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AID'S IMPACT ON WEST AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FROM
A FOUR YEAR REDSO/WCA PERSPECTIVE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This 25-page report attempts to consolidate my experience in directing REDSO/WCA since August 1978 as follows:

I. REDSO/WCA's Mandate and the West/Central African Region:

REDSO provides professional services and support to AID's bilateral programs in 24 West and Central African countries. The Region, larger than the continental United States, has an estimated mid-1982 population of 195 million, growing on an average of 3% per year with a relatively static annual per capital GNP of \$670.

II. REDSO/WCA's Effectiveness:

Total AID assistance to the REDSO/WCA region averages just under \$300 million per year - including PL480. Across the assistance spectrum, per capital U.S. assistance to Liberia is close to \$45 per year, with Gabon, Nigeria and Benin currently receiving no AID assistance directly. The other 20 countries average approximately \$3.50 per capita per year of U.S. assistance. Administrator McPherson's four points are examined against the backdrop of REDSO/WCA's organization including the system of internal communication. A special case is made for REDSO's role in the host region policy dialogue with special attention to REDSO's relationship with the Schedule A (full mission), B and C countries. The quality and effectiveness of REDSO's service outreach to bilateral programs is examined from a systems approach.

III. U.S. Development Relations with West and Central Africa:

Assistance trends are examined with a case made critical of the premature termination of assistance to Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. Under AID's support for regional approaches there is an effort to persuade AID/W to assist only truly indigenous African institutions, such as the AFDB, ECOWAS and the Entente Fund, in contrast to non-indigenous institutions that receive blanket regional funding, but leave no institution behind filled with trained cadre and management and budget systems.

IV. AID Presence in Abidjan:

Recent AFR support establishing the REDSO Director as the principal AID officer in Abidjan is a beginning, but closer integration of the REDSO and RHUDO programs is strongly recommended. The case is not made for AID assistance to the Ivory Coast based on the substantial AID presence in Abidjan, a MODE of 47 AID officers, but rather the case is made on the exceptional development potential of limited AID interventions in the Ivory Coast.

V. REDSO Staff Comments on REDSO/WCA Organization, Process and Effectiveness:

A summary of a questionnaire completed by the 14 Unit Heads and Sector Chiefs of REDSO/WCA, is briefly summarized.

1. REDSO/WCA'S MANDATE AND THE 24 COUNTRIES OF WEST/CENTRAL AFRICA*

The overriding justification for a regional office in Abidjan is to extend timely, professional services in support of the identification, design, implementation and evaluation of bilateral AID projects. REDSO does engage in the creation and direction of regional projects as well, but 90% of REDSO's field time is engaged in support of AID's bilateral outreach. The second dimension of REDSO's mandate has been to use a limited, measured amount of staff time to probe developmental trends and socio-economic conditions in the vast West African region. In independent studies (Annex B) we have attempted to relate AID priorities to the actual and anticipated situation in West Africa. A third element of REDSO's mandate is to manage specific regional projects and to represent AID overall in its relations with the Ivory Coast, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon and Nigeria.

The 24 countries constituting the REDSO/WCA-served West African region are a potpourri of newly formed nation-states. Overall mid-1982 population is estimated to be 195 million, growing on average at 3% per year. Since migration out of West Africa is insignificant, approximately 6 million new West Africans must be assimilated each year. In West Africa 45% of total population, or 88 million boys and girls, is under 15 years of age. Though mid-1980 per capita income ranges from \$120 per annum in Chad to \$3,680 in under-populated Gabon, the average mid-1980 per capita income is \$669 representing a total estimated 1980 GNP for West Africa of \$130 billion. Until mid-1981, Nigeria and Ivory Coast were strong magnets for within West African migration. The relative high status of Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Cameroon, still attracts the unemployed, though interstate restrictions are much more carefully enforced than 18 months ago. Other than the nine country franc zone, there is no easy conversion of currency from one country to another. Strong bartering, however, occurs particularly within the tribal groups that have been split by former colonial boundaries.

Fifteen of the 24 governments are headed by military leaders brought to power by coup d'etats over the past twenty years. Of the remaining nine, political force is largely represented by one party governments with the exception of Nigeria. Senegal's transition from its traditional political leader Senghor to his chosen heir, Diouf, stands out as the only recent successful transfer of political power in recent years in West Africa. One could conclude that political power has been acquired by force and will continue to be maintained by force making the creation of democratic institutions in the western sense a difficult proposition indeed.

*West Africa is used in this synopsis to include all 16 countries of West Africa, i.e., Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta; and the eight countries of Central Africa, i.e., Cameroon, CAP, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome/Principe and Zaire.

II. EFFECTIVENESS OF REDSO/WCA OVER PAST FOUR YEARS

REDSO's effectiveness in part relates to AID's overall effectiveness in West Africa since 1978. AID's humanitarian activities in most of West Africa have been and continue to be appreciated by recipient countries. PL480 Titles I through III, operational program grants to American and indigenous private voluntary organizations, and our responsiveness at the time of emergencies are clearly appreciated. But in terms of the transfer of a quantum of resources that will make a real difference in the quality of life for the people of West Africa, our program is miniscule with very few exceptions. Since 1981, we have held off chaos in Liberia with substantial amounts - with a level of total assistance ranging upward to \$85 million per year. But Liberia stands alone among its 23 peers in that exceptionally high level of per capita assistance, i.e., \$45 per capita U.S. assistance per year. In contrast, our highly publicized assistance level to the eight Sahel countries averages approximately \$3.50 per capita U.S. assistance per year. By and large, our assistance to the remaining 15 countries of the region is within this lower range downwards to nothing at all currently in Gabon, Nigeria and Benin.

So it is significant and timely that Administrator McPherson would accentuate in 1981 AID's catalytic role in policy and strategy leadership rather than in filling short-falls and development plan deficits as was AID's major role in the 50's and 60's. In pursuing McPherson's four priority areas of concern, AID has been modestly effective in West Africa in at least initiating the dialogue. More specifically, CDSSs and SPSSs have stressed the recipient policy milieu: they have accentuated productive project development in contrast to further support to expanded social services; USAID's have been stimulated to understand the range and nature of the private sector within the recipient countries and ways in which entrepreneurial incentive can be more fully undergirded. Our AID analyses have featured institution building, and have defined more carefully the technologies that AID programs are transferring to recipient countries. The variables to measure the USAID missions' impact on these four complex guidelines are infinite. Our review of individual CDSSs and SPSSs and sector studies would lead me to believe that we are somewhat more effectively describing these complex areas, but are making very limited impact at the national level.

Against that background, REDSO's effectiveness would be even more difficult to measure. Our professional staff was on the road close to 40% of each working year, i.e., just under 20 working weeks. Over 60% of this time was in the Schedule A (full mission) countries which seems logical since well over 70% of our AID resources flow to these eight countries: Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Liberia, Cameroon and Zaire.

A. REDSO/WCA Organization

Annex A shows the current organization of REDSO/WA which has pertained since August 1978. Basically three major offices carry out the mandate, i.e., Office of Technical Support (TS), Program Analysis and Development Staff (PADS), and the Office of Regional Institutions (ORI) - with TS undergirded by PADS providing professional field service ranging over 20 disciplines from the highly analytical anthropologist and economist to the implementation oriented regional supply management and contract officers. Three senior officers have reported to me throughout this four year period, which has freed up the senior deputy to be the full-time director and orchestrator of the large Office of Technical Support. This manner of organization has also permitted the Assistant Directors for PADS and ORI to have direct access to me on a regular day to day basis. It has effectively limited my span of control to three senior officers.

The principal weakness of this arrangement may have distanced me from such key offices as the Project Development Office, Controller, and Engineering within the larger Technical Support Office. I looked to my deputy to relate to these offices on a day to day basis and to orchestrate the needed common effort in shaping each country field mission as well as in Abidjan reviews of specific project documents. I probably did not give adequate attention to the PDO and Controllership functions and should have accentuated a stronger and more effective Project Development Office staffed with at least five professionals from the outset. Since my two deputies in sequence both come from the controllership ranks, I tended to leave overview of the Controller's Office to them throughout my four year tenure. Greater attention to financial management of projects, USAID missions, and regional programs was and is judged wanting by our present incumbent controller.

B. Communications

Our staff says that REDSO is an open, communicating mission, but we have had to work at it continuously. Seven principal systems have been used that constitute the communication system of REDSO.

1. Formal Meetings: My deputy and two assistant directors meet with me each Monday morning for an hour and a half to review the pending actions from the week before, and to chart the course for the coming week. They are the sounding board for review of all REDSO programmed field services personnel, the operating expense budget, and the program issues that need to be reviewed in an interdisciplinary context. They, in turn, hold staff meetings at least twice a month within TS, PADS, and ORI.

An in-depth meeting is held with PADS and ORI respectively the 2nd and 4th Thursday of each month, and all unit heads and sector chiefs meet the 1st and 3rd Thursday of each month. These sessions are devoted to sharing progress and frustrations in the conduct of REDSO's business and permit the quartet to accentuate important actions growing out of field or AID/W requests. The first Wednesday of every month an effort is made to hold a general staff meeting with as large a share of the 90 REDSO staff in attendance as are in town. Our most effective staff meetings have usually featured a key speaker relating his or her experience to development in West Africa.

2. Trip Reports and Feedback: In September 1978, we instituted a trip report requirement in order to keep REDSO management informed as to what each officer is doing on his or her field trips. This four year history has proven invaluable not only for the mission leadership but for country archival reference purposes and for providing a body of data that permits excellent orientation by sector. For example, a review of a sample of regional legal advisor trip reports gives an excellent orientation to the range of issues and policy problems confronted by AID's lawyers in West Africa. Such analyses have been made by each discipline. To reduce professional alienation and to encourage each office to feel an integral part of REDSO, the director or his deputy made every effort to comment on each trip report during the first three years. These comments were fed directly back to the traveler and acknowledged that the trip report was read and often permitted further dialogue or reference to similar efforts in an allied discipline. With 40 REDSO officers traveling 8 to 12 times per year, the feedback seemed to get out of hand and instead we have reverted to a quarterly matrix summarizing the results of each trip report by traveler. This quarterly matrix is available to all REDSO staff every two months on a rolling basis. It has advantages of consolidating all travel reporting, but a number of REDSO officers preferred the personal feedback from the director. Perhaps a combination of both, with sample feedback, would be an effective compromise.

3. Fireside Chats: Over the four years I have tried to meet in the office of every REDSO career staffer twice a year. To initiate the discussions, a questionnaire (Annex C) was used. I tried to keep the discussions centered very much on the concerns of the officer whether they be allied with specific program issues in West African Development, or more tied to imminent career development decisions. This offered me an excellent insight into the professional framework of each REDSO officer and also their attitude toward REDSO, the U.S. Mission, and AID in general. Though these discussions were privileged information, if specific actions were in order I referred each by memo to my deputy or two assistant directors. These over 200 fireside chats permitted me also to feel more comfortable in reviewing the PER ratings of the REDSO staff.

4. Retreats: All REDSO staff were invited to a day and a half retreat in 1979, 1981 and 1982. Our first retreat focused on the relevance of the AID mandate to development in West Africa and ways in which we could improve our understanding of AID priorities in respect to our current program. The second retreat, held in suburban Abidjan, focused on the way in which the inner workings of REDSO could more effectively support each and every REDSO officer on a week to week basis. It also attempted to find ways in which career development would be benefitted from the two to four years of service with the REDSO/WA. Our third retreat, held a hundred kilometers east of Abidjan, zeroed in on the Agency's new priorities under Administrator McPherson, the changes in AID/Washington organization, and a range of approaches relevant to REDSO's work in West/Central Africa. Most significant perhaps was the debate between Professor Eliot Berg, who had just completed the World Bank Report on the lagging development in Africa, and the U.S. Treasury director to the African Development Fund who challenged a number of the premises of this report. In addition, each office of REDSO TS, PADS and ORI, reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of office management including the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the REDSO director, and fed back their critique together with suggestions for improvement in our effectiveness. These three retreats seemed vital for stimulating a common mission among the peripatetic professional staff. Each retreat is summarized and available for future reference.

5. Task Forces: All bureaucracies tend to compartmentalize. Where professional staff are on the road up to 60% of their time, this tendency for compartmentalization and isolation is even more strongly felt. One approach to developing a keen commitment to priority AID programs is to task relevant staff to sharpen our knowledge of specific West Africa situations. The advantage of a task force is that it is open-ended and can be disbanded at any time. We have had six task forces normally consisting of from five to ten staffers from a wide cross-section of REDSO and, on occasion, RHUO offices. These task forces are: Ivory Coast Strategy (1979), Approach to the Entente Fund in the 1980s (1979), West African River Basin Development (1979-80), Energy and Natural Resources (1981-present), Family Health (1981-present), and Agriculture (1981-present). The first produced a compilation of current AID assistance to the Ivory Coast and a proposed strategy for the 1980s, a document reviewed with AA/AFR Butcher in the fall of 1979. The Entente Fund Assessment Task Force reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the Fund mechanism and led to the conclusions that both the Rural Development and African Enterprises programs should be evaluated in-depth before proceeding with the identification of new activities and possible new design. The River Basin Task Force reviewed the AID experience in the five principal basins in West Africa (Senegal, Niger, Gambia, Volta and Lake Chad) and concluded that a River Basin Advisory Council associated with such an institution as ECOWAS was probably premature. In any case,

it was concluded that the professional staff required to complete an effective comparative analysis of each river basin development was beyond the resources of PEDSO at this point in time. I would still rate this task force priority exceedingly high but the REDSO initiative would need to have the full support of AFR. A fourth task force, on Energy and Natural Resources, explored in a most exciting fashion the range of alternative energy options and environmental degradation consequences of West African development. The task force produced a variety of summary reports. Most exceptional was the West African fuelwood paper by James Hradsky, An Appraisal of Energy, Ecology and Forest Cover in West Africa. The Energy and Natural Resources task force offered a sounding board to a diverse cross section of PEDSO staff and visitors and met at least quarterly from 1980 onward. A fifth effective and creative task force focused on Family Health, i.e., Health, Nutrition and Population, with special concern for strengthening primary health care at the rural and urban family level. I had originally established a Population task force and the task force members themselves recommended a broader and more neutral Family Health Task Force title. Here again the Family Health Task Force has permitted the regional Food for Peace Officer, the Energy Advisors, the Natural Resources Advisor as well as specific Project Development Officers to participate with the regional Health, Population and Nutrition Advisors in examining the impediments to more effective family health care both within and beyond the limited resources of AID. The sixth task force, Agriculture, produced two major analyses. The first was a focused paper entitled, An Assessment of West African Agriculture Development. The approach was to identify key constraints inhibiting increases in agriculture productivity keying specific AID programs addressing these constraints. This was followed by an evaluation of the degree of AID success in dealing with each constraint to date. The second major contribution of the task force was to convince REDSO leadership that one agriculture economist and one agronomist was patently inadequate to effectively service the AID agriculture programs and projects in West Africa. As a consequence we are bringing in an Agricultural Development Officer with a doctorate in Ag Economics, a Purdue agricultural economist, a second Purdue economist with a rural energy specialty, a career agronomist, and have opened the door to a wide-range of short term expertise from Purdue focused on the agricultural sector of West Africa.

Staff have told me that the principal disadvantage of the task force approach is the inordinate amount of time consumed in meetings and in shaping policy papers. My conclusion, however, still is that the interplay of diverse disciplines and the creation of fresh approaches to priority AID development sectors should be part and parcel of the REDSO mandate. The task force is non-hierarchical and permits both junior and senior AID professionals to collaborate as equals in pinpointing ways to provide more effective AID assistance.

6. Slide/Cassette Modules: Early on we were convinced that REDSO needed an orientation program for new staff and visitors interested in our wide-ranging work in West Africa. Six modules have been prepared in close collaboration with or solely by REDSO staff. Each runs 10-20 minutes in length and depict AID's work in West Africa in: (1) integrated rural development (Upper Volta), (2) primary rural health care (Senegal), (3) multilateral collaboration in onchocercias (river blindness) control (Ivory Coast and Upper Volta), (4) Food for Peace outreach (West Africa), (5) the struggle to retain fuelwood sources (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta), and (6) rural women in West African development. I am proudest of Jocelyn Albert's efforts to capture the role of and pressures on West African rural women. Her concluding summary of how AID projects can better reach this key target group is sobering and relevant to our future work here.

7. WANG Comes to REDSO: REDSO/WCA's own institution building efforts have required the assimilation of computer technology in the summer of 1982. Our WANG WP5 Word Processor arrived in June, followed by the WANG VS computer in July. All 18 secretaries and administrative assistants in REDSO have undergone a minimum of 10 hours of training in a two week period on the word processor. The WANG VS with its 12 terminals will permit both word processing within each major office of REDSO as well as direct access to the evolving socio-economic country and project data system. Naturally, there are many skeptics at this early date of assimilation of this new equipment. Our Systems Analyst has yet to arrive and the Purdue agricultural economist is doing an exceptional job of exposing the REDSO staff to basic programs. The issue is, however, is this \$200,000 hardware package an effective expenditure of the U.S. taxpayer's money? It is too early to answer that question, but the following key areas are earmarked for the computer: MACS (Mission Accounting and Control System) will be experimented with beginning on October 1, 1982, and REDSO will support the West African Accounting Center document coordinator who will take each document received from a Schedule B or C country and enter it into the MACS computer system after a careful examination of its completeness. MACS will work hand in glove with the country profile being developed by REDSO's Project Development Office - first on each Schedule B and C country before moving to a generalized version of each Schedule A country. The plan is to have available to the PDO making the 6-week rounds of the Schedule B countries, a complete project by project status report on all key documents and actions interacting with REDSO/WCA. Since concurrence responsibilities under Delegation of Authority, Revised June 9, 1982 (DOA 140 Revised), requires the REDSO director to formally approve field execution of a wide-range of program documentation, the country profile, based on accurate project implementation documents, will be of high priority. The third area under development is the socio-economic

data in support of key indigenous regional institutions. The WANG VS will assist the AID/African Development Bank project in systematizing all AID inputs to date, and the tracking of pre-investment and sector studies, training schedules, and contracting with long term experts. For AID's assistance to the Secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it is hoped that the socio-economic data on each of its 16 West African countries will be so complete that a wide variety of combinations and permutations can be developed for program discussions with ECOWAS leadership. For example, the structure of each of the sixteen economies, together with foreign trade and socio-economic data, would permit analysis of key development indicators, i.e., investment ratios, literacy levels, population growth rates, per capita income, employment by sector, etc. These data would first be built up in the agriculture, energy and private enterprise sectors which are the key areas in which AID plans to support ECOWAS' institution-building efforts. Depending upon our future relationship with the Entente Fund, the same data base would benefit from the WANG VS within the five Entente Fund country programs.

The utilization of the WANG VS and two WPSs for word processing has already proven invaluable. All reports over ten pages now go promptly to the word processor in the first draft. What in the past led to 4-5 days of retyping, for example, a third draft can generally be completed now in less than one working day. The final product is letter perfect and the utilization of the diskette in Abidjan or potentially any field post permits a handy way of carrying reports at various stages of development or substantial documents too bulky to carry in multiple copies. In conclusion, the system has already been justified on the basis of word processing and it is hoped that the cost effective benefits of the data systems will strengthen REDSO's outreach service.

C. Does REDSO Have a Role in the Policy Dialogue?

The economic advisor to the Administrator and PPC maintain a set of economic and policy positions that guide not only the annual strategy and programming exercises within AID from the field level up through the geographic bureaus, but also the policy discipline essential to the annual Congressional appropriation process. At the geographic bureau level, Offices of Development Planning and Technical Services further examine development policy issues relevant for their continents' developmental situation. AFR has produced policy papers on agriculture, health, human resources development, and these are updated from time to time. Pightfully, then, the question is why would REDSO/WCA, with its over-stretched staff, devote itself at all to the policy dialogue? Over the past four years, 19 studies were completed either by REDSO staff or by contractors working under the direction of REDSO staff (see Annex B).

It should be noted that less than 3% of REDSO staff time has been devoted to this policy dialogue and I strongly would argue that it should continue for the following reasons:

The problems of West/Central African development in AID priority sectors have common characteristics within the sub-region, but benefit only slightly from policy guidance from PPC. For example, animals are a vital resource in the Sahel. PEDSO's assessment of animal traction in francophone West Africa and an extensive study of the livestock and meat marketing out of the Sahel into the coastal states of West Africa offer insights that are vital to the approximately \$75 million in current AID projects focused on the West African livestock sector. The University of Michigan analysis of the evolution of animal traction projects in the Sahel is a sobering indictment of the superficialities and fickleness of AID interventions in this important sector. It cautions those who would go rapidly nationwide on an animal traction development program.

CREDS' study of the marketing of livestock in coastal West/Central Africa confirms that the current labor-intensive marketing systems is highly efficient and that the greatest weakness is the Sahel's inability to sustain a high off-take of animals for lucrative export to coastal West Africa. It further projects that at current population growth rates there will be almost no export of livestock at the end of the 1980s, but rather this important source of foreign exchange will be crushed by rapidly increasing rates of domestic meat consumption.

In the emphasis on strengthening private enterprise within the agriculture sector the REDSO studies, The Development of Commercial Agriculture in West Africa, followed two years later by The Analysis of Selected Agriculture Parastatals in the Ivory Coast, represent two studies of keen insight into the sophisticated structure of West African agricultural production and marketing. The parastatal study offers a strong indictment of the creeping involvement of government in agricultural production. It was published just as the GOIC decreed that two-thirds of its state enterprises would be sold off to the private sector. The analysis supports such a policy action by the GOIC, an initiative that the governments of Senegal, Mali, Guinea and Ghana should study seriously.

One could go on and analyze REDSO's support for a study of West African fertility as well as migration trends in West Africa and its impact on development; studies of agricultural credit institutions in Zaire and Togo, or efforts in the energy area - including fuelwood and the experimental approach to the utilization of salt ponds in such

semi-arid countries as Cape Verde, Senegal, Mauritania and Togo. Each of these 22 studies were distributed to USAID missions in West Africa, the African Bureau, and often more widely. They are an integral part of REDSO's Information Center, and are referenced documents for new arrivals in their sectors of discipline.

In this same vein, REDSO completed 12 evaluations over the past three years, under the general coordination of PADS, that were widely disseminated throughout West Africa (Annex B). An enormous amount of staff time is required to shape an evaluation, insure that adequate base line data are available, conduct the evaluation, and refine the findings in a form usable for AID policy makers and programmers. I would suggest that the quality of the evaluation of African Development Bank, the Centre de'Ivoirien de Reserche Economic et Social, CICI/Togo and the CUNA credit projects in Togo and Sierra Leone, as well as the SHDS Phase II Evaluation, contain findings, recommendations and conclusions that go far beyond the project confines per se. The key to REDSO's effective involvement in the past policy dialogue was to insure that our limited field research was in concert with the overall Agency's priority area and that our findings and conclusions were assimilated quickly by AID field staff who benefitted directly from these studies. Since an average of 20 AID-sponsored conferences and workshops are held in Abidjan each year, and since REDSO staff are all over West Africa on a continual basis, there is ample opportunity for the feedback of relevant findings and/or recommendations. We should remember, however, that AID's limited resources compels it to work at the narrow margin of development in a limited number of sectors in West African development.

D. Quality of REDSO Outreach to West African Countries:

There are two complimentary approaches that we have used to try to insure timely and quality services to both the Schedule B and A countries. REDSO has a primary and secondary officer for each West African country. Ideally, every action cable is sent promptly to the designated primary officer, and in the case of his or her absence the secondary officer, upon receipt. Without exception, each Schedule B country has a friend in REDSO working on its behalf on a week to week basis. The annual program is triggered at the start of each fiscal year by the Abidjan Scheduling Conference. Increasingly, we have focused on the need for effective implementation planning in addition to the more traditional accent on the scheduling of new design or redesign.

A second approach to maintaining the high quality of REDSO input has been the maintenance of an independent Program Analysis and Development Staff with its stable of 13 professional officers. REDSO's Project Development Office in TS has the responsibility of scheduling all REDSO's field services focused on design, redesign or evaluation. He assists the principal officer of the receiving country to negotiate the technical services provided by PADS. The PDO does not, however, dictate the technical conclusions reached by the PADS staff: these are independently fed into the REDSO system through the Assistant Director for PADS. Where there are strong policy differences, and this is occasionally the case, they come to me and the Deputy Director for resolution. On occasion, unresolved issues are referred to AFR - particularly at the PID stage, but at the Project Paper review stage as well. This opportunity for strongly held and differing views to be expressed and accommodated within the unrelenting design and programming process is important and should be protected. Ideally, each primary officer not only should have a first-hand knowledge of each individual project in the Schedule B country against the background of current strategy, but should be familiar with the socio-economic situation within the country. The primary officer also is responsible for visits to the Schedule B country principal officer and his staff at least six times per year. In this way, REDSO expertise is continually available to each of the 14 Schedule B countries, although 95% of this expertise works out of Abidjan.

E. Effective REDSO/WCA Outreach:

Delegation of Authority 140, October 12, 1978, Revised June 9, 1982, carves out a significant role for the REDSOs. It divides the countries in sub-Sahara Africa into basically two types: (1) those requiring REDSO consultation services requested at the initiative of the USAID Mission Director, and (2) for the smaller program, a full-fledged REDSO Director concurrence responsibility requiring close collaboration between REDSO and the resident AID principal officer. The following observations should be relevant through FY83 and beyond:

1. The Schedule A Countries: REDSO's ties with the five Sahel Schedule A countries (Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Upper Volta and Niger) is greatly facilitated by the quarterly Sahel Mission Directors Council meetings. The REDSO director sits for two to three days with the Sahel Directors at the quarterly SMDC and shares in the discussion of a wide-range of program and project issues. There is no similar mechanism for the coastal West Africa Schedule A countries of Liberia, Cameroon and Zaire. One extemporaneous meeting was held in Monrovia in 1979, but

there was no facilitating mechanism to continue such sessions. Some have argued that these three economies are so highly diversified as to have very little in common. Since mission directors now have the authority to authorize projects in the field up to a maximum of \$20 million, DCA Revised accentuates the need for the relevant mission directors to call upon the services of REDSO's PLA, PCO, SMO and Engineers. But the onus for not doing so rests upon the mission director and not on REDSO. Nevertheless, 63% of REDSO professional staff time was in Schedule A countries during the most recent three month period - June through August 1982. The technical services of many PADS officers are requested both for design and evaluation effort in Schedule A countries, but the strength of the relationship is that the Schedule A mission directors feel, beyond a question of a doubt, that REDSO services should be subordinate and available when called for. In other words, REDSO is a consulting service expected to be available to their programs within a reasonable time after the request is leveled.

REDSO/WCA is the 9th Schedule A entity in West Africa, and has the direct responsibility for the Ivory Coast, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon and Nigeria. Since AID activities in these four countries are limited or non-existent, it is not an additional taxing responsibility. The single-crop diversification project in Sao Tome and Principe is run under a unique experiment in which a private voluntary organization (New Transcentury Foundation) represents the only AID presence in that country. Overall management is exercised from Abidjan, with field visits limited to twice a year supplemented by the resident NTF field manager's visit to Abidjan at least annually. The project is progressing with very limited DH overhead cost to AID.

But REDSO's outreach to Nigeria, and less so Gabon, is important and periodic contacts with the two ambassadors and their staff have been appreciated and should be continued. Nigeria is the Brazil of Africa. Its developmental progress has influence on the entire continent.

2. Schedule B Countries: For purposes of this brief analysis, Schedule C country, Ghana, will be treated as a Schedule B country though it should be recalled that at any favorable point in time Ghana would quickly revert to a Schedule A country. With the Schedule B countries of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Togo, Benin and Ghana, REDSO has a wide-range of substantive concurrence responsibilities. Guiding the relationship, however, is the strong belief that the principal officer in the resident country is in full command of the AID program. REDSO is to service his/her requirements.

We have just concluded draft written procedures required under guidance for DOA 140 Revised on the relationship between REDSO and the Schedule B countries. The key to a continuing effective relationship is the quality and timeliness of REDSO actions in each country, as well as in Abidjan where documents are often reviewed and concurred in, and REDSO's ability to insure that the primary officer rides the circuit every six weeks and not less frequently than six times per year. A third key ingredient to effective collaboration is AFR's constant support for REDSO's role in its concurrence responsibilities. PEDSO has little role in the pronouncement on country strategy statements, AFR's traditional approval of CPSSs and SPSSs, and annual budget submissions, is and should remain the key to funding levels and priorities. PEDSO has been asked on numerous occasions to assist in refining and improving Schedule B strategies. In some cases we have been helpful to the AFR review process. In some cases we have perhaps further complicated the country's strategizing efforts.

Lastly, a healthy climate can be maintained if the PEDSO director gets out in the field, preferably semi-annually to each of the Schedule B countries. There are always nettlesome policy issues that arise that can best be resolved through informal discussion. Periodic trips with REDSO's primary officer, by the REDSO director or his deputy, is vital and absolutely essential to keeping open effective collaboration. The WANG VS will be providing Schedule B countries country profile print-outs and detailed updates by project. Though keyed in the first instance to the new MACS system, they will be invaluable to the PDO's primary officers in providing a handy reference for a document by document review during the circuit riding. They will permit field tightening up of project management by being able to discuss specific project implementation letters, the fulfillment of specific conditions precedent, progress on meeting specific covenants, and a range of issues related to the effective implementation of a specific project. It is hoped that every document relevant to the project, including past and current evaluations would be keyed within the country profile. The country profile would be updated by first-hand discussion with the principal officer during each periodic country visit.

In conclusion, agreement on strategy and annual programming levels naturally must flow from AFR. PEDSO could even assist in sharpening the documentation for this annual exercise, but its principal role must continue to be in its timely support for project by project implementation and the project evaluation, and in the design or redesign of new project initiatives. By the nature of the enormous range of disciplines in REDSO/WA, the country profile status sheet can prove to be a valuable aid to the Schedule B principal officer. But he is responsible for his program and REDSO is in West Africa to be of service to him and his staff.

III. U.S. DEVELOPMENT RELATIONS WITH WEST/CENTRAL AFRICA

A. Premature AID Graduates:

It is ironic that probably the two most important countries of West Africa are largely unassisted by AID programs, i.e., Nigeria and Ivory Coast. During the Carter administration an aborted effort to provide \$3 million per year in a block grant to the GON came to naught. This amount, supplemented by ten times that level of resources from Nigeria directly, would have permitted a wide-range of programs to evolve under AID's Trade and Development Program. Now that there is a recent downturn in Nigeria's balance of payments, the Administration should rethink the feasibility of a block grant. True, Nigeria is an OPEC country, but it should be remembered that during the 1967 Middle East war, Nigeria was the only major OPEC country that did not embargo the shipment of oil to our country.

On a more limited basis, President Houphouet-Boigny's Ivory Coast represents an exciting development laboratory. The GOIC has continuously questioned why AID cannot even provide a modest level of assistance. The new Five Year Plan (1982-86) features the modernization of agriculture and the improvement of farmer incentives in support of small farmer agriculture. It accentuates the private sector as the driving force of Ivorian development. The Ivory Coast has a miniscule budget for its military and the highest percentage of government support to education of any government in sub-Saharan Africa. It has expressed a desire to collaborate with the U.S. under the Cooperation for Development in Africa (CDA) program in agriculture research. It's Minister of Agriculture followed up President Reagan's Cancun announcement by requesting the "Flying Farmers" to come to the Ivory Coast. In both cases the USG was unable to deliver to the Ivory Coast.

It is true that we now do have an embryonic initiative steadfastly supported by AID's new Private Enterprise Bureau for a modest private sector assistance program with the Ivory Coast, one of ten PKE core countries throughout the world. REDSO submitted an FY84 ABS requesting \$2 million annually in support of private enterprise development in the Ivory Coast. More broadly, REDSO has prepared two documents relevant to the USG's developmental interest in the Ivory Coast - the November 1979 task force report, Actual and Potential Channels of AID Assistance to the Ivory Coast, and the current draft up-date of August 1982, Country Profile - Ivory Coast.

State and AID should rethink the near-prohibition and provide a modest level of assistance to Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. It is true that justification probably cannot be on humanitarian grounds. Instead, the Administration could justify the importance of associating the United States with a frontier development field in the two countries. Two million dollars to each, supplemented by a substantial contribution from their own governments, would permit advancement in high AID priority areas and would insure these two countries remain beacons of hope for a vast majority of West African countries constrained by less adequate resources and/or less stable leadership. I really wonder whether \$80 million to Liberia per year, with an additional \$5 for Nigeria and Ivory Coast, would over the long run not be more vital to U.S. interests in West Africa, than \$85 million to Liberia per year and nothing to Nigeria and Ivory Coast.

B. AID Support for Regional Approaches:

1. True Indigenous Institutions: There are innumerable African regional institutions, but only three truly indigenous institutions will be examined here.

a. African Development Bank Group:

AID assistance to the African Development Bank commenced in 1968 and has been modest - averaging less than \$1 million per year of expenditure. The focus has been on: (1) providing a limited sequence of long term experts in macro-economics, finance, agriculture economics, health, water resources management, (2) assistance to pre-investment, feasibility and sector studies, (3) support for Bank staff training, and the training of key officers in national governments working on Bank programs, and finally (4) assistance in Bank management improvement with a substantial contribution to the purchase of the IBM 4331 computer and supporting studies and software.

Even though the Department of Treasury provides policy guidance and support for U.S. interests in the African Development Bank Group, the relationship with the U.S. Executive Director to the African Development Bank Fund in Abidjan has been cordial. The REDSO Director has served on the U.S. delegation to the annual meetings of the African Development Bank Group for the past decade. Even though the level of the AFDB Group lending is relatively low - approximately \$600 million per year or less than 6% of the total Official Development Assistance to the 50 African member countries, its impact should not be underestimated. The Bank is a truly African institution and maintains an active link with each of its members. In the 1980s, the quality of the AFDB outreach will remain far more critical than the magnitude of its annual lending.

African countries truly believe that the AFDB is working on their behalf and is representing their interests in the various international arena within the UN system. In respect to its leadership in Abidjan as a development forum, the African Development Bank in just these past three years has hosted or co-sponsored the following AID-assisted conferences or workshops:

1. Workshop on remote sensing in land use development -
2. Conference on making food aid more effective -
3. Workshop on mini-hydro development -
4. First conference in Africa to review progress under CDA -
5. Conference on environmental impact assessment and planning -

AFDB's conference facilities are extraordinary and the Bank's president and top leadership have been most accommodating in providing Bank facilities for development themes.

We are now in dialogue with the Bank president on a major orientation of the AID assistance to the African Development Bank Group as a prelude to launching the new project in mid-1983. For the past four years USAID assistance, even though programmed double the earlier level, has moved sluggishly on the expenditure side. Long term advisors have performed a body-shop function with very limited opportunities for providing formal training and upgrading of counterparts. With this in mind, we have proposed four target areas of assistance: (1) In support of the further consolidation of the improved project management system, to provide a senior advisor on financial management and project development; (2) To advance the effectiveness of the evaluation function of the African Development Bank through provision of an expert in evaluation systems; (3) In order to better exploit the IBM 4331 computer system, and thereby strengthen Bank management, AID has offered to provide a systems specialist with expertise on the decentralization and sub-office utilization of computer terminals in project development and monitoring; and finally, (4) To provide up to five other experts, who, together with their other three colleagues, would be contracted to spend at least 30% of their time working through the training center on programs of in-service training.

The AFDB may not accept this reorientation, nor appreciate the proposed American institutional contract to provide long term institution-building assistance. Other donors, e.g., the Swiss, Belgians, Canadians and Scandanavians, have provided a fairly open-ended line of credit to the Bank with few of AID's restrictions and requirements. But REDSO is not a body-shop recruiting office. Real targets of opportunity within a true institution-building project over the next five years should contribute to a far stronger, more effective institution than continuing along the rather lack-luster path we have been on these past four years.

b. ECOWAS:

The sixteen member countries of ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States) hope to have a functioning common market by 1994. Formed in 1975, the heads of state meet annually following the more work-oriented Council of Ministers' meeting. Already ECOWAS has frozen interstate tariffs and initiated their elimination by 1989. They have permitted the free flow of people without a visa requirement for the first 90 days of residence. They have approved a uniform international investment code. These, and accompanying sub-regional policies in telecommunications, transport, agriculture, energy and related fields of development, should permit a much greater flexibility on interstate trade, investment and the flow of persons. This is a huge region, consisting of 168 million people in 1982. The economies of scale resulting from more regionally oriented investments and progressive movement toward the common market should open trade and investment opportunities more widely to the United States, since the national markets coveted by France, the U.K. and Portugal could, over time, breakdown and be assimilated within the larger common market region. Of the 168 million resident in the 16 ECOWAS countries, there are three official languages: English (68%), French (31%), Portuguese (less than 1%). English will undoubtedly become the predominate language and this has been of concern to the French advisors in the francophone countries resulting in a general reluctance to favor close collaboration with ECOWAS on either the economic/trade or cultural/linguistic fronts.

AID has provided only \$20,000 to ECOWAS over the past four years. First requested to assist in an approximately \$50 million telecommunications project interlinking each of the 16 capitals, AID/W advised there was no way AID could assist. The response from the Export-Import Bank was nil, since they have not accustomed themselves to work through a regional mechanism. As a result, the links were divided between Japan and Europe. In turn, we have also been of no assistance in the second priority transport development sector, nor, todate, in upgrading customs. We did provide short-term experts in petrochemical/industrial development and agro-processing in the fall of 1980. Since then our limited assistance has enabled an energy symposium to take place in Freetown in November 1981, with a follow-up meeting also assisted by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in Cotonou in April 1982. We are in negotiations for the possible provision of an energy advisor to the ECOWAS Secretariat, and we have under review the possibility of giving at least moral support to an ECOWAS-aided oil window that would deal more effectively in brokering oil exporting country shipments to ECOWAS country refineries that have had chronic balance of payments purchase problems since 1973.

During the May 1982 Washington AFR review of the ECOWAS PID, we were advised that there needed to be a more substantial strategy of U.S. interests in a strong ECOWAS, as well as a more vivid description of how our limited assistance could make a difference. The October Brown/Rasmussen mission to West Africa will focus on this concern and try, on the project level, to find truly regional initiatives particularly in the complex agriculture sector. In the last analysis, most initiatives in agriculture are at the national or sub-national level, though West Africa is exceedingly fluid and nations vary in size from 96 million strong - Nigeria, to the 350,000 of Cape Verde, producing less than 20% of their food requirements.

West African leadership is proud of the modest progress in building the ECOWAS common market that has been made almost exclusively by West African expertise. Our effort will be to sharpen the ECOWAS Secretariat's ability to formulate policy and to improve their management of what will always remain a limited number of interventions. The Brown/Rasmussen team will also examine whether the ECOWAS Fund based in Lome could stimulate small to medium entrepreneurial development using appropriate development banks in those countries participating in a possible AID-assisted project. The Entente Fund's African Enterprise project has been evaluated with mixed results. A possibility of AFR approval for a somewhat similar initiative with ECOWAS seems unlikely unless we find a mechanism that would improve upon the weaknesses of the Entente Fund experiment.

c. Entente Fund:

Twenty-two years ago, the French and newly elected Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny concluded that a council consisting of the horse-shoe entente states made sense, i.e., Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo and Benin. In 1966, an Entente Fund was approved and AID has provided over \$64 million of assistance to these five countries through the Fund. Three principal programs have been assisted in Rural Development (food production and livestock), African Enterprises (I and II), and efforts at grain stabilization in Niger and Upper Volta. In 1966, AID involvement in Africa was tacitly limited to 20 bilateral programs. The Entente Fund represented a handy mechanism to provide assistance to countries beyond this magic number, but the situation has changed. In the mid-1980s there are significant AID bilateral programs in Upper Volta, Niger and Togo. AID's regional interventions through the Entente Fund, upon closer scrutiny, have been largely of a bilateral nature despite professions to the contrary. The key issue is - can the Entente Fund provide effective AID assistance of a truly regional nature in the 1980s? AFR and the IG are collaborating on an assessment of the effectiveness of the Entente Fund. What are U.S. interests in continuing to work through that mechanism? If the assessment judges otherwise, it is very much in the U.S. interest to determine how even a very limited amount of AID assistance could be focused on the Ivory Coast.

2. AID Regional Programs sans Indigenous Regional Institutions:

Nine years of work in West Africa has convinced me that regional programs grafted onto largely ad hoc committees or transient secretariats is a poor use of AID resources. Basically, in nurturing regional programs we should be undergirding an indigenous regional institution at the same time.

It is in this connection that AID should rethink its support to SHDS, CCCD, Energy Initiatives in Africa, and even CILSS. Where are the truly indigenous institutions guiding these programs? True, the CILSS Secretariat is housed in Ouagadougou, but look at the magnitude of budgetary assistance from the eight participating governments, i.e., it is less than 5% of total resources expended each year. With the ending of Phase II of the SPDS project, Boston University will pack up and leave no viable institution behind. CCCD is an up and coming example of a program that is at best piggy-backed on WHO/AFRO which itself is non-indigenous - tied to the vicissitudes of UN development assistance.

The Energy Initiatives for Africa project in turn will be largely backstopped by field contractors in Abidjan and Nairobi responding to initiatives from individual USAID missions, but is this the way that institution building should occur and technology be transferred? When EJA is terminated in 1990, what indigenous African institution will be left behind? One could say that each of these projects will evolve within a national government structure, but if that is the case, why not provide assistance on a bilateral basis directly to the agency concerned? It is within this context that the African Development Bank, ECOWAS, and even the Entente Fund have impressive credentials as home-grown, indigenous vehicles for current and future development.

IV. AID PRESENCE IN ABIDJAN:

Since Abidjan is probably the most efficient metropolis in West Africa, it has attracted U.S. government agencies like a magnet. But then too, the Government of the Ivory Coast has been very relaxed about the U.S. presence in Abidjan. In my four years, not once has there been a derogatory remark made about the size and nature of the American presence in the Ivory Coast.

I felt, upon my arrival in 1978, and still feel that AID is wise to have a principal spokesman for the AID presence in Abidjan. Upon arrival I found that USAID/Niamey had regional responsibilities for the Ivory Coast which were only superseded by the DOA 140 of October 1978. The Ivory Coast was even left out of DOA 140 and it was not until a revision was made in this delegation that Ivory Coast was re-established with REDSO/WA responsible.

There are now three AID entities in Abidjan: RHUDO, RIG and REDSO. Assistant Administrator Ruddy's letter to Ambassador Rawls in December 1981, identifies the REDSO Director as the principal AID spokesman for policy and program issues vis-a-vis the American Embassy and the GOIC. I have, and will continue to feel, that RHUDO should be an integral part of the REDSO presence in West Africa and function as our Office of Food for Peace, our General Counsel's office, or any other AID entity. Arrangements could be made to insure the freedom and safeguards of the unique nature of the housing investment program, but it is part of the AID operational family and should be coordinated with the RFPDOs in both Abidjan and Nairobi. The new facilities in Le Vallon would easily accommodate RHUDO and would permit collaboration across the urban development and housing fields - not only in RHUDO's three somewhat active countries - Ivory Coast, Liberia and Togo - but would channel their expertise into the wider REDSO outreach in all of the countries of West Africa.

Fundamental to the periodic tensions within the AID family in Abidjan, is the substantial size of the AID official presence, i.e., 47 authorized career positions versus 37 in the Embassy proper. This is not a fair comparison since REDSO, RHUDO and RIG work in 24 countries in West Africa and devote less than 2 career person years and 2 contract person years to programs in the Ivory Coast. It is probably true that two DCI incumbents have not felt uncomfortable with the RFPDO/RHUDO stand-off for it has permitted them to play a brokering role. It is a minor irritant which should be corrected by united AID/W leadership, but probably will not be.

More important is the question, how relevant is Ivorian development to the rest of West Africa? Clearly, the Ivory Coast is the most dynamic nation of the 23 that I have visited in West Africa - including Nigeria. It has nurtured its export oriented agriculture with superb results and is now turning its attention to additional food production. Its enormous investments in human resources development are already beginning to pay dividends, but will be far more beneficial to Ivorian development over the next 20 years. Though the Ivory Coast has a surprising low Quality of Life Index, it has set 1985 for a nation-wide program of immunization. Its energy policy is ideally suited for the post-1973 energy crisis, since over 80% of its commercial power is generated through hydro-electric and its recent finds of off-coast oil have, in August of this year, made it self-sufficient in petroleum requirements with plans for net exportation scheduled in 1983.

And yet, should AID provide modest assistance? The Ivorian experiment is of limited value to the eight Sahelian countries with differing climate and agriculture. Ivory Coast's situation is comparable to Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone, but the political instability and language barrier would probably make interchange between these countries and the Ivory Coast difficult. Ivory Coast may, in the 1980s, have a greater impact on Guinea - though for the past 20 years the two experiments have been estranged because of differences in political philosophies. So, one really reverts to the issue of how important is the Ivory Coast to the United States?

The U.S. was appreciative and supportive of the findings of the World Bank (Berg Report) on accelerating development in Africa. The Berg prescription is almost in complete harmony with the strategies of Ivorian development. In the end, a limited AID effort in the Ivory Coast would underscore the U.S.'s support for sound development policies and would permit a modest exchange of expertise in perhaps the private enterprise, agriculture research, and related science and technology areas. One and a half to three million dollars a year could work wonders. AID could insist upon a substantial counterpart contribution from the COIC ranging upward to 50% to 75% of total program requirements.

It is more likely, however, that the die is cast with the Ivory Coast regarded as a graduate from AID assistance. In this case, our 1979 and 1982 summary reports (Annex D) show ways in which AID's regional programs impact upon the Ivory Coast and will remain relevant for the future. Unless policies change with a shift of leadership in the Ivory Coast, there is no need for a quid pro quo of U.S. assistance to the Ivory Coast in order to house PEDSO, FHUDDO and RIG in Abidjan. The issue has never arisen and is unlikely to do so.

V. REDSO STAFF COMMENT ON REDSO/WCA ORGANIZATION, PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS

In biting the bitter pill of putting some parting thoughts together in this report, I asked REDSO's 14 unit heads and sector chiefs to comment on 11 keyed questions. I am including their responses as Annex E. In brief summary, the composite range of responses for the 11 questions are as follows:

1. Communication at REDSO/WCA

The mix of meetings reviewed in the body of this report seems about right. My greatest weakness may have been running meetings too long and focusing at too great a length on what some might judge as minutiae. One or two recommended that the fireside chats were too infrequent and did not take into account every staff officer at REDSO. Otherwise, it would seem that communication at REDSO was hale and hearty.

2. Management

REDSO senior staff was split down the middle as to whether the Program Analysis and Development Staff should be separate from the integrated Office of Technical Support. It is noteworthy that every officer in PADS who responded felt that the independent/separate PADS organization provided a more effective arrangement providing freedom of expression and independent perspective to be critical of on-going AID activities in West Africa. In most cases the staff preferred the reporting of assistant directors directly to the director, freeing up the deputy to also direct the larger Technical Support Office.

3. Primary Officers

A surprisingly large number of the REDSO staff supported the concept of the primary officer though were clear to point out the difficulties in maintaining this role with heavy travel schedules and prolonged absences from post. No one challenged the appropriateness of primary officers for Schedule B and C countries and a large number of the 13 respondents favored maintaining the primary officer system even for the Schedule A countries.

4. More Formal Concurrence

DOA Revised requires a more direct role by the REDSO director in concurrence in specific documents. This seems to be supported by REDSO staff, though certain officers would hope that earlier flexibility would ensue once the DOA 140 Revised procedure is shaken down.

5. Task Forces

The effort in focusing task forces on meaningful results and even the direction of the task force were subject to some criticism. Not surprisingly, those reporting officers that actively participated in task force work were most favorably disposed to the mechanism.

6. AID in Ivory Coast

Invariably the REDSO staff supported the retaining of the responsibility for AID initiatives vis-a-vis the American Embassy and the GOIC.

7. Decision Making

A variety of wise decisions were formulated, such as the courage to phase out certain programs, establishing of the West African Accounting Center, the move to new office facilities, the introduction of the computer and word processing capacity. Many officers failed to reference unwise decisions. One was inadequate stress on financial management - another suggested inadequate attention to the Project Development and the Engineering Offices - both in terms of week to week management attention and in respect to the human resource requirements to staff the offices effectively.

8. Management of Regional Projects

A majority of the responses favored PEDSO's retaining regional projects provided there was complete administrative and financial management control over them. The transfer of regional projects mid-stream has caused some awkwardness, though even there the judgment is that field management has improved effective overview.

9. A Separate PADS

As was expected, views as to the value of an independent PADS varied. The majority favored an independent PADS - but only by a close margin.

10. Adequacy of Career Staff

No one felt that the current REDSO staff level at the traditional MODE of 38 was adequate. There was need to augment the staff in such service fields such as RLA, RSMO, ECO and WAAC. Those favoring a PADS consolidated with TS would reduce PADS staff substantially, were a requirement made to reduce our approved MODE below 38.

11. One REDSO/WCA in West/Central Africa

A majority of REDSO respondents favored a consolidated REDSO/WCA in Abidjan. A few indicated AID might experiment with one ECO, BIA and SHO under REDSO/WCA direction, but based in Dakar.

I found the response to these 11 questions frank and constructive, and where critical - helpful. I wish that we had distributed this type of questionnaire mid-way through my management at REDSO/WCA.

ANNEXES

- A. REDSO/WCA Organization Chart as of October 1, 1982
- B. REDSO/WCA Sponsored Studies - August 1978 to October 1982
REDSO/WCA Led and/or Assisted Evaluations - 1979-82
- C. Fireside Chat Questionnaire
- D. Ivory Coast Profile
- E. REDSO/WCA's Unit Heads' and Sectors Chiefs' Views on REDSO's
Performance: Response to a Questionnaire

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OFFICE

WEST AFRICA
REDSO/WA

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Director: Gordon W. Evans

Secy: June Eldredge (C)

October 1, 1982

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Deputy Directors: A. Gordon MacArthur

Secy: Anne Dufour (C)

Program Analysis Development Office (PADS)

Asst Directors: Hudley Smith

Asst Development Officers: Martin Billings

Asst Economists: Douglas Barnett (C)

Rural Devt Officers: David Hess

Approprists: Diane McLean

Nutritionists: Melvin Duffy

Populations: William Eyr

Special Asst: Eastern Gibson (C)

Health Advisors: George Jones

Special Asst: Susan Lloyd (PTC)

Human Res Advisors: Stephen Grant

Asst Human Res Advs: Esther Addo (FSN)

Food For Peace: Buddy Dougan

Secy: Conchita Springs

Jocelyne Wong (C) on leave

Lynn Mahand (C) on leave

Judy Rindell (C)

Yvonne Achiya Nagan (C)

(vacant) FSN

(vacant) FSN

Project Development Office (PDO)

Chief: (vacant)

Acting Chiefs: James Ostern

Project Dev. Officers: Julie Deffer

(nominated)

Project Dev. Officers: Eugene Kuch

Reports Officers: Laura Hess (PTC)

Admin Asst: Melinda Owen-Yoblie (C)

Information Spec: Lucie Gray (C)

Secy: Annwita Madkins (C)

Legal Office (LO)

RLAs: (vacant)

Acting RLAs: Delinda Barrington

Asst RLAs: Alexander Newton

Secy: Madeleine Nicole (AECA)

Management Office (MO)

Management Officers: Myron Towast

Admin Asst: Pierre Sane-Aka (FSN)

CSRI: Robert Allen (FSN)

Paul Gbete-N'Da (FSN)

Suzanne Zistermann (FSN)

Robert Anon (FSN)

Maria Garcia (AECA)

Secy: Prince Anouh (FSN 1/2 time)

Margt: Annette McGowan (AECA)

Dorina N'Gou (AECA)

Suzanne N'Gou (FSN)

Language Instrns: Francis Prushue (C)

Travel Advisors: Estima Jatta (C)

(vacant) FSN

Dispatchers: Christine Raja Awa (FSN)

Drivers: Gaston Mounier (AECA)

Philippe Guerey (AECA)

Paul Eusan Annon (AECA)

Yvonne Gouss (AECA)

Francis Bly Nanzah (AECA)

(vacant) FSN

Computer Center

Computer Systems Anals: Larry Clark

(Support from PADS - Doug Barnett

as needed)

Controllers Office (WAC)

Controller: James Ito

Financial Analyst: Marsha Smith

Financial Analyst: John Cloutier

Proj Financial Anals: Barbara Knell (C)

Asst Financial Anals: Margaret Tschirhart (C)

BSA Officers: Henry Mattand

Chief Accountants: Kelly Oriola (SCN)

Asst Accts: Emmanuel Dite-Pockey (FSN)

Katlian Fehi (FSN)

Juliet Jenkins Johnston (C) (leave)

Lillian Gills (C)

Yusheen Jenkins (C)

Etiienne Gagny (FSN)

Talim Phan (C)

(vacant) FSN

(vacant) FSN

Admin Asst: Joyce Hen (FSN)

Penny Kambounakis (C)

Engineering Office (EO)

Chief Engineers: Louis Eldredge

Agr Engineers: Glenn Anders

Water Resources Engrs: Dan Jenkins

Civil Engineers: Dorothy McClellan

Natural Resources Adv: Vernita Fort

Energy Advisors: Clarence Kosi (PSC)

Asst Energy Adv: David Kohls (PTC)

Secy: Carole Affut (C)

(vacant) FSN

Supply Management Office (SMO)

Supply Mgt Officers: Hugh Garmay

Supply Mgt Officers: Tony Bilecky

Port Expert: Jans F. Bontle (FSN)

Secy: Prince Anouh (FSN 1/2 time)

Contracts Office (CO)

CO: Norman Skow

Asst CO: Richard Webber

Asst Mgt: James Dzierba

Secy: Anna Eiser (FSN)

Office of Regional Institutions (ORI)

Asst Directors: Roy Wagner

Project Officers: Ron Rogers

Proj Development Officers: Joe Carroll

Project Officers: Teddy Wood-Stervinou

Asst Project Officers: Rama Dan (C)

Asst Project Officers: Jane Wheeler (C)

Special Asst: Farah Hines (FSN)

Secy: George Gfusu-Anpian (FSN)

Ginette Mensan (C)

Regional Housing
Union Development Office RHUO

*Asst Director: Michael Lippe

Reg Housing Adv: Amy Nolan

Prog Monitor: Scott Johnson (IC)

IDI: George Deikun

Secy: Djerebou Ly (FSN)

*Asst Director collaborates closely with

REDSO Director and maintains a Direct

Program Policy link with AID/WFS/H.

Regional Inspector General Office RIG

RIG/Audit

Inspector General/Audit: John Eckman

Auditors: Jon Hines

Gary Clark

Tom Anselwich

Dave Pritchard

Raschid Kritchev (SCN)

Leon Kattel (SCN)

Secy: Nancy Oliver

RIG/Investigations

Inspector General/Invest: Louis Cooke

Inspectors: Phil Rodakanakis

Secy: Paula Saco (C)

POSITION RECORD

TYPE	REDSO	RHDD	RIG
USOH	37	2	7
Regional	1		
ICI		1	
Inst Contract	1		
Contract (PSC)	1	1	
	48	4	7
FSN	24	1	
AECA	9		
Contracts			
3rd Country Natl	1		2
Local Hire	21		3
Local Hire PT	3		
	55	1	5
Total	93	5	12

SCN - 3rd Country Natl.
C - Contract
PTC - Part Time Contract

2/2

REDSO/WA STUDIES

1. Title: Livestock and Meat Marketing in West Africa, Vols I-IV (English and French)
Author: CRED
Year: 1977-80
Subject: To trace the evolution of the livestock and meat marketing in both Sahel and coastal countries prior to 1977, to evaluate how the new situation affects livestock development, and to project likely trends through 1985.
Distribution: 4 copies of each to missions in West Africa and AID/W (Attachment 1)

2. Title: An Assessment of Animal Traction in Francophone West Africa.
Author: University of Michigan
Year: 1978
Subject: To trace the evolution of draft animal projects in the Sahel, to provide an inventory and economic analysis, and to recommend policy guidelines.
Distribution: All missions

3. Title: The Potential Role of Nigeria and Ivory Coast in assisting Sahel countries acquire emergency food grains.
Author: John Moore and Associates
Year: 1979
Subject: To analyze feasibility of coastal countries such as Nigeria and Ivory Coast in supporting their Sahelian neighbors in time of food grain emergency.
Distribution: Distributed to all missions (Attachment 2).

4. Title: Inventory of Selected Training Institutions in West and Central Africa.
- Author: African American Institute
- Year: 1981
- Subject: To prepare an inventory, review progress and assess further needs for regional training institutes in West and Central Africa.
- Distribution: All missions in West and Central Africa, AID/W, OLC, REDSO/EA and some East African missions (Attachment 3)
5. Title: Qualitative Assessment of Selected Regional Training Institutes in West and Central Africa
- Author: African American Institute
- Year: 1982
- Subject: To assess the ability of selected training institutions to service AID missions needs as an alternative to sending participant trainees to the United States.
- Distribution: Distributed in AID/W. Will be distributed in the field per attachment 4
6. Title: Analysis of Selected Agricultural Parastatals in the Ivory Coast.
- Author: Eric Hermann
- Year: 1981
- Subject: Provides framework for analysis of agricultural parastatals in West African Development concentrating on their structure and functioning in Ivory Coast.
- Distribution: To U.S. Embassy, Ivory Coast and all missions
7. Title: The Development of Commercial Agriculture in West Africa
- Author: Keith Hart, University of Michigan
- Year: 1979
- Subject: Reviews various forms of agricultural commodity production and assesses how these have affected the social life and

economic structure of rural communities.

Distribution: All missions

8. Title: Entente Fund Evaluation
Author: Martin Tank
Year: 1979
Subject: To evaluate the effectiveness of the Entente Fund as an intermediary for AID funds and to recommend AID's future relationship with the Fund.
Distribution: All missions
9. Title: West African Fertility. Levels, Trends, and Determinants
Author: R. Faukingham
Year: 1980
Subject: Summarizes and assesses current data on fertility levels in West Africa, and discusses whether programs affecting the "determinants of fertility"--infant mortality and family planning are the most effective.
Distribution: All missions
10. Title: Zaire Agricultural Credit Institution Study
Author: Development Assistance Corporation
Year: 1980
Subject: To provide GOZ and the AID mission with a workable scheme for channelling PL 480 Title I sales proceeds to small farmers and rural marketing intermediaries to help increase food production, storage, and marketing capabilities.
Distribution: USAID/Zaire
11. Title: Sahelian Social Development
Author: Skinner et al, REDSO/WA
Year: 1980

Subject: Brings together papers summarizing current knowledge on the history of the Sahel, the Fulani in development context, agricultural intensification, the beneficiaries of irrigation projects, and on the role of cooperatives in economic development.

Distribution: Attachment 5

12. **Title:** An Assessment of Agricultural Credit Policies and Institutions in Togo
- Author:** Development Assistance Corporation
- Year:** 1980
- Subject:** To assess agricultural credit policies, programs, and institutions and needs of small section IV countries of West Africa, Togo being selected as a case study.
- Distribution:** CAR/Togo
13. **Title:** Solar Salt Pond
- Author:** Charles Steadman, Clarence Kooi, Clark Spooner, REDSO/WA
- Year:** 1980
- Subject:** To evaluate the possibility of applying solar salt ponds in West Africa.
- Distribution:** AFR/DR, REDSO/WA
14. **Title:** Migration in West Africa and Development
- Author:** Francis Steir, REDSO/WA
- Year:** 1982
- Subject:** Review of recent research
- Distribution:** All missions

- 15. Title: Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon: Development of the Oil Producers
 Author: Jocelyn Albert, REDSO/WA
 Year: 1981
 Distribution: AA/AFR

- 16. Title: An Assessment of West African Agricultural Development
 Author: REDSO/WA, Program Analysis and Development Staff
 Year: 1981
 Distribution: A/AID, AA/S&T, AA/AFR, all missions

- 17. Title: USAID Experience in Policy Formulation and Project Design in the Transport Sector Of The Sahel: A Personal Opinion
 Author: James Hradsky, REDSO/WA
 Year: 1978
 Distribution: AFR/DR, REDSO/WA

- 18. Title: An Appraisal of Energy, Ecology and Forest Cover in West Africa.
 Author: James Hradsky, REDSO/WA
 Year: 1982
 Distribution: AFR/DR, all missions

- 19. Title: Demographic Factors and the Activities of the African Development Bank Group (in draft)
 Author: REDSO/WA
 Year: 1982

- 20. Title: Demographic Factors and Socio-Economic Development in the Ivory Coast
 Author: REDSO/WA
 Year: 1982

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Title: Social and Economic Development in Upper Volta -Woman's perspective
 Author: S.A.E.D - Societe Africaine d'Etudes et de Developpement
 Year: 1978
 Subject: Examines economic and social situation of Voltaic women
 Distribution:

Title: Economic and Social Development in West Africa
 Author: REDSO/WA (PADS)
 Year: 1979
 Distribution: During briefings for AID/W staff and visitors:

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EVALUATION REPORTS

1. Title: OICI/TOGO Agricultural Training and Production Project
 Author: REDSO/WA
 Year: 1981

2. Title: CIRES (Centre Ivoirien de Recherche Economique et Sociale)
 Author: REDSO/WA
 Year: 1981

3. Title: Strengthening Health Delivery Systems Project (Phase II)
 Author: REDSO/WA & WHO/AFRO
 Year: 1982

4. Title: Evaluation of AID Regular and Special Sahel Grant TO *AFDRS*
 Author: Deloitte Haskins & Sells
 Year: 1980

5. Title: USAID/Dakar Participant Training Program
 Author: REDSO/WA
 Year: 1982

6. Title: Entente Fund-Rural Development
 Author: REDSO/WA
 Year: 1981
 Distribution:

7. Title: Adaptive Crop Research and Extension Project Evaluation
 Author: REDSO/WA
 Year: 1981
 Distribution:

8. Title: CRS Soy Nutrition Project
Author: REDSO/WA & CRS
Year: 1982
Distribution:
9. Title: Operation Haute Vallee Evaluation
Author: Development Associates Inc.; REDSO/WA; Institute
d'Economie Rurale
Year: 1981
Distribution:
10. Title: Renewable Energy Project
Author: REDSO/WA; VITA
Year: 1982
Distribution:
11. Title: CUNA CREDIT/TOGO
Author: REDSO/WA
Year: 1982
Distribution:
12. Title: CUNA Cooperative Societes Project
Author: OAR/Freetown, REDSO/WA
Year: 1980
Distribution: