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An
Agency for International Development
Symposium
on
Strengthening Democratic Institutions
Summary of Proceedings

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Draft

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strengthening democratic institutions in Latin America should be a primary mission of the United States Agency for International Development, (A.I.D.). This conclusion was supported by participants in a two-day conference (July 30-31, 1987) in Washington, D.C. hosted by the Office of Administration of Justice and Democratic Development, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. Representing A.I.D., the Department of State, international organizations, the Congress, policy research organizations, and academic institutions, attendees agreed on the importance of supporting democracy in Latin America and offered insights and strategies that the Agency might consider in developing future programs. Following is an analysis of their observations and recommendations.

The Historic Context

Since 1981, A.I.D. has been guided by legislation and administrative policies that support an Agency role in democracy-building. Various actions have linked economic development and political democracy, encouraged support for popular participation, and focussed attention on issues of equity and human rights. Agency policies have recognized the need to promote the administration of justice, stronger legal systems, and electoral reform. The National Bipartisan Commission on Latin America underscored the interrelationships among economic opportunity, human development, security and democracy; civic education, stronger local governments, leadership development, access to judicial and political processes, and legislative capacity-building are activities encouraged by recent administrations.

The Policy Environment

While legislation and administrative guidelines have allowed and encouraged A.I.D. to strengthen democratic institutions in Latin America, the broader goals of development assistance have minimized the importance of democracy building in favor of anti-communist strategies and of economic development programs that may, in fact, have impeded democratic practices and structures. Policies and programs, therefore, have lacked coherency, competed for resources, and sought conflicting outcomes.

Development assistance that strengthens democratic institutions must begin with a coherent, coordinated, and consistent policy framework that places democracy at the top of the list of intended outcomes.

Program Options

Once a commitment has been made to pursue democratic institutional development in Latin America, the program options are numerous. They include support for:

1. **Grassroots Organizations.** Much activity at the grassroots, community level in Latin America is participative and democratic in nature. Support for the development of grassroots organizations is nurturing democratic practice in its natural context and is building on local, indigenous institutions.

2. **Short-term Economic Development.** While building an institutional infrastructure for democracy, economic development must continue to support equitable growth, a broad base of entrepreneurship and a vigorous market, all of which are compatible with democracy.
3. **Strong National Institutions.** Judicial, legislative, and electoral institutions are critical to democracies and need to be strengthened at the national level and extended to lower levels of government.
4. **Military Involvement.** The military cannot be overlooked as a important player in development, and assistance programs should encourage communication and collaboration with the military in development projects while educating both the military and the civilian populations on national security and the role of the military in democratic societies.
5. **Decentralization.** Enduring democracies decentralize power. A.I.D. should strengthen local, municipal, and regional governments.
6. **Voluntary Associations.** Voluntary associations provide people with a democratic experience that is rooted in their own culture and organizational norms. The encouragement of such associations enhances the opportunity to practice participation in meaningful activity.
7. **A Free Press.** A free press is an instrument of pluralism and a support to other democratic institutions. A.I.D. should promote the media in Latin America as a means of expressing opinions, organizing debate, and accepting pluralism.
8. **Political Parties.** While A.I.D. is not encouraged to be partisan in its actions, the Agency can responsibly strengthen parties by assisting in the development of mechanisms for financing parties and by offering educational assistance and leadership training.

9. **Professionalism.** Respect for roles--legislator, judge, electoral official--must be acquired by the public and by the holders of offices. Professionalism results from education and experience and leads to a valuing of the job or position apart from the role occupant.
10. **Accountability.** Actions taken on behalf of the people must be taken in public. Democracies institutionalize accountability systems and support transparency in decision-making. A.I.D. should strengthen accountability systems.
11. **Legal Education.** Sharing a common standard of fairness is a characteristic of democratic government. Legal education helps to ensure that officials and citizens act according to a common standard of fairness.
12. **Literacy.** Democratic societies are strengthened by a literate citizenry that is capable of taking informed action. A.I.D. should invest in basic education and literacy programs.

There exists no single recipe for democratic development. The experience of one nation will not be the experience of another. Furthermore, academic theories have confounded an understanding of democracy in Latin America and, perhaps, have lead to inappropriate conclusions. Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, but must be nurtured from within--anywhere that popular participation is viable.

A.I.D., therefore, will encourage different types of activities in different countries. The Agency may work with political institutions in countries where democracy is taking hold. In emerging democracies, the most viable channels of support might be the electoral process and the strengthening of the party

system. In authoritarian governments, A.I.D. activity might be most effectively limited to support for grassroots organizations and voluntary associations. In any case, the Agency must be sensitive to the unique political experience of each nation.

The Capacity of A.I.D..

Traditionally, A.I.D. has engaged in economic not political development. A substantial program of political activity may require change within the Agency in order to acquire a capacity to perform political and social analyses. The Agency is best equipped to provide economic assistance and technology transfer and would require the following resources to employ more political development strategies:

- training in political analysis;
- training to work collaboratively with the military;
- employing political and social scientists as well as economists to conduct program evaluations and develop program designs.

Conclusion

While the appropriateness of various strategies may be debated, experts agree that the United States must work to strengthen democratic institutions in Latin America. A.I.D. does not have the capacity at this time to implement all recommended strategies, nor is there an interagency coordinating mechanism to give direction to the democracy-building effort. Such a forum may well be the place to begin.

INTRODUCTION

On July 30-31, 1987, the Agency for International Development, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, Office of Administration of Justice and Democratic Development (AID/LAC/AJDD), invited twenty-two distinguished scholars and political experts to participate in a symposium on strengthening democratic institutions in Latin America. Participants were chosen to represent a wide spectrum of viewpoints; in addition to officials from various A.I.D. and Department of State offices, individuals attending the symposium represented academic institutions, international organizations, political policy and research groups, congressional foreign affairs committees, and other governmental offices. In bringing this group together, AID/LAC/AJDD sought to identify strategies for democracy-building programs.

It was intended that the event provide an open forum for discussion and debate on future strategies and priorities for democratization efforts in Latin America. While an agenda established the symposium's direction, the group was encouraged to raise and pursue issues of particular interest to group members. Because AID/LAC/AJDD wished to encourage open dialogue, participants were not asked to prepare written presentations. However, participants were encouraged to make recent, pertinent written materials available to the group. Five symposium participants were asked to prepare informal summary presentations for panel discussions on Thursday, July 30. Panel presentations were intended to serve as a point of departure for discussion.

During the course of the two-day event, participants discussed theories, shared practical experiences, and offered suggestions for Agency goals and directions. Representatives from A.I.D. and the Department of State attended all or parts of the symposium as observers and were invited to contribute to the discussions. What follows are highlights of the dialogue and the tentative conclusions reached by symposium participants on how the U.S. can most effectively support the strengthening and reinforcement of democratic concepts, processes, and institutions in Latin America. The richness and depth of group discussion fulfilled A.I.D./LAC/AJDD's expectations for a useful and productive dialogue.

SECTION ONE: INTKODUCTIONS AND BACKGROUND

Welcoming Remarks

Mr. Malcolm Butler, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean, Agency for International Development, began the symposium by welcoming the participants and thanking them for taking the time to attend the two-day event. Mr. Butler explained that the symposium was intended to assist A.I.D. in planning and implementing future democratic development programs. Mr. Butler reviewed A.I.D.'s history as a promoter of democratic development through economic development, particularly since the 1970s, when A.I.D. programs began to focus more closely on the achievement of social equity as an approach to democracy. The speaker described the themes that underlie Agency policies and programs. They include:

- **Economic Stabilization.** A.I.D. must avoid "pouring water in a leaking bucket". Economies must be stabilized before assistance can be effective. Through its program and projects, A.I.D. attempts to bring a macroeconomic framework into balance. Those that are politically powerful are usually the same as those that are economically powerful. A free market and more stable economy benefits the poor, and A.I.D. programs must encourage poorer members of society to participate economically.
- **Economic Growth.** As economies stabilize, they must be prepared to grow. Economic growth must be broadly and equitably shared. By providing jobs to the poor, economic growth allows the poor to gain political power and participate more fully in government.

- Democratization. A.I.D. is determined to support democratic development by more direct pursuit of democratic objectives in Central America. Programs, such as the Central American Peace Scholarship Program (CAPS), are one way A.I.D. is trying to make the opportunity of choice available to more people. CAPS improves the human resources base of the recipient country and exposes participants to democracy as it exists in the United States.

Further, Mr. Butler asserted that a link exists between market forces and democracy. He stressed that the nature of free enterprise was fundamentally democratic. The consumer votes through the market, and project planners must carefully examine market forces and work closely with the private sector to develop project goals and guidelines. He also stressed the idea of free choice as essential to effective economic and political development. He repeated A.I.D.'s commitment to bringing opportunity to more people and allowing them to make choices that improve their lives.

A.I.D. has learned through its experiences working with governments, groups and individuals worldwide that a characteristic of less successful projects is that they do not adequately seek the collaboration and participation of groups and individuals that a project directly serves. Mr. Butler explained that a primary objective of A.I.D. programs has always been to involve program beneficiaries in project development and execution. Finally, Mr. Butler stressed that A.I.D. must not only work to assist in the establishment of democracies, but it must also help to protect, guard, nurture, and maintain them. He sincerely hoped that the symposium would provide diverse, and innovative ideas to accomplish these goals.

Welcoming remarks were followed by introductions of participants and a review of the agenda.

Opening Remarks

In opening remarks to symposium participants, Luigi R. Einaudi, Director of the Office of Policy Planning and Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State, raised one of the most difficult questions confronting the U.S. Department of State as it joins A.I.D. in examining the issue of democratization in Latin America. How can the Department of State, as a protector of U.S. interests in Latin America, support the development of democratic political systems in Latin America? Mr. Einaudi explained that the State Department has not been an effective advocate and promoter of democracy. As a diplomatic agency, the role of the State Department is to interact effectively with existing governments, not to change the governments of independent sovereign states. However, as a protector of U.S. interests in Central America and elsewhere, the State Department has begun to reexamine its role as a promoter of democracy, particularly in light of recent U.S. experiences in Latin America, namely Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Panama.

These and other experiences have convinced the State Department that it may not always be in the best interest of the U.S. to continue to "work with them and pay them off," that is, to tolerate and support non-democratic governments because of immediate national security interests. However, in recent years, The State Department has been frustrated since the U.S. political system does not allow support of more active, substantive, and discerning foreign policy guidelines for democratization in Central America.

Under the Carter administration, however, opinion, policy, and approach began to change. Leadership voiced a "need to stop the slide" in Central America. The Department of State initiated a long-term plan for promoting democracy in this region and took steps to insure that the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in Central America would "not slide back to normal ... that is, not slip back to diplomacy only".

The Department of State invites advice and open debate on what appropriate directions State, A.I.D., the U.S. Information Agency, the National Endowment for Democracy, and other agencies might follow to encourage democratic development in Latin America. The State Department seeks guidance on what strategies to use, what networks to pursue, and what linkages to establish with political, judicial, or legislative institutions. The U.S. political system is proudly diverse, but diversity can also be dangerous when it undermines long-term national interests. Finally, the State Department would like to recognize the important role A.I.D.'s Office of Administration of Justice and Democratic Development is playing in developing future strategies by focusing on these issues. The State Department promises to contribute and to learn from symposium discussions.

A.I.D.'s Experiences in Democratic Development Programs

Roma Knee, Human Rights and Democracy Program Coordinator, Office of Administration of Justice and Democratic Development, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, Agency for International Development gave the following presentation summarizing A.I.D.'s experiences in democratic development programs.

Evolution of A.I.D.'s Democratic Development Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean

Promoting democracy and respect for human rights has long been a principal objective of U.S. foreign policy and an inherent goal of the foreign assistance program. Since 1982 when President Reagan announced a major United States initiative to "foster the infrastructure of democracy" throughout the world, the foreign affairs agencies--State, USIA, and A.I.D.--have placed new emphasis on policies and programs that contribute to strengthening democratic institutions. This has been particularly true in the Latin American and Caribbean region, where the idea is hardly new. The present "democracy" program--and many of the ideas that have surfaced for implementing it--have evolved from A.I.D.'s experience in earlier programs, such as the Alliance for Progress, which helped put in place or strengthen many of the institutions and networks employed in current programs.

The Legislative Base

For some years foreign assistance legislation has encouraged incorporation of democratic principles in A.I.D. policies and programs. Section 102 of the FAA of 1961 stated that a major objective of the aid program was to "help make a historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand to the end and that an enlarged community of free, stable, self-reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity." The Humphrey Amendment of 1961 emphasized the significance of cooperatives and popular participation in democratic growth, and was followed in 1962 by the Zablocki Amendment, which stressed the role of community development in achieving similar objectives.

Title IX, enacted in 1966, charged A.I.D. to concern itself with political as well as economic development, and gave additional breadth and direction to A.I.D.'s efforts to help develop self-supporting institutional frameworks within which modernization and development could take place. With the introduction in the early 1970s of the basic human needs approach directed toward "the poorest of the poor," the policy emphasis on political development per se began to diminish, except for continued assistance to cooperatives, labor unions, and private voluntary organizations, within the context of promoting "growth with equity" in economic development.

In 1974, passage of the Harkin Amendment linked Agency policy and programs to concern for protection of human rights, underscoring the basic human needs approach and keying a country's eligibility for assistance to its human rights performance. Enactment in 1978 of Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which sets aside a portion of A.I.D.'s annual appropriation to be used for studies, projects, and activities that promote wider observance of civil and political rights, added a positive dimension to A.I.D.'s efforts to promote human rights.

More recently, the Congress has raised the level of funding set aside for human rights programs worldwide, and gave the major boost to programs to improve the administration of justice in Latin America, particularly Central America, by earmarking significant levels of funding to be used for this purpose.

Administration Policies and Initiatives

The Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations each formulated policies that strongly reinforced these Congressional mandates. In August 1976, the A.I.D. Administrator announced a program of "New Initiatives in Human Rights," intended to focus the Agency's attention on finding ways to promote greater observance of human rights in aid-recipient countries, thus anticipating enactment of Section 116(e) by two years. President Carter declared human rights to be "the soul of United States foreign policy," and the level of A.I.D. support for human rights projects grew accordingly. The Reagan Administration, seeking to encourage governments as well as opposition groups to work toward advancing freedom and justice in their countries and to create a political and social climate in which respect for human rights could take root and grow, highlighted the Section 116(e) program as one of the major instruments of this policy. Human rights were defined as the fundamental principles of democratic societies, laying the groundwork for return to the concept of encouraging political development through U.S. assistance programs.

In an address before the British Parliament in June 1982, President Reagan declared that the United States would strive all around the world "to foster the infrastructure of democracy--the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities--which allows people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means." A.I.D., working closely with the Department of State and USIA, has been a key actor in the process of translating the President's announcement into a multi-faceted foreign policy and assistance program, reflecting both the complexities of the task of democratic development and the commitment of the U.S. government.

In 1983, President Reagan formed the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to advise on a long-term U.S. policy that would best respond to the challenges of building democracy and to threats to security and stability in the region. In its January 1984 report, the Commission concluded that fundamental strategic and moral interests of the U.S. require a long-term national commitment to economic opportunity, human development, democracy, and security in Central America. The Commission specifically recommended U.S. support for democratic processes and institutions through assistance to improve the administration of justice, technical training, and development of leadership skills.

In response to the Commission's recommendations, A.I.D. and the State Department proposed and requested funding for a five-year program of economic and democratic development in Central America, to which the Congress responded in FY 1985 with a supplemental appropriation. Included were funds earmarked for a Central American regional administration of justice program, additional funds for the judicial reform project in El Salvador (which had had an original earmark of \$3 million in FY 1983), and other funds to be used at the Agency's discretion to develop and support programs designed to strengthen democratic institutions.

Developing Policies and Strategies

The three major channels of funding to support democratic institution building in the LAC region are through the LAC Regional Human Rights Initiatives project; the regional Strengthening Democracy project, confined to Central

America; and the Administration of Justice programs. Policy guidelines and strategies for these programs were developed independently, although growing from the same root, and have changed somewhat over time.

Human Rights Projects

The initial guidelines for the Section 116(e) human rights program that were in effect from 1978 to 1982 made clear that its purpose was to stimulate A.I.D. to go beyond activities that were normally carried out in regular programming and to support new kinds of initiatives that have a significant impact on civil and political rights; and that activities begun under Section 116(e) should, as appropriate, be incorporated into A.I.D.'s regular programming as soon as possible. Support was generally to be provided in response to proposals from private groups and individuals, and stress was placed on international contact and information exchange. Proposed activities should seek to accomplish at least one of four objectives or themes: (1) encourage international contact among people who share an interest in problems of civil and political rights in the context of economic development; (2) encourage investigation and discussion of development successes where human rights are respected, the problems governments have in promoting economic development that cause them to use repressive measures, and the options available to them; (3) encourage better understanding of relationships among civil and political and social, economic, and cultural rights; and (4) encourage defense and support of civil and political rights in specific countries, including dissemination of information and advocacy and aid for disadvantaged groups and individuals.

In 1982, new guidelines were formulated that made the principal strategy that of strengthening legal systems through such activities as training (in the U.S. or third countries) for magistrates; supporting studies for the reform and implementation of civil and criminal codes; establishing regional human rights commissions and institutions that are independent of individual countries or governments; or supporting programs to educate the citizenry about their rights under the law. Another major strategy was "electoral reform" or assistance in establishing procedures to ensure secrecy of balloting and a fair and accurate vote count.

In September 1984, the guidelines for human rights projects were again revised to outline seven major objectives: (1) encourage research on and discussion of civil and political rights; (2) encourage the awareness of civil and political rights; (3) encourage adherence to the rule of law through a legal framework conducive to civil and political rights; (4) encourage free and democratic electoral systems; (5) encourage development of democratic principles and institutions that promote human rights; (6) encourage the development of human rights organizations; and (7) encourage the increased access of women and ethnic groups to the judicial system and to political processes.

Project Democracy

During 1982, in developing guidance for the President's Democracy Initiative, an interagency group composed of professionals from the Department of State, A.I.D., and USIA, working in consultation with overseas missions and the Congress, agreed upon a program with five principal components:

Leadership Training: programs for development of the theory and practice of democracy, the role of free trade unions and the market economy, and the skills necessary to build the institutions of freedom and democracy; and exchange of ideas on problems and issues of common concern to local leaders. (Special emphasis was to be placed on reaching the next generation of leadership.)

Education: through scholarships, American studies, English teaching, book programs, and other means--aimed at conveying a more accurate picture of the culture, character, and values of the American people and providing insight into the development of democratic processes.

Strengthening the Institutions of Democracy: programs seeking to strengthen the basic elements of a democratic society, a free press, free elections, freedom of association, free trade unions, freedom of religious choice and cultural practice, and substantial independence for political parties, business groups, universities, and legal and judicial systems.

Conveying Ideas and Information: to engage leaders and future leaders in exchange of ideas concerning democracy and democratic values through active programs of conferences and meetings, dissemination of publications, and the full range of educational and cultural exchange programs.

Development of Personal and Institutional Ties: involvement of a cross section of U.S. private and public institutions in the development of closer ties and working relationships between political parties, free trade unions, businesses, educational institutions, state and local governments, women's groups, ethnic groups, religious associations, and other groups with counterparts overseas.

It was noted that many of the proposed activities encompassed programs long administered by USIA and A.I.D., including grants to private organizations such as the AFL-CIO and the Asia Foundation, and assurance was stated that this new commitment by the U.S. Government would in no way interfere with the complete independence and continued integrity of these institutions.

The program thus envisioned, and later proposed to the Congress as "Project Democracy," was to be implemented by USIA, A.I.D., and a proposed new non-governmental entity that was later established as the National Endowment for Democracy.

Implementation

In addition to the regional and country-specific Administration of Justice programs, funding support for strengthening democratic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean is provided through two regional "umbrella" projects: the LAC Regional Human Rights Initiatives project, established in FY 1978, and the Central American Regional "Strengthening Democracy" project initiated in FY 1985.

The Human Rights Initiatives Project provides grant funding to national and international organizations and individuals working to promote human rights throughout the region. These grants are made in response to unsolicited proposals from nongovernmental institutions, such as universities, private nonprofit organizations, professional associations, and human rights groups to support regional programs and activities initiated and carried out principally by nationals of the countries participating. Activities range from a single conference or research project to longer term programs of two to five years. Funds were used to support planning meetings leading to the establishment of the Interamerican Institute of Human Rights and its subdivision, the Interamerican Center of Electoral Assistance and Promotion (CAPEL). The project continues to help finance some of their education, research and promotional activities. Other examples include a regionwide program to promote and protect the human rights of Indians; a project to train teachers of human rights at the community level in Central American and Andean countries; and research seeking to determine the conditions and actions that most successfully encourage transition from military rule to civilian constitutional government.

The Central American Regional Strengthening Democracy Project provides funds for activities that seek to foster and strengthen democratic institutions and practices and to promote citizen participation in the political process in Central America. Following the precedent set under the human rights program, it is intended that these funds be used to develop institutions and reach audiences not normally included in other A.I.D.-funded programs that also contribute to building democracy, such as assistance to trade unions, cooperatives and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). In other words, the focus is on political rather than economic development.

In addition to financing regional or multi-country projects, funds may also be channeled to individual A.I.D. missions to enable them to support country-specific initiatives that were not anticipated during the budgeting process. The major objectives or priority areas identified for the use of these funds are briefly described below.

- Strengthening electoral processes through technical assistance, training, and material resources to electoral courts to improve capacity to establish sound laws and procedures, administer elections, and carry out measures to prevent fraud; educating citizens about the voting process to increase their participation and raise public confidence in the system; and promoting understanding and acceptance by both government and citizenry of the importance of free and fair elections.
- Strengthening legislative capacity by helping national legislatures to develop and conduct training programs for members and staff; to establish permanent information and administrative support systems that will enhance the ability of legislators to analyze and debate issues and draft laws; and to facilitate dialogue among legislators in Central America and with their counterparts in the U.S., Canada, and Europe.
- Providing civic education and community action through the promotion of understanding and the practicing of democratic processes, mainly at the community level, by helping citizens learn to work together effectively to solve common problems or achieve common goals.

- **Promoting freedom of the press** by building a training capacity in the region that will help increase the ability of mass media professionals to gather and disseminate the news according to the standards of an independent and responsible press.

- **Strengthening local government capacity** by helping municipal officials to improve their administrative abilities and to increase their access to resources that benefit their communities.

- **Developing Leadership** through training and exchange programs that enhance leadership skills, especially among young people, and that strengthen the skills of experienced leaders through training and networking with their counterparts in other countries.

- **Supporting centers for the study of democracy:** that will provide opportunities for the study and dissemination of democratic concepts and processes through seminars and forums, study courses, research, and publication of books and pamphlets aimed at the levels of both academic and popular education.

- **Supporting research and information exchange projects** initiated by Latin American and U.S. institutions on issues relating to democratic development in the region.

Open Discussion

Immediately after the presentation of A.I.D.'s experiences in democratic development programs, participants were invited to comment on topics raised in the presentation. Included here are issues and ideas participants explored during this discussion.

Ideology

The need for and power of political conviction was the first theme presented in open discussion. It was suggested that democracy, in contrast to Marxism, is rarely promoted as a political ideology. The popularity of Marxist ideology in Latin American universities and in the media supports its acceptance as an intellectual answer to social injustice, while democratic political theory is seen as a less glamorous, moderate, middle-class alternative. Poor people don't identify with democracy. There are very few locally organized, indigenous groups that attempt to answer the needs of the community through democratic means. In pursuing efforts to counteract the popularity of Marxism, methods of communicating the ideological principles of democracy as a viable alternative for combatting social injustice should be considered. There should be greater emphasis on the philosophy of democracy as an effective method to right social injustice.

Participant Training

A.I.D.'s participant training programs were offered as one example of ways A.I.D. counteracts Marxist influences. By bringing Latin Americans to the

U.S. and introducing them to American life, Latin Americans have the opportunity to become familiar with the benefits of life in a democratic society. Greater emphasis of A.I.D. on participant training is a direct result of findings presented in the Kissinger Report. A.I.D. has increased its numbers of training participants in response to the larger numbers of Latin Americans offered training in the Soviet Union. Symposium participants questioned the effectiveness of this approach to democracy building on several grounds.

First, symposium participants observed that some scholars, encouraged to examine and criticize government structures and authority, may become vehemently anti-American when they return home or may decide to remain in the U.S. Second, regardless of the level of impact participant training may or may not have, its total cost-effectiveness was questioned. Some symposium participants felt that it is an expensive way to accomplish a goal that might be effectively achieved by providing training to scholars in their own or third countries. Third, the potential impact of the training was questioned. A study available through the U.S. Information Agency indicates that Costa Rican trainees who studied in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had less favorable impressions of their U.S. experience and training in only two categories, family life, and society and culture. The study also indicated that overall perceptions of the U.S. were more positive among those who have not visited the U.S. than those who had visited. One explanation for these findings may be that the study was conducted in Costa Rica, an established democracy.

Fourth, some participant training programs were viewed as too restrictive and, therefore, difficult to implement. As an example, a program that mandates that 40% of its participants be poor, rural Spanish-speaking women may have difficulty finding participants that meet all the qualifications. Finally, the overall impact of participant training was challenged. To illustrate this point, one symposium participant questioned the appropriateness of training non-Spanish speaking Indian women in accounting skills in the U.S. for six weeks. Would limited observations and participation in U.S. society make these participants more democratic? Another symposium participant described a group of El Salvadorean mayors brought to the U.S. for short-term training. The mayors were not markedly impressed with democratic decision-making processes, but gave enthusiastic accounts of the commercial goods available in U.S. markets. The question of whether participants' experiences in the U.S. favorably influence their perceptions of democratic ideals and beliefs went unresolved. Additional information and research in this area was recommended.

Symposium participants also recommended that A.I.D. review its past projects more thoroughly for additional guidance in alternative participant training programs that place the focus "back to the indigenous culture." Symposium participants stressed that in-country or in-region training programs might prove more appropriate and effective. The Loyola program, a participant training program conducted in the 1970s, was offered as one example.

SECTION TWO: PANEL DISCUSSIONS

Panel One: Democracies in Latin America

Definitions of Democracy in Latin America

Panel discussions began by examining the difficulty of defining democracy in Latin America. Tony Maingot offered a summary of these difficulties. Below are points made during this summary.

When attempts are made to characterize democracy in Latin America, traditional American academic definitions of democracy are not applicable. Democracy is not ethnocentric; standards by which democracy is defined cannot be based on American democratic systems. Academic treatments of democracy also attempt to define democracy in Latin America using overconceptualized political theories such as world systems analysis, which defines democracy on global, comparative terms rather than on a case-by-case basis; dependency theory, which challenges notions that elections are meaningful; and general principles of authoritarianism, commonly believed to characterize the governance systems in most Latin American countries.

Latin American political leaders have been reluctant to adopt U.S. or English democratic political systems. Although they may admire these democratic systems, they are pessimistic that these forms of democracy can be applied in Latin America given the political, economic, social, and cultural realities of their own countries.

Following are other points discussed during this session.

- One basic definition for democracy is "the periodic elections of those who make major decisions." Who elects the decision-makers and who is allowed to assume the role of decision-maker are also important factors in defining democracy.
- As part of the above definition, "pure procedural justice" must exist; that is, electoral procedures that are manipulated at any level and for any reason to achieve a desired outcome are undemocratic.
- Democratic elections do not guarantee popularity. No regime enjoys popularity all of the time. The procedure may not produce desired outcomes, but following the procedures becomes vital.
- Electoral procedures should be respected, but to insure that they can be respected, they must be appropriate for the social, cultural, and political environment in which they function.
- Finally, when examining democratic systems in Latin America, the roles of traditional power elites such as the military and the Catholic Church cannot be ignored. Democratic systems in Latin America must develop methods to work with these traditional power structures. A successful, pluralistic system of democracy must accommodate traditional power elites and new political groups. Electoral processes must recognize the importance of protecting unpopular political groups and individuals as well as promoting popular ones.

Causes of Democratic Development and Breakdown

The causes of democratic development and breakdown were explored in the next panel discussion. Larry Diamond stressed the importance of understanding that democracy is not ethnocentric; that democratic principles were implicit in every culture; and that indigenous, democratic, popular activities demonstrate the panhuman desire for democracy. Following are points stressed during his presentation.

- There is no single recipe for democratic success in developing countries. It is even difficult to identify structural prerequisites that are absolutely necessary for a stable democracy. Social, cultural, economic, and political factors interact within the unique historical setting of any given country to determine the fate of democracy. Democracy should not be considered "a product of the west" that can be exported to other countries. The unique makeup of each country will determine its form of democracy.
- Democracy and economic development are not incompatible. Rather, broad-based economic development can be directly related to political development and democracy. Equitable growth, initiative, a vigorous market, and a broad base of entrepreneurship can work with accountable democratic institutions and popular participation to support the growth of democracy. Currently, emphasis is being placed on the long-term development of democratic infrastructures. However, emphasis should

also be placed on short-term economic development. New democratic development programs may fail as the need to address high national debts becomes an overriding priority.

- The most powerful predictor of success of democratic government is not the gross national product or urbanization, but the physical quality of life (e.g., life expectancy, literacy, birth survival rates). When extreme levels of desperation are removed, people are more likely to develop democratic skills and activities.
- The strength or frailty of political institutions greatly influence democratic development. In order for democracies to continue to work effectively, they require independent electoral institutions, a strong legislative capacity, and a strong independent judiciary system. The depth to which these political institutions penetrate all levels of society is a crucial factor affecting democracy's survival. When political institutions work effectively at a "grassroots" or popular level, these institutions will be much stronger.
- Democratic political systems also require adequate mechanisms for accountability to make government more responsive to the people. Strengthening of the judiciary systems of governments should be a major focus of strengthening democratic institution programs. More effective methods to monitor the execution of power should be constitutionally mandated and supported. The judiciary body of government must have the power to correct abuses of power by the executive, legislative, and

other governmental bodies, and expose and punish corruption within the government. Also, once political leaders are elected democratically, methods to insure that they remain accountable should be developed. Transparency of decision-making should be promoted to encourage meaningful, popular participation in determining policies and allocating resources. Adequate methods of accountability should protect institutionalized political parties.

- The decentralization of power positively influences democracy. The centralization of power is inherently undemocratic. When political power is centralized, there is "too much at stake" for opposing political forces to allow pluralism.
- Political domination of one party or group leads to a "premium on power." Centralization of power facilitates corruption and often obstructs equitable economic development and undermines private enterprise development. Local, municipal, and regional governments should be given the resources to develop a degree of autonomy from centralized national controls, thus encouraging greater participation of individuals in local government and increasing the accountability of the state to local and regional concerns and priorities.
- Local, regional, and national voluntary associations support democracy by dispersing political power. Voluntary associations that are not state controlled, that are mass based, and that represent popular interests could serve as "schools for democracy." Autonomous

organizations that possess democratic, internal, organizational structures; provide regular rotation of elected officials; promote transparency of decision-making; and represent popular interests could serve as effective models for democracy.

- The independent flow of information is also fundamental to democracy. A free press that fairly presents multiple points of view can encourage greater acceptance of political pluralism. Providing the press with adequate material resources, operating capital, and talent can help it remain autonomous from the state.

Consolidation of Democracies: How to Maintain Them

The third panel discussion on democracies in Latin America addressed the issues affecting the successful consolidation of democratic systems. Mark Rosenberg offered the following perspectives on this issue.

To strengthen democratic institutions, the relation between elites and the masses must be improved. Developing appropriate and effective methods of accountability is key in bringing about this consolidation.

Supply and demand in democracy. The process of democracy can be thought of in terms of supply and demand. Supply in democratic development includes:

- elite classes that are committed to democratic leadership regardless of whether they presently hold power or not;

- parties that have respect for and understanding of democratic processes, their strengths and weaknesses; and
- structures and institutions that serve as a forum for expressing public choice.

When assessing democracy in terms of demand, there must be true understanding of what democracy is, and what it can and cannot do. Citizens within a democracy must realize that:

- Channels of access to power must be established. People usually have very low expectations for participating democratically in the distribution and execution of power since, historically, there have been few democratic initiatives that have successfully influenced decision-making in Latin America.
- Parties must understand their roles whether they are in or out of power. They must respect and understand the need for maintaining a democratic system beyond their own party's goals. A characteristic of Latin American political parties is that they have political experience in either the opposing power or in holding power, rarely both.
- Professionalism is a necessary requisite for establishing systems of accountability. Groups and individuals in democratic government must identify and understand their professional responsibilities to a democratic system. Roles must become independent of the person

occupying the role. Judges, legislators, party leaders, and others must learn to respect the institutions and the processes carried out by people.

Barriers facing democratic development efforts. Democratic development projects must address a number of barriers to successful implementation.

- Both the supply and demand sides of democratic consolidation have human and material resources components. Decision-makers must be provided with socio-political training as well as technical training of government administration. Democratic consolidation also relies on material resources. But visible manifestations of progress cannot be mistaken for social change. Real democratic progress cannot and should not be measured in material terms.
- Often, A.I.D. is not sensitive to the situational needs of developing democracies. A.I.D. does not familiarize itself with the political nuances of Latin American countries, and this has an adverse effect on project success.
- Political development projects that attempt to emulate American political systems will have great difficulty in achieving success. Even semantics pose socio-cultural difficulties. For example, the term "checks and balances" typifies the American system of government; to pressure other governments to adopt similar systems, using this term, may be interpreted as pressure to strictly duplicate U.S. government structure.

Other limitations. Limitations restricting democratic development can be categorized in "macro" or "micro" terms. Macro limitations may be:

- The regional context in which a developing democracy must function. Democratic development can be limited when threatened by external, regional forces.
- The role of the military as a traditional power structure. Democratic development can be limited by the positive or negative role the military plays in government.
- Poverty can limit democratic development. Whether democracy can be institutionalized in very poor societies remains debatable. The first concern in very poor societies is fulfilling basic needs. People accept any form of government that assists in accomplishing this.

Micro limitations on democratic development include:

- Adequate and appropriate electoral procedures. (balloting systems; training in their use.)
- Party financing. Political parties that are subject to specific economic influences such as government subsidies may have trouble maintaining autonomy. Methods to insure that party financing is independent of governmental influences should be developed.

Following are considerations that may influence the success of future strategies.

- Democratic development strategies that strengthen rural, regional, and municipal governments must be developed to allow the more equitable participation of the general population.
- Effective country-specific strategies that include the military in democratic development efforts are vital to the success of development efforts.
- The experiences of other developed, democratic governments such as Spain and Italy may provide replicable models for democratic systems in Latin America.

Open Discussion

Panel presentations on democracy in Latin America were followed by open discussion by all symposium participants. Summarized here are the issues discussed by the group.

The role of the military in democratic development. Traditionally, the soldier in democracy is seen as the obedient protector of civilian rule. In a democratic society, it is the military's duty to protect and defend the civilian population. However, military professionalism in Latin America has encouraged the soldier to take a more active role in government. As guardian of national security, the military takes a strong interest in political processes and often intercedes in the affairs of civilian government in the name of national security.

The military can play a good, bad, or indifferent role in democratic development. A military supportive of democratic initiatives can protect elections and other institutions vital to democratic rule. The military should be encouraged to support the ideology of democracy. Power and material gain can be corruptive forces behind military involvement in government. Corruption, specifically drug dealing, is extremely lucrative for military officials. The military's role in political development must be redefined so that it sees itself as the protector of democratic institutions.

Military involvement in government is often welcomed by the general public. When anarchy and confusion reign, the group that can reestablish security and reassure the basic right of survival is supported. A.I.D. can work effectively with the military to affect positive change; it needs to define appropriate actions it might take to encourage military groups to support democratic initiatives. As A.I.D. develops long-term strategies to address this issue, it should:

- Promote the military's role as guardian of democratic institutions as well as defender of national security. A.I.D. can support training the military to coordinate and collaborate with civilian government.
- Encourage balance. As A.I.D. helps define the military's institutional responsibility to democracy, it must also increase civilian understanding and expertise in addressing national security issues.
- Foster communication. Civilian and military staff seldom work effectively together because they view the other as an adversary to the the administration of government. A.I.D. should establish methods to influence communication and collaboration on major national issues.

U.S. support of military regimes in Latin America often contradicts U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the region. The U.S. will provide technical assistance and support for military governments as it tries to encourage independent democratic efforts within the country. If A.I.D. is to initiate democratic development efforts in Latin America it must first attempt to bridge the gap between military and civilian power bases. A profound separation of military and civilian rule has characterized the recent history of Latin America. The philosophy that "never the twain shall meet" must be rejected and changed. In order to do this, A.I.D. should note that:

- The Latin American military has played the role of the "imperfect stabilizer"; that is, the military has been THE traditional stabilizing force for many Latin American countries. The role of the military as stabilizer will wane when a civilian power structure can offer necessary stability.
- A.I.D. should allow for "democratic suicide"; that is, allow Latin American countries to do what the United States may consider "wrong," as long as it is done democratically. The United States should not decide when certain forms of democracy "cannot" continue.

Panel Two: Impact of Foreign Assistance Strategies on Strengthening Democracies in Latin America

The Policy Framework for Democratic Development Activities

Below are highlights of Mr. Einaudi's remarks on effective policy guidelines to encourage greater impact of foreign assistance on democratic development.

Democratic and Economic Growth. The current administration argues that there needs to be a more active policy addressing national debt issues, for this growing economic problem threatens the survival of democratic governments. A.I.D. needs to establish stronger links between economic and democratic development processes and better coordination of economic development programs. Also, while European support is substantial, it should be increased.

Consistency. A consistent foreign policy is imperative if programs promoting democratic development are to have an appreciable effect in Latin America. The State Department recognizes the need for consistency in foreign policy formulation and execution; inconsistency encourages controversy, cynicism, skepticism, and lack of continuous support both abroad and in the United States.

Major democratic indicators. Democratic policies and practices of Latin American countries are manifested in four major areas:

- Regular, competitive elections;
- Freedom of information and the press;
- Human rights; and
- A fair and effective judicial system.

Policy implementation. In order to implement an effective democratic development policy, the following concerns and recommendations should be considered.

- **Debt Equity.** An area of considerable concern, the debt crisis involves questions of equity, consolidation, and the role of the military. Nations that have experienced democracy value democracy as a means of improving the standard of living and increasing security. The problem of debt equity for Latin American countries must be aggressively addressed by the U.S. and debtor countries.
- **Support for Civilian Governments.** Whenever possible, U.S. foreign policy and assistance activities should support civilian initiatives rather than military initiatives. U.S. democratic development policies must support the efforts of civilian groups to offer political and social stability, security, opportunity, and services.
- **Policy and development coordination.** There should be better linkages between foreign policy and economic assistance activities and better coordination of State and A.I.D. efforts.

- **Coordination with Other International Organizations.** A.I.D. and State should collaborate more effectively with other international organizations that represent Latin American interests such as the Organization of American States.
- **Coordination with Other Donor Countries.** The effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance programs can be enhanced through collaborative efforts with other developed countries offering foreign assistance.

Political Implications for A.I.D. Economic Development Activities

Harlan Hobgood presented comments on the political implications of A.I.D. economic development activities based on published research and over 25 years of experience as an observer and implementer of A.I.D. programs in Latin America. Below is a summary of points made during the session.

A.I.D. and economic development. Promoting democracy was never a major goal of A.I.D. development assistance programs. Past assistance programs have been dominated by broader foreign policy concerns based on international political confrontations between the U.S. and the USSR. U.S. foreign assistance was intended to stay the influence of communism. Because poverty provided an opportune environment for the promotion of communism, the U.S. used economic assistance to alleviate extreme poverty. Economic assistance did provide developing countries with alternatives to communism. However, these alternatives were not necessarily democratic, but as long as the alternative did not conflict with U.S. national interests, the U.S. continued to provide foreign assistance.

A.I.D. is better equipped to provide economic assistance than to assess political realities within developing countries. Dominated by economists, A.I.D. provided mainly value-free economic assistance to developing countries which allowed nondemocratic outcomes.

Consequently, A.I.D. program efforts are characterized by an economic approach to development assistance. Among the results of this approach are:

- **Support of Centralization of Government.** The dominance of economic theory in A.I.D. project design and execution has led to a desire to centralize decisionmaking as the key to efficiency. Centralized institutions are more efficient decision-makers, are more able to receive technology and interact more effectively with large international institutions. They are, however, disruptive of democratic participative processes.

An A.I.D. program intended to provide competency to local governments in Costa Rica stressed technology transfer and building of administrative capacity. But providing direct assistance to local and regional governments separately was considered inefficient and uneconomical. Instead, A.I.D. provided Costa Rica with assistance to create centralized institutions that were, in turn, to establish competent local institutions. Municipal development institutions were also created to provide low interest loans to local governments. As a result of this capacity building, it was anticipated that local governments would be able to mobilize more resources, assume more responsibility for their own development, and be less dependent on central government. Instead, A.I.D. encouraged the centralization of

services that used to be controlled by local governments. Local governments were left with few decision-making responsibilities. Ten years ago, when the program began, 10% of government revenues were allocated to local governments. Today, that figure has dropped to 9%.

- **Value Neutral Projects.** Because of the very nature of its institutional capability, A.I.D. is not prepared or expected to make social or political assessments of the possible impact of its own economic assistance activities. A.I.D. often creates and then supports undemocratic institutions that are controlled by nondemocratic governments. Since A.I.D. does not consider political realities or social characteristics when predicting the success and sustainability of projects, it is, in affect, "value neutral". The Public Safety Program that became "institutional terror" in Haiti during the 60s and 70s is a good example of a project that did not adequately assess the social and political factors that would inevitably influence this project's success.

Under New Directions legislation in 1973, Congress raised the question of who benefits from foreign assistance, and whether assistance is just and in favor of the poor. New Directions expects A.I.D. to answer the question "who benefits?"; "how" they benefit remains unasked. While project goals may be clearly stated, less attention is paid to accurately predicting whether project methodology can realistically achieve these goals.

Conclusions

- A.I.D. should assess the appropriateness and impact of development assistance programs on a country-by-country basis. In order to do this, A.I.D. must develop its own institutional capabilities. It must train staff to make value judgements based on the political realities in which A.I.D. works even though, organizationally, it is not expected to do this.
- The most effective way A.I.D. can support democratic development in Latin America is to promote LITERACY. Freedom of the press and free elections are two fundamental elements of democracy. But unless the majority of the population can read a newspaper or a ballot, it is futile to promote a free press or provide electoral assistance. Ninety-five percent of A.I.D.'s funding should go to primary education projects. Support of primary education is the most effective way to promote democratic development.
- Democratic institution building should be the the primary goal of all A.I.D. programs. All A.I.D. economic and technical assistance programs should work toward this goal.

Open Discussion

Many participants stressed the importance of establishing and maintaining consistent foreign policy. Recent internal contradictions in U.S. foreign

policy for Central and South America and a history of inconsistent policy over the last twenty years have done much to weaken democratic initiatives in Latin America. Preoccupation with protecting U.S. interests in the region has often undermined the development of a coherent, long-term policy for democratic development. One specific criticism focused on U.S. support for a nondemocratic, politically corrupt government involved in drug trafficking to the U.S. In this and other cases, strategic priorities conflict with democratic initiatives. More effective methods to establish a cohesive foreign policy for the region must be developed. This necessitates the involvement of all governmental agencies that determine and implement foreign policy, including the Department of State, A.I.D., USIA, the Department of Defense, and representatives of the executive and legislative branches of government.

The group agreed that:

- There is a need for a more coherent foreign policy that effectively balances U.S. interests and democratic development initiatives in Latin America.
- Foreign policy should be formulated in collaboration with policy planners representing various governmental agencies with direct interests in U.S. foreign policy issues for the region.
- The importance of maintaining a consistent U.S. foreign policy in Latin America should be recognized by all governmental agencies with direct interests in U.S. foreign policy issues in the region.

SECTION THREE
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS:
STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES

Influencing Strategy Development

Purpose of the Symposium

The purpose of the symposium was to discuss what A.I.D. wants to do, what A.I.D. is capable of doing, and what A.I.D. should be doing to support democratic development in Latin America. It is A.I.D.'s hope that input from the individuals present representing different professional backgrounds and organizations can provide valuable guidance in the development of an effective, appropriate strategy for strengthening democratic institutions in Latin America. In the coming months, AID/LAC/AJDD will develop a strategy paper for the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau of A.I.D. that will outline the direction of future A.I.D. activities in democratic development. As it prepares to draft this paper, AID/LAC/AJDD wishes to explore issues and ideas affecting the formulation and implementation of a successful political development policy for the region.

Five Important Questions for A.I.D.

Following this summary of the symposium's purpose, Richard Bissell, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, began the final discussion session by asking symposium participants five important questions that will determine future policy priorities and strategies for strengthening democratic institutions in Latin America.

1. **Point of Initiative.** What should the bureaucratic point of initiative be within A.I.D.? Who should initiate democratic development policy,

(AID/Washington, the AID Missions, selected offices, etc.) and what is the role of the State Department in supporting these initiatives? Can A.I.D. successfully place a stronger organizational focus on this initiative and what must it do to correct the current fragmentation of the initiative? What are A.I.D.'s capabilities to carry out a political development program?

2. **Unit of Analysis.** How should A.I.D. approach this initiative? Should this analysis be conducted on a country-specific basis or by programmatic elements or themes, i.e., electoral assistance; institution building; legislative assistance; judicial assistance?
3. **Program Focus.** Should A.I.D. "take advantage" of countries in transition and focus its efforts mainly in these countries or should A.I.D.'s program focus be more institutionally-based and long-term?
4. **Program Strategy.** Once A.I.D. has decided which countries are its main focus, are there types of mechanical programs that provide technical, logistical, and material assistance (such as electoral assistance programs) that A.I.D. can immediately identify as beneficial? Should A.I.D. concentrate on these types of programs?
5. **Program Goals.** Should A.I.D. strengthen democratic institutions and place less emphasis on private sector development initiatives or other programs? For A.I.D., where should the major focus be for democratic development strategies to most effective?

Added to Mr. Bissell's questions was a final query:

- What is the role of other institutions such as USIA or the National Endowment for Democracy in political development efforts? When is it advantageous for them to pursue political development activities?

Challenged by the questions posed above, symposium participants proceeded to identify issues and offer recommendations that they believed to be essential in finding answers for A.I.D. The following is a summary of the issues and actions which were addressed.

Issues

Linking Economic Development and Democracy. One view of democratic development and breakdown asserts that improving the overall quality of life, (i.e., life expectancy, nutrition, primary health care) is fundamental to democratic development. This view was contested. The direct link between economic and democratic development has not been clearly established. Greater economic equity can strengthen democracies. But greater economic equity is not a requisite for democracy, nor does it guarantee societies will become more democratic. There seems to be no known recipe for democratic development.

Broadening Agency Perspective to Encompass both Economic and Political Assistance. If A.I.D. development strategies continue to ignore the political implications of technical and economic assistance, A.I.D. projects will, at best, enjoy moderate success in encouraging democratic progress and, at worst, perpetuate or strengthen undemocratic political systems.

Targeting Specific Countries. Each country requires a distinctive strategy that closely examines the unique socio-political characteristics of that country. Often, there is a desire to define the situational needs of developing countries using broad, generalized categories that ignore the unique socio-political realities that will have a significant effect on future development.

Using the European Experience. European democratic systems, such as the present governments of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, are alternative models for democratic development. A.I.D. should actively encourage discourse and debate of democratic principles among Latin American politicians and scholars and encourage European politicians and scholars to contribute to this dialogue.

Timing of Policy Initiatives. While there has been a repeated call for a cohesive, consistent foreign policy for the region, in reality this may be a bad time to develop future strategies. With the current administration's tenure coming to a close, support for proposed strategies may be subject to change in the next few years, continuing the very tradition of inconsistency which A.I.D. and State are presently trying to avoid.

Building A.I.D.'s Capacity. At present, A.I.D. is much more capable of conducting massive technology transfer activities than engaging in political assistance. There is no requirement in A.I.D. country statements that A.I.D. conduct periodic political development assessments. Even if A.I.D. and the Department of State develop political intervention strategies, neither A.I.D. nor State are adequately staffed to effectively monitor or execute political development programs.

Actions

Develop Country-Specific Democratic Assistance Strategies. A.I.D. should concentrate on developing long-term, democratic development strategies that are specific to individual country needs. There is no reason, however, why A.I.D. should not be able to respond to short-term, political "opportunities". Ideally, A.I.D. should develop the capacity to anticipate sudden political change. It was recommended that every two-three years, A.I.D. convene panels to review strategies for individual countries. Country panels would help determine appropriate democratic development strategies and would be comprised of experts on each country. Panel members would include academicians; foreign policy planners; and representatives from Capitol Hill, the State Department, the Armed Forces, the CIA, USIA, NSC, and other agencies with direct interests in U.S. foreign policy matters in specific countries or regions.

Presently, A.I.D. uses the Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) to conduct project reviews. However, the CDSS does not include political analysis of democratic progress and development. In order to assess project progress and develop future democratic development strategies, A.I.D. must not only look at selected democratic development projects but all A.I.D. projects for each country including technical assistance projects in finance, agriculture, labor, etc.. To accomplish this, A.I.D. will need to improve its internal analytical skills in political and social science.

Intervene at Multiple Points with a Variety of Strategies. The success of democratic development strategies will depend on the breadth and depth of program activities. A.I.D. needs to develop a better understanding of the "pathology of democratic development." In order for democratic development activities to be most effective, efforts to strengthen democratic systems must be pursued at all organized levels of society, from centralized government to indigenous, capillary, and voluntary associations. If democratic development activities are encouraged at one level and not at others, democratic development may be limited to only those levels where direct support is focussed. This is also why it is vital to develop indigenous, democratic institutions that can sustain, perpetuate, and promote the growth of democracy. Ideally, A.I.D. should pursue democratic development activities on various levels to have the greatest long-term impact including:

- leadership training;
- grassroots organizations;
- local and regional voluntary associations;
- local and municipal governments;
- democratic development for the military;
- judicial institutions;
- legislative institutions;
- political institutions;
- electoral assistance;
- the media; and
- small enterprise development.

The selection of appropriate strategies may be based to some extent on the degree of democratic activity already present in a country receiving A.I.D. assistance. For example, in:

- **Established Democracies.** A.I.D. should focus its activities on political institution building, supporting elections, improving equitable standards of fairness and trust in legal institutions.
- **Governments in Transition.** A.I.D. should assist in strengthening party systems within transitional governments. A.I.D. should also insure that electoral mechanisms function fairly and adequately the first time when they are needed.
- **Nondemocratic Governments.** A.I.D. should work with "capillary," grassroots, local organizations.

The discussion of strategies for democracy building continued with commentary and debate on specific recommendations. A summary of remarks follows.

Encourage Democratic Activity Wherever It Occurs. Democracy works on a capillary level; it is at this capillary level that democracy begins and finds its strongest foundation. Rather than seeking ways to export American democratic institutions, assistance projects can strengthen previously existing indigenous organizations that show promise for sustaining democratic ideals. When trying to decide what democratic development projects to pursue, A.I.D. should first ask where democratic activities occur. Answers can be found by determining where people organize and in what ways people come

together. The answers will vary from country to country. A.I.D. cannot impose U.S. models of democratic institutions such as mid-west cooperatives or New England town meetings, on Latin America. A.I.D. should encourage groups to meet and interact democratically, provide technical assistance on democratic procedures, and facilitate relations between legislators and constituents. A.I.D. needs to support democracy through established organizations. It can assist municipal governments in providing community services but not try to build central governments. It should search for resources at the local level, such as nongovernmental development organizations, and A.I.D. should encourage interaction and the exchange of ideas between various Latin American countries.

Support National Institutions. While much criticism of A.I.D.'s support for centralized institutions has been voiced, A.I.D. should continue to support national democratic institutions. If democracy is strengthened at a local level but cannot be supported on a national level, its survival may be jeopardized.

Explore the Role of the Military. A.I.D.'s involvement with the military in Latin America was debated. There appears to be a need to develop specific strategies for working with the military in useful and effective ways to strengthen democracy. It was agreed that A.I.D. should develop programs that encourage the sharing of information and communication between military and civilian groups. But first, it was stressed that A.I.D. field staff must be retrained to work with the military since A.I.D. never officially works with foreign military agencies and staff usually avoids them. If staff have learned to work effectively with the military, they are usually process-oriented and not as likely to become familiar with the larger

political realities of that association. A.I.D. staff must be prepared to work with the military, recognizing and understanding the caste system under which that system functions.

Possible Projects

Following are some possible projects A.I.D. could pursue to ameliorate the role of the military in democratic development activities.

- Review training courses conducted by the U.S. military for Latin American military trainees to identify course content, themes, and the possible transfer of values; and to incorporate material on the military's role in democracy.
- Provide technical assistance to the military and to civilian private organizations to strengthen the military's capacity to interact with democratic (legislative) bodies.
- Sponsor conferences on the role of the military in civilian regimes.
- Fund private indigenous organizations to work with the military.
- Retrain A.I.D. field officers to work appropriately with the military.
- Conduct analytical assessments to see what A.I.D. can learn from the past about how it can work effectively with the military without compromising democratic development efforts.

- Review military involvement in Latin American politics to determine what the role of the military is in specific Latin American democracies and what analytical skills do A.I.D. staff need to work with military groups.

Encourage Pluralism. To encourage pluralism in Latin America, A.I.D. should support projects that attempt to make public and accessible reliable, complete information regarding government performance. There seem to be few legitimate organizations or institutions in Latin America whose purpose is to provide accurate information on government activities. A.I.D. should also assist in the development of independent, autonomous groups that are capable of measuring public opinion.

Strengthen Legal Systems. It was recommended that A.I.D. increase support and assistance to Latin American legal institutions as a vital means of strengthening democratic development. Efforts should be made to reorient the legal systems of some Latin American countries. Presently, these legal systems are scholastically focused; that is, they are preoccupied with the definition and theory of the law but not its practice. Legal systems must become factual or problem oriented to be able to function effectively. It may not be possible to implement lasting change by providing mechanical assistance alone. It may be necessary to change underlying attitudes behind legal and judicial structures. And it may be necessary to adapt projects to encourage change in other sectors of society and to encourage the development of subjective rights at every possible level, in banks, unions, associations, and elsewhere.

However, A.I.D. must first gain greater understanding of the components of decision-making in Latin America. In understanding decision-making processes, A.I.D. should first examine the facets of legal decision-making: (1) administration of justice (2) legal adjudication and (3) fairness. Understanding the standards of fairness by which decisions are made at different levels of society is extremely important in predicting the success of democratic development activities that strengthen legal institutions.

Traditionally, three standards of fairness are visible in the social, economic, and legal systems in Latin America, but they are also applicable in political contexts.

- **Brotherly Standard.** When the dominant party places the interests of the second or third party equal or above their own.
- **Market Standard.** When one party regards the other as equal in the marketplace.
- **Stranger Standard.** When one party is allowed to treat another any way they wish, as long as there is a formal agreement between them, no matter how unfair.

All three standards can be found in Latin American society, economies, and politics. Usually, the dominant or ruling class operates on the Brotherly or Market Standard. Those who wish to participate in this system must bribe, buy, or pressure their way into it. The Stranger Standard is applied to those who, for economic, social, or political reasons, are outside the dominant system.

When legal institutions operate using different standards of fairness for different portions of the population, it is difficult to maintain democracy.

The belief that legal institutions will function with the same standard of fairness for all people must be substantiated. To increase democratic development, the degree of trust the population has in its legal institutions must be increased. If the Stranger Standard prevails, democracy will always be difficult to maintain; few people will be interested in the rights or concerns of those that operate on a different standard of fairness.

(Commentary continued with remarks directed at A.I.D. policy and practice.)

Learn from Experience. A.I.D. should take a close look at past projects and assess lessons learned from them. In some cases, projects that were intended to encourage democratic development were cancelled; examples include the Joint, Cooperative Service Program (AID) and the Bi-national Center (USIA). One participant stated that "the world is populated by failed A.I.D. projects because A.I.D. won't look back." In reviewing the outcome of previous projects, A.I.D. can attempt to identify factors that determine project success or failure. Projects producing positive results are often changed or cut with the inauguration of a new administration. Other projects are discontinued when they do not produce immediate results over a relatively short period of time. Studying these and other factors that influence the long-term success of democratic development activities in Latin America would be very helpful in planning future activities. Finally, A.I.D. must seek the direct advice and guidance of Latin American scholars, political experts, and others who can provide constructive insight regarding the possible barriers facing future democratic development activities.

Use Broader Perspective in Evaluating A.I.D. Programs. To understand the broadest impact of A.I.D. policies and programs, political and social scientists must contribute to program design and evaluation along with A.I.D. economists.

Recognize Internal Political Realities. Whether and to what extent A.I.D. can fund projects on many levels is another factor influencing future strategy. Congress ultimately determines project success by measuring tangible results or the program's "products". This requires A.I.D. to focus resources on projects that produce short-term, quantifiable success. Unfortunately, political development does not easily lend itself to this kind of assessment. To make continued funding justifiable, A.I.D. should continue to support projects that produce an immediate, positive result such as electoral assistance projects.

Consider Social Consequences in Debt Equity Negotiations. In recent years, discourse between Latin American countries and the U.S. has centered on Latin American debt equity problems. The need to increase social policy dialogue, or include social policy issues in debt equity negotiations was encouraged.

Coordinate Policy Development for Democracy-Building in Latin America. To insure greater consistency in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, there should be more frequent discussion of the issues that influence policy formulation. The administrative branch of government should be included in these sessions. All groups that influence or implement foreign policy should be present so that a cohesive foreign policy that is acceptable to all internal political groups can be formulated. Lack of coordination or agreement among various U.S. agencies including the State Department, A.I.D.,

the Department of Defense, and the CIA can have a negative effect on democratic progress in Latin America. Often, one agency is unaware of other agencies' programs or activities. Although an interagency commission that served as a coordinating body of foreign policy issues and activities was abolished, the need for greater intergovernmental and interagency coordination continues to exist.

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Bissell concluded the session by saying that A.I.D. does need to make pragmatic decisions about how it will allocate future resources, and he invited participants to continue to make suggestions to him and to other A.I.D. staff present.

Mr. Einaudi also offered concluding remarks. Because the State Department often discouraged A.I.D. from initiating political development programs, Mr. Einaudi described a "vacuum" in present foreign assistance strategies for political development. He believed that A.I.D. could do much to fill this void and, at a minimum, A.I.D. should continue to encourage dialogue on strengthening democratic institutions.

Finally, Roma Knee ended the symposium proceedings by commenting on the richness of the symposium dialogue and thanked all participants for contributing to the highly constructive discussions.

APPENDIX A

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An
Agency for International Development
Symposium
on
Strengthening Democratic Institutions

Proposed Agenda
July 30-31, 1987
U.S. Department of State
Washington D.C.

Wednesday, July 29

6:00 p.m.-8:00 p.m.

Informal Reception
The Inn at Foggy Bottom

Thursday, July 30

9:00 a.m.-10:00 a.m.

Welcoming Remarks
Malcolm Butler
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
Agency for International Development

Introductions & Agenda Review

Opening Remarks
Luigi Einaudi
Director, Office of Policy Planning
& Coordination
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
U.S. Department of State

10:00 a.m.-10:15 a.m.

Break

10:15 a.m.-11:30 p.m.

A.I.D.'s Experiences in Democratic Development
Programs

Roma Knee
Human Rights & Democracy Programs Coordinator
Office of Administration of Justice and
Democratic Development
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
Agency for International Development

Open Discussion

12:00 p.m.-1:45 p.m.

Luncheon (by invitation)

1:45 p.m.-3:15 p.m.

Panel I: Democracies in Latin America

Moderator: Therese Kleinkauf
Deputy Director
Office of Policy Planning & Coordination
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
U.S. Department of State

- Definitions of Democracy in Latin America
Panelist: Tony Maingot
- Causes of Democratic Development & Breakdown
Panelist: Larry Diamond
- Consolidation of Democracies: How to Maintain Them
Panelist: Mark Rosenberg

Open Discussion

3:15 p.m.-3:30 p.m.

Panel I Summary of Conclusions

3:30 p.m.-3:45 p.m.

Break

3:45 p.m.-4:45 p.m.

Panel II: Impact of Foreign Assistance Strategies on Strengthening Democracies in Latin America

Moderator: Marilyn Zak,
Deputy Director
Office of Caribbean Affairs
Agency for International Development

- The Policy Framework for Democratic Development Activities
Panelist: Luigi Einaudi
- Political Implications of A.I.D. Economic Development Activities
Panelist: Harlan Hobgood

Open Discussion

4:45 p.m.-5:00 p.m.

Panel II Summary of Conclusions

Friday, July 31

9:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.

Strengthening Democratic Institutions:
Strategies & Priorities

Group 1: Strategies for Established
Democracies

Group 2: Strategies for Countries in
Transition

Group 3: Strategies for Non-Democratic
Countries

10:30 a.m.-10:45 a.m.

Break

10:45 a.m.-12:00 p.m.

Group Presentations & General Conclusions
(Presenters to be determined by groups)

Open Discussion

12:00 p.m.-1:45 p.m.

Luncheon (by invitation)

2:00 p.m.-3:00 p.m.

Strengthening Democratic Institutions:
Suggested Priorities & Activities
(Topics to be determined in Morning Session)

Moderator: Richard Bissell
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Program & Policy
Coordination
Agency for International Development

Open Discussion

3:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.

Summary of Conclusions

Concluding Remarks

Luigi Einaudi
Director, Office of Policy Planning
& Coordination
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Closing Remarks

APPENDIX B

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INVITED PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Larry Diamond
Hoover Institute
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305

Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes
Director, Washington Office
Council on the Americas
625 K Street, N.W. #1200
Washington, D.C. 20006

Mr. Harlan H. Hobgood
President and Chief Executive Officer
Meals for Millions
P.O. Box 2000
Davis, California 95617

Mr. Horace Jennings
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., #605
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. Boris Kozolchyk
College of Law
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona 85721

Mr. Tony Maingot
4478 Via Marina, #904
Marina del Rey, California 90292

Mr. Marc Plattner
Director of Programs
National Endowment for Democracy
1101 15th Street, N.W., #203
Washington, D.C. 20005

Mr. Charles Reilly
Vice President
Office of Learning and Dissemination
Inter-American Foundation
1515 Wilson Boulevard
Rosslyn, Virginia 22209

Mr. Mark Rosenberg
Latin American/Caribbean Center
University Park PC 237D
Tamiami Campus
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199

Dr. Mitchell Seligson
Center for Latin American Studies
RM 4E04, Forbes Quadrangle
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania 15260

Mr. Barry Sklar
Professional Staff Member
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Dirksen Building, Room 423
Washington, D.C. 20510

Ms. Diane Stanley
U.S. Information Agency
301 4th Street, S.W. #848
Washington, D.C. 20547

Mr. Jack Vaughn
Development Associates, Inc.
2924 Columbia Pike
Arlington, Virginia 22204

Ms. Sally Yudelman
National Women's Law Center
1616 P Street, N.W. #100
Washington, D.C. 20036