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REGIONALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

VOLUME I

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN AFRICA

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PREFACE

1. This report was prepared by Applied Development Economics (APDEC) in accord with cooperative agreement No. AFR-0458-A-00-7062-00. The agreement requires that APDEC undertake a baseline study of regional organizations and approaches for development in Africa.
2. A major objective of the study was to make a comprehensive inventory of existing African regional organizations, to describe their status, and where possible to assess their effectiveness. This task was achieved by supplementing existing inventories with extensive field visits. The resulting profiles of over 150 regional organizations not only provide basic descriptive material on each organization's membership, location, objectives, and finances, etc., but also include, in many cases, "unofficial" judgement of effectiveness. The profiles, which are found in Volume II of this study, should be a useful source for AID and other donors seeking basic information on particular regional organizations.
3. Volume I of the study is more general, more analytic, more policy oriented. We first ask the question: what are the priority needs to achieve renewed growth in Africa? We then identify six priority areas: trade, agricultural productivity and food security; education; infrastructure; natural resource management; and development financing. Within each of these priority areas we ask the question: how can regional approaches make a contribution to problem solving? We distinguish between regional approaches and regional organizations; as is obvious, the two are not identical. It may be possible to exchange professional and technical information by ad hoc meetings, for example, without creating a formal organizational structure.
4. The structure of each of the "problem-focused" chapters is the same: a discussion of the rationale for regional approaches, a description of what exists, then suggestions of some guidelines for the future. The introductory chapter sets out broader issues of strategy, which we considered directly or indirectly in the ensuing chapters, especially in the conclusion.
5. A central theme that runs through the report is that in matters of regional policy, simple is beautiful. Market integration schemes, in the form of economic communities, are bureaucratically heavy, excessively ambitious, and uniformly unsuccessful as measured by their own objectives. The strategy that some propose as a substitute, regional production planning, is if anything, less promising. But the more focused and technical service-providing organizations--in research, training, education, infrastructure-- have significant potential for expansion and improvement. Ad hoc regionalism, that uses regional organizations or approaches where they seem to be cost-effective instruments of problem solving, appears to be the most fruitful path to follow at this stage of Africa's development.

6. The report is the product of many hands and much collaboration and interaction among its principal authors. Elliot Berg, Jehan Arulpragasam and Régis Marodon spent over 200 days in field visits; they (in addition to Robert Lenaghan and Clément Loussimbadio) interviewed representatives of some 120 organizations, as well as scores of officials and donor representatives. Primary responsibility for chapter drafts was as follows: Introduction and Conclusion, Elliot Berg; Agricultural Production and Food Security, Jehan Arulpragasam, with Régis Marodon contributing to the Food Security section; Trade, Robert Barad; Education and Development Financing, Michael Aliber; Infrastructure, Jehan Arulpragasam; Natural Resource Management, Régis Marodon. Other people who made a contribution to the paper and/or to the profiles include Alexander Berg, Dina Esposito, Robert Lenaghan, Clément Loussimbadio, Modibo Makalou, Annette Pinckney, Cinthya Whittaker, and Menghua Zeng. Nancy Berg was responsible for the editing, with help from June Plowden and Cinthya Whittaker.

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CHAPTER I

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Virtually all politically aware Africans favor closer regional cooperation. Indeed, the conviction that the continent needs more economic (and political) unity is undoubtedly the single most widely shared idea presently in circulation in Africa. Moreover, report after report stresses the urgency of economic integration. A recent document of the Economic Commission for Africa calls it the "priority of priorities".¹ It is a central theme of the Lagos Plan of Action and numerous other high-level political statements on African policy and development strategy.

BENEFITS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION

2. This emphasis on regional cooperation is understandable. Africans see it--especially in its more comprehensive form--as essential to industrialization and reduced external dependence. But there are also numerous benefits, of a less global kind, which can be anticipated from effective cooperation even of more modest kinds, such as the formation of organizations of professional associations, resource management bodies, and others.

3. Five types of short- or medium-term benefits can and should be expected. The first of course is expanded trade. This could come within a formal market integration scheme (preferential trade area or customs union) or from ad hoc, trade-enhancing policies or programs aimed at removing specific obstacles--for example, revolving export credit schemes to reduce credit constraints facing intraregional exporters, clearing houses, trade fairs, or countertrade arrangements.

4. The second source of possible advantages is through the creation of joint facilities serving a regional market. This is the "integrated industry"

1. Adediji, A., "Lettre d'Accompagnement," in Nations Unies, Commission Economique pour l'Afrique, Propositions Visant à Renforcer l'Intégration Economique en Afrique de l'Ouest (n.d., 1984?).

idea present in most market integration arrangements. It applies not only to manufacturing, but to services such as regional airlines, shipping lines, insurance or reinsurance companies.

5. A third potential source of advantages is in improving the management of financial resources, notably by increasing the volume of external assistance and its level of productivity by joint presentation of regional "requirements" and by better structures for dialogue. Joint dialogue should increase coordination between cooperating African countries and donors, and among Africans themselves.

6. Fourthly, regional cooperation should yield benefits in better natural resource management. Regionalism is imposed by geography in numerous cases: river basin management, for example, where rivers cut frontiers, and locust and cricket control, where pests originate beyond the frontiers of countries they attack.

7. A fifth source of short-term benefits is in practice potentially the most important: access to better, cheaper services and more cost-effective conduits to new technology. At issue here is regionalized research, training and education, and a wide array of other technical service provision--regional standard setting (for example, building materials specifications, road signs, professional qualifications, school examinations), regional patent and copyright regulations, commodity organizations, associations of institutions (port management associations, the African Union of Railways, among others).

8. In addition to these short-term benefits are long-term consequences that can be anticipated from more effective regional collaboration. Some of this is simply the cumulative effect of resource-saving, effectiveness-raising, short-term cooperation. But also at issue is the strengthening of institutions and the building of personal and institutional ties that form the real muscle of cooperative relationships, both economic and political.

WHY THESE BENEFITS HAVE NOT BEEN REALIZED

9. Despite these potential benefits of cooperation, and despite the strong general intellectual appeal of economic integration and its apparently universal political support, there is less integration now than there was thirty years ago, at least in terms of formal or official economic relations, and probably less real economic cooperation.

10. Not only have preindependence economic groupings in West, Central and East Africa broken up, but there have appeared many other signs of weakened ties within the region.

- o Recent years have seen a tendency toward reduced trade preferences in regional trade groupings and/or the spread of nontariff barriers. This has happened even in the CEA0, which has the most advanced preferential trade system.

- o Almost all intergovernmental organizations in the region face a deepening financial crisis and growing external dependence because of nonpayment of contributions by member governments.
- o Numerous technical service organizations have closed down--for example, OCLALAV (locust control), OICMA (migratory cricket control), the remote sensing organization in Bamako.
- o The West African Cement Mill (CIMA0), the continent's biggest experiment in regional industrial investment, has been shut down since 1984.

11. Events have not all been in the direction of reduced integration. The creation of ECOWAS in the mid-1970s, and of SADCC in 1980; the growing role of the African Development Bank--these and other developments make the balance sheet more positive. But a sense of disappointment, the feeling that progress is too slow, that integration-increasing achievements are too few, is virtually universal. As an ECA evaluation report of the early 1980s concludes: "economic integration has hardly progressed at all . . . in West Africa despite efforts at cooperation dating from the 1960s."² Many factors explain this paradox between the ideological appeal of economic integration and its poor track record.

- o The goal of economic integration is nowhere easily achieved; witness the evolution of the EEC, the Latin American Free Trade Area, and the Central American Common Market or CARICOM. Political perspectives and cultural backgrounds differ, traditional hostilities have to be subdued, vested interests of various sorts overturned or appeased.
- o The costs of integration via trade liberalization tend to fall on poorer states in the integrating community. Compensation arrangements are hard to work out, reduce the benefits to the advanced members and in any case, do little to reassure less-developed states that their future development will not be compromised.
- o African governments, like most governments, pursue nationalist economic policies. They are unwilling to sacrifice local industry in the name of trade creation, nor are they prepared to see basic foods go to neighboring states in periods of shortage and high domestic prices.
- o Other, non-market-integration forms of cooperation (river basin management, development coordination, technical service provision, and research and education) have suffered from a variety of deficiencies: lack of financial support by member states; proliferation of activities, with resulting duplication;

2. Ibid., p. 90.

overambitious goals and frequently low-quality technical work due largely to politicization of staff appointments.

II. STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION

12. How can the integration/cooperation process be made more effective? Two broad strategies are in contention. The first is the more vigorous pursuit of the "traditional" approach; that is, trade liberalization in the framework of preferential trade arrangements. The second rejects trade liberalization as inappropriate. It proposes that priority be given to expanding production, especially industrial production, and to infrastructure. This approach, which has been advocated in the past, has recently been put forward in a number of recent ECA documents and named a "global" strategy. In this chapter we consider each in turn, and the questions they raise. Then we turn for a brief look at a third, more ad hoc, or piecemeal approach to regional economic/social cooperation.

TRADE LIBERALIZATION/MARKET INTEGRATION

13. The "traditional" approach, and the one that receives the most attention, aims at building integrated regional markets by forming preferential trade areas--from free trade zones to customs unions and, ultimately, full common markets within which goods, services and factors of production will flow freely. The market integration approach is at the center of the seven existing African "economic communities": CEAO, ECOWAS, the MRU, the PTA, CEPGL, CEEAC, and the SACU. Usually associated with the preferential trade groupings are compensatory schemes managed by development financing institutions which compensate members for revenue losses due to trade diversion, and which also are supposed to finance "regional" projects especially in the least-developed member states.

14. The market integration approach can be criticized as unpromising for various reasons. One is historical--its poor record of achievements and patent failure to create integrated economies through preferential trade arrangements. With the (arguable) exception of the European Economic Community, the trade liberalization/common market schemes have nowhere achieved their objective. The messages from LAFTA, the Andean Pact, CARICOM, the East African Common Market, CEAO, VDEAC, and PTA are the same: governments are rarely willing or able to tolerate trade creation which means the sacrifice of local smokestacks and local jobs; they have only slightly more success in agreeing on the allocation of new "regional industries"; conflicts over allocation of costs and benefits between member states tends to undermine common purpose.

15. A second set of reasons relates to the meagerness of likely net benefits from such schemes, because of four main sets of factors. First, no significant growth impact can come from intra-African expansion of trade in manufactures in the near term. In common market negotiations, in the economic

integration literature, and in most analysts' thinking, the overwhelming emphasis is on manufacturers. But in most African countries manufacturing is a tiny sector. Even defined generously, it rarely generates more than 15 percent of GDP, and employs an even smaller part of the labor force. Because it is small, and for many other reasons (including its inward-lookingness and the importance of state-owned enterprises), manufacturing is not now a leading sector for growth, nor (except perhaps in four or five countries) is it likely to become one in the near future.

16. Economies of scale exist in some lines of production--petroleum refining, metal working, grain milling and cement, for example. Their exploitation via regional groupings would yield increases in productivity and output. Also, wider regional markets might make possible the development of industries that would otherwise be uneconomic.

17. However, the scope for exploitation of scale economies in light manufacturing--the predominant component of low-income country manufacturing sectors--is probably not large. In footwear, plastics, textiles, hollowware, etc., market size in individual African countries is probably big enough to support plants of reasonably efficient size. Put another way, small scale is rarely a major source of inefficiencies that characterize African manufacturing enterprises. Moreover, experience with common markets virtually everywhere in the developing world strongly suggests that governments put sharp limits on the emergence of scale economies and specialization of production. They rarely allow domestic industries to die when they are threatened by competition, even in common markets, and they often insist on controlling the location of new industries to assure balanced growth within the integrated market. All of this diminishes efficiency gains from market integration schemes.

18. Another reason to discount expected benefits derives from the social characteristics of private industrial capitalists in many African countries; these are frequently non-African--Asians or Levantines--or multinationals. Given the political uncertainty that surrounds the future for some of these groups, higher profits may not induce them to step up investment. Even more significant, profits that depend on continued unfettered access to a preferential market are highly uncertain. Common markets unravel and preferential treatment can be--and often is--taken away. For these reasons the elasticity of investment with respect to common-market-induced profit growth will tend to be relatively low.

19. The scope for expanded trade in agricultural goods may be greater than for industrial goods. But the major reasons why more of such trade does not take place have little to do with the existence or nonexistence of integrated market schemes; they lie in the economic policy environment--protected markets, nonmarket pricing for agricultural commodities, overvalued exchange rates and consequent licensing arrangements, etc. Moreover, a considerable share of the potential for agricultural trade is already being exploited, via ubiquitous parallel markets.

20. For these reasons market integration tends to bring meager or nonexistent benefits. Moreover potential costs exist, and have to be put into

the balance. The opportunity costs of negotiating and creating a regional trade-augmenting scheme--say a preferential trade area--are substantial. Large inputs in time are required for negotiation and execution, absorbing energies of administrators, political leaders, economic analysts--people with high opportunity costs. Staff analysts of high quality, of which there are few, are absorbed in preparing papers and documents for the regional trade negotiations, and spend less time on domestic policy matters. And there are also institutional opportunity costs; time and other resources are given to the creation of regional institutions while parallel national institutions may be neglected. Regional export credit schemes may be debated, for example, by representatives of countries which lack national schemes.

21. A third reason for small expected net benefits from market integration is that regional trade expansion, by diverting trade from more to less efficient suppliers, can act as a drag on agriculture, by substituting higher- for lower-priced inputs and consumer goods. If, after a period of protection, the agriculture-supplying industrial sector becomes competitive, the short-term costs are worth paying. But experience worldwide is not reassuring on this point. Highly protected infant industries do not often become mature competitors. In small economies, where there is only one domestic producer, he is almost sure to be shielded from import competition, and where the enterprise is state owned, there is an additional inefficiency-inducing factor. Since continuing inefficiency in the agriculture-supplying industrial sector is a likely outcome, there is some risk that agricultural producers could bear the weight of industrial growth spawned by regional market integration schemes.

22. Fourthly, the negotiation and the execution of trade-augmenting agreements between states generates continuous political tensions and conflicts, notably over sharing of costs and benefits. But African subregions are short on political and social cohesion, which is needed to accommodate the strains and conflict associated with cooperative economic activities, especially preferential trade areas. Tensions generated over economically minor issues might spill over into areas more important for regional cooperation, and make success harder there. Also, risks of failure of common market schemes are high, and hence the risks of wasted institution building.

23. In addition to these general reasons for skepticism about present net benefits from market integration schemes, there are other problems often identified by other critics: that the market integration idea has priorities all wrong, since what is needed first is production of more tradeables and better transport; and that multinationals benefit most from trade liberalization under present African conditions.³ Some of these criticisms underlie the ECA's proposals for an alternative regional strategy, discussed below.

3. See Constantine Vaitsos, "Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A Survey," World Development (June 1978).

THE ECA'S "GLOBAL" APPROACH

24. The Economic Commission for Africa has long been the champion of an economically unified Africa and the architect of the prevailing integration strategy--i.e. the creation of economic "communities" whose principal task is the creation of common markets: ECOWAS in West Africa, ECCAS (CEEAC) in Central Africa, the PTA in East and Southern Africa.

25. However, there is observable within the ECA considerable ambivalence about the trade liberalization/common market approach to African economic integration. This is clearly seen in an important report prepared under ECA auspices between 1982 and 1984 by a group of specialists, directed by M. O. Eyed, a former Nigerian planning minister. This report, entitled Propositions Visant a Renforcer l'Integration Economique en Afrique de l'Ouest, was commissioned by ECOWAS ministers meeting in February 1982, and appeared in its first public version in 1983 or 1984. The Secretary General of the ECA notes in the introduction that the report reflects a "large consensus" on the diagnosis of obstacles to West African integration and also on needed remedies.

26. The paper makes a severe negative judgement on the integration effort in West Africa. It calls it a "fiasco," argues that "hardly any progress" can be seen and asserts that the various regional organizations have neither built unity nor stimulated economic growth.⁴

27. What is more surprising, the authors of the report take the position that even if the market integration approach succeeded in liberalizing trade, it would still be a bad strategy. The benefits would be small, would be concentrated on the more developed states in the market, and would (within these states) benefit multinational industrial enterprises. Without changing the whole strategy of development, therefore, a greater degree of market integration would be undesirable.⁵

28. Market integration schemes, moreover, can't really be primary engines of growth.

Even if all the measures advocated by the institution specializing in the promotion of trade were applied, . . . intraregional trade . . . (now 4% of total trade . . .) would hardly reach 10% of the total, which is not enough to trigger the process of integration through trade. Consequently, the subregional economic communities must give less importance to trade liberalization. They must turn to transformation . . . (of) their national and subregional production systems, by creating a subregional transport and telecommunications infrastructure and developing new products or capacities by the community industries, and also by increasing agricultural productivity with a view to setting up of a real

4. Adediji, *ibid.*, p. 7.

5. CEA, Propositions Visant a Renforcer l'Integration Economique in Afrique de l'Ouest (Addis Ababa, 1984); also paras. 94, 95, 99.

process of economic integration in the large subregions of Africa.⁶

29. The Report's authors then turn to the ideas which make up the ECA "global" approach: a need to shift emphasis from market integration to production and infrastructure.

We are persuaded that the West African countries should give less importance to trade liberalization. . . . We agree with the Higgins Committee in B. Higgins et al., The Mano River Union: An Assessment of Past Performance and Some Guidelines for the Future (1978) that economic integration between developing countries has to involve first restructuring of existing systems to create a (true) regional economy that will replace the fragmented links that now exist with the metropolises. What is needed is . . . a concrete program aimed at tying the countries together by adequate transport (which is) the only way to remove the bottleneck that makes regional trade ineffective. (Otherwise) all the negotiations in the world on tariffs, no matter how diligent, will be useless.⁷

30. These ideas are developed more explicitly in a more recent (1988) ECA paper which says that the priority given to market integration is "premature."⁸ In discussing CEAO and UDEAC the report notes:

(These) market integration schemes, which (give) no priority to the basic industries, reinforce the position of the foreign private capital in the African countries and increase economic domination from abroad. It also has the disadvantage of accentuating the disparity between the levels of development of the member countries. (In the CEAO) Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire do some 95% of the industrial exporting. . . . Any scheme which would not contribute to changing fundamentally this inequality will be neglected sooner or later by (interior) states (especially since) the (coastal states) are less and less willing to support the community solidarit; fund.

31. They also stress the link between trade liberalization and external dependence:

The removal of customs duties without a subregional production system being set up may also incite the MNCs to capture the markets. Thus the member states run the risk of increasing economic dependence.

6. Ibid., para. 404.

7. Ibid., paras. 402 and 403.

8. UN/ECA/UNDP/IGOs, Assistance of ECA and UNDP to the Economic Integration Entities and to the River and Lake Basin organizations in the Preparation of their Project Documents for the Fourth UNDP Project Cycle (ECA/UNDP/IGOs/UNSA/II/I/3 (Addis Ababa), March 1988).

32. This "global" approach to integration strategy as outlined above thus is opposed to market integration via trade expansion on the grounds that it can't work, and that it is in any case undesirable. There is nothing to exchange; MNCs are too dominant; the disparities between member states would grow as would external dependence. The appropriate strategy is to attack the fundamental bottlenecks--poor transport and communications systems and inadequate production. Expansion of "basic" or "heavy" industry is recommended, along with large infrastructure investments.

33. If, as the 1984 Proposals Report says, these views represent a wide consensus, then there is a paradox of some significance in ECA policies. On the one hand they champion market integration via trade liberalization in ECOWAS, LEEAC and PTA. On the other hand they argue it is "premature," trivial and unsound in that it benefits MNCs and richer member states, increases dependence and leads to a dead end in terms of self-sustaining growth.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATION

34. The debate about these two main regional integration strategies is thus in a parlous state. Strong arguments have been raised against the prevailing strategy of working toward market integration by building economic communities of common markets, starting with trade liberalization. The benefits are likely to be small, the risks of failure and opportunity costs substantial. Trade diversion is not likely to be growth inducing, productivity benefits from industrial specialization are likely to be small, and increased agricultural trade should take place without formal integration schemes, if the underlying economics are conducive to it, and in many cases is already taking place underground. In addition to these arguments, there are the fears expressed by ECA, notably, that foreign corporations and richer states mainly benefit.

35. The arguments for the ECA "global" approach are if anything even less compelling than those in favor of market integration approaches. It implies first of all a tendency toward inward-lookingness or autarchy--the creation of "regional economies," the stress on "basic" or heavy industry, the implied rejection of private foreign investment, the call for a downgrading of trade liberalization policies. But even the "large subregions" of Africa would not provide markets big enough to justify much heavy industrial investment. Much of the investment required would have to be public, and the combination of public sector management and protected markets hardly promises to create an environment conducive to industrial growth.

36. The "global" approach of ECA indeed seems to be entirely public-sector oriented. It is certainly not evident that most African governments could implement the strategy changes involved--for example, less market-orientation in price/tax/subsidy policies, less emphasis on exports, an increased role for the state in direct production and in direct controls over the economy. In almost all cases, public sector institutions are already limping along at low levels of effectiveness, and budget resources lack even for maintenance of existing social capital.

37. The "global" ECA approach also seems out of tune with widely accepted priorities. For example, it stresses infrastructure gaps as a major obstacle to integration, and recommends major investment in new transport and telecommunication aimed at tying regional economies together. But few analysts today would agree that transport/communications is so critical an obstacle to expanded trade and closer cooperation; trade-obstructing national economic policies are far more basic. African operators in informal or underground economies, after all, find ways to overcome infrastructure obstacles. More important, with respect to recommended policies, most analysts would vigorously disagree with the proposal that investment in creating better regional networks should be given priority over rehabilitation of domestic road, rail and communications networks; deterioration of the latter threatens economic recovery in many parts of the continent.

38. The priorities prescribed in the "global approach are questionable in another respect. They emphasize production increases--putting the production horse before the trade liberalization cart, and that is understandable. But what kind of production, and how to increase it--those are the real issues. The recently developed consensus that agriculture should have top priority is not fully reflected in this "global" ECA approach. The accent is more strongly on heavy industry--on chemicals, energy and steel. This raises the host of issues mentioned earlier, related to economic feasibility, financing, state administrative capacity. African states so far have had limited success in putting together regional (joint) industrial projects, and the biggest such project--the West African Cement Mill (CIMA0)--has been a costly disaster. The Nigerian steel industry, warmly applauded in one of the ECA documents, consists of enterprises of uncertain viability and offers little prospect of becoming a regional growth pole.

39. A final reason for skepticism about the "global" approach is that its implementation requires a great deal of political accommodation and consensus building, for extremely uncertain economic benefits, even in the short run. This assures high risks of economic and political failure.

40. Given the weak analytic underpinnings of the main strategies of regionalization, it is no surprise that signals for policy direction are so unclear. It is symbolic of the disarray that surrounds this issue that even the position of major players is no longer clear: the ECA, organizational champion of market integration, sponsors papers and studies that attack its foundations.

41. Both the "market integration" and "global" views have messages of relevance to policymakers. In the long term, larger regional markets are essential to permit industrialization and open other options, and present programs and policies should be aimed at preparing the ground for that eventual coming together. Moreover, most observers admit that even in the short run, some gains from intra-African trade liberalization are not being effectively exploited. At the same time, the "globalists" are right in their insistence that market liberalization in present African circumstances will not be a strong motor of regional development. And the tendencies they

emphasize are real: market integration would lead to uneven and dependent growth--unless market forces are hedged in by controls and compensation arrangements, which themselves substantially diminish the efficiency gains that are supposed to power growth. These arguments, combined with its poor record of achievement, have eroded the intellectual bases of the market integration idea.

42. But the strategy that "global" analysts propose is hardly an adequate guide to policy, for reasons outlined earlier. Hence the present anomalous situation: belief in closer economic cooperation, including actual integration remains as powerful as ever among Africans, and is even of growing popularity among donors, while the analytic underpinnings of the economic integration idea are weaker than ever.

THE AD HOC APPROACH

43. There is a third approach to regional cooperation which might be characterized as a more ad hoc or piecemeal form of cooperation. It can't be characterized as a "strategy" like the first two approaches discussed. In this more modest approach, very task specific areas of regional cooperation are addressed by mandate-specific organizations. Examples abound in Africa and many such organizations are discussed in the chapters that follow, particularly in the Education and Transport chapters. "Ad hocism" also can describe the many specific proposals to deal with specific problems as, for example, regional food security schemes.

44. It is also true that economic integration organizations or others with a plethora of mandates sometimes focus on a specific task such as customs harmonization and effect a desired change in the area under their purview. However, in general, the more specialized organizations--the West African Examinations Council or the East African Wildlife Society--seem to be relatively successful in accomplishing their tasks, particularly where member countries see that it is in their interest to support the task at hand.

45. Those mandate-specific organizations are not guided by a "global view" of development or by broad market-integration preoccupations. However, on the sectoral or subsectoral level, they make real contributions to problem solving and hence to development.

46. We now turn to look at six significant sectors of the African economy, and at how regional approaches have played out in these sectors. We look first at trade, and then at agriculture, education, transport, natural resources and, finally, financial institutions.

47. In each case, we examine the rationales for regional "solutions" to the sector in question, and then at what is being done in this sector, from a regional perspective, to overcome obstacles to development. Finally, we assess the strengths and weaknesses of the various regional efforts in these sectors.

48. In a concluding chapter we assess the track record of regional approaches, and present some guidelines for making regional cooperation more effective. Finally, we outline some specific proposals for the six sectors discussed in the paper.

CHAPTER II

INCREASED TRADE THROUGH ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION

1. More than in any other field, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has looked to regional approaches in international trade. This interest in formulating collective trade strategies is at least partly based on the region's history. Africa's independent states, emerging from the colonial period as small, outward-oriented economies, have tended to view economic integration and cooperation in general, and coordination of trade policies in particular, as an essential element of any strategy to achieve self-sustained development and reduced dependence.

2. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first looks at regional approaches to increasing intra-African trade. These approaches constitute the main body of what has been done regionally in the name of increasing trade. In the second section, the scope is broadened to include private actors. This section discusses regional approaches that have facilitated the involvement of the private sector in trade, and proposals on the table for furthering private sector involvement by increasing access to credit and funds. Finally, an assessment section provides an evaluation of regional approaches in trade and offers some recommendations for the donor community.

I. REGIONAL APPROACHES TO INCREASING
INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION

3. The principle economic rationale given for regional economic integration is that it will encourage growth and efficiency by enlarging the market available to domestic producers. Larger market size will increase the range of profitable activities and hence stimulate new capital investment. It will increase the productivity of labor by encouraging greater mobility. It will in the long run allow achievement of levels of industrialization not otherwise possible. Recent trends in international trade have given further motivation for economic integration: low world commodity prices and protectionist practices in the developed countries encourage regional-oriented policies.

4. From a political point of view, many African states equate increased intra-African trade with self-reliant policies required to break from the economically "dependent" trading patterns established during the colonial period.

5. The different strategies advanced to increase intra-African trade fall into three broad categories. The first of these calls for the integration of markets through gradual elimination of customs duties and nontariff barriers between members of a preferential trade area--eventually culminating in the establishment of a common market. The penultimate goal of market integration is the creation of a customs union where common external tariffs are applied to all imports from nonmembers. In the final stage of market integration, an economic community is established where common economic and monetary institutions allow for the free movement of goods, capital and labor between member states. All of Africa's major economic integration organizations have sought to implement at least some degree of market integration.

6. A second approach involves the integration of production. According to this strategy, the main obstacle to intra-African trade is not market based, but lies rather in the inadequate development of physical infrastructure and lack of output complementarities between African states. Advocates of this approach consider the improvement of transportation and communications links between African countries to be the necessary catalyst for increased trade.

7. Integration of production also involves regional coordination of investments in basic industries and energy which will allow exploitation of economies of scale through production for the regional market. This approach is intended to avoid duplication of new investments and to rationalize the existing ones by better utilizing excess capacity and encouraging regional input-output linkages. Approved "regional" industries would be supported by tariff and nontariff policies that give preferential access to regional markets. Regional investment planning is the primary means for implementing this strategy. In practice, it involves the coordination of donor financing and foreign investment to encourage projects which correspond to agreed regional priorities.

8. The third strategy concerns regional approaches to overcome functionally specific obstacles to increased trade between African states as well as between Africa and the rest of the world. Among the obstacles to trade which may be amenable to such an approach are: nonconvertibility of national currencies; unavailability of trade financing credit; lack of information on regional markets; and market access for extraregional exports. Because of their specific nature, these functionally oriented strategies can be carried out either within a regional organization or through less institutionalized, ad hoc arrangements.

INTEGRATION OF MARKETS

History

9. The first African regional economic organizations emerged during the colonial period when territories were collectively governed through a single colonial administration. Despite the head start these groupings received,

efforts to integrate member-state markets and productive sectors met with serious difficulties. The East African Community, for example, came into existence with a shared currency, regionally coordinated infrastructure, harmonized economic policies, and a system of common institutions. Nevertheless, it was destroyed in the late 1970s by political divisions and conflicts of interest between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The former French "Federations" of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa also dissolved after independence.

10. Postindependence efforts to promote regional economic integration have been closely associated with Africa's two region-wide organizations: the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). In the 1960s, efforts toward political and economic integration met with opposition from OAU member states unwilling to transfer their newly gained national sovereignty to the OAU. While African aspirations for a united continent remained high, the OAU's mandate was primarily concerned with maintaining the territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs of its member states.

11. Taking into account the divisions surrounding schemes for continental integration, the ECA chose to promote integration by initially creating smaller economic communities in four geographically designated subregions: North, West, Central, and Eastern and Southern Africa. In 1979 the ECA's approach was endorsed by the African Council of Ministers' Lagos Plan of Action which identified subregional economic integration as an essential building block for greater self-reliance and the evolution of an African common market by the year 2000. To date, three of these ECA-inspired organizations have been created: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States (PTA); and the Economic Community of the States of Central Africa (CEEAC).

12. In addition to these three organizations and the two franc zone communities (the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) and UDEAC or the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale), the Mano River Union (MRU) and the Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) were created in the 1970s to meet the specific needs of these smaller groupings. The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), although nominally a project coordinating organ, has recently expanded its mandate to include trade-promotion programs.

Rationale for Market Integration

13. The rationale for regional trade liberalization is based on the expected "static" gains from economic integration posited by the theory of customs unions, and by "dynamic" advantages. According to the orthodox version of the theory, customs unions "create" trade by enabling regional consumers to shift from high-cost domestic products to lower-cost goods produced by other member states. In theory, market integration should stimulate intraregional competition, thereby serving to increase product specialization and exploit economies of scale.

14. For substantial trade creation to occur, however, customs union members should already produce much of their domestic needs and conduct much of their existing trade with other members. Because of the common external tariff applied to imports from nonunion members, customs unions also have the potential to be "trade diverting"; i.e., to encourage

regional consumers to shift from lower-cost, extraregional imports to more expensive products produced within the region. "Static" customs union theory holds that economic integration will only benefit the welfare of member states when net trade-creation effects of the union exceed its net trade-diverting effects.

15. Because Sub-Saharan African states produce relatively few nonagricultural goods for their domestic markets, and trade primarily with partners from outside the region, market integration between these states, according to orthodox customs union theory, is essentially "trade diverting" and is likely to have negative economic welfare effects. But as Peter Robson (among others) has pointed out, the rationale for economic integration among developing countries has always been based less on these "static" gains than on its dynamic potentials--it is not so much the impact of economic integration on the existing patterns of production and trade but rather the prospective gains to be achieved by "rationalizing the emergent structure of production."¹

Experience

16. Although most Sub-Saharan African countries have experimented with economic integration schemes for over twenty years, the degree of integration achieved through these efforts and economic gains generally have been very limited. As noted above, Africa's earliest experiment with market integration, the East African Community, was finally torn apart by divergent economic interests and political divisions among its member states. The same was true, less dramatically, of the colonial "federations"--French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and the Central African Federation (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi).

17. The continent now hosts eight major regional economic organizations concerned with trade liberalization (see Table 2.1), but despite this proliferation of supranational institutions, actual levels of recorded intra-African trade have either stagnated or declined.² Since the 1970s, when many

¹Peter Robson, The Economics of International Integration, Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1987, p. 195.

²Despite common currencies and institutional linkages, neither the CEAO nor UDEAC have substantially increased trade among their member states. Nor have they been able to avoid duplication of individual investments. See United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the ECA Mission on the Evaluation of UDEAC and the Feasibility of Enlarging Economic Cooperation in Central Africa, prepared for the December 1981 conference of the UDEAC Council of Heads of State, Libreville, Gabon. This report and other writing attributes "segmentation" of markets to the interaction of multinational firms and uncoordinated investment codes. The real reason is that governments in the region were anxious to have industrial investment and unwilling to give up any industry in the name of regional coordination.

Table 2.1

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN MARKET INTEGRATION

| | Preferential Trade (tariffs and NTBs frozen and reduced) | Common Market (tariffs and NTBs eliminated) | Customs Union (common external tariff) | Monetary (currency convertibility) |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| <u>"ECA" SUBREGIONALS</u> | | | | |
| Economic Community of West African States (ECONAS) | Since 1981, tariffs and NTBs have been officially frozen and trade in unprocessed products liberalized, but implementation at the national level is not complete. Reduc- tions for industrial products, originally scheduled to begin in 1981, have not been implemented. | Planned for 1989, but target cannot be met due to slow progress of trade liberaliza- tion program. | Planned for 1991, but expected to be delayed until 2000 or later. | Common currency proposed; partial convertibility available through WACH. |
| Preferential Trade Association of Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) | Tariffs frozen at 1981 level, initial tariff reductions on Common List commodi- ties (now over 400) implemented by most members. | Originally planned for 1992, target date has been revised to 2000 or later. | Envisioned but no target date has been set. | Partial converti- bility of national currencies through PTACH. |
| Communaute des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) | Four year freeze on existing tariffs and NTBs to take effect during first phase; provisions are still under study. | Planned by 1988. | Planned by 2000. | Clearing House to be set up in 1988. |
| <u>FRANC ZONE GROUPINGS</u> | | | | |
| Communaute des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) | Trade of unprocessed products has been officially liberal- ized. Reduced "TCR" tariffs now apply to over 450 industrial products. | NTBs officially elim- inated, but some quantitative restric- tions remain. No date set for removal of TCRs. | Originally planned for 1986. | CFA franc used as common currency. |

| | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---------------------------------------|
| Union Douanière des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) | Variable "single tax" applied to selected industrial products. Growth of preferen- tial trade is limited by use of single tax to protect national producers. | No date set for removal of single tax. | Common external tariff exists but harmonization is limited by an additional "complim- entary tax" that varies from country to country. | CFA franc used as common currency. |
|---|---|--|---|---------------------------------------|

OTHER

| | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| Mano River Union (MRU) | As of 1985, trade in 60 products of Sierra Leonean or Liberian origin and 20 Guinean products had been liberalized. NTBs continue to restrain trade. | No timetable for phased reductions, tariffs immediately eliminated as pro- ducts qualify under rules of origin. | Formally established in 1977 (except Guinea) but remain- ing NTBs and "other import charges" have resulted in dehar- monization. | Monetary union proposal is under study. |
| Communauté Economique des Etats des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) | Preferential trade protocol under study in 1988. | No target date set. | No target date set. | Bilateral clearing through CEPGL mon- etary arrangement. |

of Africa's "economic communities" or market integration organizations were formed, intracommunity exports have declined in most cases; only in ECOWAS and CEPGC have recorded intracommunity exports grown (Figure 2.1). Import shares have behaved somewhat better (Figure 2.2).

18. The lack of positive trade effects from these market integration arrangements is underscored in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The data there suggests that 1984-1986 trade with "other Africa," i.e., noncommunity partners, was a bigger share of total trade in most of the communities than it had been in 1978-1980. This apparently means that trade grew more (or fell less) with African countries outside the various market integration groups than inside each of these groups. All of these data, it should quickly be noted, refer to recorded trade. They underestimate--probably substantially--true inter-African trade since they exclude smuggling.

Problems of Market Integration Schemes

19. However, notwithstanding the very limited progress thus far achieved, market integration continues to be the prevailing approach taken by African states seeking to increase trade among themselves. We turn now to look at some of the problems of market integration approaches--problems inherent in all market integration schemes, in Africa as elsewhere.

20. Rules of origin determine the goods eligible for preferential treatment by specifying acceptable proportions of local value added in the product as well as a minimum percentage of local equity and management in the manufacturing enterprise. Although these rules apply to any preferential trade area, they are particularly important in Africa because so much of SSA's existing industrial production depends on imported inputs and foreign investment.

21. In practice, it has proven very difficult for African states to agree on rules of origin that are restrictive enough to exclude nonmember imports but still sufficiently liberal to grant preferential treatment to existing African producers. The positions adopted by member states vary greatly, depending on the mix of public and private sector production and national policies toward foreign investment.

22. Most economic groupings have instituted a sliding scale whereby increasingly restrictive rules of origin (higher percentages of required local value added or equity ownership) are phased in over time. The PTA has granted certain states temporary exemptions from the immediate application of these rules and established a "three-tier" system that provides limited preferences for enterprises which do not meet the majority local equity and management requirements.

23. Compensation schemes. The short-term benefits and costs associated with market integration may not be evenly distributed among the participating member states. This is typically the case in Africa's economic groupings.

any industry in the name of regional coordination.

Intra-Community Trade as Percentage of Trade with World, Gross Exports





Figure 2.2

Intra-Community Trade as Percentage of Trade with World, Gross Imports



Intra-Community Trade as Percentage of Trade with Africa, Gross Exports





Figure 2.4

Intra-Community Trade as Percentage of Trade with Africa, Gross Imports



Regional market protection encourages the relatively more industrialized economies to increase their production levels to meet regional demand, but where third-country imports are replaced--i.e., trade diversion occurs--the higher costs for those goods must be paid by consumers in the importing country. At the same time, the importing country gives up government revenues that would have been collected if the imported product were subject to customs duties.

24. Producers in the less-advanced countries complain that they are not served by an arrangement that favors already established industries in other member states but denies them tariff protection required to establish infant industries aimed at the national market. This uneven distribution of market integration's costs and benefits was one of the major reasons for the breakup of the East African Community. More recent agreements provide explicit mechanisms designed to compensate less-developed member states for fiscal losses due to trade liberalization. The CEAC and UDEAC have complex arrangements of this sort, and ECOWAS has designed a similar scheme, not yet operative.

25. Harmonization of policies toward transnational enterprises. Another difficulty encountered in African economic groupings concerns the role of transnational enterprises (TNEs) in the market integration process. Unlike the member states of industrialized economic groupings, African countries depend largely on foreign capital from outside their region. Since a project that is located in any member state theoretically will enjoy privileged access to the integrated regional market, there may be some exacerbation of the normally prevalent tendency to engage in "incentive wars" and/or impose nontariff barriers in order to attract foreign investment.

26. Having observed these trends in other developing country economic groupings (those in Latin American in particular), some critics have argued that market integration alone, without harmonization of national investment policies and dismantling of nontariff barriers, would actually decrease the bargaining power of member states by inducing competition to attract foreign investment and encouraging segmentation of national markets.³

27. While the long-term benefits of market integration are to be realized through increased regional competition and the winnowing out of inefficient enterprises, TNEs, like any enterprise already established in national markets, are unlikely to voluntarily abandon enterprises kept afloat by special regimes granting discriminatory tariffs and other forms of protection. African economic groupings have sought to remedy this problem by harmonizing their investment codes. However, progress in this area has been extremely limited, and, in some groupings, trade liberalization has proceeded despite the absence of a unified subregional policy toward TNE investments.

3. See Constantine Vaitsos, "Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A Survey," World Development 6 (June 1978), pp. 729-736.

INTEGRATION OF PRODUCTION

28. The numerous difficulties encountered in adopting the customs union model to African economic groupings have led to increased interest in pursuing alternatives to the market integration approach. According to some critics, the emphasis on market integration strategies is inappropriate under existing conditions where physical obstacles and the lack of subregional production systems present the more immediate barriers to intra-African trade. These critics argue that the unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of market integration puts the continued existence of Africa's economic groupings at risk and may, in the end, only serve the interests of the TNEs.

29. As was discussed in Chapter I, recently the ECA has been among the most influential organizations calling for a shift away from market integration and toward greater emphasis on integration of projects in infrastructure and basic industries.⁴ The ECA's apparent disillusionment with market integration is significant given that organization's active role in helping to establish several of the major subregional economic groupings based on market integration strategies (ECOWAS, CEEAC, and PTA). This change is a reflection of the frustration which these ECA-inspired institutions have experienced in their efforts to implement market integration strategies.

30. Production-oriented integration strategies may appeal to these organizations as an alternative approach that can lift them out of their current doldrums. According to recent ECA proposals, Africa's economic integration needs to be "rationalized" in accordance with an explicit chain of command from the ECA to the three ECA-inspired subregional organizations and on down to the numerous other economic integration entities. Not surprisingly, economic groupings whose autonomy would be curtailed or phased out under the ECA plan, such as the CEAO and UDEAC, have not reacted favorably.

Transport and communications.

31. The production-oriented integration approach places high priority on establishing improved infrastructural linkages between African states. According to this view, the existing infrastructure of most African states is an obstacle to intra-African trade because it only facilitates trade with partners outside of the region. In order for intra-African trade to expand, the reasoning goes, African states must cooperate in creating a new alternative infrastructural system that will encourage regional economic integration. Discrete projects of this type have proved easier to implement

4. See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Assistance of ECA and UNDP to the Economic Integration Entities and to the River and Lake Basin Development Organizations in the Preparation of their Project Documents for the 4th UNDP Project Cycle, paper prepared for the ECA, UNDP, African Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and UN Specialized Agencies Meeting on the Implementation of the Multisectoral Projects of African Economic Integration Entities and River and Lake Basin Development Organizations, Addis Ababa, 29 March-1 April 1988.

than the more elusive goals of market integration. The SADCC-sponsored transport proposals and the ECOWAS Pan African Telecommunications project have generated a level of support from donors that would probably have not been otherwise available.

Industry

32. Regional coordination of production has been advocated as a way to alter the distribution of investments in favor of the less-developed member states of an economic grouping. Almost all communities intend a planned allocation of "community enterprises" as a means of compensation for the costs of market integration which would be otherwise carried by the net importing countries; but few examples of successful regional allocation can be found.

33. Advocates of regional investment planning argue that it promotes more efficient use of existing capacity as well as helps to avoid the inefficient duplication of similar projects. Critics contend, however, that such "dirigiste" approaches interfere with the free operation of market forces and almost always result in an economically suboptimal allocation of investments.

34. Several African economic groupings have sought to harmonize their national policies granting incentives to new investments. Through a single investment code covering the entire economic grouping, the participating member states offer reduced taxes and preferential access to the subregional market in return for the investor's agreement to undertake a project in a priority area. Given the limited resources available to the African public and private sectors, most of these officially approved community enterprises must rely on substantial infusions of external financing from private or donor sources. As with the rules of origin applied to market integration, the percentage of local equity holding in the community enterprises and eligibility criteria concerning local value added remain contentious issues.

35. The overwhelming fact is that little "regional" investment is currently taking place, and although many feasibility studies have been conducted, few of these proposed arrangements actually resulted in new industrial investment for the regional market. Where actual investments have been undertaken, results have been less than happy. The most notorious example is the CIMAO project, a multinational public enterprise owned in equal shares by Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. The plant was built on a grand scale, intended to meet the region's projected demand for clinker, a limestone derivative used in producing cement. Regional demand turned out to be just a fraction of the plant's capacity. The resulting high production costs led to clinker prices well in excess of those in world markets. The plant was closed down in 1985, despite additional donor financing for restructuring.

36. The potential for success may be greater for smaller-scale enterprises which can be gradually expanded to meet existing regional demand. The Union Glass Company (UGC), a bottle-making plant located in Liberia, is an interesting case. Promoted by Mano-River-Union-sponsored feasibility studies and financed with donor support (chiefly Libya), the factory relies on reduced transportation costs and local raw material inputs for its comparative

advantage over imports from outside the region. Since beginning production in 1986, UGC has expanded its markets beyond the territorial scope of preferences originally granted to it by the MRU. According to a recent interview with the plant's General Manager, more than two-thirds of total production is being exported to francophone West African countries.

37. The obvious lesson from the CIMAO and UGC cases is that such enterprises cannot succeed unless they can be made competitive. Market protection alone will not ensure survival, particularly in view of the permeability of African borders to unofficial trade.

II. FUNCTIONALLY SPECIFIC STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO INCREASED TRADE

38. Regional integration, either by "market" or "production" approaches, often entails complex organizational arrangements and the setting up of administrative mechanisms under which these elaborate programs will operate. As stated elsewhere in this study, any regional organization that sets out to accomplish multiple and often all-encompassing tasks, risks getting caught up in an unending process of policy debate which, in the end, may achieve little at high cost. This is one of the risks of the ECA approach: supporting greater centralized control over the economic integration process. To avoid this disadvantage, less institutionally intensive approaches that aim at the achievement of more limited and specific functions may be preferable.

39. Regardless of how a functionally specific strategy is implemented (by an independent organization, an autonomously operated branch of a larger umbrella regional economic community, or a less formal ad hoc arrangement), its purpose and the authority to implement its programs are clearly defined from the outset. Because the policy formulation process in these groupings tends to be less politicized and their objectives more immediately attainable, the chances for success can be improved while the risks of failure are diminished.

40. Whereas the major trade-augmenting regional organizations spend a great deal of effort on forging a political consensus to bolster their own decisionmaking authority, Africans engaged in more functionally specific strategies have a more explicitly economic goal: to overcome an obstacle to trade. This approach has the added advantage of permitting expanded roles for professional associations and commercial enterprises through their active participation in the integrative process.

41. To look at functionally specific approaches to trade enhancement, we organize our discussion around certain obstacles to trade enhancement which have elicited regional approaches.

Nonconvertibility of National Currencies

42. The nonconvertibility of many of the region's national currencies is an obvious and important obstacle to increased intra-African trade. Nonconvertibility means that there is excess demand for foreign exchange, requiring rationing of available supplies. It is usually accompanied by licensing of imports. It obstructs official trade between potential regional trading partners.

43. At the initiative of the African Association of Central Banks, clearing houses have now been established which enable national currencies to be used in settling payments between the member states of each subregion. Although these arrangements have been criticized for being a "second best" response to the underlying need for exchange rate adjustments, they are nevertheless a positive example of practical steps being taken to remove a clearly identified obstacle to intra-African trade through a functionally specific strategy.

44. The clearing house arrangement enables importers and exporters in member states to make and receive payments in their own national currencies thereby reducing the need to settle payments in hard currencies. Using its own unit of account, the clearing house maintains a running balance of payments received from and owed to the participating central banks during a given settlement period. At the end of the period, all outstanding balances are paid up in hard currency. Thus, the clearing house can only realize its objective if a significant portion of the payments it handles are settled in national currencies. This requires that the distribution of trade between member states be relatively even; otherwise national currencies cannot "clear" against one another and hard currency will not be conserved.

45. Clearing houses have been set up in the West, Central, and Eastern and Southern subregions. All of these organizations are run by the central banks of the participating member states. While the basic objectives of these institutions remain the same, each has adopted its own system of regulations for carrying them out. Because the clearing houses' success depends directly on their ability to attract the participation of commercial banks, their survival as institutions requires that they maintain flexibility and responsiveness to private sector needs. Unlike most African regional organizations, these institutions have experienced few budget problems since they are financed by direct contributions from participating central banks, not governments.

46. The West African Clearing House (WACH) and PTA Clearing House (PTACH) offer useful examples of the practical problems that have been associated with the clearing house concept. For both of the two subregions served by these institutions, recorded intraregional trade is less than 10 percent of total trade with the world. Of this amount, transactions settled through the clearing house mechanism are about 6 percent for WACH and 15 percent for PTACH. This high rate of underutilization indicates that most commercial banks continue to use alternative means of settlement. In WACH as well as the Central African Clearing House, franc zone members do not require

clearing house services because they can settle payments among themselves through their own common central banks.

47. Significant imbalances of trade between clearing house members are a source of difficulty for both WACH and PTACH. These imbalances have caused some countries to maintain chronic deficit positions within the clearing houses, thereby straining the willingness of creditor countries to continue their participation in the arrangement. Trade imbalances have also limited the percentage of payments "cleared" (i.e., settled in national currencies). In 1986, 85 percent of payments through WACH had to be settled in hard currency. PTACH has done comparatively better--bringing its use of hard currency settlements down to 55 percent in 1987.

48. The PTACH/WACH comparison illustrates the influence which institutional structure and location can have on the success of a regional service provider. WACH's operations have been significantly hindered by placing its secretariat headquarters in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Unreliability of electric power supply makes computerization of accounts impractical, while poor communications and transportation connections makes WACH less accessible to the region's financial centers. In contrast, PTACH has been headquartered in Harare, occupying offices within the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe which serves as a host institution. This arrangement reduces initial institution-building costs and facilitates regional access to the clearing house's services.

49. In August 1988 the PTA's Bank for Trade and Development introduced a new traveler's check, denominated in PTA units of account, to facilitate business travel between PTA member states. These can be bought with national currency in the home country and then cashed at the destination, without requiring the traveler to obtain hard currency. Traveler's checks are to be processed through the clearing house system. The success of this initiative will depend directly on whether the checks are accepted by PTA business travelers and the banking community.

50. Countertrade is another means used to overcome nonconvertibility and the underlying obstacles to exchange rate misalignment. Like clearing houses, countertrade arrangements enable countries with nonconvertible currencies to increase their trade in goods and services while reducing the need to obtain hard currencies for settling payments. Unlike the clearing house mechanism, however, countertrade usually occurs through ad hoc barter deals, typically carried out on a bilateral basis.

51. While nearly all of Africa's countertrade occurs bilaterally, much of it with Eastern bloc countries, some multilateral barter arrangements are being considered. The U.S. has already been involved in at least one barter-style countertrade deal in the SADCC region, where U.S. wheat was shipped to Malawi in return for exports of white maize by Malawi to Mozambique. There have been difficulties on the distribution end, however, and Malawi does not appear interested in further tripartite barter arrangements.

52. Because of the ad hoc nature of countertrade deals, they are unlikely to be fertile ground for a sustained regional program for expanding

trade. African governments have tended to use countertrade as a crisis-management tool, without employing any specific long-term strategy. Nevertheless, a coordinated regional approach to countertrade may have some limited potential as a means of trade promotion. Such an approach could increase intra-Africa trade by reducing the constraints of nonconvertibility and by encouraging regional exporters to import from the region. It could also increase extraregional trade by reducing information-gathering costs and improving the bargaining skills of African countertrade negotiators. But the place of countertrade in a regional strategy to increase trade is likely to involve high costs in terms of manpower and probably in terms of other resources as well, since there is great potential for misspecification of the economic costs of goods traded. Also countertrade activities can divert official attention from the underlying policy distortions that make it necessary.

53. Parallel market trade is a noninstitutional (and most practiced) means for overcoming the nonconvertibility of national currencies. A growing amount of evidence indicates that the quantity of SSA's unrecorded trade is at least equal to, and in certain cases much greater than, the levels of intra-African trade officially recorded by African states. Unlike other strategies for overcoming nonconvertibility, however, the parallel market operates entirely outside state control and usually in defiance of its laws; it represents a popularly based response to distortions imposed by controlled trade and exchange rate regimes.

54. Like countertrade, parallel markets tend to increase trade by providing an alternate system that brings prices closer to market-clearing levels. Notwithstanding the similarity of these two activities, it is important to distinguish them in terms of the actors they involve as well as their divergent economic consequences. Parallel markets are essentially a private sector activity while countertrade in SSA is practiced mainly by state marketing boards and other parastatals. This has two significant implications. First, parallel markets are more likely to be responsive to market signals for resource allocation than countertrade. Second, parallel market trade may carry dynamic benefits in terms of development of private sector expertise which would not follow from countertrade.

55. Not surprisingly, African governments have been unwilling to extol the economic benefits of parallel market trade, regarded by most of them as an illegal activity. At the same time, however, it is easy for outsiders to romanticize the conditions under which parallel markets operate. When governments combine policy-induced price distortions with suppression of parallel market trade, the high rents generated are likely to be captured through large-scale smuggling carried out with the consent of customs officials and the active involvement of powerful political actors. This type of parallel market trade is less likely to have the beneficial economic effects associated with competitive small-scale smuggling--i.e., higher producer prices and lower consumer prices than would otherwise exist. Nor is it likely to create a sustainable foundation for increased trade.

Lack of Information on Regional Markets

56. The lack of information on sources of supply and demand within the region has also been identified as a potential obstacle to intra-African trade. For many African countries, information on overseas markets is much more readily available than is similar information on regional markets. In response to this problem, various information schemes have been suggested to overcome the perceived failure of regional markets to adequately convey data on possible intraregional trade opportunities. For example, comprehensive data bases have been proposed to provide detailed information on African products which could be marketed within the region. Such networks are already being established for the PTA and SADCC countries.

57. The apparent lack of information on regional markets may, however, be only a symptom of other more fundamental constraints on intra-African trade. The limited incentive of African public enterprises to seek out profit maximizing regional trade opportunities is no doubt part of the problem. Regionally produced goods may also be too high-cost to warrant interest from African importers. If such conditions prevail, improved access to information will not significantly increase intra-African trade.

58. The need for elaborate officially sponsored information networks may be challenged, therefore, on the grounds that private sector initiatives should be sufficient to fulfill these needs. Trade fairs and buyer/seller meetings managed by African Chambers of Commerce and other private organizations may offer a more promising and cost effective approach. The PTA, in cooperation with the ITC and a newly organized Federation of PTA Chambers of Commerce, has already implemented an apparently successful sequence of fairs and buyer/seller meetings. Such private sector-oriented gatherings can permit participants from different African countries to establish very specific business contacts and lines of communication between their firms. Regional trade fairs and/or commissions can also be an effective way to expand extra-regional exports.

59. Recently, other innovative approaches have been taken to meet the need for improved access to information on regional markets. Last year, a Nigerian entrepreneurial group began commercially publishing a bilingual "ECOWAS Yellow Pages" which it eventually hopes will gain worldwide distribution. A similar directory is planned for the PTA. Two fledgling independent magazines, Business in ECOWAS and Southern African Economist, are also looking to advertising revenues to help them establish commercial viability. In addition, Chambers of Commerce continue to exchange monthly bulletins and have now begun to collectively publish regional journals, e.g., PTA Business.

60. These latter efforts would appear to be steps in the right direction. Public sector/donor financing may be appropriate in setting up incipient professional organizations and/or commercial services aimed at improving intra-African information linkages, but initiatives of this kind should be seriously evaluated as to their long-term capacity for self-financing by the private interests they are designed to serve.

III. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

61. In the wake of the disappointing progress achieved by Africa's institutional market liberalization arrangements, we turn now to look at regional approaches which have encouraged the private sector and proposals now emerging to increase trade by improving the private sector's access to hard currencies, credit, and information.

IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND TRADERS

62. Trade can be encouraged through approaches which enhance entrepreneurial rewards, facilitate access to technology, and promote consistent quality standards for regionally produced goods. Several relatively small-scale African organizations are currently working for these specific objectives.

63. In the areas of copyright and patent protection, CAPI and ARIPO (grouping francophone and anglophone African states respectively) are actively coordinating the industrial and intellectual property laws of their respective member states. By securing entrepreneurial property rights, these intergovernmental institutions can contribute to trade expansion. Of course, the basic legal constraint on entrepreneurship occurs at the domestic level where the rule of law is not always enforced and property rights of all kinds are sometimes subject to arbitrary treatment. Regional approaches involving legal harmonization may help to discourage such instances.

64. Technology transfer centers like CRAT and can help to improve entrepreneurial access to imported technologies as well as assisting in the dissemination of African designs and expertise. Excessive generality and duplication are significant dangers for both regional and national institutions of this type. Specialization is particularly critical in this area, since credibility demands depth of expertise, and this is difficult to achieve in generalized "technology and research" organizations.

65. Quality control and standardization is needed to improve the standing of African products in international markets and establish reliable procedures for certifying product specifications. Standardization of basic industrial goods can also help in promoting regional input-output linkages between African manufacturers. The leader in this area is ARSO, an IGO working with twenty-three African countries to adopt regional standards in agriculture, engineering, industry, transport, communications, environmental protection, and other fields. As a regional forum for discussion of these issues, ARSO disseminates information on standards and technical regulations throughout Africa. It can also perform a vital role by helping representatives of African governments to bargain effectively at meetings on international standards.

66. Enlarging market access for extraregional exports. There is considerable scope for using regional approaches to increase exports of African products to extra-regional markets. Significant economies of scale may be realized if producers of like commodities can successfully pool their negotiation, marketing, and research efforts. Commodity producer associations have been organized to enhance bargaining power and influence prices through coordination of production and marketing policies. Collective marketing and advertising of regionally produced goods should also reduce costs and enhance competitiveness with synthetic substitutes. In the research field, regional cooperation can help increase production by improving access to technical expertise and coordinating efforts at the national level.

67. A critical issue is when and where a regionally defined grouping is likely to be most effective. In some cases, African exporters of agricultural commodities have chosen to organize themselves as a regional bargaining bloc within a larger international commodity organization. For example, the Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO) represents 25 African coffee producing countries at meetings of the International Coffee Organization. A somewhat different approach has been taken by the Cocoa Producers Alliance (CPA) which includes Latin American as well as African participation. These organizations can play an important role in increasing the bargaining power of smaller producers seeking to increase the quota allotments assigned to them by the international producer/consumer commodity agreements.

68. Unfortunately, experiences in this area have been disappointing from the point of view of the commodity-producing countries. During the past few years, international agreements in cocoa, coffee, sugar, oil, tin, and other primary commodities have been greatly weakened, in part, due to the recent decline of world market prices. While the unstable international trade environment may expand the importance of commodity producer associations (as compared with the producer/consumer forums), these organizations are also subject to internal destabilization as each member state competes to increase its own market share. If these trends continue, regionally defined associations may provide a viable alternative framework for intra-producer cooperation. The creation of the African Petroleum Producers Association in 1987, for example, is closely linked with efforts to improve the bargaining power of African countries within OPEC.

69. Significant potential may lie with commodity associations that deal in products which are both produced and consumed regionally. The African Groundnut Council (AGC), while primarily mandated to promote exports to the world market, has recently begun a new initiative to organize negotiations between the region's net-exporters and net-importers of groundnuts. The focus of the AGC's work in this area is to make recommendations for the dismantling of barriers to intra-African trade in groundnuts. The Council may also be an appropriate forum for addressing regional adjustment of groundnut producer prices. Policy-induced distortions of groundnut producer prices have been a major cause of large-scale unrecorded groundnut flows across African borders.

70. Regionally defined commodity producer organizations like the AGC, IACO (coffee), ADPH (palm oil), and ATO (timber) could be effective devices

for challenging protectionist policies in the industrialized countries. One way to accomplish this may be through marketing strategies designed to increase demand for African commodities. For example, advertising campaigns--supported by cooperative product research--could be organized to highlight the attractive characteristics of African products, thereby enhancing competitiveness with non-African producers and synthetic substitute manufacturers. The potential for this sort of product differentiation and promotion is not known. But the idea has been little explored, and almost nothing is being done along these lines.

71. Perhaps the most immediate benefit of regional cooperation between African commodity producers is the increased opportunity for exchange of technical and scientific information. A regional approach which provides commodity specific research data can be justified on at least two grounds. First, the collection and distribution of information from a regional location can improve access for producers. Second, a regional facility can focus on particular variables effecting African production, e.g., climatic conditions, pest control, and varietal characteristics. While regional agricultural research institutions (e.g., WARDA, IITA) perform closely related activities, producer associations may provide more effective vehicles for dissemination of this information. This objective is already being carried out, inter alia, through distribution of periodicals published and financed by African commodity producer associations. Such activities can help to lower production costs and increase exports by improving product quality and yields.

PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD AID THE PRIVATE SECTOR

72. A number of proposals to improve the private sector's access to hard currencies and credit have also been proposed. With growing frequency, donors are being asked to provide the resources required to finance these arrangements. Such donor participation typically involves lending conditions intended to promote sustainable economic reforms and progressive liberalization of trade policies.

73. Without attempting a comprehensive description of each specific scheme, the next few paragraphs give an overview of the major strategies currently being proposed.

Preexport Financing Revolving Funds

74. These funds are primarily designed to provide manufacturing firms with hard currency needed to purchase imported inputs. The fund "revolves" as firms pay back their borrowings after the goods have been exported. Revolving funds can operate successfully when firms make these repayments in hard currency, but problems occur when they are paid for their products in nonconvertible currencies. In the latter case, the revolving fund's hard currency will be quickly used up, requiring continuing infusions of hard currency from other sources. As a result, pre-export revolving funds schemes have tended to focus on increasing extra-regional exports rather than intra-African trade.

75. There is nothing inherent about preexport revolving funds that would demand a regional approach. In practice, however, donor financing may be more readily available to a regional project. Another possible advantage is the ability of a regional fund to better protect exporters from the risk of a default in payment by importers.⁵

76. Donors such as USAID and the World Bank generally advocate revolving funds as an interim measure only, to be used until overvalued exchange rates, the underlying cause of hard currency shortages, can be adjusted. These arrangements will continue to be resisted, however, by the IMF and others who regard them as an implicit dual exchange rate mechanism which merely forestalls needed exchange rate adjustments.

77. Various new proposals, incorporating a regional preexport revolving fund and a cross-border investment fund, are currently being developed, for example, by the World Bank and the PTA. These are in early stages and details are few. The cross-border investment idea is that a donor-created pool of foreign exchange could be drawn on by investors, using African national currencies. Its operation would be tied to reform in trade and exchange rate policies.

Export-Import Credit Facilities

78. Many African exporters and importers have difficulty in obtaining trade financing from international banks. To fill this need, African export-import credit facilities have been advocated as yet another means to overcome functional obstacles to both intra- and extra-African trade. The African Development Bank has commissioned a study (to be completed in 1988) which will make recommendations for the eventual establishment of an Africa-wide "Eximbank." This proposed institution would provide credit facilities and related financial and non-financial support services to African exporters and importers.

79. It is not clear, however, that trade financing requires a regional approach. Given the usual role of export-import banks as a vehicle for subsidizing the trade of particular countries, it is difficult to imagine how an Africa-wide, donor supported export-import institution could operate effectively. Setting up credit facilities at the subregional level (perhaps through the clearing houses) may reduce this difficulty, but it would still be very difficult to reconcile competing national interests. In any case, a sustainable scheme to finance trade should incorporate some long-term strategy to restore credit worthiness, which is the underlying constraint on the availability of commercial trade financing.

Commercial Credit

80. The ECOBANK project is an interesting example of what might be accomplished through the African private sector. In 1980, the West African

5. On proposals for preexport financing revolving funds in SADCC see Chr. Michelson Institute, SADCC Intra-Regional Trade Study (January 1986), pp. 24-38.

Chambers of Commerce (WACC) formed ECO Promotions to finance a study evaluating the feasibility of a new commercial bank serving the subregion. The study's initial recommendation called for government guarantees and was rejected by the WACC which insisted that the operation be wholly private. As a result, nearly all of ECOBANK's US\$ 100 million capital is to be raised from private sources within the subregion.

81. ECOBANK Transnational Incorporated (ETI) opened the doors of its first national subsidiary in March 1988. As of September 1988, approximately half of ETI's capital had been paid up, with the ECOWAS Fund expected to pay in an additional US\$ 5 million. ETI will provide financing for regional trade and investment and, through an independent subsidiary, will offer technical assistance for the preparation and implementation of development projects. As the outgrowth of a regionally based private sector initiative, ETI's experiences will be a test of what commercial banks can achieve in the area of regional trade and investment finance.

IV. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NEED TO ADDRESS POLICY OBSTACLES TO INCREASED TRADE

82. The experience of the last few decades underscores several basic facts. First, any successful regional approach aimed at increasing Sub-Saharan Africa's trade requires the commitment and support of the individual governments of the region. And second, implementation difficulties reflect the fact that among the most formidable obstacles to trade and investment have been the macroeconomic policies practiced by these countries themselves, i.e., overvalued exchange rates, inappropriate credit allocation practices, and domestic market protection.

83. Both African governments and their peoples have discovered ways to compensate for the consequences of overvaluation. Countertrade arrangements permit government officials to sidestep hard currency controls in procuring scarce imported goods from outside the region. Similarly, Africa's burgeoning parallel markets and informal border currency exchanges demonstrate a popular response to the inadequacy of official trade policies and financial institutions.

84. Some regional approaches have been used to mask the symptoms of overvaluation without addressing the underlying need for exchange rate adjustment. Clearing houses are a case in point: they seek to create partial convertibility by reducing the need for hard currencies in settling regional payments, but they do not resolve the more basic problem of inappropriate exchange rate levels set. Under the clearing house system, countries with overvalued exchange rates continue to have balance of trade deficits and remain hard pressed to come up with the hard currency needed at the end of each settlement period. These trade imbalances have generated further complications for the clearing houses which now are struggling to maintain liquidity by looking for donor financing to extend longer credits to the

central banks of their chronically debtor member states, i.e. those whose exchange rates are most overvalued and whose domestic demand management policies are weakest.

85. The recent movement toward a regional system for trade and investment financing credit should also be evaluated in the light of potential policy deficiencies at the national level. Export credit revolving funds, cross-border investment funds, and export-import credit facilities--all of these donor-supported programs tend to compensate for the ongoing inadequacy of macroeconomic policies. Without a mechanism to progressively phase out policy-induced barriers to trade and improve the availability of credit at the national level, these programs are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term.

86. Africa's large-scale regional economic organizations should also refrain from supporting protectionist trade and production policies that impede overall growth. Market integration schemes, though nominally trade liberalizing, incorporate rules of origin and compensation provisions that limit competition and protect inefficient industries. To the extent that member states implement promised tariff reductions, these are typically offset by new import taxes, or by quotas and other nontariff barriers. The current focus on infrastructural and industrial development poses similar problems. The allocation of these projects is influenced far more by considerations of regional "balance" than by their actual cost effectiveness and potential return.

87. Such policies do not promote regional economic growth or integration but merely seek to ensure an "equal" distribution of economic development benefits throughout the region. This approach is misguided. An effective regional integration program cannot ensure that all states benefit equally in relative terms, but it could be designed so that each derives some absolute benefit from the economic growth of the region as a whole. The latter approach can only be implemented if African governments are willing to change their general policies toward regional economic integration. Among the most important components of such a policy adjustment should be the liberalization of intraregional labor flows.

88. Regional economic organizations are in a position to help facilitate and coordinate the policy adjustment process that is needed to enhance productivity and trade. Africa's regional economic organizations cannot perform this role, however, if they continue to shift away from trade-related issues into broader, usually less contentious, areas of regional cooperation. The tendency among African regional economic organizations to overreach their original mandates and to duplicate functions that can be performed more effectively elsewhere has already been noted in this report. The failure of conventional market integration schemes should not be taken as a signal for the regional organizations to abandon their responsibilities in the trade area. Instead, these economic organizations should be encouraged to sharpen their resolve in dealing with all the obstacles to trade, beginning with those arising from the policy environment.

89. Regional projects and programs aimed at removing specific obstacles to regional trade are not likely to have much effect unless these efforts also facilitate the adjustment of the underlying national policy deficiencies that limit trade. This is not to say that all current trade-related regional proposals should be necessarily considered counterproductive. On the contrary, there is nothing inherently wrong with so-called "second best" economic and financial mechanisms intended to remove specific obstacles to trade. These mechanisms can play a important role in the adjustment process. To be most constructive, however, they should be modest in scale and temporary; most importantly, they should be part of an overall regional strategy leading to an improved policy environment.

ENCOURAGE PRIVATE-SECTOR-ORIENTED INITIATIVES

90. It is often observed that regional markets already exist in Africa as a result of "unofficial" or illegal cross-border trade. The energetic development of these underground links suggests that much more can be done by encouraging the legalization of these commercial activities. African governments should take these steps, in cooperation with the private sector, to explore the underlying causes for parallel markets, and ways to restore them. Donors can play an important role by helping to identify private-sector needs and by emphasizing the importance of formulating trade policies which respond to these interests.

91. In terms of increasing trade, the major benefit of expanded private sector participation is the economic efficiency it induces through open competition. Competition, however, is often lacking in African countries where state trading companies and/or monopolistic private entrepreneurs tend to dominate economic activity. Under these conditions, potential competitors (such as those that could emerge from the informal sector) are screened off from the official economy. In the absence of competition, neither the public nor private sector is under pressure to diversify markets or seek out the least costly sources of supply. This leads to the stagnation of production and ossification of existing trade patterns. By taking steps to increase competition and build popular confidence in the official economy, African governments could realize significant gains in productivity and trade.

92. African governments also need to be more receptive to private-sector-oriented approaches to meeting regional challenges. Private enterprises are capable of performing many of the trading sector tasks which have hitherto been regarded as the exclusive preserve of the public sector. Intraregional transportation facilities might be privately financed and maintained by establishing mechanisms for the collection of user fees. Regional industrial projects can be made more attractive to private financing if entrepreneurs could regard their property rights and continued market access as secure. In order to realize these benefits, governments and the private sector have to develop more effective dialogue and cooperation.

93. Wherever possible, private agents should be given the freedom to advance their own regional initiatives for increasing trade. Recent efforts of the African Chambers of Commerce demonstrate the positive results that can

be achieved through regional integration of nonstate actors. Their private-sector-based initiatives have already addressed the issue of regional market information (through trade periodicals) as well as expanding the availability of regional trade and investment financing (ECOBANK). These examples indicate that the creative energies of the private sector can be used to discover effective methods for overcoming specific barriers to trade. Much more could still be accomplished through other regional initiatives collectively undertaken by professional associations and commercial enterprises.

PROMOTE FLEXIBLE REGIONAL COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS

94. The record of efforts to increase trade through the direct authority of African heads of state has been quite bleak. Bringing together government officials--whose only clear organizational affinity is based on the geographic location of their countries--no longer appears to be an effective response to regional problems. Not only have these approaches proven costly, but in most cases their effectiveness has been reduced by the enormous efforts which must be concentrated on organization-building activities required to ensure implementation at the national level.

95. Regional approaches based on voluntary cooperation between parties sharing specific interests and motivated by similar goals are likely to be more productive than the institutionally intensive, top-down variety. All approaches to increasing trade can benefit greatly from the added flexibility and autonomy of voluntary arrangements comprised of specifically interested parties. For example, the clearing houses, which are supported directly by the central banks of each participating country, are among the very few regionally financed institutions whose operating budgets have not been plagued with arrearages in member contributions. The SADCC model has been widely commended for its low-cost administrative structure which relies on delegating clearly defined regional responsibilities to particular national ministries. Industrial projects like the Union Glass Company (noted earlier) are in a better position to penetrate new markets if they begin from a solid small-scale production base.

96. These illustrations suggest that the best way of dealing with the problem of organizational overreach and duplication is to promote an environment in which a multiplicity of flexible small-scale approaches can thrive. Over the long term, sustainable regional programs will be best generated through the voluntary merger of already existing successful efforts. Simply reducing the number of organizations while imposing discipline from above, as the ECA appears to advocate, will not ensure better regional responses to the challenge of increasing trade.

97. The major regional economic organizations should not dictate policy to the smaller ones. Organizations like ECOWAS, PTA, CEAO, UDEAC, as well as the OAU and ECA, perform important roles as forums for discussion and action on regional trade issues. But they should also recognize their functional limitations as large politically based organizations by permitting the decentralization of tasks which can be better performed without the direct oversight of the heads of state. In practice, this will mean granting greater

managerial autonomy to their subsidiary units and adopting a cooperative attitude toward independent privately based initiatives. Similarly, the ECA-sponsored economic "communities" will have to be more tolerant of the francophone organizations and other entities whose existence they now decry.

98. After nearly three decades of experimentation with various models of regional cooperation designed to increase trade, it is obvious that no single answer can be expected to provide the ultimate solution. The critical issue, therefore, is not simply to reduce the number of trade-related organizations, but rather to continue the process of experimentation and explore ways of enhancing the effectiveness of all promising regional approaches.

CHAPTER II:

INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND GREATER FOOD SECURITY

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Increasing Africa's capacity to feed itself has been one of the highest priorities of both African spokesmen and donor agencies. Yet the crisis in African agriculture continues.
2. In many countries food production is stagnant. Twenty-four nations with food emergencies actually experienced production declines of as much as 15 percent between 1981 and 1983. While Sub-Saharan Africa's average annual population growth rate was 2.8 percent between 1970 and 1982, agricultural GDP grew only at 2.1 percent during the same period. Agricultural growth rate per capita was negative during these years.
3. These figures alone fail to convey the gravity of the whole story. Some 70 to 90 percent of Africa's exploding population is rural and earns its living from agriculture. Declining per capita production, therefore, also means real income losses for the large segment of Africans who constitute the rural poor. The Ethiopian famines of 1985 and 1988 and the Sahelian famines of the early 1970s and mid-1980s, all stand as sobering testimony to Africa's vulnerability. In the mid-1980s an estimated 100 million of her people were malnourished.
4. Meanwhile, as agricultural production lags in most of the continent, governments are forced to turn more and more to world markets in order to feed their people. Food grain imports have grown at approximately nine percent per annum in the last two decades, diverting valuable foreign exchange from investment and other expenditures which are critical for the long-term development of the continent. Moreover, imports consist largely of wheat and rice, crops that are grown only at high cost or not at all in most of the continent.
5. Africans recognize agriculture as the sector of first priority. In 1984, OAU signatories affirmed that "we possess the will and capacity and have full support of the international community to feed our peoples and to lay the foundation for greater economic prosperity and self-reliance in Africa." In 1985 this pledge was made concrete as OAU governments committed themselves to devoting 20 to 25 percent of their national budgets to agriculture by the end of the decade.

6. Several areas within the agricultural sector are particularly amenable to regional approaches. We shall focus on two areas which are often singled out as being especially suitable for regional approaches: agricultural research and training, and food security.

II. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING

7. Agricultural research is critical to growth in Africa. "Africa's agricultural production must be doubled within the next 15-20 years. No amount of political will and policy reform can double the current two percent rate of growth of agricultural output and sustain it, unless science and technological advances are being generated through agricultural research in Africa."¹ Regional approaches to agricultural research can play a significant role in contributing to those advances.

RATIONALES FOR REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH

Economies of Scale

8. Economies of scale are evident in agricultural research. Unit costs of producing agricultural research output initially decline with an increase in the scale of production, whether the "product" of agricultural research is defined as number or quality of publications, as high-yielding varieties (HYV) bred, or as an impact indicator such as HYVs adopted by farmers. Most African countries, however, are not able to operate comprehensive national agricultural research systems at the minimum efficient size implied by these economies of scale. This is due to the small size of these countries and the corresponding lack of sufficient inputs to operate national agricultural research systems at these efficient levels.

9. Binswanger has shown that there are increasing returns to agricultural research associated with the area of land devoted to that commodity.² Empirical analysis seems to corroborate that point.³ Yet most African countries are small in terms of total land area to begin with. Of 24 West and Central African countries, 17 have total land areas less than 500,000 km². African countries are smaller yet in terms of total arable land. Of the same 24 West and Central African countries, only 1 has more than

1. Carl K. Eicher, "Agricultural Research for African Development: Problems and Priorities for 1985-2000," paper prepared for a World Bank Conference on Research Priorities for Sub-Saharan Africa, Bellagio, February 25-March 1, 1985, p. 13.

2. Hans P. Binswanger, "The Microeconomics of Induced Technological Change," in Induced Innovation, 1978, pp. 91-127.

3. Cf. R. E. Evenson, "The IARCs and Their Impact on National Research and Extension and on Productivity," paper prepared as part of the IARC Impact Study under the direction of Jock Anderson, n.d. (1985?).

70,000 km² of arable and cropable land. Moreover, most African nations are further fragmented by agro-climatic boundaries. In West Africa, for example, 6 of 16 countries are crisscrossed with at least 4 of the 6 main West African ecologies. As a result, total land area appropriate to growing a given crop in a given country is likely to be well under the minimum efficient size to warrant a full-fledged and comprehensive national research program on that crop.

10. Also, increasing returns are to be expected from the most important component to research: human capital. Certain research programs are too large to be effectively handled by less than a threshold minimum number of scientists. Vernon Ruttan, for example, has claimed that a minimum number of 8 to 10 M.A./Ph.D.-level scientists are necessary for a commodity research program to even begin to be effective. Research is also synergistic in nature. The productivity of a scientist increases as he/she is increasingly in contact with fellow researchers.

11. Yet most African countries are short on human capital, both in terms of the managerial personnel and scientific personnel necessary to operate the minimum, efficient-sized commodity research program. Mauritania had only 3 agricultural scientists in the whole country two years ago. Thirteen of sixteen West African countries have less than 3 scientists working on the crop that is their staple. Only 13 of 44 Sub-Saharan countries inventoried in two recent World Bank studies could boast of a total of more than 100 national scientists.

12. In addition to human capital, increasing returns to scale are registered with respect to both financial and physical capital. This is true for all agricultural research, but even more so for more capital-intensive basic and applied research and in relatively capital-intensive areas such as livestock, insect, and animal disease research. Large fixed costs in terms of necessary research facilities, libraries, and seed and plant storage imply declining average costs until high output levels are reached. Financial costs of attaining "critical mass" are significant. A recent World Bank proposal priced a minimum-sized technical team at US\$ 200,000 per year.

13. African countries lack the resources to attain the minimum efficient size with respect to capital inputs as well. Agricultural budgets across the continent are meager. Seven countries in the region spend less than US\$ 1 million on agricultural research a year. Fifteen others spend between US\$ 1 and US\$ 5 million.

14. Thus the existence of scale economies, coupled with a scarcity on the national level of the resources necessary to operate research programs at a level that will capture these decreasing costs, provide a strong argument for regional efforts in agricultural research. More research tasks can be addressed more efficiently when resources are pooled to tackle common problems.

Economies of Joint Production

Even should economies-of-scale considerations alone not warrant regionalized agricultural research, economies of joint production coupled with economies of scale will. This is because the output or impact of agricultural research institutions is not solely in research, and should not be measured in terms of research results alone. Indeed, agricultural research institutes can have a critical impact on agricultural research capacity. They can do this in two ways.

15. Agricultural research centers can play a significant role in training human capital. The preexistence of a core group of scientists working on research issues makes the incremental cost of their delivering training much lower. First, the research and training functions can be conducted simultaneously--a student can learn by working alongside a scientist. Also, more formal classes and workshops can be administered as a secondary activity by scientists at a low marginal cost. The teaching by example and the learning by doing are not limited to scientists alone. Managers and planners are bred this way too. These formulas are a familiar ones in the U.S., where the land-grant universities have demonstrated the efficacy of such joint production.

16. In addition to developing human capital, agricultural research centers can have a profound impact on institutional development. Personal contacts are enhanced throughout the region and sensible institutional operating procedures instilled. Moreover, since the potential impact of agricultural research institutions on human capital and institutional capacity enhancement is an inverse function of pre-existing capacity, agricultural research centers can be expected to have a significant institutional impact on the African continent.

17. The economics of joint production justify producing agricultural research output, human capital output, and institutional development output together since the cost per unit produced of each would decline as a result. The production of a diversified output, however, may warrant an even larger minimum efficient size of operation due to the original economies of scale arguments. These reasons taken together thus compound the previous argument for a regionalized approach to agricultural research and training on account of further economies of scale.

Externalities

18. The existence of externalities is a further rationale for a regional approach in this area. Research-generated technology has the character of a public good. Results generated in one country or for one commodity may be applicable in another country or to other commodities. In cases where for moral or practical reasons intellectual property rights should not or cannot be enforced, one is faced with a market imperfection. Countries will tend to underinvest in agricultural research since only part of total benefits accrue to the financing government. Nations may hope, rather, to gain as free riders on a neighbor's research effort. If all nations in the subregion were to act in accordance with the same rationale, investment would stand at a grossly

suboptimal level on the continent.⁴ A regional effort, on the other hand, would address this "market failure" by allowing most of the benefits to accrue to the taxing jurisdiction.

Weakness of National Agricultural Research Systems

19. The final argument for a regional approach to agricultural research is a very different one from the theoretical arguments presented above. A regionalized approach is also called for because of the present lack of national capacity in many African countries to meet immediate research objectives; and the existence of regional institutions that can go a long way in doing so. Indeed a regional approach may be necessary for the next twenty years because of the lack of viable alternatives. It may be the only possible means to secure gains in agricultural productivity. This point will be treated more extensively later.

WHAT IS BEING DONE

20. Regional approaches to agricultural research in Africa have taken a variety of forms. One model is the African regional research institute, staffed and funded by Africans with in-house implementation of research. Examples of such institutions are few, successful institutions of this type scarcer yet. A second formula is the international research center. It constitutes the most prominent regional institutional model in Africa in terms of number of organizations and researchers, breadth of activity, and amount of available resources. A third, newer, formula is the African regional research coordinating body. Staffed and funded by Africans, these organizations are small in terms of staff size. Their staff does not implement research projects. Rather, they coordinate and sometimes manage specific research programs of donors, international centers, and national agricultural research systems. A fourth and final regional model is the research network. While not strictly an organization in its own right, the network today has increasingly become the chosen vehicle of donors to exploit the potential benefits of regional cooperation.

The African Regional Agricultural Research Institute

21. The potential benefits of regional approaches to agricultural research are widely recognized by African governments. Since independence they have established African equivalents of regional colonial research institutes, such as the Empire Cotton Growing Association, which had made valuable contributions to agricultural development in the past. These regional agricultural research institutes were to be genuine African

4. Vernon Ruttan (Agricultural Research Policy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), for example, cites a study by Bredahl and Peterson that suggests underinvestment in agricultural research is due to these spill-over benefits (M. Bredahl and W. Peterson, "The Productivity of Allocation of Research: U.S. Agricultural Experiment Stations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November 1986, pp. 684-92).

institutions in every respect: a core budget funded by African member states, an African staff, and a mandate to address problems specific to Africa.

22. Seven such institutes used to function under the aegis of the East African Community. Most notable among them were the East African Agricultural and Forestry Research Organization (EAAFRO), the East African Veterinary Research Organization (EAVRO), and the East African Tea Research Organization (EATRO).⁵ In West Africa, three institutes were created with important regional mandates: the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA), the West African Cocoa Research Institute in Ghana, and the West African Oil Palm Research Institute in Nigeria. Three more recent additions were the Institut du Sahel (INSAH), the Comité Interafricaine d'Etudes Hydrauliques (CIEH), and the Institut de Recherches Animales et de Zootechnie (IRAZ).

23. None of these organizations, except INSAH, CIEH, and IRAZ, continues to function as an African regional organization.⁶ Some no longer exist; some (such as EATRO) were taken over as part of the national agricultural research system of the country in which they were located. WARDA, on the other hand, became an international center within the framework of the CGIAR system.⁷

24. In the face of such strong initial support for regional cooperation, why has this prototype of the African regional agricultural research organization failed? History shows that such a formula tends not to work for several reasons, regardless of the strong a priori rationales for it. The experiences of both WARDA (rice) and EAAFRO (forestry) are especially valuable in shedding light on the practical intractabilities of this model.

Reasons for Failure

25. While all member states are expected to contribute to the financing of these organizations according to some equitable formula, benefits are not perceived as accruing equally among member states. In particular, the countries in which the center is headquartered or has a testing center usually benefits the most. Testing is done by regional scientists at the center and thus released varieties are more likely to best match host country conditions. Moreover, close ties are built with the host country scientists, and it becomes easier to dovetail regional and national research programs. Resentment among other member states becomes particularly acrimonious when over time, for lack of funding, motivation or management ability, regional

5. The others were the East African Fisheries Research Organization, the East African Trypanosomiasis Research Organization, the Virus Vaccine Production Research Organization, and the East African Bilharzia Research Organization.

6. The only three African regional agricultural research organizations that do continue to exist, meanwhile, can hardly be showcased as success stories. All three face serious problems with arrears. Actual operating budgets are relatively low. Moreover, these organizations shown signs of structural and organizational problems as well. The profiles of CIEH and INSAH, included in Volume II, present a more detailed picture of these organizations.

7. For a more detailed treatment of this interesting and special case see Volume II.

scientists visit member country research centers less and less. These field visits were one of the first activities to face cutbacks when WARDA began to face its financial crisis.

26. Also, high levels of funding are required for effective agricultural research, and these funds must be sustained at stable levels over a long term. Without stability of institutions, personnel and budgets, that critical mass necessary for research cannot be maintained. Seeds are not transported to testing sites in time for the growing period due to lack of gasoline; projects are disrupted due to lack of pesticides or fertilizers.

27. African governments are often unable or unwilling to provide the kind of resources necessary to sustain research momentum. By 1985, WARDA member state contributions were in arrears by as much as US\$ 11.5 million. Furthermore, the tendency of some African countries to not pay their contributions to regional organizations during "crisis" years only to catch up on arrears a few years later makes budget planning extremely difficult and can disrupt research completely. One of the major changes in WARDA after it joined the CGIAR system was in fact its funding arrangement. The member states still contribute dues, but because of the anticipated variability of that source of revenue, the core institutional and program budgets are provided by outside financiers.

28. In addition, these regional organizations are plagued by bad management and bad administrative structure due to vested political interests or to plain lack of managerial capacity. At WARDA there was no single body overseeing operation and providing policy guidance to management. The 1984 External Management Review concluded that

a major cause of WARDA's inefficiency is the absence of accountability for overall institutional performance, starting at the level of the Governing Council and descending down through the organization. The limited focus of the Governing Council and the STC creates a vacuum filled by a large number of donors with their own diverse priorities and standards of accountability. External and internal constraints on the Executive Secretary make it difficult for him to exercise executive leadership in integrating programme planning and implementation.⁸

29. One of the "internal constraints" mentioned, moreover, was the institutionalization of language divisions. There existed a "an absence of trust" between Executive and Deputy Executive Secretaries at WARDA, the two being selected by different political processes and representing different linguistic groups. The Chairman of the Governing Council of WARDA observed that

the influence of these colonial languages on our subregional organizations is extremely disturbing.... Rules and Regulations governing the organizations and the election of officers become so

8. CGIAR, Final Report of the First External Management Review of the West African Rice Development Association, April 1984, p. 12.

delicate that the balance they seek to represent is in effect a capitulation to the destructive powers of these languages.⁹

30. Political appointments have probably reduced the quality of the staff. These same political pressures partly explain the inflation of WARDA's salary costs. Unemployment pressures on the national level biased WARDA's budget toward creating employment. The 1984 External Management Review observed that overstaffing was widespread. Annual expenditures on the Administrative Budget as a percentage of total WARDA expenditures increased from 17.7 percent in 1977 to 24.7 percent in 1982. Within the administrative departments the ratio of general supporting staff to professional staff increased from 1.77 in 1977 to 2.83 in 1982.¹⁰ As a result, operating expenses important for effective research, such as maintenance and transportation costs, were not being adequately met, thereby hindering the execution of research programs.

31. The tendency of these organizations to "overreach" with respect to their personnel is paralleled with respect to their mandates. Political pressures and bad management have resulted in these organizations straying from focused mandates on research and venturing into the domain of development projects. WARDA's reorientation toward its original research mandate was an important issue in its recent incorporation and reorganization within the CGIAR umbrella.

32. And finally, WARDA and EAAFRD attracted the most qualified scientists from national research institutes by offering much higher salaries than can be offered on the national level. This intraregional brain drain left already resource-poor African countries with even less human capital. It also left them with much antagonism toward these regional ventures.

The International Agricultural Research Centers

While African regional research centers have failed to take root on the continent, the international agricultural research centers (IARCs) have flourished. In total there are 20 such institutions. Of these, 13 belong to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Of the 13 CGIAR centers, 8 in particular are involved with commodity research of great relevance to Africa.¹¹ Four of these CGIAR institutes have their headquarters in Africa.¹² The others are present on the continent either in the form of subregional centers (e.g. the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics or ICRISAT Sahelian Center), programs, or technical assistance. Of the remaining 7 non-CGIAR IARCs, 2 in particular have their headquarters in Africa and have a primarily African focus to their research.¹³ The 10 international agricultural research centers with an

9. Ibid, p. 26.

10. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

11. These are WARDA, IITA, ICRISAT, CIMMYT, CIAT, ILCA, ILRAD, and CIP.

12. WARDA, IITA, ILCA, and ILRAD.

13. ICIPE and ICRAF.

important research focus on Africa are presented in Summary Table III.1 and are described in more detail in Volume II.

33. The IARCs are "African regional organizations" only in a special sense, for they are all internationally financed, and their professional staff is internationally recruited. With a few exceptions, their official mandates are worldwide in scope. In these respects IARCs are obviously less "African" than the African regional organizations discussed above.¹⁴

34. Yet clearly the international organizations are the agricultural research organizations most active in exploiting the benefits of regional approaches to agricultural research. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of the CGIAR system's total income of about US\$ 235.5 in 1986 was said to be allocated to Africa.

35. The IARCs are dedicated primarily to applied research. Some, however, conduct research further upstream than do others. This is the case with ILRAD, for example, which is conducting clinical research to develop vaccines for trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) and theileriasis (east coast fever). Substantial effort and resources are also spent by the IARCs in activities that are not purely research. On a global level a substantial portion of the CGIAR institutes' core expenditures are allocated to research support and management (36 percent), and strengthening national research capacity (18 percent).¹⁵ The strengthening of national research capacity is accomplished with expenditures on information gathering and dissemination, training, and institution building. Specific activities such as workshops, subregional tours and technical assistance attain these ends.

African Regional Research Coordinating Organizations

36. The coordinating organization is a relatively recent development. Exemplified by SAFGRAD (Semi-Arid Food Grain Research and Development) and more recently SACCAR (Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research),¹⁶ these regional organizations' member states do not fund program budgets for any actual research projects. They do not pay the salaries of research scientists. Rather, they finance a secretariat that simply coordinates research activity within the subregion. Thus costs are relatively low.

37. These organizations act to coordinate national agricultural research through networks. In fact SAFGRAD and SACCAR are two of the few African institutions that are involved in network coordination in any capacity. SAFGRAD was involved in the coordination of 4 networks and SACCAR in that of 3 networks in 1986.

38. These institutions also act as conduits for multilateral and bilateral donor assistance to the subregion. SACCAR has raised over US\$ 39

14. See introduction to Volume II.

15. CGIAR, 1986/87 Annual Report, p. 69.

16. See Volume II for more detailed treatment of these two institutions.

Table 3.1

Summary Table of
International Agricultural Research Centers in Africa¹

| | CIAT | CIMMYT | CIP | ICRISAT | IITA | ILCA | ILRAD | WARDA | ICRPE | ICRAF |
|---------------------------------------|------|--------|------|---------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Annual Budget | 22.1 | 23.3 | 10.1 | 16.8 | 20.0 | 16.0 | 8.5 | 2.1 | 8.03 | 4.6 |
| Senior Professional Staff (SPS) | 75 | 96 | 62 | 80 | 106 | 59 | 30 | 64 | 70 | 25 |
| % African SPS | 1 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 26 | 21 | 10 | 91 | 85 | 36 |
| % staff in Africa | 4.6 | 11.5 | 4.8 | 33.75 | 96.2 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | - | - |
| % SPS with primary responsibility in: | | | | | | | | | | |
| strategic research | 13 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 6 | 83 | 0 | - | - |
| crop-improvement applied research | 49 | 45 | 30 | 40 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 10 | - | - |
| other applied research | 23 | 24 | 28 | 21 | 27 | 59 | 6 | 34 | - | - |
| training, research support, adminstr. | 13 | 17 | 27 | 26 | 27 | 34 | 11 | 56 | - | - |

1. Data, from the years 1985-1987, were drawn from several different documents (annual reports, information bulletins, etc.) from individual centers and from the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research.

Summary Table cont'd.

| | CIAT | CIMMYT | CIP | ICRISAT | IITA | ILCA | ILRAD | WARDA | ICIFE | ICRAF |
|--|------|--------|-----|---------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Approx. current number of participants in: | | | | | | | | | | |
| individ. research training | 135 | 70 | 50 | 15 | 25 | 15 | - | - | - | |
| degree related ² | 25 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 65 | 0 | 15 | 20 | 8 | 10 |
| group courses | 90 | 130 | 540 | 90 | 500 | 110 | 25 | 120 | 28 | 24 |
| post-doc programs | 15 | 15 | 0 | 20 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 7 | 0 |

2. Students working toward advanced degrees at universities but conducting research at the specified center (except in the case of WARDA where number represents those training abroad).

million of external funds. Most of SAFGRAD I's US\$ 19 million was also externally raised.¹⁷

39. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, research coordinating organizations such as SACCAR act as the focal point for the coming together of international centers and donors on the one hand, and African national centers on the other. They act as indigenous regional "partners" to the international centers' subregional programs. It is considered important to African researchers, for example, that ICRISAT's research agenda and participation in Southern Africa resulted largely from SACCAR's own regional initiative and invitation. In West Africa, meanwhile, SAFGRAD works hand in hand with IITA and ICRISAT. Such arrangements contribute to the IARCs becoming more responsive to regional and national priorities. If nothing else, they facilitate cooperation by dispelling the notion among national scientists and governments that the IARC agenda is solely to fulfill the IARC global mandate, to further the research efforts going on at IARC headquarters, and to maximize the number of publications by IARC staff scientists.

Networks

40. Agricultural research networks differ from coordinating organizations in that they have no institutional base. They exploit the benefits of regional approaches by bringing together in a formalized arrangement all the actors working on a specific area and within a specific subregion. "Information exchange" networks concentrate on the diffusion of ideas, methodologies and research results among participants. In the case of "scientific consultation networks," individual participants focus on research on common priority areas, but initiate and implement such research independently. Regular meetings are held to distribute information and results. Finally, "collaborative research networks" involve joint formulation and implementation of research on areas of mutual concern to all participants. These networks are involved not only in information sharing but in scientific collaboration and training as well. Subtasks of a larger research project may be assigned to different actors on the basis of interest and comparative advantage.

41. There are approximately 64 such research networks in Africa covering a variety of crops across a variety of subregions. External funding for each network is usually obtained from either one or more bilateral donors. USAID, for example, spends approximately US\$ 400,000 per network per year for every network it supports. Coordination of collaborative networks has usually assigned to an international agricultural research center, an African agricultural research coordinating organization, or the French research coordinating bodies, ORSTOM or CIRAD.

17. While SAFGRAD was also mandated to manage most of these funds, however, they have tended to be bypassed. See profile in Volume II for more detail.

ASSESSMENT

Disappointing Results

42. We saw from the above discussion that major regional research efforts are taking place in the international centers, with some collaboration with national research efforts. The African regional organizations are largely defunct, and the national efforts weakened by lack of staff and money.

43. In fact, Africa's postindependence record on agricultural research has not lived up to expectations. We are faced with the paradox of high levels of investment on the one hand, and slow rates of technological progress on the other. In 1980, research expenditure per hectare in Africa stood at 2.8 million dollars per hectare, as compared to 0.7 in India and 2.0 in other developing Asian countries.¹⁸ Yet between 1969-71 and 1979-81 average rice, maize and sorghum yields, for example, all remained stagnant in SSA. Dunstan Spencer concludes that "probably less than 2 percent of total sorghum, millet and upland rice areas in West Africa had been sown to cultivars (improved varieties) developed through genetic research."¹⁹

44. Why such mediocre results in Africa? The principal reason has been the original overreliance of the international centers and others on transferred technology. The assumption that technology developed elsewhere could be imported, and with some adaptation, be applied to Africa has been proven largely incorrect. The locally adapted miracle HYVs that everyone hoped for have not been forthcoming. After testing over 2,000 imported rice varieties over ten years, WARDA was able to offer only 2 that performed as well as the best local varieties. ICRISAT launched a West African millet and sorghum program in the mid-1970s which imported improved varieties with the intent of enhancing genetic stock. In Burkina Faso of 2,000 millet varieties tested, however, none have been successful. That country's experience with sorghum is only marginally better: only 3 out of 5,000 varieties are under consideration after farm-level testing. Instead, sorghum and millet varieties that have been relatively more successful are those derived from local West African genetic stock.

45. The reasons why the technology transfer model has not worked well in Africa are now well known.²⁰ Imported varieties are often simply not appropriate for local conditions. Differences in local factor endowments make the cost of on-farm production relatively higher and uneconomic locally.

18. Jock R. Anderson, "International Agricultural Research Centers: Achievements and Potential, Parts I and II," draft of August 31, 1985, Chapter 2, p. 14a.

19. Dunstan Spencer, "Agricultural Research in Sub-Saharan Africa: Using the Lessons of the Past to Develop a Strategy for the Future," background paper prepared for the Committee on African Development Strategies, January 17, 1985, p. 19.

20. Cf. Hans P. Binswanger and Vernon W. Ruttan, Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions and Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 202.

Slight differences in the natural environment (such as soil characteristics, temperature, rainfall, pests, disease, length of growing period), furthermore, substantially lower the yields of environmentally sensitive varieties upon transfer. Moreover, technology transfer is not cheap. Information acquisition, technology screening, and manpower training to employ new methods all make importing an existing technology costly. Indeed, on the national level, simple technology transfer may well be more demanding on resources than indigenous adaptive research.

46. If technology cannot be transferred to Africa it has to be created or adapted in Africa, for African conditions. Research needs to focus on African constraints such as soil conditions and pests found specifically on this continent. Substantial resources must be devoted to molding new varieties to the specificities of local agroecological conditions. More focus is needed on farming systems research so as to integrate new technology with existing production patterns. A lot more attention must be paid to maintenance research in order to continue to maximize yields of adopted varieties.

47. The issue, then is what role African or international regional research organizations can and should play in developing this research. Where should resources be allocated, and who should be doing what in the struggle to improve agricultural technology.

Donor Response

48. The present, conventional stand on this issue is the delineation of research tasks along institutional lines according to comparative advantage, with a concurrent push to strengthen national agricultural research systems. In a recent paper, Matlon (1987) synthesizes this view.

National research programs must be considerably strengthened if even modest gains in aggregate sorghum and millet production are to be achieved during the next several decades. International and regional research institutions do not and will not in the foreseeable future have the resources to develop technologies appropriate for all or even most of the major production environments. The limited transferability of technologies means that while the international and regional institutions have a comparative advantage in the conduct of basic and some applied research, national institutions must do much of the applied and most of the adaptive research which is necessary to develop new technologies which fit diverse situations.²¹

49. The World Bank (1988) concurs, stressing the need to fortify national research capability.

21. Peter Matlon, "Prospects for Improving Productivity in Sorghum and Pearl Millet Systems in West Africa," paper prepared for the Conference on the Dynamics of Cereal Consumptions and Production Patterns in West Africa, July 15-17, 1987, Dakar, Senegal, p. 59 (mimeo).

Basic and applied research on major food commodities and production systems are reasonably well supported, principally through the extensive network of International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) both within and outside the coordination of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). . . . Adaptive and maintenance research--an essential ingredient if the results of basic and applied programs are to find practical use-- are less well supported. Both have to be done on a local basis, which in practice means that they are handled largely by national agricultural research systems. But despite the good intentions of African governments and donors, in most of SSA the national research systems remain too weak to complete the process of generation and adaptation of new technology. National agricultural research has thus become the weakest link in the chain of innovation. National systems are now the most in need of strengthening.²²

50. The thrust by the international donor community to strengthen national agricultural research systems has been a concerted and a strong one. In 1980 the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) was established in the Hague within the framework of the CGIAR. Its objective is to help developing countries strengthen their national agricultural research systems. Its annual budget is over US\$ 3 million. In 1985, USAID's "Plan for Supporting Agricultural Research and Faculties of Agriculture in Africa" committed over US\$ 1 billion of bilateral aid over a fifteen-year period to strengthening national research systems and national faculties of agriculture.

51. In the same year, the Special Program for African Agricultural Research (SPAAR), a donor coordinating facility, held a plenary meeting which identified areas in which donors could make a concerted initiative to strengthen NARS. Its "Guidelines for Strengthening National Agricultural Research Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa" espouses this as the area of primary donor concern and focus. The World Bank paper stresses a new Bank strategy focusing explicitly on strengthening and developing national systems so that they may be able to "complete the vital step of adapting . . . technology to the needs of their farmers."²³

Need For an Increased Regional Response

52. The current strategy with respect to agricultural research in Africa calls for some caution. The elevation of adaptive research to highest priority and the resulting strategy of strengthening national agricultural research systems is certainly defensible. But it is unbalanced. First, it implies a heavy if not complete reliance on weak national systems for any widespread, usable research results. Given the existence of strong regional institutions, this may not be necessary. Second, such a clear-cut division of tasks may in fact work against efficiency considerations. Given the existence of complementarities, such a division is not necessary. Both arguments will

22. World Bank, "Strengthening Agricultural Research in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Proposed Strategy," draft, February 1988, p. 4.

23. Ibid., p. 1.

lead to one conclusion: in the case of agricultural research, regional institutions can and should play an even greater role.

Institutional Realities

53. Strong national agricultural research capacity is essential for technological progress in the long run. Indigenous research capability once developed would be most effective at producing appropriate technologies due to sound knowledge of local conditions. Moreover national agricultural research capacity is important to ensure sustained development and reduced dependence.

54. Yet it will be years before most national agricultural systems (NARS) in Africa will be able to meet the research needs of their countries. It is generally accepted that "the strengthening of a national agricultural research system must be recognized as a long-term process needing a long-term commitment of at least 15 to 25 years of consistent effort."²⁴ This is largely due to the time needed to train local researchers. The Director of Malawi's national agricultural research service, for example, claimed that "it will take until the end of this century to achieve the desired target level of academic training" for his research staff.²⁵ In addition to training there is the need for effective on-the-job experience. Only 5 percent of Burkina Faso's 36 national researchers have more than 10 years experience. Moreover, after an effective, well-trained and experienced research team has been put in place, it takes a further 10-20 years to reap results from actual crop research. Impact from livestock research takes even longer. The total time span for NARS-level adaptive research to start producing results in most of Africa may therefore be as much as 25 to 45 years.

55. And it is likely that even after decades of large external support, the NARS will continue to be weak and vulnerable. They will continue to exist in an administrative environment where budget resources are scarce, budget systems highly imperfect, real salary levels always under threat of erosion, and plenty of good alternative jobs available for the highly intelligent Ph.D.-level researchers.

56. In the light of the present crisis in African agricultural production one must question whether Africa can afford to wait that long. Eicher's claim that "Africa's agricultural production must be doubled within the next 15-20 years" suggests that it cannot.

57. There exists, however, an alternative, regional solution to the above approach. The IARCs provide an existing institutional framework that can be employed to a greater extent to bridge the applied-adaptive gap until NARSs develop. Indeed the current operation of the IARCs in the face of an

24. World Bank, West African Agricultural Review, Washington, D.C., p. 277. Emphasis added.

25. H. Mwandemere, "Reorganization of Agricultural Research in Malawi," in Proceedings of the SADCC Agricultural Research Conference, 21 to 23 February, Gaborone, Sebele, Botswana, Department of Agricultural Research, 1984, p. 68, quoted in Eicher, 1985, *ibid.*, p. 12.

institutional vacuum on the national level has de facto often led the international centers to drift downstream. The CGIAR, for example, reports that

In general, countries with a weak NARS depend on the collaboration with the IARS on an active role being taken by the centers. As most NARSs in tropical Africa have to be considered weak, this aspect is particularly important for this continent. The dilemma is that the IARCs do not wish to be seen taking over functions that properly belong to the NARS, but, at the same time, they do aim for practical success, which may force them to do just that.²⁶

58. A restrictive delineation of tasks could thus be actually reducing the potential impact of a strong institution. The CGIAR system itself has been in existence for close to two decades. It is well financed and has a stable budget. It can rely on a staff of the best-trained scientists. It has proven institutional capacity in both research and management. An institutionalized internal and external review process of both programs and management continues to assure the quality that is crucial for productivity in agricultural research.

59. The existence of strong institutional and research capacity on the regional level coupled with weak institutions on the national level provide serious reasons to reconsider the necessity of the former's heavy reliance on the latter in order to have significant impact in SSA.

Complementarities

60. There are other good reasons to support the work of the international centers.

61. There is a complementarity between adaptive research and the applied research of the IARCS. Put another way, there is a cost to dividing the tasks of applied and adaptive research along institutional lines between international and national research centers. First, both applied and adaptive research require the same type of research skill. Evenson's work, for example, has shown that the ability to screen, borrow and adopt technology calls for the same capacity as is required to invent the new technology. The argument that IARCs have a comparative advantage to do applied research vis-a-vis NARS may therefore also be applicable for adaptive research. Second, due to the complementarity of the two tasks, productivity of researchers in both applied and adaptive research may be enhanced if the tasks are done jointly. For example, the attributes of an elite genotype can only be determined by conducting multiple yield tests. Severing these two tasks along institutional lines could hinder rather than help research productivity. This is especially so if the second task is not attended to at all when left in the hands of national institutions. The demonstrated tendency of some centers to drift

26. Hans E. Jahnke, Dieter Kirschke, and Johannes Lagemann, The Impact of Agricultural Research in Tropical Africa, CGIAR Study Paper No. 21, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 74.

downstream so as to generate impact results should thus not be discouraged. Indeed the complementarity of applied and adaptive research strengthens the argument that IARC mandates should be expanded to include more downstream research in the next decade.

62. Adaptive research undertaken by IARCs in collaboration with national counterparts can also lead to significant gains with respect to human resource and institution building on the national level. Indeed, by becoming more involved downstream, the international agricultural centers can play a lead role in promoting the long-term development of NARS, in addition to making research gains.

63. The allocation of IARC research staff to do a greater share of the region's location-specific applied and adaptive research would strengthen NAFF in several ways.

64. First, the very presence of international researchers at national sites would have a positive impact on the national system. National scientists will gain experience from working with international scientists. The on-the-job or "informal" training component of IARC activities (seen by many observers as the most important contribution of IARCs in Africa) can thus be administered in greater volume with the proliferation of international staff throughout the subregion. Direct and indirect advice from IARC staff can improve the national system's organizational and research capability. Indeed some national centers and commodity programs have even been modeled after IARCs.²⁷ Furthermore, long-term associations will be built between national and international staff. National scientists will thus also become more "tuned in" to developments on the international arena.

65. Second, IARC staff would be able to ensure that research is followed through and completed, while at the same time not overburdening the already meager capacity of NARS. This would avoid problems that we see today such as the case of the sorghum breeder in Zimbabwe who was inappropriately asked to test 100 varieties sent from ICRISAT and to report on measurements of germination, establishment, and yield, as well as disease and pest scoring! Such demands often have suboptimal results: the IARCs do not get complete and high quality results due to lack of trained manpower at national centers; national priorities are subverted for the sake of pleasing influential IARCs; and, as an end result, NARS often harbor bitter feelings toward IARCs. A bigger role for IARCs here would prevent NARSs from spreading themselves too thin and would allow them to concentrate on and master manageable tasks of national priority.

66. Third, there is a synergistic element to IARC investment in agricultural research. Evenson has shown, for example, that increased expenditure on research by IARCs tends to have a positive effect on research expenditures by NARS.²⁸ This is explained by several versions of the same

27. This was the case, for example, with the Bangladesh Rice Research Institute which is structured along the lines of IRRI.

28. Evenson, *ibid.*, p. 14.

theory. Research by IARCS open up more opportunities for gains through additional adaptive/testing investment. National centers subsequently respond to new opportunities for big benefits through marginal national investment in adaptive research. Furthermore, visiting scientists with access and influence with national leaders and researchers use this influence to procure increased domestic spending on national programs.²⁹ Similarly, local research directors are also able to use the presence of IARCs to lever government funds. Donor funding to IARCs may thus increase national efforts to strengthen NARS.

Directions for the Future

67. The above factors speak for an increased role for regional approaches to agricultural research in Africa and increased donor support for such approaches. Given the weakness of national systems and the failure and seeming nonviability of other regional agricultural research institutions in Africa, the international agricultural research centers will continue to have the primary responsibility of undertaking these regional approaches. Indeed, from an efficiency standpoint alone, Evenson points out that "further investment in all IARCs is likely to be highly productive. This is the case even though the IARCs are relatively high-cost institutions."³⁰ Funding to IARCs will have to increase if their role is to increase. Specifically, IARCs will need more resources to expand their role in each of the following four areas.

Adaptive Research

68. While the long-term strengthening of national agricultural systems must continue at a more measured pace, increased resources should be channeled through the IARCs so that they may expand their role in the area of adaptive research.

69. Clearly the involvement of IARCs in downstream activities will vary considerably by country. In larger nations with strong national research systems such as Nigeria, for example, IARC involvement in adaptive work is not that critical. But there is scope for substantial IARC involvement in adaptive research in those countries with particularly weak programs. In these cases care needs to be taken not to supplant the development of NARS by substituting for them in the long term. Rather, the emphasis should be on "showing by doing," thereby garnering short-term results while also assuring long-term development of national systems. Which countries warrant a greater IARC presence and the nature of such a presence will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

70. Similarly the formula utilized by IARCs to deliver these benefits can also vary. The various formulas currently employed (with restraint) by the various centers to interact with national systems can be expanded. For example, the handful of ICRISAT scientists in Southern Africa who are based in

29. This reportedly occurred in Malawi and is documented by Anderson, *ibid.*, in Chapter 8, p. 3.

30. Evenson, *ibid.*, p. 39.

Bulawayo undertake frequent field visits to national research sites. IITA supplements visits with resident scientist teams, its new Strategic Plan (1989-2000) providing for a minimum of six resident scientists who will be assigned (on an "exceptional basis") to national systems at an early stage of development to aid with institution building. ICRAF attaches an international scientist to each national program it works with.

71. More resources should be expended for strengthening national resources and more people should be involved. IARCs should not be "shy" in working with and training national personnel in screening and on-farm testing. CIP's on-farm trials that also teach farmers and national scientists involved in varietal trials about agronomic practices serves as one example of how an IARC can be effective downstream. Working at the national level more closely with national institutions should also aid IARCs in being more in tune with national priorities and demands.

72. Agricultural research networks, taking on a variety forms, can also be an effective and appropriate mechanism by which IARCs could move downstream and play a bigger role in both research and training.

73. There will, of course, be associated problems with this proposed outward movement of the IARCs. Care must be taken to collaborate with national researchers, not to substitute for them as the delineation of national and regional research programs and priorities on the national level can become tricky. Moreover, the coexistence of highly paid and well-supplied IARC units amidst struggling national research teams may also not breed goodwill. But positive fallouts due to the greater IARC presence can compensate and help smooth this process.

Basic and Strategic Research

The failure of technology transfer in Africa also increases the importance of research in basic science with a view to solving the problems and constraints that arise on the applied and adaptive level in Africa. Binswanger and Ruttan stress the importance of basic research:³¹ new opportunities for applied and adaptive research may be contingent on appropriate basic research; basic knowledge has to reflect local variations to some extent; there is complementarity between basic and applied research just as there exists complementarity between applied and adaptive research; and basic research can be the training ground for researchers to learn how to do good applied and adaptive work.

74. In most cases basic research will not need to be site specific, but will have to be done hand-in-hand with applied and adaptive research being undertaken on the continent. There is thus room for continued involvement in this area for universities and research institutes in the developed world on

31. Binswanger and Ruttan, *ibid.*, p. 203. Also see Eicher, *ibid.*, p. 19, who claims that "donors have underestimated the technical problems in African agriculture that will require concentrated attention through long-term basic research."

condition that an interface with researchers in Africa takes place. In cutting-edge research such as genetic engineering, the danger is that African crops and problems will be neglected: there is little impulse now for genetic experimentation on millet and sorghum, or on trypano-tolerant livestock, for example. So some way should be found to encourage research on such problems in developed country laboratories.

75. Some basic research has to be done in Africa itself. For example, the call for basic scientific research on the causes of low soil fertility, especially in West Africa, led to the recent setting up of an African branch of the International Fertilizer Development Center (headquartered in Muscle Shoals, Alabama). Sometimes a research institute is established explicitly to address basic and strategic issues within the continent. This was the case of ILRAD. ICIPE is a good example of a center involved with scientific research specific to Africa's needs--pest problems specific to Africa. The expansion of IARC mandates in the direction of basic and strategic research is often justified and is especially important in those instances where such research is necessarily site specific.

Export Crops

76. Regional approaches show promise not only in the area of traditional research on food crops, but also in the important area of export crops. Poor farmers need revenue from cash crops to supplement their variable subsistence food production. Moreover without increases in productivity the export crops of the African region risk further losses of market share to non-African exporters, and reduced prospects for growth.

77. There is an increasing awareness that not enough is being done in terms of research in export crops.³² Indeed the reaction to perceived overinvestment in tree crops during the colonial area may have gone too far. In East and Southern Africa, the percentage volume of export of major food and beverages has declined from 5.7 to 4.4 percent of total exports between the periods 1965-1973 and 1973-1984.³³

78. Regional export crop research centers of the preindependence period no longer exist. As noted above, the Empire Cotton Growing Association, the West Africa Cocoa Research Institute, and the Tea Research Institute of East Africa, for example, have either disappeared completely or become national institutions. Moreover, in the general acclaim for food crop priority, less resources are now even allocated to the national centers that study these crops, with predictable results. Research and development infrastructures for these crops have degenerated while differences between the best and the average yields of coffee, tea and coconut point to potentials of increased production.

32. World Bank, West Africa Agricultural Research Review, *ibid.*, February 1987, p. 281; and World Bank, Eastern and Southern Africa Agricultural Review, Washington, D.C., April 1987, p. 9.

33. World Bank, Eastern and Southern Africa Agricultural Review, *ibid.*, April 1987, p. 84.

79. The argument for increased regional efforts to address the problem of export crop research are no different than those outlined for food crop research. Indeed the need for such research is greater here because of the almost total absence of activity on the regional level. In the case of export crops, the international agricultural research centers have not stepped in to fill the vacuum left in the ruins of old regional organizations.

80. The possibility of creating and operating African intergovernmental organizations to conduct effective research organizations in this area, however, is questionable for the very same reasons outlined above. In addition, there is a further perceived disincentive for cooperation in export crop as compared to food crop research. African governments may view themselves as competitors for a given share of world markets. To the extent that this is true it undermines attempts at cooperation.³⁴ The long gestation period for this kind of research also places strains on attempts at African regional cooperation as it demands more patience, more management skills, and longer-term funding.

81. Two general institutional solutions could circumvent these problems and still capture the regional benefits inherent in cooperative arrangements. The first is to give the research mandate on export crops to independent third parties, namely to new or existing international research centers. The same solution presently employed for food crops could therefore be used for export crops.

82. Another alternative is to hand the task over to the private sector. Export crop research, unlike food crop research in Africa, should be able to generate substantial foreign exchange. This potential revenue could be ploughed back to finance such research. However, there is a tendency for the private sector to underinvest in agricultural research due to the existence of externalities and imperfect markets. While there is presently scope for accomplishment of regional efforts of this sort in the stages of "precompetitive" research, large-scale progress toward such a solution would probably first demand the resolution of intellectual property issues such as Country of Origin Royalty, Plant Breeders' Rights, patents and copyrights.

Training

83. As discussed above, the major long-term constraint to improved productivity of agricultural research in Africa is the lack of human capital on the national level. One expert testified that the stock of human capital in scientific fields in Africa in 1980 was approximately one-quarter of the relative scientific strength of Asia in 1970.³⁵ Swanson and Reeves estimated

34. The World Bank's Eastern and Southern Africa Agricultural Review, for example, mentions that Kenya is "loath to share their material with competitors," *ibid.*, p. 41.

35. Kenneth Shapiro, "Strengthening Agricultural Research and Educational Institutions in Africa." Hearings, the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Washington, March 26,

the need to train approximately 5,000 new agricultural scientists in the West African region alone before the year 2000.³⁶

84. The enhancement of human capital in agricultural research will require a continuous effort by several types of institutions in order to train research personnel at different levels. Training is needed for leaders of policymaking institutions, administrators of research institutions, research scientists, and middle-level technicians. Training is thus required in both the sciences and in management, and at the undergraduate, postgraduate and in-service levels. Technician training is necessary at both the vocational school and in-service levels.

85. Regional approaches to training would be useful in some of these cases.³⁷ At the undergraduate level the total capacity of African universities may be big enough to handle the expected demand for agricultural scientists and administrators on the continent as a whole. However, cost, quality, and distribution considerations may warrant the development of regional centers of excellence in this area. Such centers in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, for example, could provide cheaper and better education. Also excess capacity in larger countries may in some cases be available to handle excess demand in smaller countries without their own institutions.

86. At the M.Sc. and Ph.D. levels there is probably not enough capacity to fulfill projected needs. For example, Nigeria is the only country in West Africa that can be expected to produce enough graduates to meet its own needs for M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in the next 15 years.³⁸ Moreover, the quality of some existing programs needs to be improved. Developing quality centers of excellence to address this need is of utmost priority to Africa in the long run. Two alternative formulas are worthy of discussion. First, programs such as the African Regional Postgraduate Programme in Insect Science (ARAPIS), run by ICIPE in conjunction with 11 African universities, can substitute for the overseas alternative at about one-fifth the cost. A second formula to address the same need is the suggestion to establish high caliber international agricultural universities and training centers in Africa along the lines of the IARCs.

87. Meanwhile, however, African countries need to find immediate and appropriate solutions in the short run. Overseas education at this level is expensive but inevitable.³⁹ This is an area where donors can make direct and fruitful contributions--i.e., financing the advanced graduate training of African agricultural scientists. Costs could be reduced and the

1985.

36. See Chapter 8 of the World Bank's West Africa Agricultural Review, *ibid.*

37. For a more extensive discussion of the merits and demerits of regional approaches to education and training, see Chapter V of this report.

38. World Bank, West Africa Agricultural Review, *ibid.*, p. 286.

39. Swanson and Reeves (West Africa Agricultural Review, *ibid.*, p. 228) estimate that graduate training in Europe or North America costs an average of US\$ 25,000 a year.

appropriateness of dissertation research to national priorities enhanced, however, if arrangements can be made for students to do their actual dissertation work in Africa after completing their course work abroad.

88. The IARCs could have a substantial role in overseeing and guiding dissertation projects of student interns. For example, one Zimbabwean student who recently completed his course work in the U.S. is working on his dissertation under the supervision of the entomologist at the ICRISAT regional center at Matopos. IARCs could render the same kind of service by offering postdoctoral, hands-on training to new Ph.D.s. This kind of experience is invaluable in teaching new agricultural scientists applications of their doctoral skills. Moreover it may stem the brain drain to the developed world. Finally, it will be beneficial to the IARCs themselves if they can recruit well-trained Africans to do research in line with the center's own research objectives while perhaps lowering the center's research costs.

89. There is a final scope for regional approaches, this time in the area of in-service training. This would include in-service training of scientists, managers, and technicians. Once again given the existing capacity and staffing of the international agricultural research centers, they should increase their already important role in this area. Up to now the ICRISAT regional center in Southern Africa trained six people per year on average. Its plan to shorten its training period (from 6 months to several 1/2-to 4-month courses) and to increase the number of people trained is clearly a step in the right direction. ICIPE's FAMESA program is another.

90. In summary and in conclusion, there is significant scope and reason to lean a little more toward regional solutions in the area of agricultural research. The institutional vehicles to do so are the international agricultural centers. They can play a significant role in addressing the above four areas, all of which will benefit from regional action.

III. FOOD SECURITY

91. We consider regional approaches to food security in three areas: common markets, pest control, and early warning systems.

COMMON MARKETS

92. Few examples of regional programs in food security exist in Africa. Two regional common market proposals are under discussion, however, both claiming food security as the rationale for their implementation. The first followed the 1986 Mindelo conference and calls for a regional protected market for cereals in the Sahel. It is in fact a remodelled version of a bigger CEAO project to establish a Common Agricultural Policy (PAC: Politique Agricole

Commune). The SADCC food security program is the second regional proposal.⁴⁰ We focus here on the Sahel program.

The Sahel and Food Security

93. The Secretariats of the CILSS (Comité Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel) and the Club du Sahel organized a large meeting in Mindelo (Republic of Cape Verde) in December 1986. Experts from the countries of the Sahel, from international organizations, from donor agencies, and a number of nongovernmental organizations attended the meeting. The proposed common market for cereals is intended to meet a number of special problems.

94. In the Sahel, consumption patterns are quite different from the patterns of production, leading to increasing imports of non-locally-produced cereals, even during years of good harvest. Urbanization is playing a major role in this pattern of development. In twenty-five years the population has doubled in the Sahel, while at the same time the urban population multiplied more than five times.⁴¹

95. Senegal imports on average 350,000 tons of rice a year, rice being the staple food of urban consumers, while only 120,000 tons are produced (most of which are self-consumed by producers). From the beginning of the 1960s to the 1980s, rice imports increased by 6.6 percent and wheat imports by 8 percent. During the same period, the average consumption of rice and wheat per capita and per year increased by 11 kilos while millet, sorghum and maize consumption fell. The share of rice and wheat in total cereals consumption increased in every country. In countries like Mauritania, it increased from 18 percent to 66 percent; in Senegal from 45 percent to 52 percent. Two-thirds of rice consumption and 85 percent of wheat consumption were from non-African sources.⁴²

96. A second major problem faced by Sahelian states is that their frontiers are very permeable. Several studies are now available that show clearly that a regional market already exists between some countries in the area. The liberalization of trade in Gambia in the 1980s induced a sharp increase in border trade with Senegal. Rice, groundnuts, clothes, and radios are some of the products that currently cross the border between the two countries, responding to price incentives and distorted exchange rates. The

40. SADCC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit, Harare, SADCC Regional Food Reserve/Food Aid Study, Valakis Associates and Sir William Halcrow Partners, January 1987.

41. J. J. Gabas, and J. Giri, Bilan de la Situation Alimentaire dans le Sahel, Doc. no. 1, Conference on Cereal Policies in the Sahel Countries, Mindelo, December '86, 1986, p. 3.

42. Most figures in the paragraph are derived from: C. Delgado and T. Reardon, Policy Issues Raised by Changing Food Patterns in the Sahel, Doc. No. 14, Conference on Cereals Policies in Sahel Countries, Mindelo, December 1986, p. 21.

"illegal" traffic between other countries in West Africa is also substantial.⁴³

97. The Sahel countries are also facing distorted world market prices. This isn't, of course, a problem exclusive to the Sahel. The prices of cereals fluctuate widely on international markets, and in some periods are very low. Also, according to some expert estimates, a long-term tendency to lower real prices is to be expected. The consequence is that African cereals are not competitive in some years without protection.

98. In addition, the enormous investment that has been made to produce rice leaves the Sahel countries with substantial external debt and the inability to produce at a reasonable economic price. Senegal provides a good example of the problem faced. In 1987, producers of paddy were paid an official price of 85 CFAF per kilo in the Senegal River Basin. The losses occurring during milling leads to a rice equivalent of 140 CFA/Kg. Another 60 CFAF per kilo must be added for transportation costs to Dakar, bags, and storage facilities. Adding a marketing margin of 20 percent leads to a price of 240 CFAF per kilo⁴⁴ of rice on the market of Dakar.⁴⁵ The average import price did not exceed 100 CFAF in 1987, a gap of 140 CFAF compared to the locally produced rice. With the taxes applied by the government, the imported rice was selling at 160 CFAF to consumers--still far from the costs of Senegalese rice delivered to Dakar.

99. Because most of the states involved belong to the Franc Zone, they face a particular constraint on their economic policy. The Franc zone is ruled by monetary agreements that do not permit a member state to conduct its own exchange rate policy. There is much debate on the suitability of the monetary zone, although there is a general consensus that with the sharp decrease of the dollar over recent years, the CFAF is now overvalued. The consequence is that these countries have had to adapt to their balance of payment crisis by adopting deflationary policies to lessen the impact of overvaluation.

The Mindelo Prospect

100. The Mindelo conference resulted in a series of recommendations, some

43. Cf. the well-documented paper of J. O. Igue: Rente pétrolière et commerce de produits agricoles à la périphérie du Nigeria: les cas du Bénin et du Niger, Montpellier, INRA/ESR/LEI, March 1985.

44. All figures from Christopher Delgado: Questions a propos d'un espace régional protégé pour les céréales au Sahel, IFPRI (Institut International de Recherche sur les Politiques Alimentaires), Washington, D.C., May 1988. Document presented to the meeting of the French Society of Agronomy, Institut National Agronomique, Paris, April 19-20, 1988.

45. According to different estimates, the cost of one kilo of rice produced in the Senegal River Valley is close to 300 CFAF, if costs of paying off investment in the irrigated perimeters is included.

of which are now being discussed within the international community.⁴⁶ They generally emphasize food security and food self-sufficiency, with a particular focus on suitable policies to be adopted at the subregional level. Among the more-discussed ideas is the establishment of a regional protected market.

101. This idea is in fact not new. In 1983, the CEAO ordered a study to consider the advancement of the so-called "Politique Agricole Commune" (Common Agricultural Policy) within the CEAO zone. The report⁴⁷ suggested why a regional protected market needed to be implemented, and what form it could take. A few months later, the BDPA coproduced with the CEAO a study defining a common agricultural policy, and giving more specific recommendations in terms of regional policies to be adopted.⁴⁸

102. The basic idea, using as a model the European Community, was the establishment of a single protected market for agricultural goods. All commodities would be priced at approximately the same level, above border parities. These proposals are still on the table today, but no concrete steps to initiate them have been taken. More studies are underway in the CEAO, while working groups meet annually.⁴⁹ The official position remains the establishment of this common market "as soon as possible."

103. The Mindelo proposal is similar to that of CEAO, and the French Minister of Cooperation has supported similar regional approaches. The main document giving the elements of the protected market idea was produced by CILSS and the Club du Sahel in November 1987.⁵⁰ It proposes: the setting up of higher tariffs on all imported cereals, high enough to restore the competitiveness of locally produced cereals; the need for "protectable" geographic area within which the protected market would operate--because such an area is very hard to define, they propose to start with four countries, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, and Mali; within this area, free movement of cereals and harmonization of subsidies would be the rule.

46. CILSS-Club du Sahel, "Cereals Policies in Sahel Countries: Final Recommendations," the Mindelo Conference, December 1-6, 1986.

47. R. Bailhache, Document de Travail pour l'Etude d'une Politique Agricole de la Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, General Secretariat of the CEAO, Two Volumes, March 1984.

48. Study for the Definition of a Common Agricultural Policy, CEAO/BDPA, July 1984.

49. The first working group to elaborate the project of the Common Agricultural Policy of CEAO met in Ouagadougou in May 1985, followed by a second meeting in Abidjan (August 1986), while the third meeting was organized in Cotonou in August 1987.

50. J.J. Gabas, J. Giri, and G. Mettetal: Un espace régional céréalière protégé: première exploration d'une idée nouvelle, OCDE-Club du Sahel-CILSS, November 1987.

Assessment of the Protected Market Idea

104. Tariff protection for coarse grains even on the national level is a questionable idea. Rice (and wheat) are now consumed widely in the region, in rural as well as urban areas. The preference for these cereals seems to be strongly anchored, even among lower-income people. This means that price rises of rice will have the effect of reducing real incomes but probably without much impact on consumption patterns. This at least is the conclusion of a number of recent studies of consumption behavior in the region.

105. Moreover, agricultural supply elasticities are also believed to be relatively low, especially aggregate supply and particularly for millet/sorghum. This means that relatively large increases in the rice:millet price ratio lead to relatively small increases in millet production.⁵¹ So protection is a costly and inefficient policy to increase food self-sufficiency.

106. More suitable is the imposition of a variable import levy on rice, that would protect local producers when world prices are relatively low, and reduce protection when they are high. The idea is to link domestic prices to trend border parity prices. This is in addition to a large set of other policies designed to increase production--clearer land title arrangements, more thorough market liberalization, improvements in agricultural research, rural roads, and input supplies.

107. The reasons for rejection of national tariff protection of coarse grains are multiplied when it comes to regionalized protection. First of all, African borders are hardly "protectable." For various reasons, as noted above, African borders are permeable and impossible to protect with existing administrative capacities. Bribery is often the way for customs officers to get reasonable salaries, and links between the same ethnic tribes are still predominant across borders. Every study of markets in Africa confirms the vigor of parallel markets as soon as price distortions make them attractive. In addition, it is likely that the establishment of the protected area will in itself create distortions that will lead to new marketing channels.

108. Another major impediment to an efficient functioning of a "potential" protected market zone is the conflicting interests of the different countries. Most of the coastal countries now have a structural deficit in cereal production, and need imports to feed their cities. Such countries would have to pay much higher prices for cereals imports. What sort of compensation would they receive if they agree to participate? Given the strongly outward-looking strategy of development of a country like Côte d'Ivoire, it remains very unlikely that it will agree to participate.

109. This raises the problem of defining an optimum protection level. Some countries already have a "natural protection," because of high transportation costs. These costs can certainly be a strong impediment to

51. See K. Shapiro and E. Berg, "The Competitiveness of Sahelian Agriculture," paper presented at donor meeting in Tucson, December 1988.

sale of Sahelian cereals in coastal countries. The experience of 1985 and 1986 is illustrative: the price of millet was very low in landlocked countries because of good harvests. But the cost of transport (by road) of one kilo of Malian cereal to Abidjan exceeded the price of the product itself and made sales unattractive. Table 3.2 shows that agriculture in the Sahel is already protected, in some cases substantially. The NPCs that are greater than one indicate protection. (NPCs measure the relationship between border prices and farmgate prices. In the Table the figures for Senegal indicate, for example, that in 1987 sorghum/millet producers were protected by 86% against the import price.

110. The protected market zone is also questionable because of the unprecedented extent of economic collaboration required. An efficient protected regional market for cereals means free trade for cereals between and within participating countries, to permit transfers from producing areas to consuming areas according to price incentives. This requires harmonization of existing systems of taxes and subsidies on cereals production and consumption. "Unfair" competition between producers would result from different levels of taxation or subsidies on inputs (tools, tractors, or fertilizers). Differences in exchange rate policies would have similar effects; countries with higher degrees of overvaluation would import cereals relatively cheaply and re-export. So exchange rate coordination is essential; even in the restricted proposed region, there are three different currencies. So a degree of economic collaboration is required which would be without historic parallel in the region.⁵²

PEST CONTROL

111. Some estimates put food loss in Africa due to pests and other vertebrates (mainly birds) at as much as 20 percent of potential harvest. In Chad and Sudan, losses due to rats and insects, for example, are estimated at 10 percent.⁵³

Why a Regional Approach?

112. Pest control demands a regional approach. Pests do not respect national boundaries. As witnessed by the plague of 1988, locust swarms cover expanses greater than one country and are capable of crossing the entire continent.

52. Questions concerning the suitability and the viability of the protected market are listed in C. Delgado: Questions A Propos d'un Espace Régional Protégé pour les Céréales au Sahel, IFPRI (Institut International de Recherche sur les Politiques Alimentaires), Washington, D.C., May 1988, document présenté aux journées de la société Française d'Economie Rurale, Institut National Agronomique, Paris, April 19-20, 1988.

53. UN-ECA, "Review of Programmes and Strategies of Intergovernmental Institutions to Reduce Post-Harvest Food Waste and Losses in Africa," February 5, 1986, p. 5.

Table 3.2

Nominal Protection Coefficients

| | Year | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 |
| <u>Senegal</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Grnuts | .65 | .77 | .99 | .68 | 1.11 | .72 | .48 | .56 | 1.98 | 2.9 | 4.8 |
| Cotton | .63 | .6 | .6 | .56 | .59 | .46 | .4 | .51 | 1.28 | 1.1 | 1.96 |
| Sor/Mil | 1.32 | 1.39 | 1.22 | .94 | 1.06 | .82 | .8 | .9 | 1.37 | 1.89 | 1.86 |
| Rice | .77 | .88 | .7 | .5 | .78 | .71 | .76 | .94 | 1.53 | 1.63 | 1.4 |
| Maize | 1.35 | 1.26 | 1.18 | .87 | 1.01 | .76 | .68 | .92 | 1.53 | 1.89 | 1.82 |
| <u>Niger</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Grnuts | .75 | 1.02 | 1.21 | .78 | 1.09 | 1.09 | .81 | 1.02 | - | - | - |
| Sor/Mil | 1.19 | 1.38 | 1.24 | 1.00 | 1.43 | 1.2 | 1.17 | 1.54 | - | - | - |
| <u>Mali</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cotton | .56 | .59 | .63 | .55 | .61 | .45 | .42 | .55 | 1.2 | - | - |
| Sor/Mil | .46 | .49 | .53 | .57 | .64 | .54 | .54 | .57 | .78 | - | - |
| Rice | .42 | .53 | .51 | .45 | .69 | .68 | .69 | .80 | 1.05 | - | - |
| Maize | .43 | .45 | .51 | .54 | .65 | .54 | .49 | .53 | .74 | - | - |
| <u>Burkina Faso</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cotton | .67 | .64 | .59 | .52 | .55 | .41 | .38 | .59 | 1.24 | 1.05 | 1.73 |
| Grnuts | .49 | .68 | .81 | .54 | 1.37 | .92 | .70 | .80 | 1.74 | 1.55 | - |
| Sor/Mil | .98 | 1.12 | 1.02 | .83 | .94 | .87 | .83 | 1.08 | 1.37 | .94 | 1.4 |
| Maize | .94 | 1.08 | 1.03 | .81 | .93 | .78 | .73 | 1.08 | 1.34 | .93 | 1.35 |
| <u>Mauritania</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sor/Mil | - | 2.42 | 2.2 | 2.13 | 2.67 | 2.12 | 1.98 | 2.62 | 3.43 | 3.82 | - |
| Rice | - | 1.00 | .77 | .66 | 1.27 | 1.27 | 1.2 | 1.29 | 1.82 | 1.67 | - |
| Maize | - | 3.58 | 3.3 | 2.69 | 3.0 | 2.28 | 1.96 | 2.4 | 3.22 | 3.79 | - |
| <u>The Gambia</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Grnuts | .70 | .90 | 1.18 | .91 | 1.36 | .90 | .52 | .76 | 1.33 | 2.35 | 3.41 |
| Cotton | .71 | .71 | .70 | .68 | .70 | .55 | .42 | .59 | .78 | .65 | - |
| Rice | .99 | 1.23 | 1.00 | .78 | 1.17 | 1.08 | .85 | 1.08 | .87 | .87 | .77 |
| Maize | 1.95 | 2.0 | 2.12 | 1.75 | 1.75 | 1.13 | .83 | .97 | 1.05 | - | - |

Source: World Bank, "Monitoring Agricultural Incentives and Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," W. Jaeger, July 1988.

113. As a result, several economic reasons exist for a given country to seek regional collaboration or cooperation. First, even if the battle is to be fought nationally, it is still of interest to a country to get information on the movement of pests before they enter the area. A regional "central intelligence service" will not only be able to make that information available, but will also capitalize on economies of scale inherent in gathering, compiling and analyzing this data.

114. Second, if a wave of pests is attacking two or more countries simultaneously, there are efficiency arguments for coordinating national counter measures. Simultaneous application of eradication measures will lessen the risk of locusts "evading and reinvading" by moving between countries. Furthermore, joint implementation of control measures (for example through joint ownership and operation of spraying aircraft) can once again capitalize on economies of scale in pest control.

115. Third, even if a nation is not presently under attack it has a vested interest in controlling locust outbreaks in other countries. It is locusts born in Chad that ultimately devastate Mauritania. Fighting the battle at the early stages of the locusts' lifecycle is less costly in toto for the region, thereby implying economies of concerted regional action before the problem becomes truly regional. If Mauritania helps attack the problem in Chad, this drastically reduces the probability of Mauritania being affected. The financing of a regional approach to pest control is thus economically justifiable to national governments as a form of insurance premium payment.

116. Fourth, regional information gathering and regional pest control justify regional research and training on the basis of economies of joint production. Applied research on effective spraying techniques and the training of pilots to implement these techniques, for example, can be jointly "produced" together with the control service itself (i.e. on-the-job training and research). Decreasing costs may result in one activity with increased scale in the other. In addition to these economies of joint production, economies of scale alone may warrant regional research and training.

117. Fifth, a country not linked in a regional contract to control pests may have a "free ride" as a result of the positive externalities generated by the effective control of pests before they approach the national border. A propensity for countries to act in this manner may lead to a "market failure" of sorts. Mauritanian authorities may abstain from participation in locust control thinking that they can free ride on the efforts of other countries in the region. However, if all the other countries act likewise, Chad may end up with a locust problem that it is financially unable to cope with on its own. Consequently the entire subregion may be under attack. While some of the above reasons may have justified no more than ad hoc regional cooperative approaches to given outbreaks, this one clearly implies the need for a regional contract.

118. Finally, a regional intergovernmental organization could be a means to diplomatically circumvent impediments to effective control due to regional or bilateral political conflicts. For example, the Desert Locust Control

Organization for East Africa (DLCO-EA) was able to operate in both Somalia and Ethiopia during that war, while bilateral cooperation was impossible.

What is Being Done

119. The story of regional cooperation in pest control has been one of failure and recrimination. Of the four organizations addressing the problem in SSA, the first, the Organization for Insect Control (OICMA), had collapsed by 1987. It was the organization with the largest geographical coverage. The next, the Organisation Commune de lutte Antiacridienne (OCLALAV), collapsed this year, formalizing its demise on March 18th. It covered the most chronically affected area of the continent.

120. Meanwhile, today, North and West Africa are experiencing the worst locust plague in thirty years. The situation is out of hand and expected to spread to East Africa. While regional wars may have "protected" locust swarms to some extent, the collapse of the continent's defense system is primarily attributable to the failure of the African pest control organizations. The present crisis should have been addressed and averted in the Sahel by OCLALAV. But by then OCLALAV was in its death throes. Member states were unable or unwilling to pay its annual budget of approximately 1 million dollars. Meanwhile, today donors are now moving to set up an emergency base to fight this plague at an estimated cost of 4 million dollars. The costs incurred in terms of lost agricultural output already exceed that amount by far.

121. Only two pest control organizations remain in SSA in mid-1988.⁵⁴ There are lessons to be learned from their continued existence, as there are from those that have collapsed.⁵⁵

Assessment

122. There is room for expansion of the role of African pest control organizations based on the nature of the problem. Yet, it is the very nature of the problem that caused the demise of OCLALAV and OICMA: locust attacks occur years apart. The present cycle averages 5 to 7 years. Member states have understandably been unwilling to support the heavy institutional costs in the interim years when there is no crisis and the organization is doing

54. The UNDP 4th Cycle Programme has allocated some funds to resuscitate OCLALAV and OICMA. At least in the case of OCLALAV, the organization will become simply a coordinating body for national efforts, a clearinghouse on information regarding the pest situation and control efforts undertaken by national authorities throughout the region.

55. DLCO-EA in many ways stands as the prime example of an effective pest control organization in SSA. Indeed a recent internal World Bank document highlighted it as being one of the most successful regional organizations in Africa. More recently, however, DLCO has run into some of the same problems that have plagued other pest-control organizations: a shortage of funds resulting in deteriorated equipment and reduction of field staff.

nothing. The success of an organization therefore depends on its ability to adapt to the resulting problems.

123. How can such skilled staffs as are needed during a plague year be justified in the interim? The collapse of OCLALAV resulted primarily from its inability to find an answer to that question. One solution, and one opted for by DLCO-EA, is to expand the mandate of the organization to include related functional areas in which the organization already has significant in-house competence. DLCO now apportions a specific part of its budget to the functions of controlling army worm and quela quela attacks. It has also allocated more of its staff to research and training functions during the nonpeak periods.

124. How can peak-period capital equipment and pesticide stocks be justified during the offpeak? Once again OCLALAV had no answer for member states or donors. And there appears to be no clear answer to this question. Clearly an appropriate level of in-house emergency stock of cars, sprayers, pesticides, etc. needs to be maintained.⁵⁶ Donors may have to be involved in the revolving and maintaining of these stocks. However, cost-cutting measures can also be taken. Methods of renting in during peak periods and renting out during offpeak periods should be examined. Planes may be shared with national and other regional organizations. For example, DLCO has in the past contracted their aircraft to the IRLCO.

125. How can one organization cover such a vast area? OICMA's failure was largely attributable to the fact that it had limited resources spread over nineteen countries. Planes and personnel had to be stationed in several substations. Resources are thus spread thin and diseconomies of scale arise with all the management and communication problems inherent in such a structure. Control organizations need to be mandated to act within an optimal and manageable control region delineated according to these considerations. Moreover the delineation of an organization's mandate should be strictly along geographic lines rather than along the lines of biological species. This is essential for two reasons. First, overlap of geographical responsibilities creates problems. Second, as discussed above, it is essential for organizations to expand their mandates in terms of types of pests covered if they are to continue to exist. In its specific region the "International Red Locust Control Organization" should be covering red locust, desert locust, crickets, quela quela birds and army worm, for example. In the words of one official, "spraying is spraying." Where it is not, in-house capacity to handle more species can be increased through training or hiring relatively easily.

126. What should be done about pests from other subregions? Clearly just as much as pest control is more than a national phenomenon, it is more

56. For Africans to expect timely donor provision of such supplies in the short months preceding a crisis has proven unrealistic due to lags in recognition and reaction time. See for example Michel Launois, "Initial Report on the 1986 Locust Grasshopper Situation in West Africa," CILSS/Club du Sahel, October 1986.

than a subregional or regional phenomenon as well. Locusts enter SSA "without visas" from the Mahgreb, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. Locusts cross from DLCO's East Africa to OCLALAV's West Africa. There is thus a greater need for cooperation among regional organizations. Unwillingness to cooperate with SARCCUS, based in Pretoria, was allegedly the cause of reinvasion of pests in certain southern African countries. While F.A.O. is theoretically responsible for global coordination, more clearly needs to be done in this regard.

127. The story of regional pest control organizations clearly presents a problem. Here is an area with a legitimate rationale for regional approaches. But regional institutions have not worked primarily for reasons unrelated to the regional dimension per se. The inclination now is to entrust implementation of pest control activities to the national level while maintaining at a regional level only the information clearinghouse and coordination functions. The sense of this is not altogether clear. Many of the benefits of regional approaches are in fact at the operational stage. Moreover, how will the serious problems faced at the regional level--the depreciation of capital equipment in nonplague years, for example--be avoided on the national level? These are questions that will warrant closer examination.

EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

128. Regional approaches also have an important role to play in the institution and operation of early warning systems. Recent technological developments (such as the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) carried by satellites), coupled with the recommendations of the Bonn Summit of 1985 that donors should develop a more effective system to monitor famine in the Sahel, have resulted in the proliferation of such early warning systems (EWS) in Africa, and particularly in West Africa.

Rationales

129. There continues to be some confusion as to the meaning of early warning systems. In its broadest definition, an EWS has been interpreted as consisting of four components: warning, decision, response and rehabilitation.⁵⁷ Here we adopt a more restrictive and traditional definition, concerning ourselves with only the first component, the warning function.

130. The necessary condition for regional cooperation, the commonality of interests among regional participants, is clear in the case of EWS. The famine-generating conditions that these systems are developed for occur on a regional scale. Drought and locust plagues, for example, cross national borders.

57. Anderson International Associates, "A Report on the Problems and Approaches to Improved Management of Drought-Famine," 1987.

131. Meanwhile, the "warning" function of an EWS requires three functions: information gathering, analysis and dissemination. It is desirable that an EWS collect and analyze information in the most accurate and timely manner possible, and in an efficient and cost-effective manner as well. There are advantages to doing some of these functions regionally.

132. The consolidation of data from throughout the region allows for a more comprehensive analysis and assessment of present and forecasted conditions in the region. The dynamics of drought conditions in Niger could be relevant to Mali. Moreover, the accuracy and reliability of results and forecasts generated by EWS depends integrally on the "convergence of evidence."⁵⁸ This provides yet another benefit to comprehensive, multidimensional data from a variety of sources and on a variety of variables. In this respect a regional EWS could also play a role in ensuring the comparability of data.

133. There is an implicit assumption here that a regional intelligence unit can lead to the more effective exchange and use of information. This may be so because such an institution would either bypass or "rationalize" the flow of information between decentralized government agencies. It may also result from the economies of scale in data analysis that accrue with research undertakings of this nature. Finally, there may be economies of scale in the "marketing" of information and results. A regional system may thus be able to print and distribute its bulletins at a lower cost and to a larger clientele, for example, when compared to combined national efforts.

134. In addition to the general task of data compilation and analysis, an important reason for the reliance on regional approaches for EWS is the nature of one specific component of the data gathering process--the satellite-generated data. The convergence-of-evidence principle calls for a variety of data. While much of this is ground data--rainfall and temperature, crop projections, actual crop yields, market conditions, etc., satellites generate some important and frequently needed data used in EWS. Bearings on and corroboration of data on rainfall estimations, vegetation indices and cropped area, for example, can be effectively generated from high resolution image data and the AVHRR instrument, for example.

135. The large fixed costs of acquiring satellite image data is an important justification for supranational efforts in this area. Indeed African countries and subregions will continue to have to rely on the international community for some time in this expensive and high-technology field. And satellite image data can cover an entire subregion for little to no cost over gathering such data for one country. To the extent that satellite data is critical to early warning systems, these two reasons provide a strong rationale for a regional approach in the development and operation of EWS.

58. Charles F. Hutchinson, "Early Warning Systems for Determining Drought Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa," a background paper prepared for the World Bank, November 15, 1987, p. 3.

What's Being Done

136. There has been a proliferation of EWS in SSA, and particularly in the Sahel. Most of these have been donor-initiated. They range from satellite-based to ground-based systems, from long-term institutions to shorter projects. A cursory viewing of the main EWSs implemented on a regional level in Africa highlight two facts: the duplication of regional systems attempting to meet similar objectives throughout the continent; and the significant role played by the international donor community in these regional efforts.

- o The AGRHYMET (Agriculture, Hydrology, Meteorology) Regional Center is supported by the CILSS, UNDP and some donor countries including the U.S. Basing its analysis on meteorological data that is supplemented with METEOSAT, market data, and NDVI data from AVHRR, the Center monitors the agricultural season and disseminates the bulletins on early warning information.
- o The DIAPER, or Diagnostic Permanent system, focuses on the cereals and livestock sectors. Begun in 1984 and supported by the EDF (European Development Fund), it uses meteorological and market data.
- o FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) is sponsored by USAID. One of the most highly regarded systems, FEWS monitors a variety of data types including rainfall, yield and production estimates, prices and other physical and socioeconomic variables. The system covers eight African countries: Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique.
- o The Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) is the FAO-sponsored system that has been primarily using field data provided by national ministries. Recently METEOSAT and AVHRR data have been added, improving the system's credibility.
- o The Africa Real-Time Environmental Monitoring Using Imaging Satellites (ARTEMIS) was generated by FAO as an operation-satellite-based EWS. Funded by the Dutch, it is intended to provide timely information to FAO and other EWSs.
- o The Cellule Régionale de Sécurité Alimentaire (pre-CRESAL) examines ground data such as grain stocks, road standards and transportation availability. It is funded by the Italians and serves the CILSS countries.
- o The FERU (Food Emergency Research Unit) project is supported by the Save the Children Fund and uses market-based indicators. The OXFAM project looks at market conditions, local perceptions and migration factors. Both these systems operate in Mali and some parts of Burkina Faso and work closely with the PVO community.
- o The ESPACE project is supported by France to operate in Mali and Senegal. It uses meteorological data supplemented by METEOSAT.

- o The Systèmes d'Alerte Précoce (SAP) is funded by the EDF and combines rainfall data with health and nutrition data in Chad and Mali.
- o In Southern Africa, SADCC initiated the Early Warning System for Food Security in 1986 with the aid of DANIDA and FAO, establishing a Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) in Zimbabwe. In addition to this being a regional rather than donor initiative, the SADC system appears to differ from others in the large emphasis it places on establishing and strengthening National Early Warning Units (NEWUs) in each member state.

Assessment:

137. Two points appear clear with regard to early warning systems in Africa. First, there needs to be an increased emphasis on the ground-based, or national, component of such systems. Secondly, duplication at the international/regional level needs to be reduced.

Ground-based Efforts

138. Their ought to be a greater emphasis on the national components of early warning systems. It is ground data that is in fact trusted most and relied upon most by policymakers on the national level. Hutchinson states that "users at the national level appear to be most skeptical of international EWSs. Generally, there seems to be a feeling that reports are simply a rehash of information provided from the field and that they offer nothing that is not already known locally. Among national users, there may be more acceptance of EWSs that are nationally rather than internationally oriented."⁵⁹

139. Circumstantial evidence within areas of a country can in fact tell a lot. Evidence of sharp price increases of food crops and the outmigration of local residents, for example, are obvious warnings of need for action. A systematic collection of data on these variables will increase the accuracy of forecasts and, more importantly, allow for earlier recognition of the developing problem.

140. Indeed timeliness is another important argument for "nationalizing" (or at least "regionalizing") the international processing and interpreting of data. Users now complain that reports reach them too late to meet their needs. This is traced primarily to the centralization of these tasks at an international level. Thus this centralization aspect of EWS, a potential benefit to supranational efforts in terms of reliability appears also to have negative consequences.

141. Finally, ground-based data is critical, as discussed, for the

59. Hutchinson, *ibid.*, p. 11.

"convergence of evidence" with satellite-based data. Yet ground-based data continues to be sparse, and at times inaccurate.

142. Increased efforts are needed, therefore, in this nonregional dimension of early warning systems. National systems need to be strengthened, as planned in the SADC area, for example. There is a role for the international donor community in providing increased technical assistance and perhaps funding at the national level, with national governments having a lot to gain with respect to early warning at the local level by pursuing this national path.

International Early Warning Systems

143. The most visible characteristic of regional EWSs (implemented predominantly by international efforts as discussed) is the number of them.

144. There is clearly an important need for satellite data to corroborate and supplement ground data. There is also the need for different early warning systems to fulfill the different needs of users (to use the information to take action in the areas of environmental protection, emergency food aid or market intervention, for example). These different needs also dictate the kind of data required and the time frame by which the data is needed. But there is still room for significant "rationalization" and for reducing the duplication by different donors setting up their own EWS to achieve the same basic ends. Hutchinson states that "there are underexploited opportunities for collaboration."⁶⁰ This would include, for example, the attempt to move to a more standardized data base. The reduction of duplication in regional efforts is one of the most important items on the agenda for continued regional action in providing EWS. And since donor aid is so important to the success of EWS, it behooves the donors to consider some form of regional cooperation in this area.

60. Ibid, p. 15.

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CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH

1. Human resource development, technology transfer, and the building of indigenous capacity to manage and confront African needs and problems, necessitate a combined effort of education, training, and research.

2. Human resource development remains a leading priority for virtually all African countries. African governments allocate a significant share of public expenditure to education, averaging 17 percent for anglophone countries and over 20 percent for francophone countries.¹ Despite relatively high spending, the literacy rate remains low (although impressive progress has been made since 1960), and the average enrollment ratios for primary, secondary, and tertiary education stand at 60 percent, 15 percent, and 1.9 percent respectively, also low compared to other developing regions.² Scarcity of trained people is usually regarded as one of the chief obstacles to faster growth.

3. Research is necessary to facilitate technology transfer, to develop new technologies suitable for the African milieu, to find solutions to African health and environmental problems, and to fill gaps in knowledge all across the intellectual spectrum--demography, history, economics, the sciences. Research is increasingly pointed to as an essential output of African universities, to make them more cost-effective,³ and to stimulate intellectual rigor. However, research capacity in Africa is not great: financial support has been insufficient, and for the first generations of Africans in the postcolonial world, more rewarding and remunerative careers have been available in law, administration or politics. So even where physical facilities are satisfactory, they are often underutilized for want of staff and salaries, and other recurrent expenses.

I. RATIONALES FOR REGIONAL APPROACHES

SAVE MONEY

4. Regional approaches can save money, principally by exploiting economies of scale. For education and training, scale economies are most

1. Alain Mingat and George Psacharopoulos, Education Costs and Financing in Africa: Some Facts and Possible Lines of Action, World Bank, December 1985, p.5.

2. Calculated from *ibid.*, p.6.

3. See World Bank, Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization, and Expansion, Washington, D.C., 1988. p. 73.

readily exploited at the postsecondary level. Money can also be saved by sending students to other African countries rather than abroad for specialized training, and, in the longer-term perspective, by reducing demands for incremental capital investments needed to expand crowded national facilities.

5. Economies of scale are relevant for any level of schooling, but the issue is most significant for higher education. Higher education's unit costs are much higher than those for primary and secondary education (in Africa, 36 times that of primary and 8.5 times that of secondary),⁴ owing mainly to higher teacher salaries and capital costs. Unit costs for postsecondary technical training are highest of all.

6. Scale issues also evoke issues of quality of educational output. Graduates from larger faculties may be cheaper to produce, but they may also be less well educated. Nonetheless, economies of scale can be realized in the more obvious cases of avoiding duplication of faculties or programs.

7. The need to achieve economies of scale in education and training raises issues of regional cooperation in so far as the minimum efficient size of a given postsecondary program significantly exceeds likely enrollment levels in a particular country. Perceived manpower needs in some occupational specialties are often for small numbers of highly trained technicians--mining engineers, for example, or physicists, or professors of romance languages.

8. Sending students to other African countries for training in key areas can reduce costs for both the sending and host countries. The sending country can meet its manpower needs without establishing a program in every discipline or program, and without the heavier cost of financing studies overseas. The host country, meanwhile, can reduce unit costs for its own graduates because of greater intensity of utilization of its physical facilities and staff.

9. Scale economies are especially pertinent for technical and higher education where returns to investment are already low relative to returns for primary and secondary education. However, their potential benefits should not be exaggerated, as many other measures can be introduced to cut costs of higher education.

10. Research activities benefit from economies of scale for many of the same reasons; library and laboratory facilities are more cost effective at sizes larger than those adequate to meet national needs, provided they are used to capacity, as we saw in an earlier discussion of agricultural research. Particularly in research of a technical nature, such as in tropical diseases and alternative energy technologies, a certain minimum scale is essential; again this is often too large for many national facilities. Regional research is therefore appropriate where its costs are easily shared and its benefits mutually applicable. This is likely to be frequently the case, for instance, with research on diseases which are common to several countries, or on cocoa

4. Calculated from *ibid.*, p. 8.

technology in West Africa, or on the teaching of secondary school physics, or on the impact of interest rate policy on savings behavior.

IMPROVE QUALITY

11. Regional cooperation may improve education and research quality for given levels of spending in three main ways. First, high level training and/or research institutions benefit from "critical mass" effects: important intangible benefits accrue to researchers and educators who have the opportunity to interact with colleagues, to critique and be critiqued by them. Staffs of small institutions can easily become intellectually isolated and out of date. Critical mass can be ensured either by creating larger institutions--perhaps regional ones--or by promoting communication among institutions and their staffs--though the latter is more uncertain.

12. Second, regional institutions can recruit staff more widely, because of better access to information (for the institutions themselves and potential applicants), ability to pay higher salaries, and typically greater direct access to foreign aid.

13. Third, regional cooperation provides national institutions with standards to which they can aspire and by which they can measure themselves. This benefit is usually provided by regional associations, councils, and committees, which can coordinate curriculum development, establish common examination standards, aid national institutions in developing laboratory and library facilities, sponsor workshops and seminars, publish trade and professional journals, and cultivate a sense of community among peers. They can also facilitate the exchange of information about available programs, faculty vacancies, and research projects.

TRAINING IN REGIONAL TECHNOLOGIES

14. It is sometimes the case that regional technologies are different from national ones, for example in telecommunications, and that training and research for the one is only partially transferable to the other. Regional institutions are better suited to train for regional technologies, as the manpower needed would be small in number, but sophisticated in skills. No one country would benefit from taking responsibility for such a program, because it could not employ many of its graduates. The best example is the PANAFTEL microwave network, which involves a more advanced, long distance technology being superimposed on older, national systems. Training in operation and maintenance of the microwave and satellite relay systems is more economically done at a regional center; the vehicle could be a national center of excellence or a separate organization.

PROMOTE PAN-AFRICANISM

15. A fourth potential benefit from regional approaches to education, training, and research is their positive long-term effects on economic and

political cooperation in the region. The wish to build institutions that are more indigenous and better suited to local conditions is common to all Sub-Saharan African countries, and is especially keen in the field of education. And, to the extent that the Africanization of education and research implies greater African self-reliance, the spread of regional training and research institutions involves the collective self-advancement of the continent. Further, it lessens both the dependence on expatriate teachers and researchers, and the need to send students abroad. Also, shared experience and the creation of "old boy" networks across countries encourages long-term prospects for regionalism.

II. REGIONAL EDUCATION ACTIVITIES: WHAT'S BEING DONE?

16. Training and research are pursued and supported by several kinds of regional organizations, in various ways. There are associations and councils, regional universities, "centers of excellence," regional technical training institutions, and research institutions. Research institutions are often combined with centers of excellence and technical training institutions.

ASSOCIATIONS, COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES

17. Associations and councils perform a variety of functions. Only such organizations, and a handful of research institutions, are active at the primary and secondary school levels. Of the 60 regional and sub-regional associations that are concerned with education and research, there are 8 that address issues pertinent to primary and secondary education, including the African Curriculum Organization, the West African and East African Examinations Councils, and the UNESCO Regional Book Development Centre for Africa South of the Sahara.

18. In addition, other organizations in the area of education include the following: three that address adult education and literacy, such as the Society for the Promotion of Adult Literacy in Africa; ten associations of universities, their students and teachers, such as the Association of African Universities, the Association des Universités Partiellement ou Entièrement de Langue Française (AUPELF), the All Africa Teachers' Organisation, and All Africa Student's Union; and ten councils of documentation and bibliographic control, such as the Centre de Coordination des Recherches et de la Documentation en Sciences Sociales en Afrique Sub-Saharienne, and the East and Central African Regional Branch of the International Council on Archives.

19. Despite such variety, most associations and councils operate in a similar manner: they sponsor seminars and conferences, and publish journals and directories. Significant exceptions include the two examinations councils and the African Curriculum Organization, which provide more specific services.

REGIONAL UNIVERSITIES

20. Regional universities are the most ambitious of these regional schemes, and Africa has had two of them. The University of East Africa was conceived well before the independence of its three members--Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda--and finally inaugurated in 1964. The University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, or UBLS, was inaugurated before the independence of all its members, also in 1964.

21. Neither of these were actually attempts to draw students together from all over the subregion to a single campus, but rather were associations of already existing or soon to be built colleges in each of the member countries. Each college was to have certain specialties which the associated colleges were not to duplicate. The colleges were semiautonomous from their university administrations, and this autonomy became more marked over time as the colleges were subjected to more direction and control from their respective governments.

22. A variety of factors, but chiefly each country's impatience to develop its human resources, contributed to the disintegration of the regional universities. The University of East Africa was dissolved in the late 1960s, when Kenya unilaterally declared its intention to transform its college in Nairobi into an independent university. The UBLS disintegrated in the mid-1970s.

CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

23. Centers of excellence are not regional organizations per se, but rather are national university faculties or institutions that attract a significant number of students from other African countries--formal or informal magnet schools, as it were. Faculties become centers of excellence either because of their outstanding quality, or the uniqueness of their curricula. They are not conceived, administered, or financed regionally, but they rely on interuniversity and/or intergovernmental cooperation so that: foreign students can learn of and secure places in their programs; the sending country compensates the host institution for these students' studies; and qualifications and degrees are mutually recognized.

24. In francophone Africa alone, there are at least 62 national technical institutions that accept foreign students.⁵ Most of these are administered by national universities, though some are associated with government ministries. The average intake of foreign students is 10 percent, though subaverages vary widely between subject (a low of 4.5 percent for agriculture, and a high of 13 percent for industry and science), and host country (a low of 1.5 percent for Zaire, and a high of 27 percent for Senegal).⁶ Most centers of excellence are for technical training, whether in

5. USAID, Repertoire des Institutions de Formation en Afrique Francophone, Washington, D.C., 1985.

6. Calculated from USAID, *Ibid.*

the sciences, business administration, or rural development. Senegal's Ecole Polytechnique, an engineering school run by the military, took some 20 percent of its students from other African countries in 1983, and the share of non-Senegalese students has been rising steadily since the mid-1980s. Senegal's Ecole Nationale Supérieure Universitaire de Technologie accepts 35 percent of its students from other African Countries.

REGIONAL TECHNICAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS

25. A very large share of Africa's regional organizations are technical training institutions (TTIs). Among the 86 TTIs on which we have information, there is as much diversity, if not more, than that found among national technical institutions. The TTIs can be broken down by subject as follows: agriculture--9; health--9; management/business--22; industry--4; rural development--21; social sciences/arts--18; multi-sectoral/general--3.⁷ The majority of the TTIs undertake research as a secondary or tertiary activity.

26. The regional training (and research) institutions can also be classified by origin. Thus there are those that predate independence, such as the OCAM subsidiaries; those created by the OAU and ECA just after independence; and those established more recently by the regional integration organizations, such as ECOWAS's and MRU's telecommunications schools, and CEAO's specialized schools of mines, textiles, fishing, and business administration. There are, additionally, those that are independent, and established and sustained by donor countries.

REGIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

27. Almost all regional research is undertaken by regional centers of excellence and regional training institutions, though there remains a small group of institutions devoted only to research. There are institutions that research legislative issues (e.g., the Bureau Africain et Mauricien de Recherches et d'Etudes Législatives); education development (e.g., the Bureau Africain des Sciences de l'Education), African economic development (e.g., African Centre for Monetary Studies and the Institut Africain de Développement Economique et de Planification); African culture (e.g., Institut d'Histoire, d'Art, et d'Archéologie Africaines); science (e.g., Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre Mer and Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale); population studies (e.g., Institut de Formation et de Recherches Demographiques); and health (e.g., Organisation de Coordination et de Coopération pour la Lutte Contre les Grandes Endémies and Organisation de Coordination pour la Lutte Contre les Endémies en Afrique Centrale).

7. Some of these figures include organizations for which training is not the sole or primary activity. The figure for health is especially 'inflated' in this regard.

III. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

28. We turn to an assessment of the five types of institutions outlined above.

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND COUNCILS

29. The large number of regional associations comprises a mix of a few outstandingly successful organizations, such as the West African Examinations Council, the African Curriculum Organization, and the African Council of Communication Education, and many marginally active ones.

30. Regional associations are nevertheless very promising for the development of education, training, and research, because they are cheap to set up and run, and because they interact with institutions at all levels and in many different capacities (see the Rationales section above). Regional associations are cheap in that they enable national institutions to enjoy some of the advantages of formal regional organizations, such as critical mass and Pan-African solidarity, without the expense of establishing entities with formal, regional trappings. And, by disseminating information among universities and secondary-school leavers of different countries, regional associations facilitate utilization of centers of excellence, and thus also encourage scale economies.

31. While the rapid expansion of Africa's education sector is often cited as a cause of deteriorating educational quality, regional associations such as the West African Examinations Council safeguard quality by establishing independent standards and assessment. Also, regional research and information sharing can help school and university administrations improve internal efficiency by introducing innovative educational policies and teaching technologies. For instance, the Conference of Rectors, Vice Chancellors and Presidents, sponsored by the Association of African Universities, is just such a forum for dialogue. The African Council on Communication Education (ACCE) disseminates information on new technologies to national journalism schools.

32. The impact, and potential impact, of associations on research is less clear. The institution-building function, whereby communication links are established and information exchange increased, is probably much the same as that for educators, but there does not appear to be as much in the way of services that association can provide to researchers or research institutions. Some organizations, such as the Association for the Advancement of Agricultural Sciences in Africa, publish directories of professional researchers, institutions, and research projects.

33. As in other sectors, associations seem to succeed most readily when they provide a concrete service in a particular field, as compared with those that have a vague mandate to develop a field or profession. The West African

Science Association, the Regional Office for Science and Technology in Africa, the Association of African Physicists and Mathematicians, and the Scientific and Technical Research Committees of OAU (STRC/OAU), for instance, were cast in this latter mold. Many of the STRCs, for example, have not survived at least in part because of the vagueness and catch-all quality of their mandates. In addition to vague mandates, these associations tend to be designed such that an excessive share of their budgets is consumed by travel expenses. Many associations, of course, fall between these two extremes: they have a valuable role to play in establishing communication links between colleagues and peer institutions, but the activities they sponsor are often costly relative to their benefits. Publishing professional journals is probably a more appropriate service or vehicle for establishing links than sponsoring symposiums.

REGIONAL UNIVERSITIES

34. Scale economies are and have been exploitable in general higher education in Africa,⁹ but no longer apply as a strong rationale for having regional universities. The minimum size for efficiency in higher education institutions is actually quite small,⁹ and those countries that have not yet achieved it internally may do so in the near future. Thus, even though the climate for regional universities is possibly better now than one or two decades ago, in that manpower needs are not felt as keenly and countries are anxious to cut public spending, the scope for regional universities has diminished. This accords with the notion that the UELS was abandoned not on account of competition or poor cooperation, but because, after ten years of the steady expansion of its constituent colleges, it was no longer necessary.¹⁰

35. Regional cooperation in university education is more viable on a piecemeal basis, through regional faculties or programs. Though not an

8. George Psacharopoulos, "The Economics of Higher Education in Developing Countries," Comparative Education Review, June 1982; George Psacharopoulos, and Maureen Woodhall, Education for Development: An Analysis of Investment Choices, Washington, D.C. 1985, chapter 7.

9. Kiong Hock Lee, "Further Evidence on Economies of Scale in Higher Education," World Bank, February 1984. Lee's cross-country study shows that the majority of the decrease in average cost in higher education occurs at an enrollment of less than 500 students, although further decreases continue up to an enrollment of 10,000. According to Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 76, there are 12 Africa universities with enrollments of less than 1,000 as of the end of the 1970s.

10. I. C. M. Maxwell, Universities in Partnership: The Inter-University Council and the Growth of Higher Education in Developing Countries 1946-70, Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1980.

arrangement that is presently exploited,¹¹ two or more universities could cooperate to establish a joint department, to be administered and staffed regionally, and with a mix of students. However, the advantages of this sort of arrangement over a center of excellence are slight, and the problems potentially significant. The main advantage would be that a regional faculty would insure a minimum number of places for students from each member country, while a national center of excellence has no a priori obligation to accept foreign students. On the other hand, there is no a priori reason prohibiting intergovernmental arrangements to ensure access for foreign students to centers of excellence.

36. In any case, it should be kept in mind that achieving scale economies, especially regional ones, may not be the most potent way of reducing educational expenses. It may be easier for institutions to lower faculty and staff salaries, expand teaching hours, reduce student wastage, and give less, better-targeted scholarship support to students.¹² Such measures lower unit costs without the complications--and possible diseconomies--of regional cooperation.

CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

37. Centers of excellence have most of the advantages of regional universities and regional training institutions, with fewer of the difficulties typical of regional efforts. By attracting foreign students they can lower unit costs, and thus the cost of education for their national and foreign students alike.

38. If scholastic support to students enrolled in domestic institutions decreases, as it is likely to in coming years, use of regional centers of excellence will probably increase. Underenrolled domestic programs will eventually be relinquished, and countries will be less reluctant to send their students to other African countries for courses of study not available domestically. Even now, there does not seem to be as much duplication of departments among national universities as some of the literature implies.¹³ A casual review of university documents does not show many units beyond the seven or so main departments that the majority of universities have.¹⁴ These

11. See Laurence Wolff, Controlling the Costs of Education in Eastern Africa: A Review of Data, Issues, and Policies, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984, pp. 31-33.

12. World Bank, *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

13. The costly propensity of African universities to establish the full gamut of departments is spoken of in, *inter alia*, World Bank, *ibid.*, pp. 76ff.

14. The principal departments or divisions are the sciences, arts and humanities, social sciences, law, education, agriculture, and engineering. The following departments, on the other hand, occur much less frequently and are 'randomly' distributed among universities: business and management, architecture, journalism, veterinary medicine, social work, adult education, pharmacology, library science, etc.

infrequent, specialty departments often already attract students from other African countries (see section II above), though much can and should be done to enhance their ability to do so.

REGIONAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

39. The rationale for having regional training and research institutions would appear to be strong in some cases, particularly in the hard sciences and the health sciences. However, with regard to scale economies and critical mass, it is hard to say anything precise that has broad empirical content. There have been no studies on these technical services, to our knowledge, that address scale economies and quality issues in a systematic way.

40. The relative success and vitality of the regional training and research institutions can be explained in part by greater administrative and fiscal flexibility. Administrations have more autonomy in personnel policy, such that regional training and research institutions are able to draw from a larger pool of applicants, and are more open to foreign technical assistance. Staff receive higher real remunerations than national counterparts, enjoy tax exemptions, and have access to duty-free imports. If the support of member states begins to wane, regional institutions are adept at seeking aid money, or at initiating revenue-generating activities such as consultancies.

41. There are nevertheless some problems with the regional training and research institutions. First, the value of schoolroom technical training itself is sometimes questioned, on two grounds. As it has long been argued, advocates of technical/vocational training typically misread the needs of the labor market.¹⁵ Another source of criticism is perhaps more pertinent nowadays--that classrooms are bad places to teach technical skills; on-the-job training is cheaper and more effective.

42. Second, politicization of staffing, location, and student distribution, though more limited than in the case of national institutions or regional universities, can still be considerable. This may particularly be true in the soft sciences, where ideological considerations may hold more sway.

43. Third, even though they are less expensive (in terms of unit costs) than several national counterparts would be, regional institutions can still be expensive to run. One reason is that their physical plants can be excessive relative to enrollment or output, as is the case with the CEAO-sponsored institutions in mining and engineering in Niger, solar energy research in Bamako, and fisheries in Nouadhibou, for example. Technical training and research have high unit costs even where scale is less grandiose, but are less costly when combined with one another, as is often the case.

15. Cf. Philip Foster, "The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning," in Anderson and Windham, eds., Education and Economic Development, Chicago, Aldine, 1965; Psacharopoulos, 1982, *Ibid.*, p. 159.

44. Finally, despite being able to offer high salaries, regional institutions have difficulty attracting qualified staff. In the early stages of development, where highly qualified staff are scarce, scholars and scientists have enough prestige to be able to choose political posts with lots of kudos over academic posts with lots of headaches.

Chapter V

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONI. INTRODUCTION

1. Both the international and the African community recognize transportation and communication as sectors critical to African development. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) designated 1978-1988 as the "Transport and Communication Decade in Africa." A more recent UN-ECA policy paper (1988) stresses the development of transport and communication links as a priority for economic development in Africa, declaring that "the state of the transport and telecommunications networks constitutes a stranglehold on the development of trade."¹

2. The geographic, demographic and infrastructural landscape in Africa highlights the importance of developing transportation and communication in Africa while at the same time conveying the magnitude of the task at hand. The continent is vast. Its land area, excluding South Africa, is 28 million km², and most of this land is inhospitable and sparsely populated. Some 29 percent of the area is desert. Small pockets of rural population are separated by large distances, and population density is under 2 persons/km² across close to half the continent. At the same time, the urban centers, with populations of up to 500 persons/km², dot the continent. But they are characteristically situated far apart.

3. While all this points to the importance of transport and communication in Africa, the continent in fact inherited a very poor infrastructure. Most roads and railway systems date from the colonial period and were designed primarily to extract export commodities through main ports. Links between African countries are thus not well developed. Among the landlocked countries of the interior, infrastructure is particularly poor.

4. The development of Africa's transport and communication sectors would foster the development of the continent in more than one way. New infrastructure and the rehabilitation of old links would eliminate many of the major obstacles to trade. Markets would be better integrated: better transport links would reduce costs of providing critical inputs such as seeds and fuel, and of the distribution of final agricultural and industrial

1. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. "Assistance of ECA and UNDP to the Economic Integration Entities and to the River and Lake Basin Development Organizations in the Preparation of their Project."

products. Improved infrastructure can make African products more competitive in both African and world markets while at the same time reducing the cost of import.

5. Better communication links can also significantly improve the efficiency of markets. Improved communications infrastructure lowers transaction costs, primarily by acting as a substitute for more expensive transportation costs. A recent study in Uganda, for example, estimated that the cost of providing telephone service to 200 rural cooperatives was covered within one year by saved transport costs. In addition, better communication can improve market efficiency by making information more readily available to market participants. In Sri Lanka, telephone service to certain rural villages allowed farmers to raise their selling prices to wholesalers from 50-60 percent of the Colombo price to 80-90 percent of the capital's price.

6. Decreased transport and communication costs will not only enhance market efficiency, but can be expected to affect, in a positive way, other aspects of African life. Further growth benefits can be expected from the increased academic, intellectual and scientific exchange resulting from the resulting closer contact among Africans themselves and among Africans and international intellectuals. Indeed, technology transfer through these means will be facilitated. Better transport and communication, moreover, can be expected to bring Africans together, and enhance cooperation, in other areas. In the political, cultural and artistic arenas as well, closer contact among Africans builds the long-term foundations of integration.

II. RATIONALES

7. Arguments can be made for regional approaches to transport and communications problems in a number of areas, and for the use of a variety of organizational models to implement this regional cooperation.

CONSTRUCTION: FORGING NEW REGIONAL LINKS

8. The most discussed and visible regional activity in the transport and communications sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been the construction of new infrastructure in order to expedite the physical integration of the continent. Intergovernmental approaches to such construction are justified on several counts.

9. Benefits can accrue to several countries with the construction of a link from cities in one country to cities (or ports) in others. As in the case of SADCC, these benefits may be political as well as economic. And since physical links such as roads, railway and telephone lines can only materialize with the connection of national infrastructures, coordination in the construction of such links is necessary.

10. A coordinated regional effort to construct transport and communication infrastructure may also attract more funds to the region than would the sum of national infrastructure development projects alone. This "additionality of aid" argument must be considered a major rationale for regional approaches from the perspective of African governments. As a matter of fact, external sources contributed 49 percent of the financing of the ECA Decade's "regional," "subregional," and "national with a subregional impact" projects as opposed to 40 percent of "national" projects.²

HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION, STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

11. Several potential benefits derive from the regional coordination of transport and communication legislation, standards and technology.

12. Adoption of similar railway gages and road standards (such as maximum permissible axle-loads, for example, allows vehicles to operate throughout the region. Of course there are costs to individual countries of "harmonizing"--it implies the building of new roads according to regional specifications, or the consistent and costly strengthening of old ones according to these specifications.

13. But these must be weighed against benefits. Adoption of compatible technology and standards can enhance production and trade to the extent that it permits and facilitates the movement of factors and products, reducing costs or removing otherwise prohibitive obstacles to trade. It would reduce the cost of regulation-induced innovation where neighboring countries have different standards and regulations. It would also reduce costs where neighboring countries do not, or cannot, enforce these regulations. For example, the upgrading of road standards, while expensive in its own right, will reduce the cost of maintenance resulting, for example, from the use of heavy Kenyan vehicles on weak Tanzanian roads.

14. In addition, harmonizing rules governing the use of transportation networks can enhance transitivity and safety. This is of relevance to Africa where neighboring countries have adopted very different regulations due to their different colonial legacies. Standardization of road signs and driving regulations, the issuing of regional vehicle insurance policies as well as the adoption of harmonized port navigation and air traffic control procedures would have beneficial results for trade and safety.

15. The nature of international transportation and communication requires coordination in the setting of regional user fees and the distribution of the resulting proceeds. Regional forums are required for such cooperation.

TRAINING

2. UNECA, Global Evaluation Report of the UNTACDA, January 1988, p. 59.

16. The increased needs of the African continent in the construction, maintenance and operation of transportation and communication links calls for increased training of human capital in these areas. The high cost of overseas education, the dearth of well-qualified African trainers in new technologies, and the existence of scale economies in training, all suggest the rationality of regional approaches to training transportation and communication personnel. The issue of training is addressed more extensively in Chapter IV.

SERVICES

Joint Operations

17. In some instances, for example in the case of air or sea passenger and cargo transportation, it can make sense for African countries to jointly operate services.

18. The lack of demand on the national level, coupled with economies of scale in such industries, warrants regional transportation companies. There are huge fixed costs inherent in buying and operating expensive capital equipment such as aircraft and ships. These problems are particularly relevant today. With the European Community and North America prohibiting the operation on their territory of aircraft that do not meet new requirements on noise standards, it is estimated that African carriers will have to replace as much as two-thirds of their aircraft in order to continue servicing these international markets. Meanwhile, in the case of shipping, when not purchasing ships, African countries must rely on conference lines to meet their transportation needs. Liner rates in 1985 were close to double dry cargo trip charter rates and triple dry cargo time charter rates.³ Charter rates could be taken advantage of if large enough volumes were transported from point to point. Regional consolidation and transportation of cargo to Europe, for example, would permit Africans to lower costs in this manner.

19. In addition to the purchasing of transportation equipment, regional airlines and shipping companies would benefit from decreasing costs in other areas. For example, unit costs could be expected to decline with the extension of marketing and reservation networks.

20. However, currently African airlines are not able to exploit these economies of scale due to their small size, and several are operating below capacity. Aircraft in the SADCC area, for example, are utilized on average for approximately four hours a day.⁴ This represents about a third of the flying time required to break even.⁴ National airlines across the continent are suffering losses for the sake of national prestige. The crises suffered by some (e.g., Air Mali, Air Zaire and Zimbabwe Airlines) threaten their

3. World Bank, "Transport in Invisible Trade," September 1988 draft, p. 30.

4. Southern African Economist, "A Time Has Come for SADCC to Stretch its Wings," Vol. 1, No. 2, April-May 1988, p. 6.

continued existence. The joint operation of transportation services might go a long way towards solving these serious problems.

Pooling and Other Cooperative Models

21. The high-technology nature of the transportation and communication sectors gives rise to special circumstances warranting regional approaches, if not regional organizations.

22. As we saw above, much of the service provision necessary within the transportation and communication domain is characterized by increasing returns to scale (decreasing costs). The maintenance of aircraft and telecommunication equipment is subject to high fixed costs of equipment and human capital. It requires at least three specialized maintenance technicians to overhaul one jetliner or six. Yet not only do many individual countries lack the know-how and resources to attain minimum efficient scale for a maintenance facility, but the paucity of aircraft in these countries might not justify such capacity even if resources were available. In these cases, if such service is to be provided in Africa, regional cooperative arrangements could be the most efficient solution.

23. Sometimes it does not make sense to provide some of these services on a national or on a subregional or regional level. The insuring of aircraft, the dredging of ports, and the relaying of communications via satellite are all examples of functions that African countries are currently discussing as cheaper done through the contracting of overseas services rather than through the provision of African services. Even in these cases, however, cooperation among Africans can still be beneficial.

24. In contracting for high-technology or otherwise expensive services, coordination and joint tenders among African countries can lower costs to each country. A joint insurance policy contracted by several African airlines together is being discussed to lower unit costs. The coordination of contracts with a Dutch company has been suggested to lower the dredging costs of West African ports. The joint purchasing of the service on the U.S. INTELSAT satellite is being talked about to lower communication costs of PTA countries. Meanwhile, in Rome and London, African airlines pool spare parts so as to lower overseas maintenance costs.

25. Along these lines there may also be arguments for cooperation in the purchasing of equipment. For example, the financial crisis experienced by most African countries and their airlines, coupled with a lack of access to international credit markets, has been given as a rationale for two alternative regional proposals. African airlines will be exploring the options of group purchase of aircraft and, alternatively, of setting up a finance company through which to purchase aircraft.

26. The large "gap" between Africa and the developed world is particularly evident in the innovative and fast-moving fields of transportation and communication. Joint regional action can help bridge this gap. Individual African countries can increase their bargaining power by acting as a group in negotiations with developed countries over use of new

technology. For example, joint bargaining by African airlines, with old and loud fleets, opened up the possibility for exemptions from new, strict, noise-control regulations at European airports.

27. Finally, regional organizations can also play an important role in reducing the gap. They can help to channel to Africa information about developments at the cutting-edge in these quick-changing fields. These organizations can act as conduits and screeners of new technology to the African continent by attending policy conferences and scientific seminars in these sectors, and by communicating with their counterparts in national, regional and international bodies throughout the world. This function is at the same time important and best vested in regional institutions, due to the weak capacity of national institutions in Africa, and to the fact that there are fixed foreign exchange costs to tapping information from the world scientific forum. One actor fulfilling this function for the region is cheaper than each nation undertaking it on its own. Also, these activities require financial and human capital resources that resource-poor national institutions must spend on operations

III. WHAT'S BEING DONE

28. The importance of regional cooperation for the development of transport and communication has not escaped the attention of African nations. Excluding training institutions, over 30 African regional organizations deal with some aspect of either transportation or communication.⁵ These organizations have undertaken several regional projects over the last decade. Projects under implementation, however, are far outnumbered by proposals. These will be receiving much more attention in the next decade, making the delineation of priorities at this juncture all the more important.

29. Regional institutions involved in this area can be characterized by subsectoral mandate. It is difficult to classify them by type of activity/function as discussed above, because many organizations carry out more than one activity.

30. We look at 4 regional organizations that deal specifically with air transportation, 2 with rail transportation, 2 with maritime transportation, 2 with road transportation, and 6 with communications. Most organizations in this area, however, are not limited to a specific subsector. Indeed, as many as 14 regional organizations have a mandate to address all issues of transportation and communication in the context of their even broader objective to foster general economic development and integration in Africa. We look at these multi-mandate organizations last.

5. A cursory presentation of thirty of the most significant such organizations is made in this section. For a more detailed description of individual organizations discussed in this chapter, refer to Volume II.

AIR TRANSPORTATION

31. The four regional institutions addressing air transportation alone concentrate on capturing the benefits of regional cooperation in different but sometimes overlapping areas.

32. The African Civil Aviation Commission, or Commission Africaine de l'Aviation Civile (CAFAC), operates at the policy level, examining issues such as the development of appropriate rate structures, the feasibility of equipment standardization, and the meeting of African aviation training needs. The Commission promoted the establishment of two regional pilot training schools. It plays a major role in the "harmonization and standardization" function in this subsector.

33. The African Airlines Association's main focus is explicitly that of promoting cooperation among airlines themselves to further their joint interests. AFRAA also studies issues such as the viability of pooling arrangements to reduce insurance costs, joint maintenance centers, joint purchasing agreements, and coordination of schedules.

34. Air Afrique is a jointly operated airline. It is regionally owned and operated by its member states, connecting cities in the region to each other and to destinations in Europe and the United States by jointly exploiting the traffic rights of all the member states.

35. L'Agence Pour La Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA) operates all airports in member states, taking on general management and operating responsibility for air traffic control, ground control, airport maintenance and management, meteorological services, fire fighting and calibration of navigational aids. Its four schools provide training for most of these functions.

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

36. The Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA) and the Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA) are symmetrical organizations established by the ECA. To serve the specific interests of its member ports, for example, PMAWCA has engaged in several regional activities that can be expected to generate increasing returns. It has been involved in harmonizing port navigation systems, developing a standardized system of port statistics, studying means to reduce costs through joint contracting of dredging, and training port managers on technical matters such as port pollution.

RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION

37. Two of the surveyed organizations have mandates focusing solely on the railway subsector. The Union of African Railways brings together railway authorities and professionals to undertake activities such as: the

standardization of present and future intra-African rail links, of maintenance and repair norms and of adopted technology; the promotion of joint ventures among African railway authorities such as joint purchasing agreements and (with the CEAO) the setting up of a CEAO railway car factory; the setting up of subregional training centers such as the Ecole Supérieure Africaine des Cadres de Chemins de Fer (ESACC) in Brazzaville; the channeling of information and technology to and among member authorities through the organization of regional and international seminars, workshops and publications, and through the development of an African Railway Information System.

38. The Organisation Commune Bénin-Niger des Chemins de Fer et des Transports (OCBN) is much narrower in scope. It was intended to oversee the construction of a rail link from Benin to Niger. In practice it manages or operates the existing rail link, which still has not made it to Niger. The OCBN is one example of the jointly operated and managed railway links in francophone West Africa, in the vein of the Dakar-Niger and Abidjan-Niger lines. TAZARA is a similar undertaking in East Africa.

ROAD TRANSPORTATION

39. Two organizations surveyed address the issue of road transportation alone. The Trans African Highway Authority (TAHA) is the best known. Responsible for overseeing the construction and management of the Lagos-Mombasa highway, it has actually not been very active.⁶ TAHA is one of several ECA-initiated authorities to oversee road construction. A Trans-East African Highway Commission, for example, is based at the ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa.

40. The Regional Road Maintenance Training Center (CERFER) was established under the joint auspices of ECOWAS and the Conseil de l'Entente to meet the training needs in this area.

COMMUNICATIONS

41. There are three pan-African institutions operating in the area of communications. The Union des Radiodiffusions et Télévisions Nationales d'Afrique (URTNA) brings national broadcasters together. Postal authorities come together under the Pan-African Postal Union (PAPU). The Pan-African Telecommunications Union (PATU) focuses on building and harmonizing national and subregional telecommunications networks. PATU takes part in the direction of the PANAFTEL project, the single most important regional project in the communications sector. PANAFTEL was launched at the continental level by ITU and ECA, and supported by UNDP, ADB and the OAU. It is an umbrella project to develop an African telecommunications network by linking national networks. The network would enable the carrying of intra-African traffic without necessitating the transiting of such traffic outside Africa. To attain the objective of installing over 20,000 km of microwave and co-axial cable

6. See profile in Volume II (Autorité Routière Trans-Africaine).

transmission links and 18 international switching centers across Sub-Saharan Africa, PANAFTEL has called on the regional economic integration organizations for funding and coordinating assistance.

42. On a subregional level, the Union Africaine des Postes et Telecommunications (UAPT) appears to duplicate some of the functions of the PAPU and PATU, addressing post and telecommunications issues in francophone West Africa. Two other subregional institutions, each with affiliations to larger subregional economic integration institutions, also provide training in communications: the Union Telecommunications Training Institute (UTTI) and the Ecole Supérieure Multinationale des Télécommunications (ESMT). They are both presently being considered for incorporation in ECOWAS. The establishment of the African Regional Advanced Level Telecommunications Institute (AFRALTI) to serve the Eastern and Southern African region was recommended by a UNDP/ITU study and is presently being implemented.

MULTI-SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS

43. Fourteen organizations do not focus on any one of the above sub-sectors, but rather have a mandate to address transportation and communication issues in general. SATCC is the only such organization that has this general mandate as its only mandate. The others focus on this task within the context of their broader mandates of fostering integration and development on the continent. These regional bodies include the pan-African organizations OAU and ECA. They include as well three resource-management-type institutions--the LGA, KBO and IGADD--and, most importantly, all eight economic integration organizations in sub-Saharan Africa: ECOWAS, PTA, CEPGL, MRU, UDEAC, CEEAC, CEAO and the Conseil de l'Entente.

44. While involved in discussing assorted projects across the board (often in cooperation with the more specialized institutions discussed above), these organizations have focused primarily on two tasks.

45. First, they have promoted the construction of new infrastructure. Within the context of the ECA's proposals to undertake a new "Global Approach" to economic integration in the past decade, they have worked towards identifying projects creating new regional infrastructural links and in procuring external funding for construction. In fact, "objective 1" of the much-heralded ECA Transportation and Communication Decade in Africa was to "promote the expansion and integration of transport and communication infrastructure and services with a view to increasing intra-African trade."⁷

46. Thus the Mano River Union has pushed for the continued construction on the Freetown-Monrovia Highway, and completion of the Mano river bridge. ECOWAS focuses on the Lagos-Nouakchott "Trans-Coastal Highway" and the Dakar-N'Djamena "Trans-Sahelian Highway." Its Economic Recovery Program of 1987, for example, listed 14 projects requiring US\$ 403.7 million of funding to

7. UNECA, *ibid.*, p. 12.

construct/upgrade roads in the subregion as part of the construction of the Trans West African Highway Network.

47. The PTA adopted a regional road trunk network that includes portions of a Cairo-Gaberone Trans-East African Highway and the Beira-Lobito Highway. Also, in this vein, the ECA-sponsored integration organizations act as the subregional coordinators of the PANAFTEL project.

48. By 1983, or Phase I of the ECA Decade, these first-priority, regional projects had attracted US\$ 2.58 billion of funds. Since 1983 another US\$ 1.6 billion had been secured for interstate and regional/subregional transportation projects alone. This total of US\$ 4.18 billion secured for regional projects in just eight years constitutes over 16 percent of the total replacement value of all main paved African roads in 1984.⁸

49. In addition to road-building projects, and also with a view to promoting trade, the economic integration organizations have worked to harmonize, standardize and simplify transit procedures. In this context they have focused, for example, on regulations standardizing axle-load, on simplifying customs forms, and on establishing regional insurance schemes.

IV. ASSESSMENT

50. Regional cooperation can and will play an important role in the development of transportation and communication links in Africa during the coming decades. We will look at the activities undertaken in this sector, and consider problems and improvements that could be made. We spend a relatively large amount of time on the first activity--construction--and, within this category, on construction of new roads, due to the large emphasis placed on this activity during the past two decades. Finally, we consider the kinds of regional organization needed for the tasks at hand.

CONSTRUCTION: THE NEW INFRASTRUCTURE APPROACH

51. As noted above, the ECA has given first priority to regional, subregional, and national transportation/communication projects with subregional impact.⁹ And African regional organizations, and particularly the economic integration institutions, have been important handmaidens to the task of generating and channeling these funds to the construction of new intra-African links. Indeed there appears to be a tendency to increasingly see this task as one of their principal objectives.

8. Replacement value of paved main network in East, Southern and Western Africa was US\$ 25.2 billion in 1984. Source: World Bank, Road Deterioration in Developing Countries: Causes and Remedies, 1988.

9. Ibid., p. 19.

52. Moreover, not only have the integration organizations adopted the mandate to develop new infrastructure, this mandate encompasses the construction of new national links as well as new regional links. Since regional networks are by definition linked national networks, mandates are easily expanded to generate and oversee construction across the board. Indeed, in many cases the distinction between national infrastructure construction and those "national projects with a subregional impact" that are the domain of the economic integration institutions is a nebulous one. An ECOWAS official testified that almost any project a member government wanted funded made it onto the ECOWAS Economic Recovery Program. National governments see no cost to giving credence to the additionality theory and submitting new regional highways for external funding. The promotion of regional integration is regarded as a means to promote the construction of more new roads in Africa.

53. And yet the consensus today is that priority should not be the construction of new links, but the rehabilitation and maintenance of old ones. The relatively glamorous efforts to create new regional links may actually be harming African development rather than fostering it, diverting attention and funding from higher-priority needs. There are three reasons for this conclusion.

54. First, the economic rate of return on most of these projects, both at the national and regional levels, often do not justify their existence. For example, a recent World Bank Mission to the PTA concluded that "considering available information, quite a good number of PTA projects did not meet (the World Bank minimum internal rate of return of 10 percent) criteria of viability." Part of the problem is simply high construction costs. The cost of realizing the Trans African Highway, for example, is estimated to exceed US\$ 16 billion by the year 2000. Coupled with this are low projected levels of utilization of these intraregional roads due to the lack of tradeables coupled with protectionist customs and immigration policies. The same World Bank mission, for example, expressed its view that the viability of a PTA project for a road link between Somalia and Kenya was extremely limited because of the minimal capacity of Somalia to export.

55. Second, links such as the Trans African Highway cannot hope to work unless such a road is of equally high priority to all member states. And clearly it is not. This is evident by the fact that wealthier Kenya and Nigeria, with an interest in moving their products inland, have completed their portions of the road. Meanwhile, land-locked countries such as the Central African Republic leave their portion of the road unattended. Faced with more restrictive financial constraints, with cheaper alternative modes of accessing international markets in the short run, and with the need for higher-priority roads to link domestic markets, it is not surprising that CAR has not turned its attention to building this regional road link.

56. Even should CAR permit external funds to be diverted to building such a road, however, the problem of disparate interests will eventually recur. With maintenance of particular segments of the road entrusted to national authorities, one would expect to see some portions of the highway

deteriorate faster than others for the very same reasons. For both reasons, projects such as the Trans-African Highway are destined for failure for the time being.

57. Third, and most important, the opportunity cost of building new links is extremely high, given the need for and returns from the maintenance of existing links, and given the existence of cheaper alternative modes of transportation for intrastate links (such as air cargo). Here we focus on the former.

58. There is a growing consensus among donors that there has been a general neglect of important preventive maintenance of infrastructure in Africa. A World Bank Policy Study claims that "expenditures to compensate for past omissions in preventive maintenance in Sub-Saharan Africa are at least ten times those of supplying textbooks for all elementary schoolchildren in the region until the year 2000."¹⁰ The problem is compounded by several factors. If not adequately maintained, road surfaces deteriorate imperceptibly for the first 10 to 15 years of their lives, but then deteriorate rapidly. The costs of this deterioration to the nation, moreover, increase drastically. First, the cost of restoring a road increases dramatically with its state of disrepair. Second, vehicle operating costs also increase significantly as road quality deteriorates.¹¹ Thus in Ghana, for example, 60 percent of roads were in a state of "moderate to severe deterioration" by 1984; transport costs had increased by 50 percent on main roads and more than 100 percent on rural roads as a result. And sometimes roads cannot be used at all. The costs of moving logs from Kumasi to Takoradi Port increased from \$15 to \$20 for each ton exported due to a 250 mile detour necessitated by broken roads.¹²

59. Given a limited budget, an existing road network, and the relative costs of new construction versus maintaining roads, a policy of expanding a nation's road network through new construction can actually result in less available roads. The reallocation of resources to building 100 kilometers of new roads could lead to a loss of 400 kilometers of existing roads due to lack of maintenance, according to one World Bank scenario.¹³

60. Moreover, building new roads increases the size of the network over which the existing maintenance resources must be spread, increasing the maintenance burden to the country. The World Bank examined 85 developing countries in its recent policy study. Thirty-two of the 36 countries with the highest road-maintenance-burden ratios (length of road network to GNP) were African. New roads continue to increase this burden. In Western Africa, for example, 80 percent of unpaved roads and 48 percent of paved roads were of less than "good" standard. And of 20 countries in Western Africa for which there are data, 15 have young networks. The fact that most of the good roads are new is particularly alarming, implying that unless present maintenance

10. World Bank, *ibid.*, p. 5.

11. See Table 2.1, *ibid.*, p. 12.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

13. *Ibid.*, Box 1-4, p. 10.

efforts are increased, a higher percentage of African roads will have to be classified as "poor" within the next ten years.

61. In light of these realities, caution should be displayed before embarking on new regional transport infrastructure projects. In general, such links are likely to be more costly than beneficial. They will not be the panacea for stalled economic integration that the ECA hoped for. And there is in fact some evidence that the economic integration organizations are beginning to seriously question the new-road approach themselves.

HARMONIZATION

62. The harmonization of legislation, standards and technology is a relatively unsung area of regional cooperation that seems promising for development in Africa. First, and most important, such harmonization and standardization is necessary to facilitate the movement of factors of production and of goods across borders. Regional motor vehicle insurance schemes such as the ECOWAS Brown Card and standardized customs forms such as the PTA Road Customs Transit Declaration Document (RCTD) can significantly decrease the administrative and time costs of transporting goods across borders, thereby eliminating an important nontariff barrier to intra-African trade.

63. Second, harmonizing technology also opens up opportunities for exploiting future benefits of cooperation. Similar regional technologies and standards (such as the use of either the Airbus or the Boeing 767 in East Africa) may permit joint training and maintenance, for example. Third, this activity can only be conducted on the regional level. Fourth, while delivering benefits in terms of economic efficiency, it is also economical in its use of financial resources. And while it does use up administrative and legal resources in its formulation, uniform, simplified regulations can be expected to generate substantial savings in terms of these resources as well over time. The PTA RCTD, for example, will eliminate the need to process several separate national bills of entry.

TRAINING

64. Training, particularly for certain high technology careers within the transportation and telecommunication sectors, is appropriate at the regional level. Which specific careers lend themselves to regional formulas, and which specific formula ought to be pursued--a national center of excellence or a regional facility--are issues that warrant more detailed study.

JOINT OPERATION OF TRANSPORTATION SERVICES

65. There continues to be discussion throughout the continent on the issue of the joint operation of regional airlines and shipping lines.

66. Not only the two aviation-related organizations (AFRAA and CAFAC), but also most of the economic integration groupings (e.g. ECOWAS, PTA, CEEAC) have proposed the establishment of subregional and regional airlines. Meanwhile, there is also much talk about the creation of regional shipping lines in Africa. The topic has surfaced in the East and Southern Africa areas under the auspices of PTA. Meanwhile, in West Africa, ECOWAS has proposed a coastal shipping line.
67. The benefits of such cooperation are clear, as we discussed in the Rationale section. Yet the present and past experiences of joint airlines in Africa, those of East African Airlines and Air Afrique, attest to the difficulties of undertaking such ventures on a public-sector level.
68. A joint venture between nonprivate actors results in a tendency for "deresponsibilization." Having instituted a regional airline, national governments become concerned with extracting maximum benefits for their countries while not facing the marginal costs to the airline of procuring such benefits. As a result, for example, Air Afrique's wide-bodied DC-10 makes uneconomical short hops between West African capitals.
69. Furthermore, member governments may not feel obliged to make immediate payment for tickets used by the government itself. In Air Afrique's case, governments owe the airline US\$ 42 million in unpaid fares. Coupled with arrearage in terms of agreed-upon capital increases, the airline is starved of the cash required to run such an enterprise.
70. Having to be responsive to political rather than cost pressures also results in overstaffing. And on the management side, political appointments can often compromise quality. Moreover, such as in the case of Air Afrique, when frequent management changes are required as a form of political compromise, it is at the cost of running a good business. Indeed the name of the game becomes the sharing out of benefits so as to keep all parties happy and the airline intact, with little regard, in the meantime, to cost and efficiency imperatives.
71. At the same time, joint national ownership of an airline calls for the kind of compromises that for prestige or other reasons, governments will find difficult to make. The selection of a hub city is a case in point. The notion of a hub becomes integral to both regional shipping lines and airlines in order to efficiently transport passengers/cargo from throughout the region on a long-haul route. Clear benefits (employment generation, traffic generation, and others) accrue to the host country relative to other member states implying difficulties in assigning the hub to one country and aggravating tensions well after such an assignment is made. It is not easy to imagine, for example, both Lomé and Cotonou scaling down the operations of their ports in favor of Abidjan.
72. Finally, the costs of failure are particularly grave in the case of joint ownership of assets. In the aviation sector, for example, this has been attested to by at least two failed ventures in the last two decades: East African Airlines and Malaysian-Singapore Airlines.

73. It would appear that many of these problems could be dealt with by a consortium of private sector actors. But with only 3 of 48 regular air carriers in Africa privately owned, and with a similar situation in the marine transport sector, the hope for success in this area in the near future is particularly slim.

74. At the same time, there are numerous options, short of joint ownership of an airline or a shipping line, that can still be employed to capture the potential gains of regionalism while circumventing some of the foreseeable traps of joint ownership. These formulas for regional cooperation deserve more attention.

75. First, both national shipping lines and airlines can avoid heavy capital costs by leasing space or time on an aircraft rather than buying the aircraft. This model is particularly relevant for long-haul routes. Moreover, it is the servicing of long-haul routes in particular that are most deserving of nonnational solutions due to the larger scale economies inherent in operating these routes.

76. The Tanzanian airline is considering leasing time on the Zambian Airways DC-10 (now unused on average for 14 out of 24 hours a day) in order to operate its proposed flights to India and England. SATCC, meanwhile, is presently undertaking a study on the joint utilization of wide-bodied aircraft. In the case of shipping, joint chartering of large ships for intercontinental trips can lower costs by two to three times as compared to conference line charges. Moreover, chartering and leasing give both airlines and shipping lines the flexibility to change their equipment to adjust to changing markets and to take advantage of new technologies (such as containerization in the shipping industry).

77. A further alternative is joint operation of individual routes of interest on an ad hoc basis. This model would be more relevant to regional and transcontinental routes between African countries. It would also be more relevant to airlines than to shipping lines. For example, Ethiopian Airlines and Air Afrique are jointly operating the East-West routes and utilizing the traffic rights of the eleven countries that constitute the two airlines. A variety of arrangements can be arrived at regarding the participants' provision of aircraft, crew, etc. to run the route. One advantage of this arrangement is that it allows for negotiation and compromise on a piecemeal basis, thereby forcing marginal cost considerations in the making of each separate decision to cooperate.

78. Yet another policy that can be adopted on a national level to further a nation's regional integration via air transportation is an "open sky" policy. Rather than restricting landing rights and fifth freedom rights¹⁴ for the sake of protecting a national carrier, a country could forfeit the national airline and sell landing and traffic rights. Liberia

14. Where A and B are two countries, the fifth freedom sanctions the right of an enterprise from country A to transport traffic between country B and a third country C.

has adopted this policy. As a result it is one of the few nations in West Africa with direct air links, several times a week, to the United States, Europe, Southern Africa and Eastern Africa. Presumably the rent forfeited by the national airline is being captured by high landing fees and by the sale of traffic rights.¹⁵ While benefitting the small country, such a policy would also foster regional integration by allowing strong airlines within the region (such as Ethiopian which terminates most of its East-West flights in Monrovia), to exploit scale economies and comparative advantage.

THE KINDS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS THAT CAN/SHOULD BE CHOSEN

79. There is then lot of room for regional cooperation in the field of transportation and communication. The nature of the main activities that lend themselves to regional approaches, however, all beg a central question: what is the simplest and least costly institutional model that can effectively fulfill each activity? Indeed, cannot some of these activities--intra-African harmonization/standardization, ad hoc pooling and cooperative arrangements, and training--be conducted regionally without the existence of a regional organization to oversee them at all? Any of three institutional models may be appropriate depending on the activity at issue: (1) the economic integration organization; (2) the technical, functional organization; (3) the ad hoc, nonorganizational model.

80. Harmonization of legislation, of standards and of technology will require either bilateral or multilateral negotiation. In certain cases, such as in adopting a unified customs document or telephone tariff schedule, it may in fact require negotiations at the ministerial level. It is not surprising therefore that the regional organizations that do undertake most of these activities, like ECOWAS and PTA, are the ones that operate at a politicized level. It is equally clear, though, that there is in fact no need for a standing organization to monitor most of these negotiations.

81. Heads of State or Ministers, who commonly meet yearly in any case, can address these specific issues independently, and national authorities can proceed to implement decisions they make. And, in a variant of this model, specific annual ministerial conferences can fulfill the coordination requirements. In the field of telecommunications in Eastern Africa, progress was made well before the arrival of PTA due to the prior existence of the African Regional Telecommunication Conference (ARTC), a yearly meeting of national Telecommunication Ministries. Similarly the Ministerial Conference of West African States for Maritime Transport (MINCONMAR) fulfills a similar function in West Africa without the aid of an ECOWAS and without a costly administrative structure. Thus while a PTA or an ECOWAS Summit meeting could well serve as the forum for some of these negotiations, the organizations themselves cannot be justified on the basis of this activity alone. A simple organizational approach can work just as well.

15. The Central African Republic takes advantage of a similar arrangement with respect to shipping. It sells its UNCTAD-designated right on shipping traffic to/from CAR to European shipping lines for a profit.

82. Most cooperative arrangements between airlines, ports and telecommunications companies can also be worked out on a bilateral or multilateral basis without an overseeing organization. Indeed in these cases negotiations are usually conducted on a technical rather than political level, among professionals rather than among ministers. In most cases they can thus be organized and conducted on a more informal basis, like any other business meeting, without a promoting agent. Ethiopian Airlines became the de facto aircraft maintenance center of East and Southern Africa, before any regional organization deemed it such.

83. Ad hoc pooling and cooperation arrangements among actors in the transportation and communication arenas thus show great promise. To the extent that such activities decrease cost and increase efficiency, they should be pursued. These arrangements could vary from joint contracting of technical services from the developed countries (such as port dredging or aircraft maintenance in Rome, for example), to risk-pooling in order to lower insurance costs; from intra-African technical assistance (for example the loan of cheaper Ethiopian Airlines technicians to Zambia Airways as opposed to British Airways technicians) to joint utilization of aircraft.

84. While some such cooperative arrangements have been undertaken, several proposals are now on the table. Clearly they will require further study on a case-by-case basis. For example, the proposal to create a joint financing company for the purchasing of aircraft would appear to be preferable to the group purchasing of aircraft. But this would still warrant more careful examination. While it does not pose all the administrative and invariable political difficulties implied by the joint ownership of assets (witness the problems of the East African Community), a financing company will still require negotiation of some tricky issues.¹⁶ Also both CAFAC and AFRAA are looking into this financing possibility. This kind of overlap, unless used constructively, wastes valuable resources.

85. In the case of training, too, simpler arrangements might exist than regional training centers that require expensive administrative costs, heavy demands on consensus and compromise over time, and heavy costs of failure if all does not go well.¹⁷ Once again, closer analysis of particular cases might find ad hoc, nonorganizational solutions as the most effective. Indeed the case of Ethiopian Airlines seconding technical assistants to Zambia Airways represents a good example of such arrangements.

86. On the other hand, a more institutionalized approach may at times be appropriate. Organizations with technical and function-specific mandates provide a service to their members that ad hoc arrangements cannot match. L'Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique (ASECNA), for example, is clearly an organization serving a purpose, as well demonstrated

16. For example, who will provide the guarantee on a loan? What is the incremental access to world credit markets that such an arrangement will imply to a nation?

17. For a more extensive discussion of these issues see Chapter IV.

by its ability to generate fees for service. So are the associations of airlines and of port managers.

87. The success of these organizations is due largely to the fact that their membership is at the appropriate level. Port problems being dealt with regionally by port managers of the region is a much more effective formula than port problems being dealt with by the region's Minister's of Transportation or Heads of State.

88. The ECA thus claims that "the potential of African intergovernmental organizations has not been fully realized in the transport and communications sector. . . . In future they should be given a more important role than in the past."¹⁸ While we concur that the transport and communication sector can benefit substantially from regional cooperation, it is one area where particular attention needs to be paid to the kind of organizational structure employed to address these regional issues. Alternative, less complicated, regional approaches are frequently preferable to burdensome organizations in deriving regional benefits. Moreover, less glamorous technical service organizations such as ASECNA will tend to be more successful in garnering any real results in the area of regional transport and communication than will be the much heralded economic integration organizations such as ECOWAS.

18. UNECA, *ibid.*, p. 24.

CHAPTER VI

NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Resource management is a critical matter in all African countries, and is becoming a central concern for most African decisionmakers. The agricultural base, accounting for more than 40 percent of GDPs and providing work to 80 percent of the population of the continent, is under increasing environmental risk. Much of Africa (especially its Sahelian and Soudanian zones) is caught in a downward spiral of desertification and land degradation which is undermining its economic future.

2. This environmental crisis is the result of a complex mix of interacting factors. External factors, such as droughts, certainly play a major role in explaining the present situation. But inappropriate natural resource management is a widely relevant factor also. Increasing pressure of people on the land has led to overexploitation of certain areas and reduced fallow periods. Declining soil fertility, deteriorating soil structure, lower rainfall infiltration and increased erosion have resulted. Excessive tree cutting, uncertainties about land use rights, land-exhausting migration patterns,¹ inadequate price signals, uncontrolled bushfires, encroachment of agricultural land into fragile pastoral rangelands, inadequately organized settlements on new lands--these are some of the commonly cited factors that clearly contribute to environmental degradation.²

3. It is not readily apparent that regional approaches are appropriate for dealing with many of these environmental/resource issues, mainly because they tend to be country specific. Sociological and agro-ecological differences have led to such a variety of traditional production systems that no simple single solution is conceivable. Because of their specificities and

1. Those patterns provide temporary relief for one area while exporting inappropriate and destructive land-use practices to other areas (eg: the Nord-Est Bénoué project in Cameroon).

2. A recent compendium published by the World Bank on desertification control and renewable resource management in semi-arid zones identified five interrelated major policy areas of crucial importance for better resource management: land tenure, water management, household energy use, production systems and migration. See F. Falloux and A. Makendi, Eds., Desertification Control and Renewable Resource Management in the Sahelian and Soudanian Zones of West Africa, World Bank Technical Paper No. 70, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., January 1988.

complexities, it is, for example, likely that only local institutions can give a viable institutional framework to the land tenure problem. Similarly, only local organizations in the rural areas seem to be successful at managing grazing lands and forests.

4. Better use of fuelwood, better management of forest cover, improvement of natural resource management in general, seem to be best addressed at the national level or below. Any effective approach will require widespread national recognition of the causes and serious long-term implications of environmental problems and possible corrective action programs. Local communities will improve their situation only when they believe their efforts are necessary.

5. Nevertheless, there are clearly some activities where regional approaches are appropriate and may help to increase the cost effectiveness of resource management programs. Some training and research on demographic, sociological, agronomic, political and economic issues can be done most effectively on a regional basis. Issues of family planning, land tenure, and migration have common features across widespread regions, and for reasons of "critical mass" of staff, administrative economies of scale, and advantages of cross-country comparisons, regional research/training institutions present a priori benefits.

6. The appeal of regional approaches and regional organizations is also evident in high technology areas where national resources are inadequate to sustain effective facilities at the scale required. Solar energy is the best example. A regional center has strong potential advantages because relevant skills are exceptionally scarce, capital requirements are high, and the population to be trained in any one country small. The Centre de Recherche d'Energie Solaire, the Bamako-based, CEAO-sponsored organization, has a matchless physical plant and the potential to be on the cutting edge of applied solar research.

7. There are many cases of "externalities" in the environmental area which also favor regional approaches. This is clear in pest management. Locusts, crickets, rodents do not respect international frontiers. As discussed elsewhere, locusts often swarm in one country, then move on to attack neighboring countries. Secondly, the protection of wildlife and animal reserves can also be done efficiently by action at the regional level. The game parks in East Africa are a classic example, especially relevant because of their economic significance.³ The transnational nature of these parks requires some coordination and joint action to fight against poaching, among other things.⁴ The East African Wildlife Society is an organizational model that could be utilized to build up efficient organizations in other areas where it is necessary to protect the fauna on a regional scale--for example, CAR-Chad for elephant protection; Uganda-Rwanda-Zaire for gorilla preservation; W game park (shared by Niger, Burkina and Benin) for wildlife

3. Tourism is Kenya's second biggest foreign exchange earner.

4. Since the wildlife patrimony is the world's patrimony, there is also strong support from the rest of the world to help preserve this natural resource.

preservation in general. The necessity to promote programs at the regional level was a main recommendation made at the last meeting of the International Commission of National Parks and Protected Areas.⁵

8. Among the organization dealing with environmental resource management problems, the most well known are probably the subregional general development organizations. SADCC, CEAO and ECOWAS have specialized departments dealing with natural resource questions such as fisheries, forestry, and water utilization. Drought-related organizations are also relevant. The original mandate of CILSS, for example, includes sponsorship of training programs in water and soil management, conferences on regional environmental strategies and encouragement of studies and research projects on topics related to the preservation on the environment. These organizations are treated elsewhere in the report, since their involvement in resource management is only one of their objectives.

9. Given the variety of problems and the variety of organizations concerned with environmental/resource problems, we will restrict our discussion to one issue--management of river basins. River Basin Authorities and their related water management problems are prominent among regional organizations, and illustrate the gamut of issues that arise in resource management matters.

II. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIVER BASINS

10. River basins in Africa are a logical place to attack the problem of resource management. Water is one of the most important renewable natural resources of many African states, particularly in the Sahel. Water is a direct source of economic activity (fishing and transport) and can be used to create new opportunities for production.

11. Most African governments consider food self-sufficiency and food security as major concerns. The recent economic crisis and devastating drought over much of the continent have drawn more attention than ever before to this issue. Twenty-four major rivers flow through Sub-Saharan Africa, giving a total irrigation potential of 33 million ha., while only 16 percent of this potential has been developed.⁶ For countries where the rainy season is often short, effective management of river basins can improve agricultural

5. CPNAP is the Commission of National Parks and Protected Areas (Commission des Parcs Nationaux et des Aires Protégées), a specialized body of the International Union for the Preservation of Nature and Natural Resources. The 28th Session (March 1987) was organized for the first time in West Africa, and took place at the W park.

6. S. Barghouti and D. Lallement, Water management: Problems and Potentials in the Sahelian and Soudanian Zones, Chapter 4, pp. 58-71 in Falloux and Mukendi, *ibid.*

production through water control and irrigation,⁷ while reducing risks for farmers and pastoralists, and also ensuring that environmental practices are followed.

12. River basin development is not only critical in addressing the problem of agricultural production. It also presents, both at the national and at the international levels, a great opportunity for planned exploitation of the other outputs than can be expected from a river, such as transport and electricity generation.

THE RATIONALE FOR REGIONAL APPROACHES TO WATER MANAGEMENT

13. What is the rationale for a regional approach to the management of river basins? There are at least three reasons: the fact that rivers and basins require international policy decisions; the externalities in national resource plans; and mobilization of foreign resources.

The Need For International Political Agreements

14. Most of the big rivers of West Africa are shared by various states, which makes their management an international problem. If the river corresponds to a political boundary, such as the Senegal River, it is consequently subject to international laws, and it is of course necessary to obtain a political agreement before undertaking any important project that could affect the two banks.

Externalities

15. A river can cross a number of states from its source to the sea. The case of the Niger river is typical. It is obvious that any big project undertaken by a state on the upstream of the river can affect dramatically all the landscape of the subregion. Thus coordination is needed among the different states of the same river basin. Only this coordination can help in resolving the basic problem of developing shared water resources without infringing upon national sovereignty.

Greater Capital Attraction

16. By cooperating in pooling their resources and in planning joint development programs, the member states' regional river organizations also generate greater interest in donors. This is probably the strongest argument for collective action. The states, by grouping their approaches and efforts, wish to attract capital and enjoy greater benefits at a lower cost.

17. In sum, the recognition of the necessity to secure agricultural production with water control, to avoid border conflicts, to share resources

7. In places like Matam (Sénégal river basin), well-managed rice irrigated perimeters produce an average yield of 6 tons per ha. as compared with 1 ton or less per ha. in upland production.

and costs, to promote projects with regional impact on agriculture, transport and energy, to attract foreign capital, and to avoid environmental damage all motivate African countries to undertake action at a regional level.

DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS

18. In Africa, international cooperation for the integrated development of resources is not a recent phenomenon. In the early 1960s, international treaties focused donor attention on the emphasis given by African governments to the development of the Senegal basin, the Niger basin, the Chad basin, the Gambian basin and more recently the Kagera basin.

19. Six African international river basin organizations exist with the same purpose: to coordinate policies on the development of common water resources. They are the following: KBO (Kagera Basin Organization); LCBC (Lake Chad Basin Commission); CEB (Communauté Electrique du Bénin); NBA (Niger Basin Authority); OMVG (Organisation pour la mise en Valeur du fleuve Gambie); OMVS (Organisation de mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal).

Kagera Basin Organization

20. This organization was created in 1977 for the management of the Kagera River Basin as a result of a UNDP recommendation. The action program of KBO is based on the recommendations of a multidisciplinary mission (composed of specialists from USAID, France, Belgium, Italy and Finland) and includes six project proposals for agricultural development, two for hydropower, one for transport and communications, and one for environment. Concerning the water management aspect, very little has been done or planned.

21. Two donors are currently sustaining the activity of KBO. UNDP is financing the establishment of a documentation center. Belgium financed

8. Institutions such as the Mano River Union, the Nigeria-Niger Commission for Co-operation, and the Senegambian Permanent Secretariat are multipurpose organizations whose activities have often extended to a study of water resources and hydroelectric power. Nevertheless, they are not primarily concerned with utilizing river basins as vehicles for subregional economic development, and we will not consider them as RBOs. Similarly, the Liptako-Gourma Authority, involving three countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), is often listed as a river basin organization, but it is not. It was originally created in 1970 by its member countries after the recommendation of a multidisciplinary UNDP/FAO mission in 1969 that compiled a register of the Niger Basin potential. The purpose of the Authority was originally to develop the mining potential (Tambao in Burkina Faso, Ansongo in Mali and Say in Niger), and the energy, hydraulic, agricultural, pastoral and fishing resources of the part of the Niger Basin falling in the three countries. It is now involved in telecommunications (their main achievement) and roads. Unfortunately, it overlaps NBA in planning the Niger River Section stretching from Timbuktu (Mali) to Gaya (Niger). Since development based on water resources is not its priority, it is not included in this chapter.

phase II of a feasibility study of the Rusumo Falls hydropower project in Rwanda. When constructed, the dam is supposed to permit extension of irrigated land in Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi. Rwanda is very interested in this irrigation aspect while Tanzania is more concerned with the electrification project. The benefits of this project are less clear for Burundi and Uganda. Donors are being sought to continue the studies and implement the Rusumo project. Studies must be done, for example, on the costs/methods of transporting electric power to Tanzania and Rwanda. The agricultural development projects identified by the organization are all devoted to Uganda and have no international impact; they serve to justify the membership of Uganda.

Lake Chad Basin Commission

22. The Lake Chad Basin Commission has not taken any decisive steps to help member states coordinate action for the rational use of the natural resource that it is supposed to manage. Lake Chad is, however, facing urgent problems. Drought has dramatically reduced the area covered, from 28,000 sq. km. to 10,000 sq. km., and the volume of the lake has decreased by 60 percent. According to hydrological experts, the only way to save the Lake from completely drying out is to develop the potential filling power of the Logome river, requiring the cooperation of the Central African Republic.

23. LCBC is moving out of a very difficult period. War in Chad forced the transfer of the headquarters to Maroua (Cameroon) in 1979. After that time no noticeable activity occurred until 1983, when efforts were made to develop a rationale for regional cooperation and a plan for action. The institution has not yet put into action its plans for the use of the basin. The recent transfer of the headquarter back to N'Djamena, a precondition required by most donors before revitalization of their interest in the organization, is perhaps the sign of a new birth.

Communauté Electrique du Benin

24. The CEB is a joint venture of the republics of Benin and Togo to develop the Mano river basin. The CEB is an organization with a clear focus: its purpose is to provide electric power to member states through the Nangbeto hydro project, presently under construction. It is notable that this is the only river basin project that the World Bank has financed.

Niger Basin Authority

25. The Niger Basin Authority is the latest in a series of organizations created to manage the Niger Basin. The earlier colonial attempt (MEAN: Mission d'Etude et d'Aménagement du Niger in 1950) was followed (unsatisfactorily) by the Commission du Fleuve Niger during the 1960s and 1970s. The NBA was formed in 1980 to coordinate national programs concerned with the Niger basin. Thus, unlike some other intergovernmental organizations, the approach here is to coordinate the projects undertaken and implemented by member states themselves. NBA's planned activities include navigation regulation, collection and computation of statistics, hydrological

forecasting, environmental control, infrastructure development and agro-pastoral development.

26. The main problem faced by the organization is the mutually contradictory interests of member states along the river. Nigeria, the more powerful member of NBA, is concerned with ensuring regulation of the river flow, as excessive reduction in the water flow would negatively effect its irrigation zones and electricity production. It should be noted that as the last state on the river, its actions have no impact on any other state. Cameroon, like Nigeria close to the mouth, would like to promote navigation. Guinea and Mali, on the other hand, would like to use the water for dams and irrigation schemes that might be harmful to the Cameroon and Nigeria. Thus coordination is necessary, both to accommodate conflicting interests and to optimize water uses.

27. In fact, concrete achievements have been limited. Only 4 projects have been initiated out of the 19 planned. And the situation of those 4 projects is worrying, as the growing difficulties in NBA's budget situation have caused donors to stop assistance. For example, USAID stopped its assistance to the sedimentation modeling of the river in 1987.

Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal

28. The largest river basin organization, OMVS is one of the most famous regional organizations of West Africa. The mass of existing information testifies to the interest for nearly two centuries in the development of the Senegal basin. Many projects have been proposed, from turning St. Louis into a deep water port, making the river navigable as far as Kayes for deepdraught ships (project of Governor General Roume, 1903), to the project based on the construction of dams at Gouina and at Dagana (Union Hydroélectrique Africaine) during the 1940s. One gets an idea of the enormous existing literature by looking at the more than 25,000 documents (all concerning the basin) at the OMVS documentation center in St Louis.

29. The main goals of OMVS are very broad: to develop production; to safeguard the river and guarantee against fluctuations in water level; to increase the revenue of the people living on the banks of the river; and to safeguard the environment by reestablishing a sound ecological balance. In order to do this, the first priority was to ensure that the flow of the river remained sufficiently high and stable for the various uses under consideration, namely hydro-agricultural development, navigation and production of electricity. The first part of the OMVS program was to undertake the construction of a dam at Manantali, in order to obtain a permanent flow-rate of 300 m³/s, irrigate some 400,000 ha in the valley, produce up to 800 megawatts⁹ of hydroelectric power, and allows navigation from Kayes (Mali) to St Louis (Senegal). The Manantali dam is now completed

9. Recent decisions could decrease the capability planned to 200 megawatts.

and the second dam, constructed for different purposes in Diama,¹⁰ is already functioning.

Organisation de Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie

30. The latest signed agreement for the use of an international African river is the one concerning the Gambian river, operated under the supervision of this organization. There have been a number of different treaties of association between Senegal and Gambia, and varied attempts to build up the Senegambian confederation. Senegal has tried many times to facilitate agreements with Gambia, in order to keep communication open between Casamance and the rest of Senegal. The traffic through Gambia to Senegal is estimated to be approximately 110,000 vehicles per year, which makes a bridge in itself an interesting project to study in economic terms.

31. The goals and statutes of the OMVG are duplicates of the preexisting OMVS. The organizational chart, the mandate and the program of activity are based on the same ideas. For example, water management is based on the construction of dams, namely an anti-salt dam in Balingho (Gambia), which would be the equivalent of Diama, and the Kekreti dam to regulate the river flow. Another dam is also proposed in Konua (Guinea). Unfortunately, only broad estimates have been done by OMVG for a dam/bridge development.

32. Only the joining of Guinea in 1981 gave the OMVG real international stature. Guinea-Bissau was given the opportunity to join the organization in 1983, thus enlarging the OMVG to include states that are not part of the Gambian river basin.

Other RBOs

33. Three other major projects to develop internationally shared rivers are worth citing. Although no institution has yet been set up for them, they are probably next on the list. The Nile Basin is the largest; the basin includes portions of Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, as well as the Victoria lake basin and the Kagera river basin. The Congo Basin and its tributaries come second, and is likely to give birth in the near future to some joint venture within the CEEAC States. Lastly, an agreement concerning the Zambezi Basin was recently signed to establish a Zambezi River Basin Trust Fund and to set up a coordinating unit to ensure the implementation of an action plan and to act as a secretariat for the intergovernmental committee.

10. This dam has three purposes: during low-water periods, to prevent salt water from flowing up to the estuary; to retain a certain mass of water and increase the possibilities of irrigation; and to assure that the depressions and lakes along the river's edge are filled.

III. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

34. It seems clear that in contributing to the development of Africa, high priority should be given to exploiting African river basins. A natural resource of the magnitude of the Niger river, flowing through in a semi-desert area, must contribute to the development process, if appropriately managed. Nor is there any question about the importance the issues that these river basins address. In the case of the OMVS, the three member states are poor countries facing serious constraints. Mauritania, virtually a desert, has no serious agricultural resources because of lack of water, while Senegal and Mali are exposed to the risk of severe droughts, like the one in 1972-1973. In the three countries, success in crop growing depends heavily on rainfall, which makes one of the major policy goals of the sahelian states, the so-called "autosuffisance alimentaire," difficult to reach.

35. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the existing organizations are not performing well. They choose inappropriate roles or tasks for their membership: they design overambitious and uneconomic projects, which are not in proportion with real management capacity and perhaps of no economic value. Also, they face severe financial problems because of nonpayment or delayed payment of dues by member states.

LACK OF AN APPROPRIATE ROLE

36. One major problem of RBOs is the definition of an appropriate role, and the tendency of the regional organizations to expand their field of activity.

37. The propensity to take charge of all the aspects of development is a current bias of RBOs, often because their mandate is vague and broad. The best example is perhaps provided by KBO, for which the label of "River Basin Organization" becomes more and more improper. Like the Liptako-Gourma Authority, the KBO has such a vast mandate that it can be characterized more as a regional development agency than a river basin organization. The plan of action of KBO shows clearly that railways projects, reforestation, the fight against the tse-tse fly, and road construction are priorities for action. Another priority area for the organization is training, and member states are creating a polytechnical school to serve mainly Rwanda and Burundi. It cannot even be said that KBO is moving from its original mandate, as this mandate has always covered all aspects of economic development--transport, telecommunications, marketing, and tourism are cited in the statutes among the various functions of KBO.

38. OMVS also provides a good example of the tendency to undertake such an extended field of activity that the organization risks losing sight of its original mandate. Since its founding, OMVS has created four permanent advisory groups. Two of them, the consultative committee (CC) and the Permanent Water Commission, clearly fit within the OMVS program and are well placed to have positive impact on OMVS's efforts. The two other bodies are

CIERDA, which does research in the field of agricultural development, and CIEDI, which promotes industrial development. Because of this "grab bag" of tasks as well as lack of expertise, planning experiences, funds, etc., the OMVS has not always done its job. Attempts to convene the Permanent Commission on Water and CIEDI have been postponed since 1979. CIERDA is directly involved in agricultural research and has been unsuccessful in this area. Nor has it successfully performed the coordinating role specified in its mandate.

39. And finally, another organization--the CBLT--approached its job in too global a manner; it would have been better to start with basics, to develop and improve the existing surface and groundwater monitoring network, and to use this information to gradually build up a "basin plan."

DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING AND ACHIEVING APPROPRIATE MEMBERSHIP

40. Another problem facing the RBOs is pressure placed on them to include inappropriate members for political reasons. For example, the membership of Guinea-Bissau in OMVG does not conform to the idea of a river basin organization, for the country is not part of the Gambian basin. The justification for membership is the geographical position of Guinea-Bissau. The creation of a "climate of peace, of concertation and dialogue" (as the president of Guinea-Bissau said at the sixth session of heads of states in 1985) is certainly a praiseworthy goal, but not necessarily for OMVG (except perhaps indirectly.)

41. CBLT is also facing problems directly related to the question of defining membership. The organization remains weak, and is not reportedly¹¹ in a position to plan development of the basin because the "basin" conventionally defined does not include rivers that carry much of the flow to the lake. Inclusion of the headwaters region requires the entry of the Central African Republic, which has declined to join because the economic benefits are not clear.

PROPENSITY FOR OVERKILL

42. RBOs contribute to the idea that "big is beautiful." This is not always inappropriate, but often questionable considering the actual problems of African countries in terms of their debt services and the potential economic return that the countries can expect. The projects proposed by RBOs, perhaps because of their international inspiration, are generally

11. World Bank: Preliminary assessment of West Africa River Basin, Attachment XII, LCBC-Financial aspects, May 1987.

overambitious, involving many donors,¹² and dealing with hundreds of millions of dollars.

43. It would be unfair at this stage not to recognize the major contribution of donors in the building up of unrealistic projects. The feeling that European countries and companies have been using grants to promote projects as more value to the donor than to the recipient country is particularly strong in the Senegal river area. The returns have not been negligible in OMVS in terms of employment of consultants and contractors, and sales and equipment for European construction and consulting firms. But one may argue that donors could have had the same economic benefits by spending the money in their own country. Moreover, the movement started by the Germans to cancel their financial claim may be followed by number of other European donors. It is not known what the Arab donors' (the main donors) attitude will be.

44. Nevertheless, OMVS provides a good example of a gigantic project successfully completed but where the economic benefits are unclear¹³.

45. The construction of the Manantali dam was completed in March 1988, close to the projected target. The three countries were already obliged to borrow 250 billion CFAF to complete the dam, and the next steps of irrigation, electricity and navigation are frozen because of the forbiddingly high costs anticipated.

46. The irrigation part seems to be the only part that will be realized, even if it is not yet clear what economic uses exist for all the hectares made available. At the moment, only 54,000 hectares are irrigated, while the original plan projected 100,000 hectares before 1990, to move quickly to 350,000. The prohibitive cost of the development of one hectare (approximately 3 million CFAF or \$10,000) do not permit any positive rate of return, especially in the production of rice.

47. It is estimated that the hydroelectric sector will cost an extra 80 billion CFAF, and there is still much discussion as to which electric power lines to construct. It seems that only the Dakar line can be constructed, but the operation will run at a deficit. The French EDF (Electricité de France) asserts that a barrel of petrol must cost 25 to 30 dollars to make the operation profitable.

12. At the preconference of donors, organized in Dakar in 1983 for the financing of the OMVG projects, 15 donors were represented: African Development Bank, Arabic Bank for the Development of Africa, Belgium, Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique, European Community, Germany, Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération Français, Banque Islamique de Développement, Italy, Koweitien Fund, Saoudian Fund, West African Development Bank, FAO, BIRD and UNDP.

13. The economic benefits expected were initially judged doubtful and weak by a number of orthodox economists who criticized the project. The World Bank refused to participate in the funding of the Diama and Manantali dams.

48. Concerning the navigability of the river, the major mover is Mali, which sees here the only potential gain they can get from being part of the Senegal river development project. Despite the Malian effort to reactivate this section of the project, it is unlikely to be financed by any donors. The costs are tremendous while the trade-creation potential has still not been demonstrated.

49. Here again is a typical example of a low-priority project proposed for political reasons. The role of OMVS should have been to study the Malian proposal, putting aside the political dimension of the project, and to develop a convincing analysis on the suitability or usefulness of the project. To pass along all the projects proposed by the governments to donors is certainly not a suitable role for RBOs.

50. The effects of enormous projects such as dams are not well known in most cases, and they are difficult to assess. USAID, for example, has drawn attention to some negative aspects of the Balingho dam, planned by OMVG, on the environment, such as the loss of certain types of shrimps. Many authors reported in the early 1970s that the Manantali dam on the Senegal river, while regulating the annual flood of the river, will also eliminate an already viable system of flood recession agriculture (some 100,000 hectares involving up to one-half million people).¹⁴

51. Some critics have pointed out that the grandiose sahelian projects rarely take into account the interests of the local population. Most of the French "tiers-mondiste" literature¹⁵ emphasizes the negative aspects that could result for the local population of the Senegal river because of OMVS policies. Negative effects on health,¹⁶ destruction of fisheries,¹⁷ and

14. A transitional phase has been defined during which an artificial flood will be delivered by the dam, to supplement the natural flood coming from the two tributaries of the Senegal river (the Bakoye and the Faleme contribute about 50 percent of the river flood). The flood will be maintained to support the traditional "walo" culture until irrigated cropping becomes predominant.

15. Cf. S. Amin, S. Franco, and S. Sow, "Le projet de développement du fleuve Senegal," La Planification du Sous-Développement, Editions Anthropos, 1975; S. Bessis: "Faut-il construire les barrages sur le Fleuve Sénégal?" Jeune Afrique, No. 1072, July 21, 1981; "Aménagement du Fleuve Sénégal: le progrès va-il profiter aux paysans?" Afrique-Agriculture, October 1, 1981; "Polémique autour du projet de mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal," Croissance des Jeunes Nations, April and July/August 1981.

16. Mosquitoes, the vectors for malaria, are likely to multiply in the valley through the extension of their favorable habitats, such as irrigated fields and drainage channels. Bilharzia is also likely to increase substantially.

17. No clear evidence exists on what will happen to fish production: there will be an increase in the average level of water in lakes Guiers, M'Kiz and Aftout-es-Sahel (hence more fish) but also some species will disappear from the estuary and the stabilization of the water level will reduce the fish feeding and breeding which formerly occurred in the flood plains.

destruction of forests¹⁸ have been underlined by ecologists, environmentalists and social scientists.

52. The above critics had little impact on planners' decisions on the future of the basin, partly because they were too simplistic, and based more on ideology than on empirical evidence. Moreover, they often ignored the serious negative effects from the irregular flooding of many African rivers on millions of riparian residents, and underestimated the potential long-term benefits that could accrue to such populations from controlled flooding.

ARREARS IN MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS

53. Another major problem in all river basin organizations is the nonpayment or delayed payment of dues by member states. The lack of effectiveness of these organization stems to a certain extent from the member countries' unwillingness to give any priority to RBOs in their budget.

54. OMVS has faced a serious problem of arrears since 1979. At the end of 1979, member states owed 300 millions CFAF in unpaid contributions. At the end of 1985, this sum had grown to more than 1 billion CFAF. This represents only the arrears due to the secretariat for its operating costs.¹⁹ This means that OMVS indebtedness to its creditors has increased dramatically and that there is a real risk of insolvency.

55. NBA is also facing a serious problem of nonpayment of dues, but these arrears are due to a different combination of circumstances. The member states, though convinced that a regional organization is needed for cooperation along the river basin, now have serious doubts about the capability of NBA to accomplish this mission (recent scandals involve misuse of funds, and the poor achievement of NBA).

56. In addition, the rule of egalitarianism for payment of dues to the NBA (one-ninth of the budget for each member state) seems obviously unrealistic, since the interest in basin development varies among the different states. Nigeria, Mali and Niger account for 80 percent of the basin area and its development is a vital priority for their future. In contrast, for countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Benin, which account together for less than 4 percent of the basin area, the concern in developing the basin is far less acute.

57. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the success of RBOs in attracting donor funds. Of the river basin authorities, OMVS has obtained the more spectacular results. The OMVS was able to mobilize foreign loans or subsidies

18. 7,600 hectares of "Gonakie" forest are doomed to disappear and 42,900 hectares will slowly disappear since their roots will no longer be regularly fed by the river flood.

19. The debt relating to dam construction was assumed by the member states' budgets.

of over \$1 billion from most of the donors, the only notable exception being the World Bank which only financed some preinvestment studies.

58. Most of the existing RBOs are an attraction to donors during their first years of existence, and donors stop their participation only when there is clear evidence of financial and managerial problems, or very few concrete achievements. The credit conditions are often fairly advantageous. Grace periods range, for example, in the case of OMVS from 5 to 10 years, with interest rates in many cases lower than 1 percent. Detractors insist on the heavy burden of debt service that could result for the countries with costly projects promoted by RBOs. For Senegal, the peak of debt service attached to the Senegal river basin will be reached in 1994, at a level of approximately 5 billion CFAF. Still, this will represent a small part of Senegal's global debt service, which is close to 1 percent in 1988/89²⁰.

IV. CONCLUSION: A ROLE FOR RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS

59. The previous description and assessment leave us with a very pessimistic picture of river basin organizations. Although the potential role for them seems real and is supported by a number of arguments, the reality faced is not encouraging.

- o RBOs have too vast a mandate and tend to expand their activities to other aspects of development, leading to dilution of activities and lack of technical expertise.
- o They haven't dealt, in most cases, with their real economic justification--better common resource management of water.
- o They have a clear propensity to promote low-priority or uneconomic projects because of lack of analysis, political pressure, stimulation of irresponsibility favored by their multinational nature and the multidonor approach.
- o They have promoted overambitious projects with uncertain ecological and social impacts.
- o They have built up big structures with the secretariat absorbing scarce resources.
- o They are facing nonpayment or delayed payment of dues, leading to severe disruption in current functioning, partly because of this general feeling of failure.

20. In 1988/89, the total debt service of Senegal is estimated to be 177.1 billion CFAF, while debt due because of the dams will be approximately 1.9 billion CFAF (source: Direction de la prévision, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Dakar).

- o They have failed to keep donor interest alive, disappointing them after evidence of poor management and dilution of activities.

60. Some steps, however, can be taken to improve River Basin organizations, and, in fact, most of the RBOs are undertaking a serious program of reform on both their structures and activities. These reforms can be grouped under the need to improve planning and to improve coordination and realistic exchanges among members.

IMPROVE INFORMATION/PLANNING

61. Water is a scarce and valuable factor in agricultural development, and water-related investments should maximize returns. In most areas of Africa, little is known about what is available in terms of both surface water and groundwater. Assessment of water resources is a necessary preliminary step before any plan of action or further development of river basins is undertaken. Otherwise, there is a risk of low benefits, while ignoring areas with high potential.

62. The construction and updating of a database for the main river basins should be supplemented by information and the results of research undertaken all over the world which are of high relevancy for certain aspects of river basin management. The experience of integrated approaches to water use--human consumption, livestock consumption, crops, fisheries, urban industrial uses and the fight against desertification--can be valid for the basins under consideration where there are similarities in ecological conditions. Low-cost but efficient technologies, new crops varieties, new equipment to improve land preparation, are some of the more crucial areas where complete information is necessary in order to maximize the efficiency of the use of water.

63. The costs of an information center should be shared at the regional level. It should of course be accessible to every member state, to help in designing more adequate technology for national implementation of projects. Planning should also involve abandoning the "yes-dam/no-dam" debate (the dams are constructed in the Senegal river basin anyway), and the use of existing capacities in an optimal way. And in addition to providing economies of scale, the possibility of international financing should provide a better guaranty of the quality and viability of the information gathered. A regional approach to information gathering would also enable participants to step back and take a more objective look at environmental concerns and consequences, thus mitigating the special pleading of more parochial concerns.

64. Finally, there is now no doubt about the environmental and socio-economic constraints on the viability of a river basin project. A particularly well-adapted mission for a coordinating agency in charge of long-term planification of a common resource of different states should be to make sure that previous experience is built upon, and that the losses that can occur are negligible.

DIALOGUE AND COORDINATION

65. A river basin organization should have the clear mandate to consider demands from member states, and to conduct internal discussions on the suitability of projects. By acquiring a reputation for expertise and professionalism, they should limit unrealistic projects promoted by some member states for political reasons, while promoting economically viable projects. A RBO should be the one credible institution when bringing projects to donors.

66. Specific tasks for a RBO should include:

- o supervision of preinvestment studies, in order to avoid overlaps between national services;
- o coordination of sectoral projects undertaken at the national level;
- o provision of technical expertise to help member states in preparation of terms of references, and of suitability studies executed by qualified consultants or professionals;
- o training technical people to be reintegrated into their national agencies.

67. RBOs can play a key role by according a greater focus to coordination of national economic plans and policies. They should act as small coordinating structures, with highly qualified staff both with the strong technical skills needed to supervise water management and the clear ability to record, report and assess all socio-economic events relevant for a common management of the river basin under their supervision.

68. The RBOs should also move towards a differential scale of contribution according to the ratio of benefits to be accrued from the development activities. This seems necessary to insure a more realistic base for the budget. On particular agreements if solidarity among states is well established, contributions can be based on member's ability to pay (in terms of per capita income for example). The request for equal contributions from states having different potential benefits and different levels of development is a formula unlikely to succeed in the long run.

69. To act as a coordinating agency and as a "think tank" for optimum management of a regional resource such as a river is particularly demanding. It obviously requires a capacity to coordinate planning and a variety of national projects, to promote dialogue among different national bureaucracies, to help in preparing joint funding of projects--a complicated task. The commitment and degree of confidence of African Governments in RBOs is crucial to success. Unless the governments give priority themselves to regional goals, any coordinating organization for common water management is probably condemned to bankruptcy.

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CHAPTER VII

DEVELOPMENT FINANCING

1. African development financing has always come primarily by official development assistance (ODA). Many institutions have been involved, multilateral as well as bilateral. Regional development banks exist for all developing subregions. The banks are regarded as essential means for localizing investment decisions. Because the African region is more heavily dependent on ODA than other regions, its regional financing institutions, and particularly the African Development Bank (AfDB), have a particularly central role. Moreover, the financial crisis that has prevailed since the late 1970s, and the growing debt burden of the 1980s--twenty-two countries are now defined by the World Bank as "debt distressed"--makes the flow of external finance especially critical.¹

I. REGIONAL APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT FINANCING: RATIONALES

2. Rationales for regional approaches lie in two areas: the advantages that regional financing institutions enjoy in comparison with national financing institutions, and the advantages they enjoy vis-a-vis international, non-African financing institutions.

REGIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS VERSUS NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

3. The advantages of regional financial institutions lie in scale economies, resource additionality, and promotion of economic integration.

Scale Economies

4. The most likely source of scale economies in regional financing institutions is by the more efficient use of high-level, experienced staff, which continues to be particularly scarce in Africa. Development banking is extremely staff intensive because of the variety of sectors (agriculture, health, public utilities, etc.) in which bank staff must be able to identify and evaluate projects, and because policy elements currently take a greater role in lending operations. Many countries are not able to pay high-enough salaries to attract and retain the best analysts, managers, and technicians in

1. The discussion in this chapter primarily refers to development banks and compensation funds, rather than guarantee funds and reinsurance institutions.

their national development banks, and would probably underutilize them if they were able to do so. In any case, the supply of such people is small.

Additionality

5. An institution promotes additionality if it attracts more resources to a region or subregion than would be there in its absence. It can be hypothesized that regional financing institutions: (1) encourage member countries to devote more resources to development projects than they would otherwise; (2) encourage donors to allocate more resources (in loans, grants, and capital subscriptions) to a region than they would on an individual, bilateral base or through other mechanisms; and (3) can more easily establish the creditworthiness and prestige necessary to borrow in world capital markets.

6. The first two propositions hinge mostly on the question of whether regional members and donor countries consider it politically desirable to contribute to regional institutions. Also, some countries may feel that a regional bank can more successfully sponsor certain kinds of projects, such as regional infrastructure projects, than a local bank.

7. The third proposition concerns the more mechanical issue of amassing enough capital and being able to borrow in world capital markets. A regional institution may be more likely to be able to sustain a good credit rating than an individual government, because the callable capital that serves to guarantee its borrowing is distributed among several countries.

8. For these reasons, and due to conservative management, the AfDB Group has developed, and the BOAD is in the process of developing, the capacity to borrow on the world capital markets. Roughly 56 percent of the AfDB's 1987 lending commitments were financed by borrowings, although according to its statutes and because of its high credit rating the proportion could have been higher. This generates resource additionality or, what amounts to the same thing, provides development financing with fewer domestic resources tied up.

9. Other regional and subregional financing institutions (EADB, BDEAC, BOAD, among others) fund their lending operations by concessional loans from international institutions (EIB, IDA) or even the African Development Fund.

Promoting Regional Economic Integration

10. The third main advantage of regional financing institutions over their national counterparts--that they better promote regional integration--assumes the desirability of regional integration in the first place. They promote regional integration in three ways: they emphasize regional projects; they promote "balanced development" by allocating more resources to poorer or disadvantaged members; and they serve as forums for policy dialogue.

11. Regional Projects. All of the regional financing institutions have lending targets for multinational projects. It could be argued that regional institutions are more appropriate for financing regional (multinational)

projects than national institutions. Regional projects demand accommodation of conflicting interests and are thus inherently political. In these circumstances cooperation and coordination might best be provided by a supranational body.

12. Promoting "balanced development" by favoring the poorest and most disadvantaged countries, means that the poorest countries receive a disproportionate share of loans. "Balanced development" is supposed to facilitate regional economic integration by redressing the inequalities that hinder intracommunity trade specifically, and cooperation generally. Banks such as the AfDB, ADF, BOAD, and ECOWAS Fund, therefore, pledge to serve as vehicles for redistribution, in the interest of regional integration, and as an end in itself.

13. Redistribution does not in itself require a supranational body. But, like regional projects, it requires political accommodation, the reconciliation of parochial, national interests in the light of larger, regional objectives. If redistribution is to be pursued systematically over the long term, which it must be if it is to have any impact, an institutionalized regional mechanism such as a bank or fund, under reasonable political control, may be essential.

14. In practice, some financing institutions effect redistribution by determining countries' eligibility for loans (especially concessional loans) on the basis of (among other things) GNP per capita, population, ease of access to ports, and previous loans given, etc. The soft window of the AfDB Group, the African Development Fund, is the most strict in its application of such a system and its allocation of resources to the poorest African countries.

15. Policy Dialogue. Regional financing institutions promote better-quality policy dialogue. They engage countries in cooperation with one another in drawing together some of their best planners and economists.

REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS VIS-A-VIS INTERNATIONAL (NON-AFRICAN) INSTITUTIONS

16. The advantages of regional financing institutions as compared to international institutions (IBRD, UNDP) are, broadly speaking, that they are indeed African. The impetus to have uniquely African institutions is mostly based on pan-African aspiration, which, for financing, includes some practical considerations: that an institution staffed primarily by Africans understands African needs and problems better, and is therefore better suited to deal with them; and that an institution staffed primarily by Africans is better able to promote intra-African policy dialogue and regional adjustments

African to African

17. It is claimed that knowledge of African languages and a thorough understanding of all aspects of African life is helpful, if not essential, in designing good projects. Intimate knowledge of the forces that determine success and failure in project implementation are especially useful for

development projects, which represent such a large share of financing activity.

Policy Dialogue

18. A related claim is that calls for policy reform are more palatable, and therefore more effective, when coming from other Africans. This might be in part because an African institution calling for reforms would be more aware of what such reforms would truly entail, and would structure them accordingly.

Servicing the System

19. One final rationale for having regional financing institutions is to complement and cater to existing regional organizations. These regional financial institutions either finance a 'parent' organization's projects (for example, BDEGL and ECOWAS Fund), and/or compensate member states for sacrifices made on behalf of that parent organization (FCD, the original EADB, ECOWAS Fund). Institutions of this sort are accordingly impossible to evaluate independently of their parent organizations.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF REGIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

20. The regional and subregional financing institutions form a heterogeneous group, differing greatly in size, function, and style. We include in this group banks, insurance companies, guarantee funds, specialized project funds, and, most of all, institutions that pursue two or more of these activities simultaneously. The statutes of the BOAD, for example, permit it to make direct loans, guarantee loans from third-party institutions, buy shares in members' national banks, and finance technical assistance and feasibility studies.

21. Some institutions not only pursue different activities simultaneously, but combine (or, as some might argue, confuse) them. The BDEGL, though ostensibly a bank, mostly finances CEPGL projects, and thus does not rely on its own 'bank-like' project identification and evaluation procedures. The ECOWAS Fund and the old EADB, though also banks, were set up with the explicit purpose of compensating member countries for revenue losses associated with their respective common market schemes.

22. The range of size is great even among similar institutions. Thus the AfDB's subscribed capital is more than 500 times that of the EADB. The ECOWAS Fund's capital is over 60 times that of the FCD.

23. Differences in style are found in many areas. The banks differ from one another in their sectoral emphases. The EADB targets 57 percent to the industrial sector and 16 percent to the agricultural, while the AfDB targets 25 percent and 30 percent respectively to the two sectors. With respect to lending facilities, the AfDB Group has hard and soft windows and each facility can pursue policy-based lending up to 20 percent, while the

other banks lend only on nonconcessional terms and undertake no policy-based lending. The regional banks differ also in their cooperation with and reliance upon nonregional countries. For example, the authorized capital of nonregional members varies as follows: ADF-50 percent, AfDB-36.2 percent, PTA Bank-33.3 percent, BOAD-4.8 percent, ECOWAS Fund-0 percent. Particularly pertinent is the range of success they have in meeting multinational project lending targets. For the BOAD, 21 percent, of all lending is for multinational projects, while for the AfDB Group and the BDEAC the figures are 2.6 percent and 10 percent respectively.

24. Those institutions that act as compensating agents or subsidiary bodies show similar differences in their sectoral emphasis and share of multinational projects, and in the degree of autonomy they enjoy from their parent institutions. Thus the ECOWAS Fund has considerable latitude in project choice, as opposed to the FCD, which funds projects that are dictated by the CEAO secretariat.

25. It is only in the past decade that the financing institutions have had a discernable impact on the continent. The AfDB Group in particular has become a formidable institution; over the period 1983-87, it lent \$6.7 billion, or 45 percent of IBRD and IDA lending to Africa over the same period. Approximately 20 percent of the AfDB's operations are cofinanced with other banks, while for the smaller financing institutions the percentage is higher.

26. Table 7-1 summarizes the main features of the financing institutions.

III. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

ADVANTAGES VIS-A-VIS NATIONAL FINANCING INSTITUTIONS

Scale Economies

27. That there is a shortage of qualified personnel is true, but two factors temper the benefits of collecting high-level staff in regional institutions. First, the higher quality of the senior staff may not fully compensate for the added complications of administering funds regionally, and in an oftentimes politicized environment. Secondly, the regional institutions do not replace the national ones, nor do they relieve the national ones of their duties; in terms of personnel they are, in part at least, formed at the expense of the national institutions. To just what degree this is true depends on how many regional bank staff would have worked for international institutions, private banks or other employers, if the regional bank jobs did not exist.

FINANCING INSTITUTIONS

TABLE 7-1

| | AfDB | AfDF | AfDB Group | ECONAS Fund | PTA Bank | BOAD | BDEAC | BDEGL | FCD FOSIDEC ^a | EAD |
|--|---------|--------|---------------|----------------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------------|-------------|
| Year Established | 1963 | 1972 | | 1976 | 1986 | 1973 | 1975 | 1977 | 1973 1978 | 1967 198 |
| Subscribed Capital | 6502.8 | 4290.9 | 10793.7 | 500 | 400 | 222 | 93.2 | 27.3 | n.a. 11 | 12. |
| Loans, Grants, and Guarantees: | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1986 | 1034.1 | 588.11 | 1640.3 | | na | 48 | | 1.3 | 7.9 4.6 | |
| (number) | (26) | (60) | (90) | | | (13) | | | | |
| cumulative | 4228.1 | 2896.5 | 7225.9 | 21.3 | na | 198.2 | 32.6 | 16.2 | 41.1 | 53. |
| (number) | (453) | (477) | (963) | (15) | | (90) | (35+) | | | (60) |
| Average Loan Size: | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1986 | 39.8 | 9.8 | 18.2 | | na | 3.7 | | | | |
| cumulative | 9.3 | 6.1 | 7.5 | 1.4 | na | 2.2 | 0.9 | | | 0. |
| Multinational Projects: | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1986 | 0% | 2.5% | 0.7% | | na | 10.5% | | | 75% | |
| (number) | (0) | (1) | (1) | | | | | | | |
| cumulative | 2.8% | 2.3% | 2.6% | | na | 21% | | | | |
| (number) | (15) | | | | | | | | | |
| Interest Rates | 7.33 | 0% | n.a. | 6.5%-7.5% | | 9.31% | | | | |
| Percent Debt Funds of Operations ^b | 33.2% | 0% | | | | 10.9% | | 0.5% | | 246. |
| Paid-up as Percent of Subscribed Capital | 25.0% | | | 9.5% | 33.3% | 19.3% | 46.0% | 41.0% | | 10 |
| Nonreg. Subscrip- tions as % of Total | 36.2% | 50% | — | 0% | 33.3% | 4.6% | 19.6% | 10.7% | | 5.. |
| Cumul. Disbursements as % of Commitments | 38.1% | 35.4% | 37.2% | 36.8% | na | 49.3% | | | | 85.1 |
| Arrears on Loans | 40.3 c. | 2.1 c. | 45.0 c. | 2.4 | | | | | | |

^c All amounts in millions of \$

^a FOSIDEC makes guarantees, subsidizes interest rates, and finances feasibility studies.

^b Gross borrowing as percent of subscribed capital.

^c As of 30/4/88

Resource Additionality

28. More African Development Expenditure. African country subscriptions to regional financing institutions probably do represent an increase in development spending over what would otherwise exist, though it is not likely that it is very great. Contributions to regional development banks figure minimally in member countries' national budgets and, like contributions to other regional institutions, are very vulnerable budget items. Arrears on loans and capital subscriptions are in some cases substantial and it has been observed that African countries place greater priority on repaying the IBRD than the AfDB.

29. Significantly greater impact occurs where the financing institution is a conduit for compensation (as in the FCD and early EADB). But the greater volume of investment resources created by the need to compensate may have lower average productivity than investment resources in general, since oversized, expensive, inadequately evaluated projects are common. When loans are made for the essentially political purposes of compensation and when in addition they are pushed hastily through such project-screening processes as exist, additionality tends to bring reduced benefits, except in terms of political ends. Another way of saying this is that the marginal productivity of the additional investment spending generated by the presence of regional banks is likely to be relatively low because of politicized project choices.

30. More Donor Development Expenditure. Donors do seem to perceive a strategic importance in aiding and subscribing to regional financing institutions, particularly the African Development Bank and Fund. (The African Development Bank was the only multinational development bank for which the U.S. has increased capital funding.) Non-African countries subscribe to other regional banks as well, but most of the external aid is for particular projects that the donors co-finance. To some extent, these are projects that might have attracted donor support just as easily had they been under the aegis of a specialized regional organization or a provisional intergovernmental commission. Regional institutions might be necessary for the identification and administration of these projects, but not for attracting donor support.

31. In any case, it is not likely that the volume of additional donor allocation to Africa is substantial. Substitutable mechanisms exist (e.g., IBRD) and some of the resources directed to regional banks would undoubtedly be channelled to them in the absence of the regional option.

32. On the other hand, regional financing institutions, like other regional organizations, often stimulate low productivity or ill-considered donor spending (for example, the Centre Régionale d'Energie Solaire or CRES in Bamako). The viability of projects undertaken by regional organizations is traditionally a politically delicate issue. Most non-regional members of regional development banks shy away from voting against proposed loans that they consider to be of poor quality. Japan and the Scandinavian countries are only recently finding their voices and openly questioning some AfDB loan proposals. That there is indeed additionality is probable but, again, the benefits of this sort of additionality are not clear.

33. Enhanced Borrowing Power. Most of the regional financing institutions are at best eligible for loans on the same terms as their national counterparts. Therefore their 'regionalness' does not contribute to enhanced borrowing power, nor therefore to additionality.² The notable exception is the AfDB, which mobilizes a substantial amount of funds through its borrowings, thanks to its high credit rating. The AfDB's credit rating owes much to its precise statutes which stipulate sanctions on countries in arrears, define limits to the ratio of borrowings to callable capital, and provide for eventualities such as default or dissolution. The credit rating also reflects the AfDB's wide capital base, and especially the participation of non-regional members as subscribers.

34. This latter point implies that smaller institutions are inherently disadvantaged in so far as they tend to have narrow capital bases. However, conservative and explicit regulations, plus inclusion of nonregional members, can do much to compensate for small size.

35. Thus although additionality through enhanced borrowing power is limited as of now to the AfDB, there is scope for realizing it elsewhere.

Promoting Regional Economic Integration

36. Financing Multinational Projects. At least on a rhetorical level, regional projects are a priority for African governments, and are close to management hearts in regional financing institutions. Also, there is some consensus that identifying and financing multinational projects is a difficult task, and warrants a regional organization. Curiously, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the size of the financing institutions and their success in finding and funding regional projects. The larger institutions fall far short of their multinational, project-lending targets, although they have the most resources at their disposal, including the best staff. The AfDB Group's cumulative average for multinational project lending stands at 2.6 percent of its total portfolio. For the BOAD, multinational lending stands at 21 percent, versus a defined target of 65 percent. The smaller banks such as the BDEGL and the 'adjunct institutions' such as the FCD, by contrast, achieve much higher percentages (25 percent).

37. The usual reason given for the failure of the larger banks to achieve their multinational lending goals, and the one most commonly cited by the banks themselves, is that the project identification efforts are too weak, and are not geared enough to seeking multinational projects. More than two-thirds of the AfDB Group's funding to multinational projects is actually to regional organizations (e.g. OMVS, CEAO, ECOWAS Fund, Liptako-Gourma); thus the number of genuine regional projects that are identified through the AfDB's

2. Regional development banks rely particularly on concessional loans. These loans are often made contingent on certain conditions, including kind of operation (sector, multinational versus national, etc.) and country of origin of capital goods. Making extensive use of concessional loans thus limits a bank's flexibility and, because such loans often take longer to process and disburse, efficiency.

own efforts is considerably smaller than the size of its "multinational" portfolio suggests.

38. However, project identification is poor not only due to banks' lack of effort. Regional projects may not be as viable, and the banks are more constrained to commit funds on the basis of viability than are institutions like the FCD and FOSIDEC. Also it is not only hard to identify multinational projects, but implementation of any regional project is much more demanding than national projects. The creation of the regional CEAO graduate business school (CESAG), located in Dakar, took some five years of laborious preparation and negotiation. A new legal statute had to be defined, a curriculum accepted by all the members, as well as principles of cost-sharing, national quotas for students, and faculty recruitment rules. To finance a national business school would be much simpler: the institutional framework is mostly present and the negotiations regarding sharing of costs and benefits are unnecessary.

39. Member countries, moreover, are generally not aggressive in proposing these projects, nor enthusiastic in support of them. Member country guarantees are necessary on all loans, but countries find it difficult to agree on partitioning the risks of multinational projects among them. It is left to existing regional organizations to solicit funds for regional projects, because for member countries the national projects are of higher priority.

40. Promoting "Balanced Development." Even the banks that have stated their commitment to favoring poorer members have found it difficult to do so. There is a scarcity of viable projects in the poorer countries, and the poorer countries are often not able to borrow at nonconcessional rates; they will not do so if loans at concessional terms can be secured elsewhere. Thus the AfDB has become a bank for the relatively wealthy countries, even though its original eligibility requirements reserved a sizable share for the poorer members. In 1987, the AfDB made loans to only 10 Sub-Saharan countries, comprising little more than was lent to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia for the same period. The African Development Fund continues to adhere to lending guidelines in favor of the poorer countries, but AfDF lending accounts for only 36 percent of AfDB Group lending last year. In 1986, 35 percent of Bank Group lending went to North Africa.

41. The BOAD is more equitable in this regard, even though it does not have a soft window. BDEAC, however, clearly favors the wealthier countries.

42. Compensating organizations such as the FCD and ECOWAS Fund are more successful in favoring poorer members, although this is not so much a favor as their principle function.

43. Promoting Intra-African Policy Dialogue. Policy dialogue is encouraged by regional institutions directly and indirectly, formally and informally. For instance, the AfDB sponsors seminars on various topics (privatization, debt), and also interacts with subregional financing institutions and member country staff in the course of approving loans. The AfDB's newly produced Country Programming Papers and its entrance into policy-

based lending, while perhaps not resulting in the sort of rigorous conditionality that some nonregional observers would like, have initiated a degree of intra-African macro-policy discussion that until now was only sporadic.

44. The indirect policy dialogue, however, is still more common and more important. Within the management of these institutions and in the course of negotiating the replenishments that sustain them, Ministers of Finance or their representatives come into regular contact. With respect to the AfDB management in particular, it has been noted that meetings are highly professional and politically dispassionate, both among African representatives and between Africans and non-regional members. The political obstacles to productive policy dialogue by no means dissolve, but insofar as these institutions take on lives of their own, they resist the rhetorical and factional forces that tend to dominate regional forums.

ADVANTAGES VIS-A-VIS INTERNATIONAL FINANCING INSTITUTIONS:
AFRICAN TO AFRICAN AND POLICY DIALOGUE

45. It is certainly true that compared to foreign counterparts, African bankers in general know African problems more intricately, and are better able to communicate with other Africans. Among the criticisms of the World Bank's operations in Africa is that Bank officials, despite their competence, do not adequately understand the social problems and administrative limitations that plague project implementation, nor do they appreciate the political complexities that constrain or encourage policy reform.

46. However, the cultural intimacy that makes Africans potentially more sagacious administrators of development financing can also work against project quality. The lender's closer identification with the borrower may be a liability since screening of loan proposals frequently requires a hard nose and a cold heart. This danger is particularly relevant now that the use of policy-based lending is expanding. The ability of African banks to impose conditionality for policy-based loans is, if anything, weakened by cultural affinity. Of course, in present circumstances, all development agencies are anxious to transfer resources to crisis-ridden African economies, so conditionality is often formal and cosmetic, no matter who the lender. But the problem is more acute for regional lenders. The nature of the difficulty is illustrated by the clear difference in positions taken by the regional and nonregional members of the AfDB Group. At the May 1988 Board meetings, the nonregional members expressed sharp criticisms of the quality of recent lending. Thus the presence of nonregional members is beneficial in adding relatively objective input to bank operations.

47. The policy dialogue that takes place outside of the main functions of the banks, such as in the AfDB's round tables on debt relief and the encouragement of the private sector, is probably equally fruitful if not more than that which takes place within those functions.

IV. CONCLUSION

48. Regional development banks, then, do attract more resources for development to the African region than would exist in their absence, though this "additionality" is probably not substantial and its average productivity may be somewhat lower than investment channelled through nonregional multilateral development institutions. The general reason for this is the more overtly political objectives of some of these resource transfers (e.g., the compensation entities like FCD, FOSIDEC, ECOWAS Fund) and the generally greater degree of politicized influence on the lending even of the African Development Bank Group.

49. This is not to say that political influence is necessarily inversely related to the quality of the loan portfolio, nor that politics are absent from other (e.g., World Bank) lending operations. Nor would it be easy to prove that the quality of World Bank lending is heads and shoulders above that of the AfDB Group. (It would be easier to make that kind of demonstration with the other regional bodies.) But there is abundant anecdotal evidence in support of the argument that the AfDB portfolio is more politicized than that of the World Bank, and donor representatives and other observers in many African countries say that the AfDB Group has supported proposals that have been appraised negatively by World Bank and other analysts.

50. The lending operations of the non-AfDB Group institutions are small in absolute amounts and relative to total lending of the regional institutions. Because their costs are a priori high (given their scale), their staffing problems are usually severe, and their exposure to pressures for political lending greatest, the role of these institutions should be reassessed. Those that are engaged in compensatory lending should be replaced by mechanisms for straight income transfer. It is no favor to "compensate" a country that loses customs revenue in a market integration scheme by financing a project of dubious viability.

51. The African Development Bank Group should concentrate on project lending, on training, and on policy dialogue unrelated to conditional lending. The present trend to policy-based lending is not in the interest of the AfDB or its clients. The growing need now and for the near term is in project identification and appraisal, and this is where the AfDB could play a leading role. It also is well suited for the task of studying and debating policy reform strategies and issues with national authorities. They can do this effectively only if the dialogue is divorced from considerations of compliance with conditionality in policy-based loans. This, plus the political factor, argues strongly against AfDB policy-based lending.

52. One other consideration is relevant. On the continent as a whole, the most pressing financial sector priorities are at the national level: addressing the real liquidity crises in banking systems; rehabilitating development financing institutions; strengthening central bank control over commercial banks and imposing stricter controls on bank lending; improving interest rate structures; and creating workable rural credit systems. In the

financial area, these national priorities are clearly more pressing functions than are actions at the regional level.

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CHAPTER VIII

TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

1. We saw in Chapter I and in the succeeding chapters that regional cooperation can make important contributions to African development. Five types of benefits to be anticipated from effective cooperation were outlined: expanded trade; creation of "integrated industries" and other joint facilities serving a regional market; improved management of financial resources; better management of common natural resources such as river basins; and access to better, cheaper technical services, including research, training and education, and more cost-effective channels to new technology.

I. TRACK RECORD OF REGIONAL APPROACHES

2. Few of even these modestly defined potential benefits from regional cooperation have yet been realized. First, as noted earlier, trade within the existing preferential trade areas or "economic communities" has grown slowly or actually declined as a share of total trade--in many cases in absolute terms. Some of this may be illusory; smuggling has increased in much of the continent, so "real" volumes of trade have surely been larger than those shown in recorded trade statistics. But it seems likely that many opportunities for greater trade have not been exploited. Many countries of the region prohibit exports and, frequently, imports of basic staples. The ECOWAS states have not been able to agree on any preferences at all as yet, or have been held up by differences over rules of origin. Trade in agricultural goods that would seem to be possible because of divergent degrees of output variability in East and Southern Africa does not show up in recorded trade data.

3. The main reasons for the failures of trade expansion have already been mentioned: nationalist food and industrial policies; limited complementarity of outputs; noncompetitiveness compared to third country suppliers; high transport and communication costs; and shortages of credit and foreign exchange due to macroeconomic policy distortions or short-term external shocks. An obstructive factor in food trade is the presence of food aid in sizeable volumes in many countries. A general underlying factor may also be misplaced policy emphasis: governments in many parts of the continent have been preoccupied with the negotiation of trade preference schemes and associated compensation arrangements. They have neglected the more basic obstacles to the growth of regional trade mentioned above.

4. Secondly, few joint projects have emerged, and those that have been created have more often been failures than successes. The West African Cement Mill (CIMAO), that was supposed to provide its three partners (Ghana, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire) with clinker, cost some \$360 mn. but closed down in 1984 after a few months of production. Demand was far below projections and world prices were half those of CIMAO's. Two joint industrial projects (sugar and cement) between Benin and Nigeria fell victim to the 1984 Nigerian decision to shut its frontiers. The only successful joint industrial project that we could uncover is a glass bottle manufacturing facility in Liberia that was created as a "regional industry" within the Mano River Union. It is a Libyan-Liberian joint venture that has a reserved market in Sierra Leone (and Guinea?). The CEPGL claims more success: its official documentation lists six integrated industrial facilities including cement, steel, and bottling plants.

5. Joint hydroelectric facilities have had better fortunes. Aside from a now-paralyzed power-sharing arrangement in Southern Africa, there is a functioning Communauté Electrique Beninoise, a hydropower scheme between Benin and Togo, and the Ruzizi scheme in East Africa. Also, Air Afrique survives, the only remaining joint airline. But it remains crisis ridden, principally because of nonpayment of government bills for travel of public servants.

6. The scarcity of these jointly financed and/or jointly run industries or services is not hard to explain. First of all, investment money is scarce; neither private investors nor Finance Ministers have shown interest in these types of investment. More important, donors have not been much interested, partly because many proposed activities of this kind are of uncertain viability and partly because multinational loans are complex and hence more difficult to negotiate. Also relevant are the disagreements among African governments regarding ownership rules and value added requirements, which reflect different perspectives on the appropriate role of foreign private capital.

7. With respect to the third source of possible benefits, improved financial management, results have been mixed. The existence of the African Development Bank and the smaller financing institutions linked to the "economic communities" (ECOWAS Fund, Fonds Communautaire de Développement of the CEAO, etc.) has probably resulted in additional resource flows to Africa, and additional investment. The same is even more true of the development coordinating organizations--SADCC and CILSS, for example. But it would be hard to argue that the productivity of foreign aid resources has increased as a result of better coordination or dialogue. The average quality of investment of the smaller financing institutions is probably lower than that of other institutions because of the limited project preparation capacities of these organizations, and--more to the point--because of the explicit noneconomic goals of their lending (priority to the poorer member states and to projects with regional impact) and the high degree of political influence on their lending decisions. The indisputably poor project record of the Entente Fund is one example, and the extraordinarily lavish scale of the

investments in educational facilities made by the Fonds Communautaire de Développement is another.

8. With respect to policy dialogue, SADCC has done little. The CILSS has done more, most of it under the umbrella of the Club du Sahel--i.e., within the Club-CILSS system. This mechanism has probably been the most active agency of policy dialogue in Africa. It has sponsored scores of seminars and workshops since 1975, when it was founded, most of them organized around studies and policy documents commissioned by the Club.

9. Assessment of the quality and impact of this dialogue is difficult. The Club-CILSS system pioneered in providing a forum for debate of some important policy issues. Some of the papers it sponsored have been of high quality. In recent years, it has been useful as a forum for clarification of differences among donors. But as a policy dialogue institution it has also had many deficiencies. Its commissioned papers have been of uneven quality, and their readership among Sahelians limited. Its major dialogue efforts are colloquia on a regional basis (e.g., its Nouakchott and Mindelo meetings on cereals policy). But these meetings tend to be donor "happenings" rather than serious occasions for dialogue. They are at the wrong level as well, since it is at the national level that significant dialogue has to occur. Recent emphasis by the Club on sectoral issues, and efforts to develop country-level dialogue, are efforts to remedy some of these problems.

10. Neither SADCC nor CILSS, finally, have so far performed any disciplining or "aggregating" functions in the sense of helping to impose priorities on national investment demands. Thus CILSS, in the "First Generation" of projects that it proposed to donors as part of the antidrought strategy of the mid-1970s, simply passed along the national shopping lists of projects as submitted. It's been the same with SADCC. It is probably too much to expect that any organization openly reject spending requests of its component subunits. But SADCC or CILSS do little real coordinating when they simply lump together all the projects proposed by member states, no matter how dubious their priority.

11. Achievements in the fourth area, natural resource management, are slender. The CILSS and its affiliates, the Sahel Institute and AGRHYMET, have done some work in desertification and deforestation, but the CILSS effort has been minimal and is currently unable to find financial support. The regional agroforestry organization, the International Council of Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), has received high marks from observers and has an active research program supported by donors. And the East Africa Wildlife Society in Nairobi has made a significant contribution to wildlife management in that area.

12. The story on river and lake management authorities is similar. Some striking achievements can be pointed to in the Senegal River Basin by the Organisation de Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal, which mobilized some one billion US\$ (at 1985 exchange rates) for the construction of the Manantali and Diama dams. While a technical system for water management has been worked out, OMVS still has to deal with vexing economic issues in helping plan the future of the river basin. Economically viable agricultural uses of the

controlled water supply still have to be found. Hydropower transmitted to the one consuming center capable of absorbing it (Dakar) is more expensive than thermal power when oil can be bought at less than \$30 a barrel. The expected return on investments in improved river transport, the one benefit expected by Mali, is extremely low.

13. Other than the OMVS, the water management organizations show modest activity levels. The potentially most important, the Niger Basin Authority, lost a major supporter (USAID) a few years ago and has been unable to find new support either from its member states or outsiders. Poor management explains some of the NBA's troubles. But an excessively ambitious set of goals also entered. This factor--organizational overreach--is even more clearly present in the Kagera Basin Organization, which claims as its province virtually all economic activities in the watershed.

14. Experience with regional provision of technical services--the fifth area in which benefits can be expected from regional cooperation--has been perhaps the most positive of all the types described. Regionalized education is common, in the sense that nonnationals are enrolled at most universities. Senegal is a leader in this respect; perhaps a quarter of the students enrolled in its institutions of higher education are non-Senegalese. Regional institutions play a dominant role in technical training--for veterinarians, public administrators, airline pilots, among others. Port Management Associations pinpoint common problems, commission studies, and transfer technology to member organizations. Much of the agricultural research of the region is done in regional institutions, particularly those that are part of the international agricultural research network (CGIAR). Not all of the many organizations engaged in service provision of these kinds are flourishing. In fact, most are severely handicapped by uncertain and inadequate budgets, unclear mandates, and overly politicized personnel policies. But they are engaged in meeting real needs; they are in many instances functioning better than comparable national institutions, and they show capacity for adaptation and growth.

II. STEPS TO TAKE TO MAKE REGIONAL INTEGRATION MORE EFFECTIVE

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

15. Regionalism can become a more effective instrument of economic growth. We indicate below a number of general and specific steps to make it so. But some preliminary observations are useful.

16. First, regional cooperation should not be seen as primarily a means to some fundamental transformation in the future--either full-market integration or as part of a broad economic restructuring, like the "global" approach proposes. In the long term, closer cooperation will contribute to more intensive forms of integration, but it will do so indirectly and incidentally, by building habits of cooperation and patterns of interaction.

17. Secondly, expectations about potential gains in economic growth should be realistic. Even if fully exploited, the gains from cooperation will be nothing dramatic--marginal increments to trade; gradual increases in industrial production; better, cheaper training, education, and research; and improved access to technical services. However, the cumulative impact, even in the short run, could still be significant, and the long-term effects even more so, in terms of institutional strengthening and the building of the groundwork for more complete future integration.

18. Thirdly, "regional cooperation" covers a lot of organizational territory. It can include informal, ad hoc collaboration; the use of national institutions as regional centers of excellence; the creation of formal, functionally specialized organizations such as the African Civil Aviation Association; or the groupings of states in multi-purpose "communities" (ECOWAS or CEAO, for example) or development coordinating bodies like SADCC.

19. Some activities or functions demand a highly institutionalized regional framework: market integration, development coordination, and most river basin management arrangements. Others, like technical service provision, including education and research, can be performed in a variety of organizational ways--nationally, lightly regional (ad hoc collaboration), moderately regional (centers of excellence), or more fully regional (a specialized regional organization or a subunit in a market integration or development coordination scheme).

20. The choice of approach--whether national or regional and, if regional, to what degree--should depend mainly on economic criteria or benefit-cost considerations.

GENERAL GUIDELINES

21. A number of broad changes have to be made in the present organizational environment if regional cooperation is to assume a more meaningful role.

Fewer and Less Complex Organizations

22. If regional activity is to contribute more fully to economic growth, the choice of organizational form should be determined by economic considerations. The economic benefits from regionalized activities that are not "regional" by nature come from three main sources: scale economies, improved productivity via specialization, and "critical mass" factors--the fact that intangible benefits from professional interaction are often inadequate where organizations fail to bring together a minimum number of professionals. But cooperative activities also have costs. Substantial transaction costs can be involved in the negotiation and maintenance of an international body. Actual fiscal costs can be significant when a small, poor country has to pay contributions to numerous regional organizations. And institutional opportunity costs exist; efforts to build regional research or training institutes or augment maintenance facilities usually mean reduced efforts to build comparable national institutions.

23. This suggests that an "Occam's razor" principle should prevail in the business of initiating (or sustaining) regional activities: the least complex instrument available should be used to achieve any given objective. Where separate national organizations can do a job almost as cheaply and well as a regional one, it is not desirable to adopt a regional approach. Where scale economies or critical mass can be attained without formal regionalization, the use of a national facility should be preferred to the formation of a new regional entity. This might mean, for example, systematized entry of nonnational students into a high-quality national school or facility--the "center of excellence" idea.

24. This suggests that, in practice, regional organizations should be preferred only when average costs of providing services (or goods) decline sharply for "production" beyond that supportable at the national level, and where piggybacking by other countries is not feasible. This implies considerably fewer formal regional organizations and much more varied informal or lightly structured cooperation between African states.

25. One important exception to this rule exists. Where national institutions are exceptionally weak compared to regional ones, it will sometimes be preferable to rely on the regional organization even when other considerations might point the other way. Agricultural research is the leading example, as will be discussed below.

Depoliticization

26. Politics may be the principal impulse behind economic cooperation between states, but in Africa excessive politicization is one of the principal reasons why economic benefits from cooperative activities have been few. Examples are numerous.

- o Political factors prevented an effective attack on the problem of organizational duplication and overlap in West Africa when an ECA/ECOWAS-led effort ended in recommending the virtual elimination of CEAO and its French connections. This was of course totally rejected by the CEAO states. The issue of duplication remains unresolved.
- o The CEAO completed in 1988 a splendid research and training facility for solar energy--the Centre de Recherches sur l'Energie Solaire or CRES, located in Bamako, Mali. It is big enough to serve well as an all-African facility. But the ECA decided in June 1988 that another solar energy research center should be created in Bujumbura, Burundi. The fact that CRES is a CEAO-financed center appears to be an important reason for refusing to make it the Africa-wide center.
- o The Niger Basin Authority leadership felt compelled to expand membership from Algeria to Benin, mainly for motives of prestige; the result was inclusion of members with minor interest in the planning of water use in the basin, and creation of a more cumbersome body with more diverse and uncommitted membership.

27. The development financing bodies associated with market integration schemes provide another example. These organizations (such as the Fonds Communautaire de Développement and FOSIDEC of the CEAO, the Entente Fund, or the ECOWAS Fund) are exposed to intensive political pressures in the allocation of investment resources or guarantees. Thus the CEAO has built lavish schools in member states: the solar energy facility (CRES) in Mali; a Fisheries school in Mauritania; a textile school in Mali; a mining facility in Niger; a business school in Senegal. The cost and scale of most of these schools appears excessive in relation to needs, a result no doubt related to their character as political compensation projects.

Consolidation: The Elimination of Duplication

28. These political factors are one cause of a widely denounced phenomenon--organizational overlapping and duplication of functions. Not only do ECA/OAU "communities" encompass other market integration entities (Mano River Union and the Entente Fund in West Africa, as well as CEAO and the UDEAC in Central West Africa), but many of the OAU/ECA technical service organizations cover activities replicated by subunits of the development coordinating organization (CILSS and SADCC) or the river basin authorities.

29. Some consolidation is taking place by force of necessity; the March 1988 merger of the financially ailing African Remote Sensing Organization in Bamako with the ECA's cartographic organization in Algiers is one example. But much more can be done. The proposals made by the UN/ECA group are indicative of the scope for rationalization.

Specialization

30. A related feature of the intergovernmental organizational landscape is the tendency toward diffuse organizational mandates. Market integration organizations, coordinating bodies, and river basin authorities all tend to occupy the same functional terrain, and to extend their jurisdiction into areas covered by more specialized technical agencies. Thus SADCC and PTA cover industrial investment, transport, and agriculture, and SADCC is concerned with activities such as airline schedule coordination, which is the responsibility of the African Civil Aviation Association. The Kagera Basin Organization is, as noted earlier, a striking case of organizational diffusion; it seeks to operate in all areas, from overall development planning to sectoral programming, agricultural research and other technical matters.

31. Aside from problems of jurisdictional conflict, this tendency toward proliferation of functions works against the development of competence and effectiveness via specialization. Moreover, the combination of many willing foreign donors and a multiplicity of organizations with excessively broad mandates creates a permanent propensity toward organizational diffusion. Coordination and specialization both suffer.

32. As a general rule, specialization is to be preferred, which means that the functional bodies (the port management associations, regional agricultural operations, the Civil Aviation Association, etc.) are the

appropriate agencies for technical service provision. The all-purpose organizations (CEAO, PTA, SADCC, CILSS, KBO, etc.) should be discouraged from excursion into functional programs that are either far from their central purposes or for which specialized organizations already exist. The trade-related (market integration) organizations should concentrate more on trade expansion and less on global development objectives.

Internal Management Reform

33. Some regional organizations are well run, indeed are among the best-organized and smoothly functioning institutions in Africa. The Inter-state Veterinaries School in Dakar is an example. But many others are in deep disarray. They depend on government contributions for basic operating budgets, but this funding comes erratically if at all, making progress on planning nearly impossible, and sometimes reducing the organization to a simple holding operation without much real activity. Internal coordination is often weak: the sometimes stormy and generally uncertain relationship between CILSS and its components (the Sahel Institute and AGRHYMET) is one example. A more striking one was provided by the lack of managerial control by CEAO over the FCSIDEC, which led to large-scale embezzlement of funds in 1984.

34. More basic perhaps is the politicization of staff recruitment. National quotas and general political considerations determine management and staff recruitment with merit criteria sometimes neglected. Management rights to fire and/or tie wages to performance are restricted.

35. There is also in some cases a problem of anomalies in consultant fees and excessive staff travel. Much of the work of regional planning and coordination involves travel and consultancies, so the need cannot be denied. But there is in some cases a risk of excessive consulting fees and "travel agency" behavior. Material incentives to travel can be extremely strong.

36. Management of many regional organizations will have to improve before they can play a larger role or even attract enough financial support to do more than survive. Some needed reforms are clear enough: introduction of more merit-based recruiting systems and devolution of responsibilities for personnel decisions to operating managers; reinforcement of internal financial controls within the economic communities and, for coordinating organizations in particular, closer controls over travel costs and consultancies.

37. But more basic changes in approaches to financing should also be considered. Some African regional organizations have responded creatively to the financial austerity that has become widespread in recent years. They have sought more financial autonomy from their governing boards, and have obtained financing from domestic and external sources for particular projects and/or some share of core costs--ORANA in Dakar, for example. One suggested model emerges: the research/training/educational/technical service organization could be given temporary core financing and some technical assistance to help it become project oriented--i.e. it would prepare specific projects for which it would seek financing, rather than depend on general support.

SOME SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

38. The following are brief summaries of propositions developed more fully in the report.

Trade Expansion

39. Because ECOWAS, CEAO, PTA, et al. have proved such ineffective vehicles for expanding trade, and have uncertain medium-term prospects, there is no compelling reason to channel all trade-enhancing programs through these organizations. Ad hoc attacks on specific bottlenecks may be more effective-- a special import credit scheme for a chronically deficit country, for example, or trade mission financing in countries where information about regional sources of supply or regional markets appear to be deficient.

40. This is not to imply that existing preferential arrangements should be systematically ignored. It is rather that the interested parties can often reduce obstacles to trade by focused, bilateral (or trilateral) arrangements. For example, it may be possible to reinvigorate livestock and meat exports from Niger to Nigeria and from Mali and Burkina Faso to the Côte d'Ivoire. This possibility could be explored within the CILSS or as an autonomous effort by a particular donor and/or local governments. It is hard in this case to see any special advantages in going through CILSS or any of the other formal regional bodies with possible jurisdictional claims (e.g. CILSS, ECOWAS, CEAO, or even the Niger Basin Authority), and there are some disadvantages in doing so. The initial studies, project preparation and eventual implementation of policy changes or new programs would be quicker and easier if only the principals are involved.

41. The idea of having a regionalized trade policy reform program has emerged, notably in discussions between World Bank staff and PTA officials. The concept is attractive: assistance for trade credit facilities, trade fairs, transport links, etc. in return for multilateral trade policy reforms. The content of the arrangement remains to be defined, and there are some reasons for skepticism; negotiations with the PTA are sure to be long and cumbersome, and it is hard to see advantages accruing from the involvement of all fifteen PTA states in policy reform programs that will primarily concern only a few of them. But this approach is worth pursuing and may break new ground.

Food Security

42. Two sets of questions are at issue: the division of responsibilities in agricultural research and proposals for regionalized tariff protection and security stock policies.

43. Regional agricultural research organizations should be given greater responsibility in attacking Africa's agricultural technology bottlenecks. (These organizations are really international, not regional; other than at the CGIAR (international) agencies, there is very little regional agricultural research going on in Africa.) The conventional division of labor between

international, regional and national institutions--"basic" research by the internationals, "applied" by the regionals and "adaptive" by the national stations--is not altogether appropriate because of the weakness of the national research bodies and the urgency of the existing technological crisis. Hence the CGIAR organizations should take on more applied and even adaptive research tasks--for example, by doing more farming system work on their own stations and at national centers, using their own staff. At the same time, major new efforts should be made to train African agricultural scientists, in African universities and abroad, and on the job in the CGIAR institutions.

44. These are not radically different proposals than many now in circulation, except that less emphasis is given to short-term institution building of national facilities. The reason is that national agricultural research capacities will continue in all but a few cases to suffer from grossly inadequate salaries for professionals, lack of budgetary continuity and adequacy (no money for repairs, fuel, etc.), and a generally poor administrative environment. Nor is there much reason to believe that foreign technical assistance to national research centers can assure quality and continuity of expatriate staff.

45. The idea of a protected West African regional market for cereals has been proposed, notably at the December 1986 meeting of CILSS/Club du Sahel in Mindelo, Cape Verde. The proposal addresses a real problem--what to do about competition from cereals (especially rice) that are often low priced relative to local cereals because of distorted world prices, and the institutional inability of some states--those in the West African Monetary Union--to adjust overvalued exchange rates. But the economic advantages of protection even at the national level are questionable. Given present technological constraints, inelasticities of substitution in consumption and production are such that import replacement (notably for rice) is a high-cost and inefficient policy. Recent studies of Senegalese food policy, for example, suggest that even an 80 percent increase in domestic rice prices would lead to a rise of only 8 percent in cereals self-supply.¹

46. To be effective, moreover, given the porous frontiers of the subregion, the scheme would have to harmonize the disparate import and food-pricing policies of proposed member countries (free-trading Gambia, for example, and protectionist Senegal) which does not seem feasible. Moreover, other costs would be high. To protect rice prices alone (as has been suggested) would introduce important intrasectoral distortions. The reduction of consumer income would be considerable, given the large differences between local production costs and the landed cost of imports. Impacts on the balance of payments and growth of output would probably be negative. Poor consumers would suffer, including that large percentage of rural households that are net buyers of cereals.

1. Frederic Martin, "Food Security and Comparative Advantage in Senegal: a Micro-Macro Approach," Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1988, p. 217.

47. These outcomes make the protected regional market a questionable answer to the problem of agricultural competitiveness in the Sahel countries of West Africa. Stabilization of import prices by imposition of a variable levy is more appropriate, since it protects against the sharp periodic drops in world prices without divorcing local from world prices. And there are other measures better suited to improve competitiveness.

48. Another proposal for a regional approach to food security has surfaced in East and Southern Africa. A recent (January 1987)² consultancy study proposes the creation of a food security fund that would enable food deficit countries to purchase grains from neighboring surplus producers, instead of relying on food aid. The aim is to reduce distortions due to the easy availability of food aid. But the detailed costs and benefits have to be assessed, as well as possible effects on supplies of emergency food aid. And the highly skewed benefits, mainly to Zimbabwe and Malawi, raise issues of political acceptability.

Export Crop Research

49. Greater regional efforts should be made to increase the productivity of export crops and expand market shares in the industrial countries. Export crop research has been neglected in recent decades; food production preoccupations have dominated research priorities. But tree crops, oilseeds, fibers and other traditional exports will continue to be of major significance. The recreation or strengthening of preindependence joint research facilities, such as the West African Cocoa Research Institute, could have high payoffs.

Regional Industrial Projects

50. The ASEAN countries have created a special fund for regional industrial investments, financed in part by Japanese aid. Two fertilizer plants have been financed under this arrangement. The idea would seem to have some possible applicability in Africa and should be explored. It could be Africa-wide and autonomous, attached to the African Development Bank, or to several of the subregional trade groupings.

The Development Financing Organizations

51. These should be divided into two categories--the ADB on the one side, and the mostly "community"-attached banks and funds on the other (the Fonds Communautaire de Développement of CEAO, the PTA Development Bank, etc.). All the regional financing institutions face one serious problem in allocating investment resources: they are subject to particularly strong political influences. The trade-related financing institutions are constrained, in addition, by their noneconomic mandate--i.e. to provide "compensation" to losers by trade diversion, and to encourage "balanced" regional expansion.

2. Vakakis and Associates, SADCC Regional Food Reserve/Food Aid Study, SADCC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Harare, January 1987.

52. To increase the yield from investments financed by the regional banks, two changes should be considered. First, the African Development Bank should pull back from its heavy involvement in policy-based lending, which is not suitable for a politically responsive institution. It should restrict itself to project lending, and to training, studies, and policy dialogue. Secondly, the other financial institutions should move away from compensation by investment projects and more fully toward cash compensation arrangements.

The Development Coordinating and River Basin Organizations

53. These all suffer, in greater or lesser degree, from lack of clear and focused mandates, and consequent tendencies toward functional proliferation--a kind of organization imperialism. SADCC is the most focused, given its origins as an organization designed to provide alternatives to reliance on South Africa. But even SADCC is now being advised to expand its horizons (to trade matters, for example) and to formalize its structures.

54. Narrow focus and specialization is the best approach for these organizations. The river basin organizations need to provide overall planning and research-contracting capacity on matters related to water flow and usage. They should not manage joint facilities (power plants, for example) but leave that to national agencies or autonomous bodies. They should get out of the business of developing "comprehensive" project lists, or "global" development plans.

55. The same is true of CILSS and SADCC (and the newcomer, IGGAD in East Africa). These should concentrate on their aid coordination functions and on limited high-priority objectives. CILSS, for example, is best seen as a coordinating body, and a specialist agency on Sahelian environmental matters and on food security, narrowly defined--e.g. early warning systems and food aid management. CILSS should not be engaged in agricultural research programs that compete with more specialized research agencies such as SAFGRAD or the CGIAR institutions. Nor should it try to manage "regional" projects of its own, as it tried to do with an integrated pest management project a few years ago. And a cutback in the very large number and wide range of subjects of its regional meetings would lead to increased effectiveness.

Education and Training

56. In formal education, notably at the postsecondary level, the "centers of excellence" approach seems to be the most efficient. Scale economies can be exploited and "critical mass" advantages achieved by building up national centers and encouraging entry by nationals from other African countries. Donors have an obvious role here.

Transport

57. There are perhaps more opportunities for regional cooperation in the transport sector than in any other: regional or subregional airlines; joint maintenance facilities (or center of excellence arrangements); and sharing of

technology and experience by associations of institutions (port management, railways, airlines and airport managers, etc.).

58. The discussion of cooperation in this sector was dominated for some time by the goal of constructing Pan African infrastructure--notable highways. Recently, a consensus has emerged that development priorities call first for rehabilitation and maintenance of key segments of national road and rail networks which are now often badly deteriorated. The African infrastructure called for in the Transport Decade Plans of ECA are accordingly given lower priority by most specialists. The ad hoc approach is more relevant: interventions are called for where high costs of transport significantly limit intraregional trade and cooperation.

59. One long-standing proposal for regional cooperation does not seem to have been adequately assessed--the proposal for joint regional shipping lines. This idea, based on suspicion of collusion among existing shipping lines and market failure under the conference line arrangements, should be studied.

60. These briefly described ideas for regional cooperation are hardly exhaustive. They are simply illustrative of the range of incremental or ad hoc approaches that can make real contributions to African development.

61. From the perspective of broader strategy concerns, what is important to underscore is that these contributions are unlikely to be realized if African spokesmen continue to bestow priority attention to market integration approaches, especially when even its official partisans no longer truly believe in it. Nor is there any prospect that these contributions can be realized if regional integration becomes part of larger programs of massive economic restructuring, such as is proposed in the ECA's "global" strategy.

62. The more modest approach outlined here is more promising. It recognizes the nature of potential benefits from regional approaches and also takes into account the special features and needs of the African region. Guided by the simple question: how can regional cooperation help overcome specific obstacles to development, the more modest approach is likely to help Africa's economic recovery in the short run; in the long run it can help define future options not now observable.

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**REGIONALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

VOLUME II

**PROFILES OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

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VOLUME II

PROFILES OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

I. THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILES: PURPOSE, FORMAT, SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The purpose of the profiles is to support the general study by providing more detailed discussion of the organizations surveyed than was possible in the chapters themselves. We succeeded in finding basic information on 141 organizations. They are the building blocks upon which the study is built. The profiles should also prove useful in their own right. The collection in this volume provides a comprehensive summary of the nature and activities of the significant organizations operating regionally in Africa. It represents a more detailed inventory than can be found elsewhere.

The profiles are presented in this volume in alphabetical order; those organizations headquartered in francophone countries are listed under their French name. The profiles include the basic information on each organization: objectives, functions, structure, financing, date of establishment and official languages. A section titled "comments" generally concludes each profile, reporting recent developments and assessing the organization, when possible. To facilitate the reader's journey through a sea of acronyms, an annex to this volume provides an alphabetical list of acronyms of the organizations in Volume II, as well as some additional often-cited acronyms of international organizations.

This supporting volume and the main study that it complements gained significantly from extensive field visits and interviews conducted in Africa. APDEC researchers travelled to 25 African countries. They visited over 150 organizations, collecting substantial documentation and literature. At these regional organizations, government offices and donor agencies, APDEC researchers interviewed over 500 people.

The profiles thus draw on information from a variety of sources found both in the field and in the United States: annual reports, information brochures and technical documents published by the organization; internal and external reviews and evaluations of the organization; field interviews with officials of the organization, with donors, and with third parties; studies and journal articles; books and newspaper and magazine articles.

The level of detail of each profile necessarily varies with the availability of information from the above sources. Organizations have therefore been included even if some "vital statistics," such as current annual budget or staff size, are not known. The scope of the "comments" section in particular varies by organization. Moreover, the substance of this section depends on the perceptions of those interviewed as well as on the selected documentation made available to us. To the extent that they

represent individual judgments made on the basis of available information, these comments, and the sometimes irreverent judgments that they express, should be seen as representing "unofficial" perceptions of the problems, or degree of effectiveness of the organizations concerned. Unfortunately, the price paid for visiting so many organizations on our field trips was the lack of time to corroborate every "story" we heard.

Finally, it was not possible to accumulate a similar amount of information for every organization in existence, or even for every organization visited. Indeed, primarily due to limited or outdated documentation in Washington, failures to reply to written inquiries, and a limited travel budget, it was not possible to put together profiles on every organization listed in existing compendiums. For the sake of comprehensiveness, we have included in this volume an unadorned list of all these organizations in a second annex.¹ This supplements the table of contents of this compendium. We believe that together the two listings amount to the most comprehensive and up-to-date directory of regional organizations in Africa.

¹. It should be noted that many organizations made this list on the basis of one written reference. Thus there is a possibility that some may no longer exist or that some may actually be national institutions, mistakenly reported as regional by the original source. The listing has been compiled from a variety of sources (including interviews in the field). However, the primary sources were the following directories:

International Monetary Fund, Directory of Regional Economic Organizations and Intergovernmental Commodity and Development Organizations, June 1985.

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Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement, Les Organismes Régionaux en Afrique, Tomes I and II, October 1981.

Africa South of the Sahara, 1985-1986. 15th ed., Europa Publications (London).

United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Bulletin of ECA-Sponsored Institutions, Vols. 1 and 2, January 1986.

Association des Organisations Intergouvernementales de l'Afrique de L'Ouest, "Répertoire des Organisations Intergouvernementales de l'Afrique de l'Ouest," Réunion du Comité des Experts, 27-30 Janvier 1986.

Union of International Associations, ed., African International Organization Directory 1984/85. 1st ed., K.G. Saur (Munich).

Yearbook of International Organizations, 1985/86, Second Edition.

II. WHAT ORGANIZATIONS TO INCLUDE

A major objective of this study was to identify and describe regional organizations in Africa. However, in approaching this task, we faced a formidable problem of definition: what precisely is an African regional organization? Is it to be defined in terms of membership, sources of finance, physical location, scope of activity--or some, or all, of these characteristics?

In the end we elected to fudge this definitional dilemma, or, put otherwise, to be "pragmatic." We did not restrict our treatment of organizations to those falling within a narrow definition of "African Regional Organization" for two reasons: it might have hampered us in addressing the more important issue of appropriate regional approaches; and these organizations do not lend themselves to easy definition.

A. Regional Approaches Versus Regional Organizations

This study has focused on the issue of appropriate and effective regional approaches in tackling specific development constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa. As the study proceeded, it became clear that a large variety of organizational models are utilized in Africa to capture the benefits of regional approaches to development. To the extent that they all treat a regional need in a regional manner, they are all relevant to this study. Therefore, in answering the question: which organizations should be included, we used elastic criteria. The only restrictive conditions we set down are that the organization address a "regional" need ("regional" here being defined as two or more Sub-Saharan African countries) and that the organization has either its headquarters or a regional office in the area.

B. Organizational Diversity

Organizations operating in Africa vary in many fundamental ways. Some are intergovernmental, others nongovernmental. Most are initiated by Africans, but some key entities are regional offshoots of agencies formed and headquartered elsewhere. ICIPE, for example, the insect research organization, can easily be considered "international" rather than inter-African. It has a world-wide mandate, does work outside of Africa, and is financed and directed by the international community. Yet it was initiated by an African, focuses on problems specific to the region and its largely African staff is headquartered in Nairobi. Among organizations operating regionally in Africa, there is great variety in how they originated, and in how they are managed, staffed, financed.

A more systematic delineation of these various, contrasting dimensions clarifies this point further.

1. Funding

The nature and source of funding varies substantially among regional organizations in Africa, bringing up at once issues of dependency, sustainability, self-reliance, and African "ownership." Indeed some of the most

effective regional organizations in Africa are hardly funded at all by Africans. In certain organizations the entire budget, including the recurrent administrative and operating costs of the headquarters (such as salaries and rent) is covered by donors. The international agricultural research centers such as IITA and ILCA are a case in point. They are funded entirely by the international community, via the CGIAR. ALERT (the All Africa Leprosy Rehabilitation and Training Center) fits this mold, financed almost entirely by ILEP (the International Leprosy Association). RIPS (the Regional Institute for Population Studies), meanwhile, gets its operating funds from the UN.

In the case of most regional organizations, however, membership dues from African sources is expected to cover at least the core administrative and institutional budget. Even in these instances, though, program costs generally require external financing. Not only is this the case for regional organizations such as the CEAO and SADCC, but it is also true of donor-initiated projects such as SAFGRAD. Only in rare instances (usually when an organization actually generates its own revenue) are core program costs funded without significant recourse to external financing, as is the case, for example, of the West African Examination Council and the West African Insurance Institute.

2. Staffing

The regional organizations profiled vary substantially with respect to the proportion of their staff that is African. Most have totally African staffs, supplemented by a few technical assistants from donor agencies. A few rely heavily on non-African staff; ASECNA, for example, the regional airport management agency, had 195 staff members seconded by the French in 1986. This is true also of many of the disease control/medical research organizations, such as ALERT and the OCCGE, the French-sponsored epidemic control body. It is also the case with the important CGIAR centers such as IITA and ILCA.

3. Membership

Membership characteristics of the organizations vary drastically in three key respects. First, they vary in the exclusiveness of African membership. Organizations treated in this study range from ECOWAS, whose membership is limited to West African nations, to the IITA whose members are primarily donors--only three African countries were members in 1987. Between these extremes are several organizations which, with varying degrees of dependence (financial, management and otherwise), have ties (some more formal than others) to umbrella international institutions. Within this category, for example, is the ECA, a UN agency; CAFS, a branch of the International Planned Parenthood Federation; ALERT funded primarily by the International Leprosy Association; AFCAC under the wing of the International Civil Aviation Organization; and ARIPO with close ties to the World Intellectual Property Organization.

Organizations vary also in terms of their membership "units." The more well-known organizations tend to be those with national governments as members. This is the case with ECOWAS, CILSS and SADCC, for example.

However, many regional organizations have a membership of nongovernmental institutions (albeit inclusive of many parastatals). Thus AFRAA is made up of airline companies, PMAWCA of port management associations, the AAU of universities, and the AACC of churches. Finally individuals are the primary unit of membership in many cases. This is so for African regional organizations such as the ACCE, the Inter-African Union of Lawyers, and the Association of African Physicists and Mathematicians.

Third, regional organizations vary in whether members have access or ownership rights to the organization through the payment of dues or through the subscription of equity capital. In the case of IGADD, members participate in the organization by paying a regular membership fee. On the other hand, in the case of the African Development Bank, Africa-Re, Shelter-Afrique and Hotafric, members put up capital. Indeed with respect to Africa-Re and Air Afrique, the organization is actually a corporation.

4. Regional Activity

While they all address regional problems, not all these organizations actually operate and implement programs across national boundaries. Indeed, while organizations such as the DLCO (the locust control organization for East Africa) actually implement an activity throughout the subregion (e.g. spraying), SADCC and PMAWCA (the port management association) engage in programming and coordination on the regional level but leave actual implementation of programs to national authorities. L'Ecole Polytechnique de Thiès, on the other hand, is a national institution, operating solely in one country, but serving a regional clientele.

5. Organization

A variety of organizational structures exist. Some organizations are complicated administratively, with large mandates. Others are structurally lighter. We include the West African Examinations Council, with a permanent secretariat and a full-time staff of 110, but also the International Congress of Africanists, which has no full-time staff and no permanent secretariat, and undertakes a regional activity only once every five years.

The organizations surveyed thus vary in one or more of the above five dimensions. Our interest in being fully inclusive of regional approaches, rather than restrictive, has led us to present in this volume as wide a variety of African "regional" organizations as possible. No strict definition of the "African Regional Organization" was used to eliminate a particular institution on the basis of its characteristics. No systematic attempt was made to exclude consideration of an organization solely on the basis of its structure, source of financing, or nationality of staff, for example. Since the emphasis in the overall study is on determining the most appropriate kinds of activities for capturing the benefits of regional action, we have included organizations of any type, whatever their characteristics, so long as they seemed to be making a contribution to the resolution of priority problems.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people contributed to the preparation of this volume, and to the overall study. Michael Aliber provided general administrative leadership, including organization of the files and assistance to research assistants. He also wrote many of the profiles. Jehan Arulpragasam and Régis Marodon, the Senior Investigators, were responsible for the field interviews; they were accompanied by Elliot Berg in initial interviews. They also wrote or helped with many profiles. Other profile writers were: Robert Barad, Modibo Makalou, Cinthya Whittaker, and Meng-Hua Zeng. Nancy Berg had overall editorial responsibility, with assistance from Cinthya Whittaker. Alexander Berg helped in resolving computer/printing problems. Elliot Berg did some substantive editing and provided overall direction.

One of the potentially valuable by-products of the study is the existence of a large set of files containing numerous documents on individual organizations. These files, which will be available for consultation by interested researchers, are located at 907 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22314.

Elliot Berg
Project Director
October 1988

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African Airlines Association (AFRAA)

Address: Secretary General, AFRAA Building, Mombasa Road, P.O. Box 20116, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1968

Membership: Membership is open to national carriers owned by OAU member states and/or carriers owned by citizens of such states. Fifteen airlines founded AFRAA. Currently the membership stands at 35 state-owned airlines representing 44 member states.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: The promotion of safe, regular, economical and efficient air transport; promotion of the rapid development of air navigation communication; foster closer cooperation among African air transport enterprises.

Functions: Five standing committees implement AFRAA's specific, priority objectives. Three are of particular interest. The Traffic Committee is responsible for schedule planning and timetables. The Economic and Finance Committee is responsible for the development of joint commercial activities. The Training Committee's largest responsibility is to examine joint training programs to accelerate the Africanization of member personnel. The Legal Committee advises AFRAA members on the legal implications of any policy changes.

Structure: The association's highest authority is its General Assembly. The Assembly's Executive Committee directs the affairs of the Association while the Secretary-General, appointed by the General Assembly, manages the affairs of AFRAA.

Financing: The organization including a new office building, is completely financed by member airlines. AFRAA is presently searching for external funding to conduct several proposed studies.

Comments: A recent article (Development Horizons, April 1988) said of AFRAA's track record in the crucial area of developing joint commercial activities: they have "come up with many brilliant ideas, but not much has been achieved."

Among the few concrete accomplishments are standardization of some testing procedures for airline personnel, the publication of an AFRAA timetable, and ad hoc maintenance and servicing pooling arrangements among African airlines in Rome and London.

Several ideas have been proposed, some studies are underway, and financing is being sought for others. Among the interesting proposals being discussed are the establishment of a data bank on airline statistics, pooling arrangements to reduce insurance costs, joint maintenance centers, joint purchasing arrangements, a joint aircraft leasing and financing company, and a joint computer reservation system.

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African Association for Public Administration
and Management (AAPAM)
Association Africaine pour l'Administration
et la Gestion des Affaires Publiques

Address: The Secretary-General, P.O.Box 60072, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Established: 1971

Membership: There are 15 corporate members and some 500 individual members.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To foster the professionalism of public administration and management in Africa and particularly to develop an increasing appreciation of their value and importance.

Functions: Organizes seminars, short courses and conferences on special issues in the field of public administration and management; sponsors research on the problems relating to administrative and management practices; publishes and distributes documents such as newsletters, research papers and a journal to promote information exchange; provides consultative services. It also promotes a regional scheme of exchange of public servants and managers.

Structure: The Council is the policy organ; it is made up of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary-General, the Chairman of National Chapters, five representatives of the corporate members and five representatives of individual members. The Council meets once a year. There is a General Meeting which is held at least once every three years to approve the policies of the Council and elect the President and Vice-Presidents.

The Executive Committee is responsible for the general direction of the Association; it meets at least twice a year. The Permanent Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General. Total staff number two.

Financing: Consists of entrance fees and subscriptions from the members plus payment for services and publications. In addition, several organizations give donations and grants. Among the more significant of these are the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Ford Foundation, and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD); the ECA provides free accommodations.

Comments: The activities of the Association are mainly conducted on a project-by-project basis. This means that publication of a book will be subject to the willingness of some donor or institution to finance that particular book project. Considering that only 2 people (the Secretary General and assistant) work full time for the association, the number of publications and seminars conducted is quite impressive.

The major and most serious problem is shortage of funds. The Association must rely on donors to remain viable. Due to financing problems, quite a few projects have had to be dropped or delayed.

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African Confederation of Cooperative Savings and Credit Associations (ACCOSCA)

Address: Executive Secretary, P.O.B. 43278, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1968

Membership: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To accelerate the growth of household and domestic savings and also to expand the amount of lending to lower-income Africans for health and education purposes.

Functions: To educate the public on the benefits of adhering to a regular savings program and also to encourage increased lending on the part of banks (and other lending institutions) through training of personnel.

Structure: The governing body of ACCOSCA is the General Assembly consisting of one delegate from each member country. It meets every two years at which time it elects the Board of Directors. Each of ACCOSCA's five administrative regions is represented on the Board: Eastern African Region; Southern African Region; Western African Gulf Region; and Western African Region. There is also a secretariat composed of the Executive Secretary, five departmental chiefs, and eleven technical support staff.

Financing: ACCOSCA depends heavily on outside assistance. For example, in 1982, 92 percent of its operating funds came from donors.

African Council on Communication Education (ACCE)

Address: Executive Secretary, P.O. Box 47495, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1976

Membership: 30 schools of journalism and mass communications in Sub-Saharan Africa, plus individuals and private enterprises.

Language(s): English, French, and Portuguese.

Objectives: To promote cooperation and coordination in the fields of journalism and other media in such a way as to address Africa's development priorities.

Functions: The "four pillars" of the ACCE are training, research, publication, and documentation. Eight-week training programs are the most common, addressing topics such as media management, rural media development; theater education, etc. Topics for research include impact of new technologies, and the links between traditional and modern methods of communication.

Among the ACCE's publications are: a journal, African Media Review; a quarterly newsletter, Africom; a monograph series; and a series, soon to be started, of textbooks on communications. To date, the ACCE has started six documentation centers.

Structure: The secretariat is comprised of 11 full-time staff. The Council is fundamentally a loose association of its members who are either individuals or institutions (private and public training institutions, including ecumenical groups). They are tied to headquarters through national chapters, each handled by national coordinators (voluntary, part-time contact people in each country.)

Financing: The ACCE was started with an initial grant of \$100,000 from UNESCO. Currently, West Germany contributes 37 percent of the budget via the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, and UNESCO 20 percent of the budget. Other donors include Canada, Denmark, the US, and SIDA. Membership subscriptions amount to approximately 17 percent of the budget, and revenues from training programs and publication sales contribute as well.

Comments: ACCE operates through its member institutions, making it difficult to distinguish its accomplishments. Keeping that in mind, the ACCE has been involved in setting up six documentation centers in member institutes, and implementing training programs on communications policy and planning, media management and rural communications. It also acts as a network which permits support and sharing of expertise across the continent. The Council's clearest accomplishments are its publications that give African scholars an outlet for publication and generate training material relevant to needs specific to Africa. The Council focuses on training middle cadre ministerial personnel. It places importance on sensitizing policymakers to communication planning and to the appropriate use and need for rural media.

African Curriculum Organization (ACO)

Address: Chairman/Executive Secretary, Malawi Institute of Education, Domasi, Malawi.

Established: 1976

Membership: Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To improve curriculum development in Africa.

Functions: The ACO sponsors short- and long-term courses (two-three weeks and nine-twelve months respectively), study tours, and educational research. The ACO also publishes course materials, occasional reports relating to research, and directories, mostly of specialists in various fields of educational development. The ACO's Resource Centre/Clearing House, located at the ACO's headquarters in Ibadan, assembles curriculum information from all over Africa, as well as general materials on education.

Structure: There are no full-time staff, as both the Chairman and Executive Secretary are faculty at the University of Ibadan. The secretarial staff are also drawn from the University. The Representative Council, which meets annually, makes policy and program suggestions.

Financing: The University of Ibadan houses the ACO, funds some of its activities, and "lends" it secretarial assistance. Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, and Mauritius assisted the ACO in its early years, but since then training programs have been largely funded by the host country. UNEP and West Germany have also helped with training programs and seminars, and UNESCO has helped finance two of the ACC's publications.

Comments: The ACO has a clear purpose and worthwhile vocation and, more remarkable for an organization of small size and with a small budget, is consistently active. Since 1976, there has been at least one short-term training program every year, and a long-term training program every second year. There have been study tours approximately every other year, at which time the Representative Council meets as well.

African Groundnut Council (AGC)

Address: Executive Secretary, Trade Fair Complex, Badagry Expressway Km 15, P.O. Box 3025, Lagos, Nigeria.

Established: 1964

Membership: Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To ensure remunerative prices for groundnuts and their by-products in the world market; to promote the production and expansion of consumption of groundnut and groundnut products; to organize the exchange of technical and scientific information; to establish continuous liaison and promote solidarity among the member states, particularly in those member states most handicapped by natural or accidental conditions concerning groundnuts.

Functions: Collects technical information and statistical data on groundnuts and groundnut products, and disseminates the relevant information and research

results to member states; undertakes research work and organizes international symposia; coordinates the policies and activities of each member state on groundnuts and groundnut products, in particular on the expansion of intra-African trade; solicits financial support and technical assistance for specific programs from international organizations such as EAC, EEC, FAO, ITC; negotiates for better prices for groundnuts and groundnut products.

Structure: The Council of Ministers makes final decisions regarding the policies of the AGC, and The Council of Representatives of the member states, which meets twice yearly, is responsible for its proper functioning. There are seven Special Committees under the Council of Representatives: the Finance and Administrative Committee; the Economic and Commercial Committee; the Scientific and Technical Committee; the Sales Committee; the Contracts Committee; the Compensation Fund (created in 1981); and the Permanent Scientific Committee. Each committee meets at least once a year. The Executive Secretariat has two departments: the Economic and Commercial Department, and the Scientific and Technical Department.

Financing: The AGC is financed by its member states through their annual contributions according to agreed percentages. Donors contribute funds for specific projects.

Comments: The AGC has been most successful in the coordination of information exchange and research efforts. In June 1982, with support from the EEC, FAO and the ITC, the AGC organized an international symposium in Banjul, Gambia on "Production, World Oilseeds Market and Intra-African Trade in Groundnut and Groundnut Products." The "Plan of Action for Groundnuts" produced at the symposium claims to facilitate quick realization of AGC objectives. The papers presented at the symposium and later published include various recommendations on production, processing and marketing of groundnuts and by-products.

Despite its efforts, the AGC has achieved little in the way of promoting production, trade, and better prices. This is probably due to exogenous factors such as a declining demand for groundnuts in world markets, protectionist policies in member states and concurrent drought and diseases. Moreover, in the face of these factors, member governments frequently act contrary to the objectives of the organization. Nigeria, for example, disregarded AGC trade promotion efforts in recently banning imports of groundnuts and vegetable oil. Agreements made under the aegis of the Council are frequently not put into practice, and member states' financial support to the AGC has dwindled as well. Its European office had to be closed due to lack of funds, although this office was an important liaison to the EEC--the major importer of Africa's groundnuts.

African Institute for Higher Technical Training (AIHTTR)
Institut Supérieur Africain d'Etudes et de Recherches Technologiques (ISART)

Address: Director, P.O. Box 53763, City Square Post Office,
Haile Selassie Ave., Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1979

Membership: Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Zaire.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To make Africa self-reliant in technical manpower.

Functions: To provide higher-level technical training to African students.

Structure: The cabinet defines the main objectives of the organization, which are implemented by the Director of the Institute. AIHTTR was founded by the ECA Conference of Ministers, is a member of the Conference of Chief Executives of ECA-sponsored regional institutions, and it belongs to the industrial development and services group which promotes the coordination of work programs.

Financing: The operating budget is roughly \$750,000, based on contributions from member states. Financial support for workshops and seminars is provided by United Nations bodies such as ECA, UNDP, UNESCO, and WHO.

Comments: AIHTTR exists mostly on paper. Very few achievements have been realized. Only three people work for the Institute, and only 5 percent of eligible applicants for courses the institute is supposed to run have been offered some training. Adequate staff has not yet been recruited and infrastructural facilities, provided for free by the host country (Kenya), are inadequate. The Institute has therefore concentrated on giving regional short-term workshops and seminars. Twenty-three states have so far benefitted from these courses on such topics as educational technology, urban environment monitoring and measurement techniques, drinking water treatment and waterworks management.

The nonpayment of assessed contributions is the main reason for the present situation. Some 90 percent of the voted budget is in arrears (roughly \$3 mn.). Only 3 of the 13 members have supported the Institute so far, and only 2 of the remaining 10 have expressed some willingness to pay.

The Institute has drawn up some proposals for a reorientation of its program to respond more directly to African Governments' industrial training needs (farm machinery, electrical motors design and construction, water supply engineering, etc.). Some impressive, grandiose plans for the future school have been made and financing is being sought. Kenya has donated 300 acres of land for the construction of the building, but no donors seem to be interested in the project up to now. The survival of the program is in question at this point. AIHTTR is perhaps a typical example of an interregional organization which thinks "from above" about suitable institutions to be set up, and pays very little attention to serving real needs or priority areas. This severe assessment is supported by the distrust shown towards the organization both by African countries and by all donors.

African Regional Advanced Level Telecommunication Institute
(AFRALTI)
Institut Regional Africain des Hautes Etudes en Telecommunication

Address: Director, P.O. Box 30305, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1988

Membership: 14 english-speaking countries of Eastern and Southern countries.

Language(s): English

Functions: To set up a school to train postal and telecommunication officers, postal assistants, and postal controllers.

Comments: The implementation of a regional school in post and telecommunications is not new. The former EAPT (East African Post and Telecommunication) Institute was previously serving this regional goal. After the East African Community collapsed in 1977, the school was nationalized and became a Kenyan school. It continued to serve regional needs, the only difference being that countries sending their students to the Kenyan school had to pay a determined fee. On average, 20 foreigners out of 300 students were participating in courses every year. Politics was instrumental in the decision to start an international institute.

AFRALTI is not yet operational. Staff is not yet recruited. Some courses were organized in May 1988 under the auspices of the newly formed IFRALTI, financed by the International Telecommunication Union, to give the institute an official beginning date. Its first real year of activity should be 1989.

African Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO)

Address: Director General, P.O. Box 4228, Harare, Zimbabwe.

Established: 1976, as ESARIPO (Industrial Property Organization for English Speaking Africa).

Membership: Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To coordinate and modernize industrial property laws of member states, and to encourage technology transfer among industrialized countries and Africa.

Functions: Through the ARIPO Harare Protocol, ARIPO has arranged for mutual recognition of patents in member countries, upon examination by ARIPO or WIPO (World Industrial Property Organization). Applications indicate for which other member states the patent is to be valid. Application fees (not yet required) are to be determined on the basis of the number of countries in which the patent is to be recognized.

Since the first ratifications of the Protocol in 1984, there have been approximately 100 applications filed, of which 21 have been granted. Eighty percent of the applications are filed by non-African countries. In 1987 there were 25 applications filed, of which 7 had been granted by the end of the year. Among the member countries only Zimbabwe has filed applications. Patent applications require 20 months to process and issue.

The Patent Documentation and Information Centre, located at the secretariat, consists of a library of patent documents from African and non-African countries. There are at present 2 million documents on the premises, most of which are on microfiche. The volume of documents is expanding too rapidly for the Centre to accommodate. Most of the documents are from the UK and US, and contain technical information which presumably might be of use to indigenous industrialists. The Centre also processes requests for documents from overseas which it does not have in stock. Meeting requests, whether for information in the Centre or overseas, consumes the majority of the Centre's efforts.

ARIPO trains its own support staff, and arranges for post-training of middle and senior staff in industrialized countries.

Structure: The Council of Ministers guides the Organization on broad policy issues. The Administrative Council supervises the secretariat.

Financing: ARIPO's secretariat is financed by member dues, but ARIPO hopes that as patent requests increase in number, the secretariat will make do on application fees. Arrearages are a serious problem: on average, countries pay only 30-50 percent of their prescribed \$300,000-\$350,000 annual contribution.

The Patent Documentation and Information Centre has been financed by the UNDP, WIPO and various donor countries. WIPO also furnishes many services on behalf of ARIPO at no charge, including processing of search requests and examination of patent applications.

Comments: The level of activity at ARIPO is low, but considering that its principal operations did not start until a few years ago, it still holds considerable promise. The services that it renders are very specific and professionally rendered.

However, the organization is beset by certain paradoxes. Of the 21 patents that were granted since 1984, only 7 were actually examined by ARIPO. The rest were examined by WIPO, and granted by ARIPO at WIPO's recommendation. This implies that ARIPO is incapable of executing its principal function, even though it also claims that it must receive more applications in order to succeed.

Also, it is not clear that demand for its services are likely to increase greatly, especially if member countries continue to grant their own patents at the national level. Whereas ARIPO has received only 100 applications since 1984, member country patent offices receive a total of 750 applications every year. The utility of regional patents may in part be limited by the obstacles to intraregional trade. If the prospect for intraregional trade improves, and if the operations of national patent offices were relinquished by member states such that all patents were granted by ARIPO, ARIPO's raison d'être would be more clear, and its future more secure.

The majority of the search requests are also processed by WIPO, which is natural given that ARIPO's library is incomplete. Even if ARIPO's facilities continue to expand at a fantastic rate, its resources will not begin to rival those of WIPO and industrial country centers. And, even if they were, the institutional capacity to process those requests would be inadequate.

One solution would be to forego much of the effort of sustaining the Patent Documentation and Information Centre in favor of consolidating application examination capacity. The documentation center could be streamlined so as to facilitate processing of search requests by WIPO, rather than undertaking such time-consuming tasks itself.

The African Regional Organization for Standardization
(ARSO)

Address: Secretary-General, 12th Floor, City Hall Annexe, Muindi Mbingu Street, P.O.Box 57363, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1977

Membership: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote standardization, quality control, certification and metrology in Africa so as to promote intra-African trade, facilitate economic and industrial integration, and upgrade the quality of African products in international markets.

Functions: ARSO develops and issues African regional standards on products of specific interest to Africa. It accredits national laboratories that test and certify products as meeting regional standards in an effort to ensure quality control. ARSO is involved in strengthening the capability of national institutions in metrology by offering training, mobilizing external funds, fielding consultants and providing documentation. ARSO also collects and

disseminates information on standards through its documentation and information services.

Structure: The General Assembly is the supreme decisionmaking body. It meets every three years. Under the direction of the Assembly, the Governing Council, which consists of the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurer, and the 6 elected members of the Organization, guides the activities of the Organization, directs the implementation of resolutions and approves annual programs.

The Council has created 9 technical committees which are responsible for the preparation of African Regional Standards in their respective fields of competence: Basic and General Standards, Agriculture and Food Products, Building and Civil Engineering, Electritechnology, Mechanical Engineering and Metallurgy, Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Textile, Transport and Communications, Environment Protection and Pollution Control.

There are 16 people in the secretariat, 4 of whom are professionals. Twenty-two specialists from African countries work full time for ARSO in member states, and are paid by their national standard organizations. Three to five consultants are hired a year to develop standards.

Financing: ARSO's operating budget covering secretariat expenses amounts to \$US 300,000 per year. It is paid by the 23 member countries. Country contributions vary according to a 3-step scale (low, medium and high GNP). The organization normally collects only 80 percent of this amount during a given year so it continues to accumulate arrears.

ARSO's "extra-budgetary resources" go to covering its operational activities. This constitutes the largest part of its resources and is derived entirely from donors. An amount of approximately \$US 1.2 mn. per year is collected from multilateral agencies such as UNDP, UNIDO and UNESCO, as well as from bilateral donors such as France, West Germany and Canada.

Comments: ARSO was established in 1977, inherited a secretariat in 1979, but commenced its technical work only in 1983. Since that date ARSO has worked hard to meet its immediate objectives. It has established 546 regional standards, of which (with the vote of over 75 percent of members) 120 have been accepted for adoption. Whether in fact they have been adopted and are being utilized in member nations is unclear, however. For example, the ARSO secretariat has been told that Nigeria is using only 42 ARSO standards as Nigerian standards. This calls into question the magnitude of the impact that adoption of regional standards can hope to have on intraregional trade in the near term. Nevertheless, ECOWAS and PTA recently concluded formal agreements to use ARSO standards and services to help promote trade within their respective subregions.

ARSO is also active in other areas related to the setting of regional standards. Presently ARSO is promoting the use of centers of excellence (such as the Kenyan facility) to perform expensive calibration in the field of metrology. It also plans to act as a bargaining bloc that can eventually educate and negotiate for member states at meetings to establish international standards. ARSO furthermore acts to disseminate information on

standards and technical regulations throughout Africa. To do so it is presently developing, in conjunction with PADIS, a database named ARSO.DIS.NET.

African Reinsurance Corporation (Africa Re)

Address: Chairman, 50/52 Broad Street, P.M. Box 12765. Lagos, Nigeria.

Established: 1976

Membership: The African Development Bank, and 36 countries: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. Additionally there are 14 countries which were allocated shares but, as of December 1986, had not yet subscribed: Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To help develop the insurance and reinsurance industry in Africa.

Functions: Transacts reinsurance business inside as well as outside Africa; creates and administers pools for the various risks in the interest of African insurance and reinsurance markets; assists in the establishment and operation of national, regional, and subregional institutions, and provides technical assistance to African insurance and reinsurance institutions; invests its fund in African countries to promote African economic development. It may, however, invest abroad on a short-term basis to meet its operational and/or technical requirements.

Structure: The General Assembly, composed of one representative from each member state, is responsible for supervising and determining the activities of Africa Re. Each member has one vote per share subscribed and paid up. The General Assembly meets once a year although extraordinary meetings can be called by the board of Governors or one-quarter of the voting members.

The Board of Governors, composed of eight representatives elected by the General Assembly and one member appointed by the BAD, serves a term of three years, which is renewable. It is responsible for the general management of Africa Re, and appoints the General Manager, the Deputy Manager(s), and the Secretary General for a five-year renewable term. The General Manager is Chief Executive. Africa Re has a staff of 114 people including 32 professionals. There are three regional offices, in Casablanca, Nairobi, and Abidjan.

Financing: The insurance and reinsurance companies of member states have to pay a 5 percent treaty cession to Africa Re. The authorized capital of Africa Re is \$15 mn., of which \$9.3 mn. is currently subscribed; the shareholder's fund (capital + reserves) stood at \$13.16 mn. as of 12/31/87.

The \$15 mn. is divided into 1500 shares, each having a par value of \$10,000. Of the total shares, 500 must be equally distributed among each African country, and 500 shares distributed on the basis of the relative amount of national reinsurance premium.

Comments: Africa Re's funds are held in secure bank accounts and deposits. Long-term investments are few, though Africa Re contributed \$US 1,020 mn. to the share capital of Shelter Afrique, a housing construction firm.

Africa Re has several problems: delays in payments leading to reduced interest earnings; some national companies can't make payments in convertible currency because of foreign exchange scarcity; and the depreciation and/or devaluation of many African currencies against the US dollar, the currency in which Africa Re was required to keep its book of accounts, resulted in some currency loss.

In addition, a venture on international markets was unsuccessful. Bad investment, intense competition, and inexperience, made it harder for Africa Re to reach its objectives. Still, there is enormous potential in the African market. In many cases profitable insurance operations are possible due to monopolistic and oligopolistic markets which lead to high rates. However, Africa Re's investment policies should be more flexible. The 5 percent that national insurance/reinsurance companies have to deposit to join Africa Re seems to be a heavy burden on the resources of these institutions. Also, the Corporation is required to keep its long-term investments in Africa; only short-term investments can be made abroad. The opportunity cost of most of Africa Re's long-term investments are high because better investment opportunities may be foregone to satisfy political goals, thus sacrificing economic efficiency.

L'Agence Pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne
en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA)

Address: President, 33-34 Avenue Jean-Jaurés, B.P. 3144, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1954

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To promote the delivery of safe, regular air service to member countries and to provide meteorological information as well.

Functions: ASECNA provides the same services as any air traffic control organization but ventures beyond that. It also operates four schools: l'Ecole Africaine de Météorologie et de l'Aviation Civile (EAMAC); l'Ecole Régionale de la Navigation Aérienne (ERNA); l'Ecole Régionale de la Météorologie (ERM); and l'Ecole Régionale de la Sécurité Incendie (ERSI).

In addition, it manages all the aeronautical and meteorological services, and controls the functions of airports right down to equipment installation and its maintenance.

Structure: The main body of ASECNA is the Council of Ministers which meets yearly and decides on agency policy. Beneath it is the Administrative Council which is composed of representatives from the member states. It is the body which approves the budget and oversees the efficient running of the organization. It is headed by the Director General who is aided by three assistants: the Technical Director; the Director of l'Ecole Africaine de Météorologie et de l'Aviation Civile (EAMAC); and the Director of the Liaison Mission in Paris.

There is also an Accounting Division composed of three member state representatives chosen by the Council of Ministers for their expertise in financial matters, and a Comptroller.

Financing: The budget is based on tax (airport, customs, etc.) receipts, member contributions, and various revenues resulting from "loaning" goods and services (eg. the calibration aircraft). In 1986, for example, 75 percent of the budget was composed of tax receipts, 17 percent member state contributions, and 9 percent miscellaneous revenues.

Comments: One of the biggest problems facing ASECNA is its arrears. As of 1986, they stood at 30.6 bn. CFAF. Its basic survival is dependent on the excess tax money which reverts to ASECNA's treasury.

The AGRHYMET (Agriculture, Hydrology, Meteorology) Regional Center

Address: Monsieur le Directeur Général, B.P. 11011, Niamey, Niger.

Established: 1975

Membership: The eight Sahel countries of CILSS (Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso).

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To supply CILSS member states, international organizations and donors with information in the area of agrometeorology, climatology,

hydrology and rainfall in order to improve technical agriculture and livestock production in the Sahel region; to train technical personnel in agrometeorology and hydrology in order to strengthen national meteorological services; to coordinate national activities in meteorology; to collect, analyze and collate on a regional scale, the agrometeorological and hydrological data provided by national networks; to disseminate to national government agencies information on the weather and rainfall situation.

Function: To achieve its objectives, the AGRHYMET provides CILSS governments with technical assistance and with the material means to improve rainfall and hydrology data collection and dissemination. AGRHYMET also provides training in data analysis to strengthen national meteorological networks in the region. The AGRHYMET issues a bulletin every ten days, and monthly and annual summaries. These reports describe agrometeorological trends and provide appropriate advice to concerned countries and organizations. All the published materials are distributed to EEC countries, CILSS countries and the US.

Structure: The AGRHYMET center was launched under the aegis of CILSS. It is managed by the World Meteorological Organization. Its correspondent in each country is the national agrometeorological service. It is responsible for running multidisciplinary working groups: ministries concerned with meteorology, agriculture, agrometeorology and hydrological services. It is one of the three components of CILSS.

Financing: Provided by several donors: UNDP, USA, Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

Comments: The AGRHYMET plays a prominent role in early warning systems in West Africa. It is viewed as a prototype for collaborative development initiatives at the regional level since it brings together many donors and many recipient countries in addressing water-related problems.

AGRHYMET has been operating effectively for at least five years. Its main task has been the diffusion of weather information, via telex, every 10 days from May to October--i.e., during the growing season. It has known some successes. In 1984, for example, AGRHYMET sent out a warning in mid-October--the first to do so--signalling the catastrophic drought situation that was emerging. In 1985, AGRHYMET was the first to signal a pest invasion--in November. The FAO reaction came in February 1986, according to AGRHYMET staff. About 110 climatological stations send information to AGRHYMET. AGRHYMET has upgraded weather forecasting, set up a national and regional databank, trained technical staff, and increased the reliability of agricultural monitoring. In the early 1980s, 50-60 students were trained in each cycle of two-year courses.

As with early warning system activities in general, the utility of the rainfall information generated by AGRHYMET depends on how quickly it is checked and used at the national level. Some observers at AGRHYMET say that delays in dissemination and lack of experience of information receivers are problems. The organization has not yet received sustained support from member governments; it has received only 50 percent of its planned budget in many years. However, heavy support has come from donors. For example, in one

major directorate, the Direction de l'Exploitation, only 2 of 20 professional staff are paid by CILSS. The World Meteorological Organization handles donor contributions; the budget of AGHRYMET is thus largely run from Geneva.

The salary structure problems are acute at AGHRYMET. Some donors (e.g. the French) pay their technical assistance staffs directly. The UNDP pays salaries of Sahelian staff, but on the CILSS scales, not the UN scale; thus the Director General would be paid two and a half times more than his actual salary if he were on the UN scale.

There is some difference of opinion among AGHRYMET staff as to the appropriate mandate for the organization. Some argue that what counts is getting better information to farmers. A four-year pilot operation in Mali showed that farmers could raise yields by 25 percent if they had better information about volume distribution of rainfall. Thus AGHRYMET should have priority to getting information directly to producers.

Others contest this view. AGRHYMET is good at producing high quality meteorological information, and at storing and processing data for use by researchers on rainfall. Direct involvement with farmers is not their strong point. They should do research and training.

Meteorology is a functional area often cited as an example of organizational duplication. There are in fact two meteo/hydrology organizations, AGRHYMET and the CIEH. A new one has just been created by ECA-ACMAD. It will be located in Niamey and will work closely with AGRHYMET. But the merger of CIEH and AGRHYMET, which is often urged by those sensitive to charges of excessive organizational duplication, may not be such a good idea. The two organizations differ; the CIEH is operational, AGRHYMET is research-oriented.

AGRHYMET also provides some examples of organizational overreach. It runs a farm conducting field experiments, for example. But this is a dubious activity for such an organization. They have little expertise in agricultural research, are outside the research network, and could not effectively diffuse positive results. Moreover, it creates uncertainty among government officials as to what AGRHYMET's role really is.

The AGRHYMET (Agriculture, Hydrology, Meteorology) Regional Center

Address: Monsieur le Directeur Général, B.P. 11011, Niamey, Niger.

Established: 1975

Membership: The eight Sahel countries of CILSS (Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso).

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To supply CILSS member states, international organizations and donors with information in the area of agrometeorology, climatology, hydrology and rainfall in order to improve technical agriculture and livestock production in the Sahel region; to train technical personnel in agrometeorology and hydrology in order to strengthen national meteorological services; to coordinate national activities in meteorology; to collect, analyze and collate on a regional scale, the agrometeorological and hydrological data provided by national networks; to disseminate to national government agencies information on the weather and rainfall situation.

Function: To achieve its objectives, the AGRHYMET provides CILSS governments with technical assistance and with the material means to improve rainfall and hydrology data collection and dissemination. AGRHYMET also provides training in data analysis to strengthen national meteorological networks in the region. The AGRHYMET issues a bulletin every ten days, and monthly and annual summaries. These reports describe agrometeorological trends and provide appropriate advice to concerned countries and organizations. All the published materials are distributed to EEC countries, CILSS countries and the USA.

Structure: The AGRHYMET center was launched under the aegis of CILSS. It is managed by the World Meteorological Organization. Its correspondent in each country is the national agrometeorological service. It is responsible for running multidisciplinary working groups: ministries concerned with meteorology, agriculture, agrometeorology and hydrological services. It is one of the three components of CILSS.

Financing: Provided by several donors: UNDP, USA, Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

Comments: The AGRHYMET plays a prominent role in early warning systems in West Africa. It is viewed as a prototype for collaborative development initiatives at the regional level since it brings together many donors and many recipient countries in addressing water-related problems.

AGRHYMET has been operating effectively for at least five years. Its main task has been the diffusion of weather information, via telex, every 10 days from May to October--i.e., during the growing season. It has known some successes. In 1984, for example, AGRHYMET sent out a warning in mid-October--the first to do so--signalling the catastrophic drought situation that was emerging. In 1985, AGRHYMET was the first to signal a pest invasion--in November. The FAO reaction came in February 1986, according to AGRHYMET staff. About 110 climatological stations send information to AGRHYMET. AGRHYMET has upgraded weather forecasting, set up a national and regional databank, trained technical staff, and increased the reliability of agricultural monitoring. In the early 1980s, 50-60 students were trained in each cycle of two-year courses.

As with early warning system activities in general, the utility of the rainfall information generated by AGRHYMET depends on how quickly it is checked and used at the national level. Some observers at AGRHYMET say that delays in dissemination and lack of experience of information receivers are problems. The organization has not yet received sustained support from member

governments; it has received only 50 percent of its planned budget in many years. However, heavy support has come from donors. For example, in one major directorate, the Direction de l'Exploitation, only 2 of 20 professional staff are paid by CILSS. The World Meteorological Organization handles donor contributions; the budget of AGHRYMET is thus largely run from Geneva.

The salary structure problems are acute at AGHRYMET. Some donors (e.g. the French) pay their technical assistance staffs directly. The UNDP pays salaries of Sahelian staff, but on the CILSS scales, not the UN scale; thus the Director General would be paid two and a half times more than his actual salary if he were on the UN scale.

There is some difference of opinion among AGHRYMET staff as to the appropriate mandate for the organization. Some argue that what counts is getting better information to farmers. A four-year pilot operation in Mali showed that farmers could raise yields by 25 percent if they had better information about volume distribution of rainfall. Thus AGHRYMET should have priority to getting information directly to producers.

Others contest this view. AGRHYMET is good at producing high quality meteorological information, and at storing and processing data for use by researchers on rainfall. Direct involvement with farmers is not their strong point. They should do research and training.

Meteorology is a functional area often cited as an example of organizational duplication. There are in fact two meteo/hydrology organizations, AGRHYMET and the CIEH. A new one has just been created by ECA-ACMAD. It will be located in Niamey and will work closely with AGRHYMET. But the merger of CIEH and AGRHYMET, which is often urged by those sensitive to charges of excessive organizational duplication, may not be such a good idea. The two organizations differ; the CIEH is operational, AGRHYMET is research-oriented.

AGRHYMET also provides some examples of organizational overreach. It runs a farm conducting field experiments, for example. But this is a dubious activity for such an organization. They have little expertise in agricultural research, are outside the research network, and could not effectively diffuse positive results. Moreover, it creates uncertainty among government officials as to what AGRHYMET's role really is.

Air Afrique

Address: Director General, P.O. Box 21017, 3 avenue Bart,
Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1961

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: Joint exploitation of international air traffic and transportation rights of member countries as well as of domestic services of mutual interest to some or all members.

Functions: The airline, operating with a fleet of 3 DC-10s, 3 A300s, and 2 DC-8s, transports passengers and cargo throughout its extensive network.

Structure: A Committee of Ministers of Transport oversees the overall policy of the company. Each shareholder is proportionally represented on the Board of Directors with the stipulation that each member state is represented by at least two people. The Board is headed by an elected President and Director-General.

Financing: The airline, established as a limited liability company, is jointly owned by the member states (6 percent of capital each) and SODETRAF (28 percent of the airline's capital). SODETRAF is a consortium made up of U.T.A., Air France, and the Caisse Française de Dépôts et Consignations. The services rendered by the airline (passenger and cargo traffic) generate its revenue. In 1986 Air Afrique's operating revenue was \$US 355 mn.

Comments: Air Afrique has the most comprehensive network of any one airline in West and Central Africa. It also offers 20 nonstop flights a week between West Africa and Europe on 18 different routes while also serving the U.S. twice a week. Carrying 783,361 passengers in 1986, it was the second busiest airline on the continent after Nigerian Airways.

However, the airline faces a grave financial crisis. It registered a \$US 12 mn. loss on its operating revenue of \$US 355 mn. in 1986. Overstaffing (over 5,000 employees) and a reduction in passenger traffic is largely to blame. Worse yet, member governments owe the airline \$US 42 mn. in unpaid fares and have fallen behind in subscribing an agreed-upon \$US 25 mn. capital increase. Consequently investment plans have been suspended. The company is presently discussing plans for further outside cooperation.

All-Africa Council of Churches (AACC)

Address: Waiyaki Way, Westlands, P.O. Box 14205, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1958

Membership: 108 Churches and 15 Christian Councils in 33 countries in Africa.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To provide service to the community and, to this end, promote consultation and action among Churches and Councils.

Functions: The AACC is involved in several development-related activities. It provides assistance to refugees. It facilitates use of Church staff on a consultancy basis in various areas of competence (women and youth in development, cottage industries, etc.). It conducts workshops and conferences (on drought in the Sahel, for example). It provides training in the field of communication. The AACC also has two regular publications: the AACC Newsletter (monthly) and the AACC Bulletin (quarterly).

Structure: An Assembly elects a General Committee which in turn appoints the Executive Committee. Several departments address the various objectives of the Council.

Financing: Membership fees from Churches and Christian Councils as well as grants from Churches and Ecumenical Organizations finance AACC activities. UNESCO contributes funds on a per-project basis. Some revenue is generated through services provided, such as broadcasting, recording, and training.

Comments: The AACC appears very active in the area of communication training. Its programs on radio production, directed studies, technical courses and audio-visual courses have attracted students from over 30 countries. The fact that it attracts such a diverse clientele could be read as a reflection of the quality of AACC training program. Three-fourths of those trained are representatives of governments and NGOs, including staff from the Voice of Germany.

All African Leprosy Rehabilitation and Training Centre (ALERT)

Address: Executive Director, P.O. Box 165, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Established: 1965

Membership: 19 national and international leprosy organizations in Ethiopia, West Europe and the USA, including 5 founding members: American Leprosy Missions; The Ministry of Health of the Ethiopian Government; Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia; International Society for Rehabilitation of the Disabled; The Leprosy Mission in London.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To develop leprosy treatment and control programs in Eastern Africa, particularly in Ethiopia.

Functions: Provides training courses for personnel at different levels in the areas of treatment and rehabilitation. The Center provides leprosy treatment mainly in Ethiopia, but trains doctors from all over East Africa. There are 400-500 trainees a year. Treatment services are provided through the hospital and the local leprosy control centers. There is also a Hostel service with a restaurant, laundry, garage-workshop, store and pharmacy, etc.

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Structure: ALERT is a nongovernmental organization. The Annual General Meeting of Members (AGM) is held every year and approves the annual budget. The Minister of Health of the Ethiopian Government is the President of ALERT and chairs the AGM. A Board of Directors, the governing body, is composed of 14 members who have voting rights, and other nonvoting members. ALERT is organized into a number of departments.

The Training Department coordinates and supervises all courses, including international courses, as well as in-service training for doctors and other categories of personnel. The Hospital Department is responsible for a hospital with 207 beds and 350 staff members; the ALERT Leprosy Control Department is responsible for leprosy control in the Shoa Province. In this region ALERT has 290 clinics with 115 Health Assistants and 16 Supervisors. In addition to local employees, there are about 20 expatriate employees.

Financing: Two-thirds of the budget comes from ILEP (International Federation of Anti-Leprosy Associations). One-third comes from the Ethiopian Government (which contributes 25 percent of the recurrent budget), Swedish Red Cross, Church of Sweden Aid and the Christofel Blinedn Mission of West Germany. The 1987 budget is 3.3 milj. Birr (\$US 1.5 mn.). Some of the students being trained at ALERT are sponsored by WHO.

Comments: ALERT is the largest leprosy hospital/training center in the world. In 1981, ALERT was designated as a WHO collaborating center for training in leprosy. Due to the lack of managerial skills, the leprosy control programs have not performed well.

Association for the Advancement of Agricultural Sciences in Africa (AAASA)
Association pour l'Avancement en Afrique des Sciences de
l'Agriculture (AAASA)

Address: Secretary General, P.O. Box 30087, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Established: 1968

Membership: African and non-African individuals and institutions in the agricultural sciences.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote the development of agricultural science in Africa.

Functions: The AAASA seeks to facilitate the exchange of technical and institutional information among agricultural scientists and research units through workshops, seminars, and publications. The Association's publications include a directory of members, a directory of agricultural research and training institutions, and a newsletter. The Association also claims to give direct support to research projects, and to function as a locator service whereby governments or institutions in need of research project are matched with a research team.

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Structure: The General Conference convenes every 3 years. All members are invited to participate. The Executive Committee meets biannually. The Secretariat, led by the Secretary General, is assisted by a dozen or so Country Representatives.

Financing: The AAASA subsists on membership fees, and contributions from countries (African and non-African) and international organizations.

Comments: AAASA is a dying organization. No secretary general has been appointed by the organization, as no senior administrator is willing to accept a position in a virtually disappearing institution. Only certain members of the executive committee are still taking care of minimum tasks at the office. AAASA used to be more popular when its office were located in downtown Addis close to the ECA building, where visiting officials and consultants could easily walk in. The Ethiopian government expressed a need to take back the small building to transform it into a hotel, and AAASA was forced to move to a faraway suburb and is now almost impossible to find. Only an obsolete library with its librarian (who declares that on average three people use the facility per day) gives some appearance of life to the fourth floor of a deserted building. Apart from the publication of its directories on a random basis, AAASA does not seem to be accomplishing anything. By some accounts its major effort is to try to stay alive by increasing its membership.

AAASA is an organization that theoretically addresses crucial problems: lack of exchange of technical and research information on agricultural topics is certainly a strong impediment to a faster diffusion of new technologies among African countries. But such a big task is obviously too much for a small organization; it is even difficult to handle by large bodies such as ECA.

L'Association Africaine Pour le Développement
Du Palmier A Huile (ADPH)
The African Oil Palm Development Association (AFOPDA)

Address: President, 15 B.P. 341, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1985

Membership: Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zaire.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To conduct research and coordinate production, industrialization and marketing of oil palm development in producing countries.

Functions: To ensure the efficient exchange of information between producing countries and various international organizations; to participate in conferences; and publish technical documents.

Structure: The ADPH is composed of the General Assembly which meets every two years, appoints members to the Executive Committee, votes the budget, and decides on the various regulations governing the Association. The Executive Committee meets yearly and is the arm which coordinates all of the activities engaged in by the ADPH. It is also responsible for appointing the Executive Secretary (4-year term) who is responsible for day-to-day administration.

Financing: Membership fees are as follows: \$US 7,000 per ordinary member; \$US 5,500 per associate member and; \$US 175 per private (single person) member.

Comments: The ADPH is a very small organization with no permanent staff; it is housed in the Ivoirian Industry for Palm Trees building. The organization only got going two years ago, and the General Assembly has not yet met. However, it is professionally focused, has technical expertise, and could facilitate exchange of information and reunions of oil palm producers. It is the type of association which should be encouraged.

Association of African Physicists and Mathematicians

Address: President, University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana.

Established: Not known.

Membership: Interested African physicists and mathematicians.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To motivate physicists and mathematicians, and expose them to new developments in these fields, especially with regard to practical applications; to bring academics in this field together thereby promoting exchange of ideas and research results in order to improve the quality of African work in these fields.

Functions: The Association sponsors symposia and workshops. These were formerly conducted on a continental basis, but now are subregional, thus lowering transportation costs of participants.

Structure: The President organizes the symposia and obtains financing.

Financing: The Society has an \$8,000 per year recurrent budget which covers mailing and secretarial costs. This is financed by donors, such as UNICEF and the Institute of Atomic Energy. In addition, donors cover travel costs of participants to meetings/symposia. Host countries furnish accommodations.

Comments: This organization serves as a good example of the many "associations of academics" based at various African universities. The comments made in this section will therefore address this general type of institution just as much as it does this particular one.

The goals of these professional or academic associations are generally modest. They are also easily justifiable. Dialogue among academics is essential for professional development and prevention of intellectual obsolescence. However, the actual experiences of these organizations have not been unambiguously positive. Indeed their stories raise several key issues.

It is clear that academics in Africa cannot themselves finance the activities normally undertaken by such associations: regional workshops and conferences, and the publication of newsletters and journals, for example. A large portion of external financing is therefore necessary if these associations are to be active.

At the same time, complete external financing invites the "free riderism" phenomenon, a phenomenon which is clearly apparent in these smaller associations, but just as true of the large IGOs. In particular, with the costs of operating the organization being borne by donors, there is no cost to members in creating or joining such associations. Meanwhile there are some clear benefits: members attend conferences throughout the region; founding Presidents add to their curriculum vitae. However, it is not always clear that benefits are real for members. One indication of this is the lack of genuine interest in some of these organizations implied by the frequent lack of response of members to communication from the association.

This "no cost--only benefits" perception of creating associations can also foster duplication. For example, the Society of African Physicists and Mathematicians exists to bring together Africans in these fields. At the same time, however, there exists both a union of mathematicians and an African Union of Physicists. Indeed the latter group explains its own idleness partly due to the concurrent establishment of the Society of African Physicists and Mathematicians.

A complete dependence on external financing can also be a cause of the relative inactivity of most of these organizations. If funding is procured for a workshop, the organization comes to life. Otherwise, without substantial (or any) financing of a recurrent budget, most of these associations are dormant most of the time. Many that are supposed to be issuing newsletters or journals have in fact not done so in years.

The principal objective of these kinds of associations is to increase communication among academics and professionals in their respective fields. Therein lies a further problem. First, post and telecommunications are unreliable. More than one such association blamed its incapability to function on the difficulty the association and its members were having in corresponding with each other in any timely fashion. Second, the continent is vast. Indeed the largest cost incurred by these associations (and usually paid for by UNESCO) are the costs of transporting members to workshops. Organizations such as the Society of African Physicists and Mathematicians have attempted to lower costs by organizing such activities on a subregional rather than on a continental level. But clearly the problem remains.

The Chairman of one such association pointed to the fact that communication costs and difficulties would be reduced if the regional association could

deal solely with national associations rather than with individuals in member countries. In the case of most academic disciplines, though, it appears that such national associations either do not exist or are equally inactive.

What then ought to be done to circumvent the problems faced by these institutions, whose activity is important for long-term integration as well as improved short-term performance in the skills and professions involved. In addition to building networks of relationships, they can also play the important role of "siphoning" new ideas and research results from developed-world universities to a large number of African academics who might otherwise be unreachable.

For these associations of academics to work well there will continue to be an important role for donors to play. Funding will have to be provided on a regular basis for the holding of regional meetings, for example. Support may even be given to the publication of African academic journals. At the same time, however, at least some of the costs of these organizations should be borne by members. This will also help to "rationalize" the institutional landscape, membership accruing only to those organizations deemed worthwhile by the parties themselves.

Association of African Universities (AAU)
Association des Universités Africaines (AUA)

Address: Secretary General, P.O. Box 5744, Accra-North, Ghana.

Established: 1967

Membership: 92 universities in 38 countries (including North Africa), of which only 1 is private.

Language(s): Arabic, English, and French.

Objectives: The AAU seeks to strengthen African universities through promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation among them, and advising them with regard to administrative, financial, and educational issues.

Functions: The above objectives are pursued through: 1) promoting exchange of teachers, technicians, and students; 2) furnishing scholarships and stipends for such exchanges; 3) aiding the member universities in curriculum development; 4) collecting and disseminating information among member universities on research, pedagogy, and teacher and student vacancies; 5) establishing degree equivalences; and 6) stressing language learning.

The main vehicle for policy discussion is the Conference of Rectors, Vice Chancellors and Presidents, which convenes every other year. Additionally, the AAU sponsors seminars and workshops on specific topics, such as interracial relations, university management, and the role of the university in African development. The documentation center, Journal, directory of African

universities, and Interaf exchange program are the other main lines of communication.

Presently the AAU is coordinating and supervising an FAO nutrition project in West Africa.

Structure: The General Conference, which oversees the AAU, has representatives from each member institution. The conference determines general policies and budget guidelines, and selects the Secretary General, President, and members of the Executive Board. The General Conference convenes once every four years, and can have as many as 200 participants.

The Conference of Rectors, Vice Chancellors and Presidents convenes biannually, but it has no power to make binding decisions, only recommendations.

The Executive Board, which meets annually, is responsible for carrying out the decisions of the General Conference, and supervises the secretariat, which carries out the day-to-day business of the Association. The secretariat has 4 full-time professionals and 20 support staff.

Financing: About 85 percent of the AAU's budget, comprising the core budget, comes from contributions of member universities. Member contributions vary according to number of students. The balance of the budget, which is used to fund specific programs and projects, is provided by the OAU, some African countries, and donor countries. The Interaf Scholarship Programme, for instance, was funded almost entirely, at least until 1980, by USAID, Britain (IUC), and Canada (CIDA).

Comments: While some of the AAU's documents express rather ambitious and controversial political goals, the AAU can boast some concrete accomplishments. The regular meetings of the Conference of Rectors, Vice-Chancellors, and Presidents, as well as the occasional workshops and seminars, are perhaps the most important continental fora through which universities learn from one another and have the opportunity to form bilateral agreements. The Conference of Rectors et al has an attendance rate of 50-60 percent.

The core budget is in principle \$300,000, but arrears are such that on average only \$200,000 is received, and inadequate funds remain a problem. The exchange programs, for example, suffer from lack of financing, not only on the AAU side but also from host universities. In 1987, only 6 faculty and 20 students were exchanged. The AAU is seeking to correct this situation by approaching host governments directly rather than their universities, allegedly with encouraging results.

The usefulness of the documentation center is limited by difficulty of access, and the growing stress on publications is an effort to correct the situation. Isolation and the lack of opportunity to exchange ideas is seen as one of the most serious handicaps of African academics. Standardization of degrees is now seen as a low priority, and little is being done in this regard.

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Association des Economistes d'Afrique Centrale (ASEAC)
Association of Central African Economists

Address: Secrétaire Exécutif, B.P. 13226, Brazzaville, Congo.
Established: 1986

Membership: Professors, civil servants, businessmen, etc. who are economists or involved with economic concerns.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To promote economics in Central Africa; to promote African research and publication in economics; to encourage economic dialogue and planning; and to enhance the ability of African economists to participate effectively in international community debates on economic issues.

Comments: ASEAC is a small private association of economists which was only recently started. It could contribute to improved policy dialogue in Africa and better understanding of economic questions. Financial constraints are likely to limit concrete achievements.

Association des Institutions Africaines de Financement du
Développement (AIAFD)
Association of African Development Finance Institutions
(AADFI)

Address: President, c/o African Development Bank, BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1975

Membership: 95 ordinary members consisting of financial institutions from 42 African countries (Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe); 10 African intergovernmental development organizations including (African Development Bank, Central African States Development Bank, West African Development Bank, East African Development Bank, Fund for Solidarity and Economic Development (FOSIDEC), African Reinsurance Corporation, Economic Community of West African States, Great Lakes States Development Bank); and 28 honorary members, including national, regional and international investment and development institutions, such as the World Bank.

Languages: English and French.

Objectives: To stimulate cooperation for the financing of economic and social development in Africa, establish among its members the machinery for systematic interchange of information, encourage the study of problems of common interest, and accelerate the process of economic integration in the African region.

Functions: The AIAFD conducts research, sponsors training programs and symposia, and administers the exchange of trainees and specialists among financing institutions. The emphasis is on deriving a better overall understanding of the problems and priorities for development banking and investment planning. Seminars, workshops and exchange programs provide a means to achieve economies of scale in developing expertise while establishing a relatively standardized framework for development banking in member countries.

Structure: The General Assembly, meeting every year, is comprised of the directors of member development finance institutions (multinational and national). The Assembly establishes the overall direction of the AIAFD's activities and appoints members to the Executive Committee. The 8-member committee directs operation of the organization. Each year, the Executive Secretariat draws up a program of activities and a budget that it presents to the Executive Committee and which it implements upon approval. The General Secretariat is comprised of the Executive Secretary, the administrative assistant, 1 trainer, 1 translator and 4 secretaries.

Financing: The total budget of the AIAFD for 1988 is 632 mn. CFAF, the bulk of which was financed by the BAD and the World Bank. A large segment of the budget is for the training program and personnel costs.

The BAD provides all logistical and operational (telex, telephone, rooms, bills, paper, travel, conferences etc.). This amounts approximately to \$US 500,000 annually. Members' annual contributions come to 3,000 Bank Units of Account (BUA) for ordinary members, 4,000 BUA for special members and 5,500 BUA for honorary members.

Comments: It is difficult to evaluate the AIAFD, in part because its output is "intangible"--the promotion of greater understanding among development financiers. The AIAFD enables mid- and upper-level personnel to acquire new skills and improve efficiency in an important area: training in development banking can prevent the mismanagement of scarce capital in the development effort.

In February of 1986, the AIAFD sponsored a conference on Third World Debt that brought together about 200 participants, including regional central and development bank officials, African leaders, and representatives of the World Bank.

The AADFI is a small organization with large ambitions. Its status is enhanced by its association with the BAD, which provides the former with logistical support, funding and technical advice. The BAD provides the AADFI

with its entire staff on a full-time basis. It is an all-African organization, with only a little nonregional donor participation.

Of its other main activities, training accounts for 65 percent of the work of the AADFI. Twelve to 15 seminars/workshops/symposia are held per year. Nonregional members like the Economic Development Institute (EDI) provide experts to organize workshops, but do not give any cash contributions. FINAFRICA (Italy) holds joint workshops/seminars on Agricultural Development and Energy in Milan and co-finances travel costs. Participants in training are exclusively officials and employees of Development Finance Institutions (DFI) who usually pay their own way or sometimes secure financing from other sources. Applicants are selected by the Association or by the international agency which is sponsoring the participant. The training program includes banking techniques, restructuring industrial projects, training trainers, and development policy for Chief Executive Officers(CEO). The BAD also holds a six-week training course for development projects and teaches small businessmen procedures to get loans.

One of the key activities of the Association is to keep members informed as to what is happening in development financing. Among the published materials are information bulletins, and a special development financing bulletin (devoted to results of seminars). The Association also disseminates the annual report and makes a directory every two years of African Development Finance Institutions.

The AADFI forges links with non-African members and establishes cooperative activities with them. The Association is in frequent contact with UNIDO and EEC, and others. However, this outreach activity is weak because of the small size of the secretariat. This restricts the role of the Association to being a conduit between developed and developing institutions.

The AADFI has the potential to increase its activities but is in fact restricted by its meagre resources. The Association has had the same number of staff since 1973, even though its obligations have increased since then. For example, no one has a background in Economics or Finance and the Executive Secretary's time is spent almost exclusively on administrative tasks. Meanwhile, national financing institutions refer to the AADFI for assistance and are unable to get advice. Also a data bank has not been created because of lack of technical expertise. The potential for South-South cooperation in technical assistance has also not been exploited. Disappointed, some national institutions have stopped using the AADFI and some are beginning to accumulate arrears.

Association des Organisations Africaines de Promotion Commerciale (AOAPC)
Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations
(AATPO)

- Address:** Secrétaire Général, B.P. 23, Tangier, Morocco.
- Established:** 1974
- Membership:** Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia.
- Language(s):** Arabic, English, and French.
- Objectives:** To support trade promotion organizations.
- Functions:** The AOAPC aims to facilitate communication and foster cooperation among trade promotion organizations, member states, and members of the private sector. The AOAPC organizes seminars, undertakes supply and demand surveys of member states, and publishes various periodicals. The periodicals include a monthly, Flash: African Trade; an annual, Perspectives on African Trade; and the Yearbook of Trade Promotion Institutions in Africa. There is a Trade Information Centre at the Secretariat.
- Structure:** The General Assembly convenes biannually. There are, additionally, 4 Sub-Regional Conferences, and the Secretariat.
- Financing:** The Association's budget is financed by contributions from member states. Parts of the work program are financed by international organizations, such as the UNDP.
- Comments:** The Association suffers from chronic shortage of funds, resulting in frequent and prolonged suspension of salary payments. As of March 1985 arrearages stood at over \$2 mn., while the secretariat was in debt for \$270,000. The Association is trying to increase its membership to include all African countries. Its conferences are not well attended.

Autorité du Bassin du Niger (ABN)
Niger Basin Authority (NBA)

- Address:** Secrétaire Exécutif, B. P. 729, Niamey, Niger.
- Established:** 1980 (Predecessor: Niger River Commission, 1964).
- Membership:** Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria.
- Language(s):** English and French.

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Objectives: The organizations goals, particularly since 1986, are to coordinate national programs concerned with the Niger River Basin and to introduce an integrated development plan. All projects are to be undertaken and implemented by member countries themselves.

Functions: Each member country is supposed to inform the Authority of all projects regarding the development of the River Basin, planning being the main task of the organization. Since 1980, activities have been modest. Some ten studies/projects have been funded by donors. A relatively successful project was a study of flood crest anomalies funded by the French aid agency. This has produced some useful information, as has a second study of a two-dimensional flood-routing model which has accumulated large amounts of useful data. However, because of lack of trained personnel, there is no one at present to use the data/model. Phase one of a data storage/retrieval system was set up by USAID but, again, follow-up work has been discontinued. The most noteworthy project, but also one with no present links to ABN, is the HydroNiger project in Niamey, which does hydrological monitoring and forecasting. There are 52 hydrological stations in the Hydroniger network, and personnel has been incorporated into the Niger government. The forecasting model used by the system seems to work well. However, no information is shared with ABN.

Structure: The Council of Ministers determines the orientation of the ABN and approves policies. It meets once a year, reviews the internal administration of the Commission and appoints the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretariat implements the decisions of the Council (i.e., conducts the research, maintains contacts with national agencies so as to try to coordinate projects) and prepares the administrative budget. The secretariat comprises a Documentation Center and four departments: Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, Water Resources, River Navigation, and Transport.

Financing: Financing comes from USAID, CIDA, OPEC, France, UNDP and the Netherlands. Technical assistance is provided by the UNDP. Member states are also supposed to pay annual, and equal, contributions to the Authority.

Comments: The ABN, like the Niger River Commission that preceded it, could never get the nine member countries together to agree on organizational and program priorities. Arrears were a continual problem. UNDP has been a constant source of financial support; USAID was also a major supporter until 1986.

The reorganization of 1980 was inspired by President Sekou Touré, who wanted to remake ABN in the image of the Tennessee Valley Authority. President Touré saw the ABN as an instrument of political image-making. He sought to expand membership of the ABN for political reasons.

The ABN in 1988 is facing very serious problems. A series of crises in the early 1980s led to the replacement of two Executive Secretaries for, among other things, misuse of funds and extended absences from work without delegating responsibility. A 1987 ECA report notes that the ABN lacks credibility with member states and donors and has severe management and financial difficulties. Member contributions have fallen way behind (over five years on occasion). Previously the richer members did contribute

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(Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria). But this stopped in the 1980s. There were no operational funds in 1985 and again in 1987 when personnel was suspended and all projects discontinued except for the Hydroniger project. Donor contributions have dried up because of lack of credibility. Staff declined from 54 in 1986 to 22 in mid-1988.

A report commissioned by the Council of Ministers in 1986 recommended, inter alia, reapportioning contributions and restructuring the secretariat. The United Nations, the World Bank and USAID have also carried out recent studies or evaluations of the ABN. All reports recommend scaling down staff and goals/activities, and focusing on information processing and planning. Resuscitation of the documentation center was urged.

A 1987 meeting of Chiefs of State in Ndjamená agreed on a new statute for the ABN, which has prepared a new program focussing on rehabilitation of the Documentation Center, development of a mathematical model to simulate the river flow and a study of the impact of drought on the river.

Autorité de Développement Intégré de la Région Liptako-Gourma (ALG)
Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated Development Authority

Address: Secretary General, 10, Avenue Monseigneur Thevenoud,
B.P. 619, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1970

Membership: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To research and implement strategies for developing water, grazing, agriculture, mineral, transportation and energy resources for the Liptako-Gourma area.

Functions: ALG has completed some studies, and carried out certain projects including telecommunication linkage. The Council aims to integrate and coordinate legislation, develop technical assistance operations, and conduct studies. It seeks cooperative arrangements with or solicits assistance from third party governments and organizations.

Structure: The Liptako-Gourma Authority is based on a three-level structure: the main body is the Conference of Heads of States that meets yearly, and that defines broad objectives for the organization. The Council of Ministers is the decisionmaking arm in charge of overseeing the implementation of the decisions made at the Heads of States level. It consists of Ministers of Industry and/or Economic affairs from each country. The Secretary General concerns himself with the actual implementation of programs and policies, proposes new projects to the Council, and acts as disseminator of information between member states and Council members. He is also responsible for standardizing and keeping records that result from the Authority's activities. In 1987 there were some 40 staff of whom 10 were professionals.

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Financing: ALG manages three different funds. The Development Fund, with an initial contribution of 200 mn. CFAF from each member state, has until now received only 376 mn. of the expected total of 600 mn. These funds have been allocated to finance development projects. The Operating Fund is financed by equal contributions from the member states. The 1988 budget was fixed at 161.4 mn. CFAF, with each member contributing 53.8 mn. The Reserve Fund is financed from the Operating Fund surpluses. For instance, the contributions were fixed at 50 mn. for each member in 1986, while the operating budget was 156.5 mn.; thus the 6.5 mn. surplus went to the Reserve Fund; finally, the "Maison du Liptako-Gourma" fund is earmarked for the construction of the headquarters. It was financed by an initial contribution of 210 mn. CFAF. In addition, outside grants from various donors (such as ADB, FAC, UNDP, Kowetian Fund) contribute to the implementation of the projects. The problem of arrears is not serious enough to threaten the organization's functioning.

Comments: The distinction among the four funds cited above is in fact more or less theoretical, as all the funds have been used from time to time to balance the operating budget and to compensate for late contributions from member states. These arrears concerned both the Development Fund and the Operating budget, and now amount to 482 mn. CFAF, of which 125 comes from Burkina, 180 from Mali and 177 from Niger. Until now, these arrears have had very little adverse effect on ALG capacities, though some studies and projects, like the construction of the organization's headquarters, were postponed or dropped altogether.

The Liptako-Gourma Authority is concerned with a wide variety of development projects for the region, such as food self-sufficiency, roads, railways, telecommunications, mining, industries, energy, health and training. Given the generally unsuccessful history of integrated development in the developing world, the scope of this mandate is questionable.

The ALG has a problem of jurisdiction vis-a-vis the NBA (Niger Basin Authority). Efforts on the part of the ALG to coordinate activities and simply promote dialogue have been met with indifference by the NBA, despite the fact that the same resources (the Niger River, particularly) are central to both. For instance, in 1986, ALG organized a meeting with the other subregional organizations and only the NBA failed to attend. This is particularly damaging to both organizations, as the ALG is already a functioning unit that could and should be an autonomous but cooperating part of NBA.

Some positive achievements of ALG can be noted. Telecommunications projects costing more than 10 bn. CFAF have been realized, and various other projects are in progress. ALG has proved itself to be efficient in organizing feasibility studies and obtaining donor assistance.

On the other hand, the authority promotes the implementation of a wide variety of unrelated projects. Its aspirations are unrealistic given the region's scarce financial, human and natural resources. The notion of giving priority to feasible projects is crucial to the organization's future. For example, the organization is promoting the construction of hydroelectric facilities at Tossaye, Kandadji and Parc W--a huge undertaking that could preempt options in the rest of the basin if undertaken without any real

planning. This "OMVS syndrome" approach can lead to severe misuse of scarce local resources.

Autorité Routière Trans-Africaine (ARTA)
Trans-African Highway Authority (TAHA)

Address: Directeur Général, B.P. 100, Bangui, Centrafrique.

Established: 1978

Membership: 7 full members: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire; and 6 associate members: Burundi, Congo, Chad, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Rwanda.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To stimulate and supervise the construction of a highway from Lagos to Mombasa, with feeder roads connecting countries not on the main route.

Functions: ARTA coordinates and catalyses national road construction programs. It undertakes feasibility studies with its own technical staff, helps member states arrange for financing of their respective programs, and promotes the adoption of a common system of road signs. ARTA also publicizes the transafrican highway and its benefits.

Structure: Member states are those through which the main highway runs, while associate members are those whose access to the main highway depends on feeder roads.

The Governing Council is comprised of a minister from each member state, plus the Secretary General of the OAU and Executive Secretary of the ECA. The latter two members do not vote. The Advisory Board includes representatives from member and associate member states, donor countries and agencies, and regional African organizations. The technical staff includes 4 international technical assistants, and 14 local employees.

Finance: Member states pay an annual contribution of \$75,000, and associate members pay \$21,430, constituting a budget of between \$500,000 and \$700,000. Arrearages are serious, and it is estimated that 60 percent of the requested budget is received in a typical year.

Comments: ARTA has financial and administrative problems. The organization as a whole is in debt for \$360,000, while the Bangui secretariat alone is in debt for \$147,000. The secretariat's efforts to cut back on expenses have come too late and at too great a cost in technical expertise. Staff has been reduced by 40 percent since 1987. The secretariat's weakness is exacerbated by the fact that the director cannot choose staff himself, but rather must accept those sent to him from member countries.

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Partly due to its financial weakness, and partly due to unrealistic objectives, ARTA has been largely unsuccessful in motivating new construction, as well as maintaining existing roads. Some segments of the road have been neglected, so that what had previously been standardized gravel has deteriorated into regular dirt. Only the portions in Kenya and Nigeria have been completed in recent years, but this owes less to the ARTA's intervention than to the fact that these two countries were wealthy enough and considered these roads of high enough priority to do the job. Other countries may not have the money nor the interest; even some landlocked countries are uncertain that such roads are worth the expense.

Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD)
African Development Bank (AfDB)

Address: Président, B.P. 01 - 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1964

Membership: 50 regional members: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Peoples Republic of Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; and 25 non-regional members: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia.

Language(s): Arabic, English, and French.

Objectives: To contribute to the economic development and social progress of the African member states, individually and collectively, by financing investment projects.

Functions: The BAD operates by mobilizing capital from members through subscriptions and from international lenders, and extending loans to African member countries for projects presented by individual governments and approved by the Bank. As of April 1938, the loans carried an interest rate of 7.33 percent per annum (plus 1 percent fees for commission and commitment charges), repayable over 12 to 20 years, and with grace periods of up to 8 years. BAD loans have as their main, although not exclusive, purpose the financing of the foreign exchange costs of projects. The BAD also engages in equity participation (in enterprises and in other regional development funds or

banks), although majority ownership is not permitted. Cofinancing with other development banks and foreign donors is also undertaken.

In 1987, the BAD committed \$1.3 bn. and disbursed \$553 mn., bringing its cumulative commitments and disbursements to \$6.1 bn. and \$2.4 bn. respectively. And for the 1988-1990 period, the BAD plans to increase its commitment significantly, by some \$8.5 bn. Planned sectoral lending for the 1988-1990 period, roughly the same as for the 1984-1986 period, is: agriculture-30 percent; industry and development banks-25 percent; public utilities-20 percent; transport-17 percent; education and health-8 percent.

Structure: The African Development Bank is one of the three main branches of the African Development Bank Group. The other two are the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF). There are two "special funds" and three "trust funds" in addition to the NTF.

Each BAD member country is represented on the Board of Governors by a Governor or an Alternate, appointed or terminated at any time by the respective member country. The Board of Directors is composed of 18 members (either Governors or Alternate Governors), 12 of whom are elected by the Governors of the nonregional member countries.

The President is nominated by the Board of Directors and elected by the Board of Governors. The President is the President of the Bank Group, as well as the Chairman of the Boards of Directors (without vote) of the three institutions. He serves a five-year term, and may be reelected.

The BAD employs more than 400 professionals, 50 subprofessionals, and 540 nonprofessional staff. Additionally there are 30-odd technical assistants on loan from nonregional member countries.

Financing: The operations of the African Development Bank are financed by subscriptions of member states, consisting of paid-up and callable portions. Regional members collectively contribute two-thirds of the capital and nonregional members contribute one-third. These proportions are maintained in the course of capital replenishments. Voting power is proportionate to capital subscriptions.

With the Fourth General Capital Increase (GCI-IV), finalized in June 1987, the BAD's ordinary capital increased from \$6.4 bn. to over \$19 bn. The paid-up portion increased marginally relative to the callable portion, such that paid-up as a share of total subscribed capital decreased from nearly 25 percent from before GCI-IV, to 6.3 percent.

The BAD issues senior and subordinated debt. The senior debt is limited to 80 percent of the callable capital of nonborrowing members, while the senior and subordinated debt together are not to exceed 80 percent of the callable capital of all member countries. Outstanding debt at the end of 1987 stood at over \$2.1 bn., up 50 percent from 1986. New borrowings for 1988 are projected to amount to \$850 mn., but even so the BAD will be well below the statutory limit, especially given the recent capital replenishment. The BAD's senior debt has been accorded a credit rating of AA+ to AAA, and the subordinated debt a rating of AA- to AA+.

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Comments: The BAD has shown impressive growth since operations started in 1966. Professional staff, capital, lending activities, and rate of disbursement have all gone up rapidly and continue to do so. The BAD is now a major source of credit in Africa, lending \$1.3 bn. in 1987 as opposed to the World Bank nonconcessional loans to Africa of \$2.2 bn.

Evaluating the quality of operations is more difficult. Most of the criticism of the BAD has come from the outside, asserting that the Bank Group's operations as a whole have grown too fast and the Bank has taken on too many functions relative to its undersized and relatively inexperienced (though much improved) staff. There has been, moreover, too much emphasis on growth of operations for its own sake, while quality has been all but neglected.

Concern for project quality is foremost in these criticisms. The project identification process is weak, and selection is often political--low-priority projects are undertaken at the expense of high ones. Also, project monitoring and postevaluation processes are underemphasized, and needs are lost sight of in concern with meeting growing spending targets.¹ Finally (and this compounds the problems cited), absorptive capacity for projects is already being exceeded. There are simply not enough traditional projects 'out there.' It has even been suggested that the World Bank 'gets' the best projects and leaves the African institutions with second-rate ones.²

Some of the institutional problems are being resolved through the determined efforts of President N'Diaye, who reorganized the BAD in 1986-1987. Among the objectives of the reorganization was the improvement of interdepartmental communication, and the establishment of a semiautonomous evaluation unit. The evaluation unit is to make monitoring and postevaluation stronger.

A second measure to improve the loan portfolio is to establish more coherent and systematic lending strategies for each member country. Rather than judging loan proposals on an individual basis as they come in, loans are to be evaluated as constituents of a given country's investment program. The BAD's staff is in the process of writing Country Programming Papers (CPPs) for each country, many of which have already been completed.

Another measure (though more questionable) which the BAD is eagerly pursuing is expanding its use of nonproject lending. Nonproject loans are easy to identify, rapidly ushered through the pipeline, and promptly disbursed. Thus they improve the disbursement rate, ease the pressure on those responsible for project identification, and permit the Bank to achieve its ever-rising lending targets.

¹ The 1988-1990 Indicative Lending Programme is typical of the ADB Group's targetry in that there is much discussion about how much various categories of lending are to increase, but only slight indication as to why.

² Karen A. Mingst, "Inter-Organizational Politics: The World Bank and the African Development Bank," Review of International Studies, Vol. 13, 1987, pp. 281-293.

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This is not to deny that there may be valid reasons for pursuing nonproject lending. The concern, as with the BAD's operations in general, is that activities in this area are expanding too rapidly, particularly since policy-based loans demand a kind of expertise that the BAD has not had time to develop.

Among the conditions that the nonregional members strove to impose upon the BAD in the course of the last replenishment negotiations were a ceiling of 20 percent on nonproject loans for both the BAD and AfDF, and an agreement to coordinate with the World Bank on all policy-based loan proposals. In fact, over 46 percent of the BAD's commitments in 1987 were for policy-based loans, while policy-based commitments for the Bank Group were 36 percent.³

The BAD's policy-based lending has become a focus of controversy for other reasons as well. The BAD has a difficult time demonstrating that it is neither a mere instrument of regionals (which reduces its credibility in the eyes of nonregionals), nor an instrument of nonregionals to impose policy changes on regional members. It likes to see itself as playing a "big brother" role in Africa, mediating between perceived authoritarian parents (the World Bank and donors) and Africa. That is, it hopes to be at once sympathetic to the economic and political concerns of Africa yet capable of imposing some discipline on regionals, for example, through policy-based loans. So far, the BAD has not convinced donors that it is capable of the latter, while regional members and BAD management are irked by donors' lack of confidence. These tensions were especially evident at the GCI-IV negotiations and the Bank Group's recent annual meeting.

Problems with arrears both on capital installments and on loan repayments persist, but the BAD has become more severe with defaulters in recent years with some effect. Whereas before, repayment of BAD loans received the lowest priority from regional members (vis-à-vis repayment of IBRD loans), now sanctions on arrears are applied within three months. Sanctions involve deferment of new loan agreements and suspension of disbursements on active loans. Since the sanctions were first applied in 1982, the arrears-recovery rates have increased significantly. In January 1988, 20 countries were declared ineligible for new loans due to arrearages of three months.

The standard procedure for persistent arrearages on subscriptions is to transfer their shares to other members. However, other regionals have been unable to take up the shares released. The solution put forth by management is that nonregionals should delay their subscriptions payments to keep the balance, and to prevent the incongruity between voting power and capital subscriptions. That is, voting power should be linked to actual paid-up capital subject to the provision in the Articles of Agreement that regionals retain a two-thirds majority.

³ Babacar N'Diaye, "Statement by Babacar N'Diaye, President of the African Development Bank at the Annual Meetings of the Bank Group," June 1988.

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Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO)
Central Bank of West African States (CBWAS)

Address: Gouverneur, B.P. 3108, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1962

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, (the UMOA).

Language(s): French

Objectives: To organize and manage the monetary, banking and financial system of the UMOA.

Functions: The BCEAO alone has the right to issue bills and coins recognized as legal tender in the member states. Since it is the central bank of the West African part of the Franc Zone, the currency that it issues is the CFAF. In addition to its "normal" central banking activities, the BCEAO undertakes external training through COFEB (its Centre Ouest Africain d'Etudes Financières et Bancaires).

Structure: (See Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine for general background and information on structure.)

Comments: The situation and performance of the BCEAO was generally satisfactory until the early 1980s. Some signs of inadequate policies and performance began to appear in the mid-1980s. The net foreign asset holdings of the Franc Zone declined precipitously. The quality of commercial bank portfolios and BCEAO asset holdings declined drastically; the banking system holds over 500 bn. CFAF in nonperforming loans, which is more than 50 percent of its total credit. Private sector lending has been restricted, as total credit to the economies of the zone has been cut back in the framework of stabilization/adjustment programs and government credit demands have been given priority; the ratio of total domestic credit to GDP fell from 43 percent to 38 percent between 1982 and 1987. While budget deficit financing grew from 6 percent in 1982 to 18 percent of total credit, there has also been a regional growth in private capital outflows; the share of UMOA residents' foreign bank deposits to total deposits reached 25 percent in 1987.

Many of the problems of the BCEAO and the financial sector of the UMOA derive from economic recession, and some of them (like foreign capital outflows) are not well understood because of data problems. But there are disagreements on diagnoses and remedies by various analysts. First, the IMF position is that public sector credit ceilings have been rendered ineffective by lack of control over arrears, public sector guarantees, SOE lending, crop purchase credits, and rediscount rights at the Central Bank. Secondly, national credit ceilings have negative aspects, such as credit allocation distortion, stifling competition in the financial sector, lack of incentive to mobilize savings, insufficient flexibility in setting annual ceilings. Thirdly, while interest rates policies have become more market determined, they are still set administratively and do not reflect quickly enough changes

in money market rates. Finally, quantitative credit controls and controls on bank lending have not been effective. Public sector financial institutions have financed risky or dubious investments, and have continued to rediscount at the Central Bank, contributing importantly to the BCEAO's deteriorating portfolio.

BCEAO representatives say that the credit ceilings have been relatively effective: that such apparently "distorting" measures as imposing credit ceilings bank-by-bank actually limit credit claims of illiquid banks; and that qualitative allocations channel resources to productive sectors. They argue that if governments would not intervene in lending decisions, and lending spreads could be widened, the problem would be minimal. As for interest rate policies, the BCEAO spokesmen note that their interest rates are competitive with rates in French money markets.

Banque de Développement des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BDEAC)
Central African Development Bank (CADB)

Address: Président, B.P. 1177, Brazzaville, Congo.

Established: 1975

Membership: 6 African countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon; 3 non-African countries: France, Kuwait, and West Germany; and 2 African regional institutions: BEAC and AfDB.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To promote the economic and social development of the member states, in particular by financing economic integration projects of major importance to the members' economies, and feasibility studies for such projects. The Bank serves as the development bank for the central African part of the Franc Zone.

Functions: The Bank provides loans to member states with a major criterion being whether the projects contribute to the reduction of intraregional disparities. Capital is mobilized from internal and external sources. Credits are extended to national development finance institutions and to borrowers who receive public guarantees (i.e., semipublic or public enterprises). Sectoral allocation for the 1982-1986 period was: rural development--37 percent; infrastructure--35 percent; and industry--28 percent.

As of June 1986, cumulative lending stood at 21 bn. CFAF for 42 loans. Most of these projects were cofinanced with European and/or other African regional banks, with BDEAC seldom providing a majority share. The authorized lending for 1986/87 was established at 7 bn. CFAF.

The BDEAC just started an interest rate subsidy program in 1985. As of

1986, 5 projects were passed for interest subsidization of 2.5 percentage points.

Structure: The Bank is administered by a General Assembly of shareholders of the Bank's capital subscription, a Board of Directors, and the General Management, which is headed by the Director General. The Assembly formulates the Bank's credit policies and nominates the directors. The Board of Directors supervises the operations of the Bank, and approves the annual budget. Each shareholder is represented on the board. The Director General is appointed by a two-thirds majority of the Director and directs the administrative and operational functions of the Bank.

The BDEAC has 30 senior professionals, of which one is an expatriate, and 60 other staff.

Financing: Ordinary capital is subscribed by member states and institutions. The initial capital was 16 bn. CFAF, 50 percent paid up and 50 percent callable. As of 1986, the authorized capital stood at 41,880 mn. CFAF, all of which was subscribed. The 6 founding states and the BEAC held 88.5 percent, the nonregional members held 9.5 percent, and the AfDB held 1.9 percent. Half of the capital is called-up. In 1985/86, arrearages stood at 4.5 bn. CFAF.

In addition to ordinary capital, the BDEAC receives loans and grants from international banks and institutions. More than 3 bn. CFAF has been lent by a consortium of banks, including the International Finance Corporation for Investments and Development in Africa, the Indosuez Bank, the International Bank for West Africa (BIAO), and the European Investment Bank.

Comments: BDEAC has not been overly successful in most regards. The total volume of BDEAC lending does not represent a large proportion of aid to the region. The BDEAC has not been able to favor poorer members; rich states have received a larger proportion of loans than poorer ones. In 1985 the Congo and Gabon received loans for a total of 3.2 bn. CFAF, while Chad and the CAR received loans for 772 mn. CFAF and 1 bn. CFAF, respectively. This is due to the low absorptive capacity of poorer countries, and to the stipulation that recipient countries cover at least 25 percent of project cost, which the poorer countries are often unable to do.

Lending volume has also been constrained by a serious arrears problem. BDEAC has already engaged all of its capital and now can only mobilize resources from donor countries.

Project quality has suffered due to strong politicization. 'Political projects' abound, such as SANGAPALM in Congo and the "mini-sucrerie" project in the CAR, both of which were undertaken against the recommendations of BDEAC expertise.

In addition, only four projects have been regional in nature, despite BDEAC's stated objective to finance such projects. As with other regional development banks that fail to meet regional project targets, the requests that BDEAC receives from member countries are only for national projects. Thus BDEAC must initiate ideas for regional projects itself.

Banque de Développement des Etats des Grands Lacs (BDEGL)
Development Bank of the Great Lakes States (DBGLS)

Address: Director General, B.P. 3355, Goma, Zaire.

Established: 1977

Membership: Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To finance development projects identified by the community.

Functions: The BDEGL was set up as a specialized institution of the CEPGL. Its principal role is to help finance projects that have been proposed by the CEPGL permanent secretariat and approved by the community's Council of Ministers. At present, the Bank finances three types of projects: (1) "common projects," in which all three member states are equal partners in a joint operation, (2) "community projects," which belong to one member state but which are meant to serve all three and, (3) "national projects," which are of entirely national scope. Besides financing projects, the BDEGL also earmarks a small portion of its resources for buying capital shares in community enterprises. Since the BDEGL lacks the resources to finance alone the projects identified by the secretariat, it looks mainly to cofinance projects with interested donors. Between 1983, when the BDEGL first started to approve loans, and 1988, 74 percent of BDEGL project funds went for industrial and agro-processing projects. Other projects were in the area of energy, transport and communications, health and education.

Structure: The governing body of the BDEGL is its Board of Directors, which meets once a year. The Board is composed of seven directors, four of which are appointed by the member states (two by Zaire and one each by Rwanda and Burundi), one by subscribing national enterprises and banks, and two by the BDEGL's main foreign subscribers--Belgium and the African Development Bank. Each director has one vote. The Executive Secretary of the CEPGL attends all Board meetings in an advisory capacity. The Board appoints the Director General who is responsible for the Bank's day-to-day operations.

Financing: The BDEGL's authorized capital is set at 50 mn. SDR. At the end of 1987, paid-in capital amounted to 14.2 mn. SDR. Member states' pledged subscriptions amounts to 72 percent of the total of the subscribed capital. Private and public enterprises of the member states have subscribed for 9 percent and foreign noncommunity subscribers hold 19 percent of the BDEGL's capital shares. The BDEGL charges a variable interest rate on its loans of between 8 and 11 percent.

Comments: The BDEGL appears to have made much progress since the mid-1980s, when it was plagued by internal conflict and arrears on capital payments. In 1986, Burundi and the African Development Bank made the continued payments of their capital subscriptions contingent on the reorganization of the Bank's management structure. After the Bank's Board of Directors approved the proposed changes, which reduced the total number of directors and cut

management costs, the Bank applied for and received a second line of credit from the African Development Bank/African Development Fund. Included in the ADB program of support for the BDEGL is a technical assistance package to strengthen the Bank's financial and project development departments. The BDEGL is still looking for external sources of finance to increase its subscribed capital to its authorized amount and to build up enough funds to allow it to intervene in international financial markets. The CEPGL has recently approved a budget for the construction of a new headquarters building, replacing the inadequate "temporary" offices that have served as the Bank's headquarters for its first eleven years.

Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC)
Bank of Central African States (BCAS)

Address: Gouverneur, B.P. 1917, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1972

Membership: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To serve as the central bank of issue for all of its members, comprising the Central African membership in the Franc Zone.

Functions: The BEAC is responsible for international payments and domestic monetary and credit policy. The member states use a common currency, the Central African CFAF, that is freely convertible with the French franc at a rate of 50:1. Foreign reserves of the BEAC countries are pooled in an operations account of the French Treasury. This account is debited to make necessary foreign exchange payments settlements. Not less than 65 percent of total reserves may be held in French francs, the rest being in any other convertible currency.

The BEAC also formulates regional monetary policy, using the rediscount rate to regulate the rate of growth of the money supply. The Bank also determines the amount of credit available to member treasuries. To curb deficit financing, only 10 percent of previous year fiscal revenues may be borrowed from the central Bank.

Structure: Overall policy and direction of the Bank is set by the Mixed Monetary Committee, comprised of the Finance Ministers of the BEAC states and the French Finance Minister. The Monetary Committee of the Zone decides upon the overall credit ceilings, growth of money aggregates, and the rediscount rate. The Council of Administration manages the Bank's day-to-day operations and proposes the budget. At the country level, the National Monetary Committees (NMCs) determine the credit needs of the national economies and send their recommendations to the Monetary Committee for ratification. The NMCs represent government officials, the BEAC, development banks, and major

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users of capital. The NMCs make the important decisions concerning individual country monetary policy, making the system more flexible and attentive to individual country needs.

Comments: As of June 30, 1985, the capital of the bank stood at 180 bn. CFAF. Monetary restrictions were imposed in 1984 to stem excessive growth in the money supply. While overall credit increased 17 percent in 1985, the money supply grew more slowly in Cameroon, Chad and Gabon in the wake of serious inflationary pressures. The combined external deficit of the BEAC in 1984 was 33.9 bn. CFAF. The Franc Zone arrangement has promoted considerable price and monetary stability. Exchange rate stability has helped the zone pursue growth-conducive policies. Convertibility with the French franc may have encouraged capital inflows. The union also fosters greater fiscal coordination--a precondition for any stable economic cooperation scheme. Cameroon's adjustment policies have been among the most successful in Africa.

However, many of the problems noted in the discussions of UMOA and BCEAO apply to BEAC. Exchange rate rigidity, for example, means reduced flexibility in adjusting to external shocks. But, overall, Franc Zone arrangements seem to have facilitated adjustment. The BEAC has experienced difficulties recently comparable to those described in the BCEAO vignette.

Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD)
West African Development Bank (WADE)

Address: Président, 68 Avenue de la Libération, B.P. 1172, Lomé, Togo.

Established: 1973

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo; 2 nonregional countries: France and West Germany; the EIB on behalf of the EEC; and the BCEAO.

Language(s): French

Objectives: The objective of the BOAD is to promote balanced development of the member states and economic integration under the aegis of the UMOA.

Functions: The BOAD mobilizes domestic and foreign capital to finance, by means of loans, equity, guarantees, and interest subsidies, investments to build infrastructure, improve capital stock, and promote private investment. The Bank makes technical and financial appraisals of projects proposed by member states. There is an emphasis on projects that benefit the least developed member countries. Sectoral emphases include infrastructure, energy, and industry.

The BOAD cooperates extensively with national development finance institutions, which have received approximately 28 percent of the Bank's total lending in the form of lines of credit. If the size of a loan exceeds 20 mn. CFAF, the BOAD handles it directly with the borrower. If the amount is 20 mn.

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CFAF or less, the loan takes the form of a line of credit to a national development finance institution. As of October 1986, the BOAD had 90 loans outstanding, for a total of 66 bn. CFAF. Sectoral distribution of the projects for which loans have been made is: energy, 23 percent; loans to national financial institutions, 28.2 percent; industry, 13.6 percent; transportation 4.1 percent; telecommunications, 9.9 percent; and agriculture, 8.8 percent. Burkina Faso has received the largest share of BOAD lending (20.7 percent), followed by Benin (17.1 percent). Mali, which joined the UMOA only in 1983, has received about 1.35 percent of total commitments. The interest rate is variable according to sector, and as of October 1987 was based on a reference rate of 9.31 percent. In addition to expenditure on loans, the BOAD has spent 2.2 bn. CFAF on 85 preinvestment studies.

Structure: The Bank is controlled by the Council of Ministers of the UMOA and the Conference of Heads of State. The immediate governing body of the Bank is the Board of Governors, comprised of the president of the Bank, the representatives of member states, the BCEAO president and the non-UMOA representatives. There are 77 professional and subprofessional staff, and 54 nonprofessional staff. This includes between 6 and 8 expatriates, or 5 percent of the staff.

Financing: The resources of the BOAD come from three sources: capital subscriptions, external loans, and credit and grants. When the BOAD was created, half of the initial capital of 2.4 bn. CFAF was subscribed by the BCEAO, and half by the six regional members. By 1981, France and West Germany had subscribed 500 mn. CFAF each. The authorized capital now stands at 100 bn. CFAF, of which 73.5 bn. has been subscribed. Paid-up capital stands at 14.7 bn. CFAF, or 20 percent of the subscribed capital.

Comments: The BOAD has grown fairly rapidly, given the small size of its membership and limited resource base. To date, there has never been a default on a loan. The BOAD is relatively small in its regional impact, lending less than 30 percent of that loaned by the AfDB Group to the same countries over the period 1982-86. In the final analysis, the BOAD serves as much a political function as an economic one in that it addresses the issue of regional disparities within the UMOA, a problem that is of great importance for the survival of the union.

Over the past two years, the Bank has been required to increase interest rates and shorten grace periods and maturities so as to restore financial equilibrium. In addition, the Bank's activities have been hampered by poor economic conditions in the UMOA member countries.

The BOAD continues to seek to strengthen ties with nonregional states, especially in Europe and Asia (Korea and Japan), and with international organizations, as a means of increasing its capital. At the same time, the BOAD has also strengthened ties with other African regional organizations, particularly ECOWAS and the AfDB; the latter also advises the BOAD on improving its credit rating so as to gain access to international money markets.

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Banque de la Zone d'Echange Préférentielles (BZEP)
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTADB)

Address: President, B.P. 1750, Bujumbura, Burundi.

Established: 1986

Membership: Burundi, Comores, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English, French.

Objectives: The main goal of the BZEP is to foster the development of its member states by using its capital resources for project and intraregional trade financing. The BZEP will finance only projects identified by the PTA Secretariat in Lusaka, but it has the power to determine its own lending terms. Actual operations have not yet started.

Functions: The Bank operates through two windows--a development window through which projects are supported, and a trade window to finance intra-regional trade. Under the terms of the BZEP charter, 75 to 85 percent of the Bank's resources are earmarked for financing projects, while the remaining 15 to 25 percent are reserved for trade-related activities. The BZEP finances only small- and medium-sized projects in order to spread project benefits around to the maximum number of member states. Special priority is given to loans to support projects in agriculture and agro-processing. Although preference is given to projects benefiting at least two member states, financing is also provided for purely national projects. The BZEP has not yet defined the exact mechanisms by which it will promote intra-regional trade, since it is waiting for the results of an International Trade Commission (Geneva) study on the bottlenecks to the expansion of trade in the PTA region.

Structure: The Board of Governor's has ultimate authority over the BZEP. It appoints the President, consults the Board of Directors, approves the annual accounts, regulates the capital stock, and controls the distribution of Bank earnings and income. The Board is comprised of one governor and one alternate from each member state. Voting shares are allocated on the basis of each member's contribution to the Bank's total paid-in capital. Questions of Bank policy are dealt with by the Board of Directors, which are appointed by the member states. The Board of Directors sets Bank policy on loan terms, interest rates and borrowings in international financial markets. It also supervises the Bank administration and approves the annual budget. There are 7 directors, with member states appointing 5 and nonmember participants naming 2. At present, however, the BZEP has no nonmember subscribers, so the two posts reserved for them are vacant. The President is the chief legal authority of the Bank and is also responsible for the day-to-day operations.

Financing: The capital resources of the Bank consist of the authorized capital stock (member subscriptions), funds borrowed by the Bank, and income from Bank loans or investments. The authorized capital stock is set at 400 mn. UAPTA (SDR). However, this amount includes contributions from "potential PTA members," who have yet to join, much less contribute. The authorized

capital stock among the current 11 members is a more modest 147 mn., one-third of which is still to be paid in. Capital subscriptions are to be paid in six yearly installments. The amount now due from current members is 19.6 mn., of which 14.9 has already been paid. Arrears on paid-in capital subscriptions are subject to a 3 percent annual interest charge. Nonmember capital subscriptions are limited to one-third of the total paid-in capital. The Bank's administrative costs, including the salaries of the 27 staff members are paid out of the interest income generated by the paid-in subscriptions.

Comment: The BZEP is still in its organizational infancy. It has yet to make a project loan or even to define its trade policies. Despite its relative youth, the Bank's officials seem to be aware of some of the pitfalls that plague similar institutions. The BZEP has, for instance, succeeded in scaling down the initial project list put forth by the PTA Secretariat, which included many high-cost, basic infrastructure projects. BZEP officials also stress the conservativeness with which they have invested the Bank's paid-in capital. However, it is still too early to judge whether the Bank will succeed in its goal of attracting additional nonmember funding, since, as of now, it prefers to wait until member capital subscriptions are paid-in before soliciting nonmember funds. The only concrete achievement of the Bank to date has been to set up a PTA traveller's check scheme for transactions within the community.

Centre Africain d'Etudes Monetaires (CAEM)
African Center for Monetary Studies (ACMS)

- Address:** Directeur Général, 15 blvd. F. Roosevelt, B.P. 3193, Dakar, Senegal.
- Established:** 1978
- Membership:** 33 national and subregional central banks: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bank of Central African States, and Bank of West African States.
- Language(s):** English and French.
- Objectives:** As stated in its Constitution, the objective of the Center is to "promote the economic development of Africa through the better understanding of banking and monetary matters and the inter-relationship between these matters as instruments of economic development."
- Functions:** The Center studies monetary problems of African countries and the impact of international monetary developments on African economies. These studies are designed to enable African countries to formulate regional

strategies and agreements. A special concern is protection against the instability of the international monetary system. Study topics are proposed only by member Central Banks. The ACMS also sponsors training seminars and workshops in such fields as accounting and asset management, economic forecasting, statistical analysis, policy analysis, and debt management.

Structure: The highest authority of the ACMS is the Assembly of Governors, comprised of the Governors of the African Central Banks. The Assembly formulates the Center policy, determines member contributions, and approves the Center's budget. The Governing Council is comprised of two members from each subregional committee of the Association of African Central Banks, as well as a nonvoting member from the country in which the Center is established (in this case the Central Bank of West African States). It coordinates the financial and technical activities of the Center. The executive of the ACMS is the Director General. He supervises the three functional divisions--the training department, the research division and the administrative office. The ACMS has a special relationship with the ADB (African Development Bank), the ECA (United Nations Economic Council for Africa), and the ABEDA (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa). These three institutions are members of the Governing Council but do not vote.

Financing: The operating budget of the ACMS is provided by contributions from African Central Banks. In 1988 it amounts to 1.5 mn. SDR (Special Drawing Rights). Ordinary capital resources stand at 1.5 mn. SDR (paid up) and 1.2 mn. SDR (callable). There are minimum and maximum contributions which, stand respectively at 1.5 percent and 10 percent, in order to avoid any given central Bank from dominating. The UNDP has been a generous supporter by providing grants to improve training facilities.

Comments: The activity level sustained by the ACMS is high, and its achievements encouraging. It also seems to be fairly well regarded by the international financial community. In 1985, there were approximately 250 participants at the Center's workshops, seminars and conferences. The ACMS-sponsored Nairobi Conference in 1985 was one of the first instances of African economists and bankers discussing among themselves the need for economic policy reforms. Although a review of the ACMS's journal suggests that the research conducted has been limited in scope, the issues addressed are of the utmost importance for African Central Banks.

Recent research studies conducted by the Center include: Debt Early Warning System and the Evaluation of Debt-Servicing Capacity in African Countries (1985); the Structure and Role of Interest Rates (1985); Capital Markets and Economic Developments in Africa (1986); the Management of Public Debt in African Countries (1987); and Payments and Trade Arrangements in the North African Sub-region (1987).

Also, past seminars and courses include: exchange control and economic development of African countries (24th April to 4th May, 1984); the role of the banking system in financing the agricultural sector and rural development (24th Nov to 1st Dec, 1984); the impact of foreign investment on African countries (19th to 28th August, 1985); the problems and management of African currencies (12th to 18th March, 1986); and experiences with payments and clearing systems in African countries (11th to 22nd May, 1987).

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The training program also includes intra-bank placements which allow Central Bank personnel to seek experience in other countries. According to the 1987 Auditor's report, arrears are not a major problem, which is perhaps not surprising since the membership consists of Central Banks, not Central Governments.

Centre for African Family Studies (CAFS)
Centre d'Etudes de la Famille Africaine (CEFA)

Address: Director, Milma House, Upper Hill Road, P.O. Box
600054, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1975

Membership: Presumably the national family planning associations that are members of the IPPF.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: CAFS' multiple objectives are: to raise awareness among decision-makers of the importance of family planning to development; to inform leaders of implications of current population trends on development; to train managers, supervisors and other personnel in promoting and implementing family planning program; to compile demographic and family planning data and to carry out research relevant to its education and training role; and to provide technical assistance to national Family Planning Associations.

Functions: CAFS pursues its objectives through a number of training programs: one- to two-week seminars that allow dissemination of information and ideas to policymakers; one- to four-week workshops to promote and produce teaching and training materials to be used in family planning programs; three- to ten-week courses on a range of themes for the training of family planning staff and development planners. Subjects covered include population and development; family planning and welfare; contraceptive technology; communication, motivation and counselling; and management and supervision.

Finally CAFS has an information and documentation center that supports its training and research and acts as a reference center within the region.

Structure: CAFS is led by its own Director and has a substantial degree of autonomy. It was founded by the African Regional Center of the International Planned Parenthood Federation. CAFS had 14 full-time senior professional staff members as of May 1988.

Financing: CAFS was founded and is principally financed by the International Planned Parenthood Federation. In 1986, IPPF contributed \$US 456,200. However the share of IPPF funding is declining, and stands at approximately 40 percent of the total budget presently. More recently CAFS has found more external funding, usually tied to specific program support. Principal donors are USAID, CIDA, DANIDA and UNFPA. For example, USAID contributed \$US

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1,223,500 for three-year support of a specific Family Planning Training Support Project.

Comments: CAFS' activity since 1981 has increased significantly in terms of breadth of activity and number of people trained. Courses and workshops increased in number from 4 in 1981 to 11 in 1986. Participants increased from 77 to 170. This is largely due to the increased level of external funding. By 1986, 87 percent of participants were being trained with external funds. Moreover, CAFS training projects have been described as "high quality" in the most recent (1987) Overall Programme Evaluation by the IPPF's Evaluation and Management Audit Department. CAFS has recently begun a research program which will be applied and operational in focus (i.e. related to the implementation of family planning programs.)

Centre de Coordination des Recherches et de la
Documentation en Sciences Sociales desservant
l'Afrique subsaharienne (CERDAS)

Address: Secretary, P.O. Box 836, Kinshasa, Zaire XI.

Established: 1974

Membership: African states south of the Sahara; African universities and research institutions can become members by paying an annual \$300 fee. (No actual list of members was available at the time of this writing.)

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote cooperation among social science research institutions in member states south of the Sahara; to strengthen the contribution of such research to development efforts; and to engage in research and documentation activities at a regional level.

Functions: There are four activities in which CERDAS is involved: seminars, to be chosen yearly by the Governing Board; research in several areas including rural and urban issues and food policy planning; documentation--creating a data bank of all social science research in Africa; and publications in the form of a quarterly newsletter called the CERDAS-Liaison, and articles.

Structure: CERDAS is headed by a Governing Board composed of a representative of the Zaire Executive Council, representatives of some African countries south of the Sahara and a representative of the Director General of UNESCO. A Standing Committee may be appointed to ensure effective operations between sessions. A Consultative Assembly composed of the universities and research institutions of the states represented in the Governing Board functions in an advisory capacity. An Ad-Hoc expert Group also acts as an advisory board and is made up of African social scientists convening at the request of the Secretariat. The secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of

the Centre. It is led by a Director, assisted by a Deputy Director, Research Co-ordinator, Documentalist and support staff.

Financing: CERDAS depends mostly on contributions from African member states and the OAU as well as support from UNESCO, various international organizations, foundations and institutional membership fees.

Centre d'Etudes Economiques et Sociales de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
(CESAO)

Address: B.P. 305, Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1960

Membership: No membership. The Centre aims to serve all French-speaking African countries.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To train farmers and rural development agents.

Functions: CESAO offers short training programs in various aspect of rural life and development, ranging in length from a few weeks to a few months. For the 1988-1989 academic year, there are 9 programs planned for rural development agents, and 6 for farmers. CESAO also caters to special demands outside of its regular offerings.

Topics include cooperatives, farm management, rural health, women in development, environmental protection, and training methods. CESAO publishes Construire Ensemble (quarterly), and several collections of training materials.

In any given year there may be as many as 2,000 trainees, two-thirds of whom are from Burkina Faso. Students come from as far away as Djibouti and Madagascar. The Centre has 10 classrooms, a laboratory, and a library of 9,000 volumes.

Structure: There are 30 full-time teachers, 4 of whom have doctorates.

Financing: Most trainees are sent and paid for by agencies and/or employers. The cost of training is 16,000 CFAF per week, plus 12,000 CFAF per week for room and board. MISEREOR (a Catholic German church association) finances 45 percent of the operating budget, and Switzerland 35 percent.

Comments: CESAO is an impressive, efficient institution. Facilities are in good repair, and the demand for their training programs consistently high. Most trainees are sponsored by projects rather than governments. Teacher salaries are reasonable, at about 150,000 CFAF per month, slightly higher than Burkinabé counterparts.

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Centre Interafricain d'Etudes en Radio Rurale de Ouagadougou
(CIERRO)

Address: B.P. 385, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1978

Membership: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoro, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English and French. Instruction in French.

Objectives: To research and train in the applications and potentials of rural radio.

Functions: CIERRO's main function is training. It receives two students from each URTNA member country (Union des Radio-diffusions et Télévisions Nationales d'Afrique), plus additional students from Burkina Faso. To be admitted, students must either have passed the baccalaureat or an equivalent, or have worked in the field for three years. The training program lasts two years and culminates in the writing and defense of a thesis, at which time graduates are awarded a CIERRO diploma. Shorter-term refresher courses for midcareer professionals are also offered, but on an irregular basis. It is difficult to gauge how much research is actually conducted.

Structure: CIERRO is one of URTNA's three specialized centers. Its curriculum and other policies are largely independent of the URTNA secretariat in Dakar. There are 2 permanent, full-time teachers; the rest are contracted on a temporary basis from the University of Ouagadougou.

Financing: The GTZ (German Agency for Development) finances 75 percent of the budget through URTNA. Burkina Faso furnishes 10 mn. CFAF. UNESCO and the ACCT (Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique) provide finance for training materials and seminars. In addition, the GTZ gives students a scholarship of 40,000 CFAF through CIERRO.

Comments: CIERRO seems to function smoothly and efficiently, largely because of reliable support from the GTZ. Facilities are adequate to the task and are in good repair. The GTZ is committed to maintain support through 1990, at which time it will undertake a comprehensive evaluation of CIERRO and its mission.

Some political tension persists: the Côte d'Ivoire was disgruntled because it did not get to host the Centre, and therefore sends no students to CIERRO. More serious, however, is the fact that CIERRO has neither a good idea of what its graduates do, nor whether rural radio programs, such as civic

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instruction, agricultural vulgarization, and discussion of rural health topics, have any impact.

Centre Interafricain de Recherches et d'Etudes Supérieures en
Science de l'Education (CIRSSÉD)

Address: Directeur, BP 8121, Lomé, Togo.

Established: 1976, moved from Quebec to Togo in 1986.

Membership: No members.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To offer doctorate-level training in education science.

Functions: The three-year program consists of three semesters of course work, followed by a year of practical training in the students' respective home countries, and then a final evaluation period back at the Center. The students are sent by their Ministries of Education, and most are in their 30s or 40s. They generally come from countries which do not offer anything beyond the masters level in education science. There are approximately 12-15 new students enrolled per year.

Structure: The CIRSSÉD is run by the Association pour le Développement et de la Recherche en Education en Afrique (ADEFREDA), which retains its affiliation with the Laval School of Education in Quebec. ADEFREDA's Board of Directors consists of university and Ministry of Education Officials from francophone Africa and Canada.

Financing: Most student fees are paid by their countries, though support is also given from USAID, Switzerland, CIDA, UNESCO, and the Ford Foundation. CIDA and the World Bank assisted the Center in its early stages, when it was still located in Quebec. Donors are trying to wean CIRSSÉD away from their support (especially the Ford Foundation), to the extent that the Center was on the verge of closing last year due to lack of funds.

Centre Régional Africain d'Administration du Travail (CRADAT)

Address: M. le Directeur Général, B.P. 1055, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1975

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Zaïre.

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Language(s): French

Objectives: To organize specialized, in-service training of middle executives in social security and labor administrations of member states. Other goals include providing experts to member states; diffusing information to members; and conducting studies and research in the field of labor in cooperation with the ILO (International Labor Organization).

Functions: The center organizes two annual training sessions. The first one is for labor inspectors. The class is composed of 22 to 25 trainees and lasts 8 months. The program includes technical courses and field visits to enterprises. The second training session organized by the center is for more advanced civil servants, already employed in their national services. It is a four-month session, highly technical, with well-qualified professors. This is to compensate for the poor training given in this field in the National Schools of Administration (ENA). The school also organizes seminars on various questions linked to labor administration, such as the problem of unemployment or labor migration. Eighteen people have regular appointments at the school, though only 5 are full time professionals. In addition, 7 Cameroonian professors and 5 international experts give lectures on a contractual basis.

Structure: CRADAT is supervised by a Governing Council composed of representatives of member states, UNDP and ILO. The Council defines the general principles for the operation of the institute. An Executive Board delegates to a team comprised of the General manager, two division chiefs and a technical adviser the administrative and technical management of the school.

Financing: The recurrent budget of 79 mn. CFAF is financed by member states' contributions. These contributions are divided in two shares. The "solidarity" share is equal for each member and represents 1.6 mn. CFAF. The "servitude" share is prorated, depending on the number of students sent to the school from a given country and weighted with the GNP per capita of that country. The lowest rate is for Chad (1.5 percent) and the highest for Gabon and Zaire (10.5 percent). In addition, ILO, UNDP and Belgium finance certain courses and lectures provided by international experts.

Comments: The school has trained about 3,600 labor controllers and retrained 500 factory inspectors since its inception. However, it is facing serious problems, the main one being the arrears in payment of subscriptions from members. Arrears are estimated to be 116 mn. CFAF. Buildings are now in disrepair, the library is becoming obsolete, and no significant research activity has been undertaken of lack of funding.

Since this enormous financial problem will probably not be solved in the near term, the new manager (appointed in June 1988) has announced his willingness to expand the activity of the school to serve private sector needs. This could be done by organizing colloquiums and seminars on topics relevant to private enterprises, such as the management of human resources.

Centre Régional Africain de Technologie (CRAT)
African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT)

Address: Directeur Exécutif, Route de Ouakam X Canal IV, B.P. 2435, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1977

Membership: Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To promote the development and use of food, energy, and manufacturing technologies through programs and activities that encourage the development of indigenous technologies, and the transfer and adaptation of outside technologies which are suitable for the region, so as to strengthen technological capabilities of the member states.

Functions: CRAT was established under the aegis of the OAU and the ECA. It has only been operational since 1980. Rather than developing technology itself, the CRAT mainly does consulting in "fields of special competence": 1) feasibility/pre-investment studies; 2) design services, in which manufacturing processes are studied and documented, thereby providing a base on which recommendations and evaluations of project proposals can be made; 3) sectoral studies, concerning technologies for agro-based industries, renewable energy sources, and rural industries; and 4) information services, serving as a link to outside consulting organizations, and providing information on patents, industrial property, the legal aspects of technology acquisition, etc. CRAT also provides training programs to improve national capacities in technology policy and planning.

The CRAT continues to emphasize "rural industries development." Working with African institutions of science and technology, the Center tries to identify, adapt, develop and test techniques which are suitable for use by small farmers, low-income consumers, among others. The Centre seeks to bring entrepreneurs into the process at an early stage to ensure that promising technologies or products are distributed and manufactured.

Structure: The chief organ of the CRAT is the Council, consisting of the ministers of technology from each member state, plus the Executive Secretary of the ECA and the Secretary General of the OAU. Below the Council is the Executive Board, which again has officials representing the ECA and OAU, plus the Executive Director of the CRAT, and delegates from one-third of the member states. Below the Executive Board is the secretariat, which has about 35 members, including the Executive Director, the Directors of Divisions and professional and support staff. Total professional staff numbers 12. The Secretariat is responsible for carrying out administration and day-to-day functions of the CRAT.

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Financing: The organization is funded by contributions from the member states. Benin, for example, pays approximately \$US 9,000 per year while Nigeria pays approximately \$US 150,000 per year. Outside support is provided by, among others, the IDRC of Canada and UNDP (for publishing the newsletter).

Comments: The Centre's most concrete accomplishment is in the collection and dissemination of technological information. It also appears to have the potential of playing an important role as an African "consulting firm," by identifying African experts for project work in this area. CRAT published a "Directory of Science and Technology Institutions, Consulting Organizations and Experts in Africa." It also has an extensive library and produces several publications, including the Centre's bulletin, "African Technodevelopment." It has started negotiations for the establishment of a "Technological Information Exchange System in Africa" and held 3 training courses for national policymakers on the development and transfer of technology.

CRAT is also involved in numerous other activities, usually with the funding of UNDP. In these cases, CRAT claims to work closely with private enterprise and through national institutions of science and technology. However, its broad mandate has led to its engagement in numerous areas, with a consequent diffusion of effort and a piecemeal approach to activities. For example, the Centre is involved in the monitoring and evaluation of research and development of technology in general, as well as of specific pilot-scale and demonstration units. It holds workshops on "techniques for the reduction of post-harvest food loss" while also overseeing the construction of biogas digesters. It conducts a project on food irradiation processing, and a survey of technological needs and priorities in the rural areas. There is a danger that this lack of focus may compromise the Centre's credibility and effectiveness in any one area, since in almost every case there are other more specialized, and presumably more expert, organizations involved.

The apparent overreach of CRAT also results in duplication of activities with other organizations. A case in point is work CRAT is conducting regarding traditional food crops such as maize, a primary responsibility of ICRISAT. A senior CRAT official recognized frequent duplication of this kind, suggesting that a consortium of organizations was necessary to coordinate activities. It appears that CRAT faces a problem in collecting its membership dues. It has also expressed to USAID its perception that its "biggest problem . . . is a shortage of resources."

Centre Régional de Télédetection (CRTD)
Regional Remote Sensing Centre

Address: Directeur, B.P. 1762, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1977

Membership: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To receive, process and distribute satellite information and to assist African countries in the utilization of this information for development projects, early warning systems, pest control, etc.

Functions: To organize seminars and courses on remote sensing techniques and their application to projects in geology, hydrology, forestry, agriculture and soil utilization. It is also building up an information bank and a series of reference materials to assist remote sensing users. It cooperates with similar centers to help establish a remote sensing network in Africa.

Financing: The organization is financed by member states' contributions which are scaled to the wealth of the member. The assessed contributions were 856,102,300 CFAF for the 1981-1984 budget.

Comments: Out of the signatory member states (14), only six have contributed to the budget since the inception of the center, and only Burkina Faso, where the center is located, has no arrears in dues. For the period 1981-1984, only 18 percent of assessed contributions were paid, leading to more than 600 mn. CFAF of arrears. External assistance has helped to develop some of the institute's facilities. The end of support of some important donors, mainly the United States, has increased the problem of lack of funds and has placed serious limitations on the center's effectiveness and activity level.

Centre Sous-Régional de Mise En Valeur des Ressources Minerales
Pour l'Afrique Centrale (CRMAC)
Central African Mineral Resources Development Center (CAMRDC)

Address: Manager, Brazzaville, Congo.

Established: 1981

Members: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Zaire. Two other potential members are expected to join the organization very soon.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To assist member states in acquiring and developing adequate technical manpower capability for the optimum exploitation of the continent's natural resources.

Functions: Provides higher-level technical training to African students.

Comments: The organization is still in its infancy. Its manpower capacity is very small; the three division chiefs have no staff. Its financing problem is already serious and doubts about its future activities have been expressed. In addition, the center's activities seem to overlap those of the Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Center based in Dodoma. It is

not clear why another center was created under the auspices of ECA, as mining activities require pretty much the same type of expertise wherever they are located.

Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT)
International Center for Tropical Africa

Address: Director General, Apartado Aereo 6713, Cali, Columbia.

Established: Not known.

Membership: CGIAR continuing members; see IITA profile.

Language(s): Spanish and English.

Objectives: To increase productivity on farms with limited resources and on underutilized land areas.

Functions: CIAT has a global mandate in beans and cassava. It conducts cassava research in West Africa and in the Eastern African highlands, in close collaboration with IITA. CIAT provides germplasm for African conditions (subtropical factors, high starch content) and problems such as mite resistance. CIAT also supplies IITA with natural enemies of insect pests for biological control. Furthermore, CIAT is currently exploring all of the neotropics for additional enemies of cassava pests found in Africa.

CIAT also has a tropical pastures program; germplasm is collected that has potential for subhumid and humid areas in West Africa and sent to ILCA and to the national programs that request it. Finally, CIAT has established two regional bean research projects in Central and Eastern Africa.

Structure: Same as other CGIAR-affiliates; see IITA profile. None of CIAT staff is African.

Financing: Same as other CGIAR-affiliates; see IITA affiliate. CIAT's core operating expenditures in 1986 were \$US 21.3 mn.

Comments: CIAT's central research activity has been focused on genetic improvement to overcome production constraints with minimum use of agrochemicals. In terms of its African activities, there may be some conflict of mandates between CIAT and IITA. In East and Central Africa, for example, some CIAT scientists felt that they would be much better positioned to serve the subregion's research needs with respect to cassava. Under the CGIAR system, however, IITA has the global research monopoly on this crop.

CIAT is concentrating on collaborative operations in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. They have succeeded in introducing two new varieties of beans, although there has been little local adoption at this stage. CIAT-financed training operations in the region include "monitoring tours" in which high-level national research scientists attend CIAT-sponsored seminars. They also

include training sessions in the three countries for technicians and extension workers.

Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT)
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center

Address: Director General, P.O. Box 6-641, Mexico 06600, D.F. Mexico.

Established: 1943. Became a CGIAR institute in 1971.

Membership: CGIAR continuing members (see IITA profile).

Language(s): English and Spanish.

Objectives: CIMMYT works with scientists and national programs around the world on the improvement of Maize and wheat.

Functions: Its primary function is applied research. It also conducts workshops and symposia for researchers to exchange ideas and results. Research efforts are focused on genetic improvement of cultivars. In CIMMYT's parallel wheat and maize programs, plant breeders carry out continuous programs to produce new genotypes. At each stage of development, promising types are tested and the best performing are eventually named and released by national programs for local farmers.

Along with the development of improved cultivars, CIMMYT identifies constraints to the improvement of the productivity of resources devoted to these crops. Like new seeds, improved farming methods are developed in collaboration with developing country scientists and tested and adapted by national programs.

Structure: The organization is the same as other CGIAR affiliates (see IITA profile). In 1986, of CYMMIT's 105 internationally recruited professional staff, 6 were from sub-Saharan Africa.

Financing: Same as that of other CGIAR affiliates (see IITA profile). In 1986, CYMMIT's world-wide expenditures amounted to \$US 21.4 mn.

Comments: Like other CGIAR centers, collaboration with developing country scientists and government programs is an important aspect of CIMMYT's work in wheat and maize. CIMMYT scientists and technicians work directly in many national programs and, in turn, young agricultural graduates and scientists from developing countries come to Mexico for periods ranging from a few days to a year or more to improve their abilities to increase production of these important food crops.

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Centro Internacional de la Papa (CIP)
International Potato Center

Address: Director General, Apartado 5969, Lima, Peru.

Established: 1971

Membership: CGIAR continuing members; see IITA profile.

Language(s): Spanish and English.

Objectives: To improve potato production.

Functions: CIP does research and training in the area of potato production. For example, it works on developing, in disease-free condition, the entire range of genetic variability of potatoes. It also develops and transfers improved cultivars for both cold and warm tropical regions; extends knowledge on improved potato production, storage, propagation and pest control; and seeks to reduce the cost of potato production. In Africa, its work has been concentrated in Eastern and Central Africa with, more recently, attention being paid to Senegal, Cameroon, Togo and Cape Verde in West Africa.

Structure: Same as all CGIAR-affiliated centers; see IITA profile. CIP has 91 internationally recruited professional staff. Nine of these professionals are African. There are 2 professional staff in Burundi since 1985.

Financing: Same as other CGIAR-affiliated centers; see IITA profile. The CIP expenditures world-wide in 1986 were \$US 12.5 mn.

Comments: CIP appears to be highly regarded in Eastern Africa. CIP/Lima provides 80 percent of the genetic material used by CIP in East Africa. The normal procedure, for the CIP Gisozi experimental station, for example, is to take genetic material from local clones and send improved varieties to Lima for tests on disease resistance. "Clean clones" are returned to Gisozi for multiplication and dissemination.

The East African program has a good track record. Almost all potatoes grown in Burundi are varieties introduced in 1985 through CIP and the Burundi National Agricultural Research Center cooperation. Similarly, CIP was involved in the "diffused light" method of storage of seeds which has been widely accepted by farmers. The "heat check storage technique: breaks seed dormancy periods, permitting intercropping.

CIP is also involved with training. High-level seminars are held for national agricultural research center scientist, while internships are given at regional CIP centers and in Lima. CIP also appears to be more involved in farmer training than other international centers. On-farm trials and training courses in Kirundi, for example, are oriented to farmers. CIP researchers feel that they benefit greatly from the contact with farmers in these instances.

CIP works with PRAPAC, a cooperative research network grouping national potato programs, which operates in Rwanda, burundi, Zaire and Uganda (the latter is not really functional due to lack of funds). The network allocates research duties among centers and serves to disseminate research results among the different countries. It has had some success in this regard; the Kinigi variety of potato developed in Rwanda is now available in Burundi. Several donor officials concurred that CIP does a good job "intertwining" itself with national programs

Chambre de Compensation des Paiements de l'Afrique Centrale (CCAC)
(Central African Clearing House)

Address: Secrétaire Executif, B.P. 5513, Immeuble "Trois Z," 4793
Avenue des "Trois Z," Kinshasa, Zaire.

Established: 1979

Membership: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Chad (collectively represented by the Bank of Central African States) and Zaire (represented by its central bank).

Language(s): French

Objectives: To promote the use of national currencies in commercial and noncommercial subregional transactions, thereby reducing the need for hard currencies in settling payments between member states and facilitating intra-subregional trade.

Functions: The CCAC, which began operations in 1984, permits importers and exporters in member states to make and receive payments in their own national currencies. Within the Clearing House, these transactions are denominated in Unités de Compte de l'Afrique Centrale (UCAC) or Central African Units of Account (1 UCAC = 1 SDR). The official exchange rate of national currencies to UCACs is determined twice monthly and is calculated from the average of the daily rates during the preceding fifteen-day period. At the end of each month the CCAC totals each participating central bank's account and outstanding balances are paid for in hard currency. Net importers are given interest-free credit up to one-sixth (16.7 percent) of the average total value of trade (imports plus exports) with other Clearing House members during the preceding three years; the extension of credit by a creditor country may not exceed 20 percent according to the same formula. The Clearing House is available for all current account transactions except those pertaining to transactions between BEAC (franc zone) countries and trade in goods not originating in a member state.

Structure: The CCAC was created by the Association of African Central Banks and is governed by the Central African Exchange and Clearing Committee comprised of six administrators (three from each bank). This committee meets annually to establish rules, regulations and procedures for the Clearing House's operations. An Executive Secretary is appointed once every five years.

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A two-member Subcommittee chosen from among the Committee's members assists the Committee.

Financing: Operating expenses are financed in equal shares by the CCAC's two member banks. In 1986, these amounted to 267 mn. CFAF. There is no evidence of arrears in either member bank's contributions.

Comments: Since the CCAC predates the negotiation of the CEEAC Treaty, it has been organized as an independent institution. While the Clearing House agreement explicitly opens membership to other states in the central African subregion (Angola, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Rwanda and Burundi are eligible to join) the only two central banks currently participating are the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) and the Bank of Zaire. Plans are now underway to establish a clearing mechanism within the CEEAC framework, but it is not clear exactly how the CCAC will be related to the new institution. In any case, it will require careful coordination to avoid wasteful duplication of activities.

The volume of transactions channeled through the CCAC increased from 128 mn. UCAC in 1984 (its first year of operations) to 1,273 mn. UCAC during 1986. But in 1986 less than 4 percent of these transactions were technically "cleared" (i.e. settled in national currencies) while the remaining 96 percent had to be settled in hard currencies. The low level of clearing is directly related to the imbalance of trade between Zaire and the franc zone member states. In recent years, Zairian exports to the BEAC states have consistently put the Bank of Zaire in a net creditor position in the clearing house system. It is also apparent that the CCAC is not widely used: in 1986 only 8 out of the member states' 35 commercial banks had used it and the bulk of these transactions involved cement exports by a single Zairian company to the Central African Republic. Some of these banks have continued to use alternative means of settling payments.

Since only two central banks are members, the Clearing House does not benefit from the advantages of multilateral payments arrangements that are associated with other subregions. As a result, the CCAC's operations remain highly dependent on Zaire's economic relations with the BEAC countries. While it makes sense for the Clearing House to expand its membership, it is not clear that the inclusion of the eligible non-members would help to increase the very low level of intra-subregional trade (currently around 2 percent of total trade). The CCAC's immediate future will also depend on the institutional ramifications of the new clearing house planned for the CEEAC.

Club d'Afrique
Africa Club

Address: Secrétaire Général, Club d'Afrique, B.P. 772, Lomé, Togo.

Established: 1980

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Members: Professors of economics and international relations in member countries of ECOWAS.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: Create a climate for an effective North-South dialogue and foster closer relations between the rich and poor countries. To promote the development and the unification of the continent on the cultural, social and economic level.

Functions: Book publishing and the organization of colloquia are the two main activities of the Africa Club. A series of country economic information handbooks is also planned but, because of lack of financial resources, only one volume on Togo is available, while the second volume on Côte d'Ivoire will be published soon. Proceedings of recent colloquiums are also being prepared for publication.

Structure: The structure is minimal, and the President makes the major decisions.

Financing: Although the association is not willing to provide information concerning its financing, it seems to be supported on a bilateral basis by some OECD and African governments. It also gets occasional support from colloquium budgets.

Comments: The Club of Africa is a nongovernmental organization made up of African intellectuals. Recently, it has gained a reputation as a serious organization, and some major donors strongly believe that the association can contribute to better policy dialogue with African countries. For instance, the Africa Club organized, in 1984, a colloquium with the World Bank on private enterprise. Its independence from political organizations in Africa (such as OAU) may permit it to present fresh and rarely heard views to African policymakers.

The Cocoa Producers Alliance

Address: Secretary General, P.O. Box 1718, Lagos, Nigeria.

Established: 1971

Membership: 7 African countries (Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon, Nigeria, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, and Togo) and 5 Latin American countries (Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago).

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote the exchange of technical and scientific information among member countries; discuss problems of mutual interest; advance social

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and economic relations between producers; ensure adequate supplies to the market at remunerative prices; and promote the expansion of consumption.

Functions: The Alliance hosts an International Cocoa Research Conference every two or three years in which officials of member countries, together with international cocoa scientists, have an opportunity to consult on problems of cocoa production, to formulate collective proposals to the ICCO (the International Cocoa Organization), and to formulate a common strategy for negotiations with cocoa consumers. The Alliance also brings together cocoa production statistics and research findings.

Structure: The General Assembly is the supreme organ of the Alliance, and is composed of representatives of the member states. The Executive Committee of the Alliance is responsible to the General Assembly and oversees the functioning of the Alliance. The secretariat is headed by the Secretary General, who is appointed by the General Assembly. He is responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the General Assembly and the committees of the Alliance. Secretariat staff number 26, of which 6 are professionals.

The member states together have 1,000 votes. Two hundred votes are divided equally among all the member states and the remaining 800 votes are distributed among them in proportion to each member state's highest annual production of cocoa in the six years immediately preceding each financial year. Decisions of the Alliance are binding on all member states.

Financing: The Alliance is financed by contributions of member states. Each state's contribution is based on the votes it holds.

Comments: The Alliance's main accomplishment appears to be the organization and hosting of its biannual International Cocoa Research Conference and its role as a forum for exchange of relevant technical information, research results and policy views.

However, the Alliance's achievements lag far behind its stated objectives. In the face of the downward trend of cocoa prices, the Alliance has not been able to orchestrate a response. Attempts to promote consumption in markets of the developed world, though discussed, have supposedly stalled due to lack of cooperation of "consumer firms" such as chocolate producers. The Alliance presently produces 80 percent of the world's cocoa. Attempts are being made to attract the new Asian producers who are largely responsible for the remaining 20 percent. In November 1987, the Alliance sharply reprimanded Nigeria for allowing poor quality cocoa to infiltrate the buffer stocks. The Alliance claimed that Nigeria accounted for 70 percent of the substandard cocoa stocks. The recent abolition of Nigeria's cocoa marketing board was allegedly to blame for allowing "inexperienced and unscrupulous" traders into the market.

At its 1988 annual meeting, the Alliance criticized the International Cocoa Agreement, reached under ICCO auspices, for failing to help producers while favoring consumer interests. The Alliance also determined to take action to reduce world surpluses and to set up a committee to study ways to boost prices.

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Comité Interafricain d'Etudes Hydrauliques (CIEH)
Inter-African Committee for Hydraulic Studies

Address: Secretary General, B.P. 369, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1960

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte D'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To promote cooperation between the member states in the pursuit of hydraulic research, its implementation, and in projects of common interest to all member states.

Functions: The CIEH is involved in numerous activities: conducting studies in hydrology; communicating the results to the member states by publishing reports and disseminating information at the "Journées du CIEH," a biannual meeting, and at colloquiums (e.g., a joint colloquium in 1982 with UNESCO on the state of the art of hydrology in arid and semi-arid zones); providing technical assistance (e.g., a scheme for development of water supplies in Cameroon, or proposals for management of a "hydraulique villageoise" in Senegal); preparing and submitting plans to member states for the coordination of research and field work; preparing requests for financial and technical assistance related to research projects and approved studies.

CIEH is also involved in training at EIER (see vignette) and at ETSHER (Ecole de Techniciens Supérieurs de l'Hydraulique et de l'Équipement Rural).

Structure: CIEH has three primary bodies: the Council, composed of one representative from each member state, which makes policy decisions and determines study programs; the General Secretariat, the executive arm of the committee, which works under the General Secretary to direct the administrative and technical services; and a Technical Bureau which is responsible for the dissemination of information and supervises implementation of studies.

Financing: Financing is divided equally among member states. In 1985, the 12 member states' theoretical contributions were 8,225,000 CFAF each for a total of 110 mn. CFAF. Additional donor aid totalled 390 mn. CFAF. The actual functioning budget is 60 mn. CFA, with accumulated arrears of 237 mn. Chad (62 mn.), Benin (37 mn.) and Mauritania (32 mn.) are the states with the most significant arrears.

Comments: CIEH is facing increasing financial difficulties. It has approximately 70 mn. CFAF in unpaid bills to various suppliers such as Air Afrique and the government of Burkina Faso. It is trying to rectify the situation by devoting its time to a more project-oriented approach, functioning rather like a consulting firm. For instance, it is now working on the rainfall aspect of a German road project in Burkina. It will also be involved in the World Bank project of computerizing the hydraulic potential of Africa.

CIEH continues to exist because FAC contributes 40 mn. francs every year; just enough to cover the expense of producing reports, missions and basic supplies. In 1988, FAC contributed another 88 mn. to help finance studies.

Employed at the CIEH are 9 technical assistants, 6 engineers, 3 national service volunteers (all paid by France) and 40 Africans. The organization is heavily involved in technical issues so that a nontechnician cannot easily assess its efficiency or the quality of work. Nevertheless, it has a good reputation among donors (UNDP, WB, FED, ACDI, UNESCO, FAC), and among other African organizations (AGRHYMET, CILSS, CEAO).

Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Secheresse
dans le Sahel (CILSS)
Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel

Address: Executive Secretary, B.P. 7049, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1973. In 1976, the OCDE members established the Club du Sahel, a donor forum for the coordination of long-term policies and strategies between aid donors and the members of the CILSS.

Membership: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal.

Language(s): French and English. Arabic and Portuguese are to be added.

Objectives: The aims of this organization are to combat the effects of chronic drought in the Sahel region by increasing food security and halting environmental degradation. "Food self-sufficiency" was the formal objective in the first year of CILSS existence. Other objectives of the CILSS/Club du Sahel include: mobilizing and coordinating resources for the development of the Sahel; definition of strategies to develop water resources, transport and communications as well as crop production and livestock.

Functions: The CILSS organizes conferences on regional development strategies and undertakes studies and research projects. Its main role is that of coordinator. The initial emphasis was on identifying projects for international donor funding. In the mid-1970s a "First Generation" program for food self-sufficiency was presented to donors; it included a wish list of some \$US 3 bn. of projects. Ultimately \$US 850 mn. were financed. Since the late 1970s, policy issues such as marketing reform and recurrent costs have been studied and discussed. The Club du Sahel is, in principle, a donor think tank on the problems of the Sahel.

Structure: Concrete policy and implementation procedures are formulated by the Council of Ministers, which meets twice a year. The Ministerial Council is composed of Ministers of Rural Development. Executive functions are the responsibility of the Executive Secretariat. There are two specialized, largely autonomous, institutions under the authority of the secretariat--

Agrhymet and the Sahel Institute, the latter usually known by its French acronym INSAH. Agrhymet carries out research and operational projects and training programs in agrometeorology and hydrology. The Sahel Institute is a research institute, conducting studies, providing information and sponsoring training seminars and workshops. A Technical Committee of Experts coordinates implementation of projects of CILSS in member countries. There is also a Management Committee which includes the General Secretary of CILSS and the Administrative heads of Agrhymet and INSAH.

At the national level, CILSS National Committees relay information on national economic conditions and project performance to the CILSS' Executive Secretariat. The CILSS/Club du Sahel working groups are means by which donors and members states of CILSS conduct dialogues on policy and projects. The CILSS and its specialized institutions (Agrhymet and the Sahel Institute) have a total senior staff of 63 persons. The Executive Secretariat of CILSS and of the Sahel Institute have each 23 professionals, and Agrhymet has 17 professionals. Staff is recruited according to geographic distribution and member countries' contributions to the total budget. However, 2 member states, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, do not have any staff in any of the 3 institutions.

Financing: The Administrative budget of the CILSS (including the two specialized institutions) is financed partly by member state contributions. Each member is supposed to contribute approximately 40 mn. CFAF per year. Donors, however, have increasingly subsidized the administration, currently financing more than 50 percent of the total budget of 685 mn. CFAF. The 1987 core administrative budget for 1988 was established at 425 mn. CFAF (a 4.5 percent decrease from the 1987 budget) of which contributions from member states amounted to 318.5 mn. CFAF.

Comments: The CILSS and its donor counterpart organization, the Club Du Sahel, are unique organizations--or were until SADCC and IGGAD were founded. They combine a financial function--increasing the flow of development assistance--with an attempt at aid coordination, research and policy dialogue. The money-raising aspect has been dramatically successful, assisted by worldwide sympathy for this poverty-stricken, drought-afflicted region. From an average level of aid of \$200 mn. a year in the early 1970s, the annual average inflow rose to around \$1 bn. by the late 1970s and has remained near this high level since then.

In other areas, CILSS has been less successful. The quality of the CILSS studies has been uneven. Much more has been written than is read by policymakers in the CILSS countries. And the strategy objective was too narrowly focussed on "food self-sufficiency" to leave room for serious analytic debate. Further, the CILSS performed no "aggregating" function in its earlier years--i.e. it did no screening but simply accepted all projects submitted by member states and called the total a "development program"; no known case exists of any project that was rejected in those exercises.

The "coordination" objective was not successful in the 1970s, nor was actual investment coordinated with stated strategy goals. Donor aid resources have been invested in irrigation infrastructures and transportation, while small-scale rainfed agriculture, rural health, and environmental issues were supposed to receive priority. The stated strategy gave high priority to

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rained agriculture; but 95 percent of agricultural spending has been for irrigation. And as a CILSS report pointed out, the results of the irrigation investment for a long time were only to maintain irrigated acreage in the region at a regional level. Some previously constructed irrigation works were becoming unusable as fast as new ones were being constructed, and no forward movement occurred.

The policy dialogue function has been original and has had beneficial effects, notably by stimulating discussion in such areas as pricing, marketing, and public finance. But there has been a mismatch between the level at which decisions are made and the level of most CILSS/Club dialogue. Much of that dialogue occurs by periodic "colloquia"--big happenings where donors and CILSS state representatives have come together to discuss specially-prepared papers on such matters as cereals policy (Nouakchott 1979, Mindelo, 1986) or recurrent costs. The discussion at these meetings is too often marred by the presence of a shifting cast of characters, by a tendency toward formalism, and by the dominance of a resolution-producing objective, i.e. by the search for words of art to put in a final resolution. Serious technical discussion is sparse at these meetings. The CILSS/Club has moved in recent years to deal with this problem. National CILSS representatives have been appointed, and national-level meetings are more frequent.

The CILSS has had serious internal management problems in its 15 years of existence. These were summarized in the mid-1980s with uncommon candor (and, some say, uncommon harshness) by an AID-financed evaluating team.

The most recent years have been disastrous for CILSS as the quality of staff and leadership has declined, and its mission has become blurred by its own rhetoric and hindered by its poor management and ballooning bureaucracy. . . . Many senior CILSS officials, including the former Executive Secretary on down, seem to have been in almost permanent travel status, further adding to the climate of aimlessness and disorganization. . . . Its personnel administration and fiscal management need major improvements. Its staff needs a major reduction. (USAID, 1986)

The management problems have been reduced in the past three years, and internal organization has been strengthened. Also financial constraints remain severe for the INSAM; Agryhmet and CILSS have been adequately financed since 1986. There still are problems of politicization in hiring decisions within the secretariat, high travel costs, and excessive dispersion of activities. CILSS staff organize or participate in hundreds of meetings each year.

The recent restructuring of CILSS has diminished the reluctance of the United States and Canada to finance CILSS' activities. The number of CILSS staff was reduced from 18 to 11, which meant reduced capacity in absolute terms but better use of scarce financial resources. The United States agreed in 1988 to provide grants of \$2 mn. a year for the next five years and recently made a \$400,000 loan to CILSS in order to develop agricultural policies in eight member countries up until 1992. Canada also committed \$225,000 (Canadian) for the next three years. However, regional members remain reluctant to place too much emphasis on the CILSS, fearing that traditional bilateral programs could be jeopardized.

Commission Africaine de l'Aviation Civile (CAFAC)
African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC)

Address: Executive Secretary, B.P. 2356, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1969

Membership: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote coordination, better utilization, and orderly development of the African air transport system.

Functions: CAFAC's primary functions are to formulate plans for the operation of African regional and subregional air service; to examine the feasibility of equipment standardization and commercial air transport policy coordination; to generate fare and rate structures that are conducive to rapid growth of African air traffic; to develop existing and future training facilities; and to study the need for collective arrangements for technical assistance in Africa.

Structure: The Plenary Session, which meets every two years, is the supreme body of CAFAC and is attended by high-level state delegates. The Bureau of CAFAC is responsible for the coordination and orientation of the Work Programme between Plenary Sessions. It meets at least twice a year and consists of 5 elected members: a President and 4 Vice-Presidents, each representing one of the four CAFAC subregions. The secretariat, with a staff of seven, conducts the daily business of the Commission and implements the Work Programme. CAFAC became a Specialized Agency of the OAU in 1978.

Financing: The Commission is financed by contributions of member states and by advances from the International Civil Aviation Organization. The AfDB funds some studies.

Comments: CAFAC takes on activities that are appropriate to and best done at the regional level. First, it has done well in identifying important areas of regional interest that require further examination, and it has also raised funding for these studies. Studies have been completed or are in the pipeline, for example, on the subjects of regional training needs, the creation of an aircraft financing and leasing company, the establishment of a network of aircraft maintenance and overhaul centers, and on the potentials of regional agricultural aviation.

Secondly, the Commission plays an important role as a supranational regulatory agent by defining protocols for bilateral and multilateral

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negotiations on traffic rights and by working on the adoption of coordinated procedures for licensing of personnel.

Third, CAFAC has paid particular attention to regional training needs. It has established and found financing for two regional aviation training institutes. It has also promoted greater regional use of two Egyptian centers of excellence by arranging fellowships now accessible to all Africans.

Fourth, the Commission serves as a conduit by monitoring and channeling developments on the world aviation scene to national aviation administrations (after having attended IATA and ICAO conferences, for example). Along these lines CAFAC is also developing a computerized data and information system, AFCAIS, which will process, disseminate and evaluate data and also catalogue information about government action, research activities, and publications in the area of civil aviation.

Finally, CAFAC seems to play an important regional role as a negotiator for the continent in the international arena. There has been specific need for such joint action given common interests such as resistance to further noise-level restrictions at European airports which would in effect deny landing rights to older, noisier aircraft operated by many African airlines.

While it would appear that the Commission serves the continent well, the organization has been experiencing some financial difficulty. In 1983 arrears stood at \$US 10,880. By 1985 they had increased to \$US 1,470,755. The imposition of sanctions on members in arrears was deemed unconstitutional. A major problem is viewed as the release of foreign exchange by member country central banks. Suggested solutions have included the opening of off-shore accounts in hard currency where national administrations could collect landing fees or en-route facility charges, for example.

Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad (CBLT)
Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)

Address: Secrétaire Général, B.P. 727, N'Djamena, Chad.

Established: 1964

Membership: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: The aims of the Commission are to regulate and control the utilization of water and other natural resources in the basin; to initiate, promote and coordinate natural resource development projects and research within the basin area; to examine complaints and to promote the settlement of disputes. The entire basin covers 3,355,000 sq. km. but the CBLT mandate covers only 443,000 sq. km., or 19 percent of the total area of the basin.

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Functions: The 1982-1986 program emphasized studies on the development of water resources and the control of rinderpest disease. In addition, a Development Fund was created in October 1973. The divisions conduct research, implement projects, and run training courses.

Structure: The governing body is made up of two commissioners from each member state. Executive duties are performed by the Executive Secretariat. Ministerial meetings, held biannually, establish the overall direction and scope of the Commission's activities. The CBLT has six divisions: administration, animal husbandry, fishing, forestry, telecommunications and civil engineering, and water resources. The technical divisions are staffed primarily through UNDP and FAO technical assistance programs.

Financing: The operating budget of 470 mn. CFAF is financed equally by all four members. The Development Fund of 500 mn. is financed according to the following breakdown: Nigeria, 75 percent, Cameroon, 15 percent, Chad, 5 percent and Niger, 5 percent. External funding is sought through meetings of the Consultative Committee, comprised of member states and donors.

Comments: CBLT is moving out of a very difficult period. It has had considerable difficulty attracting donor support, particularly from OECD countries, and has had to modify its objectives.

In July 1982, a big meeting was organized in Paris to present a plan for action. The FYAP (Five Year Action Plan) sought to increase food production, fight against desertification, "stabilize agriculture" and "promote general socio-economic development." The plan proposed four options for financing the development of the basin, at estimated costs ranging from \$35.5 mn. to \$4.6 mn. All options, even the smallest option seeking funding to bridge current operations, were rejected by donors as costly and overambitious. The consensus was that the CBLT was too poorly administered to justify donor commitment to its operations. Only the UNDP agreed on \$2.5 mn. financing, an amount only sufficient to keep the organization alive, essentially financing the Secretariat's day-to-day operations with few activities in the more functional areas. At this time, most observers believed that the Lake Chad Basin Commission was on the verge of going out of existence, particularly with the withdrawal of USAID support in 1982.

After this long period of ineffectiveness, CBLT has been reactivated with major changes in its goals, due to the severe criticism of both donors and member states to its past operations. In particular, the "national" projects will be transferred to national governments (such as the irrigation projects of Kousseri in Cameroon, Diffa in Niger and Malo in Chad). The organization seems to be willing to concentrate on hydrology, teledetection and mathematical modeling of the water resources in the basin.

Coinciding with the transfer of headquarters back to N'Djamena, this reactivation seems to be supported by member states which have made serious efforts to meet their financial commitments over the last few years. On the average, they have contributed up to 67 percent of the operating budget in the last few years. However, total accumulated arrears still represent 380 mn. CFAF. The Development Fund, a unique example for a River Basin Authority of a totally self-financed line of credit, has been able to mobilize more than 1

bn. CFAF. It should also be mentioned that Chad financed the rehabilitation of the headquarters, a 170 mn. CFAF expense not taken into account in the budget. Donors (the ADB, FAC, CARE, FED and the French EDF) are showing more interest in the Commission.

The CBLT still has an uncertain future, as serious constraints still exist: the Commission's mandate does not include basin rivers that carry much of the flow to the lake; inclusion of the headwaters region requires the entry of the Central African Republic in the organization, while the economic benefits for CAR of joining the commission are doubtful. The approach of the organization remains too global (e.g. the "shopping list" of bankable projects that it has proposed to donors), and there is still little attempt to prioritize or rationalize the competing options for the development of the basin. Also, not enough emphasis is put on planning, mainly for political reasons and because of bureaucratic inertia.

Commission de Cooperation Niger-Nigeria
Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation

Address: Secrétaire Général, Immeuble Sonara, Niamey, Niger.

Established: 1971, Commission signed; protocol of amendment signed 1973.

Membership: Niger and Nigeria.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To coordinate the economies of the two member states with a view to the gradual establishment of a rational, coordinated and balanced system of cooperation to ensure the optimal development of the two countries.

Structure: The main body of the Commission is the High Authority, comprised of the two heads of state. It meets annually, making all important decisions concerning the Commission, as well as establishing the Commission's guidelines.

The Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General head the secretariat. The secretariat's function is to propose issues for consideration to the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers meets twice yearly to study these issues and develop recommendations, which it submits to the High Authority for approval. Outside expertise in technical matters may be solicited by the Commission.

Financing: Contributions are paid by Niger and Nigeria on a random basis. There is no budget nor program of activities available. No donors are involved.

Comments: The Commission has realized very few concrete achievements. The main focus has been on a telecommunication project to link Niger to Nigeria, executed by ALCATEL-THOMPSON for 700 mn. CFAF. The Commission has no

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involvement in border trade or the computerization of trade statistics even though that is one of the most significant problems of Niger-Nigeria relations. It is involved in water management because the members have four river basins in common. It is also involved in the fight against desertification by providing some information to Niger on the Nigeria plan of action. The Commission has much too broad a mandate to be effective.

Staff selection is based on nationality--i.e., recruitment is by national quota. About 36 people, of whom 8 are professionals, are appointed by the organization. The Commission's office building is oversized; at least it seems empty. Requested documents are generally unavailable. There is no formal statement of purpose or means of operations. The large objectives of finding broad areas of cooperation between Niger and Nigeria is not supported by any specific plan on how to accomplish this goal.

Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO)
West African Economic Community (WAEC)

Address: Secretary General, Rue Destenave, B.P. 643, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal (Guinea and Togo as observers).

Established: 1974

Language(s): French

Objectives: The purpose of the community is to promote the coordinated and balanced development of member states with a view toward achieving as rapid an improvement as possible in the standard of living of their populations. The final goal is full economic integration of their economies.

Functions: To expand trade by negotiating preferential agreements among member states and to help the general development of the economies of the community. The CEAO operates two regional financing organizations--the Community Development Fund or FCD, which compensates members for revenue loss due to trade diversion; and the Solidarity and Intervention Fund or FOSIDEC, which guarantees loans for development, mainly to the poorer member states.

Structure: The Conference of Heads of State is the supreme authority of the CEAO. The Conference meets every other year (or more frequently, if necessary) to establish overall CEAO policy. The President of the Conference is the head of state of the member country hosting the conference. The Council of Ministers is responsible for designing specific programs and policies. At this level, the Taxe de Cooperation Régionale (TCR), or import duty on industrial goods, is formulated. The General Secretariat executes and enforces the decisions of the Conference and Council. In addition, there is a Court of Arbitration to settle disputes between CEAO members.

Financing: The general budget of the CEAO is partly provided by contributions from member states according to their economic importance. Other revenue sources include grants and investment earnings. Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire account each for 33 percent of the general budget, Niger for 9 percent, Mali for 8 percent, and Benin and Burkina each for 6 percent. However, the budget of the General Secretariat of the CEAO finances mainly staff salaries. In 1988, it amounted to 18.4 bn. CFAF (the Secretariat General accounted for approximately 5.2 bn. CFAF and the FCD for 13.2 bn CFAF). Total contributions of member states to the budget of the General Secretariat in 1987 and 1988 amounted respectively to 765 mn. and 1.14 bn. CFAF.

Comments: The CEAO was formed out of the former Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique l'Ouest (West African Customs and Economic Union - UDEAO) in 1973. Having learned from the previous difficulties within the UDEAO, the CEAO seems to have evolved an original, flexible approach to trade liberalization, including compensation arrangements. The major achievements of CEAO are, first, that within the Community free trade has been established, in principle, for locally produced, unprocessed primary products, with certain exceptions. Second, industrial products eligible for preferential trade are not subject to the import duty (Droit de Douane) common in Francophone countries, but only have a Taxe de Cooperation Régionale (TCR) imposed. The TCR is lower than duties on imports from outside the CEAO. TCR rates also vary commodity by commodity and country by country, with poorer countries tending to receive special preference. Third, a full customs union is planned for 1990.

The use of a common convertible currency, the CFAF, by all CEAO member countries except Mauritania has been an impetus for the augmentation of trade flows within the Community. The existence of the CEAO contributed over a period of ten years to the fourfold growth of trade exchanges within the Community. Community trade seems to have stabilized; it is now 6 percent of the total foreign trade of the member countries with the world (against 2 percent in 1976). However, only one-third of total value of goods exchanged benefited from preferential tariffs. Intra-community trade is very unevenly distributed. On one hand, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal continue to dominate the CEAO and benefit the most from preferential tariffs, as they produce more than half of the 450 products covered by concessionary rates; on the other hand, they are also by far the largest contributors (the two countries' contributions amount to 91 percent of the FCD's receipts). Since 1983, a new system to tax products is being studied: the PCS (Community Solidarity Project) which was to be submitted to the Council of Ministers in May 1988. It may eventually replace the TCR. The PCS would tax products originating from third countries.

In order to reduce prevailing trade barriers and negative trends in intra-communal trade, the CEAO Secretariat has proposed the Integrated Programme of Trade Promotion (1988-1992) to enhance economic integration. It consists of trade-enhancing projects such as improving product quality and better packaging of exports; the standardization of products in community markets and encouragement of contacts among business people; the improvement of purchasing techniques and import operations; assistance to enterprises for the promotion of intra-communal trade; and the financing and insuring of exports and assistance to businesswomen. Financing requested for the five-

year period of the program amounts to 3 bn. CFAF (\$11.9 mn.), divided between the CEAO (40 percent) and foreign financiers (60 percent). Some 884 mn. CFAF has already been authorized for the program.

The CEAO has also been active in other areas since its inception. The Summit of Heads of States held in Abidjan in 1977 resulted in the creation of FOSIDEC (see vignette) and the signing of a Defense pact (ANAD) (which also involves Togo). Some of the CEAO's accomplishments outside of the trade sector include the enlargement of the UMOA (West African Monetary Union) and the ending of the border conflict between Burkina Faso and Mali under the aegis of ANAD. This was done mainly through the personal involvement of President Houphouet Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire in the negotiations. A further achievement of the CEAO is the agreement legalizing the free flow of migrant labor from the interior states to the coastal states. Worker remittances provide significant financial benefits to the interior states. In fact, total remittances exceed the net flow of formal community funds through the FCD and FOSIDEC.

The CEAO has also undertaken many regional and national projects. Those in education and research include the following.

- o The Higher School for Textile Industries (ESITEX) in Ségou (Mali); a training, research and information center built at a cost of 4.5 bn. CFAF; completion is planned for 1988.
- o Minerals and Geology Engineering School (EMIG) in Niamey (Niger); a training, research and information center with a total projected cost of 11,047 mn. CFAF, and also planned to open in 1988
- o Center for Higher Management Studies (CESAG) in Dakar (Senegal); a training, information and research center in all fields of management. It is a bilingual institution open to all the countries of the sub-region. The Center is actually an extension of the national school and renovation costs were more than 2 bn. CFAF.
- o School for Fisheries in Nouadhibou (Mauritania); an engineering school and also a training, information and research center. Its total cost: 3.5 bn. CFAF.
- o Communal Fishery Company (SCP) in Nouadhibou aims to improve the production, consumption and commercialization of fish. It represents an investment of 17.1 bn. CFAF.

These projects serve the whole community, although they are meant to benefit the poorer countries, and are cofinanced by the FCD, the FOSIDEC, the CEAO Secretariat, donor countries, and international organizations.

The CEAO has initiated other projects in the energy and industrial development sector. In March 1987, the Solar Energy Research Center located in Bamako (Bamako) was completed except for some laboratory equipment, but operating cost financing has not yet been secured. The CEAO also established a rural well program with the aim of creating over 2,600 water points in the member countries. Total contributions of member states amounted to 3.5 bn. CFAF (approximately 13 percent of the 24 bn. CFAF total cost). In addition,

studies have been conducted to create a Community Carriage (railway) Factory (FACOWA) in Bobo Dioulasso (Burkina Faso) in order to promote railway transport. The total cost of this project would come to 2,564m CFAF. Togo which is a nonmember country of the CEAO has also been associated to the project.

As for economic regional cooperation, a Common Agricultural Policy (PAC) effort is being finalized by a group of experts (3 per country), and has been discussed by the Council of Ministers in June 1988. It covers:

- o improved information flow;
- o environmental management;
- o water resources management;
- o improved productive capacity;
- o price policy and market organization;
- o agro-industrial development;
- o transport and telecommunications.

Preliminary studies of a Regional Fisheries Center in Tiebissou (Cote d'Ivoire) have been undertaken; however, financing has not been obtained yet. The Center will mainly train technicians and will eventually be coordinated with the Fisheries School in Mauritania. The project concerning the creation of a Center for Vegetables (CIS) in Baguineda (Mali) was also adopted, and cooperation with the CEBV (Communauté Economique du Bétail et de la Viande) was undertaken in order to improve livestock statistics.

In the industrial sector, a common approach was examined and adopted in 1986 for the coordination of investment codes within the CEAO. However, no concrete resolution has been reached so far. Also, the General Secretariat is planning a maritime code for the Community and various projects are being examined in railway transport.

In 1984 the CEAO was plagued by internal problems resulting from a financial scandal and a border conflict between Burkina Faso and Mali. In 1986, administrative and organizational adjustments were undertaken in order to restore the credibility of the CEAO following the "embezzlement" of CFAF 6,400 mn. (\$21.3 mn.) from FOSIDEC by an Ivoirian businessman and two other senior officials in 1984.

Another issue is the degree of autonomy that FOSIDEC will enjoy with respect to CEAO; some members want FOSIDEC firmly in the control of CEAO, while others propose "controlled autonomy" as a compromise measure. At the 12th summit in April 1987, it was decided to put FOSIDEC "directly under the authority of the CEAO secretary-general, instead of the acting president of the council of ministers. The FOSIDEC administrative council is now to comprise senior officials designated by member states rather than CEAO finance ministers." In general, the CEAO does provide benefits to its members and has a certain cohesiveness (and attraction, as evidenced by the applications for membership status by Guinea and Togo).

The ten-year report of CEAO's Secretariat (CEAO, Annex: Bilan, Réalisations et Perspectives, 1974-1975) listed the main problems of CEAO, and they are still pertinent.

- o Weak internal organizations, notably lack of defined structures, severe lack of coordination and a concentration of management authority.
- o On the budget side, contributions are always late, there are huge gaps between projections for FCD and the payments made to member (importing) states. Arrears for the total budget (operating, FOSIDEC, FCD) amounted to 20 bn. CFAF in June 1984. For FCD alone, arrears were 15.4 bn.
- o FOSIDEC has some special difficulties, due to operating cost requirements and unpaid bills on some of its projects. This situation results in a growing need for FOSIDEC to finance operating costs of completed projects.
- o The imbalance in trade creates tension between member states. Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are increasingly dominant. The other states are frequently rejecting requests for additional preference. Because of their own financial difficulties, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire are delaying systematically their one-third payment to FCD.

Despite tensions and problems, the CEAO is a relative success among African (or other) market integration schemes. There is of course still a long way to go in order to achieve economic integration in West Africa. Despite "official" free trade in agricultural goods, for example, many formal and informal barriers remain. One of the major loopholes impeding trade liberalization in CEAO countries is the lack of industrial harmonization and mainly the absence of common rules on foreign investment. A common external tariff has still not been attained even though there are ongoing negotiations. These issues need to be resolved if duplication of industries and inefficiencies are to be avoided.

Also, the CEAO has recently been lacking leadership because of the economic difficulties of the two wealthier countries, which at the same time happen to be the largest contributors within the Community. However, with the recent restructuring measures undertaken, and new management on board, some of the threats for its future seem to have subsided.

Communauté Economique du Bétail et de la Viande du Conseil de
l'Entente (CEBV)

Address: Secrétaire Exécutif, B.P. 638, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
Established: 1970
Membership: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo, Burkina Faso.
Language(s): French

Objectives: CEBV was established on the initiative of the Mutual Aid and Loan Guarantee Fund of the Entente Council States to promote production, processing, and marketing of cattle and meat in the member states, among Entente members and between members and third party countries. The main goal of the Community is to establish a common market for these commodities among Entente states, and at the same time improve quality standards.

Functions: The CEBV's main functions are to gather relevant information on the livestock market within and outside the Community; to standardize statistical data on livestock markets; to synthesize and disseminate information; to coordinate programs on animal disease research; to generate data and to provide concrete guidelines designed to improve the marketing of livestock.

CEBV coordinates the circulation, and vaccination of cattle in the subregion, and promotes exports through the quality grading of meat and the standardization of prices.

The CEBV has a periodical that comes out irregularly in which the results of its research and surveys are published for the use of technicians and experts. CEBV collaborates with other African regional organizations such as CBLT, CEAO, ECOWAS, Liptako-Gourma, and CILSS.

Structure: The supreme organ of the Community is the Conference of Heads of State of the Entente Council (see profile on Entente Council). The Council of Ministers, consisting of two ministers or their representatives from each member country, defines the general policy of the Community and executes agreements on behalf of the Community; it meets at least once a year. The Executive Secretary is appointed by the Conference of Heads of State. The CEBV secretariat has 4 professionals, 1 technical assistant, and 16 local employees.

Other countries may become associate members of the Community (without being Entente members) and thereby be represented in the Council of Ministers. Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal have expressed interest in such an arrangement.

Financing: Until 1979, the budget was financed by the Guarantee Fund of the Entente Council. The Conference of Heads of State later decided that member states should contribute directly to the CEBV, and on an equal basis. For 1988, the budget is 75 mn. CFAF, which is roughly 25 percent lower than the 1987 budget. Arrears on previous obligations amount to 15 mn. CFAF. External financing has been provided by various organizations, including FAC, CCE/FED, FAO, BOAD, Guarantee Fund, USAID.

Comments: During its early years, the Community survived mainly because of generous foreign technical assistance and aid, but this didn't last. There were 5 French and American technical assistants in 1973, 2 in 1976, none after 1979. The Community has been faced with enormous difficulties in the implementation of its agreements because of the lack of adequate funds and the lack of reliable statistical data. Moreover, the Community has very poor facilities (e.g., no computers are available), and staff is inadequate to conduct any serious task.

In February 1988, the Council of Ministers agreed to undertake concerted action to protect against animal diseases; it also noted the persistence of drought which continued to cause severe problems, particularly in Burkina Faso and Niger. The Council reiterated its interest in a production costs study for meat and livestock and also studied the conclusions of a report on the effects of meat imported from nonregional members (essentially EEC countries and Argentina). It also recommended that the secretariat submit a study of the effect on the Community of an increase in duty levied on import and export taxes on meat traded within the Community.

Measures were also taken to develop cooperation in zoo technology, disease control and research, regulation for international cattle movement, and protective measures against meat imported from nonregional countries. Despite the number and scope of measures taken, it is not clear that the CEBV has or will have a significant impact on production and intracommunity trade of cattle and meat. Trade in meat remains largely unrecorded, on-the-hoof movement of livestock, thus defeating both the effort to restructure intracommunity trade and the measures to contain livestock diseases. Also, the fact that all of CEBV members except Togo are also members of the CEAO- sponsored OCBV (Office Communautaire du Bétail et de la Viande), an organization with similar functions, raises questions about the redundancy of CEBV and the inefficiency of livestock-related organizations due to overlapping mandates and activities.

Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC)
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Address: Secretary General, B.P. 2112, Libreville-Owendo, Gabon.

Established: 1983

Membership: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire. Angola participated in the original CEEAC negotiations but has yet to ratify the Treaty.

Language(s): French, English, Portuguese and Spanish.

Objectives: To promote intra-subregional trade by gradually eliminating customs duties, nontariff barriers and obstacles to free movement of people, goods and services between member states leading to the eventual establishment of a common external tariff and trade policy before the year 2000. The CEEAC also aims to harmonize national policies in trade, industry, agriculture and numerous other areas. In addition, the CEEAC is mandated to assist the development of the least-advanced member states including the landlocked and island nations.

Functions: The CEEAC Treaty is a general "agreement to agree" in the future on specific actions; it does not mandate an immediate freeze on intracommunity tariffs (like ECOWAS) nor an initial preferential tariff reduction (like PTA).

To date, the CEEAC's efforts have focused on carrying out various studies and organizing annual summit meetings.

Structure: The Conference of Heads of State and Government is responsible for defining general policy as well as directing and harmonizing the socioeconomic policies of member states. A Council of Ministers meets twice a year to establish regulations, guide the activities of the CEEAC institutions and make recommendations to the Conference. Every four years the Conference appoints a Secretary General to head the secretariat which handles the daily business of the Community.

Financing: The CEEAC secretariat budget is supported by annual contributions from the member states. The 1988 budget amounted to \$US 3.7 mn. Arrearages have been a persistent problem, however, as detailed below.

Comments: After the establishment of ECOWAS and the PTA, Central Africa was the last remaining subregion which had not been organized into an economic integration "building block" for the African common market projected by the Lagos Plan of Action. Observers generally regard the CEEAC's creation as a step required to complete the subregional network of ECA-sponsored, trade-liberalizing institutions. The subregion incorporates two preexisting economic communities: UDEAC, which includes the Central African members of the franc zone, and the CEPGL, linking Zaire with Rwanda and Burundi; the latter two countries also belong to the PTA.

While the proliferation of trade-related organizations may not be as extensive as in West Africa, the issue of overlap and duplication of functions raises serious doubts as to the CEEAC's future role. Over half of its members already share a common currency, development bank and customs union. Although all but one (Sao Tomé and Príncipe) belong to either the Central African or PTA Clearing Houses, the CEEAC is proceeding with plans to establish a clearing house of its own.

CEEAC's market integration strategy calls for the gradual establishment of a common market over a twelve-year period to be realized in three four-year stages. In the first stage, which officially began in 1986, member states are to stabilize all fiscal and customs regimes effecting subregional trade and to agree on a timetable for tariff reductions, removal of nontariff barriers and harmonization of external tariffs applied toward nonmember states. The goal during the second stage is the elimination of intra-CEEAC tariff and nontariff barriers and setting up of a free trade zone. The final four-year stage calls for the adoption of a common external tariff under a customs union.

The low commitment of member states to the CEEAC program has resulted in very limited progress in devising a specific strategy for implementing the Treaty's provisions. The third summit, held in Libreville in 1987, was attended by only four Heads of State. At the meeting it was revealed that just four member states (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Zaire) had met their financial obligations to the budget; these countries had also made treasury advances to the secretariat to meet its payroll.

In February 1988, the CEEAC held its fourth summit in Kinshasa with all ten Heads of State in attendance (the improved participation was probably due

to Mobutu's urging). Like previous summit meetings, it primarily provided an arena for discussions of political and security concerns. Amid exhortations on the importance of "buying Central African" it was announced that member state arrearages to the CEEAC budget had not been remedied and that a CEEAC Clearing House would be set up by the end of 1988. A fifth summit meeting is planned for Bangui in February 1989.

Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL)

Address: Executive Secretary, B.P. 58, Gisenyi, Rwanda.

Established: 1976

Membership: Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire.

Language(s): French

Objectives: The Community seeks to facilitate the peaceful coexistence and common development of its three member states; to promote regional cooperation; and to promote the free exchange of goods and people.

Functions: The CEPGL focuses its activities along two paths: first, it studies issues of regional importance and advises member governments on possible courses of action. In this capacity, the CEPGL has been active in reducing the restrictions on travel between the Community members, facilitating judicial relations, promoting common educational and training courses, and in providing a common forum, such as meetings of high- and mid-level civil servants, to discuss tariff reductions on intracommunity trade. The second main function of the CEPGL is to identify and seek financing for development projects within the Great Lakes region. The Community finances three types of projects: (1) "common projects," which are jointly owned by the three member governments; (2) "community projects" which are located and operated by either private or public agents in only one member state, but which are meant to serve the other two; (3) "national projects," which are of a purely national scope.

Structure: The CEPGL's governing body is the Conference of Heads of State, which meets once a year in a regular session and whenever necessary in extraordinary sessions. The Council of Ministers and State Commissioners, comprised of the members' Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meets twice a year to review the activities of the community and to approve the budget. The organization and strategy of the CEPGL are the responsibility of its Executive secretariat under the direction of the Permanent Executive Secretary. The secretariat is also the arm of the CEPGL responsible for conducting studies and preparing for the intergovernmental technical and consultative meetings.

The CEPGL also includes several specialized institutions: the Banque de Développement des Etats des Grands Lacs; the Electrification des Grands Lacs energy center in Bujumbura; the Institute of Agronomic and Zoological Research

in Gitega (Burundi), and the SINELAC trinational public electricity utility in Bukavu (Zaire).

Financing: CEPGL projects are usually cofinanced by the member states and donors. Member funds are either channeled through the BDEGL or through the national development institutions. The CEPGL's operational budget, as well as many of the secretariat's studies, are financed by member contributions. Zaire provides 50 percent of the Community's budget while Rwanda and Burundi each provide 25 percent. The CEPGL's 1988 ordinary budget amounted to 1.7 mn. SDR, while its equipment budget totaled 42,000 SDRs.

Comments: Although, in some specific domains such as electrification, the CEPGL's achievements have been impressive, the Community has not made much of an impact on the region. The member states have been particularly slow to implement and ratify agreements reached in CEPGL forums. As of January 1988, Zaire still had 15 agreements awaiting ratification, while Burundi and Rwanda had 4 and 6 respectively--this out of a total of 20 agreements submitted to the three states for ratification. In particular, Zaire and Burundi still have not ratified the CEPGL convention on the free movement of goods and individuals which was signed in December 1985. Movement toward tariff reductions on intra-community trade has been even more laborious, as the matter is still under study. In the long run, prospects for the creation of a true regional common market depend heavily on the attitude of Zaire, the giant of the community. Unless Zaire decides to truly open up its domestic market to community trade, there is little scope for increased regional integration.

Communauté Electrique du Benin (CEB)

Address: Directeur Général, B.P. 1368, Lomé, Togo.

Established: 1968

Membership: Benin and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To cooperate on improving infrastructure for electric power generation and transmission, particularly hydroelectric power.

Functions: The CEB has supervised the building of transmission links from Ghana to Togo and Benin, and has done a feasibility study for a second hydroelectric dam on the Mono at Adjelala. The first dam on the Mono is presently under construction at Nangbôto. It will be accompanied by several subsidiary projects, also under the aegis of the CEB, including irrigated areas in both Togo and Benin, transmission links to the areas of Lomé and Cotonou, and industrial power stations in both countries.

Structure: The CEB became operational in 1973. The Inter-State Council, comprised of four ministers from each country, is assisted by the Administration Council for day-to-day responsibilities.

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Financing: Much of the resources for the CEB's construction projects come from CIDA (Canada) loans, though West Germany has furnished much of the technical assistance. Revenue is also realized through the sale of electricity to the two member states.

Conférence des Administrations des Postes et Télécommunications de l'Afrique Centrale (CAPTAC)
Conference of Post and Telecommunication Administrations for Central Africa

Address: Secretary, B.P. 728, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1975

Membership: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Zaire. Angola was observer at the creation meeting and is expected to join the organization with Sao Tome and Principe.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To simplify and improve the existing postal and telecommunications networks.

Functions: In theory the tasks are to coordinate professional training and ensure diploma equivalence, and to exchange information and personnel.

Structure: The original idea was to create a very light structure with no permanent staff or budget, the presidency and the secretariat being provided between sessions by one of the member administrations (the so-called managing administration).

Conférence Internationale des Contrôles d'Assurances (CICA)
International Conference of Insurance Control (ICIC)

Address: General Secretary, Libreville, Gabon.

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To coordinate insurance legislation within the member states; to ensure the solvency of insurance companies dealing in the area; to encourage the growth of the insurance industry in Africa.

Comments: One of their achievements is the creation of the International Insurance Institute (IIA).

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Conseil Africain et Malgache des Etudes Supérieures (CAMES)
African and Malagasy Higher Education Council

Address: Secretary General, B.P. 134, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1968

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, and Zaire.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To study problems of and disseminate information about higher education in French-speaking African countries, including Madagascar and Mauritius.

Functions: CAMES was established at the initiative of the Conference of Heads of State of OCAM; statutes setting forth the structure of the Council were not finally ratified until 1974. It serves as a forum for dialogue between Education Ministers and officials on issues such as equitable geographical distribution of higher education. It coordinates programs and diploma levels, and has organized the aggregation concours in Medicine since 1982. A crucial function they perform is to maintain the integrity of the career hierarchy of university professionals in the countries served.

Structure: The top decisionmaking body is the Conference of Ministers of National Education, consisting of two senior Ministry of Education officials from each member state. The Conference is supplemented by nonvoting members, including vice-chancellors and principals of universities of member states.

Financing: Financing is divided equally among member states. For the 1985-86 budget, each member state paid dues of 4,970,857 CFAF for a total of 69,592,-000 CFAF (about \$23,000). Donor contributions during that budget year amounted to 17,770,525 CFAF, or 25 percent of the budget.

Comments: CAMES is not a substitute for national institutions; it provides an international guarantee to member states that political involvement in African university positions and diplomas will be kept at a minimum. Only acceptance to submit to CAMES is required from national authorities. When accredited by CAMES, a professor can teach in most francophone African countries, and it is difficult for any government to question his/her academic credentials. This protects professors against government abuse of power, fairly common in Africa.

CAMES is very small; it employs only 2 professionals. Since all professors in member countries have to send their publications to CAMES to get accreditation, CAMES' documentation is a gold mine of unpublished doctoral and master's theses. It is a resource that could be exploited with only a little effort and financing, and could be of real value in disseminating and encouraging African research. CAMES is generally well respected in university

circles in member countries, and its judgments on the quality of academic job seekers is widely accepted.

Conseil pour le Développement de la Recherche Economique et Sociale en Afrique
Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa
(CODESRIA)

Address: Secrétaire Exécutif, B.P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1973

Membership: Research institutions and university faculties in 32 African and 4 non-African countries. Institutions and faculties in some African countries and all non-African countries are associate members rather than full members.

Language(s): Arabic, English, and French.

Objectives: To encourage research by African academics on issues of African economic and social development.

Functions: The Council organizes seminars, conferences, and public debates. There are nine main areas in which it seeks to encourage research, ranging from economic integration, to women in development, to industrialization. Publications include Africa Development/Afrique et Développement (quarterly), African Newsletter (quarterly), Roster of African Social Scientists (annual), Africa Development Research Annual, occasional working papers, and conference proceedings.

Structure: The General Assembly meets every 3 years, and elects the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee comprises 8 members and meets annually. The Chairman and Executive Secretary are members of the Executive Committee, and manage the day-to-day affairs of the Council. There are 7 additional staff members.

Financing: The budget is financed by member country annual contributions, extraordinary grants from member countries, donor assistance, and revenue from publications.

Conseil de l'Entente
Entente Council

Address: Secrétaire Général, Mutual Aid and Guarantee Fund, 01 BP 3734, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1959

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: The purpose of the Council is the promotion of political, social and economic coordination among the member states. In recent years it has increasingly concentrated on the latter element. The Council performs these economic functions through the Mutual Aid and Loan Guarantee Fund. The Fund is a multinational autonomous public institution designed to encourage the flow of foreign private and public capital to member countries. The current principal objectives of the Fund are: 1) to promote economic development and integration in the region; 2) to assist in preparing specific projects in the economic field and to obtain assistance from donor organizations for their implementation; 3) to provide a guarantee fund to encourage investments in the member states; and 4) to encourage increased trade, commerce and investment between the Entente countries and their neighbors.

Functions: The Council operates through the Mutual Aid and Loan Guaranty Fund to promote its goals of regional cooperation and integration. The Fund mobilizes funding for projects in such sectors as agriculture and rural infrastructure, distribution networks, industry, telecommunications, energy and tourism. Projects are supposed to be chosen on the basis of financial and economic returns with an overall objective of reducing regional disparities. The Council identifies and solicits projects, conducts feasibility studies, enlists financing from local and foreign donor sources, and extends guarantees on the investments. There is also cooperation with other regional economic organizations including ECOWAS, BOAD, the CEAO, and such issue-specific organizations as WARDA and CILSS.

Structure: Overall policy is formulated at the level of heads of state and the Ministers of Finance, Development, Planning and Agriculture, and implemented by the Management Committee (being the equivalent of the Board of Executive Directors) and the Administrative Secretariat. Staff consists of 40 persons, plus 4 expatriates are engaged in project implementation and monitoring. Autonomous branches within the Entente Council include the CEBV (Communauté Economique du Bétail et de la Viande), CERFER (Rural Roads Training Maintenance Center), CSTT (High Committee for Land Transport), CTIT (Interstate Technical Committee for Tourism), CREAM (Regional Centre for Maritime Training and Apprenticeship), and CCFTTR (Technical Centre for Road Drivers)

Financing: Operations of the Council are financed by annual contributions of member states, subsidies and grants from foreign donors, and revenues from investments and commission charges. Annual subscriptions amount to 668 mn. CFAF, of which the Côte d'Ivoire contributes 500 mn. and the four other member countries contribute 42 mn. CFAF each. Foreign subsidies and loans play a significant role in the financing of the Council. France is the largest contributor, having provided 20.2 bn. CFAF through 1985. USAID is a large contributor, providing (although directly to recipients) about \$62 mn. as of 1985. The Council also receives loans and grants from the Netherlands, the EEC Development Fund (FED) and Canada. The Council recognizes the importance of foreign involvement and encourages recommendations on policy and opera-

tions from its foreign partners. The Conseil de l'Entente budget for 1987 was 1.1 mn. CFAF, and the Mutual Fund's 1988 budget was set at 1.28 bn. CFAF.

Comments: The cumulative capital of the Fund stands at 13.4 bn. CFAF (1986). The Fund has provided guarantees of 33 bn. CFAF for 39 projects since its creation. The total value of investment realized by the guarantees is 50.9 bn. CFAF. The total value of investment warranted by the capital is 175 bn. CFAF, signifying that there is considerable underutilization of capacity. This may be explained by the lack of good projects. In 1987, a credit agreement was signed between the Entente and a consortium of four French banks for 268 m FF. Program focus is on rural development, food production, and village water supply.

Recently, the Conseil de l'Entente has been restricting the scope of its activities, acting mainly as a think tank, concentrating on Rural Development village water supply and the promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises. Investments were also made in Mining, Energy, Industry, Transport, and Tourism.

The Council has provided many benefits to its poorer members while at the same time promoting the political objectives of its founder and principal benefactor, Houphouet-Borgny of the Côte d'Ivoire. The strength of the Council is attributed to the homogeneity of its members, its flexibility, the primacy it accords to the economic development of the less-developed junior members, and the relative adaptability of its leaders.

One problem the Council faces is the fact that while the junior members have received the bulk of the investments guaranteed by the Fund, the Côte d'Ivoire has outperformed the other economies in the past two decades, and regional disparities (reduction of such being a major goal of the Council) have increased. Some critics say that regional investment and cooperation have resulted in the less-developed economies tailoring their economies to the raw material, labor and output market needs of the Côte d'Ivoire, though support for this argument is not in evidence.

The issue of dual nationality, meaning the ability of migrant labor to flow freely, is a major bone of contention in the Council. For years, the Ivory Coast had pursued an open-door policy regarding mainly Togolese and Voltaic Mossi labor for its plantations and unskilled, labor-intensive industries. However, domestic opposition, culminating in a series of anti-migrant labor riots during the late 1960s and early 1970s, forced Houphouet to reverse his policy. The labor migration issue was resolved under the auspices of the CEAO Protocols. However, migrant labor remains a serious issue within the Côte d'Ivoire, as about one-half of population growth is accounted for by labor inflows. This open-door policy was tolerable so long as the Ivory Coast was doing well economically. However, anti-migrant-labor sentiment resurges during downturns. This was the case recently when a large number of Ghanaian workers were expelled.

As is the case with other regional organizations, efficiency is often hampered by the political nature of the organization. Projects tend to lack a regionally integrative nature. The Fund has not attracted much private capital and continues to rely greatly on official donor assistance. Project

selection and monitoring, as well as consistency and commitment to project implementation are two areas which need to be strengthened. The Conseil de l'Entente seems to be a classic example of an organization in need of planning and budgeting reforms. The Council depends on Houphouet and he places great political importance in the Council. It is possible that a post-Houphouet regime will be unable or unwilling to maintain the cohesion required for the Council's success, given the personal commitment and financial subsidy that is required. Another factor to consider is donor willingness to keep the Council going. Out of a total cumulative investment budget of 50.9 bn. CFAF, donors have provided over 45 bn. CFAF. Without this aid, the Council would have little presence as an economic development organization.

Conseil Phytosanitaire Interafricain (CPI)
Inter-African Phyto-Sanitary Council (IPC)

Address: Mr. Le Directeur du CPI, B.P. 4170, N'Iongkak, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1954

Membership: The 50 OAU member states.

Language(s): Arabic, English, and French.

Objectives: To improve control of plant diseases and pests.

Functions: The main functions of the CPI are to advise member countries on national policies and to provide technical information to agronomists. The CPI sponsors studies, workshops, and conferences, and occasionally publishes technical materials. Two chief concerns are the establishment of quarantine facilities at borders, and encouragement of safe practices in pesticide use.

Publications include Réglementation Phytosanitaire Coordonnée pour l'Afrique, Manuel de Traitement Phytosanitaire pour l'Afrique, and a journal, Revue Africaine de la Protection des Plantes du CPI.

Structure: The CPI merged with the antecedent of the Scientific, Technical, and Research Commission of the OAU (OAU/STRC) in 1960, thus becoming part of the OAU. It is under the supervision of the ESCAS department (Education, Science, Culture and Social Affairs). The General Assembly convenes every 2 years. The Executive Committee meets at least once yearly. The Scientific Secretariat is divided into 5 sections: quarantine and phytosanitary legislation; pesticides and epidemics; weed research; phytosanitary education and training; and documentation center.

Financing: The CPI receives its annual budget from OAU. The annual budget for 1987 was in the order of \$450,000. OAU usually gives only half of the requested budget.

Comments: The achievements of CPI are satisfying when well focused. The scientific assistance provided to Togo in its fight against cochenilla--a disease that was devastating fruit trees--has led to expertise and the definition of a regional program project likely to be implemented. Other examples of achievements are the publication of the information bulletins, technical reports and the realization of maps of various pests types all over Africa popular enough to sell for \$100.

Nevertheless, being an OAU subsidiary body, CPI is not properly speaking responsible for its objectives and how it achieves them. It is part of the most political regional organization of Africa, the OAU; this does not provide the ideal framework to conduct programs where only technical expertise should guide decisions. This probably explains why CPI Africa-wide proposals are very rarely implemented. Technical missions like to propose the coordination of national legislation on pesticides, the strengthening of national institutions, and inventories of all phytosanitary controls measures in Africa. But these goals are generally too ambitious, given present perceptions about the need to cooperate.

One example of organizational weakness is evident in information dissemination, one of the main task of CPI. If a disease appears in, say Uganda, authorities in that country should pass along the information to CPI, which would then be responsible for warning all OAU members. The same should apply to information on chemical pesticides. In fact, nothing happens because the organization is not computerized, has no translation facilities and has not enough budget to be able to afford telex communication. CPI is also far from having the staff capacity to achieve its objectives. Only 3 professionals have regular appointments with the organization, out of a total of 20 people appointed. To be a specialized agency of OAU also involves higher personnel costs; a driver, for example, is paid 2 or 3 times more than drivers on national scales. The main conclusion is that the disappearance of CPI would probably pass unnoticed, as was the case in the 1986 demise of the Inter African Bureau of Soils formerly located in Bangui. This OAU organization was concerned with soil preservation, but for many of the reasons indicated in the CPI case, was unable to fulfill its mandate.

Conseil Supérieur du Sport en Afrique (CSSA)
Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA)

Address: Secrétaire Général, B.P. 1363, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1966

Membership: 50 OAU member states.

Language(s): French, English and Arabic.

Objectives: To promote cooperation among African countries in their efforts to develop sports.

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Functions: The CSSA, among other things, maintains contact with international organizations that could provide financial or technical support to the development of sport in Africa, and collaborate with international institutions specializing in training, research in sport education, physical health and sports news in order to create similar structures in Africa.

Structure: The CSSA is a specialized agency of the Organization for African Unity. The General Assembly, the Executive Committee, and the General Secretary are the main organizations of the CSSA. The General Assembly is composed of Ministers of sports or their representatives, presidents of every African sports confederation, members of the Executive Committee and a few honored members. It meets in regular session once every two years. The Executive Committee implements the General Assembly decisions. The General Secretariat executes the decisions and is in charge of day-to-day management. Seven geographical zones, called "sport development zones," have been established. Each zone has a General Assembly, a President and a permanent secretariat.

Financing: The organization is financed by member contributions. The normal budget is around \$1.5 mn. The OAU gives an annual but symbolic subsidy. France, West Germany and East Germany also contribute to the financing of the institution by subsidizing training periods, colloquia and seminars.

Comments: The major problem of the organization is the arrears in contributions which limit activity. Although most eligible countries are members, only seven states reportedly pay their contribution regularly. The contributions effectively paid in the average year represent \$405,800, or only 27 percent of the announced budget. Since the cost of running the secretariat alone is over \$740,000 annually, the organization has been forced to reduce its activity and staff of professionals (which now number five).

In spite of budget constraints, since its inception, the CSSA has created or sponsored the creation of several other associations including: the Association of National Olympic Committees; the Union of African Sports Medicine; and the Regional Information and Documentation Center on Physical Sport Education. It has also organized a number of seminars and roundtables: the most recent, held in Nairobi in January 1987, discussed sport development zones. The CSSA has also played a major role in the unification of the two preexisting confederations of Karate into one single organization for all Africa. Technical symposia and training seminars are also organized on, for example, such "practical" topics as sports marketing (held in Abidjan in May 1987--the U.S. contributed \$110,000 to this symposium).

Desert Locust Control Organization for East Africa (DLCO-EA)

Address: Director General, P.O. Box 4255, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Established: 1962

Membership: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

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Language(s): English

Objectives: According to its convention, DLCO-EA has three objectives: to promote the effective control of desert locust in the subregion; to coordinate and supplement national efforts to control desert locust in this area; also to assist members in controlling armyworm, quelea quelea and tsetse fly "provided that the locust situation so permits and that the member governments requiring such services (provide) chemicals and ground logistics for such operations."

Functions: Field operations consist of aerial and ground surveying on the one hand, and aerial and ground control on the other. Research activities cover the areas of insecticide, spray technology, quelea, army worm and remote sensing. The focus is on applied research such as the development of an exhaust nozzle spray. Finally, the organization also undertakes maintenance work on its equipment (cars and planes) and is involved in on-the-job training.

Structure: The organization is headed by the Director General. It consists of three departments (Operations, Scientific Research, and Administration and Finance), each headed by its own Director. DLCO-EA's Director General is responsible to the Governing Council. The Council is composed of the Minister of Agriculture from each member country and meets at least once a year to address overall policy for the organization. It is advised by an Executive Committee formed by ministerial experts from member states. An Establishment Committee aids the Executive Committee on staff matters while the Technical Committee assists on technical subjects.

Financing: The core budget of US 4.3 mn. is paid by member governments according to rates set on the basis of economic status and other factors (such as a discount for "front-line states" that become polluted as a result of spraying). The organization gets external financing in the form of funds, equipment and technical assistance from several donors such as the ODA, FAO, EEC, USAID, GTZ, SIDA, CIDA and IFAD.

Comments: The DLCO-EA is considered the most successful of African regional pest control organizations. It has helped to reduce the frequency of locust plagues from a yearly to a 5-9 year phenomenon. It experiences some delays in payments of dues, but officials claim that by year's end most dues are collected. Additional revenue has been generated by offering DLCO-EA spraying services to IRLCO and FAO outside the DLCO region.

East Africa Development Bank (EADB)

Address: Director General, 4 Nile Avenue, P.O. Box 7128, Kampala, Uganda.

Established: 1980

Membership: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

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Language(s): English

Objectives: Following the breakup of the East African Community, a new charter for the East African Development Bank came into effect. In the original charter, signed in 1967, the purpose of the Bank was confined to the provision of financial and technical assistance for the promotion of industrial development in the region. Since 1980, the Bank's responsibilities include involvement in agriculture, forestry, tourism, transport and the development of infrastructure. Preference is given to projects which promote regional cooperation.

Functions: The Bank promotes projects in numerous areas, as mentioned above. This shift in emphasis has much to do with the fact that under its earlier mandate of promoting industry, a larger proportion of Kenyan projects were approved because of Kenya's superior industrial base and infrastructure. Much of the Bank's recent operations concern the rehabilitation of existing projects and the promotion of managerial and technical expertise so as to salvage and better utilize existing sunk capital.

In 1986 there were 22 loans totalling 12.8 mn. SDR, evenly distributed between the three member states. The sectoral breakdown is as follows: agriculture--16 percent; transportation and communication--16 percent; industry--57 percent; and tourism--11 percent. As of 1986 the interest rates were 12.5 percent.

Structure: The Bank's overall direction at the governmental level is set by the Governing Council. The Council is comprised of ministers from each member state (usually Finance Ministers). The Board of Governors (3-5 from each member state) approves policies and projects. The Director General is the chief executive; he is appointed by the Council and works with the Board. Because Norwegian and Swedish assistance has been so important in rehabilitating the EADB, the Director has been either Swedish or Norwegian since 1980.

Financing: The EADB is financed by member subscriptions, and special funds granted by the Norwegian government (NORAD) and the Swedish government (SIDA). Each of the three member states have subscribed 400 shares at 10,000 SDR each. The remaining nongovernmental investors have a combined 101 shares, the largest being the African Development Bank with 35 shares. Medium- and long-term loans from the AFDB, SIDA and the IBRD amount to 35.9 mn. SDRs. The share of foreign capital to total capital is 64 percent (including AFDB loans).

The EADB's total capital in 1986 was 40 mn. SDR, which it hopes to double to 80 mn. SDR by attracting more nonregional investors.

Comments: As of 1987, total investments amounted to 50 mn. SDRs, of which 97.5 percent were loans and 2.5 percent equity participation. Growth in lending is slow due to a scarcity of loanable funds, as well as poor economic conditions in member countries and weak project-identification capacity. Tanzania has a poor record on repayment of loans due in part to low returns on projects. The portfolio of bankable projects has been diversified and should provide some stability to overall returns for the Bank. The profit rate increased 45 percent in 1983 to a respectable 9 percent. The Bank is in the

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process of streamlining its operations regarding project management and evaluation.

The largest single problem of the EADB is the inconsistent policy context in which it operates. Tanzanian policies and resulting inconsistent growth have meant that Tanzania is in arrears on repayment of loans. Kenya will most likely outperform the other members, increasing regional disparities. Uganda has a political climate that retards investment. In short, the EADB needs to attract members from Eastern and Southern Africa, as its new charter permits.

East African Wildlife Society (EAWS)

Address: President, P.O. Box 20110, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1961

Members: 10,000 members (individuals and companies) in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

Language(s): English

Objectives: EAWS assists East African Governments in protecting wildlife. It was formed by amalgamating the wildlife societies of Kenya and Tanzania, both founded in 1956.

Functions: Five projects are supported by the Society: antipoaching, research; rescue and relocation of threatened species; conservation education; and wildlife policy.

Major funds have been spent in the anti-poaching area: the society has bought and donated vehicles, equipment and aircraft to National Parks and Reserves in East Africa. Other project activities concerning the protection of threatend species are under way. A particularly successful one was the creation of a special fund to protect black rhino from total extinction. There were more than 20,000 in the 1960s but only 400 to 600 were left in 1986. The EAWS created a fenced park sanctuary for rhino in Lake Nakuru (Kenya), where 13 rangers patrol to protect approximately 30 rhino.

Wildlife needs to be managed like any natural resource, and this requires scientific data and knowledge of the animals and plants to be conserved. The Society funds research projects on specific topics and carries out (mainly ecological) studies. On the educational side, the Society publishes a bimonthly magazine (Suara), supports activities of Youth Wildlife Clubs in the three countries, and organizes workshops for teachers on conservation issues.

It also organizes and runs conservation field courses for students at the Outward Bound Mountain School (OBMS) at Loitokitok at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. The society has its own aircraft (a piper cruiser), which is used for training. It was stationed in Tsavo for about nine years, mainly to be used for research (e.g. regular collection of rainfall records in outlying

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areas, radiotracking of elephants, aerial photography, aerial counts and general communication). It was also used for antipoaching work in collaboration with the warden.

Structure: The society has twenty staff members.

Financing: Private individuals and companies pay an annual contribution to the Society. A gift shop located at the headquarters and the sale of publications also contribute to the budget.

Comments: Since its inception as a nonprofit organization, the Society has exercised a significant influence on conservation projects in East Africa and has contributed more than \$1,000,000 to wildlife preservation. The EAWS is performing a vital function for East Africa, in that it serves the long-term economic interests of the member states and seems to be very productive. EAWS is unusual in the world of regional institutions. It serves regional interests on a private, philanthropic basis.

Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI)

Address: Director, P.C. Box 3030, Arusha, Tanzania.

Established: 1974, as the East African Management Institute; reorganized and expanded in 1980.

Membership: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To improve indigenous management of state and private institutions and enterprises in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Functions: ESAMI does training, research, and consulting. Training is its principal function; the range of courses includes the standard curriculum plus courses suited to specific sectors such as transport and agriculture, and some tailored for specific sectors in particular countries. Most courses are given on the main campus in Arusha, but those of a specific nature are sometimes given at other locations. About 50 courses are offered in any given year, all for middle and top management and lasting between one and four weeks.

Research is the least important function. Most research projects involve manpower needs assessments or evaluation of management quality in a given country. Consultancies are aimed mostly at resolving specific management problems in various agencies, or for conducting feasibility studies.

Structure: ESAMI was established on the recommendation of the Eastern and

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Southern African MULPOC ministerial conference. ESAMI has about 40 full-time faculty.

Financing: Course fees account for 97 percent of ESAMI's operational costs. Member and donor country contributions furnish the rest, though only 10 of 18 members make contributions. Donor support is being sought for an expansion of physical facilities and staff.

Comments: A recent Coopers & Lybrand report highlighted deficiencies in ESAMI's own financial management, but the institution seems to be fundamentally sound and effectively addresses a real need. There has been discussion of expanding the curriculum to include a masters program in business administration, but its main task remains conducting problem-specific brief courses.

Ecole Africaine et Mauricienne d'Architecture et d'Urbanisme
(EAMAU)

Address: Directeur, B.P. 2067, Lomé, Togo.

Established: 1975

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To provide postsecondary training in architecture and urban development.

Functions: The programs in architecture and urban development are both for a minimum of five years. Approximately 20 new students are enrolled each year, making a total of 90-95 students in the school at any given time. Only 3 new students can enroll from each member country per year. Two-thirds of the students are in the architecture program, and one-third in urban development. Graduates go into or return to civil service.

Structure: The Administrative Council, consisting of ministers from member states or their representatives, meets annually. It guides the EAMAU, and approves its budget, curriculum, student quotas, etc. The Advisory Council is responsible for recommending changes in the curriculum and entrance requirements. The Council of Professors and the Council of Students represent their respective groups.

Financing: The school is financed by annual contributions from member states. The annual budget is estimated to be about 100 mn CFAF, of which only 75 mn. CFAF are typically paid. Arrears since inception total 157 mn. CFAF.

Half of the nominal budget, or 50 mn. CFAF, goes to staff salaries. Senior teachers are paid 500,000 CFAF per month, or more than 2.5 times that

of a Togolese national's salary. Students' expenses are paid by respective home states.

Comments: The EAMAU was established by OCAM. Due to consistent arrearages and structural inflexibilities (such as persistently overpaid staff), EAMAU facilities are deteriorating. Efforts to attract donor assistance in order to finance new buildings have been unsuccessful.

Ecole Inter-Etats d'Ingénieurs de l'Equipement Rural (EIER)
Inter-States School for Rural Engineering

Address: Directeur, B.P. 7023, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1968

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, C.A.R., Chad, Congo, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To train rural engineers.

Functions: The school cooperates with other (French and African) research and education organizations/facilities, and with other international organizations. There is a branch in Mali specifically for training technical assistants. Plans are also being developed to make training available to anglophones. Students are admitted on a quota basis. Forty students were admitted the first year, representing three students from each country. The school also theoretically serves as a research and documentation center.

Structure: The Governing Board consists of ministers from member states; it occupies itself with recruitment policies, development of curriculum, and graduation requirements. It also oversees the administration of technical assistance to member states.

Financing: Partially funded by France and member contributions.

Comments: The school continues to exist due to strong financial support from France. No one at the organization would discuss the amount of arrears, but apparently it is significant. There are 17 French technical assistants (mostly professors) teaching at the school with a total of 23 professors (of which one is an expert from WHO). As a result of the good facilities and the competent level of instruction, a diploma from EIER is well regarded and considered equivalent to comparable degrees obtained elsewhere. The school also conducts a little research but this remains a marginal activity.

Ecole Inter-Etats des Sciences et Medecine Veterinaires (EISMV)

Address: Directeur Général, Université de Dakar, Ave. Cheikh Anta Diop, B.P. 5077, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1967

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Chad, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: The School is primarily a training institution, but also undertakes research on animal diseases. Its main goal is to train veterinarians through college-level courses adapted to African conditions and needs.

Functions: Admission to EISMV is very selective; only 30 percent of applicants pass the entry exam and admission requires one year of post-secondary preparatory school. The course takes 6 years (including preparatory school). Training includes chemistry, biology, parasitology, medical pathology, hygiene of animal products industries, reproduction and surgery. There are approximately 60 students admitted every year, and a quota of 4 students per country for the first year of school is imposed.

The facilities and equipment used by the School include a well-maintained building for general courses and administration purposes, classrooms for about 300 students, and a library (1,300 books, 4,500 theses and periodicals) all of which are located on the campus of the University of Dakar. There is also an urban mobile laboratory, a clinic at the slaughterhouse, and one in the suburbs of Dakar. In 1988 the School had 30 teachers and 294 students.

Structure: The highest authority of EISMV is the Assembly of Heads of State. The bodies of EISMV are the Board of Directors, the Institutional Council, the School Administration Office, and the Teacher's Council. The Board of Directors is comprised of ministers of member states, the Secretary General of the African and Malagasy Education Council (CAMES), the Administrative Head of the School assisted by the Secretary General, two representatives of the teaching body, one representative of personnel, and one representative of the Students. The Board is responsible for the administrative, financial, and technical activities of the School (quota, statutes, budget) and usually meets once a year. It also designates the Administrative Head of the School for a three-year term, which is renewable.

The Institutional Council, led by the School's Administrative Head, is comprised of two veterinarians representing two member states designated by the Board, Heads of the different departments, two representatives of personnel (elected for two years), and two representatives of the students (elected annually). The Institutional Council is responsible for the quality of academic training, curriculum, and degree standards.

Financing: The annual budget is financed by the 13 member states; 30 percent is divided equally among the members and the other 70 percent is prorated by the number of students. Each member state contributes 8.2 mn. CFAF per year plus an annual tuition charge per student of 1.2 mn. CFAF.

The EISMV is assisted by a number of EEC countries. France, which helped create the School, has provided 4 technical advisors, some teachers, budgetary supplements equal to about 4 percent of total costs and 2 percent more for its technical advisors. Belgium has provided 3 coopérants and some small grants. Italy has given grants to buy equipment.

Comments: Though it is located on the campus of the University of Dakar, EISMV is autonomous and only maintains academic links with the University of Dakar. During the last 5 years, contributions from member states have plummeted (only 50-60 percent of the yearly budget is usually acquired). Some of the member states cannot even afford to recruit veterinarians in the public sector. The apparent decrease of support on the part of member states is mostly explained by scarcity of resources, which limits countries' ability to finance the school, and employ its graduates. Furthermore, training provided by the School does not seem to be well adapted to private practice, because this sector is not developed enough in most of the member countries. However, the School is efficiently managed and is a highly regarded institution in the region.

Ecole Supérieure Africaine des Cadres de Chemins de Fer (ESACC)

Address: M. le Directeur, Brazzaville, Congo.

Established: 1987

Membership: Régie des Chemins de Fer du Sénégal, Régie des Chemins de Fer du Mali, Régie des Chemins de Fer Abidjan-Niger, Chemins de Fer du Togo, Organisation Commune des Chemins de Fer et des Transports Benin-Niger, Régie Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Cameroun, Office du Chemin de Fer Transgabonais, Agence Transcongolaise des Communications, Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Zairois, Office National des Transports du Zaïre.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To assist members in developing and training qualified manpower to operate national railways networks.

Functions: Training sessions are organized for technicians and engineers of national railways. In principle only professionals with graduate diplomas are admitted. However, one-third of the students do not meet these criteria. The courses last three years (from October to June) and four specialties are taught: rolling stock, engineering, operations (in-station services and marketing), and signaling and telecommunications. In addition, whatever the specialty of the student, a management course is given to all trainees.

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Structure: An Administrative Council, formed with the general directors of the railway offices, appoints the director for the school.

Financing: The national rail systems each pay a fixed annual contribution every year, plus a fee based on the number of students sent to the school. Each rail system is supposed to provide students an additional subsistence stipend (110,000 CFA francs a month) in addition to the regular salary, accommodations being provided by the school. The operating budget is about 200 mn. CFA francs.

The French Government provides strong support for the organization. It has given more than \$61 mn. for the construction of the buildings and the basic equipment of the school. In addition, it plans to provide technical assistance during a minimum of five years.

Comments: The first-year contributions were paid, even if sometimes after extensive delays. The only "cash" problem was the cut in salary for certain students by their national networks, with the foreseeable consequences on their subsistence.

The activity of the school is too recent to make any assessment of its impact on railways in Africa. The first graduation of 62 trainees will take place soon; school capacity is 90 students. The facilities are very impressive, and the school has the most fashionable training materials (computer simulations, pedagogical models). There are plans to open the school to English-speaking countries.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO)

Address: Executive Secretary, 6 King George V Road, Onikan, P.M.B. 12745, Lagos, Nigeria.

Established: 1975

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: ECOWAS aims to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic, social and cultural activities in the region. The Treaty contains a commitment to abolish all obstacles to the free movement of people, goods, services and capital among member states. It also states that ECOWAS will promote the following: coordination of agricultural policies; common projects in marketing, research and agriculturally based industries; joint development of economic and industrial policies and elimination of disparities in levels of development; and common monetary policies. ECOWAS works within the framework of the Lagos Plan of Action for the economic

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development of Africa (1980), which proposed an African economic community by the year 2000.

Functions: ECOWAS is principally a coordinating organization to bring about market integration. In the area of trade, ECOWAS, in 1979, announced a ban on new duties and taxes, and on increases in existing taxes on goods manufactured in the Community or imported from third countries. In 1981, it launched a customs tariff elimination process which, if implemented, would lead to the elimination of taxes and duties on these goods by 1989.

The Community also proposed the exemption of semiprocessed goods from duties and the liberalization of trade in industrial products, from May 1981 on. Studies on regional telecommunication and currency convertibility were commissioned and programs on postal, industrial and agricultural cooperation devised. A common defense pact was also drafted.

Structure: The Authority of Heads of State and Governments is the supreme organ of ECOWAS. It has a rotating chairmanship and meets once per year. The Council of Ministers, to which each member sends two representatives, meets twice a year. It is responsible for approving the secretariat's budget, establishing tariff policy, and approving ECOWAS projects. The Executive Secretariat oversees the implementation of ECOWAS policies, conducts studies, and organizes the various conferences.

The ECOWAS Treaty proposes the establishment of four technical and specialized commissions, namely the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission; the Industry, Agricultural, and Natural Resources Commission; the Transport, Telecommunication and Energy Commission; and the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission. The Commissions include one representative from each member state. The active committees of ECOWAS are the Defense Committee, the Committee of West African Central Banks, and a tribunal for settling disputes between states. The staff consists of 4 statutory appointees, 52 professionals, and 174 local employees.

Financing: The secretariat's budget is financed by member contributions. The size of individual member contributions is determined according to GNP and population. Shares range from 33 percent for Nigeria, and 13 percent each for the Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana to a little more than 1 percent each for Cap Verde, and Niger. The organization's 1988 operating budget of \$8.6 mn. represented an increase of 26 percent over the 1987 figure.

In 1988, ECOWAS received a loan in the amount of \$43 mn. from the ADB which will finance agricultural and industrial projects. A \$75 mn. loan is currently being negotiated with the World Bank to finance various projects. Also, at a meeting in April 1988 in Lomé, donors provided \$262 mn. for financing regional road projects.

Comments: ECOWAS represents an important development in regional organization. It is the most ambitious and largest market integration organization in Africa. The ECOWAS Treaty rivals in complexity that of the European Community; it contains 65 articles divided into 14 chapters. The member countries use different official languages (English, French, and Portuguese). The community includes small and big countries in terms of population and

geography, and also contains high-, middle-, and (mostly) low-income countries. It encompasses countries that were former colonies of different mother countries, and therefore do not share a common official language, perspective, set of concerns or governmental structure.

ECOWAS has been a struggling organization since its formative years. Even though the Treaty establishing ECOWAS was signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975, the Community became operational only in January 1977. The organization was provisionally run by a Task Force until 1979 and only in 1981 was it replaced by a permanent staff.

In 1987, President Babangida of Nigeria, while Chairman of the Authority (of Heads of State and Governments), was reported to have commented that ECOWAS was 'seriously ill' due to the organization's recurrent failure to make decisions materialize in deeds, the 'inappropriateness' of many of its projects, and the arrears on contributions of its member states.

The Community has rarely (if ever) met any of its timetabled obligations. Implementation of policies adopted by the Community have proven difficult. Arrears in contributions remain a constant problem. Outstanding (unpaid) contributions to the secretariat stood at more than \$10 mn. in 1988, and the figure may be closer to \$17 mn., according to one ECOWAS official. Some countries have been in arrears for 10 years but recently promised to pay. However, no member has been suspended as required in the treaty.

The problems of ECOWAS are considered in more detail below. We discuss protocols and then trade issues. We then turn to look at plans of ECOWAS. Finally, we look at reasons for failures, and at some concrete achievements.

Overall, twelve protocols have been signed since the creation of ECOWAS. They include the following: definition of the concept of products originating from member states of ECOWAS; rules of origin; compensation rules for revenue loss; budgetary contributions; a nonaggression pact; immigration rules; and a protocol relating to cultural relations.

However, no member state has ratified all the protocols signed by the Authority since 1978 and only one has been ratified by all member countries. For example, the protocol on the free movement of persons, right of residence and establishment was signed in May 1979. However, it was only in December 1986 that Senegal became the first ECOWAS member to ratify the protocol conferring residence rights upon all nationals of the ECOWAS member states. This protocol, however, will not become official (even for Senegal) until seven states have ratified it. The first stage, which in principle is already in effect, eliminated the need for visas for visits of up to three months.

In the area of trade, ECOWAS does not have a common external tariff nor does the ECOWAS Treaty even say how one is to be reached, and yet the organisation calls for trade liberalization as we saw above in the functions section. In the timetable for the achievement of free trade, the member states were divided into three groups, with each given a separate calendar for adjustment. The Agreement also contained two rules of origin. Firstly, goods eligible for intraregional transfer have to have value added in the region of

at least 35 percent. Secondly, in order to enjoy preferential treatment, products must be manufactured in plants having national ownership shares of 20 percent in 1981, 35 percent in 1983, and 57 percent in 1989. Provision was also made for a mechanism to compensate for losses of customs revenues, and it was hoped that with ASYCUDA, ECOWAS' computer network, acquisition of data would make compensation faster and easier.

However, in spite of ECOWAS' efforts in this direction, none of its trade liberation measures have borne fruit. They are not yet operational because the new timetable has not yet been incorporated into the legislation of all the national administrations.

The impact of ECOWAS on intraregional trade has been minimal in the first ten years of its existence, which is hardly surprising--since liberalization timetables have not been implemented no trade preferences have yet been accorded. Intra-ECOWAS trade represented only 2.1 percent of total official ECOWAS exports in 1970, 3.1 percent in 1976, 3.8 percent in 1979, 4.6 percent in 1981, and 4.2 percent in 1984. The share is probably less in the late 1980s because of Nigeria's shrinking absorption of her neighbor's exports. These statistics represent only official trade--i.e. statistically recorded trade--which in fact represents only a fraction of total trade. But even including parallel market trade (smuggling), it is not likely that intra-Ecowas trade is much more than 10 percent of total exports from ECOWAS states.

In terms of plans, in the agricultural sector the Community has adopted a regional agricultural development strategy which aims to fight hunger and achieve subregional food self-sufficiency by the year 2000; it also aims to contain desertification by means of reforestation. In transport, a number of road networks have been planned by ECOWAS: along the coast between Nouakchott (Mauritania) and Lagos (Nigeria), with plans for an extension in the direction of Cameroon; through the sahel belt from Dakar (Senegal) to N'Djamena (Chad); and also connecting the two Eastern and Western routes to give the landlocked countries good access to ports.

Energy plans are also on paper. The Heads of State of ECOWAS created, in May 1982, a Fund for the Development of Energy Resources within the ECOWAS Fund. This Fund aims to mobilize financial resources to diversify the region's energy supplies. ECOWAS plans to build a prototypical solar village which will serve as a research and demonstration center for diverse renewable energy technologies.

In May 1987, the ECOWAS secretariat released a document outlining the "ECOWAS Recovery Programme," chiefly comprised of project proposals to be considered for approval at the July ECOWAS Summit. As stated by the General Secretariat, the ECOWAS Economic Recovery Programme is a three-year program identifying the general policy measures to be implemented by each member state and projects which will ensure a wider production base. Of the 136 proposed projects, 40 would be regional in scope. The 96 "national" projects, costing a total \$337.5 mn., covering rural development, industry, transport, communications, and energy, would draw from the public and private sectors and be executed by individual countries in the subregion. Projects concerning transport and telecommunications account for more than 60 percent of the total

amount of proposed investment. Those concerning agriculture and industry account respectively for 24 percent and 15 percent.

The ECOWAS Council of Ministers, at its meeting in June 1987, adopted an architectural design which increased the cost of the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria's future capital, from \$16.5 mn. to \$22.2 mn., of which Nigeria will contribute \$5 mn..

The summit of July 1987 ratified the Recovery Programme. In December 1987, ECOWAS experts recalculated the total cost of the Recovery Programme, taking into account depreciation of the \$US, among other things. They raised the estimated cost of the program by 80 percent, from \$926 mn. to \$1.7 bn. Officials say that \$120 mn. is already available to start 16 of the 136 projects, and \$190 mn. more is reportedly forthcoming from various institutions, such as the World Bank and the European Investment Bank.

While the Recovery Programme may give new vigor to ECOWAS, severe problems remain to be dealt with. One reason for ECOWAS' lack of success may be the broad and widening scope of its goals/programs. We have seen the extent of its efforts to unify the West African region. The actions and subjects covered at a summit meeting of Chiefs of State in July 1987 also indicate the range of issues that ECOWAS covers: a blueprint for establishing a single monetary zone; creation of a West African Health Organization, by merging the existing Anglophone and Francophone health organizations in the area; creation of a West African Women's Association; and adoption by road transport representatives of the idea of creating a professional union to defend their interests within ECOWAS. And in October 1987, the establishment of an ECOWAS Reinsurance Company was considered by insurance and reinsurance experts from member countries.

Another obstacles to ECOWAS' success is felt to be the proliferation of and competition among intergovernmental organizations in the subregion, both small and large. The CEAO is the most notable in this respect, and the sentiment is strong among some high-ranking ECOWAS staff that the CEAO obstructs ECOWAS not just as a coincidental inconvenience but because it fulfills a political objective in doing so. The CEAO was established with the blessing of France and regroups only francophone countries, while ECOWAS's mentor is Nigeria with the backing of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Whatever the relative merits of these two organizations, the CEAO brings direct and indirect benefits to its members, and these have so far been more concrete and more substantial than the accrued benefits of membership in ECOWAS. There thus seem to be few reasons for the francophone countries to forego tangible gains for presumed benefits from a larger economic union still to come.

A third reason for lack of success lies in the economic downturn in member states. Setbacks in the free movement of persons have occurred; while the Treaty calls for labor mobility, members have been reluctant to respect the protocols for understandable economic and political reasons. Economic recession and domestic unemployment create pressures on all states to protect jobs for nationals.

All of the states, including the three richest (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria) thus found that the great inflow of persons from their neighboring states created heavy, usually irresistible, political pressures to respond. So Ghana closed its borders with Togo and Côte d'Ivoire in 1982, and Sierra Leone expelled nationals from Guinea and Ghana and closed its borders from January 1980 to March 1983. Liberia closed its borders with Sierra Leone in 1984. In January 1983, Nigeria expelled about 2 mn. people from neighboring states and caused a great upheaval. In May 1985, it expelled another seven hundred thousand people from neighboring countries. In retaliation against the action of their neighbors, Benin and Togo also closed their borders.

ECOWAS certainly has some achievements to its credit. One is the investment in new telecommunications systems, which makes intercapital telephone calls possible without relaying signals through Europe or America. Additionally, the "brown card scheme" on motor vehicle insurance together with the standardization of road signs, highway codes, and vehicle documents, has facilitated the passage of goods and services across borders. Also, in March 1988, the head office of ECOBANK, a new \$45 mn. offshore bank, opened in Lomé (Togo). Recent new activities have taken place in tourism; the first regional conference of ECOWAS Ministers of Tourism was held in March 1987.

There are also recent signs of revitalization of ECOWAS. The dismissal of Executive Secretary Munu in June 1988 was widely interpreted as a sign of serious political commitment to strengthen the organization. The 11th Summit of Chiefs of State of ECOWAS took place in Lomé in June 1988, and gathered 15 out of the 16 heads of state of the Community--an event unprecedented in the history of the Community. Calls for renewal and restructuring were widespread during this as during other recent ECOWAS meetings. And donor response has been encouraging. In April 1988, aid donors of ECOWAS met in Lomé (Togo) to study and coordinate the financing of various investment projects that were adopted at the Abuja summit in July 1987. At the end of the meeting, it was announced that the aid donors had pledged a total of 78.5 bn. CFAF, which means that commitments from aid donors would cover 73 percent of the total cost of the ECOWAS program. There was also some discussion of opening up equity participation in the ECOWAS Fund to other institutions and to non-regional members, as has been done by the ADF, ADB, and EADB.

Electrification des Grands Lacs (EGL)
Great Lakes Electrification (GLE)

Address: Director General, B.P. 1972, Bujumbura, Burundi.

Established: 1974

Membership: Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire.

Language(s): French

Objectives: The EGL seeks to promote the development of local energy services in the three-state region covered by the CEPGL. It accomplishes this

by identifying energy sector projects and sponsoring studies on potential alternative energy sources and conservation.

Functions: During its first decade of operation, the EGL concentrated on developing the hydroelectric potential of the Ruzizi River which borders each of the member states. It oversaw the construction of both the currently operating 28.2 megawatt Ruzizi I generating plant and the 28.2 megawatt Ruzizi II plant, scheduled to come on-stream in early 1989. The EGL's domain is limited to project development; once its projects reach completion, they usually come under the responsibility of independent tri-national public utility companies. The Ruzizi I is operated by a specially created public utility with each member state holding one-third of its shares. The EGL has created another utility, SINELAC, to operate Ruzizi II along similar lines.

Structure: The EGL was set up as an independent tri-national agency in 1977. It came under the auspices of the CEPGL in 1980. Its governing body is the General Assembly which is composed of the ministers responsible for the energy sectors in the three member states. The General Assembly approves the budget and accounts of the EGL, appoints the Administrative Committee and makes decisions on the organizations' modes of financing. The Administrative Committee, composed of the Director General and two directors, supervises the daily operations of the EGL. An Accounts Commission has special responsibility for verifying the EGL's bookkeeping.

Financing: Funds for the EGL projects are mainly provided by the donor community, although the BDEGL (representing the CEPGL) also finances a small portion of the EGL's projects. The largest project, in terms of total cost, is the Ruzizi II hydroelectric plant for which the World Bank, the European Development Fund (FED), the European Investment Bank, as well as other donors and the three member states provided over 80 mn. SDRs. The EGL's operational budget is covered by member country subscriptions which are divided into three equal parts. The operational budget for 1988 is 987.1 thousand SDRs.

Comments: The EGL has made a significant contribution to the electrification of the Great Lakes Region. Once Ruzizi II comes on-stream, it is estimated that the EGL projects (mainly Ruzizi I and II) will be supplying about one-third of the total electricity of the CEPGL region. Whether the EGL can continue to have such an impact is more doubtful. Although it is looking at a possible extension of the Ruzizi II plant to increase its capacity to 40 megawatts, most of its current projects are oriented to developing small-scale alternative sources of energy such as biogas generators and sugarcane gasohol distilleries. It is problematic whether these less traditional projects will produce the same kind of results as the more dramatic hydroelectric projects.

Fonds Africaine de Développement (FAD)
African Development Fund (ADF)

Address: Président, B.P. 01-1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1973

Membership: Same as the African Development Bank except that the United Arab Emirates is one of the nonregional members making the figures 50 African countries and 26 non-African members.

Language(s): English, French, and Arabic.

Objectives: The African Development Fund is the larger of the two main sources for concessional loans in the Bank Group (the other being the Nigeria Trust Fund). Unlike the African Development Bank (with the French acronym BAD), the FAD allowed nonregional subscribers to its capital stock from the commencement of its operations.

Functions: The Fund grants interest-free project loans to African countries with repayment over 50 years (including a 10-year grace period) and with a service charge of 0.75 percent per annum. Loans for project feasibility studies carry a similar service charge and a repayment period of 10 years (after a 3-year grace period). For the 1988-1990 period, 70 percent of funds are to be devoted to traditional projects (including lines of credit and sector rehabilitation), 20 percent to policy-based loans, and 10 percent to technical assistance.

FAD loan commitments in 1987 came to \$766 mn., up 31 percent from 1986. The 1988-1990 lending program allocates loans by sector as follows: agriculture-40 percent; transportation-25 percent; education and health-15 percent; public utilities-12 percent; and industry-8 percent. This breakdown is much like that for the previous period, except that the share of public utilities is less while that for industry is greater.

A country's eligibility for FAD loans is calculated on the basis of, among other things, GDP, GDP per capita, population, natural disadvantages and number of previous loans. The FAD recently revised the classification system, so that 85 percent of the Fund's resources will be distributed to countries having a GDP of less than \$510 mn. (group A countries), 12 percent to those with a GDP between \$511 and \$990 (group B countries), and the remaining 3 percent to countries with GDPs exceeding \$990 (group C countries).

Structure: The FAD utilizes the offices, staff, and facilities of the BAD to carry out its functions. The President of the Bank is President ex officio of the Fund and is Chairman of the Board of Directors without vote. The Board of Governors of the Bank is also the Board for the Fund.

The Board of Directors is distinct insofar as it is comprised of six directors elected by the BAD Board of Directors (with terms of 1 year) and six elected by participating states (with 3-year terms). Thus BAD directors elect regional directors and the FAD members elect nonregional directors.

Financing: The Fund, like the World Bank Group's IDA, is financed by periodic replenishments. Unlike the BAD, the Fund gives more voting power to the nonregionals. The BAD holds 50 percent of total votes yet represents only 2.1 percent of total subscriptions. The negotiations of the Fifth Replenishment (1988-1990), concluded in November 1987, resulted in pledges from donor countries of \$2.7 bn., bringing the total of subscriptions to \$7 bn.

Comments: Like the BAD, the FAD is fast becoming a significant factor in development financing in Africa. The FAD's 1987 commitments amount to over 60 percent of IDA lending commitments to Africa.

Because it is administered by the BAD staff, the FAD faces the same problems as the Bank regarding administration, operations and project selection. Because the nonregionals have greater influence on the approval of loans, lending criteria are more rigorously enforced. Moreover, there is more cooperation between the nonregionals and management because there is more agreement on the scope and nature of the Fund's activities. There have been fewer problems regarding arrears, the bulk of subscriptions being financed by the more affluent nonregionals.

Fonds Communautaire de Développement (FCD)
Community Development Fund (CDF)

Address: Secretary General, Rue Destenauve, B.P. 643, Ougadougou, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1974

Membership: The 7 CEAO countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. (Guinea and Togo are observers)

Language(s): French

Objectives: The FCD is the CEAO's principal mechanism by which CEAO member states are compensated for customs revenue loss caused by preferential tariffs.

Functions: Two-thirds of the revenues of the FCD are used to provide cash compensation to revenue-losing members and the remaining third is earmarked for studies and projects. Of this last third, 75 percent is typically devoted to projects, 20 percent to studies, and the rest for emergency assistance, technical assistance, and printing services.

Structure: The FCD is administered by the CEAO General Secretariat.

Financing: Member countries pay into the FCD according to the degree of their participation in intra-regional trade. In 1988, approximate gross contributions by individual member countries were as follows: Côte d'Ivoire-56 percent; Senegal-37 percent; Mali-3.5 percent; Burkina Faso-1.9 percent; Niger-.2 percent; Mauritania-.45 percent (approximately). The largest exporters are the largest contributors, as expected. Total contributions to the FCD for 1988 amounted to approximately 10.9 bn. CFAF, or about 130 mn. at the 1988 average rate of exchange.

Fonds de Cooperation, de Compensation et de Développement
(Fonds de la CEDEAO)
ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development
(ECOWAS Fund)

Address: Managing Director, B.P. 2704, Lomé, Togo.

Established: 1977

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To mobilize internal and external financial resources for the economic and social development of the Community; promote trade liberalization by compensating member states which suffer losses due to application of the ECOWAS Treaty's provisions; encourage agricultural and industrial development through grants and loans for researching and financing projects; and improve physical infrastructure linkages between member states by coordinating and monitoring regional transport and telecommunications projects.

Functions: Assembles financial resources to research and fund development projects favoring West African economic integration, provides guarantees for foreign investment made in pursuance of industrial policy harmonization and, following implementation of the ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme, will administer a special compensation fund for member states which suffer revenue losses because of liberalization.

Structure: The Fund is governed by a Board of Directors comprised of the members of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers. The Board sets overall policy, reviews the budget, approves specific projects and appoints the Managing Director. The Managing Director oversees the implementation of the Board's decisions, assembles the budget, recruits and dismisses staff members, and administers the Fund's day-to-day operation.

Financing: The ECOWAS Fund has \$US 500 mn. in callable capital with almost \$US 100 mn. called up. After eleven years, however, some members have still not paid their contributions to the Fund's first tranche. At the June 1988 summit it was revealed that no member had yet made contributions to the second tranche called up the previous year. Interest from this capital has been supplemented with donor support to provide operational financing.

Comments: Formally created in the late 1970s, the ECOWAS Fund did not begin lending operations until 1983-84. The Fund thus far has implemented large-scale regional projects in the areas of telecommunications and road infrastructure. As of 30 September 1986, loan commitments in these fields covered 15 projects in 12 countries and were equivalent to SDR 26 mn., of which 36.9 percent had been disbursed. All but 4 of these projects were developed in cooperation with the ECA's PANAFTEL project which is aimed at improving telecommunications links between sub-Saharan African states.

Although a trade liberalization agreement was reached in 1983, ECOWAS member states have largely failed to implement its provisions; consequently, the Fund's compensation procedures have not been put into practice. With support from UNCTAD and USAID, however, some progress has been made on improving coordination between the national customs offices of each member state as well as harmonizing the trade statistics reporting systems used in ECOWAS, CEAO and the Mano River Union. In addition to the establishment of an ECOWAS Community Computer Center in Lomé (eventually to be made an independent ECOWAS institution), the harmonized AYUSCUDA/SYDONIA system has been made operational in Mali, Mauritania, Togo, Niger, Cape Verde and is being installed in Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Benin; work is also underway to implement the system in the remaining member states. This project will help meet the Fund's need for reliable, standardized trade statistics for regional planning and in its future role as manager of the compensation budget.

The Fund has been called upon to play a critical role in mobilizing resources for the ECOWAS Economic Recovery Program. This program is expected to cost over \$US1 bn. and donor financing will be needed for about two-thirds of that amount. Financial commitments have also been made to purchase a 10 percent share of the ECOBANK and to cover 60 percent of the costs for the construction of the new ECOWAS Fund headquarters building. These obligations have made it even more critical that member states pay in the additional \$50 mn. in capital called up at last year's summit. Problems have also been encountered in the repayment of Fund loans by member states. Inability to replenish the Fund's dwindling financial resources caused project funding to drop from a SDR 15 mn. annual average between 1983 and 1985 to only SDR 1.4 mn. in 1986. In 1987 it was reported that only 61 percent of the interest and charges due on these loans had been paid.

In response to these strains on the Fund's financial resources, proposals are currently being considered to transform its capital into shares and open participation in the Fund to other institutions and nonmember states of ECOWAS. The Fund has negotiated a \$US 47 mn. loan from the African Development Bank for this purpose; as a condition for its participation, the BAD has required that member states meet their obligations to pay in the Fund's second tranche of callable capital. Similar loans are being discussed with the World Bank and other donors.

Now completing its fourth year since becoming operational in 1984, the ECOWAS Fund appears to be moving into a new phase. With a full staff of West African professionals and a new headquarters building to be occupied in late 1988, the initial efforts directed toward staff recruitment and institutional development should now be drawing to a close, permitting the Fund to better focus on its very challenging operational responsibilities to the Community.

Fonds de Solidarité Africain (FSA)

Address: Directeur, B.P. 382, Niamey, Niger.

Established: 1976

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, and France.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To encourage development projects, especially those that have a regional impact and/or favor the poorer or most disadvantaged members.

Functions: The FSA subsidizes interest payments on loans, offers guarantees, and extends lines of credit. The capital is divided among these three functions in shares of 70 percent, 25 percent, and 5 percent respectively. As of June 1988 the FSA has subsidized loans for 22 projects (10 of which were financed by the Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement, and 4 by the African Development Bank), mostly in agro-industry (38 percent), energy and water supply (33 percent), and roads (20 percent). There have also been 6 guarantees, also principally in agro-industry (24 percent), energy and water supply (52 percent), and roads (14 percent). Total obligations for interest rate subsidies amounted to 3.4 bn. CFAF as of June 1986.

Structure: The Conference of African and French Heads of State is the main policymaking body, and meets annually. The Board of Directors (Conseil de Direction) meets two or three times annually to offer more specific guidance. The Management Board (Direction Générale) and the Director General are responsible for operations. Staff numbers 33 (3 expatriates); 10 posts are vacant (3 of them cadres). There are 6 professionals.

Financing: France contributes half of the capital and the regional members collectively contribute the other half. The initial capital was 5 bn. francs and has since grown to over 10 bn. francs. The operating budget for 1986/87 was 1 bn. CFAF; actual expenditures were 557 mn.

Comments: The FSA acts as administrator of the Association des Institutions Regionales de Financement de Développement, which seems to absorb a significant part of its administrative resources. The FSA is the brainchild of President Giscard D'Estang, who saw it as an integrating organization for financing institutions. Its activities are limited in scale. Between 1980 and 1984, FSA awarded 15 subsidies on interest notes for 8 countries, with total value of 1.8 bn. CFAF. Its guarantees, from 1980-1984, totalled 12.3 bn. for 7 operations in 3 countries. It had made no financing available for debt rescheduling (which it is empowered to do) as of end-1984. By 1987, the total value of interest rate subsidies was 3.4 bn. CFAF, in 22 operations in 9 countries. As of 1987, guarantee operators numbered 7 and totalled 3.5 bn. Four countries benefitted: Togo, Burkina Faso, CAR and Benin. Six of the seven guarantees were for Caisse Centrale loans.

The FAS seems to be operating at far from capacity. Its loan guarantee limit is 34 bn., of which only 3.5 has been used. It underspends on its operating budget and has significant staff vacancies, all of which suggests lending capacity that is underutilized.

Fonds de Solidarité et d'Intervention pour le Développement de la Communauté
(FOSIDEC)
Fund for Solidarity and Economic Development (FSED)

- Address:** Secretary General, Rue Destenauve, B.P. 643, Ougadougou, Burkina Faso.
- Established:** 1978
- Membership:** The 7 CEAO countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Guinea and Togo are observers.
- Languages:** French
- Objectives:** To encourage investments in member countries, especially in the poorer ones, by guaranteeing loans, subsidizing interest payments, and doing feasibility studies. The goal is to contribute to regional equilibrium.
- Functions:** FOSIDEC guarantees development loans made by third parties to member states, subsidizes interest payments on these loans, and finances project feasibility studies.
- Structure:** The Conference of Heads of State is the highest authority of FOSIDEC. The Conference establishes the general orientation of FOSIDEC's activities and determines member contributions. The Administrative Council is the decisionmaking body, approving specific projects and activities.
- Financing:** The initial capital of the Solidarity Fund was 5 bn. FCFA, of which the Côte d'Ivoire provided 50 percent and Senegal 30 percent. Annual subscriptions amount to 1.5 bn., with the larger members maintaining approximately the same shares.
- As of 1980, the capital stood at 8 bn. CFAF. The capital should in theory be at 17 bn. FCFA in 1986, but persistent arrearages, especially since 1982, result in an actual capital that is well below that figure.
- Comments:** See CEAO.

Institut Africain de Développement Economique
et de Planification (IDEP)
African Institute for Economic Development
and Planning (AIEDP)

- Address:** Directeur, B.P. 3186, Dakar, Senegal.
- Established:** 1963
- Membership:** All 50 members of the UN ECA.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To train economic development planners, conduct research on the subject and provide advisory services.

Functions: The IDEP is an autonomous institution under the aegis of the ECA. All of the Institute's training courses are at the graduate level. The courses last for two years and lead to an M.A. degree in Economic Development and Planning. There are three components of the degree: a nine-month Basic Program in Development and Planning; a three-month Specialization Program covering Industrialization in Africa, Energy and Development, Human Resources Development, and Agricultural and Rural Development; and a six-month Research Training Program during which participants work on their theses. This last program is also open to nondegree participants who wish to conduct research under the auspices of IDEP. Research is conducted for both professional application and for teaching purposes.

Structure: IDEP is supervised by the Council of Ministers of the ECA. The Governing Council lays down general principles and policies governing the operation of the Institute, reviews and approves budgets, and reports to the ECA. The Advisory Board on Studies and Research gives technical advice to the Governing Council. It is comprised of senior lecturers, the Director and Deputy Director of the Institute, a representative of the ECA, and representatives of various UN agencies concerned with the activities of IDEP.

Financing: IDEP is financed by the UNECA and by the government of Senegal (which provides facilities and overhead cost financing).

Comments: For many years IDEP was directed by Samir Amin, and its activities and orientation reflected his analytic and ideological preferences. During that period it had limited organizational impact on the states of the region. Many initiatives were made to close it down. Since 1984, new leadership has brought IDEP more into the mainstream, and it is now receiving support from western Foundations for special training seminars and conferences, such as one held in September 1986 on structural adjustment lending. Its teaching program has been reshaped to concentrate more on technical economics and on planning methodologies.

Institut Africain pour le Développement Economique et Social
(INADES)

Address: Bureau Exécutif 15, Avenue Jean-Marmoz, Cocody; B.P. 8, Abidjan 08, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1962

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, and Zaire.

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Language(s): French and English, with most training programs conducted in, and technical pamphlets published in, local languages.

Objectives: To educate rural communities about various aspects of rural life, mostly related to agriculture.

Functions: INADES trains farmers in its regional training centers and through correspondence courses, and sells educational publications, both technical and nontechnical (Agripromo, Agricultural Apprenticeship Series). Agricultural techniques are the main focus of the training programs and correspondence courses; topics of other publications include environmental protection, marketing, and social aspects of rural life.

INADES sells its books, journals, and pamphlets through its own bookstores, which are typically found together with the regional INADES-Formation offices, and through other, government and private, bookstores.

Structure: INADES is a nongovernmental organization run by the Jesuit order. It is functionally divided into two parts: INADES-Formation, responsible for the development and execution of training programs, and INADES-Documentation, which researches aspects of rural life and publishes the periodicals. INADES has 10 national offices: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire.

Major program and policy decisions are made by 65 trainers or administrators in the ten countries with national offices. The Governing Council is composed of 7 members, representing 6 countries (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Togo, Zaire, Ethiopia, and France). The Executive Bureau, which is responsible for the daily administration of INADES, comprises 6 members in Abidjan headquarters and a Director from each national office.

The Abidjan headquarters has 30 staff members who are responsible for the conceptualization of new programs and research, the publication of periodicals and training manuals, and administrative tasks. These tasks include managing the budget and supervising personnel, particularly in those countries that do not have their own national offices.

Financing: The budget is supported by proceeds from publications and training fees, and by assistance from (among others) international organizations and donor countries (including USAID).

Institut Africain et Mauricien de Statistiques et d'Economie Appliquée
(IAMSEA)

Address: Directeur, B.P. 1109, Kigali, Rwanda.

Established: 1975

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To train statisticians, especially in economic statistics.

Functions: The Institute offers a three-year program with an optional preparatory year. There are 20-30 new students each year, or a total of 80-100 students in any given year. In addition to the 8 member countries, 10 other francophone countries send students. The staff publishes one report of original research every year as a pedagogical exercise.

Structure: The Institute was established by OCAM. Ministers or their representatives from each member state make up the Administrative Council, which meets annually. The Council appoints a director for a three-year term. The IAMSEA has a staff of over 60, of whom 50 are support staff. Of the 11 teachers, 4 are French technical assistants.

Financing: Each country makes an annual contribution which reflects the number of students that country sends, whether or not that country is a member. Donor countries and organizations finance 80 percent of all student fees. The 1987 budget was \$85,000.

Institut de Formation et de Recherche Démographiques (IFORD)

Address: Directeur, B.P. 1556, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1971

Membership: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Togo, Tunisia and Zaire.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To act as a training and research center in the field of population studies and related subjects.

Functions: The main activity of the institute is the provision of a two-year graduate course in demography. Student selection is competitive; only professional statisticians and graduate student in economics, mathematics, geography and sociology can apply. The first year is devoted to basic, theoretical knowledge of population studies and to field experience in collection and treatment of statistical data. The second year is devoted to more advanced and applied techniques in demography. Students must write a thesis on a population problem in Africa. The institute delivers a D.E.D. (Diplôme d'Etudes Démographiques) to all students with a minimum average of 12/20.

Structure: IFORD was created by an agreement between the government of Cameroon and the United Nations. In 1983, IFORD was converted into a regional

institute. Under this new status, the Governing Council is supervised by the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); the Council includes a representative from the Cameroons, from each of twelve member states, and from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). The Governing Council is responsible for the operations of the institute.

Financing: For the period 1973-1981, the total budget was 1.5 bn. CFAF, 73 percent paid by UNFPA, 12 percent paid by the host government, 9 percent paid by France and 6 percent paid by other donors. Since 1983 (when IFORD was converted into a regional institute), member contributions have been set at 6 mn. CFAF. The UNFPA reduced its subsidy in 1984. The operating budget for 1987 was 144 mn. CFAF for member states and 196 mn. CFAF for UNFPA.

Comments: IFORD was regionalized in 1983 to spread the running costs among African countries which benefit from its operations. This has had disastrous consequences on IFORD's program of activities, since member payments are in arrears to the extent of some 502 mn. CFAF. Fourteen countries have never paid any contribution; of these only three have never utilized the services of the institute (Mauritius, Seychelles and Tunisia). Only 12 mn. CFAF have been paid by member states for 1987, and UNFPA is financing more than 90 percent of the operating cost of the institute. The reduction in 1984 of the subsidy granted by UNFPA, in addition to the problems of delay and nonpayment of contributions, have necessitated a substantial reduction of activities from October 1984 onwards.

In spite of financial problems, IFORD is still an active institution. Over 150 demographers from 17 French-speaking African countries have graduated. Another 34 students from member countries have been admitted for 1987-1988. IFORD has also undertaken various studies on demographic issues, such as: the extent and structure of infant and child mortality and the factors that cause it; and the implications of population growth on health policy. It also gave some specialized training such as the six-week, on-the-job course in the collection and analysis of population statistics provided to officials from the statistics departments in the various national administrations of the Comoros in 1984.

The institute publishes two journals: the "Bulletin de Liaison de Démographie Africaine" (last issue in February 1988) and "les Annales de l'IFORD" (last issue in December 1987). IFORD has close ties with RIPS (Regional Institute for Population Studies), its counterpart for English-speaking countries.

Institut International des Assurances (IIA)
International Insurance Institute

Address: Directeur Général, B.P. 1575, Yaoundé, Cameroun.

Established: 1972

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Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Sénégal, Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: IIA was created by CICA (Conférence Internationale des Contrôles d'Assurances - International Conference for Insurance Control) to meet the need for insurance training in French-speaking countries. It was also created to set up and manage a documentation center and provide, if required, technical expertise to member states.

Functions: The Institute has organized two training cycles. Admission to the higher-level cycle is selective, and requires a master's degree. The Institute delivers a DESA (Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures en Assurances) classified by CAMES (see corresponding vignette) at the engineer level (BAC+5). The bulk of the training focuses on insurance-related techniques. IIA also provides in-service training of two years for executive staffs already working in the insurance sector. This cycle has recently been extended to students with a baccalaureate degree.

Structure: The Administrative Council is made up of the Ministers of Finance of member states. They appoint a Management Committee which is in charge of the implementation of the training programs.

Financing: The recurrent budget is 200 mn. CFAF. The bulk of it comes from member states' contributions. Half of the budget is shared on an equal basis. The other half is calculated taking into account the importance of the cash flow of the insurance sector of each country. By this calculation, Côte d'Ivoire contributes 20 percent of the budget; the Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon and Senegal provide more than 50 percent of the voted budget. Donors also play a key role in the financing of the institute. France gives 15 mn. CFAF a year, FFSA (Fédération Française des Sociétés d'Assurance) 10 mn., EEC 15 mn. and the UNCTAD contribution in direct help (plane tickets, per diem paid to invited professors) accounts for another 10 mn. CFAF.

Comments: In the past the institute has been effective. The higher cycle has graduated 250 students and a number of African managers in today's insurance business were trained by IIA. Most member states benefited from the institute, but the percentage of students trained per nationality shows that the bigger contributors to the organization also benefited the most from its services: Côte d'Ivoire (22 percent), Cameroon (19 percent), Senegal (13 percent). Some nonmember states have also sent students to the school (Madagascar, Mauritania, Guinea, Burundi, Zaire), but this phenomenon stayed marginal (3 percent of the students trained). The second cycle produced 499 graduate students, of which nearly half were Cameroonians, and only 8 percent Ivoirians (thus skewing the percentage per nationality the other way).

The small size of the insurance market of most African countries justifies their putting their resources together to share training costs; however, resources are necessary to maintain training standards. Like a number of African organizations, IIA is suffering because of arrears in the payment of contributions. The arrears are close to 500 mn. CFAF--an estimate based on the last-published activity report (1985). The financial crisis brought the

organization near collapse in 1988, and the situation remains problematic. The manager of the institute has reacted by placing strong controls on the use of school facilities for nonworking purposes and by expanding the work week from 35 to 40 hours.

Another important problem in the day-to-day life of the institute is its inability to control the level and seriousness of the students sent by their governments, and to apply sanctions in case of absenteeism, pregnancy, or health problems, for example.

Institut du Sahel (INSAH)
Sahel Institute

Address: Directeur Général, B.P. 1530, Bamako, Mali.

Established: 1977

Membership: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To reinforce the efforts of national institutes by coordinating research by and for CILSS countries.

Functions: InsaH gathers and disseminates data; adapts and transfers technology; coordinates and promotes research; trains researchers; defines priorities and actions to be taken, and plans regional research programs. The Institute also includes a Socio-Economic and Demographic Unit (USED) which undertakes studies, projects, and surveys, and has two principal programs (the Sahel Demographic Research Program and the Planning and Development Program). In January 1988, it was agreed that USED would be converted to a new, semi-autonomous unit called CERPOD (Research centre for population and demography studies). Another unit within INSAH is the RESADOC unit, a network of all scientific and technical documentation. There is also a training department and a research department; the latter studies such topics as plant and cereals production, ecology, and protection against desertification.

Structure: INSAH is a component of CILSS, but almost entirely autonomous. Its structure includes a Management Council, a Scientific and Technical Committee, and a Consultative Council. The training department has only one core person. RESADOC has 1 core person and 5 professionals, and CERPOD 15 professionals. The Research Department has 2 core persons and 3 technicians.

Financing: INSAH is financed by the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) and UNSO (United Nations Sahel Office). INSAH in recent years received 37 percent of CILSS's core financing, or approximately 140 mn. CFA francs in 1987. Much of RESADOC funding is from the International Development Research Center (IDRC), the International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA), USAID,

and Canada. CERPOD will receive major funding (\$16 mn. for five years) from USAID.

Comment: INSAH has had numerous structural and organizational problems. According to its former managing director (1983-88), a Gambian national, INSAH is a hopelessly politicized institution, staffed with too many people of uncertain qualifications and dominated by incentives for travel. According to the Director, when he tried in 1986 to impose internal staff discipline and fire some staff, the employees took him to court. Also, pressure is said to be strong from the Malian government which tends to treat the Institute as their own organization. Furthermore, USAID and UNDP stopped all support in 1986 (to resume in 1988 for CERPOD, which has relatively autonomous status).

The UNSO, the Institute's main sponsor, has expressed dissatisfaction because it feels INSAH has been very slow to achieve its goals. After two years of existence INSAH had implemented only 3 projects (it ran seminars on soil and water conservation, agropastoralism and policy research). In June 1986, the Executive Secretary of CILSS asked USAID to finance a management audit of INSAH. After a number of evaluations and audits, INSAH was restructured and staff was cut. INSAH also, in principle, has nine project countries for which it negotiates with donors for funds. Because of accounting problems, the Institute cannot approach the European Fund for Development (the FED has been a major donor in the past), so it has urged countries to deal directly with the FED.

In its function as research coordinator, INSAH also tries to draw up an agreed research program among member countries, in agriculture, for example. But its seed development research program overlaps that of other organizations such as SAFGRAD and ICRISAT, and even that of its parent organization, CILSS. In January 1988, the Executive Secretary of CILSS got money from FAO and other institutions to allow it to set up a project of its own for a seed multiplication center. INSAH staff believe they should have responsibility for this project, and cite it as an example of overlapping and ambiguous jurisdiction. In fact, CILSS and INSAH compete for funds and relations between the two institutions are strained. This tension can be explained in large part by the unclear objectives that guide both organizations, and lead to overlapping activities.

The problem of lack of donor coordination enters here also. While USAID funds both SAFGRAD (an OAU sponsored organization) and ICRISAT (a Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research sponsored organization), most of INSAH's funding is provided by the FED for its seed project. Donors, on the other hand, feel that INSAH is duplicating the work of other organizations. However, management at INSAH thinks that donors should do the coordination. For example, there is no need, they say, for SAFGRAD to work with 9 Sahelian states, because of INSAH's presence in those countries already.

Two regional training programs in agro-pastoralism and plant protection have been undertaken by INSAH. The agro-pastoral project, which started in 1980, was undertaken jointly with UNESCO and was financed by the UNDP and UNESCO. The program focuses on training and is implemented in two schools in Senegal: the Veterinary School in Dakar (EISMV), and the Rural training school in Bamby (ENCR). A nine-month postgraduate course covers general

topics and addresses high-level rural development personnel. At the undergraduate level, a general course which lasts three months trains middle-level rural development personnel. A plant protection training project was started in 1980; it is executed jointly with the Netherlands, which also financed the project.

Another training program, on pest control, is a 2-year course for junior level staff. One of the centers is located in Kolo (Niger), but now that center is a branch of Agrhyment. The other two centers are located in Dakar (ENSUT) and Zaria, Nigeria. According to INSAH's officials, their training programs are so successful that non-Sahelian countries are asking to participate. However, the UNDP wants member states to pay scholarship costs.

Upon the request of President Diouf of Senegal, a program for better education on desertification was elaborated, and funded by the FED. INSAH plans to make a manual on desertification and is also going to bring together trainers. In Demography, INSAH decided that it should concentrate more on research and let others do the training.

CERPOD, which is very popular with donors, wants to be autonomous and seek more self-financing. CERPOD succeeds mainly because it has a clearly defined mandate and produces quality output. As noted above, donors have committed \$16 mn. for CERPOD's five year program.

Because of INSAH's numerous internal problems, management decided that states will have to take care of core costs. Meanwhile, the Institute in mid-1988 did not have enough money even to allow it to hold scientific meetings. Also, INSAH desperately needs to exchange experience and information on agricultural research with other organizations; it is isolated at present. In general, because of the competition from CERPOD and from CILSS, the future of INSAH is uncertain.

Institut Sous-Régional de Statistique et d'Economie Appliquées
(ISSEA)

Address: Directeur Général, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1961, as the Centre International de Formation Statistique (CIFS).

Membership: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To train statisticians to meet the needs of African administrations.

Functions: ISSEA offers three programs in applied statistics. The most advanced program takes 3 years, the medium level takes 2 years, and the least

advanced 1 year. There have been over 1,500 graduates since the inception of the Institute, of which two-thirds were from the 1-year program. Students have and do come from all francophone countries, but in recent years 90 percent are from the UDEAC countries. The total enrollment for 1987/88 was 138.

Structure: ISSEA has been a subsidiary of UDEAC since 1984. The Administrative Council is composed of Ministers and representatives from member states, and representatives of UDEAC and ISSEA. The Advisory Council includes professional statisticians from member states and UDEAC, as well as representatives of ISSEA and ISSEA's student body. The actual administrative unit of ISSEA is the Direction Général.

There are 13 professional staff (all Cameroonians for the present, but openings for candidates from member countries is planned) including 3 French technical assistants.

Financing: The budget is contributed by member states on an equal basis, and represents 350 mn. CFAF a year. In addition to the contributions, the budget receives funds from nonmember countries that pay a fee for each of their students: 540,000 CFAF a year for engineer training (3 years), 420,000 CFAF a year for technician training (2 years), 270,000 CFAF for shorter technical agent training (9 months). Arrears account for 60 percent of the budget, and their cumulated amount is about 400 mn. CFAF. Virtually all students receive full scholarships that are financed by donor countries and international organizations.

Comments: ISSEA is on its fourth life, having been at various times a subsidiary of the ECA, the UNDP, and most recently UDEAC. From 1975 to 1984, ISSEA was a national institution of Cameroon. It is not clear what the school will gain becoming a subsidiary body of UDEAC, even if there is a clear rationale for it because of membership structure. UDEAC is not in such a good shape to be an efficient tutorial organ. A consequence is that the problems faced by the school (lack of finance, building too small, among others) are likely to remain unsolved for a while. For instance, the need for more micro-computers (only 8 micro-computers are available for the 140 students of the school) is vital for an efficient training of students in the field of statistics. As a matter of fact, 80 percent of the students are directly employed as civil servants just after they graduate. Only Central African Republic and Congo have recently stopped their recruitment programs because of budget constraints. Otherwise ISSEA performs reasonably well.

Institut Supérieur Africain de Recherche et d'Education Syndicale
(ISARES)

Address: Directeur, B.P. 2161, Brazzaville, Rép. Pop. du Congo.

Established: 1982

Memberships: No direct memberships.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To develop trade unionism in Africa through the training of African professionals, and to promote cooperation among African unions.

Functions: The main activity of ISARES is to organize seminars.

Structure: ISARES is a specialized agency of the International Confederation of Syndicates (Fédération Syndicale Mondiale or FSM), headquartered in Prague. The Director and Assistant Director are appointed directly by FSM and report to FSM's board of directors. Seven permanent staff work at headquarters in Brazzaville, of which three are considered professionals.

Financing: The operating budget is provided by FSM. Although it is not published, it is clearly very limited, as evidenced by the poor maintenance of the small existing facilities. Some gifts are given for trips and the accommodation of participants at seminars, mainly by big syndicates such as the french CGT (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs) or the Central Council of Syndicates in the USSR.

Comments: Two seminars have already been organized. The first took place at the end of 1987 on the topic of trade unionism as a means to fight apartheid in South Africa. The second one was devoted to the study of womens' trade unions, and was conducted with the participation of women from ten African countries. A continuation of this seminar is planned for November 1988.

ISARES is a self-proclaimed political organization. The attitude of African countries towards ISARES runs the gamut from enthusiastic, like the Congo, to very cautious support from Zaire. The ideological approach of the organization and its leftist orientation condemn it to a marginal role.

International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE)

Address: Director, P.O. Box 30772, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1971; became an international center in 1986.

Membership: The following constitute the members of the Sponsoring Group for the ICIPE (SGI). A "*" denotes a signatory to the ICIPE Charter. Australia, Belgium, *Brazil, Canada, *Chile, *Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, EFC, Federal Republic of Germany, FAO, Ford Foundation, France, Friends of ICIPE, Inc., International Atomic Energy Agency, IDRC, IFAD, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, *Kenya, Netherlands, *Norway, OPEC Fund for International Development, *Philippines, Rockefeller Foundation, *Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, UNDP, UN-ECA, UNEP, World Bank, World Health Organization, *Zambia.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To develop integrated control methodologies for crop and livestock insect pests, and strengthen developing-country capacity in insect science and control.

Functions: To fulfil its objectives, ICIPE's principle activities are research and training. Crop pests under study include the borers of maize, sorghum, cowpeas and banana. Livestock pests being studied are tsetse, vector of trypanosomiasis, and ticks, vectors of several debilitating cattle disease including East Coast Fever. Study on insect vectors of human diseases is being phased out, with the exception of certain aspects of malaria research. ICIPE's research programs are supported by four research units in chemistry, cell biology, sensory physiology and biometrics, and computer usage.

A second important part of ICIPE's work is its training function. Among its training programs, the African Regional Postgraduate Programme in Insect Science (ARPPIS) stands out. A collaborative venture between ICIPE and 14 African universities, ARPPIS allows students registering for a PH.D. with any of the participating universities to take their courses and do their research at the ICIPE. Admitted students are awarded scholarships from participating donors. ARPPIS is also attempting to develop a program to encourage its graduates to commence active research careers in Africa.

Other ICIPE training programs include postdoctoral research fellowships for international scientists to gain experience in Africa; short-term courses for insect scientists from developing countries; and the FAMESA program which offers training and curriculum development in financial and administrative management of agriculture and health research projects.

The African Regional Pest Management Research and Development Network for Integrated Control of Crop and Livestock Pests (PESTNET) is an interactive research and extension effort between ICIPE and national pest management programs. It serves to exchange information and experiences between participating institutions; to test methodologies, technologies and information for validity in various ecological zones in Africa; and to provide training at different levels for pest scientists and managers in this field.

Structure: Ultimate financial and programmatic authority for the Center rests with the Governing Council which is composed of 16 members drawn from the SGI, host-country officials and members of the international scientific community. The Governing Council itself consists of an executive board and of subsidiary program and nominating committees. It meets at least once a year to review programs, policy, management and resources. Considerable guidance for this review is received from the SGI which contributes 8 members to the Council. ICIPE's management is the responsibility of its Director, who oversees the Centre's scientific programs, the Planning and Development Unit, the Administrative and Information Division, and the Finance Division.

Financing: The principle ICIPE donors are those that constitute the SGI, listed above. In addition to the UN agencies, bilateral aid agencies and private foundations, the Kenya Government is a major donor, contributing to the Centre financially and in kind. The World Bank is another large donor,

having established a trust fund for contributions on a grant basis towards the Centre's capital expenditure.

In 1987 ICIPE's recurrent core budget was approximately \$US 8mn. Special projects are funded separately under a "restricted core" arrangement where a grant is made available to fulfill a given program objective.

Comments: ICIPE is often cited as one of the most effective African regional organizations, and certainly as one of the most effective African regional research organizations. ICIPE is not unambiguously "African," however. Like the other international agricultural research centers, it has a world-wide mandate and finds its financing primarily from outside the continent.

In certain respects, however, ICIPE is more "African" than the other IARCs. Firstly it was initiated by a respected African, Dr. Odhiambo. Moreover, 85 percent of its professional staff is African. Furthermore, 8 countries (although only 3 are African) recently signed the ICIPE Charter, giving the Centre special legal status in these countries.

These factors appear to contribute to some of ICIPE's success. Both donors and ICIPE officials interviewed claimed that ICIPE had a closer relationship to African national governments as a result, thus facilitating the Centre's operation across the continent. Furthermore, the African staff may be more qualified to evaluate the appropriateness and feasibility of technology transfer. Finally, an African staff is cheaper: a full-time African scientist costs \$US 15,000 a year.

In the training area, ARPPIS seems to be particularly successful. Forty students from 12 African countries had registered with ARPIS by the end of 1987. The sixteen students who graduated in 1983 and 1984 are presently engaged in research within the continent. There has been some discussion of ICIPE joining the CGIAR system. The primary advantages of such a move are perceived to be a more stable and larger pool of funds. Management may also improve. But care would have to be taken not to lose the African flavor of this organization, which seems to make it more acceptable and effective among the countries it serves in sub-Saharan Africa.

International Congress of Africanists

- Address:** Chairman, c/o Department of History, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Established:** 1962 (as the International Congress of Africanists.)
- Membership:** Membership is open to anyone in the field of African studies. This includes non-Africans.
- Language(s):** English and French.

Objectives: To develop international cooperation in the field of African studies; to promote the exchange of information, ideas and research in the field of Africanist research.

Functions: The Congress meets once every 5 years to promote African studies, monitor the orientation of African Studies programs, and discuss concepts and theories of significance for Africanist research. The proceedings of the meeting are published and sold to individuals and libraries.

Structure: The Plenary congress elects the Permanent Council consisting of 4 representatives of each nation represented at the congress. There is no full-time staff or secretariat. The President and secretariat are chosen from the next host country.

Financing: UNESCO (via the Conseil International de Philosophie et Sciences Humaines) as well as the host government and the private sector are the main contributors to the Congress and its quinquennial meeting. Participants at the meetings are generally financed by their sponsoring institutions.

Comments: This is a "low cost" institution that appears to meet its objectives. Meetings have been held regularly (1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983). They also draw many participants, although the number has declined considerably (from 800 at the second congress to approximately 230 at the last). The next conference is planned for 1990 in Khartoum.

International Council for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF)

Address: Director General, ICRAF House, Girigiri, P.O. Box 30677, Nairobi, Kenya.

Establishment: 1978

Membership: None. ICRAF is an autonomous, non-profit international research council. Members of ICRAF's directing Board of Trustees do not represent countries or organizations (excepting host country Kenya).

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To initiate, stimulate and support research leading to more sustainable and productive land use in developing countries through the integration of better management of trees in land use systems.

Functions: ICRAF collects and disseminates information and encourages and sponsors research relevant to agroforestry systems, and on the harvesting, processing, and marketing of forest products. It also participates in the management and financing of pilot and experimental projects in agroforestry; conducts seminars; and publishes and disseminates research results and other information on agroforestry.

Structure: ICRAF is governed by an international Board of Trustees with equal representation from developed and developing countries. However, these trustees do not represent their countries or organizations and are elected on individual merit. ICRAF's Director General is responsible for management of the organization and is responsible to the Board. The Council is subdivided into four divisions: Research Development Division, Collaborative Programmes, Information and Communications Division, and Finance and Administrative Division.

ICRAF has a total staff of 143. Its internationally recruited professional staff number 33.

Financing: The Council gets its operational funds from voluntary contributions from a host of bilateral and multilateral donors as well as private organizations. Its (tentative) 1988 budget amounts to \$US 6.5 mn. Donors include CIDA, the Ford Foundation, Germany (BMZ/GTZ), France, Kenya, IDRC, Netherlands, the Rockefeller Foundation, Norway, Sweden, (SAREC/SIDA). Switzerland, USAID, Near East Foundation, and the World Bank.

Comments: ICRAF was an IDRC initiative but now has strong donor support. Its budget grew from \$US 2.2 mn. in 1983 to \$US 4.6 mn. in 1987. The Council is involved in all aspects of research, training and information dissemination in the field of agroforestry.

The manner in which ICRAF implements its research program appears to be different from that of the CGIAR institutes. It engages in "zonal collaborative research." In the case of tropical Africa this is undertaken along the lines of the AFRENA (Agroforestry Research Networks for Africa) model. Four such networks are presently in place in Africa: East (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda); Southern (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe); Western (Cameroon); Sahel (ICRAF backstopping for SAFGRAD's farming system teams in Benin, Burkina Faso and Cameroon).

Tasks are divided by country as in any collaborative network and research is location specific. ICRAF collaborates on the national level, usually contributing 1 member to a 3-member research team that operates on a national level. Indeed, in ICRAF's case, unlike the CGIAR centers, all technology-generating research is done on a national level. Moreover, such research is institutionally housed with the national system (with significant international collaboration). With the host countries necessarily initiating research and contributing significantly (personnel) to the effort, there is less probability of ICRAF being accused of acting solely to further its own research interests rather than that of the host country, a problem which plagues several of the CGIAR institutions operating in Africa. Also, while allowing ICRAF to operate with a lower budget than that of other international centers, this formula also permits significant on-the-job training of local scientists. International scientists work with nationals on a day-to-day basis from project formulation to project conclusion.

In these respects, the ICRAF modus operandi appears commendable and warrants special attention. ICRAF also has been making progress with respect to its research-supplementing tasks. A recent External Review Panel concluded: "Over the past three years; ICRAF's team has been unusually productive

in putting together, largely in-house, an imposing array of background documentation, data bases, state-of-the-art reviews, source books, and agroforestry systems inventories, which should provide a good background for future programme projections."

Several workshops have been organized by ICRAF to further assimilate, analyze and disseminate agroforestry research results and ideas. The Council has generated more than 150 publications and papers.

ICRAF offers advisory/consultancy services on its areas of expertise. This had been utilized by over 20 donor-supported agroforestry research and development projects. ICRAF also offers formal training courses. Between 1982 and 1987 it conducted nine 3-week training courses aimed at enhancing the capabilities of national research scientists and development planners to initiate and implement agroforestry research leading to the generation and adoption of new technology. A total of 223 trainees from 40 countries had benefitted from the courses by 1987.

International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)

Address: Sahelian Center: B.P. 12404, Niamey, Niger. Headquarters: Patancheru P.O., Andhra Pradesh, 502 324, India.

Established: 1972; Sahelian center in 1981.

Membership: CGIAR continuing members (see IITA profile).

Language(s): English

Objectives: To improve agricultural production in semi-arid areas.

Functions: ICRISAT has a major interest and responsibility in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Sahelian and Sudanian zones of West Africa, in the SADCC region of Southern Africa, and in the semi-arid regions of several other countries, notably Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. The major crops with which it is concerned are sorghum, millet and groundnuts. These are major rain-fed food crops grown by resource-poor farmers in those regions. In addition to these, ICRISAT is also engaged in exploring the possibility of introduction of pigeon peas and increasing production of chickpeas in some African countries. It gives major attention to improving the yield potentials and disease and pest resistance of these three major food crops. It also gives major attention to the conservation and utilization of scarce water supplies. It supports research, disseminates findings, identifies constraints to agricultural development, and works closely with national programs.

Structure: The organization is the same as other CGIAR affiliates (see IITA profile). Nine of ICRISAT's world-wide professional staff of 88 are Africans.

Financing: The same as other CGIAR affiliates (see IITA profile). ICRISAT's world-wide expenditures in 1986 amounted to \$US 20.6 mn.

International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)

Address: Director General, P.M.B. 53220, Oyo Road, Ibadan, Nigeria.

Established: 1967

Membership: CGIAR continuing members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, African Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, Organization of the United Nations, Ford Foundation, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, International Development Research Centre, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Kellogg Foundation, Leverhulme Trust, OPEC Fund for International Programme, United Nations Environment Programme. Fixed-term members of developing countries: Guinea and Zambia; Bangladesh and Thailand; Argentina and Venezuela; Egypt and Turkey; Poland and Portugal.

Language(s): English

Objectives: The geographic mandate of IITA includes the humid and subhumid tropical regions of the world, but the Institute concentrates its research and training activities primarily on the needs of sub-Saharan African countries. The central objective, in cooperation with national programs, is to undertake research which will make it possible to increase food production.

Functions: Four out of five of the research programs of IITA are crop centered: Grain Legume Improvement, Maize Research, Rice Research, and Root and Tuber Improvement. The fifth is the Resource and Crop Management Program. Specifically, the activities of these and other segments of the Institute include: development of farming systems that will provide viable, stable, and sustainable alternatives to traditional systems of shifting cultivation in Africa; development and improvement of cassava, maize, rice, soybeans, plantain and cocoyams; transference of new technologies and skills through training, publishing and through an information center and library.

Structure: CGIAR-affiliated centers such as this one are each autonomous and managed independently by their own Board of Trustees. The members of the board are drawn from the international community and serve in individual capacities. While the board determines the direction of the center's research, it does so after international consultations on scientific as well as financial/administrative matters. Each center has a Director General who is responsible to the board.

The CGIAR itself has an Executive Secretariat provided by the World Bank. It meets twice a year to consider the recommendations from a Rome-based Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) which is composed of a chairman and 14 scientists from both developed and developing countries. The CGIAR secretariat oversees the management of the centers and provides overall administrative

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and management support. The TAC, meanwhile, monitors the scientific performance of the centers and reviews center budgets in the light of defined research priorities.

IITA has a professional staff of 200 who come from over 40 countries. The support staff of over 1,000 are primarily Nigerian.

Financing: CGIAR-affiliated centers are financed by the CGIAR members. These members pledged approximately \$US 192 mn. to support the 13 centers (located world wide) in 1986. The raising of funds to support the centers is done by the secretariat in Washington. Most of the funding is not pooled, but rather goes directly to individual centers. Moreover, the bulk of the funding is not task specific, although some grants are earmarked for specific programs and activities within the framework defined by CGIAR at its meetings. IITA's world-wide operating expenditures for 1986 were \$US 17.5 mn.

Comments: The work of IITA is best described by considering individual crops.

Rice: Since the early 1970s, IITA has provided African governments with improved rice varieties and genetic materials for testing in their national programs. IITA holds workshops for rice scientists of the region, publishes results of trials, and conducts training courses for rice technicians.

Maize: IITA and CIMMYT have collaborated on maize breeding at Ibadan, notably for resistance to two major diseases of the crop--streak virus and downy mildew--and have been successful in the development of adapted productive maize hybrids. IITA has also assisted in the establishment of local seed companies for production and distribution of the maize hybrids.

Roots and Tubers: Several improved cassava varieties have been developed and distributed in Nigeria. Distribution across national borders has been difficult because of the danger of disease transmission and quarantine problems. Major attention has been directed to the development of biological control methods against two major pests--the cassava mealy bug and the cassava spider mite--which had threatened to destroy the crop. Biological control methods have now advanced to the operational stage.

Cowpeas and Soybeans: Pest control, varietal improvement, and early maturity are among the thrusts with cowpeas.

Farming Systems: This program seeks to develop more productive and ecologically sound alternatives to traditional systems of bush fallow and shifting cultivation.

The Institute's training program in 1986 was aimed at reaching national program staff. During that year, IITA had 42 staff engaged in collaborative research activities with various national programs in 6 African countries. In addition, 19 comprehensive training programs were conducted in Ibadan and 15 in countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (ILRAD)

Address: Director General, P.O. Box 30709, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1973

Membership: Same membership as other CGIAR-affiliated organizations (see profile of IITA).

Language(s): English

Objectives: To develop improved control measures for animal diseases which seriously limit livestock production in Africa and other developing regions.

Functions: Current research programs concentrate on two parasitic diseases: trypanosomiasis and East Coast fever. The emphasis is on the development of vaccines, but this does not preclude consideration of other approaches to disease control.

Training on an individual basis is offered to scientists, laboratory technicians and field personnel, and courses and conferences are held every year on topics related to ILRAD's research priorities. ILRAD's research and training facilities are located at Kabete on the outskirts of Nairobi on a 70-hectare site provided by the Kenya government. These include research laboratories, electron microscopy, radioisotope and irradiation units, a library, training and conference facilities, breeding units for laboratory animals, tsetse flies and ticks, and accommodation for cattle, sheep and goats. ILRAD also owns a 13,000 hectare ranch about 50 km. from Nairobi. The ranch supports a Boran breeding herd which provides nearly all the cattle required for the research and training program.

ILRAD's information services publish and distribute an annual report and quarterly newsletter, ILRAD Reports, in English and French. It also publishes brochures and booklets listing scientific publications of ILRAD staff.

Structure: Same structure as other CGIAR-affiliated centers (see IITA). ILRAD's staff is composed of 59 senior professionals, 24 technical staff and 338 support staff. Other than the latter group, which is 100 percent Kenyan, staff members come from 16 countries. Only 6 of the senior professional staff are African.

Financing: CGIAR-affiliated centers are financed by the CGIAR members (see IITA profile for details). ILRAD's total budget for 1987 was \$US 11.9 mn.

Comments: ILRAD has accumulated a considerable amount of information with respect to the vector for trypanosomiasis, the biology of the parasites, and the immune responses to infection. A network program involving the cooperation of ILRAD, ILCA (which has done substantial work in this area) and several national livestock research programs across Africa has been quite productive in identifying and evaluating trypanotolerance in certain breeds of cattle, and in identifying management practices to help cope with the disease.

In addition, there is considerable promise for the early development of techniques for immunization against East Coast Fever, and field tests are under way on a collaborative basis with the national program with respect to limited immunization against this serious disease.

ILRAD would be in a position to provide some backstopping and some consultation advice to national programs in both areas of its expertise on livestock disease control, and will be putting greater emphasis on such activities in the next quinquennium.

The specialized courses run by ILRAD have been developed in response to requests by national research organizations. Nearly all participants in the training program are African nationals, employed in African countries and nominated by their employers--usually ministries of livestock development or universities. More than 60 percent of course time is devoted to practical training. In addition, graduate students come to ILRAD for M.Sc. or Ph.D. degrees. Most of these positions are reserved for students from Africa or other developing areas.

Twenty-six formal courses have been held since 1979, with a total of 402 participants; 313 were professional staff from 37 African countries. Since 1981, 115 visiting scientists and technicians have come to ILRAD for individualized training programs lasting from 11 weeks to 6 months. Of these, 104 were professional staff from 19 African countries. Eleven African scientists have been awarded postdoctoral fellowships.

International Livestock Centre for Africa (ICCA)

Address: Director General, P.O. Box 5689, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Establishment: 1974

Membership: CGIAR continuing members; see IITA profile.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To assist national development efforts in tropical Africa; to improve livestock production and marketing systems. To encourage adaptation and application of better technologies to livestock production within the traditional social, economic, and ecological production systems of the African continent, rather than emphasizing the production of specific livestock commodities.

Functions: ILCA has substantial field research programs in the highlands of Ethiopia, and in the range lands of Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya and Botswana. It seeks to use livestock as a mechanism for increasing agricultural output through crop-livestock interactions existing in the mixed, smallholder farms dominating African agriculture. Livestock transfers nutrients and provides draft power to the cropping systems which in turn supply most of the feed resources and could provide forages of higher quality.

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ILCA's research is directed toward, inter alia, improved forage production; evaluation of indigenous breeds of large and small ruminants; improvement of trypanotolerance in certain cattle and small ruminants; and livestock marketing and policies. It also provides outreach services, training, publications, and a documentation center.

Structure: The organization is the same as other CGIAR-affiliated centers (see IITA profile). Of the 57 internationally recruited staff, 11 are from sub-Saharan Africa.

Financing: Same as other CGIAR-affiliated centers (see IITA profile). ILCA's total revenue for 1986 was \$US 17.8 mn. This included a CGIAR contribution of \$15.2 mn. and a special projects grant of \$2.1 mn.

Comments: A number of technological achievements have been made by ILCA-sponsored research. For example, in Nigeria, alley farming (based on alley cropping developed by IITA) has been successfully introduced. More than 100 producers have now established tree legumes on their farms. Over the next five years, a further 15,000 farmers are expected to plant alley farms as part of Nigeria's Fourth National Livestock Development Plan. ILCA is evaluating the economic impact of alley farming. In this, as in other areas, ILCA is attempting to work with national agricultural research services.

Research on animal nutrition has developed a wide range of feed supplements, including those most useful during drought. Dairy technology research has led to the development of techniques for conserving increased milk supplies in various forms of cheese and butter. These techniques have been included in the extension work of several dairy cooperatives in Ethiopia.

ILCA is now able to accommodate each year 160 course participants and 50 individual trainees at headquarters. Altogether, about 550 trainees have attended training courses and 140 individuals have spent from 2 weeks to 2 years working and studying at ILCA. A further 2,500 people have attended meetings, and links with African universities have been strengthened. The Documentation Centre now provides a monthly SDI service to scientists in sub-Saharan Africa; publications are sent (selectively) to a mailing list of nearly 6,000.

Mano River Union (MRU)

Address: Secretary General, PM Bag 9016, Monrovia, Liberia.

Established: 1973

Membership: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Language(s): English and French

Objectives: To expand trade, encourage productive capacity, develop a common and harmonious tariff policy, promote joint development projects, and enjoy an equitable distribution of economic cooperation.

Functions: The MRU has established a number of training programs to aid in reaching their objective: the Union Forestry Training Institute; Union Marine Training Institute; Union Telecommunications and Postal Training Programme. In February 1980 the Industrial Development Unit was established to focus on integrating the natural resources and industrial potential of the member states. Through this body the MRU conducts research primarily on the hydro-electrical potential of the Mano River Basin and the Basin's irrigation capabilities.

Structure: The supreme organ of the MRU is the Union Ministerial Council which includes all ministers whose portfolios are related to Union activities. Decisions are made after proposals from the Standing Committee (senior national officials) are submitted. Various "implementing organs" have been established to oversee Union activities in the areas of research and training, transport and postal affairs, and industry and trade.

The secretariat is the only full-time administrative body of the Union, composed of a Secretary General, and two Deputy Secretary Generals who both hold office for four year terms. Its responsibilities include overseeing the day-to-day business of the Union and preparing projects and programs of joint interest to the member states.

Financing: The secretariat's budget (\$US 3.7 mn. in 1984-85) is supported by contributions from the member states. By 1984-85, however, cumulative arrearages had reached \$US 6 mn. The Union has received some donor financing for its projects, including over ECU 9 mn. from the EEC (industry, hydro-electric, telecommunications) and \$US 5 mn. from the ADB (road transport).

Comments: The Mano River Union's fifteen year existence has been beleaguered by political fallouts, slow progress (and retrogression) on trade liberalization, budgetary crises due to arrears in contributions from member states, and failure to successfully implement its ambitious plans for industrialization. Most recently, the Union's autonomy has been threatened by the ECA initiative to "rationalize" economic integration in West Africa.

During the 1970s some limited progress was made toward harmonization of administrative procedures and uniform tariff schedules. Sierra Leone and Guinea harmonized their custom duties and established a common external tariff in the late 1970s, but later added additional taxes which led to deharmonization. Nontariff barriers such as licensing, documentation and transport links remain significant. Traders report continued difficulties in negotiating the highly complex bureaucratic procedures required to obtain export and import licenses. While intra-MRU recorded trade remains around 1 percent of Union trade with the rest of the world, unrecorded trade has been estimated to be many times that amount.

The MRU has had a very ambitious program for the development of regional infrastructure, training, and industries. The Mano River bridge linking Sierra Leone and Liberia was completed in 1976. The bridge has been under-

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utilized, however, because the Freetown-Monrovia highway which it joins together has yet to be completed. Several training and research institutions have been established under MRU auspices. In the industrial development area, 17 preliminary feasibility studies have been carried out. These include proposed projects to produce pharmaceuticals, charcoal, tomato and fruit processing, and small-scale wood working. The only industry that is now operational is the Union Glass Company, located in Liberia.

Political tensions following a 1983 alleged coup plot against Liberian President Samuel K. Doe resulted in a 5-year lapse during which meetings of the MRU heads of state were suspended. This hiatus ended in March 1988 when a heads of state summit was finally held in Freetown. The summit was said to have breathed some measure of new life into the MRU. Reportedly, member states have resumed paying their annual dues and renewed efforts are being made to eliminate arrears. In addition, the summit endorsed an administrative restructuring plan for the Union secretariat and approved a proposal for a study of the prospects for monetary union.

In a September 1987 report, the MRU officially expressed its opposition to the ECA's plan under which the Union would be subsumed under a reconstituted ECOWAS. The report challenges the ECA plan on the grounds that the problems of West African economic integration will not be resolved by merging all the subregion's IGOs into a single organization. Comparing its achievements to those of ECOWAS, the MRU argues that "a small fairly homogenous group of countries can push ahead with economic cooperation and integration at a pace which is simply not possible if a large group of countries . . . is involved."

Organisation Africaine des Bois (OAB)
African Timber Organization (ATO)

Address: Secrétaire Général, B.P. 1077, c/o Ministère Forestière, Libreville, Gabon.

Established: 1976

Membership: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sao Tomé and Principe, Tanzania, and Zaire.

Language(s): English, French, and Spanish.

Objectives: To optimize prices and consumption of African wood and wood products.

Functions: The OAB acts as an information network on wood and forestry matters, and promotes commercial policy coordination in the areas of prices, trade names, and quality control. The OAB has also discussed the possibility of formulating a common price policy to present to shippers so as to ensure fairer prices for transport.

Structure: The political and decisionmaking organization is the Conference of Ministers, which meets annually. Chairmanship rotates annually among member countries. The Central Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General, is responsible for the daily functioning of the Organization. The following Divisions comprise the secretariat: Legal Affairs, Commercial, Forestry Technology, Industrialization, General Affairs, Accounting, and a Chargé of Mission's office.

Financing: Each member country agreed to contribute an initial 10 mn. CFAF at the first Conference in 1975.

Comments: OAB's annual meetings provide a useful forum for discussion among the timber-producing African countries. The most recent meeting, held at Abuja in May 1988, discussed the need to take environmental concerns into account when pursuing an integrated approach to forest production. Sustainable resource development should be an increasingly important objective for the OAB and member governments.

Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle (OAPI)
African Intellectual Property Organization

Address: Directeur Général, B.P 837, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1977

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali (since 1984), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo (since 1967).

Language(s): French

Objectives: To protect intellectual property in Francophone Africa; to promote industrial development by protection and dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge; and to promote and protect African culture and arts.

Functions: The organization directly receives official copies of intellectual properties and holds them in a central location. It establishes titles to intellectual property and publishes the existing protected brands, titles and inventions in an official bulletin. It is also in charge of collecting taxes as defined by the agreement of Bangui.

Structure: OAPI is administered by an Administrative Council composed of a representative of each member state. The Council appoints the General Director who is in charge of the different departments of the organization: General Administration; Cultural Heritage and Authors' Rights; Industrial Property; Information, and Patent Documentation.

OAPI is not an ECA-sponsored institution but is a member of the Industrial Development and Services Group of ECA-sponsored regional and subregional institutions.

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Financing: The annual budget of 5 to 6 bn. CFAF is financed by the various taxes related to OAPI's activity. Fees are collected for the registration of intellectual property and an annual fee is required every year to maintain a patent. Trade marks, designs and copyrights are also subject to a fee.

Comments: Since its inception, OAPI has issued more than 9,000 patents on industrial property and an average of 120 trade mark certificates a month. It has also organized various types of seminars, like a round table on author rights in September 1982, with representatives of nine African countries.

The major problem remains the weakness of the budget, due to the poor economic situation and hence a decrease in deposits. This in turn means the organization cannot computerize its information and make it easily available-- a major constraint to the improvement of efficiency. OAPI could certainly contribute to the regularization of intellectual property protection in Africa. Registration in OAPI insures protection throughout the participating member states of OAPI, without having to register in each state. A suitable step would be to widen membership to include nonfrancophone African countries, in order to expand the service to the whole continent.

Organisation du Bassin du Kagera (OBK)
Kagera Basin Organization (KBO)

Address: Executive Secretary, B.P. 297, Kigali, Rwanda.

Established: 1977

Membership: Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania.

Language(s): English, French.

Objectives: The OBK was originally formed to coordinate development projects in the Kagera Basin region, which runs through the territory of each member state. However, the organization soon expanded its scope of action to include community projects in areas beyond the actual Kagera Basin; thus the name is something of a misnomer. The OBK is an exclusively project-oriented organization.

Functions: The OBK identifies projects of community interest and solicits donor financing for implementation. Projects are supposed to be of benefit to at least two member states in order to be considered community projects. Projects are sponsored in the areas of agriculture, transportation/communications, energy and technical training.

Structure: The OBK is overseen by a Ministerial Council that meets twice a year. The Council brings together member states' ministerial representatives and OBK staff. Its decisions are implemented by the Secretariat in Kigali, which is headed by the Executive Secretary. The OBK also maintains regional offices in Gitega (Burundi), Mbarare (Uganda) and Bukoba (Tanzania).

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Financing: The OBK maintains three separate budgets: the Recurrent Expenditures Budget; the Capital Expenditures Budget; and the Development Budget. The Recurrent and Capital Expenditures Budgets are financed by member states' contribution, while the Development Budget (from which projects are financed) is financed mainly by the donor community. The 1986 Recurrent and Capital Expenditures Budgets totalled \$1.9 mn.. Each member state is responsible for a specific percentage of the approved Capital and Recurrent Budgets. The current rules set these percentages at 35 percent for Tanzania, 23 percent for Uganda, 22 percent for Rwanda, and 20 percent for Burundi.

Comments: The OBK is exclusively project oriented. It leaves questions of trade and economic policy to be dealt with within the framework of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), to which all four members belong. The OBK suffers from a number of difficulties. The foremost is that it is too ambitious in its selection of projects. It has, for instance, been searching for several years to finance a project to connect the railway systems of Uganda and Tanzania with the more geographically isolated states of Rwanda and Burundi. Despite the considerable effort put into this project by the Secretariat (including the hiring of seven full-time contract personnel), it has still not found financing for the necessary first-stage design studies. In fact, only two projects seem likely to reach the implementation stage before the summer of 1989--a Tse-Tse fly control project, and a project to link the member states' telecommunications networks.

Another problem is a basic divergence of interest between the more geographically isolated member states and those members that are better served by existing transportation networks. For Rwanda and Burundi, which are poorly served by existing routes and whose trade is plagued by high transportation costs, improving the regional transportation network to lower their import and export costs is of primary importance. For Uganda and Tanzania, however, improvements in transportation infrastructure are less important, since both countries already have rail access to the sea (Uganda through the Kampala-Nairobi-Mombassa line and Tanzania through the Kigoma-Dar es Salaam line).

Ugandan participation in the OBK is already thought to be somewhat lukewarm, as its needs in the areas of transportation and energy, which are main components of the OBK's project portfolio, are much smaller than those of the other member states. OBK officials admit that they have four agriculture projects on the books, which are entirely located in Uganda, for the sole purpose of keeping up Ugandan interest in the OBK. Not surprisingly, it is the only OBK member to have accumulated significant arrears.

Organisation Commune Benin-Niger des Chemins de Fer et des Transports (OCBN)

Address: Directeur Général, B.P. 16, Cotonou, Benin; and B.P. 38, Niamey, Niger.

Established: 1959

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Membership: Benin and Niger.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To improve transport infrastructure in the member states, particularly by building a rail link from Parakou (the northern extreme of the railway in Benin) to Dosso and then to Niamey.

Functions: The OCBN was originally charged with the management of the Cotonou wharves and the Benin-Niger railway (which as yet does not service Niger). The OCBN no longer oversees maritime facilities, but continues to administer the railway and the road that connects Parakou, Melanville, and Maradi. A feasibility study was completed in 1979 for the extension of the railway to Niamey, but there is still no service beyond Parakou.

Structure: The Administrative Council is composed of 22 representatives from each country's government and business community; it oversees the Management Committee. The Director prepares the OCBN budget for approval by the Council.

Financing: OCBN collects revenues from its own activities, but is also subsidized by member states and the CCCE (France) when fares are insufficient.

Organisation Commune de Lutte Antiacridienne
et de Lutte Antiaviare (OCLALAV)

Address: Directeur Général, B.P. 1066, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1965

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To control infestations of insect pests and granivorous birds within the boundaries of the member states.

Functions: OCLALAV employed a number of aircraft, multiuse vehicles, trained personnel, and toxins (pesticides). Regular task forces were sent out at necessary intervals to administer the pesticides and monitor the situation. The desert locust was the main target for control.

Structure: The main organ was the Governing Council, composed of the Agricultural Ministers of the member states. The Governing Council appointed the Director General and members of the Executive Committee.

Financing: OCLALAV's budget was composed primarily of member state dues and some donor assistance.

Comments: OCLALAV formally terminated on March 18, 1988. The immediate cause of collapse were financial problems resulting from member states not paying their dues, and from dwindling donor support. There are plans to replace it with a regional coordinating center, a small body with the more simplified mandate of collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on the pest situation and control activities within member states. Indeed, pest control in West Africa will now be solely the domain of national governments.

Organisation de Coordination et de Cooperation pour Lutte
Contres les Grandes Endemies (OCCGE)

Address: Secrétaire Général, B.P. 153, Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso.

Established: 1960

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D'Ivoire, France, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To promote and coordinate research on the control of endemic diseases.

Functions: To research various diseases including: trypanosomiasis, yellow fever, malaria, leprosy, treponemiasis, tuberculosis, trachoma, bilharziosis, inchocerosis, measles, meningitis, dracunculosis, and cholera. In addition to research, OCCGE conducts intervention programs, disseminates information trains medical personnel, and develops health care policy. There are five main research centers, and four regional offices which assist principally in the administration of OCCGE's other programs, such as intervention and information dissemination. The OCCGE publishes reports on research findings and from technical conferences.

Structure: The main body is the Governing Council, comprised of the appropriate minister from each country and his/her representative. The Governing Council oversees the Organization's finances and programs. The Chairman of the Council is the Health Minister from the member state which hosts that particular year's Intergovernmental Ministerial Conference and Technical Conference. These conferences rotate on an annual basis.

The Secretary General is a qualified medical doctor with expertise in public health, epidemiology, and disease control. He executes the mandate of the Council, centralizes epidemiological data, organizes training programs, and issues warnings about epidemics.

Financing: Apart from income from services rendered and sporadic assistance from international organizations and industrialized countries, the OCCGE is financed 60 percent by annual payments from member states, and 40 percent by France. The total budget is about 700 mn. CFAF but only 40 to 60 percent of

the budget is effectively paid. Many member states have been in arrears in recent years, and research and laboratory work have suffered as a result.

Comments: France is the main donor, and several French doctors and researchers are working at the organization. There are several areas in which the OCCGE has been quite successful: it contributed to the eradication of smallpox in Africa, and to the decrease of yellow fever and spinal meningitis.

Still, OCCGE faces a growth problem. It has had difficulty adapting to the evolution of various diseases in the subregion and, of course, has faced serious budget problems. Probably due to its reliable support from France since 1987, the OCCGE has begun a far-reaching process of reforms and structural changes. They have now organized around a project-by-project approach, leading to more efficient programming and budgeting. Researchers will manage their part of the budget more directly, thus exercise better control over research activities. Some OCCGE staff also argue that the organization should not be so passive as in the past in following national health services programs. They want to concentrate their efforts on studying the feasibility and cost of these efforts, and passing along newly available techniques to member states, as well as conducting basic and applied field research.

According to this view, OCCGE should become an organization of experts that designs the best strategies for disease control, while member states implement national programs. The most difficult aspect will probably be to turn OCCGE into a truly African organization as it is still considered "French." Lagging African interest seems to stem (as exhibited in payment arrears) from the belief that France will keep the organization alive, leaving them financially unburdened.

OCCGE Centres:

Centre de Recherches sur le Meningites et les Schistosomiasis, B.P.153, Niamey, Niger.

Centre Muraz, B.P. 153, Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso; this is the administrative center of the OCCGE, as well as a research and training center in its own right. The Centre includes the College of Administration and Science, four technical research facilities (biology, medical entomology, parasitology, and pharmacy/chemistry), additional laboratories for diagnostics and training (mostly in specific diseases), and a library.

Institut Marchoux de Léprologie, B.P. 251, Bamako, Mali.

IOTA, Institut d'Ophtalmologie Tropicale Africaine, B.P. 248, Bamako, Mali.

ORANA, Office de Recherches sur l'Alimentation et la Nutrition Africaine, B.P. 2089, Dakar, Senegal. ORANA has four faculty members, a Senegalese physician, and three pharmacists, two French and one Senegalese. Research is the primary goal, and training a close second. However, the laboratory facilities are "outmoded," and the library is not kept up to date.

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There are also offices located in Cotonou, Bafoulabé (Mali), Lomé, and Nouakchott.

Organisation de Coordination pour la lutte contre
les Endémies en Afrique Centrale (OCEAC)
Organization of Coordination for the Control of Endemic Diseases
in Central Africa

Address: Secrétaire Général, B.P. 288, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Established: 1963; its statutes were adopted in 1965.

Membership: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea as of November 1983), Gabon.

Languages: French

Objectives: To carry out studies and promote and coordinate programs aimed at the control and eradication of major endemic diseases in Central Africa such as trypanosomiasis, leprosy, treponematosi, malaria, onchocerciasis, bilharzia, trachoma, tuberculosis, and measles.

Functions: OCEAC trains personnel in epidemiology and treatment, and attempts to increase exchanges of statistical data between countries and to diffuse technical information among interested physicians. Also, it studies methods of field control, laboratory techniques, treatment regimes, new vaccines and other proposed technical innovations.

Structure: The decisionmaking committee is the Inter-States Board of Directors constituted by Health Ministers of member states. They meet once a year to approve the budget and design the main lines of activity. The Secretariat is in charge of implementing the program. It has four divisions: the Administrative and Financial Service; the Laboratory Service; the Epidemiology and Statistics Service; and the Training and Documentation Service. There are 55 staff; of the senior staff, 4 come from member states and 8 from France. OCEAC is a sister organization of OCCGE (Organisation de Coopération et de Coordination pour la lutte contre les Grandes Endémies), created in 1960. The Central African States preferred to set up a new organization rather than join OCCGE.

Financing: The annual operating budget is 320 mn. CFAF. Resources are provided from four sources: 1/ contributions from member states as determined by the Inter-States Ministerial Committee (34 mn. CFAF in 1987); 2/ French Aid and Cooperation Fund assistance in the form of salaries paid to French technical assistants and a research subsidy which amounts to 130 mn. CFAF; 3/ leprosy control funding through the French Association Raoul Follereau in the form of scholarships for training or subsidies for research, amounting to 58 mn. CFAF in 1987; 4/ Organizations pursuing common programs with OCEAC such as INSERM, Pharmaceutical laboratories, and WHO.

Comments: OCEAC was not designed to provide direct services; it aimed at playing a facilitating or catalytic role. For example, the original approach for epidemiological surveys implied that OCEAC would develop appropriate survey techniques, test them and assist in their application in the field by the national services, perhaps by training local agents to collect the necessary information. The national services were then to conduct programs on their own, and give the survey results to OCEAC, which in turn would distribute the information to all member states. However, this intended procedure has proven to be infeasible, because of the weakness of national services. OCEAC claims that its services are often used as substitutes to national services.

This situation creates a paradox: the countries that most often request the services of the organization are the poorest, most problem-ridden countries of the OCEAC zone (Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea). These are also the countries that do not regularly pay their contribution to the institution. Thus those countries which pay the most benefit the least, an anomaly bound to generate conflict among member states.

OCEAC has avoided the financial crisis faced by most regional organizations because it gets financial support from France and from the Raoul Follereau Foundation, which together supply more than 80 percent of the proposed budget but very often nearly 100 percent of what the organization actually gets.

An important activity of OCEAC is to organize training and documentation services, two areas where the organization seems to be very efficient. The success of its training sessions and the crucial needs in public health in Central Africa have led OCEAC to propose the opening of a Centre Inter-Etats d'Enseignement Supérieur de Santé Publique pour l'Afrique Centrale (CIESPAC) in Brazzaville (Congo). This project is underway. Two levels of courses are planned, both tailored to African needs.

Organisation Interafricaine du Café (OIAC)
Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO)

Address: Secrétaire Général, B.P. V210 Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1960

Membership: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (all coffee-producing countries).

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To unify marketing policies for coffee so as to stabilize the price of coffee on the international market. The Organization also seeks to

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study common problems in the production, processing, and marketing of African coffee.

Functions: The OIAC acts as spokesman for African producers within the International Coffee Organization. The secretariat keeps a close eye on trends of the world coffee market, particularly the price and coffee stock situation. In the light of available relevant information and, in conjunction with the Board of Directors, the secretariat studies marketing policy and makes proposals to member countries.

Structure: Each member state is represented by one delegate in the General Assembly, which proposes and ratifies policies that are thereafter binding on member states, especially with regard to marketing policies. It meets once a year. The Board of Directors, which holds quarterly meetings, puts into effect the Assembly decisions. The Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General, and assisted by two deputies (one of whom is an economist), runs the organization.

Financing: Membership dues are the sole source of finance. Dues are scaled according to export shares.

Comments: The OIAC has not done well in defending African quotas in the International Coffee Organization. The continent produces more than 30 percent of world output, but its quota is 25 percent. Still, the OIAC allows the region's producers to speak with a single voice within ICO. It has also begun to encourage increased production as a means to regain market share. In June 1987, OIAC signed an agreement with the ADB, under which the Bank will finance coffee development projects in member states. The Bank will also set up training courses in all coffee-related areas, and will finance more research and extension.

The African producers, through OIAC, had made many concessions in order to reach agreement in 1987 with other growers on new worldwide quotas. But South American producers shipped 10 mn. bags in September 1987, exceeding quota agreements and depressing prices; it was the largest shipment in a single month since 1962, when ICO was founded. This induced the African producers at the annual meeting of OIAC in November 1987 to announce their intention to increase output and productivity and win back market share.

Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie (OMVG)
Gambia River Development Organization

Address: High Commissioner, B.P. 2353, Région du Cap Vert, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1978

Membership: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea (1981), and Guinea Bissau (1983).

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: To promote and coordinate studies and projects for the development of the Gambia, the Koliba-Corubal and the Kayanga-Geba River Basins; to organize technical and economic studies that the member states will implement; to attract donors; to supervise the management agencies in charge of joint projects; and to protect the environment.

Functions: The OMVG was modeled on the OMVS. It coordinates the development of the Gambia, Geba, and Corubal Rivers, and the basins that encompass them. No member state is supposed to undertake a project without first clearing it with the organization. At least in recent years, the OMVG program has been modest, mostly carrying out studies and working on project proposals that could be effected by member states. The High Commissioner said recently that the OMVG should be a coordinator for the national development agencies of its member states, and also should serve as a conduit for technology transfers.

Structure: At the top of the hierarchy is the Conference of Heads of State which, since 1985, meets every two years and has a president who serves a two-year term. The Conference determines the basic policies of the OMVG. Immediately beneath the Conference is the Council of Ministers, which develops the list of projects and activities, and an action agenda. The Council of Ministers also approves the budget, collects dues from member states, and reports to the Conference of Heads of States. The Council meets twice yearly.

Beneath the Council is the High Commissioner, who acts as a full-time representative of the OMVG, and is responsible for the management of the accounts. The High Commissioner is appointed by the Heads of State, serving a term of four years. He is assisted in all of these efforts by the Secretary General. The High Commissioner and Secretary General together (but mostly the latter), oversee the High Commission, which comprises four divisions: studies and planning, rural development, infrastructure, and finance. Additionally, there is a Permanent Water Commission (CPE or Commission Permanente des Eaux), and a Committee of Technical Experts. The OMVG has a staff of only 30 (including all nonprofessionals such as drivers and guards).

Financing: OMVG's operating budget in fiscal 1986/1987 amounted to 165 mn. CFAF, of which Senegal contributes 30 percent, Gambia 25 percent, Guinea 30 percent, and Guinea Bissau 15 percent. In addition, it has a "special fund," supposedly consisting of the operating budget surpluses.

Comments: The jurisdiction of the OMVG was increased on at least two occasions; the first time it was to accommodate Guinea Bissau, which wanted to come in to the organization but, at that time, was not believed to be crossed by any part of the Gambia River or its tributaries ("experts" have since determined that this is not the case). The charter was thus amended to provide for states neighboring the Gambia Basin. Attention to the other two rivers which originate in Senegal and Guinea respectively, but pass principally through Guinea Bissau, followed in 1987, when the OMVG's competence was extended to these two river systems.

Unfortunately, the OMVG has unsuccessfully pursued projects which suffer from the "OMVS syndrome"--it wants donor help to build a \$158 mn. dam in Kékéréti, a \$120 mn. dam in Balingho, and a dam at Kouya in Guinea. However,

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the donors solicited are pretty much the same as for the Senegal River dams, and the problems rising now in that basin have lead them to demand more prudent and less costly approaches to the development of the basins in the OMVG area. There is also controversy over the ecological/social consequences as compared to the economic benefits of the dams, especially that at Balingho.

A related problem is that because of the unanimity rule required for all decisions, agreement is very difficult to obtain among members. This is due, among other things, to the fact that each of the 3 river basins involved has only 1 state in common with another basin. Thus the OMVG finds itself incapable of giving priority to any of its projects because of conflicting interests and political pressure. For example, Senegal insists that Kékréti dam (inside its territory) will be able to provide enough water for irrigation to the other member countries. But the Gambians argue that the construction of a bridge-barrage at Balingho would help irrigate more hectares of land inside the country than the Kékréti.

Due to the overambitious goals of the OMVG, the failure to develop sound plans and a staff able to carry out planning and coordination, and the lack of unanimity of the member states, donors have become disenchanted with the organization. From 1981 to 1986, USAID spend about \$14 mn. of \$17 mn. authorized to improve OMVG planning capabilities and set up a laboratory. Results were discouraging. The USAID technical assistance team was not replaced with qualified local staff. UNDP operational aid was suspended at the end of 1986, and USAID suspended project aid in 1987. As of July 1987, all national personnel became the charge of the OMVG, rather than of external donors. OMVG's financial situation is made even more serious due to late or nonpayment of dues by member states. Arrears in 1985 amounted to some 54 percent of the total committed by members in 1984/1985; total accumulated arrears are substantial.

The Planning division of OMVG is reputed to be efficient. It is composed of well-trained nationals as well as experienced expatriates who together are making good use of the studies already made. Given the serious financial situation, the High Commission should surely support this key division, which has the strongest potential to provide support and credibility to the organization's activities. Better planning and scaled-down goals are advocated by most observers.

Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal (OMVS)
Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Address: Office of the High Commissioner, 46 rue Carnot,
B.P. 3152, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1972

Membership: Mali, Mauritania, Senegal.

Language(s): French

Objectives: The purpose of the OMVS is to promote and coordinate studies and projects aimed at developing the resources of the Senegal River Basin. Other goals include preventing water fluctuation and safeguarding the environment.

Functions: The OMVS devises regional development plans, identifies desirable projects and solicits international support. The first generation of projects has concentrated on hydroelectric facilities and water management as part of an integrated rural development scheme. Specifically, the action plan involved the construction of two dams at Djama, Senegal and Manantali, Mali (now completed); road, rail, and river transport development; hydroelectric production; and an irrigation project to cover, eventually, 350,000 ha. The OMVS also conducts studies, agricultural research and experimentation, and promotes cereals stabilization.

Structure: The highest body of the OMVS is the Council of Heads of State. The Council meets "whenever necessary" (usually at sessions with donors and lenders) and determines overall policy and operational guidelines. The Council of Ministers (Ministers of Rural Development) conducts the actual planning and supervision of projects, as well as approves the budget. The Secretary General implements the programs, in concert with the national administrative agencies. In 1974, the Coordination Committee was set up to overcome the complex situation whereby members promoted individual projects that did not seem to fit into the overall development plan. National Committees of the OMVS act as intermediaries between the OMVS and the national administrations.

Financing: OMVS activities are financed primarily by international sources. The largest donors/lenders are France, West Germany, the U.S., the Netherlands, the European Development Fund, and the Saudi and Gulf State development funds. The UNDP provides technical assistance. The program, which includes two dams, river ports and irrigation systems, was originally estimated to cost about \$200 mn. The actual cost of the dams alone reached \$1 bn. (\$ in 1985). The bulk of the cost has been shared by OPEC and the OECD/EEC. In addition, 28 mn. CFAF has been spent on agricultural projects in Senegal. About 80 percent of that amount was financed by donors, including USAID, the EDF, FAC, IBRD and the OPEC-funded development institutions. Approximately \$47 mn. has been spent on project studies in member states. France donated 80 mn. CFAF in August, 1986. Debt service on the dam loans was forgiven by the French and German governments in 1988.

Comments: The Diama dam in Senegal has been operating since 1986. This dam controls reflows from coastal waters and, by diminishing salinity, facilitates irrigation. The Manantali dam in Mali (which has hydroelectric capabilities) was completed in 1988. The dam will provide electricity mainly to Dakar and the lower Senegal River region. Mali justified the dam mainly on the basis that it will provide river transport lines through Kayes.

The issue of what use will be made of the controlled water remains unresolved. The Manantali was justified on three grounds: irrigated farm output, hydroelectric power, and improved river transport. But none of these is unambiguously economic. Thermal power in Dakar is cheaper until oil reaches \$30 per barrel. There is inadequate cost reduction to justify major river transport investments. And most important, it is not yet clear what can

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be economically grown on the newly created irrigable land. However, rice cannot be grown economically for import substitution and industrialization potentials are slight at present.

The Diama dam has so far contributed to checking the salinization of the Senegal River. While the area of irrigated paddy fields is being increased by 2500-3000 hectares a year, it is being offset by the loss of an already viable system of flood recession agriculture.

The ninth summit meeting of OMVS took place in Bamako, in October 1987, after having been postponed on two occasions due to disagreements between Senegal and Mauritania on routes for electric lines from the Manantali dam. The heads of state reaffirmed the importance of the dam projects, and indicated also that the navigability of the waters behind the Manantali dam is an equally important project, despite the sentiment of donor countries that this navigability is not immediately profitable, and therefore should not be a priority.

Organization for Museums, Monuments and Sites of Africa (OMMSA)
Organization pour les Musées, les Monuments et les Sites en Afrique (OMMSA)

Address: Secretary General, c/o Centre for Museum Studies, P.B. 2031, Jos, Nigeria.

Established: 1978

Membership: All African institutions concerned with museums, monuments and sites are potential members. Private individuals may become associate members.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: The objectives are to promote the interests of African institutions concerned with museums, monuments, sites, works of art and archaeological finds, and to promote the collection, discovery, study, preservation and presentation of the natural and cultural heritage of Africa for the information, education and enjoyment of all.

Functions: In principle, OMMSA provides support for museum studies, training and scientific research to relevant institutions (see comments). Future plans include starting a publication designed to serve members, to be known as the OMMSA Bulletin.

Structure: The principal organ is the General Assembly; it meets every four years, debates the policies of the organization and defines priorities. The Assembly also elects an Executive Council.

Financing: OMMSA requires a contribution of \$5,000 from every member. UNESCO sometimes provides help by subsidizing colloquiums, like the one in Malawi in 1985 (\$15,000 for secretariat expenses). The organization is exploring new

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sources of financing, such as the OAU, ACCT (Agence de Co-opération Culturelle et Technique), EEC-ACP Lome III, CAM (Commonwealth Association of Museums), and the Ford Foundation.

Comments: Though created in 1978, OMMSA has not yet "taken off." Only eight countries have ever paid subscriptions for one or more of their relevant institutions. Nine countries have indicated their intention to pay but have not paid anything so far, and twenty-two have not made any attempt to pay. The secretariat is not functioning because of lack of resources. Only the General Secretary in Jos is a full-time position, which means that effectively the institution is a one-man organization.

Achievements have been small, mainly limited to participation in colloquiums such as the meeting of NGOs in Paris (November 1985), the International Colloquium on Archaeology in Yaoundé (1986) or in symposiums such as the Symposium on West African Local Museums (1985). It is not clear that anything concrete followed these meetings.

One problem of the organization is that it is considered by governments as a nongovernmental organization, but the potential members of OMMSA are national institutions dealing with museums and monuments and these are usually government supported. Finally, these national organizations, as well as the potential donors such as the OAU, face severe budget constraints, and cultural matters are necessarily low-priority concerns.

Pan African News Agency (PANA)

Address: Director General, P.O. Box 4056, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1983

Membership: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English, Arabic, and French.

Objectives: To promote an effective exchange of political, economic, social, and cultural information among member states. Also to promote the development of already-established national news agencies in Africa, with the added task of ensuring the preservation and promotion of traditional oral, written, and visual communications.

Functions: PANA receives information from a daily average of 20 African news agencies, and produces and transmits on its network some 25,000 words per day.

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PANA also acts as a data service, providing news from Africa to a diversified clientele.

Structure: PANA is a specialized institution of the OAU. The Conference of African Information Ministers meets every two years to determine PANA policy. The actual guiding body between Conference sessions is the Intergovernmental Council, composed of 14 members elected for two years by the Conference by region: North Africa, 2 seats; West Africa, 4 seats; Central Africa, 3 seats; East Africa, 3 seats; and Southern Africa, 2 seats. At the operational level, PANA is headed by the Director General, a Conference appointee, and 3 department directors (Information, Technical, and Administrative and Finance).

Financing: The agency is financed by contributions from member states and international organizations. With Conference approval, the Agency can receive assistance from governments, public or private institutions or individuals and can commercialize its broadcasts.

Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA)
Association de Gestion des Ports de l'Afrique de L'Ouest et du Centre

Address: Executive Secretary, 12 Park Lane, Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria.

Established: 1972

Membership: 16 regular and 7 associate members. These include the major ports located within the Mauritania/Angola range of the West African coast as well as cargo handling, clearing, and dredging companies.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To improve, coordinate, and standardize African port operations, equipment and services with a view to increasing their efficiency; to ensure the coordination and development of activities of its members; to undertake studies of matters of mutual interest to its members; and to provide a forum for the members of the Association to exchange views on common problems.

Functions: Identifies, finds financing for, and oversees joint projects to modernize and improve port operations. Holds seminars and workshops to discuss issues regarding such improvement and related activities. Holds an Annual Council meeting. Organizes a biannual port symposium which brings together professionals in the shipping business (insurers, engineers, etc.) from Africa and Europe.

Structure: The chief organization of the Association is the Council, headed by a Board of Directors. Each member is entitled to two representatives on the Council. The Executive Secretariat administers the Association.

Financing: Members finance the core budget which is used to maintain the secretariat, and pay for documents and publishing, travel, etc. Membership

subscription varies from \$US 10,500 to \$US 30,000, depending on the size of the member port. The approved budget for 1988 amounted to \$US 384,000 for expenditures. Income was estimated at \$US 629,000 out of which \$US 329,000 represented current year contributions and \$US 300,000 represented recoverable arrears. In 1987, out of the \$US 875,830 to be collected, only \$US 383,851 was paid, representing a recovery ratio of 43 percent. This has supposedly not affected the operation of the association, however. Officials also stress that arrears are due not to an inability or unwillingness of member ports to pay, but to the inability or unwillingness of national central banks to release the foreign exchange to pay the fees.

PMAWCA studies and projects are all funded externally. Among the principal donors are the UNDP, the French, the British, the Swedish, and the Dutch.

Comments: The PMAWCA is a well-respected organization in the subregion. It is run by a tight, seemingly efficient secretariat of 11 people. Seminars and symposia are held on a regular basis. The last African Port Symposium was held in September 1987.

The association has undertaken studies to improve the efficiency of West and Central African ports, although actual project implementation has not been that frequent. With UNDP financing, they have standardized port statistics and performance indicators. With bilateral funding they completed a study on minimizing the cost of dredging in West African ports (which calls for regional cooperation to do so). They have organized national seminars to help ports expedite the processing of cargo by working toward "paperless frontiers." Training is also offered to mechanics involved in the maintenance of port equipment and navigational aids. A regional seminar was held in May 1988 on pollution and maritime safety which, among other things, was to teach ports how to press for compensation for shipwrecks and waste that litters African harbors. Plans in the pipeline include the standardization of analytical accounting which will standardize the basis upon which competing ports charge tariffs.

Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States
(PTA)

Address: Secretary General, P.O. Box 30051, Lusaka, Zambia.

Established: 1981; began operations in 1984.

Membership: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique and Seychelles participated in the original PTA negotiations but have yet to ratify the Treaty.

Languages: English and French (Portuguese).

Objectives: To promote intra-subregional trade by negotiating preferential tariff rates on certain products traded within the subregion and creating institutional mechanisms to facilitate that trade; eventual elimination of all tariffs and nontariff barriers, establishment of a common external tariff, and creation of a common market. Also to encourage regional cooperation in industry, agriculture, transport, communications and human resources.

Functions: Although the formation of a customs union is the most visible purpose of the PTA (as suggested by the name chosen for the organization), the Treaty also calls for broad cooperation in other fields that are not directly related to trade. The Secretariat serves as headquarters for technical committees for cooperation in the areas of transport and communications, agriculture and industry. These committees provide a forum for yearly consultations between national ministries, and are responsible for coordinating policy harmonization, feasibility studies, project implementation, and overall development strategy for the subregion.

Structure: The Authority of Heads of State meets annually to consider matters of general policy and direct the organization. At the next level, the Council of Ministers supervises the operation of PTA institutions and makes recommendations to the Authority. Every four years, the Authority appoints a Secretary-General to head the Secretariat which proposes policies, conducts studies and oversees the PTA's financial and administrative operations. In addition to the technical committees operating within the Secretariat, the PTA also comprises three autonomous branches: the Clearing House, the Trade and Development Bank, and the Tribunal.

Financing: The PTA secretariat budget is supported by contributions from the member states. In 1987 the budget amounted to approximately \$US 2.2 mn. Contributions are determined according to a formula based on per-capita GDP; this system, however, is currently under review. The staff consists of 60 employees, of which 30 are categorized as professionals.

Comments: Like ECOWAS and CEEAC, the PTA has its origins in the ECA's efforts to establish economic communities within each of sub-Saharan Africa's three designated subregions. It shares with those organizations a highly institutionalized approach to economic integration through market liberalization. Unlike its counterparts, however, the PTA Treaty calls for a flexible step-by-step process as a necessary prerequisite to the future establishment of an "Economic Community of Eastern and Southern African States." This gradualist approach can probably be attributed to the significant obstacles to economic integration within the PTA's massive subregion; not least among these are the conflicting political concerns and widely divergent economic systems of its member states.

Instead of implementing across-the-board tariff reductions, the PTA applies trade preferences to specified products which are compiled on a "Common List." To qualify for preferential treatment, goods must be of "both export and import interest to member countries" and they must meet the rules of origin specifying minimum percentages for local materials used and value added as well as management and equity participation of PTA nationals. The PTA also provides mechanisms for the negotiation and gradual elimination of nontariff barriers. A special PTA branch, the PTA Clearing House, has been

established to facilitate use of national currencies in intra-PTA trade (see separate profile).

Other steps have been taken to encourage intra-PTA trade through trade fairs, buyer/seller meetings and an information network which includes a computerized data base, trade directory and regular publications specifying the products available or sought by PTA exporters and importers. Recently, the PTA has expanded its operations into development project financing with the creation of another branch institution, the Trade and Development Bank for East and Southern African States (see separate profile). A PTA Tribunal has been established to settle disputes between members concerning the implementation of PTA policies and obligations.

The PTA is generally regarded as having a greater potential for the development of internal trade than the other ECA-sponsored subregional communities. One advantage of the PTA is that it contains several countries that have already developed substantial manufacturing industries; the leading examples are Kenya, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. Nevertheless, the majority of PTA member states currently produce very few products that are considered suitable for export to other states within the subregion. The differing interests of these two groups have led to divisive conflicts which have delayed the implementation of PTA policies and threatened to disrupt the organizational cohesion of its member states. To satisfy the demands of certain member states, the PTA has granted special exemptions from its general rules and slowed the timetable for tariff reductions.

Rules of origin requiring majority ownership and management by PTA nationals have proved especially contentious. Member states whose industries are primarily state owned (e.g., Ethiopia, Tanzania) favor the rule while those who rely more on foreign investments are concerned that their potential exports will be denied preferential treatment. In 1986, the PTA Authority called an extraordinary meeting and suspended the management and equity provisions of the rules of origin for five years. In its place, a "three-tier" sliding scale was established which offers some preferential treatment to enterprises with as little as 30 percent local equity.

The PTA has also permitted minority local equity holding on a temporary basis for the Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and the BLS countries. Zimbabwe's exemption is justified by that country's recent independence, while the others have claimed that their small size and particular economic conditions require them to rely on foreign investment. Within this group, Mauritius received special attention following a 1986 announcement of its intention to withdraw from the PTA if its trade interests could not be better served by the organization (it has since declined to do so). Kenya has expressed concern that without a similar exemption its foreign-owned industries will be unable to compete in the PTA market. Although these numerous compromises may promote PTA unity in the short term, increasingly complicated procedures for granting preferential access will probably raise the cost of conducting intra-PTA trade.

A target date for the complete elimination of customs duties and nontariff barriers was originally set for 1992, but although the number of Common List commodities has nearly doubled (from 212 to 418) many of the PTA-approved

tariff reductions have not been implemented at the national level. Similarly, initially agreed decisions to liberalize import quotas, licensing, foreign exchange allocation and other practices restricting intra-PTA trade have not all been carried out by the member states. This slow rate of implementation was officially recognized at the June 1987 meeting of the Council of Ministers, when the target date for full trade liberalization was tentatively set back to the year 2000.

At the same meeting, the Council discussed the reluctance of some member states to implement tariff reductions which would result in revenue losses. While economically stronger PTA member states may be expected to offset these losses with the additional revenues obtained from increased trade, the same could not necessarily be said for the weaker ones (net importers). The PTA Treaty does not provide any fiscal compensatory mechanism (unlike ECOWAS and CEEAC), because its framers purposely sought to avoid the complex problems that such arrangements have engendered in other regional integration groupings. A study team is currently preparing a report on possible nonfiscal compensatory or corrective measures to be presented at the December 1988 PTA Summit in Maseru. The study team will probably recommend further exemptions for the economically weaker member states.

Other approaches to increasing intra-PTA trade have proved more encouraging. In 1987 the PTA conducted three buyer/seller meetings, one on fertilizer held in Mauritius, on agricultural implements in Malawi and another on pharmaceutical products in Nairobi. These meetings, organized through a project supported by the UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Centre (ITC), provide an opportunity for intra-PTA business contacts. At the Mauritius meeting, a contract for the delivery of \$2.3 mn. in fertilizer was negotiated. ITC is also helping to establish a PTA Trade Information and Documentation Centre to collect, process and disseminate trade data to be used by Area importers and exporters. In cooperation with the PTA Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the PTA held a PTA trade fair in Nairobi in 1986; 800 companies from all PTA member states participated and business worth about \$160 mn. was negotiated. A second PTA trade fair was scheduled to be held in Lusaka in August 1988.

The PTA is now seeking an enlarged role as a development coordinating organization responsible for channeling donor assistance flows. A UNDP-financed report is currently underway to develop proposals for the "rationalization" of IGOs within the subregion. The study will probably follow the lead established by a similar ECA-supported study of ECOWAS' future role in West Africa integration, i.e., calling on the PTA to assert leadership over all other IGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa.

The PTA's expansion is reflected by the secretariat's hiring priorities. At recent meetings with PTA official's in Lusaka, our researcher observed that less than 30 percent of secretariat employees appeared to be working in trade-related areas. It appears that a significant amount of time and effort goes into drawing up proposals for donor-financed projects. Some of these proposals are likely to overlap with programs that have already achieved some measure of success using far less institutionally intensive means, e.g.: SACCAF and ICRISAT (agricultural research); ILRAD and ILCA (livestock); and ARCT (telecommunications).

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In early 1988, the PTA made proposals to the World Bank and African Development Bank for technical assistance and project financing support in the areas of agriculture, transport, industry, energy and trade. The PTA's attempts to expand its mandate have generated some concern that it may be overstepping its institutional capacity and, in particular, competing with SADCC for donor resources. Although SADCC and the PTA have expressed their intention to cooperate to avoid any conflicts, SADCC's growing emphasis on trade promotion may lead to further overlap between the functions of these two organizations.

PTA Clearing House (PTACH)

Address: Executive Secretary, c/o Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, P.O. Box 1283, Harare, Zimbabwe.

Established: 1983

Membership: Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English and French

Objectives: To encourage the use of national currencies in the settlement of intra-PTA transactions in order to facilitate and promote trade within the PTA. By establishing a mechanism for partial convertibility of national currencies the PTACH aims to reduce the need for fully convertible "hard" currencies in payments for goods and services traded between PTA member states.

Functions: Importers and exporters make and receive payments in their own national currencies. The central bank of each member state quotes a daily spot rate of exchange for its national currency against the PTA Unit of Account (1 UAPTA = 1 SDR). Every two months the PTACH totals its national accounts and outstanding balances are paid for in hard currency. Net importers are given interest-free credit up to 25 percent of that country's average annual intra-PTA trade (imports plus exports) during the preceding three years; the extension of credit by a creditor country may not exceed 20 percent according to the same formula. Use of the Clearing House is not limited to goods qualifying for trade preferences under the PTA's rules of origin.

Structure: The PTA's Clearing and Payments Committee prescribes the rules, regulations and procedures governing the Clearing House. Day-to-day operations are located within the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe whose Governor manages the PTACH as its Executive Secretary. PTACH has 9 staff members.

Financing: The PTACH annual budget is funded by contributions from the member central banks and is managed separately from the general PTA budget. In 1987

member contributions amounted to approximately SDR 140,000; only minor arrears problems have been reported.

Comments: A recent World Bank report described the PTACH as a small and efficient operation which is probably the most professionally run branch of the PTA. Despite slow progress during its initial start-up phase and the formidable challenges which lie ahead, that assessment appears to be an accurate reflection of the Clearing House's improved reputation. While the PTACH's placement within Zimbabwe's central bank is officially a temporary one, this host institution arrangement may explain the PTACH's comparatively stronger performance when contrasted with Africa's other subregional clearing houses.

In March 1988 the PTACH Executive Secretary reported that the Clearing House was being consistently and actively used by all PTA members except Djibouti, Comoros and Somalia. The yearly volume of intra-PTA trade cleared through the PTACH reached UAPTA 87.9 in 1987, more than double the level recorded in 1984, its first year of operations. During the same period, total settlements in hard currency were reduced from 81 percent to less than 55 percent. Notwithstanding these encouraging indicators, the long-term growth of PTACH operations remains constrained by the low level of intra-PTA trade. Trade between PTA member states accounts for just 5 percent of the region's trade with the rest of the world and the PTACH currently handles less than 20 percent of this existing intra-PTA trade.

In 1986 the PTA commissioned an independent study to examine the causes for the Clearing House's underutilization. Among the obstacles identified were: (1) predominance of North-South trading patterns evolved from the colonial period; (2) continued use of bilateral payments arrangements between member states; and (3) participation of PTA countries in other multilateral payments systems including the Rand Monetary Area (Lesotho and Swaziland with South Africa) and the CEPGL Monetary Agreement (Burundi and Swaziland with Zaire). Although the PTA Council of Ministers has directed all bilateral payments arrangements between member states to be phased out, these arrangements are likely to persist because of unresolved difficulties embedded in the PTACH's structure and mission.

Foremost among these difficulties are the problems caused by varying levels of production within the PTA member states. For states where PTA imports exceed national exports to the region, the PTACH does not remove the need for hard currencies in settling payments. Because the PTACH offers interest-free credit during the two-month transactions period, the optimal arrangement for net-importing governments seeking to conserve hard currency is to send all imports through the Clearing House while bilaterally demanding immediate hard currency payments for all exports. Understandably, the PTA's net exporting countries are reluctant to send their exports through the PTACH because they do not receive any interest on credits extended to deficit countries. The PTA is currently seeking donor assistance for a "support facility" to provide short-term loans for PTA member states having trouble meeting their hard currency obligations to the Clearing House. Investment financing for export-oriented projects is also being sought.

As an institution that provides a "second best" response to exchange rate problems at the national level, the PTACH may find itself at odds with exchange rate adjustment programs in the PTA member states. For example, in 1985 the introduction of Zambia's currency auction system was associated with a 85 percent drop in Zambian use of the PTACH. Export retention schemes, which guarantee national exporters a portion of their earnings in hard currency, are also not served by the Clearing House arrangement: to meet their obligations under the retention scheme, net importing countries will be required to pay their exporters with hard currency earned from other sources. If the PTACH is to continue its recent growth, it will need to accommodate itself to meet the challenges posed by these newly emerging regional trends.

Rand Monetary Area (RMA)

Established: 1974

Membership: Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To facilitate trade and payments between the Republic of South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The RMA was created to complement the South African Customs Union in a bid to strengthen South Africa's economic sphere of influence.

Functions: Under the arrangements of the RMA, the Rand is legal tender in Lesotho and Swaziland. Capital and goods flow freely between these countries. The smaller states may impose restrictions to stem any net outflow of capital to the RSA.

Comments: The future of the RMA depends on the outcome of the Namibia independence issue and, more broadly, on political evolution in South Africa. The continued willingness of Lesotho and Swaziland to tie their currencies to the rand and to accept the use of the rand in their countries is due mainly to the limited range of alternatives open to these small, South African-dominated economies.

Another factor is the effect of sanctions and counter sanctions on the relationship between Lesotho/Swaziland and the RSA. If conditions in the region continue to deteriorate, and South Africa becomes even more isolated, it is possible that Lesotho and Swaziland will abandon formal association with the RMA. Botswana, while economically dependent on the RMA, left the RMA and is pursuing its own exchange rate policy. The pula is tied to a currency basket that is about 75 percent rand and 25 percent SDR. This move has much to do with Botswana's integration into the bloc of front line States. It remains to be seen whether or not the small members of the RMA decide that politics is more important than economics and are prepared to bear the costs that rupture with South Africa might entail.

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Regional Centre For Services In Surveying, Mapping and Remote Sensing

Address: Director-General, P.O. Box 18118, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1975

Membership: There are 11 contracting member states: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, Somalia, Comoro, Lesotho, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia and Ethiopia. Ten other member states participating in the activities of the center are Djibouti, Rwanda, Burundi, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To transfer surveying, mapping, and remote sensing technology to the region to foster a better understanding and management of natural resources, especially in rural areas.

Function: The Centre was established by ECA in pursuance of the resolution of the first United Nations Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa in 1963. It provides technical training and services in cartography and related fields. Some 60 percent of time and effort is spent on training activities. Surveying and mapping equipment in the Centre is used for satellite image mapping, interpretation of remote sensing data, geodesy, aerial photography, and maintenance and calibration of all surveying, mapping and related equipment. Six engineers of the Centre travel to member states to render maintenance service. The Centre also keeps archives of satellite data. It is involved in research and project work as well.

Structure: The Governing Council, composed of representatives from all contracting member states, defines general policy and supervises operations. The Executive Secretary of UNECA is the Chairman of the Council. The Governing Council is assisted in its work by the Technical Committee. The Chief Executive of the Centre is the Director-General who is responsible to the Governing Council for the operations of the Centre. The Centre has five administrative departments and four technical departments in remote sensing, geology, cartography, and engineering.

Financing: The Centre is financed by contributions from contracting member states. International donors like USAID, IDRC and U.N. agencies provide substantial financial support. In fact, the UNECA plays a central role in the Centre's operation in terms of funds and technical support. The Centre also earns fees from services to nongovernmental organizations.

Comments: The Centre has excellent facilities which provide useful information and services. The Remote Sensing Department has trained approximately 1,000 professionals and boasts of its user service facilities, including Landsat data browse files. There is even some discussion currently underway regarding the establishment of a satellite reception station in Africa. Similarly the Geodesy and Cartography Departments provide services ranging from providing Doppler surveys for a variety of uses, to producing small-scale

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thematic maps for development planning purposes. The Engineering Department, meanwhile, has undertaken maintenance, calibration and repair services for equipment in the region, in addition to doing some training of national technicians.

Over 250 users, both individual and institutional, governmental and nongovernmental, have used the Centre's services. In principle all nongovernmental users pay fees, and indeed officials claim that, over time, this source of revenue has been accounting for a larger proportion of the budget.

The Centre also bids for contracts to implement projects. In these cases it offers its services at cost to signatories. Yet officials claim that they only have a 50 percent chance of getting a given contract due to the lack of comprehensiveness of services they offer compared to the needs of projects, and to tied aid from donors.

In determining the organization's proper role, consideration must be given to the weakness of national capability in this area. For example, much of the training done by the organization is inappropriate since technicians trained on modern technology go back and never see such fancy equipment again. At the same time, many countries fail to maintain the equipment that they do buy, resulting in an even greater demand for the Centre's maintenance capability.

Regional Institute for Population Studies (RIPS)

Address: The Director, Regional Institute for Population Studies,
University of Ghana, P.O. Box 96, Legon, Ghana.

Established: 1972

Membership: RIPS does not have members per se, but has students from, and pursues research in, the following countries: Botswana, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English

Objectives: The primary purpose of the Institute is to promote and strengthen research and training in demography and related fields, mainly in the English-speaking countries of Africa. (IFORD is the parallel, francophone, demography organization institution, based in Yaoundé.)

Functions: Training is the major function of the Institute. It runs the following programs: Master of Arts in population studies (1 year); Master of Philosophy in population studies (1 and 1/2 years); and Doctor of Philosophy in population studies (3 years). The candidates for these programs are nominated by their respective governments; all nominations are, in principle, channelled to the institute through the UNDP Office. The students are awarded UN Fellowships after they fulfil the relevant admission requirements. The

Institute also organizes occasional courses for professionals, as well as for technicians in the field, at the request of governments and institutions.

RIPS also undertakes research in the population field, addressing fertility, mortality, migration, evaluation and estimation techniques, the interrelationship of population and development, and other topics of immediate social-economic relevance to the countries of the region.

RIPS disseminates information and research results through workshops, seminars and meetings, and hosts conferences in cooperation with appropriate national services and specialized agencies. The Institute also publishes the results of research in its own publications or in other well-known journals. Publications include a quarterly newsletter, African Demography; a biannual newsletter detailing RIPS' activities; and PIDSA Abstracts, a biannual bibliographic information journal.

Finally, RIPS provides consultative and technical advisory services in the area of population at the request of the member states. Thus the Institute has carried out demographic surveys in Nigeria, and supported census analysis work in Lesotho, Liberia, Libya and Sudan.

Structure: The institute is a subsidiary body of the United Nations and was established by an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Ghana. It has a Governing Council with the Executive Secretary of the EEC as the Chairman. The Council includes the representatives of Ghana, twelve other African countries, and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. It meets yearly to prescribe the general principles and policies governing the operation of the Institute, and to establish and evaluate the training, research and advisory programs of the institute.

The Institute also has an Advisory Board on Studies and Research which meets once every two years to evaluate the academic programs of the Institute.

The Director is appointed by the Secretary-General upon the recommendation of the Governing Council. The Director acts as the legal representative of the Institute as well as Secretary of the Governing Council. The other professional staff members of the Institute are also appointed by the Secretary-General after consultations with the Executive Secretary and Director.

There are 8 full-time, permanent faculty, and 8 part-time personnel, drawn mostly from the University of Ghana. Additionally, there are 18 researchers, mostly on a part-time basis. All faculty participate in teaching, research, and consultation. The staff of the institute is paid UN-level salaries by the UN which also provides all the fellowships for the students.

Financing: RIPS is financed primarily by the UN Fund for Population Activities and the ECA. Other donors fund specific projects. The International Labor Organization, for example, supported the recent RIPS workshop. The Government of Ghana contributes by housing RIPS at the University of Ghana and providing the Institute with administrative and clerical staff.

Comments: With the UN's support and cooperation, the Institute has functioned well. It is an important source for development of professional personnel in the population field, especially at middle and high levels. Also, these students, who came from ministries and other government offices as well as universities and institutes of the countries, can provide the institute with information about population problems in their respective countries, thus enabling the institute to improve its training, research and other services to satisfy the needs of African countries.

There are now approximately 45 newly enrolled students yearly, and roughly three-fifths of those who graduate go on to the master's program. In the 1972-1983 period, some 300 students from all 20 English-speaking African countries (plus Papua, New Guinea) gained admission to the Institute for graduate diploma and 222 successfully completed the course. The Institute has also arranged a series of courses for the training of middle and low-level manpower in Liberia, Zambia and Tanzania.

The Institute had completed more than 120 research projects by 1985. There is a VS80 computer at the institute with some 16 terminals. It is used for data processing and analysis. The institute has been developing a data bank for the census and sample survey results carried out in Africa.

Despite its achievements, problems still exist. Only a few countries have requested technical assistance and advisory services in the area of population studies as well as population policies or programs (eg. Ghana, Nigeria, Libya, Liberia, Lesotho and Sudan).

Another big problem is financial, especially since a statute has been approved (though not yet implemented) shifting both the administrative and financial burden from the U.N. to RIPS member states. Once it is put into practice, this could mean a big change for the Institute. In the past few years the reduction of funding by the UNFPA, which is the main donor agency, has already brought severe financial problems to the Institute.

Regional Office for Science and Technology for Africa (ROSTA)
Bureau Régional d'Education pour l'Afrique (BREDA)

Address: Director, Bruce House, Standard Street, P.O. Box 30592,
Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1965

Membership: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English, French, and Portuguese.

Objectives: To promote, execute, and supervise UNESCO's regional science programs.

Functions: ROSTA does training and conducts research, but its main task is advising governments, universities, and regional organizations with respect to developing their scientific and technological capacity.

ROSTA currently has two main regional projects. The African Network of Scientific and Technological Institutions (ANSTI), which promotes collaboration among postgraduate science institutions, offers scholarships for study at the postgraduate level, sponsors seminars and workshops in these fields, and publishes the African Journal of Science and Technology. The Integrated Project in Arid Lands (IPAL), which studies the ecological, sociological, and economic aspects of desertification, advises governments on appropriate actions and disseminates findings. Three other projects have been approved, but have not yet been implemented.

Structure: ROSTA has a subregional office in Dakar (since 1977), plus 11 units. Including the Dakar unit, there are between 20 and 25 professionals in ROSTA, most of whom are technical specialists. The Director of ROSTA is the UNESCO representative for the subregion.

Financing: UNESCO finances ROSTA, though specific projects and programs receive additional funds from UNDP and donors. ANSTI and IPAL are funded in part by West Germany.

Scientific, Technical and Research Commission of the Organization of African Unity (OAU/STRC)

Address: Executive Secretary, P.M.B. 2359, Lagos, Nigeria.

Established: 1965

Membership: Governments of 50 countries of OAU.

Language(s): French and English.

Objectives: Ensure technical cooperation among member governments to promote the exploitation of the natural resources in Africa, in particular in agriculture.

Functions: STRC organizes symposia, meetings of experts, and conferences through OAU; it carries out the technical activities and projects in cooperation with relevant regional organizations, such as the Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources, African Consultants on Soil Sciences, and the African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research. It undertakes surveys of natural resources and provides training courses at various levels. It coordinates several committees which meet on a biannual basis and bring specialists together in, for example, an Inter-African Committee on Tradition

of Medicine. The STRC has an Inter-African Research Fund, subscribed to by governments and official organizations, which promotes joint scientific research and technical projects. Its publications include conference reports, periodicals and newsletters issued by the technical bureau and various committees.

Structure: The STRC executes decisions taken by the Scientific Council of the OAU and endorsed by the OAU Secretary-General. There are five OAU/STRC subregional offices and/or projects: (1) the Secretariat in Lagos; (2) an IAPSC (Inter-African Phyto-Sanitary Council) in Yaoundé which is funded by FAO, WAID, WHO, UNEP and OAU; (3) IBAR (Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources) in Nairobi; (4) The FOUTA-DJALLON Project in Conakry which is a livestock and forestry activity funded by UNEP, FAO and OAU; (5) SAFGRAD in Ouagadougou--a food research project which covers 26 countries and is funded by USAID, IFAD, FAC, CERDI and OAU.

Financing: Most is from the OAU. In 1986/1987, there was a \$US 1.8 mn. budget for the Secretariat in Lagos and \$US 10 mn. for all the projects.

Comments: The STRC has been undertaking quite a number of activities in various technical areas, especially in agriculture. As one of the OAU organs, it contributes to the technical cooperation among African countries through its connections with other regional organizations. It organizes meeting and conferences which offer fora for scientists to exchange information and research results on technology development. It also undertakes projects in some countries which have promoted technology development. These projects include eradication of rinderpest in some West African countries, and exploration of fishery resources in the Gulf of Guinea.

A major problem is the shortage of finance, which has become even more serious after Nigeria, where the STRC is located, suffered economic difficulties. The financial constraint has been a major obstacle preventing the STRC from expanding its activities in the region. Another problem is duplication, which is also a general shortcoming within the OAU institutional structure. Also the lack of specificity in goals puts the STRC in conflict with the more specialized agencies with which it overlaps. Its large mandate also raises questions about technical credibility, which is difficult to assure in these multipurpose organizations.

Semi-Arid Food Grain Research and Development (SAFGRAD)

Address: B.P. 1783, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Established: 1977

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

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Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote research on three food grains (sorghum, millet and maize) and two grain legumes (cowpeas and groundnuts); to develop and promote cultural practices appropriate to small, low-input, semi-arid farming systems.

Functions: The SAFGRAD project is primarily involved in regionally coordinated research, in support to national agricultural research systems, and in promoting field trials and extension programs to enhance adoption of improved technology by farmers.

Structure: The SAFGRAD project is officially administered and facilitated by the small OAU/STRC Coordination Office located in Ouagadougou, one of five OAU/STRC Regional Offices. Within the framework of the SAFGRAD project, research is carried out by the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Purdue University, and the national agricultural systems of the 26 participating countries.

Financing: Funding for the SAFGRAD I project (1977-1986) exceeded \$US 19 mn. The primary donor has been USAID, with increasing involvement of IFAD in SAFGRAD II.

Comments: SAFGRAD I's major contributions included the testing and screening of imported and indigenous germplasm as well as the establishment of commodity research groups for four SAFGRAD crops in the cooperating countries. Inroads were also made with respect to training: 28 scientists were trained at the graduate level; over 70 were provided short-term training; and 12 technical workshops were attended by an average of 58 African scientists from between 12 and 20 countries who exchanged information and ideas and planned programs. Monitoring tours were held to conduct peer reviews; they fostered increased contact among African scientists, injected an element of healthy competition, while also encouraging quality control. Further accomplishments include the establishment of a newsletter and of ACPO (Accelerated Crop Production Officers) in five countries. These officers provide a bridge between regional and international research, extension and farmers.

SAFGRAD as an institution supports the functioning of three agricultural research networks. AID officials grant that to the extent that it is perceived as an African regional organization, SAFGRAD facilitates the travel and operation of the research teams acting under its wing in Africa. It has thus made these networks more effective. Yet evaluations of SAFGRAD I expressed concern about the lack of African leadership in networking and the limited results of the SAFGRAD Coordinating Office in generating either leadership or support for national agricultural research. While AID had signed a grant agreement with OAU/STRC for most of the project's funds, the Coordinating Office had real management responsibility for only about 10 percent of them. In practice most of the funds were allocated directly to ICRISAT, IITA and Purdue University, with the SAFGRAD Coordinating Office only approving the implementation orders.

SAFGRAD II handed over network coordination responsibilities to IITA and ICRISAT. The Coordinating Office now has an increased mandate to concentrate on raising money to help national programs organize on-farm testing.

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Senegambian Confederation
Confédération Sénégalienne

Address: President, 4 Marina St., Banjul, The Gambia. (Headquarters recently moved to Dakar; address unknown.)

Established: 1967 (Permanent Secretariat) and 1982 (Confederal Secretariat).

Membership: The Gambia and Senegal.

Language(s): English, French and Wolof.

Objectives: To promote measures that will reinforce cooperation and solidarity between the Gambia and Senegal. The original secretariat, started because of a UN mission, fostered economic and social cooperation between the two countries. The 1982 secretariat has more political goals. In particular the goals are: integration of both states' armed and security forces; the development of an economic free trade area and a monetary union; the coordination of foreign policy matters; the coordination of communications policy matters, and joint cooperation in other areas deemed appropriate.

Functions: Under the Pact of Confederation, formally signed on February 1, 1982, The Gambia and Senegal agreed to implement more than 30 agreements ranging from cultural, social and economic to financial matters.

Structure: Apart from the individual organizations of the two member states, the Confederation maintains its own structure. At its head is the Presidency, a post filled by the President of Senegal, and the Vice-Presidency, occupied by the President of The Gambia. There is a Council composed of 4 Gambian and 5 Senegalese ministers, and the Confederal Assembly chaired by the President of the Gambian Parliament and occupied by 20 Gambian MPs and 40 Senegalese MPs. There were 8 staff in the secretariat in Banjul.

Financing: The Senegambian Confederation is supported by a 75 percent contribution from Senegal and a 25 percent contribution from the Gambia.

Comments: In principle, this organization will oversee the move to a political confederation and to economic free-trade area. Presently there is no impetus on the Gambian side for this to happen and hence no rationale for the organization. Political/military factors are the real *raison d'être* for the federation and may continue to be so, the most visible "cooperative scheme" being the Confederal army and gendarmerie.

Economic market integration objectives, meanwhile, have led nowhere. Negotiations on a free-trade area have been at complete standstill for over a year. No agreement has been reached on which commodities are to be included for initial tariff reductions, or on the nature of a compensation scheme. Ultimately there appears to be no reason for Gambia to move away from a relatively open economy to a more restrictive free-trade area with Senegal without exogenous political and military pressure.

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Otherwise the Confederation has been a forum for bilateral negotiation and cooperation with the permanent secretariat as monitoring agency. However, in practice it does not appear to be able to do much more than "remind parties to abide by agreements." Some of the agreements made and projects generated seem beneficial (e.g. distribution of Senegalese licenses to Gambian fishermen on the same terms as to nationals and vice versa; establishment of transmitter-receiver links between the two countries' customs directorates; organizing of football matches; joint cereal milling at borders; twinning of theatrical companies). Many of these bilateral agreements between the two countries could just as well have been (or are in fact being) implemented directly by the respective Ministries, Customs Services, etc. rather than by the Confederation.

Shelter Afrique

Address: Managing Director, Nairobi, Kenya.

Established: 1982

Membership: Class "A" Shareholders--23 African governments which are members of the African Development Bank; Class "B" Shareholders--the African Development Bank and the African Reinsurance Corporation; and Class "C" Shareholders--the Commonwealth Development Corporation.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote, through financing, investment of public and private capital for housing projects.

Functions: Shelter Afrique is incorporated as a company rather than a treaty organization so as to operate as a business concern rather than being dependent on government. It disburses loans for housing projects on the recommendation of the appropriate ministry of the applicant country, and after approval of the Board of Directors.

Structure: Shelter Afrique is composed of the General Assembly which meets yearly and elects the Board of Directors. It in turn appoints an Internal Auditor, Managing Director and Secretary General. Three departments exist as well: Operations, Finance, and Administration.

Financing: An authorized share capital of \$US 40 mn. is divided equally into 40,000 shares with a par value of \$US 1,000 each. Fifty percent is payable upon application for membership and the balance is callable. The existence of Class "C" shareholders grew out of the need to attract international capital.

A recent decision has been made to solicit yearly (beginning in 1989) contributions with a goal of \$US 300 mn. Also, the private sector is being

encouraged to take a much more active role in Shelter Afrique in the hope of attracting more capital.

Comments: Shelter Afrique is well staffed by architects, engineers, and an economist, and has an investment office and financial department. Among its accomplishments are: a study of the types of local building materials which may be used in the various countries; the creation of the "African Housing Fund" by Sweden; and twelve approved housing projects. The organization has studied the housing problem, attracted competent officials to address solutions, and is mobilizing efforts to carry out much-needed housing projects.

Société de Développement Hôtelier et Touristique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (HOTAFRIC)

Address: Président, B.P. 1545, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1970

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Mali and Zaire are observers.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To promote the development of the hotel and tourist industry of member states.

Function: HOTAFRIC participates in studies and disseminates findings. It has formulated a program for cooperation in infra-structural investment with the Organization for Development of Tourism, and coordinates and negotiates loans for future projects.

Structure: HOTAFRIC's shareholders appoint the Board of Directors, which manages the company. The Board elects a president from among its members. The company has branch offices in Paris and New York.

Financing: HOTAFRIC received an initial funding of 60 mn. CFAF from Air Afrique. HOTAFRIC also relies on assistance from the World Bank and other organizations.

Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR)

Address: Director, Private Bag 00108, Gabarone, Botswana.

Established: 1984

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Membership: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To promote agricultural research.

Functions: To fulfill its objective SACCAR's primary functions are identification of regional research programs and coordination of donor support within the subregion. It also promotes and publishes research materials, organizes workshops and seminar, and promotes regional and national training.

Structure: SACCAR is headed by a 16 person Board of Governors composed of the National Directors of agricultural research of each member state; 3 Deans of Agriculture selected from Faculties of Agriculture of SADCC member states; 2 other members elected by the Board and from within the SADCC subregion; the Director of SACCAR; and a substitute Governor. The SACCAR staff consists of the Director, a Senior Advisor, the Documentation and Information Officer, the Finance and Administration Officer, the Manpower and Training Officer, two Technical Officers, and the support staff. The Director of SACCAR reports to the Board, which liaises with the SADCC Sectoral Committee of Ministers of Agriculture and Natural Resources through the Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of Botswana. Botswana coordinates the agricultural research and training component of SADCC's overall mandate.

Financing: Member states pay annual contributions to the budget of SACCAR in accordance with the formulae applicable to the SADCC Secretariat budget. All other projects and studies are primarily externally financed. Main donors have been ODA, USAID, FRG, CIDA, NORAD, ISNAR, and SAREC.

Comments: SACCAR is widely regarded as a successful regional institution. In four years it has made significant headway in addressing each of its multiple objectives.

SACCAR has identified 12 projects as of January 1988 and had found partial funding for 7 of these. This amounted to a total of US \$ 39 mn. of external funding. The 5 projects at more advanced levels of implementation are the Land and Water Management Research Programme, the Sorghum and Millets Improvement Programme (SMIP), the Grain Legume Improvement Programme (GLIP), the Establishment of SACCAR project, and the Training in Research Management. SMIP in particular stands as a fine example of SACCAR's potential as a coordinating unit. Managed by ICRISAT and run in close coordination with national agricultural research systems, the program is producing promising varieties while training local personnel. Equally important, it is viewed by SADCC member states as their project (rather than a CGIAR project) and therefore gets their full cooperation.

SACCAR has made progress with respect to its information and data collection mandate. It has commenced the collection and cataloguing of literature on agricultural research in the region. Moreover the Agricultural Research Resources Assessment (ARRA) databank is almost complete and will be updated on a regular basis. It carries information on agricultural research

personnel, institutions and projects, as well as training and extension personnel and agencies in the subregion.

In terms of promoting publication and research, SACCAR now issues a quarterly newsletter--The SADCC/Zimbabwe Journal of Agricultural Research--which, however, has failed to come out regularly. Four workshops and seminars were organized by SACCAR in 1986/87. Several others were attended by SACCAR staff.

With respect to its training function, SACCAR has instituted its Training in Research Management program with ISNAR as the executing agent. Phase I allowed top managers of national agricultural research systems to attend courses on Research Management at ESAMI. Phase II will increase the number of training locations as well as number of people trained. Its postgraduate manpower training project has concentrated on the strengthening of area centers of excellence with the assistance of the German aid agency, which gives direct technical assistance to universities and contributes scholarship funds which are administered by SACCAR.

Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

Address: Director General, Industries and Commerce, Private Bag X84, Pretoria 0001, Republic of South Africa.

Established: 1969 (South Africa has had a customs union in the same area since 1910.)

Membership: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and its territories, and Swaziland.

Objectives: To build on the 1910 customs union with a common external tariff, and to ensure the equitable distribution of the benefits of increased trade in the area.

Functions: Under the arrangements of the Customs Union, a common external tariff is established. Tariff revenues are distributed each year according to trade displacement, loss of fiscal discretion, and value of imports from South Africa. BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) pay into the Consolidated Revenue Fund their tariff revenues. Every two years, BLS states get a rebate of 1.42 times their original contribution. The 42 percent premium represents compensation for the loss that results from free trade with South Africa.

Structure: The Customs Union Commission administers the Union and its attendant committees. The Commission meets once a year to calculate and distribute the revenue pool, collect and disseminate information, and settle disputes. Sovereigns are treated, theoretically, as equals, and decisions are made by consensus. Three committees meet throughout the year: the Customs Technical Liaison, the Trade and Industry Liaison, and the Communications and Transport Liaison Committee.

Financing: The rebates are financed from customs revenues. Administration is financed by each member state.

Comments: The 1969 Agreement applies South African tariffs to all goods imported into the customs area. Thus, South Africa exercises effective control over the trade flows in the area. Economic benefits for South Africa include free access to BLS markets and a stable supply of migrant labor for South African mines. By holding customs revenues, South Africa is able to earn interest on the deposits. SACU also serves as an instrument of political leverage and as a demonstration of South African cooperation with its neighbors. It also inhibits the BLS states from joining the sanctions movement, an economic and political windfall for South Africa. South Africa pays the 42 percent premium to the BLS states, and bears the main administrative costs of the arrangement.

The SACU arrangement increases revenues for the ELS states. The rebates constitute relatively large proportions of government revenues: 37 percent of Botswana's total revenue, 71 percent of Lesotho's and 60 percent of Swaziland's. The BLS states enjoy relatively cheap South African consumer goods, coal and electricity. BLS exporters have easy access to South African markets.

There is currently pressure on South Africa to speed up distribution of revenues; a two-year wait is now required. South Africa, however, has effectively tabled the proposal.

The BLS states are members of both SACU and the PTA, and receive special status within the PTA. However, the PTA poses no threat to SACU because South Africa's relations with the BLS states is of far greater significance to the latter.

SACU is essentially an extension of South Africa's regional foreign policy. It consolidates South Africa's influence in the region and reflects the highly dependent posture of the other states, due to geographical and economic conditions in the region. Its advantages for South Africa are considerable, not least as a channel for sanctions-busting imports and exports.

Given the complicated Southern African situation, concern has grown regarding the impact of antiapartheid economic sanctions toward South Africa on SACU. It is not likely that increasing political conflict and economic considerations would cause the BLS states to secede from SACU, but if they did economic effects would be severe. Success or failure of BLS adjustment would depend on three factors: 1) possible repercussions from South Africa; 2) the ability of BLS to survive short-term losses in foreign exchange, government revenue and strategic commodities; and 3) the ability of BLS to create new import substituting industries, markets for its exports and labor, and trade routes and structures.

Presently, 100 percent of Lesotho's trade, 70 percent of Swaziland's trade, and 62 percent of Botswana's trade is dependent on South Africa's ports. Revenues raised from BLS migrant labor in South Africa in 1983 was U.S. \$206 mn.. South Africa is the principal trading partner for BLS as well

as a heavy investor in mining and agricultural sectors in BLS. The BLS states also rely on South Africa for 100 percent of their energy sources. (These factors of interdependence apply also, but to a lesser though still important extent, on the other 6 members in the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference.) It is important to recognize, however, that the economic and political advantages to South Africa from the present arrangements probably outweigh any gains from reprisals against BLS, so there is no reason to expect enthusiasm for separation on the South African side.

Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC)

Address: Executive Secretary, SADCC Secretariat, Private Bag 0095, Gabarone, Botswana.

Established: 1980

Membership: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Languages: English

Objectives: The principal goal of SADCC is to reduce the dependence of the southern African region on South Africa. The organization seeks to accomplish this goal by creating preconditions for genuine and equitable regional integration, by mobilizing resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies, and by acting in concert to secure international cooperation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation.

Functions: SADCC activities consist of a sequence of conferences at which areas of concern are discussed and alternative strategies considered and approved. Responsibility for implementing policies rests with member countries. Regional studies in fields considered priority areas for action are carried out by specific countries: Angola for energy; Botswana for animal disease control and research; Lesotho for tourism; Malawi for fisheries, wildlife and forestry; Mozambique for transport and communications; Swaziland for manpower and training; Tanzania for trade and industry; Zambia for mining and the Southern African Development Fund; and Zimbabwe for food security. Once specific projects and programs are approved (i.e. for inclusion on authorized list), SADCC seeks to mobilize donor support. All projects and resource transfers are handled on a bilateral basis.

As of August 1987 there were 493 projects on SADCC's agenda, for which 34 percent of the \$6.4 bn. cost has been secured. The sectoral breakdown by cost of projects is: transport and communications--65.6 percent; industry and trade--18.9 percent; food, agriculture, and natural resources--9.8 percent; energy--3.8 percent; manpower development--0.9 percent; and mining--0.8 percent.

Among the more important projects are, in the energy sector program: an extension of oil storage capacity in Lobito, Angola; the rehabilitation of the Cunene river basin in Angola; the connection of electrify supply between Mozambique and Zimbabwe; the rehabilitation and extension of Malawi's electricity network; an extension of the electricity supply to the Limbe region in Malawi; and the installation of a coal storage and coal information center in Botswana.

Transport and communications projects include: the rehabilitation of the Beira corridor in Mozambique (including railway, port, and roads); the rehabilitation of the Lobito corridor in Angola (including railway, port, roads, airport, and telecommunications infrastructure); and Limpopo railway from Zimbabwe to Maputo.

In the agriculture sector, the food security component constitutes 60 percent of proposed spending, and livestock production and animal disease control another 20 percent. The proposed regional silo project has largely been abandoned in favor of a regional food security fund.

SADCC is also trying to influence the economic climate through policy dialogue. Promotion of the private sector and attraction of foreign investment have been given a lot of attention recently, and a study has been commissioned to determine how investment codes and regulations of member states might be harmonized so as encourage investment.

Structure: The main body of SADCC is the Summit of Heads of State and Government which meets annually. The Council of Ministers meets to discuss specific issues facing the organization including sectoral programs and financial resources. The Sectoral Committees and the two Commissions are responsible for the organization's program of action. Apart from the two Commissions, the Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana is the only bureaucratic organization of SADCC. The Secretariat is responsible for organizing the conferences, distributing information and research findings, and soliciting donor participation at the conferences.

The two Commissions are the Southern African Trade and Communications Commission (SATCC), and Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR), headquartered in Maputo and Gaborone respectively. The Commissions have their own secretariats, but operate in close cooperation with the SADCC secretariat as do the Committees.

Financing: The annual budget of the Secretariat is \$450,000, financed primarily by donors. Individual projects are financed bilaterally. More than \$2.5 bn. has been committed to SADCC members through the SADCC meetings, \$1 bn. of which was pledged at the meeting in January 1988 for the next four-year period. The Nordic countries are the largest donors, followed by the Western Europeans. The U.S. provided \$72 mn. for 11 projects between 1980 and 1985, and promised an additional \$50 mn. at the January 1988 meeting.

Comments: There are a number of problems facing SADCC. Dependence on South Africa persists. Considerable trade still flows through South Africa instead of through SADCC ports. The proportion of SADCC trade passing through South Africa actually increased from 26 percent in 1983 to 31 percent in 1984. By

1985, SADCC countries shipped (and continue to ship) anywhere from 55 percent of their trade (for Zambia) to 100 percent of their trade (for Lesotho) through South Africa.

For 6 of the 9 countries, South Africa is still their largest trading partner. Moreover, all of the SADCC countries except Angola and Tanzania have regularly increased trade with South Africa over the last eight years, while trade among themselves has barely evolved.

Administrative difficulties are also present. Despite its advantages, decentralization has led to slow project formulation and onerous coordinating demands. Overlapping activities with PTA are also troublesome, especially now that SADCC appears to be expanding its commitment to promote intraregional trade. Also, real administrative costs are much higher than those indicated in SADCC's budget, since so much is borne by national agencies acting for SADCC.

Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil (SARCCUS)

Address: Secretary General, Private Bag X250, Pretoria 0001, South Africa.

Established: 1950

Membership: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.

Language(s): English, French and Portugese.

Objectives: To promote the conservation, national utilization and improvement of natural resources through closer technical cooperation among member states. Particular emphasis is placed on control of soil erosion, on soil conservation and improvement, and on vegetation and water resources.

Functions: SARCCUS promotes dialogue and coordination on these issues by holding regional conferences, seminars, symposia and workshops. It also publishes the proceedings of many of these meetings.

Structure: The Commission is a loose structure of 10 separate Standing Committees: Animal Health; Animal Production; Conservation and Land-use Planning; Education and Extension; Forestry; Hydrology; Nature Conservation, Wildlife Utilization and Management; Plant Production; Plant Protection; and Soil Science. The Commission is headed by a Secretary General. The Secretariat is housed within the Department of Agricultural Technical Services of the Republic of South Africa.

Financing: The budget is financed by member dues.

Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC)

Address: C.P. 2677, Maputo, Mozambique.

Established: 1980

Membership: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To implement SADCC's transport and communications strategy, thereby improving transport and communications infrastructure in the region while becoming less dependent on South Africa.

Functions: SATCC's principal function is to arrange for the rehabilitation and upgrading of existing infrastructures in the member states. SATCC also considers new projects, where necessary, and feasibility studies. Projects are approved by SATCC and then presented at the SADCC-sponsored Annual Consultative Conferences.

The majority of projects in the transport sector are grouped into larger corridor projects. Each umbrella corridor project, of which there are 5 presently (Beira, Dar es Salaam, Lobito, Maputo, and Nacala), combines road, rail, port, and sometimes water transport infrastructures.

Additionally there are projects in civil aviation, terrestrial and satellite telecommunications infrastructure, meteorological forecasting, and regional postal system infrastructure. SATCC is also supervising the creation of the SATCC Documentation System, which is to include data bases for each subsector, thus facilitating project identification and implementation.

As of January 1988, there were 194 projects approved at a total cost of \$4,290 mn. Of this total \$1,680 mn. has been secured.

Structure: The Committee of Ministers is the supreme organ. It is assisted by the Co-ordinating Committee of Senior Officials in making broad policy decisions. The Co-ordinating Committee supervises the activities of the Technical Unit, which operates as SATCC's secretariat. The Technical Unit has been expanding in recent years to accommodate a burgeoning work load. Whereas before the Technical Unit was staffed entirely by technical assistants from the Nordic states and Italy, now it includes some regional specialists.

The formal structures of SATCC are supplemented by informal work groups, consisting of donors and SADCC members. These are typically organized around specific projects, especially the corridor development projects. The most formal of these informal associations is the "Beira Corridor Group," which incorporates private concerns in addition to SADCC member country officials and donor country representatives.

Financing: SATCC projects, like other SADCC projects, are financed by donor

countries and international organizations on a bilateral basis. The secretariat is supported by member countries and donors.

Comments: SATCC is perhaps the most active and vital part of SADCC, due to its work with transport infrastructure in the corridors listed above. The impact of this work has not yet been felt, as most of the projects are not far along in implementation. And the share of the SADCC region's extraregional trade passing through South Africa continues to grow. However, this may start to change--though not dramatically--within the next few years. SATCC has also led the way in terms of innovative organizational strategies and collaboration with the private sector, as exemplified in the Beira Corridor Group.

Union Africaine Des Chemins de Fer (UAC)
Union of African Railways (UAR)

Address: The Secretary General, P.O. Box 687, Kinshasa, Zaire.

Established: 1972

Membership: Algeria, Société Nationale de Transports Ferroviaires (SNTF); Angola, Direcção dos Serviços de Portos, Caminhos de Ferro e Transportes de Angola; Benin-Niger, Organisation Commune Benin-Niger des Chemins de Fer et des Transports (OCBN); Cameroon, Régie Nationale des Chemins de Fer du Cameroun (RNCFC); Chad, Congo, Chemin de Fer Congo-Océan (CFCO); Côte d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso, Régis des Chemins de Fer Abidjan-Niger (RAN); Djibouti-Ethiopia, Chemin de Fer Djibouti-Ethiopien (CDE); Gabon, Office de Chemins de Fer Transgabonaise (OCTRA); Ghana, Ghana Railway Corporation (GRC); Guinea, Office Nationale des Chemins de Fer de Guinée (ONCFG); Kenya, Kenya Railways (KR); Libya, Libya Al Jamahirya; Mali, Régie du Chemin de Fer du Mali (RCFM); Mauritania, Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie (SNIM); Morocco, Office Nationale des Chemins de Fer Marocains (ONCFM); Mozambique, Direcção Nacional dos Portos e Caminhos de Ferro (CFM); Nigeria, Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC); Senegal, Régie des Chemins de Fer du Sénégal (RCFS); Sudan, Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC); Swaziland, Swaziland Railways (SR); Tanzania, Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC); Tanzania-Zambia, Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA); Togo, Chemin de Fer du Togo (CFT); Tunisia, Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Tunisiens (SNCF); Zaire, Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Zairois (SNCZ); Zambia, Zambia Railways Limited (ZR).

Language(s): English and French

Objectives: To improve Africa's railway system.

Functions: The UAC's main function is to implement programs which help in the development of Africa's transportation industry. The programs fall into four primary categories: improvement of the services and performance of the existing railways as well as expansion of the railways; study of methods to interconnect railways; standardization of rolling stock and equipment; and coordination of rail transport with other transportation systems.

Structure: The main body of the UAC is the General Assembly, to which each member can send delegates. The General Assembly elects the Secretary General and the Executive Board. The latter consists of an Assistant Secretary General, and 5 Vice-Presidents representing each of the 5 subregions of Africa. All are elected for two-year terms. The Secretary General heads the secretariat composed of 6 middle managers and 20 staff persons. There are five working committees to assist the General Secretariat: Permanent Way, Signalling and Telecommunications; Materials and Equipment; Professional Training and Staff; Supplies and Documentation; and Information and Data Processing.

Financing: The UAC is funded entirely by contributions from the member railways. The 1988 budget was \$US 908,658.

Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC)
Central African Customs and Economic Union (CACEU)

Address: Secrétaire Général, B. P. 969, Bangui, Central African Republic.

Established: 1966

Membership: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad (absent from 1968 to 1985), Congo, Equatorial Guinea (since 1985), Gabon.

Language(s): French

Objectives: The objectives of the Union are the adoption of a common external tariff; removal of all duties and taxes on imports and exports between member states; coordination of the member states' industrialization policies and development plans with a view toward promoting a balanced development and diversification of their economies.

Functions: To achieve its objectives, UDEAC instituted a "single tax" system--a set of taxes on intra-Union trade which is lower than the extra-Union tariffs. A Solidarity Fund was established to transfer resources to members adversely affected fiscally by trade diversion related to trade liberalization. A common customs service was created to standardize administration and to collect the revenues from the single tax (Gabon excepted). External tariffs were also harmonized. To complement the customs union, the Central Bank of Central African States (BEAC) was created to facilitate financial and commercial exchanges through the use of a common currency (the CFAFranc) and the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. In 1974, the Development Bank of Central African States (DEAC) was created to finance

development projects in the least-developed member countries so as to reduce regional disparities.

Structure: The Council of Heads of State guides and coordinates member states' economic and customs policies, and supervises the Management Committee. The Council also determines the budget and member contributions, makes decisions on general tariff levels, and settles disputes among members.

The Management Committee, comprised of two ministers from each state, meets at least twice a year to make decisions on legislation and regulations relating to the customs union. The Committee also determines the standard single tax rate. The General Secretariat implements the decisions reached by the Council and Committee. Total secretariat staff in 1988 was 330 persons, of whom 100 are professionals.

Financing: The Secretariat is financed by member contributions. The 1988 budget in 1985 was 2.4 bn. CFAF, down 30 percent from the 1987 level. Cameroon, the Congo and Gabon are the largest contributors. The solidarity fund is financed by contributions from Cameroon (400 mn. CFAF in 1988), Congo (300 mn.), and Gabon (300 mn.). Chad has received 400 mn. as compensation payment from the Fund in recent years, and the CAR 600 mn. (Equatorial Guinea does not yet participate). But since 1987, these compensation payments have not been made because Chad and CAR haven't paid their contributions to the UDEAC budget. The solidarity fund payments thus now go to support the operations of the General Secretariat.

Comments: UDEAC has been one of the least effective of the existing market integration organizations. Its two poorest members (Chad and CAR) withdrew in 1968, though the CAR returned after concessions from the other states. The BDEAC has not made loans mainly to the poorer members; more has been lent to Congo and Cameroon. Nor has it financed any "regional" projects. UDEAC has been notably unsuccessful in two key goals--increased trade and regional coordination of industrial investment. Regional trade grew only from \$75 mn. in 1969 to \$95 mn. in 1983 (in constant 1975 dollars). Excluding Cameroon, regional trade fell from \$65 mn. to \$45 mn. over the same years. The number of firms enjoying privileged access to regional markets (i.e., those under the single tax system) grew only from 105 in 1969 to 131 in 1979, and the share of these firms' output exported within the region fell from 13 percent to 7 percent over the 1970s. This means that growth in production came through increased domestic and non-UDEAC sales.

Nor has there been any industrial coordination. The first industrial coordination problem arose in the 1960s over the siting of a new regional oil refinery. Gabon, an oil producer and geographically well located, was the best economic choice. But Congo would not abandon its plans for a refinery, and the idea of a regional refinery died when Cameroon and Congo withdrew their proposed investments.

Many similar experiences followed. A single planned glass factory was replaced by one each in three countries. A regional allocation of industry was tried in 1975--bauxite and aluminum in Cameroon, petrochemicals to Gabon, pharmaceuticals to CAR. Its effects were nil. In most consumer goods industries similar plans were multiplied in each of the countries--in beer,

textiles, footwear, cigarettes, for example. Thus in the 1970s, the share of total production that was exported within UDEAC fell from 39 percent to 1.2 percent for cigarettes, 12.2 percent to 9.9 percent for cotton cloth, and 7.3 percent to 3.9 percent for shoes.

Everybody more or less agrees on the reasons for the stagnation or decline of intra-UDEAC trade. Aside from structural factors (high transport costs, lack of complementarity, etc.) the UDEAC arrangements were not trade encouraging. The presumed preferential trade area created by the taxe unique was never very preferential. As with the taxe de cooperation regionale of the CEAO, the taxe unique is granted to individual firms, and can be variable between countries. The rates indeed often vary, usually with protective intent. Thus in the early 1970s, for example, plastic footwear imported into CAR paid a 33 percent tax unique (TU) if it came from Cameroon, and 18 percent TU if it came from Congo, while the local product paid 13 percent.

Secondly, the governments of UDEAC levied a taxe complémentaire, a supplementary levy that has protective or revenue-raising objectives. It was supposed to be temporary--a transitional device to assure fiscal stability to tax poorer members. It has endured, however, and seriously reduces the significance of the common external tariff. A final factor is the wide resort to nontariff barriers--quotas and bans--which are applied to UDEAC partners as well as outsiders.

Since only limited trade liberalization has followed the formation of UDEAC, it is not surprising that trade has not much expanded.

The explanation of the failure of industrial coordination is more contentious. Close students of UDEAC (e.g. L. Mytella) and ECA reports have generally blamed the external dependence of the region for failed industrial coordination. Transnational corporations, it is argued, induce national governments to set up national plants, thereby segmenting regional markets. But this argument, so strongly put forward in the important 1982 ECA report on UDEAC, singles out the TNCs for behavior that would be rational for any investor, small or little, public or private, given the incentives created by investment codes and the strong desire of all governments for new industrial investment. It is mainly the incentive structure that has led to market segmentation, not the TNCs who respond to it.

Since 1987, the reform of UDEAC has been the subject of many studies and much debate. An Ad Hoc Commission on a Blueprint for Economic Cooperation in UDEAC (1986-2000) has produced voluminous reports on all aspects of regional cooperation among the UDEAC states. Among other recent positive measures are the following:

- o creation in December 1984 of a project preparation facility for community industrial projects;
- o elimination of legal restrictions on trade in non single-tax countries;
- o authorization of a study to allow Secretaries General to prepare ways to integrate the taxe complémentaire into the common external tariff;

- o a review of the fiscal and economic impacts of the investment code;
- o creation in 1987 of the CEBURH, an economic "community" for livestock and fish.

These reforms fall short of the basic strategy charges recommended by the ECA report of 1982. That document called for "a new integration strategy (which) must have as its starting point the premise that unless transnational firms are regulated and their dominance in UDEAC markets is ultimately reduced, intra-UDEAC trade will not increase, regional planning will not succeed, and equitable development and collective self-reliance will not take place. . . . Without joint regulation of capital imports, competition to attract foreign capital is likely to continue to thwart efforts at regional industrial planning and result in the duplication of plant capacity and products."

The ECA report urges UDEAC to combine regional regulation of direct foreign investing with regional focus on ensuring "that domestic consumption needs are met as much as possible through domestic production. . . . In sum, regional planning must be based on a view of the economy as internally integrated and powered by domestic demand and resources. . . . Production for export should be geared to securing from external sources what cannot be produced within the subregion."

This call for an inward-looking regional strategy, with closer joint planning and an implied larger public sector role, has not been followed by the UDEAC states in the past six years.

Union Interafricaine des Avocats
Inter-African Union of Lawyers

Address: Secrétaire Général, B.P. 1921, Dakar, Senegal

Established: 1980

Membership: Active associates and honorary members in 20 countries: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia. United States and France.

Language(s): Arabic, English and French.

Objectives: To defend the integrity and the basic principles of the legal profession; to work toward the establishment and strengthening of relations among African lawyers; to defend and promote public and private freedoms and human rights; work for the establishment of an international legal defense system; support and encourage the preservation of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; participate in efforts to improve legal education in universities.

Functions: The Union is a forum for African lawyers. It organizes specialized meetings and symposia and also makes representations to countries where legal rights have been threatened.

Structure: The Union is composed of a Congress (meeting every three years) a Council, and a Bureau; it also incorporates the African Institute of Human Rights. It has consultative status with UNESCO and its relation with nongovernmental organizations include the International Law Association (ILA). The Union also publishes L'avocat africain twice a year.

Financing: In 1979, the Senegalese government subsidized (\$5 mn. CFAF) the Conference that led to the creation of the Union. Participants contribute directly to the Union. In 1982, subsidies were obtained from the CRDI (Canadian), the British Council, and the UNDP. In 1986, Scandinavian governments (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark) and Holland provided financing. Grants were also obtained from the United States (State Department) and the Ford Foundation (\$155,000) for the preparation of conferences. Although all African participants were present, no funding was obtained from any of them.

Comments: Among the activities of the Inter-African Union of Lawyers are: the organization of the first conference on the protection of rights to defense which took place in Dakar in 1979; participation by the African Institute for Human Rights in the first international symposium on the African Charter for Human Rights (100 participants) in 1982. The Union also participated in the 2nd World Congress on Human Rights. The Union drafted a penal procedure code (rules on length of detention, torture, behavior toward delinquents) which was then to be adopted by the OAU.

The action of the Union is sometimes impeded by the lack of freedom of African intellectuals to speak out. The Union also aims to set standards for the legal profession and pushes for intra-African professional dialogue. It publishes the results of its conferences and information booklets. The Union does little other than arrange these periodic meetings, but its activities are low cost and they do bring legal professionals together, with important results for long-term integration.

Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA)
West African Monetary Union (WAMU)

Address: Président, c/o BCEAO, B.P. 3159, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1962

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Language(s): French

Objectives: To enforce the rules governing the issue of the common currency (the CFAF--Communauté Financière Africaine-Franc) in West Africa, and to

ensure the centralization of monetary reserves, the free circulation of money, and freedom of transfer among member states.

Functions: Under the arrangements of the monetary union, the countries use a common currency, the CFAF, which is freely convertible with the French Franc. The CFAF is issued by the Central Bank of the UMOA, the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO). There is free circulation of currency throughout the zone. Monetary reserves are centralized by the BCEAO. International payments are conducted in the Paris foreign exchange market, reserves being drawn from the Operations Account in the French Treasury. Should reserves be insufficient to cover payments, the French Treasury provides francs in exchange for CFA francs (the latter being used to finance French local operations in the UMOA area). Should BCEAO reserves fall to below 20 percent of sight liabilities for three consecutive months, the Bank must either: (1) transfer to the Operations Account foreign currency denominated reserves; (2) instruct the member states to draw on their IMF quotas; (3) draw credit from public and private institutions in member countries; or (4) take measures to eliminate the external deficit of member countries. The BCEAO must maintain 65 percent of its foreign reserves in French francs--the proportion having been reduced from 100 percent in 1974 out of concern about the desirability of concentrating assets in French francs.

Apart from centralizing the external payments mechanism, the UMOA also creates a central monetary policy, controlling credit creation, regulating public debt and commercial banks, and promoting particular patterns of credit allocation. The BCEAO makes individual decisions on the amount of credit to be created in each member country on the basis of recommendations made by the National Credit Committees in each country. The BCEAO also sets limits on public sector borrowing from the central bank by restricting public debt to no more than 20 percent of previous year fiscal revenues. The main policy instruments available to the BCEAO are the rediscount rate and the rediscount ceilings, as well as reserve ratios. The Bank also reserves the right to authorize loans made by the banking system to individual enterprises so as to maintain control over credit allocation.

Structure: The highest legal authority of the UMOA is the Council of Chiefs of State. The Council of Ministers (made up of Ministers of Finance) controls the direction of BCEAO policies. Management of the Bank is the responsibility of the Executive Board of Directors, consisting of two directors from each state (including two from France). (Prior to 1974, France had seven directors on the Board.) The Board sets overall policy, as mentioned above; it is formulated on the basis of the recommendations made by the National Credit Committees. The BCEAO also promotes development by extending credit to its offspring, the West African Development Bank (BOAD).

Comments: The UMOA worked uneventfully until the early 1980s, when generalized balance of payment difficulties put the Operations Account into a deficit for the first time in its history. This was due primarily to the world recession and to supply factors constraining export growth. To cover the Operations Account deficit, the BCEAO had to draw down its foreign reserves as well as promote exports by channeling credit to the export sector. It is believed that due to differential rates of inflation between West Africa and France and other trading partners, the CFAF became substantially over-

valued by the mid-1980s, resulting in an import bias and a loss of competitiveness with the rest of the world. The devaluation of the US dollar since 1985 has exacerbated the overvaluation problem. Inability to use exchange rate changes in its adjustment policies clearly presents severe disadvantages for the UMOA countries.

Even so, the guarantee of free convertibility is a strong attraction to some of the small, open economies of the subregion, substantiated by the fact that Mali rejoined the Union and the new Guinean franc is linked to the CFA franc. Even Guinea Bissau has formally applied to accede to UMOA, while two anglophone countries (unspecified) have shown interest in doing so.

The UMOA has provided relative monetary and balance of payments stability, the result being relatively favorable environments for economic growth, foreign investment, and cooperation in the fields of trade policy and commercial banking. Moreover, UMOA is one part of a larger set of French connections, many of which bring broader benefits, aid flows, support in IBRD/IMF/AfDB negotiations, etc. According to two studies, one by researchers at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, the other by World Bank economists, the countries of the UMOA have performed better than those outside the zone. Furthermore, the BCEAO has been relatively efficient and well managed, and has enjoyed a high degree of international credibility, though recent emergence of liquidity strains has reduced credibility. The UMOA has managed to achieve monetary integration while permitting considerable domestic monetary, fiscal and commercial policy autonomy.

The sectoral distribution of credit is not always to members' liking. Development-oriented credits have tended to go to industry, to the relative neglect of agriculture. While the BCEAO recognizes this bias and would like to redress it, it is constrained by the fact that state treasuries are making increasing demands on its credit facilities to finance public sector deficits. Given that agricultural performance (in terms of exports and production for domestic consumption) will be important in overall growth performance (which in turn affects the public sector budget situation), this bias has serious implications for the medium- to long-term development of the UMOA economies. Another concern is the outflow of CFAF to non-UMOA countries, estimated at 40 percent of UMOA's total CFAF circulation. Most important, however, is the emergence of serious problems of liquidity, due to a large volume of nonperforming assets in the UMOA banking system. (See BCEAO for further discussion.)

There was reportedly some discussion at the August 1988 UMOA summit on the possibility of restructuring the UMOA, so that the Côte d'Ivoire would play a less dominant role, and so that adjustments could be made to reevaluate the CFAF.

Union Panafricaine des Telecommunications (UPAT)
Pan African Telecommunications Union (PATU)

Address: **Secrétaire Général, B.P. 8634, Kinshasa, Zaire.**

Established: 1978

Membership: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Language(s): Arabic, English, and French.

Objectives: To promote cooperation and coordination among national and subregional telecommunications networks.

Functions: UPAT coordinates meetings, seminars, and symposia as its principal means of promoting cooperation. It also publishes technical documents, and centralizes information on existing telecommunications networks in Africa.

UPAT concentrates on encouraging standardization of tariffs, coordination of studies, and training. UPAT undertakes almost no formal training itself, but arranges for it with regional or industrial country institutions.

Structure: UPAT is a specialized agency of the OAU, but also is under the direction of PANAFTTEL. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which is the guiding body, convenes every four years. The Administrative Council meets annually. The General Secretariat, which handles the daily affairs of UPAT, comprises three departments: the technical department; the operations, cooperation, and training department; and the administration and financing department.

Union des Radiodiffusions Et Télévisions Nationales d'Afrique (URTNA)
The Union of National Radio and Television Organizations of Africa

Address: Secretary General, 101 Rue Carnot, Post Office Box 3237, Dakar, Senegal.

Established: 1962

Membership: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoro, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To promote, develop, and coordinate radio and television activities in Africa.

Functions: URTNA's functions include: the formation of Commissions and study groups to examine various problems; collecting and publishing information relating to radio and television issues; assisting members during negotiations; organizing sporting events, workshops, seminars, etc.; operating a permanent training center and a program exchange center.

Structure: The main body of URTNA is the General Assembly, headed by the President, 2 Vice-Presidents, a Secretary General, and a Legal Adviser, and consisting of voting delegates from member states. The Assembly meets once yearly. There is also an Administrative Council consisting of 15 members (elected to two-year terms) from which are elected the President and Vice-Presidents. This Council also meets on a yearly basis. Three specialized Commissions also exist; the Program Exchange and Cultural Affairs Commission, the Administrative and Legal Commission, and the Technical Commission.

Financing: Financing is derived in part from contributions from active members and associate members, subsidies, grants, bequests, donations, and revenues from various publications and activities. Contributions are based on the population of countries. Only 20-30 percent of the budget is effectively paid. Countries such as Sudan have never contributed.

Comments: URTNA is responsible for three centers: the Center for Exchange of Programs (based in Nairobi), formed to promote the exchange of radio and television programs among African countries; the Technical Center; and the Measurement Center. URTNA is a relatively small organization with 11 permanent staff positions of which 4 are professionals. The facilities are modest and, due to its small size, staff must be prepared to assume various duties.

Arrears are a grave problem but are being combatted in an interesting way: by purchasing retransmission rights. For example, URTNA purchased the rights (for all of Africa including nonmember states) to broadcast last year's World Cup. It then turned around and sold the retransmission rights to member countries. Retransmission rights were denied to those countries which had substantial arrears (but the means with which to pay them). Zaire, as a result, had to pay 250,000 CFAF and 5,000 Swiss F after presidential intervention and the threat of civil riots (initiated by unhappy football fans) prompted payment. URTNA refuses to transmit to South Africa due to apartheid.

The organization is trying to fulfill its mandate but is still having problems. Its information bulletin has not been published in over four years and reporting of technical problems almost never occurs on a regular basis. It does, however, perform a valuable administrative function and acts as a forum for discussion for African radio and television interests.

Union Telecommunications Training Institute (UTTI)

Address: Director, P.M. Bag 375, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Established: 1976, as part of the Union Telecommunications and Postal Training Institute.

Membership: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To train middle level technicians and managers in telecommunications.

Functions: The UTTI offers three training programs: the 2-year Technical Diploma Course; the 3-year Higher Technical Diploma Course; and the Advanced Specialist Courses. The Institute is currently being restructured so that the Higher Technical Diploma Course will be its main one, and will take two years rather than three. The Institute has graduated over 400 students among the three programs since operations began. Total enrollment is about 60 students at any given time, though estimated manpower needs for the member countries requires an enrollment of 100 students, and institutional capacity (excepting lack of teaching staff and funds) is for 180 students.

In addition to the core programs, the Institute offers short, in-service courses.

Structure: The Institute has 7 full-time instructors and 3 technicians.

Financing: The operating budget is estimated at \$450,000, though actual contributions amount to far less. Sierra Leone contributes the largest share (see below), though the Institute is applying for assistance from ECOWAS. All student expenses, including tuition, room, and board, are provided by the Institute, though the Institute is considering imposing user fees so as to meet some recurrent costs.

Comments: The UTTI is currently in limbo, as it was formally divorced from the MRU in 1985-1986. It appears to be a national institution of Sierra Leone at the moment, though is anxious to reestablish its regional status. To this end it is trying to attract support from ECOWAS, and thereby become a training institute for all of anglophone West Africa.

The UTTI is well thought of in the subregion for the quality of its instruction. It has trained a large share of the professional staffs working in the national telecommunications companies of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinea seems to have had little involvement in the school, due to the language barrier and to the fact that it joined the MRU relatively late.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
Commission Economique des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique (CEA)

Address: Executive Secretary, Africa Hall, P.O. Box 3001, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Established: 1958

Membership: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, People's Republic of Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
*South Africa was excluded from the Commission in July 1963.

Language(s): Arabic, English, and French.

Objectives: To promote and facilitate concerted action for the economic development of Africa, including its social aspects, with a view toward raising the levels of living in Africa, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of countries and territories of Africa, both among themselves and with other countries of the world.

Functions: In carrying out its objectives, the ECA provides assistance to governments in general economic analysis, in financial and monetary issues of economic planning, and in general policy advice. In addition, the ECA monitors economic and social trends in Africa and studies the development problems of the region. The ECA is a force behind the entire regional integration effort in Africa, having assisted in drafting treaties, researching potentials for cooperation, providing technical and staff support, and financing specific studies and evaluations.

Structure: At the regional level, the Conference of Ministers is the arena in which African Economic, Planning, Development, or Financial Ministers deliberate on matters before the Commission. It meets annually. Matters of general policy and priorities are addressed and assigned to the ECA's program. The Council makes recommendations to member states, and reviews activities implemented the previous year. There are a number of more specialized regional Conferences of African Ministers which make policy in the areas of Industry, Social Affairs, Trade, Transport, Communications and Planning, Human Resources Planning Development and Utilization. There is an ECA/FAO Conference of Ministers of Agriculture, and, finally, a Council of Ministers for the Multinational Programming and Operational Centers (MULPOCS) of which there are five. The MULPOCs are the focal point for the implementation of subregional development programs.

The secretariat provides the services necessary for the meeting of the Conference of Ministers and the Commission's subsidiary bodies. It also implements the policies established by the Conference. It has a cabinet office and eleven divisions.

Financing: The ECA is financed by the UN. In addition to drawing on its own operating budget, many of its projects and programs are cofinanced with other UN agencies, such as the UNDP and UNESCO. The budget for the two years 1984-1985 was \$46.3 mn.

Comments: The ECA staff represents the largest resource of economic and analytical skills anywhere in Africa. In recent years its professional staff has numbered over 500 people. It publishes numerous documents and reports; recently its papers on the African economic crisis have been widely cited. For many years its studies, like those of most international agencies, stressed external forces in explaining slow African economic growth. But now economic policy is given greater emphasis, as is the question of the private sector, which was previously ignored.

The ECA has also been a major advocate of regional cooperation, and the present structure of "economic communities"--ECOWAS, PTA, CEEAC--is inspired by the Lagos Plan of Action. At times political pressures, and to an uncertain extent its own vision of future integration, lead it to contribute to organizational duplication. The creation of the African Regional Centre for Solar Energy in Burundi, for example, duplicates a similar (and overbuilt) facility already present in Bamako, even though the utilization of the latter facility for a broader group of countries would be clearly economic. Along the same lines, the recent series of reports on the rationalization of regional organizations in West Africa, although addressing an important issue, display some insensitivity to the existing situation. The reports, for example, call for a restructuring that would mean the virtual disappearance of the CEAO. This neglects the importance of self-determination to existing organizations, and takes little account of the historical, political and economic links with France, linguistic questions, and the existence of an ongoing monetary zone. The ECA restructuring proposals also include a call for a heavy bureaucratic structure at its headquarters.

West African Clearing House (WACH)
Chambre de Compensation de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CCAO)

Address: Executive Secretary, Bishop Building, 13 Lamina Sankoh Street, Private Mail Bag 218, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Established: 1975

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo (collectively represented by the Central Bank of West African States); and Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (each represented by their own central bank).

Language(s): English and French

Objectives: To promote the use of national currencies in settlement of payments and thereby economize on the use of hard currencies in transactions between member states. The Clearing House also seeks to encourage intra-subregional trade liberalization and promote monetary cooperation and consultation among its member banks.

Functions: Importers and exporters make and receive payments in their own national currencies. Within the Clearing House, these transactions are denominated in West African Units of Account (1 WAUA = 1 SDR). The official rate of exchange of national currencies to WAUAs is determined twice a month and is calculated from the average of the daily rates during the preceding fifteen-day period. At the end of each month the WACH totals each central bank's account and outstanding balances are paid for in hard currency. Net importers are given interest-free credit up to 10 percent of the average total value of trade (imports plus exports) with other Clearing House members during the preceding three years; the extension of credit by a creditor country may not exceed 20 percent according to the same formula. The Clearing House is available for all current account transactions including goods, services, income and unrequited transactions, except trade in goods not originating within a member state.

Structure: The WACH is an autonomous regional organization created by the Association of African Central Banks. Its governing body is the Exchange and Clearing Committee comprised of the governors of the WACH's member central banks. The Committee meets annually to establish rules, regulations and procedures for the Clearing House's activities. Every four years, the Committee appoints an Executive Secretary to handle the WACH's daily operations. An Exchange and Clearing Sub-Committee meets twice a year to assist the Committee. The staff numbers 31.

Financing: The budget is funded by contributions from the nine member banks. In 1986 these amounted to approximately \$US100,000 (Nigeria and the BCEAO paid more than 50 percent of this amount).

Comments: Although all ECOWAS member states (except Cape Verde) belong to the Clearing House, it is not an ECOWAS institution. This is because the discussions leading to the WACH's creation took place concurrently with the negotiation of the ECOWAS Treaty. While the WACH is the oldest subregional clearing house, it has made only limited progress during its twelve-year existence. Some of the Clearing Houses' problems stem from organizational and structural difficulties, but the greatest constraints on its future growth are the adverse economic conditions in many of the countries it serves and the low level of official intra-subregional trade.

Recorded trade within the west African subregion is approximately 5 percent of total trade with the rest of the world; the WACH handles less than 10 percent of that trade. The Clearing Houses' low utilization is partially related to the fact that payments settled between members of the West African Monetary Union (CFA countries) are handled by the BCEAO and do not require the WACH's services. Payments for oil imports from Nigeria are also settled outside the WACH system.

The volume of transactions channeled through the WACH expanded gradually from an initial annual average of about WAUA 50 mn. to WAUA 167 mn. in 1980-1981. Since then, however, the volume has declined considerably: in 1985-1986, WAUA 90 mn. in transactions was reported and, because of trade imbalances, more than 85 percent of these had to be settled in hard currency--largely defeating the Clearing Houses' primary objective to settle subregional payments in national currencies.

Trade imbalances, coupled with overvalued exchange rates, have caused some net importing countries (e.g. Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and Liberia) to fall into arrears on their hard currency obligations to the WACH, thereby delaying payments to net exporting creditor countries. The BCEAO countries are the most disadvantaged by this arrangement since their commercial and financial transfers to non-CFA members generate more than 80 percent of the WACH's credit. Recently the BCEAO prohibited direct transfer orders to WACH members who maintain persistent arrearages on their accounts. Nevertheless, while the BCEAO remains in the WACH system it continues to involuntarily provide credit for transactions between non-CFA Clearing House members (e.g. Nigeria to Liberia). Other members making substantial use of the Clearing House without incurring arrearages are Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritania.

Organizational and structural problems are at least partially responsible for the WACH's limited growth. Severe logistical problems related to its Freetown location (poor communications, electrical power outages, limited transportation links) frequently interfere with the institution's normal functions. The bimonthly system used to set official exchange rates against the WAUA was, besides being a means to reduce extreme exchange rate fluctuations, a response to the unreliable nature of daily communications with Freetown. This system poses additional disadvantages for net creditor countries who may be exposed to losses when debtor countries devalue their currencies. Although a 1980 agreement makes official exchange rate changes of more than 2.5 percent effective immediately (before the close of the fifteen-day period), it does not apply to fluctuations related to floating currencies. Given these problems, it is not surprising that many West African central banks have continued to settle intra-subregional payments through either bilateral arrangements or European and American financial centers.

Even if these internal difficulties could be overcome, Clearing House operations would remain constrained by the low level of official intra-subregional trade. The great majority of trade occurring between BCEAO countries and other west African states does not pass through any official channel but is instead transacted through parallel markets. Informal channels offer both large- and small-scale traders an easily accessed means to obtain immediate settlement of payments. This alternate system permits all national currencies to be exchanged (albeit usually at a discount) for goods or convertible currencies while also shielding traders who wish to avoid paying government taxes and other charges. By facilitating intraregional trade and establishing a mechanism for direct convertibility between national currencies, West Africa's parallel markets are already meeting some of the WACH's most basic objectives.

The West African Examinations Council (WAEC)

Address: Registrar, 7th Avenue Extension, P.O. Box 125, Accra, Ghana.

Established: 1951

Membership: The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia (joined April 1974), Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To conduct and regulate certain examinations and award-related certificates and diplomas.

Functions: The Council administers examinations for primary, middle and secondary schools, as well as for teachers, nurses, airline pilots, among others. The Council is also involved in test development and research, and shares information among member states and institutions.

Structure: The Council is composed of 32 members appointed by the governments of the member states and the National Committees, 19 members from African universities, and 1 representative each from the University of Cambridge and the University of London.

A Registrar, appointed by the Council, is responsible for the administration and management of the Council's activities. The Council is assisted by four committees: the Administrative and Finance Committee, the Examinations Committee, the Appointments Committee and the Final Awards Committee. Each member state has a National Committee. In early 1988, there were 110 people in Headquarters' staff, including internal auditors, legal staff and security personnel.

Financing: The Council's activities are supported by member country payments and student fees for service. Nigeria pays 63 percent of headquarters' budget, Ghana 27 percent, Sierra Leone 6 percent, Gambia 2.25 percent and Liberia 1.5 percent.

Comments: The fact that the service provided by the Council is contingent upon a paid fee means that the Council is a relatively healthy organization financially. Frequent self-evaluations occur--in 1987, for example, the advanced level examination standards were assessed by the Test Development & Research Office of the WAEC and found equivalent, if not stiffer than U.K. standards. In general, the Council seems to be a well-run, viable organization.

Problems have occurred in examination leakage. Also, the stress on academic achievement is being questioned; Nigeria is developing new exams for vocational education and promoting a conference to discuss curriculum changes. The economic crunch is causing concerns, and new ways to cut costs are being sought--for example, printing examinations in Africa instead of the U.K.

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West African Health Community (WAHC)
Communauté de la Santé de l'Afrique de l'Ouest

Address: The Executive Director, 6 Taylor Drive, Off Edmind Crescent -
Medical Compound, P.B. 2023, Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria .

Established: 1971. Present name adopted in 1978.

Membership: Gambia, Ghana, Liberia (1974), Nigeria, Sierra Leone.

Language(s): English

Objectives: Facilitate coordination of intergovernmental activities and foster cooperation in the health and medical fields among the member states; develop health service manpower at all levels, and disseminate technical health information.

Functions: WAHC organizes postgraduate professional medical education through its three main agencies: the West African College of Nursing (WACN); the West African Pharmaceutical Federation (WAPF); and the West African Postgraduate Medical College (WAPMC) and its two constituent colleges, the West African College of Physicians (WACP) and West African College of Surgeons (WACS). Programs include management training for health personnel and workshops on community health education at all levels. WAHC provides fellowships for training.

The Community provides technical and professional assistance to the member states. The forms of assistance include paying for specialists to serve in member countries, and to providing grants for the construction of health facilities and laboratories, etc.

WAHC supports research work on traditional medicine and local herbs, and publishes bulletins and journals which mainly deal with the health problems of the region. The publications include WAHC Bulletin (quarterly), West African Journal of Medicine, West African Journal of Pharmacy and various brochures.

Structure: The Assembly of Health Ministers, which meets annually, is the Governing Council. It sets the policies and approves the budget for programs and operations. The Assembly also appoints the Chief Officers of the community. An Executive Board, responsible for management, is composed of the Permanent Secretaries of Ministries of Health of Member states and heads of the Committees and specialized agencies which are supported by the community.

Financing: Contributions are from member countries; 60 percent is paid in local currency to the local branches like hospitals and the other 40 percent is paid in \$US to the Headquarters. Nigeria provides 45 percent of member states' contributions. Another source of funds is grants from the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation which currently is contributing about 200,000 naira yearly. The budget for 1985-1986: 3 mn. naira.

Comments: During the past decade, the community has trained numerous health service personnel from all its member states: Senior Health Administrators,

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Specialist Physicians and surgeons in every medical discipline, public Health Nurses, Nurse Administrators, Nurse Anesthetists, Medical Laboratory Technologists and others. Nigeria has played a pivotal role in the Community. In addition to its financial support, the headquarters building was built by the Federal Nigerian Government and donated to the Community in 1978. It also provides free accommodation for the top officers of the community.

The WAHC appears to provide cost-effective training of health personnel. It has allowed medical training to be done within the region, with foreign exchange and other benefits. For example, Ghana used to train its medical doctors in Europe, especially the United Kingdom. Now it sends doctors and others to be trained in WAHC at much lower cost.

The major problem is the prevailing financial constraints which make it hard for the community to expand its activities and introduce new programs. WAHC will probably be taken over by ECOWAS as a sister organization to OCCGE, which serves French-speaking countries. The WAHC will then be called WAHO (West African Health Organization).

West African Insurance Institute (WAI)

Address: Director, Monrovia-Kakata Highway, P.O. Box 2551, Monrovia, Liberia.

Established: 1978

Membership: The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To provide professional insurance education to insurance industry personnel, technical assistance to member countries, and help in organizing research programs and projects in the insurance field.

Functions: WAI's primary function is to provide training for insurance industry personnel. A one-year program is offered to prospective middle managers at the Monrovia location. Several in-service, short-term courses (lasting from 1 to 6 weeks) are being offered in each member country. The WAI also acts as an examination center for various international bodies including: the British Chartered Insurance Institute (CII); Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriters (CPCU); Life Office Management Center (LOMA); and the CLU of America, allowing those who wish to continue their insurance education to be certified by those organizations without leaving West Africa.

Structure: Each of the member countries appoints a representative to the Governing Council. WAI contributes 3 representatives to the Council. From that group, a Chairman and Vice-Chairman are elected to two-year terms. A Board of Studies also exists which is responsible for appraising and reviewing all academic matters. There are only 4 full-time professionals on staff.

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WAII students are admitted on a quota basis, that quota being based on the actual volume of premium income from the previous year. West African insurance companies are invited to nominate employees for admission to WAII courses. Others are allowed to attend. Lecturers and professors are recruited from various West African Insurance companies.

Financing: The WAII is financed by a yearly contribution from member states based on the previously mentioned quota system. For the 1987-88 academic year, this amounted to \$190,000 or 80 percent of the budget, the remaining 20 percent being contributed by the insurance companies themselves. The WAII experiences problems with arrears. It had not yet collected member contributions or school fees amounting to approximately \$350,000-\$400,000 in early 1988. Sierra Leone and Liberia had the biggest arrears.

Comments: The Institute functions well and apparently at low cost. It appears to have a competent administrative staff, a well-furnished library, and good facilities. With only a small professional staff, the Institute relies on professionals from West African insurance companies to present the seminars and sections that make up the one-year course. Their services are paid at the rate of \$US 136 per day (inclusive of salary and per diem). WAII would like to lower per diem costs by building a guest house with external financing.

The in-service short courses are offered in the various member countries, depending on demand. This formula was seen to assure convenience and a high level of attendance while lowering costs (in this case transport costs incurred by students). With 95 percent of the Institute's students coming from West African insurance companies, most student fees, room and board and (when necessary) transportation expenses are covered by these firms.

The training offered at the Institute by insurance practitioners concentrates on practical training relevant to the West African experience. WAII sees its role as training middle-level managers (lower-level professionals overseas). The fact that even larger companies (e.g. Nikon of Nigeria) that have their own training programs will send professionals to WAII for training is testimony to the fact that the Institute is filling a need, offering a more comprehensive selection of courses and at a higher level than found elsewhere in West Africa.

The level of arrears experienced by the Institute is difficult to explain in light of the Institute's apparent competence. It could be an indication of overbudgeting. The Director also pointed out that although dues and fees were often paid in local currencies, central banks were unwilling to release foreign exchange. To the extent possible, these funds were used to sponsor the short-term courses hosted in member countries.

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West African Management Development and Training Institutes
Network (WAMDETIN)

Address: Chairman, c/o Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, P.O. Box 50, Achimota, Ghana.

Established: 1987

Membership: 12 management training institutions in anglophone West Africa.

Language(s): English

Objectives: To form a network among management institutions.

Functions: Though not yet operational, the WAMDETIN is to provide member institutions greater access to information on available consultants, courses and seminars, training and research materials. It is also supposed to sponsor its own seminars, undertake research projects, and develop training materials.

Structure: The coordinating body of the WAMDETIN is composed of one representative from each country and a Coordinator from the host country. The Network secretariat is to have only one paid employee, the Administrative Secretary.

Financing: The Government of Ghana has provided office space and secretarial help through its host institution, GIMPA. Annual contributions amount to \$1,200 per institution. WAMDETIN is also trying to attract funds from donor countries, international organizations, and African regional organizations. The 1988 estimated budget is \$345,000, almost all of which is to be from donors.

West African Rice Development Association (WARDA)

Address: Director General, WARDA, 01 B.P. 2551, Bouaké 01, Côte d'Ivoire.

Established: 1970

Members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierre Leone, and Togo.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: WARDA's primary mandate did not change with the 1986 reorganization of the institution. Its objectives remain: to promote the improvement of the quantity and quality of rice produced in West Africa through inter-governmental cooperation in research, training, and in information and technology diffusion; and to promote systems of storing, processing and marketing rice.

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Functions: While its mandate has remained unchanged, WARDA's interpretation of the mandate has led to a new research strategy and new priorities. The main research emphasis is no longer to be technology transfer but technology generation. Moreover research programs are to be more focused in scope. Thus the 1988 Program and Budget highlights the following primary functions for the five years following the anticipated approval of the new strategy:

- o conducting technology-generating research programs in upland rice cropping and in rain-fed lowland rice production;
- o working with development programs to undertake on-farm research in the region;
- o harmonize support to strengthen national agricultural research by establishing links between member countries and interested donors;
- o conducting a training program involving post-doctorals, Ph.D. dissertation support, research associates and visiting scholars;
- o developing an information and documentation system for regional rice research;
- o holding regional workshops and symposia;
- o publishing a regular WARDA newsletter.

Structure: The structure of WARDA has changed significantly since 1986. Whereas WARDA was originally strictly a regional organization, it now belongs to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system. WARDA's structural reorganization reflects this fact.

The original structure and management of WARDA was seen as one of the primary failings of the organization before the 1986 restructuring. The 1983 External Management Review (EMR) pointed to the absence of a single body actually overseeing the whole WARDA operation and providing policy guidance to the management on all activities and operations. The Governing Council, composed entirely of representatives from member states, was responsible for this task. However it was plagued by political concerns and became overly occupied with administrative and political issues alone. The Scientific and Technical Committee, meanwhile, was responsible for giving advice on scientific and technical aspects of WARDA's activities, but had no involvement in related administrative and financial issues. The result, the EMR states, was "the limited focus of the Governing Council and the STC creating a vacuum filled by a large number of donors with their own diverse priorities and standards of accountability."

This lack of accountability coupled with political pressures also led to politicized and unconstrained hiring. Annual expenditures on the Administrative Budget as a percentage of total WARDA expenditures increased from 17.7 percent in 1977 to 24.7 percent in 1982. Overstaffing was particularly pronounced at the level of general service staff. Within the administrative departments, the ratio of general supporting staff to professional staff increased from 1.77 in 1977 to 2.83 in 1982. Moreover, as the EMR concluded, "the linkage between incentives and performance was minimal."

The anglophone-francophone divide was exacerbated and even institutionalized by the structure of the organization. There existed, for example, "an

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absence of trust" between Executive and Deputy Executive Secretaries, the two being selected by different political processes and representing different linguistic groups. The latter position was described by the EMR as "an expensive redundancy and . . . counter-productive because it enhances political divisiveness at the highest management level." The Chairman of the Governing Council of WARDA observed that "the influence of these colonial languages on our sub-regional organizations is extremely disturbing. . . . Rules and Regulations governing the organizations and the election of officers become so delicate that the balance they seek to represent is in effect a capitulation to the destructive powers of these languages."

The restructuring of WARDA along the lines of the other CGIAR institutions was partially an attempt to address these numerous problems. With the restructuring, the Governing Council and STC have been replaced by the Council of Ministers and a Board of Trustees. The overseeing Council of Ministers, composed of Ministers of the original member states, permits the organization to retain some of its original flavor of regional "ownership," although, in practice, efforts have been made to prevent political considerations from adversely affecting the operation of the research institution. In fact, the Council of Ministers appoints the Executive Secretary upon his/her selection by the Board of Trustees; appoints members of Board of Trustees nominated by member states upon selection of candidates by the Board of Trustees; examines WARDA programs to ensure their conformity to national and regional agricultural development policies; examines all major WARDA reports and evaluations; facilitates resolution of political issues referred to it by the Board of Trustees.

The Board of Trustees takes on the original technical obligations of the STC and more. It is now the body that oversees all aspects of WARDA policy and administration. Its duties henceforth include determining the annual work program and budget, monitoring all WARDA activities, ensuring WARDA's financial management and accountability, considering and approving personnel policies, and selecting and nominating the Executive Secretary. Moreover, this policymaking body is no longer completely regional. It is composed of seven members nominated by member states and appointed by the Council of Ministers, as well as seven members nominated and appointed by CGIAR.

Financing: Before the reorganization member states were responsible for financing the core administrative budget. Supplementary research and development projects, on the other hand, were financed by a number of donors, including bilaterals such as France, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S., as well as multilaterals such as UNDP, FAO, and CGIAR.

Failure of member states to pay their arrears practically brought WARDA to a standstill. By 1985 the organization was approximately \$US 0.5 mn. in debt against its expenditures and member states were in arrears to the tune of \$US 11.5 mn..

With the restructuring and affiliation to CGIAR, WARDA's financing arrangements have changed. Member states are now expected to pay 10 percent of the total \$US 4 mn. budget. Moreover these funds are no longer earmarked to pay for the core budget but are now used to pay for supplementary projects.

The core funding is now provided by the CGIAR. Some separate projects are covered by independent pledges from various bilateral and multilateral donors.

Comments: Although it is still too early to make a definitive assessment on the new WARDA, the organization appears to have made a significant turnaround in the past two years. During the first four months of 1987 WARDA paid its accumulated debts of \$US 1.8 mn. and thus cleared its books of its long term liabilities. Senior-person years have been reduced by 20 percent, from 55 to 44, since 1985. All international positions are now filled by international competition. Moreover, all the officials of WARDA, CGIAR and donor agencies who were interviewed expressed optimism on the future of the new WARDA.

West African Science Association (WASA)
Association Scientifique l'Afrique de l'Ouest (ASAO)

Address: President, c/o Botany Department, P.O. Box 7, University of Ghana, Legon.

Established: 1953

Membership: National science associations in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

Language(s): English and French.

Objectives: To coordinate research and facilitate information exchange among national science associations.

Functions: WASA sponsors a conference every 2 years, of which there have been 13 to date. These conferences are the principal means by which representatives of national science associations meet and discuss the possibilities for cooperation. WASA used to publish the Journal of the WASA, but there has not been an issue since 1978.

Structure: The Executive Council has 19 members.

Financing: In principle the WASA is supported by contributions of member associations, but these have not been forthcoming in recent years. The Ghanaian government financed the last conference in August 1986.

Comments: WASA is beset by lack of funds and communication barriers. Also it does not seem to have a clear focus of activity. Much of the last conference was devoted to reiterating the importance of cooperation in the development of science in Africa. However, little was said in terms of proposing actual cooperative ventures.

The WASA seems more successful as a professional organization, in which scientists have the opportunity to present papers to their colleagues. The regional character of the forum, however, is compromised by the fact that at the last conference 80 percent of the registered participants were from Ghana.

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ANNEX 1

ACRONYMS

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| AAASA | Association for the Advancement of Agricultural Sciences in Africa |
| AACC | All-Africa Council of Churches |
| AAPAM | African Association for Public Administration and Management |
| AAU | Association of African Universities |
| ABN | Autorité du Bassin du Niger |
| ACCE | African Council on Communication Education |
| ACCOSCA | African Confederation of Cooperative Savings and Credit |
| ACCT | Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique |
| ACMAD | African Centre for Applied Meteorology |
| ACO | African Curriculum Organization |
| ADPH | L'Association Africaine Pour le Développement Du Palmier A Huile |
| AFRAA | African Airlines Association |
| AFRALTI | African Regional Advanced Level Telecommunication Institute |
| AFRICA RE | African Reinsurance Corporation |
| AGC | African Groundnut Council |
| AGRHYMET | The AGRHYMET (Agriculture, Hydrology, Meteorology) Regional Center |
| AIAFD | Association des Institutions Africaines de Financement du Développement |
| AIHTTR | African Institute for Higher Technical Training |
| ALERT | All African Leprosy Rehabilitation and Training Centre |
| ALG | Autorité de Développement Intégré de la Région Liptako-Gourma |
| AOAPC | Association des Organisations Africaines de Promotion Commerciale |
| ARIPO | African Regional Industrial Property Organization |
| ARSO | The African Regional Organization for Standardization |
| ARTA | Autorité Routière Trans-Africaine |
| ASEAC | Association des Economistes d'Afrique Centrale |
| ASECNA | L'Agence Pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique |
| BAD | Banque Africaine de Développement |
| BCEAO | Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest |
| BDEAC | Banque de Développement des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale |
| BDEGL | Banque de Développement des Etats des Grands Lacs |
| BEAC | Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale |
| BOAD | Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement |
| BZEP | Banque de la Zone d'Echange Préférentielles |
| CAEM | Centre Africain d'Etudes Monétaires |
| CAFAC | Commission Africaine de l'Aviation Civile |
| CAFS | Centre for African Family Studies |
| CAMES | Conseil Africain et Malgache des Etudes Supérieures |
| CAPTAC | Conférence des Administrations des Postes et Télécommunications |
| CBLT | Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad |
| CCAC | Chambre de Compensation des Paiements de l'Afrique Centrale |

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| CCCE | Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique |
| CEAO | Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest |
| CEB | Communauté Electrique du Benin |
| CEBV | Communauté Economique du Bétail et de la Viande du Conseil |
| CEEAC | Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale |
| CEPGL | Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs |
| CERDAS | Centre de Coordination des Recherches et de la Documentation en Sciences Sociales desservant l'Afrique subsaharienne |
| CESAO | Centre d'Etudes Economiques et Sociales de l'Afrique de l'Ouest |
| CGIAR | Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research |
| CIAT | Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical |
| CICA | Conférence Internationale des Contrôles d'Assurances |
| CIDA | Canadian Aid Agency |
| CIEH | Comité Interafricain d'Etudes Hydrauliques |
| CIERRO | Centre Interafricain d'Etudes en Radio Rurale de Ouagadougou |
| CILSS | Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel |
| CIMMYT | Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y frigo |
| CIP | Centro Internacional de la Papa |
| CIRSED | Centre Interafricain de Recherches et d'Etudes Supérieures en Science de l'education |
| CODESRIA | Conseil pour le Développement de la Recherche Economique et Sociale en Afrique |
| CPI | Conseil Phytosanitaire Interafricaine |
| CRADAT | Centre Régional Africain d'Administration du Travail |
| CRAT | Centre Régional Africain de Technologie |
| CRMAC | Centre Sous-Régional de Mise En Valeur des Ressources Minerales pour l'Afrique Centrale |
| CRTO | Centre Régional de Télédétection |
| CSSA | Conseil Supérieur du Sport en Afrique |
| DANIDA | Danish Aid Agency |
| DLCO-EA | Desert Locust Control Organization for East Africa |
| EADB | East Africa Development Bank |
| EAMAU | Ecole Africaine et Mauricienne d'Architecture et d'Urbanisme |
| EAWS | East African Wildlife Society |
| ECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EDI | Economic Development Institute, World Bank |
| EGL | Electrification des Grands Lacs |
| EIER | Ecole Inter-Etats d'Ingénieurs de l'Equipement Rural |
| EISMV | Ecole Inter-Etats des Sciences et Medecine Veterinaires |
| ESACC | Ecole Supérieure Africaine des Cadres de Chemins de Fer |
| ESAMI | Eastern and Southern Management Institute |
| FAC | French Aid Agency |
| FAD | Fonds Africaine de Développement |
| FCCD | Fonds de Cooperation, de Compensation et de Développement |
| FCD | Fonds Communautaire de Développement |
| FOSIDEC | Fonds de Solidarité et d'Intervention pour le Développement de la Communauté |
| FSA | Fonds de Solidarité Africain |
| GTZ | German Aid Agency |

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| HOTAFRIC | Société de Développement Hôtelier et Touristique de l'Afrique |
| IAMSEA | Institut Africain et Mauricien de Statistiques et d'Economie Appliquée |
| ICIPE | International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology |
| ICRA | International Council for Research in Agroforestry |
| ICRISAT | International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics |
| IDEP | Institut Africain de Développement Economique et de Planification |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| IFORD | Institut de Formation et de Recherche Démographiques |
| IIA | Institut International des Assurances |
| IITA | International Institute of Tropical Agriculture |
| ILCA | International Livestock Centre for Africa |
| ILRAD | International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases |
| INADES | Institut Africain pour le Développement Economique et Social |
| INSAH | Institut du Sabel |
| IPPF | International Planned Parenthood Federation |
| ISARES | Institut Supérieur Africain de Recherche et d'Education |
| ISSEA | Institut Sous-Régional de Statistique et d'Economie Appliquée |
| MRU | Mano River Union |
| OAB | Organisation Africaine des Bois |
| OAPI | Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle |
| OBK | Organisation du Bassin du Kagera |
| OCBN | Organisation Commune Benin-Niger des Chemins de Fer et des Transports |
| OCCGE | Organisation de Coordination et de Cooperation pour Lutte Contre les Grandes Endemies |
| OCEAC | Organisation de Coordination pour la lutte contre les Endemies en Afrique Centrale |
| OCLALAV | Organisation Commune de Lutte Antiacridienne et de Lutte Antiaviare |
| ODA | British Aid Agency |
| OIC | Organisation Interafricaine du Café |
| OMMSA | Organization for Museums, Monuments and Sites of Africa |
| OMVG | Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie |
| OMVS | Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal |
| PADIS | Pan African Documentation and Information Service |
| PANA | Pan African News Agency |
| PMAWCA | Port Management Association of West and Central Africa |
| PTA | Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States |
| PTACH | PTA Clearing House |
| RIPS | Regional Institute for Population Studies |
| RMA | Rand Monetary Area |
| ROSTA | Regional Office for Science and Technology for Africa |
| RSA | Republic of South Africa |
| SACCAR | Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research |
| SACU | Southern African Customs Union |
| SADCC | Southern African Development Coordinating Conference |
| SAFGRAD | Semi-Arid Food Grain Research and Development |
| SARCCUS | Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and |

Utilization of the Soil

| | |
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| SATCC | Southern African Transport and Communications Commission |
| SIDA | Swedish Aid Agency |
| STRC/OAU | Scientific, Technical and Research Commission of the Organization of African Unity |
| DAR | Union Africaine Des Chemins de Fer |
| UDEAC | Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale |
| UMOA | Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEP | United Nations Environmental Programme |
| UNFPA | United Nations Fund for Population Activities |
| UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organization |
| UPAT | Union Panafricaine des Télécommunications |
| URTNA | Union des Radiodiffusions Et Televisions Nationales d'Afrique |
| UTTI | Union Telecommunications Training Institute |
| WACH | West African Clearing House |
| WAEC | The West African Examinations Council |
| WAHC | West African Health Community |
| WAI | West African Insurance Institute |
| WAMDETIN | West African Management Development and Training Institutes |
| WARDA | West African Rice Development Association |
| WASA | West African Science Association |
| WIPO | World Intellectual Property Organization |

ANNEX 2

SUPPLEMENTARY LIST OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

- Action familiale africaine et malgache (AFAM); Dakar, Senegal.
African Association of Political Science (AAPS); Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
African Insurance Organization; Douala, Cameroun.
Africa Center for Integrated Rural Development in Africa (CIRDA); Arusha, Tanzania.
Africa Network of Scientific and Technological Institutions (ANSTI); Nairobi, Kenya.
Africa Youth for Environment; Nairobi, Kenya.
Africa Union of Architects; Kampala, Uganda.
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO); Harare, Zimbabwe.
African Centre of Literature; Kitwe, Zambia.
African Women's Regional Coordination Committee for Development; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
African Patent Document and Information Centre; Yaoundé, Cameroun. Accueil et entraide (ACEN); Eseka, Cameroun.
African Regional Centre for Labour Administration (ARLAC); Centre Regional Africain d'Administration du Travail; Harare, Zimbabwe.
African Association for Correspondence Education (AACE); Nairobi, Kenya.
African Patent Document and Information Centre; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
African Petroleum Producers' Association APPA (couldn't find: an organization or an affiliation?); Lagos, Nigeria.
African Cultural Institute (Institut Culturel Africain); Dakar, Senegal.
African Cooperation Savings and Credit Association (ACOSCA); Nairobi, Kenya.
African Association for Literacy and Adult Education (AALAE); Nairobi, Kenya.
African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF); Nairobi, Kenya.
African Regional Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA); Maseru, Lesotho.
African Centre for Educational Exchange; Lagos, Nigeria.; African Catholic Union of the Press ; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
African Music Rostrum (AFMR); Lagon, Ghana.
African Regional Co-ordinating Committee for the Integration of Women in Development (ARCC); Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia.
African Social Studies Programme (ASSP); Nairobi, Kenya.
African Regional Centre for Engineering Design and Manufacturing (ARCDEM); Ibadan, Nigeria.
African Mathematics Union; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
African and Malagasy Sugar Agreement; N'Djamena, Chad.
African Committee for the Coordination of Information Media; Accra, Ghana.
African Center for Higher Management Studies/Centre d'études supérieures africain en gestion (CESAG); Dakar, Senegal.
African Organization of the International Federation of; Commercial, African Institute of Informatics (Institut Africain d'Informatique); Libreville, Gabon.
African Standing Conference on Bibliographic Control (ASCOBIC); Banjul, Gambia.
African Insurance Organization; Yaoundé, Cameroun.

- African Regional Aquaculture Centre; Ibadan, Nigeria.
- African Association for the Advancement of Sciences and Technology (AAAST); Nairobi, Kenya.
- African Association for the Advancement of Science and Technology (AAAST); Yaoundé, Cameroun.
- African Regional Documentation Centre on Communication Research and Policies; Nairobi, Kenya.
- African Regional Organization of the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees (AFRO-FIET); Accra, Ghana.
- African Society for Development of Millet and Sorghum based Food Industry (SADIAMIL)?
- African Network of Scientific and Technological Institutions (Réseau Africain d'institutions scientifiques et techniques); Nairobi, Kenya.
- African Women's Network for Development; Accra, Ghana.
- African Standing Conference on Bibliographic Control; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (AGECOOP); Lomé, Togo.
- Agriculture Management Training in Africa (AMTA); Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
- All Africa Teachers' Organization (AATO); Accra, Ghana.
- Antenne Nutritionnelle de l'OCCGE; Lomé, Togo.
- The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA); Khartoum, Sudan.
- Arab Organization for Agricultural Development; Khartoum, Sudan.
- Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID); Khartoum, Sudan.
- Association des Producteurs du Caoutchouc Naturel; Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Association des chercheurs africains pour le développement économique et social; Dakar, Senegal.
- Association of Surgeons of East Africa; Nairobi, Kenya.
- Association of French Teachers in Africa (AFTA); Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Association pour le Développement et la Recherche en Education en Afrique (ADEFREDA); Lomé, Togo.
- Association internationale pour la recherche médicale en Afrique de l'Ouest; Dakar, Senegal.
- Association for the Promotion of African Community Initiatives; Douala, Cameroun.
- Association des femmes africaines pour la recherche sur le développement (AFARD) ; Dakar, Senegal.
- Association africaine d'éducation pour le développement; Dakar, Senegal.
- Association internationale pour le développement de la documentation, des bibliothèques et des archives en Afrique; Dakar, Senegal.
- Association of African Industrial Technology Organizations; (AAITO); Lagos, Nigeria.
- Association des produits à marché, EEC Africa-Caribbean-Pacific; Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Association of African Central Banks; Dakar, Senegal
- Association of Medical Schools in Africa (AMSA); Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
- Association of African National Olympic Committees; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
- Association of African Historians (Association des historiens africains); Dakar, Senegal.
- Association of African Maritime Training Institutes (AAMI); Nairobi, Kenya.
- Association internationale pour le développement de la documentation, des bibliothèques et des archives en Afrique; Kinshasa, Zaire.
- Association of Social Work Education in Africa (ASWEA); Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Association des Universités Partiellement ou Entièrement de Langue Française (AUPELF); Dakar, Senegal.

- Association panafricaine pour le développement communautaire; Dakar, Senegal.
 Association des réalisateurs de journaux ruraux africains; Bamako, Mali.
 Association des institutions régionales et sous-régionales de financement du développement en Afrique de l'Ouest; Lomé, Togo.
 Beira Corridor Group (SATCC?); Harare, Zimbabwe.
 Branche Régionale du Conseil International des Archives pour l'Afrique Centrale; Brazzaville, Congo.
 Bureau d'études de conseils et d'interactions au Sahel (BECIS); Bamako, Mali.
 Bureau africain et mauricien de recherches et d'études législatives; Bangui, CAR.
 Bureau inter-africain des sols (unheard of); Bangui, CAR.
 Bureau permanent inter-africain de la tsé-tsé et de la trypanosomiase; Kinshasa, Zaire.
 CEAO Regional Center for Commercial Information and Documentation; Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
 Central African Association of Centres for the Handicapped; Kigali, Rwanda.
 Centre de formation pour l'entretien routier (CERFER); Lomé, Togo.
 Centre Regional d'Action Culturelle (CRAC); Lomé, Togo.
 Centre de recherche, d'échange et de documentation (CREDU); Nairobi, Kenya.
 Centre interafricain de production de films (CIPROFILM); Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
 Centre de recherche et de production d'énergie solaire; Bamako, Mali.
 Centre Africain de Recherches Industrielles (CARI); Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Centre de formation aux techniques des transports routiers (CFTTR); Niamey, Niger.
 Centre National de Recherches Océanographiques et des Pêches (CNROP); Nouadhibou, Mauritania.
 Centre Régional de Formation Phytosanitaire de Yaoundé (CREFFHY) Yaoundé, Cameroun.
 Centre d'études linguistiques et historiques par la tradition orale (CELHTO); Niamey, Niger.
 Centre de recherches sur les méningites et les schistosomiases; Niamey, Niger.
 Centre international des civilisations Bantoues (CICIBA); Libreville, Gabon.
 Centre radiophonique internationale d'ondes courtes; Moyabi, Gabon.
 Centre Ouest-africain de formation et d'études bancaires; Dakar, Senegal.
 Centre africain de perfectionnement et de recherche des interprètes du spectacle; Dakar, Senegal.
 Centre de recherches, d'études et de documentation sur les institutions et la législation africaine
 Centre for Research and Documentation of Oral Traditions and African Languages; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
 Centre africain de management et de perfectionnement des cadres, (CAMPC); Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
 Centre de Recherche pour le Développement International (CRDI); Dakar, Senegal.
 Centre régional de recherche et de documentation pour le développement culturel (CREDEC); Dakar, Senegal.
 Centre Régional de Formation de Kinshasa; Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Centre de Recherches Océanographiques de Dakar (CRODT); Dakar, Senegal.
 Centre for African Studies (Centre de Estudos Africanos); Maputo, Mozambique.
 Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire pour la Promotion et de la Protection des Droits de l'Homme en Afrique Centrale (CRIDHAC); Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Centre international de la culture africaine et du bien-être de l'enfance; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Christian Relief and Development Association; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
 Clerical and Technical Employees (AFRO-FIET); Nairobi, Kenya.
 Club of Africa; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Cômité international de liaison pour les programmes du Food Corps (CILCA);
 Bamako, Mali.
 Cômité scientifique inter-africain; Dakar, Senegal.
 Commercial and Development Bank for Eastern and Southern Africa; (PTA Bank);
 Harare, Zimbabwe.
 Commonwealth African Regional Centre for Youth Work; Lusaka, Zambia.
 Commonwealth Regional Health Secretariat for Eastern, Central, and Southern
 Africa; Arusha, Tanzania.
 Conférence Ministérielle des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre sur
 les transports maritimes; Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
 Conference of Rectors of French-Speaking African Universities; Libreville,
 Gabon.
 Conference des ministres africains de la culture (CMAC); Dakar, Senegal.
 Conseil africain de la comptabilité; Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Conseil africain de télédétection; Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Conseil régional pour l'éducation et l'alphabétisation des adultes en
 Afrique; Lomé, Togo.
 Consortium inter-africain de distribution cinématographique (CIDC) ;
 Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
 Coordinating Committee for Liberation Movements in Africa; Maputo,
 Mozambique.
 Documentation et informations africaines (DIA); Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Dschang Agricultural Institute; Dschang, Cameroun
 East African Women's League (EAWL); Nairobi, Kenya.
 East and Central African Regional Branch of the International Council on
 Archives (ECARBICA); Zomba, Malawi.
 East African Agricultural Economics Society; Kampala, Uganda.
 East African Railways Corporation; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Society of Travel Agents; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East and Central African Regional Branch of the International Council on
 Archives (ECARBICA); Harare, Zimbabwe.
 East and Central African Regional Branch of the International Council on
 Archives (ECARBICA); Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Natural Resources Council; Arusha, Tanzania.
 East African Development Bank (EADB); Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
 East Africa Natural History Society (EANHS); Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Academy; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
 East African Harbours Corporation; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
 East African Examination Council; Kampala, Uganda.
 East African School of Librarianship; Kampala, Uganda.
 East African Academy; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Airways Corporation (defunct); Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Tuberculosis Investigation Centre (EATIC); Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Building Society; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African External Telecommunications Company Ltd.; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Flying School; Soroti, Kenya.
 East African Natural Resources Research Council; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation; Kampala, Uganda.
 East African Remote Sensing; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Tea Trade Association; Nairobi, Kenya.
 East African Wattles Manufacturers Association; Nairobi, Kenya.

- East African Common Services; Nairobi, Kenya.
- Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Centre (ESAMRDC); Tanzania
- Eastern and Southern African Patent Documentation and Information Centre (ESAPEDIC); Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Eastern and Southern Africa Port Management Association (ESAPMA); Mombasa, Kenya.
- Eastern Africa Statistical Training Centre; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Centre (Sponsored by ECA); Dodoma, Tanzania.
- Eastern African Centre for Research in Oral Traditions and ; African National Languages; Zanzibar.
- Ecole supérieure des industries textiles ESITEX; Ségou, Mali.
- Ecole africaine de la météorologie et de l'aviation civile, (EAMAC); Niamey, Niger.
- Ecole Supérieure Multinationale des Télécommunications (ESMT); Dakar, Senegal.
- Ecole Inter-Etats des Douanes; Bangui, CAR.
- Ecole multinationale supérieure des postes de Brazzaville; Brazzaville, Congo.
- Ecole supérieure inter-africaine de l'électricité (ESIE); Bingerville, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Economic Commission for Africa (ECA UN); Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; affiliated bodies: African Institution for Higher Technical Training and Research; Association of African Tax Administrators; Regional Center for Demographic Research and Training in Africa; Joint Conference of African Planners, Statisticians and Demographers; Pan African Documentation and Information System for Social and Economic Development (PADIS); Lake Tanganyika and Kivu Basin Commission; Federation of African Chambers of Commerce; Conference of African Ministers of Trade; Conference of African Ministers of Industry; Conference of Ministers of African Less Developed Countries; African Development Information Network (AFDIN); African Training and Research Center for Women (ATRCW); African Women's Development Task Force; African Regional Coordination Committee for the Integration of Women in Development; Association of African Central Banks (AACB); Industrial Property Organization for English-Speaking Africa (ESARIPO); English-Speaking Patent Documentation and Information Center (ESAPADIC); Dakar-N'djamena Highway Coordinating Committee, Trans-African Highway Bureau; Nouakchott-Lagos Highway Coordinating Committee, Trans-African Highway Bureau; Trans-African Highway Coordinating Committee (TAH); Trans-East-African Highway Commission; Central African Mineral Resources Development Center.
- Encyclopaedia Africana Secretariat; Accra, Ghana.
- Environnement et développement national en Afrique; Dakar, Senegal.
- FAO Regional Office for Africa; Accra, Ghana; subsidiary bodies: African Commission of Agricultural Statistiques (defunct); African Forestry Commission; Commission on African Animal Trypanosomiasis; Regional Food and Nutrition Commission for Africa.
- Fédération des associations de l'Afrique de l'Ouest pour la promotion des personnes handicapées; Nouakchott, Mauritania/Bamako, Mali?
- Fédération de l'industrie textile africaine et malgache; Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Fédération panafricaine des cinéastes sénégalais (FEPAC); Dakar, Senegal.
- Federation of African Public Relations Associations (FAPRA); Accra, Ghana.

Fédération panafricaine des syndicats de l'agriculture; Lomé, Togo.
 Flying Doctors' Society of Africa; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Fondation panafricaine pour le développement économique, social et culturel;
 Lomé, Togo.
 Fonds de solidarité de l'UDEAC; Bangui, CAR.
 Forest Industries Advisory Group for Africa (FIAG); Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia.
 Higher Education Foundation for Central Africa; Brazzaville, Congo.
 Industrial Property Organization for English-Speaking Africa (ESARIPO);
 Ethiopia
 Institut Marchoux de leprologie; Bamako, Mali.
 Institut d'ophtalmologie tropicale africaine (IOTA); Bamako, Mali.
 Institut d'histoire, d'art et d'archéologie africaines; Abidjan, Côte
 d'Ivoire.
 Institut Culturel Africain (ICA); Dakar, Senegal.
 Institut fondamental d'Afrique noire (IFAN); Dakar, Senegal.
 Institut de Statistique, de Planification et d'Economie Appliquée (ISPEA);
 Yaoundé, Cameroun.
 Institut pour la recherche scientifique en Afrique centrale (IRSAC); Bukavu,
 Zaire.
 Institut Panafricain des Hautes Etudes Industrielles; Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Institute of South West African Architects; Windhoek, Namibia.
 Institute for Meteorological Training and Research; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (INRA); Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
 Institute of Development Management; Mbabane, Swaziland.
 Institute of African Studies; Freetown, Sierra Leone.
 Insurance Association of East Africa for Issue of Tariff; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Inter-African Philosophy Council; Cotonou, Benin.
 Inter-African Bureau of Languages; Kampala, Uganda.
 Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR); Nairobi, Kenya.
 Inter-african Union of Lawyers (IUL); Nairobi, Kenya.
 Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD); Djibouti
 Inter-University Committee for East Africa; Kampala, Uganda.
 International African Law Association (IALA); Lagon, Ghana.
 International Trypanotolerant Center; Banjul, Gambia.
 International Co-operative Alliance (Alliance Coopérative Internationale);
 Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania.
 International Fertilizer Development Centre (IFDC); Lomé, Togo.
 International Red Locust Control Organization for Central and Southern
 Africa; Lusaka, Zambia?
 International Congress of African Studies of Lagos (ICAS); Lagos, Nigeria.
 International Association of African Geographers; Lagos, Nigeria.
 International Public Health Education Center (CIESPAC); Brazzaville, Congo.
 International Red Locust Control Organization for Central and Southern
 Africa; Lusaka, Zambia.
 International Society for Strategic Studies (ISSA); Masvingo, Zimbabwe.
 Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters; Khartoum, Sudan.
 L'union africaine et malgache de coopération économique (UAMCE); Yaoundé,
 Cameroun.
 Lake Chad Research Institute; Maidiguriu, Nigeria.
 Language Association of East Africa; Kampala, Uganda.
 Mano Union Forestry Training Institute; Freetown, Sierra Leone.
 Ministerial Conference of West and Central African States on Maritime
 Transport (MCWCS)/ Conférence Ministérielle des états de l'Afrique de
 l'Ouest et du Centre sur les transports maritimes (CMEAOC); Abidjan, Côte

- d'Ivoire.
- Mueka College of African Wildlife Resources; Arusha, Tanzania.
- Multi-Country Posts and Telecommunications Training School; Blantyre, Malawi.
- Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOC); Niger, Zambia, Cameroon, Rwanda.
- Multinational Civil Aviation Training Center; Mvengue, Gabon.
- OCIC/Africa - French Speaking Countries; Dakar, Senegal.
- Office de recherche sur l'alimentation et la nutrition africaine (ORANA); Dakar, Senegal.
- Organisation africaine des institutions supérieures de contrôle des finances publiques; Lomé, Togo.
- Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
- Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP); Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
- Organisation commune de lutte anti-acridienne et de lutte anti-aviaire (OCLALAV) (defunct); Dakar, Senegal.
- Organisation panafricaine de la famille (CPAF); Dakar, Senegal.
- Organisation pour le développement du tourisme en Afrique (ODTA); Yaoundé, Cameroun.
- Organisation régionale africaine de la Fédération internationale des employés techniciens et cadres; Lomé, Togo.
- Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne (OCAM) (defunct); Bangui, CAR.
- Organisation internationale contre le criquet migrateur africain OICMA (defunct); Bamako, Mali.
- Organization of African Unity/Scientific, Technical and Research Commission (OAU/STRC); Lagos, Nigeria: subsidiary bodies: Advisory Board of Inter-African Bureau for Animal Health; African Consultants on Soil Scientists; Consultative Advisory Committee on Semi-Arid Food Grain, Research and Development (SAFGRAD); Inter-African Bureau for Forestry Resources IBFR (defunct); Inter-African Committee on African Medicinal Plants; on Agriculture and Mechanization of Agriculture; on Biological Sciences (defunct); on Committee on Building Materials and Housing (defunct); on Cartography, Maps, and Surveys; on Computer Sciences & Informatic Edu (defunct); on Earth Sciences, Geodesy (defunct); on Fertilizers; on Food Science and Food Technology (defunct); on Geology and Minerology (defunct); on Iron and Steel Developments (defunct); on Natural Resources; on Oceanography, Inland and Sea Fisheries; on Solar Energy; International Scientific Committee for Trypanosomiasis Research and Control (ISCTR); Scientific Council of Africa; Inter-African Research Fund (defunct).
- Organization of African Unity (OAU); Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: affiliated bodies: Bureau for Refugees; Commission of Fifteen on Refugees; Coordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees; African Telecommunications Union; PANAFTEL Pan African Telecommunications Network, Regional Centre for Solar Energy Development; Bureau linguistique interafricain.
- Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) (could not find); Accra, Ghana.
- Organization of Youth and Voluntary Work Movements for Africa; Nairobi, Kenya.
- Organization for African Freedom (OAF); Maseru, Lesotho.
- Pan African Association of Law Students; Lagon, Ghana.
- Pan African Travel Organization; Nairobi, Kenya.
- Pan African Association of Neurological Sciences (PAANS); Nairobi, Kenya.
- Pan-African Postal Union (PAPU); Arusha, Tanzania.

Pan-African Institute for Development (PAID); Douala, Cameroun.
 Pan-African College of Radiographers; Causeway, Zimbabwe.
 Pan-African Union of Journalists; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Petroleum Training Centre (PIC); Sumbe, Angola.
 Pilot and Aircraft Maintenance Technicians Training Centre; Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia.
 Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa; (Association d'Afrique orientale et méridionale pour l'aménagement portuaire); Nairobi, Kenya.
 Posts and Telecommunications Central Training School; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Programme pour l'Environnement et le Développement du Tiers-Monde (ENDA); Dakar, Senegal.
 Programme de Cartographie Hydrogéologique Internationale de l'Afrique (PCHIA); Kinshasa, Zaire.
 Programme Exchange Centre; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Recherches pour l'éducation affective des jeunes en Afrique (REDAJA); Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire/Dakar, Senegal.
 Regional Maritime Academy; Accra, Ghana.
 Regional Center for Training in Aerial Surveys (RECTAS); Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
 Regional Trust Fund for the Protection of East and Central Africa; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Regional Academy of Maritime Science and Technology; Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
 Regional East African School of Aviation; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Research Committee on Africa; Cotonou, Benin.
 Research Library on African Affairs; Accra, Ghana.
 Réseau d'innovation éducative pour le développement en Afrique; Dakar, Senegal.
 Réseau Sahélien d'Information Scientifique et technique (RESADOC); Bamako, Mali.
 Roberts Flight Information Region (FIR); Monrovia, Liberia.
 Sahel-Solidarité; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
 Science Education Program for Africa (SEPA); Accra, Ghana.
 Secrétariat de santé dentaire de l'Afrique; Dakar, Senegal.
 Secrétariat de santé dentaire de l'Afrique; Lomé, Togo.
 The Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat; Banjul, Gambia.
 Settlement Information Network Africa (SINA); Nairobi, Kenya.
 Société africaine d'études et de développement (SAED); Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
 Société africaine du développement de l'industrie alimentaire de mil? (inconnu)
 Société africaine d'entreprises commerciales (SAECO); Dakar, Senegal.
 Société panafricaine de cardiologie; Dakar, Senegal.
 Society for the Promotion of Adult Literacy in Africa; Nairobi, Kenya.
 Society of Anaesthesiologists of East Africa; Nairobi, Kenya.
 SOS Sahel International; Dakar, Senegal.
 South West African Scientific Society; Windhoek, Namibia.
 Southern Africa Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC); Blantyre, Malawi.
 Standing Conference of African University Libraries (SCAUL); Nairobi, Kenya.
 Sub-regional Research Centre on Building and Construction Material; Cacavelli, Togo.
 Tanzama Pipeline Limited; Ndola, Tanzania.
 Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA); Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
 Tea Research Foundation; ? Malawi.
 UNESCO Bureau régional de l'Unesco pour l'éducation en Afrique; Dakar,

Senegal.

- Union Africaine de distributeurs d'eau (UADE); Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Union africaine parlementaire (UAP); Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Union of West African Voluntary Workcamps Association (UWAVWA); Accra, Ghana.
- Union des écrivains du monde noir; Yaoundé, Cameroun.
- Union des producteurs, transporteurs et distributeurs d'énergie électrique d'Afrique (UPDEA); Union des conseils des chargeurs; Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Union africaine et mauricienne de banques pour le développement (UAMBD); Bangui, RCA.
- Union des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (UEAC); N'Djamena, Chad.
- United Nations African Institute for the prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI); Kampala, Uganda.
- University College Hospital; Ibadan, Nigeria: bodies associated with: Confederation of African Medical Associations and Societies (CAMAS); Federation of African Medical Student Association (FAMSA); West African College of Surgeons (WACS).
- University of Ibadan; Bodies associated with: International Congress of Africanists; African Curriculum Organization (ACO); Ibadan, Nigeria.
- African Union of Physicists (AUP); West African Association of Agricultural Economists; West African Modern Language and Literary Association (WAMLA); West African Science Association (WASA); International African Institute (IAI).
- West African Linguistic Society (WALS); Lagon, Ghana.
- West African Chambers of Commerce?
- West African Historical Museum; Cape Coast, Ghana.
- West African Insurance Consultative Associations (WAICA); Monrovia, Liberia.
- West African Insurance Institutions; Monrovia, Liberia.
- Wildlife School (Ecole de Formation Spécialisée de la Faune); Garoua, Cameroun.