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**HACIENDA DISSOLUTION, PEASANT STRUGGLE, AND LAND MARKET  
IN ECUADOR'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS  
(CANTON COLTA, CHIMBORAZO PROVINCE)\***

by

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## ABSTRACT

This paper is primarily concerned with the local politics of land transfers from landlords to peasants in twentieth-century Ecuador. Andean versions of peasant politics--resistance, self-interested collaboration, "working the system to their minimum disadvantage" (Hobsbawm 1973, p. 13)--played an important role in weakening an already limp hacienda regime and in reconstituting a semiproletarian peasantry in its image. Local analysis of three cases in Ecuador's central highlands revealed that divisions among state institutions and landed families created different conditions for peasants "to work." When a hacienda was dissolved, land transfers (and sales) were a result of long-term peasant struggles and were governed by patron-client politics. Although the market in ex-hacienda lands was stimulated by agrarian reform, it was driven primarily by estate fragmentation by inheritance and by landlord-peasant conflicts associated with the transition to capitalism in highland agriculture.

\* \* \* \* \*

The purpose of this paper is to describe and explain the recent emergence of peasant petty-commodity production in a microregion formerly dominated by large estates. I contend that the formation of the peasant sector in Colta can be traced to the fragmentation of landed estates by inheritance since the early twentieth century and to the nearly constant, even everyday struggles between landlords and peasants over access to hacienda resources. Both fragmentation and landlord-peasant conflicts shaped the emergence of a local land market. Not surprisingly, this land market has obeyed the terms of local power relations. My analysis, therefore, centers around these local power relations and the precise manner in which they shaped land transfers from landlord to peasant.

Before proceeding to an analysis of local conditions, however, it is necessary briefly to consider their larger historical and regional context.

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HACIENDA DISSOLUTION, PEASANT STRUGGLE, AND LAND MARKET  
IN ECUADOR'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS (CANTON COLTA, CHIMBORAZO PROVINCE)<sup>1</sup>

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The Transition to Capitalism in Andean Ecuador

Andean Ecuador's hacienda-huasipungo (labor/service tenancy) system emerged in its most recent form after concertaje, or bonded agricultural labor, was abolished by decree in 1918. The hacienda-huasipungo labor/tenure system integrated both internal and external peasants into a contradictory web of capitalist and noncapitalist production relations that varied considerably by region and from hacienda to hacienda. The power relations inherent to the hacienda system spread beyond the confines of the estate, shaping rural social structure and state politics.<sup>2</sup> The system dominated agrarian life in many highland regions (la Sierra) until its dissolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s as haciendas made historically uneven transitions to capitalism (Guerrero 1978, 1983; CIDA 1965; Arcos and Marchán 1978; Barsky 1978; Murmis 1978; Waters 1985; Sylva 1986).

In the central highland valleys, many haciendas made a "Junker" type transition as "modern" dairy enterprises aligned with bourgeois capital and the reformist state (Guerrero 1978, p. 57; see de Janvry 1981, p. 107; also see Lenin 1964). In the peripheral highland provinces (El Austro, Chimborazo, Tungurahua, Bolívar, Carchi), a "Junker" style transition was less viable. Nevertheless, a significant cluster of haciendas in the peripheral regions also made transitions to capitalist dairy farming by reducing their holdings to the fertile valley land where mechanization was most profitable. This compaction was accomplished by externalizing the hacienda's peasant workers through agrarian reform and via sales of the marginal lands these peasants had inhabited and cultivated within the estates (Waters 1985).

In all highland regions the estates of the landed elite suffered a history of fragmentation by inheritance and subsequent "dismemberment"<sup>3</sup> as heirs sold land to nonfamily members (see Waters 1985, p. 222; Guerrero 1978; Arcos and Marchán 1978; Barsky 1978; Archetti 1981, p. 307; Lentz 1986, p. 191; Gango-tena, Paez, and Polit 1980, p. 58, cf. Sylva 1986, p. 178). Since at least the early twentieth century, hacienda fragmentation and land sales gave rise both to a petty agrarian bourgeoisie (Archetti 1981, p. 309; see de Janvry 1981, p. 82), and to the proliferation of a significant, but often precarious minifundio sector (see Arcos and Marchán 1978, pp. 26-27). By mid-twentieth century, many haciendas were well along the road to dissolution, having become

the objects of peasant "siege" (CIDA 1965, pp. 419-88) and class struggle (Guerrero 1983). Under agrarian reformism these weakened haciendas gave way to a farmer or peasant road of petty commodity production on private parcels and to a few production cooperatives on former Roman Catholic Church and state-owned haciendas (Guerrero 1978, pp. 56-60). Today the smallholder sector supplies the bulk of Ecuador's domestic foodstuffs (McClintock 1987). As a result of these and other developments, a classical latifundio-minifundio pattern is no longer characteristic of highland Ecuador's agrarian structure (Waters 1985, p. 333).

### The Capitalist Transition in Chimborazo

In Chimborazo, as elsewhere in Ecuador's highlands, agriculture has made a transition to capitalism. Until as late as the early 1970s, however, the province's agriculture was still characterized by some as "semifeudal" or "pre-capitalist." Indeed, "prior to the initiation of Ecuador's agrarian reform program in 1964, the Province of Chimborazo was said to have one of the most anachronistic agrarian structures in the country, if not in the entire hemisphere" (Haney and Haney 1989, p. 70). The 1954 agricultural census revealed that Chimborazo's agrarian structure was classically latifundio-minifundio. Of all provincial farms, 94 percent were under 10 hectares while 0.3 percent controlled nearly 50 percent of the total available farmland (Haney and Haney 1989, p. 75; see CIDA 1965, p. 18).

It was suggested that Chimborazo's haciendas were "backward" because of: (1) distance from markets, (2) agro-ecological disadvantage relative to other regions (CIDA 1965, p. 438), and (3) the presence of a "traditional" landed "class fraction" resistant to "modernization" (see Barsky 1978). Subsequent work has suggested that these assumptions are, at best, overly schematic and, at worst, simply misinformed. Sylva (1986) has demonstrated the diverse nature of Chimborazo's landholding "aristocracy" and its intimate links with bourgeois capital. Waters (1985) has shown for nearby Salcedo, Cotopaxi Province, that under marginal agro-ecological and market conditions, so-called "traditional haciendas" followed relatively efficient, capital-scarce production strategies. In Chimborazo, Sylva noted the diversity of conditions on the haciendas, pointing out that some made a Junker style transition while others were expropriated or dissolved. On many Chimborazo haciendas, according to Sylva, capitalist relations of production (cash nexus) alternated with noncapitalist forms (Sylva 1986; cf. Guerrero 1983, p. 142).<sup>4</sup> Following Guerrero, Sylva suggested that the transformation/dissolution of the hacienda in Chimborazo was conditioned by (to paraphrase): (a) limits to capital investment on the haciendas, (b) landed families' portfolios, (c) national politics, and (d) peasant resistance.

The reproduction of the hacienda-huasipungo system in twentieth century Chimborazo was a historically complex affair, not a "museum of feudalism" as the CIDA (1965, p. 45) report had pronounced. Within this transitional, proto-capitalist system, the differential rents paid by internal and external peasants provided a base for mercantile accumulation. In general terms, the hacienda accumulation regime was subsumed by the circulation of capital in the national and international economy (see Guerrero 1978).

## The Cases

The cases concern peasant resistance and land transfers in the dissolution processes of three "traditional" haciendas located in the Colta microregion. This microregion, which lies at the heart of Chimborazo Province, is densely populated by a predominately indigenous peasantry [see Figures 1 and 2]. Fieldwork and local archival research were carried out in Colta in 1986/87. Most of the field research was concentrated on what was the Hacienda Gatazo, while archival research was intended to sample a local universe of hacienda social relations and land sales for the period 1885-1987, with special emphasis on the period after 1950. This information made possible a partial reconstruction of the recent history of the Haciendas Gatazo (Zambrano), Culluctus, and El Hospital Gatazo. Taken together, it is my belief that these local cases can contribute to finer analyses of the global trends (see Smith 1984) in rural Latin America's transition to capitalism under agrarian reformism.

The authors of the path-breaking CIDA report for Ecuador (1965, p. 57) proposed a global typology of prereform "hacienda tenure systems." This typology has been influential both in Ecuadorian social science and in the formulation of agrarian policy. In the 1970s, Andres Guerrero (1978, p. 56) expanded the CIDA typology<sup>5</sup> with a dual road model of hacienda "dissolution/transformation" [see Figure 3]. His model is useful for situating our cases in the overall highland context.<sup>6</sup>

As will become apparent below, the Hacienda Culluctus can be seen as an example of CIDA's tradicional infra (infra-traditional) and tradicional corriente (standard traditional) types. After 1972, however, Culluctus's landlord attempted to rationalize labor relations and modernize production in a Junker-style transition toward Guerrero's "hacienda capitalista con bajo desarrollo de fuerzas productivas" type (capitalist hacienda with underdeveloped forces of production). The Hacienda Gatazo would probably have fallen under the tradicional en desintegración (traditional in dissolution) category when CIDA investigators conducted their survey in 1962/63, but by 1973 Gatazo was making a partial, if subsequently futile Junker-style transition toward capitalist production. The belated modernization process in Gatazo led instead to the dissolution and parcellation sequence of the "peasant road" or vía campesina outlined by Guerrero. The Hacienda El Hospital Gatazo would most likely have fit the tradicional corriente type of the CIDA typology prior to land reform. This state-owned hacienda took the "peasant road" with the formation of an agrarian reform production cooperative in 1972.

According to Ecuador's first (1954) agricultural census, 1 percent of Chimborazo's farms controlled 64 percent of total farmland. This 1 percent included 320 haciendas over 100 hectares, with 236 in the medium-size 100-499.9-hectare range, and 84 in the 500+-hectare latifundia category. The average for the 100-499.9 category was 214.8, while the average for the 500+ category was 1,784.5 hectares (Haney and Haney 1989, p. 75, Table 2). Hacienda Gatazo closely fits this medium-size hacienda average at about 265 hectares. Its 1931 subdivision in four lots of about 65 hectares each followed a general pattern where "the number of medium-sized farms in the 20-100 hectare range" grew to control "10 percent of the total farmland. This suggest[ed]




Figure 1. Map of Ecuador and Chimborazo

SKETCH MAP  
OF  
STUDY AREA



- = PANAMERICAN
- +++++ = SOUTHERN RR
- ~~~~~ = RIVER
- ▨ = TOWN
- HCDA GATAZO = HACIENDA IN STUDY

APROX. SCALE = 1:50,000





FIGURE 2.

FIGURE 3  
 GUERRERO'S (1978) TYPOLOGY OF HACIENDA TRANSFORMATION/DISSOLUTION ROADS



SKETCH MAP OF  
HACIENDAS CULLUCTUS, HOSPITAL  
GATAZO, GATAZO, WITH ROUGH  
VERTICAL PROFILES




FIG. 4

that inheritance patterns and land markets had begun to create a significant number of family-sized units before the agrarian reform" (Haney and Haney 1989, p. 76). By 1974, "both the number of units and the total land 20-100 hectare range" grew to control "10 percent of the total farmland. This suggested that inheritance patterns and land markets had begun to create a significant number of family-sized units before the agrarian reform" (Haney and Haney 1989, p. 76). By 1974, "both the number of units and the total land area in the 20-100 hectare category increased by 134 percent . . . in the Sierra . . . they accounted for about one-fourth of the total farmland" (Haney and Haney n.d., p. 10). Culluctus was close to, but under the latifundia average at around 1,500 hectares.<sup>7</sup> Its subdivision by inheritance in 1965 and subsequent sale in 1972 also followed a general pattern in the Sierra. The postreform, 1974 census revealed "a significant decline in the amount of land concentrated in the larger production units . . . whose numbers decreased by about 40 percent and whose total area diminished by about one-half. While some of this decrease was a direct consequence of agrarian reform, most of it occurred through land sales . . . and inheritance" (Haney and Haney n.d., p. 9). State-owned El Hospital Gatazo lie in between at about 650 hectares. Such state-owned farms accounted for about one-fourth of the total area affected by agrarian reform in Ecuador (Haney and Haney n.d., pp. 8-9). They also became the foci of political agitation and union organizing in the Sierra.

The relative sizes of these three haciendas appears to correlate with their elevation. That is, in general, the lower the elevation, the smaller the property (see Figure 4). Although I have not tested this apparent pattern statistically, there is good reason to believe that lower-elevation haciendas are generally smaller because they are closer to the demographic pressure brought by towns and roads, have better soil conditions and access to irrigation, are often devoted to crops and artificial pasture rather than to natural pasture, and for these reasons have been subject to fragmentation by inheritance and land sales rather more intensively than the extensive, upper elevation estates.

#### Agrarian Reform on a Public Welfare Estate: Hacienda El Hospital Gatazo

In the nineteenth century this hacienda was owned by a religious order that operated and subsidized Riobamba's "Hospital de la Caridad." Between 1908 and 1912, the hacienda became state patrimony under the Ley de Manos Muertas of General Alfaro's liberal economic reforms (Marchán et al. 1984, p. 165). This law allowed the state to take over ecclesiastical properties when problems of succession arose. The Hacienda El Hospital Gatazo and a handful of other haciendas in Cantón Colta together subsidized the social welfare programs of the Junta de Beneficencia Pública, created by Alfaro. Subsequently, these haciendas came under the administration of the Junta de Asistencia Social del Chimborazo (hereafter, JAS).

Under the Agrarian Reform Law of 1964, huasipunqueros, or service tenants, were given legal title to their huasipungos, plots of 1-4 hectares usually located on the hacienda's marginal lands. In many cases, huasipunqueros also received an additional agricultural plot in lieu of cash compensation for "unpaid holidays." In El Hospital Gatazo and on other JAS haciendas, transfer of huasipungo title was only temporary until the entire hacienda could be adjudicated by the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) (AI/Q 1965a). In January 1972, IERAC expropriated the hacienda from

JAS, then subdivided and adjudicated it in favor of El Hospital Gatazo's ex-huasipungueros and their two newly formed peasant organizations (AI/Q 1972d).

Reform of public welfare estates became politically inevitable in the 1960s and socially urgent in Chimborazo by the early 1970s. The peasant-workers<sup>8</sup> of El Hospital Gatazo and of adjacent peasant communities began to demand their rights to land under agrarian reform legislation. JAS refused to give up the hacienda without a fight, however. Decree 1011 of 1958 allowed that JAS property could not be alienated prior to the expiration of any outstanding lease (López 1985, p. 68). The then current lease on Hospital Gatazo was not to expire until 1970, according to JAS. In a peasant assembly or asamblea de comunidades, the "peasants of the communities of Hospital Gatazo, Gatazo Chico, Amula and Mishquilli" decided to protest JAS's intent to illegally renew the hacienda's lease by taking their case to no less than the President of the Republic, to the Minister of Agriculture, and to IERAC's Executive Director, all of whom received letters from the communities shortly thereafter (AI/Q 1970a).

Despite this letter-writing campaign, IERAC's central office in Quito seems at one point to have feared peasant revolt. An official telegram from IERAC's Executive Director to the Riobamba IERAC delegation, dated 3 August 1971, read: "Con carácter urgente fin evitar problema puede presentarse levantamiento indígena intervenir ante asistencia social para traspaso IERAC predio Hospital Gatazo . . . [in all urgency end avoid problem Indian uprising may occur intervene before JAS for transfer to IERAC Hacienda Hospital Gatazo] (AI/Q 1971e).

IERAC's central office used the real or imagined threat of impending revolt to speed the process of land transfer from JAS to IERAC and the hacienda's peasant-workers. JAS undertook direct management when IERAC blocked the lease extension and reinforced its previous, unheeded order for the hacienda's "immediate transfer" to IERAC's custody (AI/Q 1971a). But the interinstitutional battle raged on when JAS presented a plan to parcel the hacienda among private buyers in a last-ditch effort to raise funds for its Riobamba operation. Apparently JAS was either unaware that the law prescribed just compensation for alienation in Class "A" bonds (AI/Q 1972a) or simply was unwilling to accept the terms of recompensation.

During this interinstitutional fray (which revealed tensions between provincial and national elites), IERAC aligned itself with peasant groups, promising land on the condition that they organize production cooperatives and comunas. In 1971, the hacienda's ex-huasipungueros notified IERAC of their wish to form a production cooperative. In a letter to IERAC's Executive Director, they stated their preference to "organize a cooperative among all the hacienda's peasants, under the following conditions: (1) definitive titling of huasipungos in the actual sites now occupied; (2) granting of land to arrimados; (3) granting of land to sharecroppers. [Together, we plan to cooperatively farm] the totality of hacienda lands, or [alternatively, work the land] collectively in comuna form" (AI/Q 1971d [author's translation]).

The ex-huasipungueros were aware that cooperative statutes granted exclusive, legal membership status to them. However, they also understood that if they did not join with other peasants, they might lose substantial chunks

of the hacienda to the pueblerino (small town) interests pressuring IERAC and negotiating with JAS for pieces of the action (AI/Q 1971d). The weight of collective peasant pressure on the huasipungueros was made apparent in the asamblea where aparceros (sharecroppers), arrimados (young households dependent on huasipungueros), yanaperos or ayudas (seasonal laborers), and probably others would have voiced their will. Thus, 88 comuneros of Gatazo Chico, a peasant community bordering the hacienda on the east, had petitioned IERAC at least four times for "a few hectares of the Hacienda El Hospital" (AI/Q 1971f). In addition, Central Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Clasistas-Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (CEDOC-FENOC) petitioned IERAC's Riobamba delegation that "84 members of . . . Gatazo Chico . . . be considered for pasture and cropland by virtue of their having lent their constant help [seasonal ayuda labor] to the hacienda . . ." (AI/Q 1972b). And 22 members of the Asociación "Cultura y Progreso" of Amula Grande successfully solicited a favorable inspection of their claim to sharecropper status on the Hacienda El Hospital "since times immemorial, having succeeded their forebears . . ." (AI/Q 1971c).

Another asamblea de comunidades<sup>9</sup> responded to a pueblerino forestry cooperative's (Cooperativa Forestal San Sebastián de Cajabamba--CFSSC) attempt to strike a deal with JAS and IERAC's regional director. Perhaps ironically (since CEDOC-FENOC also represented Gatazo Chico, whose members formed part of the asamblea de comunidades and whose claims came into direct conflict with hacienda peasants' and CFSSC's), the forestry cooperative's effort was backed by a Riobamba representative of the CEDOC-FENOC Workers' Union (AI/Q 1972b). The forestry cooperative's designs were further magnified in the peasant-workers' eyes when the Centro Agrícola (a landlords' agricultural club), the Ministry of Education, and the Municipality of Cantón Colta jointly requested that IERAC grant a very fertile section of the hacienda along the Cajabamba River for a new, agronomy-oriented high school. The arguments presented to justify the request included, among others: trees for "our children" and "education" for rural "progress" (AI/Q 1972c). The asamblea de comunidades, however, was apparently unimpressed. Trees on their agricultural land were certainly not in their interest, and they themselves could plant them if they so chose (and later they did). In their experience, "education" was for the sons of "white" townfolk and not for illiterate Indians and their children (subsequently, they did agree--rather coolly--to a bilingual literacy center which was later constructed adjacent to the cooperative's farm buildings). On 6 November 1971, IERAC's Executive Director was informed of the asamblea's position:

It seems to be the case that in the parcellation project persons who have nothing to do with the hacienda are going to be taken into account, for example, it's desired that a group of Cajabambaños, who it's said have constituted a Cooperative, be given land, likewise it's desired that [the best land] be adjudicated to the so-called Whites, and the eroded and sloping land be sold to the Indian . . . [T]o Your Excellence the Asamblea de Comunidades manifests that we will oppose by reason or by deed the strangers who wish to take control of the best lands, to which we have rights, since for decades and centuries we have worked there. All of us, who surpass 1,000 peasants, are resolved that by whatever means we will not permit our aspirations, this right, to be squandered; and we believe that under

your dignified government of morality and Law you are not going to permit such a thing . . . (AI/Q 1971g [author's translation]).

In the course of deliberations between the ex-huasipungueros of Hospital Gatazo--which, as we noted, sought (at least on paper) to include landless workers and sharecroppers under a single umbrella--and IERAC/JAS over land rights, the solidarity of the hacienda's peasant-workers weakened. In a 1973 letter to IERAC's executive director, the cooperative's leaders placed the blame on IERAC's delays: "We have insisted on many occasions that we be granted the corresponding titles and property rights to the parcels to which we have rights, yet until today nothing has been done and we find ourselves with the problem that this delay is causing great difficulties among elements of our own race, many of whom are ill-advised by divisionists and strange types that want to gradually and irrevocably divide us . . . (AI/Q 1973b [author's translation]).

Ex-huasipungueros had decided to form a cooperative in the hopes that they would gain preferential adjudication of land and thus fend off the **pueblerino** interests which sought to control the hacienda's best lands. In their legal petitions to the state, Hospital Gatazo's cooperative leaders repeatedly stressed their legal right of preferential access to adjudicated lands, as set down in the agrarian reform statutes (see AI/Q 1973b). Initially, IERAC supported the cooperative, explaining that **comuna** members could solicit membership if they so desired (AI/Q 1973c). By 1973, the **comuna**,<sup>10</sup> which seems to have taken shape as early as 1970, followed its own course in most of the deliberations over estate lands. Subsequently, IERAC took the position that the **comuna** had equal rights to land (AI/Q 1973d). In the end, IERAC awarded land to both the **comuna** and the cooperative "according to numbers of members and soil type" (AI/Q 1973a). The peasant-workers of Hospital Gatazo would be split in two camps from this moment forward.

Between 1972 and 1977, hacienda lands were redistributed as follows. About 4 hectares each went to ex-huasipungueros; the 1964 adjudications were redrawn, and ex-huasipungueros were obliged to relocate on randomly assigned plots. About 50 acres of irrigable flat land went to the cooperative, and about 35 acres to the **comuna**, with each organization receiving eroded, sloping lands designated for reforestation. The Cooperativa Forestal San Sebastián de Cajabamba was denied lands, but the agro-technical high school was granted 30 hectares of bottomland. It is evident that the regional director of IERAC's Riobamba delegation had been leaning toward a compromise which would have granted the forestry cooperative rights to the hacienda's eroded lands (AI/Q, 1971b), but the project agronomist assigned to Hospital Gatazo had opposed it, and he had allies in Quito. The provincial promoters of "education" and "progress," however, were favored by a confluence with the state's own interests and political discourse. It later became known that prior to the hacienda's transfer to IERAC, JAS had privately arranged to grant 30 hectares of the hacienda's best land to the Colegio Técnico Agropecuario Tomás B. Oleas. The President of the Republic closed the case when he personally intervened with an official decree in favor of the Colegio (AI/Q n.d.).

The internal dispute that immediately preceded the transfer of the hacienda was partially due to rivalries among peasant groups differentiated vis-à-vis their production relationship to the hacienda.<sup>11</sup> These rivalries were

manipulated by IERAC agents and *pueblerino* interests, however, in the end transforming prereform rivalries into more hardened, postreform conflicts that permeated daily life.<sup>12</sup> The transfer process was delayed for nearly three years (1970-72), while titles were not granted to individual peasant-workers and their organizations until 1977. Indeed, much of the conflict that ensued during this period could be blamed on IERAC's delays. Had redistributive reform moved quickly, the disputes might have been avoided or at least productively rechanneled.

### The Multi-Hacienda Estate of the Z. Family

Land and labor in the central highlands were clearly influenced by the peripheral integration of coastal export agriculture (cacao in the nineteenth century, bananas in the twentieth) in world markets. Roads and railroads from Sierra to Coast crisscrossed Chimborazo, indeed, the Hacienda Gatazo itself, carrying migrant workers for the plantations and the sugar mills and goods to coastal markets. Many "traditional" highland haciendas were mercantile operations financed in part by commercial capital. These haciendas combined peasant (labor reserve) reproduction with mercantile production of grains and animal products (Guerrero 1983).

The multi-hacienda estate purchased and integrated by Don Juan Z. in the late nineteenth century is a case in point. Don Juan financed the purchase of the Haciendas Nuncate, Bellavista, Amula, Gatazo, and Culluctus largely through money lending. He routinely purchased real estate at low auction prices, and he foreclosed mortgages given as collateral on the loans. He lent to landlords and peasants alike (ANH/R 1880a; RPC 1885, p. 51; RPC 1886, p. 7; RPC 1887, p. 33; RPC 1888, p. 15; RPC 1890, p. 23; RPC 1892, p. 6; RPC 1894, p. 139; RPC 1895, pp. 6, 19; RPC 1896, p. 2).<sup>13</sup> Don Juan's financial strategies for land grabbing were not unusual in this or in subsequent periods of Andean agrarian history (for a Peruvian example, see Mallon 1986, p. 152).

Don Juan was also a merchant and a prominent figure in the local town, where he owned two stores on the central plaza (RPC 1887, p. 17). He also owned the rights to a merchandise outlet on Guayaquil's central plaza, which he had purchased at a foreclosure (ANH/R 1880a) and which he later sold to raise the necessary cash to purchase Gatazo. In addition, he owned the Hacienda El Tejar, in San Luis near Riobamba. He sold El Tejar to raise cash for the purchase of Hacienda Bellavista and other parcels adjacent to Gatazo.<sup>14</sup> The purchases of Gatazo and Bellavista on the newly constructed Garcia Moreno highway linking Quito with Guayaquil promised certain marketing advantages. These advantages were later extended when the Southern Railroad followed the highway through the Hacienda Gatazo in 1904 (Marchán et al. 1984, p. 165; also see Arcos and Marchán 1978).

Hacienda Culluctus, purchased by Don Juan in 1868 (RPC 1966, p. 197), complemented Gatazo and Bellavista. Culluctus's vast paramo provided the necessary expanse for raising livestock, while Gatazo's lower-elevation, strategic location was better suited to dairy production. The estate's Quechua-speaking peasant population provided a ready labor reserve that could with some difficulty be shifted from hacienda to hacienda according to production and fiesta cycles.<sup>15</sup> Nuncate's rich, green valley pasture served for engorde, or

fattening of heifers, while the Hacienda Amula, also with its so-called "captured" peasant community (Ugshapamba), purveyed labor and was suited to gain production (as was Bellavista). It was still a relatively small operation--perhaps 2,000 hectares in all; but, nevertheless, it was a notable attempt to integrate diverse agro-ecological zones (see Figure 4, p. 7) across a fractured landscape. This "vertical integration" of haciendas also capitalized on the differential rent in labor (Guerrero 1978) that was extracted from an otherwise fragmented peasantry.<sup>16</sup>

After Don Juan and his wife, Dona Juana (of a coastal landed family), passed away, the haciendas were divided among the six heirs and their spouses. Culluctus was transmitted to a single heir, upon whose death the hacienda was subdivided in two and then sold to the ex-mayordomo and to a pueblerino compadre. Hacienda Gatazo was largely dissolved into tiny parcels by way of an extended process of subdivision in four parts and subsequent sales to its peasant-workers.


Under Don Juan and Dona Juana, the local peasantry enjoyed limited access to a wide range of hacienda resources (water, fuelwood, pasture). The peasant economy took advantage of the multi-hacienda estate's vertical integration of fragmented production zones. As a result of the estate's fragmentation and subdivision followed by land sales, Gatazo's peasants lost access to pasture, and they rather quickly became petty commodity producers. They struggled individually and collectively to purchase small slices or dismemberments of the hacienda and immediately to put the land into commercial vegetable production. Meanwhile, Culluctus's peasants struggled to retain their "traditional" collective access to grazing lands.

Relations of production on the haciendas were mixed. One could argue that they expressed the uneven and still transitional nature of capitalist development in the region. Wage labor, service tenancy, and labor rent were negotiated on an individual basis between peon and patron. Collective, ritual reciprocity was also a significant part of the patron-peon relationship, however. Landlords, for example, on both the private and the public estates, were obliged to receive peasant camari at carnival. Camari was a festive, ritual exchange of peasants' guinea pigs, eggs, and chickens for the landlord's drink, food, and courtyard ceremony. The ritual exchanges included gifts from the hacienda's tenants but also from adjacent peasant communities which supplied harvest labor (ayuda) in return for access to certain hacienda resources. Landlords often saw camari as a relatively cheap means to reduce opportunity costs or, in other words, to ensure a labor supply (Costales 1953).<sup>17</sup> Peasants appear to have understood the ritual exchange as a symbolic guarantee of access to the hacienda's pasture, firewood, and water (see Guerrero 1987). Thus, camari and other ritual fiestas symbolically reaffirmed patron-client bonds.<sup>18</sup>

A History of Fragmentation by Inheritance, Land Sales, and Everyday Peasant Resistance: Hacienda Gatazo (Zambrano)

Hacienda Gatazo, today known as Gatazo Zambrano, was purchased by Don Juan [1] in 1880 (RPC 1937, p. 522). Don Juan passed away sometime prior to 1922, and his only sons, Juan [10] and Antonio [8], both died before their

**FIGURE 5**  
**Z. DESCENDENTS INHERITING PARTITIONED HACIENDA LAND**



Key:

A: Male

O: Female

=: Marriage

|: Line of Descent

[1]: ID Number in Text

mother Dona Juana [2] passed away in 1930 or 1931. With the matriarch's death, the Z. properties, including Gatazo, were divided among the six children or their surviving heirs [see Figure 5] (RPC 1935, pp. 411, 591; RPC 1937, p. 522). Gatazo was divided in four equal parts of about 65 hectares each among the two daughters and their spouses and the two deceased sons and their spouses and children. Thus, Lot no. 1 of the four went to Candi [5] and her spouse, Dr. Fausto [4], who, at the time of the subdivision in 1931, was both the general administrator of Gatazo and the heir to Culluctus (via his marriage to Candi). Lot no. 2 went to Antonio's six children, in care of his surviving spouse, Rita [9]. Lot no. 3 went to Maria Eugenia [7] and her spouse, Abel [6]. Lot no. 4 went to two of Juan's [2] four children (the other two received Hacienda Bellavista), again in care of his surviving, remarried spouse, Abelina [11].

In 1948, the heirs of Antonio [8] redivided Lots no. 2 and no. 4 (Lot no. 4, minus a few small plots, was purchased by the heirs from Esteban [32], heir to Juan [10]) among them in three equal parts. By the late 1980s, these estate patrimonies were largely sold, piece by piece, to ex-mayordomos, favored peons ("peones queridos" or "peones de confianza"), or creditors. A more detailed outline of Gatazo's parcellation process follows.

In the absence of a will, Lots no. 1-4 were allotted in a posthumous family sorteo, that is, they drew straws. Dr. Fausto [4] and Candi [5] drew Lot no. 1, a fortuitous pick. They had previously inherited Culluctus, and ownership of Gatazo Lot no. 1 meant control of the primary irrigation canal and some bottomland along the Cajabamba River. Lot no. 1 also contained the spacious park and gardens built in the 1920s by Antonio [8] in honor of his widowed mother. The park had served as a prestigious meeting place where provincial landed families regularly gathered to amuse themselves; it was also the scene of local hacienda festivals in honor of the matriarch.<sup>19</sup> Dr. Fausto took advantage of these attributes by acquiring "exemplary . . . pure-blooded" Holstein stock for his low-technology dairy operation (see Castillo Jacomé 1942, p. 275). Gatazo Lot no. 1 was subsequently inherited by Bernadita [16] and her spouse [17] in 1965, who sold it to León, their ex-mayordomo and ex-partner, in 1973 (RPC 1973, p. 1125).

León became Bernadita's [16] partner in 1971 when they jointly created the "Sociedad Gatazo Limitada," consisting of two stockholders. Bernadita held twenty-six of the fifty shares; León, twenty-four. According to its charter, the association's primary purpose was to transform Gatazo into a modern dairy operation with Holstein cows and improved forage. The charter also contained a mutual dissolution clause in case of state intervention (RPC, 1971, p. 126). Such timely associations provided legal insurance against expropriation by the reformist military junta then in power. When the association's initial agreement expired two years later, Bernadita sold out to León for nearly a half-million sucres. She wired León from the United States--where she and her family resided--requesting that he dissolve the association and send a bank note, in effect making him the sole owner and undisputed patron.<sup>20</sup>

León has since become a powerful man in Gatazo. Among other things, he owns in excess of 200 head of cattle and over 1,000 head of sheep; he truck farms; and he sponsors fiestas regularly. His wife, Ofelia, is a relatively rich Indian who inherited and purchased land. She brought considerable wealth

into the marriage (RPC 1959, p. 224; RPC 1962, p. 1394; RPC 1965, p. 1710).<sup>21</sup> León himself is by most accounts the illegitimate child of a former *mayordomo* of the hacienda and an Indian woman, his legal and biological mother. León seems to have elected not only his biological father's last name, but his mestizo social identity as well.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps by an interesting twist of fate, his Indian wife, as her surname betrays, also seems to have had a mixed forbearance. Her father was probably the bastard son of Don Juan Z., a not uncommon outcome in the heyday of the hacienda in Andean Ecuador.<sup>23</sup> Ofelia, however, has maintained an "Indian" identity, as do most peasant women in the Colta region. As it were, Gatazo Lot no. 1 is now in the hands of the bastard, pay-as-you-go heirs of the old regime. León owns nearly half of Culluctus as well, as we shall see below. Both Gatazo Lot no. 1 and Culluctus have been designated for, or already donated to, their numerous offspring (RPC 1982, p. 316).<sup>24</sup>

Lot no. 2 was drawn by Antonio's heirs, Rita [9] and her six children (in 1935 they were minors), Jorge [28], Elizabeth [22], Irma [24], Patricia [25], Lucia [26], and Amparo [27]. By 1948, Antonio's heirs had purchased Lot no. 4 as well, which had originally been awarded to Juan's heirs, Juan's spouse, Abelina [11], and her children, Esteban [32] and Elinor [31] (Loreta [30] and Juan [33] received interests in Hacienda Bellavista). Subsequently, Esteban [32] sold most of Lot no. 4 to Antonio's heirs [9 and 21-28]. By 1948, Jorge [28] had come of age, and he wanted his patrimony clearly defined. Gatazo Lots no. 2 and no. 4, plus Hacienda San Juan Nuncata, were redivided among the six children in equal parts, three receiving lots in Gatazo, and three in neighboring Nuncata. The now combined Gatazo Lots no. 2 and no. 4 were divided in three renamed Lots no. 1, no. 2, and no. 3 (to avoid confusion of these 1948 subdivisions with the original 1931 divisions, I will use no. 1a, no. 2a, no. 3a to indicate the 1948 demarcations). Thus, Lot no. 1a went to Jorge [28], Lot no. 2a to Elizabeth [22], and Lot no. 3a to Irma [24].

Of Lot no. 1a, Jorge [28] sold marginal household plots of one solar to one cuadra each to five peasant-workers in 1948-50 (RPC 1950, pp. 313, 330, 343-45). In 1951/52, he sold some land and his part of the old hacienda residence to Abel [6] (afterward he built his own house on Lot no. 1a). Jointly, Jorge [28] (with his sisters Elizabeth [22] and Irma [24]) sold two plots to Dr. Fausto [4]. These sales among heirs were adjustments made to construct more contiguous properties. In addition, Jorge [28], Elizabeth [22], and Irma [24] were forced to exchange some hill land when "their" *huasipungueros* declined to resettle on the newly defined properties (RPC 1948, p. 386). Sales such as those made between 1948 and 1950 by Jorge [28] appear to have been "carrots" for *huasipungueros* to resettle and thus ensure a ready and cheap labor force to work his fields. In 1958, he sold three cuadras; in 1961, he sold 1 solar each to nine peasant-workers; in 1962, Jorge [28] sold six 1-cuadra plots; in 1963, he sold five plots under .33 cuadra; and in 1965, he sold twenty-three plots, each less than .5 cuadra, to twenty-one peasant-workers (RPC 1959, pp. 1028, 1029; RPC 1961, pp. 537-46; RPC 1962, pp. 683-88; RPC 1965, pp. 1449-474). These sales were the indirect result of the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law that granted legal titles to *huasipungueros*. In 1968, he sold a 10-cuadra section of poorly drained, irrigable land--then "more like a pond"--to a Riobamba merchant and commercial vegetable producer, Leonardo Mayor (RPC 1968, p. 956).<sup>25</sup> In 1971, he sold seven .5-cuadra to 1-solar plots to ex-*huasipungueros* and other peasant-workers; and in 1978, he agreed

to sell the remaining 23 hectares of prime, irrigated land, then planted in alfalfa, with the house and an alfalfa processor, to the recently formed Comuna Gatazo Zambrano in the name of Isidro, his "trusted peon." The sale was made for 1.5 million sucres, with a six-month, no-interest payment period (RPC 1978, p. 213).

The division of Gatazo Lot no. 1a in 95 parcels was not equal. Plots were assigned "in proportion to what they have been cultivating" (RPC 1978, p. 213). We do not know for how long "they had been cultivating" such plots. Two men who became the consistent leaders of the comuna received 1 cuadra each next to the irrigation canal, which assured them first take on water and greater soil humidity in times of shortage. Approximately sixteen others received .5 cuadra, five received 1.5 solares, fifty-four got 1 solar each, and eighteen received .5 solar. Besides breaking down in favor of the patron's "trusted peons," the unequal distribution of land reflected differences in cash income or ability to raise cash at the time of sale. By 1983, the copurchasers settled the redistribution based on how much they had paid for their own plot and how much they had kicked out for "additional costs in the acquisition of the farm" (RPC 1983, p. 928). In addition, Isidro had privately arranged with Jorge [28] to purchase the house and the alfalfa processor for himself.<sup>26</sup> Isidro "had built the house for his patron," and now it was only just that Jorge [28] reciprocate by giving him first shot at buying it.<sup>27</sup> This expectation was typical of land sales in Gatazo between patron and peon. An inside deal was arranged and a price agreed upon before anyone else could know that the real estate was for sale. Isidro emerged as a relatively well-situated commercial vegetable producer, with the added prestige of owning the patron's former residence. He was a comuna leader, and he could count on the labor of a large affinal kin group (field notes). His wife contributed considerable income to the household by successfully engaging in petty commerce.

The other peon favored in this sale was Miguel, who also became a successful vegetable producer and a strong comuna leader. He owed more of his success and leadership powers to another patron, however, who is also part of the history of the dissolution of Gatazo Lot no. 1a. Leonardo Mayor, the commercial producer from Riobamba who, as we have seen, purchased "San Francisco Gatazo," a 10-cuadra slice of low-lying land in Lot no. 1a from Jorge [28] in 1968, employed Miguel and his family on his, the first wage-paying, commercial vegetable operation amidst the rent-paying alfalfa fields of Gatazo. When in the 1970s Leonardo Mayor's son, Leonardo Menor, an agronomist, took over his father's operation, Miguel became his *mayordomo*.<sup>28</sup> Leonardo Menor's intensive production methods required a great deal of wage labor and extra-wage, familial vigilance on the part of Miguel's family. Miguel often sharecropped with Leonardo Menor, providing labor while Leonardo provided capital--seed, technology, agrochemical inputs, and marketing connections in Riobamba. This patron-client relationship translated into income, prestige, and technological advantage for Miguel (and, to some extent, for the comuna as a whole), while it supplied the labor and stable conditions Leonardo needed to carry out his production and marketing plans. Moreover, the comuna came to rely on Leonardo to exercise his *palanca* (influence) on their behalf when it came to dealing with the state and other development institutions. For the comuna, Miguel was an important medium through which they could seek out Leonardo Menor's help. Of course, the patron-client relationship between Leonardo, Miguel, and the Comuna Gatazo Zambrano had its contradictions, but these lie

outside our immediate concerns. It suffices to note here that from Leonardo's commercial vegetable plot, a kind of mini-green revolution in commercial vegetable production, as well as wage labor, spread unevenly but quickly throughout the microfundia of Gatazo Zambrano.

Gatazo Lot no. 2a was drawn by Elizabeth [22] and her spouse, Wilhelm [21], a military man. They began to sell small plots to their peasant-workers in 1969. By 1972, Wilhelm [21] had made eighty-one individual sales of tiny plots of .5 solar to .25 cuadra each (RPC 1969, pp. 816, 818, 827, 828, 832-34; RPC 1970, pp. 145-47, 150, 152-56, 206, 207; RPC 1972, pp. 133, 134, 137-39, 166, 167, 174, 175, 178-82, 196-202, 213, 227, 277, 278, 286-88, 300, 302, 304, 316-31, 334, 375-80, 404-07, 434, 551, 556, 589, 599, 604, 648). In 1972, the inherited hacienda house was sold to León, and the corral to Alan, a money-lender and merchant from Riobamba who began to acquire land in Gatazo Lot no. 3 (RPC 1972, pp. 1029, 1154). Again in 1974, they made eleven small sales, and in 1976, eight more. They continued to sell off the estate in 1978 with a block sale of 22 cuadras of irrigable land to Melchor and Manolo, "trusted peon" (peón de confianza) and most recent Indian mayordomo, respectively, and strong leaders of the Comuna Gatazo Zambrano (RPC 1978, p. 213). In 1983, Melchor and Manolo turned around and sold the same chunk to the Comuna Gatazo Zambrano, reserving about 1.5 cuadra each for themselves (RPC 1983, p. 332). IERAC had "authorized" them to make the sale proindiviso (without subdivision) to the comuna. In such cases, however, the proindiviso clause has no practical consequence for the size of production units. The seventy tiny plots carved from the approximately 21 cuadras were and are treated like private property by comuneros, though one must be a member of the comuna to purchase usufruct or property (nuda propiedad) rights.

Elizabeth [22] and Wilhelm [21] reserved a house with a small yard in Gatazo. They and their children have resided in Quito since the late 1970s.

Gatazo Lot no. 3a went to Irma [24] and her spouse, Ernesto [23]. In 1965, they made five sales of from 1 solar to 1 cuadra to peasant-workers of Gatazo (RPC 1965, pp. 1425-27, 1441, 1443). In 1975, they legally recognized five peasant-workers who had sharecropped on their property. In order to "liquidate this form of labor," legal title to the "lots they had been cultivating" was transferred. Three of these five sharecroppers were among the five who had purchased land from them in 1965 (RPC 1975, p. 275). In 1980, Ernesto [23] made thirteen sales of from .5 solar to .33 cuadra, again to Gatazo Zambrano peasant-workers. Ernesto [23] and Irma [24] were the last of the Z. line to farm in Gatazo. Until about 1983, Ernesto [23] administered an alfalfa-cutting operation, as Jorge [28] had earlier on Lot no. 1a.

In the 1970s, Alan sold a lot on the Panamerican Highway to INDULAC (Industrias Lacteos de Cotopaxi) for a milk-refrigeration plant which for a few years sent milk trucks to Guayaquil markets. Ernesto [23] took the job of administrator of the Gatazo INDULAC plant. He had hoped that this move would provide the market impulse necessary to modernize and expand dairy production in the area. However, when a large milk pasteurizing and distribution plant opened in Riobamba, the Gatazo plant closed and moved to a new location near Ambato. Ernesto [23] cites declining milk production in and around Gatazo, however, as dealing the death blow to the plant. He also cited the lack of capital fully to transform his enterprise to dairy production. Given his

significant commercial activities, however, it is probable that he preferred to invest his capital in safer havens elsewhere.<sup>29</sup> The drop in milk production from small herds followed the land sales which had broken up some medium-scale alfalfa production and led the way to peasant commercial-vegetable production. Ernesto [23] followed the wave: in about 1983, he plowed under his alfalfa-cutting enterprise and began to plant carrots and onions.

In their good-faith efforts to modernize their farm, Ernesto [23] and Irma [24] decided to put an end to *camari*<sup>30</sup> at the Hacienda Gatazo. For a couple of years, however, and to their dismay, some of Gatazo's peasants insisted on continuing the practice. *Camari* was not completely undermined until Protestant evangelization and a capitalist ethic negated a ritual system which had ceased to correspond to relations of production and reproduction on the hacienda. Prior to Protestant conversion, however, peasant insistence on *camari* was a conservative form of resistance to rationalized labor relations, a cultural "weapon of the weak" (Scott 1984) in the conflict between modernizing landlords and peasants over access to hacienda resources (see Thurner 1989; also see Langer 1985). The authors of the CIDA report listed three conditions linked to the *huasipunguero* peasantry's "internal siege" of haciendas (to paraphrase): (1) the *huasipunguero*'s desire to expand both the limits of his plot and his access to pasture; (2) the aspiration of "free peons" and *arriados* to become *huasipungueros*; and (3) the pressure of the hacienda's other workers to gain fuller employment, leading them to "coparticipate" with *huasipungueros* in their "siege" of hacienda resources (CIDA 1965, pp. 424-25). This last condition was an incidental recognition that siege by both internal and external peasants could be codetermined developments and not necessarily in conflict with one another. The point I wish to make here is that the continuation of *camari* in the transition to capitalism furthered all three conditions of internal (and external) siege and was, therefore, often in peasants' tactical interest.

*Camari* expressed the underlying relationship of conflict and complementarity between the peasant's economy and the landlord's (Guerrero 1983, p. 123). Other forms of peasant resistance on the hacienda also cut both ways: landlords like Ernesto [23] learned to accommodate and manipulate, putting ritual practice to work in their interests. At the barley harvest, for example, Chimborazo's peasantry has traditionally sung the *jahuay*, a Quechua work song that, among other poetic gestures, implores their master to give them *aswa* (corn beer) so that they might work harder and forget their sorrows. By 1987, Ernesto [23] no longer gave *aswa*; he gives them a bottle of coke, instead. The Catholic peasants complain, but the Protestants (who refuse to sing the *jahuay*) appear content. When I asked him why the Catholics continue to sing the *jahuay* to no avail, Ernesto [23] explained that he always orders his (Catholic) mayoral to lead the singing "because it keeps them from conversing among themselves . . . it's a form of discipline."<sup>31</sup> Yet, peasants also took their measure of Ernesto: they purposefully left a portion of harvest grain in the fields as they worked, so that it could later be recovered by family members under cover of nightfall (fieldnotes).

For Ernesto [23] and other landlords, crop theft is routine and even expected, as this favorite phrase among landlords (often on EC's lips) makes clear: "El indio que no roba, peca" (the Indian who doesn't steal, sins). The flip side to this is the peasant's notion that: "lo que es de casa, de patrón

es pes; lo que es de hacienda, de hacienda es pes" (what is of the manor is the master's, but what is of the hacienda is the hacienda's) (see Guerrero 1983, p. 126). Put simply, the house and its goods belong to the patron, but the hacienda (crops, land, water, pasture) belongs to those who work it. Members of the Z. family concur that nothing was ever stolen in the casa de hacienda, but that the hacienda's crops, water, and anything else were routinely pinched.<sup>32</sup> At harvest time, Ernesto is now obliged to sleep in his pickup truck parked in the hacienda's fields (now a diminished reserve of about 30 hectares) and with a shotgun at his side (he normally resides in Riobamba).

Since about 1983, Ernesto has engaged in commercial vegetable production with wage labor drawn from the surrounding peasant-worker communities of Gatazo. He is always hard-pressed for labor, however, and he feels fortunate if he can hire a handful of peasant girls for a day's work. His vegetable yields are, on the average, substantially lower than on neighboring peasant parcels. For lack of labor he is forced to sharecrop with neighboring, highly productive peasant smallholders who command large extended kin groups and community labor. In addition, numerous, potentially productive hectares lie fallow. In 1987, Ernesto decided to give up vegetable production despite its potential profitability--largely, in his words, because of labor indiscipline. He planned to return to alfalfa production and had decided to move back to the hacienda house in Gatazo to provide closer vigilance in the future. Hired crop vigilance, he laments, too often looks the other way when theft occurs and pleads ignorance when chastened. The hired crop "guards"--who not only overlook but are often party to planned, nocturnal crop theft--are locally known as aviadores, which might be loosely translated as "guides to the prey." The practice had its counterpart on the prereform hacienda (see Thurner 1989).

Gatazo Lot no. 3 of the original 1931 division was drawn by Maria Eugenia [7] and her spouse, Abel [6]. They began to sell off bits of their patrimony in 1954. In that year they sold twenty-eight tiny plots of slope land to Gatazo's peasant-workers (RPC 1954, pp. 791-806, 850-52, 1004, 1173, 1174, 1182, 1199, 1200, 1232, 1241, 1242; RPC 1955, pp. 3, 4, 232, 502). In 1956, Maria Eugenia died, and by 1959, Abel was in debt. He sold 10 cuadras to a Riobamba man (RPC 1959, p. 202). Abel lost most of the rest of Gatazo Lot no. 3 when his property was auctioned to pay an outstanding debt to his creditors. In 1970, Alan, aforementioned moneylender and merchant from Riobamba, became the new owner of most of Gatazo Lot no. 3 (RPC 1976, p. 768). In addition, Alan purchased the remaining 6 cuadras from Carlos [19] and from Maria Eugenia's daughter, Ester [20], in 1975. In 1972, he had also purchased a corral from Jorge [28].

The absentee Alan's property still included huasipungos after 1970 (AI/R 1983b). In 1973, Alan sold an important .5-cuadra lot with a granary on it and haymaker to a buyer apparently from Guayaquil (RPC 1973, p. 215). Then in 1976, he sold 21 cuadras to seventy comuneros from Gatazo Zambrano but in the name of Melchor, Wilhelm's [21] old "peón querido," also a worker for and sharecropper with Alan (RPC 1976, p. 768).

Thus, and in the same way that Isidro, Miguel, and Manolo had, Melchor became a strong comuna leader by virtue of his ability to arrange a land sale and serve as the comuna's legal representative. Such transfers inevitably favored the go-betweens, who felt justified in reserving a prime plot for

themselves. Moreover, Melchor became the principal comuna leader at this time. He purchased a tractor on credit extended by his ex-patron, Wilhelm, and made a good living plowing other comuneros' plots for a fee. When Melchor's tractor was embargado, or seized for not meeting payments, the comuna itself moved to purchase an International Harvester tractor on special terms with the Ministry of Agriculture, which had imported the machinery under an agreement with USAID.<sup>33</sup>

Melchor's sharecropping agreement with Alan was for a period of seven years on a 5-cuadra section of irrigated lands. When Alan died in 1982, Melchor was forced to split the harvest with Alan's heirs and mayordomo (RPC 1983, p. 745). Melchor's influence in the comuna declined as comuneros moved to resist Alan's heirs in an effort to pressure them to sell land to comuneros. Despite Melchor's powerful role as village creditor, his financial problems continued to burden him on other fronts when he entered into new sharecropping and tenant-farming agreements.<sup>34</sup>

Despite these sales and sharecropping arrangements, Alan left about 20 hectares of prime, irrigable land to his heirs, urbanites who left the operation in the hands of Alan's mayordomo. After illness forced Alan to quit his farm, Gatazo Zambrano's peasant-workers called an informal strike against his mayordomo and heirs. Between 1980 and 1983, the land remained underexploited. Most lay fallow or was merely seeded in grain--an inappropriate use for irrigable land better suited to commercial vegetable or alfalfa production. In Gatazo, however, commercial vegetable production is impossible without highly intensive labor inputs, so the mayordomo had little choice but to let the farm decay. Gatazo Zambrano's comuneros prevented other peasants from "crossing the [invisible] picket line," that is, from working for or sharecropping with the mayordomo. By 1983, the cabildos of the Comuna Gatazo Zambrano, Miguel and Manolo, respectively, initiated an expropriation suit with IERAC against Alan's heirs (AI/R 1983b).

In 1984, and having left their respective one-year terms of community office, Miguel and Manolo, now wielding notable savings as successful commercial smallholders, came close to reaching a settlement with Alan's heirs out of court.<sup>35</sup> Under this informal agreement, the heirs would sell to Miguel and Manolo in much the same way as previous estate transfers had taken place in Gatazo. By 1984, however, the comuna was more differentiated than previously, and successful smallholders like Melchor and Manolo and a few others were in a position to purchase considerably larger plots even at exorbitant 1984 prices. The newly elected cabildos--younger men with fewer resources--decided to block this sale. They hired a new lawyer and continued the expropriation suit against the heirs, at the instigation of IERAC itself.<sup>36</sup> The gap between IERAC's standard estimated value and the price demanded by the heirs, who cited market values to justify their demands, was enormous. IERAC had set a settlement price at 2,000,000 sucres for the entire subdivision, or roughly 20 hectares. By 1987, the heirs were demanding 1,000,000 sucres per hectare. The comuna decided to continue as a third party when IERAC appealed a tribunal decision in favor of the heirs. Meanwhile, the legal cost of the case to the comuna rose to more than 100,000 sucres per week.<sup>37</sup>

During the proceedings the comuna decided to cultivate the land to raise the cash needed to meet legal fees. Their illegal "invasion" stirred up the

civil conflict, and Alan's heirs protested before IERAC. Yet by 1987, the Comuna Gatazo Zambrano had harvested several crops of onions that returned handsomely (and predictably, given the field's prior fallow condition). In 1987, the comuna voted to parcel the "invaded" land evenly among all 101 comuneros, that is, in 101 tiny plots. These plots were about 70 percent planted when I left the field in September 1987. The police had not intervened largely because IERAC failed to report the orderly and productive occupation.

The "invasion" or occupation was carried out in a gradual, organized fashion. First, comuna women and children were given the green light to graze their sheep on Alan's abandoned, weed-infested fields. Such an "invasion" could hardly be answered by police and guns. Next, the comuna allowed certain dispossessed families to cultivate and squat on tiny, out-of-the-way corners of Alan's land. They were left alone. The next step occurred when the comuna began to plow under sections of the abandoned, grass-infested fields. These plowed sections were not seeded, however. Six months or so later, they were plowed once again and prepared for planting. Gradually, more sections were plowed and planted, but not those closest to the road. Finally, the comuna moved ahead--with IERAC's nod--to cultivate cash crops to cover legal and related expenses incurred in the expropriation suit.

Prior to parcellation, the comuna had made many improvements on the land. They applied their numbers to dig crisscrossing drainage ditches and to clear wider as well as new irrigation channels. They weeded and burned years of accumulated, plow-busting kikuyu sod. The labor power that had been denied AN's mayordomo now transformed overgrown and neglected fields into productive rows of onions and carrots. Yet, this collective work, or mingas, also drew voices of dissent from within the comuna. Influential voices like those of Miguel and Manolo opposed the collective work, arguing that it only favored the heirs' claims and raised the estimated value of the land, contributing to the price they would have to pay in an eventual settlement. They argued that individuals should be responsible to weed, drain, and irrigate their own tiny plots, and that such a strategy would better serve their short-run interests.

The Gatazo case was suspended in court when IERAC's indicted executive director fled the country. The comuna was now a third party in the case (IERAC versus Alan's heirs), and IERAC informed them to ignore the court's decision and to continue pressing their claim. The comuna's lawyer was only too happy to continue collecting his weekly fees. As of 1987, the conflict remained unresolved.<sup>38</sup>

#### Transition and Conflict: Hacienda Culluctus

As we noted earlier, Don Juan Z. [1] left Culluctus to his daughter, Candi [5], and her spouse, Dr. Fausto [4]. Hacienda Culluctus consisted of about 1,500 hectares of primarily upland natural pasture (paramo or ujsha sacha) devoted to livestock production. Culluctus was transmitted to Candi's and Fausto's two daughters (usufruct) and their six children (nuđa propiedad) in 1965. Prior to this inheritance, however, Dr. Fausto had sold 7.5 cuadras in "Guacona, anexo a Culluctus" to Tomás A. (RPC 1962, p. 816). And in 1964, Dr. Fausto had liquidated forty huasipungos, most in Guacona, in accord with

the Agrarian Reform law. In the presence of the military chief of Chimborazo, a lieutenant coronel of the army, and the general intendant of police, each of the forty *huasipungueros* was given title to 3 *cuadras* of land corresponding to their previous homesteads (AI/Q 1964b). In addition, two plots of land were granted for the purposes of forming "civic centers" as required by Agrarian Reform Law.

In 1965, half of the hacienda was granted to their daughter, Oprah [15], and her four children, and the other half to their daughter, Bernadita [16], and her two children (Gatazo Lot no. 1 was also subdivided). In each case they also inherited a five-year legal obligation to respect the customary right of *ex-huasipungueros* to graze their animals and gather firewood on the estate's vast uplands (RPC 1966, p. 197). Bernadita began selling off pieces of her half of Culluctus in 1967 when she sold 2 *cuadras* to Tomás A., followed by nine sales of from .5 to 1.5 *cuadras* to *ex-huasipungueros* (RPC 1967, pp. 908, 1038-41, 1058, 1091-95). Then in 1969, she sold 7 *cuadras* to an *ex-huasipunguero* (and *ex-mayoral* under her father) who had become her *mayordomo*, León (RPC 1969, p. 124).<sup>39</sup> León had raised nearly half the cash for this purchase by selling 4 *cuadras* to José L. two weeks before (RPC 1969, p. 238).<sup>40</sup> In 1970, Bernadita sold three additional plots to peasant-workers (as well as numerous other plots in Gatazo Lot no. 1). Finally in 1971, she sold her and her children's entire inheritance in Culluctus to León (RPC 1971, p. 262). Nine months later, as we have seen, she formed an "association" with León in Gatazo Lot no. 1. Transfer of ownership to León was only a question of time at this point.

Bernadita was then residing with her husband and children in the United States (RPC 1971, p. 126).<sup>41</sup> Their concern was to sell out before they could be expropriated and to re-invest proceeds from the sale in a trust fund "to further the children's education in the United States" (RPC 1971, p. 262). In this way León, the *mayordomo*, became the new patron of half of Culluctus.

The other half of Culluctus was also sold in the early 1970s. It was inherited by Oprah [15] and her four children in 1965. They sold it to César, a mestizo and *compadre* (according to Chiriboga and Tobar), from the nearby town of San Juan, in 1972 (RPC 1972, p. 428). The expropriation process against César, initiated by the pastoralist-workers of Culluctus in 1983, has been described by Chiriboga and Tobar (1985). I wish to supplement their analysis with some historical background and with interview material related to León's half of the original Hacienda Culluctus.

César purchased the hacienda with "todos sus usos, costumbres, derechos, y servidumbres anexos, entradas y salidas al predio" (RPC 1972, p. 428). As Bernadita had, Oprah also inherited the obligation to respect *ex-huasipunguero* rights to pasture, firewood, and water, as specified in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1964. However, they sold their heritage to César without specific reference to the *ex-huasipungueros* residing within the confines of the hacienda. The legal expiration of *ex-huasipunguero* rights in this sale (and the same occurred in Bernadita's sale to León) did not coincide with the customary norms and practices accepted by the peasantry, as is so often the case when peasants confront landlords (Hobsbawm 1974, p. 120). The *comuneros* of Culluctus did not read the fine print of the land sale. When César attempted to sell the land, Culluctus's peasants moved to block the sale, thereby asserting their

"traditional rights" to upland pasture. In 1983, he denied all this by maintaining, correctly, that no legal obligation had been transferred when he purchased the hacienda. César claimed that he employed only a small number of Culluctus's peasant-workers, and that these were maintained strictly on a wage basis (AI/R 1983a).

In self-defense, the peasant-workers of the pre-Comuna Culluctus/San Jacinto de Yaguachi were obliged to take both extralegal and legal action. They sought legal help in Riobamba and began an expropriation suit to gain title to 250 hectares of their "traditional grazing lands"--declared "invaded" by César. He accused Culluctus's peasants of "invading" his property on Christmas Day, 1983, with thousands of animals not only from their own but also from neighboring peasant communities' herds.<sup>42</sup> The allegation was probably exaggerated but not entirely fictitious. César obtained a police order forcefully to remove the peasants' animals from "his land." This order was countered by an order from IERAC, obtained by the president of the pre-Comuna, Carlos C., to halt the forced removal of their herd (AI/R 1983a). Subsequently, César hired off-duty rural police to carry out threats against the "invaders." As a result, two peasants were shot dead. In response, the peasants apprehended their killers and forced them to confess while holding them captive (Chiriboga and Tobar 1985, pp. 46-48). The military intervened and the expropriation process was subsequently carried out--following a national, ministerial-level investigation. The pre-Comuna de Culluctus finally received legal title to 250 hectares of their "traditional" pastureland (AI/R 1983a). Meanwhile, César remains the owner of over 500 hectares of the hacienda's best land.

Between 1972 and 1983, César made various sales to the peasants of Culluctus as well as to mestizos from his hometown of San Juan. He also attempted, as mentioned, to sell the very grazing lands that the peasants of Culluctus eventually reclaimed (AI/R 1983a). Chiriboga and Tobar (1985, p. 51) observed:

El hacendado [César], acogiendo al espíritu productivista de la Ley [Ley de Fomento Agrario], genero--como otros hacendados de la Sierra--un impulso al mercado de tierras. Los hacendados en algunos casos vendieron tierras marginales con la finalidad de capitalizarse, de reducir la presión campesina y conseguir predios más homogéneos en función de las necesidades de modernización.

[The landlord (César), taking advantage of the productivist spirit of the Law (1979 Law of Agrarian Development), generated--as others like him did throughout the Sierra--an upswing in the land market. In some cases landlords sold marginal lands to capitalize their operations, to reduce peasant pressure, and to construct more homogeneous holdings in the interests of modernization.]

Clearly, in this case our landlord was unable to carry out his plans. Land sales were blocked, and a collective expropriation process was successfully carried out at the initiative of a combatant group of pastoral peasants. César would receive a lower price from IERAC than the grazing land might have fetched on the market, and he would also have to live with those same peasant herds next to his in the expanse of the paramo.

León also sold small plots of Hacienda Culluctus to peasants in the 1970s (RPC 1973, pp. 799, 819, 850, 901, 903, 907, 911, 969, 975; RPC 1974, p. 593; RPC 1976, pp. 1096-1118; RPC 1977, pp. 9, 14-16, 22, 113). Why did "his" peasants not rise up against him, occupy his lands, or initiate an expropriation process? León, we know, was the former *mayoral* and *mayordomo* of Culluctus and Gatazo Lot no. 1. In his new social position as patron, he sponsored regular fiestas in both Culluctus and Gatazo, providing drink, meat, music, and a setting for ritual reciprocity. He maintained certain noncapitalist relations of production alongside capitalist relations, respecting what one of Chiriboga and Tobar's (1985, p. 42) informants called the "ley antigua" of the hacienda. As late as 1982, León and his wife received *camari*--gifts of eggs, guinea pigs, and hens--from their peasant-workers in exchange for drink, rights of access to hacienda resources, and a ritual feast.<sup>43</sup> On the occasion of the peasant community's patron saint day, or "fiestas patronales de San Jacinto," in August 1987, León spent three days and nights giving food and drink and getting thoroughly drunk with "his" peasants. When I asked him about this on the day after, he replied "es fiesta de allí, pes, el patrón es de chupar pes . . . ." <sup>44</sup> In contrast, César's participation in fiestas appears alienated. Chiriboga and Tobar (1985, p. 43), citing an informant's testimony, reflected that exploitation was also evidenced in traditional festive practices:

Para la fiesta de San Jacinto, el mismo nos reunia y nombraba prioste haciendonos endeudar siquiera en dos vacas, una para los gastos y otra para comer. El prioste tenia obligación--encima de eso--de entregar al patrón una colcha fina. El venia solamente a comer con sus invitados.

[For the Feast of Saint Jacinto, he himself rounded us up and he named the prioste, in this indebting us to him for two cows, one to pay for his costs and the other to eat. The prioste had the obligation--on top of everything else--to present the patron with a fine quilt. He only showed up to eat with his friends, then left.]

In short, León could be seen as a "buen patrón" or "*ali tayta*." He knew how to keep "his" peasants in line. César did not. León's wife, who is racially and culturally Indian and whose informal authority was widely recognized among Indian peasants, was a boon to León. This new breed of patrons, however, was not entirely exempt from the social contradictions leading to land conflicts with peasant groups. In 1987, such a land dispute was brewing. Nevertheless, León maintained a legitimized measure of control over his hacienda by virtue of his social reputation as a "buen patrón."

### Toward a Conclusion

In each case, resident and neighboring peasant-workers were engaged in collective and individual struggles to gain access to hacienda lands. The course and outcome of their struggles varied, however. Why? The peasant-workers of Hospital Gatazo, Gatazo Zambrano, and Culluctus have characteristically pursued identifiable reproduction strategies<sup>45</sup> (see Chiriboga et al. 1984; also see Waters 1985). These strategies are transformed by capitalist

transition, but they have their roots in the particular agro-ecological niche of their respective (former) haciendas and in the social organization of household labor. The strategies are conditioned by a host of factors--agro-ecological, demographic, technological--and by cultural, social, and economic forces.

In Gatazo Zambrano, the dominant, posthacienda strategy is petty commodity production (irrigated horticulture). It is clear that the "peasant community" of Gatazo Zambrano was reconstituted with the liquidation of rent and of access to hacienda resources, followed by sales of the parceled, dissolving subdivisions of the hacienda. The peasant settlement has improved its position by gradually moving away from the hacienda's eroded lands and toward the highly fertile, irrigated plain. This is undoubtedly an unusual circumstance for Ecuador's ex-hacienda peasants to find themselves in (see Waters 1985; Haney and Haney n.d., p. 11). Cut off from pasturelands as a result of the fragmentation by inheritance of the multi-hacienda estate, and surrounded by neighboring communities and the hacienda "reserve," slope land for subsistence, rainfall agriculture is scarce and seriously eroded. As a result, subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry are practically preempted. Due to the quality of irrigated land under peasant control, most households in Gatazo Zambrano have become dependent on cash crops for their reproduction and accumulation. If it were not for the quality of Gatazo Zambrano lands, their dominant reproduction strategy could well be semiproletarian and/or petty commerce, as it is in adjacent Gatazo Grande. Semiproletarian strategies are common in Gatazo Zambrano as well, however, as they are throughout the province (Haney and Haney n.d., p. 19).

Indeed, a multiplicity of household strategies is the norm and is partially explained by demographic factors. In Gatazo, young men tend to seek off-farm employment, while older men in their prime (aged 35-45 years) more often head households engaged primarily in irrigated horticulture. For men, the "demographic differentiation" of economic strategy seems to be a function of access to land, as Waters (1985, pp. 328-29) has argued for Cotopaxi.<sup>46</sup> Corresponding to men's off-farm employment has been a feminization of agricultural wage labor (see Haney and Haney n.d., p. 19) and a further "peasantization of women" or feminization of peasant farm labor.

In Culluctus, the dominant reproduction strategy is also petty commodity production but of a different production logic. The peasants of Culluctus are largely dependent on livestock sales. In the paramo of Culluctus, sheep and cattle herding is the primary source of peasant livelihood. Grains and tubers are complementary subsistence crops (AI/R 1983a). Semiproletarianization seems to have been less significant, largely because of the pastoralism made possible by the community's traditional access to the hacienda's natural pasture and partially because of the hacienda's relative isolation (Chiriboga and Tobar 1985).

In Hospital Gatazo, the dominant reproduction strategy is mixed and may be seen to lie somewhere in-between that of Gatazo Zambrano and Culluctus. Petty commodity production (irrigated horticulture) on tiny, privately held plots is complemented by subsistence grain production on private slope plots. In addition, sub-subsistence wages are paid by the cooperative, and access to grazing lands (for a nominal fee) is maintained under the cooperative and the comuna, respectively. As in Gatazo Zambrano, semiproletarian status is

familiar to young men who are blocked from cooperative membership and who must thus remain *arrimados* (tied) to their fathers. Ex-huasipungueros are full-time, employed members of the relatively solvent cooperative while their wives and children maintain subsistence and petty commodity production on household plots. In Andean patriarchal fashion, co-op *socios* may, and often do, send a wife or daughter to work in their stead (see Harris 1978; Mallon 1986; Deere 1977). The *comuna* operates in a similar manner, though it convenes for work only irregularly and generally pays no wages to its working members.

In short, the respective reproduction strategies carved out by the peasant-workers of each community and hacienda explain the general contours of each group's particular struggle to gain access to estate lands in recent decades. In the case of Gatazo Zambrano, the initial interest in individual purchase of expensive, irrigated plots from estate heirs is consistent with the drive to engage in household petty-commodity production as onion, carrot, and garlic prices soared in regional markets. The later struggle to occupy, expropriate, or purchase the remaining irrigable hectares of hacienda land held by the remaining heirs underlines the great pressure to expand petty commodity production. A key social element in the demographic pressure of a rapidly growing community population is the desire of younger men--now coming of age and with numerous dependents--to return to their communities as full-time farmers. Not insignificantly, these same younger men are now taking over positions of *comuna* leadership. They see fewer options to purchase land than their fathers had, and in general their politics are more radical. In Culluctus, the struggle to reclaim traditional grazing lands reflected the peasants' collective dependence on livestock sales. In Hospital Gatazo, the mixed interests of diverse reproduction strategies shaped an uneven course of struggle that pitted the population against *pueblerino* interests and often with the reformist state.

What about the specific strategies of land occupation? The different strategies of land "invasion" in Culluctus and Gatazo do share common ground. Both correspond to what Hobsbawm (1974, pp. 128-29) has called the "classical communal land invasion," as differentiated from the tactical invasions organized by "modern political movements." Although Culluctus's peasants did receive help from a "modern political movement" in the form of Riobamba's Federación de Trabajadores Libres de Chimborazo (FETLICH), their intervention seems to have been minimal (Chiriboga 1986, p. 21).

In brief, unless part of an actual agrarian revolution or insurrection, land occupation in modern politically organized peasant movements is an incident in a long-term campaign. But for the classical communal movement it is campaign, battle, and with luck, final victory. It is not the means but the end itself. So far as the invaders are concerned, all would be well if the landlords, the state or other outside forces withdrew and left the community to live and work on the land they had now justly recuperated. . . . [E]ven if they are expelled yet again by lord or government, they have at least re-asserted both their right to possession by labour and their capacity to work the land they claim as their own--an important point, since their capacity to do so may be challenged. But the object of the operation is not tactical. It is to take the land back and stay there [Hobsbawm 1974, p. 129].

The Chimborazo cases force me to take issue with Hobsbawm on two points, however. First, "the classical communal" land occupation is not always final. Hobsbawm is well aware that peasant communities may struggle for centuries to recover usurped lands from the control of landlords (1974, pp. 123-25). Second, I would suggest that such occupations are tactical in the sense that they represent movement over the long term in the direction of recuperating lost lands or gaining access to new lands. Peasant invasions in Gatazo and in Culluctus were followed by litigation leading to settlement. These peasants now train their eyes on more hacienda lands. Depending on historical conditions, then, "classical" land invasions may be intended merely to establish footholds; they may be mere beachheads in a drawn-out (even transgenerational) advance on landlords' holdings. Rather than an isolated eruption onto the political stage, such occupations may in some cases constitute only one "weapon" among many in peasants' repertoire (Scott 1986). They are part of peasants' politics and, as such, are expressions of a quiet but consistent historical agency.

In Chimborazo, peasant-workers have long been engaged in historical struggles to gain access to hacienda lands. On the "traditional" mercantile hacienda, peasants engaged in both individual/contractual and collective/ritual negotiations (such as *camari*) with their patrons to ensure certain minimal rights of access to house and subsistence plots as well as to collective grazing and fuel and water rights. With earnings from temporary work on coastal sugar plantations or from small commercial ventures (usually combined with labor migration), certain peasants (especially those younger men of *arrimado* status) were ready to purchase hacienda dismemberments in the 1930s and beyond. As rent forms were gradually eliminated, peasants purchased plots from their patrons, in effect creating an expanding ring of microfundia surrounding the shrinking hacienda. When the relative political opening of the 1960s altered the limits of negotiation (see Guerrero 1983), peasants were in a position to drive for more hacienda lands.

The struggle in Culluctus led to a violent confrontation. In 1983, when two peasants of Culluctus were murdered by hired police, Gatazo's leaders were quickly drawn to the scene. They returned with sullen but determined faces: the struggle for land could end in bloodshed, but then again, it might not. Weeks later, the peasants of Gatazo were determined peacefully to occupy estate lands in Gatazo. Still, tempers were hot. When IERAC made an official inspection in the company of AN's heirs, Gatazo's peasant leaders became angered and a brawl with the heirs and IERAC engineers nearly broke out (violence in Culluctus broke out "the day after IERAC's inspection") (Chiriboga and Tobar 1985, p. 41). As in Culluctus, Gatazo's peasants protested the IERAC inspector's report. They argued that it gave a false impression which favored the heirs (perhaps significantly, both Culluctus's and Gatazo's peasants hired the same legal defense) (AI/R 1983).

In Culluctus, fear of losing traditional rights to land via the hacendado's "illegitimate" sale of "their grazing lands" to a third party provoked a land invasion followed by violent confrontation. Likewise in Hospital Gatazo, news that the Junta de Asistencia Social intended illegally to renew the hacienda's lease, or to sell or donate significant sections of the hacienda to *pueblerino* groups, appears to have nearly provoked a revolt. Ultimately, however, it led to internal strife when ex-huasipunguero leaders organized

a cooperative to fend off **pueblerino** interests and thereby gain supposed priority legal status in the land allocation process. In Gatazo Zambrano, the uneven process of "private reform" via land sales was not furthered but expensively prolonged by IERAC's sluggish response in the expropriation suit against the AN heirs. The drawn-out legal battle provided fertile ground for a calibrated peasant land occupation and the appearance of certain divisions within the **comuna**.

The twentieth century has seen the partial dissolution of many highland haciendas and, consequently, the creation of local land markets in **microfundia** as hacendados unloaded marginal lands. When increasing political instability was made concrete in local labor problems, heirs to subdivided estates sold out to peasants in order to capitalize their diminished operations or transfer capital to the commercial or, rarely, the industrial sector. In the case of Gatazo, selling out was not a matter of mere "choice." Peasants withheld labor or chipped away at heirs' operations by persistent theft, foot-dragging, absenteeism (informal strikes), and temporary labor migration. Hacendados without sufficient labor (like Jorge [28] or Ernesto [23]) had little choice but to cultivate alfalfa, a relatively lucrative cash crop but far inferior to carrots, onions, or garlic, which required a substantial labor input. The crux was this: as peasant demographic pressure increased, the hacendado's labor productivity and labor supply paradoxically decreased. Temporary migration, semiproletarianization, land purchase for horticulture leading to re-peasantization, petty-crop theft, and foot-dragging on the job all contributed to the decline in the third generation hacendado's yields and to the growing perception among them that it simply was not worth the trouble or the lost investment.<sup>47</sup>

Patron-client relations have often been the direct channel of land and labor in the transition to capitalism in Ecuador's central highlands. Since Mallon's (1983) work on the transition to capitalism in Peru's central highlands, this conclusion is no longer surprising. I have tried to convey something of the particular nature of these relations and how they shaped a local land market in ex-hacienda lands. A complete analysis of patron-client social relations in Colta would require a much larger work with a somewhat different purpose. Here I have simply pointed out that the negotiating "space" of these relations is defined historically by struggle--shifting combinations of resistance and collaboration as peasants attempt to "work the system to their minimum disadvantage" (Hobsbawm 1973, p. 13)--and by economic conditions and household strategies devised to meet those conditions.

But what kind of land market has this transition guided by patron-client relations produced? To what extent do sales of ex-hacienda lands, these chips off the old hacienda block, so to speak, constitute the supply side of a fluid land market accessible to peasants in the Colta area? It is clear that they do not, at least in the sense of having "free" access to purchase land wherever and whenever one chooses (assuming peasants have the savings or access to the necessary credit). Sales to peasants are or have been (a) a result of subdivision or a process of capitalization, or (b) the indirect result of the social and political threats of invasion and expropriation made concrete in labor indiscipline and other forms of local resistance. The sales follow the well-worn channels of social communication in the Andes: kin (fictive or real) and/or patron-client networks.

Or do they? As outside observers have noted, Ecuador's land-transfer system is weighted down by a heavy load of regulations and restrictions (Stringer 1988). For example, land for sale must first be offered to all contiguous property owners before it can be offered to a third party. If this legal restriction were meaningful, it would surprise no one that land tended to be sold more often to kin and clients than to informed outsiders. Clearly, this restriction has not helped the development of a "true" or "undistorted" land market in highland Ecuador. But to what extent the law is responsible for the current situation remains debatable. It is my contention that removing the law would have little impact on the pattern of land sales. I would offer a qualification, however: the law restricting sales must be seen within the context of a series of agrarian reform laws that accelerated a capitalist process of hacienda transformation and dissolution. Remove the agrarian reform laws and the land sale restrictions, and the outcome would probably be different for this particular region.

Is there any land--outside of their local, diminished hacienda--that a peasant household in Cantón Colta today can hope to buy? Outside of the Highlands, usually in the eastern and western montana (subtropical montane) zones, it is claimed that ample land is available for purchase. When available, however, this land is usually priced beyond even the rich peasant's reach. Its distance from markets, combined with what highlanders perceive as the ill effects of the humid climate, makes it even less attractive to potential highland peasant buyers. The crucial issue, however, is that migration to montana zones is causing serious soil erosion and significant social conflict, especially in the Oriente, or eastern slope regions (see Whitten 1978). In the Colta area, good, subparamo land (below 3,300 meters) is practically unavailable in the late 1980s. Pressure on the land increases, and remaining haciendas are under constant siege.

The Gatazo case is of political significance because it demonstrates that given access to the productive valley floors and infrastructure usually reserved by the "emergent modern" dairy hacienda for pasture (Waters 1985; Haney and Haney 1989, p. 87), peasants are capable of making a rapid transition to a more efficient land-use regime of intensive commercial-vegetable production (given rising urban-demand schedules). Yet, what is equally significant about this case is that Gatazo's peasants were not "given" the land. Rather, they were the persistent agents of a prolonged process of private land transfers from landlord to peasant. The Gatazo peasantry's strategy emphasized unspectacular, everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1986) on the hacienda--a situation recognized by CIDA in the early 1960s as "internal siege." The patron-client politics that governed the internal siege of the hacienda served as channels for land sales and hastened a transition toward petty commodity production.

The Culluctus case illustrates the consequences of a landlord's illegitimate, capitalist counteroffensive against the peasant's claim on, or siege of, hacienda resources.<sup>48</sup> The struggle of Culluctus's pastoralists corresponds to what CIDA reported as a hacienda under "external" and "internal siege." In this case, the siege led to the partial vindication of peasants' "traditional" rights to pasture. Culluctus offers an instructive contrast with Gatazo in that differential, agro-ecological niches and tenure systems conditioned the outcomes of their respective, essentially market-driven conflicts (see Waters 1985; also CIDA 1965, p. 429).

Culluctus and Gatazo were complementary farms in a juego de haciendas (literally, set of haciendas), or multi-hacienda estate, purchased by a merchant/moneylender and landowner, Don Juan Z., between 1868 and 1884. Such multi-hacienda estates were not uncommon in Chimborazo (Costales 1957, p. 64; Gangotena 1981, p. 56) or elsewhere in the Sierra, and their functioning reveals important aspects of landed families' economic strategies and kinship structure (Guerrero 1987). After 1930, the Z. family's juego de haciendas was fragmented and subdivided by heirs. Hacienda Culluctus was halved by inheritance in 1965, then sold by an association of heirs to their respective clients in 1972. In turn, these clients sold off "dismemberments" to peasant-workers while retaining most of the land for themselves. Following a violent confrontation between peasants and the landlord's hired police, 250 hectares of César's half of Culluctus was expropriated by IERAC in 1984. The Hacienda Gatazo, smaller but more centrally located than Culluctus, was subdivided in four parts in 1931, then redivided in 1948, and finally dissolved as heirs sold plots to "their peons" in the 1970s and early 1980s. Two of the subdivisions, or lotes, of Hacienda Gatazo, however, were partially reserved by heirs. Today, these hacienda "reserves" remain the objects of various forms of peasant "siege."

Finally, the El Hospital Gatazo case provides a mixed contrast to Culluctus and Gatazo. Hacienda El Hospital Gatazo was a state-owned, public-welfare farm affected by land reform in 1972. As on other public-welfare farms in Ecuador's Sierra, the peasant struggle was characterized by negotiation among internal and external peasants and unions, local small-town or pueblerino interests, and state institutions.

These cases illustrate some of the demographic and ecological contradictions faced by Chimborazo's peasantry--contradictions which have grown steadily more acute since the 1960s. Confined to petty commodity production or mixed semiproletarian strategies, the peasantry is obliged to mine its soils and undermine its own social reproduction (de Janvry 1981). Rather than pass into oblivion or the ranks of the urban proletariat, however, peasant households have struggled in diverse and creative ways to gain limited access to hacienda lands. The Gatazo peasantry's struggle to convert hacienda lands into highly productive smallholdings should be taken as a positive example to be promoted. Ecuador now requires an agrarian program designed to extend peasant access to the fertile hacienda lands that have largely remained in the hands of the agrarian bourgeoisie throughout the Sierra.

## NOTES

1. Field and archival work in Chimborazo was carried out in July-August 1986 and June-September 1987. The research was funded in part by the Master's Fellowship Program of the Inter-American Foundation, by the Land Tenure Center, and by the Ibero-American Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Alejandra Osorio for her archival assistance. People's names (but not place names) have been changed to protect their anonymity.
2. For a more detailed discussion of the local power relations revolving around the Andean hacienda, see Thurner (1989).
3. The term hacienda "dismemberment" (from the Spanish verb desmembrar) comes from the legal parlance of land registration in Ecuador. It is worth preserving the term here since it conveys a particularly apt meaning to the Ecuadorian process of hacienda land sales to peasants. To dis-member is to disassociate a plot and its owner/inhabitant from the jurisdiction (read responsibility) of the hacienda.
4. In this discussion, by "capitalist" relations of production and "non-capitalist" relations I mean the existence of rationalized labor procurement under a wage system in the former case, and extra-wage means of procurement in the latter. These latter include rent payment in agricultural labor and specified manorial services, labor payment in goods and access to hacienda resources, and the reproduction of ritual hierarchies based on relations of production and differential access to hacienda resources. I do not use the term "noncapitalist" in an exclusive sense. That is, noncapitalist relations are shaped by the existence of capitalist relations; they are not vestigial traits of a "feudal" past. Perhaps "subcapitalist"--taken in the same sense as "subaltern"--might be a more appropriate term.
5. Barsky (1976) also developed a revised version of the CIDA typology.
6. Gangotena (1981, pp. 68-85) developed an "equilibrium" model of hacienda dissolution for the Guamote area of Chimborazo. He argues for three demographically determined "patterns": (1) "the hacienda without equilibrium," (2) "the hacienda with equilibrium," and (3) "the modernizing pre-capitalist hacienda." Without denying that "demographic pressure" is a conditioning factor in any peasant siege strategy, "demographic pressure" in itself is a nearly unquantifiable variable. Furthermore, a hacienda is not a circumscribed domain. Peasants come and go, are "hooked" and evicted. There are myriad strategies for dealing with apparent "demographic pressure." It does not explain why certain haciendas with high internal populations, and surrounded by dense peasant populations, still manage to evict or "dismember" their peasants and make a Junker transition, despite the "pressure." How the struggle is fought and with what political means are far more significant determinations. In short, the "demographic pressure" factor (excepting its legal application, which is political) has been relied upon somewhat too easily in the (sometimes functionalist) social science discourse concerning hacienda dissolution in

Ecuador. For this reason I find Guerrero's model to be of greater value for situating my cases.

7. Gangotena notes that in 1954, there were 17 haciendas in Chimborazo over 2,300 hectares in size, with a total area of 80,800 hectares. Of these latifundia, 62,000 hectares were in Cantón Guamote, a wind-eroded altiplano area to the south of Colta, where extensive grazing predominates. "The average size of these large haciendas in Guamote was 6,889 hectares while in the rest of the province it was 2,350" (Gangotena 1981, p. 56).

8. On the "peasant-worker" concept as an analytical category, see Holms (1983). I use the term peasant-worker because it depicts the twentieth-century hacienda peasant's dual circumstance more accurately than either "peasant" or "worker" alone, and it is more descriptive than "semiproletariat." They have been workers and peasants in a political sense, since throughout the Ecuadorian Andes they struck for unpaid and higher wages but were usually content to accept payment in land from their landlords (see CIDA 1965; Guerrero 1983).

9. The *asamblea* of neighboring Indian peasant groups from Amula, Mishquilli, Tungurahua, and Gatazo met at least three times in 1970/71. I was unable to ascertain how often such pan-communal meetings occur. Are they bi-annual affairs, or do they meet only in times of crisis?

10. The legal recognition of peasant communities as *comunas* nudged kin- and locality-based peasant groups into a special, dependent relationship with the state. Originally, *comunas* came under the jurisdiction of the Ministerio de Previsión Social; later, they came under the Ministry of Agriculture. The primary purpose of the Ley de Organización y Régimen de Comunas of 1937 (Decreto Supremo no. 142) was to integrate the Indian population into national (white, Spanish-speaking) society, as demonstrated in the following excerpts:

Considerando: Que la Ley de División Territorial de la República no comprende los centros poblados, que con el nombre de Caserios, Anejos, Barrios, Comunidades o Parcialidades subsisten dentro de la nacionalidad a la que es necesario incorporarles;

Que a los referidos centros poblados se debe establecerlos y reconocerlos con derechos y obligaciones propios, para su desarrollo y desenvolvimiento sociales;

Que hay que dotarles de la debida representación legal y administrativa a fin de propender a su mejoramiento moral, intelectual y material . . . [cf. Silverman 1960, p. 6].

*Comunas* came under the jurisdiction of the parroquia (in this case Cajabamba) at the bottom end of the existing hierarchy of local government. Annual elections of comuna leaders, or cabildos, could not take place without the presence of the local deputy, or teniente político, of the nearest parroquia--usually a small, predominately mestizo town. In theory, any adult--man or woman--could become a comuna member. Membership in agrarian reform cooperatives was often restricted to male heads of ex-huasipunguero households, however. Comuna members could theoretically become members of cooperatives (as, for example, is the case in neighboring Gatazo Grande). In Hospital Gatazo, however, comuna and cooperative became mutually exclusive associations, and the comuna became indistinguishable from the cooperative in the terms of membership and in the rules for access to land (see Almeida 1981).

11. In 1953, Costales noted the "Llano Chico-Llano Grande" division of the hacienda, which, curiously, he called the "Hacienda Gatazo Grande." In the 1980s, and after IERAC resettlement, the comuna was formed almost entirely of ex-huasipungueros settled on the "Llano Chico" or "Chancaguan" section of the hacienda. The cooperative, in contrast, was composed primarily of ex-huasipungueros settled on the "Llano Grande" side of the hacienda, or on the hills intermittent to the hacienda's two "llanos." Yet families were also divided by the comuna/cooperative split, including the leading peasant families (the D's and the M's). If a previous division underlay the comuna/cooperative split on the hacienda, it is safe to assume that the division was not primarily of a kinship nature. Further research is required to unravel the settlement pattern and rivalries of the prereform Hacienda Hospital Gatazo.

12. Interview, CMM, Hospital Gatazo, 30 August 1987.

13. Also interview, EC, Riobamba, 20 July 1987.

14. Interview, EC, Riobamba, 20 July 1987.

15. Interview, LRL, Cajabamba, 24 July 1987.

16. Interview, EC, Gatazo, 13 July 1987; interview, GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.

17. Interview, LY, Gatazo, 17 August 1987; interview, EC, Gatazo, 13 July 1987; interview, GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.

18. In the north Sierra, such ritual exchanges took place at San Juan and San Pedro (see Guerrero 1987). For a more detailed discussion of *camari* and other hacienda rituals, and peasant resistance, see Thurner (1989).

19. Interview, AZ, Riobamba, 23 July 1987.

20. Interview, LY, Gatazo, 17 August 1987.

21. See Mallon (1986, pp. 165-66) for Peruvian parallels.

22. Interview, GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.

23. Andean peasant marriage ritual in hacienda-dominated Ecuador sometimes included the intervention of the patron, be he landlord or parish priest. Peasants report that an Indian bride-to-be might be made to sleep with the hacendado or priest as an initiation or rite of passage before nuptials. Historically, criminal cases were brought against priests by peasants on this count, however. I have found none concerning hacendado's sexual access to young Indian brides, however.

24. Interview, LY, Gatazo, 17 August 1987.

25. Interview, LH, Gatazo, 16 June 1987.

26. Interview, LCG, Gatazo, 3 August 1987.

27. Interview, GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.

28. Under the "old regime," mayordomo was a social position open only to mestizos. Since the 1960s, however, former Indian kipus or mayorales or, in some cases, peones queridos could ascend to mayordomo status on hacienda subdivisions.
29. Interview, EC, Gatazo, 13 July 1987.
30. They recall how peasants gave so many eggs that they filled a small room--literally thousands of eggs. Interview, EC, AZA, and GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.
31. Interview, EC, Gatazo, 13 July 1987.
32. Interview, GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.
33. By the mid-1980s, the comuna's tractor was hard-put to plow the expanding fields of comunero production. Melchor finally retrieved his tractor after a five-year hiatus, and in 1987, he was back in the fields plowing for a fee. Interview, MG, Gatazo, 13 August 1987.
34. Interview, MCC, Gatazo, 13 August 1987; interview, MG, Gatazo, 13 August 1987; interview, GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.
35. Interview, LRL and MCV, Cajabamba, 24 July 1987.
36. IERAC's then executive director, in an unscheduled but colorful stop in Gatazo, vowed personally (and demogogically) to expropriate Alan's heirs and hand the land over to the comuna on IERAC's terms.
37. Interview, LC, Gatazo, 16 June 1987.
38. I was able to make a brief visit to Gatazo in March 1989. As it turns out, Manolo and Miguel were right. The comuna, led by the elder, but now politically resurrected Melchor, reached a predictable settlement with the heirs. They will pay the heirs 18 million sucres for the 22 cuadras, and they have settled with their lawyers for 7 million sucres; in total, they will have paid 25 million sucres. The 101 microplots were in intensive production and yields were relatively high in contrast to older comunero plots, which have been in onions, garlic, and carrots for a decade or more.
39. Interview, GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.
40. At this point, it is unclear how León, a huasipunguero in 1964, got this land to sell in the first place.
41. Interview, LY, Gatazo, 17 August 1987.
42. For a strikingly similar case in the central highlands of Peru, see Hobsbawm (1974, p. 140).
43. Interview, LY and OZ, Gatazo, 17 August 1987.
44. Interview, LY, Gatazo, 17 August 1987.

45. By "reproduction" I mean "the renewal from one round of production to another of the social and technical elements of production and the elements among them. Thus, if reproduction is to occur, the means of production must be renewed, and the social production distributed among those who labor and those who control the means of production in such a way that production may recommence in its previous form" (Friedman 1980, p. 162; cf. Waters 1985, pp. 32-33). By "reproduction strategy" I mean the characteristic means by which peasants reproduce the material conditions of their existence.

46. Of course, a Chayanovian would predict that access to land is a demographic function, that is, families with greater numbers and higher consumption needs will acquire more land. The household's landholdings are then fractured through inheritance and the like, returning the distribution of land to a dynamic equilibrium. A straightforward Chayanovian analysis makes little sense in peasant communities circumscribed by haciendas, however. Perhaps most highland peasant communities in Ecuador have been bounded by haciendas for most of their modern history. Waters (1985, p. 301) affirmed this in hacienda-dominated Salcedo, where "little support [wa]s found for a strong relationship between household composition and access to land." In the case of Gatazo Zambrano, it is important to recall the historical moment of the community's severance from the hacienda and its reconstitution as petty commodity producers subsumed by capital (see Post 1979, pp. 268-73). Most of those peasants who purchased irrigated land appear to have been *arrimados* under the prereform hacienda regime. *Arrimado* status allowed a certain temporary mobility. One was not bound to regular hacienda duties but rather to the *huasipungo* itself (Guerrero 1984). This demographic/social position allowed many *arrimados* to migrate to coastal sugar *ingenios* and earn wages which they later invested in hacienda land. When landlords began to block access to *huasipungos* in the 1950s, and especially after the liquidation of the *huasipungo* system following the 1964 agrarian reform, *arrimados* were socially transformed into a class faction. They were no longer in a transitional position in the *huasipunguero* household's extended demographic cycle (Guerrero 1983). Thus, the struggle for social reproduction required a new strategy: semiproletarianization, land purchase, and subsequent petty commodity production. How else could they take up their socially reproduced positions as heads of households and support their aging, ex-*huasipunguero* fathers? Any Chayanovian analysis of land tenure in reconstituted, ex-hacienda peasant communities must start with the moment and nature of land transfers from landlord to peasant, itself a contradictory result of historical forms of social reproduction and struggle. In Colta, the chronological articulation of the coastal labor market with the local land market conditioned households' subsequent, differential access to land.

47. Interview, EC and GZA, Riobamba, 31 August 1987.

48. The CIDA (1965, pp. 427-28) authors made some acute observations concerning the nature of peon-patron conflict on the "emerging modern" haciendas. They summed it up in this way:

En las situaciones nuevas que se presentan en la Sierra, es factible polarizar, en un extremo, a un gran empresario frustrado por una institución arcaica, que liga a su núcleo a los trabajadores llamados *huasipungueros*, y, en el otro extremo, a un pequeño productor frustrado, que se enfrenta con un terrateniente redefinido por nuevos rasgos que el *huasipunguero* no

alcanza a comprender. En más de algún aspecto, no es el mismo personaje de antes, porque, el actual, a diferencia de sus antecesores, está interesado en cortar su vinculación con el huasipunguero. De esta suerte, el verdadero diálogo para llegar a una mutua liberación es, en realidad, poco menos que imposible, puesto que cada uno de los sujetos se dirige a un interlocutor imprevisto, muy diferente del personaje con que corresponde realmente dialogar.

I do not agree, however, with the notion that the huasipunguero community "no alcanza a comprender" what their landlords had in mind. Chiriboga and Tobar (1985, p. 57) commit the same error in their analysis of the conflict in Culluctus: "Los campesinos de Culluctus, comunidad de pastores, quizá por su marginamiento, no estuvieron suficientemente informados ni culturalmente dispuestos a entender los alcances de la abolición del trabajo precario, de tal manera que fueron sometidos nuevamente a la subordinación tradicional y a la violencia." They knew very well, and their response makes this quite clear. They were not "sometidos a la subordinación tradicional"--they would have preferred it over the capitalist exploitation that would deny them their pastures. CIDA's claim, that "un verdadero diálogo para llegar a la mutua liberación" is impossible because peasants talk through an unexpected intermediary, misses the point. The local, uncloaked class conflict dictates that either the landlords or the huasipunguero community must go. Ex-huasipungueros and landlords know this. For them, it was (and is) merely a question of time.

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