

# TECHNOSERVE

Findings '86

WHO RUNS THE SHOW?  
Staffing Patterns Overseas

Thomas W. Dichter

Thinking about  
International  
Development



# T E C H N O S E R V E

Technoserve is a private, nonprofit organization. We provide training and technical assistance to enterprises comprised of large numbers of rural people. We call them "community-based enterprises."

These community-based enterprises principally relate to agriculture; our training helps them to increase productivity, improve their marketing, and enhance their overall management.

The results of this assistance include job creation, increased levels of income for needy people, and overall improvement in living conditions, without creating dependence on outside assistance.

Technoserve was founded in 1968. We work in Africa and Latin America. We currently have a staff of over 150 persons, made up primarily of highly-qualified citizens of the nine countries where we operate.

Technoserve is funded by church organizations, individuals, foundations, corporations, host country institutions, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

**WHO RUNS THE SHOW?**

**Overseas Staffing Patterns  
as a Key to Effectiveness  
in Enterprise Development**

## WHO RUNS THE SHOW?

# Overseas Staffing Patterns as a Key to Effectiveness in Enterprise Development

Thomas W. Dichter, Technoserve Inc.

### THE PERIPHERAL AS CENTRAL

Development practitioners in the eighties have been involved in a more intense quest for effectiveness than ever before. No longer content with short-term, local impact, we now want to see a complex calculus of local impact, broader institutional effects, sustainability, reasonable cost and replicability. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) especially, are increasingly being asked to perform accordingly by some of our major donors (such as The U.S. Agency for International Development). There is growing acknowledgement (however spotty) that much of what PVOs have tried to do so far has not been terribly successful by these new, more complex criteria. PVOs have, for some time, been acknowledged as capable of producing short-term results on the local scale, but have no strong record on sustainability or replicability or, if so, only at high cost.

As PVOs become aware of their growing visibility and the accompanying rising expectations about accountability and performance, the quest for this calculus intensifies. As the formula often seems quite elusive, this tends to make us think that the answers must also be difficult. Language being what it is, we naturally start to talk about what works and what doesn't, and from there the conventional tendency is to look for a "methodology." That term connotes something technical, which in turn suggests something rather arcane, difficult to understand, hard to master.

We forget that solutions are often where we do not expect to find them.

In our efforts to discover what works and what doesn't within our own organization, we began looking for this sort of "technical fix." We equated the technical fix with our operating techniques: with what and how we do our work. We thought of our work in the field—the assistance we give to farmers' groups—as the center of things. We should have started with who we are, instead of what we do.

After some head scratching, we began to realize that one of the most important keys to effectiveness—to the extent we have been so—lay quite

**The way an organization recruits its staff is a much overlooked key to program effectiveness.**

literally in who we are: the people who are our field advisors, the employees of the organization. We hadn't thought of this at all, in part because it does not sound technical. Had we thought of it, we would have said, "Well, that's too much a cliché to be worth anything. After all, everyone knows that the people in an organization are the organization. So what?"

In this case, the periphery—our personnel department rather than our program department—turns out to be one of the places to find answers to effectiveness. Surely, those who quest for effectiveness, who are after the grand answers to the pithy problems of development, would not think to stop in the outer reaches of the personnel department for a hard look at things. Nonetheless, we would say that staffing patterns are among the three or four most important elements underlying a successful international assistance program of enterprise development (if not other spheres of development).

In this paper we consider the



problems and progress towards an indigenous overseas professional staff. (Professional, for Technoserve, is defined as any employee designated as a "project advisor," all of whom require degrees and professional experience in accounting, business, management, sociology, agronomy or administration.) At this time, Technoserve's overseas professional staff is 83% host country, 5% third country and 12% American (70, 4, and 10).

## **THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAFFING PATTERNS AND PVO EFFECTIVENESS**

We make two presumptions about effectiveness. They both are terribly old-fashioned ones and have their genesis very much in western historical experience. The first is that effectiveness in an endeavor relates positively to cost consciousness—not "if it's cheap, it's good," but rather, "if the same thing can be done more cheaply, it is good." The second is that effectiveness in an endeavor is a function of the time invested in learning how to perform the functions required, i.e., you are more effective if you know what you are doing, and you are more likely to know what you are doing in a particular arena if you have mastered both the skills AND the environment in which they are to be exercised.

We think a conscious movement towards hiring more local nationals for U.S. PVOs overseas achieves both these things. Why? The short answers are: 1) The present use of U.S. expatriates in development is very expensive, and often so for the wrong reasons. Therefore, employing host country na-

nationals would be cost effective.  
2) Staff longevity is a major key to program effectiveness, and that is best achieved in conjunction with point one, if extremely careful local recruiting is undertaken so that local staff may stay with the organization for a long period of time.

### WHY LOCAL NATIONALS?

First of all it is morally right for development to be managed by the nationals of the countries whose projects and programs we are trying to assist. In the long run, the hiring and training of qualified nationals is one of the few truly important seeds of sustained development progress that we can help to plant. We buy the argument that learning by example is the most universal of learning processes. In spite of some tendencies to the contrary in the short run, in the long run, when one citizen sees another performing professional tasks with great skill and confidence, this fosters progress more than if that person were watching an expatriate doing the same thing.

More pragmatically, it is often politically expedient and tactically safer to have our overseas offices run entirely and permanently by nationals rather than by our expatriates. In Technoserve's case, our instincts about political expediency seem to be borne out more the longer our national staffs have established themselves in a country. In plain truth, it's not as easy to focus anti-Western or anti-American feelings on an organization whose representatives are entirely nationals of one's own country. In fact, in some instances, the people we work with (the members of agricultural co-ops in rural areas, and even the mana-

gers and administrators of the community-based enterprises with whom we work much more closely) tend to forget, after a while, that we are an American organization. This gives us a good balance of low visibility and political safety, both of which help us to keep our eyes on our overall goals.

Those goals—for us, the improvement of people's lives through the development of viable, sustainable agricultural enterprises—create more of a need for national staffs than other kinds of development activities, like building schools or clinics, and certainly more than relief activities. If we are going to do our job properly—and that means carefully analyzing the prospects of the enterprise—our staff must not only be masters of their disciplines, but must also have in-depth local knowledge about a wide range of things, from who controls the onion market in the province, to which crops do best in a dry period, to what people feel about their ethnic rivals on the next mountain top.

The pragmatic and the moral come together on the matter of cost. We feel we exercise a much more responsible stewardship of the money entrusted to us by fostering "nationalization" of our overseas staff for many reasons, one of which is certainly that expatriates cost much more than national staffs.

But that is only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, there is increasing justification for questioning the need for expatriate staff members at all these days.

Since its early days in the late forties and early fifties, the practice of development (as distinct from welfare or relief operations), defined here as an effort made by outsiders to assist people in the Third World, to alter the conditions which

**In enterprise development especially, host country professionals insure long term effectiveness.**

maintain low productivity and poverty; has depended upon the presence of expatriate operations personnel in the developing world. Whether the development work was large-scale capital investment projects characteristic of the 50s and 60s (roads, hospitals, universities, large agricultural "schemes") or small community projects run by PVOs in the 70s, the argument for the placement of such outsider staff members in development projects used to be a simple and plain one: namely, that the skills these outsiders had were skills that could not be found locally.

Few would have been able to adequately refute this argument; in the early days it was pretty much so. Given the design and conception of the projects, such outsiders were needed—there were few or no local nationals able to fill these roles.

The world has changed, both ours and theirs. On our side, more than we like to admit it, we have become a bit dependent on these jobs as development has gradually evolved into an industry. (Someone at the UN recently referred to it as the "DEV BIZ.") United States private assistance to the Third World alone accounts for over one billion dollars per year. And there are, it is safe to say, at least 20,000 American professionals (perhaps as many as 30,000) whose livelihood depends directly on the overseas positions they hold with development projects. (This excludes overseas volunteers and members of religious orders who live modestly on subsidies.) In addition these overseas Americans are responsible for perhaps an equal number of jobs at home which exist to support them logistically. Clearly, we have not tried very hard to close the gap between the rhetoric of "working ourselves out of a job"

and the reality.

On the Third World side, where there was once humble and grateful acceptance of expatriates, there is now growing resentment. The Third World can justifiably argue—as it often does—that expatriate placement in host country development projects is sometimes a function of an industry's need to market its product, rather than of what the host country itself needs. There is also a shrewd and knowing awareness that much of the money earmarked for development projects goes, in fact, back to the donor nation in the form of expatriate salaries.

This author has stood in the offices of a Minister of Public Works in a Middle-Eastern country and heard him argue eloquently about a \$4 million budget for a USAID-sponsored water project. He pointed out, using percentages that his staff had worked up for the session, the number of items in the budget that were really funnels for USAID money to be passed through his country on the way back to the United States. The items that bothered him most were the costs to bring out the "chief of party" and his team for the three year project.

The Minister had recently come to his post from New York where he had been assigned to his country's mission to the UN. He knew the details which lay behind this budget. The expatriate chief of party's base salary was in the high 40's. There was an additional 25% added on as a "hardship allowance." Additional perks, such as fully paid housing, utilities, water, a consumables allowance of American canned goods air-freighted to this remote country—where plenty of local produce was available—amounted to at least a doubling of this hard-

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ship allowance. Overhead costs for the home office support to bring this person out had to be added in, as well as the cost of sending his children to private boarding school—because adequate schooling, up to American standards, was not available locally. Finally, the budget included the shipping of the chief of party's car and paying for him to go on home leave twice during the contract. The total tab for this one expatriate came to about \$160,000.

While some of this money, of course, would go into the local economy, the greatest proportion of it would serve to boost the U.S. economy. Because the living expenses of the expatriate were so thoroughly subsidized, he could easily, if he was not an absolute drunkard and gadabout, save up to 90% of his salary. In addition, being a private U.S. citizen not employed by the U.S. Government, he does not have to pay income tax. When all these factors are added up, it becomes clear that, in real dollar terms, the expatriate can be making up to four times his base salary. The leverage effect of that extra purchasing power benefits the U.S. economy.

The Minister had, with considerable skill, pointed out almost every single way in which the presence of expatriates brought the total \$4 million benefit to his country to significantly less than that in real dollar terms. His final question was somewhat rhetorical. It amounted to asking: "Who do you think we are? What kind of a fool do you think I am?"

Besides the suspicion of the self-serving aspects of the expatriate presence, there is, in the minds of many Third World officials, the knowledge that, in the last ten years, hundreds, if not thousands, of trained technicians—many trained

**The Third World has changed. Expatriates are not as necessary to development programs as they once were.**

abroad—are looking for work. It is this last fact, more than any other, which has prompted the recent efforts, in some countries (Kenya is a good example) to crack down on the renewal of expatriate work permits.

Kenya is, in fact, a good example of the potential magnitude of the "expatriate vs. nationals" problem. A recent survey of U.S. PVOs conducted by InterAction showed that there are 61 U.S. PVOs in Kenya alone conducting 322 pro-

jects. Add to this a perhaps equally large number of PVOs from Holland, the Nordic Countries, Britain and Germany, and you have a very visible expatriate presence. With all due respect to these PVOs, who are undoubtedly well-intentioned and hardworking, it is hard not to ask whether the fact that life for the expatriate in a beautiful country like Kenya is extremely good, does not have something to do with these numbers. Certainly Kenyans are asking that question.

they may bring themselves up to the level of modernity that they desire, then we must be more honest in accepting that we cannot always count on our people being there, and become more active in the search for indigenous staff.

There are two questions to be addressed:

- 1) *To what degree are expatriates really needed?*
- 2) *How does a PVO go about finding, recruiting and keeping good local talent?*



If we, in development, are really to be true to our original purposes, i.e. that we are here to work ourselves out of jobs by imparting our knowledge and our skills to others less fortunate so that

## WHY EXPATRIATES AT ALL?

Ideally, a private voluntary organization or other development company or agency ought to be able to work towards 100% nationals on its overseas staffs. But, in reality, one of the reasons many people are in this business is because they are attracted to overseas work because they enjoy the expatriate life, the fascination, the sense of purpose, the heightened sense of connection with the work that the home office people lack. Many people are in the development business because of the chance to spend part of their careers overseas as expatriate employees of their organizations. To take that away would take the in-

centive away for some people.

Technoserve has handled this problem in one way. We strive for a highly nationalized overseas staff; ideally, to top out at about 90%, but leave room for a few expatriate positions. These few positions maintain the incentive for some staff who see the possibility of an overseas tour. More importantly, by rotating Americans between field offices and home office, there is a healthy periodical redressing of the balance between the home office perspective and that of the field. Additionally, we have learned from experience that starting a new program requires someone who really knows the organization's work. In some countries qualified nationals are harder to find than in others. In those places they must be trained. That training can be best done by someone who has been with the organization for a long time.

Accepting, for the moment, that there are local people with adequate skills for the tasks at hand, there is another reason to continue to use expatriates—one that is often unspoken. It is often the case that the prestige of the outsider is critical to success in a development project.

When Technoserve was in the process of starting up a program in an African country a couple of years ago, the most efficient route for us to take was to transfer a highly qualified African staff member from one of our programs in a neighboring country. He knew how we do business, had long experience with us, understood Africa, both intellectually and intuitively, and—something no expatriate could ever duplicate—he spoke fluently four of the languages of the region. His presence in the start-up program would have given us just the time we needed to

locate, put in place, and train the permanent staff which, we hoped, would be composed largely of nationals of the country in which we were about to start working.

When we proposed his name to the Ministry concerned, the reaction was immediate and blunt: "We don't want you to send us an African. We want you to send us an American. . . ." We argued that our first candidate was eminently qualified. "No matter" said our host, "we don't want an African. We want an American." The sentiment was utterly clear. No Africans need apply. Qualifications be damned. Experience be damned. Cultural kinship and language especially be damned. What seemed to count was the status associated with "expatriates."

We had a similar experience recently in a more developed country in Latin America. In a project where our local staff had been working for some time, a recent visit by one of our Home Office people revealed some discontent by the project beneficiaries with our staff of top flight professionals, all nationals. Did they get along well with our clients? Yes, certainly. Did they do their work adequately? Absolutely. Was there any complaint at all about the relationship? None. What then was bothering them, we asked. "We'd like to see a Gringo from your home office come down here once in a while, not just to look things over, but to work with us. Then we'd know you are really trying to help us."

These encounters may seem striking in today's Third World where we have come to expect new levels of national identity. For many years, observers have recognized the early stage of nationhood, with its pattern of conscious construc-

tion of national identities and a pervasive concern to put the mark of local identity on stamps, currency and the national airline. But now, as these countries go past those easy symbols to try to forge a deeper and more pervasive identity, the issue becomes more problem-

**The subtle dynamics of status may make some expatriates a practical necessity in many countries.**



atic. There is ambivalence about taking responsibility for their own destiny, as well as a recognition that full responsibility in this interdependent world is not a terribly realistic goal.

But perhaps the national psyche type of explanation for the status associated with expatriates goes too far. And worse, it may not be quite fair, since it tends to put the burden entirely on the side of the Third World. We think part of the phenomenon is explained by some psychological and anthropological universals—aspects of human behavior that apply to all of us. We've noticed at least five subtle explanations for "expatriate need":

**a) The Path of Least Resistance**

—The other side of the notion that being a native means knowing what is going on is the old adage "familiarity breeds contempt." For all the advantages that the national would have in theory, it may be perceived to be easier to work with an expatriate precisely because he/she is not a member of the culture. Thus, one can "skip steps" and avoid obligations and responsibilities that may be necessary in a dialogue between members of the same culture. In a way, the dialogue may be, in some respects, freer and easier to shape.

**b) Status Magic**—The desire for status certainly seems to be the aspect of the expatriate "need" that is closest to the surface. That may be because it is the most obviously universal of the possible explanations. We all want status of one sort or another, and people seem to take it where they can get it. There is a magic associated with having that which is costly and rare, and expatriates may be perceived that way. In most Third World countries, it is known that expatriates are relatively costly and the skills they are believed to possess are thought of as rare ones in the Third World.

**c) Context**—The desire or need for expatriates may be, in part, a contextual phenomenon—one that is felt most only in certain contexts, such as those areas seen to require highly technological skills. These kinds of skills may be associated more with expatriates than with nationals. We, in the United States, tend to operate contextually with respect to our perceptions of certain national personas. We think of the best watches as "Swiss", cameras as well-made in Japan, and certain high-caliber autos as German.

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**d) Force of Habit**—Especially when progress appears to be thwarted, or when the economy is in an acute state of crisis, the tendency in the Third World may be to fall back on some old habits—one of them being a desire to rely on expatriates. Looked at as a uni-



versal tendency, it is easy to see this as a temporary security blanket—a way to gain the strength to operate on one's own.

**e) Prestige by Association**—Expatriates may represent a kind of gift on the part of the assisting organization. There is more to a gift than the act of pleasing or thanking someone. Gift-giving is a complex exchange of symbols, which often have quite weighty importance. Again we, in our own culture, tacitly acknowledge this when we respond to ads that suggest that we'll be more highly thought of by the recipient, if we give a gift that costs more ("Give the very best..."). Such symbolism is actually carried by the gift itself, so that the recipient and the giver both gain prestige from its perceived value. In the Third World context, the expatriate-

as-gift may convey, vicariously, the prestige associated with a high-priced gift.

At the least, we can be sure that there is more than meets the eye when it comes to explaining the perception of the expatriate by the national. Given this complexity, we should accept that it is realistic, and perhaps even healthy, to maintain a percentage of expatriates on an overseas PVO staff. But while full indigenization may not be possible or desirable now, a higher level than exists at present could be reached. Over time, most people come to appreciate a good job, no matter who does it. Once it becomes clear that even one's compatriots can contribute a service that is useful and professional, issues of status and prestige, worries about identity, a desire for symbols that satisfy a need for attention from abroad and other vicarious advantages to expatriates, may dissolve.

### FINDING AND HOLDING ONTO LOCAL TALENT

We come back to the practical matter of locating the appropriate people. The first step in the process is to acknowledge that they are, in fact, there. Many of us too often assume that they are not, because they are not immediately visible. We think good people are available. They need to be searched out.

There must be a serious and sometimes costly commitment made by the PVO, to put an effort into locating the right people for their organization. Sometimes, an unusually aggressive and creative approach may be required. It may even mean looking outside their country. As one PVO put it, if we can't find a qualified national of  $\bar{x}$  in X, we'll

**Qualified nationals are available. They need to be actively looked for. Once found, it isn't enough to select staff on the basis of their paper qualifications. They have to "fit" the organization's philosophy and mission.**



find that same national elsewhere, even if it means finding him driving a cab in Washington, D. C.

Many nationals of host countries with skills who have left their countries would go back, particularly if offered a position with an international organization. They need the sense, sometimes, of protection that is offered to them by being associated with an organization that is not of the same nationality as they are. This paradox, the use of host country nationals to work in their country, but their placement within an agency or organization that is foreign, may be precisely the antidote needed for the status problem.

But what an effective PVO can offer most of, is the chance to perform effective development within their own country, and not be second-string employees supervised by expatriates (as is the case with many local employees of large U.S. PVOs and U.S. government aid agencies). For those qualified local people who are good and want to get their feet muddied, there are surprisingly few such opportunities.

How to make sure you've found the right people requires more subtle kinds of orientations. Simply putting an ad in the paper and plowing through 500 resumes isn't enough. There has to be a very clear-cut job description; but, underlying that job description, more importantly, there needs to be a clear-cut, articulated understanding of what this agency's philosophy and goals are. That understanding must become part of the recruitment process. What is often lacking is an understanding of how people fit into an agency's goals. Resume and technical skills alone do not tell the prospective employer what kind of an individual he's getting,

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and what kind of a fit that person will make.

Without that sort of an effort to get at issues of "fit," the right people are not found. Worse, the work of the agency is compromised. It too often happens that a PVO takes on someone who has the appropriate skills, but not the appropriate motivation or personality. Having worked his way up from peasant status to getting an MS or a Ph.D. degree in a particular tech-

vation and personality. The effort needed to find them has to be appropriate to the task. This means spending considerable time interviewing, and making sure that one puts that time in up front. This may require bringing a person in two or three times for an interview, making a genuinely serious effort to check up on references, rather than a superficial, perfunctory one. It would also mean having more than one or two people interview that



nical specialty, he may no longer want to have very much to do with the poor folks from which he's come, and does not like the bush lifestyle that often goes along with development work; the long hours in 4-wheel drive vehicles bouncing along broken roads, sleeping in uncomfortable places, getting one's feet muddied and facing the incessant demands of "hope springs eternal" poor folks wherever he goes. This is not the kind of lifestyle that the Third World elite necessarily cottons to.

Yet, in our experience, there are people in every Third World country with the appropriate moti-

person, and doing more than going over the person's values in checklist fashion. An attempt must be made to get to know that person.

### **TECHNOSERVE'S APPROACH IS ILLUSTRATIVE**

Technoserve's primary concern with all staff is "fit"—philosophical, personality, character. In looking for new people, the organization, of course, looks at skills and professional qualifications. But, these do not often help reduce the field to a manageable size. What does, is the search for the right fit. We look for



people who will work with Technoserve because they like what we do.

Our experience is that there is no level within the organization where this kind of fit is inappropriate. Clerical and secretarial and other support staff are looked at with a concern for philosophical fit. Of course, the rigor of that search is greater with operations personnel. But, everyone considered for hire is considered with the question in mind: "Does this person understand Technoserve's work, and is he/she in substantial agreement with our approach?"

There are numerous guides and instruments used in the personnel field to help determine such things as fit. Technoserve has developed its own set of such guides, and consistently makes use of them. The range of areas to be considered in an interview is quite comprehensive. Among the ones of key importance for most operations positions are these:

- Personal value system;
- Degree of realism (understanding of the "real" world, political sophistication);
- Skills appropriate to the job, or ability to acquire them;
- Commitment to helping people and to the kind of development philosophy which this organization embodies;
- Political biases;
- Source of motivation;
- Vitality;
- Energy;
- Sense of humor.

Such question areas are not merely perfunctorily covered. The interview process at Technoserve can take two days. The object is not to test the person under stress, but to attempt to know who the person is.

In addition, we want to know the person's plans. Are they looking for a long term position? How long do they expect to work for Technoserve? We are open about wanting and expecting someone to stay with the organization, and feel it is not unreasonable to say so and to delve into the candidate's real feelings about that. Many organizations feel it is not realistic or even their business to ask in advance whether the candidate wants to spend the next ten years with them. Technoserve feels unashamed about asking this.

We think that the connection between such hiring procedures and effectiveness is extraordinarily simple. If you believe that effectiveness lies in part in having experience and experience is a function of time, then you want a staff that will stay around. To do that, you ask for a personal commitment from people at the time you hire them. Our figures bear this out. In Technoserve's oldest programs (Kenya 13 years, Ghana 15 years, El Salvador 10 years), the longevity figures for the indigenous professional staff (with five years or more service) are 62%, 43% and 40% respectively. Technoserve's worldwide overseas indigenous professional staff numbers 74. Of these, 31% have five years or more service with Technoserve, which is very good considering that four of eight country programs are not yet five years old.

These figures go up with the rank of the professional staff. Our four country program directors in Africa have an average of 12 years with Technoserve. The four country program directors in Latin America have an average of six years with the organization.

On the practical side, good people are also looking out for

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themselves. In fact, if they are mature and realistic individuals, we would be concerned if they were not interested in salary, benefits and other pecuniary aspects of employment. We also recognize, therefore, that many Third World nationals have an interest in working with an American organization because they feel it brings them status, or because they hope it will bring them some greater financial security. One policy that Technoserve has instituted is to bring all overseas



professional staff into our company thrift plan. This assures that everyone gains the benefit of having part of their earnings converted in dollars. For some, this is a tremendous boon. It helps our local national employees to become highly effective development practitioners.

On the expatriate side, there is another difference which is Technoserve's tax equalization policy. In order to reduce resentment of host country staff and of Americans who are at the home office, U.S. overseas employees' salaries are reduced to make up for the difference in their tax advantage. Also, in general, when a hardship allowance is allowed, it is based on a small percentage of what the U.S. State Department allows. Because so much attention has been paid to "fit," Technoserve's expatriate employees do not mind this unusual policy of tax equalization.

Our programs have been able to achieve a degree of professionalism and credibility in the eyes of both host country officials and our intended beneficiaries which, we have been told by third parties, is considered unusual. We have had success in influencing policy at the national level, in building ties with institutions which hold some of the keys to replication of our projects at a national and international level. Finally, because our staffs are honed into top-quality professionals who stay with the organization and are mostly nationals of their own country, we are able to easily and quickly achieve regional replicability in particular sector areas. We think that much of the credit for whatever success we have had thus far goes as much to our personnel policy as it does to our technical "methodology."

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## REPLICATION & DISSEMINATION PROGRAM

Technoserve's Replication and Dissemination Program combines research with an effort to document our experience and apply the results in a number of new settings.

The fundamental thrust for R & D activities remains strongly consistent with that of the history of Technoserve to date—continued self-examination and learning so that our work of improving the lives of low-income people can become more effective.

The papers in our *FINDINGS '86* series as well as the *CASE STUDY* series are meant to share our experience and stimulate debate and dialogue with others who are concerned with Third World problems.

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## TECHNOSERVE R&D PUBLICATIONS

General Editor: Thomas W. Dichter

Findings '86

*A Primer of Successful Enterprise Development—I Principles*

*A Primer of Successful Enterprise Development—II Practice*

*Demystifying "Policy Dialogue"*

*Who Runs The Show?*