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UNITED STATES NON-PROJECT ASSISTANCE (NPA)
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE BY THE
DAC EXPERT GROUP ON EVALUATION

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by
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Overview

While most of the United States' development efforts are project oriented, non-project assistance (NPA) is an integral part of the U.S. development strategy. Project assistance is usually preferred since it can be targeted to specific development constraints. However, several types of assistance are often required to deal with a development problem (e.g., projects, NPA, food aid). With non-project assistance it is possible to influence policy at a broader level than is possible with projects.

As Table I in Section X illustrates, U.S. non-project assistance has more than doubled since FY 1981. In 1985 non-project assistance reached \$5.3 billion, or over one-half of U.S. bilateral assistance.

Most of U.S. non-project assistance is in the form of cash transfers. This category has steadily increased from 48 percent of NPA in FY 1981 to 65 percent of NPA in FY 1985. In FY 1985, over one-half of the \$3.5 billion in cash transfers went to Israel to help bring stability to the Middle East. In FY 1985 Latin America received \$793 million in cash transfers. As a share of NPA, cash transfers to Latin America have increased threefold since FY 1981 (see Section X, Tables III and IV).

The second largest category of non-project assistance is food aid, PL-480 Title I and Title III. Together, these categories have maintained an average share of about 23 percent of NPA for the past four years.

Egypt received \$200 million of the \$597 million Commodity Import Program (CIP) obligations made in FY 1985. This is a decrease from the average \$300 million level of CIPs Egypt received from FY 1981 through FY 1984. CIPs are the major form of NPA going to Africa, \$267 million in FY 1985.

NPA sector assistance has more than tripled from \$98 million in FY 1981 to \$320 million in FY 1985. Latin America is the largest recipient of program sector assistance, with much of the emphasis being placed on agriculture and private sector development.

I. Toward a Functionally Oriented Taxonomy

Definitions of NPA Flows

The following are the major types of United States non-project assistance (NPA):

- Cash Transfers - A cash transfer is a deposit of dollar funds to the account of an aid-recipient government. It is used to provide immediate balance of payments and/or budget support on an emergency basis and to support economic policy reforms and stabilization efforts.
- Commodity Import Program - A Commodity Import Program (CIP) is a tied foreign exchange program designed for fast disbursement, to help an LDC meet a foreign exchange shortfall. A CIP allows an LDC to import a wide range of goods (raw materials, intermediate and capital goods) from the U.S. and in some cases, from selected LDCs. CIPs are usually designed to support LDC economic policy reforms.
- Sector Assistance - Program sectoral assistance is designed to alleviate constraints on the growth of sectoral output and productivity. In some sector programs, the foreign exchange uses are limited to the import of specific goods or categories of goods. In other programs, the foreign exchange is used for local currency purchases. Sector programs are frequently tied to a policy dialogue between the United States and the host country. Disbursements are often conditioned on the achievement of policy goals such as import liberalization, credit tightening or pricing changes. Sectors in which the United States has had programs include agriculture, health, education and energy. The following area illustrative of sector programs:
 - Zaire. An agriculture sector program to enhance the productivity and output of Zaire's agriculture sector by increasing the supply of U.S.-origin agro-inputs to private enterprises.
 - Pakistan. A NPA energy sector project that provides balance of payments support for the procurement of mining and power generation commodities and power distribution equipment from the U.S. It will also provide the framework for a policy dialogue with the Government of Pakistan on energy generation and pricing issues.

- Costa Rica. A health supplies management project to streamline the drug and medical supplies purchasing systems and to supply foreign exchange for the import of machines and medical commodities for the social security hospitals. The project is tied to the ongoing dialogue to increase the efficiency of health sector delivery systems.

- Public Law 480 Title I - Title I provides highly concessional loans to finance United States agriculture commodities. To the extent possible this assistance is linked to specific development objectives and targets in the cooperating country. Moreover, the local currency generated by P.L. 480, Title I sales, is used for a variety of developmental purposes agreed to between the host government and AID. Care is taken to ensure that such sales do not discourage agriculture production in the recipient countries.

- Public Law 480, Title III - Title III provides multiyear supply agreements with IDA-eligible countries. Recipient countries must be prepared to undertake specific actions to address the constraints to equitable development, particularly in the food and agriculture sector. PL 480 local currency sales proceeds used for agreed-on development purposes may be applied against the country's repayment obligation to the United States--that is, the United States may forgive the loan.

These definitions reflect current U.S. practices and no changes are anticipated at this time. The current DAC classification system for NPA is satisfactory.

II. Selection of NPA Flows

1. Legislative Requirements on the Selection of Foreign Aid Mix, Especially on NPA

U.S. Foreign Assistance legislation is generally silent on the specific modes to be used to provide assistance. Development Assistance funds, since they are used to a considerable extent to directly benefit the poor, have generally been considered inappropriate for NPA programs. Economic Support Fund assistance, authorized by legislation to promote economic or political stability, is the primary instrument for providing NPA.

Legislation has, at times, required that NPA be provided to certain countries, for example, Israel and Egypt. Otherwise there are few statutory limitations that do not also apply to project assistance. Thus, procurement requirements, country limitations, special issue legislation (e.g., narcotics, human rights, etc.) apply to both forms of assistance.

2. Other Factors in the Selection of the Mix of NPA

Decisions about NPA allocations are closely tied to the economic, political and security interests of the United States. Non-project assistance can be used to assist host governments avert major economic or political upheavals. In such cases, generalized short-term support may be most effective in contributing to stabilization and economic and financial recovery. Most often cash transfers are used for generalized balance of payments support.

The country's economic situation is another important factor. A severe, short-term shortage of domestic resources or foreign exchange can be a serious impediment to growth. In addition to cash transfers, CIPs can be used to fill a balance of payments gap by providing foreign exchange for critical imports. In other situations it is necessary to relieve structural bottlenecks to achieve sectoral growth. Such constraints include inappropriate host government policies.

The kind of program that is required--whether there is an urgent need for stabilization or balance of payments support--emerges from the Agency for International Development's (AID) integrated country mission strategy statement.

3. Fit of NPA into Host Government Plans

The United States works closely with host governments in developing an integrated development assistance approach. AID's country planning and budget documents are generally shared with the host government. On a continuing basis we discuss with host governments our perception of the economic problems they face, assistance programs we have available and the potential role such assistance can play in addressing development problems.

4. Positive and Negative Aspects of Selecting NPA

AID operates under a decentralized country mission structure. For most countries the AID mission prepares a strategy statement which identifies the LDC's development problems and constraints along with an integrated assistance strategy. Then, the United States allocates its resources through an integrated foreign assistance budget process. The entire package is subjected to interagency review and debate. This integrated selection process has been both flexible and effective.

III. Criteria for Non-Project Assistance

1. Requirements for Providing NPA

An analysis of economic growth and balance of payments prospects is required. This includes:

- A statement of the GNP growth rate assumptions under which balance of payments gap projections were made, i.e., the range of alternative GNP growth rates and the associated balance of payments deficits.
- Once a gap is projected, an analysis of the economic or political impacts of not filling the gap.
- Analysis showing the LDC's import needs and how various levels of NPA will relate to those needs.

IMF conditionality requirements related to policy reform are often associated with cash transfers and CIPs, although by statute the United States cannot condition assistance solely on the basis of recommendations of multilateral financial institutions. For NPA sector assistance, sector level reviews of the expected impact of policy changes are required. This includes an assessment of sectoral priorities as they relate to AID's country development strategy.

2. Greater Concentration in Forms of NPA

Advantages:

- There is a natural tension between rapid disbursement and targeting of assistance. Rapid disbursement enables NPA to respond to a sudden deterioration in a

country's import capacity. Such generalized support can also increase the recipient's capacity to absorb additional assistance from other sources. However, with NPA it can be difficult to assure impact on specific LDC regional or income groups.

- NPA is the form of assistance most desired by recipients, and in some cases the only form of assistance that is appropriate. Since it is preferred by recipients, it provides the greatest potential for policy leverage.
- Commodity programs can be tailored to impact on specific areas of interest, e.g., private sector development.

Disadvantages:

- It is difficult to evaluate the policy impact of NPA, often because policy goals are hard to specifically pin down. As the form of assistance that allows the most flexibility, NPA is very susceptible to abuse.
- NPA programs can distort trade patterns, be a hidden subsidy to state enterprises and undercut domestic production.
- Because cash transfers are not tied to U.S. sources of procurement, they may appear to promote other developed country's exports at the expense of U.S. commercial interests. However incidental, such concerns by the American public and Congress could undermine U.S. development assistance programs.

3. Use of Existing Capacity vs. New Investments

The decision between supporting the use of existing capacity or providing for new investment in fixed plant and equipment depends on the country's development needs as described in AID's country development strategy statement, and on the availability of foreign exchange to operate existing plants effectively. AID mission recommendations, supporting analysis and descriptions of NPA's role in the overall development strategy guide the final mix. New capital and equipment will only be provided when the host government has adequate resources to finance the additional recurrent costs that result from the investment.

4. Justification of NPA

U.S. policy and economic interests along with host government development needs determines whether NPA will be appropriate. Frequently, the purpose of non-project assistance is policy change. As such, there is less concern with commodity and project details since the ultimate objective is the policy changes that are taking place.

IV. Non-project Assistance and Policy Reform

1. NPA as a Basis for Policy Changes by Host Governments

Long-term, equitable development depends heavily on the nature of the policies followed by developing countries. Policy dialogue and reform are central to most NPA programs. The extent to which NPA activities form the basis for pursuing policy discussion with host government officials depends on how the particular programs are conditioned. Practice indicates that NPA activities are more effective when they are specifically structured through preconditions, disbursements of funds in tranches, or specific covenants to support policy dialogue.

The emphasis on policy dialogue, strengthened by conditioning U.S. assistance, has yielded policy reforms in several LDCs and over a broad range of areas: Two country examples are:

- a. In Bangladesh, AID linked imports of fertilizer to policy changes in fertilizer pricing and marketing. As a result of this program:
 - Farmer access to fertilizer was greatly increased;
 - Prices paid by farmers for fertilizer under the new marketing system were lower than those paid under the old system;
 - A new class of private wholesalers developed as intermediaries. Fertilizer inputs were connected to a substantial policy change which, it is expected will have substantial beneficial effects on the entire agricultural sector.
- b. In Jamaica, AID linked NPA to the Government of Jamaica's achieving progress in making certain policy and structural reforms. Particular stress was placed

on the establishment of a market-based exchange rate system. AID also conditioned NPA on Government of Jamaica divestiture of 30 state enterprises, liberalization of coffee exports and private sector participation in coffee exports. After a progressive series of policy changes the Jamaican exchange rate system was put on a market-determined basis, the exchange rate stabilized and capital flight dropped sharply.

2. Economic Analysis Underlying Policy Dialogue

AID staff often do their own analysis, including balance of payments and budgetary projections and identification of policy and institutional bottlenecks. At times, consultants are employed to undertake special studies. The United States also uses economic analysis and country studies of the World Bank and IMF.

AID has been increasingly providing temporary technical assistance to its missions for policy dialogue and conditionality preparation. While AID does not make detailed econometric projections (because of the inadequacy of the data base) it is in the process of strengthening its use of alternative scenarios. This approach is less demanding on data and provides illustrations of anticipated outcomes associated with different levels of resources inputs by the U.S.

3. The Lead in Policy Dialogue

The United States does not have a fixed approach to who takes the lead. In each case the situation and goals are assessed, assistance modes and their respective leverage considered and finally the approach that has the best potential for meeting U.S. development objectives is selected.

4. The Formulation of Conditionality

United States conditionality is governed by three criteria:

- The formation of conditions must always be consistent with the purposes of the assistance and guided by familiarity with the recipient country's political, economic and social landscape.

- Conditions attached to NPA should be kept few in number to maximize the likelihood of success. They should be important to the success of the stabilization program and/or to long-term growth.
- Whenever feasible, the assistance should use tranches as a mechanism for compliance.

Cash transfers are most often used for balance of payments support and are considered to be most effective in influencing macroeconomic policy. An example of successful implementation of a stabilization program of Costa Rica. Through tranches AID conditioned its support to policy reform. AID worked closely with the Government of Costa Rica to maintain a stabilization program directed at exchange rate devaluation and reductions in inflation and trade deficits.

Inappropriate pricing, marketing and subsidy policies in a particular sector, are best handled through a CIP or sector program. Niger is an example where AID was instrumental in obtaining policy changes in agriculture policies. A 1984 agriculture sector development grant is conditioned on provision of evidence that the Government of Niger has significantly reduced public sector grain marketing activities, introduced a regionally differentiated cereal pricing policy and acted to privatize agriculture import supplies.

Past U.S. CIPs have included covenants relating to review and phasing out of public enterprises, encouragement of foreign and domestic private investment, managerial and technical training and incentives, formation of a consultative group, and periodic consultation with the AID mission. A common requirement of the U.S. NPA program has been country adherence to a sound stabilization program, such as those of the IMF.

5. The Potential of Aid as a Vehicle for Policy Reform

The greatest conditionality problem or limitation concerns formulation of conditions which are realistic within the host country context. For example, significant U.S. security or political considerations may tend to weaken negotiating conditions and make it more difficult to use sanctions if assistance conditions are not met.

AID is still in the process of building its analytical capability to provide the necessary technical information for designing and negotiating conditions to obtain economic reforms. Policy dialogue is more effective as leverage when analysis is accepted as appropriate, or at a minimum

understood, by host government officials. It is generally true that leverage is also greater when the level of quality of resources is significant.

6. Political Sensitivity and Policy Dialogue

LDC political sensitivity is directly related to perceive risks from change. Policy dialogue then represents varying degrees of risk activity for host governments, and donors must be sensitive to problems faced. This includes accepting that easy reforms have probably already taken place. The task for the donor then becomes one of attempting to minimize the political costs of host government officials who must face difficult decisions. This may mean movement may not be as rapid as desired and resources may have to be used to minimize some of the more probable and adverse outcomes of the reform.

Under certain circumstances, official U.S. documents may be classified for security or political reasons.

V. Donor Coordination

1. Donor Coordination of NPA

The use of AID resources in support of policy changes is at the heart of AID's development strategy. The U.S. strongly supports donor doordination for the achievement of policy reform objectives. In many cases AID has worked with and supported policy reform proposed by multilateral institutions such as the IMF and IBRD.

The U.S. has long taken the lead in a dialogue among donor countries addressing the need for greater efforts at coordination. AID has encouraged greater use of the existing IBRD-led consultative group process for discussing overall development priorities and policy concerns. AID country missions are also working with host countries to establish in-country assistance coordination mechanisms with other donors at the sectoral and subsectoral level.

2. Coordination of Policy Dialogue

Donors use a variety of means to coordinate policy dialogue. This coordination most frequently occurs through such groups as the IBRD-led consultative group, where a number

of key issues are discussed by donor countries and the recipient governments. In-country donor coordination groups and Roundtable discussions have also been used to identify and discuss policy concerns as well as to pursue issues raised in a particular consultative group. Coordination has taken place within the context of specific projects or with individual donors about a specific problem.

We believe that the best type of donor coordination occurs through a combination of broader coordination mechanisms, such as a consultative group or Roundtable discussion and an in-country donor coordination group. This combination provides sufficient opportunity for the discussion of issues ranging from macroeconomic policy concerns to specific implementation problems.

VI. Effects of Tying AID

1. Commodity Selection in NPA

Commodities are selected on the basis of the development needs and economic circumstances of the aid recipient, not for the benefit of U.S. exporters. Usually a broad range of commodities are eligible for AID financing. While the categories of eligible commodities may be restricted, the selection of particular commodities is also made by the recipient government.

2. Ties Attached to NPA

Following is the general U.S. policy regarding source of procurement:

- Cash transfers, by their nature, are free from any commodity source restrictions.
- The United States is the authorized procurement source for (a) all grants, except those to countries on the U.N. list of least developed countries (LLDC's) (b) Economic Support Fund loans and (3) PL480 assistance.
- The United States and certain less Developed Countries (LDC's) are the authorized procurement sources for (a) grants to LLDC's and (b) development loans.

There are no plans to relax these restrictions.

3. The Impact of Tying on NPA Programs

Tying, by its very nature, does not necessarily produce the least expensive or most timely procurement. Tying is a potential constraint, for if tied assistance were equally as efficient as other forms, there would be no need to tie. The rationale then is political rather than economic. Within the context of tied aid, efficiency is maximized through competitive U.S. procurement and post-audit review of commodity prices. Obviously, tying is only an issue in financing commodity procurement. Cash transfer assistance is outside the scope of tying since no commodities are being financed.

4. Impact on the Availability of or Access to Spare Parts or Repair Services

It is clear that tying may create future problems with spare parts and repair services. Unless an LDC's foreign exchange earnings increase or the original aid source continues support, there may be a problem in maintaining aid-financed equipment.

VII. Management of Local-Currency Accounts

1. Use of Counterpart Funds

The use of counterpart funds is generally agreed upon between officials of the host government (generally the ministry of planning and finance) and the AID country mission. They may be used to finance the local currency costs of U.S. assistance projects, for general budget support, or for other purposes consistent with the Foreign Assistance Act.

2. Legislative Restrictions on Counterpart Funds

The law is not specific on uses of local currency. It states that a portion of the funds may be allocated for use by the U.S. government and the remainder is to be used for mutually agreed upon programs. All CIP and PL-480 agreements include requirements for the disposition of sale proceeds.

There have been recent legislative initiatives to require that local currencies generated from AID program assistance be used for development purposes.

A 1984 evaluation of AID's Commodity Import Program by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that AID missions use these funds in a variety of ways but primarily for general budgetary support. While some country missions do require the governments to show attribution of the local currency, this is often a paper transfer and does not influence the government budgeting process.

VIII. NPA and Host-Country Institutions

1. Formal Consideration of Institutional Adequacy

The United States has an important tradition of helping to create and strengthen institutional capacity throughout the developing world. Present AID policy emphasizes attention on such activities. Institutional development is one of the four policy priorities of AID's long-range development strategy.

While AID requires formal analysis of LDC institutions for project assistance, there is no similar requirement for NPA. Since AID is decentralized, individual missions are free, to a substantial extent, to determine how and what to do. Encouraged and guided by the Agency's policy emphasis on institutional development, missions do some analysis. For example, a portion of an NPA grant to Niger was targeted on institutional technical assistance.

2. The Private Sector

There are many things that government cannot do, or cannot do well. The U.S. rejects the idea that government is the sole instrument for delivering the goods and services vital to development effort. One of the agency's priorities is to seek ways for the fuller participation of the private sector as an engine of growth.

Experience shows that--with the exception of such areas as basic public administration, major transportation infrastructure, and certain aspects of agricultural research, public health and education--private sector institutions are both less costly and more responsive to their clientele and are more innovative dynamic, and efficient than public institutions.

3. Reliance on Public vs. Private Institutions

The country situation finally determines the assistance channel. AID continues efforts to expand private sector involvement where government has not been successful. This includes the distribution of agriculture inputs and extension services. AID will soon be testing the capabilities of the indigenous private sector to manufacture and market inputs for health and population programs (e.g., oral rehydration salts and contraceptives).

4. NPA Coordination with Host Government Ministries

The nature and conditions of each NPA program determine the developing country ministry or ministries through which AID will coordinate. A single ministry rarely covers the entirety of a sector or area of program interest. An NPA program will most frequently be handled by one ministry if it is sector specific. Other cases may result in a ministry, perhaps the finance ministry, serving as the coordinator of several host government institutions.

IX. Evaluating the Economic Effectiveness of NPA

1. Evaluation of Economic Effect of NPA

Until recently, AID did not evaluate NPA in a systematic way. That is changing. AID has published a program evaluation methods report titled "Evaluation Guidelines for Non-Project Assistance: Commodity Import Programs and CIP-like Activities." This document presents a "menu" of approaches and techniques that can be used in evaluations of NPA programs. In addition, AID is preparing specific guidance on the evaluation of the economic impacts of NPA which will eventually be a part of the Agency's Handbook.

The economic effects of NPA activities vary widely, depending on the nature of the program and the size of the program relative to host country size and policies. While no single method can be proposed for every evaluation, evaluators must examine the program's effective on the growth and stability of the economy and its beneficiary impact.

The following economic impact issues were developed as part of an outline scope of work for CIP's, but portions are relevant to evaluation of NPA activities in general:

- Effect of CIP on balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves, economic growth, imports, consumption patterns, U.S. share of the market.
- Effect of program on growth of the private sector.
- Relevance of program to policy dialogue.
- Effect of program on IMF targets of negotiations.

2. Monitoring of Conditionality Provisions

Once an AID project or program begins, it is subject to continuous monitoring by those responsible for its implementation. This monitoring is most often done by, but not limited to, field mission personnel.

3. Lessons Learned from Evaluations of NPA

Despite the absence of formal evaluation guidelines, AID did CIP evaluations in 1984 in Zimbabwe, Somalia and Egypt. Following is a summary of the major issues and recommendations of those studies:

- Policy Reform. Policy dialogue and policy reform are central to most CIPs. However, CIP policy goals are often hard to pin down specifically. Thus, it is difficult to monitor the policy impact of most CIPs. If a "policy checklist" were included in the original Project Paper it could serve as a useful tool for Mission management.
- Targeting: Commodities and Beneficiaries. There is a natural programming tension in any CIP between rapid disbursement rates and targeting commodities to the beneficiaries designated in the Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS). The CIPs reviewed chose to emphasize disbursement rates. In future CIPs, it might make sense to more tightly limit commodity eligibility and imports to those that are most directly linked to AID's CDSS strategy.
- Foreign Exchange Rates. When designing a CIP, AID should critically examine the spread between the official and free market exchange rates. If the difference is large, AID should consider including

policy conditions to narrow the spread. Alternatively, AID should consider providing the CIP at a rate closer to the free market rate.

- Local Currency Programming. A more activist approach to programming CIP local currency provides an opportunity to direct a portion of a developing country's domestic resources into areas that fit.
- AID's developmental Strategy. As demonstrated in the Zimbabwe CIP, AID can have a key impact on development budget priorities in developing countries. The extra management costs of such an approach should be carefully weighed against the opportunity for increased development impact.

There is an evaluation agenda implicit in these remarks which can provide guidance to a team as it considers the design of its own evaluation.

4. Bringing Lessons Learned Back Into the Design Loop

Incorporating "lessons learned" into the design of new projects is a major objective of NPA evaluations. Such evaluations include recommendations for future action, not only for the managers of the program being evaluated, but also for the designers of future programs. These recommendations are designed to flow directly and logically from the evaluation findings and recommendations. This topic is addressed more fully in the "Report of the Expert Group of AID Evaluation on Lessons of Experience Emerging from AID Evaluation."

5. Gauging the Success of Policy Dialogue

Following are indicators of impact on policy dialogue that are suggested as useful in gauging the success of such discussions:

- Overt policy changes corresponding to conditions and covenants in program agreements.

Data sources: Host government announcements, rules, decrees, laws, or regulations; interviews with USAID Mission and embassy officials.

- Unannounced policy changes in program agreements.

Data sources: Interviews with government officials; market research; interviews with USAID Mission and embassy officials.

- Successful IMF negotiations on standby agreements, if considered complementary to U.S. AID programs.

Data sources: IMF officials.

6. Relating Policy Changes to Changes in the Economy

It is difficult to establish direct links between policy changes and subsequent events in the economy in a strict causal sense. The best that can be done is follow up on benchmark indicators of changes suggested by economic logic. This is far less satisfactory than "establishing" a link between a policy change prescribed and improvement in the economy, yet this is often all that can be done.

7. NPA and Assistance to the Poor

It is difficult to direct NPA benefits to a particular LDC group because NPA is a macro tool which is difficult to narrowly target on end users.

8. NPA Staffing Problems

NPA based policy reform requires an intimate knowledge of an LDC's economy, including economic linkages within the economy and to the outside world. AID is increasing its economic staff at the country level to deal with such issues. It is also funding additional research and technical assistance.

9. Administrative Difficulties in Managing NPA Flows

In CIP programs disbursement delays related to AID and host country procurement rules are an ongoing problem. In addition, commodity arrival accounting and local currency programming require accounting systems that are often difficult to make operate in many LDCs.

X. Size of NPA Flows

As mentioned in the overview, the following tables show the magnitude and trend of U.S. non-project assistance for the last five years. Table 1 shows NPA obligations by major category and Table 2 the percentage distribution. Tables 3 and 4 reflect the regional distribution of U.S. NPA in absolute and percentage terms.

Table 1. Bilateral U.S. Economic Assistance by NPA Categories
(Obligations - \$ Millions)¹

	FY1981	FY1982	FY1983	FY1984	Est. ² FY1985
Cash Transfers	1,173.2	1,470.7	1,589.7	1,638.4	3,461.5
CIPs	370.5	601.9	502.2	563.1	597.2
Sector Assistance	98.8	301.2	214.1	228.4	319.5
PL 480 - Title I	701.5	596.7	656.1	705.5	807.9
PL 480 - Title III	91.9	122.9	139.4	98.0	109.5
Total NPA	2,435.9	3,093.4	3,101.5	3,233.4	5,295.6
Total Bilateral Economic Assistance	5,670.0	6,492.4	6,402.5	7,164.0	10,275.3

¹U.S. Fiscal Year is October 1 - September 30

²Includes supplemental aid to Middle East obligated in September 1985.

Table 2. Bilateral U.S. Economic Assistance
Percentage Distribution of Total NPA

	FY1981	FY1982	FY1983	FY1984	Est. FY1985
Cash Transfers	48%	48%	51%	51%	65%
CIPs	15%	19%	16%	17%	11%
Sector Assistance	4%	10%	7%	7%	6%
PL 480 - Title I	29%	19%	21%	22 %	15%
PL 480 - Title III	4%	4%	4%	3%	2%
Total NPA	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
NPA Share of Total Bilateral Economic Assistance	43%	48%	48%	45%	52%

Table 3. Bilateral U.S. Economic Assistance by
NPA Categories by Region
(Obligations - \$ Millions)

	FY1981	FY1982	FY1983	FY1984	Est. ¹ FY1985
Cash Transfers	1,173.2	1,470.7	1,589.7	1,638.4	3,461.5
Africa	56.3	45.7	80.0	71.0	63.0
Asia/Near East	984.0	1,141.0	1,090.0	1,195.4	2,605.0
(Israel)	(764.0)	(800.0)	(785.0)	(910.0)	(1,950.0)
(Egypt)				(101.9)	(350.0)
Latin America	132.9	284.0	419.7	372.0	793.5
CIPs	370.5	601.9	502.2	563.1	597.2
Africa	70.5	191.9	142.2	170.0	267.0
Asia/Near East	300.0	410.0	360.0	393.1	330.2
(Israel)					
(Egypt)	(300.0)	(350.0)	(300.0)	(301.0)	(200.0)
Latin America					
Sector Assistance	98.8	301.2	214.1	228.4	319.5
Africa	3.7	31.8	16.7	57.3	36.2
Asia/Near East	18.8	88.1	21.2	2.4	85.7
(Israel)					
(Egypt)		(68.0)			(20.0)
Latin America	76.3	181.3	176.2	168.7	197.6
PL 480 - Title I	701.5	596.7	656.1	705.5	807.9
Africa	120.4	97.0	117.1	107.0	151.0
Asia/Near East	498.9	390.1	383.0	428.0	442.5
(Egypt)	(272.5)	(262.0)	(238.3)	(250.0)	(225.0)
Latin America	82.2	109.6	156.0	170.5	214.4
PL 480 - Title III	91.9	122.9	139.4	98.0	109.5
Africa	27.0	27.0	27.0	20.0	
Asia/Near East	64.9	78.9	75.0	68.0	92.0
Latin America		17.0	37.4	10.0	17.5
Total Non-Project Assistance	2,435.9	3,093.4	3,101.5	3,233.4	5,295.6

¹Includes supplemental aid to the Middle East obligated in September 1985.

Table 4. Bilateral U.S. Economic Assistance
Percentage Distribution of Total NPA by Region

	FY1981	FY1982	FY1983	FY1984	Est. FY1985
Cash Transfers	48%	48%	51%	51%	65%
Africa	2%	1%	3%	2%	1%
Asia/Near East	40%	37%	35%	37%	49%
(Israel)	(31%)	(26%)	(25%)	(28%)	(37%)
(Egypt)				(3%)	(7%)
Latin America	5%	9%	14%	12%	15%
CIPs	15%	19%	16%	17%	11%
Africa	3%	6%	5%	5%	5%
Asia/Near East	12%	13%	12%	12%	6%
(Israel)					
(Egypt)	(12%)	(11%)	(10%)	(9%)	(4%)
Latin America					
Sector Assistance	4%	10%	7%	7%	6%
Africa		1%	1%	2%	1%
Asia/Near East	1%	3%	1%		2%
(Israel)					
(Egypt)		(2%)			(*%)
Latin America	3%	6%	6%	5%	4%
PL 480 - Title I	29%	19%	21%	22%	15%
Africa	5%	3%	4%	3%	3%
Asia/Near East	20%	13%	12%	13%	8%
Latin America	3%	4%	5%	5%	4%
PL 480 - Title III	4%	4%	4%	3%	2%
Africa	1%	1%	1%	1%	
Asia/Near East	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%
Latin America		1%	1%	1%	*%
Total Non-Project Assistance	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* = less than 1%