THE EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE IN AID: A CONTEXT FOR EVALUATION

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for

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U. S. Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.

1984
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For more than 30 years the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has been providing technical and financial assistance to developing countries to improve their administrative and managerial capabilities and to strengthen institutions that are responsible for implementing development projects and programs. Since the beginning of the American foreign assistance program, institutional development has been an integral part and a primary instrument of aid. Indeed, in recent years both the problems of, and emphasis on, development administration and management have increased. More than 25 percent of all AID field projects aim wholly or in part to improve the managerial performance of Third World institutions. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been obligated by AID for projects of applied research on institutional development, project management and development administration, for technical assistance to government agencies and private organizations to improve their managerial capacity, and for training thousands of officials from developing nations in public administration and management in their own countries and in the United States.

The impact of these activities remains uncertain. Few systematic evaluations have been done of the results of these investments on managerial capacity in developing countries and observers of the various approaches that AID has used over the years disagree on their effectiveness. Some argue that public administration in many developing countries is more effective and efficient than in the past, and better than it would have been in the absence of aid. Others contend that some of the approaches to institutional development and management used by AID have either had little impact or have exacerbated administrative problems.

Administrative Problems in Developing Countries

The only issue on which there is strong consensus—within AID, in developing countries and among scholars and practitioners of development management—is that problems of planning, implementing, managing and institutionalizing development activities remain serious and pervasive. There has been a growing awareness in international assistance organizations—as reflected in the World Bank’s World Development Report for 1983—that the most carefully planned and systematically analyzed projects are worthless unless they can be implemented effectively. There is a growing recognition within developing countries that weaknesses in institutional and managerial capacity are critical bottlenecks to economic and social progress.

It has become clear over the past decade that bureaucracies in much of the Third World—and especially in Africa—have limited capacity to implement policies and to manage development projects effectively. The findings of a recent study by the Sudan’s Management Development and Productivity Center, for example, would be familiar to anyone who has worked in or with governments almost anywhere in Africa. The study found that development planning in the country is a confusing process in which the plans and programs of various agencies and ministries are often inconsistent or conflicting. Coordination and integration of
plans among government agencies and public corporations are weak, and nowhere in the government structure is careful analysis done of policy alternatives. The ability of public organizations to implement plans and projects is equally weak. Most public organizations have long chains of command and managers have large spans of control, undermining the capacity of officials to supervise subordinates. There is often little relationship between activities that public organizations pursue and their formal objectives and missions. Both government offices and public corporations are greatly overstaffed yet inherently inefficient. High levels of personnel turnover in some organizations create instability, while in others middle and lower level managers can neither be fired nor effectively disciplined. Direction and leadership within government organizations are weak, and public managers are given few incentives to perform their duties creatively or responsibly (Weaver, 1979).

Similar deficiencies were seen in a recent assessment of administration in Egypt. Ayubi (1982: 295) concluded that:

in general, the public bureaucracy is extremely large and complex. It is top-heavy, loosely coordinated, and very inactive at the lower levels. Overlapping and duplication are also widespread, and a large gap exists between formal and informal arrangements, while the excessive frequency of changes in laws, structures and leadership makes 'organizational instability' a real problem—for example, the average period of position tenure for an Egyptian minister is a year and a half, barely sufficient to enable him to familiarize himself with the tasks of the post.

Administrative performance is so riddled with a number of related pathologies, such as the 'idolization' of papers and documents, signatures and seals, routine and red tape, and the complexities and repetitiveness of a large number of formalities and procedures all of which inevitably lead to bottlenecks and delays. Serious carelessness and negligence are also among the most dangerous of Egyptian bureapathologies, recognized by a large number of experts, critics and politicians, as is the rapidly growing phenomenon of 'corruption' in all shapes and forms.

Moreover, government agencies in most African countries have little ability to provide services effectively to peripheral regions or rural areas. Decentralized procedures either do not exist or are extremely weak. Local administrative units have little authority, few skilled personnel and inadequate financial resources to serve their constituencies or to implement development projects (Rondinelli, 1981, 1982; Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983).

In Kenya, for example, administrative capacity even to carry out central development policies at the local level is quite constrained. Trapman (1974:34) notes that the inability of central ministries to coordinate with each other leads to ambiguities in decisions in Nairobi and confusion in the provinces and districts. Often, he observes,
decisions have been made in isolation by heads of technical divisions and circulated as directives to the provincial offices without consultation either of the planners or of the field staff themselves. Either field staff attempt to apply irrelevant or inappropriate policies at the local level, or ignore the directives entirely.

Moris (1977: 90) points out that in many African governments the entire administrative system "has a characteristic weakness in managing large scale or complex activities beyond the capacity of one top executive to control directly," resulting in management by reaction to daily crises. There is little capacity within government to guide or direct development projects toward larger goals.

Assessing AID's Development Management Assistance

It is to these problems in African and other developing countries that AID has aimed its institutional and management development assistance over the past three decades. But the difficulties of evaluating AID's performance in this field is complicated by the fact that the concepts and definitions of "institutional development," "development administration" and "development management" have always been broad, and have changed rather drastically over time with changing perceptions of development problems, evolving theories of economic and social development, and changing priorities of American foreign assistance policy.

Moreover, the field of administrative theory is replete with contending schools of thought and the thinking within AID has reflected that diversity. Crawley (1965: 169) pointed out nearly two decades ago that debates in AID over proper management approaches included advocates of the management process, empirical analysis, human behavior, social systems engineering, decision theory, and mathematical modelling schools of management thinking. Diversity of opinion in AID about the "right" approaches to management improvement is neither new nor now less disparate. Differences still exist between those who advocate technique- and process-oriented approaches, participatory and control-oriented approaches, and structural and behavioral approaches. The issue of whether management is a science or an art is still strongly debated.

Any attempt to evaluate AID's experience with development management must recognize that both the theories of development administration, and AID's application of them, have changed drastically over the past 30 years. During the 1950s, AID simply transferred managerial techniques and organizational structures that seemed to be successful in the United States to developing countries. AID helped to establish institutes of public administration in many developing countries to teach these methods of administration and brought thousands of administrators from Third World countries for education and training in American universities.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the emphasis shifted from merely transferring the tools of American public administration to promoting fundamental political modernization and administrative
reform, first through the community development movement, then through the political development and institution-building approaches. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, AID adopted many of the "management science" theories of administration that were reflected in the "planning, programming, and budgeting" (PPBS) and project management systems approaches, both for the administration of its own projects and for dissemination to developing countries.

With the adoption of the "New Directions" mandate in 1973 and the refocusing of American foreign aid on the needs of the poor, AID began to explore and apply local capacity building, organizational development and behavioral change approaches to institutional and managerial development. In the late 1970s and early 1980s new concepts evolved that focused on problems of managing social and human resources development. They are embodied in the learning process and bureaucratic reorientation approaches.

This paper examines the evolution of these theories and practices of development management in AID to provide an historical context for evaluation. It should be kept in mind that each of these approaches to development administration evolved from perceptions of the needs and conditions in developing countries at different periods of time and were in part the results of the successes and failures of previous attempts at improving administrative capacity in developing countries. But each also focused on different levels of administration and placed a different emphasis on different administrative problems: organizational structure, administrative process, resource input management, human resource and behavioral changes, or contextual factors. Table 1 provides a profile of the major theories of development management used in AID over the past three decades and categorizes them by their primary form of intervention.

THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL APPROACHES

AID's technical assistance for development administration during the 1950s and early 1960s was heavily influenced by the prevailing concepts and theories of economic development, reflected in the Marshall Plan and Point-Four Program, which were primarily aimed at rehabilitating physical infrastructure and industrial plants, temporarily feeding large numbers of people whose sources of income had been destroyed during the war, and re-establishing the economies of industrial societies. In much the same way, gross national product of poor countries could be increased most rapidly, it was believed, by raising the level of industrial output.

The Point Four approach urged poor nations to seek large amounts of foreign capital, to build on their comparative advantages in low-wage manufacturing or in raw-materials exporting and to apply capital-intensive technology in agricultural production. Export-oriented or import substitution industries were usually favored. Strong emphasis was placed as well on political modernization
### TABLE 1

FOCUS OF INTERVENTION IN DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE EFFORTS

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<tr>
<th>Institutional and Managerial Development Approaches</th>
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<td>TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL</td>
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<td>Community Development Movement</td>
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X = major objective of intervention  
* = minor or consequential objective of intervention
and administrative reform to create conditions that development
theorists thought were essential to promote rapid economic growth and
social change.

This early period of American experience with development assistance
was based on a strongly prevailing paradigm, the elements of which, as
Esman (1980) points out, were that all societies could modernize and
grow economically in a sequence of historically verified stages that
had occurred in Western nations over the previous two centuries and
that this modernization and growth could be accelerated in poor
countries through the transfer of resources and technologies from
industrialized nations. The state would be the principal instrument of
development. Central governments, through comprehensive planning,
could guide or control the economic, social and political forces
generating growth and modernization. Well-trained technical and
professional personnel, using modern administrative procedures and
supported by benevolent and development-oriented political leaders,
would serve as catalysts for development. The transformation of poor
countries would be rapid and the benefits of growth would be widely
shared. Economic development would bring political stability, and
eventually, democratic government.

These principles were applied through three major "movements" that
dominated AID's activities in development administration during the
1950s and early 1960s: 1) transfer of Western public administration
technology and training of officials from developing countries in
American public administration methods, 2) political development and
institution-building, and 3) community development.

The "Tool-Oriented" Technology Transfer Approach

During the 1950s and 1960s technical assistance took the form of what
Esman and Montgomery (1969: 509) called the "Point Four Model." This
consisted merely of transferring American administrative technology and
"know-how" to less developed countries, much in the same way that
industrial and agricultural technology and "know-how" were transferred
through the Marshall Plan. This approach assumed that successful
methods, techniques and ways of solving problems and delivering
services in the United States or in other economically advanced
countries would prove equally successful in developing nations.

AID and other international assistance agencies spent large amounts
of money on establishing institutes of public administration in
developing countries, on bringing people from developing nations to the
United States to study public administration and on providing training
programs in developing countries. The United Nations, AID and the Ford
Foundation together spent more than $250 million during the 1950s alone
on institution building and public administration training. AID helped
establish institutes of public administration in many countries
including Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, Korea, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. More than 7,000 people from
developing countries were brought to the United States to study public
administration through the auspices of international funding agencies
during the 1950s (Paul, 1983: 19).
Much of the knowledge transferred abroad, and most of the training
given in the United States, was steeped in conventional administrative
theory. It emphasized the creation of a politically neutral civil
service in which modern methods of management, budgeting, personnel
administration, contracting, procurement, supervision and auditing
would be applied. The transfer of Western techniques to the developing
world—what Siffin (1976) later called a "tool oriented"
approach—assumed that administrative capacity for development could be
expanded simply by adopting the approaches that had been successful in
economically advanced countries without seriously examining the
political conditions or administrative needs in developing nations.
Strong emphasis was also placed on "administrative reform" to bring
about organizational changes in government bureaucracies, which were
often considered to be irrational, politically influenced, ineffective
and corrupt.

But the tool-oriented, technology-transfer approach to development
administration came under severe criticism during the 1960s. In a
study prepared for AID, Esman and Montgomery (1969: 509) pointed out
that:

Much American know-how is ill-suited to the needs of many
less developed countries. While Americans learned to
economize on labor, these countries have labor surpluses and
acute scarcity of capital. Many of our techniques, if they
were to be useful, depend on other complementary skills and
organizations which are assumed in America, but do not exist
in other countries. Western technology has also encountered
unexpected cultural barriers. For example, it presupposed
attitudes toward time, the manipulation of the physical
world, and the proper relationships among men and between men
and government which simply do not prevail in many
societies. Many innovations which an American considers
purely technical were seen as threatening to men in other
cultures. ... Technological innovation sometimes brings
drastic changes in the social, political and personal
behavior of many individuals. In many instances, our
overseas partners in technical cooperation accepted American
practices in a literal or formal way, but applied them with
quite unexpected results.

Other evaluations later found that the institutes of public
administration, created at high cost, were able to provide services to
only a small percentage of the civil servants needing training and that
few were able to carry out research effectively or to provide
consulting services to the government (Paul, 1983). AID evaluations
during the early 1970s led to a re-examination of U.S. bilateral
assistance for public administration training and institution
building. "Fairly conventional public administration methods had been
used, as conceived by U.S. university contractors," they observed.
These methods offered "too academic an approach in the context of
conventional U.S. oriented public administration." The universities
had "spotty recruitment records in terms of continuity and quality,
relying chiefly on U.S. academics." They usually created a "separate U.S. contract ‘team’ presence, with excessive reliance upon expatriate heads of assisted institutions." Inadequate attention was given to expanding the pool of trained manpower and their approach to institution building did not effectively strengthen the linkages of the assisted organizations to leadership, support and the political environment. Finally, the assisted institutions never developed a strong research capacity (Edwards, 1972).

AID evaluators argued that more innovative programs and approaches to technical assistance were needed in developing countries, that the assistance had to be focused more directly on operational problems, and that training had to be tailored more closely to the internal problems and needs of the developing countries rather than simply providing those programs in which American universities had developed expertise.

Others noted that the administrative tools and concepts transferred to developing countries were not, in fact, merely neutral instruments. They were methods of administration that grew out of the unique American political experience and Western democratic values (Siffin, 1976; Ingle, 1979). Their application often produced unanticipated effects, or had no impact at all on improving administrative procedures, in developing countries. In some cases the techniques were detrimental to those societies to which they were transferred. Siffin (1976:63) notes that the transfer of American administrative techniques and procedures "largely ignored the human side of administration and the real problems of incentives. It afforded no foundation for the study of policymaking and administrative politics. And it simply did not fit the realities of most of the developing countries of the world."

**The Community Development Movement**

Another approach that was used extensively during the 1950s and 1960s to promote social change, inculcate the spirit of democracy, attempt to create conditions that would establish a base for political stability and promote social welfare for the masses of the poor in developing nations was community development. AID defined community development as a program that "a) involves people on a community basis in the solution of their common problems; b) teaches and insists upon the use of democratic processes in the joint solution of community problems, and c) activates or facilitates the transfer of technology to the people of a community for more effective solution of their common problems" (Holdcroft, 1978: 10).

Advocates of community development argued that the objective of economic and social modernization was to improve the lives of people in developing countries and that the movement was one of the most effective ways of doing so for the masses of the poor. They contended that the approach was also an economically sound form of national development because it mobilized underused labor and resources with minimum capital investment and extended the impact of scarce government specialists in health, education, social services and agriculture through the coordinated efforts of community development agents.
Moreover, they argued that community development was the most effective way of promoting and guiding change among large numbers of people in a peaceful and stable way and of promoting the spirit of self-help, participation and democratic decision-making. Through community development, local action could be linked with macro-economic development at the national level (Sanders, 1958; Tumin, 1958).

In his retrospective assessment of the movement for AID, Holdcroft (1978:) correctly points out that the agency adopted the community development process because it was perceived to fit so well with the ideology underlying the Point Four approach to development assistance and because it was seen as an effective instrument for promoting political stability from the "Cold War" perspective.

Beginning in the early 1950s, AID sent teams of technical assistance personnel to those countries where governments expressed an interest in establishing community development programs both to act as policy advisors and to assist with program design. Most of the programs were self-help efforts to assist villagers to establish small-scale health, educational, sanitation, and social services, obtain agricultural extension services, and construct small-scale infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, dams, and irrigation ditches. AID also provided capital assistance for community development projects in some countries.

By 1959, AID was assisting 25 countries with community development, and was heavily involved, along with the Ford Foundation, in extensive pilot projects in India. The Agency had more than 100 advisors assigned to projects and programs throughout the world. From the early 1950s to the early 1960s, AID provided more than $50 million to more than 30 countries through bilateral assistance and indirectly supported community development programs through contributions to United Nations agencies that were funding the movement in nearly 30 other countries (Holdcroft, 1978). Moreover, community development programs were used extensively as ways of preventing or countering insurgency in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam from the late 1950s until the early 1970s.

However, as Holdcroft (1978) points out, the community development movement faded for a number of reasons. Advocates of community development promised to achieve more than the movement could possibly deliver in promoting social stability and improving local living conditions, and thus it generated expectations at both the local and national levels that it could not fulfill. Moreover, community development was always perceived of by AID and by many national leaders as a form of "pacification," aimed at promoting local democratic principles, easing the threats of social instability and subversion, and guiding change in nonrevolutionary ways. Yet, it did not directly address—and indeed was often designed to divert attention from—the political and social forces that caused and maintained widespread poverty and social dissatisfaction. Often community development programs strengthened the position of local elites, landowners and government officials, and as a result it was difficult to elicit real participation by the disadvantaged. By emphasizing the provision of
social services rather than promoting productive and income-generating activities, community development did not contribute to creating a sound economic base for improving the living conditions of the poor. Resources for both the construction of facilities and for the recurrenccosts of social services, therefore, often had to come from central governments that were reluctant or unable to provide them on a large scale throughout the country.

In addition, community development programs never solved the problem of coordination, on which their success so heavily depended. The programs required substantial inputs from a variety of government ministries and agencies that did not work together effectively even at the national level. Few community development programs could overcome the ill effects of the rivalries, conflicts and lack of cooperation among government agencies, and thus required inputs could not be coordinated effectively at the local level. Advocates of community development often failed to recognize and deal with the high degree of heterogeneity in communities and the conflicts among different income, social and cultural groups in developing countries. They often dealt with communities as groups of people who had common interests and who would work together for the common good. In reality, there was often a multiplicity of differing and conflicting interests, especially between the elites and others, and among people who had always interacted on the basis of family, tribal, ethnic, religious or other affiliations. Structural barriers were often greater than the incentives offered by community development for cooperation and participation. The "self-help" approach to community development, alone, could not mobilize sufficient resources to promote pervasive and meaningful change and was not an adequate substitute for institutional development. Moreover, the community development workers were usually recruited from among the more educated and higher income groups, and they tended to support more the values and goals of the rural elite than those of the rural poor. Thus, they were not usually effective as either leaders or advisors. Often the community development pilot programs were replicated and expanded too rapidly. Community development workers were recruited in large numbers and not given adequate training. When the programs were expanded too widely and too quickly, they could not be supported with the financial and physical resources needed to make them work effectively on a large scale.

Thus, by the mid-1960s the support for community development within AID had largely faded and the movement was displaced by other, seemingly more effective, approaches.

The Political Development and Institution-Building Approaches

New approaches to development administration emerged during the 1960s, partially in reaction to the inadequacies of the technology transfer and community development processes. AID sponsored, through the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) of the American Society for Public Administration, a series of theoretical studies on administrative and political reforms in developing nations. The political modernizers believed that the transfer of American administrative procedures and techniques was not sufficient. They
viewed development administration as "social engineering" and national
governments--rather than local communities--as the prime movers of
social change. Landau (1970) defined development administration as a
"directive and directional process which is intended to make things
happen in a certain way over intervals of time." Others perceived of
it as a means of improving the capacities of central governments to
deal with problems and opportunities created by modernization and
change (Lee, 1970; Spengler, 1963). National development
administration could be the instrument of transforming traditional
societies, but unless the entire political system was reformed and
modernized, governments could not adequately direct and control social
and economic progress. "What is urgently needed in the study of
development administration," Riggs (1970: 108) argued, "is a new set
of doctrines likely to prove helpful to countries who seek to enhance
these capacities in order to be able to undertake with success programs
intended to modify the characteristics of their physical, human, and
cultural environments."

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the institution-building approach
emerged from the work of the Comparative Administration Group on
theories of political modernization and administrative reform. The
concepts and approaches to institution-building were formulated by
Milton Esman and colleagues at schools participating in the Midwest
Universities Consortium for International activities (MUCIA). The
Institution-Building approach was heavily funded by AID and tested
through AID-sponsored field projects.

The low levels of administrative capacity in governments of
developing countries was seen as an overriding obstacle or bottleneck
to development. One of the leading American development administration
theorists, Donald Stone (1965: 53) argued, that "the primary obstacles
to development are administrative rather than economic, and not
deficiencies in natural resources." He summarized the arguments of
many other development theorists in noting that poor countries
"generally lack the administrative capability for implementing plans
and programs," and that in the United States and other economically
advanced countries "a great deal of untapped knowledge and experience
is available in respect to the development of effective organization to
plan and administer comprehensive development programs." But he
insisted, "most persons charged with planning and other development
responsibilities in individual countries, as well as persons made
available under technical assistance programs, do not have adequate
knowledge or adaptability in designing and installing organizations,
institutions, and procedures suitable for a particular country."

The institution-building approach was based on the assumption that
development was "a process involving the introduction of change or
innovations in societies" (Smart, 1970). In developing countries the
most urgent need of governments was for administrative procedures and
methods that promoted change and not for those that simply strengthened
routine operating procedures. Underlying this approach was the
assumption that change was introduced and sustained primarily through
formal institutions and especially through government and educational
organizations (Esman, 1967; Blase, 1973). In order for changes to be
adopted and have a long term impact they had to be protected by formal organizations, that is, change had to be "institutionalized." The process of institutionalization involved a complex set of interactions between the organization adopting or promoting change and the environment in which it had to operate and obtain support.

According to Esman (1966) the variables that affected the ability of organizations to institutionalize change included: 1) leadership—a group of persons who engage actively in formulating an organization’s doctrine and programs and who direct its operations and interactions with the environment; 2) doctrine—the organization’s values, objectives and operational methods that rationalize its actions; 3) program—the functions and services that constitute the organization’s output; 4) resources—the organization’s physical, human and technological inputs; and, 5) structure—the processes established for the operation and maintenance of the organization.

Each of these aspects of an institution had to be strengthened if it was to be effective in introducing, protecting and sustaining change. Moreover, an effective change-inducing institution had to engage successfully in transactions with other organizations in its environment in order to obtain authority, resources and support and to make the impact of change felt throughout society. Those transactions occurred through an institution’s linkages. Four types of linkages had to be strengthened if institutions were to become effective change-inducing organizations: 1) enabling linkages with organizations controlling resources and authority needed by the institution to function; 2) functional linkages with organizations performing complementary functions and services or which are competitive with the institution; 3) normative linkages through which other organizations place constraints on or legitimize the institutions’ norms and values as expressed in its doctrine or programs; and, 4) diffused linkages through which the institution has an impact on other organizations in the environment.

The transactions allow the institution to gain support and overcome resistance, exchange resources, structure the environment and transfer norms and values (Esman, 1966). An organization became an institution when the changes that it advocated and protected were accepted, valued, and became functional in the environment (Saert, 1970). The essence of this approach to development management was to strengthen an “enclave” organization that could engage in transactions with other organizations in its environment, gain political support for its activities and allow for its survival (Honadle, 1982).

The AID-sponsored activities included a massive research program into ways of building institutional capability for development and technical assistance to institutions in several developing countries. The research produced detailed and extensive studies of organizational characteristics and administrative behavior in developing nations (Eaton, 1972).

The results of the technical assistance, however, were somewhat disappointing. Drawing on four specific cases (Siffin, 1967; Birkhead,
that were typical of many others in which the MUCIA network attempted to apply institution building theory, Blase (1973: 8-9) notes that nearly all the technical aid came from the faculty of American universities who were only able to introduce models of change and were "unable to carry their local counterparts with them on significant issues." Studies of the cases in Nigeria, Ecuador, Thailand and Turkey indicated that the local counterparts tended to support only a few of the institutional changes that were recommended by foreign assistance personnel. "Local staff members frequently attached higher priority to protecting existing relationships than to the changes proposed by technical assistance personnel," Blase concluded, "although they frequently agreed with technical personnel about proposed goals."

Ironically, during the 1970's the administrative-political reform and the institution-building approaches came under heavy attack both by administrative theorists, who considered them unsystematic and insufficiently theoretical to add much to knowledge about comparative administration (Loveman, 1976; Sigelman, 1976; Bendor, 1976) and by practitioners who considered them too abstract and theoretical to be operational (Ingle, 1979). AID, for example, reassessed its support of CAG and MUCIA at the end of the 1960s and decided at the beginning of the 1970s to cut back both its funding for public administration training and for research and technical assistance in administrative reform and institution-building.

In reaction to the widespread criticism of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid programs that were reflected in the findings of several international evaluation commissions (Pearson, 1969; Jackson, 1969), and because of increased scrutiny and oversight of the AID program by Congress, the Agency began in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adopt new management systems for its own lending and grant activities.

The system of controls and management procedures adopted by AID was influenced in part by the need to integrate project development activities and documentation with the Agency's budgeting process and with its annual Congressional Presentation. Adoption of a more systematic approach to loan and grant management was also influenced by the prevailing belief at the end of the 1960s in the efficacy of "systems management." Many administrative theorists argued that implementation could be greatly improved by the application of project management systems that had been used in corporations to manage large scale construction projects and in the Defense Department and NASA to manage defense systems and space projects. Indeed, a number of other federal agencies had also adopted planning, budgeting and programming systems (PPBS), of which AID's planning, budgeting, and review (PBAR) process was but a variation.

Planning-Program-Budgeting Systems Within AID

The management science approach, strongly advocated by technical experts, project engineers, and management consultants was one, as Esman and Montgomery (1969) pointed out, "which applies mathematical logic to optimizing the performance of an organization, usually in
cost-effectiveness terms. ... These methods include the following elements: detailed identification of the interrelated factors in a complex system of action; precise time phasing of related activities, and control of operations through the use of modern high speed communication and reporting instruments." Heavy use was made of cost-benefit analysis, quantitative analysis for decision-making, CPM-PERT scheduling and control techniques and management information systems.

AID's PBAR process, introduced in the early 1970s, was a detailed system of procedures for its entire project cycle, concentrating on the stages from project identification to approval and on logistics of implementation—especially budgeting, contracting and procurement—and evaluation. The PBAR process was expected to integrate and unify the systems used for grant and loan projects, resulting in improved project design and development; integrate AID's project planning and budgeting procedures, thereby reducing the growing divergence between the Agency's Congressional Presentations and the programs for which it requested appropriations; and allow the Agency to make more systematic and coordinated decisions about the selection of projects.

USAID Missions would be required to submit a series of detailed plans, proposals and justifications for projects. A Project Identification Document (PID) had to describe how the project relates to the Mission's overall development program for the country and the country's national and sectoral development plans; identify the primary beneficiaries of the project; provide preliminary information on the activities of other donors in the sector for which the project was being proposed; describe more detailed analyses and studies that would have to be done to develop the proposal; and provide a rough estimate of total cost and time for implementation, along with estimates of the amount of inputs that could be expected from the host country government and other donors.

Project Papers (PPs) would have to provide detailed information on the amounts of loans or grants needed from AID, total program or project costs and resources that would be provided by the sponsoring or implementing agencies within the developing country. The PPs would also include a detailed justification for the project and the preparation of a "log-frame" design.

The "log-frame," or Logical Framework, was a device designed for AID by a management consulting firm, Practical Concepts Incorporated (PCI), to formulate projects in a consistent, comprehensive and "rational" way. It required USAID Missions to describe the projects by their goals, purposes, outputs and inputs, providing for each "objectively verifiable indicators" by which progress could be measured and evaluated. In addition, the project designers would have to describe the important assumptions they were making about each aspect of the project that might affect implementation. All of this information would be summarized in a matrix format that would allow reviewers and evaluators to assess the "logical framework" of each project. The log-frame would require USAID Missions to design each project comprehensively and in detail prior to final approval of funds.
In addition, the Project Papers had to contain an analysis of the project's background—the history and development of the proposal, a description of how the proposed project related to other projects being implemented by the Mission and host country government policies and programs in the sector, and a summary of the findings of studies done of the problem that the project would attempt to solve. The part of the project paper that was considered most critical to Agency officials was the project analysis—economic analysis of the effects of the project on intended beneficiaries, on other groups and on the national economy; technical feasibility analysis of the project design; "social soundness" analysis of the project's impact on the socio-cultural traditions and values of the groups that would be affected by it; and analysis of host country government policies (tax system, credit rates, pricing and regulatory structures) that might affect the success of the project. In addition, the analyses would include an assessment of the financial ability of the government to implement the project successfully and cost-benefit or internal rate of return analyses of the project itself. Finally, the Project Paper was to include an administrative assessment of the ability of the implementing institutions to carry out the tasks described in the prospectus.

Moreover, the PP was to include a detailed implementation plan—providing a programming schedule for all tasks and activities, "milestone" indicators of progress, a schedule for disbursement of AID funds and procurement of needed inputs, and a plan for monitoring, reporting and evaluation.

Guidelines, procedures, required forms, and controls for each stage of the PBAR cycle were included in a detailed set of Manual Orders and in AID's Project Assistance Handbook. These management systems, of course, are still being used in AID.

Project Management Systems for Developing Countries

In the early 1970s, AID also began to develop training programs for those who manage projects in developing countries, borrowing heavily from concepts, methods and approaches that characterized its own planning-programming-budgeting control systems. Given the complexity of the project management cycles used by international funding institutions, Solomon (1974: 2) pointed out the need to develop administrative capacity within developing countries to manage projects as an integrated system of activities. The project cycle was considered to be an important framework for effective management because the various elements were inextricably related:

A defect in any of the phases of the project can make the project unsuccessful. Thus, decision-makers have to be interested in all aspects of the project cycle. One person or group may conceive the idea, perhaps in a sector study, another may investigate it and give it a rough formulation, a third may give it a more detailed study, a fourth may approve it, a fifth may give it more detailed form and, finally, another group or person may take responsibility for carrying
Training materials were developed for AID by several universities that focused on implementation within the framework of a generic "project cycle," that is, the actions required from the initial stage of identifying potential projects for funding by AID or by national governments through their design, appraisal, approval, organization, management, completion and evaluation.

To follow on from the work done by the universities, in 1975 AID initiated technical assistance activities aimed at improving project management systems by building the capacity of four regional and four national training centers to offer project management training, consulting, "action research," and technical cooperation. The funds would be used to help regional centers to adapt project management training materials developed by the universities and AID to local needs and to test them under local conditions. Grants were also used to adapt the materials to particular sectors, such as health and agriculture. Among the regional centers that received grants were the InterAmerican Institute for Development (EIAP), the Pan-African Institute for Development (PAID), the InterAmerican Institute for Agricultural Sciences (IICA), and the Asian Institute of Management (AIM). The grants were used to develop training programs that covered the entire project cycle as well as specific elements of project planning and management.

However, the project management learning packages developed by the universities simply reflected the application of what Esman and Montgomery had earlier referred to as the "Point Four approach" of transferring American business management methods and techniques to developing countries. The training packages included almost entirely material on project management procedures used in the United States by private corporations and by the defense industry that had little to do with the problems of project management in developing countries (USAID, 1975). AID's evaluations noted that the training materials did make conceptual advances analyzing the elements of the project cycles that were used by international aid agencies and the ways in which various parts of the cycle related to each other. They emphasized the differences in management problems among developing countries, project organizers, beneficiaries and lending institutions. They highlighted the need for multidisciplinary analysis of projects, and introduced new skills for project management, including creative problem solving, environmental assessment and technology evaluation. But, in the end, they had limited direct applicability in developing nations.

Among the weaknesses of the training packages were that they simply were not practical for building the skills of managers in less developed countries because they were too theoretical. They drew primarily on American corporate experience; there was little emphasis on the economic and financial aspects of project feasibility; and the approach to project management was too general and did not relate to the problems and opportunities in specific sectors. As a result, they could only be used as general resource materials that would require a great deal of revision for training programs in developing countries.
The universities' work, however, did lead to a stream of research carried on by individual faculty that came to question many of the assumptions underlying AID's systems approaches to project management and the usefulness of many of the techniques described in the training materials. Rondinelli (1976a: 314) for example, argued that the formal design and analysis requirements reflected in the project cycles of international agencies— including AID's PBAR system—had become so complex that their application "is beyond the administrative capabilities of most developing nations, thus intensifying their dependence on foreign experts and consultants for project planning. Foreign standards and procedures are imposed on governments, often without sensitivity to local needs and constraints." Rondinelli (1976, 1977, 1979, 1983) argued that the project cycles, although they provided reasonable iterative models for planning and analyzing the actions that had to be taken in order for projects to be implemented successfully, had become too rigid, inflexible and complex to be managed by governments in developing countries.

Even attempts to make financial management less rigid, by use of the fixed amount reimbursement (FAR), for example, often resulted in overtaxing local financial and management capacities. Indeed, one recurring criticism of the management control approaches, ironically, was that they often eroded local management capacities by imposing multiple complex donor management systems on organizations ill-equipped to cope with them (Rondinelli, 1983; Honadle and Van Sant, 1985.)

At the same time, more comprehensive studies of agricultural and rural development projects in Africa and Latin America carried out by Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), under contract with AID, were also questioning the effectiveness of the Agency's project planning procedures. Referring to AID's standardized and somewhat rigid project design procedures as a "blueprint" approach, they noted that the large gap between design and implementation, referred to frequently in AID's own evaluations, was due to the fact that effective rural development projects simply could not be designed in detail in advance and be standardized for all developing countries, or even for different areas of the same country. "Unfortunately, it is impossible to specify precisely what is needed, when it should be provided, and by whom without a detailed knowledge of local conditions," Morss and his associates argued (1975: 319).

Instead of attempting to design a project in detail at the outset, DAI analysts suggested, AID should use a process approach. "Our study suggests that the most successful projects are those which have attempted to gain a knowledge of the local area prior to project initiation or have structured the project in such a way as to start with a simple idea and to develop this required knowledge base during the initial project stages," Morss and his associates reported. The process should occur mainly by collecting adequate information during the early stages of the project, involving beneficiaries in design and implementation and redesigning the project as it proceeds.
In sum, sufficient data about local conditions were needed to define better the behavioral changes required by small farmers and to design the project to bring those changes about. More important, however, DAI's studies underlined the need for flexibility in modifying the project design during implementation rather than viewing deviations from original plans ("blueprints") as managerial problems or as indicators of poor performance or failure. "Few projects can survive a rigid blueprint which fixes at the time of implementation the development approaches, priorities and mechanisms for achieving success," DAI analysts (Morss et al., 1975: 329-330) argued. "Most projects scoring high on success experienced at least one major revision after the project (managers) determined that the original plan was not working. This flexibility is critical, particularly if the technology is uncertain and if the local constraints facing the small farmers are not well known." The study concluded that revisions of project designs during their implementation should be viewed as desirable, if assistance aimed at improving the conditions of the rural poor was to be more successful. The "blueprint" versus "process" distinction was to become a basis for much of the later thinking about development management.

LEARNING PROCESS AND LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING APPROACHES

By the mid-1970s, AID's development management activities were being shaped by a dramatic change in its mandate from Congress. The increasing criticism of the economic growth theory that had been the basis of American foreign assistance policy since the Marshall Plan, mounting evidence that poverty in developing nations was becoming more widespread and serious, and the growing realization that problems in developing countries differed drastically from those faced by industrialized countries during their periods of economic development, brought about a fundamental rethinking of development policy in the early 1970s that was clearly reflected in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Congress instructed AID to give highest priority to activities in developing nations that "directly improve the lives of the poorest of their people and their capacity to participate in the development of their countries."

In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Congress declared that the conditions under which American foreign aid had been provided in the past had changed and that in the future aid policy would have to reflect the "new realities." Although American aid had generally been successful in stimulating economic growth and industrial output in many countries, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs lamented that the gains "have not been adequately or equitably distributed to the poor majority in those countries," and that massive social and economic problems prevented the large majority of people from breaking out of the "vicious cycle of poverty which plagues most developing countries."

The Act asserted that, henceforth, American aid would depend less on
large-scale capital transfers for physical infrastructure and industrial expansion, as it had in the reconstruction of Europe during the Marshall Plan, and more on transferring technical expertise, modes of financial assistance and agricultural and industrial goods to solve "critical development problems." It would focus on providing assistance in those sectors that most directly affected the lives of the majority of the poor in developing countries; food production, rural development, nutrition, population planning, health, education, and human resources development.

For the first time, AID's primary beneficiaries were clearly identified. Congress declared it the purpose of American foreign assistance to alleviate the problems of the "poor majority" in developing nations. The new aid program would give less emphasis to maximizing national output and pursue what the House Foreign Affairs Committee called a "people-oriented problem solving form of assistance." In its report accompanying the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, the Foreign Affairs Committee argued that "we are learning that if the poorest majority can participate in development by having productive work and access to basic education, health care and adequate diets, then increased economic growth and social justice can go hand in hand."

In response to the "New Directions" mandate, aid focused its programs and projects primarily on rural areas, where studies had shown that the vast majority of the poorest groups in developing societies lived. It defined the primary "target groups" of American assistance to be subsistence farm families, small-scale commercial farmers, landless farm laborers, pastoralists, unemployed laborers in market towns, and small-scale nonfarm entrepreneurs. The AID program would help the rural poor to increase their productivity and income. It would extend access to services and facilities to rural families that had previously been excluded from participation in productive economic activities (USAID, 1975b).

The Local Action and Capacity-Building Approach

As a result of the "New Directions" mandate, AID began, in 1973, to explore the factors affecting successful planning and implementation of projects that were aimed at helping small-scale farmers. A contract was signed with Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) to carry out the applied research project, the purpose of which was "to assist AID in understanding how more successfully to work with the rural poor" and to conform more effectively with AID's new Congressional directives (Morton, 1979).

The study included field visits to 36 technical assistance projects in African and Latin American countries. The results, published in a two-volume report, Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects (Morss, Hatch, Mickelwait, and Sweet, 1975), indicated that of the 25 major factors that distinguished relatively successful from less successful rural development projects, two accounted for about 49 percent of the variation. These were: 1) the degree of involvement of small farmers
themselves in the process of decision making during the implementation of the projects; and, 2) the degree to which farmers were required and willingly agreed to commit their own resources—labor and money—to the implementation of the projects.

DAI analysts defined the combination of these two factors as local action, and argued that it was necessary, but not sufficient, for the success of rural development projects. They found, moreover, that three variables were positively associated with the level of local action: 1) the specificity of the agricultural information offered by extension services to smallholders; 2) the existence of effective local organizations; and 3) the creation of an effective two-way communications flow between the project staff and the farmers participating in the project.

While these conditions were essential for projects to have an impact on small-scale farmers, others were also important. Either the project had to provide—or other institutions had to offer—an adequate technological package for agricultural improvements, timely delivery of needed agricultural inputs and effective extension services. In addition, there had to be favorable markets for agricultural produce and the means for farmers to get their goods to market. This combination of factors, DAI's researchers found, constituted a set of conditions that would allow AID projects more successfully to meet the needs of poor farmers in developing countries.

Indeed, their case studies indicated that projects were most relevant and elicited the greatest participation when they were designed and managed in such a way that (Moras et al., 1975: 95-96) their geographical boundaries were well-defined and the client population was easily identifiable; the project staff actively sought the participation of local leaders and farmers, or delegated to them control over decisions concerning project design and implementation; and farmers were involved jointly with the staff in testing technological packages and organizational arrangements to be used in the project. In the more successful projects participants were generally homogeneous in terms of social group and economic class; the project staff developed an effective communications process with and among local participants; and organizational arrangements were created to give farmers a voice in decisions concerning project management.

Moreover, high priority was placed on technical training of the participants and many were used as paraprofessionals to teach others technical skills. Participation was elicited initially to promote single purpose activities, such as credit provision or crop promotion, and later broadened. Systems of accountability were established to permit changes in leadership among local participants and to ensure that services were provided efficiently and opportunities were offered initially for local organizations to participate in income-generating activities.

The studies concluded that when projects were designed in this way they would not only deliver services more effectively, but also build the capacity of farmers to help themselves and sustain the benefits
after the projects were completed.

The strong influence of the "New Directions" mandate in focusing the Agency's attention on the problems of the poor, and especially of the marginal and subsistence groups in rural areas, also led AID in 1978 to sponsor a large research and technical assistance project on the administration and organization of integrated rural development projects. The objective was "to increase the effectiveness of on-going Integrated Rural Development (IRD) projects and to improve the design and management of future rural development efforts which combine social services, income production, and production-support functions in a single project" (USAID, 1978).

In addition to providing technical assistance to two dozen AID-sponsored integrated rural development projects, the contractors—again DAI—also produced a study of the management and organization of multisectoral rural development activities (Honadie, Mora, VanSant and Gow, 1980). The studies revealed the importance of proper organizational structure in the successful implementation of integrated rural development projects and, indeed, in any multi-sectoral development program. Proper organizational design, DAI analysts found, included choosing the most effective organizational level at which to locate the project to ensure integration of decisions and resources, the appropriate institution to manage the projects, and the best configuration of internal organizational divisions. Four major organizational arrangements were being used for integrated rural development projects—national line agencies, subnational units of government, integrated development authorities, and project management units—each of which had advantages and disadvantages, and each of which required the existence of specific conditions to allow them to operate effectively.

DAI studied rural development projects that were organized both at the central government level and at regional and local levels of administration, but found no universally applicable lessons about the potential advantages of centralization over decentralization. Both had benefits and limitations in specific situations.

Integrated rural development projects could be more effectively managed if they were designed, not in the conventional "blueprint" fashion, but through a learning process aimed at building local and sustainable administrative and institutional capacity, in which:

1. The design is done in discrete phases rather than in great detail prior to the project's approval;

2. A large amount of short-term technical assistance is provided to help the staff deal with particular technical problems as they arise;

3. Emphasis is placed on action-oriented, problem-related, field training of both staff and beneficiaries;

4. Rewards and incentives are provided to staff to carry out project activities effectively and which are consistent with a learning and
performance orientation;

5. Applied research is made a part of the project so that staff can test and learn from new ideas;

6. Simple, field-level information systems are used that collect new information only after an inventory has been made of existing data, identifying the information that decision-makers are currently using, determining how the information will be used and assessing the costs of information collection and analysis;

7. Provisions are made for redesign of the project--its objectives, organization, procedures and staffing needs--as managers learn more about its operation and effectiveness during implementation.

The study found that the limited impact of the projects was often due to the fact that the intended beneficiaries had not participated in their design and implementation; that the designers had ignored or underestimated the "target group's" perception of risk in participating; that the projects were administratively and technically complex; and, that often the results that the projects were designed to achieve were those that were more important to the international assistance agencies than to local groups.

A number of organizational and managerial attributes were found to be essential for assuring greater impact on intended beneficiaries. These included openness to participation by a broad range of community groups; ability to adapt activities to culturally accepted practices; the ability to establish and maintain strong linkages with other organizations on which resources and political support depended; and the willingness and ability to distribute benefits equitably.

Local participation could be enhanced if organizations responsible for integrated development projects adapted new ideas to local circumstances and conditions, devised ways of gaining acceptance for new ideas among the intended beneficiaries, obtained a commitment of resources from the beneficiaries, limited or reduced exploitation of the groups they were working with, and designed projects in such a way that they could be handed over to the beneficiary groups for implementation when the foreign or external assistance ended. These conclusions about the efficacy of popular participation in project management were later confirmed by studies of participation by Cohan and Uphoff (1977) and by Leonard and his associates (Leonard and Marshall, 1982).

Moreover, the response of local groups to integrated rural development projects could be improved if the projects were organized and managed to be responsive to the needs of intended beneficiaries, developed and used a local base of social support and developed local leadership and control.

The studies concluded that integrated rural development projects should be kept small-scale, they should focus on overcoming critical constraints to rural development in the areas in which they are
located, and that the projects should be designed to build up gradually the organizational capacity of beneficiary groups so that they could participate in or eventually control, project activities.

Throughout the late 1970s, AID had also been funding research on applied methods of project planning and implementation through a contract with PASITAM—the Program of Advanced Studies in Institution Building and Technical Assistance Methodology—at Indiana University. The most widely noted result of the PASITAM work was the publication of Jon Moris’ (1981), Managing Induced Rural Development, which also made the case for a local capacity-building approach to institutional and managerial development.

Moris suggested again that many of the features of AID’s project cycle were too complex and rigid to be applied effectively in rural areas of developing countries. The local environments in which AID projects had to be designed and implemented were far different than those assumed in AID’s procedures. He noted that administrative structures in developing countries have characteristics that can create serious problems for project planners and managers. The control chain from the field to the ultimate sources of finance and support tends to be long, and within that chain decisions are frequently altered or rejected for no apparent reason; commitments to projects and programs by officials in developing countries are often conditional, and quickly modified for political reasons; and the timing of events is frequently not subject to planned control. Thus, no matter how detailed the programming and scheduling, postponements and delays must be expected.

Moris also argued that the field units that are usually responsible for implementing projects are contained within extremely hierarchical administrative structures and decisions affecting development activities are usually made or must be approved at the top. In many developing countries, however, there are strong differences in perspectives and interests between national and local administrators, and local staff are often cut-off from or in conflict with officials at the center. Finally, Moris (1981) pointed out that supporting services from the central government are usually unreliable and staff at any level of administration cannot be dismissed except for the most flagrant offenses; thus, many development projects are only half-heartedly supported from the center and poorly managed at the local level.

Within this kind of administrative environment, AID’s design and implementation requirements were often unrealistic or perverse. To be effective, the studies found, project planning and management must be a "grounded" activity in which field conditions are well understood and planners and managers are heavily engaged in day-to-day operations.

Finally, Moris (1981: 124-125) derived a number of lessons from the applied research and cases on how to manage rural development projects more effectively. Among them were the following:

1. Find the right people to lead a project and let them finalize its design if you want commitment and success.
2. Keep supervision simple and the chain of command short.

3. Build your project or program into the local administrative structure, even though this will seem initially to cause frictions and delay.

4. If the program aims at achieving major impact, secure funding and commitment for a ten to fifteen year period.

5. Put the project under the control of a single agency and see that the agency can supply the necessary external inputs.

6. Attempt major projects only when the nation's top leadership is ready for change and willing to support the program.

7. Make choices about projects and contractors based on records of past performance.

8. Treat political constraints as real if you wish to survive.

9. Recruit core staff from those who have already done at least one tour of duty in an area where the project is to be located.

10. Concentrate efforts on only one or two innovations at a time.

11. Make sure that contact staff in touch with farmers is adequately trained, supervised, motivated and supported.

12. Identify and use the folk management strategies which managers rely upon within the local system to get things done.

13. Simplify scientific solutions to problems into decision rules that can be applied routinely without special expertise.

14. Look for the larger effects of an item of technology on the entire system before deciding upon its adoption.

15. Insure that experienced leaders have subordinates who do stand in for them on occasion and that there is a pool from whom future leaders can be drawn.

Moria concluded that, realistically, development projects and programs could not be designed comprehensively and in detail—that is, in the conventional "blueprint" fashion. Many of the lessons of past experience could provide guidelines for those engaged in project planning and management, but the real challenge to both AID and
governments in developing countries was to create a process of project management based on continuous learning.

Thus, the capacity building and local action approaches moved development management theory beyond a concern only with the process of project implementation to focus as well on the "sustainability" of benefits after donors' contributions to projects ceased (Honadle, 1981; Bremer, 1964). This emphasis on post-project sustainability distinguished development management from institution-building by emphasizing functional rather than formal organizational impact, and it distinguished development management from general management by stressing the creation of social and organizational capacity for sustained development rather than merely the efficiency of service delivery or physical construction.

**Organizational Development and Behavioral Change Training**

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, AID was also applying a number of organizational development and behavioral change approaches to development management in both its technical assistance and training programs.

The primary applicant of these approaches was the Development Project Management Center (DPMC) in the Office of International Cooperation and Development in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which was working with AID's Office of Development Administration. DPMC devoted much of its attention to developing interventions for improving project and program management performance. The staff of DPMC relied heavily on the use of "process intervention" strategies and behavioral change methodologies, based in part on the "organizational development," or OD, approach to management improvement.

Organizational development is defined in the management literature as "a process which attempts to increase organizational effectiveness by integrating individual desires for growth and development with organizational goals. Typically, this process is a planned change effort which involves the total system over a period of time, and these change efforts are related to the organization's mission" (Burke and Schmidt, 1971).

Usually, OD theorists use various forms of intervention to change group attitudes and values, modify individual behavior and induce internal changes in structure and policy (Golembiewski, 1969). Among the methods used are (Golembiewski, Proehl and Sink, 1981): 1) **process analysis** activities that attempt to increase understanding about complex and dynamic situations within organizations; 2) **skill-building** activities that promote behavior consistent with organizational development principles; 3) **diagnostic** activities that help members prescribe and carry out changes within the organization; 4) **coaching or counseling** activities that attempt to reduce or resolve conflicts within the organization; 5) **team-building** activities that seek to increase the effectiveness of task groups within the organization; 6) **intergroup** activities that create or strengthen linkages among task groups within the organization; 7) **technostructural** activities that
seek to build "need satisfying" roles, jobs and structures; and system-building or system-renewing activities that seek to promote comprehensive changes an organization’s larger "climate and values."

The process of organizational development is usually initiated and guided by external "facilitators" who induce members of the organization to identify organizational or managerial problems, to analyze the problems and the forces within and outside of the organization that inhibit or promote change; to identify alternative managerial strategies, methods and techniques for overcoming their problems; to identify and diagnose the factors limiting change; to select the most appropriate strategies for improving organizational and managerial effectiveness; and then to develop processes for implementing the strategy (Gibson, Ivancivich and Donnelly, 1973). Heavy reliance is placed on job-related training in which groups from various levels in the organizational hierarchy participate in tasks that are designed to bring about behavioral changes.

DPMC, however, attempted to improve upon and go beyond conventional OD approaches. It rejected the notion that there are generic management techniques that could be used by all organizations in developing countries to improve project and program implementation. But it did accept the idea that almost all organizations have common or generic functions. It asserted that improvements in management performance could be brought about by identifying common management functions and establishing processes through which appropriate management techniques could be applied to improve an organization’s ability to achieve its goals.

The generic management functions identified by the DPMC staff included: 1) having clearly stated and shared objectives; 2) having a consensus on the strategies and means for carrying out objectives; 3) having a consensus on roles and responsibilities; 4) having realistic implementation planning and support systems; and, 5) having operational guidance and adaptive mechanisms for policy and program modification and redesign. The DPMC approach used a process of intervention that would lead the staff to identify appropriate management technologies and apply them to the generic management functions in order to improve organizational performance.

In a background study for AID’s Strategy Paper for Management Development, Ingle and Rizzo (1981: 2) defined "performance improvement" as a "process whereby people in an organized activity seek to increase its effectiveness and efficiency." The "action training" approach, as it was sometimes called, grew out of experience with management development training, behavioral psychology and organizational development in the United States. Specific principles were derived by Rizzo, Davidson and Snyder (1980) from their studies for AID during the late 1970s of health services delivery projects in Latin America. They suggested that the most effective means that AID could use to help improve project and program management would be to assist in the funding and delivery of appropriate management training. But, they insisted that conventional approaches to training would not be appropriate and suggested instead the creation of training programs.
based on the following principles:

1. Management training must be closely linked to organizational needs in specific developing countries. This could be done by explicitly identifying the changes that needed to be made in the implementing organization and then translating these changes into performance criteria for specific jobs. Changes then could be made through new knowledge, skills and attitudes.

2. Training objectives should be determined by the types of performance required to bring about changes in the organization. Therefore, it would be necessary before training programs were designed to distinguish between performance changes that could be achieved through training and those that required changes in policies, procedures and incentives.

3. Training should not be a one-time occurrence, but a continuing process over a long period of time to help develop, maintain, correct and reinforce desired behavior and performance within the organization. Much of the continuing training should be on-the-job and be accomplished through self-learning activities.

4. Instead of concentrating on individuals, training should involve a "critical mass" of people so that new management techniques and procedures could be applied throughout the organization. The training should be group or team focused and involve people at various positions in the organization's hierarchy. "Thus, the selection of trainees, the content of training, the critical mass and the utilization of the on-the-job training are all aligned for maximum pay-off to health services."

5. The contents of and participants in the training programs should be chosen by the implementing organization and not by the trainers or advisors, so that the needs of the organization become the focus of the training programs.

6. All training materials—texts, cases, readings—must be drawn from or adapted to the culture, the health sector and the organization's needs. Where such materials do not exist, some investment should be made in developing them before the training program is offered.

7. The training methods should be applied and practiced. Training courses should not merely be an intellectual exercise or the transfer of knowledge. Methods should include such techniques as role playing, case analyses, programmed instruction, simulation, field work and others that require the participants to practice what they are learning. The methods should "reflect the fact that management is a performing art and not an intellectual discipline."

8. Training programs of this kind are usually more effectively tailored to organizational needs if they are managed in-house by the implementing agency or in collaboration with an external institution. It is much more difficult to develop an appropriate training program if it is managed exclusively by an external institution.
9. If an external institution is used it should be one that can adapt to local needs and culture.

10. The training program should also include or make provision for research and development to adapt knowledge to local conditions, consultation and experimentation to test new methods and techniques under local conditions, and means of disseminating the results.

The basic concepts underlying "performance improvement" or performance management, as it was variously called, (Ingle and Rizzo, 1981; Solomon, Kettering, Countryman and Ingle, 1981) also reflected these principles. Much of DPMC's work also went into the training of trainers and consultants in the processes of performance improvement intervention and methods of action training. DPMC staff and consultants participated in more than fifty short-term assistance projects and four long-term projects by 1982. The long-term projects included helping the government of Jamaica improve its systems of project design and implementation; providing assistance with improving financial management systems in the Sahel; assisting with Portugal's Program for Agricultural Production; and helping the government of Thailand design a project management information system. In the program in the Sahel, DPMC staff developed a set of operational requirements for selecting and training trainers and consultants in its "action-training" methodology.

Although the effectiveness of these approaches and their impact in countries where they have been applied have not yet been fully assessed, AID's internal evaluation found that individual assistance activities were generally well regarded by the organizations to which help was provided. The Development Project Management Center itself, however, needed a more effective long-range plan for its work so that its activities added up to more than a series of unrelated interventions in developing countries. The processes of organizational development and behavioral change were applied in very different situations and their impact on organizational change could not be easily determined (USAID, 1982a).

Clearly, however, the concept of behavioral change used by AID has been rather narrowly defined to include only administrative and technical behavior. The OD approach tended to focus on the small group and to ignore policy, interorganizational relations and client group factors or to deal with them only from the perspective of the work group. The Agency generally ignored in its technical assistance and training a whole set of informal inter-organizational and political interactions that vitally affect the ability of institutions and managers to plan and implement development projects and programs. Rondinelli (1983) has criticized these approaches for giving little attention to the processes of social and political interaction--persuasion, mediation of rewards and punishments, tacit coordination, informal bargaining, political negotiation, coalition building, cooptation, and others that Lindblom (1965) has called methods of "partisan mutual adjustment." Nor have the organizational development and behavioral change approaches addressed the questions of
how policies and decisions are actually made in developing countries and attempted to train managers in those processes. Too often they have assumed that rationalistic patterns of decision-making apply—or should apply—and have trained managers in administrative and planning practices that have little to do with the ways in which decisions are actually made in their countries (Rondinelli, 1982).

Learning Process And Bureaucratic Reorientation Approaches

The most recent articulation of development management theories to be applied in AID are those developed through its contracts with the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) and the work of David Korten, into social development management, bureaucratic reorientation and the social-learning process.

The basic tenet of these perspectives is that the attempts by AID, other international assistance agencies, and most governments in developing countries to design projects and programs in detail in advance of implementation, using standardized and inflexible procedures (the "blueprint" approach), are ineffective in helping the poor. The project cycles used by international agencies are preplanned interventions that do not allow designers and implementors to analyze or understand the needs of beneficiaries, or allow beneficiaries to participate actively in the design and implementation of the projects. Thus, the projects and programs usually end up being ill-suited to the needs of the poor. AID cannot build capacity for sustained action using the "blueprint approach;" and even when projects are temporarily beneficial, the impacts rarely last long after the projects are completed. Indeed, Korten (1980) challenges the value of projects themselves, as temporary activities, in creating the kind of learning environment and flexible action needed to match appropriate resources to the needs of poor communities and in building the long-term cooperative arrangements through which people can solve their own problems.

This approach to development management is based in part on the principles of community development, in part on theories of social learning, and in part on field assessments of successful local programs that were planned and managed in ways far different from AID's projects. However, Korten takes the concepts beyond those underlying conventional community development in recognizing the weaknesses in "top-down" centralized planning, the need for bureaucracies to be more responsive and the necessity of planning and managing development activities through a process of social interaction, experimentation, learning and adjustment. Moreover, Korten focuses on the need to develop "institutional capacities" to manage and learn at the same time. In addition, he sees projects as obstacles to learning because of their time-bound characteristics and emphasizes the need to develop sustained capacity within organizations to engage in development activities over a long period of time. This, he argues, requires "bureaucratic reorientation."

At the heart of approach (Korten, 1980: 497) is the concept of
learning process, in which programs are not planned in detail at the outset but only the strategy for mobilizing, using and sustaining local organizational capacity to solve problems is preplanned. Observations of projects carried out by the National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines and similar "people-centered" projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand and India led Korten to conclude that they were successful because they were not designed and implemented--rather they emerged out of a learning process in which villagers and program personnel shared their knowledge and resources to create a program which achieved a fit between needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and those of outsiders who were providing assistance. Leadership and teamwork, rather than blueprints, were the key elements. Often the individuals who emerged as central figures were involved in the initial stage in this village experience, learning at first hand the nature of the beneficiary needs and what was required to address them effectively.

It is exactly this learning process that is lacking in the project and program planning and management procedures of most governments and international agencies, Korten argues, and for this reason they rarely fit the needs and desires of the intended beneficiaries. Where the poor do benefit from such activities they often become more dependent on the donors rather than developing their own capacity to solve their problems through independent action.

Advocates of the learning process approach assert that only a development program's goals and objectives should be centrally determined by those organizations providing technical or financial resources. Operational planning and management should be left to the beneficiaries and the field representatives (change agents) who worked in the places where the activities would be carried out.

An essential part of the learning process for managing social development, Korten contends (1983: 14) is coalition-building. Change can be stimulated and sustained only when a coalition--which cuts across formal lines of organizational authority and is composed of individuals and groups who are directly affected by the project or program or who have the resources to plan and implement it--can be formed to take responsibility for initiating and guiding action in innovative ways. Korten argues that the formation of such a coalition is to the learning process approach what the preparation of a project paper is to the blueprint approach. In the latter a formal piece of paper drives the project process and encapsulates the critical project concepts. In the former these same functions are performed by a locally defined social network. ... In blueprint projects the project plan is central and the coalition is incidental. Planning efforts are focused on plan preparation, and implementation on its realization. By contrast, in a learning process the energies of the project
facilitators are directed to the formation and maintenance of this coalition, while project documentation is a relatively incidental formality, a legitimating by-product of the coalition-formation process.

The result of coalition-building is empowerment, the enabling process that allows the intended beneficiaries of development programs and projects to exert a more positive influence on activities that will influence the direction of their lives.

Korten (1981) contends that such a learning process approach to program and project management would contain three basic elements: 1) learning to be effective in assisting intended beneficiaries to improve their living conditions or to attain other development goals; 2) learning to be efficient in eliminating ineffective, unnecessary, overly costly or adverse activities and in identifying methods that might be appropriate for larger-scale applications; and 3) learning to expand the applications of effective methods by creating appropriate and responsive organizations to carry out development tasks.

In order to adopt a learning process approach, government agencies and international assistance organizations must undergo bureaucratic reorientation (Korten and Uphoff, 1981:6). This requires changes in bureaucratic structure to allow organizations to manage development programs through social learning and to increase their capacity for people-centered planning and innovation. This means more than changing individual attitudes and behavior, "the more important part involves changes in job definitions, performance criteria, career incentives, bureaucratic procedures, organizational responsibilities and the like."

More specifically, the elements of bureaucratic reorientation include use of:

1. **Strategic management**, a process by which organizational leaders concentrate on a few crucial aspects of managerial performance rather than attempting to plan and control all phases of operations, and seek to reassess the organization’s goals and performance on a continuing basis.

2. A **responsive reward structure** to provide incentives for those staff who are most effective in meeting the needs of beneficiaries and clients.

3. **Flexible and simplified planning systems**, which are attuned to the needs of beneficiaries, facilitate their participation, and allow the evolution of appropriate small-scale projects and programs through collaboration with clients.

4. **Results-oriented monitoring and evaluation procedures** that measure and assess the degree to which benefits reach and are effectively used by beneficiary groups.

5. **Revised personnel policies** that offer more stable and longer term
assignments of staff, require them to have substantial experience in social and organizational analysis as well as technical specialities, and structure their assignments so that they work in multi-disciplinary teams and become conversant in local dialects and languages of the people with whom they were working.

6. **Flexible financial management procedures** that provide fairly predictable and stable funding levels over a long enough period of time to facilitate the learning process.

7. **Differentiated structure** in which specialized units or services can be established for distinct client groups and which allow specialization for tasks that serve the unique needs of different groups of beneficiaries.

8. **Well-defined doctrine** that promotes a widely shared understanding of the organization's mission in helping intended beneficiaries and from which the staff could clearly delineate their purposes and responsibilities in meeting organizational objectives.

Again, neither the theory nor the applications of these approaches have been systematically assessed. AID's evaluation of NASPAA's work notes that significant progress has been made in developing the concepts and ideas associated with "people-centered" planning and management, but that "progress has been slower [on] defining a methodology, identifying management techniques, determining a strategy of bureaucratic reorientation, and developing training programs to prepare people for social development management" (USAID, 1982: 49).

Critics within AID point out that both the organizational development and social learning approaches shift the emphasis from the technical content of programs and projects, in which they have expertise, to a process of organizational intervention and community organizing in which most AID staff have little real capacity. Moreover, such an approach is difficult to operationalize in international assistance bureaucracies because they are accountable to Congress and the Chief Executive, who are usually unwilling to provide funds for activities that they cannot describe or for processes that are likely to produce results that they cannot anticipate or control. Some AID officials argue that the Agency might not be able to obtain funds if it claims only to be experimenting. Unless it can show specifically what must be done and what the impacts will be, it cannot compete effectively for budgetary resources with organizations that do claim a high degree of certainty for their projects.

Moreover, governments in developing countries are often reluctant to admit that they do not know exactly what needs to be done and that they are simply experimenting with approaches that may or may not lead to positive results. The blueprint approach may not achieve the intended results, but it presents an image of careful analysis, design and programming that is necessary to obtain the funds required to initiate and pursue technical solutions to development problems.

In a study for NASPAA that strongly advocated a "people-centered,"
learning process approach to social development management, Thomas (1983: 16-17) nevertheless noted other constraints to adopting it in developing countries. "The generation of power by communities and citizens' groups is frightening to political and administrative leaders. The idea of 'empowering' communities, regardless of the intentions or the anticipated development consequences, is received with skepticism or fear," he pointed out. Ruling elites in many developing countries simply do not have the political will to empower local communities to pursue development activities over which political leaders do not have control. Moreover, there is deeply embedded in bureaucracies in developing countries "a self-perceived and socially reinforced need for certainty among planners and managers... ." Thomas contends that "many government agents are unable to tolerate the absence of direct control, of clear measures of efficiency and of rationally planned outcomes." In addition, the people-centered approaches are difficult to teach; the pedagogical style of universities and training institutes is to transfer objective knowledge. Finally, there are cultural constraints. In many societies that are hierarchical in structure, in which there are distinct social and bureaucratic classes and strongly enforced rules of behavior and interaction, and in which participatory practices are not highly valued, it is difficult to introduce people-centered management approaches.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In brief, AID has experimented with, tested and applied a wide variety of management development theories in its technical assistance and training programs over the past three decades in search of the most effective means of increasing the institutional and managerial capacity of organizations responsible for implementing development projects and programs.

The trends in theory over the past decade have been away from the technology transfer approach used during the 1950s and 1960s in which American public administration principles and techniques were simply transferred to developing nations with little or no adaptation. It now prescribes a process of examining the needs and conditions in Third World countries and tailoring administrative and organizational solutions to them, in collaboration with host country officials. Theory has also advanced beyond attempting to bring about sweeping political and administrative reforms, such as those reflected in the political development, community development and institution-building movements. It now emphasizes specific organizational interventions that can improve management and administration incrementally. The trends have also been away from attempting to build only the capacity of central government ministries and toward increasing the managerial and institutional capacity of local administrative units, private and nongovernmental organizations. Finally, theory has moved from attempting to create and install centralized, control-oriented, comprehensive management systems toward more flexible, adaptive, innovative, responsive and collaborative methods of administration in
which the beneficiaries have a more participative and responsible role in both planning and implementation. Concepts of development management have recognized clearly that the systems approaches that may have been appropriate for capital infrastructure projects may be neither effective nor efficient in social and human resource development projects. Social development requires a more strategic, adaptive, experimental, learning-based, and responsive people-centered approach to administration (Rondinelli, 1983).

However, AID continues to use in its own management procedures a control-oriented process that attempts to anticipate and plan for all aspects of a project prior to its approval and implementation. It continues to rely on methods and procedures of project design, selection and implementation that assume a high degree of knowledge about what needs to be done and of certainty in a world in which "the correct" solutions are not always clear, and in which the only certainty is a high degree of uncertainty. It makes use of methods developed primarily for capital investment projects, even though the largest portion of its investment portfolio is in agriculture, population, education and human development projects. It still relies heavily on technology transfer for many social development problems that are not amenable to technological solutions.

The major shift in theories of development management has been away from the technology transfer and management control approaches toward learning process, local mobilization and enhancement of indigenous administrative capacity. But this shift has not always been clearly reflected in AID management practice. Although the theory of institutional and managerial development has advanced over the past 30 years, nearly all of the approaches described earlier are still used—and have some degree of currency—within AID.

Any evaluation of AID's experience must recognize that there has always been and continues to be a wide gap between the theories—many developed in part through AID sponsored research and technical assistance experience—about how projects and programs should be managed, and the procedures that AID actually uses to design and manage the vast majority of the projects and programs that it funds.

Experience also suggests that no one theory or approach to development management is likely to be universally applicable or universally effective in the wide variety of cultures to which AID provides assistance. Indeed, different approaches to development management may be necessary or appropriate at different stages in the same project. Experience does not provide much evidence that development management is or can quickly become a "science" in the tradition of the physical sciences. Development management is more an art than a science and, perhaps, more a craft than an art. At its best, it is a judicious blending of administrative methods, techniques, and tools with organizational and political skills, good judgement, and an understanding of human motivation to achieve intended goals.

Evaluations of management performance must be based on an understanding of the development management strategies inherent in the
design of a project and of the managerial tactics used in implementation. Perhaps the most valuable use of evaluation is not to determine which approach or approaches to institutional and managerial development are "best," but to attempt to discern the range of appropriateness and applicability of various approaches under different social, cultural, economic and political conditions. Evaluation can make an important contribution to determining how different approaches to development management can be appropriately and responsively tailored to the needs of governments, private organizations and community groups to improve their managerial performance.
FOOTNOTES

1. This paper draws heavily on revised material from a larger study of development management in AID conducted by the author through the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) and sponsored by USAID's Development Administration Division. I appreciate the suggestions by Irving Rosenthal and George Honadle on this version. The opinions, interpretations and conclusions, however, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect USAID policy.

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