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# THE VIETNAM STORY

of

INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY SERVICES, INC.

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by
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International Voluntary Services, Inc.
1555 Connecticut Avenue Northwest
Washington, District of Columbia 20036
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# TERMINAL REPORT

To: United States Agency for International Development

From: International Voluntary Services, Inc.

## Appreciation

International Voluntary Services, Inc., with offices at 1555 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036, wishes to express appreciation to the United States Agency for International Development, Washington and Vietnam, for the support and assistance rendered to it in the development and implementation of the IVS program in Vietnam from December, 1956 to August, 1971. These were trying times for both agencies. It is significant, especially in view of the turn of events after 1967 that it was possible to continue the relationship for four additional years. Given the terms of its own mandate and assignment, the staff of USAID has demonstrated considerable flexibility and great cooperation in its dealings with IVS. Thus we are happy to express our appreciation to USAID.

# INTRODUCTION

The IVS/VN Story is in miniature that of IVS.

Vietnam was the scene of IVS' first success. The aid contract was signed three years after the organization was founded; a decade later IVSers in Vietnam numbered 167 - 70 towards a contract strength of 200. IVS/VN provided the model for the Peace Corp. IVS/VN accomplishments made front page stories in the USA press. The volunteers demonstrated that dedicated, idealistic youth could learn a foreign language, adjust to an exotic culture, and function effectively under strange and difficult conditions.

IVS had been organized in 1953 by fourteen internationally minded Americans, including churchmen. Their aim was to create a facility which could make available to Third World countries the technological expertise and idealism of young people who "wanted to help". The fact that the United States Government (USG) had appropriated funds for economic assistance, and had provided for the participation of voluntary agencies in its foreign aid program, promised a source of support for such IVS activities. The inclusion of South Vietnam in the list of countries to receive foreign aid, and the presence of 600,000 Roman Catholic refugees from the North created the occasion for IVS/VN.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robinson, speaking in Washington on June 1, 1956 stated

> The refugees who have fled to South Vietnam to escape the

Vietminh are being resettled on productive lands with funds made available by our aid program. In various ways our aid program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese government designed to strengthen the economy and projects that may contribute to that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program only as freely invited.

The original IVS teams were assigned to work with these refugees. Later the volunteers turned their attention to strengthening the sub-economies of the country. They recognized their dependence upon the Government of South Vietnam (GVN).

A former Director of the aid program in Vietnam from 1958 - 1962 served as the Executive Director during the crucial years 1965 - 70. His leadership was a deciding factor in enabling IVS/VN to survive the upheaval incident to the mass resignations of 1967. His interest in and concern for Vietnam tended to place IVS/VN at the center of the organization's program.

"IVS/VN also had political clout in Washington," explained a USAID official, whose job it had been to make budget presentations to appropriation committees of Congress. "The IVSers had guided senators and congressmen during their Vietnam junkets. They had seen villagers call the volunteers by name. This folksy, people to people relationship proved excellent public relations. They had seen IVS/VN in action. They favored giving it what it needed." The fact of the war, which was beginning to polarize and divide the United States, and the massive size of the USAID program in Vietnam also contributed to the importance IVS attributed to its work in Vietnam.

During its first decade, IVS/VN accepted the purposes of USG aid to Vietnam as set forth in the Truman Doctrine: To frustrate the aim of totalitarian regimes by direct or indirect aggression would "undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." Subsequently some of the more vocal volunteers began to interpret the role of the USG in Vietnam differently. They concluded that the war was evil; that they were involved in the evil because of their dependence upon USAID; and that they should either resign, or IVS should fund the operation from private sources. They would have adapted Barbara W. Tuchman's description of the US involvement with China through the Open Door policy to read: "The United States was enmeshed in that most entangling of alliances - not with a country but with a doctrine. It imposed a sense of obligation to intervene in an issue - the integrity of South Vietnam - in which American security was not at stake." * Other volunteers were equally certain that regardless of the compromises involved in the IVS/VN relations with USAID, the services they were performing justified their continuance as IVSers in Vietnam. IVS/VN team members remained polarized over this issue until the contract was terminated.

The IVS/VN story is a case study in development. Few program models of effective development in Third World countries exist even yet. IVS/VN thus participated in the engineering, experimental process whereby representatives of a modernized nation undertook to assist the government of a developing nation to survive, and at the same time to improve the living standards of the people. Volunteers wrestled with the meaning and substance

*Adapted from Stilwell and American Experience in China 1911 - 45. Bantam Books, New York, 1972. p 173.

of "development". They sought to transfer and adapt their technical knowledge based on experience in an affluent technological system to one which was poor and agrarian, and at war.

IVS/VN is a story of success and failure, or life and death, of idealism versus realism, of civilians pitted against the military, of conflict between individual freedom and bureaucracy. If institutions had memories, IVS and USAID alike could learn from the IVS/VN story. What follows is but the beginning of an attempt to indicate what may be deduced from it.

# CHAPTER I

## SUMMARY STATEMENT, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Culprit
2. The Cost of Fifteen Years in Vietnam
3. The USA Objectives in Vietnam
4. AID as Asset and Liability
5. The Distinctiveness of IVS/Vietnam
6. Input and Targets
7. What IVS Learned in Vietnam
8. What Was Unchanging for IVS/Vietnam
9. IVS/Vietnam Crises
10. IVS/Vietnam Accomplishments
11. What IVS/Washington Can Learn from the Vietnam Experience
12. Recommendations

## 1 - THE CULPRIT

Each of the parties involved with IVS/VN seeks a scapegoat for its demise. Yet each bears a share of the guilt. There is no single culprit.

The IVS Board failed to provide adequate objectives, guidelines, and supervision.

USAID being involved as an integral unit of the warmaking apparatus of the USG neglected to provide IVS/VN with oversight through sympathetic staff personnel which had marked the successful early years of IVS/VN.

The GVN took little notice of IVS/VN, which it had accepted as part of the US foreign aid apparatus, until IVS public criticisms no longer could be ignored.

The IVS/VN team suffered from the brashness of youthful idealism, the assumption that the rights the volunteers enjoyed as individual Americans also obtained in Vietnam, and insensitivity with respect to the institutional character and relationships of IVS/VN.

### The IVS Board

Since 1967, the IVS Board was preoccupied with Vietnam. The Director had been the ICA Director in Saigon during the period when IVS/VN was at its zenith in effectiveness. The IVS/VN program was the largest country program of the young organization, and 22% of the IVS/VN budget was needed to provide for overall administration. Vietnam was where the action was for America; IVS was in a headline position. Many Americans, including some of the Board members had a sense of guilt for the moral damage being done by their country in Vietnam; the IVS effort was at least

a symbolic attempt to make amends to the people who were the war's victims.

Despite its efforts to learn the facts, the IVS Board lacked the information required to make the decisions which the situation demanded. Visits were made to Vietnam by the Director, by members of the Board, and by fact-finding teams. Staff members and volunteers periodically reported at Board meetings. Individual and team reports were secured and studied. Yet the Board was uninformed as to how USAID, the GVN and the Vietnamese regarded the work and policies of IVS/VN. The reports, letters and verbal presentation of IVS/VN spokesmen failed to inform the Board as to the across-the-board aspirations of the entire team. Thus the Board lacked the depth knowledge required to make the decisions which the worsening situation had required.

Consequently, the Board members expressed and voted their preconceived notions. Since these represented the spectrum of American opinion at any given moment, unanimity was difficult to achieve. In deference to minority voices, the Board either deferred action, or tempered decisions with compromises. In the end history snatched from the IVS Board the option of decision making.

## USAID

By 1967 the USAID staff had become so large, the IVS volunteers had become relatively unimportant in the USG's total program of Vietnamese development. During the first five or more years of IVS/VN, the volunteers were the sole representatives of the US foreign aid effort out among the people. ICA agricultural officer Howard Harper being both sensitive and appreciative, provided the volunteers with counsel, advice and direction. While patently paternalistic towards the volunteers, he helped extricate

them from several difficult situations, arranged publicity for their accomplishments, and involved GVN's agricultural officials in their operation.

During the first decade IVS/VN demanded and secured from ICA/USAID considerable autonomy. Foreign aid representatives recognized that the IVS/VN operation differed substantially from the responsibilities the ICA/USAID staff carried. When as this personnel rotated, new officials began making demands, or expressing expectations of IVS/VN, the volunteers regarded these as encroachments upon their freedom. They asserted that they were unwilling to serve as USAID junior technicians, yet in earlier times their predecessors willingly had accepted secondment to the ICA/USAID staff, or had doubled as province representatives. The changing mandates of the foreign aid operation, the continual rotation of its staff, and the coming and going of IVS/VN volunteers combined to create ever new situations. During these changes the volunteers were uninformed concerning the new rules under which they were expected to operate. USAID was too preoccupied with its own operation - the largest mission of its mission of its kind in the world - to provide needed reorientation or guidance.

## The G.V.N.

Arrangements for IVS to operate in Vietnam were made by FOA/ICA/USAID. The young GVN agreed to accept American aid. The IVS contract was consistent with these purposes. Therefore the proper arrangements were made with GVN agencies, which in time became centered in the Ministry of Agriculture. For the first decade, relations between IVS/VN and the GVN were excellent. "We leaned upon the GVN. We expected the GVN to protect us from USAID," was the way the Chief of Party expressed his feelings. At the ministry level, in relations with province and district officials,

and even at the local level, IVSers were appreciative of and appreciated by the GVN officials. On the sub-Cabinet level many of these same people expressed after-the-fact regrets over the termination of the IVS/VN contract.

Even when agricultural development under the Ministry of Agriculture became unimportant among the GVN priorities, it probably would have continued to tolerate the IVS/VN presence had not IVS-labeled criticisms been called to the Cabinet's attention. The presence of a Minister whose preoccupation was with land reform rather than with improving the lot of the individual farmers rendered him insensitive to and incapable of counselling with the IVSers. The powerlessness of lesser officials who cooperated with the IVSers made their assistance in the crisis of no value in helping IVS/VN avoid the difficulties which led to its demise.

While the GVN was responsible for the action which terminated IVS/VN, the latter was periferal among the interests of a government whose main concern was survival.

## IVS/VIETNAM

IVSers continued to ask the wrong questions. Thus they misled themselves and the IVS Board as to the real issue, and in the end confused both USAID and the GVN. The finger of accusation usually makes IVS/VN or its staff the culprit. While part of the blame must be shared by the volunteers, they were not solely responsible.

The subject of continuous discussion by IVSers was the wrongness of the war, their compromised position by virtue of being affiliated with USAID, and the consequent necessity for securing other sources of funding.

Since there was little disagreement on the part of the volunteers with respect to the immorality of the war, the Board and the IVS/VN staff assumed that there was similar unanimity with respect to the steps which should be taken. Inadequate attention was given to these questions:

1. Is it realistic to expect IVS/W, which had had little experience with private funding, to secure elsewhere the capital needed to maintain IVS/VN ? Explorations made by staff assigned to this function had indicated a full year before the end, the lack of realism in this approach. The IVS Board having recognized this fact further alienated IVS/VN by announcing that private funding was impossible.

2. Would IVS/VN be able to continue in Vietnam under a new funding arrangement? The IVSers only assumed such would be the case.

3. "Would you be willing to continue your work in Vietnam, maintaining silence concerning political issues as the price for remaining?" This question never was asked of all the volunteers. Even though most IVSers felt they were compromised by their USAID connections, there were many who reluctantly would have been willing to pay the price. Yet generally they were silent when confronted with the argument that since the war was wrong, the USAID relationship should be terminated. Most would have agreed that seeking peace was their first priority. But many there were also who would have preferred to concentrate upon the second priority of helping people help themselves, rather than accept the termination of IVS/VN.

4. What would be the consequences, so far as the Vietnamese with whom IVSers had worked was concerned, by the termination of IVS/VN? The spokesmen for action asserted that the Vietnamese too shared their peace priority. No data was supplied the IVS Board as to how the farmer and

student felt. The failure of IVS/VN to secure an adequate answer before taking the fatal steps reflects alike upon the immaturity of the volunteers, and the failure of the IVS Board to guide them.

5. "Given the centrality of the war, will the GVN tolerate an expatriate organization engaging in overt peace activities, or public criticism of its actions and policies ?" The IVSers who were so involved appeared to believe that it would. If they were aware of the IVS/VN contradiction, they made no effort to resolve it save by seeking alternative support. Some of the IVSers had recognized the "development" included searching for peace, establishing social justice, and recognizing man's inhumanity, as well as efforts to improve the economic life of the people. A government zealously seeking to survive, could not indefinitely permit an operation with goals that appeared to contradict its own primary aim.

6. "What sacrifice of human integrity can an institution demand as the price for survival ?" Some of the more articulate IVSers had concluded that their official involvement in the war through USAID vitiated any values which they might create or preserve by their presence as IVSers. It is significant that the most vociferous of those who so contended have left Vietnam. Many who would have been willing to compromise have remained in Vietnam under other auspices; there are others among the alumni community in Vietnam who were willing to accomodate to being Americans in Vietnam, but not to accept USAID funding.

## Conclusion

Had the IVS Board had answers to such questions, it would have been in a position to make a decision, instead of following a policy of drift

which in the end relieved it of the responsibility for making a decision.

In justification of the staff of IVS/VN who were the spokesmen for intransigience, both in 1967 and in 1971, these were the persons whose responsibility it was to negotiate with the GVN and with USAID. Their conclusions which led them to take drastic action were the product of their frustrations and fears born of these relations. One significant difference between the 1967 and 1971 episodes was that whereas at the earlier date the staff resigned as a group, in 1971 the staff spokesmen continued to speak and act in their official capacity.

Had the Board known and understood the facts; specifically, had it known the number of volunteers who were willing to accept the limitation of no public political statements or actions as the price for IVS' continuance, it might have decided that institutional continuance was preferable to the martyrdom IVS/VN suffered by virtue of the actions and words of the few. There are those in Vietnam today who wish that such a decision had been made. But they were silent when the moment of decision was upon them. They either were reticent to speak out, or they had been asked the wrong questions. Or they had not been asked. Thus the IVS Board, the IVS/VN staff, USAID and the GVN all bear responsibility for having failed to do so.

"The currency of conscience has only one backing - a man's lifeblood" says playright Arthur Miller in The Crucible. Administration by concensus has debased this currency. Representatives of each of the agencies named above maintained anonymity in their respective collectivities, which have neither memory nor apparent conscience. In the end, those who precipitated

the actions expended only the currency of IVS/VN lifeblood - not their own. Vietnam is the weaker today because this blood is no longer available to be used - and possibly spent.

## 2 - THE COST OF FIFTEEN YEARS IN VIETNAM

### The Statistics

Period of program operation by IVS in Vietnam - Fourteen years nine months

Volunteers and staff appointed - 409

Shortest period of service - One month

Longest period of service - Nine years

Number serving two or more years - 205

Number serving three or more years - 38

Total man-years served - 785

VOLTERNS, summer volunteers of two or three months - 29

USAID Funds dispersed for IVS/VN including Washington administration - $4,226 per man-year. (To obtain the full cost, this figure needs to be supplemented with the piaster payments made by the GVN from counterpart funds).

### Comment

"IVS/VN cost too much, especially in terms of life," stated one of the Chiefs of Party. An IVSer who wanted to be more involved in the war effort than the IVS/VN staff would permit, resigned after six months. Thirty months later he lost his life in a guerrilla action.

Max Sinkler was killed in an automobile accident in April 1966, after being in Vietnam but one-half year.

Peter Hunting, the first IVS/VN war casualty, was killed November 12, 1965. The evidence is unclear as to who was responsible for his death. Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey said of him, "Peter represents the best of this country as a volunteer for peace, for the love of mankind."

Dave Gitelson was killed a few days before the beginning of the 1968 Tet Offensive near the village where he lived. On the very day Gitelson met his death, MacAlester College cited him in absentia for outstanding international service.

Three IVSers in Hue were captured by the Viet Cong during the 1968 Tet Offensive Sandra Johnson was released three months later. Following her debriefing by US authorities and the IVS staff, she resigned and returned to the USA. Mark Cayer, an agricultural technician from Quebec, Canada, and Gary Daves, a mobile science teacher from New Mexico, presumably remain prisoners of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). Inquiries made through PRG offices in Phnom Penh, with respect to their condition, have yielded no information. Sandra Johnson reported that when she was released in April 1968 they were still alive. Cayer and Daves were still relatively new to Vietnam when the Tet Offensive occurred. Their linguistic competence was limited, which prevented their having access to intelligence which might have enabled them to escape capture.

A few IVSers suffered bullet wounds. Others escaped ambush and house bombings. Almost all volunteers have been under fire many times. During the fiscal year 1964 -65, IVS staff compiled a list of insecurity incidents involving volunteers. (q. v.).

The insecurity factor was prominent among the reasons for reducing the IVS/VN team strength after Tet 1968 to one-half its size.

USAID contract funds expended for IVS/VN were as follows:

U. S. DOLLAR EXPENDITURES

| Year | No. of Assigned Volunteers | IVS/VN Project Cost | IVS/VN Overhead |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | 6 | 22,940.29 | 4,747.80 |
| 1958 | 6 | 22,324.34 | 10,832.45 |
| 1959 | 12 | 40,322.24 | 10,853.65 |
| 1960 | 20 | 27,725.63 | 10,400.85 |
| 1961 | 20 | 56,073.91 | 18,760.35 |
| 1962 | 20 | 52,572.30 | 19,888.74 |
| 1963 | 53 | 146,091.89 | 29,788.43 |
| 1964 | 74 | 144,273.30 | 37,768.30 |
| 1965 | 71 | 162,251.71 | 48,500.33 |
| 1966 | 52 | 189,140.05 | 53,998.93 |
| 1967 | 120 | 424,817.29 | 121,594.27 |
| 1968 | 151 | 497,188.24 | 123,750.08 |
| 1969 | 87 | 324,459.88 | 93,908.76 |
| 1970 | 40 | 227,939.73 | 88,727.74 |
| 1971 | 25 | 154,073.53 | 70,100.00 |
| 1972 | | 67,003.03 | 10,600.00 |
| Totals | 757 | 2,561,198.26 | 756,220.73 |
| | 77.21% | $3,317,418.99 | 22.79% |

The piaster costs of the IVS/VN program during fifteen years are a bit more difficult to calculate. These were made available by USAID as counterpart funds to the Ministry of Agriculture. Most of the period, the piastre had an inflated value in terms of the dollar. For instance, when the official rate was VN$118 per US$1, US currency could realize VN$350 on the "black market". The black market price was a truer index of its purchasing value than the inflated official price.

The total expenditures from the Ministry of Agriculture for the IVS/VN program were as follows:

| Year | Total amount | Exchange rate employed by USAID | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1956-62 (calendar years) | VN$ 23,746,176 | 1956 through 1961 | VN$ 35 | to US$ 1 |
| | | 1962 | 60 | 1 |
| 1963 | 14,300,000 | | 60 | 1 |
| 1964 | 17,050,000 | | 60 | 1 |
| 1965 | 12,064,927 | | 60 | 1 |
| 1966 | 20,000,000 | To June 19, 1966 | 60 | 1 |
| | | After June 19 | 118 | 1 |
| 1967 | 33,000,000 | | 118 | 1 |
| 1968 | 27,000,000 | | 118 | 1 |
| 1969 | 16,000,000 | | 118 | 1 |
| 1970 | 20,900,000 | | 118 | 1 |
| 1971 | 7,819,000 | | 118 | 1 |

The estimated amounts transferred to IVS/VN during each of these exchange rate periods was as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| VN$ 23,756,876 | 35 to 1 | US$ | 678,768 |
| 62,934,727 | 50 to 1 | | 1,258,695 |
| 29,600,000 | 118 to 1 | | 250,847 |
| 7,819,000 | 271 to 1 | | 28,852 |
| VN$ 124,110,603 | | US$ | 2,217,162 |

or divided by 785 man years, the cost in VN$ was an additional $2,824.

Approximately one-half of these expenditures were to cover the subsitence allowance of the volunteers. Omitting the nine months of IVS/VN in 1970, the breakdown for expenditures were:

| | |
|---|---|
| Local salaries and wages | VN$ 29,191,714 |
| Transportation and Per Diem | 34,228,775 |
| Living allowances, utilities and housing maintenance | 106,868,488 |
| Office equipment and Supplies | 6,589,888 |
| Vietnamese Youth Program (Agriculture and Livestock) | 11,108,308 |
| Vietnamese Volunteer Service (Youth Work) | 21,208,036 |
| Unrecorded expenses | 80,488 |
| | VN$ 209,275,697 |

3 - THE OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM OF THE U. S. G.

Reasons adduced by the USG for its involvement in Vietnam:

a. To enable the people of South Vietnam to choose their own form of government, rather than have a Communist rule imposed upon them.

b. To assist in the creation of a stable, united GVN.

c. To demonstrate than an armed Viet Cong minority, supported from the outside under the guise of "national liberation", could be defeated.

d. To assure the countries of Asia that the USA was concerned for their welfare and development.

e. To preserve the balance of power in Asia.

Most IVS/VN volunteers accepted these objectives down to the mid-1960's, making references to them in their periodic reports and letters home. Beginning in 1965 some of the volunteers criticised the USG "for failing to deal objectively with the political realities in Vietnam," and the GVN for its apparent "inability to mobilize the aspirations and energies of its people". Villagers in GVN areas, they charged, were not

being motivated to defend themselves against excursions of the National Liberation Front (NLF). When during the junta, following President Diem's assassination in 1963, it appeared that the GVN had no capacity for governing the people, some IVSers began to question the viability of the US program.

IVSers began to articulate their fears that the killings, the forced uprooting of peoples, and the corruption and mismanagement by the GVN (which the USG recognized but was powerless to change) were a price too high to pay for the survival of the GVN. They claimed the war was destroying the country which the USG was seeking to preserve.

Thus the correspondence between USG and IVS/VN objectives which had characterized the earlier period, tended to disappear as American military activities escalated. These widening differences in objectives were at the heart of the ultimate IVS termination in Vietnam. In retrospect, it must be admitted that the GVN and USAID permitted IVS/VN to continue long after the IVS/VN staff had ceased to support the GVN and USAID objectives.

Don Luce, who served as Chief of Party for six years, and was one of those who resigned in 1967, participated in the preparation of a proposed policy in 1969, which had it been observed by IVS/VN, probably would have enabled the team to continue. The statement is a suggested condition under which voluntary organizations should function in postwar Vietnam:

> It is important that the organization move in a direction that is consistent with the government's program. If the donor organization is not in sympathy with the overall philosophy and objectives

of the government, it should not come to Vietnam. Isolated social/economic programs working outside the general direction of the government are apt to do more to complicate the political scene than to improve the level of living of the masses.*

4 - "AID AS ASSET AND AS LIABILITY

IVS/VN as an element in the aid apparatus was subject to the same principles which determine the effectiveness and failure of all foreign assistance programs. The quantity of such aid Vietnam could absorb depended upon the capacity of the government and its people to improve national and local services.

Sir Robert Thompson has indicated there are five aid priorities. IVSers discovered these from experience:

a. Training. IVSers instructed the first farmers who joined with them in planting experiments. When IVS opened the Ea Kmat Seed Propagation Center some of these same farmers were brought in as technicians. IVSers requested and expected counterpart Vietnamese workers, and complained when they were unavailable or were lost to them through military mobilization. IVS/VN placed a strong emphasis upon the establishment of training institutions for ethnic Vietnamese and for Montagnard farmers. The volunteers went out from the experiment stations into the villages as extension agents.

After IVS/VN moved into formal education, for a time the largest of

*An Approach to Post War-Service Priorities in South Vietnam. Nguyen Tang Canh and Don Luce. Division of Interchurch Aid, Refugees and World Service of the World Counsil of Churches. Geneva. October 1969. Mimeographed.

the teams was that offering instruction in English, science and health. Many Vietnamese agricultural technicians and educators are indebted to IVS for the training they received.

b. Communications. IVSers assisted in the construction of a few roads, bridges and canals. They were themselves communication links between villagers on the one hand and government officials on the other.

c. Economic aid. IVS was an economic assistance channel for material aid supplied by governments, and through their own technical services endeavored to increase the economic value of the farmers' work.

d. Social service. The few volunteers assigned to refugee relief, and to health programs engaged directly in providing social services. Towards the end of their work in Vietnam, the Ministry of Agriculture suggested that since social services appeared to be IVSers' chief concern the volunteers should transfer to the Ministry of Social Welfare.

e. Rural community development. Such activity was the original IVS goal in Vietnam. For a time, a large team of community development technicians was engaged in the rural areas. This program had a high priority within IVS.

IVSers were concerned primarily with strengthening the economies of the individual farmers and villages where they worked rather than in developing the national economy. There were exceptions, when joining the national effort, IVSers undertook to increase ramie, kenaf, lacquer, hog and chicken production. The IVSers recognized that they were more effective in relating to the sub-economies of the regions than in dealing with the national economy which they regarded as the concern of USAID.

The variety of approaches made by IVSers in different locales evidenced the disparities which did (and do) exist throughout Vietnam with respect

to products, prices, demand, goods-flow, etc. IVSers sought to understand the values and goals of the Vietnamese who were their immediate "clients", and thus to operate within their context, rather tham impose imported customs and values.

Despite the IVSers' efforts to safeguard the indigenous cultures, they observed (often with alarm) the impact of the West, and the deterioration of Vietnamese society. These observations and insights contributed to the IVSers increasingly critical attitudes towards the GVN.

## 5 - THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF IVS/VIETNAM

During the period of maximum American involvement in Vietnam, forty-four voluntary organizations implemented aid policies in cooperation with the GVN. IVS/VN was distinctive because:

a. During several of its years of operation, the IVS/VN team was larger than that of any other voluntary organization. Save for one American foreign missions body with its own relief program, and which entered Indo-China early in the 20th Century, IVS/VN tallied the largest number of man years of service in Vietnam.

b. IVS/VN functions were sharply focussed. In its concentration upon development, IVS/VN tended to avoid engaging in the variety of programs that characterized agencies engaged in service and "refugee" relief.

c. IVSers had an outstanding command of the language, compared with most other Americans in Vietnam.

d. IVSers sought to invlove Vietnamese in their operations, as counterparts, as staff, as advisors, and as colleagues.

e. IVS/VN achieved a balance between centralized supervision and

the autonomy of volunteers who were encouraged to deal with local needs according to their particular specialties.

f. IVSers enjoyed a high degree of trust among the villagers, students, and middle and lower echelon government officials. The agricultural volunteers identified with villagers. The youthfulness of the Americans enabled them to establish rapport with students. The IVSers recognized their dependence upon the GVN middle and lower echelon officials, and sought their counsel.

g. American ambassadors expressed appreciation for the work of IVS/VN, and one of them frequently consulted the Chief of Party because of the latter's understanding of the Vietnamese situation.

Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor on June 21, 1965 stated that he had had opportunity to see at first hand the work of IVS. "It is doing a solid work and achieving results. The teaching of English in the high schools gives Vietnamese youth an added capability to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the intellectual, technological, and ethical values of American life. The IVS efforts in agriculture and public health enable the Vietnamese people who benefit from these efforts to improve both their economic and social status. All of these IVS activities are directed toward real people, real problems, and bring results."

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, May 24, 1966, after reciting the various program areas in which IVS/VN was operating, stated: "... IVS/VN is making it possible for the tens of thousands of Vietnamese to look ahead with confidence. The young people of IVS deserve the heartfelt appreciation of all Americans. I can think of no more noble service to their country and to the unfortunate people of this troubled nation than

what they are cheerfully and expertly performing."

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, writing to Director Arthur Z. Gardiner, on October 13, 1967, following the resignation of a dozen IVS/VN volunteers, stated:

> The role of IVS in Vietnam is important for several reasons. First, for the contributions that volunteers are making in the fields of education, agriculture, and community development. Second, for the very real encouragement they are giving to the Vietnamese people to persevere improve themselves. And third, for the general understanding they are fostering between people of different countries.... Some of them have given their lives and others continue working day after day under hazardous conditions. Their dedication, in spite of these risks, has set a fine example for Americans and Vietnamese alike. Working and living as they do with the Vietnamese people has enabled them to become very close to them. Together they have been working to create a better society. It is this aspect of the work which has so endeared them to the Vietnamese people. It is important that this continue and that the volunteers refrain from any political involvement in Vietnam. This is important as affecting their relations with the people they are assisting....My full support for the IVS program in Vietnam..."

On September 30, 1968, the Ambassador wrote again to Mr. Gardiner:

> I know from conversations with Vietnamese officials both in Saigon and the provinces, that the humanitarian work done by the IVS volunteers is deeply appreciated. All too often in a situation such as we find ourselves here, the individual person-to-person approach is forgotten. The ability of the IVS volunteer to bridge the gap of

understanding between Vietnamese and Americans represents a real contribution not only to our efforts to find peace here, but to efforts world-wide to cross the bridge of mistrust and ignorance that too often separate people of distant lands. I believe that by their efforts IVS volunteers are not only helping to build foundations for a peaceful world in the years ahead, but they themselves are also deriving valuable experience in international relations.

I look forward to a continuing association with IVS.

On April 26, 1972, the Ambassador wrote to Richard Peters:

Viet-Nam still benefits from the talents of several former IVS volunteers who have chosen to stay here as Fulbright-grant teachers. As you may know, since the North Vietnamese Army invaded across the DMZ three weeks ago, students at Hue University and other schools in Military Region I have halted classes in order to help the refugees flowing south...The former IVSers assigned to Hue University, John Schaefer and Thomas Malia, have been working with their students to move rice and other supplies from Danang to the refugee camps in Hue. So the "people-to-people" spirit of the "old" IVS can still be seen in Vietnam.

## 6 - INPUT AND TARGETS

The major input of IVS into Vietnam was technical assistance and service. The end results sought were rural economic development, improved human welfare and the dissemination of human knowledge. The test of each program was: "Does it help the Vietnmaese people?"

"Development" was enlarged as a concept to include agricultural

extension and experimentation, formal education, community development and health programs. IVS/VN justified the formal education enlargement on the grounds that it (1) enabled IVS/VN to establish community contacts, (2), developed and strengthened the nation's educational system, and (3) trained Vietnamese leadership.

IVS understanding of "Community Development" underwent numerous redefinitions during the years it operated in Vietnma. The original volunteers, though assigned to refugee assistance regarded themselves as a team engaged in developing the total life of the villages where they worked. The dispersal of the volunteers to experimentation stations ended this expectation for a time. Subsequently USAID/VN requested IVS/VN to resume community development activities. The term became synonymous with "generalist" each volunteer setting about to solve the problem or problems of his location which appeared most urgent and within his or her competence.

The original 1957 IVS/VN team included two registered nurses. Their contracts were terminated when it was decided by the GVN that IVS was not to deal with health problems. Subsequently IVS/VN supplied workers engaged in malaria control and health services, but these programs were short lived. "Social service" to the ill and to refugees was justified by IVS/VN because such assistance prepared people to help themselves.

By 1970, IVS/VN had concluded that development was dependent upon a degree of social and political stability. IVSers discovered they could work effectively only where some degree of order prevailed, and where there was village cooperation and cohesiveness. Since these conditions obtained in fewer and fewer places as the war escalated, the limits of

IVS/Vn effectiveness contracted.

During its first decade, IVS/VN was well accepted by USAID/VN and by the GVN and its ministries. One of the initial targets of IVS was to provide a cadre of young technicians with experience in developing countries to fill government positions. This was realized as 20-25% of the IVS/VN volunteers during the first decade moved after the completion of their IVS contracts into some form of government service. A number of early IVSers from Vietnam continue to work for the USG in different parts of the world, including Vietnam.

The appearnace of large numbers of Senior Province Advisors (SPA), following massive US troop build-up, reduced the quantitative significance of the IVSers. Some would insist that after July 1965, the SPAs made IVS/VN redundant. Volunteers who were related to village projects dispute this judgement, insisting that their style of operation enabled them to make contributions despite the presence in the provinces of "official" Americans.

As the war became more intense, with an increasing death toll among Vietnamese civilians, some of the volunteers began to question their being financed by an organization of the USG. These IVSers sought to disassociate themselves from the US war effort, in some instances through statements, and by threatening to refuse the salary paid by USAID. Some of the volunteers, recognizing that it was unrealistic to expect an arm of the USG to finance an operation in which spokesmen were expressing difference with the policy of the USG, sought to pressure IVS/W to seek private financing for the IVS/VN operation. Since IVS/W had had little experience

in raising large amounts of money through voluntary contributions, it was unable to accede to this request. The private-funding controversy between IVS/W and IVS/V was still in progress when the contract was terminated.

IVS/VN itself changed while serving as an agent of change. In 1960, IVS Program Office, Dr. Daniel Russell wrote: "So You Want to be a Volunteer." Ten years later, the IVS/VN Chief of Party asked volunteer John C. Schafer of Hue to comment on the Russell paper. Schafer's views illustrate some of the changes which had taken place in IVS/VN.

"You are a USG employee," stated Dr. Russell. "Despite USAID being the funding source of IVS/VN, by 1970 IVS/VN volunteers aspired to be a multinational force, privately funded. Present day IVSers in Vietnam don't like to think of themselves as employees of the USG. Our non-American volunteers would be horrified to be referred to in this way," commented Schafer.

Dr. Russell believed that "if IVS sent out clean-cut, idealistic young Americans who go to church on Sundays (preferably a Protestant Church), to underdeveloped Asian countries, they could improve the lot of the people living there. This is what we find objectionable. Dr. Russell trots out all of America's good old puritan values such as "independence," "self-reliance,' and 'cleanliness.' The implication is that people with these qualities working in Asia cannot help but improve things" While warning volunteers that no preaching or proselytizing is allowed, "you still are missionaries, for like Christ you are working to improve peoples' lives. Your job, says Dr. Russell is to bring 'your great American know-how' to Asia."

"After all the destruction and social dislocation Americans have caused in Vietnam; after the assassinations; after the riots; after Chicago 1968 - Dr. Russell's optimism does not set quite so well. Is the American Way of Life something we want to export? The Vietnam War and a decade of domestic violence have taught us a lot about our country and ourselves. Volunteers in Vietnam have been sobered by living with war and war's victims for two years or more. And we have witnessed what happens to the local people when rich and insensitive Americans come to live and fight in a poor land. Our experinces have not been of the kind likely to make one optimistic."[@]

7 - WHAT IVS LEARNED FROM ITS VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

a. That individual and societal economic development requires political and social stability. The early volunteers felt safe in moving around the country, living in villages. After guerrilla NLF activity began, their movement was limited, and the volunteers perforce moved into towns and cities. These changes limited the connections they enjoyed with villagers.

b. That "refugee" service is a short-term interim program. The first team at Ban Me Thuot, frustrated by their service with the Roman Catholic refugees from North Vietnam, took steps to secure reassignment to work developmental in character. While IVSers responded to refugee needs during and following disasters, they concluded in the wake of Tet 1968 that in so doing they tended to do things for refugees instead of helping them help themselves.

c. That agricultural development was the IVS forte. IVS contributions through community service and education were not as highly regarded

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[@] John Schafer to Richard Peters, June 29, 1970.

by the IVS/VN staff as were their agricultural activities. By mid-1971 there was a general feeling that IVS/VN should concentrate its future efforts in rural areas. The "generalist" approach through community development lacked focus. The volunteers engaged in education (save in the universities) generally were frustrated by the limitations of their assignments. The somewhat romantic attachment of IVS/VN to agriculture could be attributed to such factors as:

1. The early success of the agricultural teams, but this success may have been attributable to the then lack of competition from other voluntary agencies, USAID or GVN officials; to the concentration of the agriculturalists upon developmental goals, rather than having been involved in political discussions; to the technical expertise the graduates of agricultural colleges brought to their jobs; and to the obvious need in a predominantly rural country for agricultural knowledge.

2. The volunteers recruited for community development lacked clear cut job descriptions, and usually brought no specialized skills to their work. The educational team likewise felt frustrated by the lack of local direction and of challenge on the job.

3. That "bigness" was dangerous. So long as IVS/VN was a small operation numerically, the team esprit d'corps was strong. Volunteers who didn't fit were screened out before or shortly after their arrival in Vietnam. IVS/VN administration was unable to deal in the same intimate way with individuals after the team size increased. Those recruited for community development - who were "generalists" rather than "specialists" - did their own thing in their own way. Since there were no necessary common elements in their programs, team supervisors were unable to provide adequate

guidance. When changes in personnel were made, there was little or no continuity. Bigness reduced the qualitative impact of IVS/VN.

IVS/VN was well aware that such was the case, and therefore resisted or delayed expansion proposals from USAID or from IVS/W.

4. That the relative importance of the IVS/VN program decreased proportionately as the numer of Provincial Senior Advisers (PSA) increased. The pioneering IVSer had been the "one-eyed in the land of the blind." As the USAID or CORDS personnel increased in the provinces, the work of IVSers tended to be overshadowed.

By mid-1963 there were 2,000 advisers throughout the country. To many of them advising was "art, not a science, and many of the young Americans practiced this art in ways that galled and confused their Vietnamese counterparts. Diem could legitimately wonder with what great knowledge these inexperienced American'short timers' could pass on to the Vietnamese that would make a great difference in winning the war."@ Many IVSers insist that this judgement was too harsh; that among the official SPAs there were many who were cooperative, good linguists, and intent upon being helpful. In such instances, the average Vietnamese villager noting an IVSer and a PSA in his area would fail to distinguish between the representative of the volunteer agency and the representative of the USG. Both were foreigners, needful of help as much as intent upon being helpful.

## 8 - WHAT WAS UNCHANGING FOR IVS/VIETNAM

a. The centrality of "development" in the IVS purpose nas programming. IVS had been established to help Third World people help

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@ The Lost Crusade, Chester L. Cooper. Dodd, Mead & Co. New York. 1970. p. 207

themselves. The agricultural teams undertook to improve crop production in order to improve village living standards. IVSers established the Ea Kmat Seed Propagation Center to experiment with crops so as to extend effective methods and seeds to the adjacent villagers. Rural activity, education and refugee service, as community programs, were interpreted as being developmental. The failure of IVS/VN to recognize the developmental aspects of education, even within an inadequate system, was an unfortunate blind spot, attributable in part to the politizising process within IVS/VN to which student contacts contributed. IVSers anticipated latter day interpreters of development, who insist that social justice, liberation and humanization also are integral to the concept.

b. The IVS concern for the people of the country. Person-to-person relations were stressed. Agriculturalists were concerned to improve the living standards of their particular villages rather than to increase the GNP.

c. That development activity was related to political security and social cohesiveness.

d. That there must be freedom within IVS/VN for differences of opinion, and for personal expressions of belief. The limits of this freedom changed with changes in the situation.. In retrospect, it appears that USAID and the GVN alike manifested unusual tolerance of IVS with respect to this point.

e. IVS/VN insisted that its primary role - save during a short period when the Community Development team was operating - was not short-term refugee relief. This judgment did not relate to the significance of refugees, but to IVS' self-understanding. Many of the voluntary agencies made refugee service their prime purpose. Vietnamese students to whom

IVS was related informed the volunteers that responsibility for refugee work inside the camps belonged to the Vietnamese. IVS/VN had no operational budget for such work, nor did IVS/VN serve as a conduit for PL 480 food under "Food For Peace".

f. IVS regarded self-help rather than helping the Vietnamese as their method of development. Persons with "know how" were tempted to do for others, and IVSers admitted that at times they fell into this practice. IVS technicians taught Vietnamese mechanics to repair machinery; sometimes they fixed the machines themselves. While IVSers had assumed they would be assigned counterparts at the experiment stations, frequently such was not the case; thus the IVSers undertook to do what such Vietnamese would have done on the experimental farms and as extension agents.

Volunteers assigned to teach English in secondary schools generally regarded the work as of limited value, especially in those situations where they served as adjunct teachers. Many of the Vietnamese teachers they regarded as being uncommitted, and the educational system as weak. Even with these limitations, many Vietnamese today speak improved English because IVSers served as their instructors in pronunciation.

## 9 - IVS/VIETNAM CRISES

The IVS/VN position was tenuous from the beginning. Before the first volunteer arrived, IVS representative Noffsinger had written from Vietnam that all "whites" might be forced to leave within a year. Soon after the first team arrived, insurgency developed, and fighting escalated, and volunteers perforce were required to be more careful about security. Even so, there were deaths, and even more close escapes.

The IVS/VN position also was tenuous because of the nature of the USG contracts. These were revised as the names and functions of the aid organization were changed by the US Congress. Each reorganization raised the possibility that IVS/VN might be phased out. Washington, Saigon and the PSAs had the authority to recommend termination of the contract.

The GVN ministries under whose authority IVS/VN operated, and upon which the volunteers depended for counsel and backing, likewise held life or death possibilities for the organization.

IVS/VN and IVS/W did not always see eye-to-eye. Despite a constant two-way flow of letters, cables, transpacific telephone calls, field visits by Washington IVS staff, and occasional fact finding missions, IVS/VN frequently was of the opinion that headquarters did not understand.

Tensions inevitably developed between IVS staff members and between staff and volunteers. An occasional IVSer was discharged because in the judgement of the Chief of Party he was operating contrary to IVS/VN policy.

A number of the crises which IVS/VN confronted during its years which merit separate delineation were:

The Resignation Threat by Volunteers 1957

The Ban Me Thuot team members addressed a letter to USOM threatening to resign unless they were given a more significant assignment than working with the relatively self-sufficient Roman Catholic refugees from the North. The communication fell into the hands of Howard Harper, an agricultural technician, who first rebuked the volunteers for their breach of protocol, and then undertook to secure a more satisfactory assignment.

## Second Year Fears 1958

During the second year of the IVS/VN contract, the Ban Me Thuot team became fearful lest the meagre accomplishments to date would result in a non-renewal of the ICA Contract.

## The Hue University Incident 1966

During the Buddhist uprising in Hue following the dismissal of General Nguyen Chanh Thi, Hue University students burned the USIS Library and the home of the Director. US officials in Saigon declared Hue a "non-university" and directed that it receive no more assistance. The University administration had invited IVS to provide volunteers as teachers, which it continued to do, despite USAID objections.

## The Sher-Wills Incident in Binh Thuan 1966

Garson Sher was a volunteer assigned to education at the Binh Thuan station. Later in his service career, which lasted 28 months, Sher distinguished himself, especially during the tragic Tet Offensive and its aftermath. He had considerable literary ability, and even in 1966 was beginning to question some of the assumptions and actions of the USG in Indo-China.

PSA, Lloyd E. Wills, objected to Sher's September 1966 IVS Report. On October 6th, Wills complained to the Director of II Corps in Nha Trang that the Report treated not educational subject matter but ranged from "American intervention in Vietnam to garbage collection in Hanoi". He therefore urged more individual guidance for the young volunteers.

Will's complaint set off a discussion within IVS/VN as to its purpose

and authority, and finally required the intervention of USAID officials in Saigon.

The IVS staff regarded the complaint as an effort on the part of the PSA to control "what volunteers do and say". The IVS team leader stated that Wills was seeking to arrogate all decision making to himself, and that generally he was complicating USA/Vietnam relations in the province.

The Binh Thuan IVSers were being pressured to work with the Chieu Hoi (soldiers of the NLF who had defected), but had avoided participating in the psychological warfare aspects of the program. One of the volunteers was serving USAID part-time. They were eating at the USAID mess; when they began eating elsewhere after the complaint, this move was misinterpreted by Wills. The fact that Phan Thiet was ringed by insurgents, who recently had bombed the town's hotel, aggravated the total situation.

The matter was resolved in Saigon between the IVS and USAID staffs, on the basis of a Memorandum of Agreement dated March 3, 1965. Deputy Associate Director of USAID, Thomas E. Naughton, in a memo circulated September 20, 1966, noted, "the value of IVS involvement in Vietnam occurs as a direct result of their non-governmental status, and that their method of operation differs considerably from that of USAID. IVS personnel are more involved in the actual doing of a function, than advising Vietnamese officials in the doing. Additionally, a greater preponderance of their work and contacts are with non-GVN personnel". Throughout the debate, IVS staff insisted that USAID did not supervise IVS.

## The Mass IVS/VN Resignation
## 1967

During the summer of 1967, 49 IVSers signed a communication addressed

to President Johnson, protesting the war. The text of the letter was released on September 19th to The New York Times. In the ensuing period, twelve IVSers, including the entire Saigon IVS/VN staff resigned. The Director made a hasty trip to Saigon to consult with the American Ambassador. Communications were exchanged. The Ambassador expressed the hope that IVS would continue, but with the proviso that volunteers would engage in no political activities.

## The Tet and May Offensives, 1968

Despite the September resignations of IVSers, the team size continued to mount, so that by January 1968 there were 165-170 volunteers on the field. As a consequence of the violence, the insecurities, the capture of three volunteers, IVS/VN determined to reduce the team size by 50 per cent.

The consequence of this was the staff determination that there were limits to the size of the IVS/VN operation. The decision to reduce to 80 would indicate that this is about the maximum for a developmental opeartion in a country the size of Vietnam.

## Request for Security Report - 1968

In the Spring of 1968, perhaps as a consequence of the relative security that IVSers enjoyed, during the Tet Offensive, the Ministry of Agriculture requested a security report on IVS.

## Decision of "The Terrible Ten". 1968-1970

As IVS/VN concluded that its connections with USAID were vitiating its efforts to assist the Vietnamese people, the staff pressured IVS/W to

fund the operation from private sources. These discussions, which began at the Christmas 1968 staff meeting came to a head with the decision of ten volunteers to accept no further USAID salary. The failure of IVS/W to respond more positively to IVS/VN requests conditioned relations until the contract was terminated.

## The Hoa Hao Crisis
## 1970-1971

USAID Agricultural Advisor Thi claimed that the IVSers in Chau Lop were inciting the people against the GVN. Despite the presence of an outstanding team in the province, IVS pulled out rather than continue the disagreement with USAID.

The IVSers did not need to incite the people of Hoa Hao against the GVN - the distrust had existed since the days Diem became Premier. The many-splintered Hoa Hao religious movement had been involved politically since 1945 when the Japanese took over the administration of IndoChina. The Hoa Hao opposed Diem, seeking to preserve the authority and prerogatives in the area where they predominated. Diem reached an accommodation with the Hoa Hao leaders, granting them considerable control over the district and province administration, where they were strong, as a quid pro quo for supporting the GVN. Gerald C. Hickey pointed out, however, that despite official or unofficial agreements, "the ordinary Hoa Hao villager still is not loyal to the government - he supports his own leaders."@ The failure of the coop to function was one of the reasons the

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@Accommodation and Coalition in South-Vietnam, 1970. p.7.

IVS decided to withdraw after the allegations had been made.

IVS/VN Involvement in Politics

"Volunteers must be single-minded in their desire to help the people of their adopted country. This rules out political partisanship..." (Agents of Change, an IVS statement of purpose, policies, and history. 1966)

"It is important that..volunteers refrain from any political involvement in Vietnam." (Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Arthur Z. Gardiner, October 13, 1967).

IVSers have regarded themselves as "dispensers of ideas, attitudes and skills, not things". They have had concern for the people. They have "worked through traditional village leadership". While these appraoches may rule out "political partisanship," IVS efforts in Vietnam to influence ideas, to help the common people, and to work with village leadership were political acts.

USAID and the GVN insisted only that IVS refrain from making statements, or engaging in activities which related negatively to the war effort or policies. IVS being judged at these points, increasingly was found wanting. The escalation of IVS rhetoric paralleled the American build-up.

In the end, it was rhetoric rather than political activity, including the testimony of the Chief of Party before the Senate Sub-Committee on Refugees, which cast the die.

10 -IVS/VIETNAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS

a. IVSers helped establish the Quang Ngai Language Institute, which

replaced a CORDS-operated English Training Center. An IVSer directed the Institute and offered instruction until a Vietnamese director was secured. He then continued on the staff until the IVS contract was terminated. The Institute prospers today as a Vietnamese institution.

b. The Ea Kmat Seed Propagation Center at Ban Me Thuot was laid out, planned, cleared and started by the first IVS team. During the years since the GVN assumed the direction, its land size has increased to 400 hectares.

c. An IVSer started the first Mobile Science unit. This program soon was taken over by the Ministry of Education. By September 1971, twenty-four units were in operation.

d. An IVSer started the Eye Protection Project at Sa Dec, which now is operated under the Ministry of Education.

e. An IVSer, with the cooperation of OXFAM and SELA started the New Life Development in Saigon's districts Six and Seven. It later faded out.

f. The Shoe Shine House at Danang was begun and operated by IVSers until mid-1971, when Richard Hughes, who operates a similar House in Saigon, assumed responsibility for its financing. The project now is lodged in the former IVS House in Danang.

g. The Dai Tam Canal in Ba Xuyen, IVS was involved in the construction.

h. A low-lift water pump was devised by one IVSer and perfected by an IVS alumnus who at the time was with USAID.

i. The Peter Hunting Memorial Library was established in memory of the IVS martyr. Several other smaller school libraries continue in schools where IVSers taught.

j. The Hoa Hao project. The IVS-initiated cooperative involving ten hamlet groups continues. Loans secured for the purchase of equipment and water pumps were repaid.

k. Community Development Project in Ba Xuyen. An IVSer stimulated this community of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Chinese to construct a village school, gave assistance to an existing electrical cooperative, helped to make a community survey, and to the organization of a viable group of farmers.

l. Vinh Son Cooperative. In Binh Duong, thirty miles Northwest of Saigon, in a Roman Catholic village short of paddy, IVSers stimulated animal husbandry and the sinking of village wells. In May 1972, as refugees fled into the area from Binh Long Province, the hog and chicken projects and the wells were still functioning.

m. The introduction of miracle rice. IVS/VN was in the forefront in experimenting with and introducing the new varieties especially in Ba Xuyen.

n. Extension and training courses. IVS made a quantitative and qualitative impact upon the training of farmers, upon teacher training, and in manifesting an extra-curricular concern for their students.

o. IVS stimulated the organization of National Voluntary Service, which because of national mobilization virtually has disappeared, though the impact of the model continues to be felt by new youth associations.

p. The training of expatriate personnel for work in Vietnam. Approximately 40 IVS/VN alumni continue in Vietnam, most of them engaged in functions which require their use of Vietnamese. They are university teachers, reporters for American news media, executives in foreign corporations, in government service and on the staffs of other voluntary organizations. "IVSers are very much in demand because of their language proficiency," stated a TIME reporter who feels embarassed because he lacks this facility.

q. The training of Vietnamese experts for the USA. An unknown number of IVS alumni have continued their Vietnamese studies, and are now teaching in American institutions of higher learning. (Also in Japan and Australia).

## 11 - WHAT IVS/WASHINGTON CAN LEARN FROM THE IVS/VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

a. That personnel qualifications are crucial. The technical competence, emotional maturity, and capacity for empathy among the volunteers contributed much to the effectiveness of the IVS/VN program during the first decade. The fact that the first Chiefs of Party were older men, experienced, and save for John W. Barwick ( the first Chief of Party in Ban Me Thuot ), had been volunteers and could speak Vietnamese, provided the IVS/VN operation with stable leadership.

A noticeable disintegration of IVS/VN occurred after the mass resignations in 1967, not only because of the polarization within the team, but also "because we relaxed our screening processes," stated an IVS/VN staffer of that period. Technical competence, sensitivities to exotic cultures and peoples, and emotional maturity determine whether or not IVS programs can be effective. Even with volunteers screened for these characteristics, negative factors in the operating situation may doom the program. Without these qualities in the volunteers, the program will be ineffective despite conditions conducive to its success.

IVS should research the screening processes employed by othe international agencies for techniques designed to anticipate personality and/or psychological problems in applicants.

1. Technical competence. Background and education are two primary bases on which judgments must be made concerning applicants fresh out of university. Facilities for university telescoped courses in program areas to which volunteers are to be assigned should be explored.

2. Sensitivity. Volunteers must be able to relate to people and cultures that are foreign to their previous experiences. While the average volunteer in Vietnam did develop an empathy for the Vietnamese people, and proved himself able to relate at their cultural level, some there were who could not. Being able to live, eat, and work with the people without revealing any superiority attitudes is a sina quo non for volunteers working with Third World peoples.

3. Emotional Maturity. The game of "musical chairs" played in Vietnam, as staff sought to locate volunteers in places where they could be effective, and relate harmoniously with co-workers, was a time-consuming and expensive process. In some instances, there was no such possible personnel combinations. The emotional history of each volunteer should be researched prior to his appointment. No applicant should be appointed with personality disturbances "to reform him," as was done at least on one occasion.

4. Concept Preparation. Volunteers assigned to "development" should be given prior exposure to operational models in developing countires. American culture, institutions and traditions largely are irrelevant in the Third World. Thus the young volunteer must first unlearn what he knows in order to discover what he needs to know about the culture, institutions and traditions of the underdeveloped country he seeks to assist. IVSers gradually realized that they could not transplant the system with which they were familiar to Vietnam. But those who worked for only two years rarely learned in time what the developmental needs of Vietnam were or how they could be achieved. Even more important than a cram course in the cultivation of miracle rice, or in teaching English as a foreign language, the volunteers needed an understanding of the processes by which the total life of a young nation can be developed in accord with its own traditions.

b. The Assignment Process. IVS seeks applicants with particular skills to engage in specific country programs. Once in the land of his assignment, the volunteer may be routed around, depending upon the situation and needs. Frustration is the consequence of such moves, especially if a particular assignment does not interest the IVSer. Locations and work assignments therefore should be made on the basis of competence and interest as well as of need.

c. The Chief of Party. The IVS Chief of Party must have a variety of skills. As leader of the team, he must be able to inspire, direct, counsel, and discipline the members. He must devise and implement an overall program strategy so that there is a unity of impact in the team effort. He must deal with government bodies, and thus be sensitive to policies and personalities of those under whose authority IVS works. IVS/VN alumni regard the leadership qualities demonstrated by their respective Chiefs of Party as having been crucial in determining the effectiveness and even the fate of IVS/VN. The following filled this position in Vietnam (not including Par Danforth who functioned briefly as Chief of Party at Cai San).

John W. Barwick (1957-59), was appointed by the IVS Board. He had no prior experience in Vietnam nor did he know Vietnamese at the time of his arrival in country. The Program Officer of IVS, visiting at Ban Me Thuot, noted that Barwick had been an unfortunate choice. It would have been better, the Officer stated, to have permitted leadership to emerge from the initial team, than for Washington to have made a prior appointment. Program Officer reported that volunteer Gordon Brockmueller

was the "natural leader".

Gordon Brockmueller (1959-61) returned to Vietnam after home leave following his first term. He was married, and had children, the first having been born in Vietnam. His maturity, his agricultural competence, his administrative ability, and his "charisma" provided him with the authority requisite to serve effectively as second Chief of Party.

Don Luce (1961-67) was an agricultural volunteer of whom Program Officer Russell had written during Luce's first term, "He is cooperative loyal, and in no sense a trouble maker." A contemporary of Luce commented that he "was the first among the volunteers to achieve a good working knowledge of the Vietnamese language, even though he was excelled by others who came later." Though short of administrative skill, the knowledge of Vietnam which Luce had acquired, and his competence in dealing with government officials, gave this Chief of Party a prestige which was respected and acknowledged by the volunteers who worked under his authority.

Danny Whitfield (1967-69) had served as a volunteer in I Corps, both as CORDS Provincial Representative while with IVS, and later on the USAID staff. "Whitfield was without peer in his knowledge of Vietnamese," stated one of his co-staffers. The fact that he was a married man, with experience both in IVS and with USAID, enabled Whitfield to provide stability during the very difficult period when IVS/VN was seeking to reconcile the polarities in IVS/VN which had developed during the summer of 1967.

Hugh Manke (1969-71) became Chief of Party at a difficult time in the organization's life, and under far from favorable circumstances. The team and staff were polarized over the war issue. One group was convinced

that regardless of the limitations under which IVS/VN worked because of its USAID and GVN connections, continuance was preferable to withdrawal. Many of the alumni are convinced that IVS/VN should have toned down its peace activities and concentrated upon the tasks that could still have been done, rather than follow the line which in the end proved fatal to IVS/VN.

At the other extreme were those who regarded the IVS/VN dependence upon USAID as intolerable. They therefore insisted that IVS/W secure private funding to finance the operation, even though it might be necessary to reduce the team size. When IVS/W assigned one of the volunteers to seek private funding, Hugh Manke was appointed Chief of Party. The IVSers addressed personal letters to members of the IVS Board of Directors encouraging this action.

Manke believed that peace was the first priority, and lent his efforts to producing this result. Inevitably his position brought him into conflict with the GVN. His concentration upon ending the war meant that much of the Saigon administration was entrusted to his assistants, some of whom did not enjoy the confidence of all the volunteers. An aimlessness resulted, which further demoralized the already polarized IVS team. This aimlessness affected both performance and image, with the result that the responsible Minister in the GVN was able to fabricate excuses for terminating the contract. It is rumored that President Thieu himself took the action required to terminate the contract.

Manke was as much victim as responsible for the denoeument. A more mature leader might have weighed more carefully the values of institutional

preservation before taking steps which might destroy it. For years to come there will be those who will criticise and those who will justify Manke for the course he took. But as Chief of Party, what he did helped determine the IVS/VN destiny.

James Linn (1971) came to Vietnam in the summer of 1971 under the assumption that he would become Chief of Party upon the expiration of Hugh Manke's contract. By the time he reached Saigon it already was known that IVS was finished in Vietnam. Technically he did function as Chief of Party for a few days after the departure of Manke on August 23rd. Jonathan Howard and Young Chang Lai actually did the closing of the Saigon books and liquidated the IVS assets. Linn had served with IVS/VN during an earlier period, and had the qualifications to perform well as Chief of Party. He had been the Director's first choice in 1969 when Danny Whitfield's contract expired. Had the Director been insistent with respect to his choice the end results might have been different. This is one of the conjectural "what might have beens" IVS alumni will continue to debate.

James Linn is now Chief of Party in Laos.

d. Motivation of the Volunteers. Applicants for overseas service are motivated by a variety of factors. Appointees can function effectively in a country only if there is a general correspondence between their private purposes and the aims and objectives of IVS. IVS in turn must be clear and precise as to what its goal in order to screen and select volunteers from among applicants.

A high degree of idealism is essential for a volunteer to persist in the face of the handicaps and frustrations he inevitably encounters

in a developing country. The nationals will scrutinize and misunderstand his purposes. The volunteer must therefore be certain as to why he has come, and what he is there to do.

Initially, IVS screened volunteers as to their religious backgrounds. All members of the original IVS/VN team were Protestants, who were put to work among Roman Catholics. Their clients tended to misunderstand the zeal and drives of the agricultural technicians. The IVSers were required under these circumstances to insist that they were not in Vietnam to make a christian witness but to raise the peoples' living standards through agricultural and community development.

The agricultural technicians gradually came to realize that economic development as a goal was inadequate. Working in a people-to-people relation, the IVSers discovered the importance of human factors which were outside the area of economics. They perforce dealt with the superiority feelings of the ethnic Vietnamese against the Montagnards, and the consequent hostilities of the Montagnards against the ethnic Vietnamese. They experienced the authority exercised by the Roman Catholic priests over their village members. Buddhists did not hold the same high respect for President Diem as did the Roman Catholic refugees from the North. The IVSers developed an appreciation for the peoples with whom they worked, thus strengthening their motivation and effecting a revision in their own purposes.

Other voluntary agencies in Vietnam tended to concentrate their efforts upon refugee relief and service with a consequent wide diffusion of programs and operations. IVS' concentration upon development sharpened its program focus, even though it did expand its program at

times to include refugee relief and services. Thus IVS could claim to be helping people help themselves rather than just "helping people".

e. Language Study. Thanks to the IVS/VN emphasis upon language mastery, the volunteers excelled - relatively speaking - in their ability to communicate with the people. They achieved this competence not alone from concentrated study, but also from their living with or at least near the people. The necessity for communication under such circumstances produced many volunteers who were quite at home in the languages they used.

The one large Protestant mission agency from the USA operating in Vietnam likewise emphasizes language study, but its appointees anticipate years and even a lifetime in which to perfect their linguistic skills. IVSers had but two years in which to develop some language proficiency and to fulfill their goals in Vietnma.

f. Identification. The Caucasian westerner is an object of interest and scrutiny in any land where the people are of a darker pigment. The American in Vietnam also stood out by virtue of his living modes, his transport, his clothing, and his size. Such factors inhibit identification with the people, no matter how high the degree of motivation. Many of the IVSers sought to transcend such limitations by living simply, eating Vietnamese food, and even adopting Vietnamese clothing. The IVS move in later years to eschew PX and APO privileges was dictated by a desire to accept the limitations of living in Vietnam as the people do. While it could not be claimed that IVS as an organization achieved its ideal, the very fact of the endeavor did enable

volunteers to enter into a closer relationship with the people than was possible for many Americans during that same period. A member of the IVS Board held before the volunteers the wisdom of Lao Tse, who 2600 years ago wrote:

> A leader is best
> When people barely know he exists.
> When his work is done,
> His aim fulfilled,
> They will say, "We did this ourselves."

g. Politics. The IVS/VN assets proved to be of no value for purposes of contract renegotiation when the organization's leadership had become outspoken concerning political and military matters. The IVS/VN experience therefore raises questions for IVS/W with respect to its innovating or continuing programs in countries where idealists are likely to find themselves ideologically opposed to the host government and its policies. The problem is compounded if in such a country, the IVS contract is being funded by the USG as an element of its economic aid and technical assistance program there. IVS/W should develop guidelines and criteria to determine its policies with respect to working in such countries:

1. What is or will be the relation of IVS/X to the USG/X? Are IVSers regarded or to be regarded by USG/X as junior technicians in the USAID program?

2. Will IVS/X staff have sufficiently close contact with the "X" government ministires to be kept informed concerning policy, and to develop

sensitivity to issues and personalities?

3. Will other expatriate personnel in "X" country overshadow the IVS team, making the volunteers irrelevant or redundant?

4. Are there political, military or ideological factors operating in "X" country which will bring idealistic young Americans into serious conflict with the government or other vested interests?

5. Are USG policies in adjacent lands proving embarrassing to or being criticised by "X" government?

6. Will IVS be permitted to recruit and appoint volunteers who are not American citizens?

7. What is the real purpose and authority for the invitation? Is the inviting body or ministry sufficiently stable to continue in power for some time?

8. Will IVS contract relations in other countries be a limitation upon the IVS work in "X" country?

9. Are expatriate personnel needed to do the work in "X" country for which IVS is being invited? That is, are there reasons or factors other than lack of indigenous technical expertise which have produced the invitation?

Invitations to work in other countries should be weighed in the light of the answers to questions such as these.

## 12 - RECOMMENDATIONS

Government, the military, and the churches have statements of purpose and critera for testing their overseas operations. Personnel is recruited and commisioned to work towards predetermnied goals and within

stated guidelines.

IVS/VN lacks clearly stated objectives, and fails to provide adequate supervision for volunteers. This became obvious after the build-up of the IVS/VN team size in 1962. The fact that Vietnam was in the headlines attracted some volunteers who proved to be liabilities rather than assets for IVS/VN.

We therefore recommend that the IVS team in each country, under the guidance of IVS/W, institute planning and management procedures for purposes of strengthening staff administration. Planning should be both for short - and long-terms.

For country IVS teams so to function, each should

a. Define its purposes, and establish guidelines designed to achieve the objectives. These should be in accord with those established by IVS/W, the policies of the host government, and of the sponsoring organization, if any.

b. Relate total IVS resources to the fulfillment of stated objectives. Staff recruitment should be done in the light of these objectives.

c. Institute an evaluation process which tests performance against objectives, according to established guidelines.

IVS/W requires the services of an evaluation expert whose function it would be to provide regular, scheduled performance evaluations. The evaluations IVS now makes are through the quantification of data and subjective comments by volunteers. Some of the IVSers compile monthly, quarterly, semi-annually reports on their activities. These are studied

by team leaders, Chiefs of Parties, who also periodically visit the volunteers in situ. The volunteers follow no specifications in preparing these reports, and some do not bother to report. Yet those which were made constitute the major data on which perforce we have based the IVS/VN story.

We therefore recommend the employment by IVS/W of a systems analyst to conduct this continuous evaluation process, checking performance and accomplishments of volunteers against goals and objectives.

# CHAPTER II

## THE SETTING

1. The IVS Purpose
2. The Political and Military Context of IVS/Vietnam
3. Rationale for the U. S. Government's Involvement in Vietnam
4. The Importance of AID in the U. S. Strategy
5. The AID Context of IVS/Vietnam
6. Vietnam Before IVS
7. Expectations
    a. By the U. S. Government
    b. By ICA/USOM/USAID
    c. By the Government of Vietnam
    d. By IVS

## 1. The IVS Purpose

The 1953 Charter of International Voluntary Services, Inc., stated that it was established "to utilize the services of volunteers on an organized basis to combat hunger, poverty, disease, and illiteracy in the underdeveloped areas of the world and thereby further peace, happiness, and the prosperity of the people thereof".

An early IVS Statement of Purpose expounded the Charter:

> IVS was founded in 1953 to provide close contact with village people. Secretary of State Dulles had indicated an 'enlarged role for individuals as against governments'. The Act for International Development which established the Point IV Program provided for private agency participation in development. IVS has been a mechanism for coordinating governmental and private agency efforts at village levels, using background knowledge and expertise in the fields of agriculture, health, education, home economics and home construction. The expatriate personnel are trained to use the language(s) of the people with whom they work.

In 1956, IVS stated that its purposes were to:

1. Provide a structure capable of employing young American idealists who were desirous of helping peoples of the Third World, by drawing upon support funds from governments, foundations, etc.

2. Engage in rural development in the Third World.

3. Supply the government(s) and other agencies with a cadre of trained technicians who had demonstrated a capacity to engage in development under alien conditions.

In September, 1959, the Program Officer outlined the functions of IVS in even greater detail:

1. IVS recruits outstanding young Americans and sends them abroad.

2. The recruits have competence and skills required by the contracting organizations.

3. This overseas experience proves, tests and trains future foreign service officers and world-minded citizens.

4. Volunteers "learn the language and ways of the people, live with the people, and create friendship and understanding of the US and the American people".

5. IVSers impact the life and economy of the people so that results carry over after their departure.

6. IVS enlists "private and religious organizations, foundations and individuals in a cooperative program in foreign service".

7. IVS organizes the people at the village grass roots level, fostering self-help programs in a continuing process of development.

These statements sufficed for IVS/VN for a decade. However, there long had been pressure from within the IVS/VN team to expand the expatriate personnel to include non-US citizens, and to broaden the base of support. After experiments with a number of volunteers of other nationalities, a compromise agreement was reached between IVS and USAID providing that twenty percent of the team might be non-Americans. The support of the IVS program in Vietnam had been, from the beginning, provided by the USG and the GVN; International Voluntary Services, Inc./Washington had been unsuccessful in raising substancial funds for the program elsewhere; after 1967, a considerable number of the volunteers in Vietnam began to pressure IVS/W to secure private funding.

As a consequence of negotiations extending over several years, the IVS Board meeting of February, 1971, voted to aim "towards 51% of total

funding from sources other than the USG," and to "seek to become more multinational character". This new IVS policy was a direct consequence of pressures primarily from IVS/VN and secondarily from IVS/Laos.

The 1967 crisis, and the pressures from IVS/VN upon the Board of Directors, can be understood only in the light of political and military developments in Vietnam.

## 2. The Political and Military Context of IVS/VN

The contract IVS/W signed with ICA (later USAID) provided support for the IVS operation in Vietnam. In 1956, the USG'sinvolvement in Vietnam was minimal. The relations between IVS/VN and the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) were cordial. Such was the effectiveness of the IVS/VN operation that pressures were applied by MAAG to increase the team size. IVSers generally were in agreement with the US foreign policy aims. Many volunteers, upon completion of their IVS contracts, accepted positions with USAID and other governmental organizations.

IVS/VN regarded itself as assisting the struggling GVN -- but two years of age in 1956 -- to achieve viability and the strength to survive. IVS/VN accepted for itself the same limitations vis-a-vis the GVN that MAAG reconized: the GVN was host. Even though the GVN was uncertain as to the role or the potential of IVS/VN, de facto accreditation by ICA (USAID) was proof of its value. As the GVN gained strength and certainty, and as insurgency became more threatening, the GVN changed policies as well as demands upon IVS/VN

Thus for a decade, IVS/VN adapted its operations and programs to the

demands made by ICA/USAID and by the GVN. These demands were expressed both by the Saigon offices, and by SPAs. IVS/VN frequently was caught between the known desires of the villagers and the policies of the governments.

The IVS/VN role was diminished, at least quantitatively, after the beginning of the US military build-up. IVSers generally reacted negatively to the massive US military force. They resented the uprooting of the farmers and their removal to refugee camps to create "free fire zones". They were unable to plan or execute long-range development goals with women, old men and young boys as primary clients. They witnessed the death and destruction wrought by US bombs. While painfully aware of the cruelties of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Viet Cong (VC), the IVSers identified a correlation between the US military build-up and the injustices suffered by the people. Many IVSers developed a resentment against the US war effort; USAID was an element of the war machine; they as volunteers were paid by USAID; therefore they expressed resentment against their source of support.

Actions and statements of certain IVSers became increasingly embarrassing to USAID and to the GVN. Volunteers participated in peace demonstrations and refused certain privileges — commissary, PX, APO -- to demonstrate their independence of USAID. These were minority actions, even as was the signing of the letter addressed to President Johnson in the summer of 1967. But they focused international attention upon the entire organization.

### 3. Rationale for the U. S. Government's Involvement

In retrospect it is apparent that the USG became involved with Vietnam for a variety of reasons: the Cold War, the overthrow of Chiang Kai Shek

by Mao Tse Tung, then the Korean War. Much of the early justifications was expressed in terms of the Truman Doctrine: "To contain communism; to halt aggression, to prove communist leaders that aggression cannot be made to pay; to support the 'right of a people to choose their own government'; to help the South Vietnamese realize their desire 'to live in the way they prefer'; to assist a helpless people 'to advance towards economic prosperity and social advancement."[1]

Speaking at John Hopkins University, President Johnson at the beginning of the US military buid-up (April 7, 1965), explained that the USA was determined to strengthen world order, to slow down aggression, and to improve the life of man in that "conflict torn corner of the world". "Our objective," he stated, "is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want...only...that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way."

More recently the US has stated that its objectives are to secure the release of US prisoners, and to provide the GVN with reasonable chance to survive. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in one of his addresses added that the American objective was to demonstrate to China that its "militant doctrine of world revolution" could not succeed.

The revelations of the Pentagon Papers and the recent detente with China would indicate that these were justifications rather than reasons. Nevertheless, they were operative for IVS/VN during its first decade. The

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[1]General Matthew B. Ridgeway in Foreign Affairs, July, 1971, pp. 576-7

volunteers generally accepted the USG aim to curb "the communist peril" and to assist the Vietnamese "to advance towards economic and social prosperity." Some of them concluded that the effects of US military intervention were counter-productive. Escalation was retarding rather than advancing the people economically and socially. One Chief of Party admitted that he had been a supporter of the war down to 1967, when he became aware of its evil effects. Another stated that even in 1967 he had not realized the political implications of the US military involvement.

The USG was committed to working through the GVN (whether led by Diem, the Junta, Ky or Thieu), which was fighting for its life. Since IVS/VN was working under USAID contract, it too accepted the principle that the GVN was its host. IVS/VN therefore sought to work within GVN structures, and to utilize them for the realization of its purposes.

The GVN resisted insurgency and aggression in an effort to survive. GVN methods frequently ran counter to the professed aims of creating a democratic, representative government. The USG brought pressures to bear upon each of the several regimes in Saigon to democratize procedures and eliminate governmental corruption. Increasingly, IVSers regarded the GVN as being more concerned with survival than with helping its people. They felt themselves incapable of advancing Vietnam economically and socially while operating under a government which did not demonstrate a similar concern.

### 4. The Importance of Aid in the U. S. Strategy

The importance of economic development was explicit in the assistance lent the French in 1950. The late Robert Blum, who from 1950 to 1954 headed

the United States Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM), believed economic and social change could defeat countryside insurgency provided the peasants were militarily secure. STEM was a CIA operation rather than related to the foreign service assistance bodies.

IVSers consciously or unconsciously aped the "Civic Action" cadres — 1,800 Vietnamese who dressed as the peasants, and worked and ate with the people. This organization was established by President Diem with the assistance of the Colonel Edward Lansdale. Lansdale during the years 1954-57 followed Blum's pattern in emphasizing economic and social development, as a means of countering the growth of communism in the South. Under Lansdale, the Field Service Division of the United States Operation Mission (USOM) directly assisted the GVN provincial authorities in the application of US aid. Following Lansdale's departure in 1957, aid passed through the Civic Action Directorate.

When President Eisenhower placed General J. Lawton Collins in charge of the U. S. Military Advisory Group (MAAG) to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) ,Feb. 12,1955, the emphasis changed from development to the creation of a police force capable of dealing with Communist subversion.

The scale of insurgency and the 1960 abortive coup d'etat in Saigon led the White House to send Lansdale out again to study the problem. His report led to the creation of an interagency Vietnam Task Force, which operating under the State Department, included personnel from the CIA, the US Information Agency (USIA), USAID, and the Department of Defense. A National Security Action Memorandum (No. 341)

in May 1961, led to the creation of a Special Group for Counter-Insurgency which in addtion to CIA, State, and Defense representatives also included the director of USAID.

The Special Group in mid-1961 sent a study mission to Vietnam, headed by Dr. Eugene Staley of Stanford Research Institute, to ascertain what was ailing the Vietnamese economy. Staley's assignment was to devise a plan whereby the GVN could rescue itself economically. The Mission produced a Joint Communique with the GVN on January 4, 1962, promising economic development and resettlement of peasants in "strategic hamlets". The subsequent failure of the "strategic hamlet" program following Diem's death could be attributed to the ignorance of Staley's team concerning the nature of the Vietnamese society.[2]

The Special Group then dispatched the Taylor Mission in October, 1961, to study military strategy. The result was to increase the number of U. S. advisors to ARVN from 685 as of the end of 1961 to 10,000 a year later. Presidential Advisor Walter W. Rostow, a member of theTaylor Mission, believed that the application of proper methods could enable an underdeveloped nation to develop into an industrial state.

This led to the revival and expansion, with US assistance, of the "Agroville" program Diem had introduced in 1959. By 1961 this program had failed, only to be replaced by Staley's "Strategic Hamlet" program. Ngo Dinh Nhu, who was put in charge stated, "My ambition is that the fortified hamlets may form a new approach to the saving of civilization.

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[2]Corson, The Great Betrayal, p.45.

It is better than trying to get progress as a gift of the capitalistic societies."[3] By September, 1962, Nhu announced that he had converted 3,325 hamlets out of the total 11,182 which were to be built. By the end of the year, the figure was said to be 4,077. The United States granted $100,000,000 for the further implementation of the program.

The assassination of President Diem on November 1-2, 1963, ended the time being the "Strategic Hamlet" pacification effort.

General Taylor, who became Ambassador June 23, 1964, favored GVN administration of US aid. During the year Taylor was Ambassador, the US Army and Marine units landed in Vietnam, and the Seventh Fleet began surveillance of the coastal waters (March, 1965). During Henry Cabot Lodge's year as US Ambassador, following General Taylor, the American policy was one of "cooperation", involving the creation of a "ring of steel" around Saigon.

The Honolulu Conference in 1966 rediscovered "rural pacification". The U. S. Government pledged funds to implement the policy. The support was for social revolution including land reform, which as some observers noted, was a return to the Lansdale formula. Even prior to Honolulu the GVN had instituted it own pacification program under the Rural Construction Ministry. Ambassador Lodge suggested the term "Revolutionary Development", which became incorporated in the original title MORD.

Xay Dung Nong Thon literally means "rural construction". The Ministry of Construction (Bo Xay Dung) in Vietnam is called the "Ministry

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[3]Charles Stevenson in Reader's Digest, March, 1962.

of Revolutionary Development" (MORD) for the benefit of Americans. A true Vietnamese could hardly use the term "revolution", which in his language means an "unmotivated flip-flop". "Revolution is a metamorphosis which occurs without cause, for in the seamless Confucian universe man can find no place to insert a lever under one particular world."[4]

The Rural Construction Council had been established by the GVN as a counterpart to the ad hoc Mission Council which Ambassador Taylor had organized to coordinate the various U. S. agencies. A Joint Council of the two groups was established in an abortive endeavor to coordinate their work.

When Lodge again replaced Taylor as Ambassador, General Westmoreland was given full authority over the military operations, and Lodge over everything else. On February 17, 1966, Ambassador Lodge designated Deputy Ambassador William Porter, a career Foreign Service Officer, to be in charge of the "training and installation of health, education and agricultural workers and of community organizer." In overseeing and directing the "technical operations", Porter did create a forum where the problems of pacification could be identified and proposed solutions discussed.

As a consequence of the Manila Conference (November 24-25, 1966), Lodge established the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), to unify the total U. S. pacification effort, integrating all US civilian programs and people working in the rural areas by combining them under a single

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[4] Frances FitzGerald, "The Struggle and the War", The Atlantic, August, 1957, pp. 73-4.

management. The plan provided for a US senior civilian to be responsible for all civilian operations in each province and region. The Deputy USAID Director, Wade Lathram, was named Director of Civil Operations. Regional directors were given full control over all American civilians in their respective regions. Four months later, in April, 1967, President Johnson moved responsibility for pacification from the State Deaprtment to the Department of Defense. He named his special assistant for Vietnam, Robert Komer, as director of CORDS, and Deputy COMUSMACV (Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam), to General Westmorland.

During most of the period 1946-71, the US policy explicitly recognized the importance of economic development as a means for the achievement of its aims, however they may have been stated at a particular time. Despite the claim of IVS to be a voluntary organization, its dependence upon the US Government for support made it subject to demands which the USG might make of it. The fact that IVS/VN had an office for much of this period in the USAID headquarters, the fact that at one period IVSers doubled as provincial representatives for USAID, the fact that from time to time IVSers were seconded to the US operation for specialized tasks, created a relationship which had political significance. As the USAID operation became increasingly military in purpose, the IVS/VN attempt to maintain its independence was weakened.

In the chronology of IVS/VN operations, there is a parallel between its staff development (down to Tet in 1968) and the policies instituted by the U. S. Government. When community development was stressed, IVS/VN was encouraged to expand its "community development"

specilalists. When the strategic hamlet program was instituted, with a school at the center ideally of each hamlet, the educational force of IVS was expanded, even though IVSers taught primarily in the provincial high schools. The history of IVS/VN can be understood, therefore, only in the light of the history of the US invovement in Vietnam.

## 5. The "AID" Context of IVS/VN

The Act for International Development was approved by President Truman on June 5, 1950. The Act authorized the execution of technical cooperation program designed to enable the peoples of underdeveloped areas to increase living standards through better utilization of human and material resources. Its emphasis was upon building economic strength. This Act dated back to Point IV of the President's inaugural address on January 20, 1949.

The Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), a unit within the Department of State, began to implement the Point IV proposals in the autumn of 1950.

The Mutual Security Agency (MSA), established in 1951 after the Korean War began, shifted US concern from economic growth to defense support. TCA was under the general supervision of the Director for Mutual Security.

TCA and MSA were merged in 1953 as the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) with the Pentagon being responsible for the military program.

FOA was superceded in 1954 by the International Cooperation

Administration (ICA), a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State.

Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of November, 1951, foreign aid operations have been centered in AID.

The stance of IVS/VN at any given time has been complicated by changing emphases within the foreign aid program. A number of rationales have been adduced to justify the AID program. The priority given to the particular aid purpose at a given moment has conditioned the IVS/VN operation.

Foreign aid as "Lend Lease", which dated from the beginning of World War II, was primarily for defense. Beginning in 1947, the USA stimulated the establishment of a network of mutual defense alliances. Weapons, equipment, training and economic support were provided to allies by the USA. The defense aspect of foreign aid was a response to the Cold War. IVS began its negotiations for contracts in Indo-China during the period foreign aid was administered by the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), which comprehended both military and economic aid programs.

Foreign aid also is justified in terms of an economic rationale. The US recognizes that its own economic well-being is dependent upon the sustained economic development of other countries, for only such can participate in an expanding world commerce or supply the USA with necessary raw materials.

Foreign aid has a political justification. Various programs have been undertaken to enable the developing nations to achieve the strength

and stability to survive. Foreign aid, in varying proportions of economic and military assistance, has been designed to supplement and complement what the nations could do for themselves.

The idealistic dimension of foreign aid has been its humanitarian aspect. The USA has been a "missionary" nation, nurtured by religious and political purposes since the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers. The American tradition of helping the poor and the needy was incorporated into law through the Point IV Program. The USA admitted to a "grandeur of spirit and morality of purpose" in its efforts to help the Third World Peoples raise themselves from their poverty levels. Vice-President Henry Wallace, invited in 1946 to address a national student conference on foreign assistance declined, saying, "The last time I spoke on that subject, Clara Booth Luce taunted me that I wanted to give milk to the Hottentots." The Cold War hysteria of 1949 saved President Truman from any such accusations.

The IVS/VN volunteers were motivated in varying degrees by each of these foreign purposes, though IVS as an organization was created primarily to achieve humanitarian goals.

Initially, IVS/VN sought to implement this humanitarian purpose through programs of economic development. Economic development is the process by which per capita gross national product is increased. IVS/VN never relinquished the aim of assisting the individual Vietnamese family to improve living standards, though the concentration of the volunteers for a time in agricultural experimental stations involved them in a national effort. Whether working with individuals or in

institutions, the IVS volunteer sought to help the Vietnamese achieve technological, social and economic change. He discovered that this was a complicated process, involving the creation of awareness and understanding, the encouragement of initiative and the will to "self-help" -- all without destroying the cultural values of the Vietnamese.

Economic development proved difficult. The volunteer confronted an unfamiliar environment, which required that he relearn what he had been taught in the university. Many Vietnamese were either ill of health, or lacked the energy to respond to the IVSers initiatives. Despite a war-time situation the population was mushrooming. While Vietnam formerly had been a food exporting nation, due to war-time rural insecurities, food for the people was being imported. The IVSer's initial assignment: improve food production. There was a high degree of Vietnamese illiteracy but a will to learn to which the volunteer responded. The Vietnamese infrastructures were both inadequate to support the innovations of modernization; they also were being weakened by war-time measures by and on the GVN. By the volunteer's standards the people with whom he worked lived below the poverty level. Many were in debt. There were too few trained managers, so before he could work under Vietnamese leadership, he had to train administrators.

The IVSer in Vietnam recognized this diversity of need, and sought to work within it, relating to specific needs according to his competencies. The early IVSer was effective in his activities for the following reasons:

1. He approached the task idealistically. Thus he injected a will and an energy into the situation which more blase technicians lacked.

2. He lived on the level of the people with whom he was working. He studied and sought to speak and understand their languages. He avoided identification with the American business and military community.

3. He was supervised by peers who already had done what he was seeking to do. The IVS/VN structure which drew its staff from the cadre of experienced volunteers gave the volunteer during the first twelve years confidence in his leadership.

4. He recognized and was content to work within the definition of his assignment, which was to execute "on the lowest level, in the village and person-to-person, on the job, in the classroom or on the farm, the objectives of US foreign policy that the American Embassy and USAID were executing at the national level". This acceptance continued well into 1967, and for many of the volunteers until the contract was terminated.

The IVS/VN operation allegedly provided the model for the organization of the Peace Corps, which TIME called "the greatest single success of the Kennedy administration". IVS/VN therefore made staff adjustments and expanded its program to approximate the services in Vietnam that the Peace Corps would have rendered. Among the Peace Corps volunteers, approximately 50 percent were engaged in education, 25 percent in community development, 10 percent in agriculture, another 10 percent in health activities, and the remaining 5 percent in a variety

of jobs.

The IVS/VN team never reached these proportions, agriculture, education and community development each making up approximately one third of the team prior to the Tet Mou Than Offensive in February, 1968.

## 6. Vietnam Before IVS

IVS entered no empty world in Vietnam. A variety of crops, and especially rice, had been grown for centuries. The French had introduced several kinds of seeds, plants and animals during their period of colonial rule. The GVN inherited a Ministry of Agriculture, and various experimental stations from the colonial period. Traditional agriculture and

animal husbandry were conditioned among the ethnic Vietnamese by belief in geomancy, according to which, spirits abide everywhere and in everthing. Therefore any new line of action should be so taken as not to disturb the spirits. The welfare of the family is held to be more dependent upon the goodwill of the dead than upon the activities of the living. Geomancy also enabled the villager to attract favorable cosmological influences.[5] Villages and hamlets had their own guardian spirits. Therevada and Mahayana Buddhism, Roman Catholicism, the Hoa Hao and several Cao Dai sects, as well as Protestant presences in varying combinations conditioned the villagers' openness to change. These were some of the givens the IVS/VN volunteers encountered when they came to the villages.

Villagers in the same hamlet employed different kinds of seeds and methods of agriculture, according to their personal tastes, market demands, the degree of shade on their fields, the availability of water and the slope of the land. A given experiment thus demonstrated only that under those particular conditions would a given seed, plant or tree grow well. The volunteers were unable to conduct experiments which would produce seeds for all situations. The traditions, tastes, religion, and general agricultural situation of a particular village, hamlet or farmer affected the effectiveness of the IVSers' work.

Governmental experiments, even those conducted by IVS/VN, included both successes and failures. In 1956, the year the first volunteer arrived, the Government of South Vietnam introduced tilapia a fast breeding fish from the Philippines. The experiment lasted but two years.

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[5] Gerald Cannon Hickey, Village in Vietnam, pp. 38-9.

Farmers believd that they would not multiply under such hot conditions, or survive the brackish waters of the dry season. They were thought to have a peculiar flavor and to be susceptible as disease carriers. The NLF circulated reports that the fish was a carrier of leprosy, tuberculosis, etc.

Volunteers made several efforts to establish cooperatives. This was in line with national governmental policy. In December, 1958, President Diem established "The Farmers' Association". Under this decree, units were to be established in the villages, to which members would pay a fee of 10$VN monthly. In turn, they were to be able to purchase fertilizer cheaply and to engage in group marketing. The organization also was to conduct political instruction with respect to the Communist menace". Thanks to the slowness of program implementation, rising insecurity and ennui of the villagers, the promise of the Farmers' Association were not realized.

Another governmental approach to village aid was through agricultural credit programs, beginning in 1955. In 1956 credit was made available for the purchase of buffalo imported from Thailand. The National Agricultural Credit Office (NACO) began operating on the village level in mid-1958. To qualify, a recipient was required to be a resident of the village, an active farmer, a small landowner or tenant, and in need of credit. Interest was set at one percent per month. Repayments on these loans generally was satisfactory, though tardy. These NACO loans, where they were extended, generally were well received by the villagers.

The Central Party organization of the National Revolutionary Movement in 1958 distributed fertlizer to district party offices for village use. Prices were below what was being charged in the market. Both members and non-members were eligible to purchase. Since members were extended partial credit, membership in the National Revolutionary Movement increased.

"Phep vua thau le lang" is an ancient Vietnamese proverb meaning "The laws of the emperor yield to the customs of the village," or "The authority of the emperor stops at the village hedge". Down to 1904, the French had not concerned themselves with village political affairs. Legislation of that date sought to bring the village and central administrations closer together. The positions traditionally held by the village elders were altered by statute. L927 legislation broadened the base of eligibility for membership on the Village Council. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Viet Minh organized administrative committees in every village, each of the six members being selected from the Viet Minh cadre. This was replaced the following year (January, 1946) by the reestablishment of French colonial control. In 1949 the French decreed that Village Council members should be appointed by the provincial committee. Bao Dai's government in 1953 legislated universal suffrage, returning the rights to elect the Village Council to the citizens of each village. This law was reversed in 1956 when the Secretary of State at the Presidency ordered the provincial committees to appoint the Village Councils. Between 1956 and 1962, the Saigon government introduced new features in its control over village councils. Officials were required to receive a month's training, their duties were brought into line with the war policies of Saigon, and salaries were

increased. The hamlet chiefs, selected by the village councils, remained unchanged. These changes after 1953 were not well received, for they violated the ancient principle of village autonomy. Officials complained they had been reduced to civil servants. Insecurity made these positions less than attractive. Many chiefs were kidnapped and killed. Some had to vacate their homes at night, sleeping in the towns, to escape the NLF.

The Village Council in Vietnam related to agriculture in a number of ways. The Council communicated information concerning agriculture to higher authorities. It received information and disseminated it to villagers. The Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Credit Programs required Village Council cooperation. The Coucil usually was involved in organizing village cooperatives -- the IVS volunteers recognized the necessity of utlizing and strengthening them. The government called upon the councils to assist in organizing the Farmers' Association units. Matters relating to agriculture referred to councils by higher governmental units included such items as:

1. The district chief might inquire concerning the number of and total amount of agricultural credit loans.

2. The interprovince tax inspector might inquire concerning communal land, waste land, idle land, and the number of uninhabited houses.

3. The Agrarian Reform Agency might inquire how many landlords held more than 100 hectares.

4. A provincial agency might inquire concerning the number of houses, buffalo, cattle, etc.

5. The Provincial Agricultural Service might inquire about the

amount of the last paddy harvest, and the amount earmarked for sale outside the village.

6. Civil Action might require the Council to make a census of income, living standards, educational facilities, etc.

Such demands being made upon councils -- approximating 30 to 80 a year -- of villagers whose education usually was not above the primary level, posed a heavy burden upon persons whose major occupation was agriculture. Any wonder then that a district chief might complain that statistical information was "pulled from the sky".

Fatalism is a common characteristic among Asian peoples. They may reason that struggle is important against the cosmological forces which encompass them. The Vietnamese leaven their fatalism with pragmatism. While they are skeptical with respect to innovations -- such as new methods, seeds, etc. -- they will accept technological change when they have been convinced of its economic advantage. It was this open-mindedness to change which enabled the IVS volunteers, by demonstrating the increased productivity of certain varieties of seed and animals, and new methods of animal husbandry, to obtain positive responses. This same flexibility of the Vietnamese is demonstrated by their developing culturally prescribed methods of dealing with sickness, while insisting that disharmony with universal order is the ultimate cause.

The early IVS volunteers distinguished themselves by establishing a dozen experimental farms. But theirs were not complete innovations. For instance, there was a governmental nursery at My Tho, southwest of Saigon. The Asia Foundation established an experimental garden at Khanh

Hau in 1958. Thus the IVSers did not stand alone, nor did they enter a society which had no previous experience with experiment and agricultural development.

## 7. Expectations

Volunteer service was not new when IVS was founded in 1953. Great Britain and Austalia at least operated programs overseas which stimulated American churchmen to found the USA body.

Several U. S. church mission boards operated volunteer service programs, but these generally were related to the work of overseas churches and their institutions. IVS was designed to utilize religious motivation, but to exclude working through churches or religious proselytizing.

The American Friends Service Committee, the Mennonite Central Committee, and the Brethren Service Committee -- all related to the so called historic "peace churches" -- operated service programs abroad, but each was limited by its small constituency. Representatives of these three bodies were among the founders of IVS. The IVS expectation was that new funds could be tapped to finance a much larger operation than was possible for religious bodies. The terms of the Point IV program indicated the possibility of securing USG support. Iraq was the first country to which IVS sent a team under FOA contract. At the time the agreement was signed for Vietnam, negotiations were in process for a number of other countries as well.

So large did the IVS/VN team become, so well received were the

volunteers in Vietnam during the first decade, IVS expected the indefinite continuance of the program. During the years 1967-71, the problems connected with the Vietnam program loomed high on the Board's priority list — taking a disproportionate percentage of meeting and staff time and energy.

a. The U. S. Government's Expectations of IVS/VN

The several USG aid agencies to which IVS/VN related at different times changed their expectations as the US involvement in Vietnam increased. What the aid unit in Washington expected; what its mission in Saigon wanted; what the contract officer expected; and what USAID PSAs hoped for are known only to the agencies and their representatives. At this juncture we are limited in our examination to policy statements, specific pressures, and interpretations made by IVS/VN. Our reconstruction from the IVS/VN perspective necessarily is theoretical. Only through interviews with representatives of the agencies and by a study of USAID documents could an authoritative analysis be made of USG expectations of IVS/VN.

As the volunteers demonstrated their technical skills and were dispersed to the various experimentation stations, ICA and later USAID apparently came to regard the volunteers as junior technicians supplementing the activities of the aid organization. This assumption was confirmed by the willingness of a number of the volunteers for a time to double as USAID representatives in their respective provinces.

During both of these periods, ICA/USAID apparently regarded IVS/VN

as one of several voluntary organizations implementing, on the local and village level, the emerging aims and purposes of ICA/USAID and the GVN. An implicit assumption also was that the presence of a corps of idealistic Americans, living in the villages and teaching in the schools, would demonstrate the integrity of the USG intent in Vietnam.

The fact that USAID employed the volunteers in responsible positions, and employed them as staff after the expiration of their IVS contracts demonstrated the fulfillment of these expectations during the first decade.

USAID apparently assumed that these same Americans, who had served so loyally and effectively during the first ten years, and who had accepted official explanations for the American presence, would continue to do so during the period of military escalation. IVS/VN as an organization frustrated this expectation. Even though many of the volunteers in 1967 did not register dissent, the vocalizing of resentments by some of the staff of IVS/VN set a pattern for the entire operation. IVS/VN increasingly refused thereafter to cooperate in the realization of the USG expectation.

b. ICA/USOM Expectations of IVS/VN

1. Initially: FOA and ICA in negotiating the original contract expected IVS/VN to lend assistance to the resettlement of refugees from the North in areas surrounding Saigon.

This expectation was not realized to any considerable degree, because IVS was unwilling to recruit the large number of teams originally requested. Only two teams were sent, to two locations. The one in the

South, at Cai San, was terminated after less than six months because of "security" reasons. The team in the North, near Ban Me Thuot, soon requested a transfer from refugee work to agricultural development.

2. Mid-Term: From 1958 to 1965, AID/USOM requested and were provided services by IVS/VN in the fields of agricultural development, education and community development. The GVN requested an increasing number of volunteers; UASID officials reported satisfaction with IVS performance in the expanded programs of agricultural and community development and education.

The turning point in relations between IVS/VN and USAID was the decision made in Washington in the spring of 1965 to send combat troops to Vietnam. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor warned against what might be entailed by the dispatch of US Marines to Danang, which marked a transfer of the US role from security operations and a support role, to active combat.

This change in US policy also stimulated the peace movement in the USA, which in turn affected the attitudes of new volunteers. The IVSers' growing awareness of the implications of these changes, transformed IVS from a cadre of junior de facto USAID technicians into an operation increasingly critical of the US military role. Whereas up to March, 1965, they had interpreted "development" primarily in economic terms, thereafter they began to emphasize other dimensions, such as "social justice", "liberation", and "human dignity". This was a gradual process; not until mid-1967 were the implications of this IVS/VN shift to become evident to USAID.

3. Termination: From 1967 until the termination of the IVS/VN

Contact in 1971, relations generally were unsatisfactory. IVS/W sought to repair the damage done by the criticisms made by IVS/VN in the summer of 1967. Plans were even made for the continuing enlargement of the number of volunteers. But IVS/VN purposes ran counter to the changed US policy in Vietnam. The large number of district advisors assigned by USAID overshadowed the IVSers. The decision made to place all voluntary agency staff under OCO in 1966 made mandatory an alteration in IVS administration, and reduced the freedom of the volunteers to seek those changes in Vietnamese society which they regarded as being important. While many of the volunteers were content to continue their assistance to the Vietnamese people, others became critical of the compromises involved for IVS/VN in its relations with USAID. The decision of the USG to become an active participant in the war changed the conditions under which IVS/VN operated. IVS/VN refused to accomodate to those changes; some of the provincial advisors were critical of the volunteers' performance. The GVN was so intent upon its own survival the responsible officials took less and less cognizance of the IVS presence. Since IVS/VN refused to accomodate itself to the war-time situation, its usefulness to USAID/CORDS declined.

c. What the GVN Expected of IVS/VN

Vietnam had no prior experience by which to judge the pretensions and efforts of IVS. The culture was Confucian-Buddhist, neither of which religious systems offered a precedent for people sacrificing to help others who were not their own. Buddhism interpreted benevolence as a merit-gaining activity. Thus if one man helped another, his motivation was to help himself. IVS perforce had to create an image completely at

variance with Vietnamese culture to be understood for what it was.

The villagers and students with whom the volunteers worked inevitably were suspicious initially of the young Americans (and later of other nationals), who came saying they wanted to help. It was only in person-to-person contacts and at specific places that these suspicions were overcome. The low profile maintained by IVS throughout the almost fifteen years of operation prevented such understanding even becoming known nationally.

The volunteers experienced several handicaps in making clear their basic motivation and purpose:

1. They were related officially to an arm of the USG, which after 1966 was the power behind whoever ruled in Saigon. Thus any feeling which villagers and students had towards the US military machine inevitably was expressed against the volunteers -- until such time as the latter were able to make their position clear.

2. Their life-style did not appear to the Vietnamese as being sacrificial. While compared with the standards in the homeland the volunteers were living simply, most of them still lived better than did the people among whom they worked. They were able to rent houses; they had funds with which to purchase food; they rode in jeeps. Relative to the economic level of the Vietnamese, they were unable to cite their sacrifice as evidence of motivation.

3. As representatives of a miracle-working technological culture, the volunteers were expected to be able to do most anything. The blind

man believed they could help him recover his sight.[6] The volunteers, being the only Americans known to villagers and students, were regarded as trainers who would prepare the Vietnamese for positions somewhere in the affluent American establishment, or could obtain food, building materials, etc., from the Americans. So while IVS/VN itself had no funds and little materiel to distribute, the volunteers were regarded as potential channels of material aid from the USG sources.

4. The very selflessness of the volunteers made their presence and activities suspicious. Since they appeared to want nothing for themselves, they must be motivated by or paid to be there for some sinister purpose. Were they spies? Were they undercover agents? Only in person-to-person contacts was it possible for individual volunteers to break through the wall of distrust.

5. The GVN accepted IVS/VN as an arm of USAID. USAID arranged the contract, and provided both the US dollars for salaries, and made available to the GVN ministry the piasters which it in turn paid to the volunteers. Until such time as the anti-war and political acitivties of IVS became an embarrassment to the GVN, the Saigon government accepted the volunteers because of their relations with ICA/USAID. The Vietnamization program of the current USG administration made it possible for the GVN to take action against one of the USAID-recognized volunteer agencies.

d. What IVS Expected From the Vietnam Contract

IVS anticipated that Vietnam would be able to accomodate a number of idealistic young Americans who were concerned to "do something"

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[6] IVS TAP SAN, Vol. LL, No. 10, 1970, pp. 33-37.

constructive in the Third World. This expectation was realized, with IVS providing more than 750 man-years during its years of operation.

IVS as an organization starting in Vietnam with but three years of experience expected that the three Indo-China programs would be a proving ground for the IVS philosophy. Vietnam proved to be the country in which IVS engaged in a program continuously longer than any other. While the contract with Laos was signed and fulfilled a few months before work began in Vietnam, and it continues to operate today, a complete cessation of work was necessitated at one point there because of insecurities.

IVS expected -- and hoped -- that the IVS/VN team would be able to make the adjustment to a radically new situation created by the escalation of the war. There was a division among the IVS Board members with respect to this issue, even as there was in the IVS/VN team. To accomodate to pressures from IVS/VN, the Board made radical alterations in its personnel and financial support policies. These proved to be too little and too late to save the Vietnam program.

IVS/W expects from its Vietnam experience that it will be able to adjust its policies and style of operation so as to forestall any recurrence of the debacle which terminated the IVS/VN contract.

1. The initial hope that IVS/VN would facilitate the readjustment of the wetland farmers from the North to the dry-land farming methods in the Central Highlands were frustrated by IVS' early bowing out of the refugee program.

2. The hopes with respect to the development of IVS/VN in experimentation and seed propagation were realized. The GVN requested that the

team be expanded to lend assistance in a dozen places. Volunteers therefore were increased in numbers and dispersed to various sites where they either opened new experimental stations, or helped improve existing operations. The emphases they placed on crops and livestock production continues to loom high in USAID to this day. The accomplishments in agriculture by the IVS/VN teams during the decade 1957-1967 are in exactly the same areas noted by the USAID/VN Director in his 1971 Report to the Ambassador.

3. The exploration of experiment and training centers for the ethnic minorities by IVS/VN resulted in a number of such developments which continue. IVS/VN early concluded that these people required separate treatment from the ethnic Vietnamese. Thus separate facilities were developed for them. IVS/VN was effective among the Roman Catholics and Montagnards to an extent never equally true in relations with the Buddhist Vietnamese.

4. Expectations with respect to the "community development" programs were not realized. IVS/VN concluded that two years was an inadequate time for a volunteer to analyze a particular situation, and to produce significant innovations. Those community development volunteers who concentrated upon rural development tended to operate as did the volunteers engaged in agricultural development. Those in education as did members of the education team. Community development workers among refugees were more concerned to involve them in developmental programs than to lend relief assistance.

5. The health and malaria control involvement of IVS/VN was of such a short duration, and of such limited size it made little impact.

6. The educational experience achieved mixed results. The national education system itself was inadequate. The assignments of the volunteers

were far from clear. Those engaged in teaching English in secondary schools for the most part were pronunciation instructors in classes taught by Vietnamese. While the end result sought was significant -- the preparation of teachers -- the IVS role was minor. Teachers in universities and normal schools generally felt their role was relatively more important, and so did the Ministry of Education.

# CHAPTER III

## MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF IVS/VIETNAM

1. An Interim Assessment
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## 1. An Interim Assessment

"We were recruited to engage in development. The situation prevented our achieving developmental goals, so we were assured the experience was worthwhile because of what we had learned," explained two of the IVSers after their return from Saigon to the USA. This statement understates what the volunteers were able to accomplish, and hardly does justice to the values for the USA of their IVS/VN experiences.

IVS/VN activity in agricultural and community development, public health and education at least until 1965-6 filled a technical vacuum at a crucial time in the life of Vietnam. While the volunteers had doubts concerning the significance of their accomplishments even as they were engaged in work, and educators are beginning to question the efficacy of many modern educational techniques and practices, in so far as these do have social value, the volunteers were contributing to the life and development of the Vietnamese people.

The IVSers were handicapped by a variety of factors: their own lack of expertise, the necessity for transferring what they did know to a completely different culture and tradition, the insecurities of the war, the disturbances in their work because of natural disasters and military activity, and the short period any one volunteer enjoyed in which to innovate and follow-through. The two and three year terms of service made for discontinuity. While a new volunteer might be assigned to the place of a returning volunteer, there was nocertainty that the new recruit would want or be able to continue the work of his predecessor. The two

year agriculture volunteer might spend two to three weeks in the Philippines prior to his arrival in Vietnam, and an additional six weeks to three months in preparatory language study. Once on the job, he perforce continued his language study, and during the first few months suffered from linguistic incompetence. His work schedule would be interrupted by staff conferences, required trips to Saigon, visitors from the outside who wanted to inspect "his work", and by the requirements of bureaucracy.

As the volunteers became increasingly politicized, they tended to devote considerable amounts of time to in-group discussion. They sought answers to such overriding questions as, "Is there a place for IVS in a warring country?" "What are our priorities?" "How can a humanitarian organization operate within the framework of a government sponsored program, when that government is making war against the very things we are seeking to accomplish?" "Are we pawns in the hands of USAID or the GVN?" The very doubts that lay behind such questions tended to demoralize the volunteers and to reduce the value of their developmental activities.

One dimension of their presence can hardly be exaggerated: the IVS experience produced many Viet-Nam experts for the USA. In the years down to 1967, a large number of volunteers found their way back into the governmental structures. Many went on to graduate study after completing their tour of duty. And of those who completed their academic work, many in turn found their way into university teaching positions, where they are drawing upon their knowledge and experiences to educate the coming generation in American life.

Another small group of alumni, especially of the post-1967 years, are now acting as knowledgeable critics of the war. Luce and Sommers in Viet-Nam: The Unheard Voices state that the most significant role of the volunteer is not in Viet-Nam, but back in the USA helping to wind down the war. Some of those who elected to resign from IVS in 1967, as well as subsequent alumni, are so engaged.

## 2. What Viet-Nam Received from IVS/VN

IVS volunteers brought with them to Vietnam high motivation and limited technical skills. They made these available in specific situations with varying degrees of commitment. IVS/W discouraged the faint hearted. The morale of the volunteers was good down to 1967. While the IVS volunteers' technical skills were limited, compared with standards which obtained in the West, they were high for a developing country. The flexibility and adaptability of the average volunteer enabled him to learn rapidly, and to utilize his limited knowledge to maximum advantage. These skills were exercised in several area of Vietnamese life.

## 3. Refuge Relief

War creates refugees. People fled to escape bombings and terror raids. The problem was compounded in Vietnam by the forced evacuation of entire villages so as to create fire-free zones. IVS volunteers were agents of mercy to these displaced victims. They served as food distributors to disaster victims. While IVS/W did not regard itself as a refugee relief agency, the volunteers never

escaped the material claims of the people upon their consciences.

Following floods and natural disasters, and during and following the Tet and May 1968 offensives, the volunteers dropped what they were doing to aid the victims. They served as medics, drove trucks, distributed foods and building materials, and consoled the broken-hearted. The fact that they were where the action was enabled them to function in needy situations.

## 4. Agriculture

IVS/VN began in agriculture. Most of the first volunteers recruited under the ICA contract had a farm background and a degree in agriculture or nursing. While for a brief time, the volunteers who were engaged in agricultural development were outnumbered by the education team, IVS/VN regarded itself as called especially to engage in agriculture. A sophisticated series of proposals for 1971-72 had been transmitted to the Ministry of Agriculture at the time of the Cabinet's decision not to renew the IVS contract.

During IVS/VN's years of operation, personnel changed, locations shifted, assignments were altered. Each volunteer had his own particular interests and skills. There was a place for all of them in a land so basically agricultural. Assignments were made by the Ministry of Agriculture, by province chiefs, and some were made by the volunteers themselves. Failures there were along with successes. The 1971 Report to the Ambassador, by the Director of USAID/VN, mentions each of the kinds of crop and animal husbandry in which IVS/VN was engaged as areas of USAID accomplishment. Quantitatively the IVS/VN contributions

were not outstanding after 1967. Qualitatively they remained of high caliber until the end. Some of the agricultural technicians remained in Vietnam, working under other auspices, after the contract was terminated.

Volunteers were among the first to experiment in Vietnam with the several strains of "miracle rice". IVSers experimented with varieties of seeds for the different climates, soils, and areas of the country. They multiplied seeds and plants and helped distribute them. They introduced white potato and bulbing onion, stimulated home gardening, facilitated the movement of fertilizers, insecticides, and sprayers. They dug wells, perfected machinery for digging wells and trained farmers in their use. They established cooperatives for chicken raisers and animal growers. Farmers with recognized abilities were brought together for special training courses. They sought in cooperation with farmers' association to establish mass organizations related to the peoples' econimic needs.

Theirs was a support role. They were able to provide quick and easy transport. They secured supplies because of their connections with governmental agencies and voluntary organizations. They served as backstops for higher echelon government officials, and occasionally filled in for USOM officials. They supported the Vietnamese farmers not alone with materials, but also by their moral encouragement. Their very presence in the villages demonstrated that somebody cared.

a. Agricultural Experimentation

Their first experimental station, Ea Kmat at Ban Me Thuot was so

successful, IVS was asked by the Ministry of Agriculture to help staff a dozen others. IVS volunteers were the first in the Central Highlands to demonstrate new farming techniques and crop cultivation. They introduced improved sweet potatoes, cowpeas, bushbeans and watermelons. They experimented, adapted, demonstrated and trained. IVS can claim some of the credit for the widespread cultivation of vegetables in areas where they worked.

When security problems at Rach Gia ruled out irrigation and drainage demonstration, villagers were encouraged to use available land around their homes for vegetable gardens. Seedlings were distributed to the cooperating families.

The utilization of the labor of mental patients at the Bien Hoa Mental Hospital as a commercial therapy program was begun by IVS and is continued even now. Food was raised on the farm, with experiments in corn and sorghum. Efforts also were made to understand the care and health of pigs.

b. Agricultural Education

IVSers were agents of agricultural change. Through research, demonstration and extension, they were "salesmen" of new methodologies, seeds and tools. Rural peoples traditionally are conservative. They tend to continue doing what they have learned from their parents and peers. They will change methods, adopt new seed varieties, or alter the cycle of planting, cultivation and harvesting only if convinced by demonstrations that other methods are better. Therefore, to teach, the volunteers had

to demonstrate; but demonstration without persuading the farmers to adopt was pointless. So the average agricultural volunteer became both demonstration agent and teacher, as well as a practical farmer.

c. Rice Cultivation

In 1966, IVS began demonstrating and experimenting with new varieties of rice. The skills the IVSers perfected in turn were shared with other volunteers and with Vietnamese farmers. They employed a variety of approaches in extending the newly acquired knowledge.

A demonstration farm was built at Sa Dec, financed, supervised and run by the Ministry of Agriculture. 150 acres were leveled and drained. Vietnamese rice varieties, as well as four which had been developed in the Philippines, were planted. On the different experimental plots, varying kinds and amounts of insecticides, fertilizers and quantities of water were used. The aim was both to determine the varieties most suitable for the area, and to demonstrate their effectiveness to farmers who came to observe.

At Tay Ninh, the approach was less radical. While demonstration plots were laid out, the rigid demands for producing the most effective yields were not insisted upon. Having convinced the farmer to make the experiment, the volunteer was content for him to utilize some of his traditional methods of cultivation.

The multiplier effect was used at Soc Trang. A particular farmer was selected for the demonstration, and supervised. Other farmers, noting the effectiveness of the new variety, came seeking. Gradually, a corps

of experimenting farmers was developed.

Despite the costs, extra work, and criticisms of the new varieties, radical changes were introduced into the traditional rice growing patterns of Vietnam.

d. Highland Training Centers

IVS started at Ban Me Thuot — a Rhade Montagnard center. Thus early, the IVSers developed an empathy for these tribal peoples who differ ethnically from the Vietnamese. The Ministry of Agriculture cooperated with IVS in 1961 in establishing a Center at this place for the agricultural training of Montagnards. This first Center was the precursor of twelve, which have served other ethnic minorities as well. The GVN is upgrading these Centers to Agricultural High Schools.

The approaches made at these several Centers varied according to the situation, the competencies of the volunteers, the expressed needs of the people, and the insecurities. At Pham Ly Cham training experiments were conducted in the timing of planting and animal disease control. At Phu Bon, fruit trees were planted and a fishpond built and stocked. Sewing classes for Montagnard girls proved to be effective programs at Pleiku, Ninh Thuan and Da Mpau. This activity moved into "community development" as a cooperative was developed at Ninh Thuan to sell the products of the sewing classes. At Bao Loc, a brooder was constructed to improve the poultry raising. Vegetable gardens were emphasized at Quang Duc.

e. Forestry

The first arrivals in 1957 included one expert in forestry who never had opportunity to utilize this particular skill. Some years later the GVN requested IVS/VN to assign volunteers to forestry service. They introduced new types of trees, engaged in reforestation, fire prevention and control, forest soil management, logging procedures, forest inventories, and the modernization and improvement of sawmills in Dalat, Ban Me Thuot, Quang Duc, and Hue. Following the Tet Mau Than offensive in 1968, the IVS/VN forestry operations were phased out.

f. Tool Design

Labor-saving devices became all the more important because of the shortage of male-power in the villages. IVS volunteers therefore undertook to redesign locally-used handtools, and to import implements from abroad.

g. Animal Husbandry

The production of animal protein became a national necessity as increasingly large numbers of Vietnamese found their way into cities, where they were employed in positions that required a balanced diet. IVS volunteers, many of whom had worked with farm animals before coming to Vietnam, expanded their agricultural activities to include demonstrations of poultry, pig, and cattle raising.

At the Tan Son Nhut Animal Husbandry Experimental Station, IVS developed a self-help cooperative among the employees, with each contributing according to his capacity. The fund was used to purchase 3,000 broilers and layers, with the design of supplying the demand for

chicken on the market.

Volunteers were awarethat almost 100% of the food for hogs and chickens had to be imported. They knew how to produce the needed foodstuffs, but the insecurities of the countryside and uncertainties of the market inhibited their implementation. They also were handicapped because of the small number of competent Vietnamese available for staffing and manning the Centers.

h. Summary of IVS/VN Accomplishments in Agriculture

1. The volunteers facilitated agricultural development. IVS introduced new crops into the Central Highlands which continue to be cultivated. The North Vietnamese refugees had been lowland rice farmers who knew not how to farm in the highlands. Their first rice crop proved to be a near disaster. IVS therefore began to experiment with food crops including vegetables and edible grains, and also with fiber crops and livestock. They obtained experimental seeds from various sources, even by letter from friends in the USA. The results of IVS experimentation produced almost immediate effects in the living standards of the villagers among whom they worked, and thus influenced their livelihood.

2. IVS trained a cadre of Vietnamese agriculturalists. These villagers who worked with the volunteers learned research and experimentation, and, in time, extension. Farmers recruited from the villages joined the staff at the Ea Kmat Seed Propagation Center; some moved up to supervisory positions, and in time to the formal study of agriculture.

3. IVSers established and/or helped staff a dozen experimental stations. The success of their work at Ban Me Thuot led the Ministry of

Agriculture to enlarge the experimental program. The expansion of experimental work resulted in the dispersion of the IVS staff, so that instead of working as teams in community development, each team of two or three related to a given station which specialized in agriculture, animal or chicken husbandry, forestry, irrigation, etc. Many of the stations thus established later became agricultural high schools, or related to adjacent collegiate agricultural study.

4. IVS demonstrated to provincial officials and to local leaders that it was possible to communicate with Saigon, and to obtain supplies and assistance.

5. IVS demonstrated that it was possible for Americans to live in the villages, to subsist upon local products, to learn the language, and to pattern their existence after that of the people with whom they worked. This proved to be radical innovation. The French colonialists had lived on their plantations with servants. American officials were concentrated in the cities, and usually operated through interpreters when they occasionally visited the rural areas. IVS volunteers tended to be accepted by the provincial peoples because of the level at which they lived, and their identification. They were able to use their influence to obtain materials from USOM and the Vietnamese government.

## 5. Community Development

IVS/VN contributions to "community development" were varied. The Department Head of Community Development in a leading USA university defines community development as "problem solving". Given an acceptance of this definition, then each IVSer was a problem solver in the situation where he worked. IVS/VN tended to define it as "helping people to help

themselves".

Even before the first contract was signed for work in Vietnam, IVS/VN would engage in community development. As the initial team viewed this approach, the members would operate as a team dealing with a number of significant aspects of the life of the villages where they worked. Before this approach could be tested, the team was divided for work in a number of different locations.

Beginning in 1966, the GVN had requested a "community development" team of IVSers, the recruits were assigned singly, by twos, and in a few instances by threes to engage in agriculture, refugee work, and youth work. They were drawn into a variety of activities such as health, construction, institution building, small industry, sports management, and refugee relief. They worked in, or in cooperation with GVN programs, USAID projects, and private service organizations. They obtained equipment and commodities from the GVN, USAID, and other voluntary organizations such as CARE. The volunteer sought in a given situation to do what was possible, valuable, and desired by his particular clients. These community development volunteers tended to be "generalists" rather than technicians in particular specialties.

Refugee work was regarded by IVS as an emergency, rather than a permanent assignment. Refugees had no family land and usually no male breadwinner. No materials were available for crafting or manufacturing. There were no markets for what they might produce.

In relation to refugees, the IVSer was an expeditor for the distribution of food, medicine, clothing and building materials. Such

activity was regarded by the volunteer as being short-term, a coping with effect rather than seeking solutions for the refugees' problems. Refugees are transients; they want only to be sustained until they can return home. Despite this variance of goals, the IVSers assigned to refugees performed with commitment. One of them stated that, "I have an obligation to stay and deal with the suffering. I see not alone the suffering of the Vietnamese but of all men. I will work where I am needed most."

Members of the Community Development team assigned to youth work and agriculture engaged in a variety of activities. They undertook to strengthen and utilize the instructions at hand: councils, cooperatives, credit unions, youth organizations. The IVSer recognized that if his contributions were to have permanent value, participation of the people through indigenous structures was necessary. In some instances, where the existing institutions were not sufficiently flexible to accomodate a particular activity, the volunteer developed one that was, e. g. a village sports council to operate and administer the various teams that were organized.

Exploration of particular situations led to the innovation of small industries. A volunteer developed a mushroom production unit near My Tho. The results were such that it continued after the volunteer's departure.

Another organized a handicraft cooperative near Song Mao, with Montagnards making crossbows for sale to souvenir-hunting Americans.

A volunteer in Ban Me Thuot worked with a Home Improvement extension worker setting up in-service training programs, sewing classes, and

teaching homemaking and hygiene.

At Da Nang, a volunteer cooperated with UNICEF in erecting quonset huts for the hospital.

A Saigon volunteer assigned to work with the Vietnam Youth Council was involved in a program which took 47 students into school-less hamlets and refugee settlements for summer teaching.

Another Saigon-based volunteer working with SEIA, the Committee for the Development of Socio-Economic Life in Asia, organized credit unions.

By the time the contract was terminated in 1971, IVS/VN had reservations with respect to the programs it had started or been involved with under the community development heading. Many of the reasons adduced by the Program Director of IVS in September, 1959 for terminating the approach remained valid. He stated that the community development approach was not feasible for these reasons, among others:

1. The approach could not be justified economically.

2. The package approach vitiates any continuing impact following the volunteers' departure.

3. The villagers tend to lean upon the IVSers rather than learning to help themselves.

4. The community development pattern may be unsuited for the Vietnamese cultural situation.

5. There is no national or regional community development plan.

6. Experts in community development are difficult to recruit.

## 6. Education

IVS became involved in the educational process in Vietnam at the request of individuals and local government officials; as a by-product of agricultural development; and finally by invitation of the Ministry of Education and of particular institutions. IVS/VN educational expressions were: non-formal, extension and institutional.

Non-formal: The first volunteers were invited by the villagers, and even by province chiefs, to instruct them in English. Even before 1962, most volunteers conducted one or more such informal classes.

After IVS/VN had begun to staff institutions with teachers, volunteers were assigned to other programs also continued such non-formal instruction. Those volunteers who were members of the educational team were encouraged to engage in non-formal activities outside the classroom. These many extra-curricular activities were classified as "community development". They included English Clubs, the teaching of teachers, libraries, and social work activities (for and with students, teachers, and even groups outside the institutions).

Extension: In starting and staffing the experimental stations for ethnic Vietnamese and for Montagnards, the volunteers were involved in an educational process. Inside the experimental stations they trained Vietnamese helpers and even the station managers. Groups of village farmers were brought together, either inside the extension centers, or elsewhere, for training in seed cultivation, pest control, the use of implements, machinery maintenance and use, etc.

Volunteers also served as extension agents, going out to the farmers both to distribute animals, chicks, seeds and plants — but also to

instruct village folk in the housing, care and feeding of the animals, chicks and/or the cultivation of seeds and plants. As the countryside became increasingly insecure, volunteers did less and less extension work in the villages. The disappearance of their Vietnamese counterparts after the General Mobilization reduced agricultural extension in the countryside virtually to a standstill.

Institutional: The arrival of an educational team altered the character of the IVS/VN operation. During the first five years, IVSers had served primarily as agricultural technicians, engaging in developmental activities in the villages. Farmers were their primary clients. Their approach was person-to-person. Teachers, on the other hand, were concentrated in provincial towns and cities. They worked in academia instead of on the soil. The sizes of their classes prevented much person-to-person contacts which hitherto had been the IVS trademark.

The large influx of educational volunteers also swelled the size of the IVS/VN operation. Whereas the small number of agricultural volunteers had created an esprit d'corps, with an emphasis upon quality, the pressures to recruit teachers sufficient to meet the demand led to a substitution of quantity for quality. By 1968 among the educational volunteers, were those who either because of their job descriptions were inadequate, or because they regarded their classroom work as an ample performance, or because they were unable to relate informally, made a few contacts with students, teachers and community outside the classrooms.

The fact that the educational volunteers had been invited to help provide the manpower for an enlargement of the educational system also

added a dimension to the IVS/VN program. When the conflicts occurred in 1967, and again in 1970, teachers generally were content to remain at their posts regardless of the ideological tensions which became paramount for some of their colleagues.

During the last year of its operation in Vietnam, most educational volunteers were agreed that teaching in the secondary schools was not a proper IVS responsibility. The educational team leader stated that his having to travel from school to school seeking openings was a reversal of role for IVS/VN. The universities and technical schools, however, had an expanding need for teachers, and at the time the contract was terminated, a dozen such requests were in the hands of IVS/VN staff.

Science teaching originally was institutional. Some of the science teachers were attached to particular institutions. The development of the Mobile Science Program in 1963 by an IVSer in Hue proved to be one of the lasting contributions of IVS/VN. Eight years later twenty-four such units were operating. The Mobile Science Program was geared to the students' attention level, related to their experiences with the natural world, and utilized equipment which the teachers could construct. IVS/VN set up a headquarters, determined the subject matter of demonstrations, and constructed models of the equipment and visual aids needed for the units. IVS/VN continued to enjoy a close relation to the program, yet refused to carry the administrative responsibility after Vietnamese leadership had been trained. The program temporarily was suspended following the 1968 Tet Offensive, and its utility was reduced by insecurity in the countryside.

IVS/VN perforce sought to relate "education" to "development".

No adequate rationale or criteria emerged however, either to justify or to test the effectiveness of the educational programs in the institutions. IVS/VN recognized that the educational system was poor. It was patterned after the French model, which over-emphasized examinations at the expense of learning. Classroom attendance decreased noticeably during the weeks preparatory to the examinations. There was no consistency in the assignments of volunteers: in some instances they were teachers of pronunciation who assisted Vietnamese classroom teachers; in other situations volunteers were assigned to classes of their own. By 1970 IVS/VN had concluded that volunteers in the secondary schools were a luxury the nation could ill afford, but there was value in English teaching in the universities and normal schools, and limited possibilities in the areas of science instruction, high school library development, and community education. Generally the volunteers recognized that there was greater value in upgrading Vietnamese teachers of English than in doing routine instruction of classes.

Working in an inadequate educational system, IVS/VN saw the need for assisting in improving it. Whereas USAID/VN worked at the top level with the Ministry of Education of the GVN, the leverage IVS/VN had working at the local level was limited. The IVS goal with respect to education was under discussion to the time the contract was terminated. Was the IVS/VN purpose in education to develop institutions? To develop individuals? To develop groups of individuals? IVS/VN was aware that it lacked clear-cut goals in its educational program.

An inevitable educational consequence of the IVS presence in Vietnam was the influence of the volunteers upon "modernization". The

way they lived, ate, traveled and dressed conditioned the Vietnamese with whom they had contact. All contacts between technologically advanced and developing peoples have educational dimensions. Despite a human inertia to change, the effectiveness of Western methodologies "sell themselves". The Americans believe this to be true; they but slowly achieve an emancipation from their sense of technological superiority over Third World peoples. Hondas did more to revolutionize Vietnamese transport than all that had happened in the preceding history of the country.

These effects were noticeable in agriculture, community life, sanitation and public health, and in the living styles of individual Vietnamese. The programs IVS/VN stimulated in these areas were designed not alone to improve the economic lot of the people, but to help them help themselves, and to disseminate ideas of voluntarism, trust, cooperation, friendliness and internationalism.

Involvement with youth in education led to joining with youth in their political aspirations and activities. For instance, IVS volunteers participated in a Youth Conference in November, 1966, which concentrated upon matters of youth leadership, the role of youth in the national revolution, and the position of the Youth Movement vis-a-vis the government. The participants considered whether a revolution was required to effect improvements and changes at the points of poverty, illiteracy, and to bridge the polarities between rich-poor, old-young, modern-traditional, urban-rural, honest-dishonest.

The politicization of the volunteers, and the capacity of the Vietnamese

to articulate their grievances against the government were stimulated by these contacts of volunteers with Youth Movements. Criticisms were made of the USA of the points of its affluence, its emphasis upon prestigious large-scale operations, its "give-away" programs for irrelevant objects. The GVN was criticized for its corruption and red tape.

The breakdown of filial piety also became evident to the volunteers as they associated with Vietnamese youth. They discovered that Vietnamese parents "no longer understood their children and children no longer respected their parents".

# CHAPTER IV

## AN HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY OF IVS/VIETNAM

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1945-1956

| | |
|---|---|
| 1945, Sept 2 | - Ho Chi Minh proclaims Republic of Vietnam |
| 1946, Dec | - Civil War in Indochina |
| 1949, July | - Bao Dai establishes State of Vietnam |
| 1950, Feb 7 | - US extends diplomatic recognition to State of Vietnam |
| | - US Consulate General in Saigon raised to Legation |
| | - Donald Heath became Minister |
| May | - US sends economic and military aid through France |
| | - US establishes Special Technical-Economic Mission (STEM) |
| June | - President Truman increases aid to France for Vietnam War |
| Aug | - US Military Assistance Group (MAAG) established |
| 1951, Sept | - US signs economic aid agreement with Vietnam |
| 1952, July | - US raises Legation to Embassy in Saigon. Heath remains as Ambassador |
| 1953, July | - US aid to France for Vietnam War increased |
| 1954, April | - Geneva Conference begins |
| May 6 | - French suffer defeat at Dien Bien Phu |
| June 14 | - Bao Dai appoints Ngo Dinh Diem Premier of Vietnam |
| July 21 | - Geneva Agreement signed. (US abstains) |
| Sept | - Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed |
| Oct 23 | - Eisenhower promises Premier Diem direct aid |
| Nov 3 | - General J. Lawton Collins replaces Heath as Ambassador |
| 1955, Feb 12 | - US MAAG takes over training of GVN Armed Forces |
| Oct 23 | - Diem elected Chief of State; Bao Dai deposed in referendum |
| | - Diem proclaims Republic South Vietnam and himself president |
| 1956, March 4 | - Elections for Constituent Assembly held |

IVS/VN 1955-56

On January 3, 1955, IVS representative J. S. Noffsinger reported concerning a December 1954 visit with FOA officials in Saigon. He stated that the war apparently had ended in Vietnam, and that it was now safe for "white people" to travel anywhere in the country. He did note that Communists had so infiltered the countryside that they could take over within a year. Despite this threat, Dr. Noffsinger reported the desire of FOA to send teams of volunteers to villages, "hoping against hope" that they might be effective. In fact, the FOA Director of Program had asked if IVS could send in eight teams at once. Dr. Noffsinger recommended to the IVS Executive Committee that this not be done. He stated he would prefer sending teams to Cambodia and Laos. Three months later FOA in Cambodia and Laos invited to send teams to these countries.

On August 1st, the Director advised that while he still did not favor sending a team to Saigon, because of insurgency threats and political turmoil, he had discovered an upland location where Roman Catholic refugees were being resettled. Since they were wet-land farmers being resettled in dry-farming areas, Alfred L. Cardineaux, the Director of Resettlement, ICA/VN was favorable to IVS sending teams to work among them. On December 14, 1955 IVS Board Member Harold Row reported that USOM/W was enthusiastic about refugee resettlement, with the possibility that IVS/VN gradually would be able to switch to community development. IVS had heard from Cardineaux, but not from ICA/W.

On April 9, 1956, USOM/W invited IVS to send two teams to Vietnam

on a two-year contract. On May 24th, the Executive Committee gave approval, expecting that the contract would be signed by July 30th. IVS/W began its search for volunteers with the following qualifications:

1. A farm work experience background
2. A degree from a recognized agricultural college
3. A spirit of dedication, able to work on a "people to people" basis

A number of the initial applicants were lost to IVS because of subsequent delays in the signing of the contract. The first applicant was Gordon Brockmueller, who subsequently became second Chief of Party, and later IVS Program Officer in Washington.

By mid-year 1957, IVS/W knew the teams would be working in resettlement villages of unknown location.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1956 - 1957

1956

July 4 - President Diem given wide powers in draft constitution

July 6 - Vice-President Nixon visiting Vietnam states "communism has been halted"

Oct 26 - VN Constitution promulgated

1957

May 5-19 - President Diem visits USA. President Eisenhower promises continued aid

IVS/VN 1956-1957

Director J. S. Noffsinger reported from Saigon in July 1956, that ICA/VN wanted two teams. He wrote:

> "It will be the function of IVS/VN to serve in a technical capacity as demonstrators within such functions as each team member may be specially competent, such as agronomy, soils, animal husbandry, poultry husbandry, forestry, sanitation, public health, agricultural mechanics, etc. Specific patterns of operations will be suggested by the Resettlement Division of USOM/VN. IVS/VN will serve by way of assistance, direction, advice and demonstration as that the general plans are carried out. A great amount of action will be permitted in building into the new special structure desirable objectives."

IVS negotiations were conducted in Saigon through Alfred L. Cardineaux, Chief of Resettlement Division, USOM/VN. IVS/W then expected the contract to be signed by August 25th, 1956. Due to delays ICA/W did not transmit the contract to Saigon for approval until September 21, 1956. After approval by Saigon, the Resettlement Division USOM/VN assigned the IVS teams to projects 13 and 15, the identity and location of which IVS/W was uncertain. They proved to be at Cai San in the Mekong Delta and a series of villages near Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands. Dr. Noffsinger's hope, expressed on May 30, 1956, that the resettlement projects "will phase into programs of community development by the end of the first year" was realized in part.

The GVN relations of IVS/VN initially were through the "Commissariat Generale for Refugees" which had been created in 1954 following the Geneva Conference. It made use of lands formerly held by the French which had been confiscated by the GVN. The Saigon government had been assisted from the beginning in dealing with the refugees by FOA and ICA. In 1958 the

refugee body was renamed "Commissariat General for Land Development".

In beginning their work with the refugees, the IVS team saw its role as development, rather than "relief" - so considered the erection of a saw mill, the construction of a brick kiln, etc. Each refugee family had its own garden and fields and many worked with livestock. Since the technical resources needed for development were available only from USOM and GVN, the agencies under which IVS worked, a considerable portion of the volunteers' time was taken in cutting the red tape of bureaucracy.

On December 18, 1956 Par Danforth, one of the two chiefs of party-designate reached Saigon. Shortly after his arrival Danforth made an exploratory visit to Cai San, where he and his party were to be stationed.

Paul Worthington, an associate chief of party-designate arrived on January 10th, 1957. Fifteen days later five additional team members reached Saigon: Aurzella Boewe (R. N.), Gordon Brockmueller, Arthur King, Thomas Luche and William H. Shawley. The next week, with Par Danforth serving as acting Chief of Party, the Ban Me Thuot team located in a refugee village 32 kilometers away between Ha Lan A and Ha Lan B, where Roman Catholics from the North had been located eight months previously. During February the team settled in and began a survey of the dozen refugee villages assigned to them. They began their first project with Land Development on February 13, 1957 and surveyed the Eatul demonstration nursery.

In February John W. Barwick, Chief of Party-designate for the Ban Me Thuot team arrived. The Cai San team moved into a river boat while

awaiting the completion of their house. Par Danforth was Chief of Party for the Cai San Team. On March 25, the Cai San team moved into the house which had been prepared.

In April the Ban Me Thuot team proposed to up-grade agricultural production through improved methods of farming, to introduce village industries, to improve diet and health of the villagers, to secure seeds and equipment, to promote recreation, to educate the people to help themselves, and to extol the values of democracy. Shortly they had these activities under way:

* An evening class in English for the villagers
* A volunteer was teaching in the agricultural school
* 4-T Club work begun in a Rhade village
* Sanitation provisions for farm animals
* Vaccination program of pigs against cholera
* 200 imported baby chicks
* Two diesel powered tractors repaired and made operational
* Hand tools distributed to farmers for clearing land
* Contact established with Howard Harper, USOM/VN Agricultural Advisor

Animal husbandryman Arthur King was loaned to USOM/VN.

IVS/VN relations were transferred from the Resettlement Section of the GVN to the Ministry of Agriculture, which contact continued to the termination of the contract, even during those periods when the education program involved a greater number of volunteers than did agricultural development.

The team at Cai San, working with resettled villagers along the several canals began the following activities:

* Assisted extension and home demonstration workers
* Surveyed the vegetable crops and trees in the villages
* Planned garden programs for the villagers
* Nursing at the Cai San Hospital (June 14)
* Met with Roman Catholic priests and farmers for purposes of surveying needs and developing confidence
* Proposed fish pond, small animal and chicken programs

Given their lack of expertise, the absence of supervision, inadequate planning by USOM/VN or by the Vietnamese governmental agencies, no substantive orientation, their ignorance of the Vietnamese langauges, and the various religious and ethnic tensions the beginnings of IVS in Vietnam were inauspicious. So much so that the volunteers were concerned lest their accomplishments fail to merit a renewal of their two year contract. The fortuitous intervention of Howard Harper, a USOM agricultural expert on behalf of IVS/VN probably saved IVS for Vietnam.

The team assigned to Ban Me Thuot undertook work among the refugees in a dozen villages, nine of which were comprised of Roman Catholics from the North, and three consisting of Buddhists had existed from the intervention of France in Indo-China's destiny. The Saigon government had been headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem since October 1955, a ruler who both trusted and favored the Roman Catholic minority. The incipient tensions between the majority - the Buddhists - and the minority of

Roman Catholics subsequently were to become significant politically. The Roman Catholic villagers had followed particular priests of their faith in the resettlement process, having been transferred at least once between their flight from the North in 1955, and their settlement in the Central Highlands in 1956. Thus the priests exercised considerable authority over the villagers, a fact that the IVS volunteers only gradually came to appreciate.

IVS/VN staff and volunteers took a stance with respect to politics (and religion) which was to be an asset during the first decade. They had been warned against political involvement or religious proselytizing. "Act as 'good American Christians' working abroad," they were told. The volunteers had been screened as to their religious motivation and background, yet were to serve as technicians, not missionaries. They found nothing amiss in the stance of the USG assisting in the development of the young nation, which they regarded as the true Vietnam. They found the peasants among whom they worked satisfied generally with respect to the political situation. This certainly was true of the Roman Catholic refugees. Others expressed no contrary opinions to the first volunteers.

Their steering clear of politics also meant refusing to be used by USOM/VN for the achievement of its political aims. This independence early asserted by IVS/VN became an asset subsequently as USOM overtured IVS/VN for the loan of personnel, and a problem in USOM's assumption that the IVS volunteers were junior grade USAID officials. The relative freedom enjoyed by IVS/VN, compared with IVS/Laos was marked with respect to this fact.

The villages near Ban Me Thuot where the refugees were located were

the home of tribal peoples (called Montagnards) - ethnic groups displaced by the Vietnamese as they moved southward from what now is called China. The Montagnards and the Vietnamese were different linguistically, ethnically, culturally and religiously. The Vietnamese regarded the Montagnards as uncivilized; the Montagnards resented their displacement by the Vietnamese masters. This traditional hostility was aggravated by the subsidies the Vietnamese refugees received from the GVN. The refugees were given funds with which to erect homes, and had been promised "doles" for two years. The Montagnards demonstrated their hostilities towards the new-comers by being non-cooperative. The plight of the Montagnards evoked sympathy from the IVSers who soon began assisting them as well as to the Vietnamese refugees. This mutual empathy carried on until the very end.

Even when assigned initially to refugee work, the volunteers interpreted their responsibilities as being primarily in the areas of agricultural and community development rather than to provide relief services. While volunteer agencies in Vietnam inevitably have engaged in relief operations, at least channeling some relief funds and supplies, IVS/VN began with "development" as its intent and goal. The contract with USAID as well as the concerns of the volunteers themselves thus gave them a central focus which contrasts with that of other volunteer agencies with less job definition.

How to engage in agricultural development? The volunteers recognized they first must learn something about tropical agriculture. The early experimentation was therefore as much a self-teaching process as a discovery of which crops were suitable for which locations. They recognized

that in time they would engage in "extension" work, but this necessarily must be preceded by experimentation. Some extension inevitably occurred even with the first crop, as Vietnamese assistants took some of the experimental seeds to try in their own gardens. But the carrying of knowledge to the villages was preceded by the volunteers first learning what could be done.

As the volunteers began their work, first at Ha Lan A and Ha Lan B - their "long house" being on the border between - and then moving out to the other ten villages, they developed contacts with particular farmers. Some of these who demonstrated particular aptitudes later were employed by IVS/Vietnam at the Ea Kmat Ban Me Thuot Seed Propagation Center. Thus developed a cadre of trained agriculturalists consisting of Roman Catholic and Buddhist Vietnamese, and Montagnards, the latter being recruited primarily by the Province Representative of the Ministry of Agriculture.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1957 - 1958

**1957**

| | |
|---|---|
| Oct 22 | - US MAAG and USIS installations in Saigon bombed. US personnel injured |

**1958**

| | |
|---|---|
| Feb | - International Control Commission (ICC) moves headquarters from Hanoi to Saigon |
| March | - President Diem reports communist subversion increasing. Large plantation north of Saigon attacked by guerrillas |
| May 17 | - North Vietnamese liaison mission to ICC withdraws from Saigon |
| June 25 | - Cambodia accuses GVN of 19 violations of Cambodian territory since 1957. GVN repudiates allegations |

IVS/VN 1957-1958

The size of the IVS/VN team was reduced to six volunteers during most of the year, as a consequence of the closing of the Cai San station on August 31, 1957. The reason given was "insecurity".

The GVN had started the resettlement project at Cai San, in Kieng Giang province, to be the show-window of its land reapportionment and Land reclamation program. (Ordinace #57, October 22, 1956). It was designed to illustrate the potentialities of economic and social rehabilitation. Cai San was to symbolize the new nation's "determination to shelter people who linked their future with that of the free government". It was to exemplify "the purpose of American aid which was to help people help themselves". USOM allocated $10 million and 100 tractors to prepare 30,000 hectares of rice land to receive 40,000 refugees. Wide publicity was given to the fact that landless peasants had become land owners in Cai San. When later it became evident that the refugee settlers were required to purchase the lands, riots broke out.* These riots resulted in the termination of the IVS program at Cai San, and the temporary transfer of the team members to Ban Me Thuot.

The volunteers, unaware of the position of authority exercised by the Roman Catholic priests over the settlers, aroused some ire and resentment from these village leaders, which also contributed to the reasons for the IVS withdrawal from Cai San.

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* Vietnam Witness, Bernard B. Fall. Praeger, New York. 1966. p. 180

The reduction of team size was effected by the return of William H. Shawley on July 15, 1957; by the marriage and resignation of nurse Aurzella Boewe in October; by the return of Par Danforth on June 10, 1958, and by the return of other team members who did not fit into the plans for the Ban Me Thuot operation.

Thanks to the interventions of USOM advisor Howard Harper, IVS/VN was stimulated to begin experimentation. Richard Koegel developed a well digging gear, which enabled villages to secure thei own water supplies. An abandoned French plantation, was reopened as the Jarai Livestock Experimental Station. Preliminary work was begun on the Ea Kmat Seed Propagation Center on the outskirts of Ban Me Thuot. The land was surveyed and the soil tested. A bull-dozer was purchased for use in clearing the forest land.

Ea Kmat was started because the volunteers had discovered the reluctance of local farmers to take the risk involved with experiments. Given the small plots cultivated by the farmers, a failure could prove tragic. Controlled experiments were difficult to conduct on owner plots. Thus Ea Kmat was started as a place where the IVSers could test seeds, discover soil needs, study parasites, and produce seeds for widespread use. They were able to introduce garden crops, and began the large scale production of kenaf and ramie.

So successful was this experiment, IVS/VN was invited to provide technical assistance at a dozen other stations. In responding to the invitation, the team which had hoped to engage in community development was dismantled, and the IVSers belatedly discovered they were junior technicians working on a regional crop and livestock improvement level.

By April 1, 1958, the size of the team had increased to twelve volunteers plus the Chief of Party. IVS Board member Carl Taylor questioned whether manning seed propagation centers was the most useful employment for IVS/VN.

Other projects and experiments started in or near Ea Kmat during the year:

* A charcoal cooperative, designed to help 40 families in two villages to increase their income, was started.
* Cross breeding of swine (using Berkshire and Yorkshire boars) was begun.
* The raising of cattle as draft animals was encouraged.
* Veterinary practises were introduced: Animals were wormed, castration was done asceptically.
* Farmers were trained to use locally produced foods as animal feed.
* Experiments in the feeding of chickens were conducted.
* Villagers were trained in the use of poison for exterminating rats.
* Houses were sprayed with DDT to control insects.
* Rhade Extension Agents were trained to serve as Village agriculture innovators.
* 4-T Club leaders were trained.
* Five village wells were sunk using Richard Koegel's equipment.
* Two experimental irrigation wells were dug at the request of the province chief.
* Forestry possibilities were surveyed and resources mapped.
* Villagers were stimulated to produce and sell wood as a means

of producing income.

Nationally, IVS/VN worked in close association with USOM/VN. On the province level, the volunteers recognized the authority of the province chief. The volunteers went to him for project clearance, and to receive funds appropriated by the Ministry of Agriculture for local expenses. In the early stages, the province chief operated almost autonomously of Saigon. Howard Harper persuaded the Ministry of Agriculture to send representatives to inspect the IVS/VN projects.

On January 1, 1958, IVS/VN was transferred from the Resettlement Section of USOM/VN (which was discontinued) to the Land Development Division of USOM/VN. On the same date, the volunteers moved from their "long house" between Ha Lan A and Ha Lan B to Ban Me Thuot. First, they rented a house which served as a way-station for the volunteers to use as they moved out to the other villages. Then they rented a hotel in the city which served as a headquarters until the building at Ea Kmat was ready for occupancy.

Definite accomplishments during the year 1957-1958 were:

1. Ea Kmat was partially opened and made operative.
2. An irrigation project was started at an existing experimental station northwest of Ban Me Thuot.
3. A hand-rig for well-drilling was developed.
4. The profitability of poultry raising was demonstrated, which subsequently was to affect the income of many Vietnamese people, and to improve their diet, though to 1972 chicken is the highest priced meat in Vietnam.

5. Assistance was rendered to the refugees. The fact that some of the farmers with whom the IVSers worked were recruited as workers and staff at EA Kmat evidenced the early fruits of the IVS people-to-people policy.
6. IVS made contact with the Montagnards. The early training courses for Rhade Extension Agents were beginning of Montagnard Training Schools which continue to operate.
7. The first Vietnamese counterpart, a graduate of the National Agricultural College, arrived at Ea Kmat, and his training was begun. The training of Vietnamese was to prove to be one of the major IVS/VN contributions.
8. A new IVS/VN headquarters was opened at Tan Son Nhut, outside Saigon, in connection with a Livestock Improvement Station. The Chief of Party and volunteers involved in the livestock program were housed there.

The scarcity of technicians in Vietnam during the beginning years made the volunteers "one-eyed men in the land of the blind". USOM was appreciative of their accomplishments, so much so that USIS made a film depicting their program and accomplishments. Success stories about them made the front page of The New York Times. They envisaged themselves as "agents of change" who would revolutionize Vietnamese agriculture.

The acceptance of the volunteers in this situation, and their high regard by USOM was demonstrated by invitations to accept employment in Vietnam after their IVS contracts had been fulfilled. At least 27 of the volunteers during the first decade moved on to positions as agricultural agents, Aid administrators, and translators for USOM. Many others decided

to renew their contracts with IVS. At least 27 other IVS alumni of Vietnam accepted US government positions in other countries during the first decade.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1958 - 1959

1958

Sept 10 - France agrees to provide Fr. 1,490 million for agrarian reform

1959

April - Terrorism and sabotage increased

May - CINCPAC directs US advisors be provided to Armed Forces of South Vietnem

IVS/VN 1958-1959

Twelve IVS volunteers plus the Chief of Party were dispersed to

* Ea Kmat. During the year the administration of this Seed Propagation Center was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Land Development Commission.

* The Hung Loc Livestock Improvement Station. IVS assisted USOM in constructing a dam and diversion ditch for irrigation.

* Dalat Horticultural Crop Improvement Station. The IVS assignment was to double the size of the vegetable crop.

* National Agricultural College, Blao. The Agricultural Research Station also was at Blao. IVS provided volunteer assistance to both institutions. IVS started 3,000 cocoa seedlings, drafted plans for vegetable growing facilities, instituted laboratory work for agricultural students, supervised the construction of an irrigation dam, and started irrigation systems.

* Tan Son Nhut Livestock Improvement Station, Saigon. Agricultural Engineering Program begun. Serviced machinery for all stations. IVSer arranged translation of directions for operating machinery into the Vietnamese language.

A tractor Drivers School was started, which graduated 30 students monthly. Four team members were teaching English on a regular basis. During the year, IVS/VN was featured in a TIMES OF VIETNAM article, mentioned in TIME magazine, and was the subject of USIS produced movie, entitled "Partners in Progress".

A rationale offered for the IVS operation by headquarters was "that IVS seeks to capture the most successful techniques and know-how of missionary personnel and apply them to the economic problems of underdeveloped people".

The Ministry of Agriculture of the GVN requested USOM/VN to expand

the IVS/VN team from fourteen to twenty volunteers. USOM/VN and IVS/W indicated approval. In communicating the request to IVS/VN, the IVS/W Director stated: "This request is indicative of the high regard the GVN has for the quality of technical assistance being rendered by IVS in Crop and Livestock improvement programs. In the face of critical counterpart shortages for 1960 programing, they have indicated a willingness to provide a substantial portion of local currency requirements for the entire team. Such an offer is unprecedented in the Vietnamese foreign aid program."

Yet it was the judgment of the IVS/VN team that to increase the team size would be a mistake "without more concrete plans for their use than have been presented to us. We would like to make better use of what we have before we ask for more . . . There is danger in expanding before knowing how the present program will work ... The GVN is not equipped with personnel or funds to take over what we already are doing... There is danger of the program becoming one of doing something <u>for</u> them rather than <u>with</u> them.... The program will have to expand slowly in order to train and develop management and technical personnel as the (seven) stations are being developed. At the present time we have but one counterpart. We need more young men from the National Agricultural College to train at our stations."

On January 12, 1959, a new contract was signed with USAID which provided that IVS was to have "full administrative responsibility.... including the supervision and direction of the field staff personnel." Technical supervision was to be provided by a designated USOM/VN representative.

When John W. Barwick's contract expired Feb. 27, 1959, he returned to the United States. An acting Chief of Party functioned until the arrival of Gordon Brockmueller.

Dr. Daniel Russell, a professor at Texas A & M, was employed through a special USAID grant to make two separate surveys of IVS operations in several countries. His reports on IVS/VN were highly commendatory. Subsequently, the Director of IVS stated that he had shared these evaluations with the acting Chief of Agriculture USOM/VN, "to help the Mission Director and Ambassador in refuting the accusations brought by the slanted newspaper articles.... They will promote respect for IVS and portray a more optimistic picture of the American aid program in Vietnam," he stated.

The "religious" character of IVS was a subject of considerable discussion throughout its early years. Volunteers were sent complimnetary subscriptions to Norman Vincent Peale's Guideposts. Orientation lectures utilized Jesus' Great Commission as indicating the scope and concern of the volunteers' operations. Church affiliation was identified on the application, and comminications were sent by IVS/W to the pastors of volunteers. Some of the early volunteers were religious COs doing alternative service. In March 1959, seven members of the IVS/VN team inquired of IVS/W as to the religious dimensions of IVS. The Director replied on April 7, 1959: "You are entirely correct in implying that the entire spirit of IVS in the various underdeveloped countries is motivated exclusively by the spirit of Christian service.... IVS expects all of its members to act as true representatives of a Christian organization." A volunteer in his first report home stated mistakenly that IVS was "church related". Another signed his general letter, "Yours in Christ". Still

another volunteer commented in 1960, "Working for material progress one is aware of man's spiritual needs. Many times I have wondered if the life I lead presents Christ."

The Chief of Party reported to IVS/W that IVS/VN was to play a role in making plans for the total agricultural program in Vietnam, instead of being limited to planning for IVS alone. In response to a request for advice, IVS/W stated that "IVS/VN should go along withUSOM/VN Agricultural Division as far as in your judgment the program on behalf of Vietnam might be furthered. IVS/VN is working neither for itself nor for USOM/VN (even though we recognize they are supplying the funds). We are working primarily in the interest of Vietnam. If your wider participation in planning is in the interest of Vietnam, do not hesitate to enter into such activities."

By mid-year 1959, sixteen IVS volunteers were working at seven stations, plus the Saigon IVS headquarters. Noteworthy events at some of them during the year were:

At Dalat:

* Insecticides tested for effectiveness.
* IVSer participated in training course for provincial agents, under the Entomology Section of Ministry of Agriculture.
* Arranged for transport of Dalat vegetables to Saigon market, so as to stimulate growing of improved quality foodstuffs.

At Ea Kmat:

* 500 acres under cultivation
* Million coffee seedlings ready for distribution; 20 tons of kenaf seed produced; 500,000 sweet potato cuttings from tested US varieties distributed.

* IVS technician kept farm machinery in repair. Other equipment improvised and constructed for particular uses on this Farm.
* Farm visited by President Diem and 19 Ambassadors, International Control Commission members, embassy staffs and newsmen.

At Phan Rang:

* IVS team members removed temporarily while internal situation cleared up.
* Cattle improved using Santa Gertrudis bulls.
* English taught to 168 local officials at the request of the Province Chief.

At M'Drak Beef Cattle Improvement Station:

* 50 varieties of grass samples collected for tests as feed.
* Record keeping organized.

At Blao (Bao Loc):

* Cuttings rooted in mist propagation bed.
* 100 vegetable seeds tested.
* 3,000 cocoa seedlings distributed to tribespeople.

At Hung Loc:

* IVSers facilitated cooperation between the livestock and crop sections.
* Pasture lots enlarged to provide grazing for large number of cattle. Trench silo constructed to provide supplementary feed.
* 40 varieties of seeds planted for multiplication purposes.

* Machinery repaired, and station manager advised concerning machine care.

In view of the importance that "community development" later developed in IVS programming, it is significant that the IVS Program Officer reported: "The village or broad community development program with the present USOM/VN and national government setup cannot succeed in Vietnam because of the lack of across-the-board backstopping at the national level.... Until there is a more favorable climate for community development in Vietnam the more restricted program in agriculture is best for IVS. In fact the only toehold IVS has."

By September 1958 the Program Officer was able to report that despite the frustrations which early limited the accomplishments in Vietnam, the program underway by that time "if carried through to a successful conclusion should mean as much as anything the US has done in Vietnam to improve the economy of the country and raise the standard of living of the rural people." In his report he commented upon the 100 acres of land the IVS team had cleared in three months.

His was a glowing and optimistic report on IVS progress in Vietnam. Province officers and station managers, impressed with IVS accomplishments, requested more volunteers. "This work has greatly extended and speeded up the foreign aid program. It could not have been done with such haste without IVS or a much larger expenditure," he wrote. The close cooperation between IVS and USOM led to some IVSers fear of absorption by USOM/VN.

Despite the many types of activities in which the volunteers had

engaged since their arrival in December 1956, "the greatest contribution made by IVS up to this time has been in testing and propagating proven seed for the native agricultural agents to distribute all over the country," he stated. The New York Times, (April 6, 1959) credited IVS with earning Vietnam $2,000,000 on ramie and kenaf crops alone. On the six demonstration farms where the volunteers were working, their function was to be catalytic agents between "US know-how, US do-how, Vietnamese agricultural agents and leaders, village leaders, farmers and youth". The fact that the Ban Me Thuot station by that date already was operated by a Vietnamese with the volunteers serving in an advisory capacity evidenced their capacity to transfer authority.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1959 - 1960

1959

| | |
|---|---|
| July 8 | - Guerrillas attack Bien Hoa base killing two MAAG personnel and wounding others. First American military casualties |
| Aug 30 | - Pro-Government parties sweep second GVN national elections |
| Nov 14 | - French agree upon war settlements and loans to the GVN |
| Dec | - An estimated 5,000 hard core guerrillas operating, according to GVN estimate |

1960

| | |
|---|---|
| Feb 5 | - GVN requests that MAAG strength be doubled to 685 |
| April 17 | - North Vietnam protests to Chairman of 1954 Geneva Conference that the USA by increasing military and advisory personnel is converting South Vietnam into a base for a new war |
| April 30 | - Eighteen Vietnamese notables, including ten Cabinet ministers who had just resigned, demand drastic economic, administrative and military reforms of President Diem |
| May 5 | - US announces MAAG will be increased from 327 to 685 members |
| May 30 | - US Special Forces team arrives in Vietnam to conduct training |
| June | - Guerrilla activities increase |
| June 1-2 | - US top level conference on SE Asia in Hawaii |

IVS/VN 1959-1960

During the fiscal year 1959-60, the IVS/VN program was serviced by a complement of twenty volunteers. An equal number of Vietnamese nationals worked with the volunteers. Undergirding the IVS/VN effort were: The Tan Son Nhut Station Development Manager, who expedited the flow of supplies from Saigon to the other stations. The USOM/VN Agricultural Director and the Directorate of National Agriculture in the GVN were available to the IVSers for consultation. USOM/VN agricultural technicians manifested a concern for the volunteers, and extended technical assistance.

Nine of the stations where the IVS team worked were administered by the Ministry of Agriculture. Ea Kmat at Ban Me Thuot was under the Commissariat of Land Development. Five of the experimental stations were engaged in crop improvement, four in livestock development. My Tho specialized in rice culture. M'Drak in cattle. Di Linh in lacquer. Ea Kmat conducted a variety of operations, extending the number of experimental crops from four to fifteen.

The IVS volunteers assisted (and trained) Vietnamese as station managers and technicians. They also worked directly with villagers, planters, and extension agents in rice multiplication and cacao distribution.

The Vietnamese staffs at the stations included some graduates of agricultural colleges. Since they were approximately the same age as the IVSers, the two groups developed counterpart relations in technical matters, in mutual understanding and in fellowship.

At Ban Me Thuot the irrigation system was improved by the installation of two diesel pumps. Tractor maintenance instruction was given to the Vietnamese driviers. 50 hand-driven seed-drills were assembled for distribution to neighboring farmers. Classes were organized for Rhade (Montagnard) tribesmen from the Land Development villages. The IVSers gave agricultural instruction at the "missionary school" operated by the Christian and Missionary Alliance for Montagnard trainees from the mountain villages.

Phan Rang (Nha Ho) was a former French-owned banana and palm oil station. The GVN cleared the rubble and established a livestock station. When the IVSers were invited to aid in the development process, they were asked by the Chief of the Province if they would bring their own American food, or would they eat with chopsticks? When they informed the Chief that they would subsist on Vietnamese food, he greeted them warmly.

Since there were no funds with which to employ labor, the IVSers prepared the ground for the forage experiments. They discovered that Sudan-grass and sorghum imported from America fared as well in Phan Rang as in their native habitat. In addition to crop experiments, the IVSers did surveys in nearby villages and began work on an irrigation system. The purposes of the Farm were to improve, develop and multiply livestock; demonstrate practical livestock management; establish a model livestock farm; produce forage and grains for station needs; and to produce grain for the Animal Husbandry Division's poultry and swine.

Phan Rang entries in the Livestock Exposition at Tuy Hoa in December 1959 won two first prizes. An IVSer writing from the farm in May 1960

noted that the USAID/VN budget for the Animal Husbandry Division had been doubled for the year 1960-61, and wondered if this was a merit increase based on IVS/VN accomplishments?

IVSers were sent to Dalat to expand the five acres under vegetable production to twenty-five. At this Horticultural Experiment Center and Nursery, imported varieties of "truck farming" seeds were tested, as were fungicides. The USOM/VN Sub-tropical Horticultural Advisor helped the IVSers with onion and potato experiments. The provincial Director of Agricultural Services for the GVN cooperated with the station staff in testing varieties of imported vegetable seeds which might interest Dalat farmers.

Hung Loc was the largest station, with 3,500 acres, to which IVSers were attached. While technically a Livestock Improvement Station, IVSers helped create an adjacent Crop Station as well. They constructed roads, built houses, dug a well, and cleared some of the land. Machinery maintenance had a high priority on their work agenda. The IVS Program Director wrote that the cooperation between the crops and the livestock people at this Farm was its most significant aspect. He also was impressed by the conduct of a business session chaired by an IVSer, and which was attended by the heads of both the Crops and the Livestock sections.

The Livestock section concentrated during the year upon cattle culling; there was an over-supply. The IVSers helped construct a trench silo, experimented with cattle feeding, built a loading shute, and introduced pig culture.

M'Drak was a ranch style livestock station 50 miles east of Ban Me

Thuot. Its specialties were cattle improvement and the development of forage crops. IVSers sought to demonstrate the feasibility of private ranching. 300 cattle and 50 buffalo were fed. IVSers noted that the isolation of the Central highlands inhibited ethnic Vietnamese from settling there, and thus participating in its economic development.

The Di Linh volunteers concentrated upon lacquer culture. They helped expand the eight hectare lacquer-tree grove to 30 hectares (75 acres). 500,000 seedlings were raised for distribution to Highland farmers. Experiments with growing cacao plants under various conditions were conducted. 500,000 lacquer seedlings were planted (which together with the Di Linh production) should enable Viet Nam to export 500 tons of lacquer to Japan annually.

At My Tho rice experiments were conducted. Classification of 750 varieties, streamlining the rice multiplication program, the transportation and storage of rice, and the training of groups of students from the National College of Agriculture in rice genetics were among the tasks performed by IVSers.

At Tan Son Nhut (Saigon) the IVSer served as liaison between the Livestock Station and other stations throughout the country. Weanling pigs were distributed to farmers. Newly hatched chicks were delivered. Experiments were conducted on forage feeds for cattle. Whereas at other stations the volunteers had to carry major administrative responsibilities, at Tan Son Nhut, an experienced Vietnamese staff operated an established station.

The Saigon station, while equipped with excellent facilities for

cattle, pigs and poultry was from the beginning, with only 35 acres, short on land. The significance of Saigon was that it both served as IVS headquarters and was the main livestock receiving, breeding and distributing station for sll South Vietnam. The fact that there were but two graduates in dairy husbandry in the nation, made all the more significant, experiments conducted by the volunteers in mixing Jersey and Red Sindi cattle, aiming to develop a breed both hardy enough to withstand the climate, and yet capable of maximum milk production.

An IVS technician attached to Tan Son Nhut quoted from a USAID report to Congress: "The Study Mission found one of the finest agricultural projects in the Vietnamese hill country, American boys living alongside the Vietnamese. The project is helping people help themselves."

It was during this year, the first of John F. Kennedy's presidency, that he established the Peace Corps to work in "developing" countries. IVS/VN can take some of the credit for this development. A group of Congressmen, investigating the use of foreign aid funds came across IVS. They reported:

> "The committee is pleased to report the discovery of a group of young American agriculture graduates, living alongside the Vietnamese and teaching basic agriculture. . . The cost of the entire program has not yet been as much as a single mile of a recently completed highway. It is to such projects that the study committee gives its heartiest approval."

The IVS Director was consulted during the hearings on the Peace Corps by a number of Congressmen.

Harvey C. Neese, an animal husbandryman, on October 16, 1959 reported "The Director (of Animal Husbandry of the Government) wanted to give IVS

more authority than our advisor in USOM and the (IVS) Chief-of-Party wanted to have.... He wanted to turn over the whole station including money control to IVS."

The Program Director noted in July 1959 that USOM/VN was taking credit for IVS/VN accomplishments. While The New York Times had played up kenaf and ramie production without mentioning IVS or Mr. Dempsey, "the greatest fiber production man in the world today", their satisfaction should be derived from a job well done.

In his September 1959 report to IVS/W, the Program Director gave more attention to Vietnam than to any of the other IVS-related countries. He noted perturbations among volunteers over the crash program intent of USOM and the GVN to "see what will really work and be accepted". The Program Director stated that "IVS does extend the hand of the US foreign aid program in all its finest aspects.... IVS as an organization, as a team and as individual members, can and should take just pride in being not only an IVS team but an important part of a much bigger team doing a tremendous job in an important and critical area.... USOM/VN greatly strengthens and extends the hand of IVS". He concluded that South Vietnam was "the country where ICA was doing the most good".

The first reference to "insecurity" in IVS reports was in connection with the removal of the team from Cai San in 1957. The second was in mid-1959, when the Program Director's vehicle had"passed through Bien Hoa just a few hours after the American military men were killed by the NLF terrorists". He reported that he felt no fear. "These sporadic incidents are expressions of Communist felt weakness instead of felt strength."

The letters from volunteers written through 1959 revealed little political consciousness. They provided friends with information about Vietnam, the IVS stations and work, living conditions, adjustments they were making to a new climate and culture, vacations, and work schedules. They moved freely through the countryside, fearful only of wild animals, leeches, and tropical diseases. The absence of references to any security problems evidenced the peaceful conditions in South Vietnam that obtained through those years. One striking political observation from Richard Peters, writing from Phan Rang, December 10, 1959: "In the words of USOM we are here to protect this country from Communism, not for their own benefit, but for our own. This seems to me, however, to be a very shallow reason for going half way around the world. To help these people we must love them."

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1960 - 1961

**1960**

| | |
|---|---|
| July 20 | - GVN National Assembly group leaves for six-weeks visit to US |
| Oct 26 | - President Eisenhower congratulates President Diem on the 5th Anniversary of South Vietnam, and assures him of continued US support |
| Nov 10 | - The GVN in letter to the ICC charges North Vietnam with direct aggression |
| Nov 11-12 | - Abortive coup against President Diem's regime |
| Nov 16 | - Diem and Nhu announce reform plans |
| Dec | - US military personnel in Vietnam numbers 900 |
| | - Establishment of National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam |

**1961**

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan 29 | - Radio Hanoi praises establishment of NLF |
| Feb 6 | - President Diem, in first press conference announces his reform program |
| Feb 7 | - President Diem announces he will be candidate for reelection on April 9 |
| Feb 10 | - NLF announces guerrilla offensive against April 9th elections |
| April 3 | - US-Vietnamese Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations signed in Saigon |
| April 9 | President Diem and Vice-President Tho reelected |
| May 5 | - President Kennedy announces the sending of Vice-President Johnson to Vietnam. Decision to send American troops to await Johnson's recommendations |

1961

May 13 - Joint Communique from Johnson-Diem that additional US military and economic aid will be given the GVN

May 13 - Staley Mission in Vietnam studying economic conditions

May 13 - Elbridge Durbrow replaced by Frederick Nolting as Ambassador

IVS/VN 1960-1961

The number of IVS volunteers remained at 20. They were working at two agricultural schools, six crop improvement stations, and five livestock improvement stations. Staff had been increased by one Assistant Chief of Party. At these stations, experiments were conducted, seed and stock are multiplied and distributed, information disseminated, and agents, technicians and farmers trained. IVS team members directed their efforts towards improving the functions of the centers, but also made community contracts, working with provincial agents and station technicians.

The IVS and Vietnamese joint effort was supplemented by eleven Chinese contract technicians, who were distributed among the stations. Insecurity at Nha-Ho, Ban Me Thuot and M'Drak required volunteers to move into nearby towns. They left My Tho Rice Station.

Invitations to expand into agricultural education led to the stationing of volunteers at the Bao Loc National College of Agriculture and the Hue Agricultural School. IVSers began working with provincial agricultural agents in extension at four places. USOM support provided for counterpart technicians.

While volunteers were withdrawn from My Tho, they were assigned to Hue and Quang Ngai, and were cooperating with the Pasteur Institute at Nha Trang. At the Hue Animal Husbandry Station, the IVSer demonstrated economical means of feeding and housing chickens, and improving methods of slaughtering animals. At Quang Ngai, efforts were directed to expanding vegetable crops. In cooperation with the Government Sugar Cane Station the IVSer helped to develop greater labor efficiency. An

agricultural program for Montagnards was begun at M'Drak, with courses for selected tribesmen in over 70 villages. Training courses were conducted for Vietnamese farmers and agricultural agents at Hung Loc, Tan Son Nhut and Ban Me Thuot, the number being over 1,000 at the latter.

Extension activities were conducted from each of the stations save My Tho and Hung Loc, where insecurities in the area made travel unsafe. Extension included a variety of activities. Survey of village needs resulted in the installation of irrigation systems. Another survey was conducted to determine which villages could use a peanut oil press which had been contributed. A vegetable farm survey was conducted to guide the IVSers in their programmatic approaches to the farmer. A survey of rice farmers led to the construction of a dam to supply needed water.

Village demonstration and training was another dimension of extension. A survey by an IVSer led to the establishment of the Rhade Voacational Training School at Ban Me Thuot, with 150 enrolled. The aims were to train the mountain people to:

1. Make simple tools so as to expedite and simplify their work (such as hoes, looms, etc.).
2. Experiment with their own plots, planting, cultivating, fertilizing and protecting. Seedlings from what the students grew were taken back to his village.
3. Development of the student and improvement of his village.
4. Demonstration to Montagnards that someone is interested, and seeking to help them find solutions to their problems.
5. Broadcasts to the villages informing them of what each

student is doing. (Each village has been given a radio.)

Volunteers at Dalat trained farmers in the use of a chemical pesticide to eliminate slug (akin to the snail) which reduced vegetable production. Demonstration posters announcing the benefits of a certain kind of sorghum were hung and sample packets of seeds were distributed by an IVSer at a Livestock Fair. An entomologist IVSer taught farmers the proper preparation and use of pesticides. He also filled in for USOM pending the arrival of a Plant Protection Specialist. An IVS machinery expert demonstrated the use of small tractors. IVSers stimulated the organization of vegetable (Dalat) and rice (the Delta) cooperatives. A wide variety of seeds were carried to farmers and Vietnamese agents from the experimental stations. Information contained in IVSers' reports was checked and translated for distribution in printed form to villagers.

Some IVS activity was in the area of community welfare. Wheel chairs were constructed for crippled children. A windmill, filter and a reservoir were constructed for a hospital. Because of the demands upon volunteers for first aid, they sent Vietnamese assistants to a hospital for training in first aid. These stations were incorporated into the national treatment service of the GVN. Most IVSers were teaching informal English classes.

A volunteer from Phan Rang who was engaged in experiments with livestock reported that among the Vietnamese there was "a growing awareness that their lot could be improved. That awareness and the drive for self determination," he stated, "are the two central facts of our time".

Whereas the early volunteers were hardly aware of any danger from

insurgency, by the autumn of 1960, regulations had been issued concerning security précautions in the rural areas.

By the year-end of 1960, USOM/VN was considering requesting that IVS/VN add eleven additional volunteers to work on a supervisory level with the GVN and with USOM/VN.

The Director of IVS/W reported to the Chief of Party that the Far East branch advisor in the Agricultural Programs Division of ICA had complained that all IVS/VN reports were overly optimistic, and thus failed to present factual conditions. He had complained that IVS/VN team members did not offer constructive criticisms.

The volunteers could have reported difficulties they experienced in controlling disease and in the rice multiplication program. A provincial volunteer did report to IVS/W that the province chiefs experienced difficulty in getting money from Saigon with which to purchase rice from farmers, and also difficulties in distributing good quality rice to members of the Farmers' Cooperative.

The volunteers' experience with cooperatives was mixed. The first team had stimulated the organization of a charcoal cooperative. President Diem regarded cooperatives as being central to the GVN rural development program. Only 29 cooperatives were operating in 1954 when Decree Ordinance No. 24 was laid down. Between 1954 and 1958, 306 additional agricultural and fisheries cooperatives were organized. The Commission for the Study of Rural Life Organization (established May 30, 1958), helped to establish seventeen multipurpose coops in two provinces in 1959 and eight more in a single province in 1960.

The Commissariat General for Cooperatives and Agricultural Credit was established Feb. 27, 1959 unifying the structures. Farmers Associations were organized thereafter, based on the Taiwan model, which were central to GVN policy for the next few years. Their importance subsequently declined as the GVN emphasis shifted from rural economic development to the military pacification Strategic Hamlet program.

Whereas a volunteer who reported in November 1960 that "there are dedicated USAID staff who honestly are seeking to achieve," six months later he commented: "We are sacrificing close relationships with the Vietnamese to a supposedly more efficient service. With increased publicity our position has become more important. We are watched more closely and have come under the wing of USOM. Our growth has not been accompanied by a corresponding closeness to the people."

Such differences, however, did not prevent IVS/VN from continuing to relate people-to-people in a development program. A volunteer wrote: "We are our brother's keeper. The opportunity comes to do good and we respond." Edward P. Morgan, announcing in July 1960 over ABC referred to IVS volunteers as the "unugly Americans".

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

FY 1961 - 1962

1961

| | |
|---|---|
| Aug 2 | - President Kennedy states that US will continue efforts to save South Vietnam from communism |
| | - 41 engagements between armies of GVN and guerrillas |
| Sept 1-4 | - 1,000 guerrillas attack in Kontum province |
| Sept 18 | - 1,500 Communist forces seize capital of Phuoc Thanh province, sixty miles from Saigon |
| Sept 25 | - President Kennedy, addressing the UN, states South Vietnam is under attack |
| Oct 1 | - SEATO military experts meet in Bangkok to consider guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam. The US announces it is considering sending troops |
| Oct 2 | - President Diem requests Dr. Eugene Staley and his Commission to recommend increased aid from the US for economic and social development |
| Oct 11 | - President Kennedy announces the Maxwell D. Taylor mission to study military situation. Decision re US troops will be based on his recommendations |
| Oct 18 | - Diem proclaims state of emergency. Taylor and Rostow arrive in Saigon |
| Nov 16 | - President Kennedy decides on basis of Taylor recommendations to increase military advisers and equipment, but no combat troops |
| Dec 8 | - State Department publishes "White Paper," - "A Threat to Peace," documenting North Vietnam's efforts to take over South Vietnam |
| Dec 14 | - President Kennedy pledges increased aid to South Vietnam |
| | - US military forces in South Vietnam number 3,200. |

1962

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan 4 | - Joint announcement of economic and social aid from US to the GVN based on the Staley Commission recommendations |

1962

| | |
|---|---|
| Feb 7 | - Two US Air support companies reach Saigon. Total US military personnel now numbers 4,000 |
| Feb 8 | - US recognizes military command, setting up Military Assistance Command (MACV) under General Paul D. Harkins |
| Feb 18 | - Robert Kennedy in Saigon states US troops will remain until Viet Cong are defeated |
| Feb 27 | - Two dissident VN Airforce planes strafe Presidential palace in Saigon in abortive attempt to assassinate President Diem |
| March | - US press intensifies criticism of President Diem |
| March 22 | - "Operation Sunrise" - a guerrilla mop-up operation in Binh Duong Province |
| April 20 | - National Assembly pledges support to "strategic hamlet" program |
| | - US military force in Vietnam increased 5,400 |
| May 9-11 | - Secretary McNamara inspects Vietnam. Says US aid will level off. Doubts that US forces will be increased |
| May 28 | - President Diem refuses to allow US direct assistance to Montagnards |
| June 26 | - GVN National Assembly votes to extend term in office by one year on grounds that holding elections not feasible in view of insecurities |

IVS/VN 1961-1962

The IVS force remained at 20 volunteers, despite the annual turnover. IVSers were pulled out of M'Drak, Quang Ngai and Di Linh, and reassigned. My Tho was reopened. An IVSer was assigned to a new location: Qui Nhon, where a farmers' demonstration school in livestock and agriculture was located; and another to Can Tho in the Delta to assist at the Agricultural School. The volunteer concentrated upon irrigation, and the development of forage production on marginal lands. More than 1,200 trainees studied at Ea Kmat. A Tractor Driver School was started at Hung Loc.

Extension type activities during the year included the development of an irrigation system for an arid coastal village near Phan Rang, which included the creation of a community self-help fund to cover construction costs. Request for assistance in irrigating 50 hectares near Qui Nhon led to involvement with the Provincial Irrigation Service in creating the system. Demonstration windmills were constructed to provide water for irrigation.

Demonstration projects for Highlands People were established at and near Bao Loc. Plans were made for holding a training conference for 100 farmers in Binh Dinh province.

The Rhade project near Ban Me Thuot developed into a training school, seed and fruit tree nursery. An extension team traveled to the villages. 44 villages sent 124 trainees for six day period conferences.

IVSers participated in the reestablishment of 1,200 refugees who

had been resettled near Nha Trang, in Phuoc Luong. The planting of seeds and the making of tools in a shop were their major activities.

USAID, which had replaced ICA on Nov. 6, 1961, proposed an IVS/VN team expansion. Ten volunteers would be "rural". Ten would be "agricultural technicians". An expansion into the field of education also was proposed to include twenty-three vocational, English, science and laboratory teachers. The suggested health unit reported the previous year now was made a definite proposal: IVS would recruit six malaria specialists to improve and facilitate the malaria eradication program, check blood samples to determine the effects of measures being taken to check the virus, provide vehicle maintenance, do audio-visual education in the villages, and develop more effective spraying methods. The Chief of Party relayed to IVS/W an inquiry from USOM/VN concerning the possibility of a community development team for Vietnam.

The reason for this suggested increase in IVS/VN personnel is not clear. On the one hand, President Diem was pushing the "Strategic Hamlet" program, and thus needed increased technical assistance. On the other, insecurity in the villages was worsening. Chief of Party Don Luce referred to this as a problem in October 1961. IVS Director, Russell Stevenson, reporting on his recent visit to Vietnam, stated: "President Diem has faced a military problem of staggering proportions; namely, to win control over insurgent groups within the country and thus unify the people. The economic battle has been even more crucial, the need to effect a greater degree of well-being among her 14,000,000 people through land distribution, land development, industrialization, improved transportation, and control of a near runaway inflation.... It is not my pre-

rogative to comment on the enlarged program of AID from the USA; I can only note its existence, for this increasing US effort provides the framework within which we have to judge our own program (including)... the larger program we are now asked to man. There is surely no doubt that the advancing encroachments of the Communists must be stopped, that we must work in such ways as we can for a healthy and a secure South Vietnam, and in the end hope for a greater stability throughout Southeast Asia."

Relations between IVS/VN and the Christian churches and missionary organizations had been a matter of discussion since the beginning of the program in Vietnam. The Roman Catholic priests in the refugee villages in Cai San and Ha Lan A and Ha Lan B had suspected that the IVSers intended to proselytize. One IVSer had been called to task for presenting his church's position concerning war. (He was a member of a so-called "Peace Church"). Montagnard trainees of the Tien Lanh Church (the Evangelical Church of Vietnam, started by the Christian and Missionary Alliance) had been instructed by IVS volunteers. IVS volunteers found cooperation with the volunteers serving under the Mennonite Service Committee (later: Vietnam Christian Service) almost inevitable. In response to an inquiry from the Chief of Party concerning some suggested cooperative activities, the IVS/W Director cautioned "Keep alert to our reservations regarding too close an involvement with any missionary body."

IVSers had expressed concern from the beginning as to the importance of stimulating Vietnamese activity. Volunteers sometimes felt they were doing the work for the Vietnamese rather than involving the people. This was true in the days before they were provided with counterpart workers-

trainees, and later when general mobilization removed their Vietnamese associates. At the end of 1961, the staff notified the team members that they were to channel all station requests through Vietnamese personnel rather than initiate the requests themselves, as a means of developing the Vietnamese sense of responsibility.

In 1961, IVS explored the possibility of some joint IVS-Peace Corps programs. The country being considered was Thailand. In the end, the negotiations were dropped because of the different methods of operation.

Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr., Director of the Peace Corps was sent a copy of the IVS/VN annual report by Director A. Z. Gardiner of the ICA Mission in Vietnam. Shriver commented in thanking him: "The IVS accomplishment reflects a goal that the Peace Corps hopes to emulate... It is my hope that Peace Corps Volunteers...can make an equally significant contribution to the economic and social development of their host countries and to international understanding."

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1962 - 1963

**1962**

| | |
|---|---|
| July 22-24 | - McNamara meeting with General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting in Honolulu, says US military aid is paying off |
| Sept 11-13 | - General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman JCS, hails "strategic hamlet" program |
| Oct 26 | - National Assembly extends by one year President Diem's emergency powers to rule by decree |
| Dec 29 | - GVN announces 4,077 strategic hamlets completed, housing 39 percent of the population |
| | - US military strength in Vietnam reaches 11,300 |

**1963**

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan 2-3 | - Three Americans killed during GVN defeat at battle of Ap Bac - making total of 30 from beginning of aid program |
| Jan 9-11 | - Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, predicts South Vietnam victory in three years |
| Feb 24 | - Senator Mike Mansfield, following visit to Vietnam states situation less stable than in 1955 despite expenditure of $2 billion in aid |
| March 6 | - GVN Navy takes over patrol of coast from US 7th Fleet |
| March 8 | - Secretary Rusk reports that ARVN holds initiative in most areas |
| April 17 | - President Diem announces "Chieu Hoi" (open arms) campaign, offering surrender terms to Viet Cong |
| April 22 | - Secretary Rusk calls situation difficult and dangerous, and says US role is "limited and supporting" |
| | - 12,000 US Advisers now in South Vietnam. Diem wants to reduce the number |
| May 6 | - Defense spokeman says "corner definitely has been turned towards victory" |

| | |
|---|---|
| May 8 | - Riots in Hue after GVN bars flying of flags and procession on Buddha's birthday |
| May 22 | - President Kennedy says US will withdraw advisers if GVN so requests |
| June 3 | - Buddhist demonstrations in Hue and other cities Martial law imposed |
| June 11 | - Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc immolates himself in Saigon in protest against GVN suppression of Buddhists |
| June 27 | - President Kennedy announces appointment of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge |

IVS/VN 1962-1963

The team was enlarged from nineteen agricultural volunteers to a total of 53 IVSers working in 22 different areas. The main increase was because of the enlargement of the program to include formal education in secondary schools, universities and technical institutions. The staff was reorganized the assistants being reduced to one, but with three team leaders: one for education and two for agriculture.

The agricultural volunteers were enlarged to 28, working at 18 locations 10-12 of them were requested by the Chief of Party to double as USOM province representatives, especially in connection with President Diem's Strategic Hamlet (later, "New Life Hamlet") program.

IVSers gave assistance in the Strategic Hamlet Program at the existing stations of Can Tho and My Tho, and at the reopened Quang Ngai station. Tuy Hoa, Rach Gia and Phan Thiet were started to implement this program. The IVSers were involved in the social and economic phases, initiating self-help projects whereby the villagers elected to construct a bridge or lay a cement floor for their school or to construct a fish pond. The villagers were given materials, food and money for performing these functions. The IVSers spent considerable time visiting locations to assure the delivery of supplies. New stations opened were:

Rach Gia - Strategic Hamlet Program. Experimentation with garden crops. Course for the training of elected representatives as to their responsibilities.

Bien Hoa - In association with various GVN departments, IVS

demonstrated improved varieties of sweet potatoes and corn multiplication.

Phan Thiet - Site of a provincial nursery, and experimental and demonstration site for the utilization of windpower.

Nha Trang - Grape experiments. First non-USA citizen John Tayless (British) IVSer.

Hau Bon - Province tribal rehabilitation projects: wells, crops, fruit trees, for benefit of Montagnards.

Tuy Hoa - Strategic Hamlet Program families selected to receive three improved pigs. Seed corn multiplication.

Qui Nhon - Assisted with training course conducted by the Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Services of the GVN. Extension and seed corn multiplication.

Quang Tri - Self-help irrigation and bridge construction projects. Help to 3,000 Montagnards who came seeking assistance. Relief to victims of typhoon.

Since IVS began in a village outside Bàn Me Thuot, they had been concerned with the plight of the tribes people. Special courses had been organized, and beginnings of establishments for the Montagnards had been made. By 1963, Highland Village Development had become an integral part of the IVS program. The forced removal of these people from their mountain homes required a complete change in life, from "Slash and Burn" agriculture to the settled cultivation of fields and the raising of livestock. The work expanded from the Ea Kmat Land

Development Station to demonstration gardens at Bao Loc and Di Linh and at Dampau near Dalat. The purpose of the latter was to train teachers of agriculture and sanitation. These centers also became points from which extension teams of Montagnards went out to the villages.

Agricultural Station Development - Having been invited on the basis of the Ea Kmat experience to assist in a dozen others, where Vietnam was seeking to improve agricultural productivity, specific assignments were to machinery maintenance, small irrigation projects, and the teaching of English to station technicians.

Crop Development - IVSers contributed to a new dimension of agriculture in Vietnam, where the French previously had stressed plantation crops. IVSers introduced a large number of garden seeds, and experimented with pesticides.

Animal Husbandry - Pigs were made available to "Strategic Hamlet" farmers. IVS cooperated with the governmental agencies in selecting the farmers to receive them, constructing proper housing, developing feed formulas, and experimenting with inoculations. Since the average villager lacked adequate protein in his diet, animal husbandry was a means of dealing with a Vietnamese problem of health and fitness.

IVSers also aided in the self-help project (intermittently referred to as "Community Development" by IVS), irrigation, plant protection.

Twenty-five teachers were introduced to teach English, science and vocational skills. IVS endeavored to place the volunteers in provincial schools where there were no Vietnamese teachers of these assigned subjects.

Thirteen volunteers concentrated upon English teaching, four upon technical vocational guidance, and two in the introduction of new science techniques. The USOM Education Department provided guidance and support for the educational team. The Department of National Education of the GVN cooperated. IVSers discovered that due to the status accorded teachers in Vietnamese society their positions in the community were clarified by being invited to teach in the schools. The places of assignment were:

English

Hue - Dong Khan, a girls' high school
Quoc Hoc, a boys' high school

Da Nang - Phan Chu Trinn - province high school

Qui Nhon - Cuong De High School

Saigon - Trung Vuong - girls' secondary school

My Tho - Public High School

Can Tho - Phan Thanh Gian Secondary School
Normal Schools

Saigon - (Until 1962 the only Normal School in Vietnam)
National Normal

National Technical Center

Phu Tho - (near Saigon) - Junior university. IVSer organized English instruction

Technical high schools at Vinh Long, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thuot and Da Nang - IVS helped set up facilities, organize study courses, and teaching shopwork.

IVSer worked in Hue at four high and junior high schools.

At Dalat, IVSer worked with science teachers in developing experi-

ments in two schools.

At Hue, IVSers broadcasted English instruction five times weekly for one-half hour each. USIS prepared lessons for listeners.

IVS was so firmly established by 1963, the GVN Directorate of Rural Affairs expressed the hope that an IVS technician would be attached to each Provincial Agricultural Service. Provincial officials had requested so many IVS associates, all the positions could not be filled.

The assignment of seven IVSers to new schools being built as part of the Strategic Hamlet Program was planned. Visits to fifty such schools demonstrating methods and consulting with teachers in the works.

Mobile Science Units became operative around Hue and Nha Trang.

An Adult Education program was planned.

Extra curricular activities in which IVSers engaged were English clubs, movie showings, relaxation.

A "Traveling Fair" was started in Ban Me Thuot, as an extension service to the Montagnards. A team of Rhade tribesmen visited a village, demonstrated how to plant fruit trees, played with children and showed a movie. A circuit of 40 villages was completed during two months.

100 farmers brought to Qui Nhon and trained for a month, to assist the provincial agricultural chief in demonstrating seed varieties, insecticides and fertilizers.

In the summer of 1962, C. Leslie Britton, the USOM contract officer

who worked with IVS/VN proposed that a "junior-senior technician" relationship be developed between the IVSers and the USOM technicians. The IVS Chief of Party replied in the negative saying that the existing relations had developed over a considerable period of time, and that they are working well. It therefore would be best not to disturb them. At about the same time USOM technicians had been assigned to work with the IVS/VN agricultural developers. The latter welcomed this relationship, stating, "The USOM technicians can provide the financial support we need in the provinces."

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

FY 1963 - 1964

1963

| | |
|---|---|
| July 11 | - President Kennedy while affirming support for Diem, warns against internal dissent which weakens national purpose |
| July 17 | - Buddhist protestors (1,000) beaten back by Saigon police |
| Aug 4 | - Second Buddhist priest burns himself to death |
| Aug 21 | - After GVN troops had raided main Buddhist pagoda, President Diem proclaims martial law throughout the nation |
| Aug 22 | - Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau and Ambassador to the US Tran Van Chuong (father of Mme. Nhu), resign in protest against GVN treatment of Buddhists |
| Aug 26 | - US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents his credentials to President Diem |
| Aug 25 | - Hundreds of students arrested in Saigon following street demonstration |
| Sept 2 | - President Kennedy over NBC reminds GVN leaders that it is their war, and that they have gotten out of touch with people |
| | - Times of Vietnam charges CIA agents had planned a coup d'etat for August 28 |
| Sept 8 | - David Bell, USAID Administrator warns that US aid may be reduced unless the GVN changes policies |
| Sept 9 | - President Kennedy says he doesn't favor a reduction in aid |
| Sept 11 | - Ambassador Lodge informs President Diem that Ngo Dinh Nhu must go |
| Sept 12 | - President Kennedy implies aid might be cut unless Diem changes policies, for USA is not in Vietnam "to see a war lost" |
| Sept 24 | - McNamara and Taylor arrive in Saigon to survey military |

1963

situation

Oct 2 - McNamara and Taylor report situation serious but can be won by 1965 unless political crisis hampers

Oct 4 - President Kennedy recalls CIA Station Chief John Richardson whose contacts were with Ngo Dinh Nhu

Oct 7 - US suspends some economic aid to GVN

Oct 27 - Seventh Buddhist monk burns himself to death

Oct 31 - General Harkins announces 1,000 US troops to be withdrawn

Nov 1-2 - Military coup by high ranking officers deposes President Diem. Diem and Nhu assassinated

Nov 7 - US recognizes government established by military junta, headed by General Duong Van ("Big") Minh

Nov 22 - President Kennedy assassinated. Two days later President Johnson affirms US support of GVN

Dec 3 - US begins withdrawal of 1,000 support troops

Dec 19-20 - McNamara in Saigon assures General Minh of continuing US aid

1964

Jan 6 - Military junta reorganized. Triumvirate to rule

Jan 30 - Military junta overthrown by Gen. Nguyen Khanh

Feb 1 - President Johnson pledges greater war effort in Vietnam

Feb 4 - VC offensive in Tay Ninh province and Mekong Delta

Feb 8 - General Khanh announces himself Premier

March 7 - General Khanh announces reform plan to improve administration and raise standard of living

March 8 - McNamara and Taylor in Saigon laud Khanh and promise support

May 2 - VC terrorists sink US transport Card in Saigon harbor

1964

| | |
|---|---|
| May 3 | - Americans wounded, bomb thrown among inspectors of Card damage |
| May 12 | - McNamara and Taylor in 5th on-the-spot inspection promise more aid to bolster war effort |
| May 18 | - President Johnson asks Congress for an additional $125 million for Vietnam. US to send additional planes and training pilots |
| June 1 | - Top military and diplomatic officials meeting in Honolulu agree more aid necessary to deal with serious situation |
| June 20 | - General Westmoreland takes over MACV Command from General Harkins |
| June 23 | - President Johnson announces General Maxwell D. Taylor to succeed Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador. Alexis Johnson to be Deputy Ambassador |

IVS/VN 1963-1964

The IVS team in this fiscal year numbered sixty-nine, who were working in twenty-eight locations.

## Agriculture

The agriculture team was composed of two team leaders, twenty-one agricultural technicians and two home economists, engaged at twenty-one separate locations in development and health activities:

Tuy Hoa (Phu Yen province) - relations with provincial agencies responsible for animal husbandry, farmers' associations, agricultural credit, crop improvement. Extension program demonstrating rice cultivation methods.

Bao Loc (Lam Dong Province) - Rice demonstrations projects for Sre tribespeople who have limited cultivation area. Emphasis on the use of compost.

Tuy Hoa - "Chicken Chain" project. Housing, feeding, and treatment of chickens. Continued after IVSer transferred.

Ninh Thuan - Joint education-agriculture project developed by IVSers enabling teachers to supplement their salaries by raising sales crops.

Can Tho - IVS experiments with the preparation of chocolate led to a local business starting a candy production unit.

Quang Tri - Pig Corn Program. Training farmers to raise corn to feed their hogs as a means of reducing disease and producing more income.

Binh Dinh - Pig Corn Program placed 900 pigs in 300 locations. Encountered difficulties, for in Vietnam, pigs are cared for by women. But a Vietnamese superstition teaches that if a sow has piglets this will bring bad luck to her daughter when she is married. So Vietnamese have their female pigs spayed.

Quang Duc - Montagnard Demonstration and Training Center. An IVS agricultural engineer participated in building cattle and pig shelters, creation and stocking of a fish pond, three hectares of upland land cleared, drainage ditch constructed to clear four hectares of swamp. English classes taught two nights weekly.

Ba Xuyen - Rural Life Center created by IVSer at Soc Trang, the first demonstration center outside the highlands. Training classes in rural life conducted.

Dampau - (near Dalat) - Dampau Demonstration and Training Center for 4,000 tribespeople who had fled the Vietcong. Financed by profits made on Dalat strawberry profits. Gardens. Pigs. Staffed by tribesmen who are trained to start village projects.

Hung Loc - (Long Khanh Province) - Hung Loc Experiment Station. IVSer engaged in machinery maintenance. Sprinkler irrigation system installed. Seed multiplication program started.

Hoi An - Extension training for economic development projects. Self-help projects and 4-T Clubs

My Tho - Nutritional supplement experiments conducted by IVSer at an orphanage. Funds provided by a California high school student body.

Ban Me Thuot - (Darlac Province) - 90% of province population is Rhade. Demonstrations in village "long-houses" on baby care, and cooking

locally available foods.

Rach Gia - (Kien Giang Province) - Self-help projects included the construction of canals, maternity wards, bridges, schools, market places, pigpens and fish ponds.

Long An Province - 85-90% controlled by NLF. Emphasis on pigs and corn, to demonstrate to "farm people that the GVN was willing and able to help them".

Dinh Tuong Province - emphasis on well digging.

Quang Ngai - Agricultural services and animal husbandry.

Kontum - Montagnard extension.

Phuoc Long - Montagnard extension.

Bien Hoa - Rural affairs and agricultural extension.

Phan Thiet - Rural affairs and agricultural extension.

Xuan Loc - (Long Khan Province) - Machinery.

## Malaria Eradication and Rural Health Programs

Five IVSers were working in malaria research, health education, automotive maintenance, and hamlet health programs, through USOM Public Health Division's advisory board, which sought to help villagers understand health problems and to solve them.

Huong Hoa - Malaria was studied in natural habitat, where DDT had failed to arrest it. Health education for Bru tribespeople. Epidemiological surveys to assess malaria incidence, involving reconnaissance maps and collecting blood samples.

Qui Nho - Malarial technical survey.

Nha Trang - Malaria education, among Vietnamese and Montagnards.

Da Nang - Malaria technical survey and automotive maintenance.

## Education

The establishment of primary schools within each of the New Life Hamlets was an important element of the GVN policy. Thirty-four volunteers plus an Education Team Leader and an English Team Leader comprised the IVS educational team in 1964. Seventeen of these were English teachers. Recognizing the low pay of Vietnamese teachers, IVSers were ever on the look-out for ways to supplement their counterpart meager salaries. The volunteers also sought to inspire the Vietnamese teachers to a more skilled performance, albeit, under adverse conditions. Regular film showings were arranged by IVSers in cooperation with USIS or the GVN Information Service. New educational work opened by IVSers in 1964 included:

Kien Hoa - Chieu Hoi Center (Welcome Return) for Vietnamese willing to leave the VC camps. A kind of "USO" was arranged for them. Clothing was distributed.

Thuan Ty - Strategic hamlet aided by a Sacramento, California high school. Populated by Cham tribesmen. IVSer arranged for the digging of a well in the hamlet.

Vinh Long - Advising Technical School concerning woodworking methods. Demonstrated use of audiovisuals to supplement lectures. Home economics emphasis upon home sanitation and creating gardens.

Hue - The Mobile Science Program visited 100 schools in one month, reaching 400 teachers of 16,000 students.

Long Xuyen - (An Giang Province) - Coeducational high school. Monthly newspaper produced by students.

Qui Nhon - Normal School. Technical vocational instruction.

Nha Trang - IVSers organized students to go into cholera infected area to deal with sanitation problems.

Bao Loc - Library of easy-to-read English books set up. Informal evening classes for English instruction organized.

Soc Trang - Visits to leper hospital and supplies distributed.

Ban Me Thuot - Normal School for Montagnards. Six weeks summer session for teachers in English.

Kontum - Hamlet education. Normal School. Public high school-English.

Can Tho - (Phong Dinh Province) - English in public high school.

Chuong Thien - Rural Affairs Representative.

Chang Tri - Rural Affairs Representative.

My Tho - (Dinh Tuong Province) - English teaching in public high school.

Phuoc Le - (Phuoc Tuy Province) - Hamlet education.

Xuan Loc - (Long Khanh Province) - Hamlet education.

Phan Rang - (Ninh Thuan Province) - Hamlet education.

During the year, USOM/VN raised objections to Don Luce continuing for a third term as Chief of Party. The Executive Committee of IVS/W agreed that it had no alternative but to seek another Chief of Party. The majority of the IVS/VN volunteers felt strongly that since Luce was available, he should be permitted to continue. The Chief of Party stated that USOM/VN was opposed to his reappointment because Luce refused to "rubber stamp" their ideas when they conflicted with IVS principles. Luce also was convinced that USOM was jealous of his large number of Vietnamese contacts. "He knew too much," commented a Vietnamese.

IVS/W was concerned over the increasing regimentation of program and the curtailment of freedom under the new USAID administration. IVS/W sought informally from the USA Ambassador a reaffirmation of the IVS role, consistent with its "earlier ideals and purposes in Vietnam".

The Chief of Party reported a deterioration in the security situation, especially in the Central Highlands. While the IVS/VN area of operation was narrowing, USOM/VN was increasing its request for education volunteers to sixty. IVS resisted giving education priority over rural development, especially since the USAID emphasis was upon rural development.

In 1962, IVS/VN enlarged its program to include education. Volunteers had been requested to provide English instruction from the time of arrival of the original team. With the adoption by the GVN of the New Life Hamlet program (originally "Strategic Hamlet" program), the establishment of primary schools in each of the units became a pivotal part of the national policy. These schools were designed to serve as community centers as well as schools for teaching. Since the New Life Hamlet program was regarded as having both developmental and defense significance, it enjoyed the support of USOM and MAAG/VN. IVS/VN, because it was a rural operation and related to the villagers, was peculiarly suited to perform this service. IVS involvement in the program began in 1963.

At that time, some of the provinces already were well along with school building and teacher training programs. In others, not even a beginning had been made. Volunteers assigned to or recruited for this

phase of the educational program, made studies in the hamlets, often accompanied by provincial authorities, thus collecting development information which they channeled to provincial authorities. They also secured supplies for those schools which had started on their own but had not yet received the promised books. Since the mountain tribes had little experience with education, the volunteers sought to create among them a desire for education, using films and audio-visual materials. Since teachers were scheduled to receive a salary equivalent to only $8 monthly, some teachers were encouraged to start garden programs as a means of supplementing their incomes. Teachers were encouraged to attend provincial and district teacher's meetings as means of improving their teaching skills. Volunteers taught teachers how to create their own visual materials for teaching; some IVSers carried movies to the villages to reach both students and parents. These movies dealt with such diverse matters as village sanitation. The IVS role in this first phase was the mental conditioning of villagers to accept change and development.

The second phase of the New Life Hamlet program began early in 1964, consisting of teacher training and school construction. The volunteers noted that plans designed on a province level often were irrelevant for a particular village or hamlet. Volunteers were able to report these shortcomings back to provincial authorities and meanwhile devise alternative strategies to be followed while awaiting provincial action.

Professor Eugene Staley of the Stanford University Research Institute had been sent to Vietnam in 1961 to recommend a course of action for

Vietnam. After a six weeks study in Saigon, and assisted by a law professor Vu Quoc Thuc and political advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu, Staley devised a war doctrine and action plan which included the "strategic hamlet" formula. The first"Agrovilles" had been attempted by the French in the 1950's. With the launching of the program in March 1962, resumption of the plan was proposed, to include 26 such, the number to be increased to more than one hundred within a year. Strategic hamlets were to be grouped around these agro-cities. Ngo Dinh Nhu, possibly because of his relations to its inception, was favorable to this plan, and it became the focus of American involvement in Vietnam until President Diem's assassination. There was considerable enthusiasm for the strategic hamlet approach among American advisors. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated on April 22, 1963 that the strategic hamlet program was producing "excellent results.... morale in the countryside has begun to rise." The fact that the PEKING REVIEW in 1962 and 1964 protested the Staley Plan evidenced its initial promise. By the time of Diem's death, 1,500 of the 8,500 such strategic "New Life Hamlets" officially declared to be in operation, remained viable.

Ideally, the strategic hamlet included 1,200 inhabitants whose houses were grouped around a school, a well, and a fortified watchtower. The big war issue in Saigon after Diem's passing was: should this program be continued or shunned? The US Military Assistance Commander in Saigon, four-star General Paul D. Harkins wanted to increase them, while General Duon Van ('Big") Minh recommended using the strategic hamlet approach only in zones already recaptured from the Viet Cong. This was one of the areas in which Americans followed Vietnamese advice.

When General William Westmoreland replaced General Harkins he changed course, following the desire of most Vietnamese officers to superimpose the concept upon existing villages rather than transplanting millions of peasants to new locations. Initially, as implemented by Nhu, the strategy had destroyed the village substructures. Relocations of peoples tended to destroy the village homogeneity and its collective conscience.

The details of the program were set forth in a joint communique issued by the United States and Viet Nam, January 4th, 1963. The terms of the "broad economic and social programs" were designed to improve the Vietnamese standards of living, and provided for the development of rural health and education programs. Both these provisions were to result in an increase in IVS/VN staff. The communique noted that a nation-wide program of inoculations was to be started, concentrating initially upon the secure areas. Likewise, primary schools having increased from 1,191 (330,000 enrollment) in 1954 to over 4,668 (1,100,000 enrollment) in 1961 a goal of a school for every village was set.

The strategic hamlet program failed according to all authorities including the Pentagon.[1]

As a result of the agreement outlined above, US military advisors were increased from 746 to 3,400.[2]

The strategic hamlet program was launched in March 1962 during Operation SUNRISE in Binh Duong Province, Ben Cat District, which long

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[1] Report on the War in Vietnam, W. C. Westmoreland. USG Printing Office, 1958, p. 9.
[2] Ibid, p. 77.

had been under strong NLF influence. During the first two years (1962-4) over a thousand such hamlets were organized. August 1963 the showplace among the Operation SUNRISE hamlets was overrun by the NLF.[3] After Khanh's installation as Premier, the impetus tended to disappear.[4]

The IVS/VN program also was expanded in 1963 to include "Malaria Eradication and Rural Health". The first team assigned to Cai San in 1957 had included a registered nurse, but because it was decided IVS/VN should concentrate upon agricultural development after the short period of Cai San operations, five years elapsed before IVS resumed this program.

The five volunteers assigned to the program worked in malaria research, health education, automotive maintenance and hamlet health programs. Two IVSers engaged in malaria research at the Huong Hoa Malaria Research Center established by the GVN, WHO and USOM. Attention was concentrated upon the failure of DDT to reduce the malaria. They participated in epidemiological surveys so as to develop malaria control programs. Once the incidence of malaria was pinpointed health educators began visiting hamlets to spray with DDT.

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[3] Ibid, p. 80.
[4] Ibid, p. 83

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1964 - 1965

1964

| | |
|---|---|
| July 19 | - General Khanh backs expansion of war to North Vietnam. Air Force Commander General Nguyen Cao Ky says pilots being so trained |
| Aug 2 | - US Maddox attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats in Tonkin Gulf |
| Aug 4 | - Maddox and Turner Joy reportedly attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats. President Johnson orders bombing of North Vietnam |
| Aug 5 | - President Johnson asks Congress to approve joint resolution pledging full support for US forces in promoting security and peace in Southeast Asia. US sends reinforcements to Tonkin Gulf area |
| Aug 7 | - US Congress approves Tonkin Gulf resolution. General Khanh declares state of emergency in Vietnam |
| Aug 11 | - President Johnson signs Tonkin Gulf resolution into law |
| Aug 16 | - Military Revolutionary Council elects General Khanh President |
| Aug 27 | - Council disbands. New Constitution withdrawn |
| Aug 29 | - Nguyen Xuan Oanh named acting Premier. General Khanh reportedly suffered breakdown |
| Sept 3 | - General Khanh resumes premiership |
| Sept 13 | - Abortive coup against Khanh. Forces led by General Ky (loyal to Khanh) resume governmental control |
| Sept 18 | - Naval action in Gulf of Tonkin involving US ships |
| Sept 19 | - General Ky gets high position in governmental changes |
| Sept 26 | - Vietnam High National Council inaugurated. Civilian government to replace military government |
| Nov 1 | - Tran Van Huong named Premier |

1964

Nov 22-25 - Riots against government. Premier declares state of seige. US reaffirms support of Huong

Dec 19 - Taylor clashes with GVN Generals over dissolution of High National Council. General Khanh declares ARVN will not fight to carry out policy of a foreign country

Dec 23 - Secretary McNamara threatens aid cut. Khanh replies aid not essential

Dec 24 - Terrorist bombing of Brink Hotel (US BOQ Saigon) kills two Americans, wounds 52

- US military strength at 23,300

1965

Jan 8 - South Korea sends 2,000 military advisers to South Vietnam

Jan 22 - Buddhists attack USIS libraries in Hue and Saigon in protest against USA support for Huong regime

Jan 27 - General Huong ousted, General Khanh asked to accept GVN leadership

Feb 7 - VC attack Pleiku US base and airfield killing eight Americans, wounding 109, and destroying aircraft. US dependents evacuated from South Vietnam. President Johnson orders retaliatory raids against North Vietnam

Feb 9 - US Marine Corps Hawk air defense mission battalion deployed at Da Nang

Feb 10 - VC bomb US military barracks at Qui Nhon, killing 23, wounding 21 Americans

Feb 11 - Armed Forces Council announces Phan Huy Quat Premier

Feb 18 - Bloodless coup in Saigon against General Khanh

Feb 21 - General Khanh resigns. General Nguyen Van Thieu becomes top man on Armed Forces Council

Feb 25 - South Korea sends 600-man engineering unit to South Vietnam

1965

| | |
|---|---|
| Feb 28 | - President Johnson announces continuous limited air strikes against North Vietnam to produce negotiated settlement |
| March 2 | - "Rolling Thunder" bombing campaign instituted against North Vietnam |
| March 8 | - First US Marine Infantry lands at Da Nang, US forces number 27,000 |
| March 19 | - First US Army battalion arrives in Vietnam |
| March 29 | - Bomb explodes outside US Embassy in Saigon killing two Americans |
| April 2 | - US announces it will increase US troops in South Vietnam |
| May 3-12 | - Additional US troops arrive. Total now 46,500 |
| May 4 | - President Johnson asks Congress for additional $700 million for Vietnam. Voted on May 7th and 8th |
| May 13-19 | - US bombing halt over North Vietnam |
| June 1 | - President Johnson asks Congress for an additional $89 million for economic and social development in Southeast Asia |
| June 7 | - US forces in Vietnam now number 51,000 |
| June 8 | - White House confirms that US troops authorized to give support to ARVN if requested |
| June 12 | - Premier Quat resigns. Returns authority to military chiefs |
| June 16 | - Secretary McNamara announces US troop level to be 74,500 |
| June 18 | - General Nguyen Can Ky new Premier. General Nguyen Van Thieu Chief of State |
| June 27 | - 173rd Airborne Brigade undertakes first "search and destroy" mission of the war |

IVS/VN 1964-1965

The total IVS/VN team grew to 71, including fifteen staff. Seventeen were in English Education. Seventeen were in agricultural development among ethnic Vietnamese. An additional seven were in Montagnard Agricultural Development. Nine were in Science Education. The Malaria Education and Rural Health team consisted of four. One volunteer was explicitly assigned to work with refugees, though many volunteers were related to them in various programs.

In August 1965, IVS/VN suggested to IVS/W that since such difficulties were being experienced in recruiting young agricultural technicians in the USA that IVS turn to Asia as a possible source.

The escalation of the war required that the agricultural extension workers limit their activities to centralized education. The Public Health and Hamlet Teams were phased out. Team leaders who had been stationed in Saigon were moved to provincial cities: Can Tho, Hue, Nha Trang and Dalat. The two associate chiefs of party, for agriculture and for English Education, remained in Saigon.

During these years the Mobile Science work expanded, as did IVS/VN work among youth. In November 1964, IVS organized in Saigon the first bi-national seminar for 32 Vietnamese secondary school teachers from 16 schools together with their fifteen IVS counterparts. The seminar was organized to offer instruction in educational techniques. As an immediate consequence, a professional society of English teachers was organized in Hue, and modern texts were adopted in Qui Nhon and Vinh Long.

The Voluntary Youth Association (VYA) was formed under IVS inspiration in 1964. VYA sent out specialized teams of medical, agricultural and educational volunteers (Vietnamese) to assist in selected provinces.

Three weekly seminars were organized in the IVS House in Saigon for discussions with invited leaders.

35 youth participated in the week-long Youth Leadership Work Camp at Vung Tau in Nov. 1964.

Saigon youth engaged in relief work among typhoon victims in the Central Coastal areas in Nov., 1964. 5,000 students spent from two weeks to two months in summer camps during 1965.

Minh Hoa - (Kien Giang Province) - villagers constructed a canal, 6,000 meters long. IVSer helped make arrangement with the different offices for assistance with materials and food.

Rach Gia - IVSer doubled as USOM province representative.

Ba Xuyen - New Rural Life Training Center opened - the first of its kind in the Mekong Delta. IVSer coordinated the service chief's training program.

Tan Hiep - IVSer lectured to 400 trainees at the Self-Defense Corps Training Center. The graduates continued to contact the IVSer concerning agricultural problems they encountered.

American military and Aid personnel having increased to 50,000, there was a demand for Vietnamese personnel who could speak English.

Requests to IVS/VN for teachers in the schools increased. The volunteers also multiplied their informal classes, teaching officials and policemen.

Mobile Science had been so well accepted, three additional units were developed. By 1967 eight were expected to be in operation.

Renewed efforts were made to stimulate the charcoal industry at Da Nang. At Cau Hai, where 6,000 people earned their living by cutting wood, a charcoal kiln was built.

Pleiku - IVSer worked with Montagnard Social Affairs Office to locate workers for the Montagnard Training Center.

Quang Duc - IVSer asked to help develop Buon Sarpa Montagnard Training Center. Completed, then ruined Sept. 20, 1964 when Montagnards in the Special Forces revolted against the Vietnamese. Restarted in Diem's gardens at Gia Nghia. VC activity caused evacuation of three nearby hamlets and restricted IVSers travels.

During 1964-65 differences between USAID/VN and IVS/VN developed concerning IVS procedure. The issue came to focus when USAID objected to the reappointment of Don Luce as Chief of Party for a third term. Luce offered to step down or to accept a subordinate role in IVS/VN. The volunteers generally stood by their Chief of Party, insisting upon the renewal of his contract for an additional two years.

Luce as Chief of Party had decentralized the IVS operations. The volunteers believed that since this was the opposite of USAID's procedure, the difference was the root cause. They asked: Does IVS seek to deal with people where they are, or merely implement USAID

policy, hoping that some benefits will trickle?

The IVS team recognized that USAID and IVS responsibilities differ, and that each organization must perform its mission in its own way. IVS interpreted its style of operation as (1) maintaining independent contacts with Vietnamese leaders, and (2) locating volunteers in places agreed upon by the GVN. The IVS/VN team felt that IVS/W was not demonstrating sufficient firmness in dealing with AID/W on the issue, which in turn affected the morale of the team negatively. The volunteers reasoned that the Luce policy of strengthening the technical, administrative and motivating attributes of the Vietnamese rather than using Vietnamese to implement American solutions, was the correct line.

The IVS/VN intransigence with respect to the issue had developed from the team style of operation. IVSers became attached to their places of work. They became acquainted with the people and developed an appreciation for their aspirations. They discovered that the Vietnamese responded to an idea which was backed by the personal involvement of the volunteer. IVS recognized that USAID operated at the top level through counterpart offices of the GVN. IVSers felt that what was lacking in the USAID/GVN congruence was a structure to communicate with the villages and hamlets. This IVS was able to do. The volunteers attributed their success in agricultural development and extension to these IVS structures. They were not desirous of changing what for them was effective.

They also reasoned that if USAID/VN dictated the choice of IVS/VN

leadership, the placement of volunteers would follow; and that were IVS/VN to become identified with USAID, its integrity and effectiveness would be impaired.

The conclusion of the matter was that the Luce contract as Chief of Party was renewed for a third term, and the following statement was agreed to by AID/W and IVS/W:

> IVS works in Vietnam by virtue of United States Government contracts. In the broad sense its activities must harmonize with United States Government policies. IVSers therefore are obligated to avoid actions or statements to ousiders that might impair US policy objectives. Volunteers shall focus upon helping people in the host country. They shall keep comments within the bounds of good taste and good sense.

USAID/VN invited the IVS team to attend its staff orientation. The Chief of Party reported to IVS/W that since the USAID/VN's most helpful sessions were classified, from which IVSers were excluded, there was little value in their attending those portions open to them.

While this controversy between IVS and USAID over the renewal of Luces's contract was in progess, Luce wrote IVS/W questioning the appointment of prospective volunteer David Gitelson (later killed):

> We have heard he seriously questioned the US presence in Vietnam, the bombing,etc. We have an indication that he should wait 6-8 months before becoming involved in a peace

movement, in order to understand the problems and the way the Vietnamese feel. He should realize before he arrives that IVS is here for social and economic reasons, and that, if his reason for coming is to protest the war from a better vantage point, he shouldn't come.

January 9-14, 1966, the Deputy Director and Chief of the Far East for the Peace Corps made an "unofficial" visit to Saigon to investigate the possibility of sending in the Peace Corps to South Vietnam. After meeting and talking with the Peace Corps representative, the Chief of Party wrote IVS/W expressing concern lest a Peace Corps entry might force IVS out of South Vietnam, even as had happened in Liberia.

On March 13, 1965, Vice President Hubert Humphrey discussing Vietnam on MEET THE PRESS, opined that the Peace Corps should not go into Vietnam since IVS already was doing such a fine job. "I have seen it with my own eyes," he stated. USAID/VN was proposing that the IVS/VN contract team therefore be increased to 200.

In November 1965, the National Voluntary Service had proposed that groups in the USA adopt particular "sister" villages in the "New Hamlet Program", which was key to the pacification program then in process. AID/W suggested that IVS/VN serve as the exchange agent for disbursing the funds so raised in the Hamlet Adoption Program. At about the same time IVS/VN advised the Chief of Party against any pooling arrangements with other voluntary organizations. IVS, as a contracting organization with the USG, must maintain "a separate identity in relation to the GVN and to USAID". Yet during the year, IVS/VN complained to IVS/W that its

agricultural program lacked central direction from USOM/VN.

The Chief of Party wrote to IVS/W during these policy discussions saying,

> I think the war will last a long time though I do think that it gradually will get better. I fear that people will come to depend on us too much. Just as missionaries must beware the problem of rice Christians, so must we be concerned with rice refugees. Both the GVN and the Americans now are asking IVS to do contact work: (1) The USOM representative in Tay Ninh is requesting an English teacher to promote better understanding. (2) National Voluntary Service has asked IVS/VN to make all financial arrangements on their behalf with USOM. There is increasing sensitivity among the Vietnamese to American involvement as the number of Americans build up. Vietnam is a country that now needs spiritual (not in the religious sense) help more than the technical. A willingness to listen and the ability to be enthusiastic are perhaps two of our most valuable traits. IVS people must know humility."

Volunteer Peter Morse Hunting was ambushed and killed on November 12, 1965, at a point 15 km. southwest of Can Tho. Hunting had requested air transport, which was unavailable. The USOM official advised him that it was safe to drive. When Vice President Hubert Humphrey visited Vietnam, the Prime Minister presented a posthumous award to Hunting. The parents were brought to the White House to receive the award from the Vice Presi-

dent after his return to the States. Subsequently, they developed a Hunting Memorial Library at Phan Rang in honor of their son.

A number of other security incidents during the year involved IVSers:

1) In Kien Hoa, a Vietnamese was caught in a public restaurant with a grenade. Robert Biggers also was in the restaurant at the time.

2) Charles Simmons (Quang Tri) and Ann Hensley (Hue) were mentioned in an NLF letter confiscated at My Tho.

3) Tracy Atwood was mentioned in the National Geographic as having been held by Montagnards at Buon Sapar.

4) Three IVSers reported they had been passengers in planes which had been shot at from the ground.

5) The jeep of Steve Szedak was shot-up at Blao, though he was away on vacation at the time.

6) Biggers, Betts and Max Near reported having drawn gun fire.

7) Kirk Dimmitt at My Tho was the object of gun fire.

8) The IVS house at Blao suffered the explosion of a time bomb though no IVSers had been there for a month.

The IVS promotional pamphlet Agent of Change carried the statement:

> IVS has been lucky - perhaps deservedly so. While volunteers work in the provinces often away from protective forces, they have not been molested by the NLF. The reason may be that their work is deeply appreciated by all Vietnamese.

After this series of incidents and the ambush of Hunting, the Chief

of Party suggested the statement be revised. He and others were reporting to Washington that security in Vietnam was becoming worse.

IVS recognized that with the decline in security and the mass movement of peoples from their villages in connection with the pacification program, the volunteers might be called upon to do more refugee relief work. The staff cautioned the teams against becoming involved in passing out bulgur wheat to lines of refugees. Instead, they were encouraged to engage in development work with the refugee villagers, helping them to help themselves.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1965 - 1966

1965

| | |
|---|---|
| July 8 | - White House announces Henry Cabot Lodge will replace General Taylor as Ambassador |
| July 14 | - Secretary McNamara to Vietnam on military inspection trip |
| July 15 | - MACV requests journalists to observe "voluntary news censorship" |
| July 20 | - McNamara reports deterioration of situation, and requests additional American troops |
| | - General Westmoreland heads US Army Vietnam |
| July 28 | - President Johnson announces 50,000 more troops to Vietnam, bringing total to 125,000. Draft calls to increase |
| Aug 18 | - Seante approves $1.7 billion supplementary appropriation for military operation in Vietnam |
| Aug 19 | - Defense Department announces 561 Americans killed, 3,024 wounded, 44 missing since Jan. 1, 1961 |
| Oct 23 | - US forces in Vietnam now number 148,300 |
| Nov 11 | - Secretary McNamara announces plan to increase troops in South Vietnam |
| Nov 28 | - McNamara in Saigon announces that 350,000 to 400,000 total troop level be met |
| Dec 29 | - US troops now 180,000. US lost 351 planes and helicopters in Vietnam in 1965 |

1966

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan 19 | - President Johnson asks for supplemental $12.7 billion for Vietnam war expenses |
| Jan 31 | - President Johnson announces resumption of bombings in North Vietnam after 37 day pause |
| Feb 6-8 | - President Johnson, Premier Ky and aides conduct |

1966

negotiations in Honolulu concerning economic and social reforms and pacification

Feb 17 - General Taylor before Senate Foreign Relations Committee says US intends to wage limited war in Vietnam

March 2 - 215,000 troops in Vietnam; 20,000 additional en route

- General strike in Hue resulting from Ky's ouster of Corps I Commander General Nguyen Cahn Thi for demanding civilian rule. Riots spread to Hue, Da Nang, Saigon, etc. stimulated by Buddhists

April 6 - Ky seeks accommdation with Buddhists. Agrees to referendum on proposed new Constitution

April 12 - B-52's start regular bombing of North Vietnam

- US forces now number 245,000 with 50,000 supplementary naval forces

May 15 - GVN troops regain control of Da Nang after rebellion of Buddhists and anti-governmental soldiers

May 26 - Buddhist students in Hue sack and burn USIS library

May 31 - Buddhist students in Hue burn US consulate and residence

June 6 - National Leadership Committee consisting of ten generals expanded to include ten civilians

June 11 - McNamara announces US forces in Vietnam number 285,000

June 18 - GVN troops recapture Hue which had been held by Buddhists

June 23 - GVN troops seize the United Buddhist Church's Secular Affairs Institute in Saigon

June 29 - US planes bomb oil installations on outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong

IVS/VN 1965-1966

The total team numbers 52. They were divided as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| English Teachers | 24 |
| Agricultural Technicians | 11 |
| Montagnard Development Work | 3 |
| Mobile Science | 1 |
| Community Development | 1 |
| Refugee Work | 1 |
| Youth Work | 1 |
| Nursing Education | 1 |
| National Institute of Administration (Saigon) Staff | 8 |

IVS terminated at Pleiku, Dalat and Gia Nghia. Work was begun at Quang Tri, Qui Nhon, Tay Ninh, Long An and Ba Xuyen (Khanh Hung province).

IVS was working at three Montagnard Training Centers: Pleiku, Kontum and Quang Duc, though for security reasons they visited some of these rather than making them their residence.

By 1966 four Mobile Science units were operating: Hue Nha Trang, Vinh Long and Gia Dinh (Saigon). All were administered by the Ministry of Education.

There was widespread demand for English instruction, thanks to the presence of a quarter million Americans by this time in Vietnam. The Vietnamese recognizing that many of their neighbors (such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) already had adopted English as a second language, also contributed to the demand. While there had been much informal English instruction by IVSers from the starting of the program, the 24

IVSers recruited as English teachers were concentrating upon the provincial high schools, normal schools and universities. The emphasis also changed the places where IVS work was concentrated - from farms and villages to provincial towns and cities.

Stations occupied by volunteers as June 30, 1966:

Hue
Kon Tum
Qui Nhon
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
Bao Loc
Phan Thiet
Tay Ninh
Bien Hoa
Gia Dinh (Saigon)
Tan An
Vung Tau
My Tho
Long Xuyen
Ving Long
Gia (Kien Giang)
Khanh Hung (Ba Xuyen)

IVS/VN had played a significant role in the establishment of the National Voluntary Services, a counterpart Vietnamese organization. IVSers participated in the activities of this body upon invitation and under Vietnamese leadership. In the summer of 1965, 8,000 Vietnamese youth worked in rural Vietnam building schools, digging wells, conducting sanitation and health projects. In July 1965 they took over responsibility for Saigon's poorest District Eight where lived 145,000 people, many of them refugees. District Eight had the highest disease rate and a 50% illiteracy rate. The youth lived in the District, drained swamps, mobile health teams treated the sick, sewers were constructed , classes in literacy, home economics and vocational training were conducted. "The people of the Eight District are learning democracy by participation,"

commented an IVSer.

1965 was the period during which General Nguyen Khanh was head of state. The Chief of Party advised volunteers not to wear beards lest they be identified symbolically with him and his regime. This was not the first time the matter of the IVSers' appearance was raised. The first team at Ban Me Thuot - lacking simple sanitary facilities during the first few months, and whose baggage had not yet arrived - was accused of "hippie" tendencies because of their appearance. To the extent that the IVSers in the provinces allowed their hair to grow long and grew beards, they were differentiated from the USAID provincial representatives who were required to present a well-cared look.

Even though IVSers had been standing up under danger, policy was to remove them from high insurgency areas. On February 1, 1966, newly arrived Martin Sisk left IVS because he would not accept the insecurities of working in the Central Highlands.

By February 1st, the size of the team had been reduced to 45, and by the end of June to 38.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1966 - 1967

### 1966

| | |
|---|---|
| July 10 | - Announcement that US strength would reach 375,000 by end of 1966, and 425,000 by Spring of 1967 |
| July 25 | - Premier Ky urged allied invasion of North Vietnam |
| July 30 | - B-52's inaugurate bombings around demilitarized zone |
| July 31 | - Premier Ky stated he would not be candidate for election in 1967 |
| Aug 7 | - Former Vice-President Nixon in Saigon stated 500,000 US troops needed to shorten the war |
| Aug 10 | - Thailand base at U-Tapao opened for B-52 bombers |
| Sept 11 | - South Vietnamese voters elect 117 members to Constituent Assembly to draft new Constitution |
| Oct 14 | - US pilots fly record 175 missions over North Vietnam |
| Oct 21 | - Manila Conference opens |
| Oct 25 | - In joint comminique, the six allies agree to withdraw six months after Hanoi disengages |
| Oct 26 | - President Johnson visits base at Cam Ranh Bay |
| Nov 15 | - White House approves expanded list of bombing targets |
| Dec 2-5 | - US bombers raid truck depots, rail yards, and fuel dumps near Hanoi. Peking claims its embassy was hit |
| | - US Troop strength reached 389,000. US combat deaths to date total 6,644, and 37,738 wounded |

### 1967

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan 25 | - President's estimated 1967 defense needs for Vietnam, $21.4 billion. 1968 - $21.9 billion |
| Feb 23 | - "Operation Junction City" near Cambodian border begun. US artillery shells North Vietnam for first time |

1967

| | |
|---|---|
| Feb 27 | - US planes drop mines in North Vietnam rivers |
| March 10 | - US planes bomb Thainguyen iron and steel works in North Vietnam |
| March 15 | - President Johnson announces Ellsworth Bunker to replace Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador |
| March 20 | - President Johnson and Premier Ky meet in Guam. US places emphasis upon reshaping Vietnamese society; the GVN upon winning the war |
| April 1 | - New Constitution of South Vietnam promulgated |
| May 2 | - US strength in Vietnam now 436,000 |
| May 5 | - US troops retake Hill 881 after days of bitter fighting |
| May 14 to June 11 | - Local elections in 4,612 hamlets |
| May 18-19 | - US and ARVN troops move into demilitarized zone |
| June 2-3 | - US planes bombing Campha hit Mikhail Frunze, a Soviet merchant vessel |
| June 22 | - US strength now 463,000. Third nation, 54,000. ARVN 600,000+ |

IVS/VN 1966-1967

By November 17, 1966, the size of the IVS/VN team had increased to 123 from 38 as of June 30. The contract had called for a build-up to 200 within six months, but this goal never was realized. There were many reasons for this failure:

1) The IVS/VN staff resisted bigness for the sake of having a large team. "We need time to absorb new recruits," they claimed.

2) Agricultural technicians available for overseas appointment were in short supply. The shortage was discovered also by the Peace Corps.

3) The Ministry of Education of the GVN, USAID and IVS/VN turned down a number of applicants as being unsuited.

4) The IVS staff rejected one applicant on the grounds that he had wanted to come to Vietnam to fight Communism. The IVS/VN staff rejoinder was "We are here to work in social welfare, not to fight communism...We are not here for political reasons."

5) The well-publicised insecurities in Vietnam inhibited all but the strong hearted from seeking appointment to this war-torn country.

The Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington, Vu Van Thai suggested to IVS/W that he could welcome 300 non-governmental American workers for the refugee camps. This suggestion was not followed by IVS in part because IVS/VN recognized that various other voluntary organizations already were engaged in relief work. IVS decided in so far as possible to remain in development.

Relations with USAID/VN continued to be somewhat of a problem for IVS/VN. The USAID Chief of Mission reminded the IVS Chief of Party that since he had attended staff meetings of his predecessor, he should continue the practise. This invitation the Chief of Party politely declined.

The reason for the rapid increase in team size were the formal entry of IVS/VN into the educational field and the resumption of community development programs. High school teachers were the most numerous among the volunteers, with community developers a close second. Agricultural technicians were third on the list:

| | |
|---|---|
| High School Teachers | 36 |
| Teachers of English in Normal School, Universities, the National School of Administration, Nursing Schools and Technical Schools | 5 |
| High School and University Teacher of English | 1 |
| Educational Technical Specialists | 2 |
| Mobile Science | 5 |

Excluding staff assigned to supervision there were 49 IVSers employed in teaching as an aspect of development.

The other categories were:

| | |
|---|---|
| Community Development | 33 |
| Youth | 1 |
| Agriculture | 24 |
| Agricultural Technical Specialists | 1 |
| Staff (Saigon and Team Leader) | 10 |

Nine of these 120 volunteers and staff were from Canada, Europe and Asia. For the first time since the beginning of IVS operations in Vietnam there was no agriculturalist located at Ban Me Thuot.

The 46 different locations where the volunteers were located might have one or all three major programs represented.

| | |
|---|---|
| Education, Community Development and Agriculture | 6 |
| Education and Community Development | 10 |
| Community Development and Agriculture | 5 |
| Education | 9 |
| Community Development | 9 |
| Agriculture | 7 |

At five of the locations, two agricultural specialists worked together. Eighteen of the volunteers worked singly.

Three of the Community Development teams consisted of three persons each, six of two volunteers each, and fifteen worked singly.

Education was both more concentrated and more dispersed. There were seven teachers located in one city, there were two groups of four, one of five, four of three, one of two, and seventeen were singles.

These did not include the staff and personnel located in Saigon.

The fact of war provided the need for community development, and was an obstacle to its achievement. The volunteers had to learn, and they needed time in which to solve the problems of the different groups with whom they worked.

The community developers had received two weeks of specialized training at the University of the Philippines in preparation for their various assignments to villagers, students and refugees.

Village (Rural) development was concentrated in the Mekong Delta. It was the most secure of the four military areas, thus offered the probable opportunity for developing community structures and support. The peoples also were the most homogeneous. It was possible for IVSers to live in small district towns, which North of Saigon was virtually impossible. Volunteers working in rural areas perforce learned about agriculture, if they had had no prior experience. Those engaged in village or hamlet development, nursed in provincial hospitals, grew soybeans.

IVS/VN generally had rejected the notion of being channels of material supplies from the affluent West to the benighted villagers. They sought, at least, through development activities to help the people help themselves. But such activity depended upon the existence of some kinds of community structures, and the possibility of self-help. With so many organizations standing ready with the "hand out", the IVS goal was difficult to realize. In June an IVSer commented from his village: "It is discouraging to hear project planning in terms of donated supplies. There are projects created from cheap materials. Crops are planted locally from purchased seeds. These cheaply built projects, and the locally purchased seed crops made me feel good, for the people had taken the initiative. It is easier to fill out a request and have the supplies dumped on your doorstep. The true self-help attitude is difficult to inculcate."

Refugees were a fact. As of this time, the government figures indicated there were two million war victims. Most were "generated" refugees, namely, persons who had been transported from their native villages, to places where there was no land to farm. Their style of life was changed by virtue of being removed from where their ancestors were buried, to crowded places, where the residents were suspicious, and a livelihood was difficult to earn. Many of them were concentrated into camps. The majority were women, children and old men. The young men either were dead or in the armies. Eleven of the Community Development workers were involved in refugee work in seven provinces. Both the GVN and USAID had sought IVS assistance in dealing with the multiple problems of ministering to these hapless people. IVSers sought to develop projects which would improve the refugees' material condition, build community, and in some cases, institutions. IVSers, because of their connections with other agencies, were able to obtain material goods, food and even machines which enabled the refugees both to make their clothing and to earn money.

Most educational volunteers had received instruction in teaching English as a Foreign Language. Usually they were assigned to the provincial high schools. Classes of 60-70 students meeting for two hour stretches were tiring for students and teachers alike.

The Mobile Science Units had developed from one in 1963 to six. Each unit consisted of two Vietnamese teachers and an IVS advisor. The IVSer's role was to work with the Vietnamese in developing science experiments for demonstration purposes, experiments that would make

science an interesting study.

Some of the community development IVSers were assigned to "Youth Work" at the province or local level. They offered technical assistance, material support, and served as catalysts to stimulate youth activities. Through such organizations as National Voluntary Service, the Agricultural Student Program, and the Vietnam Youth Council, they participated, upon invitation, with youth in work camps, refugee relief, and in improving rural slums.

In November 1966, three youth leaders met with IVS staff. The Vietnamese demanded a greater role in the IVS/VN program. "Vietnamese," they stated, "should be working in the refugee camps - not Americans".

Community Development was hailed as being at the heart of the IVS program: It involved a team approach. It helped people to help themselves. It utilized community organizations to effect what individuals alone could not accomplish. It emphasized non-governmental organizations such as youth clubs, community councils, and even church organizations.

IVS/VN stated that the justification for volunteers being in the country was that there was a solution for the peoples' problems.

In December 1966, IVS/VN proposed the organization of an Advisory Council which would involve Vietnamese in giving direction to IVS. The Office of Civil Operations (OCO) commented concerning the proposal, "I do not know how (its implementation) will affect IVS."

At the time the Advisory Council was proposed an IVSer commented

that the increase of the civilian USAID staff in the provinces was giving Americans a high visibility. "If counter insurgency is not successful, and the military takes over the reign several months from now, IVS continuance will have to be reconsidered."

Another IVSer commented that "the strength of IVS lies in its ability to let people identify the problems that need to be solved, and to let them try to solve them in the way they think best ... As IVS/VN gets bigger, it will experience difficulties in maintaining its identity. We will be misidentified as sub-assistant provincial representatives of USAID. We are fighting for our lives in Vietnam because of USAID. We would be able to accomplish much more were we not so shackled."

The crisis which came to a head shortly after the beginning of the next fiscal year was becoming evident more than eight months before it broke.

Towards the end of 1966, NBC/TV News carried a story of the IVS shoeshine project in Da Nang. The IVSer in residence explained after the fact that he had been pressured for some time to permit a news photographer to film the opertation. As told over the air, the project was made to appear as a place where thieves were harbored. In the resultant flak over the incident, IVS/W censured the IVS volunteer who was responsible for not having first secured clearance for the filming.

USAID/VN pressured IVS/VN with respect to a proposed volunteer teaching at the University in Hue. USAID claimed the right on the grounds that the IVS education contract provided USAID should approve all

teacher locations in secondary schools. The Chief of Party threatened to resign over this demonstration of USAID authority - especially since IVSers were teaching at other universities.

The IVS/VN resisted USAID pressures to increase the number of volunteers to 220. IVS/VN noted that the number of OCO and USAID personnel was increasing as was the number of American soldiers. Anti-Americanism was on the rise. Community Development personnel were experiencing difficulties discovering their role. During these negotiations, IVS/VN rejected five of thirteen proposed English teachers on the grounds that Vietnam was becoming a difficult place for American volunteers to work.

IVS/VN reported to IVS/W that the reorganization of USAID was placing everything under military authority. IVS/VN was concerned as to how it could continue to serve the Vietnamese people under such an arrangement. They cited the escalation of violence as illustrated by the fact that a Vietnamese who had been wounded in a USA bombing had died while riding in an IVS jeep. They alleged that Ambassador Komer was pushing IVS/VN from its former position of close cooperation with USAID/VN to a more political position.

IVSer David Nesmith published a letter in the Saturday Review critical of the US military role in Vietnam. Government pressures were put upon IVS because of this communication: "Criticism of US policy violated the principles under which IVS was operating." Some of the IVS/VN volunteers, interpreting the reprimand as a curtailment of their freedom, raised the question: "Is IVS a private or a government organi-

zation?" In calling this incident to the attention of IVS/VN, Washington cited the case of the IVS Director having refused in 1960 to duplicate David Nuttle's general letter because it contained statements critical of US policy.

The IVS Board on May 25, 1967 took action expressing the hope that "It will be possible, despite political and military pressures, to continue the tradition of IVS volunteers dedicated to helping the Vietnamese in social and economic fields, and in ways the Vietnamese wish to be helped, always consistent with IVS purposes. Resolved: (1) to continue to serve the Vietnamese people as long as IVS effectively can work in Vietnam. (2) To maintain its status as private agency. (3) To take all steps with GVN and USAID to assure reasonable freedom of action for IVSers. (4) To protect the status of IVS volunteers as private citizens, conducting themselves as guests in a host country."

Don Luce wrote IVS/W (3-10) "Things are not going well for Vietnam and its people. IVS must have the backbone to stick to its obligations to help the Vietnamese people."

The official report on Gitelson's death states that he probably was killed by Viet Cong. Yet Hao villagers, who tend to be anti-GVN insist that there was no Viet Cong activity in the area that day.

Another theory is that Senator Kennedy was expected to visit the area. While the villagers had many complaints to make against the GVN representatives, who had been misusing their funds, they would not dare express their feelings openly to the Senator because of almost certain

reprisals. Gitelson had suggested to the villagers that they should write out their complaints and give them to him. He then would see that the visiting Senator received them. Gitelson's death took place the day Kennedy arrived. Advocates of this theory claim that he was taken prisoner by government forces and carried to a distant place before being shot. The GVN claimed that while a prisoner of the Viet Cong, Gitelson had made a break for freedom and had been shot while attempting to escape. Roger Montgomery, the IVS Team Leader in the Delta retrieved the body.

Steve Swift, while working in Pha Tan village had an encounter with the Special Forces. Two of them had been in a boat on the narrow man-built canal, when they brushed a boat manned by two villagers. One of the soldiers killed one of the two villagers, and demanded tht the other pay for medical services to treat his arm which had been injured slightly in the brush of the two boats. The soldier came back to the village and threatened to kill the villager unless the demand was met. Steve Swift visited the provincial office to learn the names of the two Special Forces men, and lodged a complaint. When the Provincial Office did nothing to stop the demands of the soldier, Steve wrote to the next highest level. One evening three representatives of the Special Forces visited Steve Swift and told him in no uncertain terms that unless he terminated his involvement in the incident, his own life would be in jeopardy. Thus did Steve Swift learn that no civilian redress is possible against the military forces.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1967 - 1968

### 1967

| | |
|---|---|
| July 13 | - President Johnson announces that the additional 70,000 troops McNamara has requested will be supplied |
| July 15 | - Mortar attack on Da Nang kills 13 Americans and wounds 150. Eleven planes destroyed and ten other damaged |
| July 22 | - President Johnson sends Maxwell D. Taylor and Clark M. Clifford on Far East tour to seek additional allied troops for Vietnam |
| Aug 3 | - President Johnson announces a ceiling on US troops at 525,000 |
| Sept 3 | - Nguyen Van Thieu wins presidential election with 35% of vote |
| Oct 21 | - Election for lower house held. Thieu and Ky inaugurated as President and Vice-President respectively |
| Nov 16 | - US bombs Haiphong shipyards |

### 1968

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan 30 | - Tet Mou Than offensive begins with attacks on major cities. VC invade US Embassy in Saigon |
| Feb 13 | - Pentagon announces an additional 10,500 troops will be airlifted to Vietnam to meet General Westmoreland's needs |
| Feb 24 | - ARVN forces recapture palace at Hue |
| Feb 25 | - US troop complement now 495,000 |
| March 31 | - President Johnson announces cessation of all air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam except in DMZ area |
| April 3 | - North Vietnam offers to meet with US representatives |
| May 13 | - Delegates of North Vietnam and the US hold first meeting in Paris |
| June 19 | - President Thieu signs general mobilization order |

IVS/VN 1967-1968

1967-68 was IVS/VN's year of decision. The teamsize reached its maximum of 165-170 towards the goal of 200. Shortly before it peaked, 49 of them addressed a letter to President Johnson, of whom twelve (including the Saigon staff) resigned in August. A volunteer was killed in January 1968, and during the 1968 Tet offensive the entire IVS operation was disrupted. The staff decided to reduce the team size by one-half. These events, and their consequences, conditioned the operation of IVS/VN until the termination of its contract four years later.

The year had started with considerable promise. During the summer of 1967 twenty Volterm IVSers had supplemented the teams' activities, all having had some prior Vietnamese language training. English teaching, hospital service, agriculture and community development were their assignments. Their purpose was to assist IVS in its mission, to stimulate IVS recruitment, to further their own maturation process, and to propagate the "true story" of the United States' involvement in Vietnam to America.

Tracy Atwood, and former IVSer John Sommer were the team leaders. The evaluations by the Volterns varied as to the effectiveness of the experiment. Two of them decided to become full-time volunteers. John Sommer's evaluation was that it was a "top notch study tour with a built-in boost for community development and social action".

The mood prevalent in the USA at that time among college students was that the nation's presence in Vietnam was wrong. The Volterns' individual reports adduced this as the major reason why they could not

accept appointment under IVS to Vietnam. Despite considerable effort to repeat the experiment the following year along more technical lines, the Voltern program was a one time thing.

In August 1967, IVS/VN made two volunteers available to the Political College, MACPD. The Advisor was so impressed with their performance he invited IVS to make available two volunteers to teach English to the cadets through the training period until December 1968. September developments within IVS/VN prevented this request being considered.

The Education Division of USAID/VN requested IVS/VN's assistance in utilizing 24 one-room laboratories, and thirteen two-room laboratories in high schools which USAID/VN had constructed. The reason adduced for the Vietnamese teachers lacked expertise, motivation or proper laboratory supplies. IVS/VN regarded this invitation as an opportunity both to supply science teachers, and also to conduct in-service training for high school faculty members. IVS/VN therefore requested twenty teachers of IVS/W for purposes of responding.

The Chief of Party spelled out to IVS/W the qualifications it should seek in recruiting volunteers: (1) There should be no complainers, since they would find so much to complain about. (2) They should be "self-starters" with initiative. (3) Their private lives should be above moral reproach. (4) They should be humble, willing to do simple jobs over a long period of time. (5) They should be emotionally stable.

In view of the importance English teaching was having in the IVS/VN program, the following description of this position was prepared by the

Education Team Leader:

> "The IVS English teacher lives under the weight of a wide range of problems. His job lacks glamor and importance from the perspective of Vietnamese and Americans alike. He must endure discipline problems, and see little progress. He enjoys little support or useful supervision. These problems must be dealt with by securing a directive from the Ministry of Education to the high schools clarifying the role of the IVS English teacher. The Ministry appears to regard IVS as something to endure rather than the foundation of a long range program. IVS needs to clarify its understanding of the educational objectives. It could profit from knowing what the Vietnamese believe them to be. IVS priorities should be Agricultural High Schools, Teachers Colleges, and universities where there are no Fulbright Profs. Graduates will fill cadre positions in education and agriculture."

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In the summer of 1967, the IVS/VN team again proposed to IVS/W that the Vietnam program be internationalized and privately funded. "Our purpose in Vietnam is the help of the Vietnamese," they stated. "This aim is jeopardized and even vitiated by our USAID support." At a meeting of representatives of Vietnam Christian Service, the Foster Parents Plan and IVS, called because of increasing pressures from the US government agencies "to become part of the team," the ad hoc group drafted a number of resolutions proposing among other things, "the right to negotiate directly with the GVN".

The crisis forced upon IVS/VN was created by the war, by the escalation of its intensity, by the increasing size of the American armed forces, by the infringement of Vietnamese sovereignty, by what some of the volunteers had witnessed and heard from Vietnamese, and by their own consciences. While the crisis was averted temporarily, with 21 new volunteers leaving for Vietnam in August and another seven in October, the political awakening articulated in the letter to the President and the resultant discussions, continued to infect both those who remained in Vietnam and the new recruits. Director Gardiner had expressed this fact in his communication to Ambassador Bunker requesting the continuance of the IVS/VN: "IVS, if it is to continue, must be host to volunteers representing typically American divergencies of opinion...IVS/W cannot direct in any fashion the opinions of its team members"

Ambassador Bunker in granting IVS the right to continue in Vietnam, listed as its contributions: (1) Education, agricultural and community development; (2) Encouraging the Vietnamese people to improve themselves; and (3) Fostering international understanding.

Danny J. Whitfield, who had been a volunteer in 1961-63, and who currently was on the USAID staff, having just completed a tour of duty in Quang Tri Province, was induced to become the third Chief of Party.

In accepting the challenge to become Chief of Party, Whitfield stated: "During its short history, IVS has grown and changed with the times and situations. It has proven itself adaptable and dynamic."

At the time Danny J. Whitfield became Chief of Party and just

prior to the Tet Offensive, the 151 volunteers were engaged as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| English instruction | 49 |
| Community Development | 48 |
| Agricultural Development | 32 |
| Mobile Science | 7 |
| Educational Specialists | 2 |
| University Teaching | 1 |

As individual volunteers became aware of their unconscious encouragement of the evils in governmental relations, they also became increasingly suspicious of the significance of their role. While they did not doubt the importance of what they did in particular situations, they nevertheless began to suspect they were pawns of the government and the military machine. When James Linn was asked by a Vietnamese "Why do you make Communists of our men, prostitutes of our women, and beggars of our children?" This IVS volunteer began to realize that the American impact was wrong. "US policy, if it is properly formulated, is supposed to be the policy for me....I think I find some aspects that don't set well."*

By July 1967 the issue had become so central to the IVS operation that the team held a consultation to consider appropriate action. A letter was drafted to President Johnson, and released by the Chief of Party to The New York Times on September 19, 1967. After reciting the miseries inflicted by the war upon the Vietnamese, the letter made

* Letters from Vietnam, edited by Bill Adler. Dutton & Co., New York. 1967 . p. 198.

five specific recommendations: De-escalate the war. Stop defoliation. Stop bombings. Recognize the National Liberation Front in negotiations. Turn over the problem to an international peace commission and accept its recommendations.

Forty-nine of the volunteers (including one non-American) signed the letter. Shortly thereafter twelve of the signers resigned. These included the Chief of Party (Don Luce), his Associate Chief for Community Development (William Meyers), and two Team Leaders (Gene Stoltzfus and Donald Ronk). These resignations constituted a water-shed in the history of IVS Vietnam.

The reasons adduced by those who did not sign were: (1) They felt that such an action was inappropriate. (2) They were opposed both to the substance of the letter and to its method of release. (3) They were not concerned about the issues, desiring rather to continue the work which had brought them to Vietnam. (4) The non-American personnel generally felt that their own nationality forbade their protesting to the President of the United States concerning a foreign policy matter.

One-third of the total team signed. Those who resigned were one-fourth of the signers. They stated that they no longer could accept the contradiction between what they claimed to be doing for Vietnam, and their relations with a political and military operation which vitiated their efforts. As one of the twelve said: I was no longer able to "rationalize my implicit support of American policy with my intellectual disapproval of it. Events had moved to the point where I either had to admit I support American policy or I had to remove myself from Vietnam

in a protest move saying I do not support American policy."

Don Luce, representing some of those resigning felt an obligation to inform the American people concerning the war which he could not do in Vietnam. "It was necessary for me to resign to come back to the USA to report what the Vietnamese have told me."

An interim administration was established, under Acting Chief of Party, Miss Verda Loy. Director Arthur Gardiner in Saigon, negotiated with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker for the continuance of IVS in Vietnam. He referred to the contract clause "requiring prior clearance before publication of articles written by team members," and noted that work of IVS "lies not in politics". Ambassador Bunker, in his reply affirmed the importance of volunteers refraining "from any political involvement in Vietnam".

IVS volunteer Len E. Ackland, stated during this controversy: "IVS always has thought of itself as a-political.... We were waddling in self-deception. We always have been regarded as political." He quoted a government official who spoke appreciatively of the IVS act of protest, "We want political instead of military answers."

THE TET OFFENSIVE (1968) AND ITS AFTERMATH

On January 30, 1968, during the Vietnamese New Year ceasefire, an assault was launched against most of the cities and major towns of South Vietnam. Saigon and Hue especially were badly hit. While the invading forces ultimately were driven out, 1,000 Americans were killed, and American prestige suffered a loss.

A few days prior to the Tet Offensive, Dave Gitelson in Community Development was shot in Long Xuyen. Gitelson had worked in the Mekong Delta for two years.

Mortars, fouled up transportation, supply shortages, distrust and despair marked the countryside where the agricultural technicians had worked. The schools were closed. In Hue three volunteers were captured. Miss Sandra Johnson of Michigan was released in April, but Gary Daves of New Mexico and Marc Cayer from Quebec have not been heard of since.

After the Tet Offensive, President Johnson sent General Earle D. Wheeler to Vietnam to investigate the situation. The General urged that more troops be sent. Voluntary agencies generally stepped up their teams, all save IVS/VN which decided to cut its number of volunteers by one-half. The stations of An Khe, Ban Me Thuot, Phuoc Long, Chau Loc, Cao Lanh, Hue Tuy Hoa, My Tho, Vinh Binh and Kontum were closed. Consideration also was given by the staff to the closing of Ba Xuyen and Pleiku. After 54 volunteers had terminated, six others already having departed Vietnam, and two others who resigned from IVS but remained in Vietnam, the distribution was as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| I Corps Area | 12 |
| II Corps Area | 22 |
| III Corps Area | 17 |
| IV Corps Area | 16 |
| Unassigned | 6 |
| Staff | 8 |
| | 81 |

When this calculation was made, the three Hue volunteers who were prisoners of the NLF were not included.

As of March 27th, 1968, the IVS/VN team was divided into the following categories:

| | |
|---|---|
| Agricultural technicians | 21 |
| Community Development | 29 |
| Education | 25 |
| Area Team Leaders | 4 |
| Saigon Staff | 3 |

enewed outbreak of NLF activity came on May 5th. There was heavy fighting in five districts of Saigon, including the Tan Son Nhut area where the IVS house was located. The IVS staff felt obliged to evacuate, setting up temporary quarters in one of the USAID hotels.

Volunteer Robert Walker was staying at a District Chief's house when a call came that a nearby village was under attack. Walker was alone in the house at the time, so called for air support for the village. The Air Force responded, and saved the village from being completely overrun by NLF forces. During the attack, Walker communicated information from the village, translating from Vietnamese into English to guide the American pilots.

As the fiscal year 1967-68 came to its close, the IVS program was considerably disorganized, and the future uncertain. The program as of

June 1968 was as follows:

Agriculture

The Highlander Training Centers, starting as Montagnard Training Center at Ban Me Thuot in 1961, now numbered twelve.

Forestry services formerly perfomed by IVSers at Dalat, Ban Me Thuot, Quang Duc, and Hue were curtailed.

The intensification of war, led to demand for labor saving devices. IVS was asked to help design tools and to demonstrate imported implements.

IVS/VN was engaged in agricultural education, research, demonstration and extension.

Work continued at the Bien Hoa Mental Hospital, near Saigon, the only institution of its kind in Vietnam. The IVSer put back into operation a 15-acre farm, combinig the raising of foodstuffs with a therapy program. He also sought to utilize the barn space by increasing the number and improving the quality of pigs. He was successful both in involving the patients in farm work, and in raising corn, and sorghum as feed for the pigs.

IVSers were first to become interested in the famed IR-8 "miracle rice" in 1966. When the Ministry of Agriculture became interested in 1967, IVSers had opportunity to demonstrate their skills with IR-8 and later with IR-5. Four of the IVSers were sent to the Philippines to make a study of its cultivation. One IVSer developed a demonstration farm with the assistance of the Agriculture Service. Another IVSer

concentrated upon convincing farmers of its value by helping them lay out demonstration plots. Another concentrated upon the multiplier effect, trusting that the superior production would produce its spread to neighboring farms.

The improvement of hog stock, and the raising of chickens beginning about 1965 were stimulated by the GVN, USAID, private Vietnamese business and the IVS. Volunteers helped design and build pig pens and chicken coops.

Despite the location of the Tan Son Nhut Animal Husbandry Station near Saigon, the farm was understaffed (due to the military draft) and had [illegible] equipment. The IVSer helped organize a self-help project among the underpaid employees for the production of chickens, profits going both to the members and to the "Self Help Project." One problem in animal husbandry was that almost 100% of the food had to be imported.

## Mechanical Development

The care and repair of machines is a problem anywhere and especially in lands such as Vietnam. The first IVSers contributed to the rehabilitation and operation of machinery which had become useless because of lack of trained mechanics. The mechanics on the IVS staff continued in 1967-8 to teach the operation of chain saws, to inventory available agricultural implements, and to secure parts for their repair.

## Education

IVSers were teachers in provincial high schools, private or

religious schools, technical and normal schools, and in the universities. Some volunteers carried full classroom responsibilities; others had Vietnamese counterparts; some only drilled in pronounciation. Many carried voluntary classes outside the school hours. Teaching English, in view of the demand, was regarded by IVSers as helping Vietnamese help themselves. Teaching effectiveness was hampered by ineffective administration, crowded classrooms, the certainty of the draft for the young men, and the ever impending examinations. English was regarded as a means of dealing commercially with Americans, and of communicating with neighboring coiuntries, where English already was a second language.

## Mobile Science

Mobile science having been introduced by an IVSer, the role of the volunteer thereafter became catalyst, advisor, and inspirer. As the Vietnamese caught the spirit, the IVSer bowed out. Tet 1968 demobilized the program, in some places, though it continued in others.

## Community Development

Tet reduced the idea of a team approach in most places, lasted a year in one place, six months in two. Sericulture was encouraged, 4-T activities were continued, community survey was begun in one place. The early termination of the community development program prevented it from working out. The fact that the team members had not been selected to complement each other proved a handicap to team's effectiveness.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1968-1969

**1968**

| | |
|---|---|
| July 18-20 | - President Johnson and Thieu meet in Honolulu. Johnson pledges continuing help so long as needed. |
| Oct 31 | - President Johnson announces US will halt all air, naval and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam as of Nov. 1st. President Thieu states this was a unilateral action by the US government |
| Nov 8 | - Richard M. Nixon wins presidential election |

**1969**

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan 3 | - President-elect Nixon announces Henry Cabot Lodge will replace W. Averill Harriman as Chief negociator at Paris Peace talks |
| Jan 25 | - First substantive peace talks in Paris |
| Feb 23 | - Enemy launches general offensive in South Vietnam |
| March 6 | - US troop strength now 541,500; third-world troop totals 72,000 |
| June 8 | - Presidents Nixon and Thieu meet at Midway. Nixon announced 25,000 American troops would be withdrawn by Aug 31 |

## IVS/VN 1968-69

During the period 1968-69, the highest number of IVSers in Vietnam was 87, at 29 different locations. By June 30, 1969, the number had declined to 54, fifteen of whom were from countries other than the USA. One of these, from Taiwan, headed the Agriculture Team. While the number of IVSers was cut by one-half following Tet 1968, the international personnel were reduced by only three.

The breakdown of IVSers as of the high point indicates that agriculture had resumed a relatively high place in the IVS/VN program:

| | |
|---|---|
| Agriculture | 22 |
| Community Development | 21 |
| High School English Teachers | 19 |
| University English Teachers | 3 |
| Mobile Science | 1 |
| Leprosarium | 1 |
| Vocational Training | 1 |
| Youth Work | 2 |
| Home Economics Teaching | 1 |
| Staff | 14 |

### Agriculture

Evaluations which followed the 1968 Christmas Team Meeting led IVS to consider moving from short-term projects to programs of long-term agricultural development. The Saigon team began collecting and disseminating technical information. On the field there was increased emphasis upon the documentation of projects, and strengthening relations with individual farmers, Agricultural Service personnel, and organizations which were concerned with long-term agricultural development.

One volunteer developed a chicken raising project for the Buddhist School of Social Welfare in Saigon.

The success of a poultry project at the Highlander Training School, Phu Bon, stimulated Montagnard applications for loans to purchase baby chicks.

Implementing the GVN emphasis upon protein production, hogs were distributed at Go Cong to farmers willing to raise them as per instructions.

An IVSer in Ba Xuyen province introduced artificial insemination of pigs as a means of improving stock.

An IVSer at the Horticultural Experiment Station at Dalat developed disease control by the use of fungicides.

At Sa Dec and Bien Hoa, sorghum was produced successfully for pig food.

To help farmers cross a recently constructed canal an IVSer in Ba Xuyen province helped construct culverts.

A volunteer in Tay Ninh, who had conducted experiments with the miracle rice, and had analyzed the rice cycle, helped conduct a Rice Training Seminar for Vietnamese and Montagnards.

## Community Development

The "shoe shine" project in Da Nang continued in operation at very low cost.

The draft so limited continuity in the area of youth work, it was phased out of the IVS community development program.

Community development workers undertook to create sustaining structures, rather than concentrating upon simple projects. Samples of institutions thus stimulated: A home made eye clinic at Sa Dec, a farmers' co-op at Hoa Binh, a Chicken Corporation at Kim Ke.

## Education

The drafting of Vietnamese teachers increased the work load on the rineteen IVS/VN teachers who started in October 1968. Both IVSers and Vietnamese teachers spent considerable time together during the year considering techniques for making teaching an interesting exercise.

IVSers taught English at the universities in Hue and Can Tho. At the latter place, an IVSer set up a portable language laboratory unit.

Home classes, English Clubs, and teaching at independent schools were other English development methods employed by IVSers.

The staff meeting in December 1968 decided to limit activities to those which were clearly developmental. IVS already had moved out of temporary refugee relief, orphanages, hospitals and youth work.

In December USAID/VN raised with IVS/VN the question as to whether the USG should be funding an operation with increasingly large numbers of non-Americans on the team.

IVS/VN was working in close cooperation with other voluntary agencies, especially those to which specific appeals from Vietnamese groups could be relayed.

The Hunting Memorial Library in Phan Rang was dedicated.

The period after Tet 1968 was bleak for IVS/VN. The staff was engaged in making adjustments, closing stations, sending people home, and being concerned about the security of those remaining. It was decided that arriving volunteers would be located where there was at least one other experienced volunteer.

Roger Montgomery, en route back to the USA, visited the PRG headquarters in Cambodia, seeking release of the two IVSers. AID/VN and the Embassy security officer called in the Chief of Party to inquire concerning the purpose and Montgomery's known anti-American views.

In February 1969, the IVS team strength was 69 including the two PRG prisoners.

# POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

## FY 1969-1970

**1969**

| | |
|---|---|
| Sept 3 | - Ho Chi Minh dies |
| Sept 16 | -President Nixon announces second withdrawal of 35,000 men looking forward to US troop strength of 484,000 by Dec. 15th |
| Nov 20 | - Lodge resigns as Chief of Paris Peace Talks |
| Dec 1 | - US strength 479,000 of whom 300,000 are combat troops |
| Dec 15 | - President Nixon announces third withdrawal of 50,000 men by April 15, 1970 |

**1970**

| | |
|---|---|
| April 13 | - US troop strength 429,000 |
| April 20 | - President Nixon announces planned withdrawal of 150,000 additional men over the next year |
| April 30 | - President Nixon announces he is sending US combat troops into Cambodia to destroy enemy sanctuaries and supply bases |
| June 24 | - Senate repeals Gulf of Tonkin Resolution |

IVS/VN 1969-70

Whereas 1967-68 had been the year of decision, the fiscal year 1969-70 was a time when IVS/VN sought to assess its assets and liabilities and gird for the future.

The reduction in team size, initiated after the Tet offensive in 1968 was continued. By January 24, 1970 the total team membership had declined to 41. The staff size also was reduced. The Chief of Party and the associate chiefs for Education and for Rural Development resided at Tan Son Nhut. The leadership of teams was consolidated, with one team leader being responsible for two instead of one Military Area. The Vietnamization of administration was effected by the employment of nationals to do the work formerly performed by the Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Party.

The Advisory Council continued to function. Its members consisted of a journalist, the coordinator of SELA, a lawyer, a liaison officer with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Minister of Ethnic Minorities, the Agriculture Service Chief of a province, a university professor and an inspector of education. This Vietnamese group, meeting with IVSers continued to evaluate IVS program, advise concerning the feasibility of new programs, and to counsel the staff (and volunteers who now met with the staff), concerning problems.

The Chairman of the Advisory Council, Tran Van Ngo, was convinced that there remained important work for IVS/VN to perform. He cautioned against IVSers concluding that they should cease their activities until

the war ended. He based his advice on the expectation that the two governments of Vietnam would continue to use the political institutions they had developed. He also counseled the Chief of Party to recognize that his responsibilities looked two ways: He was the leader of the IVS team: he also was the representative in Vietnam of IVS/W.

During the year, the administration of IVS/VN was tightened. The form of the monthly reports was changed in an attempt to improve communications between field and staff. Volunteers attended staff meetings. Team leaders increased their station visits. The associate chiefs of party increased their support of the field staff. Language study provisions were enlarged so as to enable volunteers to achieve a better grasp of the languages. The IVS offices in Saigon were consolidated.

Relations between IVS/VN and CORDS remained cool. The Chief of Party reported that he only visited USG offices when summoned. In January, the Associate Director for Local Development, USAID, suggested to IVS/VN that it restructure its operations so as to bring them into line with USAID programs and objectives. This communique but underlined for IVS/VN the differences between the objectives of the two organizations. The Chief of Party stated: "The prescribed job of IVS in Vietnam is to initiate change in a community. To accomplish this task, a volunteer has to disrupt the community involved....We'd best know what changes are needed and the least disruptive way of implementing them." IVS/VN insisted that the kinds of changes effected by American intervention did not meet this criteria. "The amelioration of American policy is not our business. IVS is in Vietnam only because it is concerned for the Vietnamese people," was another statement by a

volunteer concerning objectives.

## Agriculture

During much of its life, IVS/VN and rural development were synonymous. The other programs volunteers had serviced were relative late comers. During this period when IVS morale was low, because of current problems and the uncertain future, the volunteers believed that they would be able again to focus upon agricultural development. Much thought was given to projecting the future along these lines.

Unfortunately, agricultural development did not loom high among the priorities of the GVN. The Ministry of Agriculture had been virtually forgotten, save for its participation in the land redistribution schemes, and IVS/VN had little visibility in the offices of the Ministry.

In January 1970, a staff shake-up took place in the Ministry. Cao Van Than, a close associate of President Thieu, had been brought in as Minister to manage the land reform scheme. He had no credentials as an agriculturist or as an administrator. Under his leadership the effectiveness of the Ministry declined. In protest, two of the heads of Directorates resigned, and Secretary General Do Thuc Vin, a friend of IVS/VN, threatened to quit.

IVS/VN by that date had little sympathy for the rhetoric of the "Village Self Development" Program which GVN was emphasizing:

> The mobilization of residents and the enhancing of the prestige of local officials within an anti-Communist framework.
>
> The promotion of societal cohesion among villagers

through their participation in the selection of local development projects.

The promotion of rural prosperity.

Despite these handicaps, IVS agricultural volunteers continued to operate at the provincial and local levels, particularly in extension, (extending new varieties, and training farmers in animal husbandry, vegetable production and home economics), experimentation research, promoting the production of new rice varieties, training in the keeping of farm records, stimulating the formation of cooperatives, training seminars and conferences in cooperation with the Vietnamese counterparts.

Agricultural volunteers worked in conjunction with local Agricultural Services. Technical support was provided by the appropriate technical department of USAID and other governmental bodies.

## Education

During this year, English teachers began to express doubts as to the developmental significance of their work in the high schools. The IVS/VN education program had been designed to involve volunteers in development inside the Vietnamese educational system. The IVSers were assigned by the Ministry of Education primarily to provincial high schools - and some to normal and technical schools and to universities. The IVS teacher participated as a faculty member in the institution's activities, under the supervision of the principal or dean. The volunteer also taught evening English classes and assisted in the building up of

a school library. IVS/VN finally reached the conclusion that only in the higher levels could the volunteer contribute to national development. The "low-level" development functions performed in high schools hardly justified the effort.

A variation had evolved at Quang Ngai, where the Quang Ngai English Language Development Association had developed courses outside the governmental structures, designed to prepare English teachers. An IVSer was assigned to teach there in 1968. By 1970, the IVSer was replaced by a Vietnamese as Director, but the IVS volunteer continued to teach methods and supervise the intern classes. IVS/VN regarded this as a pilot project to be studied as an alternative to concentrating upon government institutions.

At a training course conducted at the Highland Vegetable Center, in which ethnic Vietnamese and Montagnards were mixed, the volunteers discovered that such an arrangement was not feasible. This discovery demonstrated the value of their original strategy in developing different facilities for the ethnic Vietnamese and the Highland Tribes.

The Mobile Science Program which IVS/VN had developed, by January 1970 consisted of sixteen units. The workers were issuing a newsletter for purposes of sharing experiences. IVS/VN sought to persuade the Ministry of Education to assign two Vietnamese as coordinators of the program promising that an IVSer would assist them. There were competent Vietnamese to prepare the simple experiments which could be dupplicated by the Vietnamese teams. The Ministry, on the other hand, was seeking to persuade IVS/VN to resume the central administration it had provided during the years 1964-68. IVS/VN continued to resource

the units, but did not resume responsibility for administration.

IVS/VN Personnel Matters

Personnel selection, orientation, training and placement became increasingly important on the IVS agenda with the years. The correspondence back and forth between IVS/W and IVS/VN, clearances with USAID/W, with CORDS/VN and with ministries of the GVN was a complicated process. IVS/VN suggested to IVS/W that placement was of such importance, it should begin towards the end of the selection process. The "game of musical chairs" was played in Vietnam, in an attempt to locate personnel in situations where they would be most effective, in response to changing needs, and in view of the security situation at a given time.

Wrote an Associate Chief of Party to Washington: "IVS is like a school. All the volunteers are suitable Nor can we forsee how a recruit will adjust and develop. Volunteers lacking in IVS dedication will bow out by a process of natural selection." IVS/VN was not pleased with the Board's phrase that the IVS/VN purpose was to ameliorate the American AID programs with IVS' "example of idealistic service".

While IVS/VN was experiencing difficulties with USAID/VN and with the GVN, it also was being attacked on the left.

An English language broadcast from Moscow on February 10, 1970 stated IVS "is a private philanthropic organization with a goal of promoting progress and peoples in backward regions on the basis of the Christian commandment: love thy neighbor. However, the body is backed by the CIA

"The Americans wanted to use the body for subversion in socialist

countries after World War II under the pretext of helping unbelievers. When this failed, the CIA lost interest. Then it was decided to use IVS as a cover for spying in lands where missionaries, the Peace Corps, and foundations are being expelled. IVSers are hand picked by the CIA. They are trained in information gleaning and radio transmitting. They are located in Laos and in Vietnam, to study local customs and to win the trust and sympathy of the people. They are instructed to mingle with the people, and to be like them in food, clothing and housing. This is the first stage.

"Then the IVSers begin the deployment of patriotic units, and remove peasants who support them. They also slander the NLF and Pathet Lao by distributing leaflets which extoll the American puppet regime in Saigon.

"The CIA purpose is to establish spies who can continue without CIA support, but who will remain on the job longer than say the Peace Corps. They plan to enlarge the program to other Asian countries." (Abridged)

## The Relations of IVS/VN with CORDS/VN

A number of volunteers resigned from IVS/VN because of its relations with the US Government. The Chief of Party wrote to IVS/W stating that the differences between IVS/VN and USAID/VN hinged upon the incompatibility of aims. Whereas IVS/VN increasingly had oriented its efforts towards development, the USAID/VN program was political. Whereas IVS/VN has sought to relate to and identify with the people, USAID has undergirded the GVN program which was concentrated upon its survival

rather than upon the people's needs.

He cited the case of a disagreement in the provinces. CORDS had sought to force the IVS team in Chau Doc to shore up the failing Farmers' Association and had attempted to prevent the formation of a cooperative, contrary both to IVS' evaluation and to the expressed desires of the local leadership. "We wish to work with the GVN/CORDS programs that are sound and developmentally oriented: we do not wish to be pushed to work for the political objectives of the Mission when they are not acceptable to the communities and are developmentally unsound," he stated. (The Chau Doc situation subsequently was saved by the timely intervention of a CORDS official).

"The business and village leaders with whom IVS works interpret US effort as being directed to the achievement of US political objectives - not to helping Vietnam. IVS' identification with USAID hurts us in our relations with these village and business leaders. Roman Catholics, Montagnards, military officials and the governing elite regard the American presence as beneficial. CORDS backs and finances the Phoenix Program which is destroying the NLF infrastructure. Its aim is not self-determination but the maintenance of a government which is in conformity with the US foreign policy objectives," he continued.

One IVS Board member addressed another as follows: "It seems we are light years away from that period in the early 1950's when IVS started and when we undertook joint programs with the technical assistance arm of the government in an effort to reach commonly defined

and commonly agreed upon objectives. As the climate in Vietnam has changed volunteers and Board members have agonized over whether IVS/VN should continue. Each time there appeared to be some reasonable justification for continuing. I now feel there is no such rationale."

A former IVS/VN volunteer writing to IVS/W: "After the Tet Offensive in 1968 the atmosphere in which we worked became progressively corroded and poisoned. We saw the beautiful culture disintegrate. There was nothing we could do to restore the former closeness with our Vietnamese intimates. The Vietnamese were pulling in, drawing in further to the protective family shell that has served them before in times of crisis. Working in Vietnam in 1969 was more difficult than it ever had been, the chances of productive work less likely, and strain more demoralizing."

These expressions from board members, IVS/VN staff, and volunteers evidenced the importance in 1969-70 of the issue raised by the IVS/VN team concerning the possibility of private funding. IVS/W was being pressured to seek private sources of income, rather than depend upon USAID contracts, looking towards the time when IVS could operate without US Government assistance. IVS/W despatched a team to meet with the volunteers in Vietnam and Laos. In June 35 IVSers and 35 Vietnamese met with the Washington delegation at Dalat to examine the facts and agree, if possible, upon recommendations to the Board.

The events leading up to this meeting were the escalation of the war into Cambodia and Laos and the threat by ten of the volunteers on May 10th to refuse salaries from USAID, receiving only the piastre payments from the GVN. IVSers had participated in the peace movement

expressions in Saigon, but the voluntary agencies generally, recognizing they were guests of the GVN, were uncertain as to how to express their revulsion against what they regarded as the war's atrocities. Their purpose was to seek to influence American policy. One of them stated that "It is quite possible that Vietnam will influence America more than America will influence Vietnam."

Clearly, some of the IVS/VN strategists had moved from an interpretation of development interpreted solely as economic, to an emphasis upon social justice and liberation as essential elements.

At the June 1970 consultation in Dalat, "The Terrible Ten" announced they would make no final decision until after the IVS Executive Committee had heard the report of the Aldrich-Peters team. During the consultation, in response to Professor Aldrich's request for "facts," Hue University Professor Anh Canh stated, "All operations by the US Government create barriers which are becoming higher and higher. From the Vietnamese perspective emotions and feelings are as important as fact." Former Chief of Party, Don Luce adduced as illustrative the fact that Vietnamese who had been associated with IVS/VN are thereby compromised and even endangered.

The action of the IVS Executive Committee was made after the return of Aldrich and Peters, which came in the fiscal year 1970-71.

The issue of the IVS/VN mission was raised again by a volunteer working in Chao Doc province. The security situation there was poor. There were many refugees for whom the volunteer felt IVS/VN should be concerned. When informed that despite their need, IVS/VN no longer had

the resources with which to respond, the volunteer countered with the statement that he had come to Vietnam to do whatever was necessary to help the American effort. "IVS/VN is hypocritical in refusing to work with the military, while accepting the security provided by the military," he charged. The IVS/VN final reply to the volunteer was that the task of IVS was not to pacify the countryside, but to help develop those parts of the countryside where security conditions permitted. This discussion clarified the IVS position that a reasonable degree of security was a sine qua non for developmental activity, and that there was no future for voluntary good works without a developmental orientation. "We have come a long way since IVS was founded, commented the Chief of Party.

Another issue with which the IVS/VN staff wrestled until the termination of their contract was created by the encroachment of so-called "veterans" upon the Tan Son Nhut IVS house. Army veterans in April 1970 began to build shacks upon unoccupied land, such as the center-grassed-sections of the boulevards and on vacant government property. In June they started the process on the edge of the large lawn of the IVS house. While the house was surrounded by a board fence, ambitious entrepreneurs began to break through to extend their squatter holdings. A temporary compromise was effected by IVS staff agreeing to move the fence back by 2 1/2 meters. "The land belongs to the government. We the people have the right to claim it," was their justification. No final conclusion to the matter was reached during the year. The problem continued to demand major attention until a new fence was erected around the by now contracted lawn, February 1971.

IVS/VN DISCUSSION PAPER - Gene Stoltzfus (9-3-70)

IVS/W and IVS/VN have differed at times over:

1. Perceptions of the purpose and role of IVS
2. Differences re style of team leadership
3. Interpretation of IVS goals in VN context

   Over internationalization and private financing - Saigon asks when? Washington how?

IVS Contribution to Vietnam:

1. Associations with Vietnamese. Friendships have developed. Some Vietnamese have benefitted professionally from the associations. IVS village operations have been a demonstration of cooperation.
2. Programs: Difficult to evaluate under wartime conditions.
   a. Extension education in agriculture requires supportive rural institutions for marketing.
   b. English instruction is valuable if such knowledge facilitates the development of self-reliance and a just society.
   c. Science education is effective if local educational institutions are capable of supporting it.
   d. Rural development, IVS' major activity, a potential political activity because both the NLF and the GVN, as well as Buddhist sects in certain areas courted farmers.
3. Other related values
   a. IVSers have used their experiences to interpret Vietnam

to Americans.

b. Many have been channeled into government positions, or into Asian graduate studies.

c. Others have criticized policy through the press, mass-media, and before Congressional bodies.

Whereas the original volunteers were motivated by high altruism and adventurism, more recently, they have placed greater emphasis upon political issue of social justice. They have tended to evaluate their performance not primarily in terms of economic development but of their impact upon the political situation. One COP resigned over the war issue; a second left after two years distressed by developments; the third and last sought to steer a middle course, seeking to force IVS/W to accept internationalization and private funding.

Decision was made at autumn Board meeting to reduce IVS/VN to a team of 20.

1970 - 1971

1970

| | |
|---|---|
| July 1 | - President Nixon announced appointment of Ambassador Bruce as Chief US delegate to Paris Peace talks |
| | - Two An Quang Buddhist nuns immolate themselves. Saigon students demand withdrawal of foreign troops from the South, and that the question of peace be left to Vietnamese. A US military command poll showed 65% of the people wanted all Americans to leave; 5% to stay |
| Aug 8 | - Senate voted 62-22 against banning use of defoliants in Vietnam, despite 100 million pounds having been scattered in eight years |
| Sept 2 | - Senate defeats Hatfield-McGovern "Amendment to End the War" |
| 6 | - Senate passes Cooper-Church Amendment to stop the President from spending funds to retain troops or advisors in Cambodia, by a vote of 58-37 |
| 17 | - PRG offers new Peace Plan in Paris |
| Oct 7 | - President Nixon called for supervised ceasefire, a general peace conference, withdrawal timetable, political solution, and the immediate release of all POWs |
| Nov 7 | - Five struggle groups form People's Front for Peace in Saigon |
| Dec 7-8 | - Anti-American riots in Qui Nhon protesting fatal shooting of high school boy by US soldier |

1971

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan | - President Nixon noted that any massive build-up North Vietnam might lead to bombing resumption |
| Feb 6 | - US Command in Saigon announced 9,000 American troops were supporting 20,000 ARVN poised to cross into Laos |
| 17 | - President Nixon announced he would impose no limits upon use of American air power in Indochina |

1971

- Two Saigon Roman Catholic priests imprisoned for nine months for publishing anti-war articles

March 14 - Senator Edward Kennedy reported 25,000 Vietnamese civilians killed in 1970, and at least 325,000 since 1965

18 - Chou En-Lai in Hanoi pledges unconditional support to PRG

25 - ARVN evacuated by US helicopters from Laos

April - Lt. Wm. Calley sentenced to life imprisonment for part in civilian killings at Song My. President Nixon announced plans to review the case

7 - President Nixon announced 184,000 troops would remain on Dec. 1st. Expressed satisfaction with Vietnamization

16 - Week rally in Washington against the war

27 - GVN orders Don Luce to leave Vietnam

29 - Defense Deaprtment announced US combat casualties declined 70% between 1968 and 1970

May 13 - Paris Peace Talks begin fourth year. US reports 22,000 Americans had died in Vietnam since the talks began

24 - US base at Cam Ranh Bay sabotaged. 1 1/2 million tons of aviation fuel destroyed

27 - GVN arrests three prominent Vietnamese known for their opposition to the American presence and to the Thieu regime

June 1 - US Army announces civilian massacre at Bong Son, September 1968, and its investigation

13 - NY Times begins disclosure of Pentagon Papers

IVS/VN 1970-1971

IVS/VN began the fiscal year with a team of 41. By December 31 the number had declined to 32. On June 30, 1971, 28 volunteers remained in Vietnam under the administration of IVS. They were scattered throughout the country, in most instances one to a station. The program foci had been narrowed to agriculture and education.

IVS/VN was distinguished by its "intelligence". Hamlet and village friends usually had warned volunteers in advance of impending insurgency. IVS staff frequently was aware of USAID and GVN actions before official notifications reached the Tan Son Nhut house. Yet despite the worsening relations both with USAID and with the GVN, IVS/VN assumed that the brewing storm could be weathered even as past crises had been surmounted.

During the summer of 1970, a volunteer noted that IVS was reaching the end of an era:

> The restoration of relative security through most of the rural areas, the return of the majority of refugees to their villages, and the end of the grant-basis development programs, perhaps signal the beginning of the period of relative normalization of rural life.

The effects of America's withdrawal of ground forces and "Vietnamization" were becoming apparent. Vietnamese who had become dependent upon the American presence were bewildered. They assumed that just as the Americans had replaced the French, someone else would take the Americans' place. Employment was reduced. The American money which had stimulated the economy no longer was so abundant. Stealing, bribery and hustling increased as the economic situation deteriorated. The GVN was

strapped for funds with which to operate its huge bureaucracy and to finance the projects formerly carried by the Americans. On November 2, the IVS Chief of Party stated: "We are beginning to see the great edifice constructed by USAID crumble for lack of maintenance funds. Most are crumbling while in disuse, which makes them appear all the more ridiculous." "Community" disappeared, and money manipulators, petty thieves, bribery and corruption flourished. An ARVN who had gone AWOL stated to an IVSer, "The United States has created a monster here."

"The Terrible Ten" chose this moment to present an ultimatum to IVS/W with respect to funding. IVS/VN had been pressuring headquarters for years to secure private funding for the Vietnam operation. When it became apparent that IVS/W could not or would not do so, ten of the volunteers declared that they would cease accepting salary from USAID funds, and would survive on the GVN-supplied piasters. In the end, one volunteer followed through on the threat. This incident illustrated the worsening relations between IVS and USAID in Vietnam.

One volunteer, commenting on the handicaps under which IVS operated stated:

> That the IVS has retained any energy or indepence at all is surprising. But it has. The IVS volunteer in the field can still be his one-man development and educational organization. He need take orders from no one. In a nation saturated with national programs rigidly applied, he may choose any project that he thinks good for his area and work only on it, There are not many countries which would encourage, or even tolerate, the presence of such a creature in the midst of an unpopular war. Nor are there many organizations which would field such unfettered volunteers and protect their autonomy in Vietnam today.

The Chief of Party commenting upon the then IVS/VN emphases stated:

> After more than ten years in Vietnam, IVS has gone past the point at which cross-cultural experience and personal education are the principal concerns. IVS/VN is now trying to determine how to maximize the developmental effect of volunteers - how to move in the desired direction.

Among the elements of the new direction determined by IVS/VN in 1970-71 were these:

1. Placements of volunteers on the basis of an up-dated evaluation of the proposed locations. Once assigned the volunteer would work there at least six months before shifting or being moved.

2. Vietnamization of staff both in Saigon and in the areas had been effective. IVS planned to continue the process.

3. IVS/VN was determined to operate insofar as possible utilizing facilities available to Vietnamese rather than employing those made available through USAID. The Vietnamese PTT was used instead of APO. Air America and US military planes were used for but 35% of the IVSers travel.

4. Members of the Education Team were given special pedagogical training.

5. A modus vivendi was effected with "neighbors" at the Saigon IVS house by the construction of a wall (completed Feb. 1971), araound a greatly reduced yard space.

6. IVS concentrated its education team in the universities at Can Tho, Saigon, Hue and Dalat.

Despite these efforts to define direction, based on an evaluation of effectiveness, certain problems remained:

1. The close identification of IVS/VN with USAID/VN through the

funding operation.

2. Rising anti-American sentiment.

3. Agricultural technicians had been unable to grasp the significance of the "community development" aspects of programs and hence to maximize the extension values of their efforts.

4. The office staff in Saigon was being required to devote an inordinate amount of time during the year to protecting the Tan Son Nhut house.

5. Community development became increasingly difficult because of the lack of rural cohesion, the absence of the cooperative community spirit, and the sense of dependence engendered by the easy accessibility of AID supplies.

6. Montagnards who had been forcibly relocated were non-respective to IVS efforts to train them for their new lives in the relocation centers.

7. The impact of IVS had been visibly reduced by the decline in numbers and the wide dispersion of the volunteers.

8. The Vietnamese Advisory Council was less effective than had been hoped. The members came from differing strata of society. They were unaccustomed to having foreigners solicit their opinions They failed to differentiate between "development" and "service".

Despite the deterioration in IVS relations with the Ministry of Agriculture, and its luke-warm USAID support, the IVS staff continued to plan for the future. Proposals were made to increase the proportion of non-Americans among the volunteers. Concentration would beupon agriculture rather than upon community development. The directorates of the

Ministry of Agriculture would be more directly involved in program development. Teachers would be sent to Singapore for specialized teacher-training. Montagnards would be employed to do extension in their own villages. A pilot-team project would be introduced in the Delta. Experiments also would be conducted in family planning.

## Agriculture

Early in 1971, IVS/VN became aware that the Ministry of Agriculture might refuse to recommend a renewal of the contract. The staff therefore began exploring with other ministries program possibilities which would enable IVS to remain. The fact that from 1957, the official relations between IVS and the GVN had been through the Ministry of Agriculture complicated the establishment of alternative governmental connections.

IVS/VN believed that the Minister of Agriculture was preoccupied with land reform rather than with the total problem of rural development. The fact that IVSers sought to work directly with the farmers ran counter to the official GVN approach. THe Vietnamese counterparts of the IVSers had been mobilized. As the IVSers were alone in the provinces, they had such low visibility, the GVN was hardly aware they existed, commented Dr. Tanh, the Director of Research. The Ministry also confessed that they did not know how to deal with those volunteers who were Asians.

The Minister of Agriculture explained to the Director of DGBFFA that the good relations of former days had changed as the volunteers had become concerned with civic, social welfare projects rather than with rural development. The Deputy Minister of Agriculture, in a communication

to the Associate Director for Local Development, USAID, stated that the IVSers appeared to be better qualified to engage in social work than in agricultural development. Since these activities were not in line with the Ministry's plans, and because it was short of funds, the Deputy Minister added, the Ministry would be unable to renew the contract.

Prior to receipt of this word, IVS/VN had made a number of proposals which would have required the concurrence of the Ministry of Agriculture:

1. Conduct village-level research and extension in areas targeted by the provincial Agriculture Service.

2. Organize training sessions in villages, utilizing expertise of the Agricultural Service.

3. Placement of volunteers after consultation with the Minister.

4. Development of plans in consultation with the Minister.

5. Plans for irrigation projects to be made after consultation with the Directorate of Irrigation. Irrigation pump tests to be made in cooperation with the Agriculture Service.

6. Work with the National Cooperative TrainingCenter in Saigon in the preparation of cooperative field representatives.

Each of these proposals evidenced IVS' recognition that, operating under the authority of the GVN, it had to "tone-up" its program.

IVS/VN concentrated its agricultural work during the year 1970-71 in the Mekong Delta and in the Central Highlands. The primary Delta effort was to expand animal husbandry and rice production. Working with the Montagnards, IVSers sought to stimulate their production of agricultural products for use and sale. Paddy-rice, vegetables, and animal husbandry

were the points of focus.

Chau Doc

IVS efforts to create a cooperative had met with little success. "Village structures and community cohesion are inadequate", wrote the volunteer. He concluded that IVS efforts to create cooperative structures in villages were misdirected and might even be harmful. The two "peoples' Common Activity Groups" succeeded in negotiating a loan from CARE for the purchase of water pumps. These continued to be of economic value, though efforts to effect cooperative purchase of fertilizers and insecticides failed.

Chou Moi

Across the river from Chau Doc, the IVSers discovered (as had the volunteers at Chau Doc) that the rotation of the IVSer who had arranged for the loan was regarded by the farmers as its abrogation. Some experimental work was done with pigs.

Phu Tam (Ba Xuyen)

This village is composed of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Chinese. Despite the three competing racial groups, the IVSer worked to establish a feedmill cooperative including production from available materials, the use and distribution of the product. Efforts to develop a community spirit failed, though individual pig farmers continue to employ the improved techniques they learned from the volunteer.

Profits from the sale of the miracle rice introduced to the village by IVS, provided sufficient capital for the villagers to purchase fifty tractors. The IVSer concentrated upon training farmers in tractor care and repair.

An IVSer engineer devised a portable irrigation pump especially for the Delta situation. While he was unable to perfect it, his work was carried to completion by a USAID staff member who formerly had been an IVS volunteer. This improved pump today is widely used in the Delta.

My Tho

IVS continued to provide staff for the My Tho Experiment Station. founded in the early days of IVS, concentrating upon experimental techniques for raising vegetables in the area.

Bien Hoa

The IVSer on the staff of the Mental Hospital assisted in the purchasing and planting of trees to replace those destroyed by defoliant chemicals. He designed and constructed suitable pig pens, and feeders. The use of table scraps as hog-feed was introduced successfully. Farm work as therapy was continued with the assistance of the Hospital Director.

Saigon (Districts Six and Seven)

The IVSer, working in cooperation with the "New Life Edification Program" of the GVN, enabled farmers to purchase pigs, construct suitable facilities, provide food and medications. The volunteer also had instructed farmers in artificial insemination. He conducted animal husbandry seminars (pig and poultry) at this and other stations.

Binh Duong (Vinh Son)

This resettlement village north of Saigon depended for income upon sales of services at the military installations. As USA troops withdraw village life disintegrated. The available land was inadequate to support extensive agriculture. The IVSer, working in cooperation with the Roman Catholic priest, facilitated the development of practical industries -

which did not prove commercially profitable. Using the limited available land, the IVSer then turned to poultry and swine production. He did house to house calling, explaining and demonstrating sanitation, medication, feeding and artificial insemination. He also instructed the householders in bookkeeping and farm management.

Ban Me Thuot

IVS began its work in this location, and save for one short interruption, continued agricultural experimentation and extension in Ban Me Thuot throughout the operation of its contract. The Rhade tribe rather than ethnic Vietnamese became a prime object of IVS developmental activity. These slash-and-burn farmers were taught to clear and level lands, to construct paddy dikes and to plant the new rice varieties. In addition to stimulating rice culture, the volunteer also introduced rabbit raising, planned an easy-to-copy rice thresher, and constructed a Honda-driven water pump.

Bao Loc

The volunteer attached to the Montagnard Training Center engaged in extension: convincing farmers to change their methods of rice culture so as to utilize the values achieved through the demonstration projects. Rice, mustard, beans, cabbage and lettuce were the crops stimulated in the surrounding area. IVSers recognized that unless the Rhade people learned how to use their lands more productively, they would lose control through the encroachments of the ethnic Vietnamese. They thus engaged in efforts to enable the Montagnards to hold onto their lands.

Phan Rang

The IVSer worked in extension, demonstrating to farmers methods he

had developed for growing bananas, gourds and watermelons. The efficacy of the demonstration plots contributed to his effectiveness. The IVSer also cooperated with National Voluntary Service (NVS) in growing pigeon grass for feeding pigs and chickens in the NVS projects.

Phan Thiet

The home economist IVSer was assisted by her Vietnamese counterpart, being afforded transport by the Agriculture Service of the GVN. Their project: teaching sewing to village women over three months' periods. The volunteer also taught nutrition, sanitation, child feeding and birth control - the latter upon request because of GVN restrictions.

Sa Dec

The IVSer was attached to the Roman Catholic Orphanage where she sought to enlist and involve community support for abandoned children. Considerable success was achieved in securing Sa Dec volunteers to assist with the programs of the Orphanage.

Saigon

An IVSer started a shoe-shine project near the Central Market in downtown Saigon in 1969. The project continued to operate, providing the boys with a home, and stimulating their education. They attended school, but also were taught discipline and work in the house. The IVSer acted both as teacher and as "big brother" to the boys.

## Education

IVS began to implement its decision to change over from secondary school English teaching to university instruction.

Hue University

IVS had enjoyed intermittent relations with the Faculty of Letters in this institution. The IVSer assigned in the autumn of 1970, took over from his predecessor not only class-room instruction, but also the English-language correspondence for the Rector. Class room instruction offered by the IVSer included spoken English, German and Linguistics.

The Volunteer also taught conversational English and French to seniors at the Duong Khanh High School.

Montagnard Normal School (Ban Me Thuot)

The Volunteer, who spoke Jarai as well as Vietnamese, was active among the students as well as offering instruction to all three classes.

Can Tho

The Volunteer, with two previous years experience in a Vietnamese Secondary School, worked both with the Faculty of Letters and with the Modern Language Center. To English majors he offered instruction in composition, conversation and grammar. To non-majors, he taught listening, reading, and easy composition.

Quang Ngai English Language Institute

The IVS project, initiated with the assistance of the Quang Ngai English language Development Association, was based on a former CORDS-operated school. Since a Vietnamese Director was functioning, the Volunteer taught English conversation, teacher training and assisted the Vietnamese Director. He also assisted in local high schools.

Tay Ninh

The IVSer, a science major, the first since the Mobile Science project was transferred to the Ministry of Education in 1969, instructed teachers in how to conduct science experiments and to incorporate them

into their lectures. He translated a laboratory manual into Vietnamese with the aid of an assistant.

Dalat University

The IVSer taught English in the Faculty of Government and Business and American Poetry in the Faculty of Letters. In cooperation with their professors, he taught a course in American Civilization.

A second IVSer with three years previous experience in Vietnam, gave instruction in English, and taught Photo-journalism in the Faculty of Business and Law. His Vietnamese wife worked among the Montagnards in Phan Ly Cham.

University of Saigon

Van Hanh Buddhist University (Saigon)

The IVSer taught English at both these Universities; participated in a seminar for high school English teachers arranged by the Modern Language Center of Saigon University; taught chess; and gave part time instruction at a Pagoda.

Long Khanh

The IVSer taught classroom English, and gave outside instruction to accelerated students.

Exodus

In February 1971, IVS/VN requested the Ministry of Agriculture to assume greater responsibility for designing and supervising the IVS program in Agricultural Development. The request went unanswered. In March USAID informed IVS that the Ministry was displeased with its performance.

Cognizant of the Ministry's current emphasis upon the Improved Village concept, IVS/VN drafted a program proposal in line with this new concept and presented it to the Vice Minister in April. The Vice Minister requested IVS to draft proposals for volunteer placement which would relate to the Five Year Plan of the Ministry. On May 2, IVS/VN presented a detailed proposal, even though the staff had been warned that the Ministry lacked money and personnel to implement the Plan.

The Vice Minister commented in a communication to USAID stating that the IVS proposal was not sufficiently technical to meet the Ministry's needs, and that therefore the IVS/VN contract would be allowed to lapse.

On March 24, 1971, a USAID/VN representative of the Division of Food and Agriculture explained to IVS/VN that USAID was moving from provincial agricultural advisors to specialists working on the IVS alleged lack of expertise, he stated, "You just don't take a B-B gun with you on an elephant hunt."

IVS/VN was of the opinion that its record belied these "evaluations". IVS had provided competent technical expertise, especially in the field

of agricultural development, since the arrival of the first volunteers. They had combined experimental and applied research, extension and community development. For fourteen years IVS/Vn with its contacts in universities throughout the world had been able to recruit the kinds of specialties requested for work in Vietnam. USAID's sudden emphasis upon "experimental research" at the expense of "development" and "extension" did not present IVS/VN with an insuperable staffing problem.

From 1962 onward, USAID/VN in theory had been pushing "subsistence agricultural development". IVS/VN conformed to this pattern, even though the USAID technical advisors had appeared more preoccupied with commercial agriculture.

The Ministry of Agriculture of the GVN was pushing land reform, with some emphasis upon commercial agriculture. Yet the Ministry of Rural Development and the Ministry of Development of Ethnic Minorities had been stressing subsistence agriculture for marginal farmers. The Ministry of Social Affairs had undertaken subsistence farming for refugees. Each of these three ministries was dependent upon the Ministry of Agriculture for technicians. Having heard that the Ministry of Agriculture was terminating its contract, IVS/VN therefore approached the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Development of Ethnic Minorities, which responded requesting (in writing and verbally, respectively), the services of IVS/VN in implementing their programs.

IVS/VN also contacted the Ministry of Education with a proposal to emphasize language and literature instruction at the university level. Changes in leadership in this ministry prevented any official response,

though it did formally request IVS to provide technicians for its 1971-72 program.

The Ministry of Social Welfare had indicated its desire for IVS/VN assistance in the development of self-sufficiency at the social welfare institutions, and with refugees. This Ministry was still awaiting word from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior as to the Proposals at the end of the fiscal year.

Consideration also was being given by IVS staff to programs in family planning, technical training, and expanding the mobile science program.

As late as May 1971, volunteers were replacing those who were planning their June departures. A new agricultural technician, and a married couple (reappointed) began work with Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia in the Cu Chi area.

Once it was apparent that IVS/VN was to be terminated, a staff member observed, after indicating some of the team's accomplishments. "Perhaps instead of hammering away at US policy from the outside we should have worked at it from the inside." This observation embraced one of the polarities which had developed. Another wrote after termination,

> Few foreign governments would put up with the right of US citizens to dispute the USA, when that dispute involved an issue of national security for the country in which the volunteers resided. We had a protective shield: The contract with USAID. While some IVSers were disparaging AID, and organizing to appear as independent of AID, they were being protected in their forays into politics by that same organization.

The opposite position was stated thus:

> American money, American material and materialism, and American "culture" were poured into Vietnam in misdirected idealism, and perhaps innocently. But the results are evil. The "band-aids" marked MADE IN THE USA have been inadequate to deal with the complex, deep-seated problems of this people and country.

But regardless of the arguments pro-and-con, and the alternative arrangements the IVS/VN sought to make, its fate in Vietnam was certain as the fiscal year 1970-71 came to an end.

IVS/VN July-September 1971

The Ministry of Agriculture had made known its decision before the summer of 1971 not to sponsor IVS/VN after the expiration of its contract June 30, 1971. IVS therefore made overtures to other ministries for sponsorship. Since none of these efforts proved productive, the individual IVSers began seeking other employment or withdrawing.

Hugh I. Manke, Chief of Party since January 1970, and a volunteer since 1967 had planned to terminate on August 31, 1971. Jim Linn (IVS/VN 1965-67) arrived as his replacement. Following Manke's departure on August 23rd, Jonathan Howard, the Associate Chief of Party and Young Chan Lai, Agriculture Chief, conducted the terminal details.

Jim Linn interpreted the IVS/VN termination as being due to GVN dissatisfactions. The expectations of the GVN and the objectives of IVS/VN alike had changed during the fifteen years of operation. While the GVN was fighting literally to survive, IVS/VN attempted to "hasten the end of the war by assuming the role of witness to the war's atrociousness and inhumanity". IVS/VN also supported Vietnamese political activists in an effort to change the GVN, Linn stated. The "new IVS/VN" was not acceptable to the GVN.

The stations where IVSers were located continued to function as follows:

Can Tho: Charles Crumpton continued teaching as an employee of Can Tho University until December 1971.

Bien Khanh (Outside Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa province): Dyle Henning

secured a Fulbright Scholar Fellowship which enable him to continue in Saigon, teaching at, and developing the library of the National School of Social Welfare. He made periodic trips back to Dien Khanh to inspect his educational development project.

Phan Rang: Jay Scarborough, who taught at the An Phuoc High School and helped to staff the Cham Boarding Facility, continued to work with the Chams even after the academic year terminated in June. Employed after that date by Pan American World Airways at Can Tho, he continued to make week-end visits back to Phan Rang.

Ban Me Thuot: Lynn Cabbage, working with the Montagnard peoples in agricultural extension was placed on the payroll of CORDS to do research and extension in the Ban Me Thuot area.

Dalat: Tracy Atwood, Team Leader of the Northern Regions, continued with the Ethnic Minorities branch of CORDS, working among Montagnard peoples in "personnel services."

Dennis Rockstroh, teaching at the Faculty of Business and Government, the University of Dalat, continued with the University in a private relation until December 1971 when he and his Vietnamese wife and child returned to the USA.

Long Khanh: High School English teacher William Robbins returned to the USA in August.

Saigon: Director Hugh I. Manke departed August 23rd.

Chief of Agriculture Team, Young Chang Lai continued his IVS contract until its termination, and now serves as an ad-hoc coordinator of IVS alumni in Vietnam.

Associate Director Jonathan Howard, continued his part-time teaching at the University of Saigon, and closed out the IVS/VN

operation at the Tan Son Nhut House, departing September 30, 1971.

Clair Olson, teaching in the Faculty of Pedagogy, the University of Saigon, departed in August.

Tay Ninh: Geoffrey Gates, High School Science Teacher, who had been slated to begin work with the Gia Dinh Mobile Science Team, departed in August.

Quang Ngai: Carolis Deal, teaching in city high schools, working with Montagnards, and assisting the Director of the English Language Institute, departed in August, then returned to Saigon.

Sa Dec: Johanna Gehman continued at the Roman Catholic Orphanage to December.

Vic Svanoe continues to work on a water system for the Roman Catholic Orphanage.

Gia Dinh (Cu Chi): Ching Cheng Yeh, agriculturalist, worked with the Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia at Cu Chi on the Tay Ninh road. He continues in Vietnam, seeking sponsorship for his work in agricultural extension.

Can Tho: Octavius Jacob, Team Leader of the Southern Regions carried through on assignment to transport vehicles, and departed for Indonesia in August.

Bao Loc: Scott Ewbank Agricultural technician at the Montagnard Training Center, went on home leave in June, and because of the termination of contract did not return to Vietnam.

Daisy Banares, was living at the VNCS House in Di Linh when Ted Studebaker was killed. She then transferred to Bao Loc for agricultural extension until her return to the Philippines in August.

Cheo Reo (Buon Blech Village): Surendra Tyagi, in agricultural extension transferred to the Buddhist School of Social Welfare in Saigon.

Bien Hoa: Paul Horton, agriculturalist and animal husbandryman at the Mental Hospital farm, continued as an employee of the Ministry of Social Services.

Can Tho: Ron Moreau remained in Vietnam as a Newsweek reporter.

Hue: Tom Malia, a teacher at the University, continues as faculty member with a Fulbright Scholar fellowship. Other IVSers at the University under a similar arrangement are John Schafer and John Balaban.

Dave Bourquin, employed by the Ministry of National Education, Youth and Culture to teach German, French, English and Linguistics at the University of Hue.

Hoa Hao: Though the projects had been terminated in 1970, Richard Fuller remained on in Hoa Hao until August 1971.

~~Vic Svanoe transferred to Sa Dec.~~

Cu Chi: Robert Henderson in agricultural extension, employed locally by IVS; now with Pan American Airlines, Saigon.

Stop



# SURVEY OF IVS PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

(1957-1971)

Station Listing

# SURVEY OF IVS PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM (1957-1971)

In this list, each volunteer serving at a particular station is identified by name and Team and by date. The stations are alphabetically arranged by province. Other stations at which a particular volunteer served can be found in the section, "Personnel Listing".

## STATION LIST

AN GIANG (Long Xuyen)

Ronald BEAHM - Mobile Science - Nov 67 - Apr 68
Barbara BECKER - Education - Sep 69 - Jun 70
James DOBKINS - ED - Nov 65 - Jul 66
Robert FLORES - Agriculture - Sep 66 - Oct 68 - Cho Moi
David GITELSON - AG - May 66 - Jan 68 - Hue Duc (killed)
Wiley HOPPER - AG - Sep 69 - Jun 70
Richard LOCKWOOD - AG - Jan 69 - Nov 70 - Cho Moi
Mark LYNCH - ED - Sep 66 - - Mar 67
Roger MONTGOMERY - CD - Jun 65 - Dec 65
Ronald MOREAU - CD - Oct 70 - Jan 71 - Cho Moi
Roy SCHROEDER - MS - Nov 66 - May 67
Fred STONE - AG - Jan 65 - Sep 66
Franklin TRIPLETT - ED - Sep 68 - May 69
Gerald Ben WOLF - ED - Oct 66 - Nov 68
Phil YANG - CD - Nov 67 - Apr 68

BA XUYEN (Soc Trang)

Linda AYLESWORTH - CD - Nov 67 - Apr 68
John GLASS - AG - Sep 67 - Jun 71 - Dai Tam
David HOLE - ED - Dec 65 - Dec 66
Mechell JACOB - CD - Nov 68 - Sep 70 - Phu Tam
Young Chang LAI - AG - Mar 67 - Jun 69
Paul LUKITSCH - AG - Aug 65 - Jun 67; Jul 69 - Feb 70 (Technical Specialist)
James MANGAN - CD - Nov 67 - May 68
George MC DOWELL - AG - Aug 63 - Apr 65
Renate MC DOWELL - ED - Aug 63 - Apr 65
Sergio MIGUEL - AG - Nov 67 - Feb 68
Ivan MYERS - Science - Oct 67 - May 68
Steve SWIFT - CD - Jul 67 - May 68

BAC LIEU (Vinh Loi)

Jonathan HOWARD - ED - Sep 68 - Jun 70
Joe NEAL - Voltern - Jun 67 - Aug 67
Ron PARTRIDGE - ED - Nov 66 - Jan 68

BEN TRE

Francis BIGGERS - AG - 1964

BIEN HOA

Manfred ARMBRUSTER - AG - Aug 62 - Mar 63 - Hung Loc
Thomas BEARD - AG - Nov 60 - Apr 61
Floyd BURRILL - AG - Dec 60 - Dec 61
Thomas COOPER - AG - Mar 63 - 1964
Kirk DIMMITT - AG - Feb 61 - Nov 61 - Hung Loc
Robert DUBYNE - AG - Nov 63 - Jun 64 - Hung Loc
Clyde EASTMAN - AG - Apr 60 - Feb 61 - Hung Loc
John GLASS - AG - Jun 67 - Aug 67
Paul HORTON - AG - Jan 68 - Sep 71
James KELLY - AG - Aug 60 - Dec 60 - Hung Loc
August Krueger - AG - Feb 63 - Dec 63
Thomas LUCHE - AG - Aug 58 - Nov 58 - Hung Loc (Gia Ray)
Adolphe MANGEOT - Voltern - Jun 67 - Aug 67
Robert MINNICH - CD - Sep 66 - Jul 67
James MOORE - AG - Jun 65 - May 66 - Hung Loc
Gene MYERS - Aug 58 - Jun 59 - Hung Loc (Gia Ray)
Harvey NEESE - AG - May 59 - Mar 61 - Hung Loc
David NUTTLE - AG - Jan 60 - May 60 - Hung Loc
Robert PLUMMER - AG - Feb 60 - Feb 61 - Hung Loc
Philip SCHROEDER - AG - Jan 62 - Jul 63 - Hung Loc
Leslie SMALL - AG -Oct 63 - Hung Loc
Donald SUMNER - AG - Jul 59 - Nov 60 - Hung Loc
Paul SUTTON - AG - Jan 59 - Jun 59 - Hung Loc
Gerald THIERSTEIN - AG - Aug 58 - 1959 - Hung Loc
Robert WILSON - AG - Feb 64 - Apr 65 - Hung Loc

BINH DINH (Qui Nhon) (An Khe)

Dianne ACHTER - Home Improvement - Jul 64 - Nov 64
Charles CRUMPTON - ED - Sep 68 - Jun 70
Michael CUSSEN - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67 - An Khe
Bette GAU - ED - Aug 62 - Sep 63
John HARBUT - CD - Sep 66 - Mar 67
Ann JACOBS - ED - Dec 63 - Mar 64
James KELLOGG - ED - Nov 66 - Oct 68
Noburo KONDO - CD - Sep 68 - Jan 69 - An Khe
Billie Lee LANGLEY - ED - Sep 62 - Aug 65
Larry LAVERENTZ - AG - Aug 61 - Dec 63
Dale LUCORE - AG - Nov 62 - Nov 64
Sharon MONAHAN - ED - Jan 66 - Nov 67
Harris NEWLIN - AG - Sep 66 - Apr 68 - Binh Khe & An Son
Curtis PIPER - ED - Mar 67 - Sep 68
Dennis ROCKSTROH - ED - Sep 67 - Jun 70
Philip SCOTT - CD - Nov 67 - Mar 68 - An Khe
Max SINKLER - Nov 65 - Apr 66 - An Khe (killed)
Robert SPENCER - CD - Nov 66 - May 68 - An Khe
Jeanne WILLIAMS - ED - Aug 65 - Jun 67
John WITMER - ED - Aug 62 - Mar 64
Jay WORRALL - CD - Jun 67 - Dec 67 - An Khe

BINH DUONG (Phu Cuong) (Vinh Son)
David ANDERSON - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Thomas CHAPMAN - CD - Jan 69
John HARBUT - CD - Mar 67 - Jun 67
Minh Chung KUO - AG - Jun 69 - Mar 71
Robert MINNICH - CD - Jan 67 - May 68
Herb RUHS - CD - Sep 66 - Jan 69
Steve SWIFT - CD - May 68 - Apr 69
Jay WORRALL - CD - Feb 67 - Apr 67

BINH LONG (An Loc)
Carlyle THAYER - ED - Dec 67 - Mar 68

BINH THUAN (Phan Thiet) (Song Mao) (Pham Ly Cham)
Manfred ARMBRUSTER - AG - Mar 63 - Jun 64
David DEPUY - AG - Aug 64 - Mar 66
Paul HELBLING - AG - Oct 68 - Nov 69 - Pham Ly Cham
John LEWALLEN - CD - May 67 - Mar 69 - Song Mao
Shiow Yuh LIN - CD - Jul 69 - Jun 71
Donald RONK- ED - Dec 65 - Oct 66
Garson SHER - ED & CD - May 66 - Aug 68
Richard SWIGART - CD - Jun 67 - Mar 69 - Song Mao
Robert WALKER - AG - May 66 - May 68 - Pham Ly Cham (&Song Mao, 67-68)

BINH TUY (Ham Tan)
Guy BUTTERWORTH - ED - Jan 67 - Apr 68
Thomas MALIA - ED - Sep 68 - Jun 70

CAM RANH
Richard AVERY - CD - Dec 66 - May 68
William JORDAN - CD - Nov 67 - Jan 68
Phil SCOTT - CD - Apr 68 - May 68

CHAU DOC (Tan Chau) (Hoa Hao)
John AMEROSO - AG - Sep 68 - Aug 70
Ruey Tsang CHIOU - AG - Dec 66 - Jan 68
Peter DONOVAN - CD - Nov 66 - Oct 67
Mary DUNDAS - CD - Feb 67 - Apr 68
Betty FELTHOUSEN - ED - Nov 66 - Apr 68 - Tan Chau
Richard FULLER - ED - Nov 66 - Apr 68 - Tan Chau
Diego GIMENEZ - AG - Oct 66 - Sep 67 - Tan Chau
Paul HORTON - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67 - Tan Chau
Jeffrey MILLINGTON - CD - Dec 66 - Oct 68 - Tan Chau
Roger MONTGOMERY - CD - Dec 66 - Mar 67
Ronald MOREAU - CD - May 69 - Oct 70 - Hoa Hao
Dale SANER - CD - Feb 67 - Jan 69 - Tan Chau
Alexander SHIMKIN - CD - Sep 69 - Dec 70 - Hoa Hao
G. Victor SVANOE - CD - Sep 68 - Sep 71 - Hoa Hao

CHUONG THIEN

Fletcher POLING - AG - 1967

DA NANG

Carl ADAMS - ED - Nov 66 - Nov 67
William BETTS - Health - 1964
Clark BROWN - CD - Nov 66 - Aug 68
William CAMP - CD - Jan 68 - Jun 69
Stephen GOLDBERG - CD - Oct 67 - Jan 68
Richard J. JONES - ED - Jan 67 - Jan 69 - Team Leader (Nov 67)
Timothy JONES - ED - Jul 68 - Jun 70
Thomas KRAL - ED - Nov 67 - Mar 68
Hugh MANKE - MS - Feb 69 - Jul 69 - Team Leader (Feb 69)
De Wayne OBERLANDER - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Larry PETERSON - CD - Feb 68 - Aug 68
Fletcher POLING - ED - 1962 - 1963
Donald RONK - ED - Oct 66 - Sep 67 - Team Leader (Oct 66)
John RYAN - Health - 1964
John SCHAFER - ED - Jul 68 - Jun 69
Charles STEVENS - ED - 1963 - 1964
Peter STILLEY - CD - Nov 66 - Sep 68
Phil YANG - CD - May 68 - Feb 70
James YODER - ED - Sep 70 - Jun 71

DARLAC (Ban Me Thuot) (Cai San)

G. Tracy ATWOOD - Voltern & AG - Aug 65 - Nov 65; Jun 67 - Sep 67
John BARWICK - Chief of Party - Mar 57 - 1959
Melvin BALKE - AG - Feb 61 - Jul 62
Thomas BEARD - AG - Apr 61 - Oct 62
Michael BENGE - ED Dec 62 - Jan 65 (Missing)
Aurzella BOEWE - Health - Jan 57 - Oct 57
George BOYD - ED - Sept 70 - Jun 71 - Montagnard Normal School
Gordon BROCKMUELLER - Chief of Party (AG) - Jan 57 - Oct 57
Ronald BRUNK - AG - Feb 58 - Jun 58
Lynn CABBAGE - AG - May 69 - Sep 71
Michael CALL - ED - Mar 65 - Apr 68 - Ban Me Thuot Normal School
Par DANFORTH - Chief of Party (AG) - Dec 56 - Jan 58
Clark DAVIS - ED - Sep 64 - Jan 66
Robert DUBYNE - AG - Jun 62 - Jun 63
Clyde EASTMAN - AG - Jul 59 - Feb 60
Donald FORTNER - AG - Aug 61 - Sep 62
Burr FRUTCHEY - AG - Oct 59 - Mar 61 - M'Drak
Diana GARDINER - ED - Oct 66 - May 68
Barbara GRIGG - ED - Sep 65 - Dec 65
Gloria JOHNSON - CE & ED - Oct 63 - 1965
Richard KEIRSTEAD - AG - Nov 59 - Nov 60
James KELLY - AG - Oct 59 - Aug 60
Arthur KING - AG - Jun 57 - Sep 59 - Cai San (Jun 57 - Oct 57
Richard KOEGEL - AG - Jun 57 - Jan 59 - Cai San (Jun 57 - Oct 57)
Francis LAY - AG - Dec 60 - Sep 61
Thomas LUCHE - AG - Nov 58
Don LUCE - AG - Oct 57 - 1958

DARLAC (Continued)

James MOORE - AG - Jun 66 - Sep 66
Gene MYERS - AG - Jun 57 - Aug 58 - Cai San (Jun 57 - Oct 57)
David NUTTLE - AG - Sep 60 - Oct 61
James PRUESS - Jan 66 - Mar 68
Peter REUMAN - MS - Aug 67 - Apr 68
Ronald RIDGE - AG - Nov 67 - Feb 68
William SHAWLEY - AG - Jan 57 - Jul 57 - Cai San (Jun 57 - Oct 57)
Mildred SKAFF - Health - Jun 57 - Nov 57
Roger SWEENEY - AG - Sep 62 - Jul 64
Sheldon TOM - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Dale WAGNER - AG - Dec 61 - Aug 63
Herbert WHITE - AG - 1964 - 1965
Sondra WILLIAMS - CD - Nov 66 - Nov 67
Paul WORTHINGTON - AG - 1958 - Jul 59
Robert YATES - Jun 57 - Jan 59 - Cai San (Jun 57 - Oct 57)

DINH TUONG (My Tho)

Carlie ALLENDER - CD - Nov 63 - 1964
Floyd BURRILL - AG - Jan 60 - Jun 61
Marjorie CALDWELL - Home Improvement - Sep 63 - 1964
Thomas CROOPE - AG - Apr 62 - Jul 63
Kirk DIMMITT - AG - Nov 61 - Feb 63
Kathleen FLANNERY - ED - Nov 65 - Jun 67
Ray GILL - ED - Nov 65 - Jun 67
Paul HELBLING - AG - Dec 69 - Sep 70
Anne HENSLEY - ED - Nov 63 - 1964
Verle LANIER - AG - Sep 59 - Jul 61
Francis LAY - AG - Oct 59 - Jan 60
William MORGAN - ED - Nov 66 - Feb 68
Irene OLIVAS - ED - Jan 66 - Apr 66
Dennis ROTHHAAR - CD - Nov 66 - Mar 68 - Cai Be
Clarence SHUBERT - ED - Oct 62 - Sep 64
Le Roy WEED - AG - Aug 63 - Jun 65
Betty WILKINSON - ED - Sep 66 - Mar 68

GO CONG

Ireneo BATOON - AG - Nov 67 - Jun 69
Darlene COOK - ED - Dec 67 - Apr 68
Ivan MYERS - ED - May 68 - Dec 68
Yen Sun UONG - AG - Jul 69 - Mar 70

HAU NGHIA (Cu Chi)

Robert HENDERSON - AG - Mar 71 - Sep 71
Ming Chung KUO - AG - Jul 71 - Sep 71
Gerald WEBB - AG - 1967
Ching Cheng YEH - AG - Jul 71 - Sep 71

KHANH HOA (Nha Trang)

G. Tracy ATWOOD - Oct 70 - Dec 70 - Team Leader (Oct 70)
Thomas AMMIANO - ED - Oct 66 - Oct 68 - Team Leader (68); Tech Spec (67)
James BODURTHA - ED - Apr 67 - Jul 68 - Team Leader (Apr 67)

KHANH HOA (Nha Trang) (Continued)
Stuart BLOCH - CD - Dec 67 - Apr 68
Mary CLINE - Health - Dec 62 - Oct 64
David COLYER - Health - Nov 63
Phyllis COLYER - ED - Nov 63
Harriet FUKUSHIMA - Health - Sep 68 - Oct 69
Richard FULLER - CD - Aug 69 - Apr 70 - Dien Khanh
Dyle HENNING - ED & CD - Nov 67 - Aug 69; Aug 70 - Sep 71 - Dien Khanh
Rensselaer LEE - Voltern - Jun 65 - Sep 65
David LESCOHIER- CD - Sep 65 - Aug 67
James LINN - CD - Mar 67 - Aug 67 - Team Leader
Newell MIDDLETON - ED - May 64 - Nov 64
Rene MOQUIN - CD - Sep 66 - Feb 68
Timothy MURPHY - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Frank RANSOM - ED - Sep 67 - Apr 68
Ronald RIDGE - AG - Jan 69 - Jun 69 - Team Leader (Jan 69)
Donald ROBOHM - AG - Nov 67 - May 69 - Dong De
Edward RUST - ED - Sep 66 - Apr 68
Wilfred SALSBERG - CD - Aug 66 - Mar 68
Robert SCHNUCKEL - MS - Sep 66 - Apr 68
Gene STOLTZFUS - ED - Jan 66 - Sep 66 - Team Leader (Jan 66)
Steve SWIFT - CD - Jul 69 - Feb 70 - Team Leader (Jul 69)
John TAYLESS - AG - May 63 - 1964
Kimball WINEGAR - ED - Mar 66 - Mar 68

KIEN GIANG (Rach Gia)
Louis BENSON - Voltern - Jun 67 - Aug 67
Donald HAMM - ED - May 66 - May 67
L. Richard JONES - Voltern - Jun 67 - Aug 67 - Ha Thien
Josef KRIEGL - CD - Dec 64 - Aug 66
Ronald "Skip" MIERAU - AG - Sep 66 - Jul 68
Christina PONG - ED - Sep 67 - Mar 68
Les SMALL - AG - Nov 62 - Sep 64
Roger TOPE - AG - Sep 66 - Mar 68

KIEN PHONG (Cao Lanh)
Elizabeth BILAN - ED - Sep 67 - Apr 68
James BODURTHA - ED - Sep 67 - Apr 67
William CAMP - CD - Sep 67 - Dec 67
Jeffrey LONG - CD - Aug 67 - Jun 68 - Cu Lao Ty Island
Christopher LUMBO - AG - Nov 66 - Mar 68
William MEYERS - ED - 1964
Robert MINNICH - CD - Aug 67
Sharon SHARRETT - CD - Nov 67 - 1968
Hugh SNYDER - CD - Aug 67 - Apr 68 - Hong Ngu

KIEN TUONG (Moc Hoa)
Gerald WEBB - CD - Sep 66 - Mar 67

KONTUM
John BOH - AG - Apr 65 - Sep 66

KONTUM (Continued)

Jan CAVANAUGH - AG - Oct 67 - Apr 68
Joan FITZJARRALD - CD - Jan 67 - Apr 68
Richard NISHIHARA - CD - Sep 66 - Sep 67
Walter ROBERTSON - ED - 1963 - 1964
John WILKERSON - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67

LAM DONG (Bao Loc[Blao]) (Di Linh)

Daisy BANARES - AG - Nov 70 - Aug 71 - Di Linh
Scott EWBANK - CD - Oct 69 - Jun 71
Robert FALASCA - AG - Jan 59 - Nov 60
Robert HENDERSON - AG - Sep 67 - Jun 69
Bruce HOLDERREED - AG - Jun 66 - Aug 67
Robert KNOERNSCHILD - AG - Sep 60 - Mar 63 - Di Linh
Richard KOEGEL - AG - Jan 59 - May 59 (Assistant Chief of Party)
Verle LANIER - AG - Jun 59 - Sep 59
Francis LAY - AG - Feb 60 - Nov 60 - Di Linh
Ted LINGREN - AG - Aug 61 - Jun 63
Richard MULLER - AG - Aug 61 - Jun 65
Stuart PETTYGROVE - Aug 67 - Aug 69
Robert PLUMMER - AG - Jul 59 - Jan 60
June PULCINI - ED - 1964 - 1965
Ronald PULCINI - ED - 1964 - 1965
Robert SULLIVAN - ED - Oct 69 - May 71
Stephen SZADEK - AG - Oct 62 - Sep 64
Richard TRENBATH - ED - Dec 67 - Mar 70
John WORTH - May 68 - Mar 71

LONG AN (Tan An)

S. K. "Boona" CHEEMA - AG - Aug 69
Ruey Tsang CHIOU - AG - Jan 68 - Sep 68
Lawrence CRAWFORD - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Harlan GROSZ - AG - Apr 64 - Oct 64
Dolores HONIG - ED - Dec 67 - Aug 69
Gloria JOHNSON - ED - Jul 64 - 1965
Myong H. KIM - CD - Sep 67 - May 69
Virgilio MORALES - AG - Sep 66 - Aug 67
James RUPP - ED - May 66 - Jul 70
Sharon SHARRETT - CD - 1967 - Jun 68

LONG KHANH (Xuan Loc)

William ROBBINS - ED - Aug 69 - Jun 71
Gene STOLTZFUS - ED - 1964

NINH THUAN (Phan Rang)

Charles CABLE - CD & ED - Sep 66 - Mar 68
Cowles CLEVENGER - AG - Nov 59 - Mar 60
Dale COPPS - ED - Sep 67 - Apr 68
Beryl DARRAH - ED - May 66 - Aug 67
Robert DUBYNE - AG - Jun 63 - Oct 63
Charles FIELDS - AG - Jun 62 - Oct 64

NINH THUAN (Phan Rang) (Continued)

Burr FRUTCHEY - AG - May 59 - Sep 59 - Nha Ho
Jimmie GREEN - AG - Sep 60 - May 61
Theodore GREGORY - ED - Aug 67 - Sep 67
Robert HARGREAVES - AG - Sep 65 - Jun 67
Peter HUNTING - ED - Aug 63 - May 65 (Killed)
Mark LA RUE - AG - Jun 61 - May 63
Robert MC NEFF - AG - Feb 62 - Jul 62
Richard PETERS - AG - Nov 59 - Jul 60 - Nha Ho
Stuart RAWLINGS - CD - Dec 67 - Apr 68
Jay SCARBOROUGH - ED - Sep 67 - Jun 71
Lemuel SCHAFER - CD - Sep 67 - Jun 68
Donald SCHMIDT - AG - Aug 60 - Mar 62
Philip SCHREIBER - AG - Jul 61 - Nov 61
Philip SCOTT - CD - Jun 68 - Sep 69
Joseph SUTTON - AG - May 59 - Oct 60 - Nha Ho
Jay WORRALL - CD - Sep 66 - Mar 68
Ching Cheng YEH - AG - May 69 - May 71

PHONG DINH (Can Tho)

John BALABAN - ED - Sep 67 - Feb 68 - Can Tho University
Alan BERLET - AG - May 62 - Dec 63
Carey COULTER - Voltern - Jun 66 - Sep 66
Charles CRUMPTON - ED - Jul 70 - Sep 71 - Can Tho University
Rodrigo DAR - ED - Sep 68 - May 69 - Can Tho University
Frederica DUNN - ED - Aug 67 - Apr 68 - Technical Specialist (Aug 67)
Joan FITZJARRALD - Health - Mar 67
Cathy GAMMON - ED - Dec 66 - Oct 67
Roger HINTZE - AG - Sep 66 - Apr 68 - Technical Specialist (Nov 67)
Octavius JACOB - CD - Jun 70 - Sep 71 - Team Leader (Jun 70)
Jerry KLIEWER - ED - Aug 66 - Jul 69
Laurel KLUGE - MS - Nov 67 - Mar 68
Suzanne KRACKE - AG - Dec 66 - May 67
James LINN - CD - Sep 66 - Mar 67 - Technical Specialist
William MEYERS - AG - Jul 66 - Aug 67 - Team Leader
Robert MINNICH - CD - Aug 68 - Jun 70 - Team Leader
Ronald "Skip" MIERAU - AG - Jan 71 - Jun 71
Roger MONTGOMERY - Aug 67 - Jul 68 - Team Leader (Nov 67)
Marilyn PALLYS - Oct 62 - Dec 63
Dennis ROTHHAAR - CD - Sep 67 - Jul 68
Timothy SEIMS - MS - Dec 66 - Sep 67
William SERAILE - ED - Oct 67 - Apr 68
Warren SINSHEIMER - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
John SOMMER - ED - Jan 66 - Jun 67
Daniel VINING - ED - Sep 66 - Nov 67
Catherine WALKER - ED - Oct 63 - Feb 65
Philip WALKER - ED - Sep 63 - Mar 65
Thomas WICKHAM - AG - Mar 64 - Apr 65

PHU BON (Cheo Reo)

G. Tracy ATWOOD - AG - Aug 68 - Jun 70

QUANG NAM (Hoi An) (Continued)
Gerald LILES - CD - Sep 66 - Sep 67
Thomas NEAL - AG - Feb 64 - Aug 65
Gerald UNDERDAL - ED - Sep 68 - Jul 69

QUANG NGAI
Carolis DEAL - ED - Aug 70 - Aug 71
Robert DAY - AG - Aug 64 - Feb 65
Huyn Sun HAN - CD - Aug 67 - May 68
David JURACEK - ED - Dec 66 - Feb 70
Hugh MANKE - MS - Jan 68 - Jan 69
Thomas NEAL - AG - Aug 62 - Oct 63
Young Ja PARK - CD - Dec 67 - Oct 68
Larry ULSAKER - AG - May 61 - Oct 61

QUANG TRI
Gary CARKIN - ED - Sep 66 - Aug 67
Charles SIMMONS - ED - Feb 64 - Sep 66
Steve SWIFT - CD - Sep 66 - Mar 67

SA DEC
Peter BURKE - Voltern - Jun 67 - Aug 67
Michael DELANEY - CD - Sep 66 - Sep 68 - Duc Thanh
Paul DETTMAN - CD - Sep 68 - May 69 - Duc Thanh
Johanna GEHMAN - ED & CD - Sep 67 - Sep 71
Peter HALE - AG - Dec 67 - Mar 69
Bonnie KRAUS - CD & Health - Sep 66 - Sep 68

SAIGON & GIA DINH
Dianne ACHTER - AG - Nov 62 - Sep 63
Carlie ALLENDER - CD - Mar 67 - Apr 68 - Team Leader
Richard AVERY - CD - Nov 67
John BARWICK - Chief of Party - 1958 - 1959
Sally BENSON - ED - Sep 67 - Jun 68
Richard BERLINER - CD - Nov 66 - Feb 68
Ray BORTON - Chief of Party - 1960
Russ BRADFORD - AG - Aug 67 - Jun 69 - Assoc Chief of Party - Agriculture
Verda Loy BRADFORD - Admin - Jul 66 - Jun 69 - ACOP/Administration
Donald BREWSTER - ED - Nov 62 - Jun 64 - ACOP/Education (64)
Gordon BROCKMUELLER - Chief of Party - 1959 - 1960
William CAMP - CD - Jun 69 - Jul 70 - Administrative Assistant
Richard CARLTON - ED - Jun 63 - Jun 64 - ACOP/Education
Jacquelyn CHAGNON - Admin - May 69 - Dec 70 - ACOP/Administration
Michael CHILTON - AG - May 61 - Feb 65 - ACOP/Agriculture
Sandra COLLINGWOOD - CD - Dec 67 - May 68
Thomas COOPER - Admin - 1964 - Aug 67 - ACOP/Administration
Beryl DARRAH - ED - Aug 67 - May 68 - ACOP/Education
Clark DAVIS - ED - Jan 66 - May 67 - ACOP/Education
Sam DE LAP - MS - Sep 65 - Sep 67 - Technical Specialist (Jan 66)
David DEPUY - CD - May 66 - Sep 66
Frederica DUNN - ED - Oct 65 - Aug 67
Donald FORTNER - AG - 1963

PHU BON (Continued)
Robert DAY - AG - Mar 63 - Apr 64
Francis MOHR - AG - Dec 67 - Mar 68
Ronald RIDGE - AG - Apr 68 - Jul 68
Surendra TYAGI - AG - May 71 - Jul 71

PHU YEN (Tuy Hoa)
Thomas FOX - CD - Sep 66 - Apr 68 - Technical Specialist (Refugees)
Christopher JENKINS - CD - Jul 66 - Nov 66
Shiow Yuh LIN - Home Improvement - 1969
Robert MC NEFF - AG - Jul 62 - May 65
Young Ja PARK - CD - Jun 67 - Dec 67
John POPE - ED - Sep 66 - Feb 68
Lucielo RAMIREZ - AG - Sep 66 - Apr 68 - Technical Specialist
Jon TAYLOR - CD - Oct 66 - Aug 67
Lawrence WALSH - CD - Jan 68 - Apr 68

PHUOC LONG (Song Be)
Ervin HUSTON - AG - Nov 66 - Sep 67
William ROBBINS - ED - Nov 66 - Mar 68
John TAYLESS - AG - 1963 - May 64

PHUOC TUY (Vung Tau)
Donald COHON - ED - Sep 65 - Mar 67
Donald FULLER - ED - Jun 64 - Aug 64
William LAAKONEN - AG - 1964 - Jun 65
Stephen NICHOLS - ED - Sep 67 - Apr 68
Robert PAETOW - ED - Oct 66 - May 67
Walter ROBERTSON - ED - 1965 - Jun 65
John TRIMBUR - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67

PLEIKU
Jimmie BIGELOW - ED - Sep 66 - Jun 68
Delvyn EPP - CD - Mar 67 - Oct 68
Ronald GOULD - ED - Sep 68 - Jul 70
Thomas STURDEVANT - AG - Aug 64 - May 66

QUANG DUC (Gia Nghia)
G. Tracy ATWOOD - AG - Jan 64 - Jul 65
Lynn CABBAGE - AG - Nov 65- Mar 69
David DEVIN - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Francis MOHR - AG - May 66 - Sep 66
Dale WAGNER - AG - Aug 63 - Sep 63

QUANG NAM (Hoi An)
Susan BRANNON - ED - Dec 67 - Jun 69
Gary CARKIN - ED - Nov 67 - Jun 68
Dorothy GRAY - ED - Nov 67 - Jun 68
Henry HOOKER - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Mechell JACOB - CD - Nov 67 - Oct 68
Octavius JACOB - CD - May 67 - Jun 69
Joseph KELLNER - ED - Nov 66 - Jul 67

SAIGON & GIA DINH (Continued)

Hsu FU - AG - Jul 69 - May 71
Donald FULLER - ED - Aug 64 - Jun 65 - Field Rep., Audio-Visual Center
Hope HARMELING - ED - Nov 66 - May 68
Charles HENDERSON - ED - Sep 68 - Jul 69
Anne HENSLEY - ED - Feb 66 - Sep 66
Bruce HOLDERRREED - ED - Aug 67 - Apr 68 - Administrative Assistant
Jonathan HOWARD - ED - Jun 70 - Sep 71 - ACOP/Education (Oct 70)
James HUNT - ED - Oct 65 - Sep 65 - Administrative Assistant (65)
Octavius JACOB - CD - Jul 69 - Feb 70 - Deputy Director (Nov 69)
Gloria JOHNSON - Home Improvement - 1962
Ann JACOBS - ED - Nov 62 - Dec 63
Joseph KELLNER - ED - Aug 67 - Dec 68 - Administrative Assistant
Noburo KONDO - CD - Feb 70 - Jun 70
Suzanne KRACKE - AG - Sep 66 - Dec 66
Young Chang LAI - AG - Jul 69 - Sep 71 - ACOP/Agriculture
Billie Lee LANGLEY - ED - Aug 65 - Jul 67
Verle LANIER - AG - 1960 - 1961 - ACOP/Agriculture
Thomas LUCHE - AG - Nov 58 - Jan 59
Don LUCE - Chief of Party (Ag) - 1960 - Aug 67
Mark LYNCH - CD - Mar 67 - Jul 69 - ACOP/Community Development (Jan 69)
Thomas MALIA - ED - Jun 70 - Oct 70 - ACOP/Education
Hugh MANKE - Chief of Party - Aug 69 - Aug 71 (Nov 69)
Victoria MARES - ED - May 68 - Sep 68 - Administrative Assistant (May 68)
Mary MARSHALL - ED - Dec 67 - Apr 68
Robert MC NEFF - AG - Jan 66 - Aug 66 - ACOP/Agriculture
Robert MINNICH - CD - May 68 - Aug 68
James MOORE - AG - Sep 66 - Aug 67
Betty MORGAN - CD - Sep 66 - Mar 67 - Technical Specialist
David MORSE - ED - Oct 65 - Mar 66
Masafumi NAGAO - CD - Dec 67 - Jan 69
Harvey NEESE - AG - Apr 59
David NESMITH - Dec 67 - May 68
Richard NISHIHARA - CD - Nov 67 - May 68 - ACOP/Community Development
Clair OLSON - ED - Oct 70 - Jul 71 - Van Hanh University
Ronald PARTRIDGE - ED - May 68 - Jul 69 - ACOP/Education
~~Richard PELTO - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67~~
Larry PETERSON - CD - Nov 67 - May 68
Richard PETERS - AG - 1961 - ACOP/Agriculture
Richard PYEATT - CD - Sep 66 - Jun 68
William ROBBINS - ED - May 68 - Jul 69
Daniel ROCOVITS - MS - Nov 67 - May 68
Herb RUHS - CD - Jan 69 - Jul 69 - Team Leader
John RYAN - Health - 1965 - Administrative Assistant (Logistics)
Robert SCHNUCKEL - MS - Jul 66 - Sep 66
John SOMMER - ED - Jun 67 - Aug 67
Neal SPENCER - AG - Mar 59
Gerry STAPLETON - ED - Nov 62 - Aug 63
Vaughn STAPLETON - ED - Jun 62 - Aug 63 - Team Leader
Carl STOCKTON - ED - 1965 - ACOP/Education
Gene STOLTZFUS - ED - Oct 66 - Aug 67 - ACOP/Community Development
Charles SWEET - CD - Jun 64 - Jun 66

SAIGON & GIA DINH (Continued)

Gerald THIERSTEIN - AG - 1959 - Aug 60
Gerald UNDERDAL - ED - Nov 69 - Jun 70 - ACOP/Education
K. V. VARADARAJAN - AG - May 68 - Feb 70
Daniel VINING - ED - Nov 67 - May 68 - Van Hanh University
Danny J. WHITFIELD - Chief of Party - Nov 67 - Nov 69
Jeanne WILLIAMS - ED - Jun 67 - Apr 68 - Technical Specialist
John WITMER - ED - Jun 64 - Jul 65
Gerald Ben WOLF - ED - Jan 69 (Acting ACOP/Ed
John WORTH - AG - Nov 67

TAY NINH

Russ BRADFORD - AG - Nov 66 - Aug 67
Amal CHATTERJEE - AG - Jul 67 - Apr 69 - Go Dau Ha
Daniel DREW - Voltern - Jun 67 - Aug 67
Geoffrey GATES - ED (Science) - Sep 70 - Aug 71
Barry KOLB - ED - Sep 66 - Aug 70
Roger MONTGOMERY - ED - Dec 65 - Sep 66
Dale RHOADS - AG - Oct 67 - Feb 68

THUA THIEN (Hue)

Len ACKLAND - ED - May 67 - Nov 67
David BOURQUIN - ED - Sep 70 - Sep 71
Marc CAYER - AG - Jan 68 - captured (Feb 68) X
Marybeth CLARK - ED - 1964 - Sep 67
Clyde COREIL - ED - Sep 67 - Feb 68
Gary DAVES - MS - Dec 67 - captured (Feb 68) X
Charles DWELLEY - Voltern - Jun 67 - Sep 67
Stephen ERHART - ED - Nov 66 - Jul 68
Donald FORTNER - AG - Sep 62
Wolfgang FRIESEN - MS - Nov 66 - Sep 67
Jimmie GREEN - AG - May 61 - Mar 63
Richard GRISHAM - ED - Sep 69 - Jul 70
Anne HENSLEY - ED - Jul 64; Sep 66 - Mar 68 - Technical Specialist (Aug 67)
Sandra JOHNSON - ED - Sep 67 - Apr 68
Richard J. JONES - ED - Jan 69 - Jun 69 - Hue University
James KELLY - AG - Mar 61 - Dec 61
William LAAKONEN - AG - Mar 64
Robert LEVEY - ED - Sep 65 - Jun 66
X Thomas MALIA - ED - Oct 70 - Sep 71 - Hue University
X Victoria MARES - ED - Apr 67 - Feb 68
Vincent MC GEEHAN - MS - Jul 62 - Jul 64
Francis MOHR - AG - Jan 65 - Jan 66
Ivan MYERS - ED - Jul 64
David NESMITH - AG - Nov 66 - Nov 67
Marilyn PALLYS - ED - Jan 64 - Aug 64
John PARSONS - ED - Jul 62 - Jun 64
Robert PLUMMER - AG - Feb 61 - May 61
June PULCINI - ED - 1963
Ronald PULCINI - ED - 1963
John SCHAFER - ED - Jul 69 - Jun 70 - Hue University

THUA THIEN (Hue) (Continued)
John SOMMER - ED - 1965
Hugh SWIFT - ED - Aug 65 - Jul 67
Larry ULSAKER - AG - 1960
Herbert WHITE - AG - 1963
Danny J. WHITFIELD - AG - Dec 61 - Nov 62
Ann WRIGHT - ED - Jul 62 - Jun 64

TUYEN DUC (Dalat)
G. Tracy ATWOOD - Team Leader - Dec 70 - Sep 71
Richard BEAIRD - ED - Nov 66 - Aug 68 - Dalat University
Raymond BORTON - AG - 1959 - 1960
Marjorie CALDWELL - AG - 1965
Michael CHILTON - Aug 60 - May 61
John CHITTY - AG - Aug 67 - Jun 68
Thomas CROOPE - AG - Jun 61 - Mar 62
Kirk DIMMITT - AG - Feb 61 - Apr 61
Clyde EASTMAN - AG - Feb 60 - Aug 60
Sabina FAJARDO - AG - Sep 68 - Aug 70
Burr FRUTCHEY - AG - Aug 59 - Oct 59
Janice GUENTHER - ED - Sep 66 - May 68
Kay HABERLACH - ED - Jan 66 - Apr 68
Bruce HOLDERREED - AG - 1966
Christopher JENKINS - CD - Nov 66 - Apr 68
Timothy JONES - ED - Aug 70 - Jun 71
Richard KEIRSTEAD - AG - Jul 59 - Oct 59
Suzanne KRACKE - AG - May 67 - Apr 68
Daniel LEATY - Aug 62 - Jun 64
Newell MIDDLETON - ED - Nov 62 - Apr 64
Richard PETERS - AG - Jul 60 - Oct 60
Wayne PULVER - AG - Nov 66 - May 68 - Da Mpau
Dennis ROCKSTROH - ED - Aug 70 - Sep 71 - Dalat University
Donald SCHMIDT - AG - May 60 - Aug 60
Richard SISK - AG - Aug 65 - Feb 66 - Da Mpau (Killed)
John SOMMER - ED - 1964
Neal SPENCER - AG - Oct 59 - May 60
Joseph SUTTON - AG - Aug 59 - Oct 59
Nancy VOLK - CD - Nov 66 - May 68 - Da Mpau
Don WADLEY - AG - Feb 61 - Mar 63
Larry WEISNER - AG - 1964 - 1965
Sondra WILLIAMS - CD - Sep 66 - Nov 66

VINH BINH (Tra Vinh)
John SPRAGENS - ED - Nov 66 - Apr 68

VINH LONG
Dianne ACHTER - AG - Sep 63 - Jul 64
Mary Elizabeth CAROLUS - ED - Sep 66 - Apr 68
Michael FAIRLEY - AG - Dec 66 - Sep 68
William GERDES - ED - Sep 62 - Jun 64 - Normal School
Peter HUNTING - MS - Sep 65 - Nov 65 (killed)

VINH LONG (Continued)

Peter KLASSEN - CD - Oct 67 - Jul 69
Harold KOOKER - ED - Oct 64 - Feb 66 - Normal School
James LINN - CD - Mar 65 - Aug 66
Victoria MARES - ED - Dec 65 - Mar 67
Betty MORGAN - CD - Sep 66
Clair OLSON - ED - Sep 69 - Sep 70
Daniel ROCOVITS - MS - Sep 66 - Nov 67
Charles ROSS - ED - Aug 63 - Apr 65
Louise ROSS - ED - Aug 63 - Apr 65
James WESTGATE - ED - Sep 66 - Apr 68
Sondra WILLIAMS - ED - Nov 65 - Sep 66

# SURVEY OF IVS PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

(1957-1971)

Personnel Listing

SURVEY OF IVS PERSONNEL IN VIET NAM (1957-1971)

In this list, each volunteer is identified by name (married names are indicated in parentheses). The team on which the volunteer served (Agriculture, Education, Mobile Science or Community Development) and the dates of the volunteer's Service Agreement are also shown. To the extent possible with the existing records, station assignments are indicated. The dates of particular assignments in the field may be found in a separate listing of personnel, arranged by station. Termination or resignation is shown (*).

Dianne ACHTER - Agriculture - November '62 - November '64
Saigon, Vinh Long, Qui Nhon

Len ACKLAND - Education - February '67 - January '68
Hue

Carl ADAMS - Education - August '66 - April '68
Danang

Carlie ALLENDER (Nesmith) - Community Development - June '63 - May '68
Team Leader
My Tho, Saigon

John AMEROSO - Agriculture - August '68 - August '70
Chau Doc (Hoa Hao, Tan Chau)

Thomas AMMIANO - Education - October '66 - October ' 68
Team Leader
Nha Trang (Technical Specialist)

B. David ANDERSON - Voltern - June '67 - August '67
Binh Duong

Christopher ANDERTON - Voltern - June '66 - September '66

Manfred ARMBRUSTER - Agriculture - June '62 - June '64
Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), Phan Thiet

G. Tracy ATWOOD - Agriculture - 1963 -1965; June '67 - August '67 (Voltern)
June '68 - September '71 (from IVS/Cambodia)
Team Leader
Quang Duc, Ban Me Thuot, Phu Bon, Nha Trang, Dalat

Richard AVERY - Community Development - September '66 - May '68*
Cam Ranh, Saigon

Linda AYLESWORTH - Community Development - June '67 - April '68
Ba Xuyen

John BALABAN - Education - June '67 - February '68*
Can Tho

Melvin BALKE - Agriculture - February '61 - July '62 (from IVS/Laos)
Ban Me Thuot

Daisy BANARES - Agriculture - July '70 - September '71
Bao Loc (Di Linh)

John BARWICK - Chief of Party - March '57 - March '59
Ban Me Thuot, Saigon

Ireneo BATOON - Agriculture - July '67 - July '69
Go Cong

Ronald BEAHM - Mobile Science - June '67 - April '68
Long Xuyen

Richard BEAIRD - Education - November '66 - August '68
Dalat

Thomas BEARD - Education - June '60 - October '62
Bien Hoa, Ban Me Thuot

Barbara BECKER - Education - June '69 - June '70*
Long Xuyen

Michael BENGE - Education - December '62 - January '65
Ban Me Thuot

Louis BENSON - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Rach Gia

Sally BENSON - Education - June '67 - Jul '68*
Saigon

Alan BERLET - Agriculture - March '62 - August '64
Can Tho

Richard BERLINER - Community Development - September '66 - February '68*
Saigon

William BETTS - Health - February '63 - February '65
Danang

Jimmy BIGELOW - Education - July '66 - July '68
Pleiku

Francis Robert BIGGERS - Agriculture - June '63 - June '65
Ben Tre

Elizabeth BILAN - Education - Jul '67 - April '68*
Kien Phong (Cao Lanh)

Stuart BLOCH - Community Development - August '67 - April '68*
Nha Trang

James BODURTHA - Education - July '66 - July '68
Team Leader
Kien Phong (Cao Lanh), Nha Trang

Aurzella BOEWE - Agriculture & Health - January '57 - October '57
Ban Me Thuot

John BOHN - Agriculture - September '64 - September '66
Kontum

Raymond BORTON - Chief of Party - September '58 - September '60
Dalat, Saigon

David BOURQUIN - Education - September '70 - September '71
Hue

George BOYD - Education - June '70 - June '71
Ban Me Thuot

Russ BRADFORD - Agriculture - September '66 - June '69
Associate Chief of Party - Agriculture
Tay Ninh, Saigon

Verda Loy BRADFORD - Administration - July'66 - June '69
Associate Chief of Party - Administration
Saigon

Susan BRANNON (Tuilesu) - Education - October '67 - June '69
Hoi An

Donald BREWSTER - Education - June '62 - June '64
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Saigon

Gordon BROCKMUELLER - Chief of Party - January '57 - May '61
Ban Me Thuot, Saigon

Clark BROWN - Community Development - September '66 - August '68
Danang

Ronald BRUNK - Agriculture - February '58 - June '58*
Ban Me Thuot

Peter BURKE - Voltern - June '67 - August '67
Sa Dec

Floyd BURRILL - Agriculture - December '59 - December '61
My Tho, Bien Hoa

Guy BUTTERWORTH - Education - October '66 - April '68*
Binh Tuy

Lynn CABBAGE - Agriculture - September '66 - September '71 (From IVS/Liberia)
Quang Duc, Ban Me Thuot

Charles CABLE - Community Development & Education - July '66 - March '68
Phan Rang

Marjorie CALDWELL - Home Improvement - June '63 - June '65
My Tho, Dalat

Michael CALL - Education - December '64 - April '68
Ban Me Thuot

William CAMP - Community Development - June '67 - July '70
Kien Phong (Cao Lanh), Danang, Saigon (Administrative Assistant)

Gary CARKIN - Education - July '66 - July '68
Quang Tri, Hoi An

Richard CARLTON - Education - June'63 - June '64*
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Saigon

Mary CAROLUS (Alexander) - Education - July '66 - May '67
Vinh Long

Jan CAVANAUGH - Agriculture - June '67 - April '68*
Kontum

Marc CAYER - Agriculture - (Captured)
Hue

Jacquelyn CHAGNON - Administration - May '69 - December '70
Associate Chief of Party - Administration
Saigon

Thomas CHAPMAN - Community Development - January '69 - June '69
Vinh Son, Saigon (Administrative Assistant)

Amal CHATTERJEE - Agriculture - June '67 - June '69
Tay Ninh

S. K. CHEEMA (Ruhs) - Agriculture & Home Improvement - June '69 - *
Long An

Michael CHILTON - Agriculture - July '60 - February '65
Associate Chief of Party - Agriculture
Dalat, Saigon

Ruey Tsang CHIOU - Agriculture - September '66 -
Chau Doc, Long An

John CHITTY - Agriculture - 1967 - 1968
Dalat

Marybeth CLARK - Education - June '64 - September '67
Hue

Truman CLARK - Education - July '62 - September '62*
unassigned

Cowles CLEVENGER - Agriculture - September '59 - September '61
Phan Rang

Mary CLINE - Health - October '62 - October '64
Nha Trang

Donald Joseph COHON - Education - June '65 - June '67*
Vung Tau

Sandra COLLINGWOOD - Community Development - August '67 - May '67
Saigon

David COLYER - Health - June '63 - June '65
Nha Trang

Phyllis COLYER - Education - June '63 - June '65
Nha Trang

Darlene COOK (Fairley) - Education - August '67 - April '68
Go Cong

Thomas COOPER - Agriculture - 1962 - September '67
Associate Chief of Party - Administration
Bao Loc, Bien Hoa, Saigon

Dale COPPS - Education - June '67 - April '68 *
Phan Rang

Clyde R. COREIL - Education - June '67 - April '68 *
Hue

Carey COULTER - Voltern & Education - June '65 - March '66
Can Tho

Lawrence CRAWFORD - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Long An

Thomas CROOPE - Agriculture - June '61 - July '63
Dalat, My Tho

Charles CRUMPTON - Education - June '61 - July '63
Qui Nhon, Can Tho

Michael CUSSEN - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Binh Dinh (An Khe)

Par DANFORTH - Chief of Party - December '56 - January '58*
Ban Me Thuot (Cai San)

Rodrigo DAR - Education - June '68 - May '69 *
Can Tho

Beryl DARRAH - Education - May '66 - June '68
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Phan Rang, Saigon

Gary DAVES - Mobile Science - August '67 (captured)
Hue

Clark DAVIS - Education - June '65 - May '67
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Ban Me Thuot, Saigon

Robert DAY - Agriculture - February - February '65
Phu Bon, Quang Ngai

Carolis DEAL - Education - June '70 - September '71 (to IVS/Algeria)
Quang Ngai

Mike DELANEY - Community Development - July '66 - September '68
Sa Dec (Duc Thanh)

Sam DE LAP - Mobile Science - September '65 - September '67
Saigon (Technical Specialist)

David DEPUY - Agriculture & Community Development - June '64 - September '66
Phan Thiet, Saigon

Paul DETIMAN - Community Development - June '68 - May '69 *
Sa Dec (Duc Thanh)

Paul DEVIN - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Qunag Duc

Kirk DIMMITT - Agriculture - February '61 - February '63
Dalat, Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), My Tho

James DOBKINS - Education - September '65 - July '66 *
Long Xuyen

Peter DONOVAN - Community Development - October '66 - October '67 *
Chau Doc (Hoa Hao, Tan Chau)

Daniel DREW - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Tay Ninh

Robert DUBYNE - Agriculture - June '62 - June '64
Ban Me Thuot, Phan Rang, Bien Hoa (Hung Loc)

Mary DUNDAS - Community Development - October '66 - April '68 *
Chau Doc

Frederica DUNN - Education - September '65 - April '68 *
Saigon, Can Tho (Technical Specialist)

Charles DWELLEY - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Hue

Clyde EASTMAN - Agriculture - June '59 - June '67
Ban Me Thuot, Dalat, Bien Hoa (Hung Loc)

Delvyn EPP - Community Development & Agriculture - October '66 - October '68
Pleiku

Stephen ERHART - Education - September '66 - July '68
Hue

Royal EVANS - Community Development - June '68 - September '68 *
unassigned

Scott EWBANK - Community Development - June '69 - June '71
Bao Loc

Michael FAIRLEY - Agriculture - September '66
Vinh Long

Sabina FAJARDO - Agriculture - June '68 - August '70
Dalat

Robert FALASCA - Agriculture - November '58 - November '60
Bao Loc

Betty FELTHOUSEN - Education - October '66 - April '68 *
Chau Doc

Charles FIELDS - Agriculture - March '62 - October '64
Phan Rang

Joan FITZJARRALD (Nishihara) Community Development - June '66 - April '68
Kontum, Can Tho

Kathleen FLANNERY - Education - September '65 - June '67 *
My Tho

Robert FLORES - Agriculture - July '66 - October '68
Long Xuyen

Donald FORTNER - Agriculture - June '61 - August '63
Ban Me Thuot, Hue, Saigon

Thomas FOX - Community Development - July '66 - April '68 *
Tuy Hoa (Technical Specialist)

Wofgang FRIESEN - Mobile Science - September '66 - September '67 *
Hue

Floyd Burr FRUTCHEY - Agriculture - March '59 - March '61
Phan Rang (Nha Ho), Ban Me Thuot (M'Drak)

Hsu FU - Agriculture -
Saigon

Harriet FUKUSHIMA - Health - June '68 - October '69 *
Nha Trang

Donald FULLER - Education - June '63 - June '65
Vung Tau, Saigon (Field Rep. for Audio-Visual Center)

Richard FULLER - Community Development - June '69 - August '71
Nha Trang (Dien Khanh), Chau Doc (Hoa Hao)

Cathy GAMMON - Education - August '66 - October '67
Can Tho

Diana GARDINER (Bui) - Education - August '66 - May '68
Ban Me Thuot

Geoffrey GATES - High School Science - July '70 - August '71
Tay Ninh

Bette GAU (Bell) - Education - July '62 - September '63 *
Qui Nhon

Johanna GEHMAN - Education & Community Development - June '67 -September '71
Sa Dec

William GERDES - Education - July '62 - June '64
Vinh Long

Ray GILL - Education - March '65 - December '65 *
My Tho

Diego GIMENEZ - Agriculture - October '66 - September '67 *
Chau Doc (Tan Chau)

David GITELSON - Agriculture - May '66 - January '68 (killed)
Long Xuyen (Hue Duc)

John GLASS - Agriculture - June '67 - June '71
Bien Hoa, Ba Xuyen (Dai Tam)

Stephen GOLDBERG - Community Development - June '67 - January '68
Da Nang

Paul GOLDMAN - Voltern - June '66 - September '66

Ronald GOULD - Education - June '68 - June '70
Pleiku

Dorothy GRAY - Education - August '67 - July '68
Hoi An

Jimmie GREEN - Agriculture - September '60 - March '63
Phan Rang, Hue

Theodore GREGORY - Education - February '67 - September '67
Phan Rang

Stephen GRIFFITH - Community Development - August '69 - November '69
unassigned

Barbara GRIGG - Education - June '65 - December '65
Ban Me Thuot

Richard GRISHAM - Education - July '69 - July '70 *
Hue

Harlan GROSZ - Agriculture - December '63 - October '64 (from IVS/Cambodia)
Long An

Janice GUENTHER - Education - July '66 - May '68 *
Dalat

Kay HABERLACH - Education - December '65 - April '68
Dalat

Peter HALE - Agriculture - August '67 - March '69
Sa Dec

Donald HAMM - Education - April '66 - May '67 (from IVS/Lebanon)
Rach Gia

Huyn Sun HAN - Community Development - May '67 - May '68 *
Quang Ngai

John HARBUT - Community Development - April '66 - May '67 *
Qui Nhon, Binh Duong (Vinh Son)

Robert HARGREAVES - Agriculture - June '65 - June '67
Phan Rang

Hope HARMELING - Education - August '66 - May '68 *
Saigon

Paul HELBLING - Agriculture - August '68 - September '70
Phan Thiet (Phan Ly Cham), My Tho

Charles HENDERSON - Education - June '68 - July '69 *
Saigon

Robert HENDERSON - Agriculture - June '67 - June '69; 1961
Bao Loc, Hau Nghia (Cu Chi)

Dyle HENNING - Community Development & Education - August '67 - August '69;
August '70 - September '71
Nha Trang (Dien Khanh)

Anne HENSLEY - Education - 1963 - March '68 *
My Tho, Saigon, Hue (Technical Specialist)

Roger HINTZE - Agriculture - July '66 - April '68 *
Can Tho (Technical Specialist)

Steven HODGE - Community Development - February '67 - April '67 *
unassigned

Bruce HOLDERREED - Agriculture - April '66 - April '68 *
Dalat, Bao Loc, Saigon (Administrative Assistant)

Allen HOLE - Education - December '65 - December '66 *
Ba Xuyen

Mel HOLLANDER - Community Development - March '69 - May '69 *
unassigned

Dolores HONIG - Education - August '67 - August '69
Long An

Henry HOOKER - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Hoi An

Wiley HOPPER - Agriculture - June '69 - June '70 *
Long Xuyen

Paul HORTON - Agriculture - June '67 - September '67 (Voltern);
September '67 - September '71
Chau Doc (Tan Chau), Bien Hoa

Jonathan HOWARD - Education - June '68 - September '71
Associate Chief of Party
Bac Lieu, Saigon

James HUNT - Education - August '64 - September '65 *
Saigon (Administrative Assistant)

Peter HUNTING - Education & Mobile Science - June '63 - November '65 (killed)
Team Leader
Phan Rang, Vinh Long

Ervin HUSTON - Agriculture - September '66 - September '67 *
Phuoc Long (Song Be)

Mechell JACOB - Community Development - August '67 - September '70
Hoi An, Ba Xuyen (Phu Tam)

Octavius JACOB - Community Development - February '67 - August '71
Deputy Director; Team Leader
Hoi An, Saigon, Can Tho

Ann JACOBS - Education - September '62 - March '64 *
Saigon, Qui Nhon

Gloria JACKSON - Home Improvement - 1962
Saigon

Christopher JENKINS - Community Development - June '66 - April '68
Tuy Hoa, Dalat

Gloria JOHNSON - Community Development & Education - 1963 - 1965;
October '66 - March '67 *
Team Leader
Ban Me Thuot, Long An

Sandra JOHNSON - Education - June '67 - April '68 *
Hue

L. Richard JONES - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Rach Gia (Ha Thien)

Richard J. JONES - Education - October '66 - June '69
Team Leader
Da Nang, Hue

Timothy JONES - Education - June '68 - June '71
Da Nang, Dalat

William JORDAN - Community Development - August '67 - January '68 *
Cam Ranh

David JURACEK - Education - August '66 - July '70
Quang Ngai

Eamonn KEEGAN - Community Development - February '67 - April '67 *
unassigned

Richard KEIRSTEAD - Agriculture - June '59 - June '61
Dalat, Ban Me Thuot

Joseph KELLNER - Education - August '66 - December '68
Hoi An, Saigon (Administrative Assistant)

James KELLY - Agriculture - October '59 - October '64
Associate Chief of Party
Ban Me Thuot (M'Drak), Hue

James KELLOGG - Education - August '66 - October '68
Qui Nhon

Myong H. KIM - Community Development - August '67 - May '69 *
Long An

Arthur KING - Agriculture - January '57 - September '59
Ban Me Thuot (Cai San)

Peter KLASSEN - Community Development - June '67 - July '69
Vinh Long

Jerry KLIEWER- Education - July '66 - July '69
Can Tho

Laurel KLUGE - Mobile Science - June '67 - March '68 *
Can Tho

Robert KNOERNSCHILD - Agriculture - September '60 - March '63
Bao Loc (Di Linh)

Richard KOEGEL - Community Development & Agriculture - May '57 - May '59
Assistant Chief of Party
Ban Me Thuot (Cai San), Bao Loc

Barry KOLB - Education - July '66 - September '70
Tay Ninh

Noburo KONDO - Community Development - June '68 - June '70
Binh Dinh (An Khe), Saigon

Harold KOOKER - Education & Mobile Science - August '64 - February '66 *
Vin Long

Suzanne KRACKE - Agriculture - July '66 - April '68 *
Saigon, Dalat

Thomas KRAL - Education - August '67 - March '68 *
Da Nang

Bonnie KRAUS - Community Development - July '66 - September '68
Sa Dec

Joseph KRIEGL - Education - August '64 - August '66
Rach Gia

August KRUEGER - Agriculture - December '62 - December '63 (from IVS/Liberia)
Bien Hoa

Ming Chung KUO - Agriculture - March '69 - August '71
Binh Duong (Vinh Sonz

William LAAKONEN - Agriculture - June '63 - June '65
Hue, Vung Tau

Young Chang LAI - Agriculture - February '67 - September '71
Associate Chief of Party - Agriculture
Ba Xuyen, Saigon

Billie Lee LANGLEY - Education - June '65 - July '67
Team Leader
Qui Nhon, Saigon (Technical Specialist)

Verle LANIER - Agriculture - July '59 - July '61
Assistant Chief of Party
Bao Loc, My Tho, Saigon

Everett Mark LA RUE - Agriculture - May '61 - May '63
Phan Rang

Larry LAVERENTZ - Agriculture - June '61 - December '63
Assistant Team Leader
Qui Nhon

Francis LAY - Agriculture - September '59 - September '61
My Tho, Bao Loc (Di Linh), Ban Me Thuot

Daniel LEATY - Agriculture - June '62 - June '64
Dalat

Rensselaer LEE - Voltern - June '65 - September '65
Nha Trang

David LESCOHIER - Community Development - September '65 - August '67
Nha Trang

Robert LEVEY - Education - June '65 - June '66 *
Hue

John LEWALLEN - Community Development - February '67 - March '69
Phan Thiet (Song Mao)

Gerald LILES - Community Development - July '66 - October '67 *
Hoi An

Shiow Yuh LIN - Home Improvent
Phan Thiet

Ted LINGREN - Agriculture - June '61 - June '63
Bao Loc

James LINN - Community Development & Agriculture - 1965 - 1967; 1971
Team Leader
(Interim) Chief of Party, August 1971
Vinh Long, Can Tho, Nha Trang, Saigon (Technical Specialist)

Richard LOCKWOOD - Agriculture - November '68 - November '70
Long Xuyen (Choi Moi)

Jeffrey LONG - Community Development - June '67 - June '68 *
Kien Phong (Can Lanh)

Paul LORANGER - Community Development - September '66 - October '66
unassigned

Thomas LUCHE - Agriculture - January '57 - January '59
Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), Saigon, Ban Me Thuot

Don LUCE - Chief of Party - October '57 - September '67
Ban Me Thuot, Saigon

Dale LUCORE - Agriculture - November '62 - November '64
Qui Nhon

Paul LUKITSCH - Agriculture - June '65 - June '67; July '69 -February '70
Ba Xuyen (Technical Specialist)

Christopher LUMBO - Agriculture - September '66 - March '68 *
Kien Phong (Cao Lanh)

Mark LYNCH - Education & Community Development - July '66 - July '69
Associate Chief of Party - Community Development
Long Xuyen, Saigon

Thomas MALIA - Education - June '68 - September '71
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Binh Tuy, Saigon, Hue

James Mangan - Community Development - June '67 - May '68
Ba Xuyen

Adolphe MANGEOT - Voltern - June '67 - August '67 *
Bien Hoa

Hugh MANKE - Chief of Party - August '67 - August '71
Team Leader
Qunag Ngai, Da Nang, Saigon

Victoria MARES - Education - December '65 - September '68
Vinh Long, Hue, Saigon (Administrative Assistant)

Mary MARSHALL - Education - August '67 - April '68
Saigon

Francesca MAYER - Education - June '67 - September '67 *
unassigned

George MC DOWELL - Agriculture - July '63 - April '65 *
Ba Xuyen

Renate MC DOWELL - Education - July '63 - April '65 *
Ba Xuyen

Vincent MC GEEHAN - Mobile Science - July '62 - July '64
Hue

Robert MC NEFF - Agriculture - January '62 - August '66
Associate Chief of Party
Phan Rang, Tuy Hoa, Saigon

William MEYERS - Agriculture - June '66 -September ' 67 *
Team Leader
Can Tho

Newell MIDDLETON - Education & Science - November '62 - November '64
Dalat, Nha Trang

Ronald "Skip" MIERAU - Agriculture - July '66 - July '68; January '71 -June'71
Rach Gia, Saigon, Can Tho

Sergio MIGUEL - Agriculture - July '67 - February '68 *
Ba Xuyen

Jeffrey MILLINGTON - Community Development - October '66 - October '68
Chau Doc (Hoa Hao, Tna Chau)

Robert MINNICH - Community Development - July '66 - June '70
Team Leader
Bien Hoa, Binh Duong (Vinh Son), Cao Lanh, Saigon, Can Tho

Francis MOHR - Agriculture - 1964-1966; October '67 - March '68 *
Hue, Quang Duc, Phu Bon

Sharon MONAHAN - Education - December '65 - November '67
Qui Nhon

Roger MONTGOMERY - Education & Community Development, September '64 -July'68 *
Team Leader
Long Xuyen, Tay Ninh, Chau Doc, Can Tho

James MOORE - Agriculture - March '65 - August '67
Associate Chief of Party - Agriculture
Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), Ban Me Thuot, Saigon

Rene MOQUIN - Community Development - July '66 - February '68 *
Nha Trang

Virgilio MORALES - Agriculture - July '66 - August '67
Long An

Ronald MOREAU - Community Development - March '69 - January '71 *
Long Xuyen (Cho Moi), Chau Doc (Hoa Hao)

Betty MORGAN (Crouse) - Community Development - August '66 - March '67
Saigon, Vinh Long, (Technical Specialist)

Sam MORGAN - Education - August '66 - February '68 *
My Tho

David MORSE - Education - September '65 - March '66 *
Saigon

Richard MULLER - Agriculture - September '64 - June '65 *

Terence MURPHY - Education - June '64 - November '64 (from IVS/Cambodia)

Timothy MURPHY - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Nha Trang

Gene MYERS - Agriculture - June '57 - June '59
Ban Me Thuot (Cai San), Bien Hoa (Hung Loc)

Ivan MYERS - Education - August '67 - December '68 *
Kien Phong, Ba Xuyen, Go Cong

Masafumi NAGAO - Community Development - June '67 - March '69
Saigon

Joe NEAL - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Bac Lieu

Thomas NEAL - Agriculture - July '62 - October '63;
February '64 - August '65 *
Team Leader
Hoi An, Quang Ngai

Harvey NEESE - Agriculture - March '59 - March '61
Saigon, Bien Hoa (Hung Loc)

Melvin NEHRING - Agriculture - August '69 - October '69 *
unassigned

David NESMITH - Agriculture - Septe[illegible]
Hue, Saigon

Harris NEWLIN - Agriculture - July '[illegible] - Apr[illegible]
Qui Nhon (Binh Khe, An S[illegible]

Stephen NICHOLS - Education - [illegible]
Vung Tau

Richard NISHIHARA - Community Dev[illegible] - July '66 - July [illegible]68
Associate Chief of Party - [illegible]munity Development
Kontum, Saigon

David NUTTLE - Agriculture - Decemb[illegible] '59 - October '61
Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), Ban Me [illegible]

De Wayne OBERLANDER - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Da Nang

John OHMANS - Voltern - June '66 - September '66

Irene OLIVAS - Education - December '65 - April '66 *
My Tho

Clair OLSON - Education - June '69 - August '71
Vinh Long, Saigon

Robert PAETOW - Education - July '66 - May '67 *
Vung Tau

Marilyn PALLYS - Education - September '62 - August '64
Can Tho, Hue

Young Ja PARK - Community Development - March '67 - November '68
Tuy Hoa, Quang Ngai

John PARSONS - Education - July '62 - June '64
Hue

Ron PARTRIDGE - Education - August '66 - August '69
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Bac Lieu, Saigon

Richard PELTO - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Saigon

Wayne PERRY - Agriculture - November '70 - December '70 *
Phu Bon

Richard PETERS - Agriculture - September '59 - September '61
Associate Chief of Party
Phan Rang (Nha Ho), Dalat, Saigon

Larry PETERSON - Community Development - June '67 - August '68
Saigon, Da Nang

Stuart PETTYGROVE - Community Development - August '67 - August '69
Bao Loc

Herbert PHIPPS - Community Development - February '67 - April '67 *
unassigned

Curtis PIPER - Education - February '67 - September '68
Qui Nhon

Robert PLUMMER - Agriculture - July '59 - July '61; July '62 - July '64
Associate Chief of Party - Agriculture
Team Leader
Bao Loc, Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), Hue

Fletcher POLING - Education - July '62 - June '64
Da Nang, Chuong Thien

Christina PONG (Collins) - Education - August '67 - March '68 *
Rach Gia

John POPE - Education - July '66 - February '68 *
Tuy Hoa

James POWERS - Community Development - February '67 - May '67 *
unassigned

James PRUESS - Education - December '65 - March '68
Ban Me Thuot

June PULCINI - Education - December '63 - February '65 (from IVS/Cambodia to IVS/Laos)
Hue, Bao Loc

Ronald PULCINI - Education - December '63 - February '65 (from IVS/Cambodia to IVS/Laos)
Hue, Bao Loc

Wayne PULVER - Agriculture - September '66 - May '68 *
Dalat

Richard PYEATT - Community Development - July '66 - June '68
Saigon

Lucielo RAMIREZ - Agriculture - July '66 - April '68 *
Tuy Hoa (Technical Specialist)

Frank RANSOM - Education - June '67 - April '68 *
Nha Trang

Stuart RAWLINGS - Community Development - August '67 - April '68 *
Phan Rang

Peter REUMAN - Mobile Science - June '67 - April '68 *
Ban Me Thuot

Dale RHOADS - Agriculture - June '67 - April '68 *
Tay Ninh

Ronald RIDGE - Agriculture - June '67 - June '69
Team Leader
Ban Me Thuot, Phu Bon, Nha Trang

William ROBBINS - Education - August '66 - August '71
Phuoc Long, Saigon, Long Khanh

Walter ROBERTSON - Education - June '63 - June '65
Kontum, Vung Tau

Donald ROBOHM - Agriculture - June '67 - May '69
Nha Trang (Dong De)

Dennis ROCKSTROH - Education - August '67 - August '71
Qui Nhon, Dalat

Daniel ROCOVITS - Mobile Science - July '66 - May '68 *
Vinh Long, Saigon (Technical Specialist)

Donald RONK - Education - December '65 - September '67
Team Leader
Phan Thiet, Da Nang

Charles ROSS - Education - June '63 - April '65
Vinh Long

Louise ROSS - Education - June '63 - February '65 *
Vinh Long

Dennis ROTHHAAR - Community Development - September '66 - July '68 *
Cai Be, Can Tho

James ROTHSCHILD - Health - February '63 - February '65

Michael RUFFIN - Voltern - June '66 - September '66

Herbert RUHS - Community Development - July '66 - August '69
Team Leader
Binh Duong (Vinh Son), Saigon

James RUPP - Education - April '66 - July '70
Long An (Tan An)

Edward RUST - Education - July '66 - April '68 *
Nha Trang

John RYAN - Health - June '63 - June '65
Da Nang, Saigon (Administrative Assistant - Logistics)

Wilfred SALSBERG - Community Development - July '66 - February '67 *
Nha Trang

Dale SANER - Community Development - October '66 - January '69
Chau Doc (Tan Chau)

Jay SCARBOROUGH - Education - June '67 - July '71
Phan Rang

John SCHAFER - Education - June '68 - June '70
Da Nang, Hue

Lemuel SCHAFFER - Community Development - August '67 - April '68 *
Phan Rang

Otto SCHATZ - Voltern - June '66 - August '66
unassigned

Donald SCHMIDT Agriculture - March '60 - March '62
Dalat, Phan Rang (Nha Ho)

Robert SCHNUCKEL - Mobile Science - July '66 - April '68 *
Saigon, Nha Trang

Philip SCHREIBER - Agriculture - June '61 - June '63
Phan Rang, Bien Hoa (Hung Loc)

Roy SCHROEDER - Mobile Science - September '66 - May '67 *
Long Xuyen

Philip SCOTT - Community Development - August '67 - September '67
Can Tho

Timothy SEIMS - Mobile Science - September '66 - September '67
Can Tho

William SERAILE - Education - August '67 - April '68*
Can Tho

Sharon SHARRETT (Long) - Community Development - June '67 - June '68
Kien Phong (Cao Lanh), Long An

William SHAWLEY - Agriculture - January '57 - July '57 *
Ban Me Thuot (Cai San)

Garson SHER - Education - April '66 - August '68
Phan Thiet

Alexander SHIMKIN - Community Development - December '69 - December '70 *
Chau Doc (Hoa Hao)

Clarence SHUBERT - Education - September '62 - December '64
My Tho

Charles SIMMONS - Education - October '61 - April '66
Quang Tri

Max SINKLER- Agriculture - September '65 - April '66 (killed)
Binh Dinh (An Khe)

Warren SINSHEIMER - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Can Tho

Richard SISK - Agriculture - June '65 - February '66 *
Dalat (Dam Pao)

Mildred SKAFF - Community Development - June '57 - November '57*
Ban Me Thuot

Leslie SMALL - Agriculture - September '62 - September '64
Assistant Team Leader
Rach Gia, Bien Hoa (Hung Loc)

Hugh SNYDER - Community Development - June '67 - April '68*
Kien Phong (Cao Lanh, Hong Ngu)

John SOMMER - Education - 1963 - 1966; June '67 - September '67
Team Leader
Dalat, Hue, Can Tho, Saigon

Neal SPENCER - Agriculture - March '59 - March '61
Dalat, Saigon

Robert SPENCER - Community Development - September '66- May '68*
Binh Dinh (An Khe)

John SPRAGENS - Education - August '66 - April '68*
Vinh Binh

Gerry STAPELTON - Education - June '62 - August '63*
Saigon

Vaughn STAPELTON - Education - June '62 - August '63*
Team Leader
Saigon

Lavonne STARK - Agriculture - June '67 - August '67*
unassigned

Charles STEVENS - Education - July '62 - May '64
Danang

Peter STILLEY - Community Development - September '66 - September '68
Danang

Carl STOCKTON - Education - June '63 - June '65
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Saigon

Gene STOLTZFUS - Education - June '63 - September '67*
Associate Chief of Party - Community Development
Team Leader
Long Khanh, Nha Trang, Saigon

Fred STONE - Agriculture - September '64 - September '66
Long Xuyen

Thomas STURDEVANT - Agriculture - July '64 - May '66
Pleiku

Robert SULLIVAN - Education - June '69 - June '70*
Bao Loc

Donald SUMNER - Agriculture - June '59 - June '61
Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), Bao Loc

Paul SUTTON - Agriculture - November'58 - November '60
Dalat, Phan Rang, (Nha Ho)

G. Victor SVANOE - Community Development - June '68 - September '71
Chau Doc (Hoa Hao)

Roger SWEENEY - Agriculture - July '62 - July '64
Ban Me Thuot

Charles SWEET - Community Development & Education - June '64 - June '66
Saigon

Hugh SWIFT - Education - June '65 - July '67
Hue

Steve SWIFT - Community Development - July '66 - August '70
Team Leader
Quang Tri, Binh Duong (Vinh Son), Nha Trang

Richard SWIGART - Community Development - February '67 - March '69
Phan Thiet (Song Mao)

Stephen SZADEK - Agriculture - September '62 - September '64
Bao Loc

John TAYLESS - Agriculture - March '63 - May '64*
Nha Trang, Phuoc Long

Jon TAYLOR - Community Development - September '66 - August '67*
Tuy Hoa

Carlyle THAYER - Education - October '67 - March '68*
Binh Long

Gerald THIERSTEIN - Agriculture - August '58 - August '60
Bien Hoa (Hung Loc), Saigon

Sheldon TOM - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Ban Me Thuot

Roger TOPE - Agriculture - July '66 - March '68*
Rach Gia

Richard TRENBATH - Education - October '67 - March '70
Bao Loc

John TRIMBUR - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Vung Tau

Franklin TRIPLETT - Education - June '68 - May '69*
Long Xuyen

Surendra TYAGI - Agriculture - May '71 - August '71
Phu Bon (Buon Blech)

Larry ULSAKER - Agriculture '60 - November '61 (from IVS/Laos)
Quang Ngai, Hue

Gerald UNDERDAL - Education - June '68 - June '70
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Hoi An, Saigon

Yen Sun UONG - Agriculture - March '69 - March '70*
Go Cong

K. V. VARADARAJAN - Agriculture
Saigon

Daniel VINING - Education - July '66 - July '68
Can Tho, Saigon

Nancy VOLK - Community Development - September '66 - May '68*
Dalat

Don WADLEY - Agriculture - February '61 - March '63
Dalat

Dale WAGNER - Agriculture - November '61 - November '63
Ban Me Thuot, Quang Duc

Catherine WALKER - Education - October '63 - February '65*
Can Tho

Philip WALKER - Education - March '63 - March '65
Can Tho

Robert WALKER - Agriculture - April '66 - May '68
Phan Thiet

Lawrence WALSH - Community Development - October '67 - April '68*
Tuy Hoa

Gerald WEBB - Community Development - July '66 - June '67*
Kien Tuong, Hau Nghia

Le Roy WEED - Agriculture - June '63 - June '65
My Tho

Larry WEISNER - Agriculture - January '64 - January '66*
Dalat Dal

James WESTGATE - July '66 - April '68*
Vinh Long

Herbert WHITE - Agriculture - October '62 - March '65
Ban Me Thuot, Hue

Danny WHITFIELD - Chief of Party - 1961 - 1963; 1967 - 1969
Hue, Saigon

Thomas WICKHAM - Agriculture - 1962 - April '65 (from Cambodia)
Can Tho

John WILKERSON - Voltern - June '67 - September '67
Kontum

Betty WILKINSON - Education - July '66 - March '68*
My Tho

Alan WILLIAMS - Voltern - June '66 - September '66

Jeanne WILLIAMS - Education - June '65 - April '68*
Qui Nhon, Saigon

Sondra WILLIAMS (Klein) - Community Development - September '65 - November '67
Vinh Long, Dalat, Ban Me Thuot

Robert WILSON - Agriculture - February '63 - April '65
Bien Hoa (Hung Loc)

Kimball WINEGAR - Education - May '66 - March '68
Nha Trang

John WITMER - Education - June '62 - July '65
Associate Chief of Party - Education
Team Leader
Qui Nhon, Saigon

Gerald Ben WOLF - Education - October '66 - November '68
Long Xuyen, Saigon

Jay WORRALL - Community Development - July '66 - May '68
Binh Dinh (An Khe), Phan Rang

John WORTH - Agriculture - October '67 - March '71
Bao Loc, Saigon

Paul WORTHINGTON - Agriculture - January '57 - July '59
Ban Me Thuot

Katherine Anne WRIGHT - Education - July '62 - June '64
Hue

Philip YANG - Community Development - June '67 - February '69
Danang

Robert YATES - Agriculture - April '57 - January '59 (from IVS/Iraq)
Ban Me Thuot

Ching Cheng YEH - Agriculture -
Phan Rang (Nha Ho), Hau Nghia (Cu Chi)

James YODER - Education - June '70 - August '71 (to IVS/Laos)
Danang