SIGNIFICANT CASES

IN

INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

Prepared by

Cynthia Clapp
Development Studies Program
Agency for International Development

December 8, 1978

Contents

Page

Introduction 1

Definition of the Concept 2

Questions 5

I. Concept of Integration 5

A. Concept and Definition 5
1. Pilot Projects
2. Self-sustainability

B. Strategy 6
1. Sequencing
2. Concentration Inherent in IRD Strategy
3. High or Low Potential Area?
4. Policy Environment
5. Groups
6. One Crop Strategy
7. Level of Technology
8. Manpower Development
9. Evaluation and Feedback

II. Approaches 11

A. Political Variables 11
1. Role of Central Government
2. Linkages with Local Government

B. Social and Cultural Factors 12

C. Ecology 13

III. Implementation 14

A. Organization and Administration 14

B. Components 15
1. Credit
2. Marketing
3. Inputs
4. Health and Nutrition

Page

IV. Issues 17

A. Distribution of Income
B. Participation

Appendix 19

Bicol River Basin Development Program 3

CADU 7

Comilla 11

Helmand-Arghandab Valley 14

INVIERNO 19

Kigoma 23

Lilongwe 28

Puebla 31

Vicos 34

Viniga 37

The purpose of this paper is to present a series of cases which exemplify the application of the integrated rural development (IRD) concept. IRD projects represent one approach to dealing with the complexities of rural poverty. The concept has received quite a bit of attention as can be seen from the readings noted on page 3. Although this paper begins with a discussion of the concept, its focus is on the experience with IRD projects in the field.

The essence of the paper is the ten cases set out in the appendix. To assist DSP participants in analyzing the cases and drawing the salient lessons from them, a series of questions is provided. Because of the constraints on the length of this paper, it was impossible to include all the information needed to answer each of the questions. The questions which are asterisked cannot be adequately answered on the basis of the appendix. They are included to point out the importance of the issues they raise. For those participants with a particular interest in IRD, additional readings are set aside in the library which provide the relevant information. (See the attached list of "Additional Readings.")

The recommended strategy for approaching this paper is to begin by reading the section which discusses the concept. Then I suggest quickly reading several of the cases before beginning to answer the questions. Answer the questions without asterisks on the basis of the appendix (as well as the readings in the library if you should have the time) and at least suggest some factors which would need to be considered in answering the asterisked questions.

Definition of the Concept

On the most abstract level, integrated rural development refers to an approach for dealing with "the ultimate cause of rural poverty (which is) lack of integration into the overall socio-political and economic system" (Kotter, p. 58). The theory of integrated rural development is that this lack of integration is too complex to be effectively dealt with by any single approach (such as the Green Revolution.) IRD coordinates various components which include a range of resources and services from a number of different sectors. These components are focused on the interrelationships between the constraints and limitations which constitute rural poverty.

For IRD programs this has meant that they are located in rural areas, with a local focus (and, to varying degrees, local participation and control); they are multi-sectoral in concept (although the projects often begin by concentrating on the agricultural sector and plan to add social service components over time); they are potentially self-sustaining, and there is an element of coordination among the implementing agents for the project." (DI p. 4).* The one element essential to the definition is that an IRD project includes components from more than one sector.

Practically speaking, this has meant integrated administration of development at the local level in such a way that the components of the different sectors reinforce one another.

Although, theoretically, one of the main issues concerns where the integration takes place (locally, regionally, nationally), the common conception is that it is a local level phenomenon. In addition, administrative integration is only one of a number of forms the integration can take. But on a practical level, administrative integration is the most readily grasped, and therefore, most often associated with the concept.

*"Development Information on Integrated Rural Development", full citation on next page.

The range of components which could be included in IRD projects is quite extensive. This is indicated by Table 1 (page 4) which suggests potential components and distinguishes between the different sectors.

The many issues and approaches can be seen from the headings to the groups of questions. They will be dealt with there. For further discussion of the theory, practice and probable shortcomings of IRD, see:

Coombs, Philip and Manzoor Ahmed, Attacking Rural Poverty, Chapter 7.

"Development Information on Integrated Rural Development", Office of Development Information and Utilization, Development Support Bureau, Agency for International Development, May 1978.

Johnston, Bruce F. "Food, Health and Population in Development".

Lele, Uma, "Designing Rural Development Programs: Lessons from Past Experience in Africa", for Presentation at the Second International Seminar on Change in Agriculture, Organized by the University of Reading and the Overseas Development Institute, Reading, England, September 9-19, 1974.

Ruttan, Vernon W., "Integrated Rural Development Programs: A Skeptical Perspective" in International Development Review, Vol. 4, 1975.

Table 1 - Components and Sectors of Rural Development

A. Components

1. Research, planning evaluation
2. Producing or importing new technical inputs suitable for rural areas (e.g., new fertilizers or hybrid seeds)
3. Rural support activities (except communication and education) e.g., cooperatives and credit institutions)
4. Communication/education support
5. Structural and infrastructure development (land reform incentives, administration reorganization)
6. Resource development (resettlement, irrigation, small industry)
7. Manpower development (technicians, managers, scientists)
8. Developing means for local participation
9. National policy and plan for rural development

B. Sector to be addressed

1. Agricultural (markets, credit, roads, seeds, fertilizers, production incentive, etc.)
2. Non-Agricultural Sectors
   a. Rural industry
   b. Rural public works
   c. Health services
   d. Family planning
   e. Nutrition
   f. Education

Source: A. T. Mosher, "Projects of Rural Development" -- modified.

I. Concept of Integration

(I suggest you read these questions now but answer them last)

A. Concept and Definition

Rural development projects can be integrated in a variety of ways. One means of approaching this is through the logical framework scheme. A program can be integrated on the level of the inputs, outputs, project purposes and program or sector goals. Draw an example from the cases for each of the levels and describe the nature of the integration.

Do each of the projects discussed include all the aspects of the definition discussed in the first section of this paper? i.e. location in rural area, local focus, local participation and control, multi-sectoral components, coordination, potential self-sustainability.

Puebla, for example, is not a multi-sector project. On what basis could it be called an IRD project?

*The point of integrated rural development projects is that the components should reinforce one another. Taking one project as an example, show how the components do reinforce each other.

What suggestions do you have to increase and strengthen this reinforcement? (A good way to approach this by thinking in terms of an interrelated system focusing on the linkages between the components).

Focus on the overall strategy of coordinating activities at the village level. Who should be involved? What are the benefits and constraints of their working together? Discuss this in terms of what its importance is in the planning and implementation stages and how it relates to participation.

1. Pilot Projects

Which projects, of those considered, can be classified as pilot projects?

What does this indicate about the size, staffing and cost of the project? Give examples.

Cadu and Kigoma are several of the pilot projects which were used as the basis for further projects. What factors led up to this? What modifications were made on the initial projects?

2. Self-Sustainability

The ability of a project to sustain itself rests on many factors. Two important factors are institutional development and economic viability. What part did these play in the projects?

What strategies were used to make these factors a part of the project?

What constraints were involved?

How large a role did foreign staff members play in the project? How does this affect the ability of the project to sustain itself? What means were used to address this issue? How successful were they? Discuss the Helmand Valley project in this respect. Analyze the efforts made to deal with this.

B. Strategy

1. Sequencing

The sequencing of the investments within the project is an important aspect of the strategy employed. This must be related to the goals and objectives of the project.

Distribution of Income and Participation:

Does the project intend to benefit the rural poor or just to generate substantial marketed surpluses?

Self-Sustainability:

Uma Lele suggests that for long run viability a few clear priorities should be established "such as increasing productivity, generating additional resources and equally important, augmenting indigenous institutional capability to undertake the more complex tasks of development over time". (Uma Lele, 1974, p. 25). Through this strategy, yields are increased which in turn can lead to increases in local incomes and revenues which support heavier investments such as infrastructure and a higher level of social services.

Compare the sequence of investment in the Lilongwe project with the sequence in the Kigoma Project. Relate this to the goals and objectives of the two and what their success was in obtaining these goals. Explain why.

2. <u>Concentration Inherent in IRD Strategy</u>

Most of these projects concentrated resources in relatively small geographical areas to the exclusion of other areas. What were the consequences of this concentration? Consider, for example, the political response to this strategy in the Vihiga Project.

3. High or Low Potential Area?

What strategy was used with respect to resource concentration? i.e. which project sites were in areas of high potential and which in areas of low potential? What factors affected the potential of an area? Compare the Lilongwe and Kigoma projects in terms of the potential of each area and how it affected the project.

4. Policy Environment

In what ways does the country's policy environment impact on the project?

*For example, does the country's price policy provide incentives to farmers to increase production?

Does the price policy benefit the city consumers to the detriment of rural producers?

5. Groups

Which projects worked through groups, collectives or cooperatives? Did the groups exist prior to the project or were they formed specifically for the project? What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of relying on groups? Consider this from the point of view of the farmers and the project staff.

Kigoma was based on the Ujamaa principle. What was their experience with collectivization?

INVIERNO intentionally left groups out of their strategy. Why? What were the effects of this?

6. One Crop

A number of projects emphasized production increases in one crop. Comparing the experiences of Lilongwe, CADU, Vihiga and Puebla which all concentrated on maize production, give the reasons for this concentration (intentional or defacto) as well as what problems were encountered. (See Uma Lele p. 49-50).

How did the concentration on potatoes as the most important crop effect the viability of the Vicos project? Could this have been avoided? If so, in what ways?

7. Level of Technology

What level of technology was used in the project? How did this relate to the manpower needs of the project? What level of skill was involved? Did this cause any significant changes in the number of people employed?

What role did research play in relation to the level of technology? What was the CADU experience with designing new farm implements? Will this affect the potential ability of the project to sustain itself?

8. Manpower Development

What constraints were imposed with respect to lack of manpower? Was there a lack of unskilled manpower? Was this more true at certain times than others? (for example, certain seasons)? Suggest some ways this constraint could be overcome and discuss their advantages and disadvantages.

Was the need for skilled manpower significant? In what areas? How did this constrain the achievement of project goals? What approaches were used in the project to address the issue of lack of skilled manpower? How successful were they? Why?

9. Evaluation and Feedback

The Puebla case states that evaluation was an integral part of that project. What types of evaluation were done? Analyze how it affected the project.

What other types of evaluation might have been done?
In situations as complex as development projects, a feedback mechanism can provide the information necessary for the evaluation and improvement of the project. What feedback mechanisms were employed in the projects? Discuss the credit barazas used in the Vihiga project and why they were useful.

II. Approaches

A. Political Variables

Did political policies and practices in the project's environment have a significant impact on the project? (See GAI pp XI 21-22 on CADU Puebla and Comilla). Was it planned for from the beginning? Compare CADU and Puebla in this regard noting how the political aspects affected the implementation and success of the projects.

1. Role of Central Government

What importance does a genuinely interested and responsive central government have for the success of a project? Compare and contrast Bicol, CADU, Kigoma and Vihiga.

* The Nicaraguan government, which does support INVIERNO, is concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families. What reasons might they have for supporting the program? Would these reasons indicate that support will be continued or not? What effects would this have on the INVIERNO program and how could these effects be dealt with?

2. Linkages with Local Government

To what extent is a project a part of the rural local government and to what extent is it autonomous? Compare, for example, Kigoma and Lilongwe.

Was the project intended to work with the local political structure or around it? Compare CADU and Cumilla. (See Tecle, "An Approach to Rural Development" pp. 101-102).

The CADU strategy was to bypass local institutions. What reasons are suggested in the CADU case as to why this may have been an appropriate strategy?

What additional reasons might you suggest? Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of having worked through CADU's local institution in terms of participation (whose?) and self-sustainability (how did it affect the prospects?)

Several projects, notably Bicol River and Helmand Valley, were formed around geophysical areas rather than political boundaries or social groupings. What were the benefits and constraints of this type of demarcation?

The Vicos project probably had the most autonomy of those considered. How did this affect the project's success and eventually its viability? In the early stages of the Kigoma project, local political leaders were not at all involved. Because of the strength of the political party in Tanzania, project officials were meeting with serious resistance. Analyze how they dealt with this, and what were the effects?

B. Social and Cultural Factors

How well were local social and cultural factors taken into consideration in designing the projects? What failures or successes that might not otherwise have occurred might this process have led to?

There is always the danger that the program will be dominated by landowners and larger cultivators. What are the social and cultural factors that lead to this? How can a project be organized to avoid this? Analyze CADU as an example.

In Vicos, the Cornell staff essentially assumed the position of "patron". How did this role fit into the traditional socio-cultural patterns at Vicos? What was its importance to the effectiveness of the Cornell staff?

*Compare the importance for the CADU and Puebla Projects of the socio-cultural factors considered in the background studies and what this meant for each project. (See GAI, page VI-20)

C. Ecology

These project sites are scattered around the world. What role did the ecology of the region play in the different projects? How effectively was it taken into consideration?

Water is a crucial resource in many parts of the world. In what projects did water play an important role? What affects did this have on the project?

It might be helpful to compare projects such as Bicol ad Lilongwe to see some of the differences between a project where water is a significant issue and a project where it is not. How did the water components tie in with the ecology of the region? What were the effects?

III. Implementation

A. Organization and Administration

What were some of the innovative approaches to organization and administration used in the projects? Were they notably successful or not? Analyze why or why not.

What kinds of administrative problems occurred? How might they have been anticipated and/or dealt with more effectively?

Analyze the organization of the Bicol Project with respect to which components they chose to address directly in the project and which they planned to coordinate. Suggest why the chose this approach considering its potential advantages and potential problems.

What interagency coordination problems occurred in the project? How were they dealth with? Could they have been better dealt with?

List the host government agencies which were involved, might have been involved and/or should have been involved in an IRD project. Explain why.

Suggest ways in which they might work together to lower costs and/or increase impact (e.g. rural health workers teaching in schools, etc.).

B. Components

1. Credit

Credit has been an important feature of many of the projects. Discuss why.

To what extent was the management of credit (i.e. the ease with which people could get credit) a factor in the utilization of credit?

Was credit subsidized? How did this affect the self-sustainability of the project? What were the advantages and disadvantages of subsidized credit?

What perceived constraints kept farmers from participating in credit programs?

One strategy of providing credit is to work through groups. Give an example of a project that worked through groups and an example of a project which did not. Compare them.

What is the relationship of the requirements of "creditworthiness" to the objective of equitable income distribution? Look, for example, at the Vihiga project and how the definition of "creditworthiness" changed over time and why.

2. Marketing

"Inadequate marketing and transport facilities, fragmented markets, and uneconomic and unpredictable prices are generally considered to be some of the major bottlenecks to rural development." (Uma Lele, p. 100).

How were the issues of marketing and transportation addressed in the CADU and INVIERNO projects? What constraints were they trying to overcome? How successful were they? Why?

The marketing components of CADU and Lilongwe are also tied to the concern about prices. What steps did they take? What were the advantages and disadvantages of these steps?

3. Inputs

Which projects aided farmers with the procurement of inputs? Was the assistance direct or indirect and what form did it take? Was it tied to credit? What were its benefits and drawbacks?

It is stated in the CADU case that in spite of the substantial increase in yields to be gained from new seeds, the actual production increases are due to credit, transportation and the intensive application of fertilizer. Why would this be the case?

4. Health and Nutrition

How extensively were health, nutrition and education taken into consideration in designing the project? How might failure to have considered them reduced the effectiveness of the project in achieving both production and quality of life goals?

*It has been suggested that health, nutrition and family planning are the three components that can be best integrated. In your opinion, why might this be the case - or why not?

IV. Issues

A. Distribution of Income

How was the project intended to affect the distribution of income among the people in the project area?

How did the project actually affect the income distribution? Consider the concept of "risk" in this discussion. Comparing Lilongwe and CADU offers some ideas on this.

B. Participation

How is participation a part of these IRD projects? What effects does it have?

What role did Ethiopians play in the planning of CADU and what effect did this have on the project?

How is participation a part of the Bicol River project?

What is the role of the traditional elite in this participation and how might it affect the project?

In Comilla and Kigoma, selected villagers were trained in agricultural practices rather than bringing in outside extension workers. What are the advantages of this kind of participation?

What are the disadvantages and constraints which would keep this practice from being adopted in more projects?

APPENDIX

The cases in the appendix reflect different stages in different projects. Accordingly, they reflect different amounts of available information. In some cases, it was difficult to nail down the facts. Unless you have direct knowledge of a case, assume the facts are correct. On the other hand, it is useful to question the assumptions and explanations of the analytic material.

	Dates of Project	Primary Sources of Outside Assistance	Country	AGRICULTURE RELATED COMPONENTS Credit	Extension	Marketing	Infrastructure	Inputs Supply	Health	Education	Family Planning	OTHER
Bicol River	1975-	AID	Philippines	*		*	x		Proposed w/Nutrition	* x	Proposed	Resettlement Tenure Reform
CADU	1967-	Swedish Int'l Development Agency	Ethiopia	x	x	x	x	x	*	x		Research Water
COMILLA	1959-1965	Ford Foundation	Bangladesh	x	Trained Selected Villagers	x	x	x		x	x	Research
Helmand Valley	1946-1974 1975-	AID (1952)	Afghanistan				x		x	x		Irrigation Research & Housing
INVIERNO	1975-	AID	Nicaragua	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	*	*Nutrition
Kigoma	1974-	World Bank UN	Tanzania	x	Trained Selected Villagers	x	x	x	x	x		Water Project Resettlement
Lilongwe	1968-1978	World Bank	Malawi	x	x	*	x	x	x	x		
Puebla	1967-1973	CYMMIT & Rockefeller	Mexico	*	x	*		*				Research Crop Insurance
Vicos	1952-1967	Cornell Univ.	Peru	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		Land Tenure
Vihiga	1970-1976	AID et al.	Kenya	x	x		x				x	Rural Industry

x = project provides these components
* = Project coordinates these inputs which come from outside sources.

Bicol River Basin Development Program

The Bicol River Basin Development Program is a cluster of projects within the Bicol River Basin, a geophysical area which does not coincide with any established political unit. It covers almost all of the Camarines Sur Province, most of Albay Province and parts of two other provinces in southern Luzon, Philippines. This area is economically depressed but, because of its resources, it has high potential - higher than its surrounding area.

The Bicol River Basin Development Program was created in May 1973 by an executive order which initiated the institutional development process. Presidential Decree No. 926 of April 28, 1978 declares the BRBDP an,

> "integrated area development program of the national government under the supervision and direction of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Integrated Rural Development Projects of the National Economic and Development Authority" (p. 1-2 of "Presidential Decree No. 926" in Project Paper, October 1976, Annex B).

The Decree also provided for a Bicol River Basin Development Program Office, under the supervision of the Cabinet Coordinating committee, which was responsible for coordinating and monitoring the planning and implementation of the projects in the Basin. It was composed of line agency regional directors and provincial directors as well as some of the local leadership.

21'

STRATEGY

The Project Paper states, "The BRBDP strategy is to build up the physical infrastructure, improve essential social services, improve land tenure arrangements, increase agricultural productivity (apparently concentrating on rice) and encouraging private investment in agribusiness and rural based industries." (PP. October 1976, p. 8).

The BRBDP strategy will be tested as an operational model of integrated rural development for the Philippines. However, each project must be economically viable on its own.

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

An essential component of the BRBDP strategy is the Area Development Program which has divided the Basin into geographic zones called Integrated Area Development units. These units are intended to encourage the decentralization of the organizational and coordinating structure and to maximize the potential for project participation. The management capability for the program is divided into a policy-making body called the Area Development Council and the project planning and implementing staff called the Area Development Team.

The Area Development Council, composed of political leaders, civic, business, religious, and farm representatives, and appropriate supervisors in the line agencies involved, is the main vehicle for drawing citizen's participation. The Area Development Team has the function of inter-agency integration of the planning and implementation of the various projects and is composed of the full-time government workers from the different line agencies who are engaged in their own sectoral activities.

COMPONENTS

Three of the ten Integrated Area Development units are funded by AID at a cost of about $3-5 million each. The activities included are 1) the construction and installation of major physical facilities such as installation of pumps, construction of pumphouses, construction of irrigation canals and a drainage canal system which would address the problems of flooding, construction of service roads and farm access paths, and the construction of a multi-purpose community building as well as the construction or relocation of elementary schools.

2) Organization of (a) compact farms composed of about 17 hectares of contiguous, irrigated land worked by about 10 farmers; (b) consolidation of fragmented agricultural land in conjunction with the presidentially decreed land tenure reform; (c) voluntary relocation to upgraded home sites; (d) Irrigator's Associations to operate and maintain each irrigation system; (e) and (f) Homemaker's Clubs and Rural Youth Clubs to facilitate project-related activities and as social focal points. The training components of the project are planned around these organizational efforts.

3) Applied Agricultural Research with the research project serving both as a demonstration farm for the farmers and a source of information for use by the extension agents.

Complementary activities planned for the project areas as part of the cluster of projects but not funded by AID include:

- agricultural credit

- a market provided by the National Grains Authority and Area Marketing Cooperatives,

- teachers for elementary schools supplied by the Department of Education and Culture,

- the Camarines Sur Electric Cooperative II will extend sufficient electric power into the area to drive all the pumps,

- the Bicol Secondary and Feeder Roads Project will provide the improved all-weather main access roads into the entire project area by FY 1979 (another AID project),

- the proposed Bicol Integrated Health, Nutrition and Population project will be approved and implemented,

- a six year participant training program to create a cadre of professional staff (part of an AID project).

CADU

The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) was established in the Chilalo awraja (area) of Ethiopia in 1967 by the Swedish International Development Authority. The original goals of the project were "to improve the ability of the local population to participate in and be responsible for the local administration and development effort and thereby improve the economic and social conditions in the area" (p. 189 SIDA). It was decided in the early stages of the project that small farmers would be the principal target population.

STRATEGY

The strategy employed came to be known as the "intensive package program" including "1) green revolution inputs, 2) adequate farm credits, 3) intensive educational programs, 4) individual farm plans, 5) improvements in local institutions, 6) assured agricultural prices, 7) reliable marketing facilities, 8) rural public works, and 9) coordination of all elements under a single authority" (p. 339 Cohen).

The project was planned as a pilot project from the beginning with its replication in mind. The majority of the background surveys and planning was done by SIDA with little Ethiopian input. The project was based on their study and understanding of the Comilla Project. However, the lack of Ethiopian input in the early stages was a serious deviation from the Comilla scheme.

COMPONENTS

The problems this led to are perhaps most noticeable in the program to develop farm implements. The new innovations were not necessarily more suitable for CADU farmers than the traditional implements. Although they tended to be more "efficient", they didn't seem to address the bottlenecks perceived by the farmers, certainly not enough to justify their cost compared to traditional implements. Perhaps, the serious problem with landowner and large cultivator domination of the benefits from the intensive agricultural extension program and the credit program could have been foreseen by Ethiopians in the planning stage. They might have made modifications on the extension strategy of using "model" farmers and demonstration plots which seemed to unintentionally benefit the wealthier farmers before it was implemented.

As CADU demonstrated that improved seed and the use of fertilizers could make agriculture profitable, the large landowners adopted the new practices. They turned to mechanization (which is encouraged by government policies), and evicted thousands of peasants. Although CADU had been aware that the land tenure system was a serious obstacle, they assumed that the external solution of tenancy legislation would take care of the situation. Because the government failed to put forth any kind of tenant security, CADU introduced temporary lease clauses to prevent eviction, at least during the period when tenants received credit from the program. (Footnote: However, the efficacy of these leases has been questioned. Uma Lele relates that "Cohen has indicated that when CADU had its lawyer attempt to enforce several leases, the project was charged with disrupting the community.)

The stringent requirements of the credit system also skewed credit towards better-off farmers and actually neglected the poorest farmers. When this was recognized the wealthier farmers were excluded from the credit program and the benefits of credit were redirected to the smaller farmers. However, it is thought that some of the smallest farmers continued to be excluded.

Research in crop production has focused primarily on variety and fertilizer trials. Although wheat varieties with an average yield 60% greater than local varieties, have been developed, the substantial production increases per acre are mainly due to credit, transport and the intensive application of fertilizer (Coombs and Ahmed p. 125).

Although substantial increases sound successful, massive surpluses were created in small regions in short periods without considering effective demand. The problems this caused for marketing is one indication of why CADU's marketing component operated at a loss. Other components included a livestock development program, road-building, water and health services.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

In spite of initial Swedish domination of the project, significant efforts were made to train Ethiopian staff. Through rapid advancement of those who did well, the Ethiopians attained positions as the superiors of the Swedes. Since the Swedish staff was willing to take the risk of making suggestions, this started an upward flow of information. Creating this development management capability was particularly important because the

CADU strategy involved bypassing local institutions. Given the confrontations with landowners over land leases and credit ceilings, the conflict with merchants in introducing standard weights and measures and the distrust and animosity of local officials, this strategy may have been the only possible way to have accomplished what they did in this hostile environment. The uphill battle to develop local institutions may have been too much (Uma Lele, 136).

MPP

In 1970, the Minimum Package Program was established to expand on the lessons from CADU (and WADU, a similar project) less expensively and using less trained manpower. The MPP strategy was for extension workers to reach farmers near an all-weather road with a 'package' of innovations. Model farmers and demonstration plots showed the potential of the new practices, marketing centers were established and credit was given in kind. Participation in decision making is a major concern and the program will become more comprehensive as components are added.

COMILLA

Perhaps the best-known and most studied case in development experience was developed at the Academy for Rural Development in Comilla, Bangladesh using Comilla Thana (district) as an "experimental laboratory." Akhter Hameed Khan, the program's director for the first twelve years, recently delineated four concepts that have come to be identified with the Comilla approach:

1) Establishment of a training and development center in every thana (TTDC).

2) A road drainage embankment - works program in every thana (RWP).

3) A decentralized, small scale irrigation program in every thana (TIP).

4) And a two-tiered cooperative system in every thana (TCCA)" (Khan 1977, page 7).

These concepts grew out of the project's goals and the initial experimentation and systematic study of local circumstances. Early study included conferences with successful farmers, teachers, workers from an earlier development program, officers of the cooperatives, artisans and others. The goal of the project, based on a broad view of development with a thorough familiarity of the local area, was the comprehensive development of the thana including the modernization of agriculture and the improvement of the life of the rural people. The strategy was two-pronged: 1) work with groups of farmers through an organization of their own by supplying farmers with new material, knowledge, skills, and the training to use them and 2) making government

more responsive to the needs of rural people -- locally through coordination, and by making the government agencies at the national level capable of serving the villagers in an effective manner.

A major approach to carrying out this strategy was the two-tiered cooperative which included a village level cooperative for planning and training, and a federation at the thana level for credit and other supervision. The cooperatives supply loans and agricultural inputs to farmers making use of new technologies appropriate to the area and to the available resources. The companion approach to the strategy was the Thana Training and Development Center which emphasized the necessity of complete coordination of the nation-building agencies and the local institutions and leaders. Several significant aspects of the concept include having one location for the nation-building department offices in the thana, and a small research and experimental farm; an effectively functioning thana council including elected representatives and representatives of the nation-building department; a training center for adult and farmer training classes; as well as the central cooperative association. Out of the pilot activities of the TTDC came the thana-level Rural Public Works Program (concept 2) and the Thana Irrigation Program (concept 3).

These two latter programs together with the Thana Training and Development Center and the two-tiered cooperative system were designed to address the three constraints to development identified by the Academy, i.e. the high risks of flood and drought, social anarchy, and small holdings. The risk of flood was lessened by clearing canals and building embankments and roads. Irrigation was widely introduced. Thana councils

and cooperatives gained strength and became significant.

Several other programs worthy of note were the Rural Education Program, and the Women's Program and Family Planning. These social service programs focused on improving the lives of rural people.

Comilla has been called one of the most successful projects undertaken. By 1968, Comilla had become an area of surplus food production, while in 1960, it was highly deficit. The project was organized in a way that combined rural services of distant government agencies into a more cohesive and effective package as well as opening up a 2-way channel of communication between villagers and outside sources of knowledge. This gave local people and local-level public administration a larger voice and practical role in rural development.

Nevertheless, even Comilla is not an unqualified success. Only about half of the eligible farmers either joined cooperatives or benefited directly from training programs. Rich farmers tended to benefit more than poor farmers. The monetary and human resources expended on Comilla were large enough to seriously limit the potential replicability for the rest of Bangladesh.

HELMAND-ARGHANDAB VALLEY

"What was once supposedly the 'bread basket' of Central Asia was by the 20th century vast barren or scantily vegetated lands affected to varying degrees by salts, alkaline, groundwater and erosion" (p. 1, 1973).

This describes the setting for the Helmand-Arghandab Valley project (HAV) in Afghanistan. In the early 1900's, the Afghans began developing parts of an old canal system in the valley contracting for technical assistance from the Germans and Japanese in the 1930's. When World War II interrupted this program, the Afghans continued the irrigation work on their own revising the plans somewhat. Foreign exchange accumulated during the war was used to contract the Idaho firm of Morrison-Knudsen Company. Morrison-Knudsen concentrated almost solely on the technical aspects of the project, ignoring questions of who would settle the reclaimed land and how; who would control water distribution; who would pay for the water? Depletion of foreign exchange reserves by 1949 caused the necessity of a loan from the Export-Import Bank.

To facilitate development in the region, Parliament created an autonomous Helmand Valley Authority (later superseded by the Helmand-Arghandab Valley Authority - HAVA) to administer the project including the processing of settler applications, the determination of plot sizes, and the location of farms and villages. Other components of an integrated rural development project were included such as helping the settlers construct their homes and prepare their land, and teaching improved cropping and water use practices.

This same year, 1952, the U. S. (ICA/AID) began a program of assistance for the economic development of the Helmand-Arghandab Valley. Having had as many as 11 projects at one time, they were merged into the "umbrella" project called Helmand-Arghandab Valley Regional Development Program in 1963. It's goal was to develop the agricultural capability and to implement water resource programs.

V. A. Noory and O. Nervik in Report on Field Trip to Helmand Valley (Robert R. Nathan Associates/Afghanistan) summarized the project by saying,

> "In the early stages of the Helmand Valley project, they observed, the emphasis was on construction activites. Later, as serious salinity conditions developed in Nad-i-Ali and Marja, major effort was devoted to solving these. Under these conditions it is understandable that little time was left either for considering the removal of other constraints, nor the changing nature of the project and problems. For HAVA, which had begun as an agency to expedite the settlement program, had become by the mid-1960's an agency that coordinated utilities, education, agricultural research and extension, housing, health and industrial enterprises.
>
> As the responsibilities of the HAVA grew, the administrative problems were further aggravated by the involvement of three major decision-making bodies in the project, the foreign sponsor represented by USAID, the Royal Government of Afghanistan (RGA), and the regional Afghan development authority, the HAVA. The lines of communication and authority between the three often became blurred, and the project goals never quite became definite."

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

"Without question, there have been remarkable gains in the Valley. The basic infrastructure is now largely in place -- roads, dams, canals and diversions exist in what was formerly empty desert. A large number of farmers have been exposed to, and have demonstrated their willingness to adopt farming practices which increase their production, their well-being and the well-being of the nation. The Valley has now been brought

to a developmental stage where, with a well-thought-out program, effectively implemented and administered, future expenditures would yield quick and attractive returns. The benefits are not all in the future, however, they are clearly visible here and now."

Excerpt from 12/73 USAID/Afghanistan
Paper, prepared for Minister of Agriculture,
on Success and Problems of Helmand Development

1) Physical infrastructure: 2 major dams; 3 diversion dams; 311 km canals; 354 km laterals and sub-laterals; 1,117 km drains; 2,321 km project and interproject roads; 381,000 acres under irrigation vs. 180,000 in 1950.

2) 325 Afghan participants trained (376 man-years).

3) Wheat production increased from 32,000 tons in 1956 to 170,000 in 1974.

4) Summer crops increased from 34,000 (68) 185,000 acres (74).

5) Production of cash crops totalling 123,000 acres (1974).

6) About 65% of wheat acreage in High Yielding Varieties.

7) Increase in double cropping (34,000 acres in 71/72).

8) Rapid cotton production increases 74/75.

9) Creation of HAVA research and extension staff.

10) Creation of Agriculture Credit Agency.

PROBLEMS

1) Due perhaps to the emphasis on technical accomplishments, HAVA seems to have paid too little attention to the people it was created to serve. For example, in the early 1950's the government was forcing different ethnic groups to live in the same village (1973, p. 19). Moreover, Stamberg indicates the ethnic diversity increased among the more recent settlers.

2) Problems of control and authority span several levels of government

a) the project area involves two provinces, each of which has a government-appointed Governor. The Governor of Helmand Province has generally (but not always) served as the President of HAVA also. The Provincial Governors must authorize the services performed by HAVA in their provinces.

b) The Central Government in Kabul exercises budgetary and policy control over HAVA through the Ministry of Planning in addition to the control the technical ministries have in their own areas. Policies affecting HAVA relate to taxes, personnel, import/export duties, water management policy, credit and cooperatives.

3) For many years, approximately 20% of total Government expenditures went to the Helmand Valley. This caused significant serious concern and criticism from the other regions and by 1974, the percentage had dropped greatly.

The AID program to the Helmand Valley was terminated in 1974.

1. AID has just painfully extracted itself from the Helmand-Arghandab after 20 years.

2. The basis for our extraction was:

   a. We were dealing in the projects mainly with technical problems and only secondarily with cultural-institutional problems. But the latter we discovered, in the Afghan context, seriously undermine the efficiency and ultimate cost/effectivness of any investments in irrigation.

   b. We could not get the Afghans to shift from continued expansion of the irrigation system to improvement of the existing systems.

   c. We could not get the Afghans to address questions of self-sufficiency <u>in any degree</u>, not even a start.

   d. We could get the stress laid on water use and management where a major part of the problem really is.

   e. We could not get any significant attention addressed to high-value agricultural crop productivity in the Valley.

Excerpt from 3/75 Memo of NESA Bureau Chief of Program Planning & Evaluation Staff on "Implication of Project Paper Review and Approval for Central Helmand Drainage Project".

By April 1975, USAID/Afghanistan was proposing a new three phase project for drainage in the Central Helmand area. Because of the obviously deteriorating conditions of the inadequately drained land, the Afghan Government's priorities changed and they became concerned about upgrading the drainage system. The project was cautiously proposed in three phases. Phase I was relatively successful and the project moved into Phase II. To augment the administrative capacity of the Afghanistan Government, a project for Development Support Training was begun in 1978.

INVIERNO

INVIERNO, which stands for Instituto de Bienestar Campesino, was created by the Government of Nicaragua as a semi-autonomous institution inteded to help the rural poor by acting as the interface between the people, and the rural development programs and services provided by the government. It is a major part of a larger rural development program. Although initially it was implemented in two regions, it is expected to later expand to cover the whole country, ultimately benefitting the majority of the poor people living in Nicaragua's rural areas.

The goal of INVIERNO is

> "to promote the social and economic progress of the rural sector, allowing its population a sustained and continuous integrated improvement, with the aim of attaining a more effective participation of this population in the economic, social, cultural and political life of the nation." (from the Ley Creadora del Instituto de Bienestar Campesino in Brown, p. 9).

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

INVIERNO was carefully planned and implemented with many of its staff being drawn from the Harvard Business School and INCAE, Harvard's Managua counterpart. However, no campesinos were involved in the planning stage of the program. The Staff Report to Congress on INVIERNO stated,

"In what amounts to a small miracle of organization and logistics for a less developed country, the credit, the inputs, and the other services are generally being furnished to the right people in the right places and, even more unusual, at the right times." (p. 16 Staff Report).

The Report indicates that INVIERNO is so far working impressively - largely due to the efficiency of the management. However, this does result in a lack of flexibility, extension workers reportedly spending most of their time filling out forms, and no opportunity to benefit from the creativity and individuality of the staff. Although the organization is new and the personnel inexperienced, the balance between tight control and flexibility should be carefully considered in future planning.

COMPONENTS

The initial package of services included agricultural production credit, agricultural inputs, technical assistance and marketing services. These were chosen because they could be quickly implemented for the earliest effect on increased agricultural production and small farmer income. The INVIERNO strategy is to bring all services to the village relying on a computer for organization; and limiting villages involved to communities of 25 to 300 families that are accessible by an all-weather access road. When INVIERNO is going to start operations in a village, a farmer is recruited to allow a demonstration on about an acre of his land. The demonstrations have generally been enough to convince some farmers in each village to buy fertilizer and other inputs on credit.

Eligibility for credit requires that the farmer has lived in the area for a minimum of two years, has an average family income less than the national average (about $700) and is able to control some land. In spite of the high upper limit, most participants are far below it. Those rejected may participate in other INVIERNO activities such as buying

INVIERNO inputs and joining technical assistance groups.

Farmers accepted to the credit program have a five-year line of credit regardless of fluctuations in yield. If bad weather causes a poor harvest, the post-harvest payment is reduced but made up following good harvest.

Interest on INVIERNO credit is 18% a year, which approximately covers the program's costs. In addition to the loan, the farmer has the convenience of carrying out all transactions in the village, being able to market without leaving the village and having all inputs delivered to the village. Since the interest rate is a little higher than the normal bank rate, the potential temptation of diverting INVIERNO funds to larger farmers and others who are eligible for normal bank loans is minimized.

Extension services are provided throughout the growing season by agents who are young graduates of agricultural schools. They visit the villages once or twice a week to arrange for delivery of credit and inputs, to schedule meetings, to oversee demonstration plots, to provide advice, to assist in marketing, to collect crop information, as well as other related services.

After the harvest, INVIERNO provides marketing services by arranging sales to private buyers, supplying information on prices and a weighing service to ensure honesty. If a private sale cannot be arranged above the official support price, INVIERNO buys the product and transports it to a government storage facility, paying the farmer the support price less the cost of transportation (Footnote: The sections on credit, extensions and marketing rely heavily on the Staff Report - pages 12-13).

STRATEGY

One significant departure from the original plan is that the original emphasis on working through groups has been dropped. Formerly, it had been thought that the only way to provide credit to small farmers at a reasonable cost was through some kind of group. But the ability of the computerized system to actually handle the individual loans and the time that would have been needed to form the groups prompted the decision to begin the credit program without groups. This probably also affected the decision to substitute INVIERNO extension agents for local campesino group leaders.

These campesino leaders, chosen by their community and trained by INVIERNO, would have dealt with INVIERNO on credit matters and with individual farmers on technical farming matters. But now INVIERNO chooses the leader from community nominees, gives them only three days of training but does not give them much to do.

KIGOMA

In the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the Government of Tanzania proclaimed a development strategy concentrating on rural development. The vehicle of the strategy was the Ujamaa village which provided economies of scale in delivering improved agricultural techniques and inputs, as well as social services.

Strategy

To facilitate this rural development strategy, the Government decentralized the responsibility for planning and implementing development projects to regional administrations in 1972. The Kigoma Region, one of the most remote and underdeveloped parts of Tanzania, has received assistance from the World Bank. It is interesting to note the incremental nature of the project. Project activities were first initiated in a fairly small number of villages which local officials had identified as having the highest potential. Using the lessons learned in these villages, the project is expanding to other areas.

In accordance with the goals of the Arusha Declaration, the goal of the regional administration in Kigoma is to improve living standards aiming to reach half the population in the region. The target was to double their annual per capita income.

During the first half of the 1970's, the Government made far-reaching program efforts to resettle the country's rural population into villages, but it was not until 1975 that the Village and Ujamaa Villages Act was instituted. This act laid down the legislative basis and delineated pro-

cedures for these new villages. The objectives of this program were to provide basic services in education, water supply, and rudimentary health care more efficiently and effectively, thereby increasing rural productivity and welfare. In effect, all components of the project were aimed at increasing production of maize, beans, cotton and groundnuts as well as fish. The political objective was to improve the lives of the people through the principles of self-reliance and community development.

Although the villages were originally intended to farm as collective units, the slow progress in resettlement prompted the government to shift the mode of farming to block farming. This style of farming combines the principles of collective and private ownership. While every family farms its own plot, each crop is planted in a section of the plot which adjoins the same crop in neighboring plots in order to make the most efficient use of machinery, pesticides and fertilizers.

Components

Due to the virtual lack of research and trials work carried out in Kigoma prior to the project, a full range of field trials was required to adequately determine what inputs and practices would be successful in the area. The Agricultural Trials and Training Center was established for this purpose.

Although a regional extension program was originally planned, it was replaced with a training program for people in the villages. Each participating village chooses one of its members as the agricultural assistant who goes to the rural center for training.

The credit component was included in the project to help make the recommended practices available to small farmers, and to help the villages with the cost of the construction of productive infrastructure (such as godowns and maize mills).

As noted, the social services component of the project have their production increasing aspects as well. A major motivation for the water program was to make water more accessible thus allowing women to use more productively the considerable amount of time which was previously devoted to carrying water. The education component focused on improving primary schools in the villages with the emphasis on farming, carpentry, masonry, etc. The project provided the inputs and the villagers built the classrooms themselves.

Rural health centers and dispensaries were built in Ujamaa villages to attract villagers. The services provided concentrated on preventive health care and improved health services in a way which the villagers could pay for themselves.

Organization and Administration

The provision of inputs and credit and the collection of marketed output was to have been the responsibility of the already existing Kigoma Cooperative Union, a somewhat problem laden organization. Perhaps because of its problems, the government decided to dissolve the Union in 1974, just as World Bank input was to have begun. This, of course, necessitated the reorganization of the project.

Responsibility for marketing, input delivery and credit were reassigned to the Kigoma Regional Administration, the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank and the National Milling Corporation and the Tanzanian Cotton Authority. The Project Management Executive, made up of the project staff was created in the Kigoma Regional Administration under the Regional Development Director. The Director heads the rural development effort and controls all the civil servants in the region.

This reorganization brought regional officials directly into the project but initially ignored the political leaders from the TANU hierarchy. As Tanzania's political party is unusually strong, project officials met with serious resistance. This was recognized and brought to the attention of the regional commissioner, the highest official in the region. He then called a meeting of political leaders from all levels to involve them in the project and enlist their support. This provided another link for communicating with the people. It established a channel for 'sending' them information as well as a good source of feedback to the project.

Replicability

With the usual difficulties of procurring construction materials, inputs, transportation, etc., the Kigoma project is somewhat behind schedule. Nonetheless, it has provided relevant experience with the IRD approach. The lessons from this experience are being incorporated in another World Bank assisted project in the Mwanza and Shinyanga regions of Tanzania. The World Bank "Staff Appraisal Report" on Mwanza and Shinyanga

states that

> "Among the main lessons from the Kigoma project are the crucial need for verification trials of technical packages at village level; for ongoing training; technical assistance and institution building to strengthen limited implementation capacity; for integration of project management into existing regional institutions; for modest production targets; and for active village participation and mobilization." p. 4

LILONGWE

The Lilongwe Land Development Program is a focal point in Malawi's large-scale project approach to rural development. The goal of this three-phase project is to increase agricultural production as well as raise the farmer's income. About 10% of Malawi's rural population live in areas covered by the four current projects.

The project is being carried out by a specially established section of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Its aims to raise productivity in maize, groundnuts and tobacco, both to satisfy the needs for staple foods of a growing population and for export. The strategy employed in LLDP is to concentrate a range of infrastructure facilities and improved farmer services on small-holders in a region of high agricultural potential which also contains the country's main agricultural research and training facilities.

The components begun in Phase I and carried on thereafter included:

1) Land development including construction and maintenance of crop extraction roads, drainage ditches and boreholes equipped with hand-operated pumps.

2) Aerial photography, map preparation and surveying for the voluntary land reorganization.

3) Construction and equipping permanent markets and crop storage facilities -- All marketing and storage responsibilities are handled by the Agricultural Development Corporation. This separate organization with its own goals has frequently come into conflict with LLDP.

46

4) Seasonal credit, input supply and medium term credit, with a 10% interest rate, for purchasing farm equipment such as ox-carts and maize mills -- Although the seasonal credit carried no interest charge, farmers who bought inputs relying on seasonal credit were charged price mark-ups to psy for administrative costs. Farmers are being encouraged to join credit groups which receive credit with a much smaller mark-up because of the lower administrative costs of dealing with groups.

5) Extension and staff training -- the extension officers could draw on transportation resources as well as the project's own staff training center which offered a variety of courses at all levels.

Under Phase II, a livestock development scheme was added, and a health services component was added in Phase III.

Organization and Administration

One aim in the administration of the project was to fill all positions in the extension service with Malawians. Hiring qualified Malawians was difficult because of the requirement that they follow normal government regulations for salary and promotion. Both salary and promotion were tied to time served, having no relation to merit or ability.

By supporting and expanding the local training facilities and recruiting their graduates, the extension staff was completely Malawianized by Phase III. Another tactic used in Phase II was to make Malawian management trainees understudies to the Project Manager, Financial Controller, etc.

Issues

In spite of the goal of diversification of crops, the farmers chose to concentrate on increasing production of maize "leading to substantial increases in marketable surpluses." (Uma Lele, p. 48). Yields and hectarage of groundnuts were expected to significantly increase but instead their yields declined and were substantially lower than yields outside the project area. This heavy concentration on maize production caused problems in marketing and maintaining the necessary price incentive. The GAI study suggests that this imbalance arose due to the farmers' preference for maize both because it is a staple crop and because maize yields could be increased with less effort than groundnuts. Uma Lele refers to complex economic and agronomic factors as well.

Because of restrictions on exporting tobacco, the project aim was not to increase its production, but to increase its yield in order to permit diversification of hectarage to other crops. However, as we have noted, small farmers were concentrating on production of maize in spite of the fact that the gross return per hectare of tobacco is three times that of maize.

> "Given that tobacco growers tend to have holdings that are far above average in size, these returns result in disparities in incomes of up to 300% between tobacco growers and non-tobacco growers...Only 30% of the farmers in the current program area sell tobacco for 11% of the cropped hectarage. The distribution of incomes is, therefore, highly skewed in favor of this group." (Uma Lele, p. 54).

Uma Lele also suggests that profits made by ADMARK (the government marketing board) on the marketing of the small holders' maize were invested in large scale commercial enterprises substantially redistributing income from small scale maize farmers to traditional commercial farmers (p. 182).

48

PUEBLA

The Puebla Project, begun in 1967 in conjunction with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CYMMIT) in the Puebla region of Mexico, was designed as a pilot project. The goals were to improve income and nutrition in the area by increasing the maize yield of small subsistence farmers who used traditional methods in a relatively low potential region.

Components

The Puebla Project grew out of the concern of CYMMIT researchers about the low adoption rate of improved technology by small subsistence farmers. This accounts for the target group, the importance of research and evaluation, as well as the experimental nature of the project. The results of seven years of research conducted at carefully located sites on farmers fields were sixteen separate production systems defined on the basis of difference in soil, elevation, previous crop and planting data.

It was assumed that for the farmers to implement the appropriate strategy involving the use of nitrogen and phosphorous, plant density, weeding and planting practices, access to credit was necessary. The staff helped coordinate credit activities initially relying on a private fertilizer dealer and then later expanding to other sources.

As a prerequisite for receiving credit, the farmers were organized into local credit groups in order to provide group pressure for repayment, and also to facilitate the spreading of information on new practices.

The key-stone of the dessemination of information was the demonstration plot. Initially there were 103 farmers with plots from 0.25-1.0 ha following the tested recommendations under the supervision of a technical assistance agent. At harvest time, the farmers' neighbors were invited for field demonstrations hosted by the farmer. From the outset, the farmer procured the inputs for the plot from existing commercial sources. He paid for them hinself relying on existing sources of credit but getting advice and assistance from the agent. This procedure tested farmer interest as well as the existing channels for credit. (Blume, p. 8).

Evaluation has been an integral part of the project since the benchmark survey was carried out in 1967. Additional evaluations based on sample surveys of the region's project participants and non-participants were carried out in 1971 and 1975. The evaluations allowed the staff to recognize and substantiate accomplishments and deficiencies.

This was likely to have contributed to the flexibility of the project. It was recognized that the local criolla varieties of maize were most suitable to the areas and therefore, the search for higher yielding varieties was eventually abandoned. Research was begun on a technology for using beans as well as maize when it was recognized that this farmer request had a valid economic basis. As progress was evaluated, the experimental design was changed accordingly.

Selected data collected by the evaluation staff indicates the success of the project.

"In 1967, total farm family income of the region's small-holders averaged $667. A general sample survey conducted in 1970 (including farmers on credit lists and those who were not) revealed that farm family income, adjusted to 1967 prices, had increased to $825, a change of 23.8 percent. In terms of value, crop earnings for the average family had grown from $202 to $293 per year, an increase of 45 percent. However, considering only those families on credit lists, income from crop production averaged $400, a 98 percent increase. These figures suggest a substantial benefit flow accruing to project participants, but equally important, they would indicate that non-participants have also benefitted -- most likely by a slow diffusion and imitation of Puebla-generated technology between those farmers using credit and those who do not." (Development Alternatives, p. J12-J13).

The Puebla staff does not feel that the project has reached enough farmers although it went from 103 farmers to 5200 farmers in 1971. It has been suggested by Don Winkelman that this is because the staff defines "participation" as only those farmers who are members of a credit group. As the suggested practices are only a little more expensive than the traditional technology, a number of farmers not in the credit program are adopting a new technology.

VICOS

In 1952, the Vicos Project (also called the Cornell Peru Project) was initiated by Professor Allan Holmberg of the Anthropology Department at Cornell University. Holmberg arranged with the Institute Indigenista Peruana for Cornell and IIP to jointly rent Hacienda Vicos in an inter-Andean Valley. The Cornell staff had the unique opportunity to be the agents, as well as the students, of change.

The Cornell staff came to Vicos as the "patron" which put them in a good position to make some initial changes. Apparently, the one thing most resented by the people of Vicos was the obligation to provide free service to the hacienda (as cooks, shepherds, etc.). This practice was promptly abolished. On the other hand, the obligation to work three days per week on the hacienda, which they seemed to find less objectionable, was retained. This gave the Cornell staff the opportunity to introduce new practices, (use of fertilizer, good seed, pesticides, proper row spacing, etc.) as well as generate new investment capital. This capital was put back into the hacienda not only to promote further agricultural productivity but also to construct health and education facilities.

The Cornell staff had to persuade the Vicosinos to use these innovations on their own plots. They provided seed, fertilizer and insecticides but charged enough to convince the Vicosinos that they were serious. One staff member spent most of his time during the entire first season visiting the farmers who had accepted the new practices for their own plots. In subsequent years, more and more farmers accepted the new

practices until about one-fourth of the families had increased their production to the point where they were selling on the national market.

As Professor Holmberg relates,

> "In October 1956, democratically, by a direct vote of all its adult citizens, the people of Vicos elected their own delegates to assume the direction and management of community and hacienda affairs. Since that time, the peon system of obligatory labor has been abolished and the Vicosinos now pay taxes on their land." p. 545 Holmberg 1971.

The following year, the Vicosinos took over the lease and they continued to make a profit for the next six years. The role of the Cornell staff was only an advisory one throughout this period. In 1962, the community of Vicos made the first down payment and by 1965, the land had been completely paid for.

Starting in 1969, a series of disasters struck the community. It began with a potato blight and a government quarantine on all market sales. Since potatoes were the mainstay of the Vicos cash economy, this was a serious blow to the community's commercial viability. This was followed the next year by a terrible earthquake which not only destroyed much of the "social and productive infrastructure" but the community morale as well.

The final blow came when the Ministry of Agriculture persuaded the Vicosinos to take out a dairy cattle loan but then delivered very poor quality animals. By voting, the community decided to return the cows and, therefore, had to default on the loan. Not only did this destroy their credit rating but, because they had grown a year's supply of cattle forage, they lost their food crop as well.

The Development Alternatives case study of Vicos characterized the community in 1975 as

> "a society beset with hostility, apathy and despair. It is racked by internal dissention. Innumerable vestiges of its once progressive social services and productive capital have fallen into decay and disuse. Most incredible of all, Vicos had largely shut itself off from the outside world and had reverted back to an exclusively subsistence agrarian economy." p. 1-3.

Based on his experience at Vicos, Holmberg has said,

> "The transition from less-than-subsistence to surplus production for the commercial market can be made within a few years by enlightening the farmers themselves, by providing serfs with increased incentives to produce in their own interest, and by land tenure reforms that convert them into peasants." p. 410 Holmberg in Wharton.

These constitute substantial breakthroughs at an early stage of the development effort. However, the uniqueness of Vicos becomes apparent when one considers the problems which have arisen with these three concepts in other development projects. The Cornell staff's ability to enlighten farmers (which I take to mean two things: 1) teaching the farmers that they can change their lives and 2) giving them the knowledge and skills by which to do so) was greatly affected by their position as patron. The control this afforded them also put them in a very good position to provide certain incentives with a minimum need to consider external factors. The ability to actually control the reform of land tenure practices may have been the most unique aspect of the project.

VIHIGA

The Vihiga Division of the Western Province in Kenya was chosen as one region in which to begin experimenting with the Kenya Government's Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP). The purpose of SRDP was to test new methods and approaches to rural development and to provide an operational milieu for developing a rural development management system and staff. The ultimate goal was the development of a broad national capability to formulate and execute rural development.

Strategy

SRDP was formulated and directed at the national level, and organized at the division level working through the line ministries to do things for the rural poor not with them. At an early stage, the Kenya government became disillusioned with SRDP and shifted their support and resources to district level development.

Although some 26 specific activities were planned for Vihiga, the Maize Credit Program distinctly overshadowed the others in the early years. (GAI p. IX-57 and Uma Lele, p. 146.) The aim of the program was:

> "To raise the level of production of maize in Vihiga so as to make the area self-sufficient in this crop, with a particular emphasis on assisting small holders to raise their standard of living." ("Second Overall Evaluation" p. 7-10).

Serious criticism was directed at the emphasis on maize alone. Vihiga is a diverse area in terms of ecology, population and cropping patterns. Questions have been raised about the appropriateness of reaching 'self-sufficiency' in just one crop and, if so, if maize was the appropriate choice; about maize's suitability for poorer and less skilled farmers; about the narrow concentration on tied credit as the appropriate strategy and about the shortages of labor at peak periods. According to several sources (Hay & Hayer, Uma Lele and GAI), it was the AID influence that led to the emphasis on maize, and that their replanning showed more concern for a successful project than for the experimental aspects of the Special Rural Development Programme. Harmon and Zalla attribute this to AID's lack of administrative guidance and organization at early stages of the project.

Components

The original proposal was for a maize production program supported by crop demonstrations, fertilizer test plots and extension advice on better crop practices intended to reach all farmers. It was estimated that as many as 3/4 of the farmers needed credit to participate in the maize production program.

However, when the program was started, it was apparently an AID decision that 'creditworthiness' rather than need would become the primary selection criterion. Of the 600 randomly chosen farmers originally surveyed to obtain baseline data, the requirements that the loan recipients grow two acres of maize and be creditworthy, eliminated all but 54 farmers.

Others were sought, and ultimately 63 received interest free loans. In succeeding years the number of loans increased but conditions varied.

Numbers of loans, repayment rates and conditions, 1971-1974

Year	No. of Loans	Total K. shs.	Repayment*	Conditions
1971	63	17,062	82.0%	Min. 2 acres, creditworthiness
1972	323	73,551	65.6%	Same as 1971 plus 10% interest
1973	920	248,557	27.6%	2% penalty interest rate; min. 1 acre; creditworthiness dropped
1974	320	84,048	approx. 20.0%	varied experimentally

*Repayment - volume of money recovered as percentage of total sume lent.

Because of falling repayment rates, an experiment was initiated to find ways of encouraging repayment without changing the terms of the loan. This experimental approach conformed more to the spirit of SRDP.

Since some SRDP personnel thought the repayment rate was low because the farmers confused loans with gifts, credit barazas (seminars) were held. The credit barazas were structured so that officials could encourage loan repayment but also so that farmers could discuss the program and their particular problems. This format led to significant interest in the meetings.

There were several other programs of some significance in the Vihiga project, as well. The system for building labor intensive roads is considered one of the highlights of the project. The intensive family planning program was based on providing greater coverage through more family planning clinics. The "Second Overall Evaluation" suggests that although it is too early to establish a substantial impact, the family planning program should not be abandoned but the program might gain considerably by a reformulation involving health and nutrition.

The pilot project for small rural businesses was started by a service foundation called Partnership for Productivity with the intent of giving loans and advice to individual business and promoting handicraft production. They are still in a very early experimental stage but so far their impact has not been cost effective or well integrated with other programs in the area. Their proposed "bicycle brigades" of junior business consultants has the potential to reach many clients. However, due to their youth and lack of experience, they have not been readily accepted.

The tea credit component which allowed farmers to grow tea by covering the initial costs has, in part, been incorporated in a loan program by the Kenya Tea Development Authority. Although initially the tea credit program did not receive as much emphasis as the maize credit program, the former was continued when the latter was recommended to be phased out in 1975. It was indicated at this time that further analysis showed that credit was not actually a constraint faced by the farmers. It was expected that small holder agricultural production would be increased through revisions of the extension and cattle dip programs and by adding a crop demonstration program.

SIGNIFICANT CASES IN INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

Additional Readings Available in PS&CD Library

Prepared by

Cynthia Clapp

Development Studies Program

Bicol River Basin Development

Lynch, Frank, "Bicol River Basin Case Study", Draft, March 1977. Bicol River Basin Development Project. Teaching case study incorporating a variety of other materials.

Rondinelli, Dennis A., Bicol River Basin Urban Functions in Rural Development Project: Summary and Evaluations, Office of Urban Development, Development Support Bureau, AID, March 1978.

CADU

CADU, "The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit - A Brief Description". A paper prepared for the Development from Below Workshop, October 12-20, 1973, Addis Ababa, by C.A.D.U. during October 1973.

Cohen, John M., "Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small-scale Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia", in the Journal of Developing Areas, volume 9, April, 1975.

Neckby, Bengt, CADU: An Ethiopian Experiment in Developing Peasant Farming, Prisma Publishers, Stockholm, 1971. CADU. Good basic source for project description in its first phase.

Comilla Project

Khan, Akhter Hameed, Comilla Revisited, May-June 1977, unpublished paper, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, Lansing, 1977.

Kline, David and Robert P. Worrell, "The Comilla Project", Communication and Education for Rural Development; A Professional Development Module, East-West Center, East-West Communication Institute, Honolulu, 1977.

Rahim, Syed A., "The Comilla Program in East Pakistan" in Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1970.

Stevens, Robert D., "Comilla Rural Development Program to 1971", in Robert D. Stevens, et al., editors, Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, East-West Center, University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976.

Helmand-Arghandab Valleyy Project

AID, Project Paper, Afghanistan Central Helmand Drainage (Phase II) (1977).

Baron, A. R., General Background Paper on Development in the Helmand-Arghandab Valley in Southwest Afghanistan, April 27, 1971.

Stamberg, Lou, Helmand-Arghandab Valley Regional Development (1954-1974) Afghanistan, Draft 1975.

INVIERNO

American Technical Assistance Corporation, INVIERNO, The First Year; An Evaluation of AID Loan 524-T-031, Report OAD-A-CR-164, prepared by Albert Brown et al., October, 1976.

"New Directions" in Development Assistance: Rural Development in Nicaragua, Staff Report on the "INVIERNO" Program, May 1977.

Kigoma Project

Harvard Business School, "World Bank Kigoma Rural Development Project, Tanzania", Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, 1977.

Weaver, James H. and Richard N. Blue, "An Approach to Integrated Rural Development: A Case Study of Kigoma Region of Tanzania", AID, Washington, D. C., November, 1976.

Lilongwe Land Development Program

Blinkhorn, Thomas A., "Lilongwe, A Quiet Revolution", Finance and Development, volume 8, No. 2, 1971.

Coombs, Philip H. with Manzoor Ahmed, Attacking Rural Poverty, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974. p. 108-111.

International Development Association, Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Development Credit to Malawi for the Third Phase of the Lilongwe Land Development Program, Report No. P-1583-MAI, March 10, 1975.

62

Lele, Uma, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975. Page 214-216. See table of contents for further references. Call No. HN 773.8 .L34.

Office of Development Information and Utilization, Development Support Bureau, Agency for International Development, "Deveeloopment Information on Integrated Rural Development," Draft, May 1978.

Puebla

Blume, James M., "Some Observations on the Puebla Project," AIDTO Circular A-388, June 23, 1975. Some attention given to how this might apply to AID.

Development Alternatives, Inc., "Plan Puebla Project", in Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects, prepared for AID, Washington, D. C., May 1975.

Jones, William I., "Mexico's Puebla Project: Is There Hope for the Minifundistas?" in International Development Review, vol. 14, No. 2, 1972.

Myren, William T., "Potential in the Puebla Approach" in International Development Review, vol. 15, No. 1, 1973.

Vicos Project

Development Alternatives, Inc., "The Community of Vicos" in Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects, prepared for AID, Washington, D. C. May 1975. Good recent article on the project.

Holmberg, Allan R., "Vicos: A Peasant Hacienda Community in Peru" in George Dalton, Editor, Economic Development and Social Change, The Natural History Press, Garden City, 1971. Discussion of the actual project begins on page 630.

b3

Vihiga Special Rural Development Project

Development Alternatives, Inc., "Vihiga Special Rural Development Program", in Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects, prepared for AID, Washington, D. C., May 1975.

Harmon, Edward D. and Tom Zalla, A USAID Sponsored Evaluation of the Vihiga Special Rural Development Project/Kenya, October 7, 1974 to November 27, 1975.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

OF

SIGNIFICANT CASES

IN

INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

Prepared by

Cynthia Clapp

Development Studies Program

Agency for International Development

Agency for International Development, (Helmand-Arghandab Valley Integrated-Farmer Intensive Development Project) 1973 (?)

Agency for International Development, Project Paper, Central Helmand Drainage, USAID Afghanistan, April 8, 1973.

Agency for International Development, Project Assistance Paper, Afghanistan: Central Helmand Drainage (Phase II) (1977).

Agency for International Development, Project Paper, Afghanistan Development Support Training, USAID/Afghanistan, April 4, 1978.

Agency for International Development, Capital Assistance Paper; Nicaragua Rural Development Sector Loan, June 10, 1975. Loan for the larger program of which INVIERNO is the major part.

Agency for International Development, Project Paper, Philippines Integrated Area Development II, USAID/Philippines, September 16, 1977. Project No. 429-0310. AID-DLC/P-2259. Also Annex B Supplement, May 1977. Statistics, graphs, charts, maps.

Agency for International Development, Project Paper, Philippines: Bicol Integrated Rural Development Project 1977-1981, USAID/Philippines, October 1976. Project No 492-0303.

All Africa-Regional Seminar on Social Welfare, International Council on Social Welfare, Lagos, Nigeria, December 8-14, 1973. Vihiga and CADU.

American Technical Assistance Corporation, INVIERNO: The First Year; An Evaluation of AID Loan 524-T-031, Report OAD-A-CR-164, prepared by Albert Brown et al., October 1976.

Arhammar, Gunnar, "The Assessment of Status of Health on an Ethiopian Rural Community (experiences of two years' public health work in Chilalo Awraja, Arussi)", CADU Publication No. 69, May 1970. CADU. Includes comments on the purposes and activities of the CADU Public Health Service.

Baron, A. R. and G. P. Owens, Available Data on Farm Income in the Helmand-Arghandab Valley, November 5, 1970. Helmand Valley.
Can be found in the back of the Harza Engineering Co., Final Report Helmand-Arghandab Valley Electric Power, Afghanistan, April 1970. AF621.312134 H343c).

Baron, A. R., General Background Paper on Developmetn in the Helmand-Arghandab Valley in Southwest Afghanistan, April 27, 1971. (Can be found with Available Data).

Blinkhorn, Thomas A., "Lilongwe: A Quiet Revolution" in Finance and Development, volume 8, No. 2, 1971.
Concise description and some evaluation of the project.

Blume, James M., Some Observations on the Puebla Project, AIDTO Circular A-388, June 23, 1975. Puebla.
Good brief (8 pages) description and evaluation of the Puebla project with some thought given to applicability for AID.

Biggs, Huntley, Dualism in Mexican Agricultural Development: Irrigation Development and the Puebla Project, prepared for AID, June 21, 1972. Puebla.
Addresses the distributional issues in Mexican agriculture and specifically Puebla.

Biggs, Huntley H., The Puebla Project: Progress and Problems, Water Management Technical Report No. 22, Department of Economics, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, July 18, 1972. (Also available through the AID R&D Report Distribution Center - PN-AAA-176). Puebla.
A description of the Puebla Project and an examination of the obstacles to continued progress with a discussion of the significance of subsistence farming for development in general. Prepared for AID.

Brant, Marvin, "Recent Economic Development", in Louis Dupree, editor, Afghanistan in the 1970's, Praeger Publishers, Washington, D. C., 1974. Helmand Valley.

C.A.D.U., "The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit - A Brief Description". A paper prepared for the Development from Below Workshop, October 12-20, 1973, Addis Ababa, C.A.D.U., October 1973. An overview of the project that tries to present it for comparison and offer its lessons.

Chambers, Robert, Managing Rural Development; Ideas and Experience from East Africa, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1974. CADU, Lilongwe, Vihiga. Interesting analysis of the management of rural development in East Africa with consideration of SRDP but little on Vihiga specifically, or Lilongwe or CADU.

Cohen, John M., "Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small-scale Landowners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia", in the Journal of Developing Areas, Volume 9, April, 1975. CADU.
Puts CADU in its historical, regional and technological context.

Cohen, John M., "Rural Change in Ethiopia: Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 22, No.4, July 1974. CADU.
Presentation and evaluation of CADU-
Short comparison to Comilla
Organization and administration of project charted and discussed.
Points out that much of emphasis on evaluation is economic.

Coombs, Philip H. with Manzoor Ahmed, Attacking Rural Poverty, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974. CADU, Puebla.
A well respected source on non-formal education based on the analysis of 25 projects in Asia and Africa.

Development Alternatives, Inc., Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects, prepared for AID, Washington, D. C., May 1975. Puebla, Vicos, Vihiga.
A three volume work of which Volume II is comprised of case studies of 36 projects (including Puebla, Vicos and Vihiga). Volume I is the final report discussing research, project success, local action, project components and a summary of the findings with their implications for AID and other major donors.

"Development Information on Integrated Rural Development", Office of Development Information and Utilization, Development Support Bureau, Agency for International Development, May 1978.
Summary of the discussion and experience on integrated rural development. Includes an overview of aid project experience and an annotated bibliography of relevant published material relying heavily on what is in their collection.

Doggett, Clinton L., The Vihiga Project: A Development Experience in Africa, USAID/Kenya, July 31, 1973. Vihiga. A detailed personal account (120 pages) by an AID project advisor who spent four years with the program. Provides interesting insights into the process of planning and implementing an AID program.

Dupree, Louis, The New Look in American Aid to Afghanistan, American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, Volume XVIII, No. 6, June 1974. Helmand Valley.

Final Report on the Appraisal of C.A.D.U. and E.P.I.D., by the Evaluation Team appointed by the Imperial Ethiopian Government and the Swedish International Development Authority. May 1974. 301.35 H945 ARC.
Guy Hunter was chairman of the team.

Gill, Gerard J., "Bottlenecks in a Single-Cropping System in Chilalo, Ethiopia: the Acceptance and Relevance of Improved Equipment" in World Development, Volume 5, No. 9/10, 1977. CADU.
The focus is on problems and constraints to use improved seed and/or fertilizer based on a survey at CADU in 1976.

Gill, Gerard J., "Improving Traditional Ethiopian Farming Methods: Misconceptions, Bottlenecks, and Blind Alleys" in Rural Africana, No. 28, Fall 1975. CADU.
Interesting discussion which gives some consideration to the advantages of the practices and implements already in use.

Government Affairs Institute, Managing Planned Agricultural Development, A Reference Book prepared for AID under Contract, Washington, D. C., August, 1976.
Enormous volume on lessons of development experience. The authors started with the 'evidence' of the projects focusing on success and generalized from the experience.

Harmon, Edward D., Jr., and Tom Zalla, A USAID Sponsored Evaluation of the Vihiga Special Rural Development Project/Kenya, October 7, 1974 to November 27, 1974. Vihiga.

Harvard Business School, "World Bank Kigoma Rural Development Project, Tanzania", Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, 1977. Kigoma.
Rather cost oriented approach to evaluating Kigoma. Rather detailed examination of the various components.

Hay, F. G. and J. Heyer, "The Vihiga Maize Credit Package" in An Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme - 1972, Institute for Development Studies Occasional Paper No. 8, University of Nairobi, 1973. Vihiga.
One of the fundamental resources on the project in its early stages.

Holmberg, Allan R., and Henry F. Dobyns, "The Cornell Program in Vicos, Peru", in Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1970. Vicos.
Good discussion of some important aspects of the process. 12 pages of background on agricultural production in the Andean area; 4 pages on "Vicos Under the Manorial System"; 3 pages on the project itself.

Holmberg, Allan R., "Experimental Intervention in the Field" in Henry F. Dobyns, et al., Peasants, Power and Applied Social Change, Sage Publications, London, 1964. Vicos.
Discusses health, nutrition, etc., but the information is fairly old.

Holmberg, Allan R., "The Role of Power in Changing Values and Institutions of Vicos" in Henry F. Dobyns, et al., Peasants, Power and Applied Social Change, Sage Publications, London, 1964. Vicos.
Includes discussion of the strategy followed.

Holmberg, Allan R., "Vicos: A Peasant Hacienda Community in Peru" in George Dalton, Editor, Economic Development and Social Change, The Natural History Press, Garden City, 1971. Heavy on the background but a good article on the early project.

International Development Association, Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Development Credit to the Republic of Malawi for the Phase II Lilongwe Agricultural Development Project, April 19, 1971. Report No. P-920.

International Development Association, Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Development Credit to Malawi for the Third Phase of the Lilongwe Land Development Program, March 10, 1975. Report No. P-1583-MAI.

Jonsson, Ingvar, "Diffusion of Agricultural Innovations in Chilalo Awraja, Ethiopia" IDR Research Report No. 17, Addis Ababa, June, 1975. CADU.

Jones, William I., "Mexico's Puebla Project: Is There Hope for the Minifundistas?" in International Development Review, Volume 14, No. 2, 1972. Puebla.
Concise critical analysis of the project.

Khan, Akhter Hameed, Comilla Revisited, May-June 1977, unpublished paper, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, Lansing, 1977. Comilla.
Some thoughts by the man who was an important force in the early stages of the project.

Khan, Akhter Hameed, Impressions of the Rural Works, Irrigation and Cooperative Programmes in the Comilla District, February, 1971. Comilla.
Somewhat impressionist and personal survey of Comilla.

Kline, David and Robert P. Worrall, "The Comilla Project", Communication and Education for Rural Development: A Professional Development Module, East-West Center, East-West Communication Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1972. Comilla.
Casebook and module text. Emphasis is on perception, communication and education.

Lasswell, Harold D., "The Emerging Policy Sciences of Development, The Vicos Case" in American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 8, No. 7, pages 28-33. Vicos.
Barely discusses Vicos - focus is on policy sciences.

Lavrijsen, J., The Food Supply of Lilongwe, Malawi, Geografisch Instituut Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, Utrecht, 1976. Lilongwe.
A fairly limited look at a single aspect of the project.

Lele, Uma, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975. CADU, Lilongwe and Vihiga.
A very well-respected volume on rural development by an economist from the World Bank.

Leonard, David K., Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977. Vihiga.

Lynch, Frank, "Bicol River Basin Case Study", Draft, March 1977. Bicol River Basin Project.
A teaching-style case with exercises dealing with participation and the "apparent conflict between economic and social soundness."

Malawi. Development Division, Development Programme 1972/73-1974-75, Volume I, Government Printer, Zomba, Malawi. Lilongwe.
Basic information on Phase II of the Lilongwe Project.

Mathai, P. M., "A Plan for Industrial Development for CADU", CADU Publication No. 100, Asella, July 1974. CADU.
Limited to the scope of the industrial development of CADU.

Meliczek, Hans, "Land Settlement in Malawi", in Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperatives, No. 1, 1977. Lilongwe.
Only mentions the Lilongwe project when discussing Malawi's development policy as background to the discussion of land settlement.

Mickelwait, Donald R., Alan Roth, et al., "Case Study: An Information System for the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) in the Philippines" in Information for Decision-making in Rural Development, Volume 2, report prepared for the Office of Rural Development, AID by Development Alternatives, Washington, D. C., May 22, 1978.

Moock, Peter R., The Vihiga S.R.D.P. Farm-Level Survey: A Preliminary Report of Findings, Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper No. 111, University of Nairobi, June 1971. Vihiga.
Somewhat limited to its area of Farm Level Surveys but there is some useful information about the project.

71

Myren, Delbert T., "Potential in the Puebla Approach" in International Development Review, Volume 15, No. 1, 1973.
A response to the Jones article. Myren is "one of the architects" of the project.

Neckby, Bengt, CADU; An Ethiopian Experiment in Developing Peasant Farming, Prisma Publishers, Stockholm, 1971. CADU.
Good basic source for project description.

"New Directions" in Development Assistance: Rural Development in Nicaragua, Staff Report on the "INVIERNO" Program, May 1977. Invierno.
Written for the House International Relations Committee to resolve the dichotomy of a 'new directions' project in a human rights violating country.

"An Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme-1972", Institute for Development Studies Occasional Paper No. 8, University of Nairobi, 1973. Vihiga.
This work has been characterized as a very good evaluation which suffers due to its distance from the actual project area, and therefore, its overly general character.

Rahim, Syed A., "The Comilla Program in East Pakistan" in Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1970. Comilla.
Begins with a brief description of the farming system in Comilla Thana to put the project in context. Discusses credit, extension and irrigation in detail. Support of the government is noted as well as the micro-level project.

Raper, Arthur F., Rural Development in Action: The Comprehensive Experiment at Comilla, East Pakistan, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1970. Comilla.
A comprehensive documentation of the program at Comilla.

Rondinelli, Dennis A., Bicol River Basin Urban Functions in Rural Development Project: Summary and Evaluations, Office of Urban Development, Development Support Bureau, AID, March 1978. Bicol River.
Concentrates on the settlement system and distribution of functions in the Bicol River Basin and those aspects of project organization pertinent to spatial issues.

Sanchez, Leobardo Jimenez, The Puebla Project and Beyond: An Experience in Improving Agricultural Production Among Small Holders in Mexico, A paper prepared for the Development from Below Field Trip/Workshop, Ethiopia, October 12-20, 1973. Puebla.
Discusses Puebla from perspectives of the nature of Mexican agriculture, the project's environment, its structure and organization, its strategies and the advances and implications of the project.

"Second Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Program - 1975", Institute for Development Studies Occasional Paper No. 12, University of Nairobi, 1975. Vihiga.
This work has been characterized as a very good evaluation which suffers due to its distance from the actual project area, and therefore, its overly general nature.

Stamberg, Lou, Helmand-Arghandab Valley Regional Development (1954-1974) Afghanistan, Draft Case Study, 1975.

Stevens, Robert D., "Comilla Rural Development Programs to 1971", in Robert D. Stevens, et al., editors, Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, East-West Center, University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976. Comilla.
Good analytical piece on Comilla focusing on the Agriculture Cooperatives Federation and the Thana Training and Development Center Program. Finishes with lessons of possible usefulness for other nations.

Swedish International Development Authority, Project Preparation Team, Report No. 1 on the establishment of a Regional Development Project in Ethiopia, Part II, Project Outline.

Tecle, Tesfai, "An Approach to Rural Development: A Case Study of the Ethiopian Package Projects", in John W. Harbeson, and Paul H. Brietzke, editors Rural Development in Ethiopia, No. 28 of the Rural Africana series, African Studies Center, Michigan State University, Fall, 1975. CADU.
Compares and contrasts CADU to WADU considering various aspects and components of the projects.

Tecle, Tesfai, Evolution of Alternative Rural Development Strategies in Ethiopia: Implications for Employment and Income Distribution, African Rural Employment Paper No. 12, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, and Institute of Development Research, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1975. CADU.
Includes a clear breakdown of CADU's organizational framework.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa, Social Welfare Services, No. 8, E/CN.14/SWSA/8, New York, 1971.

Vazquez, Mario C., "Vicos: The Interplay Between Power and Wealth" in Geogre Dalton, Economic Development and Social Change, The Natural History Press, Garden City, New York, 1971. Vicos.
Although the focus is on the "interplay between wealth and power", and income distribution is discussed, the amount of disparity in income distribution is not clearly shown. The programs initiated by the project are outlined.

73

Weaver, James H. and Richard N. Blue, "An Approach to Integrated Rural Development: A Case Study of Kigoma Region of Tanzania", AID, Washington, D. C., November 1976. Kigoma.
A people-oriented discussion of the various aspects of the project.

Widstrand, Carl Gosta and Zdenek Cervenka, Scandinavian Development Agreements with African Countries, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1971. CADU.
Gives some background on the Swedish assistance to Ethiopia. (Does not specifically discuss CADU).

Winkelmann, Don, "Factors Inhibiting Farmer Participation in Plan Puebla", Based on a paper entitled "Plan Puebla After Six Years", presented to the Ford Foundation Seminar of OLAC Program Advisors in Agriculture, Mexico City, November 6-10, 197?.
Participation analyzed not only by those receiving credit (the formal participants) but also other farmers adopting the recommended practices. Winkelmann is a CYMMIT staff economist.

Wood, Deborah A., Directed Cultural Change in Peru: A Guide to the Vicos Collection, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, Cornell University Libraries, Ithaca 1975. Vicos.
Basically an annotated bibliography of the works on Vicos at Cornell. She begins with a good basic description of the program.

World Bank, "Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit to the United Republic of Tanzania for a Rural Development Project (Mwanza and Shinyanga), Report No. P2312-TA, May 1, 1978. Kigoma.

World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Department, Rural Development Division, "Staff Appraisal Report - Tanzania, Mwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development Project, Report No. 1867a-TA, May 1, 1978.