


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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND MOBILIZED VOTING

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## POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND MOBILIZED VOTING

One most intriguing aspect of political participation in South Korea is that of a consistently high rate of voter turnouts shown by the rural citizens. Despite the fact that the rural voters, as compared to their more sophisticated urban counterparts, are less well-educated, less informed of politics, and less affluent, they continue to be very active in voting participation. This is intriguing because it runs counter to the pattern that is observed in many other countries. Studies of voting behavior in the United States and other European countries have all shown that voter turnouts tend to be consistently higher in urban districts than in rural districts.<sup>1</sup> This difference has been explained in terms of the distinctive social and political characteristics of the urban voters. They are, it has been argued, generally better educated than their rural counterparts; they are better informed of political life; they have better access to mass media; and they occupy higher class positions. And all of these characteristics lead to a higher level of political consciousness among the urban voters and therefore, a higher rate of their political participation.

In South Korea, as it is elsewhere, the urban voters are also markedly better educated and they enjoy, on the average, a substantially better standard of living. Furthermore, in respect to the media exposure and the level of political knowledge, not only are the urban voters far more avid consumers of mass media but also are better informed citizens.

Knowing these facts alone, we might be tempted to predict that the urban population should participate more actively in voting than their rural counterparts. Contrary to this prediction, however, the urban voters in Korea show a significantly lower turnout rate than do the rural voters. Why is it that the better informed and politically more conscious urban population participate less regularly in voting than their more rustic brethren in the countryside? Does it suggest that such personal attributes as education, income, media exposure and political knowledge are negatively correlated with the rate of voting in Korea? One possible explanation may be that the rural citizens are vulnerable, to a greater extent than are the urban citizens, to the pressure of mobilization by individual politicians or government officials. In spite of the fact that the rural voters lack both political knowledge and sophistication, they vote regularly because they are "mobilized". The term "mobilized voters" has been used in several earlier studies to draw a distinction between those citizens who exercise their voting rights with some clear awareness of their own political preferences and others who engage in the act of voting without any political consciousness.<sup>2</sup> The mobilized voters are essentially "apolitical" voters in the sense that their act of voting is devoid of political meaning to themselves. They participate in voting merely because they are "pushed around", so to speak, to conform to the wishes of the head of their families, their villages, their clans, or government officials in their districts. Therefore, such participation cannot be considered as a politically conscious act aimed at influencing the

selection of political leaders or the actions of the government.

Persuasive as it may be, the thesis of mobilized voting has not yet been conclusively substantiated. Several studies have hinted at the possible existence of a large number of mobilized voters in rural Korea. Typically, these studies are based on the aggregate voting data which allow at best only a weak inference about the individual basis of voting decisions.<sup>3</sup> Without knowing something about how individual citizens decide to vote, it is not possible to ascertain if their act of voting merely reflects their blind conformity to the external pressures. And the aggregate data such as the election statistics tell us very little about the individual basis of voting decision. At any rate, the voting studies based upon the aggregate data have discovered that the rural voters, despite their lack of education, political interest and modern attitudes, continue to participate in voting at a rate markedly higher than that of the urban residents. In order to account for this anomaly the thesis of mobilized voting has often been invoked.

The phenomenon of mobilized voting, if it exists en masse, has profound theoretical implications for the prospect of democratic development in a country. In the language of systems theory political participation including voting is regarded as an input function that the political system converts into policy outputs. In this respect, voting participation constitutes an important part of demand-making behavior by individual citizens and the consequence of this is to make political leaders dependent upon their ability to effectively satisfy such demands for their continued tenure in office. For this very reason, elections and voting have been considered so central to the democratic

theories.<sup>4</sup> The mobilized voters are, by definition, the very antithesis of the politically conscious citizens. They do not see their voting right as an instrument to press for their demands, nor do they use it to articulate their political preferences. Thus, political leadership is less likely to heed the voice of the people when this phenomenon of mobilized voting is widespread. After all, leaders in this situation have very little to listen to. Although mobilized voting can undoubtedly contribute to a higher rate of voting turnout--this fact may account for the unusually high election turnouts in some of the developing countries today--, it does not however contribute to the creation of an accountable and responsive government, a key element of democratic politics. On the contrary, it may help create a political milieu in which an autocratic dictatorship can operate with little or no resistance at all. In the Korean society, how extensive is then the phenomenon of mobilized voting? What social attributes, if any, characterize the mobilized voters? In what social strata are they most heavily concentrated? And, what political implications follow if mobilized voting is widespread in a society? These and other questions are the main problems of investigation in this chapter.

The basic data that we will draw upon in this chapter came from a large cross-national survey project conducted by the Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa.<sup>5</sup> The Korean part of the project consists of interview surveys with the samples drawn from various political strata, including the members of the National Assembly and their constituents, higher civil servants, and local notables. The present chapter draws upon primarily the constituency

survey data, consisting of 2,276 interviews with adult citizens. The citizens were selected by means of a multi-stage stratified random sampling technique. Of the 73 existing electoral districts, twelve districts were chosen according to (1) the level of urbanization, (2) the degree of industrialization, (3) the level of electoral competition, (4) regional dispersion, and (5) the geographic proximity to the main transportation and communications centers.<sup>6</sup> Within each of the 12 districts the voting precincts were further stratified according to the types of settlement patterns. Finally, a random list of names was compiled from the voter registration records prepared by the local election office. Approximately two hundred voters were personally interviewed in each district. During the interview survey each citizen was asked about the extent to which he was involved in politics, the type of his involvement, and his other political orientations.

#### I. Modes of Citizen Participation

The act of voting represents only one of many specific modes of political activity. Individual citizens participate in politics in a variety of ways. Some citizens discuss politics quite regularly, often leading public opinions in their respective communities. Other citizens join political organizations and become active in them in order to promote their political views. Election campaigns which occur with a regular interval provide another opportunity for the citizens to participate. Although never a majority, some active citizens work for a candidate during his campaign. In addition to all of these activities, individual

citizens can seek their political objectives through their direct contacts with key politicians or public officials. They may communicate to the officials the problems that concern their interests and may also apply direct pressure to obtain favorable solutions. As a general rule, it is likely that the more demanding a mode of political activity, the lower the rate of the citizens' participation. The act of voting, unlike some other modes of activity, appears to be a relatively easy and less demanding form of political participation. Some other activities like the citizens' attempt to influence government officials seem to require a great deal of commitment and political sophistication. Therefore, the rate of citizen participation, may vary significantly from one mode of political activity to another.

Table 1 About Here

How do the citizens in Korea participate? And, how actively do they participate? It seems useful at the outset to highlight some salient aspects of political participation before we proceed to report the data on voting in its mobilized form. The survey data included thirteen questions, each designed to ascertain an individual's participation in a specific kind of political activity. The range of activities covered in the survey was necessarily limited to those kinds that are permitted under the law. Admittedly, our survey has therefore ignored an important part of political participation, namely the extra-constitutional activities directed against the regime itself. Nevertheless, insofar as the "normal" citizen participation is concerned, the thirteen questions do

TABLE 1

Dimensions of Political Participation  
(Percentages)

Dimensions	Factor Loadings (rotated)	Survey Items	%	
			(N=2276)	
Voting:	.651	Voted in the 1973 national election	84	} 87%
	.292	Voted in the 1971 national election	88	
	.341	Voted in the election for the National Conference for Unification	90	
Political Discussion:	.679	Discussed frequently the problems facing this nation	42	} 44.5%
	.440	Discussed frequently the problems facing this community	47	
Campaign Activity:	.656	Campaigned actively for a candidate	11	} 33%
	.427	Tried to convince others to vote for a certain candidate	35	
	.301	Attended campaign rallies regularly	53	
Associational Activity:	.839	Participated actively in political organizations	4	} 11.5%
	.826	Participated actively in social organizations	19	
Contacting Officials:	.631	Contacted officials for the local problems	12	} 7%
	.291	Contacted officials to discuss national problems	5	
	.282	Contacted legislators to discuss district problems	4	

provide an adequate basis of analysis. In an attempt to describe the general patterns of political participation we have performed a factor analysis with all 13 participation items.<sup>7</sup> The results have revealed several distinct dimensions of political participation. As shown in Table 1, certain items clustered together, suggesting that empirically they belong to the same kind of political activity. All in all, five factors were extracted, each representing a different dimension of political participation. The first factor showed high loadings with three items, all of which have something to do with whether a citizen has voted in elections. This factor may be interpreted as the dimension of voting participation. The second factor was strongly correlated with two participation items (.679 and .440), one with the frequency of discussion of the national problems and another with the frequency of discussion of the community problems. Both of these activities are clearly related to the act of political discussion and therefore, we may label this factor as the dimension of political discussion. The third factor was highly loaded on the three survey items, all pertaining to some specific aspects of campaign activities. These items were: whether an individual worked for a candidate, whether he tried to persuade other voters to vote for a certain candidate, and whether he attended campaign rallies regularly. It seems clear that this factor represents the dimension of campaign activity. The items relating to organizational participation showed high loadings with the fourth factor. Whether or not one participated actively in social and political organizations were such items. This factor may be called the dimension of associational activity. Finally,

the last and fifth factor has something to do with the citizens' act of contacting the government officials. Three items showed high loadings on this factor, each pertaining to whether a citizen has approached an official and sought some solutions to the local, district, or national problems. Much of these activities may in fact be considered as an attempt to influence governmental decisions on behalf of a social group or an individual. We may interpret this factor as the dimension of contacting officials.

Briefly, what the results of factor analysis show is that the citizens' participation in Korea consists of five distinct modes of political activity, that is, the extra-constitutional and subversive actions aside, the individual citizens normally engage in the following kinds of activity: (1) voting participation, (2) political discussion, (3) campaign activity, (4) associational activity, and (5) contacting officials to influence public decisions. These five modes of political activity correspond rather interestingly to the patterns of participation identified in several other countries. A study of political participation in Japan, India, Nigeria, Austria and the United States has convincingly demonstrated the existence of a comparable structure of citizen participation consisting of four distinct dimensions: voting, campaign activity, communal activity and personalized contacts.<sup>8</sup> Although our five modes of political activity identified in Korea do not exactly parallel those identified elsewhere, partly due to the differences in the survey items employed, the similarity is nevertheless striking. The structure of citizen participation in Korea seems therefore quite similar to those of

other countries.

As expected, the citizens engaged in different modes of activities with different rates. Almost everyone voted in the national elections of 1973 (84%) and 1971 (88%). The 1972 election for the first National Conference for Unification drew some 90 percent of the eligible voters. On the average, eighty-seven percent of the Korean electorate participated in voting, which in itself is an intriguing phenomenon, especially seen in the light of the much lower turnout rates reported in many other older and well-established western democracies.

Turning to another mode of activity, namely that of political discussion, the data show a substantially lower rate of citizen participation in it. To be precise, only 44.5 percent indicated that they had frequently discussed political issues. Campaign activity attracted yet far fewer citizens to it: one out of every three citizens (33%) has ever participated in one or another form of campaign activity. Moreover, only eleven percent have ever worked actively for a candidate during an election. Thus, the citizens engage in campaign activities less frequently than they do in voting or political discussion. Associational activities involved only a fraction of the adult citizens, 11.5 percent. If one focuses on the rate of participation in political organizations such as political parties, it becomes even smaller. A minuscule 4 percent of the adult population reported that they had ever engaged in this type of activity. It is interesting to note here that this 4 percent figure is even smaller than the size of the membership that the ruling Democratic Republican Party alone claims to be its following.

Very few citizens initiated any contact with an official or a representative to discuss the problems facing their localities, districts, or the nation as a whole. Although the citizens tended to contact officials more frequently over the immediate local problems (12%) than over other types of problems (4% and 5%), it still remains that less than an average of 7 percent of the adult population has ever engaged in this mode of activity.

The structure of citizen participation in Korea conveys an unmistakable impression of a hierarchy. Of the five modes of activity, voting participation is the least difficult one in which practically every citizen is involved.<sup>9</sup> The next easiest mode of activity, but a remote second at that, is the act of political discussion. Less than one-half of the adult population engaged in this mode of activity. Campaign activity, associational activity, and the act of contacting officials all seem to require a higher degree of commitment and political sophistication and therefore, only a very small number of citizens participate in them. The more demanding a mode of political activity, the lower the rate of citizen participation in it. The hierarchical structure of participation in Korea also reflects this general pattern.

Of all the modes of activity considered, voting participation stands out alone in several important respects. Not only did the Korean citizens participate in it at a rate far exceeding those of other modes of activity, but also the determinants of voting participation appear to be distinctively different from the determinants of other modes of political activity. While political activities like political discussion,

campaign activity, and contacting officials showed strong relationships with the level of an individual's political knowledge, his political interest and his sense of political efficacy (correlation coefficients ranged between .14 and .43), voting participation showed no significant relationships at all. Moreover, it showed negative relationships in some instances.<sup>10</sup> It is therefore clear that the Korean citizens participate in voting regardless of whether or not they are politically well-informed, whether or not they are deeply interested in political affairs, and whether or not they feel politically efficacious. In this respect, voting participation stands unique among all modes of political activity.

The fact that voting participation in Korea bears no significant relationships with various measures of political consciousness is strongly suggestive of the presence of a large number of mobilized voters. Why would so many citizens who lack both political sophistication and consciousness continue to vote so assiduously year after year? Part of the answer may very well lie in the thesis of mobilized voting. Despite the fact that many Korean citizens are not well-informed and at the same time sustain little interest in politics, they nevertheless go out regularly to cast their ballots. And they may do this in order to defer to the wishes of their families, village chiefs, clan heads, or police-chiefs of their districts. Without such proddings, sometimes backed by a threat of severe sanctions, they would not have participated in voting at all. The thesis of mobilized voting, if proven, will help us better understand the nature of voting participation in developing societies like Korea.

## II. Identifying The Mobilized Voters

Mobilized voting has been defined essentially as an apolitical participation in election. A mobilized voter casts his ballot merely in compliance to the external pressure exerted upon him by his family, his village elders, his clan head, or the local police chief. In no way does his act of voting reflect his conscious choice of a candidate, nor is it motivated by his commitment to a specific issue. Typical mobilized voters may not even recall the names of the candidates whom they have supported, for they had not considered the relative merits of the candidates seriously enough to form a clear memory of them. They were merely instructed to vote for a candidate and with their obligations fulfilled, they have quickly put the whole experience out of their mind. The mobilized voters do not see themselves as playing significant roles in politics. They feel that they do not have any say about what the government does. Nor do they feel that the government leaders care very much about what they themselves think. To the mobilized voters, politics is something which is too remote, too complicated, and too formidable to understand.

Operationally, we may then use the following three criteria to identify a mobilized voter:

- (1) His (or her) voting decision depends heavily and exclusively upon the advice (or pressure) of another person such as his family member, his village head, or a government official.
- (2) He (or she) does not know either name of the two representatives from his district.

- (3) He (or she) feels totally inefficacious regarding his role in politics.

These three criteria, in addition to the requirement of voting, seem self-evident and thus, require no further elaboration. Only suffice it to say that the first criterion alone, i.e., the dependence on someone's advice for voting decision, is an incomplete indicator of mobilized voting behavior. It is quite possible that a citizen may have decided to vote anyway, with or without such advices. In this instance, the external pressure originating from an official or other community leaders acts merely to reinforce a citizen's initial intention to vote. Such a citizen's behavior should not therefore be regarded as that of mobilized voting. It is for this reason that we have added two additional criteria. Those who meet simultaneously all of these three criteria, are not likely to vote at all unless they are strongly urged to do so by somebody whom they either respect or fear. Obviously, this is a fairly stringent definition of mobilized voting, because it will define out many cases which fail to simultaneously satisfy all three criteria. Consequently, our measure may underestimate the extent of mobilized voting in Korea.

#### Table 2 About Here

In Table 2 are arrayed the data relevant to the defining characteristics of mobilized voting. Of the 2,276 adult citizens whom we interviewed, 84 percent indicated that they had participated in the 1973 election. Among those who had voted in the election, approximately 57 percent reported that

Table 2  
Defining Characteristics of Mobilized Voting  
(Percentages)

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Characteristics	%	(N)
<hr/>		
Voted in the 1973 National Election:		
yes, voted	84.0	1912
no, did not vote	16.0	364
Relied upon someone's advice in making up mind to vote:		
yes	56.6	1083
no	43.4	829
Knew one of the two representatives from own district:		
yes, knew	69.6	1591
no, did not know	30.1	685
Sense of political efficacy: <sup>1)</sup>		
somewhat or highly efficacious	63.8	1453
totally inefficacious	36.2	823
<hr/>		
Mobilized voting:		
mobilized voters	8.6	164
non-mobilized voters	91.4	1748

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1) Three efficacy items were employed to divide the sample. For a detailed description of this procedure, see footnote 12.

in making up their mind as to how to vote they had relied on someone's advice. Some thirty percent could not name any one of the two representatives that their own district sent to the National Assembly. Under the Yushin (or Revitalizing Reforms) Constitution a new electoral system of a medium-sized multi-member district has been created, a departure from the past practice of a single-member district. Each district now sends two legislators to the legislature. One-third of our sample, although they participated in the election, did not know any name of the two legislators representing their own districts. To measure the sense of political efficacy, three standard items developed by the SRC were used with a slight modification.<sup>11</sup> Since we wish to isolate those citizens who exhibit no conception of any assertive self-role in politics, the sample was divided into two groups, one group who manifest some such conceptions and another group totally lacking such a conception.<sup>12</sup> Some thirty-six percent of the citizens, as shown in Table 2, attributed no significance at all to their own political roles. They felt politically inefficacious.

Among all those citizens who cast their ballots in the 1973 election, nearly 9 percent could be considered as having engaged in mobilized voting. These voters have simultaneously met all three criteria that we have stipulated for mobilized voting. As some scholars have previously guessed from the aggregate election statistics, it is indeed true that a sizable number of Korean citizens engage in mobilized voting.<sup>13</sup> Knowing very little about politics and the stakes involved in the election, these voters nevertheless went out to cast their ballots,

either out of their respect for or fear of the local influentials and the government officials.

### III. Social Locations and Mobilized Voting

What sort of citizens are vulnerable to mobilized voting? Which social strata contribute more to mobilized voting? Has mobilized voting penetrated different geographical regions to a different extent? In this section the social locations of mobilized voters are examined.

#### (1) Geographic Distribution of Mobilized Voting

In the South Korean political system, the center-periphery problems, a common characteristic of many developing systems of Asia and Africa today, are not a salient dimension of any major importance. Not only does Korea have a relatively compact territory but also a relatively long history of a common homogeneous culture. Consequently, homogeneity rather than diversity characterizes the Korean culture. However, it does not mean that there exists no cultural differences at all from one region to another. There are still many subtle but important regional differences. The Kangwon province, a mountainous eastern region, may very well be the least modernized area in the country.<sup>15</sup> Both south and north Cholla provinces, a rich rice-producing plain region in the southwest, have probably achieved a relatively high level of modernization. Certainly no lower than the level of modernization in the southwestern region of Cholla would be that of the two Kyungsang provinces, a southern region. This is the region from where a majority of the key political

leaders including the President Park himself, came. Moreover, the Park regime has allegedly channeled over the years a disproportionate amount of the government resources into the region to implement a series of major industrialization programs. Although not all have benefited equally and directly from the fruits of such industrialization, there is no denying that the region as a whole has gained from the concentrated government efforts to modernize it. The central region of Kyunggi, and south and north Choongchung provinces, seem to have lagged somewhat behind both the southern and southwestern regions, although physically it is the closest to the nation's capital. The differences in the level of modernization are likely to affect the political cultures of various regions, an aspect of which, to say the least, is the vulnerability to mobilized voting among the adult population.

Table 3 About Here

The rate of mobilized voting varies considerably from region to region. The data in Table 3 show that the rate of mobilized voting in a certain region is five or six times higher than that of some other regions. In order to compare the regions three large urban centers included in our survey were first taken out of consideration. These urban centers, Seoul, Pusan and Kwangju, are closer to each other in terms of the level of modernization than to the regions in which they are located. Moreover, the two cities of Seoul and Pusan, each with a population well over two million, are administratively designated as the special cities, a status even higher than that of the provincial

Table 3

Mobilized Voting and Regions  
(Percentages)

	Mobilized voters	Other voters	Total (N=1911)
<u>Urban Centers</u>			
Seoul (special city)	3.6	96.4	(137)
Pusan (special city)	4.7	95.3	(169)
Kwangju City	2.3	97.7	(172)
<u>Regions</u>			
Kyunggi-do	17.7	82.3	(186)
Kyungsang-do	11.8	88.2	(478)
Cholla-do	2.6	97.4	(303)
Choongchung-do	8.3	91.7	(323)
Kangwon-do	18.2	81.8	(143)

Note: The regions include the following election districts.

Kyunggi-do: Pyungtaek, Yongin, Ahnsung

Kyungsang-do: Ahndong-si, Ahndong, Euisung, Dalsung, Koryung, Kyungsan, Chinju-si, Jinyang, Sachun, Samchunpo-si

Cholla-do: Mokpo-si, Muahn, Sinan, Imsil, Namwon, Soonchang

Choongchung-do: Choongju-si, Joongwon, Danyang, Jecheon, Kongju-si, Nonsan

Kangwon-do: Kangnung-si, Samchuck, Myungju

governments. The city of Kwangju, although it has not yet gained the coveted status of a special city, is the largest population center (pop. 800,000) in the southwestern region with all its urban attributes. It seemed therefore only appropriate to compute the rates of mobilized voting for these three urban centers separately from that of each region.

One important observation that emerges from the data is that the phenomenon of mobilized voting is significantly less extensive in large urban centers than it is elsewhere. In Seoul, Pusan and Kwangju, mobilized voting accounted for less than 4 percent of the voting public, ranging from a low of 2 percent to a high of 5 percent. Contrasting these figures with the rates of mobilized voting in the provinces, some striking differences were observed. With a single exception of the Cholla region, all six provinces showed substantially higher rates of mobilized voting (between 8% and 18%), than did the three urban centers. Our conclusion should then be clear: more extensive is the tendency toward mobilized voting in small cities, towns and villages scattered throughout the provinces than in the most urbanized metropolitan centers.

There are also visible regional variations. The voters in Cholla provinces were the least susceptible to mobilized voting. Barely three percent could be classified as the mobilized voters here. The next lowest rate of mobilized voting was reported in Choongchung provinces (8%), followed by Kyungsang (12%) and Kyunggi (18%) in that order. The highest rate of mobilized voting (18.2%) was indicated by

the voters in Kangwon region. These variations follow more or less the level of modernization that each region has attained: the more modernized a region, the lower the rate of mobilized voting.

The extraordinary case of Cholla provinces, which showed the lowest rate of mobilized voting, comparing even favorably with those of the most urbanized areas, merits further comments. The lower rate of mobilized voting in this southwestern region may be related to the two factors that characterize the political history of that area. First of all, Cholla region is one of the most highly politicized areas in Korea. The incidence of political demonstrations, revolts, protest rallies and other kinds of political activism has been far more frequent in this region than elsewhere, possibly with the exception of the Kyungsang provinces. All of these incidents could have worked together to politicize the Cholla population over the years, raising the general level of their political consciousness. In fact, our survey data have also revealed some evidence to support this argument. As compared to the voters in other provinces, the Cholla voters ranked markedly higher on various indices of political knowledge and involvement.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, they are less likely to engage in mobilized voting.

Secondly, in all past elections the government parties have fared rather dismally in the Cholla region. Apart from the fact that the region has allegedly been discriminated by the Park regime in terms of the allocation of the key government posts and resources, Cholla provinces have long been known for their strong pro-opposition sentiments, dating farther back than the present Park regime itself. Mobilized voting,

as we shall discuss later in some detail, is primarily a phenomenon closely associated with the pro-government voters. This tradition of strong pro-opposition sentiments, coupled with a relatively high level of political consciousness of the population, may account for the low rate of mobilized voting in the Cholla region.

## (2) Social Characteristics of Mobilized Voting

Traditionally, the social status of women has been insignificant in Korea. Influenced by the Confucian precepts of a rigid and hierarchical system of social relationships, women were allowed to play only a limited role in social and political affairs. Although the tide of modernization in recent years has improved their social status, much of the past inequality still remains in many aspects of women's social life. On the average, women are considerably less well-educated than men; they are less well-informed of politics; and they are less active in public affairs. Moreover, women are less modern in their beliefs and attitudes than men.<sup>17</sup> All of these differences may subject women more vulnerable to the pressures of mobilized voting.

Mobilized voting is likely to be disproportionately distributed over different age groups. It may be expected that the younger the individual citizens, the less the tendency toward mobilized voting. This expectation is based upon the simple observations that the younger citizens are generally better educated than the older generations and also tend to assume more assertive roles in politics. The type of one's residence may be another characteristic associated with mobilized voting. The voters of the countryside, more than their counterparts in urban areas,

should manifest a higher rate of mobilized voting. Similar relationships may be postulated regarding an individual's occupational and class status. The higher the prestige of one's occupation and his class status, the lower the likelihood that he would succumb to the pressures of mobilized voting.

Table 4 About Here

The evidence from our survey data is unambiguous. The six hypotheses suggested above have all been borne out in Table 4. The male-female difference was certainly more than striking. The rate of mobilized voting for women was as much as four times greater than that for men. The younger, the better educated, and the individuals occupying the prestigious jobs and the higher class positions engaged in mobilized voting far less frequently than the other voters with the opposite social characteristics. In the Korean society today, therefore, mobilized voting seems to be heavily concentrated in certain social strata, especially that segment of the society where the full impact of modernization has not yet penetrated. By the same token, certain geographic regions such as the Kangwon province still remain to be a fertile ground for mobilized voting, due to its social and economic backwardness.

IV. Mobilized Voting and Modernization

The act of mobilized voting appears to be a characteristic distinctive to the traditionally-oriented citizens. These citizens, as compared to

Table 4

Social Locations and Mobilized Voting  
(Percentages)

Demographic & social attributes	Mobilized voters	Other voters	Total (N)	$\chi^2$
<b>Sex:</b>				
Male	3.5	96.5	(1025)	75.03*
Female	14.9	85.1	(850)	
<b>Age:</b>				
20-39	7.8	92.2	(412)	32.07*
30-39	5.3	94.7	(544)	
40-49	9.1	90.9	(428)	
50-59	11.6	88.4	(303)	
60-69	11.1	88.9	(162)	
70 over	23.9	76.1	(46)	
<b>Types of residence:</b>				
Cities	6.2	93.8	(691)	16.26*
Towns (up)	10.3	89.7	(234)	
County seats (myon)	11.9	88.1	(597)	
Villages	6.3	93.7	(319)	
<b>Educational attainment:</b>				
No schooling	17.7	82.3	(480)	83.44*
1 - 6 years of schooling	8.2	91.8	(636)	
7 - 9 years of schooling	6.1	93.9	(261)	
10 - 12 years of schooling	2.8	97.2	(325)	
13 years or more schooling	0.9	99.1	(210)	
<b>Occupation:</b>				
Higher officials, owners of large business, professionals	0.0	100.0	(9)	39.67*
Middle level bureaucrats, managers of business	3.1	96.9	(32)	
Administrative personnel, higher white collar workers	4.5	95.5	(440)	
Skilled workers, small shopkeeper	5.4	94.6	(221)	
Semi-skilled workers	3.4	96.6	(58)	
Laborers, farmers	8.7	91.3	(358)	
Migrant workers	8.9	91.1	(45)	
Unemployed	15.3	84.7	(144)	
Housewife	14.0	86.0	(435)	
<b>Class status:</b>				
Upper class	3.7	96.3	(136)	21.15*
Middle class	6.1	93.9	(786)	
Working class	11.0	89.0	(730)	
Lower class	13.6	86.4	(177)	

\* Significant at the level of .001.

their more modern counterparts, tend to have a limited knowledge of politics and manifest little interest in political involvement. Moreover, they tend to have highly submissive attitudes toward the political authorities. These characteristics in turn make them especially vulnerable to mobilized voting.

Although we have found earlier that mobilized voting is heavily concentrated in certain social strata defined by low education, rural residence, low prestige occupations and so forth, these characteristics may not in themselves be the factors directly affecting mobilized voting. What really causes mobilized voting may be the degree to which an individual's attitudes and beliefs are modern, which we shall call hereafter "the level of individual modernity." The reason why these social characteristics show strong positive correlations with mobilized voting may be simply that they are all at the same time correlated with the level of individual modernity. If it is indeed the level of individual modernity, not the social characteristics like sex, age, urban-rural residence and education, that directly affects the tendency toward mobilized voting, the strong correlations initially obtained between mobilized voting and the social characteristics should diminish substantially when the effects of modernity are controlled for. As it shall be made clear, the analysis of the data confirms this.

In order to measure the level of individual modernity we have relied on a modified form of the OM-12 scale.<sup>18</sup> The scale, which consists of 12 items, was originally developed by Smith and Inkeles and successfully used in their study of six developing societies. Essentially,

it is designed to measure the extent to which the individuals possess a set of values, beliefs and behavior patterns appropriate for life in modern society. Each item of the scale measures an individual's attitude toward religion, mass media, social change, education, family planning, rationality or parochialism.<sup>19</sup> The scale scores range from a low of 1 to a high of 13.

Table 5 About Here

As expected, the initial relationships (Gammmas) between mobilized voting and the social characteristics are consistently strong (see Table 5), ranging between .22 and .63. Moreover, the relationship between mobilized voting and individual modernity is also strong, in fact the strongest of them all (.70). However, when we recalculate these relationships controlling for the effects of individual modernity, the social characteristics show very little relationships to mobilized voting. What emerges in the analysis is simply this: first, the level of individual modernity is the key variable affecting the tendency toward mobilized voting and second, the social characteristics including the urban-rural residence, education, sex and age, do not affect mobilized voting in any direct sense except that their influence on it, if any, is mediated through individual modernity.<sup>20</sup>

Now it becomes clear that the problem of mobilized voting is essentially that of modernization. As more citizens acquire modern attitudes and behavior patterns, a corresponding decline in the tendency for mobilized voting would occur. Mobilized voting is both a blessing

Table 5

Relationships Between Mobilized Voting, Social  
Characteristics, and Individual Modernity  
(Gammmas)

Characteristics <sup>1)</sup>	Modernity level <u>not controlled</u> (N)	Modernity level <sup>2)</sup> controlled
Sex	.63(1895)	.14
Age	.30(1875)	.18
Urban-rural residence	.22(1841)	.11
Education	.61(1912)	.35
Occupation prestige ranking	.45(1742)	.21
Class status	.48(1829)	.08
Modernity score	.70(1912)	---

- Note: 1) To generate tabulations on which the Gammmas are based the variables are coded as follows: Sex, female=1, male=2. Age, 70 or over=1, 60-69=2, 50-59=3, 40-49=4, 30-39=5, 20-29=6. Urban-rural residence, village county seat, town=1, city and special city=2. Education, no formal education=1, primary school=2, middle and high school=3, college and above=4. Occupation prestige, unskilled and semi-skilled work=1, white collar work=2, professional and business owner=3. Class status, working and lower class=1, middle class=2, upper class=3. Individual modernity, traditional (scores 1-7)=1, modern (scores 8-13)=2.
- 2) These figures are the averages of the Gammmas derived from tabulations controlling for the effects of the level of individual modernity.

and a plague. It is a blessing to those in power because it allows them to manipulate the election outcomes in such a way that they can always attain the electoral support of the majority. On the other hand, it is a plague to those who have an ardent aspiration for the realization of a democratic polity. Mobilized voting frustrates this aspiration, because it diminishes the chance for the people to change the government in power through a legitimate channel of electoral process.

#### V. Political Orientations Of the Mobilized Voters

The mobilized voters tend to manifest a low level of political consciousness. Were it not for the combined effect of their ignorance, apathy and fear of reprisals, they would not have participated in voting at all. The act of voting is just about the only political involvement in which they engage, and even that they do without a clear conception of what its political consequence might be. Therefore, the mobilized voters, as compared to their more assertive counterparts, should exhibit, if any, a very rudimentary sort of political orientations.

At least in two important respects, the mobilized voters may differ in their political orientations from the rest of the voting public. Because mobilized voting grows in part out of the submissive attitudes toward the sources of power, social and political, and furthermore, there is hardly any other institutions more powerful than the government itself, the party and the politicians associated closely with the incumbent regime are the usual beneficiaries of mobilized votes. To make the same point

in a little different way, it is true in theory at least that both the government and opposition parties could equally well make use of the potentials of mobilized voting. After all, a political party, whether of the government or the opposition, symbolizes both power and authority in the minds of the most submissive citizens. However, the government party has in practice overwhelming advantages over the opposition parties. In an authoritarian political system such as Korea, the huge and powerful government machinery is often placed at the service of the government party during the election period. This might include not only hundreds of thousands of the government employees actively campaigning for the government party but also various branches of the security forces that can directly apply physical threat if other methods of persuasion fail. All of these put the government party in an enormously advantageous position, and therefore the mobilized voters would invariably gravitate toward the government ticket. One distinctive aspect of the political orientations among the mobilized voters is then their support for the regime in power.

The second aspect of the political orientations that may set the mobilized voters apart from the other voting public is the degree to which they are committed to democratic values. It has been indicated that the mobilized voters come primarily from the traditional segment of the population whose attitudes toward authority are uncritically submissive. These traditional citizens know little about democracy and of course, do not have the sophistication to tell the differences between different forms of government. If they have any conception of politics at all, it

would be that of an authoritarian political order and therefore, they would manifest very little commitment to the key democratic values. Thus, it is not hard to imagine that this segment of the population would represent the least democratic social stratum in attitudes.

Indeed, our survey data substantiate both of these observations. The evidence presented in Table 6 makes it quite clear that the mobilized voters favored the ruling government party much more than did the other voting public. In theory, the confirmation of this observation should have been much simpler if we could ask a direct question in the survey whether they had voted for the government or the opposition party. However, we chose not to ask such a direct question because we thought it a highly sensitive question to ask under the circumstances, politically sensitive enough to jeopardize the survey project itself. And, even if we took the risk of doing this there was no assurance that the voters would have given us an honest answer. For this reason, we decided instead to include a battery of questions that ask indirectly about the voters' support for the opposition parties.

Table 6 About Here

One of the questions asked was: "As you may know, by opposition parties one means parties which are not members of the Government. Is there any point in having opposition parties?" While sixty-eight percent of the non-mobilized voters replied that the opposition parties are necessary, only 39 percent of the mobilized voters did the same. Another question was: "Do you agree or disagree that opposition parties protect

Table 6

Support for Opposition Parties  
(Percentages)

Questions	Mobilized voters	Other voters	<sup>2</sup> x
As you may know, by opposition parties one means parties which are not members of the Government. Is there any point in having opposition parties?			
Yes, necessary	39.3	71.9	79.05*
No	12.0	9.1	
Don't know	48.7	19.0	
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
(N)	(150)	(1705)	
Do you agree or disagree that opposition parties prevent the monopoly of power?			
Agree	42.4	67.8	72.09*
Disagree	12.0	16.8	
Don't know	45.6	15.5	
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
(N)	(125)	(1527)	
Do you agree or disagree that opposition parties divide the country?			
Agree	21.0	25.3	81.88*
Disagree	29.8	58.2	
Don't know	49.2	16.5	
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
(N)	(124)	(1515)	
Do you agree or disagree that opposition parties protect the rights of minority and of ordinary citizens like yourself?			
Agree	31.7	61.8	91.16*
Disagree	14.6	20.5	
Don't know	53.7	17.7	
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
(N)	(123)	(1497)	
Do you agree or disagree that opposition parties unfairly criticize the Government?			
Agree	18.3	25.0	61.12*
Disagree	35.7	57.7	
Don't know	46.0	17.3	
Total	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	
(N)	(126)	(1500)	

\* Significant at the level of .001.

the rights of minority and of the ordinary citizens like yourself?" Again, a significantly smaller proportion of the mobilized voters agreed with the statement (32% vs. 62%), suggesting that they were far less supportive of the opposition parties than were the other voting public. A similar pattern was observed when the responses to other questions were examined (see Table 7). Consistently, the mobilized voters showed a markedly lower support for the opposition parties than the more politically conscious citizens. A strong pro-government sentiment is therefore a distinctive aspect of the political orientations among those who engage in mobilized voting.

Another aspect of the data deserves a brief comment. Nearly one-half of the mobilized voters gave "don't know" to the five questions. Although this represents an astoundingly high rate of "don't know," it is nevertheless something one might expect from the mobilized voters. Not only were these voters poorly informed about politics but many of them were unable to distinguish between the key government institutions like the legislature and the executive branch, let alone the division between the government and opposition parties.<sup>21</sup> Probably, the kind of questions we asked were beyond the comprehension of many of these voters. Despite their inability to tell the differences between the government and opposition parties, they nevertheless participated in voting. The question is then: Which party did they support in the election? Given the overpowering stature of the government officials including police and their formal and informal influences exerted through various channels such as clan networks, youth organizations and veterans'

associations, there is every reason to believe that these poorly informed voters support almost habitually the government party and its candidates. Also, reflected rather clearly in the data is the fact that the mobilized voters have only a very rudimentary kind of political orientations. Many of them, as indicated by the high frequencies of "don't know", showed no substantive attitudes toward politics.

Is there any evidence to say that the mobilized voters are less committed to key democratic values than the rest of the other voting public? As the data reported in Table 7 shows, our answer to the question should be affirmative. The survey included three questions, each designed to measure a different aspect of the democratic attitudes. The principles of majority rule, minority rights, and accountable leadership were taken as the core elements of a democratic regime.<sup>22</sup> The questions were then formulated to determine the degree to which the citizens were committed to each of these principles. Across all three questions, those engaged in mobilized voting manifested a consistently lower commitment to the democratic principles than that of the other voting public. For example, when asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "Society is better run by a few enlightened and experienced leaders rather than by the will of the masses," a preponderant 81 percent of the mobilized voters agreed with it. This indicates that very few of them believed in the principle of an accountable leadership. The same was true with the other two democratic principles. Almost two-thirds of the mobilized voters, as opposed to only one-half of the non-mobilized voters, disapproved the principle of minority rights. In

fact, they all agreed to the statement: "People should not be allowed to speak publicly that which is contradictory to the opinion of the majority." Obviously, the idea of political democracy embraces much more than what our three questions could possibly capture. However, the analysis of our data, limited as it may be, brings out a clear tendency that the mobilized voters are less strongly committed to the democratic values. Even if we had included other facets of the democratic attitudes in the analysis, it is hard to believe that the results would have been any different.

Table 7 About Here

To conclude this part of the analysis, there is enough evidence to say something unequivocally about the political orientations of the mobilized voters. First of all, they have very little in the way of substantive attitude toward various aspect of political life. Secondly, if they do have any such attitude at all, it has two conspicuous aspects. One is their strong pro-government sentiments, and the other their attachment to the kind of values incongruent with the democratic principles. Political consequences of mobilized voting cannot be fully understood without considering these two aspects of their political orientations.

Table 7

Democratic Attitudes and Mobilized Voting  
(Percentages)

Questions		Mobilized voters	Other voters	$\chi^2$
People should not be allowed to speak publicly that which is contradictory to the opinion of the majority.	Agree	63.4	49.8	7.18*
	Disagree	<u>36.6</u>	<u>50.2</u>	
	Total (N)	100% (112)	100% (1522)	
When most of the people want to do something, the rest should not criticize.	Agree	82.0	70.9	5.75*
	Disagree	<u>18.0</u>	<u>29.1</u>	
	Total (N)	100% (111)	100% (1531)	
Society is better run by a few enlightened and experienced leaders rather than by the will of the masses.	Agree	80.9	64.0	12.71**
	Disagree	<u>19.1</u>	<u>36.0</u>	
	Total (N)	100% (115)	100% (1555)	

\* Significant at the level of .01.

\*\* Significant at the level of .001.

## VI. Conclusion: Consequences Of Mobilized Voting

The phenomenon of mobilized voting is quite widespread in Korea. Nearly one out of every ten voting citizens was what we call a "mobilized voter." This may even be an underestimation, given the stringent definition that was employed in this study to isolate the mobilized voters. In fact, mobilized voting could be much more extensive than what our figure has indicated.

Mobilized voting, as we have seen, is unevenly distributed over different social strata and different geographic regions. It was most heavily concentrated in the Kangwon province, one of the most backward regions socially and economically. Moreover, the rates of mobilized voting followed rather closely the level of modernization that each region has attained. The large urban centers like Seoul, Pusan and Kwangju showed substantially lower rates of mobilized voting than did the more rural voting districts.

As compared to the rest of the voting public, the mobilized voters shared certain distinct social characteristics among themselves. These include: old age, being a female, low education, rural residence, low status occupation, and low class status. The rate of mobilized voting among women was as much as four times greater than that of men. Also, it was significantly greater among the older voters than among the younger ones. Similarly, the higher the level of education, occupational status, or class position, the lower the rate of mobilized voting. Far greater proportions of the rural residents than their urban counterparts succumbed to the pressures of mobilized voting, too.

More importantly, the mobilized voters were essentially the traditionally-oriented citizens. They were the least modern in their beliefs and attitudes, as measured by our scale of individual modernity. Although other social characteristics such as age, sex, education, urban-rural residence were closely related to the tendency toward mobilized voting, the root cause was the level of individual modernity. Therefore, the social characteristics may be best considered as the factors affecting the level of individual modernity, and in turn, the level of individual modernity as the direct cause of mobilized voting. The phenomenon of mobilized voting therefore feeds itself upon the most traditional segments of the society.

The mobilized voters manifested political orientations of a very rudimentary sort. Neither did they know very much about politics around them nor had they any substantive views on important aspects of political life. When they did express some views however, there were two marked aspects in their political orientations. The first was their strong pro-government sentiment. Of course, this is what one might have easily expected from the most traditional citizens who tend to submit habitually to anyone in power. No other institutions rival the power and authority of the government, especially in an excessively centralized society like Korea. Therefore, the majority of the mobilized voters are very likely to gravitate toward the regime and the politicians associated with it. The second important aspect of their political orientations was their antipathy to key democratic values. As compared to the other voting publics, the mobilized voters showed considerably

weaker commitments to various democratic principles. They did not support the democratic principle of an accountable leadership nor the principle of minority rights. Both of these tendencies, their pro-government sentiment and their antipathy to the democratic values, were the most salient aspects of their political orientations.

The phenomenon of mobilized voting, if it exists in a rampant condition, has many important implications, both theoretical and practical. First of all, it provides an important margin of electoral safety for any regime in power. With ten or twenty percent of the electoral votes securely in the hands of the government party and its politicians, the success of the regime in elections is almost always assured in advance, because all that the regime in power needs to do is to win just enough votes from the more politically conscious citizens, which may not be very much when the mobilized votes already in the firm control of the regime is added to it. Mobilized voting is certainly a blessing for any regime which strives to perpetuate its power. Furthermore, it provides an important basis of the legitimacy for the regime. Is it not supported after all by the majority of the citizens? What better legitimacy is there than a clear electoral mandate given to it? Surely, no regimes in power would admit that they have won their rights to rule, largely because of the support that they extracted out of the traditional and therefore, submissive segments of the society. The greater the scope of mobilized voting, the smaller the opportunity to effect a change in the government through electoral means. Regimes that are determined to stay in power will successfully do so as long as

there are enough potential recruits for mobilized voting.

Where mobilized voting is quite widespread, not only is it difficult to bring a change in the government through an election but also the government itself is unlikely to be both responsible and responsive to the citizens that it governs. This is because the leaders of the government, secure in their positions, electorally so to speak, need not be concerned with what the citizens would do in the coming election. Free from possible demise in elections, those politicians in power have little incentive to act responsibly. On the other hand, those who engage in mobilized voting support the government ticket at the poll, not because they have any clear notion as to what policy actions the government should pursue but because they merely wish to comply with the instruction of someone whom they respect or fear. Therefore, politicians installed in power by the support of mobilized voters do not have to face articulate and insistent demands, the kind usually reserved for the more assertive and politically conscious citizens. Mobilized voting in this way helps create a political milieu that encourages an irresponsible and autocratic style of leadership of the government.

And yet, there is also an optimistic side of the implications. We have discovered in the analysis that the primary source of mobilized voting is distinctly of that segment of the society which includes the citizens with the most traditional beliefs and attitudes. As the society becomes more modern, so do the individuals, acquiring a higher level of individual modernity. This would erode the social basis of

mobilized voting, depriving the regime in power of its once secure electoral advantages. Although the process of social modernization is a slow one that takes place over a relatively long period of time, the march of modernization seems almost indubitable. In Korea today, urbanization is occurring at a rapid rate; illiteracy is already a thing of the past; mass media are spreading at a phenomenal rate, penetrating into the remotest villages and hamlets; and industrialization, with all of its usual problems, is here to stay. All of these social and economic changes are bound to have profound impact upon the belief systems and attitudes of the citizens, especially those who until now remained highly susceptible to the pressure of mobilized voting. To be sure, the social basis of mobilized voting which has so far supplied approximately 10 percent or more of the total electoral votes cast for the regime, would certainly not disappear in a matter of the next few years. However, in the long run the regime must face up to a situation in which there would no longer be a broad enough social basis of mobilized voting to insure year after year its electoral success. It must then deal with the more politically conscious citizens who are both assertive and demanding in their approach to politics.

Finally, one further point to be made relates to the problem of interpreting the aggregate voting statistics. In the study of political development, in particular the studies that focus on the problem of democratic development, voter turnout rates are often taken, explicitly or implicitly, as a measure of the level of political consciousness of the citizenry and thus, a yardstick of the level of democracy achieved.

In the studies of voting behavior in both worlds of developed western countries and developing countries, turnout rates are often interpreted to mean something about what the citizens' political preferences are. The thesis of mobilized voting challenges both of these positions. Consider, for example, the following two cases. Country A reports an average turnout rate of 85 percent, while Country B shows a 65 percent rate of voting. Further, in Country A mobilized voters account for 35 percent of the turnout but in Country B they account for only 5 percent. Which country has the more politically conscious citizenry? If we follow the position taken in much of the literature on democratic development, we must conclude that Country A, with its 85 percent turnout rate, has the more politically conscious citizenry. Obviously, it is a very erroneous conclusion which ignores a significant difference in the extent of mobilized voting in both countries. Inferring the political preferences of the citizens could be, under certain conditions, no less treacherous. Now, let us assume that the government party in Country A receives 65 percent of the electoral votes cast and the opposition party the remaining 35 percent. By any standard, this 65 percent of the votes represents nothing short of an epochal landslide, reaffirming the amount of trust that the citizens have in the incumbent regime. But, is it? Taking into account the 35 percent of mobilized voters in Country A, the valid conclusion should be in fact that the voters favor the government in power no more than they do the opposition party. The point of all of these illustrations is this: without knowing how many of the votes cast (or turnout rate) are results of mobilized

voting, it is not only difficult but almost impossible to give a judicious interpretation of the aggregate voting statistics. Where the rate of mobilized voting is substantial as is the case in many developing countries of Asia and Africa, the overall turnout rate alone indicates neither what the citizens' true political preferences are, nor the level of their political consciousness. Therefore, study of the extent of mobilized voting in these countries is essential before one can offer a substantive interpretation of the aggregate voting statistics.

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Footnotes

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1. Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 179-219; Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 128-130; and Herbert Tingsten, Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics (London: P.S. King, 1937), pp. 211-214.

2. Jae-On Kim and B.C. Koh, "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Elections," Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3, (August, 1972), pp. 825-859.

3. Kim and Koh are well aware of the problems involved in interpreting the aggregate data and their precaution is reflected in the way in which they approached the question of mobilized voting. Instead of drawing a definitive conclusion, they suggested rather cautiously a hypothesis regarding the existence of mobilized voting in rural Korea. See Kim and Koh, Ibid.

4. Empirical evidence is still lacking for the precise functions of elections in the political system, although many crucial functions have been attributed to elections. See Richard Rose and H. Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," Political Studies, Vol. 15, (June, 1967), pp. 173-201; Gerald Pomper, Elections in America (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1970), pp. 1-40; and Chong Lim Kim, "The Nature of Elite Support for Elections," American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, (April, 1974), pp. 205-219.

5. Interviews were conducted in Korea by graduate students enrolled in both political science and sociology of the following universities: Seoul National University, Ehwa Women's University, Kyungbuk University and Chonnam University. The field work began in 1973 and was completed in mid-1974. The Korean survey is a part of a larger cross-national study of the role of the legislature that the Center is conducting in Kenya, Turkey, Switzerland, Belgium and Italy.

6. The twelve electoral districts are listed in Table 3. They were carefully selected to be representative of diverse socio-economic characteristics of all districts.

7. A detailed analysis of the modes of political participation was reprinted elsewhere. See Seong-Tong Pai, Young W. Kihl and Chong Lim Kim, "Hankukin eu Jungchichamye Hyungtaewa Kutuchksung," a paper presented at the First Joint Conference of the Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America, Seoul, Korea, June 9-12, 1975.

8. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, "The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison," The Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 01-103(1971), pp. 36-44.

9. See Pai, Kihl, and Kim, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

10. The Pearson's correlations between voting participation and the indicators of political consciousness are as follows:

	Voting	Political Discussion
Level of political knowledge	-.03	.43
Level of political interest	-.06	.24
Level of political efficacy	-.02	.26
Individual modernity score	.04	.34

11. The three efficacy items include: (a) People like me don't have any say about what the government does, (b) Government officials do not care much what people like me think, and (c) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what's going on.

12. There were 823 respondents who gave inefficacious responses to all three efficacy items. Only these respondents are considered as having no conception of any assertive role in politics.

13. See Kim and Koh, "Electoral Behavior and Social Development," op. cit.

14. See Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 13-35.

15. The regional variations in political culture in Korea have not yet been studied extensively. Some preliminary results from our survey indicate significant regional differences in the political beliefs and attitudes of the adult population. Some of these differences are discussed in Chong Lim Kim and Seong-Tong Pai, "Urban Migration, Acquisition of Modernity and Political Change," a paper presented at the Conference on Population and Development in Korea, sponsored jointly by the SSRC-ACLS and the Population and Development Studies Center of Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea, January 7-8, 1975; and Young W. Kihl, Chong Lim Kim, and Seong-Tong Pai, "Sahoepulsinpungjo wa Jungchimoohwa," The Shin-Dong-A, No. 134(October, 1975), pp. 86-99.

16. The voters in large urban centers of Seoul, Pusan and Kwangju aside, the Cholla voters were considerably better informed of and more active in politics as the survey data show clearly:

Regions:	Knew all two names of representatives from district	Tried to influence others to vote for a candidate	Discussed local problems one or more times	Discussed national problems one or more times
Cholla	51%	40%	72%	69%
Kyungsang	37	32	59	54
Kyunggi	22	33	60	40
Choongchung	38	28	63	52
Kangwon	19	28	60	45

17. See Pai, Kihl and Kim, "Hankukin eu Jungchichamye Hyungtaewa Kutucksung," op. cit., pp. 10-11. The correlation coefficient between sex and the individual modernity score (OM-12) was -.28, indicating that the male voters are far more modern in their beliefs and attitudes than the female voters.

18. David H. Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry, Vol. 29 (December, 1966), pp. 353-377.

19. The twelve modernity items and the distribution of responses to them were fully reported in Kim and Pai, "Urban Migration, Acquisition of Modernity and Political Change," op. cit., pp. 9-12.

20. The relationship between mobilized voting and the level of individual modernity was also scrutinized, controlling for the effects of the social characteristics. None of these characteristics was able to reduce the relationship substantially, suggesting that the level of modernity, rather than the social characteristics, is a causal factor of mobilized voting.

21. The data on the public's ability to differentiate various parts of the government were reported in some detail elsewhere. See Chong Lim Kim and Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National Assembly," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3, (August, 1976), pp.

22. For a similar formulation, see Chong Lim Kim and Byung-Kyu Woo, "The Role of Legislative Elites in Democratic Change: An Analysis of Democratic Commitment Among Korean National Legislators," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, (October, 1973), pp. 349-379.

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