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The Problems of Democracy: An Overview

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## Introduction

It is noteworthy how ubiquitous America's rekindled fascination with democracy has become. Hardly a day passes without The New York Times offering such headlines as "Czechoslovakia: Constitutional Scholars' Lab", "Democracy Could Take Hold in Africa", "Arrests in Kuwait Casting a Chill on the Movement for Democracy", or "Botswana is Weighed as a Model for New Democracies in Africa."<sup>1</sup> In a recent editorial, readers were informed that "the hunger for books pervades fragile new democracies" and that the United States could promote democracy in the Soviet bloc through literature. According to the writer, "Eastern Europeans can read lips... but (they) prefer to read books."<sup>2</sup> Finally, the American Ambassador to Kenya, one of six political appointees on the continent, was roundly criticized in Nairobi for arguing forcefully that the U.S. feels that Kenya should democratize. Reportedly, Ambassador Hempstone "was not troubled by the ... criticism. 'I'm not a diplomat.' he said with a chuckle."<sup>3</sup> The world is changing. Ambassadors are no longer diplomats while Botswana serves as a beacon for emerging democracies! More seriously however, the above articles, a random sprinkling at best, reflect an increasing concern amongst many Americans, both official and otherwise, with the manner and fashion in which democracy can be fostered beyond the borders of the United States.

America is to be congratulated for resisting the temptation to be smug in the face of its triumph over communism.

Even other seemingly successful political ideologies such as Islam are finding it increasingly difficult to mobilize large numbers of new political adherents. The Iranian Revolution and Iran's current difficulties contributed significantly to this declining interest. Yet despite its newfound appeal, democracy as an attractive global ideal is not necessarily synonymous with affection or even respect for the United States, her policies, or her values. Although Americans often feel that Democracy = the United States, this is not a global given. For millions around the world the term "democracy" often means freedom, in the crudest and most simple-minded fashion, rather than the carefully designed political systems which we generally associate with the term. For many, democracy is more a state of mind than of being. Throughout much of the developing world in particular, democracy has come to mean paradise not parliaments. In short, not only do the aspirants have to determine what they want when clamoring for democracy, but the United States has to determine what it means by democracy as well.

This definitional problem is an important and thorny one with great relevance to the Democratic Pluralism Initiative. Does AID view democracy as a generic form of political organization or, as is more likely the case, as a political system able to promote affection for and loyalty to the United States? Although American taxpayers will subsidize pro-American feeling, they will most certainly draw the line at paying for an American style political system if the end-product is ultimately embedded in an

anti-American body politic. Thus, fundamental expectations that American sponsorship of democratic political practices or institutions will of necessity culminate in pro-American feeling need to be reconsidered.

Even assuming resolution of the above definitional question, it must be emphasized that impediments to the imposition of democracy are profound and complex. They are not merely structural but also legal, political, cultural, and ethical. Even if all politically significant parties in a traditionally non-democratic collectivity could unanimously agree on the desirability of creating a democratic political order, the problems confronting such an experiment could prove almost insurmountable. And if we return to the real world, where unanimity rarely exists, we find an even more complex set of obstacles common to virtually all pluralistic and politicized societies. Thus, challenges to the establishment of democracy will not be met simply by creating a free press, initiating open and honest elections, or developing an effective legal code. Instead, those responsible for nurturing the growth of democracy will have to confront widely differing opinions, values, definitions, and political ambitions. It is the goal of this paper to enumerate and discuss such impediments in a systematic if somewhat general fashion. These problems are further complicated by the challenge of seeking generalizable solutions to political problems in a large number of vastly different political entities. Dealing with Eastern Europe, Asia, and the

Middle East simultaneously is not without its difficulties. Thus, it is at this point that the level of analysis issue should be mentioned.

### Levels of Analysis

Systematic review of the reports emerging from previous meetings of this group highlights a fundamental tension between area specialists on the one hand, and more broad gauged scholars of comparative politics on the other. Although each group appears to have made a genuine effort to empathize with the conceptual and empirical concerns of the other, the two obviously have differing analytical concerns and foci. A genuine gap between them exists and more than occasionally asserts itself. This gap results from having to ask very general questions, whose answers are supposed to provide a plan of action, in relation to very specific cases. Or, to put it somewhat more directly, generalists are trying to develop plans and projects which specialists may someday have to implement. This chasm between macroanalytically oriented conceptualizers and microanalytical country specialists is not trivial. Despite the tensions which can undermine collaboration between comparativists and area specialists, a plan that can span the two and become operational is still needed.<sup>4</sup> A middle ground was sought in prior meetings of this group with several participants prudently emphasizing that country specific programs must be formulated. But such suggestions, ironically put forth by comparativists, are negated by area specialists themselves who imply that "my country or area" is so special or

unique than the generalizable. In short, the academics participating in meetings of this group brought with them both the strengths and the weaknesses of the academy. And although we cannot resolve the level of analysis question here, we should be aware of its importance. Comparativists are able to transcend individual cases and to derive broad generalizations which area specialists may overlook or be unfamiliar with in the first place. Area specialists on the other hand, understand peculiarities and only they can assess the applicability of plans created by the comparativists. This creative tension is what comparative politics is all about in the first place, and the ability to usefully generalize while maintaining the integrity of each case should be understood not as some sort of arcane intellectual or epistemological abstraction, but rather as a problem directly related to the success of the Democratic Pluralism Initiative.

Help in identifying specific problems was offered by Professor Larry Diamond at the January 19 meeting of this group. Diamond identifies what he terms the key factors affecting the transition to democracy. These factors are particularly helpful as they are applicable to all political settings although obviously in widely varying intensity, degrees, and combinations. Given the desirability of embedding my analysis within the parameters set by this group during its earlier meetings, it

seemed to me that Diamond's well chosen foci could effectively serve as the core of my own discussion. And although not exhaustive, his list does include the most likely impediments to the successful establishment of a democratic political order. Finally, given the vast array of countries with which we are potentially concerned, I have tried to discipline myself to address these factors in somewhat more general terms than those with which I am accustomed. After all, I myself am an area specialist!

#### Political Culture

For many social scientists political culture seems to represent some sort of vast residual category into which all that cannot be readily explained is simply tossed. For others, particularly those who focus on Western political systems, there is a much narrower definition which basically views political culture as subjective attitudes towards objective political processes. Neither of these is terribly helpful as one is too broad and the other too narrow. For our purposes therefore, political culture can best be understood as the norms and values which define political life in any given polity. Political culture is in large part a product of a society's other cultural components and is strongly influenced by such significant societal forces as language, religion, ethnicity, region, social class (discussed below), nationalism, history, ideology, and so forth. In an abstract sense one could argue that given these factors, which when aggregated signify pluralism, that democracy

could serve as an attractive mode of political interaction due to its emphasis on freedom and individual human rights. In theory democracy gives a political voice to all components of a pluralistic society. Yet most citizens, or subjects, have little interest in the abstract and are far more concerned with tangible realities and conditions. Although we cannot systematically explore the relationship between a country's cultural contours and its political culture, the linkage between the two is clearly significant. And popular attitudes towards government, power relationships, and political expression are powerfully influenced by where opinion holders are positioned in a society. This positioning is often a reflection of one's ethnicity, religion, language, and so forth. Thus culture more broadly defined is important as it can, at times, serve as a road map to how a society is configured. One's religion or ethnic group may tell us how someone fits, or doesn't, and this can highlight how attractive and effective a particular mode of political interaction may be to particular groups in a society.

One assumption, incorrect perhaps, is that homogeneous societies are more likely to sustain democratic political orders than are heterogeneous ones. For pluralistic societies are divided in ways that homogeneous societies are not. It is easier to agree in a society where citizens share a common religion, ethnicity and so forth. By this logic however, pluralistic India should be far less democratic than relatively homogeneous Egypt. According to Freedom House however, the opposite obtains.<sup>5</sup> In

short, culture is important although there is no totally reliable conceptual means for evaluating its significance. And high degrees of pluralism can be devastatingly divisive. As the Lebanese case so tragically illustrates, even a regional Switzerland can fail. Thus culture can either support or undermine attempts to democratize.

What is analytically so baffling about culture is that apparently direct causal relationships may have less significance than is immediately apparent. For example, Iran's Islamic revolution which culminated in the creation of an unambiguously Islamic republic was not about Islamic per se.<sup>6</sup> In fact, the origins of the revolution had far more to do with Iran's economic and political conditions than with its spiritual ones. Ideology did play a key role in mobilizing the Iranian masses, but the issues that disturbed them were very much akin to those of concern to those sponsoring the DPI.

There are other cultural considerations that are relevant to the pursuit of democracy. The distribution of power, issues of status, and interpersonal relations are often the product of cultural configurations within a society. The idea of democracy may be an anathema to those opposed to permitting women or various ethnic, tribal, or religious groups the right to vote. Monarchies present special problems. Members of a ruling family consider themselves to be nobility and are thus unlikely sponsors of democratic political orders in which they will be diluting their own power and contributing to the erosion of their special

societal status. Mass publics, if they truly believe in monarchy, may themselves be ambivalent about democracy or uncomfortable tampering with what can be an important component of a national culture. Theocracies or, conversely, polities explicitly opposed to involving religion in public life, are also likely to present special challenges. Although these cultural impediments to democratization differ significantly from case to case, the fact that a national culture may be constructed in a fashion explicitly opposed to the development of democracy is certain to be a key consideration in every political setting.

The relationship between cultural considerations and democratization remains murky. Although the effects of the two on one another are crucial, there is no single social scientific theory able to explain how they interrelate. Indeed, the opposite almost seems to obtain as social scientists have been reluctant to include culture within their conceptual universes.<sup>7</sup> This neglect is gradually giving way to more sophisticated explorations into the political role of culture. Ronald Inglehart in his new book Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society looks not only at how culture shapes politics, but at the fashion in which economics and politics influence and change culture over time. He explicitly argues that "...political culture exists as an autonomous and measurable set of variables with significant political consequences."<sup>8</sup> Regrettably however, the quality and quantities of data he is able to analyze are not readily available for the countries with which are currently concerned.

Furthermore, Inglehart notes that "in non-Western societies, cultural change shows patterns that are very different from those it displays throughout the industrialized West."<sup>9</sup> Still, it is encouraging that culture is finally being given the serious analytical attention it deserves. It is a promising variable with the potential for great explanatory value for the developing areas.

#### Economic Development and Class Structure

Given AID's mandate it is unsurprising that a primary topic of discussion throughout previous meetings of this group has been the relationship between economic development and democracy. Virtually all participants at every seminar seemed to agree that the two are inextricably linked. What is less clear however, is the precise nature of the relationship between economic and political development.<sup>10</sup> In light of substantial prior discussion of this issue let me simply restate the problem: Although it is often hypothesized that economic development leads to social mobilization and politicization which can culminate in democracy, democracy is not the inevitable outcome of economic growth. Thus, AID is presented with an interesting challenge. How can it use the not insubstantial tools available to it to promote democracy? This is the core of the problem and given that Professor Haggard is presenting a paper devoted exclusively to this theme I will allow him to develop the topic in its full complexity.

I have chosen to discuss class structure alongside

economic development as the two are inextricably linked. And a society's class structure undoubtedly will have a major impact on its ability to promote, or retard, the growth of democracy. The conventional wisdom has traditionally held that the growth of a substantial and prosperous middle class will stimulate democracy. Although conceptually compelling, there is substantial evidence to indicate that this linear movement does not always culminate in the establishment of democracy. For example, we now know that a significant proportion of the members of Islamic fundamentalist organizations in Egypt are well educated, reasonably prosperous, middle class Egyptians.<sup>11</sup> These groups show no interest at all however in democratic political activity and in fact are actively opposed to such forms of government. Although they may employ words such as freedom or liberty with great regularity, it is within the context of Islamic governance that they recognize and purport to prize such forms of political expression.

A different example can be found in Pahlavi Iran where many of the most vociferous and articulate opponents to the Shah were urban middle class intellectuals. Indeed, unlike the middle class Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists, the goal of the Iranians was a return to Iran's constitution and the creation of genuine democratic political institutions. Although the Shah attempted to simulate democracy through elaborate charades such as the Rastakhiz Party and other pseudoparticipatory mechanisms, these merely served to make democracy more attractive to many Iranians and its absence more frustrating. Ironically, the Revolution was

quickly taken over by reactionary religious elements with no commitment to democracy at all. This group was easily able to wrest control of the anti-Shah movement from the hands of the middle class urban Iranians who had initiated broad-based anti-Shah political opposition in the first place. Thus, economic development in Iran led to political upheaval and the exchange of one tyranny for another. What Iran has shown us is that what is needed is not some sort of generic middle class, but rather a politically sophisticated and potentially influential middle class able to mobilize support from other social sectors. To this day the gullibility of Iran's middle class which made common cause with a religious sector antithetical to everything it believed in remains a mystery. Creating a middle class which initiates political struggles that it cannot possibly win is worse than having no middle class at all. And a middle class can be a society's most isolated social grouping as its values are totally alien to both the peasantry and urban workers, as well as to an upper class which is undoubtedly sensitive to those who may aspire to replace it. Thus, the Middle East provides two examples of very different middle classes. In Egypt sectors of the middle class have turned to Islam, while that in Iran showed itself to be isolated, naive, and lacking in influence.

Another manner in which class structure can affect democracy is in those societies with heavily skewed distributions of wealth. Edward Muller has systematically looked at this question and, unlike Inglehart, who feels that culture has become

the dominant force in shaping political values, argues that economic factors in general and distribution of wealth in particular represent the key variables. Although his argument is too complex for comprehensive discussion in this context, one of Muller's primary conclusions is that "...if a democratic regime is inaugurated in a country with an extremely inegalitarian distribution of income, high inequality is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and cause democratic institutions to be replaced by authoritarian rule."<sup>12</sup> Although this insight appears to be more relevant to the preservation of existing democracies than to the creation of fledgling ones, it is cited as it augments our previous understanding of the relationship between economic factors and democracy more broadly drawn. To argue, as Muller does, that "...a high level of inequality will reduce a country's years of democratic experience" is a powerful and instructive assertion with great relevance to the DPI.<sup>13</sup> For it forces us to ask if such inequities weaken existing democracies, can democracy be fostered where there are significant imbalances in the distribution of wealth from the very outset? If so, then one strategy available to AID in its attempts to promote democracy may be efforts to promote more equitable distributions of wealth. On the other hand, policies meant to promote privatization and other modes of capitalist economic development could conceivably come into conflict with a redistributive approach. Furthermore, the vast differences in the countries with which are concerned now come into play as Eastern

Europe is in a very different situation than the Middle East and Asia vis-a-vis distribution of wealth issues. Needless to say, Muller's solution to the problem he identifies lies in the hands of political parties with strong commitments to income redistribution and the reduction of income inequalities. AID will have to determine the degree to which it can support such activities although Muller's argument is a powerful one worthy of further consideration.

Although this section could only touch upon some of the major economic and class issues relevant to the promotion of democracy, one conclusion clearly emerges. The fate of democracy, both its creation and perpetuation, is heavily dependent upon a favorable economic context. Therefore, this complex relationship which has dominated much of the attention of those concerned with the DPI requires still more analysis. It is further complicated by the widely different polities with which we are concerned, and by AID's implicit limitations which are unlikely to permit broad gauged redistributive efforts such as those advocated by Muller.

#### Political Leadership

In many instances those able to promote democracy are those most likely to lose power if their efforts are successful. Yet any overt and sustained American governmental sponsored effort to promote democracy will necessitate dealings on a government to government basis. Unfortunately governments are notoriously reluctant to tamper with the status quo. This inherent conservatism coupled with an aversion to risks can be

crippling. For example, in recent years Israel has suffered due to its almost excessively egalitarian political system. Its political sector has been paralyzed in a fashion which makes peripheral political parties more powerful than the more central ones. The solution to the problem lies in relatively uncomplicated electoral reform which will replace the proportional representation system so that voters will cast their votes for individuals and not parties. Only the Knesset can initiate such reform however, and its members are unwilling to reform the system in a fashion that may jeopardize what they already have. Israeli political parties apparently prefer the certainty of little power to the risk of even less. This reluctance to tamper with the status quo is especially evident in non-democratic countries and those with only limited democratic traditions or aspirations. Unlike much of Eastern Europe whose elites have either been removed and replaced by pro-democratic forces or, whose ancien regimes have suddenly seen the democratic light, the situation in the Middle East and Asia is quite different. Here elites still feel threatened by the encroachment of democracy as they have little to gain by it and much to lose.

An added complication to a situation in which a particular government is reluctant to support any sort of democratic initiative are those instances in which counterelites may have an interest in the promotion of democracy but are out of power. Here we can find a spectrum ranging from various types of legal oppositions to completely illegal militarized oppositional

groups. In such cases a policy decision will have to be made by the United States Government on a case by case basis. In certain situations it may be appropriate to support an opposition although prohibitions about involvement in the domestic affairs of another country certainly pertain. What is being highlighted here are two broad sets of concerns. The first is that many elites have a built-in reason to fear democratization except in those situations where they are trying to promote democracy themselves such as in parts of Eastern Europe. The second is when we find ourselves more in accord with the values of a political opposition than with a sitting government. In these situations political determinations must be made about the legality and desirability of involving ourselves with particular groups. For example, Iran's Mojahedin-e Khalq has made numerous approaches to the United States Government and assorted members of Congress for support. Despite the temptation to support an Iranian group opposed to Khomeini, the United States wisely demurred and eschewed closer involvement with the Mojahedin. In short, for those attempting to promote democracy the issue of leadership is an important one as a sympathetic regime (e.g. parts of Eastern Europe) will be quite enthusiastic, while an unsympathetic one, more characteristic of the Middle East and parts of Asia, will be resistant.

#### Political Strategies and Choices

The issue of democratization must be viewed within the broader outlines of American foreign policy and the policy

priorities of the countries with whom we are dealing. This is further complicated by changes in American political administrations. For example, while the Carter administration devoted substantial energy and attention to human rights' issues, the Reagan administration was more concerned with terrorism and the risks of unchecked Soviet expansionism. It must not be forgotten that DPI is only one arrow in AID's quiver while foreign aid in general is only a single strand of American foreign policy. Policies can and do change however, and no one is more well aware of this than foreign governments who are at times baffled not only by changes in administration, which are for the most part rational and predictable, but by radical shifts in policy priorities which are often more confusing.

The question of degree is also a key element in the promotion of democracy. Jimmy Carter in an address to a group of political scientists was asked why he applied his human rights policy so selectively.<sup>14</sup> Serious pressure was applied to some countries, while others with possibly worse records were virtually ignored. Carter's commonsensical response to this question is that the United States has different agendas with different countries. Put differently, he was more willing and able in some settings to advance his human rights policies than he was in others. International relations has been described as a groups of chess games being played simultaneously on different boards. Thus, while democratization may be a major issue in Egypt, it will be totally ignored on the Gaza Strip. The point is

that American policy-makers will have to decide how, where, and in what degree the DPI is important. Furthermore, there should be a recognition that the world is a very small place and AID's efforts in one place will be well-known elsewhere. Conscious attempts to democratize in country A coupled with benign neglect of country B will most certainly send mixed signals to others, particularly country C. This can't be helped although political strategies and choices in one setting may inevitably affect the conduct of foreign policy in others (e.g. the Arab states and Israel, Pakistan and India, etc.).

The same factors affect not only American policy makers but also their opposite numbers in the countries with whom they deal. In addition to possible elite opposition to democratization which I discuss above, there is also a possibility that while democracy is attractive, working with the United States is not. In many political settings overly public and excessively close relations with the U.S. can be politically devastating. Quiet attempts by the United State to influence structural transformation may prove for more efficacious than more public efforts such as that favored by our Ambassador to Kenya. Furthermore, a particularly large or visible U.S. presence can undermine our efforts as in some parts of the developing world the United States is perceived in primarily negative terms and her efforts, no matter how harmless, are readily demonized. The origins of such sentiments are well known to students of the less developed countries and they render DPI a particularly complex

endeavor requiring great sensitivity and tact. Elite reluctance to become overly identified with the United States also has important implications within the context of the international system as a whole.

### International Factors

In many countries public perceptions of close relations with the United States can be politically costly to political elites. In part this results from an increasingly interdependent international system in which states deal with one another on a variety of levels and have multiple identities. Egypt consciously identifies itself as being simultaneously Arab, African, Islamic, and developing. Although in making peace with Israel it was able to turn its back on all of these, it is the rare country that is this able to ignore the international system. And Egypt's ability to be so independent was undoubtedly enhanced by the more than \$2 billion a year it receives in American foreign aid. On the other hand, despite at times deafening denunciations which can result from overly public ties with the U.S., quieter relations can be productive both for the United States and for the government with whom it is dealing. To the surprise of many, even Iran and the U.S. are currently able to enjoy productive albeit quiet relations accompanied by their customarily hyperbolic and confrontational public ones. Each country recognizes the utility of working with the other although neither can afford overly public displays of mutual cooperation.<sup>15</sup>

As I indicate above, democracy may not be synonymous with

the United States in a generic sense. Nonetheless, American attempts to sponsor democracy will be regarded internationally as blatant attempts by the United States to influence the course of political life elsewhere. And given that foreign aid is a foreign policy tool, this common perception is not completely wrong. A key determinant in such situations will be the status of the country with which the United States is involved. Quite clearly Eastern Europe differs substantially from Asia and the Middle East. The Eastern Europeans are actively trying to promote democracy and are seeking external help to accomplish this. For the moment at least, many Asian and most Middle Eastern states do not share this commitment and may be actively opposed to democratization in anything other than the most basic fashion. Unsolicited or unwelcome American attempts to promote democratization might be interpreted as political subversion and must be avoided at all costs.

The final international factor to be discussed is economic. Certainly international economic factors influence domestic conditions which in turn will affect a country's political goals. Such routine factors as the price of oil, which affects both producers and consumers, levels of imports and exports, and a country's debt ratio and foreign trade profile will all influence a country's decision to democratize as well as its ability to do so. While economic decline contributed to democratization in much of Eastern Europe, such decay led to a dramatically different outcome in Iran where a reactionary Islamic government came to

power. In short, international economic factors, just as do domestic ones, have an important if uncertain influence both on decisions to democratize and on the actual process of democratization itself.

#### Structural Transformation, Governance, and Legal Reform

A democratic political order is dependent upon a rational legal system replete with judges and lawyers who can make it work. In many traditionally non-democratic polities the legal system was perverted in a fashion that legitimized and facilitated authoritarian rule. Thus, in many countries not only new legal codes, constitutions, and so forth have to be produced, but a cadre of jurists trained to implement them. And who will educate these jurists? In short, the problems confronting the establishment of a legal system are considerable and will be resolved only after great expense and effort. At the same time, the entire apparatus of free elections is needed. Here too one needs to transform and overhaul a country's complete political structure. Many American groups have substantial expertise in this area as a result of recent elections around the world. Their experiences should be collated and analyzed so that the problems of conducting free elections can be better understood and a methodology for holding elections constructed. In addition to the development of a constitution, a legal code, and free elections attempts have to be made to create a vibrant and free press, to involve the electronic media in genuine journalism (despite the fact that it may be government controlled), to stimulate the

growth of professional and trade organizations, to expand and promote literacy, to support the publishing industry, and so forth. The list of tangible innovations that can and should be implemented in order to foster a climate in which democracy is able to flourish is endless and limited only by one's imagination. My concern in this paper has been less with the mechanics of democratization and more with the impediments to its creation. Nonetheless, the mechanical considerations are important and should not be paid short shrift.

### Conclusions

This paper has served as a very brief introduction to and overview of an exceedingly complex undertaking. As we have shown, sponsoring the creation of a functioning democratic polity involves not merely structural transformation but a fundamental examination of what is meant by the term "democracy." This holds true not only for the newly emergent democracy, but also for those external forces who are attempting to engender such democracy. It is unlikely that the United States can or should divorce its own national political interests from the DPI. Therefore, the effort should be correctly perceived as an attempt to expand American influence. This is not an unreasonable goal although it does permit us to view the DPI not as a value free altruistic gesture, but as part and parcel of American foreign policy. To pretend otherwise would be inaccurate and counterproductive.

American involvement is completely appropriate when the

United States is approached for help in monitoring elections and so forth. This is currently the case in parts of Eastern Europe. It is problematic however, in those political settings in which the U.S. may attempt to start the wheels of democracy rolling unbidden by responsible indigenous political elements. Attempts to promote democracy can easily be interpreted as American sponsored subversion by country's whose skepticism about American ambitions, as well as exaggerated estimation of American power, are virtually boundless. DPI can only work where our efforts can be pursued in an open and public manner commensurate with the character of the very democracy we hope to support.

## NOTES

1. These articles all appeared in The New York Times in the sequence presented on the following dates in 1990; April 29, May 19, 18, and 16.
2. See Leon V. Sigal, "Starved for Books: Another Hunger in Eastern Europe," The New York Times, 22 May 1990.
3. Jane Perlez, "Nairobi Journal: This Envoy Starts Fires Just to Get Things Going," The New York Times, 12 May 1990.
4. For a somewhat dated but still useful discussion of these issues see, Lucian Pye (ed.), Political Science and Area Studies: Rivals or Partners? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975); also, Leonard Binder, "Area Studies: A Critical Reassessment," in Leonard Binder (ed.), The Study of the Middle East: Research and Scholarship in the Humanities and Social Sciences, A Project of the Research and Training Committee of the Middle East Studies Association (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 1-28
5. See the table entitled "Freedom House Ratings in ANE Countries, 1988-1989," reproduced in SRI International, Development of an ANE Democratic Pluralism Initiative: Rationale, Operating Principles, and Potential Projects (draft report, unpublished, 1989), p. 16b.
6. For discussion of the origins of the Iranian Revolution and the factors that led to it see, Ervand Abrahamian, Iran: Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) and Jerrold D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982).

7. It is for this reason that in concert with Augustus R. Norton I am preparing a book entitled, Culture and Politics in the Middle East (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, in preparation).
8. Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 18.
9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. For a useful example of work which considers this relationship see, Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s," Political Sociology, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 27-48. For an earlier but influential treatment of these issues, see Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relation of Economic Development to Democratic Performance," American Journal of Political Science, no. 17, August 1973, pp. 611-621.
11. See, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 12, no. 4, December 1980, pp. 423-453.
12. Edward Muller, "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality," American Sociological Review, vol. 53, number 1, February, 1988, p. 66. Also see a related piece by Muller co-authored with Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Insurgency," The American Political Science Review, vol. 81, no. 2, June 1987, pp. 425-451. This article attempts to look at the origins of political violence and instability while investigating the popular hypothesis that land maldistribution leads to political insurgence

and revolution. They conclude that income inequality has a far greater causal effect on revolution than does maldistribution of land. This conclusion is particularly useful as it helps to explain why urban political violence has become much more prevalent than rural political instability.

13. Ibid., p. 66.

14. Plenary address by former President Jimmy Carter at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989.

15. The reason for this collaboration is that Iran would like its substantial resources in the United States to be released while the United States would like further Iranian help in promoting a release of hostages in Beirut. Department of State Legal Councillor Abraham Sofaer has been engaged in protracted and reportedly productive negotiations with representatives of the Iranian government in the Hague.