PN-ABC-093

Assessment of the Management of the Sahel Development Program

March 1984

Prepared by

Sahel Management Assessment Team
(SMAT)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Sahel Development Program (SDP)

> "As a result of the special needs of the countries in the Sahel and the unique coordinating mechanism that is planning the development strategy for the region, this program affords an unusual opportunity to test a new model for development coordination. Because of the special character of this multilateral undertaking, some flexibility may be necessary in the administration of this program."
> (Legislative History, Development and Food Act, Public Law 95-88, Section 115).

At the initiative of the United States and France in 1975, a Club of the Friends of the Sahel (The Club) and the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) were brought together in a "unique coordinating mechanism." The eight-member regional organization and some 18 major western donors launched a collaborative planning and implementation endeavor in support of the Sahel Development Program. The Program's aims were fundamental: increase "food-self sufficiency;" improve "living standards of the poor;" and increase "economic growth and development" across the region. In May 1977, CILSS and Club representatives convened in Ottawa and reviewed and approved "the overall development strategy," hearalding it as a "contract for a generation; "i.e., assure major accomplishments by the year 2000."

The 1977 legislation laid the foundation for a variety of departures from traditional U.S. (i.e., AID) approaches to development. These rested essentially on the ideas that:

- -- an indigenous regional organization (CILSS) was pledged to pursue its own development path;
- -- a comprehensive, long-term development program was necessary for the region;
- -- planning and support for the organization would be undertaken by the Club du Sahel.

The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) pursued its efforts from September 1983 through March 1984 with the firm conviction that AID had not seized opportunities authorized at the inception of the SDP. SMAT did not seek to nail down the whys and wherefors of such omissions, but rather to formulate recommendations calculated to buttress AID's Bureau for Africa in endeavors to improve the management of the resources authorized and appropriated for the Program. The

range of flexibility afforded decision-makers and managers for bringing about measurable and recognizable change can be seen in the framework laid out for the SDP in the enabling legislation:

a. guidelines applicable to uses of other development assistance funds could be modified;

b. The U.S. burden would be shared equitably with other donors (normally 15% of the total annual contributions);

c. special account would be taken to:

   -- promote ecological balance;
   -- develop an effective infrastructure, including transportation;

d. major infrastructure projects would be necessary, such as irrigation and electric power in pursuit of higher grain yields, protection against erratic rainfall, and overall development

e. amounts appropriated would remain available until expended;

f. donors should expect to finance some local recurrent costs, given the drought's devastating effects, persistent high food and oil prices, and fall-off in prices for exported primary commodities;

g. regional standardization of equipment (along with use and maintenance) should be the result of flexible policies achieved through donor (including U.S.) coordination;

h. annual reports would discuss the allocation of U.S. as well as other donor contributions, assess The Club's effectiveness as a model for development, and cover progress toward achievement of combined Sahelian-donor Program objectives.

NOTE: A summary discussion of the Legislative History appears in the Appendix. Underlining was added by SMAT to emphasize those topics covered in the Management Assessment.

* * * * * *

Sahel Development Program - Concept, Strategy, and Organization

Although some progress has been achieved in Sahel regional institution building, donor collaboration,and governmental readiness to make important policy changes, the pace of improvement continues to be slow in rates of production and living conditions. The likelihood of ultimate success by the turn of the century will be enhanced by staying the course with the other donors and the Sahelian organizations cooerating to make the Sahel concept a reality.

AID's strategy must focus more on visible, high impact activities, such as infrastructure needs; e.g., road repair and maintenance, irrigation, most appropriately through turn-key contracts. While some institution building and research is necessary, attention must shift to more rapid resource flows, and ameliorating human resource constraints. Both are possible via the turn-key route which can provide in-country training and OPEX technicians/trainers. Program assistance to support policy change is recommended where governments have the requisite sophistication in institutions and personnel.

All SDP management components should be consolidated in the field under a Coordinator headquartered in Dakar and provided with delegated authority leaving minimum dependence on AID Washington. Shortened communications lines can mean better coordination and planning through face-to-face discussions. Managers can reconcile differences and make decisions more rapidly. Having all "team" members share the same social and physical environments in which they must succeed can enhance the spirit of cooperation.

Program Management

The principal contributors to program management problems in the Sahel, other than those related to program content, have been:

1. Agency efforts to obligate large amounts of money for too great a number and variety of activities, using methods (e.g., host country contracting) unsuitable for the Sahelian environment, i.e., an extreme shortage of personnel with technical, and more importantly, management skills;

2. U.S. AID missions and offices were not staffed with adequate numbers of experienced and qualified personnel;

3. The Africa Bureau did not respond forcefully and effectively when the danger signals began to appear (e.g., in evaluations, audits, consistently tardy actions, etc.); and

4. Other Agency offices were generally unwilling or unable to give Sahel missions the priority they needed;

5. Inadequate administrative and logistical support.

The result of the foregoing factors was missions overloaded with too many activities, a large portion too complicated for rapid implementation even in a more favorable environent, and missions fell and remained continually behind the curve. Even as missions have become more fully staffed (in numbers), the obligation pressures have been maintained and a sizable workload has been added just to respond to the critical evaluations and audits and the resulting additional reporting, e.g., Section 121(d).

Because senior managers have generally had no management training and only limited experience in management roles (generally none in the Sahel), and their staffs are relatively inexperienced, most missions are still doing only what is essential for day-to-day operations. They are not able to devote adequate time to planning, working with counterparts, coordinating with other donors, carrying on (or even planning) needed policy dialogue with host government officials, re-designing or re-orienting on-going projects, conducting workshops or seminars that could facilitate the integration of lessons learned, sharing experiences from elsewhere in the Sahel, and building good relationships with counterparts and other donors. Innovative development management may produce economies as a result of region-wide contracting for both management and program goods and services and standardization of equipment and vehicles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the action oriented documents that SMAT has produced, there follows a list of its principal recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

AA/AFR re-affirm the continuing validity of the SDP concept, and AID's commitment to that concept, by approving statements to that effect in the forthcoming annual SDP report to The Congress (Attachment A), in testimony before the Congress, and in deliberations with other executive agencies (State, OMB).

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

AA/AFR approve the cable in Attachment B which requests comments and suggestions from USAIDs Niamey, Banjul and Ouagadougou, and the OECD/Club see omission review and update of the overall Sahel strategy.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

The Director, SWA, initiate for the approval of the AID Administrator, an Action Memorandum authorizing the use of "no year" funding authority in the management of the Operational Year Budget in the Sahel.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

That the AA/AFR instruct the Director, SWA, to initiate necessary action to modify Sahel strategy guidance so that the functional area framework (of development assistance legislation -- FAA Section 103-106) need not be stringently applied in Sahelian regional and bilateral programs.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5

AA/AFR adopt and approve the establishment of a coordinating office located in the field with full delegation of authority to implement and manage the Sahel Program.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

AA/AFR establish a task force under the direction of _____(fill in name) to work out the implementing details related to SPCO: coordination with the Department of State; timing; location; personnel actions, including selection of key personnel; delegation of authorities; and the necessary logistics.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 7

AA/AFR designates_____(fill in name) as the person responsible for monitoring and following up on details of the Action Agenda, and for coordinating the implementing actions, both inside and outside the Africa Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8

That the Director, SWA (and the Director, SDPRO) encourage the Sahel Mission Directors' Council to invite the CILSS Minister Coordinator and the CILSS and Club Executive Secretaries (along with the hosting country Minister of Rural Development) to the next-scheduled SMDC meeting and to annual meetings thereafter.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9

1. The Director, SWA request the Liaison Officers to the CILSS and Club Secretariats to explore with their respective counterparts, a number of management improvements for consideration by the CILSS Secretariat, for example:

a. developing program budgets for INSAH and AGRHYMET; strengthening managerial capability and revising staff assignments and numbers; and developing a consolidated Secretariat program budget and back-up work plans;

b. introducing standard procedures and practices for the guidance of all donors funding "expert" positions within the Secretariat.

2. The CILSS and Club Lisison Officers report expeditiously on the results of their endeavors as a prelude to later discussions among donors on the general subject of coordinating efforts to improve the management and operating capability of the CILSS Secretariat.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 10

AFR/PD, in coordination with AFR/SWA, organize a design team to prepare a Project Paper for a regional project for increasing in-country project and program management training for the development team: host country counterparts, contract personnel, and USAID project officers.

RECOMMENDATION NO 11

AFR/SWA prepare a cable to the field in which AA/AFR re-delegates Sectionn 121(d) certification to USAID Directors and AID Representatives and revises (reduces) reporting requirements on the maintenance of Section 121(d) certification.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12

AFR/SWA send a message to the Sahel missions advising them of the SMAT proposal for a study of 121(d) operations and related issues and requesting comments on the timing of such a study and on the suggested scope of work (SMAT has provided a draft cable for SWA -- Attachment D).

RECOMMENDATION NO. 13

AA/AFR designates _____ to provide a substantive review of responses to draft IG audits and to monitor Bureau progress in closing audit recommendations, including keeping the AA/AFR informed of delinquencies and action taken by the Bureau to rectify the situation.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 14

The aforenamed designee prepare a message to the field advising of the new designation, stressing the need to arrange appropriate ongoing financial review of projects, and emphasizing the importance of good internal mission controls to ensure that draft audits are answered quickly and fully and that audit recommendations are closed appropriately and expeditiously.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 15

AFR/PD revise the project implementation progress reporting procedures to provide for exceptional reporting.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 16

AA/AFR designate _____ as Mission Management Review Officer with the responsibility for monitoring mission management improvements in the Sahel

(and elsewhere if deemed needed) and marshalling appropriate assistance for the missions for their improvement efforts.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 17

The above named designee prepare a message to the field referencing the SMAT proposals on mission management improvements and requesting missions to prepare Management Improvement Plans.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 18

AFR's Mission Management Review Officer designated in Recommendation No. 16 prepare a proposal for AA/AFR for establishing an OAS-type unit to carry out periodic and ad hoc reviews of Sahel mission operations and prepare a plan for the first year's operations.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 19

AA/AFR appoint a task force with representation from AFR/DP, AFR/PD, and AFR/PMR to propose means to ensure that audit and evaluation reports are reviewed for lessons learned and the findings synthesized and made available to missions and design and evaluation teams.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 20

A/AID approve in principle the use of the no-year funding authority in the Sahel beginning this fiscal year in accordance with procedures set forth herein.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 21

A/AID authorize AA/AFR, in consultation and coordination with LEG, to discuss the SMAT recommendation and AID's proposed response with Congressional staffers.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 22

The Africa Bureau, in collaboration with the Office of Personnel (M-PM) design suitable programs for:

-- Increased French language training

-- Orientation of personnel assigned to the Sahel

-- Staff Development Training

-- Improved incentive and awards program

RECOMMENDATION NO. 23

The Africa Bureau request the Assistant to the Administrator for Management to initiate, with the Department of State, the formation of a joint State-AID Task Force to critically review and evaluate the JAOs in the Sahel to determine (a) their effectiveness, economies, and efficiencies as well as (b) possible alternatives where JAOs are not performing as conceived.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 24

Individual AID Missions and offices should give greater consideration to using logistical support contracts for support of contractor personnel in the Sahel.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 25

The Africa Bureau collaborate with the SER Directorate to explore the feasibility of:

a. Standardizing all U.S. financed vehicles in Sahel;

b. Direct purchase from a manufacturer, including warranty maintenance for all vehicles;

c. Contracting for all spare parts and maintenance with the manufacturer or an automotive maintenance firm;

d. Leasing all vehicles; and

e. Having a Logistical Support contractor provide all automotive maintenance.

PREFACE

The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) assembled in Washington in September 1983 under the auspices of the Agency for International Development at the Department of Agriculture's Development Program Management Center (DPMC). The Team's purpose was "to improve the program and program management of the Sahel Development Program (SDP appropriations and associated assistance activities)" of AID's Bureau for Africa, Office of Sahel and West Africa Affairs. A week in September and one in October were devoted to team building, research, and preparation for visits to all SDP management elements in Washington and the field for discussions with as many AID employees, cooperating Sahelians and other donor representatives as limited time would allow. DPMC and USDA Office of International Cooperation and Development officers and contractors played key roles in facilitating the Team's organization, initial planning, and formulation of schedules and itineraries.

The Team's five members, all retired senior AID employees, began interviews in the Africa Bureau, supporting central AID Offices, and appropriate State Department offices in October. Later in the month, a canvass of the SDP field components began: bilateral AID offices in Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta; the SDP Regional Office in Bamako; the OECD/Club Secretariat in Paris; the River Basin Development Office in Dakar; plus REDSO/WCA in Abidjan. Sahelian agencies visited included the Secretariat of the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (known generally by its French Acronym, CILSS) in Ouagadougou and the Sahel Institute in Bamako. International agencies and other donor offices were contacted by individual Team members in nearly every country. The Team assembled in Abidjan in late November to review progress, compare notes on findings, and prepare one member to brief the Sahel Mission Directors' Council in Timbuktu. The same member proceeded from Mali on to Chad, while the remainder of the Team returned to the United States at the end of November

Four members assembled in Washington in early December (joined later by the fifth) and began analyzing the results of field visits, drawing conclusions, and completing Washington interviews. Again a DPMC representative worked with the Team on content and format of Team findings and recommendations. DPMC also arranged the Team's administrative and support services. The Team broke for the holidays and resumed work in early January 1984. Several special tasks were undertaken over the following weeks:

-- A briefing of the Assistant Administrator for Africa

-- Preparation and submission of a draft Progress Report

-- Drafting of a summary cable on progress to the Sahel Missions, encouraging their comments and suggestions

-- Representation at the Africa Mission Directors' Conference in Kigali to brief and consult with the AA/AFR and the Sahel Directors

-- Preparation of a synopsis of preliminary findings for the AID Administrator at his request

-- Participation in a briefing and dialogue with AID and State officers concerned with the Sahel Program

In mid-February, the Team's ranks were reduced when two members completed their contributions; the three remaining members continued toward completion of all sections of the Management Improvement Action Agenda, which comprises the totality of the Team's activities.

Unlike the traditional report that teams of this nature prepare covering such an undertaking, the SMAT provided oral recommendations for improvement to the missions as well as action documents for SWA to initiate the process required to bring about change and improvement of the Sahel program. The type of documents prepared have been draft cables, action and information memorandums which are included in the following sections and appendices.

The approach and depth of the investigation required significant contributions of time and effort by members of Office of Sahel and West Africa Affairs, Embassies and AID Missions in the Sahel and Staff Offices in AID/W. The SMAT appreciates all the assistance provided and extends its sincere thanks to those individuals who participated. We hope the implementation of the recommendations expressed in this report will facilitate the improvement of the content and management of the Sahel Development Program.

March 13, 1984

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA

FROM: Sahel Management Assessment Team

THRU: Director, Office of Sahel and West Africa Affairs

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Management of the Sahel Development Program - Concept, Strategy, and Organization

Summary. Improving Sahel Development Program (SDP) management demands concerted and integrated efforts by senior AID managers on a Management Improvement Action Agenda. The three major fronts covered in this memo are:

-- reconfirm the validity of the Sahel concept as a long-term humanitarian and developmental undertaking;

-- prepare a more diversified and collaborative Sahel strategy and program, taking account of the Sahel's special challenges;

-- consolidate all SDP management levels under a field-based Coordinator in line with Agency decentralization and delegation policies.

* * * * * *

AID's performance in the Sahel, as well as the principles and assumptions underlying the Sahel Development Program (SDP), have undergone frequent criticism. Many issues have been raised by the Congress; still more have emerged from numerous Inspector General audits. Nearly a year ago the Sahel and West Africa Affairs Office (SWA) undertook its own program assessment to review SDP relationship to the original objectives and explore any changes necessary to meet current requirements.

In September 1983, the SWA office engaged a Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) whose purpose is "to improve the program and program management of the Sahel Development Program (SDP appropriations and associated assistance activities.)" The Team has prepared and distributed a draft Progress Report and a summary cable, both containing preliminary results from visits and discussions in all Sahel regional offices and missions as well as associated Washington central and field support offices. The summary cable and a later follow-up, both asked for comments. SMAT briefed the AA/AFR and staff here in January 1984 and subsequently in February in Kigali with the Sahel Mission Directors (the latter were also briefed in December 1983 in Timbuktu); some Mission Directors provided preliminary reactions to the Report while in Kigali.

In February, SMAT met with AID and State representatives to answer questions, clarify proposals and recommendations, and encourage substantive, written comments on the Report. The only written commentary was in the form of cables from four field offices (received by March 12) whose contents were considered by SMAT in preparing this communication. This memorandum is the first of a series in which the SMAT will provide recommendations to the AA/AFR and AFR/SWA for improving the content and management of the SDP.

The Sahel Development Program was launched with great enthusiasm, a new organization, and the formation of relatively large AID Missions in countries where the U.S. had little experience, other than relief operations. The aura of poor performance that has become attached to the Program results as much from shortcomings in policy and strategy as from weaknesses in management at the operational level. The Program's original designers seriously underestimated the policy weaknesses of the Sahel countries and overestimated general knowledge about the kinds of programs and actions that would promote growth in the special circumstances of the Sahel. Programs emphasized research, basic human resources, integrated rural development, institutional development, and other long-gestating activities, while indicators of progress sought to measure short-term successes. In a decade--or perhaps two--the fruits of institution building may be reflected in much sought-after increases in production, especially food. In the meantime, more realistic and relevant yard sticks must be developed.

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Much of the special drive, energy, and idealism which inspired the Program at its inception and during its initial period has eroded. Many AID people (and some Ambassadors) no longer see the SDP as special, in spite of obvious and continuing Congressional interest and donor support. Feeling is widespread in some U.S. circles that the Sahel is getting too much attention, too much money, and too many people. Some think that weaknesses of strategy and goals must be identified and replaced with updated and relevant targets and objectives. A widespread malaise permeates the SDP based on the perception that the Program's progress is not consonant with the resources devoted to it, a situation not likely to be reversed in the near term. The impact of this malaise has been exacerbated by the daily preoccupation of mission managers with seemingly unrelenting management crises and the aftermaths of previous implementation problems, such as responding to audits and evaluations, preparing Section 121(d) reports, and redesigning projects.

Among the principal causes of uneven program success and progress in the Sahel have been:

1. Inadequate priority by AID/W (Africa Bureau and elsewhere) to the special Sahelian development challenges and support requirements.

2. Preoccupation of mission staffs with "administrivia" and day-to-day crises to the detriment of cooperative planning with host governments and institutions and collaboration with other donors.

3. Program mixes containing an excess of unrelated individual projects, some overly-complicated; e.g., integrated rural development, and most employing techniques inappropriate in the Sahel, such as host country contracting.

4. Burdening limited numbers of managerial and technical personnel in weakly-organized indigenous institutions with people-intensive activities.

5. A general lack of understanding of the area and, consequently, a lack of appropriate development techniques and technology for meeting some of the Sahelian problems.

6. Trying to move money too rapidly. The results have been projects designed quickly and inadequately with little Sahelian collaboration, followed by hastily negotiated and signed agreements that postponed or overlooked potential implementation problems.

7. Inadequate focus on coordination with countries and donors as a means for:

   -- cataloging activities already completed and underway, and identifying and dividing up future programs;

   -- achieving cooperation in intersectoral planning and mobilization of domestic resources;

   -- emphasizing macro-economic policies (budget, fiscal, monetary, foreign exchange, etc.); and

   -- changing systems and policies necessary to increased production, especially food.

8. Staff assigned with inadequate technical and managerial experience, marginal language proficiency, and little knowledge or specific orientation about the Sahel; e.g., francophone public administration, economic planning, and finance systems.

Some of the problems cited in the findings above still exist, but there has been improvement in the situation in the Sahel during the last few years:

1. Considerable knowledge has been gained of what will and will not work in the Sahel.

2. Regional institutions have evolved and provide a forum for a dialogue on development problems and policy issues.

3. Governments are considering new, more market-oriented policies and improvements in pricing, taxes, and employment policies.

4. Donor activities related to food security generally are being coordinated by host governments.

5. USAIDS generally have sufficient numbers of U.S. staff, particularly given the large number of personal service contractors, but the level of training and experience of direct hire personnel does not uniformly meet the Sahel's development challenges.

6. Recruiting, training, and retaining local national staff has begun, butrequires and demands far greater emphasis than most Missions exert, especially for continuity purposes.

7. USAIDS are fully cognizant of the need for tighter management of financial resources, and are trying hard to resolve previous problems and establish and maintain adequate financial management systems.

An Action Agenda for Management Improvement

The Team has concluded that the SDP remains a viable option and should form the basis for a new, vigorous, and more effective Program. This requires a reaffirmation of the Program at a high U.S. political level, accompanied by policy, organizational, and leadership reforms spelled out in the sections that follow. To achieve a more responsive, better managed program, and to make it clear to critics of the program (in AID, State, and Congress) that AID is serious in the pursuit of improvements, the Africa Bureau needs to adopt a broad scale Management Improvement Action Agenda and establish a mechanism for insuring its implementation in a timely and effective way. The essential, first components of the Agenda are:

1. A reaffirmation of the validity of the vision set forth by the architects of the Sahel Program, and the continuing viability of such a long-range humanitarian and development undertaking.

2. A diversified, flexible AID strategy taking a 20-year perspective, while measuring current progress against realistic, intermediate goals and targets arrived at in a collaborative manner and, foremost in importance:

   -- applying the special authority of "no-year" funding from accounts free of functional orientation (that govern development assistance); and

   -- facilitating a balanced mix of project and non-project assistance (in the least management-intensive modes) in regional and bilateral programs alike.

3. A transformation of the various SDP management and decision-making components into a new consolidated structure:

   -- located in the field in a decentralized mode;

   -- operating with all appropriate delegated authorities;

   -- drawing together existing staff offices in the Bureau itself (SWA, PD/SWAP); in the Sahel (SDPRO in Bamako, RBDO in Dakar); plus some personnel and functions from REDSO/WCA.

The Sahel concept has Congressional justification in separate legislation carrying special authority and relating U.S. long-term commitments to the mutual and combined efforts of the Sahelian countries and a specially formed donor community. Reciprocal Sahelian/donor and U.S. pursuit of humanitarian and developmental goals over the coming two decades implies a framework of programs and activities collaboratively selected, planned, and implemented with foremost regard for Sahelian priorities and coordinated donor, including U.S., responses thereto. This linkage carries over into the need for a strong U.S. management organization, close to the Sahelian regional and bilateral activities for ease of coordination, decision-making, and dialogue. The managers need to be armed with the authority necessary to move resources, material as well as human, when the changing priorities of politics, economics, and human welfare demand.

The Sahel Concept: Valid and Viable.

With the 1973 formation of a Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (generally referred to by its French acronym, CILSS), the drought-ridden countries of West Africa established the Sahel Region as a composite development grouping. The Committee pledged regional collaboration against a recurrence of the devastating 1968-1973 famine. The region's "special" nature had been implicitly acknowledged by the donor community in its concerted relief assistance during the worst of the drought. In 1976, a more formal Club du Sahel was formed within OECD to undertake a long-term, cooperative program called a "contract for a generation;" i.e., looking toward the year 2000, founded on joint action between Sahelians and donors.

U.S. legislation in 1977 established a separate Sahel Development Program (SDP) and authorized AID to furnish assistance under a long-term comprehensive program for the "development of the Sahelian region" in conjunction with an international coordinating mechanism (i.e., the Club). In May 1977 at Ottawa, CILSS and the Club (including the U.S.) endorsed a Strategy and Programme for Drought Control and Development in the Sahel, setting forth "self-sufficiency in staple foods" (food autonomy was considered unattainable by the Sahelians) as a major pursuit among overall Sahelian social and economic development goals.

A number of political, technical, and developmental reasons confirm the continuing validity of a Sahel concept and support treatment of Sahelian problems on an integrated program basis:

1. The Sahel countries, among the world's poorest, share similar (extremely harsh) physical environments;

2. Political, economic and social systems have many common aspects;

3. Agricultural production and marketing systems are similar;

4. Sahel governments are under severe pressure to deal with similar problems:

   a. slow growth in agricultural production (especially food);

   b. rising budget deficits, increasingly difficult to finance (particularly given monetary agreements with France);

   c. mounting debt problems, complicated by foreign exchange shortages and a stagnation of exports; and

   d. rapid increases in population;

5. Common regional institutions coordinate donor support and research; address critical priorities, e.g., food security; and provide a forum for conducting policy dialogues in regional or national, bilateral or multilateral contexts.

The concept of a special long-term Sahel Development Program remains valid. Lack of significant progress toward some short-term goals has been overshadowed by noteworthy gains in creating structures and institutions, improving the climate for policy changes, and increasing knowledge of what will and will not work. These gains offer a base for greater progress if the U.S. stays the course. A public reaffirmation of the special Sahel initiative will serve mutual U.S. and Sahelian interests.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

AA/AFR re-affirm the continuing validity of the SDP concept, and AID's commitment to that concept, by approving statements to that effect in the forthcoming annual SDP report to the Congress (Attachment A), in testimony before the Congress, and in deliberations with other executive agencies (State, OMB).

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

DATE_____

The Sahel Strategy and Program: A Collaborative Undertaking.

Concern expressed in various circles with the CILSS/Club strategy for the Sahel addresses some of its underlying assumptions. "Food self-sufficiency under conditions of ecological balance and self-sustaining growth" is a principal target of criticism because of lack of precision. AID has taken this "goal" as a basic premise in the Sahel Development Strategy Statement (SDSS) and developed an identity of interest between CILSS-Club-AID, despite the fact that the agriculture sectors and food production (in some countries) may be areas where AID does not have a comparative advantage and where U.S. techniques may produce the least incremental difference. Little effort has been devoted to research on other sectors, e.g., transport, whose development might produce the most immediate, short-term impact on agricultural development. Common and collaborative interest between Sahelian countries and AID on given projects is not always apparent, indicating that policy dialogue may not be as pervasive as desirable for full cognizance to be taken of country macro-economic policies and capabilities. Inadequate emphasis has been placed on intermediate measures of performance that permit informed judgment about current status and degree of success of ongoing endeavors toward year 2000 goals.

A two-pronged approach to the issue of a Sahel development strategy appears to have merit. On the one hand, AID should continue to urge the CILSS/Club partners to better define regional policy and to initiate donor-country dialogue on national development programs. "Lead donor" influence on program content in given countries may be such that U.S. resources can be concentrated on other mutually agreed development priorities (i.e., rather than across-the-board), limited to humanitarian support (food aid), or addressed to the amelioration of human resource constraints. An urgent need exists for CILSS/Club decision-makers and planners to compare and re-examine "food self-sufficiency" and "food self-reliance" especially because the latter implies that sectors other than agriculture may lead a country's development.

Furthermore, SMAT suggests that the CILSS/Club Secretariats be encouraged to name a group of internationally-recognized, outside experts to review and update the overall Sahel strategy (dating from 1977). The CILSS members and the donor community should give such a group a mandate to produce a realistic long-range strategy--not just a set of goals--setting down current base lines (or making provision for their establishment) and laying out intermediate targets for measuring progress at appropriate junctures along the continuum toward the year 2000 and perhaps beyond. The results should prove most useful in re-structuring all donor, and particularly U.S., humanitarian, and developmental assistance packages.

AID's own regional strategy for the Sahel (and the country strategies that flow from it) probably needs to complement, but not be identical with, the basic CILSS/Club approach. The AID strategy should emerge from an expanded, collaborative policy dialogue -- regionally and nationally -- involving AID, cooperating Sahelian countries and their regional agencies, and the other donors (The current guidance message -- 1983 STATE 186149 -- provides excellent directions.). The objective should be soundly-researched alternatives for application of the U.S. resources. Country program strategies should take account of the diversity of Sahelian politics, societies, and cultures, and the state of, and prospects for, national development, yet take advantage of the extensive similarities across the region to avoid duplication and capitalize on the experience of others, donors included. All U.S. activities should be endorsed and supported by the participating country(ies) and/or a regional entity as a manifestation of the collaborative and cooperative dialogue from which they evolve. SMAT has already provided the Director, SWA with comments and suggestions for use in the upcoming Dakar meeting on the current draft of the SDSS.

AID's highest priority in the Sahel is the promotion of development among the countries of the region through the selection and design of appropriate project and non-project modes of assistance that will assure the prudent use of monies made available by the Congress. In legislating the Sahel Program, the Congress provided unique funding flexibility by authorizing amounts appropriated "to remain available until expended," i.e., without requirement for annual obligation. In addition, the functional framework established for development assistance (in FAA Sections 103-106) was omitted from the Sahel Program. Nevertheless, the Agency's policy makers have not seized the opportunity thus offered. SMAT urges that the requirements for annual obligations and functional limitations be lifted without delay, allowing more flexibility in the molding of Sahelian programs and eliminating the "move money" syndrome and all the extensively documented pitfalls arising therefrom. (SMAT is providing a draft document on "no-year" money under separate cover.)

The program mix in both the regional and bilateral components of the Program places a premium on project assistance carried out in the traditional technical assistance mode. Some activity is generally found in the agriculture, health, and education sectors plus a sprinkling of modest undertakings in response to special initiatives. From the beginning, most project activity has depended for implementation on host country entities which were faced with serious shortages of trained, indigenous technical and managerial personnel and inadequate financial resources to allow for cost sharing.

Considerably more project activity should focus on infrastructure; e.g., transportation, communications, road repair and maintenance, and irrigation, carried out via turnkey contractors. This approach is less management-intensive (in terms of OE-funded personnel) and highly useful in reducing burdens on host country civil servants and contractors and in upgrading their respective skills. Program assistance should be considered to support policy reform; e.g., on taxes, employment, prices, private sector involvement, but only in countries where effective and reliable planning and budgeting systems exist along with the personnel to manage them (or engage OPEX technicians, while host country counterparts are trained, preferably in-country and in place). While immediate results cannot be expected to flow from a modified strategy and program mix, a system of intermediate goals and means of measurement will enable a better charting of progress.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

AA/AFR approve the cable in Attachment B which requests comments and suggestions from USAIDs Niamey, Banjul and Ouagadougou, and the OECD/Club see omission review and update of the overall Sahel strategy.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

DATE_____

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

The Director, SWA, initiate for the approval of the AID Administrator, an Action Memorandum authorizing the use of "no year" funding authority in the management of the Operational Year Budget in the Sahel.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

DATE_____

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

That the AA/AFR instruct the Director, SWA, to initiate necessary action to modify Sahel strategy guidance so that the functional areas framework (of development assistance legislation -- FAA Section 103-106) need not be stringently applied in Sahelian regional and bilateral programs.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

DATE_____

The Sahel Organization: Improved Management and Staffing

Renewing confidence in the viability of the Sahel Program should spark enthusiasm and, if accompanied by evidence of serious support and dedication, possibly attract some new faces into the ranks of Sahel missions. Modifying the strategy focus and tailoring programs and implementation modes to address the realities of the Sahelian political, economic, social, and physical environments should produce larger resource transfers for collaboratively agreed purposes, yet still support ongoing research and institution building. To ensure success, however, the existing, disjointed organizational structure must be subjected to strong measures of order, discipline, and leadership. Critical project evaluations and audit reports, serious design and implementation problems, and resulting huge pipelines underscore the need for an organization overhaul and improved management. Diverse and sometimes competing entities in the Bureau (the DAA, SWA, and PD/SWAP) and in the field (the Directors' Council; the eight bilateral missions; SDP Regional Office in Bamako; the River Basin Development Office in Dakar; OECD/Club Liaison in Paris; CILSS Liaison in Ouagadougou) are presently tied together loosely without clear and well-understood (or well-managed) line and staff responsibilities.

Leadership can stem only from strong management, oriented to innovative and imaginative precepts growing out of a commitment to quality program performance and implementation under guidance of revised regional and country strategies. This must be accompanied, however, by a conviction that decision-making should be as proximate as possible to the scene of action--as enunciated in Agency pronouncements on decentralization and delegation. Consequently, SMAT suggests consolidation of all SDP management components into a Sahel Program Coordinator's Office (SPCO) under

a Coordinator with full delegated authority (as spelled out in Africa Bureau Statement of Functions for a Deputy Assistant Administrator-Geographic Area). The ideal location would be Dakar, separate from the Senegal Mission.

In order to assure full exercise of functions, the Coordinator's staff would comprise:

- -- program/planning (drawn mainly from SDPRO in Bamako);
- -- controller;
- -- management;
- -- regional projects (including RBDO in Dakar);
- -- regional support (mainly from REDSO/WCA);
- -- liaison in Ouagadougou (CILSS), Paris (OECD/Club), and Rome (FODAG)
- -- Sahel Affairs Office (in Washington), working with Africa Bureau offices, Central AID offices, and other agencies, such as State, OMB and USDA.

The Coordinator would chair the Mission Directors' Council as a policy body advising on all regional and bilateral aspects of the Program. This Office would not be "another layer" between the field and Washington, but would have the authority to make most decisions now reserved to various Africa Bureau offices. The Coordinator would be responsible for the integration and consolidation of the SDSS, CDSSs for AID/W approval as well as the preparation of the Congressional Presentation and Annual SDP Report. The Coordinator would approve PIDs, regional PPs and other PPs that exceed individual Missions' authority, and consolidated bilateral and regional ABSs reviewed by SMDC. SPCO would also control the allocation of personnel ceilings and OE funding among the Missions.

Some modification of types of personnel and skills will be dictated by changes in program mix that encourage non-project assistance and infrastructure activities. For example, the latter will require the traditional capital development skills, while program assistance may call for specialists in macro-economics or foreign trade or commodity imports.

With the SPCO in place, a variety of new approaches to development management are conceivable. For example, it might be feasible and practical to advertise and award competitively, single, region-wide contracts for such goods and/or services as:

-- project and OE-funded all-terrain and standard vehicles;

-- logistical support for all mission and contractor personnel;

-- automotive maintenance;

-- non-expendable project and OE-funded equipment;

-- expendable supplies;

-- project and non-project participant training;

-- transhipping or forwarding equipment and commodities, including PL 480.

-- training, service and maintenance, and general support to mission's automated data processing.

Under a SPCO organization, program improvements might be realized by making contract awards to a university consortium or a single private contractor to undertake Sahel-wide activities, such as:

-- research on common agricultural, irrigation, or other problems;

-- building and/or repairing and maintaining intra-regional roads and important land links to coastal states;

-- design and installation of agro-hydro-meteorological and communications equipment and systems for AGRHYMET, including training of all operators and technicians.

Investigation might demonstrate that the regional approach could result in savings in funding and personnel through standard approaches enabling single individuals to support or train counterparts in more than one country. The opportunities for in-country or at least intra-Sahelian training might also be enhanced by a single contractor having substantive responsibilities for several countries.

Further details of the proposed organization, functional statements, organization chart and delegated authorities are contained in the attached paper entitled, Management and Coordination of the Sahel Development Program (Attachment C).

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5:

AA/AFR adopt and approve the establishment of a coordinating office located in the field with full delegation of authority to implement and manage the Sahel Program.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

DATE_____

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6:

AA/AFR establish a task force under the direction of _____(fill in name) to work out the implementing details related to SPCO: coordination with the Department of State; timing; location; personnel actions, including selection of key personnel; delegation of authorities; and the necessary logistics.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

DATE_____

Further Agenda Topics.

Additional action proposals for management improvement will be forthcoming under separate cover on various administrative and program matters, for example:

-- strengthened internal mission management;

-- staff development and training;

-- management of the Operating Year Budget;

-- Joint Administrative Office operations and alternatives;

-- logistical services and contracts; and

-- procurement of vehicles.

Considering the expanded delegation and significant decentralization envisioned in the SMAT recommendations, the AA/AFR will probably wish to consider some manner of program review to monitor regional and bilateral progress and institute changes, when and as appropriate. Suggestions on this matter will appear separately in a forthcoming SMAT paper.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 7

AA/AFR designates_____(fill in name) as the person responsible for monitoring and following up on details of the Action Agenda, and for coordinating the implementing actions, both inside and outside the Africa Bureau.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

DATE_____

Attachments:

A - Foreword to Annual SDP Report

B - Draft Cable on CILSS/Club Strategy Revision

C - Management and Coordination of the SDP

Attachment A

THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM:

1984 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

Foreword:

This report addresses a full spectrum of events and activities undertaken during 1983 under AID's Sahel Development Program, mainly in cooperation with the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (known generally by its French acronym, CILSS) and with other donors collaborating through the Club des Amis du Sahel within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Ten years ago, a group of West African countries formed CILSS as a means for mobilizing their people against the horrors of hunger and starvation. Some five years later, the Executive Branch and the Congress worked together in the formulation and creation of the Sahel Development Program. As this collaborative effort linking the Sahelian and donor communities enters its second decade, a review was undertaken of the continued validity of the SDP concept. It was found that there were a number of political, technical and developmental reasons that confirm the continuing validity of a Sahel concept and support treatment of Sahelian problems on an integrated program basis:

1. The Sahel countries, among the world's poorest, share similar (extremely harsh) physical environments;

2. Political, economic and social systems have many common aspects;

3. Agricultural production and marketing systems are similar;

4. Sahel governments are under severe pressure to deal with similar problems:

    a. slow growth in agricultural production (especially food);

    b. rising budget deficits, increasingly difficult to finance;

    c. mounting debt problems, complicated by foreign exchange shortages and a stagnation of exports; and

    d. rapid increases in population.

5. Common regional institutions coordinate donor support and research address critical priorities (e.g., food security), and provide a forum for conducting policy dialogues in regional or national, bilateral or multilateral contexts.

In the assessment of the program, it was found that progress was less than hoped for and identified the need for strengthened organizational and leadership arrangements and improved dialogue with Sahelian countries and other donors. At the same time, there have been improvements in the Sahel that provide a basis for expecting greater progress in the future:

1. Considerable knowledge has been gained of what will and will not work in the Sahel.

2. Sahelian institutions have evolved and provide a forum for a dialogue on development problems and policy issues.

3. Sahelian governments are considering new, more market-oriented policies and improvements in pricing, taxes, and employment policies.

4. Donor activities related to food security generally are being coordinated by host governments.

5. USAIDs are better staffed, are fully cognizant of the need for tight management of financial resources, and are resolving previous problems and establishing and maintaining adequate financial management systems.

Given the foregoing, the importance of the Sahel Development Program with its special authorization and appropriations structure is reaffirmed. It continues to serve U.S. interests by:

-- demonstrating U.S. adherence to a long-standing commitment;

-- providing a symbol of U.S. staying power under adverse circumstances;

-- increasing chances of success over a shorter period and with fewer outside resources needed because the program is carried out in a multilateral context; and

-- spreading the burden among more donors and limiting the pressure on the U.S. for major new resource allocations.

:MAT - 3/5/84

ATTACHMENT B

Draft Cable 3/5/84

ACTION: Banjul, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Paris (OECD for Fell)

INFO: Bamako (also for SDPRO), Dakar, Ndjamena, Nouakchott, Praia

SUBJECT: CILSS/Club Development Strategy

REF: a. Niamey 00698; b. Ouaga 00904; c. 1983 State 186149

1. Summary. The current CILSS "strategy" is nearly eight years old and should be revised and updated. President Kountche as the new CILSS Chairman might wish to propose such an effort by an internationally-recognized group of experts. Missions are asked to review this approach and offer suggestions. In addition, a number of topics that bear examining during the revision have been drawn from SMAT analyses and findings; such as possible trade-offs between "food self-sufficiency" and self-sustaining growth; alternative allocations of resources; the role of parastatals; intra-regional trade. Missions are requested to reply by _____.

2. The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) in its Progress Report and discussions with AA/AFR and SMDC identified a need for revision and redefinition of the CILSS/Club strategy for the Sahel. We can see how the results of such work in the CILSS/Club context could also prove beneficial to the SWA/SDPRO/SMDC collaboration on regional and country development strategy statements.

3. SMAT recommends that CILSS/Club select a group of internationally recognized experts (perhaps three) to undertake this assignment. SMAT points out that the May 1977 CILSS/Club "Strategy" provides under follow-up "that a second phase effort is required in order to finalize a revised, more complete, better structured and more coherent programme." Getting this effort underway as soon as possible could result in a final version for approval at the next CILSS/Club meeting. The new strategy might ultimately be dedicated at the 10th anniversary (March 1986) of the CILSS/Club partnership.

4. It is very important that such an initiative come from the Sahelians as an expression of their concern, determination, and readiness to concert their efforts toward common development goals with collaborative donor assistance. The naming of a new CILSS management team--Committee Chairman, Minister Coordinator and Executive Secretary--offers an opportune time to suggest this much-needed revision and update of the basic CILSS/Club "Strategy." President Kountche, Minister Shehe Sabally and Exec Sec Brah Mamane might welcome the idea of launching this initiative to emphasize that CILSS has new leadership.

5. One approach would be to discuss this matter privately with President Kountche (or, alternatively, with Minister Shehu or Exec Sec Brah) and encourage him to broach the matter with the Club. Any discussions should include a U.S. offer to share in the costs of the undertaking, perhaps through a special pledge with other donors.

6. Both action and info addressees are requested to comment and propose a course of action for concerting initial approaches and follow-up. In this context, SMAT has submitted some observations and conclusions on the existing CILSS/Club strategy that appear useful in assessing the priority of bringing about this important revision/updating and in furthering the dialogue among Sahel Missions on matters of improving AID's Sahel program management:

A. The original CILSS/Club "strategy" (May 1977) recognized its own incompleteness and the crying need for more research, particularly in the areas of policy and resource mobilization. The discussions concentrated heavily on agricultural and rural development issues, leaving intersectoral planning for later. The passage of time has changed many things in the Sahel and the rest of the world with consequent effects on the underlying situation and assumptions related to development strategy.

B. A major cause of Congressional, public and in-house (AID and State) criticism has been lack of progress in terms of improvements in agricultural production (particularly on a per-capita basis) and of living standards of the majority of the population. "Poor implementation and improper design" of projects is the most widely accepted explanation for the shortcomings.

C. Another -- perhaps less widely understood -- important factor may be the inadequacy of the process by which the Sahel governments and their regional agencies (and the donors) resolve conflicts and disagreements about strategy, goals, resource allocations and governmental policy. At the heart of this issue lies the unresolved question (by states and donors) of the possible trade-offs between the goal of "food self-sufficiency" and self-sustaining growth. Closely associated are a number of other topics, for example:

(1) alternative allocation of resources (transport vs. increased investment in agriculture);

(2) appropriate levels of Sahelian resource allocations to urban development, education, health and sanitation, other sectors;

(3) relative priority of rainfed vs. irrigated agriculture;

(4) the role of parastatals in rural development; useful alternatives and plans to develop and implement them;

(5) pricing of imported agriculture production inputs and imports to supplement domestic food production.

D. A number of topics call for increased attention (perhaps through research) from the governments (and the donors):

(1) domestic resource mobilization for development;

(2) mobilizing private initiative (domestic and foreign) in support of development;

(3) intra-regional trade;

(4) trade patterns and potential with neighboring, non-Sahelian coastal states.

7. SMAT's suggestions are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Addressees may wish to refer to Ref C (on SDSS guidance) for other ideas that may assist in carrying the dialogue forward once an agreed course of action has been decided.

8. Request addressee comments by _____.

Management and Coordination of the Sahel Development Program

Dakar is the hub of the Sahel not only geographically but in terms of port facilities, communications, airline connections, diplomatic community as well as being a modern metropolitan city. There is also a large foreign and an expanding U.S. business community. Senegal is bordered by four other Sahelian countries (The Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, and Cape Verde), three of which depend on Dakar to a large extent as a transit point. The city offers an adequate supply of housing, office space, and services necessary to support a relatively large AID organization. Logically, Dakar presents many advantages as a Sahel regional center providing all of the long-range programming/planning and support services to other AID offices and programs throughout the Sahel.

The organization anticipated to carry out the programming, planning, and managing of regional projects and support services for all Sahel programs would be separate from the USAID/Senegal bilateral program. The regional activities currently performed by USAID/Senegal would be included within the new organization: River Basin Development Office (OMVS and OMVG); Controller functions for Cape Verde; and transshipments of PL 480 and project commodities to surrounding Sahel countries.

At the present time, REDSO/WCA in Abidjan provides support services for the Sahel missions, beyond or supplementing their own capability. Long range planning for the Sahel Region is the purview of the Sahel Development Planning Regional Office (SDPRO) in Bamako. Moving SDPRO to Dakar and centralizing the support functions -- Legal, Engineering, Contracting, Project Development (including part of AFR/PD/SWAP), Food for Peace, and Supply Management -- in the same location would result in greater efficiency and improved management of resources under a unified authority and strengthening the entire Sahel program.

Sahel Program Coordination Office (SPCO)

In an attempt to improve program coordination and maximize the utilization of available resources in a more efficient manner, management functions need to be a consoldated under a single Sahel authority or coordinator, responsible for the management and allocation of all resources of the Sahel Development Program.

The Sahel Program Coordination Office (SPCO) would be established to perform this role. The Coordinator would be located in Dakar, along with his immediate staff (see organization chart) and would be responsible for the entire Sahel Program. Reporting directly to the Assistant Administrator for Africa, AA/AFR, the Coordinator, a well experienced senior officer, would operate with minimal supervision and

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represent the Office of AA/AFR and/or exercise authorities on behalf o. AA/AFR as delineated in Bureau functional statements (for a Deputy Assistant Administrator-Geographic Area), existing delegations of authorities, and management directives. The responsibilities of the Coordinator would include the following duties and functions:

- Advise AA/AFR on Sahel-wide policy matters in all aspects of economic/social development and economic assistance including Sahel Development Program, Development Assistance, security-related ESF programs, and PL 480 matters.

- Plan, coordinate, direct and supervise the activities and management of the Sahel missions, the Office of Sahel Affairs in AID/W, the OECD/Club Liaison Office in Paris, and the CILSS Liaison Office in Ouagadougou.

- Act as primary AID/AFR focal point for supervision of Mission Directors, AID Representatives, and AID Affairs Officers on behalf of AA/AFR for the Sahel.

- Direct, guide, and receive advice from, Sahel field offices through the Sahel Mission Directors' Council (SMDC) on the development of Regional and Country Development Strategy Statements, program and project approval and related budgets for all Sahel Programs.

- Coordinate the preparation, chairs the SMDC review, with AID/W representation, and approves a consolidated bilateral and regional Annual Budget Submission.

- Exercise approval authorities on behalf of AA/AFR consistent with existing delegations of authorities.

- Chair field reviews of RDSS and CDSSs prior to forwarding to AID/W for approval.

- Chair Executive Committee for Project Review (ECPR) meetings for Sahel PIDs and PPs. Insure that other Sahel missions, AID/W and SPCO participate in the PP reviews conducted by individual Missions.

- Participate with AFR/DAAs in the selection and placement by AA/AFR of Executive Personnel within the Africa Bureau.

- Chair the SMDC and provides guidance and direction to SMDC regarding AID strategy, policy considerations, program implementation, management concerns, and resource allocation.

- Insure appropriate application of AID and AFR Bureau policies.

- Act as the principal AID representative coordinating AID programs with other donors at the regional level and provide guidance, in collaboration with the SMDC, for such coordination at the bilateral level.

Allocations of Sahel personnel ceilings and administration of Sahel Operating Expense funds would be moved from AFR/PMR to the SPCO. Personnel ceilings and Operating Expense funds would then be divided by the Coordinator among the individual mission under plans agreed by the SMDC. The Sahel missions would justify their requirements to the Coordinator who would decide the relative merits and priorities. As programs and projects increased or decreased, corresponding changes in personnel and operating expense funds could be made. The Coordinator's Management Officer and Controller would administer these two functions.

Sahel Mission Directors Council (SMDC)

The Coordinator would serve as the permanent chairman of the SMDC. Council members would represent their respective bilateral programs in assisting the Coordinator in policy formulation and execution, regional development strategies, resource allocations, and overall management of the Sahel Development Program. The Council would convene semi-annually (more frequently, if required) to determine accomplishments, policy directions and strategies for the region. At least one meeting would include the Ambassadors to the Sahel countries and the Minister Coordinator and Executive Secretary of the CILSS. In many respects the Council would function as a Board of Directors managing the U.S. resources in the development of the Sahel, with the Coordinator serving as the Chairman of the Board.

Regional Program and Planning

Within the SPCO a Program Office would be concerned with the planning of the long-term development, policy reforms, regional strategies, Congressional presentations, and programming of regional projects. The nucleus of this staff would be the present Sahel Development Planning Regional Organization (SDPRO) plus some of the personnel presently assigned to AFR/SWA (the latter to be determined after additional analysis). Among the duties and responsibilities for the SPCO Program Office are the following:

- Reviews annual program budget and individual funding requests submitted by the Sahel Missions and recommends action to the Coordinator.

- Administers Sahel program budgeting operations and analyzes project proposals with respect to their conformity with AID and Bureau policies and the respective program strategies.

- Advises Coordinator on PID and PP reviews.

- Prepares and maintains a Regional Development Strategy Statement (RDSS), which defines AID's strategy for participation in a program for region-wide development in the Sahel, within the context of CILSS/Club development programs.

- Refines on a continuing operational basis the U.S. sectoral strategies for Sahel development and the U.S. participation therein.

- Identifies regional projects and as appropriate prepares the Project Identification Document (PID). This includes proposals for U.S. participation in CILSS/Club regional projects.

- Provides continual flow of sectoral technical planning guidance to missions for purposes of their program strategy and project planning.

- Reviews regional project designs and assesses implementation progress to provide information for future planning and assure that regional and bilateral projects are coordinated.

- Consults with SMDC members regarding the consistency of bilateral CDSS submissions with SDP sector and regional strategies.

- Develops guidelines and suggestions to assist in the evaluation of bilateral and regional activity relationships and promotes the exchange of information among all the missions on all evaluation results; develops an evaluation system for the Sahel regional programs; coordinates an annual portfolio review synchronized with annual ABS preparation.

- Drafts the SDP Annual Report to the Congress and coordinates the integration and consolidation of the regional and bilateral ABSs and the Congressional Presentation.

- Performs Secretariat functions for the SMDC.

Sahel Regional Support Services

Within the SPCO organization a Sahel Regional Support Office would provide similar or the same level of services to the Sahel missions as does REDSO/WCA presently; e.g., Project Development, Legal, Contracting, Engineering, Supply Management, and Food for Peace. This would require a shift of responsibility for the aforementioned services from REDSO to SPCO. In addition, some personnel from AFR/PD/SWAP would also be moved to the Support Office. This office would insure closer coordination and improved response time to the individual Sahel missions and thus improve the project design and implementation process. This change would permit REDSO to focus its support responsibilities on the non-Sahel West and Central African countries.

Sahel Program Liaison Offices/Staffs

The links required between the Coordinator's Office and AID/W, the Club du Sahel in Paris and CILSS in Ouagadougou, would be provided by small liaison offices/staffs stationed in each of these locations but responsible to and under the direction of the Coordinator. The U.S. representation required at the Sahel Institute (INSAH) in Bamako and the AGRHYMET in Niamey would also be coordinated by the SPCO staff in Dakar.

Office of Sahel Affairs in the Africa Bureau

The roles and functions of AFR/SWA and AFR/PD/SWAP in the Africa Bureau would be significantly changed in conjunction with establishing the Coordinator Office in Dakar. The functions of reporting on Sahel activities, briefing contract personnel, following-up on field request with other AID/W offices, preparing briefing papers for the Assistant Administrator, and the like would be combined into an Office of Sahel Affairs. This office would be an extension of the Coordinator's Office and have a liaison role between the Coordinator's Office and the Africa Bureau. This Sahel geographic office would be significantly smaller in terms of numbers of personnel (five or six senior professionals plus secretarial staff). All of the incumbents should have program management experience in one or more of the Sahel countries. The Office could be organized either on a geographical or functional line, depending upon accumulated knowledge of priorities and workload. Additional functions and responsibilities would be:

- Coordinating and integrating staff office contributions to SDP project review and approval.

- Answering Congressional inquiries, preparing Congressional notifications, and assisting in Congressional relations on Sahelian matters.

- Following-up and tracking individual field missions' requests for actions by AFR staff offices and AID/W staff and/or service offices; providing same service with private and public institutional, corporate, or individual contractors.

- Representing the Coordinator with State, OMB, USDA and IBRD on matters pertaining to the Sahelian missions.

CILSS Liaison Staff, Ouagadougou

The CILSS Liaison Staff would be separate from the bilateral Upper Volta mission and would be comprised of probably three professionals (Program Officer, Agriculture Economist and a General Development Officer), responsible for the following:

- Manage the Sahel Regional AID Coordination and Planning Project (625-0911).

- Conduct policy dialogue with appropriate members of the CILSS Executive Secretariat.

- Advise and coordinate CILSS actions with Project Officers responsible for INSAH and AGRHYMET.

- Maintain active liaison with CILSS/Club working groups and task forces, and participate directly in their activities as requested by the CILSS/Club.

- Participate in donor and CILSS/Club meetings.

- Contribute and participate in planning-related studies supporting CILSS/Club and U.S. SDP planning.

- Prepare special reports and provide information requested by the Coordinator's office.

OECD/Club Liaison Staff, Paris

The OECD/Club Liaison Staff would be located in the OECD Secretariat in Paris. The incumbent would receive guidance regarding AID policy and program matters in the Sahel from the Coordinator's Office:

- Serve as the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Club Secretariat.

- Assist the Executive Secretary in the full range of staff work necessary for the effective Club functioning.

- Complete staff papers and agenda items for periodic meetings of the Club, coordinating with both donor and recipient states.

- Prepare reports on all donor assistance in the Sahel, including bilateral donors, UNDP, IBRD, ADB, the U.N. Sahelian Office, and other regional organizations.

- Initiate appropriate sectoral or special studies as needed for meetings or for follow-on actions as agreed by Club membership.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FODAG), Rome

The Food and Agriculture Office, FODAG, in the U.S. Embassy, Rome, would continue to support the Sahel program by supplying short-term consultants to either CILSS or any of the Sahel missions as provided under the Sahel Regional Project (625-0911).

Requests for such assistance would be coordinated through the Project Manager on the CILSS Affairs Liaison Staff.

Sahel Regional Projects Office

Within the SPCO a Regional Projects Office would be responsible for policy, coordination, and backstopping all SDP-funded regional projects. The same office would be responsible for the actual supervision and implementation of some regional activities, e.g., the family of River Basin Development projects. The River Basin Development Office (including personnel), presently located in USAID Senegal, would be incorporated into SPCO's Regional Projects Office.

The principal projects under Regional Project Office purview, either directly or indirectly, are listed below:

Project Number	Project
625-0012	Gambia River Basin Development
625-0620	OMVS-Data Institutional Development
625-0621	OMVS Integrated Development
625-0911	Sahel Reg. AID Coord. & Planning
625-0927	Demogr. Data Collect. & Analysis
625-0928	Regional Food Crop Protection-IPM
625-0929	Planning Mgmt. & Research
625-0934	Private Voluntary Organizations
625-0940	Sahel Water Data Network & Mgmt. II
625-0944	Niger River Development II
625-0950	Reg. Financial Mgmt.
625-0955	Manantali Resettlement
625-0957	OMVS Agricultural Research - II
625-0958	Groundwater Monitoring
625-0959	African Development Foundation
625-0960	Sahel Manpower Development II
625-0961	Regional Food Crop Protection III
625-9801	Human Rights
625-9901	Special Self-Help

Some of the Action Recommendations growing out of the above discussion are as follows:

1. Establish the Sahel Program Coordinator's Office (SPCO) in Dakar under a Coordinator with the appropriate rank, delegations of authority and staff to effectively manage the Sahel Development Program.

2. Establish a staff office (Regional Programs and Planning) within the Office of the Coordinator in Dakar, staffed with the personnel from SDPRO and AFR/SWA; abolish the SDPRO office.

3. Provide all of the support services to the Sahel Missions from a Sahel Regional Support Staff located in SPCO. A corresponding shift of personnel and authorities from REDSO/WCA, AID/W and USAID/Senegal would be made.

4. Restructure the SWA office in AFR to perform as the Office of Sahel Affairs, (AFR/SPCO/SA) under SPCO.

5. Consolidate the allocations to individual Sahel Missions of personnel ceilings and operating expense funds into a single allocation from AFR/PMR to SPCO for further distribution to Missions in accord with approved plans.

Revised 2/28/84

Organization Chart

SAHEL PROGRAM COORDINATION OFFICE
(SPCO)



March 30, 1984

IMPLEMENTATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA AFFAIRS, BUREAU FOR AFRICA

FROM: Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT)

SUBJECT: Strengthening Sahel Regional Organizations

In other reports and papers, SMAT has concentrated primarily on management improvement of AID's offices involved in the planning and implementation of the Sahel Development Program. This Memo focuses on the relationships between AID and CILSS/Club decision-makers at the policy level and on AID's technical assistance to the principal CILSS agencies: the Executive Secretariat; the Sahel Institute (INSAH); and the Agricultural Hydro-Meteorological Agency (AGRHYMET). The following matters have been addressed:

a. the record of improvement in CILSS/Club activities and the need to better correlate AID, i.e., SMDC, programs with those of CILSS at the Minister Coordinator-Executive Secretary level;

b. some approaches to strengthening the managerial and operational capabilities of the CILSS Executive Secretariat;

c. possible ways and means for concerting AID's coordination requirements among the CILSS agencies.

The success of CILSS as a regional organization, marshalling the collective efforts of its members for the social and economic betterment of their populations is certainly in the U.S. interest. Preparing the CILSS agencies to do their jobs better depends to a large degree on collective support and cooperation among AID missions. No other donor commits as many resources to technical assistance for the CILSS Secretariat, INSAH, and AGRHYMET. In these efforts, however, mission directors might take more cognizance of the dual nature of their responsibilities: on the one hand to conduct bilateral programs and share the results with their colleagues; on the other hand to reinforce one another as each carries out regional activities whose results benefit all the Sahelian countries.

The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) found little consistency among the views of the managers of the various SDP management components on the subject of Sahelian organizations, regional and national, and their past and potential future contributions to economic growth in the region. Given the number of such organizations in operation, some confusion is inevitable along with some working at cross purposes; e.g., CILSS (including INSAH and AGRHYMET); the Entente Council; the

PREVIOUS PAGE BLANK

Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS): the Economic Commission for West Africa (French acronym, CEAO); the U.N.'s Office of Sudano-Sahelian Affairs (UNSSO); the West African Monetary Union (French acronym, (UMAO), to mention only the most active. While some cooperation exists (e.g., between CILSS and CEAO on solar energy), most of the organizations are jealous of their own prerogatives and wary of their peers. Among all these mentioned, CILSS is unique in its membership (others have more or less member countries) and in its primary concentration on "food self-sufficiency under conditions of ecological balance and self-sustaining growth." CILSS is also unique in its relationships with the donor communities, namely OECD and OPEC, the former through the Club du Sahel.

Most AID managers in the field (as well as some Ambassadors) are reluctant to recognize the fairly obvious fact that the regional unity of the Sahelians in the form of their organization, CILSS, has rallied the overall level of donor humanitarian and development assistance (and the high level of the U.S. share), rather than the political or other importance of the countries considered separately. With the latter as a basis for U.S. support, two (or perhaps four) countries would have sizable development programs, another three receive food assistance (plus some participant training), and the last draw some reconstruction and relief aid (possibly from ESF).

Strangely enough, the mutually reinforcing benefits of bilateral and regional assistance in each Sahelian country are largely overlooked (or decried) in favor of increased bilateral activity. Another consequence is the lack of widespread interest or concern within bilateral missions with the growth, development, and success of CILSS and its regional components in their endeavors toward formulation of regional policies, goals, and targets as a framework for national development programs. What comment missions do generate has a tendency to be negative and critical. Little attention is paid to the marked progress evident within the CILSS organization, in particular its Executive Secretariat and specialized agencies, as it moves toward better social and economic programs for the Sahelian population. The Club Secretariat, the SDP Regional Office, and a variety of donor-initiated activities have combined in their contribution to the advancement, but much work remains to be done.

The CILSS/Club cooperation has evolved through working groups, colloquia, and ad hoc seminars, producing policy papers and outlines on many fundamental topics: food crops (rainfed and irrigated); cereals policies; food strategies; village hydraulics; ecology/forestry; and recurrent costs. The CILSS Secretariat is changing its mode of operation by refraining from project management and solicitation of donor support for individual projects. The principal emphasis is shifting to policy formulation and research, support of member country-donor dialogues, and engagement of short-term expert support.

For over a year, a Reappraisal Committee (Comite de Reflexion) has been reviewing CILSS' overall performance and seeking ways for future improvement. The Committee submitted a report in camera to the January 1984 CILSS meeting in Niamey, which was returned for further work and deliberation. According to some reports, the findings eventually could produce widespread changes in the effectiveness of the organization. Even more important, the Niamey meeting concluded with appointment of a new leadership and management team: the President of Niger as CILSS President; The Gambia's Minister of Rural Development as Minister Coordinator; and a Niger cabinet member as Executive Secretary.

The Fifth Club Conference in Brussels in late 1983 forecast some of the principles and challenges that face the new CILSS managers:

a. Among the basic principles enunciated by the CILSS/Club decision makers were:

-- development is the primary concern of all Sahelians; governments and donors should combine and provide the necessary environment for broad-scaled participation;

-- the whole system for allocation and employment of natural resources must support development;

-- the idea of a "contract" between Sahelian and international communities should be the spirit behind common actions, agreed and taken.

b. High on the list of common Sahelian/donor priorities are:

-- more effective technical packages for agriculture;

-- research on the socio-ecological balance;

-- essential role of irrigated agriculture to food security;

-- complementarity between irrigated and rainfed agriculture.

c. Wide agreement underscored the necessity for harmonization and simplification of aid procedures with the objectives of:

-- accelerating external resource transfers; and

-- better matching the resources to Sahelian needs.

A major development at the Brussels meeting was concurrence on the principle of concerted action in the formulation of procedures for country-level coordination of donor activities in

support of planning the development and humanitarian programs of the CILSS members (discussed below in another context).

In its Progress Report, SMAT identified the sporadic and unstructured character of the Sahel AID-CILSS relationship as an unfortunate case of omission. Bringing the CILSS Minister Coordinator and the CILSS (and possibly Club) Executive Secretary(ies) together with AID mission directors periodically could foster greater mutual understanding and cooperation (the hosting AID director should invite the Minister of Rural Development as a matter of protocol and courtesy). A proposal along these lines might be welcomed by the CILSS leadership just taking office. Following up such meetings with expanded contact at the country level might be equally and mutually beneficial. Opportunities for encouraging the country-donor coordination process might also arise.

The CILSS/Club conference mentioned above approved "the principle of strengthened concerted action and coordination between donors, on the initiative and under the leadership of interested Sahelian governments." The two Secretariats were directed to support such "progress reviews." This opening could be most useful toward achieving the level and substance of coordination originally envisioned for the Club. Eventually a more efficient planning and allocation process might emerge for donor aid being programmed into the Sahel. Donors could also avoid the oft-mentioned accusation of "ganging up" on recipient countries. Experience from such meetings could influence the SDSS/CDSS process positively through a more equitable matching of donor resources, in particular those of the U.S., with priority and mutually agreed country requirements.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8

That the Director, SWA (and the Director, SDPRO) encourage the Sahel Mission Directors' Council to invite the CILSS Minister Coordinator and the CILSS and Club Executive Secretaries (along with the hosting country Minister of Rural Development) to the next-scheduled SMDC meeting and to annual meetings thereafter.

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

On the operational level, the mutual cooperation between the CILSS/Club Secretariats has expanded steadily and both profit from the deliberations of common working groups and other development policy forums. Some policy disagreements persist, but this is not unexpected; e.g., irrigated vs. rainfed

agriculture and regional vs. national food security stocks. A standard CILSS project identification document (PID) is a reality, however, extended mutual efforts have yet to produce a CILSS evaluation mechanism, despite the advantages that could result. Changes in management and direction at the Sahel Institute promise to induce more Club attention to the staff development, organizational, and research needs of that CILSS affiliate.

Again in its Progress Report, SMAT suggested a series of actions geared to improve management of the Secretariats' relations with CILSS entities, with donors, and with each other:

a. In order to add both form and substance to the continuing dialogue with donors, the two Secretariats should:

- -- outline formally a set of intermediate, five-year goals aimed at CILSS/Club objectives by the year 2000;
- -- define "food self-sufficiency" with more precision to enable donors to relate their own development strategies more effectively to Sahelian requirements (N.B. In its March 13, 1984 Action Memo for the AA/AFR, SMAT proposed an initiative on CILSS/Club strategy revision that);
- -- use "progress reviews" to expand donor dialogue and participation in the country planning processes;
- -- encourage donors (in "progress reviews" and otherwise) to identify sectors or projects of preference as part of a negotiating framework for improving country planning and eliminating duplication.

b. The Secretariats might schedule some preliminary meetings within CILSS for purposes of planning and coordination (to be followed by meetings with those donors providing technical assistance to the CILSS Executive Secretariat). Among the agenda items should be:

- -- two (or perhaps five) year programs for INSAH and AGRHYMET, both planned, discussed, and agreed in advance among the CILSS parties;
- -- strengthened Secretariat management, e.g., add a Deputy Executive Secretary for continuity;
- -- revised staffing pattern, narrowing requirements to those essential to primary responsibilities; namely, policy formulation and research; and support of country-donor dialogue and coordination;

-- realistic biennial work plans, identifying and relating all undertakings to anticipated results as back-up for a program budget, allocating (and ultimately accounting for) combined CILSS member-donor contributions;

-- standard personnel policies and guidelines (with CILSS standard pay scales), linking positions with salaries and benefits (see below for further commentary on this).

By way of background to some of the immediately foregoing suggestions, it is important to understand the plight of the CILSS Executive Secretary. This official has been unable to control effectively the personnel situation within the Secretariat, except for those personnel, seconded by member states and governed by rules and regulations approved by the CILSS members. Donors, on the other hand, apply a variety of standards. The total impact of these has been different salaries (usually higher than CILSS, even for the same qualifications and work), benefits, and project support (such things as vehicles, travel, seminar expenses, research) among the "non-CILSS" staff members and between them and the CILSS staff.

Some examples will illustrate the problem; one internationaly-funded expert--a Sahelian--draws an annual salary twice that of the Executive Secretary; one donor-funded expert--also a Sahelian--is paid only salary and minimum benefits; another donor-funded Sahelian receives an international agency-level salary, housing, displacement and other allowances, and has a vehicle, a travel budget, and funds for research. Many of these "experts" are comparatively free agents because they answer only to their sponsors on matters of finance. On matters of substance, most have split loyalties, but "he who pays normally calls the step." Generally, CILSS' interests are served, yet the undermining influence of some of these disparities on morale, collaboration, and even discipline is obvious.

After the CILSS/Club Secretariats have completed all necessary preparations, an effort could be launched to introduce some structure into the annual budget review process and negotiating round with the donors. Most important is the personnel obstacle that must be hurdled if CILSS' Executive Secretariat is to achieve the level of professionalism and influence that the member countries and donors anticipated in forming the CILSS/Club relationship. As a major donor to the Executive Secretariat budget, the U.S. can exert an overriding influence on the issues. In fact, one donor representative told a SMAT member that AID had to take the lead if change were to ensue. Other donors have little individual leverage to induce solutions to the problems and the Executive Secretary may have even less.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9

1. The Director of SWA request the Liaison Officers to the CILSS and Club Secretariats to explore with their respective counterparts, a number of management improvements for consideration by the CILSS Secretariat, for example:

a. developing program budgets for INSAH and AGRHYMET; strengthening managerial capability and revising staff assignments and numbers; and developing a consolidated Secretariat program budget and back-up work plans;

b. Introducing standard procedures and practices for the guidance of all donors funding "expert" positions within the Secretariat.

2. The CILSS and Club Lisison Officers report expeditiously on the results of their endeavors as a prelude to later discussions among donors on the general subject of coordinating efforts to improve the management and operating capability of the CILSS Secretariat.

AID's Sahel Regional AID Coordination and Planning Project (625-0911) and Sahel Water Data Project (625-0940) provide a major share of the resources suporting CILSS institutional development. The Planning Project funds operating expenses and long-term U.S. technical advisors for the Secretariat; a part of the staff and operating costs of the Club Secretariat; operating, equipment, and research costs of INSAH; and short-term FAO consulting services for Sahelian countries and AID Missions. The Water Data Project focuses entirely on AGRHYMET development (which incidentally receives additional support from USAID Niger bilateral projects).

Reviewing the foregoing summary leads quickly to a conclusion that relating AID's regional concerns and objectives to those of CILSS poses problems for both sides. No single agency speaks for all AID offices in the Sahel on matters of regional or national concern to CILSS. The Executive Secretary has correctly observed that conflicting decisions can emanate from USAID Upper Volta (CILSS Liaison), Mali (SDP Regional Office), and Paris (U.S. Rep to the Club Secretariat). Dealing directly with Washington, particularly on major policy matters, would be ideal, but CILSS recognizes the impracticality and unlikelihood of such a solution. The Executive Secretary has frequently suggested that one among the three principal contacts be placed "in charge," although CILSS has no particular preference among them.

Among the possibilities for improving this situation are the following:

a. Incorporate managerial responsibilities for the

Planning Project into the SDP Regional Office, designating that Office as the principal point of contact for all matters relating to CILSS regional functions. (This might have to await favorable consideration of establishing this CILSS liaison staff in Ouagadougou under SPCO).

b. Vest in the Planning Project Officer the responsibility for coordination among the CILSS Secretariat, INSAH, and AGRHYMET on all matters of policy and budget as they affect U.S. support. Continuous exchanges of information and periodic meetings among the AID liaison officers to these organizations would be required.

c. Develop a better system for use of the short-term FAO consulting service by Sahelian countries and AID missions or discontinue the service and cancel that part of the project.

d. Establish operating procedures for the distribution to USAIDs and Embassies of all major policy documents and studies prepared by the CILSS or Club Secretariats and by AGRHYMET. Comments could be invited, when and as feasible, and the results returned to originators for consideration.

e. The Planning Project Officer should advise all USAIDs on a continuing basis of upcoming Country-CILSS or regional CILSS meetings on development issues and encourage AID attendance and participation. (This could be particularly useful to strengthening the roles of the CILSS Coordinators at the national level.)

An evaluation of the Planning Project will soon get underway. SMAT members conversed informally with the SWA officers directing this activity and shared impressions and suggestions, most of which appear in SMAT reports or other documents. One point that bears repeating and particular emphasis is that of building some form of <u>conditionality</u> into a continuation of this Project. Up to now, funds have been provided for a variety of legitimate operating costs, however, these have not been linked to any tangible product, whether improvement in office operations, completion of a certain report, conduct of a seminar complete with all follow-up actions, or the like. Introducing such a dimension should enable the AID-CILSS counterparts to set goals and objectives whose achievement could be the trigger for continued support. Absent such a requirement, the incentive for improvement hardly exists.

March 23, 1984

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA

FROM: Sahel Management Assessment Team

THRU: Director, Office of Sahel and West Africa Affairs

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Management of the Sahel Development Program - Program Management

The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) submitted an Action Memorandum through Director, SWA for AA/AFR on March 13, 1984 covering the concept, strategy, and organization of the Sahel Development Program (SDP). This memorandum provides additional recommendations and information regarding program management processes.

Moving Money Syndrome

In response to the "moving money" syndrome and the unrelenting pressure to meet obligation deadlines, SMAT proposed in its memorandum of March 13, 1984 to AA/AFR that AA/AFR request A/AID's concurrence in using the no-year funding authority provided by Congress for the Sahel program. A draft memorandum to A/AID has been provided to AFR/SWA (see ATTACHMENT A).

Mission Management and Staffing

Both mission management and staffing have shown some improvement during the last three years, but more must be accomplished in terms of the job to be done. A detailed presentation on Sahel personnel problems, including suggestions for improving the situation, is included in ATTACHMENT B.

Although more experienced, better trained, and language proficient personnel need to be assigned to the Sahel, SMAT is skeptical that this will take place. The Sahel posts are perceived (erroneously in our judgment) to be among the worst posts available to AID personnel, so there generally are few volunteers. The Sahel is not considered priority by those handling assignments--or too many other areas are of equal or higher priority. The Special Incentive Differential was expected to attract personnel to the Sahel, but the Department of State is insisting that the "cap" apply, virtually eliminating the allowance as an incentive. The Agency is lowering the French language requirements as a prerequisite to entry into the Senior Foreign Service because it does not have enough Operating Expense funds to finance the needed training, so greater French fluency in the Sahel seems unlikely.

Given the foregoing factors, SMAT has concluded that the level of experience of personnel assigned to the Sahel will continue at about the same as the recent past. Looking for ways to improve the productivity of existing mission personnel, the Team's specific ideas fall into the following categories:

a) streamlining and making mission operations more effective (a message has been prepared for transmission by AFR/SWA to the field--ATTACHMENT C);

b) reducing demands on the mission--this is discussed in the Financial Management and AID/W-Field Relationships sections below; and

c) increasing short term training in the Sahel for U.S. and foreign national direct-hire and contract personnel and host country project directors and counterparts.

The Agency has increased the number of Project Implementation Courses (PICs), and these generally have been well received by the participants. However, the Sahel is far from obtaining a critical mass of PIC-trained personnel. Some of the restrictions on who can attend are not appropriate in the Sahel--some of the older officers need the training, and IDIs and those just out of IDI training also should receive it. The latter are often of necessity doing project officer jobs. The missions need to make more effective use of local national employees. Of equal or greater importance is improving the skills, particularly managerial, of host country project directors and other counterparts, whose effective performance can reduce mission workload substantially.

SMAT recommends that AFR prepare a regional project under which stepped-up management training, including project management, can be carried out in the Sahel, particularly in the countries with large programs. It is recommended further that the design team for the project explore the possibility of arranging training programs that can be attended concurrently by host country officials, mission employees, and AID-funded contractors. This would help improve working relations in the country, and would permit the training to be financed mostly, if not entirely, from program funds.

The project design team should obtain information from appropriate AID/W offices, but should also review on-going short term training programs such as the Francophone Seminar in Management of African Development, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. A draft proposal for a short term management program was submitted by Denver Research Institute to the Malian mission in 1979. The proposal is

summarized in "Development Is A Joint Effort: A Discussion Paper on Improving the Effectiveness of USAID-Funded Technical Assistance to Mali," December 15, 1980. This report and the December 1981 evaluation of the Operation Haute Vallee project in Mali provide a number of suggestions regarding training needs and ways to improve project and program management. Another useful reference would be the working paper, "AID's Response to the Implementation Needs of the 1980s," Development Support Bureau, AID, June 1981.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 10

AFR/PD, in coordination with AFR/SWA, organize a design team to prepare a Project Paper for a regional project for increasing in-country project and program management training for the development team: host country counterparts, contract personnel, and USAID and project officers.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

Financial Management

Some of the factors which contributed to the specific problems of financial control and accounting are similar to those cited above for program management in general:

1. Given the pressure to obligate funds, agreements were signed which required a certain level of funds accountability, but missions did not assure that the capability existed to meet the requirements. Since host governments had functioning fiscal systems, it was assumed that there would be no problem.

2. Mission Controller's offices did not exist in all countries when the rapid build-up began in the mid-1970s. Controller's offices generally have not been staffed consistently with senior experienced personnel. Vacancies of long standing have been common.

3. The internal audit system initially was ineffective; currently, it is essentially an external audit, creating workload for missions without commensurate benefits.

The pressure to obligate funds is still a problem and has been addressed above. Direct-hire staffing in Controller's

offices in the Sahel is better than in the past, but still needs attention. The shortfall in direct-hire positions, and general shortage of capable local hires, has led to a substantial number of personal service contracts, often with third country nationals. With these expedients, the Controllers have gotten much more on top of the financial problems associated with their programs. They have started doing project financial reviews (or contracting for them in some cases), and providing training and guidance to host country personnel serving as accountants for AID-funded project activities.

The problems which led to the enactment of Section 121(d) could have been avoided if standard procedures had been followed at the time of project design and project obligation, and if missions had been appropriately staffed with qualified personnel. Since they were not, the Agency now has one more barnacle, one that has added a heavy workload on the Mission Controller's office, USAID project officers, and host country Project Directors.

The requirements for 121(d) certification were made more onerous by the internal process adopted in the Africa Bureau (which led to delays in obligations) and the reporting requirements related thereto. Although the reporting requirements were relaxed somewhat in December 1983, a significant workload still exists, which adds little of significance to the assurance in AID/W that appropriate action is being taken. Situations change from day to day in the various projects. Mission personnel should be using their time to monitor their projects rather than sending reports to AID/W that can be used to generate cables requesting more information. It is time to re-delegate the Section 121(d) certification to the USAID Director or Representative, who is responsible in any case, and discontinue all reporting except that required for submission to Congress.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 11

AFR/SWA prepare a cable to the field in which AA/AFR re-delegates Section 121(d) certification to USAID Directors and AID Representatives and revises (reduces) reporting requirements on the maintenance of Section 121(d) certification.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

Given the problems encountered in accounting for U.S.-financed local currencies, the Africa Bureau contracted with USDA, which contracted with Virginia Polytechnic Institute, to train host country accountants and project directors. VPI and Controller personnel see the VPI activity as marginally related to the ongoing requirements for Section 121(d) certification. Furthermore, differences of view prevail on whether AID must insist on a system parallel to the host government's own accounting system or whether minor additions to the latter would suffice for AID's needs. The VPI project is scheduled for a mid-course evaluation in May-June 1984.

Host governments were initially angry at the way Section 121(d) requirements were imposed, because they applied only in the Sahel and because they resulted in the cessation of project activity in many cases--some for an extended period. However, it appears now that most governments appreciate the need for improved financial management and are pleased with the prospect of their personnel receiving training in accounting and financial management techniques. Nevertheless, some Sahelian project directors feel that AID reimbursement procedures and levels of advances hamper efficient project operations. Procedures for handling the local currency accounts and the bases for certification vary more between missions than would seem justified by the variation in program contents or country situations. A timely review appears to be in order of the 121(d) operations of the USAIDs, the relationship of USAID requirements for project accounting with country financial management systems, and the financial management training needs of host countries that AID could appropriately provide. Such a study could also incorporate the evaluation of the VPI project.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12

AFR/SWA send a message to the Sahel missions advising them of the SMAT proposal for a study of 121(d) operations and related issues and requesting comments on the timing of such a study and on the suggested scope of work (SMAT has provided a draft cable for SWA --ATTACHMENT D).

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

In years past, the audit function was essentially for producing in-house improvements, and the audit program at individual missions took into account the Mission Director's

concerns. Being used to this system, Directors in the Sahel asked for audits. Initially, few auditors were available, and missions had to wait for a year or more before an audit could be scheduled. Some auditors did not (and do not now) have French, nor an understanding of French financial systems. Thus, audits have reported that documentation or systems did not exist when in fact they did.

In recent years, the audit system has been seen in the field as an external audit system, geared to impressing outside sources rather than working for internal improvements. This perception is understandable given that executive summaries sometimes include headlines more harsh than the conclusions in the main text and, when summarizing a number of audits a year or two old, do not acknowledge this circumstance.

In such cases the Africa Bureau should have sought to have the language modified. Furthermore, in the summary audits, the Bureau should have advised the Inspector General of the Bureau and/or the Missions' actions taken to deal with the problems cited--particularly those from old audits. Some time ago the Inspector General asked to meet with AA/AFR to discuss one summary audit findings, but no action was taken by AA/AFR. The Bureau's unregulated system of responses to audits, many citing Sahelian problems requiring attention, has contributed significantly to the poor image of the Sahel program both inside and outside of the Agency--nearly as much as the audits themselves.

Mission Directors should be reminded that the audit function is not now designed to provide preventive maintenance type of assistance; rather, Directors must arrange for their own ongoing management and financial reviews and/or build into each project provisions for annual reviews by outside, independent sources. Further, the Bureau should emphasize to Directors the importance of having internal controls to insure that audit reports are responded to fully and quickly. Perhaps more importantly, the Africa Bureau needs to strengthen its own system for responding to draft audits and for monitoring the answering and closing of audit recommendations. Either a Deputy Assistant Administrator or a Special Assistant in the office of the Assistant Administrator should be given the responsibility for reviewing substantively the audit responses of the Bureau and monitoring the closing of audit recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 13

AA/AFR designates _____ to provide a substantive review of responses to draft IG audits and to monitor Bureau progress in closing audit recommendations, including keeping the AA/AFR informed of delinquencies and action taken by the Bureau to rectify the situation.

APPROVED _____

DISAPPROVED _____

DATE _____

RECOMMENDATION NO. 14

The aforenamed designee prepare a message to the field advising of the new designation, stressing the need to arrange appropriate ongoing financial review of projects, and emphasizing the importance of good internal mission controls to ensure that draft audits are answered quickly and fully and that audit recommendations are closed appropriately and expeditiously.

APPROVED _____

DISAPPROVED _____

DATE _____

AID/W-Field Relationships

As indicated in SMAT's Progress Report, the field attributes many of its problems to AID/W demands and/or tardy responses. The Team found plenty of examples to justify the field's concern, recognizing that AID/W and AFR need in many instances be looked upon as synonymous. Being so far removed from the action, AID/W personnel can lose sight of the real purpose of the AID program: to promote development in recipient countries. Thus, the priorities in AID/W often do not reflect field needs and priorities. AID/W(AFR) must launch a conscious effort toward a more supportive role to the field. AID/W needs to reduce its reporting and project documentation requirements and to stop its second-guessing of the field based on documentation. Instead, AFR (and other AID/W offices) should ensure that policy guidance to the field reflects the special nature and legislative flexibilities of the Sahel program, expedite responses to field requests, and set up mechanisms to facilitate providing the

mission support needed on a timely basis. AID/W should maintain a review role, but that role needs to be re-structured and made more effective.

The AID/W(AFR) review in the project review and approval process has contributed little to the improvement of projects, and at times has even been responsible for inappropriate design which subsequently led to the cancellation of projects. SMAT applauds the decision to give additional approval authority to the field, but regrets that staff offices have subsequently made decisions on individual projects to negate the delegations. Project Papers should not be seen as documents that respond to every conceivable question that someone in AID/W can think of; rather, they should present the essential elements of the design of the project and summarize the analysis that led to the design. The Project Paper then provides a basis for evaluation of the project at appropriate times.

This concept is best realized, and the projects are more likely to relate to host country realities, if Project Papers are approved in the field. General state of the art technical information and evaluative data available in AID/W must be provided to missions, as was proposed in the original concept of the Development Information Service. This does not require AID/W review of the completed Project Paper--that is essentially too late to make a useful input in most cases. Of even more importance to good project design is the sharing on a more systematic basis of project experience and sector analysis in the Sahel. The foregoing concepts and ideas should be incorporated in the modus operandi of the Sahel Program Coordinator's Office which was proposed in the SMAT memorandum to AA/AFR dated March 13, 1984.

Besides the reduction in 121(d) reporting already recommended, SMAT sees the need for AFR to insist that some, selected circular messages to the field need not necessarily go to all Sahel missions, particularly the smaller ones. Further, Sahel missions should only respond when the subject matter is directly relevant to their program or the host country's development priorities. AID/W and AFR requesting offices should exercise judgment and discretion in monitoring follow-up to many circulars.

The Bureau is commended for reducing the project implementation progress reporting from quarterly to semi-annually. SMAT suggests that the Bureau go even further and require those reports on an exception basis, i.e., only for projects whose physical progress is significantly lagging or whose pipeline is substantially larger than projected. Even in those cases, the AID/W review should be to determine whether AID/W can assist in overcoming problems or whether implementation

problems are showing up consistently in the same mission or in the same kind of projects (i.e., whether some AID/W direct review action or policy guidance is needed).

RECOMMENDATION NO. 15

AFR/PD revise the project implementation progress reporting procedures to provide for exceptional reporting.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

SMAT suggests that one or more regional projects should be set up to facilitate pre-project implementation activities and to improve the support of project operations (particularly of AID-funded contractors). The same projects could provide Mission Directors greater flexibility on initiatives to promote policy dialogue or support the indigenous private sector and to respond to changes in the local development environment or Washington policies. A message on these ideas has been submitted to AFR/SWA for transmission to the field for comment (ATTACHMENT E).

Last year the Mission Director in Niger requested outside experts to advise him on ways to improve mission management and to prepare a USAID Operations Manual. OAR/Banjul also requested some outside management assistance. This should be encouraged and facilitated by AID/W. SMAT suggests that a management study focusing on streamlining internal clearances and paper flow and the monitoring of project implementation and mission management improvements is needed in Mali and Upper Volta and possibly Senegal. A short review would also be helpful in Niger because the follow-up visit originally planned did not occur. The foregoing suggestions are included in SMAT's draft message to the field on improving mission management (ATTACHMENT C). Missions should also update the management improvement plans discussed in their responses to the AFR/SWA request for information on improvements in the management of the SDP (1983 State 8414, 1/12/83). AA/AFR may wish to support these SMAT suggestions and provide for AFR monitoring of progress.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 16

AA/AFR designate _____ as Mission Management Review Officer with the responsibility for monitoring mission management improvements in the Sahel (and elsewhere if deemed needed) and marshalling appropriate assistance for the missions for their improvement efforts.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

RECOMMENDATION NO. 17

The above named designee prepare a message to the field referencing the SMAT proposals on mission management improvements and requesting missions to prepare Management Improvement Plans.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

Another function of the proposed Mission Management Review Officer would be to plan periodic team visits to review mission operations. In addition, special ad hoc visits would be arranged when AID/W begins receiving reports of mission morale problems, when mission responses to Agency requirements are consistently inappropriate or delinquent, or when recurring problems are being reflected in the exception project reporting, audits, or evaluations. The Bureau often has not responded quickly or decisively in such cases in the past in the Sahel. The proposal here is for the establishment of a unit something like the Operations Appraisal Staff (OAS) that existed in recent years (and similar arrangements earlier which served AID Administrators). With the reduced personnel ceilings, the unit may be very small and utilize outside personnel or personnel on the complement. When the SPCO is established, as recommended in the SMAT memorandum to AA/AFR dated March 13, 1984, the SPCO Coordinator probably would wish to have an OAS-type unit. At such time, the AFR unit could focus on SPCO operations and less on the individual Sahel missions.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 18

AFR's Mission Management Review Officer designated in Recommendation No. 16 prepare a proposal for AA/AFR for establishing an OAS-type unit to carry out periodic and ad hoc reviews of Sahel mission operations and prepare a plan for the first year's operations.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

Until such time as the SPCO is operational, AID/W needs to assure that audit and evaluation results are being analyzed for lessons learned and the analysis provided to project designers.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 19

AA/AFR appoint a task force with representation from AFR/DP, AFR/PD, and AFR/PMR to propose means to ensure that audit and evaluation reports are reviewed for lessons learned and the findings synthesized and made available to missions and design and evaluation teams.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

ATTACHMENTS:

A - Draft AA/AFR memo to A/AID on "no-year" funding
B - SMAT memo to Director, SWA on Personnel
C - Draft cable addressing Mission Management
D - Draft cable addressing Financial Management
E - Draft cable addressing proposed regional projects

ATTACHMENT A

DRAFT ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM : AA/AFR

SUBJECT: Sahel Management Assessment
-- Use of No-Year Funding Authority

REF : Information Memorandum for the Administrator dated February 1, 1984, Subject: Sahel Management Assessment

Referenced Information Memorandum transmitted a synopsis of the Sahel Management Assessment Team's (SMAT) preliminary findings and recommendations. A particular issue of interest to A/AID was the proposal to use "no-year" funding authority in the Sahel. The Team has now made that a formal recommendation. The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth a procedure for using the authority and obtain your approval to move ahead on this recommendation.

In considering the SMAT recommendation, we wanted to be sure that any revised system would still require a disciplined approach to obligations and that we would not end up with reduced appropriations. The procedures set forth below should satisfy those concerns. In addition, we propose to discuss the procedures with Congressional staffers before implementation.

SMAT has suggested three ways in which use of no-year authority should lead to improved management of the Sahel program, either through reducing workload or by improving workload scheduling:

1. Manage the year-end obligation deadlines. Obligation deadlines have often produced hastily prepared documentation, postponing negotiation of implementation issues until after agreements were signed. If funds had remained available until negotiations were completed, even into the first months of the following fiscal year, much ill will and delayed project implementation could have been avoided.

2. Smooth out the obligation cycle. Often no funds are available for most if not all of the first quarter of a fiscal year. This could be overcome by deliberately carrying over a small amount of funds. Greater flexibility to meet unforeseen circumstances and permit some smoothing out of the obligation cycle could flow from such arrangements.

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3. Forward or fully fund certain activities. Many projects have funds added each year, despite the consequent workload. The hand-to-mouth funding sometimes leads to project implementation problems, e.g. in recruitment by contractors of long-term personnel. If obligations for new activities were to fall short because of limits on new starts or because of the use of the no-year authority, some of the otherwise unobligated funds could be used to forward fund projects that were operating smoothly.

We must remind ourselves that the Sahel Program, which engages eight beneficiary nations and over 20 donors, poses some real and sometimes unique challenges to the process of multilateral programming, allocating, and obligating of resources. No-year funds could relieve some of the complexity introduced by the following factors:

-- No Sahelian and few, if any, donor fiscal years coincide with that of the U.S.;

-- All but one Sahelian country is Moslem, meaning high holy days are currently in the months of July-August; thus,

-- Religious commitments limit Sahelian decision-makers' work schedules at a critical (to AID) juncture;

-- Donors dialogue the year round, but at headquarters or their capitals, rather than "in country."

Regarding procedures, we propose to advise the Sahel missions that we are prepared to use the no-year authority when it is clear that it will reduce or smooth out their workload or otherwise result in improved mission management or project implementation. We will ask for their anticipated obligations for the rest of the current fiscal year plus those for the first quarter of FY 1985. We will advise missions we are prepared to consider requests to carry over specific FY 1984 allocations into the first quarter of 1985 if the additional time is needed to complete negotiations of a project agreement. If any doubt exists, however, about meeting the first quarter deadline, we would withdraw the funds for use elsewhere or request that they be shifted to forward fund other projects.

Concurrent with requesting anticipated obligations, we would ask for information on projects that are running smoothly and for which advance funding would make sense from either a portfolio management or project implementation point of view. Thus, we would be ready to move quickly to shift funds if that became necessary. Missions would also be alerted to the possibility of

forward funding for certain projects. In that way, they could plan for such an eventuality and not have to act precipitously as has often happened in the past.

It has been suggested that our colleagues in State might not approve of the use of the no-year authority because of the potential impact on annual funding levels. We believe State will be concerned only if the recipient countries are concerned. The procedures proposed should be acceptable to recipient countries. The impact will usually be only a deferral of an obligation by up to three months, and the level might not change at all because of forward funding of another project(s) in the mission's portfolio.

The State concern is most relevant in the use of ESF, but these procedures would not apply to ESF. For the longer run, the Agency and missions should focus more on resource transfers and less on obligations. Resource transfers reflect program implementation and are thus more meaningful indicators of progress toward development. Resource flows should increase if these procedures are followed because project implementation will be accelerated. We will discuss the proposed use of the no-year authority with AF.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 20

A/AID approve in principle the use of the no-year funding authority in the Sahel beginning this fiscal year in accordance with procedures set forth herein.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

RECOMMENDATION NO. 21

A/AID authorize AA/AFR, in consultation and coordination with LEG, to discuss the SMAT recommendation and AID's proposed response with Congressional staffers.

APPROVED_____

DISAPPROVED_____

DATE_____

ATTACHMENT B

March 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT)

TO: Director, Office of Sahel/West Africa Affairs

SUBJECT: Personnel

Attached are two copies of Personnel which will be included in Section II of our final report.

I am transmitting this section to you at this time so you may initiate the necessary action on the recommendations immediately without having to wait for the final report.

SMAT has discussed this subject with various members of the Office of Personnel Management, (M/PM), Deputy Director R. Parsons, Policy Development (Evaluation) Division, and Training Division. They have expressed an interest in SMAT's findings and are looking forward to discussing the subject in detail with members of your staff as well as members of Africa's Office of Program Management Resources (AFR/PMR).

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Personnel

Staffing the Sahel Missions has always been difficult because of the French language requirement, harsh environment, isolated posts, lack of education facilities for dependents, inadequate medical facilities, and a general preception by most AID personnel that the Sahelian countries are some, if not the worst, of all countries that AID is working in. This has also resulted in positions not being filled for long periods of time. As a consequence, the posts are generally staffed with young and inexperienced personnel or individuals who accept a Sahel post as a least preferred assignment. Many individuals are serving in their first assignment with AID and have received little or no orientation on conditions and the environment in the Sahel. The combination of these factors has resulted in individuals spending the majority of their tours either learning their jobs or exerting less than their full capability by not being sufficiently interested, motivated or trained.

Unfortunately, many individuals are more concerned with the benefits they will receive: housing; creature comforts; R&R destinations; job opportunities for their dependents; allowances, etc., than with their job assignment. Many direct hire employees are also frustrated in their assignments because of the inordinate amount of AID paper work: PIOs; cables; checking financial reports; etc., which detracts from full use of their professional skills and hampers the implementation process. Most individuals are painfully aware that their careers are subject to carrying out their assigned task, even though the majority of the tasks inspire little imagination, professional growth, initiative or produce real job satisfaction.

AID has recognized for more than ten years the need to increase French language training of its direct hire personnel to meet the language requirements of the Sahel. Yet with each personnel assignment, adequate French language is a major stumbling block. One of the primary reasons for not qualifying more individuals in French has been lack of Operating Expense funds to pay for the language training.

Given the fact that AID has obligated nearly a billion dollars in the Sahel, during this same period, there obviously has not been a sense of priority to find the necessary resources to equip and adequately train the personnel serving in the Sahel. Since there is such an overwhelming need to be able to speak French to be effective in executing the program in the Sahel, AID should exhaust all remedies to train sufficient numbers of personnel in French to administer the Sahel program over the next ten years.

If supplemental funding is required to meet the training needs, the Agency should seek relief from Congress to satisfy this special requirement. An alternative would be to use SDP program funds for this essential requirement of the implementation of the Sahel program.

Improving the management of the Sahel will motivate personnel with a sense of purpose, job satisfaction, and accomplishment. Changing the program mix, having better designed projects, receiving timely

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decisions, reducing the pressure to obligate funds, reduction of paperwork, closer working relationship with host country nationals, stronger leadership, will all provide a professional challenge and bolster morale.

Equally important is a need to train, stimulate, and develop the Foreign National employees (FSNs). The time invested in training FSN employees would improve Mission efficiencies and continuity by lessening the frenetic feeling of being over-worked and understaffed. Unfortunately too many of the America personnel have forgotten the precept of working in a developing country, i.e., to "work themselves out of a job". The turnover of American technicians, both direct hire and contract employees, disrupts continuity of the implementation of the program. Improving the FSN staff would provide the greater continuity of staff which is essential in the long-term development process of the Sahel. Greater emphasis must be placed upon providing staff development training and giving additional responsibilities to FSN employees.

The majority of the technical assistance positions are staffed by contract employees, institutional and personal service. The need is equally great to insure that each of them has received proper orientation about the Sahel and is qualified to do their job. They share the same responsibility as direct hire personnel to train FSN employees to assume positions of greater responsibility.

Groups of individuals, even an entire mission, could be recognized for their successful accomplishments of improved management and improved project implementation. Suitable criteria would have to be developed to measure the effectiveness of the groups and their accomplishments as well as the types of awards. For example, if an entire mission were recognized for its outstanding management; successful projects implemented; reduction of waste; improvement in the host country economic development; then all members of the mission would share in the recognition and be rewarded. If the award were cash, each participating individual could receive a "bonus". Group awards would foster team building and stimulate personnel into taking a greater interest in their assignments. Morale would probably improve and individuals might repeat assignments or extend their tours of duty.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 22

The Africa Bureau, in collaboration with the Office of Personnel (M-PM) design suitable programs for:

-- Increased French language training

-- Orientation of personnel assigned to the Sahel

-- Staff Development Training

-- Improved incentive and awards program

ATTACHMENT C

DRAFT CABLE TO SAHEL MISSIONS

SUBJECT: Assessment of AID Sahel Program Management Capacities and Requirements -- SMAT Report on Mission Management

SUMMARY: This message provides: (a) a synopsis of the report of the Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) to AA/AFR on Program Management; and (b) SMAT suggestions to USAID Directors and AID Representatives for improving internal mission management. The complete text of the Action Memorandum to AA/AFR will be included in the SMAT final report which will be transmitted soon. AFR comments re the recommendations in the Action Memorandum or this message will be provided separately.

Synopsis of Action Memorandum to AA/AFR on Program Management. The principal contributors to program management problems in the Sahel, other than those related to program content, have been:

1. Agency efforts to obligate large amounts of money for too great a number and variety of activities, using methods (e.g., host country contracting) unsuitable for the Sahelian environment, i.e., an extreme shortage of personnel with technical, and more importantly, management skills;

2. U.S. AID missions and officers were not staffed with adequate numbers of experienced and qualified personnel;

3. the Africa Bureau did not respond forcefully and effectively when the danger signals began to appear (e.g., in evaluations, audits, consistently tardy actions, etc.); and

4. other Agency offices were generally unwilling or unable to give Sahel missions the priority they needed.

SMAT cited the results of the "moving money syndrome" and recommended the use of the no-year funding authority provided by the Congress for more orderly management of the OYB. While USAID staffing has improved, the Agency is still sending relatively inexperienced people to take on one of its toughest development challenges. SMAT has made suggestions for improving the situation, but does not have much confidence that there will be significant changes in the experience level or French capability of personnel assigned to the Sahel. Therefore, SMAT looked for ways of improving the productivity of existing personnel and prepared specific ideas falling into the following categories:

1. streamlining and making mission operations more effective (covered in the following section of this message);

2. reducing demands on the mission--SMAT recommendations include: reducing reporting on Section 121(d) maintenance; AID/W abiding by the provisions of Delegation of Authority 140; AID/W reducing the number of circular messages going to Sahel posts (especially the smaller ones) and requiring responses only on matters directly relevant to the mission's program or the host country's development priorities; shifting project implementation progress reporting to an exception basis;

3. increasing short term training in the Sahel for U.S. and foreign national members of the development team--it was recommended that a design team come up with a regional project for this purpose; and

4. strengthening financial management (including audit) which is the subject of a separate message.

Concurrent with recommending less second-guessing of the field by AID/W, SMAT recommended that AID/W concentrate its oversight efforts on providing policy guidance (insuring that general guidance is relevant to the Sahel), reviewing audits and evaluations for lessons learned, and ensuring that the results are made available to missions and design and evaluation teams. AID/W should also review mission operations by on-site visits rather than by requiring reports and other documentation. Such on-site reviews would be performed periodically by an Operations Appraisal Staff type unit to be created. Ad hoc visits would be triggered by reports of poor mission morale, a spate of bad audits or evaluations in one mission or in similar types of projects, or by consistently tardy or inappropriate responses to AID requirements.

SMAT Suggestions for Improving Mission Management. The suggestions which follow will not necessarily apply to all missions, or at least will be of greater importance to some than to others. Some of them may already have been mentioned at the mission during the Team's visit. Implementation of some of the recommendations will be easier and more rapidly carried out with outside help. In fact, SMAT suggests that USAIDs Mali and Upper Volta and quite possibly Senegal, would find it helpful to request outside management assistance to focus on streamlining operations, developing better internal controls, etc. USAID Niger would also likely find it helpful to arrange for a follow-on visit to its management study of last year as was originally planned. SMAT has urged the Bureau to facilitate rapid responses to USAID requests for management assistance. Specific ideas/suggestions for improving mission management follow:

1. Setting objectives and targets. Missions are encouraged to update the information provided in their responses to SWA's request for information on improvements in the management of the SDP (1983 State 8414, 1/12/83), to use this to prepare a Management Improvement Plan (MIP), and to use the MIP as a management tool. The MIP should include the items mentioned below as well as other mission priorities that may be established. In establishing priorities and objectives, it is extremely important to keep reminding oneself of the missions' raison d'etre: host country development. This should mean giving priority to assuring that host country project directors, AID contractors, and mission project officers can do their work effectively.

2. Streamlining mission operations. In line with the foregoing, one of the highest priorities should be streamlining the document flow. This implies reducing clearances where possible, and where clearances are necessary, insuring that clearing officers know why they are clearing and restrain themselves accordingly. Often the English version of documents or letters is impeccable, but the French is atrocious. Much routine USAID correspondence and documentation should be prepared by foreign service nationals, who can draft materials in French (or Portuguese) and save considerable time. Their English may need some improvement, but it is the local language version that will be read by the host country officials. Form letters and standardized documentation can facilitate operations since forms can be prepared in advance in both languages. If the USAID must meet literary standards established externally, an official USAID editor should be designated and the burden of rewrites removed from the project offices.

3. Internal controls. It is crucial that systems of follow-up be put in place and used. For project implementation, improved implementation plans are needed, so that project officers know at all times the status of the project in relation to planned targets--physical performance and expenditure of funds. If good systems are in place, then in-house reviews can focus on exceptions, i.e.. projects with problems. With good implementation plans, internal project reporting can be reduced. Good monitoring also entails frequent site visits; reliance on written reports is seldom satisfactory. Mission Directors must ensure that project officers and their supervisors have the time for, and carry out, project visits and other activities with their counterparts.

4. Policy dialogue and donor coordination. Policy dialogue is very important, and not something to be carried out only at the macroeconomic level. Projects can provide a useful

vehicle for policy dialogue. Policy dialogue also should not be seen strictly as the province of the Mission Director or the mission economist. Often ideas passed through informal channels to the right people are more effective than official demarches. The informal channels may involve host country national employees of the USAIDs, project officers, other members of the Country Team, etc. The same applies to donor coordination. SMAT has suggested that AID/W be more active in donor coordination, but this does not relieve the USAID of this function. USAID should be providing suggestions to, and monitoring AID/W in this area. Management Improvement Plans should include planning and implementation of policy dialogue and donor coordination.

5. Relations with Counterparts. Good informal working relations with counterpart personnel seem to be more the exception than the rule. This could be improved by:

   a. making more informal contact with host country nationals a mission priority;

   b. improving post orientation programs on the country and the people;

   c. encouraging language improvement at post;

   d. providing leadership in bringing mission, contractor, host country, and other donor people together;

   e. fostering workshops in different subject areas, with planning of and participation in the workshop involving all four groups; and

   f. encouraging host country national employees of the USAID to facilitate cross-national relationships.

6. Reviewing the Workload. SMAT found that most missions did not have a complete list of the activities for which the mission had some responsibility. USAIDs should take a complete inventory, of all activities: regional, P.L. 480, PVO, centrally-funded by and AID/W and carried out in country, etc. The inventory should include on-going activities that may not be a part of the project or nonproject portfolio, including items in the MIP. An assessment of this type can suggest changes in mission structure, composition or level of staffing, level of reporting to AID/W, etc. This assessment should examine how the project officer can be freed from tasks not contributing to the primary functions of support and monitoring of project activities. The structures of some missions seem

overly layered with the project officers at the bottom. Sometimes technical personnel are put in operational jobs for which they are not prepared or interested. Perhaps others should have the line responsibility, and the technical personnel serve as technical advisors to the project officers. A grouping of multi-disciplined personnel with a cluster of projects may provide more effective management than the traditional organization by field of activity (agriculture, education).

7. Use of host country nationals. In other parts of the world, host country nationals, especially direct-hire, prepare most of the routine paperwork and handle many coordination functions carried out in the Sahel by U.S. direct hires. Now that more realistic salaries are authorized for host country nationals, missions should recruit more professionals locally, within existing ceiling limitations. Greater effort is also needed in training host country nationals already on board and ensuring that they are being used to their fullest.

If missions have any questions about the foregoing, AFR/SWA will be able to contact Team members. It is also suggested that mission managers refer to "Development is a Joint Effort," an assessment of the USAID Mali technical assistance program carried out in December 1980 and distributed to Sahelian missions in 1981 for discussion at an SMDC meeting. A number of the suggestions herein are elaborated in that report. Other management issues and ideas for improving project implementation are discussed in the report.

ATTACHMENT D

DRAFT CABLE TO SAHEL MISSIONS

SUBJ: Assessment of Aid Sahel Program Management Capacities and Requirements -- SMAT Comments and Recommendations on Financial Management

1. SUMMARY. The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) has submitted three recommendations to AA/AFR regarding financial management. This message repeats those recommendations, provides further elaboration on one of them, and requests mission comments within two weeks on the study proposed. The full text of the Action Memorandum to AA/AFR will be included in the SMAT final report which will be forwarded soon.

2. Synopsis of SMAT Report to AA/AFR on Financial Management
Some of the factors which contributed to the problems of financial control and accounting in the Sahel are:

a. Given pressures to obligate funds, agreements were signed which required a certain level of funds accountability, but missions did not assure that the capability existed to meet the requirements. Since host governments had functioning financial systems, it was assumed there would be no problem.

b. Mission Controller's offices did not exist in some countries when the expansion of programs began in the mid-1970s. Controllers' offices generally have not been staffed consistently with senior experienced personnel. Vacancies of long standing have been common.

c. The internal audit system initially was ineffective; currently, it serves essentially as an external audit, creating workload for missions without commensurate benefits.

The pressure to obligate funds is still a problem (SMAT has recommended use of no-year funding authority). Direct-hire staffing in Controller's offices in the Sahel is better than in the past, but there still are not enough experienced people. Controllers have been forced to use a substantial number of personal service contractors to get on top of financial problems associated with their programs.

The problems that led to enactment of Section 121(d) could have been avoided if standard procedures had been followed at the time of project design and project obligation, and if missions had been appropriately staffed with qualified personnel. Since they were not, the Agency now has one more barnacle, one that has added

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a heavy workload on the Mission Controller's office, USAID project officers, and host country Project Directors.

The requirements for 121(d) certification were made more onerous by the internal process adopted in the Africa Bureau (which led to delays in obligations) and the reporting requirements related thereto. Although the reporting requirements were relaxed somewhat in December 1983, a significant reporting workload still exists, which adds little of significance to the assurance in AID/W that appropriate action is being taken. SMAT recommends re-delegation of Section 121(d) certification to USAID Directors and AID Representatives and a reduction of reporting requirements on the maintenance of Section 121(d) certification.

Given the problems encountered in accounting for U.S.-financed local currencies, the Africa Bureau contracted with USDA, which contracted with Virginia Polytechnic Institute, to train host country accountants and project directors. Both VPI and Controller personnel in the field seemed to see the VPI activity as marginally related to ongoing requirements for Section 121(d) certification. Differences of view prevail as to whether AID has to insist on a system parallel to the host government's own accounting system or whether minor additions to the latter would suffice for AID's needs. Some project directors feel that USAID requirements for replenishment coupled with limits on size of advances hamper efficient project operations. Procedures for handling local currency accounts and bases for certification vary more between missions than seemed justified by differences in program or country situations.

Given the foregoing, SMAT recommends a review of 121(d) operations of the USAIDs, the relationship of USAID requirements for project accounting with country financial management systems, and the financial management training needs of host countries that AID could appropriately provide. The planned mid-course evaluation of the VPI project (Sahel Regional Financial Management Project) would be included. This recommendation is discussed further in Paragraph 3 below.

In years past, the audit function was essentially for producing in-house improvements, and the audit program at individual missions took into account the Mission Director's concerns. Being used to this system, Directors in the Sahel asked for audits as preventive maintenance. Initially, few auditors were available, and missions had to wait for a year or more before an audit could be scheduled. Some auditors did not (and do not now) have French language capability, nor an understanding of French financial systems. Thus, audits have reported that documentation or systems did not exist when in fact they did. In recent years, the audit system has been seen in the field as an external audit system, geared to impressing outside sources rather than working for internal improvements.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the audit reports generally have pointed out problems that need to be dealt with and the Africa Bureau's response has not been good. SMAT recommends that Directors arrange for their own ongoing financial reviews and/or build into each project provisions for annual audits or management and financial reviews by outside, independent sources. Directors should also establish internal controls to ensure that audit reports are answered fully and quickly. More importantly, the Africa Bureau needs to strengthen its system for responding to draft audits and for monitoring the response to and closing of audit recommendations. Either a Deputy Assistant Administrator or a Special Assistant in the office of the Assistant Administrator should be given the responsibility for providing a substantive review of audit responses and for monitoring the clearing of audit recommendations.

3. Proposed study of Section 121(d) Operations. SMAT suggestions follow regarding its recommended study of Section 121(d) operations and related issues; field comments are requested within two weeks of receipt of this message:

a. Suggested Scope of Work for Proposed Study

(1) Review procedures established by mission Controllers for dealing with the control of AID-financed local currencies provided to projects, with a view to identifying problems needing resolution (e.g., disallowances), insuring that procedures are not inhibiting project implementation, and identifying procedures or techniques in one or more missions that might usefully be considered by other missions.

(2) Review the relationship between AID-imposed accounting procedures and host country accounting and financial management procedures.

(3) Assess the need for training of host country personnel in accounting, and financial management in general, and review the activities of the Sahel Regional Financial Management Project (SRFMP) in relation to host country needs and USAID needs for improved project management.

(4) Upon completion of the review, hold a workshop with the Sahel Controllers to review the Team's findings and to strive for a consensus on follow-up actions--by AID/W and the field.

(5) Submit a final report, including a separate evaluation report on the SRFMP activity and draft action documents for AA/AFR if appropriate.

NOTE: If the evaluation of Regional Project Ø911 does not provide for a review of the financial management of that project, the proposed scope of work for this study should be enlarged to include it.

b. Suggested Team Composition

-- Regional Controller for AFR or designee

-- A retired Controller, preferably with Sahel experience

-- An officer or retiree with overall mission management or project management experience

-- An officer or retiree with a good knowledge of French financial systems

NOTE: Three people might suffice if one could fulfill two of the above experience/knowledge requirements.

c. Suggested Modus Operandi

(1) One week in AID/W for consultation and reviewing files, including the SMAT report, SRFMP documentation, and documentation on Section 121(d) and its implementation.

(2) Initiate field review in Dakar, fanning out from there to the smaller missions if deemed necessary. (Views of the field solicited.)

(3) Visits to Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey--a visit to Ndjamena is not considered necessary for this study. The Team may wish to split up for these visits.

(4) Convene in Abidjan for discussion with REDSO Regional Controller to synthesize findings, and to prepare for a workshop with other Controllers.

(5) Hold the 3-day workshop.

(6) Return to Washington and prepare final report(s).

Total elapsed time about 8 weeks, 4-5 in field.

d. Questions:

(1) Does visit of one week in larger missions seem reasonable?

(2) Is a visit to all larger missions necessary since all controllers would be attending workshop?

ATTACHMENT E

DRAFT CABLE TO SAHEL MISSIONS

SUBJECT: Assessment of AID Sahel Program Management Capacities and Requirements -- SMAT Proposal for New Regional Projects to Support Mission Operations

1. Summary. This message transmits SMAT propoals for the establishment of two regional projects to support mission operations. Mission comments on the proposals are requested within two weeks of the date of this message.

2. During its field and Washington interviews, SMAT learned of some needed activities not now easily funded. In some cases, PM&R funds might be used, but only by stretching their use. SMAT is concerned about funds earmarked primarily for facilitating project design being used too flexibly. SMAT proposes establishment of a Regional project; e.g., Development Initiatives and Responses (DIR), designed to increase missions' flexibility on initiatives related to current Agency policy thrusts (policy dialogue, private sector participation, technology transfer, institution building) or in responding to changing host country political, economic, or general development environment. Such activities should relate to the overall program situation rather than specific projects or project proposals (or nonproject assistance proposals) for which PM&R funds would apply. Specific types of illustrative activities for DIR financing are:

a. Surveys or research studies to support dialogue with the host country or other donors on the Agency policy thrusts mentioned above; e.g., studies related to private sector activity in Senegal.

b. Visits to the U.S. or other developing countries of government or private sector officials to improve understanding of U.S. policy or development goals.

c. Conduct or finance seminars or workshops related to U.S. policy goals or broad development issues.

NOTE: All the foregoing can be seen as initiatives, but also be very important as responses to changes in government or other political or economic developments.

d. Responses to emergency situations not sufficiently critical to justify disaster assistance funding.

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e. Pay the internal transportation costs for P.L. 480 Title II emergency assistance when needed.

f. Arrange seminars or workshops or short term training programs to respond to project implementation problems--particularly where more than one project may be involved.

g. Facilitate the development impact of the Peace Corps by funding actions not now possible, e.g., (1) training of PCV and staff and in AID'S project design, implementation, and evaluation techniques; or (2) training host country nationals in PC training programs for PC volunteers. (Both of these ideas have been suggested by PC country directors.)

h. Initiate pilot projects to test a concept, e.g., a small loan fund in Upper Volta to facilitate PC volunteers joining with Voltans in small scale private enterprise; or initiate quickly a new activity favored by a new government.

3. It is suggested that each mission receive an allotment from the DIR project based on a general outline of proposed needs. Subsequently, missions would advise when funds had been obligated and receive a new allotment in the amount of the obligation. Initial funding levels could be based on field responses to this message.

4. Considerable delays have been experienced by missions in getting new projects initiated because of long lead times in contracting for technical assistance and Stateside procurement (particularly for the landlocked countries). Contractor personnel often are minimally effective for some months until housing and transportation are available. SMAT suggests the establishment of a regional project; e.g., Project Initiation Revolving Fund (PIRF), which could be used to initiate various procurement actions before funds are available under projects or before arrival of contractor personnel. When the funds became available, the PIRF would be reimbursed from project funds. Such a project could also be used to pre-position certain common use items such as vehicle spare parts, standard items of furniture, and possibly vehicles if Sahel missions could agree on some standardization.

5. Handbook 3 authorizes a number of pre-implementation actions, but these are seldom taken. One of the problems is that the documentation which initiates the action must have fiscal citations which are not available until project agreements are signed. Sometimes missions are reluctant to initiate procurement actions until all conditions precedent have been met, further delaying action by three to six months. Availability of the PIRF

project would assure that funding would be available to pay for the procurement even if signature of agreements or meeting of conditions precedent were delayed. The PIRF project could be managed by a regional procurement officer until the proposed Sahel Program Coordination Office (SPCO) is established. It should be possible to work out arrangements where the PIRF could also be used to pre-position OE-funded.

March 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT)

TO: Director, Office of Sahel/West Africa Affairs

SUBJECT: Administration and Logistical Support

Attached are two copies of Administration and Logistical Support which will be included in Section II of our final report.

I am transmitting this section to you at this time so you may initiate the necessary action immediately, without having to wait for the final report. This section contains three topics (A) Joint Administrative Office (JAO), (B) Logistical Contracts, and (C) Vehicles.

You will note that Topic A on JAOs contains a recommendation for the Africa Bureau to request the Assistant to the Administrator for Management to initiate with the Department of State, the formation of a joint State-Aid Task Force to critically review and evaluate the JAOs in the Sahel. We have prepared a draft memorandum, also attached, which will facilitate this action.

Topic B, Logistical Support Contracts, is self explanatory suggesting that individual missions be encouraged to use logistical support contracts, as is being done in Chad and Northern Cameroon, for support of contractor personnel in the Sahel.

Topic C, Vehicles, contains some innovative ideas of how to solve the age old problem of keeping a fleet of vehicles operating in the Sahel.

We have taken the liberty of sending copies of all three Topics to the SER Directorate so they may proceed with taking action as appropriate, particularly on the Vehicle issue. We would suggest that you designate a member of your staff to work with and follow through with members of the Overseas Management Division (M/SER/EMOS/OM) on this issue.

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ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Joint Administrative Office (JAO)

The results of JAO operations is spotty at best. Some perform well (Senegal, Mali); others less well (The Gambia, Mauritania).

Generally where the JAO is performing well, the success is in large part attributed to the personalities in the Mission. This does not necessarily mean however that duplication of services has been eliminated nor that the services rendered are less expensive. In Dakar, for example, the AID Mission entered into a separate support contract to provide administrative services for Personal Services Contractors. In The Gambia, the AID office has contracted, twice in the last 12 months, a former AID Executive Officer to assist the P.S.C. Management Officer in providing support to the AID staff. Yet, the per capita FAAS cost charged to AID by the JAO is the highest in all of the Sahel ($25,127 for FY83).

There are instances where the JAO has become bloated, personnel-wise, through the use of individual contracts for personnel by the recreation associations. In Niger the JAO has approximately 260 individuals under contract with the recreation association. Many of these individuals and their skills could be supplied by making arrangement with local firms to supply carpenters, plumbers, guards, etc. Although services are adequate, the process is not necessarily the most efficient or most economical. Comparing the JAO per capita cost between Niger ($16,749) and Senegal ($2,193), serious questions may be raised as to the management, efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness of the support services provided by the JAOs.

Considering the experience, approximately ten years, the questionable economies, efficiencies, and the dissatisfaction of many of those using administrative services provided by JAO's, it appears that the JAO concept should be reexamined in the Sahelian countries. There should be no duplication of common services at any post, and the services should be provided as economically as possible. The level and type of services should also satisfy the needs of all concerned.

Throughout the Sahel, AID is by far the largest U.S. agency, both in terms of individuals as well as programs. AID has had to resort to using numerous contract personnel, both institutional and individual personal services, to augment its direct hire staff in the implementation of its projects. Despite a concerted effort by the JAOs to provide the necessary services to the entire American community, gaps remain in services necessary to effective AID program execution. For example, some of the functions that are notably deficient include providing administrative support to AID contractors or direct hire personnel away from the capital cities, contract administration, project procurement, clearing and transporting project commodities, automotive maintenance, warehousing, property management, and arranging for housing and transportation of contracting personnel.

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Since AID is the principal user of JAO services and has had to make alternative arrangements for necessary services for contractors, it seems logical that AID should manage the JAO and provide the services to the entire U.S. community. By so doing, posts could avoid duplications of services, which presently exist, and better serve U.S. Government interests by having a single support system. AID, if designated the responsible agency to provide the support services to the other U.S. agency personnel and/or organizations, could utilize its expanded contracting authority to handle contractor personnel as well as Operating Expense funded personnel. Other U.S. agencies receiving services would reimburse AID in the same manner that services are now being reimbursed to the Department of State.

AID and the Department of State should form a joint evaluation team to examine thoroughly the concept and operations of Embassy-administered JAOs in the Sahel in an attempt to improve services, and provide them more economically and efficiently. The team should also give serious consideration to the idea of the predominate user being responsible for providing and administering the services to all other U.S. organizations at the post. The team should have a representative from State and AID (USIA possibly), plus a person from outside of government with overseas management experience and understanding of logistical support and administrative services.

Recommendation No. 23

The Africa Bureau request the Assistant to the Administrator for Management to initiate, with the Department of State, the formation of a joint State-AID Task Force to critically review and evaluate the JAOs in the Sahel to determine (a) their effectiveness, economies, and efficiencies as well as (b) possible alternatives where JAOs are not performing as conceived.

(Draft of Memorandum attached)

Draft Memorandum

FROM: AA/AFR

TO: R. T. Rollis, AA/M

SUBJECT: Review of Joint Administrative Offices (JAO)

In September 1983 the Africa Bureau commissioned a team of consultants, familiar with AID practices and operations, to make a management assessment of the Sahel Development Program. The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) was to suggest improvements in the content of the AID program, its administrative and organizational structure, and its management practices.

One of the SMAT findings is that the JAOs are providing inadequate administrative support to many of the Sahelian AID Missions (This same criticism was raised recently at the Mission Directors' Conference in Kigali and the Management Officers' Conference in Nairobi.) The complaints range from lack of adequate services (automotive maintenance, warehousing, property management, procurement, support of contractor personnel) to poorly-managed, inefficient and expensive JAOs. There are a few exceptions, however, where the JAO is performing well and the costs seem reasonable (Senegal and Mali), but this is attributable mainly to the personalities involved, not to the system or the concept.

The Africa Bureau endorses the principle of avoiding duplication of services, which only increases costs, but more than ten years of JAO experience in the Sahel reveals the principle has not been attained. In fact, AID has had to contract separately to supplement inadequate JAO services, the result being duplication of service and extra cost. A strong case can be made in the Sahel for having that organization with the greatest requirement for services, i.e., AID, provide all services to other U.S. community members at a post. The incremental cost involved would be charged to the receiving agency on the same basis that is presently used in the form of a reverse FAAS charge.

As a function of improving management of the Sahel Program, SMAT suggested a Joint State-AID Task Force (possibly including USIA), comprising one member from each agency plus a member from outside government with requisite overseas management experience in Africa, to review the JAO system. You may find that broaching the problem in the Sahel context may encourage State to cooperate in acquiring representative data that might contribute to ameliorating problems in the Sahel and the rest of Africa as well as in other developing regions where JAOs operate.

Enough time has passed and experience accumulated to warrant and justify an evaluation and critical review (a) to determine the effectiveness, efficiency, and economies (or the converse of all these)

and (b) to examine alternatives where JAOs are not performing as conceived and approved. From the SMAT discussions with State officers (AF/EX and JAO Directors), it seems apparent that any meaningful solution to the JAO problem will have to be sought at the level of State's Under Secretary for Management (Office of Management Operations) or the Assistant Secretary for Administration rather than the Bureau of African Affairs.

We would appreciate your initiating such action as may be necessary to resolve this issue. The problems of implementing development programs are subject to enough difficulties in Africa in general and the Sahel in particular without having to contend with inadequacies of JAOs' performance in supplying necessary administrative and support services.

Logistical Support Contracts

The concept of using a single contractor in each Mission to provide administrative and logistical services in support of AID contractors was enunciated in a study under REDSO Contract (REDSO/WA 80-215) June 1982. The idea was to provide the necessary support services to institutional or PSC contractors with a single contract rather than having each institutional contractor provide their own or overtaxing the limited USAID or JAO capabilities.

The support contractor could also provide services for the AID direct hire staff and/or the JAO if desired; e.g., automotive maintenance, procurement, property management, household maintenance, etc. By having only one support contractor, the services could be managed more efficiently, cost less, and avoid the excessive proliferation of individual P.S.C.s, as well as eliminate duplication of services between institutional contractors.

The concept, somewhat modified, has been initiated in Chad where there is no JAO. AID has a contract with a U.S. firm to supply the full range of administrative services to the AID Mission, supporting both AID direct hire and Voluntary Agency contract employees. Thus far, the contractor has been performing under most difficult circumstances to the satisfaction of the AID Representative. There has been no analysis of costs to determine the true economies, but thus far, the services are adequate to the needs of the post.

In the event SPCO is established, there would be increased opportunities to effectively utilize logistical support contractors in support of the SDP for bulk procurement, block contracting, maintenance of vehicles and appliances, and freight forwarding.

With the increasing number of AID contractors, limited direct hire staff and limited JAO capabilities, it would appear that the use of a single contractor for logistical support services should be expanded throughout the Sahel.

Recommendation No. 24

Individual AID Missions and offices should give greater consideration to using logistical support contracts for support of contractor personnel in the Sahel.

Vehicles

One of the most aggravating problems that has persisted in implementing projects throughout the Sahel is finding reliable vehicles and keeping them operational. The harsh environment, extreme

temperatures, poor roads, shortage of skilled mechanical personnel, and lack of spare parts have all contributed to the exasperation of all concerned with keeping vehicles running. AID has experimented with most makes and models of vehicles and has found that all vehicles, U.S. or foreign made, are destined to a relatively short life when sent to the Sahel.

Although AID has, on numerous occasions, discussed the problem with the leading U.S. automobile manufacturers, and various attempts have been made toward solutions, the problem continues to plague project managers and mission personnel.

The U.S. manufacturers would like to establish themselves in the West African market, and AID would like to purchase U.S.-made vehicles. However, the small number of vehicles in any given country has not been sufficiently attractive for the U.S. manufacturers to expend the required capital to provide adequate supplies of spare parts or train the necessary numbers of personnel to maintain their products. As a consequence, foreign made vehicles have been purchased by AID because they are known in-country and the local mechanics are more familiar with them. This does not necessarily mean that they can always be repaired or that they are more reliable. In fact, some foreign manufacturers are having the same support breakdowns as their U.S. competitors. Service vehicles are mechanical machines and are exposed to very harsh treatment; the foreign made vehicles suffer from the same ills as American vehicles. Some foreign-made vehicles are more common because dealers have been established to provide limited spare parts or cannibalize existing vehicles and keep wheels turning. Efforts by most of the AID organizations to standardize their fleets have been valiant, but with the change of personnel, dealers' performance or other reasons, the standardization plans for each country change and the problem continues. Despite attempts to standardize, the number of units that are purchased in a given country are not sufficient to warrant the manufacturer to establish an adequate stock of spare parts or train sufficient numbers of mechanical personnel.

However, if all of the vehicles in the eight Sahelian countries, were standardized, it is conceivable that the total number would be sufficiently large to interest an American manufacturer into financing a central depot of spare parts as well as train local employees to maintain the fleet. Also, there would be sufficient numbers of units that AID could, through its procurement specifications, assist in the development of a vehicle more suitable for the Sahel, i.e., oversize radiators, heavy duty suspension system, no heaters, etc. At the present time there are approximately 100 OE funded vehicles and an estimated 400 project vehicles in the Sahel. This volume should be sufficient to interest U.S. manufacturers. AID could thus benefit from competitive procurement by purhasing directly from the manufacturer.

A possible alternative to procuring the vehicles may be leasing. Considering the number of units the idea of leasing could be very attractive to a manufacturer or a leasing company such as Hertz or Avis. Under a leasing contract AID could be spared the grief of down time of deadlined vehicles. Depending on the contract, it might be possible for the leasing company to absorb and be responsible for all

maintenance. The rental per unit would depend on the contract and probably be more than if the unit were purchased, but the advantages are evident: availability of reliable transportation; avoiding expenses of large stocks of spare parts: establishing automotive maintenance facilities; and training personnel to maintain the vehicles.

An additional alternative would be for AID to purchase both project and OE funded vehicles direct from the manufacturer, and contract for the maintenance with an automotive maintenance contractor. The funding of such a contract would be attributed to both Operating Expense and project funds depending on the vehicles being serviced. The initial funding for such a contract could come out of the proposed Project Implementation Support Fund.

A variation of the last alternative would be to include all of the automotive maintenance within a country under the Logistical Support Contract for that country as described in the preceeding Section. This is currently being done in Northern Cameroon and appears to be functioning satisfactorily.

Recommendation No. 25

The Africa Bureau collaborate with the SER Directorate to explore the feasibility of:

a. Standardizing all U.S. financed vehicles in the Sahel;

b. Direct purchase from a manufacturer, including warranty maintenance for all vehicles;

c. Contracting for all spare parts and maintenance with the manufacturer or an automotive maintenance firm;

d. Leasing all vehicles; and

e. Having a Logistical Support contractor provide all automotive maintenance.

Biographic Sketches of the Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT)

The team is comprised of Thomas C. Irvin (Team Leader), Walter C. Furst, Parke D. Massey, James L. Roush, and Sam C.Thornburg. All five are former Senior AID Officers with extensive field experience, much of it in Africa.

Irvin: Served with AID from 1967 to 1979, has held senior positions in AID Saigon, Director, Regional Economic Development Office, Bangkok, and AID Representative Beirut. Since 1979 has worked as private consultant almost exclusively in the Sahel on AID-CILSS activities.

Furst: Served 38 years with AID and predecessor agencies mainly in Europe, Asia and Washington in program development and management positions. Served as Assistant Director for Program with USAID/Nigeria. Last AID assignment as Senior Evaluation Officer in AID/W involved several brief Sahel assignments for program evaluation and design. Since retirement, served on an evaluation team in Mali.

Massey: Originally with Department of State, opened first Consultate in Abidjan in 1957. With AID from 1963 to 1979, holding positions as Financial Analyst, Economist, Capitol Development Officer, Deputy Director and AID Representative, mostly in Latin America and AID/W. Has had two previous consulting assignments in the Sahel, which entailed visits to Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, and Upper Volta.

Roush: Served 25 years with AID and predecessor agencies, including over six years in Africa (opened AID Mission in Cameroon). Has also served in senior positions in Asia (Vietnam), Latin America (Deputy in ROCAP and Director in Chile) and AID/W. Since retirement in 1979, has done consulting (evaluations and management assessments) in Mali, Niger, and Senegal in the Sahel plus evaluations of AFR/RA regional projects and the evaluation system of the African Development Bank. Has served as trainer in a project documentation workshop, a workshop on the impact of agricultural policies on food consumption, and a technical assistance workshop in Cameroon for USAID contract experts and their counterparts in agricultural and rural development.

Thornburg: Served with AID from 1956 to 1978 in management positions in Bolivia, Nigeria, Vietnam and AID/W. As Director of SER/MO in AID/W, Thornburg participated in SMDC meetings and was concerned with the problems of logistics and JAO oreganization throughout the Sahel. Since retirement, he has worked for AFR/DR, the AID Affairs Office in Burundi, conducted a study of administration and logistical support for contractor personnel in Mauritania, The Gambia, Niger and Liberia, and continued to be involved in Sahel administrative management issues. He has also had eight assignments with the Office of Foreign Buildings in Department of State.

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APPENDIX

March 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution

FROM: AFR/SWA, Dennis M. Chandler

SUBJECT: The Sahel Development Program and Its Legislative History

The following information is provided for general background purposes but also to assist in discussions with representatives of OMB which would like to eliminate beginning in FY 1986 the separate account for the Sahel Development Program.

The Agency for International Development has operated a special program for the Sahel in western and central Africa since 1973. The United States assistance program, which is aimed at making the Sahelian region self sufficient in food production by the year 2000, was established following a devastating drought which struck this region in 1972-1973. The overall program is coordinated with an international donors consortium, the Club du Sahel, and an association of recipient governments, CILSS. The United States contribution represents about 10 percent of the total effort of the Club, which now approximates $1.7 billion annually.

Following the great drought in the Sahel region in the early 1970's, the Congress expressed its support for international consultations and planning for a comprehensive, long-term development program for that region. In late 1975, the Congress authorized $5 million for planning, consultation, and program development, and called on the President to develop a proposal for long-term development of the Sahel and other drought stricken areas of Africa. These provisions became Section 494B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, located in the Disaster Relief Chapter of that Act.

In 1977, Congress amended the Act to transfer Section 494B to the Development Assistance Chapter where it became Section 120 ("Sahel Development Program - Planning"), and the Congress added a new Section 121 ("Sahel Development Program - Implementation").1/ When the Congress enacted the Sahel Development Program (SDP) legislation, the Legislature History notes

1/ See attachments A, B, and C for the text of FAA Section 120 and 121, as amended; and excerpts from the Conference Report which accompanied HR6714 and the Legislative History of PL 95-88.

that the Conference Committee placed the Sahel program in Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act in order that the program be governed by the guidelines for A.I.D.'s Development Assistance programs. However, the Congress fully recognized that the Sahel is one of the world's least developed areas and that the Sahel Development Program, therefore, requires more flexibility than is normally the case. For example, Congress noted that "special account should be taken of the need to promote ecological balance and develop an effective infrastructure, including transportation.... While the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 does contemplate the occasional financing of major infrastructure under Chapter 1, the overall emphasis is away from financing such infrastructure, and it was therefore deemed appropriate to enact these special provisions for the Sahel program. The special provisions are necessary because some major infrastructure projects, including those needed for water basin development are proposed for the Sahel...".

To provide this flexibility, Congress established a separate line item appropriation for the Sahel as well as several unique features for the SDP. These include:

-- the commitment of the Congress to the long-term development of the Sahel;

-- the intent of Congress that special account should be taken of the need to promote ecological balance and to develop major infrastructure, including transportation;

-- the provision for "no year" funding;

-- the expectation that the United States and other donors finance some local recurrent costs at least during the early phases of the program; and

-- the opportunity to test a new model for development cooperation and to be flexible in the administration of the program.

The A.I.D. program in the Sahel has evolved over the past decade from disaster relief and rehabilitation, through studies and start-up activities, to reach its present phase of emphasis on food production and policy dialogue. Because of numerous implementation problems there is now renewed emphasis on consolidation into fewer sectors and projects. The special legislation for the Sahel Development Program, and with it the enhanced A.I.D. mandate, permits A.I.D. to mold the program to the dire conditions in the Sahel and to develop and implement the long range program envisioned by the Congress. In this regard, the

Legislative History is eloquent:

> As a result of the special needs of the countries in the Sahel and the unique coordinating mechanism that is planning the development strategy for the region, this program affords an unusual opportunity to test a new model for development coordination. Because of the special character of this multilateral undertaking, some flexibility may be necessary in the administration of this program.

It should also be noted that the SDP legislation is more than an economic development strategy; it is a political statement showing long-term U. S. support for this region of sub-Saharan Africa. It also helps attract support of the Congress for the entire A.I.D. appropriation. With its roots in the disaster relief legislation, the SDP is a humanitarian statement, assisting the poorest region of the world. With its multidonor plan for the future, it is a partnership commitment for long-term development in this region of Africa.

Elimination of the Sahel Development Program legislation would go beyond the concerns of the United States and eight West African nations. We could expect that such actions would be taken into consideration by the eighteen major donors in the Club and by the many states in Africa outside of the Sahel as an equivocation of the long-term development commitment made by the Congress in 1975 and restated by the Executive Branch from the first Club conference in Ottawa in 1977 through the fifth conference in Brussels in 1983. To eliminate the Sahel account with its special features would also reduce greatly the flexibility needed to increase food production and bring about more rapid development in this most difficult area of the world.

Distribution:
Mr. P. Lyman, DAS/AF
Mr. A. Love, DAA/AFR
Mr. J. Johnson, DAA/AFR
Ms. H. Johnson, AAA/AFR/DP
Mr. N. Cohen, AFR/PD
Mr. L. Holdcroft, AFR/TR
Mr. L. Rogers, PPC/PB

Attachments:a/s

to the economic growth of developing countries.

(2) The concerns expressed in paragraph (1) and the recommendations of the United States Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests shall be considered by the President—

(A) in formulating and carrying out programs and policies with respect to developing countries, including those relating to bilateral and multilateral assistance and those relating to private sector activities, and

(B) in seeking opportunities to coordinate public and private development and investment activities which affect forests in developing countries.

(3) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the representatives of the United States to the United Nations and to other appropriate international organizations to urge—

(A) that higher priority be given in the programs of these organizations to the problems of tropical forest alteration and loss, and

(B) that there be improved cooperation and coordination among these organizations with respect to tropical forest activities.

Sec. 119.[57] **Renewable and Unconventional Energy Technologies.** * * * [Repealed—1980]

Sec. 120.[58] **Sahel Development Program—Planning.**[59]—(a) The Congress reaffirms its support of[60] the initiative of the United States Government in undertaking consultations and planning with the countries concerned, and with other nations providing assistance, with the United Nations, and with other concerned international and regional organizations, toward the development and support of a comprehensive long-term African Sahel development program.

(b)[61] The President is authorized to develop a long-term comprehensive development program for the Sahel and other drought-stricken nations in Africa.

(c)[61] In developing this long-term program, the President shall—

(1) consider international coordination for the planning and implementation of such program;

[57] Sec. 119, which had been added by Public Law 95-88 (91 Stat. 628) and amended by sec. 111 of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 948) and by sec. 107 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 (93 Stat. 362), was repealed by sec. 304(g) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3147). See sec. 106 of this Act for text concerning energy technologies.

[58] 22 U.S.C. 2151r. Sec. 120, originally added as sec. 639H of this Act by sec. 20 of the FA Act of 1973 and later redesignated as sec. 494H by sec. 101(6) of Public Law 94-161 (89 Stat. 849), was again redesignated as sec. 120 by sec. 115(1) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-88; 91 Stat. 539).

[59] The title caption "Sahel Development Program—Planning" was inserted in lieu of "African Development Program" by sec. 115(2) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-88; 91 Stat. 539).

[60] The words "reaffirms its support of" were substituted in lieu of "supports" by sec. 101(7)(C) of Public Law 94-161 (89 Stat. 849).

[61] Subsecs. (b), (c), and (d) were added by sec. 101(7)(D) of Public Law 94-161 (89 Stat. 849). Subsec. (d) was subsequently repealed by sec. 502(d)(1) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-424; 92 Stat. 959).

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tries and organizations in determining development priorities; and

(3) begin such planning immediately.

(d)[61] * * * [Repealed—1978]

Sec. 121.[62] **Sahel Development Program—Implementation.**—(a) The President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for the long-term development of the Sahelian region. Assistance furnished under this section shall be in accordance with a long-term, multidonor development plan which calls for equitable burdensharing with other donors and shall be furnished, whenever appropriate, in cooperation with an international coordinating mechanism.

(b) The President shall prepare an annual report on the Sahel Development Program concerning the allocation of the United States contribution to the Program, the extent of the contributions from other donor countries, the effectiveness of the integrated effort through the Club des Amis du Sahel, and the progress made in achieving the objectives of the program.

(c) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for purposes of this section beginning in the fiscal year 1978, in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes, $200,000,000, except that not to exceed $50,000,000, may be appropriate under this section for the fiscal year 1978. In addition to the amount authorized in the preceding sentence and to funds otherwise available for such purposes, there are authorized to be appropriated to the President for purposes of this section $25,000,000.[63] In addition to the amounts authorized in the preceding sentences and to funds otherwise available for such purposes, there are authorized to be appropriated to the President for purposes of this section $86,558,000 for the fiscal year 1982 and $86,558,000 for the fiscal year 1983.[64] Amounts appropriated under this section are authorized to remain available until expended.

(d)[65] Funds available to carry out this section (including foreign currencies acquired with funds appropriated to carry out this section) may not be made available to any foreign government for disbursement unless the Administrator of the Agency for International Development determines that the foreign government will maintain a system of accounts with respect to those funds which will provide adequate identification of and control over the receipt and expenditure of those funds.

[62] 22 U.S.C. 2151s. Sec. 121 was added by sec. 115(3) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-88; 91 Stat. 539).

[63] This sentence was added by sec. 108 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-53; 93 Stat. 363).

[64] The authorizations for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 were added by sec. 308(a) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1535). This amendment replaced an authorization of $88,442,000 for fiscal year 1981, as added by sec. 306 of Public Law 96-533 (94 Stat. 363).

Sec. 101(b)(1) of the Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983 (Public Law 97-377) provides the following: "$93,757,000 for Sahel development program, of which not less than $2,000,000 shall be available only for the African Development Foundation."

[65] Subsec. (d) was added by sec. 308(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1535).

Section 115—Sahel Development Program

This section redesignates section 494B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which deals with planning for a long-term development program for the Sahel, as section 119 of that act, and adds a new section 120 dealing with implementation of a Sahel Development Program.

Following the great drought in the Sahel region of Africa four years ago, the Congress expressed its support for international consultations and planning for a comprehensive, long-term development program for that region.

In late 1975, the Congress provided $5 million for planning, consultation, and program development, and called on the President to develop a proposal for long-term development of the Sahel and other drought-stricken areas of Africa.

These provisions became section 494B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, located in the disaster relief chapter of that act. This

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amendment transfers that section to the long-term development chapter of the act, where it would become section 119 ("Sahel Development Program—Planning").

This amendment also adds a new section 120 ("Sahel Development Program—Implementtaion") to that act, containing provisions governing the participation of the United States in the Sahel development program.

The Sahel development program, which is aimed at increasing food self-sufficiency, improving the living standards of the poor, and increasing economic growth and development in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta, Cape Verde, and the Gambia, is being planned by the Club des Amis du Sahel (Club of the Friends of the Sahel). This unique coordinating mechanism, created in 1975 at the initiative of the United States and France, brings together the Inter-State Committee for Drought Control (CILSS), which is the regional organization of the Sahelian states, and about 18 major western donors.

The club has established nine specialized working teams, and a synthesis group to carry out the planning and programing activities.

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Four of these teams are concentrating on sectors basic to food self-sufficiency: livestock, rainfed agriculture, irrigated agriculture, and fisheries. The other five are working on the principal human, structural, and technical aspects of development in the region: ecology, technology adaptation, human resources and health, transportation and infrastructure, and pricing policy, storage, and marketing.

At the end of May, the club will meet in Ottawa to make decisions about the overall development strategy and the project proposals for the first 5 years of the program.

The provisions of the new section 120 attempt to deal with a number of the issues that have been raised about the Sahel program and United States participation in it.

First, the new section has been placed in chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act. That chapter establishes guidelines for AID's development assistance programs. The committee placed the Sahel program in chapter 1 in order to make clear that the program should be governed by those legislative guidelines (as well as other provisions of law applicable to development assistance generally), unless it was made clear either in legislation or in legislative history that guidelines applicable to other development assistance were to be modified with respect to the Sahel program. The committee's understandings in this respect are noted below.

Subsection (a) of new section 120 provides general authority to furnish assistance for the Sahel program. The section specifies that the assistance is to be furnished in accordance with a long-term, multi-donor development plan calling for equitable burdensharing with other donors and cooperation with an international coordinating mechanism. The executive branch has stated that the United States contribution would not normally exceed 15 percent of total contributions in any year and would under no circumstances exceed 20 percent.

Subsection (a) also provides that, in view of the special conditions in this region of least developed countries, special account should be

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taken of the need to promote ecological balance and develop an effective infrastructure, including transportation. However, the percentage of United States development assistance under this section that is used for major infrastructure cannot exceed the percentage of the total funds contributed by all donors to the Sahel program that is used for major infrastructure.

Major infrastructure means the type of capital project that would not noramlly be financed under other parts of chapter 1, such as large dams, highways, rail facilities, port facilities, or other large, capital-intensive public works. While section 102(b)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 does contemplate the occasional financing of major infrastructure under chapter 1 in a multilateral framework, the overall emphasis of the chapter is away from United States financing of such infrastructure, and it was therefore deemed appropriate to enact these special provisions for the Sahel program. The special provisions are necessary because some major infrastructure projects, including those needed for water basin development to provide irrigation and electric power, are propsed for the Sahel in order to attain

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higher grain yields, provide some protection against erratic rainfall, and further the overall development of the region. Care should be taken, however, that infrastructure projects be designed and carried out with a view to preventing unacceptable environmental damage and to ensuring broad sharing of their benefits.

Subsection (b) of new section 120 requires the President to prepare an annual report on the Sahel program, concerning the allocation of the United States contribution to the program, the contributions from other donors, the effectiveness of the Club des Amis du Sahel model, and the progress made in achieving the objectives of the program. The report should include, but not be limited to, the following considerations: increased per capita income, increased life expectancy, reduced infant mortality, improved literacy rates, more equitable distribution of resources, increased productivity per unit of land, measures to reduce the effects of future droughts, and regional efforts to rationalize markets and reduce trade barriers.

Subsection (c) of section 120 authorizes the appropriation of $200 million for the Sahel program, with a $50 million limit on appropriations for fiscal year 1978.

The $50 million requested for fiscal year 1978 is intended as the first U.S. contribution to implementation of this multilateral effort to help develop one of the poorest regions of the world. A $200 million authorization was requested by the President and recommended by the committee in order to indicate clearly that additional amounts are contemplated for future fiscal years.

As a result of the special needs of the countries in the Sahel and the unique coordinating mechanism that is planning the development strategy for the region, this program affords an unusual opportunity to test a new model for development cooperation. Because of the special character of this multilateral undertaking, some flexibility may be necessary in the administration of this program.

For example, because of the devastating effect the drought has had on Government revenues in the affected countries, and the subsequent

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drain on their resources caused by high oil and food prices and deterioration of the terms of trade for their primary commodities, they will be unable to bear certain local costs that are normally borne by recipients of development assistance, and it is expected to be necessary for donors to finance some local recurrent costs at least during the early phases of the program.

Finally, coordination among all the major donors will be necessary on procurement policy under the program, so that the United States and the other donors can adopt the flexible policies that will be necessary to insure regional standardization of equipment and effective maintenance and use of that equipment.

Section 116—American Schools and Hospitals Abroad

This provision amends section 214 of the Foreign Assistance Act in two respects: (1) by authorizing funds for the American schools and hospitals program for fiscal year 1978 and (2) by limiting the number and kind of institutions in any one country that may receive funds in any fiscal year.

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CONFERENCE REPORT
95-501 to ACCOMPANY
H.R. 6714

programs, the President shall take into account their effect on the natural resource base of the aid-receiving countries. The conferees also agreed not to specify a level of funding.

NONCONVENTIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES

The House bill provided two different earmarkings for programs in nonconventional energy technologies. It provided that not less than $10 million of the funds made available for fiscal year 1978 for section 103 of the Foreign Assistance Act could be used for programs in research, development, and use of small-scale, decentralized, renewable energy sources for rural areas. It also provided that not less than $8 million of the amount made available for fiscal year 1978 for section 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act would be available for activities designed to enable and encourage countries to use nonnuclear energy sources of energy.

The Senate amendment authorized assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act for cooperative programs of energy production and conservation with developing countries. It further authorized studies to identify the energy needs, uses, and resources which exist in developing countries, and directed the establishment of an International Energy Institute to stimulate the application of renewable and unconventional energy to developing countries.

The committee of conference agreed to a compromise provision which authorized up to $18 million of the funds available for fiscal year 1978 under chapter 1, part I of the Foreign Assistance Act to be used to carry out cooperative programs with developing countries in renewable and unconventional energy production and conservation, with particular emphasis on programs in research, development, and use of small-scale, decentralized, renewable energy sources for rural areas. It further authorized studies to identify the energy needs, uses, and resources which exist in developing countries, the results of which are to be reported to the Congress by March 1, 1978. It requested the President and the Agency for International Development to review the options for implementing the purposes of this section, one option being a nonprofit corporation—the International Energy Institute—and to submit a report of such review to the Congress by January 31, 1978, together with a recommendation as to which option should be implemented.

SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The House bill provided that the President, in furnishing assistance for the Sahel Development Program, take into account the special needs in the region for promoting ecological balance and for developing an effective infrastructure, including transportation. Funds allocated for major infrastructure projects could not exceed the percentage of funds contributed by all countries which are allocated for major infrastructure projects in the worldwide Sahel Development Program. The House bill also directed the President to prepare an annual report on the Sahel Development Program.

The Senate amendment did not contain a comparable provision.

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The committee of conference agreed to delete the House provision relating to the promotion of ecological balance and development of an effective infrastructure, including transportation. It also agreed to the House provision requiring the President to prepare an annual report on the Sahel Development Program. The committee of conference recognizing the special conditions in the Sahelian region suggests that the President, in his annual report, on the extent to which the overall developmental objectives of the Sahel Development Program are being met, include an assessment of the needs of the region in promoting ecological balance and for developing infrastructure. Special attention to this matter is necessary because some major infrastructure projects are proposed for the Sahel. The President's report should include consideration of how the infrastructure needs of the region are being addressed and what the U.S. contribution, if any, should be toward meeting these needs. In any event, the percentage of any U.S. funds allocated for major infrastructure projects under this section is not to exceed the percentage of funds contributed by all countries which are allocated for major infrastructure projects in the worldwide Sahel Development Program.

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March 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT)

TO: Director, Office of Sahel/West Africa Affairs

SUBJECT: Sahel Development Strategy Statement (SDSS)

You are aware that SMAT devoted considerable attention to the draft SDSS and its predecessor as well as the relationship between AID's strategy and the strategy formulated several years ago by the CILSS/Club Secretariats.

In the first attachment (Attachment A) hereto are a set of findings and recommendations growing out of suggestions contained in SMAT's Progress Report. These suggestions were developed more fully during the Kigali meeting (the dates in the memo were those selected in a meeting that you chaired during one of the SMDC rump sessions). Two things have gone a bit awry for unforeseen reasons:

a. The March 1 meeting did not materialize, primarily because the new CILSS Exec Sec has not assumed office (the meeting has been tentatively rescheduled for later in the month).

b. The "main concepts" may not be discussed with CILSS/Club representatives before AID's Dakar meeting. We strongly recommend, however, that this loop be closed at the earliest possible date (any outcomes or results might still find their way into the draft SDSS).

The second attachment (Attachment B) -- actually in draft cable form if you wish to so use it -- contains SMAT comments and observations on AID's Sahel Strategy that may prove useful in the drafting sessions scheduled for Dakar.

As we had earlier indicated, some of our findings might take various forms and be submitted in irregular fashion. Before this material is overtaken by events, we place it in your hands for such action as you may decide. We will include this material in the appendix to our final report.

Attachments a/s

Attachment A

SMAT Recommendations and Action Initiated: Preparation and Submission of a Sahel Development Strategy Statement

IA. Finding:

The Sahel Program lacks a current Regional Development Strategy Statement, although work was begun months ago.

IB. Recommendation:

To accelerate the preparation of the RDSS now in draft, the SMDC and SWA might designate two or three mission representatives and an SWA representative to meet for an intensive drafting period with the Director, SDPRO.

IIA. Finding:

The draft RDSS has not been reviewed or discussed in detail with the CILSS or OECD/Club Secretariats (beyond the U.S. member of the latter).

IIB. Recommendation:

AFR should consider circulating the revised draft RDSS through the CILSS and Club Secretariats for comments. This could prompt a further review and update (last done in 1979) on the CILSS strategy and refinement of same (e.g., the concept of food self-sufficiency).

III. Action Completed/Initiated:

On January 29, 1984, the SMDC-SWA-SDPRO meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, approved the following courses of action with target dates as indicated:

a. All Sahel Missions and Director, SWA, will provide the

Director, SDPRO with annotated copies of the RDSS draft, reflecting the views and recommendations of their staffs.

Due date: February 25, 1984

b. SDPRO will prepare a revised draft incorporating comments received. The main concepts only (not the full draft) will be discussed and reviewed with representatives of the CILSS and Club Secretariats for their comments and critiques.

Due date: o/a March 1, 1984 (at a scheduled Ouagadougou meeting).

c. Mission Directors from Mali and Senegal and AID Rep from The Gambia will meet in Dakar with the Directors, SDPRO and SWA (or designee of latter) and prepare a final RDSS. The mission representatives listed were designated by the SMDC to act on the Council's behalf in approving such a document.

Due date: Mid-March 1984 (several days in Dakar)

d. The RDSS will be submitted to the Director, SWA to initiate the review and approval process in the Africa Bureau.

Due date: April 1, 1984.

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Attachment B

Draft Cable 3/5/84

ACTION: Bamako, Banjul, Dakar, Ndjamena, Niamey, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Paris (OECD for Fell), Praia

SUBJECT: Sahel Development Strategy Statement (SDSS)

REF: A. State 018698; B. 1983 State 186149

1. In ref A (3/III c), the Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) discussed the SDSS in the context of the latest draft now approaching completion: Quote Strategy preparation process, SWA/SDPRO/SMDC might appoint a small task force (two or three representatives from SMDC, one representative from SWA and Director, SDPRO) to work intensively for a week on the Statement End Quote. Circulation of the draft through CILSS/Club was also suggested.

2. The SMDC meeting in Kigali on January 29, 1984 took up this proposal and agreed on a course of action asking each Mission Director and the Director, SWA to provide SDPRO with annotated copies of the SDSS draft on/about February 25, 1984. SDPRO would produce a revised draft and discuss its main concepts -- not a draft -- with CILSS/Club representatives. In mid-March, the Mali, Senegal and The Gambia Directors/Rep, representing the entire SMDC, and the Directors, SDPRO and SWA (or designee of latter) would meet in Dakar to prepare and approve a final SDSS for submission on about April 1, 1984 for Africa Bureau review and approval.

3. In the paragraphs that follow are some observations and suggestions submitted by SMAT based on a review of the draft SDSS and

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discussions with various AID and State representatives during SMAT's Washington and field visits. This material is forwarded for such use as the SWA/SDPRO/SMDC group may decide and with a suggestion that all addressees may wish to comment (to Dakar) on the ideas set forth. SMAT suggests that it may also be useful to review the SDSS guidance (ref B) for additional points that should be considered.

A. The effort to prepare a SDSS has been under way for some time. Much important work has been done but the present draft does not in our opinion sufficiently reflect some gaps and open questions left by the CILSS/Club strategy. For example, there is little discussion of the domestic financial resource constraints now impeding development -- and in many cases current government operations. If the donors come to the conclusion that the Sahel countries are doing everything possible to mobilize domestic resources for development (which is doubtful), then they will have to show a much greater willingness to finance local costs, including recurrent costs.

B. The Team was pleased to see that the draft SDSS takes a 20-year perspective, while proposing intermediate, shorter-term goals and measurable targets. To increase public and Congressional understanding of the program, the Team recommends formulation of goals and targets that relate to (a) the emphasis of the current development effort on institution building (regional and national institutions), research and experimentation, and the provision of basic services; and (b) the areas of future emphasis, such as improvement of agricultural price policies (outputs and inputs) and the role of the private sector.

C. It may well turn out that the agriculture and rural sectors should be the single (or main) focus for U.S. assistance programs, but they cannot be the only principal focus for analysis.

The SDSS should in our opinion give increased attention to other areas such as transport in which complementary action must be taken (not necessarily by the U.S.) to permit agricultural development programs to come to fruition. Given the high cost of transport, consideration might be devoted to infrastructure projects, taking account of World Bank findings regarding high rates of return in some Sahel countries for maintenance of roads and appropriate use of labor intensive approaches.

D. It is also clear that the change of what is essentially subsistence agriculture into more productive market agriculture depends heavily on demand for Sahelian food products in urban markets which are turning heavily toward higher quality imported food (some of it coming in at subsidized prices) and on the availability at reasonable prices of both producer and consumer goods needed by the rural population.

E. The proposed increased focus on matching AID-financed programs more closely with available resources, indigenous management capability, and policy reforms also requires an increased effort at collaborative programming with host governments and closer coordination with other donors. In particular, the World Bank and the IMF have considerable capability for economic and technical analysis, policy advice and forward planning as well as evaluation. The Team recommends greater use of the flexibility in the Sahel appropriation (no year funds of non-functional character), not only for projects which can support policy reform (such as increasing reliance on the private sector and the adoption of market-oriented policies in general), but also for other changes in the program mix.

F. The result of such program changes carried out gradually

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as existing activities phase out, can be fewer projects overall and increased reliance on turn-key projects employing AID contracted managers and technicians in operational positions within cooperating Sahelian institutions. (Greater use of AID-financed managers and technical personnel in operational positions should also be considered for existing projects.) This approach would reduce the burden on the limited management capability of host countries, provide needed training, and probably reduce requirements for OE-funded AID personnel.

G. Some Missions have indicated that past U.S. strategy statements for the Sahel have not made sufficient allowance for the dissimilarities among the different Sahelian countries in their physical and human endowment and the relative state of their development. The Team recommends that the SDSS provide a broad framework for the U.S. financed programs in the Sahel region. It should give particular attention to areas which lend themselves to a joint or to a cooperative approach, but should provide sufficient latitude so that individual country Missions are able to develop programs to suit the particular needs of their country. The SDSS should provide a rationale for regionally funded programs.

H. Some of the CILSS/Club Working Groups have been examining problems of common interest and those that might be attacked either on a common or coordinated basis, such as research and food security. These need to be integrated into the strategy which also should be extended to cover other subjects such as intra-regional trade and migration and economic relationships with neighboring, especially coastal, countries.

I. The country programs should take into account not only the needs of the countries themselves and the state of their

development but also the state of political relations. Senegal, Niger, Mali, and Upper Volta probably have the resources and potential to justify a full-fledged U.S. developmental effort. Mauritania, The Gambia and Cape Verde may have neither the resource base nor the governmental infrastructure to justify such extensive programs. Consideration might be given to a gradual reduction of U.S.-financed activities to humanitarian concerns (food aid) and to ameliorating human resource constraints through expanded training opportunities. Such programs could be carried out with a limited AID presence (one or two persons attached to each Embassy and operating with direction and support from Dakar). Chad is a special case which would ordinarily call for a limited approach but current circumstances seem to justify a special approach limited to relief and rehabilitation activities, while political tides continue to ebb and flow.

J. Finally, the SDSS needs to deal with the requirements for regional projects in a way which persuades U.S. Ambassadors and the Sahel countries themselves of their utility, even though allocations for some regional projects may not benefit all countries equally. For example, current guidance (ref b, para 3B) suggests under political factors that the political impact of AID programs be strengthened by identifying the "national benefits of regional programs." Too little attention has been given to the mutual benefits realized among Sahelian countries from all regional activities, especially in view of the broad similarities of political, technical, and socio-cultural systems and the great potential for replicability and avoid the need to unnecessary duplication.

SMAT - 3/5/84

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AID/AFR/SWA:DKENNEDY:DD
02/21/84: 632.3324
AID/AFR/SWA:DCHANDLER

IMMEDIATE BAMAKO, BANJUL IMMEDIATE, DAKAR IMMEDIATE, NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE, NIAMEY IMMEDIATE, NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE,

AIDAC DAKAR AND FORE REDSO/WCA

DC

E.O. 12356: N/A

DK

TAGS:

SUBJECT: SAHEL MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT PROGRESS REPORT

REF: STATE 018698

1. IN REFTEL, SAHEL MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM (SMAT) SUMMARIZED ITS PROGRESS REPORT FOR ALL ADDRESSEES. AS A FOLLOW UP, COPIES OF FULL REPORT WERE FORWARDED DIRECTLY TO ALL SAHEL MISSIONS AND/OR GIVEN TO MISSION REPS AT KIGALI DIRECTORS' CONFERENCE.

2. SMAT WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS (REQUESTED BY FEBRUARY 15 IN REFTEL) FROM USAIDS, EMBASSIES, REDSO/WCA AND SAHEL REGIONAL OFFICES. YY

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UNCLASSIFIED

CONTINUATION SHEET

AID/AFR/SWA:DKENNEDY:DD
02/21/84: 632.3324
AID/AFR/SWA:DCHANDLER

ACTION PRECEDENCE: OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE, PRAIA IMMEDIATE, ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Office of the Executive Secretary

February 6, 1984

TO: Jay F. Morris, DA/AID

FROM: Patty Pettit, ES

SUBJECT: AFR Memo re Sahel Management Assessment

The attached was returned today from Peter McPherson with:

"Jay....you should read. Thanks."

cc: Glenn Patterson, DAA/AFR
Frank Donatelli, AA/AFR

AFR: Sahel Management Assessment

Preliminary findings and recommendations of the Sahel Management Assessment Team.

Noted MPK

Jay

You should read -
Thanks

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON D C 20523

SUBJ AFR/GEN

mw
INFO R/logs

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR

FROM : AA/AFR, Glenn O. Patterson (Acting)

SUBJECT: Sahel Management Assessment

REF : Discussions Held January 19, 1984 in Conjunction with Senegal Director Designate Sarah Jane Littlefield's Visit

As you had requested in the referenced meeting, AFR/SWA is providing you a synopsis of the Sahel Management Assessment Team's preliminary findings and recommendations, along with a copy of their cable, State 018698, which solicited Sahel Mission's comments on their report.

The Team's synopsis addresses issues you had raised at the recent meeting, e.g., the issue regarding "no year" funding authority.

As indicated earlier, the Team is available to meet and discuss with you in greater detail their initial findings.

Attachments: Sahel Management Assessment Team "Summary of Principal Findings/Recommendations", and State 018698

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Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT)

Summary of Principal Findings/Recommendations

The following highlights the findings and recommendations of most concern to A/AID and/or most relevant to discussions of the SDP with the Congress:

1. The concept of a special long-term Sahel development program remains valid and AID management should reconfirm its validity.
2. The SDP regional strategy now in preparation should consider formulation of intermediate goals and targets, tailoring projects and programs to support policy objectives and development of an alternative program mix.
3. AID/W should reduce the pressure on missions to meet obligation targets and use the no-year funding authority provided by Congress.
4. AFR should re-organize and de-centralize the management of the SDP.
5. AFR and other AID/W offices and the USAIDs should mutually support the process of strengthening and improving SDP management.
6. Management in the field should be strengthened by Mission developed information and control systems and increased managerial training.

These findings are discussed in more detail below.

1. SDP Concept -- Most people interviewed in AID/W did not see the SDP as special, in spite of obvious and continuing Congressional interest. They thought the Sahel was getting too much attention, too much money,

and too many people. USAID Directors and Ambassadors also seem to have lost the vision of the SDP designers. The Team believes there are a number of political, technical, and developmental reasons for treating Sahelian problems on an integrated basis. The lack of significant progress in increasing incomes and production and the spate of unfavorable audits have overshadowed the significant gains in creating structures and institutions, the improving climate for policy changes, and the increasing knowledge of Sahelian conditions and of what will and will not work there. These gains offer a base for greater progress in the future if the U.S. stays the course as a full partner in Sahelian development. The forthcoming annual report to the Congress on the SDP might be a useful vehicle for reconfirming publicly the validity of the special Sahel initiative.

2. SDP Strategy -- The Team reviewed the draft Regional Development Strategy Statement now in preparation in the field and was pleased to see that it takes a 20-year perspective, while proposing intermediate shorter term strategies. To increase public and Congressional understanding of the program, the Team recommends the formulation of intermediate goals and measurable targets which relate to: (a) the emphasis of the current development effort on institution building (regional and national institutions) and the provision of basic services; and (b) to areas of future emphasis, such as improvement of agricultural price policies (outputs and inputs) and increasing the role of the private sector.

The team recognizes the difficulties arising from poor host country policy environment in the Sahel in the past and the uneven pace of ongoing policy improvements in the various countries. Nevertheless,

the team believes that programs and projects should increasingly be tailored to support policy objectives; e.g., increasing reliance on private initiatives, adopting market oriented price policies and improving mobilization of domestic resources.

The Team also suggests a review of the program mix, with consideration to additional infrastructure type projects (e.g., maintenance and betterment of transportation links, irrigation) and program assistance, when it can support dialogue to effect policy changes. Country programs should give greater attention to the management constraints resulting from human resource limitations. The result should be fewer projects in fewer sectors and more turnkey projects, employing AID-contracted technicians and managers in operational positions within implementing Sahelian organizations. This approach could provide needed training and such projects usually can be administered with fewer direct-hire personnel.

SDF funds are not governed by the priority areas of the existing functional accounts (FAA Sections 103-106). This flexibility offers greater latitude in the formulation of both regional and country strategies that focus effectively on the similarities and diversities among the Sahelian nations. SMAT believes this flexibility has not been fully appreciated and used.

3. <u>"Moving Money" Syndrome and No-Year Funding Authority</u>--The Team found that the unrelenting push to meet obligation deadlines, coupled with requiring all obligations before the end of August, has resulted in:

- Rushed project design, resulting in inadequate dialogue with the

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host country during design, insufficient attention to logistical and administrative requirements, and Missions' acceptance of inappropriate AID/W requests for inclusions/deletions of project elements or requirements.

- o Hasty negotiation and signing of project agreements, thereby postponing or overlooking potential implementation problems.
- o Insistence that host government officials sign obligating documents without adequate review within their organizations.
- o Last minute requests from AID/Washington to obligate funds for projects for which no obligation had been planned.

The team recommends that AID/AFR be encouraged to use the no-year funding authority provided by the Congress. This could reduce the unnecessary obligation pressures on the missions at year's end, provide funds during the first quarter when they usually are not available, and smooth the flow of obligations and negotiation workload.

The primary objection given to using the "no-year" authority is a risk that a lower level of obligation would result in reductions in appropriations in the subsequent fiscal year. SMAT doubts that obligations would drop significantly, except possibly in the first year the no-year authority was used. AID's highest priorities in the Sahel are the selection and design of good projects and prudent use of monies already available, not obligating ever-increasing amounts of money. Should a small reduction in obligation activity occur for a year, it would likely be followed closely by increased resource flow as funds were handled more efficiently, projects designed better and pipelines reduced. We would expect the Congress to respond positively to this

improved management performance by increasing appropriations in subsequent years if so requested.

4. Re-organization and decentralization of SDP Management--The organizational units directly involved in SDP planning and implementation include AFR/SWA, the Sahel Development Planning Regional Office (SDPRO) in Mali, the Sahel Mission Directors' Council (SMDC), USAID Upper Volta's Liaison Office with CILSS (the Sahelian coordination agency), the River Basin Development Office (RBDO) in Senegal, and U.S. representation on the donor-sponsored Club du Sahel Secretariat in OECD in Paris. While all are performing useful functions, the Team believes that they are not achieving their potential nor providing the synergistic effect needed, primarily for lack of direction and inadequate coordination.

The Team recommends the establishment in Dakar of a Sahel Program Coordination Office (SPCO) headed by a Coordinator with the rank of Deputy Assistant Administrator. SDPRO and RBDO would be incorporated into SPCO, and staff added to permit SPCO to perform the service functions in the Sahel that are currently provided by REDSO/WCA. The Coordinator would take direct responsibility for the liaison with CILSS and the Club du Sahel. The Team would envision the transfer to SPCO of a number of functions now performed in AID/W such as budget management and allocation, approval of projects, allocation of personnel ceilings and operating expense funds, and preparation of the Congressional Presentation and the annual report to the Congress on the SDP. Consequently, it should be possible for AFR to deal with the Sahel generally as a single unit rather than as eight countries,

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thereby reducing AFR's workload significantly.

5. Headquarters/Field Relationships --The field missions feel that "Washington is the enemy" and thwarting field efforts to implement projects. By the same token, AID/W exercises a general sense of skepticism about whether field missions are using their authority adequately and/or managing their missions and resources effectively. SMAT found evidence to support these concerns:

- o Unrelenting pressure to meet obligation targets (often artificial and arbitrary),
- o Undercutting of the spirit of field delegations by requiring: (a) Project Paper (PP) level of analysis in Project Identification Documents (PIDs); and (b) PP approval in AID/W even though the project falls within field authority.
- o Delays in or inadequate responses: waiver decision; Section 121(d) certification; project and nonproject assistance approvals; feedback on budget reviews; and staffing actions (positions unfilled for months, inadequate training possibilities, assignment of minimally qualified personnel);
- o Too many AID/W requests for comment and information;
- o Limited usefulness of most AID/W reviews: CDSS, ABS, PID, PP.
- o Auditors lack objectivity and familiarity with AID and its development goals.

Implementation of recommendations under 3. and 4. above would go far toward alleviating some of the foregoing concerns. In addition, SMAT recommends greater priority to filling Sahel direct hire positions on a more timely basis with experienced, well qualified, and language

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proficient personnel.

6. Strengthening Mission Management--Most Missions need to strengthen internal mechanisms for follow-up, monitoring, and control of project implementations. The support of host country development efforts should be given greater weight by both AID/W and USAIDs in setting day-to-day priorities and establishing of procedures. Furthermore, SMAT is also considering recommendations for training of managers at the Mission level, AFR establishment of an "Operations Appraisal Staff", and the design of two special projects:

- o A revolving fund to finance pre-implementation project expenditures.
- o An initiatives project to pay for studies, travel of host country officials and small projects related to policy dialogue, promotion of the private sector, pre-project testing of technological innovations, or other non-project or pre-project initiatives.

Attachments:

A - Bio Sketches of SMAT Members

B - Summary Cable on Assessment of AID Sahel Program Management Capacities and Requirements

January 25, 1984

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Attachment A

Biographic Sketches of the
Sahel Management Assessment Team

The team is comprised of Thomas C. Irvin (Team Leader), Walter Furst, Parke Massey, James Roush, and Sam Thornburg. All five are former Senior AID Officers with extensive field experience, much of it in Africa.

Irvin: Served with AID from 1967 to 1979, has held senior positions in AID Saigon, Director, Regional Economic Development Office, Bangkok, and AID Representative Beirut. Since 1979 has worked as private consultant almost exclusively in the Sahel on AID-CILSS activities.

Furst: Served 38 years with AID and predecessor agencies mainly in Europe, Asia and Washington in program development and management positions. Served as Assistant Director for Program with USAID/Nigeria. Last AID assignment as Senior Evaluation Officer in AID/W involved several brief Sahel assignments for program evaluatio and design. Since retirement, Furst served on an evaluation team in Mali.

Massey: Originally with State, opened first Consultate in Abidjan in 1957. With AID from 1963 to 1979, holding positions as Financial Analyst, Economist, Capitol Development Officer, Deputy Director and AID Representative, mostly in Latin America and AID/W. Has had two previous consulting assignments in the Sahel, which entailed visits to Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, and Upper Volta.

Roush: Served 25 years with AID and predecessor agencies, including over six years in Africa (opened AID Mission in Cameroon). Has also served in senior positions in Asia (Vietnam), Latin America (Deputy in ROCAP and Director in Chile) and AID/W. Since retirement in 1979, has done consulting (evaluations and management assessments) in Mali, niger, and Senegal in the Sahel plus evaluations of AFR/RA regional projects and the evaluation system of the AFrican Development Bank. Has served as trainer in a project documentation workshop, a workshop on the impact of agricultural policies on food consumption, and a technical assistance workshop in Cameroon for USAID contract experts and their counterparts in agricultural and rural development.

Thornburg: Served with AID from 1956 to 1979 in Bolivia, Nigeria, Vietnam and AID/W. As Director of SER/MO in AID/W, Thornburg participated in SMDC meetings and was concerned with the problems of logistics and JAO oreganization throughout the Sahel. Since retirement, he has worked for AFR/DR, the AID Affairs Office in Burundi, conducted a study of administration and logistical support for contractor personnel in Mauritania, The Gambia, Niger and Liberia, and continued to be involved in Sahel administrative management issues. He has also had eight assignments with the Office of Foreign Buildings in State.

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UNCLASSIFIED

AID/AFR/SWA:TIRVIN:DH
01/19/84 EXT: 632-2725
AID/AFR/SWA:EMAMUNDSON

AID/AFR/SWA:JHBIERKE

PRIORITY PARIS, ROME PRIORITY, BAMAKO PRIORITY, DAKAR PRIORITY, ABIDJAN PRIORITY, BANJUL PRIORITY, NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY, ROUTINE KIGALI

AIDAC, PARIS FOR OECD, ROME FOR FODAG, BAMAKO FOR SDPRO,

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

EMA
TI
JHB

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF AID SAHEL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

REF: {A} 1983 STATE 280519 {NOTAL} {B} 1983 STATE 300042 {C} STATE 6377

ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA

1. THE SAHEL MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM {SMAT} HAS SUBMITTED A PROGRESS REPORT FOR FIELD AND AID/W REVIEW. COPIES WILL BE HANDCARRIED TO KIGALI CONFERENCE. THE TEAM ALSO PREPARED THE ABRIDGED VERSION BEING TRANSMITTED BY THIS CABLE. THIS VERSION OMITS MOST OF THE QUOTE WHAT THE TEAM HEARD UNQUOTE SECTION THAT WAS REPORTED TO SMDC XIII. THE QUOTE OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS/IDEAS UNQUOTE SECTION IS ALSO ABRIDGED, BUT SETS FORTH IDEAS UNDER CONSIDERATION TO ALLOW SAHEL DIRECTORS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THEM AT POST BEFORE KIGALI. THE SMAT REPRESENTATIVE HOPES TO RECEIVE FEEDBACK AT THE MEETING. IN ADDITION, AS INDICATED REF {C}, SOME OF THE PROPOSALS RELATE TO THE PROPOSED AGENDA FOR THE SMDC MEETING WITH AA/AFR. THE TEAM ALSO

WELCOMES CABLED COMMENTS FROM USAIDS, EMBASSIES, SAHEL REGIONAL OFFICES, AND REDSO/WCA (BY FEBRUARY 15).

2. SMAT BRIEFED AA/AFR, DAAS LOVE AND JOHNSON AND SWA ON JANUARY 18 ON GENERAL CONTENT OF PROGRESS REPORT.

3. THERE FOLLOWS THE ABRIDGED VERSION OF THE SMAT PROGRESS REPORT.

I. INTRODUCTION: SMAT INTERVIEWED AID, STATE AND OTHER DONOR REPS IN WASHINGTON, AND U.S. AND NON-U.S. PERSONNEL IN U.S. MISSIONS/USAIDS, HOST GOVERNMENTS, AND DONOR OFFICES IN THE SAHELIAN COUNTRIES DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1983. VISITS ALSO INCLUDED THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT IN OUAGADOUGOU, CLUB DU SAHEL SECRETARIAT IN PARIS, REDSO/WCA, AND AID REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE SAHEL. ONE MEMBER OF SMAT ATTENDED SMDC XIII AND PRESENTED A SYNTHESIS OF WHAT SMAT MEMBERS HAD HEARD IN WASHINGTON AND THE FIELD AND OFFERED A FEW TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS. THIS SUMMARY REPORT OFFERS FIELD MISSIONS AND AFR OFFICES SOME OBSERVATIONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS, AND PRESENTS SELECTED IDEAS THAT HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED TO OR DEVELOPED BY THE TEAM FOR IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF AID'S SAHEL PROGRAM. THIS REPORT IS INTENDED TO ELICIT FURTHER DIALOGUE WITH USAIDS, EMBASSIES, SAHEL REGIONAL OFFICES, REDSO/WCA, AND INTERESTED WASHINGTON OFFICES. COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED BY FEBRUARY 15. DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, THE TEAM WILL DEVELOP IDEAS FURTHER AND MAY SEEK COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

II. SYNTHESIS OF WHAT THE TEAM HEARD

A. IN WASHINGTON (BOTH AID AND STATE)

1. REGARDING THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (SDP) -- NOT SEEN AS SPECIAL BY MOST INTERVIEWEES ALREADY GETTING TOO MUCH ATTENTION, TOO MUCH MONEY, TOO MANY PEOPLE.

2. DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY -- THE RIGHT HAND GIVETH AND THE LEFT HAND TAKETH AWAY. AUTHORITIES ABUSED.

3. AFR MANAGEMENT -- TOO CENTRALIZED, INSUFFICIENT DELEGATION, STAFF OFFICES CANNOT HANDLE WORKLOAD.

B. IN THE FIELD (BOTH AID AND STATE)

1. WASHINGTON IS THE ENEMY -- SOME 17 CITATIONS.

2. PROJECT MANAGERS ARE FRUSTRATED -- WITH REASON.

3. SAHELIAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE WEAK/DIFFUSE.

4. AID DOES NOT RESPOND TO COUNTRY PRIORITIES.

5. AUDIT REPORTS ARE NOT OBJECTIVE, MANY AUDITORS ARE RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED AND UNFAMILIAR WITH AID AND ITS GOALS.

6. SECTION 121(D) COMPLIANCE IS DIFFICULT, IT CAUSED CONFLICT INITIALLY WITH GOVERNMENTS, BUT BETTER MANAGEMENT SHOULD RESULT.

7. TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON REGIONAL STRATEGY.

8. FACTORS DETERRING AID SUCCESS IN THE SAHEL -- MOST PRESENTED AT SMDC XIII.

9. TOO MANY REGIONAL PROJECTS ABSORBING MONEY FOR LOWER PRIORITY ACTIVITIES.

10. SOME NEEDED CHANGES IN STRATEGY AND TACTICS:

- A. PROGRAM EMPHASIS -- MORE FUNDING TO HUMAN
- RESOURCE, QUOTE PEOPLE ORIENTED UNQUOTE
- PROJECTS, MANAGEMENT TRAINING (INCLUDING
- ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION),
- RESEARCH, INFRASTRUCTURE (ESPECIALLY FOR TRAFFIC
- ARTERIES), NONPROJECT ASSISTANCE, SUPPORT OF
- INDIGENOUS PRIVATE SECTORS.

- B. NEW TACTICS -- INCREASE CONDITIONALITY OF AID
- TO PERFORMANCE, MORE RIGOROUS ANALYSIS AND
- HONESTY IN PRESENTATION, RECOGNIZE SAHELIANS
- MUST DEVELOP THE SAHEL.

11. SWA, SMDC, SDPRO, CLUB/OECD, CILSS COMPLEX:

- A. DONOR AID TERMS AND STANDARDS CREATE
- PERSONNEL AND PROGRAM PROBLEMS FOR CILSS
- SECRETARIAT.

- B. CILSS SECRETARIAT HAS NO CLEAR CONCEPT OF
- CHANNELS FOR DEALING WITH AID ON PROJECT
- 625-0911.

- C. LACK OF CLARITY ON RELATIONSHIP AND MUTUAL

- RESPONSIBILITIES OF SAHEL MISSION DIRECTORS
- COUNCIL (SMDC) AND THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT
- PLANNING REGIONAL ORGANIZATION (SDPRO) HAMPERS
- PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF A REGIONAL
- DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT.

- D. SDPRO SHOULD BE: I) ABOLISHED, II)
- TRANSFORMED INTO A SECRETARIAT FOR SMDC, III)
- MOVED TO OUAGA (IN REDUCED NUMBERS) AND SERVE
- ONLY AN ADVISORY FUNCTION TO CILSS; IV) BE GIVEN
- EXPANDED RESPONSIBILITIES IN BOTH REGIONAL AND
- BILATERAL PROGRAM/PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND
- IMPLEMENTATION; V) BE ALLOCATED SOME TECHNICAL
- PERSONNEL (E.G., LAWYER, CONTRACT OFFICER,
- ENGINEER) AND BECOME A SAHEL REDSO.

- E. SMDC SHOULD EXERCISE MORE POLICY AUTHORITY
- VIA THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS. FOLLOW-UP
- ON ALL SMDC DECISIONS SHOULD BE VESTED IN
- SDPRO. SMDC HAS TOO MANY MEETINGS; DOES NOT
- REGULARLY INCLUDE AMBASSADORS IN SMDC SESSIONS.

C. FROM SAHELIANS AND OTHER DONORS (IN WASHINGTON AND FIELD) -- NEW

1. SDPRO -- HAS DONE USEFUL CATALYTIC WORK ON MANY
- SAHEL POLICY ISSUES; REDUCE TO 3 OR 4 PERSONS
- AND RELOCATE TO OUAGA TO WORK WITH CILSS
- SECRETARIAT AND PARTICIPATE IN CILSS WORKING
- GROUP ACTIVITIES.

2. U.S. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, PARTICULARLY IN
- FINANCE, HAVE BENEFITED CILSS. TRAINING SHOULD
- BE MORE SYSTEMATIC AND WIDELY AVAILABLE.

3. CILSS-CLUB RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED STEADILY.
- SOME POLICY DISAGREEMENTS PERSIST: IRRIGATED
- VS. RAINFED AGRICULTURE; REGIONAL VS. NATIONAL
- FOOD SECURITY STOCKS.

4. MORE CONTACT SHOULD EXIST AT NATIONAL LEVELS BETWEEN CILSS COORDINATORS AND AID MISSIONS.

5. BECAUSE U.S. PROVIDES MORE RESOURCES DIRECTLY TO
- THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT THAN ANY OTHER
- DONOR, AID SOMETIMES TENDS TO TAKE A QUOTE HERE
- IS THE MONEY AND HERE IS WHAT YOU DO WITH IT
- UNQUOTE APPROACH.

6. CLUB SECRETARIAT CONTINUES TO REFRAIN FROM
- ENDORSING CILSS'S EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
- PROPOSALS AND FROM SUPPORTING MORE SYSTEMATIC
- DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAHEL INSTITUTE.

7. SAHELIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS CAN WORK FOR PROJECT
- ACTIVITY ACCOUNTING BY ADDING DOUBLE SIGN-OFF
- PROCEDURE BETWEEN HC AND DONOR MANAGERS.

8. CILSS SECRETARIAT HAS IMPROVED MARKEDLY:
- CONCENTRATING MORE ON POLICY ISSUES, DROPPING
- INVOLVEMENT IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT; REFRAINING
- FROM DIRECT CONTACT WITH DONORS TO SUPPORT
- INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS.

9. USAID RELATIONS WITH HC ARE INADEQUATE.

10. ONE HC REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT THAT DONORS COULD
- BETTER ALLOCATE DIFFERENT AREAS OF ACTIVITY
- AMONG THEM.

III. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS BY SMAT: PROPOSALS AND IDEAS UNDER CONSIDERATION

A. THE CONCEPT OF A SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REMAINS VALID; RESULTS TO DATE MAY BE DISAPPOINTING IN TERMS OF INCREASED INCOMES AND PRODUCTION, BUT GAINS ACHIEVED PROVIDE A BASE FOR FUTURE PROGRESS. U.S. SHOULD STAY THE COURSE AS A FULL PARTNER IN SAHEL DEVELOPMENT. TO ENSURE MORE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION, AID NEEDS TO:

-- RECONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THE VISION OF THE SDP
- AS A LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT UNDERTAKING WORTHY OF
- ITS SUPPORT.

-- MAINTAIN THE SDP APPROPRIATION AND USE THE
- SPECIAL AUTHORITIES PROVIDED THEREIN.

-- UPGRADE, INTEGRATE, AND STRENGTHEN THE
- MANAGEMENT OF SDP AS SUGGESTED BELOW.

-- RECOGNIZE THAT SAHEL HAS SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT
- CHALLENGES AND PROVIDE BETTER SUPPORT TO FIELD
- MISSIONS TO DEAL WITH THEM.

-- EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN POLICY AND PLANNING TIES
- BETWEEN AID AND SAHELIAN AGENCIES AND OTHER
- DONORS.

B. AID/W ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPPORT FOR THE SAHEL PROGRAM SHOULD BE IMPROVED. AA/AFR SHOULD GIVE FIELD MORE AUTONOMY. AT SAME TIME, AA/AFR SHOULD ESTABLISH A QUOTE OPERATIONS APPRAISAL STAFF UNQUOTE UNIT TO REVIEW FIELD OPERATIONS AND RESPOND TO SPECIAL MISSION REQUESTS.

C. A MORE COLLABORATIVE SDP STRATEGY IS NEEDED, SUPPORTED BY MODIFIED PROGRAM CONTENT AND BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS.

-- SMAT SUPPORTS SDPRO/SMDC EFFORTS IN PREPARATION
- OF A REGIONAL STRATEGY STATEMENT THAT TAKES A
- 20-YEAR PERSPECTIVE AND ESTABLISHES SHORTER TERM
- STRATEGIES AND INTERIM GOALS AND MEASURABLE
- TARGETS. SMAT SUGGESTS STRATEGY STATEMENT
- CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM MIXES. GENERAL
- MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD AND HUMAN RESOURCE
- LIMITATION OF HOST COUNTRIES AND USAID SUGGEST
- FURTHER PROGRAM CONCENTRATION (FEWER SECTORS,
- FEWER PROJECTS).

- SMAT SEES THE REGIONAL STRATEGY STATEMENT AS A
- BASIS FOR EVALUATING REGIONAL PROJECTS AND
- PROVIDING GUIDANCE (BUT NOT STRAIGHT-JACKET) FOR
- CDSSS. LATTER WILL NEED TO REFLECT VARIED
- COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT SITUATION AND U.S. POLICY
- OBJECTIVES.

- RE STRATEGY PREPARATION PROCESS, SWA/SDPRO/SMDC
- MIGHT APPOINT A SMALL TASK FORCE (TWO OR THREE,
- REPRESENTATIVES OF SMDC, ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM
- SWA AND DIRECTOR, SPDRO) TO WORK INTENSIVELY FOR
- A WEEK ON THE STATEMENT. ALSO, THE REFINED
- DRAFT MIGHT BE CIRCULATED THROUGH THE CILSS AND
- CLUB SECRETARIATS FOR COMMENTS. THIS COULD
- PROMPT A FURTHER REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE CILSS
- STRATEGY AND REFINEMENT OF SAME (CONCEPT OF FOOD
- SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS NOT WELL DEFINED). IT COULD
- ALSO LEAD TO AN IMPROVED DIALOGUE WITH OTHER
- DONORS.

-- SMAT SUGGESTS A NEW LOOK AT INFRASTRUCTURE,
- I.E., ROAD REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION,
- IRRIGATION, POSSIBLY OTHER TRANSPORT AND
- COMMUNICATIONS. ROADS PARTICULARLY CAN SERVE TO
- IMPROVE RURAL ACCESS TO MARKETS AND LINK
- LANDLOCKED SAHELIAN COUNTRIES TO ONE ANOTHER AND

- COASTAL NEIGHBORS. INCREASED TRADE WITH LATTER
- MAY PROVIDE IMPORTANT CATALYST TO SAHELIAN
- DEVELOPMENT. IRRIGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO MEETING
- SAHEL FOOD SECURITY NEEDS. INFRASTRUCTURE
- PROJECTS CAN BE HANDLED ON A TURN-KEY BASIS,
- MINIMIZING HOST COUNTRY AND USAID MANAGEMENT
- REQUIREMENTS, WHILE PROVIDING ON-THE-JOB
- TRAINING TO SAHELIANS.

-- HUMAN RESOURCES WEAKNESSES OF THE HOST COUNTRIES
- AND THE USAIDS DEMAND GREATER ATTENTION. THIS
- SUGGESTS FEWER PROJECTS, MORE TURN-KEY
- INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, NONPROJECT ASSISTANCE,
- AND PROVIDING OPERATING (NOT JUST ADVISORY)
- PERSONNEL TO PROJECTS.

-- PROGRAM AND SECTOR ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE
- CONSIDERED WHERE IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN
- SIGNIFICANT POLICY CHANGES. HOWEVER, POLICY
- DIALOGUE DOES NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE SUCH
- ASSISTANCE TO BE EFFECTIVE. POLICY DIALOGUE
- COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY TOTAL MISSION
- INVOLVEMENT (INCLUDING THE EMBASSY AND POSSIBLY
- OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MISSION) IN THE
- FORMULATION OF PRIORITIES FOR DIALOGUE AND THE
- STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS.
- SUCH POLICY INVOLVEMENT PLAN SHOULD ALSO
- CONSIDER THE USE OF CILSS NATIONAL COMMITTEES,
- OTHER DONORS AND AID/W.

D. THE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGING THE SDP NEEDS MORE LEADERSHIP AND INTEGRATION AND CLEARER LINES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY.

1. SMAT OBSERVATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
- ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS:

- A. NO ONE IS CLEARLY IN CHARGE, EXCEPT POSSIBLY
- AA/AFR WHO DOES NOT HAVE TIME TO FOCUS ON SAHEL
- DEVELOPMENT OR NEEDS.

- B. THE DIRECTOR OF AFR/SWA IS NOMINALLY
- RESPONSIBLE, BUT HAS NOT BEEN PROVIDING THE
- LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO SDPRO AND SMDC AND HAS BEEN
- UNABLE TO GET ADEQUATE ATTENTION IN AID/W TO THE
- NEEDS OF THE SAHEL MISSIONS.

- C. SDPRO HAS DONE SOME GOOD WORK, BUT NEITHER
- THE TEAM'S STUDIES NOR ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

- HAVE BEEN UTILIZED FULLY BY THE MISSIONS, THE
- SMDC, SWA, OR CILSS. SDPRO'S ROLE HAS BEEN SO
- DIFFUSE, AND THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED TO IT SO
- MINIMAL, THAT IT HAS NOT ACHIEVED THE IMPACT
- POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE AND NEEDED.

- D. THE SMDC HAS PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE, BUT IT
- HAS NOT REALIZED ITS POTENTIAL, IN PART BECAUSE
- OF ITS MODUS OPERANDI, IN PART BECAUSE NO ONE IS
- IN CHARGE TO ENSURE THAT DECISIONS OF THE
- COUNCIL ARE IMPLEMENTED. NOR HAS SMDC SEEN FIT
- TO VEST SUCH FOLLOW-UP IN SDPRO IN ANY FORMAL
- MANNER.

- E. LIAISON WITH CILSS IS FRAGMENTED BETWEEN
- USAID UPPER VOLTA'S LIAISON OFFICE, THE SDPRO IN
- BAMAKO, AND CLUB SECRETARIAT IN PARIS, NONE OF
- WHOSE ROLES IS CLEAR. IMPROVED COORDINATION IS
- NEEDED.

- F. ALTHOUGH MISSION DIRECTORS DEAL WITH REGIONAL
- ISSUES IN THE SMDC, THEY SEEM OVERLY BILATERALLY
- ORIENTED. IT MAY BE NATURAL THAT THEY WOULD
- FEEL LESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OVERALL
- PROGRAM; HOWEVER, THEIR FAILURE TO FOLLOW, IN
- THEIR BILATERAL PROGRAMS, DECISIONS AGREED TO IN
- THE SMDC ITSELF ILLUSTRATES THE LACK OF
- FOLLOW-UP ON SMDC DECISIONS AND THE LACK OF
- LEADERSHIP ON THE PART OF SWA.

2. SOME IDEAS FOR IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATIONAL
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR MANAGING THE SDP FOLLOW:

-- REGIONALIZE ALL NECESSARY SUPPORT SERVICES FOR
- THE SAHEL COUNTRIES INTO A SEPARATE SUPPORT
- ORGANIZATION LOCATED IN DAKAR. ESTABLISHMENT OF
- SUCH A ORGANIZATION WOULD LEAD TO A
- CORRESPONDING REDUCTION OF STAFF AND AUTHORITIES
- FROM REDSO AND USAID/SENEGAL. REDSO WOULD THEN
- FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON THE BALANCE OF THE WEST
- AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

-- COMBINE THE AFR/PD/SWAP OFFICE WITH AFR/SWA TO
- STRENGTHEN AND MORE EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE
- PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS THROUGHOUT THE SAHEL.
- SOME SAVINGS IN PERSONNEL SHOULD RESULT.

-- CONSIDER MOVING PERSONNEL AND AUTHORITIES OF
- AFR/SWA AND AFR/PD/SWAP TO THE FIELD (DAKAR IS

- THE MOST LOGICAL PLACE} AND COMBINING THEM WITH
- THE ABOVE PROPOSED SUPPORT ORGANIZATION TO
- ESTABLISH A QUOTE SAHEL PROGRAM COORDINATION
- OFFICE {SPCO} UNQUOTE. WITH CLOSER PROXIMITY
- AND IMMERSION INTO THE REGION, THE SPCO SHOULD
- PROVIDE MORE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND
- PROGRAM DECISIONS. TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION
- AND EXECUTION OF SAHEL PLANNING, SDPRO WOULD BE
- MOVED FROM BAMAKO AND INCORPORATED INTO THE SPCO.

-- CONSIDER MOVING THE ALLOCATION OF SAHEL
- MISSIONS' PERSONNEL CEILINGS AND OPERATING
- EXPENSE FUNDS FROM AFR/PMR TO AFR/SWA {OR
- SPCO}. AFR/PMR WOULD PROVIDE A BLOCK OF
- PERSONNEL CEILINGS AND A BLOCK OF OE FUNDS TO
- AFR/SWA {OR SPCO} TO DETERMINE THE INTERNAL
- ALLOCATION AMONG THE SAHEL MISSIONS IN
- CONJUNCTION WITH THE SMDC.

3. WHILE THE FOREGOING ARE UNDER REVIEW AND
- CONSIDERATION, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS CAN BE
- INITIATED TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
- THE EXISTING U.S. AND SAHELIAN ENTITIES:

-- FORMALLY INCLUDE THE CILSS MINISTER COORDINATOR
- AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON THE SMDC AGENDA {AT
- LEAST ONCE EACH YEAR};

-- SAME FOR U.S. AMBASSADORS TO SAHEL COUNTRIES
- {ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY AT THE SAME MEETING};

-- USAIDS DESIGNATE LIAISON OFFICERS AND ESTABLISH
- REGULAR AND CONTINUOUS WORKING RELATIONS WITH
- CILSS NATIONAL COORDINATORS.

-- SMDC/SDPRO REVIEW CILSS POLICY ISSUANCES AND
- WORKING GROUP PAPERS FOR RELEVANCE TO AID
- REGIONAL AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES, PROGRAMS, AND
- PROJECTS.

E. AID/W MANAGEMENT OF SDP FUNDS CONTRIBUTES TO MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN THE SAHEL

1. EVEN THOUGH SDP FUNDS ARE AUTHORIZED AND
- APPROPRIATED ON A NO-YEAR BASIS, THE AGENCY HAS
- REQUIRED THAT SDP MANAGERS MEET ANNUAL
- OBLIGATION DEADLINES {OFTEN ARTIFICIAL AND
- ARBITRARY}. SIMILARLY, THE AGENCY'S FUNCTIONAL
- AREAS OF EMPHASIS AND SUCCESSIVE QUOTE MANDATES

- UNQUOTE HAVE BEEN IMPOSED UPON SAHEL PROGRAMS
- WITHOUT REGARD TO APPLICABILITY OR
- APPROPRIATENESS, EVEN THOUGH LEGISLATION DOES
- NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUIRE SUCH APPLICATION.

2. THE AID/W PUSH TO MEET OBLIGATION DEADLINES HAS
- RESULTED IN:

- A. RUSHED PROJECT DESIGN, RESULTING IN MINIMAL
- DIALOGUE WITH THE HOST COUNTRY DURING DESIGN,
- INADEQUATE ATTENTION TO PLANNING FOR LOGISTICAL
- AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS, AND ACCEPTANCE
- BY THE MISSIONS OF INAPPROPRIATE AID/W REQUESTS
- FOR INCLUSIONS/DELETIONS OF PROJECT ELEMENTS OR
- REQUIREMENTS.

- B. HASTY NEGOTIATION AND SIGNING OF PROJECT
- AGREEMENTS.

- C. INSISTING THAT HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- SIGN OBLIGATING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT GIVING THEM
- TIME TO STAFF THE DOCUMENTS OUT WITHIN THEIR
- ORGANIZATION.

- D. LAST MINUTE REQUESTS FROM AID/W TO OBLIGATE
- FUNDS FOR PROJECTS FOR WHICH NO OBLIGATION HAS
- BEEN PLANNED.

3. AID/W HAS PROHIBITED ANY OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAST
- MONTH OF THE FISCAL YEAR, THEREBY FURTHER
- INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON THE FIELD AND
- CONTRIBUTING TO THE TYPES OF SITUATIONS
- DESCRIBED ABOVE.

4. AID SHOULD USE THE UNIQUE FUNDING FLEXIBILITY
- PROVIDED BY THE CONGRESS TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE
- ON THE SAHEL MISSIONS TO QUOTE MOVE MONEY
- UNQUOTE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTION GIVEN TO USING
- THE QUOTE NO-YEAR UNQUOTE AUTHORITY IS THAT IT
- RUNS THE RISK THAT A LOWER LEVEL OF OBLIGATION
- WOULD RESULT IN REDUCTIONS IN FUTURE YEARS'
- APPROPRIATIONS. SMAT DOUBTS THAT THIS WOULD
- HAPPEN FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR, IF AT ALL.
- FURTHERMORE, THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR AID IN THE
- SAHEL AT THIS TIME IS NOT OBLIGATING EVER
- INCREASING AMOUNTS OF MONEY, BUT USING WELL WHAT
- IS ALREADY AVAILABLE. SOME REDUCTION IN
- OBLIGATION ACTIVITY FOR A YEAR COULD HELP USAIDS
- GET ON TOP OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS.

- FURTHERMORE, IT IS LIKELY THAT A MODIFIED AND
- STRENGTHENED SDP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE COULD WORK
- OUT HOW TO OBLIGATE ALL THE FUNDS AVAILABLE IN A
- MORE ORDERLY, LESS MANAGEMENT-INTENSIVE WAY IF
- GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY. FINALLY, THE DECISION
- TO USE THE QUOTE NO-YEAR UNQUOTE AUTHORITY
- SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE CONGRESS
- BEFOREHAND; THE EXPECTED DIRE RESULTS PROBABLY
- COULD BE FORESTALLED.

5. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE EASING OF PRESSURE ON
- ANNUAL OBLIGATIONS, AID/W COULD CONSIDER
- TRANSFERRING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE OYB TO THE
- FIELD, EITHER TO THE NEW SPCO PROPOSED IN D.
- ABOVE OR TO THE SDMC UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SWA
- AND WITH THE STAFF SUPPORT OF A RE-ORGANIZED
- SDPRO.

6. AS A FURTHER MEANS OF FOSTERING TIMELY
- OBLIGATIONS BY THE FIELD, AFR SHOULD CARRY OUT
- THE INTENT OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 140 FOR
- FIELD APPROVAL OF NEW PROJECTS. HOWEVER,
- MISSIONS SHOULD ALSO SEEK AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
- COMMENTS BY SDPRO AND OTHER SMDC MEMBERS ON SUCH
- PROJECTS. FULL FIELD AUTHORITY FOR APPROVAL OF
- PROJECTS SHOULD RESULT IN A MORE EFFICIENT
- APPROVAL PROCESS AND BETTER PROJECTS BECAUSE:

- A. MISSIONS CAN ESTABLISH THEIR OWN DESIGN AND
- REVIEW SCHEDULES AND NOT HAVE TO FIT INTO
- ARBITRARY AID/W REQUIREMENTS;

- B. GREATER HOST COUNTRY COLLABORATION IS
- FACILITATED;

- C. PRE-IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS CAN BE INITIATED
- WITH REASONABLE ASSURANCE ABOUT THE TIMING OF
- OBLIGATIONS.

- D. PROJECT PAPERS CAN SATISFY APPROVING
- OFFICERS' REQUIREMENTS AND NOT ENCOMPASS
- RESPONSES TO ALL OF THE POTENTIAL QUESTIONS THAT
- AID/W REVIEWERS CAN FORMULATE. THE RESULT
- SHOULD BE MORE CONCISE AND CLEAR DOCUMENTATION.

- E. A REVIEW OF PROPOSED PROJECTS BY SDPRO AND
- OTHER MISSIONS SHOULD LEAD TO BETTER
- COORDINATION OF EFFORT, MORE CONSISTENCY WITH
- REGIONAL STRATEGY, AND MORE PROFITING FROM

- EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE IN THE SAHEL.

7. IN CONJUNCTION WITH FIELD MANAGEMENT OF THE OYB
- AND APPROVAL OF ALL PROJECTS, THE FIELD SHOULD
- BE GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DIVIDING UP SAHEL
- OE FUNDS AND PERSONNEL CEILINGS AMONG THE
- COUNTRIES. AN EFFORT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE TO GET
- P.L. 480 ALLOCATIONS FOR THE SAHEL AND LET THE
- FIELD MAKE THE INTERNAL ALLOCATIONS WITHIN THE
- SAHEL. THESE CHANGES COULD REDUCE THE WORKLOAD
- ON THE WASHINGTON AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE
- ALLOCATION PROCESS, AND GIVE THE MANAGERS OF THE
- SAHEL PROGRAM ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO DEAL
- WITH CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE WHOLE PROCESS
- SHOULD REDUCE AFR WORKLOAD SINCE STAFF OFFICES
- WOULD NEED TO REVIEW SUMMARY SAHEL-WIDE
- DOCUMENTATION GENERALLY AND NOT INDIVIDUAL
- COUNTRY DOCUMENTS.

8. OTHER IDEAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR GIVING THE
- FIELD MORE FLEXIBILITY OF OPERATIONS INCLUDE THE
- ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO REGIONAL PROJECTS DESIGNED
- PRIMARILY FOR USE BY USAIDS WITH MINIMUM
- DOCUMENTATION. ONE WOULD BE A PROJECT
- INITIATION REVOLVING FUND, THAT COULD BE USED TO
- UNDERTAKE PRE-IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT ACTIONS
- BEFORE FUNDS BECOME AVAILABLE UNDER A NEW
- PROJECT. THIS COULD BE USEFUL INTER ALIA, IN
- PROVIDING THE INITIAL SUPPORT FOR CONTRACT
- TEAMS. SMAT WILL ALSO CONSIDER EXPANDING THE
- PROJECT TO INCLUDE ON-GOING REVOLVING FUND
- PROJECT SUPPORT OR SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE FOR
- DEALING WITH THIS NEED. THE SECOND PROJECT
- WOULD BE A PROGRAM INITIATIVES PROJECT, WHICH
- COULD BE USED TO FINANCE STUDIES, TRAVEL OF
- COUNTRY OFFICIALS, SMALL PROJECTS RELATED TO
- POLICY DIALOGUE, PROMOTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR,
- PRE-PROJECT TESTING OF TECHNOLOGICAL
- INNOVATIONS, OR OTHER NONPROJECT OR PRE-PROJECT
- INITIATIVES.

F. MISSION MANAGEMENT NEEDS STRENGTHENING

1. MOST MISSIONS NEED TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL
- MECHANISMS FOR FOLLOW-UP, MONITORING, AND
- CONTROL OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND USAID
- MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AND PROCESSES.

2. MISSIONS NEED AN INVENTORY OF ALL ACTIVITIES

- WHICH REQUIRE MANAGEMENT AND GENERATE WORKLOAD.
- THE INVENTORY WOULD INCLUDE NUMBERED PROJECTS;
- ACTIVITIES UNDER P.L. 480, S&T, TITLE XII, PVOS;
- PM&R FUNDED ACTIVITIES; LOCAL CURRENCY PROJECTS/
- PROGRAMS/SECTOR ACTIVITIES DESIGN AND EVALUATION
- AND OTHER TEAMS; VISITORS, ETC. SUCH AN
- INVENTORY CAN MAKE PERSONNEL FORECASTING MORE
- REALISTIC AND FACILITATE RELATING PROJECTS AND
- ACTIVITIES INTO CDSS AND RDSS FRAMEWORKS.

3. GREATER ATTENTION NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO THE
- SETTING OF INTERNAL PRIORITIES (INCLUDING A
- PERIODIC REMINDER THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE
- MISSION AND THE PROGRAM IS ACCELERATING HOST
- COUNTRY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT).

4. MOST MISSIONS NEED AN INTERNAL OPERATIONS MANUAL.

5. INTERNAL PROCEDURES FOR THE PREPARATION AND
- CLEARANCE OF PROJECT DOCUMENTATION NEED TO BE
- STREAMLINED.

6. MISSION MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS NEED TRAINING
- IN MANAGEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN TECHNIQUES FOR
- CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

7. GREATER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO TRAIN LOCAL
- FOREIGN NATIONALS THROUGH ON-GOING STAFF
- DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

8. LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF
- PROJECTS NEEDS AS MUCH OR MORE ATTENTION THAN
- TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, YET APPROPRIATE
- PERSONNEL ARE GENERALLY IN SHORT SUPPLY IN
- MISSIONS AND THOSE IN REDSO/WCA ARE
- OVER-EXTENDED. SUCH SUPPORT FOR INSTITUTIONAL
- CONTRACTORS NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED.

6. STATE -- AID AND EMBASSY -- USAID RELATIONSHIPS

GENERALLY, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE AND AID PERSONNEL ARE SATISFACTORY. SMAT OBSERVED THAT THERE ARE OCCASIONS, HOWEVER, WHEN THERE IS NOT AGREEMENT OR COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING ON PROGRAM EXECUTION STRATEGIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNDING LEVELS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT TO AID PERSONNEL AND PROJECTS.

AMBASSADORS ARE GENERALLY IMPATIENT FOR RESULTS FROM THE AID PROGRAM AND TEND TO CONCENTRATE ON

OBLIGATION AND MOVING RESOURCES. THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO ADMINISTER AN AID PROGRAM. SOME ARE UNNECESSARILY INVOLVED WITH DETAILS OF DAY-TO-DAY AID PROGRAM OPERATIONS. THEY APPEAR LESS KNOWLEDGEABLE THAN USAID DIRECTORS ABOUT THE ROLES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SAHELIAN AND AID REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. GENERALLY THEY ARE OPPOSED TO REGIONAL PROJECTS, BUT DO SUPPORT SOME, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE IMPACT IS FAVORABLE ON QUOTE THEIR UNQUOTE COUNTRY.

REALIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATING WITH HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS ON DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, INCLUDING SEEKING POLICY CHANGES, SOME AMBASSADORS HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN POLICY DIALOGUES.

JAO PERFORMANCES ARE SPOTTY AT BEST. SOME ARE PERFORMING WELL (SENEGAL, MALI); OTHER NOT SO WELL OR ARE NON-EXISTENT (THE GAMBIA, CHAD). STATE CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTY IN FILLING JAO POSITIONS WITH EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL. WHERE THE JAO IS PERFORMING WELL, THE SUCCESS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PERSONALITIES IN THE MISSION.

THE JAO CONCEPT HAS NOT ALWAYS INCREASED EFFICIENCIES, AVOIDED DUPLICATION OF SERVICES, OR NECESSARILY BEEN MORE ECONOMICAL. THERE ARE INSTANCES WHERE THE JAO HAS BECOME BLOATED, STAFF-WISE, THROUGH THE EXCESSIVE USE OF PSCS WITH THE RECREATION ASSOCIATIONS. COMPARING THE PER CAPITA FAAS COST BETWEEN NIGER AND SENEGAL, FOR EXAMPLE, NIGER IS NEARLY EIGHT TIMES AS EXPENSIVE, RAISING SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF THE MANAGEMENT AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JAO OPERATION.

IN ORDER TO ASSURE A UNIFIED U.S. APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL, CLOSER COORDINATION, IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF DEVELOPMENT, AND CLEARER POLICIES MUST BE PROMULGATED TO THE FIELD BY STATE AND AID.

H. STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD GO HAND-IN-HAND WITH STREAMLINING U.S. AID FIELD DIRECTION AND MISSIONS.

1. THE CILSS ORGANIZATION, COMPRISED OF ITS COUNCIL
- OF MINISTERS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, AND
- SPECIALIZED AGENCIES (THE SAHEL INSTITUTE AND
- AGRHYMET), HAS PROGRESSED MARKEDLY WITH DIRECT

- SUPPORT FORM THE CLUB/OECD SECRETARIAT PLUS A
- VARIETY OF DONOR-INITIATED ACTIVITIES. WORKING
- GROUPS, COLLOQUIAL, AND OTHER FORA HAVE PRODUCED
- SOME FUNDAMENTAL POLICY PAPERS AND OUTLINES ON
- SUCH TOPICS AS FOOD CROPS (RAINFED AND IRRIGATED
- AGRICULTURE); CEREALS POLICIES; FOOD STRATEGIES;
- VILLAGE HYDRAULICS; ECOLOGY/FORESTRY; RECURRENT
- COSTS. MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE AND THE FIFTH
- CLUB CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS LAID OUT SOME OF THE
- COMPONENTS OF A FUTURE WORK PROGRAM:

- A. CONTINUATION OF CONCEPTUAL WORK RELATING TO
- THE REGION AS A WHOLE: TOPICS, SUCH AS
- DEFORESTATION, LIVESTOCK, AND FISHERIES;
- ECONOMIC POLICIES, E.G., FOOD PRODUCTION AND
- CEREALS POLICIES; FOOD SECURITY PLANS; AND
- WIDER POPULATION PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT.

- B. IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION AND CONCERTED
- ACTION WITHIN THE REGION THROUGH A SERIES OF
- MEETINGS AND QUOTE PROGRESS REVIEWS UNQUOTE IN
- MEMBER COUNTRIES TO UPDATE ALL CONCERNED ON
- REGIONAL-NATIONAL PROGRESS AND MAP OUT NEXT
- STEPS (MAY ALSO ENHANCE DONOR SUPPORT AND
- COORDINATION).

2. A SERIES OF ACTIONS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREPARE
- CILSS/CLUB-OECD BETTER -- ORGANIZATIONALLY AND
- AUTHORITATIVELY -- TOWARD EVEN GREATER PROGRESS
- TOWARD THE GOALS OF SAHELIAN DEVELOPMENT:

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS, BASED ON THE BRUSSELS
- MEETING OUTCOME, OUTLINE A FIVE-YEAR PLAN OF
- ACTION AS THE NEXT SEGMENT IN PURSUIT OF GOALS
- ESTABLISHED FOR THE YEAR 2000.

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS CONVENE PLANNING
- MEETINGS WITH THE SAHEL INSTITUTE AND AGRHYMET
- TOWARD FORMULATION OF FIVE-YEAR PROGRAMS,
- FLOWING OUT OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DELIBERATIONS
- AND AGREEMENTS.

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS SHOULD FURTHER
- STREAMLINE RELATIONS WITH DONORS:

- A) DEFINE BETTER THE FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY
- GOALS;

- B) FORMULATE PROPOSALS WITH CILSS MEMBERS

- SUGGESTING DONORS IDENTIFY SECTORS OR PROJECTS
- OF PREFERENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING WIDER
- PROGRESS AND ELIMINATING DUPLICATION.

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS CONVENE A PLANNING
- MEETING WITH ALL DONORS PROVIDING TECHNICAL
- ASSISTANCE DIRECTLY TO THE RESPECTIVE
- SECRETARIATS AND INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AGENDA
- POINTS:

- A) MODIFY CILSS'S ORGANIZATION, E.G., ESTABLISH
- A DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR CONTINUITY OF
- MANAGEMENT; TIGHTEN STAFFING CONSISTENT WITH
- CONCENTRATION ON POLICY FORMULATION AND
- ABANDONMENT OF FUND-RAISING ANNUAL WORK PLANS;

- B) FORMULATE AND AGREE ON PERSONNEL POLICIES
- AND CONFORM DONOR SUPPORT QUOTE PACKAGES UNQUOTE
- TO CILSS PERSONNEL SCALES AND STANDARDS;

- C) AGREE ON BUDGET SHOWING A COMBINATION OF
- CILSS MEMBER AND DONOR CONTRIBUTION, BY YEAR AND
- LINE ITEM. PROVIDE FOR ANNUAL UP-DATES.

-- DISSEMINATE CONTENT AND FUTURE GUIDANCE EMERGING
- FROM CHIEFS OF STATE-COUNCIL OF MINISTERS'
- CONSIDERATION OF THE CILSS REAPPRAISAL
- COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES AND REPORT. FORMULATE
- SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS FOR FOLLOW-UP.

3. AID IS THE PRINCIPAL DONOR TO THE OPERATION OF
- THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT AND MAKES
- SUBSTANTIAL INPUTS TO THE OECD/CLUB SECRETARIAT
- AND THE SAHEL INSTITUTE. IN ADDITION, A WORKING
- FUND HAS BEEN SET UP WITH FAO TO PROVIDE
- SHORT-TERM CONSULTING SUPPORT TO CILSS MEMBER
- COUNTRIES AND SAHELIAN AID MISSIONS. ALL THE
- FOREGOING ACTIVITY IS ORGANIZED AND ADMINISTERED
- VIA THE SAHEL REGIONAL AID COORDINATION AND
- PLANNING PROJECT (625-0911), WHICH IS SOON TO BE
- EVALUATED. A VARIETY OF SUPPORT FOR AGRHYMET IS
- PROVIDED UNDER BILATERAL PROJECTS OF USAID
- NIGER. FUTURE DESIGN OF THESE ACTIVIIES SHOULD
- ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- -- NEED FOR SOME FORM OF COORDINATION - VESTED
- IN A SINGLE ENTITY - AMONG THE CILSS EXECUTIVE
- SECRETARIAT, SAHEL INSTITUTE AND AGRHYMET ON
- MATTERS OF POLICY AND BUDGET AS THEY RELATE TO

- U.S. SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL COORDINATION AND
- PLANNING.

- -- INCORPORATING 0911 MANAGERSHIP WITHIN DUTIES
- AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SMDC/SDPRO STAFF,
- THEREBY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE U.S. COMMUNICATION
- CHANNEL TO THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

- -- ESTABLISHING BETTER PLANNING/PROCEDURES FOR
- CILSS AND AID MISSIONS' UTILIZATION OF
- SHORT-TERM CONSULTANT CAPABILITY THROUGH
- OECD/CLUB AND FODAG ROME.

- -- CIRCULARIZING ALL USAIDS AND EMBASSIES ON
- CILSS/INSAH/AGRHYMET ISSUES WITH AID REGIONAL OR
- BILATERAL IMPLICATIONS {SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE ALL
- OECD/CLUB ISSUANCES} AND FOSTERING APPROPRIATE
- RESPONSES AND COMMENTARIES.

4. SMAT APPRECIATES AID/W AND FIELD COOPERATION AND SUPPORT. YY

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

ELLSWORTH M. AMUNDSON
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AFR/SWA

ACTION PRECEDENCE CONTINUED

OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY, NDJAMENA PRIORITY, NIAMEY PRIORITY,
PRAIA PRIORITY

ASSESSMENT OF AID SAHEL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

DRAFT

PROGRESS REPORT

Prepared by

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SMAT

January 25, 1984

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ASSESSMENT OF AID SAHEL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

The Sahel Management Assessment Team (SMAT) interviewed personnel in AID, State, other donor representatives in Washington, U.S. and non-U.S. personnel in U.S. Missions/USAIDs, host government officials and donor representatives in the Sahelian countries during the period September-December 1983. Visits also included the Comite Permanent Inter-etats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS) in Ouagadougou, Club du Sahel Secretariat in Paris, REDSO/WCA, and AID regional offices in the Sahel. One team member of SMAT attended SMDC XIII and presented a synthesis of what SMAT members had heard in Washington and the field along with a few tentative observations. This progress report is designed to offer field missions and the Africa Bureau some observations and tentative conclusions, and to present selected ideas that have been suggested to or developed by the Team for improving the management of AID's Sahel program. The report is intended to elicit further dialogue with USAIDs, Embassies, regional offices, and interested Washington offices. Comments will be most useful if received prior to February 15, 1984. We realize that missions may also wish to make some supplementary comments after the

Mission Directors Meeting in Kigali. During January and February, the Team will develop ideas further and may seek comments on specific proposals.

II. SYNTHESIS OF WHAT THE TEAM HEARD

Listed below is a summary of significant comments received by SMAT during interviews and meetings. Some of these are contradictory, but this only illustrates that individuals took differing views of the same topics.

A. In Washington (both AID and State)

1. Regarding Sahel Development Program (SDP)

- o More money is available than can be used effectively with existing management arrangements.
- o SDP has a goal but no clear-cut strategy for its achievement.
- o Some AID officials doubt field managers are on top of myriad of implementation problems confronting field missions--the officials hesitate citing success stories to Congress for fear that the projects may not withstand audit.
- o Disagreement exists over whether SDP special appropriation should be maintained.
- o Sahel Missions have more staff and more money than other African Missions.
- o Working and living conditions in the Sahel countries are about the same as other African countries.
- o Program effectiveness is reduced by unusual

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difficulties in recruitment of U.S. staff and dealing with language difficulties.

- o Sahel institutions are poorly developed; host country staffs are inadequately trained.
- o SDP does not enjoy special priority in AID/W management bureaus and offices.
- o SDP is not essentially different for programming and management purposes.
- o SDP gets more money than it would if not a separate program.
- o 121(d) process has been helpful in improving management.

2. Lines of Authority

- o Little real delegation given to field (DOA 140) and that has been abused.
- o The field is not reporting project authorizations quickly.
- o Geographic offices are not included in meetings which decide Missions staffing levels and operating expense allocations.
- o Lines of responsibilities are blurred between AFR staff and line offices, between staff offices in AID/W and AFR Bureau.
- o Approved CDSS's are too general to serve as guides in the project selection process.

3. AFR Management

- o Bureau is too centralized; insufficient delegation

too many countries.

- o Some realignment and reorganization proposals are being considered in light of above two points.

4. Suggested questions for which SMAT should seek answers in field

   - o What went wrong in project implementation? How did things get so bad before the signals sounded the alarm? What can we learn from the mistakes?
   - o How reliable, effective, and timely is REDSO/WCA support?
   - o What is happening with the Sahel Regional Financial Management Project (SRFMP)? Is it the best way to deal with the problem of project financial management?
   - o How good is the dialogue between host country project directors and USAID project officers? Is the dialogue being documented?
   - o Should more USAIDs adopt arrangements similar to AID/Chad for obtaining USAID and program administrative support vs. the current proliferation of hiring of personnel services contractors (PSCs)?
   - o Are microcomputers being used to the extent possible?

B. In the Field (Both AID and State)

1. Washington is the enemy

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- Undercutting the spirit of DOA 140 by requiring PP level of analysis in PIDs and finding excuses for requiring PP approval in AID/W.
- Arbitrary actions: a) unrelenting pressure to obligate funds; b) cancelling projects; c) permitting only one new start annually d) requiring the use of U.S. vehicles which cannot be serviced locally; e) changing the rules for the hiring of foreign service nationals.
- Delays in responses/inadequate responses: a) waiver decisions take 6 to 8 months; b) delayed issuance of 121(d) certification; c) delays in project and nonproject assistance approvals; d) no feedback on results of Annual Budget Submission (ABS) reviews, or attempts to revise or reverse ABS decisions in other fora; e) staffing actions/inactions: reduced ceilings; positions unfilled for months; inadequate training possibilities; assignment of less than qualified personnel.
- Too many requests for comments or information which are unrelated to, and take time from the mission's top priority: supporting host country development.
- Levying one-time reporting requirements for data already available in central files or central offices.
- Too many diverse interests need to be satisfied

in programming process.

- o Approved CDSSs are ignored in PID process.
- o 121(d) process is ever-changing, capricious, cumbersome, time consuming, and a heavy drain on U.S. and H.C. management and manpower.
- o 121(d) process has served to strengthen management of programs.

2. Project Managers are Frustrated
   - o Too much paperwork, much of which is unrelated to the development job at hand.
   - o Internal mission paper flow procedures are inefficient and inflexible.
   - o Secretarial and translation services are inadequate/inefficient.
   - o Extra workload is required for 121(d) certification.
   - o Insufficient time is available to work with counterpart and technical assistance personnel and visit projects.

3. Sahelian Regional Institutions are Weak/Diffuse
   - o "CILSS is a political organization trying to promote development through political means."
   - o "Host countries are not supporting CILSS, why should we?"
   - o River Basin Offices concentrate more on interests/ projects of missions where located than on all riparian countries equitably.

- o Duplication of efforts and programs is probably inevitable among CILSS (including Sahel Institute and AGRHYMET), the Entente Council Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), U.N. Office of Sudano-Sahelian Affairs (UNSSO), and the French-affiliated monetary and economic groupings.

4. AID does not respond to country priorities.

5. Role of Audits and Auditors

   - o Audit reports are not objective and, rather than improve AID management, seem designed to get headlines and brownie points with AID's critics in the Congress.
   - o Auditor staff is relatively inexperienced and unfamiliar with AID and AID's development goals.
   - o Auditors have stated documentation did not exist when really they did not know where to find it.

6. Section 121(d) Compliance

   - o IG, AA/AFR and FM should sit down and decide what AID requires under 121(d) in order that Missions can comply accordingly.
   - o Process imposes an extra burden on host countries by requiring a separate accounting system for U.S. projects.
   - o U.S. requirements can be integrated into country accounting systems.
   - o Compliance is extremely difficult because of lack

of trained accountants and rapid turnover of personnel after they have been trained.

- o Senior Sahelian officials and regional institutions resented the manner in which the 121(d) requirements were imposed, but most accept the need for improved financial management and do not find requirements onerous.
- o USAID systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance vary, with some requirements considered overkill by project officers and/or host country project directors.

7. Factors deterring AID success in the Sahel

- o Tough physical and inhospitable policy environments make work difficult.
- o Appropriate techniques and technology are lacking, in part because the Sahel was largely unknown territory 10 years ago for U.S. personnel.
- o Severe shortage of Sahelian human resources, both technical and administrative, hamper progress.
- o Donors and recipients have not consistently followed the strategy laid out; donor coordination has been insufficient.
- o AID/W should become more involved and facilitate concerted action by donors to get policy changes.
- o AID/Congressional dialogues foster and promote changing priorities.
- o AID/W has not given adequate priority to support of

Sahelian programs.

- o Too many projects are not accorded high H.C. priority and/or are not responsive to H.C. requests or needs.
- o Too much emphasis on regional strategy.
- o Many projects in the early years were cumbersome and unnecessarily complicated.
- o Too many regional projects absorbing resources for lower priority activities.

8. Some needed changes in strategy and tactics.

- o New program emphases should include:
  - a. Greater funding of human resources development; of "people oriented" projects.
  - b. Higher level of management training, including economics & business administration, for Sahelians and some U.S. personnel.
  - c. Increased investments in research;
  - d. More infrastructure, especially for traffic arteries;
  - e. Greater consideration of nonproject assistance;
  - f. Increased support to indigenous private sectors.
- o New tactics should include:
  - a. Increased conditionality of aid to country performance;
  - b. More rigorous analysis and honesty

in presentation;

c. Constructive and open discussion of Sahelian countries' weaknesses;

d. A halt to paying the bills for poor institutions;

e. Eliminate assumptions that we must develop the Sahel; the Sahelians must do it!

9. The SWA, SMDC, SDPRO, Club/OECD, CILSS Complex

- o Wide variation in donor assistance to CILSS Executive Secretariat will continue to create personnel and program problems until donors can concert and agree on some standards (especially on advisory personnel and their support).
- o CILSS Executive Secretariat has no clear concept of the authoritative channels for dealing with A.I.D. on Project 625-9011 (AID Ouaga; SDPRO; Club/OECD?).
- o Lack of clarity on relationship and mutual responsibilities of SMDC and SDPRO hampers preparation and approval of a Regional Development Strategy Statement.
- o SDPRO should be: a) abolished; b) transformed into a Secretariat for SMDC; c) moved to Upper Volta (in reduced numbers) and serve only an advisory function to CILSS; d) given expanded responsbilities in both regional and bilateral program/project development; e) allocated some technical personnel, e.g., lawyer, contract officer

engineer, and become a REDSO for the Sahel.

- o SMDC should exercise more policy authority via the resource allocation process. Follow-up on all SMDC decisions should be vested in SDPRO. SMDC has too many meetings; does not regularly include Ambassadors in SMDC sessions.

C. From Sahelians and Other Donors (in Washington and the Field)

- o Donors have not agreed on uniform program documentation, thus CILSS has to cope with a variety of sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting requirements; same applies for personnel funded within the Secretariat by donors.
- o SDPRO - reduced to 3-4 persons - could function usefully with the CILSS Secretariat, marshalling U.S. expert support (mainly short-term) and participating in CILSS Working Group activities.
- o U.S. management systems, particularly in finance, have benefitted CILSS. Training should be more systematic and widely available.
- o CILSS Executive Secretariat and the Club Secretariat relations have improved steadily and they benefit mutually in Working Groups and other policy deliberations. Some policy disagreements persist: irrigated vs. rainfed agriculture and regional vs. national food security stocks.
- o More contact should exist at national levels between CILSS coordinators and AID Missions.

- Because U.S. provides more resources directly to the CILSS Executive Secretariat than any other donor, AID sometimes tends to take a "here is the money and here is what you do with it" approach. Other donors are less culpable.
- Club Secretariat continues to withhold endorsement of CILSS' evaluation methodology proposals.
- Club Secretariat has not participated in the systematic development of the Sahel Institute.
- Sahelian financial systems can work for project activity accounting by adding double sign-off procedure between HC and donor managers.
- Some donor countries refrain from supporting UN and UN family projects in the Sahel because the costs - especially overhead - are too high and quality of personnel diminished.
- SDPRO has done useful catalytic work on many Sahel policy issues, but probably should be re-located with the CILSS Executive Secretariat.
- CILSS Executive Secretariat has improved markedly, e.g., concentrating more on policy issues; dropping involvement in project management; refraining from direct contact with donors to support individual projects.
- CILSS' Reappraisal Committee apparently will

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produce some candid and useful conclusions and impressions.

- o The IBRD representative in one country felt that policy performance was inadequate to justify AID's program assistance.
- o In another country IBRD representative considered that USAID relations with H.C. were inadequate.
- o One H.C. representative thought that donors tended to concentrate aid in the same sector, e.g., agriculture, and could do a better job in allocating different areas of activity among donors.

III. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS BY SMAT: PROPOSALS AND IDEAS UNDER CONSIDERATION

A. The concept of a Sahel Development Program remains valid.

1. A number of political, technical, and developmental reasons support the treatment of Sahelian problems on an integrated program basis:

   a. The Sahel countries, among the poorest in the world, share similar (extremely harsh) physical environments;

   b. Economic and social systems have many common aspects;

   c. Agricultural production and marketing systems are similar;

   d. Sahel governments are under severe pressure to

deal with similar problems:

i. slow growth in agricultural production (especially food);

ii. rising budget deficits, increasingly difficult to finance (particularly given monetary agreements with France);

iii. mounting debt problems, complicated by foreign exchange shortages and a stagnation of exports; and

iv. rapid increases in population;

e. Regional institutions have been created to coordinate donor support and research; to address critical priorities, e.g., food security, combatting desert encroachment; and to provide a forum for conducting policy dialogues in regional or national, bilateral or multilateral contexts.

2. The results have been disappointing to date in terms of traditional measures of progress: increased incomes, production, and GNP. This is due in part to the factors mentioned in II B7, but also to the lack of experience of most donors in the Sahel (given problems significantly different from other parts of the world), to the countries' poor formulation of policies, poor program selection and implementation (discussed below). Nevertheless, significant gains provide a base for future progress:

a. Internal logistics systems and communications

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have been improved and a dialogue established between food donors and Sahelian countries. A repeat of the loss of life from starvation and the cases of extreme undernutrition which occurred in the mid-70s can be prevented if the drought situation recurs -- which appears likely.

b. Considerable knowledge has been gained of what will work and what will not work in the Sahel. Research programs have been mounted and can be strengthened and expanded to seek solutions to the extremely difficult conditions for rainfed agriculture throughout most of the Sahel.

c. Sahelian institutions have provided a forum for a dialogue on development problems and policy issues. While the output from these institutions has not been commensurate with the funding and human resources provided to them, their problems are not all of their own making and improvement is evident. The countries themselves are expressing some dissatisfaction and evaluating the institutions; their Chiefs of State are to decide on evaluation recommendations in January.

d. Sahelian governments are considering new, more market-oriented policies, along with price, tax, and employment policies envisioning more incentives and incomes to rural people, reduced

demand for imports, slower expansion of government current expenditures (particularly for salaries of civil servants), and improving allocation of resources.

3. The foregoing gains are likely to be maintained and built upon to make greater progress in the future if the U.S. stays the course as a full partner in the development of the Sahel. To ensure that its participation in the Sahel becomes more effective, AID needs to:

   a. Reconfirm its acceptance of the validity of the vision of the original designers of the SDP as a long-term development undertaking and the Congress's support of that vision (Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Section 120). The forthcoming annual report to the Congress on the SDP may be an appropriate vehicle to reiterate the long term commitment.

   b. Maintain the special SDP appropriation and use the advantages provided therein to strengthen the programming and utilization of SDP funds.

   c. Upgrade, integrate, and generally strengthen the management of the SDP as suggested below.

   d. Recognize that the Sahel has special (some unique, some more difficult) development challenges, and provide better support to field missions to deal with these challenges.

e. Expand and strengthen the policy and planning ties that link U.S. and Sahelian agencies and other donors in a common effort, e.g. SWA-SDMC-SDPRO; Club/OECD-CILSS; SDPRO-CILSS; SDPRO-Club/OECD; IBRD and the IMF.

B. AID/W attitude toward support for the Sahel program should be improved.

1. High level support for the program in AID/W (in AFR or elsewhere) generally has not been evident.

2. The field's view that "Washington is the enemy" (II.B.1 above) is understandable. AID/W's (and the field's) primary reason for being is to promote development in recipient countries, but attitudes and actions of many AID/W staff do not reflect a recognition and acceptance of this fact.

3. AFR organization, staffing, and operating procedures are not consistent with the workload implicit in the number and structure of country programs. The burden on the bureau could be eased by providing more autonomy to the Sahel program--see III.D and E. below.

4. AA/AFR should consider establishing, especially if more autonomy is given to the field, an "Operations Appraisal Staff" type unit to review field operations on a periodic basis and respond to special requests from mission directors.

C. A more collaborative SDP Strategy is needed along with

modified program content and performance measurements.

The management of Sahelian development programs, including those financed by the U.S., suffers because:

- o Basic program goals, and strategies for achieving them, have not been clearly established and agreed upon, either by the Sahelian countries or the donor community;
- o Intermediate measurements of program performance have not been established to permit informed judgment about the current status and success of the SDP.
- o Policy dialogue has not been sufficiently pervasive within the Mission structure; consequently, some assistance activities are not in tune with country macro-economic policies and capabilities;
- o The program mix fails to consider special Sahelian needs and special legislative authorities.

1. The Emerging Regional Strategy

In preparing a U.S. regional strategy for the Sahel, it is appropriate to take a 20-year perspective. This is consistent with Section 120(a): "The Congress reaffirms its support of the initiative of the United States Government in undertaking consultations and planning with the countries concerned, ... , toward the development and support of a comprehensive long-term African Sahel development

program." The long-term and collaborative nature of the program is reiterated in other sub-sections and in Section 121(a). Within the 20-year perspective, however, the Team suggests that there be intermediate, three to seven year, strategies with specific goals and measurable targets.

The strategy statement should reflect the management workload and human resource limitation of host countries and USAIDs. This suggests further program concentration (fewer sectors, fewer projects). SMAT sees the Regional Strategy Statement as a basis for evaluating regional projects and providing guidance (but not a straight-jacket) for CDSSs. Latter will need to reflect varied country development strategies and situations and U.S. policy objectives. To accelerate the preparation of the strategy now in draft, the SMDC and SWA might designate two or three mission representatives and an SWA representative to meet for an intensive drafting period with the Director, SDPRO.

AFR should consider circulating the revised draft SDP strategy through the CILSS and the Club Secretariat for comments. This could prompt a further review and update, (last done in 1979) of the CILSS strategy and refinement of same (concept of food self-sufficiency is not well defined and may be inappropriate to Sahelian needs). It could also lead to an improved dialogue with other

donors.

2. Program Content and Mix

Sahel programs should take advantage of the flexibility provided by the no-year SDP authorization and appropriation and of the fact that restrictions in functional accounts set forth in FAA Sections 103 through 106 do not apply to the SDP.

Recent studies by the World Bank suggest an exceptionally high rate of return to investments in the Sahel in the repair and/or reconstruction of roads, many of which are deteriorating because of the failure of the Sahel governments to provide adequately for the maintenance of existing investments. Other professional observers of the African scene have strongly suggested the need for increased investments in communications, irrigation, transport, and other infrastructure facilities. Improved transportation systems within the Sahel are needed to improve access of rural people to markets, both for selling their production and for acquiring consumer goods as incomes rise. Improved transportation links between the landlocked Sahelian countries and their coastal neighbors could have a significant catalytic impact on Sahelian development. Increased irrigation is essential to meeting food security goals in the Sahel.

The preparation of country programs should give greater attention to the management constraints resulting from

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the human resource limitations of the host countries and the USAIDs. This suggests fewer projects in fewer sectors and more turnkey infrastructure projects.

Infrastructure projects handled on a turn-key basis, would minimize host country management requirements and provide much needed training. Non-project assistance and infrastructure type projects can be administered by AID with fewer direct hire personnel. Even where project aid is the most effective way to deal with a problem, AID should consider providing technical and management personnel to work in operational positions within the implementing organization.

Given the poor institutional and policy base, program assistance should be considered in the Sahel context as support for policy dialogue (also in the case of food aid). The IMF and IBRD will frequently play an important role in defining the needed policy reforms and in their negotiation. Policy dialogue need not be limited to program and sector aid. The SMAT suggest increased efforts to involve the entire U.S. Mission in this effort. This may require, in some cases, access to professional staffs, e.g., SDPRD or REDSO/WCA to help with the technical aspects of selecting appropriate forms of nonproject assistance and with the requisite macro economic analysis.

3. Setting Targets and Measuring Progress

SMAT believes that the recommended approach to developing a strategy and a program mix geared to Sahel conditions will establish the basis for improved, time-phased target setting and facilitate the measurement of near term progress. Given the development state of Sahelian countries, USAIDs must look for indicators of progress which supplement the traditional measures such as GDP and agricultural production, which more nearly reflect the emphasis of the current Sahel development effort on institution building and the development of basic services, and which relate to improvement of policies, e.g. agricultural pricing, greater role for private sector.

4. Local Currencies

SMAT suggests the USAIDs support the efforts by the IBRD and the IMF, as are under way in Niger and Senegal, to persuade Sahel countries to adopt unified budgets in order to gain control over the allocation of their resources and to establish the integrity of the domestic budget process.

D. The organization (Washington and field) for managing the SDP: the right components, but they need more leadership and integration, greater authority.

1. Observations on the functioning of the organizational components:

a. No one is clearly in charge, except possibly AA/AFR who does not have time to focus on Sahel development or needs.

b. The director of AFR/SWA is nominally responsible, but has not effectively exercised authority available. He has had some control over SDP program levels, but has been only minimally involved in the decision process on personnel ceilings and Operating Expense (OE) funds. He has not been providing the leadership needed to SDPRO and SMDC and has been unable to get adequate attention in AID/W to the needs of the Sahel missions.

c. The Sahel Development Planning Regional Organization (SDPRO -- also known as the Sahel Development Planning Team, SDPT) has done some good analytical work, but neither the team's studies nor its individual members have been utilized fully by the missions, the SMDC, SWA, or CILSS. SDPRO's role has been so diffuse, and the guidance provided to it so minimal, that it has not achieved the impact potentially available

and needed.

d. The Sahel Mission Director's Council (SMDC) has played a useful role, but it has not realized its potential, in part because of its *modus operandi*, in part because no one is in charge to ensure that decisions of the Council are implemented. Nor has SMDC seen fit to vest such follow-up in SDPRO in any formal manner.

e. Liaison with CILSS is fragmented between USAID Upper Volta's Liaison Office, the SDPRO in Bamako, and the Club du Sahel Secretariat in Paris; none of whose roles is clear. Improved coordination is needed.

f. Although mission directors deal with regional issues in the SMDC, they seem overly bilaterally oriented. Because of the limited authorities provided to them individually and collectively, it is natural that they would feel less responsibility for the overall program. However, their failure to follow in their bilateral programs, decisions agreed to in the SMDC itself, illustrates the lack of follow-up on SMDC decisions and the lack of leadership on the part of SWA.

2. SMAT encourages AFR to consider using the unique Sahel situation and authorities to really test in the Sahel the feasibility of the AID policy of management

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decentralization and delegation. Some ideas for improving the organizational arrangements for managing the SDP follow:

a. Regionalize all necessary support services for the Sahel countries into a separate support organization located in Dakar. Establishment of such an organization would lead to a corresponding reduction of staff and authorities from REDSO and USAID/Senegal. REDSO would then focus its efforts on the balance of the West African countries.

b. Alternatively, a Contracts Officer, Legal Officer, an FSN Engineer, and possibly a Food For Peace Officer could be added to the existing staff of USAID/Senegal which would then provide support to Mauritania, The Gambia, and Cape Verde. These four countries would then be dropped from REDSO's responsibilities.

c. Combine the AFR/PD/SWAP office with AFR/SWA to strengthen and more effectively manage the programs and projects throughout the Sahel. Some savings in personnel should result.

d. Consider moving personnel and authorities of AFR/SWA and AFR/PD/SWAP to the field (Dakar is the most logical place) and combining them with the above proposed support organization to establish a "Sahel Program Coordination Office (SPCO)". With closer proximity and immersion

into the region, the SPCO would provide more timely and effective management and program decisions. To improve the coordination and execution of Sahel planning, the SDPRO would be moved from Bamako and incorporated into the SPCO.

e. Consider moving the allocation of Sahel Missions' personnel ceilings and Operating Expense funds from AFR/ PMR to AFR/SWA (Or SPCO). AFR/PMR would provide a block of personnel ceilings and a block of OE funds to AFR/SWA (or SPCO) to determine the internal allocation among the Sahel missions. This would provide improved management of resources by SWA (or SPCO) in meeting its responsibilities for managing the SDP.

3. While the foregoing are under review and consideration, the following actions can be initiated to strengthen the interface between the existing U.S. and Sahelian entities:

- o Formally include the CILSS Minister Coordinator and Executive Secretary on the SMDC agenda (at least once each year);
- o Same for U. S. Ambassadors to Sahel countries (although not necessarily at the same meeting);
- o USAIDs designate Liaison Officers and establish regular and continuous working relations with CILSS

National Coordinators in country.

- o SMDC/SDPRO review CILSS policy issuances and working group papers for relevance to AID regional and national strategies, programs, and projects.

E. AID/W Management of SDP funds contributes to management problems in the Sahel.

1. Congress has provided a special appropriation for the SDP and appropriated the funds on a no-year basis, i.e., it is not necessary to obligate the funds in the year for which appropriated -- they can be carried over. (This provision of the authorizing legislation has been recommended for the entire AID program by various Presidential commissions over the years.) It would seem logical for the Agency to take advantage of this provision and use it to improve the management of the Sahel program, with a view to demonstrating its utility and encouraging the Congress to expand the privilege. Instead, the Agency has ignored the provision and continued to exert pressure on SDP managers to meet obligation deadlines (often artificial and arbitrary). This general frustration for field missions causes even greater problems in the Sahel because the quantity and quality of technical and management personnel is lower in Sahel countries than in other parts of the world. Similarly, the Agency's functional areas of emphasis and successive "mandates" have been imposed upon Sahel

programs without regard to applicability or appropriateness.

2. The AID/W push to meet obligation deadlines has resulted in:

   a. Rushed project design, resulting in reduced dialogue with the host country during design, inadequate attention to planning for logistical and administrative requirements, and acceptance by the Missions of inappropriate requests by AID/W for inclusions/deletions of project elements or requirements. All of these contribute to faulty design, and/or future implementation problems.

   b. Hasty negotiation and signing of project agreements--thereby postponing or overlooking potential implementation problems.

   c. Insisting that host government officials sign obligating documents without giving them time to staff the documents out within their organization.

   d. Last minute requests from AID/Washington to obligate funds for projects for which no obligation had been planned.

   e. AID/W has prohibited any obligations in the last month of the fiscal year, thereby further increasing the pressure on the field and leading to the types of situations described in a - c

above. Because no carryover is permitted and new funds are invariably late, little obligation is achieved in the first fiscal quarter. Thus, the prohibition on September obligations effectively reduces the fiscal year to eight months (although Sahel funds have no yearly limitation).

3. AID should use the unique funding flexibility provided by the Congress to reduce the pressure on the Sahel missions to "move money".

The primary objection given to using the "no-year"authority is that it runs the risk that a lower level of obligation would result in reductions in appropriations in the subsequent fiscal year. SMAT does not agree that this would happen for more than one year, if at all. The decisions to use the "no-year" authority should be thoroughly explained and discussed with the Congress. The dire consequences that are, or have been anticipated could in all probability be forestalled or even eliminated.

The highest priority for AID in the Sahel is not to continue obligating ever increasing amounts of money, but insuring that the funds that have already been made available are used prudently. Should there be a reduction in obligations for a year, this period could serve as a respite and help the USAIDs get on top of

their implementation problems.

It is anticipated that by strengthening and decentralizing the SWA management structure, available funds could be obligated in a more orderly, efficient, timely and less frustrating manner. In conjunction with the easing of pressure on annual obligations, AID/W could consider giving a greater role in the allocation of Sahel development budgets to the field, either to the new SPCO proposed in D. above or to the SMDC under the leadership of SWA and with the staff support of a re-organized SDPRO. It is the field missions that run the risk of reduced funds if

obligations fall too low because the funds generally are not available for non-Sahel missions; thus, the field will still have an incentive to obligate on a timely basis, but would be able to adjust better, collectively, to changed circumstances.

4. As a further means of fostering timely obligations by the field, AFR should carry out the intent of Delegation of Authority 140 for field approval of new projects. However, Missions should also seek and take into account comments by SDPRO and other SMDC members on such projects. Full field authority for approval of projects should result in a more efficient approval process and better projects because:

   a. Missions can establish their own design and review schedules and not have to fit into

arbitrary AID/W requirements;

b. Greater host country collaboration is facilitated;

c. Pre-implementation actions can be initiated with reasonable assurance about the timing of obligations.

d. Project Papers can be written to satisfy approving officers' requirements and not to encompass responses to all of the potential questions that AID/W reviewers can formulate. The result should be more concise and clear documentation.

e. A review of proposed projects by SDPRO and other missions should lead to better coordination of effort, more consistency with regional strategy, and more profiting from experience elsewhere in the Sahel.

5. In conjunction with field management of budgets and approval of all projects, the field (SPCO) should be given the responsibility of dividing up Sahel OE funds and personnel ceilings among the countries. An effort should also be made to get P.L. 480 allocations for the Sahel and let the field make the internal allocations within the Sahel. This could reduce the workload on the Washington agencies involved in the allocation process, and give the managers of the Sahel program additional flexibility to deal with changing circumstances. The

whole process should reduce AFR workload since staff offices would need to review summary Sahel-wide documentation generally and not individual country documents.

6. Other ideas being considered for giving the field more flexibility of operations include the establishment of two regional projects designed primarily for use by USAIDs with minimum documentation. One would be a Project Initiation Revolving Fund, that could be used to undertake pre-implementation project actions before funds became available under a new project. This could be useful, inter alia, in providing the initial support for contract teams. SMAT will also consider expanding the project to include on-going revolving fund project support or suggest an alternative for dealing with this need. The second project would be a Program Initiatives Project, which could be used to finance studies, travel of country officials, small projects related to policy dialogue, promotion of private sector, pre-project testing of technological innovations, or other nonproject or pre-project initiatives.

F. Mission management needs strengthening

1. Most missions need to strengthen internal mechanisms for follow-up, monitoring, and control of project implementation and U. S. AID management decisions and processes.

2. Missions need an inventory of all activities which

require management and generate workload. The inventory would include numbered projects; activities under PL480, local currency project, sector/program actions, policy dialogue, S&T, Title XII, PVOs; PM&R-funded activities; design and evaluation and other teams; visitors, etc. Such an inventory can make personnel forecasting more realistic and facilitate relating projects and activities into CDSS and RDSS framework.

3. Greater attention needs to be given to the setting of internal priorities (including periodic reminders that the purpose of the mission and the program is accelerating host country economic and social development).
4. Most missions need an internal operations manual.
5. Internal procedures for the preparation and clearance of project documentation need to be streamlined.
6. Mission managers and supervisors need training in management, particularly in techniques for resolution of conflicts.
7. Greater efforts are needed to train local foreign nationals through on-going staff development programs.
8. Logistical and administrative support of projects needs as much or more attention than technical requirements, yet appropriate personnel are generally in short supply in missions and those in REDSO/WCA are over-extended. Such support for institutional contractors must be improved.

G. State/AID and Embassy/USAID Relations

Generally, the relationships between State and AID personnel are satisfactory. SMAT observed that there are occasions, however, when there is not agreement or complete understanding as to program execution strategies, personnel and funding levels, and administrative support to AID personnel and projects.

Both State and Embassies shared USAID's complaint about AID/W delays in responding to field requests. Ambassadors are generally impatient for results from the AID program, tend to concentrate on obligations and moving resources. They are dissatisfied with the number of personnel required to administer an AID program. Some are unnecessarily involved with details of day to day AID program operations. They appear less knowledgeable than USAID Directors about the roles and activities of the Sahelian and AID regional organizations. Generally they are opposed to regional projects, but do support some, especially where the impact is favorable on "their" country.

Realizing the importance of communicating with host country officials on development issues, including seeking policy changes, some Ambassadors have been helpful in policy dialogues.

The performance of the JAOs is spotty at best. Some are performing well (Senegal, Mali); others not so well or non-existent (The Gambia, Chad). State continues to experience

difficulty in filling JAO positions with experienced personnel. Where the JAOs are performing well, the success can be attributed to the personalities in the Mission.

The JAO concept has not always increased efficiencies, avoided duplication of services, or necessarily been more economical. There are instances where the JAO has become bloated, staff-wise, through the excessive use of PSCs with the recreation asociations. Comparing the per capita FAAS cost between Niger and Senegal, for example, Niger is nearly eight times as expensive, raising serious questions of the management and cost effectiveness of that JAO operation.

In order to assure a unified U.S. approach to development in the Sahel, closer coordination, improved understanding of development, and clearer policies must be promulgated to the field by State and AID.

The following are being considered to assist in improving Embassy-USAID ~~the~~ relationships:

- At least once a year the Ambassadors of the Sahel countries meet with the SMDC and representatives from CILSS.
- Improve coordination and collaboration between the Ambassadors and USAID Directors in formulating country development strategy statements.
- Improve State/AID dialogue, both in Washington and the field. For better mutual understanding of

processes, procedures, policies, and authorities.

- o Improve management of Joint Administrative Organizations to insure that they are responsive, efficiently managed, and cost effective.

H. Strengthening regional organizations should go hand-in-hand with streamlining U.S. AID field direction and missions.

1. The CILSS organization, comprised of its Council of Ministers, Executive Secretariat, and specialized agencies (the Sahel Institute and AGRHYMET), has progressed markedly with direct support from the Club/OECD Secretariat plus a variety of donor-initiated activities. Working groups, colloquia, and other fora have produced some fundamental policy papers and outlines on such topics as food crops (rainfed and irrigated agriculture); cereals policies; food strategies; village hydraulics; ecology/forestry; recurrent costs. More remains to be done and the Fifth Club Conference in Brussels in late 1983 laid out some of the components of a future work program:

   a. Continuation of conceptual work relating to the region as a whole: sectoral topics, such as deforestation, livestock, and fisheries; economic policies, e.g., food production and cereals policies; food security plans; and wider population participation in development.

   b. Improvement of coordination and concerted action within the region through a series of meetings

and "progress reviews" in member countries to update all concerned on regional-national progress and map out next steps. (This may also enchance donor support and coordination)

2. A series of actions may be necessary to prepare CILSS/Club-OECD better -- organizationally and authoritatively -- toward even greater progress toward the goals of Sahelian development:

   a. CILSS/Club Secretariats, based on the 1983 Brussels meeting, outline a five-year plan of action as the next segment in pursuit of goals established for the year 2000.

   b. CILSS/Club Secretariats convene planning meetings with the Sahel Institute and AGRHYMET toward formulation of five-year programs, flowing out of the above-mentioned deliberations and agreements.

   c. CILSS/Club Secretariats should further streamline relations with donors:

      i. Define better the food self-sufficiency goal and better enable donors, e.g., the U.S., to relate their regional and national strategies to support of the goal;

      ii. Formulate proposals with CILSS members suggesting donors identify sectors or projects of preference as a means of achieving wider progress and elimininating

duplication;

iii. Use "progress reviews" (mentioned above) as fora for donor dialogue and participation in CILSS member country development planning.

d. CILSS/Club Secretariats convene a planning meeting with all donors providing technical assistance directly to the respective Secretariats and include the following agenda points:

i. Modify CILSS' organization, e.g., establish a Deputy Executive Secretary for continuity of management; tighten staffing consistent with concentration on policy formulation and abandonment of fundraising and project implementation; develop realistic annual work plans.

ii. Formulate and agree on personnel policies and conform donor support "packages" to CILSS personnel pay scales and standards.

iii. Agree on budget procedures, e.g., outline a five year budget showing a combination of CILSS member and donor contributions, by year and line item. Provide for annual up-dates.

e. Disseminate content and future guidance emerging from Chiefs of State-Council of Ministers' consideration of the CILSS

Reappraisal Committee's activities and report. Formulate specific assignments for follow-up.

3. AID is the principal donor to the operation of the CILSS Executive Secretariat and makes substantial inputs to the OECD/Club Secretariat and the Sahel Institute. In addition, a working fund has been set up with FAO to provide short-term consulting support to CILSS member countries and Sahelian AID Missions. All the foregoing activity is organized and administered via the Sahel Regional AID Coordination and Planning Project (625-0911), which is soon to be evaluated. A variety of support for AGRHYMET is provided under bilateral projects of USAID Niger. Future design of these activities should address the following points:

   a. Need for some form of coordination - vested in a single entity - among the CILSS Executive Secretariat, Sahel Institute and AGRHYMET on matters of policy and budget as they relate to U.S. support for regional coordination and planning.

   b. Incorporating 0911 managership within duties and responsibilities of SMDC/SDPRO staff, thereby establishing a single U.S. communication channel to the CILSS Executive Secretariat.

   c. Establishing better planning/procedures for CILSS and AID Missions' utilization of short-term consultantcapability through OECD/Club and FODAG

Rome.

d. Circularizing all USAIDS and Embassies on CILSS/INSAH/AGRHYMET issues with AID regional or bilateral implications (should also include all OECD/Club issuances) and fostering appropriate responses and commentaries.

4. Looking outside the AID organizational structure, SWA/SWAP might also consider locating managership of these planning/coordination resources in an entity such as the OECD/Club Secretariat. In long-range planning terms, such a move would be consistent with the idea that the regional Sahelian entities and their member countries are ultimately responsible for their own development. Likewise, it probably makes sense to consider consolidating U.S. and, ideally, all donor assistance to CILSS staff development and operations through a neutral body representing all active donors.

IV. ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS AND IDEAS

This report reflects the initial ideas and proposals by SMAT. Some of them are expected to be refined further.

There are a number of additional topics that are also being explored by SMAT and will probably be addressed in subsequent progress reports, e.g.: improving collaboration with the host country and external donors; project design methodology, importance and status of Project Officers, personnel incentives, management of Personal Service

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Contractors, management training, improving staff development, standardization and maintenance of vehicles, leasing vs. procurement of vehicles, financial management etc., etc.

Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN OFFICE AFFW-04
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TAGS:
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF AID SAHEL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

REF: (A) 1983 STATE 280519 (NOTAL) (B) 1983 STATE 300042 (C) STATE 6377

ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WCA

1 THE SAHEL MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM (SMAT) HAS SUBMITTED A PROGRESS REPORT FOR FIELD AND AID/W REVIEW. COPIES WILL BE HANDCARRIED TO KIGALI CONFERENCE. THE TEAM ALSO PREPARED THE ABRIDGED VERSION BEING TRANSMITTED BY THIS CABLE. THIS VERSION OMITS MOST OF THE QUOTE WHAT THE TEAM HEARD UNQUOTE SECTION THAT WAS REPORTED TO SMDC XIII. THE QUOTE OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS/IDEAS UNQUOTE SECTION IS ALSO ABRIDGED, BUT SETS FORTH IDEAS UNDER CONSIDERATION TO ALLOW SAHEL DIRECTORS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THEM AT POST BEFORE KIGALI. THE SMAT REPRESENTATIVE HOPES TO RECEIVE FEEDBACK AT THE MEETING. IN ADDITION, AS INDICATED REF (C), SOME OF THE PROPOSALS RELATE TO THE PROPOSED AGENDA FORTHESMDC MEETING WITH AA/AFR. THE TEAM ALSO

WELCOMES CABLED COMMENTS FROM USAIDS, EMBASSIES, SAHEL REGIONAL OFFICES, AND REDSO/WCA (BY FEBRUARY 15).

2. SMAT BRIEFED AA/AFR, DAAS LOVE AND JOHNSON AND SWA ON JANUARY 18 ON GENERAL CONTENT OF PROGRESS REPORT.

3 THERE FOLLOWS THE ABRIDGED VERSION OF THE SMAT PROGRESS REPORT.

I. INTRODUCTION: SMAT INTERVIEWED AID, STATE AND OTHER DONOR REPS IN WASHINGTON, AND U.S. AND NON-U.S.

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PERSONNEL IN U.S. MISSIONS/USAIDS, HOST GOVERNMENTS, AND DONOR OFFICES IN THE SAHELIAN COUNTRIES DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1983. VISITS ALSO INCLUDED THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT IN OUAGADOUGOU, CLUB DU SAHEL SECRETARIAT IN PARIS, REDSO/WCA, AND AID REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE SAHEL. ONE MEMBER OF SMAT ATTENDED SMDC XIII AND PRESENTED A SYNTHESIS OF WHAT SMAT MEMBERS HAD HEARD IN WASHINGTON AND THE FIELD AND OFFERED A FEW TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS. THIS SUMMARY REPORT OFFERS FIELD MISSIONS AND AFR OFFICES SOME OBSERVATIONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS, AND PRESENTS SELECTED IDEAS THAT HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED TO OR DEVELOPED BY THE TEAM FOR IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF AID'S SAHEL PROGRAM. THIS REPORT IS INTENDED TO ELICIT FURTHER DIALOGUE WITH USAIDS, EMBASSIES, SAHEL REGIONAL OFFICES, REDSO/WCA, AND INTERESTED WASHINGTON OFFICES. COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED BY FEBRUARY 15. DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, THE TEAM WILL DEVELOP IDEAS FURTHER AND MAY SEEK COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

II. SYNTHESIS OF WHAT THE TEAM HEARD

A. IN WASHINGTON (BOTH AID AND STATE)

1. REGARDING THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (SDP) --
- NOT SEEN AS SPECIAL BY MOST INTERVIEWEES ALREADY
- GETTING TOO MUCH ATTENTION, TOO MUCH MONEY, TOO
- MANY PEOPLE.

2. DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY -- THE RIGHT HAND
- GIVETH AND THE LEFT HAND TAKETH AWAY.
- AUTHORITIES ABUSED.

3. AFR MANAGEMENT -- TOO CENTRALIZED, INSUFFICIENT
- DELEGATION, STAFF OFFICES CANNOT HANDLE WORKLOAD.

B. IN THE FIELD (BOTH AID AND STATE)

1. WASHINGTON IS THE ENEMY -- SOME 17 CITATIONS.

2. PROJECT MANAGERS ARE FRUSTRATED -- WITH REASON.

3. SAHELIAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE WEAK/DIFFUSE.

4. AID DOES NOT RESPOND TO COUNTRY PRIORITIES.

5. AUDIT REPORTS ARE NOT OBJECTIVE, MANY AUDITORS
- ARE RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED AND UNFAMILIAR WITH
- AID AND ITS GOALS.
. SECTION 121 (D) COMPLIANCE IS DIFFICULT, IT
- CAUSED CONFLICT INITIALLY WITH GOVERNMENTS, BUT
- BETTER MANAGEMENT SHOULD RESULT.

7. TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON REGIONAL STRATEGY.
. FACTORS DETERRING AID SUCCESS IN THE SAHEL --
- MOST PRESENTEDAT SMDC XIII.
. TOO MANY REGIONAL PROJECTS ABSORBING MONEY FOR
- LOWER PRIORITY ACTIVITIES.

10. SOME NEEDED CHANGES IN STRATEGY AND TACTICS:

- A. PROGRAM EMPHASIS -- MORE FUNDING TO HUMAN
- RESOURCE, QUOTE PEOPLE ORIENTED UNQUOTE
- PROJECTS, MANAGEMENT TRAINING (INCLUDING
- ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION),
- RESEARCH, INFRASTRUCTURE (ESPECIALLY FOR TRAFFIC
- ARTERIES), NONPROJECT ASSISTANCE, SUPPORT OF
- INDIGENOUS PRIVATE SECTORS.

- B. NEW TACTICS -- INCREASE CONDITIONALITY OF AID
- TO PERFORMANCE, MORE RIGOROUS ANALYSIS AND

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- HONESTY IN PRESENTATION, RECOGNIZE SAHELIANS
- MUST DEVELOP THE SAHEL.

11. SWA, SMDC, SDPRO, CLUB/OECD, CILSS COMPLEX:

- A. DONOR AID TERMS AND STANDARDS CREATE
- PERSONNEL AND PROGRAM PROBLEMS FOR CILSS
- SECRETARIAT.

- B. CILSS SECRETARIAT HAS NO CLEAR CONCEPT OF
- CHANNELS FOR DEALING WITH AID ON PROJECT
- 625-0911.

- C. LACK OF CLARITY ON RELATIONSHIP AND MUTUAL

- RESPONSIBILITIES OF SAHEL MISSION DIRECTORS
- COUNCIL (SMDC) AND THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT
- PLANNING REGIONAL ORGANIZATION (SDPRO) HAMPERS
- PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF A REGIONAL
- DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT.

- D. SDPRO SHOULD BE: I) ABOLISHED, II)
- TRANSFORMED INTO A SECRETARIAT FOR SMDC, III)
- MOVED TO OUAGA (IN REDUCED NUMBERS) AND SERVE
- ONLY AN ADVISORY FUNCTION TO CILSS; IV) BE GIVEN
- EXPANDED RESPONSIBILITIES IN BOTH REGIONAL AND
- BILATERAL PROGRAM/PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND
- IMPLEMENTATION; V) BE ALLOCATED SOME TECHNICAL
- PERSONNEL (E.G., LAWYER, CONTRACT OFFICER,
- ENGINEER) AND BECOME A SAHEL REDSO.

- E. SMDC SHOULD EXERCISE MORE POLICY AUTHORITY
- VIA THE RESOURCE -ALLOCATION PROCESS. FOLLOW-UP
- ON ALL SMDC DECISIONS SHOULD BE VESTED IN
- SDPRO. SMDC HAS TOO MANY MEETINGS; DOES NOT
- REGULARLY INCLUDE AMBASSADORS IN SMDC SESSIONS.

C. FROM SAHELIANS AND OTHER DONORS (IN WASHINGTON AND FIELD) -- NEW

1. SDPRO -- HAS DONE USEFUL CATALYTIC WORK ON MANY
- SAHEL POLICY ISSUES; REDUCE TO 3 OR 4 PERSONS
- AND RELOCATE TO OUAGA TO WORK WITH CILSS
- SECRETARIAT AND PARTICIPATE IN CILSS WORKING
- GROUP ACTIVITIES.

2. U.S. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, PARTICULARLY IN
- FINANCE, HAVE BENEFITED CILSS. TRAINING SHOULD
- BE MORE SYSTEMATIC AND WIDELY AVAILABLE.

3. CILSS-CLUB RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED STEADILY.
- SOME POLICY DISAGREEMENTS PERSIST: IRRIGATED
- VS. RAINFED AGRICULTURE; REGIONAL VS. NATIONAL
- FOOD SECURITY STOCKS.

4. MORE-CONTACT SHOULD EXIST AT NATIONAL LEVELS BETWEEN CILSS COORDINATORS AND AID MISSIONS.

5. BECAUSE U.S. PROVIDES MORE RESOURCES DIRECTLY TO
- THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT THAN ANY OTHER
- DONOR, AID SOMETIMES TENDS TO TAKE A QUOTE HERE
- IS THE MONEY AND HERE IS WHAT YOU DO WITH IT
- UNQUOTE APPROACH.

6. CLUB SECRETARIAT CONTINUES TO REFRAIN FROM
- ENDORSING CILSS'S EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
- PROPOSALS AND FROM SUPPORTING MORE SYSTEMATIC
- DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAHEL INSTITUTE.

7. SAHELIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS CAN WORK FOR PROJECT

- ACTIVITY ACCOUNTING BY ADDING DOUBLE SIGN-OFF
- PROCEDURE BETWEEN HC AND DONOR MANAGERS.

8. CILSS SECRETARIAT HAS IMPROVED MARKEDL:
- CONCENTRATING MORE ON POLICY ISSUES, DROPPING
- INVOLVEMENT IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT; REFRAINING
- FROM DIRECT CONTACT WITH DONORS TO SUPPORT
- INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS.

9. USAID RELATIONS WITH HC ARE INADEQUATE.

10. ONE HC REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT THAT DONORS COULD
- BETTER ALLOCATE DIFFERENT AREAS OF ACTIVITY -
- AMONG THEM.

III. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS BY SMAT: PROPOSALS AND IDEAS UNDER CONSIDERATION

A. THE CONCEPT OF A SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM REMAINS VALID; RESULTS TO DATE MAY BE DISAPPOINTING IN TERMS OF INCREASED INCOMES AND PRODUCTION, BUT GAINS - ACHIEVED PROVIDE A BASE FOR FUTURE PROGRESS. U.S. SHOULD STAY THE COURSE AS A FULL PARTNER-IN SAHEL DEVELOPMENT. TO ENSURE MORE EFFECTIVE -- PARTICIPATION, AID NEEDS TO:

-- RECONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THE VISION OF THE SDP
- AS A LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT UNDERTAKING WORTHY OF
- ITS SUPPORT.

-- MAINTAIN THE SDP APPROPRIATION AND USE THE
- SPECIAL AUTHORITIES PROVIDED THEREIN. -

-- UPGRADE, INTEGRATE, AND STRENGTHEN THE
- MANAGEMENT OF SDP AS SUGGESTED BELOW.

-- RECOGNIZE THAT SAHEL HAS SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT
- CHALLENGES AND PROVIDE BETTER SUPPORT TO FIELD
- MISSIONS TO DEAL WITH THEM.

-- EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN POLICY AND PLANNING TIES
- BETWEENAID AND SAHELIAN AGENCIES AND OTHER
- DONORS. -

B. AID/W ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPPORT FOR THE SAHEL PROGRAM SHOULD BE IMPROVED. AA/AFR SHOULD GIVE FIELD MORE AUTONOMY. AT SAME TIME, AA/AFR SHOULD ESTABLISH A QUOTE OPERATIONS APPRAISAL STAFF UNQUOTE UNIT TO REVIEW FIELD OPERATIONS AND RESPOND TO SPECIAL MISSION REQUESTS.

C. A MORE COLLABORATIVE SDP STRATEGY IS NEEDED, SUPPORTED BY MODIFIED PROGRAM CONTENT AND BETTER PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS.

-- SMAT SUPPORTS SDPRO/SMDC EFFORTS IN PREPARATION
- OF A REGIONAL STRATEGY STATEMENT THAT TAKES A
- 20-YEAR PERSPECTIVE AND ESTABLISHES SHORTER TERM
- STRATEGIES AND INTERIM GOALS AND MEASURABLE
- TARGETS. SMAT SUGGESTS STRATEGY STATEMENT
- CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM MIXES. GENERAL
- MANAGEMENT WORKLOAD AND HUMAN RESOURCE
- LIMITATION OF HOST COUNTRIES AND USAID SUGGEST
- FURTHER PROGRAM CONCENTRATION (FEWER SECTORS,
- FEWER PROJECTS).

- SMAT SEES THE REGIONAL STRATEGY STATEMENT AS A
- BASIS FOR EVALUATING REGIONAL PROJECTS AND
- PROVIDING GUIDANCE (BUT NOT STRAIGHT-JACKET) FOR
- CDSSS. LATTER WILL NEED TO REFLECT VARIED

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- COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT SITUATION AND U.S. POLICY
- OBJECTIVES.

- RE STRATEGY PREPARATION PROCESS, SWA/SDPRO/SMDC
- MIGHT APPOINT A SMALL TASK FORCE (TWO OR THREE
- REPRESENTATIVES OF SMDC, ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM
- SWA AND DIRECTOR, SDPRO) TO WORK INTENSIVELY FOR
- A WEEK ON THE STATEMENT. ALSO, THE REFINED
- DRAFT MIGHT BE CIRCULATED THROUGH THE CILSS AND
- CLUB SECRETARIATS FOR COMMENTS. THIS COULD
- PROMPT A FURTHER REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE CILSS
- STRATEGY AND REFINEMENT OF SAME (CONCEPT OF FOOD
- SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS NOT WELL DEFINED). IT COULD
- ALSO LEAD TO AN IMPROVED DIALOGUE WITH OTHER
- DONORS.

-- SHAT SUGGESTS A NEW LOOK AT INFRASTRUCTURE,
- I.E., ROAD REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION,
- IRRIGATION, POSSIBLY OTHER TRANSPORT AND
- COMMUNICATIONS. ROADS PARTICULARLY CAN SERVE TO
- IMPROVE RURAL ACCESS TO MARKETS AND LINK
- LANDLOCKEDSAHELIAN COUNTRIES TO ONE ANOTHER AND

- COASTAL NEIGHBORS. INCREASED TRADE WITH LATTER
- MAY PROVIDE IMPORTANT CATALYST TO SAHELIAN
- DEVELOPMENT. IRRIGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO MEETING
- SAHEL FOOD SECURITY NEEDS. INFRASTRUCTURE
- PROJECTS CAN BE HANDLED ON A TURN-KEY BASIS,
- MINIMIZING HOST COUNTRY AND USAID MANAGEMENT
- REQUIREMENTS, WHILE PROVIDING ON-THE-JOB
- TRAINING TO SAHELIANS.

-- HUMAN RESOURCES WEAKNESSES OF THE HOST COUNTRIES
- AND THE USAIDS DEMAND GREATER ATTENTION. THIS
- SUGGESTS FEWER PROJECTS, MORE TURN-KEY
- INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, NONPROJECT ASSISTANCE,
- AND PROVIDING OPERATING (NOT JUST ADVISORY)
- PERSONNEL TO PROJECTS.

-- PROGRAM AND SECTOR ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE
- CONSIDERED WHERE IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN
- SIGNIFICANT POLICY CHANGES. HOWEVER, POLICY
- DIALOGUE DOES NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE SUCH
- ASSISTANCE TO BE EFFECTIVE. POLICY DIALOGUE
- COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY TOTAL MISSION
- INVOLVEMENT (INCLUDING THE EMBASSY AND POSSIBLY
- OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MISSION) IN THE
- FORMULATION OF PRIORITIES FOR DIALOGUE AND THE
- STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS.
- SUCH POLICY INVOLVEMENT PLAN SHOULD ALSO
- CONSIDER THE USE OF CILSS NATIONAL COMMITTEES,
- OTHER DONORS AND AID/W.

D. THE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGING THE SDP NEEDS MORE LEADERSHIP AND INTEGRATION AND CLEARER LINES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY.

1. SHAT OBSERVATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
- ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS:

- A. NO ONE IS CLEARLY IN CHARGE, EXCEPT POSSIBLY
- AA/AFR WHO DOES NOT HAVE TIME TO FOCUS ON SAHEL
- DEVELOPMENT OR NEEDS.

- B. THE DIRECTOR OF AFR/SWA IS NOMINALLY
- RESPONSIBLE, BUT HAS NOT BEEN PROVIDING THE
- LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO SDPRO AND SMDC AND HAS BEEN
- UNABLE TO GET ADEQUATE ATTENTION IN AID/W TO THE
- NEEDS OF THE SAHEL MISSIONS

- C. SDPRO HAS DONE SOME GOOD WORK, BUT NEITHER
- THE TEAM'SSTUDIES NOR ITS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

- HAVE BEEN UTILIZED FULLY BY THE MISSIONS, THE
- SMDC, SWA, OR CILSS. SDPRO'S ROLE HAS BEEN SO
- DIFFUSE, AND THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED TO IT SO
- MINIMAL, THAT IT HAS NOT ACHIEVED THE IMPACT
- POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE AND NEEDED.

- D. THE SMDC HAS PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE, BUT IT
- HAS NOT REALIZED ITS POTENTIAL, IN PART BECAUSE
- OF ITS MODUS OPERANDI, IN PART BECAUSE NO ONE IS
- IN CHARGE TO ENSURE THAT DECISIONS OF THE
- COUNCIL ARE IMPLEMENTED. NOR HAS SMDC SEEN FIT
- TO VEST SUCH FOLLOW-UP IN SDPRO IN ANY FORMAL
- MANNER.

- E. LIAISON WITH CILSS IS FRAGMENTED BETWEEN
- USAID UPPER VOLTA'S LIAISON OFFICE, THE SDPRO IN
- BAMAKO, AND CLUB SECRETARIAT IN PARIS, NONE OF
- WHOSE ROLES IS CLEAR. IMPROVED COORDINATION IS
- NEEDED.

- F. ALTHOUGH MISSION DIRECTORS DEAL WITH REGIONAL
- ISSUES IN THE SMDC, THEY SEEM OVERLY BILATERALLY
- ORIENTED. IT MAY BE NATURAL THAT THEY WOULD
- FEEL LESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OVERALL
- PROGRAM; HOWEVER, THEIR FAILURE TO FOLLOW, IN
- THEIR BILATERAL PROGRAMS, DECISIONS AGREED TO IN
- THE SMDC ITSELF ILLUSTRATES THE LACK OF
- FOLLOW-UP ON SMDC DECISIONS AND THE LACK OF
- LEADERSHIP ON THE PART OF SWA.

2. SOME IDEAS FOR IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATIONAL
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR MANAGING THE SDP FOLLOW:

-- REGIONALIZE ALL NECESSARY SUPPORT SERVICES FOR
- THE SAHEL COUNTRIES INTO A SEPARATE SUPPORT
- ORGANIZATION LOCATED IN DAKAR. ESTABLISHMENT OF
- SUCH A ORGANIZATION WOULD LEAD TO A
- CORRESPONDING REDUCTION OF STAFF AND AUTHORITIES
- FROM REDSO AND USAID/SENEGAL. REDSO WOULD THEN
- FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON THE BALANCE OF THE WEST
- AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

-- COMBINE THE AFR/PD/SWAP OFFICE WITH AFR/SWA TO
- STRENGTHEN AND MORE EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE
- PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS THROUGHOUT THE SAHEL.
- SOME SAVINGS IN PERSONNEL SHOULD RESULT.

-- CONSIDER MOVING PERSONNEL AND AUTHORITIES OF
- AFR/SWA AND AFR/PD/SWAP TO THE FIELD (DAKAR IS

- THE MOST LOGICAL PLACE) AND COMBINING THEM WITH
- THE ABOVE PROPOSED SUPPORT ORGANIZATION TO
- ESTABLISH A QUOTE SAHEL PROGRAM COORDINATION
- OFFICE (SPCO) UNQUOTE. WITH CLOSER PROXIMITY
- AND IMMERSION INTO THE REGION, THE SPCO SHOULD
- PROVIDE MORE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND
- PROGRAM DECISIONS. TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION
- AND EXECUTION OF SAHEL PLANNING, SDPRO WOULD BE
- MOVED FROM BAMAKO AND INCORPORATED INTO THE SPCO.

-- CONSIDER MOVING THE ALLOCATION OF SAHEL
- MISSIONS' PERSONNEL CEILINGS AND OPERATING
- EXPENSE FUNDS FROM AFR/PMR TO AFR/SWA (OR
- SPCO). AFR/PMR WOULD PROVIDE A BLOCK OF
- PERSONNEL CEILINGS AND A BLOCK OF OE FUNDS TO
- AFR/SWA (OR SPCO) TO DETERMINE THE INTERNAL
- ALLOCATION AMONG THE SAHEL MISSIONS IN

CONJUNCTION WITH THE SMDC.

3. WHILE THE FOREGOING ARE UNDER REVIEW AND CONSIDERATION, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS CAN BE INITIATED TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE EXISTING U.S. AND SAHELIAN ENTITIES:

-- FORMALLY INCLUDE THE CILSS MINISTER COORDINATOR AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON THE SMDC AGENDA (AT LEAST ONCE EACH YEAR);

-- SAME FOR U.S. AMBASSADORS TO SAHEL COUNTRIES (ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY AT THE SAME MEETING);

-- USAIDS DESIGNATE LIAISON OFFICERS AND ESTABLISH REGULAR AND CONTINUOUS WORKING RELATIONS WITH CILSS NATIONAL COORDINATORS,

-- SMDC/SDPRO REVIEW CILSS POLICY ISSUANCES AND WORKING GROUP PAPERS FOR RELEVANCE TO AID REGIONAL AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES, PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTS.

E. AID/W MANAGEMENT OF SDP FUNDS CONTRIBUTES TO MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN THE SAHEL

1. EVEN THOUGH SDP FUNDS ARE AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATED ON A NO-YEAR BASIS, THE AGENCY HAS REQUIRED THAT SDP MANAGERS MEET ANNUAL OBLIGATION DEADLINES (OFTEN ARTIFICIAL AND ARBITRARY). SIMILARLY, THE AGENCY'S FUNCTIONAL AREASOF EMPHASIS AND SUCCESSIVE QUOTE MANDATES

UNQUOTE HAVE BEEN IMPOSED UPON SAHEL PROGRAMS WITHOUT REGARD TO APPLICABILITY OR APPROPRIATENESS, EVEN THOUGH LEGISLATION DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUIRE SUCH APPLICATION.

2. THE AID/W PUSH TO MEET OBLIGATION DEADLINES HAS RESULTED IN:

A. RUSHED PROJECT DESIGN, RESULTING IN MINIMAL DIALOGUE WITH THE HOST COUNTRY DURING DESIGN, INADEQUATE ATTENTION TO PLANNING FOR LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS, AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE MISSIONS OF INAPPROPRIATE AID/W REQUESTS FOR INCLUSIONS/DELETIONS OF PROJECT ELEMENTS OR REQUIREMENTS.

B. HASTY NEGOTIATION AND SIGNING OF PROJECT AGREEMENTS.

C. INSISTING THAT HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SIGN OBLIGATING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT GIVING THEM TIME TO STAFF THE DOCUMENTS OUT WITHIN THEIR ORGANIZATION.

D. LAST MINUTE REQUESTS FROM AID/W TO OBLIGATE FUNDS FOR PROJECTS FOR WHICH NO OBLIGATION HAS BEEN PLANNED.

3. AID/W HAS PROHIBITED ANY OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAST MONTH OF THE FISCAL YEAR, THEREBY FURTHER INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON THE FIELD AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE TYPES OF SITUATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

4. AID SHOULD USE THE UNIQUE FUNDING FLEXIBILITY PROVIDED BY THE CONGRESS TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE ON THE SAHEL MISSIONS TO QUOTE MOVE MONEY

UNQUOTE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTION GIVEN TO USING THE QUOTE NO-YEAR UNQUOTE AUTHORITY IS THAT IT RUNS THE RISK THAT A LOWER LEVEL OF OBLIGATION WOULD RESULT IN REDUCTIONS IN FUTURE YEARS' APPROPRIATIONS. SMAT DOUBTS THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR, IF AT ALL. FURTHERMORE, THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR AID IN THE SAHEL AT THIS TIME IS NOT OBLIGATING EVER INCREASING AMOUNTS OF MONEY, BUT USING WELL WHAT IS ALREADY AVAILABLE. SOME REDUCTION IN OBLIGATION ACTIVITY FOR A YEAR COULD HELP USAIDS GET ON TOP OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS.

FURTHERMORE, IT IS LIKELY THAT A MODIFIED AND STRENGTHENED SDP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE COULD WORK OUT HOW TO OBLIGATE ALL THE FUNDS AVAILABLE IN A MORE ORDERLY, LESS MANAGEMENT-INTENSIVE WAY IF GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY. FINALLY, THE DECISION TO USE THE QUOTE NO-YEAR UNQUOTE AUTHORITY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE CONGRESS BEFOREHAND; THE EXPECTED DIRE RESULTS PROBABLY COULD BE FORESTALLED.

5. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE EASING OF PRESSURE ON ANNUAL OBLIGATIONS, AID/W COULD CONSIDER TRANSFERRING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE OYB TO THE FIELD, EITHER TO THE NEW SPCO PROPOSED IN D. ABOVE OR TO THE SOMC UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SWA AND WITH THE STAFF SUPPORT OF A RE-ORGANIZED SDPRO.

6. AS A FURTHER MEANS OF FOSTERING TIMELY OBLIGATIONS BY THE FIELD, AFR SHOULD CARRY OUT THE INTENT OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 140 FOR FIELD APPROVAL OF NEW PROJECTS. HOWEVER, MISSIONS SHOULD ALSO SEEK AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT COMMENTS BY SDPRO AND OTHER SMDC MEMBERS ON SUC; PROJECTS. FULL FIELD AUTHORITY FOR APPROVAL OF PROJECTS SHOULD RESULT IN A MORE EFFICIENT APPROVAL PROCESS AND BETTER PROJECTS BECAUSE:

A. MISSIONS CAN ESTABLISH THEIR OWN DESIGN AND REVIEW SCHEDULES AND NOT HAVE TO FIT INTO ARBITRARY AID/W REQUIREMENTS;

B. GREATER HOST COUNTRY COLLABORATION IS FACILITATED;

C. PRE-IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS CAN BE INITIATED WITH REASONABLE ASSURANCE ABOUT THE TIMING OF OBLIGATIONS.

D. PROJECT PAPERS CAN SATISFY APPROVING OFFICERS' REQUIREMENTS AND NOT ENCOMPASS RESPONSES TO ALL OF THE POTENTIAL QUESTIONS THAT AID/W REVIEWERS CAN FORMULATE. THE RESULT SHOULD BE MORE CONCISE AND CLEAR DOCUMENTATION.

E. A REVIEW OF PROPOSED PROJECTS BY SDPRO AND OTHER MISSIONS SHOULD LEAD TO BETTER COORDINATION OF EFFORT, MORE CONSISTENCY WITH REGIONALSTRATEGY, AND MORE PROFITING FROM

EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE IN THE SAHEL.

7. IN CONJUNCTION WITH FIELD MANAGEMENT OF THE OYB AND APPROVAL OF ALL PROJECTS, THE FIELD SHOULD BE GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DIVIDING UP SAHEL OE FUNDS AND PERSONNEL CEILINGS AMONG THE COUNTRIES. AN EFFORT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE TO GET

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- P.L. 480 ALLOCATIONS FOR THE SAHEL AND LET THE
- FIELD MAKE THE INTERNAL ALLOCATIONS WITHIN THE
- SAHEL. THESE CHANGES COULD REDUCE THE WORKLOAD
- ON THE WASHINGTON AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE
- ALLOCATION PROCESS, AND GIVE THE MANAGERS OF THE
- SAHEL PROGRAM ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO DEAL
- WITH CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE WHOLE PROCESS
- SHOULD REDUCE AFR WORKLOAD SINCE STAFF OFFICES
- WOULD NEED TO REVIEW SUMMARY SAHEL-WIDE
- DOCUMENTATION GENERALLY AND NOT INDIVIDUAL
- COUNTRY DOCUMENTS.

8. OTHER IDEAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR GIVING THE
- FIELD MORE FLEXIBILITY OF OPERATIONS INCLUDE THE
- ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO REGIONAL PROJECTS DESIGNED
- PRIMARILY FOR USE BY USAIDS WITH MINIMUM
- DOCUMENTATION. ONE WOULD BE A PROJECT
- INITIATION REVOLVING FUND, THAT COULD BE USED TO
- UNDERTAKE PRE-IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT ACTIONS
- BEFORE FUNDS BECOME AVAILABLE UNDER A NEW
- PROJECT. THIS COULD BE USEFUL INTER ALIA, IN
- PROVIDING THE INITIAL SUPPORT FOR CONTRACT
- TEAMS. SMAT WILL ALSO CONSIDER EXPANDING THE
- PROJECT TO INCLUDE ON-GOING REVOLVING FUND
- PROJECT SUPPORT OR SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE FOR
- DEALING WITH THIS NEED. THE SECOND PROJECT
- WOULD BE A PROGRAM INITIATIVES PROJECT, WHICH
- COULD BE USED TO FINANCE STUDIES, TRAVEL OF
- COUNTRY OFFICIALS, SMALL PROJECTS RELATED TO
- POLICY DIALOGUE, PROMOTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR,
- PRE-PROJECT TESTING OF TECHNOLOGICAL
- INNOVATIONS, OR OTHER NONPROJECT OR PRE-PROJECT
- INITIATIVES.

F. MISSION MANAGEMENT NEEDS STRENGTHENING

1. MOST MISSIONS NEED TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL
- MECHANISMS FOR FOLLOW-UP, MONITORING, AND
- CONTROL OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND USAID
- MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AND PROCESSES.

2. MISSIONS NEED AN INVENTORY OF ALL ACTIVITIES

- WHICH REQUIRE MANAGEMENT AND GENERATE WORKLOAD.
- THE INVENTORY WOULD INCLUDE NUMBERED PROJECTS;
- ACTIVITIES UNDER P.L. 480, S&T, TITLE XII, PVOS;
- PM&R FUNDED ACTIVITIES; LOCAL CURRENCY PROJECTS/
- PROGRAMS/SECTOR ACTIVITIES DESIGN AND EVALUATION
- AND OTHER TEAMS; VISITORS, ETC. SUCH AN
- INVENTORY CAN MAKE PERSONNEL FORECASTING MORE
- REALISTIC AND FACILITATE RELATING PROJECTS AND
- ACTIVITIES INTO CDSS AND RDSS FRAMEWORKS.

3. GREATER ATTENTION NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO THE
- SETTING OF INTERNAL PRIORITIES (INCLUDING A
- PERIODIC REMINDER THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE
- MISSION AND THE PROGRAM IS ACCELERATING HOST
- COUNTRY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT).

4. MOST MISSIONS NEED AN INTERNAL OPERATIONS MANUAL.

5. INTERNAL PROCEDURES FOR THE PREPARATION AND
- CLEARANCE OF PROJECT DOCUMENTATION NEED TO BE
- STREAMLINED.

6. MISSION MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS NEED TRAINING
- IN MANAGEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN TECHNIQUES FOR
- CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

7. GREATER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO TRAIN LOCAL
- FOREIGN NATIONALS THROUGH ON-GOING STAFF
- DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

8. LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF
- PROJECTS NEEDS AS MUCH OR MORE ATTENTION THAN
- TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, YET APPROPRIATE
- PERSONNEL ARE GENERALLY IN SHORT SUPPLY IN
- MISSIONS AND THOSE IN REDSO/WCA ARE
- OVER-EXTENDED. SUCH SUPPORT FOR INSTITUTIONAL
- CONTRACTORS NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED.

G. STATE -- AID AND EMBASSY -- USAID RELATIONSHIPS

GENERALLY, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE AND AID PERSONNEL ARE SATISFACTORY. SMAT OBSERVED THAT THERE ARE OCCASIONS, HOWEVER, WHEN THERE IS NOT AGREEMENT OR COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING ON PROGRAM EXECUTION STRATEGIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNDING LEVELS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT TO AID PERSONNEL AND PROJECTS.

AMBASSADORS ARE GENERALLY IMPATIENT FOR RESULTS FROM THE AID PROGRAM AND TEND TO CONCENTRATE ON

OBLIGATION AND MOVING RESOURCES. THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO ADMINISTER AN AID PROGRAM. SOME ARE UNNECESSARILY INVOLVED WITH DETAILS OF DAY-TO-DAY AID PROGRAM OPERATIONS. THEY APPEAR LESS KNOWLEDGEABLE THAN USAID DIRECTORS ABOUT THE ROLES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SAHELIAN AND AID REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. GENERALLY THEY ARE OPPOSED TO REGIONAL PROJECTS, BUT DO SUPPORT SOME, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE IMPACT IS FAVORABLE ON QUOTE THEIR UNQUOTE COUNTRY.

REALIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATING WITH HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS ON DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, INCLUDING SEEKING POLICY CHANGES, SOME AMBASSADORS HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN POLICY DIALOGUES.

JAO PERFORMANCES ARE SPOTTY AT BEST. SOME ARE PERFORMING WELL (SENEGAL, MALI); OTHER NOT SO WELL OR ARE NON-EXISTENT (THE GAMBIA, CHAD). STATE CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTY IN FILLING JAO POSITIONS WITH EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL. WHERE THE JAO IS PERFORMING WELL, THE SUCCESS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PERSONALITIES IN THE MISSION.

THE JAO CONCEPT HAS NOT ALWAYS INCREASED EFFICIENCIES, AVOIDED DUPLICATION OF SERVICES, OR NECESSARILY BEEN MORE ECONOMICAL. THERE ARE INSTANCES WHERE THE JAO HAS BECOME BLOATED, STAFF-WISE, THROUGH THE EXCESSIVE USE OF PSCS WITH THE RECREATION ASSOCIATIONS. COMPARING THE PER CAPITA FAAS COST BETWEEN NIGER AND SENEGAL, FOR EXAMPLE, NIGER IS NEARLY EIGHT TIMES AS EXPENSIVE, RAISING SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF THE MANAGEMENT AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JAO OPERATION.

IN ORDER TO ASSURE A UNIFIED U.S. APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL, CLOSER COORDINATION, IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF DEVELOPMENT, AND CLEARER POLICIES MUST BE PROMULGATED TO THE FIELD BY STATE AND AID.

H. STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD GO HAND-IN-HAND WITH STREAMLINING U.S. AID FIELD DIRECTION AND MISSIONS.

1. THE CILSS ORGANIZATION, COMPRISED OF ITS COUNCIL
- OF MINISTERS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, AND

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SPECIALIZED AGENCIES (THE SAHEL INSTITUTE AND AGRHYMET), HAS PROGRESSED MARKEDLY WITH DIRECT

SUPPORT FROM THE CLUB/OECD SECRETARIAT PLUS A VARIETY OF DONOR-INITIATED ACTIVITIES. WORKING GROUPS, COLLOQUIAL, AND OTHER FORA HAVE PRODUCED SOME FUNDAMENTAL POLICY PAPERS AND OUTLINES ON SUCH TOPICS AS FOOD CROPS (RAINFED AND IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE); CEREALS POLICTES; FOOD STRATEGIES; VILLAGE HYDRAULICS; ECOLOGY/FORESTRY; RECURRENT COSTS. MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE AND THE FIFTH CLUB CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS LAID OUT SOME OF THE COMPONENTS OF A FUTURE WORK PROGRAM:

A. CONTINUATION OF CONCEPTUAL WORK RELATING TO THE REGION AS A WHOLE: TOPICS, SUCH AS DEFORESTATION, LIVESTOCK, AND FISHERIES; ECONOMIC POLICIES, E.G., FOOD PRODUCTION AND CEREALS POLICIES; FOOD SECURITY PLANS; AND WIDER POPULATION PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT.

B. IMPROVEMENT OF COORDINATION AND CONCERTED ACTION WITHIN THE REGION THROUGH A SERIES OF MEETINGS AND QUOTE PROGRESS REVIEWS UNQUOTE IN MEMBER COUNTRIES TO UPDATE ALL CONCERNED ON REGIONAL-NATIONAL PROGRESS AND MAP OUT NEXT STEPS (MAY ALSO ENHANCE DONOR SUPPORT AND COORDINATION).

2. A SERIES OF ACTIONS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREPARE CILSS/CLUB-OECD BETTER -- ORGANIZATIONALLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY -- TOWARD EVEN GREATER PROGRESS TOWARD THE GOALS OF SAHELIAN DEVELOPMENT:

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS, BASED ON THE BRUSSELS MEETING OUTCOME, OUTLINE A FIVE-YEAR PLAN OF ACTION AS THE NEXT SEGMENT IN PURSUIT OF GOALS ESTABLISHED FOR THE YEAR 2000.

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS CONVENE PLANNING MEETINGS WITH THE SAHEL INSTITUTE AND AGRHYMET TOWARD FORMULATION OF FIVE-YEAR PROGRAMS, FLOWING OUT OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DELIBERATIONS AND AGREEMENTS.

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS SHOULD FURTHER STREAMLINE RELATIONS WITH DONORS:

A) DEFINE BETTER THE FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY GOALS;

B) FORMULATE PROPOSALS WITH CILSS MEMBERS

SUGGESTING DONORS IDENTIFY SECTORS OR PROJECTS OF PREFERENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING WIDER PROGRESS AND ELIMINATING DUPLICATION.

-- CILSS/CLUB SECRETARIATS CONVENE A PLANNING MEETING WITH ALL DONORS PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DIRECTLY TO THE RESPECTIVE SECRETARIATS AND INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AGENDA POINTS:

A) MODIFY CILSS'S ORGANIZATION, E.G., ESTABLISH A DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR CONTINUITY OF MANAGEMENT; TIGHTEN STAFFING CONSISTENT WITH CONCENTRATION ON POLICY FORMULATION AND ABANDONMENT OF FUND-RAISING ANNUAL WORK PLANS;

E) FORMULATE AND AGREE ON PERSONNEL POLICIES

AND CONFORM DONOR SUPPORT QUOTE PACKAGESUNQUOTE TO CILSS PERSONNEL SCALES AND STANDARDS;

C) AGREE ON BUDGET SHOWING A COMBINATION OF CILSS MEMBER AND DONOR CONTRIBUTION, BY YEAR AND LINE ITEM. PROVIDE FOR ANNUAL UP-DATES.

-- DISSEMINATE CONTENT AND FUTURE GUIDANCE EMERGING FROM CHIEFS OF STATE-COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' CONSIDERATION OF THE CILSS REAPPRAISAL COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES AND REPORT. FORMULATE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS FOR FOLLOW-UP.

3. AID IS THE PRINCIPAL DONOR TO THE OPERATION OF THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT AND MAKES SUBSTANTIAL INPUTS TO THE OECD/CLUB SECRETARIAT AND THE SAHEL INSTITUTE. IN ADDITION, A WORKING FUND HAS BEEN SET UP WITH FAO TO PROVIDE SHORT-TERM CONSULTING SUPPORT TO CILSS MEMBER COUNTRIES AND SAHELIAN AID MISSIONS. ALL THE FOREGOING ACTIVITY IS ORGANIZED AND ADMINISTERED VIA THE SAHEL REGIONAL AID COORDINATION AND PLANNING PROJECT (625-0911), WHICH IS SOON TO BE EVALUATED. A VARIETY OF SUPPORT FOR AGRHYMET IS PROVIDED UNDER BILATERAL PROJECTS OF USAID NIGER. FUTURE DESIGN OF THESE ACTIVITIES SHOULD ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- NEED FOR SOME FORM OF COORDINATION - VESTED IN A SINGLE ENTITY - AMONG THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, SAHEL INSTITUTE AND AGRHYMET ON MATTERSOF POLICY AND BUDGET AS THEY RELATE TO U.S. SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL COORDINATION AND PLANNING.

-- INCORPORATING 0911 MANAGERSHIP WITHIN DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SMDC/SDPRO STAFF, THEREBY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE U.S. COMMUNICATION CHANNEL TO THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

-- ESTABLISHING BETTER PLANNING/PROCEDURES FOR CILSS AND AID MISSIONS' UTILIZATION OF SHORT-TERM CONSULTANT CAPABILITY THROUGH OECD/CLUB AND FODAG ROME.

-- CIRCULARIZING ALL USAIDS AND EMBASSIES ON CILSS/INSAH/AGRHYMET ISSUES WITH AID REGIONAL OR BILATERAL IMPLICATIONS (SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE ALL OECD/CLUB ISSUANCES) AND FOSTERING APPROPRIATE RESPONSES AND COMMENTARIES.

4. SMAT APPRECIATES AID/W AND FIELD COOPERATION AND SUPPORT. SHULTZ

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to
T.I

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AID/AFR/SWA:EMAMUNDSON:DLB
01/05/84 EXT. 632-0990 — cable sent (reportedly) o/a 1/8 - DKamund 1/11/84
AID/AFR/SWA:DCHANDLER

AID/AFR/SWA:JBIERKE
AID/AFR/PRM:CCHRISTIAN {INFO}

AID/AA/AFR:FDONATELLI {INFO}
AID/DAA/AFR:JJOHNSON {INFO}

ROUTINE OUAGADOUGOU, NDJAMENA, NIAMEY, PRAIA, DAKAR, BAMAKO, BANJUL
NOUAKCHOTT, KIGALI
ROUTINE PARIS

AIDAC FOR ALL PRINCIPAL OFFICERS FROM DCHANDLER

DC
EMA
JB

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: KIGALI MISSION DIRECTORS CONFERENCE

PARIS FOR AFFLUR FELL

1. AA/AFR FRANK DONATELLI HAS CONCURRED IN REQUEST EMANATING FROM THE RECENT SMDC XIII TO FORMALLY MEET WITH SAHEL MISSION DIRECTORS 8 PM WEDNESDAY 1 FEBRUARY AT KIGALI.

2. IN ORDER TO REVIEW FINAL AGENDA FOR THAT MEETING, SUGGEST WE CONVENE SUNDAY EVENING THE 29TH AT 8 PM. WOULD APPRECIATE ALL SAHEL PARTICIPANTS CONFIRMING THEIR ABILITY TO ATTEND AS WELL AS KIGALI'S INDICATING THAT A MEETING ROOM COULD BE PLACED AT OUR DISPOSAL AT SUCH TIME.

3. WE HAVE ALREADY ADVISED DONATELLI THAT OUR MEETING WITH HIM WILL LIKELY FOCUS ON PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES, POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS IN PROGRAM CONTENT AS WELL AS THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE SAHEL MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM. RE LATTER, I EXPECT TO CARRY AT LEAST INITIAL DRAFT REPORT TO KIGALI. IN ANTICIPATION OF THE SMAT'S EVENTUAL RECOMMENDATIONS AS WELL AS OTHER ISSUES, I WOULD LIKE EACH DIRECTOR TO COME TO KIGALI PREPARED TO DISCUSS:

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A. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE SMDC, SDPT AND SWA SO AS TO MORE EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT OUR PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:

B. THE QUESTION OF PROGRAM MORTGAGES, OBLIGATION RATES AND QUANTITY OF NEW PROJECT STARTS.

C. REVIEWING THE SAHEL PROGRAM OBJECTIVES, I.E. ITS SINGULAR EMPHASIS ON AGRICULTURE ACTIVITIES (INSTITUTION-BUILDING) SUPPORTIVE OF FOOD SELF-RELIANCY.

D. THE POTENTIAL FOR MODIFYING REGIONAL AND BILATERAL PROGRAM STRATEGY TO INCLUDE SOME CAPITAL INTENSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE PROUECTS, RESOURCE TRANSFERS AND SECTOR ASSISTANCE.

E. THE ADVISABILITY OF USING MORE SDP FUNDS FOR NON PROJECT ASSISTANCE TIED TO REFORM MEASURES.

4. WELCOME ANY CABLED COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE ON THE ABOVE AND/OR SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL ITEMS WE COULD PLAN TO DISCUSS WITH DONATELLI. YY

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OCT 20, 1983

AID/AFR/SWA:JHOPE:VD
10/19/83:EXT: 632-0776
AID/AFR/SWA:EMAMUNDSON

AID/AFR/SWA:JBIERKE

Out: 1430 Thurs 20 Oct

PRIORITY BAMAKO, BANJUL, BISSAU, DAKAR, NDJAMENA, NIAMEY, NOUAKCHOTT, OUAGADOUGOU, PRAIA, ABIDJAN

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

EMA
JH
JB
JB

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF AID SAHEL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

REFERENCES: (A) DAKAR 19602 (B) PRAIA 2076 (C) NIAMEY 5838 (D) BANJUL 3606 (E) NOUAKCHOTT 4672 (F) OUAGADOUGOU 6020 (G) BAMAKO 6073

1. AFR/SWA APPRECIATES THOUGHTFUL RESPONSES BY MISSIONS AND THE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO THE ASSESSMENT WHICH THEY REFLECT. THE RESPONSES HAVE BEEN HELPFUL INPUT TO ASSESSMENT TEAM'S WORK IN CLARIFYING AND ELABORATING THE PROPOSED OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS FROM ITS WORK AND ITS MODUS OPERANDI. THIS MESSAGE IS TO CLARIFY INTENT OF ORIGINAL MESSAGE (STATE 280510), PARTS OF WHICH CONSTRUED DIFFERENTLY BY INDIVIDUAL MISSIONS, TO RESPOND TO MISSION COMMENTS, AND TO SHARE EVOLUTION OF TEAM'S THINKING AS IT UNDERWENT FURTHER TEAMBUILDING ACTIVITIES WITH THE BENEFIT OF OUTSIDE MANAGEMENT EXPERTS.

2. PURPOSE OF THE ASSESSMENT - TEAM'S ASSIGNMENT CONSTITUTES THE INITIATION OF A CONTINUING PROCESS FOR IMPROVING SAHEL PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT, LOOKING INITIALLY AT THE THREE-FIVE YEAR TIME FRAME AND SETTING

FOUNDATIONS FOR ON-GOING DIALOGUE WITHIN THE AFR/SWA AND SMDC FRAMEWORK. THEREFORE, AFR/SWA IS RELUCTANT TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE TEAM'S ACTIVITY AT THIS POINT, EVEN THOUGH IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE TEAM WILL HAVE TO ASSESS ITS PRIORITIES ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

3. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT VS. ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT --TEAM MEMBERSHIP CONSTRUCTED SO THAT TEAM CAN DEAL WITH BROADER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PROGRAMMING PROCEDURES AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES AND PROCEDURES. TEAM WANTS TO KNOW MISSION'S VIEWS OF THEIR CURRENT PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND TO HELP IN FINDING SOLUTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, TEAM WILL BE SOLICITING INFORMATION ON SUCCESSFUL POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES {USAID, HOST GOVERNMENT, OTHER DONORS} THAT MIGHT BE REPLICABLE ELSEWHERE IN THE SAHEL. TEAM WILL ALSO BE ENCOURAGING PEOPLE CONTACTED TO OFFER IDEAS FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGES IN THE WAY AID DOES ITS BUSINESS, EITHER SPECIFICALLY FOR THE SAHEL OR FOR GENERAL AID APPLICATION. FURTHERMORE, TEAM MUST FOCUS NOT ONLY ON CURRENT PROBLEMS THAT NEED RESOLUTION, BUT ALSO LOOK FORWARD FOR THE NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS AT LIKELY REQUIREMENTS FOR MANAGING AID PROGRAMS IN THE SAHEL AND LOOK FOR WAYS TO REDUCE THE MANAGEMENT BURDENS AND/OR IMPROVE CAPABILITIES TO MEET MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS. THE TEAM IS ALSO COMMISSIONED TO COME UP WITH IDEAS FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES IN PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT. THUS, TEAM CAN ASSURE NIAMEY AND BANJUL THAT TEAM DOES NOT PROPOSE TO REDO ROUSH WORK NIAMEY OR CORREL/BROWN WORK BANJUL. REVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THAT WORK COULD BE USEFUL TO PASS ON TO OTHERS, BUT MAIN FOCUS OF TEAM WOULD BE LOOKING AT YOUR NEEDS THREE TO FIVE YEARS FORWARD PLUS SOLICITING IDEAS FOR GENERAL APPLICABILITY.

4. DEALING WITH HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS--TEAM IS SENSITIVE TO MISSION CONCERNS ABOUT TEAM'S CONTACTS WITH HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS. MISSION INTERPRETATION APPEARS TO ANTICIPATE MUCH MORE ACTIVITY THAN TEAM HAD IN MIND. TEAM DOES NOT EXPECT TO MAKE A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, BUT IT CANNOT IGNORE THE SUBJECT IF IT IMPACTS SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE MISSION. FURTHERMORE, IMPROVING HOST COUNTRY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES MAY BE ONE OF THE BEST WAYS TO DEAL WITH USAID'S MANAGEMENT DIFFICULTIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG TERM. TEAM'S INTEREST IN POLICY DIALOGUE SHOULD BE SEEN IN SAME LIGHT AS HC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY. TEAM DOES NOT PROPOSE TO CARRY ON POLICY DIALOGUE, BUT DOES NEED TO LOOK AT

MECHANISMS FOR SUCH DIALOGUE, USAID CAPABILITIES TO CARRY OUT SUCH DIALOGUE, AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH HAVE LED TO POSITIVE RESULTS FROM THE DIALOGUE. SUCCESSFUL DIALOGUE LEADING TO POLICY CHANGES CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS IN REDUCING USAID'S PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT BURDEN. TEAM WOULD EXPECT TO OBTAIN MOST OF ITS INFORMATION RE HC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY AND POLICY DIALOGUE FROM USAID OFFICERS AND DOCUMENTATION AVAILABLE TO USAID, BUT SOME EXCHANGE WITH HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS SEEMS ESSENTIAL. TEAM WOULD EXPECT TO BE GUIDED BY MISSION RE NUMBER AND NATURE OF CONTACTS. AN INFORMAL SETTING MAY BE MOST CONDUCIVE TO THE BRAINSTORMING TYPE OF SESSION THAT TEAM ENVISIONS.

5. FOLLOWUP WITH MISSIONS--WE SUGGEST THAT DAKAR'S PROPOSAL FOR A FOLLOWUP WORKSHOP BE DISCUSSED AT SMDC XIII. ROUSH IS EXPECTED TO ATTEND SMDC XIII AND TO PROVIDE A SYNTHESIS OF TEAM'S FINDINGS TO DATE AND TEAM'S IDEAS FOR NEXT STEPS AS REFINED IN TEAM MEETING IN ABIDJAN.

6. FOR BANJUL--TEAM WILL PHONE FROM DAKAR RE SCHEDULE FOR VISIT.

7. FOR BAMAKO (SDPT)--APPRECIATE OFFER TO HAVE TEAM MEETING BAMAKO. WE WILL CONSIDER FEASIBILITY AND ADVISE. HOWEVER, ABIDJAN WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE OF RELATIVE CONVENIENCE OF AIRLINES SCHEDULES FROM OUAGADOUGOU/NIAMEY AND ONWARD TO U.S.

Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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GCAF-01 GCFL-01 PPDC-01 AFDA-01 ES-01 RELO-01 MAST-01
AFPM-01 /030 A1 S30

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 INR-10 EUR-00 AF-00 EB-08 SIG-03
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DRAFTED BY AID/AFR/SWA:JROUSH:VD
APPROVED BY AID/AAA/AFR:HJOHNSON
AID/AFR/SWA:JBIERKE
AID/AFR/PMR/CCHRISTIAN (DRAFT)
AID/AFR/PD:JCMCCABE (DRAFT)
AID/AFR/DP:ELSAIERS (DRAFT)
AF/W/EPS (INFO)
AID/AFR/SWA:JHOPE
AF/W/C (INFO)
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TO AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY PRAIA
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS STATE 280510

AIDAC PARIS/AID FOR FELL, BAMAKO FOR AID AND SWA/SDPT,

E O. 12356 N/A
TAGS:
SUBJ ASSESSMENT OF AID SAHEL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

DAKAR FOR USAID AND RBDO, ABIDJAN FOR REDSO/WA, BISSAU FOR J. ROUSH ONLY

REFERENCE: STATE 8414

1. SUMMARY: AS RECOMMENDED IN MARCH 1983 ASSESSMENT OF SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND DISCUSED IN SMDC XII IN OUAGADOUGOU IN MAY 1983, AFR/SWA HAS ARRANGED FOR SUBJECT ASSESSMENT. A TEAM HAS BEEN SELECTED, AND IT HAS REVIEWED THE PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) AND PROPOSED A METHODOLOGY AND SCHEDULE FOR CARRYING OUT THE ASSESSMENT. THIS MESSAGE IS TO SOLICIT USAID, EMBASSY, REDSO, RBDO, AND SDPRO COMMENTS ON THE TOR AND PROPOSED SCHEDULE SET FORTH HEREIN. THE TEAM HAS REVIEWED MISSIONS' RESPONSES TO REF CABLE. REPLIES ARE REQUESTED BY OCTOBER 12, SLUGGED: QUOTE ATTN: JOHN HOPE, AFR/SWA UNQUOTE. (HOPE IS CONTROL AND SUPPORT OFFICER FOR ASSESSMENT TEAM);

2. BACKGROUND: RECOMMENDATION NUMBER FIVE OF THE MARCH 1983 ASSESSMENT OF THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM STATES THAT THERE IS A NEED TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN AID'S EFFORTS IN FINANCIAL AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND WILL REQUIRE, INTER ALIA, QUOTE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AID SAHEL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS IN THE FIELD UNQUOTE AND QUOTE A SECOND GENERATION OF INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES

AT THE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS UNQUOTE. IN MAY 1983 THE SAHEL MISSION DIRECTORS (SMDC XII) DISCUSSED THIS RECOMMENDATION AND CONCURRED THEREIN, ALTHOUGH ONE DIRECTOR QUESTIONED WHETHER A TEAM COULD ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING MEANINGFUL IN TWO WEEKS IN COUNTRY AND ANOTHER DIRECTOR REQUESTED TO SEE THE TOR FOR THE ASSESSMENT. SWA HAS ARRANGED FOR A TEAM OF FIVE FORMER SENIOR AID OFFICERS TO UNDERTAKE THE ASSESSMENT AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE, FOR THE SECOND GENERATION OF INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES. THE TEAM HAS MET TO REVIEW THE PROPOSED TOR AND SUGGEST, FOR WASHINGTON AND FIELD CONSIDERATION AND COMMENT, A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY AND SCHEDULE FOR CARRYING OUT THE ASSESSMENT. THE TEAM HAS STATE 8414 OF 12 JANUARY 1983 RE: IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND HAS REVIEWED THE INDIVIDUAL MISSION RESPONSES TO IT.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)
- . PURPOSE: TO IMPROVE PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT OF THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (SDP APPROPRIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES).

THE TEAM DOES NOT SEE ITS OUTPUT AS SIMPLY A CATALOG OF MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES AND REQUIREMENTS AND ONE MORE LITANY OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS IN THE SAHEL. RATHER, IT WISHES TO GENERATE ACTION DURING AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ITS WORK THAT WILL RESULT IN REDUCING OR SIMPLFYING MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND/OR INCREASING OR IMPROVING MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES--FOR FIELD MISSIONS, HOST COUNTRY COUNTERPART AGENCIES, AND FOR AID/W OFFICES WHOSE WORK IMPACTS DIRECTLY ON THE FIELD MISSIONS CAPACITY TO MANAGE THEIR PROGRAMS.

- 2. METHODOLOGY:

---A. GENERAL APPROACH: THE TEAM DOES NOT WANT TO PRODUCE ONE MORE REPORT TO SIT ON VARIOUS SHELVES; RATHER IT WANTS TO SEE ACTIONS TAKEN THAT WILL REDUCE OR AMELIORATE THE CONSTRAINTS FACING SAHEL MISSIONS AND IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITY AND THAT OF THEIR HOST COUNTRY

COUNTERPART AGENCIES TO PLAN PROGRAMS, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT PROJECTS, AND UTILIZE RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY. THIS APPEARS FEASIBLE ONLY IF THE MISSIONS AND SELECTED AID/W OFFICES ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT FEASIBLE GIVEN REGULAR WORKLOADS AND CRISES THAT MAY ARISE. THUS, THE TEAM IS SEEKING COMMENTS ON THE TOR PRESENTED HEREIN, WILL BE SEEKING IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS IN ITS INTERVIEWS IN THE FIELD AND IN WASHINGTON, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WILL SYNTHESIZE AND PRESENT TO THE MISSIONS AND WASHINGTON AUDIENCES WHAT THE TEAM IS HEARING AND THINKING AND SEEK FEEDBACK. THE TEAM WILL TRY TO BUILD A CONSENSUS FOR IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS AND OBTAIN RECOGNITION FOR POSITIVE ACTIONS/PROCESSES ALREADY IN PLACE. AFTER SUBMITTING ITS REPORT, PART OF THE TEAM WILL PREPARE ACTION DOCUMENTS FOR INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS. IT WILL ALSO BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO THE FIELD TO HELP MISSIONS IMPLEMENT THEIR OWN MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PLANS--THIS MIGHT ENTAIL FUNDING BY THE MISSIONS.

---B. KEEPING THE TASK MANAGEABLE

THE TEAM RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS UNDERTAKING A VERY AMBITIOUS TASK, ONE THAT COULD GET OUT OF HAND AS VARIOUS AID/W OFFICES OR FIELD MISSIONS SUGGEST ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS/CONSTRAINTS/RELATIONSHIPS THAT SHOULD BE REVIEWED. TO PREVENT THIS, THE TEAM HAS TWO SUGGESTIONS: (1) TO ESTABLISH SOME CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A

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POSSIBLE ACTIVITY OR SUB-STUDY SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY IN THE ASSESSMENT; AND (2) RECOGNIZE THAT IN SOME CASES THE TEAM MAY BE ABLE ONLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER SOMETHING IS WORTHY OF MORE DETAILED STUDY AND IF SO TO PREPARE A SCOPE OF WORK FOR A SUBSEQUENT STUDY. MISSION/WASHINGTON SUGGESTIONS FOR OTHER MEANS OF HELPING THE TEAM MAINTAIN ITS SELF-DISCIPLINE WILL BE APPRECIATED AS WELL AS COMMENTS ON THE SUGGESTED CRITERIA BELOW FOR DETERMINING PRIORITIES.

--- C. ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES.

THE TEAM STARTS WITH A BASIC PREMISE: THE PURPOSE OF FIELD MISSIONS (COUNTRY OR REGIONAL) IS TO HELP HOST COUNTRIES USE AID RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO PROMOTE THEIR DEVELOPMENT. THIS SUGGESTS A REVIEW WITH MISSIONS OF WHAT ACTIONS THEY ARE TAKING OR COULD TAKE THAT WOULD PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT DIRECTLY OR INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY. MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES RELATED TO THESE ACTIONS AND POTENTIAL ACTIONS WOULD BE THE STARTING POINT FOR THE TEAM'S REVIEW. THE TEAM WOULD PROPOSE TO LOOK AT VARIOUS ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED (SEE D BELOW) FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HOW IMPORTANT THEY ARE AND HOW THEY RELATE TO PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THUS, POLICY DIALOGUE IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF BUT RELATED TO SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS OR PRIORITIES. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IS NOT JUST ENSURING CONTROLS OVER THE USE OF AID RESOURCES, BUT ENSURING THAT THOSE RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE ON A TIMELY BASIS AND PROVIDED IN A MANNER THAT PROMOTES EFFICIENCY OF PROJECT OPERATIONS.

---- (2) A SECOND MAJOR CONCERN OF THE TEAM IS MISSION REQUESTS FOR REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS,-MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS, AND MISSIONS HANDLING OF AUDIT REPORTS.

---- (3) IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE IS THE MISSION MAKING USE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS (CPAS) LOCATED IN AFRICA TO HELP IMPROVE OVERALL PROJECT MANAGEMENT, INCLUDING ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS, PROCEDURES AND CONTROLS? IF SO, HOW DO THEY EVALUATE THE RESULTS? IF POSITIVE HOW AND WHERE CAN THEIR USE BE EXPANDED? (MONITORING THE CPAS WORK BY MISSIONS IS ESSENTIAL.) THE HANDLING AND RESPONSE TO AUDIT REPORTS CAN IMPACT HEAVILY ON THE VIEWS IN AID/W AND THE CONGRESS ON A MISSION'S ABILITY TO MANAGE ITS PROGRAM AND THUS ON THE LEVELS OF FUNDING SOUGHT AND APPROVED FOR THE SAHEL. THEREFORE, A REVIEW OF MISSION PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS AS WELL AS AUDIT REPORTS WILL BE A PRIORITY.

-- (D) ISSUES SUGGESTED FOR REVIEW:

---- (1) DO THE AID BILATERAL MISSIONS, THE SAHEL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING REGIONAL ORGANIZATION (SDPRO), REDSO/WCA, THE RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE RBDO,, THE SAHEL MISSION DIRECTORS' COUNCIL (SMDC) AND AID/W BACKSTOPPING OFFICES, COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY, CONSTITUTE A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM APPROPRIATE TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES IMPLIED BY THE PRESENT CDP AND THAT WHICH IS LIKELY TO IN PLACE FIVE YEARS FROM NOW?

----- A. ARE THE CURRENT SWA ORGANIZATION/RELATIONSHIPS APPROPRIATE FOR SUPPORTING AND MONITORING FIELD PROGRAMS?

----- B. ARE USAIDS ORGANIZED, FUNDED, AND STAFFED APPROPRIATELY?

----- C. IS THE FIELD STRUCTURE APPROPRIATE--REGIONAL AND BILATERAL?

----- D. DO FIELD MISSIONS/OFFICES HAVE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY AND GUIDANCE TO BE EFFECTIVE?

-- 2. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN ALL ITS FACETS: IN AID/W, IN THE FIELD, STATE AND EMBASSY ROLES, USE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, USE OF CONTRACTORS, RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, ORIENTATION, SUPERVISION, MOTIVATION, ETC.

-- 3. CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION: SELECTION, AWARDS, PERFORMANCE, REPORTING, EVALUATION, HOST COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS, AID DIRECT VS. HOST COUNTRY CONTRACTS, ETC.

-- 4. HOST COUNTRY ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY--IN TERMS OF BUDGET, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, TRAINED PERSONNEL--AND AID REACTION THERETO.

-- 5. EXTENT AND RESULTS OF COLLABORATION WITH HOST COUNTRY IN PROGRAM/PROJECT DEFINITION AND PLANNING.

-- 6. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR PROJECTS, INCLUDING CONTRACTOR AND OTHER PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PROJECTS.

-- 7. NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES FOR POLICY DIALOGUE.

-- 8. DONOR COORDINATION, REGIONALLY AND BILATERALLY.

-- 9. PLANNING FOR REDUCTION OF DIRECT HIRE - PERSONNEL--USE OF CONTRACTORS, USE OF PVOS, USE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, GREATER RESPONSIBILITY BY HOST COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS ARRANGE FOR SELECTED EXPERTS TO MAKE PERIODIC TDY VISITS, ETC..

---- (D) BACKSTOPPING OF FIELD MISSIONS BY AID/W AND REDSO/WCA--WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON POLICY GUIDANCE, PROGRAM AND PROJECT APPROVALS, ALLOCATION OF FUNDS, ESTABLISHING PERSONNEL CEILINGS AND POSITIONS, RECRUITMENT, CONTRACTING, CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATIONS, PROCUREMENT ACTIONS, ETC.

---- (E) SUGGESTED TEAM APPROACH IN AID/W:

THE TEAM HAS MET WITH SWA AND THE OFFICE OF AA/AFR TO DISCUSS THE ROLE AND PURPOSE OF TEAM AND TO ENSURE AA/AFR SUPPORT FOR THE ASSESSMENT. WHILE AWAITING RESPONSE TO THIS MESSAGE, TWO TEAM MEMBERS WILL BE CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS IN AID/W WITH AN EMPHASIS ON OBTAINING AID AND STATE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SAHEL SITUATION, IDEAS AND

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE TEAM'S WORK IN THE FIELD, STATUS REPORTS OF FIELD REQUESTS NOW PENDING IN AID/W. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF FIELD AND WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THE TEAM'S TOR, THERE MAY BE SOME ADDITIONAL MEETINGS FOR PURPOSES OF CLARIFICATION AND POSSIBLY TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR CHANGES IN THE TOR THAT MAY SEEM NECESSARY. ONE TEAM MEMBER WILL REMAIN IN WASHINGTON THE LAST HALF OF OCTOBER FOR FURTHER INTENSIVE INTERVIEWING RELATED TO SWA ORGANIZATION/RELATIONSHIPS AND AID/W BACKSTOPPING. AFTER ITS FIELD WORK, THE TEAM WILL PREPARE A SYNTHESIS OF ITS FINDINGS, INCLUDING IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS THAT MAY APPEAR WORTHY OF BECOMING RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PRESENTATIONS WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON CONCURRENT WITH PRESENTATIONS IN THE FIELD. FOLLOWING THE FIELD PRESENTATIONS OF THE TEAM'S SYNTHESIS, THERE MAY NEED TO BE SOME ADDITIONAL MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON FOR CLARIFICATION OR FOR ATTEMPTING TO BUILD A CONSENSUS ON POTENTIAL ACTIONS. FINALLY, TWO OR THREE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM WOULD PLAN TO WORK WITH AID/W OFFICES IN THE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEAM'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

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----(F). SUGGESTED TEAM APPROACH IN THE FIELD

THE TEAM LEADER WILL MEET WITH REGIONAL OFFICES (CLUB DU SAHEL GROUP IN OECD, PARIS, RBDO, SDPRO, SAHEL INSTITUTE, CILSS, REDSO/WCA). OTHER TEAM MEMBERS WILL VISIT COUNTRY MISSIONS AS INDICATED IN TENTATIVE SCHEDULE BELOW. TEAM SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING GENERAL APPROACH AT MISSION: (A) INITIAL MEETING WITH DIRECTOR AND AMBASSADOR; (B) PRESENTATION OF TEAM AT A GENERAL STAFF MEETING; (C) TEAM INTERVIEWS OF SENIOR STAFF (EMBASSY, AID, OTHER COUNTRY TEAM MEMBERS, JAO); PROJECT OFFICERS AND THEIR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISORS, AND SELECTED CONTRACTOR AND HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL (E.G., PROJECT DIRECTORS, POSSIBLY MINISTRY OF PLAN AND BUDGET BUREAU PERSONNEL)--OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL WOULD BE INVITED TO CONTACT THE TEAM BUT INTERVIEWING WOULD BE OPTIONAL, EXCEPT THAT THE FIRST ROUND OF INTERVIEWS COULD CREATE A NEED TO CONTACT OTHERS TO VERIFY SITUATIONS OR CLARIFY ROLES OR PERSPECTIVES; (D) TEAM WOULD PRESENT TO A GENERAL STAFF MEETING A SYNTHESIS OF WHAT THE TEAM FOUND AND/OR HEARD AND INVITE REACTION THERETO; AND (E) TEAM WOULD HAVE EXIT INTERVIEWS WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND DIRECTOR (POSSIBLY WITH HIS SENIOR STAFF) TO DISCUSS ANY SUGGESTIONS THE TEAM MIGHT HAVE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION BY THE MISSION. THE TEAMS PLAN TO MEET IN AFRICA AFTER INTERVIEWS IN ALL BUT ONE MISSION TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS A NEED TO BACKTRACK TO A MISSION OR SENDA REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, AFTER THE TEAM RECONVENES IN WASHINGTON AND PREPARES ITS OVERALL SYNTHESIS, TWO OR THREE TEAM MEMBERS WILL RETURN TO AFRICA FOR BRIEF MEETINGS IN THE MISSIONS AND REGIONAL OFFICES TO DISCUSS FINDINGS, SEEK CLARIFICATIONS, AND TRY TO BUILD CONSENSUS AROUND THE TEAM'S PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE TEAM'S REPORT WOULD BE SENT TO THE FIELD FOR COMMENT, HOPEFULLY WITH A REQUEST FOR CONCURRENCE IN A NUMBER OF ACTIONS.

----(G). TEAM COMPOSITION:

THE TEAM IS COMPRISED OF THOMAS C. IRVIN (TEAM LEADER), WALTER FURST, PARKE MASSEY, JAMES ROUSH, AND SAMUEL THORNBURG. ALL FIVE ARE FORMER SENIOR AID OFFICERS WITH EXTENSIVE FIELD EXPERIENCE, SOME OF IT IN AFRICA. ALL ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF A NUMBER OF SAHEL COUNTRY AND/OR REGIONAL PROGRAMS, AND EACH HAS AN INTIMATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MANAGEMENT CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE SAHEL GAINED THROUGH BACKSTOPPING OF SAHEL PROGRAMS OR CONSULTING IN THE REGION. ALL HAVE FRENCH EXCEPT THORNBURG.

IRVIN: SERVED WITH AID FROM 1967 TO 1979, HAS HELD SENIOR POSITIONS IN AID SAIGON, REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFICE IN BANGKOK, AND BEIRUT. SINCE 1979 HAS WORKED AS PRIVATE CONSULTANT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THE SAHEL ON AID-CILSS ACTIVITIES.

FURST: SERVED 30 YEARS WITH AID AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES MAINLY IN EUROPE, ASIA AND WASHINGTON IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT POSITIONS. SERVED AS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAM WITH USAID/NIGERIA. LAST AID ASSIGNMENT AS SENIOR EVALUATION OFFICER IN AID/W INVOLVED SEVERAL BRIEF SAHEL ASSIGNMENTS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION AND DESIGN. SINCE RETIREMENT, FURST SERVED ON AN EVALUATION TEAM IN MALI.

MASSEY: ORIGINALLY WITH STATE, OPENED FIRST CONSULATE IN ABIDJAN IN 1957. WITH AID FROM 1963 TO 1979, HOLDING POSITIONS AS FINANCIAL ANALYST, ECONOMIST, CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND AID REPRESENTATIVE, MOSTLY IN LATIN AMERICA AND AID/W. HAS HAD TWO PREVIOUS CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS IN THE SAHEL, WHICH ENTAILED VISITS TO SENEGAL, MAURITANIA, MALI, AND UPPER VOLTA.

ROUSH: SERVED 25 YEARS WITH AID AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES, INCLUDING OVER SIX YEARS IN AFRICA (OPENED AID MISSION IN CAMEROON). HAS ALSO SERVED IN SENIOR POSITIONS IN ASIA (VIETNAM), LATIN AMERICA (DEPUTY IN ROCAP AND DIRECTOR IN CHILE) AND AID/W (LAC, PPC AND SER--PBAR EFFORT). SINCE RETIREMENT IN 1979, HAS DONE CONSULTING (EVALUATIONS AND MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS) IN MALI, NIGER, AND SENEGAL IN THE SAHEL PLUS EVALUATIONS OF AFR/RA REGIONAL PROJECTS AND THE EVALUATION SYSTEM OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. HAS SERVED AS TRAINER IN A PROJECT DOCUMENTATION WORKSHOP, A WORKSHOP ON THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ON FOOD CONSUMPTION, AND A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WORKSHOP IN CAMEROON FOR USAID CONTRACT EXPERTS AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT.

THORNBURG: SERVED WITH AID FROM 1956 TO 1979 IN BOLIVIA, NIGERIA, VIETNAM, AND AID/W. AS DIRECTOR OF SER/MO IN AID/W, THORNBURG PARTICIPATED IN SMDC MEETINGS AND WAS CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF LOGISTICS AND JAO ORGANIZATION THROUGHOUT THE SAHEL. SINCE RETIREMENT, HE HAS WORKED FOR AFR/DR, THE AID AFFAIRS OFFICE IN BURUNDI, CONDUCTED A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN MAURITANIA, GAMBIA, NIGER AND LIBERIA, AND CONTINUED TO BE INVOLVED IN SAHEL ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT ISSUES. HE HAS ALSO HAD EIGHT ASSIGNMENTS WITH THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN BUILDINGS IN STATE.

----(H); TENTATIVE TEAM SCHEDULE:

------ SEPTEMBER 19-23--TEAM MET TO REVIEW SCOPE OF WORK, PREPARE A METHODOLOGY AND SCHEDULE FOR THE ASSESSMENT, AND UNDERTAKE TEAM-BUILDING.

------ SEPTEMBER 26-OCTOBER 17--TEAM MEMBERS WILL BE REVIEWING MATERIALS AND PREPARING DETAILED PLANS FOR FIELD VISITS. THORNBURG AND FURST WILL DO INTERVIEWING IN WASHINGTON WITH FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS BY ROUSH.

----- OCTOBER 17-18--TEAM CONVENES IN WASHINGTON TO REVIEW COMMENTS ON TOR, DISCUSS THEM AS NECESSARY WITH AFR, FINALIZE PLANS FOR FIELD VISITS, AND CABLE MORE DEFINITE ITINERARIES AND FLIGHT INFORMATION TO THE FIELD. NOTE: CURRENT SCHEDULE HAS NOT BEEN VETTED WITH AIRLINE SCHEDULES.

----- OCTOBER 19-DECEMBER 3-- FIELD VISITS AS FOLLOWS:

------ (1) IRVIN ARRIVES PARIS OCTOBER 19 FOR MEETINGS OECD AND THEN PROCEEDS TO DAKAR OCTOBER 21 TO JOIN OTHER TEAM MEMBERS ARRIVING DIRECTLY FROM U.S. IRVIN WILL CONCENTRATE ON RBDO, GO TO BAMAKO OCTOBER 27 TO MEET WITH SDPRO AND SAHEL INSTITUTE, GO TO OUAGADOUGOU NOVEMBER 3 TO MEET WITH CILSS, GO TO ABIDJAN NOVEMBER 12 TO MEET WITH REDSO/WCA AND TO MEET WITH REST OF TEAM NOVEMBER 19-20. WILL RETURN U.S. VIA PARIS AND LONDON. (2) FURST, MASSEY AND THORNBURG WILL ARRIVE DAKAR OCTOBER 21 AND INITIATE MEETINGS THERE. THEY WILL BREAK FROM SENEGAL INTERVIEWS APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER 27 TO NOVEMBER 2 TO VISIT MAURITANIA (FURST), CAPE VERDE (MASSEY) AND GAMBIA (THORNBURG). THEY AND ROUSH WILL COMPLETE DAKAR ASSIGNMENT NOVEMBER 7. (3) ROUSH WILL BE WORKING IN

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WASHINGTON UNTIL OCTOBER 31, ARRIVING IN DAKAR NOVEMBER 1 TO JOIN OTHER TEAM MEMBERS. (4) MASSEY AND ROUSH WILL BE IN NIAMEY APPROXIMATELY NOVEMBER 8 TO 18; FURST AND THORNBURG THE SAME DATES IN OUAGADOUGOU. (5) BOTH TEAMS WILL GO TO ABIDJAN NOVEMBER 18 TO JOIN IRVIN AND TO HOLD TEAM REVIEW AND INTERCHANGE SESSIONS NOVEMBER 19-20. (6) FURST AND ROUSH GO TO BAMAKO NOVEMBER 21 AND OTHERS RETURN U.S. FURST WILL LEAVE BAMAKO ABOUT NOVEMBER 26 AND ROUSH WILL REMAIN THROUGH SMDC IF HELD AS PROPOSED (NOVEMBER 30-DECEMBER 21;

------ DECEMBER 5 TO 16--TEAM RECONVENES WASHINGTON. ROUSH AND FURST MAY BE DAY OR TWO LATE, TO PREPARE SYNTHESIS AND ARRANGE FOR ITS PRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON AND THE FIELD IN EARLY JANUARY.

------ JANUARY 3 TO 24--FINALIZE PRESENTATION DOCUMENTATION AND MAKE PRESENTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THE FIELD.

------ JANUARY 25 TO FEBRUARY 10--PREPARE AND PRESENT FINAL REPORT.

------ FEBRUARY 13 TO 24--PREPARE INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTATION.

FOR CHAD: THE TEAM IS NOT SCHEDULING A VISIT TO CHAD ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CHAD SITUATION IS UNIQUE AND NEEDS TO BE DEALT WITH ON A MORE URGENT BASIS THAN WOULD BE FEASIBLE IF IT WERE PART OF THE ASSESSMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE TEAM WELCOMES EMBASSY/AID COMMENTS ON THE FOREGOING ASSUMPTION, ON THE TEAM'S TOR, AND THE SUBSEQUENT TEAM FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. POSSIBLY TEAM MEMBER ATTENDING SMDC XIII COULD INTERVIEW CHAD REPRESENTATIVE THERE. TEAM WOULD WELCOME A SUBMISSION FROM EMBASSY/AID CHAD OFFERING COMMENTS, IDEAS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REDUCING MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS, ELIMINATING OR AMELIORATING MANAGEMENT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR INCREASING MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES IN CHAD OR IN

THE SAHEL GENERALLY. APPRECIATE COMMENTS ON THE TEAM'S PROPOSED APPROACH. EMBASSY/AID MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER HAVING A SHORT VISIT FROM A TEAM MEMBER FOR PRESENTATION OF INITIAL SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS EARLY JANUARY,.

--3. ASSUMPTIONS GIVEN THE TEAM:

--- A. OVERALL AID PROGRAM PRIORITIES WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY UNCHANGED.

--- B. NEITHER THE AGENCY NOR THE AFRICA BUREAU ANTICIPATE GREATER/LESSER PRIORITY EMPHASIS ON THE SDP.

---C. TOTAL SDP FUNDING LEVELS AS A SEPARATE APPROPRIATION WILL CONTINUE AT THE LEVELS REFLECTED IN CURRENT AAPL'S (APPROXIMATELY DOLLARS 100 MILLION); COMBINED P.L. 480 AND ESF WILL CONTINUE AT THE DOLLARS 50 MILLION LEVEL.

--- D. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR ADDITIONAL INCREASES IN FUNDING BASED ON NEW INITIATIVES (AFRICA STRATEGIC PLAN) AND THE NEED TO FUND SPECIAL EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE POLICY CHANGES WHEN REQUIRED TO OVERCOME CRITICAL CONSTRAINTS.

--- E. TOTAL DIRECT HIRE PERSONNEL (U.S. AND FOREIGN NATIONAL) AVAILABLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDP WILL REMAIN THE SAME OR PROBABLY DECLINE. ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR DECLINES OF 0 PERCENT, 10 PERCENT AND 20 PERCENT OVER

A 3 TO 5 YEAR PERIOD STARTING FROM FY 1984 END OF YEAR LEVELS,

--- F. OVERALL PROJECT PLANNING/IMPLEMENTATION CAPABILITY OF HOST COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE A CONSTRAINT DURING THE NEXT 3 TO 5 YEARS.

4. ACTION REQUESTED:

-1. COMMENTS ON THIS MESSAGE BY OCTOBER 12, SLUGGED: QUOTE ATTN: JOHN HOPE, AFR/SWA UNQUOTE.

- 2. ENSURE THAT ALL APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND OFFER COMMENTS.

- 3 ARRANGE FOR AN OFFICE WITH TELEPHONE FOR THE TEAM AND FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO HELP ARRANGE AND MANAGE THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE. TEAM MEMBERS WILL HAVE FUNDS TO PAY FOR SUCH SERVICES IF IT IS NECESSARY AND TO RENT SPACE AND HIRE SOMEONE SPECIFICALLY FOR THE JOB--TEAM WOULD LOOK TO AID OR JAO TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE RATE OF PAY.

- 4. REQUEST ALL APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL TO DETERMINE, PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM, THEIR MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES (ALMOST EVERYONE HAS TO MANAGE THEIR TIME AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PAPER FLOW), EVALUATE HOW WELL THEY ARE DOING AND CONSIDER WHAT COULD HELP THEM DO A BETTER JOB.

- 5. INVITE ALL APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL TO CONSIDER THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AID PROGRAM IN THEIR COUNTRY, THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF VARIOUS OFFICES IN THE MISSION, THE BUDGETING AND SCHEDULING OF RESOURCES, AND THE PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS WITHIN THE MISSION USED TO OBTAIN CONSENSUS ON THE FOREGOING, WITH A VIEW TO SUGGESTING WHICH SEEM TO BE APPROPRIATE OR ADEQUATE, WHICH COULD BE EXAMPLES TO OFFER TO OTHER MISSIONS, WHICH NEED IMPROVEMENT, HOW MIGHT SUCH IMPROVEMENT BE CARRIED OUT. HOW CAN THE MISSION AND THE AGENCY IN GENERAL DO A BETTER JOB OF LEARING FROM ITS EXPERIENCE AND INTEGRATING LESSONS LEARNED INTO POLICY AND PROCEDURES? LIST ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED IN A TIMELY MANNER. LIST ACTIVITIES WHICH NORMALLY ARE ACCOMPLISHED AFTER ASSIGNED DUE DATES. WHAT DOES MISSION FEEL IT DOES EFFICIENTLY AND WHAT IS DONE IS INEFFICIENTLY?

- 6. ASSEMBLE DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO MISSION MANAGEMENT--MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PLAN, MISSION ORDERS, MISSION OPERATIONS MANUAL, ETC.

- 7. PROVIDE A LISTING OF AID PROJECTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH THE MISSION IS RESPONSIBLE. FOR EACH PROJECT/ACTIVITY, LIST THE COMPONENTS (E.G., AN INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CAN HAVE SIX OR MORE COMPONENTS,, AND PROVIDE FOR EACH COMPONENT A LISTING OF THE MAJOR IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS EXECUTED DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS AND PLANNED UNTIL TERMINATION OR FIVE YEARS OUT, WHICHEVER IS SHORTER --INCLUDING CONTRACTING, PROCUREMENT, RECRUITING OFPERSONNEL, ETC. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A-FIRST CUT AT GETTING A HANDLE ON THE MAGNITUDE AND COMPLEXITY OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS TO BE MANAGED. DAM

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