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DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTION BUILDING MODEL

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is the product of an effort to elaborate the model of institution building developed by the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building.¹ The author has applied research findings from a study of the DASP,* a Brazilian organization, to the task of model development. DASP was not studied originally through the institution building framework; rather it was developed as an organizational history.² Thus the object of this paper is to develop the structure and dynamics of the institution building model in greater detail. This undertaking suffers to the extent that the basic concepts and framework of the model were not available at the time the Brazil research was conducted. Another limitation is that insights generated will tend to reflect the limited experience of a single case. The objective, however, is not to tell the DASP story, instead it is to develop the model.

* Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público (Administrative Department of the Public Service), abbreviated as DASP.

The information that follows is presented in three parts. First, as subsections of this Introduction, the basic model of the Inter-University Research Program is briefly sketched; this is followed by an historical perspective of DASP. The latter will serve to generally orient the reader. The second section of the paper is concerned with an elaboration of the tests of institution building. In the third part, model variables are examined by building upon the theory of the tests developed in the previous section.

Institution Building Guiding Concepts

The Inter-University Research Program has defined institution building as:

the planning, structuring and guidance of new or reconstituted organizations which (a) incorporate, foster and protect normative relationships and action patterns, (b) perform functions and services which are valued in the environment, and (c) facilitate the assimilation of new physical and social technologies.³

Further, they state the assumption that institution building is a generic social process, consisting of behaviors and structures which can be identified as being relevant to institution building in general. The institution building process has been completed when it can be demonstrated that certain relationships and action patterns incorporated in the organization are normative both within the organization and for other social units, and that the functions and services performed by the organization are valued in the environment. Three broad categories of tests are suggested. First is the organization's ability to survive. Second is the extent to which an organization is viewed by the environment as having intrinsic value. The third test is concerned with

whether organization relationships and action patterns are normative for other social units.

The analytic constructs selected for the model are of two types. First are a group of institutional variables, which because we are studying organizations, logically are the type of factors that might be studied in any organizational analysis. These variables include: leadership, doctrine, program, resources and internal structure. Leadership refers to persons who formulate doctrine and program and who direct its operation and relationships with the environment. Doctrine is defined as the specification of values, objectives and operational methods. Program consists of those actions which are related to the performance of functions and services constituting institutional output. Resources are defined as physical, human and technological inputs of the institution. Internal structure relates to structure and process established for the operation of the institution and for its maintenance. The second group of analytic concepts are based upon the notion that all organizations are embedded in an environment, and that the resulting relationships are part of the picture of institutionalization for a particular organization. The transactions with this environment produce certain linkages. Four categories of linkages are distinguished: enabling linkages, functional linkages, normative linkages and diffused linkages. Enabling linkages are the linkages with organizations and social groups which control the allocation of authority and resources needed by the institution to function. Functional Linkages are those organizations which supply the inputs (not resources) and use the outputs of the institution. Normative linkages are

with institutions which incorporate norms and values. Diffused linkages are nonspecific to organizations, rather, they are with the larger society (e.g. public opinion).

Finally, the objective of this paper restated is to determine the nature and interaction of clusters of institutional variables and environmental linkages based upon an analysis of organizational ecology drawn from the DASP experience.

Historical Perspective

The advent of Getulio Vargas and the revolution of 1930 represented a break with the old political order which had dominated Brazil since the Empire. The elite of the old order rested upon three economic bases:⁴ monoculture, export trade and the civil service. The wealthy owners of the Latifundia (as the vast monocultural estates were called) were the most powerful; allied with this group were the commercial interests of the cities who exported the products of monoculture. Together, this combination controlled the politics of the country. The government bureaucracy consisted of friends and relatives of the agriculture-export combination--the bachelor and doctor of laws--who corruptly and incompetently ran the machinery of government.⁵

As Governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Vargas was selected as the standard bearer of the Liberal Alliance in the Presidential campaign of 1930. The Alliance appealed to the growing labor and middle classes of the cities and opposed the rural oligarchy. The Alliance sponsored the

correction of long-standing ills such as lack of mass education and welfare, government corruption, exploitation of labor and the then current problems of economic depression.⁶ Implementation of such programs required governmental bureaucracy with higher goal accomplishment expectancy than had been traditional. Representatives of the conservative triad had little to gain from the reform of the government, and Vargas therefore turned to an incipient reforming elite to rationalize his government.

Having suspended the previous (1891) Constitution following the revolution, Vargas ruled with a provisional government. However, because of an unsuccessful counter revolution involving parts of the military in 1932, and for other reasons, he decided to call a constituent assembly for the purpose of establishing a new constitution. The Constituent Assembly of 1933 accomplished this end, and to crown their work they designated Getulio Vargas as President of the Republic for the 1934-1938 term. Thus, Vargas was clearly in control; if change was ever to be made the time was auspicious.

Because the old political order was frequently scandalized by corrupt practices and inefficiency in the supply of governmental material, President Vargas turned a reforming eye towards this area of government shortly after taking office. A series of reform agencies were established within the principal financial agency, the Ministry of Finance. This Ministry was placed under the leadership of Artur de Souza Costa, who had gained considerable reputation as a rural banker and financier. Like Vargas, Souza

Costa was from Brazil's southern most State of Rio Grande do Sul. Souza Costa brought little advanced thinking to the management of government finances. His chief motivation was parsimony, which indeed was virtuous, in view of the then depleted condition of the Brazilian Treasury.

Within two months of the establishment of the Provisional Government, Vargas decreed the creation of a Commission on Standards to set standards for materiel purchases.⁷ The Commission was still born, however, for the Brazilian businessmen appointed to leadership never assembled as a group. The creation of this Commission almost coincided with the establishment of a central purchasing agency,⁸ which because of the failure of the former Commission, eventually, inherited the standards setting function. The President of this agency, Otto Schillings, was a former functionary of Vargas' State government. Schillings had a rather narrow conception of his agency's role. His concern was primarily for consolidated purchases. He and other leaders of the finance and materiel reforms were unaware of the total extent of the technology needed for such reforms; they also did not understand the limitations of such technology in a country such as Brazil during the nineteen thirties.

Problems of civil service pay and status were also considered under the general rubric of financial reform of the federal government. The financial plight of Brazilian civil servants has always been tenuous; if the individual were without political connections it was difficult for him to survive on the minimum remuneration afforded all but the favored few.

.Although it was true that few people actually were removed from the public payrolls, it was necessary to be part of the coterie of a powerful politician in order to have a good level of living. The depression increased the uncertainties of life for the public servant. At times salaries were not paid, for the Treasury was frequently without funds. By 1935, however, Brazil and the rest of the world were beginning to recover from the depression. Public servants were looking forward to pay increases and perhaps a little improvement in their employment situation. This anticipation was probably heightened by the better life promised by Getulio Vargas and the Liberal Alliance.⁹

Congress thus created the Mixed Commission of Economic and Financial Reform in 1935, which was composed of political, military and administrative officials.¹⁰ One of the task force like subcommissions of the main body was charged with investigating the pay and organization of the civil service. To head the subcommission Vargas selected Minister Mauricio Nabuco, a foreign service officer. Nabuco had gained some experience with the standardizing of pay schedules and position titles in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies. He earned a reputation as a management analyst from an organizational study of the Ministry of Post and Telegraph that he conducted. Further, he became acquainted with the administrative operations of many governments through his foreign service career. Other foreign service officials also became interested in administration under his tutelage. One such individual,

Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, an assistant to Minister Nabuco, served as the secretary of the Subcommittee Charged With the Readjustment of the Manning Tables of the Civil Service, as the study group was called.

On September 25, 1935 Nabuco's group submitted their report--a compilation of existing positions derived from a cursory study of the duties of incumbents, followed by a consolidation of position titles. The main objective of the analysis was to develop consistency in position title nomenclature and to collect pay data from which a common salary table could be developed. The Subcommittee's salary recommendations were based upon an attempt to establish parity among positions judged roughly equivalent in duties, seniority and perquisites. The overall effect of the salary recommendations would have been a considerable increase in public expenditures for the civil service. President Vargas referred the work of the Subcommittee to Artur de Souza Costa. The Finance Minister examined the Report purely from the financial point of view, and ordered the suppression of the document. The problem of the pay of the civil service still remained; therefore the Subcommittee was reconstituted, this time under the leadership of Luis Simoes Lopes.¹¹ Mauricio Nabuco returned to his foreign service career, no longer desiring to work on the Subcommittee. However, one official from Foreign Affairs--Moacyr Briggs-- remained and participated in the making of the Subcommittee recommendations. The reconstituted Subcommittee scaled down the recommendations of the Nabuco group, but such features of the Nabuco report as the recommended establishment of a central personnel agency were retained.

Basic to any consideration of the administrative reform of Brazil is the figure of Luis Simoes Lopes. Simoes Lopes, like Getulio Vargas, was from the State of Rio Grande do Sul. As a young man, he first became acquainted with Getulio through his father, a prominent politician from the State and a close friend of Vargas. Years later, when Simoes Lopes was serving as an advisor in the Ministry of Education, he worked closely with the Rio Grande do Sul delegation in Congress which was headed by Vargas. He became a close friend of Getulio and worked diligently for him during the electoral campaign of 1930.

After the revolution, he was asked to serve as a Presidential advisor. Simoes Lopes traveled extensively in Europe and the United States observing government and administration, especially subsequent to his assignment as Presidential advisor. He also devoted his attention to the growing literature on administration. While the influence of Simoes Lopes was generally limited to matters of public administration, he worked closely with the President on many other problems. His systematic approach to problem solving and intellectual honesty were valued by the President. He served as a leveling influence on Vargas because, contrary to many advisors to dictators, Simoes Lopes never hesitated to counsel against action which he thought unreasonable.

The proposed legislation accompanying the original Nabuco report contained a provision for the establishment of a central personnel agency with the mission of selecting personnel and rationalizing the civil service. Simoes Lopes was supportive of the idea of such an institution, and thus,

Law 284 of October 28, 1936, or the "Law of Readjustment" as it is often called, provided for the creation of the Federal Civil Service Council. So called efficiency commissions also were to be created in the ministries, and the Law itself went beyond Nabuco's recommendation by charging these agencies with the organization, coordination and development of the public service. ¹²

It is interesting to note that both Simoes Lopes and Nabuco were erudite cosmopolitans who saw a need for governmental reform and who developed the capacity for such activity from experience and observation. Simoes Lopes tended to be influenced by the North American approach and experience. Nabuco drew upon personal experience with management analysis and his observation of practices abroad. Even such minor differences in the backgrounds of these individuals produced a significant divergence of opinion, such as the disagreement on the role of the politician in personnel selection. Nabuco opposed disconnecting the politician from selection completely. Simoes Lopes, whose values prevailed, believed selection to be a science that could and should be divorced from politics.

By the end of 1936, Simoes Lopes realized that personnel controls instituted by the Federal Civil Service Council were being vitiated by weaknesses in federal budget procedure. After preliminary discussions with Vargas, Simoes Lopes unilaterally proceeded to adjust the budget proposal for fiscal year 1937 in such a way that the limits of each government agency's personnel allotments would be fixed by law. Vargas submitted both versions of the personnel portion of the budget to Congress--one prepared by the Civil

Service Council and the other by the Ministry of Finance. This, he reasoned, absolved him of having undercut his Minister of Finance. One thing was clear, however; Simoes Lopes was more influential with Vargas and therefore more powerful; his proposal was adopted by Congress with little political travail.

On November 10, 1937 Vargas declared a Dictatorship following a well staged coup d' etat which was backed by the military. Vargas presented a constitution which vested predominant power in the hands of the executive. Among the organs of assistance to the President of the Estado Novo (or "New State" as it was called) indicated in the Constitution was an "administrative department" in which were to be lodged the housekeeping staff and control functions of the Federal Civil Service Council, as well as a number of other activities which included materiel standards setting and budget preparation.¹³ After less than two years of operation of the Civil Service Council, Simoes Lopes concluded that its collegial form of organization was unsatisfactory because of the constant need to adjudicate individual cases of classification and eligibility for appointment.¹⁴ Clearly, the opinion of the Presidential advisor was taken into consideration by Vargas. Thus, the Departamento Administrativo do Servico Publico (DASP) emerged from this constitutional base in hierarchical form to replace the collegial Federal Civil Service Council. There was need to broaden the circle of the original elite, and therefore rank and file as well as leadership in the organization were expanded as the number and variety of functions increased.

During the seven years that followed to 1945 steady progress was made by the reformers of Brazilian public administration. However in late 1945, a fundamental change occurred. Vargas was ejected from the Presidency by the same military force that had installed him in power in 1930. It appeared that Vargas was going to execute another coup d' etat after having promised elections and an end to the Dictatorship. The military intervened to keep this promise. Jose Linhares, the President of the Supreme Court, was designated as acting President of the Republic until elections could be held. He was wary of the DASP, especially because it was a Vargas creation. He was suspicious of its personnel and powers. Many advisors counseled the abolition of the organization and/or the reassignment of its functions to other agencies. Linhares, however, felt morally constrained from conducting sweeping reforms because a new President, Congress and Constitution were in the offing. Instead, he chose to ignore and by-pass the DASP so as to neutralize it as much as possible.

Simoes Lopes had retired from DASP shortly after the ouster of Vargas. He accepted the Presidency of the Getulio Vargas Foundation which he was instrumental in founding the previous year as an institution for the development of the Brazilian public service. Later, the Brazilian School of Public Administration was the progeny of this Foundation.

The initial inclination of Acting President Linhares to leave, but ignore DASP, was evidenced by his appointment of Moacyr Briggs to the Presidency of DASP to succeed Simoes Lopes. Shortly after his appointment however, Briggs felt that he could no longer remain in the leadership role of

the staff agency because of the behavior of the Acting President. Linhares continued to exercise the Decree-Law power by which Vargas had ruled during the Dictatorship. Under Vargas, the DASP always reviewed decrees for consistency and conformity with policy prior to sending them to the National Press for publication in the Diário Oficial.¹⁵ Linhares ignored this procedure. Instead, decrees were published directly by the Press. He independently raised the pay grades of clerical employees in the Ministry of Education by two schedules. He decreed the regional police administrators of the Federal District into the classified service. These men traditionally occupied positions of confidence under appointment by the chief of police. He violated a variety of other controls and regulations on the bureaucracy, significant among which were numerous extra legal appointments of friends and relatives to the public service. Linhares was agreeable to most requests from his ministers for special benefits and favors. Such action was rationalized as being appropriate for the democratization of the public service.

Briggs became quite exercised over the behavior of the acting President. Not only was the DASP being systematically ignored and considered subversive, but the very values and principles upon which the organization had been founded were being violated. Linhares' political intrusions into the civil service were intolerable to Briggs. He sent three confidential memorandums to the acting President in which the language describing the violations of law was stated in increasingly stronger terms. Because the President paid no attention to these warnings, Briggs felt compelled to resign after little more than a month in office.

At the same time, unknown to the President of DASP, two division directors organized a mass resignation of all division heads and chiefs of services of the DASP. Both resignations reached Linhares at approximately the same time. The President did not act upon the resignations; instead, he promptly suspended the management of the DASP. Linhares was again advised by many politicians and high executives of the government to eliminate the DASP completely. The interim chief executive was still hesitant to take such drastic action, however, for by this time it was already December, 1945 and slightly less than two months from the date of inauguration of President-elect Dutra. But Linhares did feel the need to discipline the staff agency. It was clear to the President, DASPlans and other observers that the mass resignation was a mutiny -- an action interpreted by President Linhares as a clear case of rightist reaction. In the minds of the functionaries of the DASP, their resignation was not without provocation. The staff agency had always protected the political reputation of the President, but on important matters there was never a denial of executive support.

On December 7, 1945 Linhares issued his famous Decree-Law 8323 - A which "reformed" the DASP. This "reform" considerably curtailed some formal powers of the organization, and reduced the number of major organizational units. Most of all, it embarrassed and lowered the status of the DASP.

By February, 1946, a new Congress was in session. The first order of business was the framing of a new constitution. In contrast to the Constitution of 1937, the product of this Constituent Assembly made no mention of an executive agency such as DASP. There is considerable evidence to show

that DASP and its powers were very much an issue during the deliberations of Congress in session as the Constituent Assembly, however.¹⁶ There were many proposals to eliminate or to transfer some of the agency's functions. For example, one arrangement would have specifically assigned the executive budget function to the Ministry of Finance. The Finance Ministry itself was behind many of these proposals. Interestingly, former Minister of Finance Artur de Souza Costa, chaired the Committee on Financial Norms which reviewed most of the initiatives aimed at DASP. Souza Costa remained neutral towards DASP during these deliberations and he was able to dissuade the Committee from raids on the staff agency. While he was neutral, he was no advocate of DASP. The Committee also turned down proposals to write a DASP kind of agency into the Constitution.

With Congress, a new President of the Republic -- Eurico Dutra -- was also inaugurated. Dutra found himself opposed by a majority of political factions in Congress within a few months of taking office. He was a former Brigadier General of the Army and Minister of War under Vargas; in the latter role he had developed good working relationships with DASP. As Director-General of DASP (Linhares' reform demoted the head of the staff agency from President to Director-General) Dutra selected Mario de Bittencourt Sampaio, who was a participant in the early bureaucratic reforms, a former member of the Federal Civil Service Council and several times a division head of DASP. Many of Dutra's former contacts with DASP were through de Bittencourt Sampaio. Thus, having the President's confidence, it was possible for de Bittencourt Sampaio to persuade Dutra that the DASP would be an aid in

developing a modus vivendi with Congress. The President and the Director-General agreed that both the survival needs of DASP and political support building for the administration in Congress could be satisfied by close liaison between Congress and DASP. Deputies and Senators were given technical assistance in drafting and studying legislation; and the Director-General was frequently present at plenary sessions of Congress and at Committee meetings. Such behavior sharply contrasted with the patterns of DASP's leaders during the Dictatorship, especially the intransigent functionaries of the staff agency who mutinied against President Linhares.

Within a year of the framing of the 1946 Constitution a variety of bills was introduced in Congress to eliminate or to some how modify the structure and powers of DASP. The Director-General developed the practice of trading subventions, public works projects and other "pork from the barrell" both for Congressional votes to maintain the organizational integrity of DASP and for support of Presidential programs as well.

There were other costs of survival which were dysfunctional for DASP's goals. For example, President Dutra had the idea that economy in government expenditures would be realized by not holding competitive examinations for appointment to the public service. The financial cost of the examinations was saved, but the policy resulted in large numbers of temporary appointments to the civil service. Many of these employees later were legislated into permanancy of tenure through the maneuvering of subsequent presidents and congressmen. Director-General de Bittencourt Sampaio remained quite flexible by meeting both presidential and legislative needs on such matters.

In scheming to gain legislative support for DASP, Director-General de Bittencourt Sampaio conceived of the strategy of involving DASP in development planning to elevate the prestige of the staff agency. Considerable thought had been given to national resources maximization through various studies since World War II; some basis of acceptance among legislators for the idea of plans and national planning already existed by 1946. Thus, in 1949 Congress approved the DASP prepared SALTE Plan (the letters representing the portuguese words for health, food, transportation and power).¹⁷ Mario de Bittencourt Sampaio was little concerned with carrying out the Plan; what he wanted was to enhance the prestige of his agency. The then Minister of Finance, Pedro Luiz Correia e Castro, reacted as his predecessors had when DASP seemed to be ascendant in prestige. He also presented a list of projects. However, Finance's plan was rather sickly in comparison to the impressive looking several volumes of statistics and analysis presented by DASP. In a tantrum Correia e Castro submitted his resignation to the President after Congressional rejection of his plan. The resignation was hastily withdrawn, however, when he learned that his successor probably would be de Bittencourt Sampaio.

Competition from Minister of Finance Correia e Castro did not cease with the SALTE Plan. A version of the proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1950 was submitted to Congress by the Ministry of Finance. The new scheme was to modify the traditional format of the executive budget proposal which grouped line items in expenditure accounts for personnel, maintenance, supplies and outlay. Instead, these proposed expenditures were redistributed along

organizational lines, so that the detail of account totals was established at subordinate organizational levels. The plan particularly had merit because it would give better management control and a program sense to the budget. The difficulty, however, was that little forethought was given to legal restrictions that governed the execution of the budget, and to the Brazilian economy. The machinations of the economy would have made such a plan difficult to administer. DASP's Director-General asked President Dutra not to accept Finance's version of the budget; he was turned down. Ultimately however, a great protest was heard from the federal bureaucracy, and de Bittencourt Sampaio clandestinely persuaded the Budget Committee of the lower house of Congress to proclaim DASP's budget as its own compromise version.

Following the Dutra government, Getulio Vargas was returned to the Presidency in the election of 1950. He served approximately three years of his five year term before he was removed from office by the military following a scandal which included the attempted assassination of a prominent newspaperman and politician, and which was traced to members of Vargas' family and personal staff. Following his removal, Vargas shot himself. With the demise of Vargas, DASP was set upon a course which led steadily down hill in power and prestige. A few upward swings were experienced in later years, but by the nineteen sixties it was clear that the agency was defunct in all aspects except the formalities.

When Vargas took office in January of 1951 he appointed Arizio de Viana to head DASP. Arizio de Viana had been associated with the agency

since its founding, and before that, with the preceding administrative reforms. His primary interest was budgeting and he was associated with the Budget Commission of the Ministry of Finance before it became the Budget Division of DASP; at this time he became the Division's Chief. Arizio de Viana was the last of the old guard DASPIans to head up the agency for any significant period of time.

Under President Dutra, the DASP was fighting for its existence; now; with Vargas again in the Presidency, the agency began to rebuild its previous position as innovator and controller of the federal bureaucracy. DASPIans reassumed the technical posture which characterized agency personnel during the Dictatorship. Controls on organization and personnel were reestablished; organization reform commission was launched; an ambitious position classification program was undertaken; the entrance examinations were reopened, and appointments to the civil service outside of the examination process once again were placed under control.¹⁸ Helpmate relations with Congress ceased of course.

Most of this renewed activity was jeopardized with the death of Vargas. Certainly Vargas' successor, Cafe Filho, had no commitments to DASP, if anything, he was suspicious of the agency. He gave Director-General Jair Tovar, whom he had appointed, carte blanche to destroy the organization. At first, Tovar was suspicious; however, soon he became a supporter of the organization, and in turn he generated Presidential support. While nothing innovative occurred under the leadership of Tovar, the DASP was allowed to pursue its goals. Personnel administration, and recruitment

and selection in particular, reached high water marks under Tovar; more entrance examinations were held during the fifteen months of his incumbency than were ever given during any comparable period in the history of the examinations. While it was not a period of great innovation, Tovar's administration of DASP represented one of the most tranquil periods in the history of the staff agency.

With the election of Juscelio Kubitschek to the Presidency in 1955 great changes were seen on the Brazilian scene. During the Kubitschek administration an ambitious five year Plan of Goals was adopted. Within this Plan was the proposal for the construction of the new Capitol of Brazilia. Many of the projects of the Plan of Goals were under accomplished while others were over-realized; in sum, seventy percent of the plan was achieved. Products and social costs of Kubitschek's activities included rapid and significant growth in the national economy, accompanied by runaway inflation, a large budgetary deficit and the devaluation of the national currency.¹⁹

Under such audacious presidential leadership one would assume that DASP would also thrive. Unfortunately, most of the values of DASP seemed to be incongruous with the needs of Kubitschek. The President appointed Jose Guilherme de Aragao as Director-General of DASP. Aragao was definitely a late comer to DASP. He joined the staff agency as a minor official during the late Dictatorship years, and was elevated to the role of Branch Chief within the Budget and Organization Division under the second Presidency of Vargas. His administration of DASP was perhaps the most enigmatic

in the history of the organization. On the one hand, a great deal of organizational change took place. Not only were the innovations of the last Vargas government continued but new changes appeared as well. Additional controls were placed on temporary personnel, the United States program of technical assistance in public administration was undertaken, a program of bureaucratic simplification was initiated and the School of the Public Service was created within DASP.

On the other hand, one of the greatest political intrusions into the merit system experienced in Brazil was carried out. Mass spoils appointments were made. Examinations were systematically suppressed. Little in the nature of concrete accomplishments was realized in spite of a proliferation of functions in the organization of the DASP. Aragao found it relatively simple to convince President Kubitschek of the need for certain reforms. When ever these modifications conflicted with other priorities of the President, however, they were ignored with equal facility. Kubitschek removed the supervision of the construction of Brasilia from the Public Buildings Division of DASP. Instead, he gave control to architect Oscar Niemeyer and Novacap, the public corporation created for the occasion, in order to rush completion during his five year term of office. In spite of frequent compromises in his program, Aragao seemed complacent. Many observers attribute this posture to his desire for a sinecure such as an appointment to the foreign service or to the Court of Accounts. ²⁰

During the few months of the short-lived Presidency of Janio Quadros during 1961 it appeared that the fortunes of the DASP had indeed changed for

the better. Quadros was particularly distrustful of politicians; thus, the instrumental, rationality oriented values of the DASP, appealed to him. By this time however, the DASP's key personnel were dispersed throughout government, industry and educational institutions. It was therefore difficult for him to find leadership and staff for the agency. Quadros was able to induce Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, now an Ambassador in the Foreign Service, to take over the Director-Generalship of DASP. He was able to do this because he convinced Briggs that he wanted to establish the old order of things -- much like they were under the Dictatorship. Briggs, it should be remembered, was involved in reforms beginning with the Nabuco Commission, and ending with his resignation as President of DASP under Acting President Linhares. Because of the early resignation of President Quadros, Briggs' tenure was limited to little more than seven months. Many plans were formulated, however; perhaps the most significant was the idea of massive in-service training for the entire federal establishment.

Quadros' replacement was Vice President Joao Goulart. Because of Goulart's left leaning tendencies and particularly his reputation as a champion of increases in the minimum salary and other benefits for labor, his accession to the Presidency was opposed by the military and conservative sectors of society. Others, more sympathetic to his cause, threatened to fight for "constitutionalism" and his lawful assumption of the presidency. The compromise solution was a switch from a presidential to a parliamentary system by Congress, with Goulart assuming the presidency under these conditions. Ultimately he maneuvered a plebescite that reestablished his former presidential powers.

As a replacement for Ambassador Briggs, President Joao Goulart appointed Antonio Fonseca Pimentel, who had served as the Director of the classification Division under Moacry Briggs. From the beginning, President Goulart showed no inclination to support the DASP or its values. In addition, Pimentel was not inclined to strongly resist the President and he appeared to be ineffectual generally. Goulart suppressed the entrance examinations that were initiated under President Quadros in an attempt to clear up the problem of thousands of temporary appointments to the civil service which were part of the legacy of Kubitschek's spoils practices. These appointments were the Labor Party's quid pro quo for supporting Kubitschek during the 1955 elections. Goulart had inherited the leadership of the Labor Party from Vargas, and accordingly, he was committed to gaining permanence of tenure for these appointees. He was at least partially frustrated in this goal by the Director of the Selection and Training Division, Beatriz Wahrlich, who was instrumental in generating political opposition to the President.²¹ Other problems besieged the DASP including another attempt by the Ministry of Finance to capture the budget function. Such a move was frustrated but it was no victory for DASP, for, the agency was nonfunctional for the most part by this time.

During 1964 the economic and political behavior of President Goulart could no longer be tolerated by the military, and his regime was toppled. After a modification of the constitution, Humberto Costello Branco, the general who lead the coup d' etat, was placed in office as President of the Republic. The following year the functions of DASP, excepting those con-

cerned with personnel administration, were transferred to a newly created ministry charged with planning and supervision of economic development. It appeared that personnel, which had been the original and continuing thrust of administrative reform efforts, again was to be operationalized.

II. DASP AND THE GENERAL TESTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The "Guiding Concepts" document of the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building suggests three general categories of tests or conditions for judging the quality of institutionalization of a social entity: "survival," "valuation by the environment," and "normativeness" of patterns. Each of these conditions may be categorized into further subsets. The institution building process is considered completed when these can be demonstrated to exist sufficiently. Because it is acknowledged that institutionality is a matter of degree the three tests of institutionalization and their subcategories can be demonstrated on continua. The more an organization approaches the right end of a continuum, the closer it is to being fully institutionalized in terms of that particular category. A total profile represented by relative position on all continua approximates the overall measure of institutionalization. The following are the continua, accompanied by a discussion of DASP in terms of the extent of its institutionalization.

Non-Institutionalized

1. Survival

a. Sacrifice of all
innovative elements

Fully Institutionalized

Sacrifice of no innovative
elements

In so far as survival per se is a criterion of institutionalization DASP is more institutionalized than not. Its control powers were severely curtailed after the fall of Vargas' Dictatorship in 1945. Especially cut back were

"coordinating" powers through which DASP maintained a hegemony of so-called administrative "means" (in contrast to "ends" or line functions) such as budget, personnel, and other auxiliary staff activities. By 1966, when the staff agency was finally dismembered, it had gained back most of these powers and even added additional ones. The critical thing, however, is that many of these new and reacquired functions became formalistic; either they were not carried out or they were significantly vitiated. This was nothing new, for, because of Vargas' priorities some functions of the Dictatorship era DASP became formalistic as well. Following the Dictatorship, formalism increased for two reasons: First, sufficient personnel were not available to carry out official tasks; Second, functional emphasis frequently changed because of the needs of particular Presidents; other times the leadership of DASP modified functional emphasis as well. Invariably, as shifts in the allocations of resources among Vargas priorities occurred, and the ability of the staff agency to recruit and retain qualified personnel diminished, formalism increased. Of course, as was often the case, restraint of certain functions such as the competitive examinations also produced formalism.

While the history of DASP shows a great deal of functional growth and branching to many new endeavors, there has been a basic thread of emphasis that has survived since the nineteen thirties--civil service reform, personnel system innovations, controls, and most of all, the selection of personnel by competitive examinations, have comprised the main thrust of

civil service reforms. The results have not been distinguished, and, again, formalism has resulted; considering the political circumstances however, there has not been a total sacrifice of innovative elements. These circumstances were described in the historical introduction to this analysis, but a significant factor that should be acknowledged here is that much of the economic and social growth in Brazil since 1930 has taken place under conditions of openness in the political system which makes survival of civil service reforms at any level quite amazing. Openness in the political system is characterized by access of the masses to centers of public decision-making, usually quite directly, and without intervening structures of interest articulation and aggregation. Among the demands of the masses have been a clamor for public jobs and personal favors. At times public personnel reforms have been held in abeyance--almost in a chrysalis state--during regimes that were unsympathetic to reforms. Further, the approach to reforms has changed somewhat. Thus, the personnel classification scheme that reflected the difficulties and the consensus of the nineteen thirties gave way to position classification in the nineteen fifties. Position classification itself became formalistic as well, through the impact of congressmen providing for political clients. The important point about developments in classification, however, is that changes in technology were incorporated into on-going reform attempts, even when reforms were restricted and subverted. Therefore developments in level and sophistication of technology progressed.

Thus, two factors tend to place the DASP more or less at the center on the scale of "sacrifice of innovative elements," in spite of acute formalism. Obviously, calibration of these continua is impossible, therefore "center" or "right of center" is but an approximation which probably demonstrates more institutionalization having taken place than not. First, is the character of a system that permits innovations to be safeguarded until inhospitable environmental conditions pass. Accordingly, a look at institutional development at a given point in time in Brazil might give the impression of a total sacrifice of innovative elements. This is not necessarily so, for example, it is clear that 12 per cent of an estimated five hundred thousand employees (as of 1961) entering the classified service via open competitive examinations is an unspectacular record for a central personnel agency officially charged with the conduct of these examinations since 1936. Therefore a look at the record at any given time is disappointing. However, the continued performance of this function in 1956 is meaningful. One cannot judge the persistence of innovations solely in terms of raw quantitiveness. Persistence by itself at some level of performance is significant as well, especially when ecological problems make the implanting of innovations difficult.

A second factor which places DASP more towards the center or "no sacrifice" end of the ("sacrific of innovative elements") scale has been the factor of learning during the periods of agency restraint, resulting in technical improvement of reforms after environmental conditions again permitted. An example of such learning was the plan to introduce in-service training on a

massive scale as an instrument of bureaucratic reform during the short-lived Janio Quadros Administration. The training collapsed with Quadros' resignation, but organizational learning had taken place--broad-scale training was to be substituted for the elite corps-"administrative means" monopoly strategy which had had undesirable consequences.

b. Innovations independent of founding structure or lodged in other institutions	Innovations lodged in original or descendant institution
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Survival of specific innovations is not dependent necessarily upon the continued existence of a given organization. Obviously, a function can be taken over by other agencies, it can grow to be accepted as normative for numerous groups, and in general it can become diffused throughout a social system or subsystems. However, when a function ceases to be associated with a specific organization it really leaves the realm of "institution" as we are concerned with the subject here. Perhaps the ultimate outcome aspiration for the goals of an institution is general diffusion and widespread internalization. This is to say that the environment would be thoroughly socialized to such goals. Then, perhaps the reason for organizational existence would cease. However, at this point goals have assumed the characteristics of ideas. If we choose to think of ideas as institutions, such as the idea of "capitalism," then it is possible not to be concerned with the problem of organizational persistence. However, ideas per se, aside from the question of organizational immortality, are not of primary interest in this

study unless they relate to the dynamics of the persistence of structure. This is not to say that descendant structures are not of interest, for organizations sometimes pass through several incarnations. What is important is that the essence of goals, means and structure persist discretely enough to determine that there has been organizational immortality.

There is a confusing element in the application of this organizational structure persistence ("dependence upon founding structure") scale in the case of Brazil; this is the general tendency for Brazilian organizations not to die even when functional performance has ceased. Further, a lasting cessation of functional performance often is difficult to distinguish because, as described for DASP under the preceding, "sacrifice of innovative elements" scale, there has been a quality of functional quiescence, followed by reassertion of activities and updated technology when favorable environmental conditions were again present. At least, in the case of DASP we have concluded that insofar as civil service reforms are concerned there has been organizational and functional persistence. Beginning with the Nabuco report on civil service pay and status in 1935, followed by the Law of Readjustment and the establishment of the Federal Civil Service Council in 1936, the DASP in 1937 and ultimately the central personnel agency that will remain from the dismemberment of DASP in 1965, we see a linear development in functions and an ancestral relationship among organizations.

It can be argued that in many cases the growth of functions, other than those related to civil service reforms as originally envisaged by reformers,

developed out of a desire to cope with environment. Originally civil service reform was seen as being primarily limited (1) to reducing the proliferation of titles in the civil service and the disparity between titles, duties and pay to some extent, (2) to establishing a civil service law, especially to be concerned with the rights and duties of functionaries, and (3) to adopt the competitive examination for personnel selection. However, it was not long before reformers discovered that circumstances induced other kinds of controls. For example, personnel reforms were being vitiated through the budget; eventually, this led to involvement in the process of budgetary control. Other kinds of "beat the system" attempts under the Law of the Public Functionary prompted the tightening of personnel controls and the tendency towards controlism in general. It is interesting to note that with the founding of the Federal Civil Service Council in 1936 some attention was given to organizational studies. This function was assigned primarily to the efficiency commissions in the ministries. Great difficulty was experienced in achieving performance of the function because the efficiency commissions devoted practically all available time to the review of classification and other personnel appeals regarding the status of functionaries.

In the discussion that follows of the dimension concerned with the "autonomy--ability to deviate from parent system" test of institutions it will be seen that a difficulty experienced by DASP has been the problem of selective control over inputs to the organization in the form of new functions. Further, maintenance of performance of many of these functions has not always been

possible. For example, the supervision of, and the setting of standards for purchasing and materiel systems for federal government was transferred to the Ministry of Finance at the time of DASP's reform in 1945 and never regained by the staff agency. Again, in the case of purchasing and materiel, reforms were originally independent of and in the case, preceded concerns with the civil service. Purchasing and personnel were related in the same organization under the doctrine and structure of the DASP. Leaders who emerged from the civil service reform side dominated the power structure of DASP, however.

Thus, overall, it must be said that if the criterion of survival of functions in original or descendant organizations ("dependent upon founding structure") includes all functions ever assigned DASP, the agency must be placed far towards the left, or non-institutionalized end of the scale. If, on the other hand, we view the persistence of the personnel function as primary to the development of DASP as an institution, the agency tends towards right of center--more institution-like.

2. Extent of valuation by environment

a. Non-autonomous

Autonomous

(1) Cannot formally deviate from parent system

Can formally deviate from parent system

This second category of tests relates to the extent to which an institution is viewed by its environment as having intrinsic value. Two general parameters of this institutional character have been developed--

"autonomy" and "influence." First, under "autonomy," is the ability of the institution to establish rules and procedures which "deviate from the (parent) larger system" of which it is a part. Presumably, the more it can deviate from the parent system, the more likely is it to be independently institutionalized.

As suggested previously, one important difficulty experienced by DASP has been an inability to control its inputs in the form of functions. Much of the functional growth in the staff agency has resulted from attempts to gird the personnel system against practices that would have nullified reforms. To some extent agency leadership was responsible for accretion of new functions as well. More than anything else, however, the relationship of DASP to Getulio Vargas has produced the functional growth in the agency.

More important than growth in formal functions was the subtle process of expansion of informal activities. Growth in unofficial functions particularly was related to the needs of the Dictator. On the one hand, such informal inputs were based upon Vargas' appreciation of the competence of DASP's personnel. Accordingly, the agency ventured into such fields as economic development planning. On the other hand, DASP was Vargas' handmaiden in maintaining the Dictatorship's power structure. Accordingly, the President of DASP, Luis Simoes Lopes, served on the State's Affairs Commission which controlled the former federal subdivisions of the centralized "New State." DASP often conducted studies for this agency. More important, however, were the services provided the Dictator by DASP related to the personnel function since personnel was of fundamental interest to the staff agency. Part of

Vargas' power base was urban labor; therefore it was difficult for him to oppose such things as the obtaining of public jobs through influence and the granting of bonuses and salary increases to public functionaries. It was DASP's responsibility to study such matters, and because of the agency's commitment to the Dictator, DASP usually took the brunt of labor's hostility (particularly from the civil service) following what were interpreted as unfavorable decisions. DASP became Vargas' "whipping boy" as part of his general strategy of the "trial balloon" for testing receptivity of the political environment to particular actions and policies. Because DASP was committed to protecting the Dictator's power base it crippled its capacity to carry out fundamental reforms. This followed from the expenditure of agency resources on non-reform activities, many of which, in turn, produced a negative public image.

DASP remained in the ambit of the Presidency after Vargas. While subsequent growth in formal functions might indicate agency modification of its programs, this was not the case because formalism through non-performance characterized much of the new formal responsibility. As under Vargas, the needs of Presidents of the Republic foreshadowed the performance of many agency functions. Presidential needs continued to be inimical to the good image of DASP.

Thus, the following conclusion seems inescapable: because of inability to control its inputs DASP must be considered to be non-institutional in character as related on the scale of "autonomy--ability to deviate from parent system."

**(2) Cannot acquire resources
based upon intrinsic value
without harassment**

**Can acquire resources based
upon intrinsic value with-
out harassment**

One measure of the degree to which an institution is valued is the extent of resource supply by organizations in its environment. ("Autonomy-ability to acquire resources based upon intrinsic value"). Similarly, an institution has autonomous stature when potential blockers of resources lack freedom to limit the institution and its values by denying resources of all kinds. Resulting from the binary relationship that resources suppliers have to an organization--the ability to turn it "on" and "off"--perhaps it is one of the most important tests of institutional quality; it clearly affects an organization's box score on other such tests like survival.

Because of the life and death relationship between an institution and its resource suppliers it is important that we consider the on-going situation of the institutional planner and his political calculations regarding resources. The analysis of the future in this respect is no simple problem, however. One reason is that the choice of resource connections must be made in relation to the kinds of institutional goals that are to be served and to the impact of future goal accomplishment. The foresight required for such planning is often further obscured by the uncomfortable situation of having to benefit one source of organizational support at the expense of another. Thus, one usually is confronted with what is by now the organization theorist's classical "satisficing" situation in which the accomplishment of objective A with

means B results in gaining somewhat less of consequence X than Y or Z than would have come about if other objectives and means were selected. These planning difficulties suggest some ground rules for support building. First is that there should be a broad base of support and influence. The ultimate aspiration is for such diffused internalization of organization values that they and the organization become sacrosanct in the society; accordingly it would be extremely difficult to deny such an organization resources. In the narrower focus of legislative bodies, executives, clientele and other organizational control groups that impinge on the allocation of resources, it behooves the incipient institution to diversify in the development of its supporters. The idea of multiple organizational resource suppliers leads to the second rule of institutional support seeking--that of the orientation of supporters toward the values of the institution. At the very least, such supporting organizations should not be constrained by contrary values. More than the absence of incompatibility, however, organizations with values that in some sense are related must be sought out. Finally, the third rule of institution support seeking is based upon the assumption that regardless of value compatibility, all political support has its price. Therefore, in the progress of institution building the give and take of political trading must be girded by judicious decision-making. Obviously, the price of support of an organization with values which are antithetical might be the sacrifice of the raison d'etre of the institution. More commonly, however, a tangle of commitments

force incompatibility among supporters to the surface which can result in negative consequences for the developing institution.

DASP's orientation towards the left, or non-institutionalized end of the acquisition of resources scale ("autonomy-ability to acquire resources based upon intrinsic value"), is classical in light of what has been said about planning for future resource support and the intrinsic valuation of an organization by its environment. Pre-DASPian reforms--the study commissions and the Federal Civil Service Council--were favored with some support in Congress as well as from the President. Under the Dictatorship, of course, the source of financial and authority resources was the President of the Republic himself. This pattern continued subsequent to Vargas as well. The principle difference between Vargas and others, however, was that he favored DASP's activities, and therefore ensured the flow of resources; many other Presidents either have had little interest in, or have looked with disfavor upon the agency's higher values and program goals. Presidents have neutralized the staff agency (1) by placing men of mediocre ability in the top leadership position of DASP, (2) by assigning important functions that might have been carried out by the agency to other organizations, and (3) by restraining the holding of competitive examinations and thereby lessening the agency's influence over the bureaucracy. The latter restraint has had the secondary effect of diminishing the quality of DASP's personnel resources as well. Not holding the competitive examinations has tended to discourage candidates from taking preparatory courses at the School of the Public Service; this has

resulted in lessened resource development, which ultimately affected the DASP's ability to carry out its mission because of a shortage of trained technicians. Mediocrity of leadership has had the secondary effect of precluding agency connections outside the ambit of the presidency which might have enabled it to gain needed resources.

Thus, we see that in terms of some rather fundamental rules of support seeking which were described above, DASP has not been able to develop more than one source of support and influence. Its ability to garner resources has diminished accordingly.

(3) Cannot rely on intrinsic value in defense against attacks and encroachment

Can rely on intrinsic value in defense against attacks and encroachment

Again, as was the case with the previous scale ("autonomy-ability to acquire resources based upon untrinsic value"), autonomy is based upon being valued by the environment. Ideally, institutional support should be based upon diverse groups which have thoroughly internalized the agency's value system. When such ideal conditions are not possible, quid pro quo relationships and situations of interdependence with other organizations and groups are useful. Thus, supporting groups have a stake in the viability of the developing institution, and to some extent, they can be counted upon as allies in defense situations. The problem with quid pro quo arrangements is that shifting coalitions sometimes promote transitory relationships in the absence of a durable binder. In the final analysis, nothing is really as

durable as "gut" level linkage--support based upon internalized values.

Returning to a previous theme--personnel, especially selection as the basic program of DASP--we see some use being made of the quid pro quo tactic in defense. This was demonstrated in 1961 when former President Goulart restricted the competitive examinations while engineering tenure by act of Congress for political followers, whom he had appointed to temporary positions in the civil service as a means of circumventing merit system requirements. He made many of these appointments during a previous administration where he served as Vice President. His immediate predecessor, Janio Quadros, was sympathetic to the goals of DASP and wanted to rearm the staff agency. DASP's Director of Selection and Training convinced President Quadros that the lingering problem of the temporaries should be eliminated by holding open competitive examinations. In the mean time, Quadros resigned the presidency, but by the time of Goulart's action many examinations already had been given. President Goulart halted examinations, certification of eligibles and appointments. The Director of Selection and Training managed to generate a great deal of sentiment in opposition to the President's action among professional associations and ad hoc groups of examinees by resigning and other tactics. Ultimately, the President abandoned the attempt to circumvent the system.

The significance of the foregoing is that it is an example of a quid pro quo alliance. There was no well internalized basis of support that could be counted upon generally for institutional defense. To the extent of

the temporary alliance between DASP and employee groups, DASP was able to preserve the integrity of the selection process. Unfortunately, after this incident the support group evaporated; employees who were qualified by examination ceased to be concerned with DASP and its problems. The lack of more enduring forms of support linkage can be traced to DASP itself, for potential sources of such support exist in Brazilian society. Perhaps businessmen and industrialists could have been systematically coopted around the rubric of optimizing values--economy, efficiency and rationality --which both they and DASP share. This would have required planned effort to involve such supporters in advisory and similar relationships. Other groups demonstrated related values. For example, the so-called "Middle Sectors" of Latin America espouse values such as governmental reform and modernization; these are not inimical to those of DASP. Modern military establishments also have a certain commonality with DASP on issues such as professionalism and bureaucracy. Thus, because of an inability or unwillingness to build support among groups in society favorably disposed to its values, DASP must be placed on the left side of the "autonomy-ability to rely on intrinsic value for defense against attacks and encroachment scale." To the extent that it was able to promote transitory identification with its goals, it generated defense support, fleeting, but effective for the moment.

b. Non-influential

(1) Not able to influence decisions
in its functional area

(2) Cannot enlarge sphere of action
outside organization

Influential

Able to influence decisions
in its functional area

Can enlarge sphere of action
outside organization

The second parameter for judging the extent to which an institution is viewed by its environment as having intrinsic value is its influence. The two scales which comprise this dimension are discussed together inasmuch as most relevant information from the DASP experience already has been discussed. Further, what remains of the influence of the staff agency and its descendants can be understood better within the context of the remaining general test of institutionalization which follows--"normativeness."

As described, DASP achieved optimum influence over decisions in its functional area under the Dictatorship. Its power was parlayed through performance of two principle roles. First it was the official controller and reformer of the bureaucracy; in this respect it was also the confidant of the Dictator. Second, it was one of the few interfaces in the bureaucracy where systematic study and problem solving techniques were applied to decision-making. Subsequent to the Dictatorship, the DASP remained as an influence tool of the President; most Presidents other than Vargas did not choose to use DASP in this way, however. Exceptions to the rule have been chief executives who have had difficulty in relating to Congress. With the exception of the Dutra administration, most of these were short-lived incumbencies such as those of Presidents Cafe Filho and Quadros. Perhaps it can be said that DASP was most like an institution on the "influence on decisions" criterion under President Dutra. Dutra allowed DASP's Director-General to develop linkage with Congress by trading political support of

Presidential measures for subventions and other allocations of resources controlled by the Executive Branch. Also, DASP was somewhat valued by legislators at this time (1946-1950) because staff services were supplied them by the agency. This opportunity to expand its support base was withdrawn with the return of Vargas to the Presidency in 1951, however.

The foregoing experience also relates to DASP's "ability to enlarge its sphere of action." The ability of the agency to expand functionally beyond the limitations of its formal organization have been described elsewhere in this paper. Functional growth invariably has been accompanied by formalism, usually because resources were not available. Further, and especially during the Dictatorship, the agency performed numerous tasks that had little to do with formal functions such as studying currency reforms and economic development planning.

The DASP experience suggests that a most significant aspect of institutional influence lies in the area of expertise, especially where it can be traded as political currency in the process of institution building. Viewed from this perspective the return of Getulio Vargas to the Presidency in 1951 perhaps was unfortunate for DASP, for the agency may have been able to perpetuate its incipient power position that was developing under President Dutra. While the agency was trading financial and other resources for political support, it was also transacting with legislators by supplying research assistance. Thus, while DASP must be located towards the non-influential ends of the ("influence-ability to influence decisions in functional

area and to enlarge sphere of action") continua, its development clearly points out the significance of expertise as a tool of influence in the institution building process.

3. Normativeness

Relationships and action patterns
of organization non-normative
for other social units

Relationships and action
patterns of organization normat-
ive for other social units

"Normativeness" is a measure of the impact of an institution on its environment. When an organization is normative it patterns the values and behaviors of other social units. It is possible for normative patterns to survive long after the physical artifacts of the institution have disappeared. However, without organization the phenomenon is more related to the concept of belief system. Belief system is operative at the societal or major societal subsystem levels where many structures perpetuate values. Accordingly, DASP is moribund; however, its action patterns are normative for a number of social units. The staff agency pioneered in the fields of government reorganization studies and budgetary controls. Some form of these activities survive today in Brazil. Former DASPIans such as Professor Benedicto Silva have continued to give leadership to governmental reorganizations, as in the 1965-1966 reorganization study of public finances. While it cannot be argued that DASP has been perpetuated in entities such as the Brazilian School of Public Administration, this School and its parent organization, the Getulio Vargas Foundation, are dedicated to government improvement in Brazil.

Many "old guard" DASPIans have been associated with the Brazilian School since its inception in 1951. Professor Silva was its first Director, Luis Simoes Lopes, the first President of DASP and head of the Foundation, since its inception, has continued in the role of President of the latter organization. Therefore, we see third generation organizations such as the Brazilian School and the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration which are not descendants of DASP but which are of related lineage. The latter agency provides consulting services to local government and was launched with the support of the Getulio Vargas Foundation.

The foregoing demonstrates the "spread effect"; here values and practices of an organization are normative for other entities in the environment even though the organization has not achieved immortality. DASP no longer exists as a discrete structure. We have argued that normativeness without existential form is not institutionalization. However, as developed previously, the main thrust of DASP has been in the area of public personnel administration. If a central personnel agency is established as planned, it can be substantiated that DASP has achieved immortality to some degree because of the ancestral relationship between the new agency and DASP.

Returning to the "normativeness" scale, DASP can be located at center or to the right of center. Clearly it is normative for several living organizations, subgroups and many individuals; their actions and values have been patterned by DASP. However, the factor of "normativeness" alone weakly indicates institutionalization.

Concluding Observations

An attempt has been made to synthesize the DASP experience through the frame work of the three general tests of institutionalization and their subsets developed by the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building. The following paradigm summarizes the principle findings.

<u>Institutional- ization general tests</u>	<u>Institutionalization subtest continua</u>	<u>Findings about DASP</u>
1. Survival	a. Sacrifice of innovative elements	1. The chrysalis effect 2. Ability to learn and update technology while quiescent.
	b. Dependence upon founding structure	1. Importance of discrete structure; not ideas or functions alone. 2. Concept of the ancestor relationship or organizational descendant
2. Valuation by the environment	a. Autonomy--ability to deviate from parent system	1. Ability to control inputs from environment
	b. Autonomy--ability to acquire resources based upon intrinsic value	1. Breadth of support base 2. Orientation of resource suppliers toward values
	c. Autonomy--ability to rely on intrinsic value for defense against attacks and encroachment	1. Need to seek support from societal sectors that share values.
	d. Influence--ability to influence decisions in functional area and to enlarge sphere of action	1. Significance of expertise as tool of influence 2. The problem of formalism

Institutional- izational general tests	Institutionalization subtest continua	Findings about DASP
3. Normativeness	a. Relations and action patterns normative for other social units	1. Normativeness without structure not institutional- ization

It is important to note that the above "Findings about DASP" do not represent judgments of the degree to which it qualifies as an institution. Rather they are observations about the mechanism of institution building based upon DASP. Because the data on this agency was not gathered in an institution building frame work, it is not possible to critically judge it as an institution. It can be said, however, that on the "survival" and "normativeness" tests DASP exhibits many institution-like characteristics.

It should be clear that only the fully developed institution could possibly score highly on each test and subtest of institutionalization. Therefore, in studying this process we are describing either fully developed institutions or degrees of semi-institutions. Accordingly, an examination of several organizations would reveal entities in various stages of institutional development. When semi-institutions cross the median to the developed side of each test continuum they can be considered more institutionalized than not. As long as an organization exists, however, it is institutionalized to some degree. Perhaps a descriptive trichotomy of institutional development would be: death-survival-immortality.

"Survival" is importantly related to other variables as well. Thus, it is necessary for an organization to survive in order that the other tests of

institutionalization be fulfilled in the future. While an organization certainly may not be patterning values and behaviors, by continuing to exist it could be normative for its environment at some future time. One difficulty, however, is the problem of diagnosing organizational death. For example Brazil abounds with public organizations which remain as juridical-organizational entities, but which are non-functional--formalism results. DASP has demonstrated formalism as well. However, from time to time it has been reactivated and technologically updated (the chrysalis effect) to energize civil service reforms --environmental conditions permitting, of course. Also, the personnel function has survived for over thirty years although the organizational entity has changed twice before and will probably change again (ancestor relationship effect). Thus, the test of survival is the performance of some life-like function. As is the case with all living organisms, there must be a hint of a metabolic process in order for life to persist.


We have seen that "normativeness" without a structural referent is not institutionalization. Thus, DASP still patterns the values of various individuals and groups in the sense of ideas and practices, but these entities have not inherited the agency's functions. Probably the ultimate test of institutionalization lies in the "valuation by the environment" set of tests. "Survival" and "normativeness" are more fundamental because (1) existence must precede any essential meaning we give to an organization, and (2) some social entities must prize the incipient institution's action patterns and values.

However, the real constraints on immortality (the critical difference between the semi-institution and the fully developed institution) are found in the "autonomy" and "influence" tests. These clearly separate the semi-institution from its fully developed relative.

III. A PATTERN OF ORGANIZATION AND LINKAGE VARIABLES

In the Introduction to this paper guiding concepts preliminary to the development of a comprehensive theory of institution building were discussed. Five institution variables (leadership, doctrine, program, resources, internal structure) and four types of linkages (enabling, functional, normative, diffused) were described. It has been hypothesized that interaction clusters of institutional variables and linkages occur in unknown combinations, and that these combinations are related to various transactions between an institution and its environment. The purpose of this paper has been to develop the model through an interpretation of research on the DASP previously carried out by the author. The following builds upon the tests of institutionalization already developed.

Under the "General Tests of Institutionalization" it was concluded that DASP had achieved the status of semi-institution. The "survival" and "normativeness" tests seemed to signal semi-institutionality. However, in discriminating the semi-institution from a more institutionalized entity, the tests of "autonomy" and "influence" appear to be important. The combination of these tests suggest a linearity of organizational development towards institutionality. This is to say, there appear to be stages of development through which semi-institutions pass demarked by the tests of institutionalization. This continuum of development can be represented as follows:



In the body of this essay each test will be related to arrangements of institutional and linkage variables representing minimum transactions between the organization and its environment needed to meet a particular test of institutionalization. Because the tests follow one another in discriminating non-institutions, semi-institutions and fully developed institutions, configurations of parts (i.e. arrangements of organizational and institutional variables) logically must be built upon each other. For example, the semi-institution that can pass the test of "influence", must also be "survival" and "normativeness: qualified. Further, it must be demonstrable that organizational and linkage variables are logically related to a particular test. Accordingly, if it is claimed that the variable cluster of leadership structure > enabling linkage comprises the "survival" test, it must be so demonstrated logically and empirically.

Admittedly, it is audacious to suggest these theoretical pretensions based upon the study of one case; further, there is an implication of determinism -- stages through which an organization must pass. Certainly the constructs must be tested more extensively. As for determinism, however, there is no intent to imply a lock-step movement through the tests necessarily.


The following is a development of the test continuum through related organizational variables and environmental linkages.

Survival

We have seen that the institutional subtest continua of survival ("sacrifice of innovative elements" and "dependence upon founding structure")

have not satisfactorily explained the problem of continued organizational existence or death. Rather, the chrysalis effect has shown that it is possible for an organization to lie dormant for periods of time, followed by revitalization, including updated technology. It was also learned from the DASP experience that the concept of organizational descendant or ancestor is important in explaining the survival of an organization. Accordingly the "sacrifice of innovative elements" and "dependence upon founding structure" subtests of "survival" do not add to our understanding of sustained organizational existence apparently without functioning, followed by demonstrable revivification. One generalization about such existence or lack thereof is that there are actors in any organizational force field, who, in varying degrees, can turn an organization "on" or "off" by supplying or withholding resources they control which are needed by the organization, for survival. As described, transactions with the environment that produce resources result in enabling linkage. Such linkage must be a prerequisite of "survival", although not necessarily the only prerequisite. If enabling linkage allows an organization to exist, what motivates the suppliers of this linkage? In the case of DASP leadership has fulfilled this role. Leadership here is considered a fundamental requisite to existence because it triggers the response that supplies organizational sustenance. Before developing the concept of the leadership variable further, one final component in the survival radical should be mentioned -- that of structure. Without structural form it is not possible to determine that an organization exists, or that it ever did exist for that matter. For example, as long as the juridical status of an organization continues there is structural essence. Leadership and enabling linkage alone

tell us nothing of a particular entity; their dynamics must relate to a finite structure. Thus, survival is related to the following cluster of institution building variables:



The basic leader in the DASP story has been the chief executive of Brazil, both as dictator and republican president. It was in pursuit of the political needs of Getulio Vargas that the governmental reform movement got under way in the nineteen thirties. His feelings about civil service reform happened to coincide with those of a few incipient reformers. The man placed in charge of reforms at this time by Vargas, Luis Simoes Lopes, was truly interested in vitalizing the civil service and in introducing optimizing capabilities into the government bureaucracy. Also, as a close advisor to Vargas on many matters, he was completely and emotionally dedicated to the leader. It was not surprising then, when the Dictatorship was installed in Brazil in 1937, that Simoes Lopes should have been willing to blend means of administrative reorganization with the control and power maintenance needs of the Dictator. This was no facile choice between governmental reform versus support of the dictator, however, rather the means of governmental reform perceived to be most efficacious and the power needs of the dictator were somewhat overlapping (e.g., centralization, controlism, elitism, etc.). Prior to this time, opportunities did exist for the development of other linkage supports in the environment through the Congress, before it was dissolved, and through cer-

'tain individuals and agencies in government where interest and support for administrative reforms had been indicated. Because of Vargas' commitment to reforms, Simoes Lopes' dedication to Vargas and the controlist nature of both reforms and the Dictatorship, the binding of DASP into the ambit of the chief executive was an evolutionary outcome more than anything else. However, this outcome had dysfunctional consequences for the institutionalization of DASP because leadership and enabling linkage became fixed in the Office of the President. This is not to say that there has been one leader alone, for leadership as a total phenomenon is rarely the product of a single individual even when Latin American "personalism" prevails.*

*Five roles seem to have been critical in the leadership structure of DASP. These roles, revealed by the types of transactions carried on by leaders with the environment are: (1) ends-means articulation and development, (2) ends-means allocation, (3) linking, (4) controlling and (5) blocking. The ends-means articulation and development role involves the identification, description, explanation and promotion of goals and instrumentalities for goal accomplishment. Ends-means allocation differs from the former role in that it is concerned with the prescription of ends and means which the institution actually follows. The linker role implies connecting behavior by representing institutional interests to others and vice versa, and communicating by transmission and translation of ideas. The controller role is the maintenance of goal accomplishment through compliance strategies. The blocker role is any kind of defense or protective behavior. Needless to say, the ends-means allocation role has been dominated by the President of the Republic.

The kinds of transactions between the environment and the President as the basic leader which have produced survival for DASP have varied between the extremes of whole hearted support (as under Vargas' Dictatorship) and hostility, falling short of organizational annihilation (as under Acting President Linhares).


Since the reform of DASP in 1945 by Acting President Linhares, presidents who have wanted to keep DASP under control have found it convenient to do so by placing weak leaders in the position of Director-General of the staff agency. Inasmuch as the senior leadership people resigned in mass from the agency after the fall of the Dictatorship, subsequent presidents have found it easy to inhibit the agency by controlling the quality of its leaders. This suggests that if it is desired to destroy an organization before it becomes an institution, the most vulnerable time is the early years before structure of leadership becomes firmed up. The point about survival however, is that by permitting DASP to minimally exist, even though not as an intimate partner of the chief executive, the agency has been provided with enabling linkage sufficient to maintain the low key form of existence necessary to survive.

Thus, the experience gained from DASP both demonstrates the phenomenon of the "survival" radical (variable cluster) and it illustrates a case of monopolization of two variables of the radical (leadership and enabling linkage) by one source (the President of the Republic).

Normativeness

As previously described the "normativeness" test reveals the measure of an organization's impact upon its environment. Thus, it is possible for an

organization to have died, but because of valuation of certain of its artifacts it can continue to pattern behavior long after death. However, it has been argued here that "normativeness" which is not based upon discrete structure is more in the realm of ideas or beliefs. We are concerned with organizations that minimally survive in some recognizable form, and at the same time continue to pattern behavior. Therefore, everything said about "survival" applies; in addition, two other variables must be present. First is doctrine. Without doctrine -- at the very least consisting of content of an emotive nature --- literally there would be nothing about which to be normative. Composed of goals, values and operational methods, doctrine represents the intellectual and emotional content of an organization. The second variable necessary for "normativeness" is normative linkage. The idea of persons and organizations prizing goals and technology (doctrine), for example, implies the existence of transaction (e.g. acting in terms of the norms) with a source (a discrete structure); this normativeness results in normative linkage. Thus, the "survival" radical of institution building variables is elaborated to develop the second test stage on the continuum -- "normativeness."




It should be noted that functionality is not part of the "normativeness" radical. We have seen that organizational persistence is possible as long as

(1) resource suppliers do not turn the organization "off", (2) there is activation of resource suppliers to some degree (a function of leadership) and (3) there is tangible (at least structural) evidence of existence. Thus DASP was sustained during dormant periods, when it was essentially non-functional, through both leadership and enabling linkage supplied by presidents who allowed the name to remain on the door -- so to speak. At the same time normative linkage was produced through transactions involving the doctrine of DASP applied by organizational reformers and practitioners elsewhere in the government and by educators.

Influence

Under "normativeness" it was concluded that functionality was not a prerequisite of that test. Functionality is of fundamental importance to the "influence" test however. While an organization can be non-functional and normative because it, or something about it, is valued by the environment, influence without functionality is not possible. Generally speaking, influence is a process used by leaders in attempting to pattern the behavior of others for the achievement of goals. Therefore, influence and doctrine are related, for the exercise of influence implies the existence of doctrine (goals -- discrete and abstract, and intellectualization of goals). Doctrine leads to program, for functionality implies goal implementation through organized activities. By the same ratiocination, resources must exist for an organization to be functional or there will be no energy for system operation. Functionality brings us to another construct of the influence radical: functional linkage. If an organization is functioning other systems in its environment must be engaged in

input-output exchanges with it. In other words, the organization must be functional for someone or something; these input-output exchanges represent functional linkages with the environment. Finally, normative linkage is related to "influence" because there is an implication of the existence of norm and value protecting organizations in the environment when other variables of the radical are present -- that is, when influence attempts succeed. Thus, we see the completed radical which characterizes the "influence" stage of the continuum:



For DASP, the peculiar nature of leadership arrangements has been a critical factor in the ability of the staff agency both to influence decisions and to enlarge its sphere of action. As previously suggested, the concept of leadership structure, and two roles thereof in particular, helps to illuminate the situation. Because the role of "ends-means allocator" has been dominated by the President of the Republic, the entire chain of radicals following the basic configuration of "survival" has been affected. Accordingly, DASP has influenced the decisions of others most when Presidents have allowed it to do so. The most elaborate influence arrangement was developed during the Dictatorship. Through its coordinative systems DASP had a formidable control


and communication network through which normative and functional linkages were developed. The second role -- "ends-means articulator" -- has produced doctrinal and programmatic formalism in DASP. In contrast to the "ends-means allocator" role, which has been monopolized by the President, many leaders were able to articulate doctrine and program. Formalism has resulted inasmuch as presidential priorities often precluded the fulfillment of other goals and activities.

A final factor related to influence has been expertise. It is possible that expertise explains the motivation of presidents in not completely destroying DASP. Vargas of course created the agency and realized its usefulness as an aid in decision making. President Dutra utilized DASP's expertise to gain influence with Congress. For most presidents the agency's expertise provided a shield against unpopular decisions that could be attributed to DASP and its technology.

Autonomy

In testing DASP for institutional stability it was shown that the subtests of "autonomy" related (1) to the ability of an organization to deviate from its parent system, (2) and (3) to its abilities to garner resources and to be supported in defense -- both based upon being valued by the environment. In sum, these subtests measure the capacity of an organization to develop equilibrium relationships among the entities in its solar system. In one pan of the balance is organizational skill in controlling inputs from the environment, so that it is not dominated by that environment. As the counter weight, inputs are regulated

by environmental supporters. The art here rests upon the development of a broad base of support, coupled with a great deal of value sharing by the environment. When this arrangement has been achieved all institutional variables fall into place, especially the linkages. Dynamic equilibrium, without the dominance of any particular component is achieved. In its most advanced form, the organization has so saturated its environment that it would be impossible to trace all threads of linkage support. This phenomenon has been described in the institution building model as diffused linkage; its presence completes the institution building radical. The degree to which an organization achieves ecological diffusion of supports and values is the indicator of its approximating both "autonomy" and the idealized end state of institutionalization. The completed radical is the following:




DASP's situation in regard to the "autonomy" subtest has been described under "DASP and the General Tests of Institutionalization." Briefly, however, diffusion of supports and values into the environment precisely was what never took place. Rather, the staff agency was continually inhibited at the level of the "survival" radical because of its leadership - enabling linkage investment in the President, which, in turn, inhibited the development of widespread

bases of support. Perhaps the only period in the history of DASP in which the achievement of "autonomy" was begun, occurred during the Administration of President Dutra. This situation will be considered below under "Regime Pictures" in which some important stages in DASP's history are related to the institutional development continuum and the institution building radical.

Regime Pictures

Because of the DASP's checkered career the agency presents an interesting study in change. Its institutional development has been anything but systematic and continuous; for this reason it provides an illustration and test of the institution building radical. The institution building radical is tested by the ease or difficulty with which DASP's institutional development may be explained in its terms. The phrase "regime picture" is used because presidential regimes have most clearly marked change periods in the life of DASP. The regime pictures are shown below on the institutional development continuum. A brief discussion of the regimes in terms of the institution building radical and its component variables follows.



It was under Vargas that the basic pattern of interaction which has characterized the "survival" radical for DASP was set. The "survival" radical (Leadership (Structure) enabling linkage) has been developed as a generic concept. Institutional variation resulted from presidential domination of leadership (most often allocating priorities) and monopolization of transactions which produced enabling linkage. Under Vargas' Dictatorship DASP was normative for many individuals and groups. Its doctrine was the rationale of governmental reform, and most people associated with the agency had thoroughly internalized this doctrinal system. During the Dictatorship, DASP also qualified on the "influence" test. Its doctrine, program and resources connected with normative and functional linkages were well developed. A major vehicle through which doctrine and program were transacted into functional linkage was the device of the coordinative systems. Through these systems DASP controlled governmental activities within its purview -- the so-called administrative means (as contrasted with ends or line functions).

With the fall of the Dictatorship and the revolt of the division heads of DASP the agency was severely curtailed by Acting President Linhares. DASP's resources were diminished and its programs and structure were retrenched; hardest hit were the coordinative systems. Functionality was greatly reduced; influence suffered accordingly. Normative linkages persisted, of course, as they do today with governmental reformers and others; however, the normativeness produced by doctrine, program and resource variables in combination with functional linkages ceased. Under Vargas DASP was normative for a web of governmental agencies. By 1946 this was much less true because of the


curtailment of the agency in terms of the "influence" radical (i.e. loss of program, resources, functional linkages and functionality in general).

Shortly after his election in 1946, President Dutra found himself opposed by a majority in Congress. Out of this situation arose the opportunity for Dutra's Director General of DASP, Mario de Bittencourt Sampaio, to interpose himself between the estranged Congress and President as a channel and envoy. The institutionalization picture of DASP was much affected thereby. De Bittencourt Sampaio developed considerable support for himself and his agency through practices that violated traditional doctrine of DASP, (e.g. political trading of subventions and public works projects), by staff servicing legislators and through new programs which catered to then current Congressional whims such as national economic planning. These circumstances modified the former situation of the "survival" radical. The Director-General was sharing agency leadership with the President, and a new source of enabling linkage had been developed as a result of transactions with Congress. These transactions also produced functional linkage because of the newly developed input-output exchanges between DASP and Congress. Meanwhile normative linkages with those for whom DASP had formerly been normative were modified little because the agency continued to represent its founding values. Symbolically major programmatic change had not been firmed up and formalized to any great extent during the Dutra regime.

During this period there was some indication that DASP was moving towards "autonomy." The existence of agency support in Congress hinted at

an opening for the generation of diffused linkage. The presence of such linkage must not be over stressed however, for there was no surge of favorable public opinion. Rather, the newly developed contacts with Congress caused many legislators to see the usefulness of the staff agency; to the degree that Brazilian legislators are direct channels to, and influential over society in general, DASP moved a step towards diffused environmental supports.

By 1955, under President Juscelino Kubitschek, the institution building configuration changed greatly. DASP was retrieved into the ambit of the presidency; it returned to traditional doctrine and program concerns. Kubitschek would not permit its Director-General to develop independent power sources. DASP was used as a channel for public administration technical assistance received from the US Agency for International Development. Such technical assistance programs were blocked from implementation, however; DASP was capable of accomplishing little. Kubitschek judiciously avoided the assignment of new functionally related programs in which he had an interest such as the building of the new capitol. At the same time he allowed a great deal of formal expansion in other programs that never came to fruition. Again DASP's Director-General and others were able to articulate ends and means, but not capable of allocating them. Such formalism in the face of available resources produced a variant of the "normativeness" radical:



As described, leadership and enabling linkage once again were dominated by the President, formal doctrine and program burgeoned, and ample resources were made available through Brazilian and U.S. sources. The missing element was functionality; or, stated another way, program and resources were superfluous in the absence of functionality.


The two remaining regime pictures are presented to round out the configuration of DASP's fluctuation along the scale of institutionality. The potentiality for the Quadros Administration, had he not resigned and were he able to sustain himself in office, was much like the description of the Vargas regime. He recruited as many of the "old guard" of DASP as he could find, and articulated a role for the staff agency similar to that played during the Dictatorship. Vice President Goulart inherited the Presidency upon the resignation of Quadros. While he did not seek overtly to attenuate DASP, his behavior was restrictive and antidoctrinal. As under the Linhares regime, program and resources were denied as much as possible. This was made somewhat difficult by the agency build-up that had taken place prior to the Quadros' resignation.

Recapitulation of the Institution Building Model

Examination of the Institution Building Model in relation to the data from DASP indicates: (1) a strong suggestion of linear development of the institutionalization process through the stages of non-institution, semi-institution and institution; (2) congruent with this continuum, and based upon the findings under the "General Tests of Institutionalization", the "survival" and "normativeness" tests appear to characterize most the semi-institution, while "influence and autonomy" seemingly are more related to the institutionalized end of the scale; (3) if the principle of linearity of these tests is valid, then appropriate clusters of organizational linkage variables should be relatable to each test and to the continuum of development as a whole. The following summarizes the institutional development continuum, the institution building radical and the rationale for the hypothesized clustering of variables.

<u>Institutional Development Continuum</u>	<u>Institution Building Radical</u>	<u>Summary Rationale for Variable Clustering</u>
<u>Non-institution</u> Survival	Leadership Structure	Enabling Linkage
		<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Chrysalis effect and ancestor relationship document survival.2. Enabling linkage factor because basic to survival at metabolic level.3. Leadership has motivated supply of enabling linkage in DASP experience.4. Structure essential as proof of existence.


Normativeness



1. Assumption: interest here only in normativeness related to discrete structure (not ideas); therefore, above necessary prerequisite.
2. Functionality not necessary.
3. Doctrine: basic content of normative behavior.
4. If above, and if normative for groups and individuals, normative linkage implied.


Semi-institution

Influence



1. Previous conditions necessary.
2. Functionality prerequisite; influence acts involve overt behaviors.
3. If functional, implies doctrine, program and resources.
4. Functional linkage implied by functionality - i.e. must be functional for someone or something.

Autonomy



1. Previous conditions necessary.
2. Ability to control its environment - maintain equilibrium through previous conditions above, and through broad base of support (broad value sharing).

Institution

Finally, attention should be drawn to one difficulty presented by the foregoing set of constructs. This difficulty is concerned with a critical part of the institution building radical: "influence". DASP experience which has guided the preparation of this paper indicates that "normativeness" precedes "influence" (i.e. the latter is a more advanced test of institutionalization), therefore, normative linkage must be a part of the influence radical. When DASP was its most functional (a condition necessary for the exercise of influence) it was also its most normative. Logically this should not have to follow in other cases necessarily because influence can be exercised without the development of normative linkages. The application of an instrument of naked power is a means of influence which may not be accompanied by the incorporation of norms and values relevant to doctrine and program necessarily (i.e. normative linkage). For DASP, however, normativeness was greatly reduced once certain structural and functional features (the coordinative systems) were removed. Normative linkage continued to some degree with educators and through curricula and programs, but it suffered fundamentally when functional linkage was curtailed.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 See their: "The Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building: the Guiding Concepts," February 17, 1964 (Mimeographed).
- 2 Gilbert B. Siegel, The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP (Los Angeles: School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, International Public Administration Center No. 6, 1966).
- 3 Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, op.cit page 2.
- 4 Gilberto Amado, "As Instituicoes Politicas e o Meio Social," A Margem da Historia da Republica (Rio de Janeiro: Editora do Anuario do Brazil, 1924) p. 74.
- 5 Nelson M. e Souza and Breno Genari, Tecnicos de Organizacao Cientifica em Setores Especificas para o Desenvolvimento da Administracao Publica" IDORT, XXXI (November - December, 1962) p. 15.
- 6 Harvey Walker, "The Vargas Regime," in Brazil, Lawrence Hill, editor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), p. 108.
- 7 Siegel, op. cit. p. 38.
- 8 Karl Loewenstein, Brazil Under Vargas (New York: MacMillan Company, 1942), p. 16.
- 9 Siegel, op. cit., p. 42.
- 10 Commissao Mixta de Reforma Economica-Financaia, Relatorio da Sub-Commissao Encarregada do Reajustamento dos Quadros do Servico Publico Civil (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1935).
- 11 "Conselho Federal do Servico Publico Civil--Como Surgio o Reajustamento," Revista do Servico Publico, I (November, 1937), pp. 73-74.

¹² Siegel, op. cit., p. 50.

¹³ Constituicao dos Estados Unidos do Brasil--1937, (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1940), Article 67.

¹⁴ Siegel, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁵ Equivalent to the U.S.A. Federal Register.

¹⁶ For a discussion of the deliberations of the 1946 Constitutional Convention see: Siegel, op. cit., pp. 100-103.

¹⁷ For more about the SALTE Plan and planning in general in Brazil see: Siegel, op. cit., pp. 107-109.

¹⁸ See an example of the optimism expressed by DASP Director-General Arizio de Viana in: DASP, An Institution at the Service of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brazil Section and Imprensa Nacional, 1955), passim, and especially p. 38. The fact that this document was published in English shows a posture of "look what we are going to do now."

¹⁹ For a description of economic progress under the Kubitschek Administration and documentation, see: Siegel, op.cit., pp. 115-117.

²⁰ After he got his foreign service appointment, one newspaper described the event as: "Peace had come to the Kingdom of Arago." News item Ultima Hora, October 16, 1959, p. 15, col. 2, Rio de Janeiro.

²¹ For a case study see: Siegel, op. cit., pp. 151-173.