PN-ABH-432
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# PROGRAM STRATEGY FOR DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM INITIATIVE IN PAKISTAN

Final Report

*Bureau for Private Enterprise*
*U.S. Agency for International Development*

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| *Prepared for:* | *Bureau for Asia, Near East and Europe*<br>*Office of Technical Resources*<br>*Human Resources Division* |
| *Prepared by:* | *Ernst & Young* |
| *Sponsored by:* | *Private Enterprise Development Support Project II*<br>*Project Number 940-2028.03*<br>*Prime Contractor: Ernst & Young* |

*September 1990*

**Ernst & Young**

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*Prepared for:* *Bureau for Asia, Near East and Europe*
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## Executive Summary

1. The Democratic Pluralism Initiative (DPI) is part of the Bureau for Asia, Near East and Europe's (ANE) emphasis on promoting "open markets and open societies" throughout the region. DPI supports A.I.D.'s broader development mandate by encouraging more effective, responsive, and participatory government; and ensuring protection of internationally recognized human rights. The USAID/Pakistan DPI Program seeks to address the specific DPI-related needs and conditions in Pakistan.

2. The paper begins with an analysis of Pakistan's political institutions and the underlying political dynamics to identify the major strengths and weaknesses of the political system. This system has oscillated over its four decade history between military and semi-democratic rule. Both forms of governance have been unstable and each has tended to create the conditions leading to eventual shifts toward the other form. Military governments face a problem of legitimacy--a problem which increases the longer they are in power. Party-based parliamentary governments, because they tend to represent the interests of a relatively small political party elite, have had difficulties in delivering effective governance. Over time, they become open to charges of corruption.

3. The challenge for developing a more stable and effective democratic polity is to improve institutions that provide checks on ruling governments, to increase the capacity of democratic institutions to provide effective governance, and to guarantee human rights. Six major priorities are identified in this strategy:

   a. Strengthening the responsiveness of political parties to their constituencies.

   b. Strengthening constraints on the private diversion of public resources.

   c. Enlarging the public policy environment.

   d. Improving the technical facilities of national and provincial assemblies.

   e. Improving public information flows and responsible journalism.

f. Improving human rights performance.

4. Each of these six development priorities is treated in the strategy as a distinct program component. Specific contributing factors are identified for each and, where appropriate, recommendations are made for USAID assistance to address needs in that area. (Attachment 1 summarizes the six components and recommended activities under each.)

5. A final section considers potential Pakistani sensitivities, criteria for activity selection, funding sources, and USAID management requirements.

## Preface

The purpose of this document is to provide USAID/Pakistan with a strategic framework for develcpment of a Democratic Pluralism Initiative (DPI) program appropriate to the Pakistani context.

The strategy (and an accompanying PID project document) was prepared by a consultant team contracted for USAID/Pakistan by Ernst and Young, Inc. and funded under the Private Enterprise Development Support Project (940-2028.03). The team consisted of the following members: Dr. William S. Cole (team leader), has extensive experience both in program analysis and design for A.I.D. and with the ANE Bureau's DPI activities. Previously, he led teams preparing DPI Program Strategies for USAID/ Indonesia and for USAID/Thailand. Dr. William Richter is chairman of the Dept. of Political Science at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas. As a South Asia area specialist, Dr. Richter has made substantial contributions to research and literature on Pakistani politics and has advised the U.S. government on foreign policy in the region. Dr. Raymond Gastil has extensive experience in measuring and promoting democracy. Formerly an associate of the Freedom House and the Hudson Institute, he has participated in numerous election monitoring teams in several areas of the world. Dr. Allen Jones is an historian and South Asia area specialist who has conducted several policy-related studies on Pakistan and other South Asian countries. He has participated in numerous project design and evaluation efforts for A.I.D. and other donors. Uzma Chughtai, LL.B., is a law graduate of the Islamic University of Pakistan. She currently practices law with the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The team worked closely with USAID/Pakistan mission, particularly with Kaneez Fatima Kassim and Virgil Meidema of the Program Office.

After initial briefings at AID/Washington, the team spent four weeks in Pakistan. Interviews were held with a wide variety of persons in the bureaucracy, media, parliament, academic institutions, NGOs, and elsewhere, to gain a broad understanding of the institutions and dynamics of Pakistan's political system.

# I. INTRODUCTION

A.I.D. recognizes democratic participation in government decision making and strengthening protection of basic human rights as important components of stable and equitable development. Mission portfolios in the ANE region, including Pakistan, have long included activities in this general area. But there is growing interest in taking a more strategic and programmatic approach to allocating these resources. The ANE Bureau is increasingly coming to treat efforts in this area as a distinct development category under the term **Democratic Pluralism Initiatives** (DPI).

This strategy document examines issues related to DPI in Pakistan, and explores possibilities for expanding and sharpening the focus of Mission activities in this area. The document begins with a broad examination of Pakistan's recent political history, and identifies the major sources of weakness and instability in Pakistan's democratic system. Specific priorities for addressing these weaknesses are then identified. The second section outlines a DPI Program consisting of six main components to address these priority needs. These six provide a framework of program components in which USAID could substantially contribute toward strengthening Pakistan's democratic institutions and increasing commitment to basic human rights. The Mission is already involved in some of the suggested activities, but several new initiatives are recommended. The final section of the paper addresses implementation issues that the Mission needs to consider as the proposed program moves forward.

## II. BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

This section provides a brief overview of the history and dynamics of Pakistan's political system. The analysis focuses on institutional change and the interplay of social forces. On the basis of this analysis, subsequent sections identify key problems and objectives, and provide an integrated strategy to address them.

### A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A brief review of Pakistani political history will provide a context for later conceptual analysis. Figure 1 lists the generally accepted periods of Pakistani political history, along with the names of the dominant political figure during each period. This classification provides the chronological framework for the ensuing discussion.

**Figure 1**
**Chronology of Recent Pakistani Governments**

| YEARS | TYPE OF RULE | LEAD FIGURE |
|---|---|---|
| 1947-1958 | Parliamentary Party Rule | M.A. Jinnah, Others |
| 1958-1962 | Direct Military Rule | Gen. M. Ayub Khan |
| 1962-1969 | Mixed Rule Under the Military Control | Gen. M. Ayub Khan |
| 1969-1971 | Interregnum | Gen. A. M. Yahya Khan |
| 1971-1977 | Parliamentary Party Rule (PPP) | Z. A. Bhutto |
| 1977-1985 | Direct Military Rule | Gen. Zia ul Huq |
| 1986-1988 | Mixed Rule Under Military Control | Gen. Zia ul Huq |
| 1988-1990 | Parliamentary Party Rule (PPP) | Benazir Bhutto |

## 1. Post Partition Decade (1947-1958)

One characteristic of Pakistan's political system at Partition was weak political parties with roots in the pre-Independence period. The Muslim League, the party responsible for Pakistan's creation, came to power because of its strong showing in elections in 1946. Although it included some of the landed elite, its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was a lawyer and many of its activists were students and intellectuals. Its major competitor, at least in Punjab, was the Unionist Party, dominated by landed families.

The Muslim League's experience contrasted markedly with that of India's Congress Party, which achieved independence at the same time. The Congress had a longer period of nationalist struggle, more grass-roots political organization, and a larger cadre of strong political leaders. The Muslim League's leadership was concentrated in the person of Mohammed Ali Jinnah. When he died a little over a year after Independence the party went into decline. The landed families rapidly found a place in the Muslim League. Thus, two types of individuals dominated Pakistan's politics during its first decade of independence, Muhajirs (migrants from India) and feudal landlords, particularly those from Punjab, neither of whom had much incentive to hold elections.

As a result, Pakistan's first decade of independence was marked by political instability. Seven different Prime Ministers served during that period, only two for more than 550 days. The tasks of constitution-writing and establishing political order were further complicated during this period by two major concerns: the role of religion and regional issues, both between the two wings of the country and within West Pakistan. A Constitution was finally adopted in 1956, but it lasted only two years. President Iskander Mirza declared Martial Law in October 1958 and named General Mohammad Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. A month later Ayub dismissed Mirza and assumed full power.

Thus, for a variety of reasons, parliamentary democracy in the first decade of independence failed to develop a sufficiently strong popular base or institutional framework to avoid military takeover.

## 2. The Ayub Khan Decade (1958-1969)

Following an initial stage of firm rule when he forged close links with the bureaucracy and allowed virtually no political activity, Ayub promulgated a "Basic Democracies" Constitution (BD) in 1962, under which he continued to serve as president. He argued that his Basic Democracy system would provide channels for limited popular representation and participation while avoiding the ills of partisan parliamentary democracy. In some respects, the BD system did provide access to the system for some new groups through local elections. Ayub also used the system to prolong his rule over Pakistan, doing so with the support of the bureaucracy and the military. He also reintroduced political parties and claimed the mantle of the Muslim League. Gradually, many of the landlord politicians who had been forced out of power in the martial law period of 1958-1962 found their way back into governmental favor.

After 1965 pressures grew for expanded political participation and more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic development. Protests in both wings of the country led in March 1969 to the second martial-law regime. Ayub was replaced by another general, Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, who pledged to restore parliamentary democracy and to hold direct elections as a first step in returning power to the people.

Ayub Khan's attempt to create a "guided democracy" proved to be unstable primarily because it failed to accommodate the interests of emergent regional and economic groups and, therefore, lost legitimacy.

## 3. The Yahya Khan Interregnum (1969-1970)

Yahya took several steps to restore parliamentary democratic institutions to Pakistan, but ultimately his efforts ended in

disgrace for the army. The 1970 general elections, the first in the country's history, were a victory for the democratic process. Their outcome, however, contributed to the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, won 60% of the national assembly seats in West Pakistan. Although Bhutto was himself from a Sindhi landed family, and had served in Ayub Khan's cabinet until 1966, he and the PPP campaigned in 1970 on the "democratic socialist" slogan, Roti, Kapra, aur Makan (Bread, Clothing and Shelter). Bhutto's electoral success came from his appeal to new groups that had previously been outside Pakistani politics, i.e., the lower classes and the poor in the rural areas and the lower-middle classes in the urban areas. The Pakistani defeat in December 1971 was followed immediately by the army's turning over what was left of Pakistan to Bhutto.

### 4. The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Era (1971-1977)

Bhutto ruled for more than a year as President under a continuation of Yahya's martial law regulations. During that time he managed to establish a new parliamentary constitution, with the endorsement of all sections of the truncated country. With the adoption of the 1973 Constitution and the ending of martial law, Bhutto assumed the office of Prime Minister.

Once in power, Bhutto paid back his party workers with patronage but did relatively little to provide his national constituency with concrete programs to meet their needs. He did attempt to undermine the entrenched power of the bureaucracy by establishing lateral entry recruitment, and of the military by creating a new paramilitary organization. He also pursued nationalization policies and in so doing undermined the nascent power of the new urban industrial elite. As time went on, he too turned to the traditional political elite--the landed interests--for support.

As his rule came increasingly to represent the furtherance of his own political interests, he had opponents arrested, banned one major opposition party, and increased control over the press.

The widespread rigging of the March 1977 elections led to prolonged disturbances when the aggrieved opposition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), protested the results. The ensuing uncertainty and instability lasted for several weeks after which time the PPP and the PNA attempted to negotiate an understanding for the holding of fresh elections. They were on the threshold of reaching agreement when the army intervened, declared martial law, and arrested Bhutto.

Party-based parliamentary democracy under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto proved to be unstable, largely because it foundered on widespread abuse of power and ineffectiveness of government.

### 5. The Zia ul Haq Era (1977-1988)

As self-proclaimed Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Mohammad Zia ul Haq promised to hold elections in 90 days, but these were later put off indefinitely. Politically, Zia could not afford the prospect that Bhutto and the PPP might return to power through elections. When he discovered sufficient evidence of widespread mismanagement and corruption, he launched an "accountability" campaign against Bhutto and his supporters. He argued that the civilian politicians had once again, as in the 1950s, demonstrated to the nation that they were inept in their administration, and prone to corrupt and dishonest practices.

Zia came from more humble origins than either Ayub or Yahya, both of whom had come from landed families. Also unlike either of the earlier martial law rulers, Zia stressed Islamization, in part to bolster the legitimacy of his regime. Like the earlier generals, Zia drew support and talent from the bureaucracy. His eleven-year tenure may be divided into four phases:

(a) For the first twenty-eight months he promised to hold elections and return power to an acceptable group of politicians. He announced, then cancelled, elections in November 1979 as well as October 1977. He was able to hold local-level, non-partisan, elections in 1979 (and again in 1983 and 1987).

(b) In the second period, from 1979 until 1983, Zia ruled with an iron hand. This period featured heavy press censorship, the outlaw of parties, restricted civil liberties, thwarted judicial independence, and increased brutality. By 1983, Zia was facing the problem of legitimizing his (and the military's) rule and he began searching for some alternative to party-based democracy. One ultimately unworkable solution was creation of an appointive Majlis-e-Shoora (consultative assembly). Despite Zia's tight rule during the this period, the PPP and several of its former opponents joined to form the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

(c) In the third period, Zia was forced to hold national elections to legitimize his continued rule. In August 1983, he announced a democratization plan with elections to be held prior to March 1985. After ensuring his own position through an impromptu nation-wide referendum in December 1984, he held non-partisan general elections to national and provincial assemblies in February 1985. The new civilian government agreed to a constitutional amendment strengthening the position of the President. This enabled Zia to lift martial law at the end of 1985.

(d) Zia's fourth period of rule was a semi-independent parliamentary system. After the ending of martial law, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo gradually broadened the scope of civilian authority. But President Zia still retained the real power and dismissed Junejo in May 1988. Zia announced elections for the fall, but died in an air crash in August. Like Ayub and Yahya, Zia never reached the point of leaving power voluntarily.

It is significant that the army did not declare martial law at the time of Zia's death. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Senate Chairman and Zia's former Finance Minister, became acting President on Zia's death. General elections were held in November 1988.

### 6. The Benazir Bhutto Period (1988-1990)

The Pakistan People's Party, led by Benazir Bhutto (Z. A. Bhutto's daughter), won a plurality of seats in the November 1988 elections. Although the PPP retained some of its populist support from the 1970s, it also continued to attract landlords. Its primary platform in 1988 was the restoration of democracy.

After some delay, Benazir Bhutto was named Prime Minister. She took power with several handicaps: (1) She was hemmed in by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution that ceded certain powers to the President that would otherwise have been with the Prime Minister. (2) She had to agree to retain the previous foreign minister and maintain the country's Afghanistan policy. In trying to consolidate her power she at times challenged the authority of the bureaucracy and the army. (3) She faced a strong opposition in the national assembly and was forced to survive a no-confidence vote. (4) Her government lacked a coherent program and allegations of corruption against members of her government and family weakened public confidence. All these factors sharply limited the effectiveness of parliamentary government.

On August 6, 1990, after only twenty months in power, Benazir Bhutto's government was dismissed by President Ishaq on grounds of corruption and mismanagement.

Like her father, Benazir Bhutto had mobilized sufficient popular support to come to power, but had failed to develop a sufficiently strong institutional base to continue. The legitimacy of her government was eroded by its lack of progress in addressing the major economic and social challenges facing Pakistan and by allegations of corruption.

## B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Several dynamic patterns of political change are evident in this brief outline of Pakistan's history. One is the periodic, and often abrupt, alternation of regime structures, from a

parliamentary democratic system on one side to a military-dominated regime on the other. Another is the interplay of social forces with these institutional changes, especially the competition between major elites (i.e., political, bureaucratic, and military) and class groups (e.g., feudal landowners) for dominance within the system. Others include the interplay of ethnicity and politics and religion and politics.

### 1. The Cycle of Institutional Change

Pakistan's four decades of independence have been characterized by a oscillation between conditions of **military-bureaucratic rule** and **incomplete parliamentary rule**. The dynamics of this movement are best illustrated by designating three regime types: Martial Law (ML), under which the military is clearly dominant and rules in alliance with the bureaucracy; Parliamentary Democracy (PD), in which elected political leaders rule through a parliamentary assembly and cabinet; and a Transitional System (TS), which combines features of the other two types of regime. Figure 2 (following page) shows the shift in regime types between 1947 to 1990. (Note that the system types in Figure 2 correspond generally, but not exactly, to the time periods covered in section 2.1.)

Each of these regime types has been unstable, in the sense that each has produced conditions that undermined its continuation. Parliamentary rule has been based on popular legitimacy through elections (in 1946, 1970, and 1988). But that legitimacy has eroded over time as political leaders, without adequate checks on their actions, appeared to exploit public office for personal or partisan benefit. Corruption and ineffectiveness were the charges made against each elected government. Martial Law governments have come to power with the promise of restoring order and effectiveness to government. In each instance the military has ruled in alliance with the bureaucracy. However, all military-bureaucratic leaders had to face the problem of establishing the legitimacy of their rule. They have ultimately found it necessary to seek a degree of popular legitimacy through guided or limited democracy, described here as "transitional systems." Under a transitional system the growing demand for

full parliamentary government has ultimately led to a return to party-based parliamentary regimes.

**Figure 2**
**Cycles of Institutional Change, 1947-1990**




The human and resource costs to Pakistan of this oscillation between different regime types has been high. These costs include periodic disruption of the economy, failure to address

important economic and social policy needs, and the diversion of public resources to private benefit. Any strategy for long-term social improvements and sustainable growth in Pakistan needs to address the underlying causes of political instability.

In important respects, political change has also been linear: (1) elections have broadened participation and the demand for continued participation; (2) public commitment to maintaining the 1973 Constitution and to a system of representative democratic institutions appears to have become more firmly established; (3) military/bureaucratic influence in the political process has become an expected feature of the political system; and (4) economic growth and differentiation have altered the balance of social forces underlying Pakistan's political institutions.

## 2. Struggle Between Pakistani Elites

The second important dynamic of Pakistan's political system is the struggle for power among key elites. National leadership during both military-dominated and party-based parliamentary periods has consisted of a small group of people.[1] This group has been relatively well-insulated from the other politically subordinate components of Pakistani society.

Three major elites have played a role in the power structure: the **military**, **civil bureaucracy**, and **political leaders**. The military and bureaucracy have different though generally compatible interests and have maintained a loose power alliance dominated by the military throughout the post-Partition period. This alliance may be referred to as the **military-bureaucratic elite**.

---

1 Success in bureaucratic, military, academic, and business circles requires fluency in English, the language used almost exclusively at higher social levels. One indicator of how small the Pakistani leadership is that the combined English language newspaper circulation is less than 150,000.

These elites have represented, in varying degrees at different times, specific ethnic regions and socioeconomic groups, and relations among social forces are extremely complex. Nonetheless, two major socioeconomic groups have been the **traditional feudal landlords** and **urban intellectuals and educated professionals**. Although the military and the bureaucracy have drawn some people from the traditional landed families, they have drawn much more heavily from the educated professionals.

As a traditional elite, the landed families have generally pursued their interests through political parties in the framework of the constitutional parliamentary system. Landed families have been the dominant element in the political elite throughout much of Pakistan's history. Elections have sometimes forced this group to share power with other social groups, but it has usually managed to reassert dominance later.

Over the past decade, a new class of large-scale businessmen in protected business sectors has been emerging. Initially their interests were served through special connections within the bureaucracy and they tended to stay out of the morass of party politics. In recent years, however, some elements of this class have become active in political party circles. This group's extensive resources give it a special advantage in party politics. Pursuit of business interests through the parliamentary route could become much more important in future years.

At the time of elections, highly centralized and personalized political parties (or factional coalitions) have been able to appeal to voters more on the basis of ideology and patronage than substantial policy issues. Though parties (particularly the PPP) are well-developed in terms of their ability to draw voters to the polls, there are few internal mechanisms that would hold them directly accountable to their constituents. Moreover, those institutions essential for holding these groups to account--the judiciary and the press being the most important--are still inadequately developed.

### 3. Ethnic Nationalism

Another important political dynamic in Pakistan is the recurrent phenomenon of ethnic differentiation, or "subnationalism", that split Pakistan apart in 1971. Ethnic problems continue to plague Pakistan and they remain a threat to both the security of the state and the democratic system.

Ethnic nationalism grows in areas where regional leaders, deprived of what they regard as their fair share of power or resources, are able to mobilize followers on the basis of shared identity symbols. The dominance of West Pakistan (i.e., Muhajir and Punjabi elites) after 1947 led to growing disaffection in East Bengal, the majority province, and eventually to the 1971 Bangladesh War. NWFP, Baluchistan, and Sind provinces have also fostered subnationalist movements led by counter-elites against the dominant national elites. The latest such movement, that of the Muhajirs in Sind, is a case of an ethnic group that declined from a position of dominance in the 1950s to one of insecurity and threatened loss of status in the 1980s.

Lack of openness in the political system has exacerbated ethnic nationalism. Prolonged periods of heavy-handed military/bureaucratic rule have temporarily suppressed ethnic demands. When controls are relaxed, however, violence has often erupted as in Sind in 1983. Under parliamentary government, ethnic demands have partially been channeled through the electoral system. But the subsequent failure of those in power to accommodate or balance off the interests of contending groups has led to violence and sometimes civil war, as in Bengal in 1971 and Baluchistan in 1973-1977.

The dynamics of ethnic conflict in Pakistan are therefore interwoven with those of regime change and the struggle for power among elites. Strengthening the capability of the democratic system to accommodate ethnic and other interests is a high priority.

### 4. Islamization

A fourth major dynamic in Pakistani politics has been the role of Islam, which has been a question since before independence. The role of Islam was a prominent issue during the constitutional debates of the 1950s, but became less so under Ayub, Yahya, and the early Bhutto periods. After about 1973, however, it rose again in importance to become a continuing and pressing theme in the 1980s. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to give full consideration to the issues surrounding this subject. However, it is helpful to examine the relationship of Islamization to the political dynamics already considered.

The "resurgence" of Islam as a political issue in the 1970s is attributed to a combination of several factors: (1) the trauma of the 1971 civil war and the impetus to forge a new national identity; (2) the rise in importance of the Arab Middle East in the 1970s, coupled with extensive migration of Pakistani workers to that region; (3) Z.A. Bhutto's use of Islam as a means to strengthen both foreign relations and domestic support; (4) demand for an "Islamic System" (Nizam-i-Mustafa) as a slogan for the anti-Bhutto PNA coalition in the 1977 elections; and (5) Zia's Islamization reforms, designed in part to address the lack of legitimacy of his martial-law regime. Like ethnic nationalism, Islam has been used by non-elites or counter-elites seeking entry to the system, but it has also been used by ruling elites to maintain or reinforce their dominance.

Whether a stable and workable consensus on the role of Islam in Pakistan's political system can be reached is not yet clear. However, the best mechanism for making progress toward such consensus and for addressing social and economic policy requirements in the interim is a representative democratic system.

## C. WEAKNESSES IN PAKISTAN'S DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

A central problem addressed by this strategy is the instability of Pakistan's parliamentary system and the negative consequences of that instability for effective governance. The

primary reason for the instability of military rule, noted earlier, is the inability to establish a legitimate basis for military- bureaucratic rule. Instability of party-based parliamentary rule on the other hand reflects the "half developed" or "half realized" nature of Pakistan's parliamentary system. The problem appears not to be one of lack of popular support for democracy--the country's military rulers have always had to return to popular elections and constraining constitutions to shore up the credibility of their regimes. It is rather the underdevelopment and/or decline of key institutions that has made parliamentary rule unstable.

In Pakistan's constitutional parliamentary system, assumptions are made about the **oversight** the public exercises through key public and private institutions over the actions and agendas pursued by the nation's leaders and by the bureaucracy. At least four sets of oversight institutions can be discussed in this regard: (1) institutions of democratic representation, (2) legal institutions, (3) the presidency, and (4) the press. To some extent these are functionally redundant in that all are expected to exercise oversight functions over the cabinet and law makers. However, each limits and shapes the actions and agendas of ruling governments in different ways. Figure 3 (following page) summarizes the relationships between these institutions, the bureaucracy, and the military.

### 1. Institutions of Democratic Representation

The assembly, political parties, grass-roots advocacy organizations, and the electoral system (primarily the Electoral Commission) are at the core of Pakistan's constitutional parliamentary system. It is through this system that the public exercises oversight over top leaders and hence participates indirectly in the functions of governance.

#### a. Parliament and other Representative Institutions

Pakistani voters directly elect members of the National Assembly (lower house of Parliament), the Provincial Assemblies, and local councils. The Senate (upper house of Parliament) is

indirectly elected, by members of the provincial assemblies. The provincial assemblies are unicameral and directly elected. These various representative bodies are still weak and lack effectiveness, partially as a result of the infrequency of elections and long periods of military rule when such representative institutions did not exist. Widespread vote-selling and other abuses undermine public regard for these institutions and their members.

**Figure 3**
**Political System: Components and Weaknesses**



At the local level, voters elect union councils, district councils, and municipal committees. Although these local bodies provide additional channels of popular participation and access, they have many of the same problems as the national and provincial assemblies.

### b. Political Parties and Grass-Roots Advocacy Organizations

In a representative democratic system the competing demands of various groups in society are communicated to government through intermediary channels, particularly through parties and grass-roots interest groups. Neither type of intermediary performs very well in Pakistan. Though parties are capable of mobilizing voters on the basis of ideological appeals, they are not well developed in Pakistan and lack internal responsibility to their members. They are highly focused on individuals and serve more the function of distributing patronage than aggregating interests or formulating policy. For this reason, party loyalties are weak and defections common.

Similarly, grassroots organizations can serve to articulate and clarify the interests and aspirations of specific groups, to channel these into larger arenas of discourse (government or parties), and/or to mobilize constituents for action--including participation in elections. But in Pakistan, there are few independent organizations of this type. Where linkages do exist, they tend to operate top-down rather than bottom-up. Trade unions, student organizations, and other groups are polarized along partisan lines. Many group interests, especially among the poorer sectors of society, are simply unorganized and unrepresented in the system.

## 2. Legal Institutions

### a. Judiciary

The Pakistan Judiciary is theoretically the most independent branch of government. When functioning well it performs a powerful role in checking unconstitutional or unlawful behavior of individuals in various components of government--in parti-

cular, the elected politicians, civil servants, and the military. In fact the Pakistani judiciary has often been unable to protect representative institutions against martial law or other authoritarian actions. Its effectiveness has also been weakened by heavy case backlogs, an inadequate informational base, and the establishment of quasi-judicial bodies (e.g., Special Tribunals) for the persecution of political opponents.

**b. Oversight Bodies within the Bureaucracy**

Pakistan inherited bureaucratic traditions and structures from British India. More than any other institution, the bureaucracy maintains a system of authority which extends throughout the country, from Islamabad to local towns and subdistrict units. It can often wield extensive power, unchecked by political authority. At other times, political interference in bureaucratic processes results in corruption and mediocre appointments.

Oversight mechanisms exist within the bureaucracy, but most of these are weak and appear unable to prevent corruption or take action after abuses have occurred.

**3. Press**

Pakistan's press and broadcast media have the potential to perform three valuable functions in supporting democracy: oversight of the operation of government and politics, expanding public awareness, and communication of public demands and concerns to policy-makers. However, the government has tended to dominate the press, although it has probably been freer for the last two years than at any other time in the past three decades. Even when restrictions are minimal, lack of objectivity in reporting is pervasive.

Until recently, the government had a monopoly on the broadcast media (television and radio). The establishment of an alternative TV channel, at least in Islamabad and Karachi, promises the possibility of competing sources of news.

Public opinion polling is relatively new to Pakistan and is still only weakly developed.

### 4. Presidency

Throughout most of Pakistan's history the Chief of State has been the most powerful political leader. This pattern was set by the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who served as the country's first Governor-General rather than lending his prestige to the office of Prime Minister. The only exceptions to this so-called "vice-regal pattern" were (1) in the years following Jinnah's death (1948-1951) and (2) during the first Bhutto period (1973-1977), when the President effectively followed the directives of the Prime Minister. The figurehead president was retained for about a year under General Zia, then Zia assumed the office of President as well as the roles of Chief Martial Law Administrator and Chief of Army Staff. Currently, the Eighth Amendment of the constitution establishes a strong presidency.

While these oversight institutions exist in Pakistan, all except the presidency are relatively weak. As a result, government leadership has few corrective checks on it.

## D. PRIORITY AREAS FOR DEVELOPMENT

The foregoing analysis has identified both the dynamics of Pakistani politics and the institutions and organizational linkages critical for establishment of a more stable and effective democracy. The analysis has identified several weaknesses in the party-based parliamentary system in Pakistan. Efforts to increase the stability of this system and to improve its effectiveness must focus on correcting these weaknesses. The priority areas for development are as follows:

1. Political parties are inadequately responsible or responsive to their constituencies. Elections are only slowly becoming established as mechanisms of public choice. NGOs and other

intermediary channels for articulating public demands are weak or totally missing.

2. Representative institutions, i.e., Parliament and the National Assemblies, do not adequately perform critical or deliberative roles.

3. Judicial and bureaucratic oversight of the working of government has been inadequate to combat corruption or to instill confidence in democratic government.

4. Public information media are not sufficiently objective or efficient to serve necessary oversight and communication functions.

5. The analytical base, or public policy environment, of Pakistan's democratic system is extremely weak. At present, public policy dialogue critical to this type of analysis is underdeveloped, largely because neither a cadre of research professionals nor a developed literature on this topic currently exists.

6. Civil liberties are jeopardized--by abuse of government power, by civil disorders, and by other forms of violence and exploitation.

Beyond these six areas there are clearly other underlying conditions important for building a more stable and effective democratic system. Though not the immediate concern of this strategy, they are nonetheless important areas in which USAID is making contributions:

1. Economic Growth with Equity: GDP growth of the past decade has been strong, but the opportunities and benefits generated by that growth have not been equitably shared. The poverty conditions faced by much of the nation's population, particularly in outlying districts, reduces the ability of the public to participate actively and responsibly in government.

2. Literacy and Education: Pakistan continues to suffer from very low levels of literacy (about 25%). Illiteracy makes it difficult for people to gain an understanding of the forces that shape their lives. Democratic participation looses much of its promise under such circumstances.

3. Grassroots Community Development Efforts: NGO efforts to stimulate local community-based development initiatives indirectly serve to strengthen the democratic system by helping to form the habits and commitments to self-determination and self-reliance among otherwise marginalized segments of Pakistan's society.

## III. COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED PAKISTAN DPI PROGRAM

The proposed USAID/Pakistan DPI Program components correspond to the six priority problem areas identified in Section 2. Program components and the objectives under each are listed in Figure 4.

**Figure 4**
**Six Program Components and Component Objectives**

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. STRENGTHENING RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTIES TO THEIR CONSTITUENCIES | To support the development of more effective and responsive parties through improved linkages to their constituencies. |
| 2. STRENGTHENING CONSTRAINTS ON CORRUPT PRACTICES | To increase judicial and bureaucratic oversight capabilities. |
| 3. ENLARGING THE PUBLIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT | To enlarge the scope and increase the quality of public dialogue on major governmental and public policy issues. |
| 4. STRENGTHENING NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES | To increase the capability of the National and Provincial Assemblies to legislate effectively. |
| 5. IMPROVING PUBLIC INFORMATION FLOWS | To increase the objectivity and effectiveness of the media to serve oversight and communication functions. |
| 6. STRENGTHENING COMMITMENT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES | To broaden knowledge and increase protection of basic human rights and civil liberties. |

## A. STRENGTHENING RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTIES TO THEIR CONSTITUENCIES

As indicated in the earlier analysis, political parties in Pakistan have been unable to sustain democratic government. This is in part because they have been inadequately responsive to their constituents and to the public at large. Successive elections, particularly those in 1970 and 1988, helped to improve linkages, but these still remain underdeveloped. Greater party responsiveness to voter constituencies can best be supported through indirect means. The following sets of activities will contribute to this objective:

### 1. Reinforcing Pakistan's Commitment to Regular, Free, and Fair Elections

A free and fair electoral process is the single most important factor in strengthening Pakistan's democratic system, both immediately and over the longer term. Fairness in the electoral process builds public confidence in and commitment to the system. Regular elections place greater demands on parties to consider concrete means for addressing the concerns and interests of voters.

The presence of international observer teams to monitor general elections will facilitate free and fair elections. The Government of Pakistan and all major political parties support the presence of such teams.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can provide funding and other support for non-partisan international observer teams for at least the next three general elections.

### 2. Improving Public Understanding of the Role of Elected Representatives through Voter Education

Voting in Pakistan often reflects the lack of public understanding of how representatives can and should participate in

policy formation once in office. This in turn reduces the effectiveness of elections as a mechanism for ensuring the accountability of politicians to their constituencies. Improving public knowledge of the role of elected representatives and of what they can reasonably be expected to achieve in office is therefore a major requirement for improving party responsiveness to voters.

Educational campaigns conducted by an impartial component in the political system, are one mechanism for strengthening voter education. The Election Commission of Pakistan, chaired by a Judge of the Supreme Court, could potentially serve this function. The primary function of the Commission is to conduct elections on an impartial basis. It has both a cadre of judicial and administrative workers and a set of developed procedures for doing so. The Chief Election Commissioner has expressed an interest in conducting a voter education program between or just prior to general elections, when public interest and receptivity are highest. Such a program would develop and deliver impartial voter education materials (e.g., video and/or written materials) on a country-wide basis.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can provide funding to the Election Commission (or other appropriate body) for development and testing of educational materials to be replicated and used on a nation-wide basis between or just prior to national elections.

### 3. Development of Independent Public and Constituent Advocacy Organizations[2]

Grass-root organizations in Pakistan are only weakly developed. Student organizations, labor unions, and other

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2 NGO advocacy roles need to be distinguished from NGO service roles. The defining characteristic of advocacy organizations is that they actively channel the concerns of a specific constituency up into government fora. NGOs whose primary function is service down to their constituencies (e.g., coordination, training, networking) are important but are not a priority under this program.

organized groups tend to be controlled by specific political parties. As a result, they fail to exercise independent voice within the system. Many group interests are left entirely unarticulated.

Advocacy NGOs have been expanding both in number and effectiveness. It is important to continue this development, with particular concern for two types of NGOs: (1) **public advocacy organizations**, that pursue public interest objectives such as consumer or environmental protection; and (2) **constituent advocacy organizations**, such as business associations, professional organizations, and women's rights organizations.

The central task for **public advocacy NGOs** is to strengthen their capacity to increase public demand for problem resolution in the broad public interest. The significance of public advocacy NGOs is that they demonstrate through their activities that effective coalitions can be built to address development problems through broad-based, open, and participatory politics.

A central task for **constituency advocacy NGOs** is to provide a stronger base on which a plurality of interest groups might exercise bottom-up influence over the parties and other elements in the political system.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID funding for strengthening advocacy NGOs could have significant impact in Pakistan. Activities supported under this component should meet one or both of the following two advocacy-related criteria:

- USAID funding will increase the ability of selected organizations to assess and articulate the interests of their constituencies or the Pakistani public.

- USAID funding will increase the capacity of supported organizations to effectively and responsibly channel these interests into government or into political party decision-making fora.

### 4. Strengthening Party Loyalty and Discipline

Parties in Pakistan are plagued by the frequent movement of individuals and groups from one party to another, particularly within legislative assemblies. The Government of Pakistan may pass legislation prohibiting "floor-crossing." No USAID role with respect to this or other issues which might directly affect political parties can be foreseen at this point.

**Recommended USAID Role**

No clear USAID role at present.

## B. STRENGTHENING CONSTRAINTS ON CORRUPT PRACTICES

Corruption tends to flourish under conditions where potential payoffs are high, control mechanisms are weak or absent, and there is a "climate" of corruption. All three of these conditions prevail in Pakistan, in varying degrees, at all levels of the system. However, there are oversight mechanisms that can help to reduce the levels of corruption, and thereby increase the efficiency and effectiveness of democratic government. These mechanisms--including judicial oversight, financial practices accountability, and bureaucratic accountability--increase the risks and costs of corrupt practices.

### 1. Strengthening the Oversight Capacity of the Judiciary

Corruption and accountability are recurring themes in Pakistani politics. But accountability often appears to be used more as a weapon to punish deposed enemies rather than as a mechanism to ensure legal and ethical practices by public officials. Establishment of effective and credible means of combating corruption would increase respect for democratic government among key social sectors (e.g., the middle classes, the bureaucracy, and the military) and thereby enhance the viability of the democratic system.

The judiciary, as a relatively independent and respected institution in Pakistan, is often called upon to play an oversight role. But it is hampered in two respects. First, the role tends to be intermittent and ad hoc. Secondly, the judiciary is burdened by heavy case backlogs, incomplete reporting of decisions, and other administrative problems. The GOP, with support from USAID and the Asia Foundation, has established a Federal Judicial Academy as a first step in addressing these weaknesses.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can play a significant role in helping to strengthen the judiciary and to improve judicial oversight by : (1) continuing support for the Federal Judicial Academy, (2) providing assistance for improving courts administration, in part through computerization of case tracking processes to identify and address delays in the system, (3) development of low-cost computerized law databases to increase access to the law by all parties.

## 2. Strengthening Financial Accountability Practices

One reason corruption is so widespread in Pakistan is the ineffectiveness of financial accounting procedures for monitoring expenditures. Improving these procedures is in part a matter of political will, in part a technical matter requiring testing and institutionalizing more rigorous financial practices developed outside Pakistan and modifiable to meet Pakistan's needs.

**Recommended USAID Role**

Several USAID programs are currently addressing the need for more effective financial accountability. These include: (a) the Development Support Training Project (DSTP) (391-0474) that provides training in financial management and financial accountability to individuals as well as upgrading the capacity of select institutions to provide training in these fields, (b) the Shelter Resource

Mobilization Program (SRMP) (391-0507/HG-001) which provides training in financial management to support the development of market-based financial institutions specializing in the housing sector.

No additional USAID activities are currently recommended for this area.

### 3. Strengthening Political/Bureaucratic Accountability

The potential for reaping private gain from positions of public responsibility is only partially controlled by legal recourse and improved financial procedures. Some specific mechanisms are needed to provide on-going strengthening of the ethical effectiveness and accountability of public officials.

Toward this end, the GOP established the office of **Wafaqi Mohtasib** (Ombudsman) in 1983. Each year the office handles roughly 30,000 complaints by the general public against central and provincial governmental agencies. Similar mechanisms might be developed to cover higher government officials, including ministers, and to receive complaints from within the bureaucracy rather than solely from the people it serves.

To a large extent these systems seem to work. They may, however, be too underbudgeted and overburdened with case loads to be effective. It is not yet clear what type of assistance, if any, could help in this area.

**Recommended USAID Role**

No clear USAID role at present.

## C. ENLARGING THE PUBLIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT

An effective and sustainable democracy depends in part on the existence of a sufficient base of expertise and knowledge on how the system works and what the policy options are. Although Pakistan has developed a range of policy institutes over the past

three or four decades, those addressing public policy concerns have been limited to three categories: foreign affairs (e.g., Institute of Strategic Studies--ISS; Institute of Regional Studies--IRS); economic development (e.g., Pakistan Institute of Development Economics-PIDE); Rural Development Academies; and public administration (e.g., National Institutes of Public Administration --NIPAs; Administrative Staff College). However, these institutions have neither the mandate nor the capacity to address the sorts of problems identified in this document.

This suggests that long-term political development requires a strengthening and enlarging of the public policy environment. This can best be accomplished by increasing the numbers of qualified professionals in this field, increasing the amount of research and literature on which they can draw, and expanding the fora in which dialogue on these issues can take place. Identifying and strengthening an institutional focus (or establishing a new institution if necessary) can follow once the utility of and demand for such an institution becomes clearer.

### 1. Strengthening Public Policy Dialogue

The development of an informed public and professional dialogue on political development issues and options can be directly encouraged. A major requirement for such dialogue to occur, however, is that there be adequate forums for discussion.

#### Recommended USAID Role

USAID can help to create such forums by providing limited funding for conferences and seminars on public policy and political development issues. This should involve a wide representation from different components of society--including academia, government, political parties, and the media.

### 2. Educating a Cadre of Public Policy Research Professionals

There is a growing but still small community of talented scholars and researchers in Pakistan whose work seeks to address issues relevant to Pakistan's democratic development. This

community needs to be strengthened, both in numbers and in the range of professional capabilities that they bring to policy debates (e.g., policy analysis and evaluation skills, survey research, and data analysis skills).

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can make a major contribution to the development of this cadre of professionals. The problem is one of "knowledge transfer" rather than "resource transfer" and exposure to the broad base of knowledge developed by the international community is essential. But U.S. training is often not a viable solution given the high rate of non-return and delayed return graduates from Pakistan. A more effective solution is for USAID to fund placement of a few U.S. trained Americans or Pakistanis in an appropriate university department or center to begin training Pakistani students and professionals in-country.

### 3. Broadening the Base of Policy-Relevant Research Literature

The political science literature examining the strengths and weaknesses of Pakistan's political system. remains sparse. Moreover, the proportion of books and articles on these topics by Pakistani scholars remains small relative to those produced by foreigners. Of these works, much of the writing is more journalistic than analytic in approach. Little material exists on politics below the national level.

The expansion of a relevant body of literature and the development of a stronger research cadre should be pursued in tandem. These objectives could be pursued through a research grants program for Pakistani students and scholars. Major topics that could be addressed in such a program would include:

- The functioning and potential role of union councils
- Political parties and how they can be strengthened
- Strengthening Pakistan's federal system

- Problems of intergovernmental relations in Pakistan
- The potential role of Pakistan's unions in democratic government

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can fund a high quality research grants program aimed at building both an understanding of key issues and policy options, and strengthening the cadre of in-country professionals examining and advising on these issues.

### 4. Strengthening or Establishing a Public Policy Research Institute

The expansion of dialogue, expertise, and literature on democracy-relevant public policy issues will have important consequences in strengthening understanding of governmental problems. Their impact, however, will be enhanced by providing a longer-term institutional base for continued expansion along all three dimensions. Such an institutional base might strengthen an existing governmental agency (e.g., one or more NIPAs), strengthen or expand a university-based program in the public or private sector (e.g., Social Sciences Research Institute or Lahore University of Management Sciences), or develop a new institution altogether (e.g., on the model of PIDE).

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can set aside funds for use after the first few years of activity and experience in this category, to either build up an existing public policy education and research institution or to establish such an institution. (Though the former is preferable, no clear candidate currently exists.)

## D. STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES

In theory, Pakistan's parliamentary assemblies (national and provincial) represent the orderly forums in which the popular

will is transformed and refined into concrete government decisions on policy and law. Meeting this objective, however, requires a level institutional capacity that Pakistan's representative assemblies have not yet attained. Long periods of military rule during which assemblies were either non-existent or their power greatly circumscribed and periods of civilian rule when assemblies were misused for highly partisan ends, have both resulted in the underdevelopment of the assemblies.

### 1. Developing Parliamentary Support Services

Parliamentary support services, including libraries and research services (the latter providing background papers and issue briefs), are an important element in any well-functioning parliament. Such services are particularly critical for ensuring the ability of the opposition to participate in issues debate, since the ruling party has access to the informational and analytic capacity of the bureaucracy.

USAID has been providing funds through The Asia Foundation to help strengthen these services in the National Assembly. Development of similar support services in the Senate and the provincial assemblies should strengthen parliamentary effectiveness at different levels of government.

#### Recommended USAID Role

USAID can continue to fund development of these parliamentary support services. The Mission should also fund a similar development process in the National Senate. Over the longer term, and using the national institutions as the base, support services can be built up in the Provincial Assemblies as well.

### 2. Developing Law Drafting Capabilities

In a parliamentary system, most of the legislation that is passed by parliament is presented by the government, but some may come from private members. During the last twenty months there has been virtually no legislation beyond the passage of two annual budgets. Although the reasons for this are presumably

more political than technical, the latter has clearly been a factor.

One technical skill that would further improve the functioning of the parliament and the provincial assemblies would be the ability to utilize computers (already in place in the National Assembly) and related techniques to facilitate the drafting of legislation. The output of these improvements would ultimately dovetail with the proposed computerization of law databases.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can provide the computers, technical assistance, and training to begin to establish improved law drafting capabilities. While the timing of such an initiative should reflect the interest of MNAs, actual computerization might best be delayed to a later phase with an initial concentration on basic drafting skills.

### 3. Developing New Member Orientation Programs

Although many members of representative institutions have many years of political experience, each new election brings new people to the National and Provincial Assemblies. As the electoral process continues and new social groups find their way into these institutions, it will be valuable to orient newcomers (as well as many veteran politicians) to institutional procedures, as well as to instill a broader sense of the responsibilities inherent in the parliamentary office.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can provide funding for development of appropriate materials (written and video).

### 4. Strengthening the Committee Structure within the National Assembly

One weakness of most parliamentary systems is the difficulty in making progress in formulating concrete legislation in the context of full-assembly open floor debates between the governing party and its opposition. One way around this problem is the development of a strong system of committees where debate among small well-informed assemblies tends to be more substantive and less exclusively partisan. Pakistan has only the basic outline of such a system. There is interest in exploring the possibilities for expanding the existing committee setup.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID needs to explore further the level of interest in support in this area.

### 5. Strengthening National/Provincial Assembly Linkages

Pakistan's provincial-state relations are still evolving. Though the country has been a federal system in formal terms from its inception, provincial governments have generally been overwhelmed by superior central power and resources. Only after the 1988 elections did there exist different parties in control of the government in Islamabad (the national capital) and in Lahore (capital of Punjab, the largest province). It is to Pakistan's credit that this arrangement was able to last even twenty months. Nonetheless, the relationship was marked by continuous tension and often outright confrontation. Though national - provincial government linkages are important, this may be an area that is simply too political for external assistance to be of any real value.

**Recommended USAID Role**

No clear USAID role at present.

## E. IMPROVING PUBLIC INFORMATION FLOWS

### 1. Enhancing Objectivity and Effectiveness in Print and Broadcast Media Reporting

A free, fair, and independent press plays a critical role in informing citizens about the conditions impinging on their lives and the choices that lay before them. Without access to such information, the public cannot make effective use of the electoral process to meet its needs and to serve as an important check of the abuses by elected officials.

In Pakistan the national broadcasting services (TV and radio) are controlled by the government and the slant of the news is likely to change radically with changes in government. To some extent, Pakistan's broadcast media would be improved by removing the means for government intervention. This can best be realized through expanding opportunities for private sector broadcast media development.

The print media often simply repeat official information. But here the problem is generally different. Most of the press is highly partisan, either because of the basic ideological leanings of the reporters and editors, or because of the influence of owners (including the government). Ultimately governments have had tremendous leverage simply because they control access to essential new print and control allocation of lucrative SOE firm advertising funds.

Though the problems are complex, objectivity in media can probably be strengthened by developing a combination of (a) disincentives in the form of actions that can be taken by media professional associations and (b) specialized training in ethics, investigative reporting, and other profession building topics. In this way a cadre of journalists might be developed who look on their calling as a profession with serious responsibilities to inform the general public clearly and fairly.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can make a contribution in this area by supporting curriculum development and special programs with in-country journalism schools. The Mission can also provide opportunities for Pakistani journalists to consult with journalists in the United States and other countries. Though there is currently little scope for providing USAID assistance for media privatization efforts, the Mission should stand ready to support such changes should the opportunity arise.

## 2. Increasing the Capability of the Election Commission to Process and Disseminate Election Results

In general, the Election Commission manages elections competently. Nonetheless, this effort is undermined by inadequate computer processing of results (the commission now uses military computers) leading to delays in reporting and the uncertainty attendant on such delays. In addition, the credibility of the results may be reduced, and their educative and research value diminished because the Commission is unable to produce an adequate run of the official results (only 2000 copies for the 1988 election were published, with none available to the general public).

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can support the development of an adequate computerization of the election process and a wider dissemination of official results by providing the Election Commission with equipment and technical assistance.

## 3. Expanding Public Opinion Polling Capabilities

In recent years the democratic development of Western societies has been assisted by the growing use of public opinion surveys. To an extent, opinion surveys aid the formation of a democratic national culture. These tend to replace fear and prejudice by more objective understanding of differing perspectives between ethnic and ideological groups. It is also

helpful for governments and the media to know the desires, opinions, and levels of knowledge of the public, so that they may respond more adequately.

At present, one public opinion survey capability exists in Pakistan, but its urban bias and closely held results diminishes its impact and usefulness. However, other Pakistani opinion survey organizations may exist or could be established.

**Recommended USAID Role**

No clear USAID role at present.

## F. STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

### 1. Support for Human Rights Education and Human Rights Advocacy Groups

Pakistan has had a mixed record over the years of adhering to internationally accepted standards of human rights. Such human rights as freedom from arbitrary arrest, from torture, from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc. are important in their own right regardless of the particular form of government Pakistan has in any one historical period.

Achieving better human rights performance requires work from both the top down and from the bottom up (popular demand for human rights). Top down efforts refer to the willingness and the capacity of the judiciary to pursue human rights offenders. Bottom up efforts refer, for example, to strengthening popular resistance to abuses through educational activities, particularly by urban human rights groups that publicize international human rights standards and incidents and patterns of abuse.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can have a major role helping to develop human rights groups, particularly those that carry out educational functions. Aside from "core support" for covering office and personnel salaries, resources can be provided for developing and encouraging use of more effective new instruments for human rights education (e.g., printed and visual materials).

## 2. Developing Legal Assistance Programs

Protection of human rights is achieved through a structure of laws and the enforcement of those laws. Large segments of the population may be not have access to legal recourse, due to gender, poverty, official or private intimidation, or other factors. This tends to weaken the protection of human rights. For example, in some parts of Pakistan it is almost impossible for women to seek legal assistance.

To ensure wide public access to the law, it is essential that legal services be made generally available throughout the country. Limited legal aid services already exist, but these are both isolated and underfunded.

**Recommended USAID Role**

USAID can make a significant contribution to expanding the legal aid services by (1) supporting NGOs that provide legal assistance, and (2) exploring the possibility of building up a legal aid tradition within the judiciary and/or the legal training institutions themselves.

## IV. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

As the Mission moves forward in formulating specific activities to pursue its DPI objectives, several implementation issues need to be considered: clarifying areas of political sensitivity to the Pakistanis, establishing a set of activity selection and development criteria, broadening funding sources, limiting USAID management costs.

### A. RESPONDING TO PAKISTANI SENSITIVITIES

It is important to consider the extent to which the Government of Pakistan and private Pakistani citizens are likely to welcome USAID cooperation in this area.

Any development program which touches on political and governmental processes of a host country has a potential for generating misunderstanding. Specific sensitivities should be considered with respect to the following groups:

1. **Governmental Officials**: Members of the bureaucratic, military, and judicial services in Pakistan, as elsewhere, have a legitimate concern for maintaining their own areas of responsibility. It is particularly important that USAID assistance be seen as supportive of domestic development efforts and not as an imposition from outside. For other Pakistanis as well as for government officials, maintaining Pakistani "ownership" of the development process is an important consideration.

2. **Intellectuals and Party Activists**: A reservoir of good will toward the United States exists in Pakistan and derives in part from shared objectives and in part from nearly four decades of cooperation. However, negative attitudes toward the United States exist as well. These tend to find expression among the intellectual community and in the political arena. There is some tendency to use U.S. involvement to explain any major political events or changes in Pakistan.

3. **Islamic Groups**: Most Pakistanis consider Islam and democracy to be compatible. However, some will consider any attempt to strengthen democracy a veiled attempt to undermine Islamic values important to Pakistan's national identity. It is particularly important to avoid unnecessary confrontation over such issues.

## B. ACTIVITY SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA

The following list of program development criteria is provided to assist the Mission in focusing available resources to achieve DPI objectives.

1. **Concentrate resources on opportunities for major impact**: USAID/ Pakistan should focus its resources on those program components, organizations, and activities where the assistance is likely to make a major difference in terms of the overall strategy as outlined in Sections 1 and 2. Inclusion of additional activities on the basis of contribution to principles such as "pluralism" or "participation" will only undermine the effort to ensure strategic focus on critical system development priorities.

2. **Avoid the appearance of partisan support**: As in other countries, USAID in Pakistan needs to avoid supporting, or even appearing to support, one organization, party, faction, or individual to the detriment of others in any given circumstance. This caution also applies to unnecessary involvement in matters of religious interpretation or policy.

3. **Avoid pursuing U.S. policy agendas through DPI assistance**: In strengthening participatory institutions, it is vitally important that assisted organizations set their own agendas. Even the appearance that a self-serving U.S. policy agenda is being pursued through USAID would confirm negative suspicions and undermine both DPI efforts and the Mission's program in general.

4. **Focus on medium-to-long term institutional development objectives:** It must be recognized that the fate of Pakistani democracy ultimately lies in Pakistani hands. USAID support needs to be designed to strengthen the underlying capacity of key components of the democratic system and to enhance the conditions for sustainable democratic development. Short-term attempts at quick-fix solutions are likely to be counter-productive.

5. **Ensure Sustainability without Dependence:** The Mission should avoid supporting activities which are likely to require recurrent USAID funding over the medium to long term to sustain the initial impact. The best means for doing this in institution building efforts is to focus funding on catalyzing demand within organizations for new capabilities, services and linkages, rather than on perfecting supply.

## C. BROADENING FUNDING SOURCES

The Mission Democratic Institutions Program draws resources from several different projects. The major funding sources are described below:

### 1. Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project

To pursue the broad range of objectives discussed in this strategy it is essential for the Mission to expand the resources it makes available to this initiative. The current plan is to provide funding for much of the strategy under the new SDI Project to begin in FY 1991. The SDI project is a ten year effort in three phases, with an authorization of roughly $9 million for the first two phases (five years). SDI activities are expected to be implemented through one or more NGO grantees working under Cooperative Agreements with USAID/Pakistan.

### 2. Regional 116e Human Rights Project

The 116e project is intended to support activities related to human rights, development of the rule of law, and strengthening

of democratic participation in the ANE region. Over the past three years (through FY 90) Pakistan has received $392,928 for 7 projects from this source.

Changes may be forthcoming from ANE on the 116e project both in the levels of funding available and in the purposes to which 116e funding can be applied. However, subject to these future changes, the best use of 116e funding might be for women's groups and human rights activities.

### 3. Private Investment Enterprise Program

Program activities currently planned will focus on six major areas: (1) institution building of selected business groups to voice more effectively private business interests, (2) trade and investment services designed to encourage joint ventures between U.S. and Pakistani investors, (3) private investment policy analyses, (4) integration of women-owned businesses in the overall business institutional framework, and (5) improvement of environmental, health, and safety practices. Components (1) and (4) will contribute directly to DPI Program objectives. Planned activities will be complemented by policy initiatives aimed at enhancing private sector voice through effective representation of private sector concerns to GOP's policy-related agencies.

### 4. Special Development Fund (SDF)

This project is intended to help develop the NGO sector in Pakistan. The core institution of the project, an independent and private entity, will provide leadership as well support through technical assistance, training and other resources to the developing NGO community. This entity, which is now constituted but has yet to begin operations, is expected to assist NGOS primarily in the social services sector, but may also support advocacy NGOs as well.

### 5. Development Support Training Project (DSTP)

This is a nine year (1983-91), $83 million project intended to strengthen management and technical expertise in the public and

private sectors for those involved in the planning, development and implementation of Pakistan's social and economic development programs. Its planned outputs include 4,640 individuals trained in Pakistan, 1,200 individuals trained in third countries and 8,590 individuals trained in the U.S.; 34 intensive English Language programs completed; 25 training institutions strengthened, and university classrooms constructed. Of relevance to this strategy is the planned training in the fields of financial management and financial accountability.

### 6. Primary Education Development Program (PED)

This ten year (1989-99), $280 million program is designed to establish a foundation for sustained economic and social development by encouraging policy reforms in education. The broad sector goal of the PED is to strengthen the institutional capacity of North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces to formulate and implement policy that improves access, equity, and quality of primary education.

### 7. Project Design and Implementation Fund (PDIF)

This nine year (1982-91), $33 million project is intended to assist in developing, designing, and implementing development projects and programs to promote economic stability and self-sustaining growth. Funds from this project have supported some of the Mission's DPI activities to date; this project also provides a possible model for how funding flows may take place under an SDI project, particularly with respect to GOP approval of project activities.

### 8. Shelter Resource Mobilization (SRM) Program

The main goal of the program is to encourage the mobilization of domestic resources to support the development of market-based financial institutions specializing in housing. A related goal is to improve the shelter conditions of low income families. The program purpose is to create the policy environment that will promote the establishment of market-based finance institutions. To achieve the program purpose, the GOP will adopt a number of

reforms within the housing finance sector that will promote the establishment of viable private and joint sector housing finance institutions. As part of the program, training will be provided in financial management to select individuals to work in these institutions.

## D. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

As a program, DPI will require management input from one to two USAID Foreign Service Nationals backed up part-time by one direct hire. To a large extent management of the DPI Program will consist of management of the SDI project. However, it is important to ensure that, to the extent possible, non-SDI funding from such sources as 116e be programmed to address DPI objectives in close coordination with those supported under the SDI project.

Approaching SDI implementation through an umbrella arrangement based on Cooperative Agreements with an NGO and/or other grantee organization(s) will help to reduce the management burdens on the Mission. Grantee organizations can be expected to assume major programming and monitoring responsibilities for the sub-projects they implement.

## E. PHASING

The SDI Program Strategy will be implemented over a ten year period between 1991 and 2000. Three implementation phases (also built into the SDI project) are currently envisioned: **Phase I** (2 years) will be an exploratory phase in which USAID will support a wide variety of activities aimed at addressing the six program objectives outlined in Figure 4. **Phase II** (3 years) will build on Phase I experience and, if appropriate, will concentrate resources more narrowly on areas where USAID assistance can have the greatest impact. **Phase III** (5 years) will again build on the experience gained in the previous two periods and will address the areas most appropriate at that time.

# ATTACHMENT 1

# OUTLINE OF THE USAID/PAKISTAN DPI PROGRAM

Attachment 1: Outline of the USAID/Pakistan DPI Program

| *Program Component* | *Contributing Sub-Components* | *Potential USAID Activities* | *Funding Source* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Strengthening Responsibility of Parties to their Constituencies | a) Regular, Free, and Fair Elections | • Observer Missions For Mayor Elections | SDI, PDIF |
| | b) Improved Public Understanding of Role of Electoral Representative | • Voter Education Program (Election Commission or Possibly NGOs) | SDI |
| | c) Development of Independent Public and Constituent Advocacy Organizations | • Business Associations Development<br>• Women's Rights Org. Assistance<br>• Professional Organizations<br>• Other Advocacy Organization Support | PIE<br>SDI<br>SDI<br>SDI, SDF |
| | d) Greater Party Loyalty and Discipline | • No Clear USAID Role at Present | |
| 2) Strengthening Constraints on Corrupt Practices | a) Strengthening Capacity of the Judiciary | • Courts Admin. Computerization<br>• Case Law Computerization | SDI<br>SDI |
| | b) Strengthening Financial Management Practices | • DSTP and SRM activities | DSTP, SRM |
| | c) Strengthening Accountability in the Bureaucracy (e.g. Ombudsmen Off.) | • No Clear Role at Present | |
| 3) Enlarging the Public Policy Environment | a) Strengthening Public Policy Dialogue | • Seminars, Conferences, etc. | SDI |
| | b) Educating a Cadre of Public Policy Prof.'s | • Visiting Professorships | SDI |
| | c) Broadening the Base of Research Literature on Public Policy Issues and Options | • Public Policy Research Grants Program | SDI |
| | d) Public Policy Research Institute | • Building Up an Existing Institute or Establishing a New Institute | SDI |

Attachment 1: Outline of the USAID/Pakistan DPI Program

| *Program Component* | *Contributing Sub-Components* | *Potential USAID Activities* | *Funding Source* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4) Strengthening the Capacity of the Nat. Assembly and Provincial Assemblies | a) Developing Parliamentary Support Services at National and Provincial Levels | • Library and Research Services Development | SDI, PDIF |
| | b) Developing Law Drafting Capacity | • Computerization of Law Drafting | SDI |
| | c) Developing New Member Orientation Programs | • Orientation Program Development | SDI |
| | d) Strengthening National Committee System | • No Clear USAID Role at Present | |
| | e) Strengthening National-to-Prov. Assembly Linkages | • No Clear USAID Role at Present | |
| 5) Improving Public Information Flows | a) Less Partisan Press Reporting | • Journalist Training Ethics and Investigative Reporting | SDI |
| | b) Fuller Election Results Reporting | • Computerization of Election Commission | SDI |
| | c) Increased Public Opinion Polling | • No Clear USAID Role at Present | |
| 6) Strengthening Commitment | a) Human Rights Education | • HR NGO Activities | SDI, PDIF, 116e |
| | b) Developing Legal Assistance | • Legal Assistance NGOs Development | SDI, PDIF, 116e |
| | | • Judiciary Sponsored Legal Assistance Programs Development | SDI |

# ATTACHMENT 2

# SELECTED READING LIST

**Attachment 2: SELECTED READING LIST**


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# ATTACHMENT 3

# PERSONS INTERVIEWED

**Attachment 3: Persons Interviewed**

**[note: persons listed below are in no way responsible for the conclusions of the team]**

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* Listed cities represent the home of the interviewee not where he/she was interviewed.

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