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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A PROGRAM OBJECTIVE OF U.S.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: TITLE IX OF THE 1966
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty
of the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

by

Elizabeth Fletcher Crook

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Political development as a program objective...

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PRFFACE

In the broadest sense, this paper is a study of the formation of U.S. foreign policy with regard to the less developed countries. More specifically, it is concerned with political development, as both a past and present objective of U.S. programs of foreign assistance. Even more specifically, it concentrates on Title IX of the 1966 Foreign Assistance Act as a legislative initiative in this area.

Title IX is interesting for a number of reasons. It is an example of a relatively rare historical phenomenon, i. e. a Congressional initiative in foreign policy-making. It thus provides an interesting case study of congressional and executive branch relations. It also provides an opportunity to examine the effect of an outside stimulus on the operations of a government bureaucracy.

These considerations, however, are not the major concern of this studies. Looking back on the several years of work involved in this paper, I feel that its real worth lies in anotner direction. Title IX provided a catalyst for many people involved in AID policy formation and operations to re-think the basic relationship of their programs to U.S. policy objectives in the recipient countries. I had the opportunity to "eavesdrop" on some of the internal discussions and to record the various ideas expressed to me by officials in the Agency. I can only hope that by providing a structural basis of comparison between the several

"schools of thought" as they became apparent to me, I can help to clarify some possible areas of misunderstanding, and perhaps provide some illumination for the debate in this area which is far from finished.

I feel very grateful for the large numbers of AID officials who took time out of their busy schedules to discuss Title IX with me. They were, on the whole, both candid and thoughtful, and without their reflections, this study would not have been possible. I am also grateful for the Congressmen, their assistants, and the committee staff members who spent time with me.

I feel very fortunate to have been able to work during the summer of 1967 with Dr. John Schott and Dr. Csanad Toth in the Title IX office. The experience in that office was invaluable in the preparation of this dissertation. I am particularly grateful to Mrs. Jutta Parsons for arranging a number of my interviews with Agency officials.

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Elizabeth F. Crook
May 2, 1969.

CHAPTER ONE

The History of Political Development as a Program Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs

I. Introduction

The United States has been engaged in programs of foreign assistance for over twenty years. Although there is wide consensus that the programs are an instrument of U.S. foreign policy,¹ there is little consensus on what their goals should be. "What should foreign aid be expected to accomplish?" This question has been asked many times and answered in many different ways. Should it gain for the donor military bases, allies, friendly neutrality, prestige, more trade, a sense of "righteousness" or simply more comfortable world in which to live? All these and more have been suggested as goals of foreign aid.

An important current debate now exists over the goal of economic development as the major objective of U.S. assistance programs. Three basic positions on this question can be detected among scholars interested in the aid program. First, authors such as Han Morgenthau

¹Robert A. Packenham, in a series of interviews with AID officials in 1962-63, discovered that there was complete consensus on the question of aid as a foreign policy instrument, so much so that he stopped asking this question about one-third of the way through the interviews. Robert A. Packenham, "Foreign Aid and Political Development" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1964).

and Edward C. Banfield feel that it is unrealistic for the United States to attempt such a long-range and difficult task as the economic development of underdeveloped countries. They feel that outside influence and resources can have little effect on the course of development in these countries. As Professor Morgenthau says, "To put it bluntly, as there are bums and beggars, so are there bum and beggar nations. They may be the recipients of charity, but short of a miraculous transformation of their collective intelligence and character, they will not develop economically."² Besides, adds Morgenthau, even if economic development is a result of aid, the political upheaval accompanying it can be counterproductive to U.S. interests.³

Consequently, authors such as Banfield and Morgenthau stress that the results of aid should be direct and immediate, not nebulous and distant, such as the promise of economic development. Aid should be based on businesslike and quid pro quo arrangements, and the donor should have something specific to show for his aid, such as "business friendship," the maintenance of a friendly government, additional prestige in the recipient countries, etc.

²Hans Morgenthau, "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid" in Why Foreign Aid? ed. by Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 79.

³Ibid., pp. 82-83. The Communists have an advantage in controlling this type of revolution, because they are often the only organized and disciplined revolutionary group in the country. The United States, on the other hand, is identified with colonialism, with capitalism, and with conservatism in the less developed world. Our pluralistic philosophy prevents us from carrying a direct and clear message during times of upheaval. See also Edward C. Banfield, "American Foreign Aid Doctrines" in Why Foreign Aid? ed. by Robert A. Goldwin, pp. 10-31.

The advocates of direct and immediate benefits conclude that the economic development rationale has done the program a great disservice. The program has been "oversold" to Congress and to the American people. Proponents have promised economic development which they cannot deliver, and downplayed the concrete accomplishments which the program can achieve.

The second group of authors, including Edward Mason, Hollis Chenery, Charles Wolf, Jr., and I.M.D. Little, are satisfied with the goal of economic development as the primary goal of the aid program. They see foreign aid primarily as an instrument in the cold war and feel that the resources channeled through the program can insure the independence of recipient countries from the communist bloc. In the words of Professor Mason, "The one great difference which foreign aid and the consequent economic development can make is the maintenance of independence from the communist bloc. This the less developed countries want and so does the United States."⁴ With this justification for the aid program, the authors in this group concentrate on maximizing the amount of economic development, in part by the use of economic tools of analysis such as models, econometric techniques, etc.

⁴Edward Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: Harpers and Row, 1964), p. 51. For additional examples of this school of thought see: I.M.D. Little, Foreign Aid (London, England: Allen and Unwin, 1965); Hollis B. Chenery, "Objectives and Criteria for Foreign Assistance" in Why Foreign Aid? ed. by Robert A. Goldwin; and Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southeast Asia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960).

A third group of scholars are not satisfied with the goal of economic development for the aid program. But instead of taking the position of Banfield or Morgenthau that economic development is too grandiose an undertaking, these authors take the position that it is "not enough". They would not back away from it as an objective, but would add another long-term dimension to it, the dimension of "political development." It is this school of thought which is the focus for the present study.

What is the present status and future possibilities of "political development" as a program objective of U.S. foreign assistance? In order to develop a thoughtful answer to this question the historical background of political development in the aid program must be delineated.

II. The History of Political Development as a Program Objective of United States' Foreign Assistance

This section contains an historical survey of U.S. Aid Programs during their more than twenty years of existence. During the course of these years, aid officials and presidential administrations have been required to give justification for these programs before Congress and the American public.⁵ What has been the dominant rationale of the program?

⁵ According to Jacob Kaplan, a "rationale" should give purpose and dimension to the work of aid recipients, as well as aid programmers and administrators, while maintaining support at home for the repeated appropriation of funds. Kaplan concludes that a rationale corresponding to the needs of all these groups has yet to emerge. See Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems and Possibilities (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 105.

What has been the conception of political development embodied in the programs during this time? How has it changed through the years? How important has it been?

The justifications or "rationales" given for aid programs may or may not have corresponded to the actual reality of the program in any one specific country during any particular time period. Consequently, there are various limitations on an historical survey of this type. It is neither an exhaustive study of foreign aid or even of the various rationales given for the program. Rather it is an attempt to place the rationale of "political development" in its proper historical perspective. Consequently it cannot purport to show how the rationales were actually implemented in the functioning aid program. What it can do is to show: a) the dominant rationale given for the aid program during the historical period in question, and b) show the nature and importance of political development as a subordinate rationale during the same period.

Indications of the various rationales come from a variety of sources. Included in this section are references to a series of "reports" from committees and commissions asked to study the aid program, to various reports and pamphlets written by the aid agencies themselves, to justifications given for the program before Congressional interrogators and to the foreign aid legislation itself.

The history of the aid program can be broken down into four time periods: first is the period covering the Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program; second is the Mutual Security period of the 1950's beginning with the Korean War; third is the economic development-oriented

period from the late 1950's to the middle 1960's; fourth is the present watershed period of further change and uncertainty.

A. Period I - The Marshall Plan and Point Four:

The rationale for the Marshall Plan given in reports and Congressional documents was the clearest in the entire history of the aid program. The historical context provides adequate explanation. Europe had been demolished by the Second World War. Pressures from the communist bloc countries were increasing. Europe had been America's best trading partner, its major source of capital during the 19th century, and the source of much of its cultural heritage. In an early document on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which established the Marshall Plan, the U.S. national interest was clearly stated. It was simply that "American prosperity and security were in jeopardy because of the European crisis."⁶ A more elaborate rationale was not needed.

According to Harry Bayard Price's analysis, the Marshall Plan contained the elements of a new departure in American foreign policy for the first time in history, resources from one continent were to be channeled deliberately and on a huge scale, into rebuilding production, trade, and stability in another.⁷

Lewis Paul Todd, The Marshall Plan: A Program of International Cooperation [booklet prepared for the Advisory Committee on Education, Economic Cooperation Administration], (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, n. d. 1953)

⁷ Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955) p. 6.

But the Marshall Planners, very early in the program, realized the importance of European self-help. They stated frankly that the program was not a huge program of direct relief and long-term loans. They admitted that U.S. resources were not enough to rebuild Europe.⁸

American aid would be meaningful only to the extent that it helped Europeans to mobilize their own resources of initiative, of creative energy. In so doing, they would renew their faith in themselves and in their fellowmen.⁹

The rationale given for the Marshall Plan, then, was relatively simple. A vital area of the world had been weakened severely by a war in which the United States had taken part. These were former allies. U.S. funds could not rebuild Europe by themselves, but they would provide a catalyst for European effort and initiative.

What political development rationale, if any, was given in connection with the Marshall Plan. In the preamble to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, mention was made of the "principles of individual liberty, free institutions and genuine independence" resting largely upon "the establishment of secure economic conditions, stable international economic relationships, and the achievement by the countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance."¹⁰

³ Lewis Paul Todd, The Marshall Plan: A Program of International Cooperation [booklet prepared for the Advisory Committee on Education, Economic Cooperation Administration,](Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, n. d.) p. 6.

⁹ Ibid., p. 6

¹⁰ U. S., Public Law 472, 80th Congress, 2d session, (April 3, 1948) "Foreign Assistance Act of 1948."

The belief was evidently that the economic recovery of Europe would lead to the type of political systems desired by the United States

Other examples of this belief are as follows:

. . . . the surest defense against communism is to help people everywhere secure for themselves a decent standard of living and a fuller measure of freedom. (underlining mine) ¹¹

We accept the fact that peace and economic health are indivisible, that the United States can be secure only in a world that is secure and prosperous. ¹²

This last statement "that the U.S. can be secure only in a world that is secure and prosperous" leads directly into the rationale for the early Point Four Program. If European prosperity were vital for the national interest of the United States, then why not, in relative terms, the underdeveloped world also. The root of the Point Four Program seems to have been an uneasiness about the great differences between rich and poor in the world. This uneasiness comes out clearly in President Truman's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949.

¹¹ Lewis Paul Todd, The Marshall Plan , p. 43.

¹² Ibid., p. 44.

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas . . .

I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life.¹³

There is some recognition, in the early statements justifying the Point Four Program, that economic progress depends upon certain political components.

[Economic Progress] depends also upon the sound functioning of their governments and the ability of those governments to stimulate and mobilize domestic savings and to channel them into productive investment, to maintain financial stability and to undertake public service developments such as transportation, communications, and power.¹⁴

There is also a recognition that the U.S. national interest is ultimately best served by democratic political forms. In one report published by the Economic Cooperation Administration, four rationales for the Point Four Program were given. One of the four was entitled "Building Political Democracy." Included in this section was an ex-

¹³ President Truman's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949 as quoted in David A. Baldwin, Economic Development and American Foreign Policy: 1943-62 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) p. 72.

¹⁴ U. S. Department of State Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Underdeveloped Areas. Publication 3719, Economic Cooperation Series 24, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1950), p. 2

explicit analysis of the way in which the aid program could contribute to political development. First, and most important, was the "demonstration effect" aid would have on recipient nations. In this respect, aid would illustrate two things. First it would show that "the democratic nations of the world are willing to help (the less developed countries) in their own efforts." ¹⁵ This would result in 'confidence in democratic ways . . . " which will "encourage [these people.] to support in their homelands political leaders who are dedicated to democracy and, at the same time, make it impossible for totalitarian would-be leaders to gain power. "¹⁶

The second demonstration effect would come as a result of American technicians working with their counterparts. "There is no better way of acquainting other peoples with the American economic philosophy, democratic principles, and way of living than through American technicians working side by side with leaders and ordinary people in the less developed countries. "¹⁷

It is interesting to note that neither of these specific political development benefits would result from economic development as such, but rather would come a) from identifying the sources of aid with "the

¹⁵U.S., Department of State, Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Underdeveloped Areas. Publication 3719, Economic Cooperation Series 24, January, 1950. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,), p. 12..

¹⁶Ibid p. 12

¹⁷Ibid. p. 12.

Western democratic nations" and b) from the contact of American personnel with foreign nationals in advisory capacities abroad.

The benefits accruing from economic development, as such, are more nebulous in their impact on political development than those "demonstration effects" described above. It states only that "Point Four and creative investments can give a concrete demonstration of the economic progress toward higher standards of living which can be realized through democratic means" so that the temptations of communism will be alleviated.¹⁸ It is not clear why the economic progress resulting from the Point Four assistance will automatically be accomplished through democratic means. This statement seems to assume that the recipient nations already possess democratic political forms.

It can be seen that political development was quite an explicit goal of the early Point Four Program. The means of achieving this far-reaching goal were extremely limited, however. The Point Four Program was to provide only technical assistance. It was to make surveys of economic problems, establish and operate research and experimental centers and laboratories, provide for the exchange of students and teachers, and organize international conferences on economic problems.¹⁹

¹⁸U. S. Department of State, Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Underdeveloped Areas, Publication 3719, Economic Cooperation Series 24, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1950), p. 12.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 3.

It was assumed that such activity would stimulate the actual investments of capital not provided for under the government program. It was thought that the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and private foreign investment would move in to fill the opportunity vacuum created by the provision of technical assistance.

In conclusion, the dominant overall rationale for the Point Four Program was less clear than for the Marshall Plan. The goal of political development, however, was more explicit. There was not the narrow focus on an area of the world widely recognized as vital to U.S. interests. Rather there was a vague uneasiness about the gap between the rich and the poor and a decision to make some gesture toward filling it.²⁰ There was the assumption that technical assistance would progressively bring forth capital investments and that the resulting economic progress would have the important political development "demonstration effects" cited above.

B. Period II - The Decade of the 1950's:

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1951 changed the nature and sharpened the focus of the United States assistance program. It was no longer the Europe of the Marshall Plan or the "underdeveloped countries" of Point Four, but rather the "arc of free Asia, from Afghanistan on the

²⁰The first year's appropriation for the Point Four Program was only \$45,000,000.

West to Japan on the East" that was considered as "the area offering the most urgent challenge and greatest opportunity for constructive action."²¹

Technical assistance alone, as given under Point Four, was considered inadequate. "[We have recognized] the importance of increased capital investment in the economic development process and the realization that technical advice alone cannot assure the rate of progress which present world urgencies demand."²²

In a report published by the International Development Advisory Board in 1951, the theme of national security vis-a-vis communist expansion was repeatedly stressed as the rationale for aid.

The issue is really one of economic development versus economic subversion. Soviet imperialism is seeking to chop off country after country, to leave us in isolation. Our economic policy must seek to strengthen the ties of cooperation which band the free people together.²³

. . . . the Advisory Board feels that strengthening the economies of the underdeveloped regions and an improvement in their living levels must be considered a vital part of our own defense mobilization.²⁴

²¹ Harold E. Stassen, Report to the President on the Foreign Operations Administration, January 1953-June 1955. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, n. d.) p. 2-3.

²² Ibid., p. 5.

²³ International Development Advisory Board, Partners in Progress, Report of the Board to President Truman, foreward by Nelson A. Rockefeller, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951) p. 2.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 1.

The stress on military security can also be seen in a recommendation in 1954 by the Randall Commission that grant aid be given only where support was needed to maintain military forces. Otherwise only loans were to be given.²⁵ It was only a dissenting opinion that assistance should not "just prepare for war, but that economic welfare was desirable in its own right and was a necessary precondition for peace."²⁶

If the dominant rationale for the aid program during this period was U.S. security against an aggressive and monolithic communism, were there any elements of a political development doctrine present during this period? In some of the citizens' advisory reports to the President during this period there is indication of a concern for political development. The 1951 Rockefeller Report stated that "our concept of economic development carries with it land and other reforms . . . a living wage, fair and rising labor standards, full participation in . . . increased wealth . . . the removal of discrimination It also includes freedom of speech, freedom from want, right of trial by jury, right to self-organization, right to work, and right to strike. It also includes training in democracy to enable all of the people to take an active part in public affairs."²⁷

²⁵ Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Report to the President and the Congress, published as House Report 290, 83d Congress, 2nd Session, January 23, 1954, p. 8-9.

²⁶ Ibid., see dissent by Mr. McDonald, p. 9.

²⁷ International Development Advisory Board, Partners in Progress, p. 11.

In the 1955 Report to the President on the Foreign Operations Administration by Harold E. Stassen, then chief administrator of the program, the following was reported:

Through the economic and technical assistance programs, new attention was given to the need for basic economic, social, and institutional reforms essential to a broad and equitable sharing of the benefits of economic progress and to a fuller realization of the rights and dignity of individual human beings.²⁸

This quotation appears to place political development high on the list of priorities. But the means cited to accomplish this goal indicate the limited concept of political development present in the aid program during this period.

This [concern for basic economic, social, and institutional reform,] was manifested in many ways, i. e. work and advise on tax policy, training in modern management philosophy, assistance in educational reforms, and most important is the emphasis on land reform.²⁹

None of these evoke a feeling of long-run interest in political development as such. A revealing statement was made by President Eisenhower which illustrates the nature of political development rationale at this period:

²⁸ Harold E. Stassen, Report to the President on the Foreign Operations Administration, January 1953-June 1955 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, n. d.) p. 6.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

I know of no precise relation between economic well-being and responsible political development. Yet continued poverty and despair are conditions that will foredoom moderate political life in these countries. If the best that these free governments can offer their peoples is endless hopelessness and grinding poverty, then these governments will surely fall. Certain it is that our peace, our political freedom, and our prosperity would not long survive the sweep of Communist despotism over these new nations.³⁰

In summary, then, the aid extended during the period of the 1950's was envisioned as helping allies to defend themselves against a common enemy. The political development rationale was a minor theme, being short-range in character and focussing primarily on political stability. Finally, the goal was not long-range economic development, rather mutual security. The location of countries receiving aid illustrate this point clearly. They were consumed in the "arc of Free Asia," around the periphery of the Communist world.

C. The Period 1958 - Mid-1960 :

As the decade of the 1950's drew to a close, foreign assistance under the rubric of "defense support" was given often for long-term economic development reasons.³¹ Congress became aware of the

³⁰U.S., Department of State, "Message of President Eisenhower on the Mutual Security Program for 1958" reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1957, pp. 925-26.

³¹In a study of the U.S. aid program to Taiwan, directed by Neil H. Jacoby, it was estimated that "defense support" provided more than two-thirds of all U.S. dollars supplied to the Republic of China. Jacoby concluded that "defense support" was used as an instrument of development because no statutory instrument existed up to the late 1950's, except for technical cooperation. See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 206.

discrepancy between legislative intent and actual practice. In 1957, the Committee on Government Operations, under the chairmanship of William L. Dawson, investigated the aid program in Iran and came to the conclusion that "the definition of defense support, the largest single element in the Mutual Security Program other than military assistance, is interpreted so broadly by the executive branch that it is virtually impossible to determine whether or not an expenditure made under it is in accordance with legislative intent."³²

The problem arose from the fact that defense support was not intended to foster economic development greater than that needed to obtain military objectives. The thrust of the Dawson Report was not against economic development as a goal of the aid program, but against the mislabeling procedure. The members of the Committee felt that the United States had more to gain from labeling economic development projects as such. "To the extent that economic development is disguised as defense support, we play into the hands of communists who delight in stressing the military aspects [of our aid programs]."³³

It was in this same year, 1957 that a series of studies commissioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee further reinforced the idea obliquely expressed in the Dawson Report, i. e. that long-term economic

³²U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, United States Aid Operations in Iran, First Report by the Subcommittee on Government Operations, William L. Dawson, Chairman, 85th Congress, 1st Session, January 28, 1957, p. 1

³³Ibid., p. 2.

development ought to precede military security as the major goal of the aid program. One such study, entitled "The Objectives of the United States' Economic Assistance Programs"³⁴ is representative of the thinking of this period. At its heart is the consensus, reached among professional economists, that U.S. foreign assistance could and should be used primarily to speed economic development. The military and security justifications for the program no longer seemed vital, as cracks in the communist bloc became apparent and cold war tensions decreased. Neutralist countries, rather than the members of U.S. pacts and alliances became increasingly the focus of U.S. concern. In a Report to the President on the Mutual Security Program, a citizens' group headed by Benjamin F. Fairless concluded that "long range success [of the program] lies in demonstrating that a free system is far superior to an authoritarian one in providing better living conditions . . . This demands continuing emphasis on economic development."³⁵ In addition, there was increasing agreement among professional economists concern-

³⁴U. S. Congress, Senate, "The Objectives of the U.S. Economic Assistance Programs" prepared by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max F. Millikan, Director, published in the Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Senate Document No. 52, July, 1957, pp. 1-75.

³⁵President's Citizen Advisors on the Mutual Security Program, Report to the President on the Mutual Security Program, Benjamin F. Fairless, Coordinator, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1, 1957) p.2.

ing the policy guidelines which should govern aid-giving for long-term development.³⁶

Thus the dominant rationale of the program progressively became long-term economic development. Were there any elements of a political development rationale during this period? In the study by Max Millikan, entitled, "The Objectives of the U.S. Economic Assistance Programs", certain political development assumptions were apparent. The study first noted the unsettling effects of economic development on institutions and habit patterns in recipient countries. "A little extra food in the stomach can hardly be expected to insure stable and harmonious political development."³⁷ But then the Report went on to give five

³⁶ Areas of consensus were the following:

a) that an increase in the total volume of investment was essential to long-term economic development.

b) that "self-help" measures were vital, and included the following: keeping inflation under control, establishing exchange rates to encourage exports and discourage unnecessary imports, and encouraging private enterprise.

c) A development plan was considered the first essential self-help to insure the most efficient use of resources. It did not matter in what form the resources were provided as long as there was a good development plan.

d) Finally, aid should be provided without political or military strings and should be allocated on the basis of the prospective productivity of the investment.

For further discussion, see Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities, pp. 77-79.

³⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, "The Objectives of the U.S. Economic Assistance Programs", prepared by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max F. Millikan, Director, p. 20.

ways in which economic programs could be expected to promote political democracy.

1. By posing challenging and constructive internal tasks which will capture the imaginations and harness energies of the society.
2. By well-designed programs of economic development, it is possible to channel energies toward activities of economic benefit to most groups in a society and toward activities of joint interest.
3. [Economic Development Programs] will increase and encourage young leadership at the local, regional and national levels. Community development programs will bring opportunities for young talent not of old ruling groups.
4. The increase in social and economic mobility will shrink the gap between city and country by promoting diffusion of power.
5. [Economic Development should] give countries confidence in their ability to make progress through their own efforts. ³⁸

In summary, then, during the late 1950's, a new rationale for the aid program was replacing the dominant military and security concerns of that era. Fostered by a consensus in the academic community, i. e., that aid could and should be used to achieve long-run economic development, the rationale was seized upon by aid officials who could no longer justify their programs solely in terms of U. S. security.

The first concrete result of this attitude was evidenced in the establishment of the Development Loan Fund in 1957. It was modeled on the businesslike procedures of the World Bank. Aid was to be provided

³⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, "The Objectives of the U. S. Economic Assistance Programs," prepared by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max F. Millikan, Director, p. 21.

with minimal requirements concerning either international behavior or social policies of the borrowing countries. The Loan Fund concentrated on capital projects and confined its conditions to matters affecting their execution. It embodied the "project approach" to aid.

In 1961, the aid program was reorganized under the Kennedy Administration, and economic development became a more explicit rationale for the program. However, at a very high level in government, there was concern for the political effects of U.S. aid. In a message from the President to Congress in 1961, John F. Kennedy stated that the most fundamental task of the aid program was to show the developing countries that "economic growth and political democracy go hand in hand."³⁹ However, the only criteria he mentions for governing the aid program are those of "self-help" designed to bring economic development without much regard for political development. The following quotation implies that the economic condition of a country determines its political health.

.... for widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area.⁴⁰

The establishment of the Alliance for Progress, with its emphasis on self-help and reform, is the closest the aid program has come, during this period, to a clear concern for political development.

³⁹U.S. Department of State, "Message of President Kennedy to Congress on the Foreign Aid Program of 1961" Department of State Bulletin, April 10, 1961, reprinted in Why Foreign Aid? ed. by Robert A. Goldwin, p. 3. This statement is also in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

⁴⁰"Message of President Kennedy to Congress on the Foreign Aid Program of 1961" in Why Foreign Aid? p. 3.

D. The Present Situation

At the present time, there is a feeling of crisis about the aid program.⁴¹ It is evident that the earlier rationales used to justify the program are no longer satisfactory. The theme of political development, which has been traced in this history section, is a possible alternative to economic development as a rationale for aid activities.

It should be emphasized that promoting political development is not a new rationale for the aid program. There has always been the conception that U.S. foreign aid should contribute to the growth of democracy in the recipient country. But it has been overshadowed by other considerations and rationales. There has been a diversity of means by which spokesmen of the aid program have sought to show a contribution to political development. Defenders of the Point Four Program assumed it would come from the dissemination of democratic principles by U.S. technicians in other countries. During the 1950's, it was felt that freedom (and hence democratic forms) would gradually evolve through the provision of security and political stability. With the introduction of the economic development approach, it was assumed that political development benefits would occur by such means as "uniting the peoples' energies around an economic development plan" and "bringing the city into contact with the countryside."⁴²

⁴¹This view was very frequently expressed by my respondents both in the Agency for International Development and in Congress. It is also shown by the extensive budget cuts in fiscal years 1967 and 1968, and in the even greater cuts which appear very likely for fiscal year 1969.

⁴²U. S. Congress, Senate, "The objectives of the U. S. Economic Assistance Programs," prepared by the Center for International Studies, M. I. T., Max F. Millikan, Director, p. 21.

Now there is a feeling, among the proponents of political development, that the casual, implicit, and indirect attention to political development in the aid program is inadequate. There appears to be, in the making, the same type of convergence between developments in the academic community and the needs of the aid program which resulted in the adoption of the economic development rationale in the late 1950's. At the present time, however, it is the growth of subdivisions in the field of political science, i. e. "comparative politics" and "political development" which provide the academic grist for the new "search for a rational" mill.⁴³

The initiative for introducing political considerations into the aid program in a more explicit form, has come from members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In a series of amendments to the aid legislation, this concern has been apparent. It will be the task of the rest of the paper to examine Title IX as a legislative directive, to review its sources, examine its conception of political development, and show how it is being received and acted upon in the executive branch.

⁴³ Indicative of growing interest in this field is the recent announcement of a new Journal entitled Comparative Politics. The Board of Editors includes scholars closely associated with this new academic field. Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Ralph Braibanti, Harry Eckstein, S.N. Eisenstadt, Joseph G. LaPalombara, S.M. Lipset, Roy C. Macridis, John Montgomery, Lucian W. Pye, Fred W. Riggs, Kenneth Organski, Dankwart Rustow, K.H. Silvert, Robert E. Ward, Myron Weiner.

It should be noted, however that no matter how determined the advocates of political development have become to broaden and refine the policy terms of reference of U.S. foreign assistance to include more than long-term economic development, the latter phase was a necessary precursor to a political development rationale. Several reasons can be cited to support this assertion. First of all, the emphasis on economic development allowed for the introduction of academic thought in the programming process of the aid program. Previously academic opinion had been consulted in such areas as agricultural economics, engineering, public health, but now professional economists became intimately involved in decisions about the allocation of aid. Officials of the aid agency became accustomed to the use of consultants, and close relations were developed between the academic community and the agency. With the introduction of a "political development" rationale, it is not too difficult to envision the addition of another group of consultants, corresponding to the new interest, on official AID rolls.

Secondly, the emphasis on economic development established the importance of comprehensive planning for the recipient economy, rather than the approach of the 1950's which stressed aid to isolated projects. Because the precedent of long-range planning for the economy has been established, it should not be impossible to extend this precedent to other selected areas of the society. The idea of self-help, also, has paved the way for the acceptance of a political development rationale

for aid. The idea of administrative reforms and development of the private sector lead naturally into a concern for institutional development and decentralized decision-making.

While the economic development program can be said to have laid the foundations for a broader concern for political development, there is no assurance that such a change will occur. It is the task of this study to examine the present status of political development as a program objective of U.S. foreign assistance, and to make some determination as to its possible future in this respect.

The term political development is, itself, an ambiguous one. In the next chapter an attempt will be made to present the range of definitions of political development given by scholars in the field. Then, the growing consensus in the academic community as to the need for and the elements of this new rationale will be described. The various suggestions which have been given for its implementation will be analyzed.

CHAPTER TWO

Academic Conceptions of Political Development

Before the concept of political development, as it is being used in connection with the aid program, can be defined and analyzed, the variety of definitions of the term must be discussed.

I. Academic Definitions of Political Development

Lucian Pye, in an essay written originally for the March, 1965 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and later republished in his book, Aspects of Political Development, identifies no less than ten concepts of political development used in contemporary literature on the subject. Political development is variously defined as:

1. the political prerequisites of economic development
2. the politics typical of industrial societies
3. political modernization
4. the operation of a nation-state
5. administrative and legal development
6. mass mobilization and participation
7. the building of democracy
8. stability and orderly change
9. mobilization and power
10. one aspect of a multidimensional process of social change.

A brief survey of scholarly writing in the field of political development supports the typology erected by Pye. An example of Pye's first category of "political development as the political prerequisites of economic development" is Wilfred Malenbaum's definition of political develop-

¹Lucien Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little & Brown, 1966), pp. 33-45.

ment as "the complex of changes required in the political system so that the system can cope with the tasks of economic growth."² Daniel Lerner's definition represents Pye's second category, "Political development as the politics typical of industrial societies." He defines political development as the model "which evolved in the West - the same basic model reappearing in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world."³

Pye's third definition, "political development as political modernization" appears to be a restatement of the term rather than a true definition. Many authors use the terms interchangeably. Rupert Emerson, in his studies, concentrates on the concept of political development as the growth of those institutions which will allow the operation of a nation-state, thus corresponding to Pye's fourth category. Specifically, this involves the capacity to maintain certain kinds of public order, to mobilize resources for a specific range of collective enterprises, and to make and uphold effective types of international commitments.⁴

Almost all authors include the development of administrative and legal capacity and acknowledge the necessity for mass mobilization in some form for political development, thus encompassing Pye's fifth and

²Wilfred Malenbaum, "Economic Factors and Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, [hereafter referred to as The Annals], Vol. 358, (March, 1965), pp. 41-52.

³Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), p. 46.

⁴Lucien Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little & Brown; 1966), p. 7.

sixth categories. The "building of democracy," Pye's seventh category, while shunned by many authors because of its apparent ethnocentrism and non-objectivity, is yet accepted by many others. Those accepting it as their definition of political development argue that the word "development" implies a value-oriented concern for progress. Political progress to many Americans can only be defined as the growth of democracies. Hence S. M. Lipset says that ". . . democracy . . . is the good society itself in operation. Only the give-and-take of a free society's internal struggles offers some guarantee that the products of the society will not accumulate in the hands of a few power-holders" ⁵

Manfred Halpern's definition of political development corresponds to Pye's eighth category - political development as stability and orderly change. He states that "power, profit, and solidarity are not signs that a nation has arrived, but rather that it possesses means to keep moving in deliberate response to persisting forces of transformation." ⁶ Karl von Vory's definition resembles Halpern's in its stress on overcoming imbalances and initiating orderly change. Political development is a ". . . process which has its origins in the disequilibrium of mounting anomic pressures It is a process . . . whose focus is the development of the governmental capacity to direct the course and rate of social change." ⁷

⁵Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York:Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 439.

⁶Manfred Halpern, "The Rate and Costs of Political Development," The Annals, Vol. 358, (March, 1965), p. 24.

⁷Karl von Vorys, "Toward a Concept of Political Development," The Annals, Vol. 358 (March, 1965), p. 19.

A. F. K. Organski's definition falls into Pye's ninth category in its stress on "increasing governmental efficiency in utilizing the human and material resources of the nation for national goals."⁸ Leonard Binder has a similar concept in mind when he defines political development as "the expanding scope of government services - the ratio of national income to governmental income or the ratio of public personnel to the total number of employed persons."⁹

Both C. E. Black and Fred W. Riggs view political development as one aspect of a multi-dimensional process of social change, thus fitting into Pye's last category.¹⁰ Riggs believes it is erroneous to think that economic, political, social, and psychological development are different types of change, each occurring independently of the other. Instead, he says, that "development has taken place in a society and this pattern of change affects the economic aspects of the society in one way, political aspects in another, administrative aspects in a third."¹¹

What is one to make of these apparently divergent definitions of political development? Upon close reading, it becomes clear that the authors cited above are not so much in contradiction with each other, as they are stressing different aspects of the same phenomenon. When

⁸A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 7.

⁹Leonard Einder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 7.

¹⁰C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 9.

¹¹Fred W. Riggs, "A Political Scientist Views Developmental Change," unpublished paper found in the Foreign Aid Reading Room, Litthauer School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. May, 1967, p. 7.

some speak of political development as a process of "westernization," they are concentrating on an historical answer to the question of "source." This is of major concern to historians, and of less interest to the other social scientists. Economists, on the other hand, are much more likely to think in terms of the "political preconditions of economic growth," while the anthropologists and sociologists talk in terms of personality and cultural change.

There are a variety of ways in which these definitions of political development can be broken down and classified.¹² However, for the purposes of this study, only two important distinctions need be made. First, many authors, particularly in the early years of political development studies, defined political development in terms of social and economic development. Thus, literacy, urbanization, and economic growth became the indices of political development. However, more recently, there has been increasing concern with the political institutions themselves. Professor Samuel P. Huntington has led in this shift of emphasis

Secondly, there is a distinction between scholars who are concerned about the "capacity" of the political system and those who emphasize the "processes" by which governmental activities are carried on. Each of these distinctions will be discussed in turn.

¹² Robert A. Packenham analyzed several "approaches" to political development in his article "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, Vol. 17 (October, 1964), pp. 113-115.

A. Political Environment vs. Political Institutions

Various authors, among them Everett Hagen in an article entitled "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change,"¹³ S. M. Lipset in his chapter on "Economic Development and Democracy,"¹⁴ in the book Political Man, and James Coleman in the last chapter of The Politics of the Developing Areas,¹⁵ have studied the economic and social aspects of political development. The general procedure is to rank countries by some criteria of political development.¹⁶ Then the level of political development is correlated with indices of social and economic development, such as the G.N.P., number of doctors,

¹³ Everett Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," in Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research ed. by Robert Asher, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1962), pp. 1-32.

¹⁴ S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 27-63.

¹⁵ James S. Coleman, "The Political Systems of the Developing Areas", in The Politics of the Developing Areas ed. by Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 455-529.

¹⁶ The criteria used by S. M. Lipset concerns the lack of a major totalitarian movement during the past 25 years for his study of European countries, and a history of "more or less" free elections for most of the post-war period for Latin American countries. (See S. M. Lipset, Political Man, p. 30.)

Coleman uses the following rough criterion - "A competitive social structure is one in which the interests of different groups in the society obtain a voice in political decisions, a semi-competitive structure is one in which among a sector of the population there is competitive political activity, but another important sector has no voice, and an authoritarian structure is one in which there is a hierarchy of power, with political decisions coming from the top." (See James S. Coleman, "The Political Systems of the Developing Areas", pp. 533-34). Hagen uses this same classification. (See Everett Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change", p. 4.)

number of vehicles, telephones, radios, newspapers, percentage of labor force outside of agriculture, percentage of population in cities over 100,000, the literacy rate, and the ratio of enrollment in primary school to the school-aged population.¹⁷ All three studies cited found a correlation between economic and social indices and the degree of development in the political system.¹⁸

The attempt to correlate economic and social development with political development has been carried one step further by two newcomers to the study of political development, Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde. By using sophisticated statistical techniques, (correlation coefficients, regression coefficients, path coefficients, and the Simon-Blaloch technique), they have "shown" that a causal relationship, first mentioned by Daniel Lerner, exists between Urbanization → Literacy → Mass Media → Democratic Political Development.¹⁹

¹⁷ This list is taken from Hagen's article, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change" in Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research ed. by Robert Asher, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1962), p. 4.

¹⁸ The fact that there were deviant cases was laid against two factors. The case of Nazi Germany, in which the indices were at a high level, but the amount of popular participation was low, was attributed to the historical situation stemming from the German defeat in World War I. Other cases which deviated from the pattern of close correlation between economic and political development were said to stem from an "imbalance" of the indices. It was maintained that one area of development, such as communications, had outstripped other areas such as employment opportunities, and thus contributed to an unstable situation which would normally have been correlated with a high degree of political development. Lipset suggests the role of historical factors in Politics Man, p. 28 while the imbalance of indices is suggested in Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, no. 1, (March, 1967), pp. 72-79.

¹⁹ Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Towards a Communications Theory", p. 72-79.

The result of this "correlational" and then attempted "causal" approach is somewhat curious. Many scholars have concluded that since these social and economic indices seem to appear consistently with stable democracies, they are really the "preconditions" for popular participation in government. If these "preconditions" are not met, then popular participation is neither possible nor desirable.

This belief underlies statements by Rupert Emerson to the effect that "premature exercise of overabundant democracy, laying stress on the rights of the opposition, can destroy the foundations on which successful democracy might be built later. It is necessary to bring the preconditions of democracy into being . . ." ²⁰

Some other statements which reflect this view can be found in the works of a variety of authors:

Peaceful recurrent political competition is hardly feasible where the very basis for a community still wants creating; without a sense of community with one's opponents, political competition is war. ²¹

. . . . poverty-ridden people in a climate of rising expectations are not likely to make their first concern the preservation of political forms and liberties whose meaning is obscure to them. ²²

²⁰ Rupert Emerson, "The Erosion of Democracy in the New States," in Comparative Politics, ed. by David Apter and Harry Eckstein, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 642.

²¹ Harry Eckstein and David Apter, "Totalitarianism and Autocracy," Comparative Politics, pp. 438-39.

²² Doris A. Graber, "Are Foreign Aid Objectives Attainable?" The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, (March, 1966)

Developing nations need firmness in economic planning and administration and cannot afford the delays of democratic debate and accommodation of conflicting viewpoints.²³

Underlying these statements is the assumption that certain essential prerequisites, such as national integration (quote 1), literacy (quote 2), and economic development (quote 3), are necessary for popular participation, and must occur before the peoples of a nation can be included in the government's decision-making.

In an important article published in World Politics, Samuel P. Huntington took issue with this emphasis on the economic and social preconditions to political development. He pointed out that such an emphasis permits only modernized states to be politically developed, while ignoring "fifth-century Athens, the 3rd century BC Roman Republic, the Han and T'ang empires in China, or even 18th century America."²⁴

Another objection he makes is that such an emphasis acquires comprehensiveness at the cost of precision:

The broader the definition of development, moreover, the more inevitable development becomes. The all-encompassing definitions make development seem easy by making it seem inescapable. Development becomes

²³Doris A. Graber, "Are Foreign Aid Objective Attainable?" The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, (March, 1966).

²⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol. 17 (April, 1965), pp. 386-430.

an omnipresent first cause, which explains everything but distinguishes nothing. Almost anything which happens in the "developing" countries - coups, ethnic struggles, revolutionary wars - becomes part of the process of development, however contradictory or retrogressive this may appear on the surface. Political development thus loses its analytical content and acquires simply a geographic one. At the extreme, it becomes synonymous with the political history of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.²⁵

Finally, and most importantly, Huntington states that the equation of political development with overall modernization results "in one-way concepts." There is political "decay" as well as political development, he maintains. "Many aspects of modernization do appear to be practically irreversible. Urbanization is not likely to give way to ruralization. Increases in literacy are not normally followed by sharp declines . . . but political changes have no such irreversibility."²⁶ Thus Huntington proposes a definition of political development as "independent of, but obviously affected by the process of modernization."²⁷ He focusses on what he terms "the process of institutionalization," and then proceeds to give certain characteristics of "developed political institution," i. e., adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.²⁸

²⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol. 17 (April, 1965), p. 392.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 393.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 394.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 395-403.

Thus, there is a difference in emphasis among students of political development. Some stress the interrelationship of political development with other facets of economic and social modernization. Within this emphasis, a set of politico-economic and social relationships at a particular point in time is the focus of study. Other students, among them Huntington, single out the "development and decay" of political institutions as their particular focus. Each emphasis brings different implications for U.S. programs of assistance.

B. "Process" of the Political System vs. "Capacity" of the Political System

There is a second difference in emphasis which emerges from a review of political development literature. Some authors appear to be concerned with the "capacity" of the political system, defined in a variety of ways, while others are more interested in the "process" by which governmental activities are carried on.

The capacity of the political system whether defined as the ability to stimulate economic development, to mobilize manpower for war, or to tax effectively, is obviously related to the processes of government as decisions are made and carried out. But the distinction between the two different "slants" on political development is still valid. It is entirely possible for the capacity of two political systems to be quite similar, as in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, while the "processes" of the systems are very different.

Authors who stress capacity on one hand, or processes on the other, often have different purposes in mind. Those whose main focus is not directly on political development will tend to emphasize the effect of the political system, i. e., its "capacity." Thus such students as A. F. K. Organski, who are interested primarily in world politics and the importance of power, will tend to emphasize the ability of the political system to tax the citizenry, build modern weapons, and mobilize the population for war. An economist, such as Gustav Ranis, also shows an interest in the "capacity" of the political system, but it is economics, not national power, which is his main concern. Thus he says, "The search for politics which yield the required institutional change must be viewed in the context of the role and capacity of the less developed economy's government."²⁹

The "capacity" concept is most useful in describing the present strengths and weaknesses of the political system. Authors who are more interested in causing changes in the political system will think in terms of the "process" utilized by the government in overcoming imbalances in the social and economic system. Their analysis is usually based on the "functional" model of a political system developed in the first chapter of Almond and Coleman's book, The Politics of the Developing Areas.³⁰

²⁹Gustav Ranis, "Trade, Aid and What?" in the United States and the Developing Economies, ed. by Gustav Ranis, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1964), pp. 159-172.

³⁰Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in The Politics of the Developing Areas ed. by Gabriel Almond and James F. Coleman, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-65. The members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council are the major contributors to the "functional" analysis of political development.

There are a variety of differences which emerge from a comparison of the two schools of thought. For instance, the key test of a "politically developed society" according to the "capacity" school would be the government's ability to initiate changes, to strengthen its power base, to develop its resources. For the "process" school, the test would be the government's ability to react to changes which are going on in the society as a whole, and to include a wide segment of the population in its decision-making process. Whereas the "capacity" analysis is most useful in determining present political development, the "process" analysis is oriented toward the future, toward continuing changes.

The indices used by the "capacity" type of study to determine the degree of political development in a particular country would include clear-cut figures, such as the prevalence and penetration of mass media, the tax base, the proportion of the population in contact with the government bureaucracy, even G. N. P. and per capita income. The indices used by the "process" school are less clear-cut, such as the degree of interest articulation and aggregation in the political system. Inherent in most of the work of the "process" school is the assumption that some "processes" of government are better than others. Most would agree, for instance, that interest articulation is better than manipulatory mass politics. No such explicit judgments are present in the "capacity" type of analysis. Implicit in all concepts of development, however, are value judgments as to what constitutes progress or forward momentum. Glimpses of these judgments can be seen in the texts of "capacity"

authors.³¹ They are "spelled out" more explicitly in the "process" writings, but the difference is one of degree, not of kind. Both make value judgments as to what constitutes progress.

In conclusion, it can be seen that there is a connection between the four schools of thought outlined above. Authors who focus directly on political institutions will be more interested in their "processes" than in their "capacities", while those who stress economic and social indices are more likely to be interested in the "capacity" of the political system.

II. Academic Suggestions Concerning the Role of Political Development in the Aid Program

As was mentioned in the introduction, there are many reasons for the transfer of resources between the developed and less developed countries. Not all scholars agree that a "political development dimension" for aid is either necessary or desirable.³² However, a survey of the history of the aid program has revealed that "democratic evolution," a form of political development, has long been a rationale for U.S. assistance

³¹Dr. Ranis, whose primary focus is economic development, proposed emphasis on the market mechanism, "given the fact that the society will want to avoid a coercive solution." Implicit in Dr. Ranis' conception of progress is the notion of freedom. A "coercive solution, presumably, would not be acceptable to Dr. Ranis, regardless of what the leaders of the developing country would choose. See Gustave Ranis, "Trade, Aid and What?" p. 170.

³²See Chapter I, pp. 1-4, of the present study for a discussion of these scholars.

programs. It is now our task, in this section, to undertake a similar survey of academic literature, to reveal the role advocated by various authors for political development in the aid program.

It should be noted that the reviewed literature spans ten years, during which time authors may have changed their position on the issues in question. The purpose of this section, however, is not to label certain authors as advocates of certain positions, but rather to demonstrate the wide variety of suggestions made in regard to political development and the aid program.

Six types of suggestions have been made with regard to the proper role of political development in the aid program. The first two support the primacy of economic development goals and criteria, the second two support economic development with emphasis on popular participation, and the last two present a comprehensive political development approach. Each suggestion will be examined in turn.

A. "Primacy of Economic Development: Political Development is not a Conscious Goal"

Two different types of suggestions have been made which retain the primacy of economic development in the aid program. The first argues that economic development, in and of itself, will bring the desired political consequences. One of its classic expressions is contained in a 1957 work by Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. It embodies the most extreme

assumptions regarding the "chain effect" which aid is supposed to produce. There are three distinct links in this chain. Aid is supposed to lead to economic development, which, in turn, will bring about a more democratic society, which, in turn, will lead to a more peaceful world. The first link is never questioned. Aid is assumed to bring about economic development. How will economic development, in turn, bring about political development? First, economic development will act as a social solvent. The urban elites will have to think through the needs of the countryside; labor and peasant organizations will be formed, and the general "pluralism of the society increased".³³ Second, confidence will be generated in the democratic process because more concrete public and election issues will be forthcoming, i. e., those revolving around economic development.

How will the third link be fulfilled? How will economic development, bringing greater pluralism and more concrete election issues, in turn, bring about a more peaceful world? The answer is simply that "a confident nation, making progress at home, is likely to conduct its foreign policy with poise and good sense."³⁴

Professors Rostow and Millikan do not feel that donor intervention in the political affairs of the recipient is necessary to achieve the desired

³³Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harpers, 1957), p. 101.

³⁴Ibid., p. 21

effect of political development. Their confidence in the links between economic and political development are so strong that they advocate renouncing all bilateral control of U.S. aid policy, and turning the free world assistance effort over to an international agency. Under this plan, the United States, along with other free world countries, would give assurance to every less developed country in the free world that it could secure as much capital as it could productively use. There would be no military strings, or political criteria, just economic standards which would have to be met to assure the most from the "aid dollar."³⁵

Direct intervention is eschewed by the authors, both for the reason that it is not needed and for the negative results it can have. "Indeed direct political intervention is almost certain to set up resentments and resistances which will produce the exact reverse of the result we seek."³⁶ However these authors also believe that through "our

³⁵ Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harpers, 1957), pp. 56-60.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 39. Indeed, in one section of the book, there is one small sentence which does away with the problem of political development altogether. Although the authors claim not to have placed any political strings on the aid given through their "impartial and respected" international body, there is one vital limitation. No country is eligible for aid unless its "national development goals have been democratically established." This seems to assume away the problem of political development entirely, for in order for a country to decide its development goals democratically, it must have all the attributes of a democratic society; free press to discuss the goals, elected representative to decide on the goals, and a free electorate to vote on the goals. Development aid is not called upon to produce a democratic society, but a country, in order to qualify for aid, must already have one.

economic programs, we can insist on seeking out and developing local leadership."³⁷ We can "force less developed countries to take into consideration rural, as well as urban, sectors."³⁸ Perhaps this could also be accomplished by an international organization, but it would still be a conscious effort to influence the political development of the recipient nation.

So we come to the conclusion that the early Rostow-Millikan doctrine contains many inconsistencies. In its assumptions, it seems to place great faith in the automatic chain effect of aid, but in its policy prescriptions it does not completely carry this faith into action. As far as the "proposal" is concerned, it assumes away the problem of political development by making democratic decision-making a condition of aid. As far as donor political interference is concerned, it is feared because of possible negative repercussions, but is encouraged under the guise of a "skillful" aid policy.

The Rostow-Millikan suggestion - that economic development will be an effective catalyst for beneficial political change - has been increasingly called into question. It was part of the movement in the late 1950's to replace security-oriented aid programs with those designed to encourage long-term economic development.³⁹ It is significant, however,

³⁷Rostow and Millikan, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy, p. 40.

³⁸Ibid., p. 41

³⁹For a description of this movement, see pp. 16-23 in the preceding chapter.

that these authors pinpointed certain political benefits which they hoped the new economic development emphasis would produce. But these were only "spin-off" benefits, and not the main thrust of their arguments for the economic development rationale.

A second type of suggestion also retains the primacy of economic development in the aid program, but does so, not because political benefits are "guaranteed," but because "there is no other alternative." This type of suggestion is embodied in a book by Frank M. Coffin, a former high official in the Agency for International Development entitled, Witness for Aid. In it, he admits that the relationship between economic development and political development is weak theoretically, but he points out that in practice, it seems to hold true. He quotes AID Administrator Bell's testimony in the 1963 Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act. "Although the possibility of economic progress leading to political backsliding cannot be ruled out, there is no clear case of this phenomenon among countries to which we have extended substantial amounts of development assistance." 40

Along with the conviction that economic and political progress go hand in hand is a fear of what a conscious policy of political development would involve. By having such a policy, "we would be exploiting a doctrinaire concept of what progress is."⁴¹ According to Coffin,

⁴⁰ Frank M. Coffin, Witness for Aid (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964), p. 153.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 123.

democracy is actually pluralism, but influence from a conscious aid policy, which makes "special mandates for the private sector, rural sector, housing, savings and loan institutions, etc." would be as bad as the doctrinaire Communist doctrines exported abroad.⁴²

What can the United States do, then, to promote political development in the less developed countries? We can furnish economic aid, which is a precondition for political development. And we can "keep our own national political house in order" as an example to other countries.⁴³ He uses an analogy to explain his point. "The less developed countries are like sailboats tacking before the wind They have not yet charted a steady course. If only the West wind blows steadily, we need have no fear as to the long-run course which they will choose."⁴⁴

For Coffin and other representatives of this second position, the link between economic and political development, while theoretically weak, is, in practice, the best premise for the U.S. aid program to rely upon.

⁴²Frank M. Coffin, Witness for Aid (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964), pp. 123-25.

⁴³Ibid., p. 152.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 152.

B. "Primacy of Economic Development: Political Development
Considered only in Terms of Popular Participation"

Suggestions which fall into this category also place primary stress on economic development. However, they add certain qualifying considerations which serve to place them in a separate category. These authors emphasize the importance of what, for want of a better expression, can be termed "popular participation."⁴⁵ In this analysis, the people of the recipient country must become involved in the development process. Some advocate the "capacity" view and argue that popular participation is a necessary prerequisite for economic development. Others are concerned about popular participations as a value in and of itself, particularly as it relates to involving people in the "processes" of government on local and "grassroots" levels.

One of the best expositions of the first view, i. e., that popular participation is a necessary prerequisite for economic development, is contained in the writings of Professor Gustav Ranis. In an article entitled, Trade, Aid and What? he states specifically that, "regardless of the social system a particular society adopts, there seems little escape from the fact that it must devise institutions appropriate for the mobilization of indigenous talent and resources on a mass scale. Sus-

⁴⁵ It should be noted that, for these authors, popular participation does not mean a totalitarian type of mobilization of the populous. Rather it means an increase in the numbers of people who are included in the decision-making process in the society.

tained growth cannot be achieved with the active participation of only 5 or 10 percent of the population."⁴⁶

The involvement of the necessary number of people calls for large-scale "institutional transformation." Thus, "the traditional practice of 'planning for resources' only, i. e., 'adding up' probable domestic savings and foreign aid, must, in other words, be supplemented by 'planning for policy' which aims at affecting the required institutional transformation."⁴⁷

So far, this "institutional transformation", involving more and more members of the society, can be either totalitarian or democratic. Professor Ranis, opting for the extension of the market system,⁴⁸ clearly takes the latter alternative:

Given the limitations of the machinery of government - and given the fact that the society will want to avoid a coercive solution - we suggest that the only way to ensure massive participation of the economy's human and material resources in the development effort is to permit a larger role for the market mechanism.⁴⁹

How then, can the U.S. government push for such an extension of the market system in the developing countries? The most important

⁴⁶Gustav Ranis, "Trade, Aid, and What?" in The United States and the Developing Economies, ed. by Gustav Ranis, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964), pp. 168.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 167.

⁴⁸See discussion on p. 166 of the article "Trade, Aid, and What?" for Dr. Ranis' ideas concerning the extension of the market system.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 170.

"market," according to Ranis, is the foreign exchange market. The U.S. should agree to support "such a market continuously at a given level. . ."⁵⁰ In return, the aid recipient would be committed to freeing the foreign exchange market. Pressure would also be placed on the recipient government to free other domestic markets.

Thus, with Ranis, popular participation is recognized as a prerequisite for economic growth. Mass participation in the economy is vital and should be accomplished through the extension of the market system. Aid policies should be directed with this goal in mind.

While going beyond "resources calculation," Ranis still ascribes to political development a limited role. He indicates that donor efforts should be directed at recipient government policies. If these change, then the needed "institutional transformation" will be forthcoming. Economic development is still the major focus for Ranis. Mass participation in enlarging markets is still an economic concept. Its ramifications for the political system is not explored. Will the consumer, the entrepreneur, the laborer, have more political power as a result of their entry into the national economy? This important question is not discussed.

There is a second type of suggestion which involves the "popular participation" concept. Instead of advocating an extension of the market system, these suggestions focus on certain economic and social development activities -- cooperatives, community development, labor union

⁵⁰ Gustav Ranis, "Trade, Aid, and What?" in The United States and the Developing Economies ed. by Gustav Ranis, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964) p. 171.

development--which are supposed to have a "political pay-off". Unlike the extension of the market, which is advocated primarily for economic reasons, these activities are more likely to be suggested for their political effects.

The reasoning behind this second suggestion is that as people participate in organizations designed to enhance their economic well-being, they also gain experience in the processes of democratic government. Furthermore, the greater the number of grassroots organizations, the more "pluralism" is introduced into a society. Technical assistance, is, to this school of thought, the most significant form of aid as far as political development is concerned. This idea is expressed by Professor Millikan in an article entitled, "The Political Case for Economic Development Aid." "Technical assistance should build institutions, not just supply experts. The day-to-day activities of technical assistance workers should convey a positive image of United States' goals."⁵¹ Thus technical assistance programs should be selected to allow as many groups as possible to participate in the modernization process. "We should seek to stimulate interaction between various segments of the population. The programs which do this, agricultural extension, local public works, assistance to small enterprise, should be encouraged."⁵²

⁵¹Max F. Millikan, "The Political Case for Economic Development Aid", in Why Foreign Aid? ed by Robert A. Goldwin, p. 100.

⁵²Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and U.S. Policy (Boston: Little & Brown, 1961), p. 146.

The two types of "popular participation" concepts both look toward a growth of the private sector, or a multiplication of "power centers" within the society. They differ in that the first aims at central government policies to "free" the private sector, while the second would use U.S. aid directly to build grassroots organizations.

C. "Primacy of Political Development: Economic Development is Secondary"

The two suggestions in this category carry the conception of political development as a program objective for AID further than either of the two previous categories. Political development is not synonymous with either economic development or with popular participation. Rather it involves many aspects - national integration, institutional development, communications, legal development, civic education, etc.

The two suggestions differ, however, as to how these complex goals can best be carried out. The first would stay within the context of the present aid program, but would redirect economic resources to emphasize and encourage political development. Its route to political development would be indirect. The second type would tackle the problem directly and give, what can only be termed, "political development aid."

The first type of suggestion found clear expression in the doctoral dissertation and subsequent writings of Robert H. Packenham. Instead of focussing on specific activities which foster political develop-

ment, i. e., agricultural extension, local public works, assistance to small enterprises,⁵³ Pakenham emphasized that the entire aid program, capital as well as technical assistance could be used as an instrument in political development. Instead of leaving political considerations up to the ad hoc judgment of AID officials in the field, Pakenham envisions a more or less systematic and calculated strategy of political development.

The nature of his approach is shown in the following quotation:

The primary criteria for a certain aid project might be economic development, for instance, money to be allocated for a communications system. But secondary and tertiary decisions about the administration of the system, the regions and groups who will benefit from it - these could involve political development considerations.⁵⁴

It can be clearly seen that Pakenham stays within the confines of an economic aid program, but he feels that it can be "slanted" to serve political development ends.

Pakenham gives numerous examples in his dissertation as to how the aid program, as now constituted, can be made to serve political development goals. He shows how the addition of political development

⁵³These activities were highlighted in Max F. Millikan, "The Political Case for Economic Development Aid," in *Why Foreign Aid?* ed. by Robert A. Goldwin, p. 107.

⁵⁴Robert A. Pakenham, "Foreign Aid and Political Development", p. 35.

considerations would result in different policy decisions about traditional aid activities. In the field of public administration, for instance, economic considerations alone might lead to an emphasis on improving the capacity of the central government bureaucracy, whereas political development considerations might lead to developing the capacity of local government institutions. In the field of agricultural extension, economic efficiency might dictate a program centrally administered, whereas political development needs might point to a great deal of local participation.⁵⁵

The key to Packenham's approach is not new activities, but new programming strategy. He, more than previous authors, sees the need to apply the principles of political development being formulated in the academic community. "We know enough about political development for some responsible policy decisions - more than we are applying now."⁵⁶

His approach, he maintains, will bring no additional cost to the United States in many instances. It is basically a question of "just giving some thought and attention to the political development effects of aid."⁵⁷ But this thought and attention will require important changes in AID's programming and policy-making.

⁵⁵ Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development and Foreign Aid," pp. 11-27.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 41.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

The second type of suggestion in this category, i. e., direct political development aid, has more advocates in the scholarly community than does the "indirect" route described by Packenham.⁵⁸ Direct political development aid is suggested by John Nuveen in an article entitled, "Social and Political Aid." He states that "foreign aid to the less developed countries, at the outset, must be primarily social and political if it is to serve its purpose."⁵⁹ It is clear that Nuveen is not advocating economic development aid at all, but a different type of aid, consisting not of loans, but of information, ideology, and political tactics.

Lucien Pye supports this view when he says in a seminar paper directed to AID officials that: "it is certainly plausible that it would be more economical to invest directly in the areas of political development and attitude change than to make heavy investments in the economic sphere in order merely to affect attitudes and values."⁶⁰ Samuel Huntington also comes out for a direct solution both in his article, "Political Development and Decay" and in his testimony before subcommittee hearings on "Rural Development in Asia"⁶¹ In his article, he states that

⁵⁸As will be shown, the "indirect" route is most favored by officials with practical experience in the Agency. It appears that Dr. Packenham, during the writing of his dissertation, was obviously influenced by prior thinking in the Agency with regard to political development. See Chapter 4 of the present study for a discussion of this topic.

⁵⁹John Nuveen, "Social and Political Aid" in Why Foreign Aid? ed. by Robert A. Goldwin, p. 58.

⁶⁰Lucien Pye, "Political Development and Foreign Aid," Agency for International Development, mimeo, p. 35.

⁶¹Samuel B. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," p. 245.

"American policy should be directed to the creation within modernizing countries of at least one strong, non-communist political party . . ." ⁶²

In the subcommittee hearings, he stated that

We should inaugurate new activities directed specifically toward political development. These might include assistance to political parties, programs to develop and train political leaders, assistance to more broadly based and public oriented interest groups, and more widespread support for community development programs. ⁶³

The new type of aid suggested by Nuveen, Pye, and Huntington, is given more detailed attention in articles by Dankwart Rustow, W. Howard Wriggins, and H. Field Haviland, Jr. Professor Rustow speaks for the group when he says, ". . . we should elevate what may be termed 'political development assistance' to a level of equal or greater dignity with the more traditional forms of economic and technical assistance." ⁶⁴

Most of the suggestions in this group relate to the identification and training of political leaders and to the organization of political parties.

⁶²Samuel B. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay,"

⁶³U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "Statement of Samuel P. Huntington," in Rural Development in Asia, Hearings, 60th Cong., 1st sess., March 2, 1967, p. 121.

⁶⁴Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Vanishing Dream of Stability," Brookings Institution Reprint No. 65, (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1962) p. 16. [Reprinted from the August, 1962 AID Digest, U.S. Department of State.]

A series of quotations will give illustrations of what the new type of aid envisioned by these men would be like.

Developing Political Leaders:

The most promising leaders in each country need to be identified, encouraged, and supported in ways that will be acceptable and helpful in their particular political and social environment. The best young people in fields related to political activity should be sought out and helped to develop constructive leadership careers. The values and skills of such individuals can be strengthened in numerous ways.⁶⁵

Wherever the political climate permits, assistance programs in public administration should include the training of party and labor leaders of various persuasions in methods of debate and peaceful organization. This training should have priority with instruction of engineers and public administrators.⁶⁶

Developing Political Parties:

Because political parties are the main arteries connecting the public and the government, they deserve special attention and assistance. The first need is help in thinking through the basic strategy and tactics of party development in relation to the peculiar circumstances of each country.⁶⁷

Party organizations can be enhanced by in-service training, by special schools for party officers such as the Institute of Political Education recently established in Costa Rica for young leaders of democratic parties in Latin America. And by field trips to gain first-hand comparative knowledge of various party systems such as those of India's Congress Party, Mexico's PRI and Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party.⁶⁸

⁶⁵H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Policy and Foreign Politics," Brookings Institution Reprint No. 65 (Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution, 1962), p. 22;

⁶⁶Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Vanishing Dream of Stability," p. 16.

⁶⁷H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Policy and Foreign Politics," p. 23.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 23.

Providing Contact with Political Leaders in U.S. and Third
Countries:

Much more might be done, for example in making it possible for professional politicians in new democratic parties to visit political leaders who have been successful in developing democratic parties in third countries.⁶⁹

Support should be given to more effective discourse between the leadership of the more and the less developed countries regarding their respective concepts of basic ends and means. This communication should be conducted through various channels, governmental and non-governmental. It should be based on objective, comparative analyses of various political, economic, and social systems, and should seek a more adequate consensus on essential values.⁷⁰

It should be noted that authors in this group do not necessarily envision bilateral aid channels as the major route for this kind of aid. As H. Field Haviland, Jr. stated in a Brookings Institution Symposium, "The main purpose is not to inject external assistance, but to help emerging countries recognize for themselves that political development is a key problem and to work out their own strategy and tactics to cope with it."⁷¹

Haviland and others also advocate that political development aid should be given through nongovernmental rather than governmental

⁶⁹W. Howard Wriggins, "Politics: Purpose and Program" . (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1962), p. 20 .

⁷⁰H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Policy and Foreign Politics," p. 23.

⁷¹H. Field Haviland, Jr., "An Operational Approach to Political Development" (paper presented at a symposium entitled "The Theory and Practice of Political Development," organized by the Brookings Institution for AID officials, Airlie Farms, Va., September 12-16, 1966), p. 5.

channels. "Maximum use should be made of collaboration between counterpart organizations: student groups working with student groups, businessmen with businessmen, intellectuals with intellectuals."⁷²

In sum, then, the two suggestions made in this category are similar in that they both emphasize the importance of complex political development considerations for the achievement of U.S. goals in the less developed countries. They do not rely on economic development alone, or on economic development with popular participation. One, however, advocates the "indirect" route, through the carefully planned use of economic development resources. The second, while not ruling out the use of traditional economic aid instruments, feels that direct political development assistance must be given for the end result to be achieved. The goals are similar in both cases, but the means are different.

III. Summary and Conclusions

It can clearly be seen from the academic literature surveyed in this section that there is no clearly accepted route to political development. The consensus which existed in the late 1950's about economic development is not present in the late 1960's about political development. There is, however, a growing body of accepted terminology, including

⁷²H. Field Haviland, Jr., "An Operational Approach to Political Development," presented at a Brookings Institution Symposium, "The Theory and Practice of Political Development," held at Airlie Farms, Va. September 12-16, 1966, p. 6.

phrases such as "national integration, " "institutional development, " "legal and administrative development, " "interest articulation and aggregation, " "political mobilization, " etc. There are also a series of "maxims" such as "political mobilization should not outstrip the development of institutions needed to channel participation in government". But a system of priorities has not been established. "What to do first, in a specific country situation?" and "How to do it?" These questions have not been answered.

In concluding this section, perhaps the most worthwhile exercise would be to examine the approaches to political development discussed above and summarize some of the possible advantages and disadvantages of each approach. The early Rostow-Millikan doctrine rests comfortably on the automatic link between economic and political development. Former AID official, Frank Coffin, felt the link was shaky, but saw more danger in a direct approach to political development than concentration on the "preconditions." The suggestions embodied in this approach should not be brushed off lightly. Many students of development have come to the conclusion that political development requires an extensive set of "preconditions". According to this school, more damage than good is done by a "premature" attempt to stimulate democratic political development. The contribution of this school of thought appears to be its awareness of the many and complex interrelationships in development. It warns the advocates of political development to proceed slowly in a new and sensitive area of endeavor.

Its concentration on economic and social "preconditions" has two distinct advantages. It is the type of approach with which the United States has had the most experience, and hence feels the most comfortable. It is also the approach most readily approved of by recipient governments. However, the automatic link between the "preconditions" and actual political development has been increasingly called into question and is, at best, uncertain. In fact, many authors suggest that there are important political preconditions for successful economic development, thus reversing the sequence of preconditions. At any rate, the view that development is "all of a piece," a "whole fabric" is gaining ascendancy. Whatever its advantages and disadvantages, the predominant position of the "preconditions" approach in U.S. aid programs has hindered exploration of other approaches, and thus prevented useful thinking with regard to the other facets of development.

The second category of suggestions, i. e. economic development with popular participation, has several advantages. In its first form, "extension of the market system," it is really an economic proposal and thus has the advantage of not straying far from traditional AID concerns. Furthermore, there is a great deal of consensus, both in Congress and in U.S. public opinion, that private sector development is a laudatory goal. Finally, AID has had a good deal of experience with this approach.

There are some disadvantages to the "popular participation through extension of the market" approach however. It does assume that the U.S. government will be able to pressure the other governments to "free" the private sector. It also assumes that a set of "policies" followed by the

recipient country's central government will be able to penetrate the economy in order to cause necessary changes. Furthermore, it assumes that a certain amount of development has already occurred, i. e., that there is a private sector to be "unleased." All of these assumptions might very well be unfounded in the case of a particular less developed country. Finally, the "extension of the market" approach is not completely satisfactory because it posits just one solution to the complex problems of political and economic development.

In its second form, i. e., development of grassroots institutions, it also remains close to traditional AID activities. There is support in Congress for the development of coops and other local institutions. Counterpart organizations are available to carry on the work. However, this approach, also, posits just one type of activity leading to one clearly defined goal, i. e., increased popular participation. Thus it misses some of the complexity and value of a more multifaceted view of political development.

The third type of suggestion, political development as a program objective of AID, also has both advantages and disadvantages. The "indirect route" has the advantage of using economic resources and thus remaining within the context of the present aid programs. At a low level of policy, such as the influence of an American technician on his counterpart, it would require hardly any change at all. But when it came to the high level policy changes suggested by Robert Packenham, the required change assumes more radical proportions. To "slant" the program toward the goal of political development would require high-level commitment, almost of the type needed by a "new type of political development aid."

To channel funds into certain projects and in certain ways in order to foster political development could change the set of priorities of the aid program. In the long run, this would require new emphases in U.S. foreign policy. At a minimum, more attention would have to be given to the strategic relations between longer-run internal political development in the host country and external U.S. foreign policy goals and interests with regard to the particular country.

The advantage, however, of the above strategy is that it would not be readily apparent that a change in policy would have been made. Economic resources would still flow into the recipient country. The same types of programs would be forthcoming, such as agricultural extension, educational reform, and community development. Roads would still be built and dams constructed. The recipient government would not feel threatened by such an approach, or even need to know it existed at all. It would, however, make much greater demands on the administrators of the aid program and would require support at a high policy-making level.

The second approach, that of extending "political development aid" would attempt to influence the political process directly by a variety of largely untried means. These would include political education institutes, political education handbooks, in-service training schools for promising young politicians, workshops and travel abroad for the same group, use of educational facilities to inculcate democratic values, even the establishment and encouragement of political parties.

There are several drawbacks to this approach. Because it has not been tried to any great extent, it would require new skills on the part of AID administrators and the creation of new programs. It would also require an extensive understanding of the political system in the country and cultural values attached to it. Because it is largely untried, its effectiveness is not known. Can democratic values be taught through training programs and handbooks?

Lastly, it is not at all sure that the recipient governments would approve of such aid, especially if it is directed to actual or potential opponents in the political arena. Our foreign aid programs are an overt instrument of foreign policy and depend, to a large extent, on the mutuality of interest between donor and recipient governments for their success. Such mutuality is found mostly in the area of economic development, and not in the area of greater popular participation in government.

While it is questionable how much AID can do in the way of direct political development aid, it is certainly true that there are untapped possibilities in working with U.S. counterpart organizations. This last route should be more carefully examined by AID administrators than it has been in the past.

In conclusion, it appears that all of these approaches have important contributions to make toward furthering political development. Because no one accepted doctrine has emerged, all should be studied and applied where they are relevant. There is only one difficulty. The resources of the aid program in the area of political development are

extremely limited. The "shotgun" approach to political development, using all the approaches to some extent, might not be as practical as the lack of consensus might indicate. The approach of "slanting" the aid program's current use of economic development resources to further political development appears to offer the most promise for adoption and success.

CHAPTER THREE

Congressional Concern with Political Development:

The Passage of Title IX

In this chapter, we move from historical and academic concern with political development to governmental policy-making at the present time. Thus this chapter has a two fold purpose. The first is to indicate the breath of influence of political development doctrines on governmental decision-making prior to inclusion of the Title IX amendment. The second is to study in depth, the particular developments which led up to the passage of Title IX in 1966. The pattern of the section, thus, will be one of narrowing attention from very general observations to specific analysis. The larger circles will converge on the point of particular interest - the passage of Title IX.

I. Loci of Interest in Political Development Prior to the Passage of Title IX:

There is little doubt that the backdrop for Title IX was provided by the increase of interest and research in the field of political development in the academic community during the decade of the 1960's. From the time of Woodrow Wilson, the United States has thought wishfully about promoting democracies abroad. The thought has frequently been derided, however, as the complexities of induced political change have become apparent. But research in the field of political development, undertaken by academics, with its promise of realism and objectivity,

has made this desire, again, seem realizable. The vehicle is conveniently provided by the U.S. programs of economic assistance which allow U.S. entry into other societies. Political development considerations need only to be injected into these programs in order for the goal to be realized. The importance of the academic field of political development for the passage of Title IX is evident. Without it, it is likely that there would have been no new initiative in this area.

Although the fact that political scientists have increasingly studied political development was crucial for Title IX, its relationship to the passage of the legislation was not direct. There was no specific pressure from the academic community to include a specific amendment in the aid legislation. However, many who had studied the aid program felt that more attention should be paid to political development.¹ The Congressional sponsors of Title IX were in contact with and influenced by these academicians. Hence their existence was important, although their actions were minimal. The promise of information, objectivity, and of academic approval was vital to the success of the legislation.

Keeping in mind the role of the academic community, what were the specific locii of interest in political development within and without the governmental bureaucracy prior to the passage of Title IX in 1966? Where could the initiative for the inclusion of political development doctrines in the aid program have come from? The list which has been

¹The reader is referred to Chapter 2 of this study for a discussion of these scholars.

compiled in this regard is not exhaustive. Rather it is indicative of the types of people who were interested in political development and who thus created the environment which brought forth Title IX.

In discussing these sources of initiative, an important distinction must be made between those sources which have a direct and specific responsibility for the formation of aid policy and those which do not. In the former category, three possible sources of initiative can be identified: a) internal policy formation within the Agency for International Development; b) policy formation within the Department of State; c) policy prescriptions from Congress.

In the latter category are such sources as a) the Department of Defense; b) the Office of the Vice-President; c) the Central Intelligence Agency; d) Private groups such as the Society for International Development and the Brookings Institution.

A. Direct Sources of Initiative

1. Agency for International Development

The first possibility is that the political development initiative could have come from within the Agency for International Development. Robert A. Packenham located several sources of possible initiative within the Agency in his 1964 study entitled "Foreign Aid and Political Development."² The first of these was the community development and

²Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development and Foreign Aid" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1964.)

educational experts in the Office of Human Resources and Social Development. Pakenham found that they had the most advanced concepts of political development of any Agency officers interviewed. In his own words, their replies to his questions demonstrated "the most elaborate display . . . of the concepts of the social system and political culture approaches to political development." He noted that the words they used, "participant society, interest articulation and aggregation, decentralization of power and authority, importance of local government" reflected academic vocabulary in the field of political development .³

Along with these experts, Pakenham discovered a nucleus of interested people in the Program Coordination Staff of the Agency. He particularly noted that the Program Guidance Manual, written within this office, reflected a concern for political development.⁴ Contrary to the community development and educational experts "on the fringes", these officials were described as having a direct influence on policy formation in the Agency.

Finally he discovered that certain officers, (though not many), in the Regional Bureaus, showed some explicit attention to political development in their work. The majority of these were in the Far East Bureau and were concerned with the United States' security-oriented programs in South Vietnam and in Laos.⁵ Thus, it can be assumed that

³Robert A. Pakenham, "Political Development and Foreign Aid", pp. 170-171.

⁴Ibid., p. 187.

⁵Ibid., p. 192.

even without the passage of Title IX, these sources of initiative within the Agency itself would have continued to exert some influence in the direction of greater concern with political development.

2. The Department of State:

The second possibility is that a political development initiative could have come from officials in the U.S. Department of State. The Agency for International Development is a semi-autonomous agency, but is under the direction of the Secretary of State. Thus, the Secretary and his staff could have influenced the course of political development in the Aid Program. Packenham's study pinpointed three distinct sources of initiative in the State Department. The first was a group of high level officials in the Department. Packenham quotes speeches by Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretaries Cleveland and Martin, and Ambassador Bowles to show their interest in the political results of aid. For example, he refers to a statement by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization, as being indicative of a "political development awareness." Mr. Cleveland is quoted as saying that "the essence of overseasmanship is the building of political and social institutions" with the implication that the teaching of skills is not enough.⁶ Statements like this led Packenham to believe that a concern with political development, at least as a subsidiary foreign policy objective, existed among some high level State Department officials

⁶Harlan Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone, eds., The Art of Overseasmanship (Syracuse, N. Y.:Syracuse University Press, 1957), p. 3.

subject to its influence in the matter of policy.⁹ Thus, Congress is not responsible for overall policy, but does have a direct influence on at least one instrument of that policy - the U.S. aid program. This ambiguous position of Congress, that of being responsible for the "part", but not of the "whole", creates numerous problems for the aid program.

The second question which must be asked is as follows: "If Congress does exercise direct control over the aid program, has it indeed been a source of political development initiative?" The answer cannot be a clear "yes" or "no", because the influence of Congress is heterogeneous. Congress is a collective body. Many individual Congressmen have been able to insert their own ideas into the aid legislation.¹⁰ Certain Congressional Committees have become identified with certain types of policies.¹¹ Thus it is inaccurate to claim that a steady flow of concern for political development has come from the congressional branch of government.

⁹There are other foreign policy agencies which have a similar relationship to Congress, such as the United States Information Agency and the Peace Corps, for instance.

¹⁰According to Frank M. Coffin, it is the attitude in Congress that unless a particular amendment is very bad, a committee will "go along" with the particular member rather than court his bad humor and lack of support for the legislation. Frank M. Coffin, Witness for AID (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 100.

¹¹The Foreign Operations Subcommittee under Representative Otto E. Passman, for instance, has become identified as a source of restrictive amendments with regard to the use of funds. Many of the budgetary restrictions on the aid program result from its influence. Other individual Congressmen have become associated with the protection of U.S. domestic interests. The requirements that aid goods be shipped in U.S. "bottoms," that small businessmen be allowed to bid on AID contracts, and that aid should be "tied" to purchases in the United States, are examples of this pattern.

Intertwined with other patterns of influence, however, there does appear to be an interest in the political results of aid. There has been an uneasiness about the economic development rationale. Members of Congress have been concerned that aid "reach the people" of the recipient countries. Very explicit in the aid legislation is the desire to insure the development of the private sector in the recipient countries.¹² Thus the "extension of the market system," described in Chapter II, is a well-accepted objective for the aid program in Congress. The second suggestion, i. e., the development of grassroots organizations, while less well-known, is also a theme for Congressional influence.

This second suggestion is reflected in a series of one line amendments which have come from both Houses of Congress and illustrate the interest of particular members of those bodies. For instance, an amendment dating from the middle 1950's provides for loans of under \$25,000 to small farmers and is identified with Walter S. Judd. The amendment assumes that by giving small, individual loans, more people will be reached by American aid and local grassroots development will be stimulated.

¹² An entire section of the Foreign Assistance Act is entitled the "Encouragement of Free Enterprise and Private Participation." In it, it states that it is the policy of the United States, inter alia, to foster private initiative and competition, to discourage monopolistic practices and to strengthen free labor unions." The Humphrey amendment is found under this section. Public Law 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, (75 Stat. 424) Part III, Chapter I, Section 601.

More of these amendments were offered after the reorganization of the aid program in 1961. In that same year an amendment, suggested by Hubert H. Humphrey, states that it was U.S. policy "to encourage the development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations."¹³ These organizations are commonly considered the essential components of a pluralistic society, and this amendment thus embodies a "popular participation" concept of political development. In the words of a 1966 Congressional Report, the Humphrey amendment resulted in "a positive cooperative program, the creation of a division in AID to look after cooperative projects, the use of cooperative specialists in AID's regional offices in Washington and its missions abroad, and the direct participation of U.S. cooperatives in foreign aid."¹⁴ The Report highlighted "the contribution that cooperatives and nonprofit organizations can make because of their unique ability to involve large numbers of people and to enlist their support and services . . ."¹⁵

¹³Public Law 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, (75 Stat. 424) Part III, Chapter I, Section 601, "The Humphrey Amendment."

¹⁴U.S., Congress, House, Development of Cooperative Enterprises--1966 Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, A Report for the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., second session, 1966.

¹⁵Ibid.

The Humphrey amendment, discussed above, stressed three types of business organizations, - cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations. In 1962, an amendment was adopted which moved from the advocacy of particular forms of business organizations to a wider concern with the entire development of the local community. This amendment is identified with Clement A. Zablocki, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It specified that, in giving assistance to countries having agrarian economies, "emphasis shall be placed upon programs of community development which will promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local level."¹⁶ Not only was the scope of this amendment wider than that of the Humphrey amendment, the political development goal of promoting "stable and responsible governmental institutions" (see underlining) was specifically cited. This goal was further elaborated in the House Report accompanying the legislation.

The product of successful community development is not only wells, roads, schools, other community facilities and new crops; it is, more properly, the development of stable, self-reliant communities with an assured sense of social and political responsibility.

The Committee believes that community development can be a dynamic force leading to economic improvement, social advancement, and orderly political growth.¹⁷

¹⁶ Public Law 87-565, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 255), Part I, Chapter 6, Section 461. (underlining mine)

¹⁷ U.S., House of Representatives, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. 87th Congress, 2d Session, House Report 1788 (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 26.

In sum, although there are many threads spun from the loom of Congressional pressure, one of these is certainly concerned with political development. Prior to 1966, there was, however, little awareness of an academic field of political development with findings relevant to the aid program. Rather, there existed an unstated assumption, on the part of Congress, that development should involve the population of the recipient country, should result in a thriving private sector, and should stimulate the growth of pluralistic organizations and local institutions.

B. Indirect Sources of Initiative

The sources of initiative, discussed below, did not have direct control over the aid program. They were not responsible for policy-making in the same sense that AID, the Department of State, or Congress is. However, their existence created the environment from which Title IX sprang, and in some cases, their influence was important for the passage of the legislation.

1. Private Organizations:

Two private organizations were centers of initiative on the Washington scene prior to 1966. The first of these was the Brookings Institution. This private research organization had inspired and financed a good deal of research in the area of political development, including the 1964 study by Robert A. Packenham on "Political Development and U.S. Foreign Policy." Its Director of Foreign Policy Studies,

Dr. H. Field Haviland, Jr. had formulated a concept of "civic development" which had been quite influential in the academic world.¹⁸

The second organization was the Society for International Development. This Society was not a research organization as was the Brookings Institution, but rather was a private grouping of businessmen, bankers and others interested in the development process. It had organized a subcommittee to study political development under the chairmanship of Mr. Dana Reynolds. This same Mr. Reynolds was also an official of the Agency for International Development and through him the Society had a leavening influence on the course of political development in the Agency.

2. The Office of the Vice-President:

Since 1964, the Vice-President of the United States had been Hubert H. Humphrey. His interest in political development had been illustrated by the "Humphrey amendment" which, as seen earlier, concerned the development of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations. The continuing interest of his office in political development was shown by the participation of Mr. John Rielly, an assistant to Mr. Humphrey, in the "Coop Month Seminar" held by AID in October of 1966. His seminar speech is notable for its explicit

¹⁸This concept is well developed in Dr. Haviland's article, "An Operational Approach to Political Development," Brookings Institution Symposium, September 12-16.

attention to the political development objectives of the Humphrey amendment. In it he states that "the Humphrey amendment accents pluralism."¹⁹ He continues by saying the following:

In straight government-to-government assistance programs, there is an unconscious tendency to aid government--to aid top-level sectors; a tendency to encourage monolithic governmental programs and development. We need to help the countries design devices to transform the social and economic structure for broader participation. The cooperative is a unique economic device to facilitate decentralization in decision-making; to provide the mechanics for economic, social, and political decisions at the lowest levels.²⁰

He concluded, that in carrying out the Humphrey amendment, "we have been laying an important foundation for the political development which is being widely discussed today."²¹ The Vice-President's Office, as can be seen from the above quotations, definitely constituted a source of political development initiative.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency:

It is common for those familiar with the activities of the U.S. Government to state that "the only organization really involved in stimulating political development abroad, at present, is the Central Intelligence Agency."²² The contribution of all the other sources of initiative men-

¹⁹ John Rielly, "The Five Year Record of the Humphrey Amendment" A. I. D. Coop Month Seminar, October 20, 1966, AID Mimeo, p. 2.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

²¹ Ibid., p. 2.

²² I heard this statement made several times in my interviews with Agency officials. See Chapters 6 and 7 of the present study.

tioned in this section consisted primarily of interest in the problems of political development. None were actively engaged in political development "work". It is impossible to give any picture of the Central Intelligence Agency's activities in this regard, but it has undoubtedly been concerned with both grassroots development and with the evolution of alternative forms of leadership in the recipient countries.

4. The Department of Defense:

The Department of Defense has had an interest in political development particularly as it relates to "counter-insurgency." There has been a growing realization that "wars of national liberation" are political, and must be "fought" primarily on the social, economic, and political fronts.²³ The concern of the Department of Defense, however is not with political development as an objective in its own right. Rather, it is concerned with stopping counter-insurgency movements and the political problems associated with them. In many cases, the situation must already have reached the stage of actual combat for the Department of Defense to become concerned.

²³As a research assistant, I became involved in a project sponsored by the Navy Department investigating the root causes of counter-insurgency in Venezuela. The approach was one of studying the entire political scene in the country. Political groups were identified and labeled; and the dynamics of political processes in the country were analyzed.

C. Summary

Thus we can conclude that there were a variety of groups, within and without the governmental bureaucracy, who were interested in the inclusion of political development considerations in the aid program. There was interest and concern within AID itself²⁴ There was awareness among some State Department officials of the need served by political development. In Congress, there were two types of concerns. First, there was a general feeling on the part of many Congressmen that aid should contribute to private and pluralistic development. Second, there was a series of specific amendments emphasizing particular institutions and programs which had been adopted through the pressure of individual Senators and Congressmen. Some of this particular interest had carried over to the Vice-President's office under Hubert Humphrey.

In addition, there was the actual experience of the Central Intelligence Agency in political development, and the growing interest by the Defense Department in the political aspects of counter-insurgency. Finally, there were the private locii of influence in the Brookings Institution and in the Society for International Development.

²⁴This interest will be discussed further in Chapter 4 of the present study entitled, "Preparation for and Operational Changes in Response to Title IX."

II. Direct Origins of Title IX

In the previous section an attempt was made to point out some of the groups and organizations with an interest and/or expertise in the field of political development. Not all of these were concerned about political development in the aid program, however. There is no evidence that the Department of Defense put any pressure on the Agency for International Development to move in the direction of political development. There seems to have been little direct pressure from the Vice-President's Office. There have been rumors that some Central Intelligence Agency officials would like to have some of their political development activities transferred to A.I.D., but this cannot be verified. Finally, and most importantly, the Department of State exercised no real leadership in the direction of greater concern for political development.

Thus what remains are the three sources of initiative which were particularly concerned with political development in the aid program. There is the group of officials within AID, there is the Congress, and there are the two private organizations - The Brookings Institution and the Society for International Development.

A. The Sponsors of the Legislation: The House Foreign Affairs Committee

Before describing the interrelationship of these three sources of initiative, one of them must be further discussed - the U.S. Congress. As was pointed out, Congress had shown a concern with political development in the "popular participation" sense of private sector and pluralistic

development. Individual Congressmen had gone beyond this, and had drawn attention to specific programs which they felt contributed to U.S. political objectives abroad.

In the mid-1960's, concern with political development, which had resulted either from a very general consensus or from the initiative of a few scattered individuals, became "incorporated" in a standing Congressional Committee. This was the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. Several factors made it a good vehicle for this type of concern. First, the only major business which consistently comes before this Committee is the foreign aid legislation. Moreover, it is only the "authorizing" legislation on which the members are required to act. The actual appropriations are within the domain of the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the House Appropriations Committee. Thus, the Foreign Affairs Committee is left with little substantive to do. Morale on the Committee is not high. As one member said in an interview with the author, "There is a lot of dead wood on this Committee. There is no interest in the aid program, and that is our major business. Only 5 or 6 members show up at hearings. I think it is terrible."²⁵ Thus, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is a good vehicle for aid policy concerns simply because it has no other way of making its influence felt at all. If it cannot appropriate money, it must try to influence policy.

²⁵Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, private interview held in the House of Representatives Office Building, Washington, D. C., March 21, 1968.

Secondly, the membership of the Committee in the mid-1960's made it responsive to political development concerns. As Marion Czarnecki, staff consultant to the Committee, explained in an interview, there was a natural alliance between the "old guard" and the young members of the Committee. The "old guard" was represented by Clement A. Zablocki (D. -Wisc.), who had shown his interest in pluralistic development by proposing the Zablocki amendment on Community Development in 1962. But the real initiative came from two younger members, Donald M. Frazer (D. -Minn.)²⁶ and F. Bradford Morse (R. -Mass.).²⁷ Thus, when it is said that Congress was a source of political development initiative, it is more exact to say that

²⁶ Congressman Donald M. Fraser, co-sponsor of Title IX is a Democrat from the state of Minnesota. He is forty-four years old, a lawyer, and a member of the U.S. Congress for six years. Before that, he had served in the Minnesota State Senate for eight years. His father is a professor of law, and the Congressman retains both an interest in and links with the academic community. His interest in foreign affairs is evidenced by the fact that he served as secretary and vice-chairman of the Minneapolis Foreign Policy Association. He ranks fifteenth on the majority side in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as of 1968. Information obtained from Congressman Fraser's Office, House Office Building, Washington, D. C. Feb. 1968.

²⁷ Congressman Morse, three years older than Congressman Fraser, was also trained in law. Whereas Congressman Fraser's father was law professor, Congressman Morse, himself, served as a faculty member of the Boston University School of Law from 1949-1953. He showed his interest in foreign affairs by membership in various organizations, such as the Interparliamentary Union, The Atlantic Council, and the World Affairs Council of Boston. He was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1960, and thus has served two years longer than Congressman Fraser. He ranks number ten on the minority side of the Committee. Information obtained from Congressman Morse's Office, House Office Bldg., Washington, D. C., March, 1968.

initiative, during this period, stemmed from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. It is still more exact to say that it reflects the deep concern of two members of that Committee, Congressman Fraser and Congressman Morse. It is now our task to discover what the interrelationship was between the Congressional source of initiative and the other remaining sources. They will become apparent as we trace the direct origins of Title IX.

B. Events Leading to the Legislation

1. The Cooperative Forum Speech of Congressman Fraser

In an interview with the author, Congressman Fraser stated that he first become interested in the field of political development when he began actively studying and promoting the aid program as a member of the "Democratic Study Group." As he discussed the program, he began to ask the question, "What does economics have to do with politics?" He states that it became clear to him that there was no automatic guarantee that economic resources transferred abroad would produce political results in the national interest of the United States.²⁸

²⁸Mr. Fraser elaborated this idea before a meeting of the American Political Science Association held on September 5, 1968. The relationship between economic aid and political development is complex, he said. Our aid might result in a "wrong" political output, in a negligible output, or in some positive contribution. "When we fool around with other peoples' society, we ought to know what we want to do, and what the likely impact is". From a Round-Table discussion entitled "Participation, Institutionalization and Politico-Administrative Development: Implications of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act," Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., September 5, 1968.

The problem both disturbed and fascinated Mr. Fraser. He began to direct questions to academicians testifying before his Congressional subcommittees on the subject. The Vietnam war heightened his awareness of the problem. He became convinced that political development was not being taken into consideration in U.S. military and aid efforts in that country.

During the period prior to the passage of Title IX in 1966, Mr. Fraser was in contact with two of the sources of political development initiative described earlier. He was influenced by the concept of "civic development" formulated by Dr. H. Field Haviland, Jr. of the Brookings Institution. He was also in contact with Mr. Dana Reynolds, the AID official who was serving as chairman of the Subcommittee on Political Development of the Society for International Development.²⁹ It was Mr. Reynolds who encouraged him to give his first speech on political development. In the Congressman's own words, "I would say that I came around to the concept of political development late in the game. People in AID and the academic world were already concerned . . ."³⁰

²⁹The Society for International Development is, according to its own literature, an assemblage of persons mainly engaged in or associated with programs of international development. Its main purpose is to stimulate the exchange of ideas, facts, and experience in its special field of interest. The American Economic Review, Vol. 58, no. 3, part 1, review of the Collected Papers of the Society for International Development, June, 1968, p. 580.

³⁰Donald M. Fraser, private interview held in the House Office Building, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1968.

This speech, delivered before the Cooperative Forum³¹ on November 4, 1965, was entitled "Political Development: The Missing Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Developing Nations." It was a crucial milestone on the road to Title IX. It was the first time that Congressman Fraser had publically expressed himself on the question of political development and foreign aid, and, by his own admission, "It really firmed up my thinking on political development."³²

This speech has great significance for it is not only the earliest, but also one of the most explicit expositions of the Congressman's views. In it, he comes out firmly for a political development rationale for aid. "We must take a far more deliberate and more comprehensive role toward developing nations. We should systematically try to trigger, to stimulate, and to guide the growth of fundamental social structures and behaviors among large numbers of people in other countries."³³ He reaffirms this broad and pervasive purpose when he states at the end of his speech that he is advocating nothing less than "a massive program of political development activities."³⁴

³¹In Mr. Fraser's words, an "organization of people in and around Washington, interested in politics. Things are allowed to be said off the record."

³²Donald M. Fraser, private interview held in the House Office Bldg., Washington, D. C., February 27, 1968.

³³Donald M. Fraser; "Political Development: The Missing Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Developing Nations", Mimeo, November 4, 1965, p. 2.

³⁴Ibid. p. 12.

Along with proposing a political development rationale for aid and making several concrete suggestions in this regard, Congressional Fraser asks another question in this first speech. "Who should take responsibility for an increased 'political development' efforts?" He is as occupied with this question in his first speech as with formulating a new rationale for aid. He is deeply troubled by the fact that no one in the government appears to have primary responsibility for political development.

Relating this problem to Vietnam, he says, "But, as we are reminded so frequently, the problem (Vietnam) is primarily political. Where do our leaders turn for operating competence in the political development field? Where in Washington is responsibility centered?"³⁵ Having concluded that no one has this responsibility, he asks himself where it should be placed. Not the State Department - "Its role is to deal with existing governments and provide reports and analysis."³⁶ Not the Central Intelligence Agency - "Its covert nature inhibits the feedback from experience which is essential to learning."³⁷ By process of elimination, AID remains. He concludes that political development should become a primary mission of AID."³⁸

³⁵D.M.Fraser, "Political Development:Missing Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Developing Nations", p. 5.

³⁶Ibid., p. 5.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 5-6.

³⁸Ibid., p. 6.

In this first speech, the Congressman seems as concerned about getting someone in the executive branch to pay attention to the field of political development as with promoting any specific suggestions of his own. In his "Cooperative Forum speech", he shows himself to be a concerned, but not doctrinaire, commentator on United States' foreign aid policy.

2. The House Study Mission to Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic

Another important milestone on the road to Title IX occurred very shortly after the Cooperative Forum speech by Congressman Fraser. On November 6, 1965, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee left on a special study mission to Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The purpose of the thirteen day trip was to examine the results of U.S. aid to Chile, along with several other Central American countries. Along with Mr. Fraser, Congressman F. Bradford Morse, a Republican from Massachusetts, was an active participant. The two men, while members of different political parties, discovered they had a great deal in common as far as their feelings about foreign aid and political development were concerned.

There is no formal document, such as Congressman Fraser's Cooperative Forum speech, which indicates Mr. Morse's thinking before the Study Mission trip. However in an interview with the author, Mr. Morse stated that his interest in Title IX first grew out of a deep dis-

satisfaction with the aid program. He began to realize that development was a "comprehensive thing," but that "the highest level officials at AID were all economists." "They have a certain orientation, but I know that life doesn't work that way."³⁹

Mr. Morse's feelings about the operations of AID evidently did not lead to specific action until he exchanged ideas with Congressman Fraser during the Study Mission trip. According to Morse, "we had both been doing independent thinking along these lines." The fact of discovering a mutual interest on the part of these two men, both members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, cannot be overemphasized. This discovery undoubtedly encouraged them to introduce formal legislation embodying their conceptions of foreign aid.

Mr. Morse traces the genesis of Title IX back to the Report of the Special Study Mission to Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic which emerged from this trip. He states that the Report was written in his office by an assistant, Miss Linda Lee.⁴⁰ It can be assumed, therefore, that the Report embodies primarily the ideas of that office. It presents some interesting similarities and contrasts to Mr. Fraser's "Cooperative Forum Speech."

³⁹F. Bradford Morse, private interview held in Congressman Morse's Office, House Office Bldg., Washington, D. C., March 5, 1968.

⁴⁰Ibid.

Most important, the Study Mission Report does not attempt to formulate and deliver a new rationale for foreign aid. Its suggestions are made with reference to a specific aid program (Chile), and thus take on a more limited character. Congressman Fraser labeled political development as the "missing link" in U.S. relations with developing countries. The Study Mission Report does not mention the term "political development." But its main criticism of the Chilean aid program is that it has been "deficient in the encouragement of broadened participation" - a criticism with heavy political development overtones.

Broadened participation can result from an increase in national consciousness and a desire to see the country progress, from active participation in the political processes which result in policy decisions affecting the people, and through direct involvement in problem-solving at a level close to the citizen.⁴¹

The Report contends that the solution to this problem is decentralization of decision-making achieved through the growth of pluralistic institutions. This growth was also stressed by Congressman Fraser, but there is a difference in emphasis. Mr. Fraser was interested in "organizations based on economic or community interest because they could become "the source for popularly-based political movements."⁴² The Study Mission Report was interested in these groups for their possible

⁴¹U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Special Study Mission to Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic, 89th Congress, 2d Session, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966) p. 5. The Study Mission was comprised of Congressmen Edward R. Roybal, Donald M. Fraser, and F. Bradford Morse. The trip lasted from November 5 to 19, 1965.

⁴²D. M. Fraser, "Political Development: The Missing Dimension of U.S. Policy toward Developing Nations," Mimeo, p. 8.

contribution to development and only secondarily because they expose the people "to democratic experiences of mutual cooperation in pursuit of common goals."⁴³ Furthermore, the Report seemed as concerned about "decentralizing decision-making" in the U.S. aid program as in decentralizing decision-making in the less developed countries. Most of the specific suggestions concerned the groups in the United States which should be involved in the aid program rather than how pluralistic development abroad could be encouraged. Organizations mentioned in this connection were the National Farmers Union, the U.S. Cooperative League, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the International Development Foundation.⁴⁴

A difference is also evident in the emphasis given to the need for research in the two documents. The Report does not stress the need for research for the implementation of its suggestions. This is in keeping with its dominant theme that the answer to Chile's development problems is relatively simple - broader participation of its people in its government and in its development process - and requires no analysis. In the ten recommendations of the Report, not one mentions additional research in field of political development.⁴⁵ By comparison, Congressman Fraser's very first suggestion was the "the Agency should create a top-level political study and research staff."⁴⁶

⁴³ U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Special Study Mission to Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic, 89th Congress, 2d sess., (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966) p. 5.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

⁴⁶ D. M. Fraser, "Political Development: The Missing Dimension of U.S. Policy toward Developing Nations," mimeo. p. 6.

This last point clinches the argument that, although many of the specific suggestions are similar, the approach of the two documents is quite different. Congressman Fraser sees a new rationale for aid in the findings of the academic field of political development. The Report embodies no pervasive doctrine. It conveys more of an instinctive preference for the decentralization of decision-making, both in the recipient country and in the aid program of the United States.

3. The Twenty-five Republican Congressmen's Statement
on Foreign Aid:

The "Cooperative Forum Speech" of Congressman Fraser and the Special Study Mission to Latin America both fell during the autumn of 1965. During the spring of 1966, hearings on the new Foreign Assistance Act began. During the interim, Congressman Morse's staff had not been idle. First, they had written to one hundred academicians in the field of aid studies to question them about political development and foreign aid. Miss Linda Lee, an administrative assistant to Congressman Morse, stated in an interview with the author that "the general reaction was favorable. Most felt what the aid program could be used to do this [promote political development], but some reservations were expressed, such as the fear of too much involvement, etc. This gave us encouragement to go ahead with the legislation, however."⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Interview with Miss Linda Lee, Administrative Assistant to Congressman Morse, March 29, 1968.

Along with "sounding out" academic opinion, the Morse office, during this period, took another initiative. In February and March of 1966, a group of 25 Republican Congressmen drafted a statement on foreign aid entitled "New Direction and New Emphasis in Foreign Aid."⁴⁸ Mr. Morse was the chairman of this group. In the document, the 25 Congressmen stated that they would support a "constructive program" of foreign aid. They, then, outlined the necessary components of such a program. The statement is divided into two parts: the first is a general statement of philosophy and purpose; while the second contains some 32 specific recommendations.

It is difficult to form an overall impression from the Congressmen's statement. As is so often the case with a "group" document, there are many strands brought together in the Republican statement. Some are very new, while others are old. It appears likely that Congressman Morse, and perhaps a few others, suggested those recommendations which are closest to a "political development doctrine", while other recommendations were included to appease the majority. An example of the latter is the justification given for the aid program of "fighting communism." U.S. aid is said to be needed "where Communist promises have appeal because rising expectations have been inadequately fulfilled."⁴⁹ This idea is not part of the political development doctrine

⁴⁸ Congressional Record Reprint, "New Directions and New Emphasis in Foreign Aid," Vol. 112, no. 45, March 15, 1966.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

and is explicitly denied by Congressman Fraser in his "Additional Views on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967."⁵⁰ Another example is the call to "identify U.S. aid with a U.S. label."⁵¹ Political development considerations would encourage the United States to remain in the background in the aid-giving process.

The Republican document, however, moves onto political development territory when it expresses opposition to economic development as the goal of aid. "The task of development might best be expressed not in sterile economic terms, but in terms of people . . . A human infrastructure where the people are engaged and engage themselves in the process of development can assure progress . . ."⁵² The Republican Statement is very close to Congressman Fraser when it focuses on "the people." "Sure [sic] the purpose of U.S. aid is to help

⁵⁰In his "Additional Views," Congressman Fraser condemns two "myths" attached to the aid program. The first is that "by economic progress we lessen the likelihood of a Communist (or radical) takeover in these countries (the LDCs), and the second is that "when a Communist threat exists, economic aid provides an effective answer." The promotion of these myths will cause "the public to become disenchanted and the legitimate and useful ends to be served by well-constructed aid programs will be lost in the withdrawal of public support." The Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, House Report No. 551, 90th Congress, 1st Session, p. 119.

⁵¹Congressional Record Reprint, "New Directions and New Emphasis in Foreign Aid," p. 1.

⁵²Ibid., p. 1.

people achieve progress. Unless the people benefit from development efforts, no meaningful progress can result from foreign aid."⁵³

Congressman Fraser and the Republican Congressmen agree that there is only one valid purpose for the aid program. Congressman Fraser calls it "political development," the Republican Congressmen call it "popular participation." Mr. Fraser says, "If we can't promote political development with our aid, then we should not be giving it."⁵⁴ The Republican document states, "No government to government aid should be extended to any country that shows no interest in holding popular elections, establishing broad suffrage, or creating a civil service system based on merit."⁵⁵ Although they both recognize one valid purpose for aid, there is a difference. Congressman Fraser wants to reach the people in order to create democratic institutions which, he feels, are the "ultimate U.S. national interest in these countries." In the Republican document the desire to reach the people is couched in more conventional terms. The people are needed for development to get under way. The people should benefit from development. And finally, if and only if U.S. aid reaches the people will the "bond of gratitude" be forged

⁵³ Compare this statement taken from the Republican statement with a sentence from Mr. Fraser's speech. "I am proposing that the U.S. become involved with the people of the developing nations and work with them as they shape their own future. It is our failure to become involved with the various elements in a developing society which is the focus of my concern."

Donald M. Fraser, "Political Development: The Missing Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Developing Nations," Mimeo, p. 3.

⁵⁴ Donald M. Fraser, private interview, February 27, 1968.

⁵⁵ Congressional Record, Reprint, "New Directions and New Emphasis in Foreign Aid," p. 2.

which will insure peace and stability in the world. In sum, Congressman Fraser is concerned that aid be used to build political institutions, a more difficult requirement than that it simply reach and involve "the people."

Another difference concerns the specific suggestions contained in the two documents. The suggestions made by Congressman Fraser are merely tentative ones. He is more concerned with getting someone in government to pay attention to the problem of political development than in pushing his own solutions. He sees the proposed solution of pluralism as a hypothesis which, although firmly believed in by himself, should be tested in practice. He recognizes that there are other dimensions in the political development process, such as national integration, which need attention. His emphasis on pluralism is just the beginning of a "massive program of political development activities."⁵⁶

The Republican statement, on the other hand, begins and ends with pluralism. The Republicans definitely are pushing their own solution to the problem. Pluralism is what is needed in the less developed countries and the way to achieve it is "pluralism" in the U.S. aid program.

⁵⁶ Donald M. Fraser, "Political Development: The Missing Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Developing Nations," (Speech delivered to the Cooperative Forum, Washington, D. C., November 4, 1965), mimeo, p.12.

Private and voluntary organizations should bear the major responsibility for U. S. aid.⁵⁷ Multilateral organizations should handle industrial and economic development projects. Thus freed from other responsibilities, AID would become, in effect a clearing house for the activities of non-governmental agencies. With a multitude of agencies involved in development, the role of AID would diminish greatly. The Republican statement is as much for decentralizing decision-making in the U.S. aid program as in encouraging pluralism abroad.

There is a last, important observation to be made concerning the ideas of the Congressional sponsors. Both Morse and Fraser lean toward a concept of direct political development aid as identified in Chapter II. However, Congressman Fraser carries this idea further than Mr. Morse does. In an interview with the author, Mr. Fraser stated that "political parties are the least sensitive, best point of entry for the U.S." It is through open discussion rather than actual pressure tactics that the best results can be achieved. When politicians talk to

⁵⁷For example, it is suggested that American business lend not only its financial resources, but its executive and training resources as well. The U.S. labor unions should be asked to help organize the labor force of the developing countries, the major farm and agricultural workers organizations should be drawn in, and private foundations and U.S. colleges and universities should be involved in research programs of their own. Church groups, womens' organizations, professional societies and student groups should all be encouraged to establish ties with their counterpart groups. The American political parties should have much more contact with politicians in developing countries, particularly in Latin America. Finally, the governments of individual states such as California and New Jersey should become involved in "state to country" programs. Congressional Record Reprint, "New Directions and New Emphasis in Foreign Aid," p. 1.

each other in the realm of ideas, then cross fertilization takes place. This exchange could take place in a conference between American politicians and their counterparts, say every five years."⁵⁸ It is significant that practicing politicians have more faith in this type of direct influence than do AID officials, as revealed in their interviews in Chapters six and seven.

In summary, it is tempting to conclude that as the "pure" political development doctrine, expressed in Congressman Fraser's Coop Forum speech moves out into the Congressional "atmosphere," it has to change character. In order to achieve wider support among Congressional colleagues, it becomes "popular participation" and "growth of pluralism" instead of political development. Furthermore it begins to imply a much more active role for the U.S. private sector and less for the Aid Agency.

⁵⁸ Donald M. Fraser, private interview, February 27, 1968. There are a series of other "direct political development aid" suggested by the Congressional sponsors in speeches and private discussions:

1. A conference of representatives from countries with a diversity of languages to discuss common problems.
2. Center for Democratic Development with representatives from U.S. political parties to develop operating programs in the area of political development. It would resemble the War College to utilize and analyze U.S. experience in this area.
3. Training for students from LDCs in the relationship of ideology and development.

C. Passing the Legislation

1. Form of the Legislation:

Thus, by the spring of 1966, both Congressman Morse and Congressman Fraser had developed some definite ideas about the U.S. program of foreign aid and how to improve it. They had tried to make their ideas known in various ways. Both Congressmen had given speeches on the subject. They had asked questions of those who came to testify before the Foreign Affairs Committee. They had embodied some of their ideas in a formal report to Congress -- The Report of the House Study Mission to Chile, Peru and the Dominican Republic. Finally, Congressman Morse had taken a major step to involve other members of his own Party, with the issuance in March, 1966 of the Joint Statement of the 25 Republican Congressmen.

Evidently such initiatives were not completely satisfactory to the two Congressmen. Sometime during this period, the idea came to them of introducing formal legislation. Such a move would crystallize and give emphasis to their ideas. It is true that there had been contact between members of the two Congressmen's staffs and officials in the Agency for International Development who were interested in political development. It is also true that the Congressmen had been in contact with academicians in the field. But the initiative for the amendment came from the Congressional sponsors and not from any outside influence.⁵⁹ The contact they

⁵⁹Several AID officials told me in interviews that they were sure that "Title IX was an AID egg which was hatched by Congress." Close study of the record and conversations with individuals close to the situation does not bear this conclusion out.

had had with actual aid programs in the various countries they had visited provided the greatest stimulus for Title IX.

Once it had been decided upon to draft legislation, the next step was to decide on the form it should take. First, it was decided that the amendment should not be an insertion into any other section of the legislation. Contrary to preceding amendments, such as those sponsored by Mr. Humphrey and Mr. Zablocki, the new amendment would stand by itself, under its own "Title". It would thus have its own heading, and consequently, there would be the possibility for more sections to be added in the future.

Secondly, it was decided that the amendment would be a general statement of guidance to the Agency for International Development rather than specific instructions to emphasize a certain organization or program. Previous legislation had emphasized the institutional means to be used (such as cooperatives, or community development programs), but had left the end of democratic development unstated. In the words of Marion Czarnecki, staff Consultant to the Committee, Title IX was meant to "blanket all the preceding legislation" and emphasize their collective underlying intent.⁶⁰

Thirdly, it was decided that the words of the amendment must be carefully chosen in order to insure passage through Congress. The

⁶⁰Marion Czarnecki, Staff Consultant to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, private interview held in the House Office Building, Washington, D. C., March 27, 1968.

decision was made to couch the amendment in innocuous and non-controversial language. The term "political development," for instance, would not be used. It was recognized that the amendment, however, might be so general and so universally "acceptable" as to be almost meaningless. Those drafting the legislation expected that the accompanying Report of the Committee would remedy this defect, in drawing up more specific guidelines for the aid Agency.⁶¹

2. Securing Support for the Legislation

The result of the above considerations was a text of only one sentence in length. The full heading and wording of the legislation was as follows:

Part I, Chapter 2 -- Development Assistance

Sec. 281. In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.

According to Linda Lee, Congressman Morse's administrative assistant, there was little problem in getting the amendment inserted in the legislation once the Committee's Chairman, Thomas E. Morgan,

⁶¹The foregoing analysis of the drafting of Title IX was compiled from interviews with its Congressional sponsors, their administrative assistants, and staff consultants to the Committee

had approved. It did not come up for discussion on the floor of the House and there are no recorded debates on its adoption. Miss Lee said, however, that she understood that it had become an issue in the internal bargaining of the Conference Committee and that it had been allowed to remain in return for something that the Senate wanted included in the legislation.⁶²

3. Analysis of Title IX and Its Congressional Report,
House Report 1651

The amendment introduced in 1966 did not tell the Agency for International Development to "do" or to "refrain from doing" anything specific. Rather, it stated that "emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation . . ." The use of the word "emphasis" does not appear to create a binding, legal injunction. Its use in legislation is rather unusual.⁶³

The phrase, "in carrying out programs authorized in this chapter" makes clear that the amendment is to be carried out through the regular economic development programs of the Agency. The programs which are authorized in the chapter under question are economic development programs. Title IX does not authorize new programs of a purely political development nature.

⁶²Miss Linda Lee, Administrative Assistant to Congressman F. Bradford Morse, private interview held in the House Office Building, Washington, D. C., March 29, 1968.

⁶³The judgment of Mr. Stephen Fletcher, Vice-President and General Counsel, Western Electric Company, New York City, N. Y.

Thirdly, the phrase, "maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries." is lengthy, but quite straightforward. If one stopped reading at this point, the impression would be left that Title IX exhorted the Agency to involve the "maximum" possible number of people in its own programs of economic development. One can easily envision large numbers of people building a road or constructing a dam. But the concluding phrase of Title IX broadens its scope considerably. The maximum number of people are to be involved, not only directly in the "tasks of economic development", but also indirectly, "through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions". One is left with the following question: Is the emphasis of Title IX placed upon increasing participation in economic development or upon encouraging democratic institutions? Why are the two phrases joined in the legislation? Is the latter suggested as one means of implementing the former or does it stand as an objective in its own right? Are people to be involved in certain grassroots institutions, which, in turn, are then involved in economic development "tasks?"

If the concluding phrase of Title IX broadens its scope, it also diffuses it. It is fairly easy to see how A.I.D. could get large numbers of people involved building roads and dams. It is more difficult to see how the aid program can "encourage" democratic private and local governmental institutions, in carrying out its programs of economic assistance.

The language of the amendment is, of course, the most authoritative account of its own purposes. Any analysis must begin with it. Further insight into its purposes, however, can be obtained from a variety of sources. The source legally closest to the amendment itself is the Report of the Committee accompanying the legislation. The section devoted to explaining Title IX is short, approximately two pages in length. In it, the Committee gives emphasis to the "democratic institutions" phrase, thus leading one to the conclusion that it is, indeed, the focus of the amendment, and not just a suggestion for its implementation. There are several points which can be cited to support this conclusion.

First, in the Report, the phrase, "tasks of economic development," becomes simply the "process of development."⁶⁴ This change in wording, though small, is very significant. The latter phrase is much broader than the former. It implies social, political, and cultural, as well as economic, components. This broader orientation of the Report is also shown in its reference to "social and political instability which pose a constant threat to the gains being achieved on economic fronts."⁶⁵ The initial impulse is to explain political development as a necessary element in economic development, and then further in the Report, it is emphasized as an important priority in its own right.

⁶⁴U.S., House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. 89th Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No. 1651 (Washington, D. C., 1966) pp. 27-28.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 27.

The concluding sentence of the Report states that A. I. D. should evaluate American assistance not only in economic terms, but also in terms of the extent to which our aid encourages democratic processes. The explicit attention to political development in its own right is clear.

Secondly, all the specific suggestions in the Report concern the building up of democratic institutions. "This goal can best be achieved through the fostering of cooperatives, labor unions, trade and related associations, community action groups, and other organizations . . ." ⁶⁶ The word "democratic" in the legislation is ambiguous. A democratic institution might simply be one whose internal affairs are run democratically, i. e., the election of officers, etc. Or it might mean that it is part of a larger "democratic society" and thus contributes to the decision-making process of that society. The Report opts for the second definition of "democratic". It is concerned about the "increased participation of such groups . . . in the planning, execution and evaluation of development undertakings." ⁶⁷ Such decisions are certainly at the heart of national planning in the less developed countries. Hence the Report is referring to the whole democratic fabric of a society and not just to the internal processes of the institutions to which it refers.

Thirdly, the amendment itself refers only to democratic private and local governmental institutions. The Report expands this statement to include the "building of democratic private and public institutions on all levels -- local, state, and national." The Report appears to direct

⁶⁶ U.S., House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1966: 89th Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No. 1651 (Washington, D. C., 1966) p. 28.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

attention to the central governments of the recipient countries and thus further broadens the scope of the amendment.

In sum, the Report adds flesh to the bones of the amendment, but, in so doing, it actually increases its dimensions. Thus, on three definite accounts, it allows for a broad interpretation of Title IX. First, the phrase "economic development" becomes "the process of development," opening the door for consideration of the social and political components of development. Secondly, the word "democratic" is used to apply not just to the internal processes of the institutions in question, but also to their participation in the society as a whole. Finally, the Report brings all levels of governmental and private organizations into the spotlight for consideration and not just institutions on the local or grassroots level.

The total impression conveyed by the Title IX amendment and its accompany Report is that the Committee members were divided in what they expected Title IX to accomplish.⁶⁸ There appear to be three separate schools of thought. First, there are those who feel that Title IX is simply a re-emphasis of concepts expressed previously in the aid legislation. This view finds some expression in the Committee Report on Title IX. It states that:

⁶⁸This impression is substantiated by a series of interviews held by the author with selected members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"over the years . . . the Committee has observed that there is a close relationship between popular participation in the process of development and the effectiveness of this process. As a consequence, the Committee has written a number of provisions into the Foreign Assistance Act and its predecessor statutes . . . The Committee finds that despite these periodic expressions, popular participation in the tasks of development is increasing at a very slow rate." ⁶⁹

The implication is strong that Title IX is not new, but was felt necessary because inadequate attention was paid to previous legislation embodying the same concepts.

This same view is held by Clement A. Zablocki, 2nd ranking Democrat on the Committee and a supporter of Title IX. In an interview with the author, he stated that "Title IX is just a more elaborate version of my own amendment. It is a little fancier, dressed up under a separate Title. But it is getting at the same thing Don't call it Title IX, call it AID's community development program." ⁷⁰

Secondly, there are those who view Title IX as broader than previous legislation because it generalizes from specific institutions to include all pluralistic development, but they go no further. This view is reminiscent of the ideas of Congressman Morse and the Statement of the Republican Congressmen.

⁶⁹U.S., Congress, House, House Report No. 1651, p. 1

⁷⁰Clement A. Zablocki (D.-Wisc.), private interview held in the House Office Building, Washington, D.C., March 2, 1968.

Thirdly, there is the interpretation of Title IX as the beginning of a vast program of political development. This view is held alone by Congressman Fraser. As he said in his interview, "I consider Title IX to be just a foot in the door. It is a way to get the Agency started on political development. Popular participation represents just one part of political development."⁷¹ He reiterated this idea in a meeting of the American Political Science Association. "Title IX represents one hypothesis about political development. It is cast in terms of pluralism and participation, but it is certainly not exhaustive."⁷²

Thus, two of the three interpretations of Title IX believe that it goes beyond previous legislation. Yet, when attempting to detail its request, the Committee could do little more than cite the same institutions which had been highlighted in previous amendments. Cooperatives, labor unions and trade and related associations; community action programs; even the suggestion that increased reliance be made on non-governmental organizations - all are found in other sections of the aid legislation.

Whether defined simply as pluralistic development or as the beginning of a massive political development program, the Title IX amendment and its accompanying Report opened the door to an extremely sensitive and complex field of endeavor. It also gave the Agency very little new guidance as to how to proceed into it.

⁷¹Donald M. Fraser (D.-Minn.), private interview held in the House Office Building, Washington, D. C., February 28, 1968.

⁷²From a "Round-Table Discussion" entitled "Participation, Institutionalization and Politico-Administrative Development: Implications of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act," The American Political Science Association Meetings, Washington Hilton Hotel, Wash. D. C., Sept. 5, 1968.

D. Post-1966 Congressional Interest in Political Development

During the first two years of the Agency's implementation of Title IX, Congress continued to manifest an interest in foreign aid and political development. It is the task of this concluding section to give examples of this interest and to indicate any new influence patterns which might have appeared.

Post-1966 Congressional interest in political development took three distinct forms. First, interest was shown through passage of formal legislation, which consisted of additional amendments to the Title IX section, and other changes in the Foreign Assistance Act reflecting interest in political development. Second, various hearings were held, both by House and Senate subcommittees, which revealed a growing interest in political development. Finally, various Congressmen used informal pressure tactics to force the Agency to respond to the Title IX amendment, thus manifesting a continuing interest in the legislation.

After discussing each of these three forms of interest, a perspective can be gained by discussing some of the reservations and negative comments made by members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Title IX. They will be included in the fourth and final section of this chapter.

1. Formal Legislation

a) Title IX Section:

During the two years following the passage of Title IX, other junior members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee became interested in foreign aid and political development. One of these, Representative John C. Culver, (D.-Iowa), sponsored a series of additional amendments to the Title IX section in 1967. While the original amendment had been a general policy statement, the "Culver Amendments" were of greater specificity. These amendments put emphasis on research into past and current programs, on "using the intellectual resources" of the recipient countries, and on "civic education." This last addition is perhaps the most noteworthy, for it embodies H. Field Haviland's conception of political development and tends in the direction of "direct political development aid" as discussed in Chapter II. It is not unexpected that Congressman Fraser, who had previously shown a keen interest in this type of aid, suggested the inclusion of this section.⁷ It specified that programs under the economic development chapter of the Foreign Assistance Act shall "support civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government."

Then, in 1968, further refinement of the legislation took place with the inclusion of two new sections. Thus, at the end of 1968, the Title IX section, in its complete form was as follows:

⁷³ Donald M. Fraser, private interview, February 28, 1968.

Part 1, Chapter 2 -- Development Assistance**Title IX -- Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development**

- Sec. 281** (a) In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.
- (b) In order to carry out the purposes of this Title, programs under this chapter shall --
- (1) recognize the differing needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the respective developing countries and areas;
 - (2) use the intellectual resources of such countries and areas in conjunction with assistance provided under this Act so as to encourage the development of indigenous institutions that meet their particular requirements for sustained economic and social progress; and
 - (3) support civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government.
- (c) In the allocation of funds for research under this chapter, emphasis shall be given to research designed to examine the political, social, and related obstacles to development in countries receiving assistance under part 1 of this Act. In particular, emphasis should be given to research designed to increase understanding of the ways in which development assistance can support democratic social and political trends in recipient countries.
- (d) Emphasis shall also be given to the evaluation of relevant past and current programs under part 1 of this Act and to applying this experience so as to strengthen their effectiveness in implementing the objectives of this Title.
- (e) In order to carry out the purposes of this Title, the Agency primary responsible for administering part 1 of this Act shall develop systematic programs of in-service training to familiarize its personnel with the objectives of this title and to increase their knowledge of the political and social aspects of development. In addition to other funds available

for such purposes, not to exceed 1 per centum of the funds authorized to be appropriated for grant assistance under this chapter may be used for carrying out the objective of this subsection.⁷⁴

- Red - 1966 original Title IX amendment
 Green - 1967 "Culver amendment"
 Blue - 1968 amendments

b) Other Sections of the Foreign Assistance Act Which Reflect Concern with Political Development

The Title IX section of the Foreign Assistance Act should not be examined in isolation. There were several other sections of the Act which reflected a concern with political development. For instance, in the policy section of the Act, the statement is made that "maximum efforts shall be made in the administration of this Act, to stimulate the involvement of the people in the development process through the encouragement of democratic participation in private and local governmental activities and institution-building appropriate to the requirements of the recipient nations"⁷⁵

Further on, in specifying criteria for the Development Loan Fund, the legislation states that:

⁷⁴U.S., Congress, House, House Report, 15263, Conference Report on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, 90th Cong., 2d Session, September 10, 1968, p. 3.

⁷⁵U.S., Congress, House, House Report 15263, (Part I, Chapter I, "Policy").

. . . .the President shall take into account . . . (5) the extent to which the recipient country is showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people, and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures . . . (7) the extent to which the country is making economic, social, and political reforms, such as tax collection improvements and changes in land tenure arrangements, that will enable it to achieve developmental objectives more efficiently and justly; and . . . the extent to which the country is otherwise showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people, and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures.⁷⁶

The same type of "self-help" criteria is present in the "Technical Cooperation and Development Grants" section of the act. In addition, there is the following provision for research grants:

Sec. 211 (d) Not to exceed \$10,000,000 of funds made available under Section 212, or under Section 252 (other than loan funds), may be used for assistance on such terms and conditions as the President may specify, to research and educational institutions in the United States for the purpose of strengthening their capacity to develop and carry out programs concerned with the economic and social development of less developed countries.⁷⁷

In addition to the above provisions, there are the principles of the Alliance for Progress (Title VI) which emphasize "the degree to which the recipient country is making progress toward respect for the rule of

⁷⁶U. S., Congress, House, House Report 15263, (Part I, Chapter II, "Development Assistance." Title I - Development Loan Fund.

⁷⁷Ibid., (Chapter 2 "Development Assistance," Title II "Technical Cooperation and Development Grants.) This provision was important in the grant made to the Fletcher School discussed in Chapter 5.

law, freedom of expression and of the press, and recognition of the importance of individual freedom, initiative, and private enterprise;"⁷⁸

There is also, in Chapter 7 of the Act, a section emphasizing the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction "approach", which reflect a concern for grassroots development. Sec. 471 (a) "The President is authorized to conclude agreements with less developed countries providing for the establishment in such countries of Joint Commissions on Rural Development" ⁷⁹ Finally there are the predecessor amendments, i. e., the Judd, Humphrey, and Zablocki amendments, discussed earlier in the chapter. It is clear that the 1967 and 1968 Foreign Assistance Acts indicate, in the well-chosen words of one observer, "a crystallization if not a shift in United States foreign assistance policy."⁸⁰

2. Hearings and Committee Reports Relating to Political Development:

In this short section, no more than a mention can be made of the various other Congressional documents which appeared in 1967 and in 1968 reflecting a concern with political development. In 1967 there were at least two such documents. One was Report No. 5 by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representative, entitled "Model

⁷⁸U.S., Congress, House, House Report 15263, (Chapter 2 "Development Assistance, Title VI "Alliance for Progress").

⁷⁹Ibid., (Chapter 7, "Joint Commissions on Rural Development")

⁸⁰Ralph Braibanti, "External Inducement of Politico-Administrative Development: A Design for Strategy", in Administrative Development ed. by Ralph Braibanti (Durham, North Carolina, : Duke University Press, 1968) p. 20.

Communications and Foreign Policy." Reflected in this Report is the concern of the Subcommittee and its testifiers with the development of human resources and their maximum utilization in the development process. The employment of modern communications on a large scale is urged as a tool in implementing Title IX. Dr. J. E. Stepanek, Dr. Frederick Frey, Dr. H. Field Haviland, Jr., and Edgar L. Owens, were among those who testified before the Committee.

The second example of a concern with political development came with Hearings held before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. These hearings were entitled, 'Rural Development in Asia.' Dr. Samuel Huntington and Dr. Gayle D. Ness both emphasized the importance of political development for adequate AID programming. Dr. Huntington stated that ". . . in drawing up aid programs we ought to give very careful attention to these political consequences and we ought to develop criteria, analyze very carefully the effects of the economic programs, and discuss with the recipient governments the destabilizing possibilities of one line of development against another . . ." ⁸¹

Dr. Huntington also made the suggestions noted previously, i. e., that assistance be given to political parties, that training be given to political leaders and that an office for political development be created

⁸¹U.S., Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rural Development in Asia, 90th Cong., 1st Session, 1967, p. 129.

within AID.⁸² The questions of the members of the Committee indicated interest in political development, along with some skepticism of its chances for success.

In 1968 AID itself was represented in the person of its Administrator, William Gaud, on the question of political development and the Aid Program. On March 20, 1968, Mr. Gaud testified on the subject of institution-building. He began his statement by saying that "I am here today to discuss the basic point of A. I. D. 's programs - people."⁸³ Then in his statement, he pinpointed what he felt was the relationship between the work of AID and political development. "The purpose of the host of activities we engage in is to improve the climate so that political and social development can take place."⁸⁴ He stressed the "indirect approach" of the Rural Works Program, and gave other examples of what AID was doing, in a round-about way, about political development.

In addition to Mr. Gaud's testimony in 1968, there was interest in political development on the Senate side sparked by a "Survey of the Alliance for Progress" made by the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs. In particular, a Report written by Mr. Pat Holt, staff consultant for the Subcommittee, on the "political aspects" of the Alliance stimulated discussion on the question of political development. In his Report, Mr.

⁸²U.S., Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rural Development in Asia, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 47.

⁸³U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, H.R. 15263, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 463

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 468.

Holt states categorically that "The real interest of the United States in Latin America is neither economic nor social; it is political The United States needs governments which see the world more or less as we do Such governments can only arise from a set of reasonably well-rooted, stable, democratic, political institutions."⁸⁵

Mr. Covey Oliver, who was, at the time, U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, commended Mr. Holt's study. "Mr. Holt's analysis is acute; he has caught very accurately . . . that there is an inescapable socio-psychological dimension in international relations . . ." Mr. Oliver states, in his own right, that "we must conceive of the Alliance as a union for total development and not allow ourselves to think of it merely in terms of economic goals."⁸⁶ His entire statement reflects a concern with political development.

In summary, during 1967 and 1968, many "experts" in the field of political development were called upon by various subcommittees to testify on subjects relating to political development. There was a ferment, a growing, though still small, number of people in the Congressional branch who were concerned about political development and eager to get the Executive branch to give it more consideration.

⁸⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Survey of the Alliance for Progress; The Political Aspects, Study prepared by the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Sept. 18, 1967, p. 2.

⁸⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, Hearings before the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Session, 1968, pp. 232-233.

3. Informal Pressure Tactics:

Interested Congressmen knew, however, in order to obtain change in Agency operations, they had to do more than simply include "recommending" legislation in the Foreign Assistance Act and hold hearings on the subject. They needed to bring informal pressure to bear on Agency officials with regard to Title IX. The candid comments of the sponsoring Congressmen, given in interviews with the author, are particularly revealing on the subject of informal pressure.

Congressman Fraser, when asked how he could "help" Title IX, stated that "the best thing I can do is to ask questions."⁸⁷ He then elaborated this point as follows:

I ask questions constantly, at hearings, at meetings, at luncheons. Also, when I go abroad, I send out a note to the Missions that I want to talk to them about Title IX. This gets them stirred up and they start doing their homework.⁸⁸

Mr. Morse, in answering the same question, revealed a more activist and comprehensive strategy of influence. First he acknowledged that not many Congressmen know about Title IX, "but that is not what you need . . . What you need is a few agitators to keep hounding the executive bureaucracy and just passive support from the rest of Congress."⁸⁹ In summarizing his feelings, he stated that, "it doesn't matter what Congress thinks as long as Title IX is part of the law. The re-education has to go on in the AID bureaucracy, not in Congress."⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Donald M. Fraser, Interview, February, 27, 1968.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ F. Bradford Morse, Interview, March 5, 1968.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

As an example of the activist approach referred to above, Mr. Morse obtained 60 Congressional signatures on a letter to the Agency. The letter requested that AID "use funds authorized under Section 211D of the 1966 legislation to engage broader institutional involvement in the Title IX process We believe that AID has within Section 211D an excellent opportunity to undertake the kind of study that will lead to effective implementation of Title IX."⁹¹

Mr. Morse stated, in his interview with the author, that the above letter was a "good way to mix substance and procedure," The Congressmen, who signed the letter, were subtly supporting Title IX, although they didn't realize it. He felt that it was particularly significant that all the members of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, known to be opponents of the aid program, signed the letter.⁹²

In addition, Mr. Morse stated that he had passed out speeches to members of his own subcommittee on Title IX, had gotten the junior Congressmen to suggest amendments (Culver) and thus gotten them involved, and had made numerous informal contacts with high officials in

⁹¹This letter emphasized the Culver amendments' stress on research.

⁹²Upon receipt of this letter, the Title IX Division did an analysis of the voting record of the signatories with regard to both the authorization and the appropriation bills. At least nine of the signatories had voted against both bills. This letter was instrumental in obtaining the grant for the Fletcher School discussed in Chapter 4.

the Agency to pressure them into "doing something" on Title IX.⁹³

4. Reservations and Negative Comments on Title IX

In addition to the sponsors and supporters of Title IX, several other members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were interviewed with regard to the legislation. These Congressmen were also supporters of the aid program, but they were older and had more seniority than those members sponsoring Title IX.⁹⁴ They did have "reservations" about the amendment. Significantly, none of these Congressmen defined Title IX as involving a political development analysis. One defined it as "being concerned with political consciousness, the political sense on the lowest grassroots level;" another as "the strengthening of the private sector, so that U.S. investment can find a home;" and a third as "trying to utilize private enterprise and initiative." One even stated that "Title IX gets us out of long-range development -- it is a return to Point 4".

The criticisms offered to Title IX by this group fall into two categories. The first are criticisms concerning the "substance" of Title IX: the second concern the "form" of the legislation.

⁹³Examples of post-1966 speeches given by the Congressional sponsors of Title IX include, "The Trick is People" by F. Bradford Morse given before the conference on "Societal Change in Developing Countries: Alternatives to Revolution" Institute of International Relations, Stanford University, Feb. 24-26, 1967; remarks by Congressman Fraser at the Meeting of the Society for International Development, Washington Chapter, June 1, 1967 on "People and Hunger," and an address by Congressman Fraser at the International Development Conference, International Inn, Washington, D. C. on February 7, 1967. Mr. Fraser also wrote an article entitled "New Directions in Foreign AID" which appeared in World Affairs, Vol. 129, No. 4 (1967).

⁹⁴The men interviewed included, Clement J. Zablocki (D. -Wisc.), William S. Mailliard (R. -Calif.), and Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R. -N. J.).

a) Criticisms Concerning the "Substance" of Title IX;

Surprisingly enough, the most frequent criticism of Title IX offered by this group was that the legislation was "redundant". The reasons given for its redundancy vary with the definition ascribed to the amendment. "Title IX is getting at the same thing as the Zablocki amendment, i. e., community development - it is already on the books." A second man stated that "perhaps we can move in the direction specified by Title IX, [i. e., supporting non-governmental forces] but a lot of aid is given for these reasons anyway." A third man said that "the criticism implied in Title IX is over-exaggerated. The Agency is paying attention to private enterprise and local initiative anyway."

Paradoxically, the other major "substantive" criticism reflected a fear that Title IX was too extreme, it went "too far". Typical comments in this regard were, "Don't blow Title IX out of proportion. If it is implemented too much, then it will backfire and kill the program. It is not our intention to build political parties abroad with taxpayers' money." Again -- "If we support non-governmental forces in the recipient countries we run a real risk. If the forces we support succeed, then we don't get any credit. However, if the forces fail, then we get all the blame. We lose either way." And finally -- "Interest in the aid program at this time is not sufficient to support a new initiative. Political development is nice, but it is a lot to be asking of the Agency right now."

b) Criticisms Concerning the "Form" of Title IX:

Most of the criticism of Title IX, except for the two types discussed above, centered around the "form" of the legislation.

At the base of this criticism was the belief that Congress is powerless to have broad policy influence on an executive Agency. For instance, one Congressman stated that "Great policy pronouncements, like Title IX, don't mean a thing. What Congress can do is to withhold funds, or persuade people to get rid of personnel in the Agency, but policy prescriptions should not be written into the law."⁹⁵

Another Congressman stated that Congressional amendments should relate to specific procedures. "It is alright to put a specific prohibition on an improper procedure - this has some effect. But things which start out - 'The President should take this into consideration. . . ' are ridiculous. It is easy to write such an amendment. Then you are purged of the real responsibility of finding out what the Agency is actually doing."

A third stated that he preferred to work through informal channels. "It is much more fruitful to sit down with Bill Gaud and other top Agency officials and make criticisms of a particular country program than to write policy prescriptions into law. If I, as a supporter of the program, make a serious complaint, then the Agency really pays attention to it."

One man summed up this group's feelings about Title IX in a few succinct words. "I wouldn't make a special point of opposing Title IX. I just think it is meaningless."

⁹⁵This Congressman, Mr. Mailliard, had worked out what he felt was the proper role of Congress vis-a-vis the aid program. "It is impossible for Congress or the Committee to run the program. We are too busy, and don't have enough expertise. We should hire someone else to run it, and if we don't like the way he is doing it, then we can fire him. But looking over the shoulder of the aid program is bad."