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LAND ISSUES IN THE SENEGAL RIVER VALLEY:
REPORT ON A RECONNAISSANCE TRIP, DECEMBER 1988

by

Peter C. Bloch

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The Land Tenure Center has been conducting research in the region served by the USAID Irrigation and Water Management I Project. Research reports on that project are available from the author.

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I. Introduction

The enactment of a new land law in Mauritania in 1983 and the announcement of the New Agricultural Policy in Senegal in 1984 have completely transformed the institutional context for agricultural development in the Senegal River valley. In its essence, the Mauritanian land law, reflecting Islamic principles, legalizes private ownership of land, with title granted by the State upon receipt of evidence that the applicant has sufficient financial resources to develop the land. The Senegalese policy does not permit private ownership, but encourages individuals and groups to gain access to land from a Communauté Rurale (CR) for commercial agricultural development. On both sides of the river, there has been a rush to acquire irrigable land by people from outside the valley, and tensions are high as local people strive to retain control over as much of "their" land as they can.

On the Senegal side, the situation is complicated by the resistance of local populations to the application of the 1964 National Domain Law, which only became operative in the Saint-Louis region in 1982 and in the Tambacounda region (which includes Bakel) in 1984. With the abolition of the Settlement Zone (Zone Pionnière) in the Delta, Dagana and Nianga in 1987, all land in the valley is now under the authority of the CRs; thus neither the State nor JAED has direct control of the allocation of land.* While it is desirable in principle that local populations determine the use to which their land is put, in practice the local populations everywhere in the valley are not homogeneous: only a minority of people in each ethnic group have traditional claims to the determination of land use. Practically everywhere in the valley, the CRs have thus far been controlled by members of the traditional elites, and land allocation practices have favored a continuation of their control rather than a wider distribution of land to traditionally landless elements of the population.

The conflicts which have arisen on both sides of the river during the past year must be viewed in this global context of changing land law and policy, but each one is an individual case which arises out of very localized conditions. This note addresses three different types of conflict: between traditional and modernizing individuals and groups, between Senegal and Mauritania, and the special case of the former Settlement Zones in the Delta.

* The State can take land under eminent domain for purposes of "public utility," such as road construction roads or other programs of national interest. It recently took a substantial amount of land in the Department of Matam for an Italian project involving irrigation and related activities. If the State continues to do this, the putative authority of the CRs will increasingly be perceived to be circumventable by anyone with influence on the State.

II. Traditional Land Control and the Modernizing Impulse: Middle and Upper Valley, Senegal Side

A. Caste Structure and Traditional Landholding Claims

Most of the population of the Middle and Upper Valley belongs to one of two ethnic groups, the Haipulaar (Toucouleur), who predominate in the Middle Valley from Podor to Kanel and also in the Bundu (the left bank of the Falémé), and the Soninké, in the Upper Valley from Semmé to Ballou. Both ethnic groups are characterized by rigid social stratification: a minority of "nobles" retain strong political, social and economic authority over their communities, including control over agricultural land. An intermediate group of casted people and a lower group of the descendants of slaves have no traditional land ownership rights: virtually all of them farm, on land allocated to them by the nobles, who in return receive payment in kind, in cash or in labor services. Control is the tightest on the walo land in the river's floodplain, where recessional agriculture is practiced in years of good floods.

Since the colonial era, socioeconomic studies have invariably described this inegalitarian structure of control of land and its consequences for income distribution, but the irrigation projects introduced in the region have invariably ignored or circumvented the issue. Until recently, most of the irrigation development in the Middle and Upper Valley has been on the levees of the river (fondé), where recessional cultivation was not possible and thus land tenure conflicts were supposedly minimized. SAED developed small, village-level pump-fed perimeters of 10-100 hectares, with farmers organized into groups of producers (Groupements de Producteurs -- GPs). GP members typically received equal-sized parcels and contributed equally to operating costs. While this type of development had great initial success, with enthusiastic participation from all segments of village society, in recent years there has been stagnation and even abandonment of many of the perimeters -- upwards of 50% in the Department of Matam. As the cases to be discussed in the next section reveal, the difficulties experienced by the small perimeters can be attributed at least in part to conflicts over control of land.

In the past few years, medium-scale perimeters have begun to appear in Podor and Matam and most future development in the Middle Valley will be of this type. The European Community is financing medium perimeters in Podor, and both the French and the Italians have begun doing so in Matam. These perimeters are being constructed on walo for the most part. At least in Matam, the loss of the walo will not be taken lightly by the nobles, since it constitutes the basis of their socioeconomic dominance of their villages. The apparent end of the drought cycle, and the consequent return of good floods, has reinforced the nobles' determination to control the development of irrigation. One of the cases reported in the next section shows the intensity of opposition to this new challenge.

B. Typical Cases of Conflicts over Land

1. Diatar -- Resistance to Egalitarian Access

Diatar is in the Department of Podor, adjoining the large-scale SAED perimeter of Nianga. It was one of the first in the area to be offered a small perimeter by SAED. The village chief attempted to obtain the entire

perimeter for his faction within the village; this was unacceptable both to SAED and to the other faction. A youth group affiliated with the chief's faction, hoping to smoothe over the conflict, purchased a pump. Unfortunately, the faction opposing the chief controlled the riverbank where the pump would have to be placed, and refused to permit the installation of the pump. The stalemate was punctuated by violence, and there was one death and several people were imprisoned. SAED tried to mediate, and developed the 30-ha. perimeter to demonstrate the benefits of settling the conflict. Eventually, the préfet got the factions to agree to split the perimeter and the operating costs equally, and each faction subdivided its allotment into individual plots. One year had been lost.

A further delay followed when the chief attempted to take control of the pump. Meanwhile, the villagers noticed that the neighboring village of Donaye had not only had a successful year on their perimeter, but also had received a significant extension. from the initial 18 ha. to 150 ha. The two Diatar factions then agreed to bypass the chief and to begin farming their perimeter. The chief did not accept his marginalization. One night he mobilized his family, went to the perimeter and destroyed some of the canal earthworks. He was arrested, imprisoned for a week, and died (of humiliation, we are told) two months after his release. Once the chief was out of the picture, the village quickly requested its own substantial extension. SAED complied, but unfortunately, the canal to bring water from the river had to pass through Donaye's territory; Donaye refused permission and the CR and the local politicians, who are apparently "friends" of Donaye, did nothing to help Diatar. Meanwhile Donaye continued to expand the area it was irrigating. Thus Diatar's early delay had permanent negative consequences.

2. Sinthiou Diamdior - Gaol: Traditional Village Territory

These are two neighboring villages in the Department of Matam which are part of different Rural Communities. Both have existing small village perimeters (Gaol has 3 and Sinthiou Diamdior has 2). Two years ago, Gaol requested an additional small perimeter from its CR, and SAED prepared to do topographic studies. When the topo team arrived, they were met by villagers from Sinthiou Diamdior, who said that the land belonged to them traditionally, and Gaol could not have it. Because of the territorial division of the CRs, the land law cannot recognize Sinthiou Diamdior's claims, so the préfet declared that Gaol had the right to the land for a perimeter. The topo team returned, and farmers from Sinthiou Diamdior chased them away with coupe-coupes. The préfet of Matam then organized a meeting with the two villages, the presidents of the two CRs, the two sous-préfets and SAED. During the meeting, the topo team resumed its work. The préfet spoke in Serere, and his interpreter was from Sinthiou Diamdior. The interpreter interrupted the préfet and said to him, in both Pulaar and Serere, "put the National Domain Law in your pocket; here you are chez nous," whereupon a fight broke out between the two villages in which 18 people, including the préfet, were injured. The topo team left, and SAED refuses to risk sending them back until the issue is resolved.

Some of the participants in the battle were brought to trial, with results I was unable to learn. Interestingly, however, both the judge and the prosecutor in the case have died under mysterious circumstances since the trial; one informant called this the "dossier qui tue." The préfet was

discredited by his humiliation, and was eventually replaced. The new préfet has a large dossier of land cases on his agenda, but will proceed cautiously to resolve them given his predecessor's experience. It is unlikely that the resolution will come very soon.

3. *Boyenadji -- Control of the Walo*

This village adjoins Ourosogui in the Department of Matam. Its territory is in the middle of the land granted by the Minister of Rural Development to the Italians for the construction of a medium perimeter. The design of the medium perimeter is such that all the village walo land will disappear. This has profound implications for the village, because everyone will be eligible to receive land on the medium perimeter, but not everyone has had access to walo land (the village chief stated that there is enough walo for everyone, but Christophe Nuttall of the IDA research team has discovered that much walo is not being farmed in spite of the recent excellent floods; the chief said that those who did not farm on the walo this past year are "lazy."). In fact, the Italians did not communicate at all with the traditional landowners, the joom leydi, but were welcomed by the portion of the village which is essentially composed of lower-status people and newcomers. The CR leaders in the region, who are almost exclusively of noble caste, are organizing to confront the Italians, to persuade them to relocate the medium perimeter so that it spares the walo. The implication of such a change would be that rice could not be grown as easily; it is thus difficult to conceive that the Italians and the government will accept the proposal of the notables. If they do not, however, there is sure to be extended conflict, with lengthy litigation and consequent delays in project implementation.

4. *Dembankané -- Caste, Emigration, Age Groups, Politics*

In this Soninké village in the Department of Matam, irrigation has been enthusiastically adopted: SAED has developed three small perimeters and has been planning to construct two more. But for several years, Dembankané has experienced sustained and violent conflict over access to irrigable land, with questions of caste, national politics and the return of emigrants combining to create a total impasse. The president of the CR of Bokeladji, which includes Dembankané, committed suicide last year, apparently because he was unable to resolve the conflict or, according to our informants, because he was bewitched by one of the competing factions.

The story varies according to the teller, and my informants advised me against going to the CR or to Dembankané itself to seek first-hand information. To summarize: the emigrants to France from Dembankané have been predominantly of the slave caste. As they return with modernizing ideas, they have met resistance from the village elite; it is not clear whether the resistance is to the ideas or to the social status of their proponents. The returned emigrés formed an amicale to promote economic development, and requested land from the CR for irrigation; according to one informant they had to bribe the CR to get the land. SAED developed the perimeter, but the préfet voided the CR's decision without informing SAED. Non-emigrés prepared to cultivate; the emigrés sent a delegation to the préfet to complain but the préfet refused to reverse his decision. Pumping began, a fight broke out and there was one fatality. The pump was destroyed during the fight, and the

perimeter remains unused. The conflict between the nobles and the emigrés has been compounded by intra-Socialist-Party rivalries, and the social division of the village is complete: one informant stated that there were, in essence, two village chiefs now, the traditional one and the leader of the slave-caste emigrés.

4. Mouderi -- Caste, Gender, Politics

Detailed information on Mouderi and the other villages with perimeters in the Department of Bakel is available in the Land Tenure Center's Bakel Discussion Paper Series. A detailed case study of Mouderi will emerge at the end of our research program in June 1989. Mouderi's particularity is that it is by far the most dynamic village in the Bakel area as far as irrigation is concerned, and the dynamism is very recent. Mouderi had a single perimeter from 1975 to 1985; there were several hundred members at the beginning but by the early 1980's membership had fallen to about 30. Now there are seven operating perimeters, with several more on the drawing boards. The original perimeter was intended, like all SAED small perimeters, to include everyone in the village. Membership on the new perimeters is selective.

The second perimeter was the most "traditional:" membership was limited to heads of households; women, even those who had been farming the area before the perimeter was built, were excluded from membership. The five other perimeters are even more exclusionary:

- one for the family and friends of the National Assembly deputy;
- one for the family and friends of the president of the CR himself;
- one for women;
- one for members of a religious sect, Al Fallah;
- one for a youth group.

The two additional perimeters in the planning stage are for another women's group and for low-status people who have been excluded from participation in the other perimeters.

There are two keys to Mouderi's dynamism: the application of the National Domain Law in 1984 and the fact that the president of the CR is a member of a branch of the chiefly family of Mouderi. The president has acted systematically in Mouderi's favor, sometimes at the expense of the claims of neighboring villages. Much of the land on which Mouderi's new perimeters are located belonged traditionally to the chiefly family of Diawara; in this case the president applied the law strictly: no recognition of traditional claims if the claimants were not farming the land themselves. Yet when the neighboring village of Galladé requested a perimeter on land which was traditionally Mouderi's, the CR found a way to refuse them. When the Mouderi women's group requested a perimeter, they received the land, whereas when a similar group in Tuabou made a similar request, the president managed to block them. It is interesting to note, however, that the president has acted to widen access to groups other than high-caste heads of household: other than the two for himself and the deputy, the new perimeters are all for disadvantaged groups -- women, youth and the formerly excluded. It also must be noted, however, that the developmental ideal of village-wide participation is dead, and is replaced by a situation that could be termed, without much violence to the idea, "separate but equal."

5. *Sénoudébou - Guitta -- Village Territories. Caste*

Sénoudébou is the traditional capital of the Bundu region, the left bank of the Falémé River. The Bundu was settled, primarily in the 19th century, by Hal Pulaaren from the Middle Valley. The chef de canton in the colonial era was the head of the Sy family, the landowners of the entire region; the family has representatives in most of the villages to this day, and their control of the land is as strong as ever. Guitta is a neighboring village created within the past fifty years by low-caste people from Sénoudébou, supervised by one Sy family. SAED developed a perimeter for Guitta on Sénoudébou's territory with the latter's authorization, but when it succeeded (and Sénoudébou's did not), a series of confrontations began which resulted in Guitta being forced to abandon the perimeter under threat of armed conflict. Sénoudébou did not take over the abandoned perimeter, and in fact has not farmed its own for many years. SAED constructed a new perimeter for Guitta, but it has not been as productive as the first one was.

The concept of village territories is not recognized by the National Domain Law. The CR is supposed to manage the land of the entire rural community for the benefit of all, and uncultivated land, no matter where it is located, can be assigned to any group who wishes to develop it. In the case of Sénoudébou, however, the president of the CR is a "former" slave of the Sy family and the leadership of both Sénoudébou's and Guitta's perimeters is controlled by the Sy family as well. In these circumstances it is clear that local interests will win out over attempts to enforce the letter of the land law.

III. The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict

While Mauritania's new land law was enacted in 1983, its effects on the Senegal Valley were not felt until early 1988. Within a space of six months, nearly all the irrigable land in the Trarza Region, from Rosso to Lexeiba, was allocated in parcels of up to 300 hectares to individuals with access to the formal credit system, very few if any of whom were residents of the river valley. In principle, only "dead lands" -- uncultivated but irrigable land -- was to have been allocated, but in practice much flood-recession land was assigned to nonresident individuals. Under the law, the previous occupants of the land had no means to prevent the takeover, since they had used the land without any fixed investment and therefore had no tangible evidence of use. The previous occupants were essentially haratines (black Moors, "former" slaves of the beidan, or white Moors), Wolofs and Hal Pulaaren; the nonresident beneficiaries of the allocations are essentially beidan.

The Senegal side of the river facing the Trarza consists essentially of the Department of Dagana, where most of the large-scale SAED perimeters are located. There have been few incidents involving the expulsion or harassment of Senegalese farming on the Mauritanian side in this region. The serious issues are in the Middle Valley, the Hal Pulaar heartland, and to a lesser extent in Bakel. On the Mauritanian side of the Middle and Upper Valley, Senegalese have farmed both walo and dryland for generations, sometimes as far as 70 kilometers inland. Mauritanians have also farmed on the Senegalese side. There have been isolated disputes for some time; for example, farmers from Mouderi were forced to abandon cultivation on dryland in 1975 following a series of harassments (including physical threats and night-time harvesting or

destruction of crops) by both Mauritanian local officials and residents. In general, however, the rights of Senegalese to farm on the Mauritanian side have been respected, until the 1988 crop year.

The 1988 conflict began when Senegalese from villages in the Departments of Matam and Podor were forcibly evicted from their farms in Mauritania by local officials, sometimes at gunpoint. In retaliation, residents of both towns terrorized the Mauritanian shopkeepers, and the Senegalese government began to crack down on Mauritanian camels. Most Senegalese suspect that the Mauritanian actions were a prelude to land-grabbing by nonresident Mauritanians who wanted to do in the Brakna what had already been accomplished in the Trarza, i.e. that the expulsion of Senegalese was a prelude to dispossession of Mauritanian Hal Pulaaren from their irrigable land.

The problem is complicated by a lack of agreement on the location of the border between the two countries. A colonial decree of 1905 stated that the river was the border, but one of 1933 suggests that Senegal extends 10-50 kilometers north of the river. At Independence, an apparently secret agreement placed the frontier at the high-water mark on the Mauritanian bank, but of course Senegalese farmers contend that the 1933 decree is still operative. They claim that Mauritanian farmers cultivating in Senegal have never been harassed in spite of the fact that they are clearly on Senegalese soil. The border was never an issue until nonresident Mauritanians began coveting irrigable land; now it is fairly clear that Senegalese will be forced to withdraw from farming in Mauritania, and the problem on the Mauritanian side will become strictly internal.

IV. Recent Developments in the Delta

The Delta was declared a zone pionnière under the National Domain Law, and land development was entrusted to SAED and its predecessor agency, the OAD. Over 10,000 ha. was developed by the late 1970's in large perimeters, and 8,000 ha. were leased to the Compagnie Sucrière Sénégalaise for sugarcane production. With the completion of the Diama Dam, up to 40,000 additional hectares became available for year-round irrigation, and SAED received applications from individuals and groups for several times that amount of land. SAED began distributing the land, and prepared a cadastral plan of the entire Delta. The New Agricultural Policy and the consequent reduction in SAED's responsibilities led to a 1987 government decision to abolish the zone pionnière and to return control of the land to the Rural Communities.

By 1988, SAED had given out 24,000 ha. of land in the CR of Ross-Béthio to hundreds of applicants in parcels of 5 to several hundred hectares. There was substantially less land given out in the CR of Rosso, perhaps because of the influence of its president, a new-generation, dynamic peasant leader who had organized the highly visible youth group in Ronq. In the CR of Mbane, bordering the Lac de Guiers, nearly all the irrigable land had been given to the CSS or to earlier SAED perimeters. The greatest impact of the 1987 decision was therefore in Ross-Béthio.

In 1988, the CR of Ross-Béthio undertook, with the assistance of technicians from the Ceilule Après-Barrages, a systematic evaluation of the land which had been alienated by SAED. Their goal was to reverse the allocation of all land which had not yet been developed. They visited each parcel and assessed the beneficiaries' progress. Overall, the CR took back a

total of 14,000 ha, or about 60 per cent of what SAED had allocated. Frequently entire parcels were reclaimed, and sometimes only the undeveloped portions: even the CR president's 50-hectare parcel was not immune: the CR took back about 3 ha. The next step, on which the CR is now hard at work, is to determine appropriate use of this substantial area.

Many of the allottees in Ross-Béthio are Economic Interest Groups (Groupements d'Intérêt Economique -- GIEs), a new organizational form sanctioned by the New Agricultural Policy. GIEs are legally recognized entities, and are eligible to receive credit through the CNCA, unlike the GPs on the SAED perimeters. They must have a minimum of two members, hardly a great restriction. The prospects for profitable irrigated farming in the Delta has led to an explosion in the creation of GIEs: there are well over one hundred in the CR of Ross-Béthio alone. Some are composed of urban residents of Saint-Louis and Dakar, but a very large number are residents of the CR. 118 of them have organized a Union of GIEs, for the purpose of seeking foreign assistance directly from donors rather than passing through SAED or the government. Whether they succeed in receiving direct foreign aid or not, this new dynamic is dramatically changing the shape of rural development in the valley toward private, if not strictly individual, enterprise.

While one of the biggest national debates about the Après-Barrages has been the potential loss of land to foreign agribusiness in the style of CSS, there is little evidence that this has begun to occur. Only one large enterprise has requested land from the CRs of Rosso and Ross-Béthio: an American-Senegalese livestock joint venture. The CR of Rosso refused the request of 15,000 ha., and offered 1,000 for a pilot project. As of December 1988, the CR of Ross-Béthio was preparing to grant them about 7,000 ha., half of which would be irrigable and the other half dry rangeland (which could possibly be irrigated from groundwater sources). If the figures reported here are accurate, the CR of Ross-Béthio will thus allocate about one-fourth of its available irrigable land (3,500 of 14,000 hectares) to this one project.

Another of the national concerns about the Après-Barrages is the prospect of the grands marabouts of the Tijani and Mouride sects moving their agricultural operations from the Peanut Basin to the Senegal Valley. According to the CR presidents, this concern has been exaggerated. In Rosso, for example, only two marabouts, one of each sect, have requested land: 200 hectares each for rice production: they were each granted 30 ha. In Ross-Béthio, I was unable to get information on the area not reclaimed by the CR, but the data I consulted did not demonstrate a large influx of marabouts. Thus in the two CRs with the most available irrigable land, it does not appear that the marabouts will gain access to a significant proportion of this valuable resource.

In summary, the recent return of control of Delta land to the CRs has increased the prospects for local farmers to participate in the development of the valley. There is always a danger that CR presidents and representatives may alienate their territory to outside interests and agribusinesses to a greater extent than is desirable for their residents, but the danger is probably less than it would have been had SAED remained in charge.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Après-Barrages has begun, and both Valley residents and outsiders have begun to position themselves to take advantage of the newly available year-round water. The cases discussed here demonstrate the social tensions which have arisen within and between communities as people attempt to gain access to the largest possible share of the irrigable land. The stratified societies of the Middle and Upper Valley have been riven by caste and inter-village conflict, exacerbated in the past year by the apparent loss of farming opportunities in Mauritania. In the Delta, the Rural Communities have begun to take control of their land, but it is premature to predict who the major beneficiaries will be. In all parts of the valley, the New Agricultural Policy has stimulated a great deal of entrepreneurial spirit, and it is essential that this spirit be encouraged to the fullest if the huge OMVS investments are to bear fruit.

There is a great deal that donors and the government can do to stimulate and support entrepreneurship in irrigated agriculture. While it is clearly beyond the scope of this note to discuss the needed infrastructure, credit policy, and extension and marketing services that private agriculture will require, there are land tenure policy questions which should be addressed here. The National Domain Law is probably adequate as a guiding principle, but many details require further consideration.

Land tenure policy must recognize that modern private agriculture is substantially different from traditional agriculture, especially when irrigation is involved. Commercial farmers must invest in land development, equipment and inputs, and must have access to credit and information about technologies and markets. Successful and ambitious farmers may wish to expand their holdings, and others may wish to reduce them for a variety of reasons. The legal and institutional structure should facilitate their efforts. In the West, freehold tenure with accessible land markets and land-based credit systems prevail; these institutions are unlikely to be acceptable in Senegal for some time to come. Still, farmers will have to borrow money to finance production, and land transactions will inevitably occur whether or not the laws permit them.

Under the present system, land cannot be mortgaged to finance investment or the acquisition of more land, and purchases, sales and leases are prohibited. If a person wishes land, he or she must request it from the CR; if a person wishes to discontinue farming, the land reverts to the CR's control. There is no mechanism for one person to transfer land, either temporarily or permanently, directly to another person he or she designates. On the other hand, there is nothing in the law to prevent informal subdivision of holdings through inheritance. Donors can assist the government to think about means of facilitating land transfers under the current set of laws without encouraging the negative consequences of such transfers: the development of a new bipolar structure of large holdings and landlessness.

Another problem which donors and the government should address is the lack of information available on the progress of development in the Valley. With SAED's dépérissement, the principal agency responsible for monitoring the Senegalese side of the Valley will be less able to gather and analyze data; the OMVS staff is much too small and has too many obligations to be expected to be of much help. It is very important that the dynamic processes which are

beginning, especially in the Delta, be closely followed such that successes can be replicated and failures averted in the future. In the past several years irrigation has begun under a great variety of organizational forms (GIEs, Sections Villageoises, Cooperatives, Producer Groups, individuals) and by a great variety of people (residents, nonresidents, returned emigrants, traditional nobles, SAED employees). Some will inevitably perform better than others, and it is important to understand the reasons why if resources are to be allocated in the optimal manner. In other words, support for research and monitoring is required.

A final issue is the need for a formalized system of land registration. SAED has prepared a cadastral plan of the Delta, with maps showing the location of allotments, but no such plan exists in the Middle and Upper Valley. Now that all land is administered by the CRs, there is a danger that inadequate documentation of landholding will lead to an unending series of disputes which will delay land development. While it is probably not cost-effective to undertake a comprehensive cadaster of the entire river basin, some intermediate arrangement of standardized recording and mapping of allotments should be considered. Donor assistance to SAED, the Ministry of Rural Development or the Ministry of Interior, depending on which agency has the responsibility, will be essential in developing and maintaining such a system.

The Land Tenure Center is experienced in addressing these three concerns: policy development, research and monitoring, and design and evaluation of registration systems. It is prepared to assist donors and the government in formulating strategies to deal with the pressing problems of land development and administration in the Senegal Valley.