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LAND TENURE ARRANGEMENTS ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SCHEMES IN SWAZILAND

by

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
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1. INTRODUCTION

There has been no systematic study to date of agricultural production schemes, let alone one which has land tenure as its principal focus. The first task of the research has therefore been to try to identify actual schemes and their location. At the outset, there was some concern that there might not be many agricultural production schemes (APS) in existence, but it was soon discovered that there are many of such schemes, far more in fact than could be systematically investigated, given the time and logistical constraints of this research project.

The broad definition within which this study is operating, defines APS as schemes involving institutional arrangements recognised by the state, which bring collectivities of people together in agricultural production.

The basic principle which has governed this research project, was dictated by the nature of the overall report which the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Centre is aiming to produce. This is an attempt to search for options, which rather than making a set of recommendations, sets out a variety of options with respect to the evolution of tenure in Swaziland, noting the socio-economic costs and benefits of each option. In this connection, the study of APS is important, because it provides insights into what could be viewed as a series of experiments. These throw light on the costs and benefits of a number of options which have already been tried, and which have important land tenure implications.

Land tenure is not only a central issue in rural development in Swaziland, but indeed goes to the very nerve centre of Swazi politics. This is insofar as control over the distribution and allocation of land by the king through chiefs, constitutes an important feature of continued royal rule. The basic principles of traditional land tenure have been thoroughly documented and described by Hughes in 1972, but a decade earlier in 1962, he wrote that traditional systems of land tenure in Africa are "agriculturally most inefficient and are becoming more so every year. Something must change, and soon, if the land in Africa is to make an adequate contribution to the feeding of its inhabitants". Similar views were echoed in the late 1960s by Whittington and McIDaniel (1969), and more recently by Devitt (1982). The problem of instituting land reform can be seen in the Second National Development Plan of Swaziland which stated that "the initiation of far-reaching tenurial changes to remedy (agricultural) defficiencies, would have profound implications for the existing social structure and is not at present feasible". Nevertheless, twelve years on, the Minsitry of Agriculture and Co-operatives' (MOAC) Research and Planning Department noted that "current land use practices in Swaziland leave much to be desired".

Taking political considerations into account, rural development planners and policy makers clearly have to be sensitive to traditional land tenurial practices when seeking solutions to the problems of low output and the threat of growing rural poverty which has been documented by De Vletter (1984) and Guma and Neocosmos (1986). While membership of the community secures land rights for individual men (Hughes 1972, p. 128), this in itself has been insufficient to secure the means of subsistence for rural inhabitants. Notwithstanding the arguments of writers like Hughes and Whittington and McDaniel, rural development strategy has unfolded in the context of the persistence of traditional land tenure practices on Swazi Nation Land (SNL), although these appear in cases to have undergone substantial modifications. There is now a general consensus that the Rural Development Areas Programme (RDAP), a classic improvement/modernisation type rural development strategy, has failed to achieve its major objectives of increasing small-scale agricultural output through the input of social and physical infrastructure. One explanation for this failure has been offered by the Fourth National development Plan which argues that the "solution" to the rural development problem had been institutionalised before issues constitutive of this problem had been comprehensively defined (1984, p. 166).

The kinds of problems raised by the "rural development" question can be found in the work of writers like Low (1983) who has shown how rural homestead productive units have been quick to adapt to technical and productivity-increasing innovation, while not increasing actual output of agricultural commodities. Instead, labour has been released for other opportunities offering higher returns. The Hunting Report (1983), has asserted that the effects of the RDAP, have been an indirect, marginal and inequitable distribution of benefits for people on SNL. According to De Vletter (1984), the RDAP has reinforced economic differences in the rural areas, while having a minimal impact on the rural poor, and benefitting mainly higher resource homesteads (p.24).

It is these failures which have prompted the planners of rural development to search for new solutions and draft up new strategical agendas. Insofar as specifically tenurial issues are concerned, the RDAP has left traditional allocation patterns virtually untouched. Modifications have come at the level of resettlement of communities, conducted in conjunction with traditional authorities, in an effort to try to overcome the problems of land fragmentation, which many critics have cited as a major drawback to traditional tenurial patterns. In the meantime, fencing has become common place, but apparently independently of RDAP initiative.

The kinds of solutions to rural development offered in the Fourth National Development Plan, do not address themselves so much to the problem of socio-economic differentiation on SNL, as to the question of agricultural production. The Plan argues that available evidence shows that profitable "Small-holder irrigated cash crop agriculture programmes can be developed in the rural areas...when modelled on the nucleus/small holder type scheme as seen at Vuvulane" (p. 309). It is further argued that the "approach under the RDA's of schemes with small plots of 0.5 ha or less is not a viable alternative" (<u>ibid</u>). This factual distortion of the average size of SNL plots aside, the Plan's importance is that it is actually arguing for the viability of schemes which involve radical tenurial changes. The "Vuvulane option" would entail far-reaching tenure reform including the privatisation and leasing of land to small-holder producers. But these recommendations are made in the absence of systematic evidence which proves that estate lesees in fact are better off than petty commodity producers on SNL.

Indeed, this study indicates that a wide variety of options exist without necessarily having to formally privatise land, and that some of these experiments have and are proving to be favourable for small-holder producers. At the same time, it should be noted that the findings of this research project question existing formal classification of certain land as SNL, because it is clear that a variety of production processes are taking place on land formally and legally deemed to be SNL.

The findings of this study also pose questions relating to the possible long term detrimental effects on successful production scheme members of limited access to land. There does appear to be some evidence that land shortage is an obstacle to the expansion of some petty commodity producing enterprises on SNL. Nevertheless, indicastions are that problems of low output and productivity are not fundamentally related to the system of land tenure. This can be seen for instance in APS like the Mayiwane Taiwanese assisted maize scheme, Magwanyane sugar scheme and Casalee Tobacco Project's small-holder outgrower scheme, all of which are on SNL, but where clear signs of high output and productivity have been manifest.

2. RESEARCH METHODS

Basic Issues

The research methods employed in investigating land tenure arrangements on AFS, were governed by a number of primary concerns. These were firstly the time factor, with only twelve months available for the research and report production; and secondly the logistical constraints of conducting the research almost solely on my own. It soon became clear, that one year would not be sufficient to systematically conduct rigorous research on a large number of highly diverse schemes scattered throughout the country. Moreover, given the limited budget, it was necessary to work virtually entirely on my own, and this gave rise to a number of logistical constraints. Nonetheless, a research method was evolved in order to surmount these obstacles and to provide an overall picture of the range of variations and hence options, which the different AFS have given rise to.

This involved dealing with a whole series of issues and considerations. Firstly, an attempt was made to address the research to the technical problems of land tenure in Swaziland and hence to pose questions relating to the economic efficiency of certain forms of land tenure. Environmental, demographic and technological factors were considered in assessing the appropriateness of tenurial arrangements in specific schemes. In answering these questions, it became possible to assess how accurate Hughes' assertions are regarding the rationality and efficiency of individual land tenure in relation to the traditional syatem, and the plausability of Whittington and McIDaniel's suggestion that until the problem of giving greater incentives to agricultural producers <u>through land reform</u> is solved, the development of SNL will lag behind that of individual tenure holdings.

Secondly, I have attempted to look at the decision-making process governing <u>individuals</u> in order to assess the progress and success of individual performance within the overall socio-economic system within which particular schemes operate. This has thrown some light on the range of conflicting loyalties which confront individuals in Swazi society on the question of land tenure. Entrepreneurial individuals and/or successful farmers along with representatives of officialdom for instance, tend to express loyalty to the traditional system of land tenure because it is a valued symbol of Swazi culture and unity. At the same time, they are loyal to the urge of a generation aspiring to the values of free enterprise as a sign of success and achievement in the "modern world". I have nevertheless avoided developing a decision-making model relating to AFS in Swaziland, because I believe that there is no "ideal type" peasant farmer from which such a model could be abstracted and constructed. Instead, the research findings have pointed to the existence of a whole spectrum of social and economic differences within rural Swazi society.

Thirdly, I have seriously undertaken to examine the social relationships between people in production, in conjunction with their inter-relationship with the environment. In so doing, I have taken cognisance -insofar as this is possible- of the development of market relations in Swaziland and the manner in which rural agricultural producers have been incorporated into this new market system where production is no longer primarily for use, but also, and principally for exchange. Land tenure on AFS has as far as possible, been contextualised in the structure of social relationships, sources of conflict involved as well as the differences which exist in the ownership and control of resources. I have therefore endeavoured to view land tenure within the overall socio-economic framework of Swazi society, especially its relationship with various forms of production. What has emerged, are signs that the development of private property relations has influenced traditional land tenure practices to an extent where forms and relations of private property exist in cases de facto, if not de jure, on SNL.

With these considerations in mind, a number of basic key questions emerged to inform the research of land tenure arrangements on AFS. These are:

a. Why has a specific AFS emerged in a particular region? Why at a particular time?

b. To what extent have land tenure arrangements influenced the development of AFS, and contributed towards their success or failure?

c. What are the various combinations of social relations/organisational forms/land tenure arrangements governing a particular AFS?

d. Are AFS reinforcing or generating social differences, and what are the forward and backward linkages which are being created between an AFS and surrounding communities in an area?

Answering these key questions for all AFS surveyed (particularly d. above) was difficult given the time and logistical constraints faced. Nevertheless these questions were of great importance in providing a guiding thread to address issues relating to existing institutional constraints, options and opportunities of various AFS for rural development in Swaziland.

Data Collection

In order to answer the basic key questions delineated above, as well as to collect data in line with the research priorities laid out in the projects's Terms of Reference, it became clear that a whole variety of research techniques would have to be employed. The emphasis in this project, given the different nature of the land tenure/organisational forms combinations involved in the various AFS under study, was on the collection of qualitative data. This is because it is both difficult and possibly meaningless to attempt to quantify for comparative purposes a state or Tibiyo farm on the one hand, and a smallholder production scheme comprising members who live in dispersed homesteads scattered over a large area, on the other hand.

One consequence of the time constraint was that it was not possible to collect flow data over a long period which would have been of great importance particularly in making productivity computations, but also in investigating more seriously the labour process and social division of labour within AFS. An effort was made, however, to make more than one visit to some schemes, and to stagger these over time. This did assist in facilitating the development of a clearer picture of some of the problems and issues involved in an AFS.

Insofar as it was possible, I attempted to triangulate, checking and cross-checking information by speaking to as many people as possible about conditions existing in various schemes. Given the time and logistical constraints, I also ahd to rely heavily on observations made in the field, as well as on all available documentary evidence, which was often scant and in cases simply non-existent.

Interviews were conducted through an open-ended questionnaire. In cases, interviews were taped, so that all information supplied by a respondent was recorded and hence stored. However, the tape recorder did in cases serve to suppress the response to certain questions, possibly leading to the fabrication of some information, which in any event is a problem germane to all types of data collection through survey and interview.

The Questionnaire

Even an open-ended questionnaire must of necessity consist of basic questions which are put to respondents, and in the case of this study, these were organised around six fundamental themes, set out in sections as follows:

1. Land tenure arrangements and the Establishment of the scheme.

2. General characteristics of the scheme.

3. Land tenure, organisational principles and production processes.

4. Scheme viability.

5. Marketing arrangements.

6. Problems, comments and observations.

The first section of the questionnaire sought to find out how the scheme was initiated and the process of its establishment. It was here that an effort was made to find out if the scheme involved any innovative land tenure arrangements, and whether or not there were any problems encountered in establishing the scheme in so far as tenurial issues were concerned. An attempt was also made to establish whether or not the inauguration of a scheme involved resettlement of individuals and whether or not they were given compensation.

The third section of the questionnaire delved more deeply into tenurial issues by looking at the relationship between land tenure, organisation and the production processes of various schemes. Questions of membership and inheritance practices facilitated the collection of data on modifications and innovations in tenurial practices, while data on organisation helped to demonstrate the emergence of new social relations within traditional land tenure arrangements.

The other four sections provided important and essential background information on the context of land tenure arrangements on various schemes, their viability, marketing potential of their products, and the various problems which they face currently and in the future.

Through the use of the questionnaire, attitudinal, factual and describtive data was collected, through interviewing both individuals and groups. Observation, and talking to informants who are locals and therefore familiar with the history and development of particular schemes, was in cases also extremely useful. This was because some respondents, although happy to talk about schemes in which they are involved, provided information which conflicts with that of other sources. Subsequent to a visit to the Nyonyane Sisa Ranch for instance, I encountered allegations from two different sources that certain individuals connected to management have used the ranch as a vehicle for private accumulation, keeping numbers of cattle well over and above the maximum ten that is permitted under government regulations.

A number of problems associated with the collection of financial quantitative data were encountered. In the case of schemes under government or Tibiyo management, there was understandably a great reluctance on the part of some managers to make scheme records available. In the case of peasant producers on smallholder schemes, they often are unaware of their precise income and expenditure because they do not think in these terms, and on the whole keep no records at all. There is also the question of trust - such information is not shared with outsiders - and therefore figures supplied were often fabricated. But even when respondents were willing to co-operate, the problems confronting any peasant household survey were experienced. There is a great deal of use-value production which is not realised in monetary terms, because it is not marketed, although it does represent genuine income. Furthermore, peasant producers have a complex multi-source income strategy, while the unit of analysis, the homestead in the case of Swaziland, is difficult to define. Much homestead income is not divided up and distributed in a way that would make quantification possible, while identifying homestead income according to male homestead heads does not serve much purpose either. Given the time and logistical constraints, a compromise was therefore struck. When smallholder data was required, I tried to obtain a rough idea of the returns on the crop or crops involved in the scheme from both management and participants, while attempting nothing more than to get a vague idea from the participants of the role of the scheme's principal product in overall household income and/or use-value production.

3. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SCHEMES CLASSIFIED BY LAND TENURE TYPE AND ORGANISATIONAL FORM

Given the existence of a wide variety of AFS, one of the aims of this research project has been to devise a classification system or typology of the different schemes which exist. As noted above, some of the basic questions which have been addressed, relate to the extent to which land tenure arrangements influence the development of the AFS, and to the social relations and organisational forms which govern them. It is these two criteria which have been central in the development of an appropriate classification system for the purposes of this study, although land tenure has taken precedence as a distinguishing criterion.

Armstrong has isolated three types of land tenure in Swaziland: private tenure land, Swazi Nation Land and Crown (or Government) land (1985, p.2). The historical evolution of this tripartite division - the granting of concessions by King Mbandzeni in the late nineteenth century and the Concessions Proclamation Act of 1907 - have been well documented and need not concern us here. Nevertheless, a certain amount of clarification of the discrete legal categories of land tenure is required.

Private property in land or individual title deed land can be held by freehold title or concession, but since the Land Concession Order, King's Order-in-Council 65 of 1973, all concessions are held at the pleasure of the reigning monarch and as such, land is effectively held under a long term lease. Very few of these concessions titles still exist, however.

Swazi Nation Land is held by the King in trust for the nation, but there are, in purely legal terms, different types of SNL holding. These are traditional, lease, irrigation scheme and Tibiyo and/or Tisuka (Armstrong 1985, p. 9). These are, however, legalistic classifications, but to see all these various distinct types of holding as SNL is not very useful for analytical purposes. This is because the essential relation of customary tenure, the relationship between the chief and the people (see i. below) does not really exist in its traditional form in the case of SNL lease land, Tibiyo/Tisuka AFS and Government Farms purchased under the UK-funded Land Purchase Programme.

i. SNL held under traditional tenure may not be bought, mortgaged, leased or sold and is under the control of chiefs who allocate the land to homestaed heads in the areas which are under their control. Land is usually acquired through inheritance, but may also be obtained through the traditional practice of kukhonta, which entails owing allegiance to a chief.

ii. SNL lease land is private property which has been purchased by the reigning monarch in trust for the Swazi nation, and then leased to private companies. Impala Ranch, leased to Mhlume Sugar Company, Swaziland Irrigation Scheme, leased to the Commonwealth Development Corporation and part of the land used for Casalee Tobacco Project, leased from Tisuka, are examples of this type of SNL holding.

iii. Irrigation Schemes on SNL take a variety of forms. In cases, chiefs have allocated a block of land to a co-operative which then redistributes the land among its members; in other cases, local chiefs have allocated individual plots directly to individual scheme members. In both cases, individual scheme members retain rights over their SNL dryland plots allocated by their chiefs, and do not make payment for land allocated for the schemes which they join, apart from tributary obligations traditionally made by subjects to the chiefs to whom they owe allegiance.

iv. Tibiyo/Tisuka land is land repurchased by the King, and held in trust for the Swazi nation by either of the two companies. Although formally considered as SNL, it may be alienated, sold or leased like private freehold land.

Crown Land is land owned by the government, but following the suspension of the constitution in 1973, all land rights vested in the government were vested in the King. Nevertheless, in practice, the distinction between Crown Land and Swazi Nation Land continues to exist in law: if the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives buys private land for agricultural projects, it is registere as Crown land; if the King buys land and requests the ministry to administer a project on this land, it is registered in the name of the King-in-trust, and is hence Swazi Nation Land (Armstrong, 1985, pp.5-6).

Land Tenure on Agricultural Production Schemes

Schemes have been identified within all the various legal categories identified above, although as closer examination will reveal, the purely legal distinctions do become somewhat blurred in actual concrete situations. Taking land tenure and scheme organisation as distinguishing criteria, it was possible to isolate four broad variant forms of agricultural production schemes. These are Swazi Nation Land smallholder schemes, Swazi Nation Land Tibiyo/Tisuka projects, Government Farms and Title deed agricultural production schemes. These categories may themselves be broken down into a variety of land tenure/organisational forms combinations, as the following typology of schemes indicates.

1. Swazi Nation Land (SNL) Smallholder Agricultural Production Schemes

a. Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives (MOAC) Donor-supported APS

These schemes are supported through external aid, chiefly in the form of inputs, and operated by smallholders under technical supervision from government extension workers. These schemes are on traditional SNL allocated by chiefs - in the case of the Taiwanese-assisted maize schemes on 1 ha plots.

Examples include:

i. Taiwanese assisted maize schemes including Mayiwane and Mahlangatsha

ii. Northern RDA Taiwanese-assisted rice production schemes

iii. Mpuluzi pig-breeding project

b. <u>MOAC-supported Communal Co-operative Schemes</u>

In these schemes, communal allotments have been allocated by chiefs for scheme members. An interesting precedent has been set. In the case of poultry co-operative societies, for example, communal farms have been established, allocated by chiefs for scheme members both from their own as well as from other chiefdoms. These have become the sites where poultry rearing houses and equipment is maintained. Three principal forms of ministry-supported communal co-operative schemes have been established with a varying degree of success. These are:

i. Poultry co-operative societies

ii. Demonstration grazing blocks

iii. Community forestry schemes.

c. <u>MOAC Smallholder AFS, Community Based</u>

These are similar to a. (above), but are initiated within and by the community. They may be largely self-supporting, but may also have government inputs in the form of extension services and/or technical equipment. They are smallholder co-operatives on SNL run with government support (and in cases private sector support if marketing contracts or arrangements exist). The majority of irrigation schemes would fit into this category.
An example of this type of scheme is the Magwanyana sugar scheme in the Lubombo district.

d. <u>Smallholder Schemes with NGO Support</u>

These are based on SNL, and include small-scale poultry projects, community gardens and integrated rural development projects. KaTsabedze, for example is an agricultural training scheme and integrated rural development project on SNL allocated by a local chief near Luve, initiated with help from the Salesian community based in Manzini.

These consist chiefly of:

i. Canadian Unitarian Schemes
ii. Agricultural Training schemes (See also Mission Land, 4 below)

e. <u>Private company/Smallholder schemes</u>

These schemes involve private companies engaged in contract arrangements with peasant producers on SNL. The contracts may be fairly informal, with the private company guaranteeing a market for specified quality produce, and providing various forms of credit, inputs and extension services. One example of this type of scheme is the Casalee Tobacco Project established by a tobacco marketing company in the Shiselweni district. Casalee are currently experimenting on a commercial growing operation near Nhlangano, but their ultimate aim is to provide inputs and marketing facilities for large numbers of tobacco producers on SNL.

Examples include:

i. Tobacco outgrowers attached to Casalee

ii. Cotton producers assisted by South African ginneries

2. <u>SNL Government Farms</u>

a. <u>MOAC State Farms without Smallholder Facilities</u>

These schemes are generally on repurchased land which has been legally registered as "King's Land" since the 1973 abrogation of the Independence Constitution. Consequently, they are on land legally defined as SNL, but are intended to operate as profit-making state-owned enterprises.

Example include:

i. Amanzimnyama Government maize Farm (near Siteki, maize and beans)

ii. Gege maize farm

iii. Mbuluzi Dairy project

iv. Mfumbaneni poultry breeding farm and hatchery

b. <u>MOAC State Farms with Smallholder facilities</u>

These are mainly (if not exclusively) restricted to cattle ranches. These ranches have the same legal status as MOAC farms, but are not necessarily intended to be profit-making enterprises. Instead, they aim to provide facilities to raise the productivity and output levels of peasant cattle farmers on SNL.

The various ranches in existence are set out below:

MOAC Cattle Breeding Ranches:
- Mpisi Farm
- Balegane
- Lowveld
- Shiselweni
- Highveld
- Nsalitshe (under development)

MOAC Sisa Ranches
- Nyonyane
- Nkalashane
- Mlindazwe

MOAC Fattening Ranches
- Mpala Ranch
- Balegane Ranch
- Lavumisa Ranch

3. <u>SNL - Tibiyo and Tisuka Agricultural Production Schemes</u>

The land on these schemes is legally defined as SNL, but projects are run as private, profit-making enterprises. There are two types of project:

i. Those which are owned and managed by Tibiyo and/or Tisuka

ii. Those where land is leased out or management contracts are held by private companies which manage and operate the projects

Examples of Tibiyo Agricultural projects under Type i (above) include:

Malkerns Maize Project
Gege Maize Project
Kubuta Maize/Banana Project
Droxford Farm (Ngwenya) previously Angora Goats
Dumisa Cattle Project
Tjelane Cattle Project
Mpangele Cattle Project
Malkerns Vegetable Project
Tobacco Project (Nhlangano)

Type ii (above) examples include:

Tibiyo Forest Project (Shiselweni with CDC)
Tibiyo Dairy Project

Examples of Tisuka Agricultural Projects under Type i (above) include:

Lochmoi Farm
Malkerns

Type ii (above) examples include:

Casalee Tobaccco Project (where part of the land used for the commercial operation has been leased from Tisuka)

4. Title Deed AFS

a. Smallholder Lease

This type of scheme entails smallholder outgrower schemes in the "nucleus estate" type of arrangement. Vuvulane Irrigated Farms is a classic example of this type of scheme, although the precise tenure arrangements have been confused by the transfer of ownership of the scheme from the CDC to the "Swazi Nation". Tibiyo has now taken over the scheme, but management remains with the CDC. Moreover, scheme members continue to pay rent for their plot. Mphetsheni Pineapple Settlement Scheme is another example. Originally backed by government and a private company (Pineapple Settlement Company), farmers are currently awaiting the title deeds for their land, making this scheme probably the only producer co-operative of its kind in Swaziland (i.e. a small-scale producer co-operative on title deed land). Marketing is handled through contracts with Swazican

b. Private Company AFS

These schemes involve projects where private companies have leased or possibly bought title deed land for agricultural production. Casalee Tobacco company (see 1.e above) has leased formerly derelict farms for its commercial growing operation.

c. Mission Land Schemes

These are chiefly agricultural training schemes and community gardens based on mission land.

Examples include:

(Swaziland Farmer Development Foundation)
Usuthu Mission Young Farmers Co-operative
Mdzimba Young Farmers Training Scheme
St Mary's School of Appropriate Farming Technology
Mahamba
St Phillips
Gilgal.

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4. CASE STUDIES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SCHEMES

The foregoing typology of schemes reveals the great disparity of AFS to be found in Swaziland. It is clear that agricultural producers and planners have a fairly wide variety of options to consider in seeking alternatives to current rural development strategies found largely within the RDAP approach. In order to help explore these various alternatives, some to be found within the ambit of the RDAs and some without, an attempt will be made to discuss the various types of scheme in some depth through the presentation of a number of case studies. This will provide a focus for some discussion of the costs and benefits of different types of land tenure/institutional arrangements combinations, and the options which they provide for rural development.

MOAC donor-supported AFS on Swazi nation land

The high political priority accorded to the maintenance of traditional land tenure arrangements, has led the state in conjunction with foreign donor agencies to devise methods for increasing the productivity and output of smallholder producers, without tampering with prevalent land tenure arrangements on SNL. Statistical research conducted by the Malkerns Research Station and the Taiwanese Agricultural Mission has suggested that output could be greatly augmented through the increased use of inputs and better farming methods. But peasant producers, in order to apply these, would require loans if they wished to increase their use of fertiliser and insecticide (Carloni, 1982, p.2). This has created problems in the past for AFS based on SNL, because the Central Co-operative Union (CCU) has been unable to recover its loans and has withdrawn from lending, while there is little incentive for the Swaziland Development Savings Bank (SDSB) to lend to smallholder producers on SNL.

One attempted solution to this problem was the Credit and Marketing Project for Smallholders which attempted to assist subsistence producers on SNL in 15 RDAs to increase their marketable output. The project concentrated on vegetable and rice production on irrigation schemes and rainfed maize outside the schemes. The project provided seasonal production loans, cropping recommendations and marketing support for roughly 4800 producers on SNL. The Taiwanese Agricultural Mission has played a central role in the development of the project.

According to Carloni's findings, the vegetable and rice package was unsuccessful and rested on a number of dubious assumptions. There are few incentives for SNL producers to grow vegetables and rice during the summer, because green maize requires lower labour inputs and provides a higher rate of return. The expansion of vegetable production is further hampered by low prices since producers are able to exercise little bargaining power with purchasers and have consequently been confronted with recurrent gluts. Similarly, rice production has provided producers with a low rate of return per labour hour on unprocessed rice compared to processed rice for producers who lack appropriate hulling equipment and have thereby been rendered dependent on Tibiyo who monopolise rice milling and marketing in Swaziland. Moreover, unlike green maize, there is a limited local market for rice in Swaziland.

The maize package also proved disappointing, with the increased application of inputs not leading to corresponding increases in maize output, but rather leading to the maintenance of existing output with less male labour. One consequence of this was that seasonal production loans became a mechanism for financing the substitution of male labour. There was often no augmentation of the production of marketable surpluses, while large numbers of participants repaid their loans through the off-farm wage labour earnings of male migrant workers.

Both the SDSB and the CCU have been reluctant to develop alternatives to the use of cattle as collateral for loans, and the use of harvested crop has been treated with caution because of the experience of a high rate of default, rendering the overheads of supervising these loans greater than these institutions are willing or able to bear.

The Taiwanese Agricultural Mission, however, has piloted a new credit support mechanism for smallholder SNL rainfed maize producers, providing an input package which is repaid after the harvest. One such scheme, operating under traditional tenure arrangements on SNL, is a maize scheme under the supervision of the Mayiwane RDA, located nearby the Northern RDA in north Swaziland.

THE MAYIWANE MAIZE SCHEME

Scheme Inception

The Mayiwane RDA was established in 1979, but the maize scheme itself was initiated four years later, in 1983. The scheme should be seen in the context of projects like the Credit and Marketing Project for Smallholders, as well as government efforts to promote self-sufficiency in maize production. Schemes like this one have not been established under community initiative, but have been introduced from above. Accordingly, the MOAC took the decision to initiate the scheme in collaboration with the Taiwanese Agricultural Mission which, as indicated above, had decided to try and assist small-scale producers to increase their maize production through an innovative credit support mechanism.

The MOAC then called upon the staff and management of the Mayiwane RDA to organise the scheme within the community, and to select farmers capable and willing to produce maize within certain specifications. The Taiwanese Agricultural Mission undertook to work closely with government RDA personnel if they could guarantee the co-operation of the producers.

Land Tenure Issues

This scheme is located on Swazi Nation Land already allocated by chiefs to the peasant farmers who were selected for the scheme.

There was no need to resettle anyone in order to make way for the scheme, and members used their existing land allocations. Each producer attached to the scheme is supposed to devote 1 ha of land to the scheme, and with 79 producers involved, the entire scheme occupies 79 ha of SNL. The 1 ha plots are however dispersed throughout the RDA.

Scheme members select the 1 ha of land together with government and Taiwanese extension workers to ensure the suitability of the plot for intensive rainfed maize cultivation. After land preparation, ploughing and planting, RDA extension workers monitor the progress of the plots carefully, ensuring that the maize is produced according to required specifications.

Under the traditional division of labour in Swaziland, men concentrated on land preparation and ploughing, while women dealt with the sowing, weeding, harvesting and post-harvesting processing of the crop. Increasing rates of migration, however, have meant that women have been saddled with the labour tasks formerly executed by men. The reliance on hired draught power to which this has given rise, means that the amount of land under cultivation has decreased, and in the case of female scheme members, there is little time for them to concentrate on land outside the 1 ha employed in the scheme.

The high productivity of the scheme in terms of labour time and output per hectare, seems to be reinforcing the shift in the division of labour on traditional SNL. Scheme membership will more than likely lead to a further outflow of male labour from subsistence agricultural production as current output can be maintained on smaller parcels of land. The 1 ha of land used for the scheme is below the regional average holding, and none of the participants interviewed needed either extra land allocations or to borrow land from relatives or neighbouring homesteads.

(i) Scheme Membership

Scheme members are selected by government extension workers and the project manager of the Mayiwane RDA. When a decision had been taken to establish the scheme, a number of meetings were held in order to explore the operation of the scheme. Although there were some mixed reactions among the community, response was generally favourable, and it was then up to RDA management and staff to select members for the scheme.

This was done on the basis of current performance, and assessments were made of the suitability of prospective members according to criteria relating to output and enterprise of individual producers. This placed homesteads with a low resource endowment and poor current performance at a distinct disadvantage in qualifying for scheme membership. Membership is obtained by individuals, and women can join, and indeed the majority of members are women. It is possible for two members of different households within a single homestead to join the scheme, and a survey of scheme members in the Mkhuzweni area, revealed that two of the most successful scheme members now had their sons join in order to be in a position to devote another hectare to the scheme. Both of these successful members are homestead heads; one a male and the other a female. In the case of the latter, the son was an absentee engaged in off-farm wage labour, indicating that her strategy was to produce a marketable surplus rather than to maintain current output through use of less land under more productive technique.

There are people under different chiefs who belong to the scheme, as well as under different extension workers, and extension workers under different chiefs recruit prospective scheme members. There is clearly no shortage of community members willing and eager to join the scheme, and according to one field officer there are literally thousands of farmers within the entire Mayiwane RDA who wish to join the scheme.

The Taiwanese Agricultural Mission has provided credit to scheme members through the provision of inputs in the first season as a kind of joining fee, although no actual fees were paid. Members have to undertake to make available 20 bags of maize, marketed through the CCU in order to retain membership. The Taiwanese Agricultural Mission then provided fertiliser (6 50kg bags) and seed (25 kg) as well as insecticides for each member, while shelling machines are made available after harvesting. In effect, the inputs are provided as a form of credit which scheme members have to pay back after the harvest each season.

If a member dies, the family may retain membership of the scheme if it so wishes, and there is no obligation for them either to withdraw, or remain scheme members. There are no laws governing inheritance of membership laid down by scheme management, and it is up to the family to name a successor. This is usually done through traditional inheritance practices.

(ii) Scheme Management

Mayiwane management works hand in hand with the Taiwanese Agricultural Mission who according to the RDA project manager are "fully involved in the RDA". They co-operate with MOAC extension workers dispersed in the field. Currently, scheme members operate as individuals in the scheme. There are a number of different community organisations functioning within the RDA, but it has been suggested by RDA management that scheme members form their own organisation in the form of a co-operative. This would clearly be in their interests, as depending on price, the 20 bags of maize can exceed the cost of inputs, and indeed the scheme already has surplus funds currently held in trust by the Taiwanese and RDA officials. Members are keen on a co-operative, and have indicated their willingness to form one, and will be assisted by MOAC officials to draft a constiotution in order to qualify for membership of the CCU.

Response of different chiefs within the RDA has varied towards the scheme. Some chiefs actually joined the scheme, but a few of them later withdrew because of their numerous other commitments. Nevertheless, this has not turned them against the scheme, and they continue to encourage their subjects to belong to it.

Initially there were problems with certain members being unable to meet their obligations of producing 20 bags of maize for CCU collection, and as a result they were expelled from the scheme. Others resented the continual pressure from MOAC extension staff endeavouring to ensure that strict production practices were meticulously observed. Essentially it is the MOAC staff who determine continued membership of the scheme by individuals through the ongoing assessments which they make of members' performance. If field officers feel that producers are not adhering to required standards, especially if no systematic weeding is being practised (which the Taiwanese Agricultural Mission checks on), then they recommend to the Taiwanese that that particular producer be withdrawn from the scheme.

Production and Marketing

According to RDA staff, producers are making a profit out of the scheme because of the 50 or 60 bags that they produce on average each, only 20 are "paid out" to cover the costs of the inputs. They estimated that for the 1985/86 season, an average of 70 bags of maize had been produced per scheme member. Those estimates are extremely high. According to MOAC target figures, it is estimated that on average, 20 bags of maize can be produced from hybrid seeds per hectare on SNL, indicating that the Mayiwane Maize Scheme may be producing well above targeted figures if the estimates of the RDA staff (as well as target figures) are reliable. Most scheme members use their own and family labour, although a few of the producers who were interviewed also hire casual labour from neighboiuring homesteads, offering cash or in kind renumeration.

The Taiwanese Agricultural Misssion's package seems to have basically drawn better off small commercial farmers into the Mayiwane Maize Scheme, but since the Taiwanese do not actually demand any form of security, any small-scale producer could in theory join the scheme. It would be of great use to conduct a more intensive and comprehensive survey of the scheme and scheme members, in order to determine whether the scheme bolsters an already existing class of relatively well to do small-scale commercial farmers, or is an agent of its formation. But the absence of an organised market would seem to put a ceiling on the process of differentiation, and constitutes possibly the chief drawback of the scheme.

The Taiwanese Agricultural mission only guarantees a market in collaboration with the CCU for the 20 bags of maize which have to be produced to a specific quality and ready in time for a specified deadline. Scheme members then have to find their own outlets for the remaining maize, and this becomes a major problem for those (seemingly the majority), who do not have their own transport. They are able to market locally to other peasant families who run short of maize in the form of informal inter-homestead trade, but the aim is eventually to market the maize co-operatively. While informal marketing arrangements may be more lucrative in seeking outlets for small surpluses than an organised market, it is unlikely that the informal market could cope with large surpluses. The absence of organised outlets thus places a ceiling on scheme output, and hinders the very expansion of cash-cropping which RDAP policy makers are committed to.

Problems

It would appear that an overriding problem with this scheme lies in the marketing of maize, although this is not necessarily perceived as such by some of the scheme members interviewed. This is possibly because the scheme is relatively new, and producers are excited by their increased output. They have been able to dispose of surpluses on the informal market and hence have not been confronted with the problems of rotting and weevil infested maize surpluses. Nevertheless, although harvesting and shelling for the 1985/86 season was already well under way when the research was being conducted, maize stocks from the previous season were still being consumed.

The implication is that maize surpluses will become unmanageable unless either adequate storage facilities are developed, or viable market outlets are found. There is growing evidence to suggest that Swaziland faces not a crisis of maize production, but rather one of maize storage. The future of maize schemes like this one at Mayiwane may well depend on the effectiveness of current government efforts to provide storage and market facilities for peasant producers. Failure to do so adequately could prove to be the achilles heel of these schemes which have put SNL into productive use through a practical method of advancing credit. It is still too early to comment on the effectiveness of current endeavours to establish a National Marketing Board, but as the project manager of the Mayiwane RDA pointed out: "They are not sure that they will find a market. It's just an organisation trying to organise the market". While the Mayiwane Maize Scheme is in line with state self-sufficiency in food production strategy, its ultimate success will be determined in both the spheres of production and distribution.

Comments and Observations

The Mayiwane Maize Scheme experiment reveals unequivocally that the assertions of writers like Hughes, Whittington, McIDaniel and Devitt that traditional tenure arrangements on SNL are by definition agriculturally most inefficient, are highly problematic. This is because scheme members are demonstrating that high productivity and levels of output are possible on land allocated by chiefs without the "security" factor which is often quoted as a disincentive by observers operating in the problematic of writers like Hughes et al. There is no evidence that producers in this scheme feel in any way insecure in the absence of permanence of tenure through private property and *de jure* ownership of their land allocations. Furthermore, the Taiwanese Agricultural Mission ahs devised a means of providing credit without smallholder producers having to offer cattle, land or any existing capital assets as security for their loans.

Land tenure cannot, however, be seen in isolation from the various sets of social relations which together are constitutive of agricultural production on SNL. While in a purely formalistic sense it may be argued that the Mayiwane Scheme operates on land formally and legally classified as SNL, it is clear that the total process of production is anything but traditional. With the majority of scheme members being women, transformations in the social division of labour and processes of production have taken place. While comprehensive marketing arrangements have not yet been worked out for producers in the scheme, members have been integrated into commodity relations and the market through the 20 bags which they are compelled to produce as a form of payment for the inputs provided by the Taiwanese Agricultural Mission.

Currently, further engagement in this market is limited by two main factors. Firstly, involvement in the scheme facilitates the upkeep of output of necessary means of subsistence for members by reducing the amount of land devoted to maize cultivation, thereby releasing labour power into wage employment. Secondly, this is not simply a matter of choice and utilitarian calculation, but stems directly from the absence of marketing facilities. If the scheme aims to increase the marketable surplus of maize available for sale in the urban areas in order to reduce dependence on South African maize imports, then the state will have to consider carefully the question of providing price incentives for small-scale producers. Many peasant farmers do not consider the returns on labour to maize marketed through the CCU to be high enough to produce maize on a commercial scale, and even if they do wish to do so, in the absence of transport, there is no way of facilitating the marketing of their surpluses. Moreover, the higher returns on informally marketed maize indicate that if transport facilities were available , these would be used to market surpluses informally in areas of deficit.

The development of a co-operative or farmer's association for the scheme would considerably strengthen the hand of scheme members vis a vis the CCU, but the process of maize marketing experienced in Swaziland as a whole over the past few years suggests that in the absence of storage facilities, there is little incentive for producers to increase output. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the producer price of maize will be raised as long as the country continues importing maize from South Africa where producers have the advantage of relatively attractive state subsidies.

It is the problem of marketing, and not land tenure therefore, which acts as a barrier to the development of projects like Mayiwane RDA's maize scheme, but this does not rule out traditional forms of land allocation becoming an obstacle for individual production units in the future. Homesteads like that of Mrs Dlamini in Mkhuzweni are prepared to draw in more than one household member into the scheme in order to effect a substantial increase in output. She has expressed concern over the absence of an organised market for her maize, but should this be established, her existing land allocation under traditional arrangements may place a ceiling on the development of her commercial enterprise. This constraint could prove to be a disincentive to the development of the scheme in the long run as successful scheme members seek to expand their hectarage. At present there is no mechanism which exists for this expansion other than a member drawing another household member into the scheme.

MOAC-SUPPORTED COMMUNAL/CO-OPERATIVE SCHEMES

At present, there is no apparent move towards the development of communal crop production units on SNL, but this is slowly evolving with respect to livestock and forestry. The MOAC's Forestry Section was established in 1972, and is attemting to develop community woodlots through the RDAP. It aims to establish 13,000 ha of woodlots at a rate of 2,700 per anum, concentrating on donga-ridden areas on marginal land which are fenced off and then planted with suitable tree species. Five forestry nurseries have been established in the Mahlangatsha, Southern, Central and Northern RDA and at the Malkerns Agricultural Research Station respectively. These nurseries provide an adequate source of seedlings for the development of community woodlots. Nevertheless, no funds have thusfar specifically been allocated for forestry development, nor is there land specially allocated for afforestation. This has meant that forestry activities have tended to be limited to isolated activities on SNL. There are areas on SNL where vast wattle jungles can be found, but formal afforestation programmes are largely confined to the Mahlangatsha RDA where a few communal plantations covering some 155 ha have been established.

Group demonstration cattle ranches are a more well established concept within the RDAP on SNL. Four of these have been established; the first of these at Mnyani in the Mahlangatsha RDA in 1976. The demonstration ranches are based on the breeding of indigenous cows with improved bulls. The number of animals permitted in each scheme as well as membership is determined by a herd owners; committee. The land has been allocated by chiefs, but in two of the schemes, Mnyani and Nyakeni in the Central RDA, community residents who are not members of the scheme have registered their opposition because they used to graze their herds on land now fenced off and used by the demonstration ranches. In the case of the Myani scheme, 28 homesteads were resettled under the RDAP's resettlement programme, and 14 joined the scheme with a range area of 370 ha. Although the other 14 would be keen to join, this is not possible for them at this stage. In Nyakeni, the range area is 200 ha, and most homesteads in the immediate vicinity of the fenced area are involved, but the participants' homesteads on the whole are somewhat scattered.

In Magojela, in Mahlangatsha RDA, the whole local community consisting of 48 homesteads working as a group, in involved in a range area of 600 ha. The chief of the area actually advised community members to consider ways of de-stocking, an in conjunction with RDA project staff, a carrying capacity figure of 15 head of cattle per homestead was agreed upon. The 600 ha demonstration ranch is divided into four camps, and the de-stocking programme commenced in June 1983. Cows in milk have been retained at the homestead in order to prevent the interruption of domestic milk supplies, while simultaneously spreading the grazing load. However, it is evident that some animals have been removed outside the RDA under <u>sisa</u>, simply exporting the problem of increasing their potential productivity to another area. One effect of these developments in the area is that the owners of small herds are well placed to keep their productive animals, while those with large herds are having to remove theirs.

Unfortunately there has been no systematic monitoring at any of the four demonstration ranches either by the various committee members concerned, or by government officials, and in order for such an exercise to be of any value, monitoring would have to be carried out over an extensive period of at least five years. Preferably this reaearch would encompass the collection of comparable data in a neighbouring area. Nevertheless, the tenure innovations are of some significance, and could provide a long term strategy to control overstocking and overgrazing on SNL. While there is innovation at the level of land being made available for grazing and in the case of Magojela, restriction on numbers of cattle permitted in the area, control continues to rest with the chief and traditional structures. While the experiment at Magojela is undoubtedly an interesting option, there would bound to be resistance to such arrangements, especially in areas of differentiation where large herd owners would in all probability resist the destocking of their herds.

Existing poultry co-operative societies in Swaziland are a fairly recent development, and insofar as land tenure is concerned, they are important, because they have set an interesting precedent whereby communal productive units have been established drawing in members from a variety of chiefdoms within the four districts of Swaziland. It was for this reason that it was decided to present a case study of a poultry co-operative.

THE FUYANI POULTRY CO-OPEARATIVE

Scheme Inception

The development of existing poultry co-operative societies in Swaziland stems mainly from the marketing problems which confronted hard-pressed small-scale poultry producers, unable to compete either with the larger operations in Swaziland or with the giant South African producers. At the beginning of the 1980s, they therefore began to hold a series of meetings in order to devise a common strategy to solve existing problems. The Poultry Section of the MOAC then advised poultry producers to elect representatives from each region who were met by Mr Arthur Khoza, who at the time was the Permanent Secretary in the Minitsry of Agriculture. He suggested that a central poultry co-operative, along with additional four, one from each district or region be created. Accordingly, the Asifuyisane Central Poultry Co-operative Society (ACPC) was founded in 1982, with offices in Manzini. The ACPC, which acts as a parent body of the regional co-societies, comprises representatives of each regional poultry co-operative which were established more or less simultaneously in 1982. The largest of these is the Tisimeleni Poultry Co-operative situated at the Central RDA in the Manzini region with 160 members, while the Shibane co-operative of Hhohho has around 60 members, and Lubombo's Khutsala co-operative has around 70 members (1). The poultry co-operative in the Shiselweni district

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1. These figures are for June 1986.

is known as the Fuyani Poultry Co-operative, and its actual initiation involved a variety of individuals and institutions, bringing together poultry producers, poultry officers (there is one for each region) and the chief of Mbangweni.

Land Tenure Issues

The chief of Mbangweni made a site available to interested producers, where poultry sheds have been constructed for the rearing of day-old chicks to the age of four weeks. Although the area provided is very small -500 square meters- the concept is interesting, because it has made possible the creation of communal productive units on SNL. Furthermore, it has drawn in producers from a variety of chiefdoms to a productive enterprise situated on SNL under a single chiefdom, Mbangweni. The farm itself is sited at Ntsongeni Impala, where two large sheds, each taking day-old chicks, have been constructed. Having taken the decision to work collectively, members approached the chief of the area who allocated them the site. It was an open, unoccupied piece of land previously allocated as grazing land. The people who had formerly grazed their cattle on this land were allocated another area. The chief made it clear to the co-operative members that if they want to expand at a later stage, he would allocate them more land on the same site to facilitate this.

(i)Membership

Scheme mebership is open to anyone in Shiselweni. There is an E20 joining fee, and each society member is required to purchase shares to the value of E250, but this may be paid in E25 installments. In April 1986, there were 106 fully paid up members in the society, from different areas and under different chiefs in the Shiselweni district. The co-operative has also paid shares into the central co-operative (ACFC), and it is hoped that the ACFC will eventually develop a site which has been bought in Matsapha for the establishment of a processing plant. It is intended that each district will buy shares to the value of E12,500 in the ACFC.

Most members, 98 per cent in the view of the Shiselweni Poultry Officer, are women. This is possibly because traditionally, poultry production is undermined and seen as an activity which can easily be carried out by women, whereas men prefer cattle or crop production. Membership is obtained by individuals, not households or homesteads, and this is for life, with successors named when members join the scheme.

It would be difficult, without detailed research of a good sample of co-operative members in the context of their own communities to determine their socio-economic backgrounds. According to the Shiselweni Poultry Officer, membership is "a mixture of those who are average and those who are poor", but there is a "spirit of unity", where the "average" try to bring the "poor up to their level, showing them how they can increase their income in order to pay the shares". Although he argues that the majority of members are poor, it is difficult to envisage how poor peasant farmers, who indeed in the Shiselweni district are often migrant workers and their families would be able or willing to raise the necessary finance in order to join the co-operative. Certainly, some of the scheme members visited near Nhlangano were entrepreneurs who would belong in the category of successful, well-to-do small farmers.

(ii) Scheme Management

The Fuyani Poultry Co-operative, like all regional poultry co-operatives, is run by a committee of seven members consisting of a chairperson, vice-chairperson and secretary along with five other committee members. Elections are held during the annual general meeting held at the end of the year, but committee members can be re-elected. The present committee was re-elected after having served the society during 1985.

All co-operative members have the right to vote in general meetings, and other non-members from the region are entitled and even encouraged to attend these meetings, although they cannot vote. There have as yet been no expulsions, as the co-operative's laws have not been broken by any member. It is unlikely that expulsions and breach of co-operative by laws will occur until a market has been established if and when the processing plant become operational. It also seems improbable that the ACFC will offer the same purchasing price that members get for their day-to-day informal trade. When conflicts arise in the society which the committee and poultry officer are unable to resolve, senior officials in the MOAC within the Shiselweni region are invited to try and settle them. If the problem becomes acute, then it is taken to the chief of the individual in dispute or conflict. Individuals have, in cases, invited MOAC officials from outside the district to arbitrate in the settling of disputes, but this has not proved to be an effective way of resolving conflict.

Production and Marketing

The cost of production for broilers is similar for the entire country, but in Hhohho and Shiselweni, these are raised by the transportation costs for ferrying feed which are effectively higher. To produce a broiler from a day-old to 8 weeks, costs about E3.27 per bird (at June 1986 prices.) Producers charge E5.50 per bird on the informal market, but can only get E3.30 per processed bird when selling to local supermarkets and cafes which generally import processed chickens from South Africa. In the case of egg production, producers carry overhead costs of about E1.19 per dozen eggs which they sell at prices varying between E1.40 to E1.50. Net profit for the co-operative in 1985, was around E3,000.

Marketing is undertaken principally within the Shiselweni district, and the co-operative has managed to establish regular arrangements with two supermarkets and two restaurants. But these are supplied at different negotiable prices which are not highly profitable for producers, as noted above. In the view of most the ACFC's plant, which itself must be established under government legislation. Registered co-operative members will be permitted to keep their own layers at home, and retailers will buy their produce from egg-collection points co-ordinated by a central marketing or national control body.

Comments and Observations

In terms of the evolution of traditional tenure, there are two ways in which the development of current poultry co-operatives is important. Firstly, they constitute an important experiment in communal production on SNL, where day old chicks are reared to the age of four weeks. Secondly, the concept of a chief making a piece of land available for communal production drawing in subjects from a variety of chiefdoms, is an innovation and provides food for thought for the future development of peasant agriculture on SNL. The fact that the HHohho region has not yet obtained a communal farm indicates that the provision of these communal productive units on SNL embracing a diversity of peasant farmers from different chiefdoms, is not something that can simply be taken for granted.

The actual process of obtaining land can be further illustrated by the experience of the Tisimeleni Poultry Co-operative in the Central RDA, Manzini district. Interested members went to the chief to khonta through the RDA's project manager who was able to explain to the chief the various activities in which the co-operative would be involved. The chief then sent a delegation to the co-operative members to show them the place which he was prepared to allocate them, and the site was deemed to be an appropriate one. The land, which had been previously used for grazing with no one resident on the site prior to the project's inception, is situated adjacent to the RDA project centre. Because the poultry project was the first of its kind, interested poultry farmers were initially unsure whether or not the whole scheme would materialise. This uncertainty created delays and it consequently took sime time before they were allocated the land for the project. Nevertheless, once committed, they were given assurances by the chief that if the scheme showed signs of progress, they would be given more land. So far, there have ben no problems over the communal site, and there is a general feeling amongst both members of the scheme and government RDA personnel that it would be useful if the project could influence the thinking of chiefs in other areas.

While the concept of communal productive units drawing in producers under different chiefs to an area under the control of a single chief on SNL is interesting, the real problems related to land tenure should not be underestimated. Firstly, the poultry schemes should be seen in perspective: they are relatively new and small schemes in terms of the number of members belonging to them as well as the amount of land which has been allocated to them. Secondly, there is an important question relating to the resolution of disputes and conflicts which may arise in the scheme. If such conflicts assumed significant proportions, problems could well arise in resolving them. Those in dispute, for instance, may be reluctant to accept the mediation or decision of chiefs to whom, they may argue, they do not really government poultry personnel, the society is waiting until government is able to legislate uniform prices for birds imported from South Africa, and those produced locally. Nevertheless, co-operative members are encouraged to sell to restaurants and supermarkets because it prepares them for engagement in formal markets.

At present, the co-operative has not outstanding debts. Debts are incurred within the co-operative when four-week old chicks are supplied on credit to members. The money used for buying day-old chicks and feed consists of accumulated shares. The co-operative currently has no bank debts.

Problems

The main problem identified was a shortage of funds, which in the opinion of the Poultry Officer would be used for buying a farm. This is necessary he believes, because of the large number of chiefs in the Shiselweni district. Commenting on the question of traditional land tenure practices where land is under the control of chiefs, he said that this can lead to frequent disputes. He therefore advocates the purchasing of a "real communal farm", an "isolated piece of land" for the scheme under indivudual tenure, because "you cannot go and ask the bank to give you a loan say of E50,000 and hope to offer as security one shed which has been established in a chief's area".

Another problem relates to feed purchased through the Dairy Board. Poultry farmers in the Shiselweni district would find it cheaper and more efficient to purchase directly from nearby factories in South Africa, but require an import permit to do so. There was a feed crisis in November 1985, when the Dairy Board could not supply, and contingency plans had to be hastily formulated as an import permit could not be procured. This was partly due to the absence of a vehicle, since a vehicle registration number is required for the permit. Clearly the absence of a vehicle hampers a number of possible endeavours and activities which could be pursued within the co-operative.

There is a shortage of technical staff for the scheme. There is only one poultry officer per region, with the day-to-day problems in the hands of general extentionists. This makes it difficult to advise poultry producers uniformly throughout the region, particularly in remote areas. This problem has been exacerbated by a shortage of available vehicles. This means that Shiselweni's poultry officer has found himself concentrating mainly on producers around Gege, Hlatikhulu and Nhlangano.

The final and over-riding problem is that of the market, with poultry producers eagerly awaiting government legislation which will facilitate fair competition between small producers and large commercial enterprises. The small poultry producer is looking anxiously at the work of the recently established National Agricultural Marketing Board. According to the Senior Poultry Officer in the MOAC, legislation has been proposed which will give privileges to registered members of poultry co-operative societies. Under the proposed legislation, only birds from the communal farms will be made available for processing at owe any allegiance. Since it is the scheme as a whole, rather than individuals, that has khonta'd for the land.

The future of smallholder poultry production schemes, as in the case of maize schemes, hinges largely upon the question of the market. The Manzini Region Poultry Officer raised some issues relating to marketing problems. He explained that the production level of smallholders is held down both by technical and market constraints. If small-scale producers working within the co-operative structure produced more eggs, they would not be able to store them as they have no refrigeration facilities. They therefore rely on taking the eggs straight to the market where they face a problem of competition from eggs produced in South Africa. The production costs for local smallholders are higher than large-scale South African exporters, and this means that South African eggs are cheaper. At pesent as in the case of processed poultry, there is no legislation to limit the number of eggs coming in to Swaziland from South Africa. Neither is there any legislation relating to producer prices.

Instead, South African competition is also hampering the development of the government-owned Mfumbaneni Breeding Hatchery Farm near Manzini and adjacent to Mpisi Farm, which supplies the poultry co-operatives with day-old chicks. The marketing problems faced by smallholders has meant that they are reluctant to increase the number of birds they handle and as a consequence the hatchery has not been cperating to capacity. Protection for Swazi producers in general, may however, open the way for for large local producers to control the market, because already smallholders are facing competitive problems from large-scale producers like Tinkhukhu Farm and Tabankulu Estates which can and do sell broilers at cheaper rates than peasant producers. Communal production units may provide individual smallholders with an institutional mechanism which would enable them to produce on a scale that would facilitate competition with the larger producers.

In sum, the innovative institutional and land tenure arrangements being developed by the MOAC's Poultry Section do offer some alternatives for the rural dvelopment effort in Swailand. Some consideration could be given to the establishment of communal cropping schemes, but the relative merits and demerits of the demonstration cattle ranches and the poultry co-operatives need to be weighed up. The demonstration ranches concept whereby communal allotments are made available for productive use by a chief to members of his community may provide an alternative with less disruption to traditional arrangements than the poultry schemes. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that appropriate institutional mechanisms will evolve and be developed within the poultry co-operative concept if this is to be seriously considered as a viable alternative.

Given the emphasis accorded by the Fourth National Development Plan to the "Vuvulane model" of smallholder agricultural development, community-based irrigation schemes are an important indicator of the potential for SNL-based schemes to meet the demanding requirements of irrigation scheme management. One basic question which these types of scheme pose, is whether the absence of absolute title to the land discourages investment for agricultural development. In the case of the MOAC and donor supported schemes like the Mayiwane scheme discussed above, the various investments which farmers make in the scheme are on the whole recurrent (i.e. seed, fertiliser etc), but they may also be moveable in the case of various items of capital equipment such as tractors, farming implements or even fencing. On the whole, these MOAC community based co-operatives involve irrigation, and this raises the question of security of tenure in relation to fixed investments.

As has been noted, there are two broad procedures which have been followed in the development of irrigation schemes on SNL in Swaziland. In the one case, chiefs have allocated a block of land to a co-operative or farmers' association, which has then subdivided the land among scheme members, rather the same way in which a homestead head would reallocate land among the members of his or her family. In the second case, chiefs have allocated land directly to scheme members, but in both instances, scheme members have maintained land rights over their traditional allocations.

Furthermore, in both types of scheme, the land is the subject of costly fixed capital investments in the form of dams, pump-stations, canals and land levelling. As Devitt (1982) has noted, having allocated land subject to investments of this nature, the chief "cannot arbitrarily or easily change his mind and allocate the land for other purposes. This is especially the case as the Ministry of Agriculture is often involved in providing substantial material and managerial support to the scheme" (p.8). With land thus alienated in perpetuity to a small group of the chief's subjects, the question arises as to how independently the scheme and its organisational structures can operate in relation to the local traditional authorities. Heilbronn has suggested that this has constituted a source of political tension between irrigators and their traditional authorities. It could also be argued that this is often not the case where chiefs themselves are irrigators and scheme members, although at the same time, chiefs as scheme members could use their traditional authority and standing in the community to effectively block or put a damper on decisions taken by co-operative or farmer association structures.

Devitt goes further, pointing out that one explanation of the poor performance of community-based irrigation schemes on SNL is the "lack of any effective sanctions which could be levelled at bad farmers" (p.14). Hence scheme committees are reluctant to expel members for poor performance because traditionally this is not done as no precedent exists within the framework of customary law for individuals to be deprived of their land on account of inefficiency and low agricultural output. Devitt this argues that the right to exercise sanctions of this nature are the <u>sine qua</u>

non of the achievement of economic viability, for without such a right, there is no avenue through which recalcitrent farmers can be persuaded to observe specific standards of production. If these are not observed, land and water is wasted, while neighbouring scheme members may suffer through the spread of pests and diseases, thus undermining the morale of the scheme as a whole. Hence in larger schemes on freehold title deed land such as Vuvulane Irrigated Farms, managers have insisted on the right of eviction.

It seems clear from the foregoing discussion, that the social relations which underlie land tenure are crucial in the determination of the efficiency of smallholder community schemes. Where chiefs have allocated SNL for a scheme, the hierarchical social relations within which the scheme is inserted will seriously undermine the work of co-operative committees or farmers' associations, particularly where chiefs are scheme members and thus make their presence felt within the organisational structures of community-based schemes. On freehold land, these social relations are replaced by the imperatives of private accumulation which may be more conducive towards the development of productive agricultural resources.

In the case study used to illustrate this type of scheme, it is evident that the presence of the chief as a scheme member has ensured an absence of tension between the scheme on the one hand and the chief on the other. Nevertheless, his membership appears to have had a dampening effect on the capacity of the committee to exerise its authority and carry out decisions in a thoroughly democratic manner.

MAGWANYANE SUGAR PROJECT

Scheme Inception

Magwanyane irrigated sugar project is situated at Nyetane, about 35 km south of Siteki in the Lubombo region. The scheme was an outgrowth of the construction in 1971 of the Nyetane Dam with a carrying capacity of 3,000 acre feet of water per anum. At the time, it was envisaged that the dam would be able to irrigate approximately 100 ha if sugar was to be grown, and about 150 ha if other crops were to be cultivated. The initiative to establish the scheme was taken by a World War II veteran soldier who aroused enthusiasm within the community for the development of an irrigation scheme. The community approached the chief who approved of the proposed scheme and indicated his willingness to allocate land for it. The community did not, however, have the know-how to design a viable irrigation scheme, so government was approached and in 1972, provided an economic and technical appraisal for the scheme. Those in the community who were interested then formed an association and obtained a loan to purchase an engine and piping. A sum of E3,000 was raised and used for procuring a pump, an engine, and for their installation. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture provided nearly E8,000 for the construction of a storage resevoir, canal and lining, roads, terracing as well as for bush clearance and pipeline installation.

Issues Relating to Land Tenure on the Scheme

Magwanyane sugar scheme is on SNL identified by the chief and his libandlancane (committee), who allocated an initial area of 40 ha for the project in 1972. The chief demonstrated his approval for the scheme by joining and being allocated a plot. Part of the land was already in use, some was grazing land, both of which were allocated to members of the community, some of whom wished to join the scheme. Those who had to move in order to make way for the construction of the Nyetane Dam and the establishment of the scheme itself received no direct compensation, but moved voluntarily, benefiting indirectly by being resettled in an area where they could take advantage of irrigation facilities provided by the construction of the dam. By 1976, the size of the scheme had more than doubled in terms of area and membership to 100 ha and 36 members respectively. There are currently 35 members on the 100 ha allocated for the scheme.

The scheme grows sugar-cane on one separate block of land, 54 ha in area, with the remaining land divided equally among scheme members into individual plots used for producing vegetables, maize and cotton. The decision to grow sugar was taken by scheme members in 1977 on account of the marketing problems they confronted when trying to dispose of fresh vegetables, and the success of smallholder sugar producers at Vuvulane. In addition, many of the members had experience with sugar from working on nearby estates, and the close proximity of the scheme to Ubombo Ranches sugar mill in Big Bend, made sugar production a viable proposition. The scheme applied to the Swaziland Sugar Association Quota Board and was granted a quota of 645 tonnes of sucrose per anum for the scheme at large.

(i) Membership

Scheme membership is obtained by individuals, not households, and in the case of married couples, the man and wife are regarded as individual members. There are four married couples belonging to the scheme, with a total of 22 male and 13 female members. Once they have joined, all members are treated equally and female members are allocated land for sugar as well as for other crops. Members are drawn from two chiefdoms, with the bulk of the membership coming from Chief Loyiwe's area where the scheme is sited, and three members coming from Prince Lusekwane's chiefdom.

Originally, members advanced 1 head of cattle each and formed an association in order to obatin credit and thereby received shares in the scheme. Of the 36 members in 1976, two withdrew, because they were not willing to adhere to the policy that no part-time farming would be permitted. Membership is obtained for life unless the scheme's rules are broken, and then expulsion may take place. When a member dies, membership is passed on through traditional customary procedures of inheritance, although when members join, they are supposed to name a chosen successor. In practice however, it is always the family who decides on succession. Plots cannot be subdivided. Most members are over 40 years of age and some are too old to involve themselves personally in the scheme on a daily basis. More than half of the scheme members have land outside the scheme.

(11) Management and Organisation

The size and capital investment in the scheme, has seen the evolution of a fairly elaborate management structure. The scheme joined the CCU in 1976 and became a farmers' co-operative, but did not make use of the marketing and accounting services provided by the CCU. The interest shown by the Ministry of Agriculture through its initial contribution to capital and later recurrent costs through the allocation of a budget of E170,000 over 8 years in 1977, saw direct government involvement in the management of the scheme, and a project plan was drawn up. This led to the extension and improvement of the existing irrigation system, the installation of a domestic water supply, the construction of buildings and the provision of a tractor hire service.

The ministry also provided techhnical staff for the implementation of its project plan. This included a manager (initially an expatriate volunteer); an agricultural extension officer and a construction and tractor team. The manager's role was to supervise and train the extension officer and other technical staff, to advise the Magwanyane Co-operative on crop husbandry techniques and to liaise with Ubombo Ranches' sugar mill. Nevertheless, as noted by G. McCann (1981), the first manager of the scheme, "the main objective of the project was that the farmers should run the scheme themselves and that the Ministry would be able to withdraw completely, except for the presence of an AEO"(p. 13).

Scheme members are represented by a six person committee headed by a chairperson, vice-chairperson and internal secretary, originally elected by members each year, but now every two years. This committee is responsible for the resolution of conflict, but where it fails, the chief can be called upon as a scheme member of authority to take action to resolve a dispute. The scheme has also hired a book-keeper to assiste the committee in the maintenace of records.

At inception, it was intended that all members would participate full-time in farm production activities, and the co-operative in fact established a policy to fine members E1 per day for non-attendance. Nevertheless, members are permitted to hire labourers to work on the scheme if they are unable to attend in person. The pattern which has evolved is that increasingly members hire labourers to work on the sugar cane plots, and concentrate their own efforts on their own private maize, vegetable and/or cotton plots attached to the scheme. One problem with this pattern has been that the government extension officer has often had (insofar as sugar production in particular is concerned) to supervise labour hired by scheme members, rather than to impart technical knowledge relating to fertiliser application, pest control, weed control and irrigation maintenance to scheme members.

Production and Marketing

Scheme output has passed through two principal phases, firstly with irrigation and without sugar production, and secondly with sugar production. During the first period, McCann has estimated a total return of E717 to each farmer per anum against a potential revenue for the actual cropping programme followed by Magwanyane scheme members, of E3696 per anum (pp.20-21). He cites the unorganised vegetable market, uncertain prices and serious labour shortages in the light of off-farm employment opportunities, as possible reasons for the non-realisation of such incomes.

In 1978, during the second period, the co-operative was granted a loan of E42,000 by the SDSB which was guaranteed by the CCU. The loan was used for the scheme's capital purchases and crop inputs and had been repaid by 1981 when the scheme's cumulative balance became positive at about E30,000, according to McCann's data (p.27). His estimates to 1984 show a steadily increasing cumulative balance of approximately E377,000, but in reality this situation failed to transpire. He estimated that in 1983, the scheme would turn out 730 tons of sucrose generating revenue from sugar sales of about E215,000, when in fact the scheme only produced 465 tons, for E92,432. This figure was lower than the 1980 figure of 497 tons valued at E94,937. Revenue generated from sugar production plunged further after Cyclone Domoina destroyed the dam. In 1984 it stood at E84,000 and in 1985 it fell further to E69,000.

Sugar is marketed at Ubombo Ranches, while cotton is marketed through the Cotona Ginnery in Big Bend. There is still no organised marketing system for vegetables produced by scheme members, and it remains up to individual growers to secure their own marketing outlets. Outside buyers do come and purchase vegetables directly from the scheme, and informal local markets are exploited for vegetable production.

Problems

Magwanyane irrigation scheme, after the initial wave of optimism generated by engagement in the sugar market, is faced with serious problems. The most immediate of these is the destruction of the dam by Cyclone Domoina in January 1984. Unless this is repaired and restored, the future of the scheme is in jeopardy. According to present chairman of the co-operative Mr Bhembe, "Without water, the scheme is already dead. Now we are growing no vegetables and the sucrose content of the cane we are producing is very low. The scheme was very successful and helped me as a farmer to increase my income, but without the dam it is dead".

Apart from cyclone damage, however, the scheme does appear to have suffered other setbacks. Clearly it has failed to achieve output figures targeted by the first manager. He argued that "the farmers have seen the benefits of management and have opted to continue to employ it themselves" (McCann p.37). Nevertheless, the manager hired by the scheme, misappropriated the scheme's finances and it was decided that scheme members should fulfil these important functions on their own. It would require an in depth time-study which is beyond the scope of this research project , to determine the success or failure of this system of management whereby one member is elected as supervisor by the co-operative.

One problem relating more directly to land tenure centres on the ability of a democratically elected co-operative committee to function effectively on SNL. As noted above, it was intended at inception that all scheme members should participate in scheme activities on a daily basis. Thus far, the committee itself has not been able to take action against abseteeism, and according to McCann (p.34), all committee decisions are vetted by the chief or his representative. Since the chief himself is an absentee member, the lack of action is not suprising. Hence even if the rules of the constitution are violated, in practice it seems difficult for disciplinary action to be taken given the control which the local chief exercises over land tenure.

Comments and Observations

The case study of the Magwanyane sugar project points to the fact that it is not SNL conceived of in a narrow technical sense which makes for low productivity and output. By 1981, the co-operative was producing sugar-cane on 54 per cent of the scheme's cultivated area, thus relieving earlier marketing problems and securing a steady source of income for scheme members. It is not the question of security of tenure which explains some of the problems faced by the scheme. Rather it is the social relations of SNL which have served to inhibit the development of the project. McCann who served as manager of the scheme in its crucial formative period following the granting by the Swaziland Sugar Association of a quota for the project, made the following observation:

> "...those that control the membership should be more responsible for the behaviour of the farmers. It appears that the chief in the area is happy to enjoy the personal benefits of the scheme, but is not taking action with regard to what is interpreted as lack of commitment to the project. Swazi society is traditional and hierarchical and thus it should be relatively easy to impose a code conduct on the scheme members" (p.39).

As noted above, McCann is referring specifically to the case of absenteeism and the incapacity for the committee to implement disciplinary action due to the chief's control over committee decisions effected both by his membership of the scheme and his authority within the community. The fact that the chief is himself involved in the scheme would suggest that he may be viewed as a progressive chief who has in no way attempted to impede or block development in his area. Indeed the chairman of the committee has stated that in times of crisis, the chief has in fact helped to hold the scheme together. Thus it cannot simply be argued that the success of schemes such as this one hinge on the personal qualities of individual chiefs. One possible

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conclusion and lesson which may be drawn from the scheme therefore, is that the institutions and structures of traditional authority and land tenure do indeed provide certain institutional barriers to the development of agricultural resources.

Another important issue emerging from schemes of this nature on SNL, relates to the question of the social division of labour. Available evidence suggests that as in the case of MOAC donor-supported schemes on individual plots, involvement in these community based schemes has led members to hire outside labour thereby releasing members of the homestead labour force into more lucrative wage employment. If off-farm labour is available at a cheap rate - and given the close proximity of the scheme to the Mozambican border and the large number of Mozambican refugees in the Lubombo region, this appears likely - then in all probability homestead labour resources will be released into other activities.

Hence the Magwanyane sugar scheme has shown the capacity for innovations on SNL to lead to high productivity and increased output levels. At the same time, however, the development of the scheme suggests that traditional land tenure arrangements have at least partially been responsible for the creation of barriers which have prevented the scheme's organisational structures from implementing democratically formulated policies. Moreover, despite the new opportunities created by the scheme for engagement by smallholders in agricultural development, the familiar shifts in the social division of labour on SNL appear to be occuring on the scheme. Increased productivity and output have allowed homestead labour to seek alternative off-farm wage employment.

PRIVATE COMPANY/SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SCHEMES ON SWAZI NATION LAND

Schemes under this category, involve private companies engaged in contract farming arrangements with peasant producers on SNL. There is a growing thinking amongst development planners throughout the developing world that smallholder outgrower schemes and contract farming arrangements can provide alternatives for rural development. Hence writers like Glover (1985) have attempted to demonstrate the technical efficiency of contract farming schemes and the positive role they can play in overall agricultural development. While these arguments need not be dismissed as far as they go, they have tended to ignore the analysis of the relationship between smallholder producers and the transnational companies which engage in contracts with them. Those writing within a dependency position like Dinham and Hines examine this relationship which they see as being exploitative, but they tend to overlook the fact that contract farming has benefitted certain smallholders, generating rural differentiation and in cases, enabled local capital accumulation to take place in a variety of ways. Buch-Hansen and Marcussen (1982), presented evidence which contradicts the dependency position by demonstrating how outgrower schemes in Western Kenya have led to significant levels of capital accumulation, benefitting sections of the peasantry and leading to social differentiation.

Contract farming and outgrower schemes entail a relationship between smallholder agricultural producers and agribusiness which in cases is in partnership with the local state (Neocosmos and Testerink, 1985). Agribusiness tends to control the most profitable sector which is the marketing of agricultural commodities. It also restricts smallholders to a production process which it indirectly controls while generally managing the scheme and providing technical services and other means of production, as well as credit to peasant farmers on favourable terms. It is not therefore merely the presence of a contract which is significant, but the monopoly power which agribusiness exerts over the market and which structures the relationship between smallholders and agribusiness.

Outgrower schemes transfer the major investment burden and risk to the producers who may be the prime sufferers when world market prices fluctuate. Outgrower schemes also free agribusinesses from labour management, while the peasant farmer is under pressure to increase the length of the working day over and above that which is possible under plantation conditions. In this way, the role of agribusiness resembles that of a landlord in some parts of the world.

In Swaziland, outgrower schemes and farming contracts are entered into on both SNL and freehold title deed land. Those schemes on SNL are both dryland farming operations as well as under irrigation, especially in the Northern RDA where rice production takes place. The rice is grown with the assistance of Taiwanese inputs and extension services, and sold on contract at a fixed price to the Tibiyo Rice Project. Tomatoes grown on irrigation schemes in the north have also in the past been sold to a South African cannery through contract arrangements.

In the south, South African companies, particularly the Pongola-based TransNatal Cotton Ginnery offer inputs and extehsion to dryland cotton growers in return for a guaranteed price. Hence some cotton producers market in South Africa instead of through the Cotona Cotton Ginnery in Big Bend. Indeed it would appear that a wide variety of contract farming arrangements exist on SNL in the south of the country - one peasant farmer interviewed sells cayenne pepper on contract to a South African Durban-based firm.

In Shiselweni, a tobacco project recently established by Casalee Pty. Ltd., has encouraged an outgrower scheme. Casalee has leased a number of private farms, but is primarily concerned with encouraging smallholders on SNL to produce their dark-fired cultivar, guaranteeing prices which are more favourable for smallholders than the traditionally air-cured variety which has been grown for about 50 years by SNL and title deed farmers in the Shiselweni region.

Government has encouraged tobacco cultivation, and in 1975, it launched an intensive production campaign to stimulate tobacco output on SNL. According to Dlamini (1985), tobacco producers on SNL have been offered bonuses and other material incentives, but the overall trend has been a decrease in air-cured tobacco cultivation. This is reflected in MOAC data which shows a decline from 200 tons produced in 1975/76, to 63 tons in 1982/83. Dlamini offers three major reasons for this decline: the development of Taiwanese assisted maize schemes which offer an attractive alternative to tobacco production; the disaffection of tobacco producers on SNL with the Swaziland Tobacco Co-operative in Nhlangano; and the arrival of Casalee with its own cultivar.

The Swaziland Tobacco Co-operative is controlled by freehold title deed farmers and membership favours producers who produce substantial quantities of tobacco each year. This is because the co-operative makes two payments to tobacco growers. The first includes recovery of money spent on farm inputs as well as profit, while the second is aimed at encouraging maximum production of the crop and favours well-to-do farmers who have sold a good crop in that crop season. This payment is known as an "agterskot", or an extra bonus offer after initial payment (Dlamini 1985, p.27). The prevailing situation was therefore in ways favourable for Casalee who have been able to draw on the experience as well as discontent of SNL tobacco producers.

CASALEE TOBACCO PROJECT

Establishment of the Scheme

Casalee Tobacco Project was formally established in 1983. Casalee Pty. Ltd., a Belgain-based company owned and managed by ex-Zimbabweans, conducted a number of surveys throughout southern Africa in the early 1980s in order to establish favourable locations for tobacco growing projects. The scheme is already well established in Malawi, Zaire, Zimbabwe and in the South African Venda "homeland". Casalee's surveyors found conditions to be ideal in southern Swaziland, and as a result, they decided to go ahead and establish a project in the kingdom.

Land Tenure Issues

Essentially, Casalee is a tobacco marketing company and its main aim was therefore to find small-scale peasant producers for its dark fired or smoke cured variety of tobacco. With an initially cautious reaction from smallholder Swazi farmers experienced in tobacco cultivation, Casalee decided to pilot its Swaziland operation through leasing land from private owners. Accordingly, they went in search of derelict farms and eventually secured 120 ha of land for cultivation on three separate farms situated fairly closely together near Nhlangano. Two of the farms belong to the Swazi Nation through Tibiyo and Tisuka respectively. The 20 ha Tisuka farm was leased on a similar basis to the main 50 ha farm, but the Tibiyo farm only came under Casalee management for the first three years, while a Tibiyo counterpart manager was being trained.

With the initial caution of smallholder Swazi growers, Casalee was able to find only 6 willing farmers during its first year of operation (1983/84). According to Dlamini (1985), the company "spread the rumour that the cultivar which the farmers had been growing, would no longer be accepted at the co-operative", (p.28) and that the recommended "Groot Swazi" cultivar had been changed to the "Dark Fire" cultivar. The Tobacco Co-operative failed to clarify the issue and a number of farmers abandoned their crop. Nevertheless, with its superior handling and marketing capacity over the local tobacco co-operative demonstrated through the experience of the 6 smallholder farmers who grew with Casalee during the 1983/84 season, the number of interested smallholder tobacco growers began to grow steadily. In 1984/85, the number of participants grew to 25. By 1985/86, the number had grown even further to 150, and this season there are an estimated 410 growers. Of these, 225 are in the Mahamba/Nhlangano area, 110 in Mahlangatsha and 75 in Makupheleni and Ngwempisi. A number of the experienced growers continue to cultivate the traditional or "Groot Swazi" variety alongside Casalee's cultivar, because they feel a greater sense of membership in the co-operative where they are issued with membership cards reflecting production and sales for particular seasons.

(i) Membership

Small farmers who wish to grow with Casalee, do not have to enter the scheme via their respective chiefs. Casalee have hired a manager specifically for the perposes of recruiting smallholder farmers into the scheme. He does this through RDA project managers who facilitate meetings between Casalee management and potential tobacco producers. At these meetings, Casalee is able to explain the terms under which it operates.

The company offers tractor hire services at E20 an hour for ploughing, and provide this service along with certain other inputs on credit. Fertiliser may be supplied on credit at 10 per cent interest, but the sawdust required for the smoke curing process is provided free of charge. Seeds are also supplied free, but seedlings are available for late starters at 30c per 100. Casalee planted about 30 ha of seedlings this season (1986/87).

If smallholders are interested in joining the scheme, Casalee management visits their homesteads to check on their land, and drying facilities. They must have shed or hut facilities specially for the curing process which will ultimately determine the quality of their final product. Management also checks the soil before admitting an applicant to the scheme.

Thus far, according to management, there has been no opposition by chiefs to the scheme, and the chief of Makupheleni is actually a grower himself. This is probably largely due to the fact that growers operate on already allocated land, and do not require extra land in order to join the scheme. The average size of each grower's plot is estimated at 1/8 ha, but there are a number of cases where large parcels of land are used. One farmer near Mahamba has 7 drying sheds, and could cultivate up to 2 ha this season; a number around Nhlangano have planted up to and over 1 ha.

Casalee is not particular about who joins the scheme from a homestead, and more than one member may join using separate parcels of land if they wish. Management estimates that 75-80 per cent of their growers are women, and only about 2 per cent of male growers are young men. Scheme participants decide for themselves which parcel of their land that they wish to use, and once they have planted their crop, Casalee tries to monitor their plots. Management and Casalee's 3 field officers try to visit each participant producer at least once a month in order to keep track of their progress. Many of the participants have considerable experience in growing air cured tobacco, and although as noted, some still grow both varieties, there was unanimity expressed over the higher returns which Casalee's dark fired variety brings. Speaking to farmers clearly revealed that Casalee offers a source of cash for subsistence farmers who may otherwise have limited ready cash sources.

Casalee prefers dealing with smallholder producers to its commercial operation, because they believe that intensive cultivation on small plots ultimately produces a better quality crop to that grown on a large scale. Smallholders work hard, using their own sources of labour, and in this way Casalee is able to concentrate more on the marketing side of its operation. This reinforces what we noted earlier about typical contract farming arrangements between agribusiness and smallholder producers.

Ideally, Casalee management would prefer it if all scheme members produced on contigious fields, and pointed out that their very successful project in the South African Venda "homeland" is conducted in this manner. They also stated that exploratory negotiations had been held with the CDC on the possibility of introducing mixed cropping on communal blocks under a leasing arrangement. Management does face logistical problems when trying to assist and market the product of farmers producing as far as 70 km from Casalee's base in Nhlangano. Nevertheless, they do not favour an operation which would site tobacco fields far away from homestead residences, as tobacco requires intensive cultivation in order for a top grade crop to be produced.

(ii) Management of Casalee's Commercial Operation

Casalee's commecial operation involves a fairly substantial investment with capital assets estimated at E350,000. These were all financed by Casalee itself. The company has 2 managers, 1 who oversees the project as a whole and who manages the commercial farms, and another who concentrates on the smallholder growers. Casalee also brings in about 3 assistant managers for roughly 3 months of the year to help plan and co-ordinate the marketing side of the project with the other tobacco growing operations in the southern African region. There is a single clerical worker, 3 field officers concerned primarily with the smallholder side of the operation and 4 tractor drivers. Unskilled workers selected, paid and directed by management in conjunction with 2 farm foremen, are hired on a seasonal basis. Most of these are hired from the surrounding community, and according to management, "labour is readily available". Many of the labourers observed were children -both boys and girls- and were paid at a rate of E3 per day (management did not specify the length of the working day). No housing is supplied for the workforce.

Production and Marketing

During its first two years of operation (1983/84 and 1984/85), the company incurred substantial losses, but in 1985/86, Casalee's fortunes began to change and it broke even. It turned out 170 tonnes of tobacco as opposed to the 60 tonnes the previous season, and its target for 1986/87 is 250 tonnes. Given the adverse weather conditions of low rainfall levels during this season however, it is unlikely that this target will be achieved.

A new manager was brought in at the end of the 1985/86 season, and he believes that the early losses can be partially attributed to managerial problems as well as to extensive damage to crop caused by hail. He also cited soil acidity as a possible long term problem in the operation both on the commecial farm, and for smallholder producers. In order for the project to achieve viability, ideally yields of 1500 kg per ha must be produced and smallholder producers must be able to turn out the equivalent of at least 1 tonne per ha.

Should production levels continue to rise, Casalee plans an expansion of capital outlay in terms of plant space on the farm of new shed facilities for drying, and possibly a factory for handling and packaging. This may materialise, since conditions in Swaziland are ideal because of the availability of sawdust which is crucial to the curing process. At present, handling and packaging is conducted in South Africa, and the product is exported through Durban to Belgium and sold to the international Gallagher group.

These arrangements contrast with those of the Tobacco Co-operative whereby tobacco is sold to manufacturers in South Africa with Swaziland's allocation being determined by the South African Tobacco Board. When sufficient quantities are available, the South African Board instructs the co-operative where tobacco should be delivered hence allocating quantities of each grade among South African handlers. Only a small proportion of tobacco is sold locally.

The marketing side of Casalee's operation presents few problems, as Gallaghers want a supply of up to 1,000 tonnes. Hence even if output is trebled, there is greater demand than supply. The entire final product is sold in Europe, and presently the Swaziland operation constitutes around 10 per cent of Gallaghers' market. With the quality of Malawi's product falling, management believes that the potential of the Swaziland project is limitless, but its ultimate success will depend largely on the uptake of tobacco cultivation by SNL farmers.

Comments and Observations

The policy priority accorded to contract farming and outgrower schemes raises a key question as to whether or not the creation of such schemes can be achieved merely through policy decisions. This seems unlikely, as they tend to depend on agribusiness which is often better equipped to handle the marketing side, for the major investment. Even if government is favourably disposed towards the establishment or outgrower schemes, it cannot choose to introduce them on a large scale without entering into a partnership with or providing conditions conducive towards agribusiness investment.

The Casalee operation has demonstrated that it is indeed possible for contract arrangements to exist on SNL, but management referred frequently to the success of the scheme in the Venda "homeland" in South Africa where production takes place on communal blocks of land. This may be because stricter leasing arrangements facilitate greater control by agribusiness over smallholder production. Under prevailing conditions it is not possible for Casalee to ensure that strict agricultural production standards are adhered to. For instance the company cannot insist that tobacco growers reside on their farms for specified periods, and scheme membership can only be loosely defined in terms of whether or not a smallholder is engaged in tobacco production during a particular season. Concern was also expressed by management that smallholder growers are scattered over such a large area. This is a problem which any contract farming schmeme on SNL is bound to encounter and imposes serious logistical constraints on management.

SNL holdings under traditional tenure place a barrier on accumulation for successful smallholder tobacco producers insofar as they are unable to expand their production to a scale that would enable them to obtain investable returns on their tobacco crop. Hence even if the decision to grow tobacco is "entrepreneurial", under SNL conditions it is clear that for the majority of growers, prices received less deductions for repayment of loans provide little investable savings. This situation is exacerbated from the growers' perspective inasmuch as there is no open tobacco market leaving little opportunity for entrepreneurial initiative. The consequences as Currie and Ray (1986) have shown in the Kenyan case is that contract tobacco farming has consolidated the growth of a class of agricultural smallholders whose household production is sustained only at subsistence level.

This would suggest that in general, contract farming on SNL benefits agribusiness more than smallholder producers. Casalee management gave a clear impression that a major priority in seeking smallholder growers is that this arrangement would reduce company costs and transfer the overwhelming burden of risk to the producers themselves. Furthermore, the contract farming arrangement avoids the conflicts generated by socialised production. Hence management argued that the Tibiyo operation was a good idea because Tibiyo is less likely than Casalee to be constrained by Swaziland's labour practices and regulations.

In sum, it could be argued that agribusiness can integrate and utilise traditional land tenure and other economic practices to expand commodity production without destroying them. In this way, SNL producers become locked into a situation where they may produce efficiently, but are unable to take advantage of this to expand their productive units into economies of scale and profitable ventures. Instead, cash generated from tobacco sales serves largely to maintain and reproduce household consumption at

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subsistence level.

STATE FARMS ON SWAZI NATION LAND

The establishment of government farms in Swaziland is traceable to the recommendations made by the Land Mission to Swaziland in 1969 under the chairmanship of R.E.T. Hobbs. The commission included representatives selected by the British and Swaziland governments and examined the issue of land tenure in Swaziland in a manner that would suggest ways of resolving existing problems rather than rekindling the historical disputes underlying the problems of land tenure. The Hobbs Commission Report which resulted from the land mission's study, made a number of recommendations, central to which was the inauguration of a British-funded project which would repurchase underutilised freehold land.

The commission concluded that the Swazi people were precluded from obtaining a satisfactory standard of living from agricultural production on the existing area of SNL, but that land acquisition alone would not enable them to obatin a reasonable standard of living. It therefore recommended that land development as well as changes in the patterns of land use and agriculture go hand in hand with land acquisition. At the same time, it was argued that "Swaziland should do all in its power to encourage economic development outside peasant agriculture and to take advantage of the private capital and enterprise which may be available to this end" (Hobbes Report, 1969, p.50). In arguing for a land acquisition programme, the commission stressed that it should be Swaziland Government policy that, on the whole, only undeveloped land should be acquired and that land questions must be viewed in economic and not political terms. It was also specified that "security of tenure to the individual must be a pre-requisite" (p.51) and that freehold land being efficiently farmed should not be "ignored and in the fiuture, sufficient funds must be made available so as to ensure its optimal development"(p.50).

More specifically, the Hobbs Commission Report identified land in excess of 240,000 ha in the ownership of non-citizens of Swaziland as a target for purchase, and an additional 140,000 of underutilised land. The implementation of the recommendations of the Hobbs report led to the inauguration of a Land Purchase Programme sponsored by the Government of Swaziland through grant-aid funds from the United Kingdom. This must not be confused with the continuation of the pre-independence repurchasing of land by the monarchy, mainly through Tibiyo and Tisuka. By 1983, close on 115,000 ha of land valued at E4.76 million had been purchased. The Hobbs report anticipated a total cost of E6 million for the purchase of all the land identified.

No specific legislation was promulgated to implement the Land Purchase Programme, but land which has been bought under this scheme is registered in the name of the King-in-Trust and therefore becomes SNL (Armstrong 1986, p.4). In effect this means that certain areas of freehold land are registered in the name of the King-in-Trust for the Swazi Nation. Some of this land has been purchased and is adminsitered by Tibiyo or Tisuka, while land which has been repurchased under the Land Purchase Programme is administered by the MOAC. Some of this land has been made available to land hungry chief and comes under the RDAP, while other substantial portions have been used for the creation of state farms. The fact that repurchased land is SNL rather than freehold title deed land is of legal significance, because certain statutes exclude SNL from their operation and therefore do not apply to this land. It is also significant to note that registration of repurchased land as SNL is contrary to the recommendations of the Hobbs report which stated that "The development strategy the Mission would advocate is one which takes advantage of new land acquisitions to introduce new systems of land planning and land use"(p.49). The report also argues that land acquisition will provide the possibility for significant areas of the country to "be brought under control from a land use, and particularly, from a stocking point of view" (p.50).

To this latter end, that is the question of stocking, the report devoted much attention and recommended specifically that land be provided for the establishment of ranching schemes "involving numbers of individuals grouped together either under co-operative or other principles"(p.51). Some of the land repurchased under the British scheme has been made available for community use through the group demonstration ranches described above, although as noted, this has been allocated to the control of chiefs. But the largest land holdings have been used for the creation of government cattle ranches, although some of these do offer facilities for smallholder peasant cattle farmers on SNL.

There are three types of government cattle ranches: fattening ranches, breeding stations and sisa ranches. There are three government <u>fattening ranches</u> at Mpaka (9090 ha), Balegane (6184 ha) and Lavumisa (13,820 ha), all of which are in the lowveld with each staffed by MOAC Veterinary Department personnel. Balegane and Lavumisa fattening ranches were procured through the Land Purchase Programme and although in theory the ranches are open to all Swazis, in practice they are selective and are used by freehold as well as SNL cattle owners. SNL owners are charged 65c per beast per month, while freehold owners pay 75c. Animals usually stay on the ranches for 8 to 10 months and are not supposed to stay longer than 18 months. In practice, however, some steers stay for longer and some cows calve down on the ranches and end up remaining there with their calves for a long period. The Hunting Technical services <u>Livestock Industry Development Study</u> claims that "influential people run herds of cattle which do not fit into the fattening concept, thereby interfering with good management practices"(p.75). It also maintains that the ranches are not overstocked and could handle many more animals than they do if the rules were strictly adhered to, and stock was only permitted to stay for the minimum time needed to improve condition and put on weight.

When animals are ready for slaughter, or when the ranch manager decides that an animal is in peak condition, notice is sent to the owner and after 30 days the animal is auctioned, although the owner may withdraw an animal for private sale to a butcher. Management fees are deducted from the proceeds of the sale. Mortality rates are low on the ranches (2-3 per cent) which assume no responsibility in the event of the death of an animal which is entirely the owner's loss. Nevertheless, grazing conditions are far superior to those on most of SNL and cattle owners are well aware of the benefits of the ranches for their cattle in terms of improvement in general condition and weight gain.

There are five government breeding stations which are engaged in the production of performance-tested breeding bulls for loan to competent farmers through the Veterinary Department of the MOAC. The breeding stations are smaller than the fattening ranches: Mpisi is 1,943 ha, Balegane 1,012 ha, Highveld 2429 ha, Shiselweni 2591 ha and Lowveld 4,048 ha. Bull pools are held at Mpisi and the Lowveld breeding stations while Mpisi also operates a dairy unit utilising Freisland cattle. Mpisi, Lowveld and Balegane hold mainly Nguni and Brahman, while the Highveld and Shiseiweni ranches concentrate on Nguni and Simmentaler.

Cattle owners have access to the breeding station via district livestock extension officers who list the number of bulls in demand. This list is then forwarded to the data processing unit which is responsible for progeny evaluation on the breeding stations. According to the Hunting livestock study, too many bulls are held in the bull pools, while there are too many immature males on the ranches in relation to the demand for bulls. Demand for bulls is limited to the number of applicants qualifying for the loan of a bull under the National Beef Production Programme terms which although simple, in practice virtually exclude SNL farmers from qualification. Applicants must have plenty of fenced grazing pasture to qualify, for instance, which is virtually impossible to obtain on SNL where cattle are grazed communally. Furthermore, an applicant who is ineligible for the loan of a bull, does not qualify to purchase a bull for his/her own use. Peasant cattle farmers on SNL can only hope to qualify to loan bulls through the RDA's whose bulls could be held in fenced off group demonstration ranches.

There are currently two government sisa ranches, Nyonyane and Mlindzwe which are operational, while a third is being planned for Nkalashane. The aim of these ranches is to make more land available for cattle on SNL, but under properly managed ranching conditions. Management of these ranches falls under the direct control of the Veterinary Department. It is because at least ostensibly, the sisa ranches are the most accessible for smallholder cattle owners that it was decided to present a case study of the Nyonyane Sisa Ranch.

NYONYANE SISA RANCH

Scheme Inception

The Nyonyane Sisa Ranch was established in 1978, and cattle were introduced in 1979. The land was procured through the Land Purchase Programme from private owners. In 1983, land previously allocated to the Balegane breeding station was offered to the Dairy Board which was unable to use it, and this land, formerly Edenvale Farm, was also transferred to the sisa ranch. The main area of the Nyonyane Sisa Ranch was originally a mixed pastoral and crop farm. The previous owners used to keep sheep, goats and

cattle and grew rice along the banks of the Nkomati River which flows through the ranch. These activities have been abandoned by the MOAC.
Shortly after the official opening of the ranch in 1979, it was closed in order to facilitate the removal by government authorities of numerous squatters from the ranch. Some of the squatters moved, but others -four at present- remained on the ranch. The issue of squatting highlights the problem of the formal classification of repurchased land as SNL, for there are no real precedents in customary law for this type of eviction of people from SNL. Ranch management was also faced with the problem of refencing part of the land, as large sections were rotting and new fencing had to be purchased.

Land Tenure Issues

The Nyonyane Sisa Ranch is 17,430 ha in size with a grazing area of 11,300 ha extending through two major topographical regions, from the lowveld up to the highveld. The land is divided into 66 cattle grazing camps of varying size, the largest of which is about 640 ha. Although formally defined as SNL, the scheme is managed by officials from the MOAC and not by a cattle owners' association or co-operative. When the ranch was opened, cattle owners were permitted to bring 10 cows each on to the ranch. They have been allowed to leave the female progeny on the ranch after weaning, and in practice this has meant that certain individuals have been able to keep animals in surplus of 10 on the ranch.

In managing the cattle on the ranch, ministry personnel cross-breed the animals with Brahman and Simmentaler bulls. Traditionally, the custom of kusisa involves a reciprocal relationship whereby individuals release some of their cattle, usually to members of their own lineage, who look after the animals and in return are able to make use of their various products. Reasons for cattle being sisa'd may include the fact the recipient lives in an area where cattle thrive, or a large livestock owner may be approached by a relative who is short of livestock for milk and draught oxen and obtains cattle in sisa. No payment is made for services rendered by those looking after the cattle, unlike in the sisa ranch concept where the fundamental aim is to improve the performance of livestock in Swaziland through cross-breeding programmes. Accordingly, farmers have to pay a fee for services rendered. This was initially set at E1 per beast per month, but government later felt that this was too low and decided to double the fee to E2 per beast per month. In practice the fee is not paid on a monthly basis, but annually. In cases where a farmer does not have enough cash to pay off his account, he can sell one of his beasts to cover management costs.

(i) Membership

Cattle owners were originally informed of the scheme through the media. Interested owners then had to apply for a permit from the Veterinary Department, and having obtained one, they were required to transport their animals personally to the ranch. This

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obviously excluded poorer peasant cattle owners who clearly do not have the necessary resources readily available to transport their cattle to the ranch in order to obatin membership of the scheme. Nevertheless, in theory, any cattle owner on SNL can join the scheme, provided that there is space on the ranch. In June 1986, the ranch was not accepting any animals -and had not been doing so for about a year- because of overgrazing problems. This was a result of successive years of drought which had led to the death of many animals. Management was then compelled to cull a number unproductive cattle. In June 1986, the scheme had 3,133 head of cattle which means that the scheme was carrying 1 livestock unit per 3.6 ha. In the view of the Hunting consultants, the carrying capacity of Nyonyane Ranch is 2,404 livestock units (defined as a dry cow of 450 kg with a 3 per cent of body weight daily intake) or 1 livestock unit per 4.7 ha.

Scheme management are not held directly responsible for the loss of an animal. This has occured through disease, and a few cattle have fallen victim to crocodiles in the Nkomati River. In cases such as these, cattle owners are informed and are not required to make payment for management fees, but they receive no recompensation for animals lost and they are kept on the ranch entirely at the owner's risk.

Scheme members are drawn from all over the country and all four regions. According to ranch managers, there are many cattle owners interested in joining, but existing ranches simply do not have the space to accommodate them. This would imply that animals brought to the sisa ranch prove to be far more productive than those of the average SNL cattle owner, and that the animals bred on the ranch are far superior to those bred outside. Cattle mature rapidly on the ranch and can be sold in a short period of time. Bull calves born and raised on the ranch can be sent to the Balegane Fattening Ranch to be sold, and the returns on this are far greater than those that could be obtained raising cattle at home. Other calves retained within the ranch are in a position to breed within two years, and that is clearly an asset to the owner.

The ranch has had drop outs, and people have decided to take their animals out of the scheme for various reasons. In some cases, according to management, this is because members have bought their own private farms, indicating that scheme membership has been lucrative for certain individuals. Some people have withdrawn their cattle from the scheme in order to pay <u>lobola</u> for their wives, while others felt their animals were not benefitting because of the drought. Certain owners lost animals because they brought very old animals which were not able to survive under prevailing conditions.

Individuals become members of the scheme upon delivery and introduction of the animals on to the ranch wherupon they are issued with a receipt. Membership is retained for as long as an individual is prepared to pay management fees. Once an animal grows old, management notifies the owner and advises that the animal be withdrawn or disposed of in the manner chosen by the owner. If a member dies, management simply waits for the next of kin, decided through customary or any other means to take over the membership, and the scheme has no rules of inheritance of its own.

(ii) Management and Organisation

As noted, management and organisation of the scheme is under the entire control of staff and officials of the MOAC. Currently the scheme employs a ranch manager, an assistant ranch manager, a farm foreman, two tractor drivers, a clerical officer and a recorder. In addition, 52 permanent workers are employed, and are engaged in maintenance of the road and construction of the resevoirs. the scheme also hires casual labourers who numbered 20 in June 1986.

Ranch management holds regular meetings with ministry officials. Occasionally these officials go directly to the ranch to obtain reports on its progress, but regular meetings are held at three month intervals with managers from different ranches and senior officers from the MOAC's livestock section present. At present there are no regular meetings between management and scheme members. According to Nyonyane management, a meeting was once held in each district, but this was not regularised. Nevertheless, it is the intention of the MOAC to call a meeting for interested cattle owners in order to explain to them the policies of the ranch, and it is hoped that seminars and field days will be arranged for members three or four times per year. This will provide an opportunity for members to raise their problems with managers and raise suggestions about the future operation of the ranch.

The ranch has an awkward relationship with surrounding members of the community on SNL. This stems from the eviction of squatters when the scheme was established in 1979. These people were resettled outside the ranch in the surrounding community. According to the foreman of the ranch, the squatters ultimately "realised that their eviction was not our own responsibility, rather it was the result of government policy. They eventually saw the benefits of the ranch and some even introduced their own animals into the scheme". The squatters were in fact allocated land twice following the government's purchase of the ranch. Initially they were provided with an area of land on the highveld region of the ranch, but registered their objection to this, and the government then decided to resettle them outside the ranch. This amounted to the recompensation they received for being resettled.

Production, Marketing and Funding of the Scheme

If members wish to sell animals being held on the scheme, they inform management who then transfers them to the Balegane Fattening Ranch for sale. Cattle owners are informed of the date of the sale so that they can attend if they wish to, and they are then sent a cheque. The ranch is not permitted to conduct sales on its own, unless an owner comes with a buyer, but most of the cattle are sent to the fattening ranch for sale. The number sold depends on the number that have been weaned. The ranch conducts two weaning sessions per year and its policy is that calves develop the necessary managerial skills. Owners would continue to pay a grazing fee for their breeding stock on the ranch at a level which would cover all operating costs.

It is clearly desirable that cattle owners begin to play a more dynamic role in the management of their stock on sisa ranches. There are strong indications that scheme members feel this need themselves, a fact which MOAC staff have also conceded to. But if these ranches were to incorporate poorer small cattle owners as well, it is evident that Nyonyane Sisa Ranch's assistant manager's suggestion that sisa ranches be introduced throughout all the districts in the country, should be taken seriously. This would make this type of facility more accessible to less well to do cattle owners. In the meantime, classification of Nyonyane sisa ranch as SNL remains purely formal, with <u>de facto</u> private freehold tenure relations being practised.

Other Government Farms

While government cattle ranches, at least ostensibly, have facilities for or offer services to farmers both on SNL and freehold title deed farms, there are a number of government operations which are run as purely commercial ventures. These state farms have been repurchased under the Land Purchase Programme, and like the cattle ranches are regarded as SNL in formal legal terms. Nevertheless, it is commercial capitalist relations rather than the familiar relations found on SNL which characterise their operations. Exceptions do, however exist, and a pilot schmeme on the southern wing of the Amanzimnyama maize farm near Siteki has made land available to some 20 smallholder farmers from a neighbouring chiefdom.

Although as noted, the Hobbs commission report did state clearly that economic development outside peasant agriculture should be encouraged, it did not recommend specifically that state farms be established. At present there does not seem to be any clear cut MOAC policy on the future of these schemes, whether they will ultimately be transformed into intensive smallholder settlement schemes, or remain as state run farms; but it was felt that it would be useful to try and take a close look at one of these state run enterprises in order to assess the viability of this strategy and hence determine whether or not it provides an option for future development initiatives. Accordingly, a brief study was undertaken of the Amanzimnyama Government Maize and Bean Farm.

AMANZIMNYAMA MAIZE AND BEAN FARM

Scheme Inception

The Amanzimnyama Government Maize and Bean Farm was formally established in September 1984 on a number of farms repurchased from the Du Preez family under the Land Purchase Programme. The two Du Preez farms were purchased in the 1980-81 financial year weaned on the farm are sent to the Balegane Fattening Ranch for sale. They usually take about 100 calves at a time, so that approximately 200 are sent to the fattening ranch each year. The scheme is funded solely by government. Membership fees are directed straight to the Treasury and do not come to the scheme itself. Government provides the funds for staff salaries, maintenance and all recurrent costs. If the scheme needs to purchase inputs or equipment, this is done through the animal husbandry office in Manzini. This leads to delays in cases when the animal husbandry officer is unavailable.

Problems

The farm foreman and assistant ranch manager identified a number of problems with the scheme. One of the main probelms in their view is the absence of a comprehensive road network on the farm, and that the farm is so mountainous. The original owner of the ranch made use of a bulldozer and a grader and in this way was able to control fire by maintaining fire breaks and access roads. Government has not maintained these and there is no grader available for use by ranch managers. As a result, the main road on the ranch is in appalling condition, and as the farm foreman put it "you can hardly bring your Mercedes Benz here".

Furthermore, the communication between the ranch and the Veterinary Department is poor and irregular. The ranch has no telephone and if management encounters a problem - for instance a diseased beast - it is not possible for them to contact Manzini. Without adequate vehicles - in late 1986 only one lorry was running- it is not even practical for management to keep up regular communication with nearby ranches in the Balegane area. This means that management is compelled at times to take decisions on its own, although in practice it is not supposed to do so.

Overall, however, government personnel seem to feel that the sisa ranch concept is significant and has an important role to play in agricultural production and rural development by enabling Swazi cattle owners to improve the productivity and quality of their livestock. They believe that the MOAC should attempt to develop this type of project countrywide and try to provide at least two sisa ranches in every district. The need for expansion, they argue, can be seen by the number of animals from different districts currently held on the ranch.

Comments and Observations

The Hunting livestock report has recommended that the Nyonyane sisa ranch be taken over by a proposed Swaziland Ranching Corporation (SRC), a non-profit making association which would be wholly government-owned. The medium term objective they believe, is to pass on the ranch to an owners' association with supervisory and planning services available at an agency fee by the SRC. But this would come about following an interim period of efficient SRC management when cattle owners who introduce cows to the ranch would work collectively with SRC management in order to for a total of E320,000. The scheme in its present form has been supported by funds drawn from the EEC Food Aid Account and was inaugurated at short notice without thorough planning, according to farm managers. The farms are highly arable with vast land suitable for grazing.

Land Tenure Issues

The Swaziland Land Purchase Programme Review (1983) gives the total area of the Amanzimnyama farms as 6,665 ha, but this only covers the eastern wing of the farms collectively referred to by ministry officials as Amanzimnyama. This also includes the Falata Ranch which they refer to as the southern wing, that was purchased for E145,000 and is 2,548 ha in size. The Amanzimnyama Maize and Bean Farm is to all intents and purposes run as a commercial venture aimed at increasing the country's self-sufficiency in maize production. Nevertheless, during the 1985/86 season, a section of the southern wing of the farm was divided among 20 smallholders who have each been assigned 10 ha plots.

The smallholders have been drawn from Chief Loyiwe Maziya's chiefdom in the Mapungwane area and have been chosen according to strict criteria by the MOAC based inter alia on reports from extension officers and ministry officials who have noted the farming abilities, use of technologies and general efficiency of the smallholders concerned. This is still in the experimental stage, and no data is available at the time of writing, but if successful, the experiment could be extended to the eastern (ex-Du Freez) wing of the farm. The Lubombo extension officer who manages the Amanzimnyama scheme seemed to be torn between conflict of maintaining high production levels which, under direct government control, he believes could contribute towards food self-sufficiency, and government's role of supporting and working with "the nation" through the development of the peasant farming sector. The smallholder plots on the southern wing are devoted to maize and bean cultivation, although one smallholder planted a certain quantity of cotton during the first season.

The government farm manager maintains that the Amanzimnyama farm has an area of about 728 ha of arable land, but during the 1984/85 season, only part of this (329 ha) was used. The 728 ha of arable land covers all farms on the eastern and southern wings. On the eastern wing, there are four farms with a total area of about 500 ha situated closely to one another. Nevertheless, the eastern and southern wing are very far apart. One reason why only part of the arable land was used during the first season, is the late start noted above, which also contributed to inappropriate equipment being brought on to the farm. The tractors used for ploughing were not suitable for the ploughs themselves, for instance, and when there was an obstacle in the soil, the ploughs were pulled off, making for an inefficient ploughing operation. Weather conditions were also adverse to germination with the late rainfall patterns that have characterised most of Swaziland, and the Siteki area in particular where the farms are sited, over the last few years.

The project makes use of government equipment. Some of this was made available by the Land Development Unit, and some equipment like used tractors donated by USAID which were not being fully utilised by the RDA's, was brought onto the farm. This gave the scheme a total of 9 tractors, two disc harrows, 10 ploughs, 2 planters, 1 inter-row cultivator and 1 boom sprayer.

(i) Management of the Scheme

The scheme is directed by a co-ordinating committee which oversees the general direction of the project and takes some of the major decisions such as purchase of capital equipment. This committee includes a number of individuals who are not officials of the MOAC: two officers of the Defence Force which has a camp nearby the farm and the Lubombo Regional Administrator. The ministry is represented by the Deputy Principal Secretary who chairs the committee, the Under Secretary responsible for projects, the Chief Projects Co-ordinator, the Senior Extension Officer for the Lubombo region and the Lubombo Extension Officer who acts as farm manager and secretary of the committee.

The farm manager heads a management team comprising an assistant extension officer who acts as an assistant manager and is permanently resident on the farm. There is also a foreman and two headmen to supervise the farm labour force. There are 7 tractor drivers and initially the mechanisation unit from the Land Development Unit helped with maintenance of farm vehicles, but the closure of the unit has created a vaccuum in maintenance of equipment. The labour force is employed on a seasonal basis, and during the 1984/85 season, management estimated that 200 people from the surrounding community had been employed on the farm. This figure is highly variable and is determined primarily by the farm's output.

Production and Marketing

Management was able to provide comprehensive rcords for the 1984/85 season which are set out below:

Project Costs 1984/85 (emalangeni)

Fertiliser	28,968
Seed (maize and bean)	9,853
Fuel	17,168
Oil	1,529
Grease	33
Spares	6,327
Chemicals	34,179
Labour	29,783
Equipment	
Furrow planters (2)	11,552
Cultivator	1,290
Tarpaulin Sheets	9,757
Total Project costs	149,575

All of the above costs were paid for by funds drawn from the EEC's Food Aid Account. Originally, management projected that the scheme would produce 658 tonnes of maize, but due to adverse weather conditions, the actual output figure was 490.7 tonnes. In addition, 600 kg of beans were produced of which 180 kg were sold, while the rest was used for replanting the following season. Estimated losses for the scheme during 1984/85 were put at E20,000.

Some of the maize produced on the scheme was marketed through the Swaziland Milling Company, but the scheme also sells maize to the public who may purchase their supplies directly from the scheme. According to management, there is no problem in disposing of their maize, because there is an overall deficit in the region. The same applies to beans, all of which were sold to the local community following the 1985 harvest.

Problems

The manager of the farm set out a number of problems and constraints, some of which relate directly to losses incurred during the 1984/85 season, and some of which are more general. The losses of the first production year were put down chiefly to drought which was particularly severe during December 1984 when the maize was at the sensitive tassling stage. These problems were compounded by witchweed which according to the farm manager causes damage "no matter how efficient you are in the management of the crop". The scheme also lost crop to wild animals, including warthogs, monkeys and baboons which are protected by law and that cannot therefore be killed.

Another problem accounting for crop loss was theft. According to the farm manager, members from the surrounding community on SNL help themselves to part of the crop. This was particularly severe on the southern wing, but on the eastern wing, the presence of the Swaziland Defence Force which has a camp nearby and actively assisted management in policing the crop, reduced losses to theft. SNL livestock were also quoted as having led to losses. The late and hurried start to the project meant that the farm's inadequate fencing was initially ignored and this allowed SNL cattle in search of grazing land to enter the farm premesis.

At a more general level, the manager felt that the project needs to hire clerical staff to deal specifically with the purchasing, accounting and payment of the labour force. At present all these tasks fall to him, and he feels that he needs at least an accounts clerk to deal with the finances in order to give him more time to manage the farm operation itself. He currently has an extraordinarily heavy work load and sometimes is compelled to work late into the night on clerical tasks.

The purchasing procedure also leads to difficulties. At present, there are 3 signatories able to issue cheques for payment. These are the Director of Planning and Research in the MOAC who keeps the EEC Food Aid Account cheque book, the Chairman of the co-ordinating committee and the Accountant General. Two signatories are required in order to obtain required funds. Farm management has to negotiate with the supplier for goods on credit and the invoice is then taken to headquarters for payment. But as the farm manager pointed out, this procedure is very costly and some companies do not like issuing cash invoices without payment on the spot. So if, for instance, a tractor needs a basic spare like a bolt, the manager has to rush to Manzini because there is no other way or effecting quick purchases. He feels that this problem could possibly be solved if some kind of purchasing authority could be issued to the scheme, perhaps through negotiating for accounts with more companies than those with which the scheme presently holds them (Tracar, John Deere, Swaziland Farm Chemicals).

Generally, the impression gained was that the farm manager feels his hands are being tied by his having to take care of fairly small tasks which could quite easily be delegated to juniors. These deflect his energies from the principal taks of general management of the production side of the operation. He also believes that he should have greater decision-making power:

> "I know I have to take a decision some time, but if it involves a lot of money, i have to refer it to someone and it takes quite a long time for a decision to be made. I think there has to be somebody responsible for the project that has to take a decision there and then on certain things that we need. But if the controlling body is a committee, then it means that it has to sit down and discuss things. The chairman can decide, but he has to report back to the committee. So at times takes rather long for a decision to be taken after something has been reported...Perhaps a general manager should be there to take general decisions to say, for instance, that we will finance this, or we will not finance that."

<u>Comments and Observations</u>

Third World governments in general lack the necessary capital as well as sufficently adequate technical and possibly managerial skills required to promote rural development schemes characterised by the provision of infrastructure to develop commodity production or the planning and financing of large-scale production schemes. This is equally true for the establishment of state farms and the development of agricultural production schemes based on peasant agriculture. Schemes like the Amanzimnyama Government Maize and Bean Farm require major inputs of agricultural machinery, seed and fertiliser which are beyond the capacity of the state budget to sustain on its own. International financiers and donors have an interest in promoting export crop production, as well as production for the local market which will lead to greater self-sufficiency in food production.

These are general interests which are shared with local governments of particular states, and this commonality of interests can lead to the development of different agricultural schemes in various countries. In the case of Swaziland, the Hobbs commission and the resulting Land Purchase Programme has led to the emergence of state-managed forms of capital on enterprises on land formally classified as SNL. These are large, costly operations supported by foreign finance. It is still too early to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the Amanzimnyama Maize and Bean Farm, because losses incurred during the first production cycle are no adequate yardstick for the evaluation of the enterprise. Nevertheless, the early indications are not too encouraging. The farm is vast, and is clearly being underutilised- huge areas of pasture land highly suited for grazing cattle lies idle, while available arable land itself has been underutilised. The management structure leaves farm managers on the ground in the uncertain position of not being able to take on the spot decisions which are crucial to the success of a large farming enterprise. As has been noted in the case of the Nyonyane Sisa Ranch, awkward bureaucratic procedures are a problem germane to state run enterprises in Swaziland and these can lead to unnecessary delays and losses in output.

One possible option would be to lease out these farms as Tibiyo and Tisuka have done (as in the case of Casalee), but this would undermine the government's stated commitment to the peasant farming sector on SNL. The scheme on the southern (Palata) wing of the farm needs to be monitored for progress, but if such settlement schemes were to be established on a wide scale, the specifically tenurial issues which they would raise would have to be addressed. The present set up whereby the land is classified as SNL would be problematic if settlement schemes drew in members from all over the country, as it would be the MOAC and not a chief that would be in control of land allocation. This would run counter to traditional arrangements, and it seems there would be little point in handing over the land to a chiefdom once plots have already been allocated. Settlement schemes which would eventually give legal title to successful peasant farmers would provide these farmers with the kind of incentive which may well lead to high output and productivity levels.

Nevertheless, the political risks would be great, because these schemes could lead to the growth of a class of peasant producers independent of the traditional structures of land allocation and control. This would make the issue of land privatisation a bigger priority than it is at present, both for small-scale rural agricultural producers and for the international financiers of rural development in Swaziland.

TIBIYO AND TISUKA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SCHEMES

Tibiyo TaKangwane was initially established in 1968 following the reinvestment of mineral rights to the King in trust for the nation as enshrined in the independence constitution. The first committee appointed by King Sobhuza II to administer Tibiyo soon became aware that royalties and mineral fees would provide inadequate finance. They therefore decided to embark on a policy of joint investment with foreign capital and the acquisition of shares in major companies. Loan arrangements were negotiated with foreign investment partners and the result was a series of agreements, secured through United Nations and Commonwealth-backed legal assistance, with Lonrho (Ubombo Ranches), Turner and Newall (Havelock Asbestos Mine) and Spa Holdings (Royal Swazi Spa Hotel). The cash flow which followed enabled Tibiyo to enter the field of land purchase and development, thus pursuing King Sobhuza II's strategy developed in the post-World War II period through the Lifa Fund, of repurchasing for the Swazi Nation land lost to concessionaires. By 1982, acquisition of land and improvements accounted for E3.6 million or 11.2 per cent of Tibiyo's accumulated funds (Tibiyo Takangwane, 1982).

In 1976, King Sobhuza II decided that royalty fees previously received by Tibiyo should be transferred to a new organisation called Tisuka Takangwane. Tisuka has invested in housing, property and agriculture on land repurchased by the Royal family, and in the 1980s has begun to evolve as a paralle institution to Tibiyo. Since the inception of Tisuka, Tibiyo's activities have been financed by its commercial and agricultural investments through dividend payments from its shareholdings and other income generated through these projects. Its largest expenditure has been in the agricultural sector where it has invested as a participant in the sugar and forestry industries. It has also undertaken its own agricultural projects, but participant ventures represent a far larger slice of accumulated funds, standing at E30.6 million or 60 per cent of the total, compared with the E4.3 million or 8.3 per cent taken up by investments in own undertakings (Tibyo Takangwane, ibid.).

As noted above (p.9), Tibiyo/Tisuka land is formally and legally classified as SNL, although it may be sold, leased or alienated as if it were freehold title deed land. At the same time, there are a number of legal restrictions which control the use of freehold land which do not apply to this land since it is considered as SNL. These legal criteria notwithstanding, Tibiyo and Tisuka have both launched capitalist productive enterprises on their land both with and independently of foreign capital. Tibiyo's joint ventures include Simunye sugar mill (Tibiyo, Government, CDC), Mhlume Sugar (Tibiyo, CDC) and Tibiyo Forest Project in Shiseweni where CDC manages the operation on Tibiyo's behalf. Tibiyo and Tisuka also lease out land for agricultural projects, and as has been noted, part of Casalee Tobacco Project's commercial operation is on land leased from Tisuka.

Tibiyo's own ventures in agriculture are largely devoted to the production of agricultural commodities for the local market, including maize, bananas and vegetables, although export commodities (tobacco) are also produced. The project chosen for the case study, Droxford farm is a failed project. This characteristic is by no means representative of Tibiyo's projects as a whole, although management of the scheme is typical of Tibiyo's agricultural projects. It is instructive, however, insofar as it reveals the kinds of risk factors involved in Tibiyo/Tisuka projects .

TIBIYO DROXFORD FARM

Scheme Inception

Droxford Farm is located at Ngwenya near the Oshoek border post. At inception, Tibiyo intended to rear Angora goats in order to provide mohair for the nearby tapestry industry based at Ngwenya Industrial Estates. The scheme was initiated by Tibiyo and

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operations began in 1960. The farm had previously been used for livestock and maize production, and was donated by its former owner to the King. An Angora goat and mohair consultant Dr W Durdie suggested that Angora goat breeding could be attempted at the farm, following feasibility studies and analyses which he conducted in conjunction with the Mbabane District Veterinary Officer, Dr Darkin.

Land Tenure Issues

Tibiyo inherited an uninhabited farm, where unlike most other Tibiyo agricultural projects surveyed, there were no squatters on the farm at the time of the Tibiyo takeover. The land area of the scheme is 200 ha, with 18 ha having been allocated for maize production for supplementary feed, and the remainder used as grazing land for the goats.

The scheme owns 1 tractor, 1 disc harrow, 1 plough, 1 trailer, 1 boom sprayer, 1 4WD pick-up van (shared with the Dumisa Cattle Project), all of which were financed by Tibiyo. Tibiyo also constructed a manager's house, 2 staff houses, an office block, 2 sheds for the goats and a maize crib.

(i) Management

The workforce is headed by a manager appointed and paid by Tibiyo, who has also been assigned the managerial functions of the Dumisa Cattle Ranch near Luve. Under him he has 1 tractor driver and 1 handyman, but previously he had a headman, 2 handymen, 3 workmen and a watchman. the latter were laid off when it was decided to sell the existing stock (see Production and Marketing below). The workforce is selected and directed by the project manager but paid by Tibiyo (as opposed to the project itself which is not self-accounting).

Most workers are from the surrounding community and casual labour is hired during the maize harvesting period. Both permanent and casual workers have their own SNL holdings in neighbouring SNL areas which surround the farm. In the case of permanent workers, their traditional allocations are cultivated by their wives and other homestead members, but they are able to oversee operations on their homestead parcels because the scheme does not provide housing for its unskilled workforce. Furthermore, there are no direct links between the scheme and the surrounding SNL community, and the farm operates entirely as a profit-making enterprise. This is a common feature of all Tibiyo Agricultural Projects visited, and in the view of Tibiyo managers, it is the task of the MOAC and not Tibiyo to assist smallholder producers on SNL in various ways.

Production and Marketing

There were about 400 goats before they were sold, producing an average of 20-40 tonnes of mohair per year, valued at E6,000. Marketing was never a problem for the scheme while it was still in Angora goat production, as a ready market exists at Swaziland

Tapestries. Tibiyo clipped the goats and sold the mohair to the local industry which processed it into a finished good. In 1985, a total of 1,000 bags of maize were produced, but this maize, valued at E23,000 by management, was not marketed.

According to the project manager, the farm was run at a loss primarily due to the high mortality rate - about 100 kids per anum - of the goats from pneumonia. This prompted the decision to sell the stock. The farm will remian under Tibiyo, and beef cattle production has been proposed by high level Tibiyo management as an alternative. Both the project manager and Tibiyo's field manager believe that this could create more problems. they feel that the farm should be used for dryland farm production, suggesting tobacco and potatoes as possible crops.

Problems

The future of the scheme is uncertain at present. Twenty goats remain on the farm. They belong to the King and Queen Mother, and Tibiyo is tending them on their behalf. The scheme started with 100 goats donated to King Sobhuza II. They were originally kept at Dumisa Cattle Ranch, before being transferred to Mahlangatsha and then later in 1980, to Droxford. A further 200 Angoras were bought from South Africa in 1981, and 150 local goats were incorporated for interbreeding in order to strengthen the stock. This did not help, however, and the mortality rate remained high. Tibiyo then considered moving the stock to a warmer area, but South African veterinarians from Ondersterpoort said this would not help. Similar experiments had already been conducted in the Transvaal, but had failed, leading to the conclusion that within southern Africa, Angoras can only be kept in semi-desert regions like the Cape Karoo. This prompted the eventual selling of the goats.

The project placed the manager under severe stress. He advised Tibiyo at the outset that the goats would not survive, because of the unsuitability of the grass (sourveld) and the absence of trees and browsing shrubs. Nevertheless, the General Manager of Tibiyo argued that Dr Durdle's feasibility studies were adequate. During this interview, it became evident that Tibiyo has a strict management hierarchy. Commands are issued to lower level field managers who implement decisions taken by general management in liaison with the Agricultural Projects Manager.

Comments and Observations

Although the Angora goats operation on Droxford farm proved to be a failure, the operation should be seen as fairly typical of a Tibiyo Agricultural Project in terms of land tenure, organisation and management. Tibiyo's maize projects, at least on the surface, appear to be more efficient operations than the government farms, especially in terms of management structure which although still highly hierarchical and bureaucratic, is more flexible than that of the government farms. Nevertheless, the Tibiyo field manager conceded that the maize projects were running at a loss. This he put down to storage problems on account of faulty silos, adverse climatic conditions, failure of Tibiyo to insure its cropland, shortages of labour and equipment, and above all to the seriously inadequate attempts by government through the National Maize Board to facilitate the marketing side of maize production.

These stated losses notwithstanding, it is interesting to compare the output of a Tibiyo maize farm with a government maize farm. Tibiyo's Malkerns Maize project grows maize and beans on 260 ha of land compared with the 329 ha cultivated on Amanzimnyama Governemnt Maize and Bean Farm in 1984/85. During that year, Tibiyo turned out 10,778 bags of maize. At standard weight of 70 kg per bag, this means that actual outturn of Tibiyo's project was 754.5 tonnes. This is far higher than the 490.7 tonnes produced at Amanzimnyama both in terms of output and productivity.

The reasons for this could partially be put down to the fact that the Tibiyo functions as a private company and hence is possibly able to operate more efficiently than a state run enterprise. Indeed the Tibiyo agricultural field manager who had previously worked for government noted that the stakes to produce results were much higher at Tibiyo compared with government. But the private nature of Tibiyo's operations highlights the problems of formal classifications of SNL. For quite clearly, the social relations under which Tibiyo produces bear little resemblance to traditional social relations on SNL. In cases, the Tibiyo takeover of a farm has led to the influx of settlers keen to claim their rights on SNL, but they have in cases been evicted. According to the manager and indvuna of the Dumisa Cattle Ranch, 9 squatters were evicted without compensation "because they were not recognised as legitimate farm dwellers". Ten other squatters "were recognised after they appealed to the King who said that those who had been on the white farmer's land as genuine farm dwellers should remain". Those who remained have been allocated small plots and are permitted to keep their own cattle separately from Tibiyo's stock. They also constitute the total labour force on the ranch, and receive unskilled workers' wages, while the homestead labour force is largely responsible for maintenance of their plots.

In 1982, Tibiyo contributed E0.7 million to the Swazi Nation, which amounted to 25 per cent of total expenditure of E2.8 million (Tibiyo TaKangwane, 1982). But this contribution only amounted to 8 per cent of total income of E8.6 million. What emerges from this and the foregoing evidence presented is that Tibiyo is playing a significant role in boosting export crop production both through its own and joint ventures while promoting national self-sufficiency in food production through its own ventures. However, development through Tibiyo excludes the involvement of petty-commodity producers who can only engage in Tibiyo's agricultural production schemes as workers, not as peasants. This conflicts directly with the government's RDAP strategy of fostering the growth of a peasantry through the development of cash cropping and agricultural petty commodity production on SNL.

FREEHOLD TITLE DEED SMALLHOLDER LEASEHOLD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SCHEMES

Frequent reference has been made throughout this report to the growing body of thought which holds that smallholder outgrower schemes can provide an alternative to the RDAP. The Fourth National Development Plan, as noted in the Introduction to this study, argues that the RDAP did succeed in transferring social and physical infrastructure to SNL, but that it failed to supply the means to employ and support these transfers. The plan thus presents the proposition that the RDAP is as such, a welfare policy incapable of generating productive employment.' The alternative suggested is that future agricultural development should be based on labour-intensive irrigation schemes in the nucleus estate smallholder model. The Plan further argues that the Vuvulane experience provides a successful example of this path of development.

In the section on Private Company/Smallholder APS on SNL (above p.34), a detailed analysis of outgrower schemes sought to show how agribusiness through nucleus estate outgrower projects has tended to control the conditions of smallholder production and exchange. It was also argued that agribusiness is more likely to succeed in achieving this if freehold title to the land is acquired by smallholder producers. Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF) provides a case whereby freehold title was acquired by peasant farmers through scheme participation. VIF was established in 1962 by the CDC and adjoins the Swaziland Irrigation Scheme (SIS) and Mhlume Sugar which are both CDC operations. By 1973, 223 Swazi farmers with an average farm size of 4.5 ha had joined the VIF scheme. At the end of 1982, there were 263 farms on the scheme with an average farm size of 3.2-6.5 ha. Sugar is the basic commodity produced and farmers, under the contract agreements are compelled to devote 70 per cent of their land to this crop. On the remainder of their land they may grow seasonal crops - mainly cotton and maize in summer and vegetables in winter. According to the Fourth Plan, the annual mean net income for scheme members over the 1978-82 period amounted to E3,500.

The scheme nevertheless has had a stormy past, and according to Fransman (1978) provided an important political base for Dr A Zwane's opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) Party before the outlawing of party politics in 1973. VIF also fell in the area where the NNLC won three seats in the 1972 General Elections. Moreover, there was much bitterness between smallholders and the CDC, who were viewed as behaving like colonial landlords (Neocosmos and Testerink, 1985). Much of this disaffection centred on the leasing arrangements, and this eventually led the CDC to hand over ownership of the scheme to the Swazi Nation. In the early years, the question of inheritance on the death of a settler and compensation on cancellation of a tenancy were a source of friction and led the first CDC manager J.R. Tuckett to recommend that specific legislation be enacted to deal with this and other issues (Tuckett, 1973). Although no legislation was passed, these issues were dealt with when new leases were implemented in 1975. These 20 year leases with rent re-negotiable after the first 10 years stated that the property should be used for agricultural purposes only and that no animals should be kept without permission. The lease also laid down strict agricultural standards which tenants were required to adhere to and specified that the lease may not be assigned without permission and that only the leaseholder and his family and workers where applicable may reside there. Under this leasing arrangement, tenants were obliged to spend 10 months of the year resident on the property, and the corporation was entitled to cancel leases of tenants who did not pay the rent within 30 days or who failed to comply with other conditions stipulated in the lease. In the case of the death of a tenant, the corporation was given the right to name a successor subject to compensation to the tenant's family, for approved improvements to the property.

In 1982, legal title was handed over to the Swaziland National Agricultural Development Corporation (SNADC), a parastatal, while tha land became SNL and was leased to the farmers on a 20 year renewable basis. Management however, remained in the hands of the CDC. Following this transfer of land ownership to the government, smallholders voiced dissatisfaction over the fact that rents were still being charged despite the fact that the land had been transferred to the Nation. The transfer co-incided with further slumps in already depressed world sugar market prices, leaving Swaziland's EEC quota at the minimum guaranteed price. Growing dissatisfaction among growers led government to institute a Commission of Enquiry to look into the grievances of VIF farmers in 1985. The commission's sessions were held in camera and although its work has been completed, the findings have not been made public.

Nevertheless, in 1986, the ownership of VIF passed from SNADC to Tibiyo. But this failed to bring calm to the situation as 14 farmers in dispute with scheme management over rent defaults were evicted from the scheme. Thus far their appeals to the King for intervention have failed, and some of them are encamped with their families in temporary shelters on the edge of the scheme as they await a sympathetic ear in Lobamba.

Given the sensitivity of the current situation at Vuvulane, it was not possible to conduct comprehensive research on the scheme. Nevertheless, some information was gathered, and it appears that net income has been slight for the majority of scheme members since the slump in the world sugar market. Sugar production on 70 per cent of allocated land is sufficient to cover overheads alone, and it is only on the remaining 30 per cent of the that realisation of any profit occurs. This does not generate substantial income, and seems to suggest that in Vuvulane, a similar process is taking place to that in Kenya, where Cowen (1981) has demonstrated how outgrower schemes seem to consolidate a middle level peasantry providing them with the necessary means to reproduce subsistence without being obliged to engage directly in wage employment. Of further significance, as Neocosmos and Testerink (1985) have noted, the CDC itself suffered significant losses during its involvemnt in VIF between 1962-1982, and its invested capital of 1.76 million pounds sterling was never recovered.

Another smallholder APS under freehold land tenure is situated in the Malkerns Valley adjoining Swazican, and is known as Mphetsheni Settlement Scheme where more comprehensive research was undertaken.

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MPETSHENI PINEAPPLE SETTLEMENT SCHEME

Scheme Inception

The Mpetsheni Pineapple settlement scheme was established after the Swaziland Settlement Company (SSC - formerly known as the Mushroom Settlement Company) bought 250 ha of land from Usuthu Pulp Company in Malkerns. The Colonial Government was approached for ideas on how to develop the land, and decided to lease it from SSC and develop a settlement scheme for Swazi smallholders. The government formed a subsidiary company called the Pineapple settlement company (FSC) to operate the scheme, and a lease agreement was then drawn up between government, the SSC and the FSC to cover an initial period of 12 years. The scheme was formally established in 1964 and became operational at the end of 1965.

Land Tenure Issues

According to Magagula (1980), the main objective of the scheme was to promote equality in the rural areas between Swazi and European settler farmers by expanding commercial opportunities for rural Swazis and involving them in cash crop production. He also states that the scheme was seen as an indirect device by the colonial authorities for subverting the traditional socio-economic characteristics of rural Swazi society. The aim was for scheme members to become so financially viable that they would be able to purchase their plots and become landowners after 12 years.

The 250 ha of land allocated for the scheme was originally subdivided into 27 farms of just over 9 ha each. The scheme was financed by a government-backed loan from the SDSB and the SSC. The initial funds were used to provide administrative personnel and a central equipment pool to be run on a hire basis. Loans were also made available to scheme members for the development of their holdings and for providing them with basic services such as housing and water. Each member was required to repay these loans as well as leasehold rights.

The lease agreement provided for loan finance and rules of behaviour and farming performance for the smallholders. The company was appointed marketing agent, and settlers were obliged to follow the company's marketing arrangements. A significant aspect of this clause of the lease was that farmers were prohibited from selling pineapples to the fresh vegetable market. This enabled the various companies which have operated the nearby pineapple cannery in Malkerns to ensure monopoly control over the marketing of outgrowers' produce both to secure a steady supply of fresh fruit to the cannery and to ensure that all proceeds from pineapple sales are accounted for and credited to the settlers' loan accounts.

(i) Membership

There are currently 19 members remaining in the scheme, and it is clear that management was highly selective in granting membership, and that there is little likelihood of the scheme being expanded and more members being incorporated. Members come from all over Swaziland and were selected by the FSC whose chief priority was the suitability of candidates for small-scale commercial farming operations. Membership was obtained by individuals, and as noted, the initial premise was that members would be sufficiently viable finacially within about 12 years to have repaid their various loans and to thus be in a position to purchase their plots and become freehold title deed land owners. This meant that the intention was that inheritance of membership would be determined by Roman-Dutch Law, unless a member was married by Swazi customary law only, in which case ownership of the plot would devolve according to Swazi law and custom.

Scheme members engage in pineapple production with family labour which assists with ploughing, planting and weeding, and in cases casual labour is hired for weeding and harvesting in particular, at an average rate of E3 per day excluding meals and lodging. Harvesting is done collectively with all scheme members, their families and hired labour where applicable. Ploughs, tractors and other capital equipment is available on loan from the company, while fertiliser and herbicides are purchased directly from the canning comopany.

Scheme members' indebtedness plauged the progress of the scheme in its early years, and despite the scheme's objective of having members repay their loans and qualify to purchase their land within 12 years, in the 6th year of the scheme, the average indebtedness was over E7,000. In 1973, the scheme's settlement officer estimated that about three-quarters of the members would only be able to repay their loans over 26 years. As indebtedness increased, some settlers who stood little chance of repaying their various loans were forced to relinquish membership of the scheme. Government was requested to intervene in order to rescue the scheme and eventually in 1973 agreed to inject E61,000 in order to settle the accounts of members who had been evicted or dropped out of the scheme. Nevertheless, indebtedness persisted, and between 1975 and 1978 actually increased by about E10,000 with accumulated losses standing at E26,736.

By this time, 19 farmers remained on the scheme of whom 12 had paid off their debts and therefore fulfilled the requirements to be issued with title deed to the land. But the scheme has faced a problem of government reluctance to approve the purchase of the plots by members who have paid outstanding loans. According to the last government field officer assigned to the scheme, this reluctance has in theory been overcome, but in practice, members who have now all paid off their initial loans are still awaiting the legal titles to the land. Some of them have been promised additional land allocations of up to 4.3 ha.

(i) Management

Management of the scheme was originally entrusted to the FSC, with Government, the SSC and the King represented in the Board of Directors. Smallholders were not represented on the board and gained access to it through the project manager. Requests by smallholders for representation on the board were turned down because according to the FSC, adequate channels existed for communication between scheme members and the board. Meetings between the chairman of the board, the project manager and the smallholders were infrequent and complaints by settlers over this issue were answered by the FSC which asserted that settlers made use of such meetings to raise "frivolous" issues and that if "things were not running smoothly", the board was "satisfied that this is due to the unco-operative attitude of a number of settlers"(Magagula, 1980, p.10).

By 1981, although farmers had met all obligations for land purchase, government withdrew from the scheme thereby effectively liquidating the FSC and leaving management of the project in the members' own hands. Management has since been taken over by a farmers' association which has its own elected committee chosen every two years. This organisation is financed by joining fees and subscribtion shares and meets once a week.

Production and Marketing

Figures quoted by Magagula show that per hectare production declined between 1968 and 1975 from 54 to 17 tonnes. Nevertheless cash receipts increased due to rising prices and improved quality produce, from E12,900 to E85,461 during this period. Current production has been put at about 50 tonnes per ha. Only pineapples are produced on allocated plots as the herbicide used has rendered the soil unsuitable for cultivation of other crops.

All marketing of the crop is handled by Swazican, the current owners of the cannery who took over the company from Libbys in 1984. Changes in ownership of the cannery have caused marketing problems, but at present, these do not exist. In 1968, for instance, Swaziland Canners Ltd. went into liquidation during the harvesting season and government and local businessmen were forced to stage a rescue operation. But smallholders were not paid for a substantial amount of fruit which they had delivered to the cannery, causing them severe finacial hardships. As noted, members are compelled to market their pineapples through the company and are only permitted to sell substandard pineapples on the vegetable market.

Problems

Magagula argues that this scheme was not adequately planned. No detailed soil survey was undertaken and it was subsequently discovered that a number of plots were prone to waterlogging due to shallow soils and were therefore unsuitable for pineapple cultivation. Another problem with the scheme was that at its inception, neither the company nor the settlers had working capital. With high interest loans, the debt situation of the smallholders was aggravated. Although this indebtedness was ultimately largely overcome through state intervention, the scheme has no cash flow as there is no one willing to finance the operation until members obtain their legal titles to the land. Finance is needed to replace out of date technology and equipment such as tractors which are now old and worn out.

It is clear that the actual management of the scheme has been one of its major problems since inception. The lack of participation by scheme members in the first decade and a half of the scheme's operation created hostility between management and smallholders as in the Vuvulane case. The board seemed to take the view that the settlers' failure owed to their laziness and indiscipline. The last government officer assigned to the scheme cited the fact that management has not existed since 1981, as a major reason for lack of profit realisation on the scheme. However, it is difficult to envisage how the scheme can be profitable under self-management until members receive their legal title to the land and are hence enabled to secure bank loans to inject capital into the scheme. Presently credit is issued by Swazican, but only for purchase of inputs, with these amounts deducted after delivery of the crop.

Comments and Observations

The Mpetsheni Pineapple Scheme is an interesting case of an outgrower scheme which has, over time, transformed itself into a type of producer co-operative on title deed land. However, it is unlikely that projects of this sort will become a central element of government rural development strategy. The former government officer on the scheme stated quite unequivocally that experience had taught him that it was not government policy to develop more schemes of this nature which would open up freehold land to smallholder peasant agricultural producers. This view is attested by the drawn out procedure which seems to be taking place in order to grant the actual legal titles to scheme members. This has been a very traumatic experience for the smallholders who have persisted with the scheme, and who have ultimately been compelled to take over the management of the entire project. They experimented with hiring a manager, but this arrangement proved to be unsuccessful as substantial amounts of money were unaccounted for.

Under present arrangements, members are realising between E3,000-E4,000 each year, indicating that as in the case of Vuvulane, a class of middle level peasant farmers is emerging, who are basically producing means of subsistence without being compelled to take up wage employment. And like in most contract farming schemes, it is smallholder members who bear the major investment risks while the more lucrative marketing side of the operation is monopolised and controlled by agribusiness. Through years of practical experience, scheme members have obtained the necessary skills to enable them to cultivate pineapples efficiently, and indeed, to manage the scheme as a whole on their own. But given existing government reluctance to make private property available to substantial numbers of peasant farmers, it is unlikely that this type of scheme will be etsablished elsewhere in Swaziland in the near future.

MISSION LAND AGRICULTURAL TRAINING SCHEMES

Christian missions own substantial tracts of freehold land in Swaziland. A considerable proportion of this land is underutilised, and is inhabited by squatters or allocated for grazing to surrounding SNL communities by various parish priests. A number of missions including the World Lutheran Federation, the Anglicans and the Salesian Fathers have used available mission land to develop various types of training schemes, a central concern of which is to provide training to enhance employment opportunities for young people, many of whom have dropped out of the formal educational system. In addition, these training schemes are an attempted response to the demands to establish a core of trained youth in the rural areas who will be well placed to confront the requirements of food production and through the use of the country's resources, make a living through agricultural production.

A major priority of the Salesian and Anglican missions, has been the existence of restrictions under SNL tenure relations which prevent young unmarried people from using communal land for their own livelihood. It is extremely difficult if not impossible for potential young farmers to gain access to SNL if they are not married, and without access to land or cattle, young men are not able to raise the necessary funds which will facilitate the payment of bride price.

In response to these needs, Sister Judith of the Anglican mission and Father Macdonnell of the Salesian mission have stablished a number of schemes. The Manzini Industrial Training Centre offers courses in various technical skills including agriculture to school dropouts and runs the Usuthu Young Farmer's Co-operative on land leased from the Anglican mission in Luyengo. The land was acquired to provide temoporary access to land for graduates of agricultural training projects in order to enable them to generate cash to be used for land acquisition elsewhere. Members of the Usuthu Young Farmer's Co-operative are assigned plots on lease for a period of three years. The scheme aims to raise funds for the purchase of cattle, and members are required to sign an agreement to this effect. Avialable land in Mahamba and the Gilgal area may also be put to similar use in the future.

Another important project is the KaTsabedze Rural Community Development Centre which makes use of both mission land and SNL. This is an integrated rural development project which allocates irrigated garden plots to interested members of the local community while engaging in a wide variety of other development activities.

KATSABEDZE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

Scheme Inception

The idea of developing Katsabedze sprang from the relative success of the Manzini Industrial Training centre and the desire to experiment with this concept in a rural community in the Croydon area of the Manzini district. The services of two qualified British volunteers were acquired in March 1982, and they began experimental work in irrigated vegetable and dryland crops, along with poultry and rabbit production in order to investigate the costs, production rates and land requirements for viable employment in agriculture in the area as well as other factors affecting the establishment of a successful farming enterprise in the community. Agricultural training was to be central to the project, but the idea was to produce young farmers capable of handling some of the other technical skills demanded by the farming vocation, i.e. simple building, woodwork and basic machine maintenance.

Land Tenure Issues

Origianlly, three sites in the Croydon area were considered for the development of the project. Two of these were on freehold land, while one, the largest in size was on SNL allocated by the local chief who was very enthusiastic about the venture. One of the freehold tenure sites known as the "Scout site" which is about 2 ha in area, was found to be unsuitable for agricultural production, while the other, the Phemba site of 1.5 ha proved to be conducive for irrigated crop production. Initially, experimental vegetable production was carried out on this site which is on land leased by the local Dutch Reformed Church which was keen to use the land for development purposes.

There was much consultation with the local community who were well informed about the scheme and the chief demonstrated his commitment to it by allocating 7 ha of land. Unfortunately, this land proved to be unsuitable for crop production and had, been previously assigned as communal grazing land. The SNL site has a domestic supply of water and the soil is a shallow covering of course sand over laterite. The Phemba site has a water channel drawn from the nearby river with both an installed and ram pump available for project use. The Phemba site is leasable over a long period and it runs adjacent to a large private farm with which negotiations have been conducted for the sale of some good land which could be used in the future for allotments if this is necessary. The present available land is suitable for the allocation of some 30 to 40 plots of 1,000 square meters, and there are currently 32 women engaged in vegetable production on such plots.

The Phemba site is situated on gently sloping land with considerable river frontage to the Mbuluzi river. It constitutes a community focal point easily accessible from both sides of the river. There is a Primary School nearby with a progressive agricultural programme of its own in operation. Like the local chief and the community at large, the school and staff have warmly received the project while extending their help and advice when needed.

(i) Membership

KaTsabedze was established with the intention of meeting the needs of various groups of people in the community including:

1. children and young adults who have never been to school;

2. young adults who have dropped out of the formal school system;

3. older men and women living in the rural areas;

4. those who have completed a certain level of training in formal schools but who require further education to satisfy both employment and self-employment needs.

In order to fulfil these needs, the centre offers non-formal educational training in health education, primary health care, home economics, literacy, agricultural skills, land conservation, appropriate farm technology and food production to any interested persons within the above four categories who live in the surrounding community.

In early 1987, the number of young people following a formal agricultural training course through livestock and vegetable production was only two, and this element of the project has not been very successful. At the beginning of 1986, there were six people doing the course. As stated above, 32 women have irrigated garden plots where they produce a variety of vegetables under the supervision of the project's agricultural instructor. The owmen pay for all inputs including seed, fertiliser and water and keep all the produce which they are free to dispose of as they please. In addition, the scheme holds a demonstration flock of 35 laying chickens while broiler chickens are kept on a commercial basis by community members under the guidance of the agricultural instructor. The centre also operates demonstration cotton plots.

One of the most successful components of the project has been a sewing course which has its own instructor. Close to 50 women are involved, and as in the case of the irrigated garden plots, participant women pay for all their materials and produce garments of their choice either for personal use or for sale. The project centre is also a site for the National Sebenta Literacy scheme where over 30 people, mostly women, study Siswati and English.

The centre also runs a store which supplies agricultural inputs and building material including seed, fertiliser, cement and nails to the local community. This concern is successfully managed by a local community member. The Project Centre's car, tractor and plough are available for hire by members of the community. Another activity involves a workshop which was completed in late 1985, which is available for the project's own needs, as well as for the purposes of conducting short courses in carpentry and mechanics by a qualified instructor (currently an expatriate volunteer). The workshop facilities are also available for hire on a purely commercial basis for members of the community who have practical skills but do not have the necessary equipment. Ka Tsabedze also acts as a collection centre for around 33 local handicraft producers whose goods are marketed through Manzini Industrial Training Centre's shop Eswatini in Manzini.

(ii) Management and Organisation

The KaTsabedze project is under the auspices of the joint administration of the Salesian Congregation and the Anglican Order of the Holy Paraclete. The management of the centre during the first phase (1982-85) was in the hands of a Board which was made up of permanent trained staff members paid for by the government, a representative of the local Inkhundla and an apointee of the chief. The Director of the Centre was chosen from amongst the trained instructors. The first phase of the project carried a budget of E145,450, while the second phase (1985-87) budgeted for E61,950. As the project developed, a community committee took on an executive role in decision making. Apart from the instructors, there is a full time International Voluntary Service financial co-ordinator.

The growing executive role of the community committee reflects the changing emphasis of the development guidelines of the project which place a high priority on the development of existing local organisations and resources, the involvement of the community in planning and implementation at all stages, and the effort to keep the project in community hands rather than having it identified as an extension of the formal school system or any government ministry. The project also places more emphasis now on the utilisation of skilled community members for instructional purposes whenever this is feasible.

Results and Prospects

One of the major priorities of the KaTsabedze project was to provide facilities for young farmer training and to encourage farming as a vocation within the community. The small and diminishing number of agricultural students indicates that this has not been a success, and the project has failed to encourage agriculture amongst the local youth.

Nevertheless, overall, the project cannot be regarded as a failure, as it has provided a useful service to the community. The establishment of the centre has involved substantial capital inputs which have been used mainly for the development of an irrigation system, the construction of workshops and the purchasing of machinery and equipment. The community has put these services to good use, particularly insofar as the sewing workshop is concerned. Clearly, the Katsabedze centre has generated development in the Croydon area, but this is difficult to measure in the absence of comprehensive time series studies. An index of the project's success is the development of 3 groups based at the centre but organised independently of the staff. These are a mutual aid society which offers support during death and illness comprising some 30 members, a sibhaca dance group and a football team.

Comments and Observations

It would appear that some significant project objectives are being met at KaTsabedze. These would include in particular, an attempt to reach down to the rural population through the provision of practical informal educational training and the development of lower-level/middle-level manpower within the community through the provision of financial, human and material resources. This is one scheme where linkages are being created between the project and the surrounding community at large. Nevertheless, the project has seemingly failed in an area to which it attached perhaps the greatest importance at inception - the provision of agricultural training facilities for young people in the rural areas in order to encourage farming as a vocation.

These shortcomings are best understood in terms of the land tenure constraints of SNL. The system remians restrictive for young unmarried people, and unless SNL can make the necessary adaptations to accommodate the growing numbers of unemployed youth in the rural areas, the alarming urban drift of these youth will be extremely difficult to reverse. It would appear that these land tenure constraints constitute the essence of the scheme's failure to encourage groups of young people to invest their future in the land.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this report has been to set out a variety of options relating to the evolution of land tenure in Swaziland, by examining the land tenure and organisational principals which govern different agricultural schemes, and assessing the socio-economic costs and benefits of each option. In so doing, it was noted that the importance of customary tenure in Swaziland cannot be underestimated and that this tradition is central to the continuation of royal rule by the King. The central if not essential relation governing traditional customary tenure on SNL is the control which the King exerts through the chiefs over the allocation and distribution of land.

This central feature notwithstanding, this study has observed that the concept of SNL has been expanded to cover vast tracts of land repurchased either by government through the Land Purchase Programme, or by the monarchy, particularly through the establishment in the post-independence period of Tibiyo and Tisuka. This more embracing concept of SNL has been enshrined in law, but this study has shown that formal legal definitions of traditional land tenure can in no way account for the processes of production currently to be found on SNL. The presence of medium to large-scale capital-intensive production on state farms and Tibiyo projects which are on land formally classified as SNL suggests that it may be useful to narrow down the concept and legal classification of SNL to its essential form; to confine it to smallholder holdings over which chiefs reserve the right to control and allocate land.

Various land tenure studies in Swaziland have generally addressed themselves to the question of whether or not the existing form of customary tenure provides a sound legal environment which is conducive towards intensive agricultural development by smallholder producers. This study has shown that there is no technical basis for the assumption that traditional land tenure in Swaziland automatically makes for low productivity and output. This owes partially to the existence of considerable opportunities for innovation and variation in the processes of production on SNL.

One such innovation is taking place in the form of communal co-operative livestock and forestry schemes. The poultry schemes in particular provide alternative opportunities where chiefs in three regions have provided land for communal poultry farms whose membership is open to individuals from other chiefdoms. Nevertheless, as was noted, the actual amount of land allocated is very small, and if this concept were to be extended to cropping schemes, there is a possibility that serious problems in conflict resolution could arise.

Another innovation is to be found in the Magwanyane community co-operative sugar project, an irrigated scheme in the Lubombo region situated near Siteki. Here a progressive chief is involved in a project which has contiguous fields producing sugar that is co-operatively marketed. Before cyclone Domoina, this project showed much potential, although forecasted output and productivity had not been achieved. Nevertheless, tenure relations do seem to have contributed towards the failure of the

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project to meet targeted expectations. Despite the efforts to outlaw absenteeism from the scheme, the fact that the chief himself is an absentee member, has made it difficult to enforce this and other decisions which have been formulated through democratic decision-making processes. This would indicate that the presence of a progressive chief who encourages development is in itself not enough to ensure the efficiency of community agricultural production schemes, because democraticatically elected committees will always be constrained by the presence of a chief and the constraints of customary tenure which, <u>inter alia</u>, make it difficult to evict individuals who fail to comply with the rules of the scheme.

It was also noted that contract farming is taking place on SNL. One of the key features of contract farming and outgrower schemes is the control which agribusiness wields over the conditions of smallholder production through the monopoly which it holds over the marketing side of the operation. While successful contracting arrangements for tobacco production which satisfy both agribusiness and smallholders have been reached in the Shiselweni region, management has noted that it cannot exercise the control which it would desire over peasant production. Smallholders growing the dark-fired cultivar for Casalee can be excluded from marketing facilities, but the right to eviction which some agribusiness ventures regard as of key importance to their operations, cannot be exercised.

This problem is not present in schemes which lease out land to smallholders like Vuvulane and Mphetsheni, but as the Vuvulane experience has shown, other problems may arise. Indeed in both of these schemes, problems have centred on the question of land tenure. In the case of Vuvulane, members objected to the continued payment of rentals after the ownership of the scheme had passed on to the nation, because they felt that since the scheme had become part of SNL, they were no longer obliged to pay rent. Mpetsheni provided an interesting case study where a unique set of circumstances have evolved out of a pineapple scheme leaving the 19 members of the project eligible to legal title for their plots. Despite this eligibility however, there has been an apparent reluctance on the part of government to make these titles available to the smallholder scheme members, indicating that this type of scheme will not be encouraged in future rural development plans.

A similar reluctance, that of handing over purchased land to smallholders, can be seen in the evolution of government farms and Tibiyo agricultural projects. Despite the recommendations of the Hobbs report which paved the way for the UK-funded Land Purchase Programme, purchased land is on the whole not being made available for smallholder production. In the case of the sisa ranches where facilities do exist for smallholders, they play no role in the actual management of the schemes. Instead, a more hierarchical and bureaucratic management structure has evolved, leading as was noted in the case of Amanzimnyama Maize and Bean Farm, to difficulties and inefficiencies in scheme management. Moreover, these schemes highlighted the fact that the designation of these land as SNL amounted to little more than a purely formal legal definition. This was even more apparent in Tibiyo schemes, where management made it clear that it is not the role of Tibiyo to facilitate smallholder development. Land hungry Swazi who have been anxious to assert their rights to purchased land proclaimed as SNL have in cases found that this is not possible on Tibiyo, Tisuka and government farms. Tibiyo, whose management structure is more flexible than that found on government farms and ranches appears to be achieving higher levels of output and productivity in their agricultural projects compared with similar government schemes.

One institutional constraint of SNL remains its failure to provide access to land for young unmarried people. This is of particular concern given the growing problem of youth unemployment and the general absence of formal and informal employment opportunities in the rural areas. Various Christian missions in Swaziland have noted this problem, and have established agricultural training schemes in order to encourage the uptake of farming as a vocation by Swazi youth. While the schemes themselves have offered valuable training opprtunities for enthusiastic young people, they have still faced the problem of access to land after graduation. This constraint has hamstrung the training component of the Katsaoedze integrated rural development centre, leaving the farm school with only two students in 198?. This is despite the enthusiasm of the local community including the chief who has made 7 ha of land available to the centre. So while the scheme has provided a focal point for community development and over 30 women now hold irrigated vegetable plots, the problem of encouraging youth participation in agricultural activity remains unsolved. There is little doubt that this is largely attributable to the lack of access to land which unmarried Swazi youth have, and this is a problem which any "back to the land" type of strategy for employment and rural development can ill afford to ignore.

Finally, it should be noted that although this study has severely been constrained by time, general directions for further policy research have been established. It would be extremely useful to situate some of the innovative options outlined in this study in the context of the communities in which they are located through the collection of comparative quantitative data. This would enable the different policy implications of these various options to be fleshed out more comprehensively.

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APPENDIX I

TABLE SHOWING BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHEMES CHOSEN FOR CASE STUDY

Name of Scheme	Size	Membership	Type of Scheme	Management	Land Tenure
Mayiwane	79 ha	77	Maize	Govt/Taiwan	SNL
Fuyani Poultry Co-operative	$500\ m^2$	106	Poultry Co-op	Smallholder Co-op.	SNL
Magwanyane	700 ha	37	Sugar/cotton/ vegetable co-op.	Smallholder/ Govt	SNL
Casalee	120 ha	n/a	Commercial Tobacco Farm	Private Co.	Freehold
Casalee	50 ha [a]	400-450	Contract Tobacco Farming	Private Co.	SNL
Nyonyane Sisa Ranch	17,430 ha	300 [a]	Cattle Ranch	Government	SNL [b]
Amanzimnyama	2,548 ha	n/a	Maize and Bean Farm	Government	SNL [b]
Drozford Farm	200 ha	n/a	Angora goat breeding	Tibiyo	SNL
Mphetsheni Settlement Scheme	250 ha	19	Pineapple	Co-operative	Freehold
Kalsabedze	10.5 ha	Open to whole Community	Integrated Rural Development	NGO/ Community	SNL/Mission/ Freehold

a. Estimate b. Govt. Purchased Private Farm c. Of which 728 ha arable

APPENDIX II

PROVISIONAL LST OF APS

[NOTE: The following list does not claim to be complete, and excludes most irrigation schemes]

SMALLHOLDER SCHEMES

Mayiwane Maize Scheme
Mahlangatsh Maize Scheme
Puyani Poultry Co-operative
Tisimeleni Poultry Co-operative
Shibane Poultry Co-operative
Khutsala Poultry Co-operative
Mnyani Cattle Demonstration Ranch
Nyakeni Cattle Demonstration Ranch
Magojela Cattle Demonstration Ranch
Mpuluzi Pig-breeding Scheme
Magwanyane Sugar Co-operative
Casalee Tobacco Project

GOVERNEMNT FARMS AND CATTLE RANCHES

Amanzimnyama Government Maize Farm
Gege Maize Farm
Nkalashane Cotton Project
Mfumbaneni Poultry Farm
Mbuluzi Dairy Project
Mpisi Farm
Balegane Breeding Ranch
Lowveld Breeding Ranch
Shiselweni Breeding Ranch
Highveld Breeding Ranch
Nsalitshe Breeding Ranch
Nyonyane Sisa Ranch
Nkalashane Sisa Ranch(planned)
Mlindazwe Sisa Ranch
Mpala Fattening Ranch
Balegane Fattening Ranch
Lavumisa Fattening Ranch

TIBIYO/TISUKA AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS

Malkerns Maize Project
Gege Maize Project
Kubuta Maize/Banana Farm
Droxford Farm
Dumisa Cattle Porject
Tjelane Cattle Project
Mpangele Cattle Project
Malkerns Vegetable Project
Tibiyo Tobacco Project
Tibiyo Forestry Project
Tibiyo Dairy Farm
Tisuka Lochmoi Farm
Tisuka Malkerns Farm

PRIVATE PROJECTS

Casalee Tobacco Project

SMALLHOLDER LEASEHOLD SCHEMES

Vuvulane Irrigated Farms
Mphetsheni Pineapple Settlement Scheme

MISSION LAND SCHEMES

Usuthu Mission Young Farmer's Co-operative
Mdzimba Young Farmer's Training Scheme
St Mary's School of Appropriate Farm Technology
Mahamba
St Phillips
Gilgal
KaTsabedze Community Development Centre

APPENDIX III

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR STUDY OF TENURE ARRANGEMENTS ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SCHEMES

The study of tenure arrangements on Agricultural Production Schemes is part of the research activity entitled "Changes in Agricultural Land Use: Institutional Constraints and Opportunities" which will be undertaken by the SSRU with the assistance of the Land Tenure Centre, University of Wisconsin. The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive and evaluative review of tenure arrangements on such production schemes within the context of security of tenure and flexibility for individual farmer decision making and the need for compliance with a common plan of management.

ISSUES TO BE EXAMINED BY THE STUDY WILL INCLUDE:

1. Types of schemes: identification of the different types of production schemes and institutions (e.g. MOAC, transnationals, Tibiyo/Tisuka, etc.) responsible for the schemes' establishment.

2. Inception of the schemes: how and by whom was the scheme initiated, designed and implemented; the role of traditional authorities, local community, and participants, and government institutions.

3. Land Tenure: how was the site identified and acquired; pre-existing rights to the land; physical design of the scheme; allocation of land rights in the scheme.

4. Membership: selection procedures for participants (initial members as well as subsequent members); who are participants, their standing in the community, inter-relationships, existing land rights elsewhere, socio-economic background (income sources, access to credit, etc.) role of women, and inheritance and other transferral of land/scheme participation rights.

5. Management Structure: voting rights and decision-making procedures for day-to-day scheme management and development issues; production decisions; committee structures; contributions and obligations for members and affiliated institutions (fees for capital); procedures for disciplinary action against delinquent members; procedures for resolution of conflict between members, between members and non-members, and between members and management.

6. Formal institutional linkages: access to credit, supplies, and technological advice; maintenance contracts; access to storage facilities, transport, and marketing channels; and relation to government agricultural policy objectives.

7. Resource allocation: land utilisation, family and wage labour; capital accumulation and investment. 80