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INTEGRATING WID OR RESTRUCTURING DEVELOPMENT?

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Part of the
pre-LAC workshop
packet sent to
participants
to get them
focused on WID

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About fifteen years ago, a number of the donor organizations in international development initiated women's programs. The newly formed Women's Committee of a well known donor organization had a clear mandate: "to infuse a feminist perspective into the organization." The program was fully funded and **staffed for three years.** In the first meeting of the newly formed committee there was a major split. Some of the members began immediately to strategize about how to build a power base and a constituency that would ensure future funding for the program when three years were over. Others thought three years were sufficient to achieve the feminist infusion and wanted to spend their time and effort on achieving this outcome. Fifteen years later, this women's program survives from year to year, fighting the other programs within the organization for its budget allocations. It has exactly the same staff it had when it began, and the organization is not permeated with a feminist philosophy. The director of the women's program is brought into every meeting of importance and expected to speak at least once reprimanding those in the discussion for their failure to take women's issues seriously.

What went wrong? Why did the advocates of the infusion strategy lose both with their feminist colleagues who focussed on perpetuating the Women's Program and with the institution, at large, which did not integrate Women in Development [WID] concerns into its work? Why did those who advocated building the Women's Program constituency also fail to create a power base sufficient to cause change in the other programs?

In this paper, we have been asked to examine the institutional responses to WID over the past ten to fifteen years, and to extract from this experience the relevant lessons for the institutional or structural arrangements for foreign assistance in general. Such an assignment is based on two as-

sumptions: 1) that the development community has learned which institutional arrangements are more and less effective in WID programming and 2) that the WID issue is sufficiently representative of foreign assistance issues in general so that some of what we have learned is relevant to other aid issues. The first assumption is clearly suspect since there continues to be such heated controversy among those who are concerned about WID approaches. Also we do not believe that WID is like other development issues so that lessons here are generalizable, but we do believe that there are elements in the WID issue that give it importance to development in general. We are nonetheless undeterred from our task though we approach the lessons we have learned with some tentativeness and we make the links between these and general foreign assistance with perhaps more conjecture than proof.

We begin by looking at the experience with WID programming over the past decade and a half, and set out a typology for classifying both the institutional arrangements and programmatic approaches that WID called forth. We then discuss why our abilities to predict the effectiveness of WID programming remain elusive. Finally, we turn to what has been learned that is relevant and useful for rethinking foreign assistance in all its forms, making the linkage between programming lessons and lessons for the institutionalization of program responses.

For ease of discussion, we use "institutions," "organizations," and "agencies" to refer to the broad spectrum of foreign assistance bodies ranging from UN agencies, to multi- and bi-lateral donors, to NGOs and FVOs, to foundations and consortia. In some cases, the comments we make and conclusions we draw are also relevant to national governments which have institutionalized WID concerns in their policies, planning and implementation

strategies.

I. The Institutional and Programmatic Experience with WID

There are two basic models (often referred to as the institutional "machinery") that have been adopted by donor agencies to respond to and program WID interests.

The first model involves the establishment of a special, designated WID office (with a WID Officer/Director) which has the responsibility for raising the issues of WID for the institution as a whole and for carrying out WID programming. The rationale for the special WID Office rests on the assumption that the compelling argument for the centrality of women to systemic development is not, and will not be, self-evident; someone must take on the advocacy, teaching and watch-dogging roles if WID is to be taken seriously and if institutional resistance is to be overcome.

The second model involves the integration, mainlining, or mainstreaming of WID into existing institutional program areas and sectoral activities. The rationale for this approach rests on the belief that only when the core staff and programs of the organization accept and integrate WID, will the institutional response and effort be both serious and effective.

Programming approaches to WID can also be classified in much the same way and the rationales are similar. Sometimes agencies "target" women with special women's projects or women's components of their development projects. They justify this approach as necessary to overcome past exclusions of women from the benefits of development efforts. Sometimes agencies adopt an "integration" approach which insists that every development project take account of the inclusion of and impact on women in its design, implementation and evaluation. The rationale for this approach is that every project activity

affects all segments of an economy and society and that development efforts should, therefore, take account of these effects on women.

There is no reason to suppose that the two typologies are matched, however. The designated WID Office institutional approach does not invariably go with the targeted programmatic approach nor does the mainstreaming institutional structure invariably result in integrated programming. An agency with a WID Office may adopt targeted, integrated or combined programming strategies, as can an agency with the mainstreaming structure. Similarly, there is no inevitable match of institutional machinery or programmatic approaches with the effectiveness of WID programming. Some people suggest that separate WID programs and targeted programmatic arrangements more often entail a "welfare" approach to women while integrated institutional and program approaches treat women as economic resources or producers. On the face of it, there is no internal logic that dictates the connection between one structural arrangement and its programmatic thrust. Both of the institutional and programmatic approaches have been successful in some instances and failed completely in others. Each has strengths but each has also encountered pitfalls.

In the agencies that have seriously tried to initiate WID programs, whether with a separate or integrated approach, there have frequently been high-level policy decisions and pronouncements concerning the priority of WID. They have adopted special budgets, procedures for reviewing project documents, arrangements for interactions between staff concerned with WID issues and others; training of staff to help them implement the policy initiatives. But, though the experience varies among development agencies, neither approach has been as effective in institutionalizing the WID concern as was hoped when it was adopted. What goes wrong?

The special WID office, designed to "highlight" a new program priority runs the risk (demonstrated in fact) of being "sidelined." We have seen this model sabotaged through: a) the appointment of a strong person to a weak, underfunded, understaffed, office with no line authority; b) the appointment of a weak person (a "sweet" woman who "gets along" with everyone to "persuade" people of WID's importance); or c) the appointment of a difficult person (an aggressive woman to badger recalcitrant--male?--colleagues into recognition of WID's centrality). We have seen the qualifications for the WID Officer set at such a level as to ensure a long recruitment process and the postponement of any real programming. The mainstreaming approach runs the risk of submersion or drowning in the ongoing stream of familiar activities and entrenched interests. By insisting that WID be placed within the existing programs, some institutions have ensured that it never receives the human or financial resources or the creative attention required for effectiveness.

Insofar as either of the two institutional and programmatic approaches can be effective, combinations may be more effective. Some agencies combine the special WID Office and the mainstreaming structures and undertake both targeted and integrated programming. They have sometimes designated WID officers within each of the mainstream sectoral or regional programs, in field offices, and at the top levels (next to the Prime Minister, or the Administrator, or the CEO). They have combined policy statements with program initiatives, they have done women focussed programming and integrated programming, they have established training for all levels of staff and they have systematized the monitoring process to insist on a WID component.

However, even such combined approaches can falter. Sometimes they suffer from burn-out since such efforts are difficult to sustain and the competition

for resources within development agencies is always severe. Also, placing WID officers in each department of an organization does not ensure that these individuals will have any clout within those departments. Often, such individuals, even within the mainstream, are sidelined. Systems have rarely been tried that would ensure that all WID staff, placed throughout an organization, are in touch with and accountable to each other as well as to their line authorities. Sometimes even the comprehensive approach can be diffuse and uncoordinated.

So, all approaches have merit and may be effective, but often they fail. If this sounds like an unresolved issue, then we have made our point. But some things have been learned.

II. Lessons Learned from WID Experience

What has been learned from the WID experience both about institutional structuring of foreign assistance and about programmatic approaches to achieve certain goals? The most obvious, and most serious, conclusion we can draw from comparing the WID approaches is that it is impossible to predict whether or not effective programming will occur based solely on which institutional model is adopted by an agency, and it is impossible to predict how well a project will include women solely on the basis of whether the programmatic approach "targets" or "integrates" women.

There are two levels of lessons learned from the WID experience which we shall discuss because we perceive their relevance to broader development assistance approaches. First are the lessons that have to do with the interface between institutional competencies and styles and programmatic directions and goals. Second are lessons that are derived directly from WID

programming that have implications for foreign assistance institutions and the way they organize themselves for their work.

A. Lessons about Institutional Styles and Programming Goals

Many authors and commentators have specified the conditions under which various WID approaches are effective or not effective both in terms of establishing a strong presence within the agencies and in terms of carrying out projects in the field that incorporate WID concerns (Youssef and Staudt to name only two.). Factors that are critical for effectiveness include: sufficient authority (sometimes achieved through bureaucratic insiders); sufficient resources; an active supportive constituency; and methods for circumventing antagonisms and sabotage efforts, for permeating commitment throughout an agency from policy to implementation, for monitoring and applying sanctions and rewards, and for assuring "congruence with political, ideological, and professional agendas" (Staudt, p.18)

We believe, however, that it is not the institutional machinery, per se, that makes the difference. Most of us are not against women's components in projects but we are against marginalized, underfunded, understaffed and ineffective women's projects. What is important in whether WID (or any other development initiative) is taken seriously is the institutional strategy that its proponents adopt. A strategy is context-specific. To plan and implement an effective institutional response to WID issues, one must assess both the issue's importance and the institutional context.

There are several important things to know about any given institution and, more specifically, about its institutional politics. What are the mores and where are the power blocks? Where are the alliances and antagonisms? What

are the (formal and informal) patterns of communication and decision making, and who is included and who is left out of them? Where does change come from and who resists it? Who has which interests in this issue and whose interests will be threatened? Depending on the answers to these (and other) questions, one adopts different strategies for affecting WID programming of which the structural institutional arrangements for locating the responsibility for WID are only a part.

In addition to understanding these things within a particular agency, one should also assess the relative advantage of each agency vis a vis others involved in development. In foreign assistance, there are different types of institutions at work, and each has different capabilities and limitations. Depending on what the programmatic goal is in any given situation, one type of institution may be better suited to accomplish it than others. No one type of institution can, or should be expected to, provide the full range of policies, projects or programs that may be necessary for accomplishing WID goals. Effective WID programming requires tailoring a strategy both to the institutional base from which the program is initiated and to the stage or focus of the programming goal.

For example, let us assume that there are three types of institutions: government, professional intermediary institutions, and private voluntary organizations. Each has characteristic strengths. PVOs are strong as advocacy and promotional agencies, and have organizing skills but fewer technical and managerial skills. Professional institutions are strong in research, conceptualization and analysis and can provide certain technical and managerial assistance. Government level institutions have access to financial resources and specialized expertise which gives advantages in terms of scale

and coverage and infrastructural development. Some of these strengths are more important in raising and popularizing issues, some are important in focussed or targeted programming and some are necessary for integrated, mainstream and broad scale programming.

Below is a matrix which suggests elements to consider in designing a
Institutional Responses by Stages of WId Programming

Stages/ Institutions	Popularizing	Targetting	Mainstreaming
Non-Government	advocacy of women as beneficiaries; welfare projects	advocacy of women as workers; economic projects	advocacy of women's roles in the economy; sectoral projects
Professional	research on women	technical assistance to WID projects; management assistance to WID projects	analysis of women's roles in economy; integration of gender perspective in analysis
Government	establishment of WID unit; welfare projects	recognition of women in gov't plans; economic projects	integration of women in sectoral programs; integration of women in gov't plans

The matrix indicates that a development programmer who wants to design

effective programs must take account of the kind of institution s/he works with and the type of programming s/he wants to do, matching the two in a strategy that relies on the strengths of the particular institution and recognizes the stage in programming necessitated by circumstances.

When a development focus carries a great deal of cultural/emotive baggage, more emphasis has to be put on activities that address and overcome entrenched resistance. However, the best approaches to overcoming resistance may not be those characterized as advocacy or promotional. WID has given us ample evidence of this. Women's roles and responsibilities in societies, whether modern or traditional and whether embedded in religious dictum or reflecting household convenience, are believed by each society to be "natural" (and therefore "right") based on the fact that women bear and raise children. It has been necessary for those of us who see WID as central to development to recognize and deal with basic sexism, inherent value conflicts, and cultural blind spots.

We have learned one clear lesson from the dilemmas posed by this reality. That is, when we emphasize women's equality with men, and their "rights" to an equal share of the benefits of development, we meet continual resistance both in our own development assistance agencies and among the powers that be in the recipient countries. This is because the emphasis on equality appears to challenge the values and behavior of those who have not been involved in WID programming and calls forth defensive reactions from them. At best, the resistant group accedes to WID programs that are welfare oriented, defining women as needy, poor, left out, etc. By and large, such welfare programs have not been effective either in overcoming poverty or in including women in development as actors and beneficiaries. We discuss this in more detail

below.

On the other hand, when we avoid value discussions and emphasize that women are economic producers in their roles both inside and outside their households, much of the resistance has faded. When we can demonstrate that development projects which take the gender factor into account are more apt to succeed in meeting their goals than are projects which ignore it, people who are committed to development are frequently less defensive and more engaged to think about WID differently. Again, we return to this below.

B. Lessons about Programmatic Factors

Our experiences with WID have revealed a number of factors in the programmatic realm which have implications for foreign assistance organizations and the management and arrangement of foreign assistance programs. There are several lessons to be derived by looking at development assistance through the gender "lens."

1. Disaggregation. WID has taught us the importance of disaggregating data in order to understand the population groups with whom we intend to work in development. Economistic models which assume that the labor force follows wages (people make rational decisions about maximizing their returns measuring opportunity costs against real costs) are wrong, not because people are in any sense irrational, but because they operate within systems that proscribe the range of their choices. One factor that matters greatly in every culture in determining the range of choices each person can make about work, the use of time, and the location of activities is gender. Women and men make different choices. Any development project or program that assumes labor will uniformly follow wages misses the realities of the gender based division of labor, of the nonformal economy and of household production. That is quite a bit of

reality to miss!

Further, our WID experience teaches us that within gender disaggregation, equally important is disaggregation by class, race, ethnicity, urban, rural, etc... All women are no more the same than are all men.

2. Women and Poverty. Two interrelated trends are obvious in the 1980's: the persistence of absolute poverty and the feminization of poverty. In many parts of the developing world, industrialization is either not occurring at a fast enough pace to employ all who want and need employment or is proving more capital- than labor-absorbing. As a result, the absolute numbers of poor households which must piece together livelihoods from a variety of scarce resources will remain very high. Women are the key mediators between the fluctuating opportunities in the wider environment and the daily subsistence requirements of poor households.

Insofar as the purpose of development is to alleviate poverty and the causes of poverty (and this, with the creation of the conditions for self-sustaining attainment of political and economic goals is surely the goal), one learns a great deal more about poverty--and the poor--when one looks at women and their activities. This brings us to the second important programmatic lesson learned from WID activities of the past decade and a half.

3. Women and Livelihoods. As they generate rural livelihoods, women are more apt than men to undertake a multiplicity of overlapping as well as sequential activities, subsistence as well as market activities, and income-conserving as well as income-generating activities. In urban areas, women are more likely than men to be engaged in production that starts in the home and incorporates household work and in marketing in the streets and on the sidewalks rather than in established business places. Their work is mobile,

and women often take on each other's work both at home and outside, trading tasks without direct monetary compensation.

Again, the strict economists' model of market oriented development does not capture these realities, and development assessments that measure growth in production and income miss major processes by which people improve their lives and livelihoods.

4. Women as Active Producers. During the past decade, many development projects have targeted or incorporated women as the people at the bottom of the economic ladder, left out of progress by a system of traditional values and role assignments. Most of these projects have been purely welfare projects designed to deliver goods and services to poor women in their roles as homemakers, reproducers and child rearers. Even when projects have taken a more explicitly economic orientation, targeted to women in their roles as workers and producers, often they have developed many of the same weaknesses which are found in welfare projects.

In her analysis of the "Misbehavior" of projects for women in the Third World, Mayra Buvinic suggests three factors that help explain the persistence of a welfare orientation: specific project characteristics (e.g. volunteer staff without needed technical expertise); the nature of the implementing institutions (e.g. often positioned in the welfare or social service sectors); and inadequate allocations of financial and social resources.

At least two other factors should be added to explain the persistence of a welfare-istic approach to women's programming. First, the typical WID (as well as the typical poverty alleviation) project fails to provide the range of interventions required to make women (and the poor) productive. Generally, agricultural development projects provide credit, subsidies, inputs, training,

extension and supportive price policies, not to mention the sophisticated research that goes into developing new crop varieties. A typical WID project, however, provides its beneficiaries with one or the other of these project components, but rarely with the entire package. Project inputs, such as credit, do some good. If linked to pricing policies which favor production, or with infrastructural development which aids the purchase of raw materials and the marketing of output, the impact could be far more profound. Without providing or addressing the need for backward and forward linkages that make an asset productive or employment secure, projects are able neither to integrate women into development nor to alleviate poverty.

SYNERGY
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The second, more fundamental, factor explaining the "misbehavior" of WID projects relates to their basic categorization of poor women (and the poor in general). Women are seen, first, in their social categories (mothers, female heads of households) rather than as active agents, workers and managers of resources. The poor are categorized according to assets (landless, asset-poor). At the basic conceptual level, WID and poverty alleviation projects often emphasize the weaknesses and neediness of their clients rather than their capacities and competencies. As a result, the project staff feel they must "help" the poor, rather than design a project which supports their self-directed and concerted economic activities.

YES!
A real
shift for
"victim"
participants

These four programmatic "lessons" have a common core; each points up the need for development assistance agencies to know the people their projects are intended to assist. To intervene effectively in any economic system, an outside agency should gather the relevant data about what makes the situation operate as it does (who does what, what resources they use; who has access to and control over these resources and why, where the restrictions to actions

using; expanding women's
productive capacity is a necessary
condition for sustainable economic
development ✓

lie, etc.). It should recognize the capacities that exist in the situation rather than viewing the poor as having no resources, and provide its support in such a way as to encourage and develop these as the basis on which self-reliant development will occur.

III. Institutional Implications of the WID Experience

The lessons learned from WID, both at the institutional level and in the programmatic realm have implications for how agencies engaged in foreign assistance should approach their work and how they should structure themselves to be most effective providers of aid to development.

First, in our discussion of different types of institutions, we noted that foreign assistance agencies should recognize their own institutional strengths (and weaknesses) and styles. This means that they should structure themselves in ways that allow them to work cooperatively with other agencies that have different strengths and styles.

One mechanism for linking the work of private, non-governmental agencies with professional institutions and government programs may be sectoral programming. A sectoral approach is being tested in India with some success. In India, poor women are engaged in large numbers in most of the critical sectors of the economy: in crop production, dairying, small animal husbandry, poultry, fishery, forestry/natural resources, artisan production, silk production, and home-based manufacturing. Several pilot projects in support of women's work have been launched within these sectors. Prior to the projects, surveys of the sectors were undertaken to uncover and diagnose the systems of production and marketing, the trends within each sector, the number and types of critical constraints in the sectors, and key interventions to address these

constraints. Most critical to this diagnostic process was the analysis of women's niche in each sector.

By identifying and analyzing women's work within given sectors, the project planners were able to identify key sectorally-specific interventions that could be tailored to address the circumstances and activities of a particular group operating in that sector. Moreover, because government programs are typically developed along sectoral lines, project interventions built upon and linked women to existing macro systems and institutions. And, because sectorally-specific interventions relate to all actors in a particular sector and not just to a given group of beneficiaries or to an isolated activity, these projects were able through systematic lobbying and documentation to translate their experience into effective public programs.

Donor agencies which have existing programs in certain sectors, working with government and/or professional institutions, could also select one or two successful PVOs working in these sectors and establish a three-way partnership. Coordination among institutions, i. sectoral work, could be effective in utilizing the particular strengths of each institution. PVOs would benefit from the technical expertise and direct linkage with the government or professional institution; the government or professional institutions would benefit from the gender and/or poverty perspective of the PVO; and the beneficiaries would benefit from the widest possible range of interventions and support.

A sectoral approach, as opposed to more conventional beneficiary or activity-focussed approaches, ties into the programmatic lessons mentioned above. By working with women or the poor in the critical sectors of the economy, the approach serves not only to link women and the poor to

sectorally-specific government programs but also, by so doing, to make their work in these sectors "visible" to national policy makers. By treating women or the poor as an economic category (workers) rather than as social or asset-poor categories, the approach effectively argues the case for women and the poor as agents and clients for the mainstream programs and policies of government.

Even while the sectoral approach has these advantages for foreign assistance agencies, it is also important that these agencies structure their programs to take account of the lessons of disaggregation. That is, they cannot assume that sectoral approaches are common across geographical areas. Foreign assistance agencies must structure themselves in such a way that they are able to gather information about, and respond to, the specifics of any setting in which they are providing aid. This requires an ability to fine-tune development aid and an ability to work in partnership with other agencies involved in the area of work and with the local beneficiary community on whose capacities the assistance should build.

This does not necessarily imply that foreign assistance agencies must greatly increase their staffs and have, within their departments, expertise on every micro-region of the world. It does mean that these agencies must: 1) develop analytical tools for relevant disaggregation; 2) train their staffs in use of these tools in program identification, planning, design and implementation; 3) establish staff positions whose explicit task is coordination with other foreign aid agencies, specifically the PVOs and professional level organizations; 4) set up systems (either by relying on local consultants and informants or on PVOs or other agencies) to gather information about project sites and to interact with local beneficiaries as

therefore

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Sounds like our strategic plan

partners. Implied is the necessity for structuring foreign assistance so that the communication lines from the field to headquarters, from project requesters to donors, are active. Less initiative in project design should reside in the U.S.; more should reside with those for whom the assistance is intended.

We cannot set out a single blue-print for the design of foreign assistance agencies which meets these programmatic requirements. There is, we would suggest, no single model that is right for all institutions. Rather, if the importance of knowing the clients is acknowledged--both their activities and their capacities--then each institution must seek the strategy that combines its institutional strengths and program focus for effectiveness.

IV. A Paradigm Shift?

In some sense, the questions we have been addressing here are the wrong ones. To examine the lessons learned from the WID experience and their implications for the structuring of foreign assistance is a subset of a far more important issue.

The real lesson from the WID experience goes to the heart of the development paradigm. What WID has done is to identify an additional variable without which the development equation is intrinsically flawed. When gender is not considered in development planning, the development equation is underdetermined. The explanatory and predictive power of development program design is substantially improved by the inclusion of the gender variable.

As an analogue let us look at what happens in the physical sciences when a new element of matter is discovered. If the element is important, its discovery causes a revision in all previously used explanatory systems. The shift from Newtonian physics to quantum mechanics occurred because the power

As I've said - it is a
NECESSARY CONDITION

of the quantum explanation was so much greater than that of the Newtonian approach. When the Darwinian theory of evolution emerged it, too, replaced the previously held theories of the formation of new species. Again, the explanatory power was significantly greater than that of other theories

The interesting question for us is how did the institutions of science respond to these paradigm shifts? Can we learn anything from them about how institutions of foreign assistance might adjust to the inclusion of the new, powerful gender variable?

The answer, in the scientific cases, is that the institutions adjusted with difficulty. Physicists who were masters in Newtonian physics found themselves unable to function with quantum theories. The power of the new theory was obvious, so that they could not resist it as irrelevant but their careers were threatened. Many went to specially formed institutes and summer programs for re-tooling and retraining. Many learned enough to teach quantum physics but never became well enough trained to be effective experimental physicists with the new approach. They lost out in terms of professional leadership.

The new generation of physicists still in school observed that the European universities were the center of training in quantum physics; they migrated to these centers for their scholarly work, either for degrees or for post-doctoral fellowships.

University departments and centers of physical research had all their positions filled with Newtonian physicists. To adjust to the new theory, they established parallel separate institutes and programs of quantum physics, retaining the old-guard in their tenured positions, but finding adaptive ways to initiate work in the new field. Gradually, these special centers were absorbed into full physics departments as the older generation retired and

died and younger people, by now trained in the new theoretical approach, replaced them.

The Darwinian revolution was more troubled. As is the case with WID programming, the new discovery challenged deeply held values and cultural norms. While many of the life scientists found the power of the evolutionary explanation convincing, and they retrained themselves, others fought the paradigm as in violation of both their previous work and their religious beliefs. Still, over time, universities adjusted their departments, biologists redirected their research, etc

In WID, we have been too modest. We have taken the integration of women into development as a goal, and we have undertaken women-focussed programming (whether separated or integrated). We, along with the resisters to WID, have been content to focus on women almost as an afterthought to development. We began to focus on WID when the evidence was clear that women were "being left out of" or "being disadvantaged by" development. We wanted to correct a bad situation. In the course of further research and analysis, it has become clear that women's roles are essential and important in production. It has also become clear that a gender division of labor exists in all societies and that it is necessary to factor the gender variable into our analysis (collect gender disaggregated data) in order to plan and execute development projects with a higher power of predictability and effectiveness.

But we have not demonstrated this necessity convincingly enough. The power of the gender variable is not yet widely accepted.

Many of us are, ourselves, convinced, however, that without explicit inclusion of the gender variable, all development efforts are weakened. If we are right, the essential lesson from WID for the structuring of foreign

assistance is, simply, that all institutions and agencies of foreign aid (and, in Africa, Asia and Latin America, of national development) must restructure themselves, retrain their staffs, and redesign their programs to ensure that every procedure and instrument and program and project of assistance incorporates the gender variable.