Creating Opportunities for Change

Approaches to Managing Development Programs

Studies in Development Management

Louise G. White

Creating Opportunities for Change

Studies in Development Management

Series Editor: ***Louis A. Picard***
National Association of Schools of
Public Affairs and Administration and
the University of Nebraska at Lincoln

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The Development Program Management Center of
The United States Department of Agriculture,
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Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

iv

Published in the United States of America in 1987 by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
948 North Street, Boulder, Colorado 80302

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

White, Louise G.
Creating opportunities for change.

(Studies in development management)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Economic development projects—Management.
I. Title. II. Series.
HD75.8.W47 1987 338.9'0068 87-4557
ISBN 1-55587-031-7 (lib. bdg.)

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the
requirements of the American National Standard
for Permanence of Paper for Printed
Library Materials Z39.48-1984 ∞

To Coralie Bryant
A friend and colleague whose ideas and enthusiasm
have sparked much of the growing interest
in development management

Contents

List of Tables and Figures ix

Series Foreword xi

Acknowledgments xv

Part 1 A Framework for Managing Development Programs 1

1 Characteristics of Development Programs 5
2 Dimensions of Management 21
3 Identifying Approaches 39

Part 2 Approaches to Managing Development Programs 53

4 The Goal-Directed Analysis Approach 55
5 The Anarchy Approach 87
6 The Bureaucratic Process Approach 109
7 The Institutional Analysis Approach 133
8 The Social Learning Approach 159
9 The Political Learning Approach 187

Part 3 Implications of the Approaches for Program Management 213

10 Creating Opportunities for Change 215

Bibliography 239

Index 271

About the Author and the Book 283

Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1. Characteristics of Programs 12
1.2. Characteristics of Development 15
1.3 Characteristics of Sustainability 16
3.1 Approaches to Program Management 47
3.2. A Framework for Studying Program Management 48
3.3 Predictions About Program Implementation 50
4.1 Strategies in a Goal-Directed Approach to Management 79
5.1 Implications of an Anarchy Approach for Management 106
6.1 Strategies in a Bureaucratic Process Approach to Program Management 129
7.1 Public Choice Theory of Goods 143
7.2 Implications of an Institutional Analysis Approach for Program Management 153
8.1 Strategies in a Social Learning Approach to Management 180
9.1 Strategies in a Political Influence Approach to Management 209

Figures

2.1 Responsibilities of Policy Makers and Managers 24
5.1 Relationship Between Learning and Change 97

Series Foreword

Webster defines management as "the judicious use of means to accomplish an end." Applying management concepts to economic and social development programs in the Third World is a complex and multifaceted task because the manager must deal with elusive goals, changing environments, and uncertain means, and because optimal directions for organizing donor programs to assist the management of Third World programs have been ambiguous. The comparatively new field of economic and social development management is challenged to create more useful intellectual resources for both developing country management and donor cooperators.

Specialists in the field—managers, analysts, consultants, educators, and trainers—have found that to trace the academic base of development management is to draw a broad and interdisciplinary framework. Members of the development fraternity continually call attention to the diversity of the subject areas that are critical to the judicious management of social and economic change.

The need to develop a better understanding of development program management both in theory and practice has prompted the preparation of the current NASPAA/DPMC series. The Rondinelli book, analyzing the development management work that has been funded over the past fifteen years by the Agency for International Development (AID), examines some of the major research contributions to the development management field. The White, Hage-Finsterbusch, and Kerrigan-Luke volumes synthesize, probe, and order the academic bases for practice aimed at strengthening development management. Their subjects—development program management, organizational change strategies for more effective program management, and management training strategies for promoting improved program management—are purposely interrelated. The focus is on development programs in the Third World.

These books order and organize complex subjects. They thereby invite collateral analytic work by specialists in related concentrations and with related perspectives. In particular, we seek stronger links with work by Third World specialists, for although the authors have sought a Third World perspective, they have relied heavily on literature available in the United States.

The fifth book in the series presents the development management writing of one person. The Performance Management Project has valued the work of David Korten, chiefly in Asia, throughout his close to five years of work under the Project. His writings growing out of this work have found a wide and appreciative audience among those concerned with management for greater development strength at the grass roots. The Performance Management Project and NASPAA are pleased to include a compendium of his writings in this series and to have the opportunity to emphasize this aspect of development management.

The impetus and subsequent funding for the research discussed in this series came from the Performance Management Project in the Office of Rural and Institutional Development of AID's Bureau for Science and Technology. The research should be useful to both practitioners and educators interested in international development and related fields. A major purpose of the books, from the funder's point of view, is to make more explicit the links between the assimilated knowledge and skills of the development management practitioner and the literature base that supports development practice. This required creative, developmental work. We are grateful to the authors for their considerable investment in time and thought that have brought these results.

The organizations that have implemented the Performance Management Project—the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, the Development Program Management Center and its cooperator, the International Development Management Center of the University of Maryland—have for a number of years undertaken a variety of practical and analytical work with developing country organizations for improved management. The NASPAA/DPMC Studies in Development Management series reflects an interaction between the individual authors and the experienced practitioners associated with the two implementing organizations.

I would like to express my appreciation to an extraordinary group of people connected with the Performance Management Project who have contributed to this series. These books build on the work of many practitioners and academics who have been associated with the Performance Management Project over the past seven years. Particular thanks go to Wendell Schaeffer, Louise White, and Merlyn Kettering, Project coordinators for the management training, organizational change, and program management books respectively; to the series editor, Louis Picard; and to the editorial committee who, from its inception, provided this venture with important direction and analytic support strengthened by practical experience. They and I, in turn, are grateful to the specialists outside the Project who have contributed substantially through their critiques of the manuscripts. We want to make appreciative note of the understanding, leadership, and support that the books in this series have received from Kenneth L. Kornher, chief of the USAID division which is responsible for institutional development and management research. Christopher Russell, Jerry French, Eric Chetwynd, John O'Donnell, and Robert McClusky also have provided valuable agency support to this project's research activities.

Jeanne Foot North
Project Officer
The Performance Management Project
Office of Rural and Institutional Development
Bureau for Science and Technology
Agency for International Development

Editorial Committee
Studies in Development Management

Acknowledgments

This study is one of a series of papers commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development as part of an extensive research project on development management concepts and technology. In 1982 the Office of Rural and Institutional Development in the Bureau of Science and Technology (ST/RD) initiated the Performance Management project which has been carried out through cooperative agreements with the Development Project Management Center (DPMC) of the Office of International Cooperation and Development of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and through the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA). This study was carried out under DPMC's program through a cooperative agreement with the International Development Management Center (IDMC) at the University of Maryland.

These organizations have been represented by a number of individuals who have been personally very involved throughout the conceptualization and writing, and who have contributed greatly through their interest and comments. The study builds on earlier work on program management by John Harbeson, and I am grateful for his thoughtful review of this subject. Ken Kornher and Jeanne North, representing AID/ST/RD, have been unfailingly supportive, and have passed on a number of very useful resources and comments. Merlyn Kettering of DPMC has been my major contact with the review committee, has guided the drafts through several different review processes, and was marvelously adept at pulling together a variety of comments. He has a real gift for con-

ceptualizing development management issues, and his copious marginal comments and questions stimulated many of the ideas developed in the study.

The review committee, composed of representatives from the several units involved in the Performance Management Project, includes Morris Solomon, representing DPMC; Marcus Ingle, Derick Brinkerhoff, and Barton Sensenig, all representing IDMC; and Louis Picard and Elisabeth Shields—now with the World Bank—representing NASPAA. All of these individuals read several drafts, and offered a number of very thoughtful suggestions based on their broad experience in the working world of development management. I am grateful for their confidence and ideas.

Earlier drafts were also sent to others who were generous with their time and comments, and I hope they will appreciate how many of their ideas I have used. They include Samuel Paul of the World Bank and Merilee Grindle of the Harvard Institute for International Development, both of whom have written important books in this field. Annmarie Walsh of the Institute of Public Administration and Jim Lowenthal of the Agency for International Development each wrote particularly long and thoughtful reviews of the manuscript, and reminded me of a number of important omissions.

All of these are part of a growing network of individuals interested in development management who meet several times a year to share their ideas and written work. In many respects the network serves as a unique academic/practitioner community in which participants share ideas, critique each other's work, and experiment with new designs. I have explored many ideas, formally and informally, with many of these people over the past several years. In addition to all those mentioned above, I am particularly mindful of my indebtedness to Coralie Bryant, of The American University and the Overseas Development Council, to whom this book is dedicated; David Korten, Asia Regional Advisor on Development Management; Larry Cooley of Management Systems International; Ed Connerley of NASPAA; and Steve Arnold of The American University. Haven North, Director of the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE), USAID; and Irving Rosenthal, formerly with CDIE, have been in the forefront of efforts at USAID to do innovative work on management issues. The CDIE office sponsored a number of studies on development management, and I learned a great deal by being part of their team. I was also privileged to be part of the committee to work with Jerald Hage and Kurt Finsterbusch as they wrote the complementary manuscript on organizational change that is also being published as part of this series. It was most stimulating to work with these two important sociologists as they brought their perspective to bear on development management issues.

Many of the ideas included in this manuscript have been sparked by my own involvement in development activities. I have worked with Rick Huntington, of the International Science and Technology Institute, on two occasions—evaluating an urban development activity in Egypt and assisting private voluntary organizations to review their development strategies. I have learned much observing his own management style, and his very wise perspective on the travails of bureaucracies at home and abroad. Judith Gilmore of AID's Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance (FVA) has been an important source of ideas and enthusiasm through her management of a project to learn more about the role of private voluntary organizations in stimulating institutional development. I am also grateful for the many members of program staff whom I have worked with in both Korea and Pakistan. Finally, I thank my colleague at George Mason University, Julie Mahler, for helping me conceptualize the literature on management and organizations, and for her many thoughtful comments on the manuscript.

While I am indebted to all of these people, I fully acknowledge that the responsibility for the concepts and interpretations is my own. While many will wish to qualify some of the ideas, and regret particular omissions, I relish our continuing opportunities for discussion and learning from each other, and for advancing our understanding of ways to promote developmental change.

Part 1

A Framework for Managing Development Programs

In the past development studies have centered around particularly salient concepts such as economic growth, the satisfaction of basic needs, and participation by the poor. Such terms define the development agenda and focus the energies of observers and practitioners. Currently there is an interest in sustainability, in whether or not interventions to bring about change in Third World nations will last. One view holds that sustainable development will occur only if governments enact policies that encourage citizens and the private sector to increase their productivity rather than rely on government-sponsored programs. Another view, represented by this book, holds that such policy changes are useful but that sustainable development also requires governments to be aware of how they manage and organize interventions. When management is overlooked resources will be wasted, opportunities to mobilize additional resources and support will not be pursued, and there will be no institutions in place to continue the activities.[1]

Although an emphasis on management is not new, it has been interpreted in a number of ways. The postwar period stressed a need to build effective governing institutions. In the 1970s the emphasis shifted to funding specific projects and building the management capacity of project units. There is growing interest in strengthening the capacity of public and private program agencies within Third World nations to carry out development activities. This program emphasis in fact is closely linked to the interest in sustainability. Insofar as programs are carried out by ongoing host country institutions, improving the capacity of these institutions is one way to encourage sustainable development.

The purpose of this book is to examine the particular dynamics of management at the program level and explore how programs can accomplish sustainable development activities. The book assumes that management is not a "bag of tricks" or a series of technocratic skills to be used on any and all occasions. Rather, the nature of the development process and the characteristics of programs shape what managers should be doing. For example, when development activities try to elicit new behavior, managers will need considerably more information about the perceptions of those whom they are trying to change than they do when they simply are providing services. Similarly, programs pose constraints and open up opportunities for program managers that are not always present for project managers. For example, many programs are systems of activities, where central units provide direction and support and actual delivery is carried out by other units. Insofar as programs have these characteristics, managers need to ask a far broader set of questions than is true if they are managing autonomous projects.

A closely related thesis is that managers of development programs are not merely technical agents carrying out programs designed elsewhere; managers can play a broad, varied role. They bring together numerous elements—resources, supplies, existing organizations—and work with numerous parties—agency heads, political elites, community leaders, clients—each with its own, often conflicting, interests. Managers may work with policy elites to reshape broad policy goals and translate them into feasible programs. Managers often will need to design organizations for delivering services and almost always will administer procedures for supervising and rewarding staff, for collecting information, and for monitoring activities. Managerial activities probably will include mobilizing resources from governing bodies and political elites. Many managers will have occasion to build coalitions; consult with and organize community groups; exercise leadership; and energize, inspire, and mobilize others.

The relevant literature for dealing with these activities is vast and includes generic management studies, case studies of particular countries and sectors, and evaluations of specific funded activities. Although all of these bodies of literature are relevant, most have not been applied specifically to the programmatic responsibilities of managers. They usually are discussed in the context of specific projects, or they deal with particular facets of management such as decentralization or participation. Therefore, a guiding purpose of this book is to bring together relevant studies and examine them from the perspective of program management. The book is addressed particularly to those who are willing to look at development management from a broad perspective and who are interested in comparing various strategies for improving it.

One way to proceed is to analyze programs that were managed poorly and then recommend changes. This strategy, which begins with a litany of problems, has dominated the field of development management to date.[2] An alternative strategy is to analyze the fewer but notable successes. This tactic is more positive because it emphasizes ways to make improvements, rather than simply explaining why they are so difficult to achieve.[3]

This book draws on both strategies—explanations of failures and recommendations based on successes. The failures can help managers anticipate many of the critical problems they will face, but even more interesting are the continuing debates about the best way to deal with problems and to explain successes. Two decades ago the literature was more self-assured and didactic. Observers had a clear sense of what the problems were and what had to be done and felt they just needed to collect the resources and get on with the job. In the meantime others noted that problems persisted, that there were many failures interspersed with a few successes. This realization in turn has led to a number of different approaches to deal with what were obviously difficult and complex problems. Although some might interpret this variety of approaches as a sign of confusion, it also can be seen as an indicator of remarkable vitality and energy.[4] A major purpose of the book is to describe these several approaches, their basic assumptions, and the ways in which they have been translated into specific proposals.

Part 1 presents a framework for comparing and evaluating the approaches.[5] Chapter 1 considers the characteristics of development and the nature of programs that serve as constraints and opportunities for managers. Chapter 2 uses these characteristics to propose one dimension in the framework—five functions relevant to managers of development programs. These are derived from the earlier definitions of programs and development. Chapter 3 completes the description of the framework by identifying six perspectives on these functions. Part 2 reviews the theoretical perspectives in more detail, drawing widely from the literature on management and organizations. Part 3 compares the approaches and identifies several areas where they are in substantial agreement and others where they supplement and correct each other.

In summary, the book is concerned with certain activities—namely, those that enhance development—and with a nation's own efforts to achieve and sustain these results through its programs. The book assumes that goodwill and economic resources are not enough to produce lasting results, that management is a critical factor.

Notes

1. For an interesting recognition of the importance of management, see the 1983 Annual Report of the World Bank.

2. Blair notes that academics find failures more interesting, and they are also easier to prove (1981, 8). Many problem-oriented studies conclude that "the effects of intervention are far more complex than anticipated, largely impervious to planning, and almost invariably strengthening of existing power holders" (Paget, 1983, 123). These studies include Galli (1981); MacAndrews and Sien (1982); and Streeten (1981). The last of these, representing the World Bank, does offer a new strategy, one based on a "basic needs" approach. Paget traces this litany of despair to a more fundamental self-doubt in Western social science that reform efforts can make a positive difference anywhere (1983, 125).

3. Major reviews of successful programs include D. Korten (1980); Paul (1982); Pyle (1982); Gran (1983a). Uphoff and Esman prefer to think in terms of "making progress" rather than achieving success (1984, 153).

4. Referring to the variety of approaches, Blair notes that "it is, in short, an exciting time to be involved" in development management (1985, 449).

5. Compare the conclusion in a recent study of development initiatives that we need analytic frameworks that permit us to analyze political and bureaucratic processes in a wide variety of settings, rather than lists of particular solutions or reforms (Cohen et al., 1985, 1221).

1

Characteristics of Development Programs

A book about program managers and development is essentially a study of beating the odds. Although numerous constraints can overwhelm the most conscientious efforts, the development context also presents a variety of opportunities for intervening in societies to promote sustainable development. The emphasis on development means that the book is not only interested in what managers do; it is also interested in their performance, in what they accomplish. The emphasis on programs means that the book is particularly concerned with those managers who have programmatic responsibilities. These two qualifiers are very important. Improvements in management in and of themselves do not necessarily promote, and can even impede, development.[1] Further, a program setting offers particular constraints and opportunities not present for managers operating at other levels. In order to understand how these terms shape and define management, this chapter reviews and defines the terms *program* and *development*.

An emphasis on results is relatively recent. In the past, development administration studies emphasized increased institutional strength and general administrative reform, rather than what was accomplished.[2] However, there is ample evidence that broad reforms in administrative institutions have minimal impact. A recent study of reform in three Latin American nations, for example, documents that the reforms had very little influence on the actual performance of the governments (Hammergren, 1983). Irrelevance is not the only problem, however, for reform efforts to strengthen institutions may be incompatible with development and may "beg the question of what the organization intended to accomplish other than perpetuate itself" (Brinkerhoff, 1986). Reform thus presents a troubling paradox. Although weak administrative institutions can undermine development, strengthening them can have the same effect (Bryant and White, 1982, 23). Schaffer refers to the "deadlock on development administration" associated with "more management analysis, more competent managers" (1969, 185). Because increased capacity is no guarantee of development, and may even impede it, building management capacity is only meaningful insofar as it promotes developmental changes.[3]

The focus of this book, therefore—its unit of analysis, if you will—is the performance of managers rather than management per se. The book also deals with managers rather than organizations. This distinction avoids the common tendency to assume that managers can only work through organizations or to treat management as a subset of organization studies. By focusing on managers and on what they accomplish, the book encompasses ways in which managers work within and outside their organizations and raises questions about the most appropriate organization for managing particular programs.

Programs

Although Third World governments have always been concerned with programs, the international community until recently has focused almost exclusively on specific project activities.[4] Projects are generally run by separate organizations to accomplish specific functions and operate relatively independently of host country institutions and constraints.[5] This strategy gives donors more control of their assistance and makes it easier to circumvent rigid bureaucracies and political conflicts (Paget, 1983, 128).[6] The distinction between projects and programs can be overdrawn, however. Many projects are designed to influence host country programs or serve as experiments to be replicated by program units. In addition, many activities designated as projects, particularly integrated rural development projects, fit the definition of program that follows.

Programs represent the ongoing activities of organizations.[7] They can be carried out by host government program agencies, by nongovernmental units, or by special government units established to coordinate or work with one or more agencies. In the third case they are similar to integrated projects where, typically, several program agencies assign staff to work together on a multifaceted activity. A variety of factors have led donors to take a new interest in programs and particularly in project assistance designed to assist host country programs. First, if funds are directed toward ongoing programs, host countries will have more of an investment in contributing to them and sustaining them. Second, programs are more apt to have a multiplier effect. In reviewing projects in East Africa, Moris notes that projects are usually designed to "circumvent local bureaucratic controls and procedures," which in turn means projects are less likely to be widely adopted (1977, 83). Third, there has been a growing and general concern about Western intrusiveness. Linking aid to program responsibilities is one way to ensure that donors work more closely with host country officials rather than single-mindedly pursuing their own agendas.[8] Finally, this growing interest in programs directs attention to the ongoing institutions in a country rather than to separable donor-funded interventions (Morgan, 1983).[9]

A program perspective also fits with the current emphasis by international bodies on policy dialogues with host country officials because policy making continues throughout the implementation process and is heavily influenced by how managers reshape policy guidelines. Policy dialogue with top political elites, therefore, is not the only way to influence public policy. A supporting strategy is to improve the capacity of managers in program agencies to formulate appropriate policies and design strategies to carry them out.

A recent World Bank study develops a similar thesis. Lamb urges that those concerned with policy in Third World nations should not engage merely in high level policy conversations, but should assist policy makers to improve their procedures for formulating policy (1986, 1–5). Generally, however, observers have failed to appreciate that these procedures include contributions by managers as well as policy makers. Managers need to be included for two reasons—they often have important information to contribute to policy decisions, and policy formulation continues throughout the implementation process. Consider a policy to rely more on the private or nonprofit sectors. Program managers have to translate this policy into selection criteria, set standards, and apply regulations. Improving policy, therefore, includes but is broader than improving the capacity to formulate policy. Policy is not only a general direction established by policy elites. It is also *how* that direction is applied in practice, and much of the "how" is done within program units by managers.

As used in this study, programs have the following characteristics:[10]

1. *Programs are connected to an ongoing host country organization.* Programs are the responsibility of, implemented by, or closely connected to existing and presumably ongoing host institutions. This connection will be there even when program managers delegate program responsibilities to others or even if a given program alters the rules for achieving program benefits. Because they are integrally linked with existing organizational units, programs are not merely "projects writ large," nor are they simply sustained projects.[11] Programs are related to or use an existing organizational base (Honadle, 1982a). This means that program managers will be working within existing structures rather than creating them de novo and will need to take account of existing procedures and patterns of incentives, as well as work within existing budget and personnel systems (Paul, 1982, 9). Program managers can work from this base to develop new program units but will not set them up as separate enclaves.

Because programs, by definition, are linked in some way to ongoing agencies, their results depend on the capacity and resources of these organizations to carry out programs. This is an important condition given the organizational weaknesses in many Third World agencies and the drastic shortage of resources. Whereas Hirschman could refer to projects as "privileged particles of development," programs draw on severely limited funds, and managers have to protect their resources with considerable imagination and skill. Even more to the point, this connection to ongoing institutions means that it will often be necessary to change both the structures of organizations and the attitudes of those within them. The reasons are well documented. According to Kiggundu, "The dominant management and organizational practices in most developing countries are hierarchical, mechanistic, autocratic [and there is a] widespread sense of powerlessness and hopelessness" (1986). This combination of hierarchy and powerlessness makes it very difficult to promote developmental changes.[12] Small-scale community development projects in India, for example, were successful for reasons associated with their small size and flexibility, but when they were transferred to program agencies they failed. The rigidity and inflexibility of ongoing bureaucratic norms and procedures proved overwhelming (Pyle, 1982).[13] Procedures to ensure accountability and responsiveness are therefore especially critical when managers are working through program agencies.

More positively, a program agency may provide a setting for integrating different aspects of the management process, such as design and implementation. This linkage can be important because a continuing criticism of development activities, and of implementation in general, is that planning and implementation are often done by different groups and that planners too frequently fail to consider the feasibility of their plans.[14] Programs provide an opportunity to bring together the designers, implementors, and evaluators in a single, integrated process.

In summary, the bane and blessing of a program focus are that programs have to cope with well-documented constraints but may also provide an opportunity for instigating lasting changes. There is some positive evidence in this regard. The study of administrative reform in Latin America, referred to earlier, found that in the one country, Colombia, where reformers proposed incremental changes at the program level within single agencies, the changes were far more successful than in those cases where extensive institutional reform was attempted (Hammergren, 1983, 134).

2. *Programs continue over time.* A second characteristic of programs is that they continue over time, even if they are altered in the process. Given that it is usually impossible to anticipate the effects of initial actions, or the likelihood of new problems, this time dimension makes management even more uncertain and unpredictable than it would otherwise be.

> Success in one sphere—e.g., introduction of a new technology like cattle dipping—will lead to new constellations of problems (marketing efficiency, input supply, corruption, etc.) present all along but masked by the initial difficulty. . . . The obvious problem from the design standpoint is that the hidden obstacles often cannot be specified in advance, and so will not be listed within the initial scope of program activities (Moris, 1981, 123).

The time dimension means that unforseen problems and opportunities will continually arise and that there will be a payoff in using results to monitor and revise programs. Another implication is that managers need a continued supply of resources to sustain a program. Whereas initial capital expenses may be readily available, it is often far more difficult to obtain funds for maintaining a program.

3. *Programs are ongoing systems for delivering services.* This third characteristic is true of most but not all programs. Some programs perform an operational task, such as constructing roads or utilities. A growing number, however, constitute a system of related activities carried out by several units for delivering products or services.[15] The second type of program, a system of activities, is increasingly being emphasized by those interested in development. It is unlikely that there would be a program to build a health center; instead there might be one to improve the health in a community, which could include a health center, nutrition services and potable water projects.

> In a health program, the service is not the set of individual health services, . . . but the system designed to assemble and deliver them at the village, sub-district, or district level, whichever is the appropriate unit of operation. Similarly, it may be misleading to define the output of a dairy development program as the supply of milk. Its service might well be the interrelated system which has been developed to integrate the set of services for the production, processing and marketing of milk for the benefit of specified client groups (Paul, 1982, 10).

Similarly, agricultural credit programs have to ensure that there are markets to handle additional produce, institutions willing to lend money, and ways to interact with farmers to encourage them to borrow, to invest, and then to repay the loans (Gonzalez-Vega, 1979). Because of the multipurpose aspect of programs, managers seldom have the luxury of emphasizing a single activity or designing their procedures for a single task. Managers have to balance a variety of activities, many of which are competing for the same resources, and which place very different demands on managers. A unit that has to manage a relatively structured activity may simultaneously have to carry out a very open-ended collaborative process within the community.

4. *Programs are systems of activities and services designed for different settings.* Programs as systems of activities usually have to adapt to a number of different settings and develop procedures for facilitating such adaptations. First, the services themselves are carried out or delivered by a variety of organizations and at a number of different levels, and managers spend much of their time working with these other units, coordinating them, and providing them with services.[16] Second, program managers can organize pro-

grams in a variety of ways. For example, managers of a health services program may rely on existing health organizations, train new groups of paraprofessionals outside of the health network, contract with others to provide the services, or rely on existing field units. Third, a program needs a capacity for gathering information about local conditions and for designing flexible procedures to replace centrally controlled technologies (Moris, 1981, 51)..

5. *Programs have a substantive policy identity.* Programs refer to substantive policies and will vary according to the technology and political dynamics associated with different sectors. This connection means that generic management skills and organizational strategies always need to be recast according to specific policy arenas. Whereas projects refer to specific activities in a particular place, programs refer to the characteristics of various sectors—health, agriculture, animal husbandry, and so forth (Leonard and Marshall, 1982, xi). The characteristics of programs are summarized in Table 1.1.

Development

Development has been defined in a number of ways. During the 1950s and 1960s it was equated with economic growth, particularly growth of industry and infrastructure.[17] Although later groups criticized this definition for ignoring the basic needs of the poor, the growth emphasis was not as simplistic as many suggested. Growth advocates were seldom concerned with growth for its own sake. They promoted it because they assumed it would lead to other values, specifically to economic development throughout the society. Only as it became clear that these other values were not forthcoming and that some groups benefited more than others was more attention paid to the poor, to ways in which to encourage equity, and to rural development issues.[18] In recent decades development has been defined more broadly to include a concern for basic needs, for equitable distribution, for participation by beneficiaries, and for enhancing the capacity of people to choose and carry out their futures.[19]

Although this redefinition of development to include participation and the needs of the poor has been useful for designing project

TABLE 1.1 Characteristics of Programs

Characteristics of Programs	Implications for Managers
1. Linked to ongoing host country organization	a. Will need to work within existing organization. b. May find this organization constrains development efforts and that they need to reorient it. c. Will have an opportunity to integrate design, implementation, and maintenance activities. d. Will have a natural linkage to several levels of government.
2. Continue over time	a. Will find program varies over time and that design needs to be ongoing. b. Will need information about results on an ongoing basis. c. Will need continuing resources. d. Will be able to adapt procedures and learn from experience.
3. Systems of activities and services	a. Will be working in a multi-organizational setting. b. Will assist and service other units rather than carry out program activities directly. c. Will have to juggle resources among competing activities.
4. Systems of activities designed for different settings	a. Cannot rely on a single technology; will need to experiment and adapt. b. Will need information about different settings. c. Will have an opportunity to design appropriate institutions to adapt to different settings.
5. Defined by their substantive content	a. Will need to address the technology and political dynamics associated with different policies. b. Can develop commitments around the purposes and values associated with program content.

assistance, it raises problems when analyzing country programs. One reason is that many host governments perceive programs as developmental that do not fit with this substantive definition. A review of Third World development plans, for example, finds that generally they did not emphasize "basic needs" and seldom emphasized participation or capacity building (Ingle, 1979, 49). It is troubling to rely on a definition that would omit most Third World development plans.

Another reason for caution is empirical. Research indicates that participation may or may not improve the life chances of people and that the relationship between participation and increased benefits is an empirical question rather than a definitional one (Tendler, 1982). Research also tells us that the poor do not always benefit even when programs are directed to them.[20] At the same time, programs *not* directly targeted to the poor may benefit them by stimulating overall agricultural output and employment (Minear, 1984, 21–22; Mellor, 1986).

A more limited definition is used in the framework, one that leaves room for different approaches by developing nations and emphasizes activities to increase productive and organizational capacity and reduce poverty. A development program is one that is designed to (1) carry out a nation's development goals; (2) introduce change in a society or community to increase its productive or organizational capacity; and (3) improve the quality of peoples' lives, including improvements in the well-being of the poor. Theories that define development in terms of equity and participation are introduced in subsequent chapters as specific approaches to development rather than as defining characteristics.

Development defined as capacity building means that assistance should enable people to do more for themselves rather than simply provide them with welfare. However, relief services and capacity building are not mutually exclusive. Relief activities can be developmental if they bring community members together around common concerns or if such activities enable community members to devote more energy to making choices.[21]

Note that development programs are defined by their process as much as by their substance. An irrigation program is developmental if it increases the capacity of local communities to be more productive and if the design takes into account the impact that new irrigation technology would have on social patterns in the community and on the ability of individuals to use and maintain it. Programs to provide relief could be developmental if they help a community develop an organization and if they are designed to improve the quality of life. A program to create a new infrastructure would be developmental if it increased the productive capacity in the area and was designed to benefit the broad community, even if only indirectly.

By contrast a program to stimulate credit would not be developmental if the loans did not increase peoples' capacity to be more productive and if the design failed to consider the impact of loans on social patterns in the community. Would loans, for example, be limited to the best credit risks, or would loans be offered across the board and perhaps targeted to those with the greatest need for credit? If the former, would loans make it easier for elites to dominate the poor? A relief program would *not* be developmental if it simply channeled resources to the poor and did not use them to make the community more productive or better able to handle and monitor the resources.

There is a fourth defining characteristic of development—namely, that it is carried out in what is often a hostile environment and always a difficult one. This is a very important element. Honadle very pointedly comments that a number of development management studies in the past have overlooked environmental problems and essentially ended up being "apologetic for the complexity of creation" (1982a, 178). One of the limitations of development plans made by economists is that economists tend to ignore such complexity and think of implementation as *the* problem. In reality it is "the *system* [that] is problematic" (Moris, 1981, 8). The reverse problem is also very prevalent—to spend so much time documenting the difficulties of coping with environmental problems that it is hard to visualize change at all. Including the nature of the setting in a definition of development suggests that when problems arise, they do not necessarily stem from poor program design or even from careless implementation. They simply may reflect the difficulties managers confront and the fact that development managers are always working under problematic conditions.

Managers almost always have to cope with drastically insufficient resources, with poor logistics, with inadequate infrastructures, with weak political institutions, with a virtually nonexistent private sector, and often with ethnic divisiveness and even security threats. Seemingly minor inconveniences can undermine development efforts.

> The new manager learns that even routine actions (such as requisitioning supplies) require personal intervention. Or that some critical unit of equipment cannot be serviced locally, bringing the entire operation to a standstill until the missing part arrives from overseas. Sometimes one cannot even telephone between sections of the same city, and the vehicles are in use all day long ferrying messages (and wives) back and forth. Finally, it is not unusual for lateral communication outside the organization to be forbidden, even when the help of other agencies is essential (Moris, 1981, 7).

Coping with such problems is part of the meaning of development. The characteristics of development and their implications for managers are summarized in Table 1.2.

Sustainability

The concept of sustainability has been linked to efforts to promote the private sector and is often defined fairly narrowly as financial capacity and an ability to generate additional resources. The definitions of programs and development mentioned previously, however, suggest a more inclusive meaning of sustainability. First, programs must address or create a felt need among beneficiaries if they are to continue. For example, one study found that potable water projects in Tunisia were not sustained in large part because beneficiaries placed a higher value on improving their access to the

TABLE 1.2 Characteristics of Development

Characteristics of Development	Implications for Managers
1. Fits with a nation's development goals	a. Need to be aware of development goals of policy elites. b. Will have an opportunity to influence policy and program content.
2. Builds capacity, productive and institutional implementing programs. capacity outside program unit.	a. Need to be aware of existing capacity and roadblocks in the organizations responsible for b. Need to be aware of potential
3. Deals with the impact of development programs on the quality of peoples' lives, including the poor	a. Need to learn about preferences and potential resources in areas affected by a program. b. Need information about the situation of the poor and how they will be affected. c. Need to know about impact of activities.
4. Takes place in a difficult setting	a. Need leadership and managerial skills. b. Need to be able to work with political elites. c. Need to gain support of affected beneficiaries and communities.

water and for increasing the amount of water available to them. From their view potability was not the major issue (Bigelow and Chiles, 1980).

A second aspect of sustainability concerns the ability to develop a continuing base of financial resources. Possible sources include program budgets, donor funds, beneficiary contributions, user fees, and resources generated by the activity itself. Third, sustainability requires managers to develop some organization or institution to assume responsibility for adapting development activities and for maintaining their benefits. Alternatives include the program agency itself, a separate unit linked to the agency, a regional or local government unit, or a completely autonomous unit. The point is that sustainable development refers to the benefits derived from activities and not the activities themselves. In order to sustain the benefits, to ensure that they meet felt needs, it may prove necessary to alter and adapt specific activities. Institutions to ensure responsiveness and adaptations thus are intrinsic to the concept of sustainability. Finally, programs will be sustained only if there is sufficient support for them among relevant political elites and community groups. These characteristics are summarized in Table 1.3.

This chapter has explored the characteristics of programs and sustainable development and suggested the implications of these terms for managers. Several important caveats are in order. First, many of these defining characteristics exist in varying degrees and are not simply either present or absent. For example, programs can include a few or many different activities, and settings can be more or less difficult.

Second, not all the characteristics are equally apparent in every development program. For example, in some sectors, program units are primarily operational and carry out activities directly. Land reform and infrastructural development are examples.

TABLE 1.3 Characteristics of Sustainability

Programs are more apt to be sustained when managers use them to:

1. Address or stimulate a felt need for an activity.
2. Develop institutions to continue and adapt activities.
3. Provide for continuing resources.
4. Build support among relevant groups and political elites.

Other programs are better described as systems that work through and provide assistance to other units. Agricultural crop development and urban services are examples. Although the rest of the discussion pertains to both kinds of programs, many of the most interesting implications for managers involve programs that are systems of activities, and much of the discussion will deal with these. It is worth noting, however, that this dimension is also variable. Even if a program constructs a dam or other infrastructure, the program often resembles a system of different activities carried out by several units, and managers may find it necessary and advantageous to work with other units and consult about the program's impact on them.

Notes

1. For example, see Schaffer (1969, 185); and Luke (1986, 76).

2. For reviews of this literature see Bryant and White (1982, Ch. 2); Rondinelli (1987, Part 2); Ingle (1979, 62); Luke (1986); Siffin (1976); Sigelman (1976); and Hammergren (1983).

3. See also Ingle (1979, 33). Saasa agrees that outcomes have to be taken into account. He traces the neglect of results to the influence of Western models, which tend to evaluate decisions by the processes for making them. In the Third World, however, processes are often very poor, and this approach is not appropriate (Saasa, 1985, 317–318).

4. Chambers (1974, 15–21, 29–31); D. Korten (1980, 484, 496); Grindle (1980); Lele (1975, Ch. 8); Leonard and Marshall (1982); Honadle, Gow, and Silverman (1984), and Honadle and VanSant (1984) have all had a long interest in programs.

5. As originally conceived, projects did not have these limitations. Solomon notes that many economists and engineers in the 1950s and the 1960s thought in terms of the "life of the project," which was often at least twice as long as the investment period, and they built continuity into the design. In the past decade, however, projects have been defined in more limited terms, namely, by their funding period. One reason for the shift may have been the increasing reliance on contractors to implement projects.

> From the point of view of the chief actors, namely, the contractor, the lender, or the host country, it seems like the world turns on the period in which investment funds are being pumped into the project. Definitions follow the real world. Having defined the concept of project in narrow contracting terms, we now feel the need for a more development oriented description with attributes more consistent with development (personal correspondence, 1986).

6. Most projects have been administered by a dual system, a cluster of project personnel—usually expatriates—and counterparts from the host country. As Moris describes, many of the difficulties these projects encounter arise from this dual structure (1981, 48). See Moris (1981) for a discussion of some of the reputed advantages of projects (16) and for a judgment about their core problems (122). Gran argues that the project cycle is designed to serve the bureaucratic interests of donors (1983b, Ch. 9–11).

7. Compare David Korten's description of projects as terminal and programs as ongoing (1980).

8. According to Sewell and Contee, most project assistance from the United States serves its foreign policy interests; as a result they recommend more program assistance (1985, 114).

9. A study by Development Alternatives Incorporated noted that when donors fund projects that in effect "bypass" program agencies, donors lose an opportunity for reorienting the agencies (Honadle, Gow, and Silverman, 1984). See also VanSant (1979), who argues that community-based integrated rural development projects rarely survive precisely because they try to circumvent ordinary procedures (1979, 44).

10. Others distinguish projects and programs in roughly similar terms: Ingle refers to programs as complex sets of activities that are not limited or time bound and that have a broader scope than projects (1979); Paul says programs have a policy sanction, an organizational identity, and involve replication (1982); and Honadle refers to the permanent status of programs (1982a). See also Harbeson (1985); E. Morgan (1983); and Rondinelli (1987).

11. Derick Brinkerhoff, 1986, correspondence.

12. For example, a recent empirical study of the Egyptian bureaucracy confirms that supervisors are reluctant to delegate authority, that subordinates shun responsibility, and that communication between the two groups is very rigid (Palmer, Yassin, and Leila, 1985).

13. See also Bryant and White (1982) and Honadle, Gow, and Silverman (1984).

14. The literature making this point is vast. Among those who stress its importance in the development context are E. Morgan (1983); and Moris (1981, 24).

15. Compare Moris (1981, 56–65).

16. A number of management studies have stressed this service role but relate it to project management. For example, Lele (1975) and Rondinelli (1977) use the term *project* but are really talking about programs in the sense of a system servicing a number of projects (Moris, 1981).

17. For a recent collection of essays that document these changes see Lewis and Kallab (1986). During the early postwar period, development was often defined in much broader terms and was influenced by the community development movement (Alliband, 1983; Blair, 1981). D. Korten notes that the emphasis on growth was a reaction to the complexity of

many comprehensive plans and a desire to simplify policy interventions (1984, 346).

18. Chenery et al. (1974); Adelman and Morris (1973); Bryant and White (1982); Sewell and Contee (1985); and Thomas (1985). Honadle notes that unequal growth patterns failed to produce benefits throughout the society by "limiting markets, encouraging capital flight, perpetuating corrupt bureaucratic practices, reinforcing poverty pockets, promoting unproductive use of scarce capital and supporting political instability" (1982a, 175).

19. See, for example, Bryant and White (1982, Ch. 1); Thomas (1985, 17); D. Korten (1980); Seers (1969, 1977); and Ickis (1983). Compare also Charlick's discussion of three definitions of development: technical efficiency, structural reform, and power redistribution (1984). Luke refers to a general consensus that development involves (1) the capacity to be efficient, (2) responsiveness and accountability, and (3) a concern for equity (1986, 74).

20. See, for example, Elliott (1975, 394–398); Bengtsson (1979, 24); and Minear (1984, 14–15).

21. Some argue that welfare services are not developmental (Alliband, 1983; and D. Korten, 1980). A study of private voluntary organizations in Egypt suggests that relief assistance may be developmental if it helps a group develop an organization (White, 1986a).

2

Dimensions of Management

Programs provide important opportunities for managers to bring about developmental changes in a society. Programs also pose a number of questions about the role that managers play and the functions they perform. This chapter begins by discussing the scope of management and particularly how managers relate to the broader political process. Second, it reviews the characteristics of programs and sustainable development to identify relevant management functions. A final section considers how management and organization studies treat these five functions and notes that much of the traditional literature defines management in relatively static terms and overlooks a number of opportunities for promoting change.

The Scope of Management

Whereas the term *administrator* suggests people who carry out tasks designed by others, the term *manager* implies a broader range of activities and "carries overtones of initiative and flexibility" (Warwick, 1982, 41–42). Managers play two roles—fulfilling standard operational responsibilities and shaping program content and implementation strategies. Although management is frequently defined in terms of the former role, it constitutes only part of what managers do, and often not the most interesting part or the part that has most potential for development. Kiggundu draws a similar distinction between management roles, using the terms *or-*

ganizational and *strategic* tasks, and stresses that the latter are critical for development.

> Effective management of developing country organizations, like organizations elsewhere, depends on the extent to which *both* strategic management tasks and critical operating tasks are delineated and effectively managed. Strategic tasks, often associated with top management, concentrate on the long-term aspects of the organization, deal with the organization-environment relationships, and include strategic formulation and implementation, managing contextual interdependencies, and the development of a clear organizational philosophy and "nichemanship" (1986).[1]

Strategic tasks can be carried out by officials at a number of levels in an organization. Insofar as development programs are delivered through a network of organizations, middle level managers, and even those with responsibility for field level activities, may have substantial responsibility in designing and shaping programs.[2] For example, in a program designed to make credit available, managers marshal resources, explore designs for delivering credit, and evaluate and alter the program over time. These activities can be carried out at a number of levels—in the central agency and in the field—and can involve any who make strategic decisions, who decide how to orchestrate and coordinate activities, or who have discretion in applying decisions at any level.

In addition to playing a variety of roles, managers are active both within and outside their immediate organizational units. Bryant, for example, suggests that management should be more broadly conceived than it often is, and she observes that development managers can have influence at three levels—within an organization; between and among organizations; and within the larger policy environment. These managers are, in fact, in a better position than most to work at all three levels because programs give managers an even greater leverage over the policy environment and interorganizational relations than projects do (Bryant, 1985).[3]

It does not follow that managers always exercise this potential. Some define their roles very narrowly; others have little room for exercising discretion. Nevertheless, Saasa, based on his experiences in Zambia, concludes that managers contribute to policy discussions and play a broader role in Third World nations where public opinion is often very unformed than they typically do elsewhere. He remarks that this emphasis on an expanded role for managers goes against the grain of traditional systems theory, in which policy reflects inputs from the society and "the bureaucracy only executes the policies made by their political 'masters.'" Therefore, he concludes, we need new models that pay more attention to what managers actually do and to the broader role that they frequently carve out for themselves (Saasa, 1985, 311).

The scope of management varies with the autonomy managers have. Agricultural and health programs are typically highly visible activities located in centralized ministries that impose many constraints on a program agency. Programs associated with public utilities usually have more independence, although they operate within government regulations. Research programs are typically the most independent and most free to design their own procedures.[4]

Autonomy varies at two levels. First, there is the autonomy of the program agency within the government and vis-à-vis donors or international economic bodies.[5] Program agencies draw on several kinds of funds: (1) the agency budget expressed as recurrent costs; (2) special development funds provided by the government; and (3) external funds. The larger their budgets, and the greater their access to special funds, the more autonomy program agencies will have. Second, managers can have autonomy vis-à-vis top officials in the program agency. In his important study of program management, Paul identifies two types of relations between policy makers and managers. In one, policy elites make most of the decisions. They formulate general policy goals, translate them into programs, establish an implementing agency, and create the organization for carrying out these programs. Obviously in this model managers have limited responsibility for program design.

In the second and more common model, policy makers formulate general policy goals, decide where the relevant program should be housed, and then appoint managers to design strategies for carrying out the goals. Managers have the responsibility for translating the policy into a program, for designing the way it should be implemented, and for deciding what to delegate to the field or contract out (Paul, 1982, 234).[6] In part managers' autonomy depends on the discretion they have over funds. Even if funds are available, managers may lack the authority to spend them (Uphoff and Esman, 1984, 149).[7] Managerial autonomy also varies according to strategic and operational responsibilities. A supervising body may retain strategic control of policy, budget, and personnel but may assign operational controls to managers.[8]

Figure 2.1 depicts the overlapping responsibilities of policy makers and managers. Although the discussion has implied that managers want more autonomy, they may not and even may choose

FIGURE 2.1 Responsibilities of Policy Makers and Managers



not "to fully utilize the autonomy formally available to them either due to commitment to government norms, inertia, or risk aversion" (Paul, 1982, 120). Managers may or may not be interested in getting involved in a particular arena. Policy makers may or may not be responsive to managers' suggestions or even to according them a role, and there undoubtedly will be many tensions between political leaders and those in the civil service.[9] In fact there is considerable evidence that managers define their tasks fairly narrowly, sticking to what were earlier called operational tasks rather than exploring the potential for role expansion.[10] Montgomery suggests that managers are hesitant to take many risks precisely because the political system grants them a lot of autonomy and gives them little direction. "Managers are fairly free to take risks, but they seldom seem to do so in an adventurous way because there are few guidelines to help them identify the public values that they might be expected to advance by such actions" (Montgomery, 1986a, 412).

Five Functions of Program Management

As discussed previously there are two aspects of management—operational and strategic activities—and managing development activities involves both the traditional, operational tasks and more strategic and innovative activities. The management functions described in the following paragraphs were selected because they are particularly salient to program responsibilities and development tasks. Note that each is linked to sustainable development and that without this connection a function easily becomes an end in itself and may undermine development goals.

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

The first function points to ways in which managers can shape and influence the content of policy and the programs they are called upon to manage. This function refers to a number of activities associated with decision making and the design and uses of analysis. Managers can use analysis to shape programs in two arenas. First, managers can try to influence other policy makers, either directly or by channeling information to them that documents the need for certain kinds of policies. Managers may be asked for this kind of information, or more often they will have to look for ways to communicate it. Policy makers often rely on such information to select and defend a policy and also to build coalitions of support (Cohen et al., 1985, 1217). In the Third World where political institutions are often weak, managers can have a relatively major influence on the content of policy.[11]

Second, managers have opportunities to shape policy as they translate it into program objectives and design strategies for implementing them. Program mandates are typically very general and vague and can be steered in a number of different directions. Consider an agricultural development activity planned in Zaire. Evaluators note that the policy mandate failed to clarify whether the goal was the relatively narrow one of increasing the production of maize or the broader one of achieving long-term rural development and increasing farmer income. Managers, the evaluators find, had considerable discretion for steering the program in one way or another (Rosenthal et al., 1986). This opportunity for influencing program content is even greater in those instances where programs consist of multiple activities to be carried out in a variety of settings.

This function, which is linked to the concept of sustainable development, requires managers to focus on the needs and priorities in communities and to be particularly concerned with activities that improve the quality of life within Third World societies. Note that without this qualifier this function can undermine development. Managers are naturally inclined to promote policies and program strategies that enhance their own agency, and they tend to selectively transmit information that places their efforts in the most favorable light. The emphasis is therefore on ways in which managers can shape program content to promote sustainable development.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

The second function refers to the need to enhance the structural and operational capacity of implementing units to carry out programs. Capacity is important in implementing and sustaining programs and involves central, regional, and local field units. A constant refrain in development studies is that such capacity is notoriously lacking. Heaver, to take only one example, notes that government agencies in Thailand are seldom able to expend more than 50 percent of the funds appropriated by donors for development projects in that country (1982, 1). The concept of capacity building forces managers to think in broader terms than simply producing services or carrying out a particular program and underscores that there is a basic underlying difference between development administration and service delivery. For development administration the objective does not end with goods and services; rather it requires an increase in local administrative capacity to sustain benefit flows after initial investments have ended (Honadle, 1982a, 176).[12]

Making a very similar point, an observer of recent achievements in India comments on the remarkable progress in that country. The most impressive indicator of development he finds was not

> having the surplus food thanks to the green revolution. Much more impressive was the creation of an infrastructure to take this food to the remotest village, and then not to hand it over as alms but to make it into wages for a developmental project of some sort or other—the building of a road or the sinking of a well (Akbar, 1986).

Akbar's comment captures the importance of organizational capacity. In this case capacity was represented by connections between central program units and field situations.

Program capacity also involves more effective procedures for running an organization. Capacity means expanding the ability of a unit to collect, analyze, and handle information about community needs, preferences, and program results.[13] Capacity building refers to procedures for recruiting and supervising personnel, and it means designing effective training activities and integrating these with program activities. Capacity building also means setting in place systems for monitoring finances and integrating these with program decisions and finding ways to coordinate the various participants in program design and implementation. Program agencies will often have procedures in place, but these may be ill suited to development tasks, and managers will need to work within and adapt these procedures.

Again the qualifier of development is important. The danger in carrying out this function is that managers will be tempted to develop an organizational capacity that is self-reinforcing and that easily becomes disconnected from the results it is designed to accomplish. Satia, of the Indian Institute of Management at Ahmedabad, reminds us how often a concern for results is breached in practice.

> Just as Health Department officials concern themselves with running Primary Health Centers rather than with the improvement of health, Education Department officials direct their attention to running schools—not to the educational levels of the population served. . . . [A concern for performance] would mean managing not against activities completed, but against changes in the characteristics of specified populations (1983, 78, 79).

Expand Program Resources and Political Support

The third management function refers to the need to develop additional resources and political support. Although program managers often can rely on regular budgetary authority, they undoubtedly will need to supplement regular funds and ensure that they continue during the life of the program. Managers will probably also need to find additional funds for maintaining services. The widespread scarcity of funds means that managers will have to be imaginative in acquiring additional resources, gaining the support of other organizations, or getting local organizations and beneficiaries to contribute. Managers may need to turn to donors to fund particular activities and try to take advantage of donor priorities and attempt to mesh them with ongoing program activities. Managers will need to explore opportunities to obtain additional resources from the community or to institute some cost recovery innovations.

Managers also need to look for less tangible resources, such as cultivating political support, developing alliances with political leaders, and promoting programs in local communities or among beneficiary groups. Some of the activities can be more subtle. Hirschman, for example, notes that even when resources are apparently scarce, there in fact may be some slack in the economy. In this case, development depends on "calling forth and enlisting for development purposes resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered or badly utilized" (1970, 12). As is true for the other functions, the search for resources and political support is linked to development goals. Otherwise, acquiring resources may become an end in itself, and contributors and supporters will be exploited.

Work with and Coordinate Multiple Organizations and Groups

A fourth function underscores the need for managers to spend much of their time working within an interorganizational setting. Often management studies indicate that managers need to deal with their environment. Instead of referring to this rather vague concept, this function focuses on particular parts of their environment, on the fact that a large part of program management—whether influencing policy content, implementing a program, or gathering resources—will be done with and through a number of other organizations. Some of these will be regional or local units of ministries, some will be groups of policy makers, some will be community organizations, and some will be international donors.[14]

As is true of the other functions, there is ample evidence that this characteristic of program management is difficult to carry out and is often neglected in practice.[15]

> Staff generally operate in water-tight compartments. The extension officer, the veterinary officer, and the marketing agent seldom coordinate their advice and their schedules because each is responsible to an official at a higher level who manages his specialized program independently of others according to rules established by his own professional hierarchy (Uphoff and Esman, 1984, 146).

To some extent the organizational network is a given for managers and consists of the set of organizations that are part of the program agency. In other circumstances managers will have considerable discretion in deciding how to organize an activity. They will need to ask (1) whether and how much authority to delegate to lower levels or other units; (2) how to provide needed services and support to the other units; and (3) how to manage relations among the different units. Even when managers turn activities over to other units, they will usually continue to play a number of related roles. Managers may consult and jointly plan with other units as well as monitor the activities of other units, coordinate them, and provide linkages and support services.[16] The following description of relations among units responsible for rural development suggests some of these possible roles.

> Sometimes it was merely information sharing—assessing the convergence or divergence of policies, providing price data, or letting a manager know about an occurrence that affected implementation. Other times it was joint action—fielding multiagency teams, changing priorities to fit with common objectives, or synchronizing the sequence of field activities. A third type of behavior was resource sharing—a line agency making training facilities available to a project, a project office making vehicles available to a local government unit, or a PVO lending some of its people to a local group to help complete a particular task (Honadle and VanSant, 1984, 42).

Exercise Leadership

This function is based primarily on the complexity of developmental change and on the broad set of roles associated with program management. Because programs are related to established agencies and because development usually requires new procedures and routines, managers will need to exercise considerable leadership skills within their agencies to accomplish development goals.[17] Because development is carried out in a difficult environment and resources are scarce, managers need to rely on leadership to negotiate these constraints and marshal support. In addition, the fact that development usually involves changes in the ways in which people behave means that managers need to do more than carry out assigned tasks. They also need to exert leadership in the form of persuading people, communicating new ideas, and eliciting enthusiasm.[18] This leadership function needs to be linked to sustainable development goals lest managers become manipulative or attempt to exploit others.

Relevance of Management and Organization Literature

The general literature on management and organizations has been an important source for development management, and observers and practitioners have drawn from a number of different disciplines.[19] Frequently analysts ask whether this literature is really appropriate to the Third World or whether it is only germane to Western experiences. The broad conclusion is that this is an empirical question. Sometimes theories deal with behavior that is not culturally specific, while at other times, the environment has such a profound influence that Western-based models are problematic.[20]

This section poses a different question. Insofar as all five functions involve managers in promoting developmental changes, how useful is the literature in understanding processes of change and ways to promote change? The position that is argued here is that the literature on management is not particularly helpful in this respect. It emphasizes constraints on managers rather than opportunities for change, and says little about "how" questions, about the processes for bringing about change. Those parts of the literature that do talk about change interventions define their scope fairly narrowly and focus on how managers can change their organizations internally, rather than on how managers can influence those outside their organizations.

A recent study of famine in Africa underscores that assumptions about opportunities for change can make a critical difference. It argues that development specialists have missed opportunities precisely because they assume environmental conditions are not amenable to change. The study continues that in reality most of the conditions commonly cited as causing famine, such as drought, are not inevitable but have been brought about by shortsighted policies and practices that could be changed.

> For drought-stricken Africa, the cry that the climate is changing is ultimately a cop-out, an excuse for political inaction. We do not know if the climate in dryland Africa is really becoming drier, and we do not know how to reverse this change quickly even if it is occurring.
>
> But it is certain that bad land management is reducing the use that can be made of the rain that does fall, causing the moisture to evaporate or run off damaged soils rather than seep into the ground to be used by crops and vegetation. Plant roots depend on root-level microclimate rather than climatic averages, and misuse of the land is widespread, is increasing vulnerability to drought and is reversible. Rainfall patterns cannot at present be either modified or predicted, but human behavior can and must be changed (Timberlake, 1985, 31).

Although this example focuses on the broad backdrop of large-scale famine, the same question can be asked on a more micro scale.

Can managers trying to implement an innovative program within a ministry of agriculture change its normal way of doing business, or do they have to accept what are often very confining procedures? Can managers setting up field units in remote agricultural communities have an impact on the perceptions in that community, or are managers bound by the traditional patterns of agriculture and group relations? It is perhaps obvious that any answer to these questions is of a "both-and" nature, that managers potentially can influence their surroundings but that they are also partially constrained by them. As the preceding quotation suggests, however, assumptions are often made that limit how one thinks about change.

Three bodies of literature have been particularly important sources for development administration. One derives from systems theory. It recognizes the importance of a manager's setting but stresses how it limits managers, rather than how it provides opportunities for bringing about change. In effect this literature assumes that managers' activities are determined by external forces and that they need to design what they do contingent on their circumstances. Even in that version referred to as open-systems theory, being "open" means adjusting and adapting to the environment, rather than influencing and shaping it. The environment is something that managers need to take account of, adapt to, and design programs that "fit" it. The theory tells us more about how problems arise or why managers often fail, and less about how they can work within, shape, influence, and interact with their environments.[21]

Although the environment is a source of constraints in systems theory, it is also undifferentiated. Managers are counseled to take it into account, but the environment remains a residual and global concept, one that vaguely refers to "everything out there" that is unexplained or constraining. The very term *environment* implies that boundaries can be drawn around a manager's arena, that the organization (or system) is whatever managers can control, and that the environment is that which is beyond their control.[22] Managers are left to tinker with internal procedures and structures, consigning the environment to an "other" category, something to be absorbed or adjusted to rather than made the basis for interaction. Groups in the environment are outside of decision-making patterns and the implementation system, rather than potentially a part of it (Warwick, 1975, 190).[23]

According to a recent and influential review (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), this version of organization theory also encourages managers to focus on maintaining their organizations and responding to those in power. This reactive role, the authors contend, considerably narrows the opportunities for bringing about change. There is little room for interacting with those in the community to create alternative approaches to development or even for experimenting with different institutional forms. There is also no attention to the need for reorienting the agency. Leadership is adaptive and responsive to those in power, rather than to alternative forces in the society.

A second group of writings, often called generic management theory or management science, begins with a different emphasis. By nature prescriptive, this theory emphasizes how managers can exert influence by improving their ability to make rational decisions and implement them efficiently. The knowledge base is primarily studies of the private sector and Western experiences.[24] Because of the focus on management skills carried out within an organization, management science has a rather restricted view of the arena within which managers can exert influence and neglects many characteristics of managers' political and cultural environments. For example, this theory overlooks the ways in which the political context can severely constrain what is done inside an organization.[25] Therefore, on the one hand, management science exaggerates the ability of managers to control the internal life of their organizations, ignoring such constraints as the legal basis of public programs and the political setting. At the same time, management science pays less attention to forces operating in the environment, such as political forces, and hence ignores opportunities for managers to extend their influence beyond their organizations.

Studies based on project interventions, many of which have been written by and for consultants or change agents, have similar limitations. Although these studies do deal with how managers can make changes, interventionist-oriented studies operate at a very micro level. They emphasize those aspects of management that can be changed by short-term interventions and training. The range of skills these studies emphasize, however, are often relatively narrow. Interventionist-oriented studies, for all their immediate value, overlook structural factors such as government pricing policies and institutional capacity. Because these studies leave out contextual factors, they provide little guidance on how to cope with such factors and trivialize what managers do. Management consists of discrete tasks and specific skills rather than personal, institutional, or structural characteristics precisely because the former are easier to alter. Personal leadership and the uses of power are similarly discounted because it is hard to design an intervention to influence them. Yet these aspects of management may have the greatest potential for bringing about lasting and significant changes.[26]

A third body of literature comes from public administration and explores the relationship between administration and other political institutions. How do elected officials hold administrators accountable? How do the two groups interact? What influence does the bureaucracy have on public policy? Applied to development, the public administration literature focuses on the setting within which managers function, both inside and outside the organization, and emphasizes how this setting constrains what managers are able to accomplish.

Although the public administration literature has always taken the political setting into account, it has tended to emphasize how this setting constrains what managers can accomplish. As an example, a descriptive case study of efforts to reorganize the U.S. Department of State found that managers were very limited in their ability to make any changes because external pressures combined with groups inside to create hierarchies and complex rules and regulations that were difficult to change. There were strong political pressures to set up elaborate procedures for checking on external groups and reporting on them within the agency. The result was an enormous volume of information and considerable internal strain (Warwick, 1975, 193). In the face of such external pressures, the literature reminds us that managers may not have the freedom to use organization and systems theory to design organization structures to fit their environment. Nor do managers always have the political authority to do so (Uphoff and Esman, 1984).

Other studies within public administration fit within what is called public management theory and are essentially efforts to combine public administration and management science. A review of recent examples of these studies concludes that they remain heavily oriented to private sector criteria and concerns.[27] This means that like the generic management literature, these studies emphasize internal aspects of management and pay less attention to political influence and leadership. Because the political arena is difficult to influence, it is tempting and natural to focus on the internal life of an organization where presumably it is easier for managers to have an impact.

This chapter has used the earlier discussions of programs and development to propose five management functions. They define the opportunities of managers quite broadly, assigning managers a potential role in policy discussions and institutional design as well as in carrying out the operational tasks of a particular program. This means that the book will consider theories about ways in which managers participate in the policy process and in the political arena as well as how they function within their organizations. The next chapter incorporates these functions into a framework for examining and comparing several approaches to program management.

Finally, the chapter examined the dominant emphases in the literature on managers and organizations and considered how it dealt with the functions. Much of the literature, from the fields of both public administration and private management, emphasizes the constraints on managers, and the influences that determine what they do, and pays less attention to their opportunities for altering or influencing their situations. At first glance management studies seem to be an exception because they focus on ways in which managers can apply skills and techniques to make a difference. However, these studies usually do this by greatly narrowing the arena within which managers function. The political and institutional arenas are essentially givens within which managers apply skills to make marginal differences. There is less attention to how managers can use these skills to make substantial change or to influence what goes on outside their immediate context. One of the guiding questions that is addressed to each of the approaches in Part 2 is whether any of their recent applications have gone beyond these limitations and whether these writings point to increased opportunities for promoting developmental change.

Notes

1. Leonard (1986) distinguishes among four aspects of management: policy making, organizational leadership, internal administration, and monitoring routines (bureaucratic hygiene).

2. Heaver refers to the "important managerial role of middle and junior level staff, especially field staff, whom the literature on bureaucracy has tended to ignore" (1982, ii).

3. See also Brinkerhoff (1986); and D. Korten (1984).

4. It is usually assumed that the larger the program agency, the less autonomy or discretion a program unit will have because the larger an or-

ganization is, the more specialization there is, and the more the agency is inclined to standardize and regulate activities in order to control or coordinate it (Robey, 1982, 196–199; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). On the other hand, a relatively small program located in a large agency may be given considerable latitude precisely because of their respective sizes.

5. Some treat resource dependency as a separate characteristic (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Pfeffer, 1982), others as just another "strategic contingency to be managed" (McKelvey, 1984, 641).

6. A more elaborate classification lists five relations between political elites in an agency and program managers: (1) *classical technocracy*—policy makers formulate specific goals, and delegate technical authority; (2) *instructed delegation*—policy makers formulate specific goals but delegate administrative authority to design programs; (3) *bargaining*—policy makers formulate goals and then bargain with managers about the best way to accomplish them; (4) *discretionary experimentation*—policy makers support vague and undefined goals and delegate broad authority; (5) *bureaucratic entrepreneurship*—policy makers support the programs formulated by the program managers (adapted from Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980, 114–115).

7. The lack of authority may be compounded by the role of donors, as in the following example:

> The director of irrigation for the Northern Region (Ghana) had to forego a whole construction season because he could not get both the budget expenditure authorization from the Treasury and the foreign exchange approval from the Central Bank at the same time. . . . He had funds in his budget, but they were released on a quarterly basis, and by the time he could get Central Bank approval, his Treasury authorization had lapsed. Several million dollars worth of equipment consequently lay idle during the non-rainy months when they could have been used (Uphoff and Esman, 1984, 150).

8. Paul also distinguishes among legal, effective, and induced autonomy. Legal autonomy refers to an organization's formal powers; effective autonomy is the amount of authority the organization actually enjoys; induced authority refers to the permission a supervisory body gives to a unit to exceed its formal authority (Paul, 1982, 120).

9. Annemarie Walsh has helpfully stressed this point and notes that by and large the development administration literature has ignored these tensions (correspondence, 1986). The collection of essays in Grindle (1980) is probably the best source on this issue.

10. Montgomery finds that managers in southern Africa place relatively little emphasis on policy analysis skills (1985).

11. Several authors emphasize this point. See, for example, Grindle (1980, 15–16); Thomas (1985, 14); Cohen et al. (1985); Heaver (1982); Saasa (1985); and Montgomery (1979a, 58). Montgomery stresses that managers are often in a position to propose alternatives that were overlooked in the political process.

12. Rondinelli distinguishes among three aspects of capacity: "appropriate organizational structures," "efficient administrative processes," and "uses of appropriate human resources" (1986a). Mintzberg identifies five aspects of capacity building: allocating resources, handling disturbances, monitoring performance, disseminating information, and exercising leadership with personnel (Montgomery, 1986b). Montgomery, focusing specifically on development management, includes four sets of skills: motivating subordinates, managing resources, handling organizational relationships, and analyzing policy (1985).

13. According to a recent text on management, "Instead of describing management as decision-making, we could describe management as information gathering and be more descriptive of the actual emphasis of managers" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 266).

14. Although it is assumed here that development requires managers to function in an interorganizational setting, the evidence is somewhat ambiguous. Based on research on top level managers in African nations, Montgomery underscores that "few organizations can operate independently of the activities of other organizations" (1986b, 214). In another article using the same data base, he notes that in reality managers spend little of their time relating to other organizations (1986a).

15. Mintzberg reports research that managers spend almost half their time in liaison with other organizations. In spite of this, he observes, management theory usually ignores this aspect of the manager's role (1975).

16. Several authors note that coordination is a greatly overused word. According to Chambers we often recommend coordination to hide the fact that we really do not understand how an organization works (1974, 25). See also Honadle and VanSant (1984, 42).

17. Leonard observes that next to the policy environment, "organizational leadership" is the most critical aspect of management (1986).

18. Burns observes that leadership includes both the ability to make transactions and to transform others (1978). Another recent management study that emphasizes transforming leadership is Peters and Waterman (1982).

19. The relevant literature is vast. Sociology offers organization theory, systems theory, and group behavior. The psychological and social psychological fields offer motivation studies and small-group behavior. Political science and public administration offer theories about the nature of power, the theory of the state, and the role of citizens. Economics offers micro economic theory of behavior and the derivative field of operations research. Anthropology offers insight into the influence of culture on organizations. There are hybrid fields, such as implementation, organizational development, and policy analysis that draw from several disciplines. Clusters of literature have grown up around specific topics, such as community development, lower level bureaucrats, and citizen participation.

20. Those who argue that Western-based studies have limited relevance stress the importance of cultural differences (Hyden, 1983; Moris, 1981). Others find Western studies are more applicable than is often assumed, particularly when they deal with such generic issues as motivating personnel rather than coping with environmental pressures (Kiggundu et al., 1983; Leonard, 1977, 229–238).

21. One review found that the management literature deals with three kinds of variables—characteristics of individuals, descriptions of their behavior, and the results or outcomes of their behavior—but studied them independently of each other. "All three must be studied concurrently, and the effects and moderating influences of different organizational environments must be included as well" (Campbell et al., 1970, 12). Luthans and Davis (1982) review this literature.

22. See Gricar (1984, 3); and Smith, Lethem, and Thoolen (1980).

23. A new body of literature within organization theory, identified as the "population-ecology approach," leaves virtually no room for managers to exert influence beyond altering routine internal procedures. "Ecology" refers to the emphasis on the environment of organizations. "Population" is used because the theory looks at clusters of organizations. Managers can do little to adapt, any adjustments they make are inconsequential in the long run, and there are "structural inertias" in organizations that keep them from adapting (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). In the end what matters are an organization's resources, not how the organization is managed (Aldrich, 1979, 111).

24. Two recent studies that relate organization theory to the statutory nature of public policy and implementation are Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson (1986); and Harmon and Mayer (1986). See also an earlier study by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979).

25. See Warwick (1975); Sedgewick (1981); Stone (1980); Miller (1984); and Brown and Covey (1985).

26. Brown and Covey argue persuasively that this oversight also characterizes the organizational development literature where the level of analysis is at the individual, group, or organizational levels and ignores interactions with the environment (1985). Leonard notes that the management science literature discounts leadership (1986).

27. See Overman (1984). Hammergren makes the same observation in the context of reviewing development management studies (1983, 189).

3

Identifying Approaches

The definitions of programs, development, and management in the last two chapters proposed five specific management functions relevant to promoting developmental changes in a society. One way to proceed would be to review the literature and the evidence from specific experiences to summarize what has been learned about each of these functions. It would be quickly apparent, however, that observers and practitioners differ about which functions are most important and what they look like in practice. The framework needs another dimension, therefore, one that identifies the major theories about management that are particularly useful in the context of development programs. This will be the purpose of this chapter. To introduce the approaches and make them more concrete, Chapter 3 begins by briefly describing a specific agricultural development program. The chapter then uses the literature on the program to illustrate several approaches or ways to explain why the program was generally successful.

A Development Program: Masagana 99

The Masagana 99 program in the Philippines is one of the most ambitious and heavily documented development activities.[1]

Launched in 1973, in the wake of devastating floods throughout the nation, it has sought to bring about a massive increase in rice production in rural areas long devastated by poverty and low agricultural productivity. The term *masagana* means "bountiful," and the number 99 refers to the target amount of rice to be grown on each hectare, both very ambitious goals given the poor record of rice production at the time.

Even though Masagana 99 (M-99) began as a short-term project, it evolved into a much more elaborate activity, which fits the working definition of programs outlined in Chapter 1. M-99 is the responsibility of an established agency, the Ministry of Agriculture, particularly its Bureaus of Plant Industry and Agricultural Extension. M-99 has continued for a long period of time, has required additional resources, and has been altered and adapted. A number of institutions, in addition to the Ministry of Agriculture, have been involved in implementing the program, including banking and research institutions and local provincial units. M-99 consists of a number of different activities, such as providing seed, offering credit, and marketing the produce, and also has been applied in a number of different settings or provinces. Finally, M-99 is a public policy, assigned high priority by the Philippine government.

The program also fits the definitions of development and sustainability from Chapter 1. It is consistent with the nation's development goal of becoming self-sufficient in rice and has clearly attempted to expand the country's capacity to be more productive in agriculture and to improve the capacity of those organizations concerned with agriculture. The program's long-range goal is to improve the earning capacity of rural areas, essential to improvements in the quality of life throughout the nation. As suggested by the definition of development, program managers are working within a very difficult setting. There is severe poverty and maldistribution of income, and the institutions servicing rural areas and available resources are very limited. Consistent with the characteristics of sustainability, benefits have been continued for more than a decade and appear to address a felt need in the countryside for improved agricultural productivity. Managers have been successful in developing continuing resources and have emphasized the need for effective organizations and procedures. Finally, managers have worked to build support for the program within the broader political system.

The discussion in Chapter 2 proposed that in order to capitalize on the dimensions of the program and to successfully accomplish its development goals and ensure their sustainability, managers would need to contribute to shaping program content, develop the capacity of implementing organizations, gather additional resources, deal with multiple organizations, and exercise leadership.

In the Masagana case these functions were carried out by managers at two levels: at the national level, particularly those managing the program in the relevant bureaus and in the National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC), a multiagency body; and at the provincial level.[2] Descriptions of M-99 illustrate the kinds of activities associated with each managerial function.

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

Earlier efforts to increase rice production had failed. Part of the reason was that the problem had been defined too narrowly, and planners had focused only on production and not on supporting conditions such as credit and training. In the meantime high-yielding varieties of rice seed became available, but it became clear that new seed was not enough, that "the small farmer certainly did not have the means and capacity to procure the needed inputs and integrate them on his own" (Paul, 1982, 40). The program therefore had to do more than provide a new technology. Managers in the Bureau of Agricultural Extension designed a pilot project to explore ways to bring extension services and loans to the farmers. The results were adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture. In the course of implementing the program, managers responded to experiences and changed a number of practices. For example, they learned that it was important to consider incentives in the banking industry and find ways to leverage available funds.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

The capacity of several different organizations was improved, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture and the NFAC. Designers also considered the capacity of two other clusters of institutions: first, other national level agencies dealing with components of the program, such as the Central Bank, the University of the Philippines, and the International Rice Research Institute; and second, related organizations scattered throughout the rural areas such as small private rural banks and provincial offices that organized extension efforts. The major capacity-building innovation was a fairly elaborate management information system for collecting and reporting information on loans and crops. In another innovation managers set up barrio offices close to the farmers' fields that allowed the managers to monitor how the extension agents were performing and how successful the program was in training, monitoring, and supporting the agents.

Expand Program Resources and Political Support

Although the government had committed sizable funds to the program, managers found that much of the capital was being directed to large borrowers rather than to poorer farmers who would be risky to the banks. Tanco, the minister of agriculture, notes that "fortunately there were financial mechanisms available which would allow us to use a relatively small amount of money to leverage the funds of the banking system" (1983, 59). He also confirms the importance of gaining the support of others throughout the government and private sector whose contributions were needed.

Work with and Coordinate Multiple Organizations and Groups

National level managers had to gain the commitment of many people not under their immediate chain of command. They had to promote the program to provincial level bodies and help them set up a viable system for reaching farmers and dispensing supplies. Provincial level managers had to work with local organizations, with local banks, and with local representatives of a number of program agencies.

Exercise Leadership

Descriptions of M-99 contain numerous examples of innovative and creative leadership. Tanco, the minister of agriculture, was an exceptionally energetic and imaginative leader whose personal contributions played a major role in the program's success. Descriptions also attest to the creative leadership of a number of provincial level officials, such as those who set up the barrio offices mentioned earlier.

The studies of Masagana 99 also illustrate a number of different perspectives or theories about the nature of development and management. One approach examines the *goals of the program* and the best way to accomplish these. From this perspective the most important task for the M-99 managers is an analytic one—to define the problem, set goals, design strategies, and adjust and monitor these. This perspective looks for evidence of discussions conducted among various participants, the kinds of questions they asked, and the ways in which they defined their objectives. The goal approach emphasizes the numerous conversations among different parties and the extensive management information system for targeting and monitoring the uses and repayment of the credit.

A second approach emphasizes the *unpredictability* of implementation. Those who take this perspective would not be particularly surprised at recent evidence that in spite of all the attention placed on extension workers, it is not at all clear that they made the difference claimed for them (K. Smith, 1986). This approach would look for evidence that those involved had a number of other concerns to deal with and would consider whether any of these presented opportunities to managers.

A third approach focuses on the *bureaucratic procedures* for delivering the credit and technology packages and the kinds of incentives offered to different parties to gain their support. From this perspective observers noted that local government officials were having a hard time fitting into the system, partly because agricultural field staff reported to ministry officials as well as local provincial officials. This arrangement made it more difficult for the latter to use their influence to promote the program. Those using this perspective would also be interested in how managers were monitoring the extension agents and would be particularly interested in efforts to organize the agents into small work groups.

A fourth approach emphasizes the need to develop appropriate *institutions* for carrying out M-99 and would look at how NFAC was organized and whether new institutions were needed to carry out the program goals. This approach would be particularly interested in a number of institutional innovations that were tried. For example, NFAC set up Provincial Action Committees (PACs) in each region, which brought together representatives of public and private sector organizations. NFAC also established a second set of organizations, Municipal Action Teams (MATs), composed of mayors and technicians at the village level. The fourth approach would look for evidence that these were more effective than traditional ministerial organizations, which had been tried and found wanting in prior efforts to increase rice production.

A fifth approach stresses the need to *involve the community* directly in the program, by working through local organizations and reorganizing the bureaucracy so that it can work effectively with these organizations. Those adopting this approach would look for evidence that managers were "concerned not only with increase in output, but also with welfare, equity and community self-reliance." They would be interested in one particular report that describes the response to an attack by army worms in one of the regions. To deal with the attack, the provincial manager decided to organize and work through the local leadership rather than go directly to the farmers. He

> refused to distribute his limited supply of pesticides to individual farmers or to dispatch his technicians to save individual farms. He insisted instead that the mayors organize the corn farmers in their municipalities to locate the areas of infestation and to prepare the farmers to carry out a coordinated spraying operation which his technicians could supervise (de Jesus, 1983, 74).

Yet a sixth approach emphasizes the *political dimensions* of the task, the need for managers to get the support of many different resources and to gain the commitment of people throughout the system. This approach is interested in evidence that managers negotiate with different parties and try to persuade others to participate. Apparently this did occur. Paul observes that "a great deal of negotiation as well as pressure were applied on the rural banks from the highest quarters to gain their support to the program" (Paul, 1982, 42). In addition the minister of agriculture gave a classic statement of political leadership in observing that "cooperation must be gained through desire rather than command. This requires making oneself invisible and giving credit to each of the participants in the process, focusing attention on those who are successful, quietly admonishing those not doing their jobs" (Tanco, 1983, 56).

M-99 is interesting because each of the approaches points to some important aspects of the actual program. These particular approaches were chosen because they seem relevant to the functions described in Chapter 2 and also because they reflect some of the more interesting debates and emphases in the development management literature. The approaches are not necessarily in conflict, although they may be in a particular case. However, they do emphasize different parts of the framework and different strategies for dealing with the functions in the framework. The rest of this chapter discusses the value of explicating a variety of approaches and proposes a framework for studying program management that relates the five functions described in Chapter 2 with the six approaches or theories described in this chapter.

Approaches in the Management Literature

For some, distinguishing among strategies and techniques is a convenience, a pragmatic way to organize what seems like an endless variety of recommendations. Others add that observers always view the world through particular viewpoints or lenses. They inevitably work from assumptions that determine what is emphasized, what features of a situation are examined, and what values are held. In Graham Allison's words, what each "judges to be important is a function not only of the evidence about what happened but also of the 'conceptual lenses' through which he looks at the evidence" (1969, 689). Each set of lenses raises certain questions and issues and neglects others. In this case the lens filters how one views the development task and the role of managers.[3]

Although approaches may appear to be academic constructs that complicate rather than clarify issues, they enable us to cluster and compare a wide variety of proposals. When the approach that is implicit in any management strategy or technique is clearly articulated and the assumptions are spelled out, it is possible to go beyond surface characteristics of the strategy and compare it with others. For example, one analysis of the Masagana 99 program proposes that managers could be more effective if they used the information system to closely monitor provincial offices (K. Smith, 1986). Another proposes that managers should place more emphasis on organizing local communities of farmers (de Jesus, 1983). Considered alone, each of these becomes one in a long series of more or less persuasive studies. Associating a recommendation with a particular approach in the literature, however, clarifies its assumptions and provides a basis for assessing its strengths and weaknesses.

The most widely cited models in the development literature distinguish between blueprint and learning organizations or between top-down and bottom-up management.[4] Blueprint models try to identify as many contingencies as possible ahead of time, then lay out a plan to cope with them and accomplish stated goals. Managers then apply this plan, use it to monitor what is done, and apply it as a criterion against which to evaluate results. A learning model, by contrast, assumes that knowledge and hence plans can only come out of the implementation process itself. It recommends organizational procedures that enable managers to collect information in order to design experiments and then learn from these and make adjustments. The two models are based on different assumptions about the development context and about implementation processes. The blueprint strategy assumes that managers can and should preplan activities and exert control, while the learning strategy assumes that preplanning and control lead to failed or ineffective projects.

Although the contrast between these two approaches is simplistic, it does capture a pervasive condition in the Third World. In many developing countries bureaucracies continue to be steeply shaped hierarchies in which decisions and plans are prescribed in detail and management consists of carrying out the plans, exerting as much control as necessary in the process. A blueprint approach also has been reinforced by donor funding procedures insofar as they require fairly elaborate initial designs in order to satisfy funding bodies.[5] Finally, a large literature uses the dichotomy to argue that blueprints are not suited to rapidly changing and unpredictable environments and that learning approaches that emphasize trial and error and adaptation are more useful.

The problem with this dichotomy is that many reject the blueprint strategy but still do not agree on the value of any particular learning strategy. Or they argue that there are different ways to learn and that a single strategy does not describe them adequately. Furthermore, the apparent rigidity of blueprint planning does not hold in the real world where negotiation and adaptation characterize most development efforts. In any case the distinction does not capture the range of debate within the development community and easily lapses into a caricature of some important and real differences.

The description of Masagana 99 introduced six approaches: the goal-directed analysis approach, the revisionist or anarchy approach, the bureaucratic process approach, the institutional analysis approach, the social learning approach, and the political influence approach. Each is based on a description of how managers function and contains prescriptions for improving the process (see Table 3.1).[6] The approaches have been selected very pragmatically—which deal with salient problems in managing development programs? Which capture the major debates in the field? Which have been most important in influencing particular practices and interventions? Each approach deals with the management functions described earlier from a different perspective. The perspective may be based on a particular normative definition of development or on an empirical proposition about the effects of

TABLE 3.1 Approaches to Program Management

Assumptions About Managers	Prescriptions for Managers
1. *Goal Directed:* Management is an effort to achieve program goals; it emphasizes the setting of appropriate objectives and monitoring results.	*Rational Analysis:* Improve decisions by making analysis and actions more rational.
2. *Management as Anarchy:* Managers have far less ability to anticipate or control what is done than many assume. Participants have many items competing for their attention.	*Control / Flexibility.* Strengthen and broaden reactive capabilities to maximize both control and flexibility and take advantage of opportunities.
3. *Bureaucratic Process:* Managers need to coordinate members and sub-units in their organizations and establish procedures and routines to do so.	*Incentives:* Provide sanctions and incentives to members and sub-units to cooperate.
4. *Institutional Analysis:* Use analysis to propose the set of institutions suitable for carrying out a program most efficiently and responsively.	*Economic efficiency:* Develop institutions that will lower the costs of decision making and make them more responsive.
5. *Social Learning:* Management is a process in which all stakeholders have a role. Involving others elicits their assistance, gives them a power base, and reorients organizations.	*Involvement:* Organize beneficiaries and involve them directly in design and implementation.
6. *Political Interests:* Managers work in an arena of many different interests; program objectives and strategies reflect patterns of influence.	*Influence:* Use influence to mobilize support; show leadership; broker interests; persuade and educate.

interventions. In some cases the approaches take opposing positions; at other times the approaches simply emphasize different functions.

Classifications of approaches usually rely on simplified descriptions that emphasize the differences among them. The blueprint/learning dichotomy illustrates this problem of oversimplification. Proponents of the learning approach tend to lump all strategies they define as "not learning" into a single category and define it as a "blueprint" approach. Although this is a useful way to clarify differences, it obscures any variations and developments within an approach. Even a cursory review of the development literature illustrates that proponents have refined and applied the approaches in a variety of innovative and interesting ways. The descriptions of the approaches in Part 2 will try to reflect this richness by presenting each approach from the perspective of its advocates and by taking into account a number of different statements of each approach.

A Framework for Studying Program Management

The functions described in Chapter 2 can be combined with the approaches or theories identified in this chapter into a single framework or matrix (see Table 3.2). The table indicates which

TABLE 3.2 A Framework for Studying Program Management

	Theories of Management					
	Goal Directed	Anarchy	Bureaucratic Process	Institutional Analysis	Social Learning	Political Influence
Management Functions						
Contribute to development content of program design	■	■		■	■	■
Enhance the development capacity of implementing organizations	■	■	■	■	■	
Expand program resources and political support					■	■
Work with and coordinate multiple organizations and groups			■	■	■	
Exercise Leadership	■	■				■

functions are emphasized by the respective approaches. The purpose of the rest of the study is to explore how each theory or approach defines and describes these functions. To return to the metaphor used earlier, the approaches serve as conceptual maps. They determine the contours of the territory that is examined and make assumptions about which functions are most important and how they should be pursued in practice. The present chapter concludes with a brief section illustrating how management studies make implicit assumptions that influence their analysis and prescriptions. It is optional, however, and readers may move directly to Part 2.

Illustration: Implicit Assumptions in Implementation Studies

It may not be self-evident that theoretical assumptions or approaches really do make a difference in viewing management functions. This section describes a particular management study in order to illustrate that management strategies are based on specific, and usually implicit, assumptions. Although observers may describe a given activity as though its characteristics were objectively true, they inevitably emphasize certain aspects of management and not others. These emphases, in turn, can be traced back to theories about the management process.

For example, consider the literature on implementation. Its major thesis is that policy mandates usually are sidetracked by those responsible for implementing them.[7] Given that policies are easily diverted by managers pursuing their own agendas, the studies conclude that policy elites need to find more effective ways to control managers and hold them accountable to the original goals. Note the assumptions on which these recommendations are based—first, the original goals can be adequately defined prior to implementing them; and second, if managers change program goals, they are doing so because they have their own interests. Note also that the studies discount the possibility that managers may be adapting the program goals to their situation, and the studies fail to ask whether managers are justified in redefining program goals.

A recent study of implementation illustrates how important these assumptions are. The authors propose that when a policy requires managers to change how they usually do business, managers will implement the policy only if two things are true: One, does the policy include adequate resources to absorb the expenses of a new program? Two, does the policy goal define what managers should accomplish fairly precisely, or does it state vague and general purposes such as "improved health"? Based on these two variables—adequacy of resources and specificity of goals—the authors develop a typology to predict whether or not managers will implement the policy mandate. Table 3.3 predicts when managers will implement a program goal that involves new routines and activities.

In Cell A the goals are vague, giving managers an opportunity to deflect the program to fit, rather than change their ongoing routines. At the same time the resources are adequate, meaning that the program does not compete with other activities, and hence managers are able to carry out the program if they wish. The predicted result is indeterminate. Managers will implement the program if they want to—otherwise they will not. In Cell C, however, one can predict that managers are least apt to carry out the program. On the one hand, they still have discretion, but now the resources are inadequate, and the new program has to compete with other activities. The theory therefore predicts that managers will continue to pursue their existing routines and goals, rather than advocate change. In Cell B managers are most likely to carry out the program. Here they have no discretion, and they also have adequate resources. Cell D conditions create tension because managers have discretion to adjust the program but do not have any additional resources. In this situation implementation is unlikely (Montjoy and O'Toole, 1979).

Accepting this set of predictions at face value, policy makers are advised to give managers little or no discretion; instead policy makers should make the goals very specific and should give managers adequate resources. Otherwise there is little expectation

TABLE 3.3 Predictions About Program Implementation

Adequacy of Resources	Nature of Program Goal: *Vague*	*Specific*
Adequate	A (indeterminate)	B (most likely)
Inadequate	C (least likely)	D (unlikely)

Source: Adapted from Montjoy and O'Toole (1979, 466).

that the policy will be translated into a program and successfully implemented. There are other perspectives, however, that argue for giving managers considerable discretion and claim that without such discretion they will be stymied from carrying out a program. The only way to understand the tradeoffs in withholding or granting discretion is to examine the underlying assumptions in the study.

Note the assumption that managers are bound by existing organizational routines and are reluctant to change unless pushed in that direction. From this perspective one can deduce that policy makers need to apply incentives, in this case resources, to encourage managers to do what they would not do otherwise. A second assumption is that managers are primarily technicians whose role is to translate policy into programs but who have no particular role in shaping or influencing program content. These two assumptions fit those of the bureaucratic process approach, which prescribes that managers have to establish routines and provide incentives to mesh the different parts of an organization. Further, managers focus only on program goals when these do not conflict with existing organizational procedures.

The assumptions in another approach, however, lead to different predictions. Based on the social learning approach, programs that fit the conditions of Cell A are likely to be sustained because they allow managers to adapt a program to local conditions. Similarly, programs that fit into Cell C are most apt to encourage middle level managers to turn to the community for contributions and insights. By this reasoning the lack of resources presents an opportunity, rather than a constraint.

Notes

1. The case to be described here draws from the following sources: Paul (1982); Tanco (1983); de Jesus (1983); and K. Smith (1986).

2. For an interesting analysis of the way in which one particularly innovative provincial program officer (PPO) managed the program in his province, see the study of Mario Corcolon by de Jesus (1983).

3. The notion that there are different approaches to managing programs fits with recent developments in social theory. Our theories of reality are actually "social constructions" that different people and groups create based on their values and situations. One purpose of analysis is to "unmask" these constructions by showing how they are grounded in particular world views and situations. Perrow refers to this as "deconstruct-

ing society." "For a couple of centuries we have been 'constructing' a world that we view as organized on rational principles. . . . All this is now being questioned, and we are thus beginning to 'deconstruct' this construction" (C. Perrow, 1986a, 137). Another important source for this approach is the work of Thomas Kuhn, who notes that we view the world through paradigms. Paradigms reflect different empirical theories about reality and are not merely different value positions (1970). The concept of an "approach" used in this study shares some of the characteristics of Kuhn's paradigms, but is a looser collection of theories and perspectives and not a formal theory or model. Harmon and Mayer pursue an analogous approach (1986, Ch. 4).

4. There is a considerable literature based on these two models: Landau and Stout (1979); and Stout (1980) present basic theoretical models of blueprint or control and learning. Others have applied these two models to the development arena: D. Korten (1980); Honadle and VanSant (1984); Sweet and Weisel (1979); Bryant and White (1982); Moris (1981); Rondinelli (1983); and Chambers (1985, 25).

5. See Tendler (1975). In the case of USAID it is important to acknowledge that Congress demands that it set operational goals and hold host countries accountable for predesigned activities.

6. Scott questions the common emphasis on what organizations do and suggests we should ask if they are doing the right thing (1981). This study assumes that we need to do both.

7. For example, see Bardach 1977); and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) for studies based on Western experiences. Montgomery (1979a) and Ingle (1979) review implementation studies from a development perspective.

Part 2

Approaches to Managing Development Programs

The framework developed in the last chapter included a number of different theories or approaches to thinking about development management. Recall that they were identified on a largely pragmatic basis. They capture the major debates in the literature on development management and seem particularly germane to the problems and opportunities posed by managing development programs. Part 2 develops these approaches in more detail. Each of the next six chapters begins by stating the core assumptions in an approach and then indicates which of the functions it emphasizes and what kinds of questions it poses. Because some emphasize one function and some another, they are not always strictly comparable. Nor are they always mutually exclusive. Proponents of an approach could often say to those who apply another approach, "Yes, I agree what you say could be correct, but I don't think it is the most useful place to intervene."

Each chapter then discusses some of the problems associated with a given approach and goes on to describe a variety of ways in which an approach has been developed and applied in practice in order to compensate for these potential problems. The only way to understand and appreciate the approaches, in fact, is by looking at applications and by recognizing the considerable variation in the literature. For each of the approaches has become richer and more complex, taken more factors into account, and gone beyond earlier relatively one-dimensional statements. This emphasis on the elaborations and applications in each approach is an important theme of the book. The vast literature that distinguishes among approaches runs the risk of overdrawing the logical and theoretical differences among them and neglecting ways in which the approaches are being developed and often reformulated by practitioners. Robert Chambers has a similar thought in mind when he rejects the terms *paradigms* or *models* to describe different approaches. Instead he proposes using terms such as *networks* and *discourses* because they can "accommodate shifts of meaning and content" (1985, 4).

Although this strategy does justice to the richness in the approaches, it does blur the distinctions among them. Several of the theories are beginning to address similar issues, and there is often considerable overlap among them. It seems more interesting and useful to follow the approaches where practitioners are taking them, however, rather than try to maintain more consistency than exists in reality. Part 3 returns to these issues and considers what similarities there are among the approaches and defines more clearly the issues where important differences remain.

4
The Goal-Directed Analysis Approach

Assumptions and Questions About Management Functions

According to this approach the best way to understand what managers do is to look at the goals of the programs for which they are responsible. "Goals are the organizing principle around which procedures, staff responsibilities, and structures are built and the basis of much of current management practice" (Maynard-Moody, 1983, 375). Staff share common goals, and this sharing makes cooperation and teamwork possible. Those who rely on the goal-directed approach usually assume that managers are committed to goals and go on to ask how to improve a manager's ability to use analysis to translate the goals into effective implementation strategies. Managers are seen primarily as problem solvers and decision makers. To be successful they need to communicate clear goals, control information and resources, and orchestrate them to achieve goals as efficiently as possible. Managers' roles center around analyzing, translating goals into strategies, and designing organizational structures to accomplish them. The approach values expertise and professionalism and looks for ways to improve managers' decision making and analytic skills and enhance their ability to be as rational as possible.[1]

Although this emphasis on rational analysis continues to cast a large shadow in any discussion of development management, there is one major qualification to the approach that has been very influential. According to Herbert Simon, managers have "bounded rationality." This means that instead of making optimal choices, they have a limited ability to process information and can deal with only a small number of options. As a result, managers consider only the more likely alternatives and determine which one at least is satisfactory. From this Simon derives a word for decision making under these conditions—satisficing, which is "the difference between searching a haystack to find the sharpest needle in it and searching a haystack to find a needle sharp enough to sew with" (March and Simon, 1958, 141).

Through this important concept Simon shifts the emphasis away from skills of individual managers to organizational structures for handling information (1947; March and Simon, 1958). Bounded rationality does not require forsaking rationality. Instead, because managers cannot handle sufficient information to make optimal choices on their own, it is necessary to design the organization to improve the rationality of decision making. Typically this is done by giving managers the authority to set limits on the agenda and establish rules to control the factors members take into account.[2] Simon argues that such constraints can be very positive.

> All the evidence from the fine arts suggests that unlimited freedom is not the best condition for human creativity. The Gothic cathedrals were created not out of unlimited freedom, but out of the stern physical constraints imposed by gravity acting upon masonry walls, and the equally severe social constraints of the Catholic liturgy. Man creates best when he operates in an environment whose constraints are commensurate with the capacities of his bounded rationality. More constraints restrict his creativity, less throws him into confusion and frustration (1973b, 350).

Balance is achieved when managers orchestrate the parts of an organization and define their roles so that the organization can achieve goals most efficiently.[3]

The goal-directed analysis approach is immediately and clearly relevant to development programs because of its concern for how goals shape what managers do.[4] It emphasizes three of the management functions: contribute to development content of program design, enhance the development capacity of implementing organizations, and exercise leadership. The following paragraphs suggest typical questions the approach raises relevant to each of these functions.

To understand how managers contribute to the development content of programs, the approach looks for ways in which managers contribute to shaping program goals. It asks whether managers support the goals and have opportunities for influencing their design. Do managers share the views of policy elites, or is there conflict among them? Do managers possess information that policy elites need in setting goals? How general are the goals, and how much autonomy do the managers have in reshaping them? What kinds of information do managers need to improve program definition? Have managers translated goals into the kinds of objectives that can be used to measure performance and hold others accountable?

To learn if managers enhance the development capacity of implementing organizations, the approach examines the procedures managers adopt to carry out analysis. Who do they include in decisions? Are they able to integrate analysis and decision making into the implementation process? Have managers established mechanisms to learn from experiences and to make changes as the program proceeds? Are managers able to take different situations into account in their planning? Have managers developed an information system that monitors performance, reports the information in a timely manner, and then uses it to propose changes in the program?

To determine if managers exercise leadership, the approach asks what opportunities managers have to mobilize staff and beneficiaries around program goals. Do managers have occasion to develop and share a commitment to goals and ideas and persuade others of their merits?

Problems in Applying the Goal-Directed Approach

There are three characteristics of management in the Third World context that affect how this approach has often been applied in practice. First, analysis is usually interpreted in very technocratic terms; second, development goals are typically complex, multidimensional issues that do not lend themselves to technocratic analysis; and third, the analysis is often carried out as a separate activity rather than as an integral part of the total management process.

Analysis in most Third World situations is heavily influenced by the norms and culture associated with economics and technocratic solutions. Economists constitute a large bulk of the professional staff, and development traditionally has been defined in economic and technocratic terms. Because they emphasize the role of experts and professional analysts, such rational models of analysis can impede dialogue and debate among staff and different groups. "Professional social inquiry" usually overstates the value of expertise and makes the conclusions sound more authoritative and final than the data warrant.[5]

An emphasis on technocratic norms also means that governing elites ignore alternative kinds of analysis that would be more useful. A recent study notes that because implementation in most Third World nations is very problematic, it would be most useful for evaluations to explore implementation problems. Unfortunately this is precisely the kind of study Third World leaders usually do not want and may not permit. They much prefer traditional cost-benefit studies, precisely because they are much less threatening than process studies, which describe why programs succeed or fail.

> Economic analysis fits the prescription authoritarian regimes prefer very well, as it takes emphasis away from how the policy was made, how it was implemented and the target group's reaction to it. Evaluation that takes into account why policies succeed or fail is not wanted, and if conducted is likely to be suppressed within the country (T. Smith, 1985, 139).

A second and related problem associated with the practice of analysis is that most development programs deal with very complex and multidimensional issues. They are what analysts often call "unstructured" problems for which structured techniques may be irrelevant.[6] Relatively narrow economic techniques are applied not only to specific project analyses where they can be very useful, but also to these complex policy choices. Application of these techniques inevitably ignores many important social considerations (Johnston and Clark, 1982, 230f).

A third general problem that makes analysis problematic is structural. Analysis seldom is integrated into or directs program implementation in spite of a broad consensus that planning and implementation need to be integrated.[7] An agency typically is organized along functional lines, and planning is done centrally at the agency level, thus making it difficult to integrate research and planning with operational program decisions. A recent study of plans to reform the bureaucracy in three Latin American countries finds that plans were usually made by centralized planning units that were isolated from substantive program units. Although this approach encouraged comprehensiveness, the actual plans ended up as "disembodied reforms with no base in the complaints and suggestions of clients, administrators, or political leaders" (Hammergren, 1983, 181). Just as plans need to be integrated with actual problems, they also need to take into account the realities of implementation and the capacity of organizations to carry out the plans. Again, a failure to integrate analysis into the overall management process makes this less likely.

Fourth, managers are not necessarily directed by goals as the approach tends to assume. Goals can direct managers in two ways. In one, managers are held accountable to goals by external political controls. In the other, managers are motivated to accomplish goals, either because of professionalism or the compelling nature of the goals. Both of these mechanisms, however, work poorly in many Third World contexts. Weak political institutions offer little effective oversight. In the West managers may identify with goals because their professional careers depend on how well they perform. In Africa, however, according to Leonard, "this artificial link between organization goals and a senior manager's career rarely exists. Therefore, to a much greater extent than is true in the West, commitment must be internally generated by the manager" (1986, 9).[8]

Partly because of these realities, the goal-directed analytic approach has many critics. In general they charge that it produces the well-known and discredited long range plans and blueprints. By definition, these ignore many social and organizational realities but once formulated are difficult to alter or adapt. The approach has been described as the "machine theory of implementation" in which goals automatically drive implementation.[9] Plans produced by this approach do not take into account complex problems or allow for changing conditions. Such plans fail to acknowledge that "many—perhaps most—constraints remain hidden in the planning stage. . . . Feasibility conditions keep changing over time: old constraints disappear or are overcome . . . while new ones emerge" (Majone and Wildavsky, 1978, 106).

By and large the critics do not conclude that analysis should be abandoned. Rather they recommend supplementing economic models with several different approaches to analysis.[10] The charges also suggest that analysis should be designed to encourage learning and debate and that analysis needs to be integrated into ongoing management practices. The remainder of this chapter describes a number of developments within this approach that move analysis precisely in these directions. These developments place a high premium on using analysis to establish priorities and outline needed changes, while trying to avoid many of the limitations of a blueprint approach. Insofar as overly prescribed plans and blueprints fit the needs of political elites these variations may not be used, but some managers have found opportunities to adapt and apply them. They are organized around the following topics: systems analysis; translating goals into objectives; useful and collaborative analysis; integrated management and organization learning; results-oriented management; flexible data-gathering and analytic techniques; participatory and inclusive data gathering; strategic planning and management; and performance management.

Systems Analysis

One of the more widely used analytic techniques, and one that stresses rationality, is to think of a development program as a system of many interdependent parts. Systems analysis is a strategy for taking these different elements into account and at the same time bringing some structure into the analysis so that it is consistent with bounded rationality and is not too overwhelming. Consider an extension program to increase cotton production.[11] Managers need to rely on field staff to get information and supplies to farmers; improve the planning capacity of the headquarters unit and its relations to field staff; find out from clients what problems they confront and what resources they have; and understand the crop and related technological problems. Focusing on any one of these aspects to the exclusion of others would ignore important elements.

A systems approach thinks of organizations "as problem-solving 'systems'—functionally integrated collections of parts that are capable of concerted action around a common purpose" (Elmore, 1978, 191–192). Managers coordinate the system by assigning tasks to sub-units and holding them accountable for accomplishing their part of the overall task. Managers exercise control by providing feedback about results, thus allowing the sub-units to pursue their goals as long as they are able to adapt them. Thus coordination does not necessarily require highly centralized decision making but can allow for a certain amount of flexibility.[12]

The following example illustrates these several characteristics of systems analysis—the interdependence of different elements in a manager's situation; the role of different sub-units; the need to oversee and coordinate the parts; and the importance of feedback and adaptation. Kulp, an enthusiastic advocate of systems analysis for rural development programs, describes what is unique about a systems approach. This approach

> differs from what we might call the traditional, common-sense approach to decision making. The common-sense approach tells us to plunge right into the problem, get at the heart of the matter, and come up with an answer. For most day-to-day decisions this is obviously the right approach. The Systems Approach, by contrast, says, "Whoa there! Step back a ways. Don't hack at any trees until you are sure you can see the entire forest." The Systems Approach requires that you start with an elaborate rigorous exercise in definition, in abstraction. It requires one to approach a problem with a highly formal sort of intellectual war-dance, closing in on the problem slowly with decreasing concentric circles of analysis (n.d., 9).[13]

Kulp continues that the core of systems thinking is good planning. Managers need to clarify the logic behind their decisions and be certain they have the data they need for making decisions. If careful planning is done at top management levels, then lower level staff can make operational decisions, or what Kulp calls "coping decisions," and relieve top managers. In developing countries one is constantly struck by the flood of coping decisions that take up most of the time of top administrators. Well-defined policy enables planning and coping to take place as far down the pyramid of the social subsystem as possible, where middle and lower echelon managers in much larger numbers have much more total time available (n.d., 17).

In Kulp's version systems thinking helps managers cope with complexity. At the same time he discourages participation and involvement because they can waste management talents.[14] Kulp is particularly interested in finding ways to make managers more efficient by cutting down on the meetings they need to attend, by delegating decisions to the appropriate levels, and by making paper work and reporting concise and regularized. Planning should be broken down into a "series of steps that keeps participation to a minimum" (n.d., 18). Several studies attest that standardization can facilitate the work of managers who oversee a variety of field situations. Mohapatra, in reviewing problems in implementing family planning programs in the Third World, notes that standardization was very helpful in providing a direction for local field efforts and for monitoring what field staff were doing (1977).

Others find that in the Third World context systems theory, with its stress on modeling multidimensions of a problem, can be unduly complex. Such models also often fail to lay out their assumptions carefully, thereby making it difficult to examine whether or not they are accurate. According to Johnston and Clark this oversight can impede learning from experiences (1982, 232).

Several Third World practitioners have adopted a similar technique, operations research. Operations research assumes that problems can be translated into systems terms, but it focuses in detail on one aspect of the system. Instead of describing the entire system, operations research proposes ways to intervene in order to achieve a specific objective (Blumenfeld, 1985). Like systems theory, operations research distinguishes among inputs to a decision or activity, outputs or results, and feedback into future designs. This approach specifically concentrates on the operations that managers can use to accomplish their objectives. In this sense it is a modeling technique to identify the major variables and the relationships among them and to propose ways to intervene and accomplish objectives.

The strategy has been used as a tool to help managers involve community organizations in health programs. First it asks what the major problems are that managers have to deal with in working with community organizations. A typical question would examine the relationship between the roles of a community organization and the incentives needed to get the organization involved. Then the approach proceeds to model the relationship of community groups to a health system and ends by proposing ways in which program managers can intervene to make them more effective (Goldsmith et al., 1985). In many respects, this approach overlaps "strategic management" approaches (which are described later in the chapter).

Translating Goals into Objectives

Virtually all analytic approaches attempt to translate broad goals into measurable objectives because relatively precise objectives make it easier for managers to control organizations and staff. First, objectives can serve as guides to middle level managers. The concept of guidance emphasizes that managers are "goal *directed,* and not merely goal-*oriented,* since it is the deviations from the goal-state itself that direct the behavior of the system rather than some predetermined internal mechanism that aims blindly."[15] Specific objectives ensure that everyone in the organization will have a common focus, allowing officials to demonstrate what they have accomplished.[16] Specific objectives also encourage implementation by offering criteria for evaluating activities and for determining their cost effectiveness (Rutman, 1977).[17]

A variety of experiences testify to the value of being precise about objectives. In her study of administration in Latin America, Hammergren offers several examples in which managers were able to break complex goals into accomplishable steps and use these to institute change (1983, 178). A recent World Bank review of family planning programs emphasizes the value in establishing measures that can be used for monitoring and evaluation and illustrates how managers can maintain goals and objectives at several levels of specificity.

> All family planning programs involve a hierarchy of objectives, conveniently grouped into three classes—*ultimate, intermediate,* and *program-execution* objectives. The most common ultimate objective is the reduction of fertility, although improved maternal and child health, and the spread of fertility-control as a basic human right, are others. Intermediate objectives refer to the accomplishment of attitudinal and behavioral changes needed to realize ultimate objectives—for example, spreading knowledge of fertility-control possibilities through films, radio, or schools, or the acceptance and use of family planning services by the public. Program-execution objectives refer to the performance of the specific activities carried out in pursuit of the intermediate goals. The mobilization of resources (staff, buildings, vehicles, films, supplies, funds, etc.) and the actual provision of services or the showing of films would be examples—the first called "program input" objectives, the latter "program output" objectives (Mohapatra, 1977, iii).

Specific goals also can reduce expectations and demands on managers, demands that would otherwise greatly overload the capacity of an organization. A case study of the implementation of a vaguely stated program to increase cooperatives in Zambia concluded that

> agencies with multiple, ambiguous and measurable goals find it difficult to develop technically rational solutions to the problems of implementation. They have no logical way of setting priorities or organizing routines, since *any* activity can be justified in terms

> of *some* goal. This paralysis of rational planning inhibits the agency from taking decisive or effective action on its own (Quick, 1980, 57).

Although precise objectives have clear benefits, some observers find that retaining broad goals can be very positive. For example, goals can play a catalytic and motivating role. These observers are more interested in how people respond to goals and become committed to them and less interested in how goals can be used to control staff or to evaluate activities. Research shows that in cases where members have strong commitments to program goals, the program will be much more effective than those where such commitments do not exist (Peters and Waterman, 1982). From this perspective, specific objectives are less important than the power and legitimacy of the goals themselves. When goals are meant to serve as motivators, there may be advantages in retaining some broad definitions of the goals rather than narrower operational objectives.

Strong commitment to goals, particularly to their ethical content, is often cited as one of the comparative advantages private voluntary organizations (PVOs) have in promoting development activities (Tendler, 1982). Evaluations of a number of PVO development efforts document that PVOs, such as church and humanitarian organizations, have invested considerable effort in infusing affiliates in the Third World with a commitment to development goals (White, 1986b). These experiences suggest managers need to appreciate that broader goals can serve as motivators and may need to supplement narrow objectives used for evaluation and control.[18]

Based primarily on his experiences in Africa, Leonard emphasizes the importance of commitment to goals and yet notes that it is frequently lacking in Third World situations. He urges that training programs, conferences, and workshops pay special attention to professional values and explore ways to reinforce them. Unfortunately, he observes, donors very often are distrustful of value commitments by indigenous leaders and try to neutralize them.

> There are times, however, when it would be beneficial to swim with the current of indigenous morality. For example, a geographically focused project is likely to get far better leadership from a local official than from an "objective" outsider. In any case, one cannot treat managers as interchangeable on this commitment dimension. An officer with this scarce commodity probably will perform far better than another who is more able and technically better qualified but who lacks this moral commitment (Leonard, 1986, 66–67).

Useful and Collaborative Analysis

Systems analysis and operational indicators of goals continue to be applied widely, but the general trend within the goal-directed approach is to select analytic procedures according to how appropriate and pragmatically useful they are in accomplishing particular goals, rather than according to methodological rigor. A recent management study distinguishes among three kinds of decision problems, moving from specific to more general. Most specific are the operational tasks that typically involve definable and specific objectives and are commonly referred to as well-structured decisions. In these cases quantitative or generic systems models may be most useful. Examples include personnel assignments, decisions about supplies, establishing routine maintenance, and locating facilities. A second cluster, middle level decisions, anticipates program needs in the immediate future. These decisions have to deal with conflicting objectives, with changes in technology and resources, and with uncertain demands. It is usually impossible to use specific systems models in such cases. Finally, there are longer range planning decisions about goals, where a great deal more uncertainty exists and where managers have to find ways to model alternative views of the future. The point of the distinction is that different analytic techniques need to be used for each level of decision making (Kraemer and Perry, 1983).

In order to ensure that analysis is appropriate to the problems being addressed, users may have to collaborate in designing techniques. User involvement, in fact, may be as important as the objectivity and rigor of the techniques. Thus the approach has moved from an emphasis on purity and rigor toward appropriateness, a need for collaboration, and an appreciation for the value of involving people in using and applying the techniques. As described in a number of works by Patton, "utilization-focused" analysis increases the chances that the analysis will be both relevant and used. If people are consulted and included in designing an evaluation, they will be more apt to take the information seriously.[19] Analysts who adopt this approach do more than collect useful information, they also help managers conceptualize their programs, brainstorm about alternative strategies, and reflect on ways to improve implementation.

Note that utilization has a much richer meaning than simply applying information about results in an instrumental fashion. Managers may not "use" the results in the sense of applying specific recommendations, but may still find the process helps them to conceptualize what they are doing. As an example, Patton describes how evaluation can help managers rethink a needs-based approach to development. Traditional needs assessment ignores client strengths, and Patton suggests that an evaluation consultation could help managers explore the assets clients bring as well as the needs they have. The same balance can be applied to program evaluation. Evaluation reports tend to focus on program deficiencies, things that need to be changed or improved, and areas in which a program is weak. But programs also need to be told what they have going for them, strengths upon which they can build, and assets they can use for program improvement (1981b, 79–81).

A recent experience by the World Bank in Kenya describes a particularly successful example of collaborative research. Faced with inadequate information from the government of Kenya to design an integrated agricultural development system, World Bank and Kenyan officials worked together to improve the budget and financial information processes. As described in a recent review the results have been very positive.

> The result was a Bank-funded program for assistance and training that has become a model for making progress in financial and budgetary reform. . . . Without government cooperation focused on how the system worked, it is likely the Bank's recommendations would have been ill-suited to the budget realities and would either have been ignored or have been disruptive of the operation of the Ministry (Cohen et al., 1985, 1222).

There are a number of ways in which analysis can assist in clarifying goals and designing strategies to meet them. It can provide basic knowledge about relationships among variables or offer answers to specific problems. It can be part of an interactive search among a number of people and can provide political support for certain positions. Just by being carried out, research can legitimize certain activities (C. Weiss, 1979). It can serve political uses by narrowing conflict or reducing its scope (Springer, 1985). This emphasis on the multiple uses of analysis is important because it is tempting to judge analysis by how well it marshals concrete data and to ignore that its worth also derives from its ability to clarify assumptions and define working concepts.

Practices associated with appropriate and collaborative analysis suggest that when program managers are overseeing a system of activities carried out by field units, they need to discover how their units can be most useful. Program managers may find they need to help the other units do priority setting and planning, rather than design specific projects for them. By following this reasoning program managers would adopt a "trade association" role in which they provided backup services to units, instead of becoming involved in the details of what happens on site.

The importance of field support by the central program unit is especially critical when local units are spread out geographically because they are often located in remote regions where communication and transportation may be very uneven. At the very least program managers need to provide logistical supports to ensure that resources are available when needed. In most cases managers will also need to provide technical assistance and training to build the capacity of the local unit. The key is to design the system around actual data needs and integrate it with the local planning process.

For example, consider how managers might think about information and financial support systems from a utilization and collaborative perspective. According to this approach information systems should be designed around actual data needs and integrated with the planning process. These needs may differ according to program level. For example, an evaluation of a rural development program in Niger notes that the program agency needed information on farmer preferences, such as what technology farmers preferred and why they continued to prefer ox-drawn carts. At the local level, however, the organizations in charge of handling credit simply needed records of who borrowed how much and when and if it was repaid. In this particular case the program agency had set up a data collection system in the local communities that was far too complicated for their needs or their capacities (Painter et al., 1985).[20]

When program units emphasize ways to service other units their data systems usually need to be upgraded. First, the central program unit needs regular reports on supplies so it can plan distribution and schedule deliveries. Second, because program managers usually want local units to look at the results of their activities and not merely keep track of what they have done, the managers will need to assist local units to collect information about outcomes. Third, because they work with other units, the program units need to collect information that is comparable and can be shared.

Integrated Management and Organization Learning

The emphasis on utilization is closely related to another emphasis in recent studies of analysis. To be appropriate and useful, procedures for planning or goal setting need to be integrated into the full management process so that learning can occur. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 1, the possibility of such integration is often cited as an advantage of approaching development from the program rather than the project level. Integrated management emphasizes procedures for collecting and reporting information, and one could even argue that rationality is more a function of these procedures than a characteristic of the substance of the decisions (Springer, 1985, 484, 486). The overall purpose is to integrate analysis, planning, implementation, and evaluation; overcome the frequent separation of analysis and implementation; and incorporate information about results into the management process and even to drive implementation.[21]

Before reviewing some of the specific strategies for promoting integrated learning, it is useful to distinguish between learning and adaptation. Earlier systems models assumed that organizations would automatically adapt to information from the environment in order to maintain themselves. More recent writings, however, note that learning is more involved than these adaptive responses. Learning, in this view, has two dimensions, neither of which is necessarily true of adaptation. First, in addition to changed behavior, there has to be some consciousness or awareness of what changes are being made and why. Compare the following definitions:

> *Learning:* The development of insights, knowledge, and associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions.
> *Adaptation:* The ability to make incremental adjustments as a result of environmental changes, goal structure changes, or other changes (Fiol and Lyles, 1985, 811).[22]

Clearly, the first involves more awareness and knowledge and goes beyond adjustments to new pressures.

Second, learning refers to more than increases in knowledge by individual managers and involves the norms in the organization. "Members come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations' memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time" (Hedberg, 1981, 6). Procedures that involve this "higher level" learning encourage managers and staff to gain a new understanding of their activities. They not only examine the routines and activities in the organization, but also reflect on the norms and style of the organization and how members understand their role.

> Higher-level learning aims at adjusting overall rules and norms rather than specific activities or behaviors (and has) long term effects and impacts on the organization as a whole. This type of learning occurs through the use of heuristics, skill development, and insights. It therefore is a more cognitive process than is lower-level learning, which often is the result of repetitive behavior (Fiol and Lyles, 1985, 808).[23]

Results-Oriented Management

Given that learning, as described previously, involves consciously acquiring new information at the organizational level, it requires procedures for integrating feedback and information into the implementation process. This is often referred to as results-oriented management, which monitors activities on an ongoing basis and incorporates evaluation into the implementation process. As described by Wholey, results-oriented management overlaps other techniques described in this chapter, with its stress on specific and measurable objectives, appropriate evaluation, and organizational procedures for collecting and reporting information.[24] Like these other strategies, results-oriented management adapts analysis to the realities of the management process and is open and flexible rather than constrained by formal, prescribed methodologies.

According to Wholey many evaluations are not used, not necessarily because they are poorly done, but because the information they provide is not useful.[25] Utility depends on having information systems designed around goals and objectives that provide information in a timely manner and are applicable to actual decisions. He recommends beginning by determining if an activity has even been carried out. An evaluation may document that results were not achieved, when the real problem is that the program was never implemented in the first place.[26] In some cases a quick, preliminary evaluation is appropriate, while in others a more elaborate information system is needed. Throughout, evaluators need to actively help managers define objectives and information needs and learn to report the information so that it can be applied to actual decisions. Moreover, the indicators or measures of effective management should deal with factors over which managers have some control. Timeliness, accessibility, and usability of the information are all more important than methodological precision and should drive the process of collecting and reporting information on results.[27]

Flexible Data Gathering and Analytic Techniques

To be useful and to promote learning, techniques for gathering and analyzing data should be flexible and tailored to the particular situation. One example is the variety of techniques associated with "rapid rural appraisal" strategies (Honadle, 1982b). Often program performance can be analyzed using proxy measures of results, rather than ones that rely on statistical precision. If the proxy measures tell managers what they need to know, then more time consuming approaches may waste resources and provide little additional information.

An effort to establish a relatively simple data reporting scheme in Niger illustrates some of the dilemmas involved in determining what level of simplicity is appropriate. A group associated with a rural development project in that country proposed that project managers could rely on available data about the community rather than invest in large-scale surveys. Because there was very little variance among the farms the group argued that a profile of the average farm would be sufficient. These analysts also proposed a proxy measure of seasonal migration—money orders received at the local post office, on the assumption that migrants would send money back to their villages. The analysts recognized that by basing their data system on information about the average farm, they would be overlooking a few innovative and highly productive farms. As a result they made a special effort to include high performers in the research. Project officials, however, did not adopt the proposed system on the grounds that it was too simple for the complex situation. Those who designed the system continued to maintain that "managers were overloaded with more data than they could effectively use" and that the proposed system "provided them with the information they needed to successfully manage the project" (Wentling, 1983, 125).

A technique developed by the Development Project Management Center offers another example of an approach to data gathering that emphasizes utilization of analysis and involvement by those who will be using it. This technique proposes a relatively structured process for collecting information whose purpose is to produce a report of a management activity that describes what was done in a particular case and analyzes its implications. The reports range from specific case studies to more structured analyses, according to what is appropriate and feasible. An outside consultant works closely with those involved in the activity in order to gain more intimate understanding of what occurred. The consultant tells the story of the activity by interviewing participants about a series of "critical events" and then derives propositions from these accounts. Once a number of cases are completed, the propositions can be compared. In this way they can provide a basis for drawing more general conclusions or "lessons" about the ingredients of successful management. Such a lesson can then be compared and tested in other settings. By looking at specific cases from a comparative perspective the technique addresses both the particular information needs of managers and a broader policy interest (Kettering and Sensenig, 1986b; see also 1986a).

Participatory and Inclusive Data Gathering

Inclusiveness is another development in the goal-directed approach, and like the others it takes a pragmatic approach to expertise. Instead of deferring to professional judgment, inclusive data gathering acknowledges that experts often have a limited perspective and other points of view need to be taken into account. Traditional approaches to analysis allow those with more expertise and influence to dominate decisions; new ideas are not discussed, and apparent group consensus often will mask what is really a narrow "groupthink." Political processes do not help, according to this approach, because they only reflect the ideas of those with most influence and thus are not suitable for raising alternative perspectives or soliciting additional information.[28] Moreover, interest group influence is usually viewed as highly irregular and illegitimate (Grindle, 1980, 17).

By this reasoning, managers need to incorporate a broader range of viewpoints into defining the nature of problems and program goals. One purpose is to improve the definition of the goals themselves and ensure that alternative definitions of a program are considered. Another is to ensure that relevant parties have an investment in the decision. In the political influence approach to be discussed in a later chapter, managers can include different interests by brokering among them. The goal-directed approach, however, is quite different. It proposes a number of structured techniques for incorporating more views into program decision making. The techniques elicit ideas and suggestions from relevant interests and aggregate them into some choice or set of priorities.[29] The techniques encourage managers to look at problems in new ways, validate intuitive judgments, and stimulate lateral thinking as a supplement to traditional means/ends vertical thinking.[30]

Advocates claim that such structured techniques enable groups to produce a more diverse and innovative set of alternatives than they otherwise would and that it prevents them from becoming over-routinized. These techniques encourage interaction but keep groups from becoming unduly conformist or conflict ridden. There are problems, however. Because ideas are included whether people have an investment in them or not, this method does not register how strongly people feel. Nor do people engage each other and debate or explore the ideas. A recent study raises an important caveat. It questions whether participants will feel that a decision arrived at through this process has the same legitimacy as one in which they were able to interact and register how intensely they felt about an issue (Mahler, 1987). In spite of these problems, aggregative techniques remain one of the more imaginative methods for increasing the range of alternatives that managers can include in analysis.

Another method, a "problem structuring approach" developed by Mitroff and his associates, not only collects different views, but enables a decision-making group to deal with conflicting views. Managers especially need to incorporate views that are strongly opposed to how they normally proceed. Otherwise managers will continue to do "business as usual." Because discussions about programs often deal with surface issues, everyone needs to surface their underlying assumptions. Staff should also be assigned to represent the views of those not part of the decision-making process. Once these steps are taken, the decision-making group examines and compares the opposing views (Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979, 5).[31]

Consider how the method applies to a maintenance program for an irrigation system. Managers would identify all those with an interest in the program, referred to as stakeholders, and ask what assumptions each would make about the feasibility of a maintenance program and about the conditions under which beneficiaries would contribute to the maintenance. Once these assumptions are laid out, the next step is to consider their opposites. Then a discussion is held comparing and reflecting on the various assumptions. Only after some agreement is reached at this level, do managers design the maintenance program.

Strategic Planning and Management

Another amplification of the goal-directed approach is found in a cluster of practices associated with strategic planning and management. These practices try to retain the purposiveness and future orientation associated with long-range planning while compensating for its evident weaknesses. Long-range planning has a long and uneven career in Third World nations, but in general it has fallen victim to the realities of bounded rationality and the limited capacity of managers to formulate and carry out comprehensive plans. Yet there is a forward looking and focusing thrust in planning activities that can be very valuable, as seen in the following description of planning in an integrated rural development program in Indonesia.

> Plans are not road maps because the territory is the future and it has not been surveyed yet. Plans are guides made as logically and intelligently as possible based on information at hand. They make it possible to evaluate progress and they give direction and consistency to programs, so that they at least move in the direction of their aims. When the scientists using the most sophisticated computer technology fired the rockets to the moon, they still had to make mid-course corrections to put them on target. We too have to make mid-course corrections. Without a plan, without indicators, it is difficult to ascertain whether one should make adjustments.[32]

In addition to retaining this purposive thrust, strategically oriented techniques typically emphasize both collaboration and utilization.

The concept of strategy is often left very vague. "There are strategies, and there are strategies—big and little, broad and narrow—and a precise, universally acceptable definition is not available" (Eadie and Steinbacher, 1985, 448). The thrust of thinking strategically, however, is captured in the following observations by one of the top level managers of the Masagana program.

> The effective development manager must be able to cut through this buzzing, blooming confusion which is the entire process of development, separating out what is critical from that which is not and concentrate his efforts—and God help him if he is wrong. Even if you have an abundance of resources, which is seldom the case in a developing country, you can pour them right down the drain if you attempt to spend them on too many things at the same time. Such selective emphasis, however, . . . requires a results orientation as against the emphasis on procedures which characterizes most government bureaucracies (Tanco, 1983, 58).

Traditional long-range planning typically extends the annual planning process and forecasts current activities into the future (Eadie and Steinbacher, 1983, 449). By contrast, strategic planning attempts to consciously learn about the environment and looks for opportunities to change organizations. It has three key elements. One is to establish measurable objectives and priorities in distinction to the broad goals associated with long-range planning efforts. A second is to make planning more flexible and responsive to changes in the environment. A third is to look to the future and promote change rather than merely improve productivity.

Proponents try to provide some structure to the approach. The following list of steps was drawn from several descriptions:

- Understand relevant aspects of the environment, relying on a variety of scanning techniques.
- Do an audit of the organization's strengths and weaknesses in light of possible strategies.
- Determine the distribution of authority and influence among different sub-units in the organization.
- Set targets on the basis of the above steps, looking for opportunities to provide new services.
- Design strategies for reaching the targets, taking implementation into account. Be as precise as possible about responsibilities, deadlines, and resources. This attention to implementation is as important as formulating the strategies themselves.
- Take human factors into account, such as human judgments and different perceptions and values.
- Allocate necessary resources.
- Establish procedures to monitor and control outcomes.[33]

As in the other developments described in this chapter, organizational learning is more than simple adaptation. Setting targets is a particularly critical step because "without targets, the only standard of current performance is past performance" (Mohapatra, 1977, iii). There are three kinds of targets: targets of inputs or resources, targets of activities to be carried out, and targets of results to be achieved. By specifying these ahead of time, managers can try to go beyond incremental adjustments to their present practices and come up with specific ways to determine how well they are doing. Based on a study of family planning programs, Mohapatra adds a note of realism when he observes that available resources do not always match targeted results and that managers often adjust output targets downward to reflect targeted resources (1977).[34]

Performance Management

Strategic management has been applied to the Third World setting by a group of development practitioners in the United States located in the Development Project Management Center (DPMC).[35] Their particular contribution has been to wed strategic thinking to an emphasis on how a unit performs and a belief that those who implement an activity should be involved in planning it. The approach combines a number of emphases described throughout the chapter—the need for clear objectives, the value of collaboration, and attention to performance. DPMC staff also have used the technique to improve the capacity of organizations, and not simply to develop better strategies.

The central hypothesis of this technique is that managers can increase capacity by successfully performing some task—in other words, that they learn by doing. For example, instead of stressing analytic and planning techniques in and of themselves, the theory emphasizes that work teams can be used to involve members directly in the planning process and claims that this will both improve the analysis and gain the commitment of participants. Whereas results-oriented planning tends to assume that information systems in and of themselves will encourage good management, this approach assumes that knowledge and information are not enough, that involvement and interaction are essential factors in bringing about change.

Even though proponents argue that there is no set of techniques all managers and organizations should follow, there are functions all organizations need to carry out in order to improve program performance: develop clear objectives; gain consensus among members on strategies; get agreement on the roles of all members and units; and set up procedures for getting feedback and for adapting to the information (Solomon et al., 1981; Solomon, 1984). Although many of these steps sound similar to practices described earlier, the performance management system places particular emphasis on working with organization members so that they design the practices themselves, rather than following prescribed recipes for change. Improvements "must be carried out in ways that create members' support for and valuing of the changes introduced. Otherwise these changes will not be sustained" (Brinkerhoff, 1985b, 5).

In order to create such support, the approach relies on a technique called "action training" to bring about change in and enable members to carry out the functions listed in the last paragraph. Instead of offering courses in generic management skills or introducing new technology, trainers or consultants work directly with organization members and provide training in the course of working through job-related problems. Organization members, faced with a common problem or task, come together in work teams or task groups. As teams they establish work plans and budgets and mutually agree on their respective responsibilities. This team process accomplishes two other things. It integrates the various facets of the management process by fusing doing and learning, and it brings together people at various levels of the organization around common tasks.

Proponents particularly encourage team members to develop the kinds of skills that enable them to relate openly with each other, to communicate effectively, to develop trust, and to work creatively as a team. This creates an "energetic group of people who are committed to achieving common objectives, work well together, make relatively full use of their resources, enjoy doing so and produce high quality results" (Solomon, 1984, 2).

In addition to relying on task forces or work groups to design strategies, DPMC conceptualizes management as an integrated and collaborative approach. For example, consider how the approach has been applied to financial accounting practices in the Sahel. Traditional financial accounting monitors funds and describes the flow of program resources. Managers need to go beyond this, however, to improve program performance. They need to develop techniques for what the study calls "management accounting," a technique for linking the flow of resources with program objectives (Kettering and Lusby, 1985). Whereas financial accounting would record that a certain amount of money was spent on trucks, management accounting would indicate whether the trucks were instrumental in meeting the objectives of the program. It is thus a way of integrating the monitoring of finances with the broader decision-making process and recalls the earlier discussion of integrated management.

In reflecting on the application of the approach in Haiti, Brinkerhoff notes that top level support may be essential if the strategy is going to significantly improve performance. When such support is lacking, managers may need to be satisfied with incremental adjustments, rather than strategically induced change. In the case of Haiti, a "performance management strategy" was designed to change the evaluation unit of the Ministry of Planning. In one sense the approach was successful because it helped the unit redefine its role, from policing other units to collaborating with them. This was a particularly positive change because the evaluators were generally resented, and the only way they could have any effect was to adopt a collaborative approach. In another sense the approach was not successful because improvements were very modest and failed to introduce significant change. Brinkerhoff concludes from the experience that real change will only occur when there are certain conditions in place, such as a reasonably supportive political environment. When these are not present, it is necessary to make tradeoffs between feasible but minor adjustments and more radical but less likely improvements (1985b). In a subsequent study he adds that because the approach is based on achieving consensus and relies on teamwork, it has a built-in tendency to emphasize incremental, rather than radical change (1986).

The Goal-Directed Approach and Program Management Functions

In light of the amplifications described in this chapter, it is clear that those working within a goal-directed approach to program management have developed what was often a very top down and control-oriented approach into one that is far more flexible and adaptive. Their main concern is to use analytic techniques that are appropriate to the situation. Proponents also are looking for ways to incorporate a broader range of opinions and perspectives and to propose a variety of group practices designed to capture additional information. Proponents are more aware of the human dimensions of the organization and are concerned with finding ways to involve members and to gain their support. Although the approach is very valuable in stressing that values and commitments to goals can play an important role in implementing development programs, limited attention has been given to ways to develop and reinforce commitment to development goals. Those who are concerned with this issue usually assume that if managers and staff are included in defining goals and objectives, those included will have an investment in them. There is less emphasis on dealing with the normative or substantive content of the goals and exploring how these can generate commitment.

Table 4.1 summarizes the strategies associated with the goal-directed approach; the next sections review the implications of these strategies for the three elements in the framework emphasized by this approach.

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

The approach emphasizes the importance of program content, of goals and ideas, and is thus an important corrective to approaches that rely primarily on process. Perhaps the most relevant aspect of a goal-directed approach to the program design function is the emphasis on strategic thinking. Strategic management assesses the environment, its resources, and constraints; sets priorities; and designs strategies accordingly. Managers are able to be proactive in selecting which aspects of the environment they will focus on and are not limited to adaptive behavior and activities.

A second relevant theme is the emphasis on appropriateness and relevance. Analysis is to be judged by its utility to those who will use it, thereby defining utility to include both conceptual clarification and relevant information.

A third theme is closely connected to the second. It holds that in order to ensure utility and relevance, the users should be closely involved in goal clarification and analysis. Such involvement will improve the information managers have to work with and also will ensure users have an investment and commitment to program goals.

Fourth, the goal-directed approach emphasizes the actual performance of the organization in reaching stated goals. The approach presents managers with a variety of strategies for translat-

TABLE 4.1 Strategies in a Goal-Directed Approach to Management

Systems analysis
Base plans on systematic review of relevant factors
Develop replicable interventions

Goals and objectives
Examine tradeoffs between retaining qualitative goals and translating them into quantitative measures
Use objectives as motivators, guides, and evaluation criteria

Useful and collaborative analysis
Judge analysis by appropriateness, not rigor
Design analysis in collaboration with those using it
Use analysis to conceptualize and clarify problems

Integrated management and learning
Integrate analysis with planning, implementation, and evaluation
Must be learning conscious, rather than merely adaptive
Institutionalize capacity for learning into organizational procedures

Results-oriented management
Design appropriate strategies to feed results into the management process
Develop a strategy to use and respond to results

Inclusive data gathering
Use structured techniques to gather variety of opinions
Structure problems, define assumptions, include all views

Strategic management
Review relevant aspects of the environment
Set targets or priorities
Design strategies for reaching targetted objectives

Performance management
Develop work teams so members can develop a consensus about tasks, roles, and strategies
Work with groups to develop interactive skills
Help groups plan to improve performance of program units

ing goals into measurable objectives that can be used to evaluate program outcomes. It also considers the need to reorient or motivate those in an organization to focus on performance and results and assumes this can best be done by providing new information and encouraging staff to reflect on it.

Finally, the approach has come to acknowledge that there are a variety of stakeholders and valid perspectives on development. Policy and program design needs to find ways to incorporate and reflect on these.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

The major contribution of the approach to this function is its emphasis that analysis and goal definition and learning are not primarily individual skills. Instead they need to be institutionalized into organizational procedures for handling information and learning from it. Many of the proponents insist on specific techniques and procedures, much in the spirit of Simon's concern for organizational procedures to compensate for bounded rationality.

Procedures fall into two broad groups. One emphasizes formal procedures for handling information and recommends fairly structured techniques for collecting and aggregating ideas. The approach is particularly concerned with developing procedures for monitoring results and for feeding information back into decision making. A concern for performance is thus integrated into the management process. The other relies more on interactive processes. For example, several versions stress interpersonal relations and the informal aspects of organizations and recommend bringing people together into work teams to reflect on goals and objectives and arrive at a consensus on program strategies.

Exercise Leadership

The goal-oriented approach provides opportunities for managers to mobilize relevant groups around goals, using ideas and social values to persuade groups of a program's merits. Insofar as the approach primarily emphasizes analytic techniques, interactive strategies, and consensus building, this aspect of the approach has not been fully developed.

Notes

1. Weber insists that rationality applies to the ends of managers, or to program goals, and also to the means or strategies for achieving those goals. The first is what Diesing calls "substantial rationality" and indicates whether or not goals are well conceived (Diesing, 1962, 3). Currently when rationality is applied to management, it almost always refers to selection of means or strategies rather than ends. Thus it refers to what managers do—plan, organize, coordinate, command, and control in order to achieve ends (Fayol, 1949).

2. Perrow provides a very helpful analysis of this aspect of Simon's writings in his most recent study of organizations (1986a, 128–131).

3. See Cunningham (1977, 465). Simon's description of organizational structure somewhat modifies the assumption that the best way to ensure rational decisions is to rely on a highly structured hierarchy. Even though Weber was one of the first to value hierarchy, he saw its potential problems. In his masterful essay, "Politics as a Vocation," he suggests that the only way to check the excesses of hierarchy is to rely on political leaders with vision and commitment to the political community (Weber 1958). On the one hand, rational administration is inevitable and can be very useful to shake off the weight of tradition or the excesses of charisma. Because it can also become rigid, there will always be a need for enlightened and committed political leadership to counter the rigidities of bureaucracy.

4. In other classifications this model is called "organization theory" (Hage and Finsterbusch, 1987); and "systems management" (Elmore, 1978), both of which present very useful reviews of the literature. For original sources see Katz and Kahn (1966); Churchman (1968); Taylor (1947); Simon (1947); March and Simon (1958); Thompson (1967); Weber (1958); Hage (1980); and Fayol (1949).

5. Lindblom and Cohen stress the problems associated with expert analysis (1979). The same point is made by Chambers in the context of the Third World (1974, 1985).

6. Similar terms include single/multiple goals (Hannan and Freeman, 1977); simple/complex (Honadle, 1985); structured/unstructured (Dunn, 1980; and Mintzberg et al., 1976); measurable/not operational (Mintzberg, 1983a, 174); narrow/broad scope (Paul, 1982, 108); standardized/flexible (D. Korten, 1980); stable/changing, with change being a response to environmental pressures (Weiss and Rein, 1970); and stable/changing, with change being a response to technological change (Hall, 1980).

7. An evaluation of an effort to expand the capacity of a planning unit in the ministry of agriculture in Liberia illustrates that this lack of integration can prevent other bureaus from using analysis, no matter how good it is. A study by Boyle (1986) notes that this lack of integration may be exacerbated because some ministries follow rational norms, while others do not (Hermann et al., 1985).

8. As a result, Leonard continues that training should explore ways to foster commitment to goals, and managers should be encouraged to draw on values and goals from their cultural settings (1986).

9. See Hammergren (1983, 179). In a study of family planning programs, Warwick notes they were based on such "machine" theories and as a result generally failed (1982, especially Ch. 12).

10. Tribe, for example, recommends including legal reasoning and moral philosophy (1972); and Nelson suggests including moral reasoning and historical analysis (1977).

11. See Moris (1981, Ch. 5).

12. A useful overview is found in Elmore (1978, 194). For examples of this version of cybernetic theory see S. Beer (1981); Steinbruner (1974); and Jackson (1985, 36–37). The work by Beer applies cybernetic theory to planning in Chile. This capacity for adaptation was even part of the model as originally proposed by Weber. In his formulation "the means and ends were both open to change if the secondary consequences of either were unacceptable to the actor" (Satow, 1975, 526).

13. The example is taken from an undated manuscript by Kulp, subsequently published by PASITAM (Kulp, 1977).

14. Kulp's structured approach is illustrated in the following outline of steps for designing a rural development program: (1) Analyze—compute the best program for the *average* farm in each homogeneous area; (2) standardize—adopt that program as the standard package for the zone; (3) integrate—build the zone project around the standard package; (4) saturate—overpromote the package in each farming community with enough agents and appropriately simple routines; (5) concentrate—do not spread management and resources too thin, resist pressure to start too big; and (6) accelerate—each year build up speed (n.d., 42).

15. This remark was made by Buckley and cited in W.R. Scott (1977, 67.) A similar concept, "performance gaps," is useful to get organization members to understand the need for change and to focus on areas in which change is necessary. Hage and Finsterbusch review several cases in which changes were introduced into organizations in the Third World and document that knowledge of performance gaps was an important motivator (Hage and Finsterbusch, 1987).

16. A recent study proposes four criteria for establishing objectives, all based on whether decision makers can take action on them:

1. *normative adequacy*—Sources of values and evaluative criteria are made explicit and reasons are provided for their selection.
2. *motivational relevance*—Links between activities and consequences are meaningful to those responsible for their performance.
3. *actionability*—The activities that produce a valued consequence are consciously understood and controllable by those held responsible for their performance.
4. *utilizability*—The information about performance can actually be used to conceptualize problems and take actions to resolve them (Dunn and Mitroff, 1980, 6).

17. Objectives that serve as guides are not necessarily the same as the objectives used for evaluating programs, however (Scott, 1977, 66).

18. Closely related to this interest in goals is the growing criticism of analysis that rigidly separates facts or operational statements from values or broader goals. Analysis has traditionally tried to avoid dealing with goals because they are often broad and vague, and it is hard to marshal facts to support or refute them. As a result analysis often assumes whatever goals or values are put forth by policy makers. A number of critics,

however, insist that although facts cannot prove values or goals, facts can shed light on them (Tribe, 1972; and Nelson, 1977).

19. Patton's works include an early description of "utilization-focused evaluation" that lays out the basic methodological and epistemological assumptions (1981a; 2nd ed., 1986). He has developed the methodology and provided numerous case studies in additional books, all with titles that suggest the flavor of his writings: *Creative Evaluation* (1981b); *Qualitative Evaluation Methods* (1980); and *Practical Evaluation* (1982).

20. An official associated with the project notes that in this particular case the audit requirements of the inspector general in the U.S. Agency for International Development were the major reason for the complicated data collection system (Jim Lowenthal, correspondence, 1986).

21. Indeed this is a common theme of the implementation literature in general. See Daneke (1980); Pressman and Wildavsky (1973); Ingle (1979); Hammergren (1983); Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980); Bunker (1972); and Van Meter and Van Horn (1974).

22. The article by Fiol and Lyles provides a very useful review of the literature on learning and adaptation (1985).

23. According to Argyris when members of an organization reflect on their purpose and operating norms as well as on what they do, they are engaged in "double loop learning" (1977).

24. The fullest description is found in Wholey (1983). Applications of results-oriented management are in Wholey, Abramson, and Bellavita (1986).

25. For a useful review of the literature on the utility of evaluations see Daneke (1980).

26. On the basis of her study of program implementation in Latin America Hammergren notes that evaluations are frequently carried out on programs that were never implemented (1983, 173).

27. Wholey lays out the following tasks for managers:

Level 0: Define the program and who is responsible.
Level 1: Get agreement on a set of performance objectives.
Level 2: Set up a system for measuring and assessing whether these objectives are accomplished.
Level 3: Get agreement from policy makers about expected improvements.
Level 4: Set up a system for using information about performance to encourage improvements.
Level 5: Achieve effective and efficient performance on the basis of these measures.
Level 6: Communicate achievements to others (1983, 12).

28. Sloan, for example, describes how groups differ in policy decisions in Latin America (1982, 424).

29. Structured techniques include brainstorming, the Nominal Group Technique (NGT), Delphi, and Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM). Because all are based on the same theory, a description of NGT is

illustrative of the others. NGT is designed to be used in decisions when there is no single or right answer and people hold a variety of viewpoints. It is a well-known fact of small group studies that a few articulate people can dominate any discussion, that some ideas are never even discussed, and that members often arrive at a false consensus. In NGT a problem is presented to a group, which is a group in name only, hence the term "nominal." (The rationale is therefore quite different from the basis for work teams described subsequently.) A question could be, "What problems do you anticipate in getting farmers to try a new cropping scheme?" Note there is no "right answer," but in all likelihood there will be different expectations. After individuals spend time alone writing down ideas, each takes a turn presenting one of them to the group. There is no discussion at this point, only questions of clarification. This sequence continues until all the ideas are listed. The group then uses specific decision rules to cluster them, to prioritize them, and, finally, through consensus to arrive at a ranking of possibilities. A general description is found in DelBecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975). Applications are described in Ostrowski, White, and Cole (1984).

30. The literature on brainstorming and intuitive thinking is summarized in Cates (1979); and DeBono (1970).

31. The emphasis on assumptions is critical. Although people may disagree about the best strategy, they may find it easier to resolve differences regarding assumptions. Once agreement is gained at this level, then designing a strategy that can take all the assumptions into account will be much easier. Major sources for the problem-structuring approach include Ian Mitroff and his associates, many located at Carnegie Mellon University. See Mitroff and Emshoff (1979); and Dunn and Mitroff (1980). For a broad overview see the text written by Dunn (1980). The emphasis on forcing managers to deal with conflicting views is similar to the concerns of Argyris that organizations have theories of action that are difficult to question (Schon, 1971; and Argyris, 1977). Whereas Mitroff designs structured organizational procedures, Argyris recommends confronting top level managers in workshop settings.

32. J. M. Poland, "Community Based Integrated Rural Development as Implemented in Tangse and Mbang, Aceh," (1977); cited in VanSant and Weisel (1979, 25).

33. For example, see Eadie and Steinbacher (1983); Gummer (1980); Bourgeois (1980); and Ansoff et al. (1976). The strategy fits with organizational procedures described by D. Korten (1984); and Gawthrop (1983), discussed later in the social learning approach.

34. Two practitioners describe an experience in which senior staff came together to plan a strategy for changing a job training program. A traditional, hierarchical agency was in charge of the program, which was administered by local level organizations, each trying to go its own way. "The challenge was to rise above the routine operational agenda through the selection of issues involving high stakes, and to identify pressure

points or levers through which significant change might be effected." In the end designers agreed that the key to making the system work would be the "intensive, continuous and collective participation of the senior managers of the bureau." A year later a second planning session was held with the following purpose:

> I should emphasize that we are *not* interested in the development of shopping lists of routine, ongoing operational goals. Rather, the intent is for each of the executive officers to identify for her/his colleagues the most significant improvement targets and associated strategies, above and beyond normal operations (Eadie and Steinbacher, 1985, 427, 429).

35. The approach has been developed by the Development Project Management Center (DPMC), jointly funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID. This approach is also called the Guidance System Improvement Approach and described as Structured Flexibility, referring to the emphasis on developing a system for guiding organizations to improve themselves. Publications include several discussions of the basic theoretical assumptions and descriptions of applications of the approach in a variety of development contexts. The basic theory is described in Kettering (1985); and Solomon, Kettering, Countryman, and Ingle (1981). Applications of the method in Jamaica are described by Kettering (1980); in Kenya by Ingle (1983); in Portugal by Ingle (1985); in Haiti by Brinkerhoff (1985b); in the Sahel by Brinkerhoff (1985a); and in Peru by Solomon (1983). Reviews and critiques of the approach can be found in Rondinelli (1987); Hage and Finsterbusch (1987); Creshkoff (1985); and Brinkerhoff (1986).

5
The Anarchy Approach

Assumptions and Questions About Management Functions

In the last ten years a body of literature has developed that is concerned with decision making and analysis and that challenges many of the assumptions in the goal-directed model. This literature argues that decision making and analysis are neither as rational nor as orderly as they may appear. Organizations are better characterized as anarchies or as garbage cans than as goal-directed bodies.[1] Particularly when managers are dealing with the kinds of ambiguous goals associated with development programs, individuals behave in often unpredictable and even random ways and do not follow rationally defined objectives. Goals and objectives, in fact, are more apt to emerge during the implementation process, rather than drive that process as assumed in the goal-directed approach.

The somewhat dramatic terminology used by these analysts may obscure some of the connections between the literature on decision making as anarchy and other theories about organizations. March himself co-authored with Simon a major work on organization decision making in 1958, which raised serious reservations about the role of analysis and rationality and emphasized the limitations on peoples' ability to process and handle information. The anarchy approach extends some of the arguments made at that time. The concept of organized anarchy also has roots in theories of incrementalism and studies of implementation, both of which emphasize that there are major impediments to rationality. According to incremental decision theory, people make marginal adjustments rather than clear cut decisions. Similarly, the implementation literature is replete with cases indicating that program management is usually marked by indecision, retreats, adjustments, and a general lack of clarity.[2]

Decision making as anarchy also fits with a number of recent studies that argue that the management process is more open-ended, interactive, and ill defined than is normally realized. For example, in an often-cited study, Mintzberg remarks that although we often write as if a manager is "a reflective, systematic planner . . . study after study has shown that managers work at an unrelenting pace, that their activities are characterized by brevity, variety and discontinuity, and that they are strongly oriented towards action and dislike reflective activities" (Mintzberg, 1975, 50).

Revisionist or anarchy theory goes further than these descriptions of management, however. It not only describes how individual managers make decisions or handle information in unpredictable ways; it emphasizes that the entire decision process is marked by complex interactions among participants and that much of what goes on is random and meaningless rather than intentional and rational (Anderson, 1983, 201). Organizational processes are best described as a container (or "garbage can") into which problems and ideas are tossed in an essentially random manner. The other frequently used term, *organized anarchy*, refers to the fact that much of the time, the management process has no center, focus, or structure.[3]

At the same time there are limits to the ability of people to cope with, and even to live with, anarchy. As a result people create symbols or rituals to suggest meaning and purpose. The symbols serve to unite people, and they often appear to have rational purposes even when they do not. "When faced with uncertainty and ambiguity, humans create *symbols* to reduce the ambiguity, resolve confusion, increase predictability, and provide direction. Events themselves may remain illogical, random, fluid, and meaningless, but human symbols make them seem otherwise" (Bolman and Deal, 1984, 150). Symbols include myths associated with the mission of a development unit, plans that lay out purposes and future activities, and even routine activities such as consultations with groups in the community. All of these may be purely symbolic and fail to contribute to the actual results of a program, but all may be meaningful to those involved and enable them to cope with the anarchic processes in which they are involved.

Evaluation illustrates how a managerial routine can be used for symbolic and reassuring purposes even though it fails to fulfill its ostensible purpose. As discussed in the last chapter, evaluations frequently do not address decisions that have to be made, evaluation results are not available when needed, and they often are not used by those who commission them. In addition evaluations can be very time consuming and expensive for all involved. According to the goal-directed approach, evaluations need to be improved to fulfill their purpose of providing information about programs. The anarchy perspective, however, stresses that even when evaluations fail to provide useful information they serve a number of symbolic purposes.

> Evaluation is something that organizations need to do if they are to be viewed as responsible, serious, and well managed, even though the results of evaluations are rarely used for decision making. . . . Evaluation persists because it serves significant symbolic purposes. Without it, we would worry about the efficiency and effectiveness of activities. Evaluations produces "magic numbers" to help us believe that things are working. Evaluation shows that organizations take goals seriously. It demonstrates that an organization cares and wants to improve. Evaluations provide opportunities for participants to share their opinions and have them publicly heard and recognized. Evaluation results help people relabel old practices, provide opportunities for adventure, and foster new beliefs (Bolman and Deal, 1984, 179–181).

These observations about the functions of evaluations could be made by proponents of several of the approaches described in this book. The difference is that the anarchy approach appreciates that they are necessary functions while the other approaches do not.

Organizational anarchy, decisions that function like garbage cans, and symbolic responses may be particularly common in the development setting where goals are typically vague and complex. A group of analysts interested in problems they describe as "messes" or "wicked problems" contend that they make anarchy inevitable. The term *messes* means that a problem cannot be separated into independent components. Rather it is an interdependent system of many problems and hence messy to deal with (Ackoff, 1974, 21). *Wicked problems* are similar in that they cannot be clearly defined or isolated and have the following characteristics: There is no definitive formulation of the problem; there is no stopping rule to say when it is solved; solutions are good/bad rather than true/false; there are no ways to test solutions; solutions are "one-shot" operations because each one makes a difference and cannot be undone; there is no set of potential solutions; every solution is unique; and each one is a symptom of another problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Because the problems can be defined in different ways, there are no clear mandates for solving them or for evaluating their results.[4]

In a review of rural development issues, Johnston and Clark use many of the same terms and concepts. Problems are ill defined, and the many factors that have to be taken into account constitute a "mess." There are multiple objectives, many interacting variables, and poorly understood relations among them (1982, 26). Efforts to improve the health of a community, for example, range from providing medical services to promoting life-style changes to redistributing resources. Which of these approaches people take depends on their perspective, their values about health, what else is competing for their attention, and their understanding of what it takes to bring about change. There are so many interacting influences on health that it is difficult if not impossible to sort them out and identify what causal relations are at work.

Because most development programs are dealing with situations characterized by multiple, vague, and shifting goals, the anarchy approach appears to be particularly relevant.[5] It is especially useful in raising questions about three of the management functions: contribute to development content of program design, enhance the development capacity of implementing organizations, and exercise leadership.

The approach asks who participates in program design and whether they maintain an interest in the program or are constantly being diverted by other concerns. What is the nature of learning in this situation? What other purposes are served by the goals? Do goals direct the process and serve as a reference point? Are they brought in to rationalize what has already been done for other reasons? Are managers able and motivated to respond to opportunities that arise, even when they do not seem relevant to original program goals?

Concerning the function of enhancing organizational capacity the anarchy approach raises questions about the best way to handle the randomness and disorder that are evident. What symbols and rituals will bring some order and purpose to a program unit? Can managers develop procedures that allow them to adopt a more open-ended, flexible stance? What kinds of organization structures and procedures encourage learning in this very fluid situation?

Finally, the approach suggests that leadership depends on appearances and perceptions as well as, and perhaps even more than, on actual accomplishments. It asks how managers present themselves to others. Recall that the chapter on the goal-directed approach concluded that it has not paid much attention to the need to develop a commitment to goals. The anarchy approach, by contrast, is more sensitive to the ways in which leadership depends on peoples' attitudes and perceptions and places more emphasis on the culture and norms within implementing units.

Problems in Applying the Anarchy Approach

There are two major problems in pursuing this approach. First, it is difficult to work within a very fluid and unstructured situation. As strategies related to the goal-directed model indicate, clear objectives can be very useful in providing guidance and standards. Moreover, strategic goals can serve as important mechanisms for focusing energies to bring about change. Without clear goals managers may easily lose track of what is going on and may become engulfed in what can only seem at times to be chaos. In response to the seeming disorder, managers are tempted to institute strong controls and try to impose more order than is appropriate. In other words managers are apt to revert to the versions of the goal-directed approach associated with blueprints and a machine theory of management.

A second and related problem is that managers try to avoid uncertainties and in the process may fail to explore opportunities available to them. They tend to pursue only those activities where they feel they can anticipate what will happen and where they can predict the margin for error. The result, according to Albert Hirschman, is that designers and managers will shy away from a number of activities where they might be successful (1967).[6]

Although the approach has thus far emphasized description rather than prescription, it is possible to derive several themes useful to managers. First, managers need to be very realistic about their situations. To encourage such realism, much of the literature associated with the anarchy approach attempts to sensitize managers to the realities of decision making and analysis. Where goals and technology are hazy and participation is fluid, many of the axioms and standard procedures of management collapse. Once managers appreciate that the assumptions of purposefulness and rationality associated with the goal-directed approach do not exist, they will be more open to limitations and to the need for new approaches.

Second, the approach suggests that learning is more ambiguous than it appears to be in the goal-directed approach. Managers may rationalize something they have done for a variety of reasons and describe it as something they have learned from their experiences. Further, people can only handle a certain amount of new information, and there are limits to what they can learn. They can learn new insights and some new ideas, but they are unlikely to arrive at decisive and clear models they can apply in other situations.

Third, managers need to balance order and structure on the one hand with flexibility and openness on the other. They need to appreciate that many procedures and activities that seem purposeless from a rational point of view may serve an unintended function of providing some order. Managers need to balance this appreciation for order with an openness to unexpected opportunities that emerge. The following three sections examine how the anarchy approach describes the reality of management and decision making, and how it conceptualizes learning in anarchic situations; these sections describe some of the techniques the approach proposes for balancing order and flexibility. Next the chapter describes a theory proposed by Albert Hirschman that captures many of the insights of the anarchy approach. He argues that it is impossible to accurately foresee all the opportunities that may arise during implementation and that may allow managers to override anticipated difficulties. The chapter concludes by reviewing the implications of the approach for the three management functions noted previously.

The Realities of a Manager's World

A core assumption is that goals do not provide much help in conceptualizing or describing what managers do. Instead of being directed by a concern with accomplishing goals, managers deal simultaneously with four different factors: (1) problems that require attention; (2) solutions that may or may not be responses to the problems; (3) participants who are unclear about their preferences and have a variety of things competing for their attention; (4) choice opportunities or occasions when managers have to take action. Not only are all four of these factors competing for managers' attention, but they are essentially independent of each other. Problems may arise at a time when choices are not on the agenda; or solutions may emerge unrelated to problems. Solutions that managers propose are often fortuitous and are not necessarily related to particular problems (March and Olsen, 1976, 26). Those participating in decisions may or may not be interested in them and may be present for a number of different reasons. "An organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work" (Cohen et al., 1972, 2).

A computer program is an example of a solution that does not necessarily appear when it is needed. It is likely to become available for reasons unrelated to management needs. Donors may make it available, or the program agency may have signed a contract to instruct staff in the program. Members may have been sent to a computer training course because it was being offered. The computer program then could be "an answer actively looking for a question." Once a computer capacity is added it is tempting to define data needs around the new technology. Hence what appears to be a "solution" may actually elicit a "problem" for which it could offer an answer.

Under these circumstances decisions or choices can have one of three characteristics—resolution, oversight, or flight. Conceivably a decision will resolve the original problem. However, a decision is more likely to reflect either "oversight" or "flight." Oversight occurs when the choice does not really address the problem, and flight means that the problem has become attached to another issue (Cohen and March, 1974, 83). When either oversight or flight occurs, it is hard for managers to explain what has happened, and so they develop goals or theories retrospectively to rationalize what they have been doing all along for a number of different reasons. Such rationalizations will not solve the original problem, but they may provide symbolic assurance to the organization that something is being done and thereby maintain enough momentum to pursue the program further.

The following example in which a manager is attempting to improve agricultural productivity illustrates these several points. Assume there are a number of possible solutions, such as new methods for training extension workers and improved seed. The choice of a solution may reflect donor priorities and may or may not fit a particular situation. Participants include members of different ministries and leaders of farmers' organizations, each of whom may have other priorities. Choice opportunities, or occasions to design a program strategy, may arise at any time according to the agenda of national agencies, international bodies, research universities, electoral needs of political elites, and so forth. These opportunities will not necessarily arise at the time when the problem is most evident, when new research results are ready, or when participants are most concerned with the situation. As a result there is no reason to expect that managers will be in a position to directly resolve low agricultural productivity. If they appreciate the reality of their situation, however, they may gain some wisdom in what to realistically expect and how to work within the setting to accomplish what they can.

According to the organized anarchy approach, program decisions and management activities can be understood only as part of a broader context. They are not single, decisive events but are part of a chain of multiple, and often unrelated, decisions. Numerous participants contribute to implementation strategies and choices, even if they are not aware of it.[7] Similarly, according to this perspective, solutions depend as much as anything else on what else is competing for the attention of different participants and the timing by which information arrives. Members of the organization may be preoccupied with a number of different items. Members may work hard for some activity to be included in a program and then may move onto something else before carrying it out. Their attention spans vary and may or may not coincide with program agendas. Members usually are ambiguous about their preferences, even about what is in their interest. Participants move in and out of the process, their time is limited, and they may change their minds.

March and Olsen recount an incident at the University of Oslo that illustrates how decisions get made according to this perspective. It became necessary to make a decision about a secretary in the Physics Department. There was no place for someone with her skills, and yet department members wanted to retain her. According to their analysis, the problem of what to do about the secretary became a "can" into which unrelated issues got thrown. The junior faculty decided to use the occasion to reorganize the department. Another group had a scheme for reorganization that did not deal either with the status of the secretary or with reorganizing the department. Eventually several changes were made, unrelated to the original problem, changes that no one particularly seemed to want. When it was all over the faculty reinterpreted the changes to argue that they represented an effort to democratize the department (March and Olsen, 1976, Ch. 14.) As Perrow observes, such cases are very common in most organizations. Observers usually explain them by looking for sources of power or by noting that bureaucratic processes or "red tape" can overwhelm decision making (Perrow, 1981, 297). These authors, however, are saying that such explanations cannot do justice to the randomness and unpredictability of the actual processes in these situations.

Given these ambiguities, one cannot understand what managers are doing by looking at program goals. Examining processes and activities can be much more enlightening. This point is made very vividly by Karl Weick. Most writing on management, he says, simplistically treats organizations as real entities and ignores the actual processes of management.

> Whenever people talk about organizations they are tempted to use lots of nouns, but these seem to impose a spurious stability on the settings being described. In the interest of better organizational understanding we should urge people to stamp out nouns. If students of organization become stingy in their use of nouns, generous in their use of verbs, . . . then more attention would be paid to process, and we'd learn about how to see it and manage it (1979, 44).

Whereas nouns suggest substance and continuity, verbs suggest action and process and more faithfully reflect the reality of management.[8] By focusing on process (and verbs) it becomes clear that managers spend a great deal of their energy trying to make sense of what they have already done rather than planning for the future. One way they do this is to rationalize their actions by retrospectively proposing what goals or objectives they were trying to achieve.

The theory challenges the goal-directed model by saying that functions and goals have a limited role in defining what managers do. According to Perrow it offers a strikingly realistic perspective.

> For the practicing administrator, the garbage can model is extremely valuable, since it makes some kind of sense out of the bewildering shifts, turns, and unexpected outcomes in daily organizational life. It notes that people fight hard to gain access to committees, then rarely attend, because of unstable priorities and limited attention spans. People struggle mightily to formulate rules or plans, then forget all about them as new problems arise and the membership of coalitions shifts (1986a, 136).

Learning in Anarchic Situations

According to the anarchy approach, traditional analytic tools such as systems analysis have serious limitations in helping managers set priorities, design solutions to problems, or consider opportunities because decisions reflect the interaction of different people and events rather than problem-solving techniques and logic. Just as there are cognitive limits on the process of rational analysis, there are limits on the way managers and organizations learn from experience. The goal-directed approach assumes that managers learn by adapting to feedback about their performance. According to the anarchy approach, however, "they learn under conditions in which goals (and therefore 'success' and 'failure') are ambiguous or in conflict, in which what happened is unclear, and in which the causality of events is difficult to untangle" (Springer, 1985, 498). As a result, experience is often ambiguous, and it is difficult to draw any clear lessons. It is also the case that situations are complex and usually change faster than one can learn from them. For both reasons "learning" will produce many false conclusions.

In a work appropriately entitled *Leadership and Ambiguity* Cohen and March illustrate the ambiguities of learning with the example of a manager who decides to let some employees go but keep others and train them. Not too surprisingly those he retains do well. What has he learned? "He would learn how smart he was. He would discover that his judgments about whom to keep and whom to replace were quite good. . . . He will experience some subjective learning that is direct and compelling. He will come to understand that he understands the situation and has mastered it" (1974, 200). In reality, the employees he dismissed might have done even better than those he retained but he will never have a chance to "learn" whether that would have been the case. Essentially managers can rationalize any conclusion they want to and call it learning. As a result, in complex and rapidly changing situations, experience is not a very reliable teacher (1974, 200–201).

This realism about the difficulties of learning from experience fits with recent developments in learning theory. Observers recognize that if people are to learn from experience they need some order and predictability in their situation. "If either the internal or external environment is too complex and dynamic for the organization to handle, an overload may occur, and learning will not take place" (Fiol and Lyles, 1985, 805)." As a result learning requires both change and stability. Some change is necessary in order for a manager to be able to stimulate new understandings of what is tak-

FIGURE 5.1 Relationship Between Learning and Change



Source: Adapted from Fiol and Lyles (1985, 807).

ing place, but if there is too much change or chaos in the environment, then managers may become overloaded (Hedberg, 1981).

Figure 5.1 suggests some ways to think about combining stability and change in a learning process. The vertical dimension refers to how much learning is taking place, the horizontal dimension to whether an organization is making changes or adopting new procedures. At point A neither learning nor change is taking place. At point B, an organization is changing or adapting rapidly but is not learning from it or altering its understanding of what is taking place. Point C means that less change is occurring, but the organization is learning from it and developing new understandings of what is going on in the environment and what its role is. At point D both change and learning are occurring very rapidly.

The literature on anarchic organizations predicts that when a lot of change is going on in the environment, organizations may be overwhelmed and that in such situations, point C may be a better goal for managers than point D. By contrast if there is more modest change and pressure, managers may be able to sustain their programs at point D but will need very flexible procedures. Assuming that development program managers will almost always be operating in a situation of rapid change and shifting pressures, situation C is probably far more relevant than D. According to this scenario managers will need to find ways to change slowly, giving all involved time to reflect on what they are doing.

Leadership in Balancing Order and Flexibility

Given the realities in a manager's world, and the ambiguities of learning, there are significant limits on the kind of leadership and direction a manager can provide. Cohen and March describe the nature of leadership in anarchic situations in the following example.

> If you put a man in a boat and tell him to plot a course, he can take one of three views of his task. He can float with the currents and winds, letting them take him wherever they wish; he can select a destination and try to use full power to go directly to it regardless of the current or winds; or he can select a destination and use his rudder and sails to let the currents and wind eventually take him where *he* wants to go (Cohen and March, 1974, 212).

Cohen and March strongly argue for the third strategy, for an incremental, flexible approach, rather than a strategy that relies on goal setting, strategic planning, and formal controls. Control can be counterproductive and can keep managers from exploring opportunities. Managers who wish to exercise leadership need to develop an ability to live with changing agendas, to be more open to alternative ideas and the possibility for learning and change than they are in models that assume a more rational, linear cause and effect. At the same time leaders find that there are limits to peoples' tolerance for ambiguity. Therefore leaders will often try to rationalize events by proposing goals and claiming that these goals have been driving the management process all along. In effect the approach says that although leaders should expect anarchy, people can deal only with a limited degree of ambiguity, and leaders therefore need to provide some closure and routine. Leadership depends on balancing order with as much flexibility and openness as are possible in the situation.

Leadership also depends on how much power one is perceived to possess. Managers therefore need to think strategically about their reputations and place themselves in a position to receive credit for what goes right and to distance themselves from any problems that arise. Cohen and March propose a list of strategic actions that managers can use to take advantage of existing situations, accept and take advantage of any distractions that occur, and gently guide a program in the desired direction. (1) *Spend time*—Because garbage can phenomena consume a lot of energy, managers need to spend a lot of time on an issue to get anywhere. (2) *Persist*—Even if something has not worked one day, it might work the next day. (3) *Exchange status for substance*—Many people care more about their status than about specific substantive issues, particularly routine ones. Leaders who are willing to forego some status will be in a better position vis-à-vis others. (4) *Facilitate participation by opponents*—Outsiders tend to think that insiders have more power than they actually do. Allowing outsiders to participate will make them more realistic about what is feasible. (5) *Overload the system*—When it is overloaded, others will be so busy they will leave the leadership with room to put through their proposals. (6) *Provide garbage cans*—Recall that any issue gets entwined with other issues; trying to sort them out is a waste. Instead provide lots of cans, and these will attract the garbage away from other projects. (7) *Manage unobtrusively*—Because these systems have a lot of inertia, it takes too much energy to control and guide them. Rely on indirect bureaucratic routines, rather than on high impact interventions (1974, 207–213).

Budgets are an example of an "indirect bureaucratic routine" that managers can use to manage unobtrusively. Instead of thinking of a budget as a rational plan to maximize goals, a budget can be thought of as an elaboration of prior commitments. From this perspective, managers should not continually review budgets in light of a program's performance or how well the program accomplished its goals. That strategy would require too much of a budget and undermine its real contribution to policy making. Instead, budgets can be a modest source of predictability and order in what is a very disorderly situation. Members would agree not to review everything at once but only to make specific and marginal adjustments where necessary.[10]

A related strategy is referred to as "loose coupling." In many situations managers confront a number of competing goals. A goal-directed approach attempts to prioritize alternatives and develop appropriate program strategies. According to the anarchy approach, it may be better to pursue a loose coupling strategy in which managers reduce the interdependence among different activities (Weick, 1976). Managers thereby can prevent program objectives from getting entangled with each other.

To construct an example, a manager of a health unit might be running programs in nutrition education and treatment of diseases. An anarchy approach would predict that these problems would become intertwined, that choices about staffing the education program might conflict with choices about staffing the treatment program. Decisions about the nutrition education program probably would reflect conflicts between the two programs for resources, the uneven attention spans of different staff, which resources became available first, and so forth. In such circumstances a manager might do well to keep the two programs as independent, or "loosely coupled," as possible.

Managers need to distinguish among situations where problems and solutions are closely connected or "tightly coupled" and those where they are "loosely coupled." In the latter case, managers will not need to spend resources and energy on coordination or control and will often find that consensus or common understandings are sufficient to hold together the different parts of the organization (Weick, 1976, 14).

A proper sense of timing is another useful strategy. The theory tells us that decisions are often made by those who happen not to be preoccupied with other issues and who essentially have nothing else to do. Based on this reasoning, managers can try to bring different groups into the decisions at strategic times and divert the attention of any groups who are interfering in their activities (March and Olsen, 1979, 27).

Another useful strategy is experimentation. Organizations may need "some temporary relief from control, coordination, and communication" so that they have time to learn from experience. Instead of using evaluations to control what staff do, leave them free to experiment.

> The evaluation of social experiments need not be in terms of the degree to which they have fulfilled our a priori expectations. . . . The prior specification of criteria and of evaluation procedures that depend on such criteria are common presumptions in contemporary social policy making. They are presumptions that inhibit the serendipitous discovery of new criteria (March and Olsen, 1976, 81).

On another occasion the authors use the word *playfulness*, by which they mean the "deliberate, temporary relaxation of rules in order to explore the possibilities of alternative rules." "Play" does not require abandoning intelligence or reason. It is difficult, however, to get managers to think about achieving goals rationally and at the same time explore alternative approaches to development. It therefore may be hard to incorporate both reason and playfulness in an organization or to ensure that organizations do both equally well. The problem is that most organizations reward rationality and not playfulness. Managers need to change this, to treat program goals as hypotheses to be explored and encourage staff to express intuitive judgments and conjectures (Cohen and March, 1974, 225–227). What managers and staff learn depends on how they are organized to collect and handle information and whether organization incentives encourage managers to look for new ideas and for evidence of success or failures to be corrected (March and Olsen, 1976, 54–60).

In their study of rural development, Johnston and Clark reflect a similar concern when they question the common tendency for managers to automatically tailor means to ends. Instead managers need to be constantly open to new ends, goals, or purposes and even to let the means shape the purposes. Often the best course is for managers to adjust the means and ends to each other. The alternative and dominant view, to begin with ends and then design means around them, is counterproductive.

> The conventional view has so permeated contemporary thought on this matter that it may be worthwhile to illustrate the mutual-adjustment notion. Our favorite is an old tale of an Eskimo carving a piece of bone. He carves a little not quite knowing what he is making, exploring the bone for its texture, faults and potential. He pauses, examines, carves a bit more. And again. Finally, a smile of recognition: "Hello seal, I wondered if it might be you." Problem posed and resolved all in the same process. Means and ends, thinking and doing are one (1982, 18).

According to another study, complacency is the major reason that managers are reluctant to experiment and rethink goals and purposes. Managers therefore need to develop a capacity for "camping on seesaws," for purposefully keeping themselves off balance so that they will explore new opportunities and be open to experimentation and trial and error. The authors describe six strategies designed to prevent organizations from becoming rigid and to force managers to continuously reappraise their approach. (1) Be willing to go with *minimal consensus*; waiting for maximum consensus may eliminate different points of view. (2) Instead of trying to satisfy all members, be willing to live with *minimal contentment*, so that members will be motivated to pursue change. (3) Be willing to live with *minimal resources* in order to keep the organization looking for new sources of support. (4) Place only *minimal faith in one's plans*; use them but be willing to discard them readily. (5) *Minimal consistency* will encourage an organization to explore alternative strategies or pursue novel ideas. (6) Finally, aim for *minimal rationality*; try to maintain sufficient but incomplete control of procedures in order to encourage others to keep exploring alternatives (adapted from Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck, 1976).[11]

Note the argument that managers can place too much stress on consensus and consistency. The emphasis on work groups and consensus proposed by the goal-directed approach, if taken too far, may prevent new insights and undermine creative tension in an organization.

Several reports of management strategies in development situations seem to capture the style that these authors are talking about—reports of an Indonesian family planning project attribute its success precisely to the commitment of higher level management to experimentation. Because of uncertainty about how to promote family planning, local staff were given discretion to carry out small scale experiments, many of which did not work out. "The willingness of the mission to support unconventional projects with a significant risk of failure has been essential in the rapid evolution of the overall project" (Heiby et al., 1979, 10). Blair notes that a similar openness to experimentation was responsible for the partial success in the Comilla project in Bangladesh.

> Despite the usual bureaucratic pressures to report only achievement and progress to higher levels, and the perhaps even greater pressure to report success to the Ford Foundation and to development-oriented circles abroad, director Khan adamantly insisted on rigorous self-criticism. Accordingly, the published reports and studies made by Academy personnel of all aspects of the experiment have been full of self-examination, criticism, and questioning (1978, 66–67).[12]

Exploring Opportunities in the Development Context

One observer of development activities who reflects many of the insights of the anarchy approach is Albert Hirschman. As long ago as the mid-1960s he visited a number of development projects and observed the variety of unforeseen circumstances with which managers had to cope. Like many others, he notes that unexpected problems frequently arose to confound development activities. Unlike others, however, he adds that many of these activities should be pursued in spite of these problems because implementation also presents a number of opportunities to innovate and explore alternative strategies. Like observers associated with the anarchy approach Hirschman is impressed with the unpredictability of events and the fact that solutions often appeared unexpectedly. He dubs this resourcefulness the "Hiding Hand."

> Up to a point, the Hiding Hand can help accelerate the rate at which "mankind" engages successfully in problem-solving: it takes up problems *it thinks* it can solve, finds they are really more difficult than expected, but then, being stuck with them, attacks willy-nilly the unsuspected difficulties—and sometimes even succeeds.
>
> Looking backward on this kind of sequence, an interpretation in terms of some challenge-and-response mechanism seems to be quite consistent with the facts and, of course, it is much more flattering to our ego. Indeed, people who have stumbled through the experience just described will tend to retell it as though they had known the difficulties all along and had bravely gone to meet them (1967, 14).

Like participants in the garbage can model, the managers in Hirschman's scenario reinterpret their behavior to imply that their adjustments resulted from rational foresight. "We find it intolerable to imagine that our more lofty achievements, such as economic, social, or political progress, could have come about by stumbling rather than through careful planning, rational behavior, and the courageous taking up of a clearly perceived challenge" (1967, 14–15).

Hirschman illustrates the principle of the Hiding Hand by describing a project in Pakistan to develop a pulp and paper mill to use the resources of local bamboo forests. After several difficult years getting the project under way, the mill was beginning to operate fairly efficiently when the unexpected occurred—the bamboo died and the plant owners had to find another resource. Hirschman describes a number of innovative and successful strategies the project managers adopted to diversify their resources and strengthen their position. He adds that if they had originally anticipated the difficulties they would encounter, they would not have begun the project and thereby would have missed an opportunity to develop a very significant activity (1967, 9–10).

The Hiding Hand is more important for some kinds of projects than for others. For large infrastructure projects, the benefits seem obvious and the costs very predictable, and it is usually appropriate to select them using traditional rational techniques. For other projects, typically those associated with social and rural development activities, the reverse is true—benefits seem remote and costs and problems seem enormous and uncertain. As a result, Hirschman finds that there are strong biases against proceeding with activities designed to promote social development.

To counter this bias he proposes two ways in which managers can apply the Hiding Hand principle. First, they can underestimate the difficulties they will encounter in order to compensate for the unforeseen opportunities they may find. This maxim implies that preliminary cost-benefit studies will often have a built-in negative bias because people can anticipate costs more easily than they can anticipate opportunities to do things differently once a project is under way. Underestimating problems or costs is particularly important in agricultural projects because potential difficulties are so readily apparent to everyone. Even if projects are begun, they are subject to problems in production and marketing that become immediately evident. As a result, agricultural development activities tend to be quickly abandoned (1967, 16–19). Hirschman adds that programs are in a better position than autonomous projects to discount such initial problems and apply the Hiding Hand principle. "Projects whose potential difficulties and disappointments are apt to manifest themselves at an early stage should be administered by agencies having a long-term commitment to the success of the projects" (1967, 20–21).

A second way in which managers can cope with the bias against social development activities is to overestimate their benefits. When more of these activities are started, managers will be in a position to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. In making this point Hirschman anticipates the emphasis on symbols and rituals within the literature on organizational anarchy. Recall that those who write about the garbage-can phenomena recognize that people cannot cope with total anarchy, and so managers rely on practices such as planning and evaluations to suggest that the process is more meaningful and rational than it really is. Hirschman makes a similar point in noting that comprehensive plans can be very valuable in suggesting more certainty than really exists. On the one hand such plans usually suggest that "experts" have the answers. At the same time these plans tend to exaggerate the benefits and underestimate the difficulties associated with particular activities. In this manner comprehensive plans may compensate for the tendency to avoid activities that seem fraught with problems (1967, 22–23).

> The utopian vision may be necessary not so much to offset the inflated costs of the proposed enterprise as to compensate for an infirmity of man's imagination; for even though costs may not appear unduly high, man may simply be unable to conceive of the

> strictly limited, yet satisfactory, advances, replete with compromises and concessions to opposing forces, which are the . . . frequent result of ambiguous socioeconomic development moves (1967, 33).

The Anarchy Approach and Program Management Functions

The approach makes several very important contributions. It captures much of the reality within organizations. It adds a human dimension to discussions of organizational structure and procedure. It checks the tendency of observers and researchers to assume that what goes on in an organization makes sense and to provide explanations and rationalizations even when they are not warranted. Table 5.1 reviews the developments within the approach. The chapter concludes by reviewing the implications for the three management functions dealt with by this approach.

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

Program goals are ambiguous, and analysis often serves to rationalize activities rather than guide them. Managers need to appreciate these realities and work around them, rather than rely on traditional rational techniques and procedures. Prioritizing and rationalizing may make affairs worse. Programs are really hypotheses that need to be continually refined and reshaped during the implementation process. There is always a certain ambiguity in learning from experience, however, because people can usually "learn" what they want to learn. The most important lesson is to keep open as many lines of communication as possible in the hopes of encouraging new perspectives and fresh insights into problems.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

Managers need to develop processes that bring some order to a situation while retaining procedures for finding and exploring unanticipated possibilities. When routines do not appear to be justified on a rational basis, it is important to consider what indirect functions they may be serving and how they may contribute to holding members on course. Monitoring procedures need to describe what was

TABLE 5.1 Implications of an Anarchy Approach for Management

Problematic nature of program goals
Goals do not direct management decisions and actions
Goals often rationalize what was done for other reasons
Solutions and choices do not necessarily deal with problems
Participants are not clear about their preferences or interests
Program choices depend on what is competing for attention
Learning from experience in anarchic situations
Appreciate that rational analytic tools have limited use
Recognize that learning from experience can be very ambiguous —we learn what we want to
Balancing order and flexibility
Recognize that organizations have a limited toleration for ambiguity and have a need for order
Use budgets to clarify continuing expectations
Employ loose coupling—keep unrelated programs separate
Encourage experimentation, playfulness to explore possible actions
Provide incentives for exploring new ideas
Prevent complacency by keeping organization off balance
Learn to work with only a minimum of consensus
Adapt means and ends to each other
Taking advantage of unexpected opportunities
Recognize that initial cost-benefit studies emphasize likely costs and problems and overlook opportunities for creative adjustments
Avoid getting locked into plans that overlook unforseen opportunities

done and why, rather than to be used to hold staff accountable for preset goals. Budgets can be used to bring order to a situation rather than used as an evaluation tool. Perhaps most importantly, managers need to develop incentives to reward people for taking risks, for exploring new ideas.

Exercise Leadership

This perspective emphasizes that leaders are working within very ambiguous and uncertain situations and that their influence is primarily based on how they are perceived. They should anticipate and take advantage of opportunities that arise rather than proactively set goals or attempt to control events. At the same time, leaders need to look for opportunities and be open to possibilities for learning new strategies once in a situation. Perhaps the best sign of leadership from this perspective is the creation of a climate that encourages an openness to unfolding possibilities, a tolerance for unexpected lessons and responses, and a willingness to consider new ideas and approaches during the implementation process.

Notes

1. Studies that do treat the theory as a model comparable to the others are Pfeffer (1981, 31); Chaffee (1985); Mohr (1976); and Bolman and Deal (1984).

2. Perrow also notes several of these connections (1986a, 135f).

3. There are several authors one can identify with this approach, although they do not agree completely with each other, nor do they always use the same terminology. The major writings can be found in M. Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972); M. Cohen and March (1974); March and Olsen (1976); Weick (1976; 1977; 1979); and Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck (1976). Reviews of the literature can be found in Harmon and Mayer (1986); Chaffee (1985); Perrow (1981); Springer (1985); Astley and Van de Ven (1983); and Bolman and Deal (1984). The last work uses the term "symbolic" to describe the approach, and stresses its emphasis on the use of symbols, rituals, and myths in organizations.

4. The concept of "wickedness" was originally presented by Rittel and Webber (1973). There are thorough discussions of the implications of the concept in Harmon and Mayer (1986, Ch. 1); and in Dunn (1980, 99–110).

5. It should be noted, however, that some claim the anarchy approach is also relevant to highly structured management situations (Perrow, 1986a, 138–139).

6. See also the discussion of Type I and Type II errors in Bryant and White (1982, 66–75).

7. This point is also made by the following: Springer (1985, 496); Rein and White (1977, 263); Palumbo and Wright (1980, 1170); and Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980).

8. Weick has applied his model to empirical studies of institutions of higher education. He writes in a deliberately provocative style to challenge normal ways of thinking about organizations. Much of this section is based on a review in Harmon and Mayer (1986, 629–648). They stress Weick's "belief in the primacy of process over substance."

9. See also Hedberg (1981); and March and Olsen (1976).

10. See Cyert and March (1963, 33). See discussion of this point in Perrow (1986a, 136). Other studies that explore ways to bring order into the process include Lutz (1982); Padgett (1980); and Anderson (1983).

11. For a similar position see D. Korten (1984); and Kiggundu (1986).

12. See also the cases described in Gran (1983a).

6

The Bureaucratic Process Approach

Assumptions and Questions About Management Functions

Whereas the goal-directed approach assumes that organization members can be brought together around properly defined goals, the bureaucratic process approach assumes that organizations are composed of a variety of sub-units and groups, each with its own interests and perspectives.[1] The larger the organization the more power and responsibility are fragmented among groups and the more differences there are. The anarchy approach attributes this disorder to the complex nature of program situations. The bureaucratic process approach, however, assumes that what may appear to be anarchy is actually the result of different sub-groups pursuing their own agendas.

Managers appreciate that they cannot rely on shared objectives to coordinate participants. Nor can managers improve implementation by redefining goals or by designing strategies and procedures to make management more rational. Managers have to overcome the natural resistance of members and enable members to simultaneously pursue their own interests while satisfying program needs. Instead of promoting rational program decisions, managers have to overcome resistance to changes brought about by new program directives and spend their time coordinating units and supervising and managing people. The emphasis is on coordinating units and gaining compliance rather than on formulating goals and strategies or encouraging flexibility.[2]

The problem is stated forcefully in a field report from a development project in Africa. The writer notes that when projects run into difficulties, observers typically recommend hiring more trained personnel. He strongly opposes this solution.

> The problem is not one of a lack of training or insufficient personnel members but one of conviction, discipline and close supervision. . . . In my opinion [the problem] is primarily due to the careless, easy going work style which is deeply embedded in the minds of the fonctionnaire class. . . . In almost every instance, the cadre in the field is already overtrained for the jobs they have been assigned. The problem is not that they can't do their jobs but that they don't do them. An initial remedy for this problem would be a structural reform which provided for tighter employee control and supervision. There needs to be a solidly reinforced system of rewards for those who perform well and sanctions against those who perform poorly and most of all a well-disciplined, competent corps of administrative "leaders" who are unafraid to be tough with those employees who fail in their duties (Wentling, 1981, 15–16).

The assumption that people pursue their own interests is worth looking at more closely. Although the approach obviously draws from economic models that assume individuals maximize their self-interest, the bureaucratic process approach is also heavily influenced by theories of bounded rationality and thus doubts that individuals can define or prioritize their interests. Economic models of bureaucratic behavior assume that individuals want to shirk work and that they usually have the advantage when negotiating with their employers.[3] Bureaucratic process theory, by contrast, emphasizes the limits of reasoning. Because interests are problematic, the theory makes "minimal reference to self interest" (Perrow, 1986a, 230).[4] Some would argue, however, that from a manager's perspective the effect is the same, because managers have to assume that individuals are motivated to do what seems to enhance their position, rather than to identify with program goals (Stone, 1980).

In predicting that people tend to subvert program goals, the approach is not implying they are doing wrong; rather, the approach assumes people are doing what makes sense from their perspective. It is simply more rational to protect one's position than to work hard to accomplish program goals. A study by Blair of a rural development program in Bangladesh describes the logic behind the bureaucratic process approach. He finds that agents frequently steer benefits to the better-off farmers and that managers actually encourage this behavior. One explanation is that the parties are lax or inept in favoring wealthier groups. A bureaucratic process perspective, however, offers a significantly different explanation. It observes that field level managers are held accountable by their superiors to increase production, and they in turn hold the agents accountable for ensuring an increase. Because the better off farmers are more likely to be innovative and efficient, agents and managers are more likely to be rewarded for increasing yields if they channel resources to them. Thus, according to this theory, when bureaucrats favor the wealthier, they are not expressing a social preference but are only behaving rationally from the perspective of incentives and rewards within their organizations (Blair, 1978). Therefore, bureaucrats will favor the better off farmers even if it means undercutting the organization's goal to aid the poorer farmers.

In light of this logic, when organization members do not follow through on a job assignment, managers should not spend time worrying about poor attitudes or inadequate job training. Instead managers should address the structure of their organizations, particularly the system of incentives, and examine whether existing routines actually serve as disincentives. The approach assumes that individuals behave rationally and that "each participant will continue his participation in an organization only so long as the inducements offered him are as great or greater . . . than the contributions he is asked to make" (March and Simon, 1958, 84).

Organizations are systems of exchange in which members make their contributions and receive rewards in return. Managers can induce changes in behavior by altering one or more of the factors in the decision calculus of organization members—benefits, costs, or resources. Benefits function much like economic incentives; when they are carefully designed they enable individuals to satisfy their own interests and simultaneously fulfill program goals or the tasks of the organization.[5] To some extent, prescriptions also take into account how costly different strategies are for managers because they also are economic actors who need to conserve scarce resources and focus their energies where expected rewards are greatest.

The approach focuses on two of the management functions: enhance the development capacity of implementing organizations and work with and coordinate multiple organizations and groups. Concerning the capacity of organizations, the approach asks why organizations frequently have very little capacity and become diverted from performance and engulfed in red tape. Why do managers have so many difficulties in making changes? Do established routines encourage or discourage staff from identifying with program goals? What are the best ways to supervise workers? How can managers use their assumptions about individual behavior to ensure that everyone contributes to development goals? What are the effects of the control and accountability procedures managers develop? What is the most effective procedure for getting staff to focus on their performance?

The approach also stresses that managers often have to work with other units to accomplish their goals and may choose to delegate some program responsibilities to other organizations. How can managers most effectively coordinate the other units? Under what conditions will organizations cooperate, and what steps can managers take to encourage them to do so?[6]

Problems in Applying the Bureaucratic Process Approach

Case studies of development activities describing how bureaucratic procedures engulf organizations with red tape and prevent change are legion. A large body of organization theory explains how procedures readily become ends in themselves and stifle responsiveness and innovation. Theorists refer to the "organizational imperative"—organizations develop their own internal standards of behavior, and these become more important than carrying out program goals. Hummel, for example, describes how organizations emphasize their need to continue functioning as a system and attempting to manage and control groups in the society (1977). A number of development theorists have documented how readily this dynamic is repeated again and again in the development context.[7]

This chapter focuses primarily on three of the problems associated with bureaucratic procedures—procedures may become routinized and impede change; incentives can easily undermine development goals; and an emphasis on economic incentives can overlook some important ways to motivate behavior.

Although the approach is very clear that routines and incentives need to be carefully designed to promote desired behavior, these same routines can become institutionalized and impede change and responsiveness to new program demands. Often individuals develop a vested interest in continuing routines and are loathe to consider changes because the routines protect individual competence and status.[8] Or members will be socialized to the dominant values in an organization and become attached to its routines, apart from any instrumental value they have (Leonard, 1985).[9] For either of these reasons, routines may persist even after they cease to offer any economic payoff to members.

As routines become institutionalized it is difficult to respond to new demands in the environment (Leonard, 1985).[10] Instead of a situation in which program goals determine procedures, the reverse is true—procedures influence the ways in which goals and implementation strategies are defined (Gawthrop, 1983, 122).[11] This attachment to existing routines explains why development goals are often undermined and why it is so difficult for many development agencies to actively promote change (Heaver, 1982, 20).

Although routines and incentives may be very useful to coordinate different units and gain compliance, they also can have perverse effects. Established routines can encourage behavior that works at cross purposes to program goals, as illustrated by the following example.

> Personnel of a rural development project were provided with training and vehicles. To simplify management and establish accountability, responsibility for each vehicle was assigned to a particular individual; to minimize false expense claims, each individual received a standard monthly cash allotment to cover the costs of gasoline and maintenance. Since any costs incurred above the allotment would come from the civil servant's own pocket, this practice provided an incentive not to make frequent visits to isolated rural areas because they would increase gasoline costs and raise the probability of minor repairs. Thus, the procedure was an effective deterrent to delivery services to rural areas, monitoring field activities, or incorporating villagers into project decision making. In this example the civil servant was behaving very rationally, given the alternatives. Nevertheless, considering the rural development objectives of that project, such behavior supports the observation that the structural constraints of organizations can transform individual rationality into overall stupidity (Honadle, 1986, 120–121).

A third problem is that bureaucratic procedures and incentives typically assume that individuals respond to economic and material incentives. Although it is clear that such material rewards as pay and status do motivate individuals to contribute to development programs, these are not the only sources of motivation and may not even be the most important approach to motivation in resource-poor development organizations.

The model has primarily been used to diagnose why implementation is difficult but recently is being developed in several interesting ways, some of which address the problems identified previously. Just as proponents of the goal-directed model have come to appreciate that rationality is consistent with more flexible and open-ended processes, proponents of the bureaucratic process approach have come to appreciate the limits on control and are exploring alternative strategies to coordinate staff. The common element in all of the proposals is an effort to move beyond simple models of hierarchical control and to explore a variety of incentives and ways to include staff in defining performance criteria.

Supervising Personnel—Economic Incentives

It is worth noting that bureaucratic procedures have many advantages over the highly personalized system of supervision that continues to be the dominant style of management in many Third World situations (Hyden, 1983). Moris refers to the "hub and wheel pattern" in which a manager simultaneously and personally oversees a number of independent workers (cited in Leonard, 1977, 198). This method works, according to Moris, when staff are poorly trained and when there are a limited number of professionals to supervise them. According to Leonard these conditions are no longer as true as they once were, at least in East Africa, and the personal authoritarian style associated with this approach is actually counterproductive. It results in "a system of hierarchical control neither loose enough to permit a civil servant to fulfill his present responsibilities on his own nor tight enough to force him to do so" (1977, 200).[12]

The following discussion based on experiences in Indonesia graphically illustrates the problems associated with personal supervision and the ways in which procedures and routines can significantly improve management. The writer describes the situation prior to the development of specific procedures for supervising staff.

> [A system based on personal supervision] develops loyalty to the Director but not to the program. While it can be very ego satisfying, for it's easy for the Director to be a good guy, it is not conducive to staff development in terms of individual dignity and pro-

> fessionalism, i.e., it fosters dependency. The goodies are seen as being bestowed by the Director rather than earned. It is the traditional way but, as we innovate in the field, I believe the development of a professional group secure in its own competency and with a sense that it has earned certain benefits rather than being dependent on the benevolence of the director is a move in the right direction (cited in VanSant and Weisel, 1979, 26).[13]

Management studies increasingly are exploring ways to substitute incentives for personal supervision and control.[14] Theories and prescriptions about the uses of incentives vary according to assumptions about motivation, specifically whether individuals are primarily motivated by narrowly defined tangible economic rewards or by a broader set of incentives that includes social as well as more traditional economic rewards.[15] This section examines theories based on material incentives, while the following one looks at theories that encompass a broader set of rewards.

Economic incentives can be divided into those that induce people to become part of an activity and those that stimulate them to be more productive (March and Simon, 1958, 48). Participating in an activity depends on whether the benefits people receive are greater than the costs they incur or whether there is a net balance of satisfaction over dissatisfaction. The power of incentives depends on what workers value. Theories usually assume that staff are positively motivated by ease, security, sufficient pay, and status.

The effective use of incentives depends on workers' expectations that the rewards will be forthcoming (Vroom, 1964, 15–18). Incentive systems therefore need to make it relatively easy for workers to estimate their chances of being rewarded or promoted. For example, Leonard proposes that managers develop a specific set of criteria for promotion to make such estimates easier, such as the following: No one would be assigned to a task if they would not be capable of being promoted to the next level; each person has a 25 percent chance each year of being upgraded; promotions are based on job performance and not on seniority; and those being promoted receive separate training than those newly recruited into the system (Leonard, 1977, 120–121).

In addition to making benefits predictable, an incentives model requires that members believe the incentives will be offered only if members demonstrate the desired behavior. Otherwise incentives are irrelevant. A number of studies indicate that managers often fail to make this connection. According to Moris, "Within the bureaucracy achievement is noted mostly in default—

actions do not become individually identified unless they are mistakes."[16] In researching agricultural extension agents in Kenya, Leonard finds that pay was not related to merit and thus did not serve as an important incentive. A survey shows the agents believed that education and training were more important in determining promotions than their performance on the job (1977, 121–125).

Although much of the failure to relate performance and rewards is rooted in management styles, there is also a structural reason for the failure to link incentives and quality of performance. The reason is quite simply that performance is often hard to measure in any meaningful way. Even when measures can be established, managers may be reluctant to use them because they create disincentives. For example, using "number of clients served" as a performance measure in a health clinic may lead to treating large numbers but paying little attention to the quality of the visits. There are two strategies for developing measures—one measures effort, such as time spent or visits made, and the other measures results or effectiveness of the efforts. On the face of it the latter is far preferable because it rewards workers for what they accomplish and not merely for activity. However, the experiences in an agricultural development program in Senegal shows that the answer is more ambiguous (Seymour et al., 1985).

First consider the implications of different ways to measure work effort. Given that effort is usually much easier to assess, one can understand why managers would prefer to measure effort than outcomes. Typically, measures of effort provide standardized, quantitative results, such as measures of time, hours spent, people visited, and so forth. For example, managers can count formal requests for the use of field trucks as a measure of performance. Such data are easily collected, they fit the data gathering abilities of local staff, and they are readily understood by workers. Managers can either make direct observations or they can collect qualitative information, such as asking for activity reports, and can include some open-ended questions.

However, there are several potential problems with measures of effort. There may be very vague linkages between what people do and the results of what they do. (For example, the Kenya Tea Development Authority develops explicit targets and relies on work records to measure whether the targets are met. The work records, however, only tell how many visits were made and indicate nothing about the quality of the visits [Leonard, 1977, 203].) In addition, standards for evaluating activity may vary and even be arbitrary. It is common to include those activities that are easily measured, even if they are not the most significant. Managers frequently come to rely on measuring whether or not members follow rules and regulations, with the result that the rules come to replace the program goals. Finally, activity reports may easily be distorted by the members and come to be disregarded by managers as unacceptably subjective and self-serving.[17] One way around this latter problem, of course, is to rely on redundancy, on several different sources of information (Downs, 1967).

For these reasons it may seem preferable to monitor results of activities. Such a measure, for example, would ask what changes in farmer practices came about as a result of extension agent visits. Although conceptually this is a preferable approach, there are some real problems with this strategy. The agents may have fulfilled their roles very well, but because of the program design, the farmers were unwilling to respond. Or the agents may have accomplished results other than what was planned and measured but that are equally valuable.

An evaluation of an agricultural development activity in Senegal uses effort measures on one group of workers and output measures on another, allowing for an interesting comparison of the two approaches. Managers measure the work effort or behavior of staff hired on a contractual basis, using measures such as the quantity and rapidity of their work, the extent to which they are responsible, and the quality of their interpersonal relations. At the same time managers measure the actual outputs of their regular staff, particularly whether the staff had improved agricultural production in the community. Although this second approach seems to provide more useful information to managers and to link rewards with the quality of work, managers find that it poses severe problems. It forces them to rely on much looser criteria and is harder to implement. As a result, they find that it is difficult to distinguish among different levels of performance using outcome or impact measures (Seymour et al., 1985). The evaluators conclude that although measures of results may provide useful information about program results, the measures do not provide an incentive to workers.

Evaluation can also be perverse by encouraging workers to neglect problems they confront. Potentially, reports can provide feedback to managers about conditions and problems in the field. To the extent that the reports are also used as an instrument for evaluating the work of personnel, however, agents will be reluctant to report any problems because these will reflect poorly on the agents' work. In fact knowing that routine field reports can be used to evaluate one's work makes it tempting to falsify them.

The perversity of many supervisory procedures is graphically described by Heginbotham in his study of field agents in India. He finds that agents

> writing to their superiors initially for informational purposes soon discovered that their reports were treated primarily as bases for evaluation of their personal performance, and that the evaluation was based on their relative success in achieving targets. The formats on which reports were to be submitted became increasingly quantitative and restrictive in nature, and the character of the reports soon reflected the changing motivational forces operating on field agents. Descriptive, problem-oriented accounts of the trusted representative were replaced by the quantitative reports of the defensive subordinate (Heginbotham, 1975, 164–165).

As is evident from this example, managers dry up a fertile source of firsthand information when they use evaluations to control subordinates. The perversity goes even deeper, however. Because the same evaluations of field agents can be used against the managers, the latter lower their expectations of what agents can accomplish. Heginbotham describes how managers felt they need clear and concrete standards against which to measure the work of subordinates. The standards turned out to be a two-edged sword. The field level manager could use them to evaluate subordinates, but they could also be used by higher level managers to evaluate the field unit. Each manager realized that

> his own performance was being evaluated on the basis of his ability to coerce his subordinates into fulfilling their targets. Thus the more demanding the levels of performance required of his subordinates, the greater the difficulty he would have in achieving a creditable record. [As a result] each officer was strongly motivated to minimize the potential of his region and the capacity of his staff in order to keep his own targets to the lowest possible levels (1975, 163).

In place of strategic thinking to set targets and promote change, this approach encourages managers to lower their expectations.

One of the more interesting developments in this approach is negotiating performance criteria with staff. This strategy draws on the techniques of organizational development theory and says that if workers are consulted about the measures they will have a greater investment in accomplishing them. This strategy assumes that workers will agree to reasonable objectives and that they will be more motivated to fulfill criteria they have helped to formulate.[18]

> Such participative planning has the greatest possible incentive benefits, since officials are likely to . :ommitted to targets that they believe to be realistic and hav. set. For this reason, participa- 'ive goal-setting should be extended to the lowest levels of the nierarchy. Bottom-up rather than top-down targetry is not only realistic, but essential to motivation (Heaver, 1982, 42).

An example of such a system is the "programming and implementation management," or PIM, system Chambers developed in East Africa. PIM is designed to link supervision with a "clear specification of the work to be done and then with fair evaluation of the performance of that work." The procedures are very straightforward. Supervisors and agents hold monthly meetings in which they review past problems and accomplishments. Then together they work out the goals for agents for the next month and assist them in setting daily targets. Specific mechanisms are developed for the agents to keep records of the extent to which they accomplish these targets, how their work fits with the work of the other agents, and what daily activities they engage in. The emphasis is on conferring together to set goals, using the goals to clearly define tasks, and collecting information in order to monitor how well the tasks are performed (Chambers, 1974, 41–54).

In commenting on the operation of PIM, Leonard finds it was both

> decentralized and non-authoritarian. . . . [By] routinizing the reporting of delays and those responsible for them, the PIM system made it possible for subordinates to point out shortcomings in the performance of those above them and so provided a new device for field officers to pressure their headquarters over damaging hold-ups in authorizations. If they are carefully designed to that end, procedures can achieve nonbureaucratic results, such as reversals in the hierarchical flow of demands and increases in subordinate participation in decision making (1977, 221).[19]

The Training and Visit (T&V) system sponsored by the World Bank and used extensively throughout the Third World is yet another example of a set of routinized procedures for designing and overseeing the work of field personnel. As originally developed by Benor, the r utines replaced an earlier system in which agents had a number of different supervisors and thus received conflicting and multiple demands. The purpose of the system is to establish a highly standardized set of procedures for agents to follow in working with farmers. The agents live in the villages and work directly with individual farmers, following a structured set of tasks. These specify the number of visits, how to keep records, and how to determine the success of the farmers. The system also ensures that research is closely connected to extension work. Middle managers are formally linked with research centers, and agents are trained in the results of recent research.[20]

There are potential problems with any of these efforts to routinize supervision. One problem is that routinized economic rewards can easily lead to close personal supervision. Both Western and development studies note that close supervision can lead to "passive resistance, general dissatisfaction and slow down" (Prottas, 1978, 296; Schaffer and Wen-hsien, 1975). A second problem is that managers may come to define their role too narrowly. For example, a review of PIM concludes that an emphasis on internal supervision means that no attention is given to the need to build political support at higher levels in the bureaucracy. For this reason the system is not institutionalized as effectively as it might have been (Morgan, 1979, 165–168). Another study documents that such approaches view supervision much too narrowly and ignore opportunities for motivating and inspiring subordinates (Heginbotham, 1975, 208–219). Finally, the system is very management intensive, making extensive demands on managers' time.

Economic analysis has also been used to analyze appropriate rewards when people work in groups. Assuming individuals are rationally self-interested, it is easy to imagine that they may try to free ride on the effort of others when part of a group.[21] The question is whether managers should reward workers according to their contributions relative to other workers or according to the amount of work a group produces.[22] Which of these is more appropriate depends on three factors—the size of the group, the "jointness" of the effort, and how much turnover there is.

The smaller the group, the easier it is to cooperate, and rewards based on group effort are more reasonable. "Jointness of production" means that everyone in the group has to contribute to the program benefit, and thus they are dependent on each other. Assembly line workers illustrate such jointness, whereas extension workers illustrate the lack of jointness. The more jointness, the more managers should reward workers according to group effort; the less jointness, the more managers need to base rewards on individual effort. Finally, the more turnover there is, the less time people will have to develop ways of cooperating, thus making rewards to groups less effective. If, however, workers are motivated by loyalty to a group, group rewards will be more effective than those based on individual efforts, and individual rewards may even be counterproductive (Spicer, 1985, 524).

Supervising Personnel—Social Incentives

The foregoing discussion noted that in some circumstances incentives based on group loyalty will be more effective than those based on individual efforts. This possibility illustrates an appeal to social incentives and assumes that employees belong to informal social groups and will respond to rewards that provide job satisfaction, recognition, and status (Leonard, 1977, 117; Blau, 1964). Social incentives may complement economic incentives or may be proposed as an alternative and more effective approach. One reason for the presumed effectiveness of such incentives is that managers often lack the resources to satisfy workers' material incentives, particularly worker education level increases, and therefore need to generate commitments in some other way.[23] Another is that economic incentives are hard to apply because it is difficult to measure performance.

A recent study of industrial relations in Japan observes that relations in a number of industries are characterized more by trust and cooperation than by competition. The results of what the author calls "relational contracting" are more efficient than is true in the more competitive groupings. It is not the kind of efficiency that produces the lowest price, however. Rather it is an efficiency that encourages managers to be more productive and innovative, a form of efficiency called "X-efficiency." For example, "the relationships of trust and mutual dependency make for a more rapid flow of information" (Dore, 1983, 475).

An emphasis on trust and goodwill also can generate another form of efficiency, one particularly relevant where a nation has a full employment policy and it is difficult to remove workers. Dore describes a number of advantages that can occur in such systems, which are not the case where workers are continually being evaluated and monitored and where they know they can be removed.

> People accept that they have continually to be learning new jobs; there can be great flexibility, it makes more sense for firms to invest in training, the organization generally is more likely to be a learning environment open to new ideas. If a firm's market is declining, it is less likely to respond simply by cutting costs to keep profits up, more likely to search desperately for new product lines to keep busy the workers it is committed to employing anyway. Hence a strong growth dynamism. And so on (Dore, 1983, 474).

By relying on peoples' desire for belonging or for status, managers can try to encourage members to identify their own interests with program goals. Staff can satisfy their need to belong by adopting the values of an organization, and managers can encourage these loyalties by exploring ways to socialize them into the norms of an organization. When values are changed in this way, members essentially control themselves.[21] Managers are relying on social incentives when they try to establish a climate of mutual trust. Based on experience in East Africa, Leonard observes that "the supervisor who is willing to be non authoritarian is in an exceptionally favorable situation. It is quite easy for him to provide his subordinates with a supervisory relationship that is satisfying beyond their expectations" (1977, 118).

In his study of rural development, Moris also makes a strong argument for exploring the social basis of commitment. It is worth citing at some length, particularly because he applies it to local field situations, where incentives can be most critical.

> In my own experience a significant aspect of program leadership is building up an invisible "tolerance margin" within the field team. Extra commitment and good will must be accumulated within the group, so that in times of crisis individuals will contribute more than can be contractually expected. The traditional approach to motivation, with its stress on direct (price-governed) remuneration and a contractual definition of roles, is ill-suited to the fluctuating demands of rural development field situations. A wise leader uses additional means to create a reserve capacity, essentially reciprocal in nature, the ability to call upon individuals for extra effort which they know will be taken into account at some future time even though the precise remuneration remains unstated. The group properties which widen this "tolerance margin" include the evolution of an internal ideology, peer group loyalty, confidence in the potential efficacy of group action, and the opportunity for individuals to achieve what they regard as being significant. . . . The major advantage of reciprocal exchange within a group is its superiority in handling "open-ended" situa-

> tions, where the exact nature of compensation cannot yet be specified, the tasks are not fully known, and the time duration of effort uncertain. As long as the individual trusts that the leadership is aware of his or her accumulating "organizational credit," he or she will work hard, even under unusual demands. Perhaps the most important reward is the feeling that the organization is succeeding, and that the sacrifices made voluntarily by individuals are worthwhile and appreciated (1981, 26–27).

Because of the potential power of social incentives, Leonard suggests that managers use a group rather than an individual approach to supervision. This strategy enables them to draw on both social and economic incentives. For example, in supervising extension agents, it is more effective to divide farmers into groups and assign the agents to assist the groups, rather than having agents work with individual farmers. In Leonard's design leaders chosen from among the local farmers work directly with the extension agents to

> make decisions on local agricultural matters and watch over the performance of extension staff and the standards of farmer cultivation. . . . Such groupings have sufficient social cohesion and organizational resources not only to be effective for extension but also to provide the eventual framework for needed cooperative ventures and shared services (1977, 204).

In the meantime managers find it is much more effective to supervise the agents by attending group meetings. Group meetings encourage farmers to be more responsive and at the same time enable managers to make more valid and positive assessments of what the agents do. "Reliance on the group meeting and demonstrations therefore makes extension agent work truly visible and renders possible for the first time the meaningful evaluation and reward of worker effort" (Leonard, 1977, 206). (Note that Leonard is proposing using groups to establish impersonal routines for holding staff accountable. This is quite different from the work group techniques designed to make collegial decisions. The latter use of work teams is used for decision making rather than supervision and is associated with the goal-directed and social development approaches.) Routines are useful, Leonard continues, particularly when organization members have not internalized the development goals of a particular program. Such mechanistic procedures are not necessarily controlling and in fact can allow lower level personnel to hold supervisors accountable. He concludes by arguing for some combination, for flexibility, for programming by negotiation rather than hierarchical fiat, for consultation in the setting of work targets, and for an independent collegial role for field officers in diagnosis and experimentation (1977, 218–223).

A somewhat different use of social incentives for gaining employee compliance is to give employees more discretion, in effect to place less emphasis on monitoring them, and more on delegating responsibility to those who are closest to the problems being addressed. Individuals will feel more responsibility, will have a stake in the programs, and will have an incentive to contribute to them. This strategy takes advantage of the information staff have, particularly those who work directly with the public. They have access to a lot of information that can be useful but is often not reported or fed back to managers. For example, staff are usually aware of client needs and preferences and of possible contributions clients could make, but are seldom given a chance to report these (Prottas, 1978).[25] It may be that evaluation methods encourage staff to hide their problems lest these problems be held against them. According to this view, managers need to offer incentives for field staff to report information, and one way is to give them more discretion to use the information.

In a version of this strategy called "backward mapping" program decisions are made at the field level by staff closely in touch with the situation. The approach assumes that employers cannot be expected to be seriously invested in programs "without a tangible stake in the outcome of those programs. One strategy for giving them a stake is to view them as part of the delivery system at the local level, rather than as consumers of a product that someone else produces" (Elmore, 1982, 616). The major problem for managers is not to accumulate resources at the national or program agency level, but to identify those people closest to the problem at the local level and learn from them what resources they need.

Coordinating Multiple Units

The bureaucratic process approach has some interesting applications to those situations where managers are working with or through a number of different organizations or units. First we consider situations in which managers have no authority over the other units but need their support or cooperation. The approach assumes that the different organizations have their own interests and that managers cannot rely on the organizations to cooperate without inducements. Competing interests are particularly evident when managers need cooperation from units that are simultaneously involved in carrying out their own service responsibilities. Contributing to a new program means extra work in a situation where there are many competing demands on resources and personnel. Moreover personnel find that any benefits they do receive come from their regular service agency, and it is therefore natural for them to remain loyal to their home organization. Competing interests are also evident when field units have to work within political communities and adapt themselves to local interests and resources (Berman, 1978).[26]

Exchange theory assumes that organizations will only cooperate when they receive mutual benefits from doing so (Schmidt and Kochan, 1977, 220). It directs managers to provide benefits to other organizations or lower their costs. It predicts that organizations may cooperate when they need resources—funds, specialized skills, or access to certain markets. It emphasizes, however, that there are strong organizational imperatives working against such cooperation (Aiken and Hage, 1963). Recent literature underscores the problems in gaining voluntary cooperation, particularly as the number of units increases (O'Toole and Montjoy, 1984).

A recent review of integrated rural development activities lists several different ways of coordinating program units, all of which are essentially efforts to provide incentives to gain cooperation. These include information sharing through meetings, workshops, and reports; joint action such as synchronizing the sequence of field activities, joint supervision, contracts, and joint planning; and sharing resources by seconding personnel, loaning facilities, joint budgeting, and contracts (Honadle and VanSant, 1984, 42). Managers need to weigh these and similar options by taking into account the benefits they provided to each unit and the costs these options impose on the coordinating units.[27]

The situation is somewhat different in those cases where managers are working with and through a number of units over which they have some authority. This is true when managers decide to decentralize a program so that regional or field units have a major role in implementing the program. In such cases managers find that an increasing amount of their time is spent supervising and coordinating others, over whom they have some, but limited influence. Often the others are located at some distance. Again the model predicts that supervision and coordination should be based on an appreciation of what incentives will be attractive to the different units. It also reminds managers that coordination can be a very costly strategy, creating considerable "administrative overhead" and preventing anything from being accomplished (O'Toole and Montjoy, 1984, 499).

Coordinating strategies can range from complex structural arrangements, such as matrix organizations, to more informal systems. A matrix organization can be used when individuals need to focus on two aspects of a task at once. Staff from several agencies could be assigned to a unit developing a nutrition program. Staff would be responsible both to their agencies and to the new unit. In the development context the matrix organization has been tried to some extent with integrated rural development projects, where it has been used to create linkages among several line agencies. According to the bureaucratic process approach, matrix organizations can develop all of the pathologies described earlier. In particular people may become so invested in the routines that they overdepend on formalities and focus on procedures rather than performance.[28]

Others claim that informal methods of linking departments or units work better, that success

> is invariably related to a manager's ability to recognize and use informal procedures, relationships, agreements, and communication channels. . . . The essence of an informal style is to encourage nonthreatening involvement during the evolution of a decision to create a sense of joint responsibility among those whose cooperation is needed to implement it. When this kind of informal coalition is achieved, less resistance is encountered during implementation (Honadle and VanSant, 1984, 35–36).

Informal methods rely on social incentives and enable managers to deal with the ambiguity and role conflict that arises whenever individuals are confronted with different sets of demands and responsibilities. Like several of the strategies in the goal-directed approach, informal methods draw on techniques associated with organizational development, encouraging people to share any problems they have in working with others. The bureaucratic process approach stresses, however, that people are unlikely to use informal procedures unless they are rewarded for doing so.[29]

An example illustrates how incentives and coordination can be provided through a combination of formal structural arrangements and informal processes. INVIERNO, a program to provide agricultural credit in Costa Rica, reputedly has a very effective management system. The central program unit retains functional authority in several areas, such as personnel, planning, and evaluation, while responsibility for implementing credit is decentralized to local units. The central unit uses its responsibilities to promote rational procedures and high standards. For example, to ensure high quality personnel and to relieve the local units of burdensome paper work, INVIERNO has implemented a highly professional personnel system that combines a competitive salary scale, a liberal fringe benefit package, and an effective system for the selection and promotion of the personnel from within, which includes six-month individual employee performance evaluations (Gonzalez-Vega, 1979, 41).

At the same time, INVIERNO has built lateral linkages across the divisions, primarily by using more informal team approaches. Planning is done by joint sessions involving central, regional and local staff. Rather than "isolated divisions and departments, with their corresponding heads, the insitution operates as a team even at the highest managerial levels. This team shares results, formulates plans and closely coordinates its activities. The result of this interaction is the formation of a solid *esprit de corps*" (Gonzalez-Vega, 1979, 44).

The Bureaucratic Process Approach and Program Management Functions

According to this approach, the most salient aspect of program management is the fact that different groups involved in program implementation have their own interests, which may or may not correspond to development goals. Managers are primarily supervisors who need to develop routines and procedures to overcome the natural resistance of these different parties and coordinate them to accomplish program goals. Over time the groups develop a vested interest in maintaining organization routines, and it is difficult to change them in order to carry out new development programs. Thus the approach is very useful in explaining why it is difficult to change the bureaucracy and how easily routines become institutionalized.

The chapter describes a variety of ways in which managers can get around these problems, primarily by designing incentives. Many of the most useful strategies stem from economic models that accept peoples' values and preferences and steer them in a different direction. Others that draw from a wider variety of incentives accept peoples' social needs for status and belonging and also try to develop new commitments and values. As the approach has been applied to the development arena, there has been increasing emphasis on using a variety of incentives and not being limited to those that fit in a relatively narrow economic calculus.

Table 6.1 reviews these uses of incentives. Note that they have moved far beyond the original prescriptions to impose more control. There is increasing attention to incentives, both social and economic. Recent versions of the prescriptions incorporate consultations, work teams, and routinized procedures in order to protect members from the excesses of personal authority. A common denominator of all of the techniques is that they accept peoples' preferences and interests as legitimate and recommend that managers accommodate them rather than try to change them.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

The emphasis in the approach has been on processes for supervising staff. Program goals are generally accepted as givens, and the major work of managers is to coordinate the efforts of everyone involved in the implementation process. Managers need to develop a capacity for gathering information, but unlike the goal directed model, they need information about the preferences of staff rather than information about policy options. Prescriptions have gone beyond traditional methods of centralized control and personal supervision to look for alternatives to these traditional, hierarchical strategies. For example it encourages the use of incentives based on actual performance and proposes evaluation systems that reward performance and that fit with the interests of members. It recognizes that members will often respond to social reasons for improving their performance and are not solely guided by economic incentives. Several observers propose negotiating with personnel and collaborating about measures for evaluating them.

Work with and Coordinate Multiple Organizations and Groups

Just as the approach is useful in diagnosing difficulties in bringing about change in organizations even when new program goals require it, it is equally realistic in emphasizing that other units have

TABLE 6.1 Strategies in a Bureaucratic Process Approach to Program Management

Supervise personnel by manipulating economic incentives
Make rewards predictable
Link rewards to performance
Make tradeoffs between measuring effort and results
Allow workers to negotiate performance measures
Make tradeoffs between routines and personal supervision
Reward individuals rather than groups when groups are too large to develop trust
Supervise personnel by relying on social incentives
Socialize people into values of program
Develop loyalty and trust
Work through groups to make supervision more effective
Give local staff more discretion in order to give them a greater stake in program
Manage implementation by several units
To gain the cooperation of field units, attend to their organizational interests
Look for opportunities to exchange mutual benefits with other organizations
When responsibility is decentralized, supervision and coordination assume even greater importance, while managers' authority may be very tenuous
Provide incentives to other units to follow through on responsibilities
Consider the relative merits of structural arrangements and informal procedures for coordinating staff and units

their own interests and priorities. The approach urges managers to take the interests of other units seriously, offer incentives, and look for mutual benefits. In those cases where managers have decentralized responsibilities to a number of other units, the approach reminds managers that supervision and coordination are particularly difficult and that they will need to consider combinations of structural arrangements and informal processes.

Notes

1. Among the many sources see Cyert and March (1963); Etzioni (1964); March and Simon (1958); Lipsky (1976); Blau (1964, 1971); and Clark and Wilson (1961). For interesting reviews of the approach see Allison (1969); Cummings (1977); and Elmore (1978).

2. Montgomery describes how common this tendency is within the development context (1979a). This issue has been extensively written about in the United States as the problem of overseeing the work of "street level bureaucrats," those who work directly with the public. Because they work with the public they are torn between the demands of the organiza-

tion and the demands of the public and frequently resolve these opposing pressures in ways that are counterproductive to the program (Lipsky, 1976; and Prottas, 1978).

3. These assumptions have been developed by economic theorists into a body of literature known as agency theory. See the extended review of this literature in Moe (1984); and the more critical review by Perrow (1986a).

4. In an interesting review of economic theory, Rhoads notes that in theory economic models can encompass a variety of different motivations, both benevolent and self-interested, but that in practice they assume a much more narrow set of interests based on material self-interest (1985).

5. According to one description, the model uses economic exchange theory in two ways. First, conflicting demands are converted into prices by having each individual negotiate the terms needed to agree to pursue another's preferences. Second, managers or entrepreneurs impose their goals on the organization in exchange for the negotiated wages paid to employees. In addition to these wage negotiations, organizations use elaborate systems of motivation, promotion, reward, and control to maintain order and consensus among organizational participants. Thus the employment contract is reinforced by a system of inducements that provides management with a means of securing employee consensus toward organizational goals (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983, 261).

6. The literature predicting the difficulties in interorganizational cooperation is vast and growing. See Berman (1978); Aldrich (1979); and O'Toole and Montjoy (1984).

7. For example, see Bryant and White (1982); Gran (1983b); Heginbotham (1975); Heaver (1982); and Cohen et al. (1985). These works all include a number of additional citations.

8. See Elmore (1978, 201); and Wolf (1979).

9. Leonard cites the literature on comparative organizations, which shows how the different socialization experiences of administrators goes far to explain the different administrative experiences in European nations. For example, applied to England, socialization theory explains why there was "business as usual" when the socialists came into power. Policy content shifted, but decision-making styles remained the same because administrators from both parties came out of the same socialization experience (1985).

10. The bureaucratic process approach notes that responsiveness may be difficult because bureaucratic routines become more important to staff than attending to the community. A later chapter on the social learning approach attributes this same lack of responsiveness to the different norms within implementing organizations and the community. For example, see Korten (1980); and Gran (1983b).

11. This problem is illustrated by an evaluation of an innovation in the Liberian Department of Planning within the Ministry of Agriculture. Members of the planning unit greatly increased their ability to handle

and analyze information, but the other units in the ministry were not geared to use what was produced. Therefore, it was hard to connect what the analytic unit was doing with the information needs of the various program units. Each unit pursued its traditional approach, and little was changed in spite of the increased capacity (Hermann, 1985).

12. Heginbotham also criticizes methods of supervision that depend on personal contact, based on his research in India (1975).

13. The statement comes from the Save the Children Indonesia Field Office, Bana Aceh, "Semi-annual Report, FY 1977–78," (15).

14. A number of studies of implementation argue that incentives are more effective than penalties. For example, see essays by Jacob and Brown (Brigham and Brown, 1981).

15. Proponents argue that because economic models are able to posit ahead of time what is in a person's economic interests, they can make predictions that can be falsified. There is, however, no comparable theory about social exchange. The closest social exchange theory comes to prediction is that people will take on the values of the group of which they are a part. For this reason those who find value in a predictive theory are willing to sacrifice some realism for predictability. For a further discussion of these tradeoffs see White (1976).

16. This comment by Moris is cited in Leonard (1977, 125) and is taken from a study by Moris on Kenyan administration. For a similar observation see Wentling (1981, 17).

17. A very good overview of these issues is found in Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson (1986).

18. Leonard finds this to be the case in East Africa, that although workers did far less work than could be expected, they came up with reasonable standards when asked (1977, 197–223).

19. Another evaluation of the program is found in David, Oyugi, and Wallis (1975).

20. For a fuller description of the system see Benor and Harrison (1977), who first proposed it. It is also referenced in Bryant and White (1982, 190–191); Johnston and Clark (1982); and Hage and Finsterbusch (1987). For reports of its implementation see Ray et al. (1979); and Kingshotte (1980).

21. This use of the theory comes out of the public choice literature, which explores efficiency problems related to public goods. In this case group effort is a public or collective good. For a recent review of this literature see Spicer (1985).

22. Managers can also reward workers according to some absolute standard, and in these cases public goods theory does not apply.

23. David Leonard has made this argument on a number of occasions (1984, 80; and 1985, 111).

24. Heginbotham distinguishes among three kinds of incentives: material incentives, in which the work is structured so that workers find it in their interest to be effective; feedback control, in which they respond to

monitoring: and preprogrammed control, in which they are socialized to accept the values of the agency. This latter is often marked by a strong sense of professional identity. "The Indian Civil Service was a classic case of a preprogrammed field cadre and its successor the Indian Administrative Service has maintained the tradition" (1975, 156–159).

25. According to Prottas, the fact that the field agents in the United States are involved in two different worlds means that these agents control the information clients and organizations have about each other. This control accords the agents considerable power. Because agents control most of the information, agencies find it hard to monitor them. Collecting independent information about job performance is costly and error prone (1978).

26. The literature on the use of economic exchange theory to understand interorganizational relations is growing. Essentially it assumes that organizations cooperate with each other on the basis of exchange. It includes Benson (1975); Levine and White (1961); Schmidt and Kochan (1977); O'Toole and Montjoy (1984); Warren (1967); and Aiken and Hage (1968).

27. Honadle has applied this list of coordinating devices to different parts of a manager's environment. Recall the distinction discussed in Chapter 4 among those aspects of the environment to be appreciated, influenced, and controlled. When we are dealing with the environment to be appreciated, we can only share information through such means as meetings, workshops, reports, and liaisons. When we are dealing with those aspects of the environment over which we can have influence, or can control, we can draw on all three strategies (Honadle, comments at 1986 workshop on development management, American Society of Public Administration, Anaheim).

28. One study outlines several pathologies in matrix organizations: (1) power struggles; (2) ambiguity about roles that leads to anarchy—when it is not clear what to do, one can do anything; (3) "groupitis"—people overdepend on a group or team; (4) a breakdown because of competition for funds; (5) excessive investment in overhead and information, which strangulates decisions; and (6) "naval gazing"—everyone focuses on internal processes rather than on their performance (Davis and Lawrence, 1977, 11–14). After reviewing rural development experiences, Honadle and VanSant observe that matrix organizations are much too complex for most development situations and produce conflicts that are difficult to resolve (1984, 34).

29. An evaluation of a project in Niger notes that members of the implementing organization were reluctant to spend time working in teams, not because of their attitudes toward teamwork, but simply because there were few if any rewards for spending time working with others (Painter et al., 1985).

7

The Institutional Analysis Approach

Assumptions and Questions About Management Functions

Whereas the approaches described in the last three chapters assume that managers are working within an existing set of organizations, there is a growing interest in examining the relative advantages of different institutional arrangements for implementing programs. This approach, referred to as institutional analysis, examines and compares various rules or institutions for carrying out programs. Like the goal-directed approach it uses rational analysis but applies the analysis to a different set of questions—namely, what institutions are best suited to implement program goals. In very general terms, the concept of institutions refers to the rules and norms for selecting and allocating values in a society. Institutions encompass organizations as well as the rules for assigning responsibilities to them. Rules include formal agreements, informal shared understandings, and expectations about how organizations should function and relate to each other.[1]

Institutional analysis reflects a recent trend in the social and political sciences. Until recently observers have assumed that institutions are a product of cultural and social forces and that it is important to work within and improve those that already exist. Recently, however, institutions are being analyzed as important forces in their own right, forces that can shape and influence their settings (March and Olsen, 1984). At the same time there is more emphasis on evaluating, comparing, and designing new institutions, rather than accepting existing ones uncritically. How do people behave in different institutional settings, and what influence do they have on policy and programs? The result is a broad interest in analyzing, shaping, and designing institutions.[2]

The approach raises a whole new set of issues for managers. Instead of focusing on internal organizational activities, it leads them to examine different ways to organize a program. This shift in emphasis can make a powerful difference, and according to one observer, it raises an important and substantially different set of issues. From the perspective of institutional analysis,

> [a] body of knowledge that focuses on how to organize and operate a public agency, how to motivate and supervise public employees, has far less to say. What is needed instead is a far more complicated political economy of the tools of public action. . . . Public management takes on a whole new dimension that the implementation literature has yet to acknowledge (Salamon, 1981, 261).

It is fair to ask if this is really an approach to management or if it is an issue that only can be settled at the policy-making level. The question is particularly relevant because programs are linked to ongoing host country organizations. Whereas project managers may be able to design new organizations, program managers work within existing ones. This connection, however, does not preclude program managers from experimenting with different institutions for delivering program services. As noted throughout the book many programs are actually systems for delivering services rather than operational production units. Often managers will have considerable discretion in designing these systems and in developing institutions for handling program activities.[3]

As an example consider the institutional choices facing managers of a farm credit program. One option is for the host program agency, such as a ministry of agriculture, to implement the program on its own. Another option is to ask what alternative strategies could be employed to handle credit. Credit, for example, can be provided by a number of different organizations following a number of different rules. These organizations include

> state agricultural banks, supervised credit agencies, national and regional development agencies, area pilot projects, crop purchasing authorities, various kinds of farmers associations and cooperatives, credit unions, commercial and rural banking systems, private processors and exporters, suppliers, distributors and dealers, village merchants, etc. (Gonzalez-Vega, 1979, 8).

According to an institutional analysis approach, managers often have to make such choices. Even when the decision is made at the policy level, managers may be in a position to contribute to the discussion. What have they learned about the capacity of other organizations and of local communities? Are there alternative mechanisms for providing credit? What problems have managers experienced in trying to be efficient? The answers to these questions may determine if institutional analysis is even placed on the policy agenda, and they will certainly influence what kinds of institutional arrangements are considered.

The approach is relevant to three of the management functions in the framework: contribute to development content of program design; enhance the development capacity of implementing organizations; and work with and coordinate multiple organizations and groups.

Concerning program design the approach asks how to deliver program services, rather than using analysis to select an appropriate policy. Which are the most efficient and responsive institutions? What institutions are most fitting to deliver particular services?

In order to enhance the capacity of implementing units, the approach asks what kinds of institutions will force program units to be more efficient and effective. What procedures will ensure that programs respond to peoples' preferences about development goals?

Insofar as managers rely on other units, the approach asks how they can best interact with them, and in particular, how they can facilitate the contributions of the other units to program performance.

Problems in Applying the Institutional Analysis Approach

The major source for this approach has been micro economics, particularly a body of literature known as public choice theory. The major problem raised about the approach concerns the validity of applying economic models of behavior to development problems. This section reviews the assumptions in economic analysis and public choice theory, notes some of the problems that have been raised, and introduces several alternative approaches to institutional analysis.

Public choice theory defines institutions as rules and expectations that regulate how individuals interact. Its major purpose is to design rules for choosing policies that allow individuals to maximize their preferences at the least cost. Public choice theory uses concepts borrowed from micro economics to analyze the ways in which choices are made through traditional political institutions and to compare those choices with choices made through market institutions. The theory has been particularly appealing because it begins with very specific assumptions about how individuals make choices and builds on these to present a predictable, testable model of choice. The lure of a deductive theory is even greater because development studies have failed to develop a theoretical base and because neither sociology nor public administration offers a comparable, predictive methodology.[1]

According to public choice theory, both market and public institutions pose problems in translating individual preferences into public policies, and it is important to compare them rather than simply turn to public bodies whenever there are problems with market arrangements. Based on the premise that individuals behave rationally to maximize what is in their interest, public choice theory predicts that policy elites and program managers will try to promote their own interests. Given that the public sector offers few checks, governments are usually more inefficient than the markets they try to correct. Some go on to argue that the problems with the public sector are so severe that the only solution is to privatize, to turn over all feasible activities to the private sector. Others who use public choice, and these are potentially more interesting to managers, propose ways to change public institutions. Instead of focusing on public versus private institutions, this second version of public choice theory explores a variety of mechanisms for reforming public institutions by incorporating some aspects of the market in program activities. These reformers typically encourage managers to decentralize program activities and work through the private sector or through local field units.

Public choice theory also questions whether managers have any incentive to speculate about a variety of different institutions. The bureaucratic process approach, for example, assumes that managers are more interested in expanding their jurisdiction and power base than in exploring alternative institutions and delegating responsibilities to them. In fact, however, managers have been willing to consider a number of different institutional strategies, as illustrated by the farm credit program mentioned previously.

Current economic difficulties and resource shortages can also be an incentive to managers to look for more efficient and effective strategies (Lamb, 1982).

Although public choice theory continues to dominate institutional analysis, a number of other economists not identified with public choice theory have begun to participate in this discussion.[5] They question whether efficiency and preference satisfaction are the only or primary criteria for evaluating institutions. For example, some argue there is a need for institutions that encourage innovation or promote change. These analysts are interested in ways in which institutions encourage feedback as well as competition. Others stress there is a need for institutions designed to accomplish agreed-on social goals, not just goals that are most efficient. Some emphasize that preferences can change and develop and that there is a need for institutions that can accurately reflect these changes. Although these analysts generally recommend that managers decentralize responsibilities, they are more interested in how managers can facilitate the work of other units and hold them accountable and are less apt to urge that managers simply turn activities over to the private sector. It is a different emphasis but a very significant one.

For example, some observe that quite apart from public choice theory, public managers increasingly have come to rely on a host of different units, or third parties, to implement program goals. There is a need to pay more attention to the ways in which the public and private sectors interact and the new demands this interaction places on public managers. From this perspective, managers need to play a very different role when they are working with other units, particularly some within the private sector, than they do when they are producing services directly. The chapter continues by describing several versions of public choice theory and then goes on to describe some alternative approaches to institutional analysis, emphasizing their implications for reforming organizations and managing programs.

Public Choice Critique of Public Sector Management

For a number of years economists have accepted the fact that under certain circumstances markets fail to provide the amount of goods that people want. For example, markets do not work well when people lack information to make informed choices (Arrow, 1974).

Markets also fail to supply the preferred amount of a certain kind of good, those that are called "public." Public goods are available to everyone whether or not they contribute to them, or even want them, and it is generally difficult to keep people from enjoying their benefits or suffering their costs. Malaria control programs based on spraying mosquitos provide a public good. It is difficult to divide a spraying program into separable units so that it only affects some, and it is also hard to exclude people in the area from enjoying the benefits of the program once it is carried out.[6] As a result traditional economic theory predicts that if spraying is provided through a market, individuals will free ride on spraying done by others, and less spraying will be done than individuals actually would prefer. Only a public institution, one that can draw on general tax revenue, is in a position to provide an efficient amount of spraying.

According to public choice theory, however, before it is assumed that a government program is the only viable way to provide a spraying program, it is important to analyze how governments actually function. When micro economic concepts are applied to public institutions, it is clear that there are many costs associated with government. The most important of these are transaction costs—the expenditure of time and effort when people have to interact and bargain with others. There is also the cost of paying for policies one does not want. The next step is to weigh these costs against the costs of relying on the market or, in effect, to compare market and non-market failures.[7]

There are four reasons for government or "non-market failure"—private goals, rising costs, externalities, and inequity (Wolf, 1979).[8] All stem from an initial assumption that bureaucrats are primarily motivated to maximize their own interests. First, it is difficult to translate programs into unit costs and hence to measure when the organization is providing them efficiently. This is particularly true of "public goods," goods that provide general benefits and whose value cannot be measured by selling them on an open market. Because they have no performance measures, managers substitute private goals or standards to evaluate a program. Is their budget larger? Have they hired more personnel? Like the bureaucratic process approach, the model assumes that managers want to maintain their status and expand their organizations.[9] At the same time there are no external pressures forcing managers of public programs to be efficient, to hold down costs, and to satisfy client groups.

A second cause of non-market failure is that there are no market incentives to reduce costs, and thus prices tend to rise over time. Third, beneficiaries pressure policy makers and managers to increase program benefits but have little concern for the costs. Fourth, there is inequity in that those with less influence receive fewer benefits (1979).[10]

A recent study of public enterprises in sub–Saharan Africa by Nellis adds empirical support to these predictions. Although aggregate figures are not available and are often difficult to interpret, he concludes that African public enterprises "have yielded a very low return on the large amount of resources invested in them." Some of the reasons can be traced to particular policies such as price supports, but Nellis also attributes the low performance to a number of the same administrative characteristics that worry public choice theorists. These include "unclear and contradictory objectives," "excessive political interference," "overly frequent rotation of managers," "incompatibility of civil service procedures with commercial operations," and the "pervasive and negative effects of the lack of competition" (1986, 12–20). Both Wolf and Nellis are suggesting that these characteristics are intrinsic to, or exaggerated by, public provision. (Nellis does add an important qualification in noting that many of them are also generated by particular experiences in African nations, such as the weak private sector and international pricing decisions, that can make these organizations particularly vulnerable.)

Given these characteristics, many within public choice go on to recommend that governments privatize many of their activities. Some say that it is virtually the only way to improve programs, while others pose it as an option but recognize that it is not always feasible. The privatization strategy has become particularly important in the development arena in recent years because international lenders and donors are bringing pressure on program agencies to divest themselves of many of their activities, particularly those that produce private goods.[11] As Nellis comments, however, privatization often is not feasible and may not be desirable, and therefore efforts to use institutional analysis to reform program agencies may be more interesting.

Public Choice Theory and Institutional Reform

Public choice theory is also used as a basis for reforming public institutions by incorporating aspects of the market into program design and implementation. Instead of using a simple dichotomy between private and public goods, the theory considers a broader variety of institutions and ways to treat public goods like private ones. "The objective is to improve performance in public sector institutions by institutional reforms which offer some important efficiency elements of markets—which increase incentives by enhancing competition, choice and accountability—in a non-market setting" (Lamb, 1982, 3).

Lamb, reporting on practices of the World Bank, divides these practices into two kinds: those that alter the external environment of a program agency to force it to perform better and those that emphasize internal reforms to improve performance. The first four strategies that follow are examples of external changes, and the last two illustrate internal reform. Note the interesting overlap with many of the strategies proposed by the bureaucratic process and social learning approaches.

Stimulate Direct Competition. The purpose here is to break bureaucratic monopolies so that a number of different organizations provide a program benefit. These can include private sector or community based units. For example, even if a program is operated through a public enterprise, a government body that produces and markets a private good, managers can encourage competition by and with the private sector and instruct the public enterprise to maximize its profits and try to be more competitive (Nellis, 1986).

Another way to provide competition is to contract out parts of an activity to other units. Instead of making program units more efficient, as prescribed by the approaches described in earlier chapters, managers can contract the work to smaller units less encumbered with bureaucratic procedures and history. The units can be in the private or non-profit sector, or they can be local public sector units that are given considerable autonomy to carry out programs at the local level. Smaller units can tailor program benefits to the immediate needs of the local community and can draw on local resources. They force program agencies to be more accountable by forcing them either to compete with a number of other units or be more responsive to consumers (Russell and Nicholson, 1981, 4).[12]

For example, program managers are increasingly contracting with PVOs to provide some program services. These organizations are presumably more responsive to local communities, more apt to include local citizens on their boards, more sensitive to the poor, and less susceptible to bureaucratic aggrandizement.[13] Presumably PVOs will have to be both efficient and responsive in order to be refunded because they will be competing with a number of other potential providers. Examples include using traditional herb vendors to distribute contraceptives, contracting with private firms to maintain public roads, and allowing private firms to offer fertilizer to farmers in competition with public agencies (Lamb, 1982).

Market Government Services. Instead of providing a package of services (such as fertilizer, seed, loans, and extension services), let consumers (or farmers in this case) select which mix of services they want. The purpose is to give consumers more choice and provide government bodies with better information about consumer preferences.

Organize Users. Organize local self-help units to provide services and to represent the interests of consumers to agencies. Lamb cites the example of the highly successful Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), which organized a number of local tea committees to represent the tea growers, groups that in turn forced the KTDA to be more efficient. This strategy provides an interesting overlap with the social learning approach described in Chapter 8.

Institute Performance Agreements. In this case the government agency sets performance criteria and regulations and then lets individual public units find the most effective way to meet them. The agency will need to set objectives clearly, provide backup services, and hold the units clearly accountable.

Decentralize Internal Management. Lamb's description of this strategy echoes some of the developments in the bureaucratic process approach. He notes that top level managers are often burdened with far too many decisions and recommends changes that would delegate decisions and budgetary resources to "specific working units—and to give their managers a much wider range of discretion over how they achieve objectives" (Lamb, 1982, 8). Managers can also look for ways to increase competition within agencies through bonuses, contests, and so forth. Smaller units have lower "transaction costs" because they are usually relatively homogenous, community preferences are more evident, and program benefits can be tailored more precisely to community choices.[14]

Offer Internal Incentives. Lamb's final strategy is similar to some of the developments in the bureaucratic process approach. It recommends the use of pay and promotion incentives and of techniques for evaluating managers throughout a program agency (Lamb, 1982).

Introduce Coproduction. Another reform strategy for incorporating the market is coproduction. This concept indicates that programs—particularly programs providing services rather than goods—can often be jointly produced by beneficiaries and public organizations. Clients can often provide some of the resources to make a service possible. Coproduction theory also says that program effectiveness varies according to how clients use the services. The effectiveness of a nutrition program offered by a health clinic depends partly on the way in which a mother uses those services in her home. The lesson for program managers is to design the program so that beneficiaries have an incentive to coproduce it—to either contribute to providing the service or to use it effectively.

A Technique for Institutional Analysis and Reform

A similar approach to institutional reform is proposed by the Ostroms and their colleagues at Indiana University.[15] They begin with a theoretical model of different program characteristics and propose appropriate strategies for each of these. Their particular goal is to increase voluntary and cooperative strategies for carrying out program goals and limit the need for public sector coercion. Cooperation, the Ostroms argue, will lead to more efficient and less costly results than is the case with traditional program activities. Cooperation is less costly because people only do what makes sense to them and because it avoids the costs that are incurred when public bodies have to decide on the best course of action and monitor whether people are adopting it.

The basic thesis is that institutions should be designed around the nature of the program goal and the extent to which it is a public good. Public goods vary on two dimensions. One is "exclusion"—whether it is possible and cost effective to exclude people from using a good. The second is "joint use"—whether a policy is used jointly or is consumed by individuals acting separately. Table 7.1 illustrates the four types of goods that result from these distinctions.

TABLE 7.1 Public Choice Theory of Goods

	Exclusion	
Joint use/ supply	*Possible*	*Difficult*
Low	A Private goods	B Common Property goods
High	C Toll goods	D Public goods

Economic theory predicts that if market-like procedures are used, the results will be more efficient.[16] The kinds of private or market incentives that are appropriate will vary with each type. When it is possible to exclude people from using goods, and when they do not consume them jointly, then the goods can be provided through the private sector, and privatization strategies will work (A). When it is possible to exclude people, but the goods are used jointly (as in the case of roads, for example), then the government might choose to use tolls or user fees to register demand and to encourage efficiency (C). When individuals cannot easily be excluded from using a service and they use it jointly, then the goods are classic public goods, and typically the government needs to see that they are provided (D). Even here, however, an agency can adapt some aspects of the market. The government can provide funds for these kinds of goods and contract with others to actually produce them.

The remaining type of good, "common pool goods" (C), is a special and interesting case and a type that is particularly relevant to development programs.[17] Economic theory says that unless individuals control or own a good or service, they will have no incentive to use it wisely or conserve it.[18] The question is how managers can take this logic into account in handling such common pool problems as rangeland, forests, or water resources. Consider the following example.

The Sahel is rapidly becoming desert, a clear case of a common pool policy area where individuals use the land separately, but it is difficult to exclude them from using any improvements. A traditional government conservation strategy is to devise a program to plant trees to hold back the desert. Public choice theory, however, predicts that individuals would have no incentive to conserve the land and that a tree planting program would not accomplish its purposes. This theory counsels managers to consider whether there are any alternative institutions that would encourage the peasants to tend to the trees rather than destroy them for food or fuel.

Several different solutions are possible. In West Africa the government plants kad trees and fines those individuals whose animals eat the leaves, thereby providing a negative incentive. In India the state government encourages villagers to maintain trees by sharing the profits from firewood with the villagers. According to public choice theory the Indian solution is more realistic because it provides incentives to individuals to foster the trees. However, because the trees are part of the commons and not owned by individuals, there is still no incentive for anyone to take care of them. The best policy is for the government to provide trees to individuals, giving them an incentive to use them efficiently (J. T. Thomson, 1981, 119).

Public choice theory provides managers with a tool for analyzing common pool situations and designing appropriate institutions. Take another example—a rapidly dwindling supply of groundwater. The traditional way to deal with such scarcity is to ration or regulate the use of water. Public choice theory proposes that instead of automatically relying on government coercion, managers should explore whether or not there is a basis for designing a cooperative solution to the problem.[10] Are there any institutional rules that would make it rational for individuals to mutually agree to limit their use of the water (Connerley, 1986)?

Assuming that individuals will maximize their self-interest, they will not limit their use of the water unless they know two things: first, that everyone else also will limit the use of the water; and second, that the others will only limit their use if they anticipate that everyone will. Unless they can be sure of these points, individuals always would be better off by using whatever amount they want and can obtain. According to traditional economic theory it would be very costly to come to such an agreement. For example, it would only work if individuals had complete information about the water supply and about how much others were using. Because these conditions are very unrealistic, the only solution is for a public program agency to regulate water usage.

According to public choice theory, however, a regulatory solution overlooks two things. First, there are a variety of ways in which such information can be supplied, some less costly than others. For example, there may be voluntary associations already existing in a community that could share information and bring people together. Other public bodies may already collect this information and could make it available to the community for minimal cost. Second, regulation overlooks the possibility that individuals may gradually evolve efficient institutions to ration and monitor the use of groundwater on their own.

Part of the research agenda of public choice theory is simply to determine whether these conditions are ever met in practice and what their results are. One study, which reviewed voluntary efforts to reduce water usage in a region in the United States, finds that common-sharing arrangements evolved. For example, the community got information on resource use from a state agency and learned about water use from the local courts. "The provision of information about individual users and the losses they were incurring and their willingness to explore alternatives occurred through the creation of the voluntary association" (Erickson-Blomquist and Ostrom, 1984, 40).[20]

This kind of analysis can be used to show managers how to deal with such policy problems as scarce and dwindling supplies of groundwater. Basically it suggests that managers need to consider three factors: first, the technical nature of the resource—in this case the fact that it is a common property resource; second, the way in which decisions are currently being made about the water, whether people take into account what others are doing; third, the way in which all those involved interact with each other, such as whether they monitor each other or try to hold others accountable for the water they use. The logic of institutional analysis is to trace through the implications of these three factors in a particular situation. If program managers find that the answers are unsatisfactory and lead to results counter to development goals, then it will be necessary to alter one or all of the factors. Because the nature of the good is usually fixed, it will be most effective if managers create new institutions for making decisions or for bringing people together.[21]

Institutional options range from voluntary to coercive arrangements. For example, managers could educate people about conservation. Or managers could police and regulate water usage. In theory, the public choice model simply states that the choice has to vary with the nature of the service or good in question, and the model can prescribe either of the foregoing solutions—education or policing, and variations in between. In reality, however, because the model assumes that governing institutions are inefficient and unresponsive, it emphasizes getting people to cooperate and monitor each other. (Note the recommendation that managers carry out the analysis first and then develop appropriate institutions. The social learning model described in the next chapter takes a more interactive approach and encourages community groups to work with program staff to design institutions that fit community needs. The public choice approach, by beginning with a deductive analytic technique, assumes that it is necessary first to establish rules or institutions that define how individuals will interact and cooperate.)

The model can also be expanded to take into account the distributional outcomes of different institutions and rules (Oakerson and Connerley, 1985). Managers can ask whether any potential users are being excluded, whether rules are being enforced selectively, and whether some users are benefiting more than others. This concern for distribution is an important issue because the poor may easily be hurt when common property goods are privatized. Consider the difference between publicly provided irrigation systems that benefit the community and private tubewells owned by individual farmers. When a community has a common irrigation system, village leaders will maintain it because it benefits them as well as everyone else. When individual tubewells are used, however, the better off will invest in them and will no longer maintain the old irrigation channels. The result is that privatizing hurts the poor who still depend on the elites to maintain the channels (Tendler, 1982, 52).

Alternative Approaches to Institutional Design

Economic theories in general and public choice in particular emphasize the need for institutions to ensure that policy choices reflect individual preferences. Others would agree that managers need to examine and compare alternative institutions but would differ in two important respects. First, they do not begin with the deductive method drawn from micro economics, and second, they do not assume that promoting efficient choices is the most important criterion for designing institutions.[22]

A number of theorists, for example, argue that it is more important to develop institutions that encourage innovation and that these may differ from institutions designed to promote efficiency.

Economic models that stress efficiency and satisfaction of preferences are too simple and static. Richard Nelson, for example, argues that economic models cannot deal with change very effectively because competitive market institutions may not stimulate innovation.

According to Nelson, institutions are needed to perform three functions: (1) improve demand by ensuring that all preferences are brought forth—institutions should inform people about their options and educate them about the implications of alternative choices; (2) improve supply by offering incentives to guarantee that suppliers offer a variety of services and goods—this function may require managers to monitor the market and promote a greater variety of services; and (3) ensure innovation and make sure that policy choices take changing preferences and techniques into account. According to Nelson, the kinds of institutions that can perform these roles will differ in each program area. In some situations private units will be most effective, while for other programs, public organizations will be preferable. "In some cases, a market regime may screen innovations poorly. In others, an unsupplemented market regime may fail to generate an appropriate stream of innovations" (Nelson, 1977, 142).

Nelson illustrates his argument by analyzing appropriate institutions for day care programs. Instead of beginning with economic theory or public goods characteristics, he begins by looking at the history of day care to identify the kinds of problems that have arisen in the past. This history indicates that programs have been unresponsive to clients, that they have not encouraged differentiation and variety, and that they have been of very uneven quality. Based on these findings he recommends that day care programs address the aforementioned three functions. Day care programs can encourage demand through vouchers, better information, and solicitation of public views. The programs can encourage supply by establishing a regional board to ensure that centers are organized where most needed and to guarantee minimum standards. The programs can encourage innovation by ensuring that day care centers are responsive to community preferences.

Nelson is suggesting that instead of improving the efficiency of institutions there is a need to increase their capacity to mobilize and express public preferences. Both the social learning and political influence approaches make similar points. Like public choice proponents these clusters of theorists emphasize the need for institutions to elicit and express preferences. Unlike public choice theory, however, these theorists recognize that preferences can change and that program officials will often need to play a role in informing people or educating them about alternatives. Managers may have to organize community groups or design procedures to encourage interaction among groups. Managers also may have to inform members of the public about certain options or even give the public information in order to modify its preferences (MacRae, 1973). These theorists also are willing to concede that there may be structural reasons for peoples' preferences, that societal values or historical experiences may constrain preferences.

In summary these theorists are more than willing to sacrifice the precise deductive method encapsulated in public choice for a more historical, critical analysis. Those attracted by the precision of the public choice model, therefore, find this more historical or problem-centered approach disappointing. It is too open-ended and does not provide precise predictions that can be tested. Conversely, others who are equally interested in analyzing and designing institutions, but who are willing to forego a predictive theory, find this broader approach to promoting choice and eliciting demand more appealing. It is more realistic in taking historical and contextual factors into account, and it is much more suited to the nature of development, which involves changing preferences and technologies and requires innovation.[21]

Ensuring Accountability and Reliability in Institutions

Generally those interested in institutional analysis, whether they rely on a public choice model or a more descriptive analysis, conclude that there are many advantages in encouraging and relying on multiple units to carry out programs. A number of theorists focus on the problems that can arise when managers choose to work through a variety of organizations. Instead of comparing the efficiency of public and private institutions, these theorists ask how managers can be held accountable for program results when they depend on others and how managers can ensure that other units will be reliable.

These theorists acknowledge that for whatever reasons, programs are in fact being implemented by an increasingly diverse set of units. This increasing emphasis on what Salamon calls "third party government" does not signify a move to a drastically curtailed public sector and a parallel, but growing private sector.

Rather this emphasis means that there is a complex, mutual penetration of the public and private sectors and that those concerned with institutional analysis need to explore the role of managers in monitoring and working in this more complex arena. When the issue is defined in this way, it becomes evident that public managers have an essential, albeit a somewhat different, role to play.

These theorists raise important questions about the commonly made assumption in public choice theory that competitive market incentives ensure efficiency and accountability. Drawing on the theory of bounded rationality, these theorists offer two important caveats. First, economic incentives may be ineffective. Most development tasks delegated to other units are very complex and uncertain. Technology and policies change, and smaller units may find it difficult to keep up with the newest information. Managers can make mistakes, they may have other priorities, and expert information may not be available when it is needed. Therefore, program managers cannot always rely on market incentives to keep units accountable and may need to encourage and stimulate local and private managers to devise new solutions. Given limited information and complex problems, "the current narrow focus (on economic incentives), on rule-making activities and market failures threatens to eliminate methods and strategies" to encourage innovation (Scholz, 1984, 151).

Second, private organizations are prey to many of the same inefficiencies that the public choice model attributes to the public sector. Consider the following discussion about the proverbial "bottom line" that private sector managers presumably use to hold their units accountable but that public sector managers do not have.

> In the private sector the bottom line is only a help in evaluating sales people or the head of a profit making unit. Performance in private sector jobs such as corporate attorneys, accountants, computer programmers, or marketing specialists cannot be determined by profit or loss statements. Business managers still have to make judgments about the contribution of each person to the success of the whole enterprise, which is the way it must be done in the public sector (Pfiffner, 1985, 353).

Both points suggest that managers need to design institutional mixes to meet a number of criteria—efficiency, responsiveness, accountability, and reliability—and that even when they turn over responsibilities to other units, public managers continue to play a role. Traditionally they have been assigned a regulatory role, in which they monitor other units. The institutional analysis approach, however, proposes that managers explore a greater variety of roles and consider how to assist and stimulate other units and how to include them in the overall implementation process.

Consider the example of a rural development program to help the poor in Senegal. Managers elected to rely on banks to provide the credit to farmers. They realized, however, that banks typically do not deal with high risk individuals and that it would be difficult to make loans to the poor. Banks have a natural desire to reduce credit risks, which in turn leads them to compromise program goals designed to target funds to the poor. To ensure that the banks met program goals, the managers developed special incentives to encourage banks to assist the poor with profit sharing. Managers also had designed the program to work through local farmer organizations but soon found that the farmers were compromising many of the program goals. When managers contracted with a local farmer organization to run the credit program, the farmers set the interest rates so low that the credit program was unable to cover its costs and sustain itself (Seymour, 1985). In such cases managers may have to insist that units adhere to social goals even if they compromise efficiency (Morrison, 1986, 8).

Predictably, as program managers rely more on other units to implement programs, the nature of management changes. Supervision and coordination will increase in importance relative to producing goods and services. Because managers will be relying on units that may have considerable autonomy, it will be more difficult than usual for managers to get the information they need. Contractors will be reluctant to pass on information about program difficulties for fear it will reflect badly on them. Contracting also undermines institutional memory. Individuals will not be in a position to share what they have learned and influence program strategies on a continuing basis. For their part program managers are more apt to hear about exceptional problems or horror stories than to receive systematic, useful information (Kettl, 1987).

Managers also will find it more difficult to be accountable for the performance of a number of different units. Privatizing does not guarantee competition and accountability. There may not be a number of potential contractors competing to offer a service. Also, third party units are likely to be very touchy about accountability and will try to limit review to technical issues. Implementation will become increasingly complex and hence harder for citizens to monitor. Third party implementors may be less visible and hence less easy to monitor. As a result many of the efforts to farm out program tasks will make implementation more difficult and less responsive (Salamon, 1981).

Managers can use the other approaches described in this study to deal with these problems of working through other units. Managers could adapt some of the techniques associated with the goal-directed approach, such as including members of different units in strategic planning or bringing them together in work teams to design strategies. Managers could design incentives as described by the bureaucratic process approach. Managers could directly involve client organizations as recommended by the social learning model or could focus on the political dimensions of the task.

A recent study based on experiences of the World Bank illustrates how the goal-directed approach can assist managers working with other organizations. Nellis proposes concrete steps managers can use to monitor and reform the work of other units. He is particularly interested in cases where public enterprises have been inefficient, but his model can be used by program managers to monitor implementing organizations, particularly those that are not commercial operations.

Nellis' first step is to diagnose the unit's problems and to set up a system for collecting performance information. One of the purposes of this phase is to attach a cost to the non-commercial or social service activities of the unit. The second step is to draw up a plan for improvement specifying the expectations of both the program agency and the implementing unit. The purpose of this step is to establish "in step-by-step fashion, just who will do what, with what resources and by what date;" to lay out precise performance criteria; and to specify appropriate rewards and sanctions (1986, 57–59). Nellis' model can be amended by drawing on the goal-directed approach. For example, one could ensure that the diagnosis was done collaboratively by relying on a work team drawn from the several implementing units. Or managers could set up the plan as an exercise in strategic thinking.

The Institutional Analysis Approach and Program Management Functions

The common thread of the various theories described in this chapter is that managers need to go beyond thinking simply of performance or service delivery issues to analysis of the best institutions for designing and implementing programs. This task includes, but is broader than, selecting a number of different organizations for implementing programs. It is broader because institutional analysis includes a concern with the rules that govern the relationships among those units. Do program managers rely on the voluntary contributions of the other units and design programs to offer incentives? The value of the approach stems largely from the questions it raises. It has stimulated people to ask a new set of questions and to explore and compare different institutional arrangements, rather than assume that program agencies are the only, or best, vehicle for bringing about development goals.

Although all the approaches described in this chapter rely on economic analysis, they use it differently. A major version of institutional analysis uses micro economic assumptions to examine how public organizations operate. According to public choice theory, public organizations are inherently inefficient and need to be reformed to operate more like private sector organizations. These theorists want to privatize as many activities as possible. Other theorists also draw on economics but apply it more broadly. They make a case for designing institutions to accommodate changing preferences and to encourage innovation. Although these theorists also want to reform public sector organizations, they are not as wedded to efficiency as a sole criterion, and they are more interested in the variety of institutions that can be developed.

The chapter concludes by discussing the unique demands placed on managers when they are working in an arena that combines public organizations and market institutions. These theorists acknowledge the trend for program agencies to contract out and decentralize responsibilities to other units. These analysts also focus on how program managers can work with these "third parties" to carry out program goals. Because bounded rationality is a problem for all organizations, and because development programs often are carried out with a great deal of uncertainty, program managers need to assure that the other units act reliably and responsibly. Table 7.2 summarizes the prescriptions offered by these various theorists.

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

The institutional arrangements for delivering program benefits are an important element in program design. According to public

TABLE 7.2 Implications of an Institutional Analysis Approach for Program Management

Public choice critique of public sector management
Managers replace program goals with private goals
There are no incentives to hold down costs
Beneficiaries bring pressure to increase benefits
People with less influence receive fewer benefits
To avoid these problems, privatize public sector activities

Public choice strategies for reforming institutions
Incorporate market characteristics into public organizations by enhancing competition, choice, or accountability
Delegate or contract to other units
Market government services
Organize users
Develop performance agreements
Decentralize tasks to other units
Apply internal incentives such as pay and promotions
Organize coproduction with users

A strategy for institutional analysis and reform
Institutions should be appropriate to public goods aspects of program goals
User fees will make toll goods more efficient
Governments can fund public goods, but contract with others to provide them
Managers should explore ways to increase cooperation to deal with common property goods
Managers may be able to use collaboration among existing institutions to make cooperation more efficient
Model can be used to examine distributional consequences

Alternative approaches to institutional analysis
Include other criteria in addition to efficiency
Develop concern for being responsive and encouraging supply
Develop institutions to encourage innovation
Develop institutions that provide feedback
Take into account prior experiences of a program

Interaction among public and private institutions
Relying on multiple units makes implementation more cumbersome and makes it more difficult to ensure accountability
Bounded rationality means that private sector units will not always know what to do and that there will be a need for public sector guidance and assistance as well as regulation

choice theory, public organizations have a number of inefficiencies, and therefore managers need to explore ways to reform institutions by incorporating such characteristics of markets as competition, choice, and decentralization. Other versions argue that efficiency criteria alone are insufficient and that institutions need to adhere to several additional criteria including eliciting demands, ensuring an adequate supply, and encouraging innovation.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

The first three approaches focus primarily on the procedures internal to the implementing organization. This approach warns that internal procedures alone may not make any significant changes in organizations. Often the critical feature is an external set of rules, such as market exchange or government regulation. Competition with a number of other units may encourage more efficiency than internal monitoring or evaluation procedures. Similarly, small local units may be better positioned to be responsive than organizations that rely on particular strategies of data collection and analysis.

Work with and Coordinate Multiple Organizations and Groups

Public choice theory has been used mainly to prescribe different kinds of institutions and to explore conditions under which cooperative institutions will develop. Other analysts outside of public choice theory have shown a growing interest in the practice of working with and through a number of different units. These analysts have documented the problems associated with implementation by other units, both within and outside of the public sector, and the importance of exploring ways to assist them instead of relying on traditional means of regulation and control.

Notes

1. Harmon and Mayer (1986, Ch. 2) review definitions of organizations. Economic definitions of institutions as arenas for individual interaction are dealt with in Ruttan and Hayami (1983–84); Kiser and Ostrom (1982); and Connerley (1985). Bryant relates institutions to legitimacy (1985); Huntington to patterns of behavior (1968). An earlier version of this discussion asked under what conditions organizations are institutionalized or sustained. According to Huntington, "Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability," and that an organization is institutionalized once it "demonstrates an ability to adapt to new situations, develops more complex procedures, and when it achieves autonomy and coherent procedures" (1968, 12). See also Blase (1973); and Eaton (1972). Institution building can be done either by influencing the values of organization members or by reinforcing organization structures and rules. Drawing on socialization theory,

Leonard emphasizes the role of values and suggests we can change institutions by examining the values of those we select for leaders, by providing role models, and by the values we transmit (1985).

2. For example, Perrow (1986a) writes about the contemporary interest in questioning our institutions.

3. Institutional decisions include constitutional choices or the rules for making decisions; collective decisions or policy choices; and operational or implementation decisions (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). In applying these distinctions to management, managers usually have to work within constitutional choices, they can have some influence over policy decisions, and they have considerable influence over operational decisions. Compare Figure 2.1.

4. See Nicholson (1981, 20); and Nelson (1977, 45). E. Ostrom argues that deductive theory can compensate for some of the weaknesses of positivism (1982, Introduction). Barry discusses some of the tradeoffs in using deductive theory, which takes particular contexts into account (1982).

5. There is a growing interest in institutions as a general phenomenon as discussed by March and Olsen (1984). For a recent review of the development literature on institutions, see Bryant (1985). A study in progress by Elisabeth Shields reviews the ways in which the term *institutionalization* is used within the development community. The earlier institution-building literature often erred in stressing the continuity of institutions, rather than their performance. For a review of this literature see Barnett and Engel (1982, Appendix B).

6. For a good explanation of this logic see Wolf (1979). Goldin argues that many goods that appear public on first glance have sufficient private characteristics that we can choose to treat them as private goods. Even a lighthouse, a classic example of a public good, benefits those who own boats and vacation near the sea and not others (Goldin, 1977). Buchanan analyzes mosquito spraying as a public good and examines the conditions under which a mutually beneficial solution (Pareto optimal) will emerge. Generally he argues that there should be a decision rule greater than a majority to decide on any public good (1968; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).

7. For a classic statement of costs see Buchanan and Tullock (1962); both public and private institutions have costs, and we need to make tradeoffs among them. See also Wolf (1979). This reasoning, however, is based on a limited definition of costs. In addition to resources spent on goods some consumers do not want and time invested in working for policies, costs are imposed when individuals do not receive policies they want. As a result these models are biased against an activist public sector.

8. Wolf begins by listing four sources of market failure: public goods, increasing returns, market imperfections, and wealth inequity. He then proposes the four comparable sources of non-market failure: private goods, rising costs, externalities, and influence inequity (1979).

9. Note that many of these "failures" were also cited by organization theorists and implementation studies, as discussed in Chapter 6. Public choice theory argues that its analysis is more rigorous because it is based on a predictive theory of human behavior, rather than on empirical generalizations.

10. In addition, because non-market goods are financed through public taxes or some form of external aid, there is no measure of demand. Hence organizations may well provide far more than people would want if they had to pay individually (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).

11. In spite of a growing number of cases where such "load shedding" is being attempted, a number of recent reviews emphasize that we know very little about the likely results of moves in this direction (Morrison, 1986, 9). Nellis notes that in Africa at least there has been little actual divestiture, although there is some preliminary action in this area. Part of the problem is that local capital markets are too weak to make investments, and the international lending market has also been reluctant. When the latter does get involved, it frequently demands high rates of protection (1986).

12. Both transaction costs and public choice versions of economic choice theory assume that individuals are self-interested. Recent theory accepts the concept of bounded rationality and agrees that individuals seek their interests within the bounds of a limited rationality. Perrow argues that instead of assuming self-interested behavior, it is more interesting to ask what structures call forth self-interested behavior (Perrow, 1986a, 257). He lists a variety of circumstances that do this, such as measuring individual rather than group effort (1986a, 233). There is some ambiguity about the notion of self-interest, however. Economists insist that their definition of self-interest is very open-ended and includes a wide array of preferences, including those for others' welfare. The economic approach only requires that people are willing to pay for what they want, whether it be more equity in the society or clean air. However, when economists define their terms and conduct their studies, they almost always emphasize "narrow, usually, monetary self interest" (Rhoads, 1985, 816).

13. See Tendler (1982); and Gorman (1984). In describing these reputed virtues of PVOs Tendler goes on to argue that they are not self-evidently true but should be treated as hypotheses that may or may not be true in particular instances (1982). For a case study of a social program agency in Egypt that contracted with local community organizations, see White (1986b).

14. A recent study argues that small, competing organizations are the best means to accomplish efficiency during conditions of abundance. When there is resource scarcity, as is endemic in the Third World, small units may not be efficient and may generate a lot of waste and duplication of effort (Berg, 1984, 79).

15. This approach is associated particularly with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, who direct the Center for Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University and who have done much to articulate the relevance of public choice theory to the field of public administration. Although much of their analysis is based on studies of local governments in the United States, they have begun to apply their concepts to development issues.

16. This is referred to as property theory in economics and states that if people own a good, or have private use of it, they will be more apt to purchase the amount they want of it and to take care of it. For one statement of this approach see Schultze (1977).

17. One of the best-known discussions of this type of good is found in Hardin (1968). It is also frequently referred to as the problem of the "prisoner's dilemma." Individuals acting alone and pursuing their own interest may not end up with their preferred position because of the actions of others. Hyden reminds us that the concept of "commons" usually refers to state land in the West, but that in Africa it is assigned to tribes (1983).

18. Public goods theory also has been used to predict that managers will have difficulty eliciting support for public goods. Because people cannot be excluded from their benefits, whether or not they pay for them, the same people will conceal how much they want of the goods so as to avoid paying, whether in resources, time, or energy (Olson, 1965). To get people to contribute the manager has to attach some other benefits or require them to become members of a local organization (Bryant and White, 1984). This theory about participation has been challenged both logically and empirically. The logical challenge goes as follows: Individuals reason that they do not have to contribute to get the benefits of a public good. But they will also anticipate that everyone else will use the same reasoning and decide not to contribute. Therefore, using economic reasoning, they will know that unless they contribute, public goods will not be provided. On the basis of this rational calculus people will decide to contribute if they want the good (Kimber, 1981). Empirically, several studies have shown that in fact people do contribute to public goods when there are either social or ideological reasons for doing so (Uphoff, 1985; and White, 1976).

19. For one discussion of relevant theory see Kiser and Ostrom (1982). Connerley uses the theory as the basis for the case described here on water resource management (1986).

20. E. Ostrom applies this analysis to villages in Switzerland and Japan (1985). There are a number of other studies that apply institutional analysis to development situations. These include Bratton (1986—Zimbabwe); Bromley (1982); Bruton (1985); Connerley (1985; 1986); Gellar (1985—Senegal); Hennessey (1985—Costa Rica); Nicholson (1981); Ruttan and Hayami (1983–84); Thomson (1981--Sahel; 1985—Niger); Thomson and Connerley (1986); Wynne (1985—Botswana).

21. See Connerley (1986); Oakerson (1985); and Kiser and Ostrom (1982).

22. When Connerley raises questions about the distributional consequences of different institutional arrangements, he is also going beyond the methodology of public choice.

23. Kirlin also fits in this tradition. He makes a strong case that we should be focusing on institutional analysis and design but says that public choice is limited by its preoccupation with efficient service delivery. Instead we need to design institutions that increase our capacity for making choices (1982).

8

The Social Learning Approach

Assumptions and Questions About Management Functions

One of the themes in this book is that the approaches to understanding management have been expanded and developed in a number of interesting ways. One of the most significant developments is the effort to be more inclusive, to propose ways for managers to incorporate additional perspectives into their decisions and implementation strategies. This effort has been true of the two dominant approaches to management—the goal-directed and bureaucratic process approaches. Recent adaptations recognize that managers have limited information about programs and their likely impacts on the community. Therefore, proponents of both approaches suggest that managers include more points of view in program design, that they look for opportunities to interact with others. Rather than focusing solely on control and coordination, managers need to appreciate the values of adapting to local situations and consulting with others. It is important to recognize, however, that even as the approaches have become more inclusive, the changes they propose are designed to cope with weaknesses or "limitations on an otherwise purposive and rational process" (Perrow, 1981, 296). These approaches propose that managers consult with others to compensate for the limited information managers possess and to make program strategies more rational.

The social learning model, by contrast, views the limits on rationality and the need to incorporate additional views as opportunities rather than as weaknesses. This model asserts that development involves personal transformations that can take place only if individuals themselves are intimately part of the process—that is, if they shape it and are transformed by it.[1] It is not enough for managers to learn by adapting to community demands or by consulting with clients as is done in the other models. Direct involvement in program design and implementation by community groups and beneficiaries are essential, and the role of managers is to design and oversee a process that promotes such involvement.[2]

Ickis proposes a classification of management strategies that illustrates the unique thrust of this approach. He describes four development strategies—growth, welfare, responsive, and holistic. The first three are all consistent with the four approaches described in the foregoing chapters. All four approaches can be used to promote economic growth, to provide services to improve the welfare of community members, and to respond to demands from beneficiaries. The social learning approach adopts the holistic strategy and includes a concern for growth, welfare, and responsiveness. This strategy assumes it is essential to involve community members in shaping development programs (Ickis, 1983).

The social learning approach can be thought of as a continuation of the debate about different kinds of institutions discussed in the last chapter. This approach shares with public choice theory a skepticism about the ability of traditional, large bureaucracies to bring about development and is interested in making public organizations more responsive to local communities. The social learning model differs in several major respects, however. Instead of relying on a method of analysis to prescribe institutions, it urges managers to establish processes whereby community members and groups become closely involved in the management process. Often this will mean turning over responsibilities for program design or implementation to local organizations, but the purpose is to learn and change the governing units as much as it is to accomplish the most efficient result. Accountability is not achieved by formal procedures but comes out of the interaction among managers and community members.[3]

Social learning theory suggests four different reasons for involving the community in management. The first is a pragmatic reason and is similar to developments in the goal-directed approach. Given the bounded rationality of managers and the fact that people hold different values about development, it is necessary to get more information from local groups.[4] Their opinions are worth knowing, and they often have essential expertise. The most direct way to get that information is by involving people directly. For example, managers in the Philippines found that to design an appropriate irrigation system they needed information that could only be provided by farmers. They also found that ideas and data provided by the farmers differed from, and were superior to, that provided by program engineers (D. Korten, 1980; F. Korten, 1982).

A second reason for involving people directly is to create a momentum for changing governing organizations and for promoting learning. The social learning approach holds a significantly different view of organizational learning than do the other approaches. The goal-directed model relies on techniques for collecting information and for adapting to feedback, and the bureaucratic process approach emphasizes the need for incentives to gain the cooperation of community groups. This approach, however, assumes that organizations will learn only if community groups are organized and involved immediately in the management process. Conversely, groups will be able to contribute and to avoid becoming the instruments of government officials if they have some responsibility. The involvement of members and stakeholders confronts managers with new views and experiences at the same time that it gives the members and stakeholders an investment in the program.

A third reason for involving community groups directly in the work of program agencies is to increase the community's capacity to contribute to development. An early study by Uphoff and Esman of local organizations in sixteen different Asian countries finds that the more organized groups and the ones with closer linkages to the government were much more productive (1974). Montgomery adds that these linkages were critical to productivity, that "the weaknesses of extreme localism are as debilitating as the pathologies of an unrestrained bureaucracy." Based on his own review of land reform experiences, he finds that "sustained administrative support offered by the professional bureaucracy to local institutions is an essential ingredient of long-term agrarian reform" (1979b, 59–60).

A fourth and related reason for involving community groups is that the very act of involvement changes them and increases their capacity for effective action. Development, according to this view, is not just a series of changes carried out by development organizations. It involves a transformation in the values and perceptions in the community, changes that have to occur at the community level. Such changes cannot be "done for them" but will only happen when communities have some control of their future.[5] Managers, therefore, have to find ways to involve stakeholders directly in the management process, to give them an opportunity to develop their own capacities.

This emphasis on the responsibility of community groups comes out of two different bodies of theory. One is community development theory, which argues that unless community groups are empowered and have an independent base they will be swallowed up by the dynamics of bureaucratic institutions. Thus empowerment and organization are means as well as ends and are essential for community involvement in the management process.[6] The second source is the literature on community renewal, which is interested in new and emerging community organizations and self-help activities. It points to the variety of signs that communities, when they are given the opportunity, demonstrate their own internal strengths and resources.[7]

The approach is particularly relevant to four of the management functions: contribute to development content of program design, enhance the development capacity of implementing organizations, expand program resources and political support, and work with and coordinate multiple organizations and groups.

Concerning contributions to program design, the approach observes that managers and their staff are limited by their professional biases and that community members often have expertise essential for designing sustainable programs. A major concern is that professionals and community groups view the world in very different ways and need to learn how to communicate with each other about program goals.

In exploring ways to enhance the capacity of organizations, the approach is not primarily concerned with organizing the poor. Rather it asks how to involve community groups in the design and implementation process. To what extent are managers open to involving community groups in design and implementation activities? Do organization norms support learning? Are there any mechanisms in place to involve community groups and integrate them into the management process?

The approach takes the issue of program resources very seriously and asks to what extent clients are in a position or are willing to contribute resources to a program. Are clients willing to give money, time, leadership or labor? If they are not willing to contribute, are there any ways to give them a greater investment in the program and a greater responsibility for its results?

Finally, the approach emphasizes the interorganizational context of management. What are the responsibilities of other organizations, both those in the government and those in the community? What kinds of linkages exist among them? Do these linkages promote collaboration and shared responsibility?

Problems in Applying the Social Learning Approach

A perennial problem in applying the approach is that observers often mean quite different things by the terms *participation* and *local involvement*. There are differences about how these concepts are defined and also what they are supposed to accomplish. This point is made very vividly by Charlick in his review of participatory strategies in Francophone Africa. He describes a number of activities associated with Animation Rurale, an effort to mobilize or "animate" rural communities. Charlick observes that three different perspectives can be applied to determine if a particular animation strategy is effective—whether people are liberated, whether the technical results of an activity are improved, and whether organizations are reformed and capacity is increased (1984, 1–30). After reviewing a number of specific activities associated with Animation Rurale, he concludes that a significant number are designed to improve the technical efficiency of activities and end up as fairly top-down efforts (Charlick et al., 1985).[8]

In another review of participatory strategies, Riggs confirms the difficulty in getting government agencies involved in community organization efforts or in sharing power with local groups. He notes that most of the reports of citizen participation experiences, even those written by strong proponents of social learning, emphasize the actions of the relevant government units and say very little about the roles and actions of the community organizations (Riggs, 1985, 21). Others note the difficulty that managers and staff in traditional program agencies have in working with community organizations. The operating norms in many organizations stress rationality and control, and as a result managers try to control the participatory process and are unwilling to share power or allow community groups to be involved in any meaningful way. Managers may formally delegate some decisions to subordinates, but if prevailing norms do not attach any value to the views of others, such delegation is not worth much. A closely related problem is that even when professionals are committed to collaborative involvement their apparent expertise can easily intimidate less experienced community members.

Some argue that these problems are implicit in the nature of organizations. In his revealing study of participatory activities throughout the Third World, Gran observes how difficult it is for large organizations to work with the poor. He notes that the development community has implicitly been saying, "'You, large organization, go out there and help poor people.' The problem is that large organizations cannot do that. Organizations and people have different languages and cultures; even if they learn how to communicate to an extent, they still have different and opposing agendas" (1983b, 15).

The major problem is that existing large organizations are dominated by the elites in any society and therefore are biased against the interests of the poor. Gran contends that the solution is not to reject organizations. "While organization is a major weapon of the strong against the weak, it is also often the only weapon of the weak against the strong" (1983b, 15). Gran's study documents a number of cases in which communities did successfully organize and work with and through government organizations to promote sustainable development.

Other observers find that the social learning approach is too complex and demanding given the limited capacity and hierarchical norms in most Third World settings. The approach is hard to translate into specific techniques and replicate in different settings. Moreover, the emphasis on process in the approach does not mesh well with demands for accountability by political elites and donors.

Like the other approaches this one has been amplified in practice. Observers and practitioners have gone beyond an earlier stress on community organizations and now stress management practices and institutions. These practitioners propose ways to link community groups with program agencies rather than relying simply on informal interaction or on organizing the community. Originally, community development theory emphasized mobilizing and empowering community groups and expanding self-help activities.[9] This orientation proved inadequate, however, because it "failed to adopt the painstaking approach to developing a participative administrative structure able to respond to bottom-up initiatives" (D. Korten, 1980, 482).

This comment by David Korten, one of the major architects of the social learning approach, points to the importance of new management styles and institutional structures to link community groups and program agencies.[10] It is not enough to encourage or allow groups to help themselves or to operate outside of government organizations. Groups need to participate in the program agencies themselves and be in a position to influence them.

> A social learning approach offers the potential for improving development program implementation by empowering communities for active participation in development programs and simultaneously linking those communities to the political and administrative structures in the larger society. Thus the development effort is not solely that of organizing client communities as an end in itself, but rather is the empowering of persons and communities for effective participation in the broader political and economic community (Thomas, 1985, 19).

Proponents also stress that involvement by community groups in management activities may promote changes in the implementing agencies. For example, bringing staff and community members together in work teams to design programs and plan strategies for implementing and maintaining them may be one way to get managers to be more open to new ideas and to sharing authority.[11] This view hopes that as managers interact and collaborate directly with community groups this will give rise to manager reorientation.

The remainder of the chapter describes management practices and institutions that promote social learning. It begins by looking at the record of community activity and then describes two important efforts to establish the social learning approach. A concluding section examines the literature on managing the social learning process.

The Record of Community Capacities

One place to begin is to ask how realistic it is to expect beneficiaries, and particularly the rural poor, to organize and contribute to managing program activities. Is this approach even feasible? Proponents of the social learning approach take care to document the accumulating evidence that the poor do organize and that they can function effectively. A number of studies by the Rural Development Committee at Cornell University document the variety and vitality of local organizations.[12] In an important study Montgomery notes that local institutions can "supplement the contributions bureaucracies can make to development" through such services as providing detailed knowledge of local experiences, mobilizing investment and local cooperation, generating good project proposals, accepting responsibility for specific tasks, and expressing local needs (1979b, 62).

On the basis of observations in rural Thailand, Calavan offers a "catalogue of activities which are widespread and locally managed."

1. Small-scale irrigation systems
2. Flood control efforts
3. Construction and maintenance of Buddhist temple structures
4. Administration of temple fiscal matters
5. Support of monks and novices
6. Provision of "public welfare" benefits that pass through the Buddhist temple
7. Construction, maintenance, and regulation of wells and ponds
8. Administration of funeral insurance clubs
9. Cult activities, weddings, and funerals
10. Construction and maintenance of roads, paths, bridges, and cremation facilities (1984, 217)

Timberlake describes a network of organizations called the "Six S's" founded in 1977 in Africa.

> By 1985 it had grown into 1200 village groups, 700 in Burkina Faso, 300 in Senegal and 200 in Togo. The organization runs "schools" to teach village groups leaders new techniques, and can provide finances based on word-of-mouth agreements and discussions. . . . Village groups have undertaken small irrigation and drainage, erosion control and reforestation projects. They have established fruit tree nurseries and built village grain storage facilities (1985, 210–211).

The lesson is that managers need to be aware of what capacity presently exists in communities as well as what is needed. The problem is that most studies define development exclusively in terms of "problem solving" and "meeting needs" and overlook the capacities that communities have and that can often be developed (Patton, 1981b, Ch. 2).

These and other studies provide substantial evidence that community organizations play a broad and vital role in developing cultures.[13] At the same it is well documented that people are often uninterested and even apathetic.[14] According to the social learning approach, such lack of interest reflects structural options more than it reflects the proclivities of the poor. It reflects the fact that people perceive they have no stake in decisions or that they will receive no immediate rewards.[15] Fran Korten, for example, finds that farmers were reluctant to maintain irrigation projects when they were not involved in designing the system (1981). Uphoff finds that "if farmers were approached in a well-conceived manner, with their interests clearly to be served, they would respond with resources, responsibility and initiative" (1985, 140). The lesson is to capitalize on any signs of organized activity, mobilize groups when necessary, and ensure that people understand the stake they have in being involved.[16]

Another way to overcome apparent uninterest is to be certain that programs address the actual needs of the community. According to Tendler, many programs aimed at the poor are not tailored to their particular needs and can even make it harder to reach and influence the poor. For example, many programs emphasize development and income-earning opportunities rather than welfare and consequently may be biased against the very poorest. "In many areas, the poorest are more readily assisted in activities like small trading, crafts, fishing, small livestock, women-controlled production, charcoal making, peddling, and a variety of gathering or extractive activities not requiring land ownership" (Tendler, 1982, 53).

Tendler continues that a program to promote kitchen gardens has a lot more potential to improve the income of women in a community than the more common programs to stimulate local crafts. Such a program could enhance the income of the women in a fairly efficient manner at the same time that it responds to their immediate needs for income and food (1982, 57–59). If managers are aware of the needs in a community, they will be in a better position to enlist people to contribute and less likely to write them off as uninterested.

Social Learning in Practice: Two Cases

A social learning approach also requires changes in management practices and organizational procedures. Learning is not just done by individuals; it has to become part of the structures and procedures in an ongoing institution or program unit. The result is what David Korten refers to as a "strategic organization" and goes beyond the kinds of strategic planning and strategic management that fit with the goal-directed approach. The difference is that the entire organization is structured to encourage learning. This section describes two efforts to apply the social learning model, one in the Philippines and one in Sri Lanka.[17] The section emphasizes the ways in which the programs were managed and the structural changes that were made in the implementing organizations.

The National Irrigation Association (NIA)

Like most Third World irrigation agencies, NIA, located in the Philippines, not only builds large irrigation systems but works with community irrigation associations to help them improve communal systems.[18] Like its counterparts, NIA followed the common bureaucratic practice of implementing programs in stages. First, designs were made, often by a planning and technical staff. Second, they were carried out, and third, staff planned a strategy for maintaining the new facilities. In this instance engineers were sent into the field, identified which projects looked most promising, got the agency to commit funds, and then carried out the planned construction. Once completed the irrigation systems were turned over to local groups to be managed and maintained.

In the mid-1970s high level staff at NIA decided to make two rather significant changes in this process. Prior to sending engineers out into the field, the NIA hired community development workers who worked with local communities to mobilize farmer groups. Once organized the farmers were able to think about the kind of system they wanted and to share their knowledge about the most appropriate way to design the irrigation system in their community. The major thrust of this first change was to organize the farmers prior to designing an irrigation system so that the groups could assist the engineers in designing the system.

The second change involved giving the farmers a stake in the construction by offering them loans in return for which they contributed their unskilled labor. The result of this relatively simple technology was to give the farmers a say in where the dams and canals were located, what construction materials were used, and how the construction was carried out

These changes at the community level had their counterpart at the agency level. The overall purpose was not only to organize the farmers but to do so in a way that would bring about change in the agency and enable staff to "learn" how to plan with and for the community. Thus the managers did not embark on a full-scale new effort all at once. Instead the program tried a pilot project in one community and on the basis of the project's experiences, successes, and failures planned expansion to other communities.

Unlike other pilot experiments, however, the agency did not contract with outsiders to do the pilot but used its own personnel. Thus any learning that occurred was captured by the regular staff, rather than by contract organizations. As a result the learning was direct and immediate and led to changes in many of the standard procedures in the agency. Changes included the kinds of data collected, the need for feasibility studies, and a changed role for the engineers (F. Korten, 1982; D. Korten and Uphoff, 1981). For example, new data collection guidelines asked for information on the equity contributed by the irrigators' associations, on the extent to which irrigation units were actually turned over to the community, and on the amount of land that was irrigated. Prior to NIA's conscious development of a learning strategy, staff did not routinely document the contributions of community groups. As a result important indicators of development were neglected, and staff were unaware of the role of the community (Bagadion and F. Korten, 1983).

The learning also affected the norms in the organization in a number of ways. First, staff views about program goals changed. For many NIA personnel the goal of their work was to construct certain physical structures. In contrast the goal of the participatory approach was to build simultaneously both a physical system and a local social capability for using and sustaining that system on a long term basis (Bagadion and F. Korten, 1983).

Second, staff learned to take the views and expertise of farmers seriously while understanding their limitations, although observers note that some staff absorbed these attitudes far more readily than others. As a result the role of NIA changed from providing services to "enabling local communities to develop both the physical and organizational infrastructure needed to manage their irrigation needs" (F. Korten, 1982, 3). Third, managers learned that traditional systems of control and accountability interfered with their efforts to experiment and learn from others.

Gal Oya

This second example of social learning tried to apply the learning strategy developed in the Philippines to a much larger area. The Gal Oya irrigation program in Sri Lanka was carried out in a setting with severe technical and social problems, overlaid with intense ethnic conflict, and one where there was less commitment to the strategy among the top leadership than was the case at NIA. This program thus provides an important test of how adaptable the approach is to different settings.

The Sri Lanka Irrigation Agency has had a long history of trying to improve a system rife with problems—wastage of water, lack of maintenance, and inequity toward those at the foot of the system. Initially, program designers assumed that the problems with the system could be traced to the farmers. Others argued that the real problem was not at the field level but was due to the way in which the Irrigation Agency was structured, particularly its lack of contact with farmers.

A separate unit was set up to oversee the program, to organize the farmers, and to link them to the Irrigation Agency. Because the farmers were not organized, the staff decided to follow the social learning strategy—that is, to organize the farmers and incorporate them into the planning process.[19] Instead of specifying ahead of time what the farmer organizations would look like in practice, the staff set up a process for contacting the farmers, allowing them to design the organizations, and then integrating them into the implementation process.

There was considerable distrust of government staff, so new staff were hired to serve as organizers. They adopted two practices—to live in the communities and to work as teams. Both of these proved key to the success of the organizing efforts. Once in the field the organizers began by asking the farmers what they themselves could do to deal with their problems. This emphasis on self-help had an important impact on the program, and as with NIA the organizers took care to document the role that the farmer organizations played. The fact that the farmers did try some changes on their own essentially led officials to change their attitudes and be more positive toward the farmers.

One of the keys to the success of Gal Oya was its targeted and problem-specific approach to organizing farmers. Instead of the traditional community development strategy of promoting organizations as ends in themselves, community workers brought farmers together specifically to improve the irrigation system. Both groups learned some important lessons in the process. The farmers have asked for more structure, and the organizers have come to appreciate the value of both formal and informal structures. In the meantime the local organizations have proved very resourceful in handling a number of conflicts.

The organizers faced a number of logistical problems in trying to forge links between the new organizations and the Irrigation Agency. For one, the irrigation engineers were not always ready when the community organizers were. It has also been hard to institutionalize the organizing effort within the Irrigation Agency and to include it as part of the ongoing routines. Recently, routinization has begun to happen as some of the organizers have been brought on as permanent staff.

One of the most interesting strategies, and one that distinguishes Gal Oya from NIA, is that the farmer groups were told to deal with a broader range of activities than irrigation. According to Norman Uphoff, who has been intimately involved in the entire Gal Oya learning effort, this diversity made it easier for the program staff to deal with conflicting interests because there are a wide range of policies to trade off with each other. It means, for example, that those at the head of the canals, who have first access to water, are more willing to limit their access when organizers can offer them other benefits in return.

Implications of the NIA and Gal Oya Experiences

The NIA and Gal Oya cases illustrate several important aspects of the approach. First, to be effective in the long run, learning has to be carried out in program agencies or in some body with ongoing responsibilities, not in isolated project units.[20] Essentially the NIA experience assumes that development only comes about if the poor themselves are organized and able to have influence. But NIA is not proposing another interest group or a self-help model in which the poor are organized to provide resources and labor. Rather NIA organized the poor to participate in setting agendas and designing development programs. The same emphasis and involvement have occurred at Gal Oya.

> The challenge . . . has been to think through how the program can be institutionalized without becoming bureaucratized. As much as possible, without compromising the strategy and philosophy which have made the program effective in our view, we have tried to operate in harmony with government departments, staffs and rules. To coin a new term, the organizers are like parabureaucrats. It is clearly in the interest of the Irrigation Agency and the rest of the government to have such roles in operation, bridging between farmers and officials (Uphoff, 1985, 165–166).

Second, the cases tell us that there need to be significant changes in the relevant program agencies. The bureaucracy itself has to be changed—both structures and management procedures—so that managers and staff can work effectively with the poor.[21] The bureaucracy has to be *centered* on people in the community and not just oriented to doing things for people. Originally the term *reorienting the bureaucracy* was used to make this point (Korten and Uphoff, 1981). Thomas, however, notes that the term *reorienting* is really misleading. If an organization were changed to be truly people centered, it would no longer be a bureaucracy in the normal usage of the term (Thomas, 1985).

Third, learning involves pilots and experimentation as well as "embracing error" and learning from it. Mistakes are opportunities for exploring alternative strategies rather than occasions for identifying who is at fault.[22] In Gal Oya the organizers began at the head end of the canals and then as they gained experience gradually moved to the more difficult tail-end areas. Different criteria can be, and usually are, applied at each stage. Early in the process managers need to emphasize effectiveness. Because any efforts at this stage will likely involve trial and error they may be relatively inefficient. Later, once considerable experience has been gained, managers can focus on becoming more efficient.[23]

Note that error is not something one simply reacts to once it happens. Rather error is essential to learning—hence the emphasis on being willing to experiment, to risk new approaches. In this sense social learning is different from incremental adjustments in which managers make small changes that are presumably changes in the right direction and do not carry much risk. Learning from error means being willing to attempt significant changes as part of a process in which there is opportunity for exploring and reflecting on the changes.

Fourth, the design of the system has to be appropriate to the capacity in the community. In David Korten's words, the key is whether there is a "fit" between the capacity of the beneficiaries, the nature of the program, and the structures and procedures in the organization. For example, whether or not the community is organized makes a big difference in the kind of linkages established with the program unit (D. Korten, 1980).

Fifth, a major purpose of the social learning process is to stimulate local organizations, to promote indigenous leadership, and to help farmers build a functioning organization with widespread participation. These give the community a base from which to hold an agency accountable. In the Philippines there already were organizations in some areas, which the organizers strengthened. In Sri Lanka, they had to build organizations. The key in both situations was to link the organizing effort with the task of reforming the irrigation system.[24]

Sixth, the processes should link the agency with these organizations. NIA established a relationship between the agency and the community groups that was critical, a relationship that provided managers with useful information. In the NIA case farmers have continued to provide important information about the best place to locate canals and how to maintain them.[25]

Finally, the system needs to be open-ended and flexible. This characteristic is similar to the emphasis on discretion in the public choice model and loose coupling in the anarchy approach. For example, Korten asks whether "the financial control system [is] 'leaky' enough to allow individuals to divert some funds for experiments" (D. Korten, 1984, 344). He adds that managers need to consider flexible change and structural order at the same time. "One of the most critical challenges in managing a strategic [learning] organization is that of sustaining a creative tension between those forces which provide stability and those which drive change" (1984, 344).

Managing a Social Learning Process

In this approach management has to encourage learning from experience. Bureaucrats and managers are brought together with community members to reflect on and confront a particular problem or task. They propose an idea, it is tried out, some mistakes or errors presumably occur, and new ideas are proposed as part of the experience.[26] What is it like to manage such a process? What roles do managers play within a program unit and vis-à-vis the beneficiaries in the community? More specifically, what kinds of data collection, monitoring, and evaluation strategies fit with the learning process? The four techniques that follow facilitate this process: collecting appropriate data, documenting the implementation process, collecting information about the poor, and reviewing professional norms.

Collecting Appropriate Data

In order to encourage learning, data and the techniques for collecting them have to fit the needs and capacities of all those involved.

Chambers warns that measures are often more complex than they need to be and that we should consider "optimal ignorance" and "appropriate imprecision" (1980, 1981). What do we need to know? What really is not that important? How precise do we need to be? Instead of cost-benefit measures of internal rates of return, it is probably more useful to know how many jobs were created or who were the gainers and losers from different programs (Chambers, 1985, 27).

Most often simple proxy measures are sufficient, ones that can be collected through "rapid rural appraisal" (RRA) rather than through sophisticated survey research.[27] Proxy measures are usually visible and hence can be directly observed by researchers and by the poor themselves.[28] Unfortunately, Chambers observes, researchers are more apt to use techniques that do not encourage involvement by the poor and that appear remote and manipulative.

> Social cost-benefit analysis, psychological testing, and farm surveys, all serve to distance professionals from people. . . . [The usual approach] is to extract data from and about them, process it, and use it to decide what to do to those people, environments and farming systems. The process is enormously inefficient: information is missed, distorted, misunderstood, and often not used (1985, 19).

Documenting the Implementation Process

One of the ways in which managers and others learn from their experiences is by keeping a running record of the process. Based on action research, clients and researchers collaborate in observing, reporting, and reflecting on activities. Descriptions are more important than comparisons of results with planned goals, as is done in traditional evaluation (Bottrall, 1982).[29] "[Process documentation] is a tool for providing an action agency that adopts a new intervention strategy continuous information about activities in a few project sites and the problems and issues emerging from field activities" (de los Reyes, 1983, 1).

In the NIA case researchers were assigned to document what happened, to observe what meetings were held, to record what decisions were made, and so forth. Researchers relied on direct observation and unstructured interviews. Monthly reports were produced at most of the field sites, shown to the field staff, and then sent to the agency to provide a narrative of problems and issues. The reports were not diaries but were built around issues raised by the project and defined by state-of-the-art knowledge about irrigation (de los Reyes, 1983).

In Gal Oya the community organizers placed much less emphasis on documenting what they were doing. Program managers compromised the rationale of process documentation by applying it to a sample of local projects. The reporters also discussed the results with team members before sending in their analyses. If this made them somewhat more subjective than they would otherwise have been, it also meant the reports provided instant feedback. In order to encourage reporters to be more objective, the managers stressed that they assumed mistakes would be made and that the important thing was to report them so that others could learn from them (Uphoff, 1985, 145).[30]

Collecting Information About the Poor

Because they are less visible, the poorest members in society are often ignored by programs, even programs presumably targeted at the poor. Further, studies of the poor often leave out the poorest members of the society. For example,

> in the Duale area of Ecuador, if one worked with small farmers owning land parcels of between two and five hectares one would be reaching 28% of total parcels but excluding 51% of the parcels, which are less than two hectares. In Ecuador, if one worked with farm families working plots any larger than six hectares, one would be excluding 67% of the families who work less tnan six hectares (Tendler, 1982, 48).[31]

Another problem in collecting information about the poor is that data often emphasize economic conditions and deficiencies but do not give any information about the resources of the poor or the ways in which they cope with economic conditions. To deal with these deficiencies, David Korten and George Carner developed new techniques for collecting economic data that indicated how the poor used their resources and what problems they confronted.[32] Through this process, "the poor became visible, not as potential welfare cases, but as hard working, creative individuals sustaining themselves under difficult circumstances" (D. Korten and Carner, 1984, 206).

Korten and Carner began by dividing people according to their resource base, rather than by the more traditional category of livelihood, such as farmers, hunters, or fishers. Then, instead of doing a socioeconomic profile on each group, the researchers looked at how members actually used these resources. By asking how people in fact earned income Korten and Carner found the poor had a broad and varied number of strategies for earning a living.

> For example, in a given household the husband might fish in one season and harvest coconuts in another. The wife might tend a garden and engage in small-scale trade. . . . Once available data were organized around the survival strategy concept, a dynamic picture emerged of the causes of poverty that afflicted these households and of the creative efforts of individual household units to sustain their members (D. Korten and Carner, 1984, 203).

Reviewing Professional Norms

One of the continuing themes of the social learning approach is the importance of the norms within an organization and the fact that dominant norms usually do not encourage learning. According to Robert Chambers, the learning process requires a new set of norms, one that he identifies as "new professionalism." Their core value is that clients should be taken seriously. New professionals "see poor people as active and knowledgeable, professional colleagues as much as clients, people from whom to learn and whom to serve as a role consultant" (Chambers 1985, 17).

By contrast "normal professionals" find it difficult to relate to the poor. Whereas the bureaucratic coordination model provides incentives to get staff to be more concerned about the poor, this model assumes that organization members are so inured to elitist, professional biases, they are unable to deal openly with the poor (1985, 17).[33] One reason is that bureaucrats and farmers live in very different cultures. " "Each has its unique 'calendar,' neither being the calendar year one usually thinks of. For the farmer, the relevant cycle of activity follows the coming and ending of the rains, while the official is preoccupied with a different 'cropping cycle' known as the 'budget year.'" (Uphoff and Esman, 1984, 147).

Managers need to adopt a "new professionalism" toward lower level staff as well as toward community members (Prottas, 1978; Schaffer et al., 1975). In describing the relations between managers and field agents in India, Rudi Singh observes that

> policies and plans were made at the top of the official hierarchy, with little participation by the men in the field. . . . Orders were passed down and the men in the field were expected to show results. . . . Targets and steps were not modified in accordance with

> the local situation. The local extension representative was given little opportunity for initiative, and since the plans he had to execute often had no logical relationship to the local situation, he found it difficult to achieve the target set for him (cited in Jedlicka, 1977, 46).

The norm of new professionalism says that the poor know a lot and can build self-reliant organizations, that field staff often have important insights into local situations, and that program staff have a lot to learn from both groups.

Impetus for Change

A remaining and critical issue is how to institute a learning process, how to get managers to adopt the "new professionalism." Given the assumptions in this approach that organizations charged with implementing development programs are so encumbered with dysfunctional norms and practices that they need to be reoriented, how do they change? Does the impetus come from within the agency? From creative leaders? From the community?

A large part of the literature in the approach assumes that some managers are committed to this view of development and that commitment by top level leadership is necessary to make it work. Insofar as managers want to promote social development, the model can help them understand what they need to do. Such leaders do exist and can make a difference, as in the case of NIA.[34] The social learning approach also provides a role for leaders through its assumption that ideas and values can be used to change peoples' behavior.[35]

A second and closely related argument is that a new view of social management is gaining momentum both within and outside the Third World. In one version the weaknesses in prevailing approaches are increasingly apparent to managers, and many are open to a more people-centered approach (D. Korten, 1981).

A third possibility is that mobilized community groups will provide the impetus for change. There are two versions of this theory. One holds that when bureaucrats and clients work together, the former will learn from those in the local community and appreciate what they have to offer. Although this view is implicit in some of the early writings in this approach, a second version has become more important and states that actual power has to be given to the local groups so that they are in a position to hold officials accountable. "To the extent that they contribute to salaries, or influence promotions, or determine work priorities, local communities or groups can compel field staffs to be more responsive to their concerns" (Uphoff and Esman, 1984, 148).[36]

The other strategies for bringing about change also rely on external pressures, either by consultants, PVOs, or paraprofessionals. The role of external consultants, people not constrained by being part of the bureaucracy, are included in the process through "work groups."[37] Top leaders in the agency and external resource people form an advisory group. By taking people out of their formal roles and bringing them together in a coalition to discuss problems, they are presumably in a better position to capitalize on opportunities that do arise. Writing about his experience with such work groups, David Korten warns, "There is nothing magical about forming a committee and providing it with flexible funding. The key is found in the commitment of the many talented individuals involved and in the informal dynamics which allowed each to contribute in numerous creative ways" (1982, 12–13).

PVOs are another possible catalyst for bureaucratic change. They have been moving from a focus on relief and welfare to an interest in development and in increasing local capacity. Rather than simply relieving the symptoms of poverty, much recent PVO assistance has gone to small-scale local efforts to address the causes of poverty. As they do this, some PVOs are exploring yet a third role in which they try to get government agencies to commit to new policies and reforms (D. Korten, 1986). Using a similar logic, Esman suggests that paraprofessionals also can serve as external catalysts in getting bureaucracies to change (1983).

The Social Learning Approach and Program Management Functions

The approach captures the social dimensions of development and offers specific prescriptions for establishing linkages between organizations and the community. It emphasizes that beneficiaries have an important role to play, primarily in providing information and in collaborating with administrators to design and maintain development activities. The approach is realistic about the fact that organizations frequently are not structured to carry out development and therefore that they need to radically alter their processes.

Some have questioned the approach because it demands too much of managers. If this charge is meant to imply that the technology is too open-ended and complex, the charge is not really warranted. Proponents have developed fairly detailed strategies for organizing beneficiaries and integrating them into an agency. Others charge that managers are seldom motivated to adopt the approach. Proponents reply that the approach is still useful because it describes cases where the strategy has worked and has had beneficial results. If successful cases continue to be documented, these may encourage external groups or top level staff to promote the approach throughout an agency.

Table 8.1 summarizes the strategies in this approach. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of these strategies for relevant management functions.

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

The social learning approach stresses that managers need to learn from beneficiaries about the best way to design programs. Because community members are often reluctant to share their knowledge or find it difficult to do so, the approach stresses the need to tailor data collection and design procedures to fit with the capacities and interests of those in the community.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

The approach deals with two kinds of capacity. One is a set of norms that encourages managers to be open to community members and welcome their involvement. The second recommends structural changes in organizations, such as institutionalizing linkages with community organizations. Whereas the exchange model of interorganizational relations says that managers should provide incentives to others to carry out tasks, this approach stresses that the local units need to be mutually involved in program design and implementation. Staff are not held accountable to predetermined criteria but are included in a process that makes them directly accountable to beneficiaries. This practice hopefully will encourage staff to pay more attention to their performance. Strategies to do this include mobilizing local organizations to hold managers and staff accountable; setting up procedures so that proposals by beneficiaries are part of the ongoing information system in the agency;

TABLE 8.1 Strategies in a Social Learning Approach to Management

Involve clients and community groups in management in order to:
Gain useful information
Encourage implementing organizations to change
Improve the capacity of community to share in development
Stimulate local organizations and empower them
Develop linkages between community groups and program units in order to:
Provide access to program units
Offer design and implementation responsibilities
Reorient agency units to social learning processes
Design strategies for purposive learning in order to:
Enhance learning through pilots and experimentation
Plan ways to learn from error
Go beyond more passive adaptive responses
Manage a learning process by:
Collecting data relevant to specific information needs
Using data collection techniques appropriate to capacity of community organizations
Having researchers collaborate with managers and clients to describe the activities that were carried out, problems that arose, and responses made
Collecting information that tells about the needs and capacities of the poor and the methods they have devised to cope with their problems
Encouraging staff to respect the poor, and to attend to information from local field staff
Provide impetus for changing to a learning process by:
Using leadership to promote and encourage a learning process
Relying on community organizations to encourage change in agency
Turning to other external parties, such as funding agencies or private voluntary organizations, to serve as catalysts for change

meeting in work groups where staff have access to external professionals; instituting process documentation so that all can learn from the actual steps taken; and relying on pilot projects and experiments to test out new ideas.

Expand Program Resources and Political Support

The approach is particularly sensitive to the kinds of contributions that local organizations can make. It attempts to encourage and document self-help efforts. It is open to turning responsibilities for such activities as maintenance over to local client organizations. It also develops support for a program by including external experts and consultants in advisory work teams with agency staff.

Work with and Coordinate Multiple Organizations and Groups

Because the core of the approach is to increase an agency's capacity to work with community organizations and learn from them, this management function overlaps with the second function—enhancing the development capacity of implementing organizations. This function, however, stresses that organizations not be absorbed into the implementing program units but rather maintain identity and that managers will need to deal with them as identifiable units with their own agendas and interests.

Notes

1. Even though this approach is closely linked to the Third World, some refer to an emerging paradigm that is far broader than development management. See for example, Chambers (1985); Thomas (1985); and D. Korten (1983).

2. D. Korten also identifies social learning with cybernetic theory (1980, 508, fn. 88). Much of cybernetic theory, however, is concerned with control mechanisms to manage the learning process. Such theories fit better under the goal-oriented model, which does allow for learning in the sense of adapting to feedback.

3. Although this approach to accountability is the emphasis throughout this literature, it is particularly stressed in D. Korten (1984); Johnston and Clark (1982, 164–199); and Montgomery (1979). See the very useful review of this literature in Shields (1982).

4. For an interesting collection of essays by Third World scholars on the need for administrative reform and decentralization in order to get more information from communities see Ro (1985).

5. See Thomas (1985); and Seers (1969, 1977), both of whom present a similar view of development.

6. These summary comments are based primarily on D. Korten (1980, 481–482); Holdcroft (1978); and Uphoff, Cohen, and Goldsmith (1979). See also Esman (1978a); Heginbotham (1975); Sussman (1980); Owens and Shaw (1972); Morss et al. (1976); Uphoff and Esman (1974); Blair (1981); and Alliband (1983). Community development was vigorously pursued in several less-developed countries during the 1950s and more recently in low income urban areas in the United States. The lessons from these experiences are primarily based on the failures of the reforms to bring about lasting benefits. Generally the reforms tried to work within the existing power structures and bureaucracies and failed to see that these often had conflicting interests and were using the community groups to promote their own activities. The experiments often treated the local community as a single homogeneous cluster, thereby neglecting the

conflicting interests within it. Finally, the reforms did not always succeed in building strong local organizations. A recent study of the literature confirms the general failure to provide immediate benefits but argues that in both India and the United States reformers did create institutions that have succeeded in representing the interests of the poor (Blair, 1981). Blair finds that a major reason programs for the poor fail is "overrapid expansion." For example, pilots that succeeded with lots of attention and were then expanded faced problems of lack of control and supervision and failed (1981, 102).

7. A recent collection of essays explores this emphasis from a number of disciplines. The collection draws from general systems theory and stresses the interdependence of different groups and the possibilities of new social and political forms emerging to deal with complexity (United Nations University, 1985).

8. Charlick adds that observers can apply any of four specific criteria of success—improvements in material well-being, equity, participation, and self-reliance (1984, 30–68). There is a further problem in establishing measures of any of these concepts because such terms as self-reliance are inherently difficult to measure. For efforts to develop measures of the effects of participation see Charlick (1984); Uphoff and Esman (1984); and Gow et al. (1979). Another source of the Animation Rurale approach is found in Gellar et al. (1980).

9. See Thomas (1983). One could even quarrel with the concept of "empowerment" if it implies that it is up to the state to give power to others. According to Friedmann, the state cannot bring about social transformation. That can only result from changes in the community. If managers are clever, they will try to harness or work with the forces of change (1986). For a supporting view see Berger's point that the poor as objects of development policy should be allowed to participate in defining the situation on which policy decisions are based and that there is a need for intervening institutions to assist the poor (1974, xii). See also Riggs (1985).

10. See Garcia-Zamor (1985). This is one of the key themes throughout the collection of essays in this book. The editor concludes with an essay entitled, "Can participatory planning and management be institutionalized in developing countries?" and proposes a number of ways to do so.

11. One of the sources for this theory is human relations theory, particularly the work of Chris Argyris, and his concern for "double loop learning"—that is, for reviewing goals and norms as well as learning new techniques (1977). See also Schon (1971); and M. Beer (1980). Frederickson, however, notes that the human relations emphasis implicit in the work of Argyris has focused on internal activities in organizations and "has done little for the organization's clients. . . . Only with changed structures can the aims of the human relations perspective be achieved" (1970, 4). The emphasis on reorientation in the social learning approach is described in D. Korten and Uphoff (1981). Another important source is Michael (1973), who specifically integrates learning and long-range plan-

ning in organizations and introduces the important concept of "embracing error," or purposefully designing activities so that one can learn from mistakes and successes.

12. A seminal study in a series, published by the Rural Development Committee at Cornell University, is by Uphoff and Esman (1974). Others include Uphoff, Cohen, and Goldsmith (1979); Fortmann (1980); Blair (1981); Gellar, Charlick, and Jones (1980); and Charlick (1984). The committee also published a journal entitled *Rural Development Participation Review,* vols. 1, 2, 3 (1979–1982).

13. Similar studies that document the wide range of community organizations include D. Korten (1980); Esman (1978a); Uphoff and Esman (1974; 1986); F. Korten (1981); Gran (1983b); and Montgomery (1979b). Useful bibliographies of the earlier literature can be found in D. Korten (1980); and Blair (1981). Whyte (1981) describes a number of successful efforts to involve farmers in agricultural research. Many of his cases are drawn from experiences in Latin America.

14. For a discussion of the problems of apathy and the role of "animateurs" in mobilizing the poor see Charlick (1984).

15. For discussions of this reasoning see Bryant and White (1984); Garcia-Zamor (1985); and Uphoff (1985, 137).

16. See also Stone (1984).

> To treat policy implementation as a technical process concerned with efficiency and productivity is too distant from the citizen experience. Such a remote enterprise can never be held democratically accountable. Passive citizens understand too little not to be misled and taken advantage of. The challenge of the future is thus not one of greater productivity in program administration, but rather one of how to organize the public and involve it actively and appropriately in the policy process (1984, 21).

17. Another often-cited effort to develop a participatory learning capacity is the PIDER program in Mexico. For example, see Cernea (1983).

18. There is a considerable literature on this case. The article that brought it to general attention was D. Korten (1980), reprinted in a shorter version in D. Korten (1986). F. Korten, who worked in the NIA system, writes about her experiences in F. Korten (1982); and in Bagadion and F. Korten (1983).

19. The Agrarian Research and Training Institute located in Colombo is in charge of organizing the farmers and has been assisted by experts from the Rural Development Committee from Cornell University. The institute started in 1979 and was funded by USAID through the Rural Development Participation project. The description here is based on an analysis by Norman Uphoff, one of the Cornell staff who has remained heavily invested in the project during the years (1985).

20. The best discussion of the implications of the NIA case are found in D. Korten (1980); and D. Korten and Uphoff (1981). See also Gawthrop (1983); Calavan (1984); and Bryant and White (1982). Similar points can

be found in Garcia-Zamor (1985).

21. Some argue that even when they are not trying to relate to the poor, central agencies have to be changed whenever there is some decentralization and they have to work with local units. One study of decentralization emphasizes the disjuncture between a central agency and field situations. For example, see Berman's study of the U.S. federal system. The dynamics at the local level are different from the federal level, and therefore the federal authorities would do better to decentralize and allow for maximum discretion at the local level, rather than become involved in local politics. (1978). For a similar point in the development context see Leonard et al. (1982).

22. See Michael (1973); Johnston and Clark (1982, 221); and Landau and Stout (1979).

23. D. Korten describes three phases in this learning process: learning to be effective, to be efficient, and then to expand (1980).

24. Recent studies qualify this advocacy model. Organizations of the poor may bypass local elites, which are often the best source of leadership at the local level. When the program is dealing with benefits that cannot easily be appropriated by individuals, then elite control of program activities may be consistent with the interests of the poor (Tendler, 1982, 34–36). See also Leonard and Marshall (1982). Banfield argues that in resource-poor societies the poor and middle class are competing for the same resources, but that as development proceeds all groups can increase their benefits at the same time (1958). The literature on development is replete with cases in which such control led to elite hijacking of benefits. See Brinkerhoff (1980) for an extensive analysis of four cases in which participation was a major factor but in which elites were able to coopt most of the benefits. Blair (1981, 66) cites the literature documenting this result in India. For a review of the U.S. literature see Greenstone and Peterson (1973).

25. Timberlake gives a number of examples about the value of consulting with peasants (1985, 92, 94, 100). The Puebla case in Mexico made a point of interviewing farmers and allowing them to give feedback before plans proceeded (Cernea, 1983).

26. Not surprisingly, the model has emerged out of the experience and self-reflection of its proponents. This close connection comes out most clearly in David Korten's description of his "search for a new development management." He describes how his view of social learning gradually emerged out of a series of experiences in Latin America, in which he worked with and observed the way change came about in a number of situations, from a congested squatter community to workers in a textile plant (1987).

27. Chambers provides a useful list of the advantages of RRA (1985, 29–30). A very insightful analysis of the weaknesses of survey research in the development context can be found in a study by social scientists in Nepal (J. G. Campbell et al., 1979).

28. Honadle has written about some of the problems that can arise with proxy measures unless users are careful about the assumptions they are making in adopting them (1982).

29. James March notes that evaluations that rely on previously established criteria "inhibit the serendipitous discovery of new criteria" (March and Olsen, 1979, 81). The strength of process documentation is its openness to discovering new criteria.

30. Critics charge that social learning relies too heavily on case studies, the kind of knowledge produced by process documentation (Cohen et al., 1983). Proponents say that this misses the point. When one is trying to demonstrate how to bring about change, a case study approach is more appropriate than a controlled study, which generalizes about the frequency of the success of the approach.

31. Another important study that documents the extent to which the poor are neglected is Esman's study of the landless (1978b).

32. Michael Patton writes that evaluators should stress the assets that clients have, not just their needs (1981b, Ch. 3).

33. Chambers (1985, 4) contends that the literature of public administration reinforces normal professionalism and reflects a core of knowledge that is perpetuated within professional circles, taught in professional schools, and hence perpetuated even after reality changes. Normal professionalism cannot adjust to change because it approaches the world via its specialization.

34. The director, B. Bagadion, was committed to and encouraged the kinds of changes that were soon to be described as the social learning methodology (Bagadion and F. Korten, 1983). Two observers of the approach, however, note that in one of the cases where it was tried, the processes that linked the leadership to the development activity were at least as critical as the leadership itself. Although the learning effort did receive strong support from top leaders, "it would be wrong to conclude, however, that this is simply a question of leadership. *The projects in one way or another kept top leadership informed and involved in solving problems.* This involvement seems to be the key factor" (Hage and Finsterbusch, 1987). For studies documenting the importance of leadership elsewhere, see Brinkerhoff (1986); Kettering (1985); and Honadle (1985).

35. See Thomas (1985, 24); and Johnston and Clark (1982, 215).

36. Generally, studies of the role of citizen groups in the United States find that they play a very limited role in holding the bureaucracy accountable and that they usually are coopted by the process. See Fainstein and Fainstein (1976); White (1983); Stone (1980); and Gittell (1980).

37. As used in this approach, a work group is a technique for bringing different interests together to deal with a common problem. It includes external consultants who have no immediate stake in the problem. The literature on work groups is reviewed in Schein (1977). The relevance of work groups to the development context is discussed in D. Korten (1982); Leonard (1977); and Jedlicka (1977). The performance improvement ap-

proach discussed in Chapter 4 also emphasizes task groups within program agencies (Kettering, 1980; Solomon, 1983; Ingle, 1983; 1985; and Brinkerhoff, 1985a; 1985b).

9
The Political Influence Approach

Assumptions and Questions About Management Functions

There is a dilemma at the heart of this approach. On the one hand, it is obvious that political interests are involved in any development activity. Clearly politics and the uses of power are inevitable aspects of program management, particularly of programs designed to promote change. On the other hand, acknowledging the political dimensions of development is often a signal that there is little one can do, that dark forces of political will and chicanery are more determinative than any actions that managers can take. In this sense Johnston and Clark are surely right when they note that the tendency to ascribe development failures to politics is "one of the truest but least useful observations that can be made." These authors continue that even so, it is important to take political aspects of management seriously because effective management or analysis "consists in learning to understand the constraints of power and in learning to shape feasible programs within the limits they impose" (1982, 13). Another recent study urges that donors who attempt to attach conditions to their assistance packages need to appreciate the political dimensions of development. Without such an appreciation the conditions will be unrealistic and the intended changes will not be brought about (Cohen et al., 1985).

A political influence approach makes some important assumptions about the nature of programs and management. Program goals are not right or wrong as much as they are successful or unsuccessful in accommodating relevant interests. Instead of asking whether an organization is effective or is accomplishing its goals efficiently, one should ask "effective for which group" or "for which interests." Instead of directly involving the different interests in the management process as in the social learning approach, the political influence model describes these interests, assesses their respective influence, and prescribes ways in which managers can negotiate among them and mobilize support.[1] The approach also recognizes that objectives are continually redefined throughout the implementation process, that the process of accommodation and influence is ongoing.[2]

In most versions the approach emphasizes that programs emerge as a product of bargaining among different interests.[3] In the context of development programs, however, a more general approach is needed, one that takes account of differing interests but does not assume that they interact. In fact, the most significant aspect of a situation may be that little bargaining occurs and that one or another interest is dominant. Bargaining may determine program goals and implementation activity when interests are diffused. When they are concentrated, however, there will probably be little or no bargaining, and managers will have to find ways to work within these constraints. In the former bargaining version, program outcomes reflect two factors—the relative influence of the different interests and their bargaining skills. Managers are only one among several interests in an agency and to carry out program goals managers have to negotiate with other parties, build coalitions, accommodate groups, moderate plans, and use whatever resources are available.

In the second version, a few interests may dominate the process and prevent significant bargaining from taking place. Some groups may not be aware of their interests or may not be in a position to act on them. Program goals may represent the priorities of political elites who are able to control resources and shape peoples' values and who in turn prevent competing interests from being expressed. Elite domination will not necessarily be open. For example, there may be a stable and dominant coalition with enough power to subdue conflicts and to define what constitutes program effectiveness without any open discussion. Or programs may be used by top elites to shore up support rather than deal with development problems. For example, Bates describes how governments emphasize programs that provide employment and benefits to groups whose support they need and that governments do so even if alternative programs would better meet development needs (Bates, 1980).

The approach is also a reminder that the political process associated with implementation has its own unique characteristics. Even after policy has been formulated, politics continues, albeit less visibly. Implementation is "an unending process of resolving ambiguities and clarifying priorities" (Stone, 1980, 20). The low visibility allows organized interests to have more influence than unorganized beneficiaries. Managers may need to develop support or build a coalition to counter the influence of entrenched interests. The approach therefore has a broader view of a manager's role than the other approaches do. Instead of adapting to feedback, as suggested by the goal-oriented approach, the political influence approach directs managers to be more proactive in relating to groups in the environment by exerting leadership and searching out supporters to counter elite interests.

Community interests are also more differentiated in this approach than in the others. There are both beneficiaries and losers. For example, even the highly touted green revolution benefited some and hurt others. "The 'green revolution' is a good example of a policy which raised grain production and benefited the larger, richer, risk-taking farmer, but was a disaster for the landless peasant, whose numbers and poverty vastly increased" (Smith, 1985, 140). Similarly, the approach views clients as groups with distinct interests and not merely recipients of services. Whereas the social learning approach focuses on establishing linkages with those clients and community organizations relevant to program activities, the political influence approach is potentially concerned with any groups or interests that need to be mobilized, accommodated, diverted, or reeducated.

In some respects the approach is similar to the bureaucratic process model in that both begin by acknowledging the reality of different interests. Several authors who write about the bureaucratic process approach use the terms *political* and *power* in describing their theories.[4] There are significant differences, however, between the two approaches. First, the bureaucratic process approach deals with interests based on positions in an organization, ones that managers can cope with by developing routines and coordinating procedures and by offering organizational incentives. The political influence approach is more interested in differences about agendas and program substance. Second, the political influence model is particularly sensitive to groups in the environment, to the ways in which they support or constrain what goes on in an organization, and to the way in which alliances develop between groups inside and outside the bureaucracy (Warwick, 1975).

Third, the approach recognizes that some interests, usually the elites in a society, may shape the values and norms in a policy area. Program goals may reflect these values, and the political problem is how to confront and change these values. Fourth, successful managers are those who can persuade others, rather than those who simply exchange resources (Lindenberg and Crosby, 1981, 19). A fifth difference follows from this. Interests are not necessarily fixed but can change as people interact or receive new information. In this sense political influence can be a positive way to promote and pursue program goals.

The approach therefore offers a much broader set of reasons for implementation success and failure than the bureaucratic process approach does and traces many of them to the actions of groups and interests outside the organization. The bureaucratic process approach, by contrast, focuses on problems within the manager's immediate arena. This is an important distinction.

> By focusing on the dysfunctional attributes of bureaucratic behavior, the [coordination] approach places blame for program failures at the feet of middle managers and lower-level functionaries. It thus overlooks the constraints and pressures that the larger sociopolitical system brings to bear at all levels of government, and the important role that these constraints and pressures play in goal displacement (Stone, 1980, 32).

In summary, the political influence approach acknowledges that development programs emerge from the give and take among different interests inside and outside the implementing agency. Knowing program goals is less useful than understanding the interests of various stakeholders, appreciating the power positions of each, and examining how they interact. Such a perspective takes into account the complex political environment and explores the patterns of interests and the spread of influence in the community. This approach is aware that often those in power collude in order to keep competing interests from being expressed and often use programs to support the status quo.

The approach emphasizes three management functions—contribute to development content of program design, expand program resources and political support, and exercise leadership. Concerning the function of contributing to program content, the approach asks which are the major interests relevant to a program. Are any important interests not taken into account? How much access do the different groups have? How are original goals reshaped during implementation? How much leeway do managers have to redefine the goals, to appeal to a broader coalition of interests, or to interpret unrepresented interests? What are the possibilities for compromising among the interests without derailing the program? Can the program be designed so that it does not threaten political opponents but fits in their "zone of indifference"?[5] How can managers avoid mobilizing groups who will then veto activities or make it more difficult to proceed?[6]

The approach is particularly sensitive to the importance of resources, both financial and political and asks about the potential for managers to develop additional resources. What kinds of resources are particularly critical? Are there resources available for maintaining a program? If there is more support for a program in one area, is it possible to implement it there first and use this experience to build support elsewhere? Is there a potential for recipients to contribute more to the program than originally conceived? What can a manager do to obtain these contributions? Are there institutions in a community that can offer support?[7]

According to the political influence approach leadership includes a variety of techniques associated with negotiation, persuasion, and education. How much leeway do managers have to negotiate with others and trade off various aspects of the program to gain their support? What opportunities do managers have to persuade others to change their views? What ideas and values can managers use to enlarge their base of support?

Problems in Applying the Political Influence Approach

There are four major problems in applying the political influence approach—politics is seen as a suspect and illegitimate activity, political influence can exploit intended beneficiaries, political skills are presumably an art and not a science, and a political influence approach represents the status quo.

Most observers of development activities agree that politics is endemic but think of management in apolitical terms. First, political interests are seen as obstacles to development rather than as expressions of honest differences.[8] The very term *political interests* connotes divisiveness, conflict, and sabotage of worthy goals. Indeed, in the Third World context, politics is pervasive and painful. It means corruption by agents, the abuse of power by illegitimate elites, or the promotion of particular ethnic loyalties.

Given this perspective it is natural to avoid politics, to think of programs in apolitical terms, and to focus more on strategies based on scientific management or to explore the possibilities of reorganization (Yates, 1985, 3). This bias is reinforced by much of the generic management literature. Administration is treated as a sphere separate from politics, a separation that "allows both political and administrative elites to resist interference by the other" (Lynn, 1984, 21). To keep politicians from interfering, career administrators say they are mere technocrats and should be left alone to use their expertise. The Law of Political Entropy, coined by Pfeffer, captures this sentiment.

> Once politics are introduced into a situation, it is very difficult to restore pure rationality. Once consensus is lost, once disagreements about preferences, technology and management philosophy emerge, it is very hard to restore the kind of shared perspective and solidarity which is necessary to operate under the rational model (1981, 32).

Instead of opening this Pandora's Box, it is wiser to focus on those areas where common interests are evident rather than move into the murky areas of conflicting interests. This attitude may explain the finding that Third World managers tend to avoid politics in practice. In a study of managers in southern African countries, Montgomery finds that there was indeed a lot of political activity, but that managers usually defined their interests very narrowly and did not identify them with program goals.

> First, bureaucratic actors resolve issues on the basis of personal relationships without often attempting to build structural coalitions of like-minded partners. . . . Second, the managers who engage in bureaucratic politics, at least in this sample, are not necessarily working as agents of their organizations or as originators of policies. They are more likely to be trying to solve immediate problems than to develop a constituency. . . . [There] is little evidence that managers seek to develop a sense of institutional mission or loyalty among their colleagues or subordinates. (Montgomery, 1986a, 411).

A second reason for questioning the political influence approach stems from the fear that managers may use political influence to exploit and manipulate others. In this view, managers are apt to represent the elite interests in a society and to collaborate in exploiting the poor. Gran, for example, in a very forceful statement of this position, argues that there are structural reasons to assume that governing organizations, including their managers, reflect the interests of a coalition of national and international elites. A strategy to enhance the political skills of managers only increases their potential for exploiting the poor (1983b).

A third reason for insulating managers from politics stems from the instrumental nature of development management studies. Even though their major purpose is to report interventions, it is difficult to lay out specific strategies or interventions to exercise political influence. Management as a political enterprise is an art and not a science, and therefore there "is no real set of management techniques on how to do most parts of this job" (Leonard, 1984). Consider one of the most frequently cited metaphors from the literature on implementation—the concept of managers as "gamesmen." The preeminent task of managers is to assemble resources and coordinate the interests that control the resources." To do this managers end up playing games such as budget maximization or flexible funding (Bardach, 1977). Such description emphasizes the idiosyncratic nature of management (Warwick, 1982, 179). Because there is no core technology, as some would put it, the literature has focused on those areas where it is more feasible to develop such a technology, areas that are defined non-politically.

A fourth problem is the concern that a political influence approach reinforces the status quo. Gawthrop, for example, observes that the goal-directed and social learning approaches are able to introduce new ideas and priorities into a decision situation. Managers who use the political influence approach are constrained by the existing set of interests in a manager's arena and by the need to accommodate them in some fashion (1983).

As with the other approaches, those who apply the political influence approach are expanding it to deal with some of these problems. First, proponents are trying to be more systematic. Instead of simply acknowledging that "politics is endemic," observers are describing the political arena more systematically using concepts such as transactions and political rationality.

Second, there is an emphasis on the value of developing purposive political strategies. Managers need to develop political strategies to influence program design and implementation. They need to learn how to diagnose a situation politically, how to negotiate and build coalitions, and how to mobilize support for programs. The approach enables managers to anticipate the ways in which power is used in any situation, both to support and to oppose developmental change. The approach cannot guarantee that managers themselves will not exploit others. Assuming, however, that managers are committed to development, the approach enhances their ability to understand how different interests can exploit the poor in any society.

Third, many observers stress that managers need to be leaders as well as effective administrators. Leadership gives managers more leverage to influence events. Thus managers "are transformed from passive instruments, used simply to receive and transmit information signals on a single channel frequency, to active and dynamic quasi-independent brokers of data and information, working on a multichannel frequency" (Gawthrop, 1983, 125). Others go further and argue that leadership is more than an ability to broker among interests. It involves persuasion and altering preferences. This view challenges the common tendency to depoliticize management and to focus on technocratic solutions to what are often political problems.

The rest of the chapter reviews these three amplifications—conceptualizing the political arena, developing political strategies, and exercising leadership. Each amplification explores how politics can be used as a basis for changing the environment within which development programs are designed and carried out. Politics is not only an inevitable part of reality but can be a positive dynamic. Different interests are not only possible vetoes but are potential supporters. Moreover, the different parties can change and learn as they participate in the process.

Conceptualizing the Political Arena

Policy Space Research

As noted previously management studies often sidestep the political dimension of management because it appears chaotic and unpredictable. This apparent chaos, however, does not mean that it is impossible to make any useful generalizations about the role of managers in the political process. A recent study emphasizes that "generalized frameworks for generating insights into political factors in decision-making are available" (Cohen et al., 1985). The authors go on to propose a framework they call "policy space research" that explores the policy options realistically available to decision makers. Insofar as managers contribute to program design the concept can usefully be applied to management decisions also. Policy space research suggests that managers analyze their situation to determine the area within which they can bring about developmental changes and the constraints and opportunities within this space (1217). Who are the potential allies and opponents? What opportunities are there to build supporting coalitions? Only then can participants explore the possibilities for change, and only then can participants formulate effective strategies.

Management as Transactions

Based on a comparative study of population planning programs, Warwick describes management as a series of political transactions. The virtue of this concept is that it focuses on both the substance of a program and the interactions among different interests. Transactions emphasize how implementation varies according to the environment and also explores how managers can influence and change their environments, rather than merely adapt to them.

A transaction approach lays out the factors managers need to address. First, program goals provide a direction for management but are not determinative. Structures and organizational routines make a difference, but again they provide opportunities rather than definitive directions. The environment is important; it is made up of multiple, shifting, and often unpredictable parties who need to have their interests taken into account. The implementors have considerable discretion, and managers need to work directly with them, preparing and motivating them. Finally, managers need to pursue transactions with the clients, who also have discretion and whose response can make or break a program. The point is that each of these parties has its own interests, which managers need to address through a series of transactions. Warwick observes,

> Clients are above all human beings with their own hopes, fears, aspirations, and interests. How they react to a program depends not only on their objective need for the service but on their subjective reaction to it, the site in which it is offered (such as a family planning clinic), the implementors, the program as a whole, and the government. However much a woman may seem to need family planning in the abstract, if she feels that pills will give her cancer, that she may be sterilized without her knowledge at the local health clinic, or that the implementors will treat her rudely, she may not accept the services offered; if she does, she may discontinue their use after a brief period. As obvious as this point may seem, it was widely ignored in the design and execution of family planning programs in many countries (1982, 183).

Transactions as a concept goes beyond the idea of management as playing games with other interests to promote program goals or as a series of interactions with other interests. Management is an effort to transact with other interests, to take their point of view into account, to rethink and recast programs, and to persuade and convince where possible.

Political Rationality

Another organizing concept is political rationality. The point is not that political interests are rational in any objective sense. Rather the concept suggests that managers should design their transactions around the assumption that other parties will do what seems politically rational from their perspective. They may be mistaken or even behave irrationally, but in general they will express a rough rationality. The power of the concept is that many actions that are rational from an economic perspective may be politically irrational from the perspective of the other parties involved.

The concept suggests that managers anticipate this logic, work around it, or use it to their advantage.[10] It forces managers to look carefully at the complex of political forces, distribution of resources, and options in different political settings. For example, what is politically rational to those in national agencies may be very different from what is politically rational for staff in field situations. At the national level managers may be able to act fairly autonomously on the basis of their organization's perspective and traditions. At the local level, however, local program units are more vulnerable to other organizations and to political groups in the environment (Berman, 1978, 165).

Managers can improve their bargaining power if they are sensitive to the needs of political elites and can anticipate that political elites will support programs that produce visible and widely distributable benefits.

> An ideal investment for a politician [for example] is a labor-intensive rural roads project. From an economic point of view roads improve access to producers and rural markets, thereby lowering the costs of trade and improving the chances of competition without imposing government controls or officers that could become exploitative. Simultaneously roads are very popular with the peasantry and when they run down their construction can be undertaken again. If those employed are drawn from the local area, the jobs given are a limited act of patronage that can be re-

> peated with new jobs in the future. . . . Similarly, grants to small businesses and Basic Needs programs have higher political payoffs than many large economic projects (Leonard, 1984, 12–15).

Political rationality can assist managers in choosing the best institutional arrangements for delivering program benefits. These arrangements can be selected for their relative efficiency as in the goal directed approach, for their value as incentives as in the bureaucratic process approach, or for their compatibility with community capacity as in the social learning approach. Or, following political rationality, arrangements can be selected according to how they address the evident political interests of major participants. A study of a Korean health care program observes that it failed because it did not take into account the political rationality of the health care paraprofessionals. The program began by assuming that the interests of the physicians conflicted with those of the paraprofessionals and tried to restrict what the latter could do. They responded by undercutting the program (Dunlop et al., 1982, 32).

Political rationality suggests that managers should look for ways to lower the risks associated with programs. Managers could make the goals clearer and more specific or could do more research on what people actually want. Managers could devise experiments so that less risk is involved or could try to be more realistic about what results are reasonable and reward local staff accordingly. For example, it clearly violates political rationality to design a program around an expensive import, as was the case with the Poshak nutrition program in India (Pyle, 1980). By contrast a rural electrification project in India was more sensitive to the interests of different villages and went to great lengths to assure them they would eventually be included in the program. "Villages denied one year knew that their position on the eligibility list would rise" (Hadden, 1980; Cleaves, 1980).

Consider a proposal for using political rationality as a positive strategy, admittedly one that may not always be feasible. In this scenario, a manager wants to improve a squatter community but is aware that according to the political rationality of local political elites the squatters are politically threatening. Hence the elites are reluctant to allow them to establish a permanent community. Perrow describes how a manager concerned about the needs of the squatters could use the logic of political rationality to get the elites to agree to let the squatters stay. He or she could first mobilize the squatters to build shacks on unused government land. Their presence could then be used as a tangible threat or bargaining chip with national elites—unless they made significant policy changes, the poor would become a political threat.

> If such a demonstration were organized, and then used as an argument that substantial policy changes would be needed at the top to prevent the massing (and politicization) of desperately poor Brazilians, the expansion of the favela might be allowed to stand. . . . [The role of the manager] is to convince national elites that the goals of most development projects (sewage, housing, food distribution, productivity in small businesses, community development, education, health, etc.) are *far more important than they realize* (Perrow, 1986b).

The key in this example is the distinction between long and short term interests. Perrow is suggesting that managers look for ways to convince the elites that acceding to the interests of the poor is often politically rational, at least in the long run. Whether the strategy works undoubtedly has as much to do with how open the elites are and with how much they can afford to take some risks, as it does with what managers do.

Choice Opportunities

A fourth way to conceptualize the political process is to organize it around the choices managers need to make. According to Grindle there are three kinds of choice—program design, delivery strategy, and beneficiaries—and political rationality is appropriate to all three. In designing programs, for example, managers choose how specific the objectives should be. Numerous case studies trace implementation problems to vague goals and incomplete analyses. However, such vagueness can be a conscious political strategy to build support for a program. Managers need to be able to take advantage of the positive features of vagueness rather than assume they have to redefine goals into precise objectives. Managers, she says, need to find a way to "capitalize on the support or elite consensus that may have been forged through vagueness to acquire greater budgetary and political support" (1981, 65).

Similarly, in selecting units to implement a program, managers need to look at their technical competence and also at the political calculus of different groups. Managers need to ask which organizations have experience in this area and which organizations have compatible goals. Given an organization's goals and history, would it be politically rational for it to pursue the program goals? (Grindle, 1981, 69).

Such an assessment can be broken down into a series of specific steps. (1) According to a program's history what problems does it face? Lack of resources? Lack of support? Managers typically assume the problems stem from inadequate financial resources, when the real problem may be lack of political support. (2) Appraise the relative power positions of the various actors. Appreciate that power can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, both obvious and subtle. (3) Map the environment. Who is involved, what are their views, and who is allied with whom? (4) Examine the potential managing units. How fragmented is this cluster? How much conflict exists? (Yates, 1985, Ch. 3).

Politics as Information

The economist Hirschman, a long-time observer of development activities, proposes a particularly interesting way to conceptualize the political process. He begins with a question central to management—how can organizations learn about the reasons for poor performance so they can make appropriate changes (1970, 31)? The traditional answer of economists is based on "exit." Customers who do not like a product simply exit by choosing an alternative. Many of the economists' recommendations for making political organizations more responsive described in Chapter 7 are based on this reasoning. Privatizing and decentralizing make "exit" easier, and in doing so they force organizations to be more responsive.

The problem, according to Hirschman, is that when people exit, or choose another product or supplier, managers do not necessarily learn anything about the reasons for user dissatisfaction. Moreover, what managers do learn may come too late to make helpful changes. If people used "voice" instead of "exit," they could communicate their preferences or protest or persuade managers to address their problems. This option potentially can give managers the information they need and hence may be far more useful than an economic strategy based on competition and choice. From this perspective political activity is a way to impart information, to make institutions more responsive. Managers would encourage political activity in order to learn about community preferences and reactions to program results, which is consistent with efforts in the social learning approach to learn about community views. However, Hirschman's emphasis is on political strategies to impart information and does not necessarily involve beneficiaries directly in program implementation.

One of the most interesting implications of Hirschman's analysis is that "exit" and "voice" may be incompatible. When there are several suppliers of a benefit, and community members can choose among them, they may find it easier to "exit," to choose one supplier and reject another. As a result they will be less likely to express their views and give managers the information they need to improve a program (1970, 44). He predicts that unfortunately the middle class is most apt to exit and overlook its political options. This is unfortunate because members of this class have the resources to be most effective in pressing for change. The most immediate lesson of Hirschman's analysis is that managers can find it greatly to their advantage to increase opportunities for voice. Allowing people to express their opinions may produce more change than structural and institutional changes that increase competition.[11]

Interorganizational Relations

A final effort to deal systematically with a manager's political arena is found in the increasing number of studies that take sets of organizations as the unit of analysis. One influential approach begins with the concept of an institutional network.[12] Even though it is difficult to set boundaries on a network, a boundary can be defined to include those organizations that affect each other more or less directly. The point is to focus on the relations among organizations, rather than on the organizations themselves. One begins by describing the network, estimating what linkages exist, and which represent the greatest sources of power. A manager who wants to influence a certain organization may find it strategically useful to go through another one that has stronger power links with the target organization (Perrow, 1986a, 196–199).

A somewhat different concept is an organizational domain. Networks focus on interacting organizations and raise questions about control and influence. A "problem domain" approach, however, begins with issues that cut across sectors of the society and that "join many organizations in a kind of common fate."[13] This set may be different from the first set, the organizations with which managers interact, because some organizations in a "problem domain" may not be active or involved. In problem domains the issue of control is not so important as the fact that all the organizations are somehow affected by the problem or have a stake in its resolution (Gricar, 1984, 2–3). Are all actively involved? How do they relate to each other—do they collaborate, compete, or try to exclude each other? How can they organize themselves to interact more effectively?

Interorganizational relations have their own dynamics. Organizational studies tend to see conflict as harmful; in the interorganizational arena, however, conflict of some sort is taken for granted. In addition, the patterns of authority are likely to be somewhat more unstructured (Litwak and Hylton, 1962). Earlier chapters have described how managers can use goal commitments or economic exchange to get other units to cooperate. The political influence approach is more sensitive to situations in which one organization is dominant or in which organizations have conflicting interests. It asks what managers can do to get others to support a program under circumstances when they cannot rely on mutual interest. Benson, for example, argues that managers will often need to acquire extra resources to influence others (1975).[14]

Research on interorganizational relations suggests that cooperation depends on:

1. *Values of the different organizations.* If organizations have similar values, or at least see that others have a legitimate stake in a problem, they will be more apt to collaborate (Rogers and Whettan, 1982). One problem is that public organizations may have different norms than private voluntary organizations, thus making cooperation between these two types of organization more difficult.[15]
2. *Recognition of interdependence.* A second basis for cooperation is the extent to which organizations perceive that they cannot solve their problems on their own and that they will be better off if they cooperate. Community norms may or may not support this interdependence. The prevailing norms in the United States, for example, support adversarial methods, whereas other industrial countries, such as Japan and Sweden, are more supportive of collaboration (Gricar, 1984; Schmidt and Kochan, 1977).
3. *Distribution of power.* A third factor is the distribution of influence. "There is growing evidence to suggest that effective collaboration cannot take place unless key stakeholders possess roughly equal capability to influence domain development" (Gricar, 1984, 13; see also Hirschman, 1970).
4. *Shared situation.* Geographical features can affect cooperation. How physically close are the organizations, and how

frequently are they in contact? What history have they shared, and to what extent do they have similar sources of information? The greater the extent of shared experiences, the greater the chances of cooperation.

Developing Political Strategies

In addition to thinking more systematically about the political process, the political influence approach has developed specific political strategies for managers to use. Instead of focusing on the traits of successful managers, the approach is more operational and focuses on leadership activities (Johnston and Clark, 1982, 216). In general, the strategies are designed to enable managers to anticipate and cope more creatively with multiple pressures.[16]

Negotiation and Bargaining

The approach prescribes a variety of strategies for working directly with different interests and brokering among them. Some of the most interesting work come from experiences in negotiations between unions and employers. A study by Walton and McKersie describes two dimensions of negotiations. First, negotiations involve both conflict and collaboration because any cluster of interests will usually find some ways in which interests diverge and agree. Second, negotiations can have two different purposes, one to gain substantive benefits and the other to influence peoples' attitudes. Based on these characteristics, Walton and McKersie propose that negotiation includes four kinds of activities:

1. *Distributive bargaining*—to resolve conflicts of interest, where one interest loses and another gains. The purpose of this kind of bargaining is to increase one's share. The authors predict that although both parties have a range of acceptable solutions, they enter the negotiations with a very limited view of acceptable bargaining points. The result is usually some form of a compromise.
2. *Integrative bargaining*—to find common interests. This form of bargaining is useful when a solution can be found that benefits both parties or at least when gains to one do not entail losses to others. The purpose is to increase the amount of joint gain, and the result is some integrative solution.

3. *Attitudinal bargaining*—to influence the attitudes of the participants. In this case, negotiations are not just designed to achieve specific benefits, but to affect the relationships among the parties, to promote trust and respect. The authors identify three motivational patterns—competitive, in which each party hopes to win over others; individualistic, where a party cares about gaining benefits but not whether someone else wins or loses; and cooperative, where a party wants to find a cooperative solution. Which of these patterns is used depends on power relations of the different parties, their personalities, shared beliefs, and prior bargaining experiences.
4. *Intraorganizational bargaining*— achieving consensus within each of the bargaining groups. The authors add this final aspect of bargaining as a reminder that negotiators have to take into account what each needs to retain the confidence of the respective group, and hence there are limits to what bargaining can negotiate (Walton and McKersie, 1965).

This analysis makes several useful points. First, managers need to think of negotiations as an opportunity to explore shared interests and to deal with conflict. Managers may overlook opportunities for exploring and promoting shared interests (Johnston and Clark, 1982). Or they may overlook differences and thus fail to deal with them. The point is important because many commonly used techniques, such as those associated with organizational development (OD), downplay conflict and can promote a false consensus.[17] The Walton-McKersie model also stresses that even as they negotiate with potential supporters, managers need to appreciate the vested interests of the implementing organization. Their conclusion recalls the concept of transactions, in which managers take into account the interests on both sides of any negotiation.

Power Strategy

Another political strategy distinguishes among three aspects of a manager's environment and suggests an appropriate strategy for each, based on its power resources. One arena is composed of those parts of the environment a manager can control. A second is the "influenceable" arena, which comprises

> entities external to the organization whose activities can influence organization and management performance. Such entities have ongoing relationships with the focal organization; for example, they provide inputs or receive outputs. . . . For an implementing agency, these might be marketing boards, credit associations, government agencies, and so on (Smith, Lethem, and Thoolen, 1980, 9).

The third part of the environment is beyond influence, but needs to be "appreciated." It is not "everything else" but "includes *only* those *entities whose actions affect* organizational performance directly or indirectly, and are not subject to control or influence of organizational members" (Smith et al., 1980, 10). Thus this arena consists of the givens within which managers have to work, including pricing policies, budgeting procedures, administrative system, hiring policies, land tenure systems, technological knowledge, and cultural attitudes, insofar as they affect what managers do. These distinctions expand the management arena. "The management role can no longer be seen as primarily inward looking. The manager must focus not only on those internal elements subject to his control, but equally—and often even more—on those external elements of the environment that are subject to his influence and that he has to appreciate" (Smith et al., 1980, 10).[18]

On the basis of these distinctions, the authors develop a "power strategy." Managers estimate the power resources of different groups, focusing primarily on their potential power and only secondarily on the substance of their political interests. The managers' primary interest is to gain support for a program, rather than to negotiate content or to design an appropriate program. Managers determine whose priorities are being met, who has an incentive to promote the program, and what resources groups can bring. First, managers contact those groups whom they need to appreciate and consult with the groups. Second, managers influence those with most power resources primarily by helping the stakeholders understand the potential value the program has for them (Smith, 1986).

Political Analysis

A very similar strategy is proposed by Lindenberg and Crosby. Managers, they write, perform a number of different political functions, many of them involving external groups or actors. These overtly political roles include negotiating with others, acting as a spokesperson, coordinating other organizations, organizing meetings with other units, and setting strategy (1981, 18). To be effective, managers need to think logically about political strategies by asking three questions—"What do I want?" "Who has it?" "How can I get it?" (1981, 25).[19]

Asking "What do I want?" leads to an exercise in specifying a problem, setting bounds to it, and defining objectives based on this analysis (Lindenberg and Crosby, 1981, 27–36). "Who has it?" generates a list of relevant actors and their resources and is very similar to the power approach described previously. Managers gauge the relative influence of different actors and "concentrate their attention on those actors they believe will make the final decisions as well as those who will have the most influence on the principle decision makers" (1981, 38). Managers can try various mapping techniques to inventory such resources as "economic goods and services, force, authority, information, status and legitimacy" (1981, 45). Sometimes it makes sense to inventory all relevant groups in the society to map potential support. On other occasions managers only need focus on groups in a particular sector. To answer the final question, "How can I get it?" managers can develop a payoff matrix. They list their possible strategies on one side and possible counterstrategies on the other side. The matrix is then filled in by assessing the feasibility of each management strategy and the likelihood of each counterstrategy (1981, 56).

Lindenberg and Crosby then offer a proviso that really applies to all of the strategies described in this chapter.

> We conclude by warning our readers that while the methods suggested will help organize political analysis, they are only as good as the quality of information and analysis provided by the manager himself. The purpose of analytical tools is to provide a set of lenses with which the manager may sharpen his or her focus on an otherwise murky environment. We acknowledge that the managerial political environment is far too complicated to be completely and definitively ordered by any of the methods suggested (1981, 64).

Exercising Leadership

In addition to focusing on systematic concepts and political strategies, the political influence approach emphasizes the value of leadership. This concept goes beyond traditional views of managers as supervisors or negotiators and lifts up their potential ability to persuade others, to bring new vision, and to change peoples' values and priorities. Instead of simply assessing opinions and developing strategies, managers can use personal appeals to shared values and can alter and shape preferences.[20]

Influence

A number of studies compare the relative efficacy of using influence and sanctions. In effect these studies are comparing a political concept (influence) with a bureaucratic process concept (sanctions). In general the studies conclude that sanctions, both rewards and penalties, are more costly because they require a lot of resources, managers have to continually monitor what people are doing, and if used for a long enough time, sanctions will lose some of their value. Influence, by contrast, is more subtle. It attempts to change attitudes through the use of prestige, expertise, or persuasion.

Influence has two interrelated characteristics. It generates involvement by others, and it seeks to change attitudes. When managers use sanctions, they are essentially accepting others' views as givens; when managers use influence, however, they try to involve others and thereby gain their active support.[21] Influence is often described as an informal style in contrast to more formal incentives or sanctions. The following example, based on an experience in the Philippines, illustrates how influence can induce change.

> The director of a regional planning and coordinating unit successfully managed conflicts and obtained cooperation among the national line agencies operating in the region. He relied on informal discussion in non-business locations to create an atmosphere conducive to agreement and coordination, and to incorporate the views of important people who were concerned about the issues being considered. Significantly, the influence of these persons over project outcomes was based less on formal authority than on their ability to exert behind-the-scenes power. Common mechanisms included dinner meetings at village festivals and other traditional social encounters. When the unit director was replaced by a military officer whose style was authoritarian and formalistic, the result was a decline in performance and morale and an increase in conflict. . . .
>
> The essence of an informal style is to encourage non threatening involvement during the evolution of a decision to create a sense of joint responsibility among those whose cooperation is needed to implement it. When this kind of informal coalition is achieved, less resistance is encountered during implementation (Honadle and VanSant, 1984, 35-36).

Influence conceived in this manner goes beyond strategies of negotiating differences or exchanging benefits and becomes what many would refer to as leadership. Influence includes efforts to persuade and to change peoples' opinions. Managers are seen as leaders, as mobilizers, as cajolers, and as promoters. Leonard lists the following eight characteristics of effective leaders: personal commitment to goals, ability to anticipate problems, bargaining skills, political sensitivity, capacity to inspire others, extra resources, flexibility, and the ability to recruit good staff. Most of these, he adds, are difficult to teach through training programs, but training at least can make sure that managers can exercise these skills without unnecessary difficulty (Leonard, 1984).

Values

Note that a common element in these discussions of leadership is that managers are not limited to manipulating bureaucratic incentives. Part of the currency leaders have available are ideas and values, which leaders can use to persuade and encourage. In a classic statement of leadership, Selznik observes, "The inbuilding of purpose is a challenge to creativity because it involves transforming men and groups from neutral, technical units into participants who have a particular stamp, sensitivity, and commitment. . . . The institutional leader, then, *is primarily an expert in the promotion and protection of values*" (1957, 17).

More recently, Burns describes what he calls "transforming leadership." This "occurs when one or more persons *engage* with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality. . . . Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual support for common purpose" (1978, 20).

This emphasis on leaders as initiators who trade in ideas, values, and commitments is a significant innovation. Until recently leaders were viewed solely as brokers, as those who brought together a number of different interests to develop a coalition. This emerging view of leadership is more interested in interactions among leaders and with followers and the way in which each influences the other. "Leaders interact with other leaders and are coopted into new beliefs and commitments. The leadership role is that of an educator, stimulating and accepting changing world views, redefining meanings, stimulating commitments" (March and Olsen, 1984, 739). In these studies leaders do not merely reflect and broker the interests of others. They are decisive political actors in their own right who can influence and shape political debates and activities.

Stone adds a particularly interesting dimension to managerial influence and leadership. Program managers, he argues, are in a particularly good position to appreciate both the goals and ideals that programs are designed to serve and the hard operating realities of bargaining that inevitably occur. These managers also are in a position to explain to other actors the complex interconnectedness of the political world. Managers need to help other parties understand these separate dimensions and search for ways to involve them appropriately in the management process. Echoing the concerns of the social learning approach he adds that the most important step is to find ways to interpret the policy process to citizens and then include them. "The challenge of the future is thus not one of greater productivity in program administration, but rather one of how to organize the public and involve it actively and appropriately in the policy process" (1984, 20).

The Political Influence Approach and Program Management Functions

The political influence model is a useful reminder not to take program definitions and goals at face value. They often mask elite interests, and different groups will usually have different views about these goals. The approach suggests that this perspective is important for two reasons. First, it is a realistic description of the development arena and suggests the kinds of strategies managers need to develop in order to be successful. Second, because the development context is very complex and uncertain, managers can improve their performance by taking additional interests into account. Political activity can provide important information, resources, and supports.

The chapter also emphasizes a number of strategies that managers can use to improve program performance and the increasing attention given to the positive uses of political influence and leadership. Although the strategies cannot be packaged or put into training packages as precise technologies, they can be used as models. The approach also sensitizes observers to the ways in which managers in the Third World do exercise political influence and leadership every day. Western models of management that ignore these can undermine one of the major resources these managers possess. Table 9.1 lists the major strategies associated with the approach.

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

This approach encourages managers to take the interests and preferences of relevant actors into account as they design their programs. If managers assume that others will usually act out of political self-interest, then they can anticipate the goals of other parties whose support is needed and can take these parties into account in designing programs. Managers should be clear about which aspects of a program are negotiable.

Expand Program Resources and Political Support

Managers need to pay particular attention to building political support, assessing the power positions of other actors, and anticipating sources of support and finding ways to mobilize them. The approach includes a number of techniques for diagnosing the distribution of interests in a political arena as well as recommendations to use influence to energize others and to influence their values and preferences.

TABLE 9.1 Strategies in a Political Influence Approach to Management

Develop systematic descriptions of the political arena, such as:
Management as a series of transactions in which parties recognize multiple interests and exert influence
Political rationality—assumption that others design strategies according to what is politically rational to them
Key choices or opportunities—program design, delivery strategy, and beneficiaries
Politics as a source of information about consumer preferences
Develop conscious political strategies
Negotiate among and broker interests—shared as well as conflicting interests
Focus on groups with greatest potential influence, and demonstrate to them how they will benefit from a program
Analyze the political dimensions in any situation and use this analysis to build support
Look for ways to exercise influence and leadership
Using influence to change values and preferences may be less costly in the long run than sanctions and incentives
Exercise leadership through informal and interpersonal means
Appeal to ideas and values to communicate purpose and vision

Exercise Leadership

Political influence is an important dimension of leadership. It stresses strategic behavior and a willingness to spend time interacting, listening, and contacting others. Rather than emphasize incentives as prescribed by the bureaucratic process approach, this one counsels managers to search for areas of agreement, to build coalitions, to promote new ideas, and to offer visions of the future to others.

Notes

1. The literature relevant to this model comes from political science. Among those who have applied it to development are Grindle (1977; 1980; 1981); Lindenberg and Crosby (1981); Bates (1980); Ilchman and Uphoff (1969); Wynia (1972); and Cohen et al., 1985). For a discussion of conflicting interests within bureaucracies see Abrahamsson (1977); for a more general theory of political conflict see Dahrendorf (1959).

2. Compare Hammergren's study of efforts to reform administration in South American countries. Instead of the two-stage scenario in which experts make plans and then submit them to managers, she recommends that the two groups work closely throughout the process, even if experts have a smaller role.

> The lessened role for reform experts and the correspondingly greater involvement of politicians and bureaucrats means that even at the planning stage, coalitions of supporters are being formed. Thus contrary to the two-stage scenario of reform planning by a specialized group, alliance formation among the interested parties is incorporated from the start and compromises with potential opposition can become a part of the initial proposal (Hammergren, 1983, 166).

3. See, for example, Elmore (1978); Gawthrop (1983); and Allison (1969).

4. See, for example, Pfeffer (1981); Heaver (1982); and Montgomery (1986a). In his study of power in organizations, Mintzberg notes that he is primarily concerned with "behaviors that are dictated strictly by role" (1983, 30).

5. Research on development programs in the United States suggests that sometimes programs are potentially threatening to powerful interests but are tolerated or at least not opposed. Some programs do things no one else is doing and thus are tolerated as long as they do not become competitive. Others fall into "a zone of indifference" beyond the control of other officials or fit a "vacuum-filling model of innovation in unclaimed territory." The point of these options is that even if programs were

not supported by political elites, they may be tolerated if managers take the opportunity to design them so they do not threaten the elites directly (Yates, 1976, 161). A number of other studies have made similar comparisons between urban areas in the United States and in developing societies: Alliband (1983); Leonard and Marshall (1982); Blair (1981); Tendler (1982); Holdcroft (1978); Ingle (1979); and Esman (1978a).

6. Research associated with the war on poverty in the United States finds that leaders who mobilized community groups often found that the groups turned around and vetoed whatever they tried to do. For an illustrative case study and a review of this literature see Bryant and White (1975).

7. If population planning has been institutionalized in a community, for example, then a new program can rely on its legitimacy and supporting networks; if no such institutions exist, then a new program will be much more dependent on public support (Blair, 1981).

8. See, Smith (1985, 132); Grindle (1980); and Cohen et al. (1985, 1214).

9. It is far more difficult to do this during implementation because policy has already been formulated and there is less room for give and take. The actors become very defensive and are preoccupied with what they might lose. As a result there is often no basis for building a coalition, and managers instead confront a series of fragmented maneuvers (Bardach, 1977, 43).

10. The strategy is very similar to what Bardach describes as "scenario writing," in which managers try to anticipate the likely scenario that will occur in implementing a particular program. By imaginatively constructing the likely roadblocks, managers can try to redesign the program around the roadblocks (Bardach 1977, 254–266).

11. Hirschman does add that the availability of exit can make voice more effective (1970, 83).

12. Some of the studies that emphasize the extent to which organizations are increasingly dependent on actions taken by other organizations include Pfeffer and Salancik (1978); Trist (1983); Aldrich and Whettan (1981); and Ackoff (1974). In general, this literature refers to the extent to which organizations impose external pressures on other organizations and goes on to criticize organizations for being unable to adapt to these pressures.

13. The following are among those authors who approach interorganizational relations from the view of problem domains: Trist (1983); Gricar (1981); McCann (1983); Cummings (1984); and Aldrich (1979).

14. Interorganizational theory based on a conflict model includes Benson (1975); and Zeitz (1980).

15. Tendler notes that private voluntary groups commonly indulge in rhetoric that emphasizes that they have very different qualities and values than public organizations, even though in fact they often work closely with the public sector. Research by Rothschild-Whitt indicates

that private voluntary groups often feel they need to draw this contrast in order to justify their existence and that they are able to gain supporters by playing up differences with the public sector (1982, 77–78).

16. Bardach proposes the strategy of being a "fixer." This involves intervening, sometimes covertly, often by using coercion, to improve the chances of carrying out a program. Typically this means going around normal channels and bringing together people who are in a position to free up resources or make things happen. He adds, however, that managers probably cannot rely on the strategy of "fixing" to make much difference (1977).

17. This point has been argued in considerable detail by Brown and Covey on the basis of an analysis of the material contained in the major OD texts (1985). See also White (1982). A similar point was made in the discussion of aggregative techniques in Chapter 4. A question was raised whether decisions might have more legitimacy if people could express how strongly they felt about an issue and not just indicate what their preference was.

18. Bryant uses this classification to analyze the institutional environment of organizations (1985).

19. Lindenberg and Crosby's analysis is based on Ilchman and Uphoff (1969).

20. There is a growing literature on the uses of power by managers. Pfeffer (1981) and Mintzberg (1983) are two major studies. Schein reviews the literature on different definitions of power and influence that are of particular relevance to organization behavior. She develops a model that links the resources, the intent, and the means of powerholders (1977).

21. See Fidler and Johnson (1984, 708); and French and Raven (1959).

Part 3
Implications of the Approaches for Program Management

What are managers to make of the theories and prescriptions described in Part 2? The preceding chapters attempted to organize the literature into meaningful categories while doing justice to the variety of experiences and prescriptions that are evident in the development management literature. The six theories or sets of assumptions reflect important theoretical differences and contrasting emphases. These approaches bring together studies that are based on similar views of management and similar strategies for changing it and organize what could otherwise be a bewildering array of seemingly independent studies and recommendations. At the same time the descriptions tried to avoid making the approaches more internally consistent than they really are. The descriptions presented the approaches as clusters of related propositions that taken together illustrate the dynamism and creative energy in the field of development management.

An emphasis on different approaches, even though broadly conceived, can pose a problem however. Johnston and Clark, in their study of rural development, warn that the diversity of perspectives has its down side. It may simply mean that people are not listening to each other, that they are more interested in fighting the same battles again and again and in defending their own turf than in making progress. In this sense a plurality of perspectives can be a sign of an immature field (1982, 19). Part 3 tries to avoid this impasse. It explores how managers can use the diversity to improve their chances of bringing about sustainable development and indicates ways in which the theories are moving in similar directions as well as areas where each offers a unique perspective. Part 3 also suggests how the approaches can be used to make managers aware of a variety of opportunities for promoting developmental change.

10

Creating Opportunities for Change

An implicit theme throughout the preceding chapters is that program managers do far more than administer mandates from policy makers; in fact, managers can promote sustainable development. They contribute to program content, they affect the capacity of their organizations to implement programs, they expand their resources, they interact with a variety of organizational units throughout the political and social systems, and they exercise leadership. In carrying out this array of functions managers can draw on a variety of perspectives and theories about management, each of which emphasizes different opportunities for bringing about change. This emphasis on different opportunities is particularly important because much of the literature on management has taken a limited view of the managerial role and has failed to explore the ways in which managers can introduce and promote change. The description of different functions and perspectives in this book has tried to correct these limitations.

This chapter first reviews how the approaches apply to the management functions first described in Chapter 2 and summarizes the opportunities provided by each approach. It then asks how to assess and compare the approaches and notes several ways in which the approaches are converging. In spite of an emerging consensus in some important areas, the approaches also offer unique and contrasting insights into management opportunities. One implication is that it is inappropriate to define "the one best way" to manage programs or identify a single strategy for promoting development. A better strategy, and one that does justice to the variety of insights and to different program settings, is to draw from several approaches, using them to supplement and qualify each other.

Applying the Approaches to Management Functions

Contribute to Development Content of Program Design

Policy decisions provide an important opportunity for managers to influence and shape program content.[1] Much of the traditional management literature overlooks this aspect of management by assuming that managers can have little influence on policy. There are many issues, however, for which policy makers have limited information and may be open to the expertise and experience managers can offer. In addition, program design continues throughout the implementation process, thereby providing managers with a series of opportunities for influencing program design that go beyond the original policy formulation stage. Outsiders interested in policy dialogue and policy change may also find it fruitful to discuss with managers how decisions are made within program units and how managers collect information and monitor results.

Five of the approaches suggest opportunities for going beyond narrow definitions of management and contributing to program design.

- Goal-directed—emphasizes problem definition, appropriate and usable data collection and analysis, and strategic planning.
- Anarchy—warns that goals may be used to rationalize what organizations do for other reasons and that a number of other issues can attach themselves to and complicate goals.
- Institutional analysis—emphasizes using analysis to design appropriate institutions for providing program services.
- Social learning—stresses the need to involve beneficiaries in design to gain their expertise and commitment.
- Political influence—recognizes that goals reflect particular political interests and emerge from the interaction among those interests.

Enhance the Development Capacity of Implementing Organizations

It is not enough to design a program and provide it with ample funds. Designing effective organizational procedures and assigning responsibilities to appropriate units offer further opportunities for promoting development. Even though managers of program agencies have to work within existing organizations, generally they have some discretion regarding organizational procedures. This function is particularly relevant to ensuring sustainability because procedures that enable the organization to adapt and learn from experiences can increase the chances of continuing programs.

Five of the approaches suggest ways to improve organizational procedures.

- Goal-directed—stresses that organizational procedures can compensate for the bounded rationality of individuals and facilitate the collection and analysis of information.
- Anarchy—encourages managers to explore ways to bring some order and structure to an organization and balance these with flexibility and openness to unanticipated opportunities.
- Bureaucratic process —notes the need for coordination and supervision, for using incentives to replace central controls and personal supervision of personnel, and for relating rewards to performance.
- Institutional analysis—recommends designing delivery systems to encourage efficiency or innovation.
- Social learning—proposes procedures to involve beneficiaries in design and implementation activities.

Expand Program Resources and Political Support

Resource scarcity and the need to develop supplementary resources open a number of important opportunities for managers. Managers need to define resources broadly, to include both financial support and networks of social and political support. The emphasis also encourages managers to look for contributions from the community and to develop relations with a variety of institutions in the public and private sectors. Finally, because beneficiaries may or may not want the program and its services, managers need to promote program understanding, use their influence to mobilize support, and ensure that the program is responsive to community views.

Three of the approaches deal directly with this function..

- Institutional analysis—looks for ways to enable community organizations, users, and groups in the private and voluntary sectors to contribute to program support, primarily through user fees.

- Social learning—also looks for ways to involve community organizations but stresses interactions between the groups and program staff to determine contributions and adds that a lack of resources can be an opportunity to work more closely with beneficiaries to elicit their contributions.
- Political influence—emphasizes the importance of political support and recommends that managers look for opportunities to mobilize coalitions of supporters.

Work with and Coordinate Multiple Organizations and Groups

This function reminds managers that their role extends beyond organizational boundaries and that this broader arena greatly increases opportunities for promoting change. First, programs are generally clusters of activities, linking a number of different implementing units. Managers operating out of a central program agency will spend a large part of their time working with and through other units—coordinating, facilitating, and monitoring them. Second, managers have to take into account the interests of this constellation of organizations and explore ways to gain support—including tangible resources, cooperation, and political support. Three of the approaches deal with this function.

- Social learning—emphasizes how managers can expand their opportunities by working through community organizations and non-governmental groups.
- Institutional analysis—explores rules for promoting cooperation and exchange among private, non-profit, and public organizations.
- Bureaucratic process—observes that working with multiple groups will make coordination more necessary and more difficult, and given that managers have few sanctions in this arena, they will have to rely primarily on exchange of benefits and special incentives.

Exercise Leadership

Several of the approaches define management more broadly than they formerly did and are looking for opportunities for managers to exercise leadership, rather than simply to carry out mandates. These approaches emphasize opportunities for managers to be proactive, to develop agendas and supporters, and to rely on ideas and values to develop program support. Three of the approaches deal directly with this function.

- Goal-directed—urges managers to focus on critical problems, set priorities for programs, and develop a commitment to goals by appealing to ideas and social values.
- Anarchy—warns managers that they will often be working in very ambiguous situations, that their leadership depends on peoples' perceptions of how effective they are, and that they should try to bring some order to decision making.
- Political influence—encourages managers to look for occasions to educate and inform the public and generally promote program goals.

Comparing the Approaches—Signs of Convergence

The central question in this chapter is how to deal with this plurality of approaches and the opportunities they present. Perhaps the most obvious point is that as these approaches have been amplified in practice, they have developed in many similar ways, confirming Perrow's observation that, "fortunately, over time theorists are forced to include bits and pieces of alternative theories, compromising simplicity and limiting generality, and in this way we seem to make progress" (1986a, 219). This section discusses a number of areas where the approaches converge around similar emphases.

Inclusiveness

Several of the approaches are paying more attention to different perspectives and interests, particularly the views of intended beneficiaries. Instead of assuming there is a consensus or that experts can arrive at a satisfactory definition of a situation, there is a growing recognition that views on development differ and that a program that benefits some may hurt others. There is less confidence that some policies are objectively "true" or "best" and more willingness to accept the legitimacy of different views. Strategies to incorporate the views of program staff and beneficiaries range from structured techniques—goal-directed approach; to work teams—goal-directed and social learning approaches; to market arrangements that reflect different preferences—institutional analysis; to community organizing efforts—social learning approach; to negotiations with lower level staff about field situations—bureaucratic process approach; to the use of persuasion to mobilize supporters—political influence approach.

Informal and Interpersonal Aspects of Management

Proponents within all the approaches have come to appreciate that formal procedures are not the only way to encourage change. Attitudes, commitments, and interpersonal relations also determine how people respond and how effectively they promote development, and managers can use the informal system of social relations to bring about change. Representatives of several approaches concur with advocates of the anarchy approach that informal aspects of implementation are critical and that people often react in unpredictable ways that reflect social needs. Although some studies that compare approaches to management treat the body of theory associated with human relations and organizational development (OD) as a separate approach, it is probably more interesting to observe that the techniques associated with this important body of research on organizations have had a major impact on all of the approaches. Those who adopt a goal-directed approach and provide analytic staff support to managers emphasize consultations with program staff about problems and priorities, development of work teams, effective communication of findings, and application of communication skills drawn from OD techniques. Several innovations with the bureaucratic process approach recommend negotiating expectations with staff and involving them in designing their activities. The social learning approach uses many of the interactive techniques associated with organizational development in working with community groups. The political influence approach draws from this same literature to explore how managers can develop creative leadership styles and stimulate commitment and enthusiasm in staff.

Managers Can Shape and Change Preferences

Although the approaches are taking client interests seriously, a number stress the need for managers to educate and inform and that it is not enough for them simply to reflect preferences and adapt to opinions. Several approaches include strategies for encouraging people to change their preferences. The performance improvement strategy, part of the goal-directed approach, relies on work teams to bring people together, encouraging them to share insights and arrive at a new consensus. Despite the fact that economic models usually accept preferences as givens, at least one version of public choice theory examines how voluntary organizations encourage people to develop new strategies for cooperating and sharing information. The social learning approach links beneficiaries with program agencies, giving the several parties a chance to change their views and learn. Recall that agency staff attached to both NIA and Gal Oya gained a new appreciation for the contributions of local farmer organizations as a result of working with community groups. Finally, some versions of the political influence approach urge managers to appeal to peoples' values to get them to change their minds and commit themselves to program goals.

Managers Need to Combine Flexibility and Structure

A growing number of observers from several of the approaches have begun to emphasize the need to combine flexibility and structure in implementing programs. The record is clear that blueprints prevent managers from adjusting to problems and exploring opportunities that arise during implementation. Managers therefore need to allow for flexibility to explore options and make changes. One strategy that encourages such flexibility is the use of work teams proposed by theorists within both the goal-directed and social learning approaches. These rely on consultations and open sharing of ideas and experiences. Experimentation is a second strategy that encourages flexibility. Strategies within the goal-directed and the social learning approaches are particularly interested in ways for managers and organizations to incorporate experimentation in their programs and learn from their experiences. Flexibility is also encouraged with the bureaucratic process approach by delegating activities to sub-units. Finally, the political influence approach recommends that program content should be flexible so that it can incorporate what is politically rational to affected parties.

At the same time there is a concern that taken by themselves open-ended processes generate confusion and anxiety and result in anarchy rather than results. A number of strategies, such as the performance management version of the goal-directed approach and several techniques associated with the anarchy approach, have been exploring ways to set realistic priorities, to limit options, and to provide some structure and guidance for implementation. Another way to combine flexibility and structure is to design management around carefully designed experiments. Both the goal-directed and social learning approaches recommend formal experiments or pilots as a systematic way to collect information about program effects and propose specific changes. Similarly, some using the bureaucratic process approach say that managers need to provide incentives to staff to report problems and should schedule meetings where staff and supervisors reflect on and analyze any problems that arise.

Skepticism About Technocratic Management

Just as there is an interest in flexibility, there is a skepticism about controlling and technocratic management styles throughout all of the approaches. The growing skepticism has been most evident within the goal-directed approach, primarily because it was earlier identified with a blueprint approach. Proponents are taking bounded rationality very seriously and stress that managers often are not in a position to rely on quantitative precision or to control what goes on. Similarly, the bureaucratic process approach is relying more on incentives and inducements than on hierarchical control procedures. The institutional analysis approach argues that competition is a better strategy for holding organizations accountable than trying to control them. The anarchy approach notes that control is often unrealistic and inappropriate, and the social learning approach objects strongly to efforts to control the agenda and foreclose contributions from the community.

Comparing the Approaches—Contrasting Emphases

The aforementioned similarities point to important developments that transcend particular theories or approaches. At the same time the approaches emphasize certain factors rather than others and by doing so point to different opportunities for pursuing developmental changes. For example, consider different prescriptions offered to a manager facing the prospect of reducing the number of staff. The goal-directed approach would determine how large the reduction should be, what skills are needed in the organization, and which staff have these skills. It would then recommend selective cuts among those who perform poorly or do not have the required skills. The political influence approach, however, warns that even when a careful analysis of staff performance is carried out, personnel decisions are made on political grounds because staff are hired and retained for political reasons. Those with education assume the government has an obligation to hire anyone not employed by the private sector, and political leaders can use civil service appointments to build support.[2] For these reasons, according to the political influence model, any action based on rational analysis would generate excessive controversy and conflict. Political rationality would be better served by across-the-board cuts, thereby preventing any single group from feeling it was being unfairly treated.

After reviewing the arguments in each analysis, managers would devise their own strategies. They would consider that across-the-board cuts mean the loss of many of their best workers, while selective cuts would generate considerable political opposition. Managers need to weigh the relative strength of the relevant interests, the likely losses of skilled personnel, and so forth. The point is that there is nothing inherent in either theory that makes it superior; managers are better off if they recognize both options and compare their implications. This section reviews the unique opportunities posed by each of the approaches.

According to the goal-directed approach, managers should focus on defining problems and selecting appropriate goals, objectives, and strategies. Further it assumes that program substance determines the kinds of analysis that are useful and that analytic techniques have to be tailored to the characteristics of different sectors. Managers who simply apply generic skills in any and all situations overlook an important opportunity for building on the unique aspects of a particular program. The approach also affirms that ideas and goals can be important motivators and that managers can use them to nourish commitment and enthusiasm.

According to the anarchy model, even when managers carefully identify an appropriate strategy, staff and relevant stakeholders may be preoccupied with other issues that seem more pressing, and unrelated issues may become entangled with the program. The approach is a call to modesty and patience and a warning not to be immobilized if events seem disorganized. The approach reminds managers that there is little reason to expect everyone else to accept managerial priorities or time frame. At the same time, problems or apparent roadblocks may offer unforeseen opportunities. Sophisticated analysis may emphasize difficulties and constraints and overlook the possibility for creative and innovative responses.

The bureaucratic process approach focuses on the need for managers to establish rules and procedures to coordinate all those involved in implementing a program because goals do not have an automatic claim on managers or members. The approach appreciates that managers need to provide incentives to those involved in implementation. Careful analysis and training may enhance programs; bureaucratic procedures and incentives may be the crucial ingredient in implementation, however, and managers who ignore these, who assume that persuasion and commitment are sufficient inducements, often will be disappointed. This approach is a reminder that carefully designed routines often can defuse conflict and can bring some order and predictability into an insecure situation.

The institutional analysis approach urges managers to address a broader question than they normally do. Instead of simply asking how to improve implementation and management, managers need to ask how best to design institutions to carry out programs. Governments can decentralize and delegate activities to other public bodies, turn activities over to non-governmental units, and develop a number of strategies, such as providing loans or grants. By raising such questions the approach offers a far greater range of opportunities for managers to bring about change. This approach has relied heavily on economi. analysis and norms of economic efficiency for designing and selecting institutions. It is also possible to select institutions according to whether they encourage innovation and change.

The social learning approach takes a much more expansive approach to the meaning of development. Development means increasing peoples' capacities to influence their future, but beneficiaries will only be able to do this if they are directly involved in designing and implementing programs. Such involvement is essential in expanding the perspectives and confidence of community members. More pragmatically, it provides a mechanism for gathering knowledge essential for designing effective programs and for enabling community members to assume some of the responsibilities and burdens of funding and implementing programs. The approach therefore erases the boundaries between those within an organization and groups in the community affected by the program; by directly incluc.ng community groups, the approach reorients the attitudes and procedures within the program agency.

The political influence approach is especially sensitive to the different interests in a policy arena, particularly to the ways in which they can subvert and skew programs. Its major contribution stems from this emphasis on the potential powers of different interests. Strategically, the approach proposes ways to mobilize the support of those with necessary resources or claims on program benefits and to neutralize the power of those who can subvert program goals. Instead of consulting, coordinating, or involving the relevant interests, this approach proposes ways either to negotiate with them or use influence to change them.

Looking for Opportunities— Modified Contingency Approach

One of the most important traditions within management and organization studies is contingency theory. Contingency theory assumes that managers should select from the approaches according to the nature of the situations, rather than personal whim or choice.

> Certain kinds of problems are more amenable to solution when using one perspective than when using another. It is conceivable that in certain times and settings, the use of management controls is clearly appropriate, while in other circumstances only bargaining is appropriate. . . . Using management controls in a system in which power is extremely diffuse, for example, is like using a crescent wrench to turn a phillips screw. The problem is to understand when certain tools of analysis and strategies of action are likely to pay off and when not (Elmore, 1978, 227–228).

The important contribution of contingency theory is its claim that there is no all-purpose organization design or management strategy. Any approach will function better in one setting and for some purposes than on other occasions. Stated in these general terms contingency theory adds an important element to discussions about comparing the several approaches. There are problems, however, with more specific versions of contingency theory that try to identify the kind of situation in which each approach is appropriate.[3] For one thing the approaches are not mutually exclusive. Further, programs consist of multiple tasks, each of which might fit with a different approach. To really do justice to the complexity of development activities and settings, it would be necessary to identify a large number of variables and match them with approaches, thus producing a very unwieldy matrix. Even then such a strategy would be likely to overlook some unanticipated situations.

Another problem is that contingency theory can militate against change and innovation. The purpose of the approach is to match organization structures or management techniques with circumstances. Theories typically focus on the nature of the program content or task and the characteristics of the environment. One could argue, however, that if managers focus only on being appropriate to or fitting their situation, they may overlook opportunities for introducing the unexpected (Brinkerhoff, 1986).[4]

A modified version of contingency theory can retain the affirmation that "it all depends" and still avoid a narrow theory based on a few variables. For example, managers can use the approaches to analyze the constraints and opportunities in their situations and "distinguish among different kinds of problems" (Elmore, 1978, 228).[5] Given that the approaches point to different aspects of any situation, managers can use the approaches to diagnose the most important aspects of their particular setting. Managers then could draw on several approaches and develop alternative action strategies according to the variety of opportunities present to bring about developmental changes.

Recall the earlier example of the manager faced with the prospect of reducing the staff in an organization. A rational, goal-directed approach applies systematic analysis—set objectives, determine staff levels to be retained, consider needed skills, test existing staff, retain those with the needed skills, and reassign or remove the remaining staff. The interesting question is whether the existing decision, problem, and situation lend themselves to this kind of analysis. A manager also could ask if any of the other approaches indicates important factors to be taken into account. Earlier it was noted that the political influence approach serves as an important reminder to be sensitive to what is politically rational in a given situation. An appreciation of the political dynamics of the situation may suggest that across-the-board cuts would be less damaging in the long run. Taking the example one step further, the manager also could consider if the bureaucratic process approach had any useful insights. For example, does the situation provide any opportunities to design incentives that encourage some staff to leave voluntarily? The social learning approach suggests that some of the political heat could be taken off management staff by including community members in staff evaluations. The institutional analysis approach suggests that some initiatives might be made to stimulate private or non-profit groups to compete for staff.

It is useful for managers to be aware of all of these approaches because each provides potentially relevant insights for carrying out programs. As one recent overview of management concludes, "It is the interplay between different perspectives that helps one gain a more comprehensive understanding of organizational life, since any one school of thought invariably offers only a partial account of reality" (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983, 245). A cluster of approaches with their differing emphases can sensitize managers to a variety of variables and aspects of their problems and direct them to different opportunities. "Conflicts among views help practitioners as well as organization theorists to recognize their biases, to discover their implicit premises, and to perceive different aspects of reality. . . . Dissension gives perceivers the courage to look in unorthodox directions and to say what they see" (Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981, xvii).[6]

Following this strategy, managers may find one approach more appropriate and better able to take advantage of opportunities that present themselves in a particular situation than other approaches. On other occasions managers will find that the approaches supplement each other's limitations and that it is more satisfying to draw from several approaches. The result is a modified contingency theory that pragmatically designs management strategies according to the opportunities that present themselves in different situations. It proposes the approaches as a diagnostic technique managers can use to analyze their situations and affirms that the approaches are valuable insofar as they sensitize managers to aspects of the situation they might not otherwise consider.

Looking for Opportunities—Combining Strategies

If managers use the approaches to diagnose the opportunities, they are likely to develop strategies that draw from more than one approach.[7] This section describes some of the combinations that others have found useful and is followed by a case describing how program managers in a public health agency might diagnose their situations and design a program strategy.

Drawing from Analytic and Interactive Processes

According to the goal-directed approach managers should improve the analytic capacities of their organizations. Analysis enables groups to set priorities, and can offer vision, perspective, and alternative interventions. Analysis is most useful when it "reflects systematically on the key issues, the large constraints, the feasible opportunities, and the main priorities of the development debate. This reflection becomes a basis and a guide for articulate intervention in the development mess" (Johnston and Clark, 1982, 27). The alternative way to set goals is to rely on interactive processes, such as those described by the performance management version of the goal-directed approach and the bureaucratic process and political influence approaches. Managers bring different parties together, and program goals and strategies emerge from discussion and sharing rather than in response to analysis. Interaction is a way to understand the full dimensions of a situation, gain additional insights, and get others to commit themselves to program goals.

A number of development studies conclude that either analysis or some form of interaction alone is inadequate and that both are necessary (Johnston and Clark, 1982, 25). Interactive approaches tend to reinforce existing interests and ideas, and managers who use them are usually intent on understanding and accommodating preferences (Springer, 1985; Gawthrop, 1983). By contrast, approaches that emphasize analysis—goal-directed or institutional analysis—can bring new information and ideas into the discussions and offer a larger framework within which to develop actual strategies.

Consider efforts to interact with beneficiaries in designing program strategies. Even though beneficiaries may provide useful information, they may define program goals fairly narrowly or be unaware of possible options. For example, farmer groups are often reluctant to force individuals to repay loans even though repayments are necessary to replenish funds and continue a loan program. Local groups consulted about the kinds of economic development programs they would prefer often select to learn very traditional subjects, such as tailoring skills, rather than innovative production techniques or marketing skills. Program managers often will find it useful to look for opportunities to combine consultations or interaction with community groups and analytic strategies associated with the goal-directed approach.[5]

Strategies associated with the goal-directed approach emphasize the value of designing implementation around clear objectives and commitments, while those who value interaction emphasize the merits of leaving objectives open-ended and defining them during the implementation process. Managers can use the approaches to diagnose their situations and identify opportunities for providing direction as well as opportunities for taking different views into account. Consensus on objectives may be particularly important in situations where managers are working through a number of units and the multiple levels of implementation can lead to delay and confusion (Moris, 1981, 116, 121). In situations where conflicting values are very apparent or where different participating program units have alternative agendas, the political influence approach may be a useful source for strategies to resolve conflict.

Balancing Economic and Political Rationality

Techniques associated with several of the approaches rely on economic efficiency. Systems theory and cost-benefit analysis tools used in the goal-directed approach emphasize the importance of bottom-line measures. Public choice theory, a major resource for the institutional analysis approach, argues that competition will increase government efficiency. Many of the recommendations for supervising staff discussed in the bureaucratic process approach rely on economic incentives to encourage better staff performance. By itself, however, economic rationality is a fairly narrow approach, and it ignores many opportunities for improving programs. The political influence approach notes that economically inefficient programs may be very rational from a political perspective. For example, agricultural programs frequently encourage production by providing credit, at the same time that policies discourage production by depressing prices for farm produce. Whereas supports encourage production, the low prices discourage it and usually have more impact. Even though the supports make little sense economically, from a political perspective they enable policy makers to provide direct and visible benefits to potentially important groups. Managers need to be aware of these tradeoffs and of the opportunities to build political support. Similarly, many programs designed to meet basic needs may not be sensible from an economic calculus but still make a great deal of sense from a political perspective if they allow managers to mobilize community groups around major program objectives. Thus political participation and involvement may provide more feedback and generate more innovation than institutional arrangements that promote efficiency and competition.[9] Again, managers need to be sensitive to the implications of both approaches.

Encouraging and Managing Diversity

Several of the approaches, primarily the institutional analysis and social learning approaches, encourage managers to diversify programs and to involve community groups in the implementation process. It is well known, however, that decentralization may increase complexity and delays and overload an already fragile system (Moris, 1981, 116). The bureaucratic process and anarchy approaches warn that managers cannot afford to cope with too much complexity and that when confronted with a very complex and uncertain situation, they may need to provide some structure. Some of the strategies associated with the social learning approach may exacerbate this problem and introduce more complexity than managers can handle. "Garbage can phenomena" tend to emerge whenever organizations are faced with ambiguous and unclear goals and when managers are faced with a number of demands and cannot concentrate on any one (March and Olsen, 1979, 85). Such dynamics are especially likely when community groups become part of the implementation process. In such a setting it is harder for managers to control and structure what goes on, and from their perspective they become players in what must often seem like an anarchic process. They feel that they cannot make major decisions but are part of an ongoing, unpredictable "continuous, disjointed process" (Springer, 1985, 497). Those managers then need to look for opportunities to use techniques that provide some structure and order, that introduce change gradually and sequentially.

Structure and flexibility can also be combined by introducing coordination strategies associated with the bureaucratic process approach and bargaining strategies associated with the political influence approach. Johnston and Clark describe how this might work in practice. Ideally there would be strong national organizations working with local, semiautonomous groups.

> In such a relationship, authority is exercised more through mutual adjustment than through unilateral control. Ministries at the national level set forth an array of programs that they would like to see adopted and would be willing to support. District level facilitator organizations counter with proposals for benefit packages which they believe are feasible and desirable from the perspective of villagers and field staff. Both parties recognize that they need the cooperation, resources, and "distinctive organizational competence" of the other to achieve significant results. The mixed structure of hierarchy and bargaining which emerges looks horrible on organizational charts, is rarely peaceful, and requires

> the constant support and attention of the most senior national planners and policy makers if it is not to lose its balance and slip into the adjoining abysses of local autonomy or centrist control (1982, 207–208).

Diagnosing Opportunities for Developing Leadership

A final example of ways in which managers can draw from several approaches to take advantage of opportunities in their situation concerns leadership development. Both the performance management strategy within the goal-directed approach and the social learning approach have been heavily influenced by training strategies associated with action training. This training strategy emphasizes the value of learning to deal with actual situations, rather than relying on training in generic skills. Consultants work with managers to deal with specific program-related issues, thereby helping them diagnose their problems, design interventions, carry them out, and then reflect on the results.[10]

The goal-directed approach offers another opportunity for developing leadership. There is evidence that one of the marks of successful managers is a strong commitment to program goals. Leonard observes that training cannot produce commitment, but it is possible to bring managers together with others who share similar values and encourage them to reflect on development goals. Such meetings can be used to socialize managers and staff to an appreciation of the goals and purposes of a program, thereby reinforcing commitment (Leonard, 1986, 66). Studies of private voluntary organizations attribute their success in development activities to the strong value commitments of their leadership (Tendler, 1982). It is also the case that many of the international donor groups that sponsor and support private voluntary groups have placed a high priority on developing and reinforcing values in training and consultations (White, 1986c).

The political influence approach suggests a third strategy for providing training in leadership. Leonard notes that trainers frequently shy away from indigenous models of leadership because they appear to be hopelessly mired in political connections (1986). The result is a failure to explore and use some of the strongest models of leadership available. Not only do some of these cases lift up the experiences of successful local leaders, but they demonstrate how they take advantage of local political and cultural settings. More also could be done to mine the wealth of evaluations that have been done on various projects and programs in order to develop models of actual success stories within the development context.[11]

Case Study: Opportunities for Managing a Public Health Program

This section illustrates how a manager of a public health agency might use the approaches to manage a public health program to increase sustainable development. The case is taken from an evaluation of a number of projects carried out by CARE and funded through USAID to improve water potability in Tunisia (Bigelow and Chiles, 1980). The projects were largely unsuccessful. Their failure presents an interesting context for examining how the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) could develop a more adequate programmatic response to water and health problems.

It is hardly necessary to document how important water is in rural Tunisia. Many of those living in rural areas have no convenient access to clean water, particularly during the dry season. The water that is available is often contaminated, and the lack of potable water is commonly associated with the relatively high rates of infant mortality and water-related diseases. In the early 1970s CARE began a program to improve the supply of water by upgrading and enclosing wells in order to make the water safer. In 1975 CARE launched a more elaborate effort to improve water potability in four specific provinces. The projects had three purposes—to renovate and enclose existing wells and springs, to establish a disinfection and maintenance system at the provincial level, and to improve the health awareness of the local populace. These goals meant that the projects were trying to refurbish existing wells and improve the quality of the water, rather than search for additional sources or increase the supply in present sources.

When the evaluation team reviewed the results, it found serious problems at a majority of the sites. The water was not potable, and the improvements had not been maintained. There was little change in water use patterns. Staff had been trained to disinfect water sites, but there were few visits to sites and very little evidence of disinfection. Assume that the Ministry of Public Health wants to address these problems. How do the several approaches help program managers diagnose their opportunities for dealing with water problems and promote sustainable development activities?

The goal-directed approach suggests that MOPH needs to do a better job of defining the problem. CARE officials focused on the quality of water, but the evaluators found that users were far more interested in the supply of water than in its quality. Project designers did not consult with the users and only consulted with the Tunisian government about site selection. Thus the approach suggests the need for better information systems that collect useful information about program activities on an ongoing basis and report it to staff so that more timely adjustments can be made.

The performance management strategy within the goal-directed approach suggests that program managers consider establishing work teams to arrive at a consensus on the nature of the problem and to establish priorities and objectives. The teams could include program staff from the MOPH, provincial staff responsible for disinfection and education, donor representatives knowledgeable about certain kinds of pumps, representatives of research institutes aware of different technologies for disinfecting wells, engineers responsible for designing the upgraded wells, and some representatives from the local communities. According to the evaluation each of these parties was involved in some aspect of the problem and was responsible for some of the roadblocks that emerged. The teams would be asked to share their respective approaches to the problems, come to some agreement on reasonable priorities and objectives, identify the problems, and enumerate the sequence of steps to be followed.

The anarchy approach cautions that the problem of improving the water supply is potentially a garbage can into which a number of other concerns may get dumped. Managers should consider whether in this situation it would be better to keep the water program "loosely coupled" with other program objectives. In this case efforts to link water supply and health education may have unduly complicated the activities and made it more difficult for either one to succeed. The approach also urges managers to look for opportunities to change direction and take account of community members' interests instead of adhering to the original program design.

The bureaucratic process approach is particularly interested in the difficulties that were encountered in getting health workers to actually visit local villages and carry out the assigned tasks of disinfection and education. The approach asks about opportunities to improve the motivation of community health workers and favors more effective supervision and a more adequate set of incentives. The bureaucratic process approach asks whether it would be fruitful to organize health workers into teams and consult with them about their perceptions of problems in the villages.

The institutional analysis approach asks what incentives exist for community members to cooperate with others to conserve water and maintain the improved wells. Is there an opportunity to design different rules or incentives so that community members would be motivated to monitor the water supply and improve sanitation? Is there an opportunity to stimulate private sector initiatives?

The social learning approach notes that community members were not consulted or informed about the projects ahead of time, that women did not even know of the project until the construction crews arrived to work on the well or spring. Further there was little participation by community members even after the wells were completed. Supposedly one person in each area was assigned to do basic maintenance, but this strategy did not work. The approach is also interested in several cases where local people did invest themselves in the project, particularly one case where an individual who had donated the land for a spring maintained a proprietary interest in how the spring was maintained. The approach suggests that this fact points to an opportunity to involve community members in the program, give them a stake in the project, and thereby stimulate their investment in it. The fact that participation was somewhat greater in areas where the need for water was most critical also suggests that if a program addresses the felt needs of community members and involves them directly, they may be more responsive. The evaluations did note that few organizations existed in these communities and that managers would need to directly organize the community.

Finally, the political influence approach raises questions about the different interests in the area and whether any had opposed the projects. It asks how other government officials felt about the issue of improving water and whether managers needed to use their influence to gain official support. The approach notes that curative medicine is given a higher priority by public health officials and might conclude that those managing the water program need to use some political influence to get officials to divert more resources to preventive health practices. According to the evaluation results it appears that community members are very ill informed about the relationship between water and health and that a major education program needs to be a high priority.

Using the approaches to diagnose problems and opportunities should make managers more sensitive to the possibilities in their situations. It is difficult to specify exactly which factors would weigh most heavily or even what combination of strategies would make the water program truly developmental. It is reasonable to predict that managers will see a need to include more views, to emphasize the informal characteristics of their organizations, to look for opportunities to change preferences, and to combine flexibility and structure. Beyond those common tendencies managerial strategies are likely to vary according to the specific opportunities present in each situation. Some managers might argue that the recommendations are not directive enough and fail to provide clear guidelines. On the other hand, using the approaches to diagnose situations sensitizes managers to possibilities within their particular settings, and in this sense the recommendations probably will feel more realistic to managers than approaches that chart out a more specific course ahead of time.

Conclusions

This book has defined managers as participants in a broad governing process rather than as narrow technicians, which fits with Moris' distinction between administration and management: "Administrative skills are in large part routine. Managerial responses consist of diverse actions taken to meet changing demands" (1981, 119). Managers do not only "meet changing demands," however; managers also can try to change the demands and can draw on a variety of theories to create opportunities for promoting developmental changes in a society.

This broad agenda probably reflects the reality that most managers experience. It is reasonable to assume that managers are fairly complex beings who share a commitment to program goals, who want to empower groups in the society, who wish to expand their turf, and who are wary about sharing any of their meager powers. A one-dimensional model of management behavior that ignores the ambivalence managers feel and glosses over evident failings and difficulties will ignore some of the tensions managers experience. It is important to elaborate the hard choices managers must to be prepared to make.[12] An alternative model of management that describes the managerial role from a single perspective will ignore many of the potential resources for change. In this sense the various models can inform and correct each other. As discussed in this final chapter, the approaches often support and complement each other. In other respects they disagree and pose issues that probably only can be resolved by managers themselves as they cope with particular situations. Taken as a cluster, the approaches can sensitize managers to issues they will inevitably confront and provide a number of different strategies for exploring and creating opportunities to bring about change.

Notes

1. Contributions by bureaucrats to policy making also figure prominently in Heady's important comparative study of administrative systems (1984).

2. Compare the similar discussion in Cohen et al. (1985, 1215).

3. For example, a major tradition in organization theory focuses on two variables related to organization performance—a program's technology and the characteristics of its immediate environment. This tradition compares them according to how certain the technology is and how much consensus there is in the environment. When there is certainty and consensus, hierarchical and structured organization designs are appropriate. When the reverse is the case, then organizations should be designed around more collaborative models (Thompson, 1967; Stout, 1980; and Robey, 1982). For a recent statement of this approach applied to development, see Hage and Finsterbusch, although they do not use the concept of certainty because it is so ambivalent (1987). Paul also has developed a contingency model of development programs. He classifies programs according to the complexity of their goals and the complexity of their environment and then suggests which management strategies best fit each combination (1982).

4. Perrow has questioned whether contingency theory that relates different organizational designs to particular situations is very relevant to Third World situations. The theory has more to say, he feels, where strong organizations are in place that need to be redesigned to deal with changing problems, but has less to say where the problem is to build new institutions (1986b).

5. The economist Albert Hirschman has developed a particularly interesting approach to managing development activities around the concepts of constraints and opportunities (or "latitudes"). Managers need to have flexibility so that they will be able to take creative advantage of unforeseen opportunities (1967).

6. Others argue that it is valuable to retain a plurality of perspectives. See Allison (1969); Mitroff and Pondy (1974); Burrell and Morgan (1979); Bolman and Deal (1984); and Harmon and Mayer (1986). All of these studies argue for keeping and comparing several models, but all

worry that the rational model is frequently held up as a standard against which the other models are compared.

7. Donors engaged in policy dialogues with host country officials also might find it useful to apply these approaches to their discussions. Presumably most donors are operating out of a goal-directed approach, while many representatives of Third World nations will be thinking in terms of a political influence or bureaucratic process approach.

8. D. Korten makes a similar point in recommending the value of "strategic organization" (1984).

9. A number of the analysts described throughout the study have tried to integrate different approaches. Hirschman, for example, discussed in the political influence approach, says he "hopes to demonstrate to political scientists the usefulness of economic concepts *and to economists the usefulness of political concepts*" (1970, 19) Lindenberg and Crosby, also part of the political influence approach, draw from both rational and political strategies (1981, 6).

10. For a comprehensive review of action-training experiences in the development context see Kerrigan and Luke (1987).

11. For example, see the series of studies that looked at evaluations of USAID-funded projects in Africa to determine what lessons they held for managers (Rondinelli, 1986a; and White, 1986a).

12. The recent studies of management in the southern African countries, reported by Montgomery (1986a, 1986b), illustrate the kind of work that can be done to document the realities of management in Third World settings and thereby reduce the common reliance on models based solely on Western experiences.

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INDEX

INDEX OF NAMES

Abrahamsson, B., 210
Abramson, M.A., 83
Ackoff, R.L., 89, 211
Adelman, I., 19
Aiken, M., 125, 132
Akbar, M.J., 26
Aldrich, H., 37, 130, 211
Alliband, T., 18, 19, 181, 211
Allison, G.T., 45, 129, 210, 236
Anderson, P.A., 88, 107
Ansoff, H.I., 84
Argyris, C., 83, 84, 102
Arrow, K., 137
Astley, W.G., 107, 130, 227
Bagadion, B.U., 169, 183, 185
Banfield, E., 184
Bardach, E., 52, 193, 211, 212
Barnett, S.A., 155
Barry, B., 155
Bates, R.H., 188, 210
Beer, M., 182
Beer, S., 82
Bellavita, C., 83
Bengtsson, B., 19
Benor, D., 119, 131
Benson, J.K., 132, 201, 211
Berg, B., 156
Berger, P., 182
Berman, P., 125, 130, 184, 196
Bigelow, R.E., 16
Blair, H.W., 4, 18, 102, 110, 181–184, 211
Blase, M.G., 154
Blau, P.M., 35, 121, 129
Blumenfeld, S., 62
Bolman, L., 88, 89, 107, 236
Bottrall, A.F., 174
Bourgeois, L.J., III., 84
Boyle, P., 81
Bratton, M., 157
Brigham, J., 131
Brinkerhoff, D., 6, 18, 34, 76, 77, 85, 184, 185, 186, 226
Bromley, D.W., 157
Brown, D.W., 131, 212
Brown, L.D., 37
Bruton, H., 157
Bryant, C., 6, 17, 18, 19, 22, 52, 107, 130, 131, 154, 155, 157, 183, 211, 212
Buchanan, J., 155, 156
Bucuvalas, M.J., 83, 107
Bunker, D.R., 83
Burns, J.M., 36, 207

Burrell, G., 31, 236
Calavan, M., 166, 183
Campbell, J.G., 184
Campbell, J.P., 37
Carner, G., 175–176
Cates, C., 84
Cernea, M.M., 183, 184
Chaffee, E.E., 107
Chambers, R., 17, 26, 52, 54, 81, 119, 174, 176, 181, 184, 185
Charlick, R.B., 19, 163, 182, 183
Chenery, H., 19
Chiles, L., 16
Churchman, C.W., 81
Clark, W.C., 58, 62, 90, 101, 129, 131, 181, 184, 185, 187, 203, 213, 228, 230
Cleaves, P.S., 197
Cohen, D., 81
Cohen, J.M., 4, 25, 35, 66, 130, 181, 183, 185, 187, 194–195, 210, 211, 236
Cohen, M., 93, 96, 98, 100, 107
Cole, J., 84
Connerley, E., 144, 146, 154, 157, 158
Contee, C., 18, 19
Corcolon, M., 51
Countryman, P., 85
Covey, J.G., 37, 212
Creshkoff, A.J., 85
Crosby, B., 190, 204–205, 210, 212, 231
Cummings, L., 129
Cummings, T.G., 211
Cunningham, J.B., 81
Cyert, R., 107, 129
Dahrendorf, R., 210
Daneke, G.A., 83
David, M., 131
Davis, S.M., 132
Davis, T.R., 37
Deal, T., 88, 89, 107, 236
DeBono, E., 84
de Jesus, E., 44, 45, 51
DelBecq, A.L., 84
de los Reyes, R., 174–175
Diesing, P., 80
Dore, R., 121–122
Downs, A., 117
Dunlop, D.W., 197
Dunn, W.N., 81, 82, 84, 107
Eadie, D.C., 73, 74, 84, 85
Eaton, J.W., 154
Elliott, C., 19
Elmore, R.F., 60, 81, 82, 124, 129, 130, 210, 225, 226
Emshoff, J., 72, 84
Engel, N., 155
Erickson-Blomquist, W., 145
Esman, M.J., 4, 23, 28, 35, 161, 176, 178, 181, 182, 183, 185, 211
Etzioni, A., 129
Fainstein, S., 185
Fainstein, N., 185
Fayol, H., 80, 81
Fidler, L.A., 212
Fiol, F.M., 68, 69, 83, 96
Finsterbusch, K., 81, 82, 85, 131, 236
Fortmann, L., 183
Frederickson, H.G., 182
Freeman, J., 35, 37, 81
French, J.R., 212
Friedmann, J., 182
Galli, R.E., 4
Garcia-Zamor, J.C., 182, 183, 184
Gawthrop, L.C., 84, 113, 183, 193, 194, 210
Gellar, S., 157, 182, 183
Gittell, M., 185
Goldin, K., 155
Goldsmith, A., 62, 181, 183
Gonzalez-Vega, C., 10, 127, 124
Gorman, R., 156
Gortner, H., 37, 131
Gow, D.D., 17, 18, 182
Gran, G., 4, 18, 107, 130, 164, 183, 192
Greenstone, J., 184
Gricar, B.G., 37, 201, 211
Grindle, M., 17, 35, 198, 210, 211

Gummer, B., 84
Gustafson, D.H., 84
Hadden, S., 197
Hage, J., 81, 82, 85, 125, 131, 132, 236
Hall, R., 81
Hammergren, L.S., 5, 10, 17, 37, 59, 63, 81, 83, 210
Hannan, M.T., 35, 37, 81
Harbeson, J., 18
Hardin, G., 157
Harmon, M.M., 37, 52, 107, 154, 236
Harrison, J.Q., 131
Hayami, Y., 154, 157
Heady, F., 236
Heaver, R., 26, 35, 113, 130, 210
Hedberg, B.L.T., 68, 97, 101, 107
Heginbotham, S., 118, 120, 130–132, 181
Heiby, J., 102
Hennessey, T., 157
Hermann, C., 81, 130–131
Hirschman, A.O., 8, 27, 91, 92, 102–105, 199–201, 211, 236, 237
Holdcroft, L., 181, 211
Honadle, G.H., 8, 14, 17–19, 26, 29, 36, 52, 70, 81, 125, 126, 132, 185, 206
Hummel, R., 112
Huntington, S., 154
Hyden, G., 37, 114, 157
Hylton, L.F., 201
Ickis, J., 19, 160
Ilchman, W., 210, 212
Ingle, M.D., 12, 17, 18, 52, 83, 85, 186, 211
Jackson, M.C., 82
Jedlicka, A., 177, 185
Johnson, J.D., 212
Johnston, B.F., 58, 62, 90, 101, 131, 181, 184, 185, 187, 203, 213, 228 230
Jones, Y., 183
Kahn, R., 81
Kallab, V., 18
Katz, D., 81
Kerrigan, J., 237
Kettering, M., 71, 76, 85, 185, 186
Kettl, D., 150
Khan, 102
Kiggundu, M.N., 8, 21, 37, 107
Kimber, R., 157
Kingshotte, A., 131
Kirlin, J.J., 158
Kiser, L.L., 154, 155, 157, 158
Kochan, T.A., 125, 132, 201
Korten, D.C., 4, 17, 18, 19, 34, 52, 81, 84, 107, 130, 161, 164, 167, 169–173, 175–178, 181–185, 237
Korten, F.F., 161, 167, 183, 185
Kuhn T., 52
Kulp, E.M., 61–62, 82
Lamb, G., 7, 137, 141–142
Landau, M., 52, 184
Lawrence, P.R., 132
Leila, A., 18
Lele, U., 17, 18
Leonard, D.K., 11, 17, 34, 36, 37, 59, 64, 81, 113–116, 119, 121–124, 131, 155, 184, 185, 197, 207, 211, 231
Lethem, F.J., 37, 204
Levine, S., 132
Lewis, J., 18
Lindblom, C., 81
Lindenberg, M., 190, 204–205, 210, 212, 237
Lipsky, M., 129, 130
Litwak, E., 201
Lowenthal, J., 83
Luke, D.F., 17, 19
Luke, J., 237
Lusby, F., 76
Luthans, F.A., 37
Lutz, F., 107
Lyles, M.A., 68, 69, 83, 96
Lynn, L., Jr., 192
MacAndrews, C., 4
Mahler, J., 37, 72, 131
Majone, G., 59
March, J., 56, 81, 87, 93, 94–96, 98,

100, 101, 107, 111, 115, 129, 133, 155, 185, 207, 230
Marshall, D.R., 11, 17, 184, 211
Mayer, R., 37, 52, 107, 154, 236
Maynard-Moody, S., 55
Mazmanian, D., 37
McCann, J.E., 211
McKelvey, B., 35
McKersie, R., 202–203
Mellor, J., 13
Michael, D.N., 182, 184
Miller, T.C., 37
Minear, L., 13, 19
Mintzberg, H., 36, 81, 88, 210, 212
Mitroff, I.I., 72, 82, 84, 236
Moe, T.M., 130
Mohapatra, 61, 63, 75
Mohr, L.B., 107
Montgomery, J.D., 24, 35, 36, 52, 129, 161, 165, 181–183, 192, 210, 237
Montjoy, R.S., 125, 126, 130, 132
Morgan, E.P., 7, 18, 120
Morgan, G., 31, 236
Moris, J.R., 7, 10, 12, 14, 18, 27, 52, 82, 114, 115, 122, 131, 229, 230, 235
Morris, C.T., 19
Morrison, J.S., 150, 156
Morss, E.R., 181
Nakamura, R.T., 35
Nellis, J., 139–140, 151, 156
Nelson, R., 81, 83, 146, 155
Nicholson, J., 37, 131
Nicholson, N.K., 140, 155, 157
Nystrom, P.C., 101, 107, 227
Oakerson, R.J., 146, 158
Olsen, J.P., 93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 107, 133, 155, 185, 207, 230
Olson, M., 157
Ostrom, E., 142–146, 154, 155, 157, 158
Ostrom, V., 142–146, 157
Ostrowski, J., 84
O'Toole, L.J., 125, 126, 130, 132
Overman, E.S., 37
Owens, E., 181
Oyugi, W., 131
Padgett, J.F., 107
Paget, R., 4, 6
Painter, T.M., 132
Palmer, M., 18
Palumbo, D., 107
Patton, M., 65, 66, 83, 166, 185
Paul, S., 4, 8, 11, 18, 23, 24, 35, 41, 44, 51, 81, 236
Perrow, C., 51, 52, 81, 95, 107, 110, 130, 155
Peters, T.J., 36, 64
Peterson, P., 184
Pfeffer, J., 35, 36, 107, 192, 210, 211, 212
Pfiffner, J., 149
Poland, J., 84
Pondy, L.R., 236
Pressman, J., 52, 83
Prottas, J., 120, 124, 130, 132, 176
Pyle, D.F., 4, 9, 197
Quick, S.A., 64
Raven, B., 212
Ray, A., 131
Rein, M., 81, 107
Rhoads, S., 130, 156
Riggs, F., 163, 182
Rittel, W.J., 90, 107
Ro, Chung-Hyun, 181
Robey, D., 35, 236
Rogers, D.L., 201
Rondinelli, D.A., 17, 18, 36, 52, 85, 237
Rosenthal, I., 25
Rothschild-Whitt, J., 211
Russell, C.S., 140
Rutman, L., 63
Ruttan, V., 154, 157
Saasa, O., 17, 22, 23, 35
Sabatier, P., 37
Salamon, L.M., 148, 151
Salancik, G.R., 36, 211
Satia, J.K., 27
Satow, R.L., 82
Schaffer, B., 6, 17, 120, 176

Schein, V., 185, 212
Schmidt, S.M., 125, 132, 201
Schoenherr, R.A., 35
Schon, D., 84, 182
Schultze, C., 157
Scott, W.R., 52, 82
Sedgwick, J.L., 37
Seers, D., 19, 181
Selznik, P., 207
Sensenig, B., 71
Sewell, J., 18, 19
Seymour, M., 116, 117, 150
Shaw, R., 181
Shields, E., 155, 181
Sien, C.L., 4
Siffin, W.J., 17
Sigelman, L., 17
Silverman, J., 17, 18
Simon, H., 55–56, 81, 87, 111, 115, 129
Singh, J.P., 176
Sloan, J.W., 83
Smallwood, F., 35
Smith, K., 43, 45, 51
Smith, T.B., 189
Smith, W.E., 37, 204, 211
Solomon, M.J., 17, 76, 85, 186
Spicer, M.W., 121, 131
Springer, J.F., 66, 68, 96, 107, 228, 230
Starbuck, W.H., 101, 107, 227
Steinbacher, R., 73, 74, 84, 85
Steinbruner, J.D., 82
Stone, C.N., 37, 110, 183, 185, 189, 190, 208
Stout, R., Jr., 52, 184, 236
Streeten, P., 4
Sussman, G., 181
Sweet, C., 52
Tanco, A., Jr., 42, 44, 51, 74
Taylor, F., 81
Tendler, J., 13, 52, 64, 146, 156, 167, 175, 184, 211, 231
Thomas, T., 19, 35, 165, 172, 181, 182, 185
Thompson, J.D., 81, 236
Thomson, J.T., 144, 157
Thoolen, B.A., 37, 204
Timberlake, L., 30, 166, 184
Tribe, L., 81, 83
Trist, E., 211
Tullock, G., 155, 156
Uphoff, N., 4, 23, 28, 35, 157, 161, 167, 169, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178, 181, 182, 183, 210, 212
Van de Ven, A.H., 84, 107, 130, 227
Van Meter, D., 83
Van Horn, C., 83
VanSant, J., 17, 18, 29, 36, 52, 84, 115, 125, 126, 132, 206
Vroom, V.H., 115
Wallis, M., 131
Walsh, A., 35
Walton, R., 202–203
Warren, R.L., 132
Warwick, D.P., 21, 31, 33, 37, 81, 189, 193, 195
Waterman, R.H., 36, 64
Webber. M., 90, 107
Weber, M., 80, 81, 82
Weick, K.E., 95, 99, 100, 107
Weisel, P., 52, 84, 115
Weiss, C.H., 66, 83, 107
Weiss, R.W., 81
Wen-hsien, H., 120
Wentling, M.G., 70, 110, 131
Whettan, D., 201, 211
White, L.G., 6, 17, 18, 19, 52, 64, 84, 107, 130, 131, 156, 157, 183, 185, 211, 212, 231, 237
White, P.E., 132
White, S.S., 107
Wholey, J.S., 69, 83
Whyte, W.F., 183
Wildavsky, A., 52, 59, 83
Wilson, J.Q., 129
Wolf, C., Jr., 130, 138–139, 155
Wright, P.J., 107
Wynia, G.W., 210
Wynne, S., 157
Yassin, E.S., 18
Yates, D., 192, 199, 211

Zeitz, G., 211

SUBJECT INDEX

Accountability, 123, 148–151, 160, 164, 169, 177–179, 181, 183, 185
Action research, 174–175, 180
Action training, 76, 231, 237
Adaptation, 68, 74, 83
Administrative reform, 3, 4, 5, 8–9
Africa, 30, 59, 64, 110, 139, 156, 157, 163, 166, 237; Southern, 35, 36, 192, 237
Agency for International Development. *See* United States Agency for International Development
Agency theory, 110, 130
Agrarian Research and Training Institute (Colombo), 183
Agricultural programs, 104, 116, 117, 134, 229; *see also* Rural development activities; development, 66; extension, 93
Analysis, 25, 42, 55–85, 227–229; multiple uses, 66
Anarchy approach, 43, 46, 87–107, 109, 216–223, 230, 233
Animateurs, 183
Animation Rurale, 163, 182
Annual Report of the World Bank, 1983, 4
Anthropology, 36
Approaches to management, 1, 4, 39, 42–52, 53–54, 159, 213
Asia, 161
"Backward mapping," 124
Bangladesh, 102, 110
Bargaining, 35, 188, 196, 202–203
Basic needs strategy, 4, 12, 66, 197, 229
Blueprint models, 45–48, 52, 59–60, 221, 222
Botswana, 157
Bounded rationality, 55–56, 60, 73, 110, 149, 152, 156, 160, 217, 222
Brazilians, 200
Budgets, 16, 23, 66, 76, 99, 106
Bureaucratic organizations, characteristics of, 8–9, 28, 81, 95, 109–114, 139, 160, 162, 164, 168; centrally controlled, 11–12, 176–177; politics, 191–194; processes, 95, 99, 192; reorientation of, 172–173, 182–183
Bureaucratic fit, 172, 173, 179
Bureaucratic process approach, 43, 46, 51, 109–131, 136, 138, 140, 141, 151, 159, 161, 176, 189–190, 197, 217–226, 228, 230, 233, 237
Bureaucrats, lower level, 36
Burkina Faso, 166
"Camping on seesaws," 101
Capacity building, 1, 13, 26–27, 36, 40–42, 57, 63, 90, 105, 128, 154, 179–180
CARE, 232
Case studies, 3, 185, 198, 232
Change, managers and, 14, 30–34, 50, 74, 96, 97, 137, 146, 195, 220–221, 235; in preferences, 147–148, 152, 194, 202–203, 205–208, 214–237; successful cases and, 3, 185
Chile, 82
Civil service, 24, 114
Collaboration, 65–67, 73, 75, 201–202; with staff, 128; with community, 161–181
Colombia, 9
Comilla project (Bangladesh), 102
"Common pool goods," 143–146
Community development, 36, 160; projects, 8; theory, 18–19, 31, 162, 165, 170, 181–182
Community organizations, 28, 43, 45, 62, 146, 148, 151, 156, 163, 165–173, 217, 230; catalysts for changing bureaucracies, 161, 164–178, 184, 185; farmer

associations, 93, 150, 221; involved in management, 161, 162, 178–181; irrigation associations, 161, 167–171
Community renewal, 162–163, 165–167
Computer assisted analysis, 93
Conflict, 201–203
Consultants, 32, 66, 71, 178, 180, 185, 231
Contingency theory, 35, 225–227, 236
Contracting, 140, 150, 152, 169
Coproduction, 142
Control, 46, 52, 60, 62, 64, 77, 91, 98, 100, 181, 203, 222; limits on, 114, 169, 225, 230; social 122–123, 168–171
Cooperation, 201–202
Coordination, 109, 112, 124–127, 132, 150, 189, 230
Corruption, 191
Cost-benefit analysis, 58, 104, 174
Costa Rica, 126–127, 157
Culture, 37, 81, 231
Cybernetic theory, 82, 181
Data gathering, 67–73, 116, 216; about the poor, 175–176; flexible, 70, 173–176; inclusive, 71–73; participatory, 71–73, 169–171, 173–176; rapid rural appraisal (RRR), 70, 174, 184; structured techniques, 72–73
Decentralization, 125, 127, 129, 136, 141, 152–153, 181, 184, 199, 230
Decision-making, 25, 55–57, 77, 87–92
Deconstruction, 51–52
Deductive theory, micro economics, 136, 146, 148, 155–156
Delphi, 83
Development, as capacity building, 14–15, 160, 178; as economic growth, 11, 18–19, 57–58, 160; as transformation, 159–162, 182; as welfare, 13, 19, 26, 44, 160, 167; characteristics of, 12–15, 40, 57–58, 224; people-centered, 172, 177
Development administration, history of, 1, 5
Development Alternatives, Inc., 18
Development management literature, 37, 44
Development Project Management Center (DPMC), 70, 75, 85
Donors, 7, 16, 18, 23, 26–28, 35, 46, 64, 76, 93, 139, 187, 231, 237
DPMC, see Development Project Management Center
East Africa, 7, 114, 119, 122, 131
Economic analysis, 36, 58, 59, 130, 152, 154, 199, 224, 237
Economic models of behavior, 110, 111, 113, 115–116, 120, 121, 127, 130, 131, 135–137, 143, 145–146, 156–157, 196, 221, 229
Economists, 14, 17, 57–58
Ecuador, 175
Efficiency, 61, 138–152, 156, 172, 224
Egypt, 18, 19, 156
"Embracing error," 172, 183
Empowerment, 162, 164–165, 177–178, 182
England, 130
Environment, 14, 28–29, 30–32, 37, 46, 74, 89–90, 113, 132, 195, 199, 203–204, 236
Equity, 12–13, 44
Evaluation, 45, 58, 63–64, 66–69, 81, 83, 89, 100, 106, 117–118, 124, 127, 142, 185, 231; preliminary, 69; collaborative, 65–67
Exchange theory, 111, 125, 130, 131, 132, 179, 201
Experiments, 45, 100–102, 124, 172–173, 221, 222
Extension agents, 41, 43, 60, 117–124, 177; discretion, 124

Externalities, 178
Family planning programs, 61, 63, 81, 101, 195, 211
Feedback, 60–62, 69–70, 76, 80, 96, 124, 181
Field units, 10–11, 22, 26, 31, 43, 61–62, 66–67, 122–125, 136, 174
Financial management, 66–67. 76, 173
Financial resources, 15, 16, 23, 26–28, 42, 50–51, 75, 100, 125, 162, 191, 209
"Fixer," 212
Ford Foundation, 102
"Free riders," 120, 137
Gal Oya (Sri Lanka), 169–171, 175, 221
"Garbage can" model, 87–107, 230, 233
Generic management theory, 11, 32–33, 65, 192
Goal directed approach to management, 43, 46, 55–85, 87, 89, 92, 95, 96, 99, 101, 109, 114, 123, 126, 128, 133, 151, 159, 161, 167, 181, 189, 193, 197, 216, 217, 219–229, 231, 233, 237
Green revolution, 26, 189
Guidance System Improvement Approach, 85
Haiti, 77, 85
Health programs, 10, 27, 90, 99, 197, 232–235
"Hiding hand," 102–105
Human relations theory, 182, 220
Implementation, 9, 14, 31, 36, 37, 45–46, 49–51, 55, 58, 59, 63, 65, 68, 83, 87, 94, 114, 128, 150–151, 156, 162, 189–190, 211
Incentives, 43, 50–51, 62, 64, 106, 110–113, 124–128, 131, 140, 142, 144, 224; economic, 111–121, 149; social, 121–124, 126
India, 8, 26, 118, 131, 144, 176, 182, 184, 197
Indian civil service, 132
Indian Institute of Management (IIMA, Ahmedabad), 27
Indiana University, 142, 157
Indonesia, 102, 114–115
Institutional analysis approach, 133–158, 216–219, 222, 224, 226, 230, 234
Institutional design, 133–135, 158
Institutional development, 5, 16, 26–27, 32, 43, 120, 154–155, 160
Institutional network, 200
Institutional reform, 136–146, 151–152
Integrated management, 68, 76, 81
Integrated rural development, 6, 73, 125, 126
Inter-organizational relations, 10, 28–29, 36, 42, 124–129, 130, 132, 135, 148–150, 154, 163, 179, 200–202, 211
Interpretive structural modeling (ISM), 83
INVIERNO, 126–127
Irrigation Agency (Sri Lanka), 170–171
Irrigation systems, 72, 146, 168–171
Jamaica, 85
Japan, 121, 157, 201
Kenya, 66, 85, 116, 131
Kenya Tea Development Authority, 116, 141
Korea, 197
Latin America, 5, 9, 58, 63, 83, 183–184, 210
"Law of political entropy," 192
Leadership, 29, 33, 34, 37, 42, 44, 56–57, 64, 80, 81, 90–91, 97–102, 106–107, 122–123, 177, 184, 185, 191, 210, 231–232; transforming, 207
Learning models, 45–48, 52, 59, 67–69, 74, 83, 90, 92, 96–97, 168–173, 182–184
Liberia, 81, 120
Linkages between organizations and bureaucracies, 161–173, 178–180, 230–231

Local government, 16, 42–44, 125, 157
"Loose coupling," 99–100, 173, 233
Management, accounting, 76–77; bottom-up, 45, 77, 119, 178–181; functions, 40–42, 46, 48–49, 55–57, 77–80, 90, 105–106, 109–112, 127–129, 133–135, 151–154, 159–165, 178–181, 187–191, 204, 208–210; integrated, 76; literature, 29–34, 115; political dimensions of, 187–212; results-oriented, 69–70, 74, 75; strategies, 66, 92; top-down, 45, 77, 119
Management information systems, 41, 43, 45, 57
Management science, 32, 37
Managers, definitions of, 21–22; discretion, 25, 28, 49–51; importance of, 1, 5–6; relation to political leaders, 2, 7, 23–24; roles, 2, 7, 18, 21–29, 88, 134–135, 137, 147–151, 210, 205, 215–237
Market institutions, 136, 140, 143, 147, 153
Masagana, 99, 39–46, 73
Matrix organization, 126, 132
Mexico, 183, 184
Ministry of Agriculture, Philippines, 40–44; Liberia, 130
Ministry of Planning, Haiti, 77
Ministry of Public Health, Tunisia, 232–235
National Food and Agricultural Council (NFAC), 41, 43
National Irrigation Administration (NIA, Philippines), 168–171, 174, 177, 183–184, 221
Negotiation, 44, 123, 188, 193, 202–203, 225
Nepal, 184
"New professionalism," 176
NFAC. *See* National Food and Agricultural Council
NGOs. *See* Non-governmental organizations
NGT. *See* Nominal group technique
NIA. *See* National Irrigation Administration
Niger, 67, 70, 132, 157
Nominal group technique (NGT), 83–84
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 6
Objectives, program, 57, 62–64, 73–77, 79, 82, 91, 141
OD. *See* Organization development
Open systems theory, 31
Operations research, 62
Organization development, 36, 37, 76, 118–121, 203, 212, 220
Organization norms, 68–69, 83, 91, 100, 113, 122, 130, 162–163, 176–177, 182, 201
Organization theory, 29–34, 81, 111–112, 236
Organized anarchy approach. *See* Anarchy approach
Pakistan, 103
Paradigms, 52, 54; *see also* Approaches to management
Paraprofessionals, 11, 178, 197
Participation, 12, 36, 61, 163–165; by community, 150, 157, 159–186; by staff, 114, 118–124, 185; obstacles to, 163–165; source of information, 160–162, 173, 176–178, 228
PASITAM, 82
Performance gaps, 82
Performance management strategy, 75–77, 151–152, 185–186, 220, 228, 231, 233
Performance measurement, 116
Peru, 85
Philippines, 39–44, 161, 168–173, 206
PIDER (Mexico), 183
Pilot project, 41, 45, 168–169, 172, 180, 182

PIM, see Programming and Implementation Management
Planners, 9
Planning, 11, 58–59, 61–62, 65, 67–68, 73, 104
Policy analysis, 35
Policy dialogue, 7, 36, 187, 216, 222, 229, 237
Policy makers, 23–25
Policy reform, 1, 8, 12, 187, 216
"Policy space research," 194–195
Political context of management, 27–28, 32–33, 35, 44, 77, 136
Political elites, 16, 35, 49–51, 57–58, 60, 94, 164, 184, 188, 190, 196, 211
Political influence approach, 44, 46, 71–72, 147, 187–212, 216, 218–226, 228, 230–231, 234, 237
Political institutions, 4, 14, 25, 33, 59
Political, analysis, 204–205; as "voice," 199–200, 211; influence, 190–194, 201, 206–207; leadership, 189, 194, 205–208; mobilization, 188–189, 193, 197–199, 208, 218, 224–225, 229; process, 71, 189, 210; rationality, 193, 196–198, 223, 229; strategies, 190–191, 193, 197, 202–205; support, 66, 120, 193, 195–196, 198, 206, 209, 217; transactions, 193, 195–203
Political science, 36, 210, 237
Population ecology, 37
Portugal, 85
Poshak Nutrition Program (India), 197
Poverty, 12–14, 140, 146, 150, 167, 175, 178, 184, 185, 211
Power, 187, 189–190, 193, 198, 201, 212; strategy, 203–204
"Prisoner's dilemma," 157
Private sector, 7, 14, 42, 145–150, 234
Private voluntary organizations (PVOs), 64, 140–141, 145, 178, 201, 211, 212, 217, 231
Privatization, 139, 143, 146, 150, 152, 156, 199
Process documentation, 180, 185; *see also* Action research
Professionalism, 163–164, 176–177, 185
Program agency, 9, 16, 23, 27, 124, 169–173
Program design, 9, 23, 25, 41, 68, 78, 90, 105, 152, 159, 179, 190–191, 198, 209, 216
Program goals, 25, 42–43, 49–51, 55–85, 87, 90–93, 109–110, 133, 150, 188, 195, 198–199, 231
Program lending, 1, 187, 229
Program management, functions, 24–30; integrated process, 8–9
Programming and Implementation Management (PIM), 119–120
Programs, characteristics of, 1–2, 4, 6, 8–11, 18, 22, 40; systems of activities, 2, 10, 17–18, 28–29; strengths, 66
Projects, 1, 6–7, 8, 10–11, 17, 18, 32, 68
"Property theory," 157
Psychology, 36
Public administration, 33, 36, 136, 157, 185
Public choice theory, 131, 135–146, 152, 156–158, 221, 229
Public goods, 131, [illegible]–140, 142–146, 155, 157
Puebla (Mexico), 184
PVOs. *See* Private voluntary organizations
Rational approaches to management, 32, 55–85, 87, 98, 100, 103, 105, 109, 127; reinterpreting actions as rational, 88–90, 93, 103
Regulation, 144, 145, 150
"Relational contracting," 121
Resources, financial. *See* Financial

resources
RRR. *See* Data gathering, rapid rural appraisal
Rural development activities, 39–46, 61–62, 66, 70, 73, 101, 103, 113, 122, 213
Rural Development Committee (Cornell University), 165, 183
Rural Development Participation Project, 183
Rural Development Participation Review, 183
Sahel, 76, 85, 143, 157
Satisficing, 56
Save the Children, 131
Sectors, 11, 16–17
Self-help activities, 141, 164, 170, 180
Senegal, 116, 117, 150, 157, 166
Service delivery, 134–135, 150
Social exchange theory, 131
Social interaction, 160–167
Social learning approach, 43, 46, 51, 84, 123, 130, 140–141, 146–147, 159–186, 189, 193, 197, 199, 216–226, 230–234
Social science, 4, 133, 174, 184
Sociology, 36, 136
Sri Lanka, 168–173
Stakeholders, 72, 79, 162, 190, 201
Strategic management, 21–22, 24, 73–78, 167
Strategic organizations, 167, 173, 237
Strategic planning, 73–77, 98, 118, 151, 167, 216
"Street level bureaucrats," 129
Supervision, 110, 119–125, 150, 217; through groups, 123
Survey research, 184
Sustainability, 1, 15–16, 25, 37, 213, 217, 235
Sweden, 201
Switzerland, 157
Symbols in anarchy approach, 88–89, 90, 93, 104, 107
Systems theory, 22, 31–33, 36, 60–65, 68, 81, 96, 182
Thailand, 26, 166
Theories of management. *See* Approaches to management
"Third party government," 148, 152
Togo, 166
Training, 32, 41, 64, 67, 81, 84, 110–111, 113–116, 207–208, 230; on-the-job, 76, 96. *See also* Action training
Training and Visit (T & V) system, 119
Transaction costs, 138, 141, 155–156
Tunisia, 15, 232–235
United Nations University, 182
United States, 18, 75, 129, 132, 145, 157, 182, 184, 185, 201, 211; Department of Agriculture, 85; Department of State, 33
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 52, 83, 85, 183, 232, 237
University of Oslo, 94
USAID. *See* United States Agency for International Development
User fees, 16, 143, 217
Utilization-based analysis, 65–67, 69–70, 72, 83
Voluntary associations. *See* Private voluntary associations
West Africa, 144
Western theories of management, 17, 30, 37, 52, 120, 129, 184, 208, 237
Women in development, 167, 234
Work group. *See* Work teams
Work teams, 75–77, 80, 101, 123, 132, 151, 165, 178, 180, 185, 220, 221, 233
World Bank, 4, 7, 63, 66, 119, 151
Zaire, 25
Zambia, 22, 63
Zimbabwe, 157

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Louise G. White is associate professor in the Department of Public Affairs at George Mason University. Among her publications are *Managing Rural Development with Small Farmer Participation* and *Managing Development in the Third World,* both coauthored with Coralie Bryant.

Pointing to the importance of effective management and organization for achieving development goals, Professor White presents a basic management framework and then explores six approaches within that framework that have been influential in the development literature. Chapters on the rational analysis, organized anarchy, bureaucratic process, institutional analysis, social learning, and political influence approaches outline the initial assumptions of each and describe how each has been extended and developed in practice. A concluding section compares how the approaches treat the elements in the framework and also considers their implications for managing development programs.