


Report 23  
May 1988

# FEWS Country Reports

## CHAD, MALI, NIGER and SUDAN



Famine Early Warning System  
Africa Bureau  
U.S. Agency for International Development

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*Note: FEWS will issue a special Vulnerability Assessment edition of the FEWS Country Reports next month. Separate reports (under a yellow cover rather than the normal blue) will be issued for each FEWS-monitored country except Mozambique. In these reports FEWS will identify the specific areas judged to be particularly vulnerable to food emergencies this year, along with some of the contributing factors. This special edition has been timed to coincide with the beginning of the growing season in most of these countries. It is intended to familiarize our readership with the context in which FEWS will be evaluating the significance of indicators over the course of the season.*

## Acknowledgements

FEWS depends on a variety of U.S. Government agencies, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), international relief agencies, foreign press and host government reports as sources of information used in the country reports. In particular, a debt of gratitude is owed to many individuals within various offices of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) who routinely provide valuable information, including the offices of Food For Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FFP/FVA) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Additional useful information is also provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NOAA/NESDIS) and Climate Analysis Center (NOAA/CAC), the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), the World Food Program (WFP), and other U.N. agencies.

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
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# CHAD, MALI, NIGER and SUDAN

Report 23, May 1988

Prepared for the  
Africa Bureau of the  
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prepared by  
Price, Williams & Associates, Inc.




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## Overview

USAID/N'Djamena anticipates that *Chad's* currently foreseen emergency food needs will be met through early July. After that, people in vulnerable areas must depend on a timely start of the 1988 rains and the success of traditional coping mechanisms to obtain enough food. Low rates of child malnutrition seen in most vulnerable areas that have been studied imply that the people there are getting by. Desert locusts have moved far south and in great numbers in *Mali*. This is a cause for serious concern. Problems with food availability and the pre-positioning of emergency food persist in areas determined at risk. *Niger* is still seeking donor support to finance the distribution of emergency food aid. A pattern of Desert locust sightings across the Sahel suggests the possibility of greater than normal infestations in Nigerien agricultural areas. Food aid flows to western *Sudan* have slowed down. Displaced people, in dire circumstances, continue to move north from the Southern Region.

# Chad



★	National Capital	▨	Currently require food aid
⊙	Prefecture Capitals	▧	Will require food aid before 1988 harvest
---	International Boundaries	▩	May require food aid before 1988 harvest
—	National & Prefecture Boundaries	▪	Food reported to be scarce
0 50 100 200 300 Miles		■	In-depth SAP surveys
0 100 200 300 Kilometers			

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# CHAD

## Update on Food Security



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### Summary

The food security situation in Chad has changed little from the previous month. Sharply rising prices limit the ability of donors and the Government of Chad (GOC) to purchase food aid stock in country. USAID anticipates that the combination of food aid and cereals purchased within the country will meet Chad's emergency food needs through early July. The Mission expects that traditional drought coping mechanisms will buffer populations in the most vulnerable areas after the food aid runs out. Using a GOC plan as a guideline, areas to receive food distribution will be prioritized on an ongoing basis to assure that the most urgent needs are met with available resources. Rains have been reported south of the eleventh parallel, which could disrupt transport of cereals from surplus areas in the south to NDjamena. In areas where food aid is to be distributed, however, the rains generally do not start until June. There has been a sudden upsurge in the number of refugees returning to Chad from Sudan, Cameroon and the Central African Republic (CAR). Although it is not clear what percentage of these people require aid, their presence will increase the demand on available food.

### Food Security

Emergency food aid stocks (on-hand, in the immediate pipeline, and scheduled for purchase -- Table 1) should be sufficient to cover planned emergency aid distributions in most of the country until the end of June and in Batha Prefecture through July. The first column of Table 1 shows the full amount of aid and price stabilization stock in country, plus pledged purchases and expected aid arrivals, as of the end of March (per the Mission). The second column of Table 1 details how much of the aid on-hand has been pre-positioned in vulnerable areas and how much has been purchased in country according to the EEC-funded Système d'Alerte Précoce (SAP), which has taken responsibility for monitoring food supply in Chad's Sahelian prefectures. From the SAP's report, it appeared that the 1,600 MT of in-country purchases was in addition to the pre-positioned aid. The Mission's account did not mention in-country purchases. Of the 3,100 metric tons (MT) "in the pipeline," 925 MT has been reserved for returning refugees and response to possible, but as yet unidentified, intense food crises. The rest of the "pipeline" has been programmed according to food aid distribution guidelines set by the GOC/multi-donor/multi-private voluntary organization Food Aid Action Committee (CASAU).

According to the Mission, only the League of Red Cross Societies, the donor responsible for deliveries in Batha Prefecture, will have distribution stock during July, leaving previous food aid plans for Ouaddai, Biltine, Guera and Kanem Prefectures uncovered. No food aid is expected to be available for August. The shortfall from the GOC/CASAU plan is 7,200 MT, 4,800 MT of which was planned for areas of highest vulnerability to food supply disruptions (Nokou Sub-prefecture in Kanem Prefecture, Oum Hadjer Sub-prefecture in Batha Prefecture, Ouaddai Prefecture, and Biltine Prefecture).

**Table 1: Public Cereal Stocks (MT), March 1988**

	Mission Report	SAP Report
Total Emergency Aid On-Hand	4,315	
Emergency Aid Pre-positioned in 5 Sahel Prefectures		2,190
Emergency and Program Aid Pipe-Line	3,100	3,100
Emergency Aid to be Purchased In Country	1,700	
Emergency Aid Already Purchased In Country		1,600
Price Stabilization Stock	8,690	
Total Stock Mentioned	17,805	6,890

Source: Mission Cable NDJAMENA 02420 of 22 April; Systeme d'Alerte Precoce (SAP) Report for March.


Some sources in Chad feel that if the rains arrive in the vulnerable areas by June (considered the normal start of the rainy season in Chad's Sahel), enough wild grasses and vegetables may be available by early August to make up the food aid shortfalls. At the same time, good June rains would inhibit transport and impede further food aid distributions from N'Djamena to outlying areas. It will be important to monitor reports of rainfall and non-cereal crop status in these areas from the start of June.

Should the above drought coping strategies prove insufficient to prevent a food crisis, the GOC National Cereals Office's (ONC) price stabilization stocks (Table 1) are theoretically available for emergency distributions. ONC, however, requires that its stock be paid for by other GOC agencies or by donors. According to the Mission, ONC's price stabilization stocks in Kanem Prefecture have been depleted, removing ONC's moderating influence on grain prices in the area, as evidenced by sharp price increases. The Mission also reports that the ONC stock in Biltine Prefecture was still large enough during March to maintain price stability there.

Price data reported by SAP support these impressions regarding price fluctuations (Map 2). The SAP data also show that price increases continue in Goz Beida, Bokoro, and Bousso -- areas in which the GOC and donors had hoped to purchase cereals for later distribution. It is usual for cereal prices in Chad to increase at this time of year. The increase seen this year, however, is steeper than that seen during 1987. A lack of comparable data for prior years prevents further analysis.

Deteriorating economic conditions and food scarcities seen in the vulnerable areas named above are indications that a food or nutritional crisis could be on the way. So far this fiscal year, however, the only area showing signs of existing nutritional crisis is in Nokou Sub-prefecture (Kanem Prefecture), where a November survey by SAP near the town of Ntiona found 14% of the children measured to be severely malnourished (less than 80% of the standard weight for their height). The March SAP survey of cantons in Guéréda Sub-prefecture (in Biltine Prefecture, marked by a square on Map 1) revealed less than 2% severe malnutrition among children measured. Other recent surveys noted severe malnutrition rates of 3.5% and less, although there are no recent nutritional studies in Ouaddai Prefecture or highly vulnerable areas in Biltine Prefecture outside of Guéréda Sub-prefecture.

**Map 2: Sahelian Millet Prices: Change Since End of Rains (March 1988 vs September 1987)**



## Returning Refugees


For more than a year, refugees have been returning to Chad from Sudan, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and the Central African Republic (CAR). Recent reports from the south of Chad estimate the number of returnees there from Cameroon and CAR to be at least 15,000. The reports do not detail the period over which those people returned, but do state that many of these people require aid.

More startling is a sudden upswing in the number of Chadians reported to be returning from Sudan. Some 9,300 people were reported by SAP (based on reports by canton chiefs) to have returned to Biltine and Ouaddai Prefectures during the month of March, up from 2,900 people in February and 715 people in January. SAP also reported that the private voluntary organization German Agro-Action (GAA) registered 2,500 returnees during March.<sup>1</sup> It is not clear whether the GAA's 2,500 returnees are in addition to, or a sub-group of, the numbers reported by the canton chiefs. If the latter is the case, a possible 6,800 returnees either did not require assistance or were too far from the GAA service areas to register for aid (as would be the case for the 3,900 Chadians reported to have returned to the far southeast of Ouaddai Prefecture).

While it is probable that not all of the refugees returning to eastern Chad will require assistance, this massive influx of people is sure to strain, if not disrupt, markets that are already showing sharp price increases indicative of the annual depletion of grain supplies. This situation requires monitoring during the coming months.

<sup>1</sup>Among other activities, GAA provides aid to returning refugees in Ouaddai and Biltine Prefectures.

# Mali



Legend:

- ⊛ National Capital
- ⊙ Regional Capitals
- International Boundaries
- National & Regional Boundaries
- ▨ Immediate food shortage likely

Scale:

0 50 100 200 300 Miles

0 100 200 300 Kilometers

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# MALI

## Desert Locust Swarms



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### Summary



Desert locust swarms have been sighted in an arc across Mali from Kayes in the west to as far north and east as Tessalit. These reports put swarms of Desert locusts farther south and in larger numbers than is commonly seen this time of year (Map 2). The extreme southern location of the swarms and the number of sightings raise the concern that the locusts will remain in the area during the rainy season. During this period the swarms would increase in size and feed on grain crops. At the end of the growing season, there is a possibility that swarms would then escape treatment and move back to their traditional breeding grounds to the north, in larger numbers.

The Système d'Alerte Précoce (SAP) has increased its December estimate (9,925 metric tons) of emergency grain needed in areas designated as at risk by 49,240 metric tons (MT). The team sent by USAID and the National Committee for Emergency Action and Rehabilitation (CNAUR) to monitor distribution of the 9,925 MT felt that amount would be inadequate to cover the food needs of the people at risk in Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kayes, Koulikoro, and Ségou Regions. SAP is now in the process of preparing for distribution of the first half of the additional 49,240 MT of grain.

Donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are concerned over the Government of Mali's (GOM's) lack of dispatch in pre-positioning emergency grain in areas of need designated by SAP. These concerns persist despite the finding by the USAID and CNAUR team that most grain designated for the areas at risk in Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kayes, Koulikoro and Ségou Regions did reach its intended recipients. However, the food positioning did not occur without some important logistical and financial problems. Donors and NGOs feel that food availability is a serious problem in remote areas and that the GOM has waited too long to pre-position emergency stocks in areas that are at risk. With the coming rains, overland transportation will become very difficult.


Surveys conducted by SAP in Koulikoro, Ségou, Mopti, Tombouctou, and Gao Regions show an increase in the consumption of famine foods. Villagers in these areas are harvesting and consuming wild grains such as "cram cram" and, in some cases, tubers that have undesirable side effects. There continues to be an increase in the flow of migrants from areas designated as at risk. These migrations are converging on urban centers and areas that have a greater access to grains.

# April Desert Locust Swarms



Source: Desert Locust Forecasting Manual  
FEWS/PWA, May 1988


# Niger



Legend:

- ★ National Capital
- ⊙ Regional Capitals
- - - International Boundaries
- National & Department Boundaries
- ▨ Chronic food-short areas
- ▩ Poor 1987 harvest
- ▧ Areas of most immediate food needs

0 50 100 150 200 Miles  
0 100 200 Kilometers



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# NIGER



## Locusts Enter the Picture

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### Summary

Severe local food shortages exist in widely-spread areas of Niger. Local purchases of grain and imported food assistance will provide enough food to cover national needs. However, Niger will need donor assistance with the transport of food to deficit areas. Recent Desert locust sightings in Mali raise the probability of infestations in Sahelian agricultural areas throughout the rainy season.

### Food Needs

There is a critical unmet need for donor funding of food transport to deficit areas. Rains will begin shortly and transport will become more difficult and costly. Firm donor pledges of emergency food total 80,000 metric tons (MT) of grains and other commodities. Other contributions under study would raise total pledges to as high as 118,000 MT. In February, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) multi-donor mission estimated the emergency assistance need at 101,000 MT.

### Locusts

Swarms of breeding Desert locusts have recently been reported in Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina and all across central Mali. In Mali, the locusts are far to the south of where they are normally found in April. Their early presence this far south increases the likelihood of crop damage by locusts in the western Sahel throughout the agricultural season (see Map 2 in Mali section). The swarms may not move much further south in Mali during the rainy season, as they have already found relatively favorable vegetation conditions. The advancing rains will only improve conditions for population growth, and may help to produce an extra generation or two. Serious local damage to seedlings, and later to harvests, is likely in these areas.

At the end of the season, as vegetation begins drying out, the locusts normally move north. The northward movement then threatens any vegetation or unharvested crops to the north. Additionally, a large end-of-season population of locusts in the Sahel would heighten the risk of significant numbers making northerly escapes from treatment campaigns. That event would then allow a larger than normal Desert locust population to move toward winter breeding areas in North Africa.

Recent reports of locusts near Niger's northern borders may signal conditions similar to those that have caused Mali's infestations. Locusts may thus present a much larger than normal threat to agriculture in Niger during this rainy season. Niger has not yet procured the pesticides it requires for an adequate locust treatment campaign. The issue of Dieldrin, a pesticide banned by most donors, is likely to rise again in Niger, as a significant quantity remains in stock, an implicit last resort to a major infestation.

Map 1: Summary

# Sudan



	National Capital
	Towns
	International Boundaries
	National & Regional Boundaries
	Areas receiving priority food aid distribution
	High levels of childhood malnutrition

0 50 100 200 300 Miles  
0 100 200 300 Kilometers



FEWS/PWA, May 1988

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# SUDAN

## Food Aid Slows



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### Summary

The movement of food aid to Darfur Region has slowed dramatically due to strikes, fuel shortages and violence. Transport of the first tranche of emergency food aid from Kosti is not yet complete, nor has all grain dispatched to Darfur yet arrived. The second tranche has not yet moved.

Additional food aid, beyond that promised in the first two tranches, will be needed in areas of Mellit and Umm Keddeda districts of North Darfur Province, according to a recent Mission/FEWS analysis. Only Mellit and Umm Keddeda districts, however, have received their full allotment of shipments from even the first tranche. Very little food aid has reached other areas programmed to receive distributions in North Darfur. The rainy season will soon limit the distribution of food aid, especially to areas in western North Darfur Province. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan has not yet assembled the second tranche for Darfur Region, in part due to competing export needs.

The Government of Sudan has reportedly agreed in principle to an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposal to bring relief supplies to all areas of the Southern Region experiencing insecurity and drought. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had apparently already agreed to the ICRC's plan. Increasing urban food insecurity and the upcoming rainy season (when transport will be increasingly difficult) bode ill for populations at risk.

Since December, over 50,000 displaced people have entered South Darfur Province at Safaha from the Southern Region. While relief organizations have moved large numbers of the recent population of 20,000, approximately 700 additional people arrive each day. Many displaced people are believed to be in southwest South Kordofan Province, but their numbers are unknown. A train arrived in Khartoum with 1,781 displaced people from Aweil. Thirty people died on the way and six children died in the Khartoum Railway Station before they could be moved to outlying camps. Many passengers were dropped along the railroad track from Aweil to El Obeid, for want of the fare.

### Issues

- The upcoming rainy season has important implications for populations at risk in Sudan.
  - Emergency food deliveries will become difficult or impossible to certain isolated locations.
  - Displaced people will be unable to move to places of refuge.
  - Armed conflict will decline in the Southern Region due to the decreased mobility of combatants.

## **Darfur Region**

Umm Keddada and Mellit Districts in North Darfur will require more food aid than now programmed in tranches one and two. A Mission/FEWS analysis, based on Sudan Emergency Rehabilitation Information and Surveillance System (SERISS) Agricultural project data (supplemented by information from the Sudan Red Crescent) shows that programmed emergency relief would satisfy most other emergency requirements in North Darfur. The report, however, also points out that programmed food distributions are not occurring on time.

Food distribution is not reaching target communities in Darfur Region, according to a report from the FEWS Field Representative in Khartoum. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) was closed due to strikes for most of April. As a result, there was little movement of sorghum to the west from Kosti. A general shortage of fuel for relief transport further limited the flow of food aid. An attack on trucks carrying relief grain in Darfur (one driver killed and one wounded) is especially troublesome. The World Food Programme reports that drivers of relief trucks refuse to drive farther west than Ed D'aein and Umm Keddada.

Of the 7,500 metric tons (MT) of sorghum that went out before the ABS strike, only about 4,500 MT actually reached village councils. The rest is still "on the way." Some trucks have taken up to one month to deliver food from Kosti to destinations in Darfur; a trip which normally takes eight days. There is no true field distribution monitoring system for these operations, and problems could arise and go undetected.

Only Mellit and Umm Keddada have received their full allotment of grain from the first donor-funded tranche. All other councils have received only a small proportion. Reports suggest that village council leaders in these areas have not begun to distribute relief grain as quantities are too small for any equitable or significant distributions. Even the particularly high risk zones of Mellit and Umm Keddada have not received any second tranche allotment.

A Mission/FEWS analysis shows that cash crops, stocks and the harvesting of wild grains should meet most of the food needs of people in South Darfur. According to a separate analysis of various independent pre-harvest surveys by the Agricultural Planning Unit of the Darfur Regional Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the situation in South Darfur is more equivocal. In this latter analysis, apparently, on farm stocks were not assessed, and so a large area of deficit production might not require food aid. Even so, one area of normally surplus production, the Jebel Marra, is supplying only 20 to 30 percent of normal amounts of grain to regional markets.

## **Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) Country Reports**

FEWS publishes monthly reports on Burkina, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan. These reports are designed to provide decisionmakers with current information and analysis on existing and potential nutrition emergency situations. Each situation identified is described in terms of geographical extent and the number of people involved, and the proximate causes insofar as they have been discerned.

It is necessary to identify or "target" populations in-need or "at risk" in order to determine appropriate forms and levels of intervention. FEWS reports will employ the term "at risk" to mean...

**...those persons lacking sufficient food, or resources to acquire sufficient food, to avert a nutritional crisis (i.e., a progressive deterioration in their health or nutritional condition below the status quo), and who, as a result, require specific intervention to avoid a life-threatening situation.**

Perhaps of greatest importance to decisionmakers, the process underlying the deteriorating situation is highlighted by the FEWS effort, hopefully with enough specificity and forewarning to permit alternative intervention strategies to be examined and implemented. Food assistance strategies are key to famine avoidance. However, other types of intervention can be of major importance both in the short term and in the long run, including medical, transport, storage, changes in economic development policy, etc.

Where possible, food needs estimates are included in the FEWS reports. It is important to understand, however, that no direct relation exists between numbers of persons at risk and the quantity of food assistance needed. This is because famines are the culmination of slow-onset disaster processes which can be complex in the extreme. The food needs of individual populations at risk depend upon when in the disaster process identification is made and the extent of its cumulative impact on the individuals concerned. Further, the amount of food assistance required, whether from internal or external sources, depends upon a host of considerations. Thus the food needs estimates presented periodically in FEWS reports *should not* be interpreted to mean food aid needs, e.g., as under PL480 or other donor programs.