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CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH

1984 REPORT ON
THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP
AND THE
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH IT SUPPORTS

AN INTEGRATIVE REPORT

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PART I--OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM

1. Although continuing to be designated as "integrative" the annual report prepared by the CGIAR secretariat has not for some years actually attempted to draw together the principal facts and trends concerning the CGIAR into a coherent picture. The system had become too complex to describe what was happening within it in detail in a relatively short document, and it was difficult to think of fresh generalities year after year. It became the custom for the first part of the report to address a single topic combining scientific and program interests, without any attempt to draw a relationship to the financial and budget discussion in the following sections. In this format, Part I of the report provided the basis for a substantive, often valuable discussion of an issue of importance to the Group, with no expectation of conclusions being reached.

2. With the passage of time, and the advent of a considerable number of new donor representatives, it seems time to attempt once more an overall summary of where the Group stands. This report therefore begins with an overview. It then addresses three particular questions known to be of interest to donors:

--the relationship of the Group to international agricultural research centers or similar organizations which are not sponsored by the CGIAR;

--recent trends in restricted financing of CGIAR center core programs; and

--the role of the World Bank as a residual donor.

Each of these issues involves both funding and strategic considerations.

3. As the CGIAR enters its fifteenth year of work, it remains strong and successful, having grown from four centers in 1971 to thirteen today (See Annex 1). IRRI, CIMMYT, CIAT, and IITA had been established before the system was formed in 1971. IRRI was set up in 1960 conceived as a center of scientific excellence devoted to solving the rice problems of the tropics by being located there. CIMMYT was formed several years later, absorbing some of the staff and facilities and much of the research base of the Mexican Agricultural Program of the Rockefeller Foundation. CIAT was formed in a similar way from the Rockefeller Foundation's Colombian Agricultural Program. IITA, like IRRI a completely new initiative, was started about the same time as CIAT but took some time to become operational because of the civil war which broke out in Nigeria shortly after the decision to locate the center there had been made. At the time the CGIAR was formed the first four centers had total budgets of \$17.8 million (about \$45 million in 1983 dollars) and had been operating between five and ten years.

4. CIP and ICRISAT were the first new centers formed under the Group's auspices in 1971 and 1972, respectively; ILRAD and ILCA followed in 1974, the same year the CGIAR began supporting part of the research activities of WARDA. The IBPGR began operating in 1975. IFPRI was started in the same year, outside the CGIAR system with support from several interested donors. It wasn't until November of 1979 that IFPRI joined the system. ICARDA was

set up within the CGIAR in 1976 and ISNAR in 1980. By then the first oil crisis had sent the world rate of inflation soaring so that the budget for the thirteen centers was not three times as large as the budget for the original four, but rather was 10 times as large, totalling about \$120 million.

5. The budget for the centers in 1984, after the second oil price shock, was about \$180 million. The thirteen centers in the system had research programs and collaborative research activities with developing countries that included work on all the main cereal crops, many of the food legumes important in the developing countries, the root crops that are most important in the developing countries diets, on two of the livestock diseases limiting production in Africa, on national food policies, on building national research systems, and on farming systems in most of the important ecologies of the developing world.

6. The contributions of the centers supported by the CGIAR to agricultural production and the welfare of people in the developing world are generally acknowledged, as is the quality of their scientific work. Criticisms, of course, continue to be heard, as they have been since the Group was formed, but the balance of the public image continues to be strongly positive.

7. Within the Group, however, there is an extraordinary level of review and introspection, to the point where centers are diverted to some degree from their main task of research. External program reviews, under the aegis of the Technical Advisory Committee have been conducted at the rate of three or even four per year. The first management review took place in 1983; the seventh was submitted to the ICRISAT board in mid-September 1984, less than two years later. The TAC will complete a strategic priority exercise and submit the results to the Group in May 1985. A study of training in the system is being performed on the same schedule, also under TAC auspices. Two year studies of impact and the financial reporting and budget systems will finish in 1985. Each of these exercises has its rationale and may in some sense be essential, but in addition to a heavy workload for the centers, the total amount of reviewing and questioning contributes to an atmosphere of uncertainty that seems out of phase with the with the overall reputation and performance of the CGIAR system.

8. There are a large number of issues that concern donors and others in the system. Several of these, briefly described below, are the focus of on-going study or effort:

IMPACT Beyond wheat and rice grown in Asia and in Latin America under relatively favorable circumstances, where high yielding varieties based on research done before the Group actually came into existence have made an enormous contribution to food production, what contribution have the centers supported by the CGIAR made to food production in the developing world? Are national agricultural research systems, which are critical to the effective use of research done in the system benefitting from the work of the centers? In response to these questions, centers are giving more attention to impact

and some answers are beginning to emerge. Providing more complete and authoritative judgements from an outside perspective is the purpose of the impact study.

AFRICA The dismal agricultural performance of Africa south of the Sahara has drawn increasing activity from CGIAR centers. Four centers, more than in any other region, are located in that continent. All of the centers are active in the region, and three located elsewhere have stationed 35 of their senior staff in Africa, some under special project financing. This number is growing. Many donors are faced, however, with continuing uncertainty how to divide their funding for African agricultural research among national research, national extension, national policy influencing activities, and international research. There is also a lack of confidence that the research strategies being pursued in the CGIAR system will be effective in meeting African needs. Some international agricultural research centers seem to be drawn constantly into more and more location specific activities in an effort to meet the donor's demand for results, and in the absence of other reliable program implementation vehicles. This set of issues is being addressed in the TAC strategic exercise.

GENETIC RESOURCES Controversy over issues of plant genetic resources has receded since the FAO completed action on its undertaking. Donors have been strong in their support for the work of the IBPGR and the other international agricultural research centers in this field. The Director General of the FAO has worked actively to alleviate concerns about the future. The issues involved remain complex, however, and will receive continued attention in coming months. The FAO Commission will hold its first meeting this winter. The combined program and management review of the IBPGR is scheduled for January and February 1985, and should be on the agenda of the Group's May 1985 meeting.

CENTER STATUS The international agricultural research centers do not fit easily into the categories of international organizations as established in law and practice. Each center has of necessity to make arrangements with its host government to obtain the immunities and privileges necessary for effective operation at the international level. Depending on the date and specific circumstances, these arrangements have tended to be somewhat informal and ad hoc. While in general they have worked well enough, some problems have developed as a result of increased host country controls over transfers of funds, imports and immigration. Developing countries in general are less willing to accord privileges to external groups without a very persuasive rationale and specific formal agreements. As a result, two centers, IITA and ICARDA are engaged in negotiations with their host governments on status issues. In two other cases, CIMMYT and CIAT the centers and the host governments have turned to the co-sponsors to assist in establishing the necessary international status. Responding to these requests, and the urging of the Group, the co-sponsors are working with the centers and governments concerned to resolve these issues.

MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS Growing concern that the management of center resources could be improved lead the Group to approve a new form of review, specifically of the management of the centers. While conducted

separately from external program reviews, the management studies are linked in time and substance to the center evaluations under the aegis of the TAC. As mentioned above, seven have been conducted in the past two years. The time is approaching when it will be possible to draw general conclusions from the work, and address management issues on a system-wide basis using specific information gained through the individual reviews.

FINANCIAL TRENDS

9. Two additional issues are not being addressed specifically elsewhere, and deserve somewhat more detailed attention here. These are the overall scarcity of financial resources in relation to the needs of the centers, and the perception that the Group's program is static and unable to adjust to new opportunities and changed priorities.

10. In each year since 1980 total contributions to the core programs of the Group have fallen substantially below the level of approved budgets and also below the projection at the beginning of the budget year. This has meant a downward adjustment each year which has been considerably offset by lower than expected inflation rates for much of the period. One consequence of the financial squeeze has been an increased acceptance by centers of restricted funding, as discussed in detail below. The broader issue, however, is how to bring the program and contributions into better balance particularly in the longer run, so that priority choices can be made on a realistic basis. Deliberate cuts in the program might lead to reduced support and leave the gap much as it is, at a lower level. On the other hand, the present system of short term budget-cutting is not conducive to the best management of available funding by the centers. Several donors have expressed the need for a study of long term funding. While this topic is not the direct subject of any of the present range of studies, the long term financial prospects of the system will clearly be affected significantly by the results of the strategic considerations exercise and the impact study.

11. Details of the contributions to the system since 1972 are given in Annex 3, and the recent funding trends are discussed in detail in Part II. In summary the core contributions grew by about 20% annually through 1980, when the trend turned downward. The present rate of increase is about 7% annually. This growth has been achieved in spite of the fact that nine donors who gave more than a million dollars in 1980 are expected to provide fewer dollars in 1984 than they did in 1980. In some cases, a good effort in donor currency terms has been more than offset by changes in the exchange rate with the dollar. In other cases, an overall budget ceiling has prevented expansion of the CGIAR contribution. Some donors have been reducing their commitments to the Group as a matter of policy. On the other hand, the table shows clearly that a number of donors have achieved significant increases in their levels of support.

12. The table in Annex 3 also makes clear that the major growth in funding has come from long term members of the Group. Donors who joined or rejoined the Group in 1980 or later are expected to provide \$7.2 million in 1984, which is less than a tenth of the growth in contributions in the same period. Additional potential donors continue to inquire about membership,

and some will undoubtedly join in coming years. While this is a very welcome and encouraging trend, particularly where the new members are developing countries, the additional contributions from this source will not make a major difference in the overall trend of funding.

13. Three multilateral donors have encountered replenishment or other budget difficulties which have not affected the overall funding picture substantially as yet. There may well be a considerable negative impact in 1985 and future years, unless these donors find additional sources of funds.

14. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations originated the concept of the international agricultural research center, and they and other foundations continue to play important roles in the Group. Some contributions in cash and in kind have been received from corporations by some of the centers. Nevertheless, it remains true that the full possibilities of private sector support to CGIAR activities remain unexplored. Once again, however it is important to be realistic about potential contributions from the private sector. For both private foundations and private companies the levels of the Group's annual budget, even the minimum level of annual support required for membership, seem very large. There are not many foundations in a position to make annual contributions of \$500,000 per year, and most corporations do not do so. Thus while work with the private sector offers possibilities for increased center effectiveness, that sector does not offer likely sources of income in the form of contributions large enough to change the overall financial picture of the Group.

15. Some exploration of the possibility of centers gaining income by sale of services has taken place, but thinking along these lines is in a very preliminary stage. The initial efforts have generally come up against an apparent conflict between the objective of gaining income and the objectives of the system in serving the agricultural development interests of the developing countries. Research of the type done in the centers has traditionally been performed in most countries by the public sector, although that situation is changing in at least some respects. As things stand at present, however, both the sale of services and the related idea of transferring a portion of center costs to the users, remain relatively long term matters, requiring further investigation but unlikely to make a great deal of difference in the short to medium term.

16. This line of argument necessarily leads to the question of whether the total budget for the system is too large in relation to the funds available for development assistance or the amounts being spent on agricultural research by developing countries. Both the TAC strategy exercise and the impact study are again directly relevant, particularly to the second part of the question. Meanwhile, some comparisons may put the issue in perspective: between 1973 and 1981 (the longest period for which the data are available) official development assistance (ODA) increased by 300%; ODA for agriculture increased by 400% and CGIAR support increased by 424%. There is no evidence that the CGIAR is running away with an unreasonable share. In 1981, the total of core budgets for was \$131 million, which was less than half a percent of all ODA, and under two percent of all ODA for food and agriculture.

17. From another perspective, it has been calculated--undoubtedly with a considerable margin of error--that the expenditures of the Group represented about 1% of global public expenditures on agricultural research in 1980, and about 6% of the agricultural research expenditures of the developing countries.

18. It may well be that the real problem for donors is not the overall size, but is more a question of competition at the margin. In much of the CGIAR budget, official development assistance is limited in ways which exclude the CGIAR as a recipient. Core contributions from most donors come from multilateral assistance appropriations, or from funds which are reserved for use in grant form but not assigned to any specific geographic area. In some cases the funding is from a research appropriation, with a number of claimants in addition to the CGIAR, some of which have powerful domestic or other constituencies. In most of these cases, the CGIAR claim is relatively large in comparison with the funds available in the given account. In relatively few cases is the CGIAR core grant competitive with support for national research systems in developing countries. Typically, the appropriation involved is limited by a policy to move away from multilateralism and toward bilateralism, or by a bias toward operational programs and against research. In this sense, it is probably correct that the CGIAR program is becoming relatively large, and may be approaching the ceiling--at least in real terms--of funds that can be drawn from traditional sources for unrestricted purposes.

19. To summarize, there are a number of interesting pathways toward increased financial resources to be explored in the medium and long term, but the major increments of funding are likely to come from the traditional donors, at least for the present. These increments face difficult competition for resources within the donor agencies, so that the likelihood of significant further enhancement of the real level of CGIAR contributions is not very great. Continued slow growth seems the most likely outcome. The obstacles to such growth are real enough, but most of them have been in the picture for some time already, and somehow they have been overcome from year to year.

A STATIC PROGRAM?

20. Since the admission of ISNAR in 1980, the number of centers supported by the Group has remained fixed at 13 and no major line of work has been deliberately phased out or added by action of the Group. This has led some to question whether the system can effectively implement priorities. However, a reasonably stable pattern of work is appropriate and should be expected of a research enterprise of the scope of the CGIAR, in the first place. Experience has shown that it will take a number of years to make substantial progress on crops and related forms of inquiry particularly for those crops where little basic research has been done in the past, so the pool of general knowledge on which the centers can draw is limited. It is the nature of biological research to take time, and also to be unpredictable in the time and exact character of its outcome. It would be wasteful in the

extreme to manage a research program by shifting its focus repeatedly in the light of changing concepts of what is important.

21. On the other hand, there have been numerous changes in emphasis, even in program direction, within the existing pattern of centers. Some were suggested by TAC and others originated in the centers themselves. For example, one center terminated its work on farming systems, while others have shifted resources substantially toward farming systems programs. IRRI has made a substantial move toward rainfed rice at the expense of work intended for irrigated conditions. ILCA has acted on recommendations from the Group based on a program review with a resulting major change in both program and staff. CIMMYT has implemented suggestions in a program review that it should increase its scientific strength at headquarters and devote more resources to genetic preservation for maize. ICRISAT has substantially increased the relatively size of its effort in Africa in response to priorities clearly expressed by donors. WARDA received a number of suggestions for major changes in program and organization during its recent reviews, and has been advised that these changes represent a minimum requirement for continued support. The IBPGR program for 1985 as submitted to the Group proposes a significant shift of resources away from collection to characterization of materials already collected, and improved preservation techniques.

22. At centers week in 1984, the Group will consider a recommendation from TAC that IFPRI should benefit from an increase in its budget even in times when most centers are slightly declining in their core programs. The program review for CIAT suggests a study of the future market for cassava with the clear possibility that the outcome will be a major redirection of cassava research. And further examples could be given.

23. At a more general level, it is clear than the centers as a whole have moved away from the earlier practice of issuing named varieties themselves, and see their role as providing advanced line to national systems which develop and release varieties suited to the specific conditions of production and consumer demand in their own country. This is a response to the growing capacity of national systems, and the number of location specific requirements which international centers cannot hope to meet.

24. In spite of all of the evidence of change, there remains a concern that, particularly at level or slightly declining budgets, it is very difficult to make changes and particularly to adopt new and sometimes risky innovations. Experienced research managers seem to agree that this can be a problem. Moreover, there is a widely shared perceived need among the donors that the Group demonstrate its ability to terminate an activity of low priority or effectiveness. Perhaps the strategic considerations exercise will produce a consensus on which activities merit such treatment.

INTERNATIONAL CENTERS OUTSIDE THE CGIAR

25. One somewhat baffling sidelight on the perceived stability of the CGIAR system itself is the continued creation of new research programs or centers in fields related to the work of the Group, and with similar objectives, supported independently of the CGIAR by its donor members. The

scope of this innovation outside of the system is discussed in the following paragraphs.

26. Although the Group has not added any new centers since 1980, there is an increasing number of activities which pursue similar objectives and which draw their financial support mainly from the same donors and often from the same appropriations within the donor agencies as the CGIAR-supported centers. Very often the leadership in development of such an activity is taken by one or more of the CGIAR donor organizations. These "non-associated" centers sometimes seem to be, in fact, associated with and draw on the resources of the Group in various ways. Many of them hold meetings of actual or potential donors when they find them conveniently gathered together for Group meetings, a form of consultation the donors apparently also find convenient. Some have extensive collaborative relationships with CGIAR-supported centers, and there are substantial overlaps in board memberships and other leadership.

27. Because these non-associated centers do not belong to any common group it is not clear exactly what organizations one should include in any list of them, but for convenience Table 1 lists those organizations which have used the CGIAR meetings as opportunities to meet with donors during 1984.

Each of the listed activities also has been considered by TAC for possible support by the CGIAR or works in a field TAC has considered. Some have been recommended for CGIAR support by the TAC, although in each case the Group decided not to admit the center concerned. All together, the budgets for these centers total about \$30 million per year.

28. A number of the non-associated centers have existed as long as the CGIAR, some are still in the process of being created. Each is similar to the CG centers in focusing on research to increase food production in the developing countries. All are international in staff, governance, program and financial support, although one is in the process of transforming itself from being largely governed and supported by one donor into an international governance mode. The similarity between these non-associated centers and the CGIAR-supported centers is clarified by a brief examination of each of the nine activities listed in Table 1.

29. ICIPE The International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology was set up in 1970, at a time when scientists around the world were realizing that the insect resistance to pesticides, environmental pollution and elimination of beneficial parasites and predators which resulted from heavy reliance on insecticides were problems that would have to be addressed in the developing world as well as in the industrialized countries. ICIPE collaborates closely with IRRI on the brown planthopper and interacts with ILRAD on tick-borne diseases.

30. ICIPE was discussed by TAC several times during the mid-1970s. At its 14th meeting TAC recommended support of an unspecified amount to ICIPE's core budget, but ICIPE was never granted a formal relationship by the Group. Nonetheless ICIPE enjoyed moderate growth throughout the 1970s, but at the

Table 1: SOME INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE CGIAR *

Center	Primary Focus	Location	Year of initial operation	Budget		No. Senior Staff	Programs
				US\$m	(Year)		
ICRPE	Insect physiology and ecology	Nairobi, Kenya	1970	4.77	(1982)	46	Crop borers Livestock ticks Tsetse fly Plant resistance Medical vectors Insect pathology and pest management
AVRDC	tropical vegetables	Shanhua, Taiwan, China	1972	3.60	(1983)	32	Tomato Chinese cabbage Sweet potato Soybean Mungbean
ICLARM	living aquatic resources	Manila, Philippines	1973	1.70	(1983)	14	Aquaculture Traditional fisheries Resources development and management Information services
INTSOY	soybeans	Urbana, Illinois, USA	1973	0.95	(1983)	8	Soybeans
IFDC	fertilizer	Muscle Shoals, Alabama, USA	1974	6.70	(1982)	60	Nitrogen research Nutrient interaction Phosphate research Sulfur research Potassium research Economics research National programs Technical assistance Training
ICRAF	agroforestry	Nairobi, Kenya	1978	2.20	(1983)	18	Agroforestry systems Agroforestry technology Information Training Collaborative research
IIMI	irrigation management	Kandy, Sri Lanka	1984	5.00	(when operational)	10-12 in HQ 3-4 /unit	Collaborative research Training Information dissemination
IBSRAM	soils	not fixed	1985	4.54	(when operating)	5-10	Headquarters Soil management networks
INIBAP	banana and plaintains improvement	not fixed	1985	1.75	(initially)	small	Headquarters Regional networks

* Activities currently using CGIAR meetings or in some other way related to CGIAR activities in 1984 (Total approximately \$30 million).

end of the decade it experienced a sharp financial crisis, with large financial deficits during 1979-1981. By 1982 new management practices and a reduction in program had put the organization into good financial shape. In the midst of the crisis, in 1980, the ICIPE Governing Board approached the CGIAR for the second time, requesting ICIPE be included among the organizations supported by the Group. A review team established to advise on this proposal recommended that ICIPE be included in the CG system, but the TAC did not accept this recommendation and the CGIAR agreed with the TAC. Subsequently some of the main donors to ICIPE decided to establish a Sponsoring Group for ICIPE (SGI). Nine of the donor members of the CGIAR are among the financial supporters of ICIPE.

31. AVRDC The Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center has been operating since 1972. It concentrates on breeding varieties of five vegetables suited for the hot, humid tropical areas of the world. In 1980-81 it shared germplasm with 69 developing countries in every region of the world. It has collaborative relationships with research organizations in 13 Asian countries, ten Latin American countries and two African countries, in addition to a number of industrialized countries.

32. TAC considered the importance of research on tropical vegetables or discussed the possible support of AVRDC within the CGIAR at 14 of its first 27 meetings. There was never much disagreement about the importance of the research, but the headquarters location of AVRDC prevented the Group from considering formal support. AVRDC has always had a somewhat special relationship to the CGIAR as evidenced by its presence on the program of centers week 1984. Six of the Group's donors are also donors to AVRDC, which has more non-CGIAR donors than other non-associated centers.

33. ICLARM The International Center for Living Aquatic Resources was set up in 1973, and in 1977 was incorporated as an international, non-profit institution. ICLARM sees its role as complementing the activities of existing institutions in fisheries and aquaculture in the tropical developing countries. It emphasizes stimulation, catalyzing and strengthening research activities through training, information dissemination and collaborative research activities. ICLARM must depend on collaborative research activities because it has no research facilities of its own. TAC has recognized the importance of aquaculture and fish as a food source in the developing countries, having discussed the issue in 14 of its meetings. ICLARM was never recommended by TAC for support by the CGIAR but instead TAC encouraged international consultations to clarify international needs for research on aquaculture.

34. For an extended period ICLARM has been heavily dependent on one donor for nearly half of its financial support with two other donors providing another one-third. Recently the center has undergone a period of uncertain financial support, but a number of new donors have taken up the slack left when ICLARM's primary supporter felt it necessary to realign its own internal priorities. In 1983 seven of the Group's members supported ICLARM financially.

35. INTSOY The International Soybean Program has been in operation since 1973. It was conceived as a "resource base" serving the needs of developing countries in the areas of germplasm exchange, production, marketing and food utilization. The importance of soybeans as a food in a number of developing countries, notably China and Indonesia, and increasing commercial importance in Brazil and India have been evident to CGIAR observers, and TAC has discussed the importance of research on the commodity a number of times.

Within the CGIAR, IITA has a small soybean research program with test locations representative of only the tropical zone from the equator to 12 degrees north and south. IITA has stationed staff members in the Philippines and Brazil to work on soybeans and cowpeas. AVRDC also has a soybean research program, but it also is small in size because of the center's limited resources. INTSOY cooperates with these and other CGIAR centers. Recently INTSOY stationed a plant breeder at CIAT in collaboration with ICA and a soil microbiologist at AVRDC.

36. INTSOY is in the process of stimulating the formation of regional soybean research networks for Asia, Africa and Latin America that would consist of established international soybean research programs and the major national programs. Designed to meet the needs of developing countries more adequately they would bring together all the researchers in each region who are working on the commodity. Currently two members of the CGIAR provide the bulk of INTSOY's financing.

37. IFDC The International Fertilizer Development Center was set up in 1974 next to the TVA laboratory in Alabama and in 1977 was designated as an international organization. It conducts research on fertilizer utilization on crops of importance in the developing world and research on production and processing of fertilizer materials. It currently carries out programs to assist the fertilizer sectors (public enterprises) in Bangladesh, Mali and Indonesia, and mounts technical assistance missions on the request of countries or donors. IFDC is working with the OAU and the government of Zimbabwe for the establishment of a cooperative fertilizer center in Zimbabwe.

38. The importance of research on plant nutrients for increasing food production has long been recognized by the CGIAR and discussed by TAC on many occasions, but no recommendation has been made to include a program on this topic in the Group. IFDC has long had informal relationship status with the Group, and along with AVRDC has been one of the two such centers that has made presentations at Centers Week, and participate in the regular meeting of center directors. IFDC has the largest budget among the non-associated centers, \$6.7 million in grants in 1982. Seven members of the CGIAR are also donors to IFDC.

39. ICRAF The International Council for Research on Agro-Forestry was established in 1977-78 to act as an international catalyst in agroforestry research. It initiates, promotes, and supports research for the development of appropriate agro-forestry systems and technologies for the developing countries. It has neither the resources nor the facilities to carry out

research on its own but relies on collaborative research agreements with national research organizations and IARCs.

40. Agro-forestry has been discussed on four occasions by TAC. ICRAF has never formally approached the CGIAR or TAC for support. The mode of operation as a "research council" has considerable appeal, but after operating that way for five years ICRAF staff and board are mounting a drive to establish a headquarters facility that would give them at least some modest capacity for research. A combined evaluation and planning study is considering the future, including the possibility of an increased research program. The Council faces something of a problem because over 60 percent of its funding is project and restricted, and only about 40 percent is core support. Ten CGIAR members are also donors to ICRAF.

41. IIMI The International Irrigation Management Institute is the newest of the non-associated centers to actually begin operations, having started in 1984. It is designed to enhance independent national capacity in irrigation management, and will accomplish this through collaborative research activities to identify, develop, and disseminate methods of irrigation management that will improve performance. Irrigation water management has long been recognized as an important issue for increasing food production, especially in areas where expansion to productive new land is limited. TAC discussed water management research needs at 17 of its first 32 meetings, and given it a first priority (TAC 21); TAC 27 made a strong recommendation to the Group that a water management center be included in the activities supported by the Group, but the recommendation was not accepted. Subsequently, an IIMI Support Group was set up and the center was established. Fourteen members of the CGIAR also belong to the IIMI Support Group.

42. IBSRAM The International Board for Soils Research and Management is in the process of being established. It is proposed as an organization to help ensure that existing soil information and newly-developed technology can be adapted by national country programs. It is envisioned to have a relatively small central headquarters and to operate through a number of regional "Soil Management Networks," each with a research base and collaborating with national programs within its respective region. Early discussions about soils and plant nutrient research sometimes coincided in TAC. More recently TAC has discussed the need for research on soils and has been kept informed of the progress being achieved in establishing IBSRAM. The progress report issued in May of 1984 indicates that IBSRAM "eventually will aspire to become part of the system supported by the CGIAR." From indications received in May, 1984 five members of the CGIAR expect to provide financial support or services to IBSRAM in 1985.

43. INIBAP The International Network for the Improvement of Bananas and Plantains is proposed to begin operations in January of 1985. By May of 1984 some eminent individuals had been requested to serve on its Board and others were still being identified. INIBAP is envisioned as consisting of a small core center with a series of regional networks of national programs. The center would concentrate on encouraging network activities, identifying national research projects, germplasm exchange among national programs, and links to countries with established research programs.

44. TAC discussed the need for research on tropical fruits in some of its early meetings; the present concept has not been considered by TAC, although they have been kept informed of its progress. The proposal envisions a very small budget for core and networking activities which would be supplemented with bilateral grants to national program participants for their research activities. Three current CGIAR members have indicated they will likely provide financial support for the organization in 1985.

45. From the point of view of donors, who have opposed inclusion of new centers in the CGIAR itself, what is the rationale for continuation and augmentation of this group of related external activities? The obvious answer seems to be that in each case several donors within the CGIAR firmly believe in the priority of the research program involved, but are not sufficiently numerous to carry the Group with them. There is no bar to going ahead if there is sufficient support to do so. In fact, one has the challenge and pleasure of starting something new, and an opportunity to play a considerably larger role in the new outside organization than the typical CGIAR donor can play in any IARC it may support. A few individual donors not in the CGIAR may find it advantageous to support international agricultural research through an outside center without assuming the responsibilities of CGIAR membership.

46. On the other hand, donors do take on responsibilities for the outside centers not present with CGIAR centers. Individual donor decisions have a greater impact on the program of the center. In the absence of a CGIAR structure they must take a more active role in monitoring performance. Non-CGIAR centers typically plan program and management reviews similar to those conducted within the CGIAR, but the donors and the boards must fulfill the role of TAC, the CGIAR secretariat and the Group itself.

47. The existence of such a number and range of center-like activities outside of the CGIAR strongly suggests that the Group's priority setting process has been bypassed. Might it be desirable to review all of these activities once more, and where scientific quality is good, and donor support is substantial and enduring, to bring these outsiders into the fold, thus bringing the priority judgements within the structure of the Group instead of leaving them to be made outside? There are several practical objections to such a course, and one overriding one. At the practical level, many of the non associated centers are relatively poorly funded in relation to those within the Group, and would as insiders probably require more funding than they would bring with them. Special pockets of money available to the outside centers but not to the CGIAR might tend to dry up. Also at the practical level, it is not clear that the machinery of the Group could withstand a major expansion in the number of centers. The overriding general problem is the danger that such a wholesale expansion might damage the image of the Group as a careful, selective and high quality operation, even though each individual new center was of a high standard in itself.

48. Another approach would be to create a second tier of centers associated with but not funded by the Group. The associated centers would participate in coordinating activities, be subject to review through the TAC

and the CG secretariat for program and management purposes, but continue to raise their funds separately. This approach was discussed by the Group in 1978, and with the advice of TAC, rejected. The closest that the Group has come to a special arrangement has been the regular invitation to AVRDC and IFDC to present their programs at Centers Week and to participate in the meetings of center directors. It is not really clear why this privilege should be extended to AVRDC and IFDC and not to others.

49. Some kind of associate membership would be of advantage to the donors and to the non-member centers who might wish to rely on the CGIAR procedures for monitoring and review, but this would involve additional staff and funds for both the TAC and the CGIAR secretariat. There might also be a gain in terms of coordination of programs, and increased communication with institutions facing common problems of operation. On the other hand, the advent of a number of additional centers would compound the problem already present, that the size of the CGIAR is almost too large for its informal procedures to work effectively. It might also diminish the sense of uniqueness remains an important aspect of the CGIAR's self-regard. There seems, therefore, to be no clearly preferable alternative to the present approach—that is to continue to rely on TAC's overall priority recommendations as a framework for considering the appropriate scope for the programs and activities to be sponsored by the Group.

RESTRICTED CORE ACTIVITIES

50. The growth of international agricultural research activity outside the ambit of the CGIAR is drawing core funding away from the centers sponsored by the Group, and thus may be considered partially responsible for the extreme shortage of unrestricted core grants to the CGIAR-supported centers. One result of this shortage has been the growth over the past several years of restricted core funding, which has caused concern to both donors and centers.

51. A variety of issues has been raised by donors in relation to restricted core:

- a. What do the restrictions actually mean in practice?
- b. Is there a risk that restricted core can divert the programs of centers away from the priorities determined by center boards, recommended by the TAC and endorsed by the Group? Are unrestricted funds also diverted?
- c. Do donors who restrict funding gain disproportionate influence over the programs of centers, as compared with those donors who provide unrestricted core?
- d. Is the proportion of restricted money sufficiently large that it causes problems for efficiency of center management?
- e. Is the workload connected with the administration of restricted funds a significant cost to centers?

f. Is tying of funding to the use of donor country personnel, facilities and equipment a significant problem?

In order to find out more about these questions, and the whole role of restricted funding, the centers have provided to the secretariat considerable data about restricted core activities funded during the period 1983-1985.

52. EXTENT OF RESTRICTED CORE Altogether, centers reported 116 restricted core activities involving 21 donors active in 1983-85, and with a total cost of almost \$55 million in 1984. The level of restricted core as a proportion of total core has risen from about 28% in 1982 to about 32% in 1984. Data from earlier years are not fully comparable, but it is clear that restrictions on core contributions rose significantly between 1979 and 1981. No useful overall data emerged from the survey concerning 1985. Most restricted core is funded on an annual basis, just as unrestricted core is, and year-ahead predictions are unreliable.

There were a number of factors at work in the 1983 to 1984 period:

a. the Group's decision during 1983 to transfer a number of special projects into restricted core;

b. recognition by centers and donors that funding which had been classified as unrestricted actually carried sufficient constraints that it should be counted as restricted;

c. introduction of marginal amounts of restricted funding by some donors who had previously provided only unrestricted core;

d. a substantial relative increase in contributions by one donor who adopted a policy of restricting more than half of its total contribution;

e. declines in the contributions of some donors who normally restrict their contributions;

f. variations and a long-term decline in the level of capital grants which are often restricted.

53. The first four factors have increased restricted core, the last two reduced it. The largest factor was the transfer of special projects, and all the other factors balance each other out. Two thirds of the growth in current dollars and the entire growth in percentage terms from 1982 to 1984 can be explained by the transfer.

54. The other source of restricted funding to centers, special projects, showed great vitality during the period. They increased from 19% of core in 1982 to 21% of core in 1984, more than recovering from the reduction caused by the transfer in 1983.

56. This overall average, however, is by no means representative of all the centers, which vary widely in their proportion of restricted core and of total restricted funding. Table 3 shows the detail for all centers for 1982 to 1984. Five centers, three in Latin America plus ICRISAT and IRRI, have percentages of restricted core in 1984 ranging from 34% for CIP to 54% for ICRISAT. The Latin American centers would all have restricted core percentages close to 25% were they not recipients of large grants from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), whose funds are as a matter of policy restricted to use in the region.

TABLE 3
RESTRICTED VS. NONRESTRICTED FUNDING (PERCENTAGES)

CENTER	PROPORTIONS OF RESTRICTED FUNDING					
	1982		1983		1984	
	% CORE	% TOTAL	% CORE	% TOTAL	% CORE	% TOTAL
CIAT	42	49	49	52	44	48
CIMMYT	43	49	45	52	44	51
CIP	32	36	39	43	34	38
IB PGR	0	0	0	0	1	5
ICARDA	25	31	16	21	22	35
ICRISAT	31	43	43	47	54	63
IFPRI	24	41	13	31	15	41
IITA	14	39	19	41	15	31
ILCA	7	18	23	29	17	25
ILRAD	12	12	13	15	13	15
IRRI	40	52	42	56	43	59
ISNAR	0	15	0	13	0	22
WARDA	38	70	22	60	17	67
TOTAL	28	40	43	41	32	44

57. If special projects are also taken into account, four additional centers, ICARDA, IITA, IFPRI and WARDA join the group with more than 25% of their total 1984 funding in the restricted category. WARDA is a special case, and ICARDA would not have a high percentage of restricted funding were it not for two capital grants. The two livestock centers have quite low levels of restricted core by comparison with other centers, but ILCA has a higher level of restricted work within its total funding because it has substantial special project activity. ISNAR has special projects but no restricted core funding, and IBCPR has virtually no restricted funds of any kind. (It is worth noting, however, that both centers receive funds from donors that restrict all contributions to core, but require only general attribution within the core program).

58. TYPES OF RESTRICTION Each discussion of restricted funding in the Group has noted that there are cases of nominal restrictions intended to meet formal requirements of the donors without having a significant impact on center programs. One important issue for the study of restricted core was therefore to get a sense of the range and type of restrictions involved.

59. According to center data for 1984, 54 restricted core activities with 51% of the funds fall in the category of "general attribution only", 21 with 26% of the funding were restricted in some detail, and 25 with 22% of the funding restricted in great detail.

60. Some donors give a mixture of restricted and unrestricted core funds, reflecting either the different appropriations they call upon for their contributions, or different objectives among their grants. Some donors also vary in the type of restrictions they apply. Thus we find one center reporting that a particular donor requires general attribution only, while another center finds the same donor restricting contributions in great detail.

61. The most restrictive form of funding is the project, which is planned in a multi-year format by the center and the donor with its own program of work, objectives and coherence. There were 37 projects (other than capital projects) among the 116 restricted activities identified by the centers, with a total funding in 1984 of about \$14 million. Some 29 of these projects, costing at \$8 million, were among the special projects transferred into core in 1983. Most of the eight projects which were found in core before the special project transfer were UNDP-financed, that donor having followed a project form of support to the centers from the beginning in accordance with its overall rules of procedure.

62. There were eight restricted grants for capital purposes, valued at \$6.8 million in 1984. Capital plays a relatively small share in the overall picture. It can be assumed that restricted funding of capital expenditure would be a matter of concern only if a center were building unnecessary facilities because of the availability of funding.

63. CENTER WORKLOAD IMPLICATIONS A large share of the workload involved in restricted financing is the need for separate and special reports to the donors. The survey looked at both financial and program reporting.

A relative handful of donors restrict their contributions but do not ask for any special financial or program reporting; a few more follow this approach with some but not all of their restricted grants. Most require some form of evidence that their funds have been used in accordance with the limitations placed upon them. In some cases it is clear that a donor has achieved a level of understanding with a particular center that permits a more informal relationship than may be possible with other centers. The absence of requirement for reports sometimes reflects the nature of the activity that is the work is fully covered in overall center reporting because it is self-contained and important to center purposes.

64. The great majority of restricted core donors require one financial report per year. Seven donors, in some but not all instances, require no specific financial reports on restricted core expenditures. Seven different donors require more than one report per year, usually four, on 32 activities totalling more than \$25 million in 1984, or about 45% of all restricted core. In quite a few cases the quarterly financial reports are a required step in obtaining funding. Many of these activities involve detailed forms of restriction on the activity financed. For others where the restrictions are general in nature, it seems odd that detailed financial reports are required every three months. What appears to happen in some cases is that a donor gives the center broad latitude in choosing the area and details of restricted funding in the first instance, but once the choice is made, requires detailed information about what is actually done. Having created a specific restriction, the donor is forced by internal financial rules to obtain information showing that the restriction is being followed. At least one center has been able to construct its chart of accounts so that the information required by a donor becomes a regular part of the accounting procedure.

65. In addition, 12 donors are expected to require special audits of expenditures on 27 activities. Such a requirement is more easily understandable when related to a special project, which is not a part of the core program. It appears that most of these donors require audits in some cases, not others, suggesting that an explicit decision is being made on a case by case basis to impose such a requirement. One center made the point that an audited statement has the advantage of disposing of questions about the use of funds; another states that while audits are technically required on many grants, restricted and unrestricted, they are seldom carried out by the agencies involved. Unfortunately our data do not permit distinguishing between audits that are formally required, and those that are actually carried out. They also do not distinguish between the requirement for a specially audited account prepared by the center's regular auditors and a requirement for an audit by an entity designated specially by the donor. The workload implications of these different situations obviously are quite different from each other, the latter more time consuming requirement is much less frequent.

66. For 33 activities, less than a third of the total number of restricted core activities in 1984, donors required no special program or progress reports, but were satisfied with the attention given to their special interest in the regular reports and publications of the center. For

only 12 projects was there a requirement for more than one specially written program or progress report per year. Centers were required to prepare one specially written report per year on each of the remaining 70 restricted core activities.

67. This kind of requirement also seems more appropriate to special projects than it does to core activities. There would seem to be a possible area here where donors could adjust their reporting requirements to the special nature of the system and their relationship to it. At the same time, we have evidence of cases in which numerous reports have still not provided the kind of feedback which the donor community required. In reducing the number of required reports it would be very important for centers to make sure that they provide the kind and frequency of information required to keep up interest in the donor agencies.

68. OTHER ISSUES The data related to tying of contributions were dominated by a single donor which has approached the requirement very forthrightly. Somewhat surprisingly, this study did not identify many cases of a donor financing cooperative work between one of its own scientific agencies and a center. In these cases, it is difficult to know whether the donor brought about the collaboration by offering funds for that purpose and no other, or whether a center saw an attractive and easy source of finance for something that held a high program priority independent of the availability of restricted funds. Almost all centers contract with laboratories in developed countries for specific services, using unrestricted core financing for that purpose.

69. Some donors are now holding back a portion of their CGIAR core funding for use only in collaboration with their own scientists or institutions. Others have for some time provided funds for this sort of collaboration without charging the cost to their contributions to the Group, some even using sources of funds not competitive with CG contributions. The latter approach has much to commend it in terms of equity among donors. There is probably not too much difference in the impact on center programs between the two approaches, so long as the centers have the clear right to decide what they will and will not do, in the light of their own priorities. Cases where a center is more or less compelled to seek collaboration with donor country institutions to ensure continued or increased support, on the other hand, would raise serious questions. The survey indicates that most restricted financing of collaboration between a center and an institution in the donor country is handled as special project activity, and thus does not show up as restricted core. As a result, the full extent of tied financing of this kind in the system is not reflected in the data presented.

70. An issue often raised about restricted core financing is whether the donor is paying the full cost of the activity involved; the fear behind this question is that unrestricted core resources are being drawn into an area of low priority because of the existence of the restricted financing.

71. To the extent that the available data shed light on this question, they are reassuring. Some donors are clearly paying only for a share of work in a given field, but in these cases there seems little doubt of the priority

assigned by the center to the work. In most cases, restricted core donors are reported to be providing for indirect costs or overhead, in addition to the specific activities they are interested in funding. It is not possible, given the wide variation in the system of ways of calculating such costs to make any meaningful estimate of the share involved.

72. In only a few cases could we detect the typical "foundation" approach to project funding, in which the donor has apparently required the center to finance a portion of a jointly planned activity with the clear intention that the center take on full financing from other funds after the end of the project. It may be assumed that centers enter into arrangements of this kind only when they believe that the work involved is of high priority and that the continued commitment is appropriate, assuming the success of the initial phases for which they have restricted support.

73. CONCLUSIONS ON RESTRICTED CORE While at a high level on the average, restricted core does not seem to be increasing at present to any great degree. The form of restricted financing that is on the increase is special projects, which seem likely, on the basis of past experience, to include many types of activity that might well find a place in core programs. The appropriate focus of concern is therefore probably the total level of restricted financing, in and outside of core.

74. Some centers have a much higher proportion of restricted funding than others. In some cases the reasons are coincidental, as in the case of the three Latin centers and the IDB. In others, they reflect a result of centers pursuing growth in a time when funds are short, and the availability of sources of finance which carry restrictions matching the directions in which centers wish to expand. The biggest example here is work in and for Africa.

75. For some donors, restricted funding is the only kind of support to CGIAR centers which is possible under their mandates. For others, it is a means of opening up additional sources of funding that cannot be used for unrestricted grants. The search for additional money for CGIAR purposes at a time when foreign assistance is generally scarce has driven both centers and donors into restricted funding arrangements.

76. The problem is less extensive than it has sometimes appeared, after one takes account of the proportion of the total that is very lightly restricted, of the funds restricted to capital projects, and of other ameliorations. However, the issue of undue influence by some donors and of possible program distortion cannot be dismissed entirely.

77. For example, there are cases where the arrangement with a donor, as part of a project, or as part of an annually renewable form of finance, requires the center to submit an annual workplan and to discuss that workplan with the donor, amending it to suit donor preferences. Such an interaction inevitably brings the donor agency intimately into the program planning process of the center in a way not open to donors who provide unrestricted support. There are also cases in which the full impact of restrictions has not become apparent to a center until long after the initial pledge and

general agreement has been made, and at a time when the center is in a weak bargaining position.

78. Restricted funds often come from appropriations that carry a geographic focus, or otherwise are limited by the policy interests of the donor. In qualifying center activities for the use of such funds, there is an inevitable tendency to carry over the political or other donor objectives into the center program; to try to make the contribution serve not only the purposes of the CGIAR but also the specific scientific, economic or foreign policy interests of the donor country. As the battle for funds within foreign assistance programs becomes more intense, the effort to serve multiple objectives with a single grant also becomes more intense. Therefore, restricted funding tends toward geographic concentration of programs in areas politically important to donors. It also emphasizes immediate results rather than long term research priorities. In short restricted funding will tend to push centers toward working for short run impact in specific places.

79. While there is no way of documenting the conclusion, it is clear that availability of dedicated funding reduces the severity of priority judgements by center boards on the specific lines of work for which such funding is offered. Observation of the TAC process of budget review, moreover, leaves little doubt that critical examination by TAC is much less in areas financed by restricted core than in other areas of center programs. These two statements do not prove the existence of program distortion, but they certainly give grounds for believing that such distortion does exist in some cases.

80. While like some medicines, restricted funding of core programs may be beneficial in small doses, it is clearly bad for the centers and the system in very large doses. For some centers that level has been reached. It is therefore of equal importance to all elements of the CGIAR system--both donors and centers specifically included--that the problem be contained.

81. Several lines of action suggest themselves:

a. External reviews have generally not addressed the issues of restricted core funding. Given the level of concern about the issue, it should take a prominent place on the agendas of both program and management reviews. Only in this way can its substantive impact be assessed in detail. Such an assessment should be valuable to all donors, whether they now restrict any portion of their core contributions or not. Special projects, which perhaps may in total represent a greater problem, do receive specific attention in program and management reviews, but perhaps deserve greater priority in such reviews.

b. Donors should exercise self-restraint in restricted funding of centers, and should recognize that the pursuit of subsidiary donor objectives through the core programs of the centers can be harmful to the basic goals of the center and the CGIAR.

c. Rather than seeking to impose their views directly on the centers, donors should become more active in seeking to ensure that their priority judgements concerning the work of the centers are fully expressed and considered through the priority setting machinery of the system itself, namely the TAC processes and the actions of the Group on TAC recommendations.

d. When particular types of restrictions are identified that cause problems, the centers involved might collaborate with the CGIAR secretariat to persuade the donor or donors to make appropriate adjustments.

82. During the study and in other contexts it has become apparent that requirements sometimes attached to restricted funding are now spreading informally to so-called unrestricted funding as well. Donors are not only seeking to claim seats on center boards and representation on staffs, but convey signals that the level of core support will be heavily influenced by a center decision to increase or decrease a particular line of research. In other cases, the level of non-restricted funding is said to be strongly dependent on the acceptance by a center of certain restricted financing. It would be naive to expect that practices of this kind would ever disappear completely, even in the unique world of the CGIAR. But there should be no shrinking from the fact that they do harm to the system and to the achievement of its shared objectives.

EFFECT OF WORLD BANK ALLOCATION POLICY

83. A question was raised at centers week in 1983 about the impact of the World Bank's role as residual donor on the funding of individual centers. A donor asked that this be analyzed in the integrative report for 1984, and particularly that the report set forth the effect of having the Bank's contribution follow the levels of other donor support rather than the Group's approved budget levels.

84. The policy of the Bank for many years has been to use its contribution to make the pattern of funding as nearly as possible represent the distribution of funds among centers as approved by the Group on the recommendation of the TAC. The Bank limits the amount it will contribute to any one center to 25% of the approved budget level. Allocation of the Bank's contribution also takes account of technical adjustments in budget levels made during the year by the CGIAR secretariat to reflect such events as major devaluations of host country currencies, center adjustments in the levels of carry-over funds and similar changes in circumstances.

85. For the years 1979 through 1983, World Bank contributions to all of the centers have varied between 10.1% and 11.4% of the total contributed, whereas the contributions to individual centers have varied from 0% to just over 25%. We have recalculated the figures to determine the effect had World Bank contributions been distributed in proportion to the contributions of other donors, with the following results:

a. Four centers would have received more funds in each of the five years, bringing them from six to nine percentage points higher than actual funding.

b. Three centers would have been up in some years, down in others, but with an average increase between 2% and 4% over the period.

c. Four centers would have benefitted in some years but not others, but with an average decrease of 1% to 8% over the whole period.

d. One center would have been lower each year, 15% on the average, and another in the same situation but 10% lower.

86. Looking only at 1982 and 1983, four of the 13 centers would have been affected in different directions between the two years. The 25% limitation affects three centers in 1984, an unusually large number. Overdependence on World Bank contributions is regularly pointed out in the secretariat's commentaries on the programs and budgets of individual centers.

87. A number of conclusions can be drawn:

a. Donor preferences do change from year to year, and the resulting variations, if not mitigated, might have damaging impact on centers.

b. As almost the only donor with the ability to switch funding easily among centers, the Bank has helped adjust to changes within the year in economic circumstances faced by some centers. This would not have been possible with a mechanical approach.

c. Without at least one substantial donor prepared to support the approved levels, the present budget process would become irrelevant. It is unlikely that any effort to make comparative priority judgements would seem worth the trouble.

d. Under the present system, the World Bank is able to give each center a broad idea of the funds it will have to work with during the year because the Bank's funds can be used to restore balance if late or unexpected decisions are made by donors. Without this protection, the centers would be much more dependent on timely information from all donors, and would often not know until the very end of the year what their funding for the year would be.

88. If relieved of its responsibilities as residual donor, the World Bank would undoubtedly prefer to allocate its funds in accordance with its own priorities, rather than to follow the uncoordinated decisions of others. With the system of budget allocation by the Group on the recommendation of TAC rendered ineffective, large donors, including the Bank, would undoubtedly be in a position to exercise considerably more influence over centers in return for funding. Funds would undoubtedly also flow to centers whose boards and directors were particularly adept at fundraising.

89. The present system does make it possible for a center to draw on substantial funds from the World Bank year after year, provided that the TAC and the Group continue to make recommendations and decisions on budget levels

which the individual members of the Group are not willing to fund adequately. The system may also have questionable influences on both donor and center incentives. The financial reporting and budget study will attempt to deal with these matters more directly, hopefully in the context of a budget system that will focus on longer term program trends, rather than marginal adjustments in a single year. A budget system and use of the Bank's contribution to support that system are only viable if the donors have confidence in the priority and budget decisions that result from the system, and their own ability to influence those decisions.

90. It is also worth noting that the Bank's role is changing to some extent. The advent of the stabilization mechanism, which so far is largely funded by Bank monies, and a recent decision to use Bank funds to cover the price factor in centers' budgets during the course of the year, means that a considerable portion of the Bank's contribution will be used to provide stability of funding. Its role of residual donor remains, but the amounts available for such a role are somewhat reduced. This, it is believed, is a healthy and sensible development.

CONCLUSION

91. Several wise observers of the CGIAR have pointed to a danger implicit in the period of introspection and review through which the Group is now going. Tinkering excessively with the machinery of the system and decisions at the system level may damage the key innovation represented by the Group: the concept of an independent center of excellence doing research on problems relevant to food production in the Third World, governed by a small group of highly qualified individuals serving in their individual capacities and without external bureaucratic or political control.

92. There are those who would go so far as to say that the only functions that should be performed at the system level, aside from raising funds, are what is needed to protect the centers and allow them to get on with the job. Without necessarily adopting this extreme position, one can identify a number of guides for action that flow naturally from a commitment to the center concept.

a. Whenever any added function is proposed for the Group or any of its mechanisms at the systems level, the value of performing that function should be weighed against its cost in terms of the independence of centers and the workload imposed on them.

b. The tendencies of donors to pursue tangential interests of their own through the centers should be resisted collectively and by increased self-discipline.

c. The tendencies of some host countries to assert more national control over centers located on their territory should also be resisted, and appropriate international immunities and privileges secured where they are lacking or are in question.

d. In spite of the temptations of fund availability, the centers should avoid extending their activities into areas where they do not have a unique advantage; vacuums outside the field of research, even critically important ones, should be filled by actions of others.

e. The Group's consensus on objectives needs to be broadened and made more explicit.

f. A better balance needs to be achieved between the funds available to the centers on an unrestricted and reliable basis and the priority tasks they are asked to undertake.

PART II -- THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

93. This portion of the report summarizes the recent developments in the financing of the CGIAR, as a background to the consideration of financial requirements in 1985 and subsequent years. It deals with individual centers only to illustrate general points. The financial situation in each center is covered in detail in the program and budget document submitted by the center to the Group, and in the commentary prepared by the CGIAR secretariat on each budget submission.

CONTRIBUTIONS

94. 1983 As reported to the Group in May 1984, total CGIAR contributions for core programs of centers in 1983 were about \$164 million, an increase of about \$20 million or 14% over contributions in 1982. Some \$9 million of this increase, however, corresponds to special projects transferred into core during the course of 1983 so that the increase, on a comparable basis, is \$11 million or 8%, somewhat lower than the 1981/82 average increases of 10%. The actual outcome was much below the Group's planning figures for 1983. It was \$13 million below the lower of the two levels recommended by the TAC and approved by the Group in November 1982. It was also \$10 million lower than the estimate of probable contributions made by the CGIAR secretariat at that same time. Out of the total available funds, \$2.3 million of the World Bank contribution was not actually made available to the centers. The Bank set up a small reserve for contingency purposes in the latter half of the year, which was used to make up for small variations in the funds received by centers from late-paying donors, and to meet other adjustments which were not foreseen in the allocation of the World Bank contribution. The centers could thus be relatively certain in the latter part of the year of the minimum total level of funds they would have for the year as a whole, and be able to plan the rational use of these funds. In 1983 much of the reserve was not required for this purpose. Rather than make a distribution right at the end of the year, the Bank placed the balance in the stabilization mechanism, as discussed with the Group in November 1983.

95. The components of the change between the secretariat's November 1982 estimates and the actual outcome are as follows:

a. Exchange losses amounted to about \$4 million, about the same as in 1982. The November estimate for total contributions was based on then current exchange rates. The exchange loss has been calculated by comparing the actual rate received by centers in converting non-dollar contributions into dollars with the rate used in making the November estimate.

b. Some \$7 million (\$6 million in 1982) of contributions included in the secretariat's estimate did not materialize during the year. The secretariat's estimate was based as usual on amounts pledged by the donors with or without caveats, or, when no pledge was made, on the basis of informal communications with donors.

c. On the other hand, \$7 million (\$2 million in 1982) not foreseen in November 1982 was provided by several donors. Of this amount \$3 million was a contribution matching the transferred special projects.

d. About \$1 million (\$.6 million in 1982) originally pledged as core ended up being contributed for special projects.

e. Some funds provided for restricted core activities could not be spent during the year, resulting in a reduction of contributions attributable to 1983 of \$5 million (\$3 million in 1982).

96. The difficulty of making accurate estimates is a continuing problem, and a critical one for the system. The estimates made at different times by the CGIAR secretariat not only form the basis for the decision on budgets for the year, and for the matching contributions of donors that use a matching formula, but also form the basis for program planning by centers during the year. The financial reporting and budget study should provide some assistance to improving this particular area of uncertainty faced by the centers in their planning.

97. 1984 The present estimate for core contributions in 1984 is \$175 million. If realized this level would be 7% higher than contributions in 1983. It compares with requirements of \$178 million for the lower level of the bracket approved for 1984 by the Group in November 1983, and with a secretariat estimate at the same date of contributions totalling \$180 million. The principal sources of change are the same as in 1983, although some of them cannot be calculated exactly at this time:

a. Exchange losses realized and projected, based on rates as of November 1983, are \$3 million.

b. Contributions pledged or estimated by the secretariat in November which are not likely to be realized amount to \$2 million.

c. Contributions made or pledged which were not projected in November 1983 amount to \$2 million.

d. Shifts from core contributions to special projects account for about \$2 million.

98. For several years the level of contributions provided by the Group has turned out to be less than was expected at the beginning of the year by 3%-6% and has been less than the lower level of the approved budgets.

99. Unlike the 1970's, when centers were able to plan expanding programs to address problem areas requiring immediate attention, the 1980's have required the centers to screen existing activities and reduce less important programs in order to maintain essential programs or to fund the new initiatives. This painful process began in 1981, a year which saw a number of centers operating at a deficit. In 1982 and 1983 centers faced lower than expected funding and uncertainty until late in the year as to the exact level

of funding expected by individual centers. This process appears to be continuing into 1984 as discussed above. Although the centers may have overreacted initially by retrenching more than necessary, center expenditure plans now seem to be sufficiently resilient to adapt to various levels of funding. The cost of this flexible planning is a lower allocation to long-term programs with relatively short-term projects and capital expenditures filling in the gaps. If one keeps in mind that the overall funding levels have been at or below the contingency levels as against the recommended (top of the bracket) program levels this response can be seen to be damaging to the system in the long term. From the point of view of an individual center, however, this is the only possible method of operation to keep a continuing level of activity in the most critical areas of their research.

100. COST INCREASES The continuation of moderate inflation for the past three years in the industrialized countries as well as the economic adjustment programs adopted in many host countries resulting in structural as well as continuing devaluation against the US dollar have helped to hold down cost increases in almost all centers. Cost increases in 1983 when calculated the same way as the original projections, appear to have been only of the order of 3% or 4% against an average cost increase factor of about 14% built into center expenditure plans. While individual centers have had a range of cost increases, which may not be reflected entirely accurately by the general price movements in the economies where they spend their budgets, the moderation of inflation has undoubtedly eased their adjustment to the levelling off of contributions which, on the average, have continued to grow in constant price terms. The systems budget process is slow to take these changes in the rate of inflation into account since center budgets and the anticipated cost increases are estimated as much as 18-24 months in advance. Consequently, the 1984 cost increase assumption of 10.8% at the systemwide level, although lower than the 14% budgeted in 1982 and 1983, also appears to be on the high side with the full-year estimate likely to be closer to 6%. As was the case of CIMMYT in 1982 and 1983, a substantial share of the change occurred at one center: the impact of the peso devaluation in the Philippines has allowed reductions in the dollar requirements for IRRI totalling \$3.5 million, with the amount evenly distributed between 1984 and 1985. These reduced cost estimates will be taken into account in setting expenditure plans for 1985 by the centers. The establishment of the stabilization mechanism below, would provide insurance against unexpected cost increases as long as it continues to be well funded. Adjustment of budgets periodically in the light of cost increases will allow a more equitable distribution across the system of both the losses and the gains from inflationary variations.

101. STABILIZATION MECHANISM The operating uncertainty faced by the centers has been documented extensively. As a result of the discussion of these matters, and in response to a proposal by the secretariat, the Group agreed to establish a stabilization mechanism beginning in 1984. This would protect the centers from variations in exchange rates between the allocation of pledges and actual disbursements during the course of the year as well as unexpected cost increases. Initial funding was provided out of the 1983 World Bank contribution with a contribution also pledged by the Netherlands,

and by an amount equal to unrestricted carryovers by centers into 1984, originally estimated at \$3.6 million but actually only half that amount. Any further contribution was predicated on the overall funding to be received in 1984. Specifically, if the overall system was funded above the bottom of the bracket the 1984 World Bank contribution corresponding to half of the amount above the bottom of the bracket would be set aside for the stabilization mechanism. It should be noted in this context that while the exact amount set aside for the mechanism from the World Bank contribution can vary based on specific circumstances each year, the principal reason for the substantial increase in the World Bank contribution is to provide a means for securing medium-term stability of the system. To this end the amount set aside should be determined broadly by the net impact of exchange rate and inflation variations for the system.

102. In the event, the 1984 funding prospects of \$175 million are below the approved bottom of the funding bracket of \$178 million. The amount in the mechanism is therefore \$4.1 million representing the total of World Bank and center carryover plus the Netherlands contribution. The amounts in the stabilization mechanism are invested by the World Bank's in-house investment group, along with the Bank's regular funds, and are expected to earn returns in the neighborhood of 10%.

103. In making forecasts for the operation of the mechanism in 1984, the secretariat found that it was likely there would be claims on most of the centers because inflation was actually well below the budgeted levels in most cases. At the same time, centers were finding difficulty in making calculations of their actual price experience on a working basis. Accordingly, the secretariat revised downward the approved budget levels to reflect its projections concerning inflation, and used the revised levels as the basis for allocation of World Bank funds. On this basis most centers are expected to get the full amount of their reduced bottom of the bracket budgets. At the same time, there should be few if any claims by the stabilization mechanism against centers on account of overestimated inflation rates. Some claims are expected to be made by the centers for funds from the mechanism on account of exchange losses on contributions and underestimates of the price factor, which will now be based on the new and lower estimates of inflation rates.

104. The World Bank is again reserving a small portion of its contribution to deal with unexpected problems not covered by the stabilization mechanism. If not required for this purpose, these funds would be added to the stabilization mechanism at the end of the year.

105. For 1985, the secretariat proposed and the centers agreed, to re-estimate the price factor in the 1985 approved budgets both as reflected in the 1984 base budget and in the actual price allowance in 1985. The levels used in each case would be agreed between the secretariat and the center during discussions that will take place about the time of centers week in November 1984. Only a portion of the price factor for 1985 will be included in the budget level which will be the basis for World Bank contributions to centers early in 1985. The balance would be considered only after actual experience with inflation and exchange rates in countries where

the centers operate has been considered, and appropriate changes made, probably for most centers in October/November 1985.

106. The Group discussed in November 1983, the proposal to launch a study of the financial reporting and budget process. As may be recalled this proposal responded to a recommendation of the Second CGIAR Review. As the Group was advised in its mid-year meeting in May this year the study is well under way with the fact-finding field work to be complete by early fall. The advisory panel to the study, representing a wide spectrum of practitioners in this field as well as Group members is expected to review the preliminary findings in its third meeting, just prior to the start of the ICW in November. Further discussions with the TAC, center directors and board chairmen are planned during the November meetings and a report will be made to the Group. It is hoped that the budget process for 1986 can take advantage of the early results of the study. The final report will be presented to the Group at centers week in 1985.

PART III — FINANCIAL NEEDS FOR 1985

1985 BUDGET PROPOSALS

107. For 1985, the TAC again recommends to the Group a budget for centers in the form of a bracket. Net contributions to centers of \$194 million are required at the top and \$182 million at the bottom of the bracket. The details by center are given in Table 4. This recommendation is based on the assumption that an additional contribution will be made to the stabilization mechanism of approximately \$5 million, so the net contribution requirements in total are \$199 million and \$187 million respectively. These represent increases of 7% to 14% over the expected level of \$175 million in 1984. The bottom of the bracket represents an increase of only \$4 million or 2% in nominal core program levels over 1984.

TABLE 4

CENTERS' 1985 CORE BUDGET PROPOSALS FOR PROGRAMS
AS RECOMMENDED BY TAC
(1984 \$'000)

Center	At Top of Bracket				At Bottom of Bracket			
	Operations	Capital	Gross	Net	Operations	Capital	Gross	Net
CIAT	24,058	562	24,620	23,837	23,023	429	23,452	22,669
CIMMYT	23,956	398	24,354	23,704	22,651	387	23,038	22,388
CIP	11,091	351	11,442	11,292	10,727	250	10,977	10,827
IBPGR	5,100	-	5,100	4,950	4,628	-	4,628	4,478
ICARDA	18,063	2,508	20,571	20,246	17,655	1,957	19,612	19,287
ICRISAT	21,004	2,514	23,518	23,293	19,816	2,006	21,822	21,597
IFPRI	4,916	57	4,973	4,953	4,708	56	4,764	4,744
IITA	23,797	712	24,509	24,213	22,427	700	23,127	22,831
ILCA	13,618	1,303	14,921	14,713	13,127	1,071	14,198	13,990
ILRAD	10,194	306	10,500	10,350	9,767	303	10,070	9,920
IRRI	23,315	2,610	25,925	25,175	22,255	553	22,808	22,058
ISNAR	4,126	38	4,164	4,114	3,856	36	3,892	3,842
WARDA	2,597	296	2,893	2,893	2,597	296	2,893	2,893
Total	185,835	11,655	197,490	193,733	177,237	8,044	185,281	181,524

108. The top and bottom levels were chosen to make it possible for donors to provide funding within the bracket, rather than below, and still to leave room for a modest addition to the stabilization mechanism. Should the pledge made during centers week suggest that the bracket is unrealistic, it may be necessary to consider amending the budget recommendations.

109. The TAC recommendations were made after study of submissions from each center with a base approximating the level of operations implied by the

bottom of the bracket approved by the Group for 1984, and including a price factor which varied substantially among centers, but averaged 9% for the system as a whole. As indicated in Part II, the price factor is subject to adjustment based on joint consideration of actual experience in the secretariat and the centers during centers' week. Centers offered data supporting possible program increases of up to 7% and identified priorities for reductions, if necessary, amounting to 6%. The recommendations for individual centers at the bottom of the bracket range from 10% below the base in the case of WARDA up to 9% above the base level in case of IFPRI. The recommendations at the top of the bracket range from 10% below the base to 13% above. The width of the bracket also varies, from 14% to 4% of the center program, with the exception of WARDA where a single recommendation is made. It is evident, therefore, that TAC exercised considerable discrimination, and found room to do so within the budget submissions. The substance of the program included in the bracket, which are at risk depending on the level of contributions, is equally varied. Details are found in each center's program and budget documents with a summary available in the secretariat commentaries.

PART IV -- LONGER TERM FINANCIAL TRENDS

110. The need for expanded resources to be invested in well conceived, problem-oriented research on food production in developing countries is clear enough. Within the Group, successive evaluations of individual center programs have identified additional requirements, while validating the basic work of the center. Studies of the requirements of national research systems rarely, if ever, call for a transfer of resources from the international to the national level. Much more often they call for additional output from international centers to support the growing national programs. The existence of unresolved problems to which research of the CGIAR is particularly relevant is undoubted. Moreover, investigations of the return to investment in research continue to demonstrate that good research produces an excellent rate of return.

111. A look at future requirements for the CGIAR must take into account the gap between the supply and demand. The three important studies launched last year will help clarify the issues involved: the impact study, by establishing the value added by the CGIAR to the resolution of the food production problems; the TAC strategic priorities study, by articulating the comparative advantage of the CGIAR and defining achievable goals; and the financial reporting and budget study, by proposing efficient solutions for effective financial and budgetary management within the system. A fourth requirement, developing new and innovative ways for providing finances to the system, is not being specifically studied at the present time; it clearly is an active item of the agenda for the Group.

112. While these studies are going on, a look ahead at the finances of the system can be little other than a short term projection of likely trends in contributions. This year, as in 1983, this takes the form of a simple projection of past trends into future years. The figures for 1985 represent

the program bracket recommended to the Group by TAC including funds set aside for the stabilization mechanism. Both ends of the bracket are then projected forward to 1986 and 1987 on the basis of a 7% annual growth in contributions expressed in current dollars. The result for each year is a range of figures, with a good possibility that the actual result will be somewhere in between.

TABLE 5
FINANCIAL PROJECTION
(In millions of dollars. Figures in brackets are percentage changes from previous year.)

1982	1983 Before Transfer	1983 After Transfer	1984 Estimate	1985 Recommended Bracket	1986 Projected Bracket	1987 Projected Bracket
				187(7%)	200(7%)	214(7%)
144(10%)	155(8%)	164(14%)	175(7%)	199(14%)	213(7%)	228(7%)

113. The program implications of the projections will depend, among other things, on what happens to inflation and exchange rates. If the price factor of 9% presently built in to our 1985 budget turns out to be close to accurate for the three years involved the lower set of figures would represent annual program reductions in real terms. Although the top set of figures would provide some program growth they are below the levels projected based on specific needs by the centers. Improvements in this rather bleak outlook could occur if capital requirements can be reduced from their present level, if the stabilization mechanism builds up sufficient reserves so that the annual increments can be reduced, or if price inflation is lower than 9%.

CENTERS SUPPORTED BY THE CGIAR, 1984

<u>Acronym</u> (Year Established)	<u>Center</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Research Programs</u>	<u>Geographic Focus</u>	<u>1984 Budget a/ (\$ million)</u>
IRRI (1960)	International Rice Research Institute	Los Banos, Philippines	Rice Rice based cropping systems	Global Asia	22.5
CIMMYT (1966)	Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento Maiz y Trigo	Mexico City, Mexico	Maize Bread wheat Durum wheat Barley Triticale	Global Global Global Global	21.0
IITA (1967)	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture	Ibadan, Nigeria	Farming systems Maize Rice Sweet potato, Yams Cassava, Cowpea, Lima bean, Soybean	Tropical Africa Global Tropical Africa	21.2
CIAT (1968)	Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical	Call, Colombia	Cassava Field beans Rice Tropical pastures	Global Global Latin America Latin America	23.1
CIP (1971)	Centro Internacional de la Papa	Lima, Peru	Potato	Global	10.9
WARDA (1971)	West African Rice Development Association	Monrovia, Liberia	Rice	West Africa	2.9
ICRISAT (1972)	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics	Hyderabad, India	Chickpea Pigeonpea Pearl millet Sorghum Groundnut Farming systems	Global Global Global Global Global Semi-Arid tropics	22.1

a/ CGIAR supported core budget, net of capital, at the bottom of the bracket (from 1983 Integrative Report.)

<u>Acronym</u> (Year Established)	<u>Center</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Research Programs</u>	<u>Geographic Focus</u>	<u>1984 Budget a/ (\$ million)</u>
ILRAD (1973)	International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases	Nairobi, Kenya	Trypanosomiasis Theileriosis	Global Global	9.7
IBPGR (1974)	International Board for Plant Genetic Resources	Rome, Italy	Plant genetic resources	Global	3.7
ILCA (1974)	International Livestock Center for Africa	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Livestock production systems	Tropical Africa	12.7
IFPRI (1975)	International Food Policy Research Institute	Wash., U.S.A.	Food policy	Global	4.2
ICARDA (1976)	International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas	Aleppo, Syria	Farming systems Wheat, Barley, Triticale, Broad bean, Lentil, Chickpea, Forage crops	Dry areas of West Asia and North Africa	20.4
ISNAR (1980)	International Service for National Agricul- tural Research	The Hague, Netherlands	National agricul- tural research	Global	3.5

a/ CGIAR supported core budget, net of capital, at the bottom of the bracket (from 1983 Integrative Report.)

Membership of the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research

September 15, 1983

A. Continuing Members

Countries

Australia	Germany	Netherlands	Saudi Arabia
Belgium	India	Nigeria	Spain
Brazil	Ireland	Norway	Sweden
Canada	Italy	Philippines	Switzerland
Denmark	Japan	Peoples Republic	United Kingdom
Finland	Mexico	of China	United States
France			

International Organizations

African Development Bank
Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development
Asian Development Bank
Commission of the European Communities
Food and Agriculture Organization
Inter-American Development Bank
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Fund for Agricultural Development
OPEC Fund
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme

Foundations

Ford Foundation
International Development Research Centre
Kellogg Foundation
Leverhulme Trust
Rockefeller Foundation

B. *Fixed-Term Members Representing Developing Countries, 1983-84

Asia:	Indonesia	Southern and Eastern Europe:	Greece
	Pakistan		Romania
Africa:	Tanzania	Near East:	Libya
	Senegal		Iraq
Latin America:	Cuba		
	Colombia		

* The countries of the five major developing regions of the world participate in the Consultative Group through representatives elected for a four-year term by the FAO members in each region. Two countries are elected from each region, one serving as member and the other as alternate, as they may decide, in the Group's deliberations.

CGIAR CONTRIBUTIONS TO CENTERS' CORE PROGRAMS
(\$ millions)

	Actual												Est ^{2/}
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 ^{1/}	1984
AfDB							.025	.030	.040	.045	.046		
Arab Fund					.310	.310			.255	.239	.239	.230	0.230
AsDB				.300	.500	.700							
Australia		.005	1.015	1.215	1.745	1.790	2.580	2.650	2.955	3.298	3.773	4.060	4.000
Belgium	.140	.600	.380	.620	1.740	2.250	2.720	3.085	3.265	2.373	1.823	1.875	1.930
Brazil													1.000
Canada	1.160	1.780	4.675	4.340	5.390	6.800	7.370	7.544	6.875	7.550	8.287	9.949	10.330
China													0.500
Denmark	.250	.225	.370	.400	.455	.615	.760	1.045	1.210	1.051	.945	.940	1.100
EEC						2.500	2.240	3.790	4.545	4.296	4.721	5.155	4.720
Finland													0.500
Ford Fndn.	5.315	3.675	3.000	2.800	2.000	1.590	1.000	1.000	1.300	1.300	1.000	1.294	1.060
France			.130	.410	.510	.415	.340	.675	.855	.844	.891	1.003	1.090
Germany		1.805	3.040	3.935	4.475	5.350	6.760	8.475	10.100	8.368	7.919	7.886	7.550
IDB			2.030	4.120	5.000	5.700	6.185	6.200	6.700	7.400	8.100	8.162	9.100
IDRC	.175	.345	.645	.990	1.780	1.305	1.045	.818	1.530	.961	1.059	1.963	1.810
IFAD								1.550	3.570	5.927	5.937	8.365	7.250
India										.500	.488	.506	0.500
Iran					1.975	2.000	1.000						
Ireland									.200	.180	.212	.322	0.400
Italy					.100	.030	.100	.100	.700	.965	1.577	6.101	6.790
Japan	.105	.230	.265	.675	1.200	2.500	3.500	4.845	7.000	8.400	8.850	9.077	9.930
Kellogg Fndn.	.155	.290	.280	.290	.300	.310	.320					.635	.340
Leverhulme									.490	.585	.654	.752	0.810
Mexico									.495	.948		.150	
Netherlands	.375	.430	.555	1.235	1.500	1.720	1.785	2.430	2.600	2.997	3.212	3.528	3.550
New Zealand					.105	.025	.025	.025	.025	.021	0.018	.016	
Nigeria				.645	.645	.620	.790	.825	1.976	1.142	1.205	1.004	0.990
Norway	.075	.185	.445	.810	1.120	1.510	1.880	1.975	1.995	1.902	1.874	2.176	1.940
OPEC Fund									.900	1.000	3.548	2.227	2.200
Philippines									.150	.500	.500	.355	0.500
Rockefeller Fndn.	3.990	4.545	3.500	2.885	2.165	1.595	1.250	1.220	1.600	1.000	.800	.522	0.630
Saudi Arabia					1.000	1.000						1.500	1.500
Spain										.500	.500	.498	0.500
Sweden	1.000	.150	1.490	2.290	2.255	2.240	2.725	3.115	3.390	3.315	3.173	3.051	3.110
Switzerland		.410	.140	.460	.855	1.205	1.350	1.850	2.450	2.605	2.752	4.894	5.610
U.K.	.690	1.110	1.920	2.410	2.890	3.515	4.765	6.395	6.790	6.031	6.342	5.909	5.690
UNDP	.850	1.000	1.465	2.165	1.930	3.500	4.400	3.995	4.615	5.065	6.088	6.849	8.240
UNEP				.600	.340	.340		.150			.183	.129	0.100
U.S.	3.770	5.390	6.805	10.755	14.870	18.140	21.145	24.800	29.000	35.000	40.785	44.550	45.250
World Bank	1.260	2.780	2.375	3.195	6.525	7.850	8.675	10.200	12.000	14.600	16.300	19.000	24.300
Others													
Kresge	.750												
TOTAL	20.060	24.955	34.525	47.545	62.870	77.225	85.045	99.487	119.576	130.904	143.800	164.633	175.100

Note: 1/ Inclusive of transferred special projects.

2/ As of September 1984.

Source: Centers' Program and Budget Papers and accounts, 1974-1984.