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Women Legislators in Taiwan:  
Barriers to Women's Political Participation  
in a Modernizing State

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Abstract: This paper uses interview data from samples of male and female legislators and defeated female candidates in Taiwan to test three theories about barriers to women's political participation--female socialization, role conflict, and voter and elite discrimination. All three theories appear applicable in Taiwan. Socialization barriers can be seen in the fact that women legislators come almost exclusively from a narrow spectrum of society. There are significant role conflicts between family and political obligations, and there is also strong evidence of discrimination against female candidates by both political leaders and voters. Yet, continuing modernization should progressively undermine the elements in traditional Chinese culture that support a subordinate status for women, especially because the "reserved seat" system in Taiwan provides an important incentive for getting at least some women involved in politics.

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## WOMEN LEGISLATORS IN TAIWAN: BARRIERS TO WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN A MODERNIZING STATE<sup>1</sup>

As the United Nation's Decade for Women draws to an end, the status of women throughout the world appears to be changing. The majority of governments are taking steps to improve women's lot by instituting legal and constitutional equality and eliminating discrimination against them. Yet, much remains to be done. According to a United Nation's report, women, who constitute half of the world's population, still perform nearly two-thirds of all work hours but receive only one-tenth of world income. They own less than 1% of world property and hold only 6% of government offices.<sup>2</sup> While women in some European countries have increased their representation in parliament to around 30%,<sup>3</sup> there has been no consistent increase in women's participation in politics during the decade.<sup>4</sup> Nowhere do they hold a full half of the seats of government.

This paper examines the nature of the gender gap in Taiwan, Republic of China. The Republic of China provides an interesting context for the study of women's political participation because of the existence of countervailing pressures. On the one hand, women have traditionally held a very subordinate status in the hierarchical Chinese and Taiwanese society. On the other hand, Taiwan has undergone extensive economic growth and modernization in the past three decades, and women now assume a major role in the labor force. In addition, the emphasis on equality and democracy in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three principles of the people" stimulated the Republic of China to reserve some legislative seats for women according to a formula that guarantees them about 10% of the seats. In practice women usually win slightly more than their reserved allotment.

The first section of this paper describes the nature of the government and the status of women in the Republic of China. The second discusses three major theories that have been used to explain women's almost universal underrepresentation among political leaders. The data analysis then uses a survey of female and male legislators in Taiwan to test the applicability of the theories about women's political disadvantages.

### THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S GOVERNMENT AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN

The Constitution of the Republic of China was adopted on the mainland in 1946. When the nationalist officials fled to Taiwan in 1949 in the wake of the Communist takeover, they reestablished their government positions on the island. The national level of government consists of seven bodies: the National Assembly which elects the President and Vice President and amends the Constitution, the Legislative Yuan which approves the laws; the Control Yuan which supervises the government offices; the Executive Yuan which carries out the laws; the Judicial Yuan which interprets the Constitution; and the Examination Yuan which conducts civil service examinations.<sup>5</sup> The National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan are elected bodies whose members were selected in mainland elections in 1947 and 1948. Since the the death and retirement of members has reduced the size of the three

bodies and resulted in new elections at intervals starting in 1969 to add new members. The Executive Yuan is the principal decision-making body of the national government. It is headed by a premier and consists of the heads of the executive ministries. The premier is appointed by the president with the consent of the Legislative Yuan.

While the Republic of China has essentially a unitary form of government, there are several levels of local government which perform a variety of functions under the direction of the national government. The Taiwan provincial government is headed by a Governor who is appointed by the president. In 1951, an elected provincial Assembly was created to approve the budget and advise the Governor. There are also county magistrates, city mayors, and county and city councils with wide powers over local affairs. These officials are elected except for the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung who are appointed by the President.

Women are guaranteed approximately 10% of the seats on the representative legislative bodies, but there are no elected or appointed women executives at any level. Candidates for the legislative assemblies do not run for particular seats but run at large. Those with the highest number of votes get the seats except for those reserved for special groups by the Constitution.

For all practical purposes, the Republic of China is a one-party state. The Kuomintang (KMT), established in 1919 by Sun Yat-sen, dominates the elections. There are also two minor parties: The Young China Party and China Democratic Socialist Party, and many candidates run as independent or as non-KMT candidates. In 1970 only 10% of the KMT membership were women. Currently, women are 22% of the KMT membership. The prevailing political philosophy has been the Confucian tradition of paternalistic government wherein the officials are obligated to look after their subjects who in turn owe the government their allegiance.

To protect the government from Communist infiltration and Taiwanese insurrection, martial law has been in effect since 1947; therefore, political suspects are tried in military courts, and the KMT censors all publications and media programs. Although the exiled mainlanders still control the top political jobs in the government and KMT, Taiwan's natives have been absorbed into the lower offices of the party and control the economy. Political participation is open to all citizens over twenty years of age, and the voting behavior of men and women is similar. Thus, democratic participation is permitted while freedom of speech and press is restricted.

Traditionally, Chinese culture has been characterized as patriarchal with women subordinated relative to men. The role of women, as daughters, wives, and mothers, was to serve the needs of their families and surrender their rights to fathers, husbands, and sons. With the revolution in 1911 and the adoption of a new constitution, however, women were granted equal rights under the law. Women were then granted equal opportunity to participate in politics as well as other opportunities such as education and

employment. Furthermore, the government has adopted an equal pay for equal work principle as its labor policy. Over the last two decades, with the rapid economic development in Taiwan, the status of women in terms of their participation in the various aspects of society has substantially improved, but they have not achieved equity with men. At present, the average years of education completed by women is 7.3 as compared with 8.8 years completed by men. The illiteracy rate among women and the proportion with college and above education are 18.2 and 7.8, respectively, while the corresponding figures for men are 2.8 and 13.1.<sup>6</sup>

The labor force participation rate of women has increased significantly as a result of industrialization in Taiwan, although women have always been very active in the agricultural and family-related businesses. From 1965 to 1973, when economic growth was at its peak, the labor force participation rate of females increased from 33.1 to 41.5%. This represents an annual growth rate of 7.5% which is higher than that of the male labor force (3.1%) and the highest rate of increase for women ever. Since then, with the slow down of the economy, the growth rate of women's labor force participation has suffered a set back. At present, only 43.3% of women are active in the labor force with the majority of them concentrated in service, retail, manufacturing assembly-line, and clerical occupations.<sup>7</sup> As a consequence, women earn, on the average, only two-thirds as much as men with the same educational level and tend to feel limited in their promotion opportunities.<sup>8</sup>

In terms of political participation in Taiwan, women were granted an equal right to vote and the "reserved seats" system was installed to guarantee a certain degree of representation for women in the legislative process of decision making, but they have not been effective in using these two mechanisms to secure greater access to political power. At present, although there is no significant difference in the voting rates of men and women, the rates of representation of men and women differ substantially across all levels of government. Currently, the representation rates of women in the legislative process range from the lowest level of 13% in the National Assemblies to the highest level of 14.4% at the County-City Council level. Nevertheless, these rates represent a significant increase over the past thirty years.<sup>9</sup>

#### THEORIES OF THE GENDER GAP

Three broad theories have been developed to explain the global gender gap in political participation, particularly at the elite level of holding office. First, it is held that socialization processes differentially affect the level of interest in politics of men and women. Cultural values portray politics as a man's world. Therefore, women neither pay as much attention as men to political events nor aspire to hold political office. Rather, they take on passive and supportive roles while leaving campaigning and holding office to men. The socialization process begins in childhood, where girls demonstrate less interest in and less knowledge of their governments than boys, and continues into adulthood, where women's roles restrict their concerns to home and family.<sup>10</sup>

The second theory stresses role conflict as the cause of women's low political participation. It holds that the situation of most women restricts their political activity in two ways. As homemakers and mothers, women do not have time to spare for political involvement beyond the most rudimentary level of voting and volunteer activity. Furthermore, their relative absence from professional occupations means that women do not have the necessary resources to devote to running for and holding political office.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, the third theory argues that overt discrimination against female candidates restricts their participation in political office. This discrimination may occur at two levels. First, voters may refuse to elect female candidates, perhaps as a result of socialization which teaches them that politics is a man's world and that women are not suited for public office. At the elite level, leaders of political parties and interest groups may be denying women candidates their endorsements and necessary financial backing.<sup>12</sup>

Research, especially in the United States, has produced mixed results concerning the causes of the gender gap in political participation. Initially, studies of mass participation generally accepted the childhood socialization model,<sup>13</sup> but later analysis suggested that it was far too simplistic.<sup>14</sup> Attention turned toward adult role socialization and role conflict factors, and several recent studies have tried to test the relative validity of these theories.<sup>15</sup> While their specific results have varied somewhat with their different data bases and methodologies, all have found that childhood socialization, adult socialization, and role conflict have some interacting and complementary influences.<sup>16</sup> These models are not contradictory although many of their basic assumptions diverge greatly; rather, the adult role socialization and role conflict perspectives provide an elaboration of childhood socialization theory by specifying conditions that modify the strength of socialization into traditional roles.

Socialization and role conflict provide "internal" reasons that women seek political office at much lower rates than men do. Discrimination against women constitutes a potentially very important "external" barrier as well. Evidence of voter discrimination against women rests on public opinion polls and election results. Public opinion polls indicate that sizable percentages of the voters would not vote for a woman for many offices, but the number is declining.<sup>17</sup>

Analysis of election returns indicates that while there is evidence of voter discrimination in the past, by the late 1970s, women candidates win as many votes as men who are running in similar kinds of races in a wide variety of elections.<sup>18</sup> Although there are intuitive accounts of discrimination against women by party and interest group leaders, studies in particular states and particular races have found little evidence of party or interest group discrimination.<sup>19</sup>

These three theories, then, suggest several hypotheses to be tested through an analysis of female and male legislators in the Republic of

China. Since, as noted above, the three theories have many complementary aspects, all of these hypotheses may well be supported. Still, differential results among them would give relatively greater confirmation to one or two of the theories in the Taiwan context. First, because it will take a special kind of woman to overcome the socialization process relegating women to private roles, women will have to rank very high on background socioeconomic factors, especially education. Socialization theory will then be tested using four hypotheses: women legislators will have strong family support to overcome traditional socialization against women's political participation; while most women in Taiwan should be quite traditional and conservative, the strong break with tradition required to become a female political leader should make women legislators fairly liberal compared to their male counterparts; however, even though many women politicians have overcome or broken the barriers of traditional socialization, residual socialization forces should make them less active and ambitious than comparable male elites; and because the rapid socio-economic modernization that has occurred in Taiwan should progressively undercut traditional cultural norms, younger women should be more participant and liberal than older ones.

This last hypothesis might be countered by another factor; if barriers to women's participation were much greater in the past, older women who became politically active earlier would have been much more atypical than younger women who entered politics recently.

With regard to role conflict theory, there are also four hypotheses: only women with the ability to get around the role conflict (e.g., no young children, having household help) will be able to run; family obligations will interfere more with female than male legislators; women will have less time for professional and political activities than men; men will have more political resources such as professional educations and occupations. Finally, five hypotheses are related to discrimination theory: women's candidacies will be hurt by voter discrimination; women's candidacies will be hurt by a lack of elite support: women will be more likely to represent minority or non KMT parties because the dominant party would be more likely to represent the male-oriented traditional order; women will be less active and influential in their legislative bodies; and men will have a lower opinion of women's political contributions than women will.

#### WOMEN VERSUS MEN LEGISLATORS IN TAIWAN

This paper tests the three major explanations for women's gross underrepresentation among the political elites with data from elite interviews. The study included three sets of women political elites and one control group of male legislators. The first two groups were: 1) all the forty-three women currently holding legislative office in Taiwan's major assemblies (the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, Provincial Assembly, and the Taipei and Kaohsiung city assemblies); and 2) all the women candidates who had lost in the most recent elections for these bodies. Two control groups were also used. One consisted of the twenty-one female legislators who held office in 1969 and were still alive to check for

generational effects. The other was composed of a randomly selected sample of forty-three male legislators selected in the same number from each Assembly as the women incumbents (they were fairly equivalent to the women legislators in terms of age, party, and Mainland versus Taiwanese origin) to permit male-female comparisons among the active Assembly members.

Of the 163 people in the sample, 149 were interviewed in the spring of 1985. The other fourteen either could not be found or refused to be interviewed. The number of completed interviews in each sample was as follows: 1) current female legislators, 39 (91% response rate); 2) defeated legislative candidates, 47 (84% response rate); 3) 1969 female legislators, 20 (95% response rate); and 4) current male legislators, 43 (100% response rate).

The interview schedules were based on a modification of the biographical questionnaire developed by the Center for the American Woman and politics of Rutgers University. Most of the questions were close-ended, but a few open-ended attitudinal and perceptual items were also included. The original English-language questions were translated into Chinese by one of the principal investigators (Chou Bih-Er). Pretests of the interview were conducted with several members of local assemblies in the Taipei metropolitan region who were not included in the sample. The interviews were conducted to a face-to-face basis by research associates of Academia Sinica under the direct supervision of Dr. Chou.

Our interview covered eight general areas relating to our three sets of hypotheses: 1) background socioeconomic and resource factors; 2) socialization influences; 3) political participation and ambition; 4) general political orientations; 5) situations engendering conflict between family, professional and political roles; 6) perspectives on Taiwan's election system; 7) legislative activities; and 8) attitudes about women's political role in Taiwan. Separate subsections discuss the differences that exist among the four analytic groups in this study -- current male legislators, current female legislators, prior female legislators, and losing female candidates in the latest legislative elections.

Three separate statistical techniques were applied to measure group differences, depending upon whether the dependent variable in question 1) had a large number of categories at the interval level of measurement (e.g., age or number of resolutions introduced each legislative session); 2) had a small number of discrete categories (e.g., gender or a seven-point ideology scale); or 3) involved the possibility of giving several answers to a multiple response question (e.g., up to three reasons were coded for why a legislator or losing candidate would or would not run in the next election).

One-way analysis of variance was used for the interval dependent variables. In such cases the following tables report the four groups means and the overall correlation coefficient eta. Cross tabulations were used for the second set of variables. The percentage of each group falling into certain categories (e.g., those with at least some college education or who believe that women can be as qualified as men to be political leaders are

reported along with the nominal contingency coefficient C. Finally, for the multiple response items, the percentage of each group that gave a specific response (e.g., the perception that greater social freedom gives men a political advantage) is included in the table.

The overall correlation coefficients,  $\eta$  and C, must be treated with a good deal of caution because four groups are involved. So, for example, a large difference between men and women may not produce a statistically significant overall correlation coefficient because of high similarity among the three female groups. Conversely, a very extreme deviation by one group e.g., a lack of office-holding by the female losing candidates can produce a high correlation coefficient even when the groups of major interest are fairly alike. No correlation coefficients are even reported for the multiple response items because the  $n$ 's in these tables reflect responses rather than respondents, while our percentage comparisons are of respondents.

Statistical significance levels are given for the reported correlation coefficients. This is not technically appropriate since we are comparing groups rather than making inferences from a sample to a population (and only the male legislators are a sample), but the significance measure does give a basis for comparing the relative strength of the correlation. This is especially important for comparing C's since the magnitude of C is affected by the size of the table (larger tables will have higher C's).

Socioeconomic Factors. Political leaders in Taiwan are definitely part of the social and economic elite. The data in Table 1 demonstrate that both male and female legislators are well above average in terms of their educations, occupations, and income levels. While only 10% of the Taiwan population 25 years old and above has attended a university, over 80% of the sample of current legislators have done so. There is virtually no difference in education level between male and female office holders, but significantly fewer of the defeated female candidates and earlier legislators had higher education; these groups had college attendance rates of about 70%. Yet, even these women were well above the national average. The primary difference between the male and female legislators' educational experience appears to be in terms of the schools attended. A much larger percentage of the males (26% as opposed to less than 10% for any of the female groups) attended the top-ranked National Taiwan University or the politically-oriented Chengchi University. Men also had an educational advantage in terms of advanced work; 21% attended graduate or professional school compared to 10% of the current female legislators and almost none of the other two groups. Higher education, then, is an important resource in running for legislative office in Taiwan.

The occupations of these political leaders also set them apart from the average citizen. While 58% of the population holds blue collar (32%) or agricultural jobs (26%), only 1% of all of these respondents did. More than half of the males owned their own business, and the majority of the members of all four groups were employed in either business or the professions. Current women legislators had by far the highest unemployment rate, probably resulting from the fact that their husbands provided any necessary

supplement to their remuneration as public officials. The family incomes of these politicians reflect their elite occupations. Annual incomes exceeding \$15,000 (U.S.) were almost universal for the current office holders and for approximately 70% of the past legislators and defeated candidates. Since the media family income in Taiwan is about U.S. \$8,000 and per capita income is U.S. \$3,000, the politicians enjoy a high economic status. As is the case with education, a significantly higher proportion of men than women fell into the very highest income categories of over \$30,000 (U.S.) per year (10% more as compared to current female office holders and 25% more as compared to the other two female groups).

The current office holders and recent candidates tend to be middle-aged. The male and female legislators have nearly the same average age while the losing candidates are slightly younger. This similarity in the age of the two groups of legislators is surprising. Studies in America have found women legislators on the average to be older than men because of their need to postpone political careers until later in life to avoid family role conflicts.<sup>20</sup>

The Taiwan political leaders are married in overwhelming proportions. Similar proportions of women in all three categories are married with slightly fewer of the earlier legislators currently married because of their higher average age resulting in a larger proportion of widows. Marital status was one of the few areas where current male and female legislators differed, as more of the male sample are currently married, a finding similar to those in the United States.<sup>21</sup>

The religious affiliation of the two groups of current legislators are very similar. Buddhists constitute about half of all the groups with the proportion being highest among the pre-1970 female legislators. Research on the role of women in Korean politics found that many women politicians in that country were Christian, suggesting that Christianity tended to break down the restraints of traditional Korean culture on women's political participation.<sup>22</sup> This association seems to be true to only a limited extent in Taiwan. A somewhat higher proportion of current women legislators are Christians (10%) than the population (6%), and the percentage of Christians is twice as high among the other two female groups. Still, the overwhelming majority of all three female groups is non-Christian; among the current legislators, males are almost as likely to be Christians (7%) as females (10%).

The data in Table 1, then, clearly support the socio-economic status hypothesis that women running for political office will have to rank very highly on background socioeconomic factors, especially education, in order to overcome the socialization processes relegating them to private roles. Chinese women in politics have attained high education levels. The majority have high-ranking occupations, and their families have high annual incomes. They are definitely as much a part of the social and economic elite as are the male legislators. These findings are somewhat at variance with the fourth role conflict hypothesis that women would have substantially less background socioeconomic resources, but they do not counter it entirely.

Although female politicians in Taiwan are almost exclusively drawn from a narrow socioeconomic elite, our data show that male politicians generally rank even higher on most of these elite characteristics.

Socialization Factors. The first socialization hypothesis, that female politicians need strong family support to overcome traditional socialization against political participation for women, is verified by the data in Table 2. The women participants differ greatly from the sample of male legislators on nearly all of these measures of socialization. A higher percentage of the women's fathers had attended college and had a great deal of interest in politics, and a much higher percentage of the mothers of the currently active women had a great deal of interest in politics, supporting a theory that politically participant women come from homes with politically active mothers.<sup>23</sup>

The most striking difference, however, relates to the political interest and activity of the spouses. While large majorities of all groups of these politicians have spouses who approved of their running for office, the women are significantly more likely to have husbands with high interest in politics, are active in politics, and hold a political office. As many as 20% more of the women than men were encouraged by their spouses to run for office. Furthermore, well over half the women, as compared to only 10% of the men, mentioned the encouragement and stimulation of their families major reasons they first had become interested in politics and first decided to run for office.

Participation and Ambition Factors. Male-female differences in political participation and ambition are not nearly as clearcut. There were few differences in political experience, as measured by four scales of previous office holding,<sup>24</sup> for the men and the 1985 and 1969 women legislators. While the men were slightly more likely to have held an appointed government office, the women were more likely to have had elected posts. The major group difference is between those who were defeated in recent elections and those who have held office recently or in the past. Fewer of the women losing elections held elected or appointed government positions or party offices.

The differences between male and female legislators with regard to participation in interest groups were also small. Men had a slight edge on average over the two groups of women legislators in terms of membership in civic, religious, leisure, and business and professional organizations. Men, however, were much less likely than women office holders to participate in formal groups pursuing political goals, such as party auxiliaries or veteran's associations (approximately 40% as compared to 80%), probably reflecting the fact that all women's groups are included in this category. Again fewer of the women who were losing candidates belonged to interest groups. Possibly their lack of political experience and interest group activity contributed to their election defeats. Except for the group of women who had been elected prior to 1970, there were relatively small differences between the proportions of men and women who would run again for the same or a different political office. About half of the men and women

legislators and defeated candidates were planning to run again. The male sample has just a few more who want to stay in their current office.

In sum, the third socialization hypothesis, that women politicians will be less politically active and ambitious than their male colleagues, receives only slight support. In terms of holding public office, the differences are insignificant, and only a few more men have future political ambitions. Thus, unlike the United States where even women who become involved in politics are less active and ambitious than their male counterparts (at least until recently),<sup>25</sup> there is little gender difference among politicians in Taiwan on this dimension. This may be because the break with traditional female roles is much greater for women entering politics in the Republic of China than in the United States.

Political Orientation Factors. As an indication of political orientation, the four groups of respondents were asked why they first decided to run for office. There is little difference in the motivations given by the three categories of office holders for first seeking office. The earlier women legislators were slightly less likely than the other three groups to cite concern for issues, social issues or ideology but, rather, ran because of a general feeling of public support. On the other hand, the female losing candidates were more likely to mention issue concern and ideology than the other three groups. Because more of the losing candidates were non-KMT candidates, they were also more likely than the other groups to have run to break up the distribution of party balance in their districts.

Studies of women office holders in the United States have found them to be relatively liberal on social issues regardless of their political party affiliation.<sup>26</sup> The same is true in Taiwan, thus supporting the third socialization hypothesis. The current female legislators are slightly more liberal than their male counterparts (56% to 47%), while about 75% of both of the pre-1970 women legislators and the losing women candidates considered themselves liberals. The latter group would normally be expected to be the most liberal because, as Table 4 shows, the losers were disproportionately non-KMT candidates and first sought office because of ideological or social concern. The strong liberalism of the earlier female legislators is quite surprising, however, and directly disconfirms the fourth socialization hypothesis that the older women would be more conservative. Perhaps the logic of the second socialization hypothesis was very prevalent fifteen years ago in that only extremely nontraditional women sought and won public office. The degree of liberalism among all of the respondents is also interesting given the generally conservative image of the Republic of China's government. To some extent, these results probably reflect the respondents' placing themselves on the political spectrum within Taiwan where a relative liberal might be conservative by the standards of other societies, but they also suggest that legislative members view themselves as something of outsiders vis-a-vis the executive posts of the government.

Moreover, the data in Table 4 do not support the third discrimination hypothesis that women politicians are more likely to represent minority or

non-KMT parties. There is virtually no difference between the party identifications of the male and female legislators. The percentages of both of these groups who are KMT members are representative of the party's present strength in the government. It is not surprising that a smaller proportion of the losing candidates are KMT (the dominant party wins a disproportionate number of seats) or that a larger proportion of the 1969 legislators were party members since the KMT was more dominant in Taiwan's politics fifteen years ago.

Role Conflict Factors. Table 5 indicates that there is evidence of role conflict for these women politicians, but the findings are not as strong as would be expected based on American research.<sup>27</sup> There is little difference between the male and female legislators on number of children. Yet, the role conflict theory is supported by the fact that fewer current female than male legislators have children under six years of age. There is only a slight difference in the age at which the men and women first became interested in politics or ran for their first office; this differs from findings in the United States where women start their political careers later than men.<sup>28</sup> Contrary to the third role conflict hypothesis, women who do work devote a little more time, on the average, to their professional jobs than do men, although, as previously noted, more women than men do not hold jobs other than their legislative posts. It is also clear from these data that the losing women candidates hold fulltime jobs while the members of the other three groups work only part-time. Furthermore, the various groups of politicians tended to see the family lives of both the men and women activists suffering. The male legislators were the most likely of any group to believe that the family lives of both male and female politicians suffered.

The role conflict theory receives its greatest support from the perceptions of many women legislators and candidates that women's family obligations and male social freedoms are major disadvantages to women's holding office. Over a third of the current and 1969 female legislators cited family obligations as a disadvantage for members of their sex in holding office, and over a quarter of these two groups, as well as 30% of the men assembly members, felt that male social freedom was an advantage to male legislators, presumably because it allowed them to have many more informal contacts with other politicians and business leaders.

One reason the role conflict for women in Taiwan may be less than for American women might be that nearly half of the Taiwan office holders have received help from relatives in doing household chores. Also, approximately two-thirds of the current and earlier female legislators had hired assistance in their homes. This is nearly double the proportion of male legislators who have hired help for housework. Thus, the first two role conflict hypotheses receive partial support. That the actual female-male differences were not as great as anticipated, moreover, is caused by the strong operation of the first socialization hypothesis that women legislators would come almost exclusively from Taiwan's socioeconomic elite and by the second hypothesis that they would have strong family support.

Electoral Factors. The first two discrimination hypotheses are strongly supported by the data of Table 6 on perceptions of the Taiwan election system. Approximately half of the current legislators of both sexes and the female defeated candidates agree that voters in Taiwan are biased against women candidates. Voter bias was cited by about one-fourth of the women who have held office as a disadvantage to candidates of their sex in running for office. More than one-fifth of the male sample mentioned this bias as an advantage to their sex. The hypothesis regarding elite bias against women is supported by the fact that nearly three-fourths of the two groups of women legislators agree that party men discriminate against women. A large percentage of the male legislators (41%) also agreed with the statement. Furthermore, far fewer women than men received encouragement for their campaigns from party and interest group leaders. This is especially true for the females who lost in recent elections. Finally, only a third of the males and one-fourth of the females agree that women have an equal chance to become political leaders in Taiwan.

To some extent, the existence of the reserved seat system in Taiwan counterbalances the perceptions of bias against women. About two-thirds of the current female legislators see the system as providing a guarantee for female representation. A similar proportion of the male sample feel that the system disadvantages them by increasing the level of competition between male candidates. Nevertheless, the women do not see the system as solely advantageous; 15% of those who have held seats and nearly 30% of the losing candidates feel that the reserved seat system provides an excuse for not voting for women or serves as a ceiling as well as a floor for the number of women elected. A significant proportion of women in each of the three categories (about 15%) also believe that the system increases party control over the nomination and election processes. Given their widespread belief that party leaders discriminate against women, increasing their control has a negative impact on women's election.

In sum, perceptions of the election system provide strong support for the first two discrimination hypotheses that biases among both political elites and voters hinder women's candidacies. Moreover, women are significantly more likely to perceive such discrimination which is also consistent with the fifth discrimination hypothesis.

Legislative Experience Factors. The findings in Table 7 indicate that the third role conflict and fourth discrimination hypotheses, that women would be less active in Taiwan legislatures than men are not supported. Women do not devote less time to their legislative offices than the men do, and they are not less active. The data show that women actually give more hours per week to their official duties, perhaps because fewer of them hold additional occupations. Current women legislators are almost as likely as the men to be involved in training while serving as legislators. Legislators of both sexes have received courses from their party organizations, and 28% of the women are working toward the completion of university degrees. The average number of resolutions and amendments introduced per session varied little across three of the categories of legislators. Only the women defeated in the last election who had

previously served in a legislature had introduced significantly less resolutions and amendments while in office. The main difference in legislative activity between the men and women was in the subjects of their resolutions or amendments. Over half of the men, as opposed to less than a quarter of the women, had introduced resolutions on all subject areas, giving an indication of broader and more inclusive participation.

In terms of power and influence within the legislatures, the men are only slightly advantaged in terms of the number of committees they have chaired; and women estimate a higher success rate for the legislation that they have introduced. Similar proportions of current men and women legislators (just over 50%) perceive themselves as above average in legislative influence. Surprisingly, 1969 women legislators and female losing candidates who has previously served in an assembly ranked themselves even higher. Yet, the significance of resolution or amendment success is suspect in a political system where all important policy is initiated in the executive branch. The legislatures have only the limited role of advising the executive.

In all three female groups, more people say that they enjoy holding public office than in the male group. It may be that the women derive greater prestige from holding public office than would be possible for them in any other occupation. Even so, substantially larger proportion of the women (approximately one-half) than the men (one-third) complained of feeling no sense of accomplishment. Clearly, even many women who enjoyed serving in the legislature and felt that they had above average influence were frustrated at times in their legislative goals. This greater sense of frustration of women may derive from the differing role orientations of male and female legislators. The men in the sample tended to stress the governmental oversight and need to improve efficiency aspects of the job. More of the women, in contrast, placed their primary emphasis on policy and decision making, constituency services, and educating the public. Their sense of lack of accomplishment, then, may come from the fact that policy initiatives and the ability to serve constituents mostly lie outside the legislative arena and in the executive organs of the government.

Thus, the activity and influence level of Taiwan's female politicians does not appear to be greatly affected by cultural bias and elite discrimination against women. Women are about as active and influential as the men; however, the fact that they devote more time to their offices to get similar results may be indicative of discrimination. Women legislators in the U.S., for example, feel that they must spend more time on the job than men just to be taken seriously by their male colleagues.<sup>29</sup>

Attitude Factors. The final discrimination hypothesis, that men will have lower evaluations of the political contributions of women, is very strongly supported by the statements in Table 8. The men in the sample are much less likely to hold as favorable perceptions of women in politics than the women in all three categories.

Even the male legislators, however, see women's political activities in general in a favorable light; large majorities of the men felt that women can be as qualified as men to hold office (74%) and to make an important contribution to politics in Taiwan (63%). Not surprisingly, the women almost universally agreed with these statements. The male respondents were much less willing, in contrast, to concede that women politicians possess special qualities. For example, while two-thirds or more of the female groups felt that women in politics were more honest and less influenced by interest groups, well under half of the men concurred. Similarly, most women but less than half the men felt that female politicians are less politically cunning than their male colleagues, suggesting that this trait has something of a negative connotation. In addition, men disagree with current and pre-1970 female legislators over whether women spend more time on politics and whether women's political training was less adequate than men's. Only the losing female candidates, though, were significantly more likely than the men to say that women were better at human relations.

In sum, the fifth discrimination hypothesis is supported since male legislators are much less favorably disposed towards women's political activities than women representatives and legislative candidates. While men and women differ greatly, however, over whether women bring special talents and advantages to political life, the majority of the males support women's participation at the elite level in Taiwan which perhaps softens some of the other evidence supporting discrimination theory that we have found here. Whether such acceptance of an active political role for women extends to the broader Chinese and Taiwanese society is most problematic.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study of women in Taiwan's politics provides some support for all three theories explaining the underrepresentation of women in government office. The socialization theory receives strong support from the fact that these political women come from the social and economic elite. Their incomes, occupations, and education levels are well above the average for the population as a whole. Also the high levels of political interest and activity among the families and spouses of these women tends to confirm the theory. To become part of the political elite, women need greater encouragement from family and spouse than do the men. Yet, these women are not appreciably less active or ambitious than the men. Once these few women have overcome the socialization process and become political participants, they tend to be as active and ambitious as their male counterparts, unlike the situation in the United States.

The presence of role conflicts for these women is demonstrated by the fact that more of them than men cite family obligations as a disadvantage to their sex in holding office. Nevertheless, the high social status of these women allows them to overcome the conflict by hiring extra help to assist with household tasks. Women in less elite circumstances may have to forego the luxury of holding public office unless family members are willing to help them.

Finally, there is evidence that women in politics in Taiwan still face discrimination from voters and political leaders. Large numbers of both male and female respondents cited voter bias against women as an impact of sex on campaigns, and both agreed that men in political parties discriminate against women. Many of the male respondents themselves indicated some reservations about women's current activities in politics, as nearly two-thirds agreed that women are less well trained for public office.

The reserved-seat system was generally seen as helping women by providing guaranteed legislative positions for them, although some disadvantages were cited as well. More subtly, reserving seats for women has probably helped stimulate family-connected political candidacies which are very important in the recruitment of female legislators in Taiwan. In the United States, widows taking the seats of their deceased husbands have provided an important family-connected route to legislative service.<sup>29</sup> In Taiwan, in contrast, many political activists evidently encourage their wives' or female relatives' candidacies while they are still alive. Such encouragement and support might be drastically reduced in the absence of a guarantee that some women must win. Thus, while it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that the reserved-seat system increases the number of female legislators and candidates in Taiwan, a strong presumption of this can be made. The fact that women only win a minuscule proportion of seats beyond their minimum allotment is consistent with this conclusion.

The reserved-seat system, then, assured that women will have some representation (even if a disproportionately low one) in each legislative body. The female perspective, hence, is represented. Conditions do not, however, seem to favor a shift towards equality. The fact that the government is relatively conservative and that Taiwan's society still adheres to traditional values will retard women's political participation for many years. Nearly half of the female respondents themselves agree that women are not now as well qualified for public office as men.

Nevertheless, continued economic development should eventually increase women's elite participation. For example, Tables 1 and 2 show a tremendous amount of intergenerational mobility in education. Three-fourths of the women in our study attended a university, while only 4% of their mothers did. As the number of women with higher education and professional jobs increases, the pool of eligible female legislators will grow. They will come to demand a fair share of representation as have the women of Scandinavia.

Table 1

GROUP DIFFERENCES ON BACKGROUND SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS AND RESOURCES

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Education						
Attended College	84%	82%	70%	66%	.35*	149
University Attended						
Nat. Taiwan or Chengchi	26%	8%	5%	4%	.59**	149
Occupation						
Business Owner	51%	31%	45%	32%	.41	149
Businessman or Professional	19%	26%	20%	32%		
Unemployed	19%	41%	25%	28%		
Family Income						
Over U.S. \$15,000	93%	95%	75%	68%	.46*	146
Age						
Mean	47	48	61	44	.44***	146
Marital Status						
Married	35%	85%	80%	83%	.16	149
Religion						
Buddhist	47%	46%	55%	45%	.48***	149
Christian	7%	10%	20%	21%		

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

Table 2  
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON SOCIALIZATION FACTORS

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Father's Education Attend College	12%	23%	15%	33%	.36	149
Mother's Education Attend College	3%	5%	0%	4%	.33	149
Father's Political Interest Much	20%	34%	18%	29%	.17	141
Mother's Political Interest Much	0%	19%	0%	13%	.33**	143
Parents Hold Political Office Yes	21%	33%	20%	28%	.12	149
In-Laws Hold Political Office Yes	0%	10%	10%	9%	.17	149
Other Relatives Hold Political Office Yes	9%	44%	45%	23%	.31**	149
Relatives Encouraged Political Career Yes	44%	51%	53%	47%	.19	144
Spouse Political Interest When First Ran Much	10%	50%	55%	42%	.36**	134
Spouse Current Political Interest Much	17%	53%	58%	47%	.35**	139
Spouse Active in Politics Much	24%	60%	53%	58%	.30*	136
Spouse Holds Political Office Yes	2%	26%	40%	17%	.30**	149
Spouse Support of Political Career Approve or Encourage	69%	71%	63%	73%	.29	136
Spouse Encouragement Encouraged	46%	64%	61%	64%	.20	149

Table 2 (continued)

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Friends Encouragement Encouraged	91%	72%	90%	77%	.22	146
Why First Political Interest Family Stimulation	9%	72%	50%	45%		149
Why First Ran Family Stimulation	9%	72%	90%	64%		149
Friend Stimulation	30%	28%	50%	32%		

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

Table 3  
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND AMBITION

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Elective Office-Holding Scale Mean	10.6	11.1	11.7	1.3	.68***	149
Appointive Office-Holding Scale Mean	2.5	1.0	1.0	0.3	.22*	149
Party Office-Holding Scale Mean	3.0	2.7	3.7	1.3	.26*	149
Total Office-Holding Scale Mean	16.1	14.8	16.4	3.4	.58***	149
Member Leisure Group Yes	30%	23%	30%	21%	.09	149
Member Civic Group Yes	56%	54%	35%	38%	.17	149
Member Business, Professional, Union Group Yes	35%	28%	30%	15%	.18	149
Member Religious Group Yes	49%	44%	45%	36%	.10	149
Member Political Group Yes	42%	77%	80%	47%	.32***	149
Number Group Types Over 2	40%	46%	40%	26%	.32	149
Run for Same Office Probably, Definitely	56%	49%	25%	51%	.43***	149
Run for Different Office Probably, Definitely	50%	48%	18%	46%	.32	123

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

Table 4  
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Why 1st Ran <sup>+</sup>						149
Party Invitation	40%	36%	35%	17%		
Interest Group Support	16%	15%	15%	13%		
Issue Concern	26%	23%	15%	38%		
Social Ideology	12%	15%	5%	26%		
Break District Party Balance	12%	10%	0%	21%		
Public Support	0%	15%	40%	9%		
Ideology					.40**	149
Liberal	47%	56%	75%	73%		
Party					.37**	149
KM	79%	77%	85%	51%		

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

<sup>+</sup> Up to six responses coded.

Table 5  
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON ROLE CONFLICT ITEMS

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Number of Children (Mean)	3.4	3.4	4.6	2.9	.30**	144
Youngest Child Under 6	19%	10%	5%	21%	.24	149
Age of First Political Interest (Mean)	29	26	29	24	.19	142
Age First Ran For Office (Mean)	37	34	38	37	.16	116
Hours per week on Job (Mean)	18	24	26	47	.48**	115
Male Politician's Family Life Hurt Agree	76%	64%	47%	46%	.30	141
Female Politician's Family Life Hurt Agree	93%	55%	53%	46%	.45***	145
Male Advantage/Female Disadvantage in Office-Holding <sup>+</sup>					.45***	149
Family Obligations	2%	38%	35%	9%		
Male Social Freedom	30%	26%	25%	4%		
Spouse Extra Household Work					.51***	133
Spouse By Self	68%	26%	16%	32%		
Hired Help	32%	63%	74%	37%		
Relatives Household Help Yes	30%	46%	50%	32%	.36	149

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

<sup>+</sup> Up to four different responses for both male advantages and female disadvantages were coded.

Table 6  
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTION SYSTEM  
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Voter Bias v. Women Agree	56%	46%	30%	49%	.32*	149
Party Men Discriminate v. Women Agree	41%	72%	75%	70%	.42**	125
Women Equal Chance to be Leader Agree	37%	26%	25%	33%	.42***	148
Party Leaders & Campaign Encouraged	94%	81%	73%	57%	.33	96
Interest Group Leaders & Campaign Encouraged	89%	63%	87%	52%	.43***	147
Male Advantage/Female Disadvantage in Running <sup>+</sup>						149
Male Ambition Level	23%	5%	5%	9%		
Voter Bias v. Females	21%	23%	25%	19%		
Male Social Freedom	16%	28%	10%	9%		
Politics as Male Sphere	9%	21%	25%	28%		
Effects of Reserved Seat System <sup>++</sup>						149
Guarantee for Females Increases Competition for Men	14%	67%	55%	49%		
Excuse for Bias & Ceiling	60%	3%	0%	2%		
Increases Party Control	2%	15%	30%	17%		
	5%	13%	15%	11%		

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

<sup>+</sup> Up to four different responses for both male advantages and female disadvantages were coded.

<sup>++</sup> Up to three responses were coded.

Table 7  
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Hours per week Official Duties					.12	116
Mean	52	61	56	51+		
Training for Office					.47**	149
Party	32%	23%	15%	4%		
Educational Degree	2%	28%	15%	6%		
Number Resolutions Introduced per session					.16	103
Mean	27	29	29	10+		
Types of Resolutions Introduced <sup>++</sup>						149
All	61%	23%	10%	0%+		
Local Development	33%	54%	40%	47%+		
Public Works	19%	5%	20%	47%+		
Education	14%	18%	25%	40%+		
Economics-Business	21%	13%	20%	7%+		
Elections-Civic Rights	14%	9%	25%	13%+		
Number Committee Chairs					.41***	149
2 or more	44%	41%	50%	15%+		
Resolution Success Rate					.23	115
Mean	43%	54%	59%	66%+		
Legislative Influence					.34	113
Above Average	51%	54%	68%	86%+		
Enjoy Office					.40**	115
Often & Mostly	56%	85%	100%	64%+		
Why Dislike Legislature						149
No sense accomplishment	30%	54%	50%	60%+		
Important Legislative Functions <sup>+++</sup>						149
Aid Government						
Efficiency	60%	54%	40%	26%		
Administrative						
Oversight	51%	44%	35%	45%		
Sponsor Legislation	19%	18%	10%	19%		
Policy Development	14%	23%	20%	21%		

Table 7 (continued)

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Make Independent Decisions	7%	31%	35%	30%		
Get Issues on Agenda	10%	21%	20%	26%		
Represent Party	14%	21%	20%	13%		
Discover Public Will	40%	54%	40%	57%		
Constituent Case Work	42%	62%	75%	57%		
Educate Public	9%	28%	25%	28%		

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

+ Percentages based on the 15 1982-83 losing female candidates who had some prior legislative service.

++ Up to three different responses coded.

+++ Up to six different responses coded.

Table 8  
GROUP DIFFERENCES ON PERCEPTIONS OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL ROLES

Variable/Category	Male Leg.	Female Leg.	1969 Female Leg.	Female Loser	Correlation C/Eta	N
Women Can be as Qualified Officials Agree	74%	95%	90%	85%	.50***	147
Women Make Important Political Contributions Agree	63%	97%	95%	96%	.52***	149
Women More Honest Agree	44%	80%	75%	70%	.34*	149
Women Less Influenced by Interest Groups Agree	30%	72%	75%	66%	.41***	149
Women Less Cunning Agree	42%	67%	55%	75%	.34*	149
Women Spend More Time on Politics Agree	28%	56%	56%	32%	.29	149
Women Have Less Political Training Agree	63%	46%	45%	53%	.36**	149
Women Better at Human Relations Agree	35%	41%	30%	58%	.37**	149

\* Significant at .05 level.

\*\* Significant at .01 level.

\*\*\* Significant at .001 level.

FOOTNOTES

1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, The New Orleans Hilton, August 29-September 1, 1985.  
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2. China Post, June 22, 1985, p. 3.
3. Robert Darcy, "Women as Congressional Candidates," unpublished manuscript, April, 1985, p. 2.
4. China Post, June 22, 1985, p. 3.
5. Ralph N. Clough, Island China, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Twentieth Century Fund, 1978, pp. 35-59.
6. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 1984, (Taipei: The Republic of China, 1985).
7. Council for Economic Planning and Development, An Analysis of the Utilization of Female Labor Force Participation in Taiwan, (Taipei: The Republic of China, 1984).
8. N.C. Huang and S.C. Lee-Cheu, "Women in Taiwan" paper presented at the Asian Women's Conference held in Davao City, Philippines, April 23-27, 1985.
9. Chou Bih-Er, "The Status of Women in the Electoral Process in Taiwan: The Representation of Women in a Reserved Seats Election System," paper presented at the symposium on the Future Role of Women in Asia held in Taipei, Taiwan, September 9-10, 1985.
10. For an emphasis on childhood socialization, see Barbara Sinclair Deckard, The Women's Movement: Political Socioeconomic, and Psychological Issues, 3rd Ed. (New York: Harper-Row, 1983) Chapters 2-4; Irene H. Frieze, Jacquelynne E. Parsons, Paula B. Johnson, Diane N. Ruble, and Gail L. Zellman, Women and Sex Roles: a Sociological Perspective (New York: Norton, 1978); Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Tourney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), Chapter 8; and Rita Mae Kelly and Mary Boutilier, The Making of Political Women: A Study of Socialization and Role Conflict (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978).  
For studies with a greater focus on adult role socialization, see Naomi B. Lynn and Cornelia B. Flora, "Motherhood and Political Participation: The Changing Sense of Self," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 91-103; Virginia Sapiro, The

Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization and Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983); and Kent L. Tedin, David W. Brady, and Arnold Vedlitz, "Sex Differences in Political Attitudes and Behaviors: The Case for Situational Factors," Journal of Politics 39 (May, 1977), pp. 448-456.

11. Anthony M. Orum, Robert S. Cohen, Sherri Grasmuch, and Amy W. Orum, "Sex, Socialization, and Politics," American Political Science Review 39 (April, 1974), pp. 197-209; Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper-Row, 1972), Chapter 6; and Susan Welch, "Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Participation Differences," American Journal of Political Science 21 (November, 1977), pp. 715-716.
12. Ruth B. Mandel, In the Running: The New Woman Candidate (New Haven: Ticknor & Fields, 1981); Peggy Lamson, Few are Chosen: American Women in Political Life Today (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968); and Susan and Martin Tolchin, Clout: Womanpower and Politics (New York: Capricorn, 1976).
13. Fred I. Greenstein, "Sex-Related Political Differences in Childhood," Journal of Politics 23 (May, 1961), pp. 353-371; Hess and Tourney, Chapter 8; and Dean Jaros, Socialization to Politics (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 43-44.
14. Four different themes relate to this conclusion. First, several studies argued that gender differences in politically relevant factors among children were fairly muted--see David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 335-343; M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 281-285; and Orum, et al., pp. 197-209.

Second, some later analysts concluded that the gap between men's and women's participation in mass political activities had been overstated by earlier observers, thus implying that childhood socialization had not engendered major barriers against women's becoming involved in politics--see Susan Bourke and Jean Grassholtz, "Politics as Unnatural Practice: Political Science Looks at Female Participation," Politics and Society 4(Winter, 1974), pp. 255-266; Gerald M. Pomper, Voters' Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975), pp. 67-76; and John J. Stucker, "Women as Voters: Their Maturation and Political Persons in American Society," in Marianne Githens and Jewel L. Prestage, eds., A Portrait of Marginality: The Political Behavior of American Women (New York: McKay, 1977), pp. 275-278.

Third, after the early 1970s, American gender differences in participation vanished when such factors as education and occupation were controlled, showing that no universal socialization patterns suppressing female political participation existed--see Sandra Baxter and Marjorie Lansing, Women and Politics: The Invisible Majority (Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Susan Hansen, Linda M. Franz, and Margaret Netemeyer-Mays, "Women's Political Participation and Policy Preferences," Social Science Quarterly 56 (March, 1976), pp. 580-581; and Verba and Nie, Chapter 6.

Finally, participatory gender differences in the United States are evidently much less than in most other societies, again indicating the absence of universal gender-specific socialization patterns--see Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, Jae-on Kim, and Goldie Shabad, "Men and Women: Sex-Related Differences in Political Activity," in Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 234-268.

15. Drum et al., pp. 197-209 and Welch, pp. 711-730.
16. Cal Clark and Janet Clark, "Gender and Political Participation in the United States," Women & Politics 6(Spring, 1986); Sapiro, especially Chapters 4-6; and Welch, pp. 711-730.
17. In the 1984 election, 26% of the voters said that they had not voted for the Democratic candidate for President because of his female running mate, but 16% claimed that this was their reason for doing so. See China Post, November 8, 1984, p. 2.
18. R. Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark, Barriers to Women in American Electoral Politics: A Study in Democratic Representation (New York: Longman, forthcoming), Chapters 3 and 4.
19. Ibid.
20. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Political Women (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 55.
21. Marilyn Johnson and Susan Carroll, Profile of Women Holding Office II, (New Brunswick, NJ: Center for the American Woman and Politics, Rutgers University, 1978), p. 18A.
22. R. Darcy and Sunhee Song, "Women and Korean Politics: Political Access and Role Conflict," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, University College, Toronto, June 24-27, 1984.
23. Kelly and Boutilier, p. 209.
24. The four participation scales were created by additive indices of offices held weighted by level of government and type of office. For all types of offices, the level weights were: 1) local, 2) county, 3) city/provincial, and 4) national. Two kinds of office type weighting were used. First, elective and appointive offices were weighted two and party office one. Second, weights were used with each broad type. For elective offices, executive were weighted two and legislative ones one; for appointive offices, executive were weighted two and administrative

one; and for party, administrative and executive were weighted two and honorary positions one.

25. Johnson and Carroll, Parts II & III. Traditionally, research on women politicians showed that they were much less ambitious and somewhat less active than their male counterparts. After the mid-1970s, however, these differences seemed to have narrowed greatly, especially regarding ambition.
26. Ibid., pp. 35A-38A.
27. Githens and Prestage, pp. 7-9.
28. Paula J. Dubeck, "Women and Access to Political Office: A Comparison of Female and Male State Legislators," Sociological Quarterly 17(Winter, 1976), pp. 42-52; Kirkpatrick, p. 55; and Emily Stoper, "Wife and Politician: Role Strain among Women in Public Office," in Githens and Prestage, p. 323.
29. Kirkpatrick, pp. 106-135.
30. Diane Kincaid, "Over His Dead Body: A Positive Perspective on Widows in the U.S. Congress," Western Political Quarterly, 31(March, 1978), pp. 96-104.

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