

300.7  
C663

PNAB1087

SOCIAL SCIENCE TRAINING

AND

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT

By Professor D. Glynn Cochrane

February 1974

The views expressed are those of the author and should not be taken as being necessarily representative of group or staff members within the Agency.

Social Science Training and Manpower Development.

300.7 Cochrane, D. Glynn  
C663 Social Science Training and Manpower  
Development. Feb. 1974.

56 p.

AID/otr-C-1265.

"Thomas Report"

1.Social sciences.2.A.I.D. - Training programs.3.Training programs - Social sciences - A.I.D.4.Manpower - Training - A.I.D.I.Contract.II.Title.

## PREFACE

This report is one of a number of reports and studies which will influence the formulation and content of a training program designed to equip AID personnel for the development tasks of the mid 70's.

Given the possible magnitude of the training involved and the complexity of development work, we decided to review and analyze training needs from external and internal viewpoints. In doing so we hope to gain objectivity from the outsiders and practicality from experienced AID personnel. Located between these views is the balance needed to produce a feasible system of training and manpower development.

Manpower development is more than well designed and conducted training courses or good solid supported on-the-job training programs. To exploit the value of such programs, they must relate to and be effectively integrated into program and Agency goals. Retraining for the mid 1970's, insuring that AID personnel have the knowledge and skills to carry out the mandate of the 1974-75 legislation, will require considerable investment of money and manpower. To achieve maximum return on this investment and gather the support of Agency personnel behind the program will require executive attention and backing from the top leadership of the Agency.

To effect change in its manpower resources the Agency must focus on need for and kind of change desired, as well as resolving any ambivalence or divisiveness about its manpower development programs.

The recent establishment of an Advisory Committee on Retraining provides one such focus. This Committee will, with the Manpower Development Division, work to synthesize the Agency's needs, requirements, and goals into logical training framework on which to base future programs. Those wishing to express requirements or voice points of view should contact their respective representative or the SER/PM/MD Coordinator Mr. Eugene Marble, phone number 235-9073. The members of the Committee are:

John S. Alden ASIA/TECH	Room 2643 NS	Telephone 21916
Donald E. Anderson TA/MGT	Room 200 SA2	Telephone 27938
<del>██████████</del>	<del>Room 455 RP</del>	<del>Telephone 5888</del>
Albert P. Disdler AA/AFR	Room 6942 NS	Telephone 28522
Donald L. Goodwin SA/TD	Room 609 RP	Telephone 58880
David McMakin PHA/POP/DIR	Room 510 RPE	Telephone 59661
James L. Roush PPC/RC	Room 3898 NS	Telephone 28952
Charles J. Stockman LA/DR	Room 2242 NS	Telephone 29486
<del>██████████</del>	<del>Room 411 RP</del>	<del>Telephone 5888</del>

In his paper on Social Science Training and Manpower Development, Glynn Cochrane examines the need for and contributions that disciplines of anthropology, political science, sociology and social psychology make to the training of Technical Generalist. An overview of the form and manner in which training in these fields might be acquired is also discussed. He poses a number of questions about the need for Technical Specialists that the reader may wish to consider.

Professor Cochrane is under contract to AID and on sabbatical from his position as Professor of Anthropology and Public Administration at Syracuse University. He is a British citizen trained at Trinity College, Dublin and Oxford University. His background includes six

years in the British Diplomatic Service where he worked primarily in the development field. Last year he was consultant to the World Bank and produced for that organization a report on the use of anthropology in project operations.

---

Daniel F. Creedon

Contract AID/ort-C-1265  
Applied Anthropology in Developmental Programs

SOCIAL SCIENCE TRAINING

AND

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT

By Professor D. Glynn Cochrane  
February 1974

## SUMMARY

Everything contained in this Report centers on the fact that by 1976 the Agency will not have social science skills\* that are critical for implementation of people programs. A false sense of operational capacity has been created by the 'Thomas Report,' a document which is inadequate and misleading in its treatment of social sciences. The Agency has committed itself to a course of action that it simply does not have the manpower capacity to carry out.

By 1976 the Agency will need at minimum 150 people with social science skills at what the 'Thomas Report' termed the 'Generalist' level. Such skills are now virtually non-existent. In the same year at least 32 specialists in the social sciences will be required. Agency people with in depth country social expertise do not now exist. Functional social science skills related to the new areas of program concentration are largely inadequate. The 'Thomas Report' assumed that they would not be required on an 'in house' basis. The Agency cannot buy this kind of expertise 'off the shelf.' Some of the new 'Specialist' cadre must come from retraining or recruitment. Each day that passes lessens the chances that the Agency will be able to effectively implement its legislative commitments.

This report asks whether A.I.D. really means to change and improve the skills of employees so that they can develop increased capacity to deal with people programs. Social programs need social science skills, and

\*Economists do not have such skills.

traditional concerns need to be strengthened. But, this Report suggests, not enough attention has been paid to the social science needs of the Agency. Existing skills are quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate. It will not be enough to give the old players new jerseys -- to do a renaming exercise and call economists rural development officers and so on -- the Agency needs some new players either through recruitment or retraining.

This Report identifies social science requirements and advises measures for obtaining these inputs. It recommends that the personnel implications of a smaller future Agency be authoritatively redefined; that change will, as far as training objectives are concerned, have to be more far reaching than the 'Thomas Report,' which was mainly concerned with personnel problems; that measures must be taken to ensure the supply of in depth country specific social science expertise not currently available; that a special high level task force representing important constituencies of opinion within the Agency be set up to assist the Personnel Department carry out and supervise the developmental changes that are required.

There will be no significant result from social science training unless there is visible high level Agency support. At present the innovative burden (for the large changes in manpower skills suggested by new program concentration) rests largely with the Personnel Department, though institutional experience has shown that such departments alone seldom enjoy the power and influence needed to produce significant large

scale change. Accelerated program development needs as a complementary measure accelerated manpower development.

One example of the requirement for change is evident in the fact that the Agency has no critical shortage of money for people programs; instead it is experiencing difficulty in spending funds already appropriated by purpose. The gap between commitment and capacity is going to continue to widen. Another is the recent allocation of around \$2 million for much needed research on social aspects of population problems, income distribution, and social indicators, though there is no adequate assurance that Agency personnel will have the necessary skills to apply the results in a meaningful way.

If social science inputs are to function as anything other than an intellectual cosmetic, they must be made specific, operational, and related to existing and future perceived operational needs now appreciated in the Agency and in the field. Of course social science is not going to work any miracles, but it makes poor sense to have a staffing pattern that ignores or excludes the contribution of disciplines that have been dealing with poor people in other cultures for over half a century.

Those who are not familiar with the 'Thomas Report' will need to know that in future years it has been suggested that the Agency have two main types of personnel: 'Technical Generalists' who would, broadly speaking, be responsible for 'New Directions' operations, and 'Technical Specialists' operating out of AID/W in an advisory capacity.

But there are too few people who can meet these specifications at present. In fact it will be a long time before they are available in quantity.

TIME HAS ALREADY RUN OUT

Country Specific and  
Functional Social  
Science Specialists

Generalists with Social  
Science Capability

Now Available  
February 1974

10 - 12 (some areas  
e.g. Anthropology now  
have none)

10 - 15

1975

Recruitment and Agency  
familiarization will  
take longer than two  
years. Agency is  
already in arrears  
and skills are needed  
now for existing  
legislative commitment.

After high level support  
for retraining is obtained  
Agency can only effectively  
retrain 20 in the four  
month period required for  
training (or 60 per year).  
If an immediate start is  
made (and selection is a  
long way off) 120 might be  
ready by 1976.

1976: Target is  
for effective  
implementation of  
New Directions

32 new or retrained  
functioning experts  
familiar with the  
Agency and its  
operations

150 Generalists with social  
science skills necessary for  
people programs

This Report does not attempt to deal with numbers of individuals, because definitive accuracy is not yet possible. While writing was under way final standards for qualification as a Technical Generalist or Technical Specialist were not precisely known. A figure of 150 Generalists was mentioned in connection with the Thomas Report, though it is probably too low because people programs are more skill intensive than this figure allowed.

A figure of some 20 'in house' Technical Specialists was estimated in connection with the Thomas exercise. Twelve 'in house' social science Specialists, not thought necessary by Thomas, have now been added here for reasons that are spelled out in the Report. (L.A. Bureau 2, Africa Bureau 2, Asia Bureau 2, Population 1, T.A.B. 3, P.P.C. 2). These are probably grossly conservative figures, and can only be adjusted after widespread discussion which, hopefully, this Report will help promote.

It did not seem prudent to spend great effort in the Report dealing with Specialist retraining until it was decided that such social scientists would actually exist in the Agency.

This Report does not mean to be overly critical of the 'Thomas Report' which was very useful when it was produced but now should be viewed in historical perspective.

People may quibble over figures, but they cannot quibble with the situation that the figures represent. Recommendations of this Report will accomplish little unless decisions are made within a matter of weeks. It is recommended that the facts be placed before the Administrator as soon as possible.

-1'

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. The Task and Organization of Manpower . . . . .	2
II. What is Required . . . . .	6
III. Existing Resources . . . . .	10
IV. Constraints and Possibilities . . . . .	16
V. Retraining and Obtaining Specialist Inputs . . . . .	20
VI. Recommendations . . . . .	29
VII. Final Thoughts . . . . .	35
Appendix 'A' - Generalist Training in Social Science . . . . .	37
Appendix 'B' - The Field Role of a Country Specialist . . . . .	41

## I. THE TASK AND THE ORGANIZATION MANPOWER

U. S. aid is to be focused on areas that would help very poor people in the LDC's, the so called bottom 40%. These programs would aim at pinnacles of human distress; they aim to help very poor people directly by concentrating on food, population, health, education, jobs, more equitable income distribution, etc. The focus is also on human resource development. There are other assumptions: a reduced overseas presence, a diminution in size of the Agency with a gradual phasing down of development assistance operations; greater reliance on LDC designed programs and execution; and a greater concern with the development assistance efforts of other bilateral and multilateral agencies. But these are future targets. At present, people programs only constitute a small part of U. S. development assistance. Training must deal with present as well as future needs.

A.I.D. envisages a role for two major personnel categories in the years that lie ahead, a 'Technical Generalist' and a 'Technical Specialist.' Since this, following the 'Thomas Report,' is now accepted policy the categories must be dealt with in the context of this Report.

'Generalists' would be people with in depth knowledge of a particular field, e.g. education, agriculture or nutrition, which would, in certain instances, be supplemented by knowledge of the social sciences\* that have

\*The term social science, adopted in this report, is used to refer to anthropology, political science, sociology, and social psychology. At times, the emphasis will be on one, two, or several of the related disciplines that make up social sciences, with the exception of economics. This emphasis is not derived from partisan personal predilection, but instead comes from manpower requirements and the need for training to be related to potentially effective work on the kinds of specific problems identified by the 'New Directions.'

something to contribute. The accent is on breadth, integration, and teamwork.

This is a practical approach to the need for an interdisciplinary and interprofessional focus, because, while it recognizes why integration is necessary, it properly and sensibly also recognizes that one person cannot know everything.

Each Generalist in the primary areas of program concentration, human resources, health and family planning, agriculture and rural development, and urban and industrial development would thus have a specialized core of knowledge and a broader field of acquaintanceship. A problem will be to ensure that each of the Agency's relevant organizational units has an adequate representation of social science, management, etc., so that the situation does not arise where a mission is composed of 'Generalists,' and none have any social science expertise.

The 'Technical Specialist' would be a much rarer animal of a very high powered nature usually to be found in Washington. Specialists are envisaged as being technical and as operating at a high organizational level. They would be on call for field operations.

Specialists would be largely functional, i.e. in economics, or education or nutrition. They would be few in number, because it is assumed that most of the Agency's specialized needs would be met by contractors.

However, lest these definitions be too slavishly followed it should be realized that the case that is made for the Generalist to know in depth one field and to have competence in others that impinge on his specialty,

applies with equal force to the Specialist. They too must be capable of placing their contribution in perspective, and that requires a certain 'Generalist' orientation. The real difference between Generalists and Specialists will rest on the difference between levels of competence and experience in their basic fields or disciplines, i.e. as agriculturists, or economists, or nutritionists.

The rhetoric of the 'New Directions' is not helpful. Helping the poor has always been an objective of development assistance. But does one need a policy so imbalanced, in terms of rhetoric anyway, as to suggest that only certain kinds of people should be helped and that helping the very poor is 'New'? Does one want missions to have 10% 'New' activities, so that they have to assume that 10% of what they do is in style and 90% old fashioned and out of style? One probably does not want that; but, on the other hand, one does want Congress to pass favorably on what the Agency is doing. Similarities between old and new styles need emphasis.

Change must be cognizant of existing resources and must ensure continuity. Every healthy organization can shift its program emphasis but not by throwing the baby out with the bath water. It would seem easier to deal with many things if reference to 'New Directions' could be minimized to the extent that legislative commitments permit.

But this Report cannot wish away this difficult rhetoric, and so it must exhibit some of the same confusion and ambiguity that is to be found throughout the Agency. It may be ominous that the Agency has declared 80% or 90% of its work to be 'old' style and has pinned its colors on people programs with which neither A.I.D. nor any other development agency has

had a great deal of success. The changes required are of great magnitude. The incubation period was yesterday.

The intention in making these comments is not to debate policy issues outside the scope of this Report, rather the intention is to highlight difficulties encountered in trying to conceptualize a balanced posture between 'old' and 'new' training objectives.

## II. WHAT IS REQUIRED

The problem is to adapt the Agency in the shortest time possible to produce the results called for in an efficient and effective manner in the light of a probable decline in total manpower, a restriction on direct hire appointments, and an uncertain financial future.

The question of what to do has been and is being dealt with by P.P.C. guidance and T.A.B. Strategy Papers. But the question of giving guidance on how to do these things relates to training and has been relatively neglected. Mention must now be made of the new skills required.

The shift in program emphasis is from the fairly precise quantifiable programs in power, highways, higher education, etc. to less precise areas where quantification is more difficult. This is not to imply that the former kinds of programs will not continue; obviously, as already stated, they will, but the new programs place unique demands on the Agency's manpower to an unprecedented degree.

Issues concerning population, education, and nutrition are in different ways in different societies fundamentally contentious, deeply personal, highly emotional and sensitive, and not susceptible to logical neat solutions in planning. These people programs are aptly named because they seek to involve very large numbers of very poor people, and to be successful they must be founded on knowledge of the cultural life and circumstances of those they aim to affect. In the implementation of people programs a knowledge of global considerations is obviously important, but equally important is the development of social science capacity to determine what is unique and special in the country of assignment.

The emphasis on employment generation and more equitable income distribution has led to increasing concern over the least developed countries where previous development assistance has not done enough for very poor people. Indeed, dealing with the problems of very poor people in these countries may demand more direct involvement on the part of the Agency than has been the case with previous programs.

Field personnel must be capable of taking the concepts and methodologies underlying Agency programs and adjusting them to have a good local fit in the culture where they are operating. For example, against the universal goal of limiting population growth, a population program in India might concentrate its extension on the economic advantages of a smaller family; while in South America extension might have to concentrate on the fact that smaller families make for better child care. Generalists need to be able to relate family size to socio-economic levels, to know the social meaning of having, or not having, children.

In education the task is often relevance, the preservation of a cultural heritage, avoidance of an educated unemployed or urban drift. Education for very poor people presents a challenge since much of the Agency's experience has been accumulated with higher education.

Food habits are difficult to change. One must be aware of existing patterns of preference and taste, of relevant beliefs, and of methods of food preparation and preservation. A successful nutrition program must be founded on intimate local knowledge of a kind seldom possessed by mission personnel.

Health programs must be directed toward people who find it difficult to adjust to our way of doing things since they are unaware of our theories of disease and so on. Their own remedies and medical philosophies have provided both explanation and prescription for many years.

The Agency needs to be confident that its Generalists know what people want, what they can do or are prepared to do to help themselves, what the possibilities and the constraints are on local initiatives. It may not be possible with respect to the new programs to work through and with local elites as much as in the past, since local capacity to solve and identify the sensitive issues connected with people programs is often not well developed.

Apart from mission requirements there is an increasing demand for social analyses capacity for review and evaluation of proposed projects and sector support activities, both internally within the Agency and externally in collaboration with other donors, such as the World Bank.

Following the acceptance of the 'Thomas Report,' dealt with in the following section, it has been assumed for planning purposes that new programs would require the same ratio of manpower resource allocation as traditional programs. This is a mistaken view. Programs with a high social content are more difficult to identify, more time consuming to prepare and appraise, or to monitor and manage, and usually involve smaller dollar or local financing amounts than traditional programs. They are, in short, more skill-intensive than traditional programs from a donor point of view.

For reasons such as this the manpower projection figures of the 'Thomas Report' are suspect and are in need of revision.

SPECIALIST REQUIREMENTS

What would social science Specialists actually do? They could help disaggregate the Agency's programs and policies to ensure a good fit with the cultural milieu in the country of operation. (More details are given in Appendix 'B.')

They could be responsible for orienting local mission and direct hire personnel to continuously provide social science inputs and to continuously update the Agency's appreciation of the social requirements in their projects and programs. Each could be assigned to a distinct cultural area. Each would then be on call in the manner envisaged for other Specialists.

### III. PRESENT CAPACITY TO MEET 'NEW DIRECTIONS' REQUIREMENTS

Existing social science capacity is inadequate and out of date. The skills developed and used during the past are not consistent with the social science requirements of the future. The short fall is of considerable proportion.

The 'Thomas Report' presents a forecast of manpower requirements of technical and program management personnel for 1976 and 1978, together with an analysis of the overall personnel management and training implications of that forecast. The paper is based on approval of twelve personnel categories divided into twenty-six types of personnel for forecasting and overall control of A.I.D. technical and program management personnel. Technical and program management personnel include all professional personnel, other than those in the administrative management and support categories. It includes the engineers from the SER Bureau. It excludes all other SER personnel and personnel in similar positions in other bureaus and overseas. It also excludes personnel in the offices of Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and the Auditor General.

As of June 1972, technical and program management personnel totaled 2,520 persons, 44% of A.I.D. full time U.S. employees. Of the 2,520, 832 were in Washington and 1,688 were overseas. They constituted 29% of U.S. personnel in Washington and 58% of U.S. personnel overseas. The following further assumptions are made: That the types of people required for the major program of reconstruction and rehabilitation in Indochina will not

differ greatly from those required in other overseas missions. That total A.I.D. non-SA program levels will stay essentially at the actual level of the last several years. Within these overall levels, the program mix will continue to change. The program will be marked by increasing concentration in the key areas of:

Food and Nutrition  
Family Planning and Health  
Human Resource Development

During the latter part of the decade, A.I.D. will also give greater emphasis to the problems of urbanization in the LDC's. The process of consolidation and concentration which the A.I.D. program is going through will continue after 1974, but at a slower pace.

The 'Thomas Report' was concerned to advance the concepts of 'Technical Generalist' and 'Technical Specialist.' It did not attempt to assess existing social science capacity in the 'Generalist' sphere and it assumed that 'Specialist' social science capacity would come from outside contractors.

One measure of existing social science capacity comes from an examination of the formal educational background of Agency employees:

Existing Social Science Capacity

Educational Background of 535 Non Economist

Degree Holding Agency Employees

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Anthropology	8	1.4
Behavioral Science	4	.7

Educational Background of 535 Non Economist  
Degree Holding Agency Employees (cont'd)

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
History	63	11.8
Hist/Econ	20	3.7
Hist/Pol Sc.	50	9.4
Journalism	21	3.9
Liberal Arts	34	6.4
Political Science	138	25.8
Pol. Sc/Economics	52	9.7
Psychology	53	9.9
Social Science General	35	6.5
Sociology	57	10.8
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	535	100.0

Note: 85% of these are primary degrees, and, for an equivalent percentage, almost 20 years have elapsed since the degree was taken.

Given that the Agency has a number of sociologists, is there any significance to the small number of persons with an anthropological background? It is true that the terms can be, and are often, used interchangeably, and that the methods used by both disciplines are similar. But the empirical data and the training experience of most sociologists have drawn primarily on developed country situations while anthropologists have concentrated on the lesser developed countries. The anthropologist has, in

short, usually had more general exposure to L.D.C. problems and has particular in depth experience with one country.

The concentration on cultural idiosyncracies and whole social systems is also of importance in these days when people programs demand appreciation of the uniqueness of particular cultures and integrated rural development requires conceptualization of total social systems. Of course, experience with the L.D.C. data that has been built up over the years is of further advantage.

Many Agency personnel have social science skills either as a result of formal academic training or through experience, but they need to be refined, further developed, or refreshed. This is so because in the last decade or so contact has been with dominant power groups in the LDC's, with technology transfers, commodity import programs, institutional development, cooperatives, public works, and so on. Here the tools and concepts of management and economics have served well, but they must now be supplemented.

Of those Agency personnel who have been identified as having social science educational backgrounds, only two people with anthropological backgrounds, for example, have been identified with current missions, and 75% of the sociologists, and all the social psychologists, are in AID/W. The net result is that not only is the social science element weak, but such resources as exist are mainly in AID/W, and they are mainly confined to TAB and PPC.

Some 150 Generalists will need social science training in the new areas of program concentration in terms of what is now known so that they can make

an impact locally either in terms of their own or host country initiatives, or for monitoring the work of contractors.

Availability At Specialist Level. Of the potential specialist social science cadre, a similarly long time has often elapsed since an advanced degree was obtained, and only a small percentage are directly involved in operations of the Regional Bureaus and missions. There appear to be only two persons with a doctorate in psychology or social psychology, and no direct hire employee has a doctorate in anthropology.

The Agency cannot afford to deal with disciplines or professions where it does not have the basic capacity to write probing terms of reference, or the capacity to rigorously evaluate the finished work product. More people programs are going to require more specialist 'in house' social science inputs than are currently envisaged. Social science contractors will need to be managed like any other contractor if the Agency is to get good value for expenditure of funds.

This Report does not, of course, argue that there is no useful specialist role for contractors, the universities, foundations, etc., in assisting in the implementation of the 'New Directions.' What is being suggested is that if these forms of assistance are to be successful, there must be a minimum in house specialist capacity on the part of the Agency itself in the area of social science. At least 32 are required.

It would be possible to begin assuming that existing plans and capacity will be adequate. But in time a failure to employ the kinds of skills that

it is known can help with people programs could lead to considerable embarrassment if real progress is not made.

The kinds of social science Specialist the Agency does not have in sufficient quantity have spent years making sense of various dimensions of human behavior - the political, the economic, the psychological - in societies very different from North America. They deal with important questions such as what it is that people want, why they act as they do, what is their likely response to innovation. The real strength of the social sciences lies in their command of a body of data of relevance to people projects, in the systematic nature of the enquiries carried out, and in knowing what kinds of question must be asked, what kinds of additional data obtained.

Obviously such people can be useful: This Report does not suggest that more social science Specialists, if obtained, will result in tremendous success with new programs. It does suggest that such people can help, that they can be more helpful than in the past when their interests as professionals were peripheral to the program thrust of the Agency. It does make poor sense to exclude or largely ignore disciplines whose work has been concerned with poor people in other cultures for over half a century.

#### IV. CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBILITIES

The present hope is that the Agency will somehow mold itself to the requirements of the future. But is it not likely and human that the 'old' ways of doing things, however renamed, will determine what can and is to be done and how things are to be done regardless of exhortation?

If the present emphasis on technical matters and Program and Policy guidance in AID/W continues without corresponding emphasis on manpower development in the Agency, then missions may find themselves in an increasingly difficult position. They may find it difficult to carry out programs that would have sufficient flexibility to achieve a unique fit between the circumstances of their country and what A.I.D. can offer.

It may be useful to suggest a two agency thesis, the idea being that health, population, education, etc., have taken on board a significant number of social scientists perhaps because in getting off the ground and because of the nature of their operations, they have not had to deal with traditions of staffing and well entrenched ways of doing and looking at things.

Hence, the two agencies, the 'older' concentrating on monitoring and management of change in a broad number of projects and programs tailored to specific country needs, and the new one dealing with the limited number of problems on a global basis. This means that there are different levels of receptivity to social science inputs because the two potential users, the 'old' and the 'new,' perceive that they have different problems.

The psychology of change is also important. Considered in terms of age and seniority, the structure of the Agency resembles an inverted pear with the majority of the employees being aged 36 and upwards, and a minority of younger personnel (See Manpower Planning Paper No. 6). In view of the policy of a future reduced overseas presence, there may be a growing disparity between the number of employees in Washington and the number of employees overseas. There is no evidence that attrition will adjust this imbalance, and attrition may mean the loss of the best people. Will training be wanted? Will those selected really try?

Those whose instincts tell them that their jobs and careers stand in jeopardy cannot, perhaps, be expected to support new policies enthusiastically. The trend is toward multilateral lending, and most people are very aware of the fact. It would seem prudent to reissue at an early date the existing policy that there be no reduction in force. This would have great psychological value. Can this be done authoritatively?

Specialist Considerations. Social science specialists have often seemed reluctant about association with the Agency. Some academics have attributed non-involvement to the ideological chills of the McCarthy era; others have suggested that academic life was simply more attractive. Other more important factors might be added; a lack of institutional experience which made it difficult for the quite senior social scientists who were recruited to recognize how and why things were done in large institutions; a general lack of knowledge about development work; an individualistic orientation which made adjustment to team work difficult; an inclination to treat each small community as an end in itself which gave little

guidance, in allocating scarce resources between communities, or with policy considerations at a regional or national level.

All these things contributed to non involvement, but they were not critical in the sense that they could not have been overcome by the Agency with proper selection and in-service training. The critical factor was that those who controlled A.I.D. policies did not think that they really needed social science. This was because of the then prevailing ideas of economic growth with emphasis on capital intensive infrastructural development in power, communications, and other sectors.

Perhaps in view of these considerations, it is possible to comprehend the fact that the Agency has not fully digested the results of its contact with social scientists. The pointers given by many fine pieces of work undertaken by individual consultants have not sparked an institutional response in the form of adoption of a policy toward use of social science as a routine required procedure. The contacts between Agency personnel and social scientists are still ephemeral, ad hoc, ad hominem, and extremely wasteful.

An example to illustrate the danger in not having an 'inhouse' capacity may be useful. Why do some regional bureaus use social science consultants for some types of programs and policies while other bureaus do not use similar consultants for the same programs and policies? Obviously (a) because there is no requirement to do so; and (b) because use depends on the individual whim and experience of the individuals concerned. There must, for people programs, be adoption of a uniform Agency policy and institution of uniform procedures for insuring that all programs and

policies are dealt with in the same way. Otherwise there will be reluctance to acquire a form of training whose utility is dependent on what may appear to be the peculiar caprice of one's Mission Director, or mission personnel resources.

V. OBTAINING SOCIAL SCIENCE INPUTS

In the past the objectives of manpower development have been passive concerned as they were to maintain capacity. Now it is vital that they become part of the change process, that they become a vehicle of change, mediating the tensions caused by lack of manpower for traditional programs, while there is a concurrent need to develop capacity to deal with the new areas of program concentration.

There must be a reasonable balance between the approach which would involve academic classroom kinds of training with the objectives of giving people what they ought to know and an overly pragmatic approach so attuned to existing ways of doing and thinking that changes would be of a very minor nature. The first might be thought of as a classical training approach, the second as an operational focus. The main point is, of course, that neither view should unilaterally prevail, rather there should be a consensus resulting from the contributions of both.

But missions and regional bureaus may be reluctant to state their needs. Many people may prefer to wait and see, many may think of renaming current programs. No one is wildly anxious to say they don't feel as competent dealing with new programs as they felt with the old. Nobody is quite sure how you deal effectively with two kinds of programming at the same time.

Retraining must have very visible and very high level support within the Agency. Many employees do not now consider this to be the case. In fact a survey of 47 M.I.D.S. personnel indicated that 87% felt that social science

inputs were needed in the Agency but also felt that under present conditions, they would be unable to effectively utilize social science skills. This is why visible high level support and encouragement is required.

Training is often thought of as a 'good thing' by operations people but not of particular relevance. The manpower people have a tendency to get isolated from operations and can only try to give what they feel ought to be known; the trainees are dissatisfied because they get no perceivable reward for their effort; training tends to be global and is regarded as a once-and-for-all exercise for individuals who can conveniently leave their jobs for a period.

Training needs to be related to needs that are actually perceived by people who will be expected to use trainees, but it must also produce some tangible reward for the trainee. Successful completion of training must have important career consequences in terms of things like preferential posting or job assignment, career advancement, greater feeling of security, and so on.

There are three important processes in relation to retraining of Generalists: first, choice of candidates; second, choice of forms of training; third, choice of post-training job location.

Great care must obviously be taken to institute equitable selection procedures that can enjoy the widest support of Agency personnel. Selection as a 'Generalist' is surely to be, ultimately, of more importance than a promotion, and therefore the idea of a selection board would appear warranted.

The questions of composition of such a Board and criteria for selection then arise.

Ideally, it should contain representatives from the Regional Bureaus, T.A.B., P.P.C., Personnel to see to the Agency's interests, and perhaps one or two academics familiar with the Agency to see to the social science requirements. However, the size of such a Board would be a critical factor. It must not be so large as to be unwieldy, and at the same time, it would have to represent the various important constituencies of opinion within the Agency.

It would perhaps be difficult for such a Board to begin by reviewing the personnel records of suitable candidates since these records were produced for another purpose and they might not adequately highlight the kinds of things the Board would be looking for.

Therefore, it might be useful to begin by designing a special form of application to be self-administered and submitted through normal channels, with appropriate comments by supervisors, to the Board. This, together with a review of personnel records, could serve as a preliminary screening mechanism.

What should the criteria for selection be? In the last analysis subjectivity is unavoidable, but some general guidelines may be helpful to ensure that candidates have the opportunity to make their best case and also to ensure uniformity of treatment for candidates with varied experience and backgrounds.

Previous Agency experience is an obvious starting point and it is possible to list some of the more important points:

1. Organizational Experience: Experience of people programs and of the inputs required for successful execution; ability to be clear, logical, methodical, and convincing, in paperwork; ability to work as a team member under trying conditions with a minimum of supervision; ability to effectively represent U.S. interests by forming productive relationships with counterparts and contractors, ability to liaise effectively with other Agency and local personnel; ability to generate support both within and without the Agency for particular measures, ability to lead through personal example; ability to manage effectively to get the maximum return from resources and manpower; knowledge of organizational constraints on making progress on Agency programs.

2. Intellectual Attributes: A lack of dogmatism or tendency to assume that one discipline or profession has all the answers; willingness to learn new methods, approaches, and concepts; ability to be objective and to learn from past mistakes; analytical ability to expose the important elements, variables, or questions to ensure that the initial paradigm is sufficiently comprehensive to serve as a basis for adequate data collection; synthesizing ability to ensure that the professional concerns of other generalists and specialists are adequately articulated; experience and knowledge of other countries and regions to ensure that there is a realistic fit between what is proposed or is being done and what is possible; a concern with system and method to ensure full treatment of often tediously long and seemingly unrewarding problems; creative capacity to produce new and innovative solutions adapted to local circumstances.

3. Commitment to Social Science Approaches: Depth of knowledge about previous countries of assignment as reflected in knowledge of culture, language facility, nature and type of relationships with host country nationals; knowledge of conflict between local values and beliefs and those implicit in the local U.S.A.I.D. program; knowledge of why very poor people in particular countries have not benefited from or participated in much of the recent development assistance efforts of bilateral and multilateral agencies; knowledge of what very poor people want and how these aspirations might be satisfied; explication of a personal view of development.

4. Professional Skills: Ability, competence, and experience, in major field as measured in formal qualifications, membership in learned societies, publications, familiarity with recent advances; length of elapsed time since last formal training; knowledge, training in, or experience of, other professionals and social scientists.

It will be important to probe into just how far the individual has entered into the life of the various societies where he has worked. It will be important that he or she, already and independently, can use this experience to demonstrate the need for the kind of training applied for. It will not be enough to equate experience of being in a country with what has happened to an individual's professional growth as a result of that experience.

Academic experience is of lesser importance, because if an individual has performed well, knows what is required, is well motivated to learn, and is intelligent and capable of good team work, then the fact that he has a

B.A., M.A., or PhD is unimportant. Such things reflect academic seniority not developmental seniority; in development work there really is no terminal degree. The point is never reached where one stops learning. Entrants to a retraining program may be like brides each bringing a different dowry, some of experience, some of parchment, but all needed.

Choice of Training. The second issue concerns choice of training for 'Generalists.' There have in the past been three problems involved in trying to give people the kinds of data and expertise required for people programs in particular countries. One is the fact that there have been too many perspectives, a consequence of too many authors, too many disciplines. A second is that the analyses, concepts, and data have often given little apparent guidance on how to tackle particular problems. A third is that the audience has been neither homogenous in terms of intellectual ability, interest, professional need nor experience. The basic system produced here as an Appendix 'A' for 'Generalists' has been designed to overcome some of these defects. Specific area and functional courses can be designed around this model.

This generalist information package at minimum would contain the kinds of social data, conceptual and analytical processes required by personnel in the field to meet the requirements of people programs. Courses can be designed around the model and it can, of course, be modified in the light of suggestions.

Firstly, the framework can be applied to any country or region of operations in much the same way as the Agency's 'logical framework' has

universal application. Thus information storage, retrieval, and the individual country learning experiences of Agency personnel can be standardized.

Second, the framework is neutral as to choice of discipline. The series of steps outlined do not predestine or preclude the use of any particular discipline. The framework is derived from the kinds of things that experience has shown to be useful in the solution of particular problems associated with 'New Directions' type programs and policies, and thus avoids a series of conceptual and analytical frameworks for different disciplines.

Third, the framework is neutral as to function since the steps are as applicable for education or nutrition as they are for agriculture. Social science ought not have different frameworks for different functions if there is to be progress made toward the goal of integrated development in rural and urban areas.

Finally, the framework should be made up by country and functional specialists familiar with the Agency and its operational needs in AID/W. It is estimated that one to two months would be sufficient time for preparation of the information by a specialist. A period of about three months should suffice for instruction.

Although universities can assist in training, in recent years Area programs have declined and few universities have in depth strength in all the facets of the 'New Directions'. It would be useful and convenient to have, if possible, Generalist courses run at the F.S.I., perhaps by the Specialists this Report suggests the Agency acquire, as well as by those Specialists the

Agency already has on board. Gaps could then be filled through university contracting.

Where should retrained Generalists go? The post training location must be an area where there is an expressed need for the training product. Secondly, there must be a sufficient number of trainees so that their skills acquire bureaucratic leverage. Thirdly, the training should not be confined to one level of seniority but should be adequately dispersed throughout the levels of hierarchy of the organizational unit chosen.

In order to work effectively, the Generalist with social science training must have a favorable climate within the mission, or in AID/W, and there is no point in foisting him on a mission whose director is little interested, if not actually opposed to his type of approach. Furthermore, it must be understood by the administration that no Generalist, however well-trained, is in a position to be very helpful until he first has been given opportunity to orient himself to the local culture.

In addition, the Generalist should be allowed adequate time to prepare his data in the form of written reports. If his material remains in the form of field notes, there will be no readily available, organized record of his investigations, and the chances are that 4 or 5 years hence, after a change or two of mission directors, the same old project may be hit upon and launched anew. Unless we record our failures and our successes in written reports, we are not in a position to profit from them in the future.

It is most unlikely that useful contributions can be proffered by someone who does not have a pretty substantial background in the general culture zone in question, combined with first-hand field experience; remote control collaboration will be out of focus.

The best course will be one which is substantially an A.I.D. affair though there will be university inputs. It cannot be accomplished in under four months. It is unlikely that a class size of more than 20 can be meaningfully handled. The arithmetic of 20 at a time for four months gives an indication of how long change will take and how urgent is the need for a start. This cannot be allowed to become just another course. Its success will surely be intimately related to the achievement of Agency objectives.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO GENERALISTS.

1. That the stress on technical matters, new policies, and programs must not detract from the fact that these things take place in an idiosyncratic cultural context, and that 'Generalists' need to have training to increase skills to appreciate not only universal characteristics, but more importantly what is unique to their area of operations.
2. That the present and future needs of the Agency demand and require recognition, that Manpower Development is critical to increased effectiveness, that Manpower must move from a passive to an active role, and that sufficient resources be devoted to this transition.
3. That the selection of candidates be accomplished by devising screening mechanisms and constituting selection boards for retraining in the social sciences with the objective of getting people who will make positive use of their training.
4. The adoption of types of training which would be task oriented as well as intellectually oriented, and which would cover needs as they are perceived in A.I.D./W. and missions; which would be educative as well as congruent with existing requirements; which would yield a definite career reward for successful performance; which would offer demonstrative utility through relationship to existing task performance.
5. Choice of missions as a consequence of interest expressed by those missions, which would attempt to ensure that the training product was, in terms of the disciplines and professions that make up the 'Generalist' model, representatively introduced.

6. Initiation of feasibility studies to utilize the F.S.I. for retraining purposes, with part of the staff to consist of social science specialists on assignment under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, and the remainder to be made up by Specialists on rotation from within the Agency and/or university contracting.

7. High level adoption of policy which requires social science treatment of projects and programs on a systematic basis rather than leaving such things to individual decision.

8. That in order to create the necessary psychological environment in which change can take place, the personnel implications of a smaller future Agency be publicly and authoritatively dealt with as expeditiously as possible.

9. That it would be advisable to give consideration to the establishment of a high level committee containing representatives from important constituencies of opinion within the Agency which should be directly charged with lending support to the introduction of new skills.

OBTAINING SPECIALIST INPUTS

It would be neither necessary nor possible for the Agency to obtain direct hire Specialists for all countries where people program needs are deemed especially sensitive. But some 'in house' capacity must be acquired through recruitment and retraining. It would be advisable for the Bureaus to identify regions and countries on the following basis: (a) Countries where there is considerable in-depth country experience, e.g. Laos, so that existing arrangements may be adequate; (b) Countries for which Specialists should be retrained or recruited because of the importance and estimated duration of U.S.A.I.D. activities e.g., Sahel drought areas, and where existing capacity may be marginal or unduly reliant on a single individual who is liable to posting; (c) Countries where people programs will be important, where the Agency does not possess adequate country experience and where the volume of work would not justify direct hire.

If this exercise can be completed, it would yield a numerical total of Specialists to be obtained from retraining or on contract or direct hire terms. Then contacts could be established with universities or other entities to ensure an effective input of people. At present, potential resource people in the social sciences who might become contractors have not been identified. This should be an urgent priority.

But, on the other hand, these Specialists could also be of utility to State Department as well as AID Personnel; they could serve as a focal point for national research into the kinds of problems that the Agency is interested in. Finally, this would result in having the best people working continuously

together on key problems, something that universities for understandable reasons seldom manage to achieve.

Additionally, the Agency could identify a required number of functional and country or regional specialists and to form a relationship with their universities, firms etc., - perhaps drawing on 211(d) experience - which would enable them to be on call when needed so that each year their time was divided between AID and academia. This arrangement would have the advantage of being capable of being tailored to needs and also of being subject to termination at fairly short notice.

In selecting direct hire social scientists as specialists it will be vital to assess how a spell with the Agency fits in with the individual's own long term professional growth, and how realistic the individual's own assessment is; it will be vital to assess the level of bureaucratic skills held by the social scientist; it will be vital to assess willingness to work on problems defined by others; it will be vital to assess the individual's capacity for drudgery or long work where the potential for ultimate academic recognition is limited; it will be vital to assess the capacity for teamwork. In short, the lessons of experience must be applied.

Those Agency personnel with specialist credentials who need retraining or refresher courses should be identified and suitable university contacts established, so that they can have at least a semester to convert.

In order to obtain and maintain 'in house' capacity, the Agency might usefully adopt the ODA/Sussex model and have a cadre of social science

experts at, say, the FSI where they would teach, do relevant research, and be on call for operations wherever and whenever they might be required. This might be worked on contract under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. An advantage would be that these people would know the Agency, and that at the same time they could keep up to date in their fields; a disadvantage would be their presumably small number and the fact that they could probably only be used on short-term assignments. Further, these people would probably, because of numbers, tend to be functional specialists rather than area or country specialists.

What kind of person would qualify as a Specialist? In order to form a Specialist cadre the Agency must look for people who, in terms of their research, writing, experience, and bureaucratic reputation can provide a bridge between the Agency and contractors. Specialists must be able to deal with senior academics as equals, and they must have senior organizational experience.

Such people are not now available in quantity. They cannot be picked up tomorrow or at the instant when funds and interest suddenly coincide. It will take time, and a good deal of it, to recruit such people and to give them the necessary organizational experience.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. There should be recognition of the need for 'in house' social science specialists in missions and in regional bureaus, as well as T.A.B., P.P.C., over and above present anticipated ceilings, and that the need be met through retraining and direct hire; that there should also be creation and maintenance of an inventory of in depth country specialists in universities, etc., to afford initial selection and program utilization of these skills in the years ahead.
2. That when decisions on the recommendations contained in this Report are made, work should immediately proceed on a collaborative basis to definitely establish on a quantitative and qualitative basis manpower projections.
3. Issues raised by this Report are important and require urgent attention. Bureaucratic politics, the past history and reputation of social science, and a general lack of confidence in training as an instrument of change imperil the utility of this Report. It is recommended that the matters for decision be placed before the Administrator as soon as possible, since the Administrator is really the only person with the overall authority to make these changes work.

## VII. FINAL THOUGHTS

One cannot usefully separate social science from the wider scene. There are, broadly speaking, two poles of activity in the development process, the urban and the rural. They are related in subtle ways and each must be integrated. The question must be continuously asked: How do the new job descriptions and new titles of 'Technical Generalist' and 'Technical Specialist' help in doing a better job? Does the suggested organization of manpower make the best use of skills? Does it help focus attention on the right issues?

Perhaps better use of skills would have been possible, and better vision obtained, without the term 'Technical' in relation to 'Generalists' or 'Specialists' since these are human problems where technology, though it is very important, is not the only factor at work.

Perhaps a great deal of trouble would have been avoided had these personnel categories 'Generalist' and 'Specialist' been capable of being considered as a rank. In that case what jobs were called and how they were described have been more related to needs. This surely is often the case anyway. But these things have already been dealt with. Irreversibly?

The problems faced in modern development assistance cut across the traditional boundaries of disciplines and professions. By the time one has to talk about 'multisectoral,' a certain redundancy has been reached. There is little in the suggested titular changes of the 'Thomas Report' which will help educationalists to integrate their work with agriculturalists, nor nutritionists to relate their work with the needs of urban industry.

Unless great care is taken, the evolution of a 'Technical Generalist' and 'Technical Specialist,' as the result of a too mechanical manipulation of old jobs and ways of doing things, may produce a sterile conjugal union rather than a dynamic dialectic between the old and the new.

As it is, however, there are still too many unresolved inconsistencies; a call for collaboration where none may be possible or wanted either with the LDC's or multilateral agencies; more work overseas with fewer people; a smaller future Agency and a policy of full employment; and the immediate initiation of social programs before the necessary 'tooling up' is completed.

There is a need for a good deal of sorting out to achieve a more balanced posture. But the persistence of these inconsistencies some probably irresolvable because of Congressional involvement, and of the fuzzy areas some time after the announcement of new programs makes it necessary to return to the question initially posed: Does the Agency really mean to do what it says it intends to do? Does the Agency want real change or just another training program?

APPENDIX 'A'

GENERALIST TRAINING IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Training would be directed toward giving basic skills in the collection and analysis of social data relevant to Agency objectives. This training would be of utility in monitoring or management functions. The aim would not be to produce a 'renaissance' man but an individual whose sensitivity to important social issues has been heightened, who can check that the data base is adequate, who can ensure that the right questions have been asked, and that the measures proposed have a realistic chance of success.

General Concepts: Social structure and stratification, function and process; mechanisms for integration and solidarity; belief and value systems; rationality and deviance; perception and reference groups, indigenous models of behavior and role theory; network theory; social change.

Economic Behavior: Division of labor; production and distribution of goods and services; ideas of value and prestige; normative behavior; allocation of time and indigenous maximization theory; social constraints of an individual or institutional nature on increased production and consumption.

Ideological Behavior: Identification of core values and beliefs and their relationship to indigenous models of development; local definitions of rationality and deviance; the relationship between social constraints and development; relationship between ideology and the legitimation of change; relationship between professed political ideology and traditional belief systems.

Legal behavior: Concepts of ownership and property; the system of land tenure; positive and negative sanctions on behavior; the relationship between legal and social change; legal conflicts between ethnic groups.

Political behavior: Centralized and non centralized states; the role and function of elites; legitimate and illegitimate uses of power; the relationship between politics and social change; development of posts, ethnic and national identity; the role of women; the role of minority groups; ideologies.

Psychological Behavior: Identification of national character models; processes of childhood socialization and norm formation; deviant behavior; patterns of perception; relationship between language and cultural expression; identification of motivation and cultural drives; processes of conflict resolution.

#### Specific Items

Groups: Identification of group attributes; group dynamics, ethnicity and social boundary maintenance.

Institutions: Identification of institutions by function and purpose; theories of decision making and authority; specialization and potential adaptability; viability of traditional institutions.

Leadership: Leadership in traditional and modern sectors; the role of opinion leaders; gaining and losing leadership status; issues of succession and confirmation; the limits and abuses of authority in traditional and modern sectors; the relationship between occupation, ethnicity, class and leadership.

Demography: Structure of the population in terms of age and sex and family size; relationship between births and deaths; relationship between ethnicity, occupation, income levels and family size; patterns of mobility in relation to occupation and seasonality; the relationship between social factors and urban drift; the relationship between patterns of production and changes in the composition of the population; the relationship between the location of development assistance projects and the distributional and mobility patterns of population.

Motivation: Incentives and disincentives to participate or produce; value and belief conflicts; the relationship between individual and group motivation; the characteristics of successful entrepreneurs; the short and long term consequences of change; the social costs of change; the identification of core values and beliefs and their variation by group, class, or occupation.

Obstacles to Change: Conflicts between indigenous and introduced values and beliefs; conflicts in roles and obligations; ungrounded assumptions about local behavior; unverified assumptions about rationality and probable reaction; areas where change is not possible or particularly difficult; conflicts between group and individual concepts of organization; unanticipated consequences of change.

Methods of Ensuring

Change: Design and content of mass communication strategy; cooption of opinion leaders and relevant institutions; relationship between incentives and key values and beliefs; decisions affecting the location of on the ground

activity; consideration of negative sanctions affecting participation; decisions affecting the level of support.

Area or Regional Idiosyncracies: Identification of significant social, cultural, or political factors which make location different from or similar to other areas; identification of local conception of development assistance; identification of local wants and the locally available means of their satisfaction.

The Social Prerequisites for Success in Particular Operations: Examination of the lessons of experience - the more common problems found in trying to mount programs in health, population, education, and nutrition. Identification of why certain programs worked while others did not.

Data Collection: Design of questionnaire surveys, projective tests, open ended interviews, statistically relevant samples, participant observation techniques; tests for objectivity and authenticity of data; differential perceptions of interviewees; development of informant networks; defects and strengths of qualitative and quantitative assessments.

The design and interpretation of social indicators, objective and subjective measurements; data cleaning and defects in statistical presentations; utilization of existing academic resources.

-11-

APPENDIX 'B'

SUGGESTIONS ON THE ROLE OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE COUNTRY SPECIALIST

Local Familiarization. A social scientist can offer useful insight with respect to many fundamental aspects of society. Is the latter basically democratic? Is it stratified, based on socio-economic classes? On castes? What are the cultural differences associated with the component groups? What is the relative status of the sexes? What cultural differences distinguish rural and urban groups? What are the regional differences and what significance do they have for the program?

What attitudes do the people have with respect to change? Are they interested in innovation or do they cling tenaciously to their old culture patterns? What are the traditional techniques of learning? Through imitation? Through individual experiment? Is traditional teaching audio, or visual, or both?

What are the identifiable values of the people? Is health a major concern for them? Or are philosophical and religious values of greater importance? Is education one of their real interests? What are the notions associated with prestige? Does it rest on special position? On education? Wealth? What material manifestations does such prestige take? Land? Live-stock? Political power? Participation in underwriting the costs of ostensibly religious ceremonies? What are the leadership patterns? Too often, we lose sight of the fact that prestige is a potent motivating force in cultural change and that the latter generally is effected through local leadership.

Orientation of Direct Hire and Contractual Personnel. In the first place the social scientist is able to provide North American personnel with orientation to and understanding of the cultural background of the host country and thus minimize the difficulties frequently suffered by colleagues who have to adjust to a social environment radically different from their own. The technician is thus able to focus attention on his specific job, with a minimum of time dedicated to adjustment.

In the second place, the social scientist often is called upon to orient host country technicians to the culture of their own country. At first blush, this sounds ridiculous. But it so happens that local technicians generally come from urban rather than rural surroundings; moreover, technical education tends to be limited to social sectors of relative prestige and prosperity, while programs often are directed toward rural groups and, particularly, toward population segments of less privileged social status. The upshot is that the local technician may require about as much orientation to the cultural diversification of his own country as does the North American technician.

Participation in overall planning. Thirdly, the experienced social scientist who has had a chance to become saturated with the local culture and who, concurrently, is thoroughly familiar with the technical cooperation program - is in a position to be helpful in overall planning. Obviously, he must be fully aware of the objectives of the program, as well as cognizant of the economic and political problems with which it is confronted. In addition, he must be sufficiently experienced to view possible solutions in

the light of program mechanism and resources, such as technicians and budget. In short, collaboration in over-all planning is not a job for the novice, but one for the experienced investigator who is well versed both in the local culture and in program operations.

There is scant hope of success unless the proposed changes can be adapted to the local culture and incorporated in it. Patently, there is little point in planning agricultural extension services, unless we realize that the host country farmers do not share our ideas, nor of producing audio-visual data as though they were to be directed to an audience in a metropolitan country.

Program plans should be reviewed in the light of the values of the host country and its ideas associated with prestige. Not infrequently, barriers to the proposed change may be foreseen and sometimes ways and means of by-passing such barriers are found within the local society itself. The effect of the proposed change on the various sectors of the population and on the distinct regions of the country should be considered. Sometimes agencies sponsor projects which conflict with the established norms or which favor the interests of one local group while doing violence to those of another. Sometimes, unthinkingly, donors launch projects which cause our own collaborators to lose face.

Planning and evaluation of specific projects. It is easier to demonstrate in concrete terms the usefulness of the social scientist when it comes to consideration of specific projects in given fields. Below are cited examples from public health, population, housing, resettlement, nutrition, and education.

Public Health. To date, in international programs, the approach of the social scientist probably has found acceptance primarily in public health programs. In most of the countries where A.I.D. operates, there is a thick, deeply-rooted substratum of folk medicine, on which modern public health services rest, more or less as an extraneous overlay. Without knowledge of the underlying folk medicine, it is difficult to effect any sort of fusion. Sympathetic understanding of the popular beliefs and practices related to disease helps enormously in establishing rapport between the professional personnel and the public and, by extension, in gaining an effective toe hold for modern health concepts and services.

The social scientist who has a chance to study local folk medicine is in a position to provide significant data on the score of popular disease concepts and associated therapy. In addition, such a study invariably results in an enlightening store of knowledge with respect to (1) attitudes and beliefs, (2) the role of native practitioners and (3) the essentially logical character of popular medicine.

Frequently, this logical quality explains the apathy exhibited toward the health services we sponsor. For example, if disease is attributed to the intrusion of an evil spirit in the body of the patient, the indicated solution is extraction of the offending spirit; if illness is thought to result from soul loss, manifestly the problem is one of restoring the wandering soul. In neither case is recourse to the health center a logical move. An awareness of the reasons behind such rejection of health-center services assists the professional personnel materially (1) in overcoming the resistance and (2) in substituting the concepts and practices of modern

medicine for those of the traditional culture. As an aside, it generally is far easier to gain acceptance of modern practices - such as the use of injections - than it is to instill understanding of the concepts behind them; yet, until the latter is accomplished, the graft of introduced medical culture is not genuinely established.

An intensive study of local folk medicine often shows how certain already existing beliefs and practices can be put to good use in facilitating the introduction of modern health practices. For example, if the people believe that measles are contagious, this basic notion can be expanded to apply to tuberculosis, provided the latter is not already recognized as likely to spread from one person to another. Is it customary to take native medicines in the morning before breakfast? If so, it may be helpful if the doctor prescribes his remedies according to the same pattern. The same holds for the use of ceremonial numbers. Is the medicine administered in terms of 3? That is, 3 cups of herb tea, or 3 teaspoons of medicine, or 3 drops of some preparation? Does treatment continue for 3 days, or in multiples of 3? Again, these same patterns may be exploited to gain acceptance of modern medical treatment.

Sometimes, too, the study of folk medicine reveals ways and means of enlisting the collaboration of native curers so that, instead of having them as opponents, they become, in a certain sense, collaborators.

When it comes to planning of maternal-child health services, the social scientist can define current beliefs and practices relative to pregnancy, birth and infant care. As a rule, it turns out that certain of these are

admirable and should be strengthened, while others are actually harmful and should be combatted actively. Quite often, the local culture itself provides the solution. Although it may be believed, for example, that the pregnant woman should drink little water, perhaps a certain herb tea is considered admirable for her; accordingly, to assure her an adequate liquid intake, the indicated move is to recommend use of such tea. But without a firm grounding in the folk culture, a recommendation may run entirely counter to the convictions of the people.

Health-center operation benefits notably from the orientation supplied by the social scientist. Not infrequently, it turns out that visiting hours are planned for the convenience of the staff, instead of the public. Some health centers - in keeping with our own emphasis on preventive rather than curative medicine - refuse to attend the ailing child and thus gain bitter enmity of the parents. Folk notions with respect to personal modesty may be brusquely ignored in the gynecological examination administered to the pregnant woman; in that case, she withdraws from the center. It has been found quite commonly that the public disdains services which are gratis, and that it may be preferable to make a nominal charge. Expressions of public opinion, recorded by the social scientist, point out weak points in public relations; perhaps the office attendant tends to be snippy; or the nurse, too insistent about prompt attendance; or the doctor, too rushed to explain his instructions intelligibly. In other words, a scrutiny of a health-center operation, from the viewpoint of the public, can be of notable utility in improving services and in making them more attractive to the clientele.

Different aspects of environmental sanitation also gain from the collaboration of a social scientist. Is the design of the water hydrant in accord with the fashion in which people load the water, in order to carry it to the house? Does the water - in transit, or once it reaches home base - receive such casual treatment that it no longer can be considered potable? An inspection of the handling and storage of drinking water provides a firm basis for planning an educational campaign, so that the water may preserve its potable quality. What are the cultural changes which accompany the introduction of a modern water supply system in any given region? Reduced mortality? Improved health? More home gardens? More frequent baths?

When it comes to attempts to introduce the use of latrines, it is helpful to know current habits with respect to the disposal of human wastes. Are the people "squatters" or "sitters"? It is extremely difficult to change motor patterns, and any latrine designed should accord with them. However, prestige is a potent conditioning factor, and if people of higher social status are known to be "sitters" instead of "squatters", that fact may influence the type of latrine which is acceptable. Naturally, if it is possible to have the latrine accepted as a symbol of prestige, the chances of its being widely adopted are pretty good. However, no matter how intensive a latrine project, the resulting structure probably will wind up as a show place or as a granary, unless an effective educational campaign makes clear to the people the relationship between the outhouse and health.

In any undertaking which requires comparatively large capital outlay - be it installation of latrines, sewage, windows, raised hearths, or permanent floor - it is necessary to have specific data with respect to certain

social factors. Does the family own its own home? Renters are not going to squander money improving property to which they do not have title. Is the woman a breadwinner? If so, propaganda should be directed to her, as well as to the man of the house, for the chances are that she will contribute toward the cost.

Perhaps the host country is about to embark on a spraying program in the interests of malaria control. If so, what is the distribution within the country of the various native languages, in which the technicians and sprayers must be able to communicate? What people or institutions are going to be particularly useful in preparing the rural populace?

The crude birth rate of many LDC's is around 40 per thousand people, per annum, and in some cases is as high as 60 while the death rate is around 10 and is still falling due to medical advances. Clearly, unless some progress is achieved in lowering the birth rate the rich countries will become more wealthy and the poor countries more enmeshed in a cycle of poverty as time goes by.

It is known that movement toward smaller family size tends to occur as income levels rise, but, then, how is the initial breakthrough to be achieved? This is an argument in favor of population measures being fully integrated with other development measures.

We need to look at the data base, the technology, and the policies underlying population programs. A successful program needs information about society from social scientists in terms of the number of people, the

age structure of the population, fertility rates and family size in relation to class, occupational, or ethnic application; the age of marriage and the child-bearing years; the reasons for having or not having children together with the values underlying reproductive behavior; the significance of religious and political attitudes must also be made clear.

The technology is not yet advanced enough so that considerable behavioral problems are occasioned by getting people to the point where they can conveniently make a decision to limit family size. Neither condoms, nor loops, nor pills, nor vasectomy, are entirely satisfactory though hopefully, better technology will soon be available.

It has been difficult in view of religious and moral considerations for many governments to come out strongly in favor of population control and to allocate resources and adopt policies which would result in a concerted and effective attack on the problem.

Emphasis has been on indirect control and illumination of disincentives to having large families. Some of these measures include increased taxation on large families, legalizing abortion, raising the legal age of marriage, and voluntary sterilization. It is likely that no one single measure will be successful but that a successful population program, like development itself, will contain a number of variables each of which can be regarded as necessary though not sufficient. Social scientists can help in the identification and weighing of these variables.

Housing projects. Not infrequently, low-cost housing is a concern of the A.I.D. mission. Planning will be facilitated if, at the start, a careful preliminary survey of present accommodations is made. As a consequence, needs

should be evident, both from our point of view and that of the public itself. Before plans are made, size and composition of each family should be known, as well as the functions of individual rooms, under present conditions; moreover, any preliminary study should record the tastes and the desires of the people to be served.

In the course of the survey, prestige factors would become evident and could be reviewed in the light of economic resources. Sometimes our notions of adequate accommodations are remote from those of peoples of other cultures. Perhaps, as a matter of prestige, it is essential that the kitchen be built as a separate structure; perhaps windows are deliberately avoided, in the belief that witches may enter through them.

Unless a model home is built to accord with the local culture and the tastes of the people, it will not find acceptance. A background study makes possible identification of certain details of the present dwellings which might be carried over in the model house, so that the occupants may feel at home in it. We need to know what local people consider to be minimal housing, what they consider to be overcrowding, what kinds of improvements they desire and are prepared to work for. We need also, in publicly sponsored schemes, to know what the manner of succession to property and its improvement will be. Can a man leave his property to his peers?

The relationship between housing and urban drift is also important. Is availability of housing of a specific type a factor in urban drift?

Resettlement. Even under optimum conditions, resettlement of a population is a difficult matter and one which rarely is successful. When such an undertaking is contemplated, the interest and the attitudes of the proposed colonists should be determined by means of a basic field study. Concurrently, certain aspects such as linguistic divergence, differences in formal religious affiliation and conflicting cultural traditions are bound to be revealed. The attitudes of the prospective settlers toward individuals of other areas and of distinct cultural heritage affect the likelihood of forming a cohesive new community in the area to be colonized.

An appraisal of present living conditions and of certain attitudes gives a pretty clear idea of the services which must be provided in the new area. What housing facilities are indispensable? What sanitary installations? If the people are determined that their offspring receive professional training, an offer of grade-school education in the new colony is not going to be regarded as much of an inducement.

Resettlement programs are increasingly common both as a consequence of public works, and agricultural developments as well as of disasters. The key is the recreation, or the preservation of a sense of community.

Nutrition. Quite often, the A.I.D. program attempts to combat the major dietary deficiencies which afflict the host country. Such endeavors may be sponsored by the Health, Agriculture or Education programs or, in fact, by all three of them.

Food habits are among the most difficult cultural traits to change. Before any concrete attack on the problem is formulated, it would seem

essential that the existing dietary situation be studied carefully, region by region. Such investigation would include critical inspection of local resources and their present utilization, with some attention, moreover, to seasonal differences in diet. Techniques used in the preparation and preservation of foods should be studied, as well as the foods themselves and related eating habits; beliefs, prejudices, local classifications and prestige aspects should be recorded.

The chances are that a critical inspection of the scene will reveal local resources which at present are not recognized, much less exploited. It is more than likely that organized study will show that certain dishes - already known and liked - would help materially in overcoming some of the deficiencies, provided they were eaten in greater quantity or with greater frequency. It would seem far easier to encourage people to increase consumption of such dishes than to try to persuade them to eat some exotic substance - such as ground eggshell. Furthermore, if the introduction of a new food seems essential, perhaps its acceptance could be facilitated through using it as a substitute or an added ingredient in certain existing dishes; in this case, the latter would serve as a bridge to the desired cultural change. In any event, the first basis step in improving nutrition would seem to be a close examination of the current diet.

Local beliefs with respect to foods provide useful clues for those who prepare educational materials. Why is fish disdained? Perhaps merely because, traditionally, it is not regarded as a "true" food. The same may hold for pork and lard, as a consequence of which they are slightly exploited, even

though they are available. Clearly, these are points to which an educational campaign might give attention.

Other beliefs likewise are pertinent. Are foods classified popularly as "hot" or "cold", irrespective of actual temperature? If so, how does this outlook affect the selection of fare? Does the local classification provide terms which can be exploited by those who prepare teaching materials? A little field research may show that a popular caption, such as "dry foods", may have about the same connotation as our term, carbohydrates, and it has the enormous value of being meaningful to the local population. Data presented in the vocabulary commonly in use are more likely to strike receptive chords.

Prejudice plays an important part in limiting diet. Why does the Indian mother refuse to give her small child cooked animal blood, when the latter is plentiful, inexpensive and obviously nutritious? It may be because she believes that the child who consumes blood will not learn to talk. Or perhaps the blood is considered more fit for sacrifice to the supernatural. Why is there a widespread prejudice against raising pigeons for food? Possibly it is because of the conviction that they bring bad luck to the household. Why, in some areas, are beans seldom eaten? It may be because they are thought responsible for liver ailments. Knowledge of such beliefs contributes to understanding of the local situation and provides a sound basis for planning educational materials directed toward improvement of diet.

The matter of prestige and its relationship to food habits should receive careful attention. Because of it, in some zones, indigenous

populations spontaneously shift from their traditional, relatively nutritious staples, to white rice, white bread and macaroni-like products; instead of wholesome gruels, they now drink coffee. Why? Because these foods have prestige value; they characterize the diet of those who enjoy higher social status. Unfortunately, prestige considerations seem generally to affect diet adversely; we should seek situations in which prestige might have the opposite result.

In all instances, it goes without saying that any recommended changes should be thoroughly realistic, in keeping with the local culture, and within reach of the populace, both physically and financially. If dried banana is a staple, that product should be utilized; through a little culinary experimentation, it might be combined with other available ingredients in order to provide the proteins, vitamins, minerals, or whatever other elements seem deficient. The same approach would hold for manioc and other starches.

In particular, conscious effort should be made not to seek solutions in terms of our own culture - both with respect to the foods themselves and the techniques of preparing them. We are not helping Andean diet when we encourage the people to fry potatoes instead of cooking them entire, without removing the skins. The answer to dietary problems should be sought within the range of local, regional resources and local culture. The introduction of our own staples - even on a temporary, emergency basis - would seem unsound procedure, and utilization of products, such as those distributed by CARE, cannot possibly provide a permanent solution.

Education presents a problem for countries with limited resources torn between a decision as to what kinds of education must be considered the right of all citizens and what kinds of additional resources must be allocated to secure the emergence of a cadre of people who can manage change processes and thus replace undue reliance on expatriates. There is thus involved the preservation of a cultural heritage and the creation of new jobs and opportunities.

The lesser developed countries start with a much larger proportion of people of school age than is the case in developed countries so that the traditional classroom teacher/student situation as known in developed countries is not easily replicable. It is not so much a question of what such countries would like to do as it is a question of what they can afford to do.

Any education plan is in effect an exercise in imagination since it depends on trying to work out what society will be like, what national needs and the needs of the student will be when the educational process has ended. The traditional reward in lesser developed countries under Colonialism, for academic excellence, was the giving of an opportunity to leave one's home community in the rural area. This trend needs to be arrested in a collaborative and meaningful way and a more genuinely preparatory form of education for life in the rural areas presented.

What must be avoided is the imposition of a system of education which produces large numbers of educated unemployed. Developed country education has served to divorce people from the land. Rationalism and scientific thought, individualism and professionalism are all in a sense urban based.

The attitudes, beliefs, and values of this educational process are inimical to rural life in the LDC's because the kinds of life and work that are held up as ideals as the goals for successful performance preclude the worthwhile nature of life as a farmer, an extension worker, the traditional social units, and so on.

The key educational problem in rural areas in lesser developed countries is not really acquisition of new knowledge or the devising of new systems and technologies to spread that knowledge, but rather must involve the devising of an educational system which will have as its successful models that are held out for students to emulate the work and life of ordinary people who live in rural areas.