PN-ABL-274

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PERFORMANCE MONITORING STUDY

FOR THE

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN BUREAU

VOLUME I

DI Objectives and Indicators

January 1991

Prepared for

William Schoux
Norma Jean Parker
United States Agency for International Development

Prepared by

Lawrence C. Heilman, MSI
Robert J. Kurz, Brookings Institute

MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL

600 Water Street S.W., NBU 7-7
Washington, D.C. 20024

telephone: (202) 484-7170
telex: 4990821MANSY fax: (202) 488-0754

C:Cover

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Executive Summary i

VOLUME I: DI Objectives and Indicators

Chapter One: Background 1

Purpose 1
Organization of Report 1
Methodology 2
Team Composition 2
Acknowledgements 2

Chapter Two: Introduction 3

Indicators and Democratic Initiatives (DI) 3
Indicators and Their Collection 3

Chapter Three: LAC Strategic Objectives 7

Consistent Terminology 7
Strategic Objectives 7
A Hierarchy of DI Objectives for a LAC Field Mission 8

Chapter Four: Generic Indicators for LAC Strategic Objectives 10

Strategic Objective No. 1: Improve the Effectiveness and Strengthen in the Country an Independent Justice System 11

Strategic Objective No. 2: Strengthen local and municipal government in the country 25

Strategic Objective No. 3: Strengthen the control of civilian elected leadership over the military in the country 31

Strategic Objective No. 4: Improve effectiveness and strengthen capacity in the country of the legislative branch of government 36

Strategic Objective No. 5: Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the capacity of the executive branch in the country to impose fiscal accountability in order to prevent waste, corruption, and fraud in the country . . . 41

Strategic Objective No. 6: Strengthen the dual or multi-party system 46

Strategic Objective No. 7: Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the institutional capacity of the country to administer free, fair, and open elections 51

Strategic Objective No. 8: Strengthen civic, professional, and community organizations as a means to increase citizen participation in democratic decision making in the country 55

Strategic Objective No. 9: Improve the effective exercise of internationally recognized human rights in the country 59

Strategic Objective No. 10: Strengthen free and democratically oriented trade unions in the country . . 63

Strategic Objective No. 11: Strengthen the free media in the country (print and electronic) 65

VOLUME II: DI Staff Regional Portfolio

Chapter Five: Financial Trends in the Democratic Initiatives Portfolio . . 1

Background 1

Chapter Six: The Office of Democratic Initiatives Staff Regional Portfolio 2

Introduction. 2
DI Staff's Regional Projects 3

a

1. Regional Administration of Justice - ILANUD 3
2. AOJ/Center for the Administration of Justice (CAFJ) of the Florida International University (FIU) 4
3. AOJ/Inter-American Bar Foundation 6
4. AOJ/American Bar Association 7
5. AOJ/Checchi 7
6. AOJ/ICITAP 7
7. Promoting Free and Fair Elections 8
8. Political Parties and Democracy in Central America 9
9. National Democratic Institute Regional Electoral Assistance 9
10. American Institute for free Labor Development 9
11. Education for Participation 11
12. Strengthening Participation of Indigenous Groups 12
13. Promoting Human Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean 12
14. Strengthening Legislative Capacity 13
15. LAC Financial Improvement 13
16. Central American Journalism Strengthening 14
17. Civilian-Military Relations and Democracy in Latin America 15

Summary 16

Logical Frameworks

Chapter Seven: The Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation Role of the Democratic Initiative Staff 17

Background 17
The DI Staff's Mandate, Functions, and Personnel 17
Project Management..... 20
Semi-Annual Project Reviews 21

Chapter Eight: Description of a Proposed Management Information System for the DI Staff 23

Background 23
The Characteristics of the System 23
Reports Prepared by the DI Staff..... 25
Reports Prepared by Grantee 25

VOLUME III: DI LAC Portfolio

Chapter Nine: A Review of Selected Elements of the Democratic Initiatives Portfolio in the Latin American and Caribbean Region 1

Introduction 1

Case Studies

Bolivia 3
Chile 19
Guatemala 32
Honduras 48
Panama 64
Peru 81

Chapter Ten: The Bilateral DI Portfolio - Some Lessons Learned 98

Introduction. 98
The Administration of Justice (AOJ) Assessment Process 98
DI Sector Assessments 99
The Project Identification, Design and Implementation Process
and Host Country Participation 100
LAC Field Missions and Country Team Operations 102
The Democratic Initiatives Staff 103
DI Personnel 104
Performance Monitoring by the LAC Bureau for
Democratic Initiatives 105

VOLUME IV: ANNEXES

1. People Contacted
2. Bibliography
3. The Logical Framework
4. List of Acronyms
5. Guidelines for International Selection Observing, pp. 52-56, prepared by Larry Garber

- C

LIST OF CHARTS

Executive Summary

Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives ix

Volume II

Chart 1: LAC Democratic Initiatives Portfolio, FY 1984-90 . . . . . 1A

Chart 2: LAC Democratic Initiatives Portfolio
Administration of Justice Projects - FY 1984-90 . . . . . 1D

Chart 3: LAC Democratic Initiatives Portfolio
Non-Administration of Justice Projects -
FY 1984-90 . . . . . 1F

Chart 4: LAC Democratic Initiatives Regional Portfolio
Non-Administration of Justice Projects -
FY 1984-90 . . . . . 1H

LIST OF FIGURES

Volume I

Figure 1: Objectives and Indicators 7A
Figure 2: Links between Country Program and Project Levels 7B
Figure 3: A Hierarchy of DI Objectives for an LAC Field Mission 9A
Figure 4: Improve the Effectiveness and Strengthen in the Country an Independent Justice System 24A
Figure 5: Strengthen Local and Municipal Government in the Country 30A
Figure 6: Strengthen the Control of Civilian Leadership over the Military 35A
Figure 7: Improve the Effectiveness and Strengthen the Capacity in the Country of the Legislative Branch of Government . . . 40A
Figure 8: Improve the Effectiveness and Strengthen the Capacity of the Executive Branch in the Country to Impose Fiscal Accountability in Order to Prevent Waste, Corruption, and Fraud in the Country 45A
Figure 9: Strengthen the Dual or Multi-Party System 50A
Figure 10: Improve the Effectiveness and Strengthen the Institutional Capacity of the Country to Administer Free, Fair and Open Elections 54A
Figure 11: Strengthen Civic, Professional, and Community Organizations as a Means to Increase Citizen Participation in Democratic Decision Making in the Country 58A
Figure 12: Improve the Effective Exercise of Internationally Recognized Human Rights in the Country 62A
Figure 13: Strengthen Free, Democratically Oriented Trade Unions in the Country 64A
Figure 14: Strengthen the Free Media in the Country (Print and Electronic) 69A

Volume II

Figure 15: MIS Information Network 23A
Figure 16: DI Staff MIS Flow Chart 26A
Figure 17: DI Staff MIS Flow Chart 26B
Figure 18: DI Staff MIS Components - Flow Chart 26C
Figure 19: MIS Components - Grantee Level 26D

Annex 3

Hierarchy of Objectives 1A
Logical Framework for Summarizing Project Design 5A

LIST OF TABLES

Volume II

Table 1: LAC Democratic Initiatives Portfolio AOJ/Non-AOJ 1B

Table 2: Administration of Justice Projects; Regional/Bilateral 1E

Table 3: Non-AOJ; Regional/Bilateral 1G

Table 4: Non-AOJ Regional 1I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

VOLUME I

INDICATORS AND DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES (DI)

As U.S. foreign policy seeks to redefine its objectives in the post Cold War era, programs designed to strengthen the democratic process are likely to expand. In seeking to guide these efforts, it is imperative that measures be identified to gauge progress in promoting these democratic processes. If used properly, the indicators selected can be useful in improving analytical thinking, decision making, and program monitoring.

In designing indicators for a specific DI development venture, it is important to recognize that each country has evolved its own form of governance based upon its historical experience. There is no single indicator or set of indicators which can be selected in advance to measure whether a country is following the proper path to democratic structure or process. As with any management technique, indicators need to be crafted to fit a particular country's state of development, which is a complex calculus reflecting a country's culture, problems, and needs.

INDICATORS AND THEIR COLLECTION

Choosing a specific indicator requires a decision on the appropriateness of the measurement and the cost required to collect the information. The appropriateness of an indicator is determined by its ability to communicate relevant information on the political process and structures. Cost, always a consideration, needs to be kept to a reasonable level so that the benefit outweighs the expenditure for collection.

Decisions on each of these issues have to be made on a case-by-case basis. Information available in one country may not be easily obtained in another. Information relevant in one area may not apply elsewhere. Creating an expensive computerized data collection system for indicator monitoring may not be wise unless there are other substantive benefits to be gained.

LAC BUREAU STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The identification of the Strategic Objectives for the Democratic Initiatives (DI) program was an initial task of this study. Strategic Objectives were identified that could be undertaken by a LAC field mission. The Strategic Objectives identified are:

1. Improve the effectiveness and strengthen in the country an independent justice system.

2. Strengthen local and municipal government in the country.

3. Strengthen the control of civilian elected leadership over the military in the country.

4. Improve effectiveness and strengthen capacity in the country of the legislative branch of government.

5. Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the capacity of the executive branch in the country to impose fiscal accountability in order to prevent waste, corruption, and fraud in the country.

6. Strengthen the dual or multi-party system.

7. Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the institutional capacity of the country to administer free, fair, and open elections.

8. Strengthen civic, professional, and community organizations as a means to increase citizen participation in democratic decision making in the country.

9. Improve the effective exercise of internationally recognized human rights in the country.

10. Strengthen free and democratically oriented trade unions in the country.

11. Strengthen the free media in the country (print and electronic).

GENERIC INDICATORS

Attached to this Summary is a chart that contains the Performance Indicators for each Strategic Objective.

VOLUME II

THE OFFICE OF DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES STAFF REGIONAL PORTFOLIO

The following is the list of projects for which the DI Staff currently has project management responsibilities with the exception of the ILANUD Project which is managed by a DI regional advisor located with USAID/Costa Rica.

DI STAFF'S REGIONAL PROJECTS

1. AOJ/ILANUD
2. AOJ/Florida International University
3. AOJ/Inter-American Bar Foundation
4. AOJ/American Bar Association
5. AOJ/Checchi-LOE
6. AOJ/ICITAP
7. Promoting Free and Fair Elections
8. Political Parties and Democracy in Central Democracy
9. National Democratic Institute Regional Electorial Assistance
10. AIFLD
11. Education for Participation
12. Strengthening Participation in Indigenous Groups (Knee)
13. Promoting Human Rights in LAC
14. Regional Legislative Development
15. LAC Financial Management Improvement
16. Central American Journalism Strengthening
17. Civil-Military Relations

Though there are areas where improvements can be made in the management of this portfolio as reflected in the recommendations Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, in the main, the portfolio is sound in the manner in which it has been administered by the DI Staff. The newer regional projects in journalism, legislative development, public finance, and civil/military relations are a good selection of interventions designed to promote appropriate bilateral project activity.

Some of the more significant recommendations for the DI Staff include:

- **Municipal Development**: LAC Bureau should consider placing a full-time Municipal Development/Local Government Specialist on the DI Staff.

- **AIFLD:** If the recommendations are accepted as discussed in the section "DI Staff Regional Portfolio" regarding a new relationship with AIFLD, consideration should be given to providing a full-time position for a Direct Hire to monitor the AIFLD regional project.

- **Elections Officer:** DI Staff Officer should be assigned the responsibility as the Elections Officer.

- **Scholar in Residence:** The officer should establish a position of Scholar in Residence to serve an advisory role for the DI Staff.

- **In-service Training:** DI Staff should establish a series of in-service training programs and seminars developed in conjunction with the Office of Training to assist in learning the lessons of past experiences in the DI area.

- **Spread Workload:** The project management workload should be spread more equitably among the DI Staff officers.

- **Uniform Reporting System:** In the interests of installing a uniform project management system, it is recommended that each contractor, grantee, and cooperator have the same reporting and workplan requirements.

- **DI Staff Semi-Annual Review:** As a minimum standard, there should be a formal semi-annual review of the DI project portfolio. This review should be chaired by DR. An Issues Paper should be prepared by DR in consultation with the Office Director of DI.

PROPOSED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR THE DI STAFF

The proposed Management Information System (MIS) for the DI Staff embodies the following characteristics:

- Information must be useable at the level on which it is collected.

- Information is passed selectively up the system to higher-level users based on their need to answer specified questions.

- Uniform reporting system for all grantees.

- A reporting system for the DI Staff that fits with the system presently in effect.

VOLUME III

THE BILATERAL DI PORTFOLIO - SOME LESSONS LEARNED

The country case studies provided the data for the following conclusions and recommendations:

The Project Identification, Design, and Implementation Process and Host Country Participation

The project identification and design process for DI projects should be no different from that of any other area of A.I.D.-funded projects. A well developed

understanding of the problem is critical for the articulation of a strategy and the selection of the appropriate project interventions. The design process for DI projects would benefit from going through the New Project Description (NPD), the assessment, PID, and PP stages.

Recommendations

- **The Assessment Requirement:** The first step in the project process for any DI project to be funded by A.I.D. should be problem identification or the undertaking of an assessment. If the assessment has not been executed prior to the preparation of the NPD, the NPD should outline the scope and methodology for undertaking the assessment.

- **Requirements for the Design Process:** The design process should include all the normal steps to include the NPD, PID, and PP stages. Particular attention should be given to the selection of a project "purpose" and a time horizon that reflects reasonable expectations.

- **PID Review:** Because of lack of DI technical capacity in the field, all PIDs should be reviewed in the DAEC. The PID submission should contain an ample description of the developmental problem to be addressed by the proposed project.

- **Establishment of A Baseline:** The requirements for establishing a baseline against which future project performance can be measured should be spelled out in the PID.

- **Host Country Participation:** It is critical that there be significant host country participation in all phases of the DI project cycle. This is particularly the case for institutional enhancement projects that require long-term commitments. This participation must commence with the assessment process as a part of developing a indigenous constituency for the project.

Lac Field Mission and Country Team Operations

In this new era where the A.I.D. objectives in the DI field are synonymous with USG Country Team objectives and where the mobilization of financial and personnel resources to achieve the DI objectives comes from various components of the Country Team, better coordination to insure the proper utilization of USG resources is mandatory.

Lack of personnel resources in the Country Team with requisite skills to serve in a staff capacity under the direction of the Ambassador or the DCM to coordinate

the articulation and implementation of the DI program was identified as a constraint in several of the Country Teams reviewed in the course of this study.

Recommendations

- **Country Team DI Strategy:** In County Teams where there are a variety of DI projects being implemented requiring the involvement of several different components of the Country Team, it is recommended that a Country Team DI Strategy be produced describing the rationale for each project and an implementation plan for each project.

- **OJ Committee:** Given the complexity of projects in the areas of enforcement, judicial improvement, and penal reform, it is recommended that an AOJ Committee be formed composed of the various components of the Country Team working in these areas if the Country Team has projects in these areas.

- **DI Staff Officer for the Country Team:** If the LAC field mission has a full-time Direct Hire Officer working in the DI field, every consideration should be given to having this officer split his time between serving as a staff resource working for the Country Team and the LAC field mission administering the DI portfolio.

DI Staff

Throughout the region there is a desire to know more about the regional portfolio managed by the DI Staff. This desire on the part of DI personnel in the field was complemented by the finding that these same personnel were relatively uninformed about the DI Staff portfolio. Personnel working in the DI field need to exchange ideas and experiences to learn from their own and other's mistakes.

Recommendations

- **DI Staff Semi-Annual Reports (SAR) on Regional Projects:** The SARs prepared for the DI Staff review for the regional projects should be shared with all LAC field missions on a timely basis.

- **DI Staff Newsletter:** The DI Staff should consider preparing a newsletter to be sent to all LAC field missions and Ambassadors where A.I.D. has a presence and executing DI activities.

- **DI Conference:** A DI Conference should be held periodically for DI personnel.

DI Personnel

Critical to the success of any expanded DI program is a commitment to give it far greater priority than it now has. This will entail the hiring of personnel with education and experience suitable for working in the DI field. Candidates should be well trained in the social sciences, political science preferably.

Recommendations

- **Training of DI Personnel:** Consideration should be given to developing and implementing a special training program to prepare A.I.D. personnel to work in the DI field.

- **DI Long Term Training:** Long-term training in the DI field should also be an option for A.I.D. officers that have the potential and the desire to work in the DI field.

- **Personnel Requirements for the DI Field:** LAC Bureau leadership should explore with the Office of Personnel how to address the special personnel requirements that have emerged with the evolution of DI activity and establish a training and recruitment strategy.

Performance Monitoring by The LAC Bureau for Democratic Initiatives

Indicators provide project managers with a flexible management tool for coping with the political nature of the endeavor. To maximize their contribution three conditions are imperative:

- Indicators must be accepted as a useful tool by all relevant parties;

- Actual indicators to be used must be agreed upon by all relevant parties;

- Use of indicators must be routinely integrated into the decision making process.

It is recommended that a Management Information System of project review be designated to assure the accomplishment of these conditions. This system should utilize the existing review mechanism to avoid duplication. However, simply relying upon the existing structure, with no special emphasis, is not adequate.

The special and difficult nature of the DI field requires significantly improved communications between A.I.D./Washington and LAC field missions. The current system is not making adequate use of indicators in programming decisions. Perhaps more importantly, the current system is not facilitating an appropriate

exchange of lessons learned from previous DI projects. The current system also does not effectively coordinate the monitoring and review of overlapping bilateral and regional projects. Finally, the existing system does not provide sufficient transparency for projects operating in non-traditional and highly political areas.

Recommendations

To address this situation, the following four step system is recommended:

1. **LAC Field Mission Establish Project Indicators:** During the project design phase, the LAC field mission should develop indicators for the objectives. (Strategic Objective, Program Output, goal, purpose, and/or outputs for programs and/or projects in the DI area.) To the maximum extent possible this process would be done in collaboration with the host country political officials.

2. **DI Staff Review of Indicators:** The indicators identified by the LAC field mission should be reviewed by the DI Staff at the time of the PP review. A formal response in the form of comments, suggestions, or recommendations would be sent to the LAC field mission if the PP review takes place in LAC field missions.

3. **Six Month Review of DI Projects:** In the context of the Semi-Annual Review by the LAC Bureau, each DI Project should be reviewed by the DI Staff. Particular attention should be reviewing the information on project performance based on the agreed upon indicators.

4. **Annual Review of DI Projects by Academic Advisory Committee:** An Academic Advisory Committee would be designated by the DI Staff to review DI projects and make appropriate recommendations. The purpose of this committee would be to provide an outside perspective on projects and indicators. It would be charged with providing advice on the measurement techniques appropriate to measurement indicators.

Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 1
IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STRENGTHEN IN THE COUNTRY AN INDEPENDENT JUSTICE SYSTEM

I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

1.1 Degree of control by the Judiciary of its budget
1.2 Judicial officers represent the broad cross-section of partisan, ethnic religious and regional divisions found within the country
1.3 Implementation of a Judicial career law
1.4 Increase or decrease in the numbers of act of intimidation aimed at the judiciary.
1.5 Judicial system's ability to reach decisions on all types of cases
1.6 Degree to which judicial decisions are enforced

II. JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALIZATION

1.7 Establishment of merit selection procedures as part of judicial career law
1.8 Judicial salaries are established by law to be comparable to private sector positions of similar qualifications
1.9 Establishment of active professional organizations for judicial officers

III. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY

1.10 Establishment of a court administration office.
1.11 Establishment of training programs for judges.
1.12 Existence of training programs for non-judicial court employees
1.13 Unification of documentation for all laws, decrees, legal codes and procedures.
1.14 Establishment of case management and tracking systems.
1.15 Establishment of a modern system of judicial statistics and records.

IV. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

1.16 Establishment and use of a uniform set of legal procedures.
1.17 Effective procedures for the supervision of investigations
1.18 Use of oral procedures.
1.19 Reduction in time required for processing criminal cases.
1.20 Establishment of a system of bail and pretrial release system.

V. ACCESS TO THE JUDICIARY

1.21 Local availability of courts throughout the country.
1.22 Availability of legal representation through private attorneys and public defenders.
1.23 Availability of legal education
1.24 Structure and fairness of court costs and fees.

VI. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

1.25 Increased public confidence in the justice system
1.26 An effective public education program on the justice system.
1.27 Establishment of effective justice monitoring and policy research organizations.

1533-043/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 2
STRENGTHEN LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE COUNTRY

2.1 Selection process for selecting local leaders.
2.2 Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the local level.
2.3 Level of competition for leadership positions in local government.
2.4 Responsiveness of local officials to public concerns.
2.5 Amounts and sources of revenues available for local programs.
2.6 Number and types of services provided by the local government.
2.7 Percentage of population served by basic services provided by local government.
2.8 Criteria used for determining priorities in service and resource allocation decisions.
2.9 Improved institutional capabilities of local government.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 3
STRENGTHEN THE CONTROL OF CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OVER THE MILITARY

3.1 Existence of governmental institutions controlled by the military that are unregulated by elected officials
3.2 Number of military officers, both active duty military officers serving as cabinet officers
3.3 Enactment of laws that prevent military officers from serving in key political positions to help avoid conflict of loyalty between military duty and political office
3.4 The degree to which elected civilians control the size of the military budgets and expenditures.
3.5 The degree to which elected civilians control the size of the military forces.
3.6 The degree of military control in areas other than international security
3.7 The ability of civilian authorities to access information in decisions of military officials
3.8 The ability of civilian authorities to investigate allegations of illegal or inappropriate behavior of military officers.
3.9 A growth in public opinion that military power is increasingly under civilian control.

Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives (cont'd.)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 4
IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY IN THE COUNTRY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

4.1 An electoral selection process that assures representation from the major cleavages of society
4.2 Degree of responsiveness to the problems, preferences and proposals of their constituents
4.3 Degree of legislative control over executive budgets
4.4 Legislature's role—to approve or disapprove—major executive decisions
4.5 Ability of a legislature to enact laws for the society
4.6 The degree of legislative oversight of governmental operations
4.7 Improved institutional capabilities of the legislature:
- policy and legal research
- support and investigative staff
- communication with constituents
- publication of documents, reports & proceedings

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 6
STRENGTHEN THE DUAL OR MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

6.1 Level of party identification on the part of political activists.
6.2 Level of party identification by the voting public.
6.3 Party legal status.
6.4 Ability of the party to maintain an institutional capacity to:
- research issues
- manage mass communications
- train workers
- maintain election experts/poll watchers
- raise funds
- assist candidates

6.5 Presence of political organizations (either clubs or precinct type organizations) in urban areas.
6.6 Ability to bring to office skilled, competent officials.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 7
IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STRENGTHEN THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE COUNTRY TO ADMINISTER FREE, FAIR AND OPEN ELECTIONS

7.1 Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the federal and local level.
7.2 Percentage of the public believing that the elections were fair, open and free.
7.3 Independent electoral tribunal, selected in a manner that either balances party representation or is non-partisan, with appropriate budget support, trained career staff, and logistical capabilities
7.4 The existence of a functioning impartial system to investigate and adjudicate charges of fraud in either the registration or voting process.

1533-043/D4
(1/91)

Performance Indicators for Strategic Objectives (cont'd.)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 8

STRENGTHEN CIVIC, PROFESSIONAL, AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AS A MEANS TO INCREASE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING IN THE COUNTRY

8.1 An increase in the number of different civic, professional and community organizations.
8.2 An increase in the membership of the civic, professional and community organizations.
8.3 An expansion of the financial resources available to the civic, professional and community organizations.
8.4 An increase in the number of meetings held by civic, professional and community organizations.
8.5 An increase in the number of policy institutes associated with civic, professional or community groups.
8.6 An increase in the institutional capabilities of the civic, professional and community organizations.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 9

IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COUNTRY

9.1 Ratification of international human rights instruments.
9.2 The establishment of an independent human rights commission.
9.3 A government organized and funded human rights education program.
9.4 The decrease in the number of abuses according to categories established by international human rights conventions.
- Torture
- Incommunicado detention
- Detention of persons solely for the non-violent expression of their political views
- Prolonged detention without a trial

9.5 The number of cases of human rights abuses—politically motivated crimes—brought before the justice system and the disposition of those cases.
9.6 The number of government officers punished for violent criminal acts.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 10

STRENGTHEN FREE, DEMOCRATICALLY ORIENTED TRADE UNIONS IN THE COUNTRY

10.1 Number of unions affiliated with democratic confederations.
10.2 Number of dues paying members.
10.3 Quality of collective bargaining agreement.
10.4 Increase the number of labor leaders.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 11

STRENGTHEN THE FREE MEDIA IN THE COUNTRY (PRINT AND ELECTRONIC)

11.1 Increased number of consumers of media products.
11.2 Increased public confidence in media information.
11.3 Increased journalistic, editorial, and managerial skills in the media.
11.4 Increased autonomy of the media from government control.
11.5 Increase in media investigative reporting.
11.6 Increased journalistic stature.
11.7 Increased profitability of media outlets.

1533-043/04
(1/91)

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND

PURPOSE

This report was commissioned by the Democratic Initiatives Staff (DI Staff) of the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) Bureau of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) to pursue the following objectives:

- Identification of appropriate Strategic Objectives for the LAC Bureau's Democratic Initiative (DI) program.
- Identification of Performance Indicators for the Strategic Objectives.
- Review of DI Staff portfolio
- Recommendations for the enhancement of the DI Staff's monitoring and evaluation system.
- Identification of lessons learned from an analysis of selected DI country programs and projects.
- Recommendations for the enhancement of LAC Bureau's monitoring of DI projects.

ORGANIZATION OF REPORT

This report is divided into three volumes: Volume I: DI Objectives and Indicators; Volume II: DI Staff Regional Portfolio; Volume III: DI LAC Portfolio; and Volume IV: Annexes. In Volume I a hierarchy of DI objectives for a LAC Field Mission is proposed and generic indicators for measuring progress made in pursuing these objectives are recommended. In Chapter Four Objective trees are created in order to identify the Program Activities that could significantly contribute to achieving each Strategic Objective.

Volume II, concerned with the DI Staff's regional portfolio, examines the project monitoring role of the DI Staff and makes recommendations designed to sharpen their monitoring capacity in terms of their general operations and the specifics of their project portfolio. A management information system for the DI Staff is proposed in Chapter Eight of this volume.

Volume III takes a look at DI project activity in six LAC field missions with the intention of identifying lessons learned. The findings and conclusions that result from an examination of the material presented for the six countries is translated into a series of recommendations designed to promote a stronger DI LAC Bureau capacity.

Volume IV contains the annexes.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed by the Management Systems International (MSI) team consisted of a review of documents held by DI Staff, selected A.I.D. field missions visited by members of the MSI team, and a number of other public and private entities working in the DI field. (See Annex 2, Documents Consulted.) Lengthy interviews were held with individuals from each of these organizations. (See Annex 3, People Contacted.) The MSI team also conducted field work in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru in August 1990 to review regional and bilateral DI project activity to date. Information found in the documents reviewed and the people interviewed provided the foundation for the formulation of generic indicators and for the "findings" and "conclusions" concerning the LAC Bureau DI portfolio and the "recommendations" concerned with strengthening the monitoring capacity of the DI Staff and the LAC Bureau.

The first requirement satisfied by the MSI team was to identify LAC Bureau's DI Strategic Objectives. The next step in the process was a period of reviewing the DI documentation and consulting with AID/W-based persons working in the DI field. The field work was the next step followed by a period of analysis and documentation of findings in which the entire MSI participated.

TEAM COMPOSITION

Participating in this study were the following individuals:

Lawrence C. Heilman, MSI, Team Leader.
Robert Kurz, The Brookings Institution & MSI.
Louis Goodman, The American University & MSI.
Carol Graham, The Brookings Institution & MSI.
Robert Klein, MSI
Mark Rosenberg, Florida International University & MSI.
Mitchell Seligson, The University of Pittsburgh & MSI.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The MSI team wishes to express its appreciation to Norma Parker and William Schoux, the past and present Directors of the DI Staff, and their staff. Thanks are also due to the many officers in the U.S. Embassies and LAC field missions in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru who provided assistance, cooperation, and insights critical to the preparation of this report. Other important sources to be acknowledged are the numerous public and private organizations outside of A.I.D. who are working in the DI field throughout the region that provided substantial information and ideas that contributed to the development of this report.

CHAPTER TWO: INTRODUCTION

INDICATORS AND DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES (DI)

As U.S. foreign policy seeks to redefine its objectives in the post Cold War era, programs designed to strengthen the democratic process are likely to expand. In seeking to guide these efforts, it is imperative that measures be identified to gauge progress in promoting these democratic processes. If used properly, the indicators selected can be useful in improving analytical thinking, decision making, and program monitoring.

In designing indicators for a specific DI development venture, it is important to recognize that each country has evolved its own form of governance based upon its historical experience. There is no single indicator or set of indicators which can be selected in advance to measure whether a country is following the proper path to democratic structure or process. As with any management technique, indicators need to be crafted to fit a particular country's state of development, which is a complex calculus reflecting a country's culture, problems, and needs.

The LAC Bureau has adopted a working definition of democracy from the work of Larry Diamond, which is a useful starting point:

> Democracy is a political system that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive <u>competition</u> among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for the major positions of governmental power; a 'highly inclusive' level of <u>political participation</u> in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections; and a level of <u>civil and political liberties</u> sufficient to insure the integrity of political competition and participation. Implicit in this definition is the long-held A.I.D. position that democracy also includes economic participation via a broad-based sharing in economic growth and development.

Reflecting on this definition, three sets of indicators should be considered when promoting DI programs:

- How meaningful and how extensive is the competition among individuals and groups for positions of governmental power?
- How inclusive is political participation in the selection of leaders and policies?
- To what degree are civil and political liberties protected?

At the core of LAC Bureau efforts are DI projects seeking to change existing power relationships through promoting a more democratic process. Therefore, indicators that gauge the control of state power in a Latin American society are critical. Indicators that address the following fundamental questions are key to measuring performance:

- Is there an agreed upon and well known set of "rules of the game" that govern the competition?
- Is governmental power shared between competing branches, agencies, or offices?
- Is the exercise of that governmental power open for all to see?
- Do elections result in transferring political power as well as the office?
- Who controls the purpose and amount of governmental expenditures?
- How are the appointments, salaries, and terms of office set for positions subordinate to those elected?
- What are the limits imposed on the use of the coercive powers of the state?
- What protection is created by the state to assure individual liberties?

INDICATORS AND THEIR COLLECTION

Choosing a specific indicator requires a decision on the appropriateness of the measurement and the cost required to collect the information. The appropriateness of an indicator is determined by its ability to communicate relevant information on the political process and structures. Cost, always a consideration, needs to be kept to a reasonable level so that the benefit outweighs the expenditure for collection.

Decisions on each of these issues have to be made on a case-by-case basis. Information available in one country may not be easily obtained in another. Information relevant in one area may not apply elsewhere. Creating an expensive computerized data collection system for indicator monitoring may not be wise unless there are other substantive benefits to be gained.

A.I.D. recently (February 1990) sponsored a conference on "Measurement: A State of the Art and Practical Applications for Democratic Pluralism Initiatives." That effort, although focusing on Asia and the Near East, reached several conclusions that apply here. It warned to look beyond the establishment of a "universal scale," and assess in depth the particular circumstances of individual countries. It also proposed a number of guidelines on measurement that included the following:

- Use several measures for each dimension.
- Do not rely on a single judge or rater for all measures.
- Use more categories for ratings as opposed to less categories.
- Collect annual data to monitor change.
- Allow outside experts to evaluate the effort.

To follow these guidelines requires using different types or categories of indicators. Four such categories are briefly discussed below.

- Routinely Collected Statistical Indicators: A change in the number, ratio, or percentage that demonstrates movement in a process or structure can be useful. Court statistics, crime reporting, time needed to complete processing, numbers of registered voters, numbers of cases handled are all examples of this type of data. Careful choosing of the relevant statistics can often allow a limited number of statistical indicators to communicate the information required to make a judgement.

- Public Opinion Indicators: Ongoing public opinion surveys can be effective in monitoring changes or problems for a democratic system or institution. Of course, public opinion is subject to shifts and swings for a variety of reasons. Yet in a fragile democracy, public perception may be quite telling in understanding what is happening with the power structure.

- Rapid Appraisal Indicators: Because of the limitation inherent in public opinion surveys, such as problems of time and cost and rigidity, other techniques have proven useful in monitoring political processes and training efforts. These include the use of focus group research, key informant interviews, and opinion leader interviews. This type of measurement allows identification of trends, the intensity of concerns and problems that may be unknown to poll designers.

- Institutional Change Indicators: Changes in the structure, power, and authorities of an institution can be effective measures of progress or the lack of progress. Other core elements that must be assessed in measuring institutional development are the resources available to the institution and how budget decisions are made that affect the institution. Another element that may require measurement relates to actions that encourage independence in an institution previously known for high levels of dependence. Equally telling measures that may be important to develop are those concerned with the creation of systems to hold accountable institutions that were previously autonomous or beyond any control.

There are clear limits to the contribution that indicators can make. As with other management tools, they only work when they are used. A management tool that is considered a hoop to be jumped through is not likely to make much of a contribution. While statistical indicators make an important contribution, reaching judgments on some aspects of political processes may resist quantification or a single numerical indicator. Placing an inordinate emphasis on creating a single numerical indicator or a single model is likely to be unproductive and wasteful.

CHAPTER THREE: LAC BUREAU STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

CONSISTENT TERMINOLOGY

The following list of terms and their definitions will be used throughout the course of this document. This terminology is consistent with that used by the LAC Bureau for program planning and reporting purposes. This terminology is associated with the Logical Framework. (See Figures 1 and 2. For a fuller appreciation of the Logical Framework and its applications refer to Annex 3.)

Program Goals and Sub-Goals: The higher order and longer term goals to which a LAC field mission's program contribute.

Strategic Objectives: The highest level objectives on which an LAC field mission's activities can be expected to have a meaningful impact in the short to medium term.

Performance Indicators: Criteria for determining or calibrating progress in the attainment of Strategic Objectives.

Program Activities: An input, act, or project that may contribute to producing a Program Output.

Program Output: A concrete and significant accomplishment that contributes to achieving the Strategic Objective.

Program Indicator: Criteria for determining or calibrating progress in the attainment of a Program Output.

Management Information System: An institutionalized system for collecting and reporting program performance data on a periodic basis.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The identification of the Strategic Objectives for the Democratic Initiatives (DI) program was an initial task of this study. Strategic Objectives were identified that could be undertaken by a LAC field mission. A given Strategic Objective could serve as either the "goal" or the "purpose" for a particular DI country-based project.

The process of identifying and refining LAC field mission Strategic Objectives continued throughout the data collection phase of this study. Before the field

Figure 1

OBJECTIVES & INDICATORS



1533-004/D4\2nd
(1/91)

Figure 2

LINKS BETWEEN COUNTRY PROGRAM AND PROJECT LEVELS



collection phase of this study was initiated, general agreement was reached as to the validity the of the Strategic Objectives as described below. There has been no attempt to prioritize the list of Strategic Objectives within the DI field. (See Figure 3, "A Hierarchy of DI Objectives for a LAC Field Mission" immediately following this list.)

A HIERARCHY OF DI OBJECTIVES FOR A LAC FIELD MISSION

COUNTRY PROGRAM GOAL: Support the evolution of a stable, democratic society.

SUB-GOALS:

1. Encourage the strengthening of competent civilian-run government institutions that will merit the confidence of political and military leaders, citizens, and investors.

2. Encourage pluralism, tolerance of opposing views, and support of democratic values on the part of non-government bodies, including the press, community organizations, labor unions, and business.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:

1. Improve the effectiveness and strengthen in the country an independent justice system. (Sub-Goal 1)

2. Strengthen local and municipal government in the country. (Sub-Goal 1)

3. Strengthen the control of civilian elected leadership over the military in the country. (Sub-Goal 1)

4. Improve effectiveness and strengthen capacity in the country of the legislative branch of government. (Sub-Goal 1)

5. Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the capacity of the executive branch in the country to impose fiscal accountability in order to prevent waste, corruption, and fraud in the country. (Sub-Goal 1)

6. Strengthen the dual or multi-party system. (Sub-Goal 1 & 2)

7. Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the institutional capacity of the country to administer free, fair, and open elections. (Sub-Goal 1 & 2)

8. Strengthen civic, professional, and community organizations as a means to increase citizen participation in democratic decision making in the country. (Sub-Goal 2)

9. Improve the effective exercise of internationally recognized human rights in the country. (Sub-Goal 2)

10. Strengthen free and democratically oriented trade unions in the country. (Sub-Goal 2)

11. Strengthen the free media in the country (print and electronic). (Sub-Goal 2)

Figure 3

A HEIRARCHY OF DI OBJECTIVES FOR A LAC FIELD MISSION



1533-035/D4
(1/91)

CHAPTER FOUR: GENERIC INDICATORS FOR LAC BUREAU STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

The following is a discussion of the Performance Indicators identified to measure progress in the achievement of the Strategic Objectives identified in Chapter Three. In addition to identifying and discussing the Performance Indicators, an Objective Tree is constructed for each Strategic Objective to identify the major Program Activities that a Country Team might reasonably undertake in pursuing a particular Strategic Objective.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 1: Improve the effectiveness and strengthen in the country an independent justice system.

BACKGROUND: The establishment of an independent justice system is a central requirement for any democracy. It is the role of the justice system to impose and enforce a common set of "rules of the game" on the system. This applies to both individual and political behavior. Any system of government requires a dispute resolution mechanism to resolve conflicts between individuals and groups. A system of justice provides sanctions against certain behavior, both criminal and civil, that the society has an interest in regulating. It seeks to deter unacceptable acts and to punish those who commit them despite the existence of the penalty. A basic principle of a democratic justice system is that all men and women are equal before the law. Such a system "of laws, not men" demands that the laws apply equally to all citizens, regardless of politics, social standing, economics or other factors.

The adjudication function of the justice system exists to protect the most cardinal of principles -- the rights and obligations of individuals. Enforcing its decisions regularly requires the use of the coercive powers of the state. The decisions of the use of these powers -- justified force -- is a process that places an extraordinary burden upon a democratic government. The regulation of integrity, ethics, morality, social standards, and crime is never easy. Separating right from wrong is never clear cut. A system that operates by majority rule, and also seeks to protect the rights of the minorities, faces special difficulties. It is in the justice system that the minority protection must exist. Setting the right balance between independence and accountability is crucial to assure that the protection of the individual is both possible and effective.

The system of justice in a democratic society must meet these challenges or face its demise. Conversely, a political system that does not have a fair, equitable system that is credible and legitimate to both the majority and the minority is not likely to remain democratic. The ability to impose sanctions on the powerful as well as the weak has been a struggle throughout history. In Latin America, this struggle is at the forefront of the challenges of most countries.

Internal peace problems in developing countries are often strongly related to investigative and administrative weakness in law enforcement. This situation encourages private citizens to take justice in their own hands. Institutional mechanisms created to impart justice, often lack personnel and resources. The span of time between the request for justice and delivering it is often delayed, following the dictum "justice delayed is justice denied."

Inefficiencies and corruption pervade the investigative stage. Scientific inquiry and laboratory support in the search for evidence are usually absent. Police forces are badly paid and lack training to perform such activities. In addition, their use is poorly planned, resulting in considerable waste of personnel in tasks not directly related to the purpose for which they were recruited, e.g. office work, excessive assignment to political personalities without need of such safety, etc.

The judicial process involves complicated procedures with a considerable presence of "red tape." Frequently, violators must wait for long periods of time in jail before sentencing is given. The emphasis is more oriented toward paper work than to society's role. Peer participation is rare at any stage. Oral hearings before the public are not explicitly endorsed by law and when this occurs, the procedure is frequently bureaucratic and ritualistic. Prisons are crowded and the concept of rehabilitation is not inserted in the punishment process.

Public authorities disengage themselves from the delivery of justice altogether, or on the contrary, they intervene so strongly that put in doubt the judicial power's independence. Special violations such as political crimes or faults where security forces are involved, become almost impossible to clear up. Higher authorities, by restraining support here, may appear as engineering cover ups. This attitude becomes relevant when judges are threatened and higher authorities do nothing to protect them. On the other hand, these same authorities adopt a higher profile when political enemies are on trial. Public statements condemning these people, assure beforehand that a fair trial has been jeopardized.

Improving the effectiveness and strengthening the independence of the justice system is a major undertaking. To achieve these six areas of project activity have been identified for monitoring and evaluation. These are: Judicial Independence; Judicial Professionalization; Judicial Efficiency; Judicial Procedure; Access to the Judiciary; and Public Accountability of the judiciary. A set of indicators has been proposed for each of these areas.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO MEASURE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

I. Judicial Independence.

1.1 Degree of control by the Judiciary of its budget. EXAMPLE (Judiciary budget is set in the constitution at 6% of the national budget.)

Independence of the judiciary can be gauged by the degree of control it has over its budget. Budget control is not likely to an absolute. Rather, judicial budgets are normally going to involve the executive and perhaps the

legislative branch of government. Measurement of this indicator can involve the level of consultation between the Judiciary and the other branches; the existence of a court budget office; and the levels of actual funding provided.

1.2 Judicial officers represent the broad cross-section of partisan, ethnic, religious, and regional divisions found within the country. EXAMPLE (90% of judges are members of the National Party.)

Judicial independence requires that no one group or interest dominate the judiciary. One way to monitoring this is to determine if officers be drawn from all groups of the society. This would be one measure of the nature of control exerted over the judiciary by interests, parties, religions, and ethic groups. This indicator also allows for the monitoring of the appointment process used by the country in selecting its judicial officers.

1.3 Implementation of a Judicial career law. EXAMPLE (Justices of the Supreme Court serve for ten year terms.)

Independence can also be measured by the nature of the Judicial career provided for by the country's laws. This would include the length of the terms, levels of compensation and other protection aimed at isolating judges from domination by political, economic, regional or other interests. Measurement would require an analysis of the legal and institutional structures of the judicial tenure issue.

1.4 Increase or decrease in the number of acts of intimidation aimed at the judiciary. EXAMPLE (75% fewer acts of intimidation compared to previous year.)

The relative increase or decrease of acts of intimidation such as threats, attacks, injuries, and deaths aimed at the judiciary allows for the measurement of another aspect of independence. Collection of this information would be aided by international human rights groups, the Department of State that publishes the Annual Human Rights Report, and information from the country's judicial branch.

1.5 Judicial system's ability to reach decisions on all types of cases. EXAMPLE (Civilian court jurisdiction set by law to cover all cases except those in which the accused and the victim were military.)

A system's ability to reach decisions in all types of cases -- commonly called a unified court system -- is another indicator of independence. Normally

excluded from civilian judicial involvement are those cases where both the accused and the victims are military officers.

1.6 Degree to which judicial decisions are enforced. EXAMPLE (Court orders for military officers as witnesses or for the delivery of documents are refused.)

Independence can be measured by the degree of enforcement of decisions. An important component of this is the degree that decisions that impact the executive or the military are enforced.

II. Judicial Professionalization.

1.7 Establishment of merit selection procedures as part of judicial career law. EXAMPLE (All judicial appointments are reviewed by independent board and rated on qualifications and background.)

A measure of movement toward professionalization is the use of merit selection criteria in the appointment of judicial officers. In addition to establishing the merit selection process, its implementation requires monitoring and measurement.

1.8 Judicial salaries are established by law to be comparable to private sector positions of similar qualifications. EXAMPLE (Based upon a salary comparability study, Honduran Supreme Court Justices salaries were increased to 80,000 Lempiras a year.)

In many cases judicial salaries are so low that only the most civic minded, inept or corrupt enter the profession. A measure of movement of professionalization is the establishment of salaries comparable to those in the private sector. Appropriate salaries make the judicial career attractive and minimize corruption.

1.9 Establishment of active professional organizations for judicial officers. EXAMPLE (70% of judicial officers participate in association education and training activities)

The establishment of professional associations and networks helps to strengthen the voice of the profession. It also to bring together counterparts to represent the various classes of judicial employees in public debates and policy disputes.

III. Judicial Efficiency.

1.10 Establishment of a court administration office. EXAMPLE (Supreme Court allocates four employees to establish planning office.)

Until recently, in many countries, court administration was an unknown concept. The establishment of an administration unit to manage financial, personnel, information, and planning issues is a indication of movement toward greater efficiency.

1.11 Establishment of training programs for judges. EXAMPLE (eight judicial training courses offered for new and continuing judges -- 250 judges trained.)

Judicial training programs can make a contribution to the efficiency of courts. Measurement of this indicator can be tracked in terms of courses offered and judges trained.

1.12 Existence of training programs for non-judicial court employees. EXAMPLE (Specialized training course for clerks offered; 400 clerks trained.)

Training for non-judicial court employees can also help measure efficiency.

1.13 Unification of documentation for all laws, decrees, legal codes and procedures. EXAMPLE (Annual publication of unified code.)

In many countries the lack of a unified code of laws, decrees, legal codes and procedures hampers efficient operations of the court system. Production of such documentation improves access to the court system and serves to minimize multiple systems.

1.14 Establishment of case management and tracking systems. (EXAMPLE (six pilot case management and tracking systems being tested.)

Case management and tracking has been neglected. Establishment of such systems is a measure of efficiency.

1.15 Establishment of a modern system of judicial statistics and records. EXAMPLE (Statistical analysis unit produces six annual studies of case loads, time for processing, and current status of cases.)

Based upon the information of a case management and tracking system, statistical information about the justice systems can be analyzed and

disseminated to the public. For example, the number of civil/criminal cases by court or judge could help monitor the system.

IV. Judicial Procedure.

1.16 Establishment and use of a uniform set of legal procedures. EXAMPLE (Commission created to prepare revised uniform legal procedures.)

Procedures play a vital role in the guarantee of basic rights. Court systems that seek to provide some level of equal protection, require a uniform set of legal procedures. The establishment of these uniform procedures, or at least the process toward that goal, are important indicators of the quality of justice.

1.17 Effective procedures for the supervision of investigations. EXAMPLE (The chief of the Judicial Police was replaced after refusing a court order.)

The control of investigations and of investigative police forces is an unresolved issue in many Latin American countries. The establishment of effective procedures for the supervision of investigations is an indicator of the effectiveness of judicial procedures. Similarly, effective coordination and communication between judicial and law enforcement personnel are indicators of the state of judicial procedures.

1.18 Use of oral procedures. EXAMPLE (six courts testing the use of oral procedures.)

In many countries, the justice system operate without public oral procedures. This produces a situation in which judges simply read the written statements and render a verdict without ever seeing or personally speaking to the defendant, witnesses or victims. In Guatemala, for example, this is the tradition in as many as 80% of the case. The development of procedures for taking increased amounts of testimony orally at the trial is an indicator of an improving judicial operation.

1.19 Reduction in time required for processing criminal cases. EXAMPLE (Length of time to process criminal cases reduced 15%.)

Time measures for processing criminal cases are routinely used an indicators of judicial procedures. The collection of the data to measure this indicator should result from the court statistics based upon the case management and tracking system. In each country, a norm, average or median time is dependent upon a variety of factors. The establishment of a

baseline and movement toward time reduction can be an indicator of the procedural situation.

1.20 Establishment of a system of bail and pretrial release system. EXAMPLE (six courts testing new procedures for pretrial release of non-violent defendants.)

In many Latin American countries only certain classes of individuals are released pending trials. Reforms to break the traditional system of no bail or pretrial release can be an important indicator of procedures.

V. Access to the Judiciary.

1.21 Local availability of courts throughout the country. EXAMPLE (six new courts opened in rural areas and three new courts opened in urban areas.)

Local availability of courts, and the geographic distribution of courts is an indicator of access to the judiciary. For example, law enforcement -- court officials per 100,000, by area, could help measure this indicator.

1.22 Availability of legal representation through private attorneys and public defenders. EXAMPLE (two pilot public defender projects operating in criminal courts.)

The right to legal counsel is widely recognized as an important indicator of access to justice. In many Latin American countries most defendants have no opportunity to retain legal counsel.

1.23 Availability of legal education. EXAMPLE (25% increase scholarships for students unable to pay costs of law school.)

The availability of legal education, particularly for students from lower social and economic populations and from rural areas, is an indication of access to the justice system.

1.24 Structure and fairness of court costs and fees. EXAMPLE (Appointment of commission to revise court costs and fees to improve access of the poor.)

Low levels of income among many Latin Americans make even modest court cost major barriers. The structure and fairness of fees is an indicator of the level of access to the judicial system.

VI. Public Accountability of the Judiciary.

1.25 Increased public confidence in the justice system. EXAMPLE (28% of those surveyed believed they would be treated fairly in court.)

Public confidence in the justice system is an indicator of public accountability. This indicator can be can measured by public opinion polls or interviews with practitioners in the justice system. Another measure could be based upon improvements in crime statistics or numbers of cases resolved.

1.26 An effective public education program on the justice system. EXAMPLE (Funding for public educations programs to operate with labor and peasant unions.)

Expanding availability of information about the justice system, including rights, duties and obligations, to those literate and illiterate, in both urban and rural areas can be an indicator of accountability of a justice system.

1.27 Establishment of effective justice monitoring and policy research organizations. EXAMPLE (Legal policy research "think tank" formed to monitor the operation of the justice system.)

The establishment and existence of monitoring and advocacy groups is an indicator of accountability. Legal research and "think tanks" to study the system and propose reforms could be indicators of this measure.

ACTIVITIES: The activities aimed at accomplishing this Strategic Objective are the most developed of the DI area. This list is intended to demonstrate the breath and scope of the activities.

- Policy Dialogue by Country Team: The experience of the past five years indicates that Policy Dialogue is a critical element in pursuit of this Strategic Objective. Activities that are not directly supported by a unified Country Team are likely to be hampered in their ability to meet stated goals.

- Activities of the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP): The training efforts of the ICITAP program are a vital element in efforts to achieve this Strategic Objective. ICITAP activities are limited by law in certain countries, while in other countries such as Panama, those limits are minimal. ICITAP provides a full range of basic and specialized training courses aimed at improving investigative capabilities. Program Indicators

for these training effort can include an increase in the number of investigations initiated and number leading to prosecution; expanded reporting of crimes; or improvement in crime rates to an acceptable range. Performance Indicators related to the supervision and coordination of investigations (see Strategic Objective No. 1.17, Figure 4) are also relevant. It is also important to note that relations between the ICITAP effort and the A.I.D. DI activities warrant closer attention. Serious questions of coordination are present at many levels of the two programs. While each operates separately, the inability to establish joint planning efforts hampers both programs. In many areas, A.I.D. activities cannot succeed unless ICITAP activities succeed and vice versa.

- Activities of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA):. This small assistance programs which is managed by the Department of State provides assistance directly to various elements in a countries law enforcement community. The program focuses on training to assist in anti-terrorism efforts such as operations of airports, ports, and bomb detection. Better coordination is also important between the ATA and DI programs.

- Activities to Strengthen Judicial Independence: In many countries, a variety of activities have been undertaken to strengthen judicial independence. Examples of such efforts are:

  -- Establishment of a Financial Management Capability. Greater judicial independence in terms of budgets requires the establishment of a capability to manage budgets and engage in fiscal planning. The could include, for example, the establishment of a Budget Officer position to allow for the institutionalization of court fiscal information, improved budget control, auditing capabilities, and the development of a annual judicial budget proposal.

  -- Creation of a National Commission on Strengthening the Judiciary. A National Commission can play an important role in strengthening judicial independence by seeking to identify reforms and mobilize political support for implementation of reforms. The National Commission can also serve as the focal point for specialized judicial studies, preparation of plans, and development of implementation legislative. An examples of such a reform could include a judicial tenure law. Steps to monitor this effort might include: appointment of a Commission; hiring of an executive director and other staff; and the procurement of office space and office equipment.

-- Creation of a Judicial Protection Unit. A judicial protection unit is an example of an activity aimed at improving the protection afforded judicial personnel.

- Activities to Strengthen Judicial Professionalization: Judicial professionalism could be assisted with such activities as:

  -- Establishment of a Merit Selection Advisory Panel. Such a panel could be incorporated into a review process to encourage increased use of merit selection for judicial personnel. The panel could be advisory in nature and appointed by either the Supreme Court, the President, or the Legislature. The panel could also serve to mobilize support for the increase in merit selection procedures and civil service type personnel guidelines.

  -- Establishment of Professional Organizations For Judicial Officers. The establishment of professional associations and networks can serve to strengthen the voice of the profession in decisions related to the professionalism of the court system. These associations, such as the Bar Associations, can bring together counterparts and also serve as the representatives of the various classes of judicial employees in public debates and policy disputes.

- Activities to Strengthen Judicial Efficiency: This might include such activities as follows:

  -- Establishment of a Court Administration Office. Until recently in many countries, court administration was an unknown concept. The establishment of an administration unit to manage financial, personnel, information, and planning issues can make a significant contribution to greater efficiency in the court system. Such an office would be responsible for improvements in planning, administrative reforms, financial management and budgeting, and personnel system improvements. It would also be the focal point for standardization efforts, records management, and case flow management.

  -- Establishment of Educations and In-Service Training Programs for Judges. Judicial efficiency can be improved through education and training activities. These training efforts would be based upon a needs analysis, and designed in a manner that encourages judicial independence, professionalism as well as

efficiency. Implementation of this activity could include hiring of a training staff, and the establishment of routinely offered courses.

-- Establishment of Training Programs for Non-Judicial Court Employees. Separate training activities for court staffs, such as clerks, bailiffs and other support personnel can contribute to greater efficiency.

-- Establishment of Case Management and Tracking System. Case management and tracking systems can contribute significantly to the improvement in a judicial system by identifying current standards, identifying obstacles to case flows, and allowing for caseload management.

-- Establishment of a Modern System of Judicial Statistics and Records. Improvements in records management, and statistics collection can provide important information on the functioning of the judicial system. Information for this systems, which can be automated depending upon the circumstances of the country, can be built into the case management and tracking system.

Activities to Strengthen Judicial Procedure: This could include the following:

-- Appointment of Advisory Commission to Prepare Revised Uniform Legal Procedures. Procedures play a vital role in the guarantee of basic rights. Court systems that seek to provide some level of equal protection, require a uniform set of legal procedures. The establishment of these uniform procedures, or at least the process toward that goal, are important activities in pursuit of improvements in the quality of justice.

-- Appointment of Advisory Commission to Recommend Reforms in the Procedures for the Supervision of Investigations. The control of investigations and of investigative police forces is an unresolved issue in many Latin American countries. The establishment of effective procedures for the supervision of investigations can improve the effectiveness of judicial procedures. Similarly, effective coordination and communication between judicial and law enforcement personnel are essential if the judicial procedures are to be strengthened.

-- Establishment of a Pilot Pretrial Release Project. Pilot or test reform projects in the area of retrial release can make an important contribution in strengthening judicial procedure.

- Activities to Improve Access to the Judiciary: Activities aimed at opening the judicial system to the citizens can include the following:

  -- Appointment of an Advisory Commission on Access to the Judiciary. The Commission could be charged with identifying barriers to the justice system and making reform recommendations. The Commission could also serve to initiate debate on the problem and help mobilize support for the implementation of reform.

  -- Pilot Project to Expand the Availability of Legal Representation. The right to legal counsel is widely recognized as an aspect of access to justice. In many Latin American countries most defendants have no opportunity to retain legal counsel. Such a program to make use of advanced level law students who receive credit for serving as legal advisors to the poor and indigent.

  -- Law School Loan & Scholarship Program. This type of project could seek to expand the number of law students from lower social and economic populations as well as those from rural areas. The program could be designed in a manner that allows the student to repay loans by contributing to other reform activities.

- Activities to Improve Public Accountability of the Judiciary: Public accountability can be improved by efforts such as the following:

  -- Establish a Justice Monitoring and Policy Research Institute. Such a "think tank" could assist in a variety of justice improvement efforts. Many of these activities will require the development of broad-based coalitions in support of reform efforts. The development of such coalitions based upon a consensus for implementation can be assisted through the establishment of a non-partisan "think tank" whose sole purpose is improving the justice system and improving public accountability of the system. This activity would work closely with the National Commission, but would be separate and independent of the government. It could be associated with an

existing educational institution or a private not-for-profit organization.

-- Establish a Public Education Program on Legal Rights. Expanding availability of information about the justice system, including rights, duties and obligations, to those literate and illiterate, in both urban and rural areas can be one way of expanding the accountability of a justice system. Mobilization of citizens, and encouraging citizens to assert their rights can be an important pressure for reform.

CONCLUSION: Improving the effectiveness and strengthening an independent justice system is a fundamental component of the DI field. While justice efforts have been a high priority in many countries, they have also been the source of substantial frustration. Progress has not been as swift or as sure as many officials had expected. This leads to the conclusion that efforts in the justice field are going to require longer-term commitments of resources than had been previously anticipated. In addition, it requires a greater realization that reforms in the justice system may go to the heart of entrenched political, economic, and military power structures. As a result, many of the activities in this field must be seen in the larger institutional development context.

The experiences of the past forty years have demonstrated that justice institutions in developing nations tend to be weak, personality driven, politically controlled, and resistent to reform. These are all major impediments to the development of strong democratic institutions and barriers to success in the DI program.

In the AOJ area, it is a common practice to assume that the most difficult policy and/or institutional reforms will be executed by the host government without the direct involvement or accountability of the USAID This places fundamental policy reforms which are required for the project to succeed beyond the scope of the project activity. This practice may doom the project from the very beginning. Examples in current programs, some of which are identified in the case studies, demonstrate the widespread nature of the problem. The creation of the Special Investigative Unit in El Salvador contrasted to the failure to fully utilize the Unit graphically points to the problem. Even when a project is well designed and well executed, it can fail without a receptive institution or structure from which to operate.

The failure to identify the type of change which is a precedent to success, and then acting to achieve it, will eventually impede or cause the failure of a project. This does not necessarily mean that without the structural change occurring first justice strengthening activities cannot be implemented. It does mean that

carefully crafted and closely monitored indicators of the justice institutions are an essential element in working toward this Strategic Objective.

Figure 4



1533-037/04
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 2: Strengthen local and municipal government in the country.

BACKGROUND: Local governments can contribute greatly to the effective operation of a democratic system. In part, they reflect a shift away from centralized authority and decision making. Willingness to consider strengthening local governments may be enhanced when central governments are faced with a generalized economic crisis. There is also a growing realization that a monopoly on decision making results in a reduction of opportunities for local initiatives. At the same time, population movements in many developing countries have rapidly expanded the populations in the urban centers. This trend has produced dramatic pressures on the central authorities. In some countries, this pressure may produce a willingness to consider shifting greater responsibility to lower levels of government.

By their nature, local and municipal authorities are closer to a geographic area than is the central government. Local governments can contribute to greater democracy by decentralizing political power and service delivery. Expanding the role of local governments can help provide for more democratic decision making through an increase in citizen participation. Local governments are more likely than the central governments to be sensitive to the problems and the services that have the greatest direct impact on most citizens. Because local governments can be more attuned and responsive to local problems and needs, they allow the common citizen better access to officials and to the redress of grievances. Local governments by their nature become advocates on behalf of their citizens seeking programs and assistance from the central government.

At the same time, local government are likely to suffer an number of deficiencies: revenue bases are limited; agencies of the central government can be competitive rather than cooperative; requirements for public services and infrastructure normally overwhelm capabilities; there are impediments to structural reforms; and deficiencies in managerial and service delivery personnel are severe. It is also common for power relationships and expenditure patterns at the local level to be highly dependent upon personalism, party politics, and patronage. Electoral politics, while vital for democratic participation, can also be highly disruptive to governmental services during an election cycle.

All this implies that indicators of strengthening local and municipal governments are at once both technical and political. At a minimum, strengthened local government implies weakening the central government. How a government is strengthened is also likely to produce winners and losers at the local level, both in and out of the governmental structure.

There are a variety of approaches to the dilemmas of decentralization of the delivery, financing, and management of public services. These include: privatization, deregulation, delegation, deconcentration, and devolution. The diversity of the countries of Latin America, particularly the differences between Central and South America limit the utility of a single approach or single set of indicators. Even within a country, the differences between levels of decentralization will be significant. As with other objectives, local government projects require carefully crafted indicators that take into account local history, culture, and political arrangements. The following indicators are intended as a general guide.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

2.1 Selection process for selecting local leaders. EXAMPLE (All mayors are selected by direct election.)

The means of selection of local leaders is a critical element in measuring local government. Local leaders can be selected by direct election, indirect election, or appointment by central authority. Monitoring this process can communicate significant information on the strength of local governments.

2.2 Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the local level. EXAMPLE (Elections for local officers are held in 1992.)

The scheduling and holding of elections is evident on its face. Use of this indicator becomes less relevant as a country consolidates its democratic practices. Additional indicators can be drawn from Strategic Objective No. 7 related to free, fair, and open elections.

2.3 Level of competition for leadership positions in local government. EXAMPLE (30% of local officials had competition in the selection process that granted them power.)

This indicator is intended to communicate information on the level of competition for leadership positions. Put another way, it communicates the level of control by a single party, personality, or family exercises at a local level. This indicator could be adapted to monitoring competition in a specific community.

2.4 Responsiveness of local officials to public concerns. EXAMPLE (32% of the citizens surveyed rated the local government responsive to their problems.)

This indicator would communicate the linkage between the actions of the local government and the problems of the citizens. Another means of measuring this issue would be the number of public meetings held to discuss public issues and the number of people who attend those meetings.

2.5 Amounts and sources of revenues available for local programs. EXAMPLE ($15 million in revenues, of which 88% comes from local taxes, are available for local services).

This measure seeks to focus on the nature of tax base and the revenues generated. It also provides information on the degree dependence on central government. Another way of expressing this indicator would be by comparing per capita expenditures by rural, urban or regional local governments.

2.6 Number and types of services provided by the local government. EXAMPLE (Education, water, sanitation, and health services are provided by local government.)

This indicator is targeted at the nature, extent and areas in which citizens must rely on the various levels of government for services. In many instances citizens rely on central government because local governments cannot or do provide services.

2.7 Percentage of population served by basic services provided by local government. EXAMPLE (92% of city's population have access to water, sanitation, and electricity.)

The measure seeks to go beyond the services provided and determine the availability of those services. This indicator is also a means of addressing the adequacy of local financial and administrative capacities to respond to the demand for basic services -- water, sanitation, electricity.

2.8 Criteria used for determining priorities in service and resource allocation decisions. EXAMPLE (Priorities are based upon political patronage.)

This measure seeks to identify the criteria used for service and resource allocations decisions. Such decisions could be based upon local demand, publicly available needs tests, political pressure, patronage, or merit.

2.9 Improved Institutional capabilities of local government. EXAMPLE (Local government has specialized officers for budget control, revenue collection and fiscal planning.)

This indicator is aimed at the institutional capabilities of the local government. Budgeting, revenue collection, and fiscal planning are all examples of desirable institutional capabilities. This measurement would be determined by an institutional analysis of the local government. This indicators could also be measured by measuring the public confidence in the governments capabilities. Another means of looking at this would be to measure the percentage of officers who have received training for their specialization.

ACTIVITIES:

- Local Level Electoral Support Activities: This assistance would parallel the activities identified in Strategic Objective No. 7 to strengthen the institutional capacity of the country to administer free, fair and open elections.

- Establishment of Local Government Policy Development and Research Institution: Establishing a "think tank" for policy development and research on local government issues can facilitate debate on local problems and the identification of alternative approaches.

- Establish a National Commission on the Role, Function, and Funding of Local Governments: Such a commission would be charged with developing recommendations on the appropriate division of labor between the central and local government. It could also serve to assist in forming a consensus of leaders on questions of revenue collection and distribution, service provision and power sharing.

- Establish Associations for Local Government Officials: Associations or organizations of local officials can play an important role in the dialogue with the central government. Such organizations can serve to voice local problems which may impact several local governments. These groups can also serve as training centers for local government officials.

- Establish a Training Program for Local Government Officials: Improving the training available for local officials can assist in a wide range of local government problems. By providing a national wide program, training that might be too expensive for small units of

government could become routine. Training could be in accounting, fiscal and planning areas. It could also include technical training in such areas as sanitation, fire protection or tax collection.

CONCLUSION: In 1983, an A.I.D. Program Evaluation paper on Local Governments noted:

Although local government projects are still a small amount of A.I.D.'s portfolio, their importance is growing. This is partly due to a trend toward decentralization in several developing countries and partly to country -- and mission --specific factors. The array of projects, however, shows no consistent focus and no consistent strategy. Instead, the portfolio includes a hodgepodge of decentralization initiatives, area development programs and components of larger projects, as well as assistance directly to local governments. In additions, different institutional arrangements are used, such as assistance to national institutions which help local entities, assistance at the local level, or direct local level support. Likewise, various strategies are employed including local management training assistance, assistance in revenue generation, technical studies of financial management, and participant training. The record of these efforts also varies greatly. In sum, A.I.D.'s local government portfolio is a mixed bag that has produced mixed results.

Much has been learned in the seven years since that was written. However, there should be no deceptions that decentralization is a panacea for solving governmental inefficiencies. In fact, decentralizing decisions at the local level may increase tension with the central government, and it will certainly produce major differences in the quantity and quality of services in different areas. In addition, resistance is likely to be acute in many areas seeking to strengthen of local governments. This is especially true on questions of revenue and expenditure authorities.

A 1984 World Bank Staff Working Paper on "Decentralization in Developing Countries" can serve as a useful starting point in considering appropriate indicators for strengthening local governments. It notes:

In sum a decentralization program is more likely to succeed if it is small in scope, has a long period of time which to prove itself, centers around specific financial functions, transfers responsibilities and authority incrementally, is sparing of donor involvement, and includes a training component. The more of these features that are built in, the better the chances that staff activity and productivity will increase, that citizen participation in government activities will expand and be meaningful, that planned goals of projects will

be more rapidly and economically achieved, and that meaningful development will occur.

Figure 5

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 2

STRENGTHEN LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE COUNTRY

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

2.1 Selection process for selecting local leaders.
2.2 Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the local level.
2.3 Level of competition for leadership positions in local government.
2.4 Responsiveness of local officials to public concerns.
2.5 Amounts and sources of revenues available for local programs.
2.6 Number and types of services provided by the local government.
2.7 Percentage of population served by basic services provided by local government.
2.8 Criteria used for determining priorities in service and resource allocation decisions.
2.9 Improved Institutional capabilities of local government.

PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

- LOCAL LEVEL ELECTORAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. (USAID)
- ESTABLISH A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. (USAID)
- ESTABLISH ASSOCIATIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. (USAID)
- ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH INSTITUTION. (USAID)
- ESTABLISH A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE ROLE, FUNCTION AND FUNDING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. (USAID)

1533-040/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 3: Strengthen the control of civilian elected leadership over the military in the country.

BACKGROUND: Strengthening elected civilian control over a nation's military is a crucial objective for the consolidation of a pluralistic democratic political system. Civilian control of the military is necessary to assure that military politics do not dominate the political process. Military politics tend to serve their own or other special interest group's goals. Frequently the cost of the lack of civilian control is great physical suffering and lost economic opportunities.

The nine indicators proposed here cover a broad range of issues central to the issue of civilian control of the military. Most are relatively easy to measure on a continuing basis, especially after an initial country baseline has been established in terms of these indicators. Most are easy to understand, both by specialist and other interested parties, and do not imply major expenditures. Keeping most of these indicators current could be minor task for an USAID or State Department officer.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO MEASURE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

3.1 The existence of governmental institutions controlled by the military that are unregulated by elected officials. EXAMPLE (The existence of unregulated military banks in El Salvador and Guatemala, or separate National Security Councils with vetoes over a wide range of decisions in Chile and Uruguay.)

Since military autonomy is the antithesis of civilian control, this measure communicates a basic structure of governmental power. In some instances, it may be appropriate to analyze three dimensions:

- the existence of institutions beyond the control of elected civilian leaders;
- the importance of those institutions to control of political power; and
- the type of governmental programs that are impacted by those institutions.

It is not unusual for military-controlled political institutions to exist early in the transition from military to civilian rule. However, as the democratic character of a political system is consolidated, the existence, importance, and scope of such institutions beyond the civilian control should shrink.

3.2 The number of military officers serving as cabinet officers. EXAMPLES (five military officers serving as cabinet officers.)

This relatively simple indicator communicates the nature of military involvement in non-military aspects of government. The less military officers in key non-military governmental positions, the more civilian control. In some instances, a more detailed analysis of sub-cabinet or other senior level offices may be required to appropriately measure military control.

3.3 Enactment of laws that prevent military officers from serving in key political positions to help avoid a conflict of loyalty between military duty and political office. EXAMPLE (Military officers prohibited by law for serving as defense minister.)

This type of legislation would communicate the clarity of the distinction between military and civilian roles. It would also communicate the level of civilian control of the military.

3.4 The degree to which elected civilians control military budgets and expenditures. EXAMPLE (No civilian control over the military budget.)

The independence of military budgets should diminish as military dominance shrinks and as civilian authorities set national security priorities.

3.5 The degree to which elected civilians control the size of the military forces. EXAMPLE (Size of military determined through negotiations between elected President and senior military officers.)

The level of civilian control should increase in as democratic government asserts its power in national security decisions.

3.6 The degree of military control in areas other than international security. EXAMPLE (Significant decrease in military control over rural development programs, ports, and tax collection.)

Military roles in non-military activities should diminish with civilian empowerment. However, it may take some time before a political systems transits to a situation where such a limited role is possible.

3.7 The ability of civilian authorities to access information on decisions of military officials. EXAMPLE (President and Congress cannot question military decisions.)

This indicators require a sophisticated analysis of the relationship of political institutions and the military. The ability of civilians to access information and raise questions on decisions is an extremely sensitive issues in many countries. Determining the level and nature of this ability will communicate a significantly about the relationship.

3.8 The ability of civilian authorities to investigate allegations of illegal or inappropriate behavior of military officers. EXAMPLE (Four investigations conducted with one case referred to criminal courts.)

Similarly, the ability of civilian authorities to investigate illegal or inappropriate behavior is critical to making decisions on military actions.

3.9 A growth in public opinion that military power is increasingly under civilian control. EXAMPLE (99% of the public believe that the military will follow civilian orders.)

Using public opinion polls, focus group research, or interviews with public opinion leaders, measurements of the public perception of the civil/military relationship and the balance of power can be measured.

ACTIVITIES: There are four sets of activities that can contribute to achieving this Strategic Objective.

- Policy Dialogue undertaken by the Country Team: The issues of civilian control over the military are by their nature a key element in the policy dialogue between the country and the United States. The responsibility for this dialogue falls clearly upon policy makers in Washington and on the Country Team. In some instances it requires the involvement of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of States or the Secretary of Defense. The sensitive nature of the policy dialogue requires close coordination and cooperation between all elements of the Country Team. Monitoring this activity must be done with the performance indicators for the Strategic Objective.

- Civilian-Military Relations and Democracy in Latin America Regional Project: This project provides support for:

  1. Conferences and seminars. Encouraging a dialogue on Civil/Military relations among both civilian and military officials has

proven to be a significant and difficult undertaking. The discussion of these issues is often sensitive and exposes conflicts. Monitoring the activity can be done by assessing the attitudes of the participants of the conferences, seminars, or simulations. Data for a Program Indicator for these activities could be derived from evaluations completed at the conclusion of the events.

2. Research and Publications. Research and publications of books, articles and papers on the subject can be significant in expanding understanding in the field and broadening the availability of the knowledge. Measurement can be done by reviews, sales, and surveys of readers and peers.

3. Country Profile. The development of country profiles is a critical part of the regional project.

- U.S. Military Assistance: U.S. programs play a crucial role in encouraging the growth of civilian control of Latin American militaries. In many instances U.S. military efforts are the largest efforts in a country and overshadow other U.S. government efforts. Because of the tradition of direct military-to-military relations is strong, efforts to encourage respect for civilian authority must be integrated into all military programs and projects. Data for Program Indicators for these activities should be developed on a project by project basis.

- A.I.D. training for military and civilian leaders: Though there are no such projects currently being supported by A.I.D., a training project could be at the core of activity to address this Strategic Objectives. Data for Program Indicators could develop out of interviews with participants at the conclusion of their training.

CONCLUSION: A.I.D currently has only a modest project working to strengthen civilian control over the military. In many instances this program is not well understood in the LAC field missions and is not well received by the Country Teams.

A.I.D. cannot operate effectively to support democracy in a country without taking into account the nature of that country's civil-military relations. Inasmuch as A.I.D. is vitally involved in assisting host country nationals to accelerate social and economic development, possible agendas for national development are set by civil-military relations. A.I.D. cannot effectively operate without knowing what agendas are possible and which are not due to the nature of the civil-military relations. At the very least, it is in the interest of A.I.D. to promote the creation

of publicly accessible knowledge about a nation's political system and about the role of the military within it.

Similarly, to the extent that it is the mission of A.I.D. to assist a nation with its political development -- to help accelerate the consolidation of pluralist democratic politics -- non-partisan assistance with the evolution of key political institutions is important. Helping to create greater mutual understanding of civilian and military roles in pluralist democracies as well as enhancing civilian capacity to exercise oversight can be important for the consolidation of pluralist democracies and can enhance A.I.D.'s capacities to assist with other objectives in this context.

For A.I.D. to play such a role effectively, it is crucial that its contributions be carefully coordinated with those of other activities of the U.S. Government. Particularly important is the coordination, within a country plan, of A.I.D. and other civil-military relations activities under the direction of the representative of the President of the United States (the Ambassador), necessarily with the full knowledge and encouragement of appropriate host country political authorities.

Since civil-military relations can touch on sensitive matters of international security, and civil-police relations can touch on similarly sensitive issues of domestic security, substantial coordination may at times be necessary for an Ambassador to allow A.I.D. or other agency activities in the civil-military relations area to proceed. Nevertheless, A.I.D. has the capacity to create knowledge and facilitate respect and understanding in this potentially divisive area. Once achieved, it will be important that an Ambassador have sufficient confidence in A.I.D. civil-military activities to permit some flexibility in the operation of A.I.D. officials/grantees. Dialogue and knowledge creation in the area of civil-military relations may involve the creation of new networks and contacts with a nation's military and its civilian national security officials. A schedule for keeping Embassy and host country officials apprised of progress is essential so that full advantage can be taken of contacts and understandings that may develop.

Figure 6



1533-027/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 4.: Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the capacity in the country of the legislative branch of government.

BACKGROUND: An elected legislative branch of government is a vital element in a democratic system. A legislature serves to limit the powers and prerogatives of the executive and the military. A representative legislative body serves as a forum to bring together leaders from the diverse geographic, ethnic, cultural, political, and economic groups that comprise a nation state. The legislative forum allows those groups to bring issues, problems and grievances to the central government. A legislature serves to subject programs and policies to public examination and amendment from a the perspectives of the groups represented. One strength of a legislature, to the extent that it is empowered and legitimate, is to resolve disputes, reach compromises, and allocate governmental resources based upon votes of elected representatives. A legislature, operating on majority rule with protections for the minority, allows for the balancing of interests between various groups by encouraging the formation of broad-based coalitions on matters that affect the nation.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

4.1 An electoral selection process that assures representation from the major cleavages of the society. EXAMPLE (40% of elected representatives in Guatemala represent Indian populations.)

The effectiveness of a legislature is in many ways determined by those included or excluded. Representation can be determined in any of a number of ways. For example it could be either party or district based. The point here is that representation must be assured from all major geographic, ethnic, cultural, political, and economic interests in the society. A failure on this account severely limits its ability to serve its democratic purpose.

4.2 Degree of responsiveness to the problems, preferences and proposals of their constituents. EXAMPLE (78% of the registered voters believe their elected representative is response to their concerns.)

One measure of a representative institution is the degree that it provides representation to the constituents. Use of public opinion polls, in selected areas, should quantify this indicator. Key opinion leader interviews can also contribute to measurement.

4.3 Degree of legislative control over executive budgets. EXAMPLE (Executive budgets for five programs were decreased by 25% and six new programs were added.)

The power of the purse has historically proven to be the most effective control of any legislative body. The ability, even with limits, to participate in the budgetary process of a nation is a potent indicator of effectiveness. Equally important is the degree of control that the legislature has over its own budget. This indicator can be measured through and institutional analysis focusing on legislature ability to review, debate, add, or delete items from the executive's annual budget.

4.4 Legislature's role -- to approve or disapprove -- major executive decisions. EXAMPLE (Congress disapproved four decrees and rejected two proposed cabinet appointments.)

The power to review major executive decisions is a key indicator. Specifically, this could include executive decrees or cabinet officials. Review of military promotions would be another element in this measure.

4.5 Ability of a legislature to enact laws for the society. EXAMPLE (The enactment of a criminal penalty of ten years in prison for torture.)

The power to enact legislation to govern the civil, criminal, commercial, and governmental behavior is a fundamental power of the legislature. A related element in the measurement of this indicator would be the degree that those laws are enforced. Another measurement of this is the number of key votes which are taken by the legislature and the number of substantive laws enacted.

4.6 The degree of legislative oversight of governmental operations. EXAMPLE (Public hearings held on the operation and effectiveness of four government ministries.)

The ability of a legislature to publicly discuss problems facing the society in hearings, and to summon executive branch officials to those hearings, is another indicator of effectiveness. Public exposure of mistakes, wrong doing, corruption, and malfeasance of office are powerful tools for a legislature. The number of public hearings and committee meetings held on controversial and contentious issues would be one way to monitor this indicator. This measurement would also communicate information on the committee system.

4.7 Improved Institutional capabilities of the legislature:

- policy and legal research; EXAMPLE (Creation of a legislative reference office.)

- support and investigative staff; EXAMPLE (18 support and investigative staff hired and trained.)

- communication with constituents; EXAMPLE (100,000 newsletters sent 6 times a year.)

- publication of documents, reports and proceedings; EXAMPLE (Daily record published. 250 hearing records published.)

- protective services for legislators and staff. EXAMPLE (Enactment of criminal penalty for threatening legislators. Four individuals convicted of making threats.)

Many weak legislatures lack basic institutional capabilities in a wide variety of areas. Institutional analysis would expose strengths and weaknesses that may impact effectiveness.

ACTIVITIES: Four sets of activities can contribute to this Strategic Objective. (See Objective Tree at the end of this section.):

- Policy Dialogue undertaken by the Country Team: Strong support from the entire U.S. government is critical for this objective. The of Ambassadors and senior U.S. military officers may be among the most important elements in area. The kinds of activities that should be included are:

  -- U.S. Ambassador meets regularly with the Legislature to brief them on U.S objectives, activities, and assistance programs.

  -- Visits by all U.S. executive, legislative, and military officials include meetings with legislative representatives.

  -- Plan developed to phase in legislative review of U.S. assistance activities.

- Improve Technological, Material, and Physical Plant of Legislature: A.I.D. funding for office, communications, and record keepings systems can significantly improve the operation of a legislature. It can should also serve to increase the public access to the legislature and information about the legislative actions. This can be measured through frequency of use of the commodities provided and reporting on the purposes of the use.

- Professionalization of Support Services, Staffs and Committee Structures: This activity can encompass a wide variety of efforts aimed at strengthening the professionalization of legislative efforts. Program Indicators could be as follows:

  -- Better trained legislators and staffs in process and practices.

  -- Availability of bill and fiscal summaries.

  -- Increase in bills initiated by legislators.

  -- Expanded us of internships.

  -- Increase in number and skill levels of support staffs.

  -- Establishment of organizations for legislators.

- Congressional Libraries, Research, Publication and Investigative Organizations: This activity is aimed at the creation of specialized support organizations to support the legislature. These organizations can include: library and research offices to focus on legal issues, police analysis and bill drafting; publication offices to handle printing and communications efforts; and investigative offices to assist in oversight and monitoring of executive activities. The Program Indicators would be similar if not identical to those for the professionalization activities.

CONCLUSION: While there may be general agreement on the utility of strengthening legislatures, the programs themselves are likely to be difficult and highly political. By their nature, legislatures are slow, deliberative, and produce the decentralization of power. In many instances the growth in legislative power can only be accomplished by shrinking the power of executive or military agencies. Further, the expansion of representation often produces the involvement of groups

previously excluded. In the short run this is likely to expand debate and political conflict. While A.I.D. activities may be intended as "non-political" or "technical," they can only succeed with the full political support of the Country Team. Legislative support activities need to be fully coordinated with the Country Team. If the Country Team and A.I.D. objectives do not coincide in support of a strengthened legislature, then these types of activities should not be initiated.

Figure 7



1533-024/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 5: Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the capacity of the executive branch in the country to impose fiscal accountability in order to prevent waste, corruption, and fraud in the country.

BACKGROUND: A major feature of A.I.D.'s involvement in the LAC region has been the paucity of financial accountability. The lack of procedures, standards, reporting systems, and mechanisms to encourage honest management of governmental funds has been an endemic problem.

A constraints to achieving this Strategic Objective is a historical tradition of loose controls on governmental finances. In part this is driven by personalism and party politics which view the quest for political power as a vehicle to reach financial fulfillment. A lack of trained accounting, budget, and financial management personnel is another contributing factor. Career tenure, salary levels, and non-partisan status are also elements normally not present in LAC countries. Imposing controls to prevent waste, corruption, and fraud require a mixture of independence in the exercise of sound fiscal planning and management techniques, with a system that provides accountability for those handling the public trust. Weaving this web of independence and accountability is directly dependent upon the structure of political institutions just as it depends upon skilled personnel to make it work.

The Program Indicators listed below have been drawn from the LAC Controller's work in conjunction with the work executed by Price Waterhouse in the regionally funded project which has as its goal seeking to establish integrated financial management systems in the region. Collection of this Program Indicator data is likely to be particularly difficult and politically sensitive in the early stages of a democratic transition. In many instances the inability to collect the data is an indication of the political situation. In most instances the use of all these Program Indicators would be inappropriate and excessive. However, the more developed the democratic structures, the more appropriate extensive and detailed the indicators need to be.

The Program Indicators cited here measure status of progress at the Strategic Objective and Program Output levels. It is assumed that an LAC field mission might reasonably undertake these Program Activities when pursuing the Strategic Objective of improving the effectiveness and strengthen the capacity of the executive branch in the country to impose fiscal accountability in order to prevent waste, corruption, and fraud in the country. This does not mean to suggest that this is an all inclusive list of activities to be undertaken by a LAC field mission. As is the case of each of the Strategic Objectives presented in this chapter, the

mix of Program Activities to be executed by a particular LAC Field Mission will be a direct function of local conditions. (See Objective Tree at the end of this section.)

PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND RELATED PROGRAM INDICATORS:

Program Activity No. 1: Strengthening the regulatory framework for performing a government's budgeting, accounting, and auditing functions.

Program Indicators:

- Do the existing country laws and regulations facilitate, impede, or have no effect on progress in improving financial management?
- Do laws/regulations on financial management emphasize basic concepts, policies, and structures?

Program Activity No. 2: Upgrade the human resource capacity in the government's offices concerned with budgeting, auditing, and accounting.

Program Indicators:

- The numbers of educated and licensed CPA's are increasing within the public sector financial management area.
- The quality of financial management training.
- Does any government agency license accountants and auditors?

Program Activity No. 3: Improve the budgeting capacity of the government.

Program Indicators:

- Do the basic budget laws and regulations facilitate, impede, or have no important effect on reform/modernization in financial management?
- What is the role of the Central Budgeting Office?
- What percentage of pubic sector expenditures is covered or administered in the central government budget?
- What is the nature of earmarking in central government budgeting?

- Is the government's budgeting process is linked into an integrated financial management system through common classifications relating to accounting and financial reporting?

- Does the Central Budget Office has the capability to control and evaluate budgetary execution in respect to both financial and physical performance?

- An adequate public sector financial statistics data base exists to permit performance analysis and evaluation.

- What degree of computerization in budgetary planning, analysis, and execution is performed by mainframe computer systems, by PC based systems?

Program Activity No. 4: Improve the accounting capacity of the government.

Program Indicators:

- Has the Central Accounting Office provided leadership in advancing an integrated financial management system?

- Has the Central Accounting Office provided an overall plan for implementing an integrated financial management system?

- Are there common charts of accounts classification linking accounting with budgeting and financial information data bases and reporting?

- What degree of centralization is there between the Central Accounting Office and ministries and autonomous agencies?

- Do the basic accounting laws and regulations facilitate reform/modernization in financial management?

- What degree of computerization of public accounting offices is performed by computer systems -- by PC based systems?

Program Activity No. 5: Improve the auditing and program capacity of the government.

Program Indicators:

- What is the degree of high level political support for auditing and program evaluation activities?

- Is there adequate funding for auditing and program evaluation activities?

- What is the focus of internal audit units?

- What is the focus of the supreme audit institution?

- Is the auditing and program evaluation activity linked into an integrated financial management system?

- Are performance goals, objectives, targets, and related indicators established at program/project design stages to facilitate later evaluation during implementation?

- In carrying out external audits or program evaluations are international standards applied?

- How frequent are outside auditing firms contracted to carry external audits of government agencies or enterprises?

Program Activity No. 6: Improve the cash and debt management capacity of the government.

Program Indicators:

- What percentage of taxes are actually collected by tax authorities?

- What is the average delay of receipt of taxes when due as compared to other types of revenue when due?

Program Activity No. 7: Improve the contracting and contracting capacity of the government.

- Do existing procurement and contracting laws, regulations, and procedures facilitate the performance of these functions?

- What percentage of government contracts are awarded through competitive bidding procedures?

- How does the public perceive the performance of the government in executing the contracting process?

Program Activity No. 8: A continuous dialogue between the Country Team and the host government must be sustained to support USAID efforts in this area.

CONCLUSION: The degree to which the government manifests commitment, will, and capacity to root out corruption and foster public sector financial management reform and modernization can be measured in terms of the degree of support it provides to implement the Program Activities described in the preceding section. A series of Program Indicators have been identified for measuring movement in direction of achieving the Program Outputs that are implicit in the Program Activities. Therefore, the support the government provides to support the successful implementation of each Program Activity is a test or a measure for its support for the Strategic Objective.

Figure 8



1533-039/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 6: Strengthen the dual or multi-party system in the country.

BACKGROUND: Strong political parties and party systems are crucial for the functioning of a democratic political system. Political parties, operating in a system considered legitimate, are able to aggregate interests in a manner that allows political and policy choices to be articulated. As majority rule is one key element in a democratic system, political parties become vehicles by which the majority can come together and express itself. This articulation of aggregated interests contributes to serious competition of programs, ideas, and ideologies. Parties can also serve to balance the power of the majority and protect the interests of the minority.

Political parties serve as vehicles to organize divergent elements in a society in favor or against specific policy prescriptions and serve to mobilize mass based support which is vital to political intercourse. Strong political parties can serve to minimize personalism and contribute to dispute resolution based upon the good of the whole, rather than the desires do a mobilized or special interest. Parties also serve to expand political education among activists and contribute to the identification and selection of political leaders.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: This Strategic Objective is to strengthen a system with more than one political party. However, the measurements must focus upon each party separately.

6.1 Level of party identification on the part of political activists. EXAMPLE (100% of 1,000 party activists have strong identification with party.)

6.2 Level of party identification by the voting public. EXAMPLE (52% of voting public identify with party.)

Since political parties are essentially competitors, one measure of their strength is their level of competitiveness and the numbers of people who identify with the party, both activists and the voting public. This can be measured by party participation, public opinion polling, and voting behavior.

6.3 Party legal status. EXAMPLE (Party recognized as a legal entity.)

The status of parties under the law is an important element in monitoring its strength. Legal status includes such issues as the transparency of the party operations and decision making.

6.4 Ability of the party to maintain an institutional capability to:

- Research issues. EXAMPLE (Party research office with full time staff produced 50 issue papers.)

- Manage mass communications. EXAMPLE (Party press office with full time staff produced 250 press releases.)

- Train workers. EXAMPLE (2000 political workers trained.)

- Maintain election experts/poll watchers. EXAMPLE (2000 poll watchers deployed on election day.)

- Raise funds. EXAMPLE ($1 million raised for Presidential election campaign.)

- Assist candidates. EXAMPLE (150 candidates given training program on campaign mechanics.)

These indicators require an analysis of the institutional capacity of a political party. Each component is important to a party's strength.

6.5 The presence of political organizations (either clubs or precinct type organizations) in urban and rural areas. EXAMPLE (1000 precinct level political clubs organized.)

Another key element in assessing party strength is the maintenance of grass root operations that allow parties to mobilize the population and also respond to local concerns.

6.6 Ability to bring to office skilled, competent officials. EXAMPLE (135 highly respected citizens appointed to public office.)

Winning elections in many countries does not necessarily produce the ability to operate the levers of power. Political parties contribute to this problem to the extent that they are not able to fill the office of government with competent, skilled managers who can manage problems. Measurement of this would include the number of elected and appointed officials and their previous experiences. A measure of respect could be taken from peer group or opinion leader's interviews.

ACTIVITIES: In the past, there have been a variety of efforts to assist parties during election campaigns. However, A.I.D. currently has no country activities to achieve this objective. The following are the type of activities supported by the U.S. government in a country setting to contribute to this Strategic Objective:

achieve this objective. The following are the type of activities supported by the U.S. government in a country setting to contribute to this Strategic Objective:

- Establishment of Commission on Political Parties: The establishment of a commission on political parties is one vehicle for clarifying the role of parties in the political process. The commission, which would include representatives of all major parties, factions or political groups, would be charged with making recommendations on strengthening the role of parties. This process could also help encourage the formation of a consensus on the political system.

- Establish an Institute on Political Parties: An institute, or think tank could serve as an organizational base to bridge the gap between existing political parties and encourage the creation of a common set of rules of the game. The control of the institute would have to be either strictly non-partisan or balanced in a way to assure equal access to goods and services by all parties.

- Campaign Mechanics and Election Training: Providing training on political techniques and communication skills can serve to strengthen the party capabilities. This training, which would be housed in the Institute on Parties, would be open equally to all parties or groups. All training activities should place a high priority on transparency and thus would be open to the press as well.

- Establish Regular Public Opinion Polling: Public opinion polling can serve to strengthen a variety of elements contained in several Strategic Objectives. Encouraging the establishment of an ongoing polling capability can make an important contribution to this and other Objectives. The polling function can be housed in an Institute on Parties, or in the private sector as a profit making enterprise. It can also be non-partisan or each party can have its own polling capabilities or firms.

- Establish a Civic Education Program on Political Rights and Responsibilities. Civic education, for both adults and secondary school age children, can make an important contribution to strengthening political parties. It may also contribute to several of the other Strategic Objectives.

- Expand Public Administration Programs for Party Leadership. Since the goal of a political party is to take the reins of government through elections, once they win election there is a need for skilled managers

to conduct governmental affairs. One approach to assist in this area is to encourage public administration programs for party officials, leaders and possible appointees. These education programs could be run with an existing institution such as INCAE.

- Party Support Activities of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Democratic, Republican, Labor and Chamber of Commerce Institutes. The NED and the four institutes have engaged in a variety of party support activities. Most of these appear to be funded by non-A.I.D. funds. The current relationship between the DI program and the NED is unclear. This raises the potential for conflicts and controversies on the appropriate nature of activities and the goals to be sought in encouraging democracy. For example, in the area of political parties, the NED has funded specific political parties in certain countries. This produces that appearance of direct U.S. support of one party over others. The situation is even less clear when certain NED activities are funded directly and other are funded by A.I.D. This situation warrants further study to encourage clearer lines of communication with either greater coordination or greater separation between the programs.

- Activities of USIS. USIS leadership grants and programs for political parties also contributes to achievement of this Objectives.

- Activities of other Strategic Objectives. Strengthening political parties is directly related to activities in at least the Elections, Human Rights, Justice, and Military Strategic Objectives. Of particular importance is the role of the Policy Dialogue pursued by the Country Team in those Objectives.

CONCLUSION: Political parties are a crucial element in a democratic society. Yet seeking to strengthen political parties is always going to be fraught with difficulties, and it runs against many of A.I.D.'s institutional norms of avoiding politics. Presently there is very little being done in this area. Seeking to strengthen parties opens A.I.D. to the charge of direct intervention in political processes. A.I.D.'s direct involvement also opens those receiving assistance to the charge of foreign control. One approach for A.I.D. is determine that it will support only party systems and avoid support for particular parties. This would require making activities available to all parties equally.

While support for party systems may lessen the dangers, party activities are inherently subject to special and personal agendas. The relationship between NED and A.I.D. in this area is unclear and potentially difficult. There could also be the tendency to use party activities for short-term U.S. political purposes which may

undermine long-term support for a party systems. The difficult nature of the effort may encourage the use of commodity assistance programs. While this approach may do no damage, the impact may be limited to specific events and not strengthen the systems in the longer term sought by this objective.

In sum, program and project designers should strictly adhere to a guideline of supporting party systems, not specific parties when designing projects to address the Strategic Objective concerned with the formation of a dual or multi-party system.

Figure 9



1533-025/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 7: Improve the effectiveness and strengthen the institutional capacity of the country to administer free, fair and open elections.

BACKGROUND: Elections play a fundamental role in the right of citizens to participate in one's government. To fulfill this role, the elections must be "genuine", meaning that voters are free from coercion or pressure in exercising their right to vote. Elections provide for competition in a political system, as well as imposing both independence and accountability upon political office holders. Fair, free and open elections require a number of attributes. These include set rules of the game, credible candidates, active political parties, an open media, protection from violence and coercion.

Below are a set of indicators for electoral processes. By their design these are general indicators. In some instances an electoral process may warrant an in-depth examination to measure the overall fairness of the election. A more detailed set of indicators is available in "Analysis of Electoral Process" in Guidelines for International Election Observing, The International Human Rights Law Group, prepared by Larry Garber, Pages 52-56. A copy of this is included in the Annex 4.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO MEASURE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

7.1 Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the national and local level. EXAMPLE (Elections for president in October 1991 were held.)

The scheduling and holding of elections is evident on its face. Use of this indicator becomes less relevant as a country consolidates its democratic practices.

7.2 Percentage of the public believing that the elections were fair, open and free. EXAMPLE (92 percent of those surveyed after the election believed the elections were fair, open and free.)

The legitimacy of an election is largely determined by the perception of the population that the process was fair, open, and free. This can be measured by the "feet" of the voters in terms of registration and voting. Public opinion polling is useful as well.

7.3 Independent electoral tribunal, selected in a manner that either balances party representation or is non-partisan, with appropriate budget support, trained career staff, and logistical capabilities. EXAMPLE (Electoral tribunal is considered to be an impartial judge of elections by all

candidates for president. Budget of electoral commission for 1991 elections is $400,000.)

As a country holds repeated elections, each process becomes less a crisis and more routine. There is at the same time a possibility that as outside attention slips the fairness, openness and freedom of an electoral process could be subverted. This requires an institutionalized mechanism to maintain records, develop institutional memory and be the impartial umpires of the competition. Measurement of this would require an institutional analysis.

7.4 The existence of a functioning impartial system to investigate and adjudicate charges of fraud. EXAMPLE (All but one of the leaders of the political parties agreed that the adjudication process for charges of fraud were impartial and fair.)

Another component of an election process is an impartial system to resolve disputes in the election process. This type of mechanism is likely to most contentious and difficult during the early phases of the consolidation process. However, this function is vital to managing disputes and thus build the credibility of the process.

ACTIVITIES: In recent years, A.I.D. has sought to support the holding of fair, free and open elections in several countries of the region. These activities (see Objective Tree) can be generally summarized into the following activities:

- Policy Dialogue by Country Team: Support for fair, free and open elections can be directly impacted by the actions taken by the Country Team. In large part this may be nothing more than the attitude of respect for elections that is conveyed to the political and military leaders of the host country. It may also be the threat of diplomatic and economic sanctions if an electoral process is disrupted.

- Activities of the National Endowment For Democracy (NED): These activities, which include the efforts of the Democratic, Republican, Labor and Chamber of Commerce Institutes, have involved a number of efforts. Program Indicators would depend upon the activities undertaken.

- Activities in the Country of the Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL): This regional project, based in San Jose, Costa Rica, provides electoral technical assistance and training to the electoral commissions of countries of the LAC region. Program

indicators could include the number and type of technical assistance efforts and training programs conducted for each electoral commission.

- Activities in the Country of the National Democratic Institute's Regional Electoral Assistance Program: This regional project, based in Washington, D.C., provides technical assistance and international observers for the countries of the region. Program indicators could include the number of observer missions conducted.

- Direct Assistance to the Country Electoral Commission: This assistance can be in the form of Economic Support Funds, technical Assistance, training, institution building or commodity support. Program indicators could include the number of people trained, the amount of equipment delivered or the progress toward institutional strengthening.

- Activities in Other Strategic Objectives Such as those in Justice Improvement, Civilian Control of the Military and Human Rights: Successful elections are dependent upon activities in other areas.

CONCLUSION: Fair, free, and open elections are an essential element in a democratic system. Previous experience has demonstrated the benefits to be gained from supporting stronger electoral systems, as well as the dangers that are present with even the best intentioned of programs. Based upon these experience several guidelines warrant attention:

- A.I.D.'s effort need to focus upon strengthening the electoral process, not on assisting a particular candidate or party.

- The long-term credibility of A.I.D. activities is dependent upon their openness and transparency to prevent charges of A.I.D's involvement in clandestine efforts to produce a specific result.

- Where possible, the legitimacy of electoral support is enhanced through the involvement of institutions that are seen as outside the control of the U.S. government. More to the point, A.I.D. needs to focus on institution building and avoid crisis responses that cause excessive direct involvement.

- Finally, A.I.D. needs to analyze its relationships with the N.E.D. and its four institutes. A.I.D. should seek to preclude contradictions in the system strengthening purpose of the A.I.D. funded activities and prevent confusion with other purposes that these groups may pursue utilizing non-A.I.D. funds.

Figure 10



1533-036/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 8: Strengthen civic, professional, and community organizations as a means to increase citizen participation in democratic decision making in the country.

BACKGROUND: Civic, professional, and community organizations are important contributors to achieving the "highly inclusive" level of political participation necessary for an effective democracy. The consequence of these groups is enhanced by their ability to encourage the involvement of sectors of the society that might not otherwise be active in civic affairs. Since the organizational core of the civil, community, and professional groups is not always overtly political, these groups help provide stability to public discourse. At same time, civic, professional, and community groups have a stake in the outcomes of various policy debates which serves to activate their participation.

Another aspect of their contribution is the commonality of interests or neighborhood orientation that surrounds their formation and organization. Civic, professional, and community groups serve to promote civic education and the identification of leaders. These organizations empower their leadership to demand a place in the debate to assure that their interest is heard by appointed or elected officials. Without these groups, the voices or interests of a significant number of citizens might be lost or unheard. With sufficient organizational capability, some of these groups can provide independent analysis and criticism of economic, political, and social policies.

This participation, while important in shaping public opinion for an election campaign, is not necessarily limited by the election of one leader or one party. Civic, professional, and community groups can also serve a role in holding elected officials accountable and in the operation of the government. The interests they represent can provide a balance to the interests of a political party when it comes to patronage, policies, and expenditures.

In identifying indicators for this objective, most instances will require different measures for civic, professional, and community groups. While they can be grouped for this exercise, each type of group may be quite different in purpose, financial support, and interest served. There follows a set of general indicators for measuring increased participation in this sector.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

8.1 An increase in the number of different civic, professional and community organizations. EXAMPLE (The number of organizations increased 100% over the past two years.)

The number of organizations that are functioning in a society is one measure in this area. An increase in the number of those organizations would provide an important measure of a strengthening effort. Data on this indicator could be acquired by conducting a census of organizations to establish a baseline, with follow up monitoring providing data on change.

8.2 An increase in the membership of the civic, professional and community organizations. EXAMPLE (50% of the organizations surveyed reported a membership growth of over 15% during the previous year.)

The size of the membership that these groups have is another measure that can produce important data on the strength of these organizations. Increasing the size of the membership can help measure their strength. This information could also be collected during a census of organizations.

8.3 An expansion of the financial resources available to the civic, professional and community organizations. EXAMPLE (30% of the organizations surveyed reported at least a 5% growth in their budgets over the past year.)

Financial resources are essential to the operation of effective civic, professional and community organizations. The diverse nature of such groups will also be reflected in their finances. There is no set level that can be determined in advance as appropriate. However, an expansion is one more measure of stability and capability of these groups. This information could also be collected during an annual census of organizations.

8.4 An increase in the number of meetings held by civic, professional and community organizations. EXAMPLE (40% of the groups surveyed reported monthly meetings.)

The number of meetings held is another measure of the strength of such organizations. Certainly weak groups could have many meetings and remain weak, and strong groups could meeting infrequently and remain strong. Still, this indicator does produce some measure of strength in that it provides a level of activity that can increase or decrease over time. This data would also be produced during a census of organizations.

8.5 An increase in the number of policy institutes associated with civic, professional, or community groups. EXAMPLE (four new policy research "think tanks" organized during the previous year.)

The ability of civic, professional, and community organizations to analyze governmental policies, and propose alternative ideas can be aided by the

creation of small "think tanks." Clearly, the creation of such institutes would be dependent upon an amalgamation of smaller groups. However even a small number of "think tanks" can contribute to identification of issues and to public debate.

8.6 An increase in the institutional capabilities of the civic, professional and community organizations. EXAMPLE (25% of the groups surveyed reported producing a monthly newsletter, an increase of 5% from the previous period.

Institutional capabilities of many of these groups is likely to be quite limited. That may mean that small levels of inputs, such as training, may have a significant impact upon the communication, mobilization, and organizational strengths of such organizations. Measures for this indicator could include existence of an office, paid staff, or production of newsletters. This information would be collected in a census of organizations.

ACTIVITIES: A variety of activities (see Objective Tree) may contribute to this Strategic Objective. They include:

- Training and Technical Assistance: A.I.D. could provide training and technical assistance to civic, professional and community organizations. This assistance could be aimed at encouraging the creation of groups, increasing membership, increasing financial resources and increasing institutional capabilities.

- Grants of Start-Up Funding: A.I.D. could provide limited amounts of start-up or seed money to small grass root level groups.

- Establishment of National Associations of Civic, Professional, and Committee Organizations: National level associations could be created for the many different and specialized types of groups in the civic, professional and community area. These national organizations can be useful instruments for training and technical assistance delivery. They also can serve to magnify the voice of small groups at the national level.

- Establish Policy Institutes or "Think Tanks": A.I.D could provide small endowments for a limited number of policy research institutes. These think tank would be aimed at problem identification and policy development in a specific area.

- Activities in the Human Rights, Local Government and Labor Strategic Objectives. Activities in other Strategic Objectives also are relevant here.

CONCLUSION: Strengthening civic, professional and community organizations is one way to broaden participation in a society. The establishment of diverse organizations can give a stability to a democratic system and provide balance to the power of other more political organizations such a political parties. However, the mere establishment of such groups is going to intensify debate on public policy issues. It will also increase the number of demands for limited governmental resources. Finally, these groups will eventually find themselves at odds with the established power structures of the society. All this is likely to produce both more democracy and more conflict. This means that to be successful, a democracy requires a decision making process which is both legitimate and credible to these groups. Project managers should recognize that venturing into this area will eventually produce pressure on governmental entities, especially if the society has rigid and unresponsive governmental structures.

Figure 11



1533-039/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 9: Improve the effective exercise of internationally recognized human rights in the country.

BACKGROUND: Civil and political liberties, internationally recognized human rights, are essential to the effective operation of any democratic government. Limits on the right to speak openly, seek redress of grievances, petition the government, organize political action groups or parties, and seek or hold office impose limits on the legitimacy of a political system. Without these rights there can be no integrity of political competition or participation. A democracy requires a consensus that the relationship between majority rule and the protection of the minority is essential so that the winners and losers alike remain committed to the maintenance of the democratic system.

At the core of the effective exercise of political rights is a presumption that in a democratic system political groups use peaceful methods to gain their ends. This compels a democratic government to both control the governed and to protect the governed. The rule of law, or more specifically the enforcement of the law, is a rudimentary requisite of a democracy.

The dilemma in the DI area is that in many countries it is the governments themselves, or at least elements within those governments, which are the offenders of human rights. In other situations even if the government is not the offender, it is not the defender of the civil and political rights of majority or minority citizens. This has made the human rights area highly controversial. Yet, success in democracy requires protection of human rights and measurement indicators have a significant contribution to highlighting the situation.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO MEASURE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

9.1 Ratification of international human rights instruments. EXAMPLE (Acceptance of the jurisdiction of international courts, or accession to the Optional Protocol of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the charter of the United Nations.)

This indicator provides information on the general disposition of a country toward the recognition of international human rights. The international human rights instruments provide the legal and practical framework for identifying and protection human rights.

9.2 The establishment of an independent human rights commission. EXAMPLE (The government has provided $750,000 to the independent human rights ombudsman with legal power to investigate human rights violations.)

An institutional analysis of such an organization would include such indicators as the nature of appointments, terms, tenure, staff and budget support. Other elements warranting attention relate to operations in urban and rural areas, as well as legal powers such as the ability to subpoena witnesses and initiate investigations.

9.3 A government organized and funded human rights education program. EXAMPLE (Senior officials of the government begin campaign to generate public opposition to human rights abuses and announce a reward program for information from citizens on specific cases.)

Other indicators for assessing the viability of such program would include level of direct support from senior elected and appointed leaders, as well as the budget, staff and logistical support provided for efforts in rural and urban areas. Another indicators might be a program to provide rewards for information on specific cases.

9.4 The decrease in the number of abuses according to categories established by international human rights conventions:

- Torture. EXAMPLE (The number of reports of torture decreased from 130 last year to one this year.)

- Incommunicado detention. EXAMPLE (The number of persons know to be held in incommunicado detention is now zero.)

- Detention of persons solely for the non-violent expression of their political views. EXAMPLE (No person is held in prison for the expression of non-violent expression of opinions.)

- Prolonged detention without a trial. EXAMPLE (No person is held in for more than 5 days without the initiation of legal proceedings leading to a trial in 90 days.)

The monitoring and measurement of these indicators is aided by the programs currently being conducted by international human rights groups, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States. This type of information is also normally collected by the Human Rights Bureau of the Department of State for the Annual Human Rights Report.

9.5 The number of cases of human rights abuses -- politically motivated crimes -- brought before the justice system and the disposition of those cases. EXAMPLE (Five cases were initiated against individuals for politically motivated killings. Four of those cases led to convictions and prisons sentences.)

The monitoring and measurement of this indicators can be accomplished through information available in the court system. Collection will also be facilitated by a human rights commission, independent human rights groups, and the Human Rights Bureau of the Department of State.

9.6 The number of government officers punished for violent criminal acts. EXAMPLE (14 police officers and three military officers were dismissed in connection with human rights abuses. Of this group, 12 are currently standing trial for murder. Previously, six military officers were imprisoned for 10 years after conviction for torture.)

The collection of information to monitor this indicator is assisted by international human rights groups, and the Human Rights Bureau of the Department of State.

ACTIVITIES: These are a variety of activities that can contribute to this Strategic Objective. It is useful to note that progress or accomplishment in this area requires contributions from activities addressing other Strategic Objectives. For example, activities in the justice sector, or improvements in the control of the military by civilian elected officials can contribute directly to improvements in human rights.

- Policy Dialogue by the Country Team: The issues of human rights and efforts to address them must be the subject of dialogue between the highest levels of officials in the host country and the U.S. The sensitive nature of the subject requires close coordination between A.I.D and the Country Team.

- Technical Assistance Provided to the Country Human Rights Commission by the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission: A.I.D. regional project funding in human rights has focused upon strengthening regional human rights groups. Monitoring can be assisted by information generated by the regional project in terms of services and training provided. Other measurements can be achieved through interviews with recipients of the technical assistance.

- Direct Assistance to Country Human Rights Commission: The provision of direct A.I.D. assistance to human rights commission,

often in the form of commodity assistance programs, can contribute to this objective. Performance Indicators may include interviews with key decision makers or reports on the commodities provided. Specific activities that may be supported include the development of civics curriculum for primary and secondary schools, an adult human rights program, and a tracking system of human rights violations.

- Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP): ICITAP programs may have a direct impact upon this Strategic Objective. Program indicator information can be provided by ICITAP and by interviews with the recipients of the training.

- Activities in Other Strategic Objectives such as those in Justice Improvement and Civilian Control of the Military: To be successful, success in human rights requires the activities in other areas to be successful. Improvements in human rights cannot be accomplished in isolation.

CONCLUSION: Human rights activities and the indicators associated with them are by their nature sensitive and political. The mere monitoring of indicators communicates a political statement. Recognition of this is a prerequisite for activities and the indicators monitoring movement. There is no way to achieve this without being noticed. In fact, the purpose of the information generated by the indicators is to focus or fine tune efforts to accomplish the effective exercise of internationally recognized human rights in the country. In some instances, the point of a commodity program is send a political message of support for a human rights commission.

Previous A.I.D. approaches have reached the opposite conclusions. For example see A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 29, A.I.D.'s Experience With Democratic Initiatives: A Review of Regional Programs in Legal Institution Building. That paper suggests that one of the lessons identified for A.I.D. in the DI area is that "Human Rights activities require a low profile." It is difficult to reconcile a requirement that human rights activities be a "low profile" with a desire to encourage democracy. The same applies to the use of indicators of human rights. What makes the use of human rights indicators contentious -- that is high profile -- is what makes them useful.

Figure 12



1533-026/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 10: Strengthen free, democratically oriented trade unions in the country.

BACKGROUND: The support for free, democratically oriented trade unions has been a long standing component of A.I.D. assistance for strengthening democratic institutions in the Latin American and Caribbean region. At the core of this undertaking is A.I.D.'s support of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) which has amounted to $157 million in grant funds obligated since 1962.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO MEASURE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

10.1 Number of unions affiliated with democratic confederations. EXAMPLE (50 of the 75 unions are affiliated with democratic confederations.)

10.2 Number of dues paying members. EXAMPLE (1,003 of 2,050 union members are dues paying members of unions that belong to the confederation.)

10.3 Quality of collective bargaining agreement. EXAMPLE (Three of the four collective bargaining agreements currently in effect are reflect are a reasonable assessment of the market conditions.)

10.4 Increase the number of labor leaders. EXAMPLE (100 potential leaders identified and given leadership training.)

PROGRAM ACTIVITIES: Three Program Activities (see Objective Tree) have been identified that can contribute to achieving this Strategic Objective which are:

- Policy Dialogue by the Country Team: The Country Team has an important role in pursuing the accomplishment of this Strategic Objective, and the dialogue between the Chief of Mission and the political leadership in a country will necessarily focus on role of trade unions in the country and USG support to the trade union movement. An integral part of this activity is the reporting function of the Embassy regarding labor matters.

- Labor Leadership Training by USG: There are training activities sponsored USG components including USIS and A.I.D. that provide opportunities for leaders in the trade unionist movement to receive training that develops leadership and technical skills relevant to managing labor unions.

- AIFLD: The major program activity is that implemented by AIFLD that includes a number of training dimensions. This Program Activity is a regional project to be monitored by the DI Staff.

CONCLUSIONS: Historically, AIFLD has measured its success in achieving the Strategic Objective in terms of the number of unions that are affiliated with democratic confederations, the increase in numbers of trade union members of democratic oriented trade unions, and number of dues paying members of democratic oriented trade unions. These are all appropriate Performance Indicators, and their collection is manageable. To test the assumption that democratically oriented trade unions will operate in a fashion that is compatible with a free market economy, it is also necessary to measure progress in terms of the impact that labor unions are having in promoting and achieving quality collective bargaining agreements. To measure the qualitative dimension of collective bargaining agreements will require a special evaluative effort.

AIFLD will be the entity primarily concerned with executing projects concerned with pursing the objective of strengthening free and democratically oriented trade unions in a country. Most of AIFLD's activity designed to achieve this objective has been concerned with training in-country and in the United States both leadership and the rank and file in the trade union movement. The major outputs associated with the training activities are the trained participants. Performance Indicators that the training has been executed are verified reports prepared by AIFLD and reviewed by USAID.

Civic education is an important dimension of the AIFLD training program. The impact of the training is measured in terms of the orientation and actions of the unions whose membership receives the training. To measure the impact of civic education on the individual as well on the union, special qualitative studies will have to be undertaken. The findings in these studies can be compared with the qualitative analysis that should be discussed in the Country Labor Program prepared by the AIFLD Country Program Director. The quality and impact of the training also should be reflected in the reporting of the Labor Reporting Officer working in the Embassy.

If this system is to work, it is critical that the Country Team lead the exercise to describe the country labor situation from both a qualitative and quantitative standpoint in order to establish a baseline against which performance can be measured. The country situation should be documented in the Country Labor Program, a multi-year document, prepared by the resident AIFLD Country Program Director. Also contained in the County Labor Program would be the rationale that would tie the problem to the specific activities that AIFLD would propose to undertake.

Figure 13



1533-034/D4
(1/91)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 11: Strengthen the free media in the country (print and electronic)

BACKGROUND: The media constitute an important vehicle for the dissemination of information that is critical to the functioning of a democratic system. The media can also promote communication that enhances and enlivens political discourse and offers an outlet for the expression of conflict and political opinion. The media provide a forum for the review, discussion, and analysis of government decisions. The media is a source of pressure, often the only source, to promote and enforce government accountability. That information is essential to challenging official power is beyond question. Without open information the electorate is limited in its ability to make effective choices. Liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and cannot be limited without being lost.

Viable democracies depend on a free and professional press. Maintenance of the democratic political area is dependent upon those organizations to disseminate the news accurately, quickly, fairly, in depth and responsibly. For news organizations to meet these standards, they must have staffs that are properly trained and educated to be professional reporters, writers, editors and producers. They must also be economically independent and stable.

Because of the fragile nature of democracy in Latin America, the media have come to play an important role in the evolution of political life despite the challenges of widespread illiteracy and limited mass communications systems. Even with these obstacles, the media is an indispensable institution for popular mobilization, citizen education, and opposition to non-democratic practices.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO MEASURE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

11.1 Increased numbers of consumers of media products. EXAMPLE (Circulation of newspapers increases 15% and electronic media viewers and listeners increases 7%.)

This indicator will provide a measure of the usage of the media. Expansion of the numbers of citizens reached can be measured through survey techniques. Since newspapers, radio and television income is based upon advertizing revenues, the media outlets themselves produce regular estimates of the number of individuals reached. This information is readily available and should allow for an increasing reliable gauge of readers, listeners, and viewers.

11.2 Increased public confidence in media information. EXAMPLE (58% of those surveyed reported that news media were increasing willing to challenge established political, economic and military interests.)

This indicator serves to measure the reliability of the news media as a source of information. As the media becomes increasingly professional, public confidence should grow. This type of measurement can be accomplished through public opinion surveys. As media outlets are normally interested in the views and reactions of readers, listeners, and viewers, they often conduct this type of survey.

11.3 Increased journalistic, editorial, and managerial skills in the media. EXAMPLE (78% of opinion leaders surveyed believed that La Prensa has significantly improved in its reporting.)

Measurement of skill levels can be developed through opinion leaders surveys. Similar information can be collected through peer review mechanisms. Another source of information can be found through determining the number of journalists who have received professional training at local universities, American universities, or the Central American Journalism Center.

11.4 Increased autonomy of the media from government control. EXAMPLE (Passage of legislation that prohibits prior restraint or censorship by the government.)

Measurement of autonomy can be done through an analysis of the legal structures under which the media operate. Another measure can be accomplished through interviews with journalists, editors, and government officials to determine instances of censorship. Another measure of autonomy can be taken by the number and frequency of threats that journalists receive.

11.5 An increase in media investigative reporting. EXAMPLE (15 investigative series published compared to none the previous year.)

Measurement of investigative reporting can communicate the capacity of the media to increase the coverage of complex and difficult issues. It also communicates judgments about autonomy, skill, and resource allocation. Data can be collected on this by the number of investigative series and the number of investigative reporters. Content analysis of the reports can also be used to determine nature of the subjects covered.

11.6 Increased journalistic stature. EXAMPLE (Journalists salaries had increased 52% over the past three years.)

The ability of the media to perform its duty in a democracy is dependent to a significant degree on its professionalism. While stature or respect are

difficult to quantify, there are ways to broadly gauge the growth of such qualities. The survey of public opinion leaders would be one measure. Even more concrete and precise is the level of compensation provided to journalists. As journalistic stature grows, so too should the compensation provided to the individuals involved.

11.7 Increased profitability of media outlets. EXAMPLE (Due to increased revenues, profits were up an average of 8% per year for three of four newspapers, two of two television stations and five of six radio stations.)

It has been correctly observed that many elements of journalistic independence are dependent upon the level of support of journalist receive from owners of the media outlets. While certain owners may support expanded news coverage out of sense of civic responsibility, the bottom line of any journalistic enterprise is the ability to make a profit, that is to stay in business. Without a strong economic base, few media outlets can afford to challenge entrenched interests. Without the knowledge it will survive any negative reactions from the interests challenged, progress for journalists is likely to restricted. The collection of data on profitability will be accessible in those cases where ownership is broadly based among a number of investors. In privately held or family companies, such information may be more difficult to collect. Where profitability cannot be determined, revenues from advertising may be an appropriate substitute.

ACTIVITIES: Several activities (see Objective Tree) are currently being undertaken in an attempt to move forward with this Strategic Objective. They are:

- Policy Dialogue by Country Team: Support for journalistic freedom and professionalism can be directly impacted by the actions taken by the Country Team. In large part this may be nothing more than the attitude toward the media that is conveyed to the political and military leaders of the host country.

- Programs of the United States Information Service (USIS): In virtually all countries of the region, programs of the USIS focused upon the press. While these efforts may be directly keyed to furthering U.S. interests, there is a direct linkage to this Strategic Objective. In many instances this programs seek to share U.S. values through travel and education efforts. These can be measured through surveys of the participants.

- Assistance to the Journalists, Editors, Managers, and Owners of Media Outlets in the Country from the Florida International University Journalism Project: Funding for this activity is both A.I.D. regional and bilateral accounts. This effort involves the following components.

  - Establishment of a permanent and self sufficient Central American Journalism Training Center. Program Indicators of this include the implementation of an institutional development plan as well as its sources of non-A.I.D. funding.

  - Publication of Quarterly Central American Journalism Review. Program Indicators for this are the circulation and critical review of the publications.

  - Establishment of Research Library for Journalism. Program Indicators could be the holdings of the library and the number of users served.

  - Publication of a Directory of Central American Journalists. A Program Indicator would be the printing and updating of Directory.

  - Establishment of an association of Central American journalists and the association of media owners. A Program Indicator would be the functioning of the associations measured by number of meetings and resources generated.

  - Publication of 20 journalism textbooks. A Program Indicator is the numbers of books produced and sold.

  - Education of 30 Master's degree level journalists. (20 males and 10 females.) A Program Indicator is the enrollment and degrees granted.

  - Training of 2,200 journalists in 110 media training seminars and two annual roundtable meetings per country. (1760 males and 440 females.) Program Indicators would be numbers trained and evaluations by participants.

- Activities in Other Strategic Objectives such as those in Justice Improvement and Civilian Control of the Military: Success in strengthen the media requires the activities in other areas to be successful. Improvements in media cannot be accomplished in isolation.

CONCLUSION: Strengthening the media is an integral part of strengthening a democratic system. Its activities are directly related to the functioning of a political system and to the generation of public discussions. In many instances these discussions are going to focus on sensitive issues. At one level, activities monitored by these indicators can be separated from the direct involvement of the U.S. Government as is done with the Florida International University Central American Journalism Center Project. On the other hand, journalism activities, monitored by these indicators as well as the indicators for other Strategic Objectives such as those for human rights, often become directly involved in politics. This complication cannot be avoided. Furthermore, the impact of the regional journalism project needs to be measured in the target countries.

Figure 14



1533-028/D4
(1/91)