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EVALUATION OF CINDE'S PROGRESS
TOWARDS THE ATTAINMENT OF ITS
OBJECTIVES AND LONG-TERM GOALS

PART A: CENTRAL CINDE

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Central CINDE
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CENTRAL CINDE

INTRODUCTION

Central CINDE is the coordinating and administrative body of the Costa Rican Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE). As a centralized unit, it is charged with the overall planning and integrating functions for the specific operational Programs including the Investment and Export Promotion Program (PIE), the Private Agribusiness and Agroindustrial Council (PAAC), and the Training Program (PROCAP). Additionally, Central CINDE is charged with providing a series of centralized services to support its operational Programs including lobbying, standardized accounting management, procurement, personnel administration, and legal services.

Following is an institutional analysis of Central CINDE's ability to carry out these prescribed tasks including recommendations for future activities. To the extent possible, the findings, conclusions and recommendations follow the order in which they were raised in the evaluation team's Scope of Work.

OBJECTIVES, PROGRAM GOALS AND PROCESS

Over the years, since CINDE was founded in late 1982, the organization's priorities, methods and procedures have been modified significantly due to a series of factors to be presented below. Nevertheless, its broad overall objectives have changed little. These objectives, as defined by the organization's bylaws, are:

- To contribute to the preservation of fundamental civic values which characterize Costa Rican society, such as freedom, democracy, respect for institutions and the law, justice and peace;
- To promote the effective application of the concepts of responsibility and social justice as important elements within the framework of national development;
- To support the social and economic development of the country, and thereby the general well-being of its people, through the strengthening of private institutions and production units directed at the stimulation of exports;
- To cooperate in the nurturing of a proper investment environment for the promotion of private business activities; and,
- To contribute to the strengthening and restructuring of the productive capacity of the country in order to enable it to acquire the necessary potential to compete effectively with other countries

through improvements in its knowledge base, technological levels, management expertise, efficiency and productivity.

While these objectives can be considered to be quite broad and general, a brief analysis as to their pragmatic orientation yields several key phrases which further refine CINDE's guiding organizational philosophy. Specifically, these are:

- The stimulation of non-traditional exports;
- The encouragement of private investment in areas related to non-traditional exports; and,
- The stimulation of the productive capacity of the country.

Although these more refined objectives are still quite broad, they provide the parameters within which the three current CINDE Programs operate (PIE, PAAC, and PROCAP). The stated Program goals for these entities are as follows:

PIE

The Costa Rican Investment Promotion Program (PIE) has as its stated goal "...increasing direct foreign investment in Costa Rica which will result in the growth of the productive export oriented sectors in the country, and which will in turn lead to increased levels of employment and foreign exchange earnings." Sub-goals to this include: the selection of appropriate product sectors for foreign investment; assisting in the regional development of the country by promoting all regions where sustained foreign investment can take place; and, assisting in the improvement of the investment climate of the country.

PAAC

The Private Agribusiness and Agroindustrial Council (PAAC) has three basic goals: to conduct policy dialogue between the private and public sectors as they relate to agriculture, to promote the export marketing of non-traditional crops; and, to promote investment in non-traditional crop exports.

PROCAP

The Training Program (PROCAP), the only formally 'projectized' component within CINDE, has as its goal and purpose, "...to stimulate growth in the production and exporting of non-traditional goods and services", through "...a strengthening of the human resources which are needed for the Costa Rican private sector through a program of selected training activities.

From an historical perspective, the evaluation team acknowledges the fact that the original designers of the CINDE concept (the USAID/Costa Rica Director at the time and a small group of prominent local businessmen), intentionally left the stated objectives of the organization in the broadest terms possible. At this point, it appears that this was done in an effort to allow the organization the greatest flexibility in the overall promotion of private sector interests in the country, as well as to the fact that the eventual strategy of what was needed to accomplish the overall intention of the organization was not clearly known at the time.

These factors, combined with the availability of relatively large sums of Economic Support Funds (ESF), the urgency of the crisis state of the Costa Rican economy at the time, the issuance of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the advantages it poses, and the imperatives from AID/Washington to promote the private sector, formed the parameters within which the CINDE organization was created. This has meant that the specification of CINDE's Program goals, as well as the ways in which these Programs have been implemented, have evolved, and continue to evolve, in a somewhat 'learn by doing' fashion. While this has benefited the organization's overseers and implementers, in terms of their ability to attempt and in some cases reject, a significantly broad range of possibilities, it is most likely that some inefficiencies have existed in terms of both time and money. (This is not to imply, however, that had CINDE been a typical AID project with a PID, Project Paper and all of the necessary approval stages, that the inefficiencies would have been any less. Rather, simply that there were inefficiencies.)

Of even greater significance, however, is the fact that over the life of the organization, given what might be termed 'the lack of a formally articulated strategy and implementation plan', many decision makers in the AID structure, both in Washington and in Costa Rica, have felt the need to rearrange CINDE's goals and objectives through what can best be termed administrative fiat. This has taken essentially two forms:

- attempts at making the organization work better (ie., the AID/Washington ordered 'spin-off' of the original PVO promotion unit, the isolation of CINDE's Managing Director beyond direct lines of command, the hiring of the first PIE Program Manager, etc.); and,

- the use of the CINDE structure to implement several activities which were of specific interest to other USAID programs but where of unclear relevance to CINDE's overall objectives, (ie., the 'pass-throughs' to support the Private Investment Corporation, the Ministry of Exports and Trade, and BANEX/COFISA, a Women in Development Program, the distribution of RTAC supplied text books through PROCAP, etc.).

In the case of the former, the evaluation team does not necessarily take issue with what was done, but rather with the autocratic way in which it was done avoiding the application of institutional development axioms learned over the years by AID and the development community. If CINDE is ever to become a self-sufficient and sustainable organization, its various decision making bodies (General Assembly, Board of Directors,

and Managers) must be given the freedom to define the organization's objectives, policies and procedures. This is especially the case since CINDE is a 'private sector' organization whose underlying rationale lies in the belief that the private sector is more efficient in the promotion of national development goals.

In the case of the latter, another important developmental axiom was violated through a pervasive practice which utilized CINDE as the Mission's 'beast of burden' for the implementation of many activities not directly linked to achieving the organization's developmental objectives. (In this regard, the CINDE Boards of the early years are equally at fault for having supported some of their own tangential activities.) In this category of activities lie several which were accepted by the CINDE Board simply in exchange for additional economic resources, while others were forced on the organization in an effort to achieve compliance with certain AID/Washington mandated priorities. Although most of these ancillary activities have ceased, or have been reduced over the years, it has created both a precedent and a unique paternal relationship between the Mission and the organization.

The net impact of the overly broad objectives at both the Central CINDE and Program levels, combined with the lack of an implementation plan to develop specific, well-defined objectives and plans of action, has resulted in the present day situation where the definition and articulation of objectives is performed to a great extent by USAID/Costa Rica staff and/or funded advisors. (At least a partial indication of this is the fact that the PIE Five-Year Plan, the latest draft of the PROCAP Five-Year Plan, and the initial documents of the Central CINDE Five-Year Plan are in English.) While it appears that the Mission is now aware of past errors in this regard and is sensitive to the disadvantages to its present relationship with CINDE, these practices will most likely continue until a clear, concise statement of the organization's objectives and the methods for accomplishing them is put in place and comes to be respected over time by both AID and the decision makers within CINDE.

Recommendation:

The Mission should continue the initiative of encouraging the preparation of five-year plans as part of what could be called a Project Paper-type exercise. An exercise of this type is already partially being implemented through the preparation of 5-year plans for the three CINDE Programs, plus one for the overall organization. Nevertheless, it is the feeling of the team that this exercise is being performed 'on the run' in an effort to satisfy the Mission's programmatic needs, and to some extent AID/Washington's, rather than representing an inherent 'felt need' on the part of the CINDE staff. Furthermore, it appears that the CINDE staff and its Board of Directors after years of Mission 'micro-management' considers the preparation of these plans and the items included in them, more in terms of what will be accepted by AID rather than in terms of what is best for the Costa Rican private sector. The final preparation of these plans must be transformed into a Costa Rican exercise in which 'ownership' can be claimed by those actually implementing the CINDE

Programs. While this appears to be the case with the PIE Five-Year Plan, which is actually being used for implementation purposes, it does not appear to be the case with the other plans.

As a final note, the team would strongly advise that if this recommendation is accepted, the funding for current Programs and the support of Central CINDE not be held up pending the results of the exercise. Too many positive outcomes from past CINDE activities are just now beginning to be realized and these would be adversely affected, should financial disbursements be held up further.

INSTITUTIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN PLANNING, DEVELOPING AND GUIDING PROGRAMS

The present CINDE concept, as expressed in its bylaws and implemented through its Board of Directors, is directly manifested in the goals, objectives and activities of its component Programs. Nevertheless, as was stated above, many of the early initiatives undertaken by the organization were not the result of a clearly pronounced strategy, but rather were the result of a generalized attempt to provide support to the Costa Rican private sector, as well as to respond to specific initiatives and interests originating in USAID/Costa Rica and AID/Washington. Nevertheless, over the past several years, the focus of CINDE's activities towards non-traditional exports has become much sharper and more clearly defined both in terms of its specific Programs and its ancillary activities (the majority of which have been dropped, or spun off in recent years).

Given this, CINDE's institutional accomplishments can then best be judged through an understanding of the goals, objectives and accomplishments of its component Programs. In this regard, the evaluation team fully supports the need and appropriateness for the three component Programs being implemented by CINDE. While not entirely meeting the needs of the Costa Rican private sector, the three functional Programs all address critical constraints to its development and provide systematic support for their resolution. This has been the direct result of the overall CINDE 'umbrella' and the guidance provided by its broad objectives.

Apart from its functional Programs, however, Central Cinde is also having an impact on guiding sector programs in export promotion in a much broader sense in terms of its lobbying and informational campaigns. One of the earliest thrusts of the Motivation and Communications Unit was a publicity campaign launched to convince the public of the benefits from an export-oriented economy. While it would have been an impossible task for the team to have obtained quantitative proof of the effectiveness of this campaign, we were impressed by the number of people interviewed, both informed and otherwise, who commented on the changes in their thinking towards export-related issues. Many attributed this change to have, at least, begun as a result of the CINDE campaign.

In addition, CINDE has been active in supporting several other more specific initiatives aimed at improving the export environment of the country. The majority of these initiatives were directed at legislators

and other GOCR policy makers, and dealt either generally or specifically with the following range of issues as they impact on the export of non-traditional commodities:

- Exchange Rate Policy
- Tariff Policy
- Tariff Exemptions
- Import Sur Charges
- Tax Policies Affecting Trade
- Export Contract
- Drawback Industry Legislation
- Port Charges
- Protection of Foreign Investors Legislation
- Free Trade Zone Legislation

Lobbying is an extremely difficult activity for which to measure causality. Nevertheless, several informed observers attributed CINDE's lobbying activities to have been significant in the passage of legislation, or in the modification of policies, dealing with exchange rate control, the reduction or removal of tariffs, and the application of the 'Export Contract' which protects foreign investors.

While the team doubts that CINDE can, or should, become all things to all people in supporting the private sector, there is currently at least one 'hole' between the overall CINDE objective of supporting the private sector and those of its current components. PIE is primarily concerned with attracting foreign investment which will result in the provision of employment and in the generation of scarce foreign exchange through non-traditional exports. PAAC, on the other hand, is charged with commodity development and market search in non-traditional agricultural exports. Lastly, PROCAP provides training for the staff and employees of principally local firms and institutions involved in the non-traditional export sector.

This coverage, while quite broad, does ignore one important private sector segment; the local manufacturers of non-agricultural exports. Up until now, this segment of the private sector has been given a lower priority in terms of both the Mission's and CINDE's objectives due to an intentional decision based on available resources and potential impact on the balance of payments and employment generation.

Nevertheless, through deliberations between the CINDE Board and the Mission, a proposal has been made to restructure PIE to include a functional department entitled the Industrial Development Program (Impulso Industrial), to deal specifically with local exporters and manufacturers of non-agricultural products. It is our understanding that this proposal has been given technical approval by all necessary levels within the Mission, but that the granting of final approval is being held up pending a decision as to the ownership of the ESF-provided local currency and the proper disbursement channels for it. The proposed program would provide,

"...a broad range of technical and marketing assistance to local companies in several sectors, e.g., plastics, metalworking, and possibly apparel. The initial aim would not be production of final goods for foreign markets, but rather subcontracting with foreign companies for components, since this type of export is generally seen as a less demanding target in terms of marketing and distribution." (USAID/Costa Rica, Strategy Update, March, 1988).

A final issue to be addressed in this section dealing with CINDE's accomplishments in planning, developing and guiding programs deals with the sustainability of those accomplishments, or of the mechanism which provided them. Central CINDE, and to a lesser degree its Programs, are promotional organizations whose services in other countries are considered to be fully within the public sector's responsibility to provide. (For example, it is the team's belief that the various state investment promotion agencies located throughout the U.S. are taxpayer supported.) In essence, it is the outputs of the organization in terms of non-traditional exports and the companies that produce them which becomes the unit of analysis concerning the sustainability issue.

Granted, some of CINDE's services (feasibility studies, courses and technical advice, to name the principal ones), can and should be charged for, and would most likely pay for, at least, at part of their own cost. Nevertheless, many of the operational costs of the organization will have to be supported through some type of governmental subvention. To date, this subvention has been provided almost in its entirety by USAID through the GOOCR. This mechanism has allowed the organization to remain relatively independent of local governmental structures, while affording it a level of economic activity which could not have been sustained by the GOOCR alone.

Nevertheless, this is not a stable situation. The Mission gave the team strong indications that the current levels of ESF funding which Costa Rica receives are due to be cut significantly after 1990. This would necessarily result in a far smaller portion of the pie being allocated to CINDE. The option which immediately comes to mind of having the GOOCR assume the costs of the program is most likely the only realistic long term answer (lacking the appearance of alternative funding sources), although it is fraught with potential drawbacks. For example, the GOOCR currently has its own institutions which attempt the same types of export promotion activities as does CINDE and its programs. Nevertheless, the opinion was expressed by many that the services offered and the accomplishments achieved were negligible compared to those of CINDE. This has caused institutional jealousies to develop and would not allow for a harmonious integration of the two entities in the future. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the Costa Rican Legislature would appropriate the relatively high levels of funding which CINDE would require given to demands of other national priorities.

One suggestion advanced was that CINDE become a semi-autonomous 'parastatal' organization which would be independent of political interference. The proto-type most often mentioned in this case is the Costa Rican Electric Institute (ICE), which functions in this way. A critical difference, however, lies in the fact that ICE is almost entirely self-financing through its collections from customers, while CINDE would be dependent on government allocations for, at least, a part of their economic livelihood.

Recommendations:

The evaluation team fully supports the concept behind the establishment of the Impulso Industrial initiative as being totally within CINDE's mandate, as well as within PIE's ability to implement it. We therefore strongly recommend that this initiative be approved and funded at the earliest possible date.

The team further recommends that Central CINDE, together with its Programs, develop criteria for the charging of fees for a selected number of its services. Any scheme of this type should be phased in gradually overtime so as not to scare away potential customers before the worth of the actual service is fully appreciated.


Lastly, the team recommends that the Mission consider the establishment of a CINDE endowment dedicated to selected Program activities, or to the organization as a whole. Such a concept would require the investment of a substantial sum of ESF local currency transfers (potentially as much as US \$ 50 million), in certain guaranteed securities or other fixed assets which would generate a fixed income. This income would then finance the organization. A provocative suggestion made to the team was that the investment could be made to construct a new industrial park in which CINDE would become the manager and landlord.

ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING, PROGRAM NEEDS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Organizational Structure

For historical reasons, the organizational structure of CINDE, its lines of authority, and the inter-institutional relationships between Programs are somewhat unique given the magnitude and complexity of the organization's activities. A brief analysis of the current organizational chart is most revealing in this regard.

CINDE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
(as of April, 1988)



The General Assembly

The General Assembly can be viewed as the equivalent of the stockholders in a normal corporate structure, although no stock or other economic interests are held in the organization. There are presently 48 members (recently increased from 30), chosen jointly by USAID/Costa Rica and the CINDE Board of Directors based on such criteria as professional background, type and size of business activity, and interest in the CINDE Programs. In the past they have met only once a year to elect the Board of Directors and its officers, although both the Mission and CINDE itself are currently taking measures to broaden their involvement in the future.

The Board of Directors

The Board of Directors is composed of 10 members, one named for life, and three elected each year for a period of three years from among the membership of the General Assembly. They meet biweekly to give direction to the Executive Director, establish policy and approve the Central CINDE budgets and those of its Programs. An additional key role of the Board members is to 'open doors' and lobby in the interests of the organization and its Programs.

The current composition of the CINDE Board includes three industrialists, three commercial businessmen, and four representatives from the agricultural sector. They are all influential and successful entrepreneurs and come from a broad range of types and sizes of local companies. (For example, in terms of the number of employees in each board member's company, the range is from seven to over one thousand.)

Based on the team's relatively superficial contact with the Board, this body appears to function well, to be composed of the proper types of people for the task, and commands the respect of the rest of the organization. Nevertheless, the team did detect a reluctance on the part of the Board to provide critical oversight concerning the various Programs.

The Executive Director

The Executive Director is named by the Board and serves as an advisor to it. His responsibilities are currently limited to authority over the central Administration and Finance Unit and the small Motivation and Communications Unit. Although this person, together with the President of the Board, is the legal representative for the entire organization, giving him tremendous responsibility, he currently has no direct authority over any of the organization's operational Programs. While he has the power to take any issue to the Board that he deems important, for the most part he must rely on moral suasion and informal authority to communicate his desires to the Program Managers. This single factor has resulted in what the team considers to be a relatively high level of inefficiencies in terms of both, organizational control and decision making, and in the administrative flow of paperwork. (The clearest example of this is the lack of authority on the part of the General Manager to oblige the Program Managers to comply with USAID's paperwork requirements. The ensuing lack of compliance has, on several occasions, led to vouchers not being paid and budgets not being approved in a timely fashion.)

The Councils of Directors

The three Councils of Directors correspond to the three principal activities at the Program level. They are each composed of 10 members (recently increased from 6), also selected from the membership of the General Assembly. A variable number of Council members (2-3) are also members of the CINDE Board and, at least informally, represent their respective Programs on it. The obligations of the Councils are to provide guidance in the day to day management of the Programs in providing technical advice, opening doors in terms of lobbying activities, and in the setting of Program level policies. While the Councils are composed of interested people representing the Costa Rican private sector in general, there is a tendency to select them based on their areas of professional expertise, especially in the case of agriculture and PAAC.

The actual level of decision making undertaken by the Councils varies with each Program. In the case of both PROCAP and PIE, since their policies, priorities and procedures are fairly well established, the Councils serve principally as advisory boards to their respective Program Managers in addition to approving the annual budgets. In the case of PAAC, however, which is still relatively new, the Council is far more involved in the day to day management decisions of the Program.

In the past, and continuing to the present, the distinction between the areas of decision making appropriate to the CINDE Board and those areas most appropriate to the Councils has often been blurred, especially in the case of budgetary approval. The lack of direct authority over the individual Program Managers on the part of the CINDE Executive Director has only served to further blur this distinction.

Program Needs

The needs of the Programs for support services from Central CINDE vary from specific administrative and financial services to the far more general including lobbying, integration and coordination, publicity and representation. Currently, the administrative and financial services provided by Central CINDE include: financial and budgetary management, procurement, personnel and payroll management, and limited legal services. Since it is quite obvious that these services are required by all of CINDE's Programs, the question then becomes whether they should be provided by Central CINDE, or by the Programs themselves.

While arguments have been advanced concerning the potential economies of scale which could be achieved through the centralized provision of services, the evaluation team feels that this is not a strong enough case in its own right. Rather, a stronger argument which could be advanced is that the provision of centralized services, especially accounting and financial management, provide a coalescing force which unifies the entire CINDE organization and presents a unified front to the public. Additionally, the unified provision of services would potentially tend to assist in the process of coordination and synergy between Programs which the team views as a positive goal for the future.

A precise evaluation of the worthiness and effectiveness of these services to the Programs is quite difficult under the circumstances. Due in part to a legacy of less than totally correct accounting and general administrative practices on the one hand (See the discussion below of Central CINDE's ability to manage AID funds.), and to the substantial delays and considerable paperwork requirements inherent in the AID financial approval and disbursement process on the other, the Program Managers often complain vehemently about Central CINDE's inability to provide adequate and timely administrative and financial services. (See discussion below concerning USAID/Costa Rica's supervision and support to Central CINDE.) All things considered, the three Program Managers would prefer to be in direct control of their own administrative and financial systems rather than having to depend on Central CINDE. The evaluation

team would like to point out, however, that this preference is, at least partly, based on problems resulting from a lack of understanding as to the demands of, plus a lack of respect for, the USAID financial requirements which are placed on Central CINDE, rather than being totally within the ability of the organization to resolve them.

Of additional concern is the existence of an inadequate organizational structure, as was explained above, for the effective provision and supervision of these services. Although the Head of the Administrative and Financial Unit of Central CINDE is responsible to the Executive Director, he in turn, has no direct authority over the Program Managers in terms of establishing or enforcing administrative procedures and practices. This has led to the existence of substantial inefficiencies in the flow of funding and in the provision of services, further frustrating the Program Managers.

Inter-Program Relationships

To date, the inter-program relationships within CINDE have not been as close as what would have been desired in order to obtain maximum organizational efficiency. The reasons for this appear to stem from several causes including:

- The lack of centralized authority and control in CINDE's organizational structure described above (While the Managing Director can take issues of non-collaboration among Programs to the Board of Directors, he can only suggest areas of mutual collaboration to the Managers.);
- A somewhat pervasive feeling among Program Managers that they only want to be responsible for activities directly under their control, rather than having to depend on others;
- The fact that PAAC was originally conceived of and implemented outside of the CINDE structure, and later only reluctantly accepted to become a part of it due to USAID's insistence. This has resulted in a strong reluctance on the part of the PAAC staff to depend on the other Programs, and in a continuing desire to eventually be 'free' again; and,
- The absence of common priorities and Program strategies which would have led to greater coordination.

What direct inter-Program coordination exists is most clearly seen in the relationship between the training and the investment promotion components. In this case, collaboration can be seen in the structuring of PROCAP courses to meet the needs of certain identified sub-sectors and foreign companies promoted through PIE. Nevertheless, there appears to be a tendency for many foreign companies to want to provide their own training based on methodologies developed elsewhere. Additionally, there is also a tendency on the part of PIE to promote the services of the National Training Institute (INA) where the teaching of manual skills is

required by an investor. This is not to be taken as criticism, however, since PROCAP sees itself as a 'residual trainer' providing services where no other organization can.

In the case of PAAC, little identifiable coordination exists with the other Programs. In spite of the fact that PROCAP organizes a substantial number of agriculturally oriented courses in any given year, this is not normally done through any coordinated effort with PAAC. The reason given for this from PAAC's viewpoint is that agricultural training is different from all other types and that they (PAAC) can provide better and more relevant training for their sector. This, the evaluation team sees as being unjustified, given the high quality and relevance of PROCAP's training activities in agriculture.


PIE's relations with PAAC have, until recently, been minimal and have been limited to collaboration on the establishment of PAAC's first overseas office in Miami. In this case, however, the objectives and priorities of the two components to date have dealt with different sets of people and activities. As was mentioned above, PIE is presently concentrating on the promotion of foreign investment, mainly in the manufacturing sector, while PAAC has been concentrating on the development of agricultural based exports through local investors and producers. Nevertheless, the team is concerned that once PIE launches its Industrial Development Program for local entrepreneurs, and once PAAC has developed lines of production appropriate for processing and agroindustrial uses, the same feelings of independence will prevail and no coordination will be forthcoming.

Recommendations:

Organizational Structure-

The team recommends a restructuring of the CINDE organization to allow for centralized lines of authority and responsibility, an increased importance for the Administration and Finance Division, and a clearly defined division of responsibilities and authority between the Board of Directors and the Program Councils. A recommended organizational chart embodying these changes is presented below.

RECOMMENDED CINDE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



The General Assembly--

With the possible exception of electing the Board of Directors, the General Assembly has been a non-functional body. In order to get its members more involved in CINDE's operations, the team supports the concept of the Board and Mission in the establishment of several working committees, composed of Assembly members, for the purposes of studying and recommending specific courses of action on designated topics. The number of these working committees, and the number of Assembly members on them, would vary according to the number of identified issues to be studied and their complexity. Members would be appointed by the Board based on their particular areas of expertise (ie., exporters would look at customs issues, bankers/financiers would look at exchange rate policy, etc.).

For reasons of practicality and manageability, we would not recommend that the Assembly size be changed for the time being, although we would like to stress that the present number of 48 not be taken as sacred. Until the Assembly begins to function properly, we see no compelling reasons to either increase, or decrease the number. The Assembly's size could, however, become an issue at a future date as CINDE becomes larger and/or more independent from USAID.

Internal Audit-

Concurrent with the CINDE Board's recent vote to establish the position of Internal Auditor, the team supports the concept of providing one additional internal safeguard in the flow of financial information between the office of the Manager for Administration and Finance and the USAID/Costa Rica Controller's Office. In addition to several other recommendations mentioned below concerning the financial management of the organization, the addition of an internal audit function would assist in guaranteeing both the accuracy of the organization's financial data and in turn, the confidence of USAID/Costa Rica in CINDE's ability to manage its finances.

The Executive Manager-

This proposed reorganization calls for the Executive Manager to be placed in direct line between the Board of Directors and the individual Program Managers. This is to give him direct authority over them and their Programs, commensurate with his responsibilities. Furthermore, it is felt that concurrent with this reorganization, the Executive Manager should be given voting power on the Board of Directors.

The Administration and Finance Manager-

Currently the Head of Administration and Finance is a junior position relative to those of the Program Managers with no direct authority, or even balance of power, between them. The recommendation is therefore to create a new manager's position for Administration and Finance at the same responsibility and authority levels as those for the Program Managers.

It was also pointed out by those interviewed during the course of this evaluation that having only one person in charge of both administrative and financial matters is beyond the physical capabilities of most people to manage, and that the position would best be divided in two. Since the Mission has recently contracted for a specific in-depth study of CINDE's organizational structure, the team recommends waiting until the conclusions of that study are known before passing judgment on this issue.

The Program Councils-

The original justification for the establishment of the Councils at the Program level was to reduce the burden of day to day decision making on the part of the Board, thereby passing it to a more appropriate functional level. While this was probably a reasonable idea at the time, it has resulted in two problem areas. The first is the difficulty in defining which decisions are appropriate for the Councils and which are best left to the Board of Directors. This, especially in the case of the PAAC, has resulted in a blurring of responsibilities and a heightened degree of antipathy between the two decision making bodies. The second difficulty encountered, principally by PIE and PROCAP, is that since both

Programs are well established, their day to day decision making requirements are much reduced and fully within the capabilities of their respective Managers to deal with.

Given this situation, both PIE and PROCAP are considering modifying the roles of their respective Councils from decision making bodies to those of advisory councils. The evaluation team agrees with, and supports this recommended change. On the other hand, PAAC strongly rejects this view stating that if their Council members were to be stripped of their decision making roles, they would become disinterested in the process and not be supportive of the Program.

-An Administrative Assistant Position at the Program Level

As will be discussed below, CINDE has always experienced difficulties in following AID-mandated accounting practices, especially at the Program level. One additional measure directed at rectifying this situation could be the placement of a representative from the Administration and Finance Manager's office directly within each of the Programs to assist in the preparation of the necessary accounting data. An analysis should be performed to determine if this can be accomplished without the hiring of new staff. Even if new staff are required, however, if used correctly, they could easily pay for themselves through reduced voucher rejections.

Program Needs-

The net worth of the services provided by Central CINDE to the three Programs is a function of the perceived quality of those services. As the perceived quality and appreciation for CINDE's services improves, the net value of those services to the Programs will also increase. A critical element required for this to take place, however, will be the adoption of the above recommended organizational structure complete with well defined lines of authority and responsibility.

Inter-Program Relationships-

The main reason for the relatively low level of inter-Program relations and coordination is the fact that there has been no officially sanctioned body within the CINDE structure charged with this task. Instead, and up to the present, the only coordination between Programs has been the product of the 'good faith' and persuasive capacity of the Program and Executive Managers, plus that which is undertaken by the Board. If CINDE were to be reorganized along the lines of the structure proposed above, one of the most significant results would be the establishment of a potentially more effective coordinating function residing in the position of the Executive Manager.

THE PLANNING AND BUDGETARY PROCESS

The planning and budgetary process followed by CINDE is both complex and lengthy having to pass through several approval levels including the Program Councils, the Board of Directors and USAID/Costa Rica. Following is a step by step listing of the budgetary planning and approval process followed by CINDE, together with approximate benchmark dates: (The organization's fiscal year corresponds to the calendar year.)

-September 1- The process begins with Central CINDE requesting that the Programs prepare their individual budgets including proposed expenditures and leftover funds. The Programs are given six weeks to accomplish this and to obtain approval from their respective Councils. Individual budgets are also prepared for Central CINDE Administration, the Executive Director's Office, and the Motivation and Communications Unit.

-October 15- The six budgets are reviewed by the Executive Director and a delegation of three Board members.

-November 1- The six budgets are presented to the entire Board, with explanations, for their approval.

-November 15- The six approved budgets are then sent to USAID/Costa Rica for final approval. At this point, Central CINDE removes itself from coordinating the process and allows each program Manager to push for individual budget approval (with the exception of its own budgets).

-January 1- Since the budgetary approval process has averaged four to five months in recent years, some level of bridge financing on the part of Central CINDE has been required for each of the Programs. These delays appear to have been caused by a combination of factors including: a lack of required detail and preciseness on the part of CINDE, indecision in USAID policy matters, and an overly conservative stance on the part of many players in the Mission's approval process--a result to no small degree of the recent Inspector General's Report.

-April-May- As the budgets are approved, the actual amounts are reconciled against the requested amounts and those actually spent so far during the year.

Throughout the entire year, Central CINDE maintains a Monthly Comparative Statement showing amounts actually spent compared to those budgeted. Nevertheless, due to CINDE's unique organizational structure, once the Board of Directors approves each Program budget, Central CINDE leaves the budgetary process in favor of each Program Manager fighting for his/her respective budget. Additionally, once the individual Program budgets are approved by USAID/Costa Rica, they become almost the sole domain of each Program. In this regard, no budgetary oversight or control on the part of Central CINDE is performed. Rather, each Program

Manager is free to reorganize his/her budget, shifting resources between line items as the need arises. The Administrative Director for Central CINDE is then told of these changes, at which point they are recorded in the Monthly Comparative Statement. In the past, when these transfers have been in excess of the 15 percent permitted by USAID policy, they have led to delays on future disbursements when the Mission's Controller's Office is forced to seek justification and authorization.

The evaluation team finds three problems in this budgetary process. The first is that each individual Program Manager currently lobbies for his/her budget in total isolation to Central CINDE without its support or oversight. This, almost intentionally, ignores one of the main rationales for the existence of Central CINDE--coordination and integration--and further serves to reduce the value of Central CINDE's services to the Programs.

Secondly, the fact that once a Program budget is approved, the Managers can change line items and make other changes without any input from Central CINDE. This causes programmatic problems within CINDE itself, as well as being the cause of some of the disbursement delays on the part of the Mission.

Lastly, and of the greatest concern to the team, is the fact that the budgetary approval process is so drawn out and detailed. The causes for this appear to lie both within CINDE itself, as well as within USAID/Costa Rica. On the CINDE side, the problems stem from a lack of regard for the levels of accuracy and detail required by the Mission, plus the lack of an effective organizational structure which could more readily supervise and monitor the required budgetary procedures. One Mission staffer stated the problem succinctly when he suggested that, "With CINDE we are attempting to implement a 'private sector' project using 'public sector' guidelines and regulations." Essentially, the vast majority of those interviewed within the CINDE organization felt that the levels of detail and accuracy required by the Mission are far too strict and limit their freedom in implementing their respective Programs. This feeling, whether correct or not, combined with the lack of a centralized authority within the organization which can oblige the application of accuracy and detail, has been one of the organization's principal problems in the budgetary process.

Other problems, however, originate with USAID. A first area of concern is that each budget must receive approval at four separate levels of authority with the Mission: the technical (OPS, ARDO, and Training); the Program Office; the Controller's Office; and the Director's Office. It is the team's impression that whatever time frame could be considered 'normal' under these circumstances has been increased significantly as a result of the release of an Inspector General's Report last year which was strongly critical of CINDE and the Mission's dealings with it. It appears that as a result of this report, most decision makers in the approval chain are opting for the most conservative judgments possible within their respective ranges of action. Essentially, everyone in the approval chain is choosing the most narrow and strict interpretation of his/her mandate to be the guardian of U.S. government funds. While the

team does not wish to suggest that anyone is acting excessively, the impact of this at the aggregate level has been extremely burdensome for CINDE and the development process which it is trying to promote.

Additionally, policy issues, often outside of the Mission's ability to control, have caused other delays. Most notable of these involves the current debate as to the ultimate ownership and programming responsibility of the local currency generated by the ESF allocations. This single issue was still holding up approval of all of CINDE's 1988 budgets as of the end of April, 1988 when this evaluation was conducted.

A stopgap solution which had successfully been used up until now is the use of 'bridge financing' between Central CINDE and its Programs. Since the original USAID grant in 1984, Central CINDE has managed its own core funding out of a declining 'endowment' fund. (This was not a true endowment since both the interest and principal were to be used to finance the organization's expenditures.) Over the years, as it became known that budgets would be held up, Central CINDE instituted a transfer process between its core funds and the financial needs of the Programs until their budgets were eventually approved and Central CINDE could be reimbursed. (No interest or other fees are ever charged by Central CINDE.) As of the time of this evaluation, however, CINDE's 'core' budget had been drawn down to almost zero leaving them with no further ability to bridge finance.

Recommendation:

Budgetary negotiations and oversight must come under the supervision and control of Central CINDE where more uniform and continuous policies and procedures could be followed. Under the recommended organizational structure presented above, the Executive Director would become the centralized authority through which all budgets would be monitored. It is the sense of the team that one of the greatest stumbling blocks in the budgetary approval (and disbursement), process is a generalized lack of confidence on the part of USAID/Costa Rica in CINDE's ability to provide accurate and detailed documentation in compliance with proper budgetary practices and federal government regulations. It is our feeling that one of the ways in which confidence could be returned is through the implementation of a more uniform and centrally administered budgetary process.

To further support this, it is also recommended that Central CINDE be given oversight authority in terms of the three Program budgets. Only through this mechanism will the Program Managers come to know and appreciate the need for detailed, precise and timely budget information in a standardized format acceptable to USAID.

While beyond the team's scope of work, as well as our technical ability to make specific recommendations, the team nevertheless recommends that a study be conducted involving the USAID/Costa Rica Controller's Office, the various USAID/Costa Rica Project Managers dealing with CINDE, and select CINDE staff to come up with a coordinated

plan to reduce the paperwork requirements involved in the process, as well as the time required at each step. During the course of this evaluation, Mission staff did arrive at a preliminary decision to grant CINDE a two-year budgeting cycle rather than the one-year cycle used at present. The team supports this accomplishment and further recommends that up to a five-year cycle be considered for certain agricultural projects with relatively long maturation periods.

CENTRAL CINDE'S FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

Of the many questions asked of the evaluation team in the Scope of Work, the issue of Central CINDE's financial management capability is the most contested, and therefore difficult, to pronounce on. At the time this evaluation was conducted, CINDE was having to deal with no less than five teams of auditors, investigators and evaluators, in addition to the almost daily scrutiny provided by the USAID/Costa Rica Controller's Office. In addition to this current number of observers, both the CINDE and the Mission files include the results of numerous, both continuous and eventual, audits, evaluations and investigations which make numerous statements and allegations concerning how well, or how poorly, CINDE has been managing its affairs.

Based on a careful review of these documents (internal and external audits, evaluations, reports, etc.), plus in-depth interviews with many of those involved, we have been able to piece together a chronology of judgments and events which hopefully present an objective analysis of Central CINDE's broad and overall ability to manage AID's funds. The chronology is as follows:

-November 1983- The CPA firm of Peat Marwick is hired to be the external auditor for CINDE and to develop and assist in the implementation of a financial records system.

-January 1985- An AID/Washington evaluation of CINDE's financial management capability concludes that, "I can unequivocally state that the financial systems and controls being followed by USAID and CINDE fulfill the criteria of prudent financial management and assure accountability of funds."

-March 1985- Peat Marwick completes its first in-depth audit for the years 1984 and 1985. Their final report concludes with the following, "In our opinion, the above mentioned financial statements reasonably present the financial situation of the Costa Rican Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE) as of December 31, 1984 and 1985, including the results of its operations and the changes in its financial situation for the years ending on those dates as conforming to generally accepted accounting principals applied to a consistent baseline."

-March 1987- Peat Marwick completes its second in-depth audit for the years 1985 and 1986 coming to the same conclusion as is cited above.

-May 1987- A second outside firm, Granados & Co., is hired to become CINDE's Internal Auditor and releases its report related to 1986 financial practices. In this report the auditors find many anomalies in the records such as missing, or inadequate documentation, inconsistent dates on checks and vouchers and other improper procedures. No insinuation is made, however, that there was any misuse or misdirection of funds. Rather, the problems appear to lie principally in the area of improper documentation. CINDE's Executive Manager takes steps to remedy the anomalies stating that the leaving of the organization's Administrative and Financial Manager and their inability to hire a replacement had contributed to the problems.

-Mid 1987- The results of the Internal Audit prompt the Controller's Office of the Mission to examine CINDE's accounting records in greater detail. This examination discovers an additional series of inadequate practices and procedures and results in the decision to switch the disbursement procedures from an a priori advance method based on draw downs, to a cost reimbursable method. This furthers the need for 'bridge financing' between Central CINDE and its Programs. Nevertheless, the financial flow of funds to the Programs is greatly slowed down and Managers begin to complain about Central CINDE's inability to provide adequate services.

-August 1987- A new financial director is hired by Central CINDE who begins to establish a more complete records system.

-October 1987- CINDE is advised that the Mission must now use U.S. Comptroller General Standards for Audit. In essence, this requires the Controller's Office to look into a far greater range of issues in an organization's administrative affairs, and to be far more meticulous in its examination of existing documentation. As the investigations become more detailed, an ever greater number of items are found to be in conflict with U.S. Comptroller General Standards. This again triggers the requirement for an even greater in-depth examination resulting in the Controller's Office placing a financial analyst almost permanently in Central CINDE to review the veracity of each voucher, expense and check. At this point, auditing and oversight on the part of the Mission's Controller's Office begin to take an estimated 30-40 percent of staff time at all administrative levels. Additionally, the capacity of the organization's two personal computers to handle CINDE's record keeping is surpassed, forcing the personnel to resort to laborious hand methods.

-November 1987- The new Administrative Director issues an answer to the Internal Auditor's report covering the anomalies detected for the 1986 to early 1987 period. The vast majority of the issues cited are explained in his answer and new procedures are put into place attempting to assure that they will not be repeated. As was the case with past years, any possible accusations of fraud or intentional misuse of funds are unfounded, as the vast majority of the issues raised in the Internal Auditor's report are found to be procedural.

-April 1988- As of the time that this evaluation was conducted, none of the CINDE budgets had been approved by the Controller's Office and a reimbursement request for US\$500,000 covering the last trimester of 1987, had also not been approved. (Presently due to the ownership of the ESF local currency issue mentioned above.) At this point, Central CINDE's ability to 'bridge finance' is stretched to its limit with its financial resources nearing zero. Additionally, the responsibility to answer questions from the auditors and the Controller's Office are taking so much staff time that the keeping of present records is in danger of falling behind and entering into disarray.

In the view of the evaluators, Central CINDE's capacity to manage AID funds is a relative concept. What appears to have happened is that the definition of 'capacity' has become increasingly more stringent over the years as greater levels of refinement have been applied. Somewhat less than ideal practices, principally in the area of documentation, which might have been considered to be within the realm of 'generally acceptable' practices in the past, (At least in terms of the majority of the audit reports cited above.) have now become unacceptable. Additionally, the team suspects the existence of a 'snowball' effect in terms of the anomalies encountered in the various auditing exercises. As more demands are made on CINDE's administrative staff to answer issues identified by auditors, less and less time is available to perform the various accounting tasks with completeness and accuracy. This then leads to further errors. Without a doubt, the organization has in the past, and most likely will continue to, in the future, exhibit less than perfect administrative procedures according to a strict interpretation of 'generally accepted accounting and internal control practices'.

The team lacks the knowledge and experience to pass judgment on the effective implementation of federal government regulations, nor are we qualified to assess what would be the 'proper' amount of financial control required. Nevertheless, we feel it to be of significant importance that the current state of both the budgetary and the disbursement approval processes are becoming a severe limitation to efficient project implementation. This is especially alarming in light of the fact that over the six-year period that CINDE has been in existence, neither the files consulted, nor any of the persons interviewed suggested that any of the administrative anomalies stemmed from intentional misuse of funds, nor from the desire for personal gain.

A final contributing issue requires mentioning. As the requirements of the accounting/reporting process have become more stringent, the individual Program Managers (principally PIE, and to a lesser extent PAAC and PROCAP) have considered the increasing paperwork requirements to be an impediment to the successful implementation of their programs. As a result, the quality of their responses in terms of accounting documentation has been less than desirable. At the same time, the relative lack of authority over the Program Managers on the part of the Central CINDE Executive Manager and his Administrative and Financial Director does not enable them to properly organize and monitor the AID mandated procedures.

Recommendations:

In the case of Central CINDE's financial management capability, the evaluation team makes several recommendations. The first of these is that the Mission, through Central CINDE, hire a short-term Personal Services Contractor to act as an advisor to the newly elevated Manager for Administration and Finance. This person should have a strong background in finance and administration and be familiar with AID's reporting requirements. His/her scope of work would be to analyze Central CINDE's present management systems and to make recommendations as to ways in which they can be streamlined while complying with U.S. Government regulations.

Secondly, the Mission should revert to the practice of trimestral advances based on budgeted amounts and the past trimester's expenditures. It is hoped that this would reduce the need for Central CINDE to provide bridge financing to the Programs and speed up disbursements.

Thirdly, that CINDE adopt the above recommended organizational structure giving the Executive Manager direct authority in financial matters over the Program Managers. Additionally, that the position of Administrative and Financial Director be raised to that commensurate with the Program Managers in terms of authority and responsibility.

Finally, that the Mission approve the purchase of an adequate computer system for the management of CINDE's financial and administrative records. Central CINDE already has several proposals/needs assessments from local firms concerning this issue, but has not had the time to take action on them.

CINDE'S OTHER PROGRAMS

Both the files and interviews with those involved demonstrate that CINDE has been used by USAID/Costa Rica to implement several activities within the general framework of support to the private sector, but which were not totally within the realm of the organization's objectives. Some of these were simple 'pass throughs' to other organizations which have not caused any substantive burdens on CINDE (ie., PIC and COFISA), while others have contained specific programmatic responsibilities (Motivation and Communications, the PVO Program, Women in Development, RTAC, support to the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, etc.). As the organization has matured, however, the vast majority of these activities have been dropped, greatly reduced, or have become separate entities in their own right.

The Motivation and Communications Program, which was strongly favored by CINDE and which once existed to provide centralized lobbying services, publicity, audiovisual support and publications to the Programs, has been reduced to a one person office primarily working on publicity issues. The PVO Program, which appears to have been quite

successful, became independent from CINDE approximately two years ago and continues to have a good reputation. The only 'chamber' Program still funded by Central CINDE (albeit at a much reduced level compared to a few years ago), is with the Chamber of Industry and provides financial support to fund a much needed data base for its members, as well as providing CINDE with a direct link to Chamber members. All other ancillary programs have been dropped with the exception of RTAC II which provides low-priced text books to university students through PROCAP. The team was given assurances that this program is well within the administrative capabilities of PROCAP and does not represent a burden on it, while providing a valuable service to the country.

Recommendation:

The issue of additional or excessive programs within CINDE is no longer a concern for the organization. The team can merely recommend in this case that CINDE maintain its current focused approach to implementing its objectives and policies.

SUPPORT AND SUPERVISION BY AID

The team understands that AID's primary concern in requesting this evaluation was to gain a better understanding of CINDE's current situation, rather than an analysis from an historical perspective. Nevertheless, there are several factors related to the genesis of the organization which still hold implications for AID's role today. These are:

-CINDE and its programs were a USAID/Costa Rica creation together with a small group of local business persons. Essentially, it was created from 'whole cloth' in an attempt to assist in the reversal of what has been termed, "...the desperate situation of the Costa Rican economy at the time." This urgency, combined with the availability of Economic Support Funds and the advantages of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, allowed a 'project' to be launched without the normal research, planning, and approval procedures typical of AID projects (with the exception of PROCAP which did go through the traditional project development process).

-By 1982, AID's private sector strategies world-wide were still in the incipient stages given an organization which had until then worked almost entirely with government to government types of development assistance. This meant that there was very little 'institutional wisdom', and even less guidance from AID/Washington, in how to develop private sector programs. As a result, many 'false starts' and 'blind alleys' were attempted in the early years of the CINDE project which were not totally cost effective.

-According to those interviewed, the style of the then Mission Director was one of direct, hands on management with the intention of causing things to happen quickly, although with less concern for

lengthy policy and planning exercises. In essence, he became the 'Godfather' of the organization involved in its day to day management and decision making.

Given this legacy of events and practices, the present day relations between CINDE and AID (both USAID/Costa Rica and AID/Washington), can only be called unique. As a result of the precedent created by the factors mentioned above, plus the relative size of CINDE's annual budgets (including pass throughs), and the strategic position of Costa Rica in Central America, many people in the AID chain of command have felt the urge to influence CINDE's objectives and progress over its six year existence. Additionally, the impact of the allegations contained in the Inspector General's report on CINDE issued approximately a year ago further spurred this urge to 'fix', and in many regards manage, the organization on a continuous basis.

While it is quite difficult for a group of external evaluators to pass qualitative judgment on this type of behavior, we would like to portray the issue in terms of a continuum with the desire 'to produce results in terms of development objectives on the one hand, and the need for appropriate 'institution building' on the other. AID's 'directed democracy' approach to managing CINDE such as choosing and dismissing the members of the Board of Directors, the Executive Manager and other key personnel, mandating which program should form part of the organization and which should not, and holding up budgetary approvals until specific policy initiatives have been undertaken could well have been the right decisions at the time, but it does little in terms of allowing CINDE to develop into a self-sufficient and self-managed, sustainable organization. This practice is especially incompatible with the philosophy that suggests that the private sector is more efficient in promoting an appropriate development environment. In essence, long term institution building is being sacrificed for what might be interpreted as the achievement of short term results. In this regard, AID/Washington is as much to blame as the Mission.

A further problem exacerbating the situation is the fact that from the CINDE point of view, AID does not speak with one voice, but rather with many. Not counting the various missives which have been issued from AID/Washington, the team has counted at least twelve Mission staff which interact with CINDE on a regular basis. This includes staff specifically assigned to the organization, as well as higher level supervisory staff which interact less frequently. To the CINDE staff and management this has become confusing and counter-productive. The opinions of lower level staff are constantly being questioned and second guessed, while the internal differences between the Mission's various divisions and offices come to bear on the organization.

Lastly, while the high levels of administrative and financial oversight being provided to CINDE by the Mission are beginning to show positive results in an accountant/auditor's sense, the burden this has placed on the organization has raised frustration levels to a very high degree and threatens the achievement of the organization's goals. At some point in the process, those in a position to alter these things must

decide on the relative importance between totally accurate and precise administrative and financial records and the development objectives of the organization.

Recommendation:

The team recommends that the Mission designate no more than three staff members to directly interact with CINDE; one for PROCAP, one for PAAC and one to deal with Central CINDE on administrative/financial matters. This recommendation is given in the belief that the five-year plan exercise, which has begun, will continue and that these plans will reduce the need for supervision by Mission staff. Furthermore, it is also given in the belief that the 'paperwork reduction' exercise recommended above would also substantially reduce the need for Mission staff involvement. Additionally, consideration should be given to the type of Mission employee to be used. Based on current needs, it appears that the PROCAP and PAAC advisors could remain as Personal Services Contractors, while the Central CINDE advisor should most likely be a Direct Hire.

List of Persons Contacted

USAID Costa Rica

Robert Adler, Economist
Thomas Alvarado, Deputy Assistant Controller
Richard Archi, Deputy Director
William Baucom, Chief Agriculture/Rural Development
William Barbee, Program Manager, PAAC
William Binford, Training Advisor
Kevin Kelly, Program Officer
Thomas McKee, Chief Training Division
Richard Rosenberg, Chief Office of the Private Sector
Minor Sagot, Economist
James Van den Bos, Evaluation Office
Joe Wargo, Audit Liason Officer

Central CINDE

José Angel Chacón, Director Administration and Finance
Edwin Méndez, President, Board of Directors
Anthony Shiels, Advisor
Federico Vargas, General Manager

PIE

Carlos Aguilar, Industrial Development Manager
Rodrigo Ortiz, General Manager
Jaime Pfaeffle, Investment Promotion Manager
Carlos Torres, Advisor

PAAC

Eduardo de la Espriella, General Manager

PROCAP

Clara Zomer, General Manager

Others

Raúl Heraud, Systems Management Consultant
José María Quirós, US Embassy Economist

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