


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# New Patrons for Old: Changing Patron-Client Relationships in the Bolivian Yungas

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# New Patrons For Old: Changing Patron-Client Relationships in the Bolivian Yungas<sup>1</sup>

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The Aymara campesinos of the yungas region of Bolivia are proud beneficiaries of the first social revolution in twentieth century South America. Although they took no part in the fighting<sup>2</sup> that brought the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) to power in 1952, they are still militant in support of that party that they say "gave [them] the conquests of the revolution, namely: agrarian reform, universal suffrage, nationalization of the mines, and educational reform."<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the most telling indication of the quality of change since the overthrow of the traditional quasi-feudal system is the depth of feeling with which campesinos assert that "now we are becoming human beings!"<sup>4</sup>

It is difficult for those affected—either as beneficiaries or "victims"—to do other than overestimate the pervasiveness of change in such a revolutionary setting. Nevertheless, as a social scientist who never suffered the pain and humiliation of serfdom, nor the anguish and discomfort of losing land and laborers, I discern marked continuity in terms of functions, in spite of appreciable formal change, when analyzing what has become of patronage, clientage, and power structures in the yungas region of Bolivia.

## THE SETTING

Among the many and immensely varied ecological niches in Bolivia, the yungas are so distinctive that their Aymara name has come into universal geographic usage. They are areas of rugged montane jungle in the eastern range of the Andes—semitropical in climate, and as spectacular as they are tortuous, with mountain peaks 10,000 feet high, towering over snow-fed rivers that rush through narrow valleys, sometimes as little as 2,000 feet above sea level. The steep slopes are covered (sometimes as much as 80 per cent) with dense vegetation where they have not been cleared for the cultivation of coffee or, more spectacularly, coca ranged in narrow terraces that follow the contours of the hills.

Scattered through the yungas are small-scale farmers, most of them freeholders since the large haciendas that used to predominate were divided among former serfs as a result of the agrarian reform enacted in 1953. The

farmers are mostly Aymara-speaking campesinos,<sup>5</sup> although there are a few settlements where Negroes predominate;<sup>6</sup> my discussion will focus on the Aymara in the Province of Nor Yungas.<sup>7</sup> Their residence patterns are diverse: perhaps a third of them live in scattered homesteads, with roughly equal numbers living in towns (old commercial and administrative centers, dominated by whites and mestizos,<sup>8</sup> with total populations under 2,500), and in hamlets (with populations under 150, including few non-campesinos).

There has been no archeological work in the area, but apparently the horticultural Lecos were driven northward when groups of Aymara came from the altiplano as *mitimaes* (forcibly relocated communities) during the latter years of the Inca Empire. The cultivation of coca has been important ever since, providing a labor-intensive crop easily transported to the markets in the densely populated altiplano (about 60 miles west, across the mountains). Only one community in the region claims to have been chartered by the Crown as a *comunidad indigena* (an "indigenous community," with special collective rights); most of the rest of the area was divided into haciendas where the traditional quasi-feudal system of *colonato* prevailed until the MNR revolution.

Haciendas in the yungas were not as large as in many less mountainous areas,<sup>9</sup> and the beneficent climate was such that many of the hacendados made their homes there—in contrast with the predominant pattern of absentee landlords in other areas of *colonato*.

A few scattered gold mines in the area were worked briefly during the colonial period, but only one is still active. Lumbering is carried on in a few isolated camps, which, like the mine, employ mostly mestizos from other areas. Hunting and fishing play no role in the local economy, and animal husbandry consists of a few pigs and chickens that scavenge unattended<sup>10</sup> and mules that are used for transport from throughout the region to the single road that provides a perilous connection with the rest of the country.

In contrast with the altiplano and temperate valleys regions, there were no peasant uprisings in the yungas throughout the colonial and republican periods. The sporadic sieges, massacres, and other violent activities that served as periodic outbursts against intercaste oppression elsewhere were unknown. Many of the most vocal and active *patriotas* (anti-Royalists) in the War of Independence were from the yungas, and the area served as a refuge for beleaguered guerrillas during the see-saw fighting that raged on the altiplano for fourteen years before the Republic of Bolivia was established in 1825.

Throughout history, from the Inca period to the present, the yungas contributed little to the rest of the country except coca—and the ever-increasing taxes derived from it—and got little in return.<sup>11</sup> A railroad intended to link La Paz, the *de facto* capital of the country and also the major commercial center, with the cattle-rich Department of Beni in the eastern lowlands was to have passed through the yungas, but the project was abandoned decades ago before work had progressed that far.

One of the few material achievements of the Chaco War in the 1930s was construction, by Paraguayan prisoners of war, of a road connecting the yungas with La Paz.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, the people of the yungas are like Bolivians everywhere in decrying that wasteful war that left both countries bankrupt in political as well as economic terms. However much they may deplore it, Bolivians also recognize the Chaco War as a critical event in their history that somehow laid the groundwork for the Revolution of 1952; although few have thought it through in such detail, most would probably agree with the perceptive analyses of Patch (1960) and Klein (1968) on this subject.<sup>13</sup>

One cannot understand any revolution except in historical context. Peasant revolts had flared sporadically throughout the Andes all during the colonial period, and they continued in the republican period. They were characteristically violent, but they were usually in reaction to specific local grievances, and were quickly and ruthlessly suppressed. There was little communication and less community of interest among the peasants, so that a successful revolution on the part of the Indians was out of the question.

There were others who felt oppressed in a very different manner from the Indian peasants. The traditional coalition of landed gentry and the military shared a monopoly of political power, in an oligarchic context where few others had any access to wealth.<sup>14</sup> With commercial and administrative expansion came a growing middle class with rising aspirations. They became especially restive when the Chaco War clearly demonstrated that the traditional leadership was weak and that the old values did not fit with modern problems. The 1940s saw Bolivia opened as never before to influences from without; the Allies wanted her rubber and tin, and the Axis spoke of the altiplano as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier." Foreigners also brought ideas, and the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers' Party (*Partido Obrero Revolucionario*) was founded at that time, as were the Marxist Party of the Revolutionary Left (*Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*) and the eclectic Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*). This last party, the MNR, emerged as a loose coalition of individuals with a wide range of outlooks toward the left of the political spectrum. Their first practical experience came in the mid-1940s when Victor Paz Estenssoro and other MNR activists served in the cabinet of Maj. Gualberto Villarroel and proposed a variety of progressive social legislation. Trade unions were readily established among the miners, and the Interamerican Indigenist Institute was invited to hold its congress in Bolivia. In connection with the latter meeting, the first National Indian Congress was called, at which four decrees were issued that would have undermined *colonato* if they had not been generally ignored throughout nearly all of the country.<sup>15</sup>

When Villarroel's government fell to revolution a year later, Victor Paz went into exile in Argentina. Virtually all Bolivians were surprised when—still in exile—he gained a plurality in the presidential election of 1951, but the decision was referred to Congress because he did not have an actual majority of the votes. A military junta intervened, but was deposed when

the MNR finally came to power in a bloody revolution in the capital city, April 9-11, 1952.

The accession to power of this party did not represent, as had many of Bolivia's previous so-called "revolutions," a mere changing of the palace guard and transfer of political incumbency from one upper-class clique to another. The revolution of 1952 was the basis of a real social revolution. It significantly altered the status of the former elite, and resulted in immediate and far-reaching modifications of political life and government policy that were subsequently codified in constitutional changes. The formal organization of government continued much the same as before, although the locus of effective power was greatly altered. The oligarchy (locally called *rosca*) were generally exiled, impoverished, or otherwise rendered ineffectual. The army was emasculated, its career officers forced into retirement, and its weapons distributed to miners and peasants, who formed popular militias. Clearly the bases of the old quasi-feudal order were broken, and popular support for the revolutionary regime was assured when Paz enacted universal suffrage, enfranchising the Indian masses who had previously had no voice or vote.

The new government strove quickly and remarkably effectively to overcome the serious problem of how to incorporate the numerically predominant but hitherto passive Indians actively into a more open social system. A Ministry of Campesino Affairs (*Asuntos Campesinos*) was established with the task of defending the campesinos and planning fundamental reforms in their economic, social, and political positions which had been promised by the MNR. The very name of the new ministry reflects the zealous reformism of MNR officials, who expunged the word *indio* (literally "Indian" but with deprecatory connotations) from Bolivian Spanish, and substituted "campesino" (peasant), which is far less emotionally charged.

### *Campesinos*

Many Bolivians viewed Indians as subhuman beings, and there was little meaningful communication between the tiny but totally dominant upper class and the enormous but silent mass of peasantry. Even an ardent *indigenista* (Diez de Medina 1956: 253), who rhapsodized about his country's Inca heritage, and who served as Minister of Education to a populace of whom fewer than half spoke Spanish, confessed that he could not deal with an Indian as an individual:

The Indian is a sphinx. He inhabits a hermetic world, inaccessible to the white and the mestizo. We don't understand his forms of life, nor his mental mechanism. . . . We speak of the Indian as a mass factor in the nation; in truth we are ignorant of his individual psyche and his collective drama. The Indian lives. The Indian acts and produces. The Indian does not allow himself to be understood, he doesn't desire communication. Retiring, silent, immutable, he inhabits a closed world. The Indian is an enigma.

In such an ambience, it is little wonder that hacendados made no pretense of understanding their colonos.

Unfortunately, no studies were made in the yungas by social scientists during the pre-revolutionary period,<sup>16</sup> and the fragmentary documentary evidence is a scanty supplement to the oral tradition for purposes of historical reconstruction.

A number of distinguishing features set the Aymara peasantry of the yungas apart from the local gentry and the dominant national culture of Bolivia. In some cases the distinctions were clear and objective; in others, they were situationally relative, so that an outsider might not have agreed with locally accepted criteria. Complete lack of familiarity with Spanish was an insurmountable barrier to many campesinos, and almost none of those who achieved some fluency was able to overcome the distinctive Aymara accent. The generalized *indio* physique still exists as an important stereotype, despite the fact that some adult Indians have been able to pass as mestizos for decades. Until the 1940s the campesinos of this area also had a distinctive mode of dress: a heavy broad-brimmed hat with a tiny round crown, short tight trousers of homespun wool, a tight waistcoat of the same material, bare feet, and a bowl-like haircut.

Furthermore, Indians normally lived in small thatched huts of adobe or wattle-and-daub, scattered through the countryside. They were generally thought to be "ignorant," and this was attributed as much to "Indian blood" as to the absence of schools. Nominally Catholic, they were still strongly influenced by their indigenous religion. The fiesta complex provided an occasional frenetic contrast with workaday drudgery, but it was not integrated with a socio-religious hierarchy as was the case among the highland Aymara. Class differences were constantly reinforced by the quasi-feudal policy; a peasant of any age could be called *yocalla* ("boy" in a demeaning, condescending sense) and sent on an errand by anyone of the land-holding group, and the latter in turn were addressed by peasants, with hat in hand, as *tata* ("father").

Kin ties among campesinos were important, featuring patrilineal descent, monogamy, systematic respect for elders, and a preference for patrilocal residence. Because virtually all surnames were the names of animals and natural objects, it is tempting to speculate about them as possible survivals of a pre-Columbian system of totemic patrilineages. There is, however, no indication that the *ayllu*, so important on the altiplano, was a meaningful social unit in this region in the twentieth century.

A division of labor by sex was marked, with women's only agricultural contribution being collaboration in the coca and coffee harvests. Virtually all Aymara were farmers; a few skilled *yatiri* (approximately, "medicine men") served as diviners and curers, combining herbal and magical techniques; others learned rudimentary masonry, carpentry, or tinsmithing, but few other occupational opportunities were open to them.

In short, the Aymara-speaking campesinos participated in a distinctive local sociocultural system which provided no direct access to regional or national institutions of education, government, or commerce. Most of the contacts of Indians prior to the revolution were with others on the hacienda; their rare dealings with the world beyond were almost invariably

mediated by the hacendado as both broker and patron.<sup>17</sup> In retrospect, this combined brokerage and patronage role is justified by the gentry as a benevolent paternalism and is roundly condemned by the campesinos as having been a systematic limitation of their horizons.

### *Hacendados*

Until relatively recently, both local and national governments were content to leave management of the campesinos almost entirely in the hands of the hacendados (owners of haciendas). In the yungas (in contrast with the altiplano) most hacendados actually lived on their properties, and many took an active part in dealing with their colonos—settling disputes, administering first aid, sanctioning marriages and divorces, etc. The relative autonomy of the hacienda could be attributed in part to problems of transportation and communication, but perhaps more to the point were indifference of the officials toward the Indians on the one hand, and respect for the traditional autarchy of hacendados on the other.

The hacienda comprised a community in most senses, and the Indians had little recourse to domains beyond. For certain limited purposes, they dealt with institutions elsewhere in the province, but such dealings were always mediated by the hacendado. The power of the hacendado was virtually absolute on his own property, and the hacendados formed a bloc whose wealth and political connections allowed them to effectively manipulate other levels.<sup>18</sup>

Among the services that hacendados exacted from colonos were not only tenant-farming, but also *faena* and *pongueaje*, rather more feudal in nature. *Faena* refers to group work projects on hacienda property—maintaining roads and trails, repairing walls, caring for grounds, and so forth. *Pongueaje* was the periodic in-house service rendered, by turns, by all colonos—women serving as cook-maids, and men as busboys, a week at a time in the house of the hacendado. There were also various obligatory but unpaid periodic tasks such as providing eggs, collecting firewood, driving the mules to the altiplano, drying or taking coca.

Proud of their "white" heritage,<sup>19</sup> hacendados regarded their dominant position as not only "right" but even "natural," in view of the supposed inherent inferiority of Indians. Few were sadistically abusive, but most enjoyed a degree of leisure and comfort that cost dearly in terms of labor on the part of colonos. Since Indians were considered "like children," many hacendados provided first-aid for their colonos, rudimentary schooling for a few chosen individuals, and even spoke on their behalf on the rare occasions when a colono had to deal with someone beyond the hacienda community. For example, if more sophisticated medical aid were needed, the hacendado would take his colono to the government clinic or to a pharmacist in the provincial capital; or if the police charged a colono, the hacendado would intermeditate. In each such instance, the hacendado served as patron and broker for his colono, who in turn was his client. Clientage was generalized, whereas patronage was selective; the hacendado could choose the realms in which he wished to serve as patron, whereas the

colono had virtually no way of seeking other patrons, even for limited purposes.

Even when the social reformers of the MNR acceded to power in 1952, no one would have been so bold as to predict the degree to which the sociocultural system of the campesinos (ex-colonos) was to be opened, and the pervasiveness of change in ways of thinking and acting that have in fact occurred. It is a truism that most of this change was also felt by the ex-hacendados as well (although the effects of such changes were obviously restricting rather than facilitating for that formerly dominant group).

#### POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The cardinal purpose of this paper is to illustrate how some major realignments of patronage-clientage networks have occurred in the aftermath of the MNR revolution as old roles have been redefined and new ones created.

Probably the most important changes in social organization are three that took place at the level of the individual hacienda-community. First, the colonos (tenant farmers in an almost feudal serfdom) became ex-colonos (independent freeholders), at the same time that they traded the demeaning label *indio* for the more egalitarian "campesino." Second, the hacendados (quasi-feudal landlords) were generally forced off the land and lost all claim to the services of campesinos; most ex-hacendados moved to the provincial capital and established small businesses there. Third, virtually all ex-colonos joined a syndicate (*sindicato*, sometimes translated as "peasant league"), a corporate entity representing those who had been colonos (or *arrenderos*<sup>20</sup>) on a single hacienda.

The change in status of former colonos is the basis for the enormous psychological impact of the revolution. Campesinos cherish what they call their "liberation from slavery." They look back on their obligations to the hacendado as having been extremely burdensome, and their status as having been degrading, even in instances where hacendados were not physically abusive or sexually exploitative. To the former hacendados, by contrast, the change of status has been a harsh deprivation which they strongly resent. They consider that their property was "stolen" and that the Indians, supported by the opportunistic MNR, have unjustly and systematically persecuted them for no other reason than covetousness, rationalized by a few aspiring politicians with the slogan of "class warfare."

The syndicates have been a potent force in the political socialization of the campesinos. On most ex-haciendas the syndicate provides both a sense of participatory community and a channel for brokerage with respect to nearly all of an individual ex-colono's contacts with the world beyond.

#### *From Colono to Ex-Colono*

The cardinal significance of the revolution from the point of view of the former colono is that he is no longer an "Indian" and a serf but rather a "campesino" and a freeholder. Emancipation from labor obligations to the hacendado means more in terms of human dignity than does even the

acquisition of title to land, the area of which is often actually smaller than that to which they previously earned usufruct privileges by their labor.

Freedom, however, always entails some responsibility. In the case of the ex-colonos, they were confronted with the need to budget time and resources, to make decisions, and to market produce, all of which had been done by the hacendado and/or mayordomo before the revolution. Even the most authoritarian hacendado had rendered many crucial services as patron to his colono clients, and the ex-colono was not well prepared to do many of the things that had been done for him. Ill-equipped by language, training, and experience to act independently in the world beyond the ex-hacienda, the ex-colonos have not readily abandoned the pattern of personalistic clientage, but have sought new patrons and have established new relationships with old ones.

#### *From Hacendado to Ex-Hacendado*

Hardest hit by the revolution were the hacendados, who lost their properties and their privileged social standing and economic base. The properties they lost were estates which had often been in the family for generations. Sometimes houses and their contents were abandoned. A few wealthy hacendados left Bolivia altogether and will probably never return. Some who had skills or capital went to La Paz and found jobs in business or government, or established commercial enterprises on their own. The majority were neither wealthy (in terms of liquid assets) nor cosmopolitan, had never done anything but manage a farm, and did not care to venture beyond the provincial capital. One of those known to me became a carpenter (and was sheriff during my stay). Another ran a pharmacy, where he diagnosed and treated more patients than did the physician in the government clinic. Another ran a bar, and still another was named a mayor of the town but earned more from the freight hauled by a truck he owned. A number of small general stores were run by ex-hacendados, as were a bakery and a pool hall. Many have been able to capitalize on their experience in selling produce and now serve as middlemen in marketing the coca, coffee, and citrus fruit raised by ex-colonos on land that used to be theirs. It is noteworthy that many ex-hacendados still serve as patrons to their former colonos with respect to selected realms of activity, although their general status within the social system has significantly altered.

#### *The Syndicate: A New Institution*

To effect anything approaching pervasive reform in a quasi-feudal system, it is necessary to create new social institutions. After the revolution, the campesinos on a particular ex-hacienda were often linked to each other only as distant neighbors and former co-workers. The ex-hacendado and former mayordomo who had been the co-ordinators, decision-makers, and brokers usually left the community, so that leadership and organization were minimal until the syndicates emerged as an effective institution based on a new kind of authority and oriented toward a new set of goals.

The syndicates were unlike anything seen before by most yungas cam-

pesinos, but their organizational structure clearly resembled that of the miners' unions. The groundwork for syndical organization was laid primarily by representatives of MNR, who toured the area in the early 1950s under the auspices of the party and the newly created Ministry of Campesino Affairs.<sup>21</sup> Changes at the local level were integrally related to other changes at the provincial, departmental, and national levels. New administrative institutions were created, and some old ones were ignored or by-passed. Syndicalism quickly became a potent movement, in which local syndicates were organized into provincial federations and these in turn were grouped into departmental federations, all of those comprising a national confederation.

The legislative basis for syndicates was not spelled out in the agrarian reform act (Bolivia 1953) or in related decrees. What happened in practice was that the former colonos of a hacienda would constitute a syndicate—following guidelines of the organizers from La Paz—and that the first undertaking of such a syndicate would be for the secretary-general to file with the local agrarian judge a *demanda* (petition) for reallocation of land. Provision was made for landed estates to be expropriated and reallocated, with communal plots, commons for grazing livestock, school areas, and other details to be worked out on an *ad hoc* basis by the agrarian judge and topographer on the site. The result was that the specifications for the disposition of each ex-hacienda were unique, and subject to revision at several stages in the progress of the claim.

Although the syndicates were constituted primarily as means of securing title to land, they gradually came to serve other functions as well. They were effective organizations for political socialization and indoctrination by a small cadre skilled in demagoguery and able to channel small-scale patronage. What the clients in this relationship had to offer was occasional support for MNR by participating in political demonstrations, both locally and in the national capital. Because of the difficulty of transportation, campesinos in the yungas were less often rallied than were those nearer the larger cities. When, however there was a real or supposed threat to MNR incumbency they would crowd into trucks when summoned and would race to La Paz, where their militant shouts of "Viva!", reinforced by their weapons and sheer numbers, often intimidated the opposition. On such occasions, the leader would be reimbursed for the rental of the truck and given a standard sum (usually Bs. 12,000 or about U.S. \$1.00 per man), about half of which would be passed on to the individual campesino demonstrator as per diem; many, however, complained—confidentially, not publicly—about the unreimbursed cost to them in terms of work-time lost. Demonstrations at the local level included occasional shows of force, parades, guerrilla raids on Falangist or supposedly Communist groups, etc.

The actual activities of the syndicates are varied, including far more than land claims and political demonstrations, and they often overlap the jurisdiction of pre-existing formal institutions. For example, it is the syndicates and not the courts that have supplanted the hacendado in resolving conflicts between campesinos. This applies not only to informal accusa-

tions of petty theft, minor assault, and so forth, but even to such institutionalized differences as divorce. While such conflict resolutions obviously do not have the legal force of orthodox court procedures, they are nevertheless often respected locally. The syndicates also mediate in some cases of inheritance, land exchange, and so forth, despite the fact that they have had no official legal jurisdiction since the dissolution of the *Juntas Rurales*, the short-lived rural land courts of the mid-1950s. While even the campesinos are aware that the formally structured courts in the provincial capital are supplemented by a chief of police and a *subprefecto* (cf. sheriff in the United States), they believe that within the formal official system "justice belongs to the rich." Consequently they rarely subject themselves to its costs and delays, and they hesitate to lay themselves open to the indignities and abuses that they still frequently suffer from white and mestizo townsmen, including judges and other public officials. More often they seek to resolve their conflicts within the extra-official and relatively informal system of the syndicate.

Another important kind of syndical activity is public works. On many of the ex-haciendas the ex-colonos pooled their labor to build schools, and often they even went on to hire teachers paid by special assessments (*cuotas*) when the authorities declined to assign government-paid teachers. A self-conscious concern with education is deep and pervasive in contemporary campesino life. Other public works projects include the installation of water systems, the building and maintenance of roads, bridges, and trails, the construction of football fields or of plazas, and occasionally the construction of a first aid station (*puesta sanitaria*). For these the local campesinos usually provide both funds and labor, but they seek technical assistance and materiel through higher-level syndical organizations.

Syndicates are involved not only in law, education, and public works but also in economics. One of the most popular and inaccurate myths concerning Indians in highland Latin America is their supposed predilection for communal co-operation. Urban nationals have accepted this as uncritically as have foreigners, and many ambitious development plans have failed because they were based on this unfounded assumption. Although by no means as communalistic as is often assumed, the Aymara of the yungas are not totally unco-operative. The *aini*, the traditional pattern of reciprocal labor exchange which was formerly that restricted to the extended family, now sometimes involves most of the members of a syndicate. Similarly, co-operation of other kinds has been taught as a crucial tool in effecting the common goals of the ex-colonos, both within the local community and beyond it. They early learned, from their organizers and from the dramatic example of miners and other unionized workers, that there is power in numbers when they stand united. One of the most dramatic illustrations of this power, without official authority, is the case of the 25-pound arroba in which they agreed to force coffee-buyers to pay them on the basis of a 25-pound unit (rather than a 32-pound one), and succeeded after a brief sellers' strike (Heath 1966).

A variety of other apolitical activities occur among the campesino syndicates. One of the most widespread is soccer, which is enjoyed as a spectator

sport with frequent intersyndical competition. In a few syndicates, teachers offer night courses in Spanish and in literacy; such courses are well attended, by women as well as men. Occasionally, a first aid kit and medicines are kept for use, at cost, by members. Although there is no formal program of social security, and orphans and the aged are usually cared for by kinsmen, in at least some instances when there were no relatives on the ex-hacienda, such individuals have been informally adopted by neighbors within the syndicate. Occasionally an imaginative and energetic agricultural extension agent takes advantage of the syndical organization to reach ex-colonos more efficiently with demonstrations, films, and other educational services.

Other means by which campesino syndicates could serve their members are often discussed, more by leaders than by the rank-and-file. For example, it is not only outsiders who talk about the potential value of co-operatives. A highly publicized aspect of MNR policy was to foster co-operatives, both by exhortation and by preferential taxation. Syndical leaders throughout the yungas agree that the economic condition of ex-colonos could be strengthened by the introduction of co-operatives for buying staple goods and necessities, and for selling agricultural produce. In no instance, however, had this ideal been translated into action.

The elected secretary-general of a syndicate clearly has power in many domains, but it is by no means unlimited. In sharp contrast with the stereotype held by townsmen, only a few campesino leaders have become *caciques* (despotic autocrats). On the contrary, major decisions are usually submitted to the rank-and-file, although support is often achieved through demagogic oratory rather than studied debate.

In some instances, a secretary-general also plays an important political role beyond the local syndicate. Campesinos have not been elected or appointed to public office in the yungas as have a few ex-colonos from other regions. Nevertheless, a secretary-general may also become head of the local cell of MNR and have influential contacts in the party and in various ministries.<sup>22</sup> Usually he is also an officer in a larger regional association of syndicates, and an enterprising man can make political capital out of the fact that he can muster a large number of men—and an even larger number of votes!

Quite apart from representing the syndicate elsewhere, the secretary-general also has considerable responsibility on the ex-hacienda. It is he who oversees public works projects, such as the preparation of a soccer field, or the building of a school. He keeps track of those who have fulfilled their obligations (called *faena*), and he serves as foreman throughout the work. Not only does a man in this status serve as a spokesman for his syndicate *vis à-vis* other groups and administrators, but he must also provide hospitality to visiting secretaries general and other distinguished visitors. By the same token, any outsider attempting to gain effective entrée into an ex-hacienda community would be unwise not to explain his mission first to the secretary-general, whose local authority—like that of the hacendado before the revolution—is manifold and rarely disputed.

In short, the status of secretary-general is *primus inter pares*. As a cultural broker he plays a crucial role as intermediary between his constituents and

other socio-cultural systems. Ideally, therefore, he should speak Spanish, and most of those in the yungas do. He should also be a fairly articulate and dynamic person, and many of them are. The channels through which the secretary-general acts on behalf of his neighbors and fellow members are often those established by the Ministry of Campesino Affairs in an affiliated syndical bureaucracy which links each ex-colono ultimately with the President of the Republic. An example will illustrate the organizational hierarchy, both formal and as altered during my study.

Each individual who had been a colono on hacienda Minachi has become an ex-colono, a member of the Minachi Syndicate. Those who had been *arrenderos* have similarly become members of the syndicate and have gained social and political equality with ex-colonos (although they received smaller land grants when the ex-hacienda was expropriated and reapportioned). This and two neighboring syndicates are unusual in that they more often meet jointly (as the Sub-central of Cruz Loma and often as the Central of Cruz Loma) than they do independently. The physical proximity and small size of these three ex-haciendas contrasts with the situation elsewhere in Nor Yungas, and they often ignore other syndicates that are nominally affiliated with the Central. Furthermore, a dynamic and politically ambitious campesino early convinced the ex-colonos there of the advantages to be gained from collaboration; this has included the building of a school and a number of houses around a new common plaza at Cruz Loma, which may soon become one of the "new towns" that are an unforeseen product of the MNR revolution (Preston 1969, 1970). This Central, another Central, and three unaffiliated Sub-centrals (comprising altogether some 36 local syndicates) send representatives to the Provincial Federation of Nor Yungas. This organization, together with federations representing each of the fourteen other provinces that comprise the department, is in turn administered by the Departmental Federation of La Paz. The National Confederation, comprising this federation and those from the eight other departments, is the highest organization of campesino syndicates. Its informal support of the Minister of Campesino Affairs is sufficiently strong that he often acts as its representative within the Cabinet and lobbies on its behalf *vis-à-vis* the President of the Republic.

The MNR has attempted in many ways over the years to inculcate the view of "the peasantry" as a unified bloc. The diversity of the Bolivian population remains a real obstacle to national unity. The linguistic and cultural differences between speakers of Quechua and Aymara are the best known and most striking, but there is also appreciable regional variation within each of these groups. Furthermore, there are several other campesino groups throughout the country, and even those which are not characterized by distinctive languages and cultures are often intensely regionalistic in their orientations. At the level of rhetoric, there is general consensus that "the peasantry must stand united in defending the accomplishments of the 1952 revolution," but at the level of overt action there is little effective collaboration beyond the level of the provincial federation. This, in the yungas, has been a fairly effective coalition.

Class antagonism was explicit in the MNR revolution and remains impor-

tant both in theory and practice. Because the dominant socio-economic class consisted virtually exclusively of mestizos and whites, and the oppressed peasantry were mostly Indians, the interclass antagonism is sometimes phrased in racial terms, with the *misti* (white man) cast as the villain by the Aymara. The "authorities" are allies or enemies more on the basis of party affiliation than of any realistic evaluation of the attitudes or behavior of individuals in positions of authority.

### *Old Patrons in New Roles*

This tendency to deal with people in blocs or classes is balanced by the occasional establishment of particularistic relations with specific individuals, sometimes even in violation of stereotyped relationships. For example, general resentment of the *misti* does not necessarily interfere with a peasant's establishing ties of *compadrazgo* (coparenthood) with a townsman who is not only white but perhaps also an ex-hacendado, a merchant, and a Falangist. Such cases are commonplace and reflect a fairly clear compartmentalization between relationships based on economic advantage and others in which affect plays a more dominant role. In fact, despite their cherished new freedom, many ex-colonos retain ties with ex-hacendados which are strikingly paternalistic and reminiscent of the classic pre-revolution patron-client relationship. This is particularly the case with respect to commercial agriculture.

The yungas region is unusual in Bolivia in that agriculture has long been commercial as well as conducted for subsistence. Coca and coffee, the predominant crops, are still produced for the market, although new channels of distribution have had to be established. Hacendados used to sell the produce from their haciendas to wholesalers and exporters in La Paz, but the ex-colonos who have lately virtually monopolized production do not have either the personalistic contacts or the quantity of goods that would be meaningful to such merchants. It is not surprising, therefore, to find campesinos selling their produce to middlemen in the provincial towns, nor to find that many of these middlemen are in fact ex-hacendados who call the economic differential between their buying and selling prices "interest" rather than "profit." There is some justification for this because a middleman often lends money to his campesino suppliers during the lean months between harvests, and thereby acquires an option on buying their produce, but deducts only the amount of the loan, without added interest, when delivery is made. Middlemen also serve as *compadres* to their clients, with the understanding that, when a campesino comes to town, his compadre will provide hospitality, food, and a place to sleep and that the campesino, in turn, will reciprocate by bringing a few eggs, some fresh fruit, or a similar token gift. Occasionally, too, the townsman provides counsel or some other assistance if a campesino runs afoul of the law.

The relationship between an ex-colono and his middleman is, in short, strikingly consistent with the pattern of patronage-clientage that was the ideal in pre-revolutionary days, when a "good" hacendado did the same things for a "good" colono. It therefore comes as no surprise to find that many ex-colonos are happy to continue in such a dependent (and secure) relationship with

their own former hacendados and that others have sought to establish a similar relationship with other merchants or even other ex-hacendados. What is noteworthy is the remarkable continuity in social organization (in the roles or functions of relationships) despite a considerable change in social structure (in the form of status networks).

### *New Patrons in Old Roles*

Since my discussion of the range of syndical activities has emphasized social innovations, I feel that it is important to consider some of them as new forms serving old functions, or as possible survivals of previous patterns under the jurisdiction of a new institution.

For example, when the secretary of justice and/or the secretary-general takes the law into his own hands in adjudicating a case between members of a syndicate, he is not significantly encroaching on the sphere of influence of the sheriff, the police, or the courts, none of which ever had effective jurisdiction on the haciendas. Rather, he is filling the role of the hacendado, who used to do the same thing with no more regard for the formal legal institutions of the state.

By the same token, public works projects undertaken in the name of the syndicate are more than analogous to the pre-reform *faena*; they are often virtually identical, called by the same name and performed jointly on Sunday mornings, though now on behalf of the syndicate rather than the hacienda. For that matter, the secretary-general acts much like a pre-reform mayordomo when he oversees the *faena*, or work on the collectively held property. Furthermore, he acts like a benevolent pre-reform hacendado when he serves as broker for his constituents in lobbying for a teacher, a sanitarian, or other form of patronage.

In rare instances a powerful secretary-general has instituted a labor draft whereby members of the syndicate take turns cultivating his crops while he is away, ostensibly on syndical business. Such a pattern of mandatory labor in the fields of another is reminiscent of the colonos' obligation to the hacendado that was the primary target of agrarian reform. Less similar but still related is the more common pattern whereby a few members of the syndicate help the secretary-general in his agricultural work on a voluntary basis.

When syndical leaders speculate enthusiastically about the potential value of instituting buying co-operatives, they cite the very advantages that colonos used to enjoy in many hacienda commissaries. While there is no clear-cut survival of *ponguaeje*, the former housekeeping obligation of colonos, the role of members' wives in cooking for and serving "visiting firemen" on syndical business is no less involuntary and unremunerated.

### CASE STUDIES IN CHANGING PATRONAGE-CLIENTAGE NETWORKS

Despite sweeping reforms in the forms of social structure instituted by the MNR revolution, there are, as we have seen, many instances in the yungas in which aspects of the *patrón-peón* type of patron-client relationship persist virtually unchanged, in functional terms, between former hacendados and the campesinos who had been their colonos. There are also many instances in

which a new *patrón-peón* type of relationship has been established, with the syndicate or its secretary-general assuming the dominant paternalistic status formerly held by the hacendado, and the campesino continuing in a relatively dependent servile status. But it would be grossly inaccurate to view syndicates as merely renamed haciendas, with absentee landlords (ex-hacendados) now living in the towns as middlemen or with secretaries-general functioning as Aymara-speaking hacendados. Continuity in function, with dramatic change in form, is only one aspect of the role of syndicates.

Another aspect of the role of these new institutions is the fact that they serve new functions, some of which are not only discontinuous with earlier patterns but are distinctly inimical to the old order. It is noteworthy, for example, that political socialization is by no means limited to the few dynamic secretaries-general who are effective lobbyists for their own interests and those of their constituents. Awareness of and concern for the active role of citizenship has pervaded the syndicates, reshaping the outlook and lives of many members as well as leaders. At periodic syndicate meetings, occasional special open forums, political rallies, and other occasions, campesinos are now outspoken and articulate in a way that could not have been predicted on the basis of the earlier stereotype of the Aymara.

Inasmuch as the foregoing description of patron-client relations has been couched largely in general terms, it seems appropriate now to focus on some of the changing ways in which individuals have sought access to a few selected goods and services. A number of important points can be made by comparing pre-revolution with post-revolution<sup>23</sup> patronage-clientage networks for curing, land, justice, public works, and the sale of produce among the Aymara of the yungas.

### *Curing*

One of the few realms of culture in which the 1952 revolution has wrought little change is curing, and yet the ways in which clients seek access to it illustrate the nature and type of changes even within the same provincial setting.

Before the revolution, colonos usually sought remedies directly from the *yatiri* (roughly "medicine man"), who, though resident on a particular hacienda, also served a clientele throughout the province. The sole alternative—a somewhat less popular one—was to ask the hacendado for help. On occasions when the hacendado's first aid ministrations were insufficient, he referred colonos to the government clinic in the provincial capital or (almost as often) to the pharmacist there. Colonos virtually never went elsewhere for treatment.

Since the revolution, the *yatiri* has retained his dual clientele, including not only ex-colonos on the same hacienda but also those from other haciendas in the province. The ex-hacendado has been effectively banished from the local community, but is still visited in the provincial capital by a few ex-colonos seeking help. A comparable number of ex-colonos seek help directly from the pharmacist, and a very few go directly to the clinic, but many more apply to the syndicate, where some obtain first aid and others are referred to the pharmacist. The ex-hacendado no longer engages in curing but continues to

refer faithful ex-colonos to the pharmacist and the clinic. The clinic occasionally refers ex-colonos to the pharmacist, but he does not reciprocate.

With respect to curing, then, it is clear that the campesinos still tend to look first to the local community, and then elsewhere within the province, but not beyond. The syndicate has assumed some of the roles formerly played by the hacendado in this network, but some campesinos still rely on the ex-hacendado, and others assume the initiative in resorting to higher level institutions.

### *Land*

The pre-revolutionary situation with respect to agricultural land was extremely restricted—it was virtually all controlled by the hacendados, who granted usufruct privileges on portions of their holdings to colonos, in exchange for labor. On a few haciendas a small group of *arrenderos* obtained the use of smaller plots by helping colonos (see note 20), or by offering less labor to the hacendado. There was not other access to land, and no one outside the individual hacienda exercised any jurisdiction.

By contrast, the post-revolutionary situation is extremely complex, involving patronage at each level up to and including the President of the Republic. Most of the former *arrenderos*, like the former colonos, joined the local syndicate primarily as a means of securing title to land that they had previously worked. The syndicate, in turn, submitted and actively supported a claim for portions of the hacienda, both collectively and individually, on behalf of its members. Under the agrarian reform act of 1953, the appropriate channel for such a request for expropriation was through the provincial agrarian reform judge, although many ex-colonos sought support for their claims from the provincial federation of campesino syndicates, as did the officers of the syndicate. The provincial federation did often speak or act on behalf of those clients, trying to influence the agrarian judge and also to enlist the support of the departmental federation of campesino syndicates.

The ex-hacendado found himself in direct competition with his former colonos, and often tried to defend his holdings from expropriation. The law stipulated that his defense against the claims of ex-colonos should also be considered by the provincial agrarian judge, but in some instances an influential ex-hacendado would communicate directly with the President in the hope of obtaining special exemption for his landholdings. After considering the claims and counterclaims, the agrarian judge made a preliminary ruling that was binding on both ex-colono claimants and ex-hacendado defendants, and routinely forwarded the dossier to the National Agrarian Reform Council. Since every case was reviewed at this level, ex-hacendados often tried, through personal influence and other means, to get the Council to reverse an unfavorable judge's decision. After the Council has passed judgment, each case still had to be reviewed by the Minister of Campesino Affairs, who regularly received appeals from departmental federations on behalf of their constituencies. Even the Cabinet-level decision was not final, for every case (even those in which there had been no reversal of a lower-level decision) was reviewed by the President, who received appeals both from departmental federations and from individual ex-hacendados.

In marked contrast with the network for curing, which remained restricted, that for land expanded to include every level within the nation-state, and exhibits no continuity with pre-revolution patterns. The hacendado, who used to be the patron *par excellence*, controlling access to all agricultural land, no longer provides land for anyone; on the contrary, he has been cast as a client seeking bureaucratic patrons who may possibly grant him some land. A specially devised hierarchy of agrarian courts is, like the hierarchy of syndical organizations, affiliated with but not integral to the post-revolutionary Ministry of Campesino Affairs, and ex-hacendados have not been happy having to deal with bureaucrats whose ostensible concern is campesino welfare.

### *Justice*

The quest for justice (by which I mean simply conflict resolution) reflects the expanded horizons of the campesinos and is one of the many functions taken over by the new syndical organization.

Before the revolution, nearly all such conflicts were settled on the hacienda; most were resolved among the colonos themselves, although some thorny ones were taken to the mayordomo to be settled. Those that the mayordomo found problematic he referred to the hacendado, who was unchallenged as judge with respect to the affairs of everyone within the hacienda community. On the rare occasions when colonos got into trouble with anyone beyond the hacienda, they asked, usually through the mayordomo, for the hacendado to intervene on their behalf *vis-à-vis* the concerned officials at the provincial level, namely the police for criminal cases or the subprefect for civil cases.

Since the revolution, ex-colonos generally discuss their differences in the syndicate, which serves as a kind of community forum. The ex-hacendado no longer has any authority on the hacienda, although some ex-colonos still ask him, as before, to intervene on their behalf with the police and subprefect in the provincial capital. A few even have confidence enough today to deal with the subprefect directly. Not all problems are resolved in the syndicate; a few are referred to the Central (a regional alliance of syndicates found in some but not all of the provinces), and rather more to the provincial federation of campesino syndicates. Most of the conflicts that are not settled at this level are referred to the departmental federation of syndicates; those that still remain unresolved go to the national confederation of syndicates, which passes a few important cases to the Minister of Campesino Affairs, a member of the President's cabinet whose help is sought by the officials of most provincial and departmental federations. In extremely rare instances, when both principals are wealthy and/or politically ambitious, a final judgment may be sought from the President himself (for such a case, see Heath 1969a).

While in theory the campesinos have access to the formal system of courts, as they did even before the revolution, in practice they have very rarely used the courts, either recently or in earlier years.

### *Public Works*

Prior to the revolution, campesinos laid no claim to roads, water systems, or other public works. Before the revolution, hacendados, however, often sought such concrete forms of patronage from the subprefect, the chief

official within the province. If unsuccessful there, they sometimes made the same request to the prefect (the chief official in a department), to the Ministry of Public Works, and/or to the President of the Republic; they often tried these alternatives successively, although an influential hacendado might occasionally "leapfrog" a lower official and initially approach one at a higher level. Even when the Minister of Public Works approved a request, the extreme centralization of fiscal authority demanded that the President's approval also be sought.

In the post-revolutionary years, by contrast, the ex-hacendado plays no role whatsoever, and requests for such services are usually initiated by those who never did so before, the ex-colonos. Requests are formalized in the local syndicate, which serves as a corporate petitioner on behalf of its members *vis-à-vis* the provincial federation of campesino syndicates, and sometimes the subprefect (who has almost no funds and hence usually relays requests to the prefect). Pressures are exerted on the subprefect by the individual syndicate and by the provincial federation; in similar manner, the several provincial federations join the departmental federation in trying to enlist the prefect's aid. Very few projects are supported at the departmental level or below; most are referred upward to the national confederation of syndicates, which may appeal to the Minister of Campesino Affairs or to the Minister of Public Works (who nowadays routinely relays any such request to Campesino Affairs). If a project is deemed worthwhile but too ambitious to be handled by that Ministry, the President may be advised, and he, through his Minister of Foreign Relations, can usually enlist the aid of the United States Operations Mission. By having recourse to an institution that is patently outside "the national system," the actual work is often eventually done in the local community by the Peace Corps or the Agency for International Development, entities that were unheard of before the revolution but that have introduced skills, funds, and equipment that are not available at any level within the entire range of Bolivian patronage networks.

### *Sale of Produce*

In a market-oriented agricultural economy, the sale of produce is of crucial importance. The relevant social network notably comprises the same few individuals after as before the revolution, yet the altered statuses and roles of these individuals make for a very different network in terms of patronage and clientage.

The hacendado used to enjoy a virtual monopoly on agricultural surplus. He "sold" a little to colonos in a system of contrived and hereditary debt-bondage and sold most of the produce directly to a wholesaler in the national capital, who in turn supplied both regional markets within the country and international markets. The rest went to a merchant in the provincial capital, who sold some to local townspeople but shipped the bulk of his purchases (amassed from various hacendados within the province) to the same national and international wholesalers. He was able to charge more than the hacendados by waiting until the harvest glut had subsided.

Nowadays, it is generally the ex-colonos who control agricultural produc-

tion. In a dramatic reversal of roles, they sell some of their surplus to the ex-hacendado, who has left the hacienda and now serves as middleman in the provincial capital, where he still sells produce to the national and international wholesalers with whom he dealt before. (Sometimes, when ex-colonos resent the man who used to be their own hacendado, they prefer to deal with another ex-hacendado.) A few ex-colonos sell some goods in local markets throughout the province, or in regional markets, but most of the produce goes to merchants (who sometimes go out on buying trips from the provincial capital to individual ex-haciendas), and thence to regional markets or to wholesalers in La Paz, the nation's *de facto* capital and center for export.

In contrast with most of the other patronage-clientage networks that we have analyzed, that for the sale of produce involves no new individuals or institutions since the revolution. It is also one of the few realms of activity in which the syndicate does not serve as a broker linking ex-colonos with higher level systems.

#### CONCLUSIONS

In the foregoing discussion of networks of patronage, clientage, and power relationships in the Bolivian yungas, the emphasis has been on two major themes:

- 1) The specificity of networks for various realms of concern (or fields of action, or aspects of culture), in contrast with the generalized brokerage (or "patronage," or "hinge," or "gatekeeper") status so often characterized in the literature on this topic; and
- 2) The changes (sometimes dramatic and extensive) in such networks through time.

Although the main purpose of this paper is descriptive, nevertheless a few striking conclusions from the Aymara case bear on the conceptualization and analysis of patronage and power relations in broader terms.

With reference to the local situation, despite sweeping changes in the forms of social structure instituted by the revolution, there are many instances in which the traditional paternalistic relationship persists functionally unchanged:

- 1) The patron-client type of functional relationship has been reconstituted in a new form in which the syndicate (or sometimes its secretary-general) assumes the dominant paternalistic status formerly held by the hacendado and the ex-colono occupies a relatively dependent and servile status.
- 2) At the same time, it is noteworthy that, for certain limited purposes, ex-colonos are happy to retain the old patron-client relationship that linked them as dependents of specific ex-hacendados, despite their resentment of years of "slavery" and their rallying slogan of "class warfare."

A number of general propositions emerge from these case studies:

- 1) Different individuals are often patrons for different purposes.
  - a) On the one hand, there is real value in looking at crucial individuals (or, more accurately, crucial statuses) when one is attempting to characterize

in general terms the channels of communication, distribution, and other linkages between a given local community and the broader society.

b) On the other hand, it is also necessary to look at various individuals (and statuses), when one attempts to characterize in any detail the quality of communication, distribution, and other linkages between individuals in a given local community and individuals and institutions in the broader society.

c) In short, patronage and brokerage can be, and perhaps most often are, role-specific.

2) Patronage-clientage networks for different purposes change in different ways and at different rates.

a) The phenomenon of change in patronage-clientage networks is neither unique nor unexpected. The value of having analyzed a particular situation in some detail lies in the clear demonstration that changes in patronage or brokerage for one realm of concern are not necessarily similar to those in another realm. (For example, the immensely increased complexity of the patronage-clientage network concerning land is not at all reflected in the only slightly altered network concerned with curing.)

b) In short, power and change can also be role-specific, and perhaps most often are so.

3) Many relationships that appear, in structural terms, to be impersonal and universalistic are, in functional terms, personalistic relationships of patronage and clientage.

#### NOTES

1. This is a revision of a paper, prepared on invitation for the Conference on Patronage, Clientage, and Power Structures in Latin America, held at Sante Fe, New Mexico, under the auspices of the School for American Research, 1-4 October 1969. It is based on field work conducted in Bolivia in 1964-65 under United States government contract FC (W)-397, administered by Research Institute for the Study of Man.
2. For that matter, none of Bolivia's Indians fought to topple the old oligarchy, although many (including the Aymara of the yungas) later formed peasant militias to defend the MNR from counter-revolutionaries (see Heath 1966, 1969b).
3. The "conquests of the revolution [of 1952]" have survived the overthrow of the MNR by a military junta in 1964 and six other subsequent changes of government. The list of "conquests of the revolution" comprises a virtual litany in which each catchphrase is pregnant with meaning. "Agrarian reform" refers primarily to the fractionation of large haciendas and abolition of the quasi-feudal *colonato* system whereby campesinos worked without pay in exchange for usufruct privileges to small plots, which have since been allotted to them. "Universal suffrage" refers to dropping the combined literacy and property holding requirements, so that the electorate was promptly increased by more than 1,200 per cent, and the formerly disfranchised Indian majority won a voice in politics. "Nationalization of the mines" refers to the holdings of Hirschfeld, Aramayo, and Patiño enterprises, each of which used to have an annual budget larger than that of the Republic of Bolivia; operation of the mines by a government entity has been economically disastrous but immensely popular. "Educational reform" refers to the fostering of formal schooling for campesinos; as limited as it is now, it is symbolically important to people who were previously denied access to schools.
4. Anthropologists have often remarked that they find it difficult to reconcile the somewhat wistful quality of my favorite Aymara quotation—"Now we are becoming human beings"—with the harsh and despicable image that has been generally drawn of the Aymara. It is not unusual in Latin America to find the dominant white-mestizo

population viewing the Indians as subhuman beings, employing *indio* or *indio bruto* as an epithet for those who are not *civilizados*. It is, however, unusual, to find anthropologists and travelers from different cultural backgrounds concurring in characterizing a people in wholly negative terms, as was long the case with the Aymara. For nearly a century, consistently unpleasant adjectives were applied by virtually all those who tried to know them, adding up to the following dismal thesaurus on Aymara character: anxious, apprehensive, doubtful, drunken, dull, fearful, filthy, gloomy, hostile, ignorant, insecure, irresponsible, jealous, malevolent, malicious, melancholic, morose, negative, pessimistic, pugnacious, quarrelsome, rancorous, reticent, sad, silent, sinister, slovenly, stolid, sullen, suspicious, tense, thieving, treacherous, truculent, uncommunicative, unimaginative, unsmiling, untrustworthy, violent, and vindictive (Forbes 1870; Squier 1877; Bandelier 1910; Romero 1928; La Barre 1948, 1950; Tschopik 1951). The pattern was so consistent, despite the diversity of the observers, that La Barre and Tschopik took considerable pains to "account for" such a negative "basic personality structure." Anthropologists who have worked with the Aymara during the past two decades, however, have generally found them to be at least somewhat sympathetic (Buechler 1966; Buechler and Buechler 1970; Carter 1964; Heath 1966; Hickman 1963; Plummer 1966). Different field methods and approaches to the Aymara may in part account for these differences in evaluation, but it is also conceivable that the heady "liberation" experienced by the Aymara as a result of the 1952 revolution may be reflected in changed actions and attitudes.

5. "Campesino" is used in Bolivian Spanish in a dual sense—not only meaning "peasant" (as it does in Spanish elsewhere, and even in English in recent years) but also as a post-revolutionary euphemism for *indio* (Indian), which carried an immense burden of negative connotations. The ironic result of an MNR attempt to effect cultural change by semantic fiat is that they can now boast that "there are no more Indians in Bolivia," while more than half of the adult population are campesinos who still speak only indigenous languages.
6. The Negroes are descended from African slaves brought to the area in colonial times. Living apart in a half dozen hamlets, their dress and workaday activities resemble those of the Aymara, but they speak Spanish and rarely intermarry with either Indians or whites. Those in Nor Yungas have only been briefly visited (see Newman 1966; Preston Ms.); Barbara and William Léons studied a Negro community in nearby Sud Yungas in 1969.
7. The *Provincia* (roughly comparable to a county in the United States) of Nor Yungas is an area of approximately 2,000 square miles, within the *Departamento* (cf. state) of La Paz. While studying social and political organization in the provincial capital (Coroico, a declining colonial town of about 2,200 population), epidemiological studies in the outlying areas provided an entree which I systematically used from August, 1964, through July, 1965, to acquire ethnographic data on the Aymara campesinos throughout the province. Although I never achieved easy fluency in Aymara, I enjoyed the advantage of working through a skillful interpreter who had for years lived with the campesinos and was well known and liked by them.
8. Despite the social and historical importance of the distinction between "whites" and "mestizos," it seems appropriate to phrase this discussion in terms of the single distinction that is overwhelmingly important from the point of view of the local population: that between those called "campesinos" and all others.
9. The majority were smaller than 200 acres, although a few exceeded 1,000 acres.
10. Two chicken farms have just recently been established near Coroico, both owned and operated by mestizos from other parts of the country.
11. Like so many regional historians, Morales (1929) on the yungas is intensively chauvinistic in tone, but he provides a fairly accurate body of data.
12. The one-lane road is often cut by landslides, and trucks that carry both freight and passengers still frequently plunge into the canyons, but it is an improvement over the mule trails that used to require two days' trek from the subtropical yungas through a cold pass at more than 13,000 feet elevation.
13. Although both Bolivia and Paraguay suffered enormous losses in wealth and

manpower, Bolivia was especially traumatized by the realization that her political and military leaders were equally inept, and by the implication that Indians, having been drafted to defend the nation, might claim some rights as citizens.

14. "The Church" is usually linked with the landed gentry and the military as constituting the dominant institutional triumvirate in countries where *colonato* prevails. Although the Church was indeed wealthy and powerful during the colonial period, it did not play a particularly important role in Bolivia after independence.

15. It is impossible to document the suspicion that these decrees may have been little more than "window dressing" to impress visiting dignitaries at a time when Bolivia was being called a fascist country. The decrees (*Decretos leyes* 00318-00321, of May 15, 1945) abolished *pongueaje* (the compulsory unremunerated labor that colonos had traditionally owed to their hacendados), called for the establishment of schools on haciendas, and spelled out mutual obligations of landlords and tenant farmers. It is noteworthy that the Aymara of the yungas seem to be unaware of this event or these laws. There is no evidence that hacendados anywhere obeyed the letter of the laws, but a nod in the direction of their spirit may have been the reduction of unremunerated labor requirements (from four days weekly to three), a change that is generally remembered but unexplained by older campesinos in the area.

16. For that matter, there have been few such studies since the revolution. La Barre (1948, 1950) offered little more than the affirmation that the Aymara of the yungas were markedly different (in unspecified ways) from their relatives on the plateau around Lake Titicaca, where he did more extensive and intensive research; Carter (1964: 6) did exceptionally detailed work at Irpa Chico (1963) and comparative work among Aymara on the altiplano, but he explicitly denies familiarity with the situation in the yungas. In the mid-1950s, Isabel Kelly worked in the same area where I did a decade later, but she has not yet published her findings. Buechler (1969) conducted a survey of land tenure patterns in the yungas and has also dealt (Buechler 1966) with the continuing migration of Aymara to that area from the altiplano. M. and W. Léons studied syndical organization (M. Léons 1966, 1970; W. Léons 1970) and land reform (M. Léons 1967; M. & W. Léons 1971) in a campesino community that is physically nearby but culturally different. McEwen (1969) compiled a fairly accurate account of life in the provincial capital, using field notes collected by me and several assistants. I have elsewhere analyzed selected aspects of campesino life: politics (Heath 1966), syndicalism (Heath 1969b), and interethnic relations (Heath 1971). A cultural geographer (Preston 1969, 1970) has offered brief but incisive commentaries on changing ecology, and a sociologist (Muratorio 1969) has outlined the history of syndicates.

17. I use "broker" in the sense of Wolf (1956: 1076) to designate one who mediates between different levels of the same society, and "patron" in the sense of Foster (1963: 1282) to designate one who combines status, power, influence, and authority to help someone else defend himself.

18. The most powerful manifestation of hacendado unity was the Sociedad de Proprietarios de Yungas, which maintained the road, lobbied in Congress, and in many other ways defended their interests.

19. See note 8 above.

20. The few *arrenderos* on pre-reform haciendas were colonos of colonos; that is, they served a few colonos in much the same way that colonos served a hacendado. In return, they got usufruct of a portion of the land which the hacendado had relegated to the colonos. In such instances, the colono enjoyed power as patron over his *arrendero*, though he was in turn dominated by the hacendado. Vestiges of this pattern persist in the institution of *utauawa*, landless campesinos treated as virtual slaves or stepchildren within the households of a few ex-colonos.

21. The emergence and multiple functions of campesino syndicates in this region have been described by Heath, the Léonses, and Muratorio (see note 16 above). It is clear that they did not follow the pattern of Ucureña, which is historically important but atypical (cf. Patch 1960; Dandler 1969).

22. A few influential MNR members were able to stay in responsible positions in the

administration even in 1965, after René Barrientos's "Revolution of Restoration" had driven Paz into exile in Peru. It is too early to judge the effect of the revolution of August, 1971, which returned the MNR to power (in coalition with FSB and the military).

23. The "revolution" referred to is the MNR victory in April, 1952, despite the fact that its major impact was not felt in the yungas until considerably later. While news of the takeover arrived within a day, changes in specific realms of behavior took place only gradually. The expropriation of haciendas and formation of syndicates, for example, did not begin until 1954.

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#### POST-PUBLICATION NOTE

Most of my statements in the foregoing paper are generalizations from behavior, and a few diagrams may help to show how particular kinds of relationships have changed since the 1952 revolution. Figure 1 illustrates how a single *sindicato* is linked with a nationwide system that has many and varied meanings and functions, although it did not exist prior to the revolution. Figures 2-6 show the ways in which patron-client networks change as individuals seek access to a few selected goods and services in different sociocultural contexts. Those figures obviously do not portray specific behavioral data; each is a crude graphic representation embodying no less than 85 percent of the specific observed behavior sequences in relation to that particular good or service.

In the diagrams, the party at the base of each arrow—the client—seeks patronage from the party at its tip—the patron—with the width of the arrow between them roughly indicating the volume of such requests. (Note that attempts to establish patron-client relations do not always follow “through channels” of bureaucratic organization [e.g., fig. 3], and that upper-level clients occasionally seek patronage at lower levels [e.g., fig. 6].)

## APPENDIX 1

Although I do not discuss in detail the kinds of exchanges and expectations that obtain between specific pairs of patrons and clients as diagrammed, the charts do imply such reciprocity, with each patron expecting some **quid pro quo** in the event that he helps a client.

I have tried to represent graphically some of the complexity of the functioning social organization, which is **not** congruent with the formal social structure. The figures were originally intended merely to provide illustrative representation of the ways in which new patrons serve in old roles and old patrons play new roles in a few of the changing networks of brokerage in the region. I am grateful to Dr. Robert Paine of Memorial University for suggesting that I mention that they also serve to identify some of the instances in which new patrons serve in new roles, and even a few in which old patrons still play old roles.

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15 May 1973

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2 APPENDIX

Figure 1  
HIERARCHY OF CAMPESINO SINDICAL ORGANIZATION





Figure 2

PATRONAGE-CLIENTAGE NETWORKS FOR CURING




27

4 APPENDIX

Figure 3


PATRONS-CLIENTAGE NETWORKS FOR LAND



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Figure 4

PATRONS-CLIENTAGE NETWORKS FOR JUSTICE




29'

# 6 APPENDIX

Figure 5

PATRONAGE-CLIENTAGE NETWORKS FOR PUBLIC WORKS (ROADS, WATER, ETC.)



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Figure 6

PATRONSAGE-CLIENTAGE NETWORKS FOR SELLING PRODUCE

