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THE DEVELOPMENT OF AID

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The Development of Aid

David E. Apter

I

The Persuasive Force of Innocence

It is a great pity that in these times a subject such as aid, that is, assistance for development in modernizing societies, should remain so controversial. One would have expected by now that the practice of aid would be broadly institutionalized in a developmental service which could enlarge its experience with increasing expertise and embody both in a cumulative lore, text, and procedure. Instead, programs of assistance are at a crossroads, and the reasons are entirely political. Our conceptions of aid and its consequences have been naive to the point of innocence. Our hopes were too simple for the complexity which follows from even the most successful programs. If there is a visible correlation between aid and politics it must appear to politicians and to the general public that the more aid is increased, the more things fall apart. The result is that after over a decade of hard effort, instead of trying to improve the practice, many prefer to question the principle.

The reasons for such innocence are not too hard to find. Aid, in its original conception, was a kind of promissory note for the future. With a suitable investment, an appropriate set of institutions, and the natural inclination of people overseas to want to improve themselves, the technique did not seem difficult. What was needed was an initial impetus and the rest would take care of itself. This after all had been the effect of Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe. There was no reason why, with suitable modifications, the process could not be repeated in the less developed countries. Indeed even the term itself, "less-developed", implied, in a delicate way, the urge towards development, particularly of the economic kind.

Behind this idea was the enormous success of American technology which had proved its worth during the war in helping to roll back fascism, and after the war in containing communism. What remained was to promote freedom through development in other parts of the world. Such freedom was twofold, the right to national independence and an escape from poverty. U.S. policy favored decolonization and economic development. The latter would prevent communism and the former promote liberty. Technical assistance would prime the pump. This, in its turn, meant infrastructure support to friendly countries with or without the collaboration of former colonial powers. What never occurred to us was that aid in such varying fields as education, manpower training, assistance for commercial and industrial development and the like, might be seen in a more total and abrasive perspective in years to come.

The practice of aid was spawned in politics, concretized in growth, with nation building for democracy its rationale. These were constant ingredients although they varied in emphasis over the years. Packenham suggests that an economic emphasis was predominant during the years 1947-68. Security was the uppermost concern during 1951-1960 and again between 1964-68. Building democracy more or less in our own image was the object most significantly in Latin America, especially during the period 1962-63 and again after 1966. Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act is perhaps the most explicit statement of the political rationale.¹

If we evaluate the results of developmental assistance in terms of goals like building stable democracies, the results are not very satisfactory. In Latin America for example, the region where this object was most explicit (and which received the largest share of economic aid under the Foreign Assistant Acts), only one country, Venezuela, is in an improved condition as compared with

¹ See Robert A. Packenham, *Foreign Aid and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).

1961. Four countries operate under military regimes which in 1961 were at least nominally democratic, including some of the most important in the region, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. The Dominican Republic, Colombia, Panama and Uruguay are in much greater turmoil and with more authoritarian regimes, than before. Chile has taken a major step towards a socialist solution which American policy makers regard at best somewhat lugubriously. Even Mexico has taken a turn for the worst recently in political and social terms. Similarly in Africa where today one-third of the African governments are military regimes. It would appear that the politicians are correct. Aid is a disaster. ^{But} whether a disaster or not we are stuck with it. There is no going back. As the Committee for Economic Development put it, "More rapid growth and rising incomes will not necessarily win friends and allies or insure peace and stability in the less developed countries. On the contrary, real progress involves a break with the past and may induce highly destabilizing political and social change. But profound changes are already under way in the less developed world regardless of what the United States does or does not do. The long-term political rationale for aid, therefore, rests on the calculated risk that accelerating the modernization process, and reducing the sacrifice required to achieve it, will enhance the odds in favor of an earlier evolution of responsible and independent states in the low-income regions of the world. By the same token, the risk of involvement by the great powers in crises and power vacuums abroad will thereby be reduced."¹

¹ See Committee for Economic Development, statement by the Research and Policy Committee, Assisting Development in Low-Income Countries, Sept. 1969.

II

Happy Myths and the Underworld - Development as Ideology

Building democracy by developmental means is not a cumulative or sequential process. Political instability, increased tension, the prospect of new social

and political strategies abroad, all add up to an infinitely more complex world than either politicians or their publics have been led to believe. Nor is this an exclusively American problem. Happy myths and a certain "demonology" have played a large part in the thinking of all those engaged in developmental politics. Indeed the larger and more powerful the country the more simple minded the myths and demons. Lesser myths of the "withdrawal and retrieval" variety are employed by former colonial powers which seek to retain their political influence by other means after their territories have obtained independence. The most serious are of the "universalistic" variety when a highly developed country like the United States or the U.S.S.R. implies that the pattern of its domestic development is capable of universal application and should be promoted as such. Such myths are dangerous especially if we recognize that however we might feel about the subject, overseas aid to poorer countries is bound to continue. The real question is whether it will be done well or badly and whether it can be made to serve the mutual interests of donor and recipient.

If in theory such mutualism should be one of the major goals of aid policy this is difficult to achieve in practice. Each nation defines its objects differently. The British case is closest to ours in original emphasis, "nation-building." British universalism was represented economically by commercial development overseas primarily by means of private enterprise while politically the "mother of parliaments", reproduced in its ruder offspring, those ideals of freedom and association which constituted the triumph of English civilization. In these terms "decolonization" became an achievement rather than a failure of empire. The myth combines a preference for constitutionalism, a disinterested civil service, and common bonds of association. On this myth the British Commonwealth was to have been based. Even though Commonwealth mutualism has proved to be puny the myth itself is slow to expire.

French myths are more practical. Their ideas of democracy are less sublime than the English. Their style embodies a certain cultural attractiveness. Paris is after all the capitol of the world. French language, egalitarianism, are universal. Mutualism consists of blending the broad qualities of French culture with direct economic aid to whatever regime remains more or less friendly to France. Indeed, the French have given a larger donation from their social product than any other nation in the world. The bulk has gone to former members of the French community particularly the one country which caused the greatest French post war agony, Algeria.¹

The American approach is not so different from these others except that our stage is world wide, our arena universal. Such universality has an explicit demonology, an identifiable enemy, i.e. the equally universal claims of socialism, particularly those centered in Moscow and Peking but increasingly the Havana and Santiago peripheries. We believe as a practical matter that aid should be of the self starter variety. By stimulating workmanlike responses it should be possible to generate the growth of a middle class, that universal matrix, which, the natural haven for upwardly mobile workers also requires the withering away of an obsolete aristocracy. Our myth is the establishment of a workmanlike (rather than the worker's state) which in turn is a function of expanding manufactures, an improved agriculture, increased education, technical skill, and effective public administration. These, encased in a state dedicated to mild welfare (a welfare floor rather than a ceiling) private enterprise and representative government constitute the American liberal ideal. The place to begin is with loans for investment. With growth of the self sustained kind, all other benefits will accrue, (although the route may be circuitous). To achieve that we will settle for military regimes and authoritarian leaders if these are necessary to prevent

¹ For a discussion of French aid programs see Teresa Hayter, French Aid London: The Overseas Development Institute, 1966.

their countries from falling into the hands of the other "side" (a quietist expression).

Such a view is not merely for export. It is the rock and the salvation of our belief in ourselves. Ours is a world of nations combining freedom and trade as the basis of mutualism as was made explicit in President Truman's Point Four doctrine, the main purpose of which was to establish a program for "making the benefits of our scientific and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."

The deus ex machina of technical assistance has failed in the large where it has succeeded in the small. We have made new scientific knowledge available. We have resolved many bottlenecks. We have succeeded in educational, infrastructure, and capital projects. We have broken through many of the inhibitors of growth. We have to our credit a large number of shrewdly designed programs. American expertise, the practical accomplishment of which begins in the mechanical arts (turned somewhat but not excessively theoretical) has perhaps not produced the 2% or more increase in the standard of living in the rest of the world (an increase which, President Truman hoped, would keep factories and businesses in the United States, working overtime because of the demand). But it has accomplished a very great deal. It is only terms of our large myths and our demonology that we have failed.

Certain terms now plague us. Perhaps the key word is self; self sustained growth, self government, self help. The American ideal has always smacked of the self-start.

As a result a temporariness pervades the American practice of aid giving. This has had many consequences. It has prevented us from having a career development service.¹ Also a lack of quinquennial or other long term grants has made

¹ Of course such a service could easily become an empire composed of bureaucratic technocrats or a force to contend in a powerful way with other bodies concerned with overseas affairs, such as the foreign service and the military. One consequence of elevating aid to a more singular priority would be that aid is a likely policy when both war and diplomacy become irrelevant means.

planning impossible. A hasty careerism pervades "temporary" agencies with continuous jockeying for power and position among officials much of which is entirely enervating. Our programs have a patchwork quality and lack standards for measuring success or failure. Indeed because we are able to review concrete failures more easily than successes we have lost some of our faith in experts, and conviction about the efficacy of technical assistance. We believe firmly that planning magnifies blunders. Where our belief in science is sustained this certainly does not include social science which at best should remain in the form of simple programming, survey, or economic reportage i.e. the generation of information rather than the application of expertise.

One political demon above all continues to dominate our thinking, the spread and growth of communism and socialism to more and more parts of the globe which has induced us at times to sporadic paroxysms of rage and action, and at times to near impotence and despair, so desperately do we want to believe in the universality of a middle class solution for a world of poor nations. Our socialist alter egos are no different. Each sees itself as the universal carrier of virtue. For the U.S.S.R. this is embodied in the working class. Developmental aid should therefore be designed to develop those infrastructures which will generate a proletariat. The image of the brawny decent worker, secure in his job, bending over the blast furnace, is the Soviet equivalent of the responsible burgher, American style. For China the moral image is embodied in the snub-nosed peasant, at home with scythe or gun. Indeed one can speak of aid in these mythic terms as a form of international class conflict i.e. to build a middle class, or a proletarian class, or a peasantry becomes a stratagem of aid.

We need to recognize that the world of aid is modest in its accomplishments. It can only be relatively limited in its programs. The only long run rationale for it is basically a moral one. If its purposes are political in this sense

they ought not to be mythic in objectives and ideals. In these terms programmatic aid for development is a cost for which the benefits are partly psychic and partly concrete. But each will depend above all upon the realism of policymakers and politicians. In a world populated by good neighbors and bad villains, any policy which turns the latter into the former is obviously a good one. The trouble with the myths we hold and the demons they define is that they lead us to errors about who is good and who is villainous, especially when both occur simultaneously. And, all too often the goods turn into the bads, after a long period of developmental support.

Clearly myths won't do. It is time now to begin with realities. There are certain auspicious circumstances or perhaps indications that a new beginning is possible. For one thing most of our illusions are gone, the shibboleths outmoded. And, no matter how much we dislike it or how much it costs, the political dangers of becoming isolated from the developing world are too great for us to allow this to happen. We have a body of precedents and knowledge which did not exist before: technical knowledge in the social sciences, experience in policy programming for aid, and a body of data. How to use these to replace myths with a projective realism is the task that lies ahead.

III

If You See the Future Can You Doubt that it will Work?

American development mythology is perfectly understandable in the context of our history. Our political institutions enjoyed sufficient popular political participation to allow for the more or less free play of economic interests and successfully reconciled the conflicts which resulted.

Indeed underlying our view of politics is a belief in the economic interpretation of history.¹ Society is composed of various classes and interests;

¹ See Charles and Mary Beard, Basic History of the United States (New York: Doubleday Doran and Company, 1944.)

merchants, industrialists, agrarians, urbans, workers, immigrants, etc. As the polity becomes more popular, it needs to reflect the needs of these and other groupings. That improvement is called political development. Unlike a Marxian view there is no unique value-generating class (such as a proletariat). Government serves a diversity of classes and interests (and is not the executive committee for the bourgeoisie). Relations between the polity and this diversity of interest are essentially institutional embodying the conceptions individuals have of what is right and proper.

The Wilsonian view was politically explicit about this. Development is first and foremost constitutional engineering. The polis comes first, an emphasis which sought to universalize the political evolution of England and the United States in the sense that growing popular participation and effective legal rights and safeguards were the preconditions for successful entrepreneurship and expanded commerce. "Economism" plus constitutionalism seemed the formula for success. Political democracy was the key.

Political development as "economism" plus constitutionalism was tried twice and it did not work any better after World War II than World War I. Like Weimar and the Eastern European "democracies," the post-World II constitutions, with few exceptions proved to be ephemeral. This affected the political study of development. As political institutions seemed to dissolve in the developing areas, the entire corpus of knowledge in the field suddenly became problematical.¹ The emphasis on political development was lost in favor of the analysis of the social and economic pre-requisite of the polis. This impact on political studies was not shared with those outside the discipline.

If one were to take a survey of development experts in the Agency for Inter-

¹ See the description of the evolution of foreign studies in Cyril E. Black, "Foreign Area Studies: Emergent Challenges and Trends" in Fred W. Riggs (ed.), International Studies: Present Status and Future Prospects Philadelphia: mimeograph 12, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1971.

national Development, it is most likely that the large majority would believe that the discrepancy between theory and practice, the failure of democracy and the slowness of economic growth in most modernizing societies are essentially temporary. They would argue that the important thing is not to lose sight of the fact that it took a long time and a great deal of experience in Europe and the United States before such institutions became established. Failures, while a cause for concern, should not be seen as invalidating the basic understanding of political processes and development as described.

Political science as a discipline, although not rejecting such views, has exploded the more simplistic expressions of them. Questioning economic self interest in terms of the larger matter of norms and values was what might be called the "Parsonian revolution". Sociologizing the study of politics especially as a means of examining the contrasts between ways of life in poor countries and rich ones has focussed attention on the value pre-requisites for institutional change. The "Lasswellian revolution" with its strong concern with psychological variables has generated interest in the more experimental study of motivation for development including the "disposition to be democratic." How do the needs and displacements of individuals affect political tendencies. These two influences, sociological and psychological when applied to developing areas has produced a large number of behavioral studies which, go far beyond the idea of economic self interest and constitutionalism and virtually separated the discipline of political science from its traditional focus. Indeed the new methods and theories have all but shattered the coherence of the earlier tradition. Such a situation bewilders those practitioners of aid and development interested in using modern political science for policy purposes.

This brings us to the question of what political science can do generally in the study of aid policy. The general political science literature dealing

with development has burgeoned.¹ Political development is seen as a total social and economic process. Lucian Pye suggests that modernization brings about certain universal values embodying similarities in outlook and behavior among all peoples. "Tradition-bound villages or tribal-based societies are compelled to react to the pressures and demands of the modern, industrialized, and urban-centered world."²

Some see political development in stages which are not determined by economic growth.³ Others see it as a form of disequilibrium leading at times to revolution,⁴ or concentrate on "under-development" as a consequence of economic growth.⁵ Still others are more concerned with the dynamism of the industrialization process itself as a kind of "permutation matrix" or an engine of continuous transformation.⁶ Whatever the view, the need to conceptualize the process of political development is bound up with two questions: what are the social

¹ The best recent review is Samuel Huntington "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics" in Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, April 1971.

Less recent is a review article I did with Charles Andrain, "Comparative Government: Developing New Nations" in Marian D. Irish, ed. Political Science: Advance of the Discipline, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).

² See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966). Political development consists of economic development as a prerequisite, modernization, the operation of the nation state, legal and administrative institutions, mobilization of participation, organizing democracy, and stability.

³ See A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

⁴ See Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966).

⁵ See Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), Andre Gundar Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), and Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) pp. 47-72.

⁶ See Raymond Aron, 18 Lectures on Industrial Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961).

and economic preconditions of political development and what is the political pre-condition of social and economic development?

Some scholars outside political science have been able to stimulate new thinking about the first question such as David McClelland's notion of achievement motivation.¹ It seems to explain why development occurs both historically and as between various groupings depending on the degree of n achievement distributed within the group. But if this were translated into political planning difficulties arise.² It turns out to be a slippery idea. For example DeVos discovered that in Japan, scores for individual achievement were low but group achievement was high.³ I cite this because it illustrates a problem related to the question of pre-requisites for political development, namely what might be called the "fallacy of misplaced abstraction." Apparently a specific theory, related to the basic principles of individualism, its connection of entrepreneurship, innovation, and adaptive skill, raises more questions than it answers. From a policy standpoint it would be impossible to train a people in "achievement motivation" and assume that their innovative skills would be enhanced.

This kind of difficulty affects most of the psychological, cultural, and social structural factors which political scientists have borrowed. Nor does history serve as a guide. For example it was widely believed during the days of colonial empires that to Christianize a population meant also to educate people instrumentally. The lesson should be clear. Religious conviction transferred to educational competence, should stimulate the desire for social mobility (rising up the scale of "civilization") and lead to greater innovative partici-

¹ See D. C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, (Princeton: Van Nostrand 1961).

² See Robert Levine, Dreams and Deeds, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.) Levine's analysis in Nigeria suggests that differences between Ibos, the most innovative and achievement oriented group in Nigeria are not as great as might be expected when their achievement motivation is compared with Hausa or Yoruba groups.

³ See George DeVos, "Achievement and Innovation in Culture and Personality" in D.E. Apter and Charles Andrain eds. Contemporary Analytical Theory, (Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1972).

pation. However, the connection appears to be more "systemic" than it really is. What is the independent variable, religion or education? If you substitute Islam for Christianity would the same sequence occur? The answer is, sometimes yes and sometimes no. Geertz found that in Indonesia Islam was innovative, modern, secular while in Morocco it was the opposite. How religion works in infinites complex, "The religious perspective, like the scientific, the aesthetic, the historical, and so on, is after all adopted by men only sporadically, intermittently. Most of the time men, even priests and anchorites, live in the everyday world and see experience in practical, down-to-earth terms - they must if they are to survive."¹ To put the matter differently the search for the equivalent of Weber's Protestant ethic, whether in broad cultural values or their internalized achievement form turns out to be elusive.

Similarly with education. Education, by changing the horizon of specific opportunities for individuals ought to be predictable in its consequences. Here again the experience is mixed. What type of education will produce an improved agriculture? Is the production of lawyers or a literati dysfunctional? If we know that education generates class distinctions, social cleavages, and a sense of relative deprivation as a function of opportunity will the solution lie in people's education, European style universities, teacher training, the "land-grant approach", the creation of scientific specialists or the production of rough and ready improvisors?² Such questions are crucial for political development, affecting as they do the role of the bureaucrat or civil servant, the

¹ See Clifford Geertz Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 107). See also the analysis of values in relation to development in Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957).

² See the discussions of such matters in John W. Hanson and Cole S. Brembeck, Education and the Development of Nations, (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). See also the discussion of the political significance of education in terms of political orientations, congruence with other socializing agencies, and the specific effects of school environments in James Coleman's introduction to his volume, Education and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

character of national elites, the civic culture itself. But if omnibus socio-economic variables are too complex to tell us very much, by themselves or in relationship, about the prospects of developmental change or the consequences of aid programs how can we speak of the pre-requisites of political development?

Similarly with political variables. If, as we have suggested a liberal political framework is best designed to balance individual and group preferences with social policies aimed at maximizing the greatest good for the greatest number, as advocated by many (including the more sociologically sophisticated economists like Albert Hirschmann or W. Arthur Lewis) remains at the core of American developmental policy is it not the case that it also produces economic stagnation, political stalemate, marginal pay-off and overwhelming inequality and corruption precisely the conditions which destroy developmental projects or lead to their gross abuse? Under such circumstances what good does it do to favor the establishment of parliamentary government or checks and balances, or judicial review, or proportional representation, or single member plurality voting constituencies, or bills of rights, or political parties. These are ephemeral when confronted with hard interests, ethnic and primordial; class, linguistic, religious, and the various combinations of these which occur most in periods of increasing development. To put Ghana on a firmer economic footing the democratic government of Ghana cut back military allocations 18%, favored rural development, attacked the trades unions, devalued the cedi by 44%, and promptly was overthrown. Under such circumstances it is very difficult to speak of the political requisites of economic and social development.

It is not surprising therefore that social scientists prefer to look for means to hook up variables into sequences and link sequences in systems. No factor in isolation has definitive significance. Nor is any empirical combination

of factors likely to be repeatable. It is rare for a successful sequence of steps in one social environment to repeat itself in another. Social scientists then have increasingly moved in an analytical direction which is precisely what it means to think systemically, and is exactly opposite to the direction taken by government officials and politicians who see socio-economic problems of development which need to be solved by immediate policy decisions.

Practitioners of assistance have taken exactly the opposite tack because the manipulation of given combinations of variables doesn't solve the predicaments of any specific situation. Moreover, even where there are great policy successes it is hard to turn a programmatic success into a formula. The best administrators like the best politicians are people-oriented. They seek out the individuals who can be relied upon. They want individuals who can be expected to have good judgement and competence. Leadership is the key. Leadership training by rough and ready or by more educational means is the method of recruitment.

Moreover, as any practitioner knows whether one works in a village resettlement scheme in Pakistan or a barriada outside of Lima, or in a community development project in Kenya, human situations are similar all the world over. Such typicality will allow an experienced man on the spot to employ all his intuitive as well as his technical skills in gaining cooperation, associating people with the developmental project, dealing with local officials or other bodies. The real skill involved is an individual matter. This kind of expertise can not be written up in text books. Like the politician a sensitive development officer will rely on his combination of experiential cues, private intuitions, his capacity to relate to others, his judgement about associates and friends, and certainly not the theories of social scientists. Indeed the more he reads the literature the more suspicious he becomes of theoretical solutions. Every ins-

tinct tells him that they will not handle simple truths.¹

Hence starting from a similar concern, the search for an explanation about the how and why of development, social scientists and aid practitioners draw opposite conclusions. The one seeks a wider and more capable system and resists the notion of "applied" theory as well policy research has been cast aside in favor of pure research especially in political science and sociology. The practitioner recoils from the theories as incomprehensible, unrealistic, or whimsical and prefers to work with the real people with the real problems in the real world. Occasionally developmental theorist and development practitioner will meet in conferences. Sometimes their common need for alliances serve universities, help out in recruitment, and sponsor research. But these are largely gestures to be ignored by all. Despite the association between scholars and practitioners the language of the two groups is different, their approach to and style of thinking are estranged. Where area experts in scholarly fields are to provide information to practitioners it is for their area knowledge that they are used, rather than their interpretive ideas.

The situation is, however, remedial and I propose to show some appropriate steps because there are signs that both sides would like to bridge at least some of the conceptual gaps. Certain shibboleths of development have disappeared. We are less prone to wave the flag of "institution building" or "infrastructure development" as if these by themselves embodied some powerful medicine. We are less convinced that there is a linear relationship between poverty and communism (and that if you remove the first, you are not likely to have the second). We have come to doubt that a strong middle class is the pre-requisite for democracy when imbedded in interest groups and voluntary associations, it creates a self-

¹ See the general critique by Michael Lipton, "Interdisciplinary Studies in Less Developed Countries" in Journal of Development Studies, School of African and Asian Studies, the University of Sussex, Reprint Series No. 35, n.d.

servicing party system validated by representative institutions. We are even beginning to wonder about such sacred cows as the Millikan-Rostow emphasis on developmental loans and the "absorption thesis" of Hollis Chenery. The effect of specific aid experience has over-all been so vastly different from what any program design anticipated that practitioners need a fresh perspective. Attempts at comprehensive reviews such as the Country Assistance Programs and or Long Range Assistance Surveys have provided one impetus on the practitioner side to comprehend the meaning of aid in a larger analytical context. The social scientists urge to translate general models into projective or predicative "contradictions" which can be anticipated by forecasting has been stimulated by the opportunities opened up by the growth of quantifiable national index figures and computers. The question is whether the gap which presently is very broad can be bridged.

A new emphasis on theory will not work, unless it derives likely paradoxes and contradictions resulting from typical sequences of aid or patterns of development. Moreover, the search for such a sequence or pattern will require us to apply analytical or abstract systems to concrete cases. Real societies are monopolized expressions of power. To predict how that power will work is the essential aim of political development theory. It is on this point that theorists and practitioners can agree and where the need is to begin.¹

IV

Systems for Sale

If our assumptions are correct theorists and practitioners need to rediscover each other for good practical reasons. As one practitioner put it recently at a conference, "at the end of the development decade our ideas are bankrupt".

¹ See James S. Coleman et. al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

Moreover the need to reconsider what political development means is not only for its own sake, but also to educate a reluctant public which must pay for it and to re-engage the interest of politicians who can only regard aid as a marginal interest. At the moment, aid is about as politically acceptable as taxes and infinitely less inevitable.

On the other hand, with the loss of government financed research support to universities, especially in the social sciences, and with the withdrawal by the Ford Foundation from major support for international and area studies, scholars have re-discovered an interest in policy research. They have done it, of course for purely scholarly reasons (as always), i.e. the next step in the development of our research understanding is through policy and applied methods. It also happens that there is where the money and the opportunity lie. Hence, "development" tendencies are at work on the academic side too. Retrenchment in university support has generated new "applied" strategies. Virtually every major center or institution of developmental or international studies is attempting to use the policy focus to salvage part of larger programs or to relate theory and practice in ways which will have programmatic consequence. Whether this trend will be salutary or not depends a good deal on the nature of the collaboration between practitioners and theorists. This in turn will depend on the policy questions being asked, and the hypotheses that these generate.

There are several ways to bridge the gap. One approach is to translate the word system into aggregate data, and to employ quantitative methodologies for projective purposes. Data can be derived from many sources surveys and interviews, national statistics, indicator data. Quality will depend on the caliber of data gathering agencies as well as data processing facilities. More and more sophisticated mathematical strategies are being employed to minimize the effects of incommensurabilities. There is great inventiveness in the de-

velopment of bridging categories which encompass on a higher level of abstraction what seems to be simply different at a lower (the art of comparing apples and pears). Whatever the specific strategy of research, the broad rubric under which this approach can be discussed is that of micro-components.

Within the micro-component dimension are three overlapping activities. The first is simulation. The second is cross-cultural data analysis. The third is ecological analysis. Some of those most concerned with simulation have been Ithiel Pool, Frederick Frey and others at M.I.T. The cross cultural quantitative indicator analysis has been associated with Karl Deutsch, Bruce Russett, Richard Merritt and others during the period of their work at Yale, while the ecological approach has evolved out of the work of many including Stein Rokkan, Angus Campbell, Juan Linz, Robert Dahl.¹ All use national societies as their concrete "systems". All have an explicitly political focus. All employ quantitative aggregate data.

Their theoretical basis is different from those who use macro-components, or the structuralists. It relies on behavioral and psychological hypotheses and administrative or organizational theory rather than explanations based on social and political structures and functions, and employs a mechanical model of feedbacks, dependent and independent variables, factorial techniques, and regression applications with simulation a substitute for experimentation. As much as possible statistical scientific techniques and procedures are employed. Although there is a tremendous range of difference among the three, all share in the following:

1. They use concrete units and subunits as common sense reality.
2. They employ conventional descriptive categories like "democracy," and "authoritarianism," and concrete units like parliaments and political parties, treating them as more or less constant in their qualities.
3. They restrict their generalizations to what can be directly observed or measured.
4. Their general approach is quantitative, empirical, experimental, and inductive.

¹ See especially M. Dogan and S. Rokkan, Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969)

In short, this approach, maximizes comparative and quantitative methods. It is also empirical and within the realm of commonsense. Some practitioners are drawn to it because it holds out possibilities for processing "commonsense" and for allowing an observer to see the forest as well as the trees. Moreover the skill of the theorist is increasingly technical, and can be learned by approved methods of mathematical study, survey method, computer programming and the like. It is, at every level, a method of theory which generates syndromes and patterns while remaining concrete. This way of looking at development has great appeal. It is similar to forecasting in economics. It uses indicator data. It has been taken over by "futurologists" in various research institutes like those concerned with strategic defence (the Rand and Hudson Institutes).

The second main dimension of development in theory has been a structuralist one. It uses macro-components which do not easily lend themselves to the language of dependent and independent variables. It has tended to employ the political as a residual rather than a key variable in analysis since power is seen as a complex phenomenon embodied in all concrete units of a society (work groups, families, voluntary associations as well as political parties, bureaucracies etc.) The critical unit of analysis is role. Role relationships are seen in terms of personality structure and values and beliefs. Its objective of the macro-component approach is to formulate systems which are sufficiently abstract to identify logically contradictory empirical conditions which in turn define hypotheses for research.

The origins of this tradition are to be found in several fields, the naive functionalism of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in anthropology, the idealist tradition of ideal type analysis of orientation (a normative emphasis) in the sociology of Weber, the analysis of structural differentiation and social complexity of Durkheim. Parsons undertook the job of blending these in a general

system with three components, (social system, social action, and culture). Each field emphasized different problems. The anthropological was concerned with contradictions arising from the clash and penetration of cultures, particularly the European versus the "traditional" as well as how the "meaning" of such traditional institutions as kinship changed. This kind of theory came to have a direct significance for administrators who grafted anthropological ideas on political-administrative doctrines. Amateur ethnographers as well as government anthropologists and sociologists have been employed to provide more adequate information to policy makers. In turn these "plundered" the historical sociologists, particularly Weber and Durkheim for general ideas about highly differentiated industrial and less differentiated primitive systems. Using general orientational dichotomies (like kinship versus contract) they sought to find in the contrast of tradition and modernity, tribe and state, sacred communities and secular ones, those contradictions which would help explain both the ability or readiness to change and the inhibitions placed by a community upon change. The behavioral emphasis embodied in such an approach is one of orientational load, or how much change can a man accept, how much education increases personal efficacy and how much leads to trivial specialization and a withdrawal from participation. The political emphasis derives from the character of the contradictions at all levels, cultural, social, and personality and the abilities of governments to resolve these by remedial programs, training, building supportive institutional structures for new roles, and creating new ideological syntheses to make sense out of change. In short for a structuralist politics is in the nature of a response to fundamental patterns of incongruence between ideologies, roles, and motivational patterns, the contradiction between old forms of these and new, and the resulting threats to power or authority which arise when these are insufficiently reconciled or changed.

Those associated with this form of analysis in development studies include Geertz and Fallers in anthropology, Moore, Levy, Bellah and Smelser in sociology, Easton, Almond, La Palombara, Weiner, Binda in political science and many others.

What the various groups within this approach share is the following:

1. the relationship of parts of a society to society as a whole
2. a concern with normative and structural contradictions within whole societies
3. a deductive and/or ideal typical method
4. a qualitative rather than a quantitative set of variables
5. hindsight rather than projective theorizing

The structural emphasis when applied to development then is on contradictions created by change and innovation and the search for mediating institutions to create a new level of integration. Traditional societies were seen to have been highly integrated. Change breaks this down. Politics and governmental policy need to re-create it in more modern form. Modernity means urbanization, secularity, functional differentiation of roles, universalism. While these highly generalized and global distinctions can be organized into specific hypotheses what they lack is good operational definitions, clear measurement criteria, and a standardized methodological form. In short, the macro-component approach is weakest precisely where the micro-component is strongest. As a result, while the structuralists have been most influential in developmental analysis it remains a frustrating approach. Indeed for many practitioners it is something of a joke.

A variant of macro-component analysis is in the area of political socialization which steers uneasily between the Freudianism and social "psychologism" of some of the social scientists interested in behavior per se and the perception and experimental schools of Hull and others concerned with individual behavior. The relationship to structuralism is in terms of various forms of congruence

theory. Congruence theory is based on the assumption that the better the fit between peoples ideas and cognitions and the structural relationships of roles, the greater the degree of equilibrium in a system. The method that a society selects for improving that fit is political socialization. Hence it becomes important to examine the means whereby roles are institutionalized in schools, religious bodies, ethnic groups, parties, etc. The examination of the efficacy by means of which such socialization is induced and the consequences for groups and individuals, thresholds of variance, etc., form some of the criteria for the examination of micro-components in a method which relies heavily on empirical studies particularly of the survey research and questionnaire variety. Scholars concerned with developing this aspect of political studies in modernizing societies have included Sidney Verba in his pioneering work with Almond, The Civic Culture.¹ Others include Langton's work on Jamaica,² and Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, Political Orientations of Children.³ The styles of such research have been strongly influenced by Robert Lane, David Easton, Charles Andrain and others interested in personality, behavior and socialization. Their application to modernizing societies of political socialization materials will depend a good deal on how much other structural data is available. Moreover, the emphasis in modernizing systems would shift from equilibrium to disequilibrium and the identification of boundaries of incongruity.

¹ See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

² See Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

³ See Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations, (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970).

A third line of approach "political economy" is both the oldest and the newest in political development and is an approach uniquely concerned with development in its strictest form, namely the methods of accumulation and production. These it sees as the infrastructural base for beliefs, political forms and other "superstructures". It uses material development as the independent variable and embodies a theory of stages in which there are correspondences between developmental level and political and social forms. Like structuralists, those who follow a political economic approach also see transitions between these as contradictions but they are more concrete arising from specific situations of conflict between competitive functional groupings, with functionality determined by their role in the productive process.¹

The political is stressed in each subject field. Economists are pre-occupied not with economics as such but rather with the political consequences of capitalist development as in the work of Paul Baran. Indeed, philosophers like Sartre, anthropological linguists like Claude Levi Strauss, psychiatrists like Fanon, all show a concern with the socially negative consequences of private and "imperialist" forms of development as compared with the positive opportunities embodied in socialist forms. Some monographic studies rely heavily on the application of neo-Marxist analytical and descriptive sociology as in James Petra's work on Chile, and Maurice Zeitlin's on Cuba.² Perhaps the best work on socialist development is Franz Schurmann's study of Communist China.³

Clearly the policy implications of this approach are at odds with the other two. Moreover, success for one group means failure for the other. Insofar as

¹ There is a huge developmental literature in this field, (from Rosa Luxemburg to Paul Sweezy) employing three main variables, the division of labor, capital accumulation, and technical change. See Maurice Dobb, Capitalism, Development and Planning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1967).

² See James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

³ See Franz Schurmann's Ideology and Organization in Communist China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

American developmental assistance advances the cause of capitalism, stimulates entrepreneurship, induces effective socialization and produces an environment militarily, politically and financially benign to the United States it is by definition imperialist. The consequences of aid can only perpetuate American "hegemony". To acquire or create client states which protect local capitalists, to promote, as a form of capitalist accumulation, conditions of under-development among those who are forced to give their means of livelihood and become squatters or marginals, or partially employed, to enlarge the circumstances of inequality and give rise to grossly manipulative political regimes, these are the consequences of "successful" aid.

However one regards the neo-Marxist point of view in terms of policy or theory, it points up certain realities of the development process which the other treat as ephiphenomenal. Theoretically the greatest significance of neo-Marxian political economy is that it is a form of marginal analysis which can be applied to the political and social spheres. It establishes the link between functional superfluosity in economic terms, and social and political marginality. This is extremely important in the analysis of developing countries and differs from the more classical Marxian formula (which would regard the functionally superfluous more or less as "lumpens" and consider the proletariat, the creators of value and therefore the most functionally relevant as the dynamic element). In short, the critique of capitalism in developing areas as distinct from industrial ones is that the group possessing maximal functional significance, the working class, is small while the functionally superfluous are large but restricted to marginal social and political shares by the state which prevents an appropriate social and political redistribution. In other words in less developed countries the social and political marginals are also economic marginals, hence they fall outside the normal limits of societal obligation. A neo-Marxist theory

of developmental assistance would imply at least that such assistance should be devoted directly to maximal improvement at the margin. Anything short of that is imperialism, externally induced and internally deployed.

It is an interesting theory and most relevant in highly modernized developed countries like Argentina where there are profound social cleavages, huge squatter populations victimized by ruthless exploitation, corruption and political helplessness. One reason it has not had sufficient attention is that it tends to invoke socialism as an incantational solution without recognizing "systemic" characteristic problems of socialism, such as a burgeoning bureaucracy, lack of innovative skills, political inequality, and, often enough, terror. What the political economists can point to is successful development in China, North Korea, and the astonishing performance of what is currently the most militant case, i.e. North Viet-Nam.

Each of the three main approaches can overlap. It is possible, for example to employ some of the central hypotheses about marginality under developmental capitalism as derived by the neo-Marxists, translate them into structural theories, and test them by more quantitative or cross national analysis. One effort to develop such a strategy is the remarkable work on The Politics of Change in Venezuela.¹ Combining multiple approaches the authors are able to evaluate the global effects of change in a single case, a tour de force in what might be called "combination" analysis.

V.

Combination Analysis vs. Eclecticism

Most ordinary work on development and social change occurs in a non-theoretical manner and on a more or less ad hoc basis. Quite often, especially in case

¹ See Frank Bonilla and Jose A. Silva Michelena, The Politics of Change in Venezuela, (Cambridge: The M.I.T. press, 3 volumes, 1967, 1970, 1971).

materials, theory provides a check list of important items which, when pooled, serve to alert practitioners to ills the social body is heir to. The results are typically printed up in conference reports written by developmental experts, each one of which describes some developmental problem or experience, utters a few warnings for the future and returns to work secure in the knowledge that his remarks have been solemnly recorded by some AID or United Nations scribe, to be published as the next collection of essays on developmental thinking. If these contributions are characterized by a certain gratuitousness and looseness or, even worse an utter unprofessionalism, it is justified on the grounds that professionalism is a barrier to communications. Typical of such documents is a recent report of a meeting of experts on social and policy planning held in Sweden in 1969. Here are the new shibboleths to replace the old ones; economic phenomena are also social phenomena, development is a process, the dualism of the sectors (modern and traditional), quantify with care, unemployment is underutilization of labor, bottleneck research should be specific to a given country, the need for dialogue between planners and politicians, the need to engineer social change. Prerequisites of development (equally pious but equally lacking in substance) are "peaceful radical, social change" to permit "all human and material resources of a country", "full and dynamic participation in the process of development". One wonders exactly how this is to work. Hortatory platitudes abound. "Excessive regulation and procedures in matters involving economic or social organization and resource allocation often give rise to problems of corruption. Developing countries should rationalize their procedures for trade licensing and other forms of resource allocation, giving special attention to making them more effective instruments of social policy..." One could go on.¹

¹ See "Social Policy and Planning in National Development", in International Social Development Review, No. 3. United Nations, New York, 1971.

It is precisely this kind of checklisting which practitioners have become expert in regurgitating and, although fatuous, it gives an intellectual gloss to their endeavors, providing a certain moral satisfaction or smugness because it all sounds so wise and responsible. But such pcity means nothing.

A much more important kind of checklisting is the search for social indicators. This, while it tends to be eclectic, turns attention to critical variables and their identification and is thus a pre-condition of our first approach. Secondly, because time and performance dimensions are necessary at the start, the question of system is embedded in "vectors" and structures. Indicator analysis can be a good use of ad hoc analysis or eclecticism as long as it does not end as it begins.¹ The best practitioners of indicator and trend analysis are very much aware of the limitations of the approach. "If...development is not a uniform linear progression but is characterized by changing patterns of relationship among factors, then a country's own past trends may not predict its future very well. Furthermore, the historical experiences of countries now called 'developed' have limited relevance to the devleoping countries today. It cannot be concluded that the latter countries will or should repeat the historical development paths of the former - modern science and technology have made this quite unnecessary. The most revealing kind of cross-temporal analysis would cover modern periods and involve a large sample of countries, developing as well as developed. But, as noted above, the statistical basis for quantitative studies of this kind hardly exists, except for a limited number of countries and a limited number of variables between 1950 and 1960 or 1965."²

¹ See the discussion in Raymond A. Bauer (ed.) Social Indicators, (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1966, pp. 19-48.

² See D.V. McGranahan et. al, Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development; An Empirical Enquiry, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Report No. 70, 10, memco, n.d. p. 3.

Limited projections, short time series, and most of all, comparative reviews to see of replicable patterns are possible will become more likely as statistical services in less developed countries are improved in quality and expanded in scope. Indeed, as we shall discuss later on, there is perhaps no project more worth doing because of its manageability, and the varied nature of its consequence than improving the scope and quality of research-statistical institutions. These are the pre-requisite "operations research" base for information by any government.

The possibilities of more controlled analysis of developmental change will obviously depend first of all on the availability of data. But as well, combination theories will be essential using all three forms of analysis which have been described. Clearly they can not simply be "stuck together". Each has a relevance. The first involves strategies of time series. It is above all a method for the analysis of microcomponents. The second generates a concern with macrocomponents, generalized variables like power, authority, norms, class, elites, information, etc. These, in order to be effective, will depend on the "sociological" content and form of their variables, as well as their capacity for translation into "surrogate" variables¹ or indicator variables. It is necessary for the macro theory to "engage" the micro in both methodological and empirical ways. Finally, since many of the specific propositions of the neo-Marxians deal with behavior under capitalism, it is necessary to focus on particular issues raised by the theory itself, the hegemonic or imperialist consequences of aid, the causes of "under-development" along side of development, the marginal theory of social change, etc.

Combination theories then are specific analytical and empirical strategies which are self-consciously integrated in terms of particular problems. The criteria

¹ Surrogate variables are different variables employed to identify similar phenomena. For example evaluation of opposition to government may in a democratic society be based on electoral results while under totalitarianism by underground activities.

of combination are first of all the availability of data. That should go without saying, but it implies that an improved developmental policy at the analytical level would be useless unless the advance work of infrastructure development occurs at the data gathering level. The other criteria are as follows. 1. Hypothesis formation: "The essence of any model is the hypotheses embedded in the relationships and structure. The social scientist can invest hypotheses relating to components of any desired level of aggregation, just as the physicist may promulgate hypotheses about the behavior of gasses as well as about the behavior of molecules or components of molecules." 2. Specification of causality: "We want models of social systems that will enable policy-makers to predict consequences of alternative actions. Furthermore, we want models that say more than that certain things have been associated in the past or even that, in the absence of control efforts, they will be associated in the future. We want models that will predict how the future will be different if particular actions are taken in preference to others." 3. Estimation and testing: "Social scientists do not yet possess a body of theory sufficiently developed and tested to permit the confident specification of variables to be included, of forms of equations to be used, and of appropriate lags for each variable prior to the estimation of parameters entering into equations. Existing theory offers some guidance, but it is the most fanciful kind of wishful thinking to believe that it offers much guidance in the above respects. It is obvious, therefore that any effective testing and estimation requires very large numbers of observations."¹

These criteria would hold for any system of analysis which tries to improve the science side of developmental policy making. A parallel need to that of

¹ These three criteria are taken from Guy H. Orutt, "Data Needs for Computer Simulation of Large-Scale Social Systems" in James M. Beshers, Computer Methods in the Analysis of Large-Scale Social Systems (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, second edition, 1968), pp. 234-5. Orutt would rely much more exclusively on microcomponents where I would rely more on a blend of microcomponents and macro.

generating basic aggregate data, is in the translation of qualitative information into binary or ranked data so that the body of observational material in the fields of anthropology, politics, sociology etc., can be employed in more than a monographic and unique context.

There is still very little emphasis on what I have call "combination analysis". Too many social scientists remain embroiled in parochial disputes over such large issues as the ethics of science in social matters, the degree to which computers sterilize knowledge rather than advance it, behavioralism versus structuralism, etc. That these and issues are of great importance, we do not deny. But far too often the actual debates take on a posturing aspect which prevents just those kinds of collaborative efforts necessary to build a better theoretical mousetrap. What is needed now is more organized research at centers inside or outside the academy devoted to various forms of combination analysis at a high level.

VI

Hypotheses for Hire

Obviously we can not go into the matter of which combination theories might work best for what purposes. Few such theories as yet exist, as Orcutt suggests.¹ No such decision can be made about them until the hypotheses which they are supposed to test are specified. Taking several of the main political objectives of aid as our guide, what general hypotheses can we derive as guides to would-be combination theorists? The most general of these objects, namely the creation of a stable and prosperous world of nations with a capacity for self sustained growth is too broad, but some of the other original assumptions can be reviewed in the form of hypotheses. The most obvious example is the notion that if there is poverty then there is likely to be communism far more sensible is the Lipset

¹ My own very limited efforts along these lines is to be found in my book, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

hypothesis that if there is increasing development, rising expectation, increasing educational opportunity and political participation, then there is also likely to be an increasing tendency towards radical movements. The real question for combination theory is among which groups and under what specific circumstances. A more interesting hypothesis is whether or not with successful modernization radicalization, that is the rejection of roles values and practices previously institutionalized will a) increase, b) is likely to be a middle class phenomenon, carried by c) bourgeois elites, particularly the d) best educated and most rich. A subsidiary hypothesis is that such radicalization will suddenly increase at X degree of development among those with technical skills, in responsible positions in planning for agronomy, engineering, and increasingly the military, who feel frustrated by "the system" and see a need to transform key aspects of it root and branch. Evidence for this is greatest in precisely the most advanced modernizing countries where development has produced great inequality, inequity, stagnation, and a pool of frustrated intellectuals and technicians not all of whom dissipate their energies in romantic leftism but, as in the case of Peru and Chile, generate specific developmental programs of reform through nationalization.

Indeed, these hypotheses, simple enough to describe empirically, contain many of the key questions for the political study of development because they link to the development process, questions of political institutionalization and de-institutionalization and open up the opportunity for systemic analysis of how counter-norms and counter elites, form and the patterns or syndromes of radicalization vis-a-vis regime change and political system shifts. One of the few political scientists who have tried to deal with this problem directly is

Samuel Huntington. "The revolutionary intellectual is virtually a universal phenomenon in modernizing societies" he points out.¹ But Huntington's form of analysis, is institutional rather than analytical and descriptively impressionistic or illustrative rather than inductive and projective. It is precisely the next stage in combination theory that we are after.

What I have called the twin process of "radicalization" and "embourgeoisement" is merely illustrative. Questions about dependency, efficacy loss, and above all information creation and utilization are even more important. For each we need to know structural syndromes and to program and compute degrees to which structure at the macro level relates to the behavior of microcomponents. To what extent is radicalization a phenomenon that remains largely rhetorical (perhaps punctuated by violence and terror) and to what extent does it become elaborated and articulated in the expectations and actions of other sectors of a community. And, to go back to the Lipset question, to what extent is radicalization a function of development.

I tend to regard much of the so-called radicalization process in modernizing societies as "radicalization for embourgeoisement". To put it another way, attempts to employ radical ideologies, planning, socialist methods, and the like, are essentially the present day versions of the catch-up phenomenon which in the past, particularly in Prussia and Japan, took a more "neo-mercantilist" form.² Today the emphasis on "mobilization" is more total if only because the difficulties in catching up are so much greater. Indeed, to catch up will only be possible for a very few countries, China, Brazil, perhaps a few others. The

1 See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) p. 290.

2 For a discussion of these terms see D. E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965).

The political method becomes important as a system of development. Each generates its own set of difficulties. A mobilization pattern generates coercion, a more bureaucratic military one as in Brazil, not unlike the military neo-mercantilism of Germany and Japan generates growth but becomes repressivist.

Our argument has shifted now from process (radicalization, or embourgeoisement to political system type. If each contains built in difficulties then we must rid ourselves of the accustomed thinking about political stability as a prerequisite to effective development. Political instability, i.e. changing not only governments but types of government, may be the only form of "entrepreneurship" open. Nor does this necessarily mean that society is unstable. For example Argentina is a remarkable stable society on the social level, but has experienced a bewildering array of governmental changes since Peron. Here we need a concept like "political ceiling". To what extent is it possible for what kinds of governments to use what levels of resources to carry out what degree of development and what degree of alteration in the social system. This is precisely the kind of question which combination theory can address itself to. By dealing with the micro-components in the context of a generalized theory of political system change it can do more than illustrate but also project.

What sorts of theoretical constructs are available for such combination theory at a political level. The framework which I have found useful is one which combines the following ingredients. a) functional components deriving from information creation relevant for development b) dialectical components relevant to the clash and transformation of norms, and c) motivational components relating to learning, efficacy, and commitment. These I have called the normative, structural and behavioral components out of which a macro theory can be

built. More specifically the normative can be translated into ideologies about capitalism, socialism, liberalism etc. at both societal and governmental levels. The structural component deals with emergent classes and elites, their functional significance, conflict and the discrepancies between the way they function and the ideologies people have accepted. Too bit a discrepancy and the likely chances of a political system change increase. What chances or probabilities becomes a task for comparative analysis using micro-components and indicator variables.¹

Without elaborating the matter here, the question of political ceiling can also be related to two critical variables which have great policy significance. One is the degree of information, (technical, interest, and populist) that governments have at their disposal. The other is the extent to which they can employ that information. Some political systems admit of very high degrees of populist information, namely public reaction and mood, but have very little technical information. Clearly it would be a policy objective of the United States to provide a better technical information gathering base and improve the professional services a society can muster. Moreover, the more amenable to policy on the basis of information a modernizing polity is, the more likely is it to be democratic. Providing technical information and the infrastructure to obtain it would be a critical way to raise the "political ceiling" of a relatively democratic system.

But such policy would also require follow through on the infrastructure side. Information may also show that a democratic government, with its obligations, cleavages, bargains, and commitments, is in an utterly fragile condition and the more information it has the more difficult it is to act. Then either the political

¹ For a full analysis of this see D. E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). See also D. E. Apter and Charles Andrain, eds., Contemporary Analytical Theory, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1972).

system must change to a more coercive one, or massive support will be required. The recent coup in Ghana against Busia is a case in point. The full realization of what that implies, including amounts and forms of support, and the follow-up projects that might be necessary are rarely appreciated "systemically".

This leads to another query. Under some circumstances what is necessary is not more information, (unless we are prepared to do a total job of development) but internal coercion. We are more willing to accept this when it involves military or bureaucratic regimes which are anti-socialist or anti-communist. A more ruthless question (from a theoretical point of view) is whether or not forced draft methods of development by mobilization means, such as in Communist China, do not create conditions for "embourgeoisement" and generate conditions of trade, more effective political relations and the like, i.e. in a more stable manner, than other forms. (President Nixon's visit to China may be one indication that it is. That would have appeared to be as unlikely a few years ago as a visit by Castro to San Clemente seems now.) The question of regime change in communist societies has itself become very central in political studies as the polycentric and pluralistic character of socialism manifests itself in Eastern Europe. Political system change as a basis for combination theory would require us to take a very different view of communist regimes. Demonology simply won't work.

All this suggests that process variables like radicalization and embourgeoisement, structural variables like political system can be examined empirically by microcomponent methods. Combination theories are always arbitrary. They do not exist in the abstract. They must be designed for a particular task. A policy emphasis is one way to bring them into fruition applied to major issues, with due regard for long term and short term tendencies our conception of the real world of development can be enlarged. The result can help to educate poli-

ticians and the public about what to anticipate. To put it another way since the accumulation of specific projects in any country will produce long term contradictions out of short term success, analysis of latent functionalities and dysfunctionalities, particularly those which result in political crisis constitutes the most important questions for all of us. It is precisely this kind of understanding which is needed to off-set the mythologies and demonologies with which we have clouded the aid-giving process.

Putting the question in this form raises many questions including fundamental ethical considerations. Developmental policy is inevitably social engineering, the more so as it becomes improved and predictive in its results. The political consequences of this include distribution of power based on unequal access and control over knowledge itself. Indeed, if the chief characteristic of industrial societies is the capacity to generate new information at an exceptionally rapid rate and transform it by means of a domestic infrastructure into a disposable output, then not only are modernizing societies increasingly dependent on information from abroad, but they are locked into an international stratification system in which they become "knowledge clients" of industrial scientific "patrons".

Such concerns turn our attention to an older tradition in political science but in a fresh form, namely to the concept of constitutionalism as political development. The question is what forms of the polis will enable decision-makers in modernizing societies to expand the technical side of their own policy making establishments while improving the fit between political needs and demands. Needed is a new concern that might be called a "development constitution" to deal with such matters in terms of information theory, e.g. the development of sensitive receptors within government of what might be called populist information (public reaction), interest information (the special demands of functional

groupings) and finally professional information (particularly of technocratic and welfare character). How governments receive this information and employ it to widen their capacities for intelligent decision-making and find new and fresh alternatives seems to me to be the essential question for those interested in political development. To put it another way, how can the political ceiling be raised by means of expanded information and improved decision-making. That can be seen in its broadest sense as developmental constitutionalism.¹

Combination theory is above projective, and interpretative, a research tool to enable those in positions of policy planning to understand and forecast what a development program is likely to produce. From a political science standpoint there are two broad strategies. The first is the politics of development, i.e. the political consequences of that accumulation of pressures, conflicts, discontinuities, competition, etc. arising out of developmental change. Whether such an accumulation is a primary, secondary or tertiary stage developmental problem, its consequences can be examined by studying counter-elites whose ideologies specifically challenge authority and charge it with being illegitimate, and the emergence of new kinds of interest groups such as technocrats who make demands upon the political system in a new way as a result of some policy program (agrarian reform, increased agricultural output, new technical bodies etc.) This is certainly fundamental to the tradition of political studies and how coalitions form, make demands, and disintegrate, the fluid quality of politics in developing societies becomes less difficult to understand as our basic knowledge increases. Work load analysis of modernizing political systems in bureaucratism, nepotism, and corruption all can be studied by fairly conventional means. How these more

¹ See a preliminary approach to deal with this problem by D. E. Apter and Martin Doornbos, "Development and the Political Process: A Plan For A Constitution" in Essays in Modernization of Developing Societies, A. R. Desoci (ed.) (Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1971).

familiar concerns relate to more behavioral questions is a task for combination theory, i.e., the effects of coalitions on the degree of willingness or unwillingness to innovate, a tendency to play a role in an "external" formal way, without performing effectively within it. If the assumption that modernization gives men a better control over their environment and lives is true collectively but does not hold for many individuals, their sense of efficacy may decline, causing them to retreat rather than participate effectively in change. One of the reasons for peasant or rural conservatism is precisely this sense of efficacy loss. Combination theory then is not necessarily unconventional, but it does blend levels and types of analysis into a single strategy.

The second major strategy is that of a politics for development, i.e. vary the type and what are the consequences. This requires abstracted systems which are themselves hypotheses. What I have called reconciliation systems rely on increasing marginal pay offs to new contenders for shares in the developmental process. Aid may be more effective in generating new contenders than in producing a developmental product. Indeed as a particular program becomes shaky or lacks morale, or is confronted with internal conflict, as is so often the case in community development, educational, or entrepreneurial and commercial projects, personalism leads to politics, both within the new institutions and as a work load of government. This does not necessarily resolve itself through marginal distributions of gain, but may re-awaken old "primordial" loyalties of religion, tribe, ethnicity, language, etc., with all the fissionable consequences of that - civil war, separatist movements, etc. We have seen the effects of this precisely in those reconciliation systems where the prospects of democracy seemed fairly good, as in Nigeria or Ceylon.

On the other hand, mobilization systems tend to rely on a fixed set of

developmental goals and to alter the social structure to fit such goals. In the first government is essentially participatory and managerial. In the second it is essentially hortatory and authoritarian. It generates coercion, and opportunism, but may be the most successful political system for converting late stage modernization into industrialization.

A third type is more bureaucratic. Its object is to retain the features of the social system more or less as they are, but to control the terms of bargaining and restrict demands by the selective use of coercion. Most military regimes are of this type. They commonly result when the other two types fail.

Without going into an analysis of these types or others that might be suitable it should be clear that when we are talking about the consequences of political systems for development a variation in type must reveal the consequence for development rate and priorities. However whether concerned with the politics of development or politics for development, what is required for combination analysis is a store of data which can be mobilized. The emphasis on the politics of development would include data about incongruities and political demands. The emphasis on politics for development would emphasize governmental strategies including the sequential analysis of planification.

VII

Data for Banking

Combination analysis which is a specific strategy of macro-and micro components, can also provide the basis for an information storage and retrieval system in which analytical search categories can be built into a computer program. Again there are precursors for this. The Human Relations Area Files at Yale was the first attempt to organize such a data bank with qualitative data. It suffered from a primitive set of categories for use and the unevenness of the

materials. Quantitative data around particular types of materials have been gathered in a number of places both here and abroad of which the consortium based on the University of Michigan is the best example. Survey data from all parts of the world has been accumulated in the International Data Collection Program of the Survey Research Center at Berkeley. Other important collections exist at Williams College, the Political Science Research Library at Yale, and at other places.

None of these can serve as models in a specific sense. They merely suggested that data banks around specific subjects, using qualitative as well as quantitative variables, and employing retrieval languages are possible. The relation between theory and practice should be made explicit however in a retrieval system. In other words a combination theory should provide the basis for a retrieval language in the politics of and for development. The first attempts to negotiate a bibliography on the basis of retrieval systems are extremely promising but they have necessarily taken the form of reviews of available materials rather than substantive accumulation of new data.¹ One basis for a development data bank however might begin with the materials already on hand in the reportage and statistical files of AID. Such materials go back far enough to make possible time series analysis, regression analysis etc. In short, AID has within it the materials for a first class data bank in which the statistical and qualitative materials translated into systemic variables in binary or nominal form, can be combined. Where such a data bank could be housed depends in some measure on the future of AID itself.

VIII.

Many Happy Returns

The possibilities of effective information storage and retrieval combined

¹ See for example Frederick W. Frey, et. al., Survey Research on Comparative Social Change: A Bibliography. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969).

with effective combination theory would be important enough for the development of social science policy. The question is how to translate such possibilities into a more institutional form. The organization and management of aid is critical if research is to provide policy returns. Clearly to substitute a better trained career service for the present setup would be an improvement; how much of an improvement it would be difficult to say. The mixture of talents, skills, experience, intellectual styles required for an effective and continuous developmental program is so great that it is by no means clear that more stable or permanent arrangements at a personnel level would help very much. Indeed the danger is that rigidities and orthodoxies would increase precisely in the degree that a permanent class-tiered service came to prevail.

An alternative possibility is similar in conception to the "integrated work unit". Unlike differentiated service with its various types of experts, its line and staff men, its sub-specialists all of which constitute a division of labor which intensifies conflicts between individuals and expertise, the integrated work unit combines these various specialities in a more permanent arrangement or grouping which can be called developmental teams. The idea is similar to some of the new methods of work being experimented with in factories. Today the costs of assembly line practices are becoming excessive because of wastage, improper supervision, poor morale, and attitudes of hostility on the part of workers. The result is sabotage, theft, and bad workmanship. Indeed the assembly line is becoming prohibitively expensive as a method of production in the automobile industry with some factories experimenting with permanent teams, responsible for the entire product, i.e. engaged in all aspects of the production. These work together as integrated groups, sharing in the direct responsibility for the product. Similarly with the idea of the development team, a cadre composed of

different kinds of experts. These, composed of men with field and executive experience would vary in composition according to purposes and scope of activity. They would be responsible for entire projects, i.e. from the original planning stage to the time when as functioning entities, projects could be turned over to host country operatives. Teams would vary in speciality; some being composed primarily of say agricultural experts while others might be more educational, but whatever their composition, the point is that the teams themselves ought to be more or less self contained and responsible at each stage for planning and making needed alterations in conception and organization as experience and fortunes dictate.

Each team would be composed of area, subject or technical, and administrative experts. Not very large, they would employ language and other more specialized experts from a resource pool. They would go to work after higher level discussions over specific programs had been completed at the appropriate policy levels of government. Once the alternatives were defined and priorities fixed between donor and host, the project would become the specific responsibility of the appropriate development team. The first task of the team would be essentially an orientational one consisting of study and hearings on the area and its particular problems, and the significance, politically and economically, of the proposed project. Secondly, a survey party of the team would be sent to the host country for a feasibility study and to ascertain the responsible personnel overseas, prepare to train such personnel if necessary, and specify what technical operations would be embodied in the project itself. Thirdly, the survey party would need to report to the development team as a whole, enabling the team to draw up alternative schedules, projecting long run and short run consequences, and assessing the multiple costs and consequences in each case. It is precisely at this stage that combination theory becomes crucial. Thus what we envisage is the developmental team working

out its own style and emphasis in combination theory and over time accumulating a body of theoretical experience on which to draw.

The development team approach makes a continuous group responsible for effective performance, and to take the blame for failure. It maximizes information and communication between specialities. We would expect too a much higher degree of solidarity between the members which would grow with the record of accomplishment. In short we want to maximize individual and group efficacy where today high specialization tends other wise to isolate individuals, and make them feel vulnerable outside their speciality, (and therefore less inclined to be flexible and innovative).

The developmental team is not new. It was used with considerable success at a district level in some colonial territories. In Uganda, district teams composed of various administrative officers, medical, community development, magistrates, animal husbandry, forestry, etc. worked in collaboration with district and local councils and district commissioners. This of course was at a relatively limited developmental level.

The Chinese in Mali and to some extent in Tanzania, and the Israelis in Africa more generally, have hit upon a somewhat similar format. With smaller resources and limited available technical staff their need is to maximize the impact and effectiveness of their programs as inexpensively as possible. The result is stable cadres moving from place to place in somewhat the fashion described. We suggest the development team as the nucleus of aid programming - the operating unit - in the context of a development institute, relying on data, working out combination theories in conjunction with its staff, negotiating the details of programming with host country nationals so that those who negotiate will also follow through the consequences, making provision for its host country

successors and trying to train them in the shortest period of time, and finally, when its job is done, redeployed elsewhere. Whether or not it should serve in addition to, or along side of other institutional arrangements within the present structure of AID might be a matter to discuss. Such a unit would require a backstopping involving the larger AID establishment. We do not suggest the development team idea as an all-purpose solution but rather as a mobile force capable of dealing with many projects more or less as they are presently conceived, and stimulating the organization of similar cadres among host countries.

The idea of a development team ought to be an aspect of organizational evolution within the prevailing aid structure. But it could hardly be very effective without some higher planning body concerned with the entire aid picture. Wanted is a truly international view of aid, a more total conception of the meaning of development itself--something less than "futurcology" and something more than projections from known patterns. It is precisely here that good combination theory combined with policy projections becomes possible. Within AID itself there is need for a type of Rand Corporation concerned primarily with developmental forecasting and evaluating. Specialists as permanent cadres working in collaboration with fellows drawn from policy and field positions would also help narrow the gap between academics and policy makers. The task of fitting the specifics of aid into the larger setting of international politics can not be faced up to without better understanding between theoreticians and planners on the one hand and practitioners on the other.

This bring us to a final point. Much of our thinking about development is already outmoded. If our myths preserve our innocence, they also prevent us from considering the ways in which the relations and terms of aid are presently inadequate. Take for example the idea of a gap between rich and poor countries.

Barbara Ward and others purvers of the "gap theory" are of course right when they say that the development gap between less developed countries is widening rather than narrowing. But it does not really mean much. Indeed, in such terms very few poor countries will ever catch up with rich ones. Moreover why close the gap? Highly industrialized countries, faced with a series of lamentable and insurmountable crises; compacted urban densities, the intensification of internal disparities between racial and cultural groups, the survival of primordial attachments and hostilities, crime, all point to the inadequacies of contemporary industrial life. To an increasing extent developing countries will have all these problems without the benefits of full industrialization if the gap idea prevails. The congested urban areas found in most Latin American cities are one example of what happens. Greater development will only compound the problem and closing the "gap" will only mean that the means of resolution will be ever more difficult. Instead of such "gap" notions we need to see the world in development terms, i.e. as an ecological space organized around different kinds of developmental strategies and jurisdictions depending on the character of the problems. What is really obsolete is our thinking about rich and poor, capitalism or socialism, small countries and big ones. Of course these categories are not likely to disappear in the near future. But their persistence prevents more rational plans for limiting population, decentralizing industry on a global basis, creating stable and limited industrial communities, expanding the range of educational strategies and diversities. If in the long run the problem of development is how to integrate the ignorant, the partially educated, and the highly educated whether in our own societies or abroad, we need a different set of conceptions altogether. Indeed, if our present developmental objectives are not to produce a terrible international meritocracy, some of the concerns of the political-economy approach need to be given greater attention.

I am not suggesting that thinking outrageous thoughts should be the main purpose of combination theory and policy but rather that the consequences of development are not ever likely to produce benign results. Our assumption of a good policy to produce a world of happy and prosperous nations is dangerous because behind it is the notion that if our efforts are not worthwhile in such terms, we will withdraw into neo-isolationism. But it is not our choice any more. As Adure Latreille commented in a recent issue of Le Monde, "Seen in the most charitable light, the industrialized nations of today's world bear a striking resemblance to the wealthy middle class of the 19th century. Their shortsightedness -- so thoroughly denounced today -- accepted the wretchedness of the masses as the natural order of things, and bought its peace of mind with the odd handout to the poorest of the poor. What was needed, in fact, was an effort to seek and develop a basic structural reform, a program regarded as impractical in the last century."¹ What we are suggesting is more attention to the possibilities of basic structural reform. That is the large question of development. That is what we need. That is not what we are likely to get.

IX

From Theory to Theory to Practice to Practice

What we have just described would have seemed impossible just a few years ago. For one thing the macro-theories were just being applied to developing areas. Micro-component aggregate analysis was in its infancy. Simulation studies were of the most trivial nature.² Data storage and retrieval systems were just being thought of. Today work has proceeded on all these to the extent that a genuine possibility for combination theory exists both in the politics of development and the politics for development. The political system is indeed a system

¹ Le Monde, No. 143, Jan. 15, 1972 (Weekly English Edition).

² See for example Andrew M. Scott, William A. Lucas, and Trudi M. Lucas, Simulation and National Development (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966) for some of the limitations of this approach.

and can be treated as such.¹

We needed a long period of social science development before we could get to the stage where a combination theory is possible, and a lengthy period of developmental experience before we could really begin to assess the social and political implications of it all in the context of everyday realities. What is needed now is to translate the various components we have described them into theories organized for policy, utilizing the experience of the past decade for a more improved practice. This is what I mean by theory to theory and practice to practice.

At times one wonders too if there is not some higher process at work which suggest something useful, (something like Hirschmann's "hiding hand" principle). Fortuitously enough, the proposal favoring the establishment of an International Development Institute could, in the terms we have just described, be critical in bringing together training, review, and policy changes in a context of combination theories around specific long and short term projective hypotheses. "The activities of the International Development Institute...will place greater emphasis on strengthening the research capacity of the developing countries and increasing their capacity to adapt and use modern technology. Training and other useful forms of technical assistance would continue. But this increased emphasis is on technology is needed and overdue. We have seen from the work of such private organizations as the Rockefeller Foundation what a vital contribution this research can make to growth and progress. It is time to build on this experience in U. S. foreign assistance programs."² As President Nixon himself pointed out. "The

¹ See Robert Boguslaw, The New Utopians, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1965); Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experiment and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963); and Arthur L. Stinchcombe Constructing Social Theories, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968).

² Statement of Mr. Rudolph Peterson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 29, 1971.

Institute would administer a reformed bilateral technical assistance program and enable us to focus U. S. scientific, technological and managerial know-how on the problem of development."¹ How such an Institute develops its programs, establishes its links to university and other research bodies here and abroad, creates a research and training curriculum, and above all rationalizes the theoretical and practical knowledge we have in the context of policy remains one of the most exciting prospects ahead. We need to have done with myths and demons, developmental shibboleths, sweaty good will and simple optimism (Barbara Wardism; Pearsonism). The least expensive and most beneficial thing we can do is to provide less developed countries with the best thinking we are capable of, leaving the final deployment of it to them. That, in the last analysis, is where all this business about technical assistance and aid began.

We will not try to summarize the main points of this paper except to recapitulate several of the themes we have woven together. We criticized both our thinking about aid and the status of political analysis of development. We suggested that it is now possible to integrate quantitative descriptive variables with analytical ones in a manner enabling forecasting if not prediction, or matter of incongruities between norms, structures and behaviors resulting from developmentally induced discontinuities in real life which generate load problems for political systems. If, as we suggest, such load problems become too great and a political ceiling is reached then the political system will change. How this works and what can be done about it is one of the direct political questions which arise from developmental experience. Finally if this occurs what is the appropriate political form which can work best to maximize development and minimize the incongruity dilemma. We have suggested that a new interest in constitutional

¹ See President Nixon's Message to Congress, For a Generation of Peaceful Development, April 21, 1971 (Washington, Agency for International Development.)

engineering, long lost to the discipline, might be of some relevance here. Such a policy focus becomes possible only if based on the more coherent understanding of what has happened in the past decade, an understanding alternative to the somewhat soggy myths of development which, to a distressing extent, still survive in high places. And while the concern with scholarship and policy as a means to an improved domestic and international condition is an old one, we need to make the concepts and ideas of the disciplines of real use to policy makers.¹ If combination analysis will help reduce the mythological and demonological elements of aid policy, then it is an appropriate concern with which to begin the second development decade.

¹ See Guenther Rotn, "Max Weber's Empirical Sociology in Germany and the United States: Tensions between Partisanship and Scholarship" in Central European History, II, No. 3, September 1969, pp. 196-215.