

TECHNOSERVE

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DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

Findings '86

A PRIMER OF SUCCESSFUL
ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT—I
One Organization's Principles

Thomas W. Dichter

Thinking about
International
Development



T E C H N O S E R V E

Technoserve is a private, nonprofit organization. We provide training and technical assistance to enterprises comprised of large numbers of rural people. We call them "community-based enterprises."

These community-based enterprises principally relate to agriculture; our training helps them to increase productivity, improve their marketing, and enhance their overall management.

The results of this assistance include job creation, increased levels of income for needy people, and overall improvement in living conditions, without creating dependence on outside assistance.

Technoserve was founded in 1968. We work in Africa and Latin America. We currently have a staff of over 150 persons, made up primarily of highly-qualified citizens of the nine countries where we operate.

Technoserve is funded by church organizations, individuals, foundations, corporations, host country institutions, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

**A PRIMER OF SUCCESSFUL
ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT—I**

One Organization's Principles

A PRIMER OF SUCCESSFUL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT—I

One Organization's Principles

Thomas W. Dichter, Technoserve Inc.

Effectiveness in Enterprise Development needs to be understood in the context of the evolution of a new ethos about Third World Development in general.

PERSPECTIVES, HISTORICAL & CULTURAL

Development, as a field of endeavor with that name, is no more than four decades old. The Marshall Plan, as the first modern age, massive, managed "development" effort, marks the beginning of many organizations in the field today. But even the Marshall Plan was not Development with a capital "D." International Development, as planned and managed assistance to the Third World, did not really begin until the 1960s.

There are four major categories of organizations involved in international development, namely:

- Bilateral Government agencies (e.g. USAID, CIDA of Canada)
- Multilateral Organizations and agencies (e.g. the World Bank)
- Private Voluntary Agencies (e.g. CARE, Technoserve)
- Private, for-profit contractors which implement projects of the Bilateral or Multilateral agencies.

Each has evolved over time and the details of that evolution reveal many differences from one agency to the next. A very broad picture however, is worth sketching, even at the expense of fine distinctions.

It begins in the 1950s, a period during which the emphasis was basically RELIEF. After that, the major periods in the history of western development assistance emerge as follows:

- 1960-1975. Basically large scale CAPITAL INVESTMENT in infrastructure and AGRICULTURAL SCHEMES with some experimentation in small scale grassroots work;
- 1975-1982. The age of disenchantment with large scale top down projects; the beginning of "new directions"; the hey day of "appropriate technology" and the small scale, but a strong continuation of capital investment and also of relief;
- 1982-1985. The era of re-thinking and of ACCOUNTABILITY; policy reform, institutional impact, sustainability, replicability, cost effectiveness, become new emphases.

A brief peek forward to the immediate future might suggest the following:

- 1985-1990 The SYNCRETISTIC era. Practicality dictates; many different beliefs about development are combined; polemic decreases. Reduced tendency to go from one extreme to the other.

Each category of organizations in development has, of course, had a greater or smaller role to play in the periods described above. Private Voluntary Agencies (PVOs), our subject here, began like the rest, primarily as relief agencies formed after major wars or conflicts. In the 1960s, with the advent of what came to be called community development, some began working at the local community level. The major thrust in those years was essentially the idea of doing good things for the poor. In general, this meant a combination of giving people something (a latrine, a clinic, a new kind of plow), and telling them how it worked, or how and why to use it. It was assumed that well-motivated Westerners could give communities the elements of modern hygiene, or agriculture, or education, and that such gifts would lead people to better living conditions. As it turned out, this approach was rather one-dimensional, one-directional, and after some time showed few permanent results. Nonetheless, the seeds for the later grassroots basic human needs approach were planted.

In the 1970s, the integrated community development approach began to be used: a more sophisticated approach which saw correctly that aspects of a community's life were inseparable, and thus intervention was needed all around. Additionally, a self-consciousness had arisen which made

PVOs aware of previous tendencies to ethnocentricity (in which a project would simply reflect the aid giver's values, ways of working and technologies), and hence it became important to find out what the project beneficiaries perceived as their needs.

A kind of syllabus of development sectors began to arise which had become rather standard by the end of the '70s. A large PVO might then have a program department with sections devoted to Primary Health, Family Planning, Environment, Women in Development, Adult Literacy, Nutrition, Water, and Income Generation (later called enterprise development). This "portfolio" approach to development was, nonetheless, tied together in a more or less uniform ideology—an ethos which said that the key to economic development was to reach the poor at the grassroots. This ethos was decidedly and increasingly anti trickle down and anti big.

With the 80s came a new spiral in the historical process; an examination of and concern for effectiveness. A few PVOs began raising hard questions about prior performance. Some self-examination began to reveal a fairly typical historical phenomenon—the tendency to carry things too far as a reaction to a perception of earlier mistakes. For example, the integrated approach to community development was recognized as being unmanageable, in reality. It was also acknowledged that simply asking people what they want often leads to wish lists and waste. Similarly, we began to see that not everything small is appropriate, nor is everything big inappropriate. Practicality—the concern for what works in the real world—began to push ideology somewhat to the side.

Today, many U.S. PVOs with a serious concern to be effective are trying more and more to respond to the demand! (from all donor quarters, but particularly strongly

from USAID) for measurable success, institutional impacts, and now sustainability and replicability. We could describe the significant changes in PVO ethos (again quite grossly) as follows:

OLD ETHOS

Generalist

Community as an ideological badge

Accountability for effectiveness hidden behind amateur status and "good intentions"

Low technical capacity

Ideological homogeneity in PVO community is expected

NEW ETHOS

Specialist

Community as a locus for action

Accountability comes out from behind as PVOs become more professional

Higher technical capacity

Ideological heterogeneity in PVO community is accepted

TECHNOSERVE

Technoserve is an unusual PVO in several ways. For 18 years, it has specialized in one area: enterprise development. Its staff is composed of highly trained technical specialists. We deal exclusively in know-how, rather than things or money. We give only know-how; not credit, not food, not tractors. We apply our specialty in a single arena—agriculture. We have a demonstratable record of successful project interventions—defined as successful by the latest criteria. These projects continued to operate after our intervention was over, and are still running. They are run by the community and yet are still viable as businesses. Finally, project interventions in the same agricultural commodity sector have been replicated both regionally within the country and internationally, across countries.

We have received some money from The US Agency for Interna-

tional Development to research and disseminate our findings on what works and what does not in our field of enterprise development, and at the same time to explore new avenues and methods of replication.

The donor and Technoserve both share some basic presumptions about the goals of development assistance. We agree that the purpose of development and of enterprise development as a specialty is to assist low income people in the Third World to improve their lives; to gain more control over their lives, and become less dependent. And we agree that this goal should be reached with a concern for:

- Both short and long term effectiveness;
- Stewardship—responsibility for others' money.

After examining our successes and failures over the past 18 years, we find that there are some surprisingly fundamental elements which explain success. In fact some are truisms, which makes it all the more

The following summary of Technoserve's ten principles for enterprise development, is an attempt to articulate what guides our actions. The object here is self-analysis and public discussion. This, we say, works for us, and here is why we think it does.

surprising how often they are absent. They do not constitute a methodology or a body of procedure as much as they represent, in our opinion, something prior: the sine qua non of enterprise development. They are, at one and the same time, lessons learned and essentials of enterprise development.

I. KNOWING WHO YOU ARE

Understanding and coming to terms with your organization's underlying ideology, values and philosophy seems to be a key to effectiveness. There is a capacity to act more efficiently and in concert that is gained by clarity of values. An organization which does not know "who it is" is likely to spend costly time dealing with more internal disagreement than is healthy. This hampers action.

In Technoserve's case there is a relatively clearly held orientation to development. The organization values the ideal of helping others, holds to a high standard of professionalism, considers it important to look at what history tells us about development, among other things.

Technoserve's ideological biases are:

- Pro-business and the principles which underlie business enterprises.
- That free enterprise, market-oriented economies are best suited to economic growth.
- That people are at heart acquisitive and are motivated when rewards are perceived to be proportional to efforts.

Technoserve does not believe:

- That all political power seeks to oppress the poor.
- That egalitarianism is an instinct that is natural to poor people, or any other for that matter.

Technoserve's methodological biases are:

- There are limits to "doing good."
- People can only help others up to a point.
- Deep social changes cannot be directly engineered. If you believe, for example, that you are "engineering" the creation of social bonds by helping to build an enterprise in a community, you will be disappointed.

There are many PVOs at the other end of the spectrum of values and ideologies from where we are. The main thing is that they are clear about those values. This is a key to effectiveness. Those PVOs which lack such clarity seem also to be relatively ineffective in fostering sustained development.

II. FOCUS

There are three levels of focus which may form another key to effectiveness. These can be stated as three questions: *Where, Who, How?* Generally, we have found that professionalism and overall effectiveness are enhanced by having made some choices that limit the scope of one's work. Therefore an organization needs to figure out where it will work, with whom, and how. That kind of focus leads naturally to efficiency, cost effectiveness, replicability, long-term learning, and long-term impact beyond the original target population. Focus enhances expertise and the knowledge of what your capacities are.

In our case we have made the following choices:

Where?

The agricultural arena. History seems to say that economic growth begins with agricultural health. When agriculture is work-

ing, nations and civilizations are freed to develop in other ways. Agriculture seems to be an a priori part of economic and social development. Therefore, we apply our work in the agricultural sector, not in urban areas and not in industry.

Within that sector, we tend to focus on certain commodity sectors (e.g., cattle, dairy, sugar), so that we

will gain expertise that can be efficiently used. In Kenya, for example, we have worked in cattle ranching for over ten years. In El Salvador, we have worked in feed mill projects and coffee cooperatives many times. In Ghana, we have experience in rice, sugar and palm oil. In Panama, pigs and vegetables have comprised a major part of our assistance.

Who?

Farmers. Not any farmer, but rather those who belong to (or want to start) rural enterprises. The enterprises we work with must be community based; that is, have a minimum number of people in the community sharing the equity of the enterprise. In effect, we focus on enterprises of medium scale, believing that greater economic linkages and greater impact are achieved with that scale. Medium scale is defined differently in each country, but generally means more than 25 members (the largest enterprises we work with have over 1000 shareholders or members).

How?

By training people. To put this in perspective, many PVOs who work with farmers, provide them with tools, seeds, or with credit, seeing these as essential to increased productivity. We see productivity as fundamentally dependent on business and management skills. Those are the skills that enable people to get credit on their own with which to buy the tools and seeds they need. These are the skills that enable people to plan for the future, to influence their environment rather than simply react to it. These skills enable people to look at alternatives and make decisions, adding an element of control in their lives which they may never have had before. Moreover, they are



exerting that control in the economic rather than the political sphere, which means they are gaining power within the system—fighting fire with fire.

This view is very much geared to our human focus. Because we work with groups of farmers, and not the individual peasant, providing business and management skills makes sense, as opposed to working with the individual peasant who has very limited resources.

III. ECONOMIES OF SCALE

Our concern for long term efficiency and cost effectiveness leads us to an exploration of the question of economies of scale. This is a complex matter, for while it appears self-evident that there are economies of scale in our work, defining scale is problematic. We believe that paying attention to this issue and keeping it in mind is another key to effectiveness.

Historically, Technoserve



which then may require giving credit and tools. So we have evolved a process of enterprise development which integrates all aspects of the agricultural enterprise: organization of the enterprise as a business, planning, financial controls, agronomy, market analysis, administrative controls and management development.

There are two other aspects of our work which are important to single out. We generally work quite intensively with these groups, and do so over a relatively long period (3 to 5 or more years). We have found that the skills we want to transfer are ones that take time to master and are best learned "on the job."

evolved towards the medium scale, in part as a function of the skills we wanted to transfer. A single small farmer may be an entrepreneur in the limited technical sense, but he is not necessarily a business. A medium scale enterprise, with a substantial investment in land, equipment, livestock, and expectations of a large turnover in sales, cannot be managed adequately using the same back-of-the-envelope techniques that the small individual farmer may use. While the latter may need credit to improve his lot, the enterprise needs a more complex array of interventions in order to become viable. As these skills require some training, and thus have a significant price attached to them,

and as the transfer of those skills often requires intense interaction over time, there is a clear economy of scale in applying them only to larger groups.

We see the major economies of scale attendant to our way of working, in the following way:

- Economic linkages established by a medium sized enterprise can have positive effects on other enterprises, through a demonstration effect.

- A successful, larger scale enterprise has wider socio-economic multiplier effects. More jobs are created, more income generated.

- Institutions and policy making agencies are more likely to take notice of a larger successful entity than of a smaller one. Thus the possibilities of more widespread institutional change or policy reform are greater.

- Larger enterprises necessarily produce larger quantities of whatever commodity is being raised or grown. Hence, if records are well kept, the data on production reflect larger sums and are statistically more significant. This increases the potential to influence policies regarding that commodity.

We recognize that project scale is not static, and should not be viewed as such. Indeed, if economic entities are successful, they will likely show growth in one or more of their aspects. By keeping economy of scale in mind as a key criterion for effectiveness, an organization can easily adjust to such changes in scale.

For example, one of the ironies we have found in this respect is that, as a large enterprise becomes larger and more successful, it begins to be possible for that enterprise to pay full price for the same services that it had been receiving before

from a PVO for less than full price. Even though that enterprise would have acquired the ability to perform many of these functions on its own, it may want now to contract for some monitoring or limited business services from outside. The challenge for an organization like Technoserve, which cannot afford to give services for nothing to an entity that can pay for them, is whether to fill this gap in the market by spinning off a service unit that would operate at profit. That would provide a flow of income to the non-profit side which would, in turn, enable the PVO itself to move towards greater self-sufficiency.

IV. RECOGNIZING THE TRUE MARKET AND BEING “MARKET-DRIVEN”

What we call the “true” market for a PVO’s services are the actual needs of the intended beneficiaries of the project or program. We oppose this to the “false” market, which is often the donors’ or the PVO’s perception of what needs doing. For example, we would argue that, in general, it is better in the long run for a PVO to respond to its own perception of the needs than respond to a “second hand” perception of those needs as defined by a major donor. In crude practical terms, this would mean trying to drum up business on one’s own first and seeking funding for implementation later, rather than responding first to funding opportunities and then trying to match the organization to the funding source’s project criteria.

Of course such distinctions between “true” market and “false” market are often spurious and arbitrary—who is to say that the donors’ perceptions of what is needed are

A group owned farm enterprise must reach a certain size before it can take optimum advantage of modern business skills.

Being able to say "no" to project opportunities is a function of knowing which projects fit the organization's capacities.

wrong and the PVO's perceptions right, or even that the beneficiaries' perceptions are right? But the distinction between real and false market remains a valid one when we think about the deeper issue of PVO focus and knowing who it is (hence what it can do). The tendency to respond always to the donor's offerings of funding can inevitably lead to a dissolution of focus and specialization. This, in turn, over the long run, can lead to ineffectiveness. PVOs who worry about the degree to which their work is funded by one donor (e.g. USAID) are right to do so.

We have found that by keeping pretty close to a set of project selection criteria and judging new program opportunities by a similar set of criteria, we are increasingly able to use our skills better and more efficiently. We also have better control over the variables we ourselves use to define success.

In practice, this often means

starting up a new program using our own unrestricted funds and then, once started, seeking continuation funding. This also means that we often say no to funding opportunities that come along, if the proposed program or project do not fit our predefined criteria.

V. PARTICIPATION

Today, one of the most agreed upon keys to development project effectiveness is participation of the beneficiaries. If we are to truly understand the "true" market for what we have to offer, that understanding must begin with the beneficiaries' perceptions of their needs. But we must be very careful here in not carrying the notion of participation too far, or giving it too much weight in the effectiveness calculus.

There is effective participation and ineffective (or even counter-productive) participation. We would chart the two as follows:

EFFECTIVE

Participation has its limits. Beneficiaries do not know all that is best for them.

Participation seen as a practical matter. It is insurance that project will be sustained.

Participation is sought primarily of those who want to or can be convinced to participate.

Participation is more valuable during the project design phases and evaluation phases than during the day to day decision making of actual implementation.

INEFFECTIVE

Participation done for its own sake—total acceptance of beneficiaries' definition of needs.

Participation seen as a political "act," for the sake of raising consciousness.

Participation of everyone in the community is sought, to the point of forcing it.

Participation thought of as monolithic—takes place all through project.

and the subtleties involved in establishing trust are often ones that require getting close to people, knowing their language, and most important, sticking around.

VI. OPPORTUNITY COST

One of the most interesting keys to effectiveness is the application of the concept of "Opportunity Cost." Surprisingly, there has been very little discussion or understanding of this very simple precept in the PVO community. In our experience, Opportunity Cost has been a central criterion of project selection and an overall guide to planning.

The concept is simple: every opportunity for engaging in any action has a cost, which may be high or low. That cost is related to the fact that if one decides to do "A," then by definition, one cannot do "B" at the same time. The sound-ing board against which to measure that cost is the purpose and goal orientation of the organization, in combination with its available resources (money or personnel).

This concept is particularly important for non-profit organizations which may have less control (in theory at least) over the expandability and fungibility of their resources, or fewer ways to manipulate those resources than do for-profit organizations.

For example, when we consider assistance to a new group of farmers who want to get together to start a commercial rabbitry, we ask ourselves what is the opportunity cost of this assistance? Given our staff and our resources in that country, could we achieve the same impact by any other means, by doing another project? Could we do more with those resources over the same



Consciously asking the question: 'What is the opportunity cost of a given project or program?' is a key component of project selection.

The conclusion is that participation must be tempered by the questions: Who is to participate? How much participation? When?

Participation is only part of the process. It seems to work best if it is participation for a rather specific purpose, like putting together an enterprise. It should also not be confused with egalitarianism. In fact, participation in our experience seems to work when it is organized and managed by community leaders or by project personnel. Participation, we find too, cannot be successfully done if done quickly. It takes time to get to know people

time period by way of helping more low income people?

By asking the question: "What is the opportunity cost of engaging in this new activity?" an organization provides for itself an internal check and balance system which helps to ensure project and program effectiveness

VII. ENTERPRISE VIABILITY

For PVOs engaging in enterprise development, whether defined as small scale, microenterprise, or

medium scale, we believe that a key characteristic of effectiveness is the degree to which the enterprise is rendered economically viable. This means that ultimately the outputs must be greater than the inputs. However uncomfortable this "bottom-line" approach may be, it is the only real check against the delusion that, because one is assisting the enterprise, one is engaged in enterprise development. If the enterprise cannot stand on its own after the intervention, cannot make a profit, then it is not a viable enterprise. There may be social reasons to keep it afloat but not economic ones.

SOCIAL-CENTERED

- High degree of social conscience
- Tends to micro end of the size scale
- Tends to see poverty as more a function of social injustice than of economics
- Emotionally anti big business
- Uncomfortable with capitalism though in favor of it in general
- Accepts intangible benefits
- Prefers the term "income generation"
- Prefers the term "enterprise"
- Prefers calling projects "projects"
- Uses "equity" to mean social equality
- Values community development skills on staff somewhat more than technical and business skills
- Anti trickle-down theory
- Willing to compromise short term business viability for long term social gain
- Tends to see individual empowerment as preceding enterprise viability

BUSINESS-CENTERED

- High degree of social conscience
- Tends to middle of the size scale
- Tends to see poverty as more a function of economics than of social injustice (or at least 50-50)
- Neutral or positive vis-a-vis big business
- Comfortable with capitalism; if anything, somewhat uncritical of it
- Prefers tangible benefits
- Prefers the term "profit"
- Prefers the term "business"
- Prefers calling projects "businesses" or enterprises
- "Equity" is business term meaning assets held by owners in a business
- Values technical and business skills much more than community development skills
- Neutral on trickle-down theory
- Less willing to compromise short term business viability for long term social gain
- Tends to see individual empowerment as a result of enterprise viability

We recognize, however, that there is a wide range of approaches to this question of viability of the enterprise. The differences have to do with whether the PVO is basically business-centered or socially-centered. These may be seen as cultural characteristics of the organization.



VIII. CARE IN STAFF SELECTION

A key characteristic of effective enterprise development organizations is the care with which staff are hired. While it is a cliché to say that an organization is its people, it is one of those truisms that is too often dismissed in practice.

Long term effectiveness flows from committed staff: people who will stick with the organization, apply their learning over time, become experts. Low turnover of staff (as a function of organizational care in hiring rather than as a function of organizational staleness) is a key to effectiveness.

Along with this goes a commitment to a high percentage of local national staff in positions of

responsibility. An overseas program of a U.S. PVO will have a better chance at all the elements of effectiveness we defined earlier if its staff has the depth of local knowledge and the permanence that only local people can provide.

IX. A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO GRASSROOTS WORK WITH ENTERPRISES

PVOs have long claimed that they have a special ability to work "at the grassroots," because of their philosophies, relatively small size, and relatively lower overheads. The presumption has been that this is where social and economic change must begin, and so this area, one where major players in the development field have not set foot, is the legitimate and fruitful territory of the PVO. It is also considered the right place to work for moral reasons, because it is at the grassroots, among the poor and often disenfranchised, that the most help is needed.

The problem with grassroots work, however well-intentioned, is that the fruits of it can so easily end up in a vacuum, isolated and inconsequential in the larger scheme of things. It may help to cure some of the symptoms, but does not often cure the disease. Ironically, practitioners of pure grassroots projects can suffer from precisely the ailment they are trying to correct: being ignored, isolated and disenfranchised.

Agricultural subsistence is a part of the larger economic system only in the most technical, almost negative sense. Subsistence farmers live in a country, but neither participate in its output nor draw from it. The need is to create agricultural enterprises that are productive

beyond mere subsistence. These have the potential to become real elements in a larger system. When grassroots work is conceived of in this way, it is impossible to ignore the need to work in more than one direction—both the “bottom” and the “top” must be actively influ-

institution building and replication, all at once.

In short, the pay-off of sustained and focused work in a commodity system is precisely that which the major donors are looking for in the eighties: results which are self-sustaining, relatively low-cost and replicable.



Enterprise development is not something to be dabbled in; it is “hardball.”

enced for effective and lasting change to take place.

We have found that by developing enterprises at the grassroots while, at the same time, working with institutions at or near “the top,” over time, significant changes in policy can be fostered. These changes have enormous potential economic effects on an entire commodity sector. In effect, by viewing grassroots agricultural production as part of a larger system, and by mustering data over time in a particular commodity area and bringing that data to the attention of policy makers and institutions which intervene in policy, we are able to play a role that is an intricate combination of grassroots development,

X. A GOOD BALANCE OF CAUTION AND RISK TAKING

In enterprise development in particular, a PVO is dealing with something that is risky by its very nature. There are some significant differences between a PVO starting agricultural enterprises in the Third World and starting a business in the “normal” way.

The normal business takes the risks and spreads them at arm's length among banks and other suppliers of capital. If the business fails, the “owner,” through various legal mechanisms, can still come out of the experience with his/her personal assets more or less intact. The banks can write off the loss. But in

our business, being a PVO, we are using other people's money to do good rather than investing it for them for profit, and we are also asking low-income people to put up substantial amounts of their own meager assets as equity in the enterprise (in fact this is a pre-condition to our help). When there is failure, it is not failure "at arms length." It is quite palpable and serious.

We are not suggesting that our task is technically more difficult, but rather that we carry a greater burden of responsibility not to fail. This means that we must balance caution and risk-taking very carefully. One of the first elements of caution is the recognition that rural enterprise development is "hardball"—it is not something to be done on the side or something that one dabbles in. It requires a major commitment of organizational resources over considerable time. It means having a permanent core staff, rather than hiring people on

contract for short term assignments. It means sticking with an enterprise, even if it looks like a less than perfect choice has been made. It means seeing the job through, even though some resources of the organization may be tied up for longer than planned. It means constant adjustment and flexibility.

We feel strongly that the effort is worth it. Successful enterprises can add real money to a rural economy, as Technoserve has shown in its work with agrarian reform co-ops in El Salvador. They can create permanent employment, as we demonstrated in Panama. And they can put systems in place which mean significant additional credit through properly operating savings and credit societies, such as the ones Technoserve has assisted in Kenya.

To be effective in enterprise development, it is essential to see the nature of the task clearly. To take it on unprepared is not only likely to result in ineffectiveness, but is likely to cause harm to those one intends to help.

REPLICATION & DISSEMINATION PROGRAM

Technoserve's Replication and Dissemination Program combines research with an effort to document our experience and apply the results in a number of new settings.

The fundamental thrust for R & D activities remains strongly consistent with that of the history of Technoserve to date--continued self-examination and learning so that our work of improving the lives of low-income people can become more effective.

The papers in our *FINDINGS '86* series as well as the *CASE STUDY* series are meant to share our experience and stimulate debate and dialogue with others who are concerned with Third World problems.

TECHNOSERVE R&D PUBLICATIONS

General Editor: Thomas W. Dichter

Findings '86

A Primer of Successful Enterprise Development—I Principles

A Primer of Successful Enterprise Development—II Practice

Demystifying "Policy Dialogue"

Who Runs The Show?