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THE TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT OF U.S.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN EDUCATIONAL PLANNING:
AN ANALYSIS OF THREE A.I.D.-UNIVERSITY PROJECTS

by

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CHAPTER 2: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS, THEIR TASKS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTS.

I. UNDERSTANDING THE BUREAUCRATIC, ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND EDUCATIONAL PLANNING

A. The Argument for Looking at Organizational Context and Environment

In the public policy field, Richard R. Nelson has used the question --"if we can put a man on the moon, why can't we solve the problems of the ghetto?"¹ ---as a way of exploring the flawed character of various models of public choice and decision-making. Put another way, the question is why are social programs so difficult to implement? Nelson found three models often used to guide implementation inadequate for the following reasons:

All of the traditions under consideration have tended to exaggerate the extent to which problems are technical, and the correct answers a matter of professional judgement and calculation. People whose interests are attacked or ignored by 'rational argument' are likely to be increasingly skeptical of the scientific validity of argument that professes to be 'rational.'²

As Henry notes in his analysis of five public administration paradigms (over the period 1900-1975),³ the distinction between neutral, scientific, rational "administration and "politics" with its connotation of favoritism and conflict was a prominent part of

¹Nelson, R.R., 1975 and 1977.

²Ibid., pg.18.

³Henry, 1975, pg. 379.

the tradition Nelson criticized. Further, Henry notes that the administration/politics dichotomy was reinforced by a corresponding separation in social science between "fact" and "value"; attacking the administration/politics dichotomy was viewed as heretical as an attack on the objectivity of scientific research.

The thrust of the literature on implementation and the strength of the critics' case against "rational" planning have caused public administration and public policy analysis to again consider the political process. Politics, in the sense of bargaining, was found to be an essential ingredient in the way bureaucratic actors dealt with each other. Further investigation revealed that legislative, interest group and private sector influences had a significant impact on implementation policies and had to be accounted for. But this only came after the earlier, machine-like view of administration was refuted.

In planning, the Weberian view of bureaucracy had been the dominant model. The administrative system was said to be a passive instrument for the achieving of goals established elsewhere, mostly in the political realm. The bureaucracy was a professional body whose activities were based on "neutral principals of administration." When the bureaucracy was commanded to implement policy it had only to follow proper administrative procedure, and compliance, it was assumed would follow, like a machine cranking out its product.

In a worldwide survey of planning experience, Albert Waterson's¹ catalog of such administrative "obstacles to planning," as Backward Personnel Practices," and "Dilatory Procedures" reflect a similar machine-like view of bureaucracy and its role in implementation.

¹Waterson, 1965, pp. 255-56, and 251

Certainly backward personnel practices and dilatory procedures did exist, but the model Waterston and others used treated them as causes rather than as symptoms of a more complex reality. As Motta has demonstrated,¹ the practices which Waterston would see as Weberian pathologies were, in fact, quite "rational" adjustments to the uncertainty and threat posed by the environment Third World bureaucrats found themselves in.

The model planners like Waterston used had a utopian view of the ease of the implementation process. In observing planning in India, Hanson refers to this as the "idea of planning orthodoxy" which he describes as

...a series of assumptions about Indian society on which the approach to planning is based. The assumptions involve the necessity of unanimity and the irrelevance of 'politics'; the approach necessitates over-reliance on collective effort. In practice, this means that within the Planning Commission itself a whole number of sacred cows graze undisturbed.²

The professional ethic of planners no doubt had something to do with their resistance to including politics in their model of administration, Benveniste³ pointed out in his study on planning in Mexico:

Planners usually have a stereotype of backroom politics, of politicians making favors to friends...The rationale for these favors has no value in their scheme since their intellectual models do not usually embrace these exchange processes. They disdain the political process. Thus many planning models are anti-political or at least politically naive, since they disregarded the structure of political exchanges or consider these as immoral.³

As Don Warwick has shown,⁴ planners have developed a series of

¹Motta, 1976

²Hanson, 1966, pg. 262.

³Benveniste, 1970, pg. 20

⁴Warwick, 1977.

myths of planning that were not in accord with reality; as noted earlier, much of the credit for this goes to the wealth of studies from comparative administration, detailing the reality of planning.¹ Planning is not totally a-political; in fact, planners use their access to information to further the interests of their bureau and its supporters. Planning is not simply proceeding deductively once politicians provide the goals/values; ends and means interact with each other and planners participate in the agenda-setting process. While Rondinelli and Warwick have helped restore planning's reality perspective by developing models which explicitly include politics (bureaucratic and partisan), they have stressed the importance of maintaining a balance between the analytic functions of planning and the bargain requirements of their political, bureaucratic environment.

Another challenge to the "rational," "decisionist" model of administration and implementation comes from researchers in organizational behavior. Studies of educational institutions and a public bureaucracy² have argued that past work in the field has overestimated the amount of control the organization has over its environment. These analysts, like those in public administration and planning were puzzled to find, what they called an "opaqueness in organizations" which seemed to generate four types of ambiguity, all of which run counter to the assumptions of the rationalist model of decision-making:³

¹ Ashford, 1965, Benveniste, 1970, Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974, Daland, 1967, Faber and Seers, Friedmann, 1965, and Wynia, 1972.

² March and Olsen, 1976, and Sproull, Weiner and Wolf, 1978.

³ March and Olsen, op. cit., pg. 12.

- o Ambiguity of intention--goals within an organization (and among several organizations in the same policy arena) are multiple and conflicting; there is no such thing as a single preference/decision, all require joint action.
- o Ambiguity of understanding--the link between organizational action and desired outcomes is weak; the social theories which seek to guide this process are themselves weak and open to challenge.
- o Ambiguity of the past--history is malleable and can be interpreted to mean different things if seen from different ideological perspectives.
- o Ambiguity of organization--"At any point in time, individuals vary in attention they provide to different decisions; they vary from time to time.

In summary then, there is no single decision-maker (either individual or single organization) in public policy-making; it is the result of joint action by an ever-changing cast of characters. Values are multiple and conflict, consensus is the exception, not the rule. With varying values, interpretations of the meaning of organizational actions (past or present) and outcomes (past, present or future) will also be multiple and conflicting. Finally, the low predictability of social theories increases the potential for conflict; no agreed-upon criteria for judging between them is available. Each actor will interpret action from his own perspective and will attribute "success" or "failure" to the results accordingly. These are not the kinds of conditions which lend themselves to the type of control the rational model assumes organizations have. Indeed Sproull et. al. captures the difficulty by saying it is like trying to "organize an anarchy."

Both the transactional approach of (Warwick) and the organizational behavior approach (March and Olsen) revise the model for analyzing

implementation to account for these four kinds of ambiguity or opaqueness mentioned above. This requires asking the following kinds of analytical questions:

1. Identify the full range of actors who influence policy and implementation in a particular policy area. This must include many bureaucratic actors that technicians in a policy area would not normally include. The nature of their relationships is also important.
2. If goals are conflicting and multiple, we need to discover what the goals of the various actors are, and how they are conditioned by the kind of organizational operating doctrines they use to interpret the world.
3. The social theories which underlie administrative and political action must be examined and their assumptions probed so as to better understand whether success or failure of the implementation effort was the result of poor administrative performance or flawed social theory.
4. If multiple interpretations of history are likely, we must look to see if there are multiple interpretations of the present and the future.

In short, we must understand how the various actors, each with their own view of the policy problems and solutions, affect the implementation process and its concrete accomplishments. We must accept ambiguous results and the problematic character of organizational action having an impact on social conditions.

What follows is an analytical framework for organizing the case studies. It is based on the issues just raised regarding the bureaucratic and organizational context of public policy implementation and on the relationships between AID, U.S. universities and educational set out in Chapter 1.

B. A Transactional Context Framework For AID-University Technical Assistance Projects.

We can divide the transactional context of technical assistance efforts in educational planning into three components, each analyzing the organizational context of a major institutional actor--the U.S. Agency for International Development, the university technical assistance team and officials of the country receiving the technical assistance. The transaction which links these actors together is the process of technical assistance. To reduce this set of interactions to a more manageable size, we will focus our attention on how the actors involved in the process of technical assistance interact regarding the content of technical assistance, i.e., educational planning. This will be the fourth component of the thesis.

The key to the analytical process is the assessment of the interactions between the three organizational contexts. We plan to concentrate on (1) the congruence or lack of it (i.e., conflict) between the values, policies, assumptions, behavior, and expectations of each institutional actor's approach to technical assistance and educational planning, and (2) on how the congruence, or lack of it,

affects the degree of success of educational planning technical assistance projects. For example, AID and the university team might agree that educational planning should increase the efficiency of education by reducing costs. The host country officials might view educational planning as a way of providing line agencies in the ministry of education with needed statistical services. In our analysis, we would want to see how this kind of conflict influenced the success of the technical assistance project in question. In a more general way, we want to know how different kinds of conflict constrain the technical assistance effort and how a similarity of values, policies, assumptions or expectations might reinforce each other so as to facilitate the technical assistance effort.

Equally important is the analysis of the individual organizational contexts for few of these organizations speak with a single voice. We have two purposes in this part of the analysis. First, we want to assess the degree of consensus or conflict existing within each organization regarding the subject of educational planning. Secondly, we want to understand how the external environment of the organization and its internal organizational structure and processes have influenced the intra-organization differences or consensus. Returning to our example above, we might find that within AID, there was a division of opinion between the technical division people (i.e., education specialists) in the field and program officers in AID/Washington. The former might support the provision of services to line units in the Ministry of Education as the purpose of educational planning. The

program people might argue for the cost reduction approach. Such a division within AID might ameliorate the differences between AID and the host country government and hence increase the chances for success in the technical assistance project. The analysis of organizational context of AID would also help us understand why the technical specialists and program officers disagreed; perhaps most program officers are trained in economics and prefer the cost reduction rationale, while the technical specialists' working experience with several ministries of education biases them towards a service approach.

I. The Focal Component: The Content of Technical Assistance-Educational Planning

Educational planning is the "object" which is being transferred in the technical assistance projects included in this thesis. Educational planning can be divided into the following categories:

- The theories, concepts and analytical frameworks of the educational planning process itself and of the role of educational planning in the policy-making system (how do we think about planning and about educational planning as a special type?)
- The activities and tools educational planning requires (how do planners do planning?)
- The criteria for the evaluation of educational planning (what do we consider a successful educational planning project?)

--The normative assumptions contained in the above three items
: (what values are supported by planning theories, planning methods
* and tools, and by evaluation procedures used in educational
planning?)

In the next three sections, we will be interested in (1) how an analysis of the organizational context of the three major institutional actors (as each relates to the above dimensions of the content of technical assistance) can demonstrate conflict or congruence between these actors (or their sub-units), and (2) how such conflict or congruence helps or hinders the technical assistance effort.

II. The AID Transactional Context

A. External Environmental Factors: Who Influences AID and in What Ways?

1) The Key Actors--The President, Secretary of State and their staff and members of Congressional Appropriations Committees and Foreign Affairs Committees.

2) The Type of Influence--These actors can establish the basic rationale and purpose of foreign assistance (e.g., support economic development to keep countries from becoming Communist), they can directly set policy (e.g., the Hickenlooper Amendment terminating foreign aid if just and speedy compensation is not received for nationalized U.S. companies) or they can control AID activities through the conduct of the budgetary process.

3) The Possible Impact on AID--These actors can shape the norms and values of foreign aid personnel regarding the purposes, tasks, and operating style of AID, they can set foreign aid policy by mandating certain actions, and they can shape the decision-making processes by which foreign aid projects are selected and evaluated.

B . The Internal AID Organizational System

1) How do the functional and hierarchical divisions of AID affect its ability to conduct technical assistance projects? (e.g., If the AID headquarters decides on agricultural development as its top-priority program world-wide, how will this affect an AID field mission's ability to fund educational planning projects?).

2) What are AID's basic operating doctrines (organizational ideology) regarding foreign aid, technical assistance, the role of education in economic and social developments, and planning? Are these doctrines justifying myths, or are they the real basis of action? If functional or hierarchical units have different versions of important operating doctrines, how do these differences affect the conduct of technical assistance?

3) What criteria are used to promote and reward AID personnel and do these criteria for what constitutes a successful performance coincide with those suggested by the operating doctrines cited above?

4) How does the decision-making process in AID function with regard to the approval, funding and termination of technical assistance projects; which individual and organizational actors exercise what kinds of control over the process which leads to each kind of decision?

5) How does AID respond to the manifestations of such "operating conditions" as threat, complexity and uncertainty, and how do these reactions affect its ability to conduct technical assistance? Tendler (1975, pg. 103) points out that the lack of certainty over whether a host country can develop fundable proposals causes AID to "expand 'backward' into the task environment and start to 'manufacture' project applications itself." The effect of this can be that such projects are difficult to implement because they represent AID concerns and not those of the host country.

C. AID "Output": How AID Influences the Technical Assistance Team and the Host Country Policy-Making Environment

1) How is the Technical Assistance Team Influenced by AID? What AID influences facilitate technical assistance? (e.g., provision of resources, or information on the workings of the host country bureaucracy.) What AID influences constrain the technical assistance team's efforts? (e.g., The budget justification process is meant to spell out financial requirements, but it is often used to control the way the university team conducts a project.)

2) How id the Host Country influenced by AID? How does AID facilitate technical assistance (e.g., by permitting resources that would otherwise have been used for regular programs to be used for innovative ones). How does AID influence constrain the usefulness of technical assistance? (e.g., the host country government may distort its priorities in order to receive foreign assistance funds).

III. The Technical Assistance Team Context

A. External Environment -- How do the actions of AID and the Host Country Government facilitate or hinder the technical assistance team's ability to introduce educational planning?

B. Internal Organizational System

1) How do the headquarters-field problems between the technical assistance team and its home university affect the field team's ability to conduct technical assistance?

2) What are the operating doctrines (organizational ideology) of the technical assistance team regarding the nature of the technical assistance transfer process, the role of education in economic and social development, the nature of the planning and its role in policy-making, and the relationship between educational planning and educational research? If these views are not congruent with those of the host country and AID, how does that affect the technical assistance team's ability to conduct the technical assistance project?

3) How do the expectations of the home university and the standards of the team members' professional discipline shape the operating doctrines above?

4) What kinds of coping strategies does the technical assistance team develop to deal with the uncertainty of AID and host country actions?

C. Technical Assistance Team "Output": How the Technical Assistance Team Influences the Host Country Environment and AID

1) How does the technical assistance team affect the host country as a result of its technical assistance efforts in educational planning? For example, how does the technical assistance team affect the organizational location of planning, the kinds of activities planners do, and the theoretical and conceptual premises implicit in planning tools? How does planning affect the priorities of projects in education or the relative ranking of educational projects vis-a-vis projects from other sectors?

2) How does the technical assistance team affect AID? Given the historical lack of job security in AID, the hiring of a university contract team may raise the specter of a personnel reduction. This may cause AID people to compete with the team in ways detrimental to the success of the technical assistance team.

IV. The Host Country Educational Policy-Making Environment

The analysis of the organizational context here is in less depth than the other two for a specific reason. Here we are interested in the organizational relationships in the host country as they serve as the "task environment," that is, as the setting of the AID-university technical assistance effort. We are not concerned here with a full explication of the context of planning as it affects the formulation and implementation of plans or the role of planning in carrying out

an educational reform. Our interest is confined to this question: How does the interaction between the AID-university team's conduct of technical assistance and the actions of host country officials and institutions affect the achievement of setting up an educational planning unit?

A. The Organizational Nexus -- Who are the individual and organizational actors within the Ministry of Education (e.g., the minister, the central administration, the line agencies of primary, secondary education, etc.) and those outside the Ministry (e.g., the national planners, the budget office, the national statistical organization) with an interest in furthering, or hindering, the development of educational planning? What are the specific interests of each actor and in what ways can each actor realize the aims of these interests?

B. Organizational Operating Doctrines -- How do the various actors define their operating assumptions regarding the purpose and conduct of technical assistance, the role of education in economic and social development, and the nature of planning and its role in the policy-making process? How does the congruence of operating doctrines (both among host country officials and between them and AID-university technicians), or the lack of it, affect the technical assistance effort?

C. Operating Conditions -- What is the impact on the technical assistance effort of the manifestations (in the bureaucratic culture of the host country) of such impersonal conditions as threat, uncertainty

and complexity? For example, what is the impact on the technical assistance effort of the uncertainty which results from the frequent personnel changes characteristic of many Third World bureaucracies?

II. UNDERSTANDING PROJECT DYNAMICS THOROUGH TIME: A DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE PERSPECTIVE.

In the last section, we analyzed what we might call the "vertical" dimension of a project's reality: we took a snapshot of the organizational relationships surrounding a project at a particular point in time. This section will focus on the "horizontal" dimension, the time line, the way in which organizational relationships form and grow in chronological sequence. While we can make some guesses from taking "snapshots" at different times and comparing them, this only tells us there are differences and similarities, and not about how and why they got that way.

In the field of technical assistance and even in organizational analysis there is very little written on the subject; yet, to work on a technical assistance project which started from nothing, as the author has, is to understand this reality is there even if the vocabulary for capturing it is inadequate, as it is. One way this process can be understood is to look at the way psychologists have described the maturation process in humans. For example, Daniel Levinson's book, The Seasons of a Man's Life,¹ presents a model of how men pass through a set of different developmental stages, each tied to a particular age range in the man's life. In each stage, there are certain kinds of developmental tasks or problems a man must deal with. For each

¹Levinson, 1978.

stage, there may be three or four or even five, ways or sequences in which the developmental problems of that stage are handled. In some instances, the man "completes" the development task(s) of that stage, and he can then on move unencumbered, to a new set of development tasks. In other cases, the man is unable to, or chooses not to, deal with the developmental tasks of a particular period. In these latter instances the developmental problems do not go away, Rather they come back sometimes in the same form and sometimes transformed. One way of analyzing the case studies in this thesis is to view technical assistance projects as having a life cycle, like a person does, in which certain characteristic problems arise at different time periods in a project. It allows us to view the flow of the project, its chronology, so as to understand and correct for the structural problems technical assistance projects face.

A note of caution here:

The "stage" approach Levinson presents should not be confused with those in economic development theory which posit that whole societies move from "lower," less evolved economic structures and activities to "higher," more developed ones. The model we will use is more based on the one used by psychologists to analyze individual human maturation than it is Darwin's model of the evolution of the species.

One of those who has viewed organizational development from a stage perspective is Seymour Sarason. Like Levinson, Sarason

warns against seeing the stages as being too "distinct, bounded and real"¹ for to do so would blind the analysts to "the possibility that issues and problems of a later stage were present in the minds of some in an earlier stage."² Taking a narrow perspective of the "stage" idea would be "to overemphasize the discontinuities and to underemphasize the continuities."³

Sarason found that most organizational development literature dealt with problems encountered by "mature" organizations. But these were, apparently, the survivors of a process of maturation which created a high rate of "infant mortality" among new organizations, or "new settings" as he calls them.⁴ Since the "problem of creating new settings" has not been formulated before, Sarason found that part of the difficulty in understanding was there was no language to describe it.

My major purpose...has been to suggest that the difficulty... is to an undetermined extent a consequence of the fact that we do not know how to think about or conceptualize the problem and we do not have available in our heads a set of conceptions telling us what we may expect and what we might do.⁵

¹Sarason, 1973, pg. 68.

²Ibid., pg. 68.

³Ibid.

⁴Sarason, 1973, pg. "New settings" is meant to cover a broader range of endeavors than those we normally call "organizational." His definition of the term is that a new setting is "any instance in which two or more people come together in a new relationship over a sustained period of time in order to achieve certain goals." Ibid., pg. 1. Sarason's examples run from a marriage to a revolution.

⁵Ibid., pg. 66.

In terms of strict chronology, Sarason is concerned with the following stages as they relate to the structural forces which threaten a new setting:

- o Gestation---this period includes all the activities, efforts conflicts, and compromises required to bring the new setting into being. Sarason calls this the pre-history of the new setting.
- o Starting Up---choosing a leader and core group to implement the activities of the new setting, and establishing roles and tasks.
- o Making the "Dream" of Social Change Real---there is often a "honeymoon" quality to the "Starting Up" stage, when this ends and the leader and the group take up their roles and tasks and do them, the setting moves into this stage.

Sarason stops at this point except to make some brief points about factors which bring on decline. We will extend the chronology; in Chapter 3 we will examine technical assistance projects and their periods of transition, which center around changeovers in leadership both within the aid agency and the university team. Moreover, we will be very concerned with endings. Few technical assistance projects last beyond four or five years. The entire concept of technical assistance presupposes that there is a finite life to the effort. The interpretation of project endings by aid agency and university field staff can have important effects for future new settings.¹ Both parties do draw conclusions about project performance and they have an impact on future AID-university projects.

¹I am grateful to Larry Stybel, a graduate school colleague, who helped me see endings as important events. His research into how one kind of ending, the firing a member of an organization, had future repercussions for the organization: those left in the organization would draw certain conclusions from the way the organization fired people (e.g., trust promotions and salary increases as evidence of your worth to the company, but pay no attention to verbal praise, because those fired always received plenty of that.)

We can organize Sarason's comments on the systematic threats to new settings around three topics: (1) views on the nature of social change, (2) perceptions of time relationships, that is, how the present relates to the past and the future, and (3) the problems and dilemmas of leadership.

Sarason argues that those who participate in new settings often make quite naive assumptions about the nature of social change. One assumption is that because a setting is new, a departure from the past, the environment is fully supportive or at least neutral. Sarason argues that those whose functions may be curtailed in order to create the new setting will not look on it favorably. Also, since resource scarcity is an endemic part of organizational life, other settings (new and old) will be competing for the resources allocated to the new setting.

In short, Sarason concludes:

...the before-the-beginning period contains organizational dynamics which tend to work against rather than for the new setting in the sense that its heritage is marked by conflict, real or potential.¹

Moreover, even if there is some understanding of the potential for conflict it is usually of only one kind:

...there is always a more or less dim awareness that there is a relevant history of past endeavors but largely in terms of ideas and values and not in terms of their development, organization, and problems.² (Emphasis Added)

¹Ibid., pg. 30.

²Ibid., pg. 35.

This denial of conflict in operating style and philosophy and in the selection of means to implement the agreed-upon values comes to be a denial of the positive value of conflict. And, if there are only negative consequences from conflict, then either the discussion of potential sources of conflict will be forbidden or the conflict will be resolved by compromising the differences away. The first course has the effect of repressing the development of conflict resolution measures that will get at the heart of the problem. The latter eliminates conflict by destroying those special qualities that made the new setting a departure from the old. Both "eliminate" the possibility for conflict and disorderliness, but both undermine the survival of the new setting in a form consistent with its original intention and purposes.

A second view of social change characteristic of new settings is the belief that the only barrier to significant change is the will and commitment of the participants to effect good ends. As Sarason puts it, this "sense of mission," leads those in new settings to believe that change is merely a matter of the proper motivation. In short, the assumption about change is that it can be brought about by proper personal attitude; this view shows little awareness of the webs of influence and power which can work against change and which require structural reform. This sense of mission has another undesirable aspect to it. It contains the view that the new setting is superior to the old ones; this assumption of superiority leads those in the

new setting to underestimate the power of the existing settings to constrain the new setting's sphere of action. Overall, the assumption here is that social change is easy.

Thirdly, the combination of this "sense of mission" and the idea that doing good for others is its own justification creates what Sarason calls "the myth of unlimited resources."¹ Both lead to the sense of superiority mentioned above. This seems to generate the belief that there can be no good reason for not providing all the resources needed to do the job. But what ought to be and what is are quite different:

...it is in the context of movement and social pressure in which having some, or more or even a lot of resources (such as money and people) is subtly transformed into a myth that one has enough resources.²

If resources never really match up to what is needed, then too expectations generated by the sense of mission, for something complete, something comprehensive, quickly outstrip the supply of resources. As before, there is a denial of the positive role of conflict, for that is what happens when resources are limited. Sarason makes the point that often creative, really new, solutions only come out of the drive to find alternatives which conserve resources without jettisoning the original purpose of the setting. In short, the lack of resources can force people to devise new, more efficient, even better ways of doing things.

¹Ibid., pg. 97-113.

²Ibid.,pg. 102.

Had the resources in fact been unlimited, these alternatives might never have been uncovered for the easiest course would have been to follow the most available alternative, the status quo.

The consequences of these views of a social change are to underestimate the difficulties of effecting change, to overestimate the extent of the control the new setting has over its environment and to avoid the establishment of mechanisms for conflict resolution, with the result that the conflicts are prepressed only to come out later in a more virulent form. In short, expectations are far out of line with reality and the actions based on such an imbalance can lead to the disintegration of the new setting.

It should be noted here that Robert Packenham in his analysis¹ of U.S. foreign aid doctrines¹ has found a set of attitudes towards social change which are quite similar to those Sarason found in new settings. He described these attitudes this way:

- o "Change and Development Are Easy"---The result of America's "unjustified optimism about the process of change and development and the impact the United States can have on that process."²
- o "All Good Things Go Together"---Essentially this is the belief that change in one direction always has positive effects on changes in other areas. Economic development would inevitably and naturally support political development. From this one could conclude that the best policy was a complete, "comprehensive" approach.³

¹ Packenham, 1973, pp. 111-160.

² Ibid., pg. 123.

³ Ibid., pp. 123-129.

- o "Radicalism and Revolution Are Always Bad"---The idea here was that conflict, violence and disorder were unnecessary for social change to take place and hence were always bad..¹

The implication of this similarity is that a technical assistance project, which lives in both the world of new settings and that of foreign aid, gets a double dose of this perspective on the nature of social change. The consequence is to make these views ever more difficult to challenge.

There is a second array of attitudes crucial to the creation of new settings: the perception of how the present is related to the future and linked to the past. First, there is the effect of having a timetable (either in people's heads or written into contracts and program documents):

...the existence of a fairly definite timetable can and usually does have an enormous influence on the beginning context...the feeling of pressure begins to build as it becomes apparent that the setting being created does not and cannot develop in a vacuum and is dependent upon ...a variety of other settings. The pressure is to 'get started' and to view anything before the 'beginning point' as merely secondary steps to a primary goal...²

This is also tied to a view of the future "vision of uninterrupted progress."³ The sense of mission and the myth of unlimited resources both reinforce and are reinforced by this idea of a trouble-free future. So the allure of "uninterrupted progress" and the pressure of organizing, acquiring resources and carrying on in the midst of the tensions of normal organizational life combine to drive out the

¹ Ibid., pp. 129-134.

² Ibid., pg. 62.

³ Ibid., pg. 111.

importance of the past:

The existence of a fairly definite timetable usually creates a present dominated and tyrannized by a future which, when it arrives, is not the one imagined.

The third, and final, set of attitudes Sarason discusses are ones towards leadership. One group of attitudes is an extension of some of those raised above; and Sarason categories them as the "leadership fantasy":

...the leadership fantasy, developed and nurtured over a period of years, centers primarily on the wish-fulfilling, pleasure-giving aspects. The fantasy does not contain, indeed cannot because it is a fantasy, the dilemmas, constraints difficulties, and any other negative but inevitable feature of leadership.²

The essence of this "fantasy" is the absence of conflict. One result is that the leader develops what Sarason calls "the myth of an unhampered context:" future is not constrained by the past and the future is trouble free. The view is alleged to be similar to the relationship of an artist to his materials: "...the setting (like the artist's materials) is passive, malleable and at the service of the leader (artist)"³

This control over the environment extends to those elements in the past Sarason has labelled, prehistory. Nowhere is there any

¹ Ibid., pg. 62-63.

² Ibid., pg. 189.

³ Ibid., pg. 191.

questioning of the idea that the new setting will be successful, complete.¹ If there are any threats which must be recognized and dealt with they are linked to personality not structural problems; Sarason gives us an example of a man about to take over a school principalship:

...he tended to view this (the problems of his new job) in personality terms; that is, most principals were rigid, authoritarian, and resistant to change and innovation. Although he may have understood in some abstract sense that part of the problems inhered in history and traditions as well as in the consequences of a hierarchically and centrally organized structure, in practice he viewed the problems as solely a manifestation of clashes in temperament and thinking between individuals.²

Another aspect of the leader's responsibility is also presumed to be conflict free---the selection of the core group to run the setting and their subsequent leader-core group interpersonal relationships. The leader comes to have "his picture of a happy organizational family in agreement from the beginning with the leader's values, goals and styles."³---a view at considerable odds with the usual reality of a project after the honeymoon period.

Sarason argues that the problem arises first when the leader goes to select his core group:

...the emphasis (is) placed on the formal task and the purposes of the setting. That is to say, there is a match between what needs to be done and what the individual can do. This

¹Ibid., pg. 13.

²Ibid., pg. 51.

³Ibid., pg. 192.

would be a reasonable enough answer except that it ignores the fact that the individual and the leaders will be in for what is for them a new relationship, one that involves far more than is covered in the term doing the job. (Emphasis in the original)¹

The problem is that the issues raised by a complete examination of the depth of interpersonal connection the leader and the core group members will feel once in the setting are "not even posed because they were experienced as personal, conflictful, unpolitic and unanswerable except by time."² Some of the issues are:

Whether or not they (leader and core group member) can live together, whether or not their styles are congruent, whether or not their personal needs and goals clash---they are not questions contained in the answers which leaders give about why a person was hired.³

How does this happen? Usually the sense of mission and momentum are such that people assume if they agree on basic goals they will be able to work together. But, the avoidance of conflict, which can be foreseen and the results of which are predictable, is as understandable as it is disastrous to the new setting. Silence on this issue leaves the actors no constructive way of handling the natural tensions between different styles, needs and goals means the conflict will erupt in the worse possible way, when emotions are high and reflective thinking is low.

Finally, after the core group has been working for awhile , a new

¹ Ibid., pg. 73.

² Ibid., pg. 73.

³ Ibid.

set of issues arises. First of all the roles originally set out in the plans for the setting may not be appropriate.

...the basis on which he (the leader) attracts core members emphasizes definiteness rather than tentativeness of structure. The leader and prospective core member both accept the concept of specialization of function and this works against rather than for a commitment to tentativeness of function and role... The important fact is that the setting is created as if it will function the way planned and there is no discussion of, or vehicles developed for, how to think about, become sensitive to and be prepared for the necessity to change.¹

Even if the roles are appropriate (or are changing in a constructive manner), the core group members begin to develop their own working styles and professional contacts. They begin to move away from that initial we-are-all-in-this-together feeling. As this happens, the leader begins to feel control slipping away. He feels isolated. But the leadership fantasy does not permit him to express his inner tensions and worries of possible failure. The tendency is for the leader to expect total honesty and loyalty from the core group but not reciprocate. This only results in less control as core group members draw back from this unequal situation. Disputes arise and they are seen as being mostly of the "personality clash" variety. No distinction is made between personality differences and those Sarason calls "conceptual" that is structural, explanations of conflict; but then, "it is far easier to see personality differences than to hear the conceptual ones."² Without a mechanism for sorting out these two

¹Ibid., pp. 151 and 152.

²Ibid. pg. 226.

different explanations for conflict and for resolving these issues identified, the new setting can descend into win/lose games where the various participants choose sides and the original task becomes subsidiary to the games.

What then can be done to insure new settings against the various pressures they face? Sarason offers the following observation:

The fact of the matter is that agreement on values may be a necessary condition but it is far from being a sufficient condition. Beyond values the creation of settings involves... substantive knowledge, a historical stance, a realistic time perspective, vehicles of criticism, and the necessity for and the evils of leadership. The creation of settings is not an engineering or technological task. It is also not one that can be accomplished by simply having appropriate or strong motivation.¹

In the next section, we will examine a new way of looking at organizational learning and barriers to it.

¹Ibid. pg. 6.

CHAPTER 7 : LESSONS FOR EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
FROM THE CASE STUDIES (PERU, THAILAND, TURKEY) OF
AID-UNIVERSITY PROJECTS IN EDUCATIONAL PLANNING

In reviewing case studies, drawing generalizations, especially ones which aim to improve practical affairs, must be considered a perilous endeavor. Still, if we are to learn from complex interactions such as those described in the three case studies, we must try. The lessons from these cases will be presented under the two headings used at the end of the cases: "educational planning" and "the conduct of a technical assistance project."

A. Educational Planning

1. To be successful, an educational planning unit must find the proper balance between two major tasks: the technical tasks of producing well-crafted research and planning studies and the organizational tasks of building and sustaining institutional viability and credibility. Where there is no past history of systematic educational planning, educational planners are faced with a whole host of analytical difficulties which require their technical expertise if planning is to proceed. The problems are important ones, and their solution is the professional task the planners see as their primary duty. However, concentration on the analytical and technical aspects of planning often results in the neglect of a key element: the establishment of the planning unit's credibility with officials in the Ministry of Education and in outside agencies which influence educational policy. The Educational Planning Office (EPO) in Thailand had this problem. The initial activities of the EPO and the MSU/Thailand team were so concentrated on the technical aspects of completing the Secondary Education Study (SES) that little attention was paid to establishing EPO's credibility as an organization which could produce like studies on a

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continuing basis. The staff of the NEDB (National Economic Development Board), not the EPO, was the organization which gained the most in terms of improved planning skills from the SES. Moreover, despite the usefulness of the SES to MOE officials in secondary education, these officials did not perceive EPO as the organization responsible for producing the SES. EPO was never able to establish itself as an organization whose planning skills were valued and whose participation in making educational policy was seen as vital. The EPO had great difficulty in gaining its own charter as a government unit and hence in having its own budget. EPO's impotence was particularly evident when all of elementary education was removed from its jurisdiction half way through the MSU/Thailand project.

In contrast, the development of the educational planning unit (the PAKD) in Turkey showed how careful use of the planning unit's analytical capacity, combined with a skillful institution-building strategy, can make a planning unit a potent force in policy-making. Mr. Karcioglu, the head of the PAKD, was quite aware of the administrative fragmentation in educational policy-making and understood how such fragmentation created bureaucratic rivalries which might threaten efforts to build a credible planning unit. He was also aware of the influence of politics and careful to include political realities in developing the planning unit, as was exemplified by his permitting all Turks, not just those already proficient in English, to take the qualifying exam for USAID scholarships in educational planning. An unwillingness to bend to such organizational and political forces could have seriously damaged the possibilities for doing the technical tasks of planning.

2. The absence or presence of an educational reform can and does have a

significant effect on how a planning unit balances its technical tasks and its institution-building ones.

o During an educational reform, the balance between technical tasks and institution-building tasks is likely to be skewed in favor of the former. Planners are expected to serve the purposes of the reform by carrying out the technical and analytical studies requested by policy-makers. Questions of building institutional credibility are often neglected because the political power animating the reform provides the planners with a temporary credibility. The danger, however, is that the planners will mistake this temporary credibility for a more permanent one. But, when the reform slows down and the political power behind it dissipates, the planning unit will face much of the same kind of administrative fragmentation and bureaucratic rivalry that existed before the reform. Strong institutional patterns will re-assert themselves, and if the planners have not used the reform period to prepare for this, they will have a real struggle to maintain their organization's credibility. In Turkey, Mr. Karcioğlu's institution-building efforts were sensitive to the possibilities of the 1971 educational reform. He was able to expand his unit's role from one of providing useful information to one of doing policy studies for the leaders of the reform. The planning staff acquired new skills and a reputation as an organization capable of producing high quality work. In Thailand, as noted above, the Educational Planning Office was unable to translate the modest reform effort of the Secondary Education Study (SES) into either increased staff skills or into credibility for the unit as a whole. Its participation in SES was not part of a larger institution-building effort.

o In the absence of an educational reform, the demand for policy studies is not urgent and there is little natural impetus for overcoming the organizational fragmentation and rivalries which hinder educational planning efforts. Instead of pressure from the top for policy studies, the line agencies of MOE usually become the main consumer of the planning unit's work. Without the temporary power which comes from serving as a staff agency for reform leaders, the planning unit must develop its own resources and credibility. If an educational planning unit is to have an important role in influencing MOE policy, institution-building must be a key activity. The main elements of this approach are set out below.

3. Successful institution-building requires that educational planning units undertake four major tasks: (a) choose a strong leader(s), (b) develop a clientele for the planning unit's services both within the Ministry of Education and with outside agencies, (c) train and develop a skilled technical and administrative staff, and (d) build the organizational capacity to deliver a useful product. While there is no prescribed order for doing these institution-building activities, indeed most will have to be done concurrently, it is hard to imagine how they can be done successfully without strong leadership at the start.

o Choosing a leader. A comparison of actions of the heads of the educational planning units in the three cases, Dr. Salazar Romero in Peru, Dr. Kav in Thailand and Mr. Karcioğlu in Turkey demonstrate the critical importance of the leader in building a planning organization. Before a project is initiated, the leadership of the planning unit must be carefully scrutinized. If this had been done in Peru, USAID/Peru might have seen that Dr. Salazar was much more

interested in a large educational loan than he was in technical assistance in education or in institutionalizing a more systematic form of planning. The transfer of Dr. Sayres and Dr. Cornehlis to other government programs (CRECER and INP) suggested that Dr. Salazar was more an obstacle than a facilitator of planning. Dr. Kaw was perceived as a strong leader. However, his leadership was directed towards coordinating educational development for Southeast Asian countries, not towards institutionalizing educational planning for the Thai secondary and elementary educational system. Only Mr. Karcioğlu evidenced the drive to build a planning organization.

6. Developing a clientele. For an organization to establish itself as viable and credible, it must persuade others of the value of the function it performs or of the services it delivers. A planning unit is a staff agency and, unlike a line division, does not have its own natural constituency. In a Ministry of Education, for example, a secondary education division has a natural constituency of secondary school teachers, administrators, students and parents as well as those who provide them with the educational and administrative materials necessary for their work. The planning unit must develop its own clientele.

In some cases, the planners must establish links with agencies outside the Ministry of Education. In Turkey, for instance, the educational planning unit, the PAKD, was confronted with two powerful competitors for planning leadership -- the National Board of Education and the MOE Department of Technical and Vocational Education. It avoided any direct challenge to these two organizations, performed various information-gathering tasks for the Minister and built strong links to the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Ministry

of Finance (MOF). These external connections made the PAKD less vulnerable to any line agency resistance by giving the PAKD resources with which to bargain. Also, PAKD's performance of its planning and budget duties for the SPO and the MOF gave it a credibility which led to its important role as a staff unit for the task forces of the 1971 educational reform. As a result of its service to the reform, the PAKD gained an expanded role in the planning of MOE activities. The PAKD's use of its strong ties to outside agencies permitted it to survive and then to enlarge the scope of its activities. The PAKD shows the importance of understanding how to appeal to different clienteles at different times.

The experience of the National Education Council (NEC) in Thailand demonstrates another pattern. The NEC was faced by considerable resistance from the universities it was chartered to serve. Universities wanted to protect their autonomy and were fearful that too close association with the NEC would jeopardize that autonomy. However, the NEC broke down these barriers by helping universities solve problems particularly troublesome to them. In one instance the NEC assisted a Thai university in analyzing the distribution of the teaching load of the faculty so that faculty might be more effectively used. Also, through the Michigan State University project, NEC and university staff travelled together on tours of the U.S. and, upon their return, established working groups to address specific university problems of concern to all. In short, the NEC had to perform directly useful services for their client so that their role as a service unit would be credible. The elimination of the barriers to a working relationship between the NEC and Thai universities then

left the NEC in a position to help alleviate the larger problems of duplication and waste in the university system.

Decision about who the clientele is, how the planning unit's clientele can best be served and how that clientele might change over time are crucial to an organization's institution-building activities. It is based upon these decisions that an organization shapes the staff it chooses and trains and organizes itself in a particular fashion.

o Developing a skilled technical staff. If a planning unit is to meet the needs of its clientele for sound analytical work, it must have a staff with adequate technical training. Often this requires overseas training which is costly and can take several years. There is the additional cost that such training removes skilled manpower, which is very short supply, for the length of the training period. Moreover, upon return, trainees need considerable on-the-job experience to season their technical knowledge. In short, staff training represents an investment aimed at long-term organization development. Indeed, the existence of a strong training program for educational planners usually indicates a government commitment to institutionalizing the planning function.

In Peru, Dr. Salazar's benign neglect of the planning function was reflected in the lack of training specifically for educational planners. In Thailand, the Educational Planning Office did not have a program to train core staff, as did the Turkish educational planning unit. In Turkey, Mr. Karciolgu invested in such a training program for key staff whose subsequent increased professional competence led to an expansion of the credibility and influence

of the planning unit as a whole.

o Developing an organizational capacity to deliver a valuable product.

The existence of a technically proficient staff is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for building a viable and successful planning unit. A good leader and a qualified staff must be able to orchestrate the operation of all parts of the planning organization so that it is able to produce a valuable product on a continuing basis. This requires the establishment of routines and procedures to insure the smooth operation of the organization even when personnel change. The various functions a planning unit must perform (e.g., data collection, computer processing, analysis and policy studies) must be integrated so that the product promised is, in fact, delivered. In short, the leaders of a planning unit must be good managers if the unit's technical abilities are to play a part in educational policy-making.

In Turkey, Mr. Karcioğlu was not only adept at connecting the planning unit (the PAKD) to powerful outside supporters but also was able to coordinate the planning unit's activities and motivate his staff. As a result, the PAKD became known as an organization other agencies could count on to produce useful studies. Moreover, he was able to train his top staff so they could continue PAKD after he had left for another position. In Thailand's EPO, the top leadership was involved in regional educational affairs and was not interested in coordinating EPO's effort at planning Thai elementary and secondary education. The obvious result was that EPO lacked credibility in the MOE.

4. Evaluate carefully the influence of host-country attitudes towards advisors in general and U.S. advisors in particular. Peruvians, Thais, and Turks

all had quite different attitudes about the role of a foreign advisor and about U.S. advisors. In each case, these attitudes affected the degree to which the technical assistance team could institutionalize planning. In Peru, Ministry of Public Education (MEP) attitudes towards U.S. advisors were strongly influenced by the experience with SECPANE, the education servicio. Further, the attitudes of Planning Director, Dr. Salazar, and other MEP officials towards the TCCU team were shaped by the original expectation that the MEP would receive a large loan and no advisors, rather than many advisors and no loan. As a result, the opportunity to do educational planning under Dr. Salazar was confined to those instances in which planning might lead to a large educational loan (e.g., the IBRD loan proposal). In Thailand, officials wanted their U.S. advisors to be out front and used them to achieve policy reform (e.g., in secondary education). In Turkey, the opposite was true: attitudes towards Americans and towards foreign advisors were so negative that to be effective the technical assistance team had to be willing and able to adopt a low profile.

The Turkey case was an example where the AID mission should have explored host country attitudes towards advisors more thoroughly. AID and MSU negotiated with Turkish officials for three years and still drew up a contract for a fairly sizeable, and hence visible, field team of five foreign advisors. Moreover, the contract called for a considerable influx of short-term MSU advisors. As the project progressed, the MSU team learned how important a low-profile style was and used this style to good effect. But, AID officials at the mission level should have had enough experience in the culture to foresee this problem and head it off.

5. The relationship between research (knowledge), planning (setting out possible future courses of action), and program implementation (action) has several dimensions which deserve close attention.

o All parties involved in establishing an educational planning unit should develop common understandings of the terms "research" and "planning"; without such agreement, there is likely to be confusion and conflict. In the TCCU/Peru case (see pages 124-125), there were seven different definitions of educational planning in use. In the MSU/Thailand case (see page 100), four quite different activities went under the title of "research." The variety of activities which can be included under either of these terms is substantial. Without close attention to what the terms mean operationally, technical assistance officials, university advisors and host country officials may have quite different activities in mind. The result can be a real muddle.

o The underlying nature of the activities of research, planning and program implementation is different. Research involves an effort to understand how the educational system works, how it changes and what are its most significant problems. The focus is on empirical data on the system and on the problems of that system. Planning attempts to project possible future courses for the educational system based on how the system works and the availability of needed resources. Program implementation moves beyond the proposing stage to the action stage; here the investigations of the researchers and the prescriptions of the planners are subjected to reality.

It is argued that to be successful, a planning unit must be able to link its activities "backward" to research knowledge and "forward" to program implementation. Certainly this is the ideal. But, the task is a difficult one:

Research, planning and program implementation are not only different types of activities, but they are also activities which are conducted by different organizational entities. These different organizational entities often define what they do in ways that make it difficult to link up their activities.

In Peru, TCCU originally proposed establishing an educational research unit which would do "basic" research in education and be independent of the Ministry of Education. Later, the TCCU Chief of Party argued that the research effort should be associated with the MEP's Division of Planning under Dr. Salazar's direction. The creation in 1967 of a center for educational research (the CIP) did put this unit under Dr. Salazar's planning division. But it never did more than piecemeal studies of isolated problems or aspects of Peruvian education. The unwillingness of the MEP and Dr. Salazar to provide the necessary staff and budget indicated a de facto rejection by the MEP and Dr. Salazar of this kind of research effort. It is possible that an independent research unit would have been interpreted as a threat to the planning unit Dr. Salazar headed.

In Turkey, the research unit was also a part of the educational planning agency (the PAKD). However, there it was an integral part of the planning effort. The research division of the PAKD focused on topics of direct relevance to the planning process and to the concerns of the planners. It did not undertake long-range, academic studies of basic educational problems or processes. But neither was it expected to provide quick, accurate operational data for day to day use by top decision-makers. The PAKD's research unit seemed to be integrated into its operations because it had evolved and matured with

the PAKD as it moved from being an information-gathering body to a ministry-wide planning agency. In Peru, the CIP had been grafted onto an unwilling MEP Planning Division and never became part of the planning process.

6. Planning units wishing to expand their role in and influence on educational policy-making cannot rely solely on increasing their analytical capacity; they must also find ways of increasing their power vis-a-vis the line divisions of MOE. At the beginning, most planning units have little autonomous power or control of their own. Often, they merely provide information to line units of the MOE. Their very survival depends on their ability to meet line divisions' requests. This is the way the PAKD in Turkey began. The next higher level of control would have the planning unit serving as a coordinator of different groups within the MOE. This might be for the purpose of avoiding waste and duplication among them. Here the planning unit would not be dependent on the line units; instead, they would exercise mutual influence, as was the case with the NEC staff planners and Thai university officials. Finally, there is a third level of control where the power lies predominately with the planning unit. Here the planning unit is able to see that its view prevails most of the time in disputes with line divisions of MOE. This could be called a "command" type of control.

As a planning unit moves from one level to a higher one, it does not necessarily lose the role it had at the lower level(s) of control. That is, the planning agency which exercises command type of control may still have a sub-division which provides line units in MOE with very much needed statistical and analytical services. The information-gathering role and the coordinator role can, and often do, co-exist with the command role. The difference is

that the planning unit which has command type of control can itself decide which services it will provide to the line agencies, whereas, when it is at the information-gathering stage, it is the line agencies which control the agenda.

But, what does a planning unit do to increase its power and control? It can improve its technical staff so that it is better able to produce analytical services for its clientele. This in itself is seldom sufficient. The planning unit can attract the support and assistance of powerful figures in the MOE and of important agencies outside the MOE. These supporters can ward off competitors and, through their own power provide the planning agency with opportunity to take on new roles of increased importance. Finally, jurisdiction over the ministry-wide budgeting process seems to be a critical way for a planning agency to increase its power and control.

The PAKD is an example of an educational planning agency which used all three of the above strategies in increasing its position from information-gatherer to central forum for planning and policy-making. The PAKD improved its technical staff through training. Its alliance with the State Planning Office and the Ministry of Finance provided it with protection from its enemies and with an opportunity to serve top level decision-makers during the 1971 educational reform.

But why is the budgeting process so important? First, it is important in itself: it allocates scarce resources. When the planning agency has jurisdiction over this process it has some influence over priorities within line divisions and between them. However, it does not provide the planners with an

outright ability to dictate the programs line agencies will undertake; but, it does provide them with bargaining chips. In the PAKD's case, the supervision of the budget process within the MOE was strengthened by PAKD's status as the handpicked representative of the Ministry of Finance, the arbiter of all budget and finance matters. Moreover, the PAKD was also the representative for the State Planning Office (SPO) in the MOE and as such was responsible for coordinating and monitoring planning activities for all divisions of MOE. PAKD was in an enviable position for it had influence over both programmatic directions (through the planning process) and future resource availability (via the budgeting process).

In Thailand, the situation was quite different. The Educational Planning Office (EPO), in its first study the Secondary Education Study, tried to assume the role of a coordinating or command type of planning unit. But it had no past history of having developed credibility with line divisions in MOE. In addition, EPO had no control over the budget process; officials in Thai MOE line divisions went directly to the Budget Bureau for their yearly allocations. Finally, EPO's ties to the national planners (the National Economic Development Board) were not nearly as strong as PAKD's to the SPO. The EPO never was able to acquire the kind of bargaining chips PAKD had as a result of its external ties and its prominence in the budget process.

B. The Conduct of a Technical Assistance Project

1. Keep the technical assistance project from becoming too complex at the beginning. Keep the technical assistance team small at first and add staff gradually. As the TCCU/Peru case illustrated, just the logistics of putting

seven to ten people in the field was difficult enough; it was made all the more complex by having such a large team all trying to carve out roles to play and establish good relations with their counterparts. These two processes are most difficult at the start of a project when there is the most ambiguity about what the technical assistance contract means. Translating the contract into reality is made difficult by having so many potential translators. It is much easier to add team members later, when the technical assistance team leadership and their counterparts have had the chance to pare down their original expectations to the possible. At that point the project structure is more certain, and new personnel can be integrated with more ease than at the beginning.

The composition of the team, whether or not field staff were regular faculty members of the university contractor, and the language ability of the team members can also complicate the management of the technical assistance project at its start. MSU selected all its field staff from its regular faculty. In most cases, they had worked with each other before the project started. Also, they each had secure positions to return to when their tour of duty on the project was over. This was in contrast to the TCCU/Peru situation. There the team was drawn from outside TCCU for the most part. The team had to develop cohesion at the very time it was faced with the uncertainties of defining roles and establishing close relations with counterparts. Those who were not regular TCCU faculty had to begin looking for their next appointment early in their tour of duty, for they were only under contract for one and a half to two years.

In those cases in which facility in the host country language is expected,

as it was in Spanish-speaking Peru, the lack of such a facility is a serious barrier to good relations and compounds the other difficulties inherent in initiating a technical assistance project. In the Peru case, it was particularly unfortunate that Chief of Party Brunstetter was not fluent in Spanish. It hampered his ability to communicate directly with Peruvian officials and increased the possibility for misunderstanding and miscalculation. It also confirmed Dr. Salazar's view that, if U.S. advisors really saw Peruvians as equals, they would have learned Spanish before they arrived. In Thailand and Turkey, there was no expectation that U.S. advisors would speak the local languages, which are not major regional languages as Spanish is. Still, the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation existed in Thailand and Turkey for first-class translators are hard to find, and even Thais and Turks trained in the U.S. could misinterpret what their U.S. counterparts said. Problems of this sort can only be headed off by constant checking and re-checking by the U.S. technical advisors to see that their statements and proposals are understood and that they understand their counterparts' responses.

2. Review AID and University team views on how to conduct technical assistance, how to do educational planning, and how to institutionalize educational planning. Differences should be made clear and resolved earlier rather than later. In both the Thailand and Turkey cases, AID and university personnel worked together on a task directly related to the subsequent contract between them. This helped AID officials to observe for themselves how the university staff approached technical assistance, educational planning and institution-building. In Thailand, Dr. Brembeck's participation in the Joint U.S.-Thai

Task Force assessment of manpower and education permitted AID and MSU to work out a common understanding of how to conduct the MSU/Thailand project. The lengthy three-year negotiation process between AID, MSU and Turkish officials served the same function. The consequences of not operating this way was well demonstrated by the TCCU/Peru experience. Dr. Brunstetter and USAID/Peru Mission Director Culbertson did not work together prior to the TCCU project. Subsequently, serious disagreements between AID and Brunstetter developed, as Leavitt, Sayres and Culbertson have described. The appointment of Dr. Ralph Fields as TCCU Chief of Party replacing Dr. Brunstetter, seemed to resolve these differences as Dr. Field's approach was more in line with AID's. A more intensive exploration of these differences of leadership style and approach to technical assistance at the start might have avoided the disruptive effects of the AID-Brunstetter conflict.

But, this did not happen. Both AID and TCCU were in a hurry to get the project going and the sense of "mission" of all parties was high; raising issues of a divisive character might have seemed out of place. As a result, danger signals were never raised and the subsequent conflict dragged out over a considerable time with negative consequences for the project.

3. Re-assess the effects of the programming cycle and devise new criteria for evaluating the performance of technical assistance teams. AID programming instruments assume that the technical assistance team has much more control over international and domestic events and over the actions of their counterparts than is usually the case. When such events cause delays or disagreements, the targets set out in program documents are also delayed and consequently the performance of the technical assistance team is questioned. AID program evaluation

procedures provide little or no credit for coping with and learning from the events which delay or stop the team from meeting agreed-upon targets. The evaluation process should include explicit references to both. The obstacle to implementing reforms of this nature is that AID places a premium on the ability to obligate funds for new projects; it does not place the same priority on evaluating projects and learning from experience.

A key assumption of the AID programming process is that the decision to continue or discontinue project funding is based on the intrinsic merits of the project, i.e., whether or not a project is producing what it promised to produce. But, this assumption often does not hold. A project can be cut back or eliminated by AID because of a shift in internal mission policy (e.g., USOM/Thailand shift to rural development and internal security programs) or because of changes in U.S. foreign policy (e.g., U.S. policy toward Turkey after the Cyprus invasion, the IMF limitation on aid to Peru because of the instability of its currency and U.S. aid restrictions tied to the IPC controversy).

The consequence of justifying the termination of a project on its merits when the real reason is shifting mission or U.S. foreign policy is serious. AID must dwell on the project's failures in order to justify the termination, just as it had to overplay the virtues of the project to get it funded. This "battering" of a project's performance leaves the technical assistance team angry (e.g. MSU/Turkey team) at what it perceives to be AID's lack of appreciation of the difficulty of its task. Worse, it leads AID to ignore the partial or incomplete successes of a project with the consequence that many valuable lessons of experience are lost.

As in the case of the failure to value learning outcomes and reward coping strategies, the learning of the project failures rather than its successes, would require a significant alteration in the usual style of doing business. Could or would AID be willing to share with contract teams the pressures it was under to support rural development at the expense of education and population control? If they did, how would contract teams react to having their program cut back or eliminated because of such changes in mission priorities? These are difficult questions to answer, but at least the accent would be on learning from both the positive and negative aspects of project performance rather than stressing only the negative ones.

Finally, AID should accommodate its programming process so that host country officials can participate. As the MSU/Turkey and TCCU/Peru teams indicated, AID and their host country counterparts did not understand the bureaucratic environment of the other. As a result, they could not understand the effect of that environment on the other's actions. The technical assistance team was often caught in-between. In Turkey, AID did not understand PAKD's political decision to remove the English language requirement; the PAKD was not able to understand the kind of information AID needed to put in its program documents if it was to be able to continue the NERP project. The MSU/Turkey team was caught in the middle trying to interpret PAKD actions to AID and vice-versa. If AID and the host country officials worked together on programming documents central to their joint undertakings, perhaps each would have a more realistic appreciation of the constraints under which the other part operated. This might lead to more realistic expectations and joint

proposals which were more acceptable in both parties' environment.

4. A high turnover of AID field staff has a negative effect on technical assistance efforts and should be kept to a minimum. At the level of AID project manager, high turnover means that new project managers, who have no strong stake in projects already funded, may have little empathy for the difficulties project staff have to deal with. Certainly MSU/Turkey staff felt this was the case when a whole new group of field staff arrived mid-way through their project. This situation is not likely to get better later on since a new AID field official stands to gain the more from starting up new projects which demonstrate his ability to program and fund activities, than from supervision of a project started by someone else.

The mobility of top mission staff, such as the mission director, poses another difficulty. A new mission director, just like his subordinates, wants to put his mark on the development program of the country he is in. This often means a change in the relative priorities in a mission. For example, in Peru new mission leadership came to favor higher education over secondary/elementary education. In Thailand, a new mission director increased emphasis on programs with direct contributions to increased security; this meant more money for rural development and less for education.

In short, rapid personnel turnover creates a high degree of uncertainty in the environment of technical assistance projects. Projects approved and valued on one set of criteria find the whole basis of their project questioned when personnel in a mission frequently change. The result is that the project team must spend much time and effort justifying the existence of a project which

had full mission support until the change in personnel. The conduct of project activities and the morale of the technical assistance team suffer considerably in the process.

In recent years, the standard AID tour has been increased from two years to three and sometimes four years. This is an important improvement. But, to the extent that staff do move more frequently, the problems remain.

A Final Comment

None of the ten "lessons" to be learned from the three case studies of technical assistance for educational planning are particularly surprising. The literature on technical assistance and on AID-university relations contains similar suggestions. This raises the question of what it is that causes these lessons to remain unlearned. Perhaps the problem here is the very nature of the AID approach to technical assistance. In order to satisfy Congress that AID programs deserve support, AID must promise important results within a specific time period. If AID must curry favor for its programs by promising more results, or the same results in a shorter time, then it often must assume it has more control over events and people than it really does. Overestimating the amount of control can lead AID to promise that it will produce more change in a specified time period than it can deliver. Both assumptions lead to a gap between AID expectations and what can realistically be accomplished. When there is a failure to accomplish agreed-upon goals, the blame comes to rest on the technical assistance team's performance or on the inadequacy of host country efforts. It is time for a thorough review and revision of AID's own model for planning, programming and evaluating technical assistance projects. It may be

that the source for many of the problems of technical assistance lies in AID's operating assumptions about the extent of its control over people, institutions and the pace of change.