livestock



fodder (used particularly for donkeys).

Each year more field space is cleared around the edge of this initial sorghum field. Thus the cultivated area of the new foroba is expanded as the yields of the old foroba, long since thrown over to millet, are diminishing. After this central portion of the new field has done its maximum two years in sorghum, the whole field is sown in bullrush millet (sannyò), the only Pennisetum species (Spicatum) cultivated here. Even the newly cleared areas adjacent to the old sorghum patches are seeded in millet, in spite of the fact that such fertile soil is wasted on millet, which they say does worse if there is too much humus in the soil. However, the homogeneity of the crop space has to be maintained.

Of course, if a compound divided up its foroba between several locales, then many compounds could bring their sorghum to the fresh ground, through field borrowing if necessary, such that it could all be used for the cereal crop which prefers it. This would mean that the entire area would have to be cleared in one year, but these farmers have the entire dry season from threshing (January) to hoeing (June) to clear fields (see Chapter VI). Furthermore with no more bush between each of these little sorghum fields, pests could be controlled more easily. As it stands sorghum forobaw are nearby islands in the bush waiting to be brought together by the fifth or sixth year of each field in a continuous stand of millet. Nevertheless, there are organizational reasons why each compound seeks to have a single

main foroba that I will describe presently.

Almost all the millet (sannyò) sown in Dukolomba in 1974 was the boboni three to four month variety. Before the drought, a slower five to six month sannyòba was sown, but in 1974 only one, non-Muslim, compound (#23) featured it in its foroba. A very fast, two to three month variety, shuna, is also available, but Dukolomba had never been made desperate enough by the drought to risk its use. However, some newer neighboring tonjòn villages, with their more commercially oriented compounds and slimmer co-operative labor structures, as to be expected, had smaller grain surpluses when the famine hit. These farmers could not risk another dried out harvest in 1974. They therefore planted some shuna. But the rains came heavier in 1974 (see Appendix I) keeping the birds from going south later into the year, so that the shuna ripened to find many of its bird pests still in the area. Even the shuna stands of the most diligent field guarders were devastated. Once again old villages like Dukolomba were reconfirmed in the wisdom of their conservative ways.

As the bush foroba becomes established - that is, about the time it moves from sorghum to millet - the compound wives start seeding okra (gwàn) bushes around its edge. This okra is added to the sauce for the main Bambara dish, to. Within the field two varieties of da jute (Hibiscus Cannabinus) are seeded with the first year of millet. They are cut with the harvest every year and allowed to grow from the same spot the following year. One of these, dajan, is used by the men to



make rope; the other, da kumun, bears a pod which is used by the women in their sauces.

A steady crop of millet is grown for six or even seven years before odd corners of this depleted foroba are thrown over to fonio (Digitaria Exilis) or peanuts (Arachide Hypogea). This aging foroba land can also be lent to household heads for personal (jònforo), "night field" (suraforo) space. As already noted these private male, "night" fields are discouraged almost as much as are "night people", subaga i.e. witches. They are called "night fields" to emphasize the fact that the juniors farming them belonged in the compound communal foroba field during the day.

By the time that the foroba has gone over from sorghum into millet (it is to be hoped that neighboring fields have made the transition in the same year), one corner of the field, which may have already supported two years of sorghum and one or more years of millet, is turned over to Bambara earthnuts, called tiga nguru (Voandzeia Subterreanea), and/or peanuts (mantiga). In subsequent years these legume patches are moved to other remote corners of the millet foroba, always on the edge. The area vacated by these legumes is returned to millet, for the duration of the foroba cycle. The improvement in soil fertility thereby achieved is fully recognized by the farmer. The question to be taken up at this point is why this rotation practice is not used more extensively such that all cereal grain field space would get a year or two of legumes during the course of the cultivation

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cycle. To answer this question, the process of crop production must be looked at in conjunction with that of farmer production.

The Politics of Crop Rotations

The farmers admit that where millet succedes peanuts in a rotation it does better, other things being equal, but this is not their juctification for flanking their foroba with a legume patch. Rather they say that it is easier to see to these secondary crops when one does not have to walk as far to get to them; peanuts are not worth walking any great distance in order to tend to them. This reasoning conflicts somewhat with their rationalization of mono-cropping an unbroken millet stand as a defense against crop pests. Admittedly, they confine their legume patch to the outskirts of the foroba, but even there it could attract monkeys closer to vulnerable millet.

This non-linear reasoning only indicates that the real issue lies elsewhere. Whatever agronomic question was asked, the peasants would insist that if there was "strength" (fanga) left in the soil it belonged to millet. Whenever I mentioned the peanuts on unspent ground in the mid-career foroba, they always referred me to the peanut fields along side the fonio patches on abandoned or near-abandoned foroba as a counter example. Actually these latter predominate (see Table II); and, they add, if their son was back from the Ivory Coast or if their back did not hurt etc., then they would not have had to place their peanut patch nearby in an ongoing foroba. Then they argue that



even if closer, these lazy man's peanut patches are more difficult to guard since one cannot see the monkeys for all the millet, unless one stays in the corner peanut field itself. They always conclude this sort of discussion by reminding me that if it were not for the mounting head tax they would not have to raise so much cash and therefore would not need to be so distracted by peanuts at all. No adult villager is said to have died of starvation during the drought; the one who did die then is said to have eaten too many peanuts - implying that he should have invested in grain rather than peanut surpluses.

Peanuts are a reliable source of ready cash, and some peanut fields surpassed a hectare in size (see yield, Table VI); yet their cultivation is not discussed with any enthusiasm by these farmers. Thus in evaluating both the agronomic and the marketing aspects of their cropping practices, one must move beyond strictly agronomic or marketing considerations. I am describing this village economy as one suspended between crop production and descendant reproduction in order to facilitate the transdisciplinary evaluation necessary for its understanding.

The field guarding advantages of having an uninterrupted, uniform stand of millet cannot completely explain their reluctance to inter-crop with a nitrogen-fixing legume. Theoretically, three bush foroba could be maintained simultaneously, synchronized with the timing and location of other compound foroba such that the field guarding advantages of the monofield system would not be lost. On each of these

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fields, at the same time as neighboring fields, peanuts could completely replace sorghum or millet every two years. The next two years of these cereal crops would gain the nitrogen-fixing reinforcement of the peanuts. In any given year there would be two grain fields and one peanut field. If even one-third of the total bush field space was too much for the peanuts and Bambara eart nuts required, fonio (a food crop) could be added alongside the peanuts. Fonio is also said to "strengthen" the succeeding crop, and, as a low grass, it would not impede the surveillance of the peanuts. This three-field rotation system would enable the same amount of land to be cultivated longer, that is for more than eight years, thereby giving the fallowing land a longer rest. In this savanna zone, longer cultivation on the same site does not significantly encourage the weed menace as is the case on swidden fields further to the south in the forest zone.[28] In Dukolomba, weeds are equally a threat from the beginning to the end of a field's life. In fact, they say that the weeds are worse in the early life of a field when the soil is more fertile; the opposite is true for a forest swidden where the overhanging trees block out weed growth in the fallow, that is until they are cut for a field. Once a field is open there, weeds can begin to recolonize the space. But for this to happen, weed seeds have to be blown or carried in from the adjacent bush. On Dukolomba's savanna

[28] See Conklin (1957) on weeding older swiddens in a rain forest zone.



land, given the farmer's field rotation strategy, the longer a field is cultivated, the less of the surrounding area will be bush. It too will be brought into the farmer's, or his neighbor's, expanding foroba. Therefore it will be more and more difficult for weed seeds to get into the older field.

Neither would spreading out the village field blocks between a minimum of three areas constitute a handicap (in that more bush would intersect the aggregate field space). Even under the monofield system, all the village forobaw are not in one field block (see Table II). First of all there is not enough good land in one contiguous area, and, secondly, the village as a whole has to spread its risk between microecological zones with different crops (note rainfall variability between villages in Appendix I).

However, there is one technological drawback which can be imagined for this three-field rotation plan. Time would be spent moving laborers from one of these fields to the other. The compound labor force could conceivably be split into three in order to tend each of these fields without any daytime labor time being lost moving laborers between them. Then three different sets of management leadership might develop and the unity of the compound might come into question. If it split, then each component faction would be back with one field each. But at this point the organizational structure of the compound farming unit could no longer respond to the most technologically efficacious practice. One or the other would have to go. Here, I am trying to explain why the compound farming unit has not gone.

There is universal agreement that a united labor force does more work than the sum of its parts. But this is not the only reason for not splitting the compound labor force, or its field space for that matter. The single compound foroba bush field is more than just a site for growing crops. It is the spatial embodiment of the unity of the compound farming unit and of the logic of the patrilineal descent system which defines its membership. Members of the same compound describe their relation to each other not by saying that they have the same ancestor or that they live together but rather by saying "we farm together" or "there is one field between us". Long after walls separate "brothers" concessions within a single compound, and long after multiple eating hearths (gwaw) supercede the single gwa which is supposed to be synonomous with a single compound, the single foroba remains inviolate. Those male private fields which begin to be cultivated when households in a compound begin taking their meals from separate hearths are not called jònforow, "slave fields" - the name for all private property (see Chapter V) - although people admit that this is their correct name. Rather they are called suraforow "night fields", referring to the limited amount of evening time which a male compound junior should devote to such a field. In Dukolomba, these fields are virtually non-existent. They are invariably the prelude to compound splitting and eschewed for this reason. The only compound with such fields in 1974, the Maraka fin in #35, are now (1976) split up, much to everyone's relief: if the suraforo-tigiw did not split up, other juniors might be encouraged to displace



some of their labor time from the compound foroba to production for a private field, arguing that they were not thereby dooming their compound to fragmentation. But for many of the former members of compound #35, total dependence upon the small granary of a nuclear family is now a sobering proposition.

Although foroba means, literally, "big field", it also signifies the corporate estate of the du compound or any other property owning collective. In fact, in Bambara classification systems the name (tògò) for a higher order category is its foroba togo whereas the lower order subcatefories have jònforo tògò names (see Chapter V).

Such is the view on social relationships of these bamana peasants, that the agnates in the compound cannot be considered bound to each other in a effective way unless they do something productive together. And if the agnates in a compound cannot be kept together, there would be less reason for defining patrilineal relations, in terms of ancestors further back into the past, with more distant agnates. If agnate solidarity within the compound was weak, ties within the lineage which give the ward some cohesivenese would be that much weaker, and the agnatic-like egalitarian relations within the age-sets that much harder to sustain. And if agnatic ties then had less meaning in the present, there would consequently be less of a tendency to project patrilineal responsibilities into the future. The single big foroba of the compound unit becomes the initial, irreducible building block, the physical paradigm of kin-based, egalitarian solidarity upon which so many extra-compound relations are established.

To be sure, if a single big foroba, which must be monocropped, proves expedient for field guarding purposes, then just the structure of the situation encourages the production of food surpluses with which to feed these future patrilineal responsiblities. If there can only be one foroba and if it must be monocropped there is no way it can be turned over to a cash crop and still be able to attract the same laborers. Laborers are interested in providing for their immediate dependents, particularly for those descendants who will be expected and who are organized, to provide for them when they themselves become dependent. If cash were an important part of the production objectives of these laborers, they could have that more easily and more reliably in the Ivory Coast.

Thus it is not only the field guarding advantages of the larger field which sustain its use. Even if this sort of field managemant system were more effective in produoing food surpluses than the three-field system proposed above, this is not its most important function. The fact that it brings agnates together to produce food surpluses is more important than an optimal yield, should these prove inconsistent. And cash cropping, being more removed from the continuity of the desecent line than food production, cannot draw on the same commitment of ancestors to descendants in mobilizing the necessary agricultural labor force. The important question then is not just how much food can be agronomically produced, although the continuity of the group depends on there being a certain surplus here, but how can



the agnates be kept together, not only at the compound farming level but at the ward and village co-operative labor level? Once together, not only will the agnates produce enough food, but also their mutual relations vis à vis ancestors and descendants ensures that, as long as they define each other as agnates, in order to become ancestors by reproducing descendants, they will continue to do so.

Not only is the entire foroba considered equally the responsibility and the reward of the productive members of the compound, even its farming sections (chikètigè) are designed to accomodate the entire compound labor team at once. These chikètigè sections are measured according to what the forobatigi thinks his compound can weed in three days. The size of these sections therefore provides a precise indication of the compound's view of its own production potential. In no way is responsibility for these different field sections allocated between different compound members. They farm together on one at a time, measuring their progress in three day intervals.

## Conclusion

So far I have suggested that an understanding of the descent system is essential for an evaluation of this savanna agricultural system. Descent relations co-ordinate domestic activities, marriage, and the distribution of children at the same time as they define membership and stimulate performance in the farming unit. The continuity of the localized descent group membership depends, of course,

on a successful farming performance. But, given that the productive members of the community can support themselves and, often, many others, but not as many others as in the farming village, with greater ease elsewhere, that farming performance does not depend solely on the stimulus of subsistence need. It is rather dependent upon the perpetuity of descent group relations, of the corporate groups. It is with the perpetuity of these groups in mind, that the Dukolomba farmer views new forms of agricultural technology and organization. Without these groups, he could not guarantee that his children remain farmers at all, however exciting the new methods for increasing yield that become available to him.



## CHAPTER IV: KINSHIP, MARRIAGE AND JOKING

### Introduction

In this and the following chapter I will be looking at the named relations through which the Bambara peasants of Dukolomba arrange their productive and reproductive activities. I have already suggested how the permanence of the village and the reproduction of its population into continuous descent lines has been achieved through the incorporation of its laborers into farming organizations disciplined by kin ties rather than by the prospect of a material reward or sanction. It is kinship descendants, and age mate neighbors that these laborers have been reliably kept in the compound fields in spite of the more attractive material possiblities which have elsewhere presented themselves from time to time.

The wise elder may clearly see the folly of a momentary gain achieved at the expense of the family's and the descent line's subsistence (and survival) in any given year. But the question I must now raise in discussing this peasant village system is how does the adventurous youth, the laborer himself, see it?

In the last chapter I described how the kin, descent, compound, and community orientation of these laborers has produced a peasantry united in villages and committed to farming a single major field supporting a single subsistence crop.[1] But I have yet to describe

[1] Either sorghum of millet, in any given year (see Chapter III). In newer (tonjòn) villages, manioc, with its reduced labor requirements, takes some of the farmer's subsistence input away from sorghum and millet. In older (bamana) villages such as Dukolomba this is not the case. But then, manioc does better in the sandier soils which are usually found around newer villages (see Chapter II).

how these laborers acquire such an orientation. After all, a visible material gain can easily appear more real to a callow youth than an elder's admonition to keep filling an already bulging granary. Nevertheless, there is clearly something about the way this village life is lived, or seen as it is lived, that induces a youth to equate the welfare of his ancestors (living and even dead) with his own.

In this chapter, I will describe how a simple deference to seniority in many social contexts and cultural classification systems leads the peasant to defer to organization of his descent grouping before considering the accumulation of personal assets. This interest in the timing of the reproduction of the personnel in one's own and allied production units can be historically linked to the relative importance of manual labor in this farming economy. But this does not mean that the actors have crude labor on their minds as they work out their kinship norms. Yet it is the operation of these norms and the structure of the cultural categories they are built on that affect the subsequent organization and disposition of this labor.

In the next chapter, I will examine how these peasants' classifications of kin relations (the subject of this chapter) pervades their conceptualizations of labor itself. Labor is not ideologically dissociated from its source, the kin group. This may not be the only reason why most of Dukolomba's youths do not physically dissociate their labor from their compound, but it does add a sense of logical necessity or aesthetic order to their loyalty when a visible material justification is lacking.



Age Ranking and Egalitarianism

Within the village, the thorough application of a seniority principle through a wide variety of status relations and social identity classification systems[2] forestalls the development of hierarchy along any other lines. Thus, a certain egalitarianism grows out of this age-ranking. First, age-ranking prevents the materially wealthy from gaining authority before their time and, therefore, from being able to consolidate their position. And second, where age differences are minimal, as with twins or age-mates, or irrelevant to the operation corporate groups, as with cross-cousins, spouse's younger kin, and grandparents (see Table III on Joking), there is a status void which encourages egalitarian relations. However, within corporate groups, where there is more authority to depend on age-ranking, age differences are more precisely defined. But as these differences get smaller, the egalitarian inversion of the age ranking system reasserts itself, and the corporate group finds itself in contradictory straits.

Seniority

In the last chapter I reviewed the ways in which the timing of land settlement and clearing affected its tenure. This same principle of priority or seniority governs the succession to certain offices within the village. The senior member of the senior generation of the descendants of the village founder is its chief. As far as the compound

[2] I follow Goodenough 1965 in my use of "status" and "social identity".

headship is concerned only absolute age is relevant: if the (freed) son of the former compound head's slave is older than the oldest consanguinial descendant of that compound head, the slave descendant becomes the new compound head (cf. compound #8).

As long as land and offices are allocated according to principles of relentless seniority, differences in ability and assets cannot mar their distribution. A strict observance of this system of allocation fosters a certain equality of access to land and office among those not ranked by a seniority principle.

Thus, as noted in the last chapter, between the descendant compounds of a single ancestral clearer of unclaimed bush equal land portions are allocated. The need or farming ability of any one of these compounds is not taken into account when the division is made. Nevertheless, between these descendants and those of a later settler there is an inequality of access to quality land that is traceable to the prior settlement of the first group's ancestor.

Likewise, for those agnates lined up for a compound or village office, there is an inequality of eligibility determined by one's absolute seniority or one's seniority in a senior generation, when these are different. Yet, between partners not eligible for the same office, particularly non-agnatic relatives, such as cross-cousins, or not nearby in the order of succession, such as members of alternate generations, deference to age is suspended or even ritually flaunted in one's conduct.



The Age-Sets

In Dukolomba, and in Bamana villages generally, the common denominator of these seniority principles, relative age, influences the conduct of countless social relations. Differences in the timing of clearing and settlement by the ancestors of different lineage segments affect primarily land tenure. Generational differences become particularly strategic for the sole question of succession to chiefly office. But absolute age differences affect a wide range of right and duty relationships besides ordering the succession to the rights of compound headship. Therefore ages have to be known for individuals from groups for which one does not know the exact genealogy. These age differences become known and established through the village-wide age-set system.

By means of the age-sets, authority relations are defined between members of different lineage segments irrespective of the identity or settlement history of that segment. Some authority functions are thereby taken away from the maximal lineage and invested in the village at large. Yet as this is done through the age-set system, the seniority principles used in organizing all lineage units are not undermined. In fact, with the job of organizing a wider group partially usurped from the maximal lineage by the village with its age-sets, the minimal lineage, with seniority organizing principles intact, is able to usurp other functions of the larger lineage to form a more corporate compound.[3]

[3] In the Haut-Vallée of the Niger, upstream from Bamako, maximal lineages retain greater authority, villages are more stratified, and compounds and ton youth groups are smaller (Leynaud 1960). Each of these differences is related to the others. Significantly, these farmers are called Malinke rather than Bamana (cf. Chapter II).

It is hard to say whether the village is able to supersede the maximal lineage as regional organizal unit because of the dominant role of the corporate compound in farm management, or whether the compound is able to forestall further segmentation within its own ranks because the village has already usurped authority from the maximal lineage. If stronger, the segmentary tendencies of the maximal lineage might stimulate lineal fissioning right on down the line to within the compound.

As outlined in Chapter II, the state's monopoly on warfare took away one of the more important functions of the maximal lineage elsewhere in West Africa.[4] Successful farming became their margin of security and, for this, extra-lineage labor was as easily mobilized as lineage labor in co-operation, when necessary.

Extra-compound co-operative farming is primarily performed by the corporate youth association (ton) built up out of the younger age-sets. Like the corporate compound, it performs its major function as a farming unit (Leynaud 1966) even to the point of cultivating its own field on occasion. However, it is most frequently found performing co-operative labor in the various compound fields (Ganay 1960) - see Chapters VI and VII.

Person (1968: 62) makes a perceptive statement about the role of the ton youth association in Mande community organization:

[4]See Sahlins 1961 on the advantages of the segmentary lineage system for precolonial warfare in West Africa. Among the one-time warrior Tallensi lineage position could be more important than absolute age in the community. Succession to the nuclear lineage headship, which depended upon senior generation rather than absolute age, could give one man elder status where his chronological contemporary could remain a "child" (Fortes 1945: 225).



> Le tõ (ton) joue un role important dans la police du village mais le fait essentiel est qu'il cristallise l'esprit de solidarité forge par les Kari (age-sets). Il équilibre ainsi efficacement le séparatisme des lignages, mais il menace dans une certaine mesure l'autorité des anciens. Dans tout le monde manding, il jouit en effet d'une véritable autonomie qui le distingue nettement des organisations analogues des Sénufo ou des Bobo qui sont etroitement controlées par la gérontocratie du village.

But his conclusion overlooks the implications of his own statement that the solidarity of the ton is "forged" out of the age-sets. Membership in the age-sets is defined, after all, by a gerontocratic seniority principle. Person fails to distinguish between elders, strictly defined and lineage elders, where genealogical position and generation bring some young men into this status category just as they keep some older ones out.[5] Nevertheless, his confusion does illustrate how age ranking can, by virtue of generalized application, spread egalitarian relations between lineages however much its application created (temporary) hierarchy in the lineage segment where its function in ordering production and reproduction is unassailable. Where production and reproduction are not ordered, that is outside of the lineage, age-ranking, thus removed from material process, cannot develop

[5]As with the Tallensi case (Fortes 1945) cited above.

hierarchical relations. In fact, it does the opposite: it prevents those with a material advantage, if they are younger, from forming a hierarchy.

To the degree that a lineage elder cannot guarantee the material fate of his segment relative to that of parallel segments (see Chapter II), he loses authority over his lineage juniors. Where direct material production and reproduction are not involved, village elders, through the age-set system, usurp authority functions from lineage elders. The village-wide age-set system removes some gerontocratic authority from the elders of maximal lineage in particular. The role of the maximal lineage in incorporating larger groupings can be more easily assumed by a residential unit like the ward or the village. But where productive and reproductive organization cannot be taken out of lineage control, the village-wide emphasis on age seniority serves to reinforce age-ranked authority in that minimal lineage segment which is the compound domestic unit.

The Compound

The compound head (dutigi or gwatigi) of course, cannot violate the norms and aspirations of the compound juniors (dudenw) in his management decisions.[6] It is easy enough for these juniors to leave the compound, or the village if necessary, if they are unhappy with

[6] En fait, il (dutigi) ne decide rien sans l'accord de ses "frères" classificatiores et il redoute les critiques des autres fa ("fathers") dont les filles sont marrées chez lui. Cependant, vis-à-vis de l'exterieur c'est lui la seule personne majeure et responsable. Il incarne le droit de citoyennete collectif du lu (du) et lui seul est appelé à participer a la vie publique". (Person 1968: 56).



his rule. The reasons why this so rarely happened in Bakolomba forms, after all, the theme of this study. The solidarity of the compound depends on economic conditions more than on the power of the compound head. However, the authority garnered by the compound head as a result of the compound's consensual unity gives this office an important status. The compound juniors remained equal in relation to it because its attainment was ascribed by age and not achieved. However, unlike the equality generated out of the imperative nature of the age-set system, the equality of compound juniors relative to the compound head was only temporary. One day one of them would be compound head, while the other "brothers" remained as compound juniors. This break in equal relations was most pronounced where "brothers" were closest in age. That is "brothers" of separate mothers called feden.

Fadenya

The egalitarian relations between compound juniors, and, by extension, between ward agnates, does not take the light joking air that they can between cross-cousins, spouse's younger kin, older kin's spouses, and age-mates. Agnates are only temporarily equal as one day one of them will be compound head (dutigi) while the others remain compound juniors (dudenw). The imminence of this status change becomes particularly tense because, if not handled carefully, a compound junior close in age to the new compound head may feel slighted in some way. This would lead him to take his own house (so) off to form a new compound (du). This development is most likely to happen if this man and his wives are already eating some of their meals at a separate hearth (gwa). Compound #35 was divided into separate hearths during the period of field work (1974-1975) and by 1976 they had split into three distinct compounds. We can recall from the last chapter how such compound splintering can impede farming production.

As elsewhere in Africa, the lines of compound fission[1] are particularly brittle between "brothers" with different mothers or different grandmothers, depending on the size of the compound in question. These half-brothers are called faden, literally "children (den) of the father (fa)" but meaning "children of only the father". Having different mothers means more than just having different matrilateral ties, different

[7] I continue to follow Goody's (1958: 60) distinction between cleavage within and fission between action groups.



emotional attachments associated with inturance, and a different mother's brother.[8] It means that there was a structural possibility that these two half-brothers could have been born at the same time. Although this rarely happens (even a difference of a few minutes between deliveries will be remembered), the fact that it could happen introduces an element of uncertainty and danger into the social relations between half-brothers. As noted above, the non-negotiable criteria of relative age is used to define status relationships in many key activities within the village. The degree of boundary separation maintained in one's relations with a twin in Bambara society (cf. Imperato 1977: 118ff.) is also a reflection of the importance of relative age there.

Immediately on their birth these faden agnates define points of cleavage in their minimal lineage. Irrespective of their age, their existence influences the future fissioning of the farming minimal lineage and the ward-based maximal lineage. For example, compound #11, while it deserted its closer agnates (#s 10 and 12) because of religious differences (see preceding chapter), was able to leave its Muslim agnates, compound #s 7, 8, and 9, behind in the Sokala ward because they had different grandmothers (see Genealogy, Figure III). Thus the position of males in defining the structure of the patrilineal scheme gives them a certain power relative to males who fall elsewhere in that scheme. That power can be conceived of as transcending the criteria of their

[8] Mother's brother/sister's son relationships among these Bambara are of the same order as those analyzed by Goody (1959) for neighboring West African groups.

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relative ages. Among agnates, only full brothers do not fall into different positions on the patrilineal scheme.

Furthermore, within the compound, all compound juniors are equal, regardless of their relative ages, in their relation to the father (fa) compound head (dutigi). Relative to him they are all fadenw or dudenw not older or younger brothers. The unity of the compound is partially defined by the special relation of the holder of the office of compound headship with his other agnates. The authority tied to this office somewhat pales the senior-junior distinction that guides status relations in most other contexts. For most matters of importance in village affairs a meeting (gwatigi wèlè) of all compound heads is held in the market place. Older and younger compound heads participate as equals in this reunion.

Since it is faden who are equal with respect to the compound head in this case, senior-junior status distinctions between them can be blurred on occasion. They have equal claims on the corporate property (foroba) of that compound. This blurring of age differences heightens tension amongst them. Senior faden watch junior faden for signs of presumption. For their part, junior faden vigilently survey seniors of their own generation, who precede them in line for the compound headship, for signs that on the premise of that office they might be exercising more authority than the mere fact of their seniority might entitle them to. The senior faden who some day wishes to head a large compound diplomatically tries to forestall his juniors from harboring any such suspicion.



Thus, the faden status is volatile even in the way in which it is classified. It does not fall entirely into either of the safe categories of social relationship: those where seniority or joking are exclusively dominant. Among full brothers, baden "children (dew) of the mother (ba)", the definition of status relationships[9] according to relative age is uncompromised by any other considerations. Therefore relations between these full brothers are stable, even familiar. The Bambara word for familiarity, badenya, consists merely of the suffix that substantiates nouns, -ya, being added to baden. The degrees of joking relationship will be explored later in this chapter. I will only anticipate that discussion by noting that uninhibited joking is safest with cross-cousins.

Now, faden half-brother ties fall between these two safe categories of relationship. In that sense it is marginal and therefore, in the logic of a Mary Douglas (1966), dangerous. Nevertheless, as I will proceed to show, the vitality of the village farming groups is based on the tensions between faden. This is one of the reasons why descent relations are of such importance to these savanna farmers.

Faden do not cease to be faden once they have split into separate compounds. All agnates had the same father (fa) at one point in time; therefore they are all faden. Some of the tensions between faden in the compound carry over to relations between other faden in the village.

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[9]Following Goodenough (1965), I refer to a status relationship as a right-and-duty relationship.

It has been noted how age distinctions between faden within the compound are somewhat blurred by their equal relation to the fa in theoffice of the compound head and to the compound property. Outside of the compound faden agnates of larger lineage segments have equal statuses with respect to land tenure. They all have equal claims on the land cleared by their common ancestor. As long as one faden, young or old, heads a compound, large or small, he claims the same amount of land as his agnates (see preceding chapter). But this link with the land carries this fadenw-sort of equality beyond the patrilineage. As the spiritual implications of land distribution still overshadow its (growing) economic scarcity, neighbors share an equal relationship with the spirits of the land they are farming. Because the disposition of these spirits is linked to the behavior of the original cultivator, neighboring farmers partake of the tensions already charging relations between the faden descendants of that pioneer. These sort of tensions between non-agnatic neighbors who, unlike faden, had no joint interests in a common lineage to control their passions might be more disruptive of community life if their age-base of status differences were not reinforced at a village-wide level by the age-sets.

The Bambara suffix used to substantiate nouns, -ya, is added to faden to produce a word, fadenya, to describe these volatile egalitarian relations. Fadenya means jealousy or rivalry whether or not the rivals are agnates. In his 1913 Bambara lexicon, Musa Travélé adds to his definition of fadenya: "elle est la base de beaucoup d'inimitiés et de



procès". In the epigram (above) I already cited Dieterlen's (1951: 12) recounting of fadenya's early arrival in the Bambara creation myth.

The fadenya relation is so widespread in the village for two reasons. First, fissioning and segmentation are the hazardous consequences of basing the security and continuity of one's group on patrilineal descent (Horton 1971). Second, for all the vague and volatile aspects of this relation, the charged atmosphere it produces is useful in maintaining the interest and motivation of the village labor force. The performance of the compound farming group is stimulated by the fadenya-related competition between its agnates. This competition depends on there being an element of uncertainty in the age-based status ranking of individuals. Likewise compound heads can improve their reputations relative to each other, irrespective of any age criteria, if their economic performances can be compared. This can be done as long as grain yield, not cash crops, is the measure of farming success. A superior reputation can be linked to a full granary where fadenya blurs the link between reputation and seniority. However, this economic competition might disrupt co-operation between non-agnates in the village if they were not reminded of their age-related statuses by the village-wide age-sets. Within the age-sets this fadenya competition can continue to flourish. But these rivals, in their capacity as age-mates, control no property with which they might be able to capitalize on their advantage.[10] Furthermore, their egalitarianism

[10] When it was suggested that the age-set organization, the ton, divide its farming earnings among its members so that each could purchase agricultural equipment, it was answered that such a practice would destroy the ton. Compound heads would refuse to send their sons to the ton if the outcome of ton labor were to take the same form as the outcome of compound labor.

in as much as it is not connected with a joint interest in a corporate descent group, enables them to partake of other symmetrical social relations, besides fadenya, extant in the village. Age-mates can also joke.

Joking

Like fadenya, joking is an egalitarian status relationship where age distinctions are ignored. Like fadenya rivals, joking partners find themselves in an equal status position in the midst of the surrounding, age-ranked hierarchy. However, joking partners and fadenya rivals can never be the same except outside of the kinship context altogether. That is in the village-wide age-sets.

As the attached scaling of joking relationships shows (Table III)[11], cross cousins and younger affines are permitted the greatest liberties with each other. Though not all cross cousins and not all of spouse's younger kin, or, reciprocally, older "sibling's" spouses, (both nimaw) of the opposite sex are eligible as potential spouses, joking between them focuses upon the possiblity of marriage. The joking chart (Table III) shows how the flirtatious nima tilon ceases with actual marriage: a husband who flirts with his wife is said to risk her thinking that he is merely hiding a greater affection for her co-wife. Women, for their part, ridicule those in their ranks who talk to their husbands too much. In these cases of joking between cross cousins and nimaw in-laws, it is ego's and alter's membership in exogamous agnatic groupings between which marriage is possible which underlies the permissiveness. In fact, bearers

[11] See Goodenough 1965 for a similar use of the Guttman Scale in evaluating status relationships.

Table V - JOKING RELATIONSHIPS

Guttman Scale (cf. Goudenough 1965)

Degree of Joking with opposite sex

A = Encouraged
B = Approved
C = Tolerated
D = Forbidden

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | sunguru nyiri saja - propose sexual relations | furu saja - propose marriage | kelelilon - physically attack | dalatilon - fierce insult | ko ja bò saja - sarcasm | kungokuno saja - in the bush | folimusaja - insult with or before greeting | tò mò dun saja - insult lit. "eat the ripe name" | dogò jo saja - put in their place | siruyé wotatilon - criticise w/opp. sex | dunintèsaja - while eating | jana saja - at festivals w/opposite sex | musobarosaja - at women's conversations | tonbarosaja - at tòn conversations | bara saja - at work | nyònurulawsaja - at winnowing (gully) | nyòbogòyòrosaja - at farming | chikesaja - at farming |
| Tulonkelaw | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| tu-nyògòn (kè,muso) AGE-MATES (& their spouses) | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | C | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | B |
| niman (kè,muso): Sp.-KG° | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | B |
| kaneme (kè,muso)XKG° | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | B |
| mo (kè,muso) + modem: G±2 | D | A | A | B | A | A | A | A | A | | A | B | B | B | B | B | B | B |
| tulomasama: G±3 | D | A | A | B | B | A | A | B | B | | C | B | B | B | B | B | B | B |
| nuso + cè: Sp. | C | B | B | B | B | D | D | C | C | | C | B | B | B | B | | B | B |
| beniden: Zc | D | C | C | D | C | A | A | C | C | | C | B | D | B | C | | B | B |
| den: c | D | C | C | D | C | C | C | D | D | | C | C | D | C | C | | C | B |
| dogò (kè,muso)-//KG° | D | C | C | D | C | C | C | C | C | | C | C+ | E | B | C | | C | B |
| joanikòrò: MZc | C- | B | C | D | C | C- | C- | C- | C- | | C | C | D | C | C | | C+ | B |
| bemba: MBW | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | D | D | C | C- | C | D | C | C | C |
| tinemuso: FZ | D | D | D | D | C | D | D | D | D | C | D | C | D | C | C | B | B- | B |
| benkè: MB | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | | D | C | D | C | C | | D | B |
| koro (kè,muso)+//KG° | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | | D | C | D | C | C | | C | B |
| biran (kè,muso) Sp.+KG° | D | D | D | D | D | C- | C- | D | D | | D | C | D | | D | | D | B |
| baromuso: M-Z | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | D | D | D | D | | C- | D | D | B |
| bina: F-B | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | | D | C | D | C | D | | D | B |
| ba: M | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | D | D | D | D | | D | D | D | B |
| bakò: M+Z | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | D | D | D | D | | D | D | D | B |
| fa: F | D | D | D | D | D | C | C | D | D | | D | D | D | | D | | D | B |

Note: These relatives do not engage in jotilon or senankun tilon jokings only members of differ clans do this.

of certain different clan names are permitted a certain form of ritual insult (semankunya, jo tilon) even though there may be no history of marriage between their respective patrilines.

Joking partners can ignore their age differences, since no rights in labor or property pass directly between them. Those affines between whom bridewealth is exchanged (biranw) are carefully distinguished from those affines (nimaw) who can joke. Faden agnates, particularly in so far as they are partners in the compound estate, can never be joking partners. Age-mates, however, although they compete as if they were faden, share no common estate and therefore are eligible as joking partners at the same time.

While marriageability and membership in different agnatic groupings can be seen as permitting or encouraging joking, they are not the criteria by which joking rights are distributed. Genealogically-based kinship terminology is rather ego's guide to his joking partners.

Kinship Terminology

The pervasive seniority principle is not, and need not be, promulgated as an abstract norm. It is inherent in the actors' most fundamental classification of the social identities around their kinship terminology.

Once the Iroquois-type (cf. Scheffler 1971) cross/parallel distinction is recognized in the referential kinship terminology outlined in Table IV , it can be seen how, within the focal categories of this basic structure, these farmers have developed subclass usages where features of particular concern to them are distinguished. Among these is the concern for relative age. In the terms for parallel kinsmen, relative



Table IV - KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY COLLECTED IN DUKOLONBA

| Generation | Kin | Kin's spouses | Spouse's Kin | Spouse's Kin's Spouses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| +4 | tulokorododden | | | |
| +3 | tulomasam | | | |
| +2 | mò (kè, muso) | | | |
| +1 | Parallel: Male, Female; Cross: Male, Female | Parallel: Male, Female; Cross: Male, Female | | |
| 0 | Parallel: Male, Female; Cross: Male, Female | Parallel: Male, Female; Cross: Male, Female | biran (kè, muso) | Parallel: Male, Female; Cross: Male, Female |
| -1 | | | | |
| -2 | | | | |
| -3 | | | | |
| -4 | | | | |

| Generation | Kin | Kin's spouses | Spouse's Kin | Spouse's Kin's Spouses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| +1 | fa (Older[a], Younger) | | | |
| | tò (Older, Younger) | | | |
| | benke/tinemuso | | | |
| | fa (Older[b], Younger) | | | |
| | ma (Older, Younger) | | | |
| | benke | | | |
| 0 | | biran (kè, muso) (Older, Younger[c]) | Parallel | Cross |
| | | kaneme (kè, muso) | Cross | |
| | | nima (kè, muso) (Older, Younger[c]) | Parallel | |

| Generation | Kin | Kin's spouses | Spouse's Kin | Spouse's Kin's Spouses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| +1 | den: kòròkè (Older[a]) — baba; dògòkè (Younger) — binakè | | | |
| | den: kòròmuso (Older) — bakòmuso; dògòmuso (Younger) — baromuso | | | |
| | benide (for male ego): kanemekè; kanememuso | | | |
| | birankè: nimakè (Older[b]) — baba; birankè (Younger) — binakè | | | |
| | biranmuso: nimamuso (Older) — mama; biranmuso (Younger) — baromuso | | | |
| 0 | | kanemekè; kanememuso | | |

a Older or younger than the same sex linking relative in this (+1) generation, or than ego in the zero generation.
b The relative age of ego and the kin is relevant here in classifying the latter's spouse; ego's calls his or her own spouse cò (man) or muso (woman) as the case may be; these husband-wife terms can be extended to cover nimaw eligible to become spouses through the levirate (gFW, HBS).
c Age of spouse relative to his or her kin is relevant here.

age is a component of the focal categories in ego's generation and of the subclass terms in the first ascending generation.

A parallel "sibling" must be distinguished as older (kòrò) or younger (dògò/joa) in order to be distinguished as a "sibling" at all. Only when pressed to identify the parallel "sibling" category as a whole will an informant give it a general name which neutralizes the age distinction. However, this name, kòrò-dògò, is merely a combination of the markers for older and younger. We have noted that where faden are jurally equal, because this equality can only be temporary, it produces fadenya tension between them. The fact that the age distinction is never neutralized in the patrilateral parallel sibling terminology attests to this latent importance which it retains among agnates.

Characteristically, where these agnatic fadenya tensions are not so crucial, as between matrilateral parallel "siblings", the age distinction between kòrò and dògò can be neutralized. Even so, the term for the children of two "sisters", joanikòrò, is no more than another combination of the dògò (joa) and kòrò age markers. Significantly, with this higher order term, however, the marker for younger comes first. The fact that this term exists and is frequently used, where no separate lexeme is used to refer to patrilateral parallel "siblings" irrespective of age, reflects the absence of property relations between matrilateral parallel "siblings". In the case of the former, however, age distinctions can only be tenuously suppressed when an equality of jural status favors it, since they will ultimately affect the order of authority over the corporate compound estate. As if the kòrò-dògò distinction were not



enough, specific personal names can be given to signify age rank among faden. These names are non-Muslim, but since the conversion to Islam an attempt has been made to order Muslim names to the same end. The oldest son is called, naturally, Adama.

In other Iroquois-type terminological systems, of course, older and younger parallel "siblings" are also distinguished. However, a more inclusive general category is often more visible than the kòrò-dògò expression I squeezed out of my informants. What is rarer in these Iroquois-type systems is the application of the younger-older distinction in the first ascending generation. As the attached chart shows, the categories for "father" (fa) and "mother" (ba) are extended to all same sex, parallel kin in that generation. Yet subclass terms within these categories which distinguish older from younger "fathers" and "mothers" are almost always used. The use of bina(kǫ̀) to refer to younger "father" and of baro (muso) to refer to younger "mother" is nearly mandatory. When a "mother" older than one's own is to be cited, she is called bakò(muso), i.e. behind (kǫ̀) the mother (ba). As terms of address bina and baro are used for all "fathers" and "mothers" younger than the ranking, that is the oldest, fa or ba in their compound. Often, depending upon the particular compound context, even after an elder fa is dead, the children of his oldest surviving younger brother will still call their father bina. This is one of many ploys by which faden attempt to ideologically limit their latent status differences. If the children of the eldest fa in the compound still call their father bina, the children

(den) of younger faw in the compound, who are more obliged to call this elder fa bina, cannot accuse them of seeking a special status on account of the status of their real father.

Table IV shows how these terms for parallel kin in the first ascending generation are extended to affinal kin types in that generation. Father's "sister's" husband is referred to as an older or younger "father" depending upon his age relative to that of ego's real father. Mother's "sister's" husband is referred to as older or younger "father" depending upon his wife's age relative to mother. Father's "brother's" wives are designated as older or younger relative to mother even though she is not a linking relative. However, father's older "brother's" wife will not be called younger "mother" no matter how young she is. Mother's "brother's" wife is given a special term (bemba) which like the other cross kin categories is never divided up into older and younger subclasses. Reciprocally, spouse's kin in the first ascending generation can be addressed by these same terms, ego calling them as his/her spouse does, even though they are properly referred to by the biran in-law term.

Relative age also affects the distribution of affinal terms in ego's generation. However, unlike the other age-marked terms, these terms are self-reciprocal. In this respect these affinal terms can be seen as transitional between the "sibling" and the cross cousin categories. The association of joking rights with certain of these affinal terms also reveals their identification with cross cousin statuses. Spouse's younger "sibling" and, self-reciprocally, older "sibling's" spouse are called nima (kè, muso)



meaning "lively person". Relations with spouse's older "siblings", and, self-reciprocally, with younger "sibling's" spouse, are more formal: these are biranw.

Affinity and Joking

As Table III's scaling joking relationships shows, where self-reciprocal social identities can be presented more permissive joking behavior is acceptable. The only exception to this is the biran in-law term. Biranw cannot joke since they are involved in an asymmetrical relationship involving the transfer of bridewealth. In fact, as I have indicated, the biran term is rarely used self-reciprocally in practice. Only temporarily inferior wife-takers, younger "sister's" and "daughter's" husband, and in-marrying women with whom avoidance relations have to be maintained, younger "brother's" and "son's" wife, are consistently called biran(kè, muso). The reciprocals of these, spouse's older parallel kin in ego's and in the first ascending generation, are more often called as spouse calls them. I noted this switch for spouse's kin in the first ascending generation; in ego's generation, spouse's older siblings, though referred to as biran(kè, muso), can be called as spouse calls them: koro (kè, muso).

The inferiority of the wife-taker, younger "sister's" and "daughter's" husband, results from his payment of the bridewealth - a sum which usually exceeds the yearly budget of the average compound. Among the abuses to which a groom is subjected at the wedding ceremony, the constant exaction of subsidiary payments by all of the bride's kin in attendance takes the greatest toll. Matrilateral cross cousin marriage, favored if the cousins

are separated by at least two degrees of collaterality, can reproduce this inferiority until women begin to move the other way on this "marriage route" (furu sira). If one compound has no daughters to offer, an agnate can send off a daughter on this marriage route so that the original inferiority can be corrected. Even so, with such cross cousin marriages, spouse's older "siblings", who as cross cousins (kaneme) were former joking partners, become biranw to whom more formal respects (kochè) are due.

Even if temporary, and even if the "marriage route" runs between separate villages, this asymmetrical flow of wealth can be a source of tension. Within a single village, where marriages are being increasingly made, such inequalities in wealth lead to the fear that wealthier compounds might develop a less participatory attitude towards extra-compound work groups. The nima joking relationship, also created by a marriage, can diffuse some of this temporary tension. If the marriage is between cross cousins, certain kaneme joking relations, those between cross cousins younger than the one married, will be sustained. If the marriage is in a new direction, that is where the spouses are not cross cousins at any degree of collaterality, new sets of joking relationships will be created by it.

Nimaw of the opposite sex treat each other as prospective spouses. However, it is only nimaw within the compound, older "brother's" wife and husband's younger "brother", who, through the levirate, could ever end up as spouses. These two, in addition to carrying on a vigorous flirtation,



call each other "husband" and "wife" in anticipation of that day. Other nimaw of the opposite sex, those outside of the compound, even though it is unlikely that they will ever marry (the sororate is not practiced), flirt just as much, though they only call each other nimakè or nimamusu as the case may be.

Because of the prevalence of cross cousin marriage (see Table V on "marriage routes") joking relationships between cross cousins of the opposite sex can also be related to the possibility of marriage. Just like nima joking (nima tilon), cross cousin joking (kaneme tilon) can be created by marriage: children in compounds between which there has been a marriage in the parent generation become "cross cousins". In addition, spouse's kaneme become ego's kaneme, and ego's kaneme's spouses are also kaneme when they are not called nima. Either way, the connection between these two most extreme forms of joking relationship and marriageability is hard to deny (Paulme 1939). But we need Radcliffe-Brown (1952) and then Peters (1972) to remind us how subtle it is.

Besides the case of kaneme's spouse cited above, there are other instances in which the nima affinal connection is linked to cross kin categories. Mother's "brother" is called benkè, but father's other nimakè, father's older "sister's" husband, besides being called fa or bina depending upon his age relative to father (above), can also be called benkè. Reciprocally, the children of a man's nimakè are called beniden, "sister's son", even though wife's younger "brother's" child is classed as a "child"-den, in the referrential scheme.

Same sex nima and kaneme are also permitted great joking liberties (see Table III). This reflects the lack of tension between same generation members of intermarrying groups generally beyond the familiarity enjoyed by potential spouses. Only after the marriage where bridewealth and ritual avoidance intervene - between spouse's older kin and younger kin's spouse - is this same generation playfulness suspended. The chart also shows how a joanikòrò matrilateral parallel "sibling" is permitted more joking liberties than an agnatic "sibling". Again, as with the kaneme tilon and the nima tilon, it is the absence of shared property relations which permits this familiarity. Nevertheless, since joanikòrò do not necessarily come from groups with whom marriage is permitted, joking between them is more restrained than between kaneme and nimaw.

There is also a slightly greater degree of liberty permitted between kaneme than between nimaw. A kaneme cross cousin can be called a voleri. To be called a thief in French is the worst insult permissible in any joking relationship. Possibly because cross cousins are only exceptionally (see girl #16J) found in the same compound, these greater risks can be taken.

Marriage

I have made passing references to the influence of marriage, or the possibility thereof, on dyadic relations between individuals in Dukolomba. But is is difficult to evaluate the impact of standardized patterns of joking or avoidance on the corporateness of farming and residential groupings there until the intermarrying groups are identified.



The rules of exogamy extend to any patrilineal relative, however distant. In two cases in Dukolomba where the exact genealogical connection was no longer remembered (or conveniently forgotten) intraclan marriages have taken place. But this was only in the large Buare clan, and the husband's compounds in these cases, #s 11 and 26, are the most devoutly Muslim in the village. In the case of compound #11, the younger brother (#11u) of the village imam (#11t) has married a Buare from compound #19, headed by an ancient combattant. The Buare, Cèbono, who is said to have been the first to settle the village five generations ago, is their closest common ancestor. In the case of #26's marriage to a woman from compound #18 no common ancestor could be, or would be, named.

Those West Africans who over the centuries have wished to restrict the flow of mobile property to separate groups as bridewealth, have found it convenient that Islam permits this and even closer patrilateral marriage. Fulbe herdowners in this area are particularly fond of parallel cousin marriage as a device for maintaining the genetic integrity, social composition, and size of their herd. If they were rich, no outside group would marry a woman to them without a bridewealth payment comensurate with their assets.

However, all the assets (#26's were considerable, see Appendix III) of the intermarrying Buare in Dukolomba were managed separately by each of their compounds. Compound #s 26 and 11 seem to have broken the bamana exogamic rule more as a boundary mechanism. As the largest and most productive compounds in the village (see Appendix III), at this point in their development cycles, #s 26 and 11 were asserting their independence

from bamana institutions that inextricably linked their fate with that of their neighbors.[12] Thus they eschewed not only those practices specifically proscribed by Islam, sorcery and cult group worship, but also those marriage practices that linked their life-blood, and therefore their vulnerability to witchcraft, with so many of their neighbors. Islam offered them few defenses against localized, kin-based witchcraft and sorcery. A good Muslim could only seek to limit the number of neighboring kin by way of protecting himself. Even so, these intraclan marriages were only two of a dozen or so marriages into compound #s 11 and 26.

All of the other less productive compounds in Dukolomba practice bamana exogamy. There were pious Muslims among them who, nevertheless, appreciated the advantages of exogamic marriages in the village farming context. They were the first generation to pursue the age-old bamana farming strategy with its closely incorporated community of kin without the animist protections against some of the intensities of these relationships. In the next chapter, I will refer to a few of the devices of these bamana Muslims for getting around Islam's proscriptions against practicing sorcery and sacrificing to localized spirit-forces.

Here, I will elaborate on the advantages of exogamy for the coordination of larger farming units. Among the items to be read off of

[12] Later on I will look at the ways these two compounds attempted to isolate themselves from wedding (Chapter VII) and winnowing (Chapter IX) exchange-labor networks.



the enclosed genealogy (Figure III ) are the inter-clan marriages. It can be seen that in the last three generations there are twenty-seven intra-Dukolomba marriages recorded, twenty-five of which are interclan (cf. above). I have given the number of the compound of origin of the spouse in each case - except where that compound has emigrated in its entirety.[13] It is not difficult to see how these intra-village marriages, whether intraclan or inter-clan, create, among those who interact daily, localized nima joking relationships in the allied generation and kaneme joking in the offspring generation. The density of these joking relationships within the village affects the extent to which joking is practised in the age-set. Just as the age-set gains from the intensity of fadenya within it, so it gains in solidarity according to the degree of open joking that its members can engage in. Age-mates can always joke, of course. But when they are also nima affines (older sibling's spouse/spouse's younger sibling) they can joke that much more (see Table III).

Intra-village marriages are not the only way in which the density of nima affinal and kaneme cross-cousin relationships can be increased within the village. Over half of all the in-marrying spouses in Dukolomba originate from three nearby villages: Dofunu (DF), Dingola (DN), and Bwala (BW) - (see Table V). Together with Dukolomba (DK), these villages are called jandugunaani: "four (naani) villages (dugu) of the mud flats

[13] Seven compounds that have emigrated to nearby hamlets still pay their taxes with Dukolomba.

(jan)". In referring to a soil type which predominates in this region, this name is intended to link these villages with the early settlement and clearing of the region (see Chapter II).

Some of the remaining marriages cited on the genealogy have been with a set of seven villages across the Bani River (Banikò) to the south. These marriages have been declining since the lapse of the pre-colonial need for a defensive haven across the river. Nowadays, south of the Bani seems too far to go to retrieve an angry wife, by comparison with the nearby jandugunaani not to mention Dukolomba itself. Nevertheless, these north-south marriages are still advantageous for pooling ecological risks. In rainy years fewer livestock will die to the north; in dry years southern affines will have more food to spare. In good years millet does better in the alluvial clay on the north bank of the Bani, and calabashes, cotton, and hot peppers do better on the sandy soil of the south bank.

Most of the marriages with these neighboring villages have taken place along furusira "marriage routes" between what are called furunyòòronna ("those who marry together"). These are lineage segment that have been exchanging wives for generations. On Table V I have listed the destination and origin of women who have married out of (nanaden) and into (furumuso) Dukolomba in recent memory. That more in-marrying women are listed is merely a bias of the recording technique. Many dead or long-gone out-marrying women are not easily brought back to memory, whereas many dead in-marrying women have left descendants in Dukolomba who remember

Table V - MARRIAGE ROUTES

| Compound # | Out-marrying women (Namadenw) to Jan Dugunaani | to south of Bani River Baninko | to other nearby village | In-marrying women from Jan Dugunaani | from south of Bani River Baninko | from other nearby village |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | K/DF, K/BW | | | T/DK, Ta/DK | | K/To |
| 2 | $^{2}$K/DN, K/DF, D/DF, Ta /DK$^{37}$ | $^{2}$ /TN | K/BAL, D/BLA | D/DF, Ta/DK$^{37}$, J/DK | $^{2}$Ta/BU | D/BLA, Ta/KAT J/FAM, K/FAL |
| 3 | | | | K/DF, K/DN | | Ta/KAT, J/JA |
| 4 | | | Ta/BUG | $^{2}$K/DF | | |
| 5 | | | J/SID | | K/BU | K/To |
| 6 | K/DK$^{36}$, K/DK$^{33}$ | | | K/DF, Ta/BW | | |
| 7 | D/DF, K/ DK$^{36}$ | /KU | | D/DF | J/ZU | J/NG |
| 8 | Ta/DK$^{27}$, K/DK$^{30}$, K/DK$^{28}$, K/DF | | K/To, (S/nicno) | Ta/BW, K/DK$^{30}$ T/DK$^{35}$, K/DK$^{28}$ | S/ZU, K/NS | K/To |
| 9 | K/DF | | | $^{2}$K/DF, K/DK$^{34}$ | | |
| 10 | K/DN | | K/BAL | K/DN, Ta/BW | K/NJ | /KAT, K/Ku |
| 11 | T/DN, K/DF, J/DK | | | K/DF, Ta/DN, $^{2}$K/DF, B/DK$^{19}$, K/DK$^{33}$ K/DN | K/Ku, K/TN | K/To |
| 12 | | | | K/BW | S/2A | |
| 13 | K/DN, K/DF | | J/niani | K/DF | | D/NY, K$^{36}$/DKA |
| 14 | K/DK$^{28}$, B/DK17 | | Ta/KAT, /Sinz | /BN | Da/JE | K/FAL, Ta/KAT K/NR |
| 15 | | | | | | |
| 16 | K/DF, Ta/BW, $^{3}$K/DN, T/DK$^{35}$ | | D/BAB, (nicno) | $^{4}$K/DN, $^{2}$Ta/BW, K/BW, K/DF, K/DK$^{36}$, D/DF | | Ta/To |
| 17 | Ta/DN, J/BU | | K/niani (nicno) | K/DK$^{33}$, K/DF, K/DN, Ta/DN, Ta/BW | T/MJ, S/2A | D/To |
| 18 | K/DK, $^{2}$K/DN, Ta/DN, B/DK$^{26}$ | Ta/BU | S/niani (K/Segu) Ta/KAT, /Sinz | K/DF, Ta/DN | | |
| 19 | Ta/BW, B/DK$^{11}$ | | F GW | D/DK, K/DF | S/2A | |
| 20 | | | | | | |
| 21 | T/DK | | | Ta/DF | | K/BLA |
| 22 | K/DK, K/DN | Ji/TN, /TN, Ta/ZA | J/Sid | Ta/BW | Ji/TN | |
| 23 | D/DF | | | K/DK$^{30}$, D/DF, Ta/DN | | |
| 24 | | /KU, /KO | | | | |
| 25 | | /KU | | | J/KU | Da/TOG |
| 26 | T/DK, $^{3}$K/DF, Ta/DK$^{37}$, D/DK, J/DK, K/DN, T/DN | | K/niani, Ta/ | K/DN, K/DK, B/DK, D/DK, K/DF, Ta/DN, $^{2}$Ta/DK$^{37}$ | | T/SA, Da/NG |
| 27 | T/DK | M/TN | | B/DK$^{26}$ | | |
| 28 | B/DK$^{26}$, B/DK$^{8}$ | | K/TOG | B/DK$^{14}$, B/DK$^{8}$ | J/ZU | /Koka, K/TOG |
| 29 | Ta/BW | | | B/DK$^{8}$, K/DK$^{30}$ | | K/ |
| 30 | J/DK$^{8}$, Ta/DK$^{29}$ | | | B/DK$^{8}$, T/DK$^{35}$, B/DK$^{20}$, J/BW | | |
| 31 | K/DK$^{36}$ | Ta/BU | K/BLA | K/DK$^{33}$ | Ta/BU | |
| 32 | K/DN | | | K/DF, K/DN | | |
| 33 | S/DK, K/DN | | (K/Segu) | K/DN, B/DK$^{6}$ | Fo/TN | Ta/ |
| 34 | K/DN, K/BW, B/DK$^{9}$ | | J/Sid, (NY/Banan-Kòrò) | Ta/BW | | |
| 35 | K/DK$^{30}$, J/DK$^{8}$, K/DF | T/FA | | Ta/BW, K/DK$^{28}$ $^{2}$K/DN, D/DF, To/DK$^{16}$, Ta/DK$^{37}$ | | Ta/FAL, K/BLA, /BUG |
| 36 | T/DF, B/DK$^{13}$ | Ta/TN, J/Ke | | B/DK$^{6}$, B/DK$^{20}$, K/DK$^{31}$, B/DK$^{7}$ | T/FA | /Nyanga Ta/KAT, ta/ |
| 37 | T/DK$^{35}$, B/DK$^{2}$, T/BN | Ta/NJ | | B/DK$^{2}$, K/DN | KW/2A | |
| 38 | S/DK | | S/NY | | | S/NY |
| 39 | | | | J/DK, K/DF | | J/To, Da/NG |
| 40 | Tan/DK | | | | | |
| 41 | | | Si/NG | Levirate | | T/TOG |
| 42 | | | | | | |
| 43 | | | | | | |

Clan Symbols

B: Buare
D: Dembele
Da: Dao
F: Fomba
J: Jara
K: Kulubali
T: Tarawèlè
Ta: Tangara
S: Samake
Ji: Jiro
M: Mariko
To: Togara

Village Symbols

them. Since I did not census women of Dukolomba origin in the surrounding villages, the left side of the table is less complete. But even listing the more recent departures from Dukolomba does reveal the other side of the furusira relationship. Table V shows how almost all of the extra-Dukolomba marriages are with surrounding bamanadugu rather than with tonjondugu. As we have seen, in the latter a different meaning is attached to the reproduction of descendants.

Marriages of direct exchange (fale) are frowned upon not only as a sign of poverty (fantanya), but also because, in the absence of the full bridewealth (which makes for a "weak marriage" kolonafuru), instability in one marriage can undermine the security of the other. Thus the full bridewealth (furusongo) is paid even in the marriage route alliances. Nevertheless, in these latter, more casual terms of payment are permitted because of the likelihood of a woman coming back in the other direction. Since marriage-route ties span the generations, they may begin between compounds and continue between minimal lineage segments. Also if some bridewealth is overdue, one wife-taker may run afoul of his close agnates who want a wife from this shared marriage-route relationship, now stalled by the outstanding debt. In spite of this danger, co-operation in marriage negotiations remains as the only important collective activity exclusive to these lineage segments.

#36, a relative stranger in Dukolomba, with therefore less access to age-old marriage-route preferences, made the following payments and purchases so that his older brother's son (#36G) could marry #7F. To initiate the negotiations a labilali, as this first payment is called,



of 5,000 FM[14] cash and 500 FM worth of kola nuts was given. Next a bolokòfen of 10,800 FM cash, 20 kgs. of millet, cloth (2,500 FM), and a calabash (800 FM) were given. 200 kgs. of millet were given the following year (1974) as part of the same payment. Then, at the beginning of 1975 a selimafo of 18,000 FM cash, sugar (400 FM), parafin (400 FM), pomade (300 FM), soap (150 FM), shoes (750 FM), a bra (750 FM), candy (360 FM), a head cloth (600 FM), silver (1,500 FM), and 2,000 FM traveling expenses while she went to Segu with a government sponsored theatre group. Before this marriage could be scheduled a bolokòdenfana of 2,000 FM, a sumukè of 2,000 FM, a manyèbaara of 3,000 FM, and a furunafolo of 20,000 FM still had to be paid. At the wedding itself (kònyo) the bride's female relatives are permitted to ask for whatever sums they choose as they deposit her trousseau in her husband's compound. This sum can reach as high as 70,000 FM.

These marriage-route bonds are responsible for many of the cross-cousin joking relationships in Dukolomba. If the "sister" and the "daughter" of a man from another village marry into Dukolomba in successive generations, the children of the sister's son and the children of the daughter will both be in Dukolomba and they will be cross-cousins. Even agnates can be cross-cousins through such a matrilateral connection. For example, #11J is #9K's FMBdc as well as his FFFsss; reciprocally, #9K is #11J's MFZsc as well as his FFFsss. #11J's mother and #9K's grandmother are both Kulubali kinswomen from Dufunu. These two are more likely to joke (lightly) than are agnates with no matrilateral cross-kin connection,

[14] The dollar hovers just below 500 Francs Maliens in value, or 5 new French francs.

even when they do not specifically refer to each other as "cross-cousin" (kaneme). There are numerous other examples of this phenomenon which can be found in the genealogy (Figure III ).

Furthermore, when kinswomen "sisters" marry same generation agnates, their children will be called joanikòrò ("older and younger", the term for non-agnatic parallel cousins - cf. above) at the same time as they are kòrò-dògò agnates (faden). As the joking chart (Table IV) indicates, a joani can presume greater joking privileges from another joani, irrespective of age, than a dògò can from a kòrò - or even for that matter, though much less so, a kòrò from a dògò. This joani connection can thus be used to play down kòrò-dògò age distinctions, between all matrilateral and some patrilateral parallel cousins, when egalitarian co-operation is required. When two "sisters" marry non-agnates in Dukolomba, their children will also be joani parallel cousins. The genealogy shows how Buare have shared their outside marriage-route relationships with non-Buare neighbors. For example, Buare in compound #s 6, 8, 10, 16, 17, and 22 have married women from Bwala's (BW) Tangara (clan); #35, the Tarawele (T) Maraka and #34 a Kulubali (K) slave descendant have done the same (see Table V). #31, an animist Kulubali nobleman, has availed himself of the marriage route established by the Buare of compound #2 with the Tangara of Bugula south of the Bani. Thus two clans in the village can be united by blood even though no marriage will have taken place directly between them. When the matrilateral parallel cousin of one group of "brothers" in Dukolomba marries into another group in the village, some of these "brothers" become nima with some of their "sister's" same generation in-laws.



The density of MZc (joani), K'Sp/SpK⁻ (nima), and cross-cousin (kaneme) joking relationships within the village provides an important counterbalance to the fadenya tension between agnates there. This density facilitates the practice of institutionalized joking in the non-kin and non-affinal context of the age-sets.

SENANKUNYA

Within the village, the density of these sister's children (joani), elder kin's spouse/spouse's younger kin (nima), and cross-cousin (kaneme), joking links is dependent on the occurence of certain kinds of marriages. For one, if every Dukolomba male married a woman from a different clan or village there would be no cross-cousins in the village, except as the result of an intra-Dukolomba marriage. Nevertheless, there is one form of joking to which the individual is entitled simply by virtue of his clan name (jamu). The bearers of certain jamu are encouraged to joke with the bearers of certain other jamu even if no marriages had actually occurred between their respective patrilines. These senankunya, sinankunya, or jo tilon relationships, as they are called, are said to have been part of legendary inter-clan co-operation and marriage since the days of the medieval empires (Labouret 1929, Pageard 1958). For a stranger like myself (the dugutigi gave me the jamu of Kulubali) they provided a quick route to familiarity with certain hosts. For the peasant, they are primarily important in fostering community solidarity. In the Segu area, the bearer of one jamu clan name is permitted to insult the bearers of at least one other jamu. The following senankun relationships predominated

in and around Dukolomba:

blacksmiths (nuwu) — the Fulbe — Tangara — Kulubali — Keita
Dembele — Jara — Tarawele — Buare
Samake

Like all joking relationships these are self-reciprocal. It can be seen from this diagram, that just between the Kulubali and the Buare alone a considerable amount of joking was possible in Dukolomba. In most of the older villages visited, the jamu of the chiefly clan was senankun with that of a majority of the other early settlers (siginyè-gònfèw).[15]

Age-Set Joking

It is the symmetrical reciprocity of these kin-based joking relationships which makes them so compatible with the age-set organization. All of these well-developed, kin-based systems of joking relationship play an important part in integrating faden into a wider community of non-agnates. We have already explored the historical significance of this integration in the peasant community. It is primarily as a member of an age-set that these non-agnatic joking partners co-operate in production (cf. the ton). The age-set is where fadenya jealousies and joking take place within the same relationship. Even age-mate faden are expected to joke. The transcendance of kin-based, social identities is greatly emphasized in the ideology of the age-set organization. While

[15] Gallais (1960, 1967) has noted the same phenomena.



using a patterned relationship primarily associated with the kinship or affinal setting, the age-set constitutes an alternative to kin-based forms of allegiance. In so far as it replicates so much of what the peasant is familiar with as a kinsmen, he feels fewer qualms about participating in its activities; this uninhibited participation enhances the strength of the age-set organization. Joking is only one example of a kin relationship which fortifies the age-set for its transcendance of kinship - a necessary step for checking fissioning tendencies within the nucleated village.

As can be seen from the joking chart (Table XI), after cross-cousin joking (kaneme tilon) and $K^{+}Sp./Sp.K^{-}$ joking (nima tilon), the next most joking license is enjoyed between age-mates in tunyògòn tilon. As with the other two joking partners, age-mates address and refer to each other using the same social identity term for each other: tunyògòn (kè, musò). This symmetrical reciprocity favored the use of joking in the age-mate relationship.

But age-mates, unlike other joking partners, engage in productive labor together, particularly in the threshing group and the ton youth groups (Chapter VI). As we have seen, responsibility for farming production can lead to fadenya-like jealousies. These jealousies could only be associated with joking license where they were not capable of affecting the distribution of produce and property. In so far as fadenya among laborers within the compound can lead to compound splitting, joking familiarity is out of place there. But farming performed by the age-mates

is never for the age-mates, so that the attempts of one to show off with rapid weeding are forgotten by the others as soon as the dust settles.

In the literature on Mande society, age-sets are usually identified as filan-bolo, "two hands". In Dukolomba, this name is known but rarely used. They explain that the analogy between age-mates and twins, "filani", implied by this name can lead to trouble, since twins, after all, are born at different times. To call age-mates twins would put thoughts as to who was really older in the back of their minds, thus jeopardizing the primary source of strength in the age-set: equality. Therefore, they prefer to use the name tu nyògòn, which means "born (tu) together (nyògòn)". In other villages, I found this name used to the extent that the age-sets played an important role in agricultural labor. In newer villages, where commercial relations had taken a greater hold, and nearer to the towns, where wage-labor in agriculture was more frequent, participation in the age-sets was found to be more casual and optional. They tended to have more of a festive role and were more often referred to as filan-bolo. In the towns, if they were big enough, they were called filan-ton (Meillassoux 1968).

The age-set memberships for Dukolomba have been listed on Table I. Each age-ranked set is given a letter, and the compound numbers of its members are listed. The letter for each individual's age-set is listed in his place on the genealogy.

While I was still learning the membership of these sets, I found it difficult to identify the boundaries of certain adjacent age-sets in a



work situation. It was explained to me that if attention was drawn to differences between age-sets performing the exact same task, this work would be "spoilt". Where there were divisions between tasks within a work effort, of course, these were apportioned to the age sets with the oldest getting the least onerous. Then, the age-boundaries used to divide up the different tasks were freely pointed out to me. But there were never enough of these divisions so that each age set could assume a separate task.

Table I shows that the number of calendar years contained within any given age-set varies. Usually the membership in an age-set is closed off after three years even if there have not been many births to fill it. The stipulation that a Buare has to be in every age-set can usually be met in every year of births. The antiquity of the age-set which serves as tontigiw (A as of 1974) also varies from time to time and village to village depending upon demographic conditions. Most of the older villages committed to subsistence farming will attempt to maintain a ton with at least 90 members even if an age-set whose members are over 40 years old has to remain in it and serving as tontigiw (if it was the oldest age-set still in the ton).

Married women were also supposed to be organized into age-sets according to the date of their marriage into the village. As these age-sets were not assigned any laboring task specific to themselves, their married women members tended to ignore their boundaries even when they co-operated outside of their compounds in winnowing grain, pounding shea butter nuts, or cooking for a co-operative threshing seance. Only at

initiation rites or on other festive occasions would married female age-mates band together to sing, dance, make a sacrifice or instruct younger women.

Uninitiated children, of course, are divided into age-sets from birth, but as they do no co-ordinated labor activities in their capacity as members of an age-set, I have not listed them on Table I. The name for uncircumcised males, bila kòrò, "left to age", reflects their subsidiary role in compound and village life. They are no longer called by this passive name after circumcision; they become cèwmisèn, "minor men" or kamalenw, "adolescents". Terms designating other age grade ranks are not linked to a rite of passage in this manner. They can vary with the context, particularly in a joking relationship (cf. fo'i mu saja on Table III) where old men are called "adolescents", kamalenw, and the latter, "old men", ce kòrò baw. Marriage for a woman is the only rite of passage, besides circumcision (for a boy), that is associated with a change in age grade designation. Unmarried women, unexcised and excised, (I have only listed the latter on Table I) are called m'pogotigiw: "owners of the genital covering m'pogo cloth". After marriage women are called finitigiw, "owners of a full fini cloth", even though the m'pogo is abandoned for fini at least by the time of excision.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored the meaning of relative age, or seniority, to Dukolomba's farmers. It is a principle for differentiating status relations that is generated from their reliance on patrilineal



descent in defining the membership of their productive and reproductive groupings. Descent is primarily an organization for reproduction. But it is important for production because the latter is so uncertain in this savanna context. When the rainfall does not fail them, a predatory state could loot their gains or a volatile market place could entice away their labor. Only an organization oriented towards reproduction could be assured of a continuity of membership and perpetuity of purpose over time. But it is part of the structure of a patrilineal descent organization for its component groupings to segment and fission as they are reproduced. Such centrifugal tendencies are not appropriate to the political and ecological conditions of perpetuating groups on the Segu savanna. Scattered hamlets have difficulty raising their taxes, and small production groups have difficulty overcoming the labor bottlenecks of savanna farming.

In those villages that have endured in this setting, patrilineal descent is encrusted in a dense network of affinal, then matrilateral ties where joking (saja) rather than respect (kocè) is the norm. This network has not only held in check the fissioning tensions of the patrilineal reproductive groups, it has redirected these tensions into production. But this joking network cannot be responsible for production itself. Such communalism would be irrelevant to these farmers' dominant struggle for reproducing their group. In this struggle production only transcends mere subsistence in importance to the degree that its performance encourages a corporate solidarity in descent groupings, enabling them to

reproduce a membership in this Segu environment. This happens where farming itself becomes a focus of lineage rivalry, an arena where agnates come together to surveil each other day after day.

If these groups are to stay together where the genealogy would separate them, relations of respect have to be detached from that genealogy. The relative age and generation of ancestors fades in importance before the emphasis on the relative age of contemporaries. Only where genealogy intervenes to articulate the relations of reproduction, as between faden agnates in the domestic group, does status confusion arise. Through the age-set system, age rankings are fixed for all citizens irrespective of their genealogical connection. By confirming[16] one principle of patrilineal descent-seniority, this system confines another - segmentation.

I have tried to show how this transformation is mediated by the negation of age-ranked respect in the joking system. To the extent that a mockery is made of age-ranking in the daily lives of everyone through kin-based joking licenses, and to the extent that it is needed to maintain the corporateness of patrilineal descent groups, the

[16] In discussing norms taken out of the adult context by a Welsh youth group for its own organizational purposes, Peters (1972: 158) states that they are thereby "endowed with the fiction of externality".

> "Thus endowed, (they) can carry the responsiblities of the moral problems arising out of the relationships among adults. A semblance of externality is illusory for . . . it is nothing more than the common consensus of those among whom the problems arise".



seniority principle underlying their hierarchy and organization takes refuge outside of the kinship context: in the age-sets. Only where there has been a long history of stable marriage relations between neighboring groups can joking relations run rampant and, therefore, age-sets flourish. These stable marriage routes have been developed where possible to facilitate the socialization of descendants into a corporate production unit. If descendants only needed to be identified for the organization of reproduction, the identity of the reproducing agent, the woman, would be less important. But to be bound together in larger production units, descendants need more than just patrilateral kinship to bind them.[17]

There are other transformations to be explored in this system of social relations. For example, I note how the village-wide age-sets gain a stimulus from the age ranking in the lineages when it is challenged by a dense local network of affinal and matrilateral ties and the egalitarian joking that comes with them. Yet it is the very density of these affinal and matrilateral ties that brings more neighbors on to a single genealogy where their relative ages can be standardized for the benefit of the age-sets. Furthermore, age-mates will take their relation more seriously if, one way or another, they also happen to be kin.

These are some of the ways that the strength of kinship and descent ties are manipulated to create a corporate peasant village in a hostile

[17] The importance of women to the corporate groupings of these peasants is the subject of Chapter IX below.

political environment. These kinship and descent ties are strong because they are ultimately the only thing that differentiate these peasants from the market relations surrounding them (Meillassoux 1971). They will remain strong as long as those market relations have nothing to offer the majority of these peasants save eventual destitution.



## CHAPTER V: THE CLASSIFICATION OF WORK

### Introduction

In the last chapter I went into some detail on kinship terminology because the terms themselves provide a key for differentiating joking partners from those with whom relative age is more important and to whom respect may be due. The relationships differentiated through these terms are important in the adaptation of the patrilineage to the village and the state setting.

Furthermore, these kin terms are used to describe the form of economic relations between many villagers. A compound head is not referred to as a boss but as a "father" (fa). Those working for him are referred to as "children" (denw), "children of the compound" (dudenw), or "children" of whatever social relation brought them into that field (tondenw, damadenw, demedenw, nyòbugòdenw etc. - see Glossary). These are not the quaint practices of a rural Arcadia but a deliberate attempt to define intra-village labor relations in terms radically different from those used on the wage labor market. A worker who is only that, i.e. a wage earner, is called a "work maker" (baarakèla). Even a complete stranger working in a village field is not called that, unless he too is working exclusively for wages. However, since daily wages are invariably better somewhere other than the peasant village, the stranger worker is generally working for something more than wages. Consequently, he is usually called a "child of the work" (baareden).

In the village context, work itself is given special names to distinguish it from what the compound youth could sell on the wage labor market.

These names, and the significata designating their semantic contrasts form the subject of this chapter. The features of these contrasts are relevant to my theme not only because they reflect jural features of the organization of work in the village but also on account of their intricacy alone. Where the jural and classificatory definition of a work situation is complex, it is more difficult for outside market pressures to disrupt the labor relations therein.

In order to understand the semantic domain of work (baara), I will have to make brief reference to the Bambara conception of action.

Agents and Patients

In the Bambara sentence, when the subject is the agent of an action, he or she is said "to do" (ka kè) that action (kèli). If the object that the agent is acting upon is not specified as the direct object of a transitive verb, kè is added on to the name of that action to describe what the agent is doing. For example, a male can sungurun nyini ("look for a lover") with a female joking partner (c.f. Table III); to do so is to tilon kè ("make a joke") with her. When the subject is the patient of an action, i.e. participates in an action but does not instigate it, an intransitive verb form is used: e.g., "a ja wulila", "he (his image) got upset".

To feel a sentiment is thus not a transitive act in Bambara (bamanakan). Explicit ly or implicitly the subject's "intelligence" or "image" (ja) is said to be moving or transforming when sentiments are felt. However, when the subject is the agent of a transitive action, his "life" or "breath" (ni) is held responsible. Learned behavior, particularly



language and the life-crisis rituals, forms the evolution of the individual's ja (c.f. Zahan 1963, 1960). The ja influences the style or manner in which an action is performed. But the object of an action, particularly a material action contributing towards one's survival (i.e. "work") is determined by the needs of an individual's "life" or ni. It is not only literally, as it energizes material work, that this ni life principle sustains the descent line. On a metaphorical plane, the living will attempt, through sacrifices, to retain the ni of a dead lineage-mate before it escapes to join the life-force, nyama, at large in the world (Dieterlen 1951: 58, Cisse 1974: 150). If retained, this nyama is inherited as the tere, "destiny", of a new-born lineage member (c.f. Dieterlen 1951). Cisse's (1974) informant compares the ni to nyama as the coals of a fire to smoke. The flames themselves are the nya. While one's ni is affected by one's ancestors and predecessors, one's consociates and contemporaries cannot act upon it. The sacrifices intended to keep the force of the ni within the descent line are not considered to be kèli actions. One does not "do" or "make" a sacrifice, one lets it go: ka Saraka bò. It is for the descendants whom one cannot make, but without whom one's ni dries up (ka ja).

The ja, on the other hand, can be affected by the action (kèli) of a consociate - either constructively, such as by a host who for this reason is called jatigi (only God, they say, can be a nitigi), or destructively by a sorcerer or witch. Sorcery and witchcraft can kill a ja and therefore the person, but the ni of the deceased lives on at large,

therefore as nyama. Saraka sacrifices can be "let out" to try to recapture this nyama for the descent line as well to guide the divination process towards identifying the murderer (Henry 1910, Tauxier 1924).

Since the adoption of Islam by these farmers, this conceptual distinction between the ni and the ja has not been totally abandoned; although more than just the names, as Abbé Henry (1910) argues, have changed. The force, baraka (from the Arabic), which influences the individual's material impact upon objects cannot be acquired or learned. Like the ni, it is inherited, only in this case from the mother as well as the father (in conformity, perhaps, with the devolving devolution inheritance principle in Koranic law). A bastard, however, regardless of who his parents are, can inherit little baraka and therefore can never become an imam. Likewise, it is said that the child of a woman who abuses her husband will not inherit much baraka either. Baraka can also be acquired through benedictions (dugaw) voluntarily given by other parties, on the condition that the will of God rather than personal gain motivates their praises.

All the praiser can get from handing out unselfish benedictions, and therefore baraka, to others is baraji: "learning", from the Arabic Barayyat or bara'at (Delafosse 1955: 35). By being pious, giving respect (bonya kè) and reciting benedictions (dugaw kè), an individual can improve his baraji receipts through his own kèli actions. This is "work", baraji baara. Baraka cannot be earned in this way, it is a given. An accumulation of baraji may give the individual a better chance at paradise (a good



Muslim, of course, cannot say this, for in so doing he would lose baraji). But only baraka can improve his material welfare in the world.[1]

It is not my intention to pursue a symbolic analysis of religious syncretism. I merely wish to emphasize the pervasiveness of the distinction between assertive actions (kèliw) and passive reactions, (nyama or baraka) in these peasants' notions about human conduct. This distinction's importance may be related to their having to put as much store in the quality of descendants produced by a complex combination of certain social relationships, more easily called the will of God, as in the amount of crops which they can produce with their own hands.

The "force" (ni, baraka) responsible for the material impact of an action (kèli) cannot be cultivated by the actor. He can only improve on his own "image" (ja) and "reward" (baraji) by the intention of the defined kèli action which he chooses. But he can never directly affect the "forces" behind these actions. Crudely put, the individual's ni or baraka force corresponds to his objective conditions; his ja and his baraji reflect the evolution of his subjectivity.[1] Since this study is about economy, I will be concentrating on what the farmers view as manifestations of ni or baraka: actions on objects (kèli).

Actions

In discussing their language, Bambara speakers distinguish between a more inclusive, foroba tògò ("big field name"), located as a higher

1 see Trimingham (1959: 58-9) for a discussion of a more developed syncretism of the ni/ja dichotomy with Islam among the Mandenka.

order category on a taxonomy, and a more specific name, jònforo tògò ("slave field name"). As we shall see shortly, this "big field/slave field" distinction is also used to make semantic contrasts between specific ("slave field name") kinds of phenomena.

Kèli actions are broken up into five foroba tògò categories: (a) to perform bodily necessities (mago kè); (b) to ridicule (dògòya kè, jòuna kè); (c) to give respect (bonya kè); (d) to enjoy oneself (nègè kè); and (e) to work (baara kè). Once he had identified these categories, in no instance did an informant have trouble placing an action in one of them.

Needs

Of these actions, only (a), the performance of bodily necessities, is seen as capable of being performed by the isolated individual without incurring the obligations of others. Eating and sleeping, although they are necessities, are more often classified as kinds of work (e), because work is seen as directly dependent upon them.

Furthermore, eating and sleeping call on social connections which replicate those used in important work contexts: a husband has to keep an equal number of nights with each wife. In sickness or in health, he is obliged to move his mat from one wife's house (so) to another every two days. Also, uncircumcised boys and unexcised girls sleep near their mothers. Then, upon initiation, the boys take up separate lodging and the girls sleep with the senior woman of the compound until they are married. Before Islam began to take hold, all the unmarried initiated



girls in a ward slept with the eldest woman in that ward. Each one of these sleeping units, house, compound, and ward, replicate carefully distinguished sets of working relationships.

Eating units are a direct result of farming units. In a compound which co-operates and expends most of its labor on the "public" compound field (foroba), foroba to (to: grits) will be served as the main meal to all compound members throughout the year. No woman assigned to cook on any given day can remove grain from the foroba granary herself. Only the compound chief, in consultation with his brothers, will decide how much grain is to be removed on that day. Then only a male can reach into the granary. This would preferably be the compound chief himself; however, he will often send a small boy to do it, except during a famine when only he can assume the burden of knowing exactly how little food is left.

Where too much of the labor of the compound divides to farm individual fields (jònforow) on Mondays and Fridays, the yield of the foroba will be diminished. Consequently, the elementary families of those individual field owners (jònforotigiw) will divide more frequently into separate hearths (gwaw) for consumption purposes. The legitimacy of eating foroba to as opposed to jònforo to will vary according to the conditions prevalent in each compound and village. Generally, however, foroba to is identified with much greater pride than is "individual field" to.

Women are expected to prepare snacks for themselves and their children from their own granaries, although they usually use leftovers for

this purpose. Some wives will prepare snacks for their husbands from their own grain. In Chapter IX, I shall look at how these women's granaries are filled.

Ridicule and Respect

In the last chapter we looked at the different kinds of respect (bonya, c.f. activity c) expected of different elder kin and affines. In each case we saw that the kind of respect given was specific to the dyadic relation between the two transacting persons. Ridicule (b) is another kind of activity which involves primarily dyadic relations.

Earlier in this chapter I mentioned the sacrificing (saraka bò) used to keep ni within the descent line. This sort of lineage-oriented sacrifice is not considered a kèli activity. Thus the sacrifice (saraka) is not considered as "made" (kè) but as "let out" (bò). However, sacrifices intended to serve oneself (sonni kè), and necessarily one's ja (c.f. above), are classified as kèli acts. They are further divided into sacrifices of respect (a) or sacrifices of ridicule or malfeasance (b), depending on their intention. What is interesting in this connection is that respect (c) is only given through sacrifices made on a "group altar" (foroba boli). Clearly the presence of the other initiates (bolidenw) to this particular altar (boli) insures that it will be the respect that is transmitted to its target by the sacrifice.

For the Muslim, boli sacrifices are no longer open as a public form of showing respect. Thus, benedictions (dugaw), along with the Islamic alms (jaka) remain as the modal form of showing respect. Such acts, as



we have seen, confer baraji on the doer and baraka on the receiver. Many Muslims, wishing to sabotage their enemies, resort ot their pre-Islamic "private altars" (jònforo boli). Muslims like to say that instead of getting baraji for such practices they get enemies (jirimu).

Pleasure

Pleasure (d) and work (e) are distinguished from the range of other kèli activities as jènea because they necessarily require a group (jè) for their performance. Admittedly such aspects of pleasure-making (d: nègè kè) as chewing gum or kola nuts do not immediately strike one as necessarily a group activity. But they are conceived as such. To engage in such an activity is to "put on a bright appearance" (nyèna jè kè). The same expression is used to describe the activity of those participating in a festival. Certainly when others are around a gum chewer or cigarette smoker it would be social suicide for him not to share these goods. As for kola nuts, I never saw one person eat a whole kola nut. Even when alone, a man would eat half a kola nut, pocketing the other half to offer to a friend later on. Even though it was known that I was allergic to kola nuts, no one would eat one in my presence until I had accepted (and pocketed) some myself. "A sombre appearance", nyèna fin (fin: black), i.e. longing or homesickness, is a passive state of the ja that develops in the absence of any ni life force based kèli activities.

To make conversation (baro kè) falls within the "big field name" category of making pleasure (nègè kè, d). By making conversation, one is said to get speech (kuma). There are two kinds of speech called, not

unexpectedly, foroba kuma and jònforo kuma, "serious talk" and "idle talk" respectively. The tilon kè joking practices introduced in the last chapter fall in the category of jònforo kuma, "small talk".

Premarital sexual relations are, naturally, placed with this category of pleasurable activity (nègè kè), at least by the actors. However, marital relations were more often categorized, not without some amusement, in e, the work category (baara kè). As with sleeping and eating discussed above, marital relations are not classed as work because they are onerous, but because they produce children who can contribute to the compound work effort. (Illegitimate children remain in the mother's natal compound until a bridewealth is paid.) Even though one glance at Bambara peasant farming should be enough to convince anyone, this classification of marital sex shows that they see no difficulty in explicitly find pleasure in what they call "work". The difference is that the activities separated out as "pleasurable" in the nègè kè category are nothing else.

Public/Private

I have covered this taxonomy of kèli activities in such detail for two reasons:

(1) In order to show how work (e, baara), the object of this study, is viewed in a wider scheme of activities; and

(2) to give the reader some idea of the pervasiveness of the foroba/jònforo ("big communal field"/"individual, or slave, field", public/private, general/specific) distinction in the ideology of these farmers.



When looking at the classification of work categories, and the ideological or normative attachement of various sanctions to each one, we shall see this foroba/jònforo distinction reappear in an area of crucial concern. Where this distinction is made, sactions for the behavior classified in the resultant categories tend to be polarized in an analogous fashion. This was true in most of the communities visited, even where the sanctions themselves varied.

In the case of the foroba boli and the jònforo boli altars discussed above, for example, the sanctions compelling or restraining their use have changed since the adoption of Islam. They are both "fetishes"; as such they are to be specifically eschewed by the practitioners of Islam. Nevertheless, in Dukolombe a Muslim participating in a sacrifice made to a foroba boli is sanctioned in a very different way than one sacrificing to his own jònforo boli. In the case of the former, the recalcitrant Muslim would cease to be invited to naming ceremonies save those of the closest kin, he would receive less of the ram meat which is redistributed around the village at Tabaski, and if he dared to appear at the village mosque for evening prayer, a rather complete confession and explanation would be expected.

However, the practice which has compelled several recent converts to return to their foroba boli for protection, that is the practice of "malice" (juguya) made through sacrifices to jònforo boli, comes under no such sanctions. In fact, as far as I could tell, (I could only elicit this sort of information from those who felt themselves to be under attack

from an enemy), jònforo boli were primarily maintained by Muslims. Deprived of the protection of their foroba boli, Muslims distracted from "Allah's way" by the tensions of community life would resort to the private altars (jònforo boli) for redress on particular matters. Since these altars were private and therefore ostensibly secret and unknown by others, no villager would risk calling another villager a bad Muslim because of them. Although the expression for "real" Muslim, lamaniya, meant "without boli", it was rarely used to imply that any particular Muslim did not qualify. A few Muslim informants, who were known themselves to have jònforo boli (this of course I had to find out from others), were proud to tell me that their pagan ancestors had not been afraid to confine their entire attack and redress activities to the societies of their foroba boli. The ostensible purpose of these group altars is to generate respect and protection rather than malice.

The proliferation of jònforo boli in a Muslim community and the sanctions associated with their use is affected, of course, by three conditions already introduced in this study. In Dukolomba, for example:

(1) Fadenya tensions within the compound are diffused by the more ideological fadenya-like rivalry between more distant agnates and neighbors, as stimulated by the use of individual altars jònforo boli.

(2) Dense networks of agnatic ties in this single community (see genealogy) leave a large percentage of these individual altar owners (jònforo boli tigiw) to compete for the same ancestral nyama force in



their mutual rivalries. In this way, fadenya outside the compound moves even more dramatically to center stage, leaving the compound and the fadenya within it more peaceful.

(3) Jealousies unleashed in the individual altar (jònforo boli) syndrome were often sanctions enforcing the degree of dependence which neighbors had upon each other for labor. One party bent on accumulating wealth in order to wirthdraw his labor and his economic risk from the village-wide labor pool, could expect an attack from an individual altar in a village like Dukolomba, particularly if he had a lot of faden agnates there.

In a village where labor co-operation rarely extends beyond the domestic compound level, and where certain of these domestic units have been able to accumulate some wealth, we can see that inter-compound jealousies will have less of an economic basis. In these (more maraka - cf. Chapter II) villages, patrilineal ties are usually sparse in any case. Therefore, conditions (1) and (2) listed above do not impose themselves on these cases. In villages of this kind, the practitioners of Islam considered themselves more devout than the Muslims of Dukolomba and similar villages. Individual altars (jònforo boli) were not feared, but were considered irrelevant and ridiculous. Any suggestion of a resort to one of these private altars would mobilize sanctions not unlike those brought against a Muslim joining a foroba boli circle in Dukolomba. On the other hand, in these more pious villages, an occasional member of a foroba boli altar group, even if he had made a nominal conversion to

Islam at any earlier date, would not be as heavily sanctioned. This open and undevious resort to "pagan" practices would be seen by them as less of a threat to their religious community. It would be taken as honest, open, temporary lapse symptomatic of the insecure economic and social position of this marginal Muslim. His wealthier, more pious neighbor would take this lapse as a (privately) gratifying confirmation of their asymmetrical relations. Individual altar owners (jònforo boli tigiw), on the other hand, as permanently insincere Muslims, would threaten the more pious Muslims' use of Islam as a positive sanction for the accumulation of wealth. Furthermore, this private paganism makes them too elusive and harder to exploit. Invariably, in such communities the foroba boli-using, open "pagans" were among the poorest. Further along, I will review how the wealthier compounds (invariably the most devout Muslims) in such communities depended on certain services from these poorer neighbors. Their "pagan" status made them easier to exploit without any Islamic teachings having to be violated. Their foroba boli practices were therefore condescendingly tolerated. However, if such "paganism" had been hidden, it would not only be harder to justify this exploitation, but it would also be harder to separate out the more pious Muslims - the intended leaders of the community (Trimingham 1959: 36 note).

Continuing to ignore the mediating role of agnatic kinship (conditions (1) and (2) above), we can see then that where an exclusively domestic organization of labor leads to a stratified community, the sanctions on foroba boli and jònforo boli are virtually the reverse of



what they are in less stratified communities like Dukolomba. This difference, of course, results from differences in the economic and religious community in each case. However the difference becomes magnified as it can only be expressed by these two predetermined terms for pagan sacrificing activity. As the Muslim community in Dukolomba attempts to negatively sanction foroba boli, it ends up giving tacit approval to the presence of jònforo boli. This is partly because they fall in the opposite category, in a predetermined classification, from that which they are trying to eradicate. Likewise, in more entrepreneurial villages nearby, the crusade against jònforo boli leaves participants in foroba boli groups unstigmatized. This is not so much because the latter are approved, only because they are different in a fundamental way, or at least classified as such, from the more threatening jònforo boli.

In forming my main theme, work (baara), I will show how in an analogous fashion, certain kinds of jònforo baara in and of themselves favor participation in the available alternative: foroba baara.

Work as a Message

I am obligated to go into some detail on the subcategories in the classification of work (baara kè, ɛ) as activity. This is not only to show how the distribution of sanctions can be culturally organized in this important area of activity, but also because we will be coming across each of these categories as they are used in the subsequent discussion of work content and work process.

I have used baara kè as the general or "big field" term (foroba tògò) for all work because the subcategories are referred to as kinds of baara. However, the other cover term for this area of activity, chikè, has specific symbolic associations which tell us something about how work is viewed by those who use this term. Chi, at the same time, as it means work, also means message. God's messenger, Mohamed, is called Allah ka chi baga. At another level of meaning chi kè also means to farm. When chi kè is being used to designate farming, its most common use, other forms of work are referred to as chila. The chi wara antelope - headdress sculptures, for which the Bambara are famous, were used in farming ritual. Wara means carnivorous beast, (which of course an antelope is not). Even today among the most devout Muslims, a wild and aggressive farmer is called a chi wara. Such wildness can increase production, but since its animal character makes the farmer more vulnerable to the nyama in nature being disrupted by his activity (when one is farming too hard, a mate will often tell one to slow down before he "lets out", bò, some chi kè nyama), it takes on more of a ritual aura.

I have referred to this interesting area of ritual symbolism only to put the differential use of the word chi kè (to farm) and chikela (farmer) in context. These words, with their heavy symbolic load, are most frequently used in the less stratified villages like Dukolomba. In more pious, stratified, and commercialized villages, farming is usually called genne kè - just one of many economic activities.



Residence and Descent in Work Organization

In a general way all work directed towards a public estate can be called foroba baara. However, this expression is most frequently used in the compound to distinguish contributions to compound estate from work the individual does for himself or for his own wife and children (jònforo baara).

The words used to refer to all "legitimate" (c.f. below) forms of group work can be classified according to whether they refer to a residential or a descent principle of organization. The importance which these two criteria assume in this classification should be no surprise. I have already discussed (Chapter III) the importance of residence and descent in the organization of both the village and the compound. All work groups whose membership is said to share a common "descent" (often only metaphorically used) can be called faso baara, literally "father's house work".

Where such a term is applied, reluctantly by the laborers themselves, to school building and other such labor for the state, faso can only be seen as referring to some notion of the "fatherland". Since Independence, the radio has chastised the peasants' impulse to call such work forci baara ("forced labor") as they had under the French. Nor has such propaganda encouraged them to call it famacha baara, even though today's bureaucrats are called famaw as were the Segu rulers of the 18th and 19th centuries. Even though the peasants never gave their white rulers the traditional title of fama, the Independent government would still prefer that such work for the state be seen along the more communal lines of village organization. Since many peasants have remained unconvinced of

the similarities between their own work and the work done for the state, Mali baara seems to have evolved as the compromise term settled on by both parties.

All group work mobilized on a residential principle of organization is called jama baara (from the Arabic djama'at, Delafosse 1955: 152, and c.f. Swahili, ujamaa). This etymology suggests what was argued in Chapter II: not only the state but other residentially-based groups such as the village, the ward, and the compound were given a particular functional importance in conjunction with (though not directly because of) long-distance trade and contact with North Africa.

In the paradigm below I have classified some names for group work according to whether they refer to a residential or "descent" principle for their organization, on one dimension, and according to their relevant physical locus on another:

| | Residence: jama baara | Descent: faso baara |
|---|---|---|
| In Mali: Mali baara | jamana faso baara | faso cha baara |
| In the village: dujukono baara | jama cha baara | somaw baara |
| In the ward: sokala baara | sokala baara | kinda baara |
| In the compound: dukono baara | foroba baara | foroba baara |



It can be seen from this paradigm that the use of these two organizational principles in the village will produce different results, whereas in the compound they produce the same result. The somaw, literally "people of the house", or so, is the lineage, and can include members out of their lineage's ward (sokala). Compound #11 for example, having moved out of Siribalaw a number of years ago for religious reasons (c.f. Chapter III) is still included when its somaw back in Siribalaw are mobilized. In Dukolomba, however, somaw baara was rarely used separately. A loosely defined form of exchange labor (dama baara) organized along ward lines (sokala baara) was preferred.

Work Relationships

Since the adoption of Islam, both group and individual work (foroba/jònforo baara) can be divided according to whether they produce a temporal or a spiritual compensation. In cases of work involving spiritual recompense (baraji baara, Alla ka baara), it is significantly more difficult to maintain the foroba/jònforo distinction. Group work (jè baara) which is given as aid (dème baara) is referred to as nyèman baara because of its "estimable" nature. However, since each of its participants earn baraji, it is difficult to distinguish it from privately performed good works (yeere nyè baara). Praying, for example, is unequivocably seen as jònforo baara.

However, where the exchange of rights and obligations remain in the real world, the Bambara classification system rarely becomes ambiguous.

Even when work aid (dème baara) is given, an attempt to call it something else is made. There is a fear that the recipient of such aid will resent the superiority of his benefactors - a superiority which enables them to assist him. Such resentment could lead the recipient to attack his benefactors. Therefore, when the ton youth association needs the field of a destitute compound, everyone talks about collecting the usual fee of one goat for a morning's work. Yet in such cases the fee is rarely collected. In pre-Muslim times, sorghum beer (dolo) would be served by the recipient of this dème baara. This hospitality would serve to obscure the higher value of the labor which he was being given.

Exchange labor (dama baara) (dama: "limited, precisely defined") between compounds can be used to aid a certain compound without its losing face. Accounts of which compounds exchanged laborers for what amount of time can simply be loosely kept. However, in Dukolomba, volatile jealousies make even risking this covert form of aid dangerous. Furthermore, the lack of stratification, which both produces and is maintained by these jealousies, makes such aid less mandatory in villages like Dukolomba. In these villages dama baara labor exchanges are strictly kept. Dolo beer was never served at these labor-exchange seances. Nevertheless, even in beer-drinking days, these seances were said to be more festive (nyènajè) than dème baara outings. This difference can be attributed to the tension aroused by the giving of aid, dème. Furthermore, we have already seen that these farmers do not necessarily see beer-drinking



as more festive than work, by any means.

Age-Set Work Associations

In villages like Dukolomba, compounds with higher dependency ratios (consumers/producers) could gain extra labor without the embarassment of being singled out as needy. Every compound which contributed all the laborers it had to the village-wide work associations (jè), could use those associations. Furthermore, in villages like Dukolomba, compounds which did not contribute labor to this jè baara were fined, and if they persisted, were deprived of the use of the wells.

These jew were organized out of age-sets according to the size of the task. The oldest age-sets were usually only called out to back-up a work association formed of younger age-sets to thresh the larger fields (see Age-set chart, Table I). In the days of slave raiding, and warfare, certain of these age-sets had to be organized into a more corporate group for military purposes. In this manner, a large number of the age-sets grouped into a jè work group formed the village ton, with the oldest age-sets in the ton serving as tontigi war leaders. Eventually, one of these ton, that of Segu, absorbed enough mercenaries into its ranks so that it could conquer a wide area and set itself up as a state. We have already seen how the members of this ton came to be called tonjòn ("slaves of the ton) as its recruitment became detached from the kin, alliance, and neighborly networks of a single village. The ton in the conquered villages were used by the state for corvée labor (fama cha baara) and military service (kele baara). Villages which had not formed the more

corporate ton out of their jè, were encouraged by the Segu state to do so, so that these service units could be more efficiently mobilized. Today, of course, the ton does not engage in war. Still, the flute which used to summon the tondenw out to defend the village from attack is now used to call them to meetings (tonsigi) and to farm work (ton baara). The Mali baara building work which the village tonw are now required to perform at the count y seat ("chef-lieu d'arrondissement") is never referred to as ton baara even though it is performed by the ton. It is usually called bogo baara ("mud work"), in reference to the building material.

Sanctions

In the next two chapters we shall see how (Chapter VI) and to what end (Chapter VII) these forms are used in Dukolomba. Then we will understand better the technological and historical rationality attached to sanctions maintaining performance in jè baara and foroba baara. Here I can only note how these sanctions are normatively apportioned between the different categories in any given community.

Jònforo baara, of course, needs less of a positive sanction since it is self-serving in any case. All wage labor is jònforo baara, even when age-mates travel to the Ivory Coast and work on the same palm-oil plantation together. None of these farmers was willing to describe my research as anything other than jònforo baara, even though my "wages" were not what they could have been if I had stayed at home and entered another profession. When told that I would be writing a book and gaining



"prestige", they were more convinced than ever. But then I was from Ameriki where jònforo baara is said to flourish as nowhere else.

However, in certain (usually maraka) villages jònforo baara receives less of a negative sanction than it does in Dukolomba. Dudenw ("compound members") use some foroba assets, livestock, and tools, to engage in jònforo enterprises (livestock, trade, cash cropping, etc.) for which they pay a commission to the foroba estate. In such compounds, foroba baara is seen as unenterprising, and any desire to increase it is considered a sign of laziness. A much greater proportion of the total subsistence is supplied by yields from jònforow in these compounds. In fact, compound membership is often only maintained by its component parts in so far as it provides each of them with a source of wealth to invest. Under these circumstances, compounds can expand in size beyond what would be feasible if more work were organized on the foroba baara scale. Even in Dukolomba, where jònforow are eschewed, the only compound using them (compound #35) is also one of the biggest compounds in the village.

It can be seen, then, as in the case of the foroba and jònforo boli, changing sanctions upon forobaara or upon jònforobaara necessarily imply a change in status for the other. The same is also true for the demebaara/damabaara pair. In a less stratified village like Dukolomba, the exchange-labor relation (damabaara) is favored. Demebaara by implication, then, will be considered disruptive and its use will be negatively sanctioned in the various ways cited above. In the more stratified villages, fewer damabaara relationships are entered into since they make it difficult

for the managers of the more entrepreneurial compounds in these villages to manipulate the scheduling of their labor in order to maximize on prevailing market conditions. Demebaara, again by implication, being less of a reciprocal exchange organization is less threatening. Furthermore, demebaara can always be scheduled by the giver, and can be used by him to emphasize the assymmetrical nature of the relationships prevailing between certain compounds.

As I have already noted, while the distribution of sanctions is affected by the conceptual organization of relationships to which they are applied, their actual distribution cannot be understood without considering the mediating role of the three conditions identified at the beginning of this chapter: kinship relations, kinship networks, and work relations. It is these three spheres of activity which involve the material continuation of the village. Admittedly, it is work relations which produces the food that the villagers eat. But in looking at these relations in the next chapter, I will show how their efficiency and dependability are governed by the vitality of kinship relations on their own grounds in the reproduction of the community's descendants.

Craft Work and Caste

Nevertheless, there are labor inputs that cannot be performed by these villagers in their capacity as members of kin or residential groups yet which are a precondition of the work that they do do. The work of craft artisans is particularly important in this respect. In view of what has already been said about the incorporation of the reproductive



group into the farming production process as a mechanism for maintaining its own perpetuity, it should come as no surprise that many of the tasks that cannot involve the farmer's reproductive group as such are performed by other groups: endogamous castes.

It should also come as no surprise that these tasks, that cannot be linked to the orderly reproduction of the ni life force of the group, are seen as being particularly close and vulnerable to the unordered, freely vibrating life force: nyama. The endogamous caste groups that perform the iron working, leather working, and wood working crafts are called nyamakala because they must have a "handle" (kala)[2] on the nyama in order to complete these specialized tasks. Here the nyama concept is being used to explain how a division of labor in the village might disrupt the corporate solidarity of the farming descent groups there. As long as the members of the reproductive group work together in the foroba "big field", at the compound level, and in co-operative labor groups, at the ward and village level, the ni life force being used to do that work will not "vibrate" (cf. Dieterlen 1951) out of the control of the group that is to pass it on to the next generation. If it does, it can become dangerous, free-floating nyama.

Only the endogamous castes, nyamakala,[3] are to be allowed to confront the nyama of divided labor on a daily basis. Needless to say the members of these castes are accorded unusual religious statuses and functions.

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[2] I am grateful to Pat McNoughton for the choice of "handle" as the most appropriate translation of kala (which can also mean "stalk"- cf. nyokala, millet stalk, and sokala, ward) in this context.

[3] See N'Diaye 1970 for a catalogue of some of these.

Certain cult groups (foroba boli) could only be directed by blacksmiths; the Komo, for example. Dukolomba had no Komo society because one of its other group altars (bugu kònò nyana) was fatal to blacksmiths. It was said that a blacksmith who spent the rainy season in Dukolomba would die. I never saw one try it. Dukolomba's only casted families were #s 40 and 41, the woodworkers (kule). Using the wood of the larger trees growing along the north bank of the Bani, they made mortars for pounding grain and shea butter nuts. These latter could have a diameter of as much as a meter. They also made pestles, drinking troughs, and bowls with this wood. The farmers of Dukolomba were not their only clientele, however. Nearby Dingola had an altar that was fatal to members of this woodworking caste and therefore its farmers had to seek woodworking services in neighboring villages. However, the wooden canoes (kuruw) of the nearby Somono fishermen were made by their own blacksmiths, who were specialists in using fire to make the pitch used to keep these vessels water tight. Blacksmiths also worked wood to make the masks and sculptures for which the Segu Bambara are so famous. Any woodworking task that could be carried out to the field and performed there, such as making tool handles, was done by the farmers themselves, often while field guarding. They only made repairs of iron equipment (hoes, ploughs, etc.) where a hammer would suffice. Where a fire was needed the work could not be done in a farming break. Then the work was sent out to a casted blacksmith sedentarised by his fire and bellows.

However, there were some specialist tasks that were not performed by casted specialists: hunting and weaving. Even so, they still brought



the laborers into dangerous proximity with nyama. Cissé (1964) goes on at length about hunters' societies developing techniques for protecting themselves against the nyama of the animals they kill. In the area of the Niger's interior delta, there is a breed of sheep that produces wool. The weavers of that wool are members of a caste in the Fulbe society there. But any noblemen or slave can weave cotton cloth in the Bambara area. In another article, Cissé (1974) goes into detail about the religious precautions and significance of weaving cotton strip cloth. In Dukolomba all weaving was done in the dry season.

These craft specialties do not exhaust the range of Dukolomba's dependence on non-farming activities. I have already (Chapter II) described how Dukolomba's emphasis on pure farming is itself an outcome of the development of a complex marketplace nearby. Dukolomba has to present a united front against the unfavorable manipulation of their situation by that marketplace. They have done so by stressing the homogeneity of their economic activities thereby inverting the economic specialization favored by the development of the market around them. In Chapters IX and X I will look at the activities of Dukolomba's women (IX) and male youths (X) in that marketplace to see if they are disrupting their village's long term resistance to its influence.

In the next chapter, I will review the yearly farming cycle itself to see how the production of marketable assets is affected by this confinement of the division of labor to sex and age, rather than family, distinctions.

CHAPTER VI: THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The Patrifocal Compound in Savanna Agriculture

The use of co-operative labor in the Sahelo-Sudanic agricultural situation southeast of Segu takes its first stimulus from the incidence of labor bottlenecks during its short farming season. But once in place, the institutional arrangements guaranteeing a farmer access to such pooled labor during the bottleneck periods can also be used, at other times of the year, to break the drudgery of tasks with less restricted time requirements.

The first line of this co-operation is, of course, the patrifocal compound (du) with its communal "big field" (foroba). Only one compound in this village (#35) - incidently the one with the most recent maraka ethnic provenience in the village - permitted its productive males to leave the foroba for individual "slave fields" (jònforow) in the late afternoon or dusk hours. The less controversial name for these "thorns in the side" of compound solidarity is suraforow, which emphasizes their association with the sphere of nighttime (su) activities. Homage is thereby given to the compound's normative authority over the sphere of daytime activities.

But such delicate choice of words cannot hide the threat which these individual fields constitute to the solidarity and therefore the productivity of the patrifocal compound. One need only compare the grain yields of compound #35 with those with approximately the same number of adult male laborers (#s 26 and 16) or even with compound #11, which has two



fewer adult males (see Appendix II). The preoccupation of compound #35 males with their individual fields is also reflected by the greater concern of its women for their own fields (musoforw). The absence of #35's women from the compound foroba is attributed to a style of Islamisation characteristic of the maraka ethnic identity. The self-proclaimed Banana in the village, many of them manifesting an equal intensity of Muslim devotion, are quick to point out how women's absence from compound work (foroba baara) adversely affects the overall yield.

The proliferation of "slave fields" (dit "night fields") and "women's fields" in compound #35 were said to be symptomatic of an imminent compound fissioning (du kari). The component households of compound #35 had already divided into separated hearths (gwaw) for certain consumption purposes (see genealogy). This fact alone, in addition to their investment in individual fields, was a source of ridicule, or more often, pity. Such developments in this Tarawèlè (the oldest maraka clan name in this region - c.f. Bazin 1972) compound were not envied by others or discussed with pride by themselves. Rather, they were seen as an unfortunate consequence of the inevitable fissioning of a large compound when an "older brother" (kòròkè) succeeds a "father" (fa) to the headship (dutigiya). These concerns were related to the economies of scale which could be attained by compound labor (foroba baara) relative to individual labor (jònforo baara).

In what follows I will review the economies of scale to be gained by this and other forms of co-operative labor for each variety of labor input

made in the 1974 farming season.

Field Preparation

Since I did not settle in the village under study until July 1974, my information on this stage of the farming cycle necessarily comes from what was observed in 1975. Nevertheless, I feel that general trends isolated from the 1975 experience can contribute to my more exact analysis of the inputs and outputs of the 1974 season.

No serious labor bottlenecks intervene during the period of field preparation until the onset of the early rains. Then the ground becomes workable for short periods either before it dries out again or before it must be seeded. The farmer has from the last threshing in February to the steadier rains in June (see Appendix I) to clear new "bush field" (kungo foro) space, and to manure "house field" (so foro) space. There is a tendency for the former to be done earlier, in order to give the vegetation time to dry for a good burning before the rains, and for the latter to be done later, so that the household manure has more time to mulch in those corners in which it has been piled over the course of the previous year. In addition wood is more useful for tool handles, domestic articles, house beams, grain mortars, milling pestles, livestock water troughs (these last three items are made exclusively by the kule woodworking caste of which there were two representatives in Dukolombo: #40 and #41), if the wood is cut while still moist from the rains. On the other hand, manure would lose its potency to the sun and to termites if spread out too early before the rains.



Nevertheless, the age-set based youth group (ton) is often hired for field clearing purposes. While much time is available for this task, it is accurately felt that the individual laborer will meet the strenuous requirements of tree cutting with more vigor when he is working in a group. Furthermore, the performance of the individual laborer is also significantly greater when mobilized in the cooler months (February, March) of this post-threshing period. Even so, the ton is not in great demand by all the compounds clearing new field space. Therefore, the ton relaxes its informal rule of the bottleneck period, to wit: the most needy compounds have the first privilege of "buying" its services.[1] In fact, to judge from the use made of the ton during this period, there seems to be an equally unofficial attempt to set the record straight. Although first-come first-served is the only stated ton hiring policy at any period, it would seem that the ton had made itself preferentially available to the less needy compounds during the clearing epoch in order to compensate for neglecting them during the more serious weeding bottleneck. This policy would be pursued by the ton leaders (ton tigiw) in order to maintain the image of the official impartiality of their organization.

It could be argued, of course, that the needier compounds had less reason to spend a goat for ton labor at this time than during the more

[1] This informal rule is rarely observed by the tonw in the more entrepreneurial villages mentioned above. Such tonw are usually more wealthy

serious bottleneck periods. These compounds would be further inclined to avoid the ton at this time since there is a greater tendency for a goat spent on dry season labor to be actually collected. This in return may be because the ton festivals (ton nyèna jè) eat goat in most dry seasons, or because the wealthier tend to employ the ton in this period.

Yet many of these needier compounds find themselves still clearing new fields as the rains begin; less burned ash is left in the field and other field preparation activities are cut short as the seeding deadline approaches. This is partly due to the fact that the ton gives preference to its big spending employers during this field clearing period.

Manuring is another onerous dry season task which gains co-operative labor. However, it is onerous not because it is strenuous - a quality which ennobles field clearing and most other farming tasks - but because it is unsanitary. It is therefore usually left, in the Muslim wards, to associations of uncircumcised boys (bila kòrò tonw) organized on a wand basis. They are paid a rate of 25FM for transporting ten calabashes of 25kg of manure into the housefield (soforo). In the ward of non-Muslims, Manawèrè, and the ward of recent and tenuous converts, Bablunda, the compound heads themselves take complete responsibility for manuring their housefields.

By contrast, manuring left undone by uncircumcised boys in the more Muslim wards is delegated by the compound chiefs to their juniors.



The extra-manuring care given by the less Muslim compound heads does not translate itself into superior housefield yields, however (see Appendix II). Not only are there fewer cattle manuring the housefields surrounding their wards, there is only one plough among them. As long as a field is continually fertilized, ploughing it can encourage greater yields. Furthermore, the housefields of these adjacent wards supported millet during the 1975 season; millet has a lower yield per hectare than sorghum, other variables being equal. Whether around the village or in the bush, adjacent field owners have to grow the same grain crop in order to minimize the bird menace (cf. Chapter III).

Ground Breaking[2]

It is primarily in this ground breaking period of the farming cycle that the possession of capital resources (the plough and a team of oxen) intervenes to skew the return on labor between one family and the next. For this reason, the use of the plough and team is handled with great delicacy. The farmer who got the jump on his neighbors in tilling his field, by virtue of his possession of a plough, might, on that pretext, be begrudged their labor assistance during the weeding bottleneck. The plough would in no way leave him in less need of pooled labor at this time. None of the more expensive multiculteur tool bars (called "Red plough" misidaba bilèn), that with proper attachements can be set up

[2] I entered the field at this point in the 1974 farming season. Therefore, my observations from this point on are no longer extrapolated from 1975 usages.

for weeding in addition to ploughing and harrowing, were owned in this village. Therefore, plough owners were not only discrete in its use, they were accomodating in sharing it.

Beyond these political concerns, there was some ecological basis to their discretion. As a labor saving device, ploughing is weighed against the extra field clearing which its use can require. In as much as ploughed ground, without the application of fertilizer (not likely given these peasants' income), is said by these farmers to "tire" the soil more quickly than hoeing, its use can lead to more rapid field abandonment and, therefore, extra cleaning labor. In as much as good fallow is getting more scarce in any case (as a result not only of population growth but also of the classement of most of the fertile land south of the village between it and the Bani, since 1948), ploughing becomes that much more of a disruption of the existing land use practice. Only with sufficient numbers of cattle can ploughed land be kept continually fertile. Thus in the more entrepreneurial villages the house fields (cattle parks in the dry season) are expanded at the expense of bush fields (less available to these newer villages in any case). Consequently, it can be seen that an optimal use of the plough requires further financial investments in cattle. Such investments call for a strategy of accumulation which the labor committments of the villagers under study make it difficult for them to pursue.

Ploughing also threatens the development of the hoeing art as an important focus of age-set competition among compound juniors throughout



the village. If the hoer was not considered the pillar of the community, these youths might be less inclined to return from the Ivory Coast in order to maintain their reputations as hoers. If they did not return, much of the weeding, less strenuous and therefore less prestigious, but equally as important for the success of the crop, might not get done. This is one input which the plough cannot cover.

Furthermore, the plough leaves the most prestigious form of hoeing, "second mounds" (filakè ntugun), obsolete as well. These interlinear mounds are made with the same hoe strokes which perform the final weeding. They leave these weeds to compost under this mound for the entire dry season awaiting next year's seeds. Not only the labor saving, but the fertilizing advantages, of this practice are lost if the field is to be ploughed up the next year anyway. At present, youths look forward to maintaining their stamina in making these filakè mounds as part of a mobilization of the ton youth group at the end of the weeding season. The tontigiw leaders are more apt to fine slack workers (ten kola nuts) at this time than during normal weeding seances. It is characteristic of the ton work ethic that these youths show how fast they can make filakè rather than talk about it. The latter, of course, could be done in the Ivory Coast. This is another reason, perhaps, that the bragging farmer is held in such low esteem in the village context.

The most concrete result of the farmer's caution in displaying any dependence upon the plough manifests itself in a conspicuous neglect of their oxen at the end of the dry season. Only one plough owner (#36),

the only one not connected to the founding or any other local clan (therefore the one to be least constrained by the opinions of any agnate neighbors), foddered (with caicedra leaves) his ox at this time in order to strengthen it for ploughing. Even though he had to borrow the other ox (from #4 and #13 to whom he lent plough and plougher in turn) this farmer was still among the first to have his field ready for seeding.

Among the larger plough owning compounds (#s 1, 2, 12, 16 and 26), cattle were conspicuously neglected in order to impress upon their large numbers of youths how much everyone depended upon them. Thus when the first few rains made the ground workable, there was an explosion of hoeing activity. As the novelty of this began to wear off, the oxen were already beginning to show the effects of the fresh grasses which came with these rains. To further clarify these peasants' reluctance to invest in such a labor saving device as the plough, one must recall the functions of the foroba bush field in the system of producing descendants.[3] Ploughing is an individual activity whereas hoeing is done in a large group. Hoeing with the first rains serves to bring the entire compound group out to the foroba from the beginning. No one is thereby permitted to develop the illusion that the manager of the plough and team (the latter is usually pulled along on a nose rope by an uncircumcised

[3]These considerations should be included in the debate, Goody (1971) and Hopkins (1973), about the absence of the plough in precolonial West Africa. It seems hard to believe that if there had been need for it, the plough could not have diffused from Saharan oases to West Africa in medieval times.



boy), working alone, is more responsible for the field than they are. The cool beauty of breaking freshly rained-on earth after a long, hot dry season is a powerful and refreshing reminder to all compound members of who they are: descendants in a patrilineal farming scheme.

The extent to which the plough aided their owners and renters can be judged by the relative head start these compounds were able to get on the first weeding. All plough-owning compounds which owned their own oxen as well (#s 1, 2, and 16) were into full weeding by July 17 (see Table VI), except for compound #26 which was delayed by a new sorghum field (new cleared ground is more difficult to plough) and the need to reseed their housefield. With their plough and superior numbers this compound had their housefield ready for seeding before the others; their germinating sorghum was therefore caught in a week long drought in mid-July (see 1974, Appendix I) which most other compounds (except #16 with their housefield corn) escaped. It is difficult to evalute the extent to which these compounds got the jump on the weeding labor because of the plough, since they are also among the compounds with the most manpower in the village (one reason they have been able to buy ploughs). Of compounds of comparable sizes (see Appen. II) #11 could be said to have been delayed by the lack of the plough, but #35 was further constrained by the fragmentation of their field management (see above).

Of the other plough owning compounds, #s 7, 8 and 36, were constrained in their use of that instrument by a lack of oxen, #14 by a lack of manpower. In each case these compounds shared their ploughs with compounds

TABLE VII: DAYS WEEDING 1974

| Compound No. | Date Begun | FOROBA (BUSH FIELD) Allot. Sorghum | Old Man | Man | Uncircumcised Man | Married Woman | Uncircumcised boy | Wage labor | All | Exchange labor | Ton labor* | YIELD | SOFORO (HOUSE FIELD) Old man/ uncircumcised boy | Man | Married/ unmarried woman | YIELD | PEANUT FIELD Old man/ uncircumcised boy | Man | Married/ unmarried woman | YIELD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | 3<br>7-24 | s<br>m | 9<br>11 | 103<br>109 | 78<br>[illegible] | 5 | 7<br>4 | | | 6<br>6 | | 7440<br>9500 | 1/ | 13 | 15/1 | 2500 | No full days | | | 200[illegible] |
| 11 | 8-11<br>7-24 | s<br>m | | 33<br>[illegible] | 12<br>102 | 4<br>37 | | | | 6 | | 3010<br>12066 | | 16<br>29 | 8/1<br>7/4 | 800<br>1200 | | 15 | 8/2 | 800 |
| 2 | 7-22<br>7-28 | s<br>m | | 16<br>45 | 30<br>232 | | 5<br>32 | 1 | | 19 | 15/2/1 | 3410<br>12475 | | 17 | | 2000 | No full days | | | 800 |
| 35 | 8-3<br>7-27 | s<br>m | | 150<br>106 | 65<br>52 | | | | | | 10/6/2 | 5240<br>4820 | suraforo | | | 950<br>5200 | | 7 | 4/ | 1600 |
| 16 | 8-10<br>7-17 | s<br>m | 15<br>16 | 62<br>189 | 53<br>122 | | | | | 8 | | 5215<br>11405 | 3/ | 22 | 14/3 | 1750 | No full days | | | 2000 |
| 1 | 8-18<br>7-17 | s<br>m | | 31<br>58 | 28<br>52 | 36<br>25 | 12<br>15 | | 1 | 23 | | 4530<br>7680 | /1 | 6 | 4/ | 150 | No full days | | | 2000 |
| 8 | 7-23 | s<br>m | 3 | 88 | 77 | | | | | 18 | 15/9/2 | 335<br>7215 | 2/ | 6<br>12 | 6/<br>6/ | 400<br>300 | | 15 | 6/ | 720 |
| 30 | 7-28<br>8-1 | s<br>m | 1<br>3 | 58<br>15 | 44<br>22 | 13<br>9 | | | | 6<br>5 | | 5000<br>3105 | 17/<br>11/ | | | 600<br>400 | No full days | | | 800 |
| 39 | 8-14<br>7-23 | s<br>m | | 62 | 80 | | | | | 12 | | 6845 | | 15 | 12/ | 500 | | 6 | 4/ | 800 |
| 36 | 7-23 | s<br>m | | 31 | 46 | | | | | 12 | 15/9/2 | 8745<br>30 | | 9 | 12/1 | 1200 | | 6 | 6/ | 1200 |
| 29 | 8-31<br>7-27 | s<br>m | 1 | 14<br>39 | 5<br>25 | 5<br>20 | 1 | | | | | 2120<br>4710 | 6/ | 2 | 2/ | 375 | 2/ | 1 | 1/ | 80 |
| 9 | 8-22<br>8-1 | s<br>m | | 17<br>6 | 24<br>22 | | | | | 8 | 15/9/2 | 590<br>1405 | | 6 | 12/ | 775 | No full days | | | 225 |
| 6 | 7-28 | s<br>m | | 26 | 38 | 21 | 19 | | | | | 1420<br>110 | /2 | 4 | 4/1 | 80 | | | | — |
| 28 | 7-27 | s<br>m | | 29<br>26 | 26<br>18 | 13<br>6 | | | | 6 | | 4765<br>1515 | /6 | 16 | 12/ | 800 | No full days | | | 320 |
| 7 | 7-23 | s<br>m | | 4<br>46 | 4<br>46 | 1<br>15 | 1<br>21 | | | 18 | 15/9/2 | 5970 | /5 | 11 | 10/5 | 500 | /7 | 18 | 16/6 | 1420 |
| 3 | 7-27 | s<br>m | 1<br>22 | 4<br>68 | 4<br>59 | | | | | | 15/8/2 | 6255 | | 2 | 2/ | 700 | 2/ | 10 | 8 | 600 |
| 34 | 7-23 | s<br>m | | 17<br>79 | 6 | | 3 | | | | | 1033<br>4295 | | | | | | 5 | | 240 |
| 13 | | s<br>m | | 48<br>23 | 24<br>13 | | | | | | 15/9/2 | 3340<br>2185 | | 6 | 3/ | 500 | No full days | | | 100 |
| 10 | 7-27 | s<br>m | | 56 | 24 | 30 | 28 | | | 5 | | 2585<br>10 | | | | 50 | No full days | | | 160 |
| 37 | 7-31 | s<br>m | | 62 | 43 | | 17 | | | | | 6190<br>50 | /3 | 8 | 6/3 | 200 | No full days | | | 160 |
| 25 | 7-29 | s<br>m | | 55 | 30<br>2 | 17<br>2 | | | | | 19/10/ | 3175 | | 2 | 1/1 | 1200 | | | | — |
| 17 | 8-14<br>7-27 | s<br>m | | 44<br>36 | 2<br>16 | | | 3 | | 6 | | 1505<br>4420 | | 2 | 1/ | 200 | | 14 | 4/ | 1600 |
| 32 | 7-27<br>7-23 | s<br>m | | 34<br>10 | | 38<br>10 | 20 | | | 8<br>6 | | 2080<br>887 | | 2 | 2/1 | 300 | woman's field | | | 790 |
| 22 | 7-27<br>8-5 | s<br>m | | 65<br>3 | 36<br>2 | | 6 | | | 11 | 15/2/3 | 4690<br>175 | | 2 | | 200<br>100 | No full days | | | 160 |
| 33 | 7-27<br>8-18 | s<br>m | 13<br>4 | 39<br>9 | 5 | | | | | 3<br>3 | | 2475 | 16/ | | | 300 | | | | — |
| 31 | 7-30 | s<br>m | 17 | 15 | 1 | | | | | | | 2545 | 11/ | 9 | | 800 | | | | — |
| 14 | 7-28 | s<br>m | | 16 | 24 | | | | 2 | | 28/1/4 | 1510<br>40 | | 1 | 8/ | 400 | | | | — |
| 24 | 7-23 | s<br>m | | | 33 | 50 | | | | | 7/2/3 | 3805 | | | 4/7 | 200 | woman's field | | | 75 |
| 27 | 7-27 | s<br>m | | 54 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 12 | | 2245 | | 4 | | 750 | No full days | | | 160 |
| 18 | 7-27<br>7-25 | s<br>m | | 44<br>22 | 15<br>10 | | 10<br>4 | | | | 8/2/1 | 3210 | | 2 | 1/ | | woman's field | | | 480 |
| 15 | 7-29 | s<br>m | | 30 | 33 | | 2 | | | | | 2130<br>1080 | /3 | 3 | 1/ | 500 | No full days | | | 960 |
| 40 | 7-29 | s<br>m | 32 | | | | 23 | 1 | | | 9/6/2 | 330 | /10 | 5 | | 250 | /1 | 1 | | 180 |
| 38 | 8-9<br>7-22 | s<br>m | | 38<br>18 | 22<br>11 | | | 1 | | 6<br>6 | 4/3/1 | 2180<br>2935 | | 3 | 2/ | 400 | | 2 | | 400 |
| 23 | 7-23 | s<br>m | | 49 | 29 | | | | | 6 | | | | 9 | 2/ | 200 | | 2 | 1/ | 240 |
| 19 | 7-31 | s<br>m | | 22<br>5 | 9 | 2 | | 8 | 3 | | 9/5/3<br>4/3/2 | 1500<br>10 | | 6<br>4 | 1/1 | 300 | | | | — |
| 4 | 8-27<br>7-27 | s<br>m | | 16<br>6 | 6 | | | 9<br>1 | 1 | 12 | 8/6/1<br>2/12/3 | 1200<br>1520 | woman's field | | | 300 | woman's field | | | 160 |
| 5 | 8-11<br>7-23 | s<br>m | 18<br>17 | | 1 | 12 | | 13 | | 12 | | 2155<br>3245 | /1 | 1 wage** | | 500 | 2/ | 2 wage | | 240 |
| 41 | 7-31 | s<br>m | | 28 | 3 | | | | | | 15/8/2<br>4/3/1 | 1355<br>75 | | | | | | | | |
| 42 | 7-23 | s<br>m | 28 | | | | 17 | | | | 24/5/5 | 1260 | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | 7-31 | s<br>m | | 23<br>2 | 13<br>2 | | | | | | | 2165 | | 11 | 6/ | 60 | | | | |
| 16x | | s<br>m | | | | | | | | | | [illegible] | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | 7-23 | s<br>m | 33 | | | | | | 8 | | | 2175 | | | | | | | | |
| 43 | 7-31 | s<br>m | | 14 | 14 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1/ | | | | | |

* Ton labor divides into: men/women/uncircumcised boys.

** "1 wage" means 1 wage laborer.

x signifies ton contributing to SOFORO.

willing and able to supply the missing factor (#7 with #4, #8 with #15, and #36 with #13 for cows, and #14 with #28 for labor). Each of these relationships is conspicuous for the lack of close genealogical connection between the contracting partners. The larger plough-owning compounds (#s 1, 2, 16, and 26) were able to rent out their plough services (1000 FM/day for plough, team, and two ploughers) while these other exchanges were going on throughout the month of July. Renting relationships tended to take place between enemy compounds (cf. #2 renting to #17) whereas between closely allied compounds there was no change (for example, when #16 ploughed #19's field). Since compound #s 1 and 26 had rotated their plough oxen with #13's during early July, they provided #13 with ploughing services later in that month. But since that rotation, which enabled their cows to rest, was a convenience rather than a necessity, #13 could not obtain such services earlier in July as he could in his sharing relationship with #36.

The plough gave seven of these plough-owning compounds (#14 lacked the manpower and the motivation) an even greater jump on peanut weeding labor. Peanut ground was ploughed without restraint not only because these legumes left fertility (nitrogen) in the soil which could compensate for the extra strain on that fertility posed by the plough, but also such a cash-crop field fell outside of the sphere in which a farmer could improve his intra-community reputation in any case. There was nothing to be gained by reaffirming the solidarity of the farming compound, ward or age-set group in a peanut field since its product, having



small potential for subsistence uses, was considered an illegitimate use of village land and labor only to be excused by the increasing tax burden. Another source of this illegitimacy, of course, was the fact that a peanut yield, as opposed to a grain yield (where the crops are less competitive with the weeds), could be improved more by a privately owned plough than by the good will (i.e. weeding labor) of family and neighbors.

With a plough and a ready supply of oxen, a peanut field could be ploughed (this was easily done, as these fields were always sown on ground having already born at least five years of sorghum/millet) and sown on the same day. While the ploughing destroyed the existing weed growth, the immediate sowing gave the peanut plants a jump on the weed regrowth. Therefore compound #s 1, 16 and 26 realized superior peanut harvests without having to take time out to reseed their peanuts. #15 seeded her peanut field behind the plough of her brother from a neighboring village, and therefore realized a sizable harvest with only the input of evening weeding labor (see Table VI).

Financially ambitious compounds, usually plough owners (#s 7, 8 and 36) or soon to become plough owners (#s 2, 17 and 28), in 1975 without both a plough and a change of oxen at the right time, were unable to realize this advantage. They could not plough their field in one day or even in two successive days, therefore a weed regrowth had already started in that part of the field first ploughed when the field was ready for seeding. The entire field had to be seeded at the same time, or the risk of its

destruction by monkeys became too great. With the ripening of the peanut plants staggered, monkeys would be present in the field for a longer period of time (they are most attracted only during a certain stage of that ripening process) and therefore the chance of their destroying more plants is greater. This danger is especially grave for vulnerable unripe plants which the monkey can easily pull out if only to inspect their ripeness. These plants would not attract a monkey into the field, but once there on account of an adjacent ripe plant, he will proceed to destroy them. Thus with all the peanut plants ripening at the same time, the period required for field guarding (which can never be perfect in any case) is thereby shortened. Of these compounds, all were required to attend to their peanuts during the bottleneck weeding period. Where this was not done (#23) the yield suffered. This was also the case for ploughless compounds (#s 11, 35, 3, 39 and 32) seeking a sizable peanut harvest (see Table VI). As taking away this labor from subsistence production during this bottleneck period was risky village politics, the chief's compound (#2) and the compound (#13) of the owner of the village's primary non-Muslim altar (bugukòndò nyana), were the only large compounds to inhibit their attentions to their peanut field.

The case of #30 can be considered the exception that proves the rule. This is a compound that installed a sizable peanut field without a plough and without having to give it more than occasional attentions (unrecorded on the table) during the weeding bottleneck period. This



was achieved in part at the expense of getting a late start (7/28) on weeding their grain field. The peanut field was hoed and planted (simultaneously, of course) at a very late date so that the entire first growth of weeds was destroyed in the process. While this did delay other farming inputs, it did have the advantage of giving the peanuts an edge on the second weed growth as with the case of those who were able to plough and seed their plant fields in one day.

While, of course, compound #30 could not prepare their field that quickly, they could check rapid regrowth of weeds in as much as they waited until all the first weed seeds had germinated. In the early plowed fields, there would still be considerable weed seeds left in the soil to germinate simultaneously with the newly planted peanuts. However, later in July more of these seeds would have germinated already, so if they could be destroyed before going to seed in this later peanut field hoeing, the threat of new weeds gaining on the peanut plants - which could not be seeded until the entire field was hoed (cf. above) - could be minimized.

Compound #30 chose this unusual strategy for more than technological reasons. It was conspicuous in the village as one compound which could afford a plough but which had obstinately refused to buy one. Its elder head was the defacto leader of the uncon...ed Bamana in the village. He was, therefore, anxious to show how agricultural productivity could be maintained without capitulation to outside influences, whether those be the plough or Islam. He thus drove his sons very hard in order to show

the value of the old bamana cultivation practices (the hoe, the filakè etc.) to the other villagers. In addition, his leadership of the non-Muslim ward depended upon his not seeking a permanent economic advantage (as could be provided by capital equipment such as the plough) over his poorer followers. For example, he invested his surpluses in goats, drinking their milk, rather than in cattle. His bamana followers (#s 23, 29, 31, and 33), as members of a secret society (Nya) led by him, had potent forms of redress which did not operate as efficaciously between Muslims.

Without this incidence of the plough, however, the size of the field that a compound could prepare was more completely a function of the labor at their disposal. Even though hoeing could only be performed just after the rains (ploughing is somewhat less restricted in this sense), such a restraint was not considered significant for the overall production of the compound; thus the compound is left to its own devices by its neighbors for this part of the farming cycle. Many compounds do not break their whole field in any case, seeding a certain proportion of their crop in flat (paki) ground[4] - either in last year's mounds or between them, (nyòkon). While the individual crop suffers from this practice, the rotation of flat with mounded ground over the years helps

[4]This was a widespread practice which was, nevertheless, avoided in field sections which were expected to be either too wet or too dry. Some farmers only conceded doing this if time for hoeing or ploughing ran out; but they took this line only to encourage their laborers to greater efforts. If the junior hoers kept hearing that paki was a good thing once in a while, they might slow up their hoeing efforts.



a field to retain its fertility longer. Many compounds, particularly those which own less, or inferior, land, view this practice with favor.

Therefore, regardless of the time restrictions on hoeing, a compound can always seed, or reseed, more field space than it can weed. Thus, only in the case of the compound of the cripple (#42), would an extra-compound labor group intervene, the ton youth group in this case, to assist at this stage in the farming cycle. The other destitute compound in the village (#43) was not similarly assisted not only because it was considered to belong to another village (the name of that village was constantly prefixed to the name of the head of this compound), but because its destitution was more voluntary. This compound was kept alive by the more insulting practice of alms or from what its woman could gain from winnowing other people's grain.

It is at the weeding labor bottleneck that the compound's yield (cf. DeWilde 1967) is most seriously affected by neighborly relations within the village.

Weeding

In this section, I will be referring continually to Appendix II and Table VI. They list the compounds in order of size (#of consumers)[5], matching them with their overall grain, sorghum-millet yield. Maize,

[5]The compounds have been assigned numbers according to their genealogical proximity where ever possible. Thus, compound #s 1-26 are all members of the founding clan. #27 a sororal nephew of #26 and so on,(c.f. Figure III ).

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fonio, and earth nuts in addition to jute leaves(da kumon), gumbo, and tomatoes are also grown for subsistence purposes, but in very small quantities. Only the harvest of fonio calls for co-operative labor; the ward is mobilized for this purpose after the weeding is done. Lax reciprocity is observed in this harvesting exercise which doesn't take more than a few hours in any case: fonio is sown by hand cast and requires little weeding.

Table VII is designed to indicate how the final grain yield is more often a function of the total number of consumers in a compound than of the total number of producers. Table VI is designed to give an explanation for this phenomenon. It shows the degree to which extra-compound labor (exchange, wage or youth group labor) has been used to make up for a deficiency of producers (relative to consumers) in certain cases. It is in the procurement of this extra-compound labor during this crucial labor bottleneck that the farmer sacrifices his freedom to accumulate liquid forms of wealth for access to a reliable food producing network.

I have already noted how the conditions of access to this extra-compound labor are linked to its use in producing storable subsistence crops. While the compounds with more producers per consumer may do worse for this pooling of labor during the weeding season (hence the avoidance of exchange-labor by some of them), their need of their neighbors' labor for threshing and their good will for reciprocal field protection make them, at least, enthusiastic participants in the ward

Table VII - COMPOUND DEPENDENCY RATIOS AND SORGHUM/MILLET YIELDS

| Compound # | Consumers | Workers | dependency C/W ratio | CY C:365 days·2 kgs NEEDED: kgs. | CY/W kgs./W | EY HARVESTED: kgs. | EY/W kgs./W | EY-CY Absolute Surplus (kgs.) | % weeding labor recruited from outside compound |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | 26.2 | 14.0 | 1.871 | 19,126 | 1,366.143 | 22,430 | 1,602.143 | 3,304 | 2.703 |
| 11 | 20.6 | 11.0 | 1.873 | 15,038 | 1,367.091 | 19,425 | 1,765.909 | 4,387 | 1.470 |
| 2 | 19.9 | 10.6 | 1.877 | 14,527 | 1,370.472 | 18,135 | 1,710.849 | 3,608 | 7.795 |
| 35 | 21.3 | 12.2 | 1.745 | 15,549 | 1,274.508 | 16,810 | 1,377.869 | 1,261 | 1.905 |
| 16 | 20.6 | 13.0 | 1.585 | 15,038 | 1,156.769 | 19,990 | 1,537.692 | 4,952 | 1.636 |
| 1 | 12.1 | 4.6 | 2.630 | 8,833 | 1,920.217 | 12,060 | 2,621.739 | 3,227 | 6.928 |
| 8 | 12.4 | 6.4 | 1.937 | 9,052 | 1,414.375 | 8,950 | 1,398.437 | -102 | 16.129 |
| 30 | 11.9 | 4.6 | 2.587 | 8,687 | 1,888.478 | 9,995 | 2,172.826 | 1,308 | 6.667 |
| 39 | 9.7 | 5.4 | 1.796 | 7,081 | 1,311.296 | 7,645 | 1,415.741 | 564 | 5.970 |
| 36 | 9.3 | 3.6 | 2.583 | 6,789 | 1,885.833 | 10,275 | 2,854.167 | 3,486 | 7.500 |
| 29 | 8.7 | 3.8 | 2.289 | 6,351 | 1,671.316 | 7,405 | 1,948.684 | 1,054 | 0 |
| 9 | 8.5 | 3.6 | 2.361 | 6,205 | 1,723.611 | 2,970 | 825.000 | - 3,235 | 6.557 |
| 6 | 8.0 | 2.6 | 3.077 | 5,840 | 2,246.154 | 1,810 | 696.154 | - 4,030 | 0 |
| 28 | 8.5 | 4.6 | 1.848 | 6,205 | 1,348.913 | 7,480 | 1,626.087 | 1,275 | 4.138 |
| 7 | 8.5 | 3.8 | 2.237 | 6,205 | 1,632.895 | 6,970 | 1,834.211 | 765 | 12.719 |
| 3 | 8.2 | 3.6 | 2.278 | 5,986 | 1,662.777 | 6,955 | 1,931.944 | 969 | 23.958 |
| 34 | 7.7 | 3.8 | 2.026 | 5,621 | 1,479.210 | 5,730 | 1,507.895 | 109 | 0 |
| 10 | 7.5 | 2.8 | 2.679 | 5,475 | 1,955.357 | 3,245 | 1,158.929 | - 2,230 | 4.545 |
| 37 | 6.9 | 4.6 | 1.500 | 5,037 | 1,095.000 | 6,440 | 1,400.000 | 1,403 | 0 |
| 13 | 6.9 | 2.8 | 2.464 | 5,037 | 1,798.928 | 6,365 | 2,273.214 | 1,328 | 15.942 |
| 25 | 6.4 | 2.8 | 2.286 | 4,672 | 1,668.571 | 4,375 | 1,562.500 | - 297 | 17.241 |
| 17 | 6.2 | 2.8 | 2.214 | 4,526 | 1,616.428 | 6,125 | 2,187.500 | 1,599 | 6.667 |
| 32 | 6.2 | 2.8 | 2.214 | 4,526 | 1,616.428 | 4,917 | 1,756.071 | 391 | 11.570 |
| 33 | 6.5 | 2.8 | 2.321 | 4,745 | 1,694.642 | 3,375 | 1,205.357 | -1,370 | 7.693 |
| 22 | 5.9 | 2.8 | 2.107 | 4,307 | 1,538.214 | 6,265 | 2,237.500 | 1,958 | 19.008 |
| 14 | 5.7 | 1.8 | 3.167 | 4,161 | 2,311.667 | 1,950 | 1,083.333 | -2,211 | 48.139 |
| 31 | 5.1 | 1.8 | 2.833 | 3,723 | 2,068.333 | 3,345 | 1,858.333 | - 378 | 0 |
| 24 | 5.2 | 1.8 | 2.889 | 3,796 | 2,108.888 | 4,005 | 2,225.000 | 209 | 8.696 |
| 27 | 4.6 | 2.0 | 2.300 | 3,358 | 1,679.000 | 2,995 | 1,497.500 | - 363 | 17.391 |
| 18 | 4.6 | 2.8 | 1.643 | 3,358 | 1,199.286 | 3,210 | 1,146.429 | - 148 | 8.929 |
| 15 | 4.4 | 1.8 | 2.444 | 3,212 | 1,784.444 | 3,710 | 2,061.111 | 498 | 21.127 |
| 40 | 3.9 | .8 | 4.875 | 2,847 | 3,558.750 | 1,130 | 1,412.500 | - 1,717 | 25.352 |
| 38 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 1.357 | 2,774 | 990.714 | 5,515 | 1,969.643 | 2,741 | 16.018 |
| 23 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 1.179 | 2,409 | 860.357 | 5,635 | 2,012.500 | 3,226 | 6.061 |
| 19 | 3.4 | 1.0 | 3.400 | 2,482 | 2,482.000 | 2,245 | 2,245.000 | - 237 | 18.000 |
| 4 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.444 | 1,898 | 1,054.444 | 6,020 | 3,344.444 | 4,122 | 39.726 |
| 5 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 1.333 | 2,336 | 973.333 | 4,980 | 2,075.000 | 2,644 | 13.095 |
| 41 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.278 | 1,679 | 932.778 | 1,930 | 1,072.222 | 251 | 14.545 |
| 42 | 2.1 | .8 | 2.625 | 1,533 | 1,916.250 | 1,620 | 2,025.000 | 87 | 32.258 |
| 21 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.000 | 1,314 | 730.000 | 2,525 | 1,402.778 | 1,211 | 0 |
| 16x | 1.3 | .5 | 2.600 | 949 | 1,898.000 | 920 | 1,840.000 | 29 | 0 |
| 12 | .8 | .8 | 1.000 | 584 | 730.000 | 2,175 | 2,718.750 | 1,591 | 18.182 |
| *43 | 3.1 | .8 | 3.875 | 2,263 | 2,828.750 | 35 | 43.750 | 2,219.25 | 0 |

* destitute stranger

C = consumer

W = worker

CY = Chayanov yield

EY = empirical yield

and village tonw. Hence they find it to their advantage to invest in a system which redistributes labor rather than surpluses. By dispensing the latter as charity such compounds could still insure the rights of their descendants to make reciprocal claims should the demographic and economic fortunes of the participating compounds be reversed. However, by redistributing labor instead, these stronger compounds gain access to pooled labor after the weeding, when the time constraints are more relaxed but when pooled labor remains advantageous. At these times: harvesting, threshing, brick breaking, house building, field clearing, weaker compounds can more freely dispense labor and therefore all compounds can gain from the important economies of scale to be had by mobilizing large groups for these activities. In addition, by enabling the weaker compounds to realize a sufficient yield for their own needs, their stronger allies enable them to retain their self respect. This, too, is an investment not without its economic benefits.

Running down the ranking of compounds on Tables VI and VII then, we see that compound #2 and #11 have a somewhat weaker yield than my hypothesis expects: that these yields be a function of the number of consumers in a compound rather than the number of producers.
In this and other cases a slight correction has to be made for the fact that sorghum gives a better return on labor than millet. This superior return may be due in part to the nature of the plant but also it is a function of the fact that sorghum is only planted in fertilized housefield or in the first two years of a bush field rotation. It therefore benefits from stronger soil than millet which, as in the case of compound #2's and #11's millet in 1974, can be grown in the 8th year of a rotation. Compound



#s 26 and 16, on the other hand, have a heavier proportional investment in sorghum and, therefore, other things being equal, a superior overall yield.

#35's yield is a little off the mark as well, in this case for reasons already discussed: namely, the fragmentation of the compound farming effort (foroba baara) by the individual fields (jòn forow, sura forow) of four of its elder males. Information pertaining to these private fields is sparse on the tables. The labor days noted for part time fields only represent daytime investments of labor in these fields. It was impossible to note, for each day, at what hour of the afternoon these men (and the women with their own muso forow - note yield from these women's fields) left the compound field for their own. In any case, it was invariably earlier than the compound quitting time of other grown laborers in the village. Thus the "days" worked in the compound bush field of #35 should not be given the same value as those spent in other bush fields.

Where the yields of compound #s 8, 39, 7, and 3 fall behind those with similar numbers of consumers (#s 30, 36, and 28) it can also be attributed to their heavier investment in millet relative to sorghum (as was the case for compound #s 11 and 2 mentioned above). Once this millet/sorghum differential is accounted for, it can be seen how compound #s 2, 1, 3 and 13 used exchange-labor and/or youth group labor to bring up their out-put to the level attained by other compounds with the same number of consumers but with more male producers at their disposal.

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Compound #s 8 and 7 equally availed themselves of this extra-compound labor, but they often both fell last on the list in the exchange labor rotations in which they participated, and neither could gain the services of the youth group until the end of August - by which time the ton was put to making filakè "second made" mounds as they weeded. Therefore their uses of these extra-compound services had much less of an impact upon the weeds than for the above mentioned compounds. Since this was also the case in 1975, one can presume (although it is difficult for any one responsible to state this directly, since all compounds are officially treated equally) that because these compounds have ample male producers, neither one was favored with priority treatment by the youth group, or even their own exchange-labor groups.

The superior yield of #36 relative to compounds of the same size is due not only to his total investment in sorghum on fresh ground, but also to his use of herbicides and insecticides to which he has special (i.e. cheaper) access as a member of the co-operative at the chef-lieu d'arrondissement. This membership as well as the funds with which he purchased these inputs come from his position as the government weigher and grain buyer at the Friday market of this village. The insecticides enable him to plant earlier, to take advantage of a longer period of rains; other farmers are reluctant to plant too early, even if the rains are favorable, before sufficient rain has fallen to impede the movement of seed-bearing insects through the soil.

The yields of compound #s 9, 6, 10 and 14 also require some additional explanation relative to my hypothesis. They were all experiencing



a period of discouragement, due to the recent deaths of a brother of each of them. The situation of #9 was further exacerbated by the fact that it was the compound chief who had died and by the absence of the next adult brother in a factory job in Segu (he was persuaded to return for the 1975 weeding season), leaving a teenager in charge of the compound. These crises of leadership affected field management particularly in the guarding period after weeding, when conscientious surveillance depended solely upon the will of the compound leader himself. Therefore, youth group labor in two of these cases (#s 9 and 14) failed to improve yields very considerably, since monkeys made inroads into even the well weeded but unattended sections of their fields. However, the difference in the yields between them can be attributed to #9's and #10's access to an exchange-labor group (#s 6 and 14 had no male producer to offer in exchange). #9's exchange-labor group was clearly non-reciprocal since the other laborers in it were ten years older than the teenager head of compound #9. To measure the real value of this teenager's labor one only need compare his sorghum and millet yields respectively. For the sorghum his compound worked alone, for the millet it was helped by exchange-labor and the ton.

#10's deficient yield was not only due to a crisis of discouragement but also sprung from a determined effort to lure two grown sons back from jobs in Segu and the Ivory Coast. As part of this plot, the ton did not present itself to #10 hinting that it was ready to be "hired" (on long term credit, of course) by him (this was the way in which the ton offered its service). The one adult male in compound #10 had only

been recently circumcised and therefore only provided a significant labor contribution when animated by his contemporaries in his exchange-labor group. As was the case with compound #9, a poor 1974 performance was sufficient to shame at least one of #10's absent adult males into returning for the 1975 weeding season.

The yields recorded for compound #s 34, 32, 27, 33 and 18 do not conform to the hypothesis only because of missing information. Women's field yields from the first three escaped my notice (women were generally very secretive about their harvest) and a bush sorghum field yield from the latter two also passed by unrecorded. In all these cases the bulk yield could not be facilely recorded since the ton was not used to thresh it. Since sorghum is easier to thresh, the compound can do this alone if there is not too much of it. This tends to be the case with compounds (like #33 in 1974) who have to eat it as they harvest it. Where I was able to record yields in similar cases (most women's field yields were threshed privately) it was because my research assistant, host, or, often, the women's husband informed me of the ongoing harvest. Out of the ear-shot of any men from their compound, women were content to discuss their yields as long as the conversation included a sufficient amount of joking.

Compound #34 lived and farmed separately from the rest of the village; its head was a diviner because of this (more than the other way around). It was, therefore, difficult to keep track of its women's activities, since no one else knew anything about them. Its agnatic compound #33 farmed a bush field next to its own in a removed section, thus #33's sorghum yield was able to pass me by uncounted. #34's sorghum yield, on the



other hand, was not consumed off the ear (#33's surpluses had run out by the 1974 harvest time) and therefore was big enough to require public threshing. #32's and #27's mother had crops in lots of different places and they preferred to joke than help me to keep track of them.

#18's sorghum yield was also small enough to escape my notice because, having lost access to ancestral lands, this member of the founding clan had to borrow land from #s 33 and 34 in that more removed part of the bush. Not having the experience in guarding a sorghum field surrounded by wild bush (an experience that #s 33 and 34 had been forced to acquire as slave descendants who owned and farmed land, separate from the others), #18 was constantly foiled by birds removing his sorghum seeds. When it became clear that his sorghum yield (millet seeds are said to be safer from birds) was a disaster, his ally #16 invited him (along with #19) to join in harvesting his ample yield and thereby have a respectable way of sharing in it.

#19's yield also falls below what the hypothesis would lead one to expect not because of missing information but because of motivational problems. #19, who died later that year, was a respected lineage elder who had no sons. His ally #16 gave him a son. This youth, in age-set E, was naturally anxious to work with his real brothers rather than alone for his elder agnate. His performance was therefore inferior in the latter context, and the ton had to intervene.

Towards the bottom of the list, in the smaller compounds, the lack of any producers made it difficult for extra-compound assistance to make any difference. Compound #s 25, 31, 14 and 15 have only one

productive male and #24 has none. The other exceptionally low yields at this end of the list are those for casted (nyama kala) woodworking (kule) compounds (#s 40 and 41) which have other important sources of income. They have a monopoly on making troughs, pestles (both for pounding grain and she butter) mortars, and stools from the considerable forest areas which were (until 1948) under this village's control. Even now, the Service des Eaux et Forêts permits them some access to these woods. Their wives repair broken calabashes at the weekly market.

Also at this end of the list there are extremely high yields. In most cases these can be attributed, in line with the hypothesis, to the effective use of extra-compound labor (#s 22, 38, 5, and 4). That these compounds could improve upon a shortage of producers through the use of extra-compound labor, while compound #s 25, 14, 19, 24, 40, and 41 could not, can be attributed to their being able to combine exchange-labor with ton labor, instead of having to rely exclusively on the latter.

#s 6, 19, and 24 failed to engage in exchange-labor during this period for lack of adult male producers to exchange (although in 1975 an exchange-labor group was opened up to uncircumcised boys so that #6 could participate).

For compound #s 24 and 19 there were political problems in gaining access to such a group[6]: this is the sort of situation which the overall

[6] That is, #24 was #23's separated wife and #19 was the fadenya enemy of #17, the next in line for chief.



farming strategy of these villagers is designed to avoid. #s 40 and 41 were casted nyama kala, and, therefore, presumably excluded on other grounds.

For these smaller compounds the loss entailed by lack of access to exchange-labor cannot be over estimated. Where it was not used without the yields suffering too much, it was due either to a healthy use of the ton (#s 3, 25, and 13) or a strong sufficiency of adult male producers (#s 29, 34, and 37). That the discouraged compound #s 9 and 10 could produce more than the equally discouraged and equally large compound #6, can be attributed to the former's access to exchange-labor.

#23's superior yield, however, transcends the slight input by exchange-labor made to his weeding effort. This obstinate bamana pagan seeded his foroba with a slower variety of millet (sannyòba), which all the other compounds were reluctant to do in the wake of the drought. Since the rains improved in 1974, he was the winner because his slower sannyòba gave a greater yield per hectare than the faster boboni planted by the others. The opposite would have been the case if the 1974 rains had been weaker.

Nevertheless, when all these rectifications to the hypothesis are made, it remains true that a sizable amount of the weeding labor of the ton, as well as a certain though lesser proportion of the exchanged labor, was wasted on compounds without the management capability to turn this assistance into a good harvest.

While the failure of many compounds to profit from their ready access to outside labor can be explained in each case, it is harder to

explain, in formal economic terms, why neighboring compounds continue to donate labor to such lost causes.

In 1975 not only did poorer compounds maintain their membership in their 1974 exchange-labor groups and continue to gain the services of the ton youth association, more poor compounds (see next chapter) which had not been included in these labor pools in 1974 were brought into the circuit.

Unfortunately, I was not in Dukolomba long enough to record 1975 yields so as to see whether this additional extension of reciprocal co-operative labor services paid off in crop terms. But the lack of a 1974 pay-off in such cases, without any 1975 retaliation, forces the observer to recognize that crop yields are not the only terms in which the value of this inter-compound labor is judged. In the next chapter, I will go into the precise composition of the exchange-labor groups used during these two seasons, in order to try to identify what other functions they perform besides growing crops.

Harvesting and Threshing

These two tasks are extremely important for the outcome of a yield, but they are not subject to the same constraints as weeding. Once started, they have to be performed quickly, but there is some leeway (absent in the case of the weeding bottleneck) about when one can start. Therefore, these bottlenecks do not provide the test of the village institutions' abilities to mobilize labor in the most efficient form. In a village already more fragmented than the one under study, harvesting and threshing



can become the test of its ultimate solidarity, since compounds are already left to their own devices as far as weeding is concerned. Here alliances not strong enough to hold out against the weeding threat, leaving every compound for itself, can be patched together for harvesting and threshing where co-operation is equally valuable but less costly to the individual participant. But where inter-compound institutions are functioning more smoothly, co-operation in harvesting and threshing happens as a matter of course without any politicking for alliances having to be done (as is the case with weeding).

Exchange-labor is valuable in harvesting because after the stalks are knocked down, the heads of sorghum or millet have to be cut, gathered and stored in their temporary mound before termites or other predators get to them. On its own, of course, a small compound could knock down only those stalks which it could cut on the same day. But under these conditions several economies of scale would be lost:

- women transporting the cut heads to their pile, and the compound head arranging this pile, would be left idle since they would not be processing - on account of the small number of cutters - a sufficient volume.
- with fewer cutters moving over a single field area there is a greater chance that healthy heads will be passed over.

Women are allowed to pass over an area after the harvesters say they are finished with it (see "women's pickings" - nyò noro) in Appendix II.

Thus, while lost grain is regained in this fashion, as far as the compound foroba granary is concerned it is still lost.

Since this harvesting can begin at any time once the plant is sufficiently dry (sorghum is always harvested first, of course, but only threshed after all the village's millet is harvested), compounds are less jealous with the labor. Thus laborers given in aid (deme baara kelaw) rarely seen in the weeding season are often found harvesting in the fields of other compounds in addition to, but not on the same days as, exchange-laborers (damadenw).

As long as the temporary pile of grain heads is sufficiently insulated from termites (by being piled on termite resistant logs or with DDT) and from livestock and monkeys (by being surrounded with thorns), threshing can be done at anytime before the next rains. However, once these heads are spread out on the burnt-off, cleared and smoothed threshing ground[7], the grain must be threshed as quickly as possible. Threshing is therefore the obligatory and unremunerated responsibility of the age-set organization. If there is more grain than the ton youth group can handle, age-sets which have already graduated from the ton are added to the threshing force to form a threshing ton. Each season members of an age-set, usually ten years older than that of the ton tigiw, are named as tigiw chiefs of this expanded, threshing ton. They decide which age-sets are to thresh, which ones are to rake, and which ones are to sit under a tree and watch, depending upon the size of the harvest to be beaten

[7]prepared by the dutigi or his surrogate.



on that day. These tasks are never rotated between the age-sets, but the most strenuous fall invariably on the youngest. If the wind is blowing perpendicular to the rectangular threshing ground the line of threshers have to move up and down its width rather than its length since they must have the wind coming from behind: otherwise the flying grain sheaths will sting their eyes. If the line of threshers called out that day does not reach the width of the threshing ground in such cases, at the end of the lap the same junior threshers complete the little unbeaten section, slowing up their return to the next big lap. There is no question of their immediate elders dropping the raking or resting role assigned to them for the day in order to speed up the threshing by doing the small left over section, while their juniors are walking back and regrouping for the next big lap. Much less will these seniors permanently drop their raking and resting role (which could be changed into a threshing one in a bigger field the next day) in order to extend the threshing line to the full width of the field. Threshers are not lined up by age, though, since that could leave one part of the threshing area better beaten than another. A threshing crew, however, never falls below the size of the junior ton prieri in its composition. Fines are imposed on absentees.

Where the ton, in any of its three sizes (the larger threshing ton, the two ton baw, or the single ton prieri of the under 30 youths), is well organized, the only impediment to the effective performance of this threshing labor is the rate of absenteeism of the youths in the Ivory Coast. Even though such youths pay the fine for their absence from the

threshing, the elders would still prefer that they remain at home since their rate of absenteeism forces the strenuous threshing work upon older and older age-sets.

In more fragmented and entrepreneurial villages it is more difficult to put together an effective threshing force. While these villages have a ton it may permit a greater degree of absenteeism; furthermore these villages tend to send more youths as migrant laborers to the Ivory Coast in the dry season - or even (something heavily sanctioned in the older villages) throughout the entire year including the weeding season. This means that in the newer, entrepreneurial villages it takes more time to thresh the same amount of grain. Therefore, these yields experience a greater loss to termites even if they can be effectively guarded against goats, sheep, and, during the night, wild boars.

Like other tonbaara seances, threshing is a festive occasion, with drums, singing mpogotigiw (unmarried women) and good food. While tondenw weeders are always presented with a basin of dège porridge, threshers get to grits and fish. Meat, of course, would be a bigger treat but not all of the hosting field owners can afford it, therefore none of them supply it at the risk of appearing better off than - and therefore in less need of the assistance of - their neighbors. With the retreat of the Bani flood, larger fish are found stranded in its swamps at this time (December-January)[8]. Therefore all villagers are capable of supplying this treat.

[8]Sections of most, but not all, of these different swamps are jealously owned by different compounds, all descended from early settlers (dugutigiw or siginyogònfèw). The "Bozo" fishermen own only the river itself.



When the tondenw of Dukolomba are hired out to neighboring entrepreneurial villages, which almost by definition have less vigorous tonw of their own, meat and kola nuts are expected.

Three drummers beat a large dumba base drum and two smaller ngongolo bongos behind the threshers helping to keep time. One's threshing stick must be down when those of one's immediate neighbors is up, otherwise they will become entangled and even break. This is a serious loss since the joint threshing stick has to be cured in the mud by a well and then bent to the proper obtuse angle before it is good for use.

housefield grain is threshed almost as soon as it is harvested, so that the village sheep and goats can be given free rein after three months of close supervision (by a hired Fula) since these fields were seeded. It is usually the ton prieri youths of the ward, to which that housefield belongs, which do this threshing. Likewise, the smaller sorghum bush fields are threshed immediately after being harvested, also by a ward (sokolabaara) team. However, for this bush sorghum the ton prieri age youths are often not sufficient and even ex-tondenw members from the ward are called into thresh, depending upon their age-set. All this is done before the millet harvest begins and before the harvest of the larger sorghum fields is completed. In a few cases, this bush sorghum was threshed earlier because depleted granary reserves had not been made good by the housefield harvest. Needy families, of course, brought in grain heads into the village to eat after a day of harvesting work. (I tried to keep track of this attrition in calculating my grain

yields but I invariably missed some - which is why the yields of some of the poorer compounds may read lower than they actually were). But often this was not sufficient to both feed the family and to sell in order to be able to purchase vital condiments.

All subsequent threshing is organized by a village-wide "threshing" ton, led in 1974 by the members of age-set t[9] - who had "graduated" from their senior tonba over eight years before. These threshing tontigiw decided in what order the bush field grain would be threshed. The rule followed was: those who were threshed first the year before were threshed last this year. Since the millet heads are always dry when cut, early threshing is preferable since the grain thereby spends less time in the bush, exposed, however well protected in the nyòfa stack pile, to the depredations of termites and animals, wild and domestic. The larger compounds are found at the top and the bottom of the threshing list, while the smaller compounds are found towards the middle; therefore, the compounds most able to risk the danger are the only ones exposed to the long wait every other year. But there is another reason why the larger yields are threshed first and last. There is an attempt to capitalize on the dry season movements of male youths to and from the Ivory Coast. At the earlier part of the bush field threshing season (December) there will still be some migrants who will

[9]See Table I .



not have left. At the end of the threshing season (February), there will be some discouraged migrants who will already have returned. Also at this time, young men planning a marriage or wishing to participate in the ton festival (ton nyèna jè) will begin trickling in.

It is not only to avoid the rigors of the threshing work themselves that members of the senior age-sets discourage their juniors from disappearing to the Ivory Coast, even if only in the dry season. There is the fear that with the dangers of the route and the diseases encountered to the south, these juniors will not return fit to farm in the next rainy season. But the seniors are willing to thresh if they must, for if the juniors saw that the grain they weeded was not properly processed, they might reject the idea of returning to weed the next year's grain. As already noted, village economic activities are as much focused on producing youths who will return to farm (just as in precolonial days the banana villages sought to keep its youth from pursuing trading or mercenary occupations) as they are on producing crops. What has to be clarified in the next chapter is where farming activities are geared to crop production and where they are geared to forming loyal descendants, or both.

Winnowing

After threshing is completed, the vulnerable grain is once again left under its full time guard of dudenw (who have not left the harvest since it was taken from its nyòfa pile and spread out on the threshing ground), over night if necessary, until the winnowing women come. If

they cannot winnow the entire harvest in one day (some of the larger millet yields (#s 11 and 12) took three days to winnow), the male field guard returns to the field when they leave. However, while they are winnowing, not even an uncircumcised boy, unless he is still on his mother's back, is present. It is an entirely feminine occasion.

Each woman present returns from her labors with a nklamankla calabash of millet. Just how high this calabash is heaped depends upon the ruling of the senior woman of the compound whose field it is. For winnowing sorghum, the level of grain in the nklamankla is left just below the rim (3 kgs); for winnowing millet, a somewhat more demanding task, the nklamankla is filled to the brim (4 kgs) or even heaped (5 kgs) depending upon how many women have showed up at the winnowing site.

The networks of women manifested on these occasions gave me an excellent opportunity to see how they attempted to organize that part of the economy under their control. I will look at this sector more closely in Chapter IX, since it provides an interesting test case of the dominance of the patrilineal system over the village economy.

As can be seen from Table VII on yields, the amount of grain "earned" by these winnowers was not always a function of the size of the harvest. While the senior women of the compound could not send away other village women who shamelessly showed up to help, the compound head himself had even less control over how much grain he would lose in this stage of its production. In fact, if he did not have good relations with the women in his compound they might be inclined to seek outside



support by being generous with the foroba grain on winnowing day. All compound heads complained about their lack of control over winnowing activities as related to the distribution of their harvest, but they did not interfere with their wives policies on this matter. This was not the only instance where economic matters in the compound depended upon the good will of its in-marrying women. The quality of the cooking was another thermometer of husband/wife, male/female relations in any given compound.

The winnowing of housefields was always done by the ranking women of the ward. Since there was less grain they did not bring along a daughter or a junior wife from their compound to sweep up the threshed grain for them to winnow. This they would only do for a bush field harvest. There was not enough grain in the housefield to justify this doubling of the amount of winnowers. Smaller housefields were entirely winnowed by the women of the field-owning compound itself. If outside women were not invited to winnow the housefield of a compound, the women of that compound were not expected to attend the winnowing of the ward neighbor's housefield - unless they were from an unproductive compound and could not be denied the 3 kg (housefields were usually sorghum) winnowing fee.

The women's networks activiated in winnowing the larger bush fields will be looked at in greater detail in Chapter IX. Here, I will only note in passing that the women who winnowed most frequently on the threshing ground of compounds from other wards were women from compounds

whose men were agnates with the men from the host compound. It remains to be seen to what degree these women were themselves kinswomen having coming to the Dukolomba Buare along an established marriage route (furusira). Otherwise, the women seemed to co-operate according to compound membership, winnowing with the women from the same neighboring compounds as joined their husbands to harvest and build houses (though not weed necessarily - see next chapter). In both these cases the women's networks appear to mirror those developed by the men in their farming practice.

Into the Granary

Dukolomba's lack of capital equipment forces it to co-operate once again for this last task of the farming season. With only donkey carts, (in compound #s 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 26) every cart in the village has to be mobilized to make at least one trip with four sacks of the grain of even the smallest compound yield. Two klamankla calabash full (4-5 kgs) of grain are given to the cart owner for each of these voyages. Each of these carts makes approximately the same number of voyages regardless of the relations between the cart owner and the field owner at that time. Only rarely will a close ally of the field owner make a few extra trips from threshing ground to granary for his friend.

Tondenw ward mates of the dudenw of the field owner are usually on hand to transfer the winnowed grain into 100 kg sacks for transport to the granary. It was at this point that I was discreetly (although I always had the field owner's permission, having promised not to disclose



the total to his neighbors) able to measure the basic yield of each compound. The sacks[10] were supplied by the cart owner and would be emptied at the foot of the foroba granary of the compound in question.

This granary was always built by the compound head (dutigi). Only if he was aged and criplled would a junior take charge of the task. If he was young and able but neglected the task no one could presume to take his place. The compound would have to make do with a granary of poor construction or with an old granary. Ideally a new granary should be built for each fresh crop so that there would be ready access to the older grains of previous years -- this was usually the grain that was sold once the new harvest was in. Even a woman with her private crop had to await her husband if she wanted a granary for it. If he did not oblige her, she could hire an outsider, call in a relative, or, if she only had a small amount, store the grain in sealed pots.

Once built and full, a woman could never take grain out of the foroba granary. When it was time to mill grain for a meal, a little boy was sent off with a calabash to the dutigi, or the eldest male if he was absent, to find out how much grain he should remove that day.

Elder kindabaaradenw or sokalabaara denw, from the surrounding lineage or ward respectively, would scoop the unloaded grain up in calabashes and hand it to the dutigi who would be standing above the granary opening with a few of his age-mates to pour the grain within. When the entire harvest was stored in this fashion the dutigi would

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[10] filled to 100 kgs each for the cart voyage from the threshing ground.

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then begin to receive the blessings of his neighbors.

House-Building

These same ward and lineage units which came together to bring in the threshed grain would stay together for the remainder of the cool season to co-operate in house building.

Bricks were often ordered from the ton. The clay soil of Dukolomba permitted a house builder there to leave the brick laying to the more careless efforts of the tondenw. Where the soil was loamier or sandier, straw had to be mixed in the brick mud; where a certain amount of diligence was required to keep the bricks from breaking. In Dukolomba, furthermore, brick mud could be taken from anywhere not just from a few choice holes. Thus, as the years went by, one thin layer was trimmed off of the soforow housefields surrounding the village. This field space would be thereby lowered relative to the village itself. Therefore, the older the village got the greater relief there would be between its living floors and the housefields. Soon the rains would wash the refuse out of the village into the housefields below without any human effort having to be expended. This convenience may be another reason, besides the slighter weed growth there, why the earliest Bamana in the region chose to settle in clay soil zones.

Brick laying, however, was performed by ward members (sokala denw) up to a certain age, usually corresponding to that at which membership in the threshing ton stopped (age-set t in 1974). The eldest members of the sokalabaara or kindabaara group would climb the walls and lay



the bricks as they were handed up by their juniors. The youngest in the work group would be responsible for supplying these brick layers with the thick mud used to cement the bricks together. This mud mortar was prepared the night before by the dudenw of the compound where the house was being built.

When one compound in a ward built a house during the dry season, everyone tried to, so that they could take advantage of this co-operative labor group to which they would be obliged to contribute their labor whether they needed its services or not. This sokalabaara group, however, was always classified as a form of exchange-labor (dama baara) rather than aid (deme baara) since, given the bamana norms, there was no reason to suspect that one man would want to build more houses than another.

When the roof beams of a house were set and when it was roofed with fresh branches and dirt the largest sokalabaara group was mobilized. This group not only included older age-sets in the ward but it united kindabaara groups centered on a lineage segment, that had been brick-laying separately.

When these larger house-building co-operative labor groups included members from outside the ward (#s 8, 27 and 32, each from a different ward, exchanged each other's brick layers) they nevertheless fell within the two ward divisions of the older village, and therefore corresponded to the membership of the two elder tonbaw (see Chapter III). But for the smaller kindabaara groups it was the lineage segment and/or a few

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of the closest neighboring compounds which exchanged their labor. Such was also the case for the exchange labor (dama baara) used in field harvesting. But this format is in marked contrast with the composition of the weeding dama baara units. With the kindabaara and harvesting dama baara groups the residentially and, frequently, genealogical proximity of the co-operating compounds permits a less exact observance in the reciprocity of days worked. But with weeding, reciprocity is more strictly observed because more distant compounds are co-operating and because labor is at much more of a premium at that time. Were distant compounds preferred for weeding exchange-labor because of the need to get exact reciprocity at this time, and it is easier to deman such strict accounting from strangers?

To sort out the politics of exchange labor and to evaluate its impact upon agricultural success, I have to turn to the network content of each of these exchange labor groupings.



## CHAPTER VII - THE ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS

### Introduction

It is, of course, this question of the social organization of production which has run as a theme through the presentation so far. But until now I have been looking at the impact of the more corporate institutions, compound, lineage segment, ward, village, age-set, ton, etc. upon farming practice in as much as the latter contributes to the reproduction of personnel for these institutions. I have tried to show how it is not merely in the vitality of farming success that the peasant defines the security of his situation. For this reason he calls himself a bamana (even after conversion to Islam) more often than a cikèlaw, "farmer".

I have described how the egalitarian relations within the most corporate peasant institution, the patrilocal compound, are normatively extended such that their reciprocity is replicated when ward-mates and age-mates come together for a joint enterprise. And I have noted in general terms how the density of agnatic (Chapter III) and matrilateral (Chapter IV) kin ties facilitates this transference of intra-lineage relations from within the compound to ward-wide and village-wide groupings. Now the time has come to look at the situations (cf. Van Velsen 1967) in which this transference takes place. It is one thing to note ideological and normative links between the interrelations of compound mates and the interrelations of age-mates respectively, it is another to identify the conditions under which they become operational. A dense network of agnatic and matrilateral kin ties provide a basis for

realizing this continuity from the compound to the age-set, but this remains only a possibility unless these ties are used to mobilize participation in significant social action. Participation in one's compound and membership in one's age-set cannot be said to be optional. But unless the vitality of the productive and reproductive responsibilities of the compound are transferred to the age-sets and their grouping, the latter remain as empty and ignored institutions; the village loses its integration, and, eventually, the compound itself sacrifices egalitarian co-operation as the route to security. The vitality of intra-compound relations can only be transferred out by more optional, quasi-group formations (cf. Southall 1966) engaged in equally significant material activities. Only if the organization of these optional quasi-groups replicates, both in content and purpose, the organizational relations which are imperative in the compound, can these kind of relations be expected to be the choice of those placed in a non-optional grouping such as the ward and the age-set whose members, unlike compound members, can still choose how to activate their groups.

If the compound is listless, the continuity of the group is open to question, but this is not (immediately) the case if the age-sets and wards are weak. Some newer (tonjòn duguw) villages near Dukolomba have many productive compounds but a listless ton, whose two halves fight together more often than they work together. This is not the case for the ton of Dukolomba and other neighboring bamana duguw.



The difference depends on how the most basic economic interrelations, those within the compound, are defined. The way to detect this difference is to look at the formation of more optional economic groupings where the voluntary members can be seen choosing partners through relations which they consider to be more deserving of attention. Do compounds co-operate with agnatic equals or non-kin clients when they bring in outsiders to participate in their economic affairs? What does this difference mean for the organization of the compound itself? its uses of labor? its production goals? its future as a compound? Looking at the formation of quasi-groups outside of the compound cannot help us in answering these questions unless one looks at those groups which participate in economic activities as significant for the continuity of the group as those of the compound itself. It should come as no surprise that the composition of the exchange labor groups used during the weeding labor bottleneck bring out some of the villager's most fundamental orientations towards labor and its use; orientations that are hidden behind the imperative nature of intra-compound relationships, yet which affect the economic goals and therefore the future of the community.

In this chapter I will compare the social networks used in exchange labor relations during the 1974 and 1975 weeding seasons in Dukolomba with those used during the 1975 season in a tonjòndugu, Nianiwèrè, just to the north. Then I will look at how ton youth group labor was distributed in Dukolomba during both of these seasons. It is difficult to compare the use of the ton in Dukolomba with its weaker counterparts

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in tonjonduguw that are often passed over by the compounds in their own village in favor of hiring bamanaton such as Dukolomba's.

Exchange Labor in Dukolomba

Although exchange labor (damabaara) is used both in weeding and millet harvesting (see Chapter VI), it is in the more severe labor bottleneck, weeding, that a compound can be seen using and developing those social relationships which it considers most valuable. During millet harvesting, labor was usually exchanged between ward-mates. This is easier to do since reciprocity of exchange is not too carefully measured within the ward. Ward members are obliged to pool their labor (sokalabaara) in fonio harvesting and housebuilding in any case. That a compound turns to its obligatory labor partners during a milder bottleneck, millet harvesting, does not tell us which relationships that compound chooses to depend upon when things get tougher.

During the weeding labor bottleneck not only are ward-mates, so casual about who is using whose labor at other times, not always available for exchange labor - they may have more important alliances to cultivate than with certain other ward-mates - even if they were as available as at other times, they alone might not be able to form a big enough exchange labor group. With one exception, I have labeled the exchange labor chains used during the 1974 and 1975 weeding seasons in Dukolomba (see Figure IV) by the letter of the age-set which predominates within each. The fact that I never had to use the same letter for two of these exchange labor groups reflects the success of field owners in pooling the labor of contemporaries. Age-mates are more




FIGURE IV
1974 WEEDING
EXCHANGE-LABOR
NETWORKS

easily shamed into keeping up with their equals, other age-mates, as they weed side by side up and down parallel rows of millet or sorghum. One could more respectfully let an elder or a junior weed past one in the next row; but never an age-mate or even a member of an adjacent age-set.

The question is, which age-mates find themselves in the same exchange-labor group? What other relationships are being combined with age-mates in this strategic production occasion? Are there other organizing principles for the exchange-labor groups which transcend age-set homogeneity in importance?

F: Five of the ten members of the F age-set (cf. Table I) were in the first group to go into action in both 1974 (July 27) and 1975 (July 29). Each year the five included (1974: 1, 7, 26, 34; 1975: 7, 26, 27, 29, 32) were from three different wards. Of the F's not included some were absent in the Ivory Coast (1974: 10, 34; 1975: 1, 34). One F was from a compound that, on the brink of splitting, was too tied up with private (jònforo or suraforo) individual fields to loan out laborers for the entire day even to their own foroba: (#35, the Maraka). Yet a younger weeder from this compound, who had no individual field, joined an exchange-labor group in 1975. Another F was from the leading compound of Dukolomba's animists (#30) which organized its own exchange labor group in 1975. Nevertheless, #s 29 and 32 are also from this animist ward, yet they sent E age-mates, to this exchange-labor group. In 1974, one F, #29, was sick. #10F was back from the Ivory Coast in 1975 but only to help his destitute father as much as possible before returning.



With this tactic in mind he was not open to understanding the value of spending 5/7 of his time in other people's fields.

Although a reason can be found for the absence of each F age-mate, this does not mean that the other F's joined together primarily because they were age-mates. When one considers the identity of the other laborers who joined this exchange labor group, it can be seen that the membership of the F age-set does not form its nucleus. Some of the more permanent members of the exchange-labor group (8E, 36G) are not in this F age-set. Some of these F's joined age-mates who were in the group for other reasons.

Actually, at the core of this group are 7F and 8E who are not age-mates but rather very close agnates (see genealogy, Figure III). 26F and 36G were in the group in both 1974 and 1975 primarily because they were negotiating to marry 8I and 7G respectively. #26's client kinsmen, 27F, was obliged to join his age-mate here when asked. 28B, who joined the group in 1975, had already exchanged sisters with 8A. 1F was a close agnate in addition to being an age-mate of 7F's, and, 32F's mother came from a family which always married with this lineage segment. That leaves only 29F who, sick in 1974, joined the group in 1975. His mother (see Table V) comes from compound #8. 30F, one of the F's who did not join this exchange-labor group, had his mother from compound #35 - the home of one of the other non-participating F age-mates. Thus even though #30 had another wife, besides 30F's mother, from compound #8, 30F was not drawn to this exchange labor group. #29, whose son was involved, is just as animist and isolated from the Muslim community as #30, if not

more so. But then #29F's own mother was from compound #8. 35F's mother was also not tied to the core lineage segment governing membership in this exchange labor group, even though she was from compound #28 (see Figure III) which had sent her little brother to the group. This may be another reason why the "Maraka" 35F was not involved in the exchange.

It can be seen that every member of this exchange labor group was either an agnate from a single lineage segment (Faso's) (see Genealogy - Figure III) or closely connected to it by marriage. Yet not all of them were from a single age-set. One of them, 28B, was considerably older than the predominant F age-set. Nevertheless, there were so many F's in this group that one could be excused for attributing the enthusiasm with which they weeded together to their age-set allegiance rather than their kinship allegiance. It was my observation that the actors themselves blended these two identities on this occasion.

H: On July 30, 1974 and August 9, 1975 what I have called the H exchange-labor group began to weed. The core of this group was again two close agnates, only in this case not the laborers themselves, who were still relatively young (see Table I), but their fathers', or more properly speaking their compound heads (dutigiw) since one of the youths was an adopted lamòden and the other was a pawn. #4 and #5 were two of the senior Buare agnates who had moved to the Sokala ward without converting to Islam (see Chapter III). Neither of them had



sons, but #4's wife's sister had given him one (4H) and #1 had given one to #5. This second adopted lamòden was still uncircumcised, #5 hired a pawn of the proper age in order to help him farm and gain access to an exchange labor group. #1 sent along 1J (he does not have an H) to the exchange labor group set up by his pagan agnates. 7H, also a Buare from Sokala, joined them. Their neighbor, #38, the only non-Buare compound in Sokala, whose mother comes from a line which often marries with this Buare lineage segment, sent along his little brother 38H. In 1974 an adopted member of compound #2 (2K) (adopted in the sense that his mother rather than his father was born in this compound) was added making it four Sokala Buare compounds involved in this exchange labor group. In 1975, 2K's father, who had been living as a slave descendant in compound #16 (16X) gathered his two sons (16XB, 2K) together to start a field, and therefore a compound, of his own. In 1974, only 16XB had helped this old man with his field at the same time as he labored most of his days in the field of #16 or on his behalf in an exchange labor group (A). In 1975, 2K was replaced in exchange-labor group H by 10K, also a Buare from Sokala, whose older brother was now back from the Ivory Coast (cf. above).

Even though all of the participants in exchange-labor group H were from the Sokala ward, the only H's in the village who were not included were from the tense maraka compound (#35), the officially ostracized compound #18 which had prematurely split off from #17 (see Chapter III), (although these two joined the same exchange-labor group (G) in 1975) and a border line Muslim compound from Bablunda (#25).

Therefore, while five of the seven participants (4H, 5's pawn, 1J, 2K, 7H) were from one lineage segment (Faso's) and another one (10K) was an agnate who shared Siriba (Faso's father) as a common ancestor with the other's (this leaves only 38H among the group), it cannot be denied that this exchange-labor group gained an egalitarian work spirit in as much as there was such a high proportion of age-mates in it. On the other hand, it would be problematical to activate the ceremonial egalitarianism of the age-sets if these youths were not at the same time weeding the subsistence crop of their own, and their descendants' lineage segment.

K: On August 3, 1974 and August 9, 1975 a very young exchange-labor group K was launched on its rotations like the others, it circulated into each participating foroba at least twice, for a whole day each time. While in 1974 all its members (10K, 11J, 8K, 28K[1], 17K, and 23K) had been circumcised for at least two years, in 1975 newly circumcised youths (L age-set) from compound #s 11, 10, and 28 came, instead of their older brothers (11K, 10K, and 28K), to this group. New initiates from compound #s 1, 2, and 7 (all close agnates of #s 8, 10, and 11) joined this group leaving 17K and 23K to depart with their age-mates 10K, 11K, and 28K. However, 8K, a closer agnate to the others than #s 17 or 23, remained with the group and was joined by 9K from the same soma minimal lineage segment. On August 16, 17K struck up another exchange labor group with 26K (see Chapter III on the alliance between #17 and #26 - both of their compounds had taken wives with #29's

[1]He was replaced from time to time by his older brother 28H.



relatives in Bwala). 15J, whose mother was the sister of #26's first wife, joined them.

The same principles are at work with this K group as with the other groups discussed. Agnates find themselves working together as age-mates for the lineage estate. As the age-set codes serve to dampen any agnatic fadenya jealousies between the weeders, at the same time the exchange-labor, in as much as it takes place on family fields, conditions age-mates to produce for their own posterity as fathers and ancestors.

In the 1974 group 17K and 23K are not really agnates but only fellow olan members with the other K Buare on the exchange-labor team. However, 17K's mother is a kinswoman of wives in compound #s 10 and 11, whose youths were in this exchange-labor group (cf. above). The two youths from #28, one of which farmed in this exchange-labor group each year, are related by marriage, as already noted, to #8. 28L was the only one in the 1975 group who was not a member of the Buare clan.

A: On August 3, 1974 the leaders of each of the tonbaw in Dukolomba, 39A. of the Wèrèba ton and 2A of the Sokala ton became the core of a smaller exchange-labor group. They were tontigi leaders, along with 38A for Sokala and 16A for Wèrèba, because they were the oldest members of the tontigi age-set (A) (see Table I). However, 39A's mother and 2A's older brother's wife came from the same compound (#37) part of which had since emigrated from Dukolomba (see Table V). Even, on August 9, 1975, when 2A was replaced by 38A in this exchange labor

group, one could not say that this was just the elder tontigiw getting together. 38A's mother was from this same emigre compound as 39A's. No other damadenw joined these two in 1975, but in 1974, 9G, who, as young as he was, was head of a large compound that he did not seem to be able to feed, was allowed to join the two tontigiw. #16 also sent along the son, 16xB, of the slave descendant in his compound, to this group. There seem to have been two reasons why #16, who normally eschewed exchange labor relationships for his many "sons", did this. One, while his "sons" worked well together, and there so many of them that the stimulation of numbers could be had without bringing in an exchange-labor group, this non-consanguinial duden, 16xB, was more inclined to goof off in the field and distract the others. Not being a kinsmen, and not eligible for the compound headship, ever, he could be less easily shamed into a superior performance. It was therefore worth exchanging him for a small exchange-labor group. Secondly, in 1975 16xB intended to join his father and 2K in a separate farming group. As a smaller unit this group would need reliable access to an exchange-labor group for weeding in that year, therefore 16xB had to establish a reputation as a weeder worth exchanging for. 2K (16xB's brother) may have also been put on display, in exchange group H, by his large compound, #2, for the same reason.

30: 16xB did find an exchange-labor group in 1975. Although it started late, August 11, and was smaller, with only three other members (41B, 30C, and 22D), it gained in importance as the weeding season



progressed. They were joined by 37T on August 12, and by 13B and 33G (who had been with 30C and 22G in 1974) on August 14. This group was one of two 1975 offshoots of the 1974 exchange-labor group which I have labeled 30, since it was centered on the young weeders of that compound, 30C and 30F, even though they were separated by many age-sets. Furthermore, the other members of this 1974 group, 22D, 33G, and 32E, were all from animist or near animist compounds allied to #30's and all got more labor out of the group than did #30, relative to its contribution. Some of the weeders who joined the groups later in 1975 never got back to #30's field, although his sons weeded in theirs. #30 was attempting to consolidate the support of his animist followers through the use of this group. Although he was always free with sorghum beer throughout the year, #30 knew that this sort of weeding co-operation would bind his followers to him much more solidly. Compound #s 33 and 32 were animist from his own ward; #22, #37, #41, and #13B (whose father had remained animist) were border-line Muslims from Bablunda. #16X (16xB's father) from Wereba, having just detached itself from compound #16, was a border-line Muslim looking to be seduced back into animism.

In 1975, compound #30 expanded this stategy of giving more than it received into two exhhange-labor groups which found themselves together in #30's field on August 11.

The one that included 16xB has been described as a motley group of border-line Muslims or the sons of border line Muslims. Actually there were some border-line cases who were not included. Many of those who were, constituted more than a residual collection of pagans left

behind by the village Muslims. 32E's mother and 13B's wife were from the same compound in Dufunu; women from the Faso Buare lineage segment of Sokala had married into compound #s 30, 33, and 37 (see Table V) as well as to 16x himself. #22 and #33's little brother had both married women from the same compound in Bwala, the same from which #29 himself had come. From this group only #41 was not connected by these sorts of ties since he was a nyamakala from the kule wood working caste. He could only marry other kule. In the case of 41B, common age-set membership was the only point of contact between him and other weeders in the exchange-labor group (16xB and 13B).

In the other group, which had begun weeding on August 3, 1975, #30 joined his son, 30I, with the son, 29G, of his animist neighbor and affine #29 and they both went to weed the field of destitute 9G, who had been in an exchange-labor group with some tontigiw the year before (see A above). While #9 was not a devout Muslim and needed the weeding help desperately (even though 9G's older brother had finally come back from Segu, having been absent in 1974, to weed this year). The group was also joined by the son, 18H, of the very Muslim #18. In 1974, #18 had not been included in a weeding exchange-labor group (although his ally #16 helped him to harvest - see Chapter VI) because of his dispute with #17 (see Chapter III). In 1975, #30 took advantage of #18's ostracism by his fellow Muslims and to gain influence in the village, inviting #18's son to weed with his sons. #18, with a pitiful harvest in 1974 (see Table VII - only a small sorghum harvest was left unrecorded here), and with no such invitation from a Muslim ally, had



to accept. In addition, of course, #18's wife, the weeder damaden 18H's mother, was from the same Dufunu lineage as both 9G's levirate wife and his mother as well as the mother of #32 who was allied with #30 in the other 30 exchange-labor group. Once 18H was in the group it was easier to persuade his Muslim age-mate and neighbor 35H to join, which he did on August 9, 1975. At the same time, two more ward-mates and animist allies of #30, #31, an agnatic kinsman as well, and #33, added their sons, 31G and 33G to this group. On August 12, 27F who had been left out of exchange group F this year, joined this second 30 group. By August 14, #30 had even gotten this group, now seven strong, into the foroba of the misanthropic #34 in return for the labor of 34J on subsequent dates. However, at this point 33G, the son of #34's animist agnate #33, moved over to the other 30 exchange-labor group in order not to be made to feel unwelcome in the field of his self-consciously Muslim patrilineal relative. #34's wife was a relative of the elder woman of compound #35. And one of 9G levirate wives was from #34's compound. Otherwise #35H and #34J (now that #33G had left) had no other kinship relation with the other members of this exchange-labor group, and it was the only exchange-labor group in two years in which these two compounds participated.

Thus, even in the case of these last two (30) exchange-labor groups, where alliances between animist seemed to take precedence over age-set homogeneity as an organizing principle, agnatic or matrilateral kinship again turns out to be the real determinant of membership. If this

were not the case, the age-sets or the animist initiation groups, as the case may be, would be less able to make their egalitarian ideology stick. Egalitarian relations take on a material importance in the kinship context, not only for the distribution of rights in juniors' labor but also in the distribution of bride wealth. Both the agnates who perform these labor duties and claim this bride wealth, and the matrilateral relatives who are paid out a bride wealth in turn, and who must back up the group when the agnatic labor fails to feed it, benefit from the equal distribution of these duties and these rights. Such egalitarianism can only be transferred to non-kin groupings if the latter perform a material function in the reproduction of the kinship relations which gave it birth. The portent of such a transference appears more salient to the participants if the non-kin groupings contain members who are secondarily connected by kin ties.

Exchange-Labor and Yields

There were more exchange-labor groups in rotation in 1975 than in 1974. This was due to the periodicity of the rainfall (see Appendix I) which made the weeds more of a threat in 1975. By July 29, 1975, when the first exchange-labor group of the season was mobilized, 286 mm of rain had fallen since July 9 when the field they were weeding had last been ploughed or hoed. This hoeing or ploughing kills the early weed growth. During this twenty-day interval the heavy rainfall gave a secondary weed growth a strong headstart over the sorghum which had been seeded since July 9. During this same twenty-day period only 120 mm



had fallen in 1974, and 162 mm in 1973 (these are the Duna readings - see Appendix I). 1972, of course, was one of the most serious drought years, with only 38.5 mm falling during this germinating period. Thus, in 1975 sorghum and millet sprouts were threatened as they never had been in this decade. A maximally effective use of weeding labor was more necessary than ever.

Given this ecological constraint, it is not surprising that so many loner compounds such as #34, #35, and #37 participated in exchange-labor groups in 1975. What is surprising is that compounds which had the benefit of exchange-labor in 1974 but who, through field guarding negligence, failed to harvest all of their well weeded crop (#s 9, 18, 27, 33 and to a lesser extent 22 and 32) were still enthusiastically included in exchange-labor groups in 1975. In addition, #s 13, 15, 18, 34 and 41 were invited to join exchange-labor groups that year even though their farming performance in 1974 had been decidedly inferior (see Appendix II). There was a good chance that the village would not have much grain to show for the weeding done in the fields of these negligent compounds. Of course, having these extra weeders in the group could be said to stimulate it towards a greater output in those fields which will be more diligently guarded. However, it is questionable whether this gain would equal that to be had by keeping a smaller, and therefore possibly less energetic, exchange-labor group for more days in those fields which will get guarded. In any case, the advantage of the larger weeding group could still be had by having more than one

duden from each of the more dynamic compounds participate in an exchange-labor group. This would of course favor the larger compounds, but at least there would be more grain in the village, if not in every compound, after the harvest. Why cater with exchange-labor to the compounds of inferior farmers if there will be no increase of grain production to show for it? It may be helpful at this point to turn to the weeding behavior of farmers in a tonjòndugu just to the north, Nianiwèrè, by way of contrast. When one sees what the exchange-labor relation could become in a more entrepreneurial village, it will be easier to understand its uses in Dukolomba.

Weeding in Nianiwèrè, 1975

Now, in Nianiwere, only five kilometers to the North, the 1975 weeds were no less of a problem. Even though there were twenty-one ploughs to Dukolomba's eleven, only two of them were "multi-oulteurs", tool bars which had an attachment for weeding. Of these only one was actually used for weeding: this by a Foroba Fula, or "Bambaraized" Fulani, who lived in a separate enclosure on the outskirts of the village, from which position he was not likely to share this apparatus. Thus in spite of the abundance of cattle and equipment in this village, when faced with the weeding bottleneck most of the farmers faced the same technological constraints as in Dukolomba.

Exchange-labor started a little later in Nianiwere. On August 8, one of the many sons (1x) of the chief and Koranic teacher, (a Tarawèlè Maraka, who had led the resettlement of this area and was therefore its village chief) was joined by two age-mates. One of these, (2x) was also






FIGURE V : Abbreviated Genealogy of the Chiefly Lineage in Nianiwere.

a Traore Maraka but not an agnatic kinsmen of the chief. His paternal uncle (3), had just married a Sonrai woman from the arid Northeast, towards Timbuktu. (Some considered such a marriage advantageous since the drought had forced residents of the northerly Sixth Region to settle for very low bride wealth payments for their daughters.).

This uncle (3) and the weeder's father had split into separate compounds leaving them both much smaller than the Chief's. The weeder's compound in spite of its smallness, as well as that of the chief owned cattle, but the member of the Blacksmith's cast who joined their exchange-labor group owned none. By August 7 these three were leaving their respective (forobaw) compound fields to work in each other's individual fields. These "night" or "slave" fields, ubiquitous in Mianiwèrè, were only found in one large Traore(Tarawèlè)Maraka compound in Dukolomba (#35) (cf. supra).

Also by the 7th the Chief's wife (1y), a daughter (y), who had married within the village, and the wives of two Blacksmith brothers, whose sister had married in the natal village of the Chief's wife (1y), were weeding in each other's women's fields, where they usually spent the better part of the day.

On the 8th the sole ton in this village weeded the compound fields of the two other parties to the Chief's exchange-labor group (x) (the Blacksmith and the non-chiefly Tarawèlè Maraka(2x)On the same day the Chief's dead brother's son (4z), who lived by himself in a separate compound, began an exchange-labor relationship with the Chief's sister's



son (5z), who was from a relatively larger compound. It is significant that this poor, isolated agnate of the Chief's is aided by a sororal nephew ( 5z) instead of by another agnate. By the 10th these two were spending more time in this nephew's individual field, when his turn came up, than in the field of his compound. The nephew's wife ( 3y), who came from the non-chiefly Traore Maraka descent-line party to the Chief's exchange-labor group (x), joined the woman's group of the Chief's wife (1y) and daughter (y). The ( 5z) nephew's poorer FMBs ( 6q), who was married to another of the Chief's sisters, joined a poorer collateral agnate of the Chief ( 7q) in the field of the affluent Forobs Fula who weeded with the multi-culteur. Except for the 11th and the 15th all of the exchange-labor groups continued to operate through the 16th.

On Monday, the 11th, the youth of the village went off to work in the fields of a prospective in-law of the same non-chiefly Tarawèlè ( 3) Maraka who had just married the Sonrai woman. On Friday the 15th the ton weeded the field of the Chief's affine ( 6q) and of a collateral agnate ( 8) of the Chief's, who had cows but few sons and thus could not participate in any exchange-labor. Thus, as they had also done on the 8th, the ton weeded the field of one wealthy and poor villager on the same day.

By the 20th the isolated son ( 4z) of the Chief's deceased brother was replaced, in his exchange-labor relationship with the Chief's sororal nephew ( 5z) by all of the members of the Chief's real sons' ( 1x) exchange-labor group (X). This coalition continued through the

27th, with extra siblings added to square accounts when necessary. After this date the Chief's real son (.1x) and his two age-mates separated themselves out again and, through September 3rd, rotated among themselves giving increasing attention to each of their individual fields.

Also on the 27th a poorer Foroba Fula received a wealthy pair of Kone agnates (one of whom had also married a Sonrai woman during the drought) and a poor neighbor in his field. On September 1st and 2nd when this group rotated into the fields of the two wealthy agnates, they were put to weeding a peanut cash crop. This would be an impermissible use of exchange-labor in Dukolomba.

On August 28th, a wedding was permitted to interrupt the weeding work, and on the 29th the ton weeded the fields of both rich and poor: another of the Chief's sister's poor husband (6q), the wealthy Kone agnate who was not married to a Sonrai woman, and of two women, one of whom was the Chief's sister ( 6). By September 4th, groups of neighbors were co-operating in groups of five to eight in harvesting fonio.

In Nianiwère, exchange-labor serves only one purpose: the production of crops. This is why this labor drifts into being used in individual fields and cash crops, both of which are destined for sale. The goal is solely to raise yields, not to solidify the reciprocity of kinship and affinal bonds, whereas in Dukolomba, the successful proliferation of the latter would be seen as the key to the future. For the same reasons, marriage in Nianiwère is more opportunistic, keyed on a low bride wealth,



such as with the Sonrai wives, or on patronage, as with the marriage to the Chief's sisters in cases when he did not marry the client's sisters in return. The destitute and isolated son (.4x) of the Chief's dead brother was the only member of the descent group willing to marry into the village, since he was the only one who could gain more from the ensuing commitments than he could give them.

Exchange relations between agnates are avoided since it is particularly hard to maintain strict reciprocity with such individuals. None of the members of the largest descent group in the village, the Chief's, were willing to risk an exchange-labor relationship except the Chief himself, who had many laborers, and his isolated "son", who had none. Even if any of them had been willing to take the risk, poorer agnates and affines could use this route to lay claims on them.

Where agnates were obliged to co-operate, as with the Kone, negative reciprocity had to be given special emphasis by the exchange-labor being directly deployed in the field of a cash crop (peanuts).

Rather, inequalities of wealth more often marked the exchange-labor partnership. For the wealthier partner such a source of exchange-labor was advantageous because it could be abandoned with impunity should its marginal value change with market conditions. For the Nianiwère farmer such significant market changes involve the price of peanuts, the official price for which had been rising since the slump of 1967, the export possibilities for cattle, and a more local trade in sheep and goats. If the market looks good for all these at once, the

commercially-oriented farmer may be forced to be less attentive to his grain crop in order to attend the proper market. Only older men in Nianiwèrè devote much time to the kola nut trade, so this at least did not interfere with steady attention to the fields.

Such flexibility would be more difficult if the partner was more equal in wealth or had lingering agnatic claims upon the other's estate. For medium-sized compounds in Nianiwèrè, the group-labor advantages of meeting labor claims of their poorer neighbors could not be matched by their ability to spare the laborers. Thus, it was only the larger, wealthier compounds (the Chief, the multicultsur owner, ( 5), one of the Kone) who accepted association with the poorer ones. The cost of the flexibility sought by the medium-sized compounds was loss of access to any exchange-labor. Only the women were willing to construct an exchange-labor relationship out of kinship bonds.

In Nianiwèrè, compounds with sufficient wealth attempt to put their labor at the service of this wealth so that shifts in market conditions can be taken advantage of. If peanuts are selling well their laborers can be assigned to the ample ploughs and oxen teams to increase its production; they can collect the peanut straw to fatten sheep for the market when their price goes up; they can visit a market on a daily basis looking for the right price; when it is down at the end of the rainy season, laborers can be put to work watering calabash gardens even if the millet harvest suffers somewhat as a result; their sons may have to be sent to buy cotton or peppers to the south when



their price is inflating to the north, all regardless of which agricultural tasks are coming due at the time. All this would not be possible unless the compound had wealth to spend, and capital equipment to put to work. And all this requires complete control over one's laborers; they cannot have lingering obligations in large exchange-labor groups or be members of too active a ton. Therefore, these entrepreneurial compounds attempt to isolate their right and duty relations from their neighbors and, especially, their kinsmen, particularly if these have the same amount of wealth and are consequently looking for laborers to perform the same sorts of tasks. Thus the weeding advantages of exchange-labor can only be explored to the degree that the compound's ability to administer its own assets and manage their own labor according to its changing needs is not compromised. Therefore the entrepreneurial compound seeks out its opposite, the destitute compound, for this purpose. That there are so many of the latter in such villages is a direct result of the richer compound's stinginess with their labor.[11] The Klala, the exchange-labor institution of the Guro in the Ivory Coast (Meillassoux, 1964: 181), bears some resemblance to the practice of exchange-labor in Nianiwèrè in that youths exchange their own labor primarily on their own private fields or to their own private advantage in some other way. Both practices correspond to the break up of the authority of the lineage, but it seems that the Klala remains as an instance of co-operation between equals and therefore adds vitality to the community. But then it is in the Ivory Coast where many of Nianiwèrè's youths are emigrating

to work on plantations for themselves. Private fields in Nianiwèrè itself are only a symptom of the population's shifting its economic emphais away from farming into livestock trade and wage labor.

Erasmus (1956) and Moore (1975) have shown how strict reciprocity in exchange-labor serves to exaggerate the wealth differences between participating production units. This holds true for Nianiwèrè, and if it does not for Dukolomba it highlights the importance of kin ties within its exchange-labor groups for preventing such a polarization. What Moore (1975) calls festive co-operative labor need not, as he says, lead exclusively to economic polarization either. In the case of the Darfur beer party in the Sudan, as presented by Barth (1967), and cited by Moore (1975), it does. But O'Laughlin (1973) gives us an analysis of Mbum beer parties next door in Tchad where the patrilineal groupings, and the elders who preside over them, reassert their authority through the operation of these festive labor seances. Without the protection or the interference of a precolonial state, most Mbum can be found living near their agnates. Therefore, irrespective of the amount of beer that flows, there will still be a strong concentration of agnates at any beer party. As localized members of a lineage there is more to bring them together than the beer.

But Darfur and Segu were the seats of precolonial slave-producing states. Therefore, each community would be made up of an important percentage of "strangers". Wealth differences between strangers tend to lead more of a permanent economic stratification than wealth differences



between kin. Because the Darfur state has, over the centuries, succeeded in breaking down the kin solidarities of its peasantry[2] leaving them with a volatile residence and marriage situation (Holy 1974), there is little to prevent the ambitious stranger from further polarizing economic differences between himself and his neighbors, by siphoning off their labor by means of the beer party (Barth 1967). But I hope it should be clear by now that the influence of Islam (Darfur peasants are "Muslim" too) is not the sole reason why the festive beer party, labor seance is and has been eschewed in Dukolomba. Long before the earliest conversion of some villagers to Islam, beer (sorghum dolo) was forbidden at ton baara[3] youth group and damabaara exchange-labor seances. Only as part of the demebaara (and labor) co-operation was the beer permitted to flow. But then I have already shown how this form of co-operation was eschewed in Dukolomba, with or without beer, because it enhanced economic differences between the participants (cf. Chapter V). In short, festive labor, with or without beer, is and was rare in bamana dugu like Dukolomba.

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[2]Gunnar Haaland, personal communication.

[3]Nevertheless, the ubiquity of beer at the dry season ton festival (ton nyèna jè) has caused some ambitiously Muslim villages north of the Niger near the Maraka religious and commercial center of San Sangding (Cinzani) to abolish their ton as such and replace it with the more informal jè associations that preceded the formalization of the village ton by the Segu state (cf. Chapter II). In Muslim Dukolomba, as in most converted bamana villages in the circle of Segu, where the ton has remained, beer has been replaced by lemonade at the ton nyèna jè.

Why are not Dukolomba's larger and therefore potentially richer compounds more miserly, in the Nianiwèrè fashion, about their own labor? I have recorded them exchanging it with poorer compounds year after year without the slightest assurance that the weaker parties to this exchange would turn this assistance into a full granary that other compounds could fall back on if necessary. And this is not all, usually twice a week during the weeding season they let their laborers be called out of even their exchange-labor groups by the flute of the ton.

Tonbaara Weeding

The rules by which a compound head (dutigi) can get his compound juniors (duden) excused from ton labor duties are very precisely defined. He can only get his duden excused from tonbaara without the latter, or himself by default, having to pay the mandatory kola nut fine, if he sends him to carry a message (chi) concerning marriage arrangements or to announce a death. And in both cases the tontigiw leaders have to be informed ahead of time or the fine will be imposed.

If a compound head refuses to pay such a fine and persists in keeping his duden away from the ton he will be denied the use of the latter for threshing his grain - this is a free service provided by the ton, supplemented by some of the older age-sets on occasion (see Chapter VI). When #34, the misanthrope off in his own isolated ward (Sunsurunmugu), refused to pay the fine for keeping his son in his own field and not sending him to the tonbaara of September 1974, he found that he had to thresh his own



sorghum in October. This became an all-consuming task and he lost much time and sorghum (to livestock and predators who only had to eat it off the threshing ground where it spent almost a week) as a result[4]. By November he had the fine paid and had his son back in the ton so that he could get his millet threshed by them. But if such a case persisted - this never happened while I was in the village, and no informants could name such an instance from the recent past - a compound could be denied access to a village well. The tontigiw also impose fines on those who slack off on their farming efforts during a tonbaara seance, particularly during the weeding season, as well as on those absent from a night time dance or those missing at any time (night and day) during their week-long, dry season festival (ton nyèna jè).

But it cannot be said completely that all this careful organization is in the interests of increasing grain production. For then why would the ton "sell" its 1974 labor, often without even collecting the token charge of one goat, for a morning or an afternoon, when it came due at the time of the ton nyèna jè (wealthier compounds were often charged a sheep and it was collected), to compounds such as #s 9, 14, 18, 19, 25, 40, 41, and 42 who could not supervise even a well weeded crop and bring in a respectable harvest?

This questions calls for the same sort of answer as the one concerning the waste of weeding exchange-labor. The facts of the use of both tondenw

[4]Because of the embarassment associated with these developments, I was unable to record #34's sorghum yield (see Appendix II).

and damadenw during the weeding labor bottleneck force the observer to recognize the symbolic, social, and, yes, even economic, non-farming functions of farming labor. Weeding labor gains this symbolic, social, and economic importance because of its agronomic importance. But once recognized as important for grain yield, and given that grain is the necessary though not sufficient condition for the continuation of their group, it takes on a political aspect. In Nianiwèrè, where they have tried to remove these political connotations from weeding labor, they find that they get much less of it from outside the compound. Even with the weeding labor that they waste because of these political connotations, Dukolomba still has much more of it, even if they can only use it for grain production.

What do they gain by providing irresponsible farmers with this weeding labor support? They gain the continuing involvement of these poorer compounds in the bamana village. These compounds become somewhat less poor (the differences between the Dukolomba poor and the Nianiwèrè poor are striking) and are therefore less likely to emigrate (many of the poor clients in Nianiwèrè spend the better part of their youth in the Ivory Coast trying to build up the wealth that their neighbors have). This not only brings their labor into the fields of more responsible field managers through tonbaara, damabaara, sokalabaara, etc., it ensures that their descendants will help the descendants of the more secure compounds should be tables be reversed in the future. Since these tables



are more a function of demographic success than financial accumulation, they can be turned very easily given the rate of infant mortality in such an isolated village (Imperato 1977)[5].

Thus, it is not only the weeds but the descendants of their agnates, affines and neighbors that a compound head sends his exchange-laborer after.

The Nupe

The institutions of the compound collective field (foroba), the individual field (jònforo), and the youth group association (ton) correspond in their interrelations to the remarkably analagous Nupe institutions efakó, bucá, and egbe respectively (Nadel 1942: 241-251). The real comparative question between the Bambara and the Nupe cases is why the foroba and ton are still vital among the Bambara while the efako and egbe are deteriorating among the Nupe. Nadel (1942: 247) attributes this deterioration to the inflating financial expenses (bride wealth, taxes, consumption items) compounded by an increased demand for market purchases as they become more available. The greater prosperity of Nigeria, even when Nadel was there, relative to contemporary Mali should not be seen as the only explanation for this difference. In addition, it

[5]The circle of Segu in which Dukolomba is situated was estimated in 1969 to have 304,390 people in an area of 12,750 square kilometers giving it a population density of 23.9 per square kilometer. But in the Dukolomba area itself this figure should be modified because it includes the contribution of the population of the town of Segu estimated at 40,000.

should be remembered that the Bambara have been subject to the influence of the international market since medieval times. Over the centuries, they have been able to define participation in their village institutions such that the market would not be attracting the same sorts of energies. Hence the emphasis on a jealously watched co-operation rather than on competition for measureable gain. It is interesting in this respect to note that the Nupe, by contrast, stress competition as a motivating force:

> Every co-worker in the team is aware of the number of ridges, for example, which stand to his credit in the common tilling; similarly everyone, at least among the adults, is able to describe precisely his share in the yield produced on the common land. The system of individual bucá work which runs parallel to the family work no doubt fosters such reckoning; no doubt also that this form of reckoning, essentially competitive as it is, must enhance the energy devoted by the individual worker to the common task. But such an attitude must also foster the tendency to split up and eventually dissolve the working unit. (1942: 243-4).

We have already seen, in Bambara villages where the large compound farms together, how the equivalent of the Nupe bucá, the jònforo individual enterprise (jònforobaara) even when displayed in the context of compound work (forobabaara) is seen as disruptive. The Guro bo (Meillassoux 1964: 176-180) is analogous to the Bambara ton and the Nupe egbe. Like the latter, it is getting weaker with the breakdown of its component lineages. But then the Guro have an even shorter experience as peasants under state rule than even the Nupe.





## CHAPTER VIII - DOMESTIC PRODUCTIVITY: INTENSIFICATION WITHOUT STRATIFICATION

### Introduction

It will be remembered that bamana villages like Dukolomba are so diligent in using farming labor as well as in reinforcing the structures that produce that labor, because of the taxes that have had to be paid out of the agricultural surplus produced by that labor. In Wolff's (1966) terms this tax requirement has been a "rent" the burden of which has qualified them as "peasants" for at least one thousand years.[1] These taxes were not a rent paid on land but a protection price in an area and an era of slave raiding.

Never has Dukolomba and its allied villagers been able to rise up and throw out an oppressor. The organizers of such rebellions were usually equally oppressive (Mage 1867: 440) as far as the peasant villager was concerned. Nevertheless, religious persecution by the Tukulor and economic oppression by the French (Ward 1976) were usually sufficient to get many villagers to rally around their former tonjòn rulers. But their ancestors' participation in such rebellions is not widely advertised by present day bamana, however much the present day ruling class seeks to link themselves with these past rebels. This reticence on the part of the bamana can be attributed to a fear that somehow they may be called to account for this past lawlessness. In

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[1] I agree that the appropriation of some of these farmer's surplus qualifies them as "peasants", but I do not see the need for calling that tax "rent".

this regard, it can be understood why they even deny knowledge of the nearby rebellion organized around Tuna after the French conquest (Ward 1976).

However, perhaps more importantly, they also do not sanction this rebellious activity, by admitting to remembering it, from fear of their own neighbors. If they are heard celebrating the glories of leaving the village and going off to seek one's fortune whether at war, wage labor, or commerce, they may be construed as trying to sabotage the loyalties of others to their farming responsibilities at home. The experiences of youths who have journeyed to the Ivory Coast are rarely discussed in the village. This stands in marked contrast to the cattle accumulating Fulani who celebrate the ignobling quest (see Ba and Dieterlen 1961). No, the bamana carried on their most significant rebellion as effective farmers. As such the Segu state and its predecessors, in as much as some of this farming produce came their way, had a vested interest in keeping them that way. That the ton of Segukòrò was able to move beyond being a farming association to become an army (Monteil 1924) must be related to their long time employment as mercenaries up and down the Niger (Delafosse 1931, Meillassoux 1963, Willis 1971).

With many bamana villages playing this role, it may be understood why Segu could, and still does, boast such an agricultural surplus. Mungo Park (1800: 279) arrived in the zone in the rainy season and found only Fula in the Bambara villages, the Bambara being all in the fields. He notes: "cultivation is carried on here on a very extensive scale;



and, as the natives themselves express it, 'hunger is never known'", (1800: 280). Within the Segu zone itself, the bamanaduguw zone beginning with the regions marked off on the area map (Figure I), and which corresponds more or less to the present day arrondissement of Katiena, is called the "granary of Segu". This reputation is not just due to the productive, albeit difficult to work, clay soil (jè) of this region nor just to the bamana orientation of its inhabitants but, as I have been trying to show, to both. It is hard to unravel whether bamana chose such soil because it suited their farming organization, or whether only farmers settled on such soil could succeed in becoming and remaining bamana. In Chapter III we saw how clay soils could produce a greater yield after a heavy rainfall if farmed by a group ready to meet the greater hoeing and weeding demands it, as opposed to sandier soils, made.[2]

In previous chapters I have looked at these historical pressures on the Inter Niger-Bani peasant in terms of the organizations he has developed to deal with, and sometimes even change, them. I have not stressed the boundaries of these organizations but rather the relational content, both within and between each, that enables them to survive.

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[2]Clay soils would poorly serve those in the habit of selling an important part of their surplus every year since clay produces less than sand when the rains are light. Market-oriented producers are better off on sandy soils that make better use of light rains. This is where they are found (see Chapter III).

The range or totality (cf. Mauss 1967) of the relation rather than the corporateness of the organization has been the focus of the analysis. This method has been largely dictated by the ethnographic facts.

If the peasant's organizations were too corporate and identifiable, they would be more vulnerable to sabotage by those seeking to further exploit the peasants. Hence, with the exception of the powerless village chief (an office which the state has always insisted on being filled in any case) there are few identifiable offices in the village. The solidarity of the peasants' "coalitions" (Wolff 1966) does not depend on the corporateness of any one organization. Rather, it depends on the ensemble, or totality (Mauss 1967) of the relations between the villagers as they participate in all of their organizations. The success of peasant coalitions in this village depends as much on the corporateness of the descent groups as on the density of the kinship networks binding them to the age-set solidarities.

I have argued that in Dukolomba the survival of the patrilineal and age-set organizations, each by virtue of the vitality of the other, is more basic to the security of this peasant community than the margin of agricultural surplus that they can squeeze out from year to year. Because that margin can never surpass potential migrant labor activities, it cannot be hoped that its size alone will be sufficient to retain the loyalties of the productive members of the population.

Nevertheless, once those loyalties are retained, an agricultural surplus does end up getting produced. This surplus is conspicuous



relative to that of villages where this bamana pattern of retaining laborers' loyalties has not developed. These tonjonduguw villages, such as those in the arrondissement of Cinzana, to the west of Dukolomba, are not referred to as the "granary of Segu". Having explained how the production of this bamana surplus is organized, I would now like to look at how it is distributed. What can the distribution of crops tell us about a system organized to reproduce descendants as well?

Recirculation of Goods and Services

So far I have been obliged, on several occasions, to make explicit the difference between pooling labor and recirculating crops for the production system in Dukolomba. With the former the form, or pretence, of one compound, one field, one granary, one descent line can be maintained even when its content is small at a given point in time. As long as the form remains, a greater content of agricultural producers can be absor as "descendants". As such the other members of the system can benefit from them rather than being exploited by them. Asymmetrical relations could develop if instead f labor being recirculated within the system, crops were. The recip ent of charity would lose in self-respect as he would have no product to call his own; and he would also lose the management skills for producing such a product should he be blessed with more laborers at a later date. When crops are given, the giver can always control the exact amount which his client is to receive. This gives him a power over the other which he

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might find it difficult not to use.[3] However, if he merely exchanges or gives laborers the recipient can still try to make this aid go as far as it can, if he so chooses.

I have described how a certain amount of labor pooling takes place through direct, more or less reciprocal, exchanges (damabaara); but that the greatest amount comes from the labor pool of the ton youth association (see Table VI ). The ton can be mobilized every Friday and Monday irrespective of the wishes of individual compound heads (dutigi) concerning their own laborers (duden) (see Chapter VII). Through the ton it is no longer visible which compounds are "aiding" (deme) which other compounds. Direct aid (demebaara) is more conspicuous in the more stratified tonjòn villages, like Nianiwèrè, where patron/client relations are permitted to become more visible. Through the ton, on the other hand, there is no loss of self-respect for the compound which "hires" the youth group more than its neighbors. It can be seen on Table VI how, on the average, the smaller compounds received the most outside weeding help (from tonbaara and damabaara sources).

Such crop recirculation as does take place in Dukolomba also runs through the scrambling mechanism of the ton. Each year one of the three tonw in the village (the junior ton prieri or one of the two "big"

[3] "The gift not yet repaid debases the man who accepted it, particularly if he did so without thought of return. . . . charity wounds him who receives, and our whole moral effort is directed towards suppressing the unconscious harmful patronage of the rich almoner". (Mauss 1967: 63).



tonbaw) throws a week long festival (ton nyèna jè) during which it feeds the entire village with the goats, sheep and millet earned from their Monday and Friday labor. Richer and poorer alike eat the meals prepared by the m'pogotigiw (unmarried women) from the ton. Unnoticed, the poorer citizen, may eat, and may even be given (although this denied publically and affirmed privately) a little more.

The other major form of crop redistribution, the jaka, the 1/10 - of one's income alms prescribed by Islam, usually goes to women permitting the male to save face as an equal in no need of charity. However, as we shall see in the next chapter on women, these alms usually go to the wives of a poorer relative. Not all of the village is Muslim and therefore not every compound participates in this form of redistribution. Nevertheless, receiving grain through the jaka, like receiving a meal during a ton nyèna jè, carries less of a stigma since it too can be said to result from a general practice and not from a specific asymmetry between the parties. The jaka is part of the will of God and is given to poor relatives and rich marabouts alike.

Circulation

As it is primarily labor rather than yield which gets recirculated, it is to the grain which arrives in the compound granaries that one should turn when looking for the effects of its circulation on the production system as a whole. A logical place to begin is to compare this amount (Appendix II) with the consumption needs of the compound (Table VII). Yet in so doing, one must not assume that a compound

automatically changes its production orientation as a function of the difference between them (Wharton 1970). Nevertheless, since people eat, this difference between yield and consumption must have some importance. In attempting to find out what that is, I propose to follow the formal economic practice of tracing the output of production relations to the "decision-making" compound or management unit as it is sometimes called, without assuming that this crop profit, or lack thereof, affects any decisions.

I propose to compare the surpluses produced by each compound, as well as the amount produced by a single laborer in each compound, to see just how equally Dukolomba's surplus-producing burden was distributed in 1974. Then, I will try to see if the "social inflection" of the graphed curve of these proportions tells us as much as they could tell Sahlins (1972), for other cases, about the productive organization of the community and its future.

Sorghum and Millet Yields

I have followed Sahlins (1972) in using subsistence crop yields as a measure of domestic labor intensity in the case of this Malian village. I do not think that Minge-Kalman's (1977) well-taken critique of this method, as neglecting over forms of domestic labor input, too seriously invalidates my measure for this particular peasant village. During the short three month rainy season (June - September) on this West African savanna, except for cooking, crop farming absorbs almost all of the peasants' labor from sun up to sun down. Other activities, among them, housebuilding and weaving, not to mention migrant labor,



are postponed for the dry season, particularly the post-threshing (January) dry season. Only rope, tool, and mat-making can be tentatively combined with pre-harvest field guarding. Iron and wood working are the domain of casted specialists at all times of the year.

Women do work on the gathering and processing of the shea butter (BUTYROSPERMUM PARKII) nut during the later farming season. But, in 1974, the season for which this data was gathered, the shea tree did not bear fruit as a reaction to the 1972 drought.

Another measure of domestic labor intensity, which Sahlins (1972) also uses, could be the area cleared for cultivation. Land, though owned and inherited by the compound segment of the linsage of its first clearer, is easily had for usufruct purposes. Though some land has better soil than others, and some fallows have lain longer than others, all farmers are welcome to clear as much land as they think they can weed. Furthermore, they have the entire dry season in which to clear this land. Since, however, this weeding is a more stringent bottleneck on yield than land clearing, I have chosen to measure labor output at the other end - in yield.

Labor intensity in Dukolomba is more a function of the shrieks of a line of ton age-mates, or damadenw comrades as they move in a staggered column, each one in a different row, through the young millet sprouts barely distinguishable from the weeds (some of which are even in the same Pennisetum genus) falling all around them. It is the singing, unmarried m'pogotigiw egging on the tondenw with songs of

challenge as the latter weed up a dust cloud in front of them. And finally, labor intensity is a row of three or four brothers hoeing up the fresh soil of the early rains at the rate of three mounds a second. All this vitality comes back, rains and field guarding permitting, in a superior harvest. Millet and sorghum left too long under the weeds will never produce a full head even with a superior rainfall once it is finally weeded.

I have not even included all of the crops grown in this short farming season in my measure. However, I do not believe this to be as serious a drawback to my measure as it sounds. Sorghum and millet, which I used in my measure of domestic labor intensity constitute well over 95% of the kilograms of crops harvested for all the families in the village. The relative percentage of labor that they receive during the farming season is even greater. In almost all cases, peanuts, at 40 Malian francs a kilogram (approximately twice the sale price of millet that year) were grown, exactly as the farmers claimed, in proportion to a compounds' cash needs for paying the head tax[7] - no more, no less. Peanut yields were, therefore, with a few exceptions (see Table VI), a function of compound size rather than of domestic labor intensity. Fonio (DIGITARIA EXILIS) yields were more variable relative to compound size but in all cases were small. Furthermore,

[7]In 1974 this consisted of a basic charge of 2,150 Malian francs a head with minor taxes added on, such as a 570 Malian francs/head school tax. Since 1968, 100 Malian francs has been equivalent to one new French franc.



fonio cultivation requires no weeding and is harvested and threshed during a slack period by the ward as a whole. Therefore, the variation in fonio yields, proportionately small in relation to sorghum and millet in any case, only represents a variation in labor intensity, at the most, during the hoeing and seeding stages. These are not key labor bottleneck periods in the farming cycle.

All of the unmeasureable crops[8] - maize, Bambara earthnuts (VOZNDZEIA SUBTERRANEA), cowpeas (VIGNA UNGUICULATA) and okra were grown in insignificant proportions - no maize field, for example, being larger than half a hectare. Of these, only cowpeas and okra were stored for long after the harvest. Except for seed maize, all of the village's maize was eaten, primarily on the cob and by little children, by the end of September.

Table VII shows the dependency ratios (C/W, consumers/workers) as well as the sorghum-millet (grain) yields for each of the 43 compounds in this <u>bamana</u> village.[9] The compounds are listed in order of their size and given a number according to their position on the genealogy. Minimal lineages comprising more than one compound are: #s 1-6, 7-9,

[8]Unmeasurable in the sense that, unlike millet, sorghum, and fonio, they were harvested and carried to the village day by day as they ripened. Measuring millet, sorghum, and fonio was a manageable affair since almost all of the compound's harvest for each was threshed and sacked for cart transport to the village at a single time. Peanuts were also brought from the fields in sacks, albeit on successive days, and therefore were easier to measure than the odd calabash load of maize, Bambara earthnut, cowpea, and okra that would come in from time to time.

[9]I have not taken up any of Evans' (1974) suggestions as to how this data might be statistically analysed as the "Sahlins curve" of domestic labor intensity is plotted. Here I am only looking at the data in terms of the social identity of each compound domestic unit in order to designate an ethnographically accurate direction for such a statistical analysis to take.

10-12, 13-15, 16-19, 20-25, 30-31, 33-34;[10] and compound #s 1-26 form a patrilineal clan holding the office of the village chief.

Figure VI plots the empirical yield per worker against the dependency ratio (C/W) for each compound to form the points for what Evans (1974) calls a "Sahlins curve". The straight line on the graph is the "Chayanov slope" (see Sahlins 1972) of what each worker would need to produce to feed his compound for a year. I calculated this need on a 2 kilogram consumption requirement for an adult male. Following Sahlins' (1972: 103, 115) usage, I valued women, children and the aged as 0.8 against the adult male standard of 1.0 consumer. Infants were counted as 0.5 consumer. If anything, 2 kilograms of raw grain a day is a liberal estimate of an adult male's consumption. The farmers themselves insisted on this figure and I was unalbe to systematically measure intake such as to contradict it. The spot observations that I was able to make never showed less than 1.5 kilograms being consumed by an adult male on any given day.

It was easier for me to rate the relative value of producers in the compound since I watched working activities more closely than I did eating activities. On an adult male scale of 1.0, I have rated adult married women as 0.8. All men in age-set 1 and above (see Table I ), I




[10] These minimal lineages and compound #37 have close agnates settled in a nearby hamlet. #20 has also settled in this hamlet, but only temporarily as he plans to return when he inherits the chieftainship. I gave him a number for this reason. His son, #21, has remained behind in the village.

have rated as old men both as regards to consumption (0.80) and production (0.00). However, some old men did occasionally do a day's work in the compound field (see Table VI). But since this varied from day to day and from compound to compound with little consistency, I decided not to count them as producers at all so that at least the relative production capability scaled for each compound would remain on a solid footing. For the same reason, I did not count the intermittant, and in this case often half-hearted, contributions of unmarried women and uncircumcised boys. Unmarried women were as frequently found in their old mother's private field as in the compound field. In either case these unmarried women did very little work; they were given a bit of a vacation out of respect to the bridewealth they would soon be bringing in and in deference to the workload they would have to assume after marriage. Old women were only seen away from their own muso foro women's fields on the compound foroba at winnowing time. Since none of these four categories of persons were obligatory producers, it is difficult to count on them in evaluating the production capability of their compounds. They should be considered as extra gravy to the compound production force, and for this reason I have listed them separately on Appendix II and Table VI. Their extra effect on crop productivity can be measured in the same manner as I will presently measure the production increment gained through extra compound co-operative labor.

While in the fields, in the case of each compound, for each day of work, I did establish a rough scale for the contribution of each laborer.



But to introduce these subjective evalutions into my calculations would only make more complex a process desperately in need of simplification. Between compounds, the contributions of these peripheral laborers appears, upon a cursory review of my notes, to balance out, so that my scaling of the compounds remains relatively if not absolutely accurate. Nevertheless, in order not to depart too drastically from the absolute truth, in three cases (#5, #12, and #42) I had to count old men as 0.80 workers, likewise for a pawn in #5. The hard working unmarried women in the all-women compound, #24 were counted as 0.50 each as was the adult male 16xB who worked partly for his father, #16x1 and partly for #16, the son of his father's former owner (see Appendix II).

Using these scales, I calculated the dependency ratios of consumers to workers for each compound in Dukolomba (Table VII). With these ratios, I will presently evaluate whether or not the separate neediness of the individual compound affected the overall orientation of production relations in 1974. First I will look at co-operative labor.

Co-operative Labor and Dependency

I will begin with the ten compounds (#s 1, 30, 36, 6, 31, 14, 24, 40, 19, 42) with dependency ratios over 2.5 C/W. I have not included #16x or #43 in this set, even though their dependency ratios are equally as high. #16x's son only worked part time in this old man's field, therefore I only counted him as a 0.50 worker driving their dependency ratio way up. #43 did not work at all, not even guarding what little his wife found time to weed; they lived primarily on her winnowing

earnings (see Chapter IX) and begging. Such practices condemned #43, a stranger, to having the name of the (tonjòn) village which he came from attached to his own, lest he be confused for a Dukolomba banana who was neglecting his family.

Of these ten dependent compounds, only #6 and #31 did not use extra-compound co-operative labor. They also had some of the lowest yields in the village. Three of the ten (#s 1, 30 and 36) used 46 (or 18.5%) out of 249 of the exchange-labor days employed in weeding Dukolomba's fields in 1974. Six of them (#s 36, 14, 24, 40, 19, 26) used 85 (or 31%) out of 276 ton man-days used in weeding that year.

Before one can say that these dependent compounds were given priority access to extra compound labor during this weeding season, the co-operative labor used by the least dependent compounds should be considered. For this purpose I will examine the case of ten compounds (#s 35, 16, 39, 37, 18, 38, 23, 4, 5, 41) with dependency ratios under 1.8 c/w. I have not included #21 and #12 in this set, although they each have a dependency ration of 1 c/w, since there was only one man in each compound. Of the ten, five (#s 16, 39, 23, 4, 5) used 62 (or 25%) of the 249 of 1974's weeding exchange-labor. As for ton weeding labor only four of them (#s 35, 38, 4 and 41) used 62 (or 22.5%) of its 276 days.

Thus, it can be said that dependent compounds slightly had more facile access to the ton labor force. Although they used exchange-labor it was harder for them to gain access to it because of their lack of workers to contribute. Taking this into consideration, one must give



them credit for gaining almost as much exchange labor as the least dependent compounds who had more workers to spare.

Domestic Labor Intensity

The graph (Figure VI) shows that thirteen out of the seventeen compounds with over a 7.5 (these seventeen are circled on the graph) consumer value form a curve running parallel to the Chayanov slope, somewhere just above it. The remaining four (#s 1, 6, 9, and 36) out of these seventeen larger compounds are among the furthest removed from the Chayanov slope.

Above the slope #s 1 and 36 produced some of the largest relative surpluses; below the slope, #6 had the biggest deficit in the village, and #9 was only less short of grain (relative to its needs) than two other compounds. However, these four represent half of the larger compounds with dependency ratios over 2.1.

On the other hand, of the twenty-five remaining compounds, those with a consumer value of 7.5 or less, only ten (#s 15, 24, 32, 37, 41, 42 just above and #s 16x, 18, 25, 27 just below) are near the Chayanov slope. The other fifteen smaller compounds are either far above (#s 4, 5, 12, 13, 17, 22, 23, 38) or far below (#s 10, 14, 19, 31, 33, 40) the slope.

Thus far this data on grain yield per compound has shown that smaller compounds are more prone to extremes of overproduction or underproduction than larger ones. But when the social identities of the individual compounds are considered, more interesting features

emerge from the data. Of the ten small compounds near the slope (#s 15, 24, 32, 37, 41, 42 just above and #s 16x, 18, 25, 27, 25x just below) only four (#s 15, 18, 24, and 25) are from the large patrilineal clan which holds the village chieftainship (#s 1-26).[11] And of these four, only two (#s 18 and 25) are managed by a member of that clan. #15 is managed by a widow of a clan member and #24 by the estranged wife of #23. On the other hand, of the fifteen small compounds more distant from the slope (#s 4, 5, 12, 13, 17, 22, 23, 38 way above and #s 10, 14, 19, 31, 33, 40 way below) only #38 above and #40 below are unattached by agnatic kinship to a minimal lineage. Furthermore, #40 is a casted wood worker who is expected to fall short in his farming performance while working on the village's mortars and pestles. Of the thirteen attached compounds, all but #s 31 and 33, which belong to small minimal lineages of their own, belong to the central patrilineal clan (#s 1-26).

It should be clear then, that membership in a lineage correlates with a farming performance skewed either heavily above or heavily below the compound's consumption needs (the Chayanov slope). A compound with lineage support may produce very much more, in order to consolidate that support for the future, or very much less without worrying about the consequences of a diminished grain supply. The

[11] Compound #16x is an offshoot of #16's father's ex-slave and therefore not of this chiefly clan, although it did some of its farming with #16.



course that a compound follows in this respect is often related to the stage it has reached in its development cycle. Here, I cannot look at the development cycles of each of the 43 compounds in question more than to say that, in a general sense, lineage membership permits a compound with a high dependency ratio to survive as a member of the village and lineage so that when its dependent infants become workers, they are still around to assist other agnates. Of the non-lineage compounds with high-dependency ratios, however, only #40, the casted woodworker, dared fall too far below the Chayanov slope (see Figure VI).

At the other extreme of the graph, the isolated compound without lineage ties has less to gain by producing more of a surplus than is necessary. Women from needy compounds may seek donations of this grain. But when the tables are turned, these one time needy compounds, in the absence of descent ties, can more easily forget the past generosity of the non-lineage compound. By the same token, the isolated compound has more to lose by falling too far below the Chayanov slope - there are few other compounds that have to help them out. Only if they have married women from some of the established lineages in the village can they expect help for the children of these wives.

For the seventeen larger compounds, the situation is similar. Of the four most distant from the Chayanov slope (#s 1 and 36 above and #s 6 and 9 below) all have high dependency ratios and all but #36 are from the central clan (#s 1-26). Compound #s 1 and 6 are from the same minimal

lineage; it is thus expected that their divergent farming performances should compliment each other. The record harvest of the "stranger", #36, is the exception that proves the rule. As the weigher and grain buyer for the government co-operative centered at the arrondissement seat, #36 had advantageous access to fertilizer and insecticides against seed-carrying ants. It would be more risky for a lineage member to be a grain weigher and buyer: a jealous agnate could practice sorcery if he felt the scale was not responding to the patrilineal bond between them. The agnate, grain buyer could risk losing co-operative aid from his agnate if the latter felt that he was not sharing his advantages. Thus, it is hardly likely that he could keep to himself whatever inexpensive fertilizer he might gain through the post. The "stranger" on the other hand, would not be expected to share his advantages; nor, on the other hand, would the co-operative norms of hospitality be extended to him when grain was short or labor too scarce.

But compound #1, for all its distance from the Chayanov slope, did not produce the most surplus grain in 1974. The distance of a compound's point above the Chayanov slope on the graph only represents a surplus produced relative to the needs of that compound. But when a recirculation of that grain to other compounds is called for, it is the absolute amount of that surplus which becomes important. Here again, lineage membership is the key to understanding the production data. For all its distance from the slope relative to other large compounds, compound #1 produced an absolute grain surplus (3,227 kgs. - see Table VII) that was surpassed



by compound #s 2, 4, 11, 16, 26, 36 and equalled by #23 - all clan agnates except for #36 (cf. above).

Eight of the ten small (less than or equal to 7.5 consumers) compounds that produced over a thousand kilograms of surplus grain are from the central clan (#s 4, 5, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22 and 23). Of the other two (#s 37 and 38), #37 has strong marriage ties with two minimal segments in that clan. These surplus producers cover the full - of dependency ratios. Nevertheless, of those eight compounds with dependency ratios of 1.5 or lower (#s 4, 5, 12, 21, 23, 37, 38 and 41), all of the members of the central clan, in addition to #38, produced over a thousand kilograms of surplus grain. #41, who did not, is a casted woodworker like #40.

As noted earlier most of the compounds deficit in grain in 1974 were either from the central clan (#s 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, and 25), integrally attached to one of its more successful compounds through matrilateral or clinent ties (#s 16x (to 16) and 27 (to 26)), or from another minimal lineage (#s 31 and 33). The only isolated, non-lineage compounds that permitted themselves an insufficient grain production that year were the casted woodworker (#40) and the destitute stranger (#43). Yet for all these deficits only compound #43, who was from another village anyway, was the only one that was thought of or saw itself as being close to "household failure" (Sahlins 1972: 69).

Extra-Domestic Labor Intensity

Now the contribution of co-operative labor to the yield per worker

should be evaluated. Of the thirteen compounds (#s 1, 30, 36, 13, 17, 22, 24, 15, 23, 19, 4, 5, 42) whose workers produced over two metric tons (2,000 kgs) each (again, I am leaving out #12, the lone man, who received unremunerated aid - demebaara see Table VI - from #12), eight (#s 1, 30, 36, 17, 22, 23, 4, and 5) used 78 (or 31.3%) of the 249 1974 exchange-labor weeding days. Seven of these thirteen hard working compounds (#s 36, 13, 22, 24, 19, 4, and 42) used 116 (or 42%) of the 276 tonbaara weeding days in 1974. It is clear that the use of the village wide labor pool made a great difference in these cases. The percentage of weeding labor for each compound which came from these co-operative labor sources is listed in the last column of Table VII.

By the same token, of the thirteen compounds (#s 35, 8, 39, 9, 6, 10, 37, 33, 14, 27, 18, 40, 41) which produced less than 1.5 metric tons (or 1,500 kgs) per worker (again I have left out the single man compound #21 and the idle man compound #43) seven of them (#s 8, 39, 9, 10, 33, 27, 41) used 73 (or 29.3%) of the 249 days of weeding labor exchanged in 1974. Also seven of them (#s 35, 8, 9, 14, 18, 40, and 41) used 94 (or 34%) of the 276 tonbaara man days mobilized for field weeding that season. Much of this co-operative labor can be considered wasted in an agronomic if not in an economic sense (cf. Chapter VII). Or to look at the evidence from another point of view: among the eighteen compounds that received over 10% of their weeding labor from outside the compound, six (#s 1, 14, 19, 25, 27 and 40) produced below their consumption needs (the Chayanov slope) and six more (#s 3, 7, 15, 32, 41 and 42)



barely broke even. Again it is worth pointing out that all of these except the casted woodworkers (#s 40 and 41) and one cripple (#42) are members of or close matrilateral relatives (#s 27 and 32) of the central clan (#s 1-26). Only #s 4, 5, 12, 13, 22 and 38 turned this amount of outside help into significant surpluses - again, except for #38, all are members of the central clan.

However, these divergent performances did not affect the access of these groups to outside labor the following season (1975). The inefficient farmers were not denied access to co-operative labor, in fact they got more of it than in 1974 (see Chapter VII), nor were the surplus producing compounds showered with more offers to participate in exchange-labor groups. On the contrary, in 1975, these compounds used less outside weeding labor (see Chapter VII). Again, what is significant is the lineage membership of most of the compounds in these two groups; it brings them outside labor assistance regardless of how well they do with it.

These brief calculations indicate that, however helpful, co-operative labor is not necessarily allocated either to the most dependent compounds or to those compounds with a reputation for taking advantage of it. As described in the last chapter, exchange-labor seems to follow agnatic, matrilateral, and age-set ties (in that order) irrespective of the need or abilities of the compounds concerned. I have tried to show that, when the total political setting of this bamana village is taken into account, the maintenance of these ties can often prove to be more

"economic"[12], or more productive of security, than a marginal agricultural success. Furthermore, when so vitalized, these ties, although they cannot be optimally used and remain vitalized at the same time, are conducive to the production of greater crop surpluses than any other agricultural organization in this part of rural Mali.

Social Inflection of the Chayanov Slope

So far, looking at the disposition of Dukolomba's agricultural labor form the point of view of the compound to which its final product is distributed has not turned up anything new on the whys and wherefores of its organization. It was already known that extra-compound co-operative labor was distributed irrespective of the need or farming skill of its recipients before the dependency ratios and domestic labor intensity measurements were calculated.

In view of Sahlins' (1972) example, however, it may be hoped that plotting these two on a graph may give us a curve which could delimit what Evans (1974) calls a Sahlins profile revealing a significant pattern of surplus or deficit production in the community. This surplus is measured against what Sahlins (1972) has called a Chayanov slope

[12] "The economic optimum is not the maximum possible use of the factors of production, but the use of these factors that is best adjusted to the functioning of the society's structure. The time taken for - the pace of - the development of the productive forces thus varies from one type of society to another in consequence not only of its production-relations but of all its structures. The intentional rationality of the economic behavior of a society's members is thus always governed by the fundamental, unintentional rationality of the hierarchical structure of social relations that characterise this society" (Godelier 1972: 99, emphasis in text). My study has been trying to put some flesh on these sorts of abstract statements to try and see what they can mean.



which is the graph of labor intensity for any given community, which conforms with the hypothesis in Chayanov's rule. This hypothesis holds that "the greater the relative working capacity of the household the less its members work". A Sahlins profile should be interpreted from the pattern of deviation, if any, between the empirical slope and the Chayanov slope of domestic labor intensity.

As we have seen, the Chayanov slope results from the graph of yield per worker needed (see Table VII) against the dependency ratio of the domestic group in question. Since the yield per worker needed is always a function of that dependency ratio, the Chayanov slope is always a straight line.

The empirical slope of yield per worker should be drawn between the numbered points on the graph. If these points are above the Chayanov slope, then the compound bearing that number is producing that much of a surplus. I have not drawn lines between the clusters of Dukolomba's empirical slope since I would like the reader to make his or her own interpretation of its "Sahlins Profile". Such an interpretation is flexible depending upon the appropriateness of the statistical technique used (Evans 1974).

Without tiring the reader with any such statistical interpretation, I would like to give a more impressionistic interpretation of where I think Dukolomba's Sahlins Profile lies.

Almost all the compounds are producing a surplus, i.e. are above the line. Three that are not (#18, #27, and #33) harvested and threshed

small fields (#18 and #33 sorghum, #27 millet) without my knowledge, and therefore their yields went unrecorded. They were not said to be too considerable, but probably enough to put at least #18 and #27 above the line. Similarly, a small housefield harvest of #34, who is just a hair above the line, was also missed.

With these deficiencies taken into account , it can be seen that most of Dukolomba produces a surplus. This is in keeping with their destiny as a tax-paying peasant village. Most of those who fall short of the line (#s 9, 33, 10, 31, 14, 6, 19, 40), fall very much short of it. Yet, as already noted, only two of these compounds (#s 6 and 31) did not avail themselves of co-operative labor for weeding in 1974. In 1975 all of these same six co-operative labor users (except #19 who merged with #16 - see Chapter III) gained the same access to extra-compound labor.

Above the line, the surplus producing compounds appear to trace out a curve 200-400 kgs above the Chaynov slope. The density of points along this surplus line is a graphic illustration of the outcome of egalitarian social relations: almost all compounds shoulder their surplus-producing burden. Of the compounds close to the line, #8 and, to a lesser extent, #39 used exchange labor; #34 and #35 did not.

But this parallel empirical slope appears to be cut by another perpendicular to it and the Chayanov slope. Compounds with low dependency ratios (#s 1, 4, 5, 23, 38) (again not counting #12) produce the greatest surplus per worker, while compounds with higher (#s 25, 33, 9,



10) or the highest (#s 31, 14, 6, 19, 40) dependency ratios, who should be producing more, produce the least per worker. Significantly, six out of nine of these under-producers are Buare. Yet these last ten compounds listed could not be considered on the brink of what Sahlins (1972) calls "household failure".

Nothing shows more graphically than this perpendicular empirical curve, how the farming orientation of any one peasant is influenced by factors well beyond the horizon of his own compound. Why do #4 and #15 produce so much when they each have only two other mouths to feed, while #6 of the same minimal lineage produces so little when he has eleven other mouths to feed? Many of these younger mouths can be found eating in compound #s 4 and 5 from time to time. Likewise the many hungry children from compound #9 can be found next door (see Figure II) eating in the overproducing compound of their agnate #1. Some day these little children will be laborers and #4H will be an old man with no younger brothers and, as yet, no descendants in sight. #5 has only an adopted son 5L (lamòden) and 4H is the adopted son of #4 who died in 1974. #s 1, 4 and 5 are helping to produce #6 and #9's descendants, by feeding them and thus keeping them in the village as full fledged members of the lineage, so that some day, when grown, these descendants will return the favor to the children of 1F, 4H, 1J and 5L should they have any.

Patrilineal Descent and Farming

The production data has shown us, to the degree that one is incorporated

(52)

in a farming lineage, then, that one's status as a farmer is not linked to crop output. One's reputation as a farmer can suffer with poor output, but one's claims on outside labor assistance and food relief are undiminished. The viability of the lineage itself is more related to the material "feedback" of crop output, but the compound appears to have other concerns of equal importance as it practices its farming. What are these concerns and how are they related to ultimate survival of the lineage grouping? This survival, after all, does depend, at least in part, on farming success.

The data showed that it was primarily lineage members who risked insufficient yields, casually abusing the privilege of labor assistance offered to them by other compounds in the village. However, the data also showed that it was lineage members who cultivated more grain than they could consume even after three years of storing it. At the same time, non-lineage compounds with comparable production abilities turned away from grain farming towards more profitable pursuits (peanuts, livestock trading, year round migrant labor, etc.) after their long-term subsistence needs had been met.

Thus lineage members may have the privilege of neglecting grain yield, particularly at a given point in time when the compound's development cycle has left it with a high dependency ratio. But it is also primarily lineage members who will cultivate food grains for the mere glory of it (nyò togo ba, "big grain-name") even when surrounded by more profitable uses of their time.



For a non-lineage member, the glory of growing unlimited amounts of food grain is less. Since it is unclear who will be able to avail themselves of the non-lineage surplus grain when the need arises, it is unclear who is to bestow glory on the non-lineage villager growing it. This non-lineage farmer would not want to grow all that surplus grain and then have it unheralded. So, as the graph shows, he rarely does. In the case of both the lineage and the non-lineage farmer, attendance at the funeral is said to be an index of the surplus grain grown by the deceased. A non-lineage farmer is not always willing to wait that long for praise.

Furthermore, if he did grow such an abundant surplus and redistributed it, without a descent tie binding him to the recipient, he would not have sure claims on the return of that generosity. He would be considered a fool for giving his grain away. Thus the non-lineage farmer has no choice but to ensure his own subsistence every year. He can either see to it that his descendants will have a denser lineage network than he was born with by being a generous citizen so that they can gain reliable marriage ties through which to produce more descendants. Or he can use that labor left over after subsistence needs have been met to its most profitable end, seeking to accumulate enough wealth so that he can live with security outside of the social system of the village. The latter alternative is a more risky undertaking.

Farming does have a role in the management of lineage politics in the village but that role is not always related to the crop output of that farming. As I noted in my introductory statements, these

villagers are more committed for their security to a permanent subsistence producing organization than to increasing subsistence production itself. Where these two become mutually exclusive, it is the corporateness of the organization that is chosen over crop yield. Therefore, where reliable production ties are available they are reinforced and no invidious distinctions concerning farming skill are allowed to mar them. The desirability of increasing these ties has produced a stable settlement pattern in this and neighboring savanna villages.



## CHAPTER IX: WOMEN'S PRIVATE PRODUCTION: THREAT OR PROP TO THE PATRILINEAL SYSTEM ?

### The Division of Labor

Throughout this study I have concentrated almost exclusively on the crop producing efforts of men. That crop production should assume paramount importance for the Bamana majority in rural Segu is related to the scarcity of capital in the Malian economy as a whole. While many in this majority could physically survive without gearing their family organization towards crop production in the manner I have been describing, they could less easily ensure that their own children, as opposed to someone else's, would survive. A father can not be sure that his son will have the same ability to 'get by' as he does. There is little capital to invest in the farm to ensure that it will produce regardless of the son's skill. Nor is there much capital anywhere else in the country offering many such sons the possibility of a secure job.

My discussion has yet to look at two key props to the farming social organization under analysis: women and supplementary, non-agricultural forms of production and revenue. Each of these will be the subject of the next two chapters respectively.

I have not yet described the network of social relations between women since the organization of agricultural labor in the compound foroba field is made to depend on links between men. I have emphasized the organizational reasons why patrilineal farming units reproduce themselves more effectively here as elsewhere on the West African

savanna. The physical superiority of men for hoeing the rough savanna grasses can be seen as an ecological explanation for this sort of patrilineal organization. Furthermore, the patrilineal residential unit keeps inheritance claims on the granary within the farming group. Where dual descent is an alternative on the West African savanna patrilineal descent is found to favor larger farming groups (Goody 1958: 88). I have already described the economics of scale to be gained during the farming bottlenecks by this larger cultivation unit. But it is the political conditions of this savanna as much as the constraints of the physical environment itself that lead the farmer to orient his agricultural organization towards the strengthening of his patrilineal institutions.

Women's Power

In discussing Dukolomba's marriage routes in Chapter IV, I noted how ties between women propped up the solidarity of the patrilineal organization. But their orderly recruitment as child bearers is only the beginning of their participation in the reproduction of the patrilineal, bamana way of life.

Nevertheless, the regularity of the marriage routes has some important implications for the power of women relative to men in the community, but of more interest to both sexes is how the kin ties between women affect the corporateness of the lineage segment and therefore the relations of these peasants with the outside world. Women may be "strangers" in the compounds in which they marry, but as we saw in Chapter IV, most of them have kin just over the compound



wall. This sets them apart from the male-dominated peasant women discussed by Michaelson and Goldschmidt (1971). But the peasant societies they selected for treatment were primarily land scarce societies. In them too many matrilateral kin ties might compromise one's inheritance of or access to farmland, for all the finality of the patrilineal descent rule, if other power relationships favored them at a given time. Thus these peasant patrilineages had an interest in marrying "stranger" wives as they sought to preserve their own control. However, in West Africa it is labor, rather than land that is scarce and the competition for it there determines much of the characteristics of the peasantry as a class (see Chapter II).

In fact, this essential demographic difference somewhat reverses the political situation of the in-marrying peasant wife in Michaelson and Goldschmidt's (1971) sample. In West Africa, where a group's subjection as peasants is milder or has a shorter history, the institution of bridewealth has been used by the lineage elders to maintain control over the reproductive powers of women (O'Laughlin 1974), that is over labor. Where this bridewealth has only been acceptable in the form of prestige goods, this form of labor purchase has been able to resist a "peripheral" penetration of market exchange (Bohannan and Dalton 1962), albeit the going price for labor at the center of that market might be relatively high. But a prestige good "sphere of exchange"

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[1]Harner 1975 outlines some of the implications of the land/labor for social organization in precapitalist and non-capitalist societies.

(Bohannan and Dalton 1962) is at best a temporary measure for preserving the lineage in the face of market pressures. In a pinch, the direct products of labor can be exchanged, eventually or even directly, for these prestige goods (Berthoud 1969-1970, O'Laughlin 1974).

Where a strategy of peasant resistance through the preservation of a corporate lineage has not been able to develop, bridewealth begins to inflate in competition with the market price for labor (Balandier 1970). Where this inflated bridewealth can not be paid, the lineage disintegrates and the new peasantry loses some of its internal organization. Where this process has been held in check, such as in Mali, where peasantization has a longer history and has been more gradual than to the east and south, the lineage has had to gain control over the reproductive powers of women through means even less subject to market manipulation than prestige goods. Women have to become more voluntary participants in the continuity of the lineage. This is not as difficult to achieve as it may sound once the fact of their common peasant status with the men becomes evident. The power men might have over community life relative to women appears less significant as the state and the outside market assert their control over the farming group as a whole.

One way of giving married women a greater stake in the patrilocal community is by minimizing their "strangerhood" there without compromising the exogamy which, in the absence of much heritable property, defines the corporate boundaries of the clan, lineage, and minimal segment. The sedentarization of lineage segments, which is associated with state



formation (Horton 1971) and the peasantization process (see Chapter II), facilitates this objective of building up a network of matrilateral ties complementary to the lineage: hence, in Dukolomba, the "marriage routes" (furusiraw) charted on Table V and the low divorce rate described in Chapter IV. Besides increasing the enthusiasm of wives for the patrilineage these "marriage routes" can also help to reduce bridewealth expenses (see Chapter IV). This feature alone helps the lineage to compete with the money market for its labor.

Matrilateral Kinship and the Localized Lineage

In Dukolomba one is struck with the concern of mothers that their sons be responsible members of the agnatic system I have been describing. This is most true of mothers who have come to the village along a well established "marriage route". Men appear not to notice the good agnate in their preoccupation with discovering and undermining the bad ones. A father (fa) looks on his sons (faden) as a group of rivals whose jealousy (fadenya) is to be harnessed rather than subdued. The mother (ba) on the other hand sees her children (baden) as just this subdued loving unit. As is to be expected, while fadenya means jealousy, badenya means familiarity. In Chapter IV, I explored the way in which the density of baden matrilateral ties helped to keep rivalrous faden working in the same harness. This is something the mothers (baw) are well aware of and which they seek to foster by maintaining close co-operative ties with patrilineal "sisters" who have come to the village along the same furusira marriage route. This co-operation can be developed directly, as in the winnowing networks to be described below,

or through the sons of these "sisters" - as, for example, in many of the exchange-labor groups described in Chapter VII.

The harmonious nature of these matrilateral ties is so undisputed that they could threaten the corporateness of the patrilineage where if not for one fact: it is unequivocably forbidden for one man or even brothers to marry sisters. Therefore in any given compound in any one generation there are only as many matrilateral baden groups as there are mothers. Between these mothers, particularly those married to the same man, prevails what remains to the mischievous bamanaw an overriding social preoccupation second only to fadenya itself: sinaya, the rivalry between co-wives, sina-musow. Dieterlen (1951: 12) finds sinaya making an early appearance with fadenya, among others, in the Bambara creation myth she records - see epigram above. Men discuss sinaya by name as often as they practice fadenya without mentioning it.

I have no idea whether, for their part, women discuss fadenya among themselves. Sitting down to discuss things is not something these Bambara women particularly like to do. In sitting, as opposed to working on their feet, they appear to be more intent upon the cotton they are cording or the baby they are nursing than developing any discrete conversation line. Like Marakamusw but conspicuously unlike Fulamusw, they are particularly unlikely to sit still to talk to a man whom they are not related to. They do not pursue important activities, as do men, through sitting and talking. Where they sit



and talk is not as carefully defined as it is for the men. A circumcised male can only freely enter another compound if he has an age-mate there. Women, on the other hand, think nothing of walking right through a stranger compound if so doing would make their journey between two points that much shorter.

However, I do not wish to give the impression that this separation of activities between the sexes is the man's will and that women are held in some sort of Muslim purdah. A bamana muso always feels free in passing to engage men in a bawdy joke, particularly with a nima, kaneme or senanku joking partner (see Chapter IV) but such verbal entanglement never slows her up as she moves from one task to the next.

The Maraka, in Nianiwèrè, for example, do make a pious Muslim stab at some sort of purdah for their women, by forbidding them to go out and work in the compound field (foroba). However, in the Segu hinterland all this means to a woman is that she can spend all day in her own musoforo.

Women's Fields

These musoforow are to be the subject of this chapter. The word refers not just to the private field of a woman but to all her personal affairs. These are not called jònforo as are men's private affairs since a woman's badenw have unalienable claims on her produce and earnings. A man's children (fadenw) claims his produce through the foroba system, he can deny their access to his jònforo earnings if he so chooses. As I already noted, such jònforo earnings were slight in Dukolomba.

In 1974 most musoforo enterprises were in fact millet or sorghum fields. In better years (years that have not been preceeded by severe drought) the shea butternut tree (of which there are many on the clay soils of Dukolomba) gives off its fruit. This core of this fruit is processed by the women, privately or grouped into a ward unit, depending on the particular task, and then marketed to form an important part of an income from which they are expected to cloths themselves, their children, and even their husbands in certain cases.

In Maraka Nianiwèrè since women have all day for their women's field work (muso forobaara) they are expected to buy the weekly spices in addition to the clothes. In the dry season, after the harvest of their rainy season musoforow closer to Segu, where the soil is sandier and therefore the shea butternut tree rarer, women released from the forobabaara pursue tomato, calabash, and potato (along the receding shore of the Niger) cultivation.

Even in Dukolomba, where there were elderly women who had all day for their private field they tended to contribute to the weekly purchase of condiments (nafenw). The spice (nasòngo) price for these ran from 150 to 1000 Malian francs per week, depending upon the size of the compound. On Appendix II, I have listed the average amount each compound claimed to spend on condiments at the weekly market. In some cases elder wives or mothers were said to contribute to condiment purchase over and above the sum put out (given to the senior woman of the compound) by the compound head for this purpose. Yet I was unable to get a statement on the exact amount of their contribution except in the



case of compound #36. The Appendix shows that in ten of the smaller compounds, only the women purchased the condiments. In nearly each case where women added to or even assumed responsibility for some of the condiment purchase price (nasòngo), they were cultivating their own fields.

Compound #29 had no women's field but the head of one household in that compound (29u) was coming down with leprosy and chose to farm separately, But in fact he did not farm very well so his wife managed the field using its earnings to buy the condiments for that household. Since this separate field was neither a jònforo, since the leper helped in no other foroba, or a musoforo I have added its yield to the overall foroba total for that compound.

Also, women purchased all the condiments in compound #s 4, 14, 15, 24, 31, and 32 even though no women's field yield is listed. Due to a shortage of males in these compounds, the senior women took entire responsibility for the housefield, and in the case of #24 the foroba bushfield and #15 the peanut field as well. Out of these compound fields they purchased the compound's condiments. Compound #s 40 and 41 were casted kule wood workers where the women earned their condiment purchasing power, from sewing broken calabashes on market day. In destitute compound #43 if there ever was any money to buy condiments it was the wife who had it. Where younger married women found time for a musoforo after hours, they did not then contribute to the foroba meal. Where these younger women's fields were the only musoforow in the compound

(#s 6, 10, 11, 21) one still finds men paying the entire condiment price.

Only in compound #s 2, 13, 16, 28 and 30 did elder women have their own fields and yet not contribute to condiment purchase. But then these are compounds where the younger married woman's participation in foroba work is strictly enforced. Women from villages that have been Muslim for longer, and, therefore, which excuse women of any age from the compound field more readily, who married into compound #s 2 and 16 found that they were expected to adhere to the bamana practice of compound field labor for women. Significantly, it is their bamana co-wives who monitor their contribution to the foroba work effort. The heads of compound #s 2 and 16 themselves have only become serious Muslims when it became clear that Islam had come to stay and therefore should be used towards the bamana goal of community solidarity instead of being seen as a threat to it (see Chapter III). The heads of compound #s 13 and 30, where women do not contribute to condiment purchase either, are no less pillars of the community but have remarried bamana animists. In all four of these cases, whether the compound head be Muslim or animist, religion is taken very seriously, and the bamana way - which deemphasizes market relations for all citizens, including women - is strictly adhered to. In the last case #28, the elder woman who does not contribute her field yield to compound condiment purchase, comes from a serious animist background. These five exceptions do not mean, however, that when a married woman is able to break free from the bamana way of compound field labor, she then ceases to support its



more fundamental goals.

In most of the cases where women contributed to condiment purchase, more was spent per capita on the spices (onion leaves, locust bean products, baobab leaves, peanut butter, dried fish, salt, shea butter, red peppers) than where they did not. Thus, in as much as these women's contributions were a function of the time they spent in the musoforo, the men in a compound could count on a better meal if it had women old enough to be excused from the foroba labor during daytime hours, and young enough to cultivate a sizable women's field. Nevertheless, these vigorous elder women did more in the marketplace than purchase condiments. Their participation in the market is directly related to their contribution to the quality of life in the compound.

Depending upon seasonal availability, Dukolomba's women would sell various preparations of fish, peanuts, beans, and millet cake - elements of the latter three being combined in a single preparation on occasion (red pepper and baobab fruit powder being added when available). Other market products which bore an important component of the Dukolomba market woman's own labor were baobab leaf powder and locust bean powder preparations for the to sauce and millet stalk ash which was used in cooking the to grits themselves as well as in making a crude soap. In normal years shea butter and its byproducts constituted an important part of these women's offerings. But in 1974-5, the drought prevented its marketing by all but a few elderly women with relatives to the south of the Bani where the shea tree had still born fruit. It was often these same women who were able to regularly attend

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the Tuna market there and thus able to bring back, again depending on the season, red peppers, onion leaves, cotton, and calabashes for a profitable sale. However, these items were most frequently sold in the Dukolomba market by women from the southern villages themselves. Not having purchased these items, but rather having produced them themselves, these south-of-the-Bani women could easily undersell the Dukolomba women who had had to purchase them at a market. Likewise, women from the "Bozo" villages along the river captured a greater volume of the fish sales than their Dukolomba counterparts.

During the first six months of 1975 (this includes the post harvest dry season when women have more time to prepare goods for sale at the makret), all of the women from the fifteen larger compounds, in the village (except from the compound with a leper: #29 cf. above) who made a significant contribution towards condiment purchase (#s 26, 35, 8, 36, 9 and 7) traded these specialized goods in five or more of Dukolomba's weekly markets. Of the remaining 28 smaller compounds, only #14 (where a surplus of cattle freed them from backing up the man of the compound's neglectful treatment of the grain <u>foroba</u>: milk sales were always a steady source of income to trade with), and the women from compound #24, the all-women compound, presented goods for sale with such frequency. In addition, the wives of the casted <u>kule</u> woodworkers (#s 40 and 41) presented their calabash repair services at every market. But otherwise women from the smaller compounds had more difficulty in confiding household chores to another married woman of the compound, as these were too few, so as to be able to prepare for



and attend the market. Nevertheless, as already noted, in half of these smaller compounds women purchased the entire weekly supplement of condiments.

Women from compound #s 1, 2, 3 and 16 also presented goods at five or more weekly markets but they were not allowed or did not choose to contribute to condiment purchase. These are the exceptions that prove the rule. As model agnatic compounds, firmly ensconsed in large lineages, there was enough pressure from collateral agnatic segments to keep them united. The lure of a tastier sauce (the inevitable outcome of female participation in condiment purchase) need not be added to underline the unity of brothers, paticularly if such a lure was had at the expense of investing women with some personal control, through their cooking, over the destiny of the compound. The other more isolated compounds, however, had greater need of this palatal lure to sweeten the unity of its male work force. Thus, among the larger isolated compounds (#s 26, 35, 36) their women marketed more often and made greater contributions to condiment purchase than did marketing wives and mothers from the larger lineage segments (#s 1, 2, 3, and 16). As already noted, #28 was among those larger compounds where women did not purchase condiments. But #28, which was isolated but so closely tied through marriage to several Buare compounds for two generations (see Genealogy) that it opted for the strategy of male condiment purchase. Compound #s 7, 8, 9, formed a lineage segment of their own which, since the death of former chief XV, lacked leadership and cohesion.

The "mothers" of the compound head of each marketed frequently and made significant contributions to condiment purchase.

Among the smaller 28 compounds, where fewer women were able to make such frequent appearances under the market stalls, again it is the women from the more isolated compound #s 32, 33, 31, 14, 15, 40, 41, and 43 who purchased condiments. Among the less isolated smaller compounds the weight of the surrounding lineage could assure compound solidarity without the stimulus of a sauce purchased by women. Only in #s 22, 19 and 4 from the larger lineages, were elder women, freed from forobabaara, still obliged by the overall compound poverty to see to the maintenance of the sauce irrespective of these other issues. On the other hand, the lack each of such free women in isolated compound #s 34, 37, 38 and 42 (where the old women was blind) obliged the men to finance the sauce nafenw.

What is consistent throughout these various strategies is the desire of the many in-marrying women to buy sauce extras; to make their individual mark on the foroba meal; to be a non-substitutable element in the development of the patrilineal compound unity. Where the men insist upon buying all of the condiments for the foroba meal with foroba assets, then the women do not add any extras since they would thereby only be undermining their own position. If they produced a delicious sauce, then they would only be proving the adequacy of the foroba fund for such a vital household input. But once it is recognized that condiment purchase is their responsiblity and that therefore the



quality of the meal depends upon their own initiative and skill, then they will add their extras to the sauce. The qualitative difference between a meal in a compound where the men finance condiment purchase and one where it is known by all where women make an important contribution to it is striking, although it is not something men permit themselves to discuss seriously (foroba kuma: serious talk). When a compound unit is not so fragile as to need to be held together by the sauce menus of one of its senior women, the men prefer to suffer an inferior meal and remove these women from so strategic a role in the destiny of their own, and their descendants' farming unit. This fear does not mean, however, that women would sabotage the corporate lineage, or even that the men think they would, if they gained more domestic power. It is just that, where a compound can afford to dispense with the management skills of its women without losing any corporate solidarity, it does. It is significant that in the peasant situation of the bamanaw this is rare.

Women's Field Yields and Grain Sales

I propose to compare the amount of grain sold by the owners of women's fields at the Dukolomba Friday market for the month following the harvest of those fields with their yields in order to get some idea as to which women were saving how much of their produce for the weekly expense of the compound sauce throughout the year. I am assuming that the proportion of their total yield sold in that post-harvest month gives an indication of the amount that they are prepared to spend

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on their personal marketing and consumption ends. That proportion of the grain not sold at this post-harvest time can be assumed to be related to the amount they are prepared to save for the week by week needs of their children and compounds throughout the year. It should be remembered that most of these women supplemented grain from their personal fields with as much as 50 kgs. earned over the course of a winnowing season (see Chapter VI). Of course, some of this women's field grain is bartered directly for fish, peppers, calabashes, cotton, shea butter, etc. But this is not generally done at harvest time when grain is plentiful and money scarcer. Although the post-harvest price for grain went down as low as 15 FM per kilogram on one February market day in Dukolomba it usually stayed at 20 FM/kg. The money for the government[2] price of 30 FM/kg only lasted for a few hours on a December market day. The private traders would then begin buying at 25 FM/kg. By late December no more government money made its appearance and by early January the price was back down to 20 FM/kg. But even at 15 FM, at post-harvest time, for those anxious to spend, the money goes further than the grain.

In designing Table VIII below I followed the order of women's field yields as they appear in Appendix II. In compound #s 26, 11 and 30, it can be seen that the women from Dukolomba (DK) itself have sold

[2]This buying is handled by the Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali (O.P.A.M.) division of the Ministry of Rural Development.



Table VIII: Women's Grain Yields and Sales

| Compound # | Women's Field Owners* | Yield of Private Field: millet | Yield of Private Field: sorghum | Amount sold for money at Friday market between 10/25/74 and 11/22/74 20 FM/Kg.: price | weight (kgs) | % of yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | K/DN | 500 kgs. | | 1,760 FM | 88 | 17.6 |
| | K/DK[28] | | 1,500 kgs. | 2,960 FM | 148 | 9.86 |
| | T/SA | 500 kgs. | | 1,100 FM | 55 | 11.0 |
| 11 | K/DK[33] | 600 kgs. | | 1,590 FM | 79.5 | 13.25 |
| | K/TO | | 650 kgs. | 1,980 FM | 99 | 15.23 |
| 2 | TA/BM | 250 kgs. | | 1,130 FM | 56.5 | 22.6 |
| 35 | TA/FLM | | 250 kgs. | 675 FM | 33.75 | 13.5 |
| | TA/BM | | 450 kgs. | 1,300 FM | 65 | 14.44 |
| | K/DN | | 300 kgs. | 1,400 FM | 70 | 23.33 |
| 16 | K/DN | 340 kgs. | | 1,900 FM | 95 | 27.94 |
| | TA/BM | 2,750 kgs. | | 1,100 FM | 55 | 2.00 |
| | K/DN | 300 kgs. | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | K/TO | | 400 kgs. | 800 FM | 40 | 10.00 |
| | TA/BM | | 300 kgs. | 500 FM | 25 | 8.33 |
| 30 | B/DK[8] | 150 kgs. | 300 kgs. | 610 FM | 30.5 | 6.77 |
| | T/DK[35] | 440 kgs. | | 1,040 FM | 52 | 11.82 |
| 36 | B/DK[20] | | 300 kgs. | 1,440 FM | 72 | 24.0 |
| 9 | K/DF | | 200 kgs. | 600 FM | 30 | 15.0 |
| 6 | TA/BM | | 200 kgs. | 550 FM | 27.5 | 13.75 |
| 28 | B/DK[14] | 400 kgs. | | 2,300 FM | 115 | 28.75 |
| 7 | J/NG | 500 kgs. | | 1,375 FM | 68.75 | 13.75 |
| 13 | D/NYEN | | 340 kgs. | 2,200 FM | 110 | 32.35 |
| 10 | TA/BM | 600 kgs. | | 550 FM | 27.5 | 4.58 |
| 22 | JI/TN | 1100 kgs. | | 1000 FM | 50 | 4.54 |
| 33 | K/DK | 400 kgs. | | 100 FM | 5 | 1.25 |
| | F/TN | 200 kgs. | | 610 FM | 30.5 | 15.25 |
| 19 | K/DF | 375 kgs. | | 840 FM | 42 | 11.2 |
| 21 | TA/BM | | 300 kgs. | 420 FM | 21 | 7.0 |

* See Table IV for key to clan name (K: Kulubali) and village (DN: Dingola) symbols used.

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the smaller percent of their personal field grain. The Dukolomba women in compound #s 30 and 28 form an exception because these compounds are "strangers" in the village with no wider lineages to incorporate. The wives follow the more market-oriented strategy of their husbands or sons in these two cases. Moving down the list, one can see that wives from Bwala (BW) also liquidate a relatively lower percentage of this private wealth: cf. compound #s 35, 16, 8, 6, 10, and 21. Bwala is the bamana dugu of the jandugunaani group (cf. Chapter III) immediately to the north of Dukolomba. Marriage routes have been developed between them for centuries. The wives from Bwala in Dukolomba not only have not come too far from home upon marriage, they have a considerable number of female and matrilateral relatives in their virilocal village. For those of them from the Tangara clan in Bwala, in the case of Table VIII all of them, they even have a patrilateral relative in Dukolomba: #29.

Women from Dingola (DN), another of the jundugunaani do not appear on the table to be as committed to storing their grain for periodic assistance to their husband's compounds (cf. #s 26, 35, 16 - the case of #33 is an exception here). This may be because the incorporation process has been so successful in Dingola, that the Kulubali (K) lineages there have too strong a pull on their loyalty. Bwala was disrupted by an upheaval between outgoing Kulubalis (#28 is a descendant of these) and incoming Tangaras (#29's group) a century ago such the latter have sought assistance in the incorporation of



their less established lineages by supporting the similar efforts of others. Thus while Dingola's women contribute less, when they can, to sauce purchase - except when they are going home to their own lineages - they have come to Dukolomba over stable marriage routes and have been reliable reproducers of descendants there - if, in some cases, only to ensure that Dukolomba's women play the same role for their own lineages. In any case, for these Dingola Kulubali, not only the high percentage of grain sold in this post-harvest period should be noted. Their relatively high yields should also be taken into account as their contribution to their husband's lineages are evaluated.

Wives from stable marriage routes running across the Bani River to Bugula (BU), Samine (SA) and Tuna (TN) immediately commercialize more of their yields for two reasons (cf. #s 26, 2 and 33). They have advantageous trading arrangements with the producers of items south of the river which do not grow in Dukolomba. Thus a little wealth goes further with them. Secondly, there is an ecological dimension (not to mention the safety dimension in precolonial times) to the marriage routes that Dukolomba has established across the river. The relationship depends more on geography than on the performance of the wives themselves over the generations.

What does not appear on the table is the contribution of elder widows, who because of the smallness of compounds, could not afford to have fields separate from that worked by these sons. The cases of

#s 32, 15, and 4 are significant here. The effective head of compound #15 is a woman from Dingola. The women presiding in compound #s 4 and 32 are both Kulubalis from Dufunu, another of the four (naani) janduguwnaani.

Maraka Women

Why do these bamana take such an interest in the patrilineal descent unit? In more entrepreneurial villages, such as Nianiwèrè where descendants are not such an important economic goal, women are much less likely to turn their private earnings back into the compound estate. These women are required to buy condiments in compensation for being excused from the bushfield foroba bèara labor. Therefore they only buy the minimum. They seek to turn their market transactions into expanded market operations without returning too many earnings back to improve the quality of life in their husband's compounds. Why does independence to develop these marketing opportunities in these two different villages lead to two different goals for the women involved?

In the case of the newer, entrepreneurial village such as Nianiwèrè, the women seek to develop their independence from their husbands just as the latter have sought to break loose from their lineages. Often in breaking away from their lineages, these husbands, besides leaving the village of that lineage and altering their form of worship (to Islam or to a different sect of Islam from that of the lineages)[3] seek to

[3]In Chapter II it was noted how this attempt at religious (and economic) isolation resulted in a farmer's being called a maraka.



escape the traditional "marriage routes" that have been used in maintaining the lineage over the generations. Therefore, they often marry strangers. As already noted, where there is no "marriage route" conditions for the payment of the bridewealth can be more rigorous. Consequently, such ambitious peasants seek wives from impoverished sections of the country (from the Sonrai, for example) where the bridewealths are lower. When a woman is brought into the family as a result of such strict financial reasoning, she is likely to duplicate this outlook in her own economic activities.

In Dukoloaba, the women seek to resolidify fragmented lineages and, as we have seen, only show signs of an independent marketing strategy where they have married into quite unitary, solidly established lineages. To sort out this kind of orientation I take a closer look at the economic relationships, beyond those of the compound, which women retain and seek to develop.

The Zakhat

First I will look at the relations between the various women in the village as their networks pass through the male compound chiefs. The social network with females considered important by such males can be identified, for Muslim males in any case, by their distribution of the 1/10 jaka (Arabic Zakhat) alms after the harvest. As noted in Chapter VIII, when not given to a marabout or an imam (alimami) these alms are given primarily to female relatives - since such charity would cause a male relative to loose face. Only a male office holder generally

receives such charity without his kinship relation with the donor being given a temporarily asymmetrical tone.

Jaka alms were given out as the final harvest from a given field came in. The jaka from the last harvest of the season, the bushfield millet was given the closest scrutiny as to whether it conformed to the 10% obligation called for by the Prophet. I will review the jakaw taken out of the final 1974 harvest by the more Muslim compound heads in order of the size of that harvest.

Compound #11 produced the largest amount of bushfield millet (12,100 kgs. after threshing - see Appendix II). From this he gave out 540 kgs in 20 kg basket portions. Besides myself, the male recipients of these 20 kg. baskets of millet were the village chief (#2), his first "witness" - the next in line for the chiefly office (#17), a casted kule woodworker in the village (#40) and eleven marabouts (garabuw) some as far away as Segu and Sansanding (see map: Figure I) - presumably selected by #11's brother: the village imam or alimami. The remaining twelve portions were given to women: four to the senior women of compounds whose men attended the mosque most regularly: #s 2, 16, 19 and 36 - this gesture also also perhaps in deference to the alimami; then four to senior women in the Muslim compounds (#s 3, 7, 8, and 9; #8, having two elder women, received two although both portions were given to the one who was not of slave descent) in #11's lineage segment (#s 7-12; #s 10 and 12 are effectively animist - at least in #11's eyes).



One portion went to a senior kinswoman of the casted kule woodworker (#40), whom #11 had also patronized. Three others went his own elder kinswomen who, like the kulemuso, were married into other villages.

Compound #2 had the next largest millet harvest to come in after a seance of the threshing ton: 11,600 kgs. An undeterminable amount went to itinerant marabouts who pass through the farming villages at harvest time to ensure that alms are given - to themselves, preferably in exchange for blessings (dugaw). In Dukolomba they stayed with the chief (#2) absorbing a significant proportion of his jaka. What the marabouts did not get went in 20 kg. basket portions to the alimami in compound #11, to #17, the "witness" next in line for the chieftainship, and to eight women in the village: five to the senior women of compound #s 8 (the noblewoman), 11, 16, 27, and 36; two to kinswoman of the chief's first wife (in compound #s 16 and 35 respectively); and one to the wife of #36, in recognition of the latter's own generosity and as a symptom of #2s's suppressed jealousy of his age-mate's (#36's) farming success.

Compound #16 brought in 10,800 kgs. of bushfield millet after the co-operative threshing. This went out in 20 kg. baskets to the village chief (#2), the alimami (#11f), the kule woodworker (#40), a casted maraboutic blacksmith towards Segu, a Segu marabout, his immediate neighbor (#35), #35's father's slave's son (a butcher),

the latter's own son, and #26 - a clansman and a neighbor. In addition the same portion went out to the senior women in these compounds: #8 (the noblewoman), #16 (his own wife), #17, #18, #19 (a recent widow), #s 26, 27, 28, 35, and 36 - all neighbors in the same ward except for the woman in compound #8 who was honored as a survivor of the former Chief's (XV, her husband's older brother) compound and generation. A second senior woman also received a portion in the larger neighboring compounds: #s 26 and 35.

Compound #26, the oldest Muslim compound in the village, had the next largest millet harvest at 8,800 kgs. after the group threshing. With almost an equal amount of sorghum this compound had the largest total grain harvest in the village (22,430 kgs.). This was fitting, as this is also the largest compound in the village. But its reputation as the richest compound in the village rests on its superior cattle holdings. Whether because this compound is the largest, richest, or oldest Muslim or because, not unrelatedly, it has few close agnates around, it chose to give its millet jaka (8 100 kg . sacks) over to the purchase of shea butter nuts (Dukolomba's shea trees did not bear fruit that year), the butter from which was to be used to waterproof the mud finish on the mosque. Its sorghum jaka was retained in 20 kg. portions for the chief (#2), his two witnesses (#s 17 and 16), the casted woodworker (#40), an outside marabout, and only the senior women



in compound #s 16 and 10; kinswomen in compound #s 1, 9 and 27 also received portions.

Next I will turn to the sizable sorghum harvest (8,400 kgs.) of compound #36. This jaka went in sack (100 kg) doses to a Segu marabout, and two older sisters married in larger villages (Tuna and Fana). Baskets of 20 kgs. went to the chief (#2), his witnesses (#s 17 and 16), the alimami (#11f), the casted woodworker (#40), and the senior women in compound #s 16 and 27. Calabashes of 5 kgs. went to neighbors (#s 18 and 35) and to the senior women and the present compound head of the compound (#22) from which his older brother's widow had come. The son of the non-Muslim #13 received a calabash presumably in support of his recent conversion from the animism of his father. "Daughters" who married out of #36 into other villages received miscellaneous amounts of money.

Out of his 7,200 kgs. millet harvest, #1 gave 20 kg. jaka portions to the chief (#2), as well as other agnates in his lineage segment (#s 4 and 5), the chief's witness and successor (#17), the alimami (#11f), the maraboutic blacksmith, a Segu marabout, #26 of the richest-oldest Muslim compound and an out-of-town relative. Women included in these alms were the widow of his animist agnate (#4), the wife of agnate and neighbor #6, the senior women of compound #s 6, 8, 16, 19, and the wife of an agnate (#2v) who just lost a child. Agnates, whether animist or Muslim were given greater attention than the pious Muslim in these offerings.

Compound #35 divided up its sorghum harvest (5,600 kgs.) for the jaka as much of its millet as was grown in individual jonforo fields. Among the recipients, were the alimami (#11f), the casted woodworker (#40), and the senior women of compound #s 35 (his "mother"), 11, 16, 19, 27, 14, and 30, the latter three being kinswomen thus receiving alms in spite of their animism. Also noted were younger women in the compounds of two of these kinswomen (#s 27 and 30) as well as a younger kinswoman married to #8.

Compound #8 ignored religion to an even greater extent in the distribution of alms from its 6,700 kg. millet harvest. Junior kinswomen in converted compound #s 6 and 9, as well as a senior woman of Muslim compound #26 received portions. But so did animist senior women from compound #s 14, 28, 29 and 33. These women are friends of the not-so-Muslim senior women in compound #8.

Alms from relativelese compound #39's 6,000 kg. millet harvest went to the customary recipients: the chief (#2), his "witness" (#17), the casted woodworker (#40), the Segu marabout, and the senior women of compound #s 2, 7, 16, 28, and 36.

Compound #28 took its jaka out of its larger sorghum harvest of 4,500 kgs. Like #39, with few agnates in the village, #28 concentrated on the customary recipients: the chief (#2), his witness (#17) - also a mother's brother, the casted woodworker



(#40), the alimami (#11f), the butcher in compound #35 and his son, and the head of the old Muslim compound (#26) - also an affine, and #3 an elder Muslim. Women recipients were also standard: senior matrons of compound #s 8 (the slave descendant), 16, 19, 26, 27, 30, and 35.

Of the next largest yields of Muslim compounds, #s 7, 3, and 38 distributed most of their jaka to marabouts and relatives outside of the village. #34 added a relative of his wife's married into compound #35 to some of the standard recipients: #2, #17, and the old noblewoman of #8.

#s 17 and 18 are the only ones among the middle-sized compounds to develop alms giving within the village to the extent that the large compounds did. This might be related to the above mentioned rivalry between these close agnates: Each trying to win allies in their struggle through the use of the jaka. They each gave to the casted woodworker (#40), the blacksmith marabout, and the same Segu marabout as well as to the same senior women in compound #s 16, 19, and 26. #17 also gave to the chief (#2), the alimami (#11f), the head of the oldest Muslim compound (#26), the senior women in compound #s 28, 36, and 39 as well as to myself. Additional women in #26 were also favored; one was a relative of the senior women in #39, another was a daughter of #26 separated from her husband. #18, in spite of a slighter harvest, attempted to match #17's generosity. Two other women in compound #26, not

favored in #17's jaka, were acknowledged in #18's. One was a relative of #18's wife, the other of the senior woman of #16 who had received alms from both of them. But #18 gave calabashes to two other senior women in compound #16 as well as to the son of #16's father's slave. Finally he gave alms to #17 himself.

From the jaka, of the remaining small compounds, the ranking Muslim compounds and their senior women are even more neglected. The religion of the recipient did not seem to affect the routing of alms at all. The leading animist (witch?) woman in the village, #14's "mother" , himself only marginally Muslim, looms large in the jakaw of compound #s 5, 32, and 41. The latter, a neighbor of #14, gave another offering to #14's wife as well as to #26, the established Muslim, and a senior woman of compound #16. #5 followed #14 himself as well as #s 6, 10, 19, 27, and so many others already mentioned, in giving alms to the village chief (#2), and his next in line for the office (#17). But then these alms givers turned to more personal contacts. #5 and #6 gave to their Muslim agnate #3, as well as each other and the senior noblewoman of compound #8 - also in their ward. A border line animist, #10, joined them in this latter gesture. #27 gave to his grandmother's brother (#26) as well as to three of his wives. #14 gave to the senior women of compound #s 22 and 24, both in his ward. #22, for his part, gave to women from neighboring compound #s 14 and 37 who had married across the village into compound #s 28 and 2 respectively. #19 gave to two senior women of his father's (#16) compound other



than his own mother as well as to the widow of his adopted father #19. He also acknowledged the senior woman of #27 (she was blind) and the alimami (#11s).

Two main points should emerge from this lengthy review of alms-giving. (1) Important compounds in the village are honored through and as a result of the citizenship of their senior women. Disreputable women, such as the wife of the chief (#2), were not honored however important were their husbands. The overall political position of the compound in the village suffered accordingly. (2) Alliances with other compounds are sought by giving alms to more than just one senior woman in a given compound, and antagonisms are avoided by not neglecting close female relatives of oneself or one's wife in the village. These are the ties with the ranking women in the village as the male compound heads sought them. Now I will turn to the ties that these women sought with each other.

Winnowing Networks

Winnowing, like shea butter nut processing and going to the well to wash clothes, is a public form of association between women of different compounds. It is also a way in which these women can pass a little grain around to their friends. When the compound grain has been threshed, the senior women of that compound call out their friends and allies to help them thresh it. A calabash of the grain is the reward for each participant in the winnowing seance. Only when the grain is ready to be poured in sacks and loaded on donkey carts are men to be seen at the winnowing site.

The amount that each woman takes home in her calabash can vary from 2 to 5 kgs. per day or part thereof. This amount is determined by the senior women of the compound according to the number of women there and/or, often to the displeasure of the compound head, according to the degree that she seeks to develop her friendship with these fellow winnowers.

Women connected primarily by contiguous residence in the same ward were consistently found to winnow together. The importance of this connection was not necessarily related to the fact that the husbands of these neighboring women were frequently agnates. In cases where the heads of contiguous compounds were not kinsmen, their wives were found winnowing together just as often. Rather, women in the same ward had more immediate reasons for cultivating each others co-operative spirit. These reasons often overshadowed the goal of reinforcing the corporateness of the patrilineal segment that formed the core of the ward in question.

For example, these neighboring women had to work out a system for the most effective use of their common well. Their visits there, particularly if laundry was being done, had to be timed so that too many of them would not appear at the well side at once. In the dry season, when the well water level was low, gaps had to be allowed between these visits so as to let some of the mud settle out of the water. Since women often did not have the time for social visits to each other's living spaces, time at the well was an important occasion for gossiping outside of



male earshot. When a stranger, particularly a male stranger, such as myself, approached the well all conversation stopped and the intruder was showered with greetings and jokes until he passed on.

When women are relaxing in the compound vestibule carding cotton, in the case of the older women, or grinding millet - on a metate as opposed to pounding it in a mortar - the conversation is more restricted because of the joint presence of the compound mother and her daughter-in-laws - not to mention the possibility of a senior male passing through. But for all the freedom for chatter at the well, the women perform an important political function. When a compound head persists in refusing to send his youth to a ton labor seance, a final, public sort of sanction consists of denying his compound access to the village's wells. It is up to the women using that well to enforce this sanction. If they were not willing to do it, that is - if they did not support the ton themselves, another sanction would have been found.

Of course, if he has his own well this is more difficult. But the better wells are the older ones, owned by the descendants of the older families - that is, of the wells' diggers. As we have seen, descendants of the older families tend to have the most agnates surrounding them and therefore are generally the most enthusiastic about the ton and other co-operative groups. If they were not, they would be more vulnerable to sorcery in any case. Thus, the compound head most likely to want to keep his youth's labor away from the ton will not be an owner of one of the better wells. The women to keep his wives from using that

older well will be the wives of the larger agnatic group owning it. If these wives did not identify the authority of the larger agnatic grouping with their own self-interest, they could not be called upon to support it in this fashion.

Another visible example of co-operation between wives in the same ward involves the processing of shea butter. Because of the 1972 drought, the shea tree (BUTYROSPERMUM PARKII) did not bear fruit when we lived in the village from 1974-1975. However, on returning in January 1977, I was stunned to see as many as twenty women pounding into one large mortar. When the pounded nuts come out of that mortar, it must require a certain degree of trust for the residue to be redistributed according to the amount of nuts that each woman put in.

Therefore, in labor networks for winnowing 1974's millet and sorghum (diagrammed in Figure VII), a kinship connection is not necessarily shown between women from the same ward who have chosen to winnow together. Common residence in the same ward is often sufficient for the woman whose millet is being winnowed that day to invite her neighbor even if no kinship tie binds them. On Figure VII, I have circled the group for whom this ward tie is dominant. In the case of one larger ward Wereba, such ties persisted between only about half the compounds in any given instance. In the case of Sokala, equally as large, the ward could not divide into two groupings because most of Sokala's compounds were close agnates. in order to limit the number of winnowers

Nevertheless, whether from inside the ward or from the outside, but invariably in the latter case, it is a kinship tie that determines



membership in any given winnowing group. I will examine thirty-seven of the larger sessions convened, beginning in January 1975, the day after threshing, to winnow Dukolomba's larger yields of bush field grain. I will only consider the married women in these winnowing sessions, since unmarried women visited the fields of their age-mates at will and were only rewarded half as much grain for their efforts. Therefore their presence or absence on any given occasion tells us less than do the movements of married women about women's politics in Dukolomba. I will not distinguish between winnowing sessions that ran for three days and those that lasted only a morning. Although the work can occasionally be slowed down by lack of wind, generally speaking, one could say that the time spent winnowing can be read as a function of the yield in each case. Regardless, of the precise size of that yield, a winnower took a 3-5 kg. calabash of grain home with her for each day, or part thereof, of winnowing work. We will see that the number of winnowers and therefore the drain on the final yield, was not always related to the amount of grain to be winnowed (compare "winnowing fees" to the "full harvest" listed in Appendix II). Political aspects of the relation between male field managers and female winnowers have to be considered in these cases.

The sorghum, since it was harvested and threshed first (though not threshed until the bush field millet too had been harvested and stacked in a termite-proof pile ) was winnowed first. I will review the winnowing groups in the order in which they were convened. They

also appear in this order in Figure VII:

#28 sorghum: Two outmarrying (to compound #s 8 and 26) females came back to winnow #28's grain as did a patrilineal kinswoman (#27) of ward neighbor #35. One of #28's daughters brought her mother-in-law (from compound #8) as well as one of the latter's clanswomen (#11, like the mother-in-law, a Kulubali from Tongo) with her. Compound #35 was included in that part of the Wereba ward in which #28 practiced neighborly reciprocity. All of the women of compound #35, the ward neighbor, winnowed here, as well as a home town relative (#2 from Falin-bugu) of one of them. The wife of destitute #43 was included at this and other winnowing sessions to which she had no kin or residential tie because of her poverty. Matrilateral relatives from the village of #28's ancestors, Bwala, were also included. However, the majority of the women at this winnowing seance were there because of their ward ties with the women of compound #28. As we shall see, these ward ties determine more of a winnowing group's membership where the host compound is isolated from any close agnates. #28, a displaced Bwala Kulubali, had no agnates in Dukolomba other than his own compound juniors.

#36 sorghum: The same holds true for this isolated Kulubali as well. Although the relevant "ward" for #36 included compound #s 17, 19 and 26 in addition to those who winnowed as ward neighbors for #28. This may be because #36 had even fewer



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 28 sorghum
Date 1/1/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

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FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 36 sorghum
Date 1/2/75 -1/3/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



relatives in the village than #28 yet had more sorghum to winnow. Of these ward members added to #28's group, #s 17 and 19 were able to bring certain relatives along to #36's winnowing. So was #28, whose sister (#8) and the latter's sister-in-law (#30) joined the group. All this was possible both because of the sparsity of #36's own relatives as well as of the abundance of grain he had to winnow. These two factors are not always unrelated.[2] Of course, where #36 did have, even distant, female relatives in the village they were welcome (cf. #2).

#37, 14, 22 sorghum: The yields of these three contiguous bush fields (see Table II) were winnowed on the same day by the same women. What is conspicuous about this group, relative to that of #s 28 and 36, is the proportion of winnowers to come from outside the ward (Bablunda in this case), while women from within the ward stayed home. In fact, apart from the women of these three compounds (#s 37, 14 and 22) only three other women from their ward were present: #24 (#23's estranged wife), the wife of #22's poorer kinsman (#21) and the wife of their destitute neighbor (#43). For the rest, these compounds brought in their own daughters and their wives' clanswomen, (see Figure VII), sometimes from clear across the village, in order to winnow. This may be due to the desire of these Bablunda compounds to develop contacts with more productive compounds in the village rather than with their relatively poorer neighbors. However, even more important

[2] #36 had used fertilizers and insecticides from the local government co-operative; if he had had more relatives in the village, he might not have dared. (see Chapter VIII.)

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FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound #s 14,22, & 37
Date 1/4/75 sorghum




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



are these winnower's animism. Less constrained by Islam than the women of Wèrèba compounds #28 and #36 (who lived in the shadow of the mosque), these Bablunda women sought to develop kin ties of co-operation. It is significant in this respect that it is patrilineal ties that they called upon. Of the patrilineal ties through which winnowers came to them, those with males of their husband's compound and lineage dominate over those with their own compounds, lineages, and villages of origin.

#11 sorghum: For the small amount of sorghum produced by this larger compound, its own women were nearly sufficient. However, compound #34 - a slave descendant, was the only one willing to take the political risk of winnowing alone that year. Compound #11, the village imam's (alimami's) compound, did the pious Muslim thing of inviting its immediate neighbors. Luckily for #11 there were not many of these. Only the animist ward, Manawèrè, was nearby. Because it was animist its population was small and Muslims from elsewhere would be reluctant to join them in winnowing. Thus #11 kept the winnowing fees for its sorghum down to 70 kgs (see Appendix II). Where kin did join the group, it was invariably through matrilateral ties. By keeping patrilineal concerns separate from winnowing organization, compound #11 sought to keep down the numbers joining the latter.

#19 sorghum: It is not just because such a small amount of sorghum was cultivated that only the wives and daughters of the

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 11 sorghum
Date 1/5/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 19 sorghum
Date 1/5/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

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closest agnates (#s 16 and 18) were used here. Even the wives of the agnate with whom some rivalry had developed (#17) was excluded. These winnowers had produced descendants in a secure patrilineal segment. They wished to keep it that way by seeing to it that the grain producing functions of that lineage were not mixed up other criss-crossing, centrifugal kin ties.

#40 sorghum: This casted wood worker winnowed with the other fellow caste member in the village (#41) and with ward neighbors from compound #s 28, 35, 36, and 39.

#15 sorghum: Like the similarly weak compound of her neighbors in Bablunda (#s 37, 14, 22), the mother of #15 sought her winnowers outside of this poorer ward. She called in her patrilineal clanswomen from other parts of the village. Only the wife of #13's son was included from her own ward - and this only because of ties between the wives of #5 on the other side of the village (Sokala) (see Figure VII). #5's neighbor, #38's wife, a kinswoman of #13's wife, also came along.

#16x sorghum: Here, as with #19, all the winnowers are married into or daughters of #16's lineage segment. #16x's (#16's father's slave's son) own daughter, married into compound #35, also joined the group. This group was small not only for the reasons stated in #19's case, but also because of the amount of grain to winnow was very small (800 kgs.). Even so, 60 kgs. of it went to the winnowers. 1974 was the last year in which this former slave line did most of its farming with the descent line



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 15 sorghum
Date 1/6/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

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FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 16x sorghum
Date 1/6/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



of its former master.

#s 6 and 10 sorghum: The same group of winnowers gathered in the sorghum from these contiguous fields on the same day. They were all from the same ward and, except for #38's wife, married into Siriba's descent line (Figure III). The wives of those members (#11) of that descent line who do not live in this ward (Sokala or Siribala as it is secretly called - see Chapter III) were not included. Not all the women from this ward were present however. Where participation had to be limited, because of the small amounts of grain in question, direct patrilineal ties to the women in compound #s 6 and 10, themselves patrilineal clanswomen, came to dominate the group. Even so, far too many women were included than was necessary (see Figure VII). The women argued that this many were needed to complete both fields in one day. Yet knowledgeable bystanders noted that the women were exerting their right to take the normal cut out of the foroba grain yield, regardless of its size, to remind the men responsible that this year's insufficient yield could not be blamed on the lack of rain. The women felt safe in making this threat to the compound foroba granary since, in both cases, close agnates had surplus grain that year.

#25 sorghum: As a larger and more stable compound than some of its less productive Bablunda neighbors, #25 included more women from this ward in its winnowing group. Only the wife of one agnate (#21) was left out; though a sister of #21, the widow

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound #s 6 & 10 sorghum
Date 1/6/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound #s 41 & 25 sorghum
Date 1/6/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

of #36's older brother, was there. #28's mother, also from one of Bablunda's lineages, was there. Otherwise, all outsiders from the ward came to it through matrilateral ties. From the largest compound in Bablunda's descent line, #25's women sought to strengthen the corporateness of their sons' lineage as they chose their winnowing partners.

#41 sorghum: As a casted wood worker, like #40, #41 had few local kin ties to be strengthened through the winnowing activity. Therefore, only ward-mate ties could be cultivated. As a resident of Bablunda, #41's wife winnowed with women from compound #s 13, 14, 24, 25, 37 and 43. #28's mother, originally from compound #14, joined her natal ward on this occasion.

#2 sorghum: Only two winnowers from this group were from outside #2's ward (Sokala) (#s 35 and 36). And only two others (#s 7 and 8) were not married into #2's (Ifaso's) lineage segment. Of these four outsiders then, #s 7 and 35 are patrilateral relatives of #2's late wife: the mother of three of his sons. The woman from compound #36 had a patrilateral tie with one of these son's wives. #8 was the wife of the former chief's (XY) brother. It is a tradition (lada) for one chiefly compound to pay its respects to the preceding one. Otherwise this winnowing group was confined to women married into and producing descendants for this highly corporate lineage segment.

#16 sorghum: Like #2, #16 was a large productive compound surrounded by agnates. And, as with the case of #2, winnowing

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound #16 sorghum
Date 1/7/75




Winnower's natal compound

Winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

Patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

Points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

Matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



alliances were linked to the corporateness of the compound and the lineage. In the instance of gathering up #16's threshed sorghum, only the women of compound #16 were used - except for one of #16x's daughters married into compound #35. Only #28's wife came in on a matrilateral tie since he had been farming an adjacent sorghum field. The wives of close agnates #s 18 and 19 were absent altogether.

#9 sorghum: This small amount of sorghum was threshed exclusively by the women (#s 7, 8, 9) of former chief XV's compound. Only the widow of former chief XIV's son joined the group; this in keeping with the practice of one chiefly group (XV's) paying homage to the preceding one. A patrilineal kinswoman of this widow, from compound #3 in #9's ward, also joined this small group. #9 was, at this point in its development cycle, an unproductive compound. It therefore depended on its close agnates and could not neglect them when handing out winnowing favors, even though only 400 kgs (see Appendix II) were to be processed.

#28 millet: On the same day the small amount of millet planted by #28 was winnowed. The matrilateral relative who had invited his wife to #16's exclusive winnowing group war included as were single token members from neighboring compound #s 35 and 27, the latter being a clanswoman of #35 himself. A matrilateral kinswoman of #28's mother (#2) and his sister (married in compound #26) completed this group. As with #28's sorghum winnowing group, only one winnower (#2) came from outside

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 9 sorghum
Date 1/8/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 28 millet
Date 1/8/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

#28's section of the Wèrèba ward.

#8 millet: This sizable millet yield was winnowed in one day by a large number of winnowers. Even if the field owner loses 3-5 kgs. to each winnower, he stands to lose that much again to goats, birds and monkeys by day, wart hogs and mice by night, and termites at all times, as long as the grain remains on the threshing ground. If the winnower gets the grain at least the farmer, or his wife, has an ally. Nearly all the winnowers from #8's ward (Sokala) were there. But, as can be seen from Figure VII, nearly all of them are connected by patrilineal ties to his lineage segment (#s 7, 8, 9). Outmarrying females of compound #8 (in #s 28, 29, and 30) were called in, as was an outmarrying female (#26) from the affine #28's compound. Otherwise, the winnowers who came to this group from outside of the Sokala ward, came through patrilateral ties to women in its other compounds as often as they came through patrilateral ties to women in compound #8 itself. The emphasis with this winnowing group organization is always with the ward and its larger lineage. #8's women give the mothers of their sons' agnates the opportunity to strengthen their patrilineal ties as much as they seek to strengthen their own. Of the two matrilateral ties to #8's women that were used to bring in winnowers from outside the Sokala ward: one was to the wife of #8's agnate (#11) living across the village, and one was into a descent line that had married #8A's sister (#30). Even though there were as much as forty winnowers



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

present, many close relatives of #8's women were not. These women rather chose to let the wives of their husbands' agnates bring in a few relatives each, so that their sons would attach as much importance to lineage membership as they wanted their own sons to. Compound #8 was this careful about reinforcing its agnatic ties for two reasons. (1) #8 himself was not a Buare but rather a descendant of the slave of former chief XV, whose son #8A, remained a compound junior of #8. (2) Of the closest agnates of this group, one (#9) was very unproductive, and the other (#7) worked under its potential since #7 resented having to leave a factory job near Bamako to come home and run the compound when his father died.

#12 millet: The women from compound #11 winnowed the millet of their husband's lone, animist agnate. These women included a few of their animist neighbors (#s 29, 30, 31) as before, and, also as before, a few matrilateral kinswomen. The only patrilineal kinswomen included (#s 24 and 32) were widows, each effectively heading their own compounds since their sons were not old enough to be married. Thus, including them was as much pious charity as a wish to emphasize these women's own clan ties. Furthermore, these two widows were immediate neighbors and could not be neglected by good Muslims if the size of the harvest was conspicuous. No wives of #11's agnates were included, #s 2 and 7 were not invited, but rather pushed their way in as adjuncts to



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 12 millet
Date 1/11/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

their patrilineal kinswomen (#s 31 and 35 respectively). They were pushy women anyway, or they would not have made it into the winnowing group. As before #11's women were trying to keep down the number of winnowers in order to emphasize the independence and corporateness of the lineage segment their husbands had set up in their separate ward.

#26 millet: For reasons that will become clear in what follows, #26's sorghum was winnowed exclusively by the women of his compound and one of his cousins (#27). This was not just because #26 grew less sorghum and it is easier to winnow than millet either. #26, like #11, is a large Buare compound isolated in space from its agnates. However, unlike #11, it is also isolated genealogically from them. Therefore, unlike #11, it does not seek to emphasize the separate corporateness of its descent line by restricting the range of its outside winnowing partners. For #26 that separateness is a given of the genealogy. So rather, unlike #11, its choice of millet winnowing partners reflects its desire to build up reliable ties in lieu of close agnatic ones. But unlike its two non-Buare neighbors, #s 28 and 36, #26 does not seek these ties exclusively in its own ward Wereba. Ward neighbors (#'s 36 and 39) were included, of course, but interestingly not any from the natal compounds of two of #26's wives (#s 18 and 28) nor any from a Buare compound in the ward. Furthermore, neither was #26's father's sister, the mistress of compound #27, present, although her daughter, #27's mother was. The women of compound #26 did not choose their winnowing partners



through any patrilineal ties to males in one of Dukolomba's compounds. Some of their own patrilineal female relatives were invited, but in only one case (#39) did such a tie bring in a winnower from their own ward. Otherwise, all the invited winnowers related to #26's women are related matrilaterally. However, some of these invitees themselves brought along their own clanswomen, the wives of clansmen (#21) or the clanswomen of their husbands (#5). Thus even within the composition of this one winnowing session one can note the different points of view of #26's women and that of their own allies. #26 is a large, rich, productive compound needing little help from close agnates and having none to trouble it for the same. At least from the women's point of view then, such patrilineal ties as they or #26 have are not to be encouraged. These women sell the milk from #26's numerous cattle. A patrilineal relative might feel entitled to this milk on a more favorable basis than the general public. A matrilineal relative could not make such claims, therefore it is the latter and their patrilineal relatives who are invited to winnow. Yet these winnowing partners do not seem to have recieved special favors concerning the milk either. It was interesting to observe that with one exception (#39), none of these winnowing partners came to compound #26 to purchase milk whereas other women in the village, particularly the wives of #26's clansmen, came frequently. Rather the winnowing partners went to #26's father's sister's daughter (#27), who owned

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a portion of the same herd, in order to buy milk. This may mean that since the economically secure milk sellers in compound #26 needed to give no special favors to their clients, matrilateral relatives (the winnowers) preferred to seek better terms of sale with economically weaker compound #27 which would be looking for connected co-operative allies. Milk buyers from #26's clan, few of whom winnowed his grain, or with the clans of #26's women would not begrudge these women the proceeds of this milk. As members of the same clan they would have claims on this economic success in the last resort - that is, as long as that economic success remained in the village.

#26's agnates had difficulty resenting the market orientation of his women. As head of the oldest Muslim compound in the village, #26 could claim religious immunity for the separate economic activities of his women. If the wives of more recently converted Muslims ignored the latter's agnatic ties to such extent, they would not have the prestige of having been long time Muslims to protect them. Only wives in the alimami's compound (#11) risked such independence under the cover of the imam's Muslim office held by that compound. Without such special statuses, it was difficult to isolate women from public responsibility in these bamana peasant villages. As it was, it is doubtful that #s 11 and 26 would have sought such Muslim prestige if their lineage and economic situation had not been secure to begin with. It



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 26 millet
Date 1/11/75 - 1/12/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

was difficult for the agnates to resent this religious ambition as long as these two compounds produced more food grain than any others (see Appendix II and Table VII).

#29 millet: The composition of the group winnowing the millet of #29, the animist, is almost reverse of that which winnowed the millet of #26, the long time Muslim. All the animist wives (#'s 23,30,31) of #29's small animist ward) (Manawere) were present. Winnowers who came from outside the ward, came in all but one case (#35) through patrilineal ties. Only the adjuncts (#s 1, 10 and 19) of these guest winnowers (#s 2, 8, 35, and 36) came to the group through matrilateral ties (see Figure VII). This pattern is analagous to that already examined for compound #s 13, 14, 15, 22 and, to some extent, #8. In these cases agnatic ties between the males were frail but yet still available to be developed through winnowing invitations. Patrilineal ties between winnowing females were also emphasized as a replication of this agnatic emphasis. #29 had no agnates in other compounds in Dukolomba although he had many 5 kms. away in Bwala. Thus, two clanswomen from Bwala (#s 10 and 35) winnowed in this group. Nevertheless, as his mother's father was chief (XI) of Dukolomba, he had residual claims on members of the Buare clan. Because of this tie, efforts to include Buare wives (#s 1, 2, 8, 10, 19 and 23) in the winnowing could not be forgotten.

#35 millet: #29's inclusion of two women from compound #35, his neighbor and affine #30's affine, is his own winnowing group



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

was not left unreciprocated, particularly since #35's foroba millet was winnowed the same day Ties between #35 and Manawèrè developed not only because of the proximity of their compounds and house fields or because of #35's affinity with #30, but also because too many of the ten married women in compound #35 were left out of the more exclusive winnowing groups of the pious Muslims in their own ward, Wèrèba. As a Maraka (cf. Chapter II), #35 Muslim identity was less threatened by having his grain winnowed by animists. He also threshed his fonio and his house field sorghum with the youth of Manawèrè. Except for these animist women then, only the natal compounds (#s 28 and 37) of two of #35's women were included in the winnowing group. Besides #28, one woman from compound #39 was the only other ward member present. #35 lost the lowest percentage of his foroba millet to winnowing fees of any compound in the village (see Appendix II). As a large, productive compound on the verge of splitting up (it did in 1976), #35 did not need to seek, through winnowing, serious patrilineal ties outside of itself as an assurance for its security. For #35's males, in any case, these ties were non-existent. In this sense then, this compound's indifference to the alliance-building potential of the winnowing group resembles the flirtation with independence of two of the other larger, more productive compounds: #s 11 and 26 (like #26, #35 winnowed its sorghum without any outside help). While #35 was



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 35 millet
Date 1/14/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

less productive than these two, unlike them it was maraka. As we saw in Chapter II, maraka was the "ethnic" designation given to (Muslim) descent lines that persist in being independent from their agnates over the generations.

#34 millet: #34 is the misanthropic diviner descended, as is #33, from one of Faso Buare's slaves. Except for the wife of the chief (#2, XVI) none of the wives of Faso's descendants were present to winnow #34's millet. All of the other winnowers came from or through #26 whom, as a widely known and rich Muslim, #34 sought as a patron for his diving efforts. #34's wife's clanswomen from Bwala were not invited, even though those from the nearby Sokala ward had included her in their winnowing groups.

#7 millet: #7's winnowing group resembles that of his close agnate #8, except that it is smaller. That may be due to the fact that #8 had two elderly "mothers" with many friends, while #7 had only one and she was not very popular at that. There were no women in #7's winnowing group that were not in #8's six days earlier. The same efforts to cement as many agnatic and patrilineal ties as possible is being made. Patrilineal ties between women that ran outside of the ward to bring in winnowers came from compound #s 8 and 3. #7's wife's patrilineal relatives stayed away for fear of encouraging her to come uninvited to winnowing sessions in their own wards - as she had done when #12's millet was being winnowed five days earlier.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 7 millet
Date 1/16/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



#42 millet: This poor stranger's 1,200 kgs. of millet was winnowed by the wives of his immediate neighbors in the Bablunda ward. Three of the four women who came from outside of this ward, came through ties to the women in his "host's" (jatigike'a) compound: #13.

#32 millet: Like #s 28, 36, and 42, lacking agnates, compound #32 could best build up its security-giving networks by developing reciprocal relations with its ward mates. But the animist agnates, #s 30 and 31, and their ally, #29, had not included #32 in their own winnowing activites. That left only #33 in the Manawère ward, #11 nearby in Bumunkòrò (four winnowers came from this compound), and #37 the nearest non-Buare compound in Bablunda immediately to the south. A patrilineal tie existed between women in these last two. Furthermore, three of #37's outmarrying sisters were present. But the mother of #32, though primarily interested in solidifying ties with neighbors, did not neglect her own patrilineal clanswomen (#s 13 and 19). Nevertheless, it is characteristic of the orientation of many of these women who married into Dukolomba to be more interested in establishing relationships of co-operation that will be of use to their husband's descendants than in looking out for their own clanswomen.

#13 millet: #13 was another medium-sized Buare compound, like #s 14 and 15 in its own ward, Bablunda, and like #s 7 and 8

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 42 millet
Date 1/18/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



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FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 32 millet
Date 1/19/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

in Sokala, whose ties with its agnates were becoming unstable. #13 remained a fierce animist while #15's widowed mother had remarried, though not moved in with the village imam (#11s). What is revealing about #13's winnowing group is that, even more than #s 14, 15, 7, and 8, it included more wives of relatively distant, agnates (#s 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9) than it did those of ward neighbors (#s 14 and 37). The wives of the only slightly more distant agnates (#s 21, 23, 24 and 25) in #13's own ward were not included. This choice might have been influenced by the greater size and productivity of the #s 1-9 lineage segment over the #s 21-25 one as much as by their slightly greater genealogical proximity. Again, for those weak compounds with agnates to work with, strengthening ties with as many of them as possible invariably takes priority over strengthening intra-ward ties. And again it is the winnowing women themselves who make these choices on behalf of their own offspring. #13's daughter-in-law seems to have neglected to invite some of her own clanswomen, even those (#s 4 and 10) in the lineage segments (#s 1-8, 10-12) she is courting on this occasion of her compound's millet winnowing.

#24 millet: #24, the estranged wife of #23, like #25 before her has sought to solidify her sons' agnatic relationships by inviting their agnate's wives and mothers (#s 21, 22, 25 and, more distantly 14) to winnow her compound's millet. Only her estranged



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 13 millet
Date 1/20/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



husband's other wife (#23) is left out of this lineage-based grouping. Besides these agnates' wives the wife of the casted wood worker (#41) living in her ward, Bablunda, and a patrilineal relative (#2) of ward-mate #14's mother, the only other winnowers #24 invited were relatives of hers from Dingola (DN).

#9 millet: The absence of all but two wives (#'s 3&6) of the #s 1-6 lineage segment is all that distinguishes #s 9's millet winnowing group from that of his close agnates #s 7 and 8. This difference can be attributed to #9's small millet harvest which took many fewer women to winnow. Even so, these winnowers took away almost half as much millet (110 kgs) as # 7's winnowers (240 kgs.) even though the total millet yield was only a fifth as large (see Appendix II). But, even in slow years, a compound like #9 that has agnates, is more concerned about reminding them of those ties than about a few kilograms of millet. Just in case, the women of compound #9 invited, as had the women of #s 7 and 8, some of their own clanswomen from outside the ward (#s 11 and 13). However, as with #s 7 and 8, matrilateral relatives of these women were not present. Only compounds like #s 11 and 26, in a position to avoid obligations from agnates without needing rights from them, would waste their winnowing favors on matrilateral relatives.

#31 millet: Here is another example of a weak compound with a few agnates (#30), in a small ward, which is able to use all the

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FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 9 millet
Date 1/23/75




⟹ winnower's natal compound

⟶ winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

+++++ patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

--➤ points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

- - - - - matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 31 millet
Date 1/25/75




⟹ winnower's natal compound

⟶ winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

+++++ patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

--➤ points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

- - - - - matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

patrilineal ties available to it as well as all the women in its ward in forming a winnowing group. As with the case of #29 from the same ward, Manawèrè, women from compound #s 11 and 35 in adjacent wards were included in this neighborhood activity.

#3 millet: Compound #3 had more of these ties to exploit, so like its equally productive agnate #2 the number of winnowers coming in from outside the ward was limited. Of those five winnowers that did come in from outside the ward (#s 11, 29, 16, 28 and 13) two (#s 29 and 28) came in through ties to males in the ward. And even within the ward, there were patrilineal clanswomen of the hosts (#3's wives) who did not participate. It was the ties between the co-operating descent lines that were given first priority even though the winnowing women were not members of them.

#38's millet was winnowed exclusively by the women of this same ward. Where the amount of the harvest (2,800 kgs.) did not justify the participation of all the women in this ward, those wives who were age-mates[1] of #38's wife were given preference. Neither #38 or his wife had patrilineal relatives in the village. #38's only agnates had moved to a nearby hamlet when the land towards the Bani River to the south was made into a Forêt Classée (see Chapter III).

[1]The age-set membership of married women depended both on their relative ages as well as the date of their marriage into the village.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 3 millet
Date 1/25/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

joints to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

#16 millet: With nearly 10,800 kgs. of millet to winnow, #16's women could not restrict their winnowing partners to members of the compounds of #16's lineage allies as easily as they had done with the sorghum winnowing earlier. Here the matrilateral relative (#28) of one of #16's granddaughters-in-law was included again. But this time #16's own wives brought in some of their own clanswomen from disparate compounds (#s 10, 35, 37, and, the enemy agnate #17's wife). None of these patrilateral winnowing partners were brought in from the same lineage or the same ward-based co-operative unit. Only two (#s 21 and 17) came from the compounds of #16's maximal lineage, and only one of these (#17) came from a strong minimal lineage segment within that lineage, #16's own. There was no attempt made to tie this segment to other agnatic groups, which if ties were made too close, might have more to demand than to give, at this point in their respective developmental histories. As in the case of #s 11 and 26, #16's aloofness was tolerated as long as he grew such large food grain surpluses.

#23 millet: Isolated by his animism from his agnates (#s 21, 22,25) and his wife (#24) in Bablunda, #23 lived and co-operated with his co-religionists in Manawèrè. It was the women of this ward (#s 29, 30 and 31) rather than the wives of #23's agnates who winnowed his millet. Some of their "mothers" (#8) and affine's mother (#28) joined them from outside the ward (see Figure VII).



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 16 millet
Date 1/27/75 - 1/28/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 23 millet
Date 1/28/75




- ⟹ winnower's natal compound
- → winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]
- ++++++ patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)
- ➤ points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)
- - - - - - matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



His loyal wife's matrilateral relatives also joined the group. Although she had patrilineal clanswomen in the village, she was not particularly interested in emphasizing her ties and responsibilities to their common lineage. Although her husband and sons depended on the ward of another lineage (#30) at the moment, they had a lineage of their own which would be available to them should they convert to Islam or, and this seemed more imminent at the time, should their agnates readopt certain animist practices (beer drinking, sacrificing to altars, etc.).

#11 millet: Many of the reasons why the pious Muslim women of compound #11 winnowed with the animist wives in Manawere just to the west were reviewed when #12's winnowing group was presented. For their own millet, the largest yield in the village (see Appendix II), they had to go somewhat further afield for winnowing partners. However, in order that no productive lineages could make more claims on #11's assets than they already had, no two winnowers were brought in from the same segment (see Figure VII). Furthermore, all but three (#s 6, 9 and 34) were connected to compound #11 by matrilateral ties. As before, as far as the women were concerned, the emphasis was exclusively on #11's own patrilineal integrity.

#33 millet: This slave descendant's wives winnowed with women from the lineage segments of his grandfather's former owner (#s 7, 8, 9) and his father's senior parallel cousin's former owner (#2). In addition there was the wife of his only agnate

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 11 millet
Date 1/29/75 - 1/30/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



(#34) in the village outside of his own compound. This was the first sign of co-operation I had seen between these slave descendant agnates separated by religious differences. The wife of #33's animist cohort (#13) also joined the group. It is clear here that #33 preferred to remind the descendants of his ancestors' masters of their responsibilities to himself and his line than to admit that he had few patrilineal kinsmen and work on developing the corporateness of a co-operative group at the ward level. His agnate #34, sought security, as we have seen, through the religious patronage of a rich and pious Muslim (#26).

#18's millet was winnowed entirely by women married into #s 16, 18 and 19's lineage-segment faction. Only a sister of #18 (#26) joined the group from beyond these compounds.

#30 millet: This winnowing group was virtually identical to the one mobilized to winnow #31's millet, for the same reasons (cf. above). #30 used more matrilateral, rather than patrilineal, ties outside of the ward to other winnowers. But this difference can be attributed to its more secure economic position relative to that of #31, its agnate. #30 had less reasons to cultivate rights for its offspring in other lineages, for it was more in its power to see that its own lineage did not fail. As with some of the larger compounds discussed above (#s 11 and 26), cultivating rights in other lineage segments can at a certain point, when one's own compound is productive, harm the corporate integrity of one's own lineage more than it helps it.

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 33, millet
Date 1/30/75




O former compounds of ancestors' owners

winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 30 millet
Date 2/1/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

#4 millet: As was the case with #4's agnates (#s 2 and 3) this grain was winnowed almost exclusively by wives of agnates in the same ward. As head of a weak compound, however, #4's widow was careful not to neglect any of her own clanswomen in that ward - just in case - even though the winnowing group was relatively small considering the size of the harvest (see Appendix II).

#39 millet: Like #s 28 and 36 next door in Wèrèba, #39 had no agnates in other compounds in the village. Therefore, like these neighbors, the wives in his compound sought to reinforce ties of co-operation within the non-Buare section of their ward as they looked for winnowing assistance. Two (both from #8) of the six winnowers who came from outside the ward were born there. Three others were matrilateral relatives of #39's women. The relevant part of the Wèrèba ward for #39 resembled that of #28 and included the many women married into the maraka compound #35. #36, on the other hand, seeking to appear as a more devout Muslim, included compound #26, equally as large as #35, in his intra-ward reciprocity network (cf above).

#17 millet: #17's wife followed the wives of his agnates (#s 16, 18 and 19) in seeing to it that winnowers came primarily from their compounds. However, as #17 was on bad terms with these agnates (cf. Chapter III), not as many winnowers came from them. So the wives of his ally and neighbor #26 were invited.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound #4, millet
Date 2/1/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 39, millet
Date 2/3/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 17, millet
Date 2/4/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

#1 millet: As with his closest agnates (#s 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) #1's grain was winnowed by women married into its lineage segment and the ward, Sokala. Only three winnowers (#s 13, 29 and 37) came from outside the ward, through patrilineal ties, to winnow this sizable harvest (7,200 kgs.).

#2 millet: With over 4,000 more kilograms of millet to winnow, #2 sought winnowers from outside the ward to supplement those wives of ward agnates who had been used to winnow its sorghum. However, there was an effort made to recruit these outsiders from as many different wards and lineages as possible. Hence the frequency of far-fetched matrilateral ties connecting these outside winnowers to #2's group. Of course, the patrilineal clanswomen of #2's wife and daughters-in-law were included, but then there was a lot of millet to winnow. As it was it took them three days. With a few winnowers coming from so many different corners of the village no one residential or lineage group could assume a favored relation with #2's large localized lineage. As with #2's sorghum winnowing, the absence of all but one of the wives from the compound (#11) of a close agnate in another ward is conspicuous.

To summarize these observations on the significance of women's winnowing labor networks in Dukolomba, I have divided these groups into four patterns.



FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound # 1, millet
Date 2/5/75 - 2/6/75




winnower's natal compound

winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.

FIGURE VII - Winnowing Labor Networks

Compound #2, millet
Date 2/8/75 - 2/10/75




• WIFE of #2A's age-mate (#16A).

⟹ winnower's natal compound

⟶ winnower's clansman's compound (village of their agnatic link indicated)[1]

+++++++ patrilineal tie between winnowers (common village and clan of origin indicated)

— - - ⟶ points to compound head with whom winnower has matrilateral tie (village of linking relatives indicated)

- - - - - - matrilateral tie between winnowers (village or compound link indicated)

[1]See village and clan symbols used in Figures I and III.



First, there are the "stranger" compounds (#s 28,32,36,38,39,42, and, by religious choice #23) who, with no agnates outside their own compound, seek to build up the imperative nature of the co-operative ties among their ward neighbors by ensuring that the wives of these neighbors are present at all their winnowing events. Naturally the wives of these strangers have lineages of their own in a nearby village or even in Dukolomba itself. Women from these lineages still residing in the village are invited if the grain field calls for additional winnowers. But the host wives know that their farming sons have more to gain from sound co-operative ties with ward neighbors than with cross-cousins. Of course, by passing along winnowing grains to their own lineage sisters they relieve a strain on their own lineage granary at home. This granary of their brothers' would have to feed these outmarrying women and their uninitiated children during a period of scarcity. But women are not encouraged to, nor are they proud to, look after their own lineages in this fashion. If they assumed too great a role in the reproduction of their home lineages, they might seek a place for their own children therein. At this point patrilineal group formation would become more negotiable and unstable; many of its security-giving functions in this peasant situation would therefore cease. As we have seen, in-marrying wives often have a consanguinial interest in their husband's lineage that goes beyond the concerns of their own offspring. If such a wife has married in along an established marriage route, she will have more consanguinial kin in her postmarital residential setting.

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Second, there are those compounds (#s 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 22, 31 and 30) from weak or weakening lineage segments or with weak or weakening claims on a lineage segment to which they are not related through agnatic kinship (#s 29, 33, and 37). The wives of these compounds use all the influence that is to be gained from outside winnowing partners in strengthening their sons' lineages first and their own second. Ward ties not doubled by an agnatic tie to their sons or a patrilineal tie to themselves are ignored. It is rare to see women coming to the winnowing sessions of these compounds through matrilateral ties. The host winnowers recognize that strong patrilineages, even their own if their husbands' is not salvageable, are a better investment than a private social network with no imperative, public organizing criteria. It is private ties, private gains and private property that threaten these peasants' control over the labor they reproduce.

Thirdly, there are the compounds (#s 1, 2, 3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, and 25) from large or productive lineage segments that tend to keep their winnowing groups exclusive to women from agnate compounds in their ward. Outmarrying women from these compounds come to winnow for them more often than the patrilineal clanswomen of the wives in them. These lineage segments wish to consolidate their own corporate success by excluding parallel segments. This is the opposite of the second pattern listed above where a lineage segment seeks to establish its corporateness by emphasizing, in the choice of winnowing partners,

FIGURE VIII: Women's Economic Roles in Husband's Compound (# listed).

| | large compound & strong minimal lineage | large compound & weak minimal lineage | large compound & no minimal lineage | small compound & strong minimal lineage | small compound & weak minimal lineage | small compound & no minimal lineage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| female condiment purchase | | 7<br>8<br>9 | 26<br>29<br>35<br>36 | 4<br>19 | 14<br>15<br>22<br>24<br>31<br>33 | 32<br>40<br>41<br>43 |
| no female condiment purchase in spite of presence of women's fields | 2<br>16 | 11<br>30 | 28 | 6 | 10<br>12<br>13<br>21<br>34 | 27 |
| frequent female marketing activity | 1<br>2<br>16 | 7<br>8<br>9 | 26<br>35<br>36 | 3 | 14<br>24 | 40<br>41 |
| *laka* alms given to wives of agnates & or ward mates | 1<br>16 | 11 | 28<br>36<br>39 | 5<br>6<br>17<br>18<br>19 | 14<br>22 | |
| *laka* alms given to husband's or wife's kinswomen | 2 | 8 | 26<br>35 | | | 27 |
| winnowing group centered on ward | | | 28<br>36<br>39 | 23 | | 32<br>38<br>41<br>42 |
| winnowing group centered on series of patrilineages | | 7<br>8<br>9<br>30 | | 6 | 10<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>22<br>31 | 29<br>37 |
| winnowing group centered on a single, localized patrilineage | 1<br>2<br>16 | | | 3<br>4<br>17<br>18<br>19 | 24<br>25 | |
| winnowing group centered on compound | | 11 | 26<br>35 | | | |
| client compound inviting patron's wives to winnow | | | | | 33, 34 | 27, 40 |

its similarity and reciprocity with parallel patrilineal segments around it. It places its emphasis on the patrilineal principle of association while in this third pattern a patrilineal group itself is emphasized.

Finally, there are the large, productive compounds (#s 11, 26 and 35) that are able to distance themselves somewhat from outside agnates - whom they do not need so much at this stage in their development cycle. Compound #s 2 and 16 from the third pattern might have initiated these other large compounds in their choice of winnowing partners if they had not had so many close agnate compounds right around them. #s 11, 26 and 35 can gain a little freedom with the disposition of their surplus by eschewing such agnatic ties as they do have, but should they no longer have that surplus they would have to pay greater attention to their ward-mates and agnate's wives in composing their winnowing groups. Their play at independence is fully tolerated, however, because they do produce so much food grain. But when a compound member seeks a gain that is equally as negotiable outside of the village as in it, that is a market gain, his neighbors are not as tolerant. I will look more closely at this dynamic of market relations and community control in the next chapter.

Conclusion

I have gone into such detail on these winnowing networks because they show a surfacing of the woman's personal investment in the incorporation of her husband's descent group. The importance of women to this incorporation process goes beyond the scale of their demographic



presence. The bumana descent group seeks to use the peasant family's control over reproduction as its surest weapon against the usurpation of its labor by market forces. It is no longer a question of men controling the reproductive powers of women for their own group as with the Mbum (O'Laughin 1974). Rather it is a question of either of them retaining any rights in that which they reproduce.

The centuries old competition for labor reproduced on the West African savanna may explain why most of the peasant societies that remain there today are patrilineal. There is, of course, the technological advantage of a larger male group for farming this savanna environment (Bauman 1928), which patrilineal descent helps to make organizationally feasible (Goody 1958: 88). But, more important, maybe, is the role of patrilineal descent in keeping those males oriented towards the home community at all. In this chapter I have tried to indicate the ways in which women have recognized this fact. Where women do strike out on their own in this rural area, it is not in opposition to their husband's or their own descent group. Rather, it is in the absence of any such descent group, that could offering security to themselves or their children, and the perpetuity of which could become an object of their efforts.

## CHAPTER X: THE MARKET AND RURAL POVERTY

### Introduction

Throughout this study I have concentrated on the disposition of one village (Dukolomba) towards the production of two crops (sorghum and millet). Yet I have tried to show that however basic the subsistence needs towards which these farming acts are directed, the acts themselves are no more simple than the total society in which they are done. I could not confine myself to an ecological or agronomic explanation of the crop production practices of these villagers since crop production is not the only source of supplementary income available to them. My analysis had to consider why, for so many of these villagers and in so many villages like Dukolomba, surplus crop production was the preferred use of supplementary labor-time. So far, I hope to have shown how the articulation of descent group institutions with village community life in the Malian peasant's situation encourages this orientation.

In this chapter, I will consider how economic pursuits other than food production also favor the incorporation of peasant descent groups around the latter activity. Of these supplementary pursuits migrant labor and livestock accumulation dominate the attention of these villagers.

### Migrant Labor

Samir Amin describes the vicious circle that increasingly lead the farmer from the landlocked, "labor reserve" countries of the West African Sahel to emigrate in search of wage labor.

> Emigration impoverishes the region, it also prevents the socio-economic structure from undergoing radical, progressive change; also, to defend themselves, to



> survive, these societies react by reinforcing those aspects of their traditional structure, which enable them to survive this impoverishment. But at the same time, this impoverishment reinforces the push-effect on certain elements of the population, reproducing the conditions of emigration. The form that this development then takes is that of a degenerated, agrarian capitalism, corrupted and poor . . . .
>
> In rare instances the migrants have given proof of initiatives in the direction of change. Occasionally the migrant of lowly origins in the traditional hierarchy becomes a petty shopkeeper on his return . . . In other exceptional cases, he may establish himself as a 'planter', hiring paid labor. Such persons profit from the monetarization of the economy, to the impoverishment of others who, incapable of producing even on a subsistence level, in the absence of wage labor, buy goods with money sent by those members of their family who have emigrated. (Amin 1974: 104)

We have seen that indeed in Dukolomba "traditional" structures for survival are hardly on the wane. But are the elements driven by impoverishment to emigrate also the ones who have been able to "reinforce" "traditional structures"? Do the "traditional structures" favor the isolated developing peasant, as Amin implies? His own strictures on the type of study pursued here remind us to be cautious:

> What, then, are the effects of emigration in terms of structural transformation? We cannot buy regret that this question has rarely been raised in a systematic manner. Through lack of appropriate methodology, most sociologists have been content to make random observations in this field. And these observations have appeared contradictory: some note a reinforcement of traditional structures, others observe changes notably in the direction of a capitalist type of development. Yet these observations are not necessarily contradictory. (Ibid.)

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In rural Segu there is indeed a differentiation going on between more "traditional" peasants and the petty agrarian capitalist who impoverishes his neighbors. But this differentiation takes place at the level of the community as much as it does at the level of the farming unit. The fact that the bamana/maraka ethnic designation can be given to a community as a whole reflects this (see Chapter II). In bamana villages "traditional" economic behavior flourishes. In the maraka village the agrarian capitalist drives his neighbors into increasing impoverishment and emigration, his village disappearing underneath him as he moves on with his gains. But does this process extend to the "traditional" community as Amin implies in the first passage quoted?

In the bamana community analysed here, Dukolomba, the peasants are particularly on their guard against this danger. But are they successful? First in attempting to answer this question I will look at their patterns of emigration for wage labor.

Looking down Table IX then, one sees a concentration of income from migrant work among the larger compounds (over 16 members) listed at the top of the table. This, of course, represents the greater ability of such compounds to spare this labor. However, even between them, one notes a significant variation between the more isolated compounds (#s 26 and 35) and those embedded in a larger lineage segment (#s 11, 2, 16, and 1). More youths from the former emigrate, and consequently more money is brought back to the compound head. Important

TABLE IX - Migrant Labor

| Compound # | Individual # | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | Monthly wage francs (CFA) | Amount returned to compound head | Major purchase | Location of work | Type of work |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | — months working — | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 26 | B | | | | | | | * | * | | | | | | | | | | | | Ivory Coast | |
| | C | | | | | | | | | * | | | * | 11 | | | | 10,000 | 50,000 | clothes 30,000 | Bwafle, I.C. | coffee plantation |
| | D | | | | | | | | | | 10 | * | | | | | | 7,500 | 5,000 | sewing machine 60,000 | Kachola, I.C. | loading cart |
| | D | | | | | | | | | | * | | 12 | 12 | | | | 5,500 | 50,000 | bicycle, clothes | Abidjan | selling clothes |
| | E | | | | | | | | | | | * | 9 | | | | | 5,000 | 20,000 | clothes 25,000 | Ivory Coast | plantation clearing |
| | E | | | | | | | | | | | | | * | * | * | | | | | Dakar | |
| | F | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | 5,000 | 20,000 | radio 6,000 | Abidjan | selling clothes |
| | s | 12 | 12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 78,000T | 30,000 | | Senegal | marabout |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | 25,000T | 20,000 | | Kuchala, Mali | marabout |
| 11 | t | | | | | | | | | | 9 | | | | | | | 4,000 | 5,000 | bicycle | Bwafle, I.C. | coffee plantation |
| 2 | v | | | | | | | | | | | 9 | | | | | | | | | Ivory Coast | |
| | A | | | | | | | | | 6 | 12 | 6 | | | | | | 4,000 | 20,000 | bicycle 15,000 | Sinfra, I.C. | coffee plantation |
| | y | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | | | | 4,000 | | | Korhogs, I.C. | manual labor |
| | | | | | | | | | | 10 | | | | | | | | 7,000 | 25,000 | bicycle | Abidjan | port |
| 35 | B | | | | | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | | 6,000 | 20,000 | clothes | Man, I.C. | loading cart |
| | C | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 12 | 6 | | 3,000 | 20,000 | | Bamako, Mali | manual labor |
| | G | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 12 | 4 | | 2,000 | | clothes | Bamako, Mali | cart traffic |
| | H | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | 2,000 | | clothes | Bamako, Mali | cart traffic |
| 16 | A | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 6 | | | | | | 5,000 | 10,000 | bicycle 15,500 radio 10,000 | Sinfra, I.C. | plantation clearing |
| | A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Bamako, Mali | marabout |
| | B | | | | | | | 9 | | | | | | | | | | 5,000 | 30,000 | clothes | Sinfra, I.C. | |
| | C | | | | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | | | 5,000 | | clothes | Sinfra, I.C. | plantation clearing |
| | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | | | | | | | 6,000 | 15,000 | bicycle 20,000 | Yamsukro, I.C. | coffee plantation |
| | D | | | | | | | | | | | | | * | * | | | | | | | |
| 1 | F | | | | | | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | 1,500 | 5,000 | old bicycle 5,000 | Segu, Mali | garden watering |
| | | | | | | | | | | 10 | | * | | | | | | 4,000 | 15,000 | clothes | Kachola, I.C. | cart loading |
| 8 | A | | | 9 | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | sewing machine 60,000 | Abidjan | port |
| | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | Segu | |
| | E | | | | | | | | | | * | * | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30 | C | | | | 7 | | | * | | | | | | | | | | 6,000 | 30,000 | clothes | Abidjan | plantation |
| | F | | | | | | | | | | * | 8 | | | | | | 5,000 | 25,000 | bicycle | Abidjan | masonry |
| 39 | A | | | | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | | | 7,500 | 20,000 | bicycle 25,000 | Yamasukro, I.C. | coffee plantation |
| 36 | G | | | | | | | | | 11 | | | | | | | | 3,000 | 10,000 | bicycle, clothes | Kachola, I.C. | loading cart |
| 29 | F | | | | | | | | | | * | * | | 6 | 5 | | | 5,000 | 25,000 | bicycle 20,000 | Abidjan | store |
| 9 | y | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 12 | 5 | | | | | | Segu | cart traffic |
| | G | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | 2,500 | | clothes | Segu | garden watering |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 28 | B | | | | | | | | | 10 | 12 | 12 | 6 | | | | | 2,500 | 100,000 | bicycle | Mopti, Mali | fishing |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | | | 2,500 | 2,500 | clothes | Dugabugu, Mali | sugar cane |
| 7 | v | | | | | | | * | * | | | | | | | | | | | | Baguinda, Mali | |
| | A | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | | 12 | | | | Abidjan | |
| | F | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | 7 | | | | | | | Abidjan | |
| 3 | – | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 34 | F | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 3 | 2,000 | 25,000 | old bicycle 5,000 | Kuchala, Mali | mango plantation |
| | J | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 1,100 | | | Tuna, Mali | field work |
| 10 | E | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 12 | | 12 | | | | Segu | |
| | F | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 12 | 5 | 4,000 | 15,000 | bicycle 15,600 | Abidjan | store |
| 37 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | * | * | | 6 | | | | 3,000 | 8,000 | bicycle | Kuchala, Mali | field work |
| 25 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17 | v | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Sansanding | marabout |
| | A | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | 6,000 | 10,000 | clothes | Buake, I.C. | field clearing |
| | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | Abidjan | port |
| 32 | F | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | 7,000 | 5,000 | bicycle 17,500 | Kachola, I.C. | cart loading |
| 33 | y | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2,000 | | | Segu | |
| | G | | | | | | | | | | | * | | 8 | | | | 5,000 | 5,000 | bicycle 15,000 | Korhogo, I.C. | cart loading |
| 22 | D | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | | 5,500 | 15,000 | bicycle | Abidjan | plantation |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | | | | 2,500 | | clothes | Segu | gardening |
| 14 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 31 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | | | | Segu | tailor |
| 24 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 27 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 38 | A | | | | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | | | 2,500 | | | Tono, Mali | fishing |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | | 2,000 | to pay tax | | Segu | manual lator |
| 23 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 19 | E | | | | | | | | | | | 8 | | * | | | | 5,000 | 10,000 | bicycle 15,000 clothes | Bwake, I.C. | coffee plantation |
| 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 41 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 42 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 21 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 16x | B | | | | | | | | | | | 12 | | | | | | 4,000 | | bicycle | Sinfra, I.C. | plantation clearing |
| 12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 43 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

CFA- West African francs, worth exactly twice as much as a Malian franc (FM).

*-no details available save that a trip was made

T-total earnings

**- letter for age set given; cf. Table II.

absences from #s 11 and 16, among the latter, (as well as from #17), were due to maraboutic outings of compound juniors(as indicated on Table IX ). The ambiguous position of #8 as a Buare compound headed by the descendant of a Buare slave, has stimulated its Buare youth to seek migrant labor ever since their "father", chief XV, died. Likewise, #30 is part of a lineage segment, but its youths have frequently migrated in search of a Muslim identity since their father has obstinately refused to convert. Nevertheless, their father has gained a significant cash income as a result.

The situation of the medium-sized and smaller compounds is different: Youths do not abandon their undermanned compounds except in exceptional cases. #31 has been abandoned by an elder brother's son for the same religious reasons that interfered with his agnate #30's control over his own sons. #s 13 and 29, two other animist compounds in the village, lost their sons frequently for the same reasons (see Table IX ). The absence of #10's son can also be attributed to his father's wavering conversion to Islam. #s 7 and 9, as part of #8's weakening lineage, have not felt inhibited about deserting the village labor force on occasion. Before his father died, #7 himself worked for a factory south of Bamako. Resenting having been called back to head the compound, he has not given his best efforts to farming since then. His younger brother, taking the cue, himself has visited the Ivory Coast twice. His agnate from compound #9 has been absent in Segu for several years running now. Aside from these cases,



only the younger brother of #28 has made frequent sorties; these, after his wife died, as he was anxious to accumulate the bridewealth for another one.

Thus, only from the larger isolated compounds can emigrations in search of wage labor be considered typical or normal. Most of the medium-sized compounds, whether isolated or bound into a localized agnatic grouping, seem content to invest their labor into the village; just like the larger compounds with strong agnatic bonds. Nevertheless, we should look more closely at the income returned by these migrants to see if it contributes to the economic polarization, as described by Amin, within the community.

Livestock Accumulation

Surplus earnings that are not used to buy equipment, pay taxes, or build up a bridewealth are invested in livestock holdings. In reviewing these holdings as they appear on Appendix III, one can see that while one recipient of significant amounts of income from migrant wage earners, #26, owns the most cattle in the village, another, #35, owns none. It also can be seen from Table X that those compounds with frequent emigration of wage-seeking youths do not necessarily experience the highest cash flow as far as livestock are concerned. Nor are the yields of cash crop, peanuts (see Table VI ), related to either of these.

Cash flow remains peripheral to the overall production organization of these peasants. As can be seen from Table X, livestock sales

TABLE X - 1974-1975 Livestock Transactions

| Compound # | Animal | Age (in years) | If Sold: Price (FM) | If Sold: Date | If Sold: Reason | If Purchased: Price (FM) | If Purchased: Date | If Purchased: Reason | Slaughtered | Born |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | 2 rams | 2 | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 3 billy goats | 2 | 5,500 each | December | bride-wealth | | | | | |
| 11 | 1 ram | 1 | | | | 6,000 | November | Tabaski | Tabaski | |
| | 3 billy goats | 1 | 2,500 each | January | pay tax | | | | | |
| 2 | 2 rams | 3 | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 billy goat | | | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 4 she goats | 2 | | | | | | | funeral | |
| | 1 ewe | 2 | | | | | | | funeral | |
| | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | | | | funeral | |
| | 1 mere steer | 4 | | | | | | | funeral | |
| | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | | | | baptism | |
| | 1 she goat | 1 | | | | | | | marabouts | |
| | 1 billy goat | 3 | 9,000 | March | | | | | | |
| | 1 zebu steer | 9 | 50,000 | October | | | | | | |
| | 1 zebu steer | 10 | 65,000 | October | | | | | | |
| | 1 calf | | | | | | | | | April |
| | 4 male lambs | | | | | | | | | March |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | | March |
| 35 | 1 ram | | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 1 she goat | 1 | 3,000 | October | buy clothes | | | | | |
| | 1 she goat | 9 months | 2,050 | December | buy clothes | | | | | |
| | 1 female lamb | | | | | | | | | March |
| | 3 male lambs | | | | | | | | | March |
| | 4 female kids | | | | | | | | | April |
| | 4 male kids | | | | | | | | | April |
| | 1 donkey | | | | | | | | | May |
| 16 | 2 rams | | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 ram | | | | | | | | because ill | |
| | 2 rams | 1 | 3,000<br>3,500 | January | pay tax | | | | | |
| | 1 ram | 1 | 4,000 | March | bridewealth | | | | | |
| | 1 ram | 2 | 2,575 | March | bridewealth | | | | | |
| | 2 female lambs | | | | | | | | | October |
| | 2 male lambs | | | | | | | | | October |
| | 4 female kids | | | | | | | | | January |
| | 1 female zebu calf | | | | | | | | | May |
| 1 | 1 ram | 1 | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 billy goat | 9 months | | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 1 billy goat | 9 months | 2,000 | | buy cotton | | | | | February |
| | 1 female zebu calf | | | | | | | | | May |
| | 12 female kids | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 male kids | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | 1 ram | | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 2 female lambs | | | | | | | | | October |
| | 1 male lamb | | | | | | | | | October |
| | 2 rams | 1 | 19,000 | November | | | | | | |
| | 4 rams | 3 months | | November | to buy: | | | | | |
| | 1 ewe | 5 | | | | 6,500 | November | | | |
| | 1 ewe | 2 | | | | 3,000 | November | | | |
| | 1 ewe | 2 | | | | 2,000 | November | | | |
| | 1 ewe | 1 | | | | 2,600 | November | | | |
| | 1 moor ram | 3 months | | | | 3,750 | December | | | |
| | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | 1,800 | February | | baptism | |
| | 1 billy goat | 7 months | | | | 2,300 | April | | | |
| | 1 castrated goat | 1 | | | | 2,500 | April | | for ton | |
| | 1 moor ram | 6 months | | | | 4,500 | April | | | |
| | 2 ewes | 3 | 12,500 | November | bridewealth | | | | | |
| | 2 rams | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| 30 | 1 billy goat | 2 | 6,900 | March | bridal trousseau | | | | | |
| | 3 female kids | | | | | | | | | April |
| | 4 male kids | | | | | | | | | April |
| 39 | 1 ram | 1 | | | | 3,500 | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 mere calf | | | | | | | | | July |
| | 1 billy goat | 2 | | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 1 male lamb | | | | | | | | | December |
| | 2 kids | | | | | | | | | April |
| 36 | 2 rams | | 19,000 | June | to buy cart | | | | | |
| | 1 ram | 2 | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | | February |
| | 2 male kids | | | | | | | | | February |
| | 1 zebu cow | 3 | | | | 28,000 | | | | March |
| | 4 plough oxen | 5 | | | | 55,000 | | | | March |
| | 4 goats | | 22,000 | | to buy: | | | | | April |
| | 1 goat | 1 | | | | 5,000 | | | | |
| 29 | 1 kid | | | | | | | | | February |
| 28 | 1 ram | 7 months | | | | 800 | October | | | |
| | 3 rams | 1 | 19,000 | | | | | | | |
| | 1 she goat | 1 | | | | 2,700 | | | | |
| | 1 ram | | | | | | | | Tabaski | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 3 lambs | | | | | | | | December |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | January |
| | 7 male kids | | | | | | | | January |
| | 2 lambs | | | | | | | | March |
| 7 | 1 ram | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 billy goat | 2 | | | | 2,500 | February | | |
| | 2 billy goats | 1 | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | April |
| | 2 male kids | | | | | | | | April |
| 3 | 1 ram | 2 | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 ewe | 2 | 3,000 | December | sauce expenses | | | | |
| | 1 she goat | 15 months | 3,680 | November | | | | | |
| | 1 ram | 2 | 4,595 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | February |
| | 2 male kids | | | | | | | | February |
| | 2 female lambs | | | | | | | | March |
| | 3 male lambs | | | | | | | | March |
| 34 | 1 ram | 1 | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 she goat | 2 | | | | 3,780 | August | for resale | |
| | 2 kids | | | | | | | | January |
| 10 | 1 billy goat | 9 months | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 1 billy goat | | 5,600 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 3 male kids | | | | | | | | March |
| 37 | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 she goat | 3 | 5,000 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 6 female kids | | | | | | | | January |
| | 6 male kids | | | | | | | | January |
| | 2 female lambs | | | | | | | | March |
| 13 | 1 she goat | 1 | 2,560 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 she goat | 2 | 3,300 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 billy goat | 1 | 3,700 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 billy goat | 2 | 4,600 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 male lamb | | | | | | | | December |
| | 3 male kids | | | | | | | | February |
| 25 | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 10 female kids | | | | | | | | December |
| | 3 male kids | | | | | | | | to March |
| | 1 male mere calf | | | | | | | | April |
| 17 | 1 billy goat | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | November |
| | 2 male kids | | | | | | | | November |
| | 1 moor ewe | 1 | | | | | | | |
| 32 | 1 billy goat | 3 | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 1 she goat | | | | | 2,400 | March | to breed | |
| | 3 female kids | | | | | | | | March |
| | 3 male kids | | | | | | | | March |
| 33 | 1 ram | 2 | 5,650 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 female lamb | | | | | | | | January |
| | 1 male lamb | | | | | | | | January |
| 22 | 1 billy goat | 1 | 1,500 | February | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 she goat | 1 | 2,000 | February | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | January |
| 14 | 1 billy goat | 2 | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 2 ewes | 1 | 3,000 each | February | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 5 female zebu calves | | | | | | | | August |
| | 4 female lambs | | | | | | | | January |
| 31 | 1 billy goat | 2 | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | March |
| | 2 female kids | | | | | | | | April |
| | 3 male kids | | | | | | | | April |
| 24 | 1 billy goat | 2 | 5,900 | March | to buy clothes | | | | |
| | 7 female kids | | | | | | | | January |
| | 3 male kids | | | | | | | | to March |
| 27 | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | | | circumcision | |
| | 1 mere cow | 10 | 24,000 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 she goat | 2 | 2,700 | February | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 female kid | 9 months | 2,300 | March | bridewealth | | | | |
| | 1 female kid | | | | | | | | March |
| | 1 male kid | | | | | | | | March |
| | 1 zebu calf | | | | | | | | September |
| 18 | 1 ram | 1 | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 2 zebu calves | | | | | | | | August |
| | 2 male lambs | | | | | | | | January |
| 15 | 1 ram | 2 | 6,000 | January | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 ram | 1 | 4,600 | February | to pay tax | | | | |
| | 1 ram | 1 | 3,500 | February | to buy clothes | | | | |
| | 3 mere calves | | | | | | | | December |
| 40 | 1 ram | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 female lamb | | | | | | | | August |
| 38 | 1 ram | 1 | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | 2,000 | May | Ramadan | |
| | 2 male lambs | | | | | | | | November |
| | 1 female kid | | | | | | | | April |
| | 1 male kid | | | | | | | | April |
| | [illegible] | [illegible] | 2,500 | [illegible] | to buy clothes | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 40 | 1 ram | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 female lamb | | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| 38 | 1 ram | 1 | | | | | | | August |
| | 1 billy goat | 1 | | | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 2 male lambs | | | | 2,000 | May | Ramadan | | |
| | 1 female kid | | | | | | | | November |
| | 1 male kid | | | | | | | | April |
| 23 | 1 she goat | 1 | 2,500 | June | to buy clothes | | | | April |
| | 1 female kid | | | | | | | | |
| | 6 male kids | | | | | | | | April |
| 19 | 1 ram | | | | | | | | April |
| | 1 ram | 1 | 3,500 | February | | | | Tabaski | |
| | 4 female kids | | | | | | | | |
| | 2 male kids | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 female lamb | | | | | | | | |
| | 2 male lambs | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | 1 ram | 1 | 6,000 | November | to buy bicycle | | | | |
| | 1 billy goat | 2 | 3,000 | January | to give to ton | | | | |
| 5 | 1 billy goat | 1 | 5,500 | March | to buy clothes | | | | |
| | 1 zebu calf | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 male lamb | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 female kids | | | | | | | 30 | October |
| | 2 male kids | | | | | | | | November |
| | | | | | | | | | December |
| 41 | 1 billy goat | 2 | 4,000 | January | to pay tax | | | | December |
| | 3 female kids | | | | | | | | |
| | 5 male kids | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 male lamb | | | | | | | | February |
| | | | | | | | | | February |
| 12 | 1 female kid | | | | | | | | March |
| | | | | | | | | | April |

are made for tax and bridewealth needs as they arise. Only in the case of #8, the slave descendant, was the buying and selling of small ruminants (sheep, in this case), according to their marginal value, carried out in any systematic fashion. The extra trips that he had to make to distant livestock markets in order to pursue this activity were looked on with much disfavor by his neighbors.

#36, the "stranger" grain buyer, also dabbled somewhat in this sort of speculation on the seasonal variations in the market value of small ruminants (Table X). However, he did this to a lesser extent than #8 because at the same time he was using his position as the government grain buyer (see Chapter VIII) to speculate on fluctuations in the price of millet and sorghum. His tri-weekly trips to and from the arrondissement seats, Katiena and Cinzana, in connection with his traffic in grain, were condescendingly viewed by his neighbors as symptomatic of his strangerhood. That he bought and sold small ruminants on the way was not so much the fault, in his neighbors', particularly his age-mates' (as he had no agnates outside of his compound) eyes. His frequent absences from the farming life of the village were more heavily resented than the money he made.

At the same time a Pullo (plural: Fulbe, fula in Bambara) from Djenne to the east, who had lost his entire herd in the 1972 drought, came (1974) to herd Dukolomba's sheep and goats during the rainy season when they had to keep out of sprouting and ripening fields. He quickly came to know the identities and characteristics of every small ruminant



in the village. The social dynamics of the village were such that no farmer from the village itself could have gotten as close to the livestock of his neighbors so as to profit from the knowledge gained thereby. But, as we shall see, a Fula from the outside could do this. At this time, Dukolomba had an exceptional number of small ruminants that had been traded to its farmers for very small amounts of grain during the recent drought and famine period.[1] I hope to have made clear throughout this study why Dukolomba and other bamana villages had grain to sell while many other members of the rural population were starving. Even so, this grain was sold secretly - usually being bicycled out of the village at night - as almost every bamana had a relative somewhere who was in need. By the time the housefields were harvested, the fula herder no longer had to spend the better part of the day leading all of the village's small ruminants out into the bush away from Dukolomba's fields. He was paid 100 FM for every newborn sheep and goat successfully delivered during his period of guardianship. But this fula did not leave the area after being paid. He used his wages[2] as a beginning on the long road towards rebuilding his lost herd. More importantly, however, he used his knowledge of Dukolomba's livestock holdings to act as a broker for traders and herders seeking to buy back, now that the

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[1] It was said that a goat could be purchased for a 5 kg calabash of grain at certain times.

[2] He was housed and fed in the house of his jatigi host, #26, for no charge. #26 enjoyed the prestige of housing a pious, literate Muslim from the ancient Islamic center of Djenne.

price of grain had fallen back to 20 FM/kg and lower, livestock that they had had to give up during the starvation period. The fula broker received 100 FM for each completed transaction. Since he knew Dukolomba's holdings so well his advice about a good buy frequently proved accurate. As his reputation spread he was sought out by farmers outside of Dukolomba looking for a buyer - usually at tax time. Likewise buyers came to him for a safe buy. I have listed all the sales from Dukolomba's herd that I was aware of in Table X. By the time I left the village in August 1975 only 3/4 of Dukolomba's inflated post-drought small ruminant herd remained. When I visited the village in early 1977, that herd was only half as large as I had found it in 1974.

Meanwhile, the fula herder, who had still not returned to Djenne, owned four oxen that he was renting to neighboring farmers and several small ruminants. He was getting prepared to purchase two cows as their price began to drop during that dry season. In a modest, but definite tone, he explained to me that if the bamana of Dukolomba were not so superstitious about each other's actions they would not always remain so poor. This fula had been no less haughty about the superiority of the Pullo way when he came to Dukolomba with nothing in 1974. He had separated himself for four years from his milieu in Djenne rather than be seen there without any cattle.

Conclusion

It is no accident that these contacts with the outside market have not led to an economic polarization within Dukolomba. I have tried to



show how their descent group institutions as they strengthen village solidarity prevent this. This does not mean that it does not happen in other villages, particularly in those that have not had such homogeneous settlement pattern such that descent group bonds could also serve to reinforce egalitarianism and co-operation in the villages as a whole. But the question remains: to what extent does Dukolomba's survival as a "traditional" village depend on a certain number of its neighbors being fed to the market grist mill? Could these descent groups maintain their localized, corporate solidarity if the dangers of seeking a market advantage were not continually visible to them? Secondly, could these savanna farmers survive without the bicycles, tools, kola nuts, cotton, grain marketing services furnished by the market contacts they do permit themselves?

Before Dukolomba's "traditionalism" is too heavily scorned by capitalist (DeWilde 1964) and socialist (Ernst 1974) alike, its role in resisting the destruction of the entire country by the world market for its labor should be given some attention.

> We begin to understand then why no single region of emigration has ever developed either in Africa or elsewhere. The transfer - which is more than considerable - is virtually a 'gift' from the poor source areas to the rich areas which benefit from it and this is sufficient in itself to explain the stagnation of the regions of origin of the migrants. And, because of their stagnation, the conditions for the reproduction of the pattern of unequal development are perpetuated; because inequality in the 'allocation of factors', far from being 'natural', is produced and reproduced socially.
>
> History has shown elsewhere that a rectification of the situation is possible if an appropriate effort of voluntary planning is carried out to deal with the rules of the market and the 'allocation of factors', resulting in a development which then, and only then, can stop the impoverishing flow of emigration (Amin 1974: 106).

I have tried to show why Dukolomba's farming descendants have more to contribute to this retification process than if they were merely farmers.



CHAPTER XI - CONCLUSION

The Moral Community

I have systematically tried to organise the datum on Dukolomba's land tenure, genealogy, social classification, labor inputs, material outputs, and social groupings in order to flesh out my original ethnographic impression that I was living among an unusually incorruptible group of people. I have tried to show how this incorruptibility is as much a result of their exportation of and alertness to malicious rivalry (fadenya) from their closest relatives as from any abstract norm favoring generosity or humanism in general. I only heard their word for humanism (mògòya or maya: mògò, ma: person, -ya: -ness) applied when my own, a stranger's, generosity was being discussed. Kindness between themselves, when discussed at all and this was rare, was referred to more frequently as badenya: "children (den) of the mother (ba) -ness (-ya)". Even the more general term "kinness", balimaya, was infrequently heard.[1] Kindness was expected and was so frequent because its absence was constantly discussed as fadenya, rivalry, sinsya, co-wife jealousy, juguya, malice, subaya, witchcraft, or maloya, shame (see epigram preceding Chapter I). The social atmosphere of this village was not the direct outgrowth of a cultural norm defining what that atmosphere

[1] In Chapter IX we saw how the giving of the Islamic alms focused more on specific relatives than on those most in need of "generosity".

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should be. It was the outcome of a specific constellation of social relations the structure of which was determined by their historical experience more than by any ideological synthesis. It is in the absence of this ideological synthesis that some Africans, kept so incorruptible by the social dynamics of their village setting, can be so easily corrupted upon obtaining power outside of that setting (Bekh 1971).

The Historical Community

I have tried to show how a peasant community in the Segu hinterland that depended on ideological sanctions for maintaining its internal reciprocal relations would not have lasted long. Even where ideological fears of a malevolent, mild life force (nyama) or of sorcery and witchcraft (subaya) were prevalent, if the existing social and economic relations did not bind the individual into a position of material vulnerability to these fears, he could easily convert to Islam and escape them and the community in which they flourished. A peasant could develop an abstracted ideology to improve his neighbors performance if they had no other choice any way. But on the labor scarce, land abundant West African savanna the peasant had some choices, albeit very risky ones.

The Bambara peasant who was not generous to his neighbors was more likely to be a "stranger" in the community and therefore have less guarantee of a return of generosity from them. This is the peasant who most often sought and seeks to break the reciprocal ties of his village because he is the one who had the least to gain from them in



the first place. Thus, to understand the economic activity of any given peasant we must first know exactly who they are in a particular system of social relations.

In order to be able to ask this "who" question about social relations for the Segu peasantry, one has to first interpret their history. As labor has been and is scarce relative to both land and capital in the regional economy, rural communities have differentiated themselves to the degree that they have been able to control the labor that they reproduce.

The evidence from Dukolocha is that this control can only be achieved with difficulty through an ideological and normative appeal to youthful laborers. There has certainly been no shortage of cult groups (Dieterlen 1951) and initiation societies (Zahan 1960) that have attempted just that. But the Dukolocha case shows that normative groups such as the age-sets and their ton youth group only display vitality to the degree that there is a dense network of kin ties between their members.

This dense network of kin ties is given by history to some villages and not to others. Old villages will have them and will last; new villages will not have them and they are less likely to last. Only rarely did the political and economic pressures on a village's labor in the Middle Niger region relent for a long enough spell in any one zone so that a new village there could last long enough to establish a sufficiently dense network of kin ties to resist these pressures on its labor when they resumed. Each time this happened, a relatively permanent village was left on the landscape. Therefore, it only needed

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to happen once in any given locale.

Why does the fact of kin ties have such power in this context even where the most elaborate ideologies and socialization efforts (Zahan 1960) can fail?

Reproduction

I have not accorded such a prominent place to kin ties in my analysis just because I am an anthropologist and have been trained to recognize them. I would not be prepared to argue that they become important to the same degree or in the same form in other non-industrial societies not on the West African savanna. It is, after all, in savanna Africa that the analysis of the exogamous patrilineage has been developed. I would agree with Meillassoux (1975a) that there is some connection between the exogamic patrilineage and grain agriculture under conditions of land abundance. Baumann (1928) finds a greater male farming contribution under these very same conditions.

Here, I would like to simply argue that where labor is scarce - this scarcity is a function not only of low population pressure (Harner 1975) but also of there being a market at which the product (agricultural or otherwise) of that labor can be "realized" (Terray 1974) - the social relations of reproduction take on a greater material importance. Where these social relations can be brought under more effective control by a group in such a labor scarce situation, that group's control of its political and natural environment will be enhanced. The patrilineage is the most effective form of such control available to the Bambara peasantry.



Patrilineal Descent

Fortunately for my own ethnographic problem, our understanding of the social dynamics of the West African patrilineage are relatively advanced. From what we know about these social dynamics it is not hard to see why these bamana peasants developed rather than abandoned their patrilineal organization in their attempts to resist and negate the hierarchy and asymmetrical market relations being fostered by their historical state:

> For its emergence and continuity, the segmentary lineage presumes the jural, ritual and social equivalence of siblings in the direct line of descent. Accordingly, it classifies different sibling groups as units of co-ordinate status, each internally undifferentiated, thereby excluding jural inequalities among its members, even though at any given moment the senior men enjoy superior social and ritual advantages as family heads and custodians of lineage rights. The equivalence of lineage members really consists in the equal distribution of rights and access to such positions among them, as they mature. Thus, the segmentary lineage, a rather widespread social form, excludes internal stratification, despite the inevitable inequalities in the current distribution of advantages inherent in its generational and familial composition. In place of horizontal strata, the lineage principle establishes vertical divisions between lineages as units of corporate status, as befits Durkheim's segmental model. The effect is to restrict lateral or inter-lineage mobility, while instituting vertical or intra-lineage mobility. The status system of the corporate lineage is thus diametrically opposite to hierarchic ranking; and all men are status peers in societies organized on these lines, since all lineages are co-ordinate at some level of the organization. (Smith 1975: 144).

Egalitarianism is the precondition of the unity of the bamana peasant in the face of co-opting pressures of the state and the market forces associated with it. If part of the peasant group had a favored relation with these market foces, the smaller remainder could be easily reduced

to a more exploitable form: as a slave or a proletariat depending on the epoch (Sourd-Canale 1971). The lineage serves such a group well in preventing any temporary economic differentiation from becoming a more permanent political divergence.

However, a condition of the lineages being able to forestall hierarchy is their freedom to segment:[2]

> Political relations and segmentation are synonymous, and that corporate group character emerges in the context of segmentary political relations. Group incorporation proceeds and is defined segmentarily, and the processes are interdependent. The corporate character of a segmentary lineage is thus its administrative structure viewed as a unit in a system of political relations. The corporate character lapses, together with the segmentary structure, by the removal of the political conditions which define it. (Smith 1975: 49)

Here is where the bamana peasant has his problem: how to maintain the corporate character of his lineage segments without too much segmentation? It has not just been for military purposes that the bamana peasant has only been able to reproduce himself in a united, nucleated village. As shown throughout this study, he needs a large, easily mobilized work force to meet the labor bottlenecks of the savanna farming season. Certainly, if he is to produce a sufficient surplus to meet the tax demands of the state, he must have such a labor force behind him.

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[2] cf. Goody (1958: 61): "lineages are constantly subdividing, each time, infact, that a new member is born".



As Horton has shown (1971), in West Africa, such nucleated villages need offices for community leadership that are not tied to any one segment or faction. Only with such offices can the village, the only politically and economically appropriate unit in which these peasant's lineage segments can reproduce themselves, perpetuate itself through time.

> Whereas lineage structures can only develop in segmentary fashion to the extent that administrative and political functions are tied together to particular points in a graded series of segments and statuses, office permits the differentiation of these functions variously within a system of government, as well as over time. This involves or permits increased adaptability, resilience, efficiency, centralization, scope, and differentiation of function in governmental structures which are organized on the bases of corporate office. (Smith 1975: 46-47).

> Some departure from the pure model of government by corporate lineage groups occurs even in the segmentary lineage societies; and this movement is in the direction of differentiation of governmental functions, and their association with agencies of different types, whether associations age-sets or offices. (Smith 1975: 54).

As we have seen it is primarily the corporate aspects of the age-sets that define the range of a village unity that lineage segments will not leave. Only the age-sets offer the unifying, indivisible aspects of a corporation sole without implying any of the hierarchy that such a solitary office would bring. Smith would not be inclined to accord the age-sets the importance that I have in this study:

> Age-sets may or may not be the dominant political units, but even if they are, and also simultaneously discharge corresponding administrative functions, age-sets cannot rival lineages in the complexity and order of their dual hierarchic and segmentary organization, since organi-

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> zational complexity simply expresses the great range of administrative and political functions involved, and their combination at all lineage levels, in societies where government is by lineage. (Smith 1975: 36).

But here is where the analysis left is preoccupation with corporate groups, turned from M. G. Smith to Meyer Fortes as it were. The age-sets are able to control geographical segmentation within the lineage not because of any corporate charter, but because they provide an arena for the expression of kinship relations independently of the actor's descent group membership. The unity of the village could not depend a corporation of greater organizational complexity than the lineage for two reasons. Such a corporation would foster hierarchy in the community, and it would be too visible to those agencies seeking to pry peasant labor loose from its reproductive setting, and therefore too prone to outside interference.

Kinship

Where the network of these kinship relations is not sufficiently dense, the age-sets lose their vitality and therefore their ability to restrain the segmentary dynamics of the lineages. I have already tried to show why the importance of reproducing labor in the political and economic conditions prevaling on the Segu savanna gives such a determinant role to a community's legacy of kinship relations. The availability of such relations are, at the present time, as determinant of his economic future as his access to land, tools, and rainfall.

Fortes describes a role for kinship among the Tallensi on the savanna 700 Km. to the S.E. that is analogous to what I have been trying to



document for the Segu bamana throughout this study:

> Ties of cognatic kinship breach the barriers between individuals erected by the lineage system. They represent the recognition by the society that the direct social bonds of individual with individual are as vital for the well-being of the society as the fixed framework of corporate groupings. The intricate, ever-changing web of inter-personal kinship creates a diffused sense of mutual interest and dependence among the people of neighboring communities. This sense of the interdependence of men as individuals in the hard struggle of ordinary living, thus canalized by kinship, not only transcends the more rigid solidarities of family, lineage, and local clan, but also counteracts the frictions and disturbances that constantly spring up in the relations of individuals with one another. Inter-personal kinship ties thus act both as a diffuse force of social cohesion in opposition to the sectional bias of the lineage structure, and as a moral sanction of conformity to custom. The concept of kinship amity as a basic premise of the relations of kinsfolk of every degree reflects this aspect of kinship. (Fortes 1949: 344).

It is in this connection that I have emphasized the fadenya/badenya contrast in Bambara social relations. Feden half-brothers are bound together primarily as agnates in a corporate lineage grouping. Fadenya means rivalry. Baden share a mother and the cogatic aspect of their relationship is emphasized. Badenya means familiarity. Because the farming compound is a corporate lineage grouping where fadenya dominates badenya must await the age-set setting to find secure expression.

Fortes is careful to note that among the Tallensi kinship ties do find an arena for display even:

> though the Tallensi do not have institutionalized age-grades, men or women of about the same degree of social maturity are often grouped together in situations in which many people of all ages play a part. (1949: 337).

The Bambara peasant, however, cannot take the chance that these situations

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will not arise; hence the development of the mandatory age-set organizations in his village.

Production

Throughout this study I have been careful to specify the kinship and descent relations activated in farming production, particularly when these run outside of the patrilocal compound. This is because the technology of that production is modified in important ways by the manipulation of these ties. As Fortes says for the neighboring Tallensi:

> There cannot, for example, be gross divergence between the rules governing the ownership and use of land or other productive property, and those governing the application of labor to production or the consumption of the products of labour, since both sets of rules are aspects of the jural relations of a specific group of kinsfolk by birth and marriage. (1949: 340)[3]

This, then, has been the focus of this study: the manipulation of material means and ends through status relations that cannot be quantified on the same terms. I have tried to show how this blurring of measurement of rights and duties used in productive labor is not a hangover or lag from "traditional" times. It is, rather, a deliberate practice that has developed over centuries[4] to retard the intervention of

[3]The prevalence of farming symbolism in the Bambara marriage ceremonies (DeGanary 1955, Zahan 1963) should be considered in this wider production and reproduction context.

[4]I would not argue that all West African peasantries have been as successful in developing a closed-corporate community to resist outside interference. One has only to look at the stratification and high divorce rates in Hausa and Kanuni villages, for example. I would argue, however, that the success of the bamana peasant in this respect is related to the greater antiquity of his peasant situation.



market relations among those whose material situation could only be worsened. thereby. Those who would rue the conservative practices of the bamana villager as a hinderance to the country's "development" should consider what would happen to Mali if more of its labor was sprung loose from its peasant context to be brought and sold on the market. As very little of that market is in Mali itself it seems hard to believe that that Sahelian nation would gain by such a process of "development". Significantly, it is most frequently members of national and international elites, who seek to exploit these peasants further, that most frequently curse their conservatism.

The ways in which this pattern of historical development of the bamana peasantry has affected farming production center on their reluctance to invest too much of their surplus into land improvements or farming equipment. Unless these innovations are widespread in the village they are seen as giving a special advantage to the group of laborers making the investment. This advantage is then used as a pretext for withholding work assitance either for present labor bottlenecks or future dependencies resulting from demographic changes in favor of a high consumer/worker ratio for that group. Such was the case for those who adopted the ox-drawn plough in the colonial period. They were further stigmatized because the plough made an uneconomical use of soil fertility. A ploughed clay field had to be abandoned three years earlier than a hoed one (see Chapter VI).

Even if the available technology were better integrated into local conditions, it is questionable if it would be taken up unless the financial

return on agricultural labor were permitted to rival the possible wage labor return. For, as we have seen, it would have to be taken up at the expense of a system of short term and long term reciprocity of subsistence farming services that is one of the sole reasons why many of these peasants maintain their ties to the countryside or even to Mali for that matter, at all. This is reflected in their passivity towards cash crop opportunities (peanuts), as well as to the yield increments possible under a more delicate field rotation system than the present "big field" syndrome. Keeping the labor force united in one "big field" is accorded a greater importance than the superior yield to be had from rotating crops of smaller plots.

The subsistence of the <u>bamana</u> majority of the rural population is assured through the social organization I have described in this study. This fact increases their flexibility in accepting wage labor employment situations at the same time as it makes them more conservative about changing their farming organization.

If the rural population continues to grow faster than the demand for wage-labor then they might seek a greater return from the rural landscape. But as long as the subsistence needs of the wage-laborering are are largely met through imports, then most of these peasants will continue to opt for a system that gives them subsistence security over the long term over one that merely gives them superior crop yields over the short term.



APPENDIX I: AREA RAINFALL (in mms.)[1]

| Village: | | CINZANA | | | | DOUNA | | | | | KATIENA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year: | | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 19 |
| APRIL | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | | | | | | 3.0 | 1.0 | | 1.0 | | | | | |
| | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | | 5.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 10 | | | .8 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 11 | | | | | | | | | .1 | | | | | |
| | 12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 14 | | 3.2 | | | | 2.5 | | | | | | | | |
| | 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 16 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 17 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 18 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 19 | | | | 2.1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 20 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 21 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 22 | | 4.3 | | | | 10.0 | | | | | | | | |
| | 23 | | | | | | 1.0 | | | | | | | | |
| | 24 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 25 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 26 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 27 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 28 | | 3.2 | 3.1 | | | | 6.2 | | | | | | | |
| | 29 | | | .1 | | | | 2.0 | | | | | | | |
| | 30 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 0.0 | 15.7 | 4.0 | 2.1 | (0.0) | 13.5 | 9.2 | 0.0 | 1.1 | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0. |
| MAY | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 5 | | | 11.0 | | | | 21.5 | | | .5 | | | | |
| | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 8 | | | | | | | | | 47.0 | | | | | |
| | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 10 | | | | | | | | | 6.5 | | | | | |
| | 11 | | | | | | | | .5 | | | | | | |
| | 12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 13 | | | | .6 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 14 | | | | 10.5 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 15 | | | .1 | .9 | | | | 11.0 | | | | | | 19.( |
| | 16 | | | .4 | 6.2 | | | | 3.3 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | 8.0 | | 6.1 | | 3.( |

| Village: | | CINZANA | | | | DOU NA | | | | | KATIENA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year: | | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
| MAY | 17 | | | .1 | | | | | .1 | | | | | | |
| | 18 | | | | .3 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 19 | | | | 6.4 | | | | | | | | | 5.0 | |
| | 20 | | | | | | | | 2.5 | | | | | | |
| | 21 | | | | 3.5 | | | | 3.2 | | | | | | .5 |
| | 22 | | | 3.8 | 2.8 | | 8.0 | 13.0 | | 11.0 | | | 3.0 | | |
| | 23 | | | .8 | 2.8 | | | 3.5 | | 25.0 | | | | | |
| | 24 | | | 5.2 | | | | 3.5 | 1.0 | | | | | 2.0 | |
| | 25 | | | 2.5 | 2.6 | | | 1.6 | | | | | | | |
| | 26 | | | | | | 3.0 | | | | 5.0 | | .5 | | 2.0 |
| | 27 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 28 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 29 | | 2.6 | | | | | | | | | | 16.0 | | |
| | 30 | | | 15.6 | | | | | | | 27.0 | | | | |
| | 31 | | | 1.2 | 53.0 | | 4.0 | 24.0 | 8.2 | | | | | 46.0 | |
| TOTAL | | 0.0 | 2.6 | 40.7 | 69.6 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 67.1 | 29.8 | 89.5 | 30.5 | 0.0 | 28.1 | 53.0 | 24.5 |
| JUNE | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 3 | | | | | | 15.0 | | | | | | 15.0 | | |
| | 4 | 1.7 | 22.0 | 17.6 | | | 23.0 | | | 5.7 | | | 2.0 | | |
| | 5 | | | | 71.0 | | | | | | 19.0 | | 41.0 | 6.0 | |
| | 6 | 33.3 | | | 16.5 | | | 5.5 | 52.0 | | | | | | |
| | 7 | | | 43.6 | | | | 41.0 | 19.2 | | | | | | |
| | 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 50.0 | |
| | 9 | | | | | | | | | 14.5 | | | | | |
| | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 11 | | | | | | | | | 43.0 | | | | | |
| | 12 | | | .1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3.0 | |
| | 14 | 14.6 | | | | | | | 1.0 | | | | | | |
| | 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 16 | | 28.7 | 13.7 | .2 | | 18.0 | | | | | | | | |
| | 17 | | | | .4 | | | | 19.0 | 11.0 | 7.0 | | 31.5 | | 2.5 |
| | 18 | 4.5 | | | | 2.0 | 2.0 | | | 3.0 | | | | | |
| | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 20 | 18.1 | | 3.2 | 13.6 | | | | 55.0 | 3.5 | | | | | 15.0 |
| | 21 | 13.4 | | | | 28.0 | | | 5.0 | | 3.0 | 56.0 | | | |
| | 22 | 2.1 | | | 33.0 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | |
| | 23 | | | | 5.9 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 24 | 11.1 | | 36.9 | | 4.0 | | | | | 9.0 | 8.0 | | | 13.0 |
| | 25 | | | .8 | 4.2 | | 7.5 | 12.0 | | 10.9 | | | 10.1 | 23.0 | 30.0 |
| | 26 | | 1.3 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 27 | | | | 42.5 | | | | 34.0 | | 11.0 | | 18.0 | | |
| | 28 | | 34.2 | | | | 14.0 | | 18.2 | | 6.0 | | .5 | | 10.1 |
| | 29 | | | | 2.7 | 18.0 | | | | | | | | | |
| | 30 | 7.0 | | | .2 | 24.0 | | | 6.3 | | | 22.0 | 9.0 | | |
| TOTAL | | 72.5 | 119.5 | 115.9 | 190.2 | (77.0) | 79.5 | 58.5 | 148.7 | 91.6 | 55.0 | 86.0 | 127.1 | 82.0 | 70.5 |



| Village: | | CINZANA | | | | DOU NA | | | | | KATIENA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year: | | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 19 |
| JULY | 1 | | | 7.4 | | 25.0 | 14.0 | 14.0 | | | | | | | |
| | 2 | 31.0 | 13.4 | | | | | | | | | | 13.5 | .5 | |
| | 3 | | | .5 | 4.6 | | | | | | 52.0 | 25.0 | | | |
| | 4 | 22.7 | | 5.4 | 3.5 | 25.0 | | 5.5 | | | | | | | |
| | 5 | 11.5 | 30.5 | 3.9 | | | 37.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 4.6 | | | | | |
| | 6 | 3.0 | | .1 | 10.2 | 3.0 | | 1.0 | 13.3 | 1.0 | | | 47.0 | 7.5 | |
| | 7 | | | | .3 | | | | 18.0 | | | 5.0 | | | |
| | 8 | | | | | | | | 1.0 | 20.0 | 32.0 | 3.8 | 4.2 | | |
| | 9 | 2.2 | 2.6 | | | 7.0 | | | | | 3.0 | | | | |
| | 10 | 16.8 | | | 31.8 | 22.0 | | | 23.0 | | 89.0 | | 8.2 | | |
| | 11 | | | | 2.8 | 40.0 | | | .5 | | | 11.1 | | | 4 |
| | 12 | 11.7 | | | 6.8 | | | | 7.0 | 7.0 | 30.0 | 60.0 | | | 12 |
| | 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 18 |
| | 14 | 3.1 | 1.7 | | | 2.0 | 1.0 | | | | .5 | | | | 6 |
| | 15 | | 8.2 | 22.4 | | | 8.0 | 33.0 | | | 13.0 | 7.0 | | | |
| | 16 | | | | | 12.0 | | 1.0 | | 14.7 | | | 12.0 | 61.0 | |
| | 17 | 12.2 | 18.6 | | 35.3 | | 17.0 | | .2 | | 6.0 | 25.0 | 7.1 | | |
| | 18 | | | 1.0 | | | | 1.0 | | 36.3 | | 9.0 | | 52.0 | |
| | 19 | | | | | | | | 10.1 | | | | | | |
| | 20 | | | 25.3 | 6.3 | | | 33.0 | | | 22.0 | | | 36.5 | |
| | 21 | 3.1 | 13.6 | .6 | 2.4 | | 7.0 | | 4.0 | 2.0 | | 3.2 | | | 2 |
| | 22 | | | | | | | | | | 6.0 | 7.0 | | | 10 |
| | 23 | 7.1 | | 38.7 | 2.1 | | | 18.0 | .5 | 27.0 | | | | 28.0 | |
| | 24 | | | 22.4 | 48.8 | | | 38.0 | 24.0 | 4.0 | 13.5 | | | 4.0 | 32 |
| | 25 | | | | | | | | | 6.0 | | | | | |
| | 26 | 22.5 | | 1.0 | | | | | | | 7.2 | 20.0 | | | |
| | 27 | | 13.1 | 15.9 | 34.8 | | 2.0 | 8.2 | 18.2 | 77.0 | | | | 1.5 | 21 |
| | 28 | 28.1 | | | 41.7 | | | | 22.0 | 10.5 | 4.5 | 1.0 | | | 3 |
| | 29 | 10.1 | | 1.1 | .1 | | 3.5 | 10.3 | 3.6 | 15.9 | | | | | |
| | 30 | | | .4 | 6.4 | | 43.0 | 2.0 | | 15.6 | 11.0 | | 16.0 | | 4 |
| | 31 | 25.3 | 34.9 | 4.1 | | | | 1.0 | | | 1.5 | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 210.4 | 136.6 | 170.4 | 246.1 | (93.0) | 132.0 | 156.0 | 157.4 | 246.4 | 231.2 | 177.1 | 102.0 | 192.0 | 164 |
| AUGUST | 1 | 20.4 | | | | 42.0 | | | | | 16.0 | | | 7.0 | |
| | 2 | 2.0 | | 2.3 | 35.1 | 3.0 | | | 31.0 | | 10.0 | | | 7.5 | 14 |
| | 3 | | 10.8 | .6 | | | 9.0 | 2.3 | | | | | 34.0 | | |
| | 4 | | 7.4 | | 2.8 | 27.0 | | 1.5 | 5.5 | | | 32.0 | 14.0 | | 2 |
| | 5 | 29.7 | | 1.3 | 3.3 | | | | 7.0 | 24.5 | 5.0 | | 3.0 | 15.0 | 6 |
| | 6 | 2.6 | 13.2 | | 1.6 | | 11.0 | | | | | | 18.0 | | |
| | 7 | | | | | 3.0 | | | | 11.0 | 21.0 | 1.1 | | 6.0 | |
| | 8 | 7.5 | | | | 24.0 | | | | | | 17.0 | | | |
| | 9 | 4.9 | | | | 5.0 | 8.0 | 1.0 | | | | 5.1 | 30.0 | 9.0 | |
| | 10 | 12.1 | 10.3 | 44.4 | 1.5 | 5.0 | | 39.0 | | 11.3 | | | | 23.0 | |
| | 11 | | | | | | | | | 5.0 | | | | | |
| | 12 | 14.1 | | | | 13.0 | 13.0 | | | | 4.0 | 18.0 | | | |
| | 13 | | 6.3 | 1.2 | 59.3 | | 5.0 | 1.5 | 68.0 | | | | 7.0 | 7.9 | 55 |
| | 14 | | 2.0 | 12.2 | | | 10.0 | 3.5 | | 15.5 | | 46.5 | | 5.1 | |
| | 15 | | 26.2 | 8.2 | | | | 10.0 | | | 6.5 | 1.2 | 12.0 | 6.1 | |
| | 16 | | | 14.5 | | | | 6.5 | 8.5 | | | 23.0 | | | 12 |
| | 17 | 5.2 | | | 31.3 | 16.0 | | 1.0 | 10.0 | | 24.0 | | 1.0 | 1.0 | 13 |
| | 18 | 16.7 | | 5.6 | 4.9 | 19.0 | 22.0 | | 10.0 | 31.0 | 1.0 | 35.5 | | 5.0 | |
| | 19 | | 30.2 | | 1.3 | | | | | | | | 6.0 | | |
| | 20 | 5.6 | | 4.3 | | 7.0 | 18.0 | | | | 7.0 | 2.5 | | | |
| | 21 | | 8.0 | 25.3 | 5.0 | | | 39.0 | | | | | 5.0 | 19.0 | 6 |
| | 22 | 9.9 | | | 1.6 | 11.0 | | | 2.0 | 19.3 | | 16.0 | | | |
| | 23 | 13.0 | | 1.3 | 15.4 | 37.0 | 26.0 | | 42.0 | | | 1.0 | | | |

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| Village: | | CINZANA | | | | DOU NA | | | | | KATIENA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year: | | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
| | 24 | | 24.6 | 8.1 | | | | 8.5 | | 50.0 | 32.0 | | 42.0 | 6.0 | |
| | 25 | | | | 5.1 | | | | | | 4.2 | | | 5.0 | |
| | 26 | | | | | | | | 1.0 | 21.0 | | | | | 8.0 |
| UGUST | 27 | 2.1 | | | 3.6 | 3.0 | | 15.0 | | | | 8.8 | | | |
| | 28 | | | | 42.2 | | | | 26.0 | 22.0 | 5.0 | | 12.0 | 7.1 | 40.0 |
| | 29 | | 2.5 | | | | 7.0 | | | | 21.0 | 1.0 | | 2.0 | |
| | 30 | 6.1 | | 12.9 | | 5.0 | | 11.0 | | 5.0 | | 10.2 | 2.0 | 3.5 | |
| | 31 | | 9.0 | | | 28.0 | | | | 10.0 | | | 5.0 | | |
| TOTAL | | 161.9 | 150.5 | 142.2 | 215.0 | 248.0 | 133.0 | 139.8 | 212.0 | 225.6 | 156.7 | 218.9 | 200.0 | 137.2 | 156.0 |
| | 1 | | | 1.7 | | | 39.5 | | | | | | 32.0 | | |
| | 2 | 2.3 | 4.9 | | | 3.0 | | | | | 7.5 | .5 | | | |
| | 3 | | | 6.1 | 8.2 | | | 5.7 | 11.0 | | | 4.1 | 30.0 | 45.0 | 11.5 |
| | 4 | 4.2 | | 35.9 | | 5.0 | | 51.5 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 2.5 | | | 74.0 | 1.2 |
| | 5 | | | | 3.3 | | | | | | | | 40.0 | | |
| | 6 | | 7.9 | .8 | 34.9 | | 12.0 | | | | | | | | 12.0 |
| | 7 | 3.5 | | | 7.0 | 7.0 | 9.0 | 4.5 | | 5.0 | | 9.0 | | 5.0 | |
| | 8 | | | | | 10.0 | 8.0 | | | | | 10.0 | | | |
| | [illegible] | 4.2 | | | | | | | | 32.0 | .5 | 10.0 | | | |
| | | | | 10.5 | | | | | | 25.0 | | .5 | 3.0 | 17.0 | |
| | 11 | 2.3 | 2.0 | | | 4.0 | | 11.7 | | | | 1.0 | | | |
| | 12 | | 1.5 | | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 13 | | 6.0 | | | | | | 5.2 | | | | | | 6.2 |
| SEPTEM- | 14 | | | | 7.9 | | | | 1.2 | 15.0 | | | | 7.0 | 2.5 |
| BER | 15 | | | 27.7 | | 22.0 | | 21.0 | | | 30.0 | 9.5 | | 27.0 | 5.5 |
| | 16 | | | | | | | | | | 14.0 | | | | |
| | 17 | 17.1 | | 2.0 | 6.1 | | | 1.0 | | 8.0 | | | | | 16.0 |
| | 18 | | | | 20.4 | | | | 21.0 | | | 2.5 | | | 5.3 |
| | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | 15.0 | | |
| | 20 | | 13.4 | | | | 25.0 | | | | | | | | |
| | 21 | | | 11.8 | | 5.0 | | 4.0 | | 10.0 | | 10.2 | | | |
| | 22 | 7.7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 23 | | | | | | | | | 13.0 | | | | | |
| | 24 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 25 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 26 | | | | | 2.0 | | | | | | | | | |
| | 27 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 28 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 29 | | | | | | | | | | | .3 | | | |
| | 30 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 41.6 | 35.7 | 96.5 | 88.8 | 58.0 | 93.5 | 99.4 | 41.4 | 113.0 | 54.5 | 57.6 | 120.0 | 175.0 | 50.6 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 13.0 |
| | 3 | | | .4 | | | 2.0 | 7.0 | 1.0 | | 2.5 | | | 12.0 | |
| | 4 | | 4.0 | .5 | | | | | .5 | | | | | 2.0 | |
| OCTOBER | 5 | | | | | | .5 | | 1.3 | 8.5 | 1.0 | | | | |
| | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 7 | | | .8 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 9 | | | | | | 1.0 | | | | | | | | |
| | 10 | | | | 7.0 | | | | 3.0 | | | 10.0 | | | |
| | 11 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 12 | | | | 1.9 | | | | | | | | 13.0 | | |



| Village: | | CINZANA | | | | DOU NA | | | | | KATIENA | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year: | | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 19 |
| | 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 14 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 15 | | | | | | | | | | .5 | 3.8 | | | |
| | 16 | | | | | | | | | | 19.0 | | | | |
| | 17 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 18 | | 18.0 | | | | 1.6 | | | | | | | | |
| | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | 13.5 | | |
| | 20 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1.0 | |
| OCTOBER | 21 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 22 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 23 | | | | | | | 1.5 | | | 3.0 | | | | |
| | 24 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 25 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 26 | | 4.2 | | | | | | | | | | 14.0 | | |
| | 27 | | 23.5 | | | | 7.0 | | | | 11.0 | | | | |
| | 28 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 29 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 30 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 31 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 0.0 | 49.7 | 1.7 | 8.9 | 0.0 | 11.6 | 8.5 | 6.8 | 8.5 | 37.0 | 13.8 | 40.5 | 15.0 | 13. |

[1] I would like to express my appreciation for this data to M. Diarra and M. Kansaye of the Centre d'Animation Rurale in Zinzana (Cinzana) and Katiena respectively, and to Brihima Coulibaly of the Service des Eaux et Forêts in Dou na.

## APPENDIX II - GRAIN YIELDS (kilograms)

| Compound No. | Old Men .8C | Old Women .8C (born after 1920) | Adult Men 1.0M | Married Women .8M | Unmarried Women .8C | Uncircumcised Boys .8C | Infants .5C | Total Compound Population | Crop | Early Harvest | Women's Pickings | Full Harvest | Winnowing Fees | Rethreshed Findings | Rewinnowed Findings | Total Bush Field Yield | Total Bush Field Grain Yield | Housefield Yield | Women's Field Yield | Total Grain Yield | Amount spent on condiments per week Kwian francs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 34 | S | 0 | 0 | 7,300 | 340 | 0 | 200 | 7,840 | 17,430 | 2,500 | 1,500 | 22,430 | 400 fc |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 100 | 8,800 | 510 | 0 | 180 | 9,590 | | | 1,000 | | |
| 11 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 27 | S | 0 | 0 | 3,400 | 70 | 0 | 140 | 3,610 | 16,575 | 800 | 250 | 19,425 | 500 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 145 | 12,100 | 620 | 60 | 40 | 12,965 | | 1,200 | 600 | | |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 27 | S | 0 | 0 | 3,000 | 110 | 0 | 300 | 3,410 | 15,885 | 2,000 | 0 | 18,135 | 750 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 165 | 11,600 | 570 | 105 | 35 | 12,475 | | 0 | 250 | | |
| 35 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 26 | S | 0 | 0 | 5,600 | 90 | 0 | 150 | 5,840 | 10,660 | 0 | 950 | 16,810 | 1000 fc |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 130 | 4,600 | 0 | 80 | 10 | 4,820 | | 0 | 5,200 | | |
| 16 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 25 | S | 0 | 0 | 4,900 | 65 | 0 | 250 | 5,115 | 16,600 | 1,750 | 1,640 | 19,990 | 800 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 105 | 10,800 | 560 | 0 | 30 | 11,495 | | | | | |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 17 | S | 0 | 0 | 4,000 | 80 | 0 | 150 | 4,230 | 11,910 | 150 | | 12,060 | 500 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 60 | 7,200 | 360 | 40 | 20 | 7,680 | | | | | |
| 8 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 16 | S | 0 | 0 | 300 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 335 | 7,550 | 400 | 700 | 8,950 | 500 fc |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 140 | 6,700 | 340 | 15 | 20 | 7,215 | | 300 | | | |
| 30 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 16 | S | 0 | 0 | 4,700 | 200 | 0 | 100 | 5,000 | 8,105 | 600 | 300 | 9,995 | 300 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 25 | 2,800 | 200 | 40 | 40 | 3,105 | | 400 | 590 | | |
| 39 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 14 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6,845 | 500 | 0 | 7,645 | 350 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 500 | 0 | 6,000 | 300 | 15 | 30 | 6,845 | | 0 | 0 | | |
| 36 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 13 | S | 0 | 0 | 8,400 | 195 | 0 | 250 | 8,745 | 8,775 | 1,200 | 300 | 10,275 | 300 fc |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | | 0 | 0 | | 150 fc |
| 29 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 12 | S | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 70 | 0 | 50 | 2,120 | 6,830 | 375 | 0 | 7,405 | 150 fc |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 15 | 4,000 | 260 | 25 | 10 | 4,710 | | 0 | 0 | | |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 12 | S | 100 | 0 | 400 | 40 | 0 | 50 | 590 | 1,995 | 775 | 200 | 2,970 | 350 fc |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 20 | 1,200 | 110 | 45 | 30 | 1,405 | | 0 | 0 | | |
| 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 12 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 100 | 0 | 120 | 1,420 | 1,530 | 0 | 200 | 1,810 | 250 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 110 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 110 | | 80 | | | |
| 28 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 11 | S | 0 | 0 | 4,500 | 145 | 0 | 120 | 4,765 | 6,280 | 800 | 0 | 7,480 | 450 |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 25 | 1,200 | 200 | 75 | 15 | 1,515 | | | 400 | | |
| 7 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 11 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5,970 | 500 | 0 | 6,970 | 500 fc |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 100 | 5,600 | 240 | 10 | 20 | 5,970 | | 0 | 500 | | |

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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 10 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 25 | 6,000 | 200 | 0 | 30 | 6,255 | 6,255 | 700 | 0 | 6,955 | 400 | | |
| 34 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 10 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,000 | 15 | 0 | 20 | 1,035 | | 400 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 50 | 4,000 | 200 | 35 | 10 | 4,295 | 5,330 | 0 | | 5,730 | 400 | | |
| 13 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 10 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 60 | 0 | 80 | 3,340 | | 0 | 340 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 20 | 2,000 | 120 | 30 | 15 | 2,185 | 5,525 | 500 | 0 | 6,365 | 300 | | |
| 10 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 10 | S | 0 | 0 | 2,400 | 85 | 0 | 100 | 2,585 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 2,595 | 50 | 600 | 3,245 | 150 | | |
| 37 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | S | 0 | 0 | 5,800 | 190 | 0 | 200 | 6,190 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 6,240 | 200 | 0 | 6,440 | 200 | | |
| 25 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 9 | S | 0 | 0 | 3,000 | 75 | 0 | 100 | 3,175 | | 1,200 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,175 | 0 | 0 | 4,375 | 200 | | |
| 17 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 8 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 55 | 0 | 250 | 1,505 | | 200 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 20 | 4,100 | 240 | 40 | 20 | 4,420 | 5,925 | 0 | 0 | 6,125 | 400 | | |
| 32 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 8 | S | 0 | 0 | 2,800 | 80 | 0 | 100 | 2,980 | | 300 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 800 | 72 | 10 | 5 | 887 | 3,867 | 750 | 0 | 4,917 | 150 fc | | |
| 22 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | S | 0 | 0 | 4,200 | 190 | 0 | 100 | 4,690 | | 200 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 150 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 175 | 4,865 | 100 | 1,100 | 6,265 | 200 fc | | |
| 33 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | S | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 45 | 2,200 | 200 | 30 | 30 | 2,475 | | 300 | 600 | 3,375 | 250 fc | | |
| 11 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 8 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 2,400 | 130 | 0 | 15 | 2,545 | 2,545 | 800 | 0 | 3,345 | 150 fc | | |
| 14 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 8 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 190 | 0 | 120 | 1,510 | | 0 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 1,550 | 400 | 0 | 1,950 | 200 fc | | |
| 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 (.5W) | 1 | 4 | 7 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 500 | 10 | 3,200 | 70 | 0 | 25 | 3,805 | 3,805 | 200 | 0 | 4,005 | 150 fc | | |
| 27 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | S | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 45 | 0 | 200 | 2,245 | | 750 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | 2,995 | 150 | | |
| 18 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 6 | S | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 40 | 3,000 | 145 | 10 | 15 | 3,210 | | 0 | 0 | 3,210 | 200 | | |
| 15 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | S | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 50 | 0 | 80 | 2,130 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 1,000 | 45 | 30 | 5 | 1,080 | 3,210 | 500 | 0 | 3,710 | 100 fc | | |
| 40 | 1* (.8W) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 6 | S | 0 | 0 | 800 | 0 | 0 | 80 | 880 | | 250 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 880 | 0 | 0 | 1,130 | 200 fc | | |
| 38 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | S | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 80 | 0 | 100 | 2,180 | | 400 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 15 | 2,800 | 100 | 0 | 20 | 2,935 | 5,115 | 0 | 0 | 5,515 | 250 | | |
| 23 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 200 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 300 | 4,000 | 200 | 20 | 15 | 0 | 5,435 | 0 | 0 | 5,635 | 100 | | |
| 19 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,500 | 0 | 0 | 60 | 1,560 | | 300 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 1,570 | 0 | 375 | 2,245 | 300 fc | | |
| 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | S | 0 | 0 | 900 | 50 | 0 | 250 | 1,200 | | 300 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 4,400 | 95 | 15 | 20 | 4,520 | 5.720 | 0 | 0 | 6,020 | 300 fc | | |
| 5 | 1 | 0 | TAWII* (.8W) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,500 | 35 | 0 | 200 | 1,735 | | 140 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 25 | 3,200 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 3,245 | 4,980 | 0 | 0 | 4,980 | 200 | | |
| 41 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | S | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 55 | 0 | 100 | 1,355 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 1,430 | 500 | 0 | 1,930 | 200 fc | | |
| 42 | 1* (.8W) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 1,200 | 50 | 0 | 10 | 1,260 | 1,260 | 0 | 0 | 1,620 | 100 | | |
| 21 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | S | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 90 | 0 | 75 | 2,165 | | 60 | 300 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,165 | 0 | 0 | 2,525 | 125 | | |
| 16x | 1 | 0 | ½ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | S | 0 | 0 | 800 | 60 | 0 | 60 | 920 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 920 | 0 | 0 | 920 | ate w/#16 | | |
| 12 | 1* (.8W) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 130 | 30 | 15 | 2,175 | 2,175 | 0 | 0 | 2,175 | 0 | | |
| 43 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | M | 0 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 | 0 | 0 | | 100 fc | | |

C – Consumer W – Worker S – Sorghum M – Millet fc – female contribution jf – jonforow

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# APPENDIX III

## Livestock and Equipment Ownership

| Company # | bull, ox | steer | cow | calf | TOTAL | billy goat | older male | nanny goat | kid | TOTAL | ram | older male | ewe | lamb | TOTAL | male donkey | female donkey | baby donkey | TOTAL | donkey cart | dog | plough |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | 20 | 22 | 20 | 38 | 100 | 9 | 6 | 14 | 6 | 29 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 30 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 |
| 11 | | | | | | 4 | 10 | 17 | 15 | 46 | 9 | 3 | 16 | 3 | 31 | 1 | | | 1 | | | |
| 2 | 20 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 49 | 4 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 29 | 11 | 6 | 12 | 3 | 32 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 35 | | | | | | 3 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 17 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 14 | | 2 | 2 | 4 | | 1 | |
| 16 | 3 | | | | 3 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 27 | 10 | 6 | 15 | 4 | 35 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| 1 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 13 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 7 | 25 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 16 | 1 | | 2 | 3 | | 1 | 2 |
| 8 | 2 | | | | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 5 | | | | | | 1* | | 1 |
| 30 | | | | | | 6 | 9 | 4 | 7 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 13 | | | | | | 4 | |
| 39 | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 18 | 2 | | 2 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | | |
| 36 | 2 | | | | | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 15 | 3 | | 6 | 3 | 12 | | | | | 1* | | 1 |
| 29 | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 11 | | | | | | 7 | |
| 9 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | | 1 | | 1 | |
| 6 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | | 1 | | 2 | |
| 28 | | | | | | 3 | | 10 | 2 | 15 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 16 | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1* |
| 7 | 2 | | | | | | | 5 | 3 | 8 | | | 4 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | | 1 |
| 3 | | | | | | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 18 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 4 | 23 | | | | | | 1 | |
| 34 | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | |
| 10 | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 2 | |
| 37 | | | | | | 8 | 8 | 14 | 10 | 40 | 4 | | 2 | 2 | 8 | 2 | | 2 | 4 | | 2 | |
| 13 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 21 | 5 | 15 | 13 | 2 | 35 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | 1 | |
| 25 | | | | | | 7 | 13 | 9 | 7 | 36 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 4 | | | | | | | |
| 17 | | | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 14 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1* |
| 32 | 1 | | | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 17 | | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | | |
| 33 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | 1 | |
| 22 | | | | | | 4 | 1 | 12 | 9 | 26 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | 4 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 35 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 11 | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| 31 | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 13 | | | | | | | 2 | | 2 | | 2 | |
| 24 | | | | | | 2 | 4 | 10 | 4 | 20 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 27 | | 3 | | | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18 | | | 1 | 3 | 4 | | | | | | 1 | | 3 | 2 | 6 | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 |
| 15 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 21 | 1 | 1 | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 4 | | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | |
| 38 | | | | | | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 8 | | | 2 | 1 | 3 | | | | | | | |
| 23 | | | | | | 2 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 18 | 6 | 4 | 11 | 7 | 28 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | |
| 19 | | | | | | 2 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 23 | 2 | | 3 | 2 | 7 | | | | | | | |
| 4 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | | | | | 1 | 2 | |
| 5 | | | | | | 5 | 3 | 7 | 9 | 24 | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | 1 | |
| 41 | | | | | | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 10 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | | | | | | |
| 42 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| 21 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | | | | | | 2 | | 3 | 1 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 43 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

* purchased in 1975

## GLOSSARY OF BAMBARA TERMS

Note: I have found the alphabet established by UNESCO in the alphabetisation functional literacy program in Mali (Dumont 1973) adequate for transcribing the language. Furthermore, since there is a growing literature in Bambara which employs this official alphabet, I see no reason not to take advantage of this and avoid a recurring confusion in Bambara studies to date where many authors spell the same word a different way. I have tried to follow Bailleul and Kulubali (1973) in my use of this alphabet to spell words.

Ala: God
alimani: imam

ba: mother
baba: father, father's older brother
baden: child of the same mother
badenya: familiarity
baara: work
baarake: to work
bakò (muso): mother's older sister
bamana: peasant
bamanadugu: peasant village
barají: grace
barajibaara: good works
baraka: power
barokè: to converse
baro (muso): mother's little sister, or younger wife
benideni: man's sister's children
benkè: mother's brother
bilen: red
bina(ke): father's younger brother
biran(ke,muso): in-laws
blon: vestibule
boli: altar
boliden: worshipers
bolikoden: circumcision initiates
bonya: respect
bonyake: to pay respects
bugu: thatched roofed hut



chè: man, husband
chètigè (chikètigè): field section
chi: message
chiba (chibaga): God's messenger, Mohammed
chiden: messenger
chikè: to farm
chikètigè: field section
chikèla: farmer
chila: taking a message
chiwara: a wild farmer

da: mouth, edge
dama: limit
damabaara: village earth cult
dasiri: exchange labor
dasiritu: village sacred grove
dègè: millet porridge featuring red peppers
deme: help
demebaara: work given in aid
den (ke,muso): child
di: honey
dila: rain fed swamp
diladugu: bamana village around rain fed swamps southeast of Segu
diòngo: precolonial tax
dògò (ke,muso): younger sibling or parallel cousin
dògò a nikòrò: children of sisters (see joanikòrò)
dògòyakè: to malign
du: compound
duden: compound members
dugaw: benedictions
dugawke: to bless
dugu: village
dugukolo: land
dugukolotigi: land owner
dugutigi: village chief
dugutigiw: members of the chiefly clan
dukonobaara: work for the compound
dutigi: compound head

fa: father
faden: child of the same father
fadenjuguya: malevolence between male contemporaries
fadenya: jealousy
fama: ruler, bureaucrat
famachabaara: public works
faniya: patrilineality
faso: father's place
fasojamana: fatherland

fila-ni: twin
fila-n-bolo: age set
filake n'tugun: second made mound (cf. weed composting)
fin: black
finitigi: married woman
forcibaara: forced labor
foro: field
foroba: the compound estate
forobabaara: compound work
forobaboli: community altar
forobakuma: public talk, serious conversation
forobato: the compound meal
forobatogo: general name
forobafula: non-fulfulde-speaking fulani
fula: fulani or livestock raising specialist
furukè: to marry
furunyògòma: families that marry together
furusira: marriage route

gwa: cooking hearth
gwaso: kitchen

horon: free man
horonya: freedom

ja: dry, drought, image, double
jamu: clan name
jan: inundatable clay flats
jandugu: bamana village along north bank of Bani River
jandugunaani: group of four bamana villages along north bank of Bani River
jatigi (ke,muso): host
jè (high tone): white
jè: clay
jèdugu: bamana village to east of Segu sands
jè: co-operative group
jèbaara: co-operative labor
jèmya: celebration
jine: genii
jò: initiation society
jòake: to trade
jòanikoro: children of sisters (see dogoanikoro)
jòanake: to malign (see dogoyake)
jòn: slave, captive
jònforo: private affair
jònforobaara: personal work
jònforoboli: private altar
jònforokuma: private conversation, small talk
jònforoto: private meal
jònforotògò: specific name



jònka: bamana south of Bani who feel under sovereignty of tonjon at Tuna
jònya: servitude
jugu: bad
juguya: wickedness
jula: trader

kaneme (ke,muso): cross cousin
kanemetilon: cross cousin joking
kelen: one
kelenya: unity
keli: act
kinda: residentially based lineage segment or clan barrio (cf. Murdoch 1959 on Manding)
kindabaara: work performed by clan barrio
kore: post circumcision initiation society (cf. Zahan 1960)
koredugaw: kore initiates
kòrò (ke,muso): older sibling or parallel cousin
kòròya: anteriority

lamòden: adopted child given by original parent

ma (mògò): person
maya (mògoya): humanism
mago: need, necessity
magokè: to fulfill a need
makari: pity, mercy
malo: shame
maraka: Muslim potentate
marakajè: Soninke, usually a trader or marabout
marakabilèn: descendant of long time Muslims
marakafin: descendant of Tarawele Muslim, magician jurists from Mande
massa: juridicial potentate
m'pogotigi: unmarried girl
mori: marabout, Islamic practitioner
moriba: a big marabout
moribaara: maraboutage
muso: woman, wife
musoforo: woman's private affairs

na: sauce
naani: four
nafen: condiment
nafolo: wealth
namaden: outmarrying female
nasòngo: spice price
negekè: to enjoy
ni: life
nima, nimogo (ke,muso): potential spouse among in-laws
nimatilon: flirtation
nisòngo: colonial and postcolonial tax, life price

nya: spirit
nyama: life force
nyamakala: occupational caste
nyèna fin: sadness
nyèna je: festival
nyò: food grain
nyòbugo: threshing
nyòfa: stack of harvested grain heads
nyòtigè: harvest

saja: joking
saraka: sacrifice
sarakabò: to sacrifice
shi: species, race, descent line
shiya: descendance
siginyògònfè: early settler
sinamuso: co-wife
sinankuya: inter clan joking (also called senankuya)
sinaya: rivalry between married women
sitani: satan
so: house
somaw, somogow: minimal lineage segment
somabaara: lineage labor
son: libation
sonnikè: to make a libation
syere: witness, counselor
suba, subaga: night person, witch
subagaya: witchcraft
suraforo: night field, male private field

ton: association
tonbaara: association work
tondon: member of the association
tonjòn: slave of the association, soldier
tonjòndugu: village around Segu whose rulers and many of whose settlers had a relationship of servitude to rulers at Segu; village where a significant amount of labor is invested in another pursuit besides farming
ton nyènajè: festival of the association
ton prieri: junior association
ton sigi: meeting
tu nyògòn: age mate

yeerejèle: clean oneself up
yeerenyèbaara: work of self-improvement

Where one of the above nouns appears in the text with a -w suffix, that is its plural form.



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