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**Final
Disaster Report**

Ethiopia Drought / Famine

FY 1985-1986



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F I N A L D I S A S T E R R E P O R T

THE ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT/FAMINE

FISCAL YEARS 1985 AND 1986

**BY THE STAFF OF THE USAID OFFICE
AMERICAN EMBASSY, ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

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AID Handbook 8, Chapter 7.B6**

**The views expressed herein are
those of the AID/Addis Ababa
staff and are not necessarily
those of the Agency for
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INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1984, the world came to know, through the nightly television news broadcasts, the tragic plight of the famine victims in Ethiopia. By the end of 1984, with nearly 8 million people in Ethiopia considered at risk of death due to starvation, appeals were made for 1.3 million metric tons of food, in addition to millions of dollars in other emergency relief supplies. The response was tremendous.

Over 1.5 million metric tons of emergency food were distributed at the height of the famine, reaching an estimated 7.1 million people. Concurrently, nearly one billion dollars was provided by the international community in non-food relief aid, logistical support and recovery programs. More than 60 organizations directly administered relief assistance, receiving donations from 36 different governments and innumerable individuals and private organizations.

In response to the crisis, the USG launched the largest ever emergency relief effort. Between 1984 - 1986, nearly one-half billion dollars of USG emergency assistance was granted to Ethiopia, most of it in the form of nearly 800,000 metric tons of food aid distributed largely by American and other NGOs. Additionally, nearly \$60 million in grants were given for a multitude of emergency provisions and agricultural recovery measures, ranging from a massive food airlift (nearly \$17 million) to blankets, from medical supplies to food monitors, from the establishment of a huge United Nations-managed truck fleet to the purchase of oxen.

The response of the USG was even more remarkable since US development assistance to Ethiopia had ceased in 1979 and there was no AID Office in Ethiopia in 1984. Even at the height of the USG response, the AID staff was limited by the Government of Ethiopia to only four career AID officers and one secretary. This small group was charged with the heavy responsibility of managing nearly one-half billion dollars worth of emergency aid. Fortunately, this office was also able to rely upon a handful of dedicated American dependents who joined the office on personal services contracts, a small group of skilled and dedicated Ethiopian employees, and invaluable TDY assistance from Washington and REDSO/Nairobi. In addition, most of the USG emergency assistance was channelled through a superb group of NGOs. Finally, the effort had the outstanding support of the entire United Nations operation in Ethiopia (including a special U.N. Emergency Operations office which was set up specifically to deal with the drought), and excellent cooperation from the Government of Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

The following pages review the details of the crisis from 1984 to 1986, the USG response to the situation, including mix and values of commodities and other relief items supplied, office organization, logistics, a review of NGO operations and other matters pertinent to the final documentation of this unprecedented relief effort. At the end of Section V, 14 recommendations are presented which may be useful in the implementation of future emergency assistance programs.

I. STATISTICS AND DESCRIPTION

A. Statistical Summary

1. Country: Ethiopia
2. Dates of Disaster: Calendar years 1984-86
3. Location and Number of People Affected:

REGION	NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT RISK		
	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
Welo	1,790,840	2,897,380	1,547,310
Tigray	1,331,890	1,429,390	1,000,000
Eritrea	877,000	827,000	650,000
Gonder	376,500	860,240	340,720
Sidamo	768,410	675,490	441,800
Gamo Gofa	187,000	279,280	152,470
Harerge	419,120	1,744,200	1,520,000
Shewa	435,860	1,332,250	708,810
Arsi	2,530	220,500	19,670
Bale	188,200	195,580	99,000
Gojam	35,200	163,580	0
Ilubabor	33,080	0	101,600
Kefa	1,550	29,000	90,000
Welega	0	149,190	116,470
Assab	<u>45,000</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	6,492,180	10,803,080	6,787,850

Source: RRC

4. Number of Deaths: Unknown. Estimates range from 250,000 to 1,000,000. Lack of reliable data on Ethiopia's population and normal mortality rates prevent a reliable estimate. One study, using statistical methods, concluded that as many as 700,000 may have died.

5. Date of disaster declaration by Chief of Mission: October 14, 1984

B. Description

In 1984-85, famine engulfed much of Africa. By far the greatest disaster struck Ethiopia. By mid-1985, almost 30 percent of Ethiopia's rural population, some 10 million people, were deemed at risk of starvation. The Ethiopian tragedy triggered an international response and relief effort of an unprecedented scale. Some 36 governments, various

international organizations and innumerable private agencies mobilized to provide almost two million tons of relief food in 1985 and 1986. The US Government (USG) was the biggest single donor, providing some 787,000 metric tons (MT) of food aid valued at \$400 million, and \$60 million of other relief assistance during fiscal years (FY) 1985 and 1986.

Famine has been a recurrent feature of Ethiopian history, the first recorded occurrence dating from the 13th century. In the last one hundred years, there have been 10 famines, including the great famine of 1888-92 in which as many as one-third of Ethiopia's people died. In recent decades, famine has repeatedly struck northern Ethiopia: Welo and Tigray in 1953, Tigray in 1958, and Welo in 1966 and 1974. The famine of 1984-86 was exceptional among recent famines in that it encompassed most of the country. The causes of Ethiopian famines are rarely singular. The great famine in 1888-92 was caused by an epidemic of rinderpest that virtually wiped out livestock in Ethiopia, including plow oxen needed for cultivation. More typically, famines have been caused by drought, but may also have encompassed erratic or unseasonable rainfall or hail that damaged crops, outbreaks of agricultural pests such as locusts, and epidemics of human or animal diseases.

All of these factors played a role in the Ethiopian catastrophe of 1984-85. Drought, however, was the principal cause. In 1981 and 1982, areas within the regions of Tigray and Eritrea in northern Ethiopia once again suffered poor rainfall (see rainfall data in Annex B). The harvest in the Fall of 1983 was bad throughout the North. Most administrative regions in central Ethiopia suffered some decline in food production as well. Only in the western regions of Welega, Ilubabor, Kefa and Sidamo did crop production appear unaffected by drought (see Annex A on crop production data). Then came the disastrous year of 1984. In the North, crop production fell to one-half its normal level in Eritrea, one-third of normal in Tigray, and one-fifth in Welo. Some parts of Tigray that did receive adequate rainfall were beset by army worms. Crop production in the central and southern regions was also bad, especially in Harerge and Shewa, where three million people were at risk. Even the western regions were affected. Only in the fall of 1985 did rainfall bring a general improvement in the main harvest, although serious shortfalls still occurred in the northern regions, as well as Harerge and Shewa. By 1986, food production in most areas had returned to normal or near-normal levels, although serious shortfalls were still reported in Welega and Ilubabor.

When the peasant farmers in northern Ethiopia first experienced poor harvests in the early 1980's, they followed the traditional course of action: less vital assets, like sheep or goats, were sold to buy food and able-bodied men emigrated to unaffected regions to look for casual labor. This strategy succeeded only for a short time and only while drought was limited to relatively small areas. As the drought persisted and spread, farmers were forced to sell more valuable assets, including draft oxen (if the oxen had not already succumbed to starvation), farm tools, even clothes or houses (which were dismantled for firewood). As more and more people were affected, work became harder to find and less

remunerative. Increases in distress sales of livestock depressed livestock prices while grain prices soared.

By 1984, hundreds of thousands of people in northern Ethiopia had become destitute. Their last recourse was to flee their homes for the towns in search of food. By Spring, 1985, one million people were in or encamped around shelters in northern Ethiopia. Another 300,000 had fled to refugee camps in Sudan between late 1984 and early 1985 and a further 100,000 fled to Djibouti and Somalia. Others merely wandered the countryside begging for food. An untold number died before finding help. The famine in central and southern Ethiopia never reached the proportions attained in the North. For one, the other regions had not had the succession of poor harvests that Tigray, Eritrea and Welo had suffered. Moreover, the relief effort (described in Section II below) was mobilized in time to reach most people in the south before they became destitute or fled their homes.

As with previous famines, a host of other plagues beset the drought victims, exacerbating their suffering. Epidemics of cholera and measles swept through the crowded feeding shelters where inhabitants were weakened by famine, and sanitation facilities were inadequate and their use not understood. When rains did resume, they often brought hail which destroyed crops -- not an uncommon occurrence in Ethiopia but nonetheless a disaster to farmers who had suffered successive years of drought. In some areas, the absolute quantity of rain was not at fault but rather its timing. The late start of rains delayed planting in some areas. Also, the resumption of rain after several dry years produced plagues of agricultural pests, notably army worms in southern and central Ethiopia in 1985 and throughout the country in 1986; grasshoppers and, to a lesser extent, locusts in northern Ethiopia in 1986; and stalk boreworms in Shewa in 1986. Normally, these occurrences would produce the small, localized famines endemic in Ethiopia. In 1984-85, however, these local crises were swept together into the general famine.

A special category of people affected by the drought were the pastoral peoples that inhabit much of the lowlands in eastern and southern Ethiopia. Some pastoral groups lost their entire herds. Even with outside assistance, these people need three to five years to rebuild their herds and regain their livelihood.

While the drought was the obvious direct cause of famine in most areas, the question remains why the disaster that ensued was so severe. The Ethiopian Government (called the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia -- PMGSE) has tended to blame Western donors for neglecting Ethiopia, not only in emergency relief but also in development assistance. In contrast, some critics of the Ethiopian regime claim that the famine was not only avoidable but actually man-made, the result of the PMGSE's actions or inactions.

The underlying reasons for Ethiopia's susceptibility to famine are several and complex. The most fundamental is the country's poverty. Ethiopia is ranked by the World Bank as the poorest country in the world. The vast majority of its citizens are subsistence peasant farmers

who produce little surplus in the best of times and have few assets outside of their labor, farm tools and a few animals. Even before drought struck, they were living on the margin.

Another factor is the environmental degradation. The drought-prone areas of the North have been farmed since ancient times, with little innovation in agricultural technology over the past centuries. Even in central and southern Ethiopia, where the land has not been exhausted, deforestation and poor cultivation practices on hilly terrain threaten to erode the agricultural base. The concept of resettlement -- moving people from exhausted lands in the North to more fertile areas in the West -- has been universally accepted, although the PMGSE's manner of implementing it in 1984/85 was counterproductive and produced untold human suffering and loss of life.

Ethiopia's vulnerability to drought is, thus, deeply rooted in its natural and historical circumstances. Nevertheless, the PMGSE could have ameliorated the impact of the drought. The PMGSE's agricultural policies have exacerbated Ethiopia's vulnerability by keeping farmgate prices artificially low, thus denying incentives to farmers to produce more food.

The more pernicious effect of PMGSE policies on Ethiopia's vulnerability to drought will be over the long-term. The PMGSE's economic policies, which devote few resources to agriculture and most of them to the small and inefficient state farm and producer cooperative sectors, will guarantee that the peasant sector (which accounts for 90 percent of Ethiopia's food production) will continue to stagnate. At the same time that food production is stifled, Ethiopia's population is continuing to grow at 2.9 percent per annum. To date, the PMGSE has not adopted any policy on family planning. The combination of rapid population growth and stagnation in the peasant agricultural sector will mean that Ethiopia's vulnerability to drought can only increase in the next few years. (For a discussion of Ethiopia agricultural prospects and PMGSE policy, see William Faught, "An Appraisal of Ethiopia's Agricultural Prospects," AID/Addis Ababa, April 23, 1987.)

A final contributing factor is undoubtedly the civil wars that affect most of northern Ethiopia. In Eritrea, secessionist movements have been fighting the Government in Addis Ababa for decades. In Tigray and bordering areas of northern Welo and Gonder, the rebel movements are more recent but equally pervasive. The PMGSE controls the major towns; the guerrillas control large portions of the countryside as "liberated zones". Most people in Tigray and Eritrea live in the "gray" zone in-between, where either side may operate but neither controls.

Civil strife greatly affected the relief effort (see section II.B below). The charge that the wars were the cause of the famine in the North is harder to substantiate. A survey of refugees from Tigray in camps in the Sudan found that almost all had fled because of drought or pest infestations. However, most also reported being victimized by the PMGSE military who destroyed, or confiscated crops, tools or livestock. Obviously, the wars lowered the peasants' threshold for famine, reducing what little margin their few assets represented to fend off starvation.

II: RELIEF OPERATIONS

A. Overview

The Ethiopian relief effort was unprecedented in its scope and diversity. During 1985 and 1986, some 1.5 million metric tons (MT) of relief food was distributed. An estimated 7.1 million people were reached at the height of the effort in 1985. Some \$900 million was provided in logistical support, non-food relief aid and recovery programs to help the drought affected return to food self-sufficiency. More than 60 organizations directly administered relief assistance. Donations were received from 36 different governments and innumerable individuals and private organizations.

The principal coordinating agency for the relief effort was the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) of the PMGSE. During 1985-86, the RRC distributed about one-third of the food aid. At the same time, it was responsible for coordinating operations of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which accounted for most food distribution. Almost all of these NGOs belonged to the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) which served as a coordinating mechanism, lobbying group and conduit for donations. The only significant relief operations undertaken outside of RRC's authority were those by the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) with the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LICROSS) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At the field level, however, the Red Cross programs worked in close cooperation with the other relief operations.

When the large-scale relief effort began in the Fall of 1984, the nutritional status of hundreds of thousands of people had already deteriorated to a critical level. The relief effort had to give first priority to rescuing people on the brink of death before it could intervene to prevent the status of the larger population in general from deteriorating. The effort concentrated on feeding shelters where prepared "wet" rations were fed to the most endangered groups, especially small children. The severest cases received special high-protein and high-energy foods several times a day. These were supplemented with "dry" rations of grain and other foods given to the family to prepare.

By early 1985, the shelter population stabilized at about 600,000 people. Emphasis shifted to returning people in shelters to their farms with sufficient food, seed and tools to resume farming. Also, dry ration distribution was undertaken on a broad scale to keep other drought-affected populations on their farms and prevent their nutritional status from deteriorating. The dry ration distribution systems varied greatly from organization to organization. The RRC undertook dry ration distributions based on registration of recipients by local relief committees (composed of representatives of the local administration, peasant associations, local branches of the Workers Party of Ethiopia and

RRC). Some NGOs relied on such lists. Other organizations had their own registration process. Churches Drought Action Africa (CDAA -- a consortium of NGOs), for example, registered individual families which had at least one malnourished child below the age of five. The ICRC distributed food to all families in a given area if a percentage of children from that area fell below a certain nutritional level. Save the Children/USA (SAVE) used detailed household surveys in its operational area to identify who should get assistance. By 1986, many organizations were distributing rations on a food-for-work basis rather than through free distributions. Food-for-work not only produced greater benefits for the community, but also served as a screening process, as those who did not need food were less likely to enroll in these work programs.

Although still receiving monthly dry rations, almost all of the drought-affected people were back on their farms by the main rains of June-September, 1986. In 1986, dry ration distribution continued in many areas. Major agricultural recovery projects were undertaken in 1986 in an effort to restore food production to pre-drought levels. In 1986 alone, some 33,000 MT of seed (about one-tenth the national requirement) were distributed to drought victims, along with 1.2 million hand tools and 19,000 draft oxen.

B. PMGSE Attitude and Actions

The attitude and policies of the PMGSE to the famine and relief effort were very controversial. Critics of Ethiopia -- lately joined by former Foreign Minister Woshu Wolde and former Chief Commissioner of the RRC Dawit Wolde Giorgis -- have charged that, in 1984, the Ethiopian regime gave preparations for the elaborate celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Ethiopian Revolution priority over combating the famine. Likewise, the PMGSE has been accused of trying to use the famine as a weapon against secessionist movements in various parts of the country. Its resettlement program, ostensibly aimed at alleviating the effects of the drought, actually increased the suffering caused by the famine.

The RRC has generally received praise for its role in the relief effort. With USAID support, it was established in March, 1974 in one of the last major acts of the old Imperial Government in response to the famine in Welo. The basic functions of the RRC are to:

- Identify potentially critical food shortages in rural areas, estimate emergency food needs and solicit aid from donors;
- Act as a focal point for all donations for emergency relief;
- Distribute assistance to drought-affected areas;
- Prepare and undertake short-term rehabilitation projects and
- Coordinate the relief and rehabilitation activities of other government and voluntary agencies.

The task of identifying people in need and preparing estimates of relief requirements falls upon the RRC's Early Warning System (EWS), considered one of the best in the developing world. Its estimates provided the basis for RRC's appeals for emergency assistance. These appeals were made at donors conferences, held biannually since 1984. The conferences were supplemented by personal visits to donor capitals by the RRC Chief Commissioner in 1984 and 1985. However, this practice stopped after Dawit Wolde Giorgis defected on one such trip abroad in late 1985. (The post of Chief Commissioner was left vacant until August, 1986 when it was filled by Berhanu Jembere, a former ambassador to East Germany.)

RRC's role as a donor coordinator has been limited. While its appeals for assistance have been received as credible, at least since 1984, it did not appear to have much influence on how donations were channelled to Ethiopia. In particular, it was unable to dissuade donors from shifting assistance from the RRC to NGOs as the political controversy over the PMGSE's relief and resettlement policies grew. Also, RRC's communications with USAID, the biggest single donor, were very limited during most of 1985 and 1986 until the appointment of the new Chief Commissioner. To a large extent, the UN filled the role of coordinator of donor efforts.

In general, the RRC has received high marks as a relief agency. In 1985, the USG provided 50,000 MT of emergency food to the RRC for distribution to drought-affected areas of Ethiopia. Because of doubts about the RRC's ability, the USG contracted with an NGO to monitor the entire process of receipt and distribution of the food by the RRC. According to the monitors, the RRC performed commendably in distributing the AID food. Other international organizations and NGOs report similar satisfactory results in working with the RRC. Nonetheless, some donors remained hesitant about channelling food aid through the RRC. In particular, they feared that the food would be used in the controversial resettlement program (see below) and that the RRC would not be able to resist pressure exerted by local party and military authorities, especially in the North, to apply political criteria in selecting recipients. Thus, despite the generally recognized competence and dedication of the RRC, donors relied heavily on NGOs to distribute food aid.

The RRC's role as coordinator of the NGOs in Ethiopia itself had its controversies. All NGOs working in relief (except for ICRC and LICROSS which worked through the Ethiopian Red Cross) had to sign official agreements with the RRC. Many avoided this until late in 1985. Likewise, NGOs usually undertook specific contracts with the RRC to distribute food in specified areas with a target level of recipients and aid. This system of contracts was supposed to coordinate NGO efforts and prevent duplication and overlapping. In some cases, however, it served to curb NGO activities and impede responsiveness to new areas of need, if only because of all of the paperwork entailed.

The RRC tried to place other controls on NGO operations. At one point, it tried (apparently at the prompting of higher authorities) to radically reduce the number of expatriates employed by the NGOs. On other

occasions, it tried to take greater control of trucks and aircraft operated by NGOs. However, when resistance arose, the RRC's demands were not pressed and reasonable solutions were found.

The credibility of the RRC was undermined by actions taken by the PMGSE, either on orders of higher authorities or at the initiative of local officials. On occasion, the RRC undertook sound policies which, because of inadequate resources and planning, proved to be counterproductive. Given the atmosphere of suspicion that prevailed between Western donors and the PMGSE, sinister motives were sometime ascribed by donors to what were honest mistakes, while the PMGSE ascribed equally sinister motives to what was intended as constructive criticism of the relief program.

The most controversial and counterproductive program undertaken by the PMGSE during the famine was its resettlement scheme. Resettlement of people from the overpopulated and agriculturally exhausted areas in the North to more fertile areas has long been advocated in Ethiopia, not only by the Government but also by numerous donors, including, in the past, USAID. However, the PMGSE decision to initiate a major resettlement program in 1985 to move 11 million people met with strong objections from several quarters. The USG opposed the movement because it diverted vital resources from the relief effort, entailed massive human rights violations as many people were coerced into the program and because the program's poor planning led to death and misery. Some critics claimed that the objective of the program was to depopulate areas affected by insurgent movements. (However, the region with the most powerful and longest running secessionist movement, Eritrea, was virtually untouched by the resettlement program.) Because of international protests, the PMGSE suspended the program in December, 1985, after moving some 600,000 persons during that year. The PMGSE has declared that the program will resume in 1987, but most observers believe it will resume at a slower pace and with better planning, and not until late in 1987, if at all in that year. Some NGOs and governments are now assisting the program in an effort to try to correct its worst abuses.

Another area which provoked controversy was the PMGSE's treatment of people in some feeding shelters. The PMGSE was anxious to close the shelters which posed the threat of epidemics, and return their inhabitants to farming. However, in the first instance of this policy being implemented, some 60,000 persons in the Ibnet camp in Gonder (including children in intensive feeding programs) were summarily expelled by local Workers Party officials without warning, food or supplies to undertake the journey back to their homes. An international outcry at this action caused the Ethiopian head of state, Mengistu Haile Mariam, to reverse the order and allow the camp to reopen. The number that perished in the interim, however, will never be known.

Ibnet served as a lesson. Thereafter, planning and considerable resources were devoted to returning shelter inhabitants to their homes. Returnees were provided seeds, tools, health supplies and food, and were assured that they would continue to receive dry rations until harvest time. By late 1985, only small numbers of people remained at the shelters, usually orphans, the sick and old people who had no one to support them.

A major impediment to the relief effort was the various insurgent wars in the North. The war made travel and the transportation of food aid in the area difficult. Whole regions were virtually inaccessible by road for months (see section V.E below on logistics). Moreover, relief personnel were largely confined to Government-controlled towns. They had limited access to the countryside to determine the extent of food needs. The Government showed little interest in aiding people beyond the enclaves it controlled, suspecting that food going beyond Government lines would ultimately aid the rebels. NGOs had to battle continually to keep political interference out of the distribution process, even where those receiving the distribution came from Government-controlled areas.

In early 1985, only the ICRC was consistently reaching people in the disputed "gray" zones in the North which neither side controlled. (The insurgents ran their own relief agencies with international donor assistance, bringing food in from the Sudan.) In response to international pressure, however, the PMGSE acceded to a USG request to expand NGO distributions in Eritrea and Tigray. The initiative, dubbed "Food for the North" (FFN), was undertaken by World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO) in Tigray and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (through the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS)) in Eritrea. In Eritrea, the initiative quickly expanded beyond the bounds delineated by the RRC. Between ICRC and the FFN initiatives, most of Eritrea was reached. Local government and military authorities were generally cooperative. In contrast, reaching people in the "gray" zones in Tigray remained a struggle throughout the relief effort. After two WVRO workers were killed by guerrillas of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, AID and WVRO had to cut back on the initiative in Tigray.

During 1985-86, the PMGSE, putting its military objectives ahead of all others, undertook several significant military offensives in the North (as did its insurgent opponents). These campaigns diverted resources, especially transport, critically needed to help save the lives of famine victims. The transport diversion contributed greatly to the backlog of food at the ports, especially in 1985.

C. Other Ethiopian Contributions

In addition to the RRC's efforts, public and private Ethiopian entities also contributed to the relief effort. In 1985, the Ethiopian newspapers were filled with reports of mostly modest donations by all sorts of groups (churches, police and army units, peasants associations, overseas Ethiopian Embassy staffs, etc.). There is no single calculation of the amount collected in this manner. Also, at one time a "drought tax" of one month's salary was levied against all Ethiopian citizens and a "drought sales tax" was imposed on all private businesses.

Many local non-governmental institutions served as conduits for relief aid. Ethiopian church organizations (e.g., the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), the Catholic Church, and indigenous protestant groups such as the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) and the Kale Hewit

Church), with their extensive outreach abilities, were particularly effective in reaching areas where food aid deliveries would otherwise have been hampered by local politics or conflict.

D. International Response

The impact of the television documentary first aired by the BBC in October, 1984, showing hundreds of emaciated and dying children in the emergency feeding centers had a dramatic impact on the consciousness of the world. From the end of 1984 through 1986, over two billion dollars worth of drought emergency assistance was given to Ethiopia by international public and private donors, mostly from Western countries.

The USG became the major donor in this Ethiopian relief effort, contributing more than one-third of the food aid requirements in 1985 and again in 1986. During 1985-86, the US contributed approximately one-half billion dollars in official assistance, in addition to the millions contributed in private contributions through American and other NGOs. Other Western government donors, private donors and international organizations made up most of the remaining requirements. With one or two notable exceptions, such as Poland which provided a squadron of helicopters to move relief food and Bulgaria which donated 18,000 MT of food, most East European nations made only token contributions in 1985 and virtually none in 1986. The Soviet Union, for example, devoted most of its aid to the PMGSE war effort in the North and to the resettlement program.

E. Role of the United Nations

In November, 1984, the Secretary General of the United Nations established a special Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia (OEOE). The UN Secretary General appointed as his Special Representative to Ethiopia Kurt Jansson, a Finnish diplomat who had coordinated the UN relief effort in Kampuchea. Mr. Jansson served in Ethiopia from November, 1984 to November, 1985, when he was replaced by Michael Priestley.

The OEOE acted in 1985 and 1986 as the key coordinator of the international donor response to the drought. It served as the mechanism for mobilizing donor aid, acted as the intermediary between the donor community and the PMGSE, maintained a data base on pledges, arrivals and distribution of aid commodities, and coordinated the response of other components of the UN system.

One of the highlights of the UN emergency office in Ethiopia was the prompt and effective intervention by Mr. Jansson with Chairman Mengistu to reverse the decision to close the Ibbet camp in 1985 and to allow the camp's inhabitants to return (as detailed above in this report).

The OEOE ceased operations on December 31, 1986, when its responsibilities were absorbed by the local UN Development Program office under the new Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Group (EPPG).

III. USG RELIEF ASSISTANCE

A. Initial USG Response

USG development assistance to Ethiopia ceased in 1979 with the closure of the USAID Mission in Addis Ababa because of the deterioration in relations between the USG and PMGSE. The PMGSE's failure to continue repayment of some military assistance loans from the USG and to compensate Americans for property nationalized after the 1974 revolution led to the imposition of the Brooke and Hickenlooper amendments which legally barred Ethiopia from receiving bilateral development assistance. The USG continued, however, to provide humanitarian "regular" (as opposed to emergency) food aid through CRS for maternal and child health feeding. From 1979 to 1983, this aid averaged 8,000 MT a year. Oversight of the program was performed by the US Embassy.

The USG's response to the famine began in May, 1984, with the approval of 8,000 MT of emergency food aid valued at \$4.0 million for CRS to distribute in Welo, Eritrea, Tigray and Sidamo. Also in May, cash grants totalling \$3.5 million were made to CRS and CRDA for the internal transport of food aid. A second tranche of 16,425 MT of emergency food aid valued at \$5.0 million was approved in early August for CRS (3,980 MT) and the World Food Program (WFP) (12,645 MT). UNICEF received \$1.0 million for emergency medical assistance. In addition, the USG "regular" food program through CRS in 1984 was increased to a level of 11,863 MT, valued at \$7.0 million.

In late September, 1984, at the same time that the BBC was broadcasting the footage that was to mobilize world support for the relief operation, an AID team was sent to assess the magnitude and severity of the famine. The team was granted travel permits to visit Welo, something routinely denied to US diplomats previously. The team reported that the situation in Welo and northern Shewa was critical, and that the 1984 crop had failed completely.

In November, 1984, USAID Administrator M. Peter McPherson visited Ethiopia to gain a firsthand understanding of the famine situation. Several congressional delegations then, in quick succession, visited the country. These delegations, which brought about high level USG-PMGSE dialogue on the famine, helped obtain Congressional support for the relief program. (High ranking PMGSE officials normally refused to meet with members of the executive branch of the USG.)

Over the next few months, the USG shipped unprecedented quantities of food aid, starting the largest US relief effort ever. Food aid shipments

on the high seas destined for other countries were diverted to Ethiopia to speed deliveries. From December, 1984 to February, 1985, over 108,000 MT of USG food arrived at Ethiopian ports.

B. Creation of AID/Addis Ababa

During the fall of 1984, the famine program was administered at various times by US Embassy staff, personal services contractors (PSCs) and AID personnel on temporary duty (TDY) in Addis Ababa. However, by late 1984, it was obvious that the magnitude of the USG relief program required more management. In negotiations between the AID Administrator and the RRC Chief Commissioner in October, 1984, the USG obtained the commitment of the Commissioner to allow the establishment of an AID office staffed by five permanent AID employees. These employees were to be additional to the ceiling of 28 on US Embassy staff imposed by the Ethiopian Government. The permanent AID staff arrived between January and March, 1985 (though they were not given accreditation by the PMGSE until July). These employees consisted of the US Coordinator for Emergency Relief, a deputy, a Food for Peace Officer, a Program Officer and a secretary. This was augmented by six Ethiopian employees and three PSCs hired from among US Embassy spouses.

In addition, AID/Washington and other missions provided over 50 TDY staffers during 1984-86. While the work of the permanent AID staff in 1985 generally required that they remain in Addis Ababa, the TDY staffers were able to travel to the field to monitor famine conditions and the implementation of the relief program. TDYers also were used for specific tasks requiring specialized knowledge, such as in logistics, air transport, and health. (See Annex G for list of TDY personnel.)

In the Fall of 1985, the mission hired two additional employees who essentially took the place of TDY employees serving as field monitors. (These individuals, already residing in Ethiopia as dependents of other Americans, were not counted against the ceiling of five AID employees imposed by the PMGSE.)

C. USG Assistance Provided

In 1985 and 1986, the USG provided 787,065 MT of food aid to Ethiopia, valued at over \$406.5 million (see Table 5). In addition, some \$59.1 million in support grants was provided through the Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) for relief and rehabilitation programs (see Tables 2 and 4). This aid was channelled through 20 non-governmental and international organizations as well as through the RRC. USG food aid reached 12 of Ethiopia's 14 regions.

The kinds of assistance provided in response to the famine changed over time, according to the needs in Ethiopia. The flexibility and timely

arrival of donations helped ensure the program's success. At the beginning of the famine, the emphasis was placed on saving the lives of the most vulnerable group, the children under five years of age. In keeping with this objective, large quantities of blended and fortified foods, milk and oil were ordered, constituting 20 percent of USG food aid in 1985. These included corn-soya milk, nonfat dry milk, vegetable oil, butteroil and soya-fortified grains. Because famine victims had gathered at feeding centers, attention also had to be given to shelter, sanitation and health. The US responded by funding blankets, plastic sheeting, medical teams, medicines and water supply enhancements. During 1985, some \$8 million in OFDA grants was provided for such activities. Considerable financial support was given to American NGOs to help with their start up costs.

The food situation in 1986 improved considerably with the better harvest in the Fall of 1985. The emergency relief food need for 1986 (net of carryover stocks) was estimated at 900,000 MT. The USG again provided over one-third or 340,423 MT. By 1986, the need for on-site relief and feeding centers had eased. People were in better condition and had returned to their farms. The need for supplementary food was greatly reduced. Instead, people came to distribution centers once a month to receive take-home rations of whole grain, supplemented by milk, oil or dried beans.

A critical factor in saving lives was the provision of internal transportation. As discussed below in Section V.E, the USG undertook initiatives in providing trucks and aircraft to move relief food and generous funding to NGOs for their logistical costs. In a few cases, grants were given directly to NGOs to purchase trucks. More often, the USG compensated NGOs for their own purchase of trucks by increasing funding for truck operating costs. In 1985, no hard and fast rule was used to determine the USG contribution to internal transportation. In 1986 the USG pledged 50 percent of the NGO costs for transporting USG food.

Another major focus of USG assistance was agricultural recovery. To break the cycle of the famine, it was necessary not only to return famine victims to their farms but also ensure that they had the seeds and tools necessary to resume farming. During the Spring of 1985, the provision of seeds became a priority. The US provided several thousand tons of seeds for NGOs to distribute, acquired mostly by exchanging food aid for seed with Ethiopia's Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC). In 1986, the provision of seeds, agricultural tools, pesticides, fertilizers and oxen needed to get farmers back to self-sufficiency became the major focus of US non-food aid. AID undertook a major "seed swap", whereby 17,765 MT of U.S. wheat was sold to the AMC and the proceeds used to purchase seeds available in country. In addition to the "seed swap", over \$8 million in grants were given to PVOs for agricultural recovery activities.

A final priority for USG assistance was to the northern regions where the suffering caused by the drought was compounded by civil war. As discussed in Section II.B above, the USG made the relief effort in the North a priority, supporting ICRC's program in this area and undertaking the FFN Initiative with CRS and WVRO.

TABLE 1: USG FOOD AID ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA, FY 85¹

	Commodity (Mts)	Commodity Value (000s)	Ocean Freight (000s)	Internal Transport (000s)	Total Value (000s)
Feeding Programs					
CARE	33,008	\$ 8,548.8	\$ 4,786.1	\$ 2,960.0	\$ 16,294.9
CDAA/JRP	161,194	53,277.1	25,894.0	25,516.0	104,687.1
CRS-EMG	40,559	11,620.9	7,483.7	0.0	19,104.6
CRS-REG	11,869	3,886.1	1,483.6	0.0	5,369.7
CRS-NORTH	9,000	2,253.0	1,305.0	1,205.0	4,763.0
CRS-MC	4,654	1,972.3	861.5	0.0	2,833.8
ICRC	46,154	14,080.8	6,913.5	0.0	20,994.3
LICROSS	11,610	3,800.5	1,620.4	0.0	5,420.9
RRC	50,000	9,433.5	2,989.1	1,124.6	13,547.2
SAVE	17,401	4,602.9	2,509.3	590.0	7,702.2
WFP/IEFR	9,973	3,428.9	1,736.2	0.0	5,165.1
WVRO	35,120	14,731.5	5,380.5	15,789.2	35,901.2
WVRO-NORTH	8,100	3,108.0	1,174.5	561.3	4,843.8
Subtotal	438,642	\$134,744.3	\$64,137.4	\$47,746.1	\$246,627.8
Food for Seed Programs					
CRDA	5,500	\$ 794.5	\$ 631.0	\$ 360.0	\$ 1,785.5
ICRC	2,500	395.0	250.0	0.0	645.0
Subtotal	8,000	\$ 1,190.0	\$ 881.0	\$ 360.0	\$ 2,430.5
Grand Total	446,642	\$135,933.8	\$65,018.4	\$48,106.1	\$249,058.3

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa

¹ Includes both PL 480 Title II and Section 416 commodities. Levels are based on those approved for FY 85. Some commodities were initially approved for FY 85 but shipped during FY 86. These commodities are shown on this table as part of the FY 85 program level.

TABLE 2: USG EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA, FY 85

FOOD AID - 446,642 MT \$249,058,300

NON-FOOD AID (OFDA Operational Support Grants & Contracts)

Organization - Purpose

ADRA - Blankets, medicines, logistics	\$620,874	
ADRA - Airfreight	12,500	
Africare - Medical teams	109,302	
AJJDC - Medical & shelter supplies	183,505	
CARE - Food monitors	397,555	
Concern - Seafreight for plastic sheeting	5,500	
CRS - Inland transport of food	10,508,058	
CRS - Inland transport for MC	138,000	
CRS - Eritrea Northern Initiative	1,687,355	
FHI - Feeding & medical program	803,857	
HPI - Distribution of draft oxen	540,000	
Helen Keller Int'l - Blindness prevention	34,083	
ICRC - Airlift of trucks	400,000	
Interaction - Airfreight	17,100	
MAP - Airfreight of medical supplies	71,000	
RRC - Fuel for Mekele airlift	25,000	
RRC - Internal transport of US food	450,000	
SAVE - Truck purchase	980,000	
TransAmerica - Airlift	16,627,344	
UNDRO - UN field monitor	79,565	
UNICEF - Internal transport & tires	967,000	
UNICEF - Water for displaced persons	750,000	
UNICEF - Airfreight	52,978	
WASH - Water/sanitation consultants	150,000	
WVRO - Air/ground transport, water medicines	1,597,640	
WVRO - Health/nutrition centers	3,641,694	
WVRO - Operation of two light aircraft	1,113,010	
WVRO - Airfreight	23,427	
WVRO - Tigray Northern Initiative	1,712,522	
US DHHS - Medical consultant	11,010	
Various NGOs & RRC - Plastic sheeting	244,800	
Various NGOs & RRC - Blankets	<u>92,261</u>	
 Total Non-food Aid		 \$44,046,940

Total FY 85 USG Assistance		\$293,105,240

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa

TABLE 3: USG FOOD AID ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA, FY 86¹

	Commodity (Mts)	Commodity Value (000s)	Ocean Freight (000s)	Internal Transport ² (000s)	Total Value (000s)
Feeding Programs					
CARE	74,400	\$16,147.6	\$ 9,948.9	\$ 3,856.9	\$ 29,953.4
CDAA/JRP	106,835	27,994.1	13,326.3	1,719.8	43,040.2
CRS-REG	12,783	3,508.4	1,621.3	0.0	5,129.7
CRS-NORTH	27,424	6,322.0	2,870.7	2,948.1	12,140.8
CRS-MC	4,655	1,164.0	630.4	0.0	1,794.4
EOC	4,463	752.4	309.9	287.9	1,350.2
FHI	6,960	1,150.9	726.7	634.8	2,512.4
ICRC	13,500	4,207.2	2,397.4	1,469.8	8,074.4
LICROSS	10,000	2,931.1	1,450.0	566.0	4,947.1
SAVE	23,000	3,809.5	2,967.5	1,500.5	8,277.5
WVRO	31,464	8,379.9	6,652.9	2,835.9	17,868.7
WVRO-NORTH	7,174	1,577.3	1,558.3	249.9	3,385.5
Subtotal	322,658	\$77,944.4	\$44,460.3	\$16,069.6	\$138,474.3
Food for Seed Programs					
Consolidated	17,765	\$ 2,366.0	\$ 2,275.4	\$ 0.0	\$ 4,641.4
Subtotal	17,765	\$ 2,366.0	\$ 2,275.4	\$ 0.0	\$ 4,641.4
Consolidated Food Transport					
UN/WFP WTOE	0	\$ 0.0	\$ 0.0	\$13,424.3	\$ 13,424.3
Grand Total	340,423	\$80,310.4	\$46,735.7	\$29,493.9	\$156,540.0

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa

NOTE¹: Includes both PL 480 Title II and Section 416 commodities. Those FY 86 commodities which were initially approved in FY 85 are considered part of the FY 85 program and are not included in the above table.

NOTE²: Includes some FY 87 internal transport funds for movement of FY 86 commodities.

TABLE 4: USG EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA, FY 86¹

FOOD AID - 340,423 MT \$156,540,000

NON-FOOD AID (OFDA Operational Support Grants & Contracts)

Organization - Purpose

AJJDC - Agricultural packages	\$350,000
CARE - Agricultural packages	110,179
CRS - Agricultural packages	725,908
LICROSS - Agricultural packages	2,588,292
LWR - Agricultural packages	490,356
SAVE - Agricultural packages/FFW	692,762
WVRO - Agricultural packages	3,000,000
PFP - Seeds	250,218
CARE - Sidamo feeding program	64,900
CARE - Harerge feeding program	500,000
FHI - Logistics & medical centers	468,273
UN - Truck fleet	2,400,000
WVRO - Feeding centers	2,800,000
WVRO - Tigray initiative	600,000
Air transport specialist	<u>18,319</u>

Total Non-food Aid \$15,059,207

Total FY 86 USG Assistance -----
\$171,599,207

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa

TABLE 5: USG FOOD AID ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA, FY 85-86 TOTAL

	Commodity (Mts)	Commodity Value (000s)	Ocean Freight (000s)	Internal Transport (000s)	Total Value (000s)
Feeding Programs					
CARE	107,408	\$ 24,696.4	\$ 14,735.0	\$ 6,816.9	\$ 46,248.3
CDAA/JRP	268,029	81,271.2	39,220.3	27,235.8	147,727.3
CRS-EMG	40,559	11,620.9	7,483.7	0.0	19,104.6
CRS-REG	24,652	7,394.5	3,104.9	0.0	10,499.4
CRS-NORTH	36,424	8,575.0	4,175.7	4,153.1	16,903.8
CRS-MC	9,309	3,136.3	1,491.9	0.0	4,628.2
EOC	4,463	752.4	309.9	287.9	1,350.2
FHI	6,960	1,150.9	726.7	634.8	2,512.4
ICRC	59,654	18,288.0	9,310.9	1,469.8	29,068.7
LICROSS	21,610	6,731.6	3,070.4	566.0	10,368.0
RRC	50,000	9,433.5	2,989.1	2,050.0	14,472.6
SAVE	40,401	8,412.4	5,476.8	2,090.5	15,979.7
WFP/IEFR	9,973	3,428.9	1,736.2	0.0	5,165.1
WVRO	66,584	23,111.4	12,033.4	18,625.1	53,769.9
WVRO-NORTH	15,274	4,685.3	2,732.8	811.2	8,229.3
Subtotal	761,300	\$212,688.7	\$108,597.7	\$64,741.1	\$386,027.5
Food for Seed Programs					
CRDA	5,500	\$ 794.5	\$ 631.0	\$ 360.0	\$ 1,785.5
ICRC	2,500	395.0	250.0	0.0	645.0
Consolidated	17,765	2,366.0	2,275.4	0.0	4,641.4
Subtotal	25,765	\$ 3,555.5	\$ 3,156.4	\$ 360.0	\$ 7,071.9
Consolidated Food Transport					
UN/WFP WIOE	0	0.0	\$ 0.0	\$13,424.3	\$ 13,424.3
Grand Total	787,065	\$216,244.2	\$111,754.1	\$78,525.4	\$406,523.7

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa

IV. NGO RELIEF OPERATIONS

Non-governmental organizations were vital to the success of the relief effort and critical to the USG emergency assistance program. NGOs from around the world participated in the relief effort, distributing about two-thirds of all food aid provided in 1985-86. Over 90 percent of the USG food aid was distributed by NGOs. In addition, some \$43 million in USG relief and rehabilitation grants were administered by NGOs.

USG food aid was provided to eight NGOs: CARE, CRS, EOC, Food for the Hungry International (FHI), SAVE, WVRO, ICRC, and LICROSS. An additional 10 NGOs received OFDA disaster assistance grants. The network that distributed USG food aid, however, was much more extensive, because of CDAA -- later called Joint Relief Partnership or JRP. This NGO consortium consisted of four partner agencies -- CRS (which acted as consignee for USG assistance), Lutheran World Federation (LWF), ECS and EECMY. Participating under the CDAA umbrella was a myriad of other agencies including local religious groups, foreign church aid societies and secular relief agencies. Several NGOs that participated under CDAA, such as Save the Children/UK (SCF/UK), conducted relief programs independently as well as participating under CDAA. Others, such as FHI and EOC, initially received USG food as a CDAA participant, but later administered USG food aid directly.

The success of the NGO programs is all the more striking when one considers the speed with which they were established. As the famine developed in 1984, only a handful of agencies, notably CRS and SCF/UK, operated nutrition programs in Ethiopia. The presence of these groups was vital to both alerting the world to the disaster and distributing initial food aid donations. Indeed, CRS received half of the USG food aid provided in FY 1985, either for its own programs or on behalf of CDAA. However, by late 1984, several other US agencies had mobilized. Some, like CARE, were new to Ethiopia but had long experience in relief and nutrition programs. Others, such as SAVE, were new not only to the country but also to disaster relief and USG food assistance. Nonetheless, such groups were able to put together effective programs by the critical pre-harvest months of 1985.

The NGOs brought numerous advantages to the relief effort. The PMGSE and RRC could not cope with the amount of aid pouring into the country in 1985. Additionally, the NGOs gave donors an alternate means of providing aid when doubts began to grow about the PMGSE's relief policies, especially concerning resettlement. The NGOs also contributed skills and capabilities that the RRC did not possess, including medical staff to complement the relief food, and agricultural expertise to aid in recovery.

The variety of NGOs and the diversity of their programs were one of the strengths of the relief effort. Some, such as WVRO, initially concentrated on intensive feeding and medical care of the most severely affected. Others, such as CARE, provided dry ration distribution to populations threatened with famine but whose nutritional status had not

yet fallen to a critical point. Some, like SAVE, concentrated on a single region and integrated relief food with longer-term recovery and development programs. CRS and its CDAA partners, in contrast, operated extensively, responding to newly identified areas of need. Eventually, CDAA food reached 12 of Ethiopia's 14 administrative regions.

Another advantage of the NGO programs was their political neutrality. The RRC did not (or could not) work in many areas affected by civil strife. Likewise, people from these areas were often hesitant to register for RRC assistance. In these cases, the NGOs provided a buffer between the political authorities, the insurgents and the people in need.

Finally, the NGOs mobilized public opinion and private resources abroad. No accurate estimate has been made of how much privately-raised funds were spent by NGOs on Ethiopian relief and recovery, although it is undoubtedly in the tens of millions of dollars.

Annex D presents program summaries of PL 480 and OFDA assistance for all USG-supported NGOs.

V. APPRAISAL OF USG AND NGO EFFORTS

A. Why USG Assistance Was A Success

USE OF NGOS: The famine program in Ethiopia was a cooperative effort between the voluntary agencies and the USG. The USG could not have directly provided the quantity of assistance it did, nor have had the confidence that this assistance was properly used, had it not been for the NGOs. The international, neutral and humanitarian nature of the NGOs helped to protect the relief effort from undue local interference. The interaction between AID/Addis Ababa and the local NGO representatives was frank and direct, something not always possible with the host government or international organizations. The AID office was able to closely monitor USG resources and register its complaints honestly and openly when things were not going according to expectations.

ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESSIONAL, MEDIA AND PUBLIC SUPPORT: The famine program was immeasurably assisted by the support and attention it received from the USG, the media and the public. The program was given all resources required — OFDA funds were liberally granted, and the USG was able to make good on its pledge to provide one-third of the emergency food aid need. In 1985 Congress passed supplemental legislation to provide more funding to African drought relief. Media and public support were also extremely important. Sizeable public donations were made to the NGOs for the Ethiopian famine, largely as a result of media attention.

Once the issue to provide relief was resolved, Washington decision-making was expeditious, and the individuals involved in the program in Washington (Food for Peace, OFDA, and the AID Africa Bureau) were highly dedicated. The mission could invariably rely on timely responses from headquarters. The program also received considerable support from TDY staff from Washington and Nairobi. Individuals with the particular skills required were generally allowed to leave their assigned duties in order to provide support to the AID/Addis Ababa Office.

PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY: The AID program was responsive to needs as they became apparent, shifting the type of assistance according to the changing circumstances in Ethiopia. During the first year of the famine, when the emphasis was on saving lives in a camp environment, priority was given to providing supplementary foods, medicines, shelter supplies, airlifts of provisions and water. During the second year of the famine, priority was given to dry ration distribution and agricultural rehabilitation.

SKILLED PERSONNEL AVAILABLE IN-COUNTRY: Ethiopians were in the front lines of the relief effort, administering food distribution, feeding shelters, health programs, etc. The vast majority of NGO headquarters staff in Addis Ababa handling logistics, finances and commodity management were Ethiopian. NGOs were able to put together local staffs virtually overnight. Ironically, NGO recruiting was aided in large part by PMGSE policies. The Government, by far the country's largest employer, had not given a pay raise for 10 years. Private sector employment had gradually been suppressed by the Government's socialistic orientation. This resulted in a pool of highly qualified employees ready, able and willing to work for NGOs.

STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY: The knowledge that commodities are not stolen or misappropriated is paramount to maintaining the confidence and support of donors. A minimum of USG assistance was lost in the Ethiopian program. Theft or misuse of food and other relief goods was minor, in part due to the assiduous monitoring by the AID mission. More important was the NGO's compliance with the USG requirements for accurate and timely record keeping which was strictly enforced by the AID mission through quarterly reviews and reports.

Even the best management cannot prevent misuse of resources if corruption and theft are an integral part of the local environment. Theft of relief goods in Ethiopia was very rare. In part, this is attributable to Ethiopian culture which does not sanction corruption. Also, the police-state nature of the Ethiopian Government provided an effective deterrent to crime.

An internal audit was undertaken of the AID program after the first year of the famine. This audit was requested by the AID mission as a management tool to identify areas where accountability was weak. All audit recommendations were assigned to AID staff members, and status reports on the implementation of these recommendations were made to AID/Washington every few months.

PERSONNEL: The program was aided by the fact that an AID office was established in Ethiopia. Having in-country personnel was indispensable -- the program could not have been effectively run out of a regional office. Besides the day-to-day management of food, transport and agricultural inputs, the AID/Addis Ababa staff reported on resettlement, agricultural conditions, villagization and other PMGSE policies that had a direct bearing on the relief program.

The skills mix of the AID/Addis Ababa staff was appropriate. All four professional staff members had strong managerial, analytical and communications skills. These strengths were ultimately of greater value than technical expertise. Given the wide variety of problems encountered, the frantic pace of work, and the personnel ceiling imposed by the PMGSE, staff members had to quickly become proficient in a number of fields -- health, logistics, seeds, commodity management, nutrition, pest control, agriculture, political analysis and weather patterns. When mission skills were not adequate, TDY assistance was requested. The caliber of TDY assistance was, almost without exception, very high.

B. Food Aid

TIMING OF FOOD AID ARRIVALS: Once the decision to expand the emergency program in Ethiopia was made by the USG in the fall of 1984, food aid began to arrive quickly. AID/W made a major effort to divert to Ethiopia food shipments destined for other AID programs so that food would begin arriving before the end of 1984. Some NGOs nonetheless experienced delays with food shipments. These apparently were because of the specialized nature of the commodities ordered, such as soya-fortified grains. While whole grain could have been shipped much more quickly, NGOs required fortified foods because of the severely malnourished state of people in feeding shelters.

Food aid arrivals in 1986 were also very timely. Essential to this was the preliminary food need assessment undertaken by AID in August, 1985. While this preliminary assessment was much too early to produce anything but a rough estimate of the 1986 food aid requirements, it gave AID an order a magnitude with which to plan the 1986 emergency program. This allowed AID to approve one-third of its 1986 food program before the RRC had even made its October, 1985 appeal for 1986. A further 100,000 MT of USG food was approved within six weeks of the initial RRC solicitation. A second food need assessment was undertaken by AID/Addis Ababa in January, 1986 to refine the data and corroborate the RRC's estimate of need.

QUANTITY OF FOOD AID: AID initially made food aid allocations based on the needs of the NGOs it was supporting. For 1985, this came out to be roughly one-third of the food aid requirement for that year and about 40 percent of actual food aid arrivals for the year. In 1986, the USG explicitly committed itself again to meeting one-third of the food aid need.

The quantity supplied by AID appears to have been appropriate given the program needs of the US-supported NGOs and the willingness of other donors to provide food. Granted, a portion of the 1985 US food aid was carried over into 1986. This was mostly due to logistical bottlenecks that prevented the food from reaching those in need that year. (See section V.E. below on Logistics). Likewise, a portion of 1986 food was carried over into 1987, for several reasons. First, the estimates of need made by the RRC and AID appear to have been overstated by 15-20 percent. While the RRC's estimate for the number of people in need in 1986 was probably fairly accurate, it appears to have overstated the ration requirements (i.e., the number of months of food aid distributions) required by many of those in need. Likewise, the "food balance sheet" method used by AID to estimate emergency food needs was inappropriate in some ways for the Ethiopia program (see section V.G below on the food balance sheet approach). Second, NGOs understandably erred on the side of ordering too much food rather than too little. Third, many organizations erroneously planned for large populations needing intensive feeding. Thus, early in 1986, too much supplementary food such as oil and milk was ordered. When this food arrived, NGOs found they actually needed grain instead (see section V.G. on recommendations on calls forward.)

PACKAGING: The packaging of PL 480 commodities was sometimes inadequate. Specific problems with packaging were:

Grain Bags - At the ports grain was often stored in the open for weeks, often causing them to burst in the intense heat. While USG bags were better than bags used by many other donors, they appear to have been inferior to those used by the European Economic Community (EEC) which were less prone to disintegrating in sunlight. Also, "Gift of the People of the United States" should have appeared on P.L. 480 bags in Amharic, the national language of Ethiopia. This inscription would have resulted in additional recognition of the USG donations.

Vegoil Containers - A satisfactory container for vegetable oil has yet to be found. The one gallon tins in cardboard boxes leaked, making transport difficult. The plastic pails were also unsatisfactory. Leakage in the plastic pails was so bad at the Port of Djibouti that the railway refused to move this commodity for fear that the leakage would cause a train derailment. The large plastic jugs used by some European donors had fewer problems, although they are also more expensive than the containers used by the USG.

Butteroil Containers - There were many complaints about the 55 gallon drums in which butteroil was shipped. The drums were generally too big, making transport and manual handling difficult.

Milk Powder Containers - Containers for milk powder were generally satisfactory.

BARGES: The use of "lighter aboard ship" (LASH) barges was highly unsatisfactory. During the two year emergency relief operation, 20 LASH

barges either ran aground or sank at Assab. These sinkings represented the most serious food losses for the program, alone accounting for a loss of 7,000 MT. All of these barges belonged to Central Gulf Lines. The mission sent several cables on the inadvisability of barge shipments, but such bookings continued, presumably in conformance with US cargo preference considerations. Although commodities were insured by the shippers, these barge sinkings had an overall negative effect on the program: unsalvageable commodities were sometimes badly needed to sustain NGO feeding activities, and the sight of old, ill repaired, sinking barges, which often stayed submerged at the port for months, was an embarrassment for the USG.

NGO DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA: Early in the program, AID encouraged all NGOs to operate under the CDAA umbrella to ensure uniform distribution criteria, consistent reporting procedures and program objectives. Since many NGOs had limited experience in food programming, making CRS responsible for the entire program would have ensured proper management of records and logistics.

This unitary NGO concept did not take hold, as each NGO insisted on its independence for both programmatic and public relations reasons. In retrospect, it was fortunate for the program that NGOs insisted on being independent. This individuality and lack of bureaucracy enabled the development of innovative programs, particularly as the food supply situation improved and organizations had to devise methods for identifying the truly needy. Shifting from free food distributions to food-for-work was a popular method of phasing down the emergency program. FHI was the first organization to cease free distribution and start up food-for-work projects, such as irrigation development and road construction. SAVE used their food aid to develop a comprehensive community health care program. WVRO and LICROSS turned their food distribution sites into agricultural training centers. CARE developed what was probably the most efficient logistics system within Ethiopia. CRS and its CDAA/JRP partners largely continued with their original system of free distribution. With its standardized distribution criteria and network of local churches, however, CDAA/JRP was able to shift its program to different geographical areas to meet the changing needs within Ethiopia.

LOSSES: An estimated 31,600 MT, or 4.3 percent, of AID relief food was lost in 1985-86. Most losses were due to shortlanding or damage incurred during ocean transport. LASH barges were the largest single source of losses. The balance of food lost was mostly while the food was still in port. Once NGOs took delivery of the food from the port, the loss rate was less than one-half of one percent. Annex H presents an analysis of USG food losses for the emergency program.

C. Other Relief Aid

One objective of most famine relief programs is to prevent the movement of victims from their homes to camps or towns, in order to avoid the

problems imposed by congregations of people and to facilitate recovery. In Ethiopia, however, such a migration was already underway by the time adequate food aid began to arrive in late 1984. Thus, the establishment of feeding shelters was inevitable.

By early 1985, the registered population in shelters and camps had reached almost 600,000. The following table shows the estimated registered population of people in shelters for select months in 1985.

1985					
	February	April	June	August	October
Eritrea	12,000	43,000	26,000	57,000	2,280
Gonder	--	98,000	108,000	86,800	4,000
Harerge	--	20,000	18,000	18,000	11,450
Shewa	11,000	8,000	7,000	7,000	400
Sidamo	--	--	2,000	2,000	11,200
Tigray	81,500	240,275	129,000	117,770	6,490
Welo	<u>98,000</u>	<u>166,600</u>	<u>164,600</u>	<u>103,300</u>	<u>34,350</u>
Total	202,500	575,275	455,450	391,870	70,170

The number of unregistered people congregating near (but not admitted into) the camps was estimated to have reached 400,000 by June, 1985. These included people seeking admission to shelters and relatives of those enrolled in shelters. By September, 1985, the number of unadmitted people had decreased to 195,000.

Some relief agencies found advantages to working in camps. Most important was being able to provide intensive feeding to the most severely affected, especially children. Also, greater medical assistance was possible for those whose nutritional status was complicated by disease. Finally, the shelters provided a center from which to launch rehabilitation activities, including distribution of seeds, tools, blankets and clothing.

The establishment of feeding centers required not only staff, food and medical supplies but also shelter for the inhabitants, buildings for medical and feeding programs, water supply and means of disposing of human waste.

The requirement for shelter was met effectively. Thousands of tents were provided by various organizations, although overcrowding remained a serious problem. Larger buildings were constructed with corrugated tin or local wooden poles covered by sheeting. The sheeting proved an invaluable asset which served multitudes of needs such as flooring for clinics, coverings for food and medical supplies, and as walls and partitioning. In many areas, sheeting and buildings were still in use over a year after the relief camp had closed down.

Before camps were set up, unsanitary and inadequate water supply was already a problem for the drought-stricken population, precipitating high incidences of diarrhea, dysentery and skin and eye infections. The establishment of camps, with their concentration of people, exacerbated these problems. Based on a report from USG-provided consultants who reported water significant problems in most feeding centers they visited, OFDA provided money to UNICEF for the establishment of water supply points (including boreholes) for twelve relief camps and several adjacent towns in Welo. Unfortunately, the method of implementation (which used the Ethiopian Water Works Construction Authority to do the actual work) did not function efficiently and the camps were phasing down by the time these water supplies became operational in mid-1985.

Despite herculean efforts, water supply, sanitation and health conditions remained generally poor in the camps. Experts believe disease may have killed as many or more people as starvation did. The 10 common causes of morbidity in Welo region in December, 1984, as reported by the UN's World Health Organization (WHO) were: measles, diarrhea, malnutrition, unspecified fever, pneumonia, skin infection, genito-urinary infection, malaria, eye disease and rheumatism. Epidemics reported by WVRO in 1985 included relapsing fever in Lalibela, typhus in Ajibar and Alamata and meningococcal meningitis in Ibnet. Because measles outbreaks were among the major causes of morbidity, vaccinations were administered to 5,000 children at Ibnet by WVRO. Generally, medical supplies were adequate.

Outbreaks of severe diarrhea, confirmed by Medecins Sans Frontieres, a French NGO, to be cholera-related, swept through several camps and accelerated with the start of the rains. The PMGSE refused to officially confirm the cholera outbreak (presumably from fear of hurting coffee and meat exports), instead referring to it publicly as "severe diarrheal disease" and issuing guidelines for diarrheal management. As of August, 1985, there were 700 cases of cholera in Addis Ababa with 50 to 60 resultant deaths. Fortunately, public education and adequate medications prevented an epidemic.

An assessment of the emergency in Ethiopia presented by OEOE in December, 1984, projected a need for 48 expatriate medical teams, each consisting of a medical doctor, a nurse and a nutritionist. The response was an influx of dedicated but inexperienced persons. The PMGSE's Ministry of Health and RRC expressed concern about the nature of medical care provided and stiffened acceptability requirements for relief workers including work permits and six-month minimum stays. The UN also called for intensified training of local health personnel working in the shelters. One evaluation of health and sanitation resources at major feeding centers in May, 1985, found a desperate need for public health expertise. Most NGOs were able to provide only curative medical care to the detriment of effective public health and surveillance measures.

Wet feeding operations, although having a positive impact on the mortality rate, were hampered by the lack of clean water, scarcity of firewood for cooking and insufficient space to accommodate the overwhelming number of people in need of this service. Severely

malnourished children, although less likely to survive, were often given priority over older children and adults. WVRO reported an incredible decrease in mortality in three months at Sanka, from an average of 11 deaths per day down to 1.5. This heartening statistic probably was typical of most camps once food aid was regularly available.

D. Recovery

Planning for the agricultural rehabilitation of drought victims started almost simultaneously with the relief effort. The first AID study of seed requirements for drought-affected farmers was prepared in January, 1985. The recovery strategy that year was simple: to return the shelter population to their farms in time to plant at least a minimal crop for the main growing season in 1985. As most shelter inhabitants were destitute, having eaten their seed and sold their farm tools and animals, they needed basic inputs of seeds and handtools.

In 1986, the recovery program set more ambitious goals. The target was to return famine victims to food self-sufficiency. This required more than the minimum supplies of seed and hand tools. Plow oxen, decimated by the drought, had to be replaced. Moreover, many areas had been so severely affected by environmental degradation and overpopulation that a return to even a minimal self-sufficiency was impossible without some improvement to farm technology. Thus, many agencies introduced fertilizers, pesticides and rural extension advisers into their agricultural package (agpak) programs.

In some cases, the agricultural situation had deteriorated to a point beyond recovery. This was notably the case of some pastoral groups for which the drought was the coup de grace to their old livelihood, which had been already undermined by erosion, overcrowding and the encroachment of settlers on their land. Undaunted by the challenge, some NGOs -- notably ERCS -- undertook to teach these people a new way of life as settled agriculturalists.

The total contribution of agricultural recovery items in 1986 was massive. Some 33,000 MT of seeds were provided, representing about 10 percent of all seed planted that year. In addition, 19,000 plow oxen and 1.2 million hand tools were distributed, as well as 6,200 MT of fertilizer, \$7.5 million of other agricultural chemicals, and \$2.0 million of livestock. The UN estimates the cost of 1986 agricultural recovery inputs at \$43.0 million.

AID's policy on recovery was to support the most essential agricultural inputs. First priority was given to seeds and their distribution. Secondary priority was given to tools. In a few cases such as LICROSS and American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJJDC), AID funded more comprehensive agpaks including oxen and fertilizer. In most cases, however, AID left it to the recipient NGO to fund the complimentary inputs of fertilizer, pesticides and livestock. Altogether, AID funded 5,250 MT of seeds in 1985. In 1986, AID funded 12,866 MT of seeds and

\$5.6 million in other inputs through seven NGOs. An estimated 1.5 million farmers received AID-funded agricultural supplies in 1986.

The recovery process was complicated by several factors. War and logistical bottlenecks affected the distribution of agricultural inputs just as they affected relief food distribution. Moreover, there was little seed available through commercial channels. Normally, almost all Ethiopian farmers save some of their crop to use as seed for the following season. The quantity of improved seed sold commercially is extremely small. Purchasing local grain to use as seed is restricted because of the power exercised by AMC, a state monopoly. In the famine conditions of 1985, AMC was particularly anxious to control local grain markets and keep the urban population supplied. In Addis Ababa, the open market price for teff reached the equivalent of \$1,400 per MT.

Faced with this shortage of seed, AID, CRDA and ICRC formulated an innovative solution -- a swap with AMC of relief food for local grain to be used as seed. AID provided 8,000 MT of wheat for the swap. To speed the process, RRC advanced 3,000 MT of relief grain from its own stores. AMC delivered 2,750 MT of seeds to CRDA and ICRC. Despite the complicated logistics of the swap, it was a great success. In 1986, AID sold 17,768 MT of wheat to AMC. The proceeds were used by seven NGOs to buy seed from the AMC, Ethiopian Seed Corporation and local grain merchants.

Despite the enormity of the inputs, Ethiopia's recovery has been only a qualified success. In part, this reflects the severity of the drought and the length of time needed for recovery, especially among livestock and plow oxen. Also, pockets of poor or erratic rainfall in 1986, compounded by pest infestations, hampered recovery. Underlying the slowness of recovery, however, is Ethiopia's poverty. Beset by environmental, policy and population problems, Ethiopia's agricultural sector will remain vulnerable to famine. The solutions lie far beyond the scope of recovery and rehabilitation.

E. Logistics

OVERVIEW: By early 1985, the principal constraint confronting the relief effort was no longer the quantity of relief food. Ethiopia literally had more food aid than it could handle. Logistics had become the bottleneck. The relief operation required almost two million tons of commodities to be moved in 1985-86 across some of the world's most rugged terrain to reach the millions in need. Compounding the natural barriers were man-made ones. Insurgencies limited the use of roads in the northern one-third of the country. Likewise, security problems also affected the Ogaden in the southeast and even the road from the main Port of Assab.

Ethiopia's transportation infrastructure is very limited. It has a single functioning rail line, a limited road network and ready access to only three ports. In 1985, Ethiopia's truck fleet was, on average, 11 years old and plagued by a shortage of spare parts and tires.

Essentially, the relief effort had three separate supply lines, each with its own port, road or rail links, and primary warehouse complexes. The main system originates at the Port of Assab, and encompasses the warehouses at Desie/Kombolcha in Welo, and Nazareth in Shewa. From Desie/Kombolcha, secondary routes reach all of Welo, northern Shewa and Gonder (although the last route presents security problems). The Nazareth center serves the entire southern half of the country through a network of tarmac and all weather roads.

The northern transport system serves Eritrea and Tigray through the Port of Massawa and the principal city of Asmara. All transport by road in this area is problematic because of security. The Port of Djibouti and the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad represent the third system. This system serves principally the Harerge region through the rail depot at Dire Dawa. However, the rail line also connects to Nazareth from where cargo can be forwarded to the southern half of the country. Finally, a small quantity of food landed at the Kenyan Port of Mombasa and transported overland through Kenya through the border town of Moyale to the Sidamo region of Ethiopia .

PORTS: The capacity of Ethiopia's ports to discharge cargo was generally adequate for the needs of the relief effort. Moreover, the discharge rate exceeded the rate that trucks took food out of the ports, leading to an ongoing backlog of over 150,000 MT at Assab. The enormous backlog slowed discharge as there was literally no place to put the arriving food. On occasion, shipments were delayed or diverted to other ports (which, in turn, created a storage problem at Djibouti, although on a smaller scale).

The slow offtake was the biggest single cause of food losses during the emergency. None of the ports had sufficient warehouse space for the backlog of food. Nor were sufficient pallets and tarpaulins available. Exposure to direct sunlight for weeks or months on end burst bags and damaged food. Moreover, although all the ports have desert climates, a freak rain storm struck Assab in May, 1985, putting the town under three feet of water and ruining 14,000 MT of food. Remedial action was taken, more tarpaulins and pallets were purchased and closer attention paid to storage techniques. When heavy rains struck Assab again in 1986, losses of food were minor. Djibouti also suffered catastrophic rainfall in April, 1986, leading to the loss of hundreds of tons. The cleanup of the resulting mess was hampered by poor coordination between some NGO consignees and their agents, problems with the railroad and the inexperience of local officials in dealing with the disposal of large amounts of spoiled food. Also pronounced in the case of Djibouti was the reluctance of the port and local firms to invest in pallets and tarpaulins as this equipment was not used for the port's normal cargo and would not be needed once the emergency was over.

A final controversy was the fees charged by the ports to consignees. It was generally felt that fees were excessive (especially for the poor service the consignees received) and, at times, arbitrary. Final settlement of port fees often took a year. After prodding by the USG, other donors and the UN, the PMGSE agreed to a reasonable flat rate charge for emergency food.

PORT OFFTAKE: The loss of food at the ports was the direct result of the slow offtake. Port offtake was the most contentious issue in logistics and a near-constant source of conflict between the donors (especially the USG) and the PMGSE. While the PMGSE did not have sufficient resources to move all relief aid by itself, it was reluctant to divert resources it did have from its other priorities -- insurgencies (especially the war in Eritrea), resettlement and supplying the urban population.

Exact data on the PMGSE's trucking resources and how much of these it did commit to the relief effort is not available. At the beginning of 1985, Ethiopia had probably 2,500 long-haul trucks (12-35 MT capacity). Most of these, some 2,000, belong to NATRACOR, the National Transport Corporation. Most of the trucks were well over a decade old and, on average, were deadlined 30 to 40 percent of the time because of long delays in procuring spare parts. The annual attrition rate was estimated to be 10 percent, compared to a three percent replacement rate. Moving one million tons of relief commodities just to primary warehouses (e.g., Kombolcha, Nazareth) alone would require about 700 trucks full-time for a year.

In early 1985, the USG believed that the major obstacle in port offtake was the PMGSE's failure to commit its own truck resources. The USG, through the OEOE, made several approaches to the PMGSE to secure a pledge of a minimum daily offtake of 2,500 MT of relief food from Assab. These demands produced occasional spurts of action but no long-term effort. Offtake generally lagged at half the targeted level. Meanwhile, the USG provided substantial funding to NGOs for internal transport of food aid but not for the purchase of additional trucks.

A major exception was CRS's lease of a Kenyan-based fleet of 54 tractor-trailers. AID supported the venture as a quick solution to the offtake problem that did not entail a permanent donation of trucks to Ethiopia. However, the complexity of leasing and importing trucks (on a temporary basis) led to a five month lag between the time the idea was conceived in May, 1985 and when the leased trucks started operating.

Finally, in June, 1985, AID undertook a major study of truck resources and needs of the USG-supported NGOs. This report, produced by an AID/W TDYer, concluded that, despite the NGOs own purchases of trucks and the PMGSE's resources, additional trucks were needed to move relief food. The study proposed that the USG fund a consolidated NGO fleet. Because of difficulties in securing the commitments of NGOs and the PMGSE to this idea, the USG finally joined with the OEOE and Band Aid to form a consolidated fleet under the UN flag.

The UN Fleet (which was eventually operated as the WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia, or WTOE) was agreed to by UN ASG Jansson and AID Administrator McPherson in August, 1985. The USG donated 150 trucks and tractor-trailers; Band Aid provided 100. The first trucks arrived in November of that year and became operational in December. After some start up difficulties, the UN Fleet became an effective and efficient operation, performing on average 30 percent of the port offtake from Assab in 1986. Because of the WTOE and additions to regular NGO fleets,

plus the lower food need, much of the logistical bottlenecks that beset the program in 1985 were alleviated in 1986. Nonetheless, massive amounts of food aid continued to clog the docks in Assab until the beginning of 1987.

Thirty WTOE trucks were also committed to moving food from Massawa to Eritrea and Tigray. In contrast to Assab, Massawa did not experience the ponderous backlog of food aid in 1985. Likewise, offtake from Djibouti was fairly regular except when flash floods disrupted the railroad. (The WTOE did mount one major operation to move food from Djibouti when rail offtake had been slowed by flood damage.)

SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION: Secondary distribution -- moving food from primary warehouses to the distribution sites -- presented a different set of problems. In general, there was not a shortage of trucks, in part because most NGOs established their own fleets. The RRC's fleet included some 350 short-haul vehicles as of early 1985, and was augmented by a further 200 light trucks donated by Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In addition, Ethiopia possessed some 2,750 privately-owned commercial trucks which were hired for secondary distribution.

The major problem in secondary distribution was inaccessibility because of security problems, lack of roads or mountainous terrain. Security was a problem throughout Eritrea and Tigray as well as the northern portions of Gonder and Welo. Despite the war in Eritrea, logistics in this region were generally the easiest. For much of 1985 and most of 1986, all major roads were open to relief cargo, even where other cargo required a military escort. Even distribution sites off major roads could be reached by truck without special arrangements or precautions. In contrast, Tigray continually presented a logistics problem. Roads were frequently mined and convoys with escort were required on all but a few roads. The most problematic route was to Mekele, which was served only erratically by road. There were continual problems securing sufficient trucks for a convoy and little incentive for truckers to sit idle for days as convoys were formed or wait for roads to be swept. Likewise, the PMGSE rarely committed sufficient resources to securing the road and providing escorts.

The solution to the Mekele problem was twofold: a commitment of military resources to keep the road open and the dedication of trucks to the Asmara-Mekele route. However, the crisis in the Mekele shelters in late 1984, could not await the arrival of new trucks or a change in the PMGSE's military strategy. The donors, therefore, started an airlift, including two L-100 aircraft (the civilian version of the C-130) under contract to the USG, to Mekele and other isolated relief centers in the North. Though initiated as a stopgap measure, the airlift continued for over a year as a reliable "landbridge" alternative to supplying Mekele was never fully operational. Even in 1986, with a major input of more trucks, an airlift was resumed under EEC sponsorship for several months. ICRC also continued to use its aircraft to supply Mekele during much of 1986.

Outside of the North, the problem confronting secondary distribution was usually rugged terrain, a lack of roads, or rain which made many roads impassable in the pre-harvest months just when emergency ration requirements were the highest. In the isolated mountain reaches of northern Shewa and southern Welo, the FRG and Great Britain airdropped grain while Polish and NGO helicopters moved more delicate oil and milk cargo. The Polish helicopters were also used to reach remote areas in Harerge. In eastern Gonder, the USG financed the airlift of food by light aircraft for FHI into remote canyons that otherwise could only be reached by mule train. The USG also financed the use by WVRO of two light aircraft throughout much of 1985.

F. Relief Effort and Foreign Policy

The USG decision to provide nearly one-half billion dollars worth of drought emergency assistance in 1985 and 1986 was made solely upon humanitarian grounds in order to save the lives of the millions facing starvation. Although some hoped that this massive infusion of emergency relief aid would also serve to improve the relations between the two governments, such an improvement did not occur, at least not at the very top levels of the PMGSE where all important political decisions are made. In fact, in some respects the increased USG presence in Ethiopia served to further alienate the two governments, for the USG became a vocal critic of human rights violations and the lack of proper attention to the drought by the PMGSE. The PMGSE, on the other hand, often protested what it saw as USG interference in its internal affairs.

Although the USG was the major donor, it was isolated from dealing with the top levels of the PMGSE for most of 1985 and 1986, even on issues directly related to the relief effort. It was left to the OEOE to perform the role of mediator between the highest levels of the PMGSE and the donor community, a vital role which that office performed well. The US Embassy's effort to reach Politburo members was successful only when US Congressmen and other VIPs were visiting, and these limited meetings seldom were able to range very deeply into the substance of the major issues between the two governments.

Despite the lack of meaningful improvements in government-to-government relations, there was no doubt that the people of Ethiopia were aware of the US contributions and were extremely and warmly grateful for them. School children in Addis Ababa still smile broadly and raise their thumbs as US diplomatic cars drive by, and Americans are highly regarded. The massive aid donated by Americans contributed significantly to the longtime, historical friendliness between the two countries and has kept alive and rekindled those warm feelings.

G. Recommendations

The experience of the Ethiopia relief effort is in many ways unique. The size of the disaster itself was unprecedented, as was the extent of

international attention and relief assistance it received. Moreover, a special field office was created with the sole purpose of managing USG relief aid. Undoubtedly, some of the lessons learned in Ethiopia will not be applicable to other situations where the size and duration of the disaster (and the political climate within which it occurs) will differ. Nonetheless, many of the recommendations made below can be applied to other famine relief and disaster assistance programs.

CALLS FORWARD: All calls forward should be reviewed by the field mission. Because of the urgent need for relief food, some calls forward submitted by NGO headquarters in the US were approved by the Food for Peace Office in Washington without review by AID/Addis Ababa. However, these calls forward were often based on outdated information. The feeding needs in Ethiopia changed rapidly with the closure of camps and the development of various logistical bottlenecks. To accommodate these changing circumstances, the mission should carefully review all calls forward in concert with the NGOs in the field to ensure that the commodity quantities and mix are still appropriate. If calls forward are made in the absence of this information, an imbalance in food stocks can occur. This happened in the latter half of 1986, when oil and milk products were in surplus while grain was in short supply.

SUPPLEMENTARY FOODS: The supplementary food levels (oil, non-fat dry milk (NFDM), corn-soya milk (CSM)) should be decreased over time as a famine relief program progresses. When most NGOs started programs in Ethiopia in late 1984 and early 1985, the nutritional status of the population, especially children under five years old, was critical. The need for on-site wet feeding with supplementary foods was massive. However, as the nutritional status of the population was restored, nearly all recipients were shifted to dry, take-home rations. By the second year, very little on-site wet feeding was done. Much of the oil and milk products ordered was not needed for wet feeding and could not be fully used in dry ration distribution. In some cases, NGOs changed their rations to increase the proportion of milk products to grain in order to use food originally intended for wet feeding.

NGO PROGRAMMING APPROACHES: Diversity of approaches among NGOs in their programming methods should be accepted. Many aspects of programming relief food -- especially determining when people should and should not get rations -- are extremely important to the proper management of a program and are of direct interest to the USG as a donor. Attempts to have NGOs adopt uniform procedures, however, were not only unsuccessful but would have been counterproductive as well. NGOs had diverse capabilities and resources. Moreover, they faced different social, political and military situations in the areas in which they worked. Thus, varied programming methods were appropriate.

NGO MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A good technique for ensuring sound management and accountability procedures is for AID to conduct a "management survey" (similar to an internal audit) of NGO procedures. AID/Addis Ababa had a retired AID controller and a retired auditor conduct such a survey of NGO (and AID/Addis Ababa) procedures to identify weaknesses in accounting, record keeping and other management tools. In addition, AID/Addis Ababa

conducted formal reviews of NGO programs on a quarterly basis to ensure proper management and compliance with regulations.

LOCAL AID REPRESENTATION: A local AID office is essential for the management of a disaster relief program of major size and duration. The essential skills needed for such an office are in analysis, management, communication and diplomacy (for use with the NGOs as well as with the host government, UN and other donors). Technical skills in logistics, health, nutrition, etc., are not essential for permanent staff as these can be obtained on a TDY basis. More important are the abilities to weigh, analyze and reconcile the conflicting and partial data available, synthesize it into a coherent picture, and accurately communicate it to the decision makers in AID/W.

FIELD TRIPS: On-site monitoring of relief programs by AID staff is essential for understanding the situation in famine areas.

GRANT MANAGEMENT: For long-term relief and rehabilitation grants (i.e., lasting more than six months), responsibility for grant management should be delegated, to the greatest extent possible, to the field office. By 1986, the Ethiopian situation was no longer an "emergency" even though it remained a disaster. Since much of the on-going AID grants were for rehabilitation rather than relief, these grants became the responsibility of AFR/PD rather than OFDA. Even the relief components had become rather routine. Understandably, these continuing relief activities were given lesser priority by OFDA than new emergencies such as the Mexican earthquake. In fact, the diversion of OFDA's management resources from emergencies to long-term relief programs could be deemed inappropriate, especially when there is a full-time AID staff in-country to manage the program. In these circumstances, OFDA (and SER/CM) should delegate to the field certain contract management responsibilities, such as no-cost budget amendments and grant extensions, for these continuing activities.

DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESOURCES: A major disaster relief program requires flexibility to address the variety and changing nature of relief needs. The Ethiopia program was composed of a variety of complementary inputs. The food aid component would not have been successful without Title II internal transport funding to get the food to the victims, and OFDA funding for trucks, program administration, feeding centers and health/nutrition personnel. Likewise, OFDA agricultural recovery grants and the Title II food-for-seed swap were essential to returning the drought victims to self-sufficiency.

AGRICULTURAL RECOVERY: In a famine relief program, attention should be given at the earliest possible juncture to agricultural recovery needs. Plans must be developed early for seeds, tools and other inputs needed by drought victims. Special attention must be paid to people in feeding shelters as they are likely to need the most assistance and may be reluctant to return to their homes unless they are confident that they will get the agricultural inputs needed to resume farming and the relief food needed to sustain them until the next harvest.

PORT MONITOR: A full-time port monitor is indispensable if the ports used do not normally handle major food shipments. Forwarding agencies cannot be relied upon to handle such shipments unassisted. Ideally, NGOs should employ their own port monitors to ensure that their food is being stored properly and dispatched expeditiously. A single monitor to oversee all AID food may also be practical. In any case, frequent visits by the local AID staff are needed to ensure that all parties are doing their job.

TRUCKS: An assessment of logistical resources and needs is as important as that of food aid requirements. Unless there is the capacity to deliver the food to those in need, the actual donation of food will be of little consequence. Likewise, a commitment to provide food aid requires a concomitant undertaking to provide the additional transportation resources needed to deliver it to the targeted areas. Granted, a certain amount of "leveraging" may be needed to try to get the local government to supply its share of transport resources. However, if the USG is committed to providing food aid in an emergency situation, regardless of the host government's cooperation, the same policy should be applied to providing the transport resources to deliver the food if it proves necessary to do so.

BARGES: The use of LASH barges should be avoided in cases where heavy port congestion is expected. When ports experience long backlogs of ships waiting to discharge and/or shortages of storage space for discharged cargos, port authorities have every incentive to delay the discharge of barges, thereby using them as "floating warehouses" and freeing up quay space for ships to discharge. When barges are in poor condition or improperly moored (as was often the case in Ethiopia), losses of cargo can be high.

AIRLIFT: Management of airlifts requires special knowledge and attention; either a transport specialist should be used to manage emergency airlifts full-time, or one contracted on a short-term basis to set up a management system for use by a non-specialist. Given the cost of an airlift, specialized contract management and supervision is cost effective, even on a short-term basis. The TransAmerica airlift, at a cost of \$16.6 million, was the single most expensive non-food component of the USG relief assistance. By chance, OFDA contracted with an air transport specialist to prepare an airdrop proposal in July, 1985. In gathering information for the proposal, he came across several aspects of the TransAmerica operation where cost savings could be realized. These included longer flight times for TransAmerica aircraft compared to those logged by other C-130 aircraft flying the same route, and long delays between the time TransAmerica aircraft "blocked on" (i.e., started to taxi from which point the USG started paying for the flight) and actual take off. The advice of the consultant helped the AID/Addis Ababa contract manager (a professional accountant who devoted at least a quarter of his time to the airlift) to tighten management and bring the cost of flying a ton of food from Asmara to Mekele down from about \$475 to about \$350. Given the cost of the airlift (some \$20,000 per day per aircraft), a full-time professional manager would be justified.

The initial contract was for three months and obviously the operation was intended to be a short-term, stopgap measure. Time, rather than cost-effectiveness, was of the essence. However, the operation turned into a long-term (and very expensive) commitment and the TransAmerica contract was extended several times. Had this been anticipated, competitive recontracting rather than contract extensions would have been the more appropriate way to extend the operation after the initial three months.

FOOD BALANCE SHEET: The food balance sheet is one of the easiest and most broadly applicable techniques for estimating emergency food requirements. However, its conclusions must be examined in light of other data available. This was especially the case in Ethiopia where the RRC produces food need estimates using the enumeration method (i.e., enumerating the number of rural people facing severe shortages of food and calculating the number of months for which these people must be supported). While the food balance sheet approach estimates the emergency shortfall in all sectors, including the surplus producing regions that normally feed the cities, the enumeration technique looks at only those rural people who are facing a severe shortage of food. In Ethiopia, the relief food distribution system addressed the problem as defined by the enumeration approach. Thus, much of the emergency food need as defined by the food balance sheet was for people who did not qualify for relief food distribution. In 1985, a food balance assessment would have shown an emergency food need some 50 percent greater than that indicated by the RRC. While in 1986, the food balance sheet and the RRC were in agreement on the emergency food aid level, this was probably the result of the RRC overestimating the number of months of rations needed by much of the population at risk. Thus, a large amount of relief food went undistributed in 1986 because it was not needed -- at least as far as the enumeration approach was concerned. (While a large amount of 1985 relief food was also not distributed, this is mostly due to logistical bottlenecks that prevented the food from being delivered in time.) If the enumeration approach shows a lower emergency deficit than the food balance sheet, and the criteria of the enumeration technique are the same as those used in distributing the relief food, then the enumeration method estimate of food need should be accepted.

VI: ACTIVITIES OF OTHER DONORS

A myriad of donors, both private and governmental, contributed to the relief effort. The total of donations received by Ethiopia may never be calculated accurately but probably nears \$2.0 billion (compared to Ethiopia's annual GNP of under \$5.0 billion). Unfortunately, consistent data does not exist except in the area of food aid arrivals.

Table 6 presents food aid contributions according to WFP's arrival data. After the USG, the most important donor was the EEC and its member states. In contrast with the USG, the EEC favored channelling food aid

through the RRC. Other major donors included Canada and the other OECD (Western) countries. Third world countries, notably China and Zimbabwe, made significant contributions, as did private donors such as the Canadian Food Grain Bank. Among the Warsaw Pact countries, only Bulgaria made more than a token contribution in 1985 and none donated any food in 1986. (The USSR's only food contribution -- 3,100 MT of rice -- was made in 1984.)

One disadvantage suffered by other donors was the time lag in food arrivals. Delays in donations were often inevitable because of the fiscal years of the donor government. The result was certain shortfalls between pledges and arrivals. For example, some 122,000 MT of relief food arrived in early 1987 which had been pledged in 1986.

Non-food assistance is harder to quantify. What constituted non-food aid is subject to interpretation, such as whether funding for internal transport of food aid or aid to resettlement schemes should be included. Moreover, donors were free to ascribe their own value to their contributions. For example, the trucks donated by the USSR to the RRC were valued at \$24,400 per truck. Those donated by the USG to the UN fleet cost nearly four times as much but had 10 times the capacity of the Soviet trucks.

Table 7 presents the UN's data on non-food aid contributions, based largely on what donors reported. Table 8 gives the RRC's account of non-food aid it received. It should be noted that, because of differing interpretations, the data on the two tables is not comparable.

TABLE 6: DONOR FOOD AID, 1985 AND 1986

(IN MTS)

DONOR	TO:	***** 1985 *****			***** 1986 *****			% OF TOTAL FOOD AID
		RRC	NGO	TOTAL	RRC	NGO	TOTAL	
U.S. GOVERN- MENT		50,000	413,903	463,903	0	315,845	315,845	41
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY & MEMBER STATES								
EFC		123,633	49,511	173,144	121,970	60,030	182,000	
Belgium		24	15,033	15,057	0	0	0	
Denmark		0	1,437	1,437	0	415	415	
France		1,230	8,043	9,273	8,000	0	8,000	
FRG		6,938	41,460	48,398	0	22,647	22,647	
Greece		7,540	0	7,540	0	0	0	
Ireland		0	1,543	1,543	0	0	0	
Italy		7,173	3,148	10,321	2,304	11,740	14,044	
Netherlands		282	5,280	5,562	0	5,276	5,276	
Spain		358	5,279	5,637	0	0	0	
U.K.		25,338	14,576	39,914	0	7,000	7,000	
EEC TOTAL		172,516	145,310	317,826	132,274	107,108	239,382	30
CANADA		27,972	52,922	80,894	47,500	3,000	50,500	7
OTHER OECD STATES								
Australia		630	19,568	20,198	6,304	8,900	15,204	
Austria		4,000	837	4,837	4,000	3,984	7,984	
Finland		0	4,958	4,958	0	0	0	
Iceland		0	64	64	0	0	0	
Japan		0	10,063	10,063	0	0	0	
New Zealand		0	140	140	0	0	0	
Norway		9,500	513	10,013	0	0	0	
Sweden		14,000	423	14,423	9,000	10,900	19,900	
Switzerland		0	3,196	3,196	0	1,000	1,000	
OTHER OECD TOTAL		28,130	39,762	67,892	19,304	24,784	44,088	6

....CONTINUED

TABLE 6: DONOR FOOD AID, 1985 AND 1986 (CONTINUED)

(IN MTS)

DONOR	TO:	***** 1985 *****			***** 1986 *****			% OF TOTAL FOOD AID
		RRC	NGO	TOTAL	RRC	NGO	TOTAL	
WARSAW PACT								
Bulgaria		17,958	54	18,012	0	0	0	
Czechoslovakia		391	0	391	0	0	0	
GDR		2,060	0	2,060	0	0	0	
Hungary		2,484	0	2,484	0	0	0	
Poland		<u>1,110</u>	<u>876</u>	<u>1,986</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	
WARSAW PACT								
TOTAL		24,003	930	24,933	0	0	0	1
OTHER GOVERNMENTS								
China		23,594	0	23,594	2,000	3,000	5,000	
India		0	0	0	4,000	0	4,000	
Iran		0	5,158	5,158	0	0	0	
Israel		0	204	204	0	0	0	
Libya		0	1,000	1,000	0	0	0	
Pakistan		1,000	0	1,000	0	0	0	
UAE		1,825	0	1,825	0	0	0	
Yugoslavia		0	5,771	5,771	0	0	0	
Zimbabwe		12,469	0	12,469	12,246	0	12,246	
Minor Donors		181	12	193	0	0	0	
OTHERS TOTAL		39,069	12,145	51,214	18,246	3,000	21,246	4
WORLD FOOD PROGRAM								
		7,918	38,439	46,357	53,640	1,000	54,640	5
PRIVATE DONORS								
		<u>15,589</u>	<u>36,383</u>	<u>51,974</u>	<u>1,751</u>	<u>53,296</u>	<u>55,047</u>	6
GRAND TOTAL								
		365,197	739,796	1,104,993	272,715	508,033	780,748	100

SOURCE: WFP data on food aid arrivals by calendar year.

NOTE: Regular food aid programs through the PMGSE and feeding programs for Sudanese refugees are not included.

TABLE 7: TOTAL NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE, 1985-86

	(IN '000s)	
	1985	1986
Australia	\$9,849	\$0
Austria	830	0
Belgium	3,109	0
Bulgaria	8,916	0
Canada	10,044	1,050
China	3,163	850
Cuba	774	0
Czechoslovakia	2,852	0
Denmark	4,028	0
EEC	22,650	23,120
Finland	796	980
France	370	0
German Dem Republic	10,036	0
Germany, Fed Rep of	55,076	1,000
Greece	152	0
Hungary	700	0
Ireland	0	1,000
Italy	49,344	0
Japan	18,178	1,570
Korea, Republic of	710	0
Libya	1,836	0
Netherlands	2,705	0
Norway	360	0
Poland	4,215	2,590
Romania	19,000	0
Spain	600	0
Sweden	12,250	5,690
Switzerland	2,467	100
USSR	260,000	62,000
UK	37,205	4,540
USA ¹	93,606	47,782
Yugoslavia	133	0
FAO	4,200	0
IBRD	0	4,000
IFAD	0	2,000
UNDRO	1,655	0
UNHCR	8,761	50
UNICEF	26,396	640
WHO	220	0
WFP	3,418	0
Private/NGO	N/A	24,860
Recovery (donor unspecified)	N/A	16,970
TOTAL	\$680,604	\$200,792

SOURCE: OEOE except USA data which is from AID/Addis Ababa records.

NOTE¹: USA data by fiscal year; includes internal transport funding for food aid

TABLE 8:NON-FOOD AID CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RRC, 1984-86

	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Austria	\$0	\$472,195	\$16,379	\$488,574
Belgium	73,171	0	0	73,171
Bulgaria	0	2,660,279	0	2,660,279
Canada	393,457	0	0	393,457
China	0	118,021	18,146	136,167
Czechoslovakia	17,561	997,079	0	1,014,640
Egypt	0	158,537	0	158,537
European Com	165,854	5,516	438,318	609,687
France	0	140,488	0	140,488
German Dem Rep	801,463	2,351,078	0	3,152,541
Germany, Fed Rep	453,607	8,120,474	12,249	8,586,330
Greece	167,074	321,471	142,729	631,274
Hungary	0	487,341	0	487,341
India	0	0	20,000	20,000
Italy	175,717	11,452,917	5,368,242	16,996,876
Japan	18,763	603,483	67,841	690,088
Kenya	0	11,707	0	11,707
Korea, Rep of	301,800	71,474	364	373,638
Netherlands	0	126,293	78,802	205,095
OPEC Fund	0	1,609,756	0	1,609,756
Poland	381,760	98,295	0	480,055
Private	0	914,068	689,418	1,603,486
Romania	0	7,380,488	0	7,380,488
Saudi Arabia	691,996	0	0	691,996
Spain	0	103,858	0	103,858
Sweden	539,590	1,756	11,561	552,907
UNDRO	0	15,591	14,034	29,625
UNHCR	12,195	0	199,167	211,362
UNICEF	0	40,273	58,933	99,206
USA	0	42,254	0	42,254
USSR	0	9,884,720	107,000	9,991,720
United Kingdom	0	693,831	107,245	801,076
WFP/WTOE	0	0	468,262	468,262
Yugoslavia	9,891	0	110,839	120,730
TOTAL	\$4,203,900	\$48,883,242	\$7,929,529	\$61,016,671

SOURCE: RRC

TABLE 8A: MISCELLANEOUS CONTRIBUTIONS
 A number of small countries are reported by the
 PMGSE to have made these donations during the emergency.
 In many cases dollar or birr values were not stated.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Donation(s)</u>
Algeria	\$1.0 million, "in line with the OAU Emergency Fund".
Bangladesh	70 packages of medicine valued at 25,000 birr [= \$12,077]
Gabon	219 tons of medicine and food plus the services of two aircraft to fly them to Ethiopia.
Haiti	\$50,000
Jordan	\$17,000
Korea, North [DPRK]	1000 MT of maize.
Mongolia	\$25,000 (loan)
Maldives	\$5,000
Nepal	10,000 birr [= \$4,831]
Yemen (PDRY)	1,250 MT flour, "over" 21 tons of grain, and 200 cans of butter.

ANNEX A: ETHIOPIAN CROP PRODUCTION DATA, 1979/80 - 1985/86

**TABLE A-1: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF CEREALS AND PULSES,
1979/80 - 1985/86, BY REGION**

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
	(In '000 MT)						
Arsi	437	504	561	602	469	372	520
Bale	143	81	156	198	130	59	152
Eritrea	188	188	188	188	188	94	126
Gamo Gofa	116	123	93	148	99	55	128
Gojam	794	727	748	898	775	680	834
Gonder	600	485	529	773	515	439	638
Harerge	653	334	364	481	353	198	287
Ilubabor	206	106	132	218	247	120	184
Kefa	386	312	223	352	362	234	314
Shewa	2,035	1,731	1,475	1,989	1,633	1,179	1,593
Sidamo	207	192	153	212	193	139	173
Tigrzy	229	229	229	229	229	80	153
Welega	651	432	521	585	527	316	547
Welo	762	1,000	866	788	503	151	520
Errors & Omissions	1	9	-30	16	17	0	0
TOTAL	7,407	6,453	6,208	7,676	6,239	4,116	6,169

SOURCE: PMGSE's Central Statistics Office (CSO), "Time Series Data 1979/80 - 1983-84", FAO crop assessment for 1984/85 and USAID estimate for 1985/86.

NOTE: CSO data for Tigray and Eritrea represents average production for some earlier period, not an estimate of actual production for the period 1979/80 - 1983/84.

**TABLE A-2: PER CAPITA CEREAL AND PULSE PRODUCTION
1979/80 - 1985/86, BY REGION**

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
	(1980/81-1983/84 Average = 100)						
Arsi	88	98	106	111	84	65	88
Bale	109	60	112	139	89	39	98
Eritrea	(107)	(104)	(101)	(99)	(96)	46	61
Gamo Gofa	107	111	81	125	83	44	100
Gojam	108	97	97	112	94	80	96
Gonder	112	88	94	133	86	71	101
Harerge	183	91	97	124	88	48	68
Ilubabor	127	64	77	123	136	64	96
Kefa	133	104	73	111	111	70	91
Shewa	128	106	88	115	91	64	85
Sidamo	119	107	83	111	99	69	83
Tigray	(107)	(105)	(102)	(98)	(95)	33	61
Welega	136	88	103	112	98	57	96
Welo	103	131	110	98	60	18	59
TOTAL	120	101	95	114	90	58	84

SOURCE: Production data from previous table; population data from Ethiopian 1984 census; assumes annual population growth rate of 2.9 percent per annum.

NOTE: CSO data for Tigray and Eritrea represents average production for some earlier period, not an estimate of actual production for the period 1979/80 - 1983/84.

ANNEX B: RAINFALL DATA

Ethiopia has three rainfall seasons: belg (February-May), kiremt (June-September), and bega (October-January). The country is divided into three zones, corresponding to the seasonal pattern of rainfall. The central zone includes Welo, Shewa, Arsi and the highland cropping areas of Harerge, Bale and Sidamo, as well as portions of other administrative regions (see Figure B-1). This area features important "small" rains in the belg season followed by major rains in the kiremt. The bega season is generally dry. The belg season is often used to produce a minor crop, while the main (meher) crop is planted in the belg or kiremt season and harvested in the bega season. The northern/western zone follows a similar pattern although the belg rain is usually not as intense and is used almost exclusively to plant long-season crops for the meher harvest. The third, southern zone features a radically different pattern with "small" rains in the bega season and major rains in the belg; the kiremt is dry. The southern zone is drier and lower than the most of the rest of the country and is mostly pastoral.

The Table B-1 presents rainfall data for 1982-86 as reported by the Ethiopian National Meteorological Services Agency. The data has several limitations. One, the number of stations for which data is available is limited and often of little agricultural significance. The coverage of drought-affected areas is limited. Two, the table included "normal" rainfall calculated as the mean of several preceding years. However, there are discrepancies in the reported mean values from year to year which cannot be accounted for by changes in the base years. Three, because of Ethiopia's mountainous terrain, the rainfall pattern at one station may not be representative of an area only a few miles away which is at another elevation or on the opposite side of the same mountain. Drought (or good rainfall for that matter) often affects pockets that cannot be identified from general patterns. Four, annual totals of rainfall, or even seasonal totals, may mask patterns that have major effects on crops. Thus, if the belg starts late, long-season maize and sorghum crops will be adversely affected. Likewise, crops in some areas may be damaged if rain does not continue through the end of September. The timing of rainfall is as important as the quantity.

FIGURE B-1: WEATHER ZONES OF ETHIOPIA




TABLE B-1: RAINFALL IN ETHIOPIA, 1982-86

(IN MILLIMETERS)

<u>TOWN, REGION</u>		<u>BELG</u>	<u>KIREMT</u>	<u>BEGA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Asmara, Eritrea	Normal	87.5	417.7	50.3	555.5
	1982	174.3	459.1	2.9	636.3
	1983	110.1	269.4	0.0	379.5
	1984	110.6	312.0	29.9	452.5
	1985	199.9	470.3	43.6	713.8
	1986	86.4	361.5	NA	NA
Mekele, Tigray	Normal	93.6	495.5	8.3	597.4
	1982	0.0	407.9	12.2	420.1
	1983	NA	516.4	36.0	NA
	1984	46.9	250.9	27.7	325.5
	1985	174.8	317.6	0.0	492.4
	1986	80.3	670.3	NA	NA
Kombolcha, Welo	Normal	259.3	707.3	98.5	1065.1
	1982	201.1	360.0	68.6	629.7
	1983	275.9	540.0	67.0	882.9
	1984	260.3	273.6	86.8	620.7
	1985	271.9	655.5	11.6	939.0
	1986	276.0	792.4	NA	NA
Alamata, Welo	Normal	277.4	410.7	101.9	790.0
	1984	130.4	49.0	95.0	274.4
	1985	230.7	226.3	28.8	485.8
	1986	316.3	429.8	NA	NA
Bati, Welo	Normal	230.2	483.6	124.9	838.7
	1984	141.9	182.8	58.9	383.6
	1985	44.1	508.6	23.2	575.9
	1986	371.8	NA	NA	NA
Sirinka, Welo	Normal	324.4	355.1	193.5	873.0
	1984	251.7	166.5	106.9	525.1
	1985	226.2	482.7	51.4	760.3
	1986	NA	560.0	NA	NA
Gonder, Gonder	Normal	164.5	960.0	99.0	1223.5
	1982	85.6	475.1	0.0	560.7
	1983	105.0	913.9	88.3	1107.2
	1984	104.5	845.8	60.0	1010.3
	1985	200.4	716.4	146.2	1063.0
	1986	53.1	822.8	NA	NA
Debre Markos Gojam	Normal	229.6	1266.4	133.4	1629.4
	1982	185.0	681.7	16.7	883.4
	1983	206.6	859.9	172.0	1238.5
	1984	143.7	1030.3	40.5	1214.5
	1985	193.5	1151.9	107.7	1453.1
	1986	164.2	869.3	NA	NA

TABLE B-1 (CONTINUED)

<u>TOWN, REGION</u>		<u>BELG</u>	<u>KIREMT</u>	<u>BEGA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bahir Dar, Gojam	Normal	124.1	1280.6	127.9	1532.6
	1982	82.2	682.6	3.4	768.2
	1983	31.4	1066.4	140.9	1238.7
	1984	61.9	1206.4	13.4	1281.7
	1985	198.0	1200.4	43.3	1441.7
	1986	34.3	1038.0	NA	NA
Addis Ababa, (Bole Airport) Shewa	Normal	262.9	745.2	37.4	1045.5
	1982	221.0	481.0	82.5	784.5
	1983	388.2	742.8	44.4	1175.4
	1984	174.1	959.1	42.1	1175.3
	1985	280.1	699.3	30.2	1009.6
	1986	389.6	675.9	NA	NA
Debre Zeit Air Force Base, Shewa	Normal	183.6	675.5	37.3	896.4
	1982	122.1	428.3	23.4	573.8
	1983	358.2	697.7	21.8	1077.7
	1984	127.7	534.6	7.1	669.4
	1985	190.6	791.4	1.3	983.3
	1986	198.7	464.6	NA	NA
Dire Dawa, Harerge	Normal	163.2	313.7	21.7	498.6
	1982	272.6	170.9	46.1	489.6
	1983	393.7	350.9	19.2	763.8
	1984	171.8	168.0	64.5	404.3
	1985	215.7	253.5	4.3	473.5
	1986	441.4	232.7	NA	NA
Jijiga, Harerge	Normal	292.0	394.4	95.3	781.7
	1982	239.8	228.9	42.6	511.3
	1983	274.6	272.3	22.9	569.8
	1984	76.1	271.5	54.9	402.5
	1985	264.6	227.3	19.4	511.3
	1986	324.1	199.6	NA	NA
Godie, Harerge	Normal	184.7	25.1	122.6	332.4
	1982	109.9	0.0	3.5	113.4
	1983	222.4	59.1	46.6	328.1
	1984	17.1	26.2	38.0	81.3
	1985	228.4	2.7	35.3	266.4
	1986	77.0	0.3	NA	NA
Abada, Bale	Normal	217.2	470.5	94.1	781.8
	1984	117.2	462.7	5.8	585.7
	1985	163.8	449.9	51.5	665.2
	1986	NA	NA	NA	NA

TABLE B-1 (CONTINUED)

<u>TOWN, REGION</u>		<u>BELG</u>	<u>KIREMT</u>	<u>BEGA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Awasa, Sidamo	Normal	285.1	472.5	136.7	894.3
	1982	189.5	411.7	122.3	723.5
	1983	451.2	442.4	118.8	1012.4
	1984	213.7	436.4	68.9	719.0
	1985	317.8	447.9	62.2	827.9
	1986	364.5	NA	NA	NA
Neghele, Sidamo	Normal	429.7	55.1	249.1	733.9
	1982	524.4	3.1	57.5	585.0
	1983	297.9	84.6	288.9	671.4
	1984	207.9	70.8	200.8	479.5
	1985	377.5	32.7	262.3	672.5
	1986	522.5	66.7	NA	NA
Nekempte, Welega	Normal	406.8	1537.6	257.2	2201.6
	1982	304.5	944.7	29.6	1278.8
	1983	NA	NA	343.8	NA
	1984	260.0	778.2	46.6	1084.8
	1985	360.6	1142.6	188.0	1691.2
	1986	151.4	1204.3	NA	NA
Gore, Ilubabor	Normal	539.1	1367.6	374.8	2281.5
	1982	337.1	870.1	147.4	1354.6
	1983	324.9	1117.2	374.8	1816.9
	1984	424.9	1047.5	184.5	1656.9
	1985	554.7	1042.6	203.2	1800.5
	1986	263.7	1165.9	NA	NA
Jima, Kefa	Normal	441.4	823.1	192.0	1456.5
	1982	369.4	594.6	83.0	1047.0
	1983	500.2	810.2	235.3	1545.7
	1984	279.0	725.9	225.2	1230.1
	1985	520.0	714.5	122.9	1357.4
	1986	365.5	797.3	NA	NA

ANNEX C: RELIEF FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS, 1985-86

TABLE C-1: NET FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION¹

(IN MT)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
JANUARY	41,800	38,000
FEBRUARY	47,700	48,000
MARCH	57,200	50,000
APRIL	56,500	50,000
MAY	64,100	56,000
JUNE	69,300	75,000
JULY	75,700	78,000
AUGUST	79,300	83,000
SEPTEMBER	65,500	81,000
OCTOBER	65,700	78,000
NOVEMBER	69,200	59,000
DECEMBER	68,600	44,000
TOTAL	760,600	740,000

SOURCE: OEOE

NOTE¹: Includes only rural relief as reported
by food distributors

**ANNEX D: SUMMARY OF US SPONSORED NGO PROGRAMS AND OTHER
USG SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES**

CARE

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

CARE was involved primarily in dry ration distribution in Harerge and Sidamo regions. At the height of its program, CARE was reaching 650,000 beneficiaries per month. CARE's distribution network in Harerge was quite extensive, covering all eight highland awrajas of the region. Beneficiaries were selected in cooperation with the RRC and a nutritional surveillance system operated by Save the Children/UK. CARE's program in Sidamo, which began in mid 1985, was aimed at assisting pastoralists who had lost a large percentage of their cattle during the drought. The provision of food aid in Sidamo is scheduled to cease in June, 1987, with the onset of the long rains. The food aid for the Harerge program was transported by rail from the port of Djibouti, while that for Sidamo came through the port of Mombasa, Kenya, and was transported to Ethiopia by truck. CARE's logistics system was one of the most efficient and cost effective ones in the relief effort.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

COMMODITIES (MTS)	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
Bulgur	31,281	63,988	95,269
Vegoil	1,527	2,286	3,813
CSM	200	126	326
Wheat Flour	--	8,000	8,000
Total	33,008	74,400	107,408

VALUE (000)

Commodity	\$8,548.8	\$16,147.6	\$24,696.4
Ocean Freight	4,786.1	9,948.9	14,735.0
Internal Transport	2,960.0	3,856.9	6,816.9
Total	\$16,294.9	\$29,953.4	\$46,248.3

OFDA GRANTS

ACTIVITY: Food Monitors for USG Donation to RRC

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-C-SS-5048-00

AMOUNT: \$397,600

EFFECTIVE DATES: 2/1/85 - 9/30/85

continued...

DESCRIPTION: This contract paid for eight food monitors (seconded from CARE/India) to perform end-use checking of the 50,000 MT of USG food distributed by the RRC in 1985.

ACTIVITY: Sidamo Distribution Program

GRANT NO.: OTR-0000-G-SS-6061

AMOUNT: \$64,900

EFFECTIVE DATES: 10/1/85 - 9/30/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant paid for staff and vehicle operating costs associated with CARE's feeding program in Sidamo.

ACTIVITY: Harerge Distribution Program

GRANT NO: OTR-0000-G-SS-6066

AMOUNT: \$500,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/20/86 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided partial coverage of personnel and operating costs for the Harerge feeding program.

ACTIVITY: Seed acquisition and distribution

GRANT NO: AFR-0000-G-SS-6012

AMOUNT: \$110,179

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/04/86 - 3/03/87

DESCRIPTION: This grant funded the transportation and distribution costs for seeds obtained by CARE through the 1986 seed swap program which were distributed in Harerge. It also covered CARE's administrative costs for implementing the 1986 seed swap program on behalf of the six other NGOs that participated in the swap.

SEED SWAP

1986

AMOUNT OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: 1,161 MT

VALUE OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: \$278,400

DESCRIPTION: CARE procured some 700 MT of maize and sorghum seed which was distributed to farmers in Harerge region.

**Churches Drought Action Africa (CDAA)/
Joint Relief Partnership (JRP)**

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

In 1984, the Catholic and Protestant churches combined their Africa relief aid resources to establish an international network known as "Churches Drought Action Africa" (CDAA). In December 1985, the CDAA operation in Ethiopia changed its name to Joint Relief Partnership (JRP). Executive members of JRP were the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, Lutheran World Federation and Catholic Relief Services. Operating agencies included various Catholic missions, Irish Concern, Jesuit Relief Services, Norwegian Church Aid, Seventh Day Adventist, Baptist Mission, Red Barna, Save the Children/UK, Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Society of International Missionaries.

From the beginning in October 1984, CRS provided the main administrative support for this program. CRS acted as consignee for the USG commodities, handling logistics and reporting requirements. At the height of its program, JRP reached 1.6 million beneficiaries through 80 feeding centers. JRP commodities were distributed in all regions of Ethiopia except Gojam and Arsi. The program was targeted toward children under age five, lactating mothers, the destitute, aged and handicapped. The ration provided a family take-home package of 45.36 kg cereal, 4 kgs of NFDM and 3.6 kgs of oil per month. JRP centers monitored height-for-weight of children, using the nutritional data generated to determine participation in the program.

The standardized registration criteria, record system and reporting process, combined with the wide-ranging network of operating agencies, allowed CDAA/JRP to be highly responsive to newly identified areas of need.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 COMMODITIES

COMMODITIES (MTS)	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
Bulgur	118,361	81,350	199,711
SFSG	9,211	10,000	19,211
Oil	13,041	6,300	19,341
CSM	7,278	1,505	8,783
NFDM	13,303	6,930	20,233
Lentils	--	750	750
Total	161,194	106,835	268,029

continued...

VALUE (\$000)	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
Commodity	\$53,277.1	\$27,994.1	\$81,271.2
Ocean Freight	25,894.0	13,326.3	39,220.3
Internal Transport	<u>25,516.0</u>	<u>1,719.8</u>	<u>27,235.8</u>
Total	\$104,687.1	\$43,040.2	\$147,727.3

OFDA GRANTS

ACTIVITY: Internal Transport

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-4152-00

AMOUNT: \$10,508,058

EFFECTIVE DATES: 11/27/84 - 12/31/85

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided internal transport and other administrative costs in support of the CRS emergency and CDAA food aid programs in 1984-85.

ACTIVITY: Agricultural Rehabilitation

GRANT NO: AFR-0000-G-SS-6017-00

AMOUNT: \$725,908

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/1/86 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION: CRS provided seeds and tools to needy farmers through this grant. Priority was given to Tigray, one of the regions which in the past was most seriously affected by drought. Other regions which received seed were Shewa and Gamo Gofa.

SEED SWAP

1986

AMOUNT OF PL 480 COMMODITIES SOLD: 3,547 MTS

VALUE OF PL 480 COMMODITIES SOLD: \$926,712

DESCRIPTION: CRS purchased some 1,193 MT of seed with the 1986 seed swap proceeds. The seed was distributed in several regions of southern Ethiopia and in Tigray as well.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) - Emergency

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

This program preceded the formation of the Churches Drought Action Africa (CDAA) consortium. CRS emergency food aid was distributed in Tigray, Eritrea, Welo, Sidamo and Shewa. Supplementary rations were provided to seriously malnourished children; take-home commodities were provided to drought-affected families with at least one child under five years of age.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 COMMODITIES

COMMODITIES (MTS)	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
SFSG	6,6060	--	6,060
Vegoil	4,149	--	4,149
NFDM	3,611	--	3,611
Bulgur	<u>26,739</u>	--	<u>26,739</u>
Total	40,559	--	40,559

VALUE (000)

Commodity	\$11,620.9	--	\$11,620.9
Ocean Freight	7,483.7	--	7,483.7
Internal Transport	<u>--</u>		<u>--</u>
Total	\$19,104.6	--	\$19,104.6

OFDA GRANT

For OFDA grants received by CRS, see the CDAA program description.

**Catholic Relief Services - Food for the
North Initiative (CRS-FFN)**

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The CRS-FFN program was an outgrowth of negotiations between the USG and the PMGSE on supplying more relief food to areas of northern Ethiopia affected by insurgencies. Begun in August 1985, the program reached a maximum of 440,000 beneficiaries per month from some 30 sites in all eight awrajas of Eritrea. The Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS) implemented the program on behalf of CRS. Because of the difficulties of travel and data collection in the wartorn region, ECS relied on the extensive network of Catholic churches and missions in Eritrea to identify areas in need. ECS showed great flexibility in implementing the program, reaching conflict and drought victims from both government and non-government controlled areas. Cooperation between ECS and ICRC, which sought also sought to reach people in conflict areas, was excellent.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
COMMODITIES (MTS)			
SFSG/Bulgur	6,000	18,371	24,371
Flour	--	3,500	3,500
CSM	<u>3,000</u>	<u>5,553</u>	<u>8,553</u>
Total	9,000	27,424	36,424
 VALUE (000)			
Commodity	\$2,253.0	\$6,322.0	\$8,575.0
Ocean Freight	1,305.0	2,870.7	4,175.7
Internal Transport	<u>1,205.0</u>	<u>2,948.1</u>	<u>4,153.1</u>
Total	\$4,763.0	\$12,140.8	\$16,903.8

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Internal Transport of Food Aid in Eritrea

GRANT NO: OTR-0000-G-SS-6036

AMOUNT \$1,687,355

EFFECTIVE DATES: 6/21/85 - 5/31/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided funding for operating costs and truck purchases for the CRS-FFN Initiative.

**Catholic Relief Services - Missionaries of
Charity (CRS-MC)**

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The Missionaries of Charity, affiliated with Mother Theresa of Calcutta, reached the some of the most needy people of Ethiopia. Their program included shelters for the infirmed or mentally handicapped, and feeding for destitute people. Both shelter residents and the destitute received hot meals. Sites were operated in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Jijiga, Jimma, Alamata and Mekele. Some 14,140 beneficiaries were served on a monthly basis. CRS handled logistics, commodity administration and reporting for the MC program.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
COMMODITIES (MTS)			
Rice	2,994	2,995	5,989
NFDM	264	264	528
Beans	80	41	121
Oil	<u>346</u>	<u>435</u>	<u>831</u>
TOTAL	4,654	4,655	9,309

VALUE (000)

Commodity	\$1,972.3	\$1,164.0	\$3,136.3
Ocean Freight	861.5	630.4	1,491.9
Internal Transport	<u> --</u>	<u> --</u>	<u> --</u>
Total	\$2,833.8	\$1,794.4	\$4,628.2

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Internal Transportation

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5068-00

AMOUNT: \$138,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 12/20/84 - 12/19/85

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided internal transport funds for the movement of Missionaries of Charity food aid.

Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

In 1985, EOC operated a food distribution program as an operating partner of the Churches Drought Action Africa (CDAA). In 1986, the USG initiated a PL 480 program directly with the EOC. Food distribution took place in Hagaz, Eritrea; Mekele, Tigray; Genet Berr, Welo; Addis Zemen, Gonder; Deder, Harerge; and Agarfa, Bale. Approximately 70,000 beneficiaries per month were reached.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
COMMODITIES (MTS)			
Wheat	--	3,825	3,825
Vegoil	--	302	302
NFDM	--	<u>336</u>	<u>336</u>
Total	--	4,463	4,463
 VALUE (000)			
Commodity	--	\$752.4	\$752.4
Ocean Freight	--	309.9	309.9
Internal Transport	--	<u>287.9</u>	<u>287.9</u>
Total	--	\$1,350.2	\$1,350.2

Food for the Hungry International (FHI)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

FHI received USG food in 1985 as an operating agency of Churches Drought Action Africa (CDAA). In 1986, FHI became a direct recipient of USG food. It operated in five sites in southern Shewa (Alaba, Enemore, Ameya, Mitto and Danno) and two sites in Gonder (Robit and Wogada). A monthly average of 37,669 beneficiaries were reached by the program.

FHI was the first organization receiving USG food to shift from free distribution to food-for-work. While FHI's priority was always to get the food to needy people, the organization believed that food for work could accomplish this while without creating dependency among recipients. A number of road and water projects were completed using emergency food-for-work distributions.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

	FY 85	FY86	TOTAL
COMMODITIES (MTS)			
CSM	--	578	578
Vegoil	--	217	217
Wheat	--	<u>6,165</u>	<u>6,165</u>
Total	--	6,960	6,960
VALUE (000)			
Commodity	--	\$1,150.9	\$1,150.9
Ocean Freight	--	726.7	726.7
Internal Transport	--	<u>634.8</u>	<u>634.8</u>
Total	--	\$2,512.4	\$2,512.4

OFDA GRANTS

ACTIVITY: Feeding and Medical Centers

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5069

AMOUNT: \$803,857

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/29/85 - 4/30/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant funded supplemental feeding and emergency medical programs for five FHI sites in Shewa and Gonder. Each site, manned by a team of four expatriates and 18 nationals, served about 50,000 people. The grant paid for personnel, medicines, equipment and transportation.

continued...

ACTIVITY: Feeding and Medical Centers

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-6021

AMOUNT: \$468,273

EFFECTIVE DATES: 5/1/86 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION: The grant paid for the continued operation of four of the five camps supported by the above grant. Activities undertaken during the grant period included nutritional surveillance, health education, vaccination campaigns and distribution of agricultural packages.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

ICRC's mandate is to assist victims of civil strife and war. ICRC's operations were vital to alleviating the suffering in conflict-affected areas of northern Ethiopia. ICRC used a system of transport planes, light aircraft, airdrops and its own fleet of trucks to reach drought-affected people in conflict zones. ICRC administered distribution centers in Eritrea (Barentu, Keren, Dekamere, Adikaye, Segeneti, Rama, Akordat, Senafe, Areza, and Asmara), Tigray (Maichew, Mehoni, Adigrat, Wukro, Atsbi, Quiha, Adi Gudom, Axum, and Adwa), Welo (Alamata, Sanka, Didigsala, and Lalibela), Gonder (Ibnet, Debark, Dabat, and Areb Gebiya) and Harerge (Wobera, Habro, Gara Muleta). ICRC reached a monthly average of 177,000 beneficiaries with USG commodities. At the beginning of the relief effort, ICRC interpreted its mandate liberally, providing aid to badly-affected areas where no other organization was working. As other organizations mobilized, ICRC more narrowly targeted conflict areas. ICRC emphasized providing agricultural inputs to return people to food self-sufficiency and was particularly careful in curtailing distributions as soon as beneficiaries could support themselves.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
COMMODITIES			
Vegoil	3,120	1,850	4,970
Wheat Flour	29,265	8,500	37,765
Beans/Peas	5,250	3,150	8,400
Bulgur	<u>8,519</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>8,519</u>
Total	46,154	13,500	59,654

VALUE (\$000)

Commodity	\$14,080.8	\$4,207.2	\$18,288.0
Ocean Freight	6,913.5	2,397.4	9,310.9
Internal Transport	<u>--</u>	<u>1,469.8</u>	<u>1,469.8</u>
Total	\$20,994.3	\$8,074.4	\$29,068.7

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Truck Airlift

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5109

AMOUNT \$400,000

continued...

EFFECTIVE DATES: 6/13/85 - 7/31/85

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided air transport from Europe to Ethiopia for trucks used in ICRC's emergency food distribution program.

SEED SWAPS

1985

AMOUNT OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: 2,500 MTS

VALUE OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: \$645,000

DESCRIPTION: ICRC swapped the donated PL 480 wheat with the Ethiopian Agricultural Marketing Corporation for an equal amount of wheat seed which was distributed in northern Ethiopia.

1986

AMOUNT OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: 1,264 MTS

VALUE OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: \$330,241

DESCRIPTION: ICRC used the proceeds of the 1986 seed swap to purchase teff seed for distribution in northern Ethiopia.

League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LICROSS)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The USG assistance to LICROSS was distributed through the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) in Bati and Ambasel in Welo region; Harar in Harerge; and Wolaita, Sidamo. The LICROSS/ERCS program fed approximately 300,000 beneficiaries per month with USG food. It was almost exclusively run by ERCS youth volunteers, thus minimizing administrative costs and giving the young people valuable experience in program management. LICROSS/ERCS was particularly adroit at phasing out emergency feeding at the earliest feasible opportunity.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

COMMODITIES (MTS)	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
Vegoil	1,633	1,000	2,633
NFDM	660	--	660
Rice	150	--	150
Wheat Flour	9,167	8,170	17,337
Beans	--	830	830
Total	11,610	10,000	21,610

VALUE (\$000)

Commodity	\$3,800.5	\$2,931.1	\$6,731.6
Ocean Freight	1,620.4	1,450.0	3,070.4
Internal Transport	--	566.0	566.0
Total	\$5,420.9	\$4,947.1	\$10,368.0

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Agricultural Rehabilitation

GRANT NO: OTR-0000-G-IC-6045

AMOUNT: \$2,588,292

EFFECTIVE DATES: 1/23/86 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided improved seeds, agricultural implements, oxen, fertilizers and pesticides to 400,000 families in Kalu & Ambasel regions of Welo. The project was designed to return recipients to food self-sufficiency. LICROSS worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture extension agents to maximize project effectiveness.

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The Government-to-Government program provided 40,000 MT of USG wheat and 10,000 MT of CSM to the RRC for dry-ration distribution in 1985. According to a distribution plan agreed upon by the RRC and AID, the wheat was distributed in nine of Ethiopia's 14 administrative regions and the CSM in the three northern regions of Welo, Tigray and Eritrea. The RRC was specifically prohibited from distributing US commodities to people in the PMGSE's resettlement program. CARE was contracted to provide eight food monitors to perform end-use checking. The wheat arrived in February, 1985 and the CSM in May, 1985. The US wheat was distributed to 788,880 beneficiaries, while the CSM was received by 772,378 beneficiaries.

The RRC's performance in the Government-to-Government program was generally very good. It made an effort to improve its warehouse records and stacking to keep track of the USG commodities. There were cases of food being distributed at sites not included in the agreed distribution plan -- mostly due to local RRC officials taking the initiative to send food to sites where conditions were most critical. In all cases, food was distributed in agreed upon administrative areas.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 COMMODITIES

COMMODITIES (MTS)	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
Wheat	40,000	--	10,000
CSM	<u>10,000</u>	--	<u>10,000</u>
Total	50,000	--	50,000
VALUE (000)			
Commodity	\$9,433.5	--	\$9,433.5
Ocean Freight	2,989.1	--	2,989.1
Internal Transport	<u>1,124.6</u>	--	<u>2,050.0</u>
Total	\$13,547.2	--	\$14,472.6

OFDA GRANTS

ACTIVITY: Fuel for Airlift

AMOUNT: \$25,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: October, 1984

DESCRIPTION: This grant reimbursed the RRC for fuel used in 14 food aid flights from Asmara to Mekele. These flights carried a total of 173 MT of relief food between 23 and 29 October 1984.

continued...

ACTIVITY: Plastic Sheeting and Blankets

AMOUNT: \$170,150

EFFECTIVE DATES: December, 1984

DESCRIPTION: RRC received 500 rolls of plastic sheeting and 5,000 blankets to provide shelter and covering for people in the highland areas of Mekele, Korem and Alamata.

ACTIVITY: Internal Transport of US Food

AMOUNT: \$450,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 2/25/85 - 9/30/85

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided an advance to the RRC as part of an agreement by AID to provided 50 percent of the internal transport costs for the 50,000 MT Government-to-Government program.

Save the Children, USA (SAVE)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The SAVE program operated in the Yifatna Timuga awraja in Shewa Region. At its height, SAVE reached 354,000 beneficiaries per month. Participants were selected from families with at least one malnourished person; height for weight measurements were applied to monitor nutritional status. Only take-home rations were distributed.

During the latter part of 1986, SAVE shifted its food distribution program from free distribution to food-for-work activities which included terracing, tree nurseries and water catchment projects. SAVE also incorporated health services and education into its food program. SAVE workers had considerable success with their vaccination program. The staff also began an oral rehydration therapy (ORT) project which taught mothers how to administer ORT using locally available supplies.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

COMMODITIES (MTS)	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
Bulgur	15,257	7,388	22,645
Wheat	--	14,750	14,750
SFSG	1,225	492	1,717
Vegoil	307	124	431
NFDM	<u>612</u>	<u>246</u>	<u>858</u>
Total	17,401	23,000	40,401

VALUE (000)			
Commodity	\$4,602.9	\$3,809.5	\$8,412.4
Ocean Freight	2,509.3	2,967.5	5,476.8
Internal Transport	<u>590.0</u>	<u>1,500.5</u>	<u>2,090.5</u>
Total	\$7,702.2	\$8,277.5	\$15,979.7

OFDA GRANTS

ACTIVITY: Purchase of Trucks

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5106

AMOUNT: \$980,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 5/31/85 - 8/30/85

DESCRIPTION: These funds were used for the purchase of 30 trucks for primary and secondary transport associated with the SAVE food aid program.

continued...

ACTIVITY: Agricultural Rehabilitation

GRANT NO: AFR-0000-G-SS-6016-00

AMOUNT: \$692,762

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/1/86 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided seeds, tools and water pumps. Some of the grant inputs were used by SAVE's food-for-work projects.

SEED SWAP

1986

AMOUNT OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: 300 MT

VALUE OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: \$214,761

DESCRIPTION: The proceeds of the seed swapped was used to purchase 300 MT of seed which was distributed to SAVE's beneficiaries in northern Shewa.

World Food Program (WFP)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

This project (WFP #1393, Exp 1) provided emergency assistance to drought victims. The commodities were turned over the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) for country-wide distribution. The RRC allocated the commodities to both its own distribution sites and to NGOs.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
COMMODITIES (MTS)			
Vegoil	1,207	--	1,207
CSM	5,766	--	5,766
Wheat	<u>3,000</u>	--	<u>3,000</u>
Total	9,973	--	9,973
VALUE (000)			
Commodity	\$3,428.9	--	\$3,428.9
Ocean Freight	1,736.2	--	1,736.2
Internal Transport	<u>--</u>	--	<u>--</u>
Total	\$5,165.1	--	\$5,165.1

World Vision (WVRO)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

Throughout the first year of the famine, World Vision operated camps whose primary purpose was to provide wet feeding and nutritional rehabilitation to the most severely malnourished. The wet feeding component was divided into the following categories: supplementary feeding for children below 80% weight for height; intensive feeding for children less than 70%; and super-intensive feeding for children less than 70% who were seriously ill. World Vision also provided take-home rations for famine-affected families. Feeding centers were located in Alamata, Lalibela, Sanka, Ajibar in Welo region; Ibnet, Gonder region, and Ansokia, Addis Ababa and Omosheleko, Shewa region.

During the second year of the famine, the emphasis shifted away from on-site feeding towards take-home rations and food for work. World Vision reached an average of 181,000 beneficiaries per month with USG commodities. Distribution of agricultural inputs was given top priority during 1986 so that recipients could return to self-sufficiency.

PL 430 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 COMMODITIES

COMMODITIES (MTS)	FY 85	FY 86	Total
Bulgur	24,553	15,776	40,329
NFDM	3,600	6,000	9,600
CSM	2,846	5,688	8,534
Vegoil	521	4,000	4,521
Butter oil	<u>3,600</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>3,600</u>
Total	35,120	31,464	66,584

VALUE (000s)

Commodity	\$14,731.5	\$8,379.9	\$23,111.4
Ocean Freight	5,380.5	6,652.9	12,033.4
Inland Transport	<u>15,789.2</u>	<u>2,835.9</u>	<u>18,625.1</u>
Total	\$35,901.2	\$17,868.7	\$53,769.9

OFDA GRANTS

ACTIVITY: Emergency/Water/Medical Support for Camps

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5009-00

AMOUNT: \$1,597,640

continued...

EFFECTIVE DATES: 11/8/84 - 2/7/85

DESCRIPTION: This was the initial grant for establishment of the WV feeding centers in Alamata, Lalibela and Ibnet. The grant also funded health care for those suffering from famine-related diseases. The grant provided 60,000 blankets and ten 5,000 gallon water tank. Internal transport was also funded through this grant.

ACTIVITY: Funding for Five Nutritional Health Centers

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5064-00

AMOUNT: \$3,641,694

EFFECTIVE DATES: 4/1/85 - 9/30/85

DESCRIPTION: This was a continuation of USG support for WV feeding and health activities. This grant supported centers in Welo, Sidamo, Gonder and Shewa regions.

ACTIVITY: Airfreight of ORS

GRANT NUMBER: N/A

EFFECTIVE DATES: N/A

AMOUNT: \$23,427

DESCRIPTION: AID provided funding in May 1985 for WVRO to airlift oral rehydration packets to Ethiopia to treat cholera and other diarrheal diseases that threaten feeding shelter inmates.

ACTIVITY: Airlift of emergency supplies

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5063-00

AMOUNT: \$1,113,010

EFFECTIVE DATES: 2/1/85 - 10/31/85

DESCRIPTION: This grant supported the operation of two Twin Otter cargo aircraft. These aircraft transported critical, high-value fortified food, pharmaceutical commodities and project personnel from Addis Ababa to WV's program sites.

ACTIVITY: Nutrition and Health Centers

GRANT NO: OTR-0000-G-SS-6057-00

AMOUNT: \$2,800,000

continued...

EFFECTIVE DATES: 10/1/85 - 9/31/86

DESCRIPTION: This was the final grant in support of WVRO's health and nutrition centers. In 1986, WVRO changed the emphasis of its program from on-site wet feeding to dry ration and agpak distributions.

ACTIVITY: Agricultural Rehabilitation

GRANT NO: AFR-0000-G-SS-6015-00

AMOUNT: \$3,000,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/10/86 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant funded the cost of seeds, fertilizer, handtools and transportation. The purpose was to return recipients of food self-sufficiency.

SEED SWAP

1986

AMOUNT OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: 4,203 MT

VALUE OF PL 480 WHEAT SWAPPED: \$1,098,103

DESCRIPTION: World Vision purchased some 2,956 MT of seed which was distributed from WV's health/nutrition centers.

World Vision - Food for the North Initiative (WVRO-FFN)

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The WVRO-FFN program was designed to reach people affected by in urgency in areas of Tigray. The WVRO program, along with its counterpart CRS program in Eritrea, was an outgrowth of negotiations in March, 1985, between the USG and PMGSE on increasing the flow of relief food to areas which had not received food through normal relief channels because of security problems.

The WVRO-FFN program was intended to reach 270,000 beneficiaries at five sites in Tigray. Only two sites -- Inde Selassie and Axum/Adwa -- became operational. The program in Inde Selassie got underway in October 1985 with distribution handled by World Vision staff. The Axum/Adwa program began in January 1986 with distribution administered through the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. After an incident at Alamata in which two WVRO employees were killed by insurgents, WVRO decided its Tigray staff were unnecessarily exposed to danger. At the same time, WVRO found that its operation at Inde Selassie was unable to reach the targeted beneficiaries from contested zones and that there was no major need for emergency food in the area. At the three other proposed distribution sites, nutritional surveys found the intended population was not in need of emergency rations. In April 1986, WVRO and AID mutually agreed that the program in Tigray should be reduced to only the Ethiopian Orthodox Church sites in Axum and Adwa.

PL 480 TITLE II AND SECTION 416 INPUTS

	FY 85	FY 86	TOTAL
COMMODITIES (MTS)			
Bulgur	3,780	5,089	8,869
CSM	2,970	1,203	4,173
Vegoil	<u>1,350</u>	<u>882</u>	<u>2,232</u>
Total	8,100	7,174	15,274
 VALUE (000)			
Commodities	\$3,108.0	\$1,577.3	\$4,685.3
Ocean Freight	1,174.5	1,558.3	2,732.8
Internal Transport	<u>561.3</u>	<u>249.9</u>	<u>811.2</u>
Total	\$4,843.8	\$3,385.5	\$8,229.3

continued...

OFDA GRANTS

ACTIVITY: Truck Purchase and Operating Costs

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5174

AMOUNT: \$1,712,522

EFFECTIVE DATES: 7/1/85 - 12/31/85

DESCRIPTION: The grant covered half the costs for the initial phase of the Tigray program, including personnel, equipment, supplies and truck purchase and maintenance.

ACTIVITY: Internal Transport and Administrative Support

GRANT NO: OTR-0000-G-SS-6062

AMOUNT: \$600,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 2/8/86 - 7/31/86

DESCRIPTION: This grant provided logistical and administrative support for the WVRO-FFN program, essentially as a continuation of the above OFDA grant.

Adventist Development and Relief Association (ADRA)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Procurement and transportation cost of trucks

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5044-00

AMOUNT: \$620,874

EFFECTIVE DATES: 2/14/85 - 2/13/86

DESCRIPTION: The grant supported ADRA's program of relief assistance and feeding centers. The total program budget, including ADRA's contribution, was \$980,000. AID's inputs paid for personnel, tires, medicines, blankets, fuel, truck maintenance and inland freight.

ACTIVITY: Transportation of relief supplies

GRANT NO: Letter Grant 1/27/85

AMOUNT: \$12,500

EFFECTIVE DATES: 1/27/85

DESCRIPTION: The grant paid for the airfreight costs of 50,000 pounds of medicines, blankets and clothing.

Africare

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Medical equipment and personnel expenses

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5127-00

AMOUNT: \$109,302

EFFECTIVE DATES: 7/8/85 - 9/4/86

DESCRIPTION: The original operational support grant was for two volunteer emergency medical teams. However, because of delays in starting the program, the grant was reduced from \$300,000 to \$109,302 to cover only one medical team, located in Kat-bare in southern Shewa. The program provided general medical care, immunization and tuberculosis therapy to approximately 35,000 beneficiaries.

American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee (AJJDC)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Tents for Ibnet Camp

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5090-00

AMOUNT: \$183,505

EFFECTIVE DATES: 5/1/85 - 8/31/85

DESCRIPTION: This program, implemented by the Israeli philanthropist Abie Nathan, provided tent shelters and related facilities for feeding and health centers at the Ibnet shelter in Gonder.

ACTIVITY: Ag-Paks

GRANT NO: AFR-0000-G-SS-6014-00

AMOUNT: \$350,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/10/86 - 3/9/87

DESCRIPTION: The grant partially funded AJJDC's program to provide agricultural recovery assistance to 12,000 rural families most seriously affected by the drought in two areas in Gonder administrative region. The assistance included seeds, basic agricultural tools, oxen, fertilizer and pesticides.

Concern

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Sea freight costs for USG-donated plastic sheeting

GRANT NO: Not available

AMOUNT: \$ 5,500

EFFECTIVE DATES: April 25, 1985

DESCRIPTION: Concern received 100 rolls of plastic sheeting from AID to cover feeding centers, latrines, warehouses, floors etc., at CONCERN's eight feeding centers. This grant, administered through WVRO, paid for the sea freight for this sheeting.

Heifer Project International (HPI)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Purchase of Oxen and Tools

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-SS-5174-00

AMOUNT: \$540,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 12/16/85 - 12/15/87

DESCRIPTION: The grant will procure some 2,000 oxen over a period of two years. The grant is being administered through CRDA, the consortium of NGOs working in Ethiopian drought relief. They will be distributed by CRDA member organizations to farmers who lost their oxen during the drought. The grant includes funding for a project manager, plows and veterinary medicines.

Helen Keller International (HKI)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Blindness prevention

GRANT NUMBER ASB-0000-G-SS-5102

AMOUNT: \$34,083

EFFECTIVE DATES: 5/31/85 - 2/28/86

DESCRIPTION: The famine threatened to cause blindness in thousands of malnourished children. HKI provided training to staffs of several NGOs on the prevention of blindness and treatment of related eye diseases among famine victims. It also provided some two million doses of Vitamin A to 27 NGOs for distribution.

Lutheran World Relief (LWR)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Tools and Agpak Distribution Costs

GRANT NO: AFR-0000-G-SS-6018-00

AMOUNT: \$490,356

EFFECTIVE DATES: 3/1/86 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION: The grant provided agricultural tools to drought victims to help them return to food self sufficiency. The grant supplied the farmers with plow points, hoes, sickles, and pick axes. In addition the grant provided approximately \$245,000 for the purchase of seeds and \$29,000 for transportation.

Interaction

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Airfreight Costs

AMOUNT: \$ 17,100

EFFECTIVE DATES: 4/11/85

DESCRIPTION: AID reimbursed Interaction for part of the cost of an air shipment organized through Interaction of emergency relief supplies from the U.S. to Addis Ababa for various NGOs.

MAP International

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Airfreight of medical supplies

GRANT NUMBER: N/A

AMOUNT: \$71,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: N/A

DESCRIPTION: This grant was made in November 1984 to airlift donated medical supplies to Ethiopia for various NGOs.

Partnership for Productivity (PPP)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Seed purchase and distribution

GRANT NUMBER: OTR-0000-G-88-6004

AMOUNT: \$292,218

EFFECTIVE DATES: 11/6/85 - 11/5/86

DESCRIPTION: AID originally approved a grant of \$1.2 million to PPP for seed purchase, distribution and technical assistance. PPP had planned to work under CRDA. Two PPP seed specialists arrived in November 1985. CRDA, however, concluded that PPP could not operate under CRDA without violating the latter's charter as a non-operational organization. After PPP failed to find another agency with which to affiliate, AID and PPP decided to terminate the grant and deobligate the balance of funds remaining.

TransAmerica Airlines

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Airlift of Relief Food

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5026-01

AMOUNT: \$16,627,344

EFFECTIVE DATES: 12/2/84 - 11/30/85

DESCRIPTION: From November 1984 to the end of November 1985 TransAmerica operated emergency food airlifts within Ethiopia. The program aim was to deliver emergency commodities to areas which were not accessible to trucks. Mekele was the principle relief center served. By the end of November 1985, Transamerica had transported 38,200 MT of relief commodities at a cost of approximately \$474 per MT.

Air Transport Specialist

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Assessment of airdrop/airlift operations

GRANT NUMBER: N/A

AMOUNT: \$18,319

EFFECTIVE DATES: N/A

DESCRIPTION: This contract provided an air transport specialist to assess the need for and feasibility of the USG providing aircraft to conduct airdrops in northern Ethiopia in 1986, and to develop a project plan for such an operation. AID decided that a long-term airdrop operation in 1986 was not imperative. The contractor also provided advice on management of AID's contract with TransAmerica for airlifting food into Mekele.

UN Office for Emergency Operation in Africa and WFP

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Operation and maintenance of U.N. Truck Fleet

GRANT NO: OTR-0000-G-SS-6012-00

AMOUNT: \$2,400,000 OFDA funding plus \$13,424,300 of PL 480 Title II funding

EFFECTIVE DATES: 11/1/85 - 12/31/86

DESCRIPTION AID provided 150 trucks or tractor-trailers (paid for by the \$13.4 million contribution from PL 480 inland transport funds) and an OFDA grant of \$2.4 million to establish and operate a consolidated UN fleet to move food aid in Northern Ethiopia. The Band Aid/Live Aid Foundation provided another 100 trucks or tractor-trailers. The consolidated UN fleet provides long haul service from the ports of Assab and Massawa to Welo, Tigray, Eritrea, Shewa, and Gonder regions. The fleet moves food beyond the primary warehouse centers of Kombolcha and Asmara to distribution points and secondary warehouses along the main roads. To increase the fleet's usage, Hararghe was added to its operational area. The fleet has also transported seeds and commodities for food-for-work programs.

UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Monitoring and coordinating emergency food program

AMOUNT: \$ 79,565

EFFECTIVE DATES: 6/6/85 - 2/28/86

DESCRIPTION: AID financed the secondment of a U.S. citizen to the UN Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia to help monitor and coordinate overall donor emergency relief efforts.

UNICEF

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Water Drilling Program

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5074-00

AMOUNT: \$750,000

EFFECTIVE DATES: 4/18/85 - 1/17/86

DESCRIPTION: The program, in cooperation with the Ethiopia Water Works Construction Authority, constructed 12 water supply points in Welo region, to serve relief camps and towns.

ACTIVITY: Medical Supplies Airlift

AMOUNT: \$ 52,978

DESCRIPTION: The grant reimbursed UNICEF for the cost of airfreighting 39 tons of relief medical supplies from Copenhagen.

ACTIVITY: Truck leasing and tires

GRANT NO: ASB-0000-G-SS-5093 (truck leasing)
ASB-0000-G-SS-5141 (tire purchase)

AMOUNT: \$485,000 (truck leasing)
\$485,080 (tire purchase)

EFFECTIVE DATES: 5/22/85 - 11/3/86

DESCRIPTION: The grant was provided as a USG contribution to the general transportation fund of the UN Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia, to facilitate hiring by the RRC of trucks to move relief food. The grant also included an in-kind contribution of tires for relief vehicles.

US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Health needs assessment

GRANT NUMBER: N/A

AMOUNT: \$11,010

EFFECTIVE DATES: N/A

DESCRIPTION: The US DHHS provided a epidemiologist in May-June 1985 from the Center for Disease Control to assess health conditions and medical needs in feeding shelters and relief centers.

Water and Sanitation for Health Project (WASH)

AID CENTRALLY-FUNDED PROJECT

ACTIVITY: Technical Assistance in Water and Sanitation

AMOUNT: \$150,000

DESCRIPTION: Water and sanitation specialists from the WASH project visited Ethiopia in November and December 1984 and in March 1985 to study and make recommendations on how to improve water supplies for feeding shelters.

Various NGOs and the RRC

OFDA GRANT

ACTIVITY: Supplies for shelters

GRANT NUMBER: ASB-0000-G-00-5091 (plastic sheets)
ASB-0000-C-00-4194 (blankets)

AMOUNT: \$244,800 (plastic sheets)
\$92,261 (blankets)

EFFECTIVE DATES: N/A

DESCRIPTION: The USG provided 900 sections of plastic sheeting and 23,040 blankets to various relief organizations. The plastic sheeting and about one quarter of the blankets came from stockpiles of emergency assistance materials maintained in Italy. The items from the Italian stockpile were airlifted to Ethiopia by TransAmerica. Among the principal users of these supplies were the RRC and Irish Concern.

TABLE E-1: USG FOOD AID ARRIVALS, CY 85

CON-SIGNEE	PORT	10/84-12/84 ²	1/85	2/85	3/85	4/85	5/85	6/85	7/85 ³	8/85	9/85	10/85	11/85	12/85	Total
CARE	Djibouti	0	0	1,500	0	0	16,422	5,100	1,283	8,000	0	0	0	0	32,305
CRS ²	Assab	4,207	8,506	10,493	5,488	4,574	7,408	9,777	10,720	21,167	14,635	8,919	5,167	1,867	112,928
	Djibouti	0	3,478	0	3,628	2,834	3,390	5,294	3,894	879	0	996	7,716	2,603	34,712
	Massewa	2,804	7,888	7,653	7,636	5,907	8,672	8,611	9,782	8,007	4,981	11,075	2,601	9,016	94,633
	Total	7,011	19,872	18,146	16,752	13,315	19,470	23,682	24,396	30,053	19,616	20,990	15,484	13,486	242,273
RRC	Assab	0	0	32,000	0	0	4,397	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36,397
	Massewa	0	0	8,000	0	0	5,602	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13,602
	Total	0	0	40,000	0	0	9,999	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	49,999
WFP	Assab	4,770	0	0	0	0	1,582	1,641	0	386	0	0	0	0	8,379
ICRC	Assab	0	0	0	1,550	0	0	0	600	1,300	4,033	8,162	4,676	0	20,321
	Massewa	0	0	0	400	1,754	0	0	440	8,068	551	14,224	8,800	4,640	38,877
	Total	0	0	0	1,950	1,754	0	0	1,040	9,368	4,584	22,386	13,476	4,640	59,198
LICROSS	Assab	0	1,132	950	1,250	0	0	0	0	7,612	507	0	0	0	11,451
SAVE	Assab	0	0	1,102	105	32	1,013	0	11,823	459	0	0	3,322	6,403	24,259
WRO	Assab	0	0	0	1,530	400	1,228	0	5,809	11,798	1,489	6,096	2,590	0	30,940
	Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,009	0	0	3,112	0	0	6,121
	Massewa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,275	6,275
	Total	0	0	0	1,530	400	1,228	0	8,818	11,798	1,489	9,208	2,590	6,275	43,336
TOTAL		11,781	21,004	61,698	21,587	15,501	49,714	30,423	47,360	67,676	26,196	52,584	34,872	30,804	471,200
PORT TOTALS															
	Assab	8,977	9,638	44,545	9,923	5,006	15,628	11,418	28,952	42,722	20,664	23,177	15,755	8,270	244,675
	Djibouti	0	3,478	1,500	3,628	2,834	19,812	10,394	8,186	8,879	0	4,108	7,716	2,603	73,138
	Massewa	2,804	7,888	15,653	8,036	7,661	14,274	8,611	10,222	16,075	5,532	25,299	11,401	19,931	153,387
	Total	11,781	21,004	61,698	21,587	15,501	49,714	30,423	47,360	67,676	26,196	52,584	34,872	30,804	471,200

SOURCE: WFP

NOTE¹: Some arrivals may be private American donations, not USG food; WFP data is not complete.

NOTE²: These arrivals were FY 85 USG food which arrived in calendar year 1984.

NOTE³: CRS arrivals includes CRS regular and emergency programs, the Missionaries of Charity and the CDA/JRP program.

9/18

CON SIGNEE	PORT	1/86	2/86	3/86	4/86	5/86	6/86	7/86	8/86	9/86	10/86	11/86	12/86	1986 Total	1985/86 Total
CARE	Djibouti	279	6,939	2,898	7,431	14,231	10,310	4,250	1,216	0	11,386	4,328	0	63,268	95,573
	Mombasa	3,250	0	0	0	0	1,349	0	0	0	2,275	0	0	6,874	6,874
	Total	3,529	6,939	2,898	7,431	14,231	11,659	4,250	1,216	0	13,661	4,328	0	70,142	102,447
CRS	Assab	12,770	3,803	1,000	13,537	3,307	993	6,184	32,132	0	7,493	0	0	81,219	194,147
	Djibouti	4,431	4,513	0	0	0	0	957	1,500	0	0	0	0	11,401	46,113
	Massawa	14,028	720	0	0	10,556	0	2,851	6,537	3,500	8,228	736	0	47,156	141,789
	Total	31,229	9,036	1,000	13,537	13,863	993	9,992	40,169	3,500	15,721	736	0	139,776	382,049
EOC	Assab	0	0	0	2,800	0	480	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,280	3,280
	Massawa	0	0	0	1,101	0	0	0	87	0	0	0	0	1,188	1,188
	Total	0	0	0	3,901	0	480	0	87	0	0	0	0	4,468	4,468
FHI	Assab	0	3,115	0	0	1,775	0	0	2,301	0	0	0	0	7,191	7,191
ICRC	Assab	350	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	0	0	0	0	1,100	21,421
	Djibouti	7,964	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,964	7,964
	Massawa	1,500	0	0	0	4,075	1,286	0	1,091	0	0	0	0	7,952	46,829
	Total	9,814	0	0	0	4,075	1,286	0	1,841	0	0	0	0	17,016	76,214
LICROSS	Assab	1,632	0	0	0	3,368	0	0	3,380	1,610	1,591	0	0	11,581	23,032
RRC	Assab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36,397
	Massawa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13,602
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	49,999
SAVE	Assab	1,123	5,924	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,500	0	0	9,547	33,806
WFP	Assab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8,379
WVRO	Assab	3,520	1,600	123	535	1,588	8,304	3,168	1,285	0	0	0	0	20,123	51,063
	Djibouti	2,659	14,340	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,999	23,120
	Massawa	8,411	5,390	0	0	68	0	0	773	0	0	0	0	14,642	20,917
	Total	14,590	21,330	123	535	1,656	8,304	3,168	2,058	0	0	0	0	51,764	95,100
TOTAL		61,917	46,344	4,021	25,404	38,963	22,722	17,410	51,052	5,110	33,473	5,064	0	311,485	782,685
PORT TOTALS	Assab	19,395	14,442	1,123	16,872	10,038	9,777	9,352	39,848	1,610	11,584	0	0	134,041	378,716
	Djibouti	15,333	25,792	2,898	7,431	14,231	10,310	5,207	2,716	0	11,386	4,328	0	99,632	172,770
	Massawa	23,939	6,110	0	1,101	14,699	1,286	2,851	8,487	3,500	8,228	736	0	70,938	224,325
	Mombasa	3,250	0	0	0	0	1,349	0	0	0	2,275	0	0	6,874	6,874
	Total	61,917	46,344	4,021	25,404	38,968	22,722	17,410	51,052	5,110	33,473	5,064	0	311,485	782,685

SOURCE: WFP

TABLE E-2: USG FOOD AID ARRIVALS, CY 86
AND CY 85 AND 86 TOTALS

(IN MT)

7/2/86

ANNEX F: RELIEF TRANSPORT RESOURCES

TABLE F-1: RELIEF TRUCK FLEETS

<u>Fleet, by NGO</u>	<u>Long-Haul Trucks</u>	<u>Short-Haul Trucks</u>	<u>Total</u>
ADRA	2	5	7
CARE	38	0	38
CRS	12	12	24
CRS "Kenya Lease"	54	0	54
CRDA	31	21	52
Concern	6	5	11
Ethiopian Catholic Sec	38	4	42
FHI	0	4	4
German Agro Action	3	0	3
ICRC	50	28	78
LICROSS/Ethiopian Red Cross	21	8	29
Lutheran World Federation	10	17	27
Norwegian Church Aid	5	6	11
Philadelphia Church	2	3	5
OXFAM/Save the Children UK	15	6	21
Redd Barna	18	7	25
SAVE/USA	20	20	40
24 Hour TV	0	2	2
World Univ Services Canada	21	9	30
WVRO	<u>108</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>114</u>
NGO TOTAL	454	163	617
RRC	331	668	999
WTOE	<u>250</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>250</u>
GRAND TOTAL	1,035	831	1,866

SOURCE: OEOE

NOTE: Long-haul trucks have the capacity of 10 to 35 MT;
Short-haul trucks have a capacity of 3 to 9 MT.

TABLE F-2: DONATIONS OF TRUCKS AND TRAILERS TO THE RRC AND WTOE

Donor	1984		1985		1986		Total Value
	Trucks	Trailers	Trucks	Trailers	Trucks	Trailers	
DONATED TO RRC							
Austria	0	0	19	0	0	0	\$ 463,415
Bulgaria	0	0	10	12	0	0	486,829
Czechoslovakia	0	0	34	0	0	0	193,951
German Dem Rep	35	0	35	0	0	0	1,536,585
Germany, Fed Rep	8	0	128	0	0	0	5,366,836
Italy	0	0	198	115	2	28	9,848,976
Japan	0	0	3	0	0	0	17,450
Korea, Rep of	30	0	0	0	0	0	301,800
OPEC Fund	0	0	33	0	0	0	1,609,756
Private	0	0	9	7	0	0	408,510
Rumania	0	0	80	0	0	0	4,634,146
UK	0	0	0	30	2	0	432,745
USSR	0	0	300	0	0	0	7,317,073
WTOE	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>73,171</u>
Total	73	0	849	164	6	28	\$32,691,244
DONATED TO WTOE							
Band Aid	0	0	100	80	0	0	\$ 2,569,120
USG	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13,424,300</u>
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>\$15,993,420</u>
GRAND TOTAL	73	0	1,099	444	6	28	\$48,684,664

SOURCE: RRC and WTOE

TABLE F-3: EMERGENCY AIRLIFT RESOURCES

<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Service Dates</u>	<u>Operation</u>
USG	2 C-130s	11/84 - 11/85	Airlanding from Asmara to Mekele and other towns in Tigray and Eritrea
UK	2 C-130s	11/84 - 12/85	One C-130 used for airlanding food from Assab to Mekele, the other for airdrops in northern Shewa and Souther Welo
FRG	2 C-160	11/84 - 12/85	Same as UK aircraft
GDR	2 AN-26 1 IL-18	11/84 - 10/85	General airlift
Libya	2 AN-26	2/85 - 10/85	General airlift
France	1 C-160	1/85 - 1/85	General airlift
Poland	3 MI-8*	2/85 -	Airlanding food in Shewa and Harerge and support of FRG and UK airdrops
USSR	12 AN-12 22 MI-8 ¹	11/84 -	Mostly movement of resettlers
ICRC	1 or 2 C-130s 1 Twin Otter 2 Pilatus Porters	3/85 -	Airlanding for towns in Tigray and Eritrea, and airdrops in southern Tigray and northern Welo (C-130s provided by Belgium and Sweden, or under contract from private companies)
WVRO	2 Twin Otters	1/85 - 12/85	Airlift of personnel and supplies to WVRO camps (supported by USG)
LWF	1 C-130	9/85 - 3/86	Airlanding for Eritrea and Tigray
EEC	1 C-130	7/86 - 9/86	Airlanding for Tigray

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa

NOTE¹: Helicopters

ANNEX G: LIST OF TDY PERSONNEL AND VIP VISITORS TO ETHIOPIA,
OCTOBER, 1984 - MARCH, 1987

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS

Congressman Tony Hall (D-OH) and staff, November, 1984
Congressman William Gray (D-PA) and staff, November, 1984
Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX) and staff, November, 1984
Congressman Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and staff, November, 1984
Congressman William Emerson (R-MO) and staff, November, 1984
Congresswoman Margaret Roukema (R-NJ) and staff, November, 1984
Congressman Edolphus Towns (D-NY) and staff, November, 1984
Congressman Cooper Evans (R-IA), November, 1984
Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA), December, 1984
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and staff, December, 1984
Congressman William Nelson (D-FL) and staff, January, 1985
Senator Paul Trible (R-VA) and staff, February, 1985
Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) and staff, February, 1985
Congressman Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and staff, February, 1985
Congressman Robert Dornan (R-CA), May, 1985
Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-MI) and staff, July, 1985
Congressman Michael Synar (D-OK), August, 1985
Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and staff, September, 1986
Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX) and staff, February, 1987

CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DELEGATIONS

Jerry Tinker and John Wise, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
and Refugee Policy, April, 1986

Terry Peel, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, November, 1986

AID/WASHINGTON

M. Peter McPherson, Administrator and staff, November, 1984
Steven Singer, Deputy Director, FVA/FFP, November, 1984
Brian Kline, Deputy Director, AFR/EA, February, 1985
General Julius Becton, Director of the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance, April, 1985
Tim Knight, Deputy Director of OFDA, April, 1985
Walter Bollinger, Deputy Assistant Administrator, FVA/FFP,
April, 1985
Jay Morris, Deputy Administrator, May, 1985
John Wilkerson, Special Assistant to the Administrator, May,
1985
M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, August, 1985
Kelly Kammerer, Director of Legislative Affairs, August, 1985

AID/WASHINGTON (CONTINUED)

Steven Mintz, Director, AFR/EA, August, 1985
Ted Morse, Director of Task Force on African Famine, October,
1985
Brian Kline, Deputy Director, AFR/EA, October, 1985
Mark Edelman, Assistant Administrator for Africa, December, 1985
John Wilkerson, Special Assistant to the Administrator, March,
1986
Richard Eney, Ethiopia Desk Officer, April, 1986
Brian Kline, Deputy Director, AFR/EA, May, 1986
Walter North, OIC/Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, August, 1986
Kelly Kammerer, Director of Legislative Affairs, November, 1986

OTHERS

Mayor Marion Barry, Washington, D.C. and staff, December, 1984
California State Senate Majority Leader John Garamendi and
staff, December, 1984

USAID TDY PERSONNEL

Dr. Anita Mackie -- agricultural specialist and program
development, USAID/Botswana, 9/84 - 12/84
Fred Cole -- program development, program management and
logistics, AID/W, 11/84 - 12/84
Fred Fischer -- program development, AID/W, 11/84 - 12/84
(later served as USAID Representative/Addis Ababa)
John Greenough -- administration, USAID/Kenya, 11/84 - 12/84
Walter North -- program development, USAID/Indonesia, 11/84 -
1/85 (later served as AID/Addis Ababa program officer)
Robert Cahn -- logistics specialist, AID/W, 12/84
Mary Proko -- secretary, AID/W, 12/84 - 3/85
Fred Cole -- program development, program management and
logistics, AID/W, 1/85
Donald Anderson -- general program management and logistics
advisor, AID/W, 1/85 - 2/85
Nancy Metcalf -- Food for Peace Officer, REDSO/Nairobi, 1/85
Dennis Warner -- water and sanitation specialist, WASH project,
1/85 - 3/85
Robert Cahn -- logistics specialist, AID/W, 2/85 - 3/85
Nancy Metcalf -- Food for Peace Officer, REDSO/Nairobi, 2/85
James Pagano -- program management, USAID/Liberia, 3/85 - 5/85
(later served as AID/Addis Ababa program officer)
Charles Kline -- water and sanitation specialist, WASH project,
3/85 - 4/85
Dr. Thomas Novotny -- health program advisor, Centers for
Disease Control, 5/85 - 6/85
Max Walton -- administration, AID/W, 5/85

USAID TDY PERSONNEL (CONTINUED)

Donald Anderson -- general program management and logistics advisor,
AID/W, 6/85 - 7/85

William Granger -- field monitor, AID/W, 6/85 - 8/85

Larry Heilman -- field monitor, AID/W, 7/85 - 8/85

David Atwood -- agricultural economist, AID/W, 7/85 - 9/85

Robert Herald -- air transport specialist, private consultant, 7/85

Peter Bradford -- port and logistics specialist, AID/W, 8/85 - 9/85

Gladys Gilbert -- field monitor, AID/W, 8/85 - 9/85

Sharon Fee -- field monitor, AID/W, 8/85 - 10/85

Gary Mansavage -- field monitor, USAID/Uganda, 9/85 - 10/85

Linda Haddon -- secretary, AID/W, 9/85 - 10/85

Nancy Metcalf -- Food for Peace Officer, REDSO/Nairobi, 10/85 - 11/85

Emily McPhie -- field monitor, USAID/Uganda, 10/85 - 12/85

Winston McPhie -- field monitor, USAID/Uganda, 10/85 - 12/85

Cary Kassebaum -- field monitor, AID/W, 10/85 - 11/85

Kurt Kunze -- inspector, RIC/Kenya, 10/85

Frederick Guymont -- water engineer, REDSO/Nairobi, 11/85

Rick Gold -- Food for Peace Officer, AID/W, 11/85 - 12/85

Max Walton -- administration, AID/W, 11/85 - 12/85

Thomas Worrick -- agriculture economist, AID/W, 1/86 - 2/86

Jon O'Rourke -- Food for Peace Officer, REDSO/Nairobi, 2/86

Fred Cole -- program development, program management and logistics,
AID/W, 2/86

Larry Heilman -- field monitor, AID/W, 3/86

Charles Christian -- program monitoring, private consultant, 3/86 - 4/86

Ray Cramer -- program monitoring, private consultant, 3/86 - 4/86

Frederick Guymont -- water engineer, REDSO/Nairobi, 3/86

Jon O'Rourke -- Food for Peace Officer, REDSO/Nairobi, 5/86

Peter Garrity -- administrative support, private consultant, 5/86

Donald Anderson -- general program management and logistics advisor,
AID/W, 7/86 - 8/86

William Faught -- agriculture specialist, REDSO/Nairobi, 7/86

Nancy Metcalf -- Food for Peace Officer, REDSO/Nairobi, 8/86

William Faught -- agriculture specialist, REDSO/Nairobi, 8/86

Laura Tuck -- agricultural economist, AID/W, 8/86

Patricia Melton -- commodity specialist, USDA, 9/86

Robert Reynolds -- commodity specialist, USDA, 9/86

Gary Robbins -- Food for Peace Officer, REDSO/Nairobi, 11/86

John Gaudet -- environmental and pest management specialist,
REDSO/Nairobi, 1/87

Dr. George Schaefers -- entomologist, Cornell University, 1/87

David Atwood -- agricultural economist, AID/W, 1/87

ANNEX H: REGULAR STAFF, USAID/ADDIS ABABA

The following individuals served on regular assignment as the staff of the USAID office in Addis Ababa during all or part of the severest period of the drought.

A.I.D. Direct-Hire Staff

Fred Fischer, U.S. Coordinator for Emergency Relief
Frederick E. Machmer jr., Deputy U.S. Coordinator for Emergency Relief

Cathy Gordon, Food for Peace Officer
Walter North, Program Officer
James Pagano, Program Officer

Mary Proko, Executive Assistant
Cookie Dwyer, Executive Assistant
Mary Cross, Executive Assistant

Personal Services Contract Staff

Betty D. Sparkman, Administrative Officer
Don Dwyer, Program Assistant
Suzi Kolstad, General Services Officer

Foreign Service National Staff

Ayelework Abebe, Program Assistant
Aster Yigzaw, General Services Assistant
Debebe Agonafer, Agricultural Economist
Desta Zewdie, Secretary
Hirut Ayele, Secretary

ANNEX 1: USG RELIEF FOOD LOSSES

The loss of USG relief food during the 1985-86 emergency was moderate: about 4.3 percent of relief food delivered was damaged or otherwise unaccounted for. Loss reports (some of which are incomplete) submitted by eight of the 10 organizations which received USG emergency food indicate that 26,339 MT of relief food was lost. Assuming that the loss rate reported by these organizations is representative for the USG program as a whole, then the total losses of relief food, as extrapolated, amounted to 31,570 MT. (This would still exclude losses for the CRS regular program and food-for-seed swap.) Of the 26,339 MT reported lost, 14,745 MT, or 2.3 percent, is attributed to shortlanding and marine damage. Losses of food while still in the port account for a further 8,872 MT, or 1.6 percent, of food deliveries. Once NGOs took delivery of food from the port, only 2,722 MT was lost, which is less than one-half of one percent.

Table 1-1 compares the loss rates for various agencies, which vary considerably from organization to organization. Obviously, differences in the managerial and logistical capabilities of the organizations were important in determining loss rates, especially for inland losses. However, a variety of other factors influenced loss rates as well, especially for port and marine losses.

Marine losses, often affected by the type of vessel, were by far the most important. The owner of the vessel is usually responsible for the loss or damage of cargo. RRC's marine losses were very small but 80 percent of its cargo came on a bulk grain carrier, an efficient and effective type of vessel. Cargo losses from LASH barges probably account for at least half of all marine losses. The loss of a quarter of a consignment arriving on LASH barges was not unusual. (So many Gulf Central barges sank at Assab that the barge fleet area was dubbed "Pearl Harbor".) The port used also influenced rates of marine loss. Table H-2 shows that the marine loss rate for the CARE program varied considerably from port to port. The long delays in discharging barges at Assab led to higher marine losses there. Also, Assab's quarantine officer condemned whole cargoes when the load was only partially damaged. Finally, some discharge reports at Assab were done poorly and may have included as marine losses food that was actually lost or spoiled after being discharged.

The quantity and quality of port management and facilities, as well as the degree of port congestion, had a great impact on port losses. Assab was vastly overcrowded and lacked sufficient storage facilities for the backlog of food that accumulated there. Food often sat on the quay for months, often without a tarpaulin covering. Not surprisingly, when a freak rainstorm flooded the port in May, 1985, the effect was devastating. Some 14,000 MT of all donor food was reportedly damaged by the storm. Port records, which themselves are unreliable, suggest that 6,000 MT of this food was USG donated, more than half of it belonging to WVRO. Massawa and Djibouti had similar problems, on a smaller scale, but generally these two ports were better managed.

Finally, the loss rates were generally higher in 1985 than in 1986. CRS's rates for marine and port losses in 1986 were roughly half of those for 1985. Obviously, the decrease in port congestion, especially at Assab, was important in reducing losses in 1986.

NGOs cannot be held responsible for marine losses; their responsibility for port losses is less clear cut. For the most part, the NGOs' agents were responsible for food while in the port. In the cases of Assab and Massawa, the agent was the Marine Transit and Service Corporation (MTSC), a state-owned monopoly. In Djibouti, private firms acted as agents. Although no NGO had much success in obtaining satisfactory service from MTSC, some NGOs received better service from their agents, in part because of close monitoring by the NGO of the agent's performance. Also, some managed better port offtake, thereby reducing the exposure of food at the port.

Although loss rates among different commodities varied, it is hard to discern the actual influence of commodities and their packaging on loss rates because of the simultaneous impact of port used, type of vessel and NGO management capabilities. However, it does seem that milk was the most vulnerable commodity, having suffered a loss rate of over six percent.

TABLE I-1 : FOOD LOSSES BY TYPE OF LOSS AND ORGANIZATION

NGO	FY 85-86	MARITIME LOSSES		PORT LOSSES		INLAND LOSSES		TOTAL	
	APPROVAL LEVEL (MT)	QUANTITY LOST (MT)	LOSS RATE	QUANTITY LOST (MT)	LOSS RATE	QUANTITY LOST (MT)	LOSS RATE	REPORTED LOSSES (MT)	LOSS RATE
CRS	354,321	8,706	2.69%	3,750	1.16%	1,053	0.32%	13,509	4.16%
WVRO	81,858	2,750	2.80%	4,712	4.79%	1,412	1.59%	8,873	9.18%
CARE	107,408	1,159	1.01%	301	0.30%	120	0.12%	1,580	1.43%
SAVE	40,401	1,176	2.92%	N/A	N/A	46	0.10%	1,221	3.02%
LICROSS	21,610	453	2.15%	104	0.49%	0	0.00%	556	2.64%
FHI	6,960	58	0.83%	4	0.06%	92	1.31%	153	2.19%
EOC	4,463	65	1.43%	1	0.02%	0	0.00%	66	1.45%
ICRC	59,654	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
RRC	50,000	379	0.76%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	379	0.76%
WFP	9,973	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
REPORTED TOTAL		14,745	2.23%	8,872	1.60%	2,722	0.45%	26,339	4.29%
ESTIMATED TOTAL	736,648	16,462	2.23%	11,773	1.60%	3,334	0.45%	31,570	4.29%

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa and specified NGOs.

NOTE: Loss rates are calculated based on the relevant quantity of food as reported by the NGO. In many cases, these quantities differ from the final FY 85-86 approval levels. For example, some USG shipments were consigned to one NGO but were later reallocated to another organization. A reallocated consignment would be included in calculating the marine and port losses of the original NGO that served as consignee without being included in that NGO's FY 85-86 approval level.

NOTE: Local ICRC and WFP offices did not report losses to AID/Addis Ababa.

NOTE: SAVE had not settled port losses with MTSC at the time its loss report was submitted. Most other NGOs still had USG food at the port or in warehouses when loss reports were submitted. Eventual losses may be higher.

TABLE I-2: CARE/ETHIOPIA MARINE
AND PORT LOSSES BY PORT

<u>Port</u>	<u>Marine Loss Rate</u>	<u>Port Loss Rate</u>
Djibouti	0.4%	0.3%
Mombasa	0.3%	0.0%
Assab	4.5%	1.0%
Massawa	2.8%	N/A ¹

SOURCE: CARE/Ethiopia

NOTE¹: Upon receipt by CARE in Massawa, the consignment was reallocated to ICRC. ICRC's port losses are not available.

TABLE I-3: FOOD LOSS BY TYPE OF LOSS
FOR SELECTED USG COMMODITIES

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Marine Loss Rate</u>	<u>Port Loss Rate</u>	<u>Inland Loss Rate</u>	<u>Total Loss Rate</u>
Bulgur	2.48%	1.65%	0.45%	4.39%
Wheat Flour	1.50%	0.53%	0.04%	2.07%
SFSG	2.71%	0.55%	0.32%	3.58%
Vegoil	1.66%	0.52%	0.20%	2.37%
SBS Oil	1.90%	0.66%	0.52%	3.08%
Butter Oil	0.25%	1.10%	0.74%	2.09%
NFDM	2.25%	3.07%	1.21%	6.53%
CSM	3.60%	2.10%	0.42%	6.12%

SOURCE: AID/Addis Ababa and NGOs.

ANNEX J: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS USED

ADRA	(Seventh Day) Adventist Relief Agency
AJJDC	American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
AMC	Agricultural Marketing Corporation (PMGSE)
Agpak	Agricultural Package
Bega	Rainfall season (October-January)
Belg	Rainfall season (February-May) (also season often used to produce a minor crop)
CDA	Churches Drought Action-Africa (later JRP)
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Association
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSM	Corn-Soya Milk
CSO	Central Statistics Office (PMGSE)
ECS	Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat
EEC	European Economic Community
EECMY	Ethiopian Evangelical Church-Mekane Yesus
EOC	Ethiopian Orthodox Church
EPPG	UN Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Group
ERCS	Ethiopian Red Cross Society
EWS	Early Warning System
FFN	Food for the North
FFW	Food-for-Work
FHI	Food for the Hungry, International
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West)
FY	Fiscal Year
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFER	International Fund for Emergency Relief
JRP	Joint Relief Partnership
Kiremt	Rainfall season (June-September)
LASH	Lighter Aboard Ship
LICROSS	League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MAP	Medical Assistance Program
MC	Missionaries of Charity
MT	Metric ton (2,200 pounds)
MTSC	Marine Transit and Service Corporation
Meher	Main crop
NATRACOR	National Transport Corporation (PMGSE)
NFDM	Non-fat dry milk
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OEOE	UN Office of Emergency Operations in Ethiopia
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
ORT	Oral Rehydration Therapy
PPF	Partners for Productivity
PMGSE	Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia
PSC	Personal Services Contract(or)

ANNEX J: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS USED (CONTINUED)

REDSO	USAID Regional Development Services Office
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SAVE	Save the Children/US
SCF/UK	Save the Children Federation/United Kingdom
SER/CM	USAID office of contract management
TDY	Temporary Duty
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNASG	UN Assistant Secretary General
UNDRO	UN Disaster Relief Organization
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
US DHHS	US Department of Health and Human Services
USG	United States Government
WASH	Water and sanitation health project
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WTOE	WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia
WVRO	World Vision Relief Organization