

301.4072

096

PNAB#EUS
ISN 71422

UNDER WHAT SOCIAL CONDITIONS CAN PEASANTS
AND OTHER SOCIAL GROUPS ORGANIZE?

By

William H. Overholt
Hudson Institute, Inc.
Quaker Ridge Road
Croton-on-Hudson
New York 10520

HI-2007/2-D

Prepared for the Southeast Asia Development Advisory
Group Rural Development Panel Seminar on "Peasant
Organization in Southeast Asia," September 25-27, 1975,
in New York

Under What Social Conditions Can Peasants and Other Social..

301.4072 Hudson Institute, Inc.
096 Under What Social Conditions Can Peasants
and Other Social Groups Organize? William
H. Overholt. Sep. 1975(?).

1 v.

Prepared for the SEADAG Development Panel
Seminar on Peasant Organization in Southeast Asia,
New York, Sept. 25-27, 1975.

1. Peasantry. 2. Sociology, Rural. 3. Organizations. 4. Socio-
political development. 5. Social conditions. I. Overholt,
William H. II. Title. III. SEADAG. IV. Peasant Organization
in Southeast Asia.

Copyright ©, William H. Overholt

A.I.D.
Reference Center
Room 1006 NS

UNDER WHAT SOCIAL CONDITIONS CAN PEASANTS
AND OTHER SOCIAL GROUPS ORGANIZE?

Under what conditions can a social group become politically influential? That question is the key to the sociology of politics. The answer varies, but there is always a constant in the answer: a social group can exercise deliberate political influence only to the extent that its members can coordinate their activities for political purposes. That is, a group can influence politics only if it is organized. Under what conditions then can a group organize or be organized? This is the crucial question addressed here.

There is a second constant part in the answer to the initial question: the conditions under which a group can become politically influential depend on the nature of the political system in which the group is located. Now it turns out that each kind of political system (democracy, revolutionary system, mobilization system, segmental tribe, etc.) can be described by the ways in which the ability of groups to organize is distributed and channeled. Noticing this, we can turn around and characterize kinds of political systems by the way in which they allocate and channel organizational capabilities. If organizational capabilities can then be expressed in terms of a small number of measurable variables, political sociology will have taken a major step forward: it will have defined political systems at the most abstract level, and analyzed the internal dynamics of those systems, in terms of a small number of measurable variables. This paper seeks such variables as part of the search for general solutions to the problem of the conditions under which groups can organize.

If the above argument can be sustained, then analysis of the social basis of political organization is the key problem of both political sociology and comparative politics. Not surprisingly, perspectives on (and assumptions about) the social basis of political organization pervade the literature of political sociology; stratification theories, group theories, various autonomous organization theories, and social stability theories¹ all make contributions to, and rest upon assumptions about, this issue. But there is a corresponding tendency to take the solution of the the problem for granted, to assume the triviality of the problem and to hasten toward more immediate issues on the basis of unexamined assumptions regarding this more fundamental issue. Construction of a science was never accomplished by taking fundamental issues for granted.

This essay will survey various literatures within political sociology for insights into the general problem of organizational capability, then pull the insights together into a coherent theory of group capabilities for organization, and of the ways different kinds of political systems channel such capabilities. The following survey serves three essential purposes: (1) to demonstrate the extraordinary isomorphisms among diverse parts of sociology; (2) to demonstrate how central and pervasive the question of groups' ability to organize is for social and political theory; and (3) to justify key decisions, such as the choice of a definition of organization, in the synthesis that follows this survey.

Stratification Theories

Stratification theories explain aspects of politics by reference to the different desires and resources of various social groups. A brief

survey of some parts of these theories will leach out their insights regarding the social basis of political organization.

Stratification theories begin with Aristotle, who divides each state into the wealthy, the middle class, and the poor, and further subdivides the poor into agricultural, commercial and manual workers.² In assessing the political impact of the various groups within a system, he notes that wealthy people are too busy to take time off for political activity, that the poor are too subservient, and that the farmers are unavailable for political activity because they are tied to their land and thus can't spend their time going to town for politics. He favors an agrarian population with a large middle class, because the citizenry will then participate moderately in politics.³ He appeals primarily to the variables *availability* (time for politics), *autonomy* (lack of psychological or social or political restraints on using available time for politics), and *propinquity*. In questions of ultimate political conflict, he sees the outcome of struggle among social groups as determined by the relative *quantity* and *quality* of the groups, where quality refers to freedom, wealth, education, and good birth. He misses such intervening variables as organization.

Marx makes no such error. His basic criterion defining a class, drawn from Ricardian economics, is the relation of a group to the means of production. But his analysis of the peasants makes clear that, even though they have a common relation to the means of production, "[I]n so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization, they do not form a class."⁴ His explanation for the lack of political organization among the peasants notes their

physical isolation from one another, the lack of *interaction* and *communications* among them, their *poverty*, and their lack of diverse *talents*. In addition, he notes that as a consequence of their inability to organize themselves, their political representative could only constitute an unlimited power over them. In all these respects industrial workers differ simply. Concentrated in factories, their physical *propinquity* provides excellent *communications*, facilitates *consciousness* of their common plight, and allows a division of labor which develops a variety of *skills*, all of which enhance their ability to organize.

Seeking to follow Marx, Bukharin identifies preconditions which a class must possess if it is "to shunt society from the capitalist track:"⁵ economic exploitation, political oppression, poverty, productivity, freedom from private property, and conditions of union. The first three are motivating conditions. Whereas Marx employs poverty as an explanation of why the peasants *are not* a class, both Marx and Bukharin employ poverty as an explanation of why the workers *are* a class. The contradiction is only apparent, since in the case of both workers and peasants poverty *motivates* organization, but in the case of the peasants poverty also deprives them of the *technical* capacities (such as communications) required for organization; the excellent technical conditions of the factories eradicate the ill effects of poverty in that respect. Productivity is a subcategory of Marx's category, "skills." Bukharin's "conditions of union" seem to be the *propinquity* and communications to which Marx refers.

Max Weber has argued that class organization is facilitated by *conflict* with another group where the conflict of interests is vital and direct, *common conditions*, ability to achieve *propinquity*, and *leadership* directed

to *understandable common goals*.⁶ He stresses the effect on the political activity of a group of its economic *dispensability*, in the sense of ability to devote time to politics without severe economic loss. Lawyers and rentiers are dispensable in this sense, whereas workers, entrepreneurs and journalists are not.⁷ This observation is as applicable to people acting as members of political groups as it is to people participating individually in government positions. Weber also calls attention to the importance for class organization of the *transparency* of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the 'class situation,' and links this transparency to general intellectual conditions and to the absence of cross-cutting determinants of relations among classes.⁸

Contemporary writers have continued to focus on the capabilities of peasants and various kinds of workers. Mao Tse-tung's "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society"⁹ confines itself to the degree of hardship experienced by each class, its degree of geographical concentration, and its size. Most analyses of rural political upheaval¹⁰ have focused primarily on aspects of social structure which are presumed to *motivate* rural discontent, but the failure to investigate interactions between motivating conditions and technical conditions has led to contradictory and insignificant results.

A survey of Latin American peasant¹¹ movements finds that Latin American peasants are overcoming the Marxian obstacles to political effectiveness. According to Anibal Quijano Obregon, contact with urban values, erosion of feudal belief systems, the decreasing power of the rural elite, increasing social differentiation among the peasants, increasing communications within the peasantry, and emergence of social

groups between the elite and the peasants, facilitate the consciousness and organization of the peasants. Initially organized by urban leaders, they eventually acquire the ability to maintain autonomous political organizations.

Barrington Moore¹² argues that solidarity among peasants exists wherever the spread of a market economy has not destroyed an older network of cooperative relationships and cites Marx's analysis of the French peasants as an example of the latter situation. According to Moore, radical solidarity occurs wherever there are conflicts with overlords concerning scarce land, and conservative solidarity occurs where there is a high degree of cooperation with the overlord in the achievement of some common purpose. But Moore sees the peasantry as capable only of destruction, and dependent upon leadership from other groups who inevitably turn on the peasants when they construct a new regime. Similarly, a survey of Balkan peasant uprisings found that peasants preferred jacqueries to organized revolution because the outside leadership necessary to organized revolution invariably turned on the peasants.¹³ The crucial issue for these writers is *leadership*.

A survey of twentieth century peasant revolutions by Eric Wolfe emphasizes the disruptive effects of the capitalist market on peasant society and the handicaps of the peasant in taking political action.¹⁴ The handicaps consist of the peasant's isolated work and competitive relationship with other peasants, his inability to leave his work for political activity and then return to it without suffering economic damage, the community mutual aid and ability to survive on a subsistence crop which tie the peasant to his land and community, the peasant interests

which cut across class alignments, and the peasant's characteristic lack of decision-making experience. Wolfe's analysis thus appeals to variables of *isolation, interests, availability, autonomy, and leadership.*

Studies of industrial workers refer to the same variables, usually discovering a high capability for organization. Chilean miners possess a sharp class consciousness and are highly organized, due to high *interaction* among the miners, high *propinquity*, and *isolation* from other groups.¹⁵ Likewise, in "American capitalism" the powerful corporations provide their workers with countervailing organizational power because of their conditions of work.¹⁶

A broad comparative study by Kerr and Siegel¹⁷ of unions in various industries found that propensity to strike depended primarily on organizational ability to strike, and more specifically that propensity to strike varies positively with: (1) homogeneity of the work group; (2) isolation of the group from the larger community, including isolation due to lack of mobility out of the group; (3) the cohesive capability of the group, as determined by their frequency of interaction, rate of turnover and absence of cultural barriers; and (4) the unpleasantness of the work. An independent partial test of this theory by Lammers¹⁸ confirmed the Kerr and Siegel hypotheses and added the influence of effects of norms and sanctions. Lammers also found that the outcome of strikes correlated most highly with the relative organizational strength of the union, where organizational strength is defined as a composite of degree of member participation, degree of agreement among leaders, and clarity of strategy. On the other hand, the outcomes of mutinies correlated most highly with the intervention of third parties.

The most systematic contemporary studies of the social basis of political organization have been Seymour Martin Lipset's analyses of the formation of a democratic political party among Saskatchewan farmers,¹⁹ of student protest groups,²⁰ and of the maintenance of a democratic opposition party within the International Typographers Union.²¹ Lipset's work gains added importance from his demonstration that modes of analysis previously applied primarily to class-based revolutionary insurgent groups and unions are applicable to class-based and non-class-based democratic political parties and also to student protest groups.

In Saskatchewan an atomized community of farmers faced a discriminatory unified grain exchange. Older farmers gradually became disillusioned with the idea systems which supported the status quo,²² and the Grain Exchange gradually became *visible* as the economic enemy because of a series of issues, incidents, and crises.²³ This visibility was enhanced by the obviousness of the economic restraints on the wheat farmers, by "the clarity of the relation between wheat prices and total welfare," and by the homogeneity of the community's economic interests.²⁴ On the other hand, organization was hampered by the absence of committed *leadership*, by the influx of new settlers to whom the issues were not yet visible, by the presence of immigrants who did not speak English, by the need for financial investment in cooperatives, and by the absence of an adequate *communications* network.²⁵ These obstacles were overcome by training leaders through experience, by educational activities, by founding a farmers' newspaper, and by constructing a decentralized organization which constituted a communications network. The resulting organization was politically effective in a democracy and democratic in internal

structure. The crucial determinants of organizational capability here were communications, leadership, and the visibility of issues; the need for financial investment appears to be a special strategic need rather than a general organizational need. (The distinction will be further clarified later.)

In a study of the International Typographers' Union, Lipset, Trow and Coleman found that the ability to maintain an organized democratic opposition within a union was facilitated by such factors as: autonomy of the members, homogeneous interests, absence of divisive conditions (notably stratification), having a minimal gap between worker leadership capabilities and the leadership requirements of running the union, a low probability that the leadership will be coopted by another group, interaction, communications, having a variety of functions performed by a single group, identification of members, leisure and money among the members, and ideological differences with the opponent organization. The analyses of student protest groups appeal to similar sets of basic variables.

Lipset frequently treats political organization as a step on the way to class consciousness.²⁶

The transformation of a group from a large mass of individuals, who do not recognize the existence of a basic, common class interest, to a self-conscious class occurs through the intervening factor of organized group action.

In other words Lipset, unlike Marx, treats political organization not merely as part of the definition of a conscious class, but also as a way of achieving consciousness. Whereas other writers stress that groups must possess awareness of common conditions in order to organize, Lipset stresses organization as a method of achieving awareness. Both views are

of course correct, since organization requires some reason for organizing and visibility of that reason, and since the existence of an organization increases the visibility of the reason for organizing. Likewise organization requires communications, but the existence of an organization also enhances communications. This is an important set of feedback loops. The focus on consciousness rather than organization as the central problem is confusing, however. If consciousness is distinct from organization, then focusing on it throws us back into the realm of individual psychology or upward into the development of group norms; it seems preferable to focus on the problem of organization, because modes of conflict among political organizations can then be used to define the political system.

Like Lipset, Dahrendorf seeks to take elements of the Marxian conceptual scheme and to modernize them. Dahrendorf acknowledges that class conflict is only one cause of social conflict and social change²⁸ and redefines the concept "class" as a relation to authority rather than as a relation to the means of production. According to him, every imperatively coordinated association has people who rule and people who are ruled; the objective interests of these two groups conflict, whether the members realize it or not. As long as the members are unaware of these objective interests, the interests are "latent"; when they become conscious individual orientations they are "manifest."²⁹ Aggregates of people with identical latent interests are called "quasi-groups"; recruited from these quasi-groups are organized "interest groups."³⁰ Now the old question returns: how do quasi-groups generate one or more interest groups? Dahrendorf identifies several kinds of preconditions for organization of an interest group:³¹ technical conditions (personnel, founders, and an

ideology articulating and codifying interests), a political condition (absence of political repression), and social conditions (communications, and recruitment to the quasi-group which "follows a structural pattern rather than chance"). Dahrendorf denies that communications are ever a scarce organizational resource in an industrial society,³² but such a view is untenable: the costs of communication are prohibitive for groups like traveling salesmen. And when he generalizes from this that ruling and suppressed classes invariably have equal chances to organize, he ignores substantial differences in availability, leadership skills, and autonomy. These differences are not always present but they certainly are not always absent.

This stratification literature converges on a limited set of preconditions of organization (communications, leadership, availability, autonomy, propinquity, interests, visibility of those interests), together with a variety of other variables which can be interpreted as affecting those preconditions. The literature diverges in the class of aggregates (potential unions, revolutionists, management interests groups, democratic political parties in a society, student protest groups, democratic political parties in a union...) to which the analysis applies, and it diverges a great deal in the language used to express basically similar ideas. These preconditions appear to be very general in the sense that any aggregate of people would require them in order to organize, despite the fact that they were leached out of a literature basically devoted to the analysis of classes. Regrettably, the choice of a set of variables by any given writer tends to be unsystematic and promiscuous: unsystematic in the sense that each neglects variables convincingly identified by others as crucial, and

promiscuous in the sense that all sorts of variables are lumped together with little regard for theoretical coherence. Variables like "poverty" and "isolation" have contradictory effects on ability to organize and therefore must enter the analysis of organizational ability indirectly, through more basic intervening variables. More generally, any variables whose effects can be subsumed under intervening variables should be removed from the basic theory. (Science consists not of amassing great numbers of correlations, but of reducing multifarious relationships to a few manageable hypotheses.)

Having concentrated on the insights stratification theory provides into the social preconditions of political organization, one must recall that much of the stratification literature assumes erroneously the automatic translation of social cleavages into political action.³³ Stratification translates into political action only through organization, and organization does not occur automatically even when its preconditions are present. Moreover, organizations can often manipulate issues and political groups in ways that do not follow directly from the social base.

Group Theories

Most stratification theories rescue and refine fragments of Marx's analysis: Dahrendorf the concept of class, Lipset a more generalized analysis of the social basis of political consciousness, and so forth. Twentieth century group theories originate primarily in Bentley's feeling that the Marxian worldview of interacting groups is useful but too "rigid."³⁴ Reacting against the institutionalism and the psychological reductionism of his day, and against the rigidity of Marxism, Bentley

strips Marxism of all scientific content and leaves us with a disembodied world view of political activity ("organization groups," in his terms) and all thought ("discussion groups") resulting from the conflicting interests of various groups. Moreover, the obvious political groups (e.g., parties) and intellectual currents merely represent "underlying groups" based on such factors as the physical environment, wealth, population, industrial technique, communications and transportation, and the manner in which these underlying factors are organized (e.g., the corporation).³⁵ Political groups conflict, gaining advantages from size, from intensity of interest, and from such techniques as blows, bribes, allurements, arguments, and organization.³⁶ While he recognizes that groups can be effective only in extreme situations unless they organize,³⁷ Bentley holds that a political group which "represents" a large group will inevitably win over a smaller group. Of the mass group he says,³⁸

There is a tendency to action among them. If sufficiently goaded they will certainly come to 'know' their own interest.

...

The strength of the cause rests inevitably in the underlying group and nowhere else.

In short he believes that all political activity has its roots in social interests, that some interests are "manifest" and others "latent,"³⁹ and that latent interests invariably rise to attain influence appropriate to their size and intensity. Why the latter should be true we are not told. He has obfuscated the fundamental problem of organization.

Having convinced himself that groups automatically attain their proper influence in this way, it follows that government is just another group⁴⁰ which "has no value in itself, except as one aspect of the process,"⁴¹ and that the outcome of group pressures will be identical

whether the government consists of a tyrant or of fair representatives of all interests.⁴² Moreover, society as a whole consists merely of "the balance of the group pressures,"⁴³ and does not enter into the explanation of any political phenomenon.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, all groups in society reflect a noncontroversial "habit background" which reflects "rules of the game,"⁴⁵ and whole nations can be considered as groups in an analysis of war.⁴⁶ Here he has fallen into the same trap as those modern sociologists who assume that fundamental conflict within a society precludes fundamental consensus.

Bentley's group "theory" is more than a terminology but less than a theory. It is in Rosenau's term a "pre-theory," a way of looking at the world.⁴⁷ Its discussion of groups, interests and pressures reads like a theory, but reduces to tautologies, because all three terms are defined merely as "activity."⁴⁸ "If we say activity, we have said all."⁴⁹ Bentley knew and acknowledged most of this. He intended only to provide a worldview, "to fashion a tool." He constantly emphasized that his work was provisional. His view of social groups "underlying" political conflict underlies most of the modern sociology of politics, and his focus on politics and society as activity underlies modern theories of social action. But he did not provide basic propositions about groups which would have vivified his world view in the way that Einstein's equations vivified the view of the physical world as a geometrical field.

Bentley sought an empirical science based on measurable variables,⁵⁰ but was unable to carry it through--as he was quick to admit.⁵¹ His followers have either moved to a higher level of abstraction rather than providing scientific content,⁵² or they have abandoned the search for a

general theory of politics and settled for atheoretic case studies of the size, wealth, beliefs, and influence strategies of various pressure groups.⁵³ Some theorists have argued that the narrower focus is more useful,⁵⁴ and Zeigler has gone so far as to deny that group theories sought comprehensive theory.⁵⁵ Others (e.g., Truman) have just moved to second order problems while seeming to stay within the realm of general theory.⁵⁶

Unlike Bentley, Truman moves very quickly to empirical propositions about all interest groups, focusing on the central problems of cohesion and leadership. Truman defines interest groups in terms of shared attitudes,⁵⁷ thereby building into the definition a motivation for common political activity and sidestepping the problems of "consciousness" and "objective interest" that tantalize stratification theorists. He argues that overlapping memberships (i.e., conflicting attitudes) lead to inner conflict and a tendency to withdraw from activity.⁵⁸ He also lists as determinants of cohesion: communications, size which increases heterogeneity, leadership struggles, differential impact of external change, and group heterogeneity.⁵⁹ Since group size and differential impact of external change have their effects on cohesion through the intervening variable of heterogeneity, they are not central to his theory of cohesion. Truman argues that federated groups are frequently less cohesive than unitary ones "where the constituent units antedate the federal body," where the constituent units formalize lines of cleavage rather than cutting across them, and where the powers of the central leadership are inadequate to the circumstances in which the group finds itself.⁶⁰ In other words, the greater the cohesion and legitimacy of subunits relative to the central body, the less the cohesion of the organization as a whole.

Like Bentley, Truman acknowledges that some groups which seemingly should possess political influence are unorganized. When shared attitudes exist in the absence of interaction, Truman therefore refers to "potential groups," the analogue of Bentley's latent groups. He argues that "organization indicates merely a stage of interaction" and like Bentley emphasizes the possibility that these groups will be goaded into action and the resulting deterrent influence on political decisions contrary to their interest.⁶¹

The interests of the potential groups are usually widespread, though momentarily weak, and as such serve to limit in a general way the behavior of the more apparent participants in politics. The unacknowledged power of such unorganized interests lies in the possibility that, if these wide, weak interests are too flagrantly ignored, they may be stimulated to organize for aggressive counteraction.

This is a happy conclusion, but a conclusion dependent on an assumption that all any group needs in order to organize is a little more motivation.

Truman sees groups as seeking "access" to governmental decision processes, and as assisted in this search by their status in society, by certain internal characteristics, and by the nature of governmental institutions. The internal determinants of effectiveness in gaining access are cohesion, organization, size, financing, and technique, according to him.⁶²

Truman's analyses of the conditions for cohesion, and of leadership strategies to maintain cohesion, provide a body of propositions which give some content to a theory about groups in the political process. This analysis does not in itself constitute a complete theory, nor would a complete theory of shared-attitude groups in the political process ever constitute a full theory of politics in the sense intended by Bentley.

Truman's focus on access to governmental decision processes as the goal of groups permits him to state that "Government is not simply a neutral force,"⁶³ and his focus on shared attitudes facilitates his argument that attitudes from the whole society can impose structural forms on groups within the society.⁶⁴ Indeed, one can almost refer to the whole society as a group, since "society is the interactions of men,"⁶⁵ and in Truman's view one can refer to government as a group.⁶⁶ But Truman takes for granted the society as a whole and he takes for granted a basically American structure of government, thereby limiting his theory to an analysis of interest groups seeking access to American government.

The concept of access is not nearly so fruitful as the concept of cohesion in Truman's work, despite a prevalent view to the contrary. Access is amorphous and vague. Moreover, access is not so important as influence⁶⁷ in a stable system, and it is almost worthless in analyzing the major features of a revolutionary system. Thus the crucial contribution of Truman to group theories of politics is the general concept of cohesion and its preconditions. For the purposes of this essay, what is even more interesting is that the preconditions of organization of interest groups discovered by Truman are fully consistent with the preconditions of organization of parties and classes discovered by the stratification theorists.

Andrew Janos⁶⁸ has also employed group theory which deals directly with the ability of groups to compete politically. He suggests that all politically ambitious groups must possess: communications; solidarity; freedom from accountability to outside groups; and control of their own group structure, resources, and leadership. He subsumes these under

"integration" and "autonomy." According to him, all such groups pursue their goals through rational persuasion, political deals, or threats, and all such groups can be categorized in terms of representativeness and of the extent to which they include various aspects of members' lives. Political systems can be categorized according to the extent that conflicting group interests are regarded as legitimate and are systematically aggregated (reconciliation system) or not (fragmented system). Janos's hypotheses regarding the preconditions of group influence are once again consistent with other findings although he omits key variables. What he adds to a group theory is the attempt to characterize the political system as a whole in terms of the way group interests are channeled by that system. His primitive dichotomy (reconciliation system vs. fragmented system) will not take us very far, nor did Janos intend a full definition of whole systems in terms of the channeling of interests. But his step is important and suggestive, and worth further effort.

Most contemporary writers in the tradition of group theory have been less ambitious. Typically they acknowledge the overwhelming importance of organization, but then ignore the problem of specifying the conditions that facilitate organization. Some, like Latham, bury the problem in a trichotomy (incipient, conscious, and organized groups), others like Wootton ignore it completely, and the majority circumvent it by defining interest groups in ways that presuppose uniformity of interest, consciousness of that interest, and existing organization.⁶⁹ Various "small group" studies begin by providing their groups with all the preconditions of organization, although they occasionally manipulate communication and leadership, and concentrate on group process and structure.⁷⁰ Whereas

the older group theorists tended to recognize the social basis of political organization as the central problem, and then to obfuscate the answer by assuming that injury to a group's interests would automatically lead it to organize, contemporary students have hidden this central issue behind their definitions and spent their energies observing small groups which have been provided in advance with all the preconditions of organization. Despite the early group theorists, economically affected groups may remain inert.⁷¹ Despite the contemporary empiricists, "We frequently have recognized the social basis for politics, but as yet have not perfected the tools for analysis."⁷²

Before proceeding to several criticisms of group theories, it is worthwhile to notice a consensus in the group literature on the way the subject should be divided analytically. Each theorist suggests that organization requires certain preconditions or resources (e.g., communications, autonomy, leadership...) for organization. The cohesion facilitated by these preconditions is mobilized or maintained or both by leaders or representatives. The resulting organization then is characterized as possessing certain resources for conflict with other groups (e.g., money, size, knowledge) which are deployed in accordance with some *techniques* to attain group goals. Thus we have a sequence of analyses (preconditions of organization; strategies of organization; conflict resources; conflict strategies) built into the literature. Some writers emphasize one part of the sequence, some emphasize others, but the sequence as a whole coheres. Moreover, the utility of the distinction between affective and instrumental leadership in analyzing political phenomena from small groups to national politics⁷³ suggests that this basic distinction between internal and

external politics, and their corresponding resources and strategies, is sound (Cf. Chart I.)

A fundamental challenge to group theories comes from Mancur Olson, Jr.,⁷⁴ who questions the belief of virtually all group theorists (and stratification theorists also) that shared interests are sufficient motivation for coordinated activity. The shared interests, he argues, are usually public goods in the sense that benefits obtained by a group cannot then be denied to any member of the group. Since each member will obtain the group benefits whether he contributes to the group or not, and since the withdrawal of any member from a large group will not affect the attainment of the benefits, there is no incentive for any member to remain active in the group. Olson concludes that in large groups adequate organization can only be obtained by utilizing organizations that already exist for other purposes or by providing special benefits or punishments that are private goods in order to motivate active membership. Small groups, according to Olson, are different because the withdrawal of a single member will make a noticeable difference in the provision of the public good. Thus, relying on variables common to group theorists (size, communications, interests), he arrives at diametrically opposed conclusions. Even if a group is conscious, he tells us, it will not succeed in organizing.

Olson's argument presumes that individuals act according to a narrow, short-term individual rationality, an assumption upon which much of modern economics has prospered. And Olson's evidence regarding economic interest groups is largely convincing. But people do vote, despite the cost of their time and despite the low probability that one vote will make a difference. And people do join political discussion groups, or massive

marches on Washington, despite the personal cost, large group size, and small impact of individual participation. In an indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, players typically do not act according to narrow, short term, individual rationality.

A number of mechanisms suggest why many political groups do not behave according to the expectations created by Olson's theory. First, many political groups provide special benefits of self-esteem, comradeship, and so forth, that are obtainable only through active participation. This is in accord with Olson's theory, but Olson does not adequately emphasize the extraordinary diversity of such special benefits in many political groups. Second, most political groups are federations, which (as Olson points out) makes the small group theory applicable rather than the large group theory. Just as important, even in the absence of formal federalism, interlocking local social pressures can often make a large group act like a federated group. Third, as Frohlich and Oppenheimer⁷⁵ demonstrate, the existence of a mechanism which calls attention to the effects of individual non-participation can eradicate the effects of large size on motivation.

Fourth, Olson's argument is frequently a self-defeating prediction. Kant was not the only human to feel that "What if everybody acted that way?" was a sufficient reason not to act in individually rational but anti-social ways. Conceptions of duty, morality, and self-esteem often operate here, as do practical considerations of the consequences of a norm of individual, short-run rationality. People do contribute to the Red Cross, frequently through strangers arriving privately at their doors. Fifth, a substantial part of political activity represents the projection into the public arena of private conflicts;⁷⁶ when those private conflicts are socially conditioned and shared, they may provide a basis for group activity that is

outside the realm of Olson's carefully calculated external rationality. Sixth, individuals frequently build their personal identities around group memberships; when an individual identifies with a group, he will calculate his *personal* benefits and costs in part according to the *group* benefits and costs. That is to say, he will identify his own interests with those of the group, and see non-participation as a betrayal of himself. All of these considerations, together with Olson's argument from individuals' short-term rationality, can be summarized in the statement that individuals may coordinate their behavior with others either from expectation of some calculated exterior (i.e., not purely psychological) gain or from a sense of solidarity with other members of the group. Such a formulation differs from Olson's in the ways noted, and it differs from the earlier group theorists' formulations in not assuming that expected gains necessarily come from fully common or shared attitudes.

Whereas Olson's argument strikes at group theories' accounts of groups' ability to organize deliberately, a tradition of analysis parallel to group theories argues that that organization (defined as coordination) can be the latent consequence of partisan strategies. Adam Smith⁷⁷ argued that when numerous independent entrepreneurs participate in a market, supply and demand would be coordinated by price, and various desirable consequences would follow. Smith's argument rests on the interesting premises that perfect information is available throughout the market, yet the group of entrepreneurs is so large and dispersed that deliberate coordination of their activities is impossible. The key variables in this theory are interests, communications, propinquity, and group size. Deliberate coordination enters Smith's theory when he notes the advantages (e.g., in dexterity) of the division of labor *within* the firm.

Several modern writers have applied Smithian arguments to politics. Truman and Bentley, who see society as a rather mysterious stable equilibrium of group pressures, employ a vague and untestable invisible hand argument. Lindblom⁷⁸ argues more rigorously that various forms of "partisan mutual adjustment" among conflicting groups will lead, not necessarily to equilibrium, but to various desirable states such as Pareto optimality, reasoned debate, and broad assent to decisions. Lindblom's discussion of partisan mutual adjustment avoids mention of the relative degree of organization of interest groups, and of the effects of varying degrees of organization on policy outcomes, but his work with Dahl argues the importance of relative organization in bargaining.⁷⁹

This literature from both economics and political science shows that any general discussion of coordination or organization must distinguish deliberate coordination from ecological coordination. Second, it demonstrates flaws in the assumption that "shared attitudes" imply the possibility of deliberate coordination.⁸⁰ (Surely entrepreneurs in a single market possess shared attitudes.) Third, awareness that shared attitudes are seldom perfectly partisan suggests that ecological and deliberate coordination are more intimately related than is apparent from the rather different theories which analyze them. Fourth, the Smithian argument's appeals to the variable of propinquity, interests, group size, and communications suggest resonances with stratification theory and orthodox group theory. The positive effect of communications on both ecological and deliberate coordination creates a rather delicate balance in a theory dependent upon the presence of one kind of coordination and the absence of the other.

Group theories tend to provide inadequate accounts of the roles of institutions.⁸¹ Truman, Bentley and Latham acknowledge that government is a group, but the accounts of government, and of society as a whole, are inadequate. Olson's individualistic group theory neglects the effects of institutions and institutionalized norms. (Smith provides an adequate account of the role of government in maintaining the market, and Lindblom gives attention to formal decision-making and to governmental agencies.) Better accounts of the roles of institutions could vitiate the valid criticism that group theories are usually concerned only with subsystems.⁸² Moreover, such accounts would show whether group theories are applicable to more than one kind of political system. (Most orthodox group theories, by some unspoken convention, end with an exposition of group influence in an obviously American system of legislature, judiciary and executive. This, together with an implicit assumption of free interplay among groups, leads critics like Weinstein to argue that the theory is applicable only in democratic systems.⁸³ On the other hand, Huntington argues that group models are most applicable to societies like those of Eastern Europe;⁸⁴ in the same volume Janos urges "utmost caution" in applying group models to Eastern European politics.)⁸⁵ Moreover, imputation to each cohesive group, including the government, of a formal or informal decision process which aggregates individual views into a group view would scotch once and for all the erroneous belief that group theories of politics necessarily deny the possibility of individual political efficacy.⁸⁶ In this respect group theory can gain a great deal from various autonomous organization theories.

Autonomous Organization Theories

Stratification and group theories of politics focus on the generation by society of organized political actors. Other theories take for granted the existence of organizations. Organization theory⁸⁷ studies the internal structure and process of organizations. Game theory⁸⁸ analyzes methods by which an individual or a perfectly coordinated group can cope with opponents in various highly abstract environments. Market economics and partisan mutual adjustment theory discuss some ecological consequences of certain forms of competition among groups whose internal organization is taken for granted. Although these theories do not always explicitly address the question of the conditions under which organization is possible, all of them make assumptions about (or contributions to) the related question of the conditions under which an existing organization can remain viable.

For market theory the criterion of survival is the ability of the firm to earn a profit or at least to avoid losses that destroy the firm's assets. Game theory provides a similar result if one assumes a finite sum game and if one assumes that loss of all assets constitutes destruction of one of the players. (Neither assumption holds for all or even most games.) Partisan mutual adjustment theory implies that interest groups can survive only if the interests of the individual members continue their potency. Such abbreviated answers are appropriate to theories which focus on interaction among organizations rather than upon organizations themselves; they provide a useful shorthand for determining who is in the game and who is not. But we should be wary when we find organization theory, which is the study of the anatomy and physiology of organizations, giving us the same kind of answer.

Before considering in detail the contributions of organization theories to understanding of organizational viability or of the viability to organize, we can perhaps acquire some insight into a prior problem: what is organization? Surely any organization theory must be based on a concept of organization, as must any inquiry into groups' ability to organize. The problem is not trivial, for "there is no point at which one can make a clean surgical cut between organizations and non-organizations."⁸⁹ In the most ambitious recent attempt to create a theory of organizations, March and Simon choose to give examples of organizations rather than to define them,⁹⁰ a decision that augurs ill for the construction of rigorous theory. Some organization theorists seek to delimit their subject by distinguishing it from small units like the family; these writers refer to "large organizations" or "complex organizations." But Blau and Scott⁹¹ rightly point out that society is large and complex and organized but is not what the organization theorists had in mind. They and others therefore identify their subject as "formal organizations," meaning organizations which are deliberately created. But recent years have witnessed the deliberate creation of whole nations, so the concept of formal organization fails to achieve its purpose. Another definitional tactic fails because its referent is a strategy of organizing, not the organization itself: "Organization is the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities."⁹²

Bakke provides a compendious concept of social organization:⁹³

a continuing system of differentiated and coordinated human activities utilizing, transforming and welding together a specific set of human, material, capital, ideational, and natural resources into a unique problem-solving whole engaged

in satisfying particular human needs in interaction with other systems of human activities and resources in its environment.

He goes on to say that definition of a particular organization would specify an organizational charter, basic resources, activity processes, and bonds of organization which integrate charter, resources and processes. Then he elaborates each of these. Defining a basic concept in ponderous fashion destroys from the beginning all hopes of elegant theory. It renders science impossible. A definition is a scalpel for filleting reality, not a catalog for flailing at it.

The struggle to construct theory around a concept of organization that is blatantly undefined or ill-defined derives from organization theorists' focus on business and (secondarily) government. Organization theory is engineering, not science, and many organization theorists are concerned that they not lose direct touch with their clients. Krupp⁹⁴ notes that

Managerial problems and unifying behavior are central concerns; the main variables are absenteeism, cohesiveness, communications, cooperation, competition, leadership, labor turnover, productivity, morale, participation, satisfaction, size, status, task fulfillment.

Becker and Gordon carry the attempt to limit organization theory to business to its logical conclusion when they define formal organization as "a purposely developed system, i.e., an ongoing interaction of procedures and resources, to which an owner has property rights."⁹⁵ Such a definition is only a little less discrete than the others. Bakke, a respected theorist, has argued that among the criteria for a definition of a social organization should be the ability of managers to recognize translated versions of the terms and the inclusion *in the definition* of all variables which managers consider critically important.⁹⁶

A science of organization can no more be built upon such definitions of the basic concept than physics could be built upon a definition of matter as "large, deliberately constructed chunks of concrete and steel." Science will require an elegant and general formulation, along lines suggested by Weber, by Barnard, and by Lasswell and Kaplan.⁹⁷

An "organization" is a system of continuous purposive activity of a specific kind. A "corporate organization" is an associative social relationship characterized by an administrative staff devoted to such continuous purposive activity.

It is the central hypothesis of this book that the most useful concept for the analysis of experience of cooperative systems is embodied in the definition of a formal organization as a *system of consciously coordinated activities of two or more persons.*

Cooperation is the integration of diversified operations; solidarity, of diversified perspectives....Organization is a pattern of solidarity and cooperation.

From this conclusion regarding definitions we may proceed to a search for clues from organization theory regarding our central question, "Under what conditions can social aggregates organize?"

Organization Theories and the Ability to Organize

The direct predecessors of modern organization theory sought to help managers make their businesses more profitable. Scientific management theory, popularly identified with "efficiency experts," emphasized efficient use of physical skills by laborers and developed methods of time and motion study to implement their ideas. Human relations theory, the psychological counterpart of time and motion study, examined the behavioral processes which contribute to a stable firm. Administrative design theory sought structural principles for constructing firms that would be conducive to efficient conduct of work in accordance with management goals.

Modern organization theories carry forward one or more of these older approaches or seek to integrate structural principles and psychological insights into more comprehensive theory, usually starting with Max Weber's monumental theory of bureaucracy.

Weber saw a money economy as an important, but not indispensable, precondition of bureaucracy, because payment in kind gives officials an opportunity to usurp the sources of income, and because (in the case of the state) a monetary economy facilitates steady taxation.⁹⁸ He defines bureaucracy as an organization in which highly skilled employees work full time according to standardized rules which assign fixed responsibility and authority to each office, and in which the hierarchy of officials is topped by a single person and management is based on written rules.⁹⁹ The advantages of such a system he lists as "Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs."¹⁰⁰ Various contemporary writers have argued that the concept of bureaucracy is no longer useful,¹⁰¹ that organizations are increasingly nonbureaucratic,¹⁰² that the advantages of bureaucracy should not be allowed to obscure systematic and inherent disadvantages ("dysfunctions"),¹⁰³ that formal bureaucracy does not work in the absence of informal communications patterns that are not part of the model,¹⁰⁴ that bureaucratic effectiveness is affected by subtle changes in the environment of work¹⁰⁵ and by the attitudes and personalities and informal organization of organization members,¹⁰⁶ and that effectiveness in a complex environment may often be better achieved by decentralized and redundant systems which are

radically different from bureaucracy.¹⁰⁷ This literature focuses primarily on the internal structure of existing organizations rather than on the capability of a group for organization, but it does suggest that the organizational effectiveness of a group can be limited by the personalities of its members, by communications limitations, and by lack of money, as well as by inadequacies of structural design.

Selznick¹⁰⁸ has urged a broader view of organizations as adaptive social structures which exhibit tensions between the goal-oriented *needs* of the organizations and the *commitments* of the organization to the individuals and groups which compose the organization. Such an orientation calls attention to the issues (posed by other writers) of *congruence* between individual roles and the personalities of the individuals who fill those roles,¹⁰⁹ and also between the type of involvement of a member and the type of power or incentives used to manipulate him, but it goes beyond congruence to pose the more general issues of the constraints and tensions imposed on an organization by the social environment. Potentially such a perspective could link up with the insights of stratification theory and group theory, but Selznick does not push his analysis (or even his perspective) that far. He does provide a set of abstract conditions which he identifies as imperatives for the maintenance of a cooperative system: "security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces of informal relations within the organization"; "continuity of policy and of the sources of its determination"; and "a homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organization."

Writing a decade before Selznick, Barnard recognized the utility of defining formal organization as "a system of consciously coordinated

activities or forces of two or more persons"¹¹⁰ but remaining explicitly aware that formal organization as defined is embedded in a "cooperative system" consisting of "a complex of physical, biological, personal, and social components..."¹¹¹ Instead of jumping straight into typologies after the fashion of most contemporary writers, Barnard starts from his abstract definition and attends to fundamental issues.¹¹²

An organization comes into being when (1) there are persons able to communicate with each other (2) who are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a common purpose. The elements of an organization are therefore (1) communication; (2) willingness to serve; and (3) common purpose. These elements are necessary and sufficient conditions initially, and they are found in all such organizations.

Communications according to Barnard are "the limiting factor in the size of small organizations, and, therefore, a dominant factor in the structure of complex organizations,"¹¹³ They are strained by "(a) the complexity of purpose and technological conditions (including complex or subtle requirements or precision of coordinated movements); (b) the difficulty of the communication process; (c) the extent to which communication is necessary; (d) the complexity of the personal relationships involved, that is, of the social conditions (including especially the size of the group)."¹¹⁴

With regard to his second "element" of organization, willingness, Barnard notes that the motives of individual participation in an organization "may be highly diverse in character,"¹¹⁵ contrary to the assumptions of "shared attitudes" or "common values" or "common goals" that typify stratification and group theory approaches to organization. He maintains that purely material inducements will be inadequate to maintain any organization for an extended period¹¹⁶ and says that willingness to cooperate reflects a balance of anticipated or experienced satisfactions and dissatisfactions as compared with alternatives.¹¹⁷ In an argument paralleling

the group theorists' distinction between latent and manifest interests, and the stratification theorists' discussion of consciousness, he maintains that contradictions between organizational purposes and individual purposes easily become visible "when the purpose is concrete, tangible, physical; but when the purpose is general, intangible, and of sentimental character, the divergencies can be very wide and yet not recognized."¹¹⁸

With regard to his third "element," purpose, Barnard notes that organizations change their purposes over time in order to perpetuate themselves.

A fourth component of all organizations, and the primary subject of Barnard's book, is what he calls "executive functions." According to him, these functions must be performed in all organizations, including the smallest ones, although in small organizations they are not necessarily performed continuously or by differentiated groups or individuals.¹¹⁹

Comparing Barnard's elements of organization with the findings of group and stratification theories, we note that his central concern with communications, common purpose, motivation and leadership is shared by those theories. Those theories contradict Barnard in their strong assumption of the necessity of "common goals" or completely "shared attitudes," and it appears that they do so not because the phenomena they discuss are fundamentally different but because classes and interest groups happen to be defined in terms of shared attitudes. Classes and interest groups are thus a special case of the Barnard organization and are completely included within his concept. At the same time the other theories demonstrate that Barnard is wrong when he asserts that his three elements are sufficient for organizations. Suppose the potential members of the organization can communicate, are willing to cooperate, and possess

an organizational purpose, but are women who must stay at home all day caring for their children. Or suppose the government will not permit their organization. Availability and autonomy are also necessary conditions, so Barnard's conditions are not sufficient. Moreover, even when one adds these other necessary conditions, one does not have sufficient conditions for organization; the combination of the "elements" of organization is neither automatic nor inevitable. Once again Barnard knew this,¹²⁰ but his statements about the "elements" tend to confuse this point.

Barnard relates formal organization to general social organization more systematically than other organization theorists. Defining informal organization as interaction in the absence of joint purpose, especially where such interaction is unusually frequent, he maintains that informal organization "(a) establishes certain attitudes, understandings, customs, habits, institutions; and (b) it creates the conditions under which formal organizations may arise." Informal organization "necessarily precedes formal organization" and is a precondition of acceptance of common purpose, communication and willingness to cooperate.¹²¹ For Barnard society as a whole is "a complex of informal organization,"¹²² and social mores, customs and institutions arise out of an "endless chain" of informal relationships among the members of a society.¹²³

Formal organizations for Barnard are those characterized by joint purpose, a formulation similar to that of Blau and Scott (cited above) but not assuming such a sharp dichotomy between formal organization and general social organization. The tendency of some new societies to take on characteristics of formal organization does not surprise the Barnard formulation, and indeed such a possibility fits neatly into Barnard's

careful, parallel accounts of informal and formal organization. Later organization theorists (March and Simon, Blau and Scott) on the other hand use the concept of "formality" unsuccessfully to banish most informal organization from their theories.

In Barnard's theory formal organizations arise spontaneously from informal organization, or from individual effort, or from spawning by an existing organization, or by fragmentation of an existing organization.¹²⁴ All formal organizations, from the simplest to the most complex, follow the same principles.¹²⁵ The persistence of formal organizations, once they have been created, requires either effectiveness or efficiency, and usually both.¹²⁶ Effectiveness here consists of accomplishment of the organizational purpose, and efficiency consists of maintaining membership in the organization by distributing satisfactions proportionate to the burdens of organizational participation.¹²⁷ An organization which is efficient is also said by Barnard to be in equilibrium, since there is a balance between burdens and satisfactions. This concept of equilibrium is the most circular and least convincing part of Barnard's theory; March and Simon choose to found their theory upon it.

March and Simon¹²⁸ seek a comprehensive theory of organizations by combining Barnard's concept of equilibrium, various human relations-type findings about individuals and groups, and an overall view of the organization as a set of individual decision-makers. Focusing primarily on decisions by individuals, they list factors affecting (1) decisions to join or leave the organization, (2) decisions by organization members to produce or not to produce, (3) limits on the rationality of decisions by those who want to produce, (4) some sources of conflict in decision-making, and (5) some considerations regarding planning and innovation.

According to this theory, employees remain in the organization as long as the inducements provided to them by the organization appear to the employees to outweigh their contributions. Conversely, the organization's ability to continue providing inducements depends upon adequate contributions from the employees. Given some assumptions about contributions and the perception of inducements, various contributions and inducements of the organization can be aggregated, and an equilibrium model can be constructed. But Krupp¹²⁹ has pointed out that the assumptions needed for aggregation amount to assumption of the stability that March and Simon wish to demonstrate. Thus this explanation of the viability of organizations is not terribly useful.

More interesting is the March and Simon account of the factors which affect a work group's ability to control its members (i.e., the degree to which work groups are able to organize). According to them, work group control varies with degree of identification of the members with the group, uniformity of group opinion, and range of group control of the environment.¹³⁰ In turn identification of members with the group varies with perceived prestige of the group, extent to which goals are perceived as shared, degree of interaction, number of individual needs satisfied by the group, lack of competition,¹³¹ and the smallness of the group.¹³² Uniformity of group pressures varies with degree of interaction in the group and with cohesiveness of the group; conversely, uniformity of opinion increases cohesiveness and cohesiveness increases interaction.¹³³ These basic variables vary with a number of more remote variables. Physical proximity is identified as "an important base for group membership."¹³⁴ It takes little ingenuity to recognize in this account of the cohesiveness of work groups the outlines of stratification and group theorists' accounts

of the conditions which determine a variety of other groups' capabilities for organization. March and Simon have rediscovered Marx's analysis of why the proletariat can organize and restated it, applied to work groups, in tortuous jargon. Moreover, we know from previously cited analyses that unions' ability to organize within organizations can be analyzed in terms of such propositions, and union organizations are a phenomenon which the March and Simon focus on individual decisions is incapable of handling.¹³⁵

More interesting still, we find from the March and Simon analysis that "motivation to produce" (i.e., the whole organization's motivational capability of the whole organization) varies with: degree of individual identification with the organization,¹³⁶ uniformity of organization opinion,¹³⁷ range of perceived organizational control of the environment (defined as perceived alternatives and consequences of alternatives to membership in the organization), and the individual goals in terms of which the organization and its alternatives are evaluated.¹³⁸ Bringing out the full parallelism requires rewording of some propositions without change of content, and raises some empirical questions (e.g., whether the emphasis on perceived alternatives with regard to the whole organization as opposed to the emphasis on objective control of the environment by the work group reflects differences in the phenomena or language in the analysis), but in every case the weight of evidence and intuition is on the side of fully parallel analyses. As Barnard said,¹³⁹

The temptation is to assume that, in the more complex organizations which we meet in our actual social life, the effect of complexity is to modify or qualify the theory. This appears not to be the case.

The failure of March and Simon to perceive basic isomorphisms among the phenomena they study, and the resultant failure to exploit these isomorphisms for a parsimonious and coherent theory of organization, follow directly from their individual decision-making perspective. And the inadequacies of the decision-making perspective, when it is marketed as a comprehensive theory of organizations, are evident when one compares the March and Simon theory with Barnard's work. One can easily fit all of the content of March and Simon into the general framework of Barnard, but one could hardly conceive of trying to fit Barnard into the March and Simon perspective. March and Simon inventory more propositions, and produce more evidence and a longer bibliography, but their theory remains decisively inferior. The reasons are evident: March and Simon took all the fundamental and apparently simple issues for granted, starting with their failure to define organization. That failure was rhetorically wise, for any acceptable definition would have put into relief the poverty of their theory. In the end, they produce complicated theory for a narrow range of organizations whereas Barnard produced simple theory for a broad variety of organizations. That is the price of taking fundamental issues for granted.

It is worthwhile to note that the group and stratification theorists' accounts of the requirements of organization tend to include more basic elements than do the organization theorists'. Businessmen in America take absence of repression of their organizations for granted; so therefore do the organization theorists. Businessmen take the availability of the labor force for granted; so therefore do the organization theorists, although this assumption is unwarranted even in the case of business.

(Women for example have tended to be unavailable.) Moreover, money can usually be turned into communications, autonomy, availability, goals, or any other basic element of organization, and modern businesses make full use of this liquidity, so organization theorists are tempted to forget about the basic elements and to substitute money in their place. Equilibrium analysis, after all, reduces to a fancy way of saying whether a business is operating in the red or in the black. But for the purposes of an adequate organization theory money must be treated as a liquid form of other basic resources and not usurp the central place.

Some writers have addressed questions of organizational viability and ability to organize without donning the blinders that characterize most organization theory after Barnard. Dahl and Lindblom construct a compendious analysis of processes of calculation and control using as one basic building block a concept of control of one person by another. According to them, effective control of one person by another requires consistency of the controller's goals with some of the controlled man's goals, adequate rewards and penalties (including those which are internalized in the controlled man), means of control which are consistent with the controlled person's identity, and adequate communications.¹⁴⁰ Given these basic assumptions, they provide a typology of forms of control (command, bargaining, polyarchy, the market) and analyze each type in detail. Their focus on the "atomic relationship" of control is fruitful, and they avoid the characteristic error of taking communications for granted that characterizes some small group theorists and macrosociologists who construct theories around atomic relationships. But their focus on the atomic relationship leads them away from systematic

comparison of the relative abilities of groups to organize. Their account of the preconditions of control is less detailed than the accounts of some stratification and group theories, and their analysis pivots around their typology of forms of control rather than around their preconditions of control. Such an approach is fruitful, but we shall find it useful to employ different emphases on each of these points in an analysis that is in some respects complementary.

Most writers addressing questions of organizational viability are either too vague (in their definitions of the factors supporting organization) or too specific (in the referents of "organization") or both. For instance, in a factor analysis of likely indicators of organizational effectiveness among insurance firms, Seashore and Yuchtman¹⁴¹ discovered that all of the factors referred to the ability of the firms to extract from the environment resources necessary to sustain the organization. But they fail to characterize the resources specifically. MacKenzie¹⁴² suggests conceptualizing organizations and their conditions of viability in terms of flows of energy, cash, information, and people. But he notes the possibility of organizations without cash flows; more important, neither the relations of the flows to the concept of organization nor the relations among the flows are specified, making analytic manipulation impossible. Golembiewski¹⁴³ notes that work group cohesiveness varies with "task and structure." He cites findings by Sayles that group cohesiveness was facilitated by "monoprocessual departmentation and physical proximity in assembly lines, and hindered by low skill, noncentrality of work, and amenability of work to time study." Golembiewski's categories are too general, and Sayles's too specific. Parsons¹⁴⁴ adopts as basic resources

of organization the old economic categories of land, labor, and capital, and adds organization itself to the list of fluid resources. Like the other writers he has failed to relate the basic resources to his concept of organization.

The most serious effort to address directly the social conditions under which organizations (or kinds of organizations) are founded is by Stinchcombe, who notes that "theory in this area is of little beauty and power."¹⁴⁵

Confining himself to formal organizations in the manner of Blau and Scott, Stinchcombe analyzes the conditions which motivate the founding of new organizations and the conditions under which such foundings will be successful. On motivation he argues that¹⁴⁶

People found organizations when (a) they find or learn about alternative better ways of doing things that are not easily done within existing social arrangements; (b) they believe that the future will be such that the organization will continue to be effective enough to pay for the trouble of building it and for the resources invested; (c) they or some social group with which they are strongly identified will receive some of the benefits of the better way of doing things; (d) they can lay hold of the resources of wealth, power, and legitimacy needed to build the organization, and (e) they can defeat, or at least avoid being defeated by, their opponents, especially those whose interests are vested in the old regime.

He notes that a huge number of variables affect the technical ability to organize once adequate motivation exists, but he maintains that a few intervening variables summarize the effects of social structure on organizational capacity. The variables are: general literacy and specialized training; urbanization; a money economy; a recent political revolution; and the density of social interaction. According to Stinchcombe, literacy and training facilitate use of checks and thereby stimulate

trade, facilitate the spread of innovations, increase the formality and stability of legal arrangements through use of written law, make possible coordination among physically dispersed people, increase solidarity and empathy among people by enhancing their communications and storing their heritage, and make possible the regulation of intricate bureaucracies. Urbanization presents people with a variety of alternative roles, encourages regularization of relations among strangers and devices for mobilizing resources, and is associated with universalism, social mobility, literacy, innovative activity, and political activity, all of which enhance the formation of new organizations. "A money economy liberates resources so that they can be more easily recruited by new organizations, facilitates the formation of free markets...,depersonalizes economic social relations, simplifies calculation of the alternative ways of doing things, and allows more precise anticipation of the consequences of future conditions..."¹⁴⁷ Political revolutions remove old obstacles to innovative organization and create new resources for social transformation. Dense social organization provides experience with organization and provides resources, especially loyalty and trust, for the creating of new organizations, but may also create a network of vested interests which confine new organizations to narrow spheres.

Stinchcombe¹⁴⁸ also argues that new organizations fail more often than old ones because: (1) they involve new roles and will thus be disadvantaged by the absence of related skills in the larger society and also by social restraints on learning of new skills; (2) because invention and integration of new roles is costly, difficult, and wasteful; (3) because they rely heavily on trust among strangers; (4) because they do not possess institutionalized ties to consumers.

Stinchcombe provides a summary of existing knowledge in this area and organizes the summary using several devices: separation of motivational and technical conditions of organization; separation of the conditions of founding from the conditions of survival; and use of a small number of intervening variables to summarize the impact of a wide variety of social conditions. Such a summary is terribly useful but it fails according to Stinchcombe's own criteria of beauty and power. Each part of the theory is *ad hoc*, a summary of individual propositions rather than an integrated theory. How do we know that his technical variables (literacy, etc.) do not require supplementation by a dozen other basic intervening variables? What is the logical relation between a variable like "urbanization" and ability to organize? (A theory, as opposed to a summary of correlations, would posit a direct conceptual relationship as well as an empirical one.) On what grounds does he choose "urbanization" as the intervening variable rather than one of the others which are "associated" with it (e.g., universalism)?

These questions would not arise had Stinchcombe developed his theory of the social conditions which support organization systematically from his definition of organization. But he does not do so, and he cannot do so because the concept of formal organization is too restrictive and vague to support general theory. Put another way, he chooses the wrong intervening variables because he lacks an adequate concept of organization.

The virtues and vices of Stinchcombe's analysis reflect the fundamental difficulties of organization theory at *its best*. Organization theories provide insights into the structures and processes of organizations, whereas group and stratification theories generally take organization to be an undefined and unanalyzed endpoint of certain social

processes. But organization theories chronically neglect fundamental conceptual issues. A parochial conception of the field of study focuses concern on a particular kind of organization and distorts analysis. The fundamental concept of organization either is not defined or the definition, once stated, is not systematically related to the hypotheses of the theory. These critical problems render systematic investigation of the relation between social structure and ability to organize impossible, because clear conceptualization is a prerequisite of systematic investigation.

Social Stability Theories

Organizations, groups, and strata or classes, are pieces of society. The whole society usually is not conceptualized as an organization, a group, or a stratum, but the whole society is frequently viewed as a set of formal and informal organizations, a set of groups in equilibrium, or a set of strata in conflict. Notwithstanding this general separation of analysis of the part from analysis of the whole, stratification and group theories' analyses fail to apply to the whole society only if one imposes exceedingly arbitrary restrictions on the definitions of concepts employed in those theories. Organization theories have separated their subject from the whole society only by refusing to define their subject or by employing artificial distinctions which collapse under scrutiny. Moreover, theories of social stability derive from theories of groups and organizations.

Lining up perspectives on the whole with perspectives on the parts, one generates an endless series of isomorphisms. For Truman, groups are interactions with a certain frequency, and "society is the interactions of men."¹⁴⁹ Is society not therefore a group? Perhaps not, for society

may not attain the threshold level of interaction. But how does one establish the threshold? The threshold is completely arbitrary, so the seeker of generalizations may justifiably set it low enough to include stable societies. Bentley inferred from his view of society as conflictful that society could not be treated as a group with group interests except when in conflict with another society, but his view that conflict excludes common interests was clearly erroneous and in conflict with his own concept of a societal "habit background." Game theory has familiarized contemporary social scientists with the possibility of combining conflict and cooperation in any relationship and has called attention to the rarity of the purely conflictful zero-sum game in social interaction. Group theories err in supposing that groups necessarily possess "shared attitudes" and that interactions among groups are predominantly conflictful. Conflict and shared or interlocking interests pervade groups and society and also organizations. Conflict models of society emphasize the Bentleyan view of equilibrated conflict among groups, whereas consensus theories of society emphasize the shared interests or shared attitudes which Bentley and Truman impute to groups.¹⁵⁰

If one removes from books and articles on the stability or cohesion of social aggregates all references to the type of aggregate (group, union, class, society...) under consideration, readers will be hard put to identify the type of aggregate which the writer had in mind. For instance, students of nation building know that social cohesion is strengthened in institutionalized conflict or by conflict which gives rise to new social norms, by external or internal threats to a society that possesses a basic consensus, by conflicts which crosscut one another rather than reinforcing one another,

and by conflict which is non-ideological rather than ideological (unless the goals sought by conflicting groups are identical). But these are the major propositions of a book about groups, not about societies, and of an author who believes that social stability results from the maintenance of boundaries between conflicting groups together with reference group phenomena and resentment.¹⁵¹

The specific propositions of group and stratification theories regarding the cohesion of groups and classes have precise analogues in theories of societal and national cohesion. The emphasis on communications from Aristotle to Marx to David Truman parallels Karl Deutsch's findings regarding nationalism and government.¹⁵² The issue of consciousness in classes and groups parallels the issue of observability in role theory.¹⁵³ The importance of coordination skills and leadership among members of a society as emphasized by Almond and Verba¹⁵⁴ and by Dahl and Lindblom¹⁵⁵ parallels the importance of the same abilities in Marx's classes and Truman's groups. The inability of societies like Pakistan to maintain stability parallels the inability of dispersed peasants or laborers to organize themselves. In short, the instability of Laos, Sudan and Pakistan may result from the same conditions which make difficult the organization of peasants and white collar workers.

Organization theories provide a host of similar parallels with social stability theories. Just as Janowitz finds a fundamental distinction between the elite nucleus and the rest of the elite of a (military) organization,¹⁵⁶ so Mosca finds a fundamental distinction between the top leadership of society and the middle leadership.¹⁵⁷ Just as Likert believes that effective organization requires certain kinds of management,¹⁵⁸ so

Pareto believes that social stability requires certain distributions of residues.¹⁵⁹ Just as Lindblom and Braybrooke find that certain kinds of decision-making are appropriate to large organizations in complex environments, so Lindblom finds that similar kinds of decision-making are appropriate for similar reasons in similar societal environments. Just as Roethlisberger and Dickson found a threat to effective management in informal work groups, so Rousseau and Madison found a threat to effective government in "cabals and partial societies."¹⁶⁰ Levy's functional requisites of society¹⁶¹ are very similar to Stinchcombe's requisites of organization (although there are some important differences here), and Greer's view of government as an organization with circular energy processing systems and of society as an organizational process¹⁶² evokes MacKenzie's view of organizations as a set of flows. Feldman's image of society as a tension management system¹⁶³ evokes Selznick's image of organization as torn between externally derived needs and internal commitments. The concern of macrosociologists with national character and with congruence between political leadership and social authority patterns¹⁶⁴ is a precise projection of the concern of organization theorists with bureaucratic character (or the "organization man") and with congruence between personality and role demands.¹⁶⁵

These parallels between macrosociology and organization theories have not gone unnoticed, but they have not been adequately exploited. Mayo¹⁶⁶ maintains that "A society is a cooperative system" and Drucker¹⁶⁷ that "The proper study of mankind is organization." Greer¹⁶⁸ views organization as "coterminous with social life." After noting that his definitions of collectivity apply both to the whole society and to smaller collectivities, Parsons¹⁶⁹ argues that "This fundamental

structural homology between the total society and sub-collectivities within it is one of the most important aspects of the structure of social systems."¹¹

Even the most popular fallacies tend to be shared by social stability theories and their sub-system analogues. By far the most common fallacy of stratification, group, and organization theories is that organization is adequately explained when one has identified *motivations* to organize or to work within organizations, disregarding technical problems such as communication and leadership. Thus Marxists (ignoring Marx) often focus almost exclusively on psychological consciousness, group theorists assume that latent groups can organize if sufficient damage is done to their interests, and organization theories tend to concentrate on the distribution of incentives. Likewise, Cohen¹⁷⁰ is able to divide theories of social stability into coercion, interest, value, and inertia theories, all of which refer solely to motivation and tend to ignore technical issues.

Although neglect of technical issues in analyzing social stability precludes balanced theory, the focus on motivational questions reflects a sound intuition that the stickiest problems are located among these questions. Without pretending to do justice to a complex debate, several comments are important. First, the inertia theory of compliance with social norms can be subsumed under the interest and value theories, since inertia reflects either an implicit judgment by a person or group that choice of, or search for, deviant alternatives is not worth the effort, or else an implicit judgment that choice of, or search for, deviant alternatives would be contrary to personal or group values. Second, the coercion theory of compliance with social norms can be subsumed in value and interest

theories, because coercion consists precisely of depriving an individual or group of salient interests or values. To say this is not to argue that existing coercion theories can easily be subsumed under existing value or interest theories. Quite the contrary, for existing value and interest theories do tend to emphasize a voluntaristic image of social compliance. Finally, the concept of "interest" makes sense only by reference to some set of "values." This does not mean that social stability theories can most usefully be constructed around a concept of "values," but it does demonstrate that no fundamental contradictions exist among the major explanations of compliance with the behavioral requirements of social order, and it does suggest the possibility of integrating the various perspectives.

Social order by definition involves some minimal level of coordinated activities--a level sufficient, for instance, to keep the proportion of violent deaths reasonably low and to maintain some sort of continuity in some kinds of social relationships. Such coordination requires motivation to coordinate among the individuals and groups which compose the society. The most obvious and most simplistic explanations reduce to three: coordination occurs because of agreement, because of unintended ecological consequences of individual activities, or because certain people force others to coordinate their activities. The first, usually labeled the consensus theory, corresponds to the "shared interest" assumption of group and stratification theories and to the "common purpose" assumption of organization theories. Rather than confronting each of a variety of variations of this slippery theory, we can begin with the strongest possible assumption and whittle it down. Are common values (in

some sense of perfectly shared commitments to some clear set of principles) necessary to social order? First, as a variety of writers have noted, shared values such as financial success may induce competitive divisiveness rather than order. Second, conflicting values may not disturb social order if they are isolated from one another--for instance, by geography or by some sort of social distance. Rockefeller and a small farmer may hold contradictory values but not have to deal with each other, or they may hold contradictory values and have to deal with each other but not have to deal with each other in ways which engage the contradictory values. Third, coordination can be achieved by people with different but complementary values. A.F.C. Wallace has shown that common goals and shared cognitions are not logically necessary to stable social organization (even in the absence of coercion). He argues that lack of such sharing permits construction of a more complex cultural system than would be possible with sharing and that it "liberates the participants in a system from the heavy burden of knowing each other's motivations."¹⁷¹ Culture in his view "may be conceived as an invention which makes possible the maximal organization of motivational diversity."¹⁷² Some readers may be surprised to hear that Parsons similarly argues that societal integration can be accomplished through integration of subsystems of value orientations which are not identical rather than through a uniform set of value orientations for the whole society.¹⁷³ (He does characterize these subsystems as variations around a basic pattern, but such a characterization is either a possibly useful tautology or an unsupported empirical position which lacks logical necessity.)

Thus what seems to be necessary is some kind of complementarity, or complementarity together with isolation, rather than any kind of unanimity.¹⁷⁴ And when one adds the possibility that some of the complementarities may be artificially induced through institutionalized sanctions, one has a consistent perspective on the requirements of social order, though not anything approaching a full theory of social order. Moreover, precisely the same requirements exist for organizations, groups, and classes. Members of such aggregates may share common values or purposes, but they may also have complementary but different purposes. This essay will henceforth refer to goals or values or identifications which are either identical or complementary as "interlocking." Where values or interests or goals or identifications do not interlock sufficiently to achieve coordination without sanctions, those individuals or groups desiring a given kind of coordination may provide resources to some institution whose purpose is to induce or to coerce compliance. When such an institution is unnecessary or is supported by most of the aggregate, the consensus model applies. When such an institution is consistently supported by one group and when it consistently applies coercion to another group, then the coercion model applies. But both the coercion and the consensus models are variations of a single model of coordinated activity achieved in part through voluntary coordination and in part through provision of resources to a central coordinating institution with coercive and inductive powers. This model must be supplemented by the addition of ecological coordination.

We have suggested that these arguments apply to societies, groups, classes, and organizations. These various aggregates are not necessarily

isomorphic in all interesting respects, but there exist broad and fundamental isomorphisms in the conditions which inhibit or enhance organization, and in the conditions which inhibit or enhance certain structural characteristics. This assertion would appear trite to Parsons, but would encounter skepticism from sociologists like Franz Schurmann who see fundamental distinctions between societies and organizations arising from distinctions between goal orientation and value orientation, between role and status, and between conscious maintenance and self-maintenance.¹⁷⁵ Our contention will be that these differences are more usefully viewed as quantitative than qualitative, that a continuum is more useful than dichotomy.

Contrary to Schurmann, societies require conscious efforts at maintenance. Modern societies have differentiated institutions devoted specifically to that purpose. While it is true that American society is more routinized and institutionalized than General Motors, it is just as true that General Motors is more routinized and institutionalized than the local drugstore; a dichotomy which cuts at one of these points makes no more sense than a dichotomy which cuts at the other. The larger an organization is, and the heavier its decision load, the more it will have to rely on routinization and institutionalization; societies follow these principles (which will be defended and elaborated later) just as organizations do.

Nor do differences between status and role, or value and goal, imply a fundamental dichotomy between societies and organizations. The ordered exercise of power is less visible in societies than in organizations because of the mass of conventions, habits, and so forth, but one can

hardly doubt that the ordered exercise of power occurs in all societies. Status and role coexist in both societies and organizations; every peasant possesses a role with rather clearly defined expectations, and every organization tends to generate charismatic officials and elder statesmen whose generalized authority overflows the specific expectations of their roles. Every institutionalized organization possesses values (which are the most generalized orientations regarding the way the organization and its members should operate) which give coherence to the conventions, habits, and laws of the organization. And every society has goals, including the preservation of the society. But contrasts in size, in decision loads, and in organizational resources make status, value and authority more visible in societies and role, goals, and power more visible in smaller organizations.

Schurmann's theory of revolution maintains that after the destruction of (self-maintaining) society, conscious organization is required to reconstitute a new system which then becomes routinized into a self-maintaining society. But the distinctions made between organization and society merely introduce unnecessary complexity into the discussion. The case of society is no different from the case of smaller organizations. The founding of an organization, like the founding of a society, requires an initial period of conscious construction and training and exercise of formal power, but that initial period is succeeded by dramatic increases in routinization, in reliance upon habit and convention and ecological pressures. Why obscure fundamental similarities by imposing an artificial dichotomy?

Conclusion

This desperately brief survey of stratification, group, organization, and macrosociological theories reveals repeated isomorphisms in the findings of those theories regarding the ability of social aggregates to coordinate behavior. . The correspondences among theories are seldom perfect, but the differences are no greater between kinds of theory than they are within kinds of theory. Moreover, the differences time and again prove to be complementary rather than contradictory. One theory may emphasize motivation and another may emphasize communication, but the two are not mutually exclusive. Just as frequently, the differences among theories result from the superiority of one assumption to another, rather than from contradictory empirical findings; an example is the superiority of a theory of organization based on an assumption of interlocking goals to one based on the excessively strong assumption of shared goals.

Tracing analogies and isomorphisms is intellectually titillating, but it does not constitute theory. Out of all the variables mentioned in these various theories we must locate those which are theoretically central, and using those variables we must construct a few basic concepts and hypotheses of great generality. We turn next to this task.

FOOTNOTES

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION I

1. For a review of the literature of political sociology which uses a similar but somewhat different position of the field, cf. Morris Janowitz, Political Conflict (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), Ch. 1.
2. Aristotle, The Politics (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), Book IV, Ch. 3
3. Ibid., IV, 6; IV, 11; VI, 4.
4. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 338
5. Nikolai Bukharin, Historical Materialism (New York: International Publishers, 1927), 338ff.
6. Max Weber, Theory of Economic and Social Organization, trans., A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford, 1947), 427.
7. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 85-86, 97.
8. Max Weber, "Class, Status and Party," *ibid.*, 185-186. Weber's emphasis.
9. Mao Tse-tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," in his Selected Works (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), Vol. I.
10. Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success," in Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 3-77; Ted R. Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Strife," World Politics XX (Jan. 1968), 245-278; Manfred Halpern, "A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation," Journal of International Affairs XXIII, 1 (1969), 54-75; Hamza Alavi,

"Peasants and Revolution," in R. Miliband and John Saville, eds., The Socialist Register, Vol. 11 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965); Kathleen Gough, "Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India," Pacific Affairs XLI (Spring 1964), 526-544; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 296-299; Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962," Journal of Conflict Resolution X (Sept. 1966), 249-271; Mary Wright, "The Chinese Peasant and Communism," Pacific Affairs XXIV (1951); Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics XVI (April 1964).

The tendency to emphasize motivation to the exclusion of virtually all other factors, or to analyze other factors almost exclusively with an eye to their impact on motivation, has been exacerbated by the methodological fads accompanying "behaviorism" in political science. Since the individual and his motivations are susceptible to survey methods, and since survey methods yield large volumes of data which can be manipulated by primitive statistical techniques, the modern student rushes to this level of analysis. Individual motivation also tends to be overstressed in a democratic society where political scientists take for granted the significance of individual behavior; they disregard Aristotle's reminder that "quality" (broadly defined) is as important as "quantity." Interestingly enough, students who have been strongly influenced by Marx's writings tend to end up in the same bog because of the Marxian emphasis on the importance

of "consciousness." To show the contrast between the emphasis on motivation and the emphasis on a broader range of factors leading to organization, compare Lipset's analysis of some of the passages cited in this chapter with mine. Cf. his Revolution and Counter-Revolution (New York: Anchor, 1970), Ch. 5.

11. Anibal Quijano Obregon, "Contemporary Peasant Movements in Latin America," in S.M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 301-40.
12. Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 453-483.
13. Stephen Fischer-Galati, "The Peasantry as a Revolutionary Force in the Balkans," Journal of Central European Affairs XXII (April 1963), 12-22.
14. Eric Wolfe, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
15. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Miners and Agrarian Radicalism," American Sociological Review 32, 4 (Aug. 1967), 578-586.
16. John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism, the Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).
17. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike--An International Comparison," in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin and A.M. Moss, eds., Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), 200-201.
18. Cornelius J. Lammers, "Strikes and Mutinies: A Comparative Study of Organizational Conflicts Between Rulers and Ruled," Administrative Science Quarterly 14 (1969), 558-572. Note that his findings for

mutinies do not contradict the importance of organizational strength even in that case; these findings merely add the organizational strength of a third party to the balance. A second unfortunate source of confusion in Lammers' research is the failure to separate the adequacy and clarity of strategy from the strength of the organization pursuing the strategy.

19. Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (New York: Doubleday, 1968).
20. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Students and Politics," in S.M. Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin, eds., The Berkeley Student Revolt (New York: Anchor, 1965).
21. Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trown, and James Coleman, Union Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 1962).
22. Agrarian Socialism, op. cit., 61.
23. Ibid., 64, 83
24. Ibid., 72, 80, 90.
25. Ibid., 68-69. 80, 82
26. Ibid., 57
27. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).
28. Ibid., 129
29. Ibid., 17
30. Ibid., 187
31. Ibid., 184-6
32. Ibid., 200
33. Giovanni Sartori, "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology," in S.M. Lipset, ed., Politics and the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 83-85.

34. Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 467.
35. *Ibid.*, 210, 445, 462-463.
36. *Ibid.*, 213ff
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*, 226-227
39. *Ibid.*, 184-186
40. *Ibid.*, 261, 263
41. *Ibid.*, 300
42. *Ibid.*, 306
43. *Ibid.*, 258
44. *Ibid.*, 220
45. *Ibid.*, 218
46. *Ibid.*, 220
47. Contrast the view of Sartori, *op. cit.*, 71, who believes it to be merely a terminology. On James Rosenau's concept of the "pre-theory," cf. his "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 27-92.
48. Bentley, *op. cit.*, 211-213, 259.
49. *Ibid.*, 217
50. *Ibid.*, 200
51. *Ibid.*, 434
52. Robert T. Golembiewski, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes on Analysis and Development, in H.R. Mahood, ed., Pressure Groups in

- American Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), makes this point. For an example of this tendency cf. Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," American Political Science Review 46 (June 1952), 376-397.
53. Samuel J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method," H.W. Ehrmann, ed., Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), stresses this point. For example, cf. the case studies in Ehrmann and in Zeigler, op. cit. Cf. also Graham Wooton, Interest Groups (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970).
 54. Harry Eckstein, "The Determinants of Pressure group Politics," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics (New York: Free Press, 1963), 408-420.
 55. Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), iv.
 56. An example is David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968). Cf. the comment of Paul F. Kress, Social Science and the Idea of Process: The Ambiguous Legacy of Arthur F. Bentley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).
 57. Truman, op. cit., 25.
 58. Ibid., 157-167. But Eldersveld, op. cit., thinks he perceives a growing tendency for Americans to resolve conflicts rather than withdraw (p. 192).
 59. Truman, op. cit., 167.
 60. Ibid., 119-129
 61. Ibid., 35-36
 62. Ibid., 159

63. Ibid., 106
64. Ibid., 129
65. Ibid., 29
66. Ibid., 106
67. As Eldersveld, op. cit., 186-187, remarks.
68. Andrew Janos, "Group Politics in Communist Society," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
69. Latham, op. cit., 386,337; 83. For a definitive example of circumvention cf. the article on "Interest Groups" in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
70. Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961)
71. Friedrich, op. cit., 182.
72. Eldersveld, op. cit., 184-185
73. Cf. Verba, op. cit.
74. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken, 1968)
75. Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, "I Get by With a Little from My Friends," World Politics XXIII (Oct. 1970), 104-120.
76. This is the fundamental hypothesis of Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking, 1960)
77. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1937)
78. Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965)
79. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953).

80. T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (New York: Doubleday, 1965). Ch. 7.
81. Zeigler, op. cit., 25
82. Oran Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), Ch. VI, as cited in Kress, op. cit., 221
83. in Herbert J. Storing ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1962), 222
84. in Huntington and Moore, op. cit., 35
85. op. cit., 448
86. For such a view, cf. Joseph LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group theory in Non-American Field Situations," in Eckstein and Apter, op. cit., 428-429.
87. My remarks on organization theory will rely heavily on summaries of that literature by James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958) and by Sherman Krupp, Pattern in Organization Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1961)
88. Among the more useful volumes in this literature are R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966); and the collection by Martin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related Approaches to Human Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964)
89. W.J.M. MacKenzie, Politics and Social Science (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), 245
90. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), 1

91. Ibid., 7
92. John M. Gaus, "A Theory of Organization in Public Administration," in Frontiers in Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), quoted by Philip Selznick in Amitai Etzioni, ed., Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).
93. E. Wight Bakke, "Concept of the Social Organization," in Mason Haire, ed., Modern Organization Theory (New York: Wiley, 1959), 37.
94. Krupp, op. cit., 131
95. Selwyn W. Becker and Gerald Gordon, "The Entrepreneurial Theory of Formal Organizations, Part 1: Patterns of Formal Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 11 (1966), 319.
96. Op. cit., 28-29. Occasionally one gets a breath of fresh theoretical air, however; cf. the more inclusive definition of the firm used by R.M. Cyert and J.G. March, "A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives," in Haire, op. cit., 80.
97. Max Weber, Theory of Economic and Social Organization, op. cit., 151; Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 18-19; Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 30-31.
98. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber, op. cit., 204-209.
99. Ibid., 196-198.
100. Ibid., 214
101. For instance, D.S. Pugh, D.J. Hickson, C.R. Hinings and C. Turner, "Dimensions of Organization Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (June 1968), 65-105.

102. Warren G. Bennis, "Post-Bureaucratic Leadership," Trans-Action 6, 9 (July-Aug. 1969); and his "What Post-Bureaucratic Leadership?" Current #110 (1969); Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), 108-131.
103. Robert K. Merten, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," Social Forces 18 (1940), 560-568; Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954). March and Simon, op. cit., 36-47, provide a useful commentary and summary of these analyses of dysfunction.
104. Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven Yale University Press, 1962), 216-217.
105. Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
106. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). Robert B. Denhardt, "Bureaucratic Socialization and Organizational Accommodation," Administrative Science Quarterly (1968), 441-450; Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levinson, "National Character," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison Wesley, 1954), 977-1020; Rensis Likert, The Human Organization (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), esp. Ch. 3-4; F.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939); Robert T. Golembiewski, 1968, op. cit., and his "Small Groups and Large Organizations," in James G. March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 87-141; and many others most of which are cited in the foregoing works. There is also of

- course an extensive literature on the effects of organization on participants in organizations, but this literature is only tangential to the purposes of the present essay.
107. Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965); David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963).
 108. Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," op. cit.,
 109. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961); Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (September 1971), 129-166.
 110. Op. cit., 73.
 111. Ibid., 66.
 112. Ibid., 82.
 113. Ibid., 106; cf. also 91.
 114. Ibid., 107.
 115. Ibid., 44.
 116. Ibid., 93
 117. Ibid., 85.
 118. Ibid., 87.
 119. Ibid., 111.
 120. Ibid., 101-102
 121. Ibid., 114-116.
 122. Ibid., 96.
 123. Ibid., 123.
 124. Ibid., 101-103.

125. Ibid., 94-95.
126. Ibid., 82.
127. Ibid 96-97
128. March and Simon, op. cit.
129. Krupp, op. cit.
130. March and Simon, op. cit., 50-60
- 131 Ibid., 65-66
132. Ibid., 76
133. Ibid., 59-66.
134. Ibid., 80
135. Krupp, op. cit., 164, makes the latter point.
136. Ibid., 73.
137. Ibid., 78.
138. Ibid., 53.
139. Barnard, op. cit., 94-95.
140. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), 112-117.
141. Stanley E. Seashore and Ephraim Yuchtman, "The Elements of Organizational Performance," in Bernard P. Indik and F. Kenneth Berrien, eds., People, Groups and Organizations (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1968), 172-188.
142. MacKenzie, op. cit., 253.
143. Robert T. Golembiewski, "Integrating Small Behavioral Units into Large Formal Organizations," in Indik and Berrien, op. cit., 140.
144. Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations-I," Administrative Science Quarterly 1 (June 1956), 63-85.

145. Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in James G. March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 242-293.
146. Ibid., 147
147. Ibid., 151.
140. Ibid., 148-150.

II. A THEORY OF THE ABILITY OF SOCIAL GROUPS TO ORGANIZE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

An aggregate is any set of human beings.

Organization is coordination of activities.

Which aggregates are capable of organization? A general answer to this question probably exists, despite the high level of abstraction, and that answer almost certainly must be phrased in terms of the variables which we shall shortly focus upon. But the present inquiry will answer a more limited question, based on distinctions among kinds of coordination.

Coordination can be either ecological or deliberate. Ecological coordination includes coordination resulting from (1) common orientations to similar external circumstances, as when a multitude of people simultaneously turn on the seven o'clock news or when otherwise independent farmers plant their corn in the same season, and (2) ecological interdependence as in the case of a market. Deliberate cooperation ranges over a continuum from the partisan coordination of duelers to the cooperative coordination of astronauts seeking to bring their ship home safely. Perfect partisanship and perfectly cooperative orientations are both rare in deliberate coordination; more commonly, coordination results from a combination of partisan and cooperative interests, as in the case of management and labor who share an interest in the success of the business but conflict over division of the revenue, or the case of a husband and wife who share an interest in companionship but conflict over whether to go to the movies or to stay home. The following discussion concerns deliberate organization in which the cooperative component is dominant, and "organization" henceforth refers to this particular kind of organization except where otherwise

noted.¹ With small but important modifications the analysis can be extended to other forms of coordination.

Cooperative deliberate organization is logically impossible unless members of the aggregate under consideration are motivated to undertake the cooperative activities, possess the skills necessary for performance of the coordinated activities, and possess the technical preconditions required for coordination of their activities. Members of the aggregate will be motivated to coordinate their activities to the extent that they possess visible and salient interlocking goals. The coordination skills required may vary somewhat with the type of organization required, but every kind of coordination requires ability to carry out the activity being coordinated. Finally, coordination of activities is logically impossible in the absence of communications, availability of time and energy for carrying out the (coordinated) activities, and autonomy from political, social, cultural, economic or psychological influences which would prohibit coordination of activities. Each of the underlined words above is a precondition of organization, without which coordination of activities is logically impossible. These are not the only preconditions of organization which one can construct, but this set of preconditions is special because it is directly and parsimoniously related to the definition of organization and because the presence of all these preconditions implies the presence of all other preconditions (except a suitable strategy for utilizing the opportunity to organize--an item usefully separated from what we shall call "preconditions" or "resources"). For instance, proximity of members of the aggregate is a precondition of coordination of activity, because infinitely distant members could not communicate and

thus could not coordinate their activities, but given that an aggregate possesses communications one knows that the aggregate also possesses propinquity. This list of preconditions takes precedence over other lists because of its centrality, parsimony, and comprehensiveness. Other variables affect an aggregate's ability to organize by affecting one of these preconditions.

Definitions of Preconditions

The visibility² of a goal for a given aggregate is the degree to which the putative goal is perceived as a possible goal to be achieved through aggregate activity. The saliency of a goal is the importance of that goal to members of the aggregate, as indicated by the relative willingness of the members to act in pursuit of the goal when the other preconditions are held constant.

Communications capacity (or simply communications) is a measure of the maximum possible level of information flow within the aggregate.

Coordination skills consist of generalized individual capabilities for a given kind of coordination.

Availability is the amount of time members of the aggregate possess for activity coordinated with other members of the aggregate after the completion of activities devoted to goals of higher saliency. (One could also define availability using indifference curves.)

The autonomy of an aggregate is the degree to which the aggregate is free of psychological, social, political, economic or cultural restraints on its possible organization.

From Preconditions to Resources

The preconditions are not merely preconditions of organization; they are organizational resources, the basic elements out of which organizations are constructed. Although it may seem anomalous to refer to a variable like autonomy, which is a mere absence of constraints, as a resource, the anomaly is only in the eye of the beholder. Absence of constraints from one perspective is provision by society of room for maneuver from another perspective. Each of the preconditions is an organizational resource. Money is a liquid resource and force a liquid motivational resource. The view of these preconditions as the basic resources out of which men construct organizations underlies everything that follows.

How Do the Resources Combine?

Men combine organizational resources to obtain coordinated activity, to form organizations. What are the rules of combination? More precisely, how can we conceptualize (a) the way (or ways) in which the resources combine into organizations and (b) the limits imposed on organization by limited resources? First, the resources are not dichotomous prerequisites which an aggregate either possesses or does not possess. A second plausible model is combination in fixed proportions. Two atoms of hydrogen combine with one atom of oxygen to form one molecule of water, and extra hydrogen does not provide extra water unless extra oxygen is also present. But, since giving an army radios instead of bugles improves its organizational capabilities without changing any variable except communications, the resources do not combine in fixed proportions. Third, the resources are prerequisites and therefore if one of them is absent, the aggregate's ability

to organize (Q) is zero, a condition not fulfilled by a linear combinations model ($Q = a + \sum b_i R_i$).

Let Q be the maximum possible coordinated activity that the given aggregate can achieve in unit time. That is, Q is the aggregate's potential for organization, its organizational capability. We shall speak as if each aggregate can be assigned a single Q , but in some circumstances it may be useful to assign an organization several Q_i corresponding to capabilities for several kinds of organization. The concept of organizational capability is implicit in much of the literature of political sociology (e.g., Marx, Dahrendorf, Lipset, Weber, Bentley, Truman), but users of the concept have shrunk from careful examination of their assumptions. Despite organization theory's concern for improved coordination, organization theory addresses strategies of resource utilization rather than shortage of resources (except money) as the primary problem.³ Political scientists have used related concepts. Lasswell and Kaplan⁴ employ a concept of morale that approaches our concept of total coordinated activity.

The degree of a person's participation in a group is the extent and intensity of his solidarity and cooperation with the group. The morale of a group is the degree of participation of its members.

So far our discussion has provided two conditions which any mathematical model of the way organizational resources combine must satisfy:

- (a) If any resource (R_i) is zero, then organizational capability (Q) must also be zero, and
- (b) Q must be a continuous, monotonic increasing function of each resource.

These conditions generate a family of possible formulae:

$$Q = \prod_i b_i R_i^{c_i} \tag{1}$$

71

where b and c are constants, and Π denotes a product. In the absence of further information, and on the intuitive grounds that most of the R_i would affect Q in linear fashion, the most reasonable initial hypothesis is $c = 1$, yielding

$$Q = \Pi R_i, \text{ where } R_i = bR_i^c \quad (11)^*$$

The concept of organizational capability as formulated applies only to a single aggregate, but political organizations can often be most fruitfully analyzed as coalitions of aggregates. The combined organizational capability of several aggregates is simply the organizational capability of the aggregate which includes all the members of the several aggregates. (One cannot, however, calculate the ability of two or more aggregates which have already been organized to form a coalition from the organizational capabilities of either the several aggregates or the combined aggregate. Such a calculation must take into account characteristics of the organizations that have been formed, and characteristics of the environment, as well as organizational capabilities.) When each member of a possible coalition is strong in the resources in which the other member is weak, we shall say that the two aggregates are organizationally complementary. When an aggregate lacks the leadership for effective organization, but possesses the other preconditions, we shall say that it is susceptible to organization.

Organizational Strategies

Resources can exist without being used. Only when organizational resources are utilized in accordance with an effective organizational strategy

*This formula assumes a single source of motivation. For reasons of space I have omitted a long, mathematically complex discussion of possible models for the interaction of multiple motivations.

does potential become, in some degree, actual. The organizational strategy chosen depends upon the aggregate's relation to its environment, as well as on its organizational resources, so we must conceptualize the organization's relation to its environment.

An aggregate organizes in order to pursue goals or to participate in a game or games. In the game or games, the organization employs resources in accordance with some strategy. To distinguish the resources and strategy thus employed from organizational resources and organizational strategies we shall call them "conflict resources" and "conflict strategies." Some readers may prefer the clumsier but apparently more general "goal-attainment resources" and "goal-attainment strategies."

The distinction between organizational resources and strategies on the one hand, and conflict resources and strategies on the other, underlies most of the literature of political sociology. Most game theory assumes perfectly unified players and focuses on strategies for use of conflict resources. Group theories characteristically deal with both organizational and conflict questions but intermingle the two aspects and make simplistic assumptions that the largest or most disciplined group will always win or that some undefined fair equilibrium among groups arises. Organization theories' distinctions between "efficiency" and "effectiveness" amount to distinctions between organizational and conflict questions, but organization theories' focus on money tends to blur the distinction between organization and conflict resources. Their focus on functioning organizations obscures organizational resources other than money and labor (which is identical to availability) and when they do discuss organizational resources their focus on business leads them to identify those resources as land, labor and capital⁵ rather than as some set of resources intimately related to a general concept

73'

of organization. Stratification theories as a group deal with both aspects, but most individual stratification theorists focus on either organization or conflict and then make simplifying assumptions about the other aspect. Evidence from small groups that differentiation between affective (organizational) and instrumental (conflict) leaders arises naturally⁶ indicates that this distinction cuts at a joint.

Organizational strategies consist of patterns of utilization of organizational resources, including especially specification of roles, and allocation of resources (including personnel--i.e., availability) to roles. When the aggregate is not given from the start, delineation of the boundaries of the aggregate is also a crucial part of the organizational strategy. (We assume here that what Parsons calls "coordination decisions" are implicitly made in the process of defining roles and allocating resources to roles.) Organizational strategies are efficient to the extent that they achieve the full organizational potential of the aggregate. They are optimal if no discernible alternative strategy would employ resources more efficiently. Most organization theory concerns strategies of organization, and the standard issues of centralization-decentralization, how to treat one's subordinates, and so forth, fall into this category.

Conflict resources vary both in content and in relative importance with the game in which the organization participates. In an election the size of the party may be the most important factor, while in a revolution discipline may be more important. Specification of the game includes specification of the resources.

These concepts may seem excessively abstract and perhaps banal, but failure to separate clearly these resources and strategies has led some of

the greatest political sociologists and organization theorists into confusion. As Weber argued in a different context,⁷ "The apparently gratuitous tediousness involved in the elaborate definition of the above concepts is an example of the fact that we often neglect to think out clearly what seems to be 'obvious,' because it is intuitively familiar."

Some Limits on Organizational Strategies

Size and Discipline

A given amount of coordinated activity can be achieved either through low-level coordination of activities of many people or through intensive coordination of activities of a few people. This distinction parallels Huntington's⁸ distinction between the scope and intensity of power and Coser's⁹ distinction between the size of a group and the degree of involvement of its members. We shall distinguish the size of an aggregate, defined as the number of its members, and the discipline of an aggregate, defined as the average amount of coordinated activity contributed by an individual member of the aggregate in unit time. (Discipline can be disaggregated into (a) level of activity and (b) degree to which the activity is coordinated.)¹⁰

For most aggregates an increase in size entails a decrease in the discipline achievable by the aggregate. Typically an increase in the size of the aggregate implies communication over a greater area, more complex channels through which messages must pass, and so forth. If N is the size of an aggregate, then the number of possible communications channels is $N(N-1)$, and the number of pairwise relationships among sub-aggregates is $(3^N - 2^N + 1)/2$.¹¹ The latter figure indicates how rapidly possible goal conflicts rise relative to size. This inverse relationship should apply to

all aggregates, except those which increase size by adding members whose goals are identical to the goals of current members, who bring to the aggregate disproportionate resources, and so forth.

Theoretical and empirical evidence for a broad range of different kinds of aggregates supports the above assertion. "Large groups apparently devote a larger proportion of their resources to their own operation than do other groups."¹² Discordant factions develop more frequently in large decision-making groups of boys.¹³ Dispersion of ownership has led to loss by owners of effective control of corporations.¹⁴ With regard to political parties, Michels¹⁵ argued that "(A)s the organization increases in size, the struggle for great principles becomes impossible." Lenin¹⁶ declared that "before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all definitely and firmly draw the lines of demarcation between the various groups," and Friedrich¹⁷ observed of the Nazi Party that "(I)ts large and fairly heterogeneous membership interfered so much with its role as a ruling party that the Schutzstaffeln (SS) or protective guards of Himmler eventually became a serious rival."

Rousseau extends the same hypothesis from parties to governments and whole societies:¹⁸

...it may be laid down as a principle that, when the functions of government are divided among a number of tribunals, the fewer in number will sooner or later acquire the greater authority, if it were for no other reason than because affairs will be transacted with greatest ease and expedition in the fewest hands, which naturally brings them control of affairs.

The social bond is enfeebled by extension; and in general a small state is proportionately stronger than a great one. Likewise, The Federalist¹⁹ makes the point that the larger the number of people included in a republic the less likely that one interest will be able

16

to dominate, and Dahl²⁰ says that "Any argument that no political system is legitimate unless all the basic laws and decisions are made by the assembled people leads inexorably to the conclusion that the citizen body must be quite small." Huntington²¹ points out that Turkey was able to become an effective modern state only after divesting itself of the social diversity of the Ottoman Empire.

At a higher level of generality, Merton²² observes that strain among roles associated with a given status can be reduced by abridging the role set or by having the individual in the status leave the organization; the greatly increased number of possible relationships in a larger group tends in many situations to produce more complex role sets. Similarly, Lasswell and Kaplan²³ maintain that "The accommodation by and circulation of an interest group vary with the degree to which it is concerned with general rather than special interests." But the most convincing proof of our general hypothesis is every man's experience that in most cases small committees can get things done and large committees cannot.

When comparing two different aggregates one must notice, however, that potential for discipline relates inversely to size only when their per capita organizational capabilities are similar.

Participation and Decision Load

From the above it follows that, if an aggregate possesses fixed minimum requirements for discipline and for coordinated activity, then that aggregate possesses some limit of size which it cannot exceed. Collective decision making is coordinated activity and therefore, when predominantly cooperative, subject to all the principles which govern coordinated activity in general. Most organizations, moreover, have decision loads (defined as decision-making activities) which cannot be pushed below some minimum without threatening the

11'

existence of the organization or the attainment of its purposes. Most important organizations (especially businesses, governments and so forth) cannot afford to have their decision making consist of a high volume of poorly coordinated activity rather than a lesser volume of highly coordinated activity; that is to say, they have minimum requirements for discipline. It follows that the size of decision-making groups within such organizations is limited. To put this another way: within any aggregate the size of the decision-making group is limited by the decision load and by the organizational capability of the aggregate. If we define "participation" as the number of members of the aggregate participating to some fixed degree in the making of an average decision, then possible participation is proportional to organizational capability and inversely proportional to decision load.

Participation can be reduced in two ways: centralization and non-participatory decentralization. That is, participation can be reduced by concentrating all decisions in the hands of a single smaller sub-aggregate, or it can be reduced by dividing the set of decisions into subsets and then assigning each subset to a different small sub-aggregate. The Politburo of a communist party is an example of the first alternative, the committee system of the United States Congress an example of the second.

Low decision loads and high organizational capability make broad participation possible but do not impose an organizational strategy based upon broad participation.

Evidence indicates that these hypotheses apply to a broad variety of aggregates. A survey of the literature on small groups indicates that only rare task groups fail to develop a differentiated group of decision makers²⁴ and that "Just as the central position in a communication net increases the chances

that an individual will assume a leadership role, so does the assumption of such a role increase the probability that an individual will become a central communications figure.²⁵ Likewise Dubin argues that groups with minimum numbers of "linkages" (i.e., relationships or communications channels) are more efficient than groups with more linkages and cites findings that groups seek to reduce their linkages to a minimum if given opportunity.²⁶ Small groups with centralized decision structures turn out experimentally to accomplish tasks faster, more efficiently, and with fewer errors than small groups whose decision structures did not have a differentiated decision structure.²⁷ Regrettably most of the small group literature does not systematically vary levels of organizational resources and like other literatures fails to distinguish questions of participation from questions of centralization, but the above findings suggest that the hypothesis is correct. Studies of political interest groups support the hypothesis more directly. For instance, Truman²⁸ explains the omnipresence of what he calls the "active minority" in political interest groups by reference to variables of size, resources, distribution of resources, and habit.

Students of organization also provide evidence which supports our participation hypothesis, although this literature consistently confuses the participation questions with the centralization questions. Bureaucracies characteristically are large and have heavy decision loads, and Weber²⁹ notes that fully developed bureaucracies are always monocratically organized; that is, the largest organizations with the highest decision loads and requirements for discipline tend to be the organizations with the most extreme reduction of participation. Organizations in crises (i.e., organizations confronting dramatic increases in decision loads) suffer reductions in communication channels,

overload of utilized channels, personal withdrawal, reduction of authority, reduced integration, and so forth,³⁰ all of which correspond to organizational resource shortages and attempts to compensate for these resource shortages by reducing the effective size of the decision groups. Studies of political crises such as the Cuban missile crisis discern a similar pattern.³¹ More generally, Parsons³² has argued that

The larger and more differentiated an instrumental system, the more essential management or managed coordination becomes to keep the organization going as a functioning concern. With this there will emerge executive or managerial roles.

Students of politics have confirmed this finding. Weber observed that division into activists, passive members, and mass members is common to all parties³³ and elsewhere argued that "It is unimaginable how in large associations elections could function at all without this managerial pattern."³⁴ A congeries of schools of elite theorists divide politics into elite and mass, and democratic theorists like Sartori³⁵ follow them in distinguishing the active Demos from the passive. Dahl³⁶ also argues the universality of this phenomenon:

Although we have here a formidable problem that so far as I know has never been adequately analyzed, it is a reasonable preliminary hypothesis that the number of individuals who exercise significant control over the alternatives scheduled is, in most organizations, only a tiny fraction of the membership. This seems to be the case even in the most democratic organizations if the membership is at all large.

Michels summarized this division within parties in his famous iron law of oligarchy. But as Lipset³⁷ has argued in his study of Agrarian Socialism, "The Saskatchewan movement indicated limitations on Michels' iron law of oligarchy," limitations which result exclusively from the unusually high levels of organizational resources possessed by the farmers in question,

from a wise strategy of mobilizing additional resources, and from relatively low decision loads and need for discipline. A study of the democratic International Typographers Union yielded parallel results.³⁸

Another group of writers extends this argument to whole societies. We do not customarily think of whole societies as organizations, but the requirements of social order in a society are tantamount to minimum levels of coordination and discipline. Tiny and highly traditionalized societies (i.e., those that are small and have low decision loads) do not always require differentiated decision-making elites,³⁹ but large societies with heavy decision loads do require them. As Machiavelli⁴⁰ tells us, the "multitude without a head is altogether unserviceable." Moreover, the degree to which participation must be reduced or can be increased follows the lines of our hypothesis. Coser⁴¹ points out that "the authoritarian regimes of modern Europe were all instituted in the wake of a serious loss of internal cohesion bordering on anomie." China is perhaps the extreme case of a huge society with relatively low organizational capabilities and relatively high decision load; in accordance with our hypothesis it is also the society with most drastically curtailed participation in societal decisions.

Theorists of society as a whole, like organization theorists, have failed to distinguish the conditions which require reduced participation from the conditions which require centralization. To this point our argument has confined itself to participation, and leaves open the option of "dispersed inequalities" of participation as well as the option of centralization. We turn now to conditions favoring centralization and decentralization.

Centralization

Organizational strategies specify roles and allocate resources to roles. One can compare the distributions of resources allocated among roles by alternative strategies and, given some partition of role requirements (into, say, "responsibilities" or "functions"), one can compare the distributions of responsibilities allocated among roles by alternative strategies. A systematic theory of organizational strategies would have to analyze the allocation (in terms of some statistical measures) of each resource and kind of responsibility under a range of possible circumstances. Organization theorists have not done this,⁴² but have instead described particular configurations (e.g., Weber's bureaucracy), or analyzed the functions or dysfunctions of certain sub-configurations, or have employed factor analysis to interrelate various characteristics, or have sought to explain particular aspects of resource or responsibility distribution. Centralization is the aspect which has attracted greatest attention, but it is an ambiguous aspect which can refer to distribution of liquid motivational and strategic resources, to distribution of decision-making responsibility, or to central position in a communications network. Seldom are these kinds of centralization carefully distinguished from one another; instead they are treated as different facets of one primitive phenomenon. To be sure, these kinds of centralization are related, but their coincidence is far from perfect.

In what follows we shall plead "also guilty" to lack of comprehensive theory of organizational strategy, and shall confine attention to a few variables which influence several forms of centralization and decentralization of political organizations.⁴³

An organization may respond to a heavy decision load by centralizing its decision-making procedures, but even a tiny group has a limited organizational

92

capability, so centralization even when carried to its limit does not necessarily provide adequate decision-making capability. When the decision load becomes extremely high, decentralization of decision-making responsibility is therefore forced as long as we assume reduction of the decision load impossible. In support of this proposition, Hage and Aiken⁴⁴ found that less centralization was associated with greater complexity, and Blau⁴⁵ found that increasing size promotes differentiation, but at declining rates. (Various political scientists have taken this proposition to imply that as society becomes larger and more complex, political decision-making processes also become more decentralized, but this conclusion follows only if organizational capability and routinization do not keep pace with complexity.)

Some deterioration of decision-making efficiency may be acceptable to an organization under heavy decision loads if other pressures for centralization are sufficiently strong. In addition, if certain kinds of decisions are routine, then those kinds of decisions can be formulated in terms of abstract rules; by this process one decision (the rule) covers what previously were many separate decisions. Promulgation of rules is therefore, among other things, a device for maintaining centralized decision-making procedures by reducing the decision load. Rules, policies, laws, values and ideologies never decentralize decision making, even when they are binding on the top decision makers, but such routinized decisions can exist in a situation where central decision makers do not exercise firm control. Thus Hage and Aiken⁴⁶ obtained a weak positive relationship between formalization and centralization. In a context highly susceptible to routinization of decisions, a decentralized allocation of liquid resources can provide a way to maximize centralization of decision making. On organization charts, such a situation gets interpreted as

93

decentralization, but if the rules so constrain use of resources that the subordinate has little freedom of action, then only resource allocation has been decentralized and decision making may remain highly centralized.

In the opposite kind of context, a context of risky decisions not easily susceptible to routinization, Blau⁴⁷ has argued that fear of failure creates pressure for centralization of decisions. But the structural issue may not be so straightforward. Blau himself argues that need for technical expertise encourages delegation of decisions, and risk and need for technical expertise sometimes coincide. Moreover, for other risky decisions "deliberation then moves out of channels toward men of generalized wisdom...communicating informally and effectively,"⁴⁸ a process which could increase participation and decrease centralization. One suspects that the effects of risk on centralization of decision making depend on: (a) the extent to which the chief executive perceives possible strategies for isolating himself from the consequences of the decisions; (b) the extent to which strategies appear which would isolate the organization as a whole from the risk of any given set of decisions; and (c) the type of advice perceived as relevant to the decision. In regard to (b), one would expect that centralization would be forced whenever the operations of the entire organization need (or appear to need) to be tightly integrated with one another. An assembly line needs to be tightly integrated; a research corporation like RAND does not. We shall refer to organizations of the former kind as having a high need for integration or need for coordination.

To the extent that motivation consists of the liquid motivational resources of money and force, achievement of discipline may depend upon centralized control over the allocation of resources. Marx argued that the discipline of the capitalist factory required separation of the worker from the means of production,

and Weber⁴⁹ made the parallel argument that "...separation of the warrior from the means of warfare, and the concentration of the means of warfare in the hands of the war lord have everywhere been one of the bases of mass discipline." For the same reasons discipline in attainment of public goods depends upon some degree of centralization of control over some resources.

In addition to these primarily internal characteristics of an organization, strategic needs for secrecy and for a united front relative to opponents influence centralization. Divided leadership easily leads to public washing of dirty linen, so groups which need to project an appearance of unity tend toward centralization of decision making, or at least to reliance on a single formal head.⁵⁰ Likewise need for secrecy can pressure a group toward centralization of decision making, as Lenin remarks for political parties and Truman for unions.⁵¹ But here, as with risk in decisions, the situation is more complicated than a straightforward relation between need for secrecy and centralization. Risks that valuable information will be lost by penetration of an organization's communications net can logically be reduced in two ways: by giving full information to only a few points in the net or by providing only minimal information to each point in the net. The former represents the tactic of a presidential decision group in a crisis (e.g., Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis). The latter represents the tactic of communist cells, which do not know the members of other cells, or of espionage nets in which every member knows only what he absolutely must know. Thus both centralization and decentralization of information can serve the purposes of secrecy. And, as with risk, need for centralized decision making to assure secrecy is a function of the need for integration. The organization which must operate in a highly integrated manner incurs additional pressure for centralized decision making

if it requires secrecy, but if highly integrated decision making is unnecessary then decentralized decision making is possible. If it does centralize decision making, it will have to concentrate information flows at the center of the decision process, but will usually continue to rely on decentralization of information flows to guarantee secrecy outside the office of the central decision maker.

Further analysis requires more precise definition of "decision making." A broad concept of the decision-making process would include a number of distinct phases: identification of new problems,⁵² collection of information (intelligence), generation of alternative possible policies, information processing, decision among the alternatives, and implementation of the decision. One can distinguish a broad concept of decision making, as exemplified by the whole list, and a narrower concept consisting of routinized identification of problems, routine processing of information relative to given alternatives, and decision among those alternatives. All of the hypotheses about decision making which have been made above apply exclusively to the narrow conception of decision making.

Reduction of participation in decision making occurs in part because of the need to limit communications chaos in view of man's limited capacities as a communications channel. But this confinement of communications to fixed channels also limits the ability of the organization to absorb new kinds of information, identify new problems, and generate imaginative strategies. Absorption of information would be facilitated by maximizing the number of points on the communications net which could absorb new information and by maximizing the amount of this information that flowed to decision makers, but such maximization would return us to the problems of communications chaos. Likewise,

-96-

problem identification and generation of a variety of alternatives would be facilitated by maximizing diversity of information and viewpoints presented to decision makers. Thus high participation rather than low and decentralization rather than centralization facilitate these three phases of organizational activity.⁵³ By contrast implementation of decisions is facilitated by centralization of liquid motivational resources, and of the communications net, in the hands of those who make the decisions.

Centralization and decentralization of various kinds can also be influenced by factors not discussed here. For instance, centralization of decisions may be encouraged by certain distributions of skills (e.g., if the aggregate contains only one competent decision maker), by evolution (e.g., if the organization was founded by a single entrepreneur rather than being founded as a federation), and by ideological preferences (e.g., for hierarchy among the Nazis).

Each of the hypotheses has been stated for all aggregates, thus generalizing evidence that usually derives from a variety of particular kinds of aggregates. What is "center" and what is "periphery" in discussions of centralization therefore depends upon careful specification of the aggregates and processes under consideration. The president is the center and the cabinet and presidential assistants the periphery within the highest level of government, but for other purposes the cabinet is center and government is periphery, or government is center and society is periphery.

Organizational Crystallization

The likelihood that an aggregate will establish an organization (i.e., systematically coordinate its activities to some given degree) is, other things being equal, proportional to its organizational capability. Put another way,

91

the probability that an aggregate will form an organization is proportional to its motivation and its ability to form such an organization. Stated this way the proposition has great intuitive force. Moreover, such a proposition is implicit or explicit in most interest group theory, stratification theory, and organization theory, as well as in the economics of the emergence of new firms. Despite this, it may not be correct as stated. Certainly motivation and ability to organize must enter the formula for such a probability, but they may not enter the formula in precisely the way suggested. For instance, motivation might have a greater than proportionate effect on the probability of organization but not on organizational capability. Nonetheless, the formulation as stated makes more sense than any other as an initial hypothesis. At this point the writer can discover no data sufficiently precise to test this hypothesis.

With regard to this hypothesis, the most important thing which must be held equal is access to organizational strategies. Introducing knowledge of new strategies of organizing should dramatically increase the probability that resources will actually be employed in construction of organizations. Moreover it is a reasonable hypothesis that the intensity of the search by members of the aggregate for appropriate strategies is proportional to their motivation.

Once attempts to organize occur, a feedback process begins in which attempts to employ organizational resources generate new resources. Organization increases the visibility of interlocking goals and decreases the visibility of conflicting goals by providing differentiated roles in which use can be made of motivations consistent with role requirements while shielding the occupant of the role from some conflicting demands. It provides a mechanism for coordinating expectations and thereby facilitates production of public goods by large aggregates.⁵⁴ The process of creating an organization raises the

98

visibility of the goals of the organization, thereby attracting additional resources and also provoking people with opposing goals into forming countervailing organizations. Moreover, coordination of activities within the organization gives rise to a sense of common identity which reinforces the salience of organizational goals.⁵⁵ Similarly, formation of an organization usually leads to creation of new channels of communication (as well as restrictions on use of existing channels) and to systematic development of leadership and other coordination skills. If the organization avoids provoking a challenge which it is not yet ready to meet, then the organization may become less vulnerable to those forces which previously reduced its autonomy, and it may develop an institutionalized relationship with its environment which increases autonomy by making the future more predictable.

Organizational Seeding

The hypothesis that organizations will tend to form when adequate resources are available corresponds to the hypothesis that crystals will tend to form in a supersaturated liquid. The feedback processes which increase the capabilities of an organization which has already formed correspond roughly to the tendency of a crystal in solution to enlarge by drawing additional resources to itself from the solution. Likewise, the introduction of an organization into an environment of unutilized organizational resources can precipitate the formation of new organizations, a phenomenon we can call "organizational seeding." Organizational seeding occurs because: (a) creation of some organizations increases the visibility and salience of certain issues for possible opponents, and thereby stimulates organization of countervailing groups; (b) creation of new organizations sometimes involves invention of new organizational strategies, or promulgation of organizational strategies not previously known to various aggregates, and

thereby increases the probability that existing resources will be more efficiently utilized through emulation; and (c) some organizations create other organizations as part of their conflict strategy.⁵⁶ For instance, the formation of big businesses can stimulate the formation of unions. The success of communist peasant mobilizers in one country can stimulate attempts to emulate their strategy in other countries. Political parties create local branches. Any such events, which directly stimulate use of existing but previously unused organizational resources, we shall call "organizational precipitants." Parallel to this concept and equally useful is the concept of "strategic precipitants," namely events by which an organization is directly stimulated to pursue a given kind of conflict strategy.

Summary

This article has analyzed the conditions under which an aggregate can organize itself or be organized, and has employed the answers in brief discussions of a few aspects of organizational strategies. In doing this our purpose has been not so much to generate particular new low-level hypotheses as to seek parsimony of concepts and basic hypotheses, high generality of hypotheses, and theoretical coherence. What is new is not the individual results, but (a) derivation of hypotheses applicable to all aggregates from (b) consideration of the most basic definitions and of a very small number of axiom-like hypotheses.

FOOTNOTES

1. This may seem vague, but it is no vaguer than the statement from physics that $E = mc^2$ only when the velocity of the object in question is low relative to the speed of light. How low is "low" depends on the precision desired, and how deliberate is "deliberate" also depends on the precision desired.
2. This concept of visibility refers to goals and must be distinguished from Merton's concept of "visibility," which is "the extent to which the norms and role performances of a group are readily open to observation by others." Cf. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1957), 319.
3. For related but very different concepts, cf. R. Likert, "Measuring Organization Performance," Harvard Business Review (March-April 1968), 41-50; and Frank Friedlander and Hal Pickle, "Components of Effectiveness in Small Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968), 289-304.
4. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 34. Cf. also the related concept of power in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 143.
5. Somewhat surprisingly this criticism applies to Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations, I and II," Administrative Science Quarterly 1 (June and Sept. 1956), 65-85 and 225-239.
6. For a compendium of this evidence, cf. Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Chs. 6, 7.
7. Max Weber, Theory of Economic and Social Organization, trans., A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford, 1947), 140.

at'

8. Huntington, op. cit., 143.
9. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1964), 97.
10. This concept differs from Weber's: "'Discipline' is the probability that by virtue of habituation a command will receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, on the part of a given group of persons," Max Weber, Theory of Economic and Social Organization, op. cit., 152. Cf. also his "The Meaning of Discipline," in From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 253.
11. These computations are straightforward, but the reader who does not wish to go through them himself can find them in Theodore Caplow, "Organizational Size," Administrative Science Quarterly 1 (March 1957), 484-505. The number of communication channels is, of course, twice the number of relationships.
12. Ibid., 502.
13. A. Paul Hare, "A Study of Interaction and Consensus in Different Size Groups," Administrative Science Review 17 (1952), 261-267.
14. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: MacMillan, 1932).
15. Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Free Press, 1966), 366. Cf. also Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 53.
16. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? (New York: International, 1943), 26.
17. Carl J. Friedrich, "The Failure of a One-Party System: Hitler Germany," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 243, 253. Friedrich also notes (p. 250) that the party simultaneously lost power and proliferated.

18. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New York: Hafner, 1947), III, 4; II, 9.
19. The Federalist (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), 53-62.
20. Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 85.
21. Huntington, op. cit., 310.
22. Robert K. Merton, "The Role Set: Problems in Sociological Theory," British Journal of Sociology VII (June 1957), 117.
23. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, op. cit., 42.
24. Verba, op. cit., 124.
25. Ibid., 129.
26. Robert Dubin, "Stability of Human Organizations," in Maison Haire, ed., Modern Organization Theory (New York: Wiley, 1959).
27. Mauk Mulder, "Communication Structure, Decision Structure and Group Performance," Sociometry 23 (1960), 1-14; and Thornton R. Roby, Elizabeth H. Nicol and Francis M. Farrell, "Group Problem Solving Under Two Types of Executive Structure," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 (1963), 550-556.
28. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 139-155.
29. Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber, op. cit., 197. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), make a similar point when they argue that "...one reason for 'one-man control' is to reduce the problem of coordination at the top." (239).

41. Coser, op. cit., 89.
42. An interesting start on a theory is provided by Selwyn W. Becker and Gerald Gordon, "The Entrepreneurial Theory of Formal Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 11 (1966), 315-344.
43. We deliberately narrow our choice of variables to the exclusion of many which are valuable for economists. For an analysis of greater utility to a businessman, cf. Manfred Kochen and Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization," American Political Science Review LXIII, 3 (Sept. 1969), 743-749, and the reply by Frank Levy, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Another View," American Political Science Review LXV, 1 (March 1971), 172-179.
44. Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, "Relationship of Centralization to Other Structural Properties," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (June 1967), 72-92.
45. Peter M. Blau, "A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations," American Sociological Review 35 (1970), 201-218. Cf. also the exchange which resulted from this article in American Sociological Review 36 (1971): Norman P. Hummon, "A Mathematical Theory of Differentiation in Organizations"; Marshall W. Meyer, "Some Constraints in Analyzing Data on Organizational Structures: A Comment on Blau's Paper"; and Blau, "Comments on Two Mathematical Formulations of the Theory of Differentiation in Organizations."
46. Hage and Aiken, op. cit.
47. Peter M. Blau, "Decentralization in Bureaucracies," in Mayer N. Zald, ed., Power in Organizations (Nashville: Vanderbilt U. Press, 1970).
48. Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 81.

49. Max Weber, "The Meaning of Discipline," op. cit. 261.
50. Weber, "Politics As A Vocation," op. cit., 89-90.
51. David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 131.
52. On problem identification, cf. Wilensky, op. cit., 82.
53. On the utility of participation and decentralization for information collection, innovative problem identification, and generation of alternatives, cf.: Huntington, op. cit., 140, citing James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organizations: Notes Towards a Theory," in James D. Thompson, ed., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), 193-218; MacKenzie, op. cit., 263, citing Burns and Stalker, The Management of Innovation (Tavistock, 1961); Wilensky, op. cit., 49-50; and Dubin, op. cit., who recommends for innovation a serial system in which each position has only one link to another position. This argument is also supported by a series of experiments. Harold J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communications Patterns on Group Effectiveness," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 46 (1951), 38-50, found that a wheel pattern of communications led to faster solution of simple problems than a circle pattern. The simple problems involved only routine information processing and decision. Marjorie Shaw, "Some Effects of Unequal Distribution of Information Upon Group Performance in Various Communications Nets," same journal #49 (1954), 547-553, obtained the opposite results for groups solving complex problems which involved innovation of alternatives. Selwyn W. Becker and Nicholas Baloff, "Organizational Structure and Complex Problem Solving," Administrative Science Quarterly 14, 2 (June 1969), 260-271, found division of labor groups superior to hierarchical and committee groups in solving

complex problems involving generation of alternatives, processing of information, and decision making. They particularly suggest that decentralization is better for generation of alternatives. On the utility of centralization for implementation, cf. the above citations of Huntington, Wilson, and Dubin.

54. Cf. Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, "I Get By With a Little Help From My Friends," World Politics XXIII (Oct. 1970), 119.
55. Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., 30-33.
56. On the third point, cf. Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in James G. March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).