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NOT BY EXPERTISE ALONE:
THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN ADVISOR
ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

by

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Today, I would like to examine in a rather personal manner some aspects of the role of a foreign technical advisor on rural development. What I have to say applies equally well to an FAO expert from one Asian nation on loan to another or to an AID specialist working abroad, so that most of you in this audience will have a first hand knowledge of my topic.

Inevitably my viewpoint is conditioned by my own experience and observation. Hence, my comments tend to deal more with the place of an agricultural economist or rural social scientist concerned with helping in planning or program formulation than with a biological scientist or an engineer. The differences, however, are more of degree than of kind.

I am going to draw, too, mostly on my experiences in Iran several years ago, partly for obvious reasons of distance and partly because after this lapse of time it will be easier for my friends to forgive me the errors I make in my effort to be objective without being personally critical. I was in Iran working with the agriculture section of the Division of Economic Affairs of the Plan Organization which was charged with preparing the third plan which currently is in effect. In this effort, although we applied some of the more formal methods of economic analysis, the largest proportion of our time went into discussions with some 50 government agencies about what could be done in the light of our projected demand for agricultural production and the production targets we were trying to derive from them. Literally hundreds of hours -- really the backbone of our effort -- were spent discussing possible program approaches with Ministry technicians, and with foreign specialists from FAO, UNTAB, American Point 4, Ford Foundation, and other agencies. Out of hundreds of individual meetings we painfully put together, commodity by commodity, appropriate targets and individual action programs. In the process we tried to inject some measure of coordination and balance, to put new emphasis on programs with low capital-output ratios, and to minimize the unfavorable impact on individuals that comes with change in the rural sector.

Let me turn, now, to what I see was the role of the foreign advisor in all this discussion, cajoling, writing, and endless reassessment of the possibilities for increasing the agricultural output of a whole nation. In essence, what I am proposing to do is to give you an idealized version of what I now see that I should have done.

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I can categorize the role of the rural development advisor under a number of headings, all of which are supposedly to be found wrapped up in some single, superhuman technician. Of course, they can't be, and to point out all these roles is only to emphasize the broad qualifications which are called for and to point out the various facets of an individual's skills which he must exercise to the extent he is able.

Professional competence.

Let me start with professional competence -- the obvious sine qua non. In the case in point, this was in agricultural economics and in development economics. But, as will emerge later, this kind of competence should not be too narrow or too highly specialized. Quite a broad range of professional skills -- though often not necessarily profound -- is called for. In agricultural economics and rural social science, this includes a good deal of agriculture, since one must deal at length with technicians in various fields of agriculture and must judge often times rather technical program proposals. With that, let's pass on, since in this seminar I don't propose to focus on problems of professional training and competence.

Outside, objective view.

The rural advisor can often make a substantial contribution in the form of an objective, outside viewpoint. This can express itself in many different directions. Most countries have a number of myths about agriculture to which even well-trained people subscribe. When I asked about the division of wheat between landowner and tenant in Iran, for example, I was told that the crop is traditionally divided into five parts, one each for the person who supplies the land, water, draft power, seed, and cultivation labor. "However," my informant would continue, "in my village ..." and then he would continue to describe a different, local arrangement. I don't believe I ever talked to anyone whose own personal experience substantiated what he suggested was the general pattern, yet somehow it never occurred to most of them to doubt that their own village was a rather uncommon exception. The foreign advisor is more able to see this inconsistency and point it out than the technician who was raised and lives in the country.

Or take the question of whether peasants will accept new techniques when they are introduced. I frequently heard the tired argument expressed that peasant farmers were too lazy or too conservative to adopt new crops or new cultural techniques. Sometimes this came from people rather close to the administration of the national agricultural program. Yet I could point out that within the last two decades cotton production had increased two and a half times and that, within memory of many Persians, sugar beets had been introduced and production increased until it had reached some 45,000 hectares and was expected nearly to double within the next 5 years.

Finally, the outside observer can see progress over a longer period. Technicians who work in a country are often too close to the forest to see the trees. An outsider can point out that development under the most favorable circumstances can hardly show anything but just beginnings within less than a generation, and that many low-income countries start with such handicaps that longer time horizons must be envisaged. Even so, in Iran in just the past 10 years agricultural production must have risen by about a third -- not a bad accomplishment in reality.

A complete view of agriculture.

One contribution that the foreign agricultural advisor can make is to see the whole of agriculture. In most low-income countries the agricultural administrators are very much urban oriented. The advisor's colleagues in a developing country may well have had a secondary education in the largest urban center of the country -- where else can one get a high school education? -- and then went on to the United States for a narrow technical training in agronomy which assumed a rural orientation without actually introducing it. Furthermore, most languages seem to distinguish rather strictly between agriculture and animal husbandry -- as does British usage of this language -- so that I soon discovered that the term "agriculture" in Iran really meant more nearly that which I had in mind by the term "agronomy." Frequently, as a result of the urban background and the narrow technical orientation of my colleagues, I found myself reminding everybody at a roundtable session that a change in cropping pattern or cultivation technique has to be seen not only in terms of effect on yield of the crop involved but also in terms of its effect on farmers' livestock enterprises and their personal lives. One result following the introduction of custom tractor services for plowing in northeast Iran, for example, was to eliminate the need for draft animals. With no need to keep oxen, farmers found the core of their livestock enterprise gone, so they let their stables fall into disrepair. Thus, we found there had been a drop of wool production in the region attributable to the disappearance of 3 or 6 sheep farm flocks which were easy enough to keep if you had a stable anyhow but did not in themselves justify keeping one. There had also been a fall in milk consumption, following the disappearance of the family milk cow or ewes and goats.

Realist.

The foreign advisor should be a realist and sometimes an iconoclast -- although not a cynic. Let me give an example or two. The Iranians had begun two large, elaborate, spectacular dam and irrigation schemes. They were wonderful for purposes of spending money and showing foreign dignitaries. At the time they were begun, there was even a certain program justification in terms of being able to begin immediately -- through the use of foreign contractors -- a program which could demonstrate to a disaffected population the government's concern for their welfare. The most impressive of these was the Dez dam in the far south of Iran, not far from the oil fields. The original estimates of cost

had several times escalated upwards, and by the time we were considering the third plan, the original economic justification had largely evaporated. The benefit-cost ratio was barely as high as one, even taking a rather favorable set of assumptions. One part of the project, it turned out, was going to involve a capital outlay of somewhere in the neighborhood of \$800 an acre. Yet, at the same time, there were several thousand opportunities for small irrigation schemes, spread through the country, which would have cost no more than \$25 to \$100 per acre to develop. Some could be structured to encourage investment of private capital so that no central government development funds would be necessary. It was these small irrigation schemes that we proposed to favor during the third plan -- but we had an uphill fight because a number of powerful forces in the country wanted instead a new dam even less economic than that at Dez. My Iranian colleagues were frequently unable to be very vocal on this question. The fascination of big dams and the belief that big dams were synonymous with development held high favor with many ranking officials. It was up to the foreigners, then, to point out the facts, to marshal the arguments, and to champion the cause of the development which would have greater and more widespread impact but which would be very difficult to show visiting firemen. This was the realistic -- and unpopular -- viewpoint. But, it should be noted, it was a viewpoint to which a lot of people privately subscribed, and they welcomed the foreigner taking the lead. To espouse small system irrigation development had become quite respectable in Iran by the time I left, thanks to the efforts of virtually every foreigner concerned with either agriculture or economics.

Or, another example, In one area of the Dez project, a new sugar cane plantation was being established. It was popular pastime to tell foreigners that sugar cane had been cultivated in this area in the time of Cyrus the Great, and that this new project would symbolize the return of Iran to the position of progressiveness and importance it had held 2000 years ago. Yet, as you know, sugar cane is not a crop that can be easily introduced to peasants nor one which peasants can easily cultivate and get high yields as small holders. Indeed, the new government plantation was planned for something like 8,000 hectares, all to be taken from peasants and turned into some kind of modern mechanical agricultural monster. But in this region, using the same quantities of water and virtually the same mill equipment, sugar beets will produce as much sugar per acre as cane. Peasant farmers can grow sugar beets quite successfully on their own holdings. The cultivation techniques are not so demanding as for cane, and minor variations in the timing of field operations during the season are unimportant. Almost for the first time, during the preparation of the third plan, we began to consider the relative merits of reestablishing the myth or of letting peasant farmers grow a new, high income cash crop on their own land. Our examination indicated rather clearly that sugar production would be just as large from sugar beets and the social side effects much happier, so we suggested no expansion of cane acreage during the plan period. But we were the object of some rather sharp, although somehow vague, criticism for we had had the timidity to attack a popular myth.

A rather different example of the necessity for realism comes in the instance of regional planning. Among our Iranian colleagues there was substantial confidence that central planning from the capital city would be about all that was needed. They had little interest in other parts of the country and even less interest in spending any time in provincial cities. Yet development -- and especially agricultural development -- does not take place in central government offices. A plan which has no regional component is hardly a plan at all and has only a limited chance of being implemented. All this was the realistic view -- as our colleagues sometimes reluctantly admitted -- but it was a hard one to do much about, so we generally preferred to look the other way. And, as a matter of fact, we did no regional planning to speak of, a serious weakness.

Negotiator.

The method of elaborating a development plan may sound rather mechanistic in the classroom where one summarizes all the individual steps in a few sentences. But in fact, of course, the theory is the part most rapidly dealt with. It was pretty clear, without much research in Iran, that what was needed was just as much increase of agricultural production as administratively possible, with increasing emphasis on programs with low capital-output ratios -- extension, credit, seed improvement, fertilizer distribution, disease control, and so forth. And so began the donkey work. Most of our hours of working time were taken up with patient discussion and examination of technical feasibilities. The contribution of the planners in this case was to convene the experts from various agencies concerned with a problem -- how to increase vegetable oil supplies, say -- and then get them to tell us what they could do and how much it would cost. But many of the technicians had never devoted much thought to long term program planning. Few knew much about budgeting, or the actual operating costs of the agencies they administered, or how to select one aspect of a program for emphasis at the cost of other aspects. So it fell the job of the planner to negotiate -- to meet, and meet, and meet, and to ask intelligent questions, to ask for justification of assumptions, to inquire about interrelationships. Under such conditions, certain skills about how to conduct meetings need to be exercised, and in Iran these came most easily from the advisor. So we discussed in our own "shop" the agenda, the probable objections of the technicians to a program proposal, how to keep useful notes, how to get agreement in such a form that it would be recorded and usable in writing up a program. In the meetings themselves, there was the problem of how to ask about the justification of an opinion without implying that someone was a liar. Sometimes I felt my preparation would have been more appropriate had I taken business administration in graduate school, specializing in collective bargaining.

Fall guy.

Some functions of the foreign advisor are simply to do those things which his colleagues, because of their position, cannot. In most societies there is a very real problem of "face" and of incurring the wrath of one's superiors. A technician in the country must continue to live there and must expect his promotions from the others with whom he works and must gain his satisfactions from his own society. He has no real avenue of escape. The foreigner, on the other hand, avoids several of these disabilities. As a foreigner, he expects to leave, so that he can afford to run risks of disfavor that his counterpart cannot. Often in Iran my colleagues and I would agree that some statement or

opinion would have to be challenged, and it would become obvious that the person who could best do it -- because he was most immune from any consequences -- was the foreign advisor. And, being a foreigner, he was naturally expected to be somewhat on the rash and ill-informed side, especially when it came to etiquette. So here was a real contribution to be made, which often both parties recognized, and which only the outsider could contribute.

There is a related function of putting up something to be knocked down. To write a statement on paper for the sole purpose of having a concrete starting point for criticism is a recognized committee technique. But in Iran, as in many countries, there is a problem of "face" involved. Few people are willing to write something simply to have someone else criticize it, because personalities and individual reputations become all intermixed. Further complications enter when the topic under discussion is politically sensitive or involves taking sides in some administrative controversy. In Iran the most clear-cut case came when we were trying to elaborate a tenure statement for the plan. There were as many ideas about land reform as there were Iranians. The problem was to reach a balance that would express the prevailing liberal sentiments among the younger, foreign-educated Iranians in the Plan Organization while not raising too much over opposition from the land owners who were the politically powerful supporters of the government. We prepared probably 10 different drafts before we finally succeeded in reaching a mutually acceptable statement -- although like most compromises this really pleased no one. Writing such successive drafts fell the responsibility of the foreign advisor, because if someone had his toes stepped on too hard, we could always retreat behind the smoke screen of the foreigner and suggest that he had misunderstood and that no one really meant it to be that way in the first place. Then no one had to bear blame -- the Iranian could agree to make the correction while excusing the foreigner on the grounds of his not being intimately familiar with the local situation. As a whole, it is a technique I recommend.

Teacher.

Of course, the agricultural economist in an advisory capacity is almost by definition a teacher. But we usually have in mind something akin to our concept of a major professor -- someone who deals with a high level application of a science, the general concepts of which are already known by his pupils. At this point, however, I want to refer to a much more elementary level -- so I have chosen to say that the advisor must be a "teacher" which carries a connotation of someone who imparts basic knowledge and principles.

Many of those one deals with in a planning context have had almost no background in analytic economics. This is particularly true in agriculture, I find. Not infrequently, a country is so pressed for adequate numbers of trained personnel to staff its planning agency that it must choose people who have technical training in the subject-matter field they deal with but very little training in formal economic theory or applied economics. Such, for example, are the agronomists and animal husbandrymen. Even when the individuals concerned have had training in economics, where the education system is heavily

influenced by French methods the economics they learned generally was only economic history and law affecting economic activity. Often they studied very little of what we understand in English-speaking countries as analytic economics. Further, in a planning context, one deals by the very nature of the responsibility with a large number of technicians responsible for administering programs of extension, seed multiplication, pest control, and the like who have had very little economics training but who must be active participants in the economic development planning process. Indeed, the ranking administrators themselves frequently have had little formal training in economics before they are asked to deal with sometimes very subtle problems of planning and economic policy.

Under these circumstances, the agricultural economist finds himself explaining repeatedly such concepts as marginality, optimization, elasticity, the inevitability of marketing functions, capital-output ratio, and the like. As in other forms of teaching, one effect of all these capsule lectures is to sharpen the advisor's own understanding of the applicability -- and weaknesses -- of these tools and concepts in a country with a low-income agriculture.

A related teaching function is what I came to call "thinking economically"; that is, the habit of thought which orders various alternatives, compares the costs of achieving them, and reaches some sort of balance. You will recognize this to be marginal analysis and optimization. But those of you who have taught freshman economics will understand me when I say that these are very difficult concepts to explain to agricultural technicians even though they are critical to the planning process. In Iran, I have a favorite example, and one which I can give you because those I worked with quickly saw what I was driving at and now would be among the first to agree. When we went to the livestock disease control agency, we inquired what they would suggest as a program for the third plan period. There was no question of competence, since almost to a man they were trained veterinarians, many with foreign educations. They offered to talk this over among themselves and supply us with a draft program. This was certainly acceptable to us, since we were, as usual, pressed for time and didn't relish any more meetings than necessary. A week later, we received their proposal. It consisted of a list of virtually every animal pest known in Iran -- and they are legion. They were ranked in no particular order I could discern. The most important diseases were mixed in with the most obscure. In true technical tradition, they had with competence simply told us what diseases existed and what means of control could be employed. Obviously, this was not an economic plan. At this point, we had simply to sit down with them and discuss the disease problem in detail, they contributing their veterinary knowledge and we our habit of "thinking economically". At length, we found that perhaps three fourths of the loss of meat from sheep could be attributed to just two pests. Clearly, this was the place to begin on the disease control portion of an economic development program, and after we explained our reasoning -- that is, taught a bit of economics -- they agreed and recast their program proposals.

Expressor.

Too often, the foreign advisor is burdened with the responsibility of being what may be termed the "expressor". That is, too often he must sit in on a meeting -- sometimes working through translators -- and then be expected to prepare a summary of the meeting or to prepare a statement which expresses the agreed position. I don't quite know why this is so often the foreigner's duty, but that seemed to be the case. Often in Iran the advisor was the only one who took notes, even in a fairly high level meeting. But in any case, contribution of the advisor was to gather the range of facts and opinion expressed, sort them out according to some coherent system, and then prepare a written statement. Even more discouraging, I frequently found myself doing this for agricultural technicians who had American educations and who presumably had learned in our graduate schools the techniques of assembling, ordering, and expressing facts and opinions.

Defender of the longer view.

The foreign advisor is often able to take a longer view of the problems of the country where he is working, and he frequently finds himself defending some program or other which cannot be expected to bring immediate results. Officials of the agencies with which he works are often so pressed on day-to-day matters and trying to resolve pressing problems that they are unable to devote time to and hardly even to justify longer term programs. Thus, in Iran, the foreign advisors found themselves trying to get a long-term research program undertaken, not just in agriculture but in a number of other fields, too. We found ourselves defending seed trials, development of census agencies, building up educational systems, or reforestation. In espousing these causes, it wasn't that our Iranian colleagues didn't agree or couldn't see the validity of our case. Rather, it was just that they felt so overwhelmingly the need for present action to relieve present problems that they had little energy left over to devote to the longer horizon.

People-oriented.

The outside advisor is often the one who is most concerned about individual freedoms and choice. Don't mistake me: planners as a group tend to be very much in favor of improving the lot of the common man. But there is also a tendency to try to do this from the top, and in terms of aggregates. People "should" do such and such for their own "good". Therefore, we will design programs which force them to do it. Since, in most countries, such programs simply cannot be administered, the net result is too often to put the government official once again in the position of putting himself against the peasant. Foreign advisors found themselves repeatedly arguing in favor of a permissive program, one which would encourage farmers to make their own decisions -- and to decide not to change at all if that was what they wanted.

How can a country modernize its agriculture with such an approach, we would be asked. The answer, we tried to point out, was that part of what we were after anyhow was to enlarge the scope of the individual to express himself -- even if it meant saying no -- and that, besides, coercive programs in agriculture tend to have a dismal record of accomplishment, even if they do look comprehensive on paper. Certainly in Iran, where administrative structures were excessively weak, it did no good to speak of compulsion. Programs which encouraged change by offering incentives and information had in the past been more successful than coercive attempts. Among the most successful development programs in Iran in recent years has been that which financed private import of tractors and that which made foreign exchange available for low lift pumps. Neither had any coercive element in it; both had resulted in real change in the countryside. Yet, still, there was a tendency, faced with the frustration of resistance to change and the magnitude of the agricultural development problem, to respond by saying "they've got to ..."

Organizer of foreign aid.

A real function of the advisor to a central planning agency is that of an organizer of foreign aid. Not that this is done in the absence of the responsible officials. But with outside assistance coming through increasing numbers of agencies some coordination on both the recipient side and the donor side is needed. Whirlwind missions from foreign governments or international agencies need quick, accurate summaries of major problems. The very fact that the foreign advisor had only rather recently been forced to learn all this for himself helps him organize it for other foreigners. Often, too, the advisor can be more candid, both because of his position as an advisor and because he is not so emotionally involved in the culture. This extends not only to pointing out the weaknesses -- of which foreigners generally tend to do much too much -- but also to pointing out the strengths and the places where improvement is taking place but often at a pace and in a form that discourage the national administrator.

There is a purely technical function in organizing foreign aid, too, although this is not one in which the agricultural economist is generally too directly involved. A new science of "aid management" is growing up. A country must now learn to consider with a very long time horizon such questions as debt service load, suppliers' credit to merchants, foreign exchange commitments involved in accepting aid, and the like. Increasing sophistication is needed, and the foreign technical advisor is often able to supply some of this and to teach ranking administrators about these problems in a way that younger, if competent, national administrators cannot.

Organizer of research.

Frequently the foreigner is better able to understand the need for research and its usefulness in the planning process than his national counterpart. For one thing, the man raised in the society has a "feel" for its structure and

processes, which, even though it may be inaccurate, at least gives him a sense of knowing what goes on and what the situation is. The foreigner, on the other hand, finds that he must gain this appreciation of the structure and the workings of the society for himself in a more artificial -- that is, academic -- manner. He must read studies, inquire from knowledgeable people, and try to fit together the jigsaw puzzle for himself. In the process, he will most likely become aware of the general dearth of accurate, analytical information about agriculture in low-income countries.

Iran is perhaps worse off on this score than most countries and so it is both a good and a bad example for illustration. So far as I could see, there was not one farm management study in Iran, yet we were trying to design programs which involved a major change in enterprise combinations if farmers were going to participate. We were being pressed to program central market wheat elevators, but we knew nothing about the marketing structure so that we couldn't have any assurance new central facilities would be used. As a matter of fact, some preliminary inquiry about wheat marketing indicated that existing terminal facilities were substantially underutilized -- although we couldn't be sure -- and also indicated that the merchants engaged in the wheat trade preferred for cost and political reasons to store their wheat holdings in small lots in provincial centers and bring it to large urban centers as it was needed through the year. And as for studies about village structure, the social psychology of peasant farmers, attitudes toward risk and uncertainty, sources and utilization of credit, effectiveness of extension programs, levels of literacy and all the rest, we were virtually without any research guidelines at all.

To encourage undertaking research is not easy. A natural agency is the agriculture college, but developing countries generally are pressed to be able to offer good agricultural education at the higher level in any event, so that staff teaching loads are either too high to permit research or the practice of part-time teachers prevents real research. In government agencies, understaffed "statistics" sections generally have a hard time just keeping up with the routine material that is available to them to do anything about research. The planning agencies certainly have neither the staff nor the orientation to undertake the research function -- even though they tend to be as aware as anyone of the needs.

Under such circumstances, the foreign technical advisor must try to get small beginnings underway, hoping they will grow after he departs. Sometimes these seem pitifully small compared to the need, but when I look back on some of the studies I consulted, I realize that even a rather small research project can make a big contribution to the planning process. The "marginal value" of objective research in the first stages of agricultural development is enormous, and a study that would be a doctoral dissertation in the United States becomes a foundation stone for policy formulation in a developing nation. (And this, I might add, is one more reason why foreign Ph. D. candidates in U.S. universities should be encouraged to do rigorous, objective research on their home countries --

especially those studying in agricultural economics. Their research on American problems can have little usefulness other than its educational value to the candidate; a good doctoral dissertation on marketing in Iran could have changed our whole policy approach to grain marketing.)

Experience and philosophy.

Finally, let me touch briefly on an enormous contribution that the foreign advisor makes: that of injecting a philosophy of knowledge into a working process. This sounds very abstract, and it is, so I can't usefully dwell on it here. There are many who have tried to grapple with this, and I refer you to them. But let me note as a witness that the philosophy of knowledge which a foreign advisor brings is enormously important, even if almost indefinable. There are symptoms of attitude toward information that derive from the philosophical orientation: objectivity, analysis, quantitative assessment, intellectual integrity. But more than that there is the whole concept that knowledge is something that can be harnessed and put to service. The continual illustration of how to go about this on a practical, day-to-day basis is very important in helping newly returned or newly graduated administrators make an effective beginning on their careers.

Coupled with this is the experience the foreign advisor brings and his ability to apply this to the new situation. The experience may not be first hand; indeed, one of the things the advisor can demonstrate is how much "experience" can be gained through wide and continued reading. Too often such experience is inadequately incorporated by local administrators who have never gained the habit of professional reading and who have no access to the journals or libraries which in more developed countries provide the backbone of this activity.

Some attributes of a foreign advisor.

Now, if an agricultural economist who is a foreign advisor to a planning group is to make all this myriad of contributions he obviously is going to have a set of qualifications far beyond those of mere mortals. But we must settle for what we can do. In fact, the desirable personal attributes are much the same for the rural development advisor as for teaching and administrative positions anywhere. The balance is perhaps somewhat different ideally for the foreign advisor in a developing country where agricultural development is just getting underway. The advisor should be warned in advance and psychologically prepared for rather slow progress. This is all the more important in that his local colleagues will be faced with the same problem of frustration in getting progress to come. The foreign advisor must be a realist in judging what he should be able to accomplish and in setting standards of achievement for himself. Otherwise, he will soon become so critical and so difficult to get along with as to virtually eliminate his effectiveness. He should have a much more explicit and detailed understanding of his own cultural background and his own intellectual tradition than he would ordinarily need to be effective in his own country. He should have a willingness to learn continually and to adapt. Finally, I suggest taking along several barrels of patience.

Faced with the frustration that is an inevitable accompaniment to conscientious advisory work, it is hardly surprising that a foreign advisor will most often leave a country with a large sigh of relief and a sweeping sense of annoyance focused not on individuals but on "the system". One mark of a good advisor is that he rather quickly forgets the frustration and petty annoyances once he backs off a little and remembers instead the absorbing interest which the challenge of agricultural development presents.

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These, then, are some of the non-professional roles that a rural development advisor plays. Of course, they vary in relative importance depending upon the type of program, the country, and the particular skills of both the advisor and the people he deals with. But they are important roles -- perhaps just as important as being some kind of a walking encyclopedia of biological science or applied economics. Perhaps the crucial thing is to be forwarded that just as agricultural development involves far more than merely agricultural science or economics, being an advisor on rural development involves far more than just consulting on obscure applications of professional expertise.