Social Analysis for the Nineties: Case Studies and Proposed Guidelines

December 1989

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December 1989

Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development under contract number PDC-5315-I-15-8101-00 by Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and the Institute for Development Anthropology (IDA), under a joint venture agreement between DAI, IDA, and Research Triangle Institute (RTI).

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Producing a report of this type was a major undertaking, and many people deserve credit for the quality of the final product. First, I would like to thank the A.I.D. project managers who made this report possible -- Anna Quandt of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination and Joan Atherton of the Bureau for Africa. Supportive, considerate, flexible yet tenacious, their contributions -- moral, material, and written -- were much appreciated. Second, a profound thank you to the staff of the A.I.D. library, specifically, Jean Tift, Mary Nelson, and Pat Simons, whose advice and patient assistance made the quantitative analysis of project documents possible. Third are all those key informants, who patiently answered our questions and queries about social analysis. To the extent possible, I have incorporated and developed many of their perceptions, ideas, and recommendations. Final editing and production were in the very capable hands of the DAI Publications Office.

This report was prepared under contract to A.I.D. to be used for planning purposes in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. Although the report does not represent official A.I.D. policy, my strong hope is that the principal recommendations proposed here will be adopted as official A.I.D. policy. At present, the opinions expressed and these recommendations are the sole responsibility of the study team.

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THE CONTEXT FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS

What is Social Analysis?

Social analysis is first and foremost a perspective and not a check list or a particular philosophy about development, although some practitioners would argue that certain key assumptions and values underlie its practice. The most basic contribution of social analysis to development is to challenge and clarify explicit and implicit assumptions -- made by those responsible for planning and implementing development policies -- about problems to be solved and the institutional linkages between proposed policy interventions and their impact on income, asset distribution, employment, the role of women, distribution of power, health, nutrition, the environment, and other areas of inquiry. These assumptions, often strongly held with little empirical support, derive from the donor's cultural background or the more specialized paradigms of academic and technical experts.

This perspective uses in-depth knowledge of a country's culture and socioeconomic institutions, as well as insights from the comparative study of similar institutions in other countries, to help clarify and anticipate the consequences of resource allocation decisions, the impact of introducing new technologies and information and how best to adapt these to the local context, the potential for their subsequent adoption, and the identification of new ways for people to organize themselves to meet their goals and to sustain these institutions over time.

Social analysis may be applied to issues in many sectors; to all stages of planning, implementation, and evaluation; and over a wide range of development objectives. Above all, social analysis contributes to an understanding and clarification of relationships -- it helps those responsible for facilitating development to anticipate how people of all types, conditions, roles, and classes will respond to new initiatives, whether they are targeted projects, generalized

assistance such as infrastructure, or broad changes in the policy or political environment.

Social Soundness Analysis (SSA) is one specific way that one agency, the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), has tried to incorporate social analysis into project identification and design. Although the current practices and guidelines for SSA have their weaknesses, this study argues that the integration of social analysis into A.I.D. work of all types and at all stages is crucial to the design and implementation of projects that are socioculturally sound, cost-effective, and sustainable.

The principal objective of this report is to provide suggestions for revising the current SSA guidelines in ways that will, first, serve to improve their actual use and, second, further A.I.D.'s ability to design socioculturally sound and cost-effective development interventions. This assessment provides a review of the Agency's past experience with social analysis, with five illustrative case studies; provides a framework for the proposed guidelines; and presents the specific issues to be addressed by these guidelines.

The Introduction of Social Soundness Analysis

The role of social science in development planning expanded during the early- and mid-1970s. In the early 1970s, the Overseas Development Council organized breakfast working meetings with a small group of Congressmen. These meetings critically examined the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance policies. Partially in response to these meetings, the 1973 and 1975 amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act included the New Directions legislation, outlining the mandate to address development funds and benefits to the rural poor majority. A.I.D. then organized the Working Group on Rural Poverty, which supervised the drafting of the guidelines for SSA; these were incorporated into the A.I.D. Project Assistance Handbook in 1975.

Similar concerns at the World Bank found expression in the McNamara Doctrine. These concerns, however, did not lead as directly to an increased role for social analysis in project planning and implementation as was the case in A.I.D. Bilateral donors, particularly the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA), and A.I.D. have been more active than multilateral donors in incorporating social analysis into development planning and implementation.

The original focus of the social soundness analysis of development projects included:

- Compatibility of the proposed project with the sociocultural context in which the intended beneficiaries live;
- Potential for project benefits to spread; and
- Potential for an equitable distribution of project benefits and burdens among the people affected.

Bureaucratic pressure to do social soundness analysis and to show the Congress that the Agency was taking the New Directions mandate seriously resulted in the recruitment of more than a dozen social analysts, mostly anthropologists, who had strong incentives to translate their findings as social scientists into A.I.D. programming decisions. As these consultants and employees became familiar with A.I.D. programming procedures and strategies, they were increasingly effective in bringing social science and area studies insights to bear on project, program, and policy work. They became more successful in altering project and program design features where previously only justifications for decisions already taken were acceptable.

Perhaps the most important effect of A.I.D.'s incorporation of social analysis occurred when mid- and high-level A.I.D. managers responded favorably to SSA after working with individual social analysts who were solving A.I.D. problems in an A.I.D. context. These converts, who found that social analysis could make A.I.D. programs better, played a crucial supportive role in protecting social

analysis from bureaucratic backlash during the 1977 reorganization of the Agency, following the election of President Carter, and in advocating the changes in staffing and procedures that characterize what may be termed the second stage of institutionalization of social analysis.

This second stage saw an increase in the number of full-time anthropologists and similarly trained analysts to more than 50, and a de facto broadening of the role of social analysis into many aspects of A.I.D. work, including policy formulation and impact studies in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC), centrally funded research in the Bureau for Science and Technology (S&T), and program and project work in all regional bureaus and many major field missions. Thus, there was a considerable spread effect of social analysis through its influence on new guidance documents, such as the Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS), and through the increasing presence of social analysts in A.I.D. decision-making positions.

At the same time, the overall composition of the A.I.D. bureaucracy was changing, with even larger numbers of professionals coming from backgrounds in the Peace Corps and similar organizations with extensive field experience at the community level in developing countries. Regardless of their disciplinary background or their views about social science, these individuals brought an appreciation of the diversity and complexity of rural situations that previously had been lacking within the Agency as a whole.

As a result of the intersection of a number of factors, the Reagan years had a marked impact on the status and use of social analysis. The Reagan administration reduced the overall number of A.I.D. direct hires when there was already a change toward more generalists and fewer specialists in the Agency. Thus, most Foreign Service positions labeled social analyst, behavioral science advisor, anthropologist, or the like were abolished, as was the position of senior anthropologist for policy, which had provided a degree of central oversight for social analysis from 1976 to 1979. In contrast, individual social analysts, most

of whom were in fact anthropologists, were not eliminated from A.I.D.'s work force but found other positions, such as rural development officers.

Many social scientists have risen to positions of respect and authority in the A.I.D. management hierarchy. Because of this and because many non-social scientists have been impressed with the potential of social science and country expertise, A.I.D. is using social analysis skills at least as widely today as it was in the 1970s. In this sense, social analysis is much more effectively institutionalized today, and given high-level support, than it was when it was initially introduced.

At the project level, social scientists have played an important role in both design and implementation. Their contributions have often helped designers to anticipate potential problems and implementers to deal with actual problems. The full flavor of their contribution is captured in the following case studies, which show precisely how social analysis can make a difference:

- The Agroforestry Outreach Project in Haiti
- The Central Selva Resource Management Project in Peru
- The Manantali Resettlement Project in Mali
- Project North Shaba in Zaire
- The Provincial Area Development Program in Indonesia

The case studies were selected on a subjective basis according to the following criteria: the projects were known to the study team either through personal involvement or personal interest; social analysis was believed to have made a significant contribution; in most cases, good documentation was available; and all were viewed as good, worthwhile, sometimes stimulating development interventions.

THE AGROFORESTRY OUTREACH PROJECT IN HAITI

Description of the Project

The deforestation underway in most of the tropical regions worldwide has taken on particularly grave proportions in Haiti. Most recently, the rapid expansion of the charcoal market, resulting from increasing numbers crowding into the capital city, and the reliance of large numbers of cash-needy rural families on the income made from the cutting of trees to supply this market, have contributed to deforestation. The consequences of this have been devastating for the ecology and economy of rural Haiti, contributing to soil erosion as valuable topsoil washes down the denuded slopes; decreasing fertility of the farmers' land and, in turn, lower crop yields in this already malnourished nation; incapacity for organic restoration of the soil, resulting in the conversion of forest land into barren savanna; and the disappearance of fuelwood, the primary source of household energy. While deforestation -- now virtually complete throughout the island -- cannot be held solely responsible for the current ecological and economic crisis in Haiti, it is one of the most important factors.

Several forestry projects have been initiated by both the government and donors with little success. These projects have generally been ignored by the peasant and it has been difficult to involve him or her in planting and maintaining the trees. Some efforts have relied on Food-for-Work arrangements. In such cases, local peasants energetically plant thousands of seedlings, but subsequently neglect the young trees and, in many cases, turn them over to free-ranging goats. It is even more difficult to prevent rural residents from cutting the trees, whose sale brings in desperately needed cash. In short, the most common incentives to motivate farmers to plant trees -- appeals to plant trees for "Mother Haiti," for their grandchildren, or to preserve the soil on

their plots of land -- emphasize long-term payoff and do not meet peasants' immediate needs. Similarly, the top-down, directive approach, usually involving traditional work groups, is also inappropriate.

Prodded by an influential congressman, A.I.D./Haiti devised an alternative program strategy for reforestation during the late 1970s. As part of this effort, A.I.D. contracted Gerald Murray, an anthropologist with considerable experience in Haiti, to evaluate 25 years of reforestation and erosion control activities and identify the determinants of success and failure. Murray concluded that most projects had failed not because of land tenure or attitudinal barriers among peasants, but because of fatal flaws in one or more key project components. His recommendations offered concrete actions that could be taken to effectively program and manage reforestation activities and these formed the basis of the Agroforestry Outreach Project (AOP).

The basic design concepts of the project were derived from ethnographic studies and anthropological research on land tenure and the domestic economy of the Haitian peasant. Murray formulated the problem of deforestation not in terms of the government institutions to be strengthened, nor in terms of the ecological issue of environmental degradation and denuded hillsides. Rather, he examined the problem from the point of view of the Haitian peasant -- the true implementer of the project -- without whom large numbers of trees could not be successfully planted and maintained. Thus, the motivational factors, perceived needs, and microeconomic context of rural residents became the basis for the project framework and for selecting and adapting the most appropriate technology.

It was clear that the project needed to promote trees in response to the peasants' need for cash in the short term. As a result, the planting and harvesting of trees was promoted as a cash crop. If the tree was seen by the small farmer as contributing little or nothing to his own cash needs, then it would be politely ignored. If the tree was perceived as detrimental to his

economic interests, then it would be firmly rejected. Thus, the central design issues became:

- How to ensure that benefits accrued in a timely manner to the farmers;
- How trees could be planted on smallholdings without interfering with agricultural production; and
- How to ensure that the peasants, and not the government or the project, would be seen as the sole owners of the trees with unlimited rights to harvest the wood whenever they wished.

The technology was then adapted to respond to these issues.

Another issue that had to be resolved was the institutional strategy and means of implementation. Past experience has shown that even a technically sound project with good microeconomic incentives will fail if placed in the hands of institutional intermediaries who misuse the resources or divert them to differing ends. In the case of Haiti, it had become clear that "governmental involvement condemned a project to certain paralysis and possible death" (Murray 1987). Thus, in spite of adverse comments from the A.I.D. mission which wanted to work through ineffective and corrupt public institutions, this project was implemented through international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

In 1981, under the original Project Paper (PP), grants were awarded to Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and The Pan-American Development Foundation (PADF). CARE and PADF concentrate on the establishment of tree nurseries and seedling production, extension to small farmers, and training of local personnel. CARE operates directly with farmers in the northwest, while PADF works directly through local NGOs in most of the rest of the country. In addition, a Coordination and Technical Support Unit was established within the mission. Two of the first three coordinators were anthropologists, first Fred Conway and later Ira Lowenthal. Gerry

Murray was Project Director for PADF for the first two years, followed by another anthropologist, Glen Smucker.

The Haiti AOP has been an unprecedented success, far exceeding the targets set by project planners; between 1982 and 1986, approximately 110,000 farmers planted more than 25 million seedlings. In early 1985, the project was extended and a contract awarded for applied research on technical and socioeconomic factors related to small farmer tree planting. In 1986, the project was further extended to December 1989 and, in addition to continuing on-going activities, amended to support a program of biological and genetic tree improvement to be maintained by the NGOs implementing the project. By the end of 1989, after eight full years of implementation, the AOP will have produced and distributed more than 50 million trees to 200,000 peasants, 30 percent of whom are repeaters planting for the second time. Generally speaking, 40 percent of the trees will survive outplanting. A follow-on project, the Haiti Agroforestry Program (HAP), was designed in early 1989.

Contributions of Social Analysis

An anthropological focus was used throughout the project and specifically influenced the content of the design. Murray writes (1987:236-237):

> The very choice of "wood as a marketable crop" as the fundamental theme of the project stemmed from ethnographic knowledge of the cash-oriented foundations of Haitian peasant horticulture and knowledge of current conditions in the internal marketing system. Furthermore, ethnographic knowledge of Haitian peasant land tenure -- which is highly individualistic -- guided me away from the community forest schemes that so many development philosophers seem to delight in but that are completely inappropriate to the social reality of Caribbean peasantries.

Not only did Murray's in-depth knowledge of Haiti inform project design, but also the lessons learned from his evaluation of 25 years of conservation projects in Haiti. For example, the ordinary reforestation project failed to take

the necessary programmatic and informational steps to assure the peasant tha he would be the owner and beneficiary of the tree. In many projects ir Haiti, the peasants have been told that the trees being planted are the government's trees. Similarly, rumors abound that the expatriates involved ir reforestation projects will one day return and expropriate the land on which project trees have been planted. AOP addressed this issue by instituting a formal agreement between the farmer and the project in which the projec provides the seedlings and technical assistance, and guarantees the farmer complete and exclusive ownership, in return for his labor for planting and maintenance.

As discussed above, a social analysis of the project setting and the needs of the participants also informed the design and adaptation of the technology component. Given the conditions that the trees were to provide a return in the short-term, meet the demands of the charcoal market, and require little maintenance once planted, fast-growing, drought-resistant species were selected, for example *Leucaena leucocephala, Cassia siamea,* and *Eucalyptus camaldulensis.* This is in contrast to the slower growing hardwoods that had been previously promoted.

Similarly, the nursery system was adapted to produce light-weight, easily transportable, micro-seedlings, as opposed to traditional, bulkier bagged seedlings. Not only did this method increase the number of seedlings that could be transported at one time, but it also required less time for ground preparation and less labor for planting. This nursery system constituted a technical breakthrough that reduced to a fraction the fossil fuel and human energy expenditure required to transport and plant trees. This was important, as trees are planted at the beginning of the agricultural season when labor is relatively scarce.

Guided by prior ethnographic knowledge of Haitian cropping patterns, the AOP worked out with peasants various border planting and intercropping strategies to ensure that tree planting did not interfere with agricultural production and was feasible even for smallholders. The four options identified included: woodlots on plots no longer useful for food production; border plantings on good agricultural land that can be cropped on a continuous basis; rows of trees in the center of fields vulnerable to erosion; and trees intercropped with food.

The continued presence of a social scientist and the addition of the applied research component on technical and socioeconomic factors provided a means for formative evaluation of preliminary results and the identification of mid-course corrections, including:

- Providing appropriate varieties of hardwoods as peasants opted to postpone cutting trees in order to harvest poles and construction wood that sold at a higher rate than charcoal;
- Lowering the minimum number of trees an individual had to plant when it was found that farmers did not always have enough land and were frequently sharing the trees with neighbors and relatives; and
- Increasing the emphasis on extension and training, particularly harvesting techniques and soil conservation strategies.

In this way the social scientists have acted as information brokers: communicating the needs and desires of the farmers to technical specialists who then adapted the technology to meet these needs. Furthermore, the social scientists have identified the messages to accompany the technology to promote its adoption -- for example, wood as a cash crop and clarification of ownership.

During the design of the HAP in 1989, a follow-on to the AOP, the consulting team was requested to review a $10 million proposal submitted by CARE, prepared by their regional officer for natural resources, home office staff in the United States, and U.S. project staff in Haiti. In response to what is cited as the primary cause of the cycle of poverty found in Haiti -- lack of

knowledge and inappropriate attitudes concerning resource management, limited community organization, and inadequate access to basic farm inputs -- the CARE strategy is composed of six components including: training and extension; community organization; agroforestry; soil conservation; staff development; and complementary agricultural practices.

While basically technically sound, there are serious limitations in terms of sociocultural feasibility, a point strongly emphasized in the social analysis conducted for the HAP. The CARE project proposes to follow a blueprint approach that has proven successful in other regions of the world, but will meet numerous constraints and most likely ultimate failure in the Haitian context. The social analysis provided the mission with the necessary information -- and ammunition -- to deal with CARE and negotiate some mutually acceptable compromise. As of this writing, negotiations are still underway.

Lessons Learned

This particular project is a stirring example of the power of anthropological ideas and the importance of incorporating lessons learned from previous experience. As with the following case studies, anthropological insights are most useful and appreciated when translated into concrete proposals that A.I.D. planners and managers can act upon.

While the AGP illustrates that projects using social analysis as a design and implementation tool have greater likelihood of being successful, it also illustrates that no one has a crystal ball and can predict the complex chain of action and reaction that any development project initiates. Under the applied research component, Frederick Conway (1986) conducted in-depth research on the decision-making framework for tree planting among project participants. His study highlighted several important -- and unpredicted -- aspects, including:

- Farmers were producing wood for domestic use;

- Soil conditions and their improvement were of major concern to many farmers interviewed, and formed their primary motivation in planting trees;

- Some farmers were using trees in an effort to transform whole subsystems of farm production, for example, using trees to establish or re-establish coffee groves;

- Several farmers were using trees as a means of storing capital resources. In an environment where crop failure is frequent, the peasants prefer to leave the tree as a "bank" against future emergencies. This use of the tree as a bank made particular sense, given the slaughter of their traditional bank, the pig, in the early 1980s -- thanks to an outbreak of African swine fever; and

- Farmers were using project trees to address objectives that relate directly to their current and future access to the two most important factors of production -- labor and land. For example, farmers have planted trees to establish a firmer claim on inherited land and tenants have planted trees on plots of land leased for several years in order to assure "the first right refusal," if the land is ever put up for sale. In addition, some owners, particularly households headed by women without access to male labor, are using project trees as a distinct, alternative strategy for dealing with relative and absolute labor shortages within the production unit.

Lowenthal argues that the importance of this study is that it illustrates the peasants' necessity and ability to adapt introduced technology to their own needs and systems. It also illustrates how little the outsider -- as well as the insider, for that matter -- can really predict in the design of an intervention. He writes (1989:27):

> What we are witnessing here is the appropriation of project trees as a tool, by the peasants themselves. Their subsequent application of that tool -- in its myriad capacities as a biological, social, and symbolic resource, to a diversity of management tasks and objectives, may have profound implications for their capacity to survive the current crisis in the agricultural sector.

A corollary of this lesson is that neither planner nor technician, anthropologist nor forester, could ever have foreseen or "recommended" to farmers the strategies that have evolved using this new resource. Thus, while it is crucial that projects be designed from the viewpoint of the peasant, this is no substitute for participation of the beneficiaries in project implementation and feedback loops. The social scientist can further this involvement by acting as an information broker when necessary.

The experience with the CARE proposal illustrates that even NGOs, generally commended for their understanding and sensitivity to the local context, can fall into the trap of using blueprints developed outside of the local setting. The structure and approach of the training program, the emphasis on community organization, and the argument that low-technology is best although it may cost more and be inappropriate, are all standard features of the CARE approach. The analysis by a social scientist showed that the design had little, if any, compatibility with the Haitian context and would probably be unsuccessful. This experience also raises the question as to the need for a social analysis of proposals submitted by NGOs. This issue will become increasing important as NGOs are used more frequently as implementers of A.I.D.-funded projects.

THE CENTRAL SELVA RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROJECT IN PERU

Description of the Project

The A.I.D.-financed Central Selva Resource Management Project in Peru took place in the context of the high priority placed upon tropical forest development by the second administration of Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985). Initially, A.I.D. enthusiasm for becoming involved in the project was low, due in part to the high costs and dubious development returns associated with tropical forest development, and in part to concerns about the potential impacts of the project on the environment of the steeply sloped and extremely humid Palcazu Valley, and on its Native American

inhabitants, the Amuesha. However, in light of the inevitability of a major tropical forest development effort under the Government of Peru's (GOP) Proyecto Especial Pichis-Palcazu (PEPP), and U.S. policy makers' desire to support the Belaúnde administration, the decision was made to proceed with project identification and design.

In order to promote rapid action, the GOP under President Belaúnde circumvented the ministries that would normally be responsible for different aspects of rural development activity in Peru by creating independently funded integrated rural development projects in tropically forested priority areas. In addition to the Pichis-Palcazu project (PEPP), to which this project was linked, there were eight other projects. In addition, A.I.D. also provided substantial support to the Alto Huallaga project, as part of U.S. efforts to stem coca production in that region.

The project design began with two major goals:

- The development and promotion of production regimens that could be sustained in the steeply sloping, high-rainfall area; and
- The provision of institutional support for the Amuesha in order that they might be better able to take advantage of officially anticipated benefits of the project and more effectively defend their lands and lifeways.

A team of consultants, composed of specialists -- including an anthropologist -- with long experience in the area, elaborated upon these general goals and provided the information base drawn upon in the writing of the PP (JRB Associates 1981).

At the time the report was written, both team members and most A.I.D. officials involved with the project contemplated a relatively modestly funded effort that would combine applied research with small-scale pilot activities. However, pressures mounted for the project to increase in scale in response to

large amounts of money in the mission's pipeline which needed to be allocated. The team charged with writing the PP consisted of mission staff with no firsthand experience in the Palcazu Valley. This meant that they also lacked a sense of on-the-ground possibilities and constraints to balance against the bureaucratic exigency to allocate funds (Stocks 1988).

As a result, the report was used as the basis for the design of a large project, despite its warning that the Palcazu Valley could not support a big development project, and that, if A.I.D. was to get involved, it should be on a small scale with emphasis on applied research in both technical and social science areas. However, the PP included a large budget for the project and used the information in the report to justify how it should be spent. The document borrowed a considerable amount from the report, and included its original social and technical points. However, these points were arranged and reconstructed in such a way that the overall thrust of the project described in the PP bore little resemblance to that originally envisioned by the consulting team.

Questions raised about the potential for sustainable production in the Palcazu Valley, and the development of the area for indigenous peoples, were not addressed. Instead, the PP simply said that the issues would be addressed by the project, with no indication of how. The PP adopted the position that adequate information on successful production in the humid tropical forest exists, and that the major agricultural issue was simply a question of putting together an appropriate package for the Palcazu. In fact, since no research had been conducted on an area as humid and as steep as the Palcazu, the information did not exist. With respect to the role of the Native American population, a specialist who reviewed the PP shortly after its completion commented: "The interests and needs of the Amuesha were so far outside the experience of the authors of the PP that they were not considered in any meaningful way."

Approved by A.I.D. and the GOP in 1982, the project described in the PP contained ten components, including forestry, agricultural, and livestock development; a continuous land-use inventory; and feeder road location, planning, and road maintenance. The formulation of these components reflected a number of serious social and technical flaws, some of which were specific to individual components, while others were more general in nature.

Under the agricultural development component, the project singled out crops for special emphasis that were inappropriate to the zone. The PP called for emphasis on cacao and wing bean production, despite the fact that these could only be cultivated on the seven percent of soils in the valley classified as suitable for intensive cultivation. These lands were already under intensive cultivation for the production of food crops such as corn, beans, and peanuts. Similarly, the PP called for emphasis on pineapples, normally grown as a widely spaced monocrop because of the tree's intolerance of shade, with the ground between the trees kept bare or allowed to grow up in weeds. In the steeply sloping, high-rainfall Palcazu Valley, pineapple would have been an extremely unfortunate choice from an environmental point of view.

More importantly, the agricultural component misunderstood the social organization of production among the Amuesha. Because the Amuesha have a well-organized political organization, with a clear leadership hierarchy for dealing with external entities, the PP assumed that the Amuesha could be treated as a producers' organization. However, their political organization is an artifact of the exigencies of receiving legal recognition from and dealing with the Peruvian state. It does not extend to most areas of internal governance, where an egalitarian social organization and weak political leadership structures prevail. This meant that a much more intensive effort to promote agriculture and other development activities would be required than the PP had envisioned.

Other components of the project, as designed in the PP, suffered from similar difficulties. For example, the livestock development component assumed that existing pastures were of good quality and understocked. This ignored the fact that each of the three major groups occupying the area -- settlers with large areas of land, smallholding settlers, and the Amuesha -- had fundamentally different livestock regimens. These related to the historical circumstances of their occupation of the area, the kinds of lands they occupied, and their overall production strategies. In fact, pastures were of poor quality across the board, and the only group whose pastures were understocked was the Amuesha.

The forestry component of the project envisioned providing small entrepreneurs with credit to establish sawmills in the area to which the Amuesha and others would sell their lumber. This invited a range of problems by separating the ownership of the land from the processing of the timber, removing any incentive for mill owners to support sustained yield production once initial investment was recovered, and leaving them in a position to essentially dictate prices to producers. Only among the Amuesha were there sufficiently large blocks of forest to attempt the sort of management system contemplated in the PP.

These component-specific flaws reflected a number of more general errors in the PP. It did not consider the physical remoteness of the area, or its relationship with regional and national markets. The PP assumed that the GOP could and would enforce appropriate land use. This flew in the face of social science wisdom about the importance of local participation in land-use management activities to address production and marketing constraints. It also ignored the abysmal record of the GOP generally and the Belaúnde administration in particular in actually promoting land use on the basis of capability.

As a result of these and other deficiencies in the PP, the project underwent continuous modification to bring the design into line with conditions

encountered in the field as the project was implemented. Technical specialists hired to implement the project consistently raised two issues in connection with this rolling redesign: first, the extent of the redesign; and, second, the exceptional dedication and bureaucratic courage of the A.I.D. Project Officer charged with implementing the project.

Because relatively little of the area of the Palcazu was actually suited for intensive agriculture or livestock, the forestry management component was increasingly emphasized as the project was redesigned. This included the natural forest management envisioned in the PP, as well as a greater emphasis on agroforestry. As a result of this change, the Swiss/German settlers, who controlled a substantial part of the agricultural land, received little from the project. Since they emphasized agriculture and livestock, the settlers had cleared most of their forested land, and the remaining blocks were too small, scattered, and inaccessible to be incorporated into the project's forestry activities.

As a result of this redesign, a project that -- in its PP form -- was described as being a "sure failure" and a "potential disaster" for the Amuesha and the physical environment of the Palcazu, was converted into one widely recognized as sensitive and innovative with respect to native people and the environment. For example, an assessment in support of the design of the Development Strategies for Fragile Lands (DESFIL) project stated (Painter et al. 1985:10):

> The design and implementation of a natural forest management regimen under the auspices of the Central Selva project will provide information on the feasibility of establishing sustainable and economical tropical forest production systems. The Central Selva experience will be a basis for formulating development policies for many regions of the humid tropics. It is extremely important that the natural forest regimen and other Selva Alta activities with similar far-reaching implications be identified and that their significance be communicated to any new government.

Project implementation went well beyond working with the Amuesha in forestry management, although this was the centerpiece activity. It included for, example, the establishment of a sawmill owned and run by the Amuesha to enable them to control the commercialization of their own lumber, and the training of Amuesha in business administration to manage the mill efficiently.

Contributions of Social Analysis

The continuing modification of the project was carried out by both technical specialists and social scientists. However, because of difficulties experienced in the Peruvian special projects in coordinating diverse technical activities around a central theme (APODESA 1984:91-93), the work of social scientists associated with the project was considered particularly important. Social science contributions are repeatedly cited as having been particularly strong in three areas:

- Working with technical specialists and enabling them to see how the different components of the project needed to fit together, and creating a consensus about what they were trying to accomplish;
- Helping the project attain credibility in the eyes of the Amuesha through effective incorporation of their concerns into the continuing redesign of the project; and
- Assisting other project personnel in attaining legitimacy with the Amuesha through their work with the social scientist.

Because of these contributions, the project is frequently cited by those who were associated with it as an example of the kind of fundamental contributions that effective social analysis can make.

Ironically, while the project was exceptional in the degree to which social analysis was incorporated from an early stage -- including the hiring of social scientists to explore the issues raised in the JRB report in greater depth (Miller and Martínez 1981 and 1982) -- the prospects for social science

participation in project implementation initially appeared problematic. There were also a number of Peruvian anthropologists and sociologists whose extensive work on tropical forest development issues was a tremendous resource to the project. Drawing upon these individuals and institutions was frequently difficult, because they were widely viewed by members of the Belaúnde administration as opposing official tropical forest development efforts, and their participation in implementation and evaluation was frequently opposed by the GOP. A.I.D./Peru demonstrated moments of inspiration in finding ways to tap their knowledge and insights.

The work of Richard Chase Smith, the anthropologist on the JRB team, was widely regarded as having been instrumental in defining what the implications of the project were for the Amuesha. His long-term experience in the area played a central role in allowing him to identify a range of issues related to Peruvian national development strategies involving the Amazon, the relations of the Amuesha with non-Indian populations, and the specific threats that different types of development posed to Amuesha society.

Since at that time Smith worked for Cultural Survival, the A.I.D. Project Officer sought to continue the organization's participation in the project by placing it in charge of social science activities. With considerable difficulty he persuaded the directors of PEPP and A.I.D., both of whom were concerned about the implications of having an international human rights advocacy organization working within an officially sponsored development project, to permit Cultural Survival's participation. He also persuaded the mission to support Cultural Survival's participation in the project through a grant, rather than a contract, in order to assure Cultural Survival that it would be free to maintain a critical stance.

This process was complicated by Cultural Survival making a series of written and oral statements which were widely regarded as being increasingly confrontational in tone. Thus, when the organization elected not to participate

in the project after 16 months of negotiations, there were widespread feelings that social scientists had been given their chance and been proven wanting when faced with the task of implementing a project -- rather than acting as a critic. Enthusiasm for maintaining a social science component in the project was low (Sugrue n.d.).

Despite these difficulties, a social science component was maintained because of widespread recognition of the threat posed to the Amuesha by development activities associated with the PEPP. Anthony Stocks, an anthropologist with a number of years of experience working with indigenous people in lowland Peru, was hired as a social science advisor by the implementing contractor to provide technical assistance. Stocks worked with technical specialists in all areas of the project and played an instrumental role in educating Peruvian and North American bureaucrats and technicians about how the different components of the project should fit together in order to achieve general development objectives.

Stocks' central contribution was in gaining acceptance of the project by the Amuesha. Key project components, such as the natural forest management regimen and support for sustainable cropping systems, could not have advanced without Amuesha participation and cooperation. In this regard, the watershed event was project support for providing the Amuesha with land titles. Initially, the Amuesha were not inclined to cooperate, seeing the land-titling project and the promised benefits generally, as a smokescreen to take their lands. By going to each of the communities and talking candidly about benefits and risks, Stocks persuaded the Amuesha to cooperate with the land titling. They agreed to cooperate on condition that the titling should include all of the Amuesha, not simply those who lived within the project area.

Stocks presented this argument to A.I.D. and explained its basis in Amuesha production ecology and property rights. A.I.D. accepted the Amuesha position, and the project officer authorized the use of project funds to title the

lands of all of the Amuesha, whether or not these fell within the officially designated project area. This was a potentially risky decision, because the use of project funds to benefit people not located within a project area could be construed as inappropriate in an audit. However, the land titling program demonstrated project commitment to working with the Amuesha and paved the way to cooperation in other areas.

For example, it facilitated Amuesha involvement in agricultural extension activities. In this instance, Stocks visited each of the 22 Amuesha communities individually, explained the extension program, and requested that they select a person to receive extension training. When the first organizational meeting was held at the project camp, 19 of the 22 communities had selected extensionists and were ready to begin immediately. This level of involvement permitted the project to move ahead with more ambitious income-generating activities. These included the creation of an Amuesha lumbering cooperative to manage timber resources according to the natural forest management regimen developed by the Tropical Science Center, harvest the trees, cut them into lumber, treat the boards at a sawmill owned by the Amuesha, and market the lumber (Hartshorn 1989).

When Stocks left the project at the end of 1985, he was replaced as the social science advisor by Thomas More. The transition from Stocks to More illustrated the different types of strengths and skills that different social scientists may bring to a particular situation. Like Stocks, More was extremely effective at working directly with the Amuesha. He was regarded as being more effective than Stocks at analyzing the project in relation to broader policy issues concerning tropical forest development in Peru. While some of the technicians found this to be valuable, this sort of analysis threatened and offended some officials directing the PEPP. Thus, he was less effective than Stocks in building consensus among project administrators around short-term, pragmatic objectives. However, by this point in the project, Peru was experiencing a change in government and a deepening economic and political crisis. Some

judged it an appropriate moment for clear statements about the implications of the project for planning future activity in the Palcazu Valley.

Lessons Learned

This project offers several lessons regarding the role of social analysis in project design and implementation. First, A.I.D. needs to be willing to face up to the difficult issues raised by social analysis at the design stage. In this case, social scientists outlined in considerable detail a number of issues with which the project had to deal, both in regard to the Amuesha and the institutional bases of production in the area generally. They also indicated, along with the technical specialists, areas in which additional information was needed in order to prepare a responsible project design.

In the face of the bureaucratic pressure to allocate a large amount of money to the project and the political pressure to provide support to the Belaúnde government, these considerations were largely ignored in the writing of the PP. Such behavior communicates a lack of seriousness about dealing with substantive concerns and, in the case of Cultural Survival, may have contributed to their decision not to participate. On the other hand, taking the bureaucratically risky decision to allow all Amuesha to participate in the land titling project insured Amuesha involvement in the project.

Another lesson learned is that social scientists need to be pragmatic. This does not mean attempting to address social issues as an atheoretical technician. Nor does it mean pulling punches in order to avoid offending the sensitivities of A.I.D. or host country bureaucrats. However, it does mean that the social scientist needs to be able to do more than criticize; effective social analysis needs to define what alternatives are available and make specific statements regarding the costs and benefits associated with each. While the criticisms and concerns of Cultural Survival were widely recognized as valid, their refusal or inability to move from general criticism to recommendations

about what to do also communicated a lack of seriousness. The impression left with A.I.D. officials and many Peruvians was that Cultural Survival was willing to abandon the Amuesha to their predictable fate at the hands of the project in order to avoid being criticized for collaborating with the U.S. Government.

While social analysis played a central role in the project from its inception, the impact on implementation came about as a result of the interaction between social scientists, technicians, bureaucrats, and the Amuesha as a part of the continuing redesign of the project. This contribution did not derive from following SSA guidelines. Rather, it was a result of the social scientists defining the social processes shaping and being shaped by the project, and then communicating the nature and implications of these processes to their colleagues. It was the general understanding of social process that allowed project staff to begin fitting the various components together. Finally, the translation of these understandings into positive actions was dependent upon project staff being willing to make bureaucratically risky decisions in the interest of achieving development objectives.

THE MANANTALI RESETTLEMENT PROJECT IN MALI

Description of the Project

A.I.D./Mali's involvement with the Manantali Dam began during the late 1970s, when President Carter's Special Envoy to Africa met with the President of Mali. Concerned about unfavorable international reports regarding the development impacts of large dam projects, and the plight of people who were to be displaced by the dam, the Malian president requested assistance with resettling the people who would lose their homes to the dam. At that time, the mission had already decided not to become involved in the dam project. The southwestern part of the country, where the dam would be constructed across the Bafing River, a major tributary of the Senegal River, was not a

priority area for the mission, according to its CDSS.

Additionally, an unfavorable feasibility study by the Gannett-Fleming engineering firm had already led the U.S. Government to decide that no U.S. funds were to be used in the project. The World Bank had also declined to provide funds. However, the Government of Mali (GOM) succeeded in securing support from other donors to build the dam (A.I.D./Mali 1984:10). So, when the Carter administration instructed the mission to assist in the resettlement of the population to be displaced, it was clear that dam construction would proceed with or without U.S. assistance.

The mission officer responsible for the design of the resettlement project was a folklorist with many years of experience in Mali. He had recently begun working for the mission under contract, and he subsequently became a direct-hire employee. This background was significant in shaping his approach to the general issue of settlement, and his efforts to respect the social and cultural realities of rural Mali. In addition, this experience gave rise to a commitment that, having undertaken the resettlement project, A.I.D. had a responsibility to follow through with the necessary financial and institutional support.

This was important because the imposition of the project on the mission meant that it did not receive enthusiastic support. While there was a general desire that the project should succeed, or, at least, in the words of one observer, not be unsuccessful, the Manantali Resettlement Project was not of sufficiently high priority for the mission to adopt positions that might entail disagreement with the GOM.

Because of his familiarity with the work of Scudder on resettlement (Scudder 1981a and 1981b), the design officer contracted the Institute for Development Anthropology (IDA) to assist in writing the Project Identification Document (PID). Not surprisingly, the PID addressed resettlement as a social

issue and focused upon how to reestablish the production system to be disrupted by the forced relocation. The emphasis was on relocating functioning communities rather than collections of individuals. This meant paying attention to the functioning of formal and informal institutions responsible for defining and regulating access to productive resources.

There were two dimensions to this problem. One was that existing institutions should not be undermined because this would also undermine the bonds of solidarity, cooperation, and reciprocity upon which production depended. The other dimension was that within the social context of rural life in the pre-dam days, there was inequality in access to resources within the traditional corporate community structure. Left to their own devices, local elites could manipulate events so that their already privileged positions would be enhanced at the expense of poorer neighbors. While these inequalities were not judged to be particularly significant within the context of the pre-dam society, they could become so as a result of changes in the regional economy following construction of the dam.

The PID reflected understanding of the kinds of problems resettled populations commonly encounter and technical assistance needs were defined in terms of this understanding. Also included was a monitoring component to record the impacts of the project on the population to be relocated, and to assist resettlement authorities in addressing the needs created by resettlement as these occurred (Koenig 1983).

Unfortunately, maintaining this integrated perspective through the preparation of the PP proved difficult. The major problem was that the A.I.D. staff and contractors who wrote the PP never actually functioned as a team. Some members of the design team never actually met one another, and most of those who did were not together long enough to coordinate effectively their respective tasks. Subsequently, the approval process was difficult -- in large part because of the internal contradictions of the PP. Because the project

was isolated both geographically and topically from the rest of the A.I.D./Mal program, the mission found it difficult to devote the resources needed to move the project ahead expeditiously.

An additional problem with the PP was that, while it reflected the findings of Scudder and other researchers with respect to the importance of reestablishing functioning communities and anticipating the problems that people were likely to experience, it did not reflect the emphasis this research placed on planning for long-term economic growth. Settlement studies show that relocated populations frequently survive the move well in the short term, but falter in the medium to long term, resulting in environmental destruction and impoverishment. Frequently, this is because the traditional production regimens, which may have been preserved through the move, are not appropriate for the post-relocation social and economic context. Therefore, the resettlement project needs to be the first stage of a longer term plan for economic growth and development. However, A.I.D./Mali declined to discuss development beyond the resettlement, because it feared that this would be interpreted as a commitment to an area which did not figure in its country strategy.

Nevertheless, the PP did preserve the idea that resettlement efforts should be guided by social science understandings of the impacts of relocation on the local population, and it contained terms of reference for establishing a monitoring unit. The PP also provided for the collection of socioeconomic data on topics such as land tenure and local institutions (A.I.D./Maii 1984:55). It included provisions for *animateurs* in the villages to be resettled. These *animateurs* were to act as a liaison between the villagers and the project, presenting proposals and options regarding the settlement process from the project to the villagers, and present villagers' views to the project. They would also assist villagers with the organizational aspects of the move.

The PP referred to the "excellent social analysis" conducted by the Institute for Development Anthropology (IDA), and suggested that this should be the

basis of the monitoring effort during implementation. Subsequently, IDA was contracted to undertake the task through the Cooperative Agreement on Settlement and Resource Systems Analysis (SARSA). The IDA team consisted of a doctoral student in anthropology who resided in the project area for two years and supervised the collection of the monitoring data, as well as a two-person senior advisory team, which visited the project twice yearly. An information management specialist also visited the project: once, at the beginning, to set up a computerized database system for managing and analyzing the monitoring data, and later, near the end of the project, to assist with data analysis. In addition, the monitoring exercise was supported by other IDA senior staff with resettlement experience, including Scudder, who visited the project while working on other activities.

The implementation of the project was slowed by a number of factors, including weather, financial management and administrative difficulties, and relations between the local population to be resettled and the responsible state authorities (Koenig 1985 and 1986). One of the best rainy seasons enjoyed by Mali in several years slowed the construction of roads and infrastructure, key for moving the local population and reestablishing social and economic life in the new area.

Implementation was also slowed by the *animateurs*, who were formally responsible for promoting the resettlement effort among the local population and assisting them in organizing to make the move. However, they were also called on to assist with a wide range of other activities related to the project, but not included in their terms of reference. This prevented them from working as closely or intensively with beneficiaries as would have been desirable. As a result, as the time for moving drew near, the resettlement effort was running behind schedule. The project was not ready to receive the relocated people and had not informed them about what their options were and what they needed to do in order to take advantage of programs in support of their resettlement.

These delays were compounded by an unwieldy contracting system whereby Malian contractors responsible for construction were paid upon presentation of vouchers. The mission was committed to using the Fixed Amount Reimbursable (FAR) system, under which contractors would be reimbursed for expenses incurred. This was a totally foreign approach to Malian contractors, who previously only worked on the basis of advances against anticipated expenses. In the institutional analysis for the PP, this was cited as a potential bottleneck and, indeed, this turned out to be the case (Snyder 1983). Because they were "up-fronting" major costs, the contractors attempted to cut corners wherever possible. In addition, because many had not worked before on a contract requiring this level of effort, project management was sometimes deficient. The net result was that construction of houses and other infrastructure in support of the resettlement ran behind schedule, and workmanship on the houses was shoddy.

These delays contributed to a third problem -- the frequently tenuous relationships between the resettled population and the state authorities responsible for resettlement. Areas of conflict included: the quality and timing of house and infrastructure construction; just compensation for relocatees; allocation of land in the new area; and access to project services ranging from food aid to health care.

The head of the Social and Monitoring Section of the GOM agency responsible for the resettlement was himself an anthropologist, and he understood and sympathized with the complaints of the local population. Although he was frequently impotent to address bureaucratic delays or to change the attitudes of other project officials who sought to measure project success in terms of how quickly houses and roads were constructed and people moved, rather than in terms of quality of life issues, he made his section accessible to the local population. This provided beneficiaries with a window on the workings of

bureaucratic politics. As a result, the local population became increasingly skillful in applying political pressure and doing end runs around designated authorities to get what they needed.

A final issue was the level of A.I.D. involvement. Day-to-day management of the project was left to contractors who had little authority to mobilize mission resources or interest. Direct involvement by the project officer or by higher mission officials tended to come in the form of crisis management. One aspect of the low priority accorded the project was that it was never adequately staffed with counterparts to assist GOM officials in administration. As a result, this task fell by default to the social scientist responsible for overseeing the monitoring. For example, he became heavily involved in the administration of the food aid program and settling disputes about housing and land distribution. Similarly, the Malian *animateurs,* who were supposed to be gathering data as part of their field activities, frequently found that the mechanics of the resettlement monopolized their time.

Despite these difficulties, however, all 10,000 people displaced by the dam had been relocated into their new villages by the time that the dam gates were closed. While it is too early to tell what the long-term implications of the move are for them, there are early signs that the new villages are functioning communities -- well on their way to reestablishing viable agricultural production systems. The food aid program, which was supposed to assist the population by compensating for the harvests lost as a result of the move, has apparently succeeded. Designed to be temporary, it was phased out as agricultural production was established in the new area. In addition, organizations for carrying out agricultural production within the resettled communities appear to be functioning, and the capacity of people to mobilize government attention to local needs may have been enhanced.

The construction of the dam had been the source of a boom in the local economy. By early 1988, this had virtually ended. However, because

large numbers of local people became involved in activities such as trade and transport, which arose as a result of their employment, the prosperity generated by the dam construction has lasted much longer than anyone had anticipated. It remains unclear what the medium- to long-term economic prospects for the area are.

Contributions of Social Analysis

Social analysis made important contributions to the project in three important areas:

- The conception of the project itself as addressing a social issue rather than as an engineering problem of building enough houses and roads to accommodate the 10,000 people resettled;
- The distribution of land in the newly settled area; and
- The apparent success of the project in not fostering dependency on the state to provide food and solve all problems created by the change.

At the same time, the quality of the data collected in the monitoring exercise was poor, due to the heavy administrative burden imposed on the field personnel responsible for this component of the project. This may have negative implications for detecting and addressing medium- and long-term problems associated with the relocation.

The conception of the project as a social issue defined a series of technical questions that allowed the project to maintain coherence over time, despite an unfavorable bureaucratic environment and a lack of coordination at the PP stage. The social conception of the project drew upon an established body of literature on settlement and resettlement, which permitted designers and implementers to make informed predictions and diagnoses based upon previous experience with similar situations elsewhere. While some of the problems were dealt with more effectively than others, the problems associated with resettling

the population were, in fact, addressed, rather than being left in the "black box" of exogenous variables, as so frequently happens.

Social science input associated with the monitoring activity also played a role in successfully allocating land among the relocated villagers. Some project administrators and engineers originally envisioned simply allocating people house sites and field areas. From early in the project, social scientists recognized that this would never be accepted locally. They played a central role in presenting the local population's views to project officials. At the same time, they were aware that simply leaving land allocation in the hands of established local institutions, while it would probably be accepted in the short term, would reproduce and exacerbate inequities in land distribution in favor of the local elites who controlled those institutions. In addition to being unjust, this meant that large numbers of people would be allocated land insufficient to establish a viable agricultural production system.

Social scientists thus played a key role in having the land distribution system redesigned. The system that was eventually used, a lottery system supervised by local officials of the government political party, appears to have solved this problem. While it has been charged, with some apparent justification, that local elites frequently rigged the lottery to their advantage, land distribution is not as skewed in their favor as it might have been otherwise. The general fairness of state authorities involved in the allocation process is widely accepted.

The Manantali Resettlement Project was a traumatic experience for those forced to move. The benefits promised in terms of improved housing, land, health care, job opportunities, and the like did not live up to expectations. What frequently happens in such situations, however, is that the relocated population becomes so demoralized that all sense of community and solidarity is destroyed and local production systems are permanently undermined. People may then become permanently dependent on food aid or other forms of state

assistance. If this is not forthcoming or does not meet their needs, they may abandon their home areas altogether, joining the growing ranks of the unskilled and unemployed urban population.

In the case of Manantali, functioning communities were reestablished -- people continued to cooperate in agricultural production and also cooperated in new activities, as they sought to meet the needs imposed by the move. While it is too early to predict what the future holds for the relocatees of Manantali, they came through the initial experience in better social and physical condition than is usually the case. This is in large part due to the effort made to inform people about their options during the relocation, and to solicit their participation in decisions related to land allocation, house design, settlement pattern, and the selection of neighbors.

This participation was important in several areas. For example, villagers persuaded project officials to maintain the existing village structure rather than to consolidate groups of pre-dam communities into larger post-dam units as part of the resettlement process. Villagers also persuaded the project to allow them to construct their own granaries and kitchens in the new communities and then reimburse them in cash for the work, rather than contracting this work to the companies constructing the new villages, as had been originally planned.

Lessons Learned

The major lesson to be learned is that a project with a strong social component from the outset, which is maintained over time, can overcome the substantial bureaucratic and logistical problems encountered during design and implementation. While the project arguably would have been more effective with greater mission support, a more coordinated PP effort, and more efficient administration, it did manage to meet the most essential needs of the population. While the villagers were probably not better off as a result of

the move, the immediate impacts do not appear to have left them worse off either. This was possible because the project remained focused on the social objectives throughout its life and did not succumb to the temptation to make decisions solely on the basis of bureaucratic or technical convenience.

The project also illustrates the importance of both topical and geographical knowledge in successfully designing and implementing a development project. Topical knowledge, based on previous experience with forced relocation in many areas of the world, provided the basis of the social conception of the project in the design phase. In the implementation phase, local knowledge became important in understanding local manifestations of general problems, and in responding to them creatively.

Finally, the project illustrates the importance of having responsible people in the host government agency who share a social science perspective. Had the Malian head of the social and monitoring unit of the resettlement effort not understood and been sympathetic to the needs of the people being relocated, the project could have easily failed regardless of how elegant the social design had been. People could have ceased to cooperate, raising both the human and financial costs. In addition, had the state agency not been responsive, at least to the extent of remaining accessible even when it could do nothing, it would have contributed significantly to the demoralization and apathy that frequently plague resettled populations.

PROJECT NORTH SHABA IN ZAIRE

Description of the Project

In the mid-1970s the Government of Zaire, with the assistance of A.I.D., decided to support a rural development project in North Shaba. The project area was located about half way between Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam, three days by train from Lubumbashi, the capital of Shaba region. The objectives

of the project were to promote an increase in overall maize production and marketing, as well as an improvement in the general well-being of the population of North Shaba. These objectives were to be achieved through the implementation of an integrated approach to overcoming the key constraints to agricultural development, including lack of roads, lack of markets, and lack of improved technology. It was hoped that this approach would serve as a model that could be replicated elsewhere in Zaire.

The project consisted of six sub-systems, each managed as a separate entity yet coordinated by a Project Management Unit (PMU), including:

- Agricultural research (adaptation) and extension (A&V);
- Road rehabilitation and maintenance (INFRA);
- Intermediate technology (IT);
- Farmer group development (DGF);
- Marketing and credit (AC); and
- Data collection and analysis (SCAD).

For the purpose of this case study, though social analysis informed each component, only A&V, DGF, and SCAD are discussed in detail below.

Implementation started in 1977. At the height of its activity there were over 1,000 people employed by the project. Over the next decade, a total of approximately $31 million was spent, 47 percent of which was contributed by the Government of Zaire. Almost 60 percent of this participation came from counterpart funds generated by the sale of American surplus foodstuffs, some provided virtually free and some on a soft loan basis by the PL 480 program. When donor support terminated in the fall of 1986, so did PNS. The project, however, resulted in increased maize production and marketing far exceeding the targets set by the original project planners.

At the center of the project was the agricultural research and extension (A&V) component, one of the most successful aspects of the project. Based on findings and recommendations in the social soundness analysis that were incorporated into project design, this component was a radical departure from what was then the existing extension system. As a result, A&V had to confront and deal with several major constraints resulting from historical, institutional, and personnel factors.

Prior to the establishment of Project North Shaba (PNS), the existing Department of Agriculture (DOA) employees functioned more as rural policemen than extension agents. These agents knew little about farming, even less about extension methods, and commonly worked in collusion with merchants' representatives, soldiers, police, and other government officials. They were an integral part of the negative cycle of hidden taxes, bribes, confiscation of livestock, jailings, and other disruptions and disincentives to agriculture (Blakely 1982). In contrast, extension agents under PNS were hired locals who had received a diploma in agriculture from a neighboring vocational school, and were further trained by the project. They were then sent out to live and work in a farm center. Instead of coercion, they practiced persuasion by demonstrating the new technology in their own fields.

In the original PP, farmer organizations were emphasized as a means of promoting beneficiary participation -- a key ingredient for project success. To help ensure that project benefits reached small farmers, to facilitate their participation, and to establish the base upon which producers' cooperatives could eventually be built, the project included a farmer group development (DGF) component. Farmer groups, together with women's groups, were not only to represent all major groupings within the farm center, but also to initiate action programs whereby services would be provided to members.

During the first two years, these farmer groups provided a useful information link between PNS and local village leaders: tools and machines

produced by the IT subsystem were distributed; village blacksmiths were selected for training; and new agricultural techniques were demonstrated. But the farmer groups did not undertake any of their own action programs. Once the extension agent was trained and in place, in a sense replacing the group as the information link to project staff and new technology, few incentives for maintaining the farmers groups existed. While some groups did become involved in marketing their produce together, thereby obtaining a slightly higher price, this was an annual activity that did not evolve into something broader.

The purpose of SCAD was to serve as a management information system, providing progress indicators for each of the subsystems. Additionally, it was to monitor the impact of PNS on maize production levels and on the lives of the people in the area. It took SCAD five years to be acknowledged by the other subsystems and, in the early years, was regarded with skepticism and suspicion by project staff. This was so for two reasons: first, staff did not really understand the extent to which an effective information system could improve project performance; and second, since SCAD was organizationally parallel to their own subsystems, they resented what they interpreted as its watchdog role. Its major contribution to PNS was in the provision of reliable data on agricultural yields and production in North Shaba, data which over time became the indicators for measuring the impact of PNS.

Contributions of Social Analysis

Several social scientists were involved in the design and implementation of PNS. Many of their contributions to the design are discussed below, but their contributions to the implementation of the project are more difficult to identify and quantify. Given that they were involved primarily as managers during implementation, these individuals set the tone of the project and defined the issues in social terms.

From the very beginning, PNS was designed and implemented as an antidote to the prevailing top-down, highly centralized approach to development. The project was designed as a bottom-up, local participation project. However, the political environment and historical legacy of Zaire did not encourage the development of independent, potentially radical, grass roots organizations. This political reality, and the differing agendas of project implementers, stood in stark contrast to the philosophy of the project and, in many cases, was an obstacle to implementation.

Similarly, the applied research component of the A&V subsystem was to use a modified farming systems research (FSR) methodology to develop and adapt technological interventions. However, the personnel provided by the DOA had been trained in the conventional manner that made a clear distinction between research and extension. They saw their job as extending the best available maize technology package to the cultivators. While the design had argued for more of an FSR approach, the practicalities of staff orientation and the fear of rocking the boat, made it obvious that this suggestion was premature.

As described above, the development of farmers groups was intended to facilitate beneficiary participation. The social analysis and, in turn the PP, emphasized "the need to work with natural social groupings, particularly extended families where there exists a strong sense of mutual trust, as well as a tradition of collective action" (A.I.D./Zaire 1976). While there appeared to be an understanding of the complex sociopolitical organization of the different areas, the project design assumed that farmers would work collectively and never questioned motivational factors and incentives for individuals to collaborate.

In fact, the groups' functions of facilitating dialogue between small farmers and project staff and of encouraging the adoption of recommended maize and other production practices were carried out very successfully by the extension

agent: he became a surrogate for the local institution. Without this function, and other functions that met the farmers' needs, farmer involvement in these groups declined. The impact evaluation concludes, "Farmer organization, while a laudable aim, must be done with a purpose and only once farmers see a clear gain from such undertakings in common. Organizing for organizing's sake will prove, as it did in PNS, to be ultimately futile" (Poulin et al. 1987).

Probably the most important contribution made by the social analysis was the design and implementation of the PNS extension service. The social soundness analysis identified factors that would be critical to project success, including: recruitment of agents locally; placement of agents in communities where they lived and worked with the project beneficiaries; accountability for the agent's work to be to the farmers and not to government administrators located outside of the project area; and improved training in agricultural and communications skills. In light of the high degree of acceptance of the extension agents, adoption of the new technological package and cultural practices, and impressive increases in maize production, one can conclude that the component was socioculturally feasible.

One of the most obvious arenas for the social scientist to make a contribution was in the SCAD subsystem, which was to be managed by the expatriate chief-of-party, advisor to the Zairian project director. It became clear, however, that the responsibilities of project management took priority and time away from his role of providing professional direction to this subsystem. When professional direction was provided, it was by an economist. While certainly beneficial, as demonstrated by the information on agricultural production and yields, the social dimensions of project impact were often pushed aside. As the PNS experience demonstrates, unless a strong commitment is made to data collection and analysis for project management and evaluation, the effort will be largely ignored.

The PMU, including social scientists, played an important brokering role between project participants and the government. PNS represented the farmers' interests to the local authorities and the outside world, often in an advocacy role. The PMU successfully negotiated an increase in the price of maize and, in 1983, the deregulation of prices. In addition, PNS fostered good relations with the governor of Shaba. While sometimes supportive of price increases, most helpful was his support in correcting abuses, particularly those committed by the local police.

Lessons Learned

The design of PNS followed closely the dominant philosophy of the mid-1970s: beneficiary participation was one of the key ingredients for project success. It followed the blueprint for development of the time, albeit an informed blueprint, and promoted: local organizations; farming systems research and technology development from the bottom-up; and integration of women into project activities, among other activities. As described above, factors such as the political context, institutional culture and attitudes of the Zairian staff, and incentives motivating farmers to take actions collectively were never addressed by the design team and may explain some of the differences between what was designed and what was implemented.

The A&V subsystem illustrates that when the sociocultural feasibility component of the SSA is of high quality, the project is more likely to be successful. However, as differences between what was designed and what actually happened illustrate, it is necessary to use a problem-oriented approach and closely examine the goals, objectives, and assumptions made during the design stage.

THE PROVINCIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN INDONESIA

Description of the Project

The Provincial Area Development Program (PDP) was designed by the Government of Indonesia with A.I.D. support as a decentralized initiative to upgrade selected rural development programs. Emphasis was placed on activities thought to have the potential of directly and immediately increasing the incomes of the rural poor. Designers recognized that the rural poor within each participating province had differing needs. Therefore they required different local government intervention points both in terms of actual programs and of implementation arrangements.

PDP was regarded by its planners as experimental and process-oriented in that it attempted an introspective and evolutionary approach to improved local project management. As ultimately approved, the project had three stated objectives:

- Increase the productive capacity and incomes of the rural poor within targeted project areas as directly and immediately as possible;
- Improve the capabilities of local government within participating provinces to undertake rural development activities; and
- Improve the capabilities of key central government agencies to support local government in this process.

A major element of the PDP approach was the decentralization of local project planning and implementation to provincial and subprovincial levels. While provincial governments were to provide overall administrative and budgetary support to PDP activities, actual day-to-day project implementation and the information systems to support that implementation increasingly involved subprovincial levels of government. PDP provided each province with technical and financial resources to be directed toward specific subprojects designed to have an impact on the rural poor. Thus, provincial officials received, along

with new responsibilities, opportunities for training and on-the-job experience in planning and management. Though not explicitly stated as a project goal, project implementation reports suggest that beneficiary participation also became an important unstated objective of PDP implementers at all levels.

To support decentralization, PDP invested in training and technical assistance to improve the planning and implementing capacity of local officials, especially those attached to government planning bodies at the provincial and district levels. Loan funding was provided to support a variety of small subprojects, intended to be innovative and replicable interventions to alleviate rural poverty.

In practice, the requirements for capacity-building and for stimulating quick-impact activities were not always complementary. This led to a certain inconsistency at all levels of PDP regarding targeted administrative behavior and the incentives to support that behavior. Although considerable commitment to institution building was evident before and during the project, staff in the field tended to respond to project success criteria of a more traditional nature, criteria established by their own institutional incentive system. This tension, resolved with varying degrees of success at different times and places within the PDP experience, remained at the heart of the issues with which project implementers and evaluators wrestled throughout the life of the project.

A recent report summarizes the main achievements of PDP (A.I.D./Indonesia 1989:14).

- **Impact on Beneficiaries:** The project has had a significant positive impact on beneficiaries. Its targeting success has been quite high, average real net beneficiary gain represents an 11 to 18 percent increase in average household income for recipients reporting a gain, and the sustainability rate for beneficiary gains is an estimated 58 percent.

- **Impact on Institutional Capacity:** The planning and management capacity of local institutions has improved tremendously as measured by the district-level case studies illustrating that local learning has occurred, and by the numerous innovative subprojects and structural innovations initiated.

- **Cost-Benefit:** PDP was judged to be worth doing from the high percentage of relatively poor people who increased their incomes as a result of the project and the many reported cases of nonbeneficiaries who adopted PDP's techniques; the technical assistance, equipment, and learning opportunities provided to local agencies and the national government; and the very favorable rate of return on subprojects.

Contributions of Social Analysis

While the summary socioeconomic analysis in the PP drew on detailed provincial analyses, it was written largely as a justification for the project's social viability. It noted high-level government backing for and participation in PDP planning, the incentives for local officials to make serious attempts to reach the poor, and their involvement at the district and subdistrict levels in early discussions about subproject identification. The analysis concluded that there was a favorable administrative environment for the replicability of PDP, its possible spread effects, and encouraging bureaucratic support of program objectives.

The focus on raising incomes of the poor, as distinct from a concentration on agricultural production targets alone, was presented as a PDP innovation requiring a favorable institutional environment. Although two of the three PDP objectives had to do with building institutional capabilities at the local and national government levels, the bulk of the detailed social analysis, reflecting the narrow focus of existing SSA guidelines, addressed the single objective of increasing the incomes of the rural poor.

In the logframe, issues of continuing government interest, support, and capacity are treated mainly as assumptions. The design analysis provided some reasons to be sanguine about these eventualities but did not offer much in the way of contingency analysis of how to deal with predictable deviations from appropriate administrative behavior on either the A.I.D. or the government side. Instead, detailed institutional arrangements were provided to support expected program coordination requirements and an extensive quantity of technical

assistance and training was incorporated in the project design to build needed planning, implementation, and monitoring capacities.

At the level of planning for subprojects, however, the high quality and quantity of socioeconomic analysis was valuable both for the substance of its findings and recommendations and for the model it provided of a beneficiary versus production focus. Because the analytical process for this project thrust was inclusive and participatory, carried out in significant part by government personnel, it gave PDP a running start for a continuation of this kind of analysis during implementation as each annual cycle of subprojects was identified. Unfortunately, momentum waned to some degree as processes became more routine and traditional bureaucratic incentives held sway.

The 1981 mid-term evaluation of PDP noted several PDP benefits of social and institutional importance (French et al. 1981):

- Greater provincial attention to efforts to identify and reach the poor;
- Increased attention to cross-sectoral coordination in planning;
- Greater attention to local needs and priorities, even when these were outside broad national priorities; and
- Increased responsibility for coordination within the Provincial Planning Boards, with attention given to previously ignored issues, such as subproject integration and overall evaluation.

Each of these favorable developments was, in part, built on the base of social analysis conducted before and during PDP implementation. This analysis helped refine the goals and planned benefits of PDP and provided information to help implementers achieve them.

While the focus of the social analysis at the design phase was on identifying and reaching the rural poor within the selected PDP provinces and districts, there was a greater focus during implementation on institutional issues.

Each province was assigned an expatriate technician whose role was defined as a planning advisor. The background of these advisors varied but all were thrust into a milieu of social and, especially, institutional concerns and most were equipped by training or experience in Indonesia to address these concerns. Additionally, A.I.D. funded a series of short-term institutional development consultancies to help PDP identify and deal with the capacity-building component of the project.

The series of capacity-building consultancies in several PDP provinces was performed by a team of six Indonesian and American consultants, five of whom were social scientists. This provided a healthy synthesis between the experience of the outside consultants in dealing with similar issues elsewhere and the knowledge of the Indonesians about how things happen -- or do not happen -- in their own country.

PDP provides a reverse example of the value of using social analysis during both design and implementation to establish benchmarks and suggest indicators for program monitoring. A continuing weakness of PDP, as cited in evaluation reports, was the failure to take advantage of the learning opportunities occasioned by the innovative and experimental nature of PDP-sponsored subprojects. This failure was the result of a continuing lack of effective internal evaluation and monitoring.

Bureaucratic pressures from both the government and A.I.D. directed what subproject monitoring did occur into rather formalistic, budget-oriented channels. Much of the data collected had only marginal value for improving subproject design or implementation. There was no effective countervailing influence to provide an incentive for monitoring progress against the unique PDP objectives of reaching the rural poor or increasing local government capacities. Monitoring mechanisms should have been capable of identifying localized needs requiring subproject adaptations and they should have measured the extent to which specific subproject objectives were being achieved over time. These issues were

raised in external assessments and evaluations but follow-up was limited.

Had there been more emphasis by social analysts on the requirements for monitoring related to the social and institutional objectives of PDP, and had this emphasis been accompanied by suggested indicators and appraisal techniques, local project management would have had both an impetus and some tools to carry out more appropriate monitoring. As it was, though some of the expatriate provincial planning advisors raised the monitoring issue, it never became a central concern of day-to-day implementers.

Lessons Learned

The most important lesson of the PDP experience is the difficulty of introducing and maintaining institutional innovation in a context of well-entrenched bureaucratic behavior. PDP's design represented a well-thought-out mix of institutional and impact objectives, but the design stage analysis treated them as separate issues and gave much more attention to social issues surrounding local subproject beneficiaries. Later, during implementation, there was an enlarged focus on institutional arrangements, but this effort could have had more impact had it come earlier.

Maintaining an impetus on social and institutional goals from the design phase of a project or program requires strong advocates during implementation to buck natural tendencies toward traditional implementation procedures and an aversion to risk-taking. Ironically, PDP had high-level advocacy but this often did not translate well to operational levels. Because the project was large and geographically scattered, the direct influence of A.I.D. staff, even those committed to PDP's social and institutional innovations, was limited.

As a result, those people most influential at the level of day-to-day provincial operations tended to be the contracted provincial advisors. Initially, most of them were generalists with backgrounds in various aspects of rural

development. By education or experience, most fit the category of social analyst and performed a continuing role as advocates for the social and institutional innovations of PDP.

When the contracts of these advisors ended, there was some pressure, especially from the Indonesian side, to replace them with technical specialists in agriculture, the dominant sectoral component of PDP field activities. The PDP mid-term evaluation argued correctly against this change, noting the varied nature of the provincial programs and the importance of the institutional and systems development aspects of PDP. This required that preference in placement of long-term personnel at provincial levels be given to rural development specialists with ability to impart management, administrative, and evaluative skills.

In some cases, lower level provincial development staff had more commitment to the PDP's social and institutional objectives than did their superiors. Another role played by the planning advisers was to give credibility to these concerns and to provide a counterweight to the inertia of the entrenched bureaucracy in some places.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE STUDIES

Although the five case studies dealt with here cover a wide range of development activities -- agroforestry in Haiti, local resource management in Peru, resettlement in Mali, integrated rural development in Zaire, and provincial area development in Indonesia -- certain common lessons emerge regarding the role of social analysis.

- An informed social analysis during the design phase can significantly affect the design for the better, while providing the necessary information for practical use during the implementation.
- The basis for this informed social analysis is often the availability of a social scientist with in-depth geographical, and sometimes topical, expertise.

- Social analysis is most effective when it offers practical solutions and alternatives to potential problems -- at both the design and implementation phases.

- Social analysis is most effective when there is a receptive institutional audience on the part of both the donor and the host government and the presence of project officers willing to go against the bureaucratic incentives for doing their job in a certain way in order to be effective.

- Crucial to informed social analysis is the recognition of the institutional context and constraints of A.I.D. itself and other participating donor agencies and NGOs and their potential impact on the project.

- Informed social analysis is not a crystal ball which can successfully predict every possible outcome, problem, or eventuality. It is a continuing process that informs the process of implementation. For this reason, social scientists often play the role of broker during implementation -- representing the interests of participants and beneficiaries.

- During implementation, the social scientist often plays the role of catalyst and facilitator with his or her technical colleagues -- enabling them to see how the different components of the project fit together and ensuring that initial insights generated during the design are respected.

- During implementation, the social scientist may be called upon to play the role of gadfly, goading bureaucrats and technicians into taking risks and avoiding their natural predilection to adhere to established procedures and objectives.

TOWARD GUIDELINES FOR THE 1990s

Proposed Framework for the New Guidelines

The proposed framework weaves together several, sometimes complementary, sometimes disparate, approaches to the study of rural social change in the Third World. In brief, it consists of the following key elements:

- **A Broad Unit of Analysis:** If social analysis is to survive and make a meaningful contribution, the unit of analysis has to move beyond the community and the individual to encompass the region and, where

necessary, the nation or state. Hence, the importance of studying the networks and linkages that tie the various societal levels together.

- **The Role of Decision-Making:** Knowing the way resources are allocated at various levels and who are the key players, both individual and institutional, is key to understanding how the new resources provided by a project or program are likely to be allocated and utilized.

- **The Role of the Environment and the Natural Resource Base:** Third World countries have a resource endowment that tends to be more natural-resource intensive than do developed countries. Consequently, using these natural resources at a socially optimal rate is critical to sustainable development. Development interventions that address environmental problems can therefore contribute significantly to sustained economic development.

- **The Role of Politics:** Development is an intrinsically political process, whether dealing with the priorities and agendas of the donors, national governments, implementing institutions, or potential beneficiaries. Placing proposed development interventions within this broader political context is crucial for predicting possible outcomes.

- **The Role of Institutions:** In many ways, the focus of development has shifted from the local to the institutional level. Given that much development assistance is channeled through institutions -- at national, regional, and local levels -- their analysis, in terms of policy and sustainability, is primordial.

- **The Role of Sustainability:** This key concept is now applied so generally that it can refer to practically anything since so many "sustainabilities" are deemed desirable: environmental, political, institutional, technical, economic, financial, benefit, and so on. From a practical perspective, sustainability refers primarily to using the resource base in a way that it can support the local population over time.

- **The Role of Values -- Implicit or Explicit:** Certain moral values underlying this approach to social analysis try to move beyond the 1970s concentration on the rural poor to encompass Third World rural populations in general, while embracing the goals embodied in the proposed A.I.D. agenda for the 1990s: economic growth, the alleviation of poverty, sustaining the environment, and fostering the democratic process.

Proposed New Guidelines: Social Analysis for the Nineties

Based on this framework, a set of modified guidelines for social and institutional analysis at both project and program levels is proposed. **These guidelines are not meant to be applied to all interventions, at all times, under all conditions. Rather they are meant to be used selectively, with the level of discrimination and specificity to be decided upon by planners and designers in response to their specific needs.**

Not only do these guidelines reflect current interests and priorities in the development literature, but they also incorporate the findings discussed above, particularly the importance of sociocultural feasibility, the crucial role of institutions, the need for simple indicators to measure impact, and the value of questioning the key assumptions made in the design. They are summarized in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1

SOCIAL ANALYSIS FOR THE NINETIES

Key Components

Participants and beneficiaries
Sociocultural feasibility, the environment -- both biological and man-made, and the natural resource base
Institutions and organizations
Politics, decision making, and national, regional, and local linkages
Indicators and impact
Sustainability
Key assumptions regarding the nature of the problem and the proposed solution(s)

It is important to emphasize that this sequence of components and questions is **not** an outline to be followed in all cases. It is, instead, a way of looking at social and institutional subject matter **from all angles** -- so that the analyst progressively thinks his way through the relevant issues. Each of these key components will be briefly discussed below and the key questions to be asked by the social analyst listed.

Participants and Beneficiaries

The present guidelines -- at both PID and PP levels -- rightly stress the importance of an accurate description and analysis of potential beneficiaries, direct and indirect, as well as potential losers. It is also important to distinguish between beneficiaries and participants, since they are not always synonymous. The draft guidelines for social analysis in Non-Project Assistance (NPA) give first priority to identifying the targeted population groups. The guidelines recommend that the following population characteristics should be considered, based on their relevancy to objectives and goals of the proposed program: location, approximate numbers, age and sex composition, socioeconomic composition, ethnicity, means of employment, and other data the analyst may determine as important.

The key word here is "relevance" -- the provision of information that is directly related to the proposed program, or focused on a specific development issue. The key questions to be addressed -- and these will vary depending on the nature of the activity -- should include, but not be restricted to, the following.

- ***Who Are the Direct Beneficiaries?*** Their specific characteristics should be described and analyzed, as well as the way their particular needs and interests in the proposed activities were identified, with a focus on the motivational factors involved and the decision-making process at the household level. Particular attention should be paid to location, approximate numbers, age and sex composition, and ethnicity.

- *Who Are the Indirect Beneficiaries?* In development activities, various groups are linked with the direct beneficiaries in one way or another -- leaders, businessmen, government administrators, technical agency personnel, and perhaps expatriate technical assistance -- all of whom stand to benefit indirectly. The analysis should include a brief description and analysis of these groups and how they will benefit.

- *Who Are the Participants?* If the participants are not synonymous with the beneficiaries, both direct and indirect, their specific characteristics should be described and analyzed, together with their relationship to the beneficiaries.

- *Who Stands to Lose?* Certain groups may stand to lose economically or otherwise as a result of the planned interventions. For example, in the case of a project to divert water for an irrigation scheme, farmers in the area whose land will not be irrigated, together with their laborers, buyers, transporters, and consumers, may be jeopardized by the project. In other cases, certain segments of the population will be excluded by conditions introduced by the project. Where women play important production roles, for example, a project directed toward men -- explicitly or implicitly -- may place women, and perhaps their children, at risk.

Sociocultural Feasibility

The purpose of this component is to describe and analyze the feasibility of the planned interventions in relation to identified constraints and incentives. A well-done section on feasibility is closely associated with overall project success. For the draft NPA guidelines, the focus is on those constraints and incentives that affect the productivity and economic behavior of groups who will be involved: What evidence is there that the expected behavioral changes will be forthcoming, and from what groups of people? The focus should be broader than behavioral change, however, and should address some of the following issues:

- *What is the Relationship Between the Local Population and Their Natural Resource Base?* Here the analyst will look at the role the resource base -- the land, water, and trees -- has played historically in the development of the area in question and how this has affected human well-being. Furthermore, information can also be collected on people's stocks and assets, the basis for their adaptive strategies.

- *What Key Services, Facilities, and Infrastructure Are Available?* This question summarizes available information on the current development landscape -- but only to the extent that it is relevant for better understanding the implications and possible impacts of the proposed interventions. Answers may include information on previous, ongoing, and proposed development activities; availability of social services; state of economic infrastructure; and most pressing needs in terms of desired services.

- *How Do People Adapt to Change, Risk, and Uncertainty?* This question proceeds on the assumption that development is an evolutionary process, that it is dynamic, subject to change, and based on previous experience. By knowing and understanding the way people have adapted previously, predictions can be made about how they may adapt in the future. Of particular interest here are incentives, motivational factors, and decision making -- for individuals, households, and groups. This item is of particular relevance for policy changes that can have severe implications for the local population.

- *What Problems Are Likely to Occur During Implementation?* The most common are generally of two types: those that are internal to the planned program and are more tractable, and those that are external and less tractable. The potential problems should be identified and alternative ways of addressing them outlined. The evidence indicates that policy makers and civil servants prefer to be offered several alternative plans of action, rather than a black and white/either-or scenario. Potential problem areas should be identified and closely monitored during the process of implementation -- a point discussed in more detail below.

- *What Mechanisms Are in Place to Ensure Equity of Access?* Should any subgroups of the population be specially targeted to meet distributional considerations? The draft NPA guidelines emphasize that the analyst should recommend means for ensuring equity of access to goods and services under the proposed program and, where relevant, means to prohibit undue or inequitable access by groups already favored in that society. How can planned participation in the program be strengthened to include the poor or any other sectors of the population who may be likely to be under-represented?

Institutions and Organizations

There is increasing interest and pressure to improve the level of institutional analysis. Various analytical approaches have been proposed, ranging from the more conventional audit of organizational capacity, which examines

what the institution has, to the more dynamic assessment of the policy environment, which focuses on incentives, performance, and sustainability. There is also increasing evidence that local organizations of beneficiaries have a key role to play in achieving sustainable development.

A.I.D. has recently issued draft guidelines for institutional analysis at both the project and the NPA levels. The issues identified in the PID are assumed to be important if the focus of the project is institutional development, or if the project has a significant institutional development component. The guidelines include organizational choice and structure, incentives and disincentives, functional linkages, internal organizational constraints, and external constraints. Based on this assessment, the analyst is expected to recommend which institutions to be further considered for involvement in the proposed project or program, how these organizations could be effectively linked for participation in the activity, and issues that should be analyzed in more detail at the PP stage. The guidelines proposed for the NPA are somewhat broader, more realistic, but considerably more ambitious. These include, for example, the political context, implementation issues, and sustainability.

Consolidating these various approaches and guidelines, the following key issues for analysis of institutions and organizations at project and nonproject levels emerge:

- ***Is There a Hospitable Institutional Landscape?*** Identify the major institutions and organizations that will be involved in the program in terms of major decision making, allocation of resources, resource flows, and implementation. Specify their mandate, major activities, and functional linkages with each other. Such linkages at all levels -- forward, backward, and horizontal -- are important for the provision of political support and access to resources and information.

- ***What are the Internal Dynamics of the Key Institutions?*** What individuals, positions, and/or departments have full authority to make decisions and implement changes? What are the formal and informal processes of communication between or among positions, departments, offices, and/or other organizations? What are the organizational incentives/disincentives for undertaking program activities?

- ***What is the Level of Institutional Capability?*** Assess the capability and willingness of the participating institutions to attract and manage resources; conduct research, analyze the results, and use them; formulate and analyze policy; plan and implement, particularly the timing and phasing of proposed activities; administer programs; resolve conflict; monitor and evaluate; and negotiate. What are the major constraints to the effective functioning of identified organizations in fulfilling their present mandates? The assessment should specifically focus on the activities that each institution will be tasked with under the planned intervention.

Politics, Decision Making, and Linkages

These three elements are closely interwoven and crucial to understanding the social feasibility of a planned intervention since, almost by definition, development is a political process dealing with the allocation of scarce resources in a social arena where, unless care is exercised and viable alternatives proposed, there will be winners and losers, some fire, and a lot of smoke. The draft guidelines contain several important suggestions regarding both politics and decision making. All of the approaches stress the importance of identifying, describing, and analyzing the relevant linkages among groups and institutions at national, regional, and local levels.

Under this section, the key issues to be addressed include the following.

- ***Who Are the Major Stakeholders in the Proposed Program?*** Identify and analyze the key actors, interest groups, political parties, and institutions likely to be involved and/or to benefit. This calls for identifying the differing agendas of these elements, specifying the way they complement or contradict one another, and predicting how they and their agendas may affect the outcome of the planned intervention. Is the proposed program politically rational from their perspective?

- ***Is There a Favorable Political Environment?*** Describe the relevant political context in which the program will operate. How does this context constrain or enhance institutional behavior and effectiveness, particularly in relation to the proposed program activities and goals? How does the center respond to demands for decentralization, participation, and local empowerment? To the extent that public responses to reform and other types of programs can be anticipated,

a program can be designed to reduce the unfavorable effects that would otherwise foment unrest and lead to overall program failure. But the reasons why such programs can arouse such strong reactions are also important to know since they may throw some light on the more questionable assumptions underpinning the planned intervention.

- *How Are Developmental Decisions Made?* For the proposed program and its various component parts, what is the lead organization that has decision-making authority? How does a single decision make its way through the process, whether one or more entities are involved? Is there an informal decision-making process that parallels the formalized procedures? How are actions/decisions supposed to flow and be implemented/taken under the proposed program as envisaged by designers? How can existing political factionalism, communication barriers, and open conflict, both within and between participating institutions, be effectively dealt with for coordinating the implementation of the proposed program?

- *What Are the Key National/Regional/Local Linkages?* Such key linkages can include historical, environmental, political, economic, social, and institutional factors – but information should be provided only on those that have affected previous development interventions and may throw light on those proposed under the program. Of particular interest are such issues as decentralization and local autonomy, political representation, marketing channels and networks, ethnic interests and rivalries, and the reciprocal roles of economic and political institutions.

Indicators and Impact

The analysis should propose ways to monitor the planned effects of the proposed interventions. This means moving beyond the numbers game of "outcomes" – number of bridges built, number of people trained, and metric tons of corn harvested – and predicting what impact they will have. The analysis should concisely and realistically discuss all probable short- and long-term, direct and indirect, impacts from each element of the proposed program on all possible population groups, including both "winners" and "losers." The reasoning behind these impact predictions should be discussed, and the analysis should recommend design alternatives that may mitigate negative economic and/or social consequences, especially for poor groups earlier determined to be vulnerable from the standpoint of access to adequate income, nutrition, and social services.

This section should also include several simple key indicators for measuring impact -- something that is much easier said than done, as demonstrated by the dearth of good impact data. Much more creative thinking and imagination should be focussed on the generation of simple impact indicators that can be easily used to measure change -- or lack thereof -- over time.

What is required during the design phase is not simply the identification of simple indicators for monitoring impact, but also ideas about the way this information can be collected. Although the design can sketch the broad outlines of such a monitoring system, those responsible for managing the proposed program should develop it for implementation. The logical framework in the PP could include a column on expected impacts of planned interventions together with indicators for measuring them at regular intervals. These indicators would have to be simple, updated on a regular basis, and used as a planning tool, not only for monitoring progress, but also for assessing impact and performance -- on a regular basis.

Key questions to be addressed by the social analysis should include the following:

- ***What Are the Potential Impacts -- Direct and Indirect -- of the Proposed Interventions?*** The analysis should discuss all probable short and long-term, direct and indirect impacts from each element of the proposed program on all possible population groups -- including both "winners" and "losers."

- ***How Can the Potential Negative Effects be Mitigated?*** The analysis should recommend design alternatives that may mitigate these adverse effects and specify the potential costs involved.

- ***What Indicators Should be Used to Monitor Impact?*** The analysis should specify simple indicators for measuring impact on which information can be collected easily on a regular, timely basis.

- ***How Should this Information be Collected?*** The analysis should provide suggestions, rather than a blueprint, about how this information should be collected. Providing a blueprint for implementers to accept or reject

will not solve this problem since they must have an information system that also responds to their planning and monitoring needs.

Sustainability

Sustainability is like happiness -- everyone believes in it and everyone has a different definition. Sustainability covers many dimensions -- financial, institutional, economic, environmental, technical, and political. In the interests of relevance and precision, the social analysis should carefully define what is to be sustained -- the proposed program, the results and impacts of the program, or some combination of the two. The principal objective should be to generate self-sustaining improvements in human capability and well-being, the basis of which is sustainable livelihood security. This definition moves beyond institutional sustainability, and all that that implies.

As the NPA guidelines correctly emphasize, the analysis should assess the probability that host country implementers can sustain the program. The guidelines draw attention to such issues as institutional capacity, ability to meet recurrent costs, political will of the public sector, and public support for the program. By the same token, however, the analysis should also focus on sustainability at the beneficiary level -- not so much in terms of sustaining benefit flows, but in terms of providing the necessary economic and political security to pursue sustainability on their terms, where sustainability refers to the maintenance or enhancement of resource productivity on a long-term basis. This calls for identifying specific measures undertaken by the program to achieve this end. These may range from improving land tenure arrangements to encouraging the formation of local interest groups.

The social analysis should address the following key questions:

- ***What Is to Be Sustained?*** The analysis should specify exactly what is to be sustained once the external assistance ends. This may include the whole program, certain aspects of it, benefit flows, livelihood security, specific institutions -- to list a few possibilities.

- ***How Is Sustainability to Be Achieved?*** The analysis should answer this briefly and include information on specific measures undertaken by the program to provide the necessary economic and political security for both individuals and institutions to pursue sustainability on their terms.

- ***What Are the Major Constraints to Achieving Sustainability?*** The analysis should briefly identify the key constraints -- financial, institutional, economic, environmental, technical, political -- to achieving sustainability.

Key Assumptions

Two of the more interesting pieces of design documentation are the ***logical framework*** (logframe) and the issues section, found in both the PID and the PP. The purpose of the logframe is to summarize briefly in one table what the proposed development intervention is expected to achieve. In theory, it should serve as the basic document in the design process -- to be modified accordingly as conditions change.

In the case of the PID, as with the PP, the logframe has four columns with succinct information on program goal, project purpose, outputs, and inputs. The information provided is of four types: a narrative summary; indicators; ways of measuring the indicators; and, finally, important assumptions. The indicator column is the most detailed since it contains quantifiable information on what the interventions are supposed to achieve. As a result, the other columns receive short shrift. The first and the last -- the summary and the assumptions -- are potentially the most useful, either for planning or for summarizing what has been planned, since they provide a succinct description of the project, together with some rationale for the choices made and the decisions taken.

Although the social analysis should not be expected to question all the assumptions, it should question those dealing with changes in behavior. Specifically, the social analysis should address the following.

- ***Are the Assumptions Concerning Individual Change Justified?*** In many programs, there are assumptions made about the ways in which people -- as groups or as individuals -- are expected to change their behavior. These assumptions should be spelled out and discussed.

- ***Are the Assumptions Concerning Institutional Change Justified?*** Likewise, there are assumptions made about the ways in ways in which institutions are expected to change. These assumptions should be spelled out and discussed.

- ***Which Assumptions Are Amenable to Modification?*** Assumptions are usually of two sorts -- those over which A.I.D. has no control and those amenable to some modification. The two should be carefully distinguished as they help establish the limits of what the proposed program can expect to achieve.

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